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**SEXUAL EQUALITY:  
THE ISRAELI KIBBUTZ TESTS  
THE THEORIES**

**KIBBUTZ, COMMUNAL SOCIETY, AND ALTERNATIVE  
SOCIAL POLICY SERIES**

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# **SEXUAL EQUALITY: THE ISRAELI KIBBUTZ TESTS THE THEORIES**

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## INTRODUCTION BY THE SERIES EDITOR

The Project for Kibbutz Studies at Harvard University's Center for Jewish Studies is pleased to present Volume VI of the Kibbutz Studies Book Series. This volume is the result of ongoing collaboration with the Institute for the Study of the Kibbutz and the Cooperative Idea at the University of Haifa. One of the persistent questions raised about the Israeli kibbutz is the result of its attempt to establish equality between the sexes.

Much of the writing on the kibbutz between 1950 and 1970 focused on different areas of kibbutz life. Patterns of work, social fellowship, political participation, education, and child rearing have been examined. What typifies the pattern of exploration and questioning of the kibbutz in the 70's and the 80's is not the confirmation of whether basic patterns of fellowship, equality, democracy, and local control exist in the kibbutz, but rather the understanding of how different groups fare under this system. Thus the major focus of recent inquiry has been on the relationship between the generations, the relationship between the sexes, the relationship between groups in the kibbutz factory, and the relationship between kibbutz members and non-kibbutz members with whom they have contact (hired labor in the kibbutz community, hired labor in regional kibbutz industries, disadvantaged children who study in the kibbutz, and people from nearby towns).

The relationship between the sexes has created the most persistent controversy and disagreement over interpreting the past, present, and future of the kibbutz from the point of view of stratification, inequality, and the relationship between groups in the community. Interest in this subject has arisen at a time when the relationship between the sexes is a central issue for Western society, and the consequences and upshot of the ideals and achievements of the creators of progressive Israeli institutions are coming under greater scrutiny.

This volume, therefore, speaks to several audiences. First, it provides historical insight and social analysis of one of the social experiments of the early Israeli pioneers. In light of this, it cannot be forgotten that innovations in the relations between men and women--given the larger looming national, cultural, political, and economic aspirations of early kibbutz members--was not one of the major goals. The reality of how this experiment turned out is a fascinating story aside from the substantial controversy which has arisen between different

schools of thought who try to explain these events. Recently, historical scholarship has taken a giant stride forward with the publication of Margalit Shilo's excellent article on "The Women's Farm at Kinneret, 1911-1917" (1981).

M. Shilo's piece comes very close to portraying the reality of sex role change among some parts of the early Jewish settlements in Palestine. A second audience might view this aspect of the kibbutz and the Israeli experience as a test of the idea of sex role equality in a laboratory setting. The tension between the two audiences must be made explicit. The story of the relationship between the sexes during an important chapter in socialist Zionism has more than historical importance. If indeed the relationship between the sexes is a measure of dignity in any attempt to create a good society, then a careful analysis of extensive attempts which began nearly a half-century before the current popular phase of sex role equality has deep implications.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that Israel and the kibbutz setting within it was not and is not a sterile laboratory. Indeed the central argument between the various contributors to this volume is whether the Israeli kibbutz is or is not a test of theories of sex role equality or inequality. The question mark in the volume's title was, therefore, carefully placed. Despite the answer to this question, the contributors to this volume again demonstrate the ongoing capacity of the kibbutz and its change-oriented segment of recent Israeli history to meddle in more than a passing way in the larger human questions and plans that must concern every social reformer. To the second audience of social scientists, social theorists, and social planners, this summary of the key events, positions, and information illustrates the complex set of factors that must be analyzed, accounted for, and weighted in evaluating the experiences of a half-century rather than the experiences of the moment.

Inquiry into the sex role issue on the kibbutz, both of an academic research nature and a reflective nature by kibbutz members themselves, has a long and checkered history. As a number of authors note in this volume, kibbutz members themselves sought to study this issue in a number of conferences and meetings which span the whole history of the movement. One record of the historical development (which is unfortunately lacking) is the study of the development of sex role equality and inequality and the relationship between the sexes in one kibbutzim. Such a fascinating exploration would be made possible by the extensive archives available at each individual kibbutz. Aside from these personal archives, each kibbutz has maintained a more or less complete record of minutes of General Assembly meetings, and sometimes committee meetings. In addition, each



kibbutz has had, from the beginning, an internal newsletter in which members freely express their analyses, hopes, fears, and disappointments. Most of the older kibbutzim, which were founded before 1940 and are likely to have emphasized the struggle for sexual equality more than many younger kibbutzim, would have more than fifty years of records of this newsletter.

The reader will note that the following collection of research articles does not present the voices of individual women and men examining their own experiences, or even analyses of such life history data--with the exception of the historical overview by Marilyn Safir. The tremendous availability of documentation in the kibbutz movement provides a revolutionary possibility for researchers to study the development of sex roles in individual communities as social settings. Proponents of full sexual equality are wont to explore the history of why "things were never right," but a significant research question would also be: why and how, in a specific setting which attempted to "set things right," did things go wrong? In every historical setting, unpredictable developments--many authors in this volume refer to the early economic difficulties of the kibbutzim--will be interacting with and shaping the development of relationships between the sexes.

The important question for researchers is not why the experiment of sexual equality in the kibbutz did not succeed because of a series of historical factors, or why any series of historical factors was unimportant because of the basic sociobiological program; but how the sexes managed ongoing social changes in light of their desire to promote a dignified relationship, and whether certain categories of social change make it easier or more difficult to effectuate such changes. Must we accept a priori the superior concept of our modern age that would claim that because (at least in the industrialized West) serious economic scarcity is not a fundamental problem, this necessarily means that sex role equality will be easier to achieve? A more in-depth examination of individual settings might have clarified this question.

One item of research currently underway is an historical review of articles on this question in the weekly newspaper of the Kibbutz HaMeuchad Federation (Blasi and Tabak, 1982, forthcoming). Each of the four associations of individual kibbutzim began publishing such a newsletter to trace federation-wide developments in the late 40s and early 50s, and this material presents an important unexplored historical record. Today 3 kibbutz federations exist: The United Kibbutz Movement (representative of the center), The Religious Kibbutz Movement (representative of orthodox kibbutzim), and the Kibbutz HaShomer HaTsair Federation (representative of the

left and associated with the Mapam political party). Each of these federations has an ideological journal which publishes more extensive and substantive analytical pieces on their successes and failures.

A complete review of research in this area is available in the Kibbutz Bibliography (Shur, Beit-Hallahmi, Blasi, and Rabin, 1980). Most of the research on sex roles in the kibbutz has generally been of an empirical nature or comprised of general descriptive pieces which attempt to analyze the failures and successes of the kibbutz experiment. This current volume collects the most notable examples of this research.

Serious research into the sex role problem of the kibbutz began in 1955-1956, with the classic contribution of the late Yonina Talmon-Garber, of the Hebrew University. Talmon-Garber collected an enormous amount of data during this period, which was slowly published and released over the next 15 years. Her study was based on a small number of kibbutzim in the Ichud HaKvutzot vohaKibbutzim Federation (now part of the United Kibbutz Movement). Her general sociological overview on the kibbutz was published in 1972 by Harvard University Press (Talmon-Garber, 1972). In 1965-1966, Menachem Rosner conducted an extensive study of women in the Kibbutz HaShomer Ha-Tsair Federation, which was a response to the growing perception of the gap between ideology and reality in this area in the left-wing kibbutz movement (Rosner, 1969). In 1967 Joseph Shepher completed another extensive study exploring the impact of changes of the sleeping patterns of children on the social structure of the kibbutz. This was a period of heightened concern over the privatization of the kibbutz movements, because many persons believed that a shift from children sleeping in collective children's houses to sleeping in their parents' apartments would have serious detrimental implications for the communal nature of the kibbutz (Shepher, 1967).

Both research projects were conducted to assist the kibbutz movements in making policy decisions to strengthen the egalitarian and communal nature of the kibbutz. They are interesting examples of empirical work which strives for objectivity but is based on a goal of advocacy.

In 1969 one of the most extensive analyses ever conducted of the kibbutz movement explored the problem of the second generation (Rosner, Ben-David, Avnat, Cohen, and Leviatan, 1978). This work which, to a great extent, serves as the basis for the contributions by Martha Shuck Mednick, Michal Palgi, and Menachem Rosner, begins to introduce a very serious question into kibbutz studies and social research in general: Whatever the achievements of a social invention are confirmed to

be, can they be solidified for more than one generation? Indeed, while the kibbutz has received tremendous attention as a battleground for the social/psychological versus the sociobiological theory of sex role inequality, the question of generational continuity in terms of policy is far more practically relevant to current thinkers and planners on the sex role issue.

The 70s have witnessed very detailed inquiries into the questions raised by these earlier studies. This work is based mostly on studies of individual kibbutz cases. Joseph Shepher conducted further research in 1972-1973 which combined both case study and survey research findings (Tiger and Shepher, 1975). Spiro followed up his work of the early 50s with a specific study of the sex role problem in the same community in 1978 and 1979 (Spiro, 1956, 1980). Between 1972 and 1975 Blasi conducted a survey of the quality of life in one kibbutz, which included an examination of group stratification, where sex role inequality can be viewed in the light of other achievements and failures in avoiding a stratified society according to power, prestige, and resources (Blasi, 1980). Blumberg's research in the late 70s further explored the connections between economic power and sex role equality.

The study by Rosanna Hertz and Wayne Baker was conducted in 1977 and 1978, and zoomed in on the problem of work and the relationships between men and women in the kibbutz. Michal Palgi completed a much larger study on this issue (Palgi, 1978). This volume includes yet another study by Uri Leviatan on the same issue. Leviatan's work illustrates an interesting fact: it is based on data drawn from the study of education, the study of industry, and the study of aging in the kibbutz; but it demonstrates that male/female differences, whether they are removed for special analysis by the researcher or not, clearly have a life of their own in many of the studies on other issues conducted on this social invention. It would therefore suggest that in an egalitarian society--whether the definition of equality is based on the identity of activities and aspirations between the sexes or equivalence of status between the sexes, or whether sexual equality (as the sociobiologists increasingly claim) is dysfunctional for the family, for the children, and for the species--sex differences are an obligatory dimension for the social researcher, no matter what phenomenon he or she explores. It is however, hoped that the rich availability of empirical work which Michal Palgi has shepherded in this volume will be complemented in the not-too-distant future by both comprehensive theoretical analyses and more extensive historical studies.

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## PREFACE

The editors of this timely volume describe the chapters that follow as an attempt to set the kibbutz experience in the realm of sex role equality into an experimental perspective. What modern society can learn from the kibbutz, as I see it, is that it is a society that has reached a critical threshold in the first stage of the sex role revolution. As I have argued elsewhere (Friedan, 1981), the time has come in modern society (and so in the kibbutz also) to progress to a second stage in the search for sexual equality. The kibbutz is a model example of the problems and plusses of the first stage of feminism and sex role equality in that it made an attempt to include women in the productive sector of the workplace, before she had children.

There are valid arguments to be made for the fact that women moved back into the service sector after bearing children, and there are good reasons for her renewed interest in her own family on the kibbutz, regardless of the fact that it is a "revolutionary society." I do not posit that all the arguments made in this book, however, are valid. Some chapters irritate me, some outrage me, and some make me enormously eager to rush over to Israel myself and conduct my own interviews to find out what the real story is. I believe that the sociobiologists have misused the experience of the kibbutz, and I would prefer to dismiss their arguments (even though others may not). Instead, I think we have to go beyond the grammar arguments, and the connections between animal and man, and we must explore in depth the paradoxes of the human experience itself without attributing it to something beyond our control. The kibbutz, especially in its return to familism, has given us some hints as to how we may go on from the recognition of the paradoxes that exist to a resolution in the second stage.

As I would define it, the kibbutz as originally planned was based on a first stage concept of equality that itself was based only on the male model of the work experience. It did not put an equal value on the experiences in work, home, and society that, up until now, have been relegated to the female. The kibbutz did not put equal importance on the female work experience, and therefore found itself trying to make women more like men. A second stage point of view (even on the basis of feminist progress in the modern women's movement, short of experiments as radical as the kibbutz) would say that this simply is not an adequate approach; that even today on the basis of our own experience in Western society, we see that we can only go so far in terms of strict legal equality, in terms of changes in the role of women alone, or in terms of a first stage concept of equality based on the values of men. If this is done in a capitalist society--or a communist one, as far as that is concerned--you leave the woman



doubly burdened, oppressed, with too much of a burden to really ever achieve equality. And of course, the work that has traditionally been done by the woman in the general service area is continually underestimated and undervalued. Also, much of this work has been left without economic value because it has been done privately in the family.

In Western society, we are now saying that the second stage concept of equality goes further than equal pay for equal work; that it must be equal pay for work of comparable value. We must assign a new value to work that has previously been undervalued, or not valued at all, because it has been done by the female. Furthermore, we cannot hope to have complete equality if we look for changes in the female sex role alone--we must look for comparable changes in the male sex role, and a transcending of sex role polarization. It is clear to me that because the kibbutz was based on a model of equality based primarily on the male experience, it devalued female experiences, and only sought changes in the role of women. Not only did the woman not achieve equality, but it is clear from the following chapters that she was relegated to the most menial and least-rewarded work in the kibbutz. This was combined with a denial of the value that it is possible to place on the work of the female in the private family (which of course was abolished in the kibbutz), so of course the woman rebelled and asked for more emphasis on the family.

Furthermore, advanced second stage feminism as I envision it, says we should not say "equality versus the family," or "feminism versus the family." The family itself is evolving, and we cannot deny the importance of family for human society. What is really involved in equality in the second stage is, as a first step, transcending the sex role polarization between male and female (so prevalent in the kibbutz today), recognizing and using the diversity of talents and needs, and meeting the common responsibilities of man and woman. These talents, needs, and responsibilities will not necessarily be the same among all women and men, but we need to use the abilities of everyone, without sexual stereotypes, and without limiting the contributions of any single member of a society. The kibbutz has not yet achieved this goal.

Such a goal will necessarily involve the restructuring of the workplace and the home. The authors in this book argue that the kibbutz was restructured towards the communalization of the family that was needed. But was there really restructuring of work life and home life for both man and woman in the kibbutz? There was not. There was disregard of the values of the female in work, and of the basic values of the family. There was not a restructuring of work--it was never taken into account that the work was to be shared by the females, who would also be those

who would give birth to babies. Thus, when women's pregnancies disrupted work schedules, women were relegated to the most menial work, that which happened to be closest to the kibbutz settlement. It is understandable that this happened when the kibbutz movement began, because in that period, work did depend on brute muscular strength for survival. It is certainly this author's feeling that we cannot have real feminism or equality between the sexes, or real transcending of sex role polarization, until we reach a fairly advanced level of industrial or post-industrial society. But it is ironic and wrong to characterize the failures of an imperfect phrasing of equality--that is, according to a private, male model, to which women could not really hope to adapt--and use the failure of that structure as an argument against the possibilities of transcending sex role polarization and achieving equality in post-industrial Israel, or America, or anywhere else.

The lessons we can take from the kibbutz are: (1) that there must be restructuring of work and home for women and men, giving equal value to the experience of women, the work that was relegated to them, and to the abilities of women as there was given to the work, experience, and abilities of the male; and (2) that we must open the women's experiences to men as previously the male role in the workplace was open to women in the first stages of feminism and the kibbutz. These are also valuable lessons that we can take from the kibbutz: it does not work on a male model; but on the other hand, we learn from the kibbutz that day care, and communal child care, while not really a substitute for mother and father (because there are primary values in the roles of mother and father), are good for the child as such--there is nothing in the research presented here that throws any question on that issue. It is good for the children to be exposed to children's houses; indeed they were planned very well. Some combination of private family and communal services is probably the way of the future. There are certainly examples from the kibbutz as to how this kind of thing can be organized; indeed it works rather well if it is not seen as a polarization of communal work versus the family. But the fact remains that the kibbutz--because it has exaggerated sex role polarization--is leaving women a little farther from equality in the kibbutz than they are in the rest of Western society--and this is not good. It denies to Israeli society the full contribution of the women politically and economically; it does put a limit on the talent pool available to the kibbutz itself. And finally, the simple fact is that inequality is wrong. It is morally wrong. Complete sex role polarization, which may or may not have been necessary for survival at an earlier level of society, is not necessary now. In fact, the evolution of work in post-industrial society is more and more in the direction of human services, where "female" experiences become more and more important for men.

The way to regard the kibbutz is as an experiment in first stage equality that, because it did not advance into the second stage, was bound to fail. That is the lesson I take. And I think that is the lesson that a really sophisticated observer of the kibbutz would take too. The founders of the kibbutz movement could not see beyond the first stage--that equality cannot be achieved in terms of male values alone, and only in terms of redefining the female role. In the second stage they have to consider restructuring the role of both woman and man-- creation of new values for men as well as women. That is possible in the stage of evolution in which the kibbutz society is now found, where it was not possible before. This book can be used to judge and learn from the imperfections of the first stage of feminism--I hope that the kibbutz stays alive long enough to go through the second stage.

Betty Friedan

FOREWORD  
BY THE EDITORS

The goal of this book is to collect in one volume the major views of scholars on sexual equality in the kibbutz, and its implications for innovations in the area of sex roles in modern society. An overview of contradictory approaches to the subject is provided. The place of men and women in the spheres of work and public activity, and education and the family is reviewed. Finally, in the concluding section, a more comprehensive integration of the various findings and positions is attempted.

Research on sexual equality in the kibbutz has been typified by little disagreement between scholars about information and empirical data. The reader will note that with few exceptions, researchers who defend viewpoints which are both sociological and sociobiological, do not dispute what is known about the place of men and women in the kibbutz. There are, however, some exceptions to this generalization. First, there has been little systematic research on whether or not women can or cannot get along with each other when they work in the same area. This is a persistent claim by Tiger and Shepher, which has yet to be fully documented, or confirmed also in the light of comparative research with the behavior of men in their work branches.

Second, the category of data about which scholars with differing interpretations of sex roles in the kibbutz agree, tends to be quite limited. Thus we find that most contributors agree on their descriptions and their empirical data on what kibbutz women and men do. Some authors, like Tiger and Shepher, never ask kibbutz women or men what they think or feel. Authors such as Blasi, who have explored locus of control and feelings of powerlessness among kibbutz women, and Palgi and Rosner, who have explored job satisfaction, usually arrive at conclusions in stark contrast to sociobiologists.

This interaction between methodology and theory can be explored throughout the book. Certainly one of the major limitations of the selection we present is that no explicit and detailed review of sociobiological and non-sociobiological theories for explaining sexual inequality are reviewed. Clearly it is beyond the scope of this collection to systematize and weigh, summarize and review, these dominant schools of thought. We nevertheless recognize this limitation as one which we embraced in order to avoid compromising our goal of presenting a fully comprehensive review of the kibbutz case.

Each contributor both identifies and gives preeminence to



a different set of factors explaining the degree of equality or inequality among the sexes in the kibbutz. The final attempt at an integrated explanation should be viewed then, as one particular stand on the evidence researchers currently have at their disposal. Rather than be viewed as a final word, it should be viewed as our attempt to initiate a comprehensive evaluation of the kibbutz case, and to encourage the reader to do likewise.

Clearly, a major part of the unravelling of the riddle of sex differences in an egalitarian and democratic fellowship such as the kibbutz will be found in giving further attention to the following lines of inquiry: (1) more extensive research on factors which have been identified by various contributors to this volume but have, up to now, received only superficial attention from scholars. Yonina Talmon, for example, has spoken of the interplay between spheres where a concession to sex role inequality in one sphere leads to unpredictable consequences in other spheres. A detailed exploration of such interactions has yet to be made, and viewed in the light of both sociobiological and non-sociobiological theories; (2) despite extensive survey research and organizational analysis of the kibbutz, there are few sources of in-depth interviews with kibbutz men and women separately, and kibbutz couples, which clarify these factors through a deep analysis of personal histories; (3) it must be admitted that many of the contributors to this volume, despite their theoretical or political point of view, clearly focus more on women than men. Some readers may recognize this as a simple continuation of part of the problem, namely that the definition of equality in the kibbutz was always based on making women into men. The research on inequality of the kibbutz, with its female-centered quality may be biased towards leaving men, their aspirations, histories, frustrations, and investments, out of the picture.

Certainly, we hoped through this volume, to raise more questions than we answered. It was not our intention to present the kibbutz as a black box, which contains, however mysteriously, all of the major factors involved in the sex differences argument. Many questions certainly remain. The relation between history and social inquiry again looms large as a basic fuel in the debate of this book. Do some authors view history as testing theories and giving appropriate answers when they like the results? And do others focus on the uniqueness of the historical circumstances when they prefer to claim that history has not injured their ideas? What specific aspects of a real historical setting give a social theorist the appropriate permission to exclude it from his or her "hunting and gathering" for answers? How do we distinguish between differences and dominance? The crucial theme in the contributions presented here is the claim by some authors that differences lead to domi-

nance, whether in an egalitarian or an inegalitarian society; by others that differences do not necessarily lead to dominance in a radical socialist experiment; and then again claims by still others that male dominance is functional for the species, and necessary for female dignity. These three positions lead to three different stands on the idea of similarity between the sexes.

The first would claim that similarity should be energetically worked at as the only safeguard against dominance. The second position claims that similarity is unnecessary, and itself a form of dominance and role-imprisonment. What becomes apparent is that none of the differences between men and women are based on exploitation or the ability of one group to monopolize power, prestige, and resources, which can be used against the other group. This view, which characterizes the integrative explanation in the final chapter, does not see sexual equality in a vacuum but rather views it as an organic part of social invention in a small community. The third position would claim that similarity between the sexes should be avoided because it is a danger to happiness, family, and healthy child rearing.

One curious problem with the second view discussed above is that while women seem to benefit from collective services in the kibbutz in a way that limits their individual oppression, it is difficult to identify what special structural arrangements in the kibbutz were designed to eliminate special forms of oppression which men as specifically male have experienced in Western society.

Finally, while the kibbutz increasingly looks like an unfortunate failure to the radical proponents of sexual equality, and a lovely laboratory to the proponents of sociobiology, it must not be forgotten that it has a characteristic which should be equally threatening to both groups. Its success in minimizing fragmentation and alienation of every sphere of social life, one from the other, in modern society; its creation of a supportive social fellowship and a large democratic community for social reform, distinctly challenges the jaded visions of supporters of sex role equality who would like to see differences eliminated between the sexes but either care little or do little or theorize that little need be done to make society itself more democratic, more egalitarian, more cooperative, more communal, more informal, smaller, and more intimate.

The kibbutz challenges those who would eliminate sex role differences to answer the question: What is your vision for a whole and good human society? Surely that answer is not based on sex role criteria alone. On the other hand, sociobiologists who see in the kibbutz a justification of traditional sex role

patterns, cannot continue to be blind to the fact that the sanctity of the traditional sex-typed pair bond between man and woman is in and of itself no insurance of a good society. The fragmentation of modern society has isolated the family, and made it "a broken piece," a Haven in a Heartless World in Christopher Lasch's terms, which is forced to survive in an increasingly anti-social, competitive, and unsupported environment. The breakdown of the family, the crises of child abuse and domestic violence, the alarming increase of public violence against women, cannot be blamed on feminism. The challenge of the kibbutz, amidst its failures and many complex problems is its attempt to recast social life so that it is less violent, more dignified, more cooperative, more supportive; so that parents have concrete values to pass onto their children (which children can appreciate and respect because they address the major problems of the age).

Those who view the kibbutz as a sex role failure must not ignore the measure of dignity between the sexes and in families it has created as a social convention. Those who view the kibbutz as a sex role success should avoid the theoretical error of using this "test case" for the claim that sexual inequality is functional for social stability. If the kibbutz is viewed as a test case, its impact as a total furnace of social regeneration must be taken into account. The rightness of the sociobiological viewpoint must involve, of necessity, a serious utopian challenge to modern society.

This volume then, illustrates a number of issues for sociological inquiry. First, it represents a very extensive head-to-head confrontation between the socio-biological and the socio-structural/socio-psychological positions on sex role innovation in a modern setting. Despite the lack of a crystal clear refutation of either position in this volume, the editors believe that the kibbutz case carries the whole discussion to a new level of detail. Secondly, it represents a case study of social change and social reform in a setting which has been characterized with ongoing documentation and analysis over an eighty year period. We believe that this provides a tremendous opportunity for social scientists interested in social change and social movements to understand what governs success and failure. Thirdly, in terms of the construction of broader concepts of society and social theory, the kibbutz provides an uncommon opportunity. We can look into this fishbowl and examine four dominant factors which social theorists allude to in making sense of the world.

Is it the desire, the intention, the ideology of humans (which define and direct their behavior), which govern social change? This view bids us pay attention to the underlying ideological struggle between the sexes in the kibbutz, the inconsis-



tencies in the ideology, the manipulation of good ideas by poorly intentioned interest groups, and the impact of that faith for understanding the failure of an egalitarian attempt. However, to pay attention to the structures, the institutions, and the norms which governed the socialization of children and adults, the relative impact of different groups on the community, the conditioning of social behavior, and the dispersal of resources through planning, always made one form of behavior more suitable than another.

Is change itself the culprit, and is a more historical view which attempts to describe the unpredictable developments and the ongoing interactions between various aspects of kibbutz life, and between the kibbutz and the larger society which determine the particular relationships between the sexes that evolved more appropriate? Or, are fundamental capabilities of the human species in question--natural differences, biogrammar, genetic predispositions, and precultural differences between the sexes? This view searches for where the historical and the empirical wash out of our data in a specific kibbutz case, and leave an ahistorical truth or clear tendency.

Each of the contributions to this volume is dominated by a stress on one of these factors and a reinterpretation of all other factors in light of the one that is specifically stressed and defended. The kibbutz as a social phenomenon which has been studied from so many different points of view, and is documented by so many different methodologies, can itself serve as a general testing ground for social theory. This is because it is likely that the kibbutz lacks one disadvantage which is frequently a problem in social research--that the defender of a particular point of view, or the importance of a particular factor factoring explanatory strength, has been inundated by his or her preference in what questions to ask. Thus, an additional goal of this volume was to illustrate the differing ways scholars confront the same phenomenon.

The Editors



PART I:

SOME CONTRADICTING APPROACHES  
TO SEX EQUALITY IN THE KIBBUTZ



## INTRODUCTION -- SOME CONTRADICTING APPROACHES TO SEX EQUALITY IN THE KIBBUTZ

Throughout this book, it will be seen that in the area of sex-role equality the reality in the kibbutz falls short of its ideals. It deviates from the expectancies of its members, its students, and its own ideology. We bring together articles focusing on different aspects of women's life: their work and public activity, their family and socialization, as well as the historical roots of the division of labor in the kibbutz. Throughout the articles, the different writers try to explain why there is no equal division of labor in the kibbutz, both at work and in public activities. Their explanations and reasoning will be better understood after reading this section. Included are articles representing the two main streams of explanations: nature versus nurture. This argument began before the development of the kibbutz movement, but was elaborated further following its establishment. The reason for this is that the kibbutz was thought by many as a good test-case for the effects of nature versus nurture.

Kibbutz society is built so that women are economically free. Kibbutz institutions are responsible for education, laundry, and feeding its members; households are relatively small; women are politically independent. This, as the argument goes, is a real laboratory case where women could prove that differences are due to environment and not to gender. The failure to achieve equality, so claim the sociobiologists, is a proof of natural differences between the sexes. In this section we shall try to give a good representation of both theoretical approaches. At the end of the book, there is an attempt for integration.

Talmon, the first Israeli to study the kibbutz thoroughly (only one out of the three big movements) proposes a dual explanation to discrepancies she finds between role-demands, role-conceptions, and role-performance. Her explanation is environmental and sociological. She reasons that division of labor within the family and outside family according to sex in the kibbutz can be caused by: a) the early socialization of its founders that was deep rooted and resurged when a family was built; and by catching the effects of the surrounding society where there was role division according to sex; and b) the dynamic interrelationship between the growing importance of the family, the economic sphere in which economic criteria of efficiency are dominant, and political participation in communities and assemblies.

While the processes of sex-role differentiation were dominant in the period studied by Talmon -- the fifties and early sixties -- she also discerned deliberate efforts of de-differentiation to narrow the gap between ideology and reality.

The sociobiological viewpoint was first presented by Tiger and Shepher. We present both the conclusions of their book Women in the

Kibbutz and an article which they wrote following the appearance of their book. Both their contributions give the sociobiological explanation -- but the explanations themselves differ.

In Women in the Kibbutz, after demonstrating the extent of role division and showing that the main instigators of familization are women, the authors examine some alternative explanations for these phenomena. They reject the arguments of the unfinished revolution, the early socialization, the male conspiracy, and the external influences, saying that none of these can sufficiently explain why, despite structural advantages and ideological trends, the kibbutz has not managed to abolish division of labor according to sex.

The authors' explanation for women's action against their principles of socialization and ideology for equality, against the wishes of men in the kibbutzim, and against the economic interest of the kibbutzim is the basic "biogrammar" of the human species. They claim that by their "biogrammar" women are "built" to prefer close contacts with their children and any activities concerned with homemaking rather than be involved in other activities.

In their second article "Kibbutz and Parental Investment (Women in the Kibbutz Revisited)" the authors propose a different explanation for their findings of sharp division of labor according to sex and the familial trends of women in the kibbutz. They summarize their earlier findings and explain them by parental investment. They state that in most mammals and birds, parental investment is performed by the female. This asymmetry is the cause for sexual division of labor as females who invest generously in their offspring have to forego investment in alternative tasks. The passing on of parental investment activities to others (relatives, etc.) alleviates the maternal investment and one speaks of "allomothering." In the kibbutz there is an institutionalized allomothering. The delegation of parental investment to nonrelatives to such a great extent can happen only, according to the writers, in extreme situations in which all parents' energy is needed for existence. When the economic and security situation improved, the birth rate rose and "even the delegated system of parental investment created a sexual division of labor." More women worked with children (not men!) and in service branches.

The authors conclude their article by stating that as soon as environmental pressure is removed from women, a behavior, predictable through parental investment, returns.

Another writer who offers a "pre-cultural" explanation for the process of sex-role differentiation is M. Spiro in his latest book on the kibbutz. In his first study of the kibbutz in 1951 he presented the high degree of sex-role equality and the low importance of the family that he found to be proof of the influence of culture on nature. Now he offers a reinterpretation of some of his earlier findings con-

cerning play of kibbutz children -- as a function of those elements in human nature that the culture was unable to change. In addition to the sociobiologic "precultural" explanation, the author mentions also the "psychobiological" theory of Erikson and the "psychosocial" psychoanalytical theory. The latter two consist of experientially acquired wishes and desires. According to the author, "they are no less panhuman than those genetically inherited because the experiences by which they are acquired are dependent either on certain invariant characteristics of the human organism or on those characteristics of human society that are invariant" (1980:101). He continues by bringing an example of one precultural need -- the parenting need. He shows how a precultural interpretation can be given to this need by four different theories. Assuming that this really is a precultural need, he explains the "counterrevolutionary" attitudes of kibbutz-born women to the family and the vicissitudes of the revolutionary attitudes of their mothers and grandmothers.

After the three articles that represent the "precultural" explanation for role-division according to sex in the kibbutz, follow those that represent the psychosociological explanation. The first among those is Mednick's. In her article she writes that the kibbutz is an example of society intentionally designed to free woman from her oppressed state. As the kibbutz is an outstanding modern example of planned social change, its study will show the possibilities and restrictions of such change in the field of sex-role equality. With the aid of data collected from second-generation kibbutz-born adults, she shows that in spite of egalitarian ideology, economic independence, and institutional arrangements designed to free women from a "double career," the kibbutz is a sex-differentiated society. The trend, according to Mednick, is toward a further division of labor according to sex in all spheres of life. She is, therefore, not optimistic about the chances of role-change in the kibbutz today if the familistic trend will continue.

In the last part of her article, the author discusses the implications of the kibbutz experience for the world feminist movement. She suggests a paradigm for sex-role change in a planned context, which applies to the kibbutz as well.

The second, by Joseph Blasi, tries to unmask psychosociological and historical factors ignored by the "natural differences" explanation. He presents a detailed critique of Spiro's research and analysis. It is an opportunity to see a point-by-point meeting between the two schools of thought whose contact in the professional literature has sometimes seemed like ships passing each other in the night. Blasi shows how a lack of historical perspective--later elaborated by Safir--encourages particular kinds of argumentation. He also indicates alternative interpretations of Spiro's data. The point is to show that explanations of sex role differentiation on the "nature" end of the spectrum must answer a specific list of queries before



their conclusions are accepted carte blanche. Blasi asserts a certain suspension of sociological reasoning when sociobiologists present their theories as fact, not because they answer all the basic questions, but because they remain survivors after other explanations are carelessly eliminated. He also directs attention to the fact that researchers are not disagreeing mainly on the empirical facts.

In her article, Safir goes back to the beginning of the settlements in Israel. She shows, with many historical citations, that the first kvutzot (from some of which the kibbutzim eventually evolved) were not all egalitarian. Women had to work both in agricultural and kitchen work, the latter being their main vocation. At this time, women were not welcome, as were men, to the kvutzah because they were thought to be able mainly to do domestic work. Only in later years when the kibbutz was established did the attitude toward women change, and their work was mainly agricultural. The author goes on to show that sex-role equality in the kibbutz was a one-way equality. Women did all jobs in the kibbutz but men did not do educational and service work. This, accordingly, was the beginning of the division of labor according to sex.

In the last article of this section, Blumberg uses a cross-societal paradigm to emphasize the retreat from sex-role equality in the second generation of kibbutz members. She concentrates on two components of the structure of society that affect women's roles-- demographics, and the mode of production (which includes the social relations of production and the techno-economic bases). Blumberg asserts that in the First Stage of kibbutz development, demographics were such that almost all members were young, childless, predominantly male, and generally immigrants. The mode of production was exclusively agricultural. In this "revolutionary" time, women enjoyed sex-role equality for the most part. By the time the Second Stage arrived, there were many more kibbutz-born members, and women had been moved out of agriculture and into low esteem service jobs on the kibbutz.

Blumberg argues that this move for women was the result of a shift in the sources of economic power in the kibbutz paradigm. While some women might still be participating in production, very few were reaping the same rewards as men. There was virtually no female representation on economic committees or in management. Blumberg argues that economic power is an excellent predictor of control over life options (marriage, divorce, household authority, etc.), and once economic power is lost, life options are no longer under one's own control. The Second Stage of the kibbutz resulted in women's loss of economic power bases, and therefore signalled the deterioration of sex-role equality on the kibbutz. Blumberg closes her arguments pointing out that the kibbutz has moved into a Third Stage that involves industrial modes of production, and

a move to include women in the work force of the factories. In this Stage, Blumberg envisions a move to better economic control for women, and thus a move back to a sexual ideology of egalitarianism on the kibbutz.

CHAPTER ONE  
SEX-ROLE DIFFERENTIATION IN AN EQUALITARIAN SOCIETY

Yonina Talmon

EDITOR'S PREFACE

The following selection is illuminating not only because it deals with discrepancies between role-demands, role-conceptions, and role-performances, but also because it suggests bases for the assignment of roles. The biological factor of sex is one reference point for such assignment. Until recently, at least, men and women have played distinctly different roles within a society, although, except for obvious biological functions, definitions of proper male or female behavior vary from one society to another. In Western society, the male is usually required to play the role of breadwinner; this represents his primary obligation. Men have been largely exempt from other familial obligations. At the same time, they have dominated the roles associated with political leadership. Female roles, on the other hand, have been more directly concerned with the care of children, the preparation of food, cleaning, and economic activities within the home. If women worked outside the family, their jobs were frequently related to the kinds of work done in the home - domestic chores, nursing, teaching.

What happened in a society, or rather a segment of a society-- the collective settlements of Israel-- in which group values opposed the traditional sex differentiation of roles is the subject of Talmon's study. The people of the collectives wanted men and women to play the same roles; that is, they wished to obliterate sex differences. In Levinson's terms, they did not differentiate between male and female activities when defining role-demands. Women were expected to work and fight alongside the men and to share political leadership in the collective councils; the limited tasks involved in the socialization of children and care of the flat were to be performed jointly by husbands and wives; and men were to participate in what used to be regarded as strictly female activities.

What was the relationship between the egalitarian ideology governing sex roles, the different conceptions individuals had about these roles, and the actual performance of the roles? Talmon found that general egalitarian values remained strong among both sexes on the collectives, but that individual conceptions governing particular activities changed and that sex-role specialties developed in both the "internal system" of the family and the "external system" of the occupational and leadership areas. Women were more likely than men to be responsible for cleaning the home and caring for clothes; they were less likely to be found in heavy agricultural work - in transportation, equipment, and machinery maintenance, and the like. Individual role-conceptions developed according to the way roles were performed. Sex differentiation was less marked regarding participation in the committees that organized and planned the activities of the settlements, but it was definitely apparent in this area, too.



What was the source of these discrepancies between role-demands, role-conceptions, and role-performances? Perhaps the traditional Western ideas that many Israeli women held about the "proper" role of women contributed to the gap. Perhaps the egalitarian ideology upon which the role demands were based had gone beyond the limits of biological possibility. For example, women were able to work and fight when they were young and unencumbered by pregnancy and lactation, but child-bearing made it necessary that they perform work which did not interfere with or jeopardize biological functions. Talmon's study implies that sex-role differences are inherently linked to biological differences and that cultures must assign roles consistent with these differences, and it also implicitly questions the possibility of constructing a society with complete equality of the sexes.

## INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is an analysis of the emergence of sex-role differentiation in a society originally based on a denial of sex differences. The kibbutzim<sup>1</sup> in Israel have consciously cultivated a predominantly masculine image of the feminine role in their systems of training and education. The tenet of sex equality still occupies a central place in their proclaimed ideology. Yet, in spite of the systematic efforts to conduct role allocation in accordance with this ideal, a fairly clear-cut though fairly flexible sex-role differentiation has emerged in internal family activities as well as in work assignment and in nomination to committees and central offices. Most of the general theory on sex-role differentiation is based on one model. It deals with the transition from a sharply differentiated role allocation to a less differentiated one. It seems that the study of this process in reverse might further clarify the interrelations between the institutional and the ideological factors operating in this transition.

The main foci of our analysis will be: (a) analysis of the interrelation between differentiation in internal family tasks and differentiation in external activities; (b) analysis of the interrelation between differentiation in role allocation on the one hand and redefinition of sex-role models on the other; (c) analysis of the main institutionalized mechanisms evolved in order to bridge or cover up the gap between the proclaimed ideology and reality in this sphere.

## SEX-ROLE DIFFERENTIATION IN THE FAMILY

We shall start our analysis with an examination of the division of labor and sex-role models within the family. The most important determinants of internal sex-role allocation during the initial phases of the movement were the far-reaching limitation of family functions and the egalitarian ideology. Spouses tended their small and simply-furnished rooms and looked after their children during their daily reunion, but had few other household responsibilities. Internal relations between members of the elementary family were patterned to a large extent on relations between co-members and emphasized equality and companionship. Execution of family tasks was based on a tenet of strict sex equality.

Husbands were expected to participate in looking after the family living quarters and take care of the children just as much as their wives. Spouses had no right to impose their authority on each other, and there was hardly any differentiation between their spheres of special competence.

An analysis of our data on the families in the kibbutzim in our sample reveals a gradual increase of family functions and a concomitant increase in sex-role specialization. The family has regained some of its lost functions in the sphere of housekeeping. Most families have their afternoon tea at home with their children. In some of the kibbutzim, families will sometimes eat their evening meal at home too. Housework has become much more time consuming. The typical dwelling unit now consists of a semi-detached flat containing one or two rooms, a kitchenette and private sanitary facilities. While the style of internal decoration has remained on the whole functional and uncluttered, the standard of equipment and the number of items of furniture supplied to each unit have increased considerably. The flat now requires more elaborate and more systematic care. Though most clothing still goes to the communal laundry, many families tend to look after their best clothes at home so that there is a little extra washing, mending and ironing now and then. An increase of the personal money allowance and a certain widening of the range of choice of consumer goods have brought about the need for planning and budgeting. Most important of all changes in this sphere is the partial reversal of functions in the sphere of child care and socialization. Parents take a more active part in looking after their children. There is much closer cooperation between nurses, instructors, teachers and parents. Parents help in looking after their young children. They take turns in watching them at night and nurse them when they are ill. They help in the preparation of festivals arranged for the children and attend most of them. There is considerably more parental supervision of the children's behavior, their choice of friends and their reading habits. Some of the kibbutzim have introduced a more radical reorganization. Children in these kibbutzim no longer sleep in the children's houses. They stay with their age groups during the day, but return home every afternoon.

An examination of our data on the families in our sample of kibbutzim and a more systematic and rigorous observation of the division of labor in a subsample of 60 families indicate that a fairly specialized albeit flexible and fluctuating division of labor has emerged in most families. The husband will usually help his wife to clean the flat and will prepare the afternoon tea. Few husbands perform these tasks regularly, but all of them do it now and then. A considerable number of the husbands take over household duties only in case of emergency when their wife is either very tired, ill or away. Clothes are exclusively the concern of the wife. The husband does not take much interest in clothes and in almost all cases does not help his wife to look after them at all. In most of the families, the wife does most of the housekeeping and it is mainly her responsibility. Her husband is regarded as her assistant or as her

temporary stand-in but not as co-worker on equal terms. Budgeting of personal allowances of the whole family is almost invariably the responsibility of the wife. Officially, these allowances are personal and not transferable, but in practice this injunction is overruled and the allowances are pooled together and treated as a family allowance. Most men are not very interested in this small-scale budgeting and leave the planning and management of the family "finances" to their wives.

In the sphere of child care, there is considerably more cooperation and interchangeability than in housekeeping. This is clearly the effect of the system of socialization. As parents do not carry the main responsibility for either maintenance or socialization of their children, emphasis is put on affective ties. The main function of the parents is to minister to their children's need for security and love. Both of them interact with their children in much the same way and play a common protective role. Fathers usually take a lively interest in their children and participate actively in looking after them. They play with them, take them for walks and put them to bed about as much as the mothers. Mothers have closer contacts with babies and small children, but fathers come into the picture very early. Sex of the children has no marked effect either. Fathers are only a little more concerned with boys. Mothers look after both boys and girls.

In spite of the considerable blurring of differences between the father role and the mother role, there are some signs of differentiation even in this sphere. The mother is as a rule more concerned with the bodily well-being of the children and takes care of them while they are at home. She usually has more contact with the children's institutions and the school and supervises the upbringing of her children there. There is not much routine disciplining in the family, but such as there is, is more often than not the mother's responsibility. The source of this responsibility is primarily in her duties as housekeeper and part-time caretaker of her children. The child has to conform to certain standards of cleanliness and order. The living quarters of the family in the kibbutz are small. In many cases, one room serves all purposes. While standards of order are by no means very strict and exacting, there is a concern with the neatness of the flat. Even with a maximum of permissiveness the child has to be controlled and restricted to some extent. There are also the problems of personal cleanliness and health preservation. The father is less involved in these problems and the child may find in him an ally in cases of exaggerated concern with them on the part of the mother. The father's main responsibilities are outside the home -- in the yard, on the farm, in dealing with communal affairs which concern the kibbutz as a whole. Mothers have more say in routine matters and practical problems. Fathers have more say in matters of principle. In the eyes of the growing child, the father emerges gradually as the representative of the kibbutz and its values within the family, while the mother acts primarily as the representative of the family in the kibbutz.<sup>2</sup>

It should be stressed that while the emergent pattern is based on a division of spheres of competence and authority, it is not a clear-cut and uniform pattern. The family has remained basically equalitarian and does not enforce an institutionalized position of pivotal authority for



either of the spouses. Division of labor is more specialized than decision-making but it is not segregated and rigid either. The pattern of role allocation differs appreciably during different phases of the life cycle in any given family and from family to family.

So far we have dealt with actual division of tasks and authority in the family. The ideological aspect of intra-familial differentiation was examined by means of four questions included in our interview schedule. The first question was a general one: "How in your opinion should internal family tasks be divided between the spouses?" The question was followed by more specific questions on the norms pertaining to child rearing, care of the flat and care of clothes.

For the classification of the answers given to these questions, two cross-cutting criteria were used--extent of sex-role differentiation and degree of flexibility postulated by the norms pertaining to internal division of family tasks. Four distinctive ideological patterns emerge from this classification:

(a) An "equalitarian" pattern, based on strict equality and complete interchangeability.

(b) A "joint" pattern, based on close cooperation between husband and wife. This pattern is less equalitarian and more flexible than the equalitarian pattern. It allows for some sex-role differentiation but demands joint activities and mutual help.

(c) A "differentiated" pattern in which specialized activities outnumber shared ones. Most adherents of this pattern are against any rigid general norm and hold that the division of labour within the family should be decided by the spouses. They saw it as a matter of opinion and convenience and not so much as a matter of principle. This pattern is more flexible and considerably less equalitarian than the former patterns.

(d) A "segregated" pattern, based on a clear-cut and rigid sex-role differentiation. Household work and child care are defined as women's work.

The table shows that respondents tend to be most equalitarian when dealing with the problem on a high level of ideological generalization, but become less equalitarian when dealing with more specific norms. Norms pertaining to child care are more equalitarian than norms pertaining to household duties. Norms of care of clothing are least equalitarian of all. It should be noted that the number of respondents who are undecided, reluctant or unwilling to express their explicit opinion increases progressively when we pass from the general ideological question to the questions pertaining to child care, care of flat, and care of clothing. Only 7 of the respondents failed to take a definite stand on the general ideological issue whereas the number of uncommitted and undecided respondents rises to 103 when we reach the most specific issue. The decrease in equalitarianism is accompanied by an increase in ambivalence and indecision.

Comparison of the proclaimed ideology and actual practice in our sub-sample of families indicates that the ideological position is on the whole more equalitarian than the actual practice. While the general ideological position lags far behind, there is only a small gap between the more specific norms and actual behavior. There is in fact quite a close fit between the continuum obtained when examining actual practice and the continuum obtained when considering norms - child care is least differentiated; care of the flat comes next in this respect; care of clothes is almost exclusively feminine.

## ROLE ALLOCATION AND ROLE MODELS IN THE EXTERNAL SYSTEM

We turn now to the examination of the extent of sex-role differentiation in work assignments and in nomination to committees.

The original ideology postulated that women should participate equally in hard productive work, especially in agriculture. The main emphasis of the ideology pertaining to intra-familial tasks was on the participation of men in activities traditionally defined as feminine tasks. The main emphasis of the ideology pertaining to work assignment was on the participation of women in masculine tasks. Work assignment was not completely equalitarian even during the initial phases of development but crossing of the line between the masculine and feminine tasks was common. A considerable number of the women were assigned to predominantly masculine occupations and a certain percentage of the men worked in predominantly feminine tasks.

Examination of the work histories of our respondents during the last ten years indicates that there is a gradual but cumulative trend of growing sex-role specialization in work assignment. Table 2 shows that a fairly clear-cut division of labor has emerged in this sphere.

Men are concentrated mainly in agriculture, in production services<sup>3</sup> and in central public offices. Women are concentrated in services and in education. A more detailed analysis of each category indicates considerable sex-role specialization. No woman is assigned to field crops, to fodder, to fishery or to bee keeping, and they are a very small minority in the fruit orchards. Quite a number of them work in the vegetable gardens and in the tree-nursery but even in these branches they are only a third of the workers. Women are a small minority in the dairy and flocks. They constitute about half of the workers in poultry. If we take production services we see that women are found only in accountancy. No women are found in either carpentry, electricity, maintenance of machines or construction. When we turn to the predominantly feminine categories, we find indications of an even sharper differentiation. Workers in the kitchen, in the clothing-shops and stores are almost exclusively women. Workers in the shoe-repair shop and in sanitation are almost exclusively men. There is a fairly sharp differentiation in education too. Nurses and kindergarten teachers are exclusively women. Women are a majority in teaching, but they are concentrated mainly in primary school teaching. Teachers in high school and instructors are predominantly male. To sum up, most occupations are

Table 1  
Distribution of Ideological Patterns Pertaining to Sex Role Differentiation in Internal Family Tasks (in Percentages)

	Equalitarian	Joint	Differentiated	Segregated	Total	N
General	29	44	22	5	100	311
Care of Children	16	64	8	12	100	278
Care of Flat	9	41	24	26	100	233
Care of Clothing	5	15	5	70	100	215

Table 2  
Sex Role Differentiation in Work Assignment (in Percentages)

	Agricultural	Non-Agricultural Production	Production Services	Services	Education	Central Public Offices	Others	Total
Men	32	8	27	6	5	11	16	100
Women	8	2	1	38	35	2	14	100

Table 3  
Ideological Patterns--Sex Role Differentiation in Work Assignment (in Percentages)

	Equalitarian	Joint	Differentiated	Segregated	Total	N
	10	38	48	4	100	316

Table 4  
Predominantly Masculine Committees  
(in Percentages)

	Central Public Offices	Secretariat	Economic Committee	Planning Committee	Security Committee	Youth Activities Committee
Men	97	88	95	100	100	78
Women	3	12	5	---	---	22

Table 5  
Joint Committees (in Percentages)

	Work Assignment	Social Committee	Cultural Committee	Absorption Committee	Housing Committee	Library Committee	Landscaping Committee
Men	65	60	67	55	55	55	50
Women	35	40	33	45	45	45	50
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 6  
Predominantly Feminine Committees (in Percentages)

	Education Committee	Health Committee	Consumption Committee	Soldiers Committee	Parents Committee	Total = 100%
Men	38	39	33	28	---	
Women	62	61	67	72	100	

Table 7

Ideological Patterns--Sex Role Differentiation in Social Participation (in Percentages)

	Equalitarian	Joint	Differentiated	Segregated	Total	N
Men	23	38	33	6	100	297

Table 8

Ideological Patterns--Sex Role Differentiation in the Internal and External Systems (in Percentages)

	Equalitarian	Joint	Differentiated	Segregated	Total	N
Family	29	44	22	5	100	312
Occupation	10	38	48	4	100	316
Committees	23	38	34	5	100	297



segregated or almost segregated. There is a small number of occupations where a majority of one sex participates with a minority of the other sex. Women participate in predominantly masculine occupations more than men do in predominantly feminine occupations. Interchangeability is thus limited and asymmetrical.

We have examined the ideological aspects of work assignment by means of the following questions: "How in your opinion should the jobs be divided between men and women? Are you for or against sex-role differentiation in this sphere?" Classification of the answers to this question leads us again to the four ideological patterns encountered in the ideological analysis of intra-familial differentiation. We present the distribution of these patterns in Table 3.

The main emphasis is on the "differentiated" pattern while the "joint" pattern is second in importance. The gap between ideology and reality is narrower than in the internal system but has not disappeared completely. Ideological acknowledgement of segregation still lags behind reality.

Let us now turn to an examination of participation in committees and overall leadership of the community. Examination of the membership of committees in the last 10 years indicates that in most kibbutzim there is a gradual yet cumulative trend towards growing sex-role differentiation. In the following tables we present the data on the extent of differentiation at the time of our inquiry.

Men predominate in central offices, in the secretariat which is the most important committee in most kibbutzim, in the economic committee which is second in importance and is sometimes even more important than the secretariat. The members of the committees for planning and security are exclusively male. Though the educational committee is, as we shall soon see, predominantly female, men predominate in the committee in charge of youth activities.

We find approximately proportional representation in three important committees--in the committee in charge of work assignments, in the committee in charge of social relations and personal needs of the members, and in the committee in charge of cultural activities. Joint participation is found also in a number of small committees which are sub-committees of either the social or cultural committees.

Women predominate in the committees in charge of education, health and consumption. They are a majority in the sub-committee in charge of members who serve in the army. Members of the sub-committee in charge of aged parents are exclusively women.

To sum up, there are more exclusively masculine committees than exclusively feminine committees. Men predominate in overall leadership and in central committees. Men predominate in overall planning, in management of economic production and security. Men and women cooperate in the management of social and cultural affairs. Women predominate in

committees in charge of consumption, education, health and welfare. Differentiation in this sphere is thus considerable. It should, however, be pointed out that it is neither rigid nor clear-cut. The number of exclusively masculine or exclusively feminine committees is comparatively small. In most committees both sexes are represented. There are quite a number of committees with proportional or near proportional representation.

The ideological attitudes towards participation in committees were examined by means of the following question: "Should women participate as actively as men in communal affairs? Are you for or against sex-role differentiation in this sphere?" The classification of the answers to these questions leads us again to the four ideological patterns encountered in the examination of attitudes towards familial and occupational division of labor.

The main emphasis is on the "joint" pattern, the "differentiated" pattern coming next. A comparatively high percentage of the respondents adhere to the "equalitarian" pattern. As in the former sphere, there is more equalitarianism in theory than in practice.

We conclude our examination of internal and external role differentiation by a comparison of actual and ideal division of labor in the three spheres. Differentiation is most marked in the occupational sphere. It is difficult to compare differentiation in the family to differentiation in committees, but it is quite clear that there is less segregation in these spheres than in the sphere of work assignment.

Let us now compare the distribution of the ideological patterns.

Norms pertaining to the occupational system are most differentiated. Next in this respect come the norms pertaining to nomination to committees. Norms pertaining to the family are the most equalitarian.

We have already noted above that ideology lags behind reality in both the internal and external systems. This leads to the conclusion that the main pressures in the process of differentiation are institutional and that ideological reformulation follows suit. The original ideology accommodates itself to the changing reality, but lags behind it, conducting a rear-guard action against extreme differentiation. It is perhaps significant that the gap between ideology and reality is narrower in the occupational sphere than in the other spheres. The comparatively sharp occupational sex-role differentiation is sanctioned by the ideology more than the more flexible and more equalitarian sex-role differentiation in the other spheres. This seems to indicate that the pressure towards differentiation is at its strongest in the occupational sphere and that analysis of the process of differentiation in this sphere is of crucial importance.

## DYNAMICS OF DIFFERENTIATION

How can we account for the considerable sex-role differentiation revealed by our analysis? Examination of our data on stages on institutional differentiation and scrutiny of the assumptions and considerations which underlie the choice of each of the ideological patterns indicates that the sex differentiated role allocation emerges out of an interplay between changes in the internal and external systems. We shall first examine the development of the interrelations between the family and the occupational sphere and then proceed to analyze the dynamic interplay between these institutional spheres and social participation.

There was very little pressure towards sex-role differentiation in the family at first. The kibbutzim transferred most of the functions which loom so large in other types of families to communal institutions. All families were young and the birth rate was very low. Since the family unit was small and had very few tasks to accomplish, there was little objective need for a clear-cut division of labor or for a unified command to ensure coordination. Moreover, since the spouses had very few common objectives and tasks, the unity of the family depended primarily on close, affective contacts and companionship. This pattern of companionship operated against differentiation and rigidity. The process of differentiation sets in with the rise of the birth rate and with the overall increase of family functions. The family regains some of its lost functions and becomes more involved in internal activities. Our material indicates that the more task-oriented the family is the more marked is the tendency towards role differentiation within it.

How can we account for the fact that most of the reassumed family responsibilities fall on the wife? Analysis of the interviews reveals that the effects of former socialization and the influence of differentiation in the outside world are not eliminated. The equalitarian ideology does not penetrate very deeply and certain traditional norms persist in spite of it. The attitudes towards care of clothes, to take just one example, indicate clearly the effect of a sex differentiated role prototype. We were surprised to find such a strong and emphatic opposition to interchangeability in this sphere. Many of the respondents who were equalitarian on a high level of generalization stopped short and retracted from their equalitarian position when it came to care of clothes. It was considered as inappropriate, effeminate and slightly ridiculous for men to be engaged in such tasks. Quite a number of the respondents felt that it was somehow "unnatural." Covert conventional role images underlie the attitudes to many other tasks. We should take into consideration also the effects of differentiation of initial training--most wives have had more preparatory experience in performing household tasks and are more competent than their husbands in this sphere.

The initial tendency to differentiation is precipitated by the internal dynamics of family living. The advent of children accentuates the importance of familial roles. The identification with the specifically and typically feminine role of mother undermines the masculine image of the feminine role upheld by the official ideology and weakens the resistance



to sex-role differentiations. We observe a gradual process of generalization which leads from childbirth to childrearing to household duties. The various tasks involved in these responsibilities are correlated and are conceived as parts of a complex yet coherent whole.

A similar though more intense process of differentiation occurs in the sphere of work assignment. During the first phases of development the equalitarian ideology was reinforced by the demographic and economic structure of the kibbutz. The kibbutzim put an almost exclusive emphasis on productive labor and the standard of living was kept very low. The simple and small-scale services did not require many workers and a considerable number of the women could turn to productive labor. Most members were young and unattached. Innate biological differentiation was not very noticeable and could be ignored. The primary determinant of the shift in the division of labor is the woman's sex-linked child-bearing role which accentuates biological differentiation. Communal institutions replace the mother very early but they cannot completely eliminate her special ties to her baby. Pregnancy and nursing of babies partially incapacitate the woman for hard labor in outlying orchards and fields. Pregnant women are usually transferred to lighter tasks and nursing mothers work only part time. Since they have to nurse and feed their babies every few hours, it is more convenient for them to work in one of the communal service institutions which are situated near the children's houses. As long as they look after their babies during work hours, they have to resign themselves to taking a leave of absence from productive labor. At first this leave of absence was kept to the bare minimum. Communal institutions took over as soon as possible and the mother, no longer hampered during working hours, returned to productive labor. With the birth of more children and with increasing age, mothers usually found it increasingly difficult to return to hard physical labor and the maternity leave grew longer. The recurrent and prolonged interruptions entailed serious discontinuity. Mothers lost touch with their former jobs and drifted away from them. In the course of time, many of them tended to leave agriculture permanently.

The birth of children affects the economic structure of the kibbutz in yet another way. It entails a growing need for more workers for services and children's care. The balance between productive and non-productive labor changes considerably. This process is further enhanced by the gradual rise in the standard of living. Non-productive labor now absorbs about 50 percent of the labor force. Women are only about 45 percent of the total population. The services, child care and education need all the female working power they can get.

The dividing line between masculine and feminine tasks is determined by the ecological setting and by the economic structure of the kibbutz. We can discern the effect of the following factors: (a) the extent to which a given job requires considerable physical strength and strenuous exertion; (b) the extent to which it requires specialized technical skill; (c) the extent to which it requires spatial mobility; (d) the extent

to which it requires continuity of effort for considerable blocks of time from the point of view of the time rhythm of the working day and from the point of view of the overall work career. Considerations of rationalization and production work against the blurring of sex job differentiation. Agriculture in the kibbutz is becoming increasingly large scale and heavily mechanized. It seems now a waste to assign able-bodied and technically skilled men to the services. Women cannot fully replace them in productive labor because of the limitations that physical disability and childbirth impose on them. Work assigners find it increasingly difficult to allow women to work in agriculture or to draft men to work in the services. When practical considerations of efficiency gain precedence over ideological considerations, sex differentiated job allocation comes to be regarded as inevitable.

Sex differentiation is an outcome of internal pressures within each sphere as well as of an interplay between them. The occupational sphere exercises pressure on the internal division of labor in the family. Productive labor and overall administration draw the men far afield. Women's work does not take them far from their flat and from the children's houses. They find it easier to fit the care of the flat into their timetable. The children's houses are nearby and the mothers can drop in during the day. They take the children to their flat on their way home. As they are concentrated in occupations closely allied to housekeeping and child care, they find it easier to cope with these tasks at home.

Role differentiation within the family in its turn exerts pressure on the occupational sphere. The emergence of an outright feminine prototype of the woman's role precipitates the process of differentiation in work assignment. There is a growing concern with the preservation of a feminine and youthful appearance. Considerations of beauty care are not quite acceptable and are met with ridicule when admitted openly, yet they have a marked effect on work assignment. Women are not as eager as they used to be to work in agriculture and one of the main reasons for this reluctance is the fear that strenuous and exhausting physical labor and work in the open throughout the year will have an adverse effect on their complexion and figure. There is a growing concern with the maintenance of the right balance between external and internal roles. Women tend to avoid work in overall administration because jobs in this sphere are very demanding and preoccupying and do not leave them enough time and energy for their familial roles. Quite a number of members feel that as a rule women should be assigned to jobs that do not interfere with their paramount duties as wives and mothers.

We have already noted that while sex-role differentiation within the family is considerable, it is less clear-cut than in work assignment. This difference is closely related to the division of functions between the family and the occupational sphere. The dividing line between internal family activities and external activities has shifted considerably but this did not entail a radical change in the institutional division of labor. The kibbutzim put the main emphasis on the occupational sphere and it has remained the major focus of activities for both men and women. The fact that both husband and wife work full time in communal institutions exerts

pressure towards sharing of household chores performed after work and obviates the tendency to turn household duties and child care into the wife's exclusive task areas. It should be noted also that the internal pressure towards differentiation within the family is not very strong either. The core of specific family responsibilities has remained comparatively small and most of the tasks involved are not very specialized. These counter-pressures account for the fact that the considerable sex-role specialization in the internal family activities did not lead to rigidity and polarization.

The attenuation of the equalitarian ideology and the loosening of communal control over the family lead to a considerable variation in familial role allocation during different stages of the life cycle of any given family, and from family to family. The family has a certain leeway to develop a pattern which suits the personally held values, the needs and interests of its members. A change in the size and in the age and sex composition of the family, a shift to a more or less arduous or time-consuming job, leads to role reallocation. Equally important is the interplay between the personalities of husband and wife and the variation in the nature and intensity of the emotional bonds between them. The tendency to sex-role differentiation is evident in all families, yet each family works out its own dynamic pattern.

How do these processes of differentiation affect the patterns of voluntary participation in the committees and how, in their turn, are they affected by them? Participation in committees serves as an important alternative direction of emancipation from sex differentiation. This outlet for activity and avenue of ascent very often compensates the women for their partial exclusion and for the limitation of their opportunities in the occupational sphere. The sphere of participation is less differentiated than the occupational sphere, but it cannot escape from the pressure towards differentiation. This pressure comes from both directions. Lines of cleavage between the sexes in committees are about the same as in the occupational sphere and in the family. Since women are gradually excluded from production and overall administration, they lose touch with these aspects of community life and can contribute very little to the work of committees which deal with production, planning or overall administration. When they are elected to one of these committees, they are usually very passive and often drop out after a while. They concentrate in committees in charge of organization, of consumption, of children, of health and personal problems. Only in these committees can they draw on the experience that they have gained in their jobs and at home and give expert advice. Only in such committees do they feel competent and in their element.

The kibbutzim realize that joint participation is an indispensable bridge between the sexes and make special efforts to avoid under-representation and segregation. These efforts are only partly successful because most women are not very keen on nomination to committees and many of them try to avoid it as much as possible. The reluctance to accept responsibilities in committees is closely related to the limitation of the family sphere in the kibbutzim. Participation in committees is an important outlet for housewives since it emancipates them from domesticity and isolation. Women in the kibbutzim work outside their home all day. Work in service



institutions entails intensive, constant, and very often strained contacts with many members. By the end of the day they usually crave for their children and for a quiet evening with their husbands at home. The short time spent together in the evening is the main manifestation of the unity of the family. Cutting it short by active participation in committees during off-hours encroaches on family life.

Yet another important determinant of differentiation is the persistence and resurgence of sex differentiated role stereotypes. Behind the equalitarian facade we find considerable differentiation. The conception of women as reticent, passive and placating has not disappeared. Many feel that a great deal of drive and self-assertion and a strong involvement in public affairs are unfeminine. Attempts of women to make their mark in the general assembly and in the committees are often met with condescension and excessive criticism. Women who hold important leadership positions are treated with a mixture of admiration and vague discomfort. Women tend to be self-conscious and self-deprecating when evaluating their roles in this sphere. The considerable ambivalence concerning feminine social participation reinforces their tendency to withdrawal.

To sum up, the three spheres are closely interconnected. Division of functions among them has many repercussions on internal differentiation within each of them. Concessions made to segregation in one of the spheres call for similar concessions in the others. The task-determined division of labor undermines the equalitarian ideology and reinforces sex differentiated stereotypes which persist and develop in spite of it. The redefinition of role models precipitates the tendency to sex-role differentiation.

## INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS

The discrepancy between the proclaimed equalitarian ideology and the growing differentiation between the sexes is a source of severe strain. Since women are mainly concentrated in occupations and tasks which are closely allied to traditional housekeeping, they very often feel that they might as well perform these tasks within their own home rather than outside it. They retreat to their private sphere and press for a far-reaching definition of the relations between the family and communal institutions. Women are, in fact, the main agents of the familistic trend. The kibbutzim are thus faced with a dilemma. Institutional exigencies and normative pressures lead to growing differentiation. The kibbutzim cannot yield to segregation since marked inequality between the sexes breeds discontent and disaffection which threaten to overthrow the collective organizations of consumption and child care. This dilemma has led to the emergence of ingenious "intermediate" institutional mechanisms which partly bridge and cover up the gap between ideals and reality and check differentiation. These supplementary mechanisms operate in all three systems, but they are most prominent in the occupational sphere.

## Rationalization and Mechanization of Service Institutions

Until very recently the kibbutzim have concentrated most of their efforts on improving efficiency in production branches, and the services lagged far behind in this respect. Most service branches operated with a minimal budget and with inadequate and outdated equipment. Their organizational structure was, in addition, very loose and ill-defined. The efficiency drive leads to a certain formalization of communication and control in the work teams and to a far-reaching mechanization of most work processes. This reorganization affects the service branches in many ways. It reduces the number of workers engaged in them so that a certain percentage of the women working power can be assigned to other occupations. It raises the standard of services rendered and enhances confidence in collective institutions. Work becomes easier and more manageable. There is less tension within the team and fewer complaints from the "clients."

## Professionalization

The kibbutzim are making a persistent effort to develop scientifically tested techniques in the sphere of housekeeping and child care and to turn these occupations into semi-professions. Workers in these fields are sent to get professional training in institutions outside the community. The Federations organize seminars and refresher courses in home economics, nursing and child care in which members get some theoretical grounding and practical guidance. The training is kept up and continued by means of extensive reading in semi-scientific literature and by occasional lectures. Professionalization makes manifest the hidden potentialities of collectivistic organization of the services. It leads to cultivation of different talents and capabilities by specialization and systematic training. It enables workers to develop high levels of competence and encourages them to perfect their mastery of certain spheres of activity. The professional aura enhances the prestige of jobs in housekeeping and child care and establishes them as full-fledged occupational roles. The specialized training supplies the incumbents of these roles with certain objective criteria of excellence. Their position as competent experts bolsters their status vis-a-vis their "clients" and protects them from excessive criticism.

## Diversification of Feminine Occupations

The occupational opportunities available to women in the kibbutz are rather limited, but the range of choice open to them can be widened by branching out into new spheres of activity. A recent development in this sphere is the beginning of a training program in social work, psychological therapy and counseling. Training in arts and crafts provides additional openings. A certain increase of suitable employment opportunities results from the development of local industries and crafts.

## De-differentiation

(a) Cultivation of spheres of joint activity. The kibbutzim make many efforts to cut the number of exclusively feminine or exclusively masculine occupations. They often develop new branches which are suitable for men as well as for women. They try to achieve proportional or nearly proportional representation in as many committees as possible and pressure is put on the women to accept nomination. The nomination committee will often prefer a female candidate to a male one of equal or even better qualifications. This balancing mechanism serves as an antidote to the limiting effects of occupational sex-role differentiation and overcomes to some extent women's reluctance to accept office. Apprenticeship in a committee enables women to gain experience and to develop new interests and new skills. Quite a number of women who were at first very insecure in their new role have gradually become active and competent participants in the deliberations of their committee. Such an "equilibrating" system of recruitment helps to discover untapped energies and hidden talents and opens up new avenues of satisfying activity.

(b) Symbolic denial of differentiation. The persistence of specifically feminine and specifically masculine roles is partly covered up and neutralized by the temporary participation of men in specifically feminine roles and vice versa. The kibbutzim make a point of assigning a number of men to specifically feminine occupations on a short-term basis. The most important example is participation of men in work in the kitchen and the dining hall. They are drafted by a system of rotation in which each man serves a two- to three-month period. Most of the men serve in the dining hall where everyone can see them every day. Similar mechanisms operate in the family too, particularly in the participation of fathers in taking their children out for their daily walk and in putting them to bed in the children's houses. Their participation in what is regarded as a typically feminine task serves as a highly visible symbolic denial of segregation.

Participation of men in feminine tasks has a practical value, but its main significance lies in its symbolic meaning as "atonement" for differentiation. Essentially, it is a token interchangeability. Women participate in masculine tasks much more and for much longer stretches than men in feminine tasks. Girls and young women are assigned to work in masculine occupations for a number of years. When they grow older and have children, they leave these occupations and settle down in services and child care. Work in productive labor is regarded as an indispensable rite de passage for most women.

(c) A more durable crossing of the lines occurs in exceptional cases. The kibbutzim encourage women who continue to work in productive labor, in overall administration and in central committees, to hold out as long as they can. These exceptions to the rule serve as living proof that there is no deliberate discrimination. The exemplary life stories of such women who have achieved equality in spite of serious difficulties travel far and wide in all kibbutzim and have become an important part of popular lore. Some of these women have become larger-than-life heroic figures.



In some of the kibbutzim in our sample we discern signs of the emergence of a cycle pattern. This pattern is based on a system of role allocation which combines continuity of career with controlled mobility. It institutionalizes a sequence of changes of occupations during the life cycle coupled with patterned shifts of the center of gravity from one institutional sphere to another. During the first phase of the cycle, the main emphasis is on joint participation in the occupational system. As long as they are young and have no children, women tend to concentrate on either predominantly masculine or joint occupations. When their children come, they settle down in services and child care and become engrossed in family affairs. When the children grow up and the mothers have more free time, they put more emphasis on social participation. The second phase is based on considerable sex differentiation but is preceded and followed by more equalitarian stages. The cycle pattern is not rigid and allows for many combinations and variations. It does not try to erase sex differentiation completely, but neither does it yield to polarization and segregation. It takes into full consideration the developmental aspects of family life and defines the inter-relations between the external systems and the internal family system accordingly. It combines equality and differentiation in an ordered yet flexible and continually changing pattern.

#### FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup>The main features of collective settlements (kvutzot or kibbutzim) are: common ownership of property except for a few personal belongings and communal organization of production and consumption. Members' needs are provided for by communal institutions on an equalitarian basis. All income goes into the common treasury; each member gets only a very small annual allowance for personal expenses. The community is run as a single economic unit and as a single household. Husband and wife have independent jobs. Main meals are taken in the communal dining hall. In most kibbutzim children live apart from their parents and are looked after by members assigned to this task. They spend a few hours every day with their parents and siblings, but from their birth on they sleep, eat and study in special children's houses. Each age group leads its own life and has its autonomous arrangements. The kibbutz is governed by a general assembly, which convenes as a rule once a week, by a secretariat and by various committees. Each kibbutz is affiliated to one of the Federations of Collectives. The federations recruit most of their new members from youth movements which channel their members to kibbutzim.

<sup>2</sup>Our data disprove the hypothesis that the mother figure is always the more permissive and supportive and the father more denying and demanding as far as the administering of specific disciplines and as far as everyday relations are concerned. It reinforces the hypothesis of "positional" differentiation. The mother is the representative of the family while the father is the representative of the community at large.

<sup>3</sup>In this category we include: transportation, equipment and machinery maintenance shop, electrical shop, carpentry shop, construction.

<sup>4</sup>Women are about 45% of the population of the kibbutzim.

CHAPTER TWO  
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE WOMEN IN THE KIBBUTZ RESEARCH

Lionel Tiger and Joseph Shepher

With three of the four women assistants on our project, we are taking lunch at a Druse restaurant atop Mount Carmel, near the University of Haifa. About our findings, one woman says, "Why is it all so surprising? What did you expect to do?"

We have maintained that the study of the kibbutz is promising ground for understanding sex differences everywhere and their impact on the division of labor. In 1956 two pioneering students of the problems of working women, Alva Myrdal and Viola Klein, pointed out that the basic social adjustment necessary to support wives and mothers who want careers centered on "collective houses in which such services as cooked meals, laundry, day nurseries, etc. can be obtained at a reasonable price by the families living in them." These things are built into the kibbutz system. The kibbutz, with its deep ideological commitment to the equality of all human beings and, of course, equality of the sexes, also offers women the independence prerequisite to equality. All in all, the kibbutz is perhaps the most likely place for the development of equality of the sexes.

Like most students of the issue, we do not settle for a solely legal interpretation of equality; we distinguish between formal and actual equality of the sexes. Sexual equality does not exist in most societies mainly because men and women consistently do different work and therefore have unequal status. This difference in occupational prestige is itself puzzling. Is low status attached to women's work? Or does the work have low status because women do it? Do cooking, sewing, and child care by definition have relatively lower prestige or do they have low prestige because women do them? The evidence suggests that the second answer is true; we have witnessed the gradual decline in prestige of certain occupations when they become feminized, such as elementary-school teaching and clerical work (Sullerot, 1971).

If, however, factual equality of the sexes depends on occupational roles, it can be achieved only if differential work prestige disappears or if men and women do the same work. The first condition is hardly achievable; in a complex society, there will always be some jobs that are differentially rated, along with the skills, talents, and education needed to perform them. It seems to us, therefore, that sexual equality cannot exist until work allocation and consequently work status do not have gender as a criterion.

Here we must point out a recurrent if obvious theme in feminist writings (e.g., Janeway, 1971; Barrett et al., 1974; Rosaldo and Lamphere, 1974)--that women are not only women but persons. It is argued that even the use of the words "men" and "women" gives rise to sexist bias. Anthropologist Constance R. Sutton introduced a motion at the 72nd Annual Meeting



of the American Anthropological Association under which the AAA would "urge anthropologists to become aware in their writing and teaching that their wide use of the word 'man' as generic for the species is conceptually confusing (since 'man' is also the term for the male) and that it be replaced by more comprehensive terms such as 'people' and 'human beings,' which would include both sexes." The motion was passed by voice vote (AAA Annual Report, 1973, April 1974).

How can women prove that they are not only women but human beings? One way is by taking jobs usually done by men. Cooking a meal, caring for a child, sewing a dress, are considered women's work; managing a corporation, teaching at a university, and presiding at a political convention are "human" work, although it is not obvious why it is more genuinely "human" to manage a corporation than to rear a child. Interestingly, "humanness" in much feminist writing frequently is not used to characterize the work of a truck driver, an agricultural wage worker, or a sewer cleaner. If "humanness" implies high prestige work, a great majority of both men and women are evidently doomed to "unhuman" careers. But if we disregard this bias and accept the idea that division of labor should occur without any regard to sex differences, the case of the kibbutz becomes significant.

