

The
Politics
of the
Palestinian
Authority

From Oslo to al-Aqsa

Nigel Parsons

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
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To my parents

Ernie and Jill Parsons

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Acknowledgments

I first visited the occupied Palestinian territories in 1986, although I did not realize it at the time. I was working as a volunteer on kibbutz Bet Hashitta, and had taken some time off to visit Bethlehem and East Jerusalem. I did not know that they were in the West Bank. More specifically, I did not know that there *was* a West Bank. Following another trip, this time to Nazareth, I returned to my kibbutz sporting a newly acquired Palestinian headdress or *kufiyya*. To my surprise, it prompted quite a reaction, not entirely positive. My curiosity was aroused, and in the ensuing years I have sought to understand Israelis and Palestinians as best as I could. The result is this book. Numerous people deserve credit for helping me along the way.

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Palmerston North, February 2005

Note on Transliteration

Arabic nouns are transliterated according to the system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (IJMES) and rendered in italics but without diacritical marks, other than *ayn* (‘) and *hamza* (‘). Exceptions have been made for people, institutions, and places that are particularly familiar in their traditional English rendition (e.g., Yasir Arafat, Fatah, Bir Zeit University, and Bethlehem).

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
Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Groups

AHC	Arab Higher Committee
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
ANM	Arab Nationalists Movement
AUC	The American University in Cairo
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CAC	Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee
CEC	Central Election Commission
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNN	Cable News Network
CPRS	Center for Palestine Research and Studies
DCL	District Civil Liaison Office
DCO	District Coordination Office
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DoP	Declaration of Principles
EU	European Union
Fatah	Palestinian National Liberation Movement
FIDA	Palestinian Democratic Union
FLN	National Liberation Front
GUPS	General Union of Palestinian Students
Hamas	Islamic Resistance Movement
HCNS	Higher Committee for National Security
HDIP	Health Development Information Project
IAF	Israeli Air Force
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPCRI	Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information
ISM	International Solidarity Movement
JEC	Joint Economic Committee
JMCC	Jerusalem Media and Communications Center


JRSC	Joint Regional Security Committee
JSC	Joint Security Committee
MAS	Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGC	National Guidance Committee
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIHC	National and Islamic Higher Committee for the Follow-Up of the Intifada
NRP	National Religious Party
NSC	National Security Council
NWO	New World Order
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
PA	Palestinian National Authority
PARC	Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees
PBC	Palestine Broadcasting Company
PCBS	Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics
PCP	Palestinian Communist Party
PCPSR	Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research
PCSC	Palestinian Commercial Services Company
PECDAR	Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PGFTU	Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions
PIF	Palestinian Investment Fund
PISGA	Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army
PLF	Palestine Liberation Forces Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMA	Palestinian Monetary Authority
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNF	Palestine National Front Palestine National Fund
PNI	Palestinian National Initiative
PNLA	Palestinian National Liberation Army
PPP	Palestinian People's Party
PPSF	Palestine Popular Struggle Front
PRC	Popular Resistance Committees
PRCS	Palestinian Red Crescent Society

SAMID	Palestine Martyrs' Sons Work Society
SANGOCO	South African Non-Governmental Organization Coalition
SLA	South Lebanese Army
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
TIPH	Temporary International Presence in Hebron
UN	United Nations Organization
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNLU	Unified National Leadership of the Uprising
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCO	United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories
UNWCAR	United Nations World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Related Intolerance
WZO	World Zionist Organization


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Map 1 The West Bank and Gaza Strip, March 2000. Reproduced by permission of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. *The Palestine Question in Maps 1878–2002*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2002). Note: ▲ indicates Israeli settlement.




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 2002*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2002).




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Map 4 Jerusalem: Palestinian Neighborhoods and Israeli Settlements, 2000. Reproduced by permission of the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. *The Palestine Question in Maps 1878–2002*, (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2002).



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Preface

The Israeli army has razed to the ground 420 Palestinian villages, the Manshiyya neighborhood in Jaffa, the Moroccan quarter in the old city of Jerusalem, hundreds of “un-licensed” houses around East Jerusalem, hundreds of houses in Rafah, thousands of palm and olive trees, and now the old towns of Nablus and Bethlehem, and Jinin refugee camp, and Ramallah. Tomorrow, they will start destroying the old town of Hebron. And on it goes.

Sharon, you are reminding us of our worst nightmares.

This is how Su‘ad al-‘Amari recalled the Palestinian spring of 2002. Most of the villages she refers to disappeared between 1948 and 1952, the Moroccan quarter following the 1967 war, and Arab homes in East Jerusalem have been demolished steadily for years but with renewed vigor since the onset of the Oslo process in 1993. In spring 2002 the Palestinian towns of the West Bank, old and new, were attacked from the air and sacked by the IDF as part of the same campaign that leveled the Hawashin quarter of the Jinin refugee camp. In Gaza 2004 the southern governorate of Rafah was not alone in recording the continued destruction of hundreds of homes and shops, ongoing loss of agricultural land, and a rising toll of dead, wounded and homeless.¹ In the center of the Strip a single operation in Nusayrat and al-Burayj refugee camps left fifteen dead in March.

In the West Bank one bloody operation concluding in January left nineteen dead in Nablus.² Israeli settlers continued to target new neighborhoods in Arab East Jerusalem, and in Hebron the Arab population of the old city moved out in increasing numbers under settler and IDF pressure. In the meantime, construction of the separation barrier around the West Bank added new episodes to the Palestinian narrative of dispossession, another bout of the type of colonial violence inherent to the prosecution of the Zionist project in Palestine. If Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon reminds Palestinians of their worst nightmares, then that is entirely fitting: from Qibya to Gaza, and from Sabra and Shatila to Jinin, he embodies them.³

It did not always seem destined to continue thus. Nearly one decade earlier on September 13, 1993, U.S. president Bill Clinton cajoled another retired Israeli general turned prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, into shaking hands with Yasir Arafat, chairman of the PLO. The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles that they signed promised among other things “to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict.”⁴ But it did nothing of the sort, and even as the happy pictures issued forth from the White House, dark warnings were heard from skeptics on the margins. Few wanted to listen. Most of the skeptics were Palestinian anyway. In the meantime the PLO embarked on the transition from liberation movement in exile to semi-autonomous authority in some very

constricted bits of Palestine in the hope that the next step would be a second transition to sovereign statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as its capital.

In June 2003 at the Red Sea port of Aqaba, Sharon, the new Palestinian prime minister Mahmud 'Abbas, and U.S. president George W. Bush inaugurated the Roadmap with the express aim of putting the Oslo process back on track. This book takes a critical perspective to that process. But back in the summer of 1994 as I enrolled for my first semester at Bir Zeit University this was not my intention. This is not the book I had hoped to write. I did not want to believe the skeptics. My few weeks working on a kibbutz had left quite an impression on me, and I was full of naïve third-party enthusiasm for Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation. It did not take long for the skeptics to make an impression of their own: The DoP was a Palestinian Treaty of Versailles, a framework for surrender. Interlocutors from every generation and faction told me that far from resolving the conflict, Oslo would restructure and deepen it. It was not long before I saw even the most faithful Fatah cadre begin to suspect a deception. I had hoped that they were wrong, but as one semester progressed into four the arguments against Oslo drew increasing strength from reality on the ground around us. Oslo rewarded Palestinians with accelerated land confiscation, destruction of olive groves, bulldozing of orchards, and demolition of homes. Thousands waited for relatives in jail, some of them run by Israel, an increasing number by the PA. People continued to die violently. Periodically crippled by closure, the economy stuttered and living standards were vulnerable. Restrictions on freedom of movement increased; no longer just separated from relatives across the border or behind the Green Line, Palestinians could now find themselves separated from the next town or village or even the next street. The promise of withdrawal, of an end to occupation, proved false; the IDF remained on most of the land standing guard over new and expanding settlements as Oslo collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions.

The al-Aqsa intifada saw both sides pay a high price in human life; Israel bore the brunt of an anti-colonial violence driven by despair and a rising thirst for revenge; the West Bank drew full-scale reinvasion; and the Gaza Strip wave after wave of assault from land, sea, and air. The Palestinian people were isolated under assault. Journalists, camera crews, and even the United Nations were at times denied access, at times counted among the casualties.⁵ Global state and corporate media were intimidated.⁶ Palestinian online information sources were disrupted. Foreign aid workers were deported and new arrivals barred from taking up their posts. Volunteers from the International Solidarity Movement were deported, and some of them killed.⁷ And as spring gave way to summer in 2002, the unlikely figure of the U.S. ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer labeled the Palestinian condition a “humanitarian disaster.”⁸ Prepared for the UN secretary general, the Bertini Report found two-thirds of the population below the \$2 per person per day poverty line, 1.5 out of 3.3 million Palestinians on direct food assistance, 50 percent unemployment, over 20 percent of Palestinian children suffering from malnutrition, and a similar percentage from anemia. Bertini predicted,

Given the difficulties faced by the population in accessing health services and medicines, a steady increase in mortality rates and spread of diseases should be expected. There is also rising concern about the spread of diseases such as diarrhea and insect borne diseases as a result of water

contamination, lack of garbage disposal and the reduced coverage of vaccination programmes, especially for children under the age of five.⁹

Subject to ongoing occupation, colonization, closure, and assault the situation would continue to deteriorate to the point at which a number of IDF reservists refusing to serve were joined by over two dozen pilots refusing to fly missions over Gaza and the West Bank. Four former heads of Israel's internal intelligence agency, Shin Bet, felt compelled to voice their objections, among them Avraham Shalom. He was frank in his assessment: "We must once and for all admit that there is another side, that it has feelings and that it is suffering, and that we are behaving disgracefully... Yes, there is no other word for it: disgracefully."¹⁰

I visited Palestine on two occasions during the al-Aqsa intifada, in August 2001 and June 2003. Of my former colleagues from Bir Zeit University roughly half were now living abroad, and one of them was dead. Among those who remained I was told, "It was nice to see you, but next time you come I don't know if we'll still be here. Who knows, maybe we'll be in Jordan, maybe Iraq." Ongoing home demolition invoked what Iyad al-Sarraj described as "the fear of being destroyed over and over again, of being moved from your home, over and over again." It was a daily reminder of 1948, and Palestinians read a simple message: "there is no place for you here."¹¹ It was a commonly held sentiment, and fear of transfer gained ground as the latest U.S.-led war on Iraq approached. Back among my Palestinian friends, another view drew an analogy with American Indians: "They've taken our land and resources, herded us into reservations, and now they will watch us die."

I have also been told that "Israel is a phase" and "Israel will become Palestine."¹² The demography that partly informs this view is interesting. Following completion of the PA's first census in 1997, Youssef Courbage suggested that, within the borders of mandate Palestine, Palestinian Arabs might reach demographic parity with Jews by 2008, but would certainly do so no later than 2010.¹³ One of the options put forward in Israel to deal with this is transfer. Public advocates of transfer have formed a consistent and vocal feature of Sharon cabinets, among them Moledet head Rehavam Ze'evi (assassinated in October 2001), his successor as party leader Benyamin Elon, the Soviet-immigrant Avigdor Lieberman (Ihud Leumi-Yisrael Beiteinu list), and NRP head Effi Eitam. Muna Hamza noted that "Eitam has publicly favoured what he terms 'evacuation by choice' whereby the life of the Palestinians would be made so difficult that they would 'voluntarily' relocate elsewhere."¹⁴ Hamza also reported that in December 2000 Sharon and a host of luminaries including former prime ministers Shimon Peres, Binyamin Netanyahu, and Ehud Barak attended the Herzliya conference, the recommendations of which included "the principle of population transfer to Jordan as a way of resolving the 'demographic threat' to Israel." In June 2002 Sharon as prime minister joined President Moshe Katsav in appearing at a Moledet conference on "Transfer Now."¹⁵ On both occasions the point might be made that the eminent speakers were not there to lend support to the principle of transfer. But their very attendance alluded to the momentum gathering behind the transfer idea. Furthermore, transfer's advocates could draw on heavyweight political support in the United States, generally among fundamentalist Christian Republicans such as Tom DeLay, then leader of the Republican majority in the U.S. House of Representatives.¹⁶ Within Israeli academe (and to the astonishment of

most of his readers), one of the leading lights of Israeli revisionist history has since suggested that Israel's founding father, David Ben Gurion, erred, having "got cold feet" in 1948. "The non-completion of the transfer" said Benny Morris "was a mistake."¹⁷ Morris insisted he did not support transfer "at this moment" but acknowledges that it may yet happen, and that in some "circumstances, apocalyptic ones...acts of expulsion will be entirely reasonable. They may even be essential."¹⁸ This Israeli government has not adopted an official policy of transfer. In an international environment increasingly hostile to ethnic cleansing, that would be difficult to do, even for such a favored ally of the United States. But consider Morris on Ben Gurion:

There is no explicit order of his in writing, there is no orderly comprehensive policy, but there is an atmosphere of transfer. The transfer idea is in the air. The entire leadership understands that this is the idea. The officer corps understands what is required of them.

The Sharon government's calibrated response to the al-Aqsa intifada, combining institutional degradation, a media-manageable casualty rate, restriction of movement by closure, and construction of the separation wall, has induced unemployment, poverty, malnutrition, disease, and increasingly violent political anarchy that is quietly encouraging "evacuation by choice" as a fact. Some three years after the al-Aqsa intifada began, Sari Hanafi estimated that 100,000 Palestinians, or 3.3 percent of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza, had already left the country."¹⁹ In the short run, developments seem unlikely to encourage them to go back. The Roadmap calls for the PA to make the transition to "an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbors."²⁰ With official U.S. and Israeli approval behind it, Palestinian statehood does now seem likely. But ongoing occupation and the prosecution of accelerated Zionist colonization in the West Bank, with all its negative consequences for Palestinian development, does not auger well for what Palestinian statehood might actually mean.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I, *Toward an Institutional Solution to Palestinian Nationalism*, seeks to conceptualize and explain the PLO's route to Oslo. Chapter 1 presents a theoretical and conceptual framework based on the historical-structural approach to transition and the transition approach to democratization. It aims to illustrate how structural constraints precluded the possibility of success through armed struggle, obliging the PLO to rely on diplomatic means instead. Entry into a meaningful diplomatic process is shown to have required the acquisition of key criteria of government-in-waiting status. These criteria are an authoritative leadership, a bureaucracy, a subordinate armed force, an accepted territory, an acceptable national project, international recognition, and an orientation congruent with the international balance of power. Institutional change is characterized as the product of purposive elite agency, operating in the context of structural constraints and opportunities, moving toward an institutional solution to the issue of Palestinian self-determination, realized through diplomatic means. Chapter 2 applies this framework to a brief narrative history of the Palestinian quest for self-determination from the inception of the PLO in 1964 to the launch of the Roadmap in 2003. Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the circumstances surrounding the birth of the DoP, particularly the negotiations in Madrid and Washington

that preceded and briefly paralleled those in Oslo. This chapter includes testimony from several participants in those negotiations.

Part II, *The Framework of Transition*, examines the semi-autonomous governing arrangements constructed for Palestinians by the Oslo process between the signing of the DoP and the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum of 1999. Chapter 4 examines the ways in which the Oslo framework and the state-building process that occurred within it reflected the ongoing impact of the Zionist colonization enterprise and then facilitated the acceleration and entrenchment of that enterprise in the occupied territories. The Oslo process is identified as a means of resecuring the authoritative leadership of the Diaspora-based elite, precluding the formation of a cohesive alternative leadership from the occupied territories, but only within a framework of transition that perpetuated Palestinian dependency on the Israeli economy and accelerated Zionist colonization of the West Bank.

Part III, *From Liberation Movement to National Authority to Statehood: Progress and Regression*, examines the rise and fall of the Oslo process and the attempts to restore it. Each chapter draws on extensive fieldwork conducted among Palestinians during this period. Chapter 5 takes a closer look at the empirical detail of the institutions of the PA, focusing on the bureaucracy and the security services. Chapter 6 assesses the socio-political makeup of the PA with a look at the role of civil society, the Legislative Council, and the Fatah movement. The politico-administrative modification that is the PA is seen to be managed by the reconstituted Palestinian elite, a combination of the returnee PLO leadership and staff and allied local agents. The transformation of the PLO's bureaucracy and armed forces into the apparatus of the PA and allied institutional expansion is shown to have co-opted local intifada activists into the security services, while a sufficient number of middle-class professionals and technocrats were recruited into the bureaucracy. The new institutions were to govern and contain Palestinian society, to cap and pacify a previously impressive capacity to resist colonization. Chapter 7 examines the critical failure of Oslo, the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, and the role of Palestinian institutions and leadership in it. Drawing on the increasing availability of Israeli sources in English, an attempt is also made to characterize the machinery of colonization that has propelled the settlement project forward. Emphasis is placed on the social, economic, and political consequences of accelerated colonization for the Palestinians and the undermining of the socio-political foundations of PA rule. Chapter 8 returns to the seven criteria for transition to statehood outlined above and reviews the status and condition of Palestinian institutions at the point at which the Roadmap sought to preserve them, now on the explicit understanding that they serve as a step toward statehood.

Part I
Toward an Institutional
Solution to Palestinian
Nationalism

1

Conceptualizing Palestinian Institutions

Structure, Agency, and Transition

The course of the Palestinian armed struggle made it clear that the PLO began from a position of such intrinsic weakness that military victory would always remain elusive; such were the constraints on the liberation campaign that success could only ever be realized through a radical shift in the regional balance of power, a development that was signally unforthcoming.¹ The impossibility of liberating Palestine through military means left the PLO leadership with a dilemma: how to enter a diplomatic process to realize more limited, but nevertheless acceptable, results. Moreover, securing entry to a diplomatic process would require that international society recognize the PLO as a prospective government that would behave *as* a government, and play by the rules of the game. For the PLO and its constituents, the success of any diplomatic process would then be judged by whether or not it delivered an acceptable solution to the issue of Palestinian self-determination.

The following pages outline a framework for conceptualizing the PLO's transition toward a diplomatically realized institutional solution. Essential criteria for entry into a diplomatic process are delineated and progress summarized at key points in time. Institutional developments within the PA are then measured against the same criteria to assess progress toward statehood, the striking lack of which—despite seven years of engagement in the Oslo process—provided the background for the al-Aqsa intifada, the most recent in a series of anti-colonial revolts to confront the Zionist settlement project in Palestine.² The framework outlined here is augmented by an elaboration of the structural context containing the Palestinian national movement and a historical narrative of institutional development focused on a series of turning points in the institutional history of Palestinian nationalism. James Mahoney and Richard Snyder cite the term “critical junctures” to describe this type of turning point, moments in which “political action created structures that had persistent causal effects which shaped subsequent trajectories of political change.”³

The trajectory of the Palestinian national movement is interpreted within a framework based on an integration of two of the main approaches to regime change: the historical-structural approach, which locates analysis of structural development within a historical narrative, and the transition approach, which emphasizes the role of human agency on the part of political elites.⁴ The aim is to benefit from both approaches and move toward the type of “integrative” approach to political change called for by Mahoney and Snyder, in this instance allowing for an examination of the shift from PLO to PA, and from PA toward statehood “in a way that links structures to the shaping of contingent actor choice”⁵ on the part of the Palestinian leadership. The institutional focus of a book such as this lends itself to this type of integrative approach. As Mahoney and Snyder have noted,

The causal impact of human actors on institutions and the causal impact of institutions on human actors are unmediated by intervening levels of analysis. This “closeness” of institutions to agency makes them a powerful optic for analyzing the role of human design both in creating institutional structures during critical junctures and in sustaining those structures after junctures.⁶

In the typology of integrative approaches, this one might be considered “path-dependent”⁷ in the sense that battlefield success via armed struggle has been assumed to be impossible, with the agency of the PLO leadership driven onto the path of diplomacy instead. However, within the confines of a broadly defined diplomatic path, institutional adaptation to structural context is cast as a realm for the exercise of purposive elite agency.

Within the historical-structural approach, emphasis is placed on “long-term processes of historical change...processes are explained not by the agency of political elites but primarily by *changing structures of power*.”⁸ As applied in David Potter et al.’s account of democratization, the structural approach is defined as “emphasizing *changing structures of power* favourable to demoralisation.”⁹ This can be redefined here as emphasizing changing structures of power favorable to the realization of an institutional solution to the issue of Palestinian self-determination. The aim is to illustrate the ways in which patterns of political, economic, and social development, operating and interacting between different levels, have structured power and delimited the range of options available to the Palestinian nationalist elite. The impossibility of realizing Palestinian statehood through armed struggle, and the immense obstacles in the way of an acceptable diplomatic solution, have underlined the appropriateness of looking to structural factors to account for the trajectory of the movement.

In Potter et al.’s view, two of the more significant contributions to the structural approach have come originally from Barrington Moore, and more recently from the collective endeavors of Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John Stephens. Moore assessed the contrasting political evolution of several states by examining the shifting relationships between four distinct components of the polity; three socio-economic or class groups and the state apparatus.¹⁰ Developments in the relationships between these four components accounted for the political outcome of the transition process, in Moore’s analysis either a democratic, partially democratic, or nondemocratic outcome. The structures of power identified by Moore, class groups and the state, can be analyzed to illustrate the significance of socio-economic change within the Palestinian polity as well as institutional developments within the PLO and their bearing on the trajectory of the nationalist movement. Rueschemeyer et al. argued similarly that the determinant factor in the outcome of a transition process is the balance of power between different class groups, but went on to consider structural factors beyond the national level.¹¹ On the international level, they analyzed the role of international conflict and war in determining political outcomes; for instance, transition in a democratic direction could be enhanced through the military defeat of a nondemocratic regime or the mass mobilization of society behind the war effort; equally, a prolonged conflict might serve to bolster the role of the military within society, preventing a democratic transition from occurring altogether. These issues raise

interesting points for analysis of Palestinian institutions: what has been the role of the regional states-system and the balance of power in determining their trajectory, what are the implications of the PLO's historic commitment to armed struggle, and to what extent did the mobilization of Palestinian society during the first intifada prompt the attempt to effect an institutional solution to the issue? Furthermore, what was the relationship between the failure of that solution and the rebellion that ensued in late September 2000? The causes and consequences of the two intifadas bring us to another issue raised by Rueschemeyer, the role of transnational economic relations and their impact on class formation. In the Palestinian case, it draws attention to the dependent economic relationship with Israel and its impact on Palestinian class formation, the impact of accelerated Zionist settlercolonialism in the West Bank and Gaza, and the economically ruinous consequences of colonization's handmaiden, the closure policy.

With a view to developing the type of integrative conceptual base called for by Mahoney and Snyder, I have adopted their "resource" conception of structure, wherein structures "simultaneously enable action by providing tools actors use to pursue their political projects and constrain action by delimiting the range of possible projects."¹² The structural constraints on the Palestinian leadership have been and remain many, but consideration of the "empowering properties of structures"¹³ for agents opens several interesting avenues for enquiry. On the one hand, it allows us to reconsider the ways in which the PLO problematically harnessed itself to structural developments such as those behind the first intifada and used them to secure a new role for itself in the PA. On the other hand, it raises the question of "paths not taken"¹⁴ and tools not picked up, perhaps the most important of which for the PA has been the first intifada's capacity for social mobilization. Glenn E. Robinson's pioneering study of structural change, the first intifada, and the Oslo process interpreted the PA as a vehicle not only for putting an end to the uprising but also for precluding "the promise of social transformation." Critics of Oslo, among them what Robinson terms a grass roots "counterelite,"¹⁵ looked on in despair as Yasir Arafat failed to harness the intifada to the struggle for self-determination, choosing to manipulate social divisions through patronclientelism instead, in order to secure a ruling coalition for the PA.¹⁶ While this neutralized society's capacity to mobilize against Oslo or the PA, it also neutralized a formerly impressive capacity for social mobilization that might have been used to combat accelerated Zionist colonization. Indeed, as will become clear in the textual analysis of the Oslo framework in chapter 4 "demobilization" was the key to Arafat's highly problematic mandate.¹⁷ Indigenous calls for reform and a model of governance that might harness rather than repress society's capacity for mobilization, for example through expanded civil resistance, may gain ground as Palestinian nationalism searches for a way forward beyond the al-Aqsa intifada.

Consistent with the search for an integrative framework, historicalstructural insights are augmented by the transition approach, which places the emphasis on elite leadership and human agency. Potter defined the approach as emphasizing "*political processes and elite initiatives and choices* that account for moves from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy."¹⁸ For our purposes here, this has been adapted to read as follows: political processes and elite initiatives and choices that account for the shift from liberation movement to quasi-state apparatus pursuing diplomatic means to reach an institutional solution to the issue of Palestinian self-determination. When approaching the al-Aqsa intifada, this allows for an examination of the role of elite leadership in the negotiations

at Camp David II and during the intifada itself. In the latter instance, it serves to rebut charges that the PA leadership initiated the al-Aqsa intifada because they expected to gain from it, which, as Yezid Sayigh has noted, is little more than a convenient excuse for full-scale reoccupation.¹⁹ An alternative view, that Arafat largely watched from the sidelines and hoped to emerge from it on top, hardly stands as a ringing endorsement of judicious national leadership either.

The elite agency focus of the transition approach, associated primarily with Dankwart Rustow,²⁰ is essentially a historical approach describing a route with three distinct phases. The route to democracy does not fit mechanically with the Palestinian search for an institutional solution, but the conceptualization of transition as a historical process with stages driven by elite agency is illuminating, even as we remain cognizant of the fact that structures place limits on action or that “actors make choices but not in circumstances of their own choosing.”²¹ Consistent with an integrative approach to transition, I use Mahoney and Snyder’s “reflexive” conception of agency to stress that “actors self-consciously deploy structural resources and modify their behaviour in response to changing situations.”²² Agents thus have the capacity to “appropriate” structural resources for themselves, rather than being passively driven by them down narrow, wholly predetermined pathways.²³ The idea of appropriation proves helpful in chapter 2 when we attempt to explain adaptation to changing circumstance by the institutions of Palestinian nationalism at several different junctures, first on the part of the PLO in exile, and later through the PA in Palestine.

Rustow’s model begins with the single background condition of national unity, followed by three phases constituting the transitional route; the preparatory phase, the decision phase, and the habituation phase. Rustow defined his background condition of national unity as “simply mean[ing] that the vast majority of citizens...must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.”²⁴ An assessment of Palestinian national unity in 1964 requires some caution due to the number of overlapping or alternative identities that might be said to have been detracting from it, including Pan-Arabism, Nasirism, political Islam, and the Hashemite’s promotion of Jordanian identity in the West Bank. This caveat notwithstanding, a sufficient sense of Palestinian identity can be said to have been obtained insofar as a substantial body of people shared a sense of Palestinian identity and held an agreed perception of the contours of Palestinian society. Moreover, that sense of identity had an institutional history.

Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal flag the anti-Egyptian revolt in 1834 as a precursor of modern Palestinian nationalism. Occupied by the army of Muhammad ‘Ali, led by his son Ibrahim, Palestine found itself subject to unpopular imperial policies that included conscription and agricultural production tailored to Egyptian needs.

The tough rule and new reforms led to the 1834 revolt’s outbreak in the heart of the country, uniting dispersed Bedouins, rural sheikhs, urban notables, mountain fellaheen, and Jerusalem religious figures against a common enemy. It was these groups who would later constitute the Palestinian people.²⁵

Confronted if not threatened by Zionism from 1882, Palestinian identity received another jolt with the onset of the First World War. Rashid Khalidi locates the emergence of a distinct Palestinian self-consciousness in the aftermath of the defeat and collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1917. Ann Lesch stresses the importance of events in the 1930s, linking a distinct Palestinian national identity with responses to the British Mandate and increased Zionist immigration, which culminated in the general strike of 1936 and the full-scale revolt of 1937 to 1939.²⁶ In 1948, Palestinian national identity manifested itself in the Arab Higher Committee's unsuccessful call for the establishment of a Palestinian government.²⁷ The Arab League duly recognized Palestinian identity and established the (albeit ineffectual) All Palestine Government in Gaza, replaced by the PLO between 1963 and 1964.²⁸ In the wake of the 1948 disaster (*al-Nakba*), the Palestinian communities in the diaspora gave rise to a series of distinctly Palestinian institutions from the late 1950s onward. Laurie Brand has documented the institution-building process and has pointed to the economic and political marginality of the Palestinian refugees within the host Arab states as contributing to the maintenance of a distinct Palestinian identity. Brand went on to interpret the establishment of the PLO as the *culmination* of a process of national *re-emergence* that subsequently asserted "exclusivity of allegiance through expanding existing popular organizations, like workers and student groups, and through establishing new ones."²⁹ From this perspective the "reorganization and mobilization of the Palestinians" associated with the establishment of the PLO did not emerge from a "political and organizational void"³⁰ but rather marked a new stage in a process that was already underway. With this in mind, we can say that an adequate sense of Palestinian national unity (a combination of national identity and sense of political community) preceded the establishment of the PLO in 1964. That identity could be appropriated by the PLO, then shaped, institutionalized, and enhanced, not least of all by the pursuit of armed struggle, which, given the impossibility of liberating Palestine by military means, served primarily as a resource for mobilizing Palestinian society and achieving national unity behind the leadership of the PLO. The important point is that the necessary background condition of national unity can be said to have obtained in a *sufficient* sense as of 1964.

With the necessary background condition of national unity in place, the first phase of the transitional route is the preparatory phase, within which Rustow cast political elites as agents operating in the context of social conflict. This consideration is also applicable to the PLO on two levels, both within the PLO as an institution (those in favor of adopting diplomatic procedures versus those favoring continued armed struggle), and in relations between the nationalist leadership in exile and Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza. The preparatory phase of democratic transition is said to conclude with "a deliberate decision on the part of political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to institutionalise some crucial aspect of democratic procedure."³¹ The PLO's preparatory phase, conceptualized here as preparation for adopting diplomatic means, might be said to have concluded, and the decision phase to have opened, with the landmark adoption of international diplomacy during the twelfth PNC meeting in 1974.

Rustow's second phase, the decision phase, represents a "historical moment when the parties to the inconclusive political struggle decide to compromise and adopt democratic rules."³² In the PLO's case, this can be adapted to assess the decision to try to resolve a serious international conflict by procedural rather than military means, with the goal of

establishing self-rule within Palestinian territory. Such a project could only be realized through dialogue with the international community, requiring the PLO to enter mainstream international society and to accept the rules of the game. Moreover, the ambition to enter a diplomatic process required that the nationalist elite adopt the characteristics of a quasi-state apparatus in support of that goal. In each case, the important point is that the adoption of these rules and procedures and the institutional adaptation that accompanied them, involved a “conscious decision at least on the part of the top political leadership.”³³

The final phase is the “second transition or *habituation* phase,”³⁴ during which the rules agreed to previously become entrenched and procedures consolidated. Rustow’s observation that “a distasteful decision, once made, is likely to seem more palatable as one is forced to live with it,”³⁵ brings to mind the reluctant shift within the PLO toward agreement on a diplomatic agenda. In this respect, the PLO can be considered as still not habituated to the diplomatic procedures of international society as of 1974, but it advanced significantly in this direction by the time of the nineteenth PNC in 1988. The subsequent institutional adaptation through the metamorphosis into PA, facilitated solely by the diplomacy of the Oslo process, underlined the extent to which the PLO (more specifically the PLO-mainstream around Arafat), had become habituated to diplomacy by 1993. The PA leadership’s repeated insistence on the need to resume negotiations even as the al-Aqsa intifada raged about it and Israel targeted its infrastructure and personnel, suggests that this habituation had not been reversed. Rather, diplomatic channels had been sidelined by events, not least of all by the change of governments in Israel and the United States in early 2001 and the effective absence of a willing interlocutor for the next two years.

The PLO leadership’s initial decision to adopt diplomatic means had farreaching consequences for the institution, adding tremendous momentum to the development of a quasi-state apparatus which included not only a bureaucracy and armed force, but also an array of ministerial portfolios and an extensive diplomatic service. Within our framework, the PLO as an institution can be seen as the product of purposive elite leadership, appropriating resources to meet the needs of the transition process, the diplomatic direction of which had been set by structural constraints. As it developed, the institution itself would come to assume an increased causal significance.

As Karen Remmer notes, “important theoretical insights have been achieved by placing questions of institutional incentives and constraints at the centre of the study of regime change and consolidation.”³⁶ Based on the assumption that structural factors obliged the PLO leadership to direct the institution away from armed struggle and into diplomacy, the PLO as an institution might be viewed as an “intervening variable rather than as the appropriate point of theoretical departure.”³⁷ In effect, the PLO’s institutional input into the transition process becomes a “meso-level” variable, constituted in the diaspora, reflecting the conditions and interests of Palestinian society on the outside, acquiring an institutional momentum and set of vested interests of its own, while also having to take into account socio-economic changes within the Palestinian polity on the one hand, and regional and international structures on the other.

From this perspective, the PLO can be recognized as an institution mediating between Palestinian society and the regional and international states-systems. Remmer has highlighted the importance of taking into account the interaction between structural and

institutional factors. Referring to the rise of institutional approaches since the 1980s, Remmer noted,

The revival of interest in institutions has tended to pull analysts back to the national level of analysis. Variable patterns of linkage with the international system, which were successfully highlighted by more sophisticated versions of dependency theory, are downplayed in favor of the organization of domestic interests and institutions. As emphasized by Barbara Stallings, "Ironically, just as international variables became especially important in the 1980s, they disappeared as the key factor from theories of development."³⁸

Not surprisingly, just as international variables have played a major role in patterns of development and democratization, they have also had a major bearing on the political trajectory of the PLO and the PA. Moreover, in addition to forming the context for action on the part of the nationalist elite they have also, by extension, shaped the institutional character of the institutions themselves. It follows that an examination of Palestinian nationalist institutions should be properly set in international context.

The relationship between historical-structural context and the character of Palestinian nationalist institutions is indeed profound. Perhaps the most obvious consequence, deriving from the regional balance of power, was the exclusion of the PLO in its formative years from the territory of Palestine, which forced it to operate and develop in the diaspora:

The lack of a sovereign territorial base mean[t] that the fate of Palestinian efforts toward political mobilization and national-building [were], to a far greater degree than those of state actors, inextricably tied, not only to developments in one or two countries, but to conflicts and contradictions throughout the region as a whole.³⁹

This relationship between structural context and institutional character was accentuated by the nature of the Arab states-system and the factional nature of the PLO as a complex organization.⁴⁰ The adoption of diplomatic means implied political and territorial compromise, a contentious issue and potential threat to "national unity." Competing Arab regimes were often all too ready to intervene in PLO policy making through the sponsorship of proxies, for instance through the Syrian-backed al-Sa'iqa and the Iraqi-sponsored ALF. For many years, this situation constrained the leadership's ability to take bold steps, primarily through the concern to hold the coalition of nationalist forces together. In Sayigh's view,

This gave rise to the politics of consensus and the lowest common denominator rather than majority rule, since the outvoted group could seek external support and threaten the PLO's claim to be the sole legitimate representative of all the Palestinians.⁴¹

The adoption of armed struggle as a means of mobilizing support for this diaspora-based leadership also generated political consequences of its own:

The nature of the Palestinian leadership and its politics...were overwhelmingly shaped—to the effective exclusion of social and economic factors—by the fact that the bulk of the PLO's combat strength, civilian membership, and “governing” institutions were based in exile, as was at least half of the Palestinian population. The fact that the Palestinian leadership based its legitimacy on its role in the armed struggle against Israel encouraged the tendency toward populist politics and authoritarian control.⁴²

The influence of the regional system on the institution's strategic position and by extension its structure and internal politics, highlights again the influence of international structural factors in setting the parameters of elite decision making. Equally, certain key characteristics of the PA can be seen to derive from the early history of the national movement, underlining the need to trace the relevant process-related antecedents back to the establishment of the PLO.

Completing the framework are the key characteristics which would enable the PLO to enter a diplomatic process and the PA to aspire to statehood. These characteristics are

- an authoritative leadership
- a bureaucracy
- a subordinate armed force
- an accepted territory for the realization of self-determination
- a coherent and broadly accepted national project
- international recognition of the authoritative leadership
- an orientation congruent with the international balance of power

In Weber's oft-cited definition, “a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”⁴³ The dimensions of the would-be Palestinian state remain far from resolved (that is de facto control of territory, if not de jure right to it) and indeed with the publication of the Roadmap the prospect of a state within *provisional* borders has become part of the officially sanctioned diplomatic lexicon. Suffice to say here that, as Barry Buzan noted, based on a Weberian separation of state from society, the concept of state effectively becomes the institutions of “central government”⁴⁴ or, in Joel Migdal's words,

An organization composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state's leadership (executive authority) that has the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.⁴⁵

This highlights the first three criteria sought and accumulated by the PLO along its transitional route: leadership or executive authority, interpreted as *authoritative*

leadership, plus the agencies it leads and coordinates in order to formulate and implement national policy, listed as a *bureaucracy* and *subordinant armed force*.

The fourth criterion is an *accepted territory*, a defining characteristic of any state being a physical space within which the state apparatus can exercise sovereign authority. A defining feature of the Palestinian campaign for self-determination has been a lack of such a territory, along with a struggle to secure it and an inconclusive debate over what the dimensions of it ought to be. In this respect, the term “accepted territory” is used to mean accepted both within the Palestinian polity and by the principal actors with whom the PLO and PA have had to interact in order to secure any de facto jurisdiction on the ground.

The precise territorial boundaries within which the PA or the prospective Palestinian state might eventually exercise authority remain unresolved. Nevertheless, the fact that at least *some* territory has been accepted (and reaffirmed, even by the second Sharon government in 2003) as an arena within which it might openly assert *some* authority might be seen as a positive step. On the other hand, the limited extent to which that territorial base was first permitted to expand, and more recently forced to contract, serves as a fairly bleak index of progress in the substance of Palestinian statehood and raises awkward questions about what statehood might actually mean if or when it does emerge.

The fifth criterion is an *acceptable national project*, closely linked to, yet conceptually distinct from, an accepted territory. Whereas a territorial foundation is a defining characteristic of all states, the Palestinian need for a national project arose solely from the absence of a state and represents a necessary component in the campaign to get one: without a well-defined, acceptable, and hence negotiable national project, entry into the diplomatic process would remain barred due to a lack of sufficient internal consensus and external credibility. Again, as with the issue of territory, the term “accepted” is applied to both Palestinian and relevant non-Palestinian actors. For the Palestinians as a refugee society with a keenly honed sense of legitimate rights, the Oslo process proved itself structurally incapable of delivering a national project in keeping with minimal just expectations: the PLO’s national project was rendered unacceptable, leading us to the al-Aqsa intifada.

The final two criteria are *international recognition* and an *orientation congruent with the international balance of power*. *International recognition* is taken to mean recognition of the PLO by the society of nation-states as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, together with recognition, at least as a negotiable program, of the legitimacy of the national project. However, widespread international recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people was not enough in itself to gain entry into a meaningful diplomatic process. Indeed, a major characteristic of the PLO’s trajectory prior to Oslo had been a prolonged inability to transform diplomatic success into substantive negotiations.

Diplomatic frustration leads to the seventh and final criterion, an *orientation congruent with the international balance of power*. The structure of power at the regional and international levels, dominated as they have been by Israel and the United States respectively, required a willingness to deal with both powers on their own terms and abide by the rules of the game, or else risk remaining stranded in the diplomatic wilderness. Aaron David Miller illustrated this point well when he wrote during the cold war that

Unlike Israel, the Palestinian national movement never developed reliable great power support. It is the Arab states that fill PLO coffers, facilitate delivery of most of its Soviet and Eastern bloc military equipment, house the majority of its constituents, and plead its case in world capitals and international forums.⁴⁶

The end of the cold war stripped the PLO of its already limited Soviet options, while the outcome of the first Gulf War, with the reversal of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to which the PLO had taken an ambivalent position, left it isolated in the Arab world. In short, the PLO had little choice but to reorient itself if it hoped to remain a relevant player. In the closing stages of the alAqsa intifada, the PA would reformulate itself in an effort to do the same. These and other critical junctures in the institutional history of the national movement are summarized in Table 1, a heuristic device that delineates the essential criteria for entry into a diplomatic process, suggests how the values and orientation of the leadership have evolved, and summarizes progress at key points in time to illustrate institutional change.⁴⁷ The development of the PA is then measured against the same criteria to assess progress toward Palestinian statehood. The structural factors that have set the context for transition are elaborated upon in chapter 2, along with a condensed historical narrative of institutional adaptation within the national movement from 1964 to 2003.

Table 1 Transition from Liberation Movement to National Authority, 1964–2003

	1964	1974	1988
Authoritative Leadership	No: PLO just established but lacking legitimacy. Fatah, ANM, Communist Party, and others all outside the framework of the PLO and in competition with each other.	Partial: Fatah now inside PLO and Arafat is chairman. Factional relations mostly institutionalized. PNF in West Bank declared allegiance to PLO despite leftist orientation.	Partial: Arafat and Fatah firmly in control of PLO but challenge arising during first intifada from West Bank and Gaza indigenous national leadership and Islamic groups, Hamas and Islamic Jihad.
Bureaucracy	Emerging: Result of the creation of the PLO in 1964. Fatah is still a marginal guerrilla group.	Yes: Fatah inherits PLO institutions after 5th PNC. Bureaucratic expansion to meet new requirements in Beirut.	Yes: But exiled in Tunis.
Subordinate Armed Force	No: PLA established as conventional military force of PLO, but Fatah launched its own armed struggle independently.	Partial: Arafat in charge of both PLO and PLA, factional coordination within PLO, but military commands retain independence.	Partial: Enhanced within PLO after Fatah and PLA merged in 1983 to form PNLA. Other PLO factions now marginal in this respect. But in West Bank and Gaza, nationalist factions retain some independence and Islamists outside PLO.

Accepted Territory	No: Jordan has competing claim to West Bank. PLO calling for total liberation of mandate Palestine and liquidation of Israel.	Emerging: Two-state solution implied after 12th PNC. Rejected by both Israel and Jordan.	Partial: Jordan dropped claim to West Bank and PLO accepted UNSC Resolution 242 at 19th PNC. But rejected by Israel and unresolved with U.S.
Acceptable National Project	No: Committed to armed struggle and political ideas vague and conflicting.	Emerging: “Phased Plan” and “PA” adopted by 12th PNC. Rejected by Israel and Jordan.	Partial: Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza accepted by 19th PNC but Israel continues to reject role for PLO.
	1964	1974	1988
International Recognition	No: PLO has only limited recognition at the Arab level and in dispute with Jordan.	Emerging: Arab League recognizes PLO as sole legitimate representative of Palestinian people at Rabat and UNGA grants PLO observer status.	Partial: Gains of 1974 consolidated with embassy network and 19th PNC opens way for dialogue with the U.S., but legitimacy still rejected by Israel.
Orientation Congruent with the International Balance of Power	No: Both PLO and Fatah maintain positions based on revolutionary nationalist agenda.	No: U.S. rejection of PLO as agent for U.S.S.R. in Middle East. Kissinger soon to commit the U.S. to no dialogue with PLO.	Emerging: But U.S.-PLO dialogue short-lived.
	1993	1996	2003
Authoritative Leadership	Partial: Enhanced by DoP PLO leadership assert authority from within semi-autonomous enclaves in Jericho and Gaza.	Yes: PLO recast as PA and legitimized on domestic and international levels through elections to Legislative Council.	Partial: Restructured: PA post of prime minister created, ministry of finance reformed, ministry of interior subject to struggle with presidency.
Bureaucracy	Yes: Can now be recast as institutional backbone of PA within West Bank and Gaza.	Yes: PLO institutions and personnel reconsolidated as institutions of PA and expanded through recruitment among indigenous population.	Yes: Staff expanded but work and infrastructure degraded by IDF and closure. Increasingly subordinate to IDF bureaucracy of occupation.
Subordinate Armed Force	Partial: Enhanced by DoP. Redeployment to West Bank and Gaza opens path to assert control over indigenous nationalist forces and to co-opt and coerce Islamist groups with Palestinian police.	Yes: PNLA and indigenous nationalist forces merged in Palestinian police, plus some recruitment among Islamists. But Islamist groups retain independent structures and conduct unauthorized operations.	Partial: Severely degraded by Israel, subject to reconstruction, focus of struggle between cabinet and presidency. Part of a global process of disarming non-state actors post September 11, 2001.

	1993	1996	2003
Accepted Territory	Partial: Enhanced by DoP. Israel agrees to semi-autonomous enclaves in Jericho and Gaza.	Partial: PA control established in expanded semi-autonomous enclaves but extent of expansion and East Jerusalem still contested.	Partial: Contracted by IDF reinvasion, divided by increased settler-colonialism and closure. Boundaries of September 28, 2000, still recognized. Roadmap contains option of state with temporary borders.
Acceptable National Project	Partial: Enhanced by DoP. PA accepted by majority of Palestinians and international society as first step toward statehood, but Israel retains own interpretation.	Partial: As in 1993, but needs forward momentum for legitimacy. Vagaries of the process becoming evident to domestic Palestinian opinion.	Partial: Diminished in Palestine; contradictions of Oslo and colonization evident in al-Aqsa intifada. Income differentials and consumption provide a source of social strain. UNSC 1397 expresses U.S. and international acceptance of PA as an intermediate step toward statehood. Roadmap codifies that and adds conditional Israeli consent.
International Recognition	Partial: Enhanced by Oslo and DoP leading to Israeli recognition of PLO as legitimate leadership of Palestinian people.	Partial: PLO recognized as representative of Palestinian people, but not as sovereign government of a state.	Yes: Roadmap contains official Israeli and U.S. commitment to PA. Negotiations to be led by prime minister. Arafat marginalized by Israel and U.S.
Orientation Congruent with the International Balance of Power	Yes: PLO now admitted into international society but not as government of nation-state. Collapse of U.S.S.R. leaves no alternative sponsor.	Yes: Unchanged since 1993.	Yes: Roadmap and context of Middle East in flux increase PA dependency on U.S. readiness to offset power asymmetry with Israel.

2

From PLO to PA and on Toward Statehood

Palestinian Institutional Development from 1964 to 2003

The aim here is to place PA politics in context by providing an overview of the major factors shaping the trajectory of the national movement from the inception of the PLO in 1964 up to the launch of the Roadmap in 2003. Using the conceptual model outlined earlier, the historical trajectory of the PLO, and later the PA, is related to the domestic, regional, and international structures that have formed the context in which the institutions of Palestinian nationalism have had to operate and which have set the parameters for elite decision making. The principal structural factors under consideration are socio-economic or class change within Palestinian society, the regional balance of power between Israel and the relevant Arab states, the nature of the Arab states-system, and the international environment conditioned first by the cold war and subsequently by the political hegemony of the United States.

Over the years, the relationship between the PLO and Palestinian society has grown to resemble that of a state and a society, albeit one in which the state in question remained very heavily qualified. In this respect, Palestinian society can be said to have formed a key component of the structural context conditioning the trajectory of the PLO in the transition toward an institutional solution. It follows that the aspects of Palestinian society of most interest are those that formed structural constraints or resources for the leadership as human agents. The analysis that follows identifies the most politically salient classes in the diaspora and the occupied territories, traces developments in the relationship between their respective institutions, and concludes by outlining the relationship between the PA and its subject population.

Transition in Structural Context

One of the striking features of the history of the Palestinian national movement was the extent to which it was led from outside. With this in mind, it is useful to outline some of the features of the diaspora communities that shaped the social and political composition of the PLO. The outcome of the fighting and expulsion by “Jewish militia (and later the Israeli army) between December 1947 and early 1950”¹ created a large refugee population (estimated by the UN to be 726,000 people) with a mixed socio-economic profile, cast out across the Middle East but principally in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon and later in the Gulf Arab oil states. Following this large-scale social, economic, and political dislocation, a fresh national consciousness first emerged among the refugee communities

who subsequently established the political factions and guerrilla groups, Fatah among them. Once established, and particularly after the guerrillas' capture of the apparatus of the PLO, this national movement found fertile ground for recruitment among the large refugee population, thousands of whom were recruited into the PLO and its constituent factions as political, military, and bureaucratic cadres.²

Within the national movement, Fatah's rise to hegemony was achieved in part by its ability to attract a cross-class coalition ranging from the wealthiest Palestinian capitalists in the diaspora to the poorest displaced peasants in the refugee camps.³ Between these two extremes there emerged a substantial middle class, composed of what Pamela Ann Smith has termed a new bourgeoisie: Palestinians who managed to transfer "sufficient capital from Palestine to start new businesses,"⁴ particularly to Lebanon and the Gulf oil states, together with professionals such as teachers, doctors, and lawyers. The Palestinian community in Kuwait was especially instructive, given that Fatah was established in Kuwait and that it consistently dominated political organization in the community.

Brand divided the Palestinian community in Kuwait into four categories: first, a minority of very wealthy individuals; second, the middle and upper classes including "many professionals (journalists, engineers, doctors, lawyers, and teachers), among them large numbers of the politically aware and nationally conscious";⁵ third, lower- and middle-class skilled workers; and fourth, former peasant-farmers employed as unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The community had steadily expanded as the needs of the Kuwaiti economy coincided with the availability of Palestinian labor:

Kuwait's drive to develop its nascent state structure and economy coincided with the expulsion from Palestine of both an educated class that in effect constituted a 'ready made' bureaucracy and a largely peasant class that, through loss of lands, was transformed into a large pool of unskilled or semi-skilled labor.⁶

In terms of the character of the national movement, the point to underline is that the bulk of the Palestinian professional and bourgeois classes found Fatah's social conservatism a more attractive option than the Marxist-Leninist social revolutionism of the PFLP and DFLP. According to Smith,

The majority confined their support to those organisations within the Palestine Liberation Organisation (mainly Fatah) which eschewed involvement in the internal affairs of the other Arab states and concentrated solely on the liberation of Palestine...⁷

Fatah's co-option of the middle classes assisted in the subordination of the semi-class-based leftist factions and contributed to the formation of what might be loosely termed a nationalist elite: a combination of the Fatah leadership, and the military and bureaucratic apparatus of the PLO, supported by the Palestinian bourgeois and professional classes in the diaspora who provided the PLO, and especially Fatah, with financial support. The politically salient groups in the diaspora can thus be characterized as first, the political elite; second, the cadres that staffed the bureaucracy and military apparatus (a "nationalist bourgeoisie" constituting the institutional expression of Palestinian nationalism in the

diaspora); third, the Palestinian bourgeois and professional classes; and fourth, the bulk of the poorer refugee camp population who would later seem to be effectively (if not rhetorically and perhaps temporarily) abandoned during the transition to the PA.

The interesting aspects of class formation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are again those that have provided constraints and opportunities for elite decision making on the part of the Palestinian leadership. The first are the notables, the large land-owning families that mediated Jordanian control over the West Bank between 1948 and June 1967.⁸ Following the Israeli occupation, this group initially performed the same role until Israeli policies undermined the basis of their political authority. Emil Sahliyya's analysis of West Bank politics attributed the decline of the pro-Jordanian elite to the opening of the Israeli labor market to Palestinians, who followed the lure of higher wages. This led to labor shortages in the West Bank's agricultural and industrial sectors.⁹ The notables' traditional resources of capital and land were henceforth less influential, while their capacity to dispense state-patronage suffered with their severance from their patron in Amman. Furthermore, it proved almost impossible to dispense patronage from the Israeli occupation regime, not only because it looked bad, but also because the new colonial power proved extremely miserly.

Robinson's important study of class change in Palestinian society expands on the notables' decline, attributing it to

The by-product of three structural changes that occurred under Israeli rule: the virtual elimination of the Palestinian peasantry, land confiscation, and the establishment of a Palestinian university system.¹⁰

The issue of land confiscation and the virtual annihilation of the peasantry raise perhaps the major determinant of West Bank class formation since 1967, the distortion of the process by Israeli settler-colonialism. The nature of Israel as a settler-colonial state has been forcefully demonstrated by Robinson, who cites a useful definition:

“One can speak of colonization when there is, and by the very fact that there is, occupation with domination; when there is, and by the very fact that there is, emigration with legislation.” The Jews attracted to Zionism emigrated to Palestine, and then they dominated it. They occupied it in deed and then adopted legislation to justify this occupation by law.¹¹

Although Robinson applied this definition to the state of Israel in its pre-1967 borders, it seems to me to fit quite adequately the current situation in the occupied territories.

‘Adl Samara draws attention to the distortion of Palestinian class formation in the West Bank that resulted from the imposition of this settler-colonial regime; both Palestinian labor and capital have been subordinated to the colonial power, for instance as migrant laborers and subcontracting businesses. In Samara's analysis, PLO inability to establish a national authority capable of directing development left political power in the hands of the occupier, leaving the West Bank and Gaza Strip as dependent territories, that is, unable to control their surplus accumulation, and hence possessed of a weak national-economic basis for national self-assertion.¹²

Sara Roy has coined the term “de-development” to distinguish the impact of Israeli policy from less malignant forms of underdevelopment.

Both processes describe a structural relationship between a stronger (dominant) and weaker (subordinate) economy. But while most definitions of underdevelopment allow for structural change and reform within the weaker economy (though that change often is disarticulated because it is oriented to the needs of the dominant economy), de-development not only distorts the development process but undermines it entirely...a de-developed economy is deprived of its capacity for production, rational structural transformation, and meaningful reform, making it incapable of even distorted development.¹³

The economic policies of the colonial regime were, and still are, readily apparent in the collected military orders imposed on the occupied territories to the advantage of the Zionist core, and almost all of which have remained in effect since the establishment of the PA. Israeli settler-colonialism has thus formed the context for economic and social development in the occupied territories from 1967 onward: it has conditioned patterns of social-structural change with important political consequences, but has not done so through promoting the type of structural transformation or sectoral change traditionally associated with positive economic development.¹⁴ Rather, occupation and colonization have fostered a malign de-development that managed to alienate almost every Palestinian class group.¹⁵ One of the crucial features of the autonomy project realized in Oslo was a pivotal role for the diasporabased elite, in alliance with landowners and merchants, in what amounted to a new means of perpetuating the neo-colonial economic order established by occupation, but with a new coalition of imported and local agents put in place to manage it.

The decline of the notable class was matched by the rise of what Sahliyya terms “the pro-PLO urban elite.” This group was responsible for launching two local initiatives, the PNF in 1973, and later the NGC. Through the PNF, “they meant to secure a policy-making role for the West Bank urban elite in the PLO and have some influence on its political orientation.”¹⁶ Living the daily reality of colonial occupation in a way that the diaspora elite were not, the PNF were committed to a quick diplomatic solution and sought to encourage the PLO in this direction. The PNF gained a new prominence after the municipal elections in 1976 which, much to Israel’s surprise, returned a majority of pro-PLO candidates to office.

Writing over a decade after Sahliyya, Robinson argues that the new social forces came to constitute a “counterelite” composed of individuals from non-notable class backgrounds whose social advancement owed much to the expansion of the university education system during the 1970s and 1980s:

New Palestinian social classes—principally villagers and refugee camp residents from middle-and lower-income groups—not only experienced university student life for the first time but also came to dominate it. As a result of the changing class character of the Palestinian student population, the student movement was radicalized.¹⁷

As the social background of the body of university students underwent significant change, the numbers enrolled increased dramatically. Joshua Angrist's study of trends in Palestinian education and work found that "[enrollment in West Bank and Gaza Strip universities doubled between 1981 and 1985." In addition, "the fraction of the labor force with 13 or more years of schooling rose from 7 percent to 12 percent between 1981 and 1990. The fraction with less than 12 years of schooling fell from 81 percent to 67 percent."¹⁸ As important as social background and enrollment numbers was the character of the education they received. Muhsin Yusuf observed, "the social structures, values [and] national feelings...of any society are influenced by the education system." In the case of the Palestinian universities, this education departed from the general pattern of transmitting accepted values: "Its objective [being] to prepare the younger generation for accepting and implementing new ideas and change."¹⁹

Another factor radicalizing new graduates may have been the diminishing returns on tertiary education. Angrist's study showed that between 1982 and 1988, a greater role in the labor force was accompanied by a drop of almost a third in real wages, "while the real wage of those with 12 years of schooling held steady and the real wage of those with 11 or fewer years of schooling increased slightly."²⁰ Concurrently, Robinson has shown how the class changes in the character of the student movement lent it an ideological imperative, leading to the expansion of grassroots organizations specifically designed to confront the occupation *and* the notable class. They gradually came to constitute a semi-autonomous indigenous leadership, much of which would eventually become focused in the NGOs, which while continually reiterating loyalty to the PLO in exile, also represented a potential challenge to the diaspora's authoritative leadership. Such were the structural developments by the early 1990s that it seems the diaspora-based political elite felt that they *had* to enter a diplomatic process and realize a compromise solution quickly if they were to retain their leading position within the Palestinian polity. The secret Oslo channel provided for such a compromise, wherein the political elite in exile retained their leadership position, bolstered by the institutional apparatus of the PLO, itself transformed via the Oslo process from liberation movement in exile to national authority governing the semi-autonomous areas of Palestine. Moreover, they found willing local partners, principally among the Palestinian bourgeoisie and notable class in the occupied territories. "Thus the interests of the inflated PLO bureaucracy coincided with those of wealthy Palestinians on the local scene, who could see in autonomy a way to preserve their standing."²¹

Structural constraints on the regional level can be divided into the balance of power between the PLO and Israel, and the PLO's relationship with the Arab states. The balance of power both between Israel and the Arab states and between Israel and the PLO in particular has emphatically and decisively favored Israel. The benefits of entrenched state-power, such as an established territory and an institutional-military capacity to mobilize men and resources, together with substantial Western assistance, has allowed Israel to easily defeat the PLO and to defeat and then restrain the front-line Arab states.

The PLO's relationship with the Arab states has been altogether more complex and was rendered particularly salient given the organization's inability to establish an independent territorial base inside Palestine. Rashid Khalidi has pointed to the unusual nature of the Palestinian polity as one people living in contrasting circumstances, under several different and often hostile regimes, and subject to regular competitions for loyalty

between the PLO and the regimes themselves.²² Moreover, the fact that the PLO itself was forced to operate on the territory of other sovereign states had complicated consequences of its own.

The need to establish secure sanctuaries brought the Palestinian guerrillas into conflict with the Arab governments concerned and invited punitive Israeli reprisals, increasing the burden on civilian populations and national economies. Opposition to the presence of these sanctuaries from government quarters or communities prompted the guerrillas to seek protection through developing their military capabilities, invoking the help of external allies and building alliances with local parties and social forces. Their intervention in domestic politics inevitably exacerbated latent tensions in the host society and fuelled civil strife.²³

The Arab states have also had to contend with their own legacies of colonialism and state building in a volatile region, and have frequently been in competition with one another, as well as with the PLO, over representation of the Palestinians.²⁴ The Arab states in question are primarily those in the front line with Israel: Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. They might also be divided into the states with radical regimes such as Egypt under Nasir, Syria, and Iraq, and the conservative, pro-Western states such as Jordan and Lebanon, together with the oil-based regimes in the Gulf, dependent upon the West in general and the United States in particular as a market for oil exports and a supplier of military equipment and protection.

The relationship between the region and the international system has also had a substantial bearing on the PLO's trajectory. The strategic significance of the region, derived to no small extent from its oil deposits, drew superpowers into the equation. The United States in particular has demonstrated a consistent determination to protect the pro-Western Arab regimes, particularly those sitting on its precious oil supplies, while at the same time remaining committed to the defense of Israel, both as useful regional enforcer and as a source of votes from the domestic Jewish lobby. At the same time, the United States demonstrated a consistent reluctance to deal with the PLO, due in large part to the PLO's refusal to renounce violence and to recognize Israel, but also out of a fear that an independent Palestinian state would be anything other than pro-Western in the cold war context. The role of the U.S.S.R. was more ambiguous, offering limited material and diplomatic support while generally giving priority to relations with the pro-Soviet Arab states. The remainder of this chapter sets the developments highlighted in Table 1 against this structural background. Long-term process-related antecedents are explained, while specific years have been selected for their value as turning points or "critical junctures" in the transitional route.

1964

This year is a good starting point for two reasons. First, this was the year that witnessed the establishment of the PLO; and second, the very last day of 1964 marked the official launch of Fatah's armed struggle.²⁵ It is important to note that the PLO was established

independently of the guerrilla groups and that Fatah launched its armed struggle *independently* of the PLO. The existence of the PLO, the “official” Palestinian leadership approved by the Arab states, was accompanied by the parallel emergence of Fatah and other guerrilla groups who maintained leadership aspirations of their own. In other words, an effective authoritative leadership—the first criterion identified by Table 1 as a requisite for entry into a diplomatic process—did not exist at this point.

The establishment of an authoritative leadership over the national movement was vital because in lending the movement institutional coherence, it provided a readily identifiable leadership both within the national polity and as a reference point for potential interlocutors. In the case of the Palestinian national movement, this has been a twofold process, involving first the ascension of Arafat and Fatah within the PLO, and second the consolidation of the PLO’s leadership within the Palestinian polity. In 1964, Palestinian politics remained embryonic, with Fatah and others remaining marginal and operating outside of the PLO’s framework, while the PLO itself was newly established and had only recently embarked on the quest for legitimacy.

Prior to the guerrillas’ assumption of control, the PLO’s early patrons in the Arab states, and Egypt’s President Nasir in particular, had conceived of it as *their* organization. The PLO was supposed to contain the Palestinians by offering a vocal and institutional outlet, nicely characterized by Patrick Seale as “a sort of corral in which Palestinians could charge about harmlessly letting off steam.”²⁶ The Arab regimes were struggling with their own problems of state building and internal legitimacy, not to mention a vulnerability to Israeli reprisals, and had no intention of granting the PLO autonomy or of allowing it to wage a serious armed struggle.

In the meantime, Fatah developed ideas of its own. Established in Kuwait during the late 1950s, Fatah drew inspiration from the FLN’s success in driving the French from Algeria. As Gowers and Walker noted, “The FLN’s triumph in Algeria in a war led both from inside and outside the country by an organization relying principally on its own resources could serve as a useful model.”²⁷ However, prior to the 1967 war, Fatah remained marginal, overshadowed since 1964 by the Arab states-sponsored PLO. Despite launching its first operation on December 31, 1964,²⁸ Fatah would remain marginal until the propaganda coup of the battle of Karama in March 1968. Similarly, the leftist ANM and other Palestinian political groups, including the PCP, remained outside of the framework of the PLO.²⁹

Despite the lack of an authoritative leadership, the decision to create the PLO did have important consequences for the institutional content of the national movement, leading to the establishment of institutions and procedures providing a foundation for the future quasi-state apparatus. Under the chairmanship of Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the Arab states-sponsored PLO established its basic institutional components, including the Palestinian National Charter, a cabinet in the executive committee, a type of legislature in the PNC, a functioning bureaucracy, diplomatic ties with Arab states, and the regular armed forces in the PLA, all of which would later be inherited by Fatah and the other guerrilla groups. Despite the lack of an authoritative leadership over the disparate factions, by 1964 the PLO had started to realize a measure of institutional coherence with the establishment of the second and third criteria listed in Table 1: a bureaucracy to administer the national movement and an armed force subordinate to the leadership, albeit a leadership that did

not extend to the guerrilla groups and that was about to change hands in dramatic circumstances.

The fourth and fifth criteria required by the PLO were an accepted territory and an accompanying national project. In 1964, neither the PLO nor the guerrilla groups operating outside it were ready to consider anything other than the total liberation of mandate Palestine, precluding the possibility of territorial compromise. Prior to the disastrous outcome of the 1967 war, the PLO and most Palestinians still looked to the Arab states for liberation and expressed some confidence in their capacity to bring it about. Similarly for Fatah, misplaced analogies with contemporary struggles in Vietnam and Cuba inspired a wild optimism in the capacity to instigate and wage a prolonged guerrilla war of national liberation. In this context, plans for a territorial solution acceptable to the Palestinians were only conceived of as involving the destruction of Israel, an outcome completely at odds with the orientation of international society and its leading powers in Moscow and Washington. Closer to home, the vexed question of Jordan's claim on the West Bank would remain unresolved until 1988.³⁰ The acceptable national project, intrinsically linked to the question of land, was similarly absent. The only national project acceptable to the Palestinians required the institutional displacement of Israel, a project beyond the Arab states' capacity to deliver and diametrically opposed to the mainstream orientation of international society.

What of the sixth and seventh criteria, international recognition and an orientation congruent with the international balance of power? The Arab states sponsoring the PLO gave it their blessing (some more readily than others), although wider international recognition would take time to fully develop and even then remained problematic with the competing claim of the Hashemites.³¹ As a movement committed to the destruction of Israel, there were clearly no opportunities for meaningful dialogue in this context. Similarly, the PLO's verbal commitment to the destruction of Israel and the guerrillas' plans for revolutionary warfare lent them a distinctly anti-Western orientation during this period. Although this factor was less significant during the cold war due to the Soviet option, diplomatic recognition by the U.S.S.R. was still to be achieved and would never match the intimate relationship between the United States and Israel.

To summarize the position in 1964, the nascent Palestinian national movement lacked most of the key attributes that the structural context required they possess. There was no authoritative leadership; the PLO had been established independently of Fatah and other political-guerrilla factions who continued to contest its authority and to operate independently. There was no prospect of territorial compromise and hence no realistic national project to present to potential interlocutors. Moreover, the West Bank remained under Jordanian control, placing the guerrillas on a collision course with the regime in Amman. The PLO was still not a major player within international society and retained a distinctly anti-Western character. On the positive side, the establishment of the PLO did produce an embryonic bureaucracy and a regular military force in the PLA, and the PLO did enjoy a measure of recognition among the Arab states. Rustow's background condition of national unity, present in a sufficient sense, could now be consolidated and given further institutional expression by the apparatus of the PLO. By the end of 1974, both the apparatus and its international profile would have advanced considerably.

1974

The significance of 1974 derives from the steps taken by the PLO leadership toward the realization of a diplomatic solution. The most salient points were the adoption of an implicit two-state solution by the twelfth PNC, the Arab Leagues' recognition of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people, Arafat's address to the UNGA, and the expansion of the PLO's diplomatic service to meet these new requirements, a development that accompanied a general tendency toward institutional expansion following the relocation to Beirut.

Samir Abraham characterized the period 1967–1973 as "the formative years of revolutionary growth."³² In terms of authoritative leadership, the major development was the guerrilla groups' entry into the framework of the PLO and Arafat's assumption of the chairmanship. Fatah's entry into the PLO arose from an historic opportunity presented by two related consequences of the June 1967 Six-Day War: the military failure of the Arab states and the humiliation of the PLO's incumbent leadership with whom they were associated. The Arab states' military failure transformed the situation facing the resistance, whereupon Fatah's conception of a Palestinian-led armed struggle and self-reliance appeared justified.³³ In this respect, the initial opening for the establishment of a centralized authority within the institutions of the national movement can be attributed to structural factors; the structure of power within the regional system favored Israel, Israel won the war, and the vacuum generated by the Arab states' defeat opened a window of opportunity for the Fatah leadership. The PLO's eventual readiness to grant Arafat the chairmanship and to restructure the organization around the guerrilla groups made the final decision to enter the PLO framework relatively uncomplicated.