We presented extensive data on kibbutz women that allow the following conclusions:

1. Early in kibbutz history, more than half the women worked for a considerable time in production. Then came a long, gradual process of sexual polarization of work. Today the sexual division of labor has reached about 80 per cent of maximum.
2. Sexual division of labor is more polarized in the second and kibbutz-bred generations than it is in the first generation, and more polarized in younger kibbutzim than in older ones.
3. Despite complete formal equality in political rights, women are less active in the General Assembly than men are, as measured both by their presence in the Assembly and by the incidence of their participation. Women are somewhat overrepresented in committees dealing with social, educational, and cultural problems; they are seriously underrepresented in committees dealing with economy, work, general policy-making, and security.
4. The higher the authority of an office or committee, the lower the percentage of women in it. At the highest level of the kibbutz, women make up only 14 per cent of the personnel.
5. Women seem to have special problems sustaining all-female work groups; they usually prefer mixed-sex groups or male leadership.
6. Men and women receive nearly the same number of years of education; in fact, women have a slight edge. Advanced schooling, however, differs in kind for each sex. Women are overrepresented in higher

nonacademic education leading to such jobs as elementary-school teaching, kindergarten teaching, and medical nursing. Men are overrepresented in higher academic education leading to such jobs as agriculture, engineering, economics, and management.

7. From the ninth grade on, women consistently fall below men in scholarly achievement. This discrepancy between the sexes seems to be wider here than in comparable modern societies.

8. Although women, like men, are drafted into the army, the overwhelming majority of kibbutz girls (like other Israeli girls) do secretarial and service jobs there; few do characteristically male work or occupy command positions. The conception of the women's army as essentially a substitute unit, also providing back-up aid and encouragement for the fighting men, is completely accepted by the kibbutz girls. There has, however, been a steady expansion of the range of noncombat tasks for women.

9. Even the long, demanding Yom Kippur War did not substantially change the division of labor in the kibbutzim, even though almost half the men were called up by the army for a long period.

10. The family has risen from its initial shadowy existence to become the basic unit of kibbutz social structure. It now fulfills important functions in consumption and education, and there are demands for further expanding its function. Increased familization is indicated by high and growing rates of birth and marriage, and by a decreasing divorce rate. The status of singles, especially of women, is becoming more and more problematic, to the extent that the family, the kibbutz, and even the federations now try to help them marry.

11. The main instigators of familization are women, whose attitude toward familism is more positive than men's.

12. Attitudes toward equality have always been more egalitarian than actual behavior has. This discrepancy causes recurrent soul-searching within the kibbutzim and federations.

## POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS

Before we try to explain our findings, we wish to examine some of the possible interpretations of our data.

1. The argument of insufficient revolution would hold that despite the ideological commitment of the kibbutzim, the kibbutz revolution has not been a total one. At first, more than half the women worked in production. And yet very few men shared cooking and washing, and none sewing and child care. When more children were born, service work increased and women had to leave their work in production to attend to those tasks, which men still did relatively rarely.

To this argument we reply that in the beginning, there were so few service tasks that only a handful of people were needed to do them. And as for production, everyone who could help there was badly needed because of the extreme difficulties of economic survival. The low technological level of the early kibbutzim made physical strength an important attribute; it was unreasonable to transfer men from jobs of hard labor to the kitchen and replace them with women. Still, ideology had an impact on the division of labor, and the kibbutz deviated widely from the traditional sex typing of work in the culture of the founders' origin. It is true, however, that basic ideas of who was more suitable for which work resisted ideology more stubbornly than did other operating assumptions.

Why were the early kibbutzniks not as radical about sexual division of labor as about private property, religion, competition, urban life styles, etc.? Perhaps we should even ask why the early kibbutzniks could not afford to be as radical about it. Is there any society where men are as widely and consistently involved as women in cooking, sewing, washing, and child care? The answer being no, we can argue that the kibbutz did more to avoid sexual division of labor than did any other society.

But as physical strength has become progressively less relevant in most work, why shouldn't men and women be interchangeable now? The answer is that women have no personal or social inclination to yield certain service tasks to men, and men are reluctant to yield certain production tasks to women. Even when technological development obviates one of the basic reasons for sexual division of labor, the division remains. The theory of insufficient revolution leaves us with more tough questions than satisfying answers.

2. The socialization argument would explain our findings by pointing out that since the founders of the kibbutz were socialized in a culture where sexual division of labor was polarized, they would have internalized the values and norms behind polarization, and therefore would not have been able to carry out their revolutionary aims or to socialize the second generation successfully.

There are several problems with this argument. First, if the results of primary socialization are unalterable, why don't we witness the same failure in other aspects of kibbutz life? If we accept that the founders came from the shtetl as described by Zborowski and Herzog (1969), we must wonder what happened to the norms of individualistic, achievement-oriented, competitive behavior central to that society. Instead of these, the kibbutz stressed cooperation, mutual help, and economic rewards independent of social role and work performance. Despite some small compromises, the system of equal economic rewards is intact and flourishing today. Why didn't basic socialization remain unalterable here? The same question must be raised about the shtetl's plutocracy and piety, lastingly replaced on the kibbutz by direct democracy and a secular or even antireligious ethos.



There is also an important methodological problem in the socialization argument. Even the most radical feminists agree that male dominance is universal in contemporary and historically known societies (Millett, 1970); they argue that men and women everywhere are socialized to internalize "male-dominated values and norms." But if basic socialization has an unalterable impact on values, norms, and attitudes, then we can never change the sexual division of labor. Furthermore, we can never find sound scientific evidence that sexual differences and sexual division of labor reflect cultural values and norms. To prove that sexual differences, including sexual division of labor, are either biologically or culturally determined, we would, for example, have to take a hundred male and a hundred female babies, socialize them without male-dominated values, and see whether this results in sex differences and in sexual division of labor. (We think it would, but we can never prove it, any more than feminists can prove the opposite.) If basic socialization is truly unalterable, there would be no acceptable socializers for our 200 babies; anyone we chose would be contaminated by his own basic socialization. And we could not simply leave our 200 babies without socialization and return to see whether they had developed a sex-typed or a non-sex-typed society, since it has often been proved (Davis, 1940, 1947, 1949) that babies without socialization do not develop into human beings.

So the socialization argument too leaves us with more questions than answers. Of course, we do not argue that socialization has no impact on personality; what we are arguing is that there are differences in various spheres of life in regard to the extent to which resocialization is possible. We are also aware, as was rejected in the first half of our century, that socialization does not work on a tabula rasa. There is at birth a basic diagram, a set of biologically determined dispositions, which has been called a "biogrammar" (Tiger and Fox, 1971). Culture (i.e., socialization) in its plasticity may go against those dispositions, but not for long and not for many people, without causing serious difficulties for both the individual and society. For instance, Shepher (1971) has proved that kibbutz children educated in a peer group are not attracted to one another sexually and do not marry one another, even though such unions are not only sanctioned but encouraged by public opinion. This biologically determined disposition against incest is more important than are socialization and public opinion. The same phenomenon has been found by Wolf (1966, 1968, 1970).

3. The male conspiracy argument states that to maintain their supremacy, men conspire against women. By forming a coalition, they block the entry of women into prestigious occupations and the higher echelons of the political system (which has, of course, often been the case). The most effective way to do this is to dominate socialization by inducing women to not only accept inferior status themselves but to compound and perpetuate the problem by raising their young to accept the same inequities. We agree that this is indeed a partial explanation--that the bonds men form are unhelpful to the careers and ambitions of women (Tiger, 1969, 1975b). But as we have seen, this part of the male conspiracy

argument does not apply, since the kibbutz established itself in the aggressive search for sexual equity.

In the beginning, there were more men than women in the kibbutz; if they had wished to, they could have acted as a group against the women. We have no evidence that they ever did so. Perhaps certain men considered certain women unacceptable for certain political positions--just as they considered certain other men unacceptable. It may also be true that a majority opinion of many men and women kept some women from certain positions. But we are confident in stating that such majorities did not originate in any male conspiracy. In fact, our study in Ofer showed that the opposite was true.

In Ofer, there is constant pressure, mostly from men, for women to assume greater political responsibilities, due to a shortage of suitable men and a relative abundance of talented women. A woman of fifty, with a brilliant intellect, a talent for organization, and excellent leadership qualities, was asked several times to assume the tasks of secretary, treasurer, or work coordinator. If she had agreed, she would have been elected in the General Assembly unanimously. She always refused the offers. During and after the Yom Kippur War, the kibbutz offered the difficult task of the work coordinator to a woman, an offer that had been made every year to one woman or another. Under the pressure of the war, three women accepted, but each one resigned after a short while, claiming family responsibilities. Recently a young man was elected to the position. He is much less talented than any of the three women, and the managers (all of them men) of agricultural and industrial branches sadly recall the good old days when the work coordinators were women.

After the last national convention of the Ichud Federation, Kibbutz Ofer had to elect new members to the federation's council. The secretariat nominated two men and two women. When these nominations were presented to the Assembly, both women asked not to be elected, because membership in the council would require them to be away from the kibbutz for one or two days a month. One of the women is a young elementary-school teacher with a six-year-old daughter; the other is a kindergarten teacher with four grown children and two grandchildren.

Even the most belligerent fighters for sexual equality in the kibbutz (most but not all of whom are women) do not argue that men block women's way. They usually point to the unwillingness of women to assume political responsibility. Wherever a woman shows a talent and inclination to accept responsibility, the way is open for her. Activating women in work and political activity is more a task of Ofer's men than of its women. All in all, this hardly amounts to a male conspiracy against the women.

4. The retreat argument supplements the argument of insufficient revolution and goes like this: when women realized they had lost all hope of staying in production because no men would assume responsibility for child care and other service tasks, they retreated into the service



branches and presently lost all desire to escape from them; since they were doing for the community what a housewife would do for her own family--cooking, washing, babysitting, etc.--they began to enjoy their self-imposed seclusion within the family (this would explain their enthusiastic support of such social changes as familistic housing and the "hour of love").

Although this argument points up some well-established facts, it interprets them questionably and colors them with the word "retreat." It may be true that kibbutz women assumed responsibility for education and consumption and then gradually identified with those social roles. In the national council of the Kibbutz Artzi in 1966, the most important leader of the federation's women, Yona Golan, stated that the federation should not send women back to the fields and bring men to the kindergarten; rather, that it should see that women's work enjoyed the same prestige as men's and not be considered any less of a contribution to the community's well-being. Golan thus challenged a male-centered, feminist attitude that sees humane, important, and prestigious work as male. Economic expansion, which centers on production, still lingers as a goal in much of the kibbutz movement, but more and more investment and manpower are being given to education and consumption.

One can consider such rediscovery of women's roles a retreat only if one thinks that the abolition of sexual division of labor necessarily constitutes progress. Progress is by definition positive, retreat negative. Without using these value judgments, one must ask whether the return of women to women's roles has had a negative impact on the kibbutz, which some say it has. At a recent convention of the Kibbutz Artzi, several speakers condemned the "hour of love" as an indulgence that interfered with the children's education schedule and the mothers' work schedule. It is relevant to note that most of the complaints came from men--a fact not very compatible with the argument that men conspire to push women back into traditional housewifery.

5. The external influence argument claims that the kibbutz did its best to carry out the "androgynous" revolution, but could not sustain it against the influence of the sexist norms of the society around it. There are many facts to contradict this. Israeli society in its early years was similar to kibbutz society as far as the sexual division of labor was concerned. Women did men's work; such institutions as the Working Women's Council (Moetzot Mapoalot) and the Organization of Working Mothers (Irgun Imahot Ovdot) participated more than a little in the labor force, at least until the establishment of the state in 1948, when formal legal protections for all citizens were established.

The kibbutz has always stood in flagrant opposition to the Israeli system of private property. Capitalistic individualism and competition did not influence the kibbutz system, but neither did sexual division of labor, in which urban Israel somewhat resembled the kibbutz system. The kibbutz is an open society rather than a "total institution" (Goldenberg and Wekerle, 1972), and its openness is not selective. The kibbutz could

not and does not open its gates to influences on sexual division of labor and close them to influences on capitalistic individualism. In the late 1950's, thousands of kibbutz members received millions of German marks in reparation payments. This most seductive external influence could have resulted in the desertion of the kibbutz by thousands of members who preferred to keep the funds rather than turn them over to the kibbutz treasury. The number of people who did desert was surprisingly small--in Ofer, one family in seventy. If external influence is so strong, why should it hold sway only in the sexual division of labor and not in economic and political patterns?

The five arguments we have presented all have some point to them, yet none can sufficiently explain why, despite structural advantages and ideological fervor, the kibbutz has not lived up to its goal of abolishing sexual division of labor. True, the kibbutz has ensured complete formal equality between the sexes and enabled women to fulfill themselves in work, polity, and education. But the kibbutz has reached greater sexual polarization in work than has the surrounding society (so that alleged external influence should now work in the opposite direction). Only 34 per cent of Israeli women are in the labor force, and they constitute only 24.5 per cent of the total working population (Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1973). This percentage is higher than that of Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, and Portugal, but lower than that of all the rest of Europe and the U.S.A. (Sullerot, 1971). And within Israel, the percentage of women who work in agricultural and industrial production, clerical positions, and management is still much lower in the kibbutzim.

The kibbutz has been conspicuously successful with other aspects of its ideology. It maintains its communal economic and social organization, its direct democracy, its system of collective education. It remains rural and secular. We do not mean to suggest that in all these institutions the kibbutz has succeeded in maintaining an original and flawless integrity; there have certainly been compromises and dilutions. But nowhere have the institutions changed to the point where their core has been impaired. Why then is it principally in the sexual division of labor that failure has been so pervasive and overwhelming?

## BROADER ANSWERS

It should be clear that we regard any formal sociological explanation for what we have described as partial and, by itself, inadequate. Some sociologically-describable variables, such as sex, age, social class, and ethnic origin, determine behavior more than others do. But there is no way to gauge their respective influences. One of the aims of biology is the assessment of what is central to an animal's survival and success; as in other sciences, such assessment requires the data and techniques of other disciplines. When biologists cannot explain why something happens, they can examine the physiology of the event. If the ways of studying the physiology are too crude, they can turn to the

chemistry and physics of the organ involved; if that fails, molecular biology may have a role to play. The history of science is littered not only with mistakes and with hypotheses mercifully abandoned, but once-sturdy disciplinary boundaries that can no longer keep one fact isolated from others.

Perhaps the first social thinker to insist on the interplay of disciplines was the fearless Karl Marx, who turned his integration of the several social sciences into an immensely powerful theory. He strove to assimilate in his work what was known in every science. It is not common knowledge that he wrote to Darwin, offering to dedicate Das Kapital to him, for he saw a connection between his own synthetic economics and Darwin's effort to organize knowledge of living things--a connection recalled by Engels at Marx's graveside. And Marx's synthetic system--whatever its inadequacies then and now--did provide a way to organize not only socioeconomic but also symbolic and cultural phenomena. He and Engels also sought to relate their work to the evolutionary anthropology and biology of their time (e.g., Trigger, 1967; Joravsky, 1970; Tiger, 1973; Morin, 1973; Fox, 1973; Freeman, 1966; Heyer, 1975; Tiger, 1975).

But as many have recently noted, the social sciences in both Marxist and capitalist traditions have been systematically isolated from the biological sciences, for reasons we have already mentioned. The result is that in a study such as this, one must argue as if for the first time that on purely scientific grounds, organisms of different sexes and ages respond differently to social stimuli, and that such stimuli may not be the exclusive determinants of the social action of these organisms. Among the primates and other animals, this is well-established. To be sure, it is also becoming clear that social stimuli play a greater role in animal societies than was once thought. Though there are limits to their flexibility, complex animals show individual differences and are very sensitive to changes in population and social structure. The controversies over the respective relevance of species-specific genetic factors and local environmental factors often appear to turn on the metaphorical question of whether the cup is half full or half empty.

We cannot forget the relevance of genetic transmission of behavioral characteristics. A chicken does not behave like a turtle or cobra; a rhesus does not behave like an orangutan; a collie like a Newfoundland. These animals not only do not look alike, they do not behave alike, and these differences between them are anything but random. So it is with humans. If we can assume that human behavioral nature is totally plastic, we are assuming in effect that cross-cultural similarities result either from cultural diffusion or from coincidence. While coincidence and diffusion are certainly partial explanations of cultural universals, they are by themselves inadequate--first, because in this theory human organisms are held to contribute nothing to human life, and second, because some cultural universals exist under such different circumstances that it is highly unlikely that they will have sprung up independently in very diverse communities. It is simply very improbable that they



result from spontaneous invention or development, and thus attention must be focused on the common human factors, not only on the variable environmental ones. One useful method of approaching human biosocial nature without constructing a rigid strait jacket that rules out variation and option has been adapted from the study of human language. All human languages have, in Chomsky's phrase, a "universal grammar" (1966, 1968). Languages, and even dialects, vary considerably and reflect different cultural patterns. But all human language is as marked by a system as is human metabolism; individuals differ in metabolism, and some groups vary slightly from others, but there is a system--and in the production of language there is also a species-wide pattern. The only surprising thing about this is that John Locke's tabula rasa notion had been successful for so long that it was deemed a breakthrough when it was shown that we, like other animals, show species-wide unity in our communication.

In an effort to develop what may be a behavioral baseline from which cultural variation developed--a biogrammar--Tiger and Fox (1971) united the concept of universal grammar with Count's concept (1973) of a biogram, the basic form of an animal's social life. Count's argument maintains that it is improbable that any animal's behavior is random. The more complex the animal, of course, the more extensive the opportunities for variety in social responses, and the fewer the range of responses that could be considered "genetically programmed behavioral propensities" (Tiger and Fox, 1966).

In discussing biogrammar, we have restricted ourselves to Homo sapiens, thereby avoiding both homologous and analogous comparisons with other animals. The use of such comparisons has been shown in both ethology and biology (e.g., Tinbergen, 1963; Lorenz, 1974; Blurton-Jones, 1972; Eisenberg, 1966), but some people have preferred to interpret them as demeaning to humans and vaguely threatening to human freedom (e.g., Gluckman, 1972; Cook, 1974; Gould, 1974) or incorrect on methodological grounds (e.g., Callan, 1971; Larsen, 1974). We limit the scope of our remarks here because we feel that our case is strong enough supported by exclusively human documentation. We can assuage protectors of Homo sapiens by focusing on that particular ape alone.

We have already cited evidence that sex differences in political and economic activity are universal, that the care of young children is virtually everywhere a female monopoly, and that some widely argued explanations for this universality are weak, improbable, or partial. Our data show that although some 10 to 15 per cent of the women in the kibbutz express dissatisfaction with their sociosexual roles, the overwhelming majority not only accept their situations but have sought them. They have acted against the principles of their socialization and ideology, against the wishes of the men of their communities, against the economic interest of the kibbutzim, in order to be able to devote more time and energy to private maternal activities rather than to economic and political public ones. Obviously these women have minds of their own; despite obstacles, they are trying to accomplish what women elsewhere have been



periodically urged to reject by critics of traditional female roles. Our biogrammatical assertion is that the behavior of these mothers is ethologically probable: they are seeking an association with their own offspring, which reflects a species-wide attraction between mothers and their young. Usually women have no choice but to have close contact with their children; in the kibbutz, the opposite is true. So, what kibbutz women choose to do may be significantly related to what other women elsewhere routinely do under similar circumstances, if also apparently more constraining ones. A single case cannot define a species, but given the experimental style of kibbutz society, the result is certainly revealing.

We shall now comment briefly on what may be the species-specific mother-child connection. It has customarily been assumed that the thrust of ethological and biological explanations of behavior is genetic. However, the most interesting recent discussions of the mother-infant dyad have stressed behavioral contributions to the child's maturation. Affection, verbal stimuli, and touch are finally as important for the health of a growing child as food, shelter, and warmth; foundlings given the "necessities" may sicken or die without truly human contact. As the kibbutz shows, this contact need not be with the mother: any responsible person will do; it is perhaps from the mother's point of view that the substitution is least adequate.

Abraham Maslow (1973: 229) noted that most utopias have been created by men. The records available to us suggest that the men who dominated the public life of the kibbutz also strongly influenced basic child-care policy. Had women been more fully and assertively involved, the severance of the link between mother and child as a matter of theory and then of practice might have been less extreme. Today kibbutz mothers may be responding not only to their need to be close to their children but also to their children's ability to elicit these feelings from them. Tinbergen (1974) argued that autism in children may result from their not receiving the necessary stimuli they try to elicit through their behavioral repertoire; denied basic "behavioral nutrition," they manifest this drastic form of withdrawal. Just as protein deficiency in the early months of life will retard myelination and development of the brain and thus affect intelligence and other functions (Montague, 1973), so may behavioral deprivation induce autism.

This is indeed a turnabout--biologists arguing that social deprivation is the cause of physiological deficiencies, including, in extreme cases, death. The ethological argument, then, is not that the genetic process is omnipotent but that biologically necessary social interactions are basic to both emotional and physical health. It is significant that the first Nobel prize for work in ethology, awarded in 1973 jointly to Karl Von Frisch, Konrad Lorenz, and Niko Tinbergen, came under the official category of Medicine and Physiology; the statement accompanying the awards said that ethological study of behavior is directly relevant to individual and community health (see also Marler and Griffin, 1973).

Since mother-child interaction is necessary for the child's health (Bowlby, 1969, 1974), both mothers and children in the kibbutz may be reacting to a strenuous violation of the biogrammar governing their relationship. Blurton-Jones (1972) suggested that studies of the milk of human mothers, the sucking rates of babies and the time between their feedings indicate that "man shows features in both mother and baby which are typical of those mammals in which the young feeds almost continuously." Clearly the biogrammatical rules, if such rules exist, need not be followed precisely; the kibbutz example suggests that one can drastically alter the ways of being a mother under the stimulus of ideology and still produce children who are able to live competently in and outside their communities. (That kibbutz-bred people function well in Israeli politics, education, and the military is disputed weakly, without direct evidence, by Goldenberg and Wekerle, 1972.) But under changed economic conditions where there is less insecurity about ideological experimentation, the women and perhaps the children began a return to a pattern more typical of our species--and perhaps more appropriate to a mammal with our evolutionary history and need for extensive socialization.

To some, the idea of women seeking intimate association with their children may seem vaguely obsolete and generally inhibiting of broader human development. But one must remember that from the time kibbutz women become fecund, they are routinely provided with contraceptives; if they have children, it is because they have chosen to. Moreover, the intimacy of the kibbutz ensures that adolescent girls have ample contact with nearby children, so that the process of mothering becomes relatively familiar to them. (Many Euro-American women, because of the residential and age-graded pattern of their lives, lack this useful preparatory experience with children.) It is not surprising that inexperienced mothers externalize their uncertainties and ambivalences and blame men, patriarchy, their communities, or some other part of their social world. Their accusations are in part well-founded, since they have not been given realistic instruction, either formal or informal, in child rearing. And unless women stop having any or as many children--which low birth rates during the early seventies suggest that some may have decided to do--their decreasingly maternal-linked education, socialization, and expectations will make greater the hazard that their sociosexual life will be out of joint with what they know and want.

In a demonstration of the interplay of community and physical processes, Raphael (1973) suggested that such a routine physiological matter as successful breast-feeding may sometimes depend on a supportive and informative social network. Her argument requires more empirical testing, but if, as we know, physical illness and even death can be caused by social events such as "black magic" or voodoo, then the far less dramatic problem of inability to breast-feed may demonstrate the importance of social life for mothering (see also Abernethy, 1973; Wade, 1974). It is also possible that the emphasis that women in the kibbutz place on motherhood is in part occasioned by their reaction to or rebellion against their own mothers, who cultivated a nonmaternal life style. Friedan (1963) made a similar suggestion in proposing that the home-

centeredness of American women of her generation was a pendulum response to their mothers' bluestocking coolness to maternity. This is perhaps a plausible explanation for American women, but for kibbutz women it is less useful, because the law of parsimony is violated and an unnecessary element is introduced into the argument. It is perhaps clearer and simpler to say that these women have made their own decisions. How can their commitment to motherhood be merely their way of rebelling against their mothers? Where would they have learned this style of maternal devotion, since their mothers, aunts, and friends did not adopt it before them? Why not leave home (in this case, the kibbutz) like countless rebels? The strategy of their "rebellion" happens to be the general one of the human female. Can they be so pummeled by resentment that they decide to spend twelve to twenty years in close contact with three or four young children? It is far more likely, and more respectful of their dignity, to say that these women know their own minds and act accordingly.

This explanation admittedly does not allow for the feminist grievance that women are forced at every important step of their lives to conduct themselves according to the norms of men. Their argument assumes that men are the center of all things, and that women, lacking any autonomy, must forego thoughtful and independent choices. Our data suggest that the women in the kibbutz do not act in so craven a way; that they are not only independent of the men in the kibbutz but willing and able to act in important ways frowned on and unsuccessfully opposed by the men. It is precisely such male-centered arguments as those of Mitchell, Firestone, and Millett which provide a basis for accepting men's standards as the most important ones, and which directly or indirectly corrode the importance of concerns and enthusiasms which women have and which men may neither accept nor understand.

It is paradoxical to argue that there are no important differences between the sexes but that men alone are both greedy for power and effective in retaining it, and that women are painfully susceptible to the duress of men. Proponents of the feminist critique have usually assumed the truth of the first principle and urged the destruction of the social forms taken by the second. Another tactic, more consonant with empirical data, could be to assess the rights, obligations, and enthusiasms that would follow if indeed there were important differences between the sexes. However, the social scientists who might provide firm ground for reaching such judgments have traditionally ignored these differences. Now, understandably, out of respect for the moral validity of the feminist movement, most have stood down from examining the grounds of social reform unsentimentally. But even the most moral people can be wrong; in this case, if feminist theorists are wrong in their estimate of what women want, not only will they fail to attract broad support, they will induce some followers to devote themselves so firmly to predominantly male patterns of work, politics, reproduction, and values that they will forego an aspect of life they could enjoy along with others. It is an irony that just when countless men and women and even nuns and priests are



openly having liberal sexual relations, a new morality urges women to devalue and limit femininity and maternity.

If the predisposition of mothers to be with their offspring is a positive attraction, not a negative retreat, it is because of our mammalian and primate origins and the long, formative hunting-gathering period of our evolutionary past. If Blurton-Jones (1972) is right in maintaining that we are a "carrying" (in the sense that babies are carried, as by chimps, rather than nested, as by eagles or cats) rather than a "caching" species, the enthusiasm of women in the kibbutz and elsewhere for association with their children is further clarified; the same is true of Lee's findings (1970) about Bushman women, who on gathering expeditions in the hot Kalahari desert carry their children on their backs up to the time the children are four years old, despite the fact that there usually are responsible adults around who could spare the women this arduous task. Lee's calculation of the fewer calories expended by the mothers compared to the food values they acquire fails to explain why the mothers take their children with them. The simple reason is that when the children are threatened with their mothers' absence, they start to cry, and apparently this is enough to induce the mothers to take them along. Why kibbutz women--and Bushman women--should choose to be with their children now perhaps makes more sense (see also Hinde 1974:229-45).

In fact, it is generally easier to understand our findings about women and children in the kibbutz than about the marked sexual divisions of work and of economic and political activity. All the explanations we considered have failed to link the basic biological function of gender--reproduction--with the social patterns we found. We discovered that while the kibbutz began to show increased sexual division of labor, its birth rate increased and familism grew. We suggest--we cannot prove it at this stage of our research--that the rate of childbirth and the division of labor are causally related. The division of labor increased when both pronatal attitudes and economic security were creating increasingly suitable conditions for children. Every parent knows how much children cost, in energy and time, as well as in money; even on the kibbutz, a high birth rate deprives adults of resources that would otherwise have been theirs. It can be argued that there are other good reasons for producing more children--to contribute to the security of the state, for example, or to encourage the growth of the kibbutz movement. But these concerns were even more urgent in the early days, when the kibbutzim were smaller, fewer, and more precarious; the kibbutzniks did not determine to have more children then for these reasons alone, and there is no reason to believe they did so later on.

We know that the birth rates not only of other animals but also of humans are affected by social circumstances (Grebenik, 1972). Nevertheless, it appears to be a rule of biogrammar that as part of the broad reproductive process, the sexes tend to create distinctions between themselves, and sometimes in ways that are not directly or indirectly reproductive. In the case of humans, these distinctions may involve work.



play, politics, and war. In other words, what have been termed "patriarchal attitudes" may be fundamental reproductive patterns of Homo sapiens. We are not certain that this is so; we are seeking something more substantial than attitudes to explain such a sturdy and widespread pattern of human behavior.

It has been suggested from both a feminist viewpoint (e.g., Greer, 1971) and an ethological viewpoint (e.g., Tiger 1969) that the sexes segregate in marked and statistically decisive ways. The persistence of the pattern may well have been central to the persistence of our species in the past. Of course, such segregation is not necessarily inevitable or desirable now; it has, however, been part of a successful breeding system that has allowed humans to populate various areas of the world in large numbers. Given the crisis of overpopulation, it may be very undesirable for such segregation to continue if it stimulates or even supports human fecundity. Indeed, one may ask whether the current feminist perturbation, its legal, moral, and economic thrust aside, is a cognitive expression of a hidden biological process--a species reacting to overpopulation. Meanwhile, men and women in the kibbutz have no qualms about bearing children; perhaps that is the reason they divide the sexes and increase their birth rates, acting against the trends of the socially concerned progressive elements of Euro-American society, with which they otherwise often align themselves.

We have been focusing on the prime reproductive period of kibbutz women, because we believe that it is during those years that women make critical choices. But women's reproductive phase occupies an ever-smaller part of their lives as life span itself increases and children are born to them earlier and closer together. The economic and political future of the women now mothering three or four children remains to be seen. Whatever they do, life in the kibbutz will give them more support and assurance than women outside the kibbutz receive. Their children will be taken care of and educated until maturity; they will be given jobs and economic security; and they will probably be among relatives and friends of long standing. Women outside the kibbutz can be confident of nothing of the kind; indeed, recent trends toward increased divorce and desertion of wives and children by husbands, and the courts' increasing reluctance to automatically provide alimony and other security to women who are capable of working, all put added strains on women. In vast numbers, they end up physically and legally with the children they have borne.

The broader question raised by these developments may be related to the question of the origin of the family in the human primate line, which is a vast subject we cannot possibly review here. In the kibbutz system, both men and women work throughout their active years in the general economy of their communities, and all are in effect wage earners. In the rest of Israel, as in most other societies, women have to depend on others (uncles, aunts, sisters, brothers, cousins, husbands, lovers, friends, any person or organization) for at least some economic support

in order to raise their young: outside communal settlements such as the kibbutz, this economic transfer takes place chiefly through the kinship system.

One of the functions of the kinship system is to regularize such support despite the sexual or other enthusiasms of the individuals involved. As Tiger and Fox formulated it (1971:71), the chief function of any kinship system is to protect the mother-infant bond from the relative fragility and volatility of the male-female bond. Men's and women's attractions to each other are often enough short-lived; the kinship system persists to ensure economic support to the temporarily dependent woman and her young. This can be effected, as we said, in a variety of ways, by a parent, or another relative, or by the state in the form of welfare, as in the U.S., or in the form of more dignified but essentially similar payments, as in Sweden. In Euro-American societies, and more and more in others as well, the most common pattern of such transfer payments is by a workingman to his wife and children. A high proportion of women work outside the home, as many as half in some communities and age groups, but the predominant source of family income still comes from men.

The broadest question in the study of human kinship systems is also very incompletely answered: Why do men, to the extent that they do, support children and women? Why should an industrial worker in Reims, New York, Kiev, or Toronto give almost all his income to his family, and keep only a very small portion for himself? It can be argued that in return he is given shelter, food, laundry service, sexual access to a woman, etc. But would he not be better off, from his selfish point of view, if he dwelled in a bachelor apartment and used his entire income for his own social, sexual, aesthetic, and other pleasures? If men are so selfish, so intent on exploiting, depriving, and stunting women, why do they not avoid long-term commitments altogether and coolly look to their own sociosexual self-interest? Relatively few men do so. Without for a moment disputing the inequity that persists between men and women in politics and work, we should direct future research to what stimulates men to enter family life, and whether such stimulus is related to the sexual divisions of the kibbutz and other societies.

The present moral argument for extensive reform of the situation of women has existed for a long time in North America, Europe, and elsewhere (e.g., O'Neill, 1968; de Beauvoir, 1953; Mill and Mill, 1970). The reason it is now the object of such urgent public and private attention is related to perturbations in the mating system--one of which, we suggest, is that men are in practice or in prospect fast becoming "liberated" from responsibilities to women and families. Faced with the possibility of living independently without men, women are demanding the jobs and rights that will enable them to support that independence. To put it another way, if men give the impression that they cannot or will not fulfill their part of the reproductive bargain, they must cede their economic perquisites. To kibbutz women, confident of their own and of

their men's sexual dignity, and of their own economic security as well, this presents no problems; they are enthusiastically reproductive. Yet while their birth rate rises, their sisters elsewhere are less and less certain about gender and sex, about their commitment to men and men's commitment to them. Some have responded to the rapid moral and social devaluation of maternity by having fewer children--which is understandable, both in the political terms framed by advocates of limiting population and in the context of kinship, mating, and parenthood that has simultaneously brought the species to numerical prosperity and peril.

We have defended the narrower adequacy of our own sociological argument, but at the same time we have underscored the inadequacy of sociological analysis alone by placing it in a comparative biosocial framework. We have also made room for the new questions that such knowledge provokes. As social scientists, we have claimed the kibbutz to be what its founders and citizens' as utopians claim it to be--an experiment that affirms possibilities for radical change in social forms and in people's commitments to one another. We have found that the aspect of this experiment involving major changes in women's lives was substantially less successful than all others, and we believe that this fact can be useful in evaluating what may be a deeply rooted pattern of human behavioral nature.

Though such a conclusion will be painfully unpopular just now, we estimate that our data about women in the kibbutz are in accord with the data of others about human and mammalian sex differences. We suggest that the current controversies about sex and gender are rooted in major structural social changes, and that their abrasive effects can be most effectively mitigated or eliminated if we take the measure of the creature who is always the focus and instrument of what is happening. We have tried, apart from this essentially Fabian stance, to take no judgmental positions on these matters--for, when all is said and done, rhetoric and illusion claim no more influential place in social science than they do in surgery.

Perhaps we did make one judgment--that people's actions are not necessarily the unhappy performances of the duped and confused, and may well reflect what people wholeheartedly want to do. Whether women who do not live on kibbutzim will or should be affected by the lives of women in the kibbutz is not a question we can answer. All we can fairly say is that few other women enjoy the supporting facilities available in the kibbutz, and this should give pause to those who seek to emulate their example. As for those who claim that women who are eager to bear and raise children are tyrannized and obsolete, they can see for themselves how contemporary women in the kibbutz are.

It is very possible that the controversies about sex and gender which we have touched on here are the result of a growing recognition on the part of both men and women that the old sexual certainties are cracking--if not crumbling--in which case, the kibbutz is here to provide a



challenging (if, to some, discouraging) example of the complexity of developing novel social forms that offer sexual, political, and economic dignity. And of course it cannot be responsibly ignored because in these bedrock matters of birth, love, and child care, nothing less than the tutored heart and the informed imagination will finally do.



CHAPTER THREE  
KIBBUTZ AND PARENTAL INVESTMENT  
(WOMEN IN THE KIBBUTZ RECONSIDERED)

Joseph Shepher and Lionel Tiger

On the 15th of September 1975, two books waited for the Israeli author in his mailbox at the University of Haifa: the first copy of Women in the Kibbutz, just arrived from New York and the heavy volume of E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology: A New Synthesis (1975). Shepher browsed with satisfaction through the pages of his recently published book with Lionel Tiger, but did not read it: he knew it almost by heart from the repeated proofreadings. Instead, he started to study Wilson's book. When, after several days, he finished chapters 15 and 16 on parental investment, he was as though struck by lightning: the lightning of the feeling of overwhelming evidence. But it was too late. The book was out and had run its course. Its three editions provoked some 40-odd reviews and created a scientific debate. Most of the reviewers praised the well-organized data and the sophisticatedness of their analysis but disagreed with the authors' interpretation. Especially the feminists--Bernard (1976); Shapiro (1976); Somerville (1979); and Syrkin (1976)--accused the authors of using selectiveness of analysis of different data, of internal contradictions, and of biological determinism. Others, like Cohen (1975); Peres and Russkin (1977); Rosner and Palgi (1976) were more balanced in their criticism. Interestingly, none of the critics claimed that Tiger and Shepher were wrong in their biological argument, that their use of the vague concept of "biogrammar" is theoretically vulnerable and guilty of group selectionist aberrations. Most sociobiologists praised the book and quoted it repeatedly: Wilson (1979); van den Berghe (1979).

It is only fair that after 5 years, the authors themselves should reconsider their own arguments and put them in the right theoretical dimensions. In fact, we, the authors, can hardly excuse our ignoring parental investment theory as the right theoretical framework for our argumentation by the synchrony of the publication of our book with that of Wilson's. All his enormous contribution to the formulation of sociobiological theory notwithstanding, E.O. Wilson was, to a certain extent, codifying earlier pieces of the theoretical framework: especially Hamilton (1964) and Trivers (1972). Whereas Hamilton's papers were published in a highly professional biological journal, Trivers' 1972 article was published in a volume much more accessible to social scientists, mainly Campbell's (1972) Sexual Selection and the Evolution of Man (1871-1971). In fact, both authors read this volume during the hectic days of the writing of their own book, but seemingly did not realize the relevance of Trivers' paper (that was based mainly on ornithological evidence) to their own human case. Moreover, as most social scientists, the authors were too slow in adjusting themselves to the new forms of evolutionary thinking and in keeping up with the burgeoning literature of the early 1970s. Be that as it may, it is

never too late to admit one's shortcomings and to try to eliminate them.

Trivers' 1972 theory of parental investment is as simple as it is powerful. It is, in fact, a specific case of Hamilton's (1964) inclusive fitness theory. Hamilton, in his effort to answer the question of whether or not altruism is an evolutionary plausible strategy, convincingly proves that an animal can increase its fitness (the relative number of its surviving offspring) not only by breeding itself but also by helping its close relatives to breed instead. This help--consensually called altruism--is proportional to the degree of relatedness of the benefactor to the beneficiary. The question of whether an animal should breed itself or should act altruistically to its relatives is a question of individual strategy highly dependent on environmental factors.

Another problem of strategy arises between males and females in sexually reproducing species. In order to have offspring, a sexually reproducing creature has to combine its genes with those of the opposite sex. In some species, the offspring is created by the very fact of fertilization and no additional care is needed to bring the offspring to maturation. In others, different energetic efforts are needed to achieve the same purpose, such as gestation, feeding, protecting, teaching, etc. All these efforts may collectively be called parental investment, although in many species it is not the biological parents that perform them (the best examples are the hymenoptera).

In most birds and mammals, parental investment is highly asymmetric. The greatest part of parental investment is done by the female, and in some avian and mammal species the male only contributes his sex cells. The disproportionate parental investment is the basis of different sexual strategies of males and females. Since the female usually is the high investor, she becomes a limiting resource for the low-investor males. Males usually fight for females and the latter are cautious and selective. Males usually tend to mate polygynously, being able to genetically benefit from mating with every female, mainly because they count on the high investment of the female which would prevent her from deserting the offspring. On the other hand, females are not usually prone to being polyandrous because they cannot, thereby, increase their fitness. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that in the whole mammalian class, polygny is usual and polyandry is highly exceptional. So it is with humans. More than 70 percent of human societies are polygynous whereas only 1 percent are polyandrous.

Parental investment and inclusive fitness explain not only male-female strategies, but also parent-child conflict and sibling conflict (Trivers 1974) and several problems of courtship, kinship and marriage (Chagnon and Irons 1979; Symons 1979).

Let us now review our findings in the light of the p.i. theory. We summarized them on pages 262-263 of our book:

1. Early in kibbutz history, more than half the women worked for a considerable time in production. Then came a long, gradual process of sexual polarization of work. Today the sexual division of labor has reached about 80 percent of maximum.

2. Sexual division of labor is more polarized in the second and kibbutz-bred generations than it is in the first generation, and more polarized in younger kibbutzim than in older ones.

3. Despite complete formal equality in political rights, women are less active in the General Assembly than men are, as measured both by their presence in the Assembly and by the incidence of their participation. Women are somewhat over-represented in committees dealing with social, educational, and cultural problems; they are seriously underrepresented in committees dealing with economy, work, general policymaking, and security.

4. The higher the authority of an office or committee, the lower the percentage of women in it. At the highest level of the kibbutz, women make up only 14 percent of the personnel.

5. Women seem to have special problems sustaining all-female work groups; they usually prefer mixed-sex groups or male leadership.

6. Men and women receive nearly the same number of years of education; in fact, women have a slight edge. Advanced schooling, however, differs in kind for each sex. Women are overrepresented in higher non-academic education leading to such jobs as elementary-school teaching, kindergarten teaching, and medical nursing. Men are overrepresented in higher academic education leading to such jobs as agriculture, engineering, economics, and management.

7. From the ninth grade on, women consistently fall below men in scholarly achievement. This discrepancy between sexes seems to be wider here than in comparable modern societies.

8. Although women, like men, are drafted into the army, the overwhelming majority of kibbutz girls (like other Israeli girls) do secretarial and service jobs there; few do characteristically male work or occupy command positions. The conception of the women's army as essentially a substitute unit, also providing back-up aid and encouragement for the fighting men, is completely accepted by the kibbutz girls. There has, however, been a steady expansion of the range of noncombat tasks for women.

9. Even the long, demanding Yom Kippur War did not substantially change the division of labor in the kibbutzim even though almost half the men were called up by the army for a long period.



10. The family has risen from its initial shadowy existence to become the basic unit of kibbutz social structure. It now fulfills important functions in consumption and education, and there are demands for further expanding its function. Increased familization is indicated by high and growing rates of birth and marriage, and by a decreasing divorce rate. The status of singles, especially of women, is becoming more and more problematic, to the extent that the family, the kibbutz and even the federations now try to help them marry.

11. The main instigators of familization are women, whose attitude toward familism is more positive than men's.

12. Attitudes toward equality have always been more egalitarian than actual behavior has. The discrepancy causes recurrent soul-searching within the kibbutzim and federations.

How is sexual division of labor connected with parental investment theory? Obviously, the higher p.i. of the female is energetically extremely demanding. The very asymmetry of parental investment between male and female is the foundation of sexual division of labor. Assuming that every individual has the ability to expend a limited and equal amount of energy to all the possible endeavors and purposes, the female, by investing generously in the offspring, has to forego investments in alternative tasks. Assuming that the amount of energy expended is not limited but flexible because of possible time differences in energy investment, the female has to work more hours than the male if she wants to perform the same tasks in addition to those of her high parental investment. Thus, if we take the first assumption, namely  $\sum e_m = \sum e_f$  (total available energy is equal in both sexes), and we know that  $pi_m$  then the free energy  $fe$  of the male must be greater than that of the female. Thus,

$$fe_m = \sum e - pi_m \quad \text{and}$$

$$fe_f = \sum e - pi_f \quad \text{and since:}$$

$$pi_f > pi_m \quad \text{therefore, obviously:}$$

$$fe_m > fe_f$$

In the case of the second assumption, the total available energy will be a linear function of time.

$$\sum e_m = t_m e \quad \text{Where } e \text{ is the unit of energy expended in } t \text{ time:}$$

$$\sum e_f = t_f e \quad \text{and therefore, free energy:}$$

$$fe_m = t_m e - pi_m$$

$$fe_f = t_f e - pi_f \quad \text{therefore } fe_m = fe_f \text{ is possible only if } t_f > t_m$$



Assuming that  $fe_m$  should be equal to  $fe_f$ , we have:

$$t_m e - pi_m = t_f e - pi_f$$

$$pi_f - pi_m = t_f e - t_m e \quad \text{or:}$$

$$\Delta pi = \Delta te$$

That is, the higher the difference in parental investment between the female and the male the higher will be the difference between the time she and the male have to work in order to have the same "free energy."

All this concerns the quantitative aspects of division of labor between the sexes. The size of p.i. depends on the number of children, their ages and spacing of births.  $\Delta p.i.$  is uninfluenced by  $pi_m$  until after delivery, except for the male's contribution to the female's feeding and, thereby, to the nutrition of the offspring. After delivery,  $\Delta pi$  is highly dependent on the propensity of the male to invest in the offspring directly or indirectly, although the flexibility of  $\Delta pi$  is much lower in preindustrial cultures where lactation is simply part of the natural order of things.

Sexual division of labor is not less dependent on asymmetry of parental investment from the qualitative point of view. Not only is the female able to expend less "free energy" than the male, but the free energy she does expend must be devoted to tasks that, in order to be fulfilled, have to be in close propinquity to the tasks of parental investment. Hence, the "domestic" character of "female" tasks: guarding the fire, homemaking, cooking, washing, or alternatively any work that can be carried out without unduly moving, transferring, or otherwise disturbing the baby.

Now all this assumes that only the two parents can share the parental investment. But parents can and do delegate their parental investment activities, first of all, to relatives, such as siblings, grandparents, uncles, and aunts, who themselves are interested in the well-being of the offspring according to Hamilton's inclusive fitness principle. Since in most cases maternal investment is thereby alleviated, we usually speak of "allomothering." Allomothering can be part of inclusive fitness altruism, but it can be undertaken by an unrelated individual, if she can profit thereby, by training herself in mothering for her future tasks.

In the case of the kibbutz, we witness an institutionalized allomothering. In the "classical" collective system of housing (see pages 56 and 162-165) the parents spend from 1½ to 3-4 hours per day with their child, according to the child's age. The older the child, the longer the time spent with him. The "real" parental investment--feeding (after weaning), washing, dressing, toilet training, playing,

teaching, walking--was carried out mainly by a nurse or nurses, absolutely unrelated to the child (normatively, the policy was to prevent sisters, grandmothers, or aunts from working with the children in order to maintain the universalistic standards between the nurses and the children). During the night, the children sleeping in the children's houses, usually situated in the ecological heart of the kibbutz, were watched by a female night watch.

Such a far-reaching delegation of parental investment to non-relatives, especially in early childhood, is extremely rare in human societies. Under what conditions would one expect such a strategy? If the parental investment theory makes good sense, one has to hypothesize that such a strategy would be chosen only in extreme situations, in which all the energy is needed in order to provide the basic needs of life such as food, shelter, and security. Such situations arise, for instance, in war, extreme difficulties in production, and scarcity of manpower. In the early kibbutz, all these elements were present, with two additional factors: this was a self-selected group of unrelated youngsters, and they believed that they could substitute friendship relations for family relations (see pages 37-38, 59, and 206-210). Therefore, no relatives for allomothering were available. Even if there were, the ideology stemming largely, but not exclusively, from the extreme situations and their having nicely adjusted to them, prevented "nepotistic" allomothering. Not that the whole process of the collectivization was very smooth (see page 161) and, at least partially, the origin of the Moshav Movement can be traced back to the disputes on parental investment in the first kibbutz (Bein 1945; 166-168; 230-232). Moreover, the general attitude was not to hasten with marriage and when married, to postpone having children (see pages 206-210). Thus the group had decided to change the composition of total free energy available to all tasks except parental investment to:

$$\Sigma fe_1 = fe_m + fe_f = (\Sigma e - pi_m) + (\Sigma e - pi_f)$$

by having only a few children (let us assume 25 percent of the women) we shall have:

$$\Sigma fe_2 = (\Sigma e - pi_m) + 0.75 (\Sigma e - pi_m) + 0.25 (\Sigma e - pi_f)$$

$$\Sigma fe_2 = 1.75 (\Sigma e - pi_m) + 0.25 (\Sigma e - pi_f)$$

whence it is obvious that:

$\Sigma fe_2 > \Sigma fe_1$  where  $\Sigma fe_1$  represents a situation in which all adult females have children.

Moreover, instead of letting all the mothers freely invest in their offspring, the kibbutz instituted groups of five children nursed by a single nurse, thereby cutting total parental investment by 90 percent

and increasing the free available energy considerably. That was not easy either, but it was rendered possible because of the dire environmental conditions, the powerful ideology, and the tight solidarity of the group.

From the point of view of the individual, this strategy was acceptable as long as he or she considered his or her attachment to the group as mentally, emotionally, and economically better for parent and offspring than in another social form. There were expectable differences between males and females. The latter had more difficulties in accepting the strategy than the former obviously because of their higher initial parental investment. The long and obstinate fight to return to personal and not delegated parental investment is largely the fight of women.

Of course, not all members of the kibbutz were prepared to delegate parental investment to others. Many left the kibbutz and are still leaving because of the collectivistic parental investment strategy. Recently, the Kibbutz Artzi federation stood up in its convention against the pressure of legitimately introducing the familistic housing system of the children. One of the results: couples leave the kibbutzim of the Artzi federation and join kibbutzim of the Ichud federation, where the housing system is familistic.

In view of the system of delegated parental investment, one can easily understand the quasi-underground existence of the family in the early kibbutz as well as the impressive process of gradual familization.

The nuclear monogamous family, as was known in the cultures where most kibbutz founders were socialized, is a result of high paternal investment in the offspring. The economic existence of the female and her children was dependent on the male's work. Bulwarked by religious sanctions, this created either a very strong social control negatively sanctioning males who neglected their paternal duties, and/or the romantic love complex largely the outcome of atomization of the productive system, the dependence of sexual outlet on marriage and the competition among males for the most desirable females. The traditional sexual division of labor between the providing male and the home making socializing female broke down in the early kibbutz. Everyone had to provide. There were few children and few home services. Hence, the nuclear family was also unimportant. Couples were slowly formed, there was a high rate of divorce and a lot of talk of free love. Marriages were informally contracted and even the privacy of the couple was intruded upon by the "primus" custom (see pages 207-210). Since the investment of the male was not needed or at least not individually, it was not necessary for the nuclear family to be an important and stable unit. This explains the comparatively large percentage of singles (not divorced or widowed!), both males and females, who have children in the kibbutz:



	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	%	N	%	N
Kibbutz Artzi	1.73	(17)	3.22	(17)
Ichud	3.69	(61)	3.73	(27)
TOTAL		78		44

Comparable data for Israel	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	%	N	%	N
	2.95	9,100	1.96	4,500

(Not strictly comparable because those singles are not necessarily the parents of the children in the household. Statistical Abstracts, 1979.)

Also a very large percentage of divorced and widowed persons have children:

	<u>Males</u>		<u>Females</u>	
	%	N	%	N
Kibbutz Artzi	91.04	(216)	95.84	(578)
Ichud	83.63	(181)	93.68	(595)
TOTAL		397		1173

(Computed from Tables 2, 50a, 51a.)

Obviously, if the parental investment is delegated to the collective, the marital status of the parents does not have a decisive impact on the socialization of the children.

But when the economic and security situation improved, and starting from the late 1930s, more and more children appeared (Shepher, 1977: 38-41), even the delegated system of parental investment created a sexual division of labor. Since an increasing number of women were extracted from the labor pool of production in order to handle the growing number of young children (nobody suggested that men should do



this), and since the growing population needed more services, more women who wanted to be close to their children, first reluctantly and later willingly, agreed to supply the services of cooking, washing, ironing, mending, and health care.

But it was a change of degree, not of kind. It was not until the mid-1950s, after the War of Liberation was over and security was much better and the economic situation had greatly improved, that the twin process of polarization of sexual division of labor and "familization" gathered momentum. With the amazing force of an irresistible social movement, the women of the Ichud federation won their case: the familistic system of housing was legitimized in 1967, and today there are almost no kibbutzim left in the Ichud federation with the collectivistic system. The Kibbutz Meuchad federation followed and with the impending fusion between the two federations, the last obstacles were to be removed before the full introduction of the familistic system. The Kibbutz Artzi federation, in which such an "iconoclastic" proposal could not even be mentioned earlier, was compelled to deal in its recent national convention with the formal request of one of its kibbutzim to introduce the familistic system of housing. In spite of very effective informal pressure of the young women in many kibbutzim, the convention rejected the request, trying to block the way of the growing Social Movement within its cohorts exactly as the Ichud federation did in 1950 and 1964 and probably with no greater chance of success.

The defenders of the ideology, mainly males, found consolation in the illusion that the change in the housing system is not more than a technical matter. But what happened was nothing but the reindividuation of the parental investment. Instead of 1-3 hours, mothers now spent 15 hours per day with their children. They bathed them, put them to bed, woke them up in the morning, bathed them again, dressed them, brought them back to the children's house, and visited them there once or twice during the day-care hours between 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. The nursing mother kept her baby at home 24 hours a day for the first 3 to 6 months, and only thereafter brought it to the babies house for the day. In acknowledgment of the fact that females take the greatest part of this new individual parental investment, the working hours of the mothers were formally cut between 12.5 - 37.5 percent, no matter where those mothers worked. Since most of them, however, worked in the children's house, the cut is an obvious change in the direction of the individuation of parental investment. The corrolaries of this sweeping change strengthened the nuclear family tremendously. The familistic system of housing necessitated a large apartment. Instead of the one-to one-and-a-half-room apartment allotted to a couple whose children spent the night in the children's houses, the new system provided the family two to three bedrooms, a large living room complete with a kitchenette and an open or closed patio. The big apartment needed a lot of housework and the kitchenette was an attracting factor for the family to have its evening meals there instead of in the communal dining hall.

Having more housework, the woman needs more help from her mate. More paternal investment strengthens the nuclear family. All the indicators of its growing importance appear: the romantic love complex, early dating and early sex life of the young females, early marriage, great formal ceremonialism of the wedding, stability of the marriage, descending divorce rates, ascending remarriage rates, almost unbearable social status of singles, especially of females in the age of fertility, institutionalized and informal matching for singles, and rising fertility rates reaching a new modal average of four children per couple.

The males, indeed, invest much more than earlier, in their children and in the family home. Seeing his mate almost collapsing under her self-imposed heavy burden of five to seven hours of work, housework, preparation of meals, and nursing and nurturing the children, the male takes upon himself the heavy work of gardening, removing the garbage, managing the laundry, and occasionally substituting for the tired wife by bringing food and washing the children, etc.

The strong nuclear family constantly attracts new functions to itself: it is a central unit of consumption, it has an important say in the matter of education, and it becomes a focus of rites de passage of all its members. Bowing to this general tendency, the kibbutz transfers to the family functions that were once characteristically collective: care for the children during Sabbath, care for the sick, and care for the aged. Especially in cases of manpower shortage, the kibbutz readily finds solutions in the general atmosphere of inclusive fitness and parental investment. This development pushes the kibbutz to the extreme limit of its uniqueness: it becomes more and more like the moshav shitufi, a kolchoz-like form of cooperation, where production is collective but consumption is individual.

In what sense is the present explanation superior to what we used in our book (1975:269-281)? First we used a very inarticulate and, even at the time of its English publication (1973), completely outdated biological paradigm, that of Count (1973). Count's essays on the biogram were first published in German and English (Count, 1958a and 1958b). In his elaboration of the vague concept of biogram, Count (1973: 25-25) devotes two pages to the concept of "parentalism" and actually speaks of parental investment, but amazingly he does not reach the conclusion that there might generally be some differences between the sexes in parental investment. Even in dealing with the mammalian biogram, he has only this to say:

The peculiar mammalian physiological pattern of coitus-uterine gestation-lactation has its psychological corollary: The female always possesses a double reproductive orientation: an erotic orientation toward a male partner and a broody orientation toward her offspring; while the male possesses but one: an erotic toward a female partner. Hence the monopoly of familialism by the female sex.

Count completely misses the point: the problem is not single and double orientation, but basically higher female parental investment and high variability of male parental investment. The question is--generally and especially in the human case: under what conditions will a strategy of higher parental investment "pay" for a male. Shepher (1978) tried to explain how the human male became a reluctant monogamist deviating, thereby, from the usual mammalian pattern.

Tiger and Fox (1971: 6) criticized the concept of biogram: "the total repertoire of possible behaviors of any species." They argued that such a repertoire would be a static list, and in order to understand how the elements in the list are related, one had to know the rules that governed the relationship between the different items of the repertoire. These rules being similar to those of the grammar of a language, can therefore be called "biogrammar". Thus the human biogrammar would be then the set of ground rules according to which, the repertoire of universally human behavioral traits are organized.

Let us now return to Women in the Kibbutz, where we presented our main argument:

We have already cited evidence that sex differences in political and economic activity are universal, that the care of young children is virtually everywhere a female monopoly, and that some widely argued explanations for this universality are weak, improbable, or partial. Our data show that although some 10 to 15 percent of the women in the kibbutz express dissatisfaction with their sociosexual roles, the overwhelming majority not only accept their situations but have sought them. They have acted against the principles of their socialization and ideology, against the wishes of the men of their communities, against the economic interest of the kibbutzim, in order to be able to devote more time and energy to private maternal activities rather than to economic and political public ones. Obviously these women have minds of their own; despite obstacles, they are trying to accomplish what women elsewhere have been periodically urged to reject by critics of traditional female roles. Our biogrammatical assertion is that the behavior of these mothers is ethologically probable: they are seeking an association with their own offspring, which reflects a species-wide attraction between mothers and their young. Usually women have no choice but to have close contact with their children: in the kibbutz, the opposite is true. So, what kibbutz women choose to do may be significantly related to what other women elsewhere routinely do under similar circumstances, if also apparently more constraining ones. A single case cannot define a species, but given the experimental style of kibbutz society, the result is certainly revealing (1975:272).



All this is true, but the argument that kibbutz women act in an "ethologically probable" way is a theoretically free-swinging assertion. Kibbutz women act as they do because they are mammals and, therefore, are predisposed to a high and direct parental investment. They, being cultural animals, are able to subdue this predisposition as long as the environmental situation makes such a postponement and suppression the only viable alternative. No sooner is the pressure removed than behavior predictable through parental investment theory inexorably returns.

Then too: in our handling the double phenomenon of polarization of sexual division of labor and familization, we argued that the two processes were parallel, but we did not show why. Parental investment theory explains both, and in fact, argues that the two phenomena are the different facets of the same process: the reindividuation of parental investment.

In summary: we rather agree with our own critics. We accept the data, but we criticize the interpretation. Only for different reasons.



CHAPTER FOUR  
CONCLUSIONS FROM  
GENDER AND CULTURE: KIBBUTZ WOMEN REVISITED

Melford Spiro

A PRECULTURAL INTERPRETATION

Any attempt to assess the possible determinants of the counter-revolutionary changes that have occurred in the kibbutz movement in such institutions as marriage, the family, and sex-role differentiation is beset with formidable difficulties. The problem is too complex, the data are too limited, and our methods of investigation were too primitive to permit an unequivocal interpretation. The weight of the evidence nevertheless suggests that although the possible cultural determinants discussed at the beginning of the last chapter may have contributed to these changes, on balance they do not appear to have been decisive. Evidence from sabra childhood behavior suggests, instead, that these counterrevolutionary changes were more probably brought about not primarily as a response to external cultural conditions nor by culturally acquired motives, but by precultural motivational dispositions.

Since, however, it is a basic axiom of the social sciences that human behavior and motives are primarily, if not exclusively, culturally programmed, I wish to observe, lest this conclusion be rejected on axiomatic grounds, that the counterrevolutionary changes in the above domains were not the only (nor even the most dramatic) changes brought about by the sabras. A perhaps even more dramatic change occurred in the sexual domain. Hence, before continuing with this discussion, I would like to examine briefly this latter change which constitutes a rather unequivocal exception to our social science axiom.

According to the ideology of the kibbutz pioneers, attitudes and orientations to sexual behavior and sexual anatomy are cultural artifacts. Hence, so they believed, if children were raised in a sexually permissive and enlightened environment, in which boys and girls, living together, were acquainted with each other's bodies and were taught to view nudity as natural, so that notions of shame were not attached to the exposure of sex organs--in such an environment, differences in sexual anatomy would assume little more importance than any other kind of anatomical differences. This belief was important for the pioneers not only because of their commitment to healthy sexual attitudes, but also because of their conviction that sexual equality (in its "identity" meaning) required an attitude of indifference to sexual dimorphism. If, as they believed, the only "natural" difference between the sexes consists in differences in sexual anatomy, if children were raised to view this difference as inconsequential, the road to sexual equality (as they conceived it) would then have been paved.

Acting upon their beliefs the pioneers established an entirely "enlightened" sexual regime in the children's houses. Boys and girls used the same toilets, dressed and undressed in each other's presence, walked about their dormitory rooms (if they chose) in the nude, showered together in one shower room, and so on. This system worked (and works) as the pioneers expected until the first intimations of puberty in the girls--in general, girls enter puberty a year or two before the boys--at which time the very girls who had been raised in a sex-blind environment developed intense feelings of shame at being seen in the nude by the boys. Sometime before our 1951 study, the girls in Kiryat Yedidim, for example, initiated an active rebellion against the mixed showers: they began to shower separately from the boys, refusing to admit them into the shower room at the same time. Consistent with this attitude, some of the girls would return early to their children's house at night to undress and be in their pajamas before the boys arrived.

Despite the girls' active opposition, the educational authorities refused to change the system of mixed showers. Moreover, when high schools were built in the kibbutzim, mixed showers and bedrooms were instituted in the high school dormitories as well. By 1951, however, the mixed showers in most kibbutz high schools had been unofficially abandoned. As one teacher in Kiryat Yedidim put it, the mixed showers had become "a form of torture" for the girls, their shame at exposing their nude bodies in front of the boys being intensified by the latter's teasing. Hence, though the high school authorities did not officially sanction it, arrangements were made for boys and girls to shower at different times. In a survey I conducted in Kiryat Yedidim in 1951, only three students in the entire student body favored a return to the mixed showers. Today, the sexes not only shower separately, but in almost all kibbutz high schools there are now separate shower rooms for boys and girls.

The same process has taken place with respect to the dormitory rooms. I have already noted that even in the grade school the older girls felt considerable discomfort about undressing in the presence of the boys. Their discomfort was exacerbated in the high school. In 1951, for example, although boys and girls in the high school in Kiryat Yedidim shared the same rooms (usually three boys and three girls to a room), they were careful to undress in the dark with their backs to each other. Moreover, so that their bodies would not be exposed, the girls wore pajamas (regardless of the heat) even though they slept under sheets. Despite these precautions, succeeding generations of students have been persistently unhappy with these living arrangements until, seven years ago (and after many generations of female protest), the high school authorities capitulated to the girls' demands, and instituted unisexual bedrooms. Similar changes have been introduced in most other kibbutzim as well.

In sum, the original kibbutz belief, that in the proper learning environment children would be sex-blind, was proven to be false even in the sexually enlightened conditions in which these children were raised. Even if it were the case that the only natural difference between males and females is one of sexual anatomy, this one difference apparently is not as trivial as had been assumed. In this instance, at least, it had important social and psychological consequences which could hardly have been culturally determined, for these children (as we have seen) developed a sense of sexual shame not as a result of, but in opposition to, the cultural values of their learning environment.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, nudity on an impersonal and anonymous bathing beach is one thing; but in an intimate and potentially sexually charged small group, it is quite another. When, then, the social institutions that embodied these cultural values became too painful for the children, they pressed for their abolition in violation of the attitudes in which they had been imbued and over the opposition of the adults.<sup>2</sup>

Is this not the same process that describes the counterrevolutionary changes in the family and sex-role differentiation which were instituted by the sabras upon becoming adults? In the case of these children, reared in a learning environment that was predicated on the assumption that sex differences in behavior and psychology are cultural artifacts, that boys and girls differ only by virtue of their sexual anatomy, and that this difference becomes socially important only so far as culture makes it so--in the case of these children the sex differences in behavior that they exhibited very early in their lives were exhibited in spite of and in opposition to their learning environment. This being so, it seems most likely that these sex differences (like their sense of sexual shame) were brought about not by culture, but by the triumph of human nature over culture; that is, by motivational dispositions based on sex differences in precultural, rather than culturally constituted, needs. If, then, the counterrevolution of the female sabras was motivated by precultural needs, these needs cannot be unique to them; rather, all things being equal, it is probable that they are shared by females in any society. Hence, having thus far avoided any discussion of the types of precultural needs that might explain these sex differences in motivation, we must finally address this issue directly.

#### PRECULTURAL NEEDS AND THE SABRA COUNTERREVOLUTION

In the typology of possible determinants of the sabra counterrevolution, three types of precultural needs were distinguished. One type ("biological needs") consists of genetically inherited drives. The other two ("psychosocial" and "psychobiological" needs) consist of experientially acquired wishes and desires. Here, then, we have three types of determinants of sex differences in motivational dispositions which are present prior to (or, as in some cases, independent of) the



acquisition of culturally constituted motives. Although the latter two types are experientially acquired, they are no less panhuman than those genetically inherited because the experiences by which they are acquired are dependent either on certain invariant characteristics of the human organism or on those characteristics of human society that are invariant. Since the invariant characteristics of human society (biparental families, group living, socialization systems, and the like) are institutional solutions to adaptive requirements of human beings (the satisfaction of early dependency needs, for example) which they share by virtue of their constituting a common biological species, these needs too are indirectly "psychobiological." From this perspective, then, those precultural needs that are experientially acquired are no less a part of "human nature" than those that are genetically inherited. In the present stage, at least, of human biological and social evolution, both are invariant characteristics of human personality and both constitute panhuman bases for human behavior. (For the most important anthropological statement of this thesis, see La Barre (1954).)

Although precultural needs, then, may be either genetically or experientially acquired, the research strategy employed in this study does not permit us to decide whether the motivational determinants of the sabra counterrevolution--and, therefore, of precultural sex differences in motivation anywhere--are the one or the other. That the counterrevolution was motivated by precultural needs is an interpretation, it will be remembered, that was adopted only after the cultural hypotheses comprising our explanatory paradigm were finally rejected as incompatible with the data. The precultural interpretation was then adopted not only because it was the one remaining hypothesis in the explanatory paradigm but because it was the one interpretation that was compatible with the entire array of data. On the basis of these data, however, there is no way of deciding whether the sex differences in precultural needs that are reflected in the counterrevolution are genetically or experientially acquired. Hence, the only thing we can do is delineate the shape of these competing types of precultural interpretations by offering examples of the more prominent theories which exemplify each type.

To simplify our task, I shall concentrate on only one need for which, according to our analysis of the behavior of sabra children, there are precultural sex differences. For this purpose I have chosen the parenting need because, in one sense, it is the cornerstone of all the changes that comprise the counterrevolution. The aim of the feminist revolution of the pioneers, it will be recalled, was to minimize the woman's involvement in family, and especially in mothering roles because (it was believed) this would maximize her involvement in extra-familial roles. This, in turn, was expected to lead to the dissolution of sex-role differentiation, and thereby to sexual equality (in its "identity" meaning). Hence, the feminine counterrevolution, as I have often emphasized, is essentially a phenomenon of sabra females, for



while the males have persisted in economically traditional male roles, the females have rejected the more "masculine" of the traditional male roles in favor of other kinds. Moreover, to a much larger extent than the males, the females have also reemphasized the very family--and especially parenting--roles which the pioneers had attempted to deemphasize. Since, then, the parenting need (like most other precultural needs) is shared by both sexes, it is with respect to its greater strength in females that examples of alternative types of precultural interpretations will be examined. In the following discussion, then, "the female parenting need" is used as an ellipsis for "the greater strength of the parenting need in females."

According to one prominent example of a biological interpretation, the female parenting need is an instance of those precultural needs which are genetically determined. Phylogenetically inherited, this need is interpreted in the same manner as any other biological characteristic that is the product of biological evolution, namely, by natural selection. Such an interpretation would hold that in the conditions obtaining in the early history of our species, a strong mother-child bond was an adaptive requirement, so that a strong parenting need in women had a selective advantage. Tracing this advantage to the adaptive requirements of the hunting stage of human evolution, this is precisely the interpretation offered by Tiger and Shepher (1975: 274-277) for the female parenting need and, therefore, for the counter-revolution in the orientation of the female sabras to the family.<sup>3</sup> According to this interpretation, then, the female parenting need is conceptualized as a "biological" need which, phylogenetically inherited, serves as an internal stimulus to behavior.

We now can turn to examples of those theories of the female parenting need according to which this need, though precultural, is experientially acquired. According to one example, the female parenting need is a "psychobiological" need which is acquired as a result of psychological experiences derived from a biological characteristic of the female organism. Specifically, this need is explained as the motivational consequence of the girl's cognitive and emotional reactions attendant upon her psychic awareness of the structure of her reproductive organs. This theory, as most prominently formulated by Erikson (1963:91), anchors many sex-linked needs in what he calls the "ground plan" of the body. Given that boys and girls have a different "ground plan," each is characterized by "a unique quality of [inner] experience." The experience of girls is different from that of boys as a function of (among other things) the "inner space" that characterizes the female reproductive organs. This experience, which is "founded on the preformed functions" of the "future childbearer," provides girls with a motivational disposition for childbearing and hence for parenting. This thesis has been more extensively developed by Bardwick (1971:15). It is because of the girls' creative inner space, so her thesis goes, that "an anticipatory pleasure and rehearsal of future maternity . . . looms large in the girl."

Perhaps the most influential (and controversial) examples of a "psychosocial" interpretation of the female parenting need are those formulated by Freud (1964, ch. 33). For Freud, like Erikson, this need is acquired as a result of experiences related to female sexual anatomy, but since for Freud these experiences are social (consisting in the girl's interaction with significant others), it seems more accurate to say that for him the female parenting need, though precultural, is more a "psychosocial" than a "psychobiological" need.

According to the first of Freud's hypotheses, if the young girl feels loved by her mother, then, given the dependency need of children, she develops a libidinal attachment to and identifies with her. Since, for the growing girl, the mother's parenting role is her most important characteristic, the girl's identification with her mother is the basis for her desire to emulate that role particularly. To be sure, the earliest identification of the boy is also, and for the same reason, with the mother; and by this explanation of the girls' acquisition of the parenting need, one would expect that boys would acquire a parenting need no less strong. This is exactly what psychoanalytic theorists like Bettelheim (1954) and others have suggested, a suggestion which receives support from the fantasy play of the sabra children in which, it will be recalled, the second most frequent identification of the boys was with parenting women. Nevertheless, the boy's identification with the mother does not persist because, according to these latter theorists, with his discovery of the anatomical differences between the sexes, he realizes that he cannot become like her. For Freud, however, it is not because he cannot become like her, but because his fear of castration leads him to give up his desire to become like her, that is the crucial factor in the boy's disidentification with his mother. On either interpretation, although boys may subsequently come to envy women for their childbearing function, they give up their identification with the mother

For the girl, on the other hand, the discovery of the anatomical differences between the sexes has a rather different consequence, which leads to Freud's second hypothesis. When the girl makes this discovery, disappointment supersedes her attachment to the mother as the basis for her parenting need. Viewing herself as having been deprived of a penis, the girl develops a strong wish to acquire one. Eventually, however, she must accept the fact that she cannot gratify this wish (just as the boy must accept the fact that he cannot gratify his wish to bear a child). When, then, the girl gives up her wish for a penis, she puts in its place a wish for a child, and the latter wish acquires all the intensity of the former.

The above four theories are among the most prominent examples of precultural interpretations of the female parenting need. Since, in our present state of knowledge, there is no way of assessing their relative merit, we can only say that all of them can account (in principle) for the precultural existence of this need. But even if all four examples were to be disconfirmed, this would not invalidate the conclusion

of this study that the female parenting need is precultural. For if the findings reported here are reliable, the disconfirmation of the above examples of precultural interpretations of this need would merely oblige us to search for alternative interpretations.

On the assumption that the female parenting need is a precultural need, we cannot only explain the counterrevolutionary attitudes of the female sabras to the family, but we can also explain the vicissitudes of the revolutionary attitudes of their mothers and grandmothers. For on this assumption, when the kibbutz pioneers rejected (and physically abandoned) their biological family of origin, it is entirely understandable (and, in hindsight, at least predictable) that they would have created a sociological family to take its place. Thus it is that the kibbutz, as we have seen, became for them a surrogate family; one, however, in which culture took the place of biological kinship as its basis. Moreover, their repressed parenting need--the women's exaggerated expressions of affection for their grandchildren is evidence for its repression and for the subsequent "return of the repressed"--was initially satisfied by the maternal attitudes they displayed to all kibbutz children. In short, although in the early years of the kibbutz few women performed the role of genitrix, any could (and many did) perform the role of mater.

But a surrogate family can take the emotional place of the biological family only until one's own family of procreation becomes psychologically important; and on the assumption that the female parenting need is precultural, this must inevitably happen unless the initial motive for the repression of this need is transmitted from one generation to the next. In the kibbutz case, the motive for its repression (whatever it may have been) was obviously not transmitted to the second generation, for the sabras have not only established larger biological families than their mothers, but they have also transferred a significant measure of their familial emotions from the sociological family (the kibbutz), which had been the focus of the familial emotions of the kibbutz founders, to the biological family which each has created herself. This is the process, or so at least it seems to me, by which the kibbutz has been transformed from one, undifferentiated child-oriented community to a structurally differentiated community consisting of separate (though integrated) child-oriented families.

But this is not all. Insofar as the female sabras value parenting as a phase-specific role in the life cycle, the gratifications they derive from this "feminine" role obviate the need to strive for status in "masculine" roles. Confident in and valuing their status in the family domain, their desire, however, for sexual equality in extra-familial domains has in no way diminished, although it has taken a different form from that desired by women who disvalue the maternal role. Instead of seeking "status identity" with men in a system of sex-role uniformity, the sabras seek "status equivalence" in a system



of sex-role differentiation. It is all the more significant, therefore, that although many of them have been frustrated in this attempt by the narrow range of occupational opportunities available to women, they have neither abandoned their familistic orientation, nor have they attempted to reinstate the pioneers' "identity" meaning of sexual equality.

These kibbutz findings, if I may be permitted a personal note, forced upon me a kind of Copernican revolution in my own thinking. When I returned to Kiryat Yedidim in 1975, I realized that my understanding of what I thought I had been doing in the kibbutz in 1951 was very different from what I found myself doing in 1975. As a cultural determinist, my aim in studying personality development in Kiryat Yedidim in 1951 was to observe the influence of culture on human nature or, more accurately, to discover how a new culture produces a new human nature. In 1975 I found (against my own intentions) that I was observing the influence of human nature on culture; alternatively, I was observing the resurgence of the old culture (in modern garb) as a function of those elements in human nature that the new culture was unable to change. If this is so, then what is really problematic about the data presented in this book is not the feminine counterrevolution of the sabras, but the feminist revolution of their parents and grandparents. For if, as these data suggest, many of the motivational differences between the sexes are precultural, and if, moreover, these differences are more or less accurately reflected in the system of sex-role differentiation presently found in the kibbutz (and in almost every other human society), then the challenge for scientific inquiry presented by the kibbutz experience is not why the sabras, in their system of sex-role differentiation, conform to "human nature," but why the kibbutz pioneers had attempted to undo it. Since, however, a nonspeculative answer to this question requires historical data which I do not command, and since in any event the question is best answered by a study of contemporary movements in the West that are making the same attempt today, there would be little gain in offering a speculative answer. Instead, I wish to turn to some of the broader issues implicit in the kibbutz experience.

Unlike cultural theories, which attribute sex differences to sexually appropriate role modeling, our analysis of the kibbutz data has suggested that the obverse is closer to the truth; that is, sexually appropriate role modeling is a function of precultural differences between the sexes. Implicit in this difference between cultural and precultural interpretations of the motivational bases for role modeling is an even more important difference with respect to the origin and persistence of systems of sex-role differentiation. Since, according to cultural interpretations, there are no precultural differences between the sexes, it follows that sex-role differentiation is itself culturally determined. Hence, it is just as feasible for social systems to be constructed on (or to evolve into) a "plan" of sex-role uniformity as of sex-role differentiation. According to precultural



interpretations, however, the former alternative is not feasible, for the precultural motivational differences between the sexes renders it highly probable that these differences will inevitably be institutionalized in some type of sex-role differentiation.

Of course, the content of any system of sex-role differentiation is culturally constituted, so that such systems can--and many do--become ossified and exploitative. If, then, as a reaction to such a situation, a particular system were to be abolished, it is highly likely, as the kibbutz experience suggests, that another, albeit non-exploitative system, would take its place. For if many sex differences in motivation are precultural, then systems of sex-role differentiation not only create sex differences in motivational dispositions, but they also constitute important institutionalized means for the expression and gratification of these precultural dispositions. Lest I be misunderstood, I should like to make explicit some of the implications of this conclusion.

1. To say that sex-role differentiation is a consequence of sex differences in precultural needs does not imply that all differences in sex roles are a result of these differences; this inference is both theoretically untenable and empirically false. Moreover, to say that the sexes differ in precultural needs, is not to say that they differ in all precultural needs, nor is it to say that they differ only in precultural needs, for both statements, again, are theoretically untenable and empirically false.

2. To say that sex-role differentiation, as such, has its origin in sex differences in precultural needs is not to say that sex roles are themselves precultural in origin. Any system of sex-role differentiation is a culturally constituted system; that is, it consists of a set of rules and norms which, viewed as cognitive messages, inform social actors of the appropriate behavioral means by which their needs may be gratified. This being so, although the motivation for performing certain sex roles may stem from a desire to gratify needs, their performance is governed by cultural rules and norms.

3. To say that the performance of some sex-roles gratifies precultural needs (among others) does not imply that sex differences in these needs are differences in kind; rather (as the evidence from sabra children demonstrates) they are typically differences in degree. This is especially true of those needs whose expression and gratification are institutionalized in sex-role systems. Hence, the fact that such systems tend to classify social roles categorically as either male or female does not mean that sex differences in precultural needs are categorically different. On the contrary, so far as these needs are concerned, human beings are most probably bisexual. The behavior of sabra children indicates that both sexes share the same needs, the differences between them consisting of differences in the strength of these needs. Nevertheless, although the differences are in degree, rather than in

kind, if the sex-role system does not recognize these differences, then, as the kibbutz data suggest, the social actors will eventually change it.

There is, however, another side to this coin. Whether they are genetically or experientially acquired, it often happens that a reversal occurs in the relative strength of precultural needs. Some males, for example, may exhibit an especially strong parenting need, while some females may exhibit a relatively weak one. This being the case, we may expect that in any society there will be a certain percentage of social actors for whom the culturally appropriate sex roles are psychologically inappropriate. If, then, inflexible boundary rules deny these actors access to the complementary set of sex roles found in their society, or if they are not provided with alternative roles, we may also expect that such actors will exhibit psychological dislocations which, in the absence of relevant structural changes, will lead to sociological dislocations.

4. From the last point it follows that, as a principle of social policy, no social role should be barred to any person on the grounds that his or her recruitment is inconsistent with the current system of sex-role differentiation. In short, no individual or group of individuals should be prohibited from achieving sexual equality in the "identity" meaning of equality. If, however, our findings are reliable, attempts to correct the inequalities in any particular system of sex-role differentiation should most effectively be addressed to the achievement of sexual equality in its "equivalence" meaning, for it is the latter meaning of equality that is important for most people to achieve. Hence, for any group of individuals to attempt to impose their particular reversal of a panhuman distribution in sex differences upon others is an insult to their basic human dignity. If, moreover, the political or media influence of such a group assures their attempts a measure of success, the ensuing social and psychological dislocations for the larger society can be expected to be as serious as those attendant upon the reverse kind of straightjacketing (except that in the latter case the consequences are felt only by a minority). For if systems of sex-role differentiation, as such, are in large part a function of sex differences in motivational disposition, attempts to convince women that sexual equality, for example, is worthwhile only in the "identity" meaning of equality, and that "feminine" careers--even if they achieve equality in its "equivalence" meaning--are unseemly pursuits imposed on them by a sexist society, may (if successful) deprive them of important sources of human gratification. Moreover, to the extent that some women are persuaded by this ideology, but continue to be motivated by powerful countervailing needs, the resulting inner conflict may lead, as one psychiatric study has shown (Moulton, 1977), to painful feelings of guilt and depression.

Single cases prove little; they are primarily useful insofar as they challenge received opinion. The kibbutz case does not prove the

existence of precultural sex differences. Rather, it challenges the current intellectual and political pieties which deny the existence of such differences (just as they deny the existence of other group differences) on the grounds that to be different is ipso facto to be unequal. That individuals and groups must be identical in order to be equal is surely one of the more pernicious dogmas of our time, and the fact that, ironically enough, it has become a liberal dogma does not make it any the less so. Until or unless the kibbutz data are interpreted differently, the kibbutz case constitutes a challenge to this dogma so far as sex differences are concerned. Of course, the strength of this challenge cannot be determined without much more extensive research--especially longitudinal research--in a variety of cultural settings. Until then, prudence suggests that scientific formulations and public policies related to sex differences proceed with caution.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. In 1951, under the influence of kibbutz ideology, the high school personnel attributed the sabras' reactions to the influence of students from the city who had imbued them with feelings of sexual shame. Being a cultural determinist at that time, I too found this to be a persuasive explanation although, in retrospect, its flaws are obvious. First, these shameful feelings were almost always aroused during (or shortly before) pubescence when most girls, still in the grammar school, were not yet exposed to city students. Second, even for those whose puberty was delayed till high school, the assumption that the cultural values of a tiny minority of outside students could prevail over those of the majority, especially when the latter were natives (supported by the entire weight of their native and much more prestigious environment) makes little sense. Moreover, if the absence of sexual shame is natural and its acquisition cultural, this explanation makes even less sense, for one would then have expected the cultural to give way to the natural. If the kibbutz students were indeed influenced by the city students, it is more reasonable to believe that they were ready to be influenced because this influence was syntonic with their natural dispositions.
2. It is pertinent to observe here that these children, whose behavior refuted the assumption that the shame aroused by sexual dimorphism is cultural, are the same children who, upon becoming adults, reversed the attempts of the pioneers to minimize the importance of dimorphism by eschewing feminine clothing, jewelry, and cosmetics. Today, as we have seen, female sabras attempt to enhance their feminine appearance by these cultural means, and male sabras obviously approve of these attempts.
3. There are, of course, alternative biological interpretations of the female parenting need which, departing from classical Darwinian



theory, one might mention--parental investment theory, for example (Trivers, 1972). I do not discuss this theory here because although our research design does not permit us to decide whether, as a precultural need, the female parenting need is biologically or experientially acquired, this does not hold for this particular biological theory which (for reasons which would require an extensive discussion) does not seem to adequately explain the kibbutz data.

CHAPTER FIVE  
SOCIAL CHANGE AND SEX-ROLE INERTIA:  
THE CASE OF THE KIBBUTZ\*

Martha T. Shuch Mednick

SEX ROLES AND SOCIAL CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW

Numerous theoretical and empirical analyses have addressed themselves to questions about changing roles for men and women (Bernard, 1971; Dahlstrom, 1971; Holter, 1970). Regardless of the focus of a particular study or theoretical piece, certain issues are fundamental. These issues are the extent to which sex-role change is possible, the isolation of social and psychological factors that result in change, and the spelling out of the personal and social consequences of change. One method of looking for answers to these questions is to examine what in fact has occurred in various societies, in subcultures within societies, and at various times in history. Such crosscultural and historical analyses, while useful, have the problem of being retrospective and also limited in their generalizability. There is also the danger of drawing far-reaching conclusions based on oversimplification or incomplete reading of the total psychological and social context within which experiments in role change have occurred. This analysis of the case of the kibbutz is presented to illustrate this point.

SEX-ROLE CHANGE: CONTEXT

There appear to be planned and unplanned contexts in which sex-role changes have taken place. The best illustration of the unplanned context is the occurrence of a severe emergency such as a war, which involves the total utilization of human resources. Under the conditions generated by such a state of affairs, i.e., the absence of men and the need for a high production level in the society, many jobs and functions formerly ascribed to men are taken over and effectively and eagerly carried out by women. Trey's (1972) analysis of women's role in World War II bears this out. Such change is generally temporary and does not lead to a change in society's assumptions about sex-appropriate

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\* "Method Note" at the end of this article briefly describes the survey which was the major source of data for this paper. The author wishes to thank the staff of the Social Research Center on the Kibbutz at Givat Haviva, Israel for their willingness to share these data and for their assistance. The Center's research was sponsored by the Settlement Study Center of the National and University Institute of Agriculture, Rehovot, Israel, and directed by Menachem Rosner. The author's work was supported by Howard University-sponsored Research Grant No. OA-SRP-301, July 1, 1971-September 30, 1972.

personality and behavior. When the emergency subsides, tasks and statuses are again allocated on the basis of traditional views. Nevertheless, as Holter (1970) notes, such an experience is instructive since it indicates the possibilities for role change inherent in any society. It also tells us that society regards woman as a flexible commodity, available for labor and other activities when the need exists, but reshelved fairly safely when conditions return to "normal." Turning to an example of planned change, we can look at a communist society such as the Soviet Union, where ideology dictated that woman's oppression was the result of capitalism and the patriarchal family system. This led to a stated goal of woman's equality and full participation in the political and economic system and to the institution of social changes designed to achieve these goals. The two contexts are not necessarily mutually exclusive; that which was dictated by ideology in the Soviet Union was reinforced by economic factors at first and later by the enormous reduction of the male population during World War II. Many of the tasks assigned to women, particularly in the area of work, were probably as much a function of necessity as of ideology. A careful look at the change in role arrangements as the economy improves and the sex-role ratio approaches the pre-World War II balance may reveal the relative influences of ideology and necessity. Nevertheless, it is the planned context that is most germane to the following discussion.

An examination of examples of planned change reveals an ideological stance which has emphasized freeing woman from her "condition" or "oppressed" state. However, the need for complementary change in the role of men has rarely been mentioned. In addition, all of these societies have continued to be predicated on masculine assumptions and values (Holter, 1970). Thus we see that woman is defined as "equal," "emancipated," or "liberated," when she has permission to adopt the traditional occupations, attributes, and goals of men.

It is only in very recent years, and the discussions by Scandinavian social scientists and politicians (Dahlstrom, 1971; Palme, 1972) have been the vanguard here, that the notion that men's roles are changing--to their advantage--has begun to emerge. Past efforts, interests, and energy have focused on legislative and institutional changes designed first to free woman from the onerous tasks of her family role so that she could work outside the home and then to raise her status at work and in society. This has rarely been matched by any effort to encourage men to aspire to woman's domain. And yet, this may be the only path to change that lasts, does not produce stress, and is even productive. Psychologists (Bem, 1974; Block, 1973; Carlson, 1972) and sociologists (e.g. Bernard, 1972; Holter, 1970; Rossi, 1964) are raising questions about the destructiveness of stereotyped sex roles for men as well as for women and the limited nature of our ideas about what constitutes "sex equality," the recognition of and reactions of women to status inequality, and the consequences of fundamental sex-role change. It



is one of the aims of this discussion to show how difficulties involved in establishing a real and permanent sex-role change can be understood in terms of the essentially reciprocal nature of demands and opportunity for change.

The kibbutz is an outstanding modern example of planned social change. In the following section the kibbutz goals will be outlined, followed by a description of the current situation in several domains of role expression. The next section will outline some factors that may have precluded lasting role change in the kibbutz setting, and present a preliminary effort at a theoretical analysis of the social-psychological determinants of change. Finally, we will discuss the implications of the kibbutz experience for the attainment of the goals of the feminist movement.

## SEX ROLES AND THE KIBBUTZ

### Ideology and Institutions

The structure of the kibbutz was intentionally designed to free woman from her oppressed state. The socialist ideology viewed the condition of woman in capitalistic society as no better than that of a servant. The founders of the kibbutz believed that economic and social dependence on a husband in a traditional patriarchal arrangement necessarily denied her the attainment of equality or the realization of her potential. Their philosophy was feminist and the institution they created had and still has characteristics that are widely assumed to guarantee woman her freedom and to result in dedifferentiation of sex roles.

Kibbutz women are socially and economically independent from their husbands; marriage does not relegate them to the second-class status of married women in most societies (Bernard, 1972; deBeauvoir, 1949; Holter, 1970). Each individual's needs are fulfilled through a highly democratic decision-making apparatus (Spiro, 1970; Talmon, 1972) and all members can be equal participants in this process. Egalitarianism is one of the central values of kibbutz society, and from the outset it was stressed that women and men are to be equal recipients of the consequences of such an ideology. Institutional structures are designed to insure woman's equality and allow her the freedom to work and to be a full participant in the society. For example, children are cared for in children's houses from the time of birth. Adult houses can thus be small and since simplicity is also valued, general housekeeping duties<sup>1</sup> are few. Most meals are taken in the communal dining room; if a family chooses to eat at home, they can simply pick up the food they need in the kitchen storeroom or take a prepared meal home. In addition, the provision and care of clothing is communal. Most of the time-consuming

tasks involved in running a household are absent. These services make the tasks of child and home care extremely undemanding in terms of time and responsibility and free the kibbutz member for other activities.

### Work and Social Participation

To what extent have these factors been effective in changing sex roles? As has been reported in considerable detail by several investigators (Rabin, 1970; Rosner, 1967; Talmon, 1972), the outcome has not conformed to the intentions and expectations of the generation that planned the kibbutz. The following description is based on impressions from personal observations, a reading of the literature, and the data of a survey administered to members of the founding generation and their offspring, the second generation of kibbutz members. The respondents in the latter group ranged in age from about 20 to 39. All participants were randomly selected from the membership of a representative sample of 55 kibbutzim. The founders are members who established and are still living on the kibbutz, and the second generation is composed of current members who were born and raised on the kibbutz. All data reflect conditions at the time the survey was taken (1969).

These data confirm what has been observed earlier (Leon, 1964; Rosner, 1967) and this can be best seen by looking at the two most important aspects of kibbutz life-work and social participation. Work is the central value of the kibbutz. Moreover, productive work, that which results in economic gain, is valued most highly. On the other hand, services, which include the kitchen, the laundry, the clothing factory, and the dining room, are regarded as necessary, but nonproductive (Talmon, 1972) and therefore less valued. Table 1 shows the proportion of men and women of the two generations now in each occupational category. The women of the second generation are primarily in education;

Table 1. Incidence of Kibbutz Men and Women in Various Occupations

	Second Generation		Founders	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Agriculture	60%	13%	28%	6%
Technical and Industrial	31	3	27	4
Services	2	18	9	40
Education	3	62	7	35
Miscellaneous	1	1	3	2
Management, administration	3	3	24	13

Table 2. Occupational Aspirations of Second Generation<sup>a</sup>

Occupation	Men (N = 174)	Women (N = 185)
Agriculture	21%	5%
Technical and industrial	39	4
Services	5	23
Education (culture, social service)	6	46
Management and leadership	5	4
Studies (higher education)	5	1
Science	3	5
Art and entertainment	10	11
External <sup>b</sup>	6	1

<sup>a</sup>For portion of sample indicating desire to change.

<sup>b</sup>Indicates a wish to do movement work outside the kibbutz.

this category includes child care and all levels of teaching. Though more of the older women may have worked in agriculture in their younger days, very few have remained in it; most of them are now in services or, like their daughters, in education. The few women in agriculture are usually in the poultry branch or in plant nurseries. Table 2 presents data on aspirations of those who said they would change their occupations if they could, and the picture is similar.<sup>2</sup>

It has been suggested that women in the kibbutz are pressured by a variety of situational factors to select occupations that allow them to be close to home and children (Talmon, 1972). For example, if a parent is needed at the children's or infants' home during the day, it is expected that the mother be available. Women demanded and obtained a free hour during the working day to spend with their children. Working in the fields or in the factory, generally a fair distance from the living area of the community, would preclude this. It appears to be assumed that fathers should not have this free time since they are employed in the productive sector. When the work day and siesta are over, the children go home to spend the afternoon and early evening with their parents; the housemother also goes to her home to be with her children. This means that working away from the kibbutz (e.g., in the city) or studying at the university involves complex arrangements for child care in the afternoon. While this can be managed, the individual family must make the special arrangements on its own. Those who do so are often subject to criticism and feel considerable guilt since it is part of the child-rearing philosophy that these hours of the day are the time to be spent with parents (personal communications, Givat Haviva and Kibbutz Maanit, 1972). This seems to indicate that the pressure, both subtle and direct, is for retaining the present differentiated occupational structure.



Turning to participation in local governance, the best survey indicators of such participation were questions about attending the general meeting, active participation at the meeting, and degree of willingness to be active in various important committees. Figures 1 and 2 depict these data; the traditional sex-role picture, particularly for the second generation, is reflected in these indicators and reinforces earlier findings (Talmon, 1972). With regard to willingness to be active in committee work, the women stressed education, social welfare, and culture,<sup>3</sup> while the men stressed economics. It must be noted that it is the economic committee that holds the real power in the kibbutz. This is the group that must approve the budget for all departments, and sooner or later everyone must turn to it for approval of their proposals. Very few women ever serve on this committee. Moreover, women rarely hold major offices or committee chairs--nor do they seem to be interested in doing so. There are of course many men who do not serve or participate in these functions, but what is important for our discussion is that it is only men who are actively involved. Political activity away from the kibbutz is engaged in almost entirely by men. Those who hold external political office must spend a considerable amount of time away. In a visit to one of the party headquarters I spoke with Yona Golan, a member of the founding generation, who is politically active and is now the Minister of Foreign Affairs for this particular party. She described women as no longer active, as not wishing to be, and as turning their interests to home and children instead. She interpreted this as a logical pendulum swing away from the stress and strain of the early days.<sup>4</sup> Her observations on current role choice are confirmed by the data of this survey. The women of the second generation are less interested in community involvement than were their pioneer mothers and seem quite content to function in their private personal domain and leave the public life to men.<sup>5</sup>

### Social Status

The significance of the work and social participation data is further clarified by an examination of self-ratings of social status. Class differences have never developed on the kibbutz, but there are differences in status and prestige and these are rooted in work and social participation. The highest prestige is accorded to someone who is both a good worker and an active participant in the society. The self-ratings of social status, which can be seen in Table 3 and Figure 3, indicated that women's self-ratings are consistently lower than men's.

The second generation rate their mothers substantially lower than their fathers, and when people rated their spouses, wives' ratings were consistently and significantly lower than husbands' ratings. It is interesting that spouses' ratings of their status show a higher relationship to each other than self-parental ratings. To some extent it is the case, as would be expected on the basis of a communal philosophy,

Figure 1

Sex comparisons of two kibbutz generations:  
Attendance and participation at general meeting




Figure 2

Sex comparisons of two kibbutz generations:  
Willingness to be active in committees






Table 3. Interrelationship of Self-Ratings of Social Status (Second generation respondents only)

	R
Self with spouse	.32
Self with mother	.19
Self with father	.20
Mother with father	.44

that each individual must establish his or her own status on the kibbutz. The results of several regression analyses, using participation in the general meeting as a dependent variable, reflect the close relationship of the status variable to a major indicator of activity and involvement (see Table 4). The regressions are also fairly similar for men and women, indicating that for people who wish to be involved the dynamics may be independent of sex. This is a hypothesis that can be tested in future work.




Figure 3. Sex comparisons of two kibbutz generations: Self-ratings of social status.

## THE FAMILY

It is impossible to discuss sex roles or woman's status without taking up the issue of the family. Involved here is the place of the family vis-a-vis the community as well as the roles of the husband and wife within the family.

Table 4. Multiple Regression Analysis for Declared Frequency of Talking at General Meeting<sup>a</sup>

Variable selected	Men		Women		
	Mult. R	% Variance	Variable selected	Mult. R	% Variance
<b>Analysis A</b>					
1. Social status	.40	.16	1. Social status	.32	.10
2. Ready to fight for principles	.44	.19	2. Fight for principles	.35	.12
3. Self-actualization in work	.44	.20	3. Self-actualization in work	.37	.13
4. Satisfaction with work	.47	.22			
<b>Analysis B</b>					
1. Social status	.40	.16	1. Social status	.31	.10
2. Ready to act in committees (social/education/cultural)	.46	.21	2. Ready to act in economics	.39	.15
3. Ready to fight for principles	.48	.23	3. Number of children	.41	.17
4. Number of children	.50	.25			

<sup>a</sup>These analyses used second generation data only.

The place of the family in the kibbutz has always been the subject of intense ideological discussion. A perceptive analysis is offered by Talmon (1972) who notes that ideologically there was an "intrinsic antagonism" between the two groups and loyalty to the family was regarded as incompatible with loyalty to the community. Practical factors were also involved in that the strategic and economic conditions that prevailed in the early days meant that survival depended on group effort. These communities overcame enormous physical difficulties by:

channeling most of their manpower and capital into production and restricting consumption services to the bare minimum. The non-familistic division of labor was to a large extent a matter of economic necessity. Centralized communal organization of the non-productive branches of the economy enabled the kibbutzim to reduce investment in these spheres and to utilize fully the productive capacity of the members. It also made it possible to reduce the number of women engaged in social services and to draw many of them into active participation in the effort to advance production (Talmon, 1972:5).

The result was an organizational system in which the kibbutz performed most of the ordinary family functions and took charge of child-rearing and education. Deemphasizing the centrality of the family was also motivated by the desire to free woman from her traditional burdens. Indeed in early days this "freeing" was reflected in the blurring of sex-role differentiation in the occupational and political arenas, i.e., women worked in production, were active in the society, etc. This lasted while the standard of living was low, the community relatively small, and until children were born. As the number of children increased and as the communities grew and became more affluent, the role of the family became greater (Talmon, 1972).<sup>6</sup> At present it is clear that the family is the emotional nerve center of the kibbutz. Parents are intensely involved with their children throughout their mutual lives. They are bereft when children choose as adults to leave; as one man said to me, "a man without his son on the kibbutz is a very lonely man." I asked a young kibbutz woman how many children she wanted and she said, "I don't know ... four, five, as many as I can!" When I asked her why, she explained that if you have a large family you will always have people around ... "friends don't mean a thing--it is only family that will stay with you.

The survey data relevant to the kibbutz family shed some light on the extent to which there is a push to coordinate the institutions with personal needs. One of the survey items concerned the issue of children sleeping in their parents' houses. In most kibbutzim they



still do not; they live with their peer group in the children's house and are cared for by the nurse-housemother. Changing this would have enormous consequences for kibbutz life. It would require major physical rearrangements, considerable expense, and radical ideological change. In spite of this, almost two-thirds of the women and half of the men of the second generation endorse this change.

Another current issue concerns giving increased influence and decision-making power to the family unit.<sup>7</sup> The women more than the men are interested in such an increase. Thirty percent of women but only nineteen percent of men endorse this change, not a landslide of public opinion but for women in particular, a push by a sizeable minority.

There is also a general trend toward the endorsement of a system that would allocate a lump sum to each family for their personal needs.<sup>8</sup> This is in contrast to a system where specified amounts are allocated to different need categories by the economic committee. The lump sum system increases family autonomy since it can then do its own budgeting.

Thus there is a push to legitimize the family as a domain of influence and to recognize it by giving it more than an emotional function. The push to "familization" is greater for the second generation than for the first and greater for women than for men. This is threatening to the kibbutz because it leads to a decline in the significance of the community vis-a-vis the individual and to a weakening of fundamental values, processes, and institutions. Since women ostensibly lead the push for such innovation, they are blamed for the demise of kibbutz institutions. In a review of Talmon's book, Schneider (1973) points out:

Of particularly timely interest [is] ... the part women play in undermining the revolutionary orientation and especially that part of it that affirms the equality of the sexes ... it is the women who take the lead in reaffirming the values of the family, in undermining the communal child care and rearing centers, and in [pushing] ... the rights of the individual to creature comforts and to special forms of personal gratification .... (Schneider, 1973:181).

Shepher (1969) and Talmon (1965) have shown that as family autonomy increased on the kibbutz, sex roles in the home were more clearly defined and differentiated along traditional lines. There was a commitment to equality and even considerable sharing of certain tasks, but it was clear in their data that in the home the husband was helping the wife with her tasks.

For the kibbutz woman this means that in spite of a continued commitment to an egalitarian philosophy, her role is continuing to turn toward the traditional and that the process will accelerate if changes such as those described are effected. As women become tied to an increasingly elaborate household, their involvement in work, politics, and communal activity is bound to decline still further. Women's focus will be "inside"; the "outside" will continue to be the domain of the men. Indeed the kibbutz is now in a phase very reminiscent of the United States' own feminine mystique of the late forties and fifties. The kibbutz women emphasize all the traditional aspects of femininity, ostensibly as a compensation for their former state of serious deprivation.

#### SEX-ROLE CHANGE: IMPLICATIONS OF THE KIBBUTZ EXPERIENCE

The aforementioned data and observations lead us to conclude that the kibbutz is now a male-dominated, sex-differentiated society. This is the case in spite of commitment to an egalitarian point of view, women's economic independence, and the maintenance of structural arrangements designed to guarantee the individual's freedom to work and participate in society. Moreover, the direction of the society, apparently as a result of pressure from women at least as much as men, is toward greater sex-role differentiation along traditional lines in every area of the life of the community. It is thus clear that while the kibbutz-created institutions may be necessary for sex-role change, they are quite obviously insufficient. The environmental manipulations and the ideology were not powerful enough to overcome other extremely potent maintainers of status quo. What were these?

Discussions of the kibbutz as an indicator of the extent to which sex-role change can be expected (e.g., Gerson, 1971; Talmon, 1965) are generally pessimistic, concluding that there has been a demonstration of the inherent etiology of the tasks and traits traditionally assigned to men and women. The fatalistic corollary to this is that there are some things that simply cannot be changed. This is in fact a widespread belief, one which is adhered to by sophisticated as well as less sophisticated observers of the kibbutz. Although the causal process is frequently couched in psychological or sociological rather than overtly genetic terms, they all seem eventually to reduce to biology. For example, there is the sociological approach of observers such as Talmon (1965) and Rosner (1967). Talmon took the view that the originally blurred roles were brought back into focus by the advent of children, the simultaneous economic growth of the community, and the decline in the crisis atmosphere. However, it is the biology of child bearing and rearing that is regarded as the ultimate determinant (Talmon, 1965:151). The nature of the occupational job structure, its narrowness, and the change to mechanized agriculture are also used as explanations, but this too is bound up with assumptions about the

biological capacities of men and women (Rosner, 1967). Thus woman's lack of physical strength and the cycle and strains of reproduction keep her out of production, and man's physical strength and freedom from child bearing make it essential for him to be in productive activities.

Other explanations such as those by Bettelheim (1970) or Spiro (1970) are couched in psychodynamic terms. Bettelheim, for example, suggests that the woman's current flight to femininity and overemphasis of mothering are guilty reactions to a rejection of their own mothers or natural reactions to the frustration of their needs of intimacy. Such views, in addition to being essentially biological, also focus on intrapsychic factors and exclude significant social determinants.

It is worth noting that a biological explanation for this and other "social problems" has enormous intrinsic attraction. This is partly because it provides an apparent justification for the comfortable choice of leaving things as they are. Thus traits are assigned to a group on the basis of biological differences and this in turn is used as justification for the lowering of status or the maintenance of a status that is already low. Moreover, since that which is inherent is generally believed to be immutable, change can only be effected in the direction of adaptation to the givens. It is not only the biological explanation per se but this belief that operates as a force against change. This hypothesis is supported by Tavris (1973), who found that belief in biological determinism was correlated with conservative views regarding sex-role change.

The following discussion will focus on factors in the situation and the person other than biology which may have precluded lasting role change, and expand on the implications of this discussion for the goals of the feminist movement.

First, the feminine mystique, that is, the push back to the family and home, is not a "logical" pendulum swing back to nature away from a period of true feminist fulfillment. It is in fact a backlash that followed, as it has before, a period of economic and military crisis during which everyone, men and women alike, were needed to do all the onerous tasks involved in building and defending the society. In this situation the crisis atmosphere combined with the ideology to create a force that enhanced male values. Aside from stress on military preparedness, there was the devotion to physical labor and the extreme emphasis on productivity and economic growth. The atmosphere that evolved was one in which stereotypically masculine behavior was reinforced. Other behaviors, tasks, and attributes were less important, many were in fact counter-productive and therefore devalued. Coincidentally most of these were behaviors, tasks, and attributes traditionally assigned to women, those regarded as feminine.



As the crisis diminished, growth and affluence and the arrival of children went hand in hand with an increased need and demand for member services. Not only do children require more services, but economic growth also spurred a push for a daily life that was comfortable and pleasant, in short, one requiring housework. It then seemed natural for women to return to their traditional tasks of child and home care and equally natural for men to remain in production. It could probably be shown that at this point the rationalization about woman's true nature was reactivated, as a way of reducing the anxiety raised by the discrepancy between the ideology of equality and emancipation and the reality of the behavior in which women were engaged. Furthermore, since there is little reason to believe that the effects of original sex-role socialization had been erased (see e.g., Rosenfeld, 1957; Spiro, 1970) this was probably easily accomplished. Indeed, adherence to traditional views is now almost universally found in writings about the kibbutz, and Rosner (1967) has shown that although stereotypic thinking about personality traits of men and women is not extreme in kibbutz populations, it is nevertheless widely held that their suitability for certain jobs and the nature of their interests are based on innate inclinations. This is used to "explain" the division of labor, and by the attribution of traits such as "timid," "passive," etc., the low rate of social participation as well.

It must be stressed that the current picture represents reaction to a limited view of emancipation--a kind of limitation not unique to the kibbutz. Indeed it seems to have been reflected in most early feminist thought, certainly in all socialist experiments based on Marxist thinking and in much of the writing on American historical communes. Although kibbutz women became economically independent from men and did men's work, this did not effect a change in the values assigned to roles. The conception of what constitutes the domain of man was never in doubt, nor was its superior nature. Moreover the blurring of sex roles was only temporary since in this atmosphere women had the privilege of working and fighting like men, but men did not have the obvious reciprocal privileges. The rejection of women's work and traits as important for society is an age-old view. This view was never changed in the kibbutz, indeed it is intrinsic to the ideology. Emancipation ideology means that woman needs to be elevated to the position of man but has not addressed itself to change for man or change in the value placed on tasks and traits (Holter, 1970).

The impact of extreme pronatalism is another vital element in the dynamics of the sex-role backlash. It is true that children came late and the birthrate was low in the early years of the kibbutz, but this was a result of the crisis conditions and certainly not a philosophically based event. In recent years the pressure to reproduce has become very strong. It is fed by several sources including nationalism and the communities' own motive to survive. In the early days the settlements grew by immigration; this means of growth has



virtually ceased and the only realistic hope for the continued existence of the kibbutz is in what is referred to as "internal immigration" ... that is, the production of many children. The median aspired family size was more than four in 1967, and this aspiration, unhampered by economic or other restraints, may soon be realized.<sup>9</sup> The external pronatalist pressure is also reinforced by an intrapsychic pressure stemming from the women's need for personal fulfillment. Since bearing and rearing children is probably the most valued nonmasculine kibbutz role, this may be a kibbutz woman's way of being a productive kibbutz member. She raises her status and prestige and achieves a degree and quality of satisfaction and esteem not easily matched in any of her other roles. Thus social pressure is complemented by personal needs. This in combination with the never-challenged assumption that child care and all related services are feminine tasks may be viewed as a continuing reinforcer of sex-role division along traditional lines.

In sum, the following factors have been delineated as significant for a complete understanding of the failure to achieve permanent role change on the kibbutz:

1. The atmosphere of economic and military crisis and the nature of the ideology combined to create a society based on masculine tasks, traits, and values, with a concomitant devaluation of those classically ascribed to women.
2. The emancipation found in the early days was a response to crisis as much as an effect of ideology.
3. The ideology did not contain a full analysis of the implications of sex-role change for both men and women, therefore consciousness about roles did not change.
4. Certain role areas never changed. Most important was the area of child care and education, always defined as woman's work.
5. The values of the kibbutz as well as the external society are heavily pronatalist.
6. The only female activity that is rewarded and a source of self-esteem for women on the kibbutz is child bearing. Furthermore, having many children is viewed in masculine terms, that is, producing members for the kibbutz and thus perpetuating the community.

7. The attribution of biology as an explanation for woman's role is overdetermined by the pronatalism and the emphasis placed on physical strength. This widely-held view operates as an impediment to change.

## A PARADIGM FOR SEX-ROLE CHANGE

We turn now to a discussion of the significance of the kibbutz experience for planned role change in our society. We have already indicated that there are a number of elements spurring the new feminist movement that were not part of the kibbutz picture. Antinatalism and all the related questions about the inevitability of marriage, motherhood, and traditional lifestyles for both men and women are very important. While this may or may not lead to an immediate change in sex-role attitudes and behavior, there is in any case a distinct possibility that not having children will be rewarded or at least not lead, as it has in the past, to negative consequences.

However, of even greater importance is the issue of raised consciousness about sex roles and the extent to which assumptions about men and women and their "true nature" influence behavior and preclude change. According to the view presented here, this is fundamental to the planning of sex-role change. Therefore the defining characteristics of the process and the factors which may enhance or retard its attainment should be articulated. It is also necessary to suggest the impact of this process on behavior and in turn on the system within which it develops.

A possibility for an explanatory model is presented graphically in Figure 4.<sup>10</sup> It is postulated that factors such as devaluation of women's tasks and attributes can create a sense of dissatisfaction and unhappiness that is focused on the self (Step 1). The exact nature of this is not fully specified but it is probably a function of the degree to which a society, explicitly or implicitly, subscribes to the belief that you as an individual are responsible for what happens to you. If introjected, this means that if you try hard, work hard, and behave as a good member of the society, you will deserve and obtain a generous helping of the rewards offered by the system. If you are not rewarded, you have only yourself to blame. Self-blame is logically related to low self-esteem and feelings of incompetence.

In Step 1 it is further suggested that the sense of personal control as defined by Gurin, Gurin, Lao, and Beattie (1969) will be low. That is, the individual feels that obtained rewards are in fact not contingent on her own efforts. Most likely, and this is consonant with Rotter's Social Learning Theory (1972) which argues for situation specificity, expectancies about one's control of rewards




Figure 4. A paradigm outlining the consciousness raising-action process and its impact on expectancy.



will be high in some areas, e.g., child bearing and rearing, and low in others, e.g., political involvement. The answer to these empirical questions may explain, at least in part, the behavior of women in the kibbutz or in other similar situations.

The second step is crucial in the general process of consciousness raising. Here women come together in segregated groups whose task is, or soon becomes, that of a discussion of the origins of their common condition. Factors leading to the formation of these kinds of groups are not yet clear, but there is an apparent paradox in the fact that communalization of work on the kibbutz did nothing to catalyze feminist thinking. Since women worked together rather than in isolated households, common solutions to common problems should have been developed. The unsatisfying, unpleasant and devalued nature of their work has been made clear. Such circumstances should have provided at least two of the necessary conditions for consciousness raising. Evidently this was not enough, in fact, criticisms of self and others seem to have been fostered (Rosenfeld, 1957).

An analysis of Step 3 provides a clue to the resolution of this paradox. It is suggested that the kibbutz society's idealism and strong ideology about equality precludes the development of system blame. To accept the kind of role awareness needed for this step, some inequality would have to be perceived and accepted. Moreover, this would have to be viewed as the result of the subtle but systematic discriminatory factors inherent in the system. Sanger and Alker (1972) have shown that active feminist women do believe that factors within the social structure control the extent to which rewards are contingent on their own behavior. Extent of system blame may also--to bring it back to the basic question of how change takes place--be affected by the degree of commitment to the existing way of life. Thus for our own society we would predict that a married woman with children who has worked as a housewife for ten years would be less likely to blame the system for making her unhappy than someone who has a strong career commitment along with a family commitment.

Step 3 thus involves a full realization of the nature of roles<sup>11</sup> and an understanding of how this has created low status and feelings of dissatisfaction. Additionally it requires a rejection of the belief that biology is destiny and a turning from self-blame to system-blame. This should lead to an increase in self-esteem and then, with group support, to appropriate action. Successful action--that which is rewarded--will in turn lead to a further increase of a sense of personal control in these new areas, i.e., the development of new areas of heightened expectancy about the impact of one's behavior. It is obvious that the system has to be perceived as potentially responsive in order for this process to take place.

It is also important to note that not only the process, but also the actions, are group-centered; individuals may do the acting, but they represent a group and know that they represent a group. This may be one of the most profound contributions of the new feminist movement. There have always been individual innovators who have overcome social obstacles for various idiosyncratic reasons. These have been the token women found in and pointed to proudly by almost every society or group.<sup>12</sup> New feminism has made it clear that tokenism and emancipation from the consequences of rigid sex-role typing are mutually exclusive phenomena. In fact the evaluation of the status of one or even several members of an oppressed group may function in a sinister way to decrease the likelihood of mass change. Why this may be so becomes clear from our paradigm. Since existence of the token implies that one can "make it" if one is good enough or tries hard enough, the system is exonerated and self-blame is reinforced.<sup>13</sup> This makes the development of system-blame less likely and consequently decreases the probability that the process we have described will be enacted. This does not mean that personal attainment should be downgraded, but that groups and raised consciousness must be recognized as important catalysts of such attainment at more than the merely token level.

The kibbutz and its approach to the liberation of women has thus demonstrated the insufficiency of the changes that were wrought and has directed us to examine alternative explanations of role change. This is its lesson for further research and action.

#### METHOD NOTE

The data reported in the first section of this paper were a small part of the results of a large-scale survey of first and second generation kibbutz-members. The major purpose of the survey was an assessment of the changes that would be needed to insure the continuation of the communal society. The respondents were 918 adult men and women members who had been born on the kibbutz (age range, 20 to 35) and 400 original settlers or founders who were members of a representative sample of kibbutzim (N = 55).

The self-administered objective questionnaire contained 297 items dealing with various aspects of kibbutz life including occupational attitudes and aspirations, values and attitudes and intergenerational attitudes.

More specific information about the methodology may be obtained from the author.

## FOOTNOTES

1. This is also dictated by antimaterialistic values: the emphasis is on a standard of living that is comfortable but simple. The accumulation of private possessions of great value is frowned upon and thus consumerism (one of woman's major functions in capitalistic societies) is a minor facet of life.
2. It should be noted that aspirations which are kibbutz-irrelevant are difficult to attain for men or women and a source of serious concern for the kibbutz. Although in conversations with me young women argued that women were less encouraged than men in such pursuits, this is anecdotal; others said it made no difference whether it was a young man or woman who aspired to the arts or higher education. In any case, the decision is made by the kibbutz in terms of the community's needs and resources. The aspirations to higher education indicated here are deceptively low since the sample represents committed kibbutz members. Many of those with irrelevant, unfulfillable desires may already have dropped out.
3. The data on education, social welfare, and culture are presented as one index since they were fairly highly correlated for the entire group. This was part of an effort at data reduction. The women of the second generation in fact expressed greatest interest in education. The economic committee is the kibbutz Office of Management and the Budget.
4. She also pointed out that this is a general pattern in the country as a whole and not just on the kibbutz.
5. As can be seen there are strong generational differences for the men as well, but an examination of this is not within the scope of this study.
6. It should be noted that even in the early days familial attachments were significant and the family was a recognizable unit. Such ties apparently provided satisfactions that could not be supplied by ties to the community or to any of its members (Talmon, 1972).
7. As the kibbutz is now structured, it is the individual member who participates and each person has equal influence. For example, if a young member asks the kibbutz for support of university study, parents are not involved in the decision except as individual members. Families, particularly where they are very large, may exert influence in informal ways, but the extent to which this is done and effective is impossible to determine.

Certainly it is not part of the formal mode of arriving at decisions.

8. This is a relatively small amount and involves "extras," e.g., special occasion clothing, or hobby money, or household furnishings.
9. In 1968, the following data on actual family size were reported for one of the kibbutz federations: zero-8.7%; one-17.8%; two-31.9%; three-34.2%; four-6.7%; five-0.7%.
10. This is presented as a general model which may be applied to the kibbutz setting as well as to others.
11. It is at this point that the recent work on androgyny is so apt (see, e.g., Bem, 1974; Block, 1973; and Rossi, 1964).
12. Very similar ideas expressed in somewhat different terms are advanced by Holter (1970).
13. Women who are in powerful positions may of course serve as role models and show that such attainment is possible. This is also important but its effect (according to the proposed view) would probably be the result of an interaction with models' and observers' consciousness about their common condition as women.



CHAPTER SIX  
A CRITIQUE OF GENDER AND CULTURE: KIBBUTZ WOMEN REVISITED

Joseph Blasi

The most recent occurrence in the continuing saga of research and interpretative argument on kibbutz men and women was the publication of Melford Spiro's new book, Gender and Culture: Kibbutz Women Revisited, (1979). This article is an attempt to examine the bases of Spiro's argumentation. This approach makes sense for a number of reasons. First, there is little disagreement about the accuracy of evidence on kibbutz women while important issues arise over the selection of evidence. Secondly, while many authors have sought to argue against and for psychological and sociological conclusions from kibbutz sex role data, these arguments are often taking place at a very general level as conflicting theories are battling it out with claim and counterclaim. This article is a close textual critique of Spiro's arguments rather than a global debate about the issues he raises. Thirdly, a philosophical problem with his sociobiological point of view is the presumption that "what is" predicts "what can or ought to be" in the sex role laboratory.

This article tries to consider arguments about: 1) whether the kibbutz is an egalitarian society vis-a-vis sex roles; 2) whether it could be such a society if certain actions and policies were followed; and 3) whether the claim that it "is not" and "ought not to be" strictly egalitarian in a new respect is based on the nature of equality between the sexes as an ahistorical component of our discussion or on a misreading of kibbutz research data and a complementary failure of the kibbutz in some respects as an institution of social invention.

In 1975 anthropologists Joseph Shepher and Lionel Tiger published a controversial study of how three generations of kibbutz women responded to freedom from their traditional roles (Tiger and Shepher, 1975). Their data were, in my opinion, conclusive in showing significant and alarming differences between men and women in participation in production (agricultural and industrial) and service (kitchen, laundry, education, support services) work branches, participation in weekly town meetings, representation on committees with substantial power, holding of important political offices and leadership positions, choice of academic training, scholarly achievement, military service, and orientation toward the family and child rearing. In all cases both sexes took on the more traditional roles with which we are familiar in the West. Shepher and Tiger concluded that sex differences in political and economic activity are universal and that the part of the kibbutz experiment that dealt with women and major changes in their lives supports this view when the evidence is examined. In their view, the behavioral differences noted above result from a species-wide attraction between mothers and their young based on a biogrammar which determines biologically-necessary social interactions basic to emotional and physical health.

So then, what is the advancement of Spiro's work over this earlier research? Spiro, who wrote two classic descriptions of the kibbutz social and educational system in the fifties (Spiro, 1956, 1958), decided on a different perspective. He was concerned with why the new kibbutz generation, which was born into the revolutionary egalitarian institutions, decided on a counterrevolution in the area of sex roles. He states: "Moreover, since this generation had been raised in and inculcated with the revolutionary expectations of the kibbutz founders, to explicitly ask the latter question is to implicitly address another: Do these changes represent the triumph of the old culture over the new, or do they represent the triumph of nature over culture?" (Spiro, 1979: xvii). He, thus, manages to narrow the argument over biogrammar; if we credit that critics of the precultural explanations may be right in assuming that kibbutz founders failed to equalize sex roles because their earlier socialization could not be brushed away, if we can prove that the next generation not only failed in this endeavor but made the roles more polarized, the discussion reaches critical mass.

First, Spiro discusses the ideology of female liberation. Early kibbutz members assumed that a conscious or unconscious attempt by men to exploit women was not a good explanation for sexual inequality. The author commits an error in assuming this is true. No systematic research on kibbutz women or men has tried to carefully define the elements of a possible male conspiracy. We do find that the move for sexual equality in the early part of this century in the kibbutz saw use of the phrase, "the biological tragedy of the women." He claims that the woman's reproductive system was seen as the major restraint on achieving equality. The community builders felt that, if they could relieve mothers of child rearing, "the social consequences set in motion by women's reproductive biology . . . would be reversed" (Spiro, 1979: 7). The sexual division of labor would be eliminated and equality in the economic realm would lead to and assure the same in politics, the home, and cultural life. Early members were striving for the "identity meaning of equality where men and women must be similar if not identical with respect to certain critical attributes."

True, the kibbutz, as a society of over 250 small cooperative towns with a population of 100,000, spread throughout Israel and made men and women similar if not identical in several critical attributes: work outside the home, economic equality, and access to physical and social services. For example, men and women each have one vote per person in a weekly town meeting that makes all decisions; they receive an identical education in the formal sense (some formal tracking based on sex exists in the subjects but there is no difference in access to educational resources); and child rearing, consumer buying, cooking for major meals, laundering, and household repairs are performed and organized outside the family unit by community work groups. It is in the context of this fairly utopian structural arrangement that the behavioral differences Shepherd and Tiger found are startling. Spiro's main argument, however, is that the kibbutz founders did not achieve what they wanted in terms of sexual

equality, but they did get an "equivalence" type of equality, which is not that bad since it was freely chosen by the second generation, it is not based on discrimination, and it seems to be based on some invariant characteristics of the human organism.

"Equivalence," as a type of equality, means "a pluralistic system of values, one in which the different forms assumed by the critical attributes are viewed as having more or less the same worth" (Spiro, 1979: 7). Spiro's whole argument, like Shepher and Tiger's, rests on the assumption that the founders of the kibbutz really did try to put the identity form of equality into practice and that they failed in this specific attempt. If, however, it can be proved that they never got beyond putting the equivalence type of equality into practice, then their failure cannot be seen as a "triumph of nature over culture" but as a half-baked attempt whose conclusion was also half-baked. An important distinction to make is between half-baked and half-hearted. Early kibbutz ideologues were fairly full-hearted about sexual equality; they were excited about it and talked about it in absolute terms. But there was a lot of heart lacking and the dough was never completely baked. My reviews of A History Of The Cooperative Movement In Palestine by Harry Viteles and the internal publications of one kibbutz, which is in the same political movement, a neighbor of, and very similar to the kibbutz Spiro studied, has unearthed discomfoting evidence. Viteles reviewed the ideological documents and reports and meeting minutes of most of the three kibbutz federations' deliberations from the twenties to the sixties (1967).

Let's start with heart. Kibbutz women disagreed among themselves on sexual equality as a goal and this often led to public arguments among the women. There are few, if any, examples of males defining sexual equality as changing their own behavior. The ideology was one-sided. Research done at Harvard's Project For Kibbutz Studies shows that only one-third of the kibbutz members fit the image of the aggressive ideologue which is the reigning myth of kibbutz founders (Blasi, 1979, 1980). The large number of members that joined for mostly personal if not very mixed reasons would seem to dilute any claim that there was strong coherence within the early ideology itself and that its diffusion was homogeneous among the founders. Spiro's sketch of the ideology makes it seem more whole than it was. He presents little direct evidence; and counter-evidence does exist. This issue must be systematically examined.

Now, did the kibbutz experiment in sexual equality mix and bake the whole loaf? I think not. Spiro overlooks some very obvious facts. Striving for an identity view of equality is not making child rearing (though collectivized) an almost total female work branch as did the early kibbutz members. He does agree that economic factors influenced the founders. If that is so, then they simply did not really try to systematically apply their ideology. Also, he makes a large case out of data showing that in fantasy play young girls in the kibbutz overwhelmingly choose the female role model while young boys choose animals (as opposed to female adults or male adults). He claims that the differences



are not to be explained by social learning theory because "during the same period in which we studied kibbutz children, kibbutz socializers refrained from administering these social reinforcements that might expectedly lead to sex preferences in behavior" (Spiro, 1979: 81). Let us put aside for the moment the fact that my personal experience indicates that there is moderate sex bias in socialization of kibbutz children in the educational system and in some cases strong sex bias in the parents' home (which research on the kibbutz tells us has a stronger influence). Further research can clarify this. I am concerned that Spiro overlooks the fact that seeing women all day is a good explanation as to why girls model them so much (especially women performing nurturing behaviors all day), and the absence of males in the educational system in the lower grades might explain why boys model animals and (by the way) engage in a lot of modeling of adult females, in fact, twice as much modeling for adult females as girls for adult males. Spiro makes very serious claims based on interpretive data collected in 1951. If such claims are to be made, then the history of how men and women ended up on their respective roles must be seriously considered.

A close reading of Viteles (1967) and other internal kibbutz publications indicates that in assembly meetings and federation conferences, proposals for social change continually came up and the representatives continuously designed specific structural and behavioral solutions. One long-term argument was the quality and quantity of labor power sent from individual kibbutzim to the work in the movement. Percentages were agreed upon after much argument and a labor-power tax was levied on each "co-operative neighborhood." Not so with sexual equality. The subject was always discussed without specific organizational solutions being presented (in most cases) or voted on. What, for example, would have been the effect of legislating that men and women should make up equal numbers of production and service branches? Or legislating that men should receive training in dealing with young children and make up half of the early schooling systems staff? True, the fact that this seemed weird to people who eliminated wage systems, created total social security, and developed an impressive direct democracy, only indicates that their hearts were not carefully defined on the matter (let us not forget their East European sexist legacy), and they did not have an awareness of sufficient organizational levers for effecting such change (Marx was not writing in the previous century about the details of sexual equality). We know that early kibbutz members did not have searching sessions to explore sex roles as are common in men's and women's groups today, separately and together. The kibbutz was a social invention that relied a lot on blanket structural innovations which made certain types of behavior impossible by mutual agreement on a new social structure. This was never tried in the sex-role realm as it was in the economic realm. Women were never given affirmative action education in engineering or economic planning to make sure they could serve on those committees or in those work branches. True, they never asked for it. And the men never asked for training in child development, cooking, or sewing. Another crucial historical fact is that the population of the initial kibbutzim were skewed with several



times more men than women. They were also extremely small (Eleazari-Volcani, 1927). Rosabeth Kanter (1976, 1977) has constructed a very persuasive argument that demographic dominance could have had a strong influence on the behaviors that followed. This cocoon effect of sexual polarization has been ignored by Spiro.

He, unfortunately, continues the tradition begun by Shepher and Tiger of focusing on what the women did not do as opposed to what the men did and did not do. This author will not be convinced of kibbutz sex-role research until this methodological bias is removed. In short, his survey of sabras (second generation members) in six veteran kibbutzim in 1976 corroborates the Shepher and Tiger behavioral data in the areas of sexual division of labor, governance, marriage, and emphasis on the family and femininity, but there is no convincing proof that the so-called "revolution in sex roles" was more than a half-baked attempt. It should be made clear that Spiro is not to be blamed for creating this image. Kibbutz members themselves have done this. Western social scientists only--incorrectly, I believe--presumed that the organizational innovations in the area of sex roles were as radical as economic, political, and child-centered innovations. (I, for one, do not consider a fully female collective child rearing system to be an innovation for women.)

Increasingly in the kibbutz research literature, the importance of infrastructure and supporting institutions are being emphasized to explain the social inventions in which the kibbutz succeeded (Leviatan and Rosner, 1980). Sexual equality simply did not have comparable supports, and, more importantly, it had no cultural or national ethic in then-Palestine and contemporary Israel to galvanize, organize, encourage, and prod kibbutz men and women. While not addressing this issue, Spiro puts much stress on his data asking sabras how they explained the situation to themselves. This section is an original and clear advancement over previous research, since, unlike the Shepher and Tiger work, it asks women and men how they evaluate their own sexual inequality and how they explain it. Nevertheless, their opinion that the explanation of the failure to reach the identity-type of equality is precultural, while it agrees with Spiro's view, should not be viewed as strengthening his theory. The fact that other forms of stratification in societies persist in most places and that some people believe that this cannot be overcome may not indicate truth, but rather an explanation of a phenomenon we have not been able to change. I do not mean to slight the exquisite job of describing the terrain, marshalling new data, reviewing other research, and honestly confronting other points of view. Unfortunately, Spiro weighs the opposing points of view and opposing evidence much too lightly and unpersuasively. He uses Blumberg's (1974) notion of the relative power of women versus men to control their life options to show that the reality of sexual equality in the equivalence sense is strong in the kibbutz. But the fact that kibbutz women are fully equal to men in deciding whether and whom to marry or about the termination of marriages, etc. does little to assess equality in the central spheres of social, political, and economic life and in the stratification of power, prestige, and resources. At least Tiger and Shepher were unabashed sociobiologists

favoring equality but claiming it was somehow unreachable. Spiro's "psychobiology" (an unfortunate attempt, I believe, to distance himself from the sociobiologists) wants to prove that inequality is really equality. He says, "In short, no individual or group of individuals should be prohibited from achieving sexual equality or the 'identity' meaning of equality. If, however, our findings are reliable, attempts to correct the inequities in any particular system of sex-role differentiation should be most effectively addressed to the achievement of its "equivalence" meaning, for it is the latter meaning of equality that is important for most people to achieve. Hence for any group of individuals to attempt to impose their particular reversal of panhuman distribution of sex differences on others is an insult of their basic human dignity" (Spiro, 1979: 109). This is blaming the victim. Why is the "equivalence" meaning of equality important for most people?

He claims that there is no discrimination in the kibbutz. This notion simply ignores historical evidence that proves there were never any affirmative attempts to provide education in economic planning, management, engineering, or agricultural science to kibbutz women nor education for men in the arts and childrearing, kitchen, and clothing. If one describes discrimination as preventing the structural supports to train people to do what they think they cannot do by agreeing with them and reaping the benefits, then in sex roles the kibbutz has definitely discriminated. As the doyen of world utopian inventions it should not be protected from this charge. Spiro admits that women have low-status occupations and inequitable work conditions but underrates and eventually dismisses the evidence. His attempt to explain away the low-status female service positions by noting that men also serve in support positions for production is misleading. The kibbutz carpenter and exterminator have more status than the women in the laundry.

Spiro claims that economic pressure forced some of these inequities and, thus, status inequality "does not represent a retreat from sexual equality as an ideal [but]. . . the unanticipated consequence of a simultaneous commitment to incompatible values" (Spiro, 1979: 51). This however is just the point. The kibbutz never marshalled the fine tuned interaction between psychological development on the individual level, inter-kibbutz infrastructure and institutions, and specific legislated local mechanisms in each community with a national ethic of sexual equality which might have achieved more success. The limitations of Spiro's viewpoint are further exposed when he claims that the reason 93 percent of the kibbutz women are not happy in their work is because of the limited range of occupations available to them. But it only follows that expanding their vocational alternatives ipso facto must entail the inclusion of women in production branches and men in service branches.

Arguing that Spiro's explanations can sustain alternative approaches is different from claiming that the "social policy" of theory is misguided. I do not believe, in agreement with him, that much will change in most kibbutzim for women or men in regard to their roles. Women and men support the equivalence meaning of equality because they are trapped



by historical circumstances and have trouble imagining more effort for equality on top of what they have already achieved. Both sexes have individuals who have interests of power and self-centeredness served by the status quo, and neither is repressed or oppressed enough in total in other areas of their lives (as many other Western women are) to be very revolutionary. Kibbutz women are not organized as a movement. They argue their cases individually and not as a group. They grab at their children and their families beyond the point of justified nurturance because that is all they have to hold on to. Israeli society is sexist and its political situation and legacy of war creates a certain unwritten agreement about claims women will or will not make on their men. The addition of missing segments I suggested might bring some kibbutzim to the next stage of meeting their egalitarian challenge, but we cannot use the kibbutz as a simple guide to our own plans for sexual equality. Its history and culture are unique, and many, if not most, of the segments lacking there, are, in fact, the driving force behind tremendous changes in sexual differentiation in our society. What can be learned from the kibbutz is that men and women can strive very hard and still achieve little. Perhaps social-learning communities or neighborhoods like kibbutzim with these missing segments would be capable of achieving the identity-type of sexual equality in the context of the kibbutz's outstanding achievements in other areas of social, political, economic, and educational life. For do we want men and women to be equal in an unequal society?

When we find that men and women are unequal in an equal society we should not rush to psychobiology post haste. Indeed, Spiro became persuaded that his final analysis of the childhood of adult second generation kibbutz members shields him from this criticism. He discards some items too quickly. He does own up to the seeming logic of his interpretations and those I have presented. He hopes to prove that if sex differences are culturally acquired we would expect children raised in the kibbutz learning environment to have displayed few, if any, sexual differences in behavior. This is based on the assumption that the children at a very young age are somehow kept from the structural differences in the adult world and that their education was nonsexist.

I have already indicated that important correspondences between the childhood and subsequent adult behavior of kibbutz sabras is understandable because the structure of the educational system (early years) is totally polarized. Social-learning theory would not suggest children can be protected from this (Bandura, 1977). They are taught to expect, think about, model, be rewarded for, talk about, and motivate sexual differentiation. There are no tables in his book presenting data on these claims. Kibbutz children's education is quite sexist. For example, neither children's books, lesson plans, television, nor radio programs favor a nonsexist education, and no compensatory "explanations" exist. The above sources of differentiation certainly offer a powerful alternative explanation to Spiro's 1951 data showing that kibbutz boys preferred strenuous interaction with toys, macroscopic play, and locomotor play over girls. The lack of verbal reinforcement he claims exists in kibbutz education-- this claim must be proven--might not destroy these other influences. Also,



it is patently strange to imagine an environment of so much sexual differentiation as the kibbutz avoiding a sexist education in such a pure way. My observations do not support his claim that the social-learning explanation will not work. Since he repeatedly claims that "Kibbutz socializers attempted to discourage rather than encourage sex differences" (Spiro, 1979: 88), one wonders what women who believe in psychobiology are doing striving to be so impartial!

Nonfantasy play not involving identification with adults is shown in 1951 data to yield significant differences between the children according to sex. Spiro proves that the boys' nonfantasy play prefigures male roles and the girls' female roles and then claims that "since it is unlikely that the later differences were culturally acquired, it seems reasonable to assume it . . . was to a large extent by sex differences in precultural motivational dispositions" (Spiro 1979: 92). In light of the above considerations, this is not persuasive.

Also, nonplay behavior indicating male aggressivity and female integrativeness, which are also called differences in instrumental-expressive leadership patterns, are said to "hardly have been influenced by differential reinforcement for . . . [both sexes] were strongly encouraged to engage in cooperative and to refrain from aggressive behavior . . . [and] among adults physical aggression was practiced by neither sex, and adult leadership roles were beyond the experience of these pre-school children. These differences in childhood, in short, were most likely based on precultural determinants" (Spiro, 1979: 94). If there were truly equality between adult men and women in the kibbutz and the kibbutz educational system were truly nonsexist, I could entertain this conclusion, but, in fact, males in the kibbutz do engage in cooperative behaviors and do it while they take the high-status positions, the instrumental positions, the leadership positions, the military positions, and the physically active positions. I do not accept the notion that physical aggression in adults is necessary to explain the boys' behavior. What about their memory of wars, television military experiences, and the deaths of male figures in wars?

Finally, his conclusion which dismisses external cultural and historical conditions and culturally-acquired motives is not without substantial and reasonable alternative interpretations, unintegrated data (that exists), and the need for empirical investigation. To his credit, Spiro notes that "The problem is too complex, the data are too limited, and our methods of investigation were too primitive to permit an unequivocal interpretation" (Spiro, 1979: 96). The weight of the evidence is in the other direction. The kibbutz would be useful in studying the sex-role issue in family and community settings as contrasted with the sex-role issue as experienced in national trends. After all, if such an innovation is possible, it will be combined with local patterns of intimacy and fellowship. Every "new woman" or "new man" will not live in a luxury apartment in Manhattan with many resources, few stable attachments, much upward mobility, and no children. The kibbutz can be

useful in evaluating the respective advantages of national and infrastructural approaches to "identity equality" and aggressive intentional efforts in local settings. Those desirous of the identity equality have dismissed the kibbutz as unfortunate and useless and, evidently, as an "uncomfortable place to visit."

Spiro's assertion that psychobiology is the right interpretation of kibbutz data simply ignores important historical evidence and is based on many questionable interpretations of his own data and others' research. We are at the point where careful historical analyses, social learning analyses, examinations of kibbutz sex-role social policy, and other more microscopic research initiatives are needed. These must look deeply into areas and documentation which we only lightly brush against at this time. The availability of much empirical (or at least statistical) data has given scholars the illusion that "the evidence is in, only interpretation awaits us." The effect of this approach has been to effect widespread conceding of "what the evidence is" among these people who disagree on interpreting it, while encouraging more abstract argumentation and theorizing among the conflicting schools of thought. Perhaps further research is needed.

CHAPTER SEVEN  
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:  
THE KIBBUTZ AS AN EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL  
AND SEXUAL EQUALITY

Marilyn P. Safir

Is human nature biologically determined, or is human behavior basically flexible, influenced by learning and the environment? These two diametrically opposed approaches are both reflected in research on the position of women in Israel, and in particular, women in kibbutzim. This young country inhabited by people from diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, unique in its compulsory military draft for both men and women, famed for its Golda Meir, has been a focus of interest for social scientists in the last decades--particularly concerning the position of women.

Sociobiologists and psychologists seemed to have been influenced by, for example, Konrad Lorenz's studies (1963-1966) on the evolution of animal behavior. In this vein, Tiger and Shepher (1975) see current social structures (e.g., the kibbutz) as biologically programmed. Masculine and feminine behaviors are thought to result from evolved biological differences--man, the hunter; woman, the child bearer. Spiro, in his reanalysis of kibbutz data (1980) also comes to the conclusion of a basic difference in the nature of men and women.

Proponents of the flexible nature of human behavior do not view anatomy (biology) as destiny. John Money in a series of articles stresses the importance of the pre- and post-natal environment in the development of masculine and feminine behavior (e.g., 1963, 1970). In fact, Money and Ehrhardt (1974) have investigated cases of imposed gender identification and have found that girls or boys reared as a member of the opposite sex view themselves and behave in a manner appropriate to their rearing--not to their biological sex. They conclude that sexual identification and behavior is modified by the psychosociological environment. Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) have found that, for the most part, attributed differences between the sexes in terms of skills, activity, and interest are myths, not supported by research findings.

The kibbutz is a system of collective living unique to Israel and has made a communal practice of childbearing, laundering, and food preparation. Tiger and Shepher ask:

What happens to women who entrust their children's care to communal nurseries from the age of two to six weeks on? What happens to women who are supported not by their husbands, but by the collective to which they belong?... To women whose communities are ideologically devoted to equality and for decades have stressed the ideal of sexual equality?... To women who are drafted into military service, wear uniforms, and carry rifles?... To women whose food is cooked in communal kitchens and whose clothing is cleaned in communal laundries?



The investigators ask these questions because they view the kibbutz as a social experiment to change human nature in relation to money and position, social equality and family relations.

These authors find this experiment failed in the particular area of sexual equality. They interpret this failure as the direct result of women's intrinsic nature, implying that it is the result of some biologically programmed tendency. In spite of all the opportunities presented to women, each succeeding generation of kibbutz women has become more traditional--i.e. services oriented--in their work choice, marrying younger, having more children. In addition, women are more personally interested and involved in their children's care: bringing them more and more into the home, insisting on their sleeping there instead of in the children's house.

Tiger and Shepher point out that the kibbutz has failed to establish sexual equality. After having analyzed the data of four generations of kibbutz members, they found extreme polarization of labor by sex, with most work categories being carried out by 70-80 per cent of either women or men, i.e., services vs. agriculture. This polarization is even greater among persons raised on the kibbutz, as compared with those who join the kibbutz as adults. Younger kibbutzim are more polarized in their division of labor than older kibbutzim. The newer the kibbutz, the greater the tendency towards polarization of work categories in each succeeding generation.

They found that men work primarily in agriculture, industry and management. Women who are employed in agriculture are confined to its "easier" aspects, i.e., in the hothouses, vegetable farming, and poultry raising. In industry, women tend to work in ceramics, plastics, printing, textiles and arts and crafts. In heavier industries, women's work is confined exclusively to administration. The majority of these administrative jobs, say Tiger and Shepher, are the routine jobs of typists, bookkeepers and technical secretaries.

Women predominate in the areas of education and service. It was found that no men work with infants and preschoolers. Men constitute less than 18 percent of the labor personnel in elementary schools, about 40 percent in high schools, and 35 percent in work with outside youth groups. In all of these sub-categories, they are always employed as teachers, never as childcare workers (metaplot). Women are used exclusively to care for the young in the children's houses, to work in the laundries, do the cooking, repair and iron the clothing. When men do work in the service areas, they are likely to be employed in maintenance, general storeroom--as opposed to the clothing storeroom--work, shoemaking, sanitation, and in the library, archives and club-houses.

Women are usually underrepresented in political activity, in central management positions on the kibbutz and in the inter-kibbutz movement activities.

Apart from cultural definitions of what is women's or men's work, it is possible to define work on the basis of the ratio of men to women in a particular job, as well as the availability of a particular job. Tiger and Shepher examined movement from work category to work category, classifying their data into (1) male, (2) female, and (3) neutral jobs, and into three time phases (1) first work, (2) longest work, (c) last work.

Their findings reveal that neutral work tends to be temporary and rarely long-term, for example, the student at college. The most frequent pattern for both men and women is in same-sexed type job from start to finish, i.e., men - a1 b1 c1; women - a2 b2 c2. In other words, about two-thirds of women and three-quarters of the men work in the same sex jobs in all time phases. Also, more men than women start out in same-sexed jobs: approximately 77 percent versus 67 percent. More men than women who begin in same-sex jobs end in same-sexed jobs: 85 percent versus 75 percent.

The only movement of men into women's jobs occurs with increasing age, when men are no longer able to work in production jobs. Women tend to move out of men's jobs with the birth of their first child.

Disagreement with Tiger and Shepher (1975) is based not on their statistical findings but on their conclusions that the kibbutz, as a social experiment, succeeded in establishing communal life and property, but did not in the area of sexual equality as a result of woman's nature.

The aim of this chapter is to examine how adequately this experiment to establish sexual equality was designed. In order to fulfill this goal, we must examine the social environment in which the kvutza (the forerunner of the kibbutz) and the kibbutz movement were developed during the early part of this century.

The kibbutz was a dream of ghetto youth, coming primarily from Eastern Europe. In order to free and empower the prototype ghetto Jew, they believed they would have to develop a socialist communal society. They banded together in Zionist groups that would return to their Jewish homeland to create their communal utopias. They aspired to establish a new society in which there would be equality for all; human dignity devoid of exploitation. Production was collectivized and the members received goods and services according to their needs rather than according to individual productivity. The group became more important than the good of any individual. Marriage was rejected as reactionary, a cornerstone for the traditional economic structure and also threatening to group solidarity, and consequently, family ties were also rejected.

Strong prohibitions existed in the early years against marriage and child bearing (Talmon, 1972; Shepher, 1968). When couples did form, they were expected to behave towards one another in public in the same way they would to another member. The couple never worked together and often did not receive vacations and time off together. These strictures were in fact a necessity to the group's solidarity since women were outnumbered by at least 2 to 1.

Other factors that reinforced these anti-familial attitudes were inherent in the original structure of the kibbutz. In addition to being an agricultural settlement, the kibbutz was a military outpost that had to defend the country as well as its own existence. Talmon describes the situation:

Each new settlement marked a further step into more outlying and more arid frontier regions; it fought its way under great odds: eroded barren soil, a severe scarcity of water, inadequate training of the settlers, and a lack of capital resources for basic investment. On top of all this lay the heavy burden of self-defense in a hostile environment. Settlement entailed, in most cases, a long, preparatory period of entrenchment, land reclamation, and experimentation, during which cultivation yielded little or no profit.

The kibbutzim overcame almost insurmountable difficulties by channeling most of their manpower and capital into production, and by restricting consumption and services to a bare minimum. The non-familistic division of labor was to a large extent a matter of economic necessity. Centralized communal organization of the non-productive branches of the economy enabled the kibbutzim to reduce investment in these spheres, and to utilize fully the productive capacity of the members. It also made it possible to reduce the number of women engaged in social services and to draw many of them into active participation in the effort to advance production. (1972:5)(emphasis mine)

Why then, if manpower was in short supply, were women outnumbered over two to one? In spite of the economic necessity of women entering into traditional male jobs to meet the kibbutz workpower needs, women settlers had to fight prejudice to join the kibbutz and then to be allowed to do men's work.

Daphna Izraeli (1981) analyzed the Zionist Women's movement in Palestine, 1911-1927, paralleling the period that the kibbutzim were being established. Her findings revealed some interesting trends and concepts which influenced daily life in Palestine and the early kvutzot/kibbutzim.

If we look at the general attitudes towards sexual equality, we find that:



Labor Zionism was ideologically committed to social equality and did not concern itself with the issues of women's emancipation. One explanation may lie in the socialist theory: that if the elimination of exploitative relationships automatically results in women's emancipation, then within the new society in Palestine, women's emancipation must be assured. A more persuasive explanation, however, is that the Zionist movement defined the problem of Jewish existence as the fundamental and overriding social issue to which all efforts had to be directed. (Izraeli, 1981:4)

What do we know of these early pioneers to Palestine with their dream of revitalizing the Jewish homeland?

The move to Palestine required determination and idealism from all the immigrants, but even more so from the women. They had to combat the traditionally stronger social control exerted by parents over daughters, the stigma attached to a single woman leaving home, especially in the company of a group of men, as well as the physical hardship of the passage itself. It is not surprising that women composed only about 30 percent of the total immigrants to Palestine, many of whom joined the religious communities in the holy cities. Among the minority who came to live a productive life as laborers -- those whose initiative, energy and ideological fervor were the dominant force for change in the structure of the Jewish community -- the proportion of women was even smaller.

Women came to Palestine ready to participate more fully in social life than they had been permitted to do in Jewish bourgeois circles in Russia. In the words of Sara Malchin, a founder of the women's movement:

"These young women Zionists dreamed of engaging in battle and sacrifice for the ideal of redemption, even while still in the diaspora."

They did not expect to struggle for women's places, they thought equality would be an accompanying feature of their move to the new homeland. (Izraeli, 1981:6-7)

Among the two most important cultural creations of the second wave of immigration were the image of the ideal pioneer -- the halutz -- and the ideal form

of social organization -- the kvutza (forerunner of the kibbutz). Halutz literally means a member of the vanguard, one who goes before the camp and fulfills its highest purposes. These include a readiness for personal sacrifice made necessary by the persistent dangers of working in the malaria-infested swamplands and of defending the young collectives from attack by Arab marauders, belief in a return to the biblical state of farming the land, and dedication to manual work. During the second wave, physical work was idealized and elevated to a religious value. These key elements of the halutz ideal had an essentially masculine character, which heightened the relevance of biological differences between the sexes.

The most urgent problem facing the new immigrants upon their arrival in Palestine was employment. In vain they knocked at the doors of the established farmers of the first wave (1881-1891) who were unwilling to substitute Jewish labor for the cheaper more experienced and amenable Arab labor. Women faced greater obstacles than men. The first wave farmers considered their insistence on having "men's jobs" "unnatural." They stigmatized and ostracized the women and forbade their own daughters any contact with them. Those who were less antagonistic feared for the women's safety. (Izraeli, 1981:7-8)

The early pioneers, both men and women, did not find employment in Palestine as they did not have the skills necessary for agriculture, so these young people

...moved north to the barren lands of the lower Galilee, drained the swamps and established a new type of communal life -- kvutza -- a small collective settlement in which everyone labored.

Two of the guiding principles of the new settlement were "conquering the land," that is, making it arable for Jewish farmers, and economic self-sufficiency. The kvutza was a pragmatic solution for the pioneers who faced the problem of "how to organize some form of settlement for young people with strong socialist and nationalist aspirations, without capital and with little experience and know-how. This form of living very quickly became a normative ideal.

In the kvutza the women were automatically assigned to the kitchen and the laundry. It seems that among the men and many of the women, the conscious rebellion against the traditional occupational structure of Jewish society did not extend to women's work. It remained part of the "world taken for granted" that domestic work was the woman's responsibility. The attitude of the man is described by one of the women pioneers in an article that appeared in the socialist party newspaper at the time:

"Many (of the workers) believed that the role of the young female idealist coming to Palestine was to serve them. The young women, who were still inexperienced, submitted to this view and believed that in cooking and serving they were solving most of our questions (concerning our role) in Palestine. The young woman who dared to doubt this assumption was considered strange."

It is ironic that the women should have been expected to perform domestic tasks, which in their former homes usually had been the responsibility of the domestics. They were poorly equipped for the jobs they were expected to fill so "naturally," and doubly frustrated because the roles for which they had hoped were denied them. Although the men had been neither farmers nor watchmen prior to immigration, it was assumed natural for them to undertake these "manly" roles. Ploughing and loading crops were considered too strenuous and even harmful for women...

Since the training men received from professional agronomists in Palestine was usually not extended to women, the "ability gap" between the sexes widened. Economic considerations also encouraged the perpetuation of a traditional division of labor between the sexes: The newly formed communes were dependent on the World Zionist Organization, which had yet to be convinced that agricultural collectivism was preferable to the previous system of farms under the direction of a professional agronomist in which the pioneers were paid a wage, women paid less than men. The halutzim (plural form of halutz) had to prove that the kvutza was economically viable. Viewing women as less productive, they feared that their participation in agriculture would result in a deficit, and so women were confined to more "suitable" jobs: The same men who had demanded that



the farmers of the first wave overlook economic considerations on ideological grounds and prefer them to Arab laborers, accepted only one to three women into a kvutza with between 1-30 male members on the grounds that women were economically less productive. The fact that women were so few bound them even more strictly to domestic chores, because it was impossible for them to rotate between kitchen and field work. In 1909, there were 165 Jewish workers organized in kvutzot, or workers collectives in the Galilee, only 11 of whom were women. In 1912, there were 522 Jewish workers in kvutzot in Judea, 30 of whom were women. During the war years, the number of workers rose to 1,500 while the proportion of women increased to over 13 percent (200 women).