The Fatah guerrillas had been propelled to the forefront of Arab popular consciousness by the successful defense of Karama in March 1968. Following Karama, the popularity of the guerrillas, combined with the impotence of the incumbent PLO leadership, lent the guerrilla groups, with Fatah principal among them, an irresistible momentum that quickly led to their takeover of the PLO. At the fourth PNC (July 1968) the guerrillas first entered the organization; the charter was amended in line with a new emphasis on independent action and the primacy of armed struggle. Arafat was officially elected chairman of the executive committee by the fifth PNC on February 3, 1969. From this point forth, Arafat and Fatah could begin the process of consolidating their authoritative leadership within the PLO.³⁴

The establishment of an authoritative leadership around Arafat had been facilitated in no small part by Fatah's pursuit of armed struggle. This principle now became an article of faith, embodied in the PLO's amended charter.³⁵ Just as armed struggle helped open the door to the PLO, an ongoing commitment to it *in principle* would now serve as a valuable means of mobilizing Palestinian society around Arafat and the PLO.³⁶ In the wake of the severe national dislocation caused by the creation of Israel, the commitment to armed struggle served to reconstitute a sense of national identity. In the view of Fatah's Nizar 'Amr, the battle to confirm Palestinian existence succeeded at the 1974 Arab summit in Rabat, but it was clearly armed struggle that had delivered it.³⁷ Together with Fatah's emphasis on Palestinian self-reliance (as opposed to the previously popular pan-Arabism), the guerrillas' assumption of authority might be said to have enhanced Rustow's background condition of national unity. It also underscores the utility of the

“resource model of structure” favored by Mahoney and Snyder; to adapt and paraphrase the latter, in a deft piece of political entrepreneurship, the guerrillas elevated armed struggle to the top of the Palestinian “repertoire of idioms and symbols” and in so doing transformed the PLO into an effective “collective action frame” for popular mobilization.³⁸ The armed struggle may have never threatened to liberate Palestine, but it did enable the new PLO command to mobilize Palestinian consciousness around a dynamic concept that did much to restore national self-respect and affect a durable authoritative leadership for the national movement.

Neither Arafat’s leadership of Fatah nor his chairmanship of the PLO translated smoothly into uncontested authoritative leadership. By 1971, postmortems on the Black September debacle in Jordan, in which the Palestinian guerillas were trounced by the Jordanian regular army, were prompting a contentious debate. Within Fatah, portentous critiques from the left came from, among others, Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal) and Muhammad Sa’id Musa Maragha (Abu Musa), both of whom advanced to the movement’s revolutionary council. In 1974, with the encouragement of Iraqi intelligence, Banna went on to seize control of Fatah assets in Iraq and establish his own faction, Fatah Revolutionary Council. He launched his first assassination attempt on the Fatah mainstream from Baghdad (the target was Mahmud ‘Abbas, also known as Abu Mazin, the PA’s first prime minister some three decades later) and he duly became perhaps the most infamous Palestinian dissident up until his death in Baghdad in 2002.³⁹ Maragha would also lead a revolt within Fatah, but several years later. Beyond Fatah, the nature of the PLO as a complex organization and the fractious character of the different composite factions made the establishment of authoritative leadership in that body no easy task. Both the PLA and the leftist factions would present challenges. For example, in February 1970 ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya of the PLA had branded Arafat an “ignorant dictator”⁴⁰ and called for all forces to unite under the PLA. He ultimately backed down, and amid complex institutional wrangling⁴¹ Arafat began to tame the PLA by having himself appointed commander at the seventh PNC later in the year. The PFLP would also present a challenge, establishing the Rejection Front with three smaller factions only months after the twelfth PNC and withdrawing their representative (not for the last time) from the PLO’s executive committee.

In addition to the use of armed struggle, Fatah’s bid to establish an authoritative leadership within the PLO was greatly assisted by the movement’s nationalist but non-ideological character. The rejection of an explicitly secular and social-revolutionary agenda allowed Fatah to recruit across class divisions and to appeal to both secular and observant Palestinians. In this regard, Fatah might be said to have formed a coalition in its own right, constituting a front within the larger front of the PLO. Robinson has suggested that “its rhetoric aside, Fatah was constituted in large part by nonrevolutionary elements...[it was] basically a conservative movement which reflected the traditional clan politics of Palestinian society.”⁴² This seems to have been true for a good part of the senior ranks of the movement, drawn from the older generation, but by the time of the second intifada it was arguably less true of cadres in the refugee camps of the West Bank and Gaza. In the meantime, socially conservative cadres were at the helm, “expatriates from the oil-rich Gulf sheikhdoms, colleagues from Gaza, and pre-war veterans”⁴³ took a generally non-ideological approach to the struggle. This facilitated a policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of the Arab states that allowed for some meeting of

minds between the Fatah leadership and the regimes around them.⁴⁴ It enabled Fatah to benefit from the patronage of conservative Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf States, rendering Arafat the central source of finance for the PLO's bureaucracy and armed forces through his unprecedented control over the purse strings. In addition, Fatah had at times been able to pursue good relations with radical regimes such as the FLN in Algeria, and Syria had lent Fatah significant support, at least until Hafiz al-Asad's assumption of power in 1970.⁴⁵ This broad-based level of support was automatically denied to the PFLP and DFLP, whose opposition to so many Arab regimes made them anything but welcome in most Arab capitals. The breadth of Fatah's support greatly assisted in the subordination of the left with their explicitly secular and class-based analysis.⁴⁶

In addition to the establishment of an authoritative leadership within the PLO, the PLO needed to establish its authoritative leadership within Palestinian society. The struggle for control in Jordan between the PLO and the Hashemite regime from September 1970 (Black September) to July 1971 illustrated just how difficult this might be. During the fighting, differing levels of commitment, determined largely by the class structure of Palestinian society, worked to the advantage of the regime. Just as some of the Palestinian ruling families had undermined the resistance during the Mandate, so economic concerns and social privilege once again prevented the resistance from receiving the unequivocal support of their own constituency. Brand has recorded how Western economic support for the Hashemite regime, derived from a shared hostility to anti-status quo Arab nationalism and Palestinian irredentism (and illustrative of the interaction between international structures and the region), allowed the regime to construct a substantial public sector that served as a vital state-patronage network:

The huge amounts of Western financial assistance awarded since the late 1950s had enabled the bureaucracy nearly to quadruple in size. The government had gradually become the principal employer in the country, and the technocratic class that had developed had a vested interest in preserving its position and extending its power base. Potential supporters were wooed with jobs and grants.⁴⁷

Similarly, Smith has noted that during Black September, some wealthier Palestinians, in particular "landowners, merchants and sections of the prosperous middle-class actively or passively supported the King's actions against the Palestinian resistance movements."⁴⁸

Following the PLO's relocation to Lebanon, a demonstrable inability to liberate Palestine through military means, and the corresponding emergence of a diplomatically realized two-state solution, lent the West Bank and Gaza constituency a far greater significance. The emergence of these constituencies as the most important component of a future Palestinian state prompted the development of institutional ties between the occupied territories and the PLO in the diaspora. In the West Bank, the PNF declared its allegiance to the PLO in a statement issued in December 1973, and not long afterward PNF members were allotted three seats on the executive committee by the twelfth PNC. According to Lisa Taraki,

The endorsement of the PNF by the [PNC] in 1973 marked the beginning of a joint political effort between the PLO leadership outside and the

political forces in the Occupied Territories. More important, however, it represented the first response by the Palestinian leadership to an initiative originating in the Occupied Territories.⁴⁹

The PNF duly became the first indigenous political leadership subordinated to the nationalist elite in the diaspora. Israeli repression accounted for the PNF's official demise, the last statement of which was issued on March 3, 1977, calling for Palestinian participation in a proposed Geneva peace conference.⁵⁰ However, Sahliyya poses the question: was the PNF really the PLO's representative in the West Bank, or was it a potential rival? If allowed to operate freely, the PNF may have come to constitute "a forceful representative of the interests of West Bank Palestinians."⁵¹ In contrast to the official nationalist narrative, Sahliyya attributes the PNF's decline to the hostility of the Palestinian leadership in exile; local Fatah representatives, following instructions from Beirut, accused the PNF of being dominated by communists and facilitated its collapse.

But before long, the indigenous urban elite re-emerged among the nationalist mayors elected in the municipal elections of 1976. In the absence of any other political structure, the municipalities became "the highest political post in the West Bank."⁵² Their rise to prominence illustrates the structural change within West Bank society identified by Robinson, the breakdown of notable authority, and the ascent of the new nationalist elite:

Members of the nationalist elite who came to the fore as a result of these elections were younger, better educated, and more ideological than their status notable counterparts. Two-thirds of the elected councillors were under fifty, while 10 percent were younger than thirty, compared to 40 percent and 3 percent, respectively, in the 1972 municipal elections. In addition, 28 percent of those elected had a university education, while only 10 percent of those elected in the 1972 elections did. Moreover, 40 percent of the new council members and one-third of the new mayors were openly nationalistic or leftist, while the 1972 results were 20 percent and 8 percent, respectively.⁵³

The NGC (declared illegal by Israel in March 1982) again mobilized and gave expression to pro-PLO and pro-diplomatic voices within the occupied territories, this time in response to the Camp David Accords. However, as with the PNF, the NGC fell victim to inter-factional conflict. In an echo of the struggle over the PNF, Fatah cadres from the inside and in exile opposed the substantial presence of the leftist factions and their opposition to dialogue with either Jordan or the United States. The executive committee eventually determined that the PNF's political program "contradicted that of the PLO and reflected the political stance of the hard-line factions."⁵⁴ Both the PNF and the NGC constituted local leadership initiatives reflecting structural changes to West Bank society, and both were effectively subordinated to the authoritative leadership in the diaspora. This pattern would re-emerge twice more, first during the original intifada, and then again via the national project initiated in Oslo.

Movement toward an authoritative leadership within the PLO had important consequences for the second and third criteria, the bureaucracy, and the subordinate armed force. Fatah's takeover of the PLO enabled them to secure an iron grip on the

bureaucratic institutions of the PLO and begin the establishment of a coordinated, if not subordinated, armed force:

At one stroke Fateh came to control not only the administrative and financial network of the PLO but also the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA with regular units numbering approximately 12,000 men) and the Palestinian Liberation Forces (guerrilla units drawn from the PLA), which formed part of the PLO. Simultaneously, Fateh enjoyed the official recognition and representation that the PLO had enjoyed since its founding in 1964...⁵⁵

It was control of this established institution and its network of contacts and supporters that would enable Arafat to lead the PLO's diplomatic initiatives only five years later.

As Fatah consolidated its grip on the PLO, so the PLO consolidated its presence among the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Following relocation to Beirut, the bureaucratic apparatus was expanded to meet the new conditions facing the Palestinians in Lebanon. The presence of some 300,000 Palestinian refugees provided a friendly constituency and readily mobilized population—a resource that the PLO leadership could readily appropriate—while the inbuilt limitations of the Lebanese state apparatus granted them the necessary space in which to rebuild and operate; in a short space of time, the PLO established control of territory stretching from west Beirut down to the south Lebanese border with Israel, labeled respectively “the Fakhani Republic” and “Fatahland.”

No longer able to take the military initiative, the PLO set about diversifying its operations, further expanding the institutional apparatus into areas of social services and developing a substantial diplomatic service.⁵⁶ Employment and welfare services for Palestinian refugees were provided by the Palestine Martyrs' Sons Work Society (SAMID),⁵⁷ headed by Ahmad Qray' (Abu 'Ala', later a member of the Legislative Council for Jerusalem, the PA's first minister of economy, trade, and industry, and its second prime minister). The Palestinian Red Crescent Society built much-needed hospitals and provided substantial medical care.⁵⁸ The Palestinian Research Centre collected documents on Palestine, conducted significant research, and published the journal *Palestinian Affairs*.⁵⁹ As Sami Musallam observed, an array of complementary institutions, complete with ministerial portfolios for members of the executive committee, began to lend the PLO the trappings of a genuine state apparatus in-waiting.⁶⁰ The new-found focus on diplomacy produced a global network of some ninety Palestinian embassies established by the Political Department under Faruq al-Qaddumi, a founding member of the Fatah central committee.⁶¹ Senior embassy staff were usually drawn from the leadership of the GUPS, the Fatah union established by Arafat himself, from among cadres already resident in the country in question.⁶²

This impressive range of institutions raised the PLO's profile while providing much-needed services for the guerrillas and the civilian refugees. However, institutional expansion had consequences of its own, not least of all because regular infusions of cash were required to maintain it. The effects of this expansion and bureaucratization were threefold. First, through his central position in Fatah and Fatah's dominance within the PLO, Arafat enjoyed personal control of PLO finances enabling him to establish an

awesome patronage network among the military cadres and civilian bureaucrats whose loyalty ran directly to him.⁶³ Second, the bulk of the PLO's budget went directly to Fatah from donors such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while this substantial institutional expansion served only to increase the PLO's reliance on conservative Arab states. Third, bureaucratic expansion generated a substantial nationalist elite within the PLO who would eventually resecure its position within the Palestinian polity through the Oslo process and the transition to national authority.⁶⁴

Major developments unfolded during 1974 that concern the fourth and fifth criteria, an accepted territory and an acceptable national project. The evolution of PLO policy in both respects was conditioned by structural factors: first, an ongoing inability to overcome Israel militarily (graphically illustrated by the formal disappearance of the Arab states-led military option after the 1973 October War),⁶⁵ and second, the need to accommodate a more mobilized constituency in the occupied territories with an increasingly well-educated and middle-class leadership, just as the West Bank and Gaza emerged as the likely territorial basis for a future Palestinian state.

The result of the twelfth PNC (June 1974) committed the PLO to a ten-point plan known as the phased plan, point two of which included provision for "a people's national, independent and fighting authority on every part of Palestinian land that is liberated."⁶⁶ (The political initiative in this regard was left to the DFLP, the first faction to openly propose a compromise solution at the twelfth PNC.) This represented the first time that the PLO had openly allowed itself to conceive of an intermediate goal along the path to liberation. Equally significant was point four of the plan, the first time an official resolution of the PLO had made explicit reference to the establishment of a state. Despite the ambiguous language, for those with ears to hear it, there was no doubt that this alluded to the existence of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The decisions of the twelfth PNC marked the emergence of both an accepted territorial basis for the proposed Palestinian state, and a national project to accompany it. The objections of the Rejection Front notwithstanding, a two-state solution and a national authority were now PLO policy.

These developments were accompanied by a rapid improvement in the PLO's international status. In October 1974, the Arab summit in Rabat partially resolved the dispute between the PLO and Jordan over representation of the Palestinians: although a measure of ambiguity remained, the PLO was granted the status of "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."⁶⁷ In November of the same year, Arafat was invited to address the UNGA, a gigantic leap in international legitimacy resulting in two further gains. First, the PLO was granted observer status at general assembly sessions and, second, Resolution 3236 explicitly recognized the Palestinian people's right to self-determination.⁶⁸ The PLO had now taken significant strides toward fulfilling two more criteria for a successful transition toward government-in-waiting status.

The PLO's adoption of diplomacy can be said to represent the decision phase identified by Rustow within the transition process. To recall Rustow's phrase, democracy is "acquired by a process of conscious decision at least on the part of the top political leadership."⁶⁹ In the case of the PLO, the decisions leading to Arafat's UN address represent a series of elite initiatives culminating in the adoption of diplomatic rules and procedures on the part of the national movement. Similarly, the adaptation of the PLO's institutional content as a result of these initiatives was carried out deliberately by actors

adapting to their structural surroundings. In Rustow's words: "What matters at the decision stage is not what values the leaders hold dear in the abstract, but what concrete steps they are willing to take."⁷⁰ The PLO leadership had plainly taken concrete steps at the expense of abstract ideals. The next task was to secure a consensus within the PLO regarding the adoption of diplomatic and procedural means. Unfortunately, international structural factors would continue to deny the leadership the opportunity to capitalize on these diplomatic gains, rendering an internal consensus all the more difficult to realize.

This burst of diplomatic activity, with its inherent threat of compromise, led the PFLP to suspend its membership of the executive committee and the establishment, together with three smaller factions, of the Rejection Front. In reality, they would have little to worry about for some time. As Alain Gresh observed, between 1974 and 1977, in spite of all of the achievements, the PLO was given no viable diplomatic option with committed U.S. support.⁷¹ The PLO's diplomatic success was prevented from translating into concrete negotiated agreements by a combination of Israeli intransigence and the U.S. preoccupation with the supposed cold war threat that a Palestinian state was imagined to represent. U.S. policy had already undermined the PLO during the Black September crisis, when the Nixon administration used the CIA to stiffen King Husayn's resolve.⁷² Regular payments to the king were reputedly suspended until he undertook to act decisively; once U.S. policy had been implemented and the resistance liquidated, payments were resumed.⁷³ The PLO also suffered for being on the wrong end of the Nixon Doctrine, the essence of which

Envisaged reliance on regional surrogate powers to enforce respect for the status quo and defend American interests. In the Middle East this was fulfilled by Iran in the Gulf and Israel in the Fertile Crescent.⁷⁴

During the 1970 crisis, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger successfully deployed Israel to deter a pro-PLO Syrian incursion into Jordan, whereupon Israel was elevated to the status of strategic asset.⁷⁵ This use of dependent, pro-Western regional allies was consistent with the role played by Ethiopia under Haile Selassie in the Horn of Africa and the apartheid regime in South Africa. In the Middle East, U.S. policy dovetailed neatly with the Israeli strategy of aligning with non-Arab states on the periphery of the region in Iran, Turkey, and Ethiopia.

In terms of the transitional model, the end of 1974 revealed significant progress, especially through the elite-driven adoption of procedural means and institutional adaptation, both of which closed the gap between the PLO and its structural context. However, the leadership's capacity to capitalize on these results was continually frustrated by the hostile orientation of Israel and the United States, the dominant players on the regional and international levels. A centralized leadership had started to coalesce within the PLO, while the PLO had secured its place as the recognized authoritative leadership of the Palestinian people. The bureaucratic and military apparatus were expanding and diversifying, lending the institution the hallmarks of a government-in-waiting. The implicit recognition of a two-state solution opened the possibility of a territorial settlement alongside Israel, and, at least within a majority of the PLO, the call for a national authority on any part of Palestine proved an acceptable, if vague, national project. Finally, the PLO's international status had risen immeasurably, and the

leadership's readiness to play by the rules of the game had been clearly indicated. However, both Israel and the United States chose to ignore the PLO's moderation and leap in status, determined instead to deny it a meaningful diplomatic dialogue and, if possible, to marginalize it altogether.

1988

The PLO's shift toward a diplomatic solution reached a watershed this year when the nineteenth PNC explicitly accepted UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 and openly called for a two-state solution alongside Israel. Jordan's renunciation of claims to the West Bank, the decisions of the nineteenth PNC, and the brief U.S.-PLO dialogue form the major developments of interest and mostly concern the last four criteria in Table 1. However, prior to that, the antecedents of the intifada and the situation in 1988 require some examination, together with the implications for the authoritative leadership of the PLO.

In the years preceding the intifada, the PLO's campaign to assert authoritative leadership over the West Bank and Gaza had taken place amid a three-way competition with Jordan and Israel. As Israeli colonization steadily undermined the mediating role of the notable class, both the PLO and Jordan sought to win local loyalties through disbursing substantial funds via the Joint Committee, established in 1978.⁷⁶ The PLO exercised patronage through funds for institution building, including research groups, unions, and newspapers, which served as fronts for the promotion of the nationalist agenda. A second aspect of the institution-building process involved an interfactional competition for influence. As Cobban noted, the Palestine-based PCP had an established tradition of promoting mass organizations that preceded the 1967 occupation. The communists were joined by other leftist factions toward the end of the 1970s, and finally by Fatah during the early 1980s. Following the withdrawal from Beirut, Fatah began the construction of its own institutional network, laying the basis for its role in the intifada.⁷⁷

The Fatah leadership owed much in this respect to the efforts of Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), operating from Amman until 1986, in the period following the PLO's eviction from Beirut.⁷⁸ From his position as chief of Fatah's military wing, Wazir set himself the task of creating a network of activists within the West Bank and Gaza. His reputedly extraordinary organizational capacity lent him a degree of personal control over the activists that would form the foundation of Fatah's role in, and the PLO's eventual direction of, the intifada. The personalized nature of Wazir's control meant that his death dealt the network in the occupied territories, known as the Western Sector (*al-Qita' al-Gharbi*), a serious blow. However, the durability of the intifada underlined the extent to which local leadership capabilities had developed while also lending the PLO in Tunis a priceless weight in the diplomatic arena.⁷⁹

The scale and durability of the intifada can be attributed to the systematic discrimination of the settler-colonial regime on the one hand, and the direction, provided by the indigenous nationalist leadership on the other. Ziyad Abu 'Amr attributed the root causes of the uprising to "twenty years of Israeli occupation and Israeli policies aimed at undermining the material and national existence of the Palestinians in their own land." He specifically identified land confiscation, "an aggressive settlement policy," repressive measures, and human rights violations that "[u]nlike classical patterns of colonialis...

failed to win the sympathy or support of any meaningful sector of the occupied population.”⁸⁰ Indeed, as noted earlier, Israel’s policy of land confiscation directly alienated and undermined the large land-owning notable class that might otherwise have mediated colonial control, returning us to the major structural changes in Palestinian society identified by Robinson. Not only did structural changes undermine the authority of the notable class, they also generated a new university-educated non-notable “counterelite” that was ready and able to lead the national mobilization of society. In Robinson’s pithy summary,

The revolutionary process was directly linked to the structural changes which preceded it. In this case, structural changes had weakened an old elite and brought a counter-elite to the fore. This new elite mobilized and transformed society in order to better confront the occupation.⁸¹

Despite the PLO’s investment in institution and network building, the spontaneous onset of the uprising presented a double challenge to the Tunis-based leadership, first from the indigenous nationalist leadership, and second from the non-PLO Islamic factions, Hamas (formed by the Muslim Brotherhood as a *response* to the intifada), and Islamic Jihad.⁸² In order to meet this challenge, the PLO leadership drew upon its network of activists to establish the UNLU, *al-Qiyada al-Wataniyya al-Muwahhada lil-Intifada*, a series of locally organized coordinating committees that institutionalized cooperation among the four leading nationalist factions of the PLO: Fatah, the PFLP, DFLP, and PPP (formerly the PCP). The PLO’s capacity to realize this was partly facilitated by the reunification of the leading nationalist factions that occurred during the eighteenth PNC in April 1987, and that ended the Syrian-sponsored split between Fatah and the left. The end of this damaging split bolstered Arafat’s authoritative leadership within the PLO and restored the credibility of the PLO within the wider Palestinian society.⁸³

Abu ‘Amr has summarized PLO-UNLU coordination thusly:

Shortly after the outbreak of the intifada, the PLO’s factions outside began coordination with their organisations inside instructing them to fully coordinate with each other...the PLO’s leadership outside played a principal role in deciding and coordinating the format of the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising... In addition, the deportation by Israeli occupation authorities of national leaders from the occupied territories who joined the PLO leadership and institutions outside...contributed in creating a uniformity of the political national outlook between the “exterior” and the “interior”...⁸⁴

This model of operational unity has also been stressed by Cobban, who pointed to Tunis’s role in providing the leaflets (*bayanat*) and radio broadcasts that helped direct the intifada.⁸⁵ ‘Ali Jarbawi expounded a similar view at the time: “the UNL[U] sees itself as the local political and activist arm of the PLO. UNL[U] communiques illustrate tight coordination between the inside and outside, and show absolute support for the PLO abroad.”⁸⁶ Robinson presents a rather different view, asserting that the character of the UNLU changed dramatically from March 1990, whereupon senior political figures such

as Faysal al-Husayni replaced the lower-level grass-roots leadership drawn from the camps and the popular committees that had previously held the reins and, significantly, eluded the full authority of Tunis. From this point forth, "Tunis was finally able to control decision-making at the top level of the Intifada and to ensure that such decisions more accurately reflected its own thinking."⁸⁷ Robinson's nuanced interpretation of the UNLU, consistent with his focus on the structural changes behind the intifada, underlines the salience of viewing the PLO's trajectory from a structure-agency perspective. Structural changes within the occupied territories generated a potential threat to the PLO-Tunis, but also a potential resource: as an agent, the PLO-Tunis sought to subordinate the local leadership in defense of its own political hegemony, while also appropriating the nationalist mobilization expressed by the intifada to enhance its diplomatic standing.

The intifada might thus be said to have held mixed consequences for the authoritative leadership. Structural changes underway since the 1970s facilitated the uprising through the generation of an indigenous nationalist counter-elite that presented a potential threat to the political hegemony of Tunis. On the other hand, the widespread mobilization of society behind the PLO's agenda lent the Tunis-based leadership a fresh legitimacy in the eyes of international society; indeed, the threat of wider instability finally prompted a reappraisal of U.S. policy toward the PLO. In this respect, the intifada supplied the PLO with a renewed diplomatic weight that it had sorely lacked since the withdrawal from Beirut. At the same time, the West Bank and Gaza exerted a greater gravitational pull on PLO decision making, a development reflected in the decisions of the nineteenth PNC, and that further habituated the organization to the use of diplomatic means. In 1990, the prospect of incorporating Hamas into the PLO was raised at talks in Khartoum, but the demand of 40 percent of PNC seats was deemed unreasonable and the matter was dropped.⁸⁸

The bureaucracy remained functional but exiled in Tunis, as did the armed forces, now some two thousand kilometers from the territory they aspired to liberate. However, in between the eviction from Beirut in 1982 and the onset of the intifada in late 1987, two important developments occurred with consequences for the authoritative leadership. The first involved a rebellion against Arafat *within* Fatah, the second a reorganization of PLO military forces that enhanced the position of Arafat and Fatah within the PLO, and that would later be reflected in the composition of the PA's security apparatus.

Prior to the invasion of Lebanon, the PLO leadership had garnered some credit for negotiating and maintaining a cross-factional ceasefire for ten months from July 1981. U.S. appreciation of PLO discipline was not well received in Israel, lending added incentive to the decision to invade. In the aftermath of a campaign in which guerrilla performance was questioned, compounded by the consequences of withdrawal from Beirut, a serious challenge arose to Arafat's leadership *within* Fatah.⁸⁹ In January 1983, dissidents led by Muhammad Sa'id Musa Maragha launched a bitter attack on Arafat during a session of the Fatah revolutionary council. Shortly thereafter, this became a full-scale military rebellion with Syrian support, aimed at wresting control of Fatah from Arafat's hands. The Fatah chief returned to Lebanon to confront the rebels before being forced to retreat again, this time from the port of Tripoli under Syrian artillery fire. The rebels were eventually marginalized, but the incident again demonstrated the susceptibility of Arafat's authoritative leadership to interference from the Arab states.⁹⁰

Fatah subsequently consolidated its position within the PLO by securing effective control over the remainder of the military apparatus. In 1983, the Fatah military committee decided to merge its forces, as did the PFLP and the DFLP, with the PLA to form the Palestinian National Liberation Army, although the Damascus-based factions revoked their decision in 1984 under Syrian pressure. This development was recounted by 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda as commander of the PA's National Security apparatus in the Gaza Strip. As if to underline the point, Majayda himself began his career as a PLA officer, prior to joining Fatah. He also explained how the guerrilla groups outside the PNLA had subsequently withered away, for reasons as mundane as their members having to earn a living.⁹¹ After all, even revolutionaries have to pay their bills. The upshot was to leave Fatah in generally undisputed control of PLO military forces, a major step toward the creation of a subordinate armed force, at least in the diaspora. Beginning in 1994, the PNLA would be redeployed to Palestine and transformed into the security apparatus of the PA.

In Palestine, the intifada complicated matters through the proliferation of local armed elements. Two indigenous armed groups emerged claiming allegiance to Fatah: the Black Panthers (*al-Fahd al-Aswad*) in the West Bank and the Fatah Hawks (*Suqur Fatah*) in the Gaza Strip. Both were nominally subordinate to Tunis, yet both retained an element of independence and readiness to defy the leadership in exile. The PFLP also retained its own military wing in the territories, the Red Eagles (*al-Suqur al-Ahmar*). Moreover, both Hamas and its military wing, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (*Kata'ib 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam*), and Islamic Jihad organized military operations to confront the occupation outside the framework of the PLO. In this respect, progress toward a subordinate armed force can be said to have advanced significantly in the diaspora, but to have been complicated in Palestine. Oslo would present an opportunity to address this, and the indigenous nationalist leadership along with it, through a combination of co-option and coercion.

As for establishing an acceptable territorial basis for the proposed Palestinian state, 1988 saw the PLO take a major stride forward. This was somewhat unanticipated given that only the year before, during the November 1987 Arab summit in Amman, King Husayn had relegated Palestine to the bottom of the agenda. Indeed, preoccupied with the Iran-Iraq war and still smarting over Arafat's withdrawal from the Amman initiative, this most politically astute of Arab leaders seemingly allowed his personal feelings to cloud his judgment. This attempt, "wilful or otherwise, to downgrade the PLO in full view of a large and politically aware Palestinian television audience in the West Bank and Gaza backfired."⁹² The explicit demotion of the Palestine issue and implicit marginalization of the PLO leadership was duly noted by a restive population, contributing to the outbreak of the first intifada.

Less than one year later, Husayn's response to the intifada's forceful demonstration of solidarity with the PLO, and concomitant rejection of Hashemite pretensions to represent the Palestinians, prompted Husayn to renounce Jordanian claims to the West Bank on July 31, 1988. He also took practical steps to underline the point,

Dissolv[ing] the Jordanian parliament which had West Bank representation, and cancell[ing] Jordan's West Bank development scheme. The Palestine National Council said that it would take over the

responsibilities, and early in August Jordan stopped paying the salaries of 21,000 Arab school teachers and civil servants on the West Bank.⁹³

Husayn's surprise move challenged the PLO leadership to take the initiative, prompting the hasty elaboration of an acceptable national project with important ramifications for the organization's international status and orientation.

The links among these three criteria had been clear for some time. In 1975, Kissinger had sought to preclude the possibility of a Palestinian state and a role for the PLO with his unhelpful commitment to Israel, "prohibit[ing] the United States from negotiating with and recognizing the PLO, until the PLO accepted UN[SC] Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognized the right to exist of the state of Israel."⁹⁴ The conclusion of the Camp David Accords three years later again saw both U.S. and Israeli policy explicitly rule out a Palestinian state and a role for the PLO in a political settlement. The outcome of the nineteenth PNC would allow the PLO leadership to formulate an acceptable (in the sense of "negotiable") national project that met the requirements of the United States, reorienting the organization in a more pro-Western direction and improving its international status accordingly.

The PNC was convened in its nineteenth session in Algiers during November 1988, the upshot of which was a proclamation establishing the state of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with UNGA Resolution 181 (the "partition" resolution) of November 1947.⁹⁵ Despite this initiative, the Israeli government continued to ignore the PLO and Palestinian claims to a state. On the other hand, U.S. policy was seriously wrong-footed: how were they to respond when they had always looked for a solution involving Jordan? U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz denied Arafat a visa for the United States, in response to which Arafat addressed the UNGA in special session in Geneva. By the end of proceedings, Arafat had uttered the words required of him by U.S. foreign policy, explicitly accepting Resolutions 242 and 338, recognizing Israel's right to exist and renouncing terrorism. As a result, the U.S. ambassador to Tunisia Robert Pelletreau was authorized to open a dialogue with the PLO, represented in Tunis by Hakam Bal'awi, a future member of the PA's Legislative Council for Tulkarm and minister of the interior under Qray'.⁹⁶

The 1988 initiative can be interpreted as an elite-driven process designed to align the organization more closely with its structural context: the national project ratified by the nineteenth PNC met the demands of the mainstream nationalist constituency in the occupied territories, and eventually produced the reward of a dialogue with the United States. This apparent breakthrough can be usefully contrasted to the failure of three diplomatic initiatives formulated earlier in the decade: the Fahd or Fez Plan, the Reagan Plan, and the Amman Agreement. Each represented an attempt to formulate an acceptable Palestinian national project, the first two by external actors, the latter a joint project by Arafat and King Husayn, each of which failed for want of the right alignment of Palestinian, regional, and international factors.

The first project was proposed by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and later resurfaced at the Arab summit in Fez during August 1981. Its key provisions included

An Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in 1967; the establishment, after a short transition period under UN auspices, of a

Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza; and, in the controversial Clause 7, “that all states in the region should be able to live in peace.”⁹⁷

The plan failed at its initial outing due to Syrian opposition and Asad’s boycott of the 1981 Arab summit. Moreover, despite Arafat’s tacit approval, Fatah did not officially endorse it, depriving the plan of an Arab consensus even before it reached Israel and the United States. The Fahd Plan resurfaced in September 1982, this time at the reconvened Arab summit in Fez where it was renamed the Fez Plan. Despite a favorable response, this time from both the PLO and Syria, it once again came to nothing as Israel and the United States ignored it. Israel remained doggedly opposed to any plan involving a role for the PLO and a prospective Palestinian state, and in the context of serious regional instability (the revolutionary regime in Iran, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war), the United States took a similar view, preferring to rely instead on conservative and pro-Western Jordan in any solution, as embodied in the Reagan Plan.

The Reagan Plan emerged almost alongside the Fez Plan in September 1982. Reagan called for further Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian entity linked to Jordan, while clearly ruling out the option of a Palestinian state. The PLO appeared ready to test U.S. intentions, probing for room for maneuver. Khalil al-Wazir had tried to take a positive view, declaring, “Without an active and broad political move to bolster the role of the loaded rifle, we will end up in a vacuum.”⁹⁸ Nevertheless, despite the Fatah leadership’s apparent flexibility, the Reagan Plan hit the brick wall of Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin. In the event, the Reagan Plan suited neither the PLO nor Israel, and underlined the difficulty of formulating a national project that could close the gap between actors with such fundamentally different conceptions of what constituted “acceptable.”