Domestic chores--although physical work--had low status among the pioneers who established a hierarchy of values according to both the conditions under which work was performed and the type of work engaged in. A member of a collective had higher status than someone who was an employee: "productive work," work that produced marketable goods, was deemed more valuable than "non-productive work," such as services provided for the members of the collective. Thus, cooking, laundering, and mending were not considered "productive work," and they ranked low among pioneering values. Cooking for a collective held greater prestige than cooking in a private household, but it was less "worthy" than tilling the soil. Within productive work, agriculture, specifically field crops (falcha), became the embodiment of the halutz endeavor, symbolizing economic self-sufficiency as well as rejection of the pattern set by the farmers of the first wave with their dependence on Arab labor and foreign markets.

One of the unintended consequences of this pioneering ideology as well as of the new forms of social organization was that they relegated women to secondary roles in the new society. The halutza (female form of pioneer) had virtually no opportunity to become a bearer of the effective symbols of the halutz ideology. Thus, the women's dissatisfaction and growing sense of deprivation came to focus on three issues: formal status, participation, and attitudes in the kvutza.

In these early years, women were not accorded full membership; it was taken for granted that the kvutza was made up of male members and the few women were helpers doing domestic work. They were not included as members in the annual contracts with the Zionist Organization even though "they had shared the burden and dangers equally with the men." As Maimon explains, "it was argued that in point of fact the women were working for them (the male members of the kvutza) not for the Palestine Office (of the Zionist Organization) which was concerned with the farm, not with the kitchen."

In addition, the women felt deprived of the opportunity to "conquer new fields of work" through agriculture and to guard the kvutza as the men were doing, and they resented the restrictions placed on their participation in group decision making about the affairs of the kvutza. In an article "On the Question of the Women Workers" which appeared in the workers' newspaper in 1913, Tchiya Liberson bemoaned the fact that: "The men could not get used to thinking of them (the women) as real members. They did not want to come to terms with the fact that the women express their ideas freely about how matters should be handled and that they stand firm in their opinions." The problem of women's participation in group meetings was exacerbated by the fact that relatively few knew Hebrew, the language of religious instruction in the diaspora, and of the pioneers of Palestine. A study of second wave pioneers still living in Palestine in 1940 found that 60 percent of men, but only 30 percent of women, knew Hebrew upon arrival. (Izraeli, 1981:8-13)

In spite of these hardships, i.e., denial of full membership in the kvutza; the policy of restrictions on the number of women pioneers (halutzot) who could join a kvutza; the handicap of not being fluent in the language of their new home, these women were optimistic:

By defining self-alteration as their major goal, the halutzot adopted a stance that fitted well with the dominant ideology and was, therefore, attractive. The women believed that they had the same potential as men, though for historical reasons it had remained dormant. Through training as manual workers, they would overcome their passive, dependent character. Once the halutza proved her skill, she would not only be accepted as a full member in the kvutza, but men would seek her out. (Izraeli, 1981:17)

This approach evolved into what Spiro (1980) called the "identity" meaning of equality: "Viewing the domestic activities that are related to women's reproductive biology and that are traditionally conceived as feminine--childbearing, childrearing, homemaking, and the like--as inferior to and of lesser value than those extradomestic activities that are traditionally viewed as masculine. This ideology held that women could achieve equality with them if, but only if (economically at least), they became like men. Indeed for the pioneer woman any kind of sexual differentiation, including sexual dimorphism, was viewed as a symbol of female inferiority, and hence to be minimized as far as possible" (1980:7-8). This resulted in the women trying to look as much as possible like men, wearing trousers, no cosmetics, jewelry, etc.

In spite of accepting masculine values, the women continually had to battle. Joseph Baratz (1954) in his history of Kibbutz Degania makes reference to these struggles. He first reported how a frail youth developed into one of the best workers at Degania, and continued:

All the men in the kvutza worked happily from the beginning, but at first the women were not happy. The reason why there were only two of them was that we still thought women could only cook and wash. We men went out before dawn, six of us with our mules and ploughs, and we stayed out until after dark; then we would come home and wash and have our meal, and then we would sit for hours talking about our work, telling each other about our animals, how the soil was getting black, and later how the green was showing. We were so enthusiastic, there was never any end to it. The women listened and were jealous, their work was quite different and the conditions for it were very hard. There were neither stoves nor kerosene -- not to speak of electricity as there is now. They cooked in the open over a wood fire on two stones placed upright, the bitter smoke blowing in their eyes, and in the end the food tasted of smoke and was only half cooked. They scrubbed and they sewed, they even saw to it that we washed and put on clean shirts for the Sabbath, but they had no part in our working lives.

One day they came to us, 'Listen to us,' they said. 'We came to this country with the one idea in our hearts - to work and to live with nature. But what now? You men are happy, you like your work, but we are worse off than our mothers were in their small towns. What do you yourselves think of it? Should we continue in this way, with this difference between your lot and ours?'



We couldn't understand them. Our fathers had been breadwinners and our mothers had cooked. 'How else can it be?' we asked. 'Should a woman plough? Or should the men cook? What would other people think of us? We would be ashamed before everybody.'

But our women gave us no rest. They insisted that things must change, that we should buy cows and chickens and grow vegetables so that there would be work for the women, and that more women should be sent for. It was a difficult problem, we couldn't understand it and it made us suffer. And how were we to have vegetable plots when we had no irrigation and every pail of water had to be brought up by mule or hand?

But in the end the women won. Gradually we understood and we changed. Now we know that women can do farm work, that they can even plough, and they can even fight. Not their words but their actions have proved it to us. But it took us a long time, and even after we had introduced mixed farming this question kept coming up. Every time a new branch of farming was started, somebody would ask if a man ought not to be put in charge and the women kept to housework. Now it is no longer a problem in Degania, but it still is in some other settlements, even though it has long been the custom for women to hold responsible jobs on the farm.

At the time when these arguments about mixed farming were going on, we didn't realize that we would have to introduce it anyhow; without it we could never have improved our crops. (Baratz, 1954:52-53)

I have chosen another example where Baratz tells us about his wife:

At the time we got the cows, Miriam was away on a visit to her father in Russia. When she came back, she found two young men looking after the cows; they had learned to do it in Germany. This wasn't her idea at all and she begged and begged them to teach her to milk, but they thought it unsuitable; 'A woman to come near the big brutes, no!' So she went to the wife of the local Arab Sheikh and asked her to teach her; several times she crept out at night to the Arab village and one morning, when the sleepy young men arrived in the cow shed, there was Miriam grinning at them and the pails frothing with milk. In the end, though she worked also in the poultry yards, she made the dairy her life work. (Baratz, 1954:N.P.)

The Plough Woman (1975), a book of memoirs of pioneer women in Palestine\*, has a number of vignettes that also touch on the problems these women had to overcome to be accepted as "equals."

For example, Deborah Dayan (Moshe's mother) was an active socialist in Russia, and the only Jewish girl in the entire village where she studied. She was a socialist member of the village council. She writes of her early days at Degania with much happiness and without much feminist awareness.

I am in the kvutzah of Deganiah, by the Jordan. Today for the first time I am permitted to bake the bread on my own responsibility. "Bread for fifty people!" I say to myself, and alternately I swell up with pride and shrink with terror. How does a little creature like myself come to understand this tremendous task, and face a gigantic oven full of loaves? Yes, I know the theory of it perfectly. B., the skillful baker, has taught me everything. She told me exactly how long to knead the dough, she told me when to add the water, and was very emphatic about adding only a little at a time.

She gives me her instructions and goes out. And now I must convert theory into practice. A little time passes and my hands begin to tremble with exhaustion. The fingers won't obey orders. I put all my strength into it - but the flour will not turn into dough. I know I oughtn't to do it, but I add more water and the flour turns into a sticky, sloppy mess. I can't pull my hands out without dragging everything along. I twist them, rub them - no use! My back aches, I am tortured by thirst, the flies settle on my face and I can't drive them away. They crawl over my forehead, into my eyes and mouth. "Bread for fifty people!" I repeat to myself and attack the mess of flour and water again. I feel all my strength running out of me. I stand on one foot, then on the other. I try to think of other things, but I am haunted by one thought; I want to add more water. M. passes by and looks at me with pitying eyes.

And now - at last, the first good signs. Something like dough begins to emerge. It grows smoother and less clinging, and I can free my hands. I can add water, drink a little myself, and wipe the sweat off my face. The torture changes to pleasure. A stone has fallen from my heart, or I feel as if I had just thrown off my winter mantle and run out with the first sign of spring, over the green meadows.

\*originally published in 1932.

It seems to me that only yesterday I was a thing torn by doubts and hesitations. In the noisy city, in the great library, in the museum, in the classes, the question would suddenly confront me: Why are you doing these things? Who needs you? Can't they do without you and people like you? And in such moments a paralysing apathy would creep over me; I wanted to see no one, speak with no one. But now? My comrades are out in the field, mowing the harvest which we have sown. Close by I hear the mill grinding out grain. And the flour from the mill comes straight to me, and I bake the bread for all of us. Bread is surely needed. (Shazar, 1975:54-55)

Another example--B.B. who at age 16 or 17 wanted to become a worker and join a kvutza, wrote of a conversation she had in a worker's club:

"Why don't you come into the club and fix things the way you want?"

"I don't want to work in the kitchen. I want to join a kvutzah. I want to learn to work."

"They won't take you into a kvutzah. The kvutzoth aren't for young girls like you. Besides, you can't speak Hebrew. Forget the kvutzah - it's just a dream."

"It's not a dream," I answered proudly. "My brother has friends in a kvutzah, and they'll take me in."

"You have a brother here?"

"Yes, and a sister, too."

"Well, well. And who are they?"

"You know them, I think. Their names are Ezra and Hemdah."

"What? Hemdah is your sister? You don't look a bit like her. Listen, if your brother vouches for you, they may let you in. But you might as well know that's just a pull."

"No it isn't. My brother is known over there, and he says they can use me. And I hope to start work soon."

"But what do you want a kvutzah for?" they started again. "Why don't you join us? We need a girl in the kitchen just now."



"No, I'm going to wait. I want to go to a kvutzah if I can."

When I went out of the club that evening, the two boys went out after me, and for a little while I caught part of their conversation. . . They were wondering whether I would ever become a real worker.

Two weeks passed and no answer came from the kvutzah. I grew uneasy and wondered at the reason. Was it true that it was all a matter of pull? Were they ashamed to answer "no" just because my brother had applied for me? Often in the street the two young men I had met at the club passed me by. They smoothed down their masses of hair, greeted me with "Shalom" but did not stop to speak to me. What was going to happen with me? Would I have to work in the club after all?

At the end of two weeks my brother came in one evening and found me in tears. He was startled.

"What's the matter?"

"I don't understand you," I sobbed. "I'm here two weeks, I can't get into a kvutzah, and you take it so calmly - as if I'd come here just so."

My brother looked relieved.

"Is that all? I thought something was really the matter. If that's all you want, well, I've got an answer from the kvutzah. They ask you to come."

"Read me the letter."

"They say that one of the girls is sick, and there is no one to work in the kitchen. They want you to take the train tomorrow afternoon and at three o'clock they will meet you at the station."

"Kitchen?" I stammered. "I don't know how to cook. What am I going to do there?" (Shazar, 1975:66-68)

Again, the acceptance of a woman into the group, but into the traditional work pattern. We see that working in the kitchen was the obvious solution and many women accepted this solution through a lack of awareness of the prejudices involved. In this case B.B. did not succeed in the kitchen having never cooked before. Being unused to the primitive conditions, she broke a number of things to the chagrin of the kvutza. She continued describing a discussion about what to do with her.

That evening I was again the subject of discussion. Again they asked Abraham: "Well, are you still going to teach her?"

Abraham lost his temper. "Why do you pick on me? Am I responsible? Did I bring her here?"

Shachar added: "I talked with Hasidah. She said we ought to take her out of the kitchen -- we can't stand all that damage. Anyway, she can do some washing. Since Hasidah fell sick, no washing has been done, and we haven't a clean thing to put on for the work."

I am asked if I can wash clothes. Sure! I am filled with joy: here's something I can do, at last.

When I got up early next morning, there were already two barrels of water at hand, brought by Abraham. He showed me the three stones which served as stove, and the heap of thorns which served as fuel. Following Abraham's advice, I poured a lot of washing soda into the hot water and rubbed the clothes well. But when I got to the dark clothes, I couldn't rub anymore, because there was no more skin on my hands. I could neither wash the clothes nor wring them out. Miserable, ashamed, humiliated to my helplessness, I began to cry. It was the first time in my life that things were going against me. And when Abraham came up, I showed him my hands.

He smiled, "You're a real worker." he said, "there's no getting away from that. Leave the clothes in the boiler, with water. You'll finish tomorrow."

I took down the wash, which was dry by now, and went into Hasidah's room. The village nurse was there. As I came in, I heard her say:

"Now that you've got a new girl, things'll be easier for you."

"She's not much of a help." Hasidah said. "We've made an unlucky choice. She wants to work, but she doesn't know how. And she's too childish for a kvutzah."

The nurse asked me to sew two towels together and make a compress.

"I can't," I said. "My hands are all raw, and I can't straighten my fingers out."

"Let me see. How did you get them that way?"

"From the wash."

There was a frightened look on her face. "Don't let any water come on your hands for the next few days."

"How can I do that? There's a tubful of laundry outside."

Hasidah smiled. "That's my help. There's something queer about her. The first thing she told me was that she has a lot of clothes, and her sister has even longer braids than she."

After a pause she added: "It looks as though a long time will have to pass before we have the right kind of people coming to the country." (Shazar, 1975:76-78)

This last example reveals the prejudice of a woman who worked hard to earn her place--washing and cooking for the kvutzah--towards this very young and inexperienced upper class girl who wanted to be accepted as a worker.

Miriam Schlimowitch wrote about the womens' communes and why they developed:

We, the chalutzoth (women pioneers) of the third immigration stream of 1919 to 1923, found it hard to understand the women workers' movement of Palestine. We had been brought up in and by the Russian revolution, at a time when women were occupying important economic and cultural positions. We believed that the wall which divided man's work from woman's had fallen forever. I, at least, was therefore astonished to find in Palestine separate women workers' institutions. If the enterprises to be found in the women workers' farms are also to be found in the general farms, why the separate farms? But before long the realistics of Palestinian life taught me to approach the woman question in quite another way.

Soon after my arrival, I went to work in one of the kvutzoth in Galilee. I was bitterly disappointed when I perceived how small the role was which the women played, how weak their influence on the common



system. And doubt awoke in me. It was possible that the woman comrade did not earn her own keep, brought in less than she used up! Would it therefore not be better for me to return to my earlier work, and be a teacher once again? There at least I would be sure of doing creative work, and of feeling no difference between myself and the men comrades. I was offered the post of teacher in a large kvutzah which had a school. I promised to give my answer shortly, and meanwhile set out for the town of Tel Aviv.

On the way I made a detour to the farm of women workers at Nachlath Jehudah. The work of the women there made a tremendous impression on me. Here were women carrying on without help, on their own initiative and responsibility, and doing as well as the men. I made up my mind to try once more for land work. Hannah Chisick, who directed the place, proposed that I work half-days on the farm, and in the evenings teach the women Hebrew. I accepted.

We worked under difficult conditions. The farm got its water from the colony of Nachlath Jehudah. We had no cistern or pipes of our own. I and another woman were busy all day long lugging cans of water from the barrels while another comrade had to run every so often to the colony council to plead for more water. And as soon as there was a quarrel between ourselves and the council, they threatened to cut off the water. And there were actually days when we had to bring our water from Rishon le-Zion, if we did not want the shoots in the nursery to wither and die, or let the cattle and fowl go thirsty. The summer was embittered by this situation and only in the rainy winter season did we breathe freely.

But in spite of all the hardships and suffering, the work had life and content. The colonists who came to see "the work of the girl pioneers" had nothing but praise. It was a joy to look at the tree nursery. Before long, our settlement had made a name for itself as a model farm. The women believed in themselves and in the path they were indicating for the women workers of Palestine.

I worked, as a matter of fact, all day long, and evenings I taught the girls. Teaching was a sort of continuation of the day's occupation; the lessons in Hebrew and in working class literature were echoes of our daily experience.

In the winter we sold the nursery, and the colony balance sheet showed a profit. This was triumph! It showed that the women workers' farm could stand on its own feet. (Shazar, 1975:159-160)

Rachel Janaitz wrote:

From the beginning of her appearance in the country twenty-five years ago, the woman worker has been closely bound up with the general labor movement; and yet the ways of the women workers are peculiar to themselves.

Even at the outset, when workers took their first grip on the land, in the days of the first kvutzoth - Sedjera, Deganiah, Kinereth and Merchaviah - days of triumph for the workers' ideals, even in those days some of the women workers had already separated off into a special women's kvutzah or commune, a kvutzah without a home, a wandering kvutzah which had neither soil nor a plan nor budget.

What brought this thing about?

In the thick of that passionate movement toward the land, the women workers suddenly found themselves thrust aside and relegated once more to the ancient tradition of the house and the kitchen. They were amazed and disappointed to see how the cleavage was opening, the men comrades really uniting themselves with the land, but they, though on it, not becoming part of it. The united front was cracking. So that even then a handful of women--all of them very young--set out in a group to build up their own working relationship to the soil.

And quickly enough there began to spring up those early kvutzoth of women workers - on the shore of Galilee, in the Emek (the Valley of Jezreel) and on the sands of Judaea. And if the kvutzah subsisted only for one year, and if the land it worked was only hired--who cared? For the principle issue was not the farm, the economic unit, but the kvutzah as such. Nor did they find it so hard to break in the naked soil of the wilderness, if thereby they could slake their thirst for work on the land, and satisfy their passion for a partnership with mother earth.

There was much joking about those early kvutzoth. No one believed in the success of our idea. But the deep, burning enthusiasm which had caught us up enabled us to ignore the doubts of others. Yes, it is quite clear now to everyone that the temporary kvutzah was economically senseless. But in those days it had a deep sense, and because of this it emerged whole from the difficult war period.

Shortly before the close of the war, the dream of a Jewish Legion ripened into realization. The woman worker was caught up in that rush of sacrifice no less than the man; what the kvutzah had not been able to satisfy in her, she sought to fulfill in this new phenomenon. It is not easy to write about those sacrificial days. Were the women really caught up in a military emotion--or were they merely imitating the men comrades? No, no. That spirit was absent on both sides. We were enslaved by one idea; one well of feeling sent up its deep, turbulent forces in both of us; the idea was not war, but liberation. But for the men there was the front--and for the women, again, disappointment. There were hundreds of women who reported for duty with the Legion, just like men. Of course, they were not taken. That rebuff left us flat and wearied: we were not to participate in that great moment. This incident deserves a place of its own in the history of the women workers' movement.

The year after the war those girls' kvotzoth disappeared; it was something sudden, as if a sponge had wiped them off the slate. Nor was there any struggle about it. The women felt that this form had outlived itself; something new had to answer the spirit of the changed times. Yes, we could no longer form our associations so easily, wander from place to place, take root and uproot every year. The time had come for the permanent settlement, stable, rooted in its own soil.

After the wandering kvutzah came, as its natural inheritor, the meshek ha-Poaloth, the women's training farm; after group vagabondage came the planned, sensible and stabilised unit.

And so the women's farm was created in Petah Tikvah, the tree nursery in Jerusalem, and the collectives in Nachlath Jehudah and Shechunath Boruchov.



This was in 1921, the time of the big expansion in agricultural work, when the Emek was bought and new forms of land units sprang up, the large kvutzoth, or communes, the moshav ovdim or workers' individualist-cooperative settlement. In every place, the woman worker has her own important role to play.

It does not matter what the exact forces were which brought about the result, whether it was through the pressure of the original women's farms, or through the actual necessities of the life on the land--but as a worker the woman found her role to be richer, fuller and more variegated than ever before. Her place was definite; the vegetable gardening system, the dairy work, chicken raising and tree planting. She was gradually relieved from the exclusive claim of the kitchen and laundry; the men learned to give her a hand there. But once she broke into the fuller life of the system, the woman began to understand how much she lacked in training and independent preparation.

A new and complicated question emerged: the question of mother and child in the workers' collectives. The women began anxiously to seek a way to unite care of the child with productive labor on the soil. And out of this search arose new life-forms in the field of child-rearing. If we have been enriched by the many values in this field, we must thank the woman worker on the land. (Shazar, 1975: 137-139) (emphasis mine)

Rachel Janaith raised the question of childcare. Resulting from the early antifamily policy, no preplanning occurred in this area. Tiger and Shepher (1975) also stated that no preplanning was made for childrearing in comparison with the economic and social spheres of the kibbutz. In fact, there was no worked out ideology, simply the expectation that, given the communal aspect of the new society, new types of familial relationships would blossom.

Joseph Baratz (1954) describes the early stages of "communal" childcare in Degania:

When our first child, Gideon, was born--he was the first baby in the kvutza--everybody fussed about him and nobody knew what to do with him. Our women didn't know how to look after babies. There was nobody whose advice Miriam could ask, the other women were still younger than she was. She found her own methods.

After the child was born, she was dangerously ill and both of them had to spend some time in hospital, but when she came back she began to work as before, and wherever she went she took the baby with her. She took him to the vegetable plots and to the kitchen and to the poultry run. If she were in the cowshed, she put him down on the straw and the cow licked him. The whole of Degania cried over the baby; they cried because they thought he would die of dirt, or they cried because the baby cried; Miriam begged them: "Please don't worry about him, he's all right, he'll stop in a minute, he has nothing at all to cry about;" but they still worried, they thought Miriam ought to be dandling him all the time. At meetings, too, Miriam had Gideon with her, and everybody wanted to hold him, he was passed all round the table from lap to lap. Even if he was in his cot in the evening, they would come and wake him and pick him up, everybody was so excited that there was a baby in the colony; and yet they worried all the time: 'How can he grow up in this way? What will happen to him?'. . .

Miriam didn't mind their fussing over the baby, she was glad that everybody in the kvutza was fond of him and she was sure that he would do all right. But she was nearly killing herself, working as hard as ever and looking after him as well and sometimes getting up in the middle of the night to wash his things, and going back to sleep again for a little.

When another child was born in the colony, she proposed to its mother that each of them should take it in turn to look after both the babies, but the other mother only wanted to look after her own, so both of them went on overworking.

Our daughter was born when Gideon was not quite two. It was at the time of the cattle plague. Miriam had been working in the cowsheds and she was nearly sick with remorse and worry--had she perhaps not looked after the cows properly? Did she perhaps not know enough? So she decided to take a course at Ben Shemen where there was a cattle farm. Everybody was horrified; how could a mother with two small children, one of them only a few weeks old, do such a thing? But she took them both to Ben Shemen with her, and when she came back she knew a lot more about her job and it was useful to us, and she went on working and the children were all right.

But we saw it couldn't go on like this. Not everybody was as tough as Miriam, and even her health wouldn't stand it indefinitely. By the time there were four children in the colony, we decided that something must be done.

It was a difficult problem. How were the women both to work and look after the children? Should each mother look after her own family and do nothing else? But the women wouldn't hear of giving up their share of the communal work and life. Should one woman look after all the children? It seemed strange at first. How could a mother hand over her child to another? Somebody proposed that the colony should hire a nurse. But Joseph Bussell said: 'The children must belong to their parents but the responsibility for them must be shared by all, in this sense they are the children of the kvutza. All the women, whether single or married, should take part in looking after them, then the mothers could do other work as well. And the cost of the education of the children must be borne by the community as a whole.'

So we didn't hire a nurse, but we chose one girl to look after the lot of them, and we put aside a house where they could spend the day while the mothers were at work. And so this system developed and was afterwards adopted in all of the kvutzoth, with the difference that in most of them the children slept in the Children's House, but with us they stayed at night in the parents' quarters. That is why our buildings are planned differently: in Degania, people with children have one or sometimes two little rooms in addition to their own. Only recently have we built a hostel for children over twelve where our own children will live as in a boarding school together with others whom their parents have sent to be educated in Degania.

We find that it works well. Nowadays the women in the Children's Houses are trained; the children are always closely in touch with their parents--they are only away from them while the mothers are actually out at work--yet the mothers are not overburdened with their care and can take their full part in the life of the colony. But it doesn't suit all women. It is, indeed, one of the decisive tests of a woman's calling to the kvutza whether she can bear to leave her first baby in the creche and trust other women to look after it. (Emphasis mine) (Baratz, 1954:65-68)



Most of these quotes come from the period of the kvutzot - the kibbutz forerunner. Of these groups, only Degania developed into a kibbutz. The following quote shows the development of thinking with the establishment of more kibbutzim. Nina Richter (Shazar, 1975) philosophized on communal aspects of childrearing and described the practices that existed or that she believed should develop:

What impelled the kvutzah and the kibbutz--the two forms of worker's communes--to abandon home for group upbringing? The idea springs originally from the will to deepen the relationship and strengthen the bond between the individuals in the group. To this end, we are ready to relinquish what is dearest to us into the hands of the collective whole. We know that the future of the group as such depends on the spirit in which our children are brought up. There is an additional motive: we want to make women free in social and family life.

This group upbringing of children already has a history in Palestine, and a tradition has slowly been created. Unfortunately, we are so absorbed and used up by the daily grind that we cannot go into the root principles of the question, though this would clarify many problems for us, and release new energies. At the present, every kvutzah and kibbutz has followed its own path; group upbringing is an established principle; but no general principle or method, and no general formulation of the problem, have yet been reached. . .

The situation differs from kvutzah to kvutzah. The readiness to assume the cares of the upbringing of the children depends on the inner condition of the kvutzah, on the tone and spirit of the common life. And just as we have nowhere worked out fully a final and harmoniously interwoven living together of the comrades, so we have not reached the final stage in which the children belong to the group as a whole.

And how is it with the parents? To us the act looks simple and natural enough; but it is not easy for the mother to relinquish her newborn child to the children's home.

There is much to be said about the general influence of the collective form of life on the family, but I want to consider only the fact that among us the child grows up away from the parents' home. In our form of life it is not easy, even in a general way, to create close and narrow bonds between parents and children.

The hours of labor which we have to put in every day leaves the father little time for his children, especially when the latter have a separate home and their own regulations. Sometimes the parents may be free but cannot visit the children because this would create disorder. In a family which lives its own separate life, it is the mother who creates the living relationship between father and child. (Italics mine)

In our case, however, it is not the mother who feeds and tends the child, for the child enters into its own social life, and has its own group interests. Yet, in spite of this, our children always long for their parents and look forward eagerly to every meeting with them. The child suffers if the parents do not come when they are expected, and often the relationship between them is tense and nervous.

The real solution of the problem regarding the relation of the family to the communal group, and of the communal group to the child depends on two factors. First, will the collective be able to create that human atmosphere in which parents will give up their children to the group without fear or regret? Second, will the comrades who have no children of their own be prepared to share to the full the burden of the upbringing of the children, with its joy and suffering?

One thing we have achieved by our method of child upbringing, and that is the liberation of the mother in the group. For this we may be grateful. We see now that it is only by the method of group upbringing for the children that the mother can be a free member of the social structure. Once relieved of this heavy yoke, certain that everything will be done, physically and spiritually, for the good of her child, the mother can devote herself to the work which she has chosen. The very possibility of choosing her work gives the woman a footing of equality in the family and makes possible a free, unforced relationship between husband and wife.

In the whole complex of practical questions raised by our methods, the most important is this: does our children's home create for the young ones a separate and isolated little world, or is it part of the world of the grownups? In the small kvutzah, this question is not altogether actual, for there the number of the children is small, and the whole place, with all its workings, is perpetually present to the child. Hence,

in the small kvutzah, the approach to the child is easy and simple. But in the large settlements there is a danger that the children will be as it were locked up within the walls of their children's home. This is something which must not be permitted to happen if we want the child to remain bound to the group, to the settlement and its economy, to the work and to everything that we hold dear. To achieve the desired aim, the commune must be constantly aware of what is going on in the children's home, and the life of the young ones must constitute a matter of deep daily interest.

And now let us turn to the personnel occupying the key posts in the process--those who are set over the child during this crucial formative period. We must face the truth that this important function in the organism of the commune is entrusted too frequently to individuals with little knowledge and experience. For the number of our children keeps growing, and we have not concentrated on the problem of the children's home those energies and that devotion to which it is entitled.

The question of the right comrade in the children's home is one of the most important in the settlement. She is responsible not only for the physical and mental condition of the young, but also for the general atmosphere which dominates the home and, in large measure, for the attitude of the group toward the home. We have few working women specialists in this line. In the course of time, the woman in charge learns much from the actual work, but there is, meanwhile, a constant and heavy drain on her strength and her nerves.

We shall establish our children's homes on true and firm foundations only when we shall have prepared the right number of skilled and devoted women comrades who will know how to engage the interest of the entire settlement in their work. First we must make things lighter for the woman in the children's home by improving her working conditions. The working hours must be shortened. (In some of the kvutzoth the educator works ten and twelve hours a day.) The woman in charge of young ones must have a clear head, and must always be in the right mood. Further, the comrades must understand and appreciate the work of the educator; and the latter, after a time, must be given the opportunity to finish her training, either in Palestine or abroad.



A series of problems is raised by the kindergarten teaching. With children up to two years of age, even the unskilled teacher may be used, for she hopes that her healthy, natural mother instinct will help her out, and that she will learn from the work itself. But it is otherwise with children between the ages of three and six, and none of our comrades would dare to accept the responsibility without the requisite training. And therefore, the trained kindergarten teacher must be looked for outside of the commune, and this creates special difficulties.

In most cases, the education of these girls is unsuited to our life and our form of community, and it is not easy to transplant them into the soil of a Palestinian communal group. The girl herself is assailed by a thousand doubts, and often the commune itself cannot help her; and it is the children who pay, in the end, for all these experiments. Often enough, this situation simply has to be accepted. But the ultimate solution will be found when the settlements choose the right persons and then give them an opportunity to get the proper training.

And now something regarding the mother in her relation to our institutions--particularly the baby-home.

The woman who has lived for some years in the commune, and knows our institutions, certainly believes in this group upbringing as the best. And yet she suffers from a deep inner division. Nearly every woman wants to feed and tend her own little one. She wants to look at it every now and then, watch its daily development--particularly during the wonderful period of the first year. And if our mothers must surrender all this, they suffer and long.

Besides this, a mother trembles much more about the care of a new born baby than about an older child, and with justice, because the first year of a child's life is the most important and the most dangerous. These denied emotions are responsible for the atmosphere of tension often to be found round our baby-homes. It is true that in most cases the mother has perfect confidence in the devotion of the women who work in the baby-home; and that confidence grows from year to year, it becomes mutual and is accompanied by understanding. And yet these difficult elements cannot be eliminated. They come most vividly to the fore when the child is sick. However strongly the mother controls herself, she still loses her peace of mind and feeling of security. Her confidence in the comrade in charge weakens. She

begins to make demands which, objectively seen, are inadmissible, and the two women cease to understand each other. At such moments, we perceive the genuine difficulty of group upbringing for children, and we see ourselves lacking in self-training and self-control.

The struggle between intelligence and instinct emerges clearly in another case--when one mother comes to the help of another who can no longer give her baby milk. The possibility of this form of mutual aid is one of the strongest points in favor of our baby-homes. And the practice is a usual and accepted one. But sometimes it occurs that the child of the second mother needs more milk--and then it is very difficult for the first mother to ration her own child.

These are the details which make clear what goes on in the heart and mind of a mother who gives up her child to the group. It is unreasonable always to expect complete self-control; and we do wrong to accuse a mother of all sorts of weaknesses when this struggle is going on within her. This, indeed, is the moment for the most intimate kind of understanding.

The economic side of our children's homes has been the subject of much discussion, for this is the foundation of the whole system of group upbringing. Why is the cost so high for each child, and why do we need so many workers in the homes?

The majority of our group institutions are in the agricultural communes of the Valleys of Jezreel and the Jordan--and this is one of the reasons for the high cost of upbringing.

Babies cannot be given cheap care in a climate which is hard even on grown-ups. The heat and the dryness are a strain on the children. In the summer months they lose their appetite, they vomit and run temperatures. Naturally, not all of them suffer alike. Our climate bears the hardest on babies which have just been weaned--that is, on babies between eight and eighteen months of age. The "older" ones, from two years on, gradually acclimatise themselves. When a child has been weakened by the great heat, it needs special attention of a nurse if its later development is not to suffer.

There is another factor making for high costs. When a large number of children live in the same house, the danger from infectious sicknesses increases. To

combat this danger, we have instituted a rigid system of hygiene, and this system, again, means money and personnel. And it is well to notice at this point that in times of epidemics in the country, the children in our communes suffer less than all others. Official statistics also show that the infant mortality is lower in the group homes than among children brought up in individual families; they show further that our mortality rate compares well with that of the most developed countries in the world. (Shazar, 1975:193-199)

As we have seen, with the birth of the first child, the process started that has resulted in the extremes found in the kibbutz today. At first, no plans were made for total communal care of the children, since it was accepted without question that only the mother or some other woman could properly care for an infant. These same young idealists who were so concerned with establishing a new society unquestioningly accepted the values and beliefs of their parents regarding mother-child relationships. Their equalitarian values were not maintained as more and more women were transferred from production to service work.

Very few women returned to production in a reverse process, and prejudicial beliefs about job capability were reestablished. "Men are more successful with heavy work; women are more capable in fine work. Therefore, women are more suitable in the clothing store, doing the mending," was a frequently expressed opinion.

The feminization process on the kibbutz began with the founding members' acceptance of women's traditional nurturant role, when, with the birth of the first children, women returned to child-rearing functions. While role-sharing of the masculine jobs were acceptable on an economic basis, childrearing was automatically considered an exclusively feminine job. In fact, since bottle-feeding and sterilized milk are relatively recent additions to Israel society (fresh milk was not pasteurized and bottled until 1966), the mother had to breast-feed her baby because of lack of sanitary facilities and refrigeration. For at least the first half year after the baby's birth, she was bound to the home, for too much time would be wasted for her to travel back and forth to the fields between feedings. As more children were born into the kibbutz, the process by which women left production jobs to lower-status service jobs accelerated. (Lower status, from an ideological and economic point of view.)

Today, most women in the kibbutz work in jobs that are analogous to traditional housework. These service jobs have had lower status than production jobs from the very beginning, even though we have seen that these jobs were as hard if not harder than "productive jobs." Even though people do not earn monetary salaries, Rosner (1974) found that clear differences existed in job status, and production and management jobs are rated at the top. Of the service jobs, the "metaplot" (nannies) and nurses have higher status than persons



employed in food preparation or clothes care, according to Talmon (1972:45). She points out that because jobs like "metaplot" or nurses require long training and specialization, they tend to become permanent assignments. This in turn increases competition for these positions, and causes "permanent deprecation of those assigned to unspecialized jobs." These unspecialized tasks tend to be "arduous, monotonous or full of tension." If one must prepare food for one's family, it is relatively easy to plan a menu to the taste of all. However, if one is responsible for preparing meals for 500, one is bound to meet with complaints and dissatisfaction. This, in turn, tends to reduce job satisfaction and increase work tension.

As an alternative to Tiger, Shepher, and Spiro's conclusions, we can hypothesize that with this movement to nurturant roles, a certain cognitive dissonance came into play. To justify the time absorbed by childcare tasks, women themselves began to increase their identification with traditional feminine roles by giving them more positive, attractive images.

Talmon (1972) found that women more than men were likely to leave the kibbutz, were more likely to be dissatisfied with their jobs, and experienced more stress. Over a decade later, Tiger and Shepher (1975) found that only 15 percent of women express dissatisfaction, even though they are doing more of the same type of work they did ten to fifteen years ago. Do kibbutz women today, then, demand more time with their children in order to give themselves a feeling of increased status or satisfaction, and thereby reduce their cognitive dissonance? Those kibbutz women who are unsuccessful in reducing their dissonance by increasing the values of their feminine pursuits, should theoretically experience psychological distress. Talmon (1972) found that the dissatisfaction of the wife was a major factor in a couple leaving the kibbutz.

This was generally accepted as true during the period that Tiger and Shepher (1975) collected their data and true even today. Although we lack exact figures, we estimate that the wife makes this decision in over 80 percent of the cases in which a family leaves the kibbutz.

From our examination of kibbutz development through early records, we find that while social and sexual equality was an ideal, the formal planning to create the necessary conditions were not developed. We have not found evidence which suggests that in the formative period of the kibbutz movements there was equality--both men and women accepted prejudicial ideas about their own and each other's abilities.

Our examination of historical sources has also revealed that the female pioneers had to fight to gain equal standing in the kibbutz. Social planning and economic policies were developed to enhance communal living and ownership. However, planning was haphazard for child care and services, growing unpredictably with increasing birth rates.

Physical barriers to equality were done away with. However, we have seen that the psychological barriers to equality existed both in men and women and resulted in polarization of men's and women's work (except for the very early years when family groups and children were few).

Both men and women contributed to the institutionalization and stereotyping of what work is suitable for men and for women--without regard to ability or interest. This resulted in a socialization process that further polarized job choice. We will discuss this issue in a later chapter.

Current awareness of psychological and sociological pressures in the kibbutz which influenced job choice is growing. For example, the Kibbutz Artzi Movement passed a resolution in 1980 encouraging men to fill 20 percent of the jobs in early childhood education. Kibbutz-wide recognition of the "greater" contribution of educators to the well-being of the kibbutz, greater even than production workers should result in an equalization of status in these two fields. Sex typing of jobs will also decrease when work that has little intrinsic interest (i.e., laundry, dining hall service, clothing warehouse) is really temporary and all members rotate though for short periods. Finally, when men and women are psychologically free and able to move into what were considered masculine or feminine jobs according to interest and not sex, the goal of sexual equality will be achieved.

CHAPTER EIGHT  
KIBBUTZ WOMEN:  
FROM THE FIELDS OF REVOLUTION  
TO THE LAUNDRIES OF DISCONTENT

Rae Lesser Blumberg

During the hardship-filled pioneering era of the Israeli kibbutz in the 1920s and 1930s, women labored in the fields side by side with the men. Together they toiled to create an agrarian socialist-beachhead for the hoped-for revolution. Yet within a single generation, the women all but disappeared from the "fields of revolution." They ended up working in largely low-esteemed jobs in the kitchens, laundries, and nurseries from which they had ostensibly been liberated. The failure of the kibbutz to maintain sexual equality--one of its founding tenets--has been all the more noticeable because of its success in other areas.<sup>1</sup>

Many women, especially those doing the lowest-esteemed service jobs in the laundries and kitchens, are discontented with their lot; nevertheless, where explanations are attempted, they typically stress that the cause for retreat from sexual equality lies primarily in the women themselves--in their psychological and/or biological makeup (see Spiro, 1964; Rosner, 1967; Viteles, 1967; Rabin, 1970; Gerson, 1972; Talmon-Garber, 1972; Keller, 1973; Mednick, 1973).

There are two stages in most of these descriptions. In the first stage, the pioneering days, women were more or less equal (Rosner, 1972; Barkai, 1973; Padan-Eisenstark, 1973). In the second stage, less than a generation later, over 90 percent of women were working in little-esteemed service jobs (Viteles, 1967), were greatly under-represented in the political offices and the powerful economic committees (Rabin, 1970), viewed themselves and were viewed as less than first-class citizens (Rosner, 1967), and were dissatisfied enough--especially with their jobs--to push the kibbutz in the heretical direction of greater emphasis on individual familial responsibilities (Talmon, 1972; Spiro, 1964; Rosner, 1967; Viteles, 1967). In short, sources agree that there was a sharp decline in the position of women between Stage One and Stage Two. Why?

This chapter argues that the erosion of sexual equality was not due to inherent drawbacks of women as women. Rather, the explanation is based primarily on structural factors--mainly on contradictions in the kibbutz's political economy. Specifically, this explanation of the changes in the sexual division of labor and status of women in the kibbutz concentrates on two components of the mode of production, the social relations of production and the techno-economic base,<sup>2</sup> in interaction with demographic factors.



These variables are taken from the author's cross-societal paradigm on structural factors affecting the position of women (Blumberg, 1974). The aim of this paper is to analyze the retreat from sexual equality as a case study in terms of the paradigm.

## STAGE ONE

Although the first kibbutz was founded in 1909, the ideology of the collectivist "large kibbutz" was not developed until 1921, when Ein Harod was created (Weintraub, Lissak, and Azmon, 1969). The mode of production in the kibbutz was planned as agrarian socialist, where "agrarian" refers to the techno-economic base, and "socialist" to the social relations of production. The founders of the early kibbutzim were idealistic Eastern European Jews committed to revolution and a "return to the land." Demographically, they were young, childless, and primarily male (Talmon, 1972). In the pioneering-era kibbutzim, both sexes were involved in production (Goldschmidt, 1959; Lenski and Lenski, 1974; Lomax, et al., 1968; Edwards, Reich, and Weisskopf, 1972). The work was backbreaking: privations were many and comforts were few. And services were absolutely minimal. Although history has credited the early kibbutzim with complete sexual equality, some diaries and memoirs of members of the pioneer generation show that even at the start, the small burden of service tasks fell disproportionately to the women--who complained, with varying success.

It is also alleged that women participated actively in the town-hall democracy of the pioneering-stage kibbutz: members' meetings, rotating political offices, and a number of committees, of which the economic committees tended to be the most important. During this period, births were absent or rare.

## STAGE TWO

Within a generation, the kibbutzim developed an extremely sex-differentiated division of labor. Today, in the average kibbutz, less than 10 percent of the women remain in the highly esteemed agricultural jobs; the rest are in service jobs, mostly cooking, washing, sewing, child care, etc. Except for "childhood education," teaching and caring for the offspring of the members, and a handful of specialized jobs (e.g., nurse), these service tasks are held in low esteem. Roughly half the women in the typical kibbutz are engaged in these ill-regarded "domestic drudgework" tasks. Talmon's research shows that the women most dissatisfied with their drudgework service jobs are those who have been most supportive of changes viewed as ideologically regressive in the kibbutz (Talmon-Garber, 1972). These range from eating an occasional meal with one's family to the still-heretical demand that children sleep in their parents' quarters rather than in the communal children's houses. (Gerson states that "currently, only 20 out of 230

kibbutzim have private sleeping arrangements for children" (Gerson, 1972).

Other changes occurred during this second stage in the development of the kibbutz. First, the service sector increased to encompass more than half the total labor force. "Service" (capital-consuming) jobs are, for ideological and economic reasons, not regarded as productive labor. Second, the kibbutzim since the 1950s have grown primarily by natural increase; in earlier years, they grew mainly by immigration. Third, the participation of women in the all-important economic committees is down virtually to the zero point.<sup>3</sup> Today, women are fully represented only on the committees related to consumer services and childhood education (Rabin, 1970). And as kibbutz office-holders, women are rare enough to be held up as "examples" of the still-proclaimed ideology of sexual equality. It appears, then, that as women left the high-prestige jobs of agricultural production, other aspects of their status also suffered. How important for sexual equality is female participation in production? What influences the sex division of labor in a society's basic productive activities? What is the connection between women's work and women's power and status? Before an attempt can be made to account for the kibbutz's slide from Stage One to Stage Two, these questions must be tackled.

The cross-societal paradigm of sexual status proposes a series of factors which influence sexual division of labor in a society's main productive activities, i.e., the extent to which women "bring home the bacon." Many authors have insisted that the female's first step toward sexual equality is precisely her involvement in "productive-labor" (see Martin and Voorhees, 1975; Oboler, 1973; Sanday, 1973; Leacock, 1972; Sacks, 1970; Benston, 1969; Lenin, 1936). Moreover, Sanday, using a small sample of societies, found that where women's productive contribution was low, so invariably was their status. Conversely, women did not always enjoy high status when they made a high contribution to their group's subsistence (Sanday, 1973). (After all, slaves can do most of a society's productive labor and still be treated like slaves.) In short, some female contribution to production seems a precondition for equality, necessary but insufficient. Specifically, it is proposed, the probability that women will participate in a major subsistence activity in a group's techno-economic base is affected by; (1) the compatibility of the task and simultaneous child-care responsibilities (especially to unweaned children); and (2) the supply of male labor relative to the total labor demand in the activity.

1. Compatibility with simultaneous child care, especially lactation. Ethnographic data reveal that in the majority of human societies children are breastfed (the baby bottle is a nineteenth-century invention) and are not weaned until at least two years of age. So during many of a woman's prime working years, she has a biological constraint on her labor: she has to be in proximity to her youngest child at

several times during the day. What kinds of tasks are compatible with such childcare obligations? Brown, Whiting, and Blumberg have proposed some rather similar considerations (see Brown, 1970; Whiting, 1972; Blumberg, 1974; Murdock and Provost, 1973). In general, those activities which are done close to home or do not require hard, fast travel, which are not dangerous to any small children in the vicinity are less likely to cause inconvenience to the mother and harm to the child. That strength seems to be much less involved as a factor is persuasively argued by Brown. Two compatible activities by these criteria are gathering and hoe horticulture. And both these activities have predominantly female labor forces, according to data in Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas. Conversely, incompatible activities--hunting or herding large animals--have an overwhelmingly male labor force, according to the same ethnographic data.<sup>4</sup>

2. Male labor supply vs. demand. But compatibility is not the whole story. Even in the pre-industrial societies included in the Ethnographic Atlas, where women must breastfeed each child, there are cases of women in modally male activities and vice versa. And if only compatibility were involved, we could not explain female participation in production in industrial societies, both socialist and capitalist. In these societies, women may bottlefeed their babies, but they are expected to assume primary responsibility for care of children. Yet women are found in large numbers in these "incompatible" industrial-economy jobs, even when they have small children. Compatibility of an activity with childcare responsibilities may be a facilitating factor and its converse an inhibiting factor for female participation, but equally important is the relationship between male labor supply and demand. First, the techno-economic base sets parameters for the size and characteristics of the labor force needed to obtain a given level of technology and of output. But second, these demand requirements must be mediated against the realities of the demographic situation, especially the supply of available males relative to the short-term requirements of production.<sup>5</sup> In periods of male unemployment, men may invade "traditionally" female fields. Conversely, if an activity is crucial to group survival, and the available male labor force is inadequate, women will be thrown into the vacant slots, even if the task is considered drastically inappropriate for women under normal circumstances, and even if special arrangements for baby-tending might be required for some of the women. Israeli women fought in combat in their country's 1948 war, although not in its 1956, 1967, and 1973 wars, when the military and manpower situations were more favorable.

Even if women have to contribute to production as the entrance fee to compete for sexual equality, it is clear that not all entrants gain the prize. There are societies (e.g., Azande) where women do much of the labor and receive few rewards (Sanday, 1973). What else is needed for equal status? Most important is women's degree of autonomous economic control over their group's means and fruits of production, i.e., their economic power. Furthermore, for women,



economic power seems the most achievable of the three major sources of power--property, position in a politico-administrative hierarchy, and force--which Lenski proposes as affecting a society's inequality systems.<sup>6</sup> Empirically, women's degree of economic power relative to the men of their group runs the gamut from near zero (e.g., Rwala Bedouin) to dominant (e.g., Iroquois), with numerous ethnographic accounts of widely scattered societies (in Africa, Southeast Asia, Insular Pacific, and North America) where women have the upper hand economically. With respect to the other two dimensions of power, however, the empirical variation is not as great: there is no known instance of women achieving even parity, let alone dominance, in control of either their society's politico-administrative hierarchy or coercive force domain.

Preliminary computer results obtained by the author also show economic power as the single strongest factor affecting a variety of dimensions of sexual equality. To test the paradigm, a pilot sample of sixty-one pre-industrial societies has been coded on most of the paradigm variables, using the Human Relations Area Files. Economic control is measured by an index combining items on proportion of means of production in female hands (relative to the men of their group or class), relative proportion of surplus allocated by women and their relative position with respect to accumulation of economic resources (acquisition of wealth; inheritance). The only current measure of force is the extent of wife-beating. Because precoding efforts revealed almost no instances in which women had important political positions, this variable is not included in the preliminary analysis. But the economic index is much stronger than the coercive force variable. Moreover, there is a strong inverse correlation: the higher women's economic power, the less likely they are to be beaten.

More important, the economic index correlates very strongly with almost all the dependent variables. These dependent variables measure the extent to which women enjoy "life options" equal to those of the men in their group. Specifically, life options refer to issues which occur in all human groups, such as relative freedom (1) to decide whether, whom, and when to marry; (2) to terminate a union; (3) to engage in premarital and (4) extramarital relations; (5) to exercise household authority; (6) to have access to educational opportunities; (7) to move about spatially without restriction. The economic power measure proves far and away the strongest predictor of an index formed from four of these life options (marriage, divorce, premarital virginity, and household authority).

Finally, the economic index correlates significantly with two other variables identified in the literature as affecting female status: the prevailing sexual ideology, ranging from male supremacist to egalitarian; and the extent to which males participate in "female" activities such as child care and domestic tasks.

In sum, the preliminary analyses of the 61-society pilot sample (to be reported on systematically in a forthcoming paper) support the extant ethnographic findings that female economic power is not rare, and the hypothesis that it is the most important influence on other aspects of relative sexual equality.

Under what circumstances can women's labor be translated into the sort of economic power discussed above? First, it is proposed, a group of factors which tap what may be called the strategic indispensability of the female producers and/or their products are important. These variables address such questions as: (1) how important and difficult to substitute are the women's productive activities? (2) how important and difficult to substitute are the female producers themselves? (3) to what extent do women work independently of male supervision, control technical expertise in the activity, and organize on their own behalf (Blumberg, 1974)? In addition to the strategic indispensability factors, the society's kinship system, and its social relations of production, must also be considered.

With respect to the kinship system, it appears that on the average women have more autonomy in societies emphasizing maternal kin institutions (residence, descent, inheritance) than in those emphasizing paternal ones (see Leavitt, 1971; Schlegal, 1972). Preliminary results of the 61-society pilot sample show that women have more economic power where marital residence is commonly with the wife's kin; the descent system also correlates significantly with female economic power, although not as much as marital residence. In the first-generation kibbutz, however, kinship system variables could not have been relevant.

In the kibbutzim, the social relations of production provide for formally collective control over production and distribution. Distribution has remained completely egalitarian to this day: no man or woman receives more than another. But contribution to and control over production is another story. Kibbutz women at Stage Two not only are much less involved in production, they have a smaller say in de facto control over the means of production: indeed, they cannot even allocate their own labor to their liking. To understand how this came about, we must analyze the contradictions and constraints for female equality embodied in the kibbutz's granting of collectivist social relations of production onto an agrarian techno-economic base.

The kibbutz founders came from Eastern Europe, where the techno-economic base was the classic agrarian combination of plow cultivation of cereal crops with some animal husbandry, but Jews were not allowed to be cultivators. In the Middle East, where the dominant techno-economic base was similar, they chose an agrarian base. But the average contribution of women to production in agrarian systems is quite low--when the demographic pyramid is normal. Worse still, agrarian societies are almost uniformly characterized by female subjugation (Michaelson and Goldschmidt, 1971). In any case, their choice would

have made the maintenance of sexual equality an uphill struggle, even in the absence of further constraints introduced by their version of the theory and practice of socialist relations of production. Although the kibbutz founders chose an agrarian base and extolled agricultural labor, they saw themselves not as romantic escapists but as a vanguard, building socialism. They wanted their movement to grow and each kibbutz to achieve a viable and expanding economic base. Thus, from the start, they were committed to maximizing production, but within the context of their ideology.

The first constraint of their ideology was their principle of self-labor, i.e., rejecting the use of outside, alien workers. This principle implied two consequences. Immigrants would be welcomed not only to expand the movement but also to provide a self-labor force for a growing productive base. And women would be emancipated not only because sexual oppression would be out of place in a revolutionary socialist society but also because women freed from individual domestic drudgery could become part of the self-labor force.

Women's participation would be made possible by the collectivization of "women's work," including child-rearing. In reality, the kibbutz has gone much farther in collectivizing these services than other socialist societies to date; and their approach to "childhood education," rearing the children communally in age-graded children's houses, is both unique and successful.

Unfortunately, kibbutz socialist ideology not only ranked "production" (capital-creating) activities above "service" (capital-consuming) tasks, but it remained vague as to which kibbutzniks of which sex would be doing these collectivized but disesteemed services. On the one hand, the nastiest of the "domestic drudgery" jobs were supposed to be rotated. On the other, there is no evidence that any men ever were permanently assigned to the nurseries (Rabin, 1970). Basically, sexual equality was seen as a one-way street: women were to be integrated into "male" economic and political roles, but there was no systematic attempt to integrate kibbutz men into "female" domestic roles.

Another tenet of kibbutz socialism was that only labor--of the factors of production, land, labor, and capital--resulted in value added. Moreover, an accounting system based upon that premise was created, utilizing the yardstick known as income per labor day, or "the difference between the value of sales, and the cost of raw materials plus depreciation, divided by the number of labor days worked in the specific branch" (Barkai, 1971). Barkai also observes that because capital- and land-intensive branches have the highest income by that yardstick, "even in the 1930's and 1940's...the extension of dry farming and animal husbandry and the elimination of labor-intensive branches like vegetable growing [would have seemed] the optimum policy for kibbutzim." But, he writes, this policy was not totally put into practice because of the "restriction on the amount of land and the financing of fixed capital stock."<sup>7</sup>



This kibbutz bookkeeping had very serious consequences for the women. The classic agrarian activities of dry farming (of cereal crops) and animal husbandry look best in the books but they tend to have, according to ethnographic data, a predominantly male labor force. As early as 1936, kibbutz women are on record as protesting the primacy of dry field crops and as favoring horticultural activities such as vegetable and tree crops--precisely those which the Ethnographic Atlas data show as having predominantly female labor forces, and which have high compatibility with childcare responsibilities.

Unhappily, the labor intensivities of agrarian and horticultural production differ markedly. Agrarian production involving plow-based dry farming on permanent fields requires more land and fewer people than horticultural production which is based on the hoe rather than on the plow. Horticultural garden plots are smaller and require much more labor per unit of area, especially for high yields. Accordingly, because agrarian activities are inherently less labor-intensive than horticultural ones, they invariably looked more impressive in the kibbutz ledgers.

Since the kibbutz was economically rational on its own terms, kibbutz women who urged the intensification of horticultural production were fighting a very tough battle. Spiro (1975) notes that during one of his subsequent stays at the kibbutz he studied in the 1950's the women were upset because the kibbutz had decided to abolish the horticultural crops, which women worked in and enjoyed. But, he continues, they were sadly convinced that the move was in the best interests of the kibbutz, since both sexes could "see" that the horticultural crops were less profitable.

Thus far, no hard data seem available as to the relative profitability of agrarian and horticultural crops on the world market, especially when grown with comparable levels of technological and capital inputs. If the kibbutz was growing the agrarian field crops on a large scale (with efficient technological and capital inputs, for sale on a wider market), while growing the horticultural vegetable and fruit crops on a small scale (with mostly hand labor and low technological inputs, for sale on a local market), then profitability by capitalist criteria might similarly have favored agrarian production. It is suggestive, however, that one of the most profitable recent additions to kibbutz cultivation are "hothouse" crops--perishable vegetables, fruits, and even flowers--grown horticulturally (but with high technological aids) and flown to Europe for sale in the colder months (Sharon, 1972). Not surprisingly, women are found in these "hothouse" branches even though women have almost vanished from the agrarian branches.

One final ideological tenet cannot be attributed to kibbutz socialism. The kibbutz pioneers may have been revolutionary socialists out to build a new world, but they also were creatures of their time.

The child psychology that was incorporated into their general ideology was Freudian-tinged. It valued breastfeeding, as well as much contact between mother and infant, while rejecting the notion that children are best raised by the exclusive ministrations of one female. An aerial photo of a typical kibbutz shows that the children's hut series, dining hall, adults' quarters, and "domestic" services are located near the center. Gardening-type horticultural crops and poultry runs and perhaps the dairy are also located close in, while the agrarian field crops are located on the farthest perimeter. The inconvenience of walking back to the nurseries in the blazing summer sun, to breastfeed or visit a child, adds another reason kibbutz pioneer women were apt to dislike field crops once they became mothers (see Spiro, 1964; Talmon, 1972; Shamgar, 1972). And it was not just that women disliked working in the fields: one research study has shown that agricultural branch managers tended to have a low opinion of women as field workers because of all the time they lost from production in going off to check up on their children (see Leshem, 1972).

Immigration is also proposed as an important factor in the erosion of sexual equality in the kibbutz, despite the fact that it does not seem to have been mentioned in the extant literature. During the early years of the kibbutz, births were absent or rare. For a long time thereafter, during the period of greatest growth, kibbutzim continued to grow by immigration, and births remained below replacement levels (2.1 children per couple, approximately). By the 1950s, perhaps the heyday of Stage Two rates of immigration slowed, and the kibbutz growth rate dropped to only about 1.5 percent annually (Barkai, 1971). In fact, since then, natural increase has been responsible for most of this growth, and frankly pro-natalist sentiment is strong among significant groups at most kibbutzim (see Talmon, 1972; Rosner, 1972).

Like the founders, the immigrants to the kibbutz were overwhelmingly young and childless--and predominantly male. They too were drawn for ideological reasons. Below, it will be argued that they represented an unencumbered potential labor force preferable for a number of pragmatic reasons to the kibbutz pioneer mothers. Spiro has noted that as the birth rate increased, "more and more women were forced to leave the 'productive' [fieldcrops, for the most part] branches of the economy and enter its 'service' branches.. ... But as they left the 'productive' branches, it was necessary that their places be filled, and they were filled by men" (Rosner, 1963). These replacement males, it is proposed, were drawn from the immigrants; and their arrival hastened the decline into Stage Two.

Basically, it is argued, once women and services began to be equated, a downward spiral was created. It affected not only women's occupations, but also their voice in economic control, political participation, in prestige, self-esteem, personality characteristics deemed typical, and roles deemed appropriate. Ultimately, in this microsocialist economy,

men came to exert de facto control over most production and management. In fact, the consequences for the women were just what socialist theory predicts for a group which cannot control the allocation of the factors of production--including its own labor. Let us examine a proposed reconstruction of what transpired.

The dedicated young kibbutzniks of the pioneering Stage One received only land and a few of the essentials to start their enterprise from subsidiaries of the Zionist Organization. The main task was economic survival and the odds against it seemed formidable. Women were a minority and mostly childless; they worked side by side with the men, and they still did more than their proportional share of service tasks. Revolutionary zeal and direct participatory democracy were at their highest. The weekly members' meeting subjected most problems to lengthy debate, and the important kibbutz offices and committee posts were rotated in accordance with the newly established doctrine. Much of the toil of the first phase was connected with preparing the land for production.

But even after survival was more assured, most energy had to remain dedicated to subsistence. Attempts were made to maximize--and reinvest--surplus by increasing technology and capital investments. Especially if these investments favored cereal crops, a decrease in labor intensivity per unit of production should have begun. There are some indications that births began to occur at this point. It appears that the slight increase in economic well-being and the slight drop in labor requirements was sufficient to permit women's temporary release from full-time production during the period surrounding childbirth, and the permanent release of a few women to care for the babies, as the kibbutzim experimented with their innovative and unique system of children's houses. The arrival of children, however, put strong pressure on militating toward the growth of the labor-intensive, still-small service sector. The high value placed on children in the kibbutz meant more of an investment in nutrition, laundry, and nurseries--not just in child care.

In fact, there is evidence that the condition of women in the kibbutz became problematic fairly early in its history. The kibbutz movement had soon organized itself into three federations, varying largely in the purity of their socialist ideology. In 1936, the most radical, Hakibbutz Haartzi, held a federation conference on the position of women. By then, of course, many of the earliest kibbutzim were well enough established so that a good number of children had been born. It appears that the women at the conference were aware of the probable consequences of being replaced by men in production--and were worried. Their complaints indicate that even then women were becoming concentrated in service jobs viewed as "unproductive" labor in terms of kibbutz ideology. And the women resented it:



There were men, they said, who were more suitable for the nursery than were the women. ... Few admitted that, in fact, certain jobs were more suitable for women while others were better done by men. ... And there were some "productive" jobs which women could do just as well, such as tree nursery, vegetable growing, and so on. ... Everybody agreed that the measuring rod of woman's equality-status in communal life was the unbiased participation of both sexes in "productive" work (Viteles, 1967).

In short, at the 1936 conference, the equal capacity of women in horticultural activities was held up against an implied lower level of their performance or preference in what we may assume are the glamour agrarian activities--but the women vehemently opposed their removal from production.

Ironically, data from the height of Stage Two make it clear that despite the various allegations that kibbutz women disliked field crop work, they never lost their commitment to production. In a 1958 multi-kibbutz survey, fully 70 percent of the women stated a preference for "productive" activities, as did 65 percent of the men. However, at the time of the survey, only about 10 percent of the women actually worked in agricultural production in most kibbutzim, while the percentage of men preferring "productive" activities was close to the proportion actually engaged in such tasks (Viteles, 1967). Both the 1936 and 1958 data imply that women were hoping the kibbutz would stress "productive" activities which they found congenial.

As early as 1936, though, a force was present--in growing numbers--which would doom the hopes of the women for a reallocation of "productive" activities for more than a generation: the arrival of single, male immigrants.

This continuing arrival of immigrants during the 1920s and the 1930s reduced the pressure on the kibbutz to experiment with horticulture or greater mechanization of services (which might otherwise have been undertaken both to satisfy the complaints of the women and to meet the labor demands of their growing productive base). The result was an economy increasingly split on sex lines.

At one end of this emerging bifurcated system, field crops and related low-labor-intensive activities came to dominate kibbutz "productive" work, despite the fact that these activities presented grave difficulties for kibbutz mothers. But now, of course, a labor force viewed as preferable to the pioneer mothers was available to fill the manpower needs of the kibbutz "glamour sector." At the other end of this bifurcation, labor-intensive and largely low-prestige tasks not viewed as "productive" labor in kibbutz ideology were permitted to grow. If horticultural activities were viewed as relatively unprofitable, and if kibbutz women were decreasingly needed in agrarian production, then

piling them into services (to some extent in lieu of capital investment) makes the most sense in economic terms. By this time, too, the kibbutz had passed from its first bloom of revolutionary fervor to a second state where economic efficiency was increasingly stressed over ideological considerations. Once this dichotomized state of affairs becomes accepted as "natural," then Talmon's arguments are indeed compelling: since women could not completely replace men in certain agricultural tasks because the work was too hard--or too far away from the nurseries--it was considered "a waste to allow [women] to work in agriculture and at the same time assign able-bodied men to services" (Talmon-Garber, 1972).

Since the kibbutz observed the seniority system with respect to the allocation of certain scarce resources such as desirable housing and jobs, how could women in agriculture be replaced by men unless the women left voluntarily? Indeed, there is no indication that any kibbutz pioneer mother was ejected, protesting, from the fields. But such action was unnecessary: a gradual process of attrition, combined with ideological and practical attempts to retain the immigrants, eventually led to the almost total exodus of kibbutz women from agrarian production. Furthermore, as the process of male replacement proceeded, it built up its own relentless logic that further undermined female "status-equality."

Growth of the service sector was fueled by the impact of a higher birth rate and a rising standard of living. People had to staff the services regardless of the labor demands of production, and some women working there during the postpartum period preferred not to return to the distant and inconvenient fields. Others might have been persuaded--or persuaded themselves--to stay where they were "for the good of the kibbutz," because of the perceived efficiency of males<sup>8</sup> in agrarian production or because of the immigrants' possibly more tenuous commitment to the kibbutz. One could speculate that during this phase, a few young mothers were working permanently in childcare, while others were temporarily (especially as part of their postpartum light duties) in the increasingly necessary but unpleasant domestic services. Although some women probably preferred service work to labor in the fields, for others it was simply the lesser of two evils (Padan-Eisenstark, 1973). For whatever reasons, women began to be disproportionately represented in the low-valued service tasks just as an alternate source of labor appeared which made it possible to replace them in production. This, in effect, froze women into the sector due to undergo the greatest continued expansion over the next generation.

Moreover, it is proposed, women's segregation into services and withdrawal from "productive" labor was accompanied by secondary consequences that hastened the decline in the politico-economic voice of women as a group, and in their status and prestige. Even though the kibbutz's means of production and distribution remain fully collectivized, decision-making in matters of "political economy" has become

less so. In the post-pioneering kibbutz, despite the weekly members' "town meeting," many important issues tend to be decided at the level of the production branches, or--more often--the economic committees. Such matters come to the general members' meeting only as an anticlimatic finale (Leshem, 1972). Thus, in the typical kibbutz, the economic committees have long represented a pinnacle of power--and women who do not work in the relevant production branches are highly unlikely to serve on them. So as women withdrew from "productive" labor, they apparently lost whatever voice they had previously had in these committees, and their power declined apace.

Women's withdrawal from "productive" labor also affected their prestige. Women, like everyone else in the kibbutz, are evaluated on the basis of the perceived value of their occupational branch. Thus, those women working in service branches other than childhood education (about half of the kibbutz females, in fact) were low-valued--both by those working in other activities (i.e., predominantly men) and by themselves as well.

It is clear that the women saw their plight as sex-linked. Viteles describes the results of a multi-kibbutz survey in which "thirty-five percent of the women replying to what could be done to brighten their work suggested that an increase in the number of men in the consumer services would be the most important practical and moral encouragement. This would make the work more bearable and also conducive to change in the general attitude towards assignments in the consumer services (Viteles, 1967). Consumer services are so low-regarded that large proportions of the workers are temporary and other surveys on the kibbutz have shown that temporary work assignments, too, are correlated with low prestige and dissatisfaction.

In fact, Rosner has conducted survey research with multi-kibbutz samples which has shown that: (1) working in low-evaluated service jobs produced "feelings of inferiority and deprivation" among the women doing such work; and (2) this loss in both self-esteem and male evaluation has made the sexual segregation of women in service jobs seem more "natural" to all concerned. Large majorities of respondents of both sexes justify the sexual division of labor by allegedly typical character traits of females vs. physical abilities of males. Rosner sampled 466 women of twelve kibbutzim and 86 men from four kibbutzim, and found that the women have adopted a very conventional image of themselves. Fully 90 percent felt physical strength limited the kinds of work they could do; only 6 percent considered tractor work suited for women. At the same time, 85 percent of both sexes felt that men's work roles resulted from their particular physical abilities. In contrast, approximately three-fifths of both sexes claimed that peculiarly feminine character traits make women better suited for certain work roles. Revealingly, 76 percent did not think that an economic-committee coordinator could just as easily be a woman as a man. Worse yet for the kibbutz's officially proclaimed sexual equality, almost



30 percent thought that the basic intellectual abilities necessary for administrative workers and coordinators were unequally distributed between males and females (Rosner, 1972).

A final factor which seems to have further eroded women's status should be mentioned. This involves one aspect of the movement toward increased familial obligations for parents (Talmon, 1972). Specifically, the push by some women to reduce the working hours of mothers who have taken on added after-hours household tasks. That demand has been used by some managers of productive branches as self-evident proof of the undesirability of giving productive jobs to mothers who would lose more hours of work than they allegedly do now in attending to family concerns (Leshem, 1972).

By the end of the 1950s, most kibbutzim had such a stereotypically sex-differentiated division of labor that not only were men "producers" while women served in consumer services, but kibbutz accountants were likely to be male, and bookkeepers female, while high school teachers were mostly men, and elementary teachers women.

But a new factor was entering the equation, the beginnings of an industrial revolution. From 1950 to the early 1970s, employment in the kibbutz manufacturing grew by 250 percent,<sup>9</sup> while employment in farming remained at mid-1950s levels (Barkai, 1973). Although in recent years female participation in agriculture averaged 10 percent in the typical kibbutz, by 1972 women comprised almost 60 percent of the manufacturing work force (Leviatan, 1972). And because of the labor needs of industrial production, there may be pressure to increase that percentage. The highly sophisticated technology of kibbutz agriculture means that increased mechanization would free few, if any, workers. In addition, few immigrants have been drawn to the kibbutz during the last twenty years. Hired labor, resisted in most kibbutzim on ideological grounds, increased modestly, from 8 percent (1954) to approximately 9 percent of the total work force in the late 1960s, due to the labor demands of manufacturing. But 80 percent of these hired workers are concentrated in only 18 percent of the plants: and in one-third of all plants, there is not even one paid worker (Leviatan, 1972).

Kibbutz industry has proven even more profitable than its agriculture. Kibbutz industry necessitates additional labor. And that leaves women as the last remaining ideologically acceptable source of this needed laborpower. Where are kibbutz women most visibly employed in labor-intensive, undercapitalized activities? The domestic drudge-work services. At last (after a generation of the women's complaints), investment began to enter the personal services. "Restructuring the personal service sector to save labor-intensive operations [e.g., partial mechanization of services, including introduction of partial self-service in dining halls] ... was the most important feature of the evolving pattern of the kibbutz in the 1960," according to Barkai

(Barkai, 1973). And it appears that many of the women freed from service tasks did in fact end up in industrial production.

Will the kibbutz women's greater participation in such a high-productivity, high-profit area of the kibbutz economy have positive repercussions for their participation in economic committees and kibbutz political office? Will it enhance their position and overall status? The important question seems to be whether women can avoid ending up on the wrong side of a potentially evolving worker-professional manager line. The kibbutz is trying to retain the traditional principle of workers' control in the face of industrial size and specialization requirements militating toward the emergence of a separate managerial stratum. If de facto differentiation between managers and workers does occur, women must be represented among the managerial group in proportion to their numbers in the labor force, or their gains from increasing participation in revenue-producing activities are likely to be rather limited.

Kibbutz industry seems to be the most important change potentially enhancing female participation in production and (ultimately) control; but there have been other developments as well. For one thing, the kibbutzim have begun to introduce revenue-generating (vs. consuming) services, such as research institutes and computer software assistance, in which female participation is appreciable. For another, an occasional new farming branch--the horticulturally grown "hothouse" crops, for example--emerges in which women are able to become a high proportion of the labor force. The result of these new opportunities for "productive" labor might indicate that the nadir of women's status may be past. Even though their return to "productive," capital-creating jobs will not guarantee them a strengthened voice in kibbutz control, it seems a reasonable bet in light of the kibbutz's socialist relations of production and modus operandi over two generations.

In terms of the paradigm, there are two main factors influencing female participation in the group's main production activities. The first, the nature of the techno-economic base, has recently been changing in the kibbutz in a way militating toward increased female participation. The second, the demographic determinants of labor supply (in relation to the demand generated by the techno-economic base) must also be examined. After all, two demographic factors placed an important role in bringing about Stage Two in the first place: the flow of immigrants, and the relatively high birth rates of the 1950s and 1960s (which further constricted kibbutz women's educational and occupational opportunities).

Currently, the most important demographic changes are those stemming from the human tragedy of war. The kibbutzim have suffered disproportionately high battle losses in each of Israel's wars because they contributed so many of the officers, fliers, and combat troops (Stern, 1973).

The last two wars, the 1967 Six-Day War and especially the high-casualty 1973 Yom Kippur War, seem to have affected the demographic pyramid of a number of kibbutzim. Thus, with the recent low rates of immigration, those losses may intensify problems of labor shortage that had emerged in the majority of kibbutzim by the early 1960s (Barkai, 1973). Male battle deaths may also raise the female age of marriage and of first pregnancy (which had been very young during the period of high fertility in the 1950s and 1960s), and may affect job distribution as well.

Aside from the techno-economic and demographic changes discussed above, are there other factors which appear to have an impact on kibbutz women's work and sexual status? Clearly, the women's movement, which began to emerge worldwide during the 1970s, must be considered. There was no such movement throughout the slide to, or during, Stage Two. In fact, the 1950s were a reactionary period for women in the Western world. Because of the claim that socialism would solve the problems of sexual equality, socialist women long were discouraged from organizing on their own behalf. Separate women's caucuses and demands would have been irrelevant, diversionary, or even counterrevolutionary. But today, such women's caucuses are springing up in many kinds of organizations, even in socialist groups. Among such groups it is now less frequently asserted that Marx, Engels, and/or Lenin wrote the definitive word on how women were to achieve equality within a socialist framework.

The kibbutz is not isolated from world trends. Its child psychology of the 1920s and early 1930s, its high birth rates and "feminine mystique" during the comparable years in the West, all indicate that the kibbutz does not exist in a cultural vacuum. Today, these larger influences may help create a women's movement there. Bar-Yosef and Padan-Eisenstark see recent signs in Israel which could lead in that direction. The foundation for an Israeli women's movement might have been laid, they write, by the emergence of an extreme, stereotyped sex-role system during the Yom Kippur War and the absence of any planned mobilization activities for women, which led many females to a high degree of frustration and felt need for change (Bar-Yosef and Padan-Eisenstark, 1974). An Israeli women's movement should have an impact on sex roles in the kibbutz as well.

Another factor which may also affect the position of kibbutz women is advanced education. In recent years, there has been a greatly expanding movement toward higher education among kibbutz youth. To date, the movement has been surrounded by controversy. Some see it as necessary if the kibbutz is to keep its young people. Others warn that there is little room for using their costly higher education in the constricted occupational range of the kibbutz, and that college-educated kibbutzniks might be more likely to leave. The kibbutzim have long resisted developing a differentiated educational elite--a reversal of traditional emphasis on and respect for learning in Jewish culture. But



slowly, according to Rosner, the prestige of an educated specialist has risen above that of the rank-and-file member of even the "glamour" field crops branch (Rosner, 1972).

Up to now, the kibbutz has given men the majority of the advanced educational and training opportunities. Women's young age of first birth during the 1950s and 1960s took most of them out of the running for university or technical training located away from the kibbutz. And the kibbutz chose very few women for leadership training at the Hebrew University-affiliated kibbutz training institute for production branch and general managers. In 1972, for example, there were only 14 female students among the 220 sent by their kibbutzim to the three-year program, a mere 6 percent (Sharon, 1972).

But the proportion of kibbutzniks in higher education has been increasing rapidly of late. Coupled with the changing cultural and demographic situation described above, this could lead to more women being sent by the kibbutz for advanced education. Given the clearly rising prestige accorded to those with specialized training, this trend could become another factor in an improvement in the status of kibbutz women.

The kibbutz has been called a "man's world" in its occupational, political, and cultural systems (Keller, 1973) as indeed it has been during the long years of agrarian dominance. But although some recent analysts (Mednick, 1973) envision a continuation of the sexual status quo, this does not seem likely, in view of the changes in the kibbutz techno-economic base and demographic situation described above.

To conclude in terms of the paradigm: during the retreat from Stage One to Stage Two, kibbutz women lost not only their productive role--they also lost much of their power, as measured by degree of control of the kibbutz political economy. Has this negatively affected their life options, as the paradigm predicts? Life options, it may be recalled, are the dependent variables in the paradigm that serve as an operational yardstick of female status.