The Husayn-Arafat talks produced the Amman Agreement of February 1985, the essence of which suggested a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation that accommodated Palestinian self-determination. This proposal, much closer to the shared preferences of the Israeli Labor Party and the United States, formally broke down over Arafat’s reluctance to accept Resolutions 242 and 338 without first securing U.S. recognition of the Palestinian’s right to self-determination.⁹⁹ In reality, Arafat’s retreat was prompted in large part by opposition from within the PLO (within Fatah, the PFLP, and the DFLP, all with Syrian support), not least of all over the issue of representation. In Wazir’s words, “Nobody will negotiate on our behalf or share our representation. ...There is no compromise on this whatsoever.”¹⁰⁰

The failure of the Amman Agreement demonstrated just how complicated progress toward a diplomatic solution could be: a political initiative on the part of the leadership could not ignore the need to maintain internal unity within a complex organization; moreover, the PLO again proved itself extremely politically porous, always ready to absorb external influences, in this case Syrian. In this instance, transition toward an acceptable national project gave way to the need to maintain internal cohesion within the institution. In contrast, the 1988 initiative saw the disparate factions close ranks in response to the challenge of the intifada and the Hashemite political withdrawal. In other words, by 1988 the interests of the institution *required* the formulation of an acceptable national project if the PLO were to retain its authoritative leadership within the

Palestinian polity. As a consequence, the PLO leadership retained the loyalty of its most important constituency and gained a dialogue with the United States.

The U.S.-PLO dialogue represented an important diplomatic channel, long-coveted by Arafat and long-denied him by successive U.S. administrations. It was opened by Reagan on December 14, 1988, and closed by the first president Bush on July 20, 1990.¹⁰¹ Despite the apparent breakthrough, the diplomatic results of the dialogue were minimal and talks were formally discontinued following an abortive operation against Israel by a minor PLO faction.¹⁰² However, in terms of the transitional model, the fact that the dialogue happened at all underlines the PLO's movement toward an orientation congruent with the international balance of power.

Summarizing developments by 1988, we can say that Arafat and Fatah had further consolidated their authoritative leadership in the diaspora; Arafat had weathered the Syrian-backed challenge to his authority within Fatah, and Fatah had consolidated its control over the PLO's military with the formation of the PNLA. In the occupied territories, structural changes had generated a fresh nationalist elite, ready and able to lead the intifada, a challenge that the PLO leadership met through the institutionalization of the intifada via the UNLU and the eventual subordination of the UNLU to Tunis. The coordination of PLO groups via the UNLU also helped contain the threat of the Islamists operating beyond the framework of the PLO. The PLO possessed both a substantial bureaucracy and a subordinate armed force in the diaspora, yet both were mired in unproductive exile. Jordan's renunciation of claims to the West Bank allowed for substantial progress toward an accepted territory, while the nineteenth PNC and acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 matched this with an acceptable national project, the results of which appeared to underline the rewards of habituation to diplomacy. The leadership's 1988 initiative thus realigned the institution with its structural context, first as a response to changes within the occupied territories, and second toward an orientation congruent with the international balance of power. However, these positive developments were offset by Israel's persistent refusal to negotiate.

The dramatic volte face in international orientation following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, would keep the PLO closely aligned to domestic constituencies in the West Bank and Gaza, but set it at odds with the regional and international structural context in which it was embedded. In point of fact, as Philip Mattar noted, PLO policy was actually so confused it simply left plenty of room for misinterpretation, but was predictably characterized by the Western media as unambiguously pro-Iraqi. Before long, the lack of a clear condemnation of the invasion or of a call for Iraqi withdrawal had left the PLO diplomatically isolated.¹⁰³

On the domestic level, Arafat was paying attention to his key constituency, the Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Jordan, among whom support for Saddam Husayn's clever linkage of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories was substantial. Equally, Arafat had one eye on his Islamist competitors in Palestine, together with the radicals within Fatah and the rest of the PLO. In addition, Arafat had been engaged in a strategic alliance with Iraq, as a result of which the PLO is said to have received \$48 million annually.¹⁰⁴ Finally, despair over the failure of the 1988 initiative and the breakdown of U.S.-PLO dialogue reinforced the logic of Arafat's position.

The costs of failing to clearly condemn the invasion hit the PLO on three levels. Internally, the organization appeared to totter toward insolvency. The PLO's treasury, the PNF (*al-Sunduq al-Qawmi*), lost the 5 percent "liberation tax" levied from the estimated 350,000 Palestinians residing in Kuwait. The same Palestinian community was reduced to around 30,000 individuals, resulting in a collective loss of an estimated \$8 billion in Palestinian income and assets and the loss of vital revenue repatriated to the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁰⁵ Key Arab states, including traditional wealthy supporters in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, were alienated from the PLO, and the weight of Arab consensus in the international arena, so painfully constructed over two decades, evaporated overnight. Moreover, this rapid turnabout in international orientation lost the PLO much goodwill and credibility in the West and saw them punished shortly thereafter with exclusion from the Madrid Conference.

1993

With the signing of the DoP between the Israeli government and the PLO in September 1993, the organization completed its transition to government-in-waiting status and became directly and openly engaged in a diplomatic process aimed at realizing an institutional solution to the issue of Palestinian self-determination. From this point forth, the nature of the transition process was fundamentally different: with the liberation movement now accepted as a legitimate government-in-waiting, the aim of the process shifted from the acquisition of key attributes necessary to attain that status, to the conversion of those attributes into government status per se.

First and foremost, the authoritative leadership of the PLO in exile was both clarified and enhanced by the DoP. Within the PLO, Arafat and Fatah consolidated their grip on the institution through the secret Oslo channel, marginalizing the leftists from decision making and co-opting the remainder (most prominently FIDA) to Fatah's fait accompli. In the occupied territories, Israel's recognition of Arafat's authority granted the leadership a renewed legitimacy: when residents of the West Bank and Gaza were asked at the time "how did this agreement affect your attitude towards the PLO," 46.5 percent felt it had enhanced it, while just over 19 percent said it had been negatively affected.¹⁰⁶ The DoP also resolved the problematic relationship with the delegation from Madrid, at that time still negotiating in earnest in Washington. Moreover, the Oslo process would soon facilitate the redeployment to the West Bank and Gaza, allowing the PLO to more effectively subordinate both the indigenous nationalist leadership and the non-PLO Islamic groups.

The consolidation of the diaspora leadership's authority was underpinned by the provisions for the return and transformation of PLO institutions. The Tunis-based bureaucracy was destined to become the institutional backbone of the PA across the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, recruitment from among the indigenous population into the ministerial apparatus would secure valuable local support for the autonomy project. Similarly, the redeployment of the PNLA resolved another obstacle in the way of the creation of a subordinate armed force, allowing the leadership to assert control over the military wings of the indigenous nationalist factions, the majority of the members of which would be recruited into the PA's extensive security apparatus. The Oslo process

also granted the PLO the opportunity to return and deal directly with the military wings of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Furthermore, the provisions for an executive authority and later an elected council facilitated the incorporation of local allies, principally the notable class and the indigenous bourgeoisie, into the new national project.

The DoP also marked a quantum leap in terms of the fourth criterion, an accepted territory. Whatever its shortcomings, the DoP did finally demarcate *some* territory within which the institution could assert a measure of legitimate authority. The fact that this authority was both heavily proscribed and confined to two small semi-autonomous enclaves in Gaza and Jericho was of secondary importance, although it did generate much domestic skepticism. The popular mood was neatly captured by a joke suggesting a new flag; the PA should drop the old Arab nationalist colors of black, white, green, and red in favor of something more modest, a chili for Gaza and a banana for Jericho, which more accurately reflected the scope of their authority.¹⁰⁷

Closely linked to territory were advances in the PLO's national project. The provisions of the DoP facilitated the establishment of the PA, a project accepted, with reservations, by the majority in the occupied territories. In the same poll cited above, just over 60 percent of Palestinians felt that the DoP "constitutes a realistic step that may lead us towards a Palestinian state,"¹⁰⁸ while only 33 percent disagreed. Crucially, the PLO's project also received international society's stamp of approval. Unfortunately, the terms of the agreement that framed the project were so vague they remained widely open to interpretation. The agreement also postponed discussions over particularly sensitive issues for final status negotiations, including Palestinian sovereign statehood, the status of Jerusalem, illegal Israeli settlements, refugees, and borders. The PLO's interpretation naturally placed emphasis on the PA as a necessary step along the path to full statehood with Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital; in contrast, the Israeli interpretation suggested that the final outcome would be something altogether less substantial.

Finally, the DoP marked significant development in terms of both international recognition and orientation. The agreement provided explicit Israeli recognition of the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, underscored in practice by the realization of a diplomatic dialogue with the government in Tel Aviv. Israel's legitimization of the PLO was followed by a leap in the international recognition accorded by international society, in particular the West, and including the United States. Although the DoP failed to legitimize Palestinian claims to statehood, it did legitimize the PLO as the authoritative leadership of the national movement. This period saw Arafat begin to revel in the limelight of international respectability conferred upon him by Oslo and enjoy regular photo opportunities alongside pillars of the international order, and was crowned in 1994 by his ascension to Nobel laureate in the trinity of himself, Rabin, and Peres. In this respect, the advances in international recognition derived from Oslo enhanced the authoritative leadership of the PLO, but did rather less to legitimize Palestinian claims to statehood, the declared aim of the PLO's national project. As for international orientation, the advances gained in terms of status derived in large part from a decisive shift Westward. In the context of the NWO and the almost unchallenged political hegemony of the United States in the region, the DoP firmly realigned the PLO into a position consistent with the prevailing regional and international structures of power. By extension, as Christopher Parker has noted, this realignment allowed them to take advantage of the restructuring of "international patronage networks occurring in the

post-Cold War international environment generally.”¹⁰⁹ Tangible financial benefits were not long in coming; in October 1993, just one month after the signing of the DoP, “forty-two donor countries and agencies met at a U.S.-sponsored conference to pledge financial support, in one of the broadest and most ambitious international aid efforts in history.”¹¹⁰ Both the scale and the sources of this new-found international support for Palestine were impressive. On top of the list of new sponsors was the EU, which according to Rex Brynen had pledged some \$400 million by 1998, “plus up to \$300 million in loans offered through the European Investment Bank, plus another \$1.3 billion or so pledged bilaterally by individual EU members.” The United States would come in second, “followed by Germany, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Italy and the Netherlands,” while the World Bank would pledge a further \$228 million in loans.¹¹¹ Such were the rewards for the PLO’s realignment, via the DoP, into a position congruent with the international balance of power.

1996

By 1996, the authoritative leadership of the PLO had undergone a substantial evolution, as a result of which the authority of the returnees had been further consolidated and arguably reached its zenith. Through the Oslo process, decision making within the PLO had substantially narrowed down to involve mainly Arafat and Fatah, supported by some of the minor PLO factions and loyal independents. In the meantime, authoritative leadership within the PA had been achieved by a combination of co-option and coercion, enhanced and legitimized by the elections for the Legislative Council and the PA presidency, easily won by Fatah and Arafat respectively, in January 1996. Within the terms of the Oslo process, the PA now formed a legally constituted governing authority in the semi-autonomous zones of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and construction of the institutional and social bases for governance continued to advance.

This authoritative leadership was supported and enforced by the substantial bureaucratic and security apparatus of the PA. PLO institutions and personnel were imported from Tunis and elsewhere to form the backbone of the administrative and coercive apparatus. Both were bolstered through a process of institutional adaptation and expansion that allowed for the large-scale recruitment of personnel from among the indigenous population. This process had also begun to reduce the resources available to the non-state NGO community and facilitated the incorporation of some of the technocratic and professional middle classes into the autonomy project. The PA quickly established a disparate and pervasive subordinate armed force, composed of returnee PNLAs soldiers and indigenous armed elements such as the Black Panthers and the Fatah Hawks. The PLO’s combat forces from the diaspora were thus merged with local nationalist fighters to form the PA’s security apparatus, all of which were subordinate to and dependent on the authoritative leadership of Arafat. However, despite the recruitment of individual Islamist supporters into the new apparatus, both Islamic Jihad and the military wing of Hamas remained outside the PA. Moreover, the Islamists’ retention of an independent and sporadically effective military capacity continued to question the PA’s authority within the occupied territories and strained its relations with successive Israeli governments. Reinforcing the capacity to co-opt, both the PA and Israel continued

to coerce: by late 1996 an estimated 1,200 Palestinians had been jailed by the PA, with 7 tortured to death, and a further 6,000 imprisoned by Israel, which retained the right to arrest and detain “suspects” in those areas in which it retained security control (areas B and C). Indicative of realities on the ground, of those Palestinians then in Israeli jails, some 3,000 had been arrested *after* the signing of the DoP.¹¹²

The PA had made additional but limited progress with its accepted territory, assuming a measure of practical authority within the autonomous zones of Gaza and Jericho and expanding the boundaries of PA jurisdiction following the IDF’s pre-election redeployment from West Bank population centers in late 1995. In the West Bank, the semi-autonomy realized in the Jericho enclave had now been extended to include all the major urban centers except Hebron and East Jerusalem, but only as part of a complicated arrangement that divided West Bank territory into separate categories in areas A, B, and C. At the same time, every Israeli settlement remained in place in Gaza while colonization both expanded and accelerated throughout the West Bank, further isolating East Jerusalem from its Arab hinterland. Nevertheless, within the confines of its territorial and legal restrictions, the acceptable national project of the PA was now an accomplished institutional fact. The cautious hopes that greeted the announcement of the DoP fluctuated, with the period following the IDF redeployment in late 1995, followed by the elections on January 20, 1996, characterized by renewed (if very short-lived) optimism. An election day opinion poll found that 50 percent continued to support the DoP, while only 16 percent opposed it. Significantly, Fatah retained a “solid majority of support with 57 percent of voters identifying themselves as Fateh supporters.”¹¹³ The high turnout for the elections, 73.5 percent in the West Bank and 86.77 percent in the Gaza Strip, served as an index of the legitimacy of the national project within the occupied territories. Finally, the autonomy project continued to receive the support of the international community and the official if reluctant endorsement of Netanyahu’s Likud government following the May 1996 elections in Israel.

Little had changed in the last two criteria since 1993; the PLO continued to enjoy international recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the PA constituted a recognized semi-autonomous governing authority with a sort of associate membership of international society. However, international recognition of the institutions did not extend to unconditional support for the Palestinian right to full self-determination, or to the PA’s automatic right to evolve into the government of a sovereign state. Unfortunately for the PA leadership, the post-cold war context left them with no alternative superpower sponsors and so they retained a pro-Western orientation. Given the accelerated Israeli colonization drive pursued under Oslo and the PA’s concomitant inability to promote rational economic development, international patronage in the form of Western financial assistance constituted a critical life-support machine without which the PA would have quickly collapsed and died.

2003

Recalling Mahoney and Snyder, the publication of the Roadmap in 2003 marked a critical juncture for Palestinian institutions in two main respects: domestically, it released major elite-driven institutional changes within the PA with consequences for authoritative

leadership, the bureaucracy, subordinate armed force, and accepted territory; internationally, it signaled a broad revalidation of the PLO's national project and ongoing recognition of an albeit modified Palestinian leadership that it was hoped would demonstrate a clear pro-Western orientation and decisively suppress the remnants of anti-colonial revolt. In return, the PA would secure its existence as an institution now recognized as an intermediate step on the road to statehood, recognition that now officially extended to Israel and the United States. It was, at least in principle, an important gain given that Oslo's precarious arrangements had folded some three years earlier following the failed Camp David II summit in July 2000 and the visit of Ariel Sharon (then in opposition) to the al-Aqsa mosque in September. Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and U.S. president Bill Clinton had attempted to realize a final status agreement at very short notice and more or less on Israeli-U.S. terms and found the Palestinians surprisingly resolute. The Sharon visit then prompted a spontaneous release of pressure pent up beneath Oslo's crust of failure. From the perspective of authoritative leadership, the decision not to buckle at Camp David greatly restored Arafat's standing within the Palestinian polity. The uprising was then appropriated as a resource to supplement diplomatic means. But this position, and an initial reluctance to confront the resistance head on (and later reinforced as Israel ignored, belittled, or traduced him when he did), came at considerable cost: recognition of Arafat's authoritative leadership was withdrawn by Israel and the United States, much of the PA's bureaucratic and security service infrastructure was demolished, and its territory reoccupied. Embarrassed by the carnage, the international Quartet of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia produced the Roadmap, a hybrid attempt to end the al-Aqsa intifada, preserve some remnant of Palestinian institutions, and put the Oslo process back on track.

The authoritative leadership of Arafat within Fatah and of Fatah within Palestine was now open to question. A non-ideological competition for resources between returnees and local cadres coupled with Oslo's self-evident failings as a national project had mobilized considerable grassroots pressure for reform between the 1996 elections and summer 2000. The uprising stalled that process and redirected the pressure for change. Israel's devastation of the local leadership again reduced the challenge from within the movement, but the decline of authoritative leadership was evidenced by the increased operational independence exercised by local splinter groups in the West Bank and Gaza. The intifada left Arafat and the returnees in charge of Fatah, but a Fatah unreformed at its highest levels, weakened by loss of personnel, and fragmented by closure. As Fatah and the PA lost ground, Hamas and Islamic Jihad gained it. But ongoing Israeli raids and assassinations suggested they would be hard pressed to consolidate their alternative leadership claims.

For the PA, external pressure had seen Arafat relinquish the portfolio of Minister of the Interior back in 2002. The momentum for reform forced more concessions the following year, most importantly the creation of the post of prime minister (with whom he would fight for control of the Ministry of the Interior and by extension the security apparatus), and the empowerment of a respected finance minister. Both impinged on his patronage network. The trend for forcible regime change set by the latest war on Iraq was noted, a very real incentive to reform and *be seen* to reform. Prime Minister Mahmud 'Abbas then attempted to establish his own authoritative leadership predicated on a clear pro-U.S. orientation and engagement with the Sharon government. He failed. Prime

Minister Ahmad Qray' kept a prudent distance from both Israel and the United States and seemed destined to survive a little longer if to no short-term advantage. No such complications were evident within the more sheltered corridors of the PLO, which remained a possible bolt-hole with some mobility in the event of further deterioration in the PA.¹¹⁴

In spite of the devastation, the size of the PA's bureaucracy and the armed forces actually hit a peak at this time. Drawing on World Bank and UNSCO figures, Roy showed that by mid-1998 the PA's civilian workforce approached some fifty thousand employees, not including local government workers and those hired on a daily basis, while the security services passed forty thousand to give a total of almost ninety thousand salaries on the public sector wage bill, around one fifth of the total Palestinian labor force costing 60 percent of the PA's budget.¹¹⁵ By 2003, the PA employed some 132,000 personnel in total.¹¹⁶ Two points can be made in mitigation: first, prior to IDF reinvasion consolidation of the PA's grip on the urban centers witnessed considerable progress in internal revenue collection and its ability to pay for itself; second, recruitment increased during the al-Aqsa intifada in a well-meant effort to substitute incomes lost in the private sector and Israel due to closure. But salaries constituted a crippling expense just as closure and reinvasion left the PA unable to collect taxes or utility payments, particularly in the north of the West Bank.¹¹⁷ Closure and the denial of access to jobs in Israel, the impact of the separation barrier, and a loss of donor interest added to the financial and economic gloom. In the meantime, popular alienation from the PA was compounded by a growing disparity between the reconstituted elite and those left out of it, particularly residents of the refugee camps. A penchant for conspicuous consumption had not helped. Murid al-Barghuthi observed on his return to Ramallah: "The marks of personal power do not fit with the absence of their national power or with the power of Palestinians in general according to the strange arrangements of Oslo."¹¹⁸

The security apparatus needed the Roadmap's reprieve even more than the bureaucracy, although immediate returns were similarly few. The al-Aqsa intifada had tested its role as Israel's colonial gendarme and seen it fail. Partly unable and partly unwilling to police the uprising, personnel and infrastructure were now severely degraded and movement restricted by closure. The capacity of the police to maintain law and order was all but gone, and the capacity of the judiciary to administer justice (never very high) continued to sink. Traditional customary law, out of court settlements, and vigilantism made a spirited comeback, especially in the ravaged north of the West Bank and the southern Gaza Strip.¹¹⁹

Pertinent to accepted territory, the Roadmap's inauguration was followed quickly by the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Camp David Accords, first agreed on September 17, 1978. I was in Egypt at the time, where the "celebrations" were decidedly low key, the treaty now something of an embarrassment: Israel had made spectacularly good use of the interval to tighten its colonial grip on the West Bank and Gaza, the pace of colonization having only accelerated under cover of Oslo. The PLO's agreement with Israel had received enthusiastic Egyptian support, Oslo having seemed briefly to vindicate Egypt's contentious precedent. It was not an argument put forward with much conviction by 2003. For the PA, colonization contributed heavily to the dislocation between government and the governed in the occupied territories and the outbreak of fresh hostilities.

Prior to IDF reinvasion, territory secured in early 1996 had expanded slightly. In 1997, the Hebron Protocol divided the town into areas H1 and H2 and gave the PA jurisdiction over the former. In 1998, the Wye River Memorandum renegotiated the Interim Agreement and saw Areas A, B, and C quickly joined by “nature reserves” in Area D. Area B would be subdivided into B+, B, and B-. Finally, further renegotiations contained in the 1999 Sharm alShaykh Memorandum were implemented: at its maximum extent between March and September 2000, the PA enjoyed civil and security jurisdiction over 18.2 percent of the West Bank and civil jurisdiction over 21.8 percent (the West Bank itself constitutes twenty two percent of mandate Palestine). The 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement had given them around 60 percent of the strip, a proportion that was not revised. Beyond these disjointed islands of semi-autonomy, Zionist colonization advanced apace.

Colonization had marked consequences for the PLO’s national project. Dependent and mandated to demobilize, confined to isolated cantons of semi-autonomy, and unable to plan rational development, the PA proved quite unable to confront the colonization campaign to which it was attached. Colonization caused grave social, economic, and political difficulties for the indigenous population, and severely detracted from any prestige the national project may otherwise have accrued. In 2001, the World Bank underlined the scale of investment in Oslo when it reported that donor assistance had totaled \$6.5 billion in pledges and \$4.4 billion in disbursements, the equivalent of \$195 per Palestinian over the seven years of Oslo and “one of the highest levels of per capita official development assistance anywhere in the world.”¹²⁰ But aid on even this scale could not offset the impact of colonization and the closure regime. By 2000, colonization had almost eroded away the basis for viable Palestinian statehood and with it the “acceptable” from the PLO’s national project. The concept of relative deprivation formulated by Ted Gurr casts a revealing light on the social-psychological aspects of what happened.¹²¹

In simplified terms, relative deprivation is the discrepancy between what people think they are justifiably entitled to and what they think they actually can obtain.

...the fundamental recognition is that collective aggression is the result of thwarting or arbitrarily depriving people in their attempts to satisfy their needs and aspirations.¹²²

The perception of deprivation from what “they are justifiably entitled to” is a defining feature of the Palestinian condition. But none felt it more keenly than the refugees, and none more readily than the residents of the camps, having been disproportionately sacrificed, disadvantaged, and now disproportionately alienated from the national project. For those in the diaspora, the possible implications of a final settlement return us to Rustow’s background condition of national unity; taken to mean a combination of national identity and political community, they may have retained their sense of national identity, but they faced a bitter struggle for inclusion within the future political community.

The irony was that just as the PLO’s national project hit its nadir in Palestine, international approval took several steps forward: George W. Bush made an early

reference to Palestinian statehood in October 2001; followed up in March 2002 by having the United States sponsor UNSC Resolution 1397—the first UNSC resolution to explicitly refer to “a vision of a region where two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders”; and capped that with the Roadmap, which managed to extract qualified Israeli consent to the same goal.¹²³ But how to render the project consistent with a reality acceptable to the Palestinians asked to live it? The Roadmap prescribed a number of measures to restore the “acceptable” to the equation, including a freeze on settlement construction, IDF withdrawal to the September 2000 boundaries, even more donor assistance, and an improvement in the economic situation to normalize Palestinian life. Two phases replete with confidence-building measures were to be followed by a “Permanent Status Agreement” and an “End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” that “ends the occupation that began in 1967, and includes an agreed, just, fair and realistic solution to the refugee issue, and a negotiated resolution on the status of Jerusalem that takes into account the political and religious concerns of both sides.” Agreement was somewhat optimistically set for 2004 to 2005, although it was noted, “Non-compliance with obligations will impede progress.” It had made almost no progress at all. Following the collapse of the ‘Abbas cabinet in September 2003, U.S. Roadmap monitor John Wolff left the country for lack of an interlocutor in the PA, although he would return after Qray’ had survived a few months. The impasse was indicative of lack of an actual agreement between the Israeli government and the Palestinians to match the textual commitments made in the Roadmap. What now constituted “acceptable” to the parties? The Sharon cabinet insisted on an authoritative Palestinian leadership willing and able to disarm its own dissidents in the midst of accelerating colonization, newly protected by construction of the enormous separation barrier. The reward would be permission to negotiate an Israeli diktat that looked like it might include most of the Gaza Strip and forty-odd percent of the cantonized West Bank.¹²⁴ There was in short a marked lack of convergence on what constituted an acceptable national project in its territorial or other dimensions. Qray’ could neither hope nor want to accede to these conditions. Sharon had no need for him to do so; citing (as Barak had with Arafat) the lack of a partner, the Israeli prime minister could justify unilateral disengagement and—in supreme irony—appear to be the one making the concessions. It might be noted that the West Bank and Gaza had now acquired their own top-level domain (.ps), the equivalent of a national code for Internet addresses;¹²⁵ it may yet fit the virtual statelet they are unilaterally awarded.

As he was marooned in the ruins of his bulldozed Ramallah compound that would eventually become his makeshift mausoleum, it was easy to forget the extent to which international recognition had once been accorded the person of Yasir Arafat. That recognition reached something of an apogee in December 1998 when Clinton paid an unlikely visit to Gaza to witness “a show of hands by the PA elite, including PNC members, in once again repealing the PLO Charter.”¹²⁶ The Clinton presidency framed the Oslo process from inception to collapse. During this time Arafat’s relations with the United States were as warm as they would ever get, and Clinton remained the only U.S. president to have met him in person. But a decidedly pro-U.S. orientation stubbornly refused to deliver an acceptable political result. Negotiations continued, and Arafat was received as an official guest at the White House as late as January 2001, welcomed to Downing Street in October, and allowed to address the Davos World Economic Forum

(then in New York) as late as February 2002. But it did not last. Steadfastness at Camp David II and a refusal to confront the Palestinian resistance pulled him away from a clear orientation consistent with the international balance of power, at least in Israel and the United States, the two places where it mattered. It came just as the constellation of international forces that had worked to erect and maintain the PA shifted decisively for the worse in both places. In January 2001, Bush replaced Clinton in Washington D.C., and in March, Sharon replaced Barak in Tel Aviv. A climate already hostile to Palestinian anti-colonialism degenerated further after September 11, 2001. Arafat had been quick to condemn the attacks, sending “the condolences of the Palestinian people to President Bush, his government and to the American people for this terrible act.”¹²⁷ It did him little good. Israel exploited the redirection of global media attention to escalate its assault on the PA. Netanyahu summarized the mood with a call for a “coalition of freedom” to combat “evil forces” starting with “the regime of terror standing opposite us.”¹²⁸ By late June 2002, the Bush administration seemed more-or-less to have concurred, actively promoting Arafat’s marginalization but stopping short of calls for assassination or exile, the express preference of Israel’s minister of defense, chief of staff, and deputy prime minister.¹²⁹ ‘Abbas would attempt to clearly realign the PA with the United States, but Israel’s pursuit of its colonization campaign, coupled with the Roadmap’s lack of an implementation mechanism and the United States’ hands-off approach, dictated that the parties would not come into conjunction. Prime Minister Gray’ later toured Europe in search of support and resources; he was welcomed, but stalemate at home served the opposition. The sudden absence of Arafat from the political scene in November 2004 then seemed to hold out the possibility of renewed negotiations, depriving Sharon of his manufactured excuse for unilateralism—the supposed absence of a Palestinian partner with whom he could talk. And yet in the context of colonization and closure and the construction of the separation barrier, the prospects for the ‘Abbas and Gray’ government and whatever came after it were as replete with familiar problems as they were with new uncertainties.

3

Authoritative Leadership and the New National Project

The Politics of Palestinian Diplomacy in Madrid, Washington, and Oslo

For the PLO leadership that negotiated it, the DoP was supposed to lead to a diplomatically realized institutional solution to the problem of Palestinian self-determination. Heralded as a breakthrough toward a lasting peace, it in fact went on to become the foundation of a framework that restructured and deepened conflict. But where did the DoP come from? More specifically why, with a competent delegation negotiating in Washington, did the PLO go to Oslo at all? To answer these questions the PLO's trajectory needs to be examined from the Madrid Conference, held between October 30 and November 1, 1991, up to conclusion of the secret Oslo channel in August 1993.

The prelude to the Madrid Conference found the PLO-Tunis in a tight spot. Changes in the social structure of the occupied territories had facilitated the marginalization of the diaspora-based elite through the generation of a capable indigenous leadership represented by a proxy delegation that could negotiate on the PLO's behalf. On the regional level, the outcome of the first Gulf War saw the comprehensive defeat of Iraq and the estrangement of the PLO from the mainstream Arab states, including major long-term sponsors in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In Israel, the restraint of Yitzhaq Shamir's government in not responding to Iraqi missile attacks further strengthened the hand of a government fiercely determined to avoid negotiations with the PLO. On the international level, the political hegemony of the United States in the context of the NWO found the PLO bereft of an alternative great power sponsor and consequently vulnerable to the promotion of alternative interlocutors. Both regional and international powers were thus working to marginalize the PLO-Tunis, a problem facilitated and compounded by the availability of alternative negotiators empowered by structural change in the occupied territories.

This highly unfavorable context placed severe restrictions on the nationalist elite's scope for agency; with no real military option and politically marginalized on the regional and international level, plus pressured by changes to the social structure of the occupied territories, they were obliged to remain committed to diplomatic procedure. However, this now seemed to mean accepting the unpalatable terms of the Madrid Conference and permitting an indigenous proxy delegation to negotiate on their behalf. At this moment, the role of elite agency focused on two of the criteria from Table 1: an authoritative leadership and a national project. The outcome of the secret Oslo negotiations was a result of the nationalist elite in Tunis subordinating the Palestinian national project as pursued in Washington to the imperative of maintaining their own

leadership position within the Palestinian polity. The Oslo channel offered the PLO-Tunis the opportunity to revive its leadership position by negotiating its own national project which, crucially, included a role for PLO institutions and personnel in the diaspora. In so doing, it precluded the possibility that indigenous forces represented in the delegation might form a cohesive alternative leadership with their own national project, even one negotiated on behalf of the diaspora-based elite.

This interpretation of the Oslo channel gains weight if we recall Remmer's concern with institutional constraints and incentives. The outlook for the PLO as an institution was bleak, its condition described by political marginalization and financial crisis. While it is impossible to measure the precise causal significance of this in driving the elite along their trajectory, it can be said that the political and economic crisis that gripped the institution clearly did not bolster determination to stand firm in negotiations and to support the delegation in Washington. Rather, the state of the institution encouraged the leadership to reach a rapidly negotiated compromise national project that restored its own authoritative leadership and generated new and much needed sources of finance. Moreover, a deal reached directly between the PLO-Tunis and the Israeli government deprived the delegation of any kudos it might otherwise have accrued from delivering a diplomatic breakthrough on the PLO's behalf. With the delegation cut down to size and denied the political capital of a deal, the PLO-Tunis reduced the salience of both delegation members and their constituencies in the formation of the PA and facilitated the perpetuation of its own authoritative leadership within the institutions of the forthcoming autonomy project.

The remainder of this chapter falls into two sections, the first covering the Madrid Conference and the Washington negotiations, and the second covering the secret Oslo channel. It begins with a more detailed examination of the national, regional, and international outlook for the PLO prior to Madrid, considers the conditions for Palestinian participation in Madrid and the composition of the Palestinian delegation, and then examines the nature of relations between the delegation and Tunis. Drawing on the firsthand testimonies of those involved, it suggests that the Palestinian delegation from the occupied territories had not come close to representing a cohesive alternative leadership. Nevertheless, the emergence of the secret Oslo channel is explained as a means of precluding such a possibility by rapidly re-establishing the authoritative leadership of Tunis. The Oslo channel facilitated this through the provision of direct bilateral negotiations between the PLO and Israel, allowing Arafat to employ close confidants from the diaspora-based Fatah leadership (in marked contrast to the model of negotiating through the delegation), and allowing for rapid progress in pressing circumstances. The outcome met the needs of the diaspora-based nationalist elite, producing an internationally acceptable national project that restored their authoritative leadership and provided for a negotiated transition from liberation movement to national authority. Moreover, the project negotiated in Oslo included a central role for PLO institutions and left PLO personnel firmly in charge of the process.

The Madrid Conference and Negotiations in Washington

The Madrid Conference in Structural Context: National, Regional, and International Considerations

Within the Palestinian polity, the PLO leadership faced three interrelated crises affecting its authoritative leadership in the aftermath of the first Gulf War: first, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the indigenous nationalist leadership constituted a PLO “inside” with resources of its own; second, the PLO’s secular nationalism faced a serious challenge from the consistent levels of support expressed for the political Islam of Hamas and Islamic Jihad; and third, in the diaspora, the Tunis-based institutions faced an apparently serious threat of insolvency arising from the multiple financial costs of the first Gulf War. The financial crisis in Tunis also reduced the flow of funds to the nationalist network in the occupied territories, adding to the potential threat from the indigenous leadership, while Hamas continued to play a prominent role with its own provision of social welfare services.¹ The faltering of the intifada, which by this time had degenerated into a choreographed standoff with the IDF, also served to undermine the salience of the PLO as a party to a solution.

With the Tunis leadership at the nadir of its fortunes and obliged to accept a proxy delegation in Madrid, the challenge of the local nationalists became especially pertinent. A number of key delegation members were drawn from what might be termed the institutions of civil society, including the vibrant NGO community that had flourished in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. With this in mind, it is helpful to expand a little on the background to Palestinian civil society and the internal structural changes it reflected.

Institutions that might be considered components of a civil society have a history that predates either the state of Israel or the PLO. However, for the sake of brevity, the analysis here deals solely with the period during which the PLO has taken an interest.² The PLO leadership had been cognizant of the need to promote political struggle in the occupied territories from the 1970s; in a three-way tussle with the Israeli occupation and the Hashemites in Amman, the tenth PNC had called for activists to mobilize the Palestinian masses in trade unions as early as 1972. The establishment of the PNF in August 1973, and in particular its adoption of the PLO Charter, then provided a “framework for the national movement in the Occupied Territories.”³ The difficulties besetting the armed struggle, together with the increasing reliance on diplomacy, meant that by the time of the twelfth PNC in 1974, the PLO leadership attached far greater significance to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as the potential territorial base for a Palestinian state. The PLO factions began to organize more seriously within the occupied territories, transplanting the symbols and vocabulary of the PLO from the diaspora to Palestine. One of the means by which they did this was the cultivation and support of Palestinian NGOs, an initiative first taken by the PCP (not represented on the PLO executive committee until 1987), the only faction led from inside the territories. By 1982, the loss of Beirut and the one remaining front with Israel lent the occupied territories an even greater weight within PLO strategy. The campaign of institution building had thus been underway for some time when the intifada began in December 1987.

The PLO factions operated a rough division of labor, divided between what Joost Hiltermann calls the military-political wing and social-political wing of each faction.⁴ The military-political wing organized resistance operations, while the social-political wing provided services that would otherwise be provided by the state. The NGOs filled the space arising from the absence of a state structure, mobilizing the population behind the nationalist agenda in the process. Hiltermann quotes Eqbal Ahmed, who observed that a revolutionary guerrilla movement “concentrates on out-administering, not on outfighting the enemy.” The aim, says Ahmed, is not “simply to inflict military losses on the enemy,” which is usually “vastly superior” in military terms, but to destroy the legitimacy of its government and to establish a rival regime through the creation of “parallel hierarchies.”⁵ This policy amounts to a shadow government, which the Palestinians managed to establish to a limited extent during the first intifada.

NGOs developed to cover several sectors, including the agricultural and medical relief committees, the trade union movement, the women’s movement, human rights groups, and general research institutions. However, the struggle for influence in the occupied territories of which the NGOs were part took place among the competing PLO factions as much as among the PLO, Israel, and Jordan. By the late 1970s, this internal rivalry led to an intense struggle for control known as “the war of the institutions.” The struggle was particularly intense within the union movement. In an effort to break the hegemony of the secular left PCP, PFLP, and DFLP in the NGO community, Fatah de-ployed its substantial financial resources to establish what might be called parallel-parallel institutions of its own.

Throughout the 1980s, when the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee for the Steadfastness of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Homeland—a distributive organization established in 1979 that was funded by members of the Arab League and controlled by the PLO (principally Fatah) in conjunction with Jordan—funnelled money into the occupied territories, Fatah organizations were always the most well funded, sometimes to the total exclusion of others.⁶

Illustrative of the factional impact on the NGO sector, the union movement split in 1981. The original General Federation of Trade Unions established by the leftist factions remained in Nablus, while Fatah established its own federation, with precisely the same name, in Ramallah.⁷

The impact of factionalism on the trade unions was replicated within every other sector. For instance, the PCP established the Union of Medical Relief Committees in 1982 and the agricultural equivalent PARC in 1983, building on “the extant voluntary work committees.”⁸ Initiatives such as these did not go unnoticed by other factions keen to maximize popular grass roots support. The PFLP, the DFLP, and lastly Fatah each established parallel institutions for health, agriculture, labor, and women, until, by the mid-1980s, “there were five women’s committees, four health committees, at least two agricultural committees and two competing labour union federations.”⁹

The eruption of the intifada in December 1987 may have been a spontaneous event, but the established factional networks allowed Tunis to coordinate and eventually direct it, principally through the UNLU. With a solid institutional structure providing services

and promoting the nationalist agenda in the absence of the PLO leadership, the NGO institutions carved out a leading role for themselves within the occupied territories. In each case then, the factional NGOs have performed a factional function, a nationalist function, and, finally, a service function. By the time of the Madrid Conference, the personnel who staffed and led these NGOs constituted an educated, capable, and politically active indigenous national leadership with its own institutional power base. The favorable response from this community to the overtures of the U.S. administration would later oblige the PLO-Tunis to sanction participation in the Madrid Conference. However, the delegation did not constitute a coherent or cohesive alternative leadership to the nationalist elite in the diaspora, and any potential to do so would be pre-empted by the Oslo channel.

The period immediately prior to Madrid found the PLO similarly constrained on the regional level; the ill-fated alliance with Iraq served to isolate it from mainstream Arab state opinion,¹⁰ shattering twenty years of consensus over the PLO's authoritative leadership and severely reducing the diplomatic stature of Tunis. All the major Arab states agreed to attend the Madrid Conference without insisting that the PLO represent the Palestinian people. Beyond the Arab states, the PLO's political isolation from Israel was nothing new, yet it remained the most serious and enduring obstacle to a diplomatically realized institutional solution that included a role for the diaspora-based nationalist elite. Besides leaving the PLO in the diplomatic wilderness, the Likud government exacerbated anxieties by continuing to expand Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This process reached alarming proportions with the accelerated immigration of Jews from the U.S.S.R. Demographic change in favor of Israel, together with the continuing settlement drive, raised the very real possibility of Palestinian land shrinking to the extent that it would disappear altogether as the meaningful territorial basis for a prospective state;¹¹ were the situation to continue unchecked, the identification of an accepted territory for the national project might have become almost impossible. That this would actually happen anyway, only within the Oslo process rather than without it, is a moot point.

Each Israeli government that addressed the question proclaimed its abiding determination never to negotiate with the PLO. Alternative solutions envisaged by the senior political parties were essentially twofold: on the right, the Likud preferred to try and generate a collaborationist Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, willing and able to implement Camp David-style autonomy under Israeli sovereignty;¹² on the left, the Labor Party retained a traditional preference for a deal with King Husayn.¹³ The Likud view remained the more salient in the period immediately prior to Madrid, first because Labor were badly wrong footed by Husayn's severance of ties with the West Bank in 1988, and second, because Likud held the premiership from 1986 until June 1992.¹⁴

The initiation of the U.S.-PLO dialogue in 1988 had not been well received by the Likud. In order to counter this development before it generated an unwelcome momentum of its own, Likud foreign minister Moshe Arens prepared his own initiative, the principal plank of which involved "holding elections amongst the Palestinian population for representatives with whom we would negotiate." Arens's proposals became known as the Shamir Plan, evolving between April and May 1989 into a twenty-point initiative intended to generate a more amenable Palestinian leadership in the West

Bank and Gaza, willing to implement Israeli-sponsored autonomy. Arens expressed his reasoning succinctly:

If we did not want to deal with the PLO—and in my opinion it would constitute a grave mistake to do so—then it was up to us to find interlocutors among the Palestinians in the territories.¹⁵

Presented in Washington by Shamir in April 1989, this idea remained central to Israeli policy, despite objections from ultra-right elements in the Likud-led coalition, up to the elections of June 1992. During the negotiations over Madrid, Arens (defense minister from June 1990 to June 1992), continued to resist the idea of a delegation, maintaining that elections better served Israeli interests:

The most important thing, to my mind, was that we deal with the Palestinian Arabs in the territories by holding municipal elections...the obvious alternative to elections would be a non-elected Palestinian delegation, raising the issue of PLO representation...¹⁶

As for a delegation “raising the issue of PLO representation,” Arens’s analysis proved more or less correct. The Israeli-U.S. restrictions on the Palestinian delegation appeared adequate on paper, yet the PLO-Tunis could and would subvert them. The Palestinian delegations to Madrid and Washington represented important constituencies on the inside, yet they were effectively managed by the PLO-Tunis. This was obviously different from direct PLO recognition and participation in an international conference, but it still effectively emptied the restrictions of much of their intended meaning. It is important to outline these conditions to understand how they were supposed to work and, more importantly, to see how the PLO leadership in Tunis systematically overcame them. This point merits close attention because it questions the assertion that the Palestinian delegation began as, or evolved into, a viable alternative leadership to the PLO.

On the international level, the outlook for the PLO was similarly grim. The internal collapse of the U.S.S.R. had removed a traditional, if not always very effective, counterweight to untrammelled U.S. hegemony. Indeed, Arafat had recognized the implications of diminishing Soviet influence, and publicly supported the anti-Gorbachev coup in August 1991.¹⁷ Not for the last time, the United States looked to seize a propitious moment and rearrange the Middle East. Despite a more nuanced approach than that employed a decade or so later, the results for Bush senior would be disappointing. Confronted with an intransigent Israel, Secretary of State James Baker found himself obliged to make sweeping concessions simply to get the conference underway at all. The United States duly imposed a series of Israeli-stipulated conditions on the Palestinians that, it was hoped, would further isolate the PLO.

The Conditions for Palestinian Participation in Madrid

The restrictions placed upon Palestinian participation in the Madrid Conference undermined the PLO’s authoritative leadership on two levels. On the national level official PLO exclusion obliged the Palestinians to field a “second eleven,” a delegation of

respected and capable nationalist figures with important constituencies who nevertheless lacked the political weight, and consequently the power, to compromise, which continued to inhere solely in Tunis. On the international level the very structure of the negotiations—held deliberately outside of UN auspices despite their being predicated on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338—deprived the Palestinian delegation of a traditionally sympathetic forum and stripped the negotiations of the weight of the international legal rulings in favor of the PLO and Palestinian self-determination.

The composition of the Palestinian delegation was subjected to a series of arbitrary restrictions determined by the Israeli government and agreed to by Baker. Other parties to the talks, with the benefit of sovereign status, freely formed their negotiating teams, while the composition of the Palestinian delegation was determined by the sensitivities of the Israeli government. The restrictions imposed were as follows: first, the PLO was excluded from the conference from the outset, as were any persons considered by Israel to be members of the PLO; second, Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem or the diaspora¹⁸ were also forbidden to join the delegation to assuage the Likud's anxiety that such a precedent might affect final status negotiations by casting doubt on Israel's (illegal) annexation of the city or by conceding the (legally established) right to return of Palestinian refugees; third, the Israeli-approved, non-PLO, non-East Jerusalem, non-diaspora Palestinian delegation were denied the right to attend the conference as a Palestinian delegation, being obliged to form a joint delegation under Jordanian auspices instead.¹⁹ If that were not enough, Shamir then predicated talks with the joint delegation on the attendance of Syria and Lebanon in Madrid, firmly in the belief that neither would be there. They were there, and much to the prime minister's distress, negotiations began.²⁰

Despite the restrictions, members of the Palestinian delegation were quick to assert their independence. Albeit Aghazarian, director of the Palestinian press center in Madrid, recalled how the delegation orchestrated a separate press conference on the opening day, ensuring that the Palestinians took an early initiative with the media.²¹ Furthermore, despite Arafat's long-standing fear of Jordanian influence,²² members of the Jordanian team were supportive of the Palestinians and helped them to assert their independence. Dr. A. Kafanani, subsequently a member of the Jordanian negotiating team in the talks with Israel, spoke of Jordan's interest in facilitating a Palestinian-Israeli track and seeing that it worked; if the Palestinians could reach an agreement with Israel, Jordan would be free to follow.²³ Nevertheless, with the structure of the conference finally set under the co-sponsorship of the United States and, nominally, of the almost defunct U.S.S.R., and with the UN confined to observer status, the Palestinian delegation undertook its task in patently unfavorable circumstances. Again, not for the last time, the Israeli government, with U.S. connivance, had deliberately set out to undermine the authoritative leadership of the PLO and to generate an alternative leadership from the occupied territories. The question remained, would they succeed?

Acutely sensitive on the issue of leadership, Arafat authorized participation in Madrid only with the greatest reluctance. In Nizar 'Amr's view, there were significant risks in accepting a delegation: first, because this reduced the Palestinian population to residents of the West Bank and Gaza, who were only 40 percent of the total population; second, because it threatened to divide the Palestinians between inside and outside; and, third, because of the possibility that the United States and Israel could turn the delegation into

an alternative leadership. ‘Amr readily acknowledged that this was a major concern for Arafat, particularly given the initial popularity of the delegation within the occupied territories. He also confirmed that the delegation’s steady accumulation of legitimacy as negotiations unfolded, both through its ongoing media exposure and through its regular interaction with the legitimate representatives of other parties to the talks, only heightened Arafat’s anxiety. Arafat himself was later to remark, “We went to Madrid against our will, and in dishonorable conditions.”²⁴

In the view of Ghassan al-Khatib (appointed PA minister of labor in 2002), Arafat allowed the delegation to go to Madrid, “simply because he was under the impression that he has no other options.”²⁵ Despite Arafat’s misgivings, two factors strongly suggest that the delegation neither became an alternative to the PLO, nor, more pertinently, to the Tunis leadership of the PLO. These are the eventual composition of the delegation itself, a combination of actual PLO and unequivocally pro-PLO figures, and the extensive nature of the communications and working relationship between the delegation and the PLO leadership in Tunis. Contrary to Israeli and American hopes, the delegation was both of the PLO and sufficiently loyal to the Tunis leadership.

The Composition of the Delegation

The delegation’s composition illustrates beyond doubt that it should be considered as a PLO delegation, albeit one that represented the PLO-inside (including the institutions of civil society and the NGOs), rather than the PLO-Tunis. While Israeli-U.S. restrictions prevented overt participation by leading figures from among the Tunis leadership, key consultative figures and delegation members can quite clearly be characterized as *members* of the PLO.

The delegation began to take shape early in 1991, during exploratory talks held between Palestinian figures from the West Bank and Gaza and U.S. consular staff in Jerusalem. Anxious to avoid the snub delivered to his predecessor George Schultz in 1988 (when Palestinian figures in Jerusalem boycotted a meeting with Schultz, leaving him to address an empty room and referring him to Tunis),²⁶ Baker arranged for the U.S. consul general in Jerusalem to contact Palestinian figures and to gauge their mood prior to his arrival.

A brief summary of the profiles of the Palestinians involved in these early exchanges speaks for itself. To begin with, the U.S. Consulate informed Faysal al-Husayni that Baker would be visiting the region and wanted to know if Palestinian leaders would meet with him. Husayni was the senior Fatah representative in Jerusalem and would subsequently lead the wider Palestinian negotiating team, including the support staff in the technical committees, while the Gaza-based ‘Abd al-Shafī led the delegation in Madrid. Descended from the notable clan aligned with the Mufti during the mandate, Husayni also enjoyed close links with the intifada activists, represented Fatah in the UNLU from 1990 onward, and had an institutional base of his own focused on East Jerusalem’s Orient House. He was allowed to join the delegation directly after the 1992 election brought Labor and Rabin to power. Husayni discussed the proposal with other local figures, including Ghassan al-Khatib, at this time the official spokesman for the PPP, a faction that had joined the PLO executive committee during the seventeenth PNC in 1987. Khatib also had a base in the NGO movement with the JMCC, and lectured at

Bir Zeit University. Also consulted were Riyad Malki, acknowledged as a leading member of the PFLP in the West Bank and who also ran the research NGO Panorama, and Zahira Kamal of the Yasir 'Abd Rabbu wing of the DFLP, now the FIDA faction, a prominent activist among women's groups, and minister for women's affairs from November 2003.²⁷ Both of these factions held seats on the PLO executive committee. In addition, the unaffiliated but left-leaning and widely respected physician, Mamduh al-'Aqr, and former Bir Zeit University lecturer Hanan 'Ashrawi, took part in the deliberations.²⁸ As a major center of nationalist activity, a number of Bir Zeit staff were included in the delegation. Indeed, Albert Aghazarian characterized the organization of the Palestinian mission to Madrid as "a Bir Zeit operation."²⁹

Once discussions with Baker were sanctioned by Tunis, a series of meetings took place between the Palestinian delegates and the secretary of state. According to 'Ashrawi, Husayni wasted no time in declaring his allegiance: "We are here at the behest of the PLO, our sole legitimate leadership." Baker responded,

Whom you choose as your leadership is your own business. I am looking for Palestinians from the Occupied Territories who are not PLO members and who are willing to enter into direct two-phased negotiations on the basis of UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 with the principle of land for peace, and who are willing to live in peace with Israel. Are there any in the room?³⁰

Of the eleven Palestinians in the room for that first meeting, 'Ashrawi noted three who might well be considered PLO members. PLO membership has never been rigidly defined, not least by the PLO itself. However, Ghassan al-Khatib of the PPP attended the first meeting: as spokesman for the PPP, Khatib can be considered unequivocally as a PLO member. Two other figures may not have held an official position in the hierarchy of a PLO faction at that time, yet both possessed good nationalist credentials. Sa'ib 'Urayqat represented al-Najah University in Nablus where he was professor of political science, and was also editor of the Arabic daily *al-Quds*, the leading Palestinian daily newspaper, acknowledged at the time as taking a clear pro-PLO line. Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi had been among the founders of the PLO, a senior communist figure, and a long-standing head of the Palestinian Red Crescent in Gaza. Having helped establish the PLO in 1964, he had been a tireless nationalist campaigner ever since. 'Abd al-Shafi represented both Gaza and the communists, and would eventually agree to lead the delegation to Madrid, despite some initial reluctance. In his own words, "they insisted and said that this was a unanimous decision of the executive committee."³¹

'Ashrawi estimates a total of eighteen meetings took place, mostly in Jerusalem and some in Washington. Following the early withdrawal of the PPP, Tunis permitted only Husayni, 'Ashrawi, and Zakariyya al-Agha (representing a notable family from Khan Yunis in the Gaza Strip) to deal with Baker.³² Of these three, both Husayni and Agha were later appointed to the twenty-one-member Fatah central committee (and hence to the revolutionary council), reflecting their roles in the negotiations and the new circumstances prevailing after PLO redeployment in the West Bank and Gaza. In summary, the delegation negotiating with Baker included individuals representing significant constituencies from the occupied territories that clearly constituted PLO

personnel if not cadres from Tunis, and were firmly subordinate to the authority of the diaspora-based leadership.

A valuable firsthand perspective on the delegation is provided by Kamil Mansur, the Paris-based academic who served as legal advisor to the delegation from the Madrid Conference up to the signing of the DoP. Mansur dismissed the conception of a non-PLO delegation from inside with PLO supervisors from outside:

The main distinction is not between the PLO and the inside, it is between the PLO outside and the PLO inside. The PLO from the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem, and the PLO from Tunis.³³

Mansur divided the delegation according to place of residence and function, whereby the delegation might be viewed as follows:

- members of the delegation from the West Bank and Gaza³⁴
- consultants or advisors from the West Bank and Gaza
- advisors from outside (of which Mansur was one)
- PLO personnel from Tunis sent directly to supervise the negotiations

Although reluctant to specify names, Mansur acknowledged that Husayni and possibly ‘Urayqat, together with others he remained unwilling to name, belonged to Fatah and should automatically be considered as part of the PLO. In Mansur’s view, even Hanan ‘Ashrawi could be considered as an operative member of the PLO *at that time*. From this functional perspective, during the Madrid and Washington talks, it is quite legitimate to consider the figures from the inside as full members of the PLO, even while they were not a part of the PLO hierarchy or leadership in Tunis.

The case for viewing the delegation as an alternative to the Tunis leadership, if not to the PLO, is put by Inbari.³⁵ However, Inbari does acknowledge the essential PLO nature of the delegation, and divides it into four parts: the first group constituted Husayni and those around him, a group that Inbari contends represented an alternative PLO leadership from inside the occupied territories; the second group, led by ‘Abd al-Shafi, was apparently close to the leftist PLO factions declining to take part in the talks, and appointed by Arafat to counterbalance Husayni; the third group included the relatively minor Yasir ‘Abd Rabbu wing of the DFLP; and the fourth group, the PPP, was led by Bashir al-Barghuthi and represented in the talks by official spokesman Ghassan al-Khatib. Each group represented a constituency within the occupied territories, either factional, geographic, or both. None of the figures involved had the nationwide reach or support to form a real alternative to Arafat and Tunis, even had they wished to do so. From a leadership perspective, the delegation as a whole constituted less than the sum of its parts and can in no way be considered a cohesive alternative. Israel may have hoped to promote it as such, foreshadowing the decapitation and isolation of Palestinian leadership within individual locales that took place during the al-Aqsa intifada, but it was not to be at this point. Moreover, on a functional level, the authority of the diaspora remained intact when it came to final decisions on the selection of personnel.

In the end, all of the participants seemed to agree that it was the PLO leadership in Tunis who had the final say in the formulation of the delegation. ‘Ashrawi was emphatic:

Finally, the PLO leadership had to determine the names of the members of the delegation without saying so... Israel too was aware of this scenario and turned a blind eye... In Jerusalem James Baker sat with our Palestinian friends allegedly choosing the names of the Palestinian delegation, while in reality the names were being chosen in Tunis.³⁶

Mamduh al-'Aqr, one of fourteen members in the main delegation to Madrid and a senior figure during the bilateral talks in Washington, readily confirmed this perspective when he was interviewed:

From the very beginning it was well known that the PLO leadership... named the delegation and defined every step and every statement...so the coordination and communication was complete.³⁷

Coordination with Tunis

In addition to the composition of the delegation, the level of coordination between the delegation and PLO leadership in Tunis, both in the run up to the Madrid Conference and during the negotiations in Washington, further supports the contention that the delegation was directed by, and loyal to, the Tunis leadership. This high level of coordination is borne out through the personal recollections of those involved. Important specific instances include the consultations between Jerusalem and Tunis over Baker's original proposal for a meeting, the address by Husayni and 'Ashrawi to the PLO's political committee in Tunis, the debate between Tunis and the delegation over the delegation's opening address to the Madrid Conference, the role of Orient House in supporting the delegation during the negotiations, personal accounts of regular visits to Tunis by delegation members between rounds of negotiations, and the eventual public presence of Tunis officials in Washington.

Following the initial approach from the U.S. Consulate, Husayni and 'Ashrawi immediately conveyed news of the enquiry to Tunis. Their contact there was Akram Haniyya, a deportee since 1986, a former member of the PNF and the NGC, a special advisor to Arafat on the occupied territories, and a member of Fatah's revolutionary council. Haniyya in turn raised the matter with Arafat and the PLO executive committee.³⁸ Within the executive committee, Mahmud 'Abbas is said to have taken the most favorable line, in contrast to Arafat and others who were less enthusiastic. When it became clear that most on the inside were keen to go ahead, Arafat and the executive committee finally gave their consent, suggesting that Tunis responded to pressure from the indigenous leadership while retaining ultimate authority.³⁹ The PLO's decision was announced on March 10 and the first meeting with Baker took place in the U.S. Consulate in West Jerusalem on March 12.

As the preparatory talks with Baker unfolded, coordination between the delegation and Tunis evolved to include regular visits by 'Ashrawi and Husayni to PLO headquarters. The first of these visits took place in spring 1991 when the two of them were summoned to address the executive committee. Later that year they were summoned again, this time to the twentieth PNC meeting in Algiers in September. On this occasion they addressed the political committee, precipitating a split over participation in Madrid. These visits to

Tunis, theoretically forbidden by Israeli law and contrary to the contorted U.S. formula for negotiations, continued regardless for the next two years.

In order to maintain the myth of PLO noninvolvement, the level of coordination required some initial secrecy. Nevertheless, the fact that coordination and communication remained effective is illustrated by the following anecdote. 'Aqr recalled that prior to traveling to Madrid, delegation members were required to spend four days in Amman for a briefing by senior PLO personnel. In the course of the briefing, a disagreement arose between delegation members and the Tunis officials over the delegation's opening statement. The Tunis officials insisted upon a pre-prepared speech in Arabic written by the renowned poet and executive committee member Mahmud Darwish. The delegation argued that an international conference required a text prepared for a world audience, which in turn meant that it was better to draft a new one in English; although Darwish's speech was wonderful in the original Arabic, it was, they argued, essentially untranslatable. The delegation finally won the argument and, once in Madrid, 'Aqr was charged with conveying the new draft to Nabil Sha'th, a member of the Fatah central committee. 'Aqr recalled,

We agreed to meet in a cafeteria...we started reviewing the text, and then within half an hour or forty minutes, the whole cafeteria was flooded with people and we realized that these are all either the Mossad or secret police from different countries.⁴⁰

This small anecdote serves to illustrate how coordination between the delegation and Tunis continued, despite the byzantine restrictions imposed by Israel and the United States.

In the same regard, Israeli sensitivity to PLO involvement required the Tunis officials to stay in a separate hotel from the delegation for the duration of the Madrid Conference. However, by the time the talks resumed in Washington, the situation had evolved: U.S. officials proved willing to recognize the Tunis personnel as the key reference points for the delegation, and consequently permitted them to stay in the same hotel. Even so, just for propriety's sake, they were accommodated on a different floor. For the duration of the talks in Washington, the two key Tunis personnel were both senior Fatah members, Nabil Sha'th of the central committee, and Akram Haniyya of the revolutionary council.

During the negotiations, the delegation's technical support was provided by thirty-four committees staffed by a large, essentially volunteer, team led by Sari Nusayba and based in Orient House. Jack Khanu of the PPP worked in the technical committees and shared some valuable insights. With regard to Tunis-delegation relations, two trends stand out: first, all the work of the technical committees was referred directly to Tunis from the beginning; second, the overwhelming majority of the estimated six hundred staff members were either in Fatah or sympathetic to it, and many of them were subsequently employed in the PA. In Khanu's own words: "You would think it was Fatah headquarters."⁴¹ From his own work in the committee dealing with the media, Khanu confirmed the leading, if some times heavy-handed, role of Tunis in overseeing their work, and the appointment of Tunis-favored personnel to head several committees. The overwhelming impression created by Khanu's firsthand experience is one of close coordination with Tunis throughout the negotiations, with Tunis sometimes asserting its

authority to an extent that was never really necessary, all of which is a far cry from the picture of Orient House as an alternative power base for an alternative leadership.

Beyond the coordination in Madrid and Washington, there were regular meetings in Tunis either between rounds of negotiations or toward the end of each round, during which delegation members would brief the leadership on the direction of the talks and discuss strategy for the forthcoming round. ‘Aqr described the coordination during two particularly long rounds of over one month each: “[E]very weekend, two or three of us would go and brief them [Tunis]...and bring new guidelines or directions.”⁴² The level of the Tunis leadership’s involvement is also acknowledged by Mahmud ‘Abbas in his account of the process:

A committee composed of members of the PLO leadership was formed to follow up the negotiations and to supply the delegation directives and to prepare the studies it would need at the negotiating table...⁴³

One final testament to the operational unity of the delegation and Tunis can be derived from personal accounts of how the relationship operated in Washington and the difficulties encountered by the delegation when it came to making decisions. Although coordination became easier, it remained awkward. Referring to his frustrating experience of trying to negotiate in the State Department, ‘Aqr noted that “every point we had to negotiate with the Israelis, we had to go back and phone directly to our people in the hotel...for every single small point...”⁴⁴ ‘Abd al-Shafi maintained that straightforward issues where the PLO could not object were dealt with by the delegation alone. However, “we preferred that whenever there is an issue [and] it’s not clear where the PLO stands, of course we had to communicate.” As for the delegation’s relationship with the Tunis representatives, “no issue came up where there was a real disagreement.”⁴⁵ Mansur also touched upon the subject of decision making when discussing his definition of PLO membership. Characterizing membership as “something very broad,” he said,

What matters is...access to Arafat, access to the executive committee. People from outside would go also directly to Tunis. They did not need...to pass necessarily through the people who were in Washington from Tunis... all could be considered as taking place within the framework of the PLO.⁴⁶

Incidentally, Mansur attributed this high-level access to several individuals, naming Husayni and ‘Ashrawi from the “Jerusalem group” specifically. If further confirmation of the chain of command were needed, ‘Abd al-Shafi readily acknowledged the authority of Tunis:

As a delegation we were accountable to the executive committee... I always said when I was asked by the press, “who is our reference?”, I said, frankly, it is the executive committee...⁴⁷

However, while acknowledging the authority of the executive committee, ‘Abd al-Shafi’s concerns over Arafat’s exclusive control of decision making led him to Tunis in January

1994. During three days of talks, ‘Abd al-Shafi and other delegation members tried unsuccessfully to gain a greater say over the direction of the negotiations.

On a final point of interest, the PLO had clear and unmistakable representation in the multilateral talks and their corresponding working groups on issues such as refugees.⁴⁸ Following the change of Israeli government in June 1992, this became relatively easy. As the new foreign minister, Shimon Peres accepted diaspora PLO members Yusuf Sayigh on the economic development committee and Ilyas Sanbar on the refugee committee, providing they stand down as committee heads and participate as delegation members only. In addition, the multilateral talks were supervised from Tunis by Ahmad Qray’, a member of the Fatah central committee.⁴⁹

The Balance Sheet on an Alternative Leadership

In her autobiographical account of this period, ‘Ashrawi makes the assertion that Baker expected the negotiations, and later the elections, to produce an alternative leadership. The Israelis would certainly have benefited from separating the delegation and the internal leadership from Tunis, and Arafat undoubtedly feared such a possibility.⁵⁰ As noted earlier, the Israeli government explicitly stated its desire to generate a non-PLO leadership with which it could negotiate and the Madrid formula reflected this. More recently, the marginalization of Arafat and the cantonization of the West Bank and Gaza by bypass roads and closure have underlined the advantages construed by the Israelis, at least periodically, in a divided and weakened Palestinian leadership. Back at the time of Madrid, U.S. priorities were for a settlement, and if a non-Tunis leadership could deliver one, so much the better. Delegation members were well aware of this and never displayed any intention, or indeed the capacity, to form an alternative to the leadership in the diaspora. In Mansur’s view, the suggestion that they might do so is silly: “It is a joke... I have never stopped saying this.”⁵¹

Both the composition of the delegation and the level of coordination between them and Tunis demonstrates that they were a PLO delegation, albeit one composed of PLO personnel from the inside (with constituencies on the inside), but effectively managed by PLO personnel outside, mostly drawn from the senior Fatah hierarchy. Moreover, the testimony of delegation members themselves only confirms this point. Husayni, as noted above, went out of his way to explain this to Baker. Other delegation members confirmed that they were aware of U.S. and Israeli intentions, and yet they never demonstrated a readiness to separate themselves from the authority of Tunis. For instance, Mamduh al-‘Aqr recalled,

All of us in the delegation, we were aware of the fact that the Israelis and the Americans, they were keen to create an alternative leadership... From the Israelis it was almost explicit...explicit in the sense that it was their condition...that they will talk only to people from inside—the West Bank and Gaza—and they would recognise only these people.⁵²

The Americans, on the other hand, were a bit more flexible:

I [‘Aqr] remember just ten days before we went to Madrid, he [Baker] said, “If you want all this effort to collapse...just say, ‘we are the PLO.’” I asked, “Can we say we were sent by our leadership?” Baker replied, “If you *have* to say it, just say ‘leadership,’ without specifying the PLO.”

To ‘Aqr, Baker himself never seemed keen to promote them as such:

But because we were aware...that this was a goal it seems that the Americans...were...looking from the angle that the evolution of things would lead to the creation of an alternative leadership... We were aware that sometimes we have to re-emphasise our link with the PLO...that there is no chance at all of an alternative leadership.⁵³

Is it the case that the threat of an alternative leadership increased as the delegation accrued legitimacy of its own? Mansur disagreed: “Everybody knew, people inside and outside, that any implementation could not take place without the PLO. Any agreement, any DoP, without the working mechanism [of the PLO] was useless.” Furthermore,

Any solution would have to be not only *endorsed* by the PLO but *implemented* by the PLO...we would tell the Americans that and they would get mad about it...in order to have security in the West Bank and Gaza...you’ve got to bring the PLA [sic], and the Israeli’s [knew] this and they agreed to it.⁵⁴

Mansur believes this was increasingly obvious to the Israelis and Americans by spring 1993, by which time the PLO were more visibly involved in Washington.

Inbari asserts that Arafat feared Husayni in particular, suspecting that he and the nucleus of intifada activists around him were forming a potential alternative leadership. During the formulation of the delegation, in Inbari’s words “he [Arafat] did all in his power to keep Husayni out.”⁵⁵ That Arafat failed is attributed to both his weakness at this point and to the favorable intercession of Haniyya on Husayni’s (and ‘Ashrawi’s) part. However, the problem is a lack of evidence. Moreover, was it feasible for Husayni to even try and depose Arafat had he wished to? In Palestine, who would follow him beyond his East Jerusalem power base, and what form would relations with the Islamic groups take? It seems far more likely that Husayni remained functionally loyal to Arafat, despite the well-known animosity between them.⁵⁶ This also appears to be the conclusion reached by Rabin, who described him as “a mere ‘mailbox’ for transmitting orders from Tunis to the Palestinian delegation.”⁵⁷

If there was no cohesive alternative leadership, there were clearly tensions between the Tunis officials and the delegation. Mansur readily acknowledged this, but maintained that everyone considered themselves to be operating “within the framework of the PLO.”⁵⁸ ‘Aqr recalled,

They always, all along, resented the fact that there is no direct negotiations with them and that it had to be through a delegation from the

occupied territories. They resented the fact that the American-PLO dialogue was not resumed.⁵⁹

Given the PLO's long-cherished status as "sole legitimate representative," this was hardly surprising. Aghazarian also acknowledged a certain degree of tension in Madrid, between what he described as the organic PLO (the delegation) and the hierarchical PLO (Tunis). Nevertheless, consistent with all the other interviewees, he stressed "[we were] aware we are a PLO delegation."⁶⁰

In summary, there is little firm evidence for the existence of an alternative leadership. However, insofar as elements in the delegation represented constituencies and the structural changes taking place within the occupied territories (and manifested during the intifada), the delegation represented a *potential* challenge that would have accrued momentum from striking a deal, even a deal that brought in the PLO-Tunis. The Oslo channel allowed the Tunis leadership to retake the diplomatic limelight, to realize a rapid solution to the institutional crisis of the PLO, and to deny the delegation the opportunity of delivering their own negotiated national project. That hypothetical national project might have dispensed with the diaspora-based PLO altogether (an unlikely outcome given the objections outlined above, particularly institutional capacity), or it could have included them, but only as part of a package that inevitably raised the profile of the constituencies represented by the delegation, thus detracting from the authoritative leadership of the diaspora-based nationalist elite. In the event, the delegation's position would soon be undermined by the direct negotiations between the PLO and Israel, precluding such an outcome altogether.