As noted, kibbutz women have lower access than men to advanced education and training opportunities, one of the life options named above. It is also clear that they fall short in the freedom of movement option--they are less likely than men to be sent on off-kibbutz assignments. On the other hand, it must be stressed that kibbutz women are at no economic disadvantage whatsoever with respect to divorce, another life option. But the picture for divorce seems not entirely egalitarian in practice. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the classic sexual inequality pattern of middle-aged men leaving their wives for younger women is not absent in the kibbutz. In fact, Padan-Eisenstark suggests that one reason why in recent years a number of younger women

chose to work in services while few requested field work may have been linked to this pattern. The younger women could hardly have avoided observing the fate of some older pioneer women. Having lost their looks at an early age to years of fieldwork under a scorching sun, a number of them lost their husband's affections to younger, less weather-beaten females (Padan-Eisenstark, 1973). Spiro too notes that kibbutz women worry from a comparatively young age<sup>10</sup> about loss of attractiveness to men (Spiro, 1964). Such preoccupations seem an index of less-than-equal status--and perhaps less-than-equal second chances in the marriage market. Concerning the remaining life options--women's relative freedom vis-a-vis marriage initiation and non-marital sex, and their share of household authority--women's prerogatives theoretically equal those of men, but as with divorce, empirical study is needed to ascertain how equally women fare in practice.

To summarize, then, in the transition from Stage One to Stage Two, kibbutz women seem to have lost most in occupation, politico-economic control, and prestige. They apparently have lost less in life options. And they have lost nothing in formal rights and benefits of kibbutz membership, which remain collectivist and egalitarian in keeping with kibbutz ideology. Nor has kibbutz ideology ever deviated from its formal commitment to sexual equality.

Accordingly, it seems a reflection on the relative strength of ideology that it could not save women's role in production and politico-economic control when the techno-economic base and the demographics of labor supply and demand were against them. But these two main structural factors are changing: the techno-economic base is becoming increasingly industrial, and the demographic picture is altered by the reduced number of immigrants and by the battle deaths of so many young men. These changes, it is argued, must result in some improvement in the position of kibbutz women. But how much improvement?

The minimum gains seem to be women's greater participation in well-esteemed production jobs and the passing of the low point of sexual inequality. But the gains from these recent structural changes could well be greater, especially if an organized women's pressure group emerges in the kibbutz, in keeping with the recent trends in other countries. The resulting confluence of factors might be powerful enough to impel the kibbutz to analyze and try to eliminate the contradictions and blocks to female equality still embodied in its ideology and practice. The maximum gains could see the kibbutz returning to the road toward nonexploitive equality between men and women.<sup>11</sup> If this occurs, not only will the women of the kibbutz benefit, but a blueprint for equality may well be provided for women of the world.

## REFERENCES

1. In general, the kibbutzim have grown and prospered greatly, while remaining little collectivist islands in a larger capitalist sea. As of late 1972, there were 233 kibbutzim (all but 17 organized into three major federations) with just over 100,000 members. Kibbutz population constitutes approximately 3.6 percent of the Israeli total.

2. The social relations of production refer to who (e.g., the whole group communally, a small hereditary aristocracy, etc.) controls the "means of production"--land labor, and capital--and who allocates any surplus the group may produce. The forces of production, the other main component of the mode of production, include the techno-economic base, which involves the nature and level of the technology used by the group to produce their subsistence (i.e., ultimately, how they manage to feed themselves). This techno-economic base has implications for many things, including the division of labor and organization of work, two other aspects that may be conceived of as part of the forces of production. The techno-economic base, often referred to as the "mode of subsistence" in pre-industrial societies, is very important in a number of evolutionary theories of societal development, and has often been used as a convenient summary of a society's level of development. The basic pre-industrial modes of subsistence include hunting-gathering, shifting hoe cultivation, permanent-field plan agriculture, and intensive irrigated agriculture.

3. Unhappily, it has not been possible to find data to test the assertion that in the pioneering days, when they participated in production, women's representation on these committees was more or less in proportion to their numbers. The reader should take into account the "thin" nature of the data base on the kibbutz prior to the 1950s.

4. The Ethnographic Atlas is a compilation of coded data on primarily pre-industrial societies. The computer tape version includes data on 1170 such societies. Using it, the author found information on sexual division of labor for 85 societies whose main economic activity was gathering; in 86 percent of these, women were the main labor force. Similarly, sex division of labor data are available for 376 societies where hoe horticultural cultivation is the principal subsistence activity, and in only about one-fifth of these cases were males the predominant work force (see Murdock, 1967; Blumberg, n.d.; Boserup, 1970).

5. The supply of males may be inadequate because of (a) factors decreasing the male population, such as emigration, external war, and male occupational risks; (b) factors decreasing the total population which also cause a shortage of available males, such as disease, internal war, and general emigration; (c) factors increasing the need for labor, such as economic expansion and changed production techniques.



6. Lenski has stressed almost equally three power sources affecting distribution of privilege and prestige: the power of property (more generally, economic contrast); the power of position (especially in a politico-administrative hierarchy); and the power of force (coercion). Marxist writers would disagree with him, and would posit the more central importance of the society's economic arrangements (Lenski, 1966).

7. Barkai criticizes the "income per labor day" criterion as an inefficient management tool because it "ignores two cardinal economic constraints--the size of the land endowment and the price of capital" (Barkai, 1971). Even in socialist countries, economists put "shadow prices" on land and capital, despite the fact that they too subscribe to the labor theory of value.

8. Concerning women's lower perceived efficiency, two factors have been mentioned in the literature: distance from the nurseries and strength. Given the kibbutz dedication to breastfeeding and its norms that mothers (vs. fathers) should come in to visit even weaned small children during the workday, the distance argument is valid. The strength argument seems more culturally tinged, given the early date by which most kibbutzim achieved mechanization in agriculture. According to rural-sociologist colleagues, physical strength is not a necessary requirement for, say, driving a tractor, although handling an animal-drawn plow might indeed have benefited from a brawny worker. Therefore, it is interesting to note the case of the USSR. In Russia, following the horribly high male death rates of World War II, agriculture, which then absorbed half the labor force, fell heavily into the hands of female labor, and middle-aged women at that. Goldberg estimates that up to 73 percent of the heaviest non-mechanized tasks of agrarian production are done by females (Goldberg, 1972). Apparently, "efficiency" criteria have to be put by the board when labor demand exceeds (male) supply.

9. By the early 1970s, 146 of the 232 then-established kibbutzim had installed at least one industrial plant. Leviatan presents figures from Stanger showing that in the single decade 1960-1970, industry doubled its proportion of total output, in one of the three kibbutz federations, from 20 to 40 percent of total production (meanwhile, farming declined from 73 to 50 percent). By 1971, 25 percent of the total kibbutz labor force in all three federations were working in manufacturing; however, in several kibbutzim half of all production workers were so engaged, and in a few, fully 90 percent of production was industrial (Leviatan, 1972).

10. In fact, both sexes agree that it is harder for women to grow old in the kibbutz. Even though in recent years industry may have provided jobs for a few older women, most women's progression as they aged seems to have been from a job in one of the more respected service sectors

dealing with "childhood education" to one in the poorly esteemed "domestic drudgework" branches (see Talmon, 1972; Bart, 1967).

11. If, in fact, kibbutz women's position does improve because of the recent changes in the techno-economic base and in demography, additional confirmation would be given to the paradigm summarized in this paper. This support would be above and beyond the empirical results obtained on the pilot sample of sixty-one societies.

PART II:

WORK AND PUBLIC ACTIVITY  
IN THE KIBBUTZ



## INTRODUCTION--WORK AND PUBLIC ACTIVITY IN THE KIBBUTZ

The sharp division of labor by sex in the kibbutz has resulted in the work sphere being the most problematic area. The kibbutz is currently organized so that women members work mainly in educational or service occupations, and most men work in agricultural and industrial occupations.

This sharp division of labor seems to contradict the ideology of equality between the sexes, and many authors have tried and continue to try to determine the causes for it (see Tiger and Shepher; Mednick). These explanations vary from the biological to the psychosociological.

The two articles that appear in this section try to analyze the relationship of women to their work as compared to that of men. Other articles in this book are also concerned with this issue. Kibbutz life is one whole which we researchers somewhat artificially divide into different sections. Reference to the present issue can be found in almost all the articles of this book.

The first article in this section by Hertz and Baker deals with the division of labor in the kibbutz. A major advantage of this study is the collaboration of the writers who were both working in the same kibbutz. One observed service branches while the other examined production branches.

Hertz and Baker argue that role-division at work can be understood best by studying differences in the structure of opportunities and differences in work organization and culture and not inherent differences between the sexes. They pay special attention to the effects of channeling high school boys and girls into different work sectors--production versus education and services. An additional explanation which they use to account for this division of labor is the higher standard of living in the kibbutz and the high birth rate. The result of these processes is that more women workers are required for the "female branches" in the present work organization.

Leviatan's article deals with the centrality of work in the life of women. According to him, results from studies in the domain of work imply that there exists a sex difference such that work seems to play a less central role in the lives of women. These results are used to explain two common findings from studies of work: women tend to report the same level of job satisfaction as men although they have much less reason to be satisfied with their jobs as the attributes of their jobs are much less positive (i.e. their jobs offer much fewer opportunities for need satisfaction) than the

attributes of men's jobs (Blasi, 1979, 1980). Neither do women differ from men with regard to their level of general well-being and psychological adjustment. But indicators of well-being are expected to be related to job attributes (Inkeles, 1960). One way to explore the centrality of the work domain is to utilize Kurt Lewin's concept of Psychological Life Space (Lewin, 1951) and interpret the degree of relationship between measures of attributes and of satisfaction with a specific domain of life and measures of general well-being as an indication of the relative centrality of that domain. When this analysis is used, the strength of the relationship of women is usually lower than for men. Less work centrality measured in one form or another has been reported from studies in many different parts of the industrial world including the U.S. (e.g., Andrews and Whitey, 1979).

CHAPTER NINE  
WOMEN'S AND MEN'S WORK IN AN  
ISRAELI KIBBUTZ: GENDER AND THE ALLOCATION OF LABOR

Rosanna Hertz and Wayne Baker

INTRODUCTION

The kibbutz way of life has attracted the avid interest of proponents of collective social alternatives as well as the scrutiny of a wide range of social scientists. One of the main tenets of kibbutz ideology is social equality; however, this general ideology stands in sharp contrast to the perplexing lack of sexual equality--most conspicuously, the sexual division of labor (Blumberg, 1973, 1977; Rayman, 1977; Tiger and Shepher, 1975; Rosner, 1980). The modern kibbutz reveals gender-like work roles and the segregation of men and women in work life. This social contradiction has engendered numerous speculations, explanations, and interpretations of the reasons contributing to the emergence and maintenance of a sexual division of labor.

Our purpose in this paper is to construct a structural explanation of the emergence and maintenance of the sexual division of work life which differs yet lends support for other recent explanations (discussed below). We argue that the sexual division of labor in the kibbutz has been created and maintained by a set of institutions which are connected to and feed into the creation of the dual opportunity structure. Formally, community bodies exist that determine the general labor allocation; that is, the number of individuals needed for work in different branches. Theoretically, at any point in time, new entrants to a branch should be determined by the number of job openings or the opportunity structure. And if the opportunity structure is the same for both males and females we would expect to find a random distribution. However, this is not the case. So the question becomes how is it that gender is linked to the allocation process? Concurrent with a set of institutions, yet sub rosa, a series of community norms differentially evaluates males and females as potential kibbutz workers. These norms have been created by a set of historical processes and serve to legitimate the division of activities and

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The data collection and preliminary data analysis for the paper was performed jointly by both authors. The final analysis was the responsibility of the senior author.

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opportunities into two very different sectors. Therefore, the differential evaluation of the activities (service vs. production sector) determines the differential evaluation of men and women. Thus, these sub-rosa norms permeate the institutional structure so that from early work life onward, males are channeled into the "production" sector and females are channeled into the "service" sector.<sup>1</sup> Further, while ideologically a member chooses a branch of work, in practice prior work experience is a necessary pre-condition for entry. Therefore, once individuals have been channeled into gender-based sectors it is difficult to move between sectors and mobility normally only occurs within sectors. Since the two sectors contain different sets of opportunities, mobility prospects, work organization and culture, sectoral location shapes the work experiences of kibbutz members, with larger repercussions on the behavior of men and women in the community.

## METHODS AND RESEARCH SETTING

This paper is drawn from a larger field study of an Israeli kibbutz, conducted in 1977 and 1978 for a total of 14 person-months in the field (Baker and Hertz, 1979). Methods included participant-observation, living and working in the community, informal and more-formal interviewing, the collection of oral histories, and the collection of demographic records, economic and accounting records, production reports, and other archival data. The kibbutz site was chosen on the following criteria: at least 40 years old (pre-state founding), combination of agricultural and industrial economic base, median population size and affiliation with the Kibbutz Artzi (the National Kibbutz) Federation. These criteria served to locate a settlement that was mature, economically stable, with three generations, a stable population, and a radical Marxist-socialist ideology.

Since many community studies are conducted by a single researcher, entry is normally permitted only into the "men's world," or the "women's world." For example, Whyte's (1961) and Suttles' (1969) community studies focus primarily on the men's and boy's worlds. In both cases, entry into the women's world was socially restricted. Gans (1967), in contrast, had knowledge of the women's world through his wife; moreover, his marital status made him a "safe" male for some limited interaction with women.

This methodological problem pervades many kibbutz field studies, since kibbutz life is divided into men's and women's worlds. With little exception, men in the kibbutz we studied work in the production sector and women work in service sector. (The only exception is the greenhouse-plant nursery. This branch, only moderately profitable, and employing few members, is retained solely for ideological reasons: a token production activity for women. It is also retained as a

reserve labor force for the children's houses.) And this appears typical of most kibbutzim previously researched (Spiro, 1964; Bowes, 1978).

As a male/female research team, we had access to both the men's and women's worlds in the kibbutz. We worked in the main branches in the production and service sectors. Hertz worked in the green-houses, kitchen, laundry-sewing, and the children's houses, concentrating on the children's houses--the single largest branch in the kibbutz. Baker worked in the cotton branch--the main agricultural branch--and the factory, the largest production branch in the kibbutz. Thus, we were able to examine and experience at close range the separation of work worlds, the divergent work cultures of men and women, and participate in the structures that lead to the sexual division of labor.

## RECENT EXPLANATIONS

Before we present our empirical findings and interpretations, we need to briefly discuss the recent alternative explanations of the kibbutz's sexual division of labor. As one of the authors has argued elsewhere, there are two types of arguments that abound in the literature: structural and psycho/socio-biological. Both arguments attempt to explain the roots of the sexual division of labor. The "structuralists," among them Talmon (1972), Blumberg (1974, 1977), and Bowes (1978) argue that changes in the social and economic structure of the kibbutz have created a system of sexual stratification which perpetuates women's low status. On the other hand, there are the "sociobiologists" and "psycho-biologists," including Tiger and Shepher (1975), who argue that women's contemporary position represents the emergence of their biologically and psychologically ingrained predispositions. (For a fuller analysis of these two types of arguments, see Hertz, 1982.) We will briefly illustrate each argument.

Blumberg (1974) argues that the move from an "early pioneering phase" of near sexual equality to a traditional sex-typed division of labor can be explained by the changes in the mode of production and demographic structure. Early kibbutzim deliberately chose an "agrarian" mode of production and "socialist" relations of production. But cross-cultural and historical evidence clearly shows that agrarian modes of production have always been linked with a predominantly all-male labor force. Conversely, all-female labor forces are always linked with "shifting cultivation" and "hoe-horticultural systems" (Blumberg, 1970; Blumberg and Winch, 1972; Lenski, 1970; Martin, 1973; Murdock and Provost, 1973). Thus, the kibbutz agrarian mode of production is a strong determinant of an unequal sexual division of labor.

The agrarian mode, with its far-flung fields and large areas of cultivation, can not be easily combined with child-care activities. Since kibbutz "child-psychology...valued breast feeding, as well as much contact between mother and infant..." (Blumberg, 1974:21) and the children's houses were located in the center of the kibbutz, it was inconvenient or nearly impossible for mothers to work in the fields. This is one reason, Blumberg contends, that women preferred working in vegetable gardens, orchards, and poultry: these activities permit close proximity to the children's houses.

While the kibbutz is socialist it is also economically rational. Within the restraints of equal rewards to labor there is a process of continually evaluating the profitability of each branch of the productive sector (Barkai, 1971). Blumberg contends that economic decisions pushed the kibbutz towards field crops and the elimination of vegetable gardens (as well as other labor-intensive activities). This closed women out from participation in production activities to an even greater extent. This process of attrition was exacerbated by the arrival of immigrants--mostly young, single men. As the women left production, their places were taken by the newly-arrived men.

Meanwhile, service remained labor-intensive. The growth of the service sector, creating increased demand for workers, and the replacement of women in production, led to the virtual segregation of women in the service sector. Along with this, production activities--i.e., income generators--became more valued by the community. Women were trapped, then, in low-valued positions, which in turn produced low social and self-esteem.

This process created a downward spiral. Women were increasingly channeled to the low-prestige services. Participation in the main committees, except service committees, decreased and political power diminished. Declining self-esteem and male evaluation "has made the sexual segregation of women in disesteemed service jobs seem more 'natural' to all concerned. Large majorities of both sexes justify the sexual division of labor by alleged typical character traits of females versus physical abilities of males" (Blumberg, 1974:35).

Tiger and Shepher (1975), in their recent work on women in the kibbutz, conclude that sexual inequality in the kibbutz--as in all other settings--is biosocially determined. They assert that women in the kibbutz are responding to a set of "biologically determined dispositions" which has been called a "biogrammar" (Tiger and Fox, 1971:265). They write: "Culture (i.e., socialization) in its plasticity may go against those dispositions, but not for long and not for many people, without causing serious difficulties for both the individual and society." The kibbutz was one of the experiments that went against those dispositions. But, like a balloon pushed



out of shape, it irresistably must spring back to its natural state and form. As Tiger and Shepherd summarize:

...the overwhelming majority (of women) not only accept their situations but have sought them. They have acted against the principles of their socialization and ideology, against the wishes of the men of their communities, against the economic interest of the kibbutzim, in order to be able to devote more time and energy to private maternal activities rather than to economic and political public roles...

...Our biogrammatical assertion is that the behavior of these mothers is ethologically probable: they are seeking an association with their own offspring, which reflects a species-wide attraction between mothers and their young (Tiger and Shepherd, 1975:272-273).

In short, the biological predispositions of women compel them to act against an ideology and social structure strongly opposed to sexual inequality. Perhaps, the inequality in status between men and women may be explained or justified on the basis of presumed biological determination of behavior. However, this type of analysis downplays sex-linked differences in the work individuals perform and in the positions they occupy in the community. Further, such explanations only act to obscure the bases of inequality (e.g., mechanisms of control for entry into a branch, the differential experience of high school boys and girls). Thus, the manner in which positions in the kibbutz economy are filled is the focal concern of this argument.

## SECTORAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE SEXUAL DIVISION OF LABOR

To begin, we must examine the state of the kibbutz prior to the birth of children and the subsequent establishment of childrens' houses. The membership was homogeneous: members were in their late teens and early twenties, unrelated as kin, and from similar European backgrounds. All members, regardless of gender, received the same work training and scouting experiences through the movement in Europe. For the first ten years, prior to moving to the present land-settlement, the founders chose to establish a city-collective. The kibbutz members became part of the city labor force and therefore the various types of work were subject to the constraints of the city labor markets. Participation in a labor force external to the collective reinforced a traditional sexual division of labor: That is, men and women were constrained to work in jobs appropriate for their respective genders. For example, women worked at a variety of household tasks for the wealthy who lived in elite urban neighborhoods, or in

cafeteria kitchens. Men worked on the docks, or in construction crews. However, women as well as men contributed monetary income to the collective.

For various reasons the kibbutz abandoned its original idea of an urban collective and shifted to an agricultural settlement similar to other kibbutz predecessors. The collective's focus was the creation of a viable production sector; and therefore all revenue and surplus was returned to this sector. The service sector operated only in a highly restricted form. Building of kibbutzim took place within an ideology of self-labor: i.e., the collective was solely dependent on itself for workers. Therefore, initially at least, gender offered no exemption from toil in the fields.

When the first children were born, however, the question arose, "Who shall care for them?", a question Baratz (1960) reports as arising in the first collective settlement founded in 1909. But the question of who shall care for the children is better understood as who shall not care for the children. The answer was collective childcare, a model which became the basis of communal childcare. The model's social acceptability was strongly tied to a demographically and ideologically finite labor force: one worker would take care of several children, thus freeing the other mothers for work in the production sector. While nurturance held no monopoly over individual motherhood, women held the first positions as childcare workers, despite protests from these early pioneer women. In short, the solution of collective childcare maximized the number of workers in the production sector.

The kibbutz we studied, founded twenty years after the initial settlement that Baratz wrote about and operating within the mold of the kibbutz federation, knew that the children's houses would be established in similar fashion to its predecessors. It was assumed that women would care for the children. The small number of children born in the earlier years meant that relatively few women would actually attend to the children. As the number of births increased in later years, so did the number of childcare workers needed--which eventuated in an increase in female childcare workers. The shift in the number of women in service was gradual and incremental.

To reiterate, the early sexual equality of women and men within the agricultural settlement was due not only to the fact that there were few children. Equally important were the dire economic conditions. The service sector employed few individuals, as all hands were needed in cultivating the production sector, which represented sustenance for the present and insurance for the future.

However, perhaps what is most important to the gender inequality between men and women today in the kibbutz is the concept of collective consumption, which is presently linked to the service sector. Initially, the production sector produced the service sector. Expansion of the service sector occurred once the production sector was economically more productive, and when it no longer needed to reinvest its surplus in the land. Machinery replaced field workers and jobs were created in the service sector, shifting some of the finite labor force. Further, with an economically stable production sector the kibbutz could absorb the expense of its first "baby boom." While children are a future investment ensuring the survival and reproduction of the collective, they are considered a consumptive aspect of kibbutz life, not unlike American society, until they become full-fledged kibbutz workers. Therefore, the way in which the production sector evolved determined the opportunities for a service sector. But once in place, the existence of the service sector acts to constrain the production sector. Once the kibbutz created a demand for collective consumption, the fact of collective consumption then structured decision-making in the production sector. The existence of the production sector and the form that it takes is predicated on the basis of the composition of collective consumption.

With the apparatus of two sectors firmly entrenched in the kibbutz, sexual equality which was unproblematic in the 1930's and 1940's, is problematic today. Ironically, while the initial kibbutz childcare system was established to "free" women for work in the production sector, it now constrains their choice of work. The end result is a sexually polarized division of labor. This is shown rather dramatically in Table 1. At this point we turn to examine the institutional system and its perpetuation.

#### THE INSTITUTIONS: THE LINKAGE OF GENDER TO THE ALLOCATION PROCESS

Several other institutions are connected to and feed into the creation of differentiated work channels for men and women: high school and the economic and work management committees. Combined, these institutions control the allocation of labor. Hopefully, this analysis may begin to shed light on the linkage between gender and labor allocation.

#### THE CHANNELING OF HIGH SCHOOL ADOLESCENTS

The critical point wherein kibbutz work-careers are most strongly influenced is not in the decision-making process associated with the distribution of adult labor, but rather in the initial distribution of adolescent labor. Put differently, the initial investment in training or human capital takes place in high school, the beginning



Table 1: Percentage Male and Female by Work Branch

Production Sector:	% Male	% Female	Total	Index of Dissimilarity:		
				% Male	% Female	difference
Factory	87	13	100 (54)	30.5	4.2	26.3
Cotton	93	7	100 (15)	9.1	0.6	8.5
Livestock & Poultry	92	8	100 (26)	15.6	1.2	14.4
Garage	100	0	100 (16)	10.4	0.0	10.4
Miscellaneous Production	100	0	100 (14)	9.1	0.0	9.1
Business Services	75	25	100 ( 8)	3.9	1.2	2.7
Orchards	100	0	100 ( 5)	3.2	0.0	3.2
Greenhouses-Plant Nursery	0	100	100 ( 7)	0.0	4.2	4.2
<hr/>						
Total Production Sector	87	13	100 (145)			
<hr/>						
Service Sector:						
Children's Houses	3	97	100 (58)	1.3	33.3	28.8
Clothes-care	4	96	100 (49)	1.3	28.0	26.7
Laundry	25	75	100 ( 4)	0.6	1.8	1.2
Kitchen	29	71	100 (21)	3.9	8.9	5.0
Health Care	0	100	100 ( 8)	0.0	4.8	4.8
High School	65	35	100 (20)	8.4	4.2	4.2
Miscellaneous Service	23	77	100 (17)	2.6	7.7	5.1
Total Service Sector	16	84	100 (177)	100.0	100.0	154.6
<hr/>						
TOTAL ALL BRANCHES	48	52	100 (322)			
<hr/>						
Other:				Index of Dissimilarity = 77.3		
not working	26	73	100 (19)			
work outside	79	13	100 (28)			
study	45	55	100 (22)			
miscellaneous	45	55	100 (29)			
kibbutz management	100	0	100 ( 3)			
Total Other	52	48	100 (101)			
<hr/>						

of work life for kibbutz members. With entry into the high school, each boy and girl is required to work a few hours each day in various branches of the kibbutz. In this regard, the high school provides the juncture at which students begin to gain experience (human capital) in a highly structured setting.

However, adolescents receive differential experience based on gender. All girls are required to help out in the children's houses. Few girls escape childcare indoctrination today. As more children were born, the need for help in the children's houses increased and more and more girls were sent to this branch. Boys help out in the production activities and have never been sent to the children's houses. In this regard student discretion for work assignment is most severely limited. This is evident in high school girls' attitudes toward their work assignment. Assignment in the children's houses goes against the desires of many high school girls. Many with whom we talked stated that they did not prefer to work in the children's houses (Gerson, 1972). Yet, as they put it, they had "no choice." This is consistent with the treatment of sexual equality throughout the history of the kibbutz. Kibbutz men were never integrated into the service sectors nor have they ever assumed traditional feminine roles (Rabin, 1970; Keller, 1973; Blumberg, 1974). Females are further resigned to the fact that they will return to the children's houses after military service.

But why are girls sent to service branches, mainly children's houses, and why are boys sent to production branches? Tiger and Shepherd's "biogrammatical assertion" does not seem plausible: since high school girls do not yet have children, it seems unlikely that they are "...seeking an association with their own offspring, which reflects a species-wide attraction between mothers and their young" (1975:272). The explanation we are proposing does not rest on any assumed connection between women and children.

A former headmaster of the high school tried to pass a decision that would have prevented girls from working in the children's houses and force them into production branches. As he stated:

When I worked in the high school, a year before I was the Headmaster, I tried to pass through the Economic Coordinator that girls will not work in the children's houses: not at all. There were two basic reasons: (1) I prefer that the girls will try to work in the agriculture, in the greenhouses, and in the dairy. Not to begin in the children's houses and then after the army continuing to serve in them. To try something else. And the other reason (2) is that it is not good for the children and it is not good for the girls. Some of the girls cannot

control things: some of them are shouting; some of them are hitting; and some of them begin working at an early age--fourteen maybe--and it is a big responsibility to leave six children with a little girl.

I tried to pass the decision, but I didn't succeed because of the needs of the kibbutz. Not only in this kibbutz: we also tried to pass it in all the kibbutzim ...but it did not pass in one of them...

## ECONOMIC AND WORK MANAGEMENT

Increments in human capital or work experience are acquired in high school prior to the departure from the kibbutz for obligatory military service. For example, branch 'foremen' and veteran workers report that the vast majority of branch workers had worked there in their high school days. Eight out of ten dairy workers, for example, had worked in the dairy during high school. This holds true for women in the children's houses: the vast majority gained their initial experience in the houses during high school. Thus, when students return from military service it is their accumulated human capital which is of greatest importance to the planning staff of the kibbutz. Rather than men and women returning from military service as bearers of abstract labor they return as partially trained workers, each with a certain investment which is not ignored by the administrators of the different branches. The work team and economic management need to anticipate and plan for future labor needs and allocations. High school work aids the selection of future workers and economic planning. For example, as a foreman said about future workers for his branch:

You can see that all those people who work in the branch are "sons of the kibbutz" (kibbutz-born males) who worked here before the army. We also take boys from the high school. They help us but it is not so important--what is important is that we create new workers for the future.

There are some people in the army now who will come back and work in my branch. That is what makes me optimistic about the future. We have three men in the army from one (high school) class and four men in the other (high school) class. These seven or eight worked before (while) in high school--maybe one or two will decide not to become members of the kibbutz...but we should get some workers from this group in the army.

Further, the cultural norm of the kibbutz is such that the economic management--all men--feels that the needs of the kibbutz and each branch are best met when females work in the children's houses and



males work in production. The production foremen also state that they prefer boys over girls, both for high school work and as prospective team members. For example, the dairy foreman told us point-blank that he didn't want girls working in "his" branch. He demanded boys from the high school. And, this dairy foreman was slated to be the next Economic Coordinator of the kibbutz.

Entry into any branch is controlled by the branch team, the branch foreman, the Economic Coordinator (merkaz hameshek), the head of the Work Committee (vada avoda). While it is a general 'rule' of kibbutz life that a member can leave a branch at will, and, conversely, a member cannot be forced to remain in a branch against the member's will, a member cannot enter any branch without the consent of the team, foreman, Economic Coordinator, and Work Committee. De jure, a member cannot be forced to stay in a branch, or to enter a branch against the member's will; however, since entry is controlled, the de facto situation is that any member can effectively be kept in any branch--or placed in any branch. Thus the student who works in the dairy gains valuable training, experience, and specialized knowledge of the dairy; likewise, the student who works in the children's houses gains early training, experience, and specialized knowledge of child-care. But more important, the student who works in the dairy lacks experience and knowledge in the children's houses, and the student who works in the children's houses lacks experience in any production branch. Therefore, from the team's perspective it is to their advantage to receive workers who have experience in their particular branch.

Work experience, is, then, strongly correlated with gender, and this is how the division of labor is justified. Female experience in the service sector disqualifies them from branches in the production sector. Yet if experience in a branch was the sole operating criterion we would expect to find little movement between branches in the production sector. However, this is not the case. Not only do men move within the production sector but also men with limited systematic experience move in and out of the service sector. In the former case, the kibbutz adheres to a matched seasonality of agricultural and industrial work. Initially this group gained experience in only one branch and they are shifted to another branch dependent upon seasonal labor needs (Baker and Hertz, 1979). Thus, because of the labor demands in the production sector, these workers have more access to experience than workers in the service sector. Further, some men will move into the service sector (specifically the kitchen/dining room) during points of job transition (i.e. holding community office). However, the starting point for female work is the children's houses and as we will discuss further on, the demands for labor in the children's houses are much more inflexible. Therefore, slack which exists for men to gain skills in a variety of branches does not exist for women, and the ideology of experience which is supposed to be neutral becomes totally gender-related.

Thus, what appears to both students and kibbutz planners as compulsory but temporary work roles during high school is transformed into an entirely rational and efficient process for distributing labor in the post-high school period. It is at this juncture that women become linked to "women's" work and men are likewise linked to "men's" work.

#### THE KIBBUTZ DUAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE: CONCEPTS

The opportunity structure concept has not previously been applied in kibbutz research. Our opportunity structural analysis locates the sexual division of labor and the behavioral characteristics of men and women within the social structure of the kibbutz. As Stinchcombe (1968:129-130) aptly points out:

...Concept formation in sociology, where causal forces are the product of somewhat invisible features of the social structure, is difficult because most people's intuition psychologizes the phenomena. Most people find it easier to identify good or bad executives than good or bad administrative structures. Most people find it easier to think of ambitious and lazy people than to think of opportunity structures...

Kanter's (1976:415) use of opportunity structure concepts in complex organizations is an important departure from conventional arguments about sex differences in work behavior, arguing instead that "work attitudes and work behavior are a function of location in organizational structures."

Opportunities in the service sector are more limited and restricted than opportunities in the production sector. Simply put, there are more production branches than service branches. While high school girls have little choice but to go to the children's houses, high school boys have a much wider range of choices: the dairy, fishery, cotton, factory, turkeys, chickens or the orchards. The dual sets of work opportunities carry over into work life as adults. Men show greater inter-branch mobility than do women. Men have the opportunity to move around a number of production branches; women, on the other hand, have no training or experience in any production activities. They move within the constricted range of opportunities within the service sector.<sup>2</sup> As a female member lamented:

I didn't want to be a childcare worker, but I am one...the people here are very narrow minded. When you are younger, you are working with children, and then in the kitchen, and when you are older -- in the clothes care, laundry and sewing...You have no choice.

Even in an extreme case, a woman who wants to work in a production branch has to fight an uphill battle: a fight against her lack of experience in any production activity and against the production work team, foreman, and economic management.

Location in an opportunity structure affects workers' behavior and attitudes toward work. When men's and women's behaviors and attitudes differ, it is often assumed to be indicative of "sex differences." However, as Kanter (1976:416-17) observes:

...People in low-mobility situations tend to limit their aspirations, seek satisfaction in activities outside of work, dream of escape, and create sociable peer groups in which inter-personal relationships take precedence over other aspects of work. When men occupy low-mobility positions, they tend to exhibit these characteristics; since most of the women studied in organizations tend to be disadvantageously placed in the organization's opportunity structure, they confirm the generalizations made about "women's organizational behavior." Yet when we observe men disadvantageously located in the opportunity structure, they tend to demonstrate the same characteristics. What one line of thought considers a "sex difference," I consider a structural phenomenon...

Because of the allocation of labor into either the service sector or the production sector any kibbutz member--male or female--who works in service activities will experience less mobility prospects than one who works in production. Since kibbutz women, beginning when they are high school students, are disadvantageously placed in an opportunity structure with limited and blocked mobility, they tend to demonstrate the characteristics of anyone stuck in such a situation. Since women are stuck in this situation, they confirm the generalizations made about women in work and kibbutz life.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, we can go one step further. Not only do members in a limited opportunity structure feel helpless against the structural constraints, but members working in the children's houses experience a "work culture" that is personally debilitating. Members working in production branches have a totally different "work culture." Therefore, it is important to look at the consequences of these different work worlds as they may explain differential attitudes and behaviors.



## DIVIDED WORK WORLDS: THE CONSEQUENCES

It is important to point out that no monetary value is attached to kibbutz jobs. Members are not paid directly for their work. Therefore, quality of jobs should be more important in the kibbutz than in other work systems. On one hand, work takes place within the context of a system where there is equality of material rewards that is socialistic. On the other hand, because of the fixity of material rewards this makes the desirability of the jobs that much more important. What then are the jobs that groups want to monopolize, and why? It has been theorized since Adam Smith that income varies inversely with the desirability of jobs in a laissez-faire market model. We thus examine why jobs are more or less desirable in a collective, which operates without income differentials. For a comparison of the differences between work cultures, we will limit our discussion to the children's houses and the factory.<sup>4</sup> We compare them according to several characteristics:

### Ideological Locations

Work is a central facet of the ideology and the practice of the kibbutz. Kibbutz ideology does not directly allow for the differential evaluations of the major sectors. Members, whether they work in the productive or the service sectors, receive the same material benefits. The main difference in the community's orientation toward the two sectors resides in their respective roles: work in the children's houses is identified with community continuity (socialization of kibbutz children); work in the factory is identified with community sustenance (provision of economic-material needs).

The dual opportunity structure we have described, however, conflicts with the major precepts of kibbutz ideology. Yet, it is not at the level of kibbutz ideology that the dual opportunity structure is produced. Rather, it is the differential allocation of labor to the different sectors which is critical.

The differential organization of work in the production and service sectors results in different practices for filling positions in those branches. The practices which serve to recruit that labor (and thus insure the operation of those branches) are, in turn, legitimated pertaining to sexual (biological) differences. The "crowding" of women into certain branches (especially though not exclusively children's houses) is often legitimated by their presumed "instinct" for childcare. Such crowding effectively produces a different structure of opportunities for women, as compared with men, which contradicts the ideology of equality in the kibbutz.

The dual opportunity structure is further perpetuated under the ideological guise that children's house work is sacred. Sacred work is work that must be reserved for members only; the kibbutz doesn't want outsiders, like volunteers, involved in socializing kibbutz children. The use of member labor is thereby not only ideologically rationalized but also volunteer labor is labelled as unacceptable for these reasons: 1) Volunteers are from foreign countries and the language barrier makes communicating with children problematic (even though volunteers could be used in the children's houses to do housework, i.e., washing floors, folding clothes, making beds and so on); 2) The turnover rate of volunteers is high which is problematic for work in the children's houses because of an explanation that children need continuity of workers. Also, familiarity of children's families is seen as important and can only be acquired by long term residents. (These issues are not as problematic for other branches.) Therefore, workers in children's houses cannot be freed by the use of volunteer labor to work in the production sector.

While one would expect workers involved in socializing future kibbutz members to receive more prestige than those involved in economic activities, this does not occur. Those involved in education receive less prestige than those involved in economic activities. Further, there is a great deal of community attention and control over the children's houses, due to their ideological centrality. This undermines the autonomy of childcare workers by direct intervention and through the inference that everyone is as qualified as the childcare workers. Nonetheless, this intervention does not override the accepted view that women are the best childcare workers. It simply distinguishes between members as administrators and women as real or surrogate "mothers."

### Organizational Differences

Both branches are comprised of several work teams. In the children's houses branch, there is one team per house; in the factory branch, there is one team per machine-operation. While each children's cohort moves through the general system of houses, each house is not highly integrated with the next. The factory production process, however, is built from tightly linked and interdependent production steps. Factory teams are organically linked through a coordinated process. In contrast, each children's house exists, for the most part, as an isolated work place. In Durkheim's (1933) terms, the organization of work in the children's houses is the "segmented type" and the organization of work in the factory is the "organic type." Women are thus isolated and limited to the same sets of activities, whereas men work in larger teams and rotate between activities.

The nature of work influences the form of cooperation among workers. Using Goffman's (1959) concepts, workers in a children's house team "stage similar individual performances." Workers in a

factory team "stage dissimilar performances which fit together into a whole emergent, team impression." Thus, women work in very small, isolated work teams. There is little sense of overall integration, coordination, or branch "unity."<sup>5</sup> In the factory, the opposite is true: especially, there is a sense of integration and branch unity. (Actually, the sense of 'unity' and team spirit is even greater in the agricultural and livestock branches since each has one team per branch.)

### Branch Autonomy

The factory is more autonomous than the children's houses. The factory has its own internal management, consisting of three internal committees, team foremen, and the at-large factory general meeting. The main activities of factory production are outside the purview of the community. Production decisions are mainly the responsibility of the factory workers themselves. Overall economic policy is set with a large amount of input to the general economic management. There is no analogous internal management in the children's houses branch. Most decisions--except minor and trivial details--are made in the kibbutz General Meeting and various general committees, such as the Childrearing Committee (vada chinuk) and the Pedagogical Committee (vada pedagogie) which are staffed mostly by members who do not work in the children's houses.

Although children's house teams are not formally linked, as in a production process, they are informally linked through social networks, primarily the connections of family and kinship. For example, work teams are connected through the multiple roles of parent-worker, where a mother in one house is a worker in another. Members who do not work in the houses may be connected to several teams through the ties of kinship. The children's houses branch is the only one through which every member is connected, directly or indirectly, to every other member. Thus, there is much more informal community attention and community control centered on and through the children's houses -- and on the workers in those houses -- than any other production branch.

### Role Conflict as a Consequence of Role Overlap

Women who work in the children's houses and also have children in them experience a peculiar type of role overlap: they are mothers and childcare workers. For example, two houses may be linked because a worker in the first house is a parent in the second, and a worker in the second house is a parent in the first. This scenario is repeated until it creates an intricate finely-meshed network, enveloping all the children's houses.

But this engenders a potentially unstable situation. Each worker must consider the potential impact of their actions on the decisions that will be made about their own children in other houses. For



example, a worker may be hesitant to discipline a child if that child's mother can retaliate as a worker in another house. Although one may argue that this "pluralistic" model prevents the misuse of authority, it actually takes the minimal authority of childcare workers and constrains it even further. Such workers are thus constrained by the de facto limits of the family structure, and the de jure control of the collective system. This makes work in the children's houses less desirable. Further, for some women, taking care of everyone else's children takes away from the rewards of their own motherhood and the ideological nexus of the family unit.

Of course, this type of role overlap and conflict does not exist for factory workers. Again, this is independent of the sex of the worker in either branch. If women worked predominantly in the factory and not in the houses, they would not suffer from this peculiar form of role conflict. Conversely, if men worked in the children's houses, they would suffer from the role overlap of father/childcare worker.

### Labor and Uncertainty

Each branch seems to have an insatiable demand for labor. However, the parameters of the demand for labor differ in each branch. For the children's houses, the demand for labor is inflexible: children must be cared for every day of the year. Childcare is also not seasonal; rather, it is dependent on the number of children in the houses. This varies at two points: entry into the system at birth; and exit from the system at high school age. Exit is predictable but somewhat irregular. Entry is highly unpredictable and irregular. The community does not attempt to control the number of births. The birth rate is considered to be "uncontrollable" in kibbutz life. It is the couples' decision to have children, but it is the collective's responsibility to rear them. All of these parameters of the demand for labor are catalysts creating uncertainty in the workplace and exacerbating the differences in choice sets between male and female workers. Thus even when women work in other branches they can rarely make tenure claims to those branches. The mechanism by which women are shifted to the children's houses is the regulating body's ability to allocate labor based on an historical ideology of "female childcare workers" in response to increased birth rates.

However, there is a small group of women who are anomalies or "tokens" as Kanter (1977) refers to them. They do not experience this kind of uncertainty. Such women, through fighting either an uphill battle in the production sector or being certified as "unfit" childcare workers (which is not without a price) will have their tenure claims validated by their branch of work. These women reflect the superior power of the factory in general kibbutz decision-making. As with any other factory worker, male or female, the factory branch fights to retain its experienced and skilled workers. If the kibbutz

is debating whether to pull workers from other branches for the children's houses, no factory worker--male or female--will ever go. The probability that these few women would return to the service sector is nil. In fact, they display the same high mobility that men with a history of work in several production branches have. Women working in the production sector thus enjoy the same opportunities and work "culture" that men do.

The demand for labor in the factory is more patterned and predictable. Production can be easily manipulated in order to increase or decrease production levels. The demand for labor reflects the market demand for the product: a highly seasonal--and predictable--pattern. Also, yearly seasonal patterns are more 'visible' and 'understandable' than cyclical patterns, such as the birth rate, which fluctuate over a much longer time-span. Thus, the demand for labor in the factory, and the changing needs of the factory, generate much less uncertainty for factory workers.

As we have demonstrated, then, sectoral work location shapes the work experiences of kibbutz members. This central aspect of kibbutz life and ideology is critical for understanding the behavior of men and women in this type of community. As we have argued above the sectoral division has created different cultures and outcomes for the workers within each sector.

## CONCLUSION

We have argued that the sexual inequality in kibbutz life can be best understood as differences arising from the structure of opportunities and differences in work organization and culture - not from inherent differences in men and women. Further, the institutional allocation system is not merely an intervening variable that reflects average male and female differences. That is, this is not primarily or merely a reification of existing real differences between men and women.

The sexual division of labor starts early in a member's life, as boys are channeled into production and girls into service. This early division is crystallized in adult work life. Those channeled into production enjoy greater opportunities and more mobility than those channeled into service. The blocked mobility of service workers is exacerbated by the debilitating work culture of the service sector.

Workers in the service sector tend to develop behaviors and attitudes which reflect their work situation. They tend to decrease commitment, limit aspirations, decrease participation, and seek satisfaction elsewhere. Since women are disadvantageously placed in the service sector, they tend to display all these characteristics;

consequently, these traits become the ascribed traits of kibbutz women. Most conspicuously, women have shown increased attention and concern with the family. Also, they have decreased "political" participation in the more powerful committees. But how can women, who receive no training or experience in production and economics, be expected to participate in the powerful economic and work committees? Production workers are in the opposite situation. Their attitudes and behaviors tend to reflect the greater opportunities and "culture" of their work situation. Since men are advantageously placed in production, they display the behaviors that come to be ascribed as the traits of men.

While presently in the kibbutz there is moderate resistance to this gender-linked division of labor, it is insufficient resistance to overturn the structure. To ensure that the gender-linked division of labor is not reproduced in future generations, the system of labor allocation must be changed. Gender cannot be the major determinant for channeling high school boys and girls into sectors. Further, since most kibbutz work follows an apprenticeship model of learning, high school work experience is an insufficient condition for adult work placement. On-the-job training can begin at any point in one's life -- or at least age 21, when military training is completed. A quota system has been proposed by some and criticized by others (Gerson, 1978). Yet this is, at the very least, one interim solution.

Further, the sexual division of labor can be explained by the expansion of the service sector and most pointedly, by high birth rates. If the kibbutzim cut their birth rates--say by half--this decrease would begin to dismantle the system at its origin. Less women would be needed in the service sector and they could engage in other types of work. In young kibbutzim, those with few children, the majority of females work in production. But given the inherent moral and political questions associated with births, the demand for a reduced birth rate would probably be unacceptable to the kibbutz population.

Whether females make better childcare workers than males is debatable. In the 1980's as more American men become involved with the rearing of children perhaps their kibbutz counterparts will follow suit. Therefore, kibbutz women will once again be "freed" for production sector work. This is not to suggest that men should assume total responsibility for childcare. But perhaps in the future it could be more equally shared and as a result more highly valued.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Production activities generate income for the community. Service activities do not generate income and are viewed as part of consumption. Different accounting procedures and methods of managerial economic decision-making are used in each sector. These two sectors are sub-



divided into numerous branches. For example, the production sector includes the cotton branch, fishery, dairy, factory, citrus groves, and so on. The service sector includes the laundry-sewing facility, kitchen, and the childrens' houses.

2. Our main focus in this paper is on the overall opportunity structure which channels males into the production sector and females into the service sector. However, we note that there is an age-related job path within each sector. In the service sector, younger women work in the childrens' houses, older women work in the kitchen, and elderly women work in clothes-care. (Pregnant women also work temporarily in the clothes-care.) In the production sector, younger men start out in the physically-arduous agricultural branches, such as the cotton, fishery, and dairy, and when they get older move to the garage, factory, and carpentry.

3. This can be viewed as a micro-example of the "blaming the victim" syndrome (e.g. Ryan, 1971).

4. Blumberg (1974) suggested that the industrialization of the kibbutz held great potential for changing the sex-segregated structure of work. However, although the kibbutz we studied had a large industrial branch, founded about 15 years ago, relatively few women worked in the factory, and those that were factory workers worked primarily in administration. The probability that more women would shift to the factory seems low.

5. Lever (1978) has shown how girls' game playing is different than boys' game playing, such that girls, for example, only learn to interact in small groups, while boys participate in large groups, coordinated sports, and learn to interact in differentiated roles, teams, and coordinated activities.

## CHAPTER TEN

### WHY IS WORK LESS CENTRAL FOR WOMEN: INITIAL EXPLORATIONS WITH KIBBUTZ SAMPLES AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS\*

Uri Leviatan

The purpose of this article is to take the researcher into the empirical workshop which has influenced many recent investigations on women and men in the kibbutz. I want to illustrate the complexities of analysis and interpretation which a social researcher confronts when he tries to clarify one crucial concept in the kibbutz sex roles debate.

Results from studies in the domain of work imply that there exists a sex difference such that work seems to play a less central role in the lives of women. These results are used to explain two common findings from studies of work: women tend to report the same level of job satisfaction as men although they have much less reason to be satisfied with their jobs since the attributes of their jobs are much less positive (i.e. their jobs offer much less opportunities for need satisfaction) than the attributes of men's jobs. Women also do not differ from men with regard to their level of general well-being and psychological adjustment. But indicators of well-being are expected to be related to job attributes (Inkeles, 1960). One way to explore the centrality of the work domain is to utilize Kurt Lewin's concept of Psychological Life Space (1951) and interpret the degree of relation between measures of attributes and of satisfaction with a specific domain of life and measures of general well-being as an indication of the relative centrality measured in one form or another. This has been studied in parts of the industrial world as different as the U.S. (e.g., Andrews and Whitey, 1974), Finland (Haavio-Mannila, 1971), and the Israeli kibbutz (e.g. Palgi, 1976; Leviatan, 1976).

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It is my purpose in this paper to explore the question: what are the origins of such sex differences in the relations of job attributes and job satisfaction with indicators of well-being and psychological adjustment. First, I will present six different existing hypotheses that are offered to explain the sex differences in work centralization. These hypotheses are explored critically, and then some of them are put to test with data from studies--secondary analyses--in the kibbutz society.

## EXPLANATIONS OF THE SEX DIFFERENCES IN WORK CENTRALITY

A. Education. One explanation claims that the differences found between men and women in the centrality of the work domain should in fact be attributed to the differences between the sexes in their level of formal education since the population of women workers has a lower level of formal education. Once education is controlled in the analysis, the differences between the sexes disappear almost completely (Quinn, n.d.; Saleh and Lalljee, 1969).

B. Part work-role. The second explanation is, in a sense, also of a statistical nature. It is suggested that the work domain is less central for women workers because in many studies the samples of women workers include many who are only part time and/or temporary workers. For those groups, work is less central and therefore they "contaminate" the sample of workers. When comparisons are made between full-time and work-career-oriented workers of both sexes, the differences disappear. (The question still remains as to the origin of the women being less career-oriented and why it is that part time and temporary workers are more likely to be women than men. This has probably a lot to do with the other explanations to follow.) It can be argued that since trends in the industrial world are for more women to take jobs upon themselves--close to 50% now in the USA and a projected 55-60% in 1990 (Department of Labor, 1979)--and since more women will get engaged in full time jobs (op. cit.), we should witness a growing centrality of the work domain among the female population.

C. Role conflict. The third explanation for the lesser centrality of work for women focuses on the role conflict of working women between their expected roles as homemakers and their roles as full time career-oriented workers (Presser and Baldwin, 1980). If that is the case then once the demands of homemaking work are eased on women, either by providing adequate child care facilities, and/or by more equal distribution of duties between husband and wife, the differences between the sexes would disappear and work would become a source of expected satisfaction among women just as it is for men. Indeed, norms are changing in the distribution of housework in families toward more equalization (Thornton and Freedman, 1979) and societies see it more and more as their responsibility to offer appropriate child care services.



D. Psychological Defensiveness. Another explanation of the lesser centrality of work for women focuses on the fact that working women, as compared to men, occupy jobs with attributes which offer much less opportunities for satisfaction of needs; also, women's jobs are of a much lower status than those of men. In order to avoid frustration, women set themselves lower expectation levels for their jobs (Saleh and Lalljee, 1969; Taveggia and Ziemba, 1978; Weaver, 1978). This allows their job satisfaction to be as high as that of men since satisfaction depends on the degree of congruence between a desired state in a domain and the actual level attained in it (e.g., March and Simon, 1958; French et al., 1977). As regards work centrality, the rationale of the defensiveness explanation is as follows: the less positive job attributes that a woman encounters in her job is such that the only way for her to preserve a reasonable level of adjustment and to avoid frustration is to adopt a position that work is not so important after all, and therefore it does not matter so much one way or another, for the general feeling of well-being. Once women are offered jobs with attributes that are of the same positive level as those of men's and once their jobs are esteemed as those of men's, the difference in centrality would disappear.

E. Social-Environmental Influences. Another reason claimed for women to have different expectations and views concerning the work domain and their roles in it, has to do with the societal direction given to them which starts in the socialization that women get while growing up and continues with the role expectations for women in their adult life (Saleh and Lalljee, 1969; Crowley, Levitin and Quinn, 1973; Douvan and Adelson, 1966). These societal influences discourage any expectations for achievement and self-growth for women in the work domain. It leaves the work domain solely to men, and builds expectations among women for self-development and for self-expression in the domains of family and social interaction (e.g. Weinrich, 1977).

Such arguments (A through E) are not mutually exclusive and all may operate at the same time. They have, however, one common denominator: all point to the environmental demands or restrictions as to the main source of the differences between the genders. The last argument has a different emphasis.


F. Biogrammar. Women are programmed biologically to find more satisfaction in the domain of family than in the domain of work. Proponents of this argument are of the opinion that the sex differences will remain even when efforts are expanded in order to solve the problems raised in the environments of women. Moreover, they think that such differences are even desirable from the point of view of women and functional from the point of view of the species survival (Tiger and Shepher, 1975; Spiro, 1979).

Looking for the reasons responsible for the sex differences in the centrality of work is motivated not only by an intellectual interest but also by its great importance concerning policy making in our society. If it is the case that women have lower expectations for need satisfaction from work only, or mostly because of the environmental constraints or demands (lower education, lesser opportunities for "full-time" and life-career jobs, role conflict, different socialization, a reaction of denial due to frustrating situations), then society should act to change those external situations. If, on the other hand, women do have different preferences from men due to different biologically based gender dispositions, then society should allow those differences to flourish and find ways to satisfy them. At the same time society should develop ways to make the domains that are preferred by women as esteemed and rewarding as are those preferred by men.

Figure 1 summarizes in a schematic presentation the causal flow model that combines all the hypothesized relationships among the clusters of variables mentioned thus far.

Figure 1

Hypothesized relationships among Gender, Centrality of Work, Job Attributes, and Well-Being with six possible clusters of intervening variables between Gender and Centrality of Work



The blocks in Figure 1 represent clusters of variables, the arrows represent directions of relationships, and the numbers represent theoretical hypotheses. It is hypothesized that job attributes (the characteristics of the job that contribute to its offered opportunities for need-satisfaction) affect job satisfaction (1) and also level of well-being and psychological adjustment (2). Job satisfaction, too, is hypothesized to affect the level of well-being (3). Hypothesis 4 denotes that the centrality of work operates as a modifying variable for relations 2 and 3. Hypotheses 7A to 7F denote the expected relations between gender and the various experiences or dispositions it has with regard to the work domain as enumerated in the explanations A through F. Relations 5 and 6 are part of the same content but they involve a chain that includes it in the job attributes experienced by the two sexes. The clusters A through F are thought to act as intervening variables between the gender variable and the centrality variable. These clusters as well as the centrality variable are surrounded by a broken line to denote the fact that in the present paper, most are not directly measured but rather inferred.

#### THE KIBBUTZ SETTING IN RELATION TO THE SIX EXPLANATIONS

The present paper presents data from studies conducted in the Israeli kibbutz society. This topic of research is of particular interest in the kibbutz setting because of the unique features that the kibbutz offers as a research site and also because its content is of particular centrality to kibbutz ideology and policy making since both work and equality between the sexes are the most cherished values of kibbutz life.

As a research site the kibbutz offers the following:

A. Women kibbutz members have at least the same level of average formal education as men do (Leviatan, Shalev and Ovnat, 1975). Thus, the intervening variable of Education in Figure 1 is controlled.

B. The kibbutz is one of the few societies where 100% of all adult women do participate in the labor force in full-time jobs and in which work is a full life-career for all women just as it is for men. This controls effectively for the intervening variable of Part-Work Role in Figure 1.

C. Women on the kibbutz are freed from all the main chores of housework which is taken care of by the community (Rosner, 1967). Child care is institutionalized for the whole day (and in most kibbutzim for the whole night as well). This fact eliminates Role Conflict as an intervening variable.



But most important of all, the kibbutz setting offers an opportunity to study reactions toward work of the women population as such, rather than some biased--in an unknown way--subgroups of women as we find in all other studies in this domain. Other studies in the industrial society choose one of the following approaches: (1) Only working women are studied (e.g. Quinn and Magione, 1973) which introduces a bias in representation of the female population since a sample of working women represents only, at best, 50% of the total women population. (2) Nonworking samples of women are asked hypothetical questions concerning their attitudes towards work which introduces unknown errors and puts the validity of the measured reactions into question.

The kibbutz is one of the few settings in which representative samples of all women can be studied regarding their reactions toward work in nonhypothetical situations as all women are part of the labor force.

In any case, the control that the kibbutz setting offers for the intervening clusters of Education, Part-Work Role, and Role Conflict clears the research scene for the exploration of the remaining three intervening clusters: the hypothesis about the impoverished job attributes and the resultant psychological defense mechanism activated by women to reduce the centrality of the work domain (D), the hypothesis about the differential socialization and other social influences (E), and the hypothesis about the natural disposition that originates from a biogrammar.

D. Exploration of the relevancy of intervening variables of the Defensiveness type (D) call for answers to two separate questions: (1) are men and women of the kibbutz really distinguished from each other as regards the degree of positive attributes of their jobs; and (2) are the relationships between the perceived attributes of the jobs and measures of well-being and psychological adjustment indeed weaker for women members

Regarding the first question, many inside and outside the kibbutz movement believe that the answer is yes. Starting in the 20's and the 30's (e.g. Yaari, 1976, 1980), one finds documentation of leaders and members at large expressing concern about the inequality between the sexes in this regard. This concern has been also expressed in observation by researchers of kibbutzim (Talmon, 1972; Antonovsky and Antonovsky, 1974; Mednick, 1975; Gerson, 1972) to cite just a few of the writings that appeared in English; and many more appear in Hebrew. Resolutions taken by the legislative bodies of the kibbutz movement express the same concern. For example: the last draft for the "Law of the Kibbutz" (HaKibbutz HaArtzi; see also Yassour, 1975: 319-357) that is processed now at the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) states among other kibbutz social goals: "...to advance the kibbutz women member so that she achieves actual equality in the spheres of work, social

life, education and public activities." Similar resolutions were accepted by the kibbutz movements in several conventions (Rosner, 1967; Tiger and Shepher, 1975; Leviatan and Rosner, 1980). I mention these resolutions because it indicates a concern for a situation that needs change or at least support.

The trouble with the seeming consensus above is that the data in this sphere is anything but a clear cut case. For instance, the Antonovskys' (1974) data create a concern. Their female sample reports less satisfaction from its work role than the male sample. However, it is a very small sample from a single kibbutz.

But consider another example: Mednick (1975) thought that women in the kibbutz society see their work domain as less important because it is less fulfilling and less esteemed by the community. According to Mednick, the community esteems the production jobs--which also happen to be men's jobs--more than the services which are the women's jobs (Defensiveness interpretation D). The study upon which she (Mednick, 1975) bases her arguments is now published in full. The complete data do not corroborate this part of Mednick's assertion. Rosner, Ben-David, Ovnat, Cohen, and Leviatan in Table 7.15 (1978) compare a probability sample of about 450 young kibbutz born men to about 450 young kibbutz born women from 54 different kibbutzim. First, no differences are found in the importance attached by those two groups to characteristics of jobs (e.g. being interesting, having opportunities for self-utilization, having significance, having opportunities for achievement, using intelligence, administrative skills, leadership skills, having responsibility). The percentages of the two samples that stated such attributes of their jobs to be important ranged from 95% to 43% and in no case did the sex difference exceed 5%. When asked about the availability of those and some other job characteristics in their jobs, the two samples did not differ with regard to their perceptions of the importance of their jobs to the kibbutz (90% for women, 89% for men); the extent of esteem given to their jobs by the kibbutz communities (71% for women, 70% for men); interesting job (61% versus 54%); use of skills and abilities (61% versus 58%); use of leadership skills (48% versus 46%); having responsibility (83% versus 76%). When these two samples were compared on an index of job satisfaction, the women scored even a bit higher than the men. We see, therefore, that a real discrepancy exists between what people, laymen and researchers alike, believe the reality to be, and what research data prove it to be.

The inconsistencies of data and findings increases when the second question is explored: the relation between job satisfaction and measures of well-being and adjustment (such as attachment to, and involvement in the kibbutz).

Antonovsky and Antonovsky (1974) who expected to find a weaker relationship for women found a stronger relationship. The study of the second generation upon which Mednick has based her observations shows that although women had a slightly higher job satisfaction than men, men were equally or more attached to kibbutz life -- 68% versus 64% (Palgi, 1976), had a higher retention rate (Leviatan, 1975) and the relationship of job satisfaction to kibbutz attachment was stronger for men -  $\chi^2=7.7$  versus  $\chi^2=6.0$  for women (Palgi, 1976).

In summary, the intervening variables of the Defensiveness type should be viewed at best with great doubts and with a further inquiring eye.

E. The case of the intervening variable of the social environment influences E type is not less problematic because of other reasons. On the one hand one has the following situation: work is one of the major values of kibbutz society if not the most important of them. This value is not only paid lip service by resolutions and ideological statements that emphasize its importance in adult life and through the socialization years of childhood and adolescence, but it is also emphasized by the introduction of the work activity as a regular part of the day for students as young as second graders (who may work twenty minutes a day in various chores within their house and around it). This continues through the last grade of high school when students, boys and girls alike, work about three hours a day after school hours in regular branches of the kibbutz economy as well as in serving themselves at school.

An illustration of the actual success of these efforts in environmental influences can be seen in Ben-David (1975). When kibbutz members are asked to assign esteem scores to several stereotyped images of membership (dedicated members, excelling workers, talented members, artists and athletes, etc.) the stereotype that gains the highest esteem is the excelling worker and no differences were recorded between the sexes in this sense. On the other hand, the discrepancies between declared goals and actual, sometimes even unintended practices, have been noted in other societies (Lobban, 1977). That is, although the declared goals are of no sex differences, many stimuli exist in the socialization process that are very much sex-typed: themes and heroes and heroines in books, the kind of pictures used in school and home material, persons to identify with, etc. Some observers of kibbutz life have indicated that this must also be the mechanism in operation in the kibbutz. The example cited is the clear cut sex division of jobs that could easily be recognized as a fact of covert socialization (Mednick, 1975; Buber-Agassi, 1976). Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, no empirical research that bears directly on this question is available.



F. The case for the intervening variable of the biogrammar (F) in relation to the kibbutz has been made by Tiger and Shepher (1975) and more recently, Spiro (1979) that the kibbutz is a test case for the hypothesis of the sex differentiated biogrammar. The kibbutz has been one of the few societies in which a consistent effort has been made to equalize the sexes with regard to all domains of life (work being one of the major areas) and yet the differentiation between the sexes has not decreased.

The next step, of course, is to find ways to test the three remaining hypotheses: defensiveness (D), environmental influences (E), and biogrammar dispositions (F) in order to determine which is the most plausible intervening variable to explain sex differences in work centrality.

## HYPOTHESES

Figure 1 includes several relationships among variables that are often repeated and that were supported in many studies. Arrows 1, 2, and 3, represent the most common relationships found in many studies. Their validation in this study should add credence to those findings that are not so common, since it adds to the construct validity of the model presented by the figure.

I present those relationships formally as hypotheses 1 through 3.

Hypotheses 1 through 3: Arrow 1 in Figure 1: a positive relationship is expected between job attributes and job satisfaction. Arrow 2 in Figure 1: a positive relationship is expected between job attributes and well-being. Arrow 3 in Figure 1: a positive relationship is expected between job satisfaction and general well-being.

The next hypothesis is, in fact, testing the assumed reality that for women work is indeed a less central domain of life when compared to men. This is tested by cross sex comparison of the strength of the relationships depicted by arrows 2 and 3. If it is true that work is less central for women then relationships of the type 2 and 3 should be weaker for them.

Hypothesis 4: The relationships between job attributes and well-being and that of job satisfaction and well-being will be weaker for women.

The next set of hypotheses are concerned with the choosing between the rival interpretations of the assumed sex differences in work centrality as discussed in the previous section: defensiveness, social environmental influence, and biogrammar dispositions.

The defensiveness hypothesis 7D deals with the interpretation labeled (D) in Figure 1. According to it, women develop psychological defense mechanisms of denial and rationalization in order to overcome the frustrating situations of their work. One way to test such an hypothesis is to expect women who have the most impoverished work situation to show least attachment to work and to perceive work to be least central in their life.

Two parts to this expected chain of events:

Hypothesis 5: Women have less favorable job attributes than men.

Hypothesis 7D: The more impoverished the jobs of women are, the lesser will be the centrality attached by them to the work role.

A possible test of the validity of the biogrammar interpretation for the origin of the sex differences in centrality of the work role is comparing several kibbutz age groups regarding sex differences in work centrality. Here is the rationale: if the sex differences stem from a natural disposition which society tried to oppose, we should expect that sex differences would be strongest at earlier ages when the accumulated effects of society's opposition are weaker, and they would become smaller as the accumulated effects of opposing society's efforts had a chance to operate more strongly. Rival interpretations that suggest maturation effects that may lead one to expect more sex differences at older ages and the question of cohort differences as opposed to age differences, will be attended to in the discussion section.

Hypothesis 7F: The older the group of kibbutz members in which the two sexes are compared, the less the differences will be between them in centrality of the work role.

The social-environmental influence explanation (E) asserts that the sexes are not differentiated by either natural disposition or other natural traits with regard to the centrality of the work domain in their life. It argues that the differences found in our society stem from the fact that social influences, covert and overt alike, develop different role expectations in the two sexes such that for men the work role becomes more important than for women. It is further argued that the kibbutz society is no exception in principle although it may emphasize such differentiation less than other industrialized societies.

A comparison of age groups with regard to their sex differences should be as relevant for the test of the above argument as for the first one; only the rationale is in the reverse direction. We should expect that sex differences would be stronger in the age groups that were exposed more to society's influence (older) and weaker in those age groups exposed less to society's influence. Hence, the next hypothesis:

Hypothesis 7E: The older the group of kibbutz members in which the two sexes are compared, the larger the differences between them in terms of their centrality of work involvement.

It should be noted that it is because of the extreme assumptions of the proponents of both interpretations that the above formulation of the hypothesis is at all possible. Had not Tiger and Shepherd assumed, for instance, that the kibbutz is a test case of a society that tried to equalize the sexes, hypothesis 7F could not be stated. Had others not taken the position that no differentiation in natural disposition exists and that all differences are due to social environmental influence, hypothesis 7E could not be stated.

## METHOD

The data base for the analysis in this paper came from three separate studies which were subjected to secondary analyses. The three studies were: (1) a study of high school boys and girls, (2) a study of Industry and Farm of the kibbutz movement (Eden and Leviatan, 1974; Leviatan, 1978), and (3) a study of the kibbutz elderly (Leviatan, Adar and Amad, 1980).

### POPULATION AND SAMPLE

High School Study (1). This study was a preliminary one conducted (Vidra, 1977) in a typical high school to which about ten kibbutzim send their high school students. The school is located in the northern part of Israel. All students of the 11 and 12 grades (ages 17-19) were asked to respond to questionnaires dealing with work issues and general well-being and some other topics. These students work a full day (sometimes two days) each week in various branches of their kibbutzim. Fifty boys and fifty girls responded to the questionnaires (98% response rate).

Industry and Farm Study (2). A description of this study in full appears in Eden and Leviatan (1974). For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that 630 kibbutz member-workers from 27 industrial plants and 220 from 23 farm branches were asked to answer questionnaires about their work, their behavior in, perceptions of, and attitudes towards it. About 600 of the workers answered the questionnaire, and they are the ones that compose the sample upon which the analysis was performed. The age distribution of this sample was similar to that of the general kibbutz adult population of that year (1970): 49% of the sample were 20-39 years of age; 21.5% were 40-49 years; 19.6% were 50-59 years old and 9.6% were 60-70 years old. About 30% of the sample were women.



For the present analysis the sample was broken into four groups by age and sex: young men 20-39 years old ( $N \approx 200$ ), young women 20-39 years old ( $N \approx 100$ ), older men 40+ years old ( $N \approx 200$ ), and older women 40+ years old ( $N \approx 100$ ).

Elderly Study (3). This study is a very comprehensive study about problems of aging in the kibbutz society (Leviatan, Adar and Amad, 1980). Five hundred and twenty individuals aged 45-80 years were interviewed at length using a variety of measures and covering a large range of topics. This sample came from 10 of the most veteran kibbutzim of four movements who were purposely selected for the study of aging. In structure and norms, the selected kibbutzim represent the veteran kibbutzim. For the purposes of the present analyses the sample was broken into two age groups: 45-59 years old (34.4%) and 60-80 years old (65.6%). In each age group about half were men.

Together, the current analyses relate to five age groups, each with male and female samples. The age range for the total sample is 17 - 80 and the combined size of all samples is 490 males and 410 females.

## MEASUREMENT

Since the three studies were originally conducted each for a different purpose, there exists the problem of comparable measures. Fortunately, similar measures were used in at least two of the studies. Those are the measures used in the current, secondary analyses. The same analysis techniques were also supposed to be applied to the three studies, but this turned out to be more difficult since the computer data set was not available for the Industry and Farm study, and all analyses had to be based on computer outputs of previous runs. Other technical problems did not allow certain analyses of the High School and the Elderly studies. The end result is some compromise between the desired level of analyses and what was possible. The following measures were taken in at least two of the studies as indicated in the accompanying parentheses. All were measured on a five category Likert type scale where 5 indicates the most positive score and 1 indicates the least positive score.

1. One question asking about "general satisfaction with life now" (study 1 and study 3).
2. A six-item measure of mental health (Hunt et. al., 1967). Internal consistency  $r_{-tt} = .78$  (study 1 and study 2).

- 3-5. Three indices of alienation: (Tannebaum et. al., 1974): each with two items: powerlessness ( $r_{tt}=.68$ ); normlessness ( $r_{tt}=.61$ ); self-estrangement ( $r_{tt}=.72$ ) (study 1 and study 2). For study 3 a combined measure of the first two indices was available ( $r_{tt}=.65$ ).
6. One measure of general kibbutz satisfaction (study 3). For study 2 -- two items index of kibbutz involvement: perception of involvement and number of general meetings attended out of the last eight meetings ( $r_{tt}=.62$ ) (study 2).
7. Job satisfaction was measured by two items asking about general satisfaction with work and with job in study 1 ( $r_{tt}=.76$ ) and by the first item only in studies 1 and 3.

Job attributes were measured by the following indices: and only for studies 1 and 2.

8. A five-item index measuring opportunities for self-realization ( $r_{tt}=.84$ ).
9. A three-item index measuring the opportunities for control and influence at work ( $r_{tt}=.74$ ).
10. A five-item index measuring degree of knowledge about various aspects of work and work place ( $r_{tt}=.86$ ).
11. A three-item index measuring level of skills needed for job ( $r_{tt}=.71$ ).
12. A five-item index measuring the opportunities for positive peer relations at the work place ( $r_{tt}=.73$ ).

In study 3 it was also possible to obtain measures of satisfaction with other domains: family, civic activity, social status, social relations, leisure, residence, cultural activities, and intergenerational relations.

## ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESIS TESTING

The analyses are inter-sex comparisons across as many as possible from the five age groups. Comparisons are on all descriptive measures and on first order relations between the variables as required by the hypotheses. In most comparisons the statistic in use is the median correlation of a matrix of correlations of several independent variables with several dependent variables. This method is admittedly unsophisticated as compared to some multi-variable approaches such as Multiple Regression Analysis or Multiple Classification Analysis, but

this technique had to be employed given the fact that rectangular correlation matrices were the only data available for the Industry and Farm study. It should also be noted that the median correlation statistic introduces a bias into the results so that the relations seem weaker between sets of variables as compared to other, multiple approach, techniques. But since the bias is the same for all sub-samples, the trends found can be assumed to be the same as those with unbiased methods.

In operational terms the hypotheses are stated as follows:

Hypothesis 1: A positive relationship between job attributes (variables 8-12) and job satisfaction (variable 7).

Hypothesis 2: A positive relationship between job attributes (variables 8-12) and indices of well-being and psychological adjustment (variables 1-6).

Hypothesis 3: A positive relationship between job satisfaction (variable 7) and indices of well-being and psychological adjustment (variable 1-6).

Hypothesis 4: The relationships between job attributes, and job satisfaction (variables 8-12 and variable 7) and indices of well-being and psychological adjustment (variables 1-6) would be weaker for women than for men.

Hypothesis 5: Women's job attributes (variables 8-12) would be less favorable than men's.

Hypothesis 7D: Of the five cross sex comparisons, those with the largest sex differences on the variables of job attributes would show the largest sex differences in relationships between job attributes and job satisfaction and indices of well-being and psychological adjustment.

Hypothesis 7E: The results of hypothesis 4 (see above) would be more pronounced for the older sample than for the younger samples.

Hypothesis 7F: The results of hypothesis 4 (see above) would be more pronounced for the younger samples than for the older samples.



## RESULTS

### DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS

The descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1. It shows means and standard deviations of all measures for each of the groups included in these cross-sex analyses. Within each age group a test for the differences between the mean scores of the sexes was performed.

The data in Table 1 corroborate findings from previous studies. No difference was found in any of the five cross-sex comparisons of job satisfaction. Most measures of well-being also do not show sex differences: none in the high school sample; only two out of five comparisons show sex differences in the young group of the Industry and Farm study, and none in the older group of that study; one out of three comparisons in each of the groups in the elderly study are significant. On the whole only four out of twenty-one comparisons indicate significant differences between the sexes.

The cluster of job attributes does not help solve the inconsistency of findings from previous studies among kibbutz workers. Only one sex difference is found in the high school sample, and it indicates a more favorable job attribute (skill level needed for job) for girls. The Industry and Farm study brings strong indications of the opposite since all five job attributes of the younger group are more favorable for men. Three out of five attributes are also more favorable for the men of the older group (see test of hypothesis 5).

### VERIFICATION OF FINDINGS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES

Next, I present the results of the testing of hypotheses 1-4 which are intended to verify often reported results and validate the data.

Test of hypothesis 1: A median correlation between all five job attributes and the measure of job satisfaction is  $r_{\text{mdn}}=.38$  ( $p<.01$ ) for study 1;  $r_{\text{mdn}}=.34$  ( $p<.01$ ) for study 2 (the two samples combined Leviatan, 1970). For study 3 it is  $r_{\text{mdn}}=.35$  ( $p<.01$ ) also for the two subsamples combined. Thus, the hypothesis is supported in all three cases and, as should be expected, a positive relationship exists between job attributes and job satisfaction.

Table 1

Means, standard deviations and intra age group sex differences for variables of well-being, adjustment, job satisfaction, and job attributes. Three studies, by age groups by sex.

Variable	High School 17-19; 18				Industry and Farm 20-39; 28				Industry and Farm 40-70; 52			
	M (50)		F (50)		M (200)		F (100)		M (200)		F (100)	
	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD
1. Satisfaction- life	3.54	.89	3.72	.88	-	-	-	-	4.26	.97	4.30	.89
2. Mental health	4.16	.51	4.16	.68	4.49	.71	4.63	.60	3.52	1.11	3.65	1.15
3. Powerlessness <sup>a</sup>	.50	.86	3.42	.88	3.78	1.07	3.54	1.22	*			
4. Normlessness <sup>a</sup>	4.05	.90	4.14	.89	4.24	.83	3.66	1.15	***			
5. Self estrangement <sup>a</sup>	3.66	.92	3.61	.95	3.93	.97	3.83	1.15	3.78	1.11	3.89	1.17
6. Kibbutz life satisfaction, or kibbutz involvement	-	-	-	-	3.57	.01	3.58	1.01	3.56	1.18	3.20	.93
7. Job satisfaction	3.92	1.10	3.66	.94	3.52	.93	3.71	.80	3.63	.82	3.59	1.03
8. Self realization	3.11	.71	2.94	.78	3.24	.89	2.71	.89	***			
9. Control & influence	3.64	.83	5.57	.95	3.45	1.04	2.85	1.04	***			**
10. Knowledge	3.07	.78	3.06	.77	3.57	.88	2.71	.89	***			***
11. Skill level	3.83	1.06	2.91	.84	4.11	1.17	3.55	1.21	***			***
12. Peer relations	3.90	.92	3.57	.63	3.41	.94	2.90	.98	***			***

<sup>a</sup>For these measures the scales were reversed so that a higher score means less alienation.

<sup>b</sup>Differences were computed with the student's t statistics. \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Means, standard deviations, and intra age group sex differences for variables of well-being, adjustment, job satisfaction, and job attributes. Three studies, by age groups by sex.

Study: Age - range; mean:	Elderly 45-59; 52			Elderly 60-80; 67			
	M (90)	F (90)	dif	M (170)	F (170)	dif	
Variable	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD	$\bar{X}$	SD	dif
1. Satisfaction- life	3.57	.66	3.63	.87	3.61	.74	3.54 .77
2. Mental health							
3. Powerlessness <sup>a</sup>							
4. Normlessness <sup>a</sup>							
5. Self estrangement <sup>a</sup>	3.61	.91	3.30	.93	*	3.60	.90 3.38 .89 ***
6. Kibbutz life, satisfaction, or kibbutz involvement	3.68	.71	3.81	.72	3.79	.72	3.76 .68
7. Job satisfaction	3.74	.89	3.89	.91	3.84	.93	3.86 1.02
8. Self realization							
9. Control & influence							
10. Knowledge							
11. Skill level							
12. Peer relations							

<sup>a</sup>For these measures the scales were reversed so that a higher score means less alienation.



Hypothesis 2: The relations of job attributes to indices of well-being could be ascertained in the three studies by the method of multiple regressions of the latter variable on the variables denoting job attributes. In the High School study the results of multiple regression for each sex separately were available: variables 1 and 3-5 regressed on variables 8-12. Altogether eight multiple regressions were noted. The average squared, adjusted, multiple regression across all four dependent variables and the two subsamples was  $R^2 = .178$ . The summary statistics are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Summary table for results of multiple regressions of the work-domain variables, job satisfaction and job attributes as predictors of life satisfaction, mental health and three measures of alienation.  
High School study by sex.

<u>Dependent variable</u>	<u>Sex</u>	<u>R<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>R<sup>2</sup><sub>adj</sub></u>	<u>A (constant)</u>	<u>SE (Standard Error)</u>
1. Life satisfaction	M	.38**	.32	1.42	.73
	F	.11	.07	2.00	.85
2. Mental health	M	.34**	.24	2.83	.43
	F	.18	.12	0.36	.13
3. Powerlessness	M	.19*	.13	1.88	.80
	F	.25*	.22	4.54	.78
4. Normlessness	M	.24*	.17	3.80	.83
	F	.15	.12	3.40	.83
5. Self-estrangement	M	.32**	.22	1.97	.81
	F	.20*	.19	1.01	.88

\*p < .05

\*\*p < .01

Table 3

Association of job attributes and job satisfaction to life satisfaction, mental health and alienation. Satisfaction and involvement with kibbutz life. Three studies, five age groups, by sex.<sup>a</sup>

Study:	High School		Industry and Farm		Industry and Farm		Elderly		Elderly	
Age: Range	17-19		20-39		40-70		45-59		60-80	
Mean	18		28		52		52		67	
Sex, (N) <sup>b</sup>	M (50)	F (50)	M (200)	F (100)	M (200)	F (100)	M (170)	F (170)	M (90)	F (90)
<u>Association between:</u>										
1. Job satisfaction & life satisfaction (vars. 7)	.23	.22	-	-	-	-	.38**	.35**	.38**	.35**
2. Job satisfaction & mental health & alienation (vars. 7 & 2-5)	.22	.15	.19**	.00	.22**	.04	-	-	-	-
3. Job attributes & mental health & alienation (vars. 8-12 & 2-5)	.07	.06	.15*	.08	.20**	.11	-	-	-	-
4. Job satisfaction & kibbutz life satisfaction (vars. 7 & 6)	-	-	-	-	-	-	.31**	.38**	.42**	.33**
5. Job satisfaction & kibbutz involvement (vars. 7 & 6)	-	-	.06	.13	.24**	.09	-	-	-	-
6. Job attributes & kibbutz involvement (vars. 8-12 & 6)	-	-	.10	.16	.17*	.14	-	-	-	-

<sup>a</sup>The measures of association between two single variables is the Pearson coefficient of correlation. When more than one variable is involved on either side of the association, the median correlation of the total rectangular matrix of correlations is indicated.

<sup>b</sup>These are approximate numbers. The actual number fluctuated around these numbers by 5.

\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01

In the Elderly study a somewhat different set of measures of job attributes was used. When the indices of well-being were regressed on this set, the multiple regression squared coefficients were as follows: Life Satisfaction  $R^2=.11$ ; kibbutz life satisfaction  $R^2=.26$ ; Alienation  $R^2=.12$ . Thus, we find this hypothesis to be supported also.

Hypothesis 3. Relation of job satisfaction to measures of well-being. The relation of job satisfaction to satisfaction with life is  $r=.23$  ( $p<.05$ ) for the whole sample in the High School study;  $r=.36$  ( $p<.01$ ) for the whole sample in the Elderly study. The relation of job satisfaction with kibbutz life satisfaction is  $r=.37$  for the Elderly study; in study 2 data were available for each subgroup but not for the whole sample. So was also the case with the relationship between job satisfaction and measures of alienation and mental health. Treatment will be deferred therefore, until the inspection of differences between sexes within age groups is presented.

It may be concluded that where appropriate measures were available, the three studies had corroborated the expected relationship between job attributes, job satisfaction and measures of well-being.

Hypotheses 4, 5, 7D, 7E, and 7F will be tested by use of Table 3. In this table the entries are the median correlations for each subsample based on a matrix of intercorrelations between the variables of job attributes and job satisfaction and the variables of life satisfaction, mental health, alienation and satisfaction or involvement with kibbutz life. For instance, there are five measures of job attributes and four measures of alienation and mental health (combined). This should give 20 coefficients of correlations ( $5 \times 4$ ) for each subsample from studies 1 and 2. The entry in the table would indicate the level of the median coefficient of correlation from such a matrix.

Hypothesis 4 expects sex differences in the magnitude of relationships between the variables from the work domain and those denoting well-being and adjustment. It expects that the relations for men will be stronger. The data in Table 3 do not support this prediction. None of the sex differences stands up to a statistical test of an accepted significance level. However, there is a trend. Out of the 15 comparisons, 12 show a tendency for the sample of males to have somewhat stronger relations. In three comparisons the tendency is in the opposite direction.

The weak correlations on the whole and the lack of strong differences between the sexes may in part be due to the method chosen for comparison: the comparisons of median correlations, which pull correlations down as compared to other methods. Support for this contention was given previously when the data of the High School study



was subjected to multiple regression analyses (see Table 2). The relations became much stronger and the differences between the sexes became much more pronounced. In four out of the five comparisons, the boys displayed a much stronger relationship between the domain of work and the variables of well-being.

Another indication for the validity of hypothesis 4 is brought by the Elderly study. There it was possible also to regress the variables of "satisfaction with life in general" and "satisfaction with kibbutz life" on variables in all domains of satisfaction. Thus, we could observe the centrality of the work domain relative to other domains of life and also its net contribution to the explanation of variance in dependent variables. Table 4 shows the results of these analyses.

It may be seen that the work domain is indeed one of the most important domains of life to both men and women in the kibbutz. For the two dependent variables it contributes (in all four subsamples) a major part of their explained variance which runs from 50% for older men and younger women in "satisfaction from kibbutz life" variable to 20% for younger women in "satisfaction from life in general" variable. The net contribution to the explanation of variance in the dependent variables is still sizeable and its range runs between 13.5% and 7.2%. In three of the four sex comparisons, men show a stronger association between work satisfaction and the measure of general satisfaction by at least 2% of net explained variance. In the fourth comparison, women show a stronger association that surpasses their compared group of men by 1.4% of net explained variance.

#### HYPOTHESES THAT EXPLAIN SEX DIFFERENCES IN CENTRALITY OF WORK

Hypothesis 5 stipulates that women are offered jobs that have less favorable job attributes than men. The data in Table 1 is as varied and inconsistent about this matter as the other studies mentioned in the introduction. No support for this expectation is given with the sample of the High School study. If anything, it indicates a trend in the opposite direction since in one out of the five variables - the job skill level - girls report higher scores. Both subsamples of the Industry and Farm study support the hypothesis.

Hypothesis 7D stipulates that subsamples of women that would show the most impoverished job attributes would also demonstrate the least association of the work domain variables with the measures of well-being and adjustment. The correct test for such hypotheses is to compare the male and female subsamples within each age group so that both age and the unique measure biases of each study are controlled. Tables 1 and 3 supply the basis for the test of the hypothesis. The sharpest differences in the level of job attributes is found between

Table 4

Summary tables of multiple regression analysis of current general life satisfaction (A-D) and satisfaction with kibbutz life (E-HO).

Predictors are variables of domain satisfaction<sup>a</sup>.

Four groups: Men, 60-80 years old; women, 60-80 years old; men, 45-59 years old; women, 45-59 years old.

<u>Predictor</u>	<u>R<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>r</u>	<u>β</u>	<u>Relative contribution to explained variance</u>	<u>Net explained variance</u>
<u>A. Men 60-80 yrs</u>					
Satisfaction with:	.300				
Work		.383	.306	39.5	11.7
Social relations		.342	.239	27.7	8.2
Housing		.310	.196	20.6	6.1
Family life		.211	.171	12.1	3.6
<u>B. Women 60-80 yrs</u>					
Family life	.280	.352	.282	35.8	10.1
Work		.350	.272	34.9	9.5
Social relations		.269	.206	19.7	7.3
Cultural relations		.362	.113	10.5	4.1
<u>C. Men 45-59 yrs</u>					
Work	.278	.376	.324	44.0	12.2
Social relations		.366	.242	32.4	9.0
Family life		.330	.198	23.4	6.5
<u>D. Women 45-59 yrs</u>					
Social relations	.377	.471	.282	35.3	13.2
Family life		.462	.249	30.5	11.5
Work		.351	.216	20.1	7.6
Cultural activity		.331	.160	14.1	5.3
<u>E. Men 60-80 yrs</u>					
Work	.264	.415	.316	49.7	13.1
Social activity		.290	.225	24.7	6.5
Social status					
in kibbutz		.274	.142	14.6	3.9
Housing		.213	.136	11.0	2.9

(continued)

Table 4 - Continued

<u>Predictor</u>	<u>R<sup>2</sup></u>	<u>r</u>	<u>β</u>	<u>Relative contribution to explained variance</u>	<u>Net explained variance</u>
<u>F. Women 60-80 yrs</u>					
Social status in kibbutz	.263	.451	.398	68.3	17.9
Work		.334	.251	31.7	8.4
<u>G. Men 45-59 yrs</u>					
Social status in kibbutz	.232	.344	.293	43.4	10.1
Work		.319	.287	38.3	8.0
Housing		.241	.176	18.2	
<u>H. Women 45-59 yrs</u>					
Work	.227	.377	.304	50.2	11.4
Cultural activity		.258	.211	23.8	5.4
Social status in kibbutz		.303	.191	25.6	5.8

<sup>a</sup>The predictors presented in the summary table are only those which have passed a F test of  $p \leq .05$  in the stepwise multiple regression analysis. The original list of predictors included one item measures of satisfaction from the following domains: family, work, leisure, social relations, civic activity, social status, housing, cultural activity, intergenerational relations.



the young men and women of the Industry and Farm study. In all five measures women score much lower than men. But when we inspect Table 3, we find that this subsample shows much less differences (rows 4 and 5) between the sexes in the magnitude of the association between the measures of job attributes and measures of well-being as compared to the older group of the same study. Moreover, the young women of the Industry and Farm study have the most positive scores in job satisfaction of all five subsamples of this study. It must be concluded that the data of this study do not show even a trend of support for hypothesis 7D.

Hypotheses 7E and 7F are the reverse of each other. Both expect the magnitude of sex differences in the relationships between work domain measures and well-being measures to be associated with age. Hypothesis 7E expects the sex differences to increase with age while hypothesis 7F expects the sex differences to decrease with age.

Table 3 is the data base for these tests. It is easier to comprehend the data in Table 3 when transferred into a graphic presentation as done in Figure 2.

In Figure 2 the vertical axis represents the sex differences in the amount of variance explained in the measures of well-being by the measures of the work domain. The horizontal axis is for years of age. Each of the five subsamples of Table 3 is represented by its mean age and by its age range. Each of the graphs drawn connects points that represent the magnitudes of sex differences for all age subsamples for which the same measures were used. The numbers attached to the individual graphs indicate the corresponding rows in Table 2.

Two major conclusions to be drawn: whatever differences do exist between the sexes, they are relatively small as compared to some sex difference in centrality found in other studies. But even with these small differences between the sexes, all five comparisons across age groups indicate that the sex differences do increase in their magnitude with age. In no comparison is there an indication of the reverse trend. This must be interpreted, then, as stronger support for hypothesis 7E than for hypothesis 7F.

The reverse sex difference found for the younger group of the Elderly study may be due to the unique salience of the work role for women members of kibbutzim at this particular age which is the time that many of them make a mid-life change in their occupation. The crises that many times are associated with finding a new appropriate work career may account for the relative importance of the work role at that particular age.



## DISCUSSION

1. The purpose of several of the hypotheses tested in this study was to check the credibility of the data. I have assumed that if the data supported commonly expected relationships, it would indicate that the data could also be trusted for the test of other hypotheses. Indeed, support was rendered for all three of these hypotheses. Job attributes were related to job satisfaction (hypothesis 1). Both were related to indices of well-being and adjustment (hypotheses 2 and 3).
2. Hypothesis 4 comes closer to the focal interest of this study. The trends in the data supported this hypothesis, too. The relationship of job attributes and job satisfaction with indices of well-being was stronger for the male subsamples than for those of the females; although the sex differences in work centrality, as measured here, seems to be smaller than in previous studies. Partly this can be attributed to the techniques of analysis (the use of the median correlation for comparisons); but it also may be due to the kibbutz society being actively engaged -- and with some success -- in equalizing the sexes more than other societies. The relatively small differences between the sexes seem even more impressive when we consider that in this study the samples of both sexes represent their respective total populations while in other studies the women workers represent a biased subpopulation of workers only.
3. The actual existence of sex differences in work centrality within the subsamples of this study corroborate the assumptions employed in the introduction that sex differences exist even when one controls for formal education, for the intensity of the work role, and for role conflict.
4. This leads us directly to the core question of this study: the test of hypotheses 7D, 7E, and 7F. In general, the results of the analyses do not support hypothesis 7D. Although for some age groups, the premise part of the hypothesis (Hypothesis 5 - that women's job attributes are less favorable) is corroborated by the data.
5. The straightforward comparison between the support rendered by the data to hypothesis 7E and that rendered to hypothesis 7F is unquestionably in favor of 7E: all six cross age comparisons show that the older the group the larger the sex differences of job centrality so that it is more central for men. No cross age comparison shows even a trend in the opposite direction.



This simple conclusion poses several questions and needs some discussion:

a) None of the sex differences reaches statistical significance. It is possible that the difference found is simply a random fluctuation without meaning? Two answers relate to this question.

First, the sex differences are small partly because of the employment of median correlations for comparisons. In the Results Section, I demonstrated how sex differences increase when a more cumulative measure like the multiple correlation is used. For the Industry and Farm study such an increase could be appreciated if in the third row of Table 3 the entries were the highest  $r$ 's of the inter-correlation matrix instead of the median correlation. It would have changed the correlations for the young group from .19 to .36 (males) and from .08 to .34 (females). For the older group the change would have been from .20 to .40 (males) and from .11 to .25 (females). The sex differences for the younger group would stay the same but for the older group they would have increased from 2.8% to 9.8% of explained variance, and these " $r$ " values are the minimal to expect in a multiple correlation.

Second, the consistency of the cross-age sex differences, as shown in Figure 2, makes the notion of random fluctuation improbable.

b) The findings that support hypothesis 7E exclude the possible support of 7F. To some extent such a conclusion is an artifact of the way the two hypotheses were presented. Two dimensions were included in formulating the hypotheses. Each was dichotomized into "yes" or "no" categories. One dimension deals with the existence or non-existence of sex differentiated biogrammar; the other dimension deals with the existence or non-existence in the kibbutz society of sex differentiated effects of socialization and social environmental influences. Hypothesis 7E maintained "no" to the first dimension and "yes" in the second dimension. Hypothesis 7F maintained "yes" to the first and "no" to the second and so no overlap could occur between the two. The reason for these formulations was two-fold: first, to follow the arguments of the sex biogrammar proponents who see in the kibbutz society a test case for their hypothesis (which it ceases to be once they do not assume the "no differentiating" effects of social environment and socialization), second, to present an extreme case of comparison between the two hypotheses.

Now that the results show that at least some social environmental effects do influence sex differences, we can return and inspect the other two combinations of the two dimensions. The response, "no" on both dimensions has no meaning with our data as it predicts no effects from either the sex biogrammar or the environment. "Yes" on both dimensions predicts effects from both sources. Following the logic

Table 5

Deviations of perception from actual sex-typing in five kibbutz jobs by three age-groups of children from one kibbutz<sup>a</sup>

Age Group	Number by Sex		Job												Average Deviation Score	
	M	F	Poultry		Dining Hall		Tractor		Dairy		Child Care		M	F		
			M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F				
3-4	12	10	25.0	6.7	20.0	20.0	8.4	0.0	8.4	13.4	18.6	10.0	22.08	10.02		
5-6	8	3	4.2	33.3	37.5	33.3	0.0	33.3	33.4	33.3	0.0	0.0	15.02	26.64		
8-10	11	7	6.0	9.5	0.0	0.0	14.3	15.2	9.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.24	5.72		
(actual percentage of male workers)			33.3		0.0	100.0		66.6		0.0						

Source: Lester. This table is a reworked table from data presented by Lester.

<sup>a</sup>The deviation scores are the differences between the actual percentages of male workers and the percentages of male workers as indicated by each group of children in response to a question.

for the tests of hypotheses 7E and 7F we should expect that in order to support such an hypothesis ("yes" on both dimensions) the data would have to show an increase in sex differences with the advancement of age, but the sex difference should be evident already at the "beginning." Indeed, the youngest group of this study who are of high school age already show sex differences in the centrality of work as is evidenced by Table 2 and by Graph 1 in Figure 2. But is that age the "beginning"? What about the socialization and environmental effects, relevant to the work role, that they went through while growing up?

Although no clear answers are available to this question, a preliminary study (Lester, 1978) conducted in one kibbutz, may indicate a direction for a possible answer. In that study 51 children of three age groups: 3-4, 5-6, and 8-10 were presented pictures of work places that are also part of the job structure on that particular kibbutz. A sex-ambiguous figure was presented with each picture and the children were asked to tell the interviewer whether the figure, who was they were told a worker, was a woman or a man. Their answers were compared with the actual ratio in that kibbutz of men and women in the same jobs. Table 5 is a reworked summary table from Lester's paper. The entries are deviations from actual ratios in that kibbutz. The age pattern of deviations from reality is quite consistent for the boys. The younger ones deviate a lot and the older ones place the figures in the sex group that corresponds to their reality. It is less consistent with the girls (maybe because of their smaller number). In any case the average deviations which are relatively large for the youngest group almost completely disappear by age 8-10. This means that by age 8-10 the sex-typed work roles have already been learned. The same paper also shows that socialization by modeling is operative in the kibbutz at a very early age. When the children were asked where they would "most like to work" as adults, they chose, each sex, his or her own most sex-typed occupations. As the place where they would least want to work, they chose the opposite sex-typed jobs.

The above illustrative data indicate that socialization effects in the domain of work are operative in the kibbutz society at a very early age, and that they have a sex differentiating effect. Thus, although it is still possible that the biogrammar effect is real in the sphere of work centrality, positive proof is needed to show that it contributes to sex differences over and above what could be explained by socialization and other societal effects.

c) Could it be that the increase with age of sex differences in work centrality is a result of a maturation process? As people become older, their sex biograms with regard to work become more apparent since it takes time for it to mature, or because it starts operating only at an older age. This is, of course, a theoretical possibility, but one that cannot be tested with the data of this study because it cannot be separated from accumulated environmental effect. I find it



also lacking on another account: it is possible to understand the biological function for the human female emphasis on family and child rearing roles and the de-emphasis on the work role during the child-bearing period, but what is the biological or species preservation function for such a de-emphasis on the work role at the age of 60-80?

d) Another possibility is the interpretation of the findings of this study as indicating generational rather than age effects. A complicated argument could perhaps make the point for the age versus the generation effect (e.g., the first generation of kibbutz founders was the one that had put most emphasis on work and non-sex differences at work [Tiger and Shepher, 1975]). But I would agree that a much better answer to such criticism would be a longitudinal or even better, a cross-cohort, cross-sequential design for a new study.

e) The Industry and Farm study is different from the other two studies in its sample composition. It includes workers of industry and farm only while the other two samples are representative of the total population of their age groups. One could argue that the sample of study 2 is different enough from the rest as to render its results incomparable to the findings of the other studies. This is not the case because although the sample is different from the other two samples, the bias is the same for the two sexes in that sample. Figure 2 also shows that the relation of sex differences to age is similar for the subsample of the Industry and Farm and those of the other two studies.

f) Levitin and Quinn (1975) have presented data that is relevant to the study reported here. They show correlations between job satisfaction and life satisfaction, plotted for men and women separately, as a function of age. The correlations for women are consistently lower at all age groups but the sex differences do not increase with age. This seems to stand in contrast to the findings of the current study. It is also a negation of hypothesis 7E. The explanation, I think, is that the women workers of their sample were a select group. Moreover, the older the woman worker, the more select the group she belongs to since only those who have survived societal pressures for one reason or another, have stayed in the labor market. In the kibbutz society all members stay at all ages.

It is also possible that the young workers (16-20) in the United States have already been subjected to all societal effects possible with regard to the work role, and the sex differences at this age had already approached the maximum. In the kibbutz society, with its stronger emphasis upon sex equality, the societal effects may start to accumulate at a faster rate only in adult life, after graduation from school.

6. How generalizable are the results from this study to populations outside the kibbutz society? There is no way to answer such a question with assurance; but if one wants to derive

analogies from a related field of research -- the area of organizational behavior in work organizations -- there is enough reason to believe that findings from kibbutz research is generalizable to the wider industrial society and to the American population in particular (Leviatan and Rosner, 1980). Assuming that the findings indeed are relevant for the populations of the industrial society, this study (in fact, any study of women at work in a kibbutz) is of importance to the future issues in the domain of women's work that no study conducted in any other industrial society could contribute. This is because in any study of women at work, we deal with a biased sample of women even if it may represent 50% of the population of women, as it does now in the United States. There is no way to be certain how the population of working women is different from the population of non-working women concerning attitudes and behavior tendencies toward work. But it is expected that close to 100% of the women will be part of the labor force in the relatively near future. Only the kibbutz women population can offer answers to questions that relate to gender (rather than "working women") reactions and attitudes towards the work domain because it is the only population that is 100% engaged in labor-force work roles.

7. Future research should concentrate on overcoming the weaknesses of this study. One major problem with this study is that the effects of socialization and social environmental influences are not measured directly but rather inferred. True, this is also the case with the measure of the sex biogram, but the sex biogram cannot be measured directly while societal influences could come a bit closer to a direct test. I would like to suggest several ways for further study of hypothesis 7E:

- a) Two groups of women who represent the opposite extremes on a continuum of work centrality should be compared by interviews in depth and biographical analysis as to their different socialization experiences and environmental exposures in regards to their work roles. Special attention should be given to the nature of events and experiences that had contributed to differential socialization so that such information could be used for applied purposes (see point e below).

- b) Studies of the kind reported by Lobban (1977) should be conducted in different kibbutzim to find out the effects of informal and unintended sex-typed socialization toward the work role. The kibbutzim selected should represent different levels of sex differences in work centrality.

- c) Longitudinal studies with different cohorts should be initiated in order to test the importance of generation versus age versus historical effects in contributing to sex differences in work centrality.

d) Studies based on the principles of design of the current one in which sex differences will be compared across different age groups but where more age groups would be involved so that a more accurate sex difference, as a function of age, could be discovered.

e) Finally, a field experiment in several kibbutz communities should be initiated in which conscious efforts would be exerted to socialize children so that no sex difference would ensue in the centrality of work (the input relevant to such efforts should come from findings of studies of the kind suggested in the previous paragraphs).





PART III:  
EDUCATION AND FAMILY





## INTRODUCTION -- EDUCATION AND THE FAMILY

Education and family in the kibbutz can be conceived of as both the targets of the attempted change in sex roles and the nests of a further resocialization in a new rearrangement of sexual identities and responsibilities. The editors were limited in providing a balanced view in this section because no articles exist on the problems of boys' education in the kibbutz, and few researchers have ever considered it meaningful to interview men in the kibbutz about the problems they perceive in family life in the kibbutz, any conflicts they might perceive, and how they were educated, how they raised, or how they relate to their children. This is not to predict that such problems exist.

Padan-Eisenstark begins to unravel an explanation about the patterns of life of adult women by searching through the education of young girls. She claims that while the kibbutz educational system structures equal chances for development of all children, the school program is predominantly shaped after male interests. The differential aptitudes, interests, and occupational leanings of adult men and women in the kibbutz (second and third generations) are seen as logical consequences of the differing opportunities for status achievement, the differing roles, and the clear tracking of male and female activities, which is very subtle among young children, and more explicit in the high school.

Padan-Eisenstark begins to develop a theme of female withdrawal from the kibbutz, which begins in adolescence. Safir traces this withdrawal into the family, and traditional female activities in more detail, by reviewing a number of psychological and social-psychological studies on the kibbutz educational system. Just as evidence about the history of the sex role change initiative in the kibbutz raises serious questions for the socio-biological position, the experiences of young kibbutz girls, in terms of their educational achievement, educational aspirations, and the narrow range of appropriate female role models requires integration into an overall explanatory theory of why sex differences take place. Safir's claim is that passivity and withdrawal are logical responses by kibbutz girls to circumstances which are clearly slanted against expanding their horizons.

Nathan further supports the argument that the individual choice of kibbutz women is constrained by the social structure and demographic chains as these affect the kibbutz family. He views the behavior of kibbutz women as a response to a situation that they must confront, rather than an expression of desire. Central to his argument is one of the basic disagreements among various contributors to this volume; namely, was as much effort, social structure, attempts to control attitude and behavior, interpersonal and

ideological structure invested in changing sex roles as in changing other aspects of kibbutz society? The sociologists claim that a large investment was made, and therefore the failure in this sphere is exemplary.

Nathan sees the counterrevolution of rising sex role polarization and familism in the kibbutz as never being preceded by a true revolution of a parallel change in male and female sex roles. We especially direct our attention to the third and fourth generation of kibbutz women, and their response to the status problem of their mothers and grandmothers.

Suzanne Keller avoids general claims of failure and success to map out in great detail what changes in family and sex roles in what specific areas were achieved. She sees the kibbutz as attaining a more egalitarian family without more equality for women. Rather than viewing the kibbutz as an environment in which people's desires for sex role change could be classified as serious and unserious and thereby immediately translated or not translated into action, Keller explores complex changes that took place and are taking place in the kibbutz family, and the relationship of this to the relationship of men and women. There was an attempt to change the status of women without revising sexual stereotypes. Men put women in a double bind by supporting both an egalitarian ideology and a stereotypical view of their wives. Ultimately, the question is what is the effect of sexual inequality on the general thrust of equality in the kibbutz? Is sexual inequality a hidden cancer?

Is it the hidden class structure which exemplifies the easy and mounting little diasaters which will invade a social invention if it does not constantly match its goals with specific actions oriented towards change? Indeed notable in her position is Keller's claim that in fact there are lessons from the kibbutz, perhaps because the gap between ideals and reality exists on every front where innovations in human dignity are attempted. Perhaps it is because the kibbutz so clearly shows how sex role equality is not only a matter of public legislation, lifestyle, and innovation in the occupational sphere, but a highly complex attempt at reeducation which takes place in the most intimate bases of people's lives: the place where the couple works out its mutual respect and dignity, the place where the delicate and important task of raising children is worked out, and the place which serves as a center of people's hopes and fears--the family. Perhaps what is different about the kibbutz from the societies that would learn from it is that this exceedingly private sphere of the family is closer and more integrated into the public spheres in which some of the relevant struggles for sexual equality take place.

Because this experiment has existed for over eighty years, the

kibbutz provides the first opportunity to look at one nexus, where both spheres meet; namely, the system of education. In the kibbutz system of education, everything is closely controlled and monitored by the community. As the various authors show, an attempt to create a radical system of socialization for the sexes could not be insulated from changes in the family and the rule-making and arrangements that took place between husbands and wives.

Both proponents of the socio-biological and the social-structural and social-psychological explanations of the events we have reviewed in the kibbutz have given insufficient attention to the influence of a fragmented society, of disconnected spheres, versus an integrated comprehensive community of co-members on the attainment of sex role equality. Extremists among the socio-biologists would seem to claim that family life will be either impossible or jaded with sex role equality and the healthy survival of the species will be threatened. Certain feminists go beyond recognizing the ability of each individual to express their sexual preference to a claim that heterosexual relationships and the male-female family are themselves the root of the problem. A thorough understanding of education and family in the kibbutz will be an important addition to these discussions.



CHAPTER ELEVEN  
GIRLS' EDUCATION IN THE KIBBUTZ

Dorit D. Padan-Eisenstark

The kibbutz girl is raised from infancy in a social system of a particular kind, comprising both a special type of family structure and a unique educational system. Both the kibbutz's ideology and its organizational set-up are geared to materialize amongst other aims, the ideal of equality between all members, and between men and women in particular (see Bettelheim, 1970; Golan, 1957:167-77; Heiman, 1963:6-11; Spiro, 1956; Talmon-Garber, 1956; Weingarten, 1955). In some of the kibbutzim there are already two generations of kibbutz-born-and-raised adult women. It is therefore possible to draw some conclusions on the impact of this unique educational framework on its products.

The aims of this paper are to investigate whether the kibbutz's institutional framework and its educational system provide some solution to modern women's role in society; whether the kibbutz provides equal chances of development and participation for both girls and boys; and to what extent has succeeded in giving its girls an opportunity to choose the role they wish to play, within a guided framework, which is not in conflict with adult women's actual position in kibbutz society.

To answer these questions we have to consider the combined impact of the kibbutz's educational system, its institutional framework and its central ideas regarding equality between the sexes. The original idea of equality adhered to by the founding generation of the kibbutz movement was extreme and based on masculine standards. Women strove for equal participation with men in all occupational, social, political, and military activities, ignoring even physical differences between the sexes. This concept of equality is designated by the kibbutz members of to-day as "Mechanical Equality." The central institutional arrangements of the kibbutz were also planned to achieve this aim. The collective education system and the communal services were meant to free the women members from the burden of house keeping and childcare, thus enabling them fully to participate in extra-familial activities.

It turned out, though, that the running of the centralized services and education required about half of the kibbutz's manpower. Men, in spite of the ideology of equality, are both reluctant to work in these occupational spheres and are also more rationally utilized in agriculture and industry where hard physical work is required. Thus the main burden of the communal services and child care falls upon the women. As a result the division of labor between the sexes in the kibbutz is paradoxically even more clear cut and "traditional" than in the rest of Israel: 79% of kibbutz women (as against only 39% of the total Israeli woman-power) work either in education and childcare or in service occupations (Padan-Eisenstark, 1973).



Under the impact of this actual division of labor between the sexes, a new concept of equality, designated "Qualitative Equality," developed. According to this new concept the differences in aptitudes, interests and occupation leanings between the sexes are acknowledged, yet they are given equal status. The actual attitudes and evaluations of kibbutz members, though, do not live up to this new ideal, as expressed by one of the leading women in the kibbutz movement:

What is the image of the woman member that we wish to set before our daughters as an educational ideal? The answer to this question is not simple...We still, unconsciously, hold on to our former image of the woman who is similar to men in all duties and privileges, and who is evaluated by standards which prefer the Masculine to the Feminine.

We have not yet drawn the necessary conclusions from the psychological and sociological changes which have occurred in the kibbutz community. We have not given enough thought to the formation of a new image of the woman member which takes into account the actual social roles of women in the kibbutz of today, and their special interests and psychological needs (Chasan, 1962:23).

What is more, there still exists in the mind of most kibbutz members a deep rooted ideological distinction between the so-called productive tasks which contribute to the kibbutz's income and which are highly esteemed, like agriculture and industry, as against the service occupations which are not economically productive and regarded as a necessary evil. It must be kept in mind that the former are mainly men's while the latter are mainly women's occupations in the kibbutz of today (Roth, 1962; Galili, 1967:17; Gerson, 1956:144). Whatever the standing of the individual kibbutz educator towards the two above-mentioned ideals of women's equality, it seems that the kibbutz's educational system as a whole is still patterned to achieve the former ideal of "Mechanical Equality" which stands in stark contrast to kibbutz reality, and to the attitudes and beliefs of many of its members.

Nevertheless, as the kibbutz's educational framework is a rather closed system relatively segregated from adult roles, the kibbutz girl is raised in a relatively consistent atmosphere up to the beginning of adolescence, when, as will be elaborated further, the incongruence and conflict between educational standards and the kibbutz reality become manifest.

In order to clarify the changes in the kibbutz girls' position in different stages of the educational system, a brief review of this process will be presented. The kibbutz girl is raised from infancy in an age-graded system, sharing with her age-mates of both sexes bedroom, meals, play and later also study and work. The educational system extends over a life span of eighteen years from the baby and toddler house,

through kindergarten, elementary education and high school. At the age of eighteen, and before the graduates of both sexes are drafted into the army, they have to decide whether they wish to become full members of the kibbutz in their own right, or leave the community for another kibbutz or a different way of life.

Among toddlers, the grown-ups' division of labor is already reflected in the children's play. Although all toys are open to all infants, the girls tend to concentrate around the doll's house, while the boys prefer toy machinery and construction material available on the play-ground (Golan, 1963).

At the latency age from 6 to 12, though, sex differences in activities and interests seem to be minimal. Furthermore, the artificial educational framework of the children's household and children's farm, which are not based on rational and economic considerations, enable the equal role allocation of both girls and boys to all types of activities. Children at this age work one hour daily in household duties, helping the nurse to clean, prepare the meals, wash dishes etc., or in the running of the children's educational farms which grow flowers and vegetables and breed animals. Girls and boys perform all these duties on equal terms, each child being assigned for three months to a particular task. At this age the girls also take full interest and participate in extra-curricular activities, like sport and scouting, which are predominantly patterned along boys' interests. Thus at this stage school activities seem to be more or less suited to the interests of children of both sexes, and segregated enough from adult roles, to maintain a high degree of congruence between the children's actual activities and the ideology of "Mechanical Equality" which is still the basis of the kibbutz's educational standards and program.

It should be noticed that while kibbutz education, with its strong age-graded organization, seems to be especially suited to the psychological needs of children of both sexes in the latency age, its benefits for younger and older children are still controversial (Bettelheim, 1970). With the advent of adolescence, though, the harmony between educational standards, ideology and actual role allocation of the girls and their aptitudes and interests starts to break down. In addition to the growing differences between the sexes in physical and psychological development, the impact of the actual position of the adult kibbutz woman starts to impinge on the adolescent girls' daily reality, especially in the sphere of work, as will be further elaborated.

The school program, though, does not reflect these changes. Study subjects, sports and extra-curricular activities are predominantly shaped after male interests. The result is a growing passivity or withdrawal of adolescent girls from many activities, as one of the kibbutz educators wrote:

We have not paid enough attention to the special interests of girls in our study program... A large number of girls drop out

either by passive withdrawal, or by skipping of lessons from the realistic subjects like electricity.. educators should be trained to develop the emotional and aesthetic interests of the pupils beside the intellectual ones ... Competitive sports and manifestations of physical strength are the basis of the physical training for both boys and girls. Admitted that these activities answer to the needs and interests of the boys, should they therefore be regarded as ideal for the girls as well ... A special program for the physical training of girls must be developed, including subjects like rhythmic gymnastics etc... (Gilai, 1962:32).

Another source of stress and conflict for girls at this age is their growing interest in their outward appearance. Most adult kibbutz women have by now partly substituted the former puritanical and masculine dressing style for a more feminine one. Yet the importance attributed by the young girls to make-up, style of dressing and sex appeal, in imitation of the urban "Glamour-Girl," although encouraged by their male age-mates, is still frowned upon by most educators and many of the kibbutz members, as argued by the educator just cited: "We, the educators, are too enthusiastic when a girl is masculine in her behavior, refuses to wear dresses, doesn't care about her looks and teases her girl friends for being so fussy about the style and color of their dresses. Don't we by this attitude, suppress one of the central, positive feminine attributes?" (Gilai, 1962:32).

As girls mature earlier than boys at this age, the close-knit age-group, and the common housing and sleeping arrangements become another source of strain for the adolescent girl. It is the girls, more than the boys, who express dissatisfaction and admit embarrassment with the "mixed" sleeping arrangements and who claim that the close contact with their peer group "gets on their nerves" (Rabin, 1968:62-9). Furthermore it seems that the girls' attempts to find contact and establish friendships with older boys bring them into conflict with their own peer group (Davon, 1967:38-9).

The work assignments of the adolescent girls, though, constitute the central source of stress. It is in this sphere where the incongruity between the educational ideology of equality and the kibbutz reality is most apparent. Adolescents from the age of 15 are incorporated in the adult kibbutz labor scheme. The adolescent's day is divided into 4-5 hours of study and 3-4 hours of work. The work is assigned to the youngster by a committee composed of representatives of the high school, both students and teachers, and a member of the adult work assignment committee. In this framework the actual needs of the kibbutz economy predominate over educational and ideological considerations in the work assignment of the adolescents. The communal services and the nurseries are always in need of young labor to perform the less skilled but hard physical tasks, like scrubbing floors, washing dishes and carrying the children. It is the adolescent girls who are thus predominantly assigned to these tasks. The boys, though, are mainly assigned to



agriculture or industry, where they are given the opportunity to handle elaborate modern machinery, and where they can acquire positions of responsibility at a very young age (Social Research Centre, 1972:2).

Thus, given the relatively low esteem and poor equipment of the service occupations in general, the unskilled jobs assigned to the girls in the sphere of childcare and education, and the ideals of "Mechanical Equality" between the sexes they were brought up with, no wonder the adolescent girls are frustrated and reluctant to perform these jobs. Thus while a relatively high percentage of boys (24%) gets permanently attached to some particular occupation to which they later return after coming back from the army, only 10% of the girls released from the army look forward to returning to their former jobs (Social Research Centre, 1972:2).

Research carried out recently using a representative sample of kibbutz-born and raised young adults reveals that the reaction of most young kibbutz women to the conflict between educational standards, ideology, and actual role opportunities, is one of resignation and withdrawal, which manifests itself in various fields (Social Research Centre, 1972:2-5). Most young kibbutz women accept the work assigned to them by the community as a duty to be performed without complaint, but show little positive interest in any particular kind of work. Out of all occupational spheres, young women seem to prefer education and childcare, which are the most professional and also the most highly esteemed amongst the tasks usually available for them in the kibbutz (Social Research Centre, 1971:27).

Young women not only show less interest in political and economic activities than their fellow men, but also in comparison with women of the older generation. The main interest of these young women seems to focus on their family roles, their small apartments and especially their own children. The latter trend finds its expression amongst others in a desire for a relatively large number of children. 75% of the young women (as against 57% of all kibbutz members) considered the ideal kibbutz family to be a large one comprising four or more children. Thus, paradoxically, it has come about that the role aspirations of the young kibbutz women are more restricted and "traditional" than those of their mothers not only in the past, but also at present (Rosner, 1969:30-1).

To come back to the question posed at the beginning of this article, it may be concluded that the kibbutz has not yet solved completely the problem of girls' education and of woman's role in the community. Furthermore, because of the prevailing ideological ambiguities, and the limited occupational choice available for women in a predominantly agricultural community, the kibbutz girl seems to be in an even more perplexing situation than her urban peers.

Nevertheless this seems to be only a transitory situation, as both the kibbutz's ideological changes and its economic development point



toward increasing congruence with women's needs. The growing emphasis on "Qualitative" instead of "Mechanical" equality between the sexes makes educators aware of the necessity to reshape the school program so as to give fuller play to the different aptitudes and interests of girls and boys. The increasing economic prosperity in most kibbutzim gives rise to a more affluent and "feminine" style of life, expressed in changing tastes in dress and housing, including a greater emphasis on the decorating of the home and on social life within the home in place of the former ascetic, masculine and politically oriented way of life. Furthermore the introduction of modern industry in the kibbutz opens new occupational sectors suitable for women and adolescent girls, thus increasing their range of vocational options. Last but not least, most kibbutzim have lately invested large sums in the mechanization and improvement of communal services, diminishing the need for women to operate them, on the one hand, and raising their status in the community on the other.

It therefore seems that in spite of the present problems, both kibbutz education and its institutional framework contain important elements which can be adopted to contribute to the solution of women's role in modern societies.

CHAPTER TWELVE  
SEX ROLE SOCIALIZATION/EDUCATION ON THE KIBBUTZ\*

Marilyn P. Safir

Contemporary kibbutz structure has been developed to enhance the opportunity for social equality. However, we have seen that there has nevertheless been a continued polarization of men's and women's work as well as their political and social activity. In this chapter we will try to identify some of the factors that contribute to and maintain this situation.

In a previous article, we showed that the pioneers (both men and women) were unaware of their stereotyped attitudes as to men's and women's "nature" and abilities. This lack of awareness influenced the development of structures in which women were totally responsible for childcare and services. Agitation during the 1950s and 60s--primarily by male kibbutz members--for women to become more active in communal life and to be equal partners in decision making did not succeed in producing changes. What are the possible reasons for maintenance of this polarization today?

An obvious answer is the limited number of female role models on the kibbutz. Safir and Dotan (1977) found that this is a factor which influences even very young children (3½-5 years). Thirty boys and 30 girls in two kibbutzim and 30 boys and 30 girls from a middle-class city area were asked what they wanted to be and what they expected to be when they grew up. There was no significant difference between the total number of choices between city boys (19) and girls (21) and kibbutz boys (20). Kibbutz girls had significantly fewer choices (12). When content was examined, city children were not particularly stereotyped in their choices. However, both kibbutz boys and girls were; for example, a high percentage of boys chose to be an officer in the military--or tractor or truck driver, while a majority of girls chose teacher, or metapelet (nursemaid). When aspiration was compared to expectancy, kibbutz girls showed a further reduction of job choice (from 12 to 7) and reduction of level of aspiration, i.e. teachers expected to be metaplot or mothers. Kibbutz boys showed no decrease in choice or aspiration, while city children showed a small non-significant change in the direction of stereotyped choices.

In contrast to the narrow range of appropriate female role models, kibbutz education is more democratic than the city school system in Israel. Classes are small, children receive more individual attention, educational material is suited to the child's interest and ability, the

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\*The author would like to thank Shoshana Livne who reviewed the Hebrew sources for relevant material.

atmosphere is noncompetitive. Devereaux et al. (1974) found that kibbutz children see their teachers as generally more supportive than city children. In sixth grade, city children are tested in order to stream them in junior high school, i.e. science vs. humanities. All these courses are open to kibbutz children. In spite of these differences between kibbutz and city schools, Padan-Eisenstark, whose article appears in this section, suggested that role stress occurs at adolescence for kibbutz girls. She attributes this stress to school programs, that she believes to be shaped by male interests, thereby resulting in passivity or withdrawal of many girls from these activities. We believe that girls' passivity and withdrawal results from role conflict rather than lack of interest in "masculine" activities. Beinbaum and Safir (1981) and Livne, Safir and Seginer (1981) found that kibbutz girls, in the last two years of high school, are more likely than kibbutz boys or city girls to postpone choosing a profession, which is another way of reducing role conflict. The kibbutz girl can say she does not know what to choose so as to avoid making an unappealing choice within the kibbutz framework, or to a choice that would bring her into conflict with her social milieu, i.e. actress, scientist.

It is relevant for us to examine the educational aspirations of kibbutz members, as advanced education opens options for jobs requiring high levels of skills, i.e. management and teaching. Rosner (1978) studied second generation kibbutz members. He found that the majority of subjects were interested in continuing their education. Most wanted to study courses connected with their current or (possible) future jobs. However, two thirds were also interested in a general education. Men were more optimistic about their chances of fulfilling their educational aspirations than women. A follow-up found that the mens' optimism was justified. Although the womens' academic aspirations were lower, they were less optimistic about their chances of fulfillment. This lack of optimism proved to be realistic. We may hypothesize that women's disappointment in this area results in a further lowering of aspirations.

Safir (1975), Mednick (1976), and Nathan (whose article also appears in this section) have suggested that kibbutz women may turn to traditionally more feminine roles as compensation for limited and less attractive job choices, or to reduce cognitive dissonance. For example, although kibbutz education encourages women to work in agriculture (Gerson, 1968) most prefer to work in education, while in fact most work in the service areas. Palgi (1976) found that women working in agriculture or industry were not particularly satisfied, felt they were not using their skills and abilities, nor were in positions of responsibility. In fact, many of the jobs the women filled were at the lowest echelons. Therefore it was not surprising that research with second generation kibbutz members revealed that men assign more importance to work and women, to family. This difference between men and women is greater among those who were kibbutz born (second generation) than those who joined the kibbutz (first generation) (Ben-David, 1975; Leviatan, 1976).



Today, children are seen as an important and natural resource of the kibbutz, as larger families are a significant factor in increasing the kibbutz population. The birth rate in city families is decreasing in Israel, while it has been steadily increasing in the kibbutz. (The kibbutz ideal is four plus children versus two/three for city families.) An increase in family size has resulted in a further increase of service related jobs, and to a shift to children sleeping with their parents rather than in children's houses. Tiger and Shepher (1975) suggest this latter change results from maternal needs. It seems reasonable to assume, however, that it is easier to put four children to sleep in one house than to spend 2 to 3 hours putting four children to sleep in four different children's houses. The economic success of the kibbutz also contributes to the possibility of the children sleeping in the family apartment. A large family needs more living space, requiring building additions to existing or new housing to enable the children to sleep with their parents. Early kibbutz apartments consisted of two rooms, as children slept in the children's houses. Today many kibbutzim\* are building four room apartments with small kitchens to accommodate family sleeping arrangements.

Kibbutz members tend to marry young and start their families early, and most women tend to postpone further studies until their thirties. In addition, the researcher Michal Palgi has suggested that young women's involvement with their children reduces their time for involvement in kibbutz activities.

We have seen that womens' production jobs are generally unskilled, and do not lead to advancement. The service jobs are relatively specific and do not prepare women for leadership roles in the kibbutz structure. This can easily result in lowered aspirations and further channeling of energy into "feminine" pursuits, resulting in a vicious circle.

How does this affect the girls' development within the kibbutz environment? Kibbutz girls have been found to have poorer self-images than city girls (Frenkel, 1979; Meir, 1979). Meir also found that girls' self-image is less stable, and neurotic tendencies are higher than the city girls. They are more conformist than city girls and kibbutz boys (Shuval, 1976). They are significantly less androgynous on the Bem Sex Role Inventory than city girls (Ellings, Safir and Leiblich, 1981). Their ego development as measured by Loevinger's scale is lower--two thirds at a conformist level, while three quarters of city girls are at a post conformist level (Beinbaum & Safir, 1981; for another view see Snarey and Blasi, 1980). Kibbutz girls were found to be more self-critical and less assertive in defending their image and traits than kibbutz boys. Their self-reports were less stable, more anxious, and more emotionally liable than male adolescents (Rabin, 1968; Tiger and Shepher, 1975).

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\*Only the Kibbutz Artzi movement does not have family sleeping arrangements.

In intelligence and aptitude tests, kibbutz boys were higher on most scales--verbal as well as performance (Nathan & Schnable, 1976; Dar, 1974). Edelist (1980) found kibbutz boys to be more creative and original and to have more confidence than girls. Limited job choice and the ideological ambiguities of the kibbutz produce a conflictual situation for the kibbutz girl resulting in resignation and lack of positive interest in any particular kind of work (Padan-Eisenstark, 1973). Allon (n.d.) also suggested that the reason for kibbutz girls' lower achievements in some areas or decreasing achievements in higher grades may result from job role conflict. Girls are not enthusiastic about non-professional work (i.e. kitchen, clothing warehouse) and through lack of female role models in professional jobs (apart from education) see these job choices as meager. Therefore, the kibbutz girl sees herself as filling the needs of the kibbutz and not fulfilling self-expression.

These findings indicate different/unequal experience in the socialization process of males and females in the kibbutz. An area in which lack of equality has been obvious is that of teenage work assignment (around the age of fifteen). At this point, the adolescent works 3-4 hours a day and studies 4-5 hours. The needs of the kibbutz determine the job assignment. The service jobs and the children's houses are always in need of "temporary" workers (who may be unskilled) to do hard work--washing dishes, floors, etc. The girls are assigned to fill these jobs. The boys are assigned to jobs in production that may allow them to develop skills, assume responsibility, enter into mainstream positions at an early age. Fortunately, this procedure is currently being revamped.

Army service is also a more significant experience for boys than girls in a kibbutz society. A large percentage of Israeli army officers are kibbutzniks. (Kibbutz members comprise 3.2% of the population.) Most kibbutz boys join the elite corps (paratroopers, pilots, making up about 50% of these units in addition to being officers)--high status pursuits for the general Israeli population, as well as the kibbutz. We should note that, although sex role polarization has been more extreme on the kibbutz, female socialization is more stereotyped in Israel than in other Western societies. Safir, et al. (1980) found in a randomly selected sample that 78% of Israeli women were sex-role stereotyped (22% fell in the androgynous range on the Bem Sex Role inventory), the rest in the feminine range. Males tended to resemble American males with 50% receiving androgynous scores, 35% masculine and 15% feminine. Lieblich (1981) found Israeli boys were significantly higher than girls on both verbal and performance scale scores on the Weischler Intelligence Scale for Children. Kibbutz education has succeeded in reducing these extreme differences found in the general population (see Safir, Lavi and Nevo, 1980; Nathan and Schnable, 1976).

The kibbutz has developed within the context of Israeli society. In our earlier chapter we showed the conflicting forces that existed in the early part of the century. Socialist ideals and values existed with

values socialized in traditional patriarchal ghetto and oriental societies.

The kibbutz however has been in the forefront of Israeli society in establishing social equality within the family. Women are kibbutz members in their own right. They are not economically dependent on their husbands, nor are they dependent on them for social status. The responsibility for caring for and raising their children is shared by the kibbutz, all men and women work. Rosner and Palgi in this volume have shown that there is much less role differentiation by sex within the kibbutz family than is typical than in Western society.

We have, however, tried to point out some problem areas within the communal society. We have attempted to show that sex role polarization has occurred and is maintained as a result of socialization processes within the Israeli society and the kibbutz, and not necessarily a result of different and inherent natures of males and females. The uniqueness of the kibbutz, the continuing concern for the wellbeing of all its members, plus continued self examination through research, discussion and formulations for change, results in dynamic structure which is in continual flux and development. The issues that we have raised have been raised within the kibbutz as well. The various kibbutz movements are actively trying to remedy the situation. Psychological barriers to equality have always proved to be more difficult to change than physical or legal barriers. Change must occur within, as well as between individuals, as well as in the structure of a society. The kibbutz structure with its integration of education, childcare, and group policy decisions should enable the kibbutz movements to evolve social and sexual equality at a faster rate than Israeli society. These movements are currently devoting their energies to produce these changes. In addition, Rosner, et al. (1978) have pointed out that new developments and technological changes have reduced manpower needs in the kibbutz production branches. It may be assumed that polarization will also be reduced due to the shifting of men and women to new jobs that have recently been created, or will be created.



CHAPTER THIRTEEN  
COUNTERREVOLUTION WITHOUT REVOLUTION?

Michael Nathan

The growing number of books and papers dealing with problems of the family and women in the kibbutz try to convince us that we are facing a real counterrevolution regarding the sex role of women in the kibbutz (e.g., Tiger and Shepher, 1975; Spiro, 1979). This presentation is generally based on three assumptions:

1. Early in the kibbutz history, more than half of the women population worked in production, while today sexual work division is much more polarized.
2. The concept of sexual equality among female members of the founding generation was egalitarian. They are described as feminists who preferred productive "male" occupations and rejected the traditional sexual work differentiation. Today however most of the kibbutz women are satisfied with the traditional feminine sex role.
3. The so-called "familistic" trend. The meaning of this trend is a gradual transfer of tasks which were formerly performed by the collective to the family, especially tasks in the domains of consumption and education. As a result the power of the family as a subsystem within the kibbutz is growing. According to their different convictions authors offered different explanations to the so-called counterrevolution. Spiro, who introduced the term counterrevolution in reference to these changes, called his explanation a pre-cultural one. Tiger and Shepher, who published their book on women in the kibbutz four years before Spiro, named a very similar explanation a biosocial one. Other authors tried to give us sociological and psychological explanations.

I have no intention of participating in this dispute among biological and sociological reasonings. I will however attempt to examine the thesis of counterrevolution, in order to comprehend the extent to which it is tenable.

#### WORK DIVISION ACCORDING TO SEX

The concept of a role is always complementary. For example, the concept of a parent's role can only be understood in relation to the role of the child. In the same manner, the concept of sex role refers to the behavioral patterns and psychological characteristics, typical

of one sex in contrast to the other. Any change in one sex role affects that of the other. Therefore changes in the female sex role must be accompanied by changes in the male sex role. This should also apply to work sex role differentiation. Can we detect such changes?

In one example from original documents (Zur and Porath, 1981:66) we read about a complaint raised by a young woman: "Why do the boys not participate in doing the hard laundry work and why should the girls not participate in agricultural work?... Why should the girls do all the dirty and boring work, while the boys do the interesting and fulfilling jobs?" she asks. This question was raised during the first years of Kibbutz Degania. In this book as well as in the book of Tiger and Shepher (1975) and in Gerson's book (1979) we can find an abundance of material showing us that at no time in kibbutz history did men seriously participate in the traditional female work. Therefore it should not be a surprise that women in the kibbutz had always done "feminine" jobs (kitchen and laundry work, child care, education etc.).

As early as 1916, i.e., about six years after its establishment, Degania, the first communal settlement in the country and at that time still the only one, adopted the following resolution:

"The matter of children's care is the duty not only of the mother, but of all women, including the young girls, so as to enable members who are mothers, to work side by side with these young girls" (Baratz, 1954:67).

This means that "all women" (not all members) are under the obligation of taking care of the children of the community, i.e., it is defined as a totally feminine duty.

Sex role differentiation was defined in the past in the same manner as it is in the present! It is true however that there was a larger proportion of women who deviated from this pattern. How can this be explained? The first and the most decisive explanation is the fact that there were very few children to take care of. Therefore a major part of the female working power was free to participate in the "male" and productive jobs. Secondly, the lower standard of living at that time did not require as much service work from the members as it does today.

Therefore we can see that the higher proportion of women doing "male" jobs was not related to a different definition of sex roles but due to different job requirements. The discussion on sex roles in the kibbutz was mainly a discussion of the female role but never dealt in a serious way with the complementary male role. A change in

the definition of the male role is a necessary condition for a change in the definition of the female role. This condition was never achieved in the kibbutz!

## ATTITUDES TO SEX ROLES AND EQUALITY

There is no need to add to all the descriptions in the literature any further material in order to demonstrate changes in the attitude to the concept of the female sex role and equality that occurred in the kibbutz (Gerson, 1979; Rosner, 1969; Spiro, 1979; Tiger and Shepher, 1975). Questions like those raised by the girl from Degania, challenging the reality of work division in the kibbutz, are less heard nowadays. I will add two more notes on this subject:

1. The change is parallel to the change in the reality of the kibbutz, where women have lesser degrees of freedom to deviate from the traditional role.
2. The change closes the gap between reality and ideology, and thus weakens the tension that was created by this gap. It seems that Festinger's dissonance theory (1957) is relevant in order to understand the way kibbutz-girls choose to meet this problem. Since they assume that it is not within their power to change reality, they prefer, nolens volens, to change their value-system, or more precisely, the relevant component.

The change that occurred is an adaptation of ideology to reality, i.e., a change in the superstructure.

It is important to note that the value of equality as a basic value of the kibbutz society still occupies a central and dominant position in the community value system. There may be a source of tension created by the possible contradiction between the value of equality and the changed concept of the female sex role. Thus there is a need for reconciliation between the two.

## THE KIBBUTZ FAMILY

The most salient change in the kibbutz reality is a change in the status and strength of the family. This change is opposite in its tendency to what is happening in the Israeli family outside the kibbutz. This factor is even more outstanding if we take in mind the fact that the kibbutz family is not an economic unit, and that the woman in the kibbutz is not dependent on her spouse for her support, or for the support of the children.

One of the noticeable changes in the kibbutz family is the growth of fertility. There is a marked discrepancy between decreasing



fertility rates in the whole of Israeli society and increasing fertility in kibbutz-society. According to the Israeli Yearbook of Statistics (1976: 81; 1978: 92), the rates of fertility for Jews in 1951 was 4.01 as against 3.21 in 1975 and 2.99 in 1977. There was a decrease in fertility rates of Israeli-born women from 3.57 to 3.08 in 1975 and 2.89 in 1977; regarding European-born women from 3.18 in 1951 to 2.83 in 1977; and with women hailing from Asian-African countries from 6.31 in 1951 to 3.77 in 1975 and 3.42 in 1977. There are no similarly detailed data regarding the kibbutz movement; yet, there is some relevant information relating to fertility rates among different age groups. The figure of kibbutz women above 50 is 2.68, for those aged 45-49: 2.89; between 40-44: 3.1; between 35-39: 3.2; and between 30-34: 3.5.

What is conspicuous in this context is not only the different tendency, but the absolute difference. It should also be remembered that 90% of all kibbutz members are either European-born or the offspring of European-born families, i.e. of a background with a fertility rate below the average in Israel.

It is not sufficient to explain the wish of the kibbutz women for motherhood, and to demonstrate its biological basis. What we do however have to understand is the fact that the trend in the kibbutz is so different from the trend outside the kibbutz. This question will be dealt with later in this paper.

It is important however to emphasize that the change that occurred in the role of the family did not mean a change in what is considered a "female job." The significant change that occurred is the fact that some of the tasks that in the past were "part of the job", are now occurring within the realm of the family unit. It was a woman who gave supper to children in the children's house then. It is a woman (mother) who gives supper at home to her children and family.

Let us return to the question of the growth in the number of children in the family. In another paper we may find a partial answer: "It goes without saying, that national and kibbutz ideology operate with considerable force in the direction of large-sized families. Due to the structure of the kibbutz, having a large number of children does not constitute an economic burden (to the family), and the parents have no worries about the upkeep of their children. The very opposite might be stated -- children are considered an economic asset for the kibbutz. The main obstacle in the development of the community is the shortage of members. As a result, the overwhelming majority of the members view the growth of the average family with satisfaction" (Nathan, 1980).

These explanations, as true as they may be, are not sufficient for the understanding of this phenomena. The most determining factor for the growth of fertility is the mutual wish of both partners to

strengthen the family unit. A family with many children is perceived in the kibbutz as strong and powerful. The strengthening of the family is not only the result of a large-sized family, the opposite. The wish for a strong family unit is a decisive factor of the wish for a large-sized family.

I assume that the existence of a strong and stable family is the result of a psychological need of kibbutz members. The need is for intimate relations. Such relations permit the existence of the individual identity within the collective, and enables the individual to stand against pressures of society.

Gerson's paper (1981) is relevant in this context. He used the term "density" to describe one of the characteristics of social life in the kibbutz. In my opinion, members in the kibbutz try to defend themselves against the pressure of this "density" through a large and powerful family.

The wish for strengthening the family in the kibbutz does not necessarily contradict the interests of the kibbutz. On the contrary, a stable family helps the kibbutz, because it is a precondition for the stability of kibbutz society. Such stability is much more important today than it was in the past. It is a necessary condition for the functioning of the very complex economic and social system that is the kibbutz today.

#### REVOLUTION IN KIBBUTZ SEX-ROLE DIFFERENTIATION?

I would like to raise a further question. What is the impact of the developments described in this paper on girls growing up in the kibbutz today? Girls now grow up in a conflict situation. On the one hand, there is an ideology of equality, which also influences the conduct of the educators, making it more or less equal in regard to both sexes. It should be born in mind, that the impact of kibbutz educators (teachers and "metaplot") at all age levels is much greater than in non-kibbutz society. On the other hand, a reality that is far from egalitarian prevails in the kibbutz. The most extreme way of solving or evading the conflict is to leave the kibbutz. However, there are also alternative possibilities of solutions within the kibbutz. Those are of special interest, since each such solution inevitably affects the character of kibbutz society.

I have already mentioned one frequent solution, that of change of attitudes and values and the acceptance of a traditional, female sex-role. Since the conflict is primary, many of the solutions are of superficial character. The conflict is repressed, but continues to exist in the deeper strata of the personality. We know that such repressed conflicts are no less important than conscious ones. However, unlike conscious conflicts, they are not subject to rational treatment.

Even today there are kibbutz-born girls, though their number is relatively small, who are able to withstand pressure in the direction of conformity to sex-role standards inside the kibbutz. They manage to live the lives of modern women within kibbutz-society. They make use of various advantages deriving from the social structure of the kibbutz, which facilitate the fulfillment of the maternal role together with professional and "male" work.

In different social and psychological constellations the very same conflicts may lead to different solutions. Some of these constellations depend on developments and changes in non-kibbutz Israeli society, while others are conditioned by processes in the kibbutz. As one author notes, "In the kibbutz, there is no direct effect of the number of children on their mother's work. But, as long as child-care is a feminine occupation, the higher birth-rates limit the possibilities of occupational choice of young women and also enhance a problem which applies to both sexes, namely, the incompatibility between personal aspirations and the needs of the kibbutz" (Palgi, 1980).

The possibility cannot be ruled out that, when the next generation grows up, the women may opt for a more modern female sex-role concept in the kibbutz. One of the decisive factors would be the existence of the repressed conflict, and as a result, dissatisfaction with the traditional female sex-role. Lipman-Blumen (1972) found a greater inclination to a modern conception of the feminine sex-role with girls whose mothers were not satisfied with their role as housewives. Wherever mothers liked their roles as housewives or at least revealed no opposition or dislike to it, the daughters showed a greater tendency to prefer the more traditional conception of their sex-role. The researcher assumes that the mothers who were disgruntled encouraged their daughters to opt for another style and pattern of life than their own. On a higher level of generalization, it may be said that the more dissatisfaction mothers feel with their lifestyle, the more do they encourage their daughters to deviate from it. If this is applied to kibbutz-society, it may well explain the trends mentioned above as shown by female members of the second and third generation. However, on the strength of Lipman-Blumen's theory, one may predict a return to a more modern attitude in the next generation. The possible success of such a development cannot be achieved without:

1. A decrease in the number of children per family.
2. A parallel change in male and female sex roles.

Only then may the vision of revolution in sex role differentiation in the kibbutz society become a reality.



CHAPTER FOURTEEN  
THE FAMILY IN THE KIBBUTZ: WHAT LESSONS FOR US?

Suzanne Keller

More than 60 years have passed since the first kibbutz was founded by young idealists fleeing anti-Semitism and oppression in their homeland. Imbued with the goals of nineteenth century socialism, Jewish nationalism and Tolstoyan morality, they sought to start afresh in a new land and create a just and humane society.

One of the settlers' initial aims was to dispel the crippling stereotype of Jews as superintellectuals incapable of working with their hands. As socialist idealists, the pioneers also hoped to prove the superiority of cooperative social forms over competitive ones. In a context of cooperation and justice they sought to demonstrate the true worth of every individual regardless of creed, age or sex. Individuals would work for and be rewarded by the community directly. Women would no longer have to depend upon men economically, legally or spiritually, and patriarchal power over the young and the women would be broken forever. The harsh conditions and priorities of pioneer life focused collective attention and commitments on communal needs. The family, whatever its form, had to take second place. Since few of the young founders were married and even fewer had children, this posed no special hardships. The relationship between the family and the collective only became an urgent problem later, when the founders themselves became parents. Later still, as the founders became grandparents, personal and family concern would not always coincide smoothly with collective priorities.

In this chapter I will concentrate on findings from some of those settlements which were founded and developed on those ideals--those kibbutzim which have made the most radical attempts to change family and child-rearing institutions. For it is in these communities that the costs, benefits, achievements and failures of sexual equality, communal child rearing and an altered division of labor are most apparent.

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## SOME KEY INNOVATIONS IN THE FAMILY

In their desire to alter the relations between the sexes and the generations, the pioneers were led, through trial and error, to a redefinition of marriage, work and motherhood. The bourgeois model of marriage which prevailed in nineteenth century Europe, with its disadvantages for women and children masked by romantic illusions and filial pieties, was rejected in favor of a more personal and private one. The woman was no longer to depend on her husband for any of the usual support. She could earn her own living; she did not maintain a private household for her mate; she did not assume his name; and she did not exclusively care for their children. Hence the relations between the couple could rest on intrinsic considerations of affection and compatibility rather than on status and security. And since each partner was to have a distinct legal identity, neither a woman's social status nor her standard of living depended on her husband's failures or achievements.

In the very early years there were attempts to do away with monogamous marriage altogether by experimenting, informally, with polygamy and polyandry and by abandoning such terms as husband, wife and marriage. But monogamy soon became the accepted form, though with some important innovations. Although a man and a woman could now join together on the basis of desire uncontaminated by mundane needs for economic security or social status, the couple as an entity was somehow to keep itself in the background. Couples were discouraged from spending their leisure time together and kept friendships, work schedules, and vacations separate. Marriage was considered a private affair; public displays of affection were kept to a minimum, and divorce was relatively painless.

Given the pressures and problems of building a settlement in the desert, communal loyalty was placed above family loyalty. The kibbutz assumed many of the functions formerly assigned to the family and developed many ingenious devices to prevent "the consolidation of the family as a distinct and independent unit" (Talmon-Garber, 1968:49). Husbands and wives were allotted separate jobs, and there was a strict ban on assigning members of the same family to the same place of work. And with both men and women laboring long, hard hours in the fields, dining and household services had to be organized communally.

Initially, too, because of the difficulties of building a community from scratch and under extremely unfavorable conditions, children were not especially welcome. It was feared that children would divide rather than unite the community by deflecting energies and loyalties from the communal to the personal sphere (Russcol and Banai, 1970:201). Later these attitudes changed, and children were hailed as a treasured link to the future, but the highest acclaim continued to be reserved for productive work. Collective nurseries, one of the

key social contributions of the kibbutz, were initially developed as much to free the mothers for needed labor as to free the children from the worst features of traditional family life.

From the start, therefore, we notice a curious contradiction. Adults were expected to marry and live in a sustained partnership with a member of the opposite sex. But at the same time they were not to put conjugal ties above their ties to the community. How to walk the thin line between conjugal and communal commitment was a source of unresolved tension from the very beginning. As the community grew, moreover, so did a concern with the birth rate, which was far below replacement level. Hence there was an early stimulus to family and procreative concerns.

The kibbutz has made extraordinary achievements in the sphere of family life, and has accomplished a large part of what its founders set out to do:

1. It broke the power of the father, or of the patriarchy, over women, children and household.
2. It eliminated the legal, economic and personal dependency of the wife on the husband.
3. It developed an effective method of child rearing.

However, the promised equality of the sexes has failed to materialize to the extent envisaged, and this remains one of the major contemporary problems of the kibbutz.

#### THE DIVISION OF LABOR BY SEX

Contrary to ideology and public pronouncement, a fairly pervasive and clear-cut division of labor by sex has emerged in the kibbutz, both within the household and in the wider community. It is true that the context of household care has been communally organized, but there are now tendencies towards a more traditional household organization with women responsible for its operation. The reasons for this are complex: housework grew more time-consuming as apartments became larger and better appointed; more time could be spent with the children; and some meals could be taken at home rather than in the communal dining hall. The couple continues to share some household duties, such as afternoon tea or play with the children, but essentially the woman has the main responsibility; the husband is her temporary stand-in or assistant (Talmon, 1965:142). Even childcare, a pleasant duty focused mainly on affection and attention and devoid of most onerous disciplinary aspects, has assumed certain sex-typed characteristics. Fathers are active outside of the apartment in yard, farm and community, whereas



mothers prevail within the home. Mothers tend to be more involved with very young infants and with the bodily well-being of children, while fathers attend to older children and to matters of their moral education. So the parents divide along a number of lines, and the children gradually come to see mother as representative of "the family in the kibbutz" and the father as representative of "the kibbutz in the family." All of this takes place in a generally egalitarian context, however, and without sex-based patterns of authority. But as is often the case, the ideology of equality is more pronounced in theory than in practice.

The sexual division of labor, though extensively modified on the domestic level, has not been effaced entirely. Still, there is far less separation than in the larger kibbutz community, where occupations are clearly and extensively sex-typed.

Initially, as much as possible, work was assigned without sexual consideration, and women participated extensively in traditionally masculine tasks, while men, though even then to a smaller degree, did some of the traditional feminine tasks within the household (Talmon, 1965:146). But now a clear-cut sex-patterning of work exists. Men are associated with agriculture, production and central public administration and women with services and education. Closer inspection reveals a fairly detailed sex-typing of work, with women entirely absent in some fields (fishery, carpentry, machine maintenance) but not in others (poultry raising). One wonders about the rationale for this. It cannot be only the oft-cited difference in physical strength of women which assigns them to orchards but not to carpentry or, conversely, which sees men teaching the higher but not the lower school grades. Surely we note here the operation of some system of belief about men's and women's inherent or traditional capacities and aptitudes.

The result is that the overall division of labor by sex is not radically different in the kibbutz from what it is outside. The vast majority of kibbutz women are engaged in non-income-producing activities and in fields traditionally assigned to women. The majority of men, on the other hand, are engaged in occupations considered masculine. A survey of 818 members of 18 kibbutzim showed that there were very few cross-overs (Rabin, 1970:297).

As a result several writers have made the point that women did become free from individual household and child-care responsibilities only to find themselves doing these same tasks on a communitywide basis. The metaplot (communal nurses) are all women (most of them young), and the same holds true for kindergarten teachers, cooks in the communal dining halls, and functionaries in the central kitchens and nurseries. Rabin contends that objective needs compelled women to take up the very jobs from which the kibbutz had promised to lib-

erate them (Rabin, 1970). And Spiro observes that women used to participate in a variety of family and household tasks, but now they have become specialists who do nothing else for eight hours a day (Spiro, 1958).

Women are also underrepresented in the managerial and leadership positions of the community. They are altogether absent from some committees and are predominant in those dealing with concerns defined as feminine, such as health, education and services. Talmon found that men predominate in the central offices as well as in committees devoted to planning and security. In three committees--those in charge of work assignments, social relations and cultural activities --men and women were proportionately represented. Most committees do have both sexes represented, though not proportionately, but community leadership is largely in male hands.

Part of the reason for this imbalance has to do with the occupational concentration of women and men, each gaining experience in some areas but not in others. Hence, committee work will favor those who know something about the areas involved--which takes us right back to occupational sex-typing and its carryover into other spheres. Moreover, women do not seem to be keen to serve on committees, and therefore avoid being nominated. Given their growing responsibilities in the home, combined with full-time work outside it, committee work would be yet a third obligation to cut into their limited free time (Talmon, 1965:151).

All in all, then, we note a growing differentiation of the sexes in work, leadership and family. Women have less opportunity for the most prestigious and rewarded positions in the kibbutz economy and polity, a fact not lost on them. One survey of 300 high school seniors (Rabkin and Rabkin, 1969:40-48) showed that while girls identified their future with the kibbutz they felt that there were not enough interesting jobs for women there. And a sharp sex difference was noted on a question about feminine propensities for household care, with the girls disclaiming and the boys insisting on a strong affinity between the two. Despite their joint upbringing, they clearly possessed different conceptions of femininity.

There has, indeed, been a basic reorganization of work in the kibbutz, but it affects husbands and wives rather than men and women generally. Husbands do not have to support wives, and wives do not have to cook and keep house for husbands. Both are members of the community on their own, and neither derives status from the other. On a deeper level, however, the equation of man as worker and of woman as mother remains intact. Whatever else women may do, however hard they may work, they are still first and foremost mothers. This has created some of the same problems of time allocation and cross-pressures between jobs and maternity which beset women in noncollective

societies. Partly in response to this, women will forgo more prestigious and demanding employment in favor of the unskilled manual and service work which combines more easily with their maternal duties. Thus the kibbutz has succeeded in freeing wives from dependence on their husbands but it has not substantially altered the division of labor or rank between men and women.

The rank and prestige hierarchy in the kibbutz is more closely related to the situation and opportunities of the sexes than appears at first glance, for the differential distribution of rewards which it reflects readily lends itself to the creation of permanent status divisions. Raising a cash crop is considered more important than cooking the food or doing the laundry, even though the latter are clearly essential and even indispensable services. The problem is a familiar one in social stratification. It stems from the assessment of the contribution made to the wealth as distinct from the welfare of the community. Raising a cash crop adds something of value that was not there before. It can be exchanged. Cleaning and mending cannot be--at least not until we use more adequate yardsticks of collective well-being and communal wealth. Raising cash crops, irrigating the desert, developing economic and technical resources are, of course, also more difficult than cooking or cleaning. Thus the cash crop raiser is likely to be considered as making the more significant contribution to communal prosperity on both counts. Productive work will thus be ranked above service work, and by association, men will rank higher than women. Even though the woman's role of producing children adds "something of value that was not there before," men's productive work still ranks higher than women's reproductive work.

The discrepancy between the ideal of equality between the sexes and the reality must pose special hardships for women. Financial non-dependency on husbands and the right to self-support are, of course, important gains for kibbutz women, but these are advantages only if opportunities for self-support are favorable. We have seen that they are relatively less so for women than for men. In addition, women have a double burden of job plus familial obligations. Hence they face the same problem women face in the outside world as they try to find a way to combine motherhood with status-conferring and meaningful work outside of the home. Should they fail to do so, they might choose to forgo the right to self-support in favor of full-time motherhood, a prospect which some are evidently seriously contemplating. Thus, in the work area, women in the kibbutz confront two key problems: lower status in the community stemming from the lesser value attached to the work assigned them; and the absence of work satisfaction which becomes "an essential--and unfulfilled-- need once economic independence has been achieved" (Hurwitz, 1965:361).