The Impact of Oslo on the Delegation

According to Mansur, the delegation were aware of other channels (but not necessarily Oslo), for some time. From May and June 1992, "we had reached...a stage where...we felt that the Madrid formula...was leading nowhere." In April, Israel had recognized the indivisibility of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit. There were also discussions in June about confederation with Jordan, implementation of Resolution 242, and territorial compromise. The Israelis, in Mansur's view, were clearly probing different paths, testing ideas on the delegation while trying secret talks with the PLO. When discussions in Washington reached substantive issues, decisions were required at a higher level. Progress in Washington required discussion of territorial exceptions such as settlements, military locations, and certain areas of Jerusalem. Mansur recalled, "We were told not to do that."⁶¹

The slow pace of negotiations in Washington was largely attributable to the delegation's insistence on sticking to principles, including a stress on Resolution 242,

[As] a guide to the entire process and that Palestinian self-government in the interim period was a transitional phase toward the full implementation of the resolution and toward the exercise of the Palestinian right to self-determination.⁶²

Mansur acknowledged that instructions from Tunis were deliberately designed to prevent progress, “but it has been exaggerated.” Equally, “the Americans didn’t do anything to facilitate Washington.” Indeed, they started to intervene only in April 1993, presenting a very poorly prepared draft DoP, which only widened the gap between the Israeli and Palestinian positions and which the two sides themselves had already closed. Mansur was outraged: “Unbelievable... I told them this... I really can’t understand the reason...it was not possible under these conditions to make progress in Washington... Was it connected to the Oslo track? I don’t know.”⁶³ ‘Aqr recalled that, between the eighth and tenth rounds in Washington,

We started to understand that the leadership is putting obstructions...we started to realize that to get support from the Europeans and the Americans, we have to engage in the negotiations and to start talking in specifics and details. They [Tunis] didn’t want us to do that...they want to convey the message to the Americans and to the Israelis that they have to deal with them directly...later on it became clear that...we are just wasting time... They won’t allow any progress in the negotiations.⁶⁴

From the beginning, ‘Aqr asserted that the delegation had only ever aimed to achieve a role for the PLO in Tunis: “We cannot deliver and it has to be our legitimate leadership...they are the only ones who can deliver and...sign. Who can make concessions except the leadership? We cannot ourselves.”⁶⁵ The delegation allowed for this all along, but expected the talks in Washington to lead to recognition of the PLO. The delegation understood their role as reaching a critical point, whereafter “further progress needs the PLO.”⁶⁶ The delegation also insisted on maintaining their red lines, crucial if they were to keep the support of their own constituencies, particularly on sensitive issues affecting daily lives such as the removal of settlements and the release of prisoners. On the other hand, the PLO leadership in Tunis had greater room for maneuver, and hence for compromise, which it seems the Israelis understood. In ‘Aqr’s view, “It seems that the Israelis realised that if they want to go ahead and strike a deal with this delegation, then they have to give in substantively.”⁶⁷ One might also add that after so many years in exile, the Tunis-based elite were not best equipped to understand the realities of life under occupation and failed to grasp the gravity of the issues associated with it.

Meanwhile, as Washington plodded on, strains were developing between the delegation and Tunis. Allan Groth’s analysis of PLO decision making during this period illustrates the deterioration in coordination.⁶⁸ In December 1992, Rabin deported 415 Hamas activists to Lebanon, whereupon the PLO immediately suspended round eight of the negotiations. Rabin’s refusal to repatriate all the deportees produced a series of contradictory statements and demands, both from within the PLO in Tunis and from the delegation, as to how to resume the negotiations.

The delegation, while following Arafat’s and the PLO EC’s instructions and acting as their implementation instrument, nevertheless seems to have made a few crucial statements without prior coordination with Tunis (and vice versa). Subsequent developments show that this period exacerbated a deterioration in relations between Tunis and the “inside” delegation.⁶⁹

The most serious crisis between the delegation and Tunis occurred during the tenth round in Washington. The delegation refused to deliver a position paper negotiated, via Egypt, between Arafat and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. 'Aqr justified the delegation's position: "We would be betraying our national conscience... It was a terrible paper, terrible...the same as Oslo."⁷⁰ Husayni, 'Ashrawi, and 'Urayqat then resigned from the delegation in early August 1993. The "three mutineers" eventually resumed their duties,⁷¹ but developments in Oslo would soon overshadow their efforts. The PLO leadership was about to conclude direct negotiations with the Israeli government over the DoP, the blueprint for a national project that would resecure the authoritative leadership of the diaspora-based elite, with the crucial institutional support of the PLO's bureaucracy and the PNLA.

The Oslo Channel

It is easy to overlook the fact that the Oslo channel began life as only one of several covert channels of communication between Israel and the PLO. Other contacts with both Likud and Labor had been underway at least since the early 1980s. When Rabin first learned of Oslo in February 1993, it was not considered particularly serious, assuming a greater significance only when Israel realized Arafat seemed ready to sanction it.⁷² A security channel had already been operating concurrently with Washington between the Palestinians, the Israeli government, and the United States.⁷³ According to Nizar 'Amr, during the fourth meeting the Americans asked the Palestinians to find someone from the PLO. Nizar 'Amr was chosen, much to his surprise, and the meeting was taken as the first signal that Israel was ready to open a channel to the PLO. A series of meetings followed in London, with 'Amr reporting directly to Mahmud 'Abbas. For the PLO, this was a significant development because Israel was now addressing security, an issue at the heart of Israeli preoccupations. This was difficult to deal with via the delegation as they lacked both the military and organizational power of the PLO. According to 'Amr, the security channel gave rise to the Gaza first idea, to be later augmented with Jericho. Having served its purpose, the London channel closed as Oslo opened.

Direct Negotiations in Oslo: Similarity and Divergence with the Example of Sadat

The secret Oslo channel was operational between January and August 1993, leading to the signing of the DoP on September 13, 1993.⁷⁴ Despite the PLO's increasingly open role in Washington, the negotiations had still not led to a seat at the negotiating table. Mar'i 'Abd al-Rahman, director general of the PLO's Department of Arab and International Affairs (then Mahmud 'Abbas' office), said he had always believed that Washington would lead nowhere. He labeled it "a talking shop only,"⁷⁵ and pointed to the example of the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David agreement, which had required direct negotiations to succeed. Similarly, the PLO would choose to employ direct and secret diplomacy in Oslo. In practical terms, this was a far simpler operation than the complexities of bilateral negotiations by proxy in Washington and multilateral negotiations elsewhere. It also facilitated direct negotiations between the Israeli

government and the PLO, and forcefully re-established the authoritative leadership of Tunis.

The multilateral model, with success on one front tied to success on another, provided protection in numbers, yet the sheer scale of a comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict carried the implication of reaching no agreement at all. Sadat had abandoned multilateralism during the 1973 October War, and sought direct and separate talks with the Israelis in his bid to regain Sinai and cut back Egypt's crippling military budget. Arafat would use the Oslo channel to re-establish his authoritative leadership by negotiating an internationally acceptable national project and by gaining a territorial foothold in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho enclave. When informed by 'Abbas that the Oslo channel had developed a declaration of principles, Arafat apparently remarked, "I want Gaza-Jericho. What would I do with the Declaration of Principles? Why do I need it? Do I frame it and hang it on the wall?"⁷⁶ The opportunity for direct negotiations arose once Rabin concluded that a separate deal with Syria over the Golan was unlikely, and that the PLO represented the next best opportunity for diplomatic progress.

However, the nature of the deal the PLO thought it had struck diverged markedly from the reality it soon faced, and nowhere was this more obvious than on the issue of settlements. In this respect the analogy with Sadat is quite inappropriate, and the comparison equally revealing. Whereas Egypt secured the return of Sinai in full and saw Israel forcibly evacuate its settlers from the peninsula, the PLO would quickly find itself boxed into isolated cantons divided up by bypass roads and compressed on all sides by *rapidly expanding* settlements with a growing and well-armed settler population coordinating closely with the IDF. The misplaced analogy with Israeli withdrawal from Sinai led to overconfidence on the part of the PLO leadership that it could negotiate away the settlements as part of a final political solution. It has also been suggested that Israel's near total withdrawal from southern Lebanon followed by the offer to return almost all of the Golan Heights to Syria in March 2000 may have bolstered the PLO's determination to stand firm at Camp David II later the same year.⁷⁷ The general secretary of the Fatah higher committee for the West Bank, Marwan al-Barghuthi, made this point as the summit passed: "The Palestinians will not accept—and Mr. Arafat cannot accept—less than what Egypt and Jordan received and Syria and Lebanon will receive from Israel."⁷⁸ But withdrawal from territory outside Palestine proved one thing; withdrawal from territory inside it was quite another. Edward Said remarked that settlement in Palestine has been one of the "abiding continuities" of Israeli politics, and it has enjoyed cross-party consensus on most if not literally every aspect. Said lamented the PLO's failure to grasp this inconvenient fact, but notes that it is not alone: "It is an irony of recent Arab political analysis that we went suddenly from a style of considering *everything* about Israel as being always the same, to one in which we saw differences everywhere inside Israel, differences that were total."⁷⁹ Geoffrey Aronson adds some detail to the contrast between the deal secured by Sadat and the PLO's belief that it could emulate it with a full withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza:

The precedent of Yamit and other Sinai settlements, which were destroyed when Sinai was returned to Egypt, is often mentioned in support of this thesis.

That Sinai was ceded precisely in order to safeguard Israel's control of the West Bank, including settlement expansion, and the fact that a peace agreement between two strong states such as Egypt and Israel is qualitatively different from an Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement are only two of the many reasons why the Sinai settlement analogy has little relevance to the viability of settlements on the West Bank.⁸⁰

Aronson's point is underlined by Eyal Weizman, who observed that the Master Plan for the Development of Settlements in Judea and Samaria was consciously developed *in parallel* with the progress of negotiations with Egypt during 1978. Matityahu Drobless, head of the Jewish Agency's Land Settlement Division and author of the Master Plan, could not have been more direct; as peace with Egypt approached Drobless implored the government to wage "a race against time" using settlement as a means of heading off any possibility of an Arab state in the West Bank.

...Now [when the peace with Egypt seemed immanent] is the most suitable time to start with wide and encompassing rush of settlements, mainly on the mountain ranges of Judea and Samaria... The things must be done first and foremost by creating facts on the ground, therefore state land and uncultivated land must be taken immediately in order to settle the areas between concentrations of [Palestinian] population and around it...being cut apart by Jewish settlements, the minority [sic] population will find it hard to create unification and territorial continuity.⁸¹

Ideologically in tune with the messianic settlers of Gush Emunim, Drobless held a similar vision to that of the minister of agriculture in the first Likud government, Ariel Sharon. This was a key position for the settlement enterprise because the ministry controlled the Israel Lands Administration and financed the WZO's Settlement Division.⁸² The Master Plan proposed by Drobless has been modified several times, first in the Sharon Plan of 1981, and again in Sharon's Seven Stars Plan a decade later (the latter with the specific aim of bolstering the Jewish presence along the eastern seam of the Green Line, the temporary border drawn by the armistice in January 1949). The details may be slightly different, but the basic goal has always remained the same: to colonize the West Bank as extensively as possible in order to prevent the emergence of a viable Palestinian state. By 1993, Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza had lived the reality of occupation for twenty-six years; in contrast to the optimism in Tunis, the delegation to Madrid and Washington entertained few illusions about Israel's colonial ambitions.

PLO Personnel in Oslo

Illusions and outcomes notwithstanding, the Oslo channel afforded Arafat far greater control over negotiations than did the strained relationship with the delegation. He may have sanctioned the delegation, met with them, and directed much of their agenda, yet they represented constituencies with which he was not entirely familiar and did not fully trust. Delegation members were also constrained by the need to remain sensitive to constituents within Palestine, in addition to their inability to effect real compromise

without PLO approval. Given the precarious state of the PLO, Oslo allowed for rapid progress and the full restoration of the authoritative leadership in Tunis.

First contact was made on December 3, 1992, at a meeting in London between Qray' and the Israeli academic Yair Hirschfeld. According to 'Abbas, the report by Qray' on the meeting was handed to Arafat, from there to 'Abbas, and a decision taken between Qray' and 'Abbas to pursue the channel further. All three were long-standing colleagues and members of the Fatah central committee. During his first trip to Oslo, Qray' was accompanied by Hasan 'Asfur, a member of the PPP rather than Fatah, but well-known by 'Abbas and considered entirely trustworthy. Qray' and 'Asfur were joined by Mahir al-Kurd, a colleague from the department headed by Qray' within the PLO.⁸³

In July, with the Oslo channel well underway, 'Abbas addressed the Fatah revolutionary council, and for a further two days the central committee. Careful not to mention Oslo specifically, he simply alluded to the likelihood of an agreement being reached between the PLO and Israel, and the possibility of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho before the end of the year. By mid-August the negotiations had reached a critical stage, resolved eventually by telephone diplomacy. According to 'Abbas, the individuals privy to these calls were "Arafat himself, Yasser Abd Rabbo, Abu Ala, Hassan Asfour and myself."⁸⁴ When the agreement was ready to sign, 'Abbas contacted Sa'id Kamal, the PLO's ambassador to Cairo, who dispatched Tahir Shash, the PLO's legal advisor, to Oslo. According to Groth, the PPP's Bashir al-Barghuthi was also informed from the start, as was Fatah central committee member Muhammad Ghnaym.⁸⁵ The relatively small number of personnel involved and their close relationship to Arafat afforded the PLO chairman a degree of control that he could never have exerted over the delegation.

The PLO's decision to shift the locus of negotiations from Washington to Oslo can be explained as a means of re-establishing the authoritative leadership of the diaspora-based nationalist elite. This was achieved through the subordination of the delegation's progress in Washington to a directly negotiated national project realized between the PLO and Israel and enshrining a role for the leadership, personnel, and institutions of the PLO in exile. The Oslo channel offered Arafat a direct bilateral route to negotiations with the Israeli government, in contrast to the complicated mechanism of directing the delegation in Washington. Oslo also allowed Arafat to negotiate directly through known personnel from the leadership in Tunis, in particular fellow Fatah central committee member Ahmad Qray' in Norway, directed by Mahmud 'Abbas in Tunis. It also served to pre-empt the possibility of the delegation realizing their own diplomatic breakthrough. While not constituting a cohesive alternative leadership, delegation members did represent constituencies within the occupied territories that, given time, may have formed a serious challenge to Arafat's position. The Oslo channel offered the PLO chairman the means to rapidly reconsolidate *his* leadership within the Palestinian polity, acquiring new sources of international legitimacy and finance for the institutional power base of the PLO and pre-empting the possibility that structural changes within the occupied territories might come to fruition, generating a serious, substantive alternative to the authority of Tunis.

Mamduh al-'Aqr had no doubts about the rising anxiety in Tunis, or about Israel's readiness to exploit it:

The Israelis could detect how desperate our leadership was...it seems that they felt isolated. I trace this back to after they left Beirut...they started to lose contact with the reality in the West Bank and Gaza and with the intifada again they felt threatened...that a new generation of leadership, a new strategy is coming and with the negotiations...they were kept completely aside, at least on the surface.⁸⁶

Mansur also pointed to an institutional imperative behind Oslo, but noted that “this is something else...and not against the delegation.” In other words, the PLO did save itself in Oslo, but not specifically because it feared an alternative leadership. Faced with political isolation and the threat of insolvency, the PLO sought a way to extricate itself but was entitled to do so: “What is the instrument of the people if there is no leadership? Go back to [19]48...the PLO saved itself and by saving itself it saved the Palestinian people.”⁸⁷ The terms of the Oslo process clearly did redeem the institution and the chairman’s patronage network.⁸⁸ The DoP and the Gaza-Jericho Agreement that followed it would allow Arafat to assert the external elite’s authority over the most important, and potentially troublesome, Palestinian constituency.

The subordination of the Palestinian national project to the elite’s concern with re-establishing their authoritative leadership seems consistent with the view of Haydar ‘Abd al-Shafi. When asked why he felt the PLO went to Oslo, he replied: “This is a question that you should pose to Chairman Arafat...certainly there was no *national* gain.”⁸⁹ Moreover, both ‘Aqr and ‘Abd al-Shafi felt that Washington could have led to a better national project. ‘Aqr was adamant:

I have no doubt that if the negotiations were left to [their] natural development in Washington, the Israelis would have conceded a better deal, and the development of the negotiations was leading to that eventuality...the settlement is an Israeli necessity. They wanted it, the Americans wanted it... With the deadlock in Washington, the Israelis had to give in... The first sessions we had with the Rabin government...started to move away from previous government proposals and then we came to deadlock and that deadlock could not have been resolved except by Israeli concessions... we were talking about the whole of the West Bank and Gaza and we were talking about East Jerusalem as part of the transitional period.⁹⁰

‘Abd al-Shafi was equally clear: “I’m sure that if we’d stayed on we could have got much better terms, and much clearer commitments from Israel.”⁹¹ However, the Oslo channel foreclosed this option. In ‘Aqr’s words, “They equated the PLO only with their persons—a tragic thing.”⁹² In light of the al-Aqsa intifada, the failure of the Oslo process to deliver Palestinian self-determination is all too apparent. For many, the portents were not encouraging long before that. Speaking in 1995, ‘Abd al-Shafi recalled a conversation with Mahmud ‘Abbas:

I talked to Abu Mazin...and he is convinced that the process...is going to end with an independent Palestinian state. Now, I don’t doubt that he is

speaking sincerely, that really this is his honest belief, but I see he is under an illusion. He does not know the extent of the Israeli determination to hold on to the land.⁹³

Part II
The Framework of
Transition

4

PLO-Israel Agreements of the Oslo Process

The agreements comprising the Oslo process formed the framework for transition from PLO to PA, defined the essential characteristics of the PLO's national project, and allowed the diaspora-based elite to re-establish their authoritative leadership. In so doing, Oslo facilitated the transformation of the PLO's bureaucracy and armed forces into the civil and military institutions of autonomy, the subordination of indigenous forces to the returnee elite, and the establishment of a new governing coalition in Palestine. The bulk of these institutional and political arrangements, with some qualifications, would survive the al-Aqsa intifada. A small measure of accepted territory was also granted, and later slightly enlarged, as a foundation for the national project. Despite the reoccupation of all but one of the West Bank towns during spring 2002, the PA's right to administer the territory secured via Oslo was also reaffirmed with the publication of the Roadmap, which called for the IDF to withdraw "progressively from areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides [to] restore the status quo that existed prior to September 28, 2000."¹ The Palestinian leadership's international recognition, greatly enhanced by realignment with the prevailing international balance of power in 1993, would also survive the assault, although the uncontested centrality of Yasir Arafat would not in the years that remained to him.

With this in mind, attempts to read Oslo the last rites miss the point: aspects of Oslo's negotiating concept—a series of agreements without an explicit final goal or third party monitoring device—have indeed been surpassed by the advent of the Roadmap, at least on paper. On the other hand, the principle of Palestinian autonomy and the foundations of prospective statehood that Oslo established—however battered, circumscribed, and subject to revision—are still in place and have if anything been augmented. The details of the Oslo framework, be they institutional, political, territorial, legal, functional, or economic, still remain central to understanding the PA and the circumscribed Palestinian state that looks set to emerge from it. Israeli legal expert Nathan Lerner opined, "The agreements exist, even if the signatories don't observe them. They exist as long as they haven't been abrogated by the parties, and they cannot be abrogated unilaterally." The failings of the Oslo framework also explain the anti-colonial revolt that interrupted the state-building process. This is especially true of the implications for Israel's colonization campaign. Alan Baker, legal advisor at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pointed to a legal advantage bestowed on the settlers by Oslo:

The central claim was always that they are living in the area contrary to international law, which forbids the transfer of a civilian population to an occupied territory... Now they are living there by agreement—by the force of an international treaty that determines that their status will be decided in the final agreement.²

Notwithstanding the point that treaties can only be concluded by states, Baker made a valid point that was not lost on Palestinian critics of Oslo. The framework did however repeatedly enjoin both parties to refrain from actions prejudicial to the outcome of a final status agreement. This is not consistent with accelerated colonization and the doubling of the settler population over the decade following the signing of the DoP.

Back in the happier days of 1993, the DoP appeared to facilitate an impressive turnaround in fortunes for the nationalist elite in Tunis, although not all of them welcomed it. Indeed, within PLO circles and beyond them, awkward questions were asked about the terms of the agreements that had facilitated this dramatic change. Having dealt with “why Oslo” in the previous chapter, the focus here is on the details of the framework it inaugurated and on two of the principal questions raised by it: first, to what extent did the agreements provide for the successful realization of the PLO’s mandate and an eventual transition to statehood, and second, what were the specific institutional provisions governing the political and economic shape of the PA? The Palestinian nationalist movement was in transition, that much was clear, but the question remained, transition to what?

The PLO’s mandate as it approached Oslo was based on a reluctant acceptance of partition and the compromise of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This policy became explicit in November 1988 with the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine issued by the nineteenth PNC. The PLO based this decision on UNGA Resolution 181,³ and further refined the initiative the following month. Following Arafat’s Geneva address to the UN, the PLO chairman “explicitly stated that the PLO accepted [UNSC] Resolutions 242 and 338,” implicitly recognized Israel’s right to exist within the borders of the UN partition plan, and renounced recourse to terrorism,⁴ an initiative that reflected the PLO’s conclusive habituation to diplomatic means. However, acceptance of these particular UN resolutions was accompanied by a caveat reaffirming the PLO’s interpretation. In Arafat’s words, this meant “the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, and, as I have mentioned, *including the State of Palestine*, Israel, and other neighbours, according to Resolutions 242 and 338”⁵ (emphasis added).

The Oslo process undermined the case for statehood by avoiding any reference to Resolution 181, the international legal basis for the foundation of a Palestinian state. Instead, 181 was replaced by an unspecified interpretation of Resolution 242. This had been the case since the Letter of Invitation to the Madrid Conference, and helps explain the delegation’s insistence on sticking to principles, including the Palestinian interpretation of the Resolution’s meaning. The shrewd Palestinian legal critic Burhan Dajani observed,

All UN resolutions, whether pertaining to the country, the land or the people, were successfully excluded. Even UN General Assembly Resolution 181, on which the Palestine National Council...had based the very legitimacy of the proposed Palestinian state, was thrown out... The United States deftly replaced these resolutions with UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338...⁶

The substitution of Resolution 242 for 181 represented a fundamental weakening of the PLO's case for a state, a problem echoed with distressing regularity in the other documents of the Oslo process.

Arafat's diplomacy post-DoP has been widely criticized as inadequate if not naive. According to Usher, "The idea that the Israelis would not try to capitalise on the ambiguities and lacunae in the agreement betrayed, as one Palestinian observer put it, 'a catastrophic strategic ineptitude' on the PLO leader's part."⁷ This criticism is well made, but it is as well to consider the extent to which goals of the Oslo process were restricted to fulfillment of the PLO's mandate. Indeed, it might be said that a need to restore the authoritative leadership of Tunis at the very least merged with the details of the national project they negotiated. This being the case, the behavior of the PLO chairman appears well-calculated and rational: the DoP restored the authority of the diaspora-based elite and allowed them to pursue their mandate from a position of enhanced political and financial security. This security would duly become entrenched in the institutional content of the Oslo process.

The semi-autonomous Palestinian institutions established by Oslo suffered severe restrictions in their legal and territorial scope long before Sharon's campaign to physically demolish them. However, within their confines, some scope for elite agency could be exercised in the internal institutional arrangements of the new national project. If the secret Oslo channel served to re-secure the nationalist elite's authoritative leadership in principle, the institutional details facilitated their perpetuation in practice through the transformation of the PLO's bureaucracy and armed forces into the civil and security services of the PA. Furthermore, institutional expansion, coupled with the provisions for an elected council, offered additional means of securing local support and realizing a heterogeneous alliance with indigenous political forces. Consistent with the pattern elucidated in chapter two, this institutional adaptation constitutes the expression of purposive elite agency operating in the context of determinant structural constraints.

The documents that established the Oslo framework were negotiated in a two-year burst of diplomatic activity between the PLO and Israel's Labor government. They opened with three letters of mutual recognition and the DoP in September 1993, and were followed in quick succession by the Paris Protocol on Economic Relations, the Cairo Agreement, the Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities in the West Bank, the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, and the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In many respects the Interim Agreement marked a high-point for the PA's domestic legitimacy, initiating the redeployment of Israeli forces outside the West Bank population centers and facilitating the elections of January 1996. Following Labor's defeat in May, two further agreements were concluded with the Likud, the Hebron Agreement in January 1997 and the Wye River Memorandum in October 1998. Although not fully implemented, the latter did initiate one more albeit very limited IDF redeployment subsequently renegotiated by Labor in Sharm al-Shaykh and eventually implemented in late 1999 and 2000. Camp David II and the Taba talks that came after it represent a conceptual break with Oslo's incremental logic, a doomed attempt to resolve everything in sixteen and six days respectively, while the Mitchell Report, the Tenet Plan, and the Roadmap were attempts to revive what was already in place. They are treated separately in later chapters as a transitional phase in the

diplomatic process that accompanied the final slide into anti-colonial revolt and attempted to shape a path out of it.

The Three Letters of Mutual Recognition

September 9, 1993

The three letters of mutual recognition illustrate with stark clarity the asymmetrical nature of the concessions made in Oslo. Concluded among the PLO, Israel, and Norway, the first was exchanged between Arafat and Rabin, the second between Arafat and the late Norwegian foreign minister Johan Jurgen Holst, and the third between Rabin and Arafat. Dated September 9, the letters preceded the DoP by four days and form the ultimate reference point for the Oslo process.⁸ In his fine analysis, Dajani identified six key points in Arafat's letter to Rabin: the PLO's recognition of Israel, a failure to specify Israeli borders, de facto recognition of Israeli legislation over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, acceptance of UNSC Resolution 242, the PLO's commitment to ensure *Israeli* security, and Arafat's abandonment of key clauses in the Palestinian National Charter.

The first point, PLO recognition of Israel, bears directly on the issue of Palestinian statehood insofar as the PLO recognized Israel's right to statehood without receiving a comparable commitment in return. In his letter to Rabin, Arafat sets his name to this key Palestinian concession when he affirms that "the PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security."⁹ In so doing, Arafat conferred upon Israel the *Palestinian* legitimacy it always sought without receiving a guarantee of Palestinian statehood in return. Regardless of Israel's position in international law, its membership of international organizations, and the long-standing recognition by a number of sovereign states, no other people or organization could endow the state of Israel with the same mantle of legitimacy as could the will of the Palestinian people, expressed through the PLO.

The veracity of this assertion was quickly borne out by events on both the Arab and international levels. Within the Arab world the Palestinians had always been too weak to lead a war against Israel, but influential enough to prevent a completely unsatisfactory peace. The symbolic precedents set by the assassination of King 'Abdullah of Jordan in 1951, the ostracization of Egypt after Camp David and the assassination of Sadat in 1981, and the assassination of Bashir Jmayyil, president-elect of Lebanon in 1982,¹⁰ all pointed to the symbolic weight of the Palestinian cause and its value to the PLO. No other Arab leader dared to publicly pursue peace with Israel as long as Israel continued to ignore Palestinian rights. However, once the PLO had come to terms with Israel, other Arab leaders were relatively free to follow. The alacrity with which King Husayn took his opportunity in 1994, only one year after the PLO concluded the DoP, demonstrated just how fundamentally the PLO's concessions had altered the equation.

On the international level, mutual recognition opened the way for a quantum leap forward in Israel's diplomatic standing. As Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi noted ruefully, "immediately after Oslo, not less than forty countries either resumed diplomatic relations or established new diplomatic relations with Israel."¹¹ The full extent of this improved international standing was dramatically revealed in November 1995. Following the

assassination of Rabin on November 4, the outpouring of official grief at his funeral demonstrated just how successful his policies had been. The Israeli English language daily, *The Jerusalem Post*, widely noted for its hostility to the Labor Party, Rabin, and the DoP, was forced to admit as much:

It is easy to forget how recently Israel felt isolated and alone in the Cold War world community, with few warm friends in a sea of hostility. Now to see condolences and expressions of sympathy pouring into Israel from India, China, Russia, Ukraine, Slovakia, and South America is a reminder of how far we have come in such a short time.¹²

In the same edition, the Israeli journalist David Makovsky reported “22 presidents, 25 prime ministers, 15 foreign ministers, one king, one chancellor, and the heir apparent to the throne of England”¹³ attended the funeral of the leader of a state that until two years earlier had been something of a pariah outside of the Western world. Most significantly, those in attendance included President Mubarak of Egypt, a tearful King Husayn of Jordan, the Omani foreign minister, and an unspecified minister from Qatar. Prior to the PLO’s concessions in Oslo, such a turnout would have been quite unthinkable.

Dajani’s second problem with the PLO’s recognition of Israel arises from its vagueness: nowhere in the text does the letter specify how much of Israel is actually being recognized. From its inception Israel has possessed a remarkably elastic set of borders; expanding and contracting from time to time, it has consistently refused to comply with UN definitions of where its borders *ought* to lie. With the vagaries established in the letter echoed in the DoP, together with the PLO’s unqualified acceptance of Resolution 242, the strong international legal case for full Israeli withdrawal was seriously undermined. Two further points can be made in this regard. First, a caveat contained in Article V.4 of the DoP asserted, “the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.”¹⁴ However, this would seem to be a two-edged sword; while a “declaration of principles” has no recognized status in international law and thus might be seen as detracting nothing from the Palestinian case, the state of Israel is a sovereign party to the agreement, whereas the PLO is not.¹⁵ Treaties can be concluded only between sovereign states, which, Dajani suggests, implies that the final Israeli interpretation will carry the greater weight. As a result, “Israel can claim that the DoP falls within the province of its sovereignty and thus not binding on it.”¹⁶ Second, at the end of this theoretically open-ended process, Israel could claim the right to annex the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip, a position greatly enhanced by the PLO’s recognition of the validity of Israeli law in the occupied territories.

The third point derives directly from this recognition of a borderless Israel; the PLO in effect recognized all the laws of the state of Israel passed to the detriment of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories, “laws that have been used to expropriate land, usurp water rights, impose extortionist taxes, and expel inhabitants.”¹⁷ This implicit recognition of Israeli law became explicit in the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area. The eminent Palestinian lawyer Raja Shihada noted that the issue was left open to interpretation in the DoP, but that the subsequent Gaza-Jericho

Agreement resolves the situation; “[it] perpetuates, with Palestinian consent, the occupier’s law.”¹⁸

The fourth point derives from the PLO’s unqualified acceptance of Resolution 242 as a basis for negotiations, the text of which makes no reference to the Palestinian people or to their right of self-determination, but rather confines itself to calling for “a just settlement to the refugee problem.” From a Palestinian perspective, another difficulty arises from the passage that calls for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied...” It will be recalled that during Arafat’s address to the UNGA that followed the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine, the PLO chairman specifically added that the Palestinian understanding of 242 included the establishment of a Palestinian state. Consistent with the substitution of UNGA 181 with UNSC 242, this interpretation was excluded from the letters of recognition. In addition, acceptance of the call for withdrawal from “territories occupied” left Israel with a great deal of latitude as to just how much withdrawal would be necessary, if indeed it chose to withdraw at all.

Dajani’s fifth point concerns guaranteeing Israel’s “peace and security,” wherein the PLO committed itself to renouncing “the use of terrorism and other acts of violence” and an assumption of “responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to ensure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.”¹⁹ In effect, the PLO made itself responsible for the security of Israelis while simultaneously marginalizing the right of Palestinians to resist the occupation, a point made repeatedly to me by disgruntled friends and activists on the ground between 1994 and 1996. The Palestinian police were intended to act as a means of enforcing order and the rule of Arafat, mandated to protect Israelis from Palestinians, and not the other way around. Israeli charges of noncompliance notwithstanding, many officers would demonstrate a grim determination to do so.

Palestinian commitments to Israeli security form the single theme of Arafat’s letter to Holst:

In light of the new era marked by the Declaration of Principles, the PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and co-operation.²⁰

This statement seemed to strip the Palestinian people of their right to fight for self-determination and amounted to an indirect call from Arafat for an end to the intifada. Despite the persistence of the occupation, albeit in a revised form, the PLO conceded the right to resist. In the same spirit, Fatah decreed an official end to the intifada just prior to the elections in January 1996. Led by Marwan al-Barghuthi, the higher committee in the West Bank issued a statement annulling the general strike observed “on the ninth of each month to commemorate the beginning of the Intifada.”²¹ Ironically, this took place in the same week that Israel helpfully decapitated Yahya ‘Ayyash, the popular Hamas figure known as “the Engineer” (*al-Muhandis*). He may indeed have been responsible for lending crucial logistical support to several suicide bombing operations, but his assassination set all of Gaza in a ferment and seriously questioned Arafat’s ability to rule.

The sixth and final point concerns the assertion that “those articles of the Palestinian Covenant [*sic*] which deny Israel’s right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are no longer valid.”²² Despite undertaking to submit the necessary changes to the PNC for approval, Dajani points out that Arafat and his colleagues on the executive committee “exceeded their [constitutional] authority,” and defied the procedure stipulated by the charter itself.²³ In the context of Arafat’s centralized leadership, this in itself is no surprise. However, it does underline the systematic lack of regard for due procedure and collective decision making that increasingly came to define Arafat’s leadership of the PLO, and would be all too evident in his stewardship of the PA.