For these and other reasons the woman question has reemerged in the kibbutz in full force. Women experience and express dissatisfac-



tion with their relatively lower status and their double load of work, and they are among the chief instigators when couples leave the kibbutz (Rabin, 1965:299). Spiro considers this a problem of the first order. "With the exception of politics," he writes, "nothing occupies so much attention in the kibbutz . . . ." He goes on to note that "if Kiryat Yedidim should ever disintegrate, the 'problem of the woman' will be one of the main contributing factors" (Spiro, 1956:221).

## REASONS FOR THE PERSISTENCE OF THE WOMAN QUESTION

The kibbutz experiment has made extraordinary contributions in a number of areas. Sexual equality, in the full meaning of the term, is not, however, one of them. Women did achieve freedom from domestic bondage, but this freedom did not bring full dignity and status.

Communal child care does free women from most, though not all, of the tasks of child rearing, but it frees them for work which may not be as gratifying. Women are still concentrated in kitchens, laundries and nurseries. Femininity is still focused on a nurturant, service ideal. But now, instead of doing one family's dishes and laundry, women do those of hundreds. And instead of service to one household, service now extends to the entire community. Not surprisingly, many women fail to see these developments as proof of liberation, emancipation or equality, by any definition.

As discussed earlier, the goal of economic equality between the sexes, sincerely, even passionately proclaimed and pursued, has been blocked by two unexpected developments in kibbutz life. One was the renewed emphasis on reproduction as population growth became necessary; the other, the need for specialization of work (and of leadership) as the community grew larger and more heterogeneous. The one reinforced the social importance of motherhood; the other the necessity for male political leadership and full-time work specialization.

There are three levels one must consider in tracing the implications of the increased birth rate, scale and specialization of work. On the community level, women's procreative contribution accentuates their maternal image, while also promoting a growth in service work and preoccupation with the welfare of children. It thereby changes the balance between productive and nonproductive work.

On the domestic side, more children, higher living standards, larger households to care for, accentuates a domestic division of labor in the familiar direction--which is also the line of least resistance. Childbirth, childcare and household care form part of a complex yet coherent whole (Talmon, 1965).

On the subjective level still other factors come into play. With an increased emphasis on childbearing and maternity, deeply rooted biopsychological needs and desires, repressed in the early pioneer days, reemerge and turn women away from the masculine work arena. Then there is the impact of childbirth itself and the special ties fostered between infant and mother. These lead, at least for some women, to a demand to take care of her own infant for a time. Whether or not this desire is natural, it has obviously not been culturally erased by the radical changes in child rearing over the past several decades. And as women spend more time anticipating the arrival of their progeny and later in caring for them, work interests and concerns change also. Pregnant women are transferred to lighter tasks, and nursing mothers may work only part-time in order to be near their infants. This creates job disruptions, loss of time for seniority and other discontinuities which the more specialized or essential tasks can ill afford. Thus men come to predominate in these activities, and women gravitate to the less-skilled, less-demanding work which they can more readily combine with their family concerns and time schedules. But the development is neither smooth nor simple as women find themselves aspiring to incompatible goals of maternity and child rearing as well as participation in the highest and most valued activities of the community.

The problem is not, however, only one of type of work, nor status available, nor even of the time allocation between two compelling responsibilities. It goes deeper than that. It lies in the fact that the kibbutz endeavored to change the status of women without basically revising its stereotypes of male and female. Nor was there sufficient awareness that by assigning primacy to productive work it gave primacy to the male role and, by derivation, to men. This had as one unintended result the fact that women would be more eager to perform men's work than men to do that of women. The stipulated changes in the relations between the sexes were thus headed primarily in one direction. Equalization proceeded along a one-way street.

We realize now that the early kibbutz conception of equality between the sexes rests on turning one of the sexes into a partial version of the other. For this is what happens when women gauge their emancipation by their opportunities to do men's work rather than by their contribution in their own right. The occupational similarities fostered thereby are deceptive. They do not erase the basic sex differentiation, nor the values attached to it, but merely push it out of sight. Thus women, engaged in providing their equality, have tacitly accepted a male yardstick for it. With the renewed emphasis on procreation, the reproductive division between the sexes comes to the fore once again and women are caught up in cross-purposes from which escape is difficult. Under such conditions dissatisfaction is unavoidable, role conflict virtually inescapable. Equality must mean something more than and different from submerging one sex into the

other. But to achieve this, equality must be defined differently. In this vein, one writer suggests that achievement "of equality is not a matter of getting women into one occupation or another, of having more women in the Knesset . . . but of conscious education toward a full partnership of the sexes in household management and raising a family--and in this respect we are still back in the bush" (Bondy, 1972:9, 38).

The notion that equality should mean neither the loss of identity nor the adoption of male patterns and objectives may lie behind the resistance to this conception of emancipation among women in many parts of the world. In the kibbutz this expresses itself in a noticeable generation conflict between militant feminists of the pioneer generation, with their denial of the conventional insignias of femininity, and an equally militant generation of granddaughters who insist on their right to be different from men, to be feminine, to accent beauty, eros and the creation of life (Kahanoff, 1972:8-9, 30-31).

At the same time, however, the present generation of women feels relatively secure about the rights and opportunities won for them by their feminist forebears. Their demands for finery and flirtation thus rest on rights previously attained by the matriarchs of old. Not having won these rights, they also do not fear to lose them, a confidence not, however, shared by the pioneer women who are apprehensive about the young women's indifference.

One of the key problems confronting the women of the kibbutz, then, concerns the partial as well as only partially realizable conception of equality between the sexes which prevails there. This, combined with the unmistakable if tacit pressure on women to become "equal," meaning like men (plus the improbability of attaining equality), gradually results in their more or less passive resistance and a turning back to traditional feminine preoccupations, a rejection of masculine prizes and values, and a return to a modified form of familism. The women thus reject an equality that implies giving up their identity. When, in addition, maternity becomes socially desirable and necessary again, the one-sided equality and formal "de-differentiation" between the sexes recedes in favor of separateness and differentiation.

#### EGALITARIANISM

Granting the limited conception of equality in the kibbutz, based as it was on hard productive labor, minimal family involvement and particular occupational activities, how could women possibly achieve equality? Only by working hard in agriculture, in central administration and in specialized jobs involving machinery and manual skills; by not having children, because this takes time away from production; not doing service work, because this ranks lower than productive work;



and by stressing a style of strength, sobriety and collective responsibility. Anything short of that must reduce their chances for equal access, equal honor and equal achievement.

But we already know that they cannot compete on these terms since they do have children, do concern themselves with their offspring's care and growth, do concentrate on service work and do exhibit a different expressive style. Were they not to do these things, they would not be women, but men or quasi-men. And since these activities are also essential, men would have to find ways to do them or, where naturally incapacitated (such as in bearing children), would have to find substitutes for them. But for some reason, this basic imbalance in the prevalent definition of equality is not acknowledged. And women, having accepted a male value system, feel and actually are relatively inadequate to meet its demands.

Kibbutz society, according to a number of observers, "is first and foremost a society of men" (Gilan, 1965:239). Its values and projects reflect male more than female concerns. And the ideology of sex equality does not penetrate very deeply. Talmon found that lip service was paid to the ideal of equality but that in practice "the effects of former socialization" and the impact of growing differentiation in household and community limited its realization. She also stressed that "covert conventional role images underlie the attitudes to many other tasks" (Talmon, 1965:149).

Indeed one notes that the creed of economic and social equality by sex has stopped short of challenging the basic stereotypes of male and female. These were somehow to remain intact and not radically affected by economic self-reliance, the independence of spouses and the new nondomestic focus of women. Old stereotypes persist. "The conception of women as reticent, passive, and placating has not disappeared" (Gerson, 1971:566-573). Drive, self-assertion and strong involvement in public life are considered unfeminine, and women exhibiting these traits are regarded with ambivalence.

In truth, the masculine bias that prevails in the kibbutz is striking. The yardstick against which individual contributions are measured is geared to the capacities and achievements of men; hence the tendency to interpret the failure of sex equality as the fault of women's lesser ability to do heavy physical labor, or needing to take time out for pregnancy and infant care, or otherwise being women. But this roster of relative inadequacies is in itself a reflection of a hidden hierarchy of values. These are values which rank one type of contribution to collective survival categorically higher than the other, with the result that those performing these activities will likewise be ranked unequally. Unless the basis for this ranking is changed, therefore, inequality between the sexes is inevitable.

The same bias is reflected in the ambivalent attitudes towards pregnancy and childbirth about which kibbutz culture, like other male-oriented cultures, is of two minds. Even though these major female events are essential to social survival, they nonetheless are considered secondary to economic productivity. Indeed, the pioneering founders, radical though they may have been on other grounds, were quite conventionally male in their designation of pregnancy, childbirth and lactation as "the biological tragedy of woman." Instead of seeing these as the fundamental life forces they are--or perhaps because the truth caused them jealousy--they designated the female capacity to bear children as something of a deficiency and limitation. Thus were early priorities expressed and apparently accepted by men and women alike.

The pervasive masculine bias in the kibbutz must create considerable psychological strains for women. They are members of a society that plays down feminine capacities without ceasing to emphasize their necessity. Motherhood and femininity, while important, are not important enough. This sets up a current of relative deprivation and discontent with which we are all too familiar.

Given these contradictions and frustrations, women may well seek to revert or escape into the tried and true domain of home, family, children. Not only would this make life easier in the sense of fewer cross-pressures, but it would also permit women to play starring rather than subordinate roles. And while a return to "familism" would probably accentuate the sex division in kibbutz society, it would also help women to recoup a lost self that has left them literally in no man's land.

Thus, gradually, if reluctantly, women begin to concentrate on children, services and quality of life, while the men become engrossed in the wider community. The traditional dichotomy of the industrial nuclear family begins to reemerge. At first, according to Polani (1965:330-341), the women struggled terribly against these developments: "Enraged and bewildered they saw a breach forming in their common front with the men." That rage suggests that the return to familism is not totally voluntary, not totally a reflection of women's natural disposition towards motherhood and child care. Part of that rage must have reflected their awareness of a loss of status, of a partial return to the gilded cage. For in the value system of the kibbutz, participation in public life is valued above domestic commitments, raising crops over bearing children. Women thus lose on both grounds.

The problem is not simply one of service versus productive labor, or of individual versus shared maternity, important though these be. It concerns the self-esteem of women in a society that does not sufficiently appreciate their contribution as women. This, combined with contradictory messages as to where women's primary goals lie--in service

work for the community or in bearing and caring for children--creates special hardships for women, hardships as yet insufficiently appreciated.

The question that arises is: Why are kibbutz settlers ambivalent about femininity and activities traditionally labeled feminine? In part it may be a rational response to needed priorities in community building. But in part it seems to reflect irrational and unexamined fears. One author has suggested that the deprecation of femininity has its source in the lack of self-esteem among men. The male founders may have had serious anxieties about their own self-worth. Their manhood undermined in the society that rejected them, they became intent on securing it in the society they would create (Gilan, 1965).

The emphasis on masculinity entered the self-conceptions of women as well as of men and resulted in their playing down femininity as traditionally defined. Hence when women, in the pioneer days, rejected makeup, attention to dress and personal appearance, it was not only because there were more important things to worry about, but also because they sought to prove themselves equal in style to their masculine models. This has to be expected when a culture draws an erroneous equivalence between being equal and being masculine.

Thus the problem of the woman in the kibbutz turns out, in part at least, to be a problem of men. The woman question conceals another, more fundamental one, having to do with male self-doubt and male self-deception about their feelings and fears concerning women. Yet virtually no one has inquired into men's difficulties and dissatisfactions in the kibbutz. Everyone has been so busy investigating women's trials and tribulations that we are quite ignorant about the men and their problems as men.

Developments in the kibbutz demonstrate a pattern familiar from other social experiments where women became "free" to do work previously reserved for men. At first there is the lure of novelty and the challenge to prove oneself, but both become less compelling in time. And since sex-typing persists in areas other than work participation (where, ideally, it is effaced), in time men and women will gravitate to different spheres of interest and activity. So, for example, men have increasingly found their way into leadership positions in kibbutz society. There they will likely as not remain, as the women shuttle back and forth between their procreative and their productive undertakings.

Moreover, there is a heritage of unconscious prejudice and past traditions which help perpetuate the relative inferiority of women in the kibbutz. True, this inferiority is not personal or domestic--a genuine advance over other modern societies--but its link to occupational participation threatens to make it communitywide. For in the kibbutz, too, "the less talented man will sometimes be preferred to the more talented woman" (Leon, 1969:130). To be equal a woman must be exceptional.



Hence I must disagree with those who assert that civic and economic equality has been achieved by the women of the kibbutzim and that what remains are psychological survivals and lingering prejudice. In my view women have the dubious freedom to have two lifetime preoccupations: low-ranking jobs and part-time motherhood.

In sum, the kibbutz has not eliminated sex inequality though it has substantially reduced sex differentiation in marriage, ideology and work. As a result the woman question cannot be put to rest: first, because the original ideals to abolish the sexual division of labor and to create equality of status have been imperfectly realized; and second, because the basic conceptions of what is masculine and what is feminine remain relatively unchanged. All of this occurs in a culture which contains elements of defensive masculinity and the downgrading of feminine capacities and contributions to which this typically leads. In the long run this must lead to a growing divergence between ideal and reality in the kibbutz.

The divergence between ideal and reality in sexual equality, and the strains it engenders, are already apparent. The dilemmas created thereby have led to countermeasures in the kibbutz to halt the trend toward the growing normative and institutional sex differentiation for fear that it would eventually undermine communal solidarity (Talmon, 1965:154). Hence "ingenious" intermediate mechanisms have emerged to bridge the gap between ideal and reality. These are most prominent in the occupational sphere where sex differentiation is also most pronounced. They include the rationalization and mechanization of services, which makes them less labor-intensive and thus releases some women for other kinds of work. They also raise efficiency and output, and make the service sector altogether more attractive and prestigious as a calling. Professionalization, another such mechanism, endeavors, via scientific and tested techniques, to turn housekeeping and child care into semi-professions, which increases the expertise and standing of those engaged in them. Some effort is also devoted to expanding the occupational opportunities of women into new areas such as counseling, arts and crafts, and social work.

In addition the kibbutz endeavors to discourage symbolic and actual sex differentiation by exerting pressure on women to join as many committees as possible, to develop new and non-sex-typed branches of occupational activities, and to favor women candidates in areas where they are now underrepresented. There is even an attempt to make men engage in specifically feminine occupations on a short-term basis, in kitchen and dining hall which have high communal visibility. These symbolic denials of sex differentiation are considered only a "token interchangeability" by Talmon, however; almost a kind of atonement for the way the community is structured. And then there are always the exemplary women who have achieved "equality in spite of serious difficulties" or, as I would say, equality on masculine terms, who serve

as proof of the absence of deliberate discrimination as well as inspiring examples to others.

As yet then there is neither a rigidity of pattern nor a crystallization of sentiment and habit. I have described central tendencies, major pressures and contradictions, and sources of strain that are moving the community to greater sex differentiation in work and in life. However, the situation is in flux, and there is much room for experimentation and variation. There is also a changing configuration of emphases at different stages of the life cycle. When young and without children, women are engaged in masculine or joint occupations. When children appear they become engrossed in feminine services of all kinds. Later in life they return to less feminine pursuits. And similarly, men past their productive prime will perform lighter, less "masculine-type" work. Mobility and cross-overs between sex-typed spheres of life are possible, even frequent, but the spheres are valued unequally.

## CHILD REARING IN THE KIBBUTZ

Patterns of child rearing in the kibbutz are important for at least two reasons: the impact of a different kind of mothering on women and children, and the degree of sex differentiation in childhood.

### Mothering in the Kibbutz

Two features strike the observer of kibbutz child rearing. One is the fact that like all pioneer societies, the kibbutz is extremely child centered. Children represent the future, the vindication of one's struggles and sacrifices. The other is that kibbutz child rearing is performed by communal agents, an innovation of considerable significance. Communal child rearing, whatever its difficulties, has proven itself an effective method of raising children. This is attested to by numerous studies that show the superiority of kibbutz-reared children in a number of areas--including their idealism, autonomy, cooperation, capacity for leadership, courage and loyalty to the community. In fact, the kibbutz seems to have managed to combine individual and collective aspects of child care in admirable fashion. A child not only knows and loves his own mother but also forms close and enduring ties with other adults and with children of his own age. This peer group, varying between eight and 16 members at different points during childhood, is part of the child's life from the time he enters the infant house at the age of four days until high school.

Altogether at least four adult women are involved with child care. There is, of course, the child's biological mother, who is joined by the chief communal nurse (the metapelet) and her two assistants. The biological mother remains the child's alone, whereas the social mothers must be shared with the other children. This, then, forms the setting

for socialization of the child as he moves through the toddler's house, kindergarten, primary grades and on to high school at 12 years of age. From their age-mates, who form their most continuous membership group, and from the women who care for their needs, children learn the fundamentals of the world in which they will live.

The division between biological and social mother, between family and nursery, is present from the earliest days. The child develops somewhat different relations to each. With his biological mother, the child develops especially warm relations despite disrupted contacts because he knows that this is the woman who gave him life. In addition this is the woman who represented the whole world during the first four days of life and who is the source of nourishment during the first six weeks. Thus a child's first impressions, nurture, warmth and love come from his biological mother.

This mother is not the only source of security for the child, however. There is also the metapelet, who actually spends more continuous time with the child; while less romantic a figure, she has more actual influence on the child's day-to-day life. But while the mother can focus wholly on her child, the metapelet must divide her time among several children and in that sense she may have a less concentrated impact on any one of them. It is she, however, who becomes the focus for sibling rivalry and competition for attention among the children. She is also the one who is in charge of disciplining them. Thus, whereas the mother can be totally nurturant, loving and nonpunitive, the nurse must combine affection with discipline (Bar-Yosef, 1968:166). Like the mother in a conventional family, therefore, she becomes an ambivalent figure in the child's life. She has the power of punishment and reward.

Thus the communal nurses exact demands, can threaten and thwart, thereby creating dependencies and anxieties. The mothers, by contrast, can play a highly positive role. Freed from economic worries for themselves or their children, not having to discipline them, and associated from the earliest days with warmth, nurturance and survival itself, they can be extremely loving and supportive figures in their children's lives. Only their classification as females may make them targets, by association, for some of the ambivalence felt towards the metapelet.

The child views his father as special, too, and sees him as the husband of his mother, as a worker in the kibbutz, and as playmate and giver of gifts. Unlike the father in a typical Western family, however, the kibbutz father can be an even more permissive and nurturant figure than the mother, for in the household shared by the couple, even in a kibbutz, it is still the woman who must keep things in order and make demands for cleanliness and comportment. Since living quarters are small such demands are unavoidable, but they do fall to the mother.



The father is not considered responsible for household activities. "His occupational role makes him a hero in the eyes of the growing child. Most of the occupations are known even by small children, and among the first words a child learns are the names of his parents' occupational roles . . . . According to the existing pattern of the division of labor, his father will be the one who is recognized as responsible for the farm . . . in the eyes of the child, the wider world" (Bar-Yoseph, 1968:173). Thus in a sense the father's role has changed more dramatically in the kibbutz than elsewhere, although most studies, imbued with the motherhood mystique, have paid very little attention to him.

Kibbutz fathers should, in fact, represent the epitome of selfless, loving parenthood. Unlike the mother who as a woman may be partly identified with the ambivalently regarded nurse, the father has no such association to fight against. I would expect, therefore, that the good father should be a developing archetype in the kibbutz. This may be linked in subtle ways to the longing for the ideal father which patriarchal systems implant in the young. Paradoxically, in successfully breaking patriarchal power, the kibbutz may also have succeeded in reinstating the paternal ideal. If this is carried over to the more prestigious occupational roles of men, the male role can emerge in a very positive light, purged of its major negative features.

The biological family is thus less complex a system for the kibbutz child than for children generally, since the mother and father roles are relatively undifferentiated in their emphasis on affection, permissiveness and nurturance towards the child. The family is expressive rather than task-oriented, and the child can use the family setting for reinforcement and support, since it is and remains an unconditional source of love and diffuse acceptance.

What about mothering, then? Have any of the dire effects of multiple mothering and communal child rearing been demonstrated in the kibbutz? Bettelheim notes how reluctant American psychologists and psychiatrists were to find value in the kibbutz experiment. Their objections to separating children from their parents, especially from their mothers, blinded them to some of the considerable advantages of such an upbringing. Among these are the division of labor among mothers, the voluntary assumption of motherhood in its more delimited form by those specially gifted for it, and the absence of those debilitating struggles between the home and the world of housebound mothers in industrialized societies. There is also the positive influence of peer group socialization and the confidence, trust and cooperation it helps develop. Indeed, with regard to the basic values of the kibbutz, the experiment seems successful since the children seem socialized into the values of the community, are self-reliant, idealistic and committed to the group and its goals.

Bettelheim saw as one positive gain for kibbutz children the freedom from ambivalence towards parents that the small family usually engenders. Not dependent on their parents for economic security or social destiny, they are freer to develop emotional relations untainted by resentment, anxiety and self-interest. As a consequence, however, he also noted a comparative lack of emotional intensity in the relations between parents and children. "Blood simply is not thicker than shared emotional experiences" and it is the latter which binds people together --which means that parents must here compete with peers and nurses (Bettelheim, 1962:123).

Since dependency is shared or diffused in the kibbutz, the child has a number of different models, all important in their own way but none as exclusively and uniquely important as parents in the Western nuclear family. There is multiple mothering, the good father and the same-age peer group. There are also siblings to whom one is linked via one's biological parents.

The absence of the biological mother did not cause the maternal deprivation expected. Mothering was not abolished, but increased and divided among several figures. Everyone has remarked on the mother's intense emotional involvement with her children. And though the mother's visits are rationed she constitutes a continuous presence in the child's life. "Collective education has . . . proven that the existence of more than one image in infancy is not only not harmful for personality development, but, on the contrary, may be a very important psychohygienic factor" (Neubauer, 1965:70). Another observer notes that the kibbutz belies the assertion that what babies need most are a father and a mother in a house--in other words the conventional Western nuclear family (Lewin, 1965:69). He also admits that the practice of multiple mothering worked out better than he expected. Indeed, it has been suggested that the solutions hit on in the kibbutz "inadvertently exploded all Western notions about the sanctity of maternal care. If there was one belief cherished by educators and psychiatrists, it was the doctrine that an infant removed from his parents, particularly his mother, and raised together with other children in an institution, was doomed to warped and disastrous results" (Russcol and Banai, 1970:201). This has patently been disproved by the kibbutz and the new generation of human beings it has created.

Of course here, as elsewhere, ideal and reality may not always go hand in hand. The kibbutz was an experiment under trying, insecure and very difficult conditions. Poverty, hardship and uncertainty marked the early years, and innovation proceeded through trial and error. Not all communal nurses were devoted and capable rearers of children, and not all children responded to the training and attention they received in a favorable way. Every form of training is a way of mistraining; every discipline creates its rebellion; all supervision is a constraint. Growing up is problematic by definition, since children are forced into channels they have not chosen or been free to

choose. But taking into account these general difficulties of socialization and the specific hardships of the kibbutz, the experiment has worked remarkably well.

Finally, not all women respond positively to sharing child rearing responsibilities with nurses and peers. Some, especially those working at unfulfilling jobs, might well prefer to raise their own children. Some may even "romanticize the family" (Polani, 1965:339) that the pioneers strove so hard to revamp. Freedom from child care may seem like an infringement "on motherly rights" for those women who long for an exclusive relation to their children. One such woman recalls a terrible struggle against her conditioning when she let her baby go, fighting the baby house authority all the way (Banks, 1972:28). Only later did she relax and appreciate the freedom this made possible and the ensuing harmonious relations between herself and her children. This same woman had occasion to find herself in a conventional family set-up at some later point, while away from the kibbutz, and came to appreciate its virtues more than ever before. She ruefully recalled the free time available, secure in the knowledge that her child was well taken care of, and the complete devotion to the child in the period set aside for her. The minor annoyances of her children in the kibbutz days were "only pinpricks compared to the great wounding rows we have here, in a so-called normal family set-up" (Banks, 1972:28).

The desire to return to such a setup may be motivated as much by the lack of interesting enough work or by too few chances for conspicuous achievement as by a natural maternal possessiveness. There is the suggestion that "women who hold public office in the kibbutz are less 'family conscious' than women who do not hold office in the community" (Polani, 1965:339). And the aforementioned witness of her own conversion to communal child care also notes a connection between interesting work and preference for communal child rearing.

All in all, the study of the successes and failures of kibbutz child rearing suggest that in principle children may derive considerable benefit from an upbringing that stresses peer relations, a merging of home and community and voluntary mothers.

### Sex Differentiation in Childhood

Despite the changes in the family that have been brought about in the kibbutz, sex-typing has not been abolished there. The couple continues to be a distinctive social, sexual and emotional unit as well as a cultural ideal. Whether sex differentiation is natural or not, the kibbutz, as is true of societies generally, did not try to establish. Instead, it organized the development of appropriate sex identities, interests, and male and female roles in the earliest years of life. Indeed, according to Spiro, the culture's stake in survival made a concern for progeny and procreative roles mandatory. "A proper sexual identification is among the most important tasks of childhood," he



observed, and if individuals fail to "identify themselves clearly as either male or female, then they cannot establish differential relationships to adults of the same and opposite sex" (Spiro, 1958:236-237). Should they fail in this the society is endangered at a crucial point.

Since most adult roles in kibbutz society continue to be sex-typed, to be considered a normal, functioning adult one must conform to the cultural script as written for men and women respectively. Thus, adults might be expected to emphasize the attainment and maintenance of socially sanctioned heterosexual relationships, including parenthood.

In view of the continued focus on heterosexual intimacy and identity, children cannot avoid sex-typing in their own upbringing. There is likely to be some inconsistency in this, however, as the need for male-female differentiation on behalf of reproduction must be reconciled with the proclaimed irrelevance of such differentiation in the running of the community.

Another point of interest is the fact that women continue to be the key figures in the lives of children of both sexes. For, in the kibbutz as in societies with differently organized family systems, children are not only born of woman, but their earliest and deepest impressions gained prior to and at birth are experienced inside of and in close association with a female. Later, it is still females who dominate the child rearing process for boys and girls alike. Thus we note two distinctive attributes of kibbutz society which are shared with other societies around the world: each child is exclusively classified as a member of a given sex, and each child is born of and has its earliest as well as its later experiences of nurturance and care with only one, the female, sex.

#### Bases of Differentiation in the Kibbutz

Gender identity, sexual identity and sex differentiation of personality and of interests and activities start in early childhood. What, then do we know about the treatment of kibbutz children according to their gender and sex? How similarly or differently are girls and boys raised? What are their role models? From where do they acquire their identities as future parents, a destiny strongly exalted in the kibbutz?

From infancy onward boys and girls are socialized by the same techniques, taught the same games and treated very much alike in a variety of respects. They eat, sleep, shower and play together. Since they are nonetheless expected to identify with a different sex category, how does this come about? How do they manage to make reliable sex discriminations and tell the sexes apart so as to identify with the "right" sex, especially since the social differentiation of the sexes is not very evident in the children's houses?

A number of clues are used to build up a construct of the opposite sex. One is perception of different anatomies since there is no taboo on nudity among the children. Another is clothing, especially the clothing worn on afternoon visits to parents. Ordinary clothes worn in the nurseries are not sex-typed, but non-play clothes are. Hairstyles also are different for boys and girls, with girls having ribbons and being generally fussed over more regarding their appearance. Then there is language, highly significant in Hebrew, in which every speaker must learn language appropriate to his or her sex. All nouns are either masculine or feminine, and gender affects the declensions of nouns and adjectives. In learning to speak each child also learns to identify itself as male or as female.

Closely allied to language is the area of personal names. These, too, are sex-typed, and since there are fewer names than there are individuals, the same name occurs several times, reinforcing the symbolic division by sex.

By age three a kibbutz child is generally expected to be able to discriminate between the sexes, learn sex-typed names, label others and itself correctly, and have some notion of the absolute and permanent division of these two different classes in human society.

One factor absent in kibbutz society is strong parental differentiation by sex, since the parents perform similar functions for the child and are not, in the very early years, perceptibly differentiated occupationally.

Thus kibbutz children experience differentiation by sex in two principal forms in their childhood years: by being classified as a member of an exclusive gender group, and by learning to differentiate the sexes by name, label, appearance, dress and speech. Every child must go through some such process as this: I am a boy and my metapelet is a woman and I will never be a woman. Or, I am a girl, my metapelet is a woman, and I will also be a woman someday. The sex categorization extends to dress, speech, name, but not to family, economic roles or to occupational activities in the community.

Despite the tendency to minimize sex differentiation in childhood, we note that it nonetheless constitutes a major part of the learning process. By high school age, however, it becomes more explicit and extensive. School curricula become sex-typed, with boys doing heavier labor in the student work assignments and also engaging in competitive sports and the girls turning to other interests and activities (Rabin, 1965:285-307). Each sex seems here to prepare itself for the different tasks it will assume in the community later on, though the way in which this is achieved awaits detailed study.

During these years biological maturation at puberty brings sexuality to the fore. Specific heterosexual interests emerge at this

time, but heterosexual pairing is not encouraged until after army service and the return to the kibbutz. Then sexual experimentation is more common and continues until couples fall in love and decide to get married. Marriage constitutes a key relationship for adults and is a prerequisite for the procreation of the next generation.

A number of researchers have noted that while the sexes are reared jointly, freely sharing bedrooms and bathrooms, sexual relations in the sibling peer group are discouraged and "the incest taboo is in full force . . . ." (Buxbaum, 1970:285). This stems from a rather deep-seated sexual puritanism and a sexual repressiveness in childhood which stands in marked contrast to the ideology of nonrepressiveness. This is particularly trying for adolescents who are expected to maintain rather strict control over their sexual impulses at a time of heightened awareness of sex. "They are unrestricted until they get into high school, at which time educators let them know that sexual relations are not desirable and the children themselves erect a shame barrier which up to this time has not seemed to exist" (Buxbaum, 1970:285).

Not surprisingly, sex seems to be a rather confusing area which readily arouses anxiety. Some of this has been documented by means of Thematic Apperception Tests, protocols in which kibbutz-reared children were shown to differ sharply from other Israeli children. Sex taboos appear to be stronger among them, as is their provisional rejection of heterosexual themes and relations (Gerson, 1965:233-237).

### Problems in Sex Identity

Since sexual identity is learned, every society must cope with culturally engendered learning problems. The kibbutz has its share. There is, first of all, the significance of the female in the lives of both boys and girls. This must create different problems for each, since boys will not grow up to be adult women. And studies show that boys do have special identity problems. Rabin, for example, found that boys identify less strongly with males than girls do with females (16 percent versus 47 percent). Boys also identified with females twice as frequently as girls identified with males. Some boys reject their male identity altogether and "express their feminine strivings openly" rejecting their maleness in fantasies of self-mutilation (Buxbaum, 1970:228; Kaufmann, 1965:261-269). This syndrome, which has been described for other societies (Bettelheim, 1969), was frequently reported to one researcher in the kibbutz she studied.

Both boys and girls, it appears, identify most strongly with the metapelet, the woman who is most directly and continuously involved in their upbringing. Since they come into contact with a number of these women in the course of childhood, one wonders which one is most significant for them. Or perhaps they all add up to one composite image. Her power to reward and punish seems to make her the principal adult role model for all the children and underscores the significance of power for childhood identification.



Although there is not a plethora of information on any of these questions, the role of the father in sex-role identity seems particularly neglected. As was pointed out earlier, the father represents an extremely nurturant, loving, unambivalent figure with considerable prestige for his work role in the kibbutz. This should help boys, though how much is not clear, since the father is not highly differentiated from the mother in early childhood. It should also facilitate the heterosexual adjustments for girls, since the male is both benevolent and nurturant whereas the female, as chief disciplinarian, is an ambivalent figure.

Boys do appear to have more psychological problems in childhood than do girls, a pattern that is fairly widespread in industrial societies. They have less continuity of experience with the same sex-role model, hence less reinforcement in masculinity via their contacts with mother and metapelet. But there is also the suggestion, stemming from the work of Rabin, that kibbutz children tend to identify less with same-sex parents than children not so reared (Rabin, 1965:204). If this finding is more widely confirmed, it raises a fairly fundamental question about the significance of parental role models for gender identification, which is something of an article of faith today; for it suggests that kibbutz children develop their gender identities by other means.

Still, heterosexuality may well be a focus of anxiety and confusion for kibbutz adolescents. One test asked fourth graders, aged 9 to 11, to draw a male and a female figure. Kibbutz children made far fewer sex differentiations than did other Israeli and American children with whom they were compared (Rabin, 1965:110). A clear-cut sex identity may be difficult to achieve for children raised in a situation where sex differentiation is minimized in official ideology and in public display, while being emphasized on the personal and private level.

Assessments regarding the family in the kibbutz depend in part on one's definition of the family. If this includes the economic interdependence of the spouses or children's exclusive dependence on their parents, then the family cannot be said to exist. This is Spiro's reason for considering the family to have been essentially eliminated in kibbutzim. The domestic unit in the kibbutz includes neither economic cooperation nor common residence between parents and children nor exclusive parental responsibility for rearing children. Moreover, considering the pioneers' goals of destroying patriarchal family power, the father's role has been reduced, his power and authority annulled. The kibbutz also makes it possible for women to combine motherhood with outside work with the approval of the community. And the children are independent of their parents for subsistence, educational attainments or social standing. The main

function remaining to the family unit is reproduction in a context of lifetime companionship and erotic intimacy. Its main contribution is parenthood freed from the burdens of child rearing and child support. This should make parenthood extremely attractive to kibbutz couples.

A number of observers disagree with the view that the family has been disbanded (Bronfenbrenner, 1969:84). Talmon-Garber notes that the family always remained a distinct unit, with a line drawn between serious and nonserious sexual relationships. Parents had definite responsibilities toward their children and watched their development with concern and pride. Children were closely attached to their parents. And while the family unit may have spent less time together than a conventional family--though even this is doubtful given the modern suburban household--relations were less strained and less ambivalent. Parents had the blessings of parenthood without its burdens. Children could be loved unconditionally without the sting of discipline. Indeed from this perspective, the original division between family and community responsibilities freed the family from the usual tensions, thereby strengthening its emotional and symbolic hold. The result is that children often become the emotional center of their parents' lives and, in turn, may become overdependent on them.

In one sense, then, the nuclear family has been eliminated in the kibbutz, but in another it has not. It lives on in the fact that the kibbutz does, approvingly, set apart two adults of opposite sex, living in a socially condoned sexual relationship, and closely relating to their own children. Part of the confusion surrounding this question stems from some contradictory objectives entertained by the founders, who simultaneously believed both that the family could be dispensed with and that it was "the basic cell of human society" (Darin-Drabkin, 1961).

Given the growing need for progeny, the original claims dispensing with the family were somewhat premature. In time, moreover, the second generation makes its appearance and causes major social redefinitions in the kibbutz. It promotes a core of specific family duties and loyalties and gives substance to marriage beyond the emotional feelings of the couple. And with the grandparental generation a sense of social and biological continuity develops that may set entire lineages apart as distinctive foci of interest and sentiment.

In time, also, the couple reemerges as an important collective focus. Its union is celebrated, its affection publicly demonstrated, its activities joined. Rituals symbolizing the union--tea with the children, some regular meals taken separately--develop. Gradually kibbutz architects take cognizance of the family's separateness by designing semidetached dwellings as physical symbols of the change.

More and more, the couple exists as a sexual, emotional and conjugal entity, sharing living quarters, memories and a destiny through its children.

There is also a growing division of labor within the household, although parental roles continue to be flexible and overlapping. Still, the mother tends to be more involved with household and child care even in their attenuated form. The home is still more the woman's domain.

It is well to keep in mind, however, that the kibbutz has achieved its major aims of destroying the patriarchal family and of liberating the wife from domestic confinement and total dependence on her husband. Indeed, practically none of the traditional functions of the nuclear family remain intact except the one most underestimated at first--procreation of the next generation. For the rest, the family is neither a producing nor a consuming unit, does not socialize or educate its offspring except indirectly, and is not a source of security in old age. Even the couple, refurbished though it be, has been transformed by the equality built into the marriage bond. With traditional dependencies and patterns of authority eliminated, there is ample room for deep bonds of intimacy and affection between mates and the generations.

Increasingly, however, tensions do develop between the family and the collective, as the family claims more rights and a greater voice in the education of its children. There is a basic rivalry, but the collective continued to be preeminent. If the family accepts the primacy of the collective, it is an ally. If it disputes that collective authority, it becomes a danger. The collective still comes first (Talmon-Garber, 1968:56).

In sum, there is much we can learn from these small cooperative settlements and their achievements of a new form of family, communal child rearing and equality between the sexes. Beset by danger, lack of resources and inexperience they have made impressive headway in achieving their aims.

One of these objectives, however, equality between the sexes, has been attained only in part. For a number of reasons, overt and covert, subjective and collective, reality has fallen short of the ideal. Some of these reasons are easy to understand though not easy to deal with--for example, the increased sex-typing of work due to the reemergence of a focus on maternity and the activities and preoccupations surrounding it. The birth of a child makes all the difference, in the kibbutz as elsewhere.

But there are also less tangible reasons. They comprise all those beliefs and myths, facts and half-truths, that shape the images of the sexes and their importance in any society. Ultimately, it is



the differential importance attributed to the contributions of men and women to survival which underlies the inequality between the sexes in kibbutz life. Given its basic priorities and values, greater equality between the sexes may not be realizable in the foreseeable future.



PART IV:  
AN ATTEMPT FOR INTEGRATION





## INTRODUCTION--AN ATTEMPT FOR INTEGRATION\*

While other researchers judged the degree of sex-equality in the kibbutz mainly on the basis of the degree of abolition of sex-role differentiation and concluded, therefore, that the kibbutz did not succeed in attaining the goal of equality, Rosner and Palgi start with a different definition of this goal.

Based on theoretical considerations and on the changes in the definition of equality prevailing in the kibbutz, the authors distinguish between two main aspects of equality between the sexes:

1. The abolition of the traditional role allocation, according to which the man is the provider and active in public life, while the woman is responsible for the household and for the child rearing within the family.
2. Equal rights and equal opportunities for members of both sexes to hold all social roles--by providing adequate training and equal opportunities for professional and managerial advancement, equal rewards for similar roles, and in the case of sex-role differentiation, equal status of women's roles.

As for the first aspect, the authors draw evidence (from research done in the kibbutz) to their statement that in the kibbutz role-division between the male who "provides" for the family and is responsible for "outside" matters, and the female who is only the "homemaker" has been abolished--even though there are differences in the centrality of these areas in the psychological life space of both sexes.

There exists a differentiation between female and male tasks in the kibbutz but this differentiation does not--as in other societies--bring about deprivation of rights and/or inferior status (in material, emotional, and prestige rewards) for the tasks and offices that are defined or perceived of as "female." But this differentiation in fact restricts the range of the jobs available for women in the kibbutz and their representation in the central economic kibbutz committees.

The authors contend that while the earlier ideology of equality between the sexes in the kibbutz was based on identity of occupational and political tasks, the present ideology is based on equality that

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\*Appeared in the Kibbutz Interdisciplinary Research Review, 3-4, 1976:369-370.

takes into account the differences between the sexes. The right for equal opportunities for self-actualization in the kibbutz is granted to both sexes. There is also no conflict for women between child-bearing and full participation in the workforce and public life of the kibbutz.

Even so, the authors do not think that the kibbutz can be offered as a test-case of the possibility of realizing the equality between the sexes. This is so because of the special conditions of the kibbutz, its earlier physical conditions that put utmost importance to physical strength, and its small size and thus restricted choice of jobs and offices.

According to the authors, the meaning of the kibbutz experience for the feminist movement can be mainly in helping it to clarify its attitude towards motherhood and childbearing, especially in light of the fact that the kibbutz experience has proved that childbearing and rearing does not necessarily impede woman's activity in work and politics. The kibbutz experience can also help the feminist movement in clarifying its attitude towards the concept of "femininity." It demonstrates that the woman's propensity for jobs connected with nursing, social services, welfare services, etc., is not of necessity a negative phenomenon, because in the kibbutz these "feminine" jobs do not "suffer" from inferior status in comparison to "male" jobs and offices.

The authors conclude that the importance of the kibbutz experience in clarifying the problem of sex-equality is not because of its serving as a test-case but because of its ability to represent new aspects of equality that are absent in a stratified society where women are sometimes discriminated against and deprived of their rights.



## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

### EQUALITY BETWEEN SEXES IN THE KIBBUTZ: REGRESSION OR CHANGED MEANING?

Michal Palgi and Menachem Rosner

#### INTRODUCTION

The implementation of equality between the sexes has been one of the central aims of the kibbutz movement since its inception, and the subject has been discussed often in its internal press and even at several countrywide conferences.

Ever since the rise of the feminist movement, activities in recent years claiming women's equality, along with the increase of public and scientific debates concerning those demands, interest in the experience of the kibbutz in this area has increased. Several scholars have been attempting to find support for their views in the unique experience of the kibbutz movement (Mednick, 1975; Kanter, 1976; Tiger and Shepherd, 1975; Keller, 1973). Tiger and Shepherd (1975:281) sum up their extensive work, which includes numerous facts and data about women in the kibbutz, as follows:

We have found that the aspect of this experiment involving major changes in women's lives was substantially less successful than all others, and we believe that this fact can be useful in evaluating what may be a deeply rooted pattern of human behavioral nature.

In the authors' opinion, the relative failure of the kibbutz in this matter is indirect proof that the feminist movement will also fail to realize its aims, because of the mothers' natural tendency to be with their offspring, the intensity of which has been proven by the kibbutz experience. On the other hand, female researchers of feminist convictions are attempting to prove that the kibbutz experience is unable to serve as a test case for the controversy regarding the importance of biological factors versus environmental ones in determining women's social status:

The kibbutz has never been a perfect testing ground for gauging the importance of environmental nurture as against nature's importance, as far as the origin of equality of the sexes is concerned (Kanter, 1976:662).

Generally speaking, these investigators agree with the statement that in spite of the far-reaching institutional changes in the kibbutz (collective education and consumption), the goal to achieve equality between the sexes has not been reached. In their opinion, however, the reasons are not women's natural inclinations, as Tiger and Shepherd claim, but the specific conditions under which the kibbutz experiment has been carried out. First, during the pioneering period, the emphasis was on physical strength, and the masculine pattern predominated. They stressed the shortcomings of the kibbutz egalitarian ideology, which stood for the introduction of women into masculine roles, but not vice versa--

introducing men into feminine roles (which, because of being feminine, were still considered inferior) (Mednick, 1975; Keller, 1973).

Generally speaking, the investigators agree that the changes in women's status in the kibbutz have taken place not against women's wishes, but with their support. However, while Tiger and Shepherd regard women's natural inclinations as the cause of their attitudes, in M. Mednick's view, this is a sort of "false consciousness." In her opinion, the kibbutz system is responsible for the failure to attain equality between the sexes and, therefore, the problem is how to make the women aware that they should struggle against the "guilty" system. Although it is important that the problem of equality between the sexes has been presented in those works in a wider theoretical context, they cannot answer certain basic questions concerning the trends of development in this field. Neither do they adequately explain the criteria for evaluating those problems, whose existence cannot be disputed. Social research which has been conducted in the kibbutz movement in recent years enables us to delve upon some of the changes which have taken place regarding the status of both sexes in the kibbutz and have not been satisfactorily analyzed in the works mentioned above.

In our discussion, we will focus upon the problems which we consider as being central in evaluating the extent to which equality between the sexes existed in the kibbutz: 1) the increase in familistic trends; and 2) the maintenance, and perhaps even the intensification, of the division of work and public roles, according to sex.

It is generally accepted that these problems do exist, but there is far less agreement as to additional questions which have arisen in connection with them. Regarding the first problem, the main question is: Is there a contradiction between strengthening of the family with the accompanying importance it assumes in women's life-space and their full participation carrying out occupational and public roles? Are women with many children, even in the kibbutz, also obligated to restrict their occupational and public activity? Or perhaps does the existence of the educational and consumer collective institutions eliminate the contradiction between woman's role as a mother and her role as worker, as prevails in other societies?

As for the second problem, the question is: Does the fulfillment of different roles by both sexes cause a difference in the social status and rewards which these roles entail?

Tiger and Shepherd write: "If however, factual equality of the sexes depends on occupational roles, it can be achieved only if differential work prestige disappears or if men and women do the same work. The first condition is hardly achievable; in a complex society, there will be always some jobs that are differentially rated, along with the skills, talents and education needed to perform them. It seems to us, therefore, that equality of the sexes cannot exist until work allocation and consequently work status do not have gender as a criterion" (Tiger and

Shepher, 1975:261).

However, the question which has not been answered in that book is: Is it a constant datum that the roles typed as "feminine" in the kibbutz, or outside it, really demand less skill, fewer abilities, and less education than those typed "masculine"?

Is it true that women receive less education and training than men? Are feminine types of work in the kibbutz really less prestigious and less appreciated than masculine ones? Since prestige is not the only reward, one should continue and ask whether women do get fewer opportunities than men for self-realization, expression of their talents, and satisfaction of their psychological needs.

The answer to these questions is essential for a correct understanding of the processes taking place in the kibbutz, particularly as far as the feasibility of applying the experience of the kibbutz to other societies is concerned.

When focusing on the questions to be answered, additional problems arise: How should the aim of equality between the sexes in the kibbutz be defined? Should this be done by way of historical research which could determine how the aim was understood in the initial stages of the kibbutz movement, and how it was defined in later periods? Any such endeavor would meet with difficulties, since in the earlier stages, when action preceded the ideological definition and its crystallization, no generally accepted definitions existed regarding this subject. Even when attempts at defining ideologies were made, there were different and even contradictory points of emphasis.

In another work (Rosner, 1969) we have shown examples of the contradictory interpretations that were current in the Kibbutz Artzi, which consistently advocated the aim of equality of the sexes. Some interpretations were influenced by the socialist ideology which tended--as far as possible--to bring women's and men's roles, as well as their education, under a common denominator. Other interpretations were influenced by the psychoanalytical current which emphasizes anatomical features of women's physical attributes, and warns against "exaggerated optimism as far as activizing women in all spheres of life is concerned." Therefore, the definitions of the past cannot serve as an unambiguous criterion for evaluating present reality. It therefore seems to us that before determining to what extent the kibbutz has succeeded or failed in realizing the aim of equality between the sexes, a clear definition of this aim is necessary. The definition suggested below is based on both theoretical considerations and the changes which have taken place in the conception of equality of the sexes in the kibbutz.

In our opinion, a distinction should be made between two aspects regarding equality of the sexes. The first aspect is the abolition of the traditional division of roles, according to which the man is the breadwinner, and the active party in public life, while the woman is responsible for the household and the children's education within the family



framework. This division, which is an outcome of the industrial revolution, has had some grave social and psychological results: 1) woman's confinement to the narrow limits of the home, thereby according the man dominance in the field of economy; and 2) the restriction of the scope of the roles of the members of both sexes, while at the same time furthering instrumental and achievement orientations of man, versus emotional and integrative orientations of the woman. The field of public activity has become the man's domain, and the private-familial zone that of the woman.

The collective educational and consumer institutions in the kibbutz were intended, first and foremost, to enable women to work at occupations of a public nature, and not to be solely restricted to the family sphere. The man, on the other hand, is able to be a partner in the performance of family roles, which have been greatly reduced in the kibbutz. We shall try to determine how far this aim is being realized in the kibbutz, and what the trends of development are at present.

The second aspect regarding equality of sexes is related to the roles outside the family--the "public" ones. The sociological conceptions of social stratification distinguish between "role differentiation," when members of different groups carry out different roles, and "social stratification," where the roles fulfilled by one group obtain rewards differing from those of the other group. The types of rewards differ in different societies. The absence of rewards which can be calculated in quantitative terms, such as money, is characteristic of the kibbutz, in contrast to the existence of rewards, whose main significance is psychological, which may vary in importance for different people or groups.

Hence, the second aspect of equality of sexes might be formulated as follows:

1. Equal rights for members of both sexes to fulfill all roles and equal facilities for fulfilling them, by acquiring equal training and equal opportunities for advancement in professional know-how and managerial responsibility.
2. Equal rewards for fulfilling identical roles (outside the kibbutz it is the traditional demand of equal pay for equal work).
3. To the extent that members of both sexes are performing different kinds of roles, it should be ensured that the role-related rewards in which members of one sex are concentrated should not be inferior to that of the roles which members of the other sex fulfill.

According to this conception, the criterion of equality of the sexes is not the allotment of identical roles to members of both sexes, but rather giving equal opportunities to select the roles preferred, and

which enable the realization of everyone's special abilities and talents. Moreover, the criterion for equality of the sexes is not "equalization" based on uniformity, by viewing people as being identical and interchangeable, but rather "equality," as the equal right to realize specific abilities and to satisfy the specific needs of every person or group of people.

At this point, the second aspect is combined with the first one. The elimination of the separation between the role of the breadwinner and that of the housewife liberates people from the subordination to a pre-determined social role, to one granting freedom of choice between different roles. The second aspect, on the other hand, ensures that those performing different roles will have the same opportunities for self-realization and satisfaction of their needs.

### FAMILY, FAMILISM, AND THE EQUALITY BETWEEN THE SEXES

In the expanding literature pertaining to the status of women in the kibbutz, one finds a general consensus of a strong connection between the rise of familialism and the broadening role of the family in different institutional areas (especially education and consumption) on the one hand and a decline in goal determinism of achieving equality of the sexes on the other. This consensus is based on two major assumptions.

1. The augmentation of family status causes the woman to return to her traditional role in concentrating her duties in the private-familial sphere, while the man is more inclined to fill public roles. Although specific examples of the exclusion of women from the kibbutz work system have not been noted, some people interpret the tendencies in this direction, within some kibbutzim, as the setting of trends towards the expansion of family authority at the expense of the collectivity of the kibbutz institutions; for example, the changeover to children's sleeping at their parents' homes, or the establishment of an inclusive budget. The assumption is that these trends express a desire to return to the role of housewife on the part of the woman. One investigator (M. Mednick) makes this far-reaching statement: "Indeed the kibbutz is now a phase very reminiscent of our own "Feminine Mystique" of the late forties and fifties." She was referring to the phenomenon described by B. Friedan of educated American women giving up professional careers in order to concentrate upon the role of housewife, a change which, for many, resulted in a feeling of emptiness and frustration after the children grew up.
2. The expansion of the family roles causes the inequality in the realm of division of labor inside the family to increase casting the main responsibility for the management of the

family economy and the children's care upon the woman. Therefore, in the kibbutz, as elsewhere, the woman assumes a "double role" in that, after completing her tasks within the regular work routine, she does household chores at home. This process has been legitimized according to this claim by the decision to shorten the woman's workday by one hour.

The extension of the family-roles intensifies the role-division processes within the family, and by casting this additional burden upon her, she is put into a detrimental position.

Paradoxically, all the investigators note that the women themselves are the main supporters of the expansion of familial trends (Mednick, 1975:224). The investigators differ, though, in their interpretations as to why this phenomenon of dominant female support exists. Tiger and Shepher (1975) explain this situation as resulting from "the mother's natural inclinations to be with her children." This tendency, they note, is a positive attraction, not a negative regression, and results both from our mammalian origin as apes and from prehistoric man's extended hunting and gathering period. Bettelheim, on the other hand, views the familial tendencies of kibbutz-born girls as a protest against the non-familial and unmotherly behavior of their own mothers (as guided by the masculine example). Y. Talmon and others, in turn, find a connection between the degree of satisfaction achieved by the woman from performance of her public roles--at work and in public activity--and to what extent she is inclined to expand the family roles. Talmon (1972), found that female kibbutz members fulfilling professional roles are less supportive to a changeover to family-sleeping arrangements.

In view of these contradictory opinions, we shall attempt to offer a more detailed explanation of some of the following problems: 1) What is the objective and subjective significance of the changes of the family status in the kibbutz? 2) Do demographic phenomena such as marrying at a younger age, increased birth rate, and the decreasing divorce rate, have the same impact on the individual as certain social processes (the development of extended families), or institutional changes (the change of family sleeping arrangements and the expansion of family centered roles in the spheres of consumption)? Does the wish for more children also result in the desire for family sleeping arrangements?

In the following review of our research within the different kibbutz movements, we shall go about answering these questions under the premise that the concept of familism should not be simply on one level but should be treated as a multidimensional phenomenon instead.

There are practically no differences between the movements in those aspects connected with demographic processes relating to the family's rising importance in the kibbutz social structure, and in those matters



connected with some of the social expressions of these processes. The findings based on the general kibbutz population census cited by Tiger and Shepher indicate that there are no differences between the Kibbutz Artzi and the Ichud, regarding the percentage of marriages and number of children. In the Kibbutz Artzi, which is considered to be less "familial," the number of families with three children and more, is even greater than in the Ichud (1975:224). The gross rate of births (number of births per thousand) is constantly rising in all the kibbutz movements from 21.1 in 1962 to 27.2 in 1972 (and is higher than the customary birthrate in the Jewish population as a whole--23.4 in 1971). The rate of divorces in the Ichud is somewhat lower when compared to the two other movements, but the difference, in the opinion of the investigator, is "not significant" (Gerson, 1968:185). The average age of marriage of girls born in the Kibbutz Artzi (21.47) is slightly higher than that of those in the Ichud (21.21), but this difference seems fairly small (M. Rosner et al., 1978).

There are no research data concerning the extended, multigeneration family but, apparently, the number of families of this kind in the Kibbutz Artzi is no lower than their equivalent in the Ichud. Perhaps even the opposite could be asserted since the number of kibbutz-born adults remaining in the kibbutz of their birth, and establishing their families there, is higher in the Kibbutz Artzi. There seem to be no differences between the movements when considering that the symbolic expression as to the family's significance, the marriage ceremony, has turned into a well-attended public event. A more thorough examination of the findings of the second-generation research concerning the importance of the family in the life of those investigated revealed that in this area, also, there are no differences between Kibbutz Artzi's young married couples and those of the Ichud.

There is, however, a great difference between the attitudes of the Ichud Hakvutzoth vekaKibbutzim, and those of Kibbutz Artzi who are a part of both generations and both sexes, concerning the tendencies towards augmenting family authority. Some 70% of Ichud-born girls support the establishment of family-sleeping arrangements, as compared to 25% of Kibbutz Artzi-born girls (among the young men, 40% as compared to 12%). Some 70% of the Ichud-born adults (of both sexes) support the establishment of an inclusive budget (signifying the extension of the authority of the individual and the family in the area of consumption) compared to 20% of adults born in the Kibbutz Artzi. Similar differences were also revealed in the responses to the general question regarding the wish to extend family authority in the sphere of consumption, and the legitimization of the family's appearance as a "political unit" in matters connected with one of its members. (The specific question referred to the attitude towards organized support, by parents, if one of their children's requests were brought before the kibbutz assembly.)

The attitudes of Hakibbutz Hame'uchad members resemble those of the Ichud, and are more favorably inclined towards the expansion of familial

roles. Within the Kibbutz Artzi, however, these trends are viewed as damaging vital kibbutz institutions. It follows that one cannot simply state that Kibbutz Artzi members are less "familialistic" than those of other movements. In certain areas their attitudes and behavior resemble those of the members of other movements, while in other spheres, they differ.

A similar phenomenon is revealed on the level of the individual as well. This is done by examining the connections between the behavior of those investigated and their attitudes in various familial spheres, as it is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1

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The Structure of Correlations Between Family-Related Behavior and Attitudes Toward Kibbutz Values

<u>Familialism</u>		<u>Attitudes Towards Kibbutz Values</u>
A. <u>Structural Dimension</u>	B. <u>Value Dimension</u>	C. <u>Other Kibbutz Values</u>
a. Respondents' age of marriage	Favorable attitudes towards:	a. Commitment to Kibbutz
b. Number of children	a. Familial children sleeping arrangements	
c. Importance of family	b. Inclusive budget c. Legitimation of family as "interest group"	b. Conformity with ideology of the Kibbutz Federation

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Significant correlations were found between the variables within the "A" section expressing the augmented family status inside the kibbutz social structure, and also between the variables within the "B" section, signifying the desire to extend the family authority by means of institutional changes. There were no significant correlations between the attitudes and behavior in section "A" and those in section "B." On the other hand, significant correlations were found between the attitudes in section "B" and those of section "C" which express a general relationship to the kibbutz and kibbutz values.<sup>1</sup>

These findings, which are consistent both on the level of the inter-movement comparison, and on the level of the individual, indicate two dimensions, in the tendency of increased importance of the family and familialism inside the kibbutz. These could be defined as a structural dimension and a value dimension. The structural dimension mainly expresses the demographical changes connected with the increased importance of the family in the kibbutz, such as having more children, their young age, the development of the extended family, and their symbolic manifestations (the marriage ceremony, the wedding ring, etc.). These changes indicate the augmentation of the family's status within the social structure of the kibbutz. For the individual--on the other hand--the family assumes importance upon the establishment of a new family, and with the advent of parenthood. The larger the number of children, the greater the significance of the family. The value dimension expresses a set of attitudes and opinions in favor of expanding family authority in kibbutz life.

These attitudes are also connected with others, supporting a change in the institutional structure of the kibbutz toward the weakening of the collectivistic elements. It seems to us, then, that the concept "familialism" should not be used without defining it specifically. In our opinion, it is necessary on the one hand to distinguish between the familial behavior of the individual and the rise in the importance of the family in the social structure of the kibbutz, and the support of changes in the institutional structure by expanding family authority, on the other hand.

#### Conclusions Relating to the Problem of Equality of the Sexes

The important conclusion of this discussion concerning the subject of the equality of sexes is the fact that if a kibbutz family desires a relatively large number of children--as compared with their customary number in the past--it does not necessarily mean that they intend to change the kibbutz educational arrangements too, or wish to have the children at home during the night--just as it has not been proven that the desire for larger families necessarily results in the wish to extend family authority. We have no evidence that women who want their children to sleep at home also aspire to the role of housewife and to the concept of "feminine mystique." The findings of the investigation of kibbutz female members in the Kibbutz Artzi (Rosner, 1966: 80) show that the investigated subjects regarded their position as definitely more advantageous than that of the typical housewife. Only a few women showed the inclination to do domestic work (laundry, ironing, etc.). The overwhelming majority noted that they only did work of this sort when services in the kibbutz were unsatisfactory. (Shepher (1967), in his inter-kibbutz research study comparing different systems of sleeping arrangements for children, states: "we did not find the image of the housewife to be the predominant one in kibbutzim, where children slept at home. On the contrary, we discerned the inclination to stress this image in kibbutzim where children slept in children's houses. The two findings are



interconnected. Where sleeping is in children's houses, the women search for various expressions of the female image; where children sleep at home, this urge is satisfied by the system itself" (Tiger and Shepherd, 1975:135)).

Therefore, a fatalistic approach to the familialistic trends in the kibbutz is unjustified and these trends should not be considered a regression of the equality of the sexes. This achievement is the participation of all women in the kibbutz work system, which ensures socio-economic independence, and a feeling of partnership in the kibbutz enterprise. However, the criterion for attaining equality of sexes is not only the fact that the woman has emerged from the limiting bond of the home, but also her partnership with the man in the fulfillment of family roles.

#### THE DIVISIONS OF WORK IN THE KIBBUTZ FAMILY

Claims are being made to the effect that equality of sexes was not achieved in the kibbutz, because of the division of work according to sex in the areas of occupations and public activity. Confronted with this claim, the question of whether processes of polarization, according to sex, are taking place in the family sphere as well, is important. All the more so, since the increase in the number of children, and a higher standard of living (as indicated by a larger family flat, more and better furniture, and changes in patterns of consumption) have definitely increased the number of roles each adult has to perform and demand more time and effort. Are these additional expenditures of time and effort to be made by the woman? Has shortening the woman's workday resulted in men performing less domestic work?

We regret to say that we have not sufficient data as to the arrangements of members of kibbutz families. Tiger and Shepherd (1975), however, present detailed data concerning the present division of domestic work in the families of investigated subjects from four kibbutzim. Only four out of 13 household tasks were usually performed by the woman (bringing foodstuffs, preparing the afternoon meal, cleaning the kitchenette and the bathroom). However, as far as all the other tasks were concerned, such as cleaning the flat, washing dishes, managing the family budget, gardening etc., most of the subjects investigated replied that these were performed by both partners together or in turn. They reached the conclusion that as far as the division of work and authority--in the family--is concerned, the kibbutz gives a clear picture of a marriage based upon partnership ("companionship marriage"). Nevertheless, work continues to be divided according to sex. The egalitarian ideology has proven itself to be more efficient inside the microstructure of the family than in the macrostructure of the kibbutz (Tiger and Shepherd, 1975:233).

A similar image is evoked by the Dutch investigator F. Selier (1973) specifically dealing with the division of roles in the kibbutz family. He concludes: "I would like to stress that, in comparison with the

Western world, the kibbutz is characterized by a large measure of "interchangeability of roles" (Selier, 1973:20). One of Selier's surprising findings is that there is more equality in the division of roles (i.e. the measure of the husband's participation in housework is greater) when the family is larger or when children begin sleeping at home (Selier, 1973:31).

A similar picture is shown by the Kibbutz Artzi investigation of women members, dealing with division of educational roles between the sexes. Apparently, the situation changes according to the children's ages. The mother fulfills the central role when they are babies and at the pre-kindergarten age, while the father's role becomes gradually more important during the kindergarten and school-age stages. During the secondary-school stage, both parents have an equal share. The kibbutz uniqueness in this aspect can be discerned by the institutionalization of the leisure-hours spent with the children, according them a central place in the timetable of both parents. Particularly when the children are young, both the father and the mother spend 3-4 hours in the afternoon with their children. Here the kibbutz differs from most modern societies where less and less concentrated time is spent with the children, and fathers working away from home are seldom with their children.

Another finding of the kibbutz woman-member research expresses this difference between kibbutz and city life as well. In the Kibbutz Artzi, 75% of those investigated claim that in the kibbutz family there is more equality in the area of division of work between the sexes than in the Israeli city. The percentage of those who think that the situation in the kibbutz is characterized by greater equality in the area of the family, as compared to the city, is significantly higher than that of those claiming this in connection with other areas, such as work and public activity. Once more this strengthens Tiger and Shepherd's conclusion mentioned above. The major factor in the family area is not the change of the role of women, but that the men's roles have been revolutionized. Although a certain differentiation in the division of work, which is not completely egalitarian, can be discerned, the notable fact is that men have "invaded" the area of roles characterized by solidarity and emotionalism, which, according to their traditional distribution, were thought to be feminine.

It is of remarkable interest to note that even in societies which have made special progress in the sphere of the equality of sexes (the Scandinavian countries and the U.S.S.R.) no fundamental changes in the family division of work have taken place as yet. This--in spite of the declared policy and planned efforts directed towards this aim--is indicated by the summing-up of an investigation held in Finland (1972) by E. Haavio Mannila: "The traditional division of labor between the sexes still persists in most of the families although two-thirds of the wives are working outside their homes. This circumstance causes dissatisfaction: Women are more often dissatisfied with their husbands' participation in household tasks than with their own status at work and social activities even if their formal positions in the latter are inferior to

the men's position" (Haavio-Mannila, 1972:217).

Elsewhere, the same writer makes a similar claim concerning the socialist countries: "Various investigations in the socialist countries show that within the family, traditional conceptions and a conservative division of domestic chores are still dominant. Obviously, it is more difficult to influence attitudes or behavior on the "micro" level of the family (Haavio-Mannila, 1972:102). What then in the kibbutz has brought about the revolution on the "micro" level of the family, which is more influenced by biological factors than other spheres; a revolution which continues and persists despite all the changes? It seems to us that the answer lies in the kibbutz egalitarian system of values, expressed, among other things, by a practically complete lack of stereotypes as to the differences in the abilities and characteristics of the two sexes--a phenomenon which is unusual when compared with other societies (Rosner, 1969). Moreover, an egalitarian system of interpersonal relations is maintained and reflected in the character of the kibbutz family, which is based upon partnership.

#### DO WOMEN FORM THE VANGUARD OF THE FAMILISTIC TREND?

As mentioned above, most investigators share the view that it was due to women's aspiration that the rise of familialistic trends in the kibbutz originated. Opinions differ when it comes to interpreting those aspirations. Tiger and Shepher view them as an expression of biological tendencies, while other investigators think that women seek compensation in the family for their relative deprivation in other areas.

In our opinion, the role of women in strengthening familial tendencies should be examined against the background of the more general causes for the growing centrality of the family in the kibbutz social structure. Talmon's investigations allow us to distinguish between three kinds of factors in this sphere:

1. Situational tendencies connected with the improvement of security conditions, better economic circumstances, and social stability. An increased number of children and the improved standard of living have added new content to the family, a social unit, whose ties had been predominantly emotional in the past. When the family unit assumed a multigenerational character (since a considerable number of young people remain in the kibbutz of their birth), its dimensions grew numerically and the network of social relationships connected with the extended family increased.
2. Specific changes evolved in the social structure as expressed by the increase in size of the kibbutzim and the larger number of social groups varying in age, generation differentiation, and origin. The processes of institutionalization introduced new elements of formal relationships, which weakened the emotional attachment to the all-embracing



kibbutz framework and the interpersonal connections. Due to these circumstances, the family assumes greater importance, as it serves as a framework guaranteeing personal, emotional, and direct relationships, and where considerations of the needs and inclinations of the individual as a family member have priority. The search for the "warm family nest" is intensified as a result of the relative weakening of the "familial" character of the overall kibbutz framework.

3. It is a well-known fact that in revolutionary societies, based upon identification with an ideological aim and a central goal, family ties are weakened, and the family appears as a factor "competing" with the collective frameworks. On the other hand, the family rises in importance as the revolutionary tension weakens. The routinization process in the kibbutz, which increasingly tended to bring to the foreground everyday concerns, was instrumental in diminishing the focus on identification with the central ideological aims. These changes furnished a suitable medium for furthering familial trends. Thus, women's part in the growth of these tendencies should be viewed within the context of these larger processes.

The demand for expanding family authority is, in general, more acute in those kibbutzim and movements where the general social and ideological relationships have deteriorated. Y. Talmon revealed differences between various types of kibbutzim in the Ichud Hakibbutzim Vehakvutzoth. The findings of the research on the woman member in the Kibbutz Artzi showed that the demand to implement family authority was stronger in those kibbutzim classified by investigators as "less committed to kibbutz values" (Rosner, 1969). The differences between the Kibbutz Artzi, with its "more collectivistic" conception, and the other movements can also be explained on this basis. Variations between the movements, concerning the support of children's sleeping with the family, for example, are greater than the differences between the sexes in each of the movements. For instance, the "Second Generation Study" revealed that in all the kibbutz movements, the percentage of young women not born in a kibbutz or educated there supporting children's sleeping with their families, is greater than the percentage of kibbutz-born girls holding this opinion. In the Kibbutz Artzi, more young men support this attitude. These findings, however, negate Bettelheim's above-mentioned assumption that, particularly, kibbutz-born women are the main supporters of this institutional change.

#### Summary

Even though more women than men support the extension of family authority in the kibbutz, it would be a mistake to regard them as being

mainly "responsible" for the increased familialism in the kibbutz. The rising status of the family in the kibbutz social structure derives from social and situational modifications, based mainly in ideological changes.

Perhaps the point-of-balance between family and kibbutz relationships differs in the different movements. In the Kibbutz Artzi, we find more pronounced collectivistic trends; children are educated in regional "children communities" from adolescence on, and are separated from their families during the week. There, tendencies favoring the extension of family authority are weaker than those of the Ichud Hakibbutzim, where children have been sleeping in their parents' homes in some of the kibbutzim since their inception, and in which the family unit had stronger legitimation from the start. It might be regarded as symptomatic that in spite of the "less-familial" arrangements in the Kibbutz Artzi--when compared to the Ichud--fewer women there have claimed that (even in comparison to the surrounding society) the kibbutz is a less convenient unit in the area of the family (10% versus 37% in the Ichud) (Rosner et al., 1978:499).

On the other hand, in the Kibbutz Artzi, as compared to the Ichud, more kibbutz-born women maintain that the kibbutz is a less convenient framework for realizing professional aspirations (55% compared to 46%). This difference certainly cannot be explained by biological conditioning, and it apparently originates from differences in education, ideological orientation, and personal aspirations.

#### DIVISION OF LABOR IN THE KIBBUTZ

Earlier on, it was assumed that one of the conditions for women's participation in the workplace is the complete abolition of role division between husband and wife where the husband is the breadwinner and the wife is the homemaker.

While surveying the work division in the kibbutz, one might wonder if this condition has been met. It is true that almost all women belong to a workplace of the kibbutz, but they concentrate in jobs that might seem similar or identical to household jobs. A majority of them (about 80%) work in childcare, clothes care, and cooking--only a minority has other occupations such as nurse, industrial worker and secretaries.<sup>2</sup>

To clarify this subject, it might be asked if the job of a professional cook in the kibbutz, who prepares the food for hundreds of diners, is more similar to the job of a housewife who cooks for her own family or to that of a chef who cooks for a big restaurant? Also, is the job of a professional children's nurse or kindergarten teacher who looks after 6-15 children of the same age group more similar to that of a housewife who looks after her own children, or that of a children's nurse or kindergarten teacher who works in a daily nursery out of the kibbutz? Clearly, there are quite a few differences between the work of a kibbutz

cook and that of a restaurant chef, particularly in regard to the different people with whom the kibbutz cook gets involved during her working time; in the kibbutz the customer, the boss, and the coworkers are all members of the same system--and this brings about very intricate relationships. On the other hand, from the point of view of content, organization, etc., the job of kibbutz cook is much more similar to that of a restaurant chef than it is to a housewife.

The principles of high efficiency, rational management and proficient work organization are as important in the kibbutz services (kitchen, dining-room, laundry, clothes-store) as in the "productive" branches of the kibbutz. The difference is that the products of the "productive" branches are sold to the "outside" market, while the products of the services are consumed by the members.<sup>3</sup>

The differences in job content between housewives out of the kibbutz and childcare workers in the kibbutz are quite clear. The childcare workers are more instrumental and efficient and less emotional than the housewives who look after their own children.

It seems to us that the most significant difference between the childcare branches and other branches in the kibbutz is that there are no "hardware" products in childcare and the "profits" are not evaluated and entered into the bookkeeping; only the costs are.

We think, then, that even though most women in the kibbutz work in the "services" and childcare branches, they can easily be considered as "breadwinners" whose work is similar to that of career women outside the kibbutz. Accordingly, our view is that the first condition for women's participation in the workforce of the kibbutz is fulfilled.

In regard to the second condition, the main question is whether there is only a differentiation in occupation according to sex, or whether there is also a differentiation in the status of the different occupations? Or more specifically: Do "feminine" occupations have lower status than "masculine" occupations in the kibbutz?

Many writers (Agassi-Buber, 1975) state that "feminine" occupations (all over the world) are characterized by lower prestige, lower salaries, and lower work conditions and quality than "masculine" occupations. The same was also assumed about the kibbutz (Tiger and Shepher, 1975; Talmon, 1972). It was assumed that the prestige of childcare and service occupations is lower than the prestige of the "productive" branches and this in turn has brought about a lower level in their work conditions. From this it was concluded that women are less satisfied in their work than men. This assumption was contradicted by a series of recent studies (Palgi, 1976; Rosner, 1978). (See Table 1).



TABLE I

## JOB SATISFACTION AND ITS MAIN PREDICTORS OF KIBBUTZ-BORN ADULTS BY SEX (AVERAGE)\*

	MALE			FEMALE			T
	$\bar{X}$	SD	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	N	
Job satisfaction**	34.3	8.7	455	35.3	8.6	456	1.76
Self actualization at work**	37.3	8.1	455	37.5	8.2	456	n.s.
Use of own skills**	37.0	9.1	455	37.9	9.6	456	n.s.
Prestige of work in kibbutz***	4.0	1.1	455	4.0	1.2	456	n.s.
Importance of work to kibbutz***	4.6	0.8	455	4.6	0.8	456	n.s.

\* Palgi (1976:84) has the data from research on the second generation in the kibbutz.

\*\* An index with a scale from 10 to 50.

\*\*\* A single item with a scale from 1 to 5.

a. No differences were found between men and women in: 1) their satisfaction from their occupation; 2) their wish to change their working place; 3) the main predictors of job satisfaction, such as possibilities for self-actualization in their job (i.e., for doing interesting work, for using their skills at work, for doing varied work, etc.); 4) the prestige of their work in the kibbutz; or 5) the importance of their work to the kibbutz.<sup>4</sup>

b. Differences between the sexes in the variables mentioned above can be found in specific branches, and not necessarily "feminine" ones. The most problematic branch from this aspect is the industrial branch. Women working in industry, which is a profitable production branch, in comparison with women working in other branches, are less satisfied with their job, see few opportunities for self-actualization, and think that their work is not very important to the kibbutz and not very much appreciated (Palgi, 1976).<sup>5</sup> (See Table II.)

TABLE II

JOB SATISFACTION AND OTHER REWARDS AT WORK OF KIBBUTZ-BORN WOMEN BY WORKPLACE (PERCENTAGES OF THE TWO HIGHEST CATEGORIES)\*

	Agriculture	Industry	Child care	Services	Total	N
Job satisfaction	65	40	69	66	67	450
Use of skills	45	20	66	63	61	450
Variety at work	59	40	74	65	69	450
Involvement at work	75	27	92	87	87	450
Group spirit	61	40	66	58	63	450
Prestige of work in kibbutz	80	50	73	63	71	450

\* Ben-David (1975:220) has the data from research on the second generation in the kibbutz.

These findings indicate a basic change in attitudes towards work in the kibbutz. Skill is increasing in importance while branch profitability is decreasing, and the differentiation between productive and service branches is losing its significance.

c. The process of professionalization of the childcare and service branches is evident also in the difference in the level of education of the sexes. More women than men in the kibbutz received higher education, and more women than men work in occupations that require higher education. Main fields of education for women are education, nursing, physiotherapy, and secretarial; men received more education in the technical and managerial fields and general academic subjects.

From this data it can, therefore, be assumed that even though there is a division of work according to sexes in the kibbutz, the "feminine" branches are not "inferior" in their status. Also, the differences between the branches in members' work satisfaction, in work content, and in team spirit are not related to any division according to sex. Even more, it was found that women who work in the childcare branches are the most satisfied.

Can we then conclude that if the status of women's occupation in the kibbutz is not inferior to that of men's, there is no special problem in the present division of labor?