Turning to Rabin’s letter to Arafat, the Israeli response is illuminating in its brevity. Restricted to a single paragraph, it reads,

In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, wish to confirm to you that in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.²⁴

The asymmetry is clear: in return for the PLO’s recognition of the state of Israel, an agreement not to specify borders, acceptance of Resolution 242 with all its pitfalls, de facto acceptance of Israel’s apartheid legislation in the occupied territories, a commitment to make the PLO responsible for Israeli security, and the arbitrary emasculation of the Palestine National Charter, Arafat gained Israeli recognition of the PLO as a suitable negotiating partner. There is no commitment to a Palestinian state and no mention of the Palestinian right to self-determination.

The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

September 13, 1993: Institutional, Political, and Territorial Dimensions

If the broad political outlines of Oslo were established in the letters, the first institutional details emerged with the DoP. Article I reads:

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, the elected Council (the “Council”) for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.²⁵

The call for the establishment of the PISGA was expanded in Article VI.1:

Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the *authorized Palestinians for this task*, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council²⁶ (emphasis added).

The authorized Palestinians in question were of course the PLO leadership (mainly the Fatah leadership) returning from the diaspora, and carefully selected local allies. The explicit written inclusion of the PLO was underlined by the amendment to the DoP's preamble, which substituted the words "the Palestinian team" for "the PLO team." The DoP thus secured in principle what the Gaza-Jericho Agreement would secure, and the Interim Agreement extend, in practice: the re-establishment of the authoritative leadership of the diaspora-based elite through the initiation of a national project on Palestinian territory with the PLO leadership firmly at the helm.

In order to secure their authoritative leadership, the returnees would rely on three institutional pillars: transformation of the PLO's bureaucracy into the civil service of the PA, transformation of the PNLA into the security apparatus, and the construction of a political alliance with local forces via representation in the Legislative Council. This alliance would be reflected in the modalities for election, and augmented by patronage extended via Oslo's donor-dependent economic arrangements.

Turning to the civil service first, Article VI.2 outlined the spheres of civil responsibility that would be conceded to the PISGA:

Authority will be transferred to the Palestinians in the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism... Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.²⁷

One can take a critical stance on the restricted jurisdiction conceded to the Palestinian side, but it did grant Arafat and the nationalist elite a precious margin of institutional space. Furthermore, as the sectoral and territorial boundaries of autonomy expanded so too would opportunities for institutional expansion, local recruitment, and co-option.

While Article I introduced the provision for elections, Article III expanded on it and called for the establishment of the Palestinian police force in this connection. It specified that

In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.²⁸

The role and parameters of the Palestinian police were expanded in Article VIII:

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for the overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.²⁹

The retention of border control by Israel, as well as jurisdiction over Israeli citizens, plainly undercut the jurisdiction of the Palestinian police. Nevertheless, the DoP did in principle facilitate the transformation of the PNLA into the core of the PA's fledgling security apparatus.

The role of returnee and local recruits was specified in Annex II.3(c), with final arrangements to be confirmed as part of the forthcoming agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement was to include

Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police officers.³⁰

This served three purposes. First, as with the bureaucracy, the transformation of the liberation movement into the institutions of autonomy facilitated the perpetuation of the elite's institutional power base, and the renewal of key patronage networks. Second, the construction of a heavy security apparatus (note Article VIII's emphasis on a *strong* police force) granted the PLO leadership the means to coerce indigenous nationalist and Islamic groups and effectively quell armed opposition to the new national project. Moreover, Annex II.3(e) specified the "establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes."³¹ This condition points to the mechanisms for co-operation that would be effected in practice between the Palestinian police and Israeli intelligence in their attempts to enforce autonomy. Third, consistent with the pattern of bureaucratic expansion, the development of the security apparatus allowed for wide-scale local recruitment among the local population. Most importantly, the intifada's semi-independent nationalist fighters, including Fatah's Black Panthers and the Fatah Hawks, were neutralized, at least in the short term, through co-option into the new security apparatus. The provisions of the DoP thus greatly facilitated the realization of a subordinate armed force, albeit within the restricted framework of limited autonomy.

The third pillar of the new order was the elected Council. Annex I established that, among other things,

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.
3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they were unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.³²

Article IV defined the restrictions on the Council's jurisdiction: "jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations."³³ Article V.3 listed these issues as "Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest."³⁴

The major significance of the Council rested neither in the limitations on its jurisdiction nor in the dangerous precedents set for Jerusalem and the refugees. For the returnee leadership, an elected council offered another means of securing local support and legitimizing the national project. To this end, Arafat would successfully manipulate the electoral system to suit the needs of traditional notables and the wealthy bourgeoisie. Council members were elected on a constituency basis, which clearly favored candidates with a large familial or other financial power base. In summary, the DoP's provisions for an elected council provided the returnee elite with another institutional means of securing their authoritative leadership, complementing the provisions for the bureaucracy and security services, and lending the national project a useful veneer of democratic legitimacy.

Despite its many and varied concessions, the DoP did establish a measure of accepted territory. Article XIV (misleadingly entitled Israeli *Withdrawal*; the reality was a rather modest redeployment) established that "Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II." Annex II.2 noted,

Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.³⁵

This redeployment of Israeli forces was to be followed by a second "withdrawal," to be negotiated as part of the Interim Agreement. Article XIII.1 specified,

After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of the elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.³⁶

The point is that the DoP's provisions for a limited Israeli withdrawal secured, at least in a minimal sense, a measure of accepted territory for the establishment of the new national project. What the DoP signally did not do was promise a halt to Israel's settlement drive let alone the dismantling of one settlement already in place, raising serious questions about the extent that the PA's accepted territory might reach in the future.

Economic Dimensions

The economic provisions of the DoP built directly on the pre-existing economic relationship between Israel and the occupied territories, a coreperiphery relationship

between the Israeli metropole and its dependent Palestinian colony reflecting the settler-colonial nature of the Zionist enterprise. To best fulfill their colonial agenda, successive Israeli governments oversaw the systematic destruction of the economic basis for Palestinian independence in the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, the occupied territories served as a captive market for Israeli exports and a source of cheap labor and natural resources, most notably land and water, for the core economy. Indeed, prior to the first intifada, jobs in Israel “accounted for about 40 percent of the employment in the West Bank and Gaza...involving some 109,000 workers in 1987.”³⁷ Lack of economic growth also prompted wide-spread emigration, particularly among educated Palestinians, fulfilling another Zionist goal—the depopulation of the indigenous Arabs. As summarized by Ghassan al-Khatib at the time,

Israeli laws are inherently designed to serve the needs of the occupier in manipulating and transforming the Palestinian economy into a state of dependency, prolonging the occupation and thus forcing Palestinians from their homeland.

Israeli laws and policies have been instrumental in tightening Israel’s absolute control over land and water, restricting permits for industrial projects, creating a situation of unequal competition between the Palestinian and Israeli economies, and forcing more than half the Palestinian workforce to become cheap migrant labor working for the Israeli industrial and service sectors. A meager local market and weak purchasing power, coupled with restrictions on exports, have restructured the production infrastructure... making it dependent and complimentary to Israeli production requirements.³⁸

In this context, the DoP revealed a substantial continuity in Israeli policy. The shift from military government to semi-autonomy promised the perpetuation of the core-periphery relationship, but within the framework of the politico-administrative modifications provided for by Oslo.

This shift in Israeli policy was prompted to a large extent by the costs of administering the intifada. The intifada had rendered

Direct occupation through the military authority and the civil administration...bankrupt... [Moreover, w]ith the rise to power of the Labor Party, a new concept called for a transition from the old form of colonialism to a form of neocolonialism, economic in nature, in which Israeli rule will be carried out by local agents.³⁹

What were the specific mechanisms established for the perpetuation of Israeli control over the Palestinian economy? The economic aspects of the DoP were introduced in Article VII.4, under the section on the Interim Agreement.

In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian

Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority...⁴⁰

However, Article XI underlined the extent of Israeli control over substantive issues by subordinating development policy to a joint committee:

An Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and IV.⁴¹

Annex III expanded on the responsibilities of the Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, a body mandated to ensure cooperation in a number of spheres central to economic development. This included the development of water resources, electricity, energy, financial development, transport and communications, trade, and industry.

The spirit behind the model is placed in broader regional context by Annex IV, Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development Programs, which called for the establishment of a development program for the region, consisting of two elements: an economic development program for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and a regional economic development program. The arrangements with the Palestinians were thus conceived of as a means of opening the path to wider economic targets in the Arab world, an optimistic view expressed by their architect, Shimon Peres. Had the Peres vision come to fruition, Israel's status as a relatively advanced economy would have allowed it to act "as a base for finance and business, a center of international investment, in what is to be a 'Middle Eastern Common Market.'"⁴² In the heyday of Oslo's early optimism, Arab enthusiasm seemed real and the dividends for Israel promising; in 1994 Morocco hosted the Middle East and North Africa Economic Conference in Casablanca, followed in 1995 by a second regional economic conference in Amman. In the pithy summary of one skeptical analyst at the time, "the Palestinians have turned out to be the bridge over which Israel will walk to reach the Arab world."⁴³ In truth, there was no need to worry, and the enthusiasm petered out swiftly thereafter.

What were the implications of these arrangements for the economic content of the transition process? To begin with, the stipulation that economic development occur within a joint Israeli-Palestinian framework denuded the institutions of self-government of effective economic authority. In the words of Dajani, "this protocol makes the entire process of development contingent on joint action by the two sides—which is tantamount to subordinating development to Israeli control."⁴⁴ This underlines the fundamental goals of the autonomy project for the Israeli government: the perpetuation of the coreperiphery relationship with some politico-administrative modifications.

A revealing assessment from 1993, presented by the giant Israeli conglomerate Koor, underlined the full extent of Palestinian dependence on the Israeli economy:

The Palestinian economy in Gaza and the West Bank constitutes a third-world backwater within a highly developed Israeli economy. The economic power of the Gaza Strip does not exceed 1% of that of Israel. Its

separation from Israel will condemn it to absolute economic chaos. The Territories depend on Israel for almost everything. Israel takes in 90% of Gaza's exports and 70% of the West Bank's.⁴⁵

The autonomy project was born into a dependent economic relationship that the DoP appeared destined to maintain. However, the DoP altered the situation in one respect by creating a semi-autonomous institutional framework with co-operative local agents in place to manage it.

The local agents in question were, of course, the returnee PLO leadership and their local allies. The local Palestinian bourgeoisie would provide the capital, making the most of cheap labor, while the PA endeavored to provide stability and a climate conducive to investment. Samir Hazbun captured the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the Authority as it was then conceived, when he suggested that the PA "will act as a chaperon, overlooking Palestinian interests, and directing and advising the private sector, which is expected to launch most investments leading to economic development."⁴⁶ The DoP suggested that much of this economic development would take place on a joint Israeli-Palestinian basis.

Provisions for finance, trade, and industry were introduced in Annex III, Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation in Economic and Development Programs, and included the following provisions:

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.
6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.
7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.⁴⁷

A number of factors made it difficult to assess the real opportunities for profit under the PA, even before the wholesale destruction of spring 2002, including the embryonic nature of the project, Labor's defeat in May 1996, the stalemate in the negotiations that followed, and the repeated closure of the occupied territories, none of which provided an encouraging climate for business. However, the provisions of the DoP clearly suggested that, at least in principle, the opportunities for profit existed for those in a position to take them. Having tracked and encouraged the private sector throughout the Oslo process, the World Bank in 2001 reported,

On the eve of the [al-Aqsa] intifada there were approximately 56,000 business units in [the West Bank and Gaza], over 90 percent of them family or solely-owned small/medium enterprises (SMEs) or

microbusinesses. The private sector altogether employed 334,000 people, or 52 percent of the total Palestinian workforce, and contributed 88 percent of GDP.⁴⁸

Always vulnerable to political upheaval and severely hit by closure and the PA's induced inability to pay its creditors, the private sector would quickly suffer disproportionate damage during the al-Aqsa intifada.

The perpetuation of Palestinian economic dependency managed by the returnee elite and Palestinian capitalists was foreseen by 'Adl Samara. He observed that during a conference held in Tunisia in 1990, "seventy Palestinian businessmen and tens of PLO leaders, including Yaser Arafat, declared that 'the participants were determined to make a future Palestine the Singapore of the Middle East.'"⁴⁹ The implications of this model, explained Samara, included

The exploitation of the cheap skilled and educated labor in the West Bank and Gaza, the creation of joint ventures with Japanese multinational corporations [and presumably other foreign concerns], and economic cooperation with Israel.⁵⁰

Furthermore, "part of the capital of the multinational corporations who might be invited to exploit the West Bank belongs to Palestinian millionaires who are living in the diaspora."⁵¹ While the national project was still in its infancy, there was early evidence that diaspora-based Palestinian financiers and businessmen were preparing to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the Oslo framework.

One of the most striking features of the early days of the project was the visibly rapid growth of the banking sector, a sphere in which the Oslo framework afforded the PA some latitude. As with other sectors, banking had previously been restricted by the dictates of the military occupation. According to the Palestinian research institute MAS, "a total of 32 [banks], and nine in Jerusalem, had to cease operation under the new Israeli military rule."⁵²

On the eve of the Madrid Peace Conference, there were only two banks with 13 branches in the West Bank and Gaza—the Cairo-Amman Bank in the West Bank and the Bank of Palestine in Gaza. [However, by] the end of May 1995, the number of banks had increased to ten with 41 branches.⁵³

The size of the deposits received by the banks increased accordingly, reaching approximately "\$975 million by the end of May [1995], which at the end of March was \$828 million—almost an 18% increase in two months."⁵⁴ MAS attributed these deposits to an increase in foreign aid, local residents transferring savings from cash to bank deposits, and residents transferring accounts from foreign to local banks. Over five years later in September 2000, private sector deposits increased to reach \$3.54 billion.⁵⁵

The revitalized banking sector appeared to be gearing up to finance development under autonomy. In Gaza, the Egyptian Arab Land Bank and the National (Ahli) Bank agreed with the PA to finance construction of the Rafah airport. In another initiative,

Palestinian businessmen established the Palestine Investment Bank in March 1995 with the intention of funding other development projects in conjunction with the PA. The Commercial Bank of Palestine also emerged during the early days of the PA, “established by Palestinian business investors, intending to invest all their money in the West Bank...‘but only to develop industry.’”⁵⁶ Disagreements quickly broke out among Palestinian economists, the PA, and the banking sector over the transfer of deposits outside the occupied territories. The first PA finance minister, Muhammad al-Nashashibi, “accused bankers of transferring deposits abroad without taking part in the operation of re-building and re-construction or encouraging investment.”⁵⁷ The banks responded by blaming a lack of stability and a Palestinian central bank for impeding investment. The Arab Bank in Gaza also asserted that it had “granted \$15 million in loans at an interest rate of 10 percent since the bank opened in September 1994.”⁵⁸ The World Bank attributed the relative risk aversion of the Palestinian banking sector not only to “the uncertain political situation, but also due to a lack of confidence in the contractual environment.”⁵⁹ Nevertheless, the explosion of the banking sector during the early stages of the PA, and its steady expansion thereafter, suggested two things: first, private capital perceived a significant economic potential in the autonomy project; and second, that the PA was keen to promote the role of local businessmen within this framework. Citing Palestinian figures on the eve of the intifada, the World Bank reported that “bank credit to the private sector...[had reached] US\$1,064 million in September 2000...,”⁶⁰ while noting this remained a relatively “low loan-to-deposit” ratio that “did not exceed 30% in the [West Bank and Gaza], against more than 80 percent in other Middle East and North African countries.”⁶¹

Emerging from the wreckage of the al-Aqsa intifada, Muhammad Shtayya counted 23 different banks in the West Bank and Gaza with 109 branches, just over 3,500 staff, and \$3.5 billion in deposits. He put the loan/deposit ratio at 28 percent, extremely low, but explicable in the context of colonialism. In an uncertain environment banks asked for very high collateral. Families were reluctant to use land as collateral because the land issue was far from settled in Palestine. Even selling it to relatives ran a risk: they might be absent for an extended period abroad and absentee property was routinely confiscated by Israel in the course of its colonization campaign.⁶²

The DoP’s provisions for joint projects were quickly taken up by the Israeli conglomerate Koor, which launched the sadly misnamed initiative Salam-2000. According to the optimistic Hazbun, this two-track project was designed to work as follows:

The first track involves joint ventures with Arab firms in trade and industrial projects. The second track involves the establishment of an investment company with Palestinian businessmen and other international entrepreneurs to invest in the [West Bank and Gaza]. Some of the initial projects to be implemented by the new company are: 1) a cement plant in the West Bank 2) Telecommunications infrastructure 3) An agro-chemical formulating plant 4) Industrial parks...5) Factories in the autonomous regions...[apparently for food processing] 6) A trading company to export Palestinian goods to existing and new markets, primarily in Europe.⁶³

The construction of industrial parks was promoted by the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction. In June 1995, PECDAR announced that the PA “and Israel had agreed to establish nine industrial zones inside the Palestinian areas, with three in Gaza and six in the West Bank.”⁶⁴ The scheme was estimated to cost around \$920 million to be raised from private capital, from foreign aid, and from the World Bank.

The World Bank then published a plan for “privately-financed Palestinian ‘industrial estates’...in July 1995... In the Bank’s view, the parks would serve as ‘security islands’ which would attract Israeli-Palestinian joint ventures.” Private capital would play the major role in financing the projects:

Of the \$200m. needed for the program’s initial stage, \$150m. would come from private sources, \$20m. from donor states, \$10m. from the World Bank, and \$20m.-worth of land would be allotted by the PA. The same proportions roughly apply for the plan overall.⁶⁵

The industrial zones project made little progress due to deteriorating security, lack of investment, and policy disagreements within the Authority.⁶⁶ Nevertheless, some agreement would eventually be reached on Gaza and in principle all the zones were to be built along the borders, however drawn, between Israel and the territories. This would serve two purposes: first, to remove the bulk of the Palestinian workforce from Israeli territory; and second, to provide access to cheap Palestinian labor for both Israeli and Palestinian capital. By early 1997, Palestinian unemployment had already hit 50 percent in the West Bank and up to 70 percent in the Gaza Strip.⁶⁷ The DoP thus provided a framework for joint Israeli-Palestinian investment in the context of abundant, cheap, and relatively powerless Palestinian labor. By the end of Oslo the Palestinian economy would have suffered a catastrophic decline, ground down first by closure and then devastated by Israeli violence. However, in the early days developments suggested that both Palestinian and Israeli private capital saw an interest in the success of the autonomy project.

The Cairo Agreement

February 9, 1994

The Cairo Agreement dealt with the practicalities of joint Israeli-Palestinian control of border crossings, entry procedures, and joint patrols along the roads of Gaza and Jericho. It provided a first glimpse of the arrangements in the soon to be “liberated” Palestinian areas, particularly in regard to the jurisdiction of the Palestinian police and the territorial basis of the national project. The phrase “the devil is in the details” might be said to sum up the Cairo Agreement and all that followed, along with what now became the spirit of the negotiations. Uri Savir, director general of Israel’s Foreign Ministry and chief negotiator under Rabin and Peres, gave a valuable firsthand account of what happened during and after Norway. If we wish to take a charitable view of Oslo, distinguishing between an authentic spirit prevailing in Scandinavia and the cynical manipulation that followed, Savir tacitly suggests a good place to look. Excluded from all negotiations in

Oslo, an embittered and skeptical IDF led by Chief of Staff Ehud Barak now assumed a central role, poring over every detail “as if it were imperative to arrive at a solid prescription for every possible contingency.”⁶⁸ Rabin and Barak established an IDF planning team, in close communication with the IDF’s representative Uzi Dayan, reporting directly to the General Staff.⁶⁹ From here on in, the IDF’s imprint on the agreements became all too visible, and the “spirit” of Oslo, to the extent that it ever really existed, began to dissipate.

For example, the general introduction to the Cairo Agreement established the jurisdiction of the Palestinian police and the formation of joint patrols: “Roads within Jericho city will be under Palestinian control. Joint patrols on the main roads will be operated, led by the Palestinian vehicle.” However, it quickly added that “the Israeli authorities will have the overriding responsibility and powers for security and the Palestinian Authority will have the responsibility and powers for civil affairs, subject to the Gaza Jericho Agreement.”⁷⁰ The implications for future Palestinian sovereignty were not encouraging: “liberated” Palestinian zones were systematically divided between areas of Palestinian autonomy (with Israel retaining overall authority), surrounded by large areas under full Israeli control. These arrangements thus clarified in practice what the DoP had introduced in principle: the division of Palestinian territory as a basis for the national project and the curtailment of the PA’s jurisdiction within semi-autonomous enclaves.

Regarding border control, Article 1.(a) made it clear that “Israel remains responsible [for] the Egyptian border and the Jordanian line.”⁷¹ The arrangements were to apply specifically to the Allenby/Husayn bridge between the West Bank and Jordan, and the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt. Within the provisions for Gaza, Article 1 stated that

During the interim period the Gush Katif and Erez settlement areas, as well as the other settlements in the Gaza Strip, and the Israeli military installation area along the Egyptian border in the Gaza Strip...will be under Israeli authority.⁷²

Article 2.(a) extended this to the three connecting roads between the Strip’s settlements, along which “the Israeli authorities will have all necessary responsibilities and powers in order to conduct independent security activity, including Israeli patrols.”⁷³

The Paris Protocol on Economic Relations

April 29, 1994

Negotiated separately and then attached to the Gaza-Jericho Agreement five days later, the formally free-market Paris Protocol is of interest for where it ended up and for what it maintained as much as for what it changed. Uri Savir noted with regret that

It became part of the whole Gaza-Jericho Agreement and was subordinated (according to Arafat’s agreement with Rabin) to the security

part of the agreement, in case of contradiction between the two, which ultimately severely hampered Palestinian economic development, as it allowed for prolonged closures of the autonomous areas as a result of terrorist action against Israel.⁷⁴

The subordination of economic freedom to Israeli security, or more accurately the right to self-defeating collective punishment, bore the imprimatur of the prime minister, General Rabin, and the chief of staff, soon to be prime minister, General Barak. Consistent with the DoP, Article II further subordinated economic development to agreement by joint committee.

A semi-harmonized tax regime is stipulated, including almost parallel VAT rates to avoid disadvantaging Israelis. Rates of at least fifteen to sixteen percent were agreed for PA areas, compared to seventeen percent in Israel. However, the Protocol fell short of establishing a full customs union as tariff barriers were not entirely uniform and Palestinian trade with Israel restricted.⁷⁵ Israel continued to enjoy unhindered access to Palestinian markets, while Palestinian products, industrial and agricultural, remained subject to restrictions. The PA did not secure an independent currency, although everyone agreed that it would not have been viable anyway. Under Article VII Palestinian workers retained access to jobs in Israel, but only on condition of Israel's right to determine "the extent and conditions of the labor movement in its area."⁷⁶

Customs and excise collection remained under Israeli control, but the revenue would henceforth be transferred to the PA. Article IV provided for a monetary authority, the PMA, which would enjoy control over banking and fiscal policy, and manage "official reserves, bank licensing and regulation, and settlement of foreign exchange accounts with Israel and Jordan."⁷⁷ The Authority was also entitled to set levels of direct taxation which the new Ministry of Finance, built on the old Civil Administration, would collect. In contrast, indirect taxes were still to be collected by Israel but then passed on to the PA. This arrangement would lend Israel some major leverage, allowing it to withhold funds accrued by the PA as a means of exerting political pressure. Indeed, not long into the al-Aqsa intifada, the PA would find itself financially crippled as Israel withheld legitimately earned revenues, severely restricting the PA's capacity to provide even the most basic of services.

For the newly reconstituted elite, Article II's provisions for import diversification opened channels for extending patron-client networks. Within quantitative limitations, the Protocol empowered the PA to diversify sources of certain goods and to set its own tariffs in categories A1, A2, and B. This included selected foods, construction materials, and fuel. The PA could also import heavy equipment for reconstruction duty free and petrol for sale at lower rates than in Israel. The responsibility for allotting quantities fell to PA bureaucrats, which Sharif al-Musa and Mahmud Ja'fari noted at the time, presented an almost irresistible opportunity for graft. The system could be, and was, easily manipulated to the advantage of selected wholesale merchants in collusion with the PA. Predictably, it was not long before charges were heard that the PA had "not made public auctions for the import of cement, communications equipment, and petroleum, and that it favored particular merchants."⁷⁸ Israeli firms also cashed in, securing lucrative supply monopolies, with the beneficiaries reportedly including Dor Energy and the cement company Neshet, as did well-placed Palestinians such as Preventive Security's

Muhammad Dahlan, Arafat's financial advisor Muhammad Rashid (Khalid Salam), and symbol of the big bourgeoisie, Nabil Sha'ath. This is by no means an exhaustive list—the monopolies multiplied and with them the opportunities for profit.⁷⁹ While Arafat himself never showed any interest in the personal accumulation of wealth, he was adept at deploying patronage and the monopolies did not escape his attention. According to Brynen, Arafat used them to generate a pool of “discretionary funds” that were “used to finance small infrastructure projects in almost every rural community in the West Bank, often in association with external donors.”⁸⁰ Naturally, the recipient community was always made “well aware of where these resources have come from.”⁸¹

PECDAR managing director, Muhammad Shtayya, acknowledged by international agencies and Palestinians alike as a paragon of transparency, accountability, and professional integrity, took exception to the negative publicity generated in this regard: “The patronage and monopolies issue was used by the Israelis to try to assassinate the character of the Authority, which is not to say there was no corruption.” In his view, the only important monopolies were petrol and cement, and the provenance of both could be readily explained. Prior to the PA's monopoly, Israel used to distribute petrol directly to some one thousand Palestinian petrol stations so the PA could not collect the value-added tax (VAT). There was no Palestinian import company to intercede, so the PA took the initiative: “They said ‘we are the importers, send us one bill, on the basis of this we get the seventeen percent VAT.’” In return for that, the PA took a modest commission. “The main idea was to get one bill” and hence a refund of the VAT. It was the same story with the cement monopoly. In the context of wider reforms, PECDAR began work on establishing Palestinian distribution companies to undertake these tasks. In the meantime, problems had arisen because some of the revenue generated had not gone to the Ministry of Finance but to bank accounts in Tel Aviv. However, all was now unified and fully above board. He added, “Whenever the Israelis wanted us to be corrupt, they corrupted us.”⁸²

The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area

May 4, 1994

The Gaza-Jericho Agreement was arguably more significant than the DoP for two reasons. First, it fulfilled the requirements of Article XIII of the DoP concerning the “Redeployment of Israeli Forces,” together with Annex II, the “Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area,” facilitating the first redeployment of diaspora-based armed forces to Palestine. The IDF redeployment is now a matter of record, as is the arrival of Arafat in Gaza on July 1, 1994. Second, the agreement detailed the specifics of the embryonic PA and, as Raja Shihada observed, set the pattern for what followed.⁸³

In the main, the Gaza-Jericho Agreement deals with the specifics of IDF redeployment and the establishment of Palestinian institutions, although the structure of the civil and military branches, together with their jurisdiction and responsibilities, would become clearer with the Interim Agreement. Of particular interest are the details of the embryonic institutions and the degree and nature of the PA's territorial jurisdiction. What emerges is

a pattern of restriction on legal jurisdiction and authority over resources, especially land and water, and the internal division of territory.

Turning first to the security apparatus, Article II.6 provided for the deployment of Palestinian forces in the autonomous areas: “The Palestinian Police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security of Palestinians in accordance with this Agreement and Annex I.”⁸⁴ The role of the new police force is expanded upon in Article XVIII, which covered “The Prevention of Hostile Acts.”

Both sides shall take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism, crime and hostilities directed against each other, against individuals falling under the other’s authority and against their property, and shall take legal measures against offenders. In addition, the Palestinian side shall take all measures necessary to prevent such hostile acts directed against the Settlements, the infrastructure serving them and the Military Installation Area...⁸⁵

Annex I, Article II provided further details of security cooperation and established a JSC, with a series of DCOs to implement cooperation in practice. Article II.2.(e.5) specified that this includes immediate notification of “a terrorist action of any kind and from any source.” It followed that the remit of the Palestinian security apparatus included the protection of Israeli settlers and the arrest and imprisonment of Palestinians engaged in resistance against the ongoing, if modified, occupation.

Annex I, Article III provided the first glimpse of the structure and composition of the Palestinian security apparatus. According to Article III.(3.a.),

The Palestinian Police shall consist of one integral unit under the control of the Palestinian Authority. It shall be composed of four branches:

1. Civil Police (Al Shurta);
2. Public Security;
3. Intelligence; and
4. Emergency Services and Rescue (Al Difa’a Al Madani).

The security services would evolve substantially beyond this blueprint. Nevertheless, the agreement did introduce the basic structure of the apparatus used to police autonomy. Article III.(3.c.) specified that “the Palestinian Police will be comprised of up to 9,000 policemen in all its branches.” This number would more than quadruple as the autonomy project expanded, not least through widespread recruitment among local activists.

Details of the civil apparatus were introduced in Article III on the “Transfer of Authority.”

1. Israel shall transfer authority as specified in this Agreement from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority, hereby established, in accordance with Article V...

Article V specified that this authority “does not include foreign relations, internal security and public order of Settlements and the Military Installation Area and Israelis, and external security.” Article III.5 also established

A Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee (hereinafter the CAC) and two Joint Regional Civil Affairs Subcommittees for the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area...to provide for coordination and cooperation in civil affairs between the Palestinian Authority and Israel...

CAC-related restrictions on the PA’s legislative authority are listed in Article VII. Clause 3 stipulated that all legislation had to be submitted to a subcommittee to be established by the CAC, while clause 9 noted that “laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area prior to the signing of this Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with this agreement.” In short, Gaza-Jericho confirms the picture of the PA as an administrative intermediary of Israeli rule.

In the face of all these restrictions, elite agency found some scope for expression in the PA’s internal institutional arrangements. Prior to the election of the Council, executive and legislative powers were vested solely in the transitional PA. The initial size and scope of this body were detailed in Article IV:

The Palestinian Authority will consist of one body of 24 members which shall carry out and be responsible for all the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it...

The Palestinian Authority shall administer the departments transferred to it and may establish...other departments and subordinate administrative units as necessary...

This meant that prior to the election the returnees were granted the exclusive right to make appointments and establish institutions, lending them substantial powers of patronage. Elite agency governed the expansion of the bureaucratic and security apparatus and the disbursement of appointments to senior positions, as Arafat and those around him constructed an institutional power base with key local allies.

Beyond the provisions for institutional adaptation, Gaza-Jericho also deals with territorial aspects of autonomy. Article II.1 began, “Israel shall implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and from the Jericho Area to begin immediately with the signing of this agreement.”⁸⁶ Alas, the limited scope of the misnamed “withdrawal” was made clear in Article II.3:

In order to carry out Israel’s responsibility for external security and public order of Settlements and Israelis, Israel shall, concurrently with the withdrawal, redeploy its remaining military forces to the Settlements and the Military Installation Area, in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, this redeployment shall constitute full implementation of Article XIII of the

Declaration of Principles with regard to the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area only.⁸⁷

Article II.3 emphasized that withdrawal is actually a rather limited redeployment that leaves both the IDF and Israeli settlements in place. Furthermore, Article II.5 added, "Israelis, including Israeli military forces, may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area."⁸⁸

Writing in the immediate wake of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, 'Azmi Bishara remarked,

The Gaza model is a bantustan. Gaza, currently, is a "place" that lacks sovereignty and at the same time is not a part of Israel. It's neither one thing nor the other. Its people do not have the right of entry to Gaza's neighbouring countries. In this respect, they are even more restricted than in the bantustans of South Africa, where at least you could travel to work... Gaza is an entity that is totally separate from, yet totally dependent on, Israel, politically and economically. It is a bantustan with one gate that can be opened and closed any time Israel chooses.⁸⁹

The extension of autonomy that followed confirmed that the Gaza model would be applied to the West Bank. The creation of Palestinian enclaves in the major population centers denoted Area A replicated it, complete with the infrastructure of settler bypass roads constructed along with redeployment. Returning to Bishara,

Where is the basis for statehood? It resides only in the fact that there will be one PNA for all these bantustans... At the end of the day, we can call these townships a state if we wish. We can call Arafat 'emperor' if we wish, but the reality is bantustanisation.⁹⁰

Because the letters of recognition and the DoP omitted any reference to UNGA Resolution 181 and failed to specify the Palestinian interpretation of UNSC Resolution 242, Israel could continue to claim that there is no legal basis for a Palestinian state and that withdrawal need not mean full withdrawal to the 1967 borders. However, although the international legal status of the West Bank and Gaza appeared jeopardized, the legal situation *within* the occupied territories did not. Shihada noted with regret that Article VII.9 of Gaza-Jericho appeared to resolve this conundrum when it stipulated that the "laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area prior to the signing of this Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with this Agreement."⁹¹ The PLO thus consented to the perpetuation of Israeli law in the autonomous zones, in addition to their de facto perpetuation in the areas that remain under full Israeli occupation.⁹² Shihada explored the implications of this concession in the spheres of legal jurisdiction and jurisdiction over land and water. In his view, the formally intact legal jurisdiction of Palestinian courts beyond annexed East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements was implicitly undermined by the DoP.⁹³ He draws attention to Article IV of the agreed minutes to the DoP, which read as follows:

It is understood that

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.
2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.⁹⁴

This implicit differentiation in legal status between Palestinians resident in the occupied territories and the Israeli settlers living in their midst became explicit with Gaza-Jericho. According to Annex III, Article 1.2,

Israel had sole criminal jurisdiction over the following offenses:

- a. offences committed in the Settlements and the Military Installation Area subject to the provisions of this Annex; and
- b. offences committed in the territory by Israelis.⁹⁵

The result is that the Gaza-Jericho Agreement “has entirely removed the Israeli settlements—as well as the Palestinians of East Jerusalem—from the legal jurisdiction of Palestinian courts.”⁹⁶ The legal distinction between Israeli and Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza thus shifted from the de facto extension of Israeli law to the occupied territories into the de jure maintenance of the occupation and the legal codification of the status quo.

This shift from de facto to de jure occupation is confirmed in the articles dealing with jurisdiction over land. Annex II, Article II.B.22 specifically excluded “Settlements and the Military Installation Area,” from Palestinian jurisdiction, despite the fact that the land upon which they are built was Palestinian-owned and their confiscation contrary to international law. The same is true for the water supply, listed in Annex II, Article II.B.31, which stipulated the ongoing control of major water resources by the Israeli company, Mekoroth.⁹⁷

- a. All water and sewage...systems and resources in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area shall be operated, managed and developed (including drilling) by the Palestinian Authority...
- b. As an exception...the existing water systems supplying water to the Settlements and the Military Installation Area, and the water systems and resources inside them continue to be operated and managed by Mekoroth Water Co...
- d. ...the Palestinian Authority shall enable the supply of water to the Gush Katif settlement area and the Kfar Darom settlement by Mekoroth, as well as the maintenance by Mekoroth of the water systems supplying these locations and the water lines crossing the Jericho Area.⁹⁸

Again, these provisions confirm the impression that the Gaza-Jericho Agreement transformed the Israeli occupation from an illegal reality into a de jure blueprint for extra-

territorial autonomy and bantustanization, whereby Israeli settlements and military installation areas acquire added legitimacy, and Israeli control over the resources of both land and water remain essentially intact.

Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (The Early Empowerment Agreement)

August 24, 1994

Early empowerment lent added momentum to the transformation of the bureaucracy and security services and the establishment of revenue generation mechanisms necessary to support them. Five additional spheres of PA authority were specified and extended beyond the Gaza-Jericho enclaves: direct taxation, social welfare, education and culture, health, and tourism. This would be followed, in August 1995, by “a subsequent Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities [which] brought about the transfer of authority in eight more areas (agriculture, census and statistics, energy, insurance, labor, local government, postal services, and trade and industry).”⁹⁹ Article XI allowed the PA to begin to actively collect income tax and VAT, but not to tax the land, which continued to inhere in Israel. Nasir ‘Aruri observed that this was consistent with the policy of separating authority for land (which Israel assiduously sought to retain) from responsibility for the people (which it did not want).

Extending its reach, the PA could now absorb employees from the extant Civil Administration and merge them with the returnee bureaucrats into the new civil service. The multifaceted security services developed alongside this nascent bureaucracy, although Article VI.5 renewed Israel’s overall responsibility for security, while Article VI.4 obliged the PA to notify Israel in advance of any “large-scale events and mass gatherings.” Article VII allowed the PA to “promulgate secondary legislation regarding the powers and responsibilities transferred to it,”¹⁰⁰ although Israel retained the right of review. If the PA was found to have exceeded its authority, Article VII.3.1 called on the PA and Israel to refer the matter to the sub-committee established by Gaza-Jericho, the implication being that the PA remained bound by Shihada’s “occupier’s law.”

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip

September 28, 1995

Finally concluded in the Red Sea resort of Taba after lengthy and fraught negotiations in Eilat, the Interim Agreement superseded Gaza-Jericho and was instantly dubbed “Oslo II.” It provided further photo opportunities and was signed in a second, hastily arranged ceremony at the White House on September 28, 1995. The original text ran to over four hundred pages with annexes, the core of which fulfilled the requirements of Article VII.2 of the DoP, which stipulated that

The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the [Legislative] Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority...and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.¹⁰¹

The Interim Agreement is by far the most complex document of Oslo's canon, and the technical details of the wide-ranging negotiations that produced it were inevitably subject to the detailed input of the IDF, along with the bureaucracy of occupation that it staffed, the Civil Administration. A very distant remove from Oslo, the agreement that emerged bore all the hallmarks of the people who negotiated it. In a letter sent to Peres from Eilat, Savir wrote, "All in all, I have the impression that the civil negotiating teams are made up of people living in the settlements, many are lawyers, and many simply aren't interested in dismantling the [civil] administration."¹⁰² Between the settlers of the Civil Administration and the security prerogatives of the IDF, there remained little space for good will, and a great deal of scope for perpetuating occupation.

The lack of goodwill was more than evident in the Interim Agreement's most striking aspect, the formal division of the West Bank into three differentiated zones: Areas A, B, and C. This first emerged in Article XI:

1. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity of which will be preserved during the interim period.
2. The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council, as specified below:
 - a. Land in populated areas (Areas A and B), including government and Al Waqf land, will come under the jurisdiction of the Council during the first phase of redeployment.
 - b. All civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and B...will be transferred to...the Council...
 - c. In Area C, during the first phase of redeployment Israel will transfer to the Council civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory...
 - d. The further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented...in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council...¹⁰³

The stipulation that the West Bank and Gaza be considered a single territorial unit seems reassuring, until we consider that for all practical purposes they were already divided, not only geographically but also by the regular imposition of closure that could totally seal them off one from the other. Moreover, the scheduled redeployment to locations *within* the West Bank implied a measure of permanency, especially in light of the accelerated colonization drive pursued by Labor and Likud thereafter.

The three distinct zones were the major West Bank urban centers excluding Jerusalem and Hebron, the villages and hamlets outside them, and the "unpopulated" areas that

remained. Area A comprised the Palestinian population centers of Jinin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Nablus, Ramallah, and Bethlehem. Jerusalem was excluded as an issue for final status negotiations. Hebron, with its unique concentration of militant religious Jewish settlers in the heart of a Palestinian urban area, was subdivided by Annex I, Article VII into areas H1 (PA civil and security control) and H2 (PA civil powers over Palestinians, IDF security control with civil powers over settlers) and subject to a separate agreement concluded some eighteen months later. Area A comprised some 4 percent of the West Bank with 19 percent of the Arab population. The IDF withdrew fully from Area A toward the end of 1995, but redeployed immediately to the outskirts of each town. The impression conveyed by residents in the wake of the redeployment was one of relief that town centers were now free of Israeli troops, accompanied by cynicism as new checkpoints sprouted along every major road—a Palestinian checkpoint nearest to the town, followed by a new IDF checkpoint barely a stone's throw away.

Populated zones outside the major Arab towns were designated Area B. This included 450 villages occupying some 23 percent of the West Bank and including 68 percent of the population. Within Area B, the PA assumed civil responsibilities and the Palestinian police deployed to maintain order, while Israel retained a presence and overall responsibility for security. Israel retained full control of Area C, which included areas with no sizeable Palestinian population and territory occupied by Israeli settlements and military installations. Significantly, even by the conclusion of Oslo's last component at Sharm al-Shaykh in 1999, Area C remained the greater part of the West Bank, much of which would be required to form the territorial basis of a viable Palestinian state.¹⁰⁴ The Interim Agreement did improve on the DoP by stipulating that "neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status quo of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of permanent status negotiations" (chapter V, Article 31(7)). For the Palestinians, this was meant specifically to put the brakes on Israeli settlement construction. However, the PA never secured any planning and building powers within Area C, powers that continued to inhere in Israeli institutions and that were used with cynical determination to propel the colonization project forward. The PA did secure planning and building powers in Areas A and B, but these were often of no practical benefit because the borders of Areas A and B correlated precisely with the areas of Palestinian population density. In other words, most of the people might be in Areas A and B, along with their homes, but

Most of the available land for building on the edges of the villages lies within Area C. Accordingly, although planning and building powers in Areas A and B has ostensibly been transferred to the Palestinian Authority, the transfer of power is meaningless in a large proportion of cases.¹⁰⁵

According to Article X.2, the inauguration of the Legislative Council would precipitate a series of three further IDF redeployments at six-month intervals "to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council." Even if they had all gone ahead as scheduled and ended in July 1997 (which they did not, but were renegotiated, twice, in 1998 and 1999 and partially completed in 2000), and if the PA's borders expanded on schedule to their full extent, Israel was still expected to control around one

third of the West Bank. Retention of settlements and military installations during the interim phase suggested a blueprint for the final status negotiations, which confirmed fears of bantustanization. Fears were compounded by the imposition of “internal closures,” a new policy first imposed during February and March 1996 in the wake of a string of suicide bombings that followed the ‘Ayyash assassination (and which helped lose Peres the election in May). Internal closure also followed unrest caused by Netanyahu’s provocative opening of the “Hashmonean Tunnel” under the al-Aqsa Mosque on September 23, 1996. Israeli tanks were deployed outside the towns, and movement between Areas A, B, and C was all but impossible.¹⁰⁶

If internal division eroded the territorial basis for statehood several years before the al-Aqsa intifada, restrictions placed on the incipient Palestinian legislature set alarm bells ringing over the limits to its legal status and jurisdiction. According to Article XVIII,

- 4 a. Legislation, including legislation which amends or abrogates existing laws *or military orders*, which exceeds the jurisdiction of the Council...shall have no effect and shall be void *ab initio*.
- b. The Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council shall not promulgate legislation adopted by the Council if such legislation falls under the provisions of this paragraph.
5. All legislation shall be communicated to the Israeli side of the Legal Committee.
6. ...the Israeli side of the Legal Committee may refer for the attention of the Committee any legislation regarding which Israel considers the provisions of paragraph 4 apply...¹⁰⁷ [emphasis added]

The result was to place all legislation under the effective veto of the occupying power.

Annex IV, the Protocol Concerning Legal Matters, added a little more detail to the legal situation. The principle—one law for Palestinians, another for Israelis—remains the same. Just consider the following from Article I:

- 1.a. The criminal jurisdiction of the Council covers all offences committed by Palestinians and/or *non-Israelis* in the Territory, subject to the provisions of this Article.
...“Territory” means West Bank territory except for Area C which, except for the Settlements and the military locations, will be gradually transferred to the Palestinian side...and Gaza Strip territory except for the Settlements and Military Installation Area...
2. Israel has sole criminal jurisdiction over the following offences:
 - a. Offences committed outside the Territory...
 - b. Offences committed in the Territory by Israelis.¹⁰⁸ [emphasis added]

The emergence of two codes of law and two distinct realms of jurisdiction was not new to the Interim Agreement, but it did confirm Shihada’s fears over the legitimization of occupation.

The agreement also underlined the “securitization” concerns of the provisions of the Oslo process, a term coined by Graham Usher to describe how Israeli security came to substitute international law.¹⁰⁹ References to a strong police force that first appeared in the DoP were echoed in Gaza-Jericho, and expanded on by the Interim Agreement in Articles I.3, XII–XV and Annex I. Two important points need to be made: first, the remit of the Palestinian police was firmly directed toward the protection of Israelis from Palestinians and not the other way around; and second, despite the stipulation that the police be established by the legislature, they were in fact established by the PLO chairman and answered directly to him from the outset.

Annex I, Article II, under the heading “Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence,” outlined their mandate.

1. b. The Palestinian Police will act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror.
 - d. The Palestinian Police will arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror.
2. Both sides will...act to ensure the immediate, efficient and effective handling of any incident involving a threat or act of terrorism, violence or incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. To this end, they will cooperate in the exchange of information and coordinate policies and activities. Each side shall immediately and effectively respond to the occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitement and shall take all necessary measures to prevent such an occurrence.
3. c. [Each side shall] apprehend, investigate and prosecute perpetrators and all other persons directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism...¹¹⁰

If clarification were needed, this provided it: Israeli security had taken practical precedence over the legality of the Palestinian claims to self-determination and the right to struggle to that end. Moreover, the PA’s security services were specifically obliged to cooperate with Israeli intelligence *at the same time* as the IDF remained in occupation of much of the West Bank and Gaza and thousands of Palestinian prisoners remained in Israeli jails.

Usher also drew attention to the unaccountability of the police as they set about fulfilling this mandate. Article XIV had stipulated that “[t]he Council shall establish a strong police force.”¹¹¹ However, as with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, the PA began to assume its responsibilities in May 1994, almost two years before the inaugural session of the elected Council in March 1996. This near two-year interlude between Arafat’s arrival in Gaza and the inauguration of the Council granted Arafat more than enough time to transform his personalized network of military cadres into the core of the PA’s security apparatus. These cadres were never in reality accountable to the elected civilian politicians; they received orders from Arafat directly and were solely accountable to him. Further up the chain, Arafat himself was now accountable to the Israeli government, along with the other senior PLO and Fatah cadres who were co-opted with him into the structures of the autonomy project.

The Four Documents Comprising the Agreement on Hebron

January 15, 1997

There are four separate documents to the Hebron Agreement: the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron; an Agreed Minute: the American Plan on al-Shuhada Street; the U.S. Note for the Record; and the Letter from U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Netanyahu. The main point is the reproduction on a micro scale of the macro scale internal division facilitated by the Gaza-Jericho and Interim agreements.

The February 1994 massacre of twenty-nine Palestinians by a Jewish settler in Hebron’s Ibrahimi Mosque gave former prime minister Rabin every excuse he needed to evacuate the fanatical, violent, and wholly unwelcome settlers from the heart of Hebron’s old city. Instead, he did nothing, other than to allow the establishment of the TIPH, a

token peacekeeping effort subjected to constant abuse by the settlers. This led many to conclude that Israeli governments of whatever hue had no intention of uprooting even the most marginal of settlements. The Hebron Agreement appeared to support this assessment, leaving around 420 militant and well-armed Jews in the heart of Hebron's old city surrounded by 120,000 Palestinians whose entire pattern of daily life they continued to govern.¹¹² Even prior to the al-Aqsa intifada, the negative effect of the settler's presence ranged from the division of rights to worship in the mosque to the closure of the main commercial road in the town center. Closed to *Palestinians* after the massacre, the agreement provided for a gradual reopening, with the addition that USAID construct a wall down the middle, "0.40 meters wide, 1.50 meters high and 30 meters long."¹¹³

The limited redeployment around Hebron fulfilled the requirements of the Interim Agreement, which had first established the division of Hebron into zones H-1 and H-2. Article 2.(a) of the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron stipulated the following:

1. The Palestinian Police will assume responsibilities in area H-1 similar to those in other cities in the West Bank; and
2. Israel will retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area H-2. In addition, Israel will continue to carry responsibility for overall security of Israelis.¹¹⁴

Article 9 added the reassurance that "both sides reiterate their commitment to the unity of the City of Hebron, and their understanding that the division of security responsibility will not divide the city."¹¹⁵ However, for all practical purposes, Israel's retention of control over the Jewish settlement area in the heart of the old city did precisely that, setting another predictable precedent for any final status negotiations.

As for Israeli jurisdiction, Article 10.b. stipulated,

In Area H-2, the civil powers and responsibilities will be transferred to the Palestinian side, except for those relating to Israelis and their property, which shall continue to be exercised by the Israeli Military Government.¹¹⁶

Consistent with the pattern above, Israel again established the legitimate right to exercise authority within occupied Palestinian areas, detracting from the jurisdiction of the PA and consolidating the rule of one law for Palestinians and another for the Israeli colonists squatting illegally in their midst.

The Wye River Memorandum

October 23, 1998

The Wye River Memorandum was a half-hearted attempt to resuscitate Oslo and its incremental crawl toward permanent status arrangements. Negotiated with no great enthusiasm by Likud, it was ostensibly a mechanism for implementing unfulfilled

commitments made by Labor, including the further redeployments secured in the Interim Agreement. In public Netanyahu agreed to stick with the Oslo framework, but only on new terms that placed an obsessive emphasis on Israeli security. The accord contained five substantive sections covering further redeployment, security, economic issues, permanent status, and unilateral actions. The practical effects were limited: the IDF conducted a minor redeployment in the West Bank, the CIA undertook a greater role in policing Palestinians, the PNC reconvened to alter (for a second time) the PLO's charter, and new sources of revenue were sought to bolster Oslo and keep the PA afloat.

Of the three further redeployments stipulated three years earlier in the Interim Agreement, the first two were now allotted specific values, transferring a total of 13 percent from Area C, of which 1 percent went to Area A, 12 percent to Area B, and a further 14.2 percent from Area B to Area A. The third further redeployment was left for future negotiations, while the two rescheduled for implementation were broken down into three stages over twelve weeks:

Stage 2 percent of Area C to Area B, and 7.1 percent of Area B to Area A

1:

Stage 5 percent of Area C to Area B

2:

Stage 5 percent of Area C to Area B, 1 percent of Area C to Area A, and 7.1 percent of Area B to Area A

The first stage was implemented on November 19, transferring 2 percent of Area C to Area B between Jinin and Nablus, which included the town of Qabatiyya. A further 7.1 percent was to be added from Area B to Area A in December,¹¹⁷ but thereafter, under pressure from his disintegrating cabinet, Netanyahu stalled, citing Palestinian noncompliance with his omnipresent security conditions as an excuse.

The security provisions in Wye underline the extent to which Israel's implementation of its commitments became entirely contingent on the PA's success in policing its own people. The preamble to Article II sets the tone:

The struggle against terror and violence must be comprehensive in that it deals with terrorists, the terror support structure, and the environment conducive to the support of terror. It must be continuous and constant over a long-term, in that there can be no pauses in the work against terrorists and their structure.¹¹⁸

The security provisions, which 'Aruri noted take up over half of the document,¹¹⁹ include the outlawing and combating of "terrorist" organizations, the prohibition of illegal weapons, prevention of incitement, and mechanisms for security cooperation. An enhanced role for the CIA, which developed considerably under director George Tenet (at the helm from July 1997 until July 2004), is specified in Article II.A.1.c:

In addition to the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation, a U.S.-Palestinian committee will meet biweekly to review the steps being taken to eliminate terrorist cells and the support structure that plans, finances, supplies and abets terror. In these meetings, the Palestinian side will

inform the U.S. fully of the actions it has taken to outlaw all organizations (or wings of organizations, as appropriate) of a military, terrorist or violent character and their support structure and to prevent them from operating in areas under its jurisdiction.

In practice, the upgraded role for the CIA included verifying the dismissal of individuals suspected of killing Israelis from the security apparatus and ensuring that PA prisoners served the full term of their sentences. The security drive aimed at Hamas saw the CIA monitor the PA's attempts to confiscate unlicensed weapons.¹²⁰ The PA also began to target and close social service outlets providing welfare for needy Palestinians.¹²¹ The new arrangements came on top of a previous campaign that the former head of Shabak had himself declared effective; only in 1997, Ami Ayalon had noted with approval that "Arafat is doing his job—he is fighting terror and puts all his weight against Hamas."¹²²

The PA was also called upon to issue a decree prohibiting "all forms of incitement to violence or terror, and establishing mechanisms for acting systematically against all expressions or threats of violence or terror."¹²³ Furthermore, just for good measure, the PNC was required to reconvene in order to revoke, again, the provisions of the Charter that are "inconsistent with the letters exchanged between the PLO and the Government of Israel on 9–10 September 1993."¹²⁴ The upshot, observed 'Aruri, was to equate all forms of resistance with terrorism, with the threat that any Palestinian contesting Zionist-settler colonialism be punished by the PA, now working in close cooperation with the CIA.

Indicative of the precedence afforded security, Wye's economic provisions amounted to no more than one third of those governing the reinforced security arrangements. According to Article III.1–6, both sides "reaffirm their commitment to enhancing their relationship and agree on the need to actively promote economic development in the West Bank and Gaza." There was a call to "reactivate" the collaborative framework set in place by the Interim Agreement, another indication that all was not well. Specific provisions were to include

A strategic economic dialogue to enhance their economic relationship. They will establish within the framework of the JEC an Ad Hoc Committee for this purpose. The committee will review the following four issues: (1) Israeli purchase taxes; (2) cooperation in combating vehicle theft; (3) dealing with unpaid Palestinian debts; and (4) the impact of Israeli standards as barriers to trade and the expansion of the A1 and A2 lists.¹²⁵

Also promised were the openings of a Gaza industrial zone, a northern and southern safe passage route, a Gaza airport, and a seaport. The airport did in fact open in November 1998 and made a promising start: by early December 1999, Palestinian Airlines was running flights to five Arab destinations (three times weekly to Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and one flight per week to Bahrain and Qatar), and had just initiated a twice-weekly service to Cyprus. These were to be augmented in March 2000 by a Gaza-Rome agreement with Alitalia, and flights to Moscow were also under discussion.¹²⁶ The airport was closed in September 2000 immediately upon the start of the al-Aqsa intifada, and the IDF later tore up the runway. The industrial zone opened too, although the intifada would

deny both projects the opportunity to develop fully. The safe passage routes would in fact require another agreement to progress at all. Most disappointing, as Roy noted, despite progress in specific areas the Wye Memorandum failed to address the instrument responsible for crippling the Palestinian economy: that is, Israel's closure policy. Rather than calling for its revocation, Wye seemed to implicitly accept it "as an economic fact of life in the West Bank and Gaza."¹²⁷

If there was little good news for the economy at large, the promise to expand import exceptions on lists A1 and A2 seemed to offer further opportunities for patronage. In addition, Article III.7 reiterated the importance of continued assistance from international donors. To this end, both sides "agree to jointly approach the donor community to organize a Ministerial Conference before the end of 1998 to seek pledges for enhanced levels of assistance."¹²⁸ Donors would in fact pledge another \$300 million per year for 1999 and 2000, ostensibly to underpin Wye, but perhaps, as Brynen has speculated, also "to deter any unilateral Palestinian action upon the expiry of the Oslo process in May 1999,"¹²⁹ Roy made an important point in this regard, noting that for all the billions of dollars poured into Oslo, donor aid had "not promoted long-term economic transformation," but rather had financed "the costs of closure in order to keep the 'peace process' politically alive."¹³⁰

Article IV reiterated the commitment of both sides to aim for a permanent status agreement by May 4, 1999. To that end, Article V obliged the parties to disavow unilateral actions in order "to create a positive environment for the negotiations," and stipulated that "neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement."¹³¹ Netanyahu went home and did just that, immediately approving another round of land confiscation for thousands of new housing units, including two hundred in Kiryat Arba, home to the shrine of celebrated mass murderer Baruch Goldstein.¹³²

The Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum

September 4, 1999

The fact that the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum was negotiated at all is instructive, necessary only because of Netanyahu's unwillingness to implement the commitments already secured in the Hebron and Wye documents. Having ousted the Likud in May, Barak's new Labor-led government renegotiated those commitments in the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum. The final component of the Oslo framework, its most important features were a commitment by both parties to relaunch permanent status negotiations and to reach a final agreement by September 13, 2000 (the talks had formally opened and immediately stalled in May 1999), expansion of the PA's territorial base via three rescheduled IDF redeployments that replaced the two agreed upon in Wye, opening of the safe passage routes between the West Bank and Gaza, reopening at last of Shuhada Street in Hebron, construction of a seaport in Gaza, further strengthening security cooperation, and the prompt release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails.

Fulfilling its obligations to complete the first two further redeployments originally stipulated in 1995, Israel agreed to the following timetable:

- a. On September 5, 1999, to transfer 7 percent from Area C to Area B;
- b. On November 15, 1999, to transfer 2 percent from Area B to Area A and 3 percent from Area C to Area B;
- c. On January 20, 2000, to transfer 1 percent from Area C to Area A, and 5.1 percent from Area B to Area A.¹³³

The three stages, constituting the Interim Agreement's original first and second further redeployments, were actually completed, if a little behind schedule: the first stage transferred 7 percent from Area C to Area B just under a month late on September 10; the second stage was delayed from mid-November to January 5, 2000, whereupon Israel transferred 2 percent of Area B to Area A and a further 3 percent of Area C to Area B; and, some two months late, stage three was implemented on March 21, 2000, allowing the PA to add 6.1 percent from Areas B and C to Area A. This final redeployment granted the PA an accepted territorial base with full autonomy over 18.2 percent of the West Bank and civil authority in a further 21.8 percent.¹³⁴

The provisions for the safe passage route were also important for the PA's territorial base, having been originally stipulated in the 1995 Interim Agreement to reinforce the perception of Gaza and the West Bank as "one single territorial unit." The southern route was scheduled to open on October 1, 1999, and to be quickly augmented by a temporary northern route no more than four months later. The southern route did in fact open on October 25,¹³⁵ but only under a reconstituted version of Israel's pass system that used the PA as an administrative intermediary for Israeli vetting procedures. Once underway, while the arrangements could not be equated with "free" travel in the proper sense of the term, around eleven thousand Palestinians traversed the route in its first month, as residents of the West Bank noted a marked increase in visitors from Gaza.¹³⁶ It was closed less than one year later, just over a week into the al-Aqsa intifada, on October 6, 2000.

The inevitable security clause asserted that both sides continue to exchange information and coordinate closely together, while acting effectively against any "occurrence or anticipated occurrence of an act of terrorism, violence or incitements..."¹³⁷ The PA was specifically obliged to continue with weapons collections, the apprehension of suspects, and to submit to Israel a list of its "thirty thousand" policemen to ensure none were on a list of those wanted by Israel. Israel also committed itself to release 350 Palestinian prisoners in two waves, the first on September 5 and again on October 8. About half of them were actually released; 199 in September, but then only 33 in two batches two months late at the end of December.¹³⁸ Israel's handling of the second prisoner release could be read as a microcosm of Oslo in general; publicized as a goodwill gesture to mark the Ramadan celebrations it was condemned by the PA as too little, too late and in breach of signed commitments. Apart from putting further strain on the relationship between the PA and the Israeli government, it did nothing to shore up support for the PA among the Palestinian public, with whom the issue of prisoner release continued to resonate deeply, not least of all in the refugee camps that were home to so many prisoners' families.

In conclusion, juxtaposing the PLO's mandate with the framework constructed by Oslo left little room for confidence in the PA's capacity to realize a second transition to statehood in anything like the form originally conceived. The goal of a fully sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza envisaged by the nineteenth PNC looked very unlikely

indeed by the time of the Roadmap fifteen years later. Settlements, borders, sovereignty, refugees, and Jerusalem—all these issues remained unresolved. And even the issues that Oslo had not avoided, including the institutional, political, and territorial details of autonomy, illustrated severe restrictions on the PA that were equally apparent in the framework's economic content.

From the letters of recognition to the memoranda negotiated at Wye and Sharm al-Shaykh, the Oslo framework constituted a hopelessly lopsided continuum of compromise whereby the provisions of international law were systematically undermined. The PLO's inability to secure better terms or to ensure the full implementation of those concessions it did extract vividly reflect the structural context in which it was negotiated, wherein changes in the occupied territories generated a *potential* threat to the authoritative leadership in the diaspora which, in the wake of the first Gulf War, found itself diplomatically isolated and in possession of an institutional base facing insolvency.

The institutional content of the framework illustrated the mechanisms whereby the elite could resecure their authoritative leadership in practice. It included the transformation of the bureaucratic and military apparatus of the PLO into the civil institutions and security apparatus of the PA, accompanied by widespread recruitment among local activists to co-opt and coerce local armed elements. Gaza-Jericho afforded the returnees a two-year window in which to wield exclusive executive power, granting scope for elite agency to shape institutions and co-opt local forces into the new national project. The alliance with local notables and the bourgeoisie was enhanced by the prospect of an elected council, promising local agents a role in government and the means to disburse patronage. Underpinned by import monopolies and donor aid, patron-clientelism held a set of temporary political arrangements in place as the PA sought to consolidate its institutional foothold inside Palestine. The limited territorial basis for statehood became especially clear from the Interim Agreement onward, as both the West Bank and Gaza remained under external Israeli control, with islands of Palestinian autonomy surrounded by newly (if arguably) legitimate settlements and an expanding network of bypass roads. In the meantime, substantive and consistent economic development and a corresponding improvement in Palestinian quality of life remained subordinate to Israel's accelerated Zionist colonization drive and crippled by the periodic imposition of a calibrated closure regime purpose built to protect it. Israeli-Palestinian joint committees subordinated development planning to a broader framework under Israeli control, while the repeated imposition of closure ruled out consistent economic growth. Oslo had offered a path out of a crisis by promising an institutional solution to the issue of Palestinian self-determination. But it did so only via a framework that subverted the PLO's mandate and frustrated Palestinian just expectations of what that institutional solution would mean.

Part III
From Liberation Movement
to National Authority to
Statehood: Progress and
Regression

5

The Bureaucracy and Security Apparatus of the National Project

The conclusion of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994, opened the door for the first contingent of PLO forces to deploy in the Gaza Strip and Jericho enclave,¹ facilitated the establishment of the PA in Palestine, and set the clock ticking on the five-year interim period that would precede final status negotiations. The DoP's provisions for a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority were assumed by the PA, the designation chosen for the new national project by Arafat's decision to invoke the ten-point "Phased Political Program" from the twelfth PNC of 1974.² Point two of the program had called for the establishment of a "people's national, independent and fighting authority on every part of Palestinian land that is liberated."³ The PLO central council had ratified Arafat's decision, together with the DoP, on October 10, 1993.⁴

It has been argued that the framework of transition provided for a national project constituting a politico-administrative modification of the Israeli occupation, managed by a reconstituted Palestinian elite, and predicated on the perpetuation of Palestinian economic dependency in the context of accelerated Zionist colonization. This chapter assesses the elite-driven institutional adaptation of the PLO undertaken in these circumstances, returning us to the first three criteria of Table 1: an authoritative leadership, a bureaucracy, and a subordinate armed force. The analysis draws on empirical material to help explain the process of elite formation under autonomy. As Brynen noted,

Palestinian elite formation...*must* be understood in different ways. In other words, the impact of traditional patterns of social organization, occupation and socio-economic change, and the organizational dynamics of the Palestinian national movement operate simultaneously, generating different paths of elite recruitment and multiple lines of elite cleavage. Moreover, the future emergence of formal state structures may complicate this picture further.⁵

The focus here is very much on the transition of PLO institutions and personnel into the PA, which leads by extension to the hegemonic Fatah faction whose personnel retained a centrality, but not omnipresence, in the process. The diaspora-based nationalist elite succeeded in reasserting their authoritative leadership, supported by the practical transformation of the PLO's bureaucratic and military institutions into the quasi-state apparatus of the PA, enhanced by bureaucratic and military expansionism, a common feature of state-building projects in decolonized and developing countries.⁶ The authority of the PA was further bolstered via alliances with local elites; the co-option of local notables and wealthy businessmen into the institutions of the PA promised a share in the

disbursement of quasi-state patronage, complementing the opportunities for private capital established in principle by the DoP.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section examines the nature of power and decision making within the PLO and draws out predictable yet significant lines of continuity in the PA. The analysis identifies a pattern of what might be termed factional-corporatism, whereby institutional cohesion was linked with the authoritarian rule of Arafat. It is useful here to borrow from the model of the rentier state, which argues that freedom of “rulers from their dependence on domestic revenue sources frees them from the demands for democratic participation that accompanies the provision of taxes.”⁷ The Palestinian liberation tax notwithstanding, PLO finances have been mostly based on donations from state sponsors, sponsors who have generally favored Fatah. Arafat’s centrality within Fatah both facilitated and maintained his personalized control of PLO finances. Control of financial resources allowed the PLO chairman to rely on rent seeking within the PLO, perpetuating his authority and helping to maintain the cohesion of the institution. This pattern would be repeated with some modifications in the PA, and it duly became a principal target of efforts to reform it.

The second section examines the formal structure of Fatah and the patterns of institutional adaptation prompted by the autonomy project. This serves two purposes. First, it allows for an assessment of political processes within the central faction of the autonomy project, in particular the highly problematic politics of marrying the internal wing to external structures, necessitated by the latter’s redeployment to Palestine. Second, as the PLO undertook the realization of its institutional initiative on the ground, attention to the key players within Fatah facilitates a more nuanced analysis of Fatah’s role in the PA. The third section outlines the civil institutions of the PA and the nature of the bureaucracy that staffed them, illustrating the centrality of Fatah personnel and the supporting role of local elites. The final section examines the structure and composition of the security services. It details the role of returnee and local activists in the security apparatus and examines their performance in light of Oslo’s contradictory logic.

Patterns of Continuity in the PLO and the PA

A demonstrable continuity in the patterns of patronage, rent seeking, and centralized leadership established in the PLO quickly revealed itself in the PA. To underline the extent of these continuities, we begin by looking at the PLO from the perspective of the executive committee. Most of the observations here are based on an interview with the late Sulayman al-Najjab, the PPP’s representative on the executive committee until his death in 2001. Najjab had been a member of the executive committee since the PPP first took a seat during the eighteenth PNC in 1987, following which the essence of the PPP’s political program was adopted by the nineteenth PNC in 1988. He was present in Geneva for the launch of the diplomatic initiative that led to the U.S.-PLO dialogue and was reconfirmed as the PPP’s representative by the twenty-first PNC in 1996. As a non-Fatah and genuinely independent member of the executive committee with extensive firsthand experience of the institution, Najjab’s observations offer a valuable insight into the workings of the PLO with implications for the PA.

Najjab's account illustrated four characteristics of the PLO that demonstrate the rent-seeking model in transition: first, the consolidation of Fatah hegemony within the PLO; second, the personal control of PLO finance by Arafat; third, the importance of the military within the diaspora nationalist elite; and fourth, in the wake of the DoP, a shift in Arafat's sources of legitimacy and the concomitant displacement of PLO institutions by the PA.

The diaspora-based nationalist elite had long served as Arafat's key political constituency. In Najjab's words, there was

A fundamental reason why Yasir Arafat had such influence and power within the framework of the PLO and its executive organs. This goes back to the fact that the PLO was in the diaspora and the representation reflected in its institutions reflects the balance of forces among Palestinian gatherings outside, not the balance of forces within the framework of Palestinian society which is in the occupied territories.⁸

The composition of the executive committees elected by the twentieth and twenty-first PNC's (the latter being the first held in Palestine since 1964) illustrate the point. Three of the factions with seats on the executive committee, the PPSF, the ALF, and the PLF, had a barely discernible following inside Palestine, which probably did not extend much beyond close friends and family. As for individuals, the twentieth PNC counted the deportee Najjab among its members but was otherwise dominated by exiles. In contrast, the twenty-first PNC deliberately added five new members from inside Palestine to redress the balance (see Appendix 1). Israeli obstacles to resident participation obviously affected their ability to assume a greater role, but this was not the only factor at work. In 1991, in an echo of the PNF from 1974, the PPP had launched an initiative to redress