#### By-Products of the Division of Labor According to Sex

A crucial problem is the extent to which the existing division of labor in the kibbutz enables the actualization of the occupational aspirations of both sexes. The process of occupational placement in the kibbutz has undergone substantial changes. The growing number of kibbutz-born adults has brought about a change from collectivistic occupational placement--in which the needs of the kibbutz system are of most importance to a more individualistic occupational placement--in which more consideration of the individual's inclinations and aspirations is taken.

At the same time, there are certain limitations to the work arrangement in the kibbutz. The variety of jobs is limited because of its small population, because of the emphasis given to production branches (i.e., agricultural and industrial), and because of the reluctance to have kibbutz members working out of the kibbutz. This limited choice of occupations, among which there are relatively few highly skilled jobs, cannot always meet the aspirations of kibbutz members. This is specially relevant to kibbutz-born adults whose level of aspiration for self-actualization in their occupations is quite high (in comparison with their parents). In research conducted among kibbutz-born adults (Ben-David, 1975) it was found that 35% of the men and 14% of the women aspire for work that requires academic studies. Also, among those who have well-defined occupational aspirations 52% of the women and 44% of the men give great importance to its realization. Some 32% of these women and 23% of the men think they might not be given the chance to reach these aspirations. The differences shown above between men and women are not significant, but might point to a trend in which women's occupational level of aspirations is lower than men's and where they are not sure they can realize these aspirations. Two other studies (Dar, 1974; Natan, 1976) show how the division of labor in the kibbutz affects differentially the motivation to study and the school achievements of high school students from the higher forms. Dar (1974:47) indicates that the lower achievement of girls in their studies in these forms, compared with their relatively higher achievement in lower forms, is a result of difficulties that arise from a conflict the girls have. The source of this conflict is the incompatibility between symmetrical and egalitarian socialization and the reality where there is strong role differentiation.

Why do women perceive their chances of achieving their aspired goals as lower than those of men? The reason, most probably, lies in the work division in the kibbutz and the high demand for childcare workers. In the last few years, the number of children in the kibbutzim has increased and so did the average working days per child. As most of the workers in childcare are young women, almost all of them are asked to work in this sector. This conflicts with the occupational aspirations of some



of the women who are interested to work in sectors other than childcare and services.<sup>6</sup>

It might also encumber the realization of studies in those sectors which are in demand. This situation can be found in almost every kibbutz--the demand for womanpower might increase or decrease periodically but is always higher than the supply.

All in all, the results of a higher rate of childbirth in the kibbutz are different than outside of it. Out of the kibbutz, a mother with young children might work outside of her household. In the kibbutz there is no direct effect of the number of children on their mother's work. But, as long as childcare is a "feminine" occupation, the higher birth rates limit the possibilities of occupational choice for the young women and also enhance the problem that applies to both sexes, the incompatibility between personal aspirations and the needs of the kibbutz.

It must be remembered, however, that only a small percent of the young women face this problem--most of them state that they wish to work in the "feminine" sectors.

Two byproducts of the division of labor by sex have been introduced above: the lowering of the level of occupational aspirations, and the uncertainty of women in being given the chance to fulfill these aspirations. These byproducts concern only a minority of the young women in the kibbutz but surely have relevance to the entire kibbutz.

Other byproducts that might affect the whole functioning of the kibbutz system are:

1. The fact that most young women aspire for "feminine" occupations such as teachers, nurses, physiotherapists, etc., causes supply higher than the demand in those occupations. This leads the professional women to work outside of the kibbutz, while there is high demand for working power in "masculine" occupations. (In a survey of industrial plants in the Kibbutz Artzi Movement, it was reported that there is a demand for 250 technical workers: engineers, technicians, etc.) (Rosner and Palgi, 1976).
2. The division of labor by sex limits the adaptability of the work arrangements of the kibbutz to changing situations. This phenomenon was especially outstanding during and after the Yom Kippur War in Israel. During this period, a high percentage of the young men were enlisted; but even so, very few women were transferred to "masculine" branches. It seems that the "sex typing" of these occupations and the lack of knowledge concerning these workplaces have made women reluctant to help there (Palgi and Rosner, 1974). Similar phenomena might appear also at peacetime.

The existing separate working-sectors for men and women might lead to lack of workers in the one and surplus of supply in the other.

The division of occupations according to sex affects also the role division in the public activity of the kibbutz.

#### Women's Participation in Public Activity in the Kibbutz

Public activity in the kibbutz is carried out mainly by committees whose members participate in them on their own free time. Apart from these, there are some offices in public activity which are full time or almost full time jobs: the secretary, the treasurer, the farm manager, and the head of the cultural committee.

According to research findings (Rosner, 1969; Palgi, 1976) and to the census of 1973 (Tiger and Shepher, 1975) "sex typing" exists also in the public activity of the kibbutz but not to the same extreme as in the occupational area. (See Table III.)

TABLE III

SPHERE OF COMMITTEE ACTIVITY, BY SEX, OF KIBBUTZ-BORN ADULTS WHO WERE ACTIVE (PERCENTAGES)\*

Committee Activity	Men	Women
Economic	26.1	9.6
Political	2.4	0.0
Social	17.4	26.7
Cultural	21.8	23.7
Educational	10.6	20.0
Services	2.4	6.7
General	19.3	13.3
Total	100.0	100.0
Number active	207	135
Number not active	343	365

\* (Palgi, 1976: 105) has the data from research on the second generation in the kibbutz.

Tiger and Shepher (1975:140) show that from among members of the social, cultural, educational, and the "services" committees 54% were women and 46% were men. In the economic committees, 80% were men. It is then justifiable to look at the first sector of public activity as neutral (from the point of view of "sex typing") and at the second sector as masculine.

In all the committees together, there were about 47% women and 53% men. In the kibbutz secretariat there were 37% women, and among committee chairmen there were 35% women. So, it seems rather rash to describe the kibbutz as a society where men rule (Mednick, 1975). Tiger and Shepher (1975:143) also point out that there is no other society in which the percentage of women among those active in political and public life is between 40% and 50%. It must also be remembered that committee membership is rotational, and so a very large percentage of women are liable to be committee members for a small number of years.

The greatest polarization between the sexes can be found in the three central offices of the kibbutz, i.e., kibbutz secretary, kibbutz farm manager, and kibbutz treasurer, where 90% of all officeholders were men. In everyday life, these officeholders have very high authority to decide upon matters, but their authority is limited by the democratic system of the kibbutz: the committees, the secretariat and the kibbutz general assembly that has the highest power for decision making. Therefore, it might be argued that the authority and power of these officeholders (of which so few are women) is limited by the system.<sup>7</sup>

Still, attention should be paid to the reason that so few women hold these offices. In order to discuss this, one should differentiate between the economic offices (farm manager and treasurer) and the purely social office (secretary of the kibbutz). The first are usually manned by branch managers or officeholders in industry (after they pass a 1-year course) and therefore are mostly closed before women who, because of the division of labor in the kibbutz, do not usually come from this work sector. During the last few years, more women became treasurers of the kibbutz because more of them hold accounting offices. It can be assumed, then, that women hesitate to partake in these offices because of their "masculine" image and because of lack of knowledge in all the productive sector of the kibbutz.

The office of the secretary of the kibbutz is usually held by two kibbutz members one of which is preferably a woman. This has been institutionalized in the last few years by most kibbutzim. A general reason for both men and women to be reluctant to have any of the three central offices is their negative balance of reward. It must be remembered that in the kibbutz monetary rewards do not exist and the social pressures on these offices are strong and continuous.

The effect of women's low participation in the central offices in the kibbutz (also in committee chairmanship) can be felt in the kibbutz



general assembly. Even though about the same number of men and women attend the assembly, fewer women are prepared to talk in the assembly. This is because they do not feel that they have enough knowledge in matters discussed (Rosner et al., 1978). Also, because of this, they are perceived as more peripheral in the kibbutz than men (Palgi, 1976).

These findings and others indicate that women are motivated by different factors than men to take part in political and public activity. Women's motivators are mainly expressive (the wish to have many friends, etc.) while men's motivators are mostly instrumental (having influence in the kibbutz, etc.).

This might also explain the lack of difference between men and women in their satisfaction from their social situation even though women have lower status and are active mainly in lower levels (committee members) in the kibbutz (Palgi, 1976). The argument is that factors that bring about a feeling of satisfaction from one's social situation are usually more expressive (such as strong social ties) and factors connected with power and activity in the kibbutz have little effect on these feelings.

This section might be summed up as follows:

1. There is less differentiation between the sexes in public activity than in the occupational fields. This can be demonstrated by the lack of a "feminine" sector in public activity.
2. There is underrepresentation of women in the central offices, especially the economic ones.
3. The underrepresentation of women in the central offices brings about less influence of women in the kibbutz.
4. Even so, women are not less satisfied than men as regards their social situation. It seems that the reason for this is that they give little importance to "power" and "centrality" rewards and more importance to social rewards (such as social ties).

#### WHAT ARE THE TRENDS OF DEVELOPMENT?

What are the trends of development? Can one possibly state that, compared to the past, we are facing a process of deepening polarization? Can it be predicted, on this basis, that future developments might follow the course of extrapolation? When did the transition to separation-according-to-sex begin; and, to what extent is it connected with the second central tendency--the augmentation of familial tendencies which, according to various authors, has influenced the status of the family in the kibbutz?

Tiger and Shepher's data (1975:86) show that the process of women's disengagement from the branches of production occurred before 1948. In the "glorious past" during the early twenties, when 80% of the women did productive work, the kibbutzim were few and socially unstable; there were few children and only small service branches. Little change is evident between 1948 and 1954, and no significant change between 1954 and 1973, when far-reaching demographic changes took place in the kibbutzim (the ageing of the veteran generation, the second-generation adult joining the kibbutzim as members), together with a basic structural change in the productive branches, as a result of the intensification of industrialization. All this makes it hard to agree with the authors' assumption that the polarization process is still going on.

What conclusion, then, can be drawn concerning the future? It seems to us that two processes might, conceivably, introduce more women into nonfeminine occupations in the future:

1. A movement toward professional occupations unconnected with educational or service branches, by girls who have no inclination towards these latter occupations. The current tendency to make allowance for individual preferences, as far as work is concerned, permits us to assume that more women workers will be engaged in noneducational and non-service work.
2. The increased importance of industry, in which the percentage of women workers is already much higher than in agriculture (according to Tiger and Shepher's data, women comprise 20% of workers in industries, and only 12% of agricultural workers). The policy of increasing the number of industrial workers and the desire to employ fewer hired workers, enables the assumption that the number of women workers in this section might increase.<sup>8</sup>

This, of course, will depend on women's wish for this type of work, which is apparently connected both with the improvement of the general conditions of industrial work and with the raising of women's status in the plants.

However, the realization of these trends will be determined not only by the expansion of the variety of occupations for women workers, but also by the feasibility of "disengaging" women members from educational and service branches. This can be accomplished either by changes in organization (which would necessitate fewer workdays in educational and service branches) or by introducing more men into so-called "feminine" jobs. If these transitions do take place (women's introduction into industry and men's into service and educational branches), it would make it impossible to contend that this would be unprofitable, since men bearing industrial or professional roles do not have the same advantages as in the past, when their agricultural work demanded physical strength.

Therefore, one may assume that polarization will not deepen, but will even narrow-down gradually. It may be surmised that men's introduction into feminine occupations will start in occupations whose image is more neutral, such as teaching, working in the dining room and in the kitchen, and that only at a later stage--if at all--they will go into occupations with a definite feminine label (handling clothing and caring for little children). The question remains, however, whether the number of men willing to do these types of work will balance the number of women who would be prepared to leave the feminine occupational circle for other types of work regarded as neutral.

Let us now examine the trends of development relating to the division of labor in public roles. The trends of development relating to the division of public roles according to sex also cannot be described as subject to a process of deepening polarization. Even in the distant past, scarcely any women filled central roles in the field of economics, such as economy administrator, treasurer, etc., and it cannot be assumed that the number of women in noneconomic roles and committees has decreased.<sup>9</sup>

Additional proof of the assumption that women are no less active than they had been in the past can be found in N. Barzilai's research (1974) in which she compared women members' position in one of the kibbutzim of Ichud Hakibbutzim Veba-Kvutzoth in 1954 to their position in the same kibbutz in 1974. She found that the public activity of women had increased considerably in recent years. Against these objective data, we have subjective evidence from kibbutz members that women's activity has decreased during the same period (Rosner, 1966). However, these images evoked by veteran women members might be the expression of subjective feelings that they, themselves, were less active, rather than a sound grasp of the objective changes.

We consider that there are two factors that might possibly have an impact on future developments: 1) Raising the educational and professional standard of kibbutz women members; their participation in training-courses in the field of economics and management would also justify increasing their representation in economic roles and committees. 2) The demographic situation: the data at our disposal show the impact of the age element on the measure of public activity. Younger women, who marry at a relatively young age, tend to have quite a large number of children during a short period. Most of them work in the educational sector, and are occupied in the evenings when the greater part of public activity takes place; so they have few opportunities for activity in central public roles. This apparently is the origin of the lower level of activity of young women, during the phase of their return to the kibbutz after army service, up until the ages of 30-35. Their male peers can, however, begin to undertake central roles right after completing their military service. In later stages of the life cycle, these differences might become less acute. Therefore, the size of the different age groups in the population of women, as a whole, might also influence their representation in public roles.



## MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT SPHERES

Various investigators have endeavored to understand the connection between the two central manifestations of women's position in the kibbutz: role division according to sex and familial tendencies.

One explanation, based upon the assumption that women are the "pioneers" of familial tendencies, is that they turned back into the family because they were socially deprived especially in the choice of occupations.

Talmon (1960) even found that the women who have no satisfaction at work were more supportive of the introduction of familial sleeping than others who had more professional jobs and were more satisfied at work. On the other hand, in the findings of the second-generation research, which encompassed a much larger population of all the movements, no statistical connection was found between satisfaction at work, or other occupational characteristics, and familial orientation.

Tiger and Shepher offer another explanation, by asking: Is polarization in the division of work a result of the increasing importance of the family? Answering this, they reply with two alternative hypotheses, supported by anthropological findings, showing that woman's dominance detracts from her sexual attraction, while masculine dominance enhances his.

1. With the aim of ensuring the stability of sexual attraction and emotional ties inside the nuclear family unit, the number of dominant women should be limited; the division of labor in the kibbutz contributes to this end.
2. Polarization of work was an initial development, which resulted in the growing tendency of both men and women to marry and have children.

The authors are aware that an empirical examination of their hypotheses is impossible.

In our opinion, the division of work according to sex (mainly by decreasing the number of women in agricultural branches) can be explained adequately by economic and social factors, without having recourse to the explanation offered above which cannot be examined. In our opinion, too, the sociological explanations of the process of the stabilization of the familial framework and the augmentation of the birth-rate are more convincing than the assumption that this process originated in the division of work according to sex, which increased sexual attraction. Likewise, we do not understand why women working in vegetable gardens, plant nurseries, or orchards (the agricultural branches where women worked in the past) might necessarily be more domineering (a quality which lessens, according to Tiger and Shepher, their sexual attraction) than women bearing executive roles in the spheres of services and education?

The examination of developments in recent years indicates that several other assumptions relating to mutual relations between the life spheres have not been verified.

One cannot state that, as a rule, the increased importance of the family in the kibbutz does interfere with women's entrance into new professions; or, prevents her going out for longer periods to extend her studies or training. In these two areas, arrangements have been made to satisfy familial considerations, preventing any change for the worse as far as the equality of opportunities in the spheres of work and education are concerned.

Women occupied inside the kibbutz work in places near the children's houses, and the mother is able to make a break in her workday for feeding or visiting her little children.

Regional schools, and other places at a distance, also make special arrangements in this direction. Several kibbutzim give priority, as far as higher education and training are concerned, to the younger women members in order to make it possible for them to finish their studies before having children. But quite a few women who already have several children go out to study while their marriage partner undertakes additional responsibility in caring for the children.

Kibbutz research has not proven that large families interfere with the mother's public activity. Tiger and Shepher have even found a positive correlation between the level of activity and the number of children.

In our opinion, then, the misgivings that the increased importance of the family in the kibbutz would lower woman's status, and interfere with her activity, have not been verified. There are two main reasons for this: 1) the collective educational system bears the greater part of the burden of childcare, and 2) the egalitarian division of family chores between husband and wife. The main problem connected with the large number of children in the kibbutz is not the heavier burden it puts upon the mother, but the need for more women to work in the educational sector. Herein lies the essential difference between the kibbutz and other societies.

On the other hand, various findings show the psychological impact of the augmented status of the family upon the woman's life. According to the second-generation-research findings, men testified that the sphere of work is the all-important one in their lives. Women, on the other hand, accorded priority to the familial sphere. Considerable differences between the generations are definitely visible. Women veterans attach more importance to work than do second-generation men. From this point of view, veteran men head the list, followed by: veteran women, young men, young women (Y. Ben-David, 1975:32).

U. Leviatan (1976) found that the sphere of work is less central in women's lives as compared to men, since their position therein has less

impact on their general satisfaction in life than it has upon that of the men.

M. Palgi (1976) found that familial orientation (attitude regarding family-sleeping arrangements) has a greater impact upon adult daughters' attachment to the kibbutz than it has upon that of the sons. Kibbutz-born women desiring familial sleeping were, generally speaking, less attached to the kibbutz than those whose attitude about collective sleeping was positive. No similar results were found among the young men.

All these findings, then, indicate that women consider the family sphere as more central, while young men see the sphere of work and other public spheres as being relatively more important. This indicates that despite the objective fact that in the kibbutz, the division of roles between man as the "provider" and woman as the housewife and mother responsible for family affairs have been eliminated, there still remain differences between the centrality of the various spheres in the psychological life sphere of both sexes. This, however, is a matter of differing accentuations, and not of making certain roles of work and activities marginal. For the woman, there is not even a set of relations in which increased importance of one sphere must make another sphere less important.

Here the structural difference between the kibbutz and the collective moshav is salient. As the number of children of a woman in the moshav increases, the number of hours she works in the collective work schedule decreases. In the kibbutz, on the other hand, there is no connection between the familial burden and women's work in the kibbutz. Here the kibbutz institutions bear the main part of the familial burdens, rather than the family or the mother.

## SUMMARY

Numerous research findings, which have accumulated during recent years, give us the opportunity to examine the extent to which the goals of equality between the sexes, as defined above, have been attained. Have the institutional arrangements in the kibbutz really proven fertile ground for both sexes to realize their specific talents and abilities? Have they been able to satisfy the specific needs of each of them, both as individuals with their own personalities, capabilities, and special needs, and in their status of either man or woman?

Has the kibbutz indeed eliminated the distinction between the man as the provider, the citizen "active" in public affairs, and the woman, as the one responsible for the domestic needs, or the care and education of the children?

From an objective point of view, this can be answered in the affirmative. This issue has been extensively revolutionized in the kibbutz,



thereby changing not only the roles of women, but also those of men. All women are included in the kibbutz work schedule, or--in statistical terms--as members of the labor force.<sup>10</sup>

The women working within the framework of the kibbutz work schedule should be seen as "providers," although many work in the field of education and services, which are branches from which no income is derived.

This definition is based both upon economic considerations and upon the analysis of the sociological character of the women's roles. From an economic point of view it is possible to calculate the "income" derived from work in the services, or in education, by "shadow price" methods. In the kibbutz this "income" is a part of the collective income. The work is performed in a public place and not in the family unit. The "clients" are not part of the family. The work orientation is similar to that in the production branches emphasizing professionalism, rationalization, and goal-effectiveness. The services differ primarily in that their products are consumed by kibbutz members or children, while the products of the production branches are sold on the market.

Men's involvement in the fulfillment of the limited domestic and educational duties remaining within the family framework is greater than that of any other form of society. The accepted norms in this field, at present, are more egalitarian than those connected with occupations and public activities of the kibbutz. It has not been verified that the expansion of the family roles, as a result of larger homes, or increases in number of children, etc., have reduced men's involvement. Certain data indicate an increase as a result of the heavier domestic responsibilities. The structural extension of the family as indicated by a larger number of children, families consisting of more than one generation, and the increased importance which the family plays in the life of the individual, do not endanger the degree of equality between the sexes, as compared to the situations where the family is responsible for all domestic work and the education of young children. In such situations, a higher birth rate might possibly be a limiting factor for women working outside the home as "provider" for the family.

In the kibbutz, to the contrary, the impact of the higher birth rate upon women's work and activity is only temporary, limiting the woman in her job for no more than 6 months after childbirth. According to the findings of our investigations, even the preference for family-sleeping arrangements and an inclusive budget do not seem to express a wish to return to the role of housewife, or a disengagement from the kibbutz work-schedule. The above attitudes express individualistic attitudes and a diminished attachment to the kibbutz, rather than the desire to return to the role of housewife. It follows, then, that no trend can be discerned to make changes in this major aspect of equality between the sexes. Women in the kibbutz are able to let other women share in the upbringing of their children, thanks to their confidence in the quality and standard of the collective educational system.

The point that should be raised is whether the second aspect of equality between the sexes has been realized as well. Do women fill roles which are not inferior to those of men from the point of view of stratification (i.e., the quantity and quality of the rewards they receive)? Generally, the contention has not been that women receive lower rewards, such as esteem, influence, and intrinsic satisfaction when performing roles identical to those of men. This situation differs from that prevalent in other countries and in Israel outside the kibbutz where the demand for equal pay for equal roles has met with only partial response.

The current claim is that in most cases women fulfill tasks which differ from those of men, and that in the kibbutz, too (like in all other societies) feminine roles are accorded less rewards. The specific argument put forward is that the branches of education and services are less highly esteemed than others and that the working conditions connected with these positions are less satisfactory for women. This assumption has been valid in the past but is not confirmed by the data of various research investigations conducted in recent years. The lower status of service branches and the inferior work conditions in them were related both to the "productivist" orientation and to the "ascetic" values prevailing in the "pioneer" period. The main challenge of the kibbutz in that period was to prove that Jews coming from the Diaspora can succeed in hard physical agricultural work and that a collective farm can be economically efficient. A result of this orientation was both the high prestige of production and hard physical work and the low standard of living expressed by a low level of investment in the service branches. (The attitude to education deviated from this pattern since the kibbutz was from its inception a "child oriented" society and the children had a higher standard of living than adults.)

During the past few years, considerable investment has been made to improve the work conditions in the service branches and to increase the opportunities for professionalism. This change is reflected in recent research data where on the average no differences could be discerned in job satisfaction and esteem between production and service branches and between men and women. The average professional level of the types of work conventionally considered as feminine--the fields of education and the services--is higher than that of many branches considered masculine.

The opportunities for professional training in the services are not inferior to those for the production branches, and might even be considered better. However, the problematics originating from the sex-role polarization existing in the fields of work and activity should not be ignored:

A. As a result of this polarization, some of the women have to do work incompatible with their personal inclinations. This problem can be found among men as well, due to natural limitations caused by the relatively small size of the kibbutz settlements, resulting in the emphasis

of the production element of the economy, and the special attributes of the kibbutz's working arrangements. However, it is true that these limitations are more prevalent with women than with men.

B. The existing polarization limits the elasticity of the kibbutz work-schedule, hindering rapid adaptation to emergency situations or other drastic changes.

C. The concentration of women in a relatively small number of occupations might possibly affect the level of aspirations of adolescent girls, and indirectly, too, their achievements in disciplines which might seem non-essential for their future occupations.

D. Occupational polarization results in a certain degree of polarization in the field of public roles as well, affecting women's aspirations and ability to function in central economic roles.

E. The inferior representation of women in central public roles also results in lower active participation in the kibbutz general assemblies, which in turn tends toward a feeling that their status in the kibbutz social structure is marginal.

The extent to which the aims of equality between the sexes in the kibbutz have been realized to this point can, in our opinion, be illustrated by the diagram in Figure I.

We see that the kibbutz has removed the partition between the feminine domestic segment and the public-masculine one. The public field includes members of both sexes, whereas in the occupational roles, a threefold division exists: feminine, masculine, and neutral spheres. In the section of public roles, however, the division is dual: masculine roles and neutral roles. Generally speaking, the status of the feminine roles equals that of the masculine roles, and no difference exists between the status of women and that of men functioning in neutral roles.

Although, as a result of women's limited representation in public roles, they exert less influence, and are, therefore, in less prominent positions, they get the same satisfaction as men do from their social status. The chores and duties connected with family life have been narrowed down due to the kibbutz setup and men's participation in many family roles.

What trends of development can be discerned at present?

Are we witnessing a continuous shifting towards increased polarization between the roles of the sexes?


A comparison of the findings from 20-30 years ago with recent statistical research data confirm the assumption that polarization is on the increase. Will the kibbutz have more equality between the sexes in the



Figure I

a) Division of roles between the sexes in the kibbutz

b) Division of roles between the sexes in traditional manner






Masculine sphere   
 Feminine sphere   
 Neutral sphere 

Figure II



era of affluence than compared to that of the pioneering era? We disagree with Mednick's (1975) assumption that equality is characteristic of the emergency pioneering circumstances, while conditions of affluence and a higher standard of living are reviving the conventional division of roles: "Then it seemed natural for women to return to their conventional tasks: childcare and domestic work. Similarly, it seemed natural for men to remain in the production branches." This description is oversimplified.

Mednick justly notes that the conception of sex-equality in the pioneering period emphasized above all women's entry into masculine roles.

But during the pioneering period physical prowess was a primary condition for success in these roles, so that many women were from the start in an inferior position. They made great efforts to prove themselves capable of working in those roles and jobs. However, when, with an increase in births and the expansion of services, the question was raised, who would do the arduous manual work and who would work in the service and educational branches, the economic considerations won priority.

With the transition to the period of affluence and the rise in the standard of living, far-reaching changes from the above-mentioned points of view took place. With the advent of developed mechanization and the rise in professionalization, the focus upon physical fitness lost some of its impact, and consequently the emphasis upon masculine superiority as far as physical fitness was concerned decreased. On the other hand, when the standard of living began to rise, the quality of the services and the development of the field of consumption became more important. Therefore, the status of the branches responsible for these spheres and that of those working in them--mainly women--began to rise considerably. This was not the only change. In contrast to the values which had characterized the pioneering period, when the kibbutz was mainly considered to be an instrument for realizing national and social goals, more emphasis was placed upon the social content of the kibbutz in recent years. This was expressed by greater stress being put upon the quality of life and social relations inside the kibbutz. This changed emphasis is expressed also in the difference of outlooks between the first and second generations.<sup>11</sup> While the first stressed more the instrumental role of the kibbutz, the second generation put more emphasis on social values. This course of development furthered the importance of the roles dealing with the social, cultural, and educational aspects of kibbutz-life, in which women function in relatively large numbers. Therefore, one may assume that especially the period of affluence might contribute to the augmentation of the status of women and to the enhancement of equality between the sexes.

Another change is the transition from a collectivistic emphasis to an individualistic one. We mention "emphasis" since the change has taken place inside the collective framework of the kibbutz, and practically no

attempts have been made to introduce fundamental changes into this framework. But the change of emphasis is essential towards understanding two of the central processes which have been examined in this paper: The rise in status of the family and the polarization of the division of roles. The individualistic trend in the family sphere is expressed by the desire for family sleeping arrangements and the extension of family authority versus that of the collective institutions. As far as the choice of professions is concerned, there has been a transition from collective role allocation (decision making by the kibbutz institutions as to individual's work and his public roles) to a situation in which more importance is attached to the desires and aspirations of the individual. Under these circumstances the demands or preferences of groups of women (even though they might be a minority) for professional work deviating from what is generally considered the accepted conventional feminine types of work, receive due attention. One researcher at least (Barzilai, 1974) points out the difference between the conceptions and images of professional women and those of other women members of the kibbutz. Professional women in the kibbutz were found to have more egalitarian conceptions than other women regarding how they envisaged the sex-image differences, and those of the adaptation of work and public roles for members of both sexes.

These young women have faith in their way of life; they are aware of the "woman problem" in the kibbutz and regard the achievement of satisfaction at work as the condition for their self-realization. The majority of professionals desire to achieve a balance between the aspirations of the individual and the needs of the kibbutz. (Barzilai, 1974: 232)

Their professional aspirations are not guided by the sex-typed images concerning work, but they do not reject certain jobs just because convention has stamped them as being feminine.

It follows that the personal aspirations for self-realization which characterize the second generation might narrow down the sex-related polarization, since personal aspirations are those that count and not necessarily the sex label. However, in the short run the number of women able to choose "nonconventional" professions is limited, as a result of the heavy demand of educational and service branches.

We discern that because of the conditions prevailing during the pioneering period, the dominant pattern was to seek roles of the masculine type. The image of "chalutzah"--the woman pioneer--working at "masculine" occupations in agriculture and other branches evolved.

When the service branches began to expand and the birth rate increased, polarization grew. Most of the women resign themselves to adapting to the needs of the kibbutz and become workers in the service and educational branches.



Another expression of role polarization is the emergence of family trends--an attempt at expansion of the family sphere, turning it into the principal field in which women find expression.

But the combination of work in service and educational branches, and the extension of the family, does not satisfy a young girl's desire for self-realization. This results in the choice of professional roles, and the crystallization of attitudes is closer to the egalitarian pole.

On the surface, the circle seems to have completed itself. Nevertheless while the initial conception of equality was founded upon identity between roles, the current conception is founded upon qualitative equality acknowledging the differences between the sexes and recognizing equal rights to self-realization in the collective and egalitarian framework of the kibbutz. The technological conditions and the set of values of the kibbutz make this development possible, and the present stage of kibbutz development bears out Holter's assumption (1971) that developed technology and socialism are the conditions of realizing equality between the sexes. Nevertheless, what differences between the sexes does this conception of equality recognize?

We consider that differences are acknowledged in three spheres:

A. The kibbutz has never denied the maternal links of the woman to her children. But from the kibbutz's point of view motherhood is only one of woman's several roles. Collective educational institutions were established in order to enable women to function in public roles. During the first period of collective education, when the collectivistic basis of the social structure was strongly accentuated, limitations were sometimes imposed upon the roles of parents and mothers in contrast to those of the educators. In recent years, there is a tendency to extend the educational roles of the parents. Due to this, the mothers' role in the upbringing of her infant in its first year has become more pronounced and arrangements have been made for a mother to meet her small children during work hours also, and not only afterwards. These arrangements could be regarded as augmenting the legitimation of the ties between mother and child, in a manner that does not interfere with her public role activities and advancement.

B. Our findings have indicated the existence of differences between the sexes, concerning the importance of some of their psychological needs.

The women put greater emphasis upon social attachments thereby, perhaps, indicating the importance of the need for affiliation. Men, however, emphasize more their aspiration to influence the course of life in the kibbutz, thereby indicating the possible existence of a stronger tendency towards achievement orientation.<sup>12</sup>

These findings may also be considered an expression of the difference between emotional-expressive orientation and the instrumental-goal-directed

orientation. The difference between the above orientations is not expressed in the kibbutz in the way described by Parsons (1942): The woman accepts the emotional tension-reducing role of the mother and housewife, while relinquishing the purposeful role of the earner-provider, the person active outside the family, as personified by the man. The role of the nurse in the children's houses in the kibbutz has goal-oriented-instrumental characteristics, since it is a "public" role, and not a domestic one.

However, in the kibbutz work system, and even in the sphere of public activity, women have stronger representation in roles of a tension-reducing character, those which care for the individual and stress social unity and solidarity. These are not exclusive female prerogatives: many roles, especially in the social sphere, are defined as neutral, but women share a fair amount of representation in these spheres.

C. In recent years, great changes have taken place in the kibbutz woman's outward appearance, indicating a different approach regarding the self-image of the two sexes. This tendency finds expression in efforts to cultivate one's outward appearance, and also by changes in the style of dress and in the establishment of cosmetic treatment in most of the kibbutzim.

It can be surmised that the rising standard of living had brought about new conceptions of the lifestyle in the kibbutzim, which have resulted in the narrowing of the gap, in this sphere, between the kibbutz and the society surrounding it. Moreover, they are also connected with the changes in the conception of the female image, by creating a greater awareness to outward appearance, which had formerly blurred the differences between the sexes, to one accentuating special female traits, not excluding elements of erotic attraction. In comparison with the past, we find a considerable difference, but most women continue to prefer a modest style of dress and appearance compatible with the rural environment and with a work-centered lifestyle. Only on Friday nights or when away from home is the appearance of kibbutz women indistinguishable from that of women from other walks of life. In comparison to the past, a different self-image of the woman has emerged which expresses itself in the desire to cultivate those inclinations and traits which, in their opinion, suit their sex. Taking these different trends into consideration does not change the prevalent basic image of the qualities and abilities of members of both sexes, which is far more egalitarian than that current in other societies.<sup>13</sup>

On summing-up our discussion, we return to the questions presented in the introduction in connection with the possibility of drawing conclusions from the kibbutz experience, as far as other societies are concerned:

1. The kibbutz experience has proved once more that the family unit is vital, while also noting the importance of mother-child relations.

2. Experience has proven that it is possible to limit the mother's role even in the care and upbringing of very young children, while handing over many functions in this field to professional educators, without detrimental effects to either mother or child.
3. In the kibbutz, like in all other societies we know of, the education of young children has remained in female hands, although not those of the mother herself.
4. There is no real evidence of the existence of any connection between the allocation of roles according to sex, and the strengthening of the family. It may be assumed that factors originating in the structural changes of the kibbutz, the economic conditions, and demographic trends have generated both processes.

Thanks to the collectivistic education and consumption and to the egalitarian allocation of roles inside the family, the increased birth rate, and the additional domestic chores do not interfere with the woman's occupational functions. This enables her to take greater part in fulfilling public obligations when compared to a woman's participation in such roles in other societies.

5. Under the conditions of a collective and egalitarian society, the division of roles according to sex does not lower the woman's status. As far as manifestations of this kind existed in the past, they originated from the temporary historical circumstances. With the improvement of work conditions in the service branches, and the rise in their professional status, these differences in status are gradually disappearing.
6. It is not possible to regard the kibbutz experiment as a "test case" for the feasibility of realizing the equality between the sexes through institutional changes, and as providing an answer to the question of "nature or nurture." The reason is that the kibbutz experiment has evolved under special conditions: a collective society, pioneering conditions emphasizing physical strength, its small size, and its limited choice of occupations. The possibility of drawing conclusions on the basis of such a single case is doubtful.

Nevertheless, the kibbutz experiment indicates the possibilities of realizing equality between the sexes, taking into consideration particular needs of each social group, and the individual needs of its members.

In examining and evaluating the kibbutz experiment, its special conditions should be taken into account. One relevant example is the



different approach to having a larger number of children and its impact upon equality between the sexes. While some investigators regard the growing birth rate in the kibbutz as a regression from the goal of equality between the sexes, others think that it proves that the biological desire for many children is more powerful than the aspiration to attain equality. In our opinion, the main lesson to be learned from the kibbutz experiment is that under kibbutz conditions, there is no contradiction between having a large family and full and equal participation of the woman in the work schedule and public life. There is no contradiction between the desire for motherhood and the wish for self-expression through professional work, creative art, or public activity. This is the great difference between the woman's position in the kibbutz, and that of women in other societies, including the collective moshav.<sup>14</sup>

The kibbutz experiment also presents a number of problems to the feminist movement, which, in our opinion, has not properly evaluated the issue. The fact that in the kibbutz having a relatively large number of children does not interfere with the occupational and public activity of the women, might be helpful in clarifying the feminist movement's attitudes to childcare and motherhood. Various spokeswomen and investigators of this movement, especially in the U.S.A., express a negative attitude toward large families.<sup>15</sup> Does this originate from the fact that women desiring large families are ready to give up work outside their homes and the possibilities of personal career connected with it? Or does the negative attitude derive from a general trend, advocating the reduction of birth rate as well as the limitation of economic growth and the moderation of the rise in the standard of living? Does equality between the sexes demand the relinquishment of the role of motherhood or modification thereof, even if it does not interfere with women's self-realization? This question is connected with another one, which the fighters for equality between the sexes have not clarified as yet, and that is the attitude to "femininity." Should one deny the existence of qualities and inclinations, and perhaps even values, which one sex emphasizes more than the other? Some writers and researchers regard any designation of qualities and values according to sex as the starting point for discrimination, since the mere fact of acknowledgment of feminine qualities results in giving women roles which are generally considered inferior. Others note the inclination to cooperation, mutual assistance, solidarity, etc., as opposed to masculine inclinations to aggression, hierarchy, etc.<sup>16</sup>

The mere fact that qualities and inclinations of this kind exist does not yet prove that their origin is biological or environmental. Should the feminine inclination to professions, connected with the care of people and service to them, such as nursing, welfare, etc., be regarded as negative? Should they be evaluated as "inferior" professions, even if those working at them receive the same rewards and the same esteem as those working in roles in which men predominate? Of course it is impossible to accept a social division of work based upon ascriptive criteria and the exclusion of persons of one sex from certain professions or roles. It should be possible for representatives of both sexes to engage in a

profession or role of their choice. The educational system should enable the students to familiarize themselves with all available professions, and avoid labeling them according to sex. But the possibility that the majority of the members of one sex would choose a certain type of professions, of their own free will, while the majority of the other sex choose other roles and professions, should also be taken into account, although there might not be any difference in the status and rewards of these roles. Should the educational and social system take purposeful action in directing boys toward "feminine" professions, or girls to "masculine" ones; or should it only fight the stereotypes which influence the desire to enter professions labeled according to sex? The uniqueness of the kibbutz experiment is that it presents these problems on a "laboratory" scale, since the birth rate among families of educated working women is high and there is sex-role differentiation but no discrimination against women's roles, which are not considered inferior per se.

An all-conclusive answer to the above questions cannot be included in this paper. Neither has the kibbutz movement summed up as yet its attitude towards them.

We think that the contribution of the kibbutz experience to the problem of the equality of the sexes is the presentation of new dimensions deviating from those existing in societies in which manifestations of deprivation and discrimination against women are widespread.

## FOOTNOTES

1. We have examined, separately, the correlations in the samples of married kibbutz-born young men and women, and we found that:
  - a. The larger the increase in the number of children, the greater the importance of the family in the mother's life ( $r=.22$ ) and that of the father ( $r=.23$ ). No connection between the age at marriage and the number of children has been found; nor has any connection been revealed between the age at marriage and the importance of the family (all the correlations presented here are significant on the ( $P < .05$ ) level).
  - b. Significant correlations were found between the three attitudes supporting the extension of family authority in the educational and consumption areas, and in the political structure. Those who support the establishment of family-sleeping arrangements, also tend to support the extension of the family-role in the sphere of consumption ( $r=.18$ ) and also the familial support for family members in the kibbutz general assembly ( $r=.25$ ); there is also a connection between the two latter attitudes ( $r=.13$ ).
  - c. There are no significant correlations between the number of children and the support of the extension of the family authority in the different spheres; neither is there any connection between the importance of the family in the life of the subject investigated and the latter attitudes.
  - d. On the other hand, the supporters of the extension of the family authority tend to be less identified with kibbutz life and its values. For example: The correlation between the support of family-sleeping arrangements and the general index of commitment to the kibbutz is  $-.29$ ; the correlation between the latter attitude and a positive attitude to the movement ideology is  $-.22$ . Generally speaking, supporters of the family sleeping arrangements had received less ideological and movement education than those opposing that attitude ( $r=.30$  for kibbutz-born women, and  $r=.15$  for men).
  - e. No correlation was found between the number of children in a family or the part the family plays in the subject's life and his attachment to the kibbutz with its ideological commitments and attitudes.
2. The sociologist P. Vande Berghe devotes a few lines to the kibbutz in his book, "Age and Sex in Human Societies" (1973:56). He says that slowly and gradually, more and more women found themselves back in the kitchen, the laundry, or the children's houses. The main difference between the kibbutz and the surrounding society was that, instead of being a nonprofessional and unpaid servant in the nuclear family, the woman became a professional servant, who is now paid by a masculine collective.



3. This difference brought about a change in the bookkeeping for the two types of occupations. Whereas for production branches both expenses and income were taken into account, which made it possible to reckon the economic surplus brought in by that type of work, in the service branches, only expenses were listed and no income alongside them. Recently it has been suggested that the income of the service branches should be reckoned in the form of "the alternative price"; i.e., the price of a product bought from an outside supplier. Without going into the reasons for and against this suggestion, the mere fact that it was raised indicates the lack of any practical justification for discriminating between "profitable" production branches and consumption branches, which only spend money.
4. While the findings of research conducted upon the "woman question" in the Kibbutz Artzi (1965) show less satisfaction from work among women members, especially among workers in service branches, a number of later research works--"The Second Generation" (Ben-David, 1976), "A Comparison Between Agriculture and Industry" (Leviatan, 1976), that of Tiger and Shepher (1975) as well as the published findings of the survey of "Attitudes to Absorption in the Kibbutz Artzi"--show no difference between the sexes in satisfaction at work. Where differences were found, they showed no consistency. The "second generation" research showed more satisfaction among kibbutz-born young women than among young men.
5. It is a remarkable fact that the highest percentage of dissatisfaction at work was found, expressly, in branches with mixed work teams, rather than in ones where all the workers were women.
6. The following data indicate the rising birth rate and the increasing number of workdays put into child care. Between 1958 and 1973, the number of children in all educational groups rose by about 5% (according to the population census, published by the department of statistics). The number of workdays invested on the average per child increased by 7%. According to the summary of workdays in the Kibbutz Artzi, published by the unit for research of the department of economics, the number of workdays invested in child care rose, as a result of these two manifestations, by 11.5%. During this period, the number of members of both genders grew in the Kibbutz Artzi by 14%, but on the other hand, a number of the older women members stopped their work in the educational sector. These numbers then, illustrate the reasons why demands to do educational work are put upon young women.
7. Various research works have indicated that many role bearers in the kibbutz industrial plants would prefer to have less authority over other people than they had. Other research (Rosner, 1971) found that the respondents who enjoyed more authority than they had are less satisfied at work than others. This finding is connected with the egalitarian kibbutz norms.

8. According to the estimate of the growth of the industrial sector in the kibbutzim, the number of kibbutz members working in them would grow from 6,250 in 1975 to 15,000 in 1985.
9. This assumption can also be proven by comparing the data presented by Tiger and Shepher. The first data (1975:124) make it clear that the percentage of women in committees and central roles in the Kibbutz Artzi was 29% in 1934-1944. On the other hand, the data regarding the level of activity (based upon the census taken in 1973) indicate that 64% of the women members of the Kibbutz Ha-Artzi movement had filled roles of this kind in the past.
10. It may be claimed that this limits the freedom of choice between the sole role of being a housewife and the double role of housewife and "provider," which is women's lot outside the kibbutz. However, the woman who chooses to be a housewife by implication becomes economically dependent upon her husband who supports her, and consequently she gives up her independence and the freedom of making decisions in many aspects of her life. In the kibbutz, the participation of both sexes in the work schedule is the foundation for equality in all spheres of life in the kibbutz, where the individual and not the family is the basic social unit.
11. In the summary of the chapter, "The Kibbutz as an Instrument for Realizing National Goals, or as a Home Realizing Values," Cohen writes: "When comparing the profiles regarding the accentuation of different values, the similarity of attitudes on the one hand, of women and those of the second generation, and on the other hand those of men and the founder generation, is salient. Generally, men and members of the founder generation stress more the role of the kibbutz in the attainment of national and socialistic goals. The sphere of self-realization and social values is more strongly emphasized by the members of the second generation and women (with one exception)" (Cohen, 1974:189).
12. There is much evidence of women's stronger need for social attachments than that of men. Therefore, the conflict between social attachments and achievements is liable to be more frequent among women (Hoffman, 1974). However, the author also points out that the desire for social relationships motivates women, in certain cases, towards achievement behavior.
13. Some 90% of a list of 29 characteristics were defined by most of those investigated as neutral, compared to 25% in Germany and about 12% in the U.S.A. Only among a small minority has the phenomenon, widespread in other societies, of evaluating characteristics considered to be feminine, been evaluated negatively (Rosner, 1974).
14. D. Padan-Eisenstark and B. Meir-Hacker (1975) point out the structural and ideological barriers which prevent the realization of

the professional aspirations of women who desire them. The family, household, and child care only permit her to take part-time jobs, making studying and professional auxiliary courses difficult, while ideological reasons prevent arrangements which could facilitate them. In the kibbutz there is no "objective barrier" preventing professional work and training for women. This is fully legitimized, since the professionalization of education (at all stages) and that of the services creates a definite need for periodic study courses.

15. An example of the vagueness existing in connection with this problem is the discussion of Hoffman (1974:108) about the connection between the employment of women and productivity. She justly claims that when there will be more children's day schools and when men take a greater share in the children's upbringing, the manifestation of a negative correlation between fertility and women's work will disappear. But for some reason or other she claims that this negative correlation will disappear only in those occupations which do not completely satisfy those in them. On the other hand, she assumes that when the woman has satisfactory work she will limit the number of her children even if more would not increase her burden: Herein lies a latent assumption that there is no contradiction between finding satisfaction at work and in motherhood. This means that the woman who is satisfied at work will, therefore, give up the idea of many children. The kibbutz experiment does not verify this assumption. It is doubtful whether it is justified, theoretically, to regard the number of "satisfactions" to which a person aspires as "limited"; in other words, attaining satisfaction in one field will cause a person to renounce satisfaction in other spheres.
16. Giele (1977) distinguishes between the "feminine" aims: cooperation, safeguarding life, the encouragement of growth and self-realization, peace and harmony with nature; and "masculine" aims: competition, economic success, aggression, etc., noting that it is desirable for both sexes to put more emphasis on the "feminine" aims (Klein, 1971:27).

Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, as well, note in their discussion (1979:79) that certain values are characteristic to women. But they claim that these values are not the result of an internal feminine nature, but an outcome of the discrimination against women which has generated positive values as well as negative ones. Instead of discarding them, women should hand them over to men, too.

Meissner sums up investigations of the behavior of men and women workers with a statement that men workers emphasize hierarchy and competition, while women workers cooperate, maintaining mutual support and encouragement (1975:334).



*APPENDIX*

## APPENDIX

### SELECTED RESOLUTIONS OF THE COUNCIL, DEVOTED TO THE SUBJECT OF WOMEN IN THE KIBBUTZ (HELD AT NIR DAVID ON THE 24, 25, 26 NOVEMBER, 1966)

Translated by Nechama Genosar

#### INTRODUCTION

The problems of the woman in the kibbutz is one of the central ones in our life, and is reflected in the existence of the kibbutz as a whole. The equal value of the sexes is one of the fundamental principles of the kibbutz, and has a far-reaching impact upon the creation of its patterns of life.

From its beginning, the kibbutz accorded very important social assets to its women members:

1. Economic independence, which guarantees the equal value of both marriage partners in the frameworks of the family and the kibbutz society.
2. Collective education, and the transformation of most domestic chores into social services, thereby eliminating the double role of any woman working outside her home (her roles as a mother at her work, and in her field of activity).
3. A high standard of equal education accorded to all children.
4. The full integration of women into the organized occupational set-up of the kibbutz.

Parallel to these achievements, the changes which have taken place in kibbutz reality have generated problems in the spheres of woman's work, her activity, and the family's place in her life; so to, as far as the style of life in the kibbutz is concerned.

#### THE EQUAL VALUE OF THE WOMAN IN THE KIBBUTZ

The principle of equality between the sexes is expressed by:

1. The equal value of both sexes in the various spheres of kibbutz life, by means of guaranteeing conditions for expressing one's personality and developing it.

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We bring here only resolutions from the Kibbutz-Artzi movement, as no councils dealing with the equality of the sexes were held in the other kibbutz movements in recent years.

2. Full partnership of the members of both sexes, as far as decision-making, activities, and determining the image of the kibbutz and the movement are concerned.

The integrity of a woman's life is conditioned by the full integration of her roles in the family, at work, and the shaping of a style of life compatible with that of the kibbutz and its values.

#### IN THE SPHERE OF WORK

The kibbutz endows all work with equal value, from the point of view of economics and social life, without discriminating between work in production, education, and the service branches. However, the council recommends having mixed work teams of men and women in most branches. This will oblige the kibbutz to make maximal efforts to incorporate women into the agricultural and industrial branches and men into certain services (mainly the kitchen), and also "replace" permanent workers in the older children's houses.

The permanent participation of the women in production branches, even to a limited extent, will increase their ability to bear decision-making roles in the field of economics, and to contribute to a correct balance between the structure of the institutions and the social image of the kibbutz.

#### THE SERVICE-BRANCHES

The council determined that the progress, as far as equipment and know-how in the service branches are concerned, does not comply with the tasks and character of the work performed by them. The council decided that the department of education, and other suitable institutions, together with those parallel to them in the "Alliance of Kibbutzim," should work toward improvements in the spheres on consumption, and toward equalization of their standard to that of the branches of production, by means of:

1. Suitable housing and equipment, worthy of their importance for kibbutz life, and equal to those in the production branches.
2. The development and organization of educational and professional training projects in the field of consumption services (for the workers in the kitchen, the clothing store, laundry, sewing workshops).
3. Organizing the work in the kitchen and examining the cadres and investments in order to be able to decrease the number of kitchen workers (by introducing floor-washing machines, vacuum cleaners, window and door cleaners in public



institutions, and the use of more semi-ready-made food-stuffs, etc.).

The council decided to incorporate a maximal number of men into the service branches, especially the kitchen, and rotation arrangements made for nonprofessional work to be done by all kibbutz-members.

The service branches would be based upon work teams; this trend should be taken into consideration when rotation is being put into practice.

The council decided that the services for members should include additional types of work (special laundry, ironing, baking), at present performed by women after work, in order to allow them more free time.

In order to raise the standard of central instruction in the service branches, the council decided that special training should be given to instructors and central organizers of these branches.

## EDUCATION

The great majority of women kibbutz members identify themselves with collective education, which is one of the central pillars supporting the movement and the kibbutz. This was confirmed by the findings of research on female members in our movement (see Rosner, 1967).

The extent of the success of collective education depends upon the realization of its principles, alongside continuous confrontation with the changes in our life.

With the aim of intensifying this connection, the council decided that child-care workers ("metaploth") be given a year of training in the annual course for "metaploth" at Oranim seminary. In cases when a whole year of training is out of the question, a three-month course will be substituted. The decision upon this rests with the department of education.

Continuous instruction and teaching of the fundamentals of collective education to all parents, especially the younger ones, will assist them in fulfilling their educational roles, and intensify their ideological and social identification. Extended training for "metaploth" and instruction for parents are the two sides of the same coin.

## AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY

The right of men and women to choose their profession, is the framework of a production branch according to the needs of the kibbutz, entails the following obligations:

1. When possible, from the point of view of personnel and other conditions, agricultural branches suitable for women to work in them, such as plant nurseries, rose cultivation, and hothouses, should be established.
2. The expansion of industrial plants, and the growth of their importance in the occupational set-up, has opened many possibilities for suitable occupations for women. When planning a kibbutz industrial plant, the solution of the occupational problems of both veteran and younger women should be taken into consideration, and they should be employed in the production and management sectors.
3. The agricultural and industrial branches should be flexible enough to make the same arrangements possible to women working in them as is customary in the kibbutz for all other mothers.
4. The process of expanding the variety of professions should include the establishment of artistic handicraft workshops and others.

#### HOURS OF WORK

Taking the woman's role as a mother into consideration, and in order to facilitate her activity in all spheres of life, the council decided that:

1. After the birth of her second child, each mother should work with 1 hour less--7 in all.
2. Every woman over 35 years old should work 1 hour less.
3. Women between the ages of 50 to 59 will work 6 hours; from 60 to 64, 5 hours; and from 65 onwards, 4 hours.

#### ROTATION IN SPECIAL PROFESSIONS

In professions necessitating extended training, such as teaching, nursing, etc., efforts should be made to introduce arrangements, which would allow workers in such professions to participate in the work performed by the service branches, and also to be active in the kibbutz. With this aim in view, women should be trained in these branches, in numbers exceeding the immediate needs of the kibbutz.

## ACTIVITY

The kibbutzim, and the women themselves, should take continuous initiative in augmenting women's share in all committees and their chairpersonship. They should be included in the decision-making bodies of the kibbutz, in central occupational and social roles, especially in the spheres of economics and politics.

The council put upon the women, the kibbutzim, and the movement's institutions, the obligation to add women to the groups of activities in the Kibbutz Artzi, Mapam party, the youth section, etc.

The Council decided that:

Women should be included in central roles in every elected body, both in the kibbutz and in the movement. The appointment committee of the kibbutz is to be responsible for this inside the kibbutz. The personnel department and the Kibbutz Artzi secretariat will work for the practical implementation of this resolution in the movement.

## SUMMARY

The aim of these resolutions is to create a kind of public opinion that would understand the women's specific problems and be prepared to make efforts both in the social and economic spheres to implement their solution.

The implementation will be the crucial test. The kibbutzim are very different from each other in the spheres of their demographic composition, the structure of their economy, and in their ideological-social awareness.

In order to implement these resolutions practically, and as soon as possible, each kibbutz shall elect special committees or teams to work for the full implementation of the resolutions, together with the woman's department.

After an allocated period of time, the committee or the staff elected should bring their suggestions before the kibbutz meeting. The suitable Kibbutz Artzi departments will examine the conditions of the smaller kibbutzim, in order to implement the council's resolutions in these kibbutzim. The expansion of the mutual assistance projects will assist these smaller kibbutzim to implement the resolutions.

The council will elect an advisory committee, which shall assist the suitable institutional bodies in clarifying and crystallizing ways and means of implementing these resolutions.



From the resolutions of the 45th Council. September '80

## WORK IN THE EDUCATIONAL FRAMEWORK

### INTEGRATING MEN IN EDUCATIONAL WORK

Both sexes bear the responsibility for children's education. A vital and urgent task for the movement is to include men in the educational sector of work, especially in the younger age groups. The council resolves that each kibbutz adopt the aim of introducing 20% of men into the educational staff of the younger age groups. At the present stage, each kibbutz will decide upon a significant number of men who will begin working in these age groups.

Suitable members of both sexes who do not regard education as their profession should, however, be included among the workers in the sector of education, for a number of years, as customary for officeholders in the kibbutz.

Accepting woman's right to select her profession entails the obligation to include women in branches of production, and in those that serve the production branches, the expansion of existing branches and building new production branches for women members.

This policy of encouraging men to work in the educational sector should also be implemented, in areas of work performed by secondary-school pupils. From now on, boys, as well as girls, will participate in educational tasks currently performed by girls only, by the rotation of workplaces, after a short period of training.



*EPILOGUE*





## EPILOGUE

### THE VARIETY OF DATA, METHODS, THEORIES, AND IDEAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The purpose of this book has been to review the major research and interpretations on the equality and inequality between the sexes in the kibbutz. Data has been presented on the differences between the sexes in terms of their roles, experiences, and behaviors, their commitments and characteristics, and the outcome of their participation in kibbutz life (differential access to power, prestige, and control of resources). Whether the specific sphere under study has been the workplace or the family, each researcher has usually chosen a particular set of these facts on which to concentrate. The gaps have sometimes spurred the controversy between different researchers.

### NEED FOR HEALTHY DEBATE

In the final section of the book, two authors attempted to give an integrative explanation admittedly based on the limits of current research work. It takes issue with both exaggerated claims of the level of inequality between the sexes in the kibbutz (which seem to be motivated more by a tremendous let-down on the part of egalitarians at the kibbutz's partial failure and partial success than a careful examination of all the facts), and the decidedly weak aspects of the sociobiological arguments. The reader will obviously recognize that there is not complete unanimity among the four editors on all issues. We do, however, contend that the kibbutz presents a fascinating opportunity to identify and then examine the major social paradoxes in attempting intentional social change of sex roles.

As a comprehensive attempt to radically affect most of the major spheres in the lives of women and men the kibbutz suffers the dubious distinction of being tugged at from both ends of the political and theoretical spectrum. Supporters of sex role equality are appalled at the partial achievement of its social experimentation, and proponents of a biological explanation see it as a welcome justification of their views, suitably outfitted by its special structure and history with the proper "controls" to truly test sociobiological theories. The editors, however, view specific aspects of the kibbutz social structure and its unique history as explaining exactly why it does not serve as a test case.

Supporters of sex role equality, in our opinion, have often rushed headlong into a cavalier disregard for one of the major global laboratories for studying the complexity of sex role change. This has led to representing the polarization between the sexes as being more extreme in certain spheres of kibbutz life than is

in fact true. The increasing trend of women in industry is a case in point. Mixed success and mixed failure are surely uncomfortable experiences for theorists and advocates alike. The gap between ideology and reality on such an important issue as the possibility of equal dignity between the sexes demands careful attention. Given the combination of this endeavor with a goal of creating more equality, fellowship, and democracy in general in social life, the kibbutz demands attention, not dismissal. Curiously, the dismissal of the kibbutz experience by theorists and advocates who are themselves seriously exploring the gap between ideology and reality in their own societies has essentially left kibbutz research on sex differences as almost the sole proprietorship of the sociobiologists. Dismissal has therefore precluded healthy debate on a well-documented case.

The predominance of the sociobiological explanation in the literature and the lack of a suitable sourcebook of other points of view has only helped to quicken this dismissal. This volume is, to some extent, a response to this problem. It is indeed unfortunate, because the gap between ideology and reality, the differing and often contradictory definitions of "feminism" and equality, are at the center of the crisis of the sex role equality movement today. This "movement" is typified by large victories in terms of public image and general life-style change, by a growing female assertiveness worldwide (again, it is hard to pin down where the men are), but with complexities hauntingly similar to that of the kibbutz: (1) equality is often found only in certain spheres of social life; (2) the definition of equality is often male-centered and not matched by a comparable movement among men or a serious dialogue about mutual dignity; (3) the integration of full equality between the sexes with children and family life is seen as highly problematic, requiring constant innovation; and (4) equality may mean less dignity for women. As one Soviet woman expressed it: "Now she is still responsible for all the work at home, but the husband is no longer obliged to support her. That is what equality has led to."

Unfortunately, discussion on these points is often dominated by married women of the upper middle class who can hire maids and buy "female services" and thereby "achieve" sex role equality, or by single women who forsake children and a family life. How do working women for whom employment is a necessity--and family and children are a desire and a responsibility--reorganize their work, family life, child-rearing, and social life to find greater dignity? And what are the possible contributions, requirements, and pitfalls of men's participation or non-participation in this endeavor? The kibbutz stands centrally relevant as a setting which has confronted all these complexities in its seventy-year history.



The sociobiologists and psychobiologists are attempting to use the kibbutz as a test case in order to reverse both activity and policy support for greater "identity" equality between the sexes. So added to the first irony that one of the only settings to eliminate the "housewife," establish economic independence of women and men, witness a great decline in violent crimes against women, and make a number of modest attempts to remake the social community is dismissed, we find the second irony: that a partially successful egalitarian experiment becomes a major source of evidence to justify absolute sex role inequality. In all fairness it must be pointed out that the categories of "supporters of sex role equality" who often support a social/structural explanation of the kibbutz's failures, and the sociobiologists and psychobiologists, are not mutually exclusive. Many sociobiologists have made specific statements supporting specific goals of equality (in terms of wages, or the law, for example). Many supporters of sex role equality have argued about fundamental differences between the sexes that are not only physical. Does this group wholly accept social/structural explanations? Many contributors to this volume have advised unequivocal declarations on these issues. Also, there is a very discriminating view and an ideology which is intentionally anti-male.

If biology is the explanation of the failure of the kibbutz, why are there inter-federation differences in sex role polarization? Biology should not be able to discriminate between kibbutz federations. If the differences are natural, why is so much control of opportunity structures, so much tracking and restriction of the choices that young men and women on the kibbutz make required? Why is the stronger family in kibbutzim less committed to kibbutz values? Why do non-kibbutz-born female members of kibbutzim support personal care over collective child care much more than kibbutz-born women? Why do kibbutz high school girls' aspirations take a nose-dive when they perceive they are threatened by role differentiation? How can we account, as Spiro points out, for the fact that the men and women of the kibbutz attempted this change in the first place? If it was natural, why did they not leave well enough alone?

#### THE BASIC DILEMMA

The previous questions point to the basic dilemma: Do significant sex differences, when they exist in social action (the causes), inevitably lead to exploitation defined as inequality in power, prestige, and control of resources between the sexes as groups (the caused consequences)? (Clearly, individual differences will occur.) These questions challenge proponents of both dominant viewpoints in this book. If the answer to the basic dilemma is "yes," then for sociobiologists

the question arises: Do you accept the connection between sexual differences and exploitation as natural also--genetically determined and adaptable for the species? In other words, is it sexual differences that are natural, while their consequences are open to alteration, or is it male domination and control that is natural? Or do the sociobiologists not consider inequalities in power, prestige, and control of resources as exploitation? It should not be accepted as self-evident that this is not the case. For example, one could claim that people who love each other do not have to worry about such inequalities since they get taken care of.

If the answer to the basic dilemma is "no" (that sex differences do not necessarily mean exploitation), the sociobiologists must demonstrate how the social world can be arranged so that the unequal consequences of sexual differences do not occur. These mechanisms must be demonstrated to be workable without resorting to an "identity" view of equality (i.e., demanding shared characteristics between the sexes). Thus, collecting cross-cultural evidence of male dominance must now be matched with collecting cross-cultural evidence of male-female co-dignity and non-exploitation. If such a conclusion cannot be found, then only one conclusion remains: women are victims of genetic disaster, and insofar as men are victimized by the same disaster, they end up additionally with a lot of social "goodies." Nevertheless, sociobiologists have still presented many convincing arguments that powerful forces are at work in maintaining sex role differences in the kibbutz. If they cannot be laid at the feet of biology, their power still remains awesome.

If the answer to the basic dilemma is "yes" for the theorists of the social/structural explanation of the kibbutz case, then they must clarify exactly what mechanisms cause the exploitation and determine that people do not really like having these consequences in their lives, and are capable of changing them. The argument can be made that autonomy is simply not as important to some people. Are there conditions in which people will put up with clear disadvantages in social organizations because of other more important goals? If so, what are the paradigms and limits? How powerful is the random distribution of sexes across occupational roles (just to choose one major sphere for eliminating differences) as a factor in reducing exploitation? In other words, is the "identity" view the only workable policy? Do we find examples of situations in which identity in social roles exists between the sexes, but inequalities of power, prestige, and resources as consequences still persist? Under what conditions, and in what kinds of social structures do we observe these possibilities?

If the answer to the basic dilemma for theorists of the social/structural persuasion is "no" (that significant sex differences in the division of labor and other spheres need not necessarily lead to exploitation), then they must demonstrate what mechanisms make this possible. This is the equivalence view of equality between the sexes, but it requires demonstration of the social inventions which can make the sexes "separate but equal."

One now sees that it is possible that both sociobiologists and social structuralists who answer "yes" to the basic dilemma can find themselves searching for the same set of social mechanisms to reduce inequality between people if they choose a common strategy of working on the consequences of the sex differences rather than the differences themselves. This possibility in no way suggests that the strategy of working on the consequences of sex differences rather than the differences themselves will be successful. It does, however, point to the need to differentiate between egalitarians and non-egalitarians in the sociobiological camp. It is often the case in this volume that one contributor presumes a set of assumptions holds for his or her theoretical opponent and engages in a type of labelling and categorization which may be inaccurate.

#### VARIETIES OF STRATEGIES AND DATA

The possible answers of theorists to the basic dilemma raise a corollary question: If we are against exploitation as defined, should efforts be more profitably invested to eliminate the sexual differences themselves (the identity view of equality), to eliminate the bad consequences of the sexual differences (the equivalence view of equality which attempts to attack the inequities-as-consequences in people's lives rather than the characteristics of the persons themselves), or to re-make society in general without attention to sex to be more egalitarian, cooperative, and democratic?

In essence this question goes beyond ascribing "cause" and asks what pressure points in the social system are likely to yield the desired consequences with the least investment of energy and the greatest realistic accessibility for the possible change-agents. It is a question of social change strategy that certainly has been a major problem for the kibbutz as a social movement.

Another problem is categorizing just what sexual differences are salient when we presume sexual differences and exploitation to be connected, and what differences are of peripheral or negligible importance. This speculative point has



not been sufficiently explored by contributors to this volume. Views have ranged from emphasizing differences mainly in terms of roles (the workplace and child rearing/family life receiving the emphasis); of characteristics (instrumental versus expressive styles); or of broad-based clusters of gender "markers" (including roles, experiences and behaviors, and attitudes and characteristics. In this last case, little attempt is made to rank the differences in order of importance or significance as if to say that men and women are just different, and one aspect of the cluster of differences is as important as the next aspect). What is important to notice is that there is a definite relationship between how a researcher categorizes and ranks sexual differences and what factors in the social structure he or she emphasizes in adopting a change strategy.

A related theoretical problem which might be considered a Durkheimian perspective is the relationship between sexual differences and inequalities in different types of society. Is it possible that in a more unified and integrated community like the kibbutz the very fact of fellowship and the reduced number of reference groups magnifies the limitations and strengths of sex role equality? In this setting, it is easy to eliminate wage inequality since the wage system can be eliminated (a strength), yet it is quite difficult to change the occupational and higher education patterns of women and men, because the whole system hangs together to support the status quo (a weakness). Conversely, in a very fragmented society like the United States, wage inequality has not been easily or successfully reduced (a weakness), while women--especially in recent times--can take advantage of the anomic, fragmented social spheres to engage in new choices, and tackle new opportunities, because there are simply more choices and possibilities in a less controlled setting. Perhaps then, in the mass society, sex differences are more easily experimented with (a strength), but the social planning capacity to alter inequalities structurally is significantly reduced (a weakness). Simply put, the dilemmas are: sex differences and inequality in an equal society versus sex differences and equality in an unequal society. If this is indeed a salient dilemma, then the comparison of sex differences and sex role innovation under two kinds of solidarity has tremendous implications, each for the other.

Our desire here is not to stake out definite ground in answering all of these questions, but rather to star the problems raised by the whole volume. The four possibilities for confronting the basic dilemma indicate that studying the relationship between sexual differences and inequality, or mutual dignity and exploitation, will always require the analysis and demonstration of social inventions because the issue under discussion is no less than how men and women can work out a dignified, just,

and happy life between them, and how these possibilities might be related to social setting.

In our view, the assertion of the kibbutz as a test case by some may pale in comparison to the realization that one of its main services in this field of research is to illustrate varieties of social innovation, their possibilities for failure or success. It really does not matter whether others who look upon the kibbutz are trying to build kibbutzim or not, the basic issues remain the same--how does one restructure social life? The theories, the methodologies, and the debates are tools to understand the patterns of respect or disrespect between persons. If scientific analysis, policy-making, and advocacy get mixed together by some of the contributors, this is the reason. The fact that social understanding around this issue has a point does not mean that the standards of clear thinking should be compromised. It is to that end--clear thinking--that this overview and recommendation for further work is directed.

The special nature of the kibbutz also raises two disturbing questions: In a society with less overall exploitation or inequality, do sex differences become especially salient because they involve lower costs? In short, does progress in general, for all people--not men or women as subgroups--reduce the unwelcome social consequences on the "caused" side of our basic dilemma (enumerated above), diminish the public perception of sexual differences, weaken the sense of moral and political condemnation of differences between groups, and deaden radical social innovation? If this hypothesis can be confirmed, then the kibbutz is--in this area--a victim of its own success in certain respects. Additionally, confirmation of this view would certainly have one powerful policy consequence: future attempts to reduce differences in power, prestige, and control of resources between groups or in a social setting must either emphasize sex-based effects from the beginning or have their very success reduce an interest in attending to sex-based issues at a future stage. Obviously, this hypothesis has meaning only if the biological explanation is wrong. Thus, the absence of many more serious forms of oppression against women in the kibbutz (including the absence of violence against women) and even more extreme forms of discrimination and the egalitarian achievements of the kibbutz may explain why a women's movement has not arisen in the kibbutz (let alone a broad-based movement on the part of both sexes to reevaluate their standing, one vis-a-vis the other).

Or is the explanation that persons who would start such serious trouble leave the community? Conversely, is the movement aspect of sex role initiatives related to larger oppressive societal conditions which so increase the negative stakes of

sex differences that extreme, and perhaps undue attention is drawn to the differences themselves under these conditions? These questions have yet to be answered.

#### VARIETIES OF METHODS AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Many other areas are ripe for research. Historical research is necessary to reconstruct exactly what happened in various stages of the development of the kibbutz. Kibbutz members themselves have views and strategies whose terms must be identified and whose trails must be followed. Because of the vagaries of statistical analysis, many of the contributors in this volume cite data where men and women diverge on a particular matter or behavior. One sex is said to be clearly and significantly associated with that attitude or behavior over and against the other. Often, however, such data gets translated into an inaccurate generalization that "Sex A supports X," when in fact only a modest correlation is true. This method, and our less than precise way of describing significant differences between groups can often hide the fact that a sizable minority (sometimes over one-third) of Sex B may also support "X" (i.e., engage in the same behavior or hold the same attitude that supposedly typifies Sex A). Sensitivity to the manner in which such quantitative analysis can influence generalizations about sex differences is not enough; research is needed to understand what motivates these sizable minorities to act and think other than our desired predictions. We must continue to test and take apart generalizations based on narrow statistical margins. Such quandaries can be found throughout this work.

As Hertz and Baker's careful reconstruction of opportunity structures and differences in work organization illustrates, much insight is to be gained from careful ethnographic research on individual kibbutzim. Both kibbutzim that are very little or very much polarized in sex roles should be identified. This type of research becomes especially meaningful given the abundance of larger surveys, which have been conducted. Most of the general patterns of the population have been mapped, and yet we lack a lot of knowledge. There are examples of in-depth life histories of women and men exploring the variables of sex differences using a study of lives model. Not one anthology of descriptive interviews is available to help us understand the tone of the issues in real life. Since the kibbutz is not the only society that has experimented with massive sex role changes, it might be fruitful to compare it with various Scandinavian countries, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and others to see how the limitations and complications in achieving innovations are similar or different. As a type of worker cooperative, and a cooperative community, the kibbutz can be com-



pared with the experience of sex differences in these two forms to understand if certain phenomena are special to the particular social forms.

The way in which males are to be integrated into further research has received insufficient attention. Seemingly, the agreed-upon conclusion from all quarters that so much of this debate has centered on the women or the women imitating the men has had little effect on the choice of research strategies. Are men to be used simply as a basis for comparison (methodologically, as it were), reproducing the dependence of the definition of women's freedom on what men do? Perhaps only very careful, in-depth interviews can unveil the conflicts and the achievements which men experience with sex differences, inequalities in power, prestige, and control over resources, and the major issues of competence, affiliation, autonomy, and caring behavior. The kibbutz is a challenge not to deny maternal links to children and women's interest in family, but to also understand how these bonds relate to men's bonds to children and family life. Earlier research suggesting that kibbutz men are less rigid than their counterparts in the general Israeli population in appropriating human qualities to men or women alone can serve as a basis for longitudinal research. A complete research strategy dealing with kibbutz men must be developed.

Perhaps the view that sees the strengthening of the kibbutz family as the major responsibility of women has been all wrong. Palgi and Rosner have enumerated other reasons why the family's role expanded. A reading of Christopher Lasch's perspective of the modern family as a "Haven in a Heartless World" may suggest that it is specifically the reduction of social fragmentation and the provision of a healthy, welcome environment for the kibbutz family that makes it increasingly useful.

In the 70s, research indicated that the kibbutz has been relatively protected from high rates of divorce. It is also considered to be almost completely free of family violence and child abuse. The kibbutz may represent an interesting combination in the modern world of family stability with a greater degree of sex role equality. Can these claims be confirmed or denied? Are they related to the traditionally lower rates of family disintegration among Jews, or to the fact that "weak families" leave the community and do not appear in the statistics? With these and other new subjects of research comparison between various federations, the non-religious secular kibbutzim (representing 95% of the communities) with the Orthodox religious kibbutzim (representing only about 5% of all communities) might provide further insight into whether biogrammar leads to constant trends in all federations or is revealed as a "genetic generality" which is washed out on closer

scrutiny.

#### MORE THINKING VERSUS MORE RESEARCH?

It may not be true, however, that simply expanding the spheres of research and adding additional methodologies will alter the major conclusions to which the contributions of this volume point. Probably the greatest scientific requirement is not more kibbutz research per se, but more comprehensive and detailed theoretical explanations of these findings. One direction is to try this in the light of stratification theory, including Rosabeth Kanter's important work on opportunity structures (1976). Further analysis should be attempted in the light of theories of work organization and locus of control theory (see Blasi, 1980, who discovered alarming differences using the locus of control measure on kibbutz women and men). Basic research on psychological differences between the sexes will help clarify the major dilemma raised above. More importantly, the kibbutz research must be integrated into more global debates taking place among sociobiologists and between sociobiologists and proponents of a social structural explanation of sexual inequality. Indeed, the string card of the sociobiologists is not that they deny bountiful occurrences outside of their "genetic black box," but that they often see biology as subsuming all sociological explanations as their engine, catalyst, and connecting wire. The social structural insights are not denied, but reconnected in a new framework. This claim presents complex philosophical problems.

#### THE FUTURE

Lastly, as in many areas, the kibbutz movement engaged in social experiments long before they came into vogue in the West, but today the kibbutz has much to learn from the non-cooperative world. Worker participation in industry is one example. While developing democracy in the work branch early in this century, today the kibbutz is avidly studying social-technical approaches to enriching the job and expanding participation and improving the workplace.

A special committee of one of the kibbutz federations has been planned to carry out action research to increase sex role equality and study the experiments. This will require the identification of a whole series of real-life experiments around the world among children, adolescents, and adults to see if the kibbutz has something to learn from attempts to equalize child rearing between parents, to reduce sex-typing in grammar school, to train male child care workers, to deal with math fright in young women, etc. Sadly, no treasury of these innovations exists for the kibbutz movement to learn from. It is unclear how each kibbutz

federation really perceives its future survival and success as a democratic experiment as hinging on further innovations in the area of sex roles. What kinds of inequality can breed what kinds of threats to survival in an egalitarian movement? The scope of the "partial failure" and the "partial success" is now open for all to see. Will the kibbutz federations put serious economic and human resources behind studying innovations around the world and trying them out in kibbutzim and educating the population about options? Because the resolutions of the Kibbutz Artzi Federation quoted in the previous chapter opt both for reducing sexual differences (the identity view of equality) and reducing the consequences of those differences (the equivalence view of equality), it has a grand task before it. Will the federations really put serious resources behind this effort?

Policy planners and policy researchers can find a wealth of fascinating research projects around these questions. It would be especially interesting to see how scholars that take widely differing points of view on the basic dilemma noted above would construct differing sets of recommendations. Nevertheless, as Palgi and Rosner indicate, because of the special nature of the kibbutz state of affairs in the sex roles sphere, observers cannot expect that strategies for change will always closely follow the requirements of fragmented mass societies of the West. Perhaps, the West too can learn from the kibbutz. And then again, what differences are important, what consequences do they have, what strategies for change are available, and is change really possible in the terms of each specific insight that may emerge?

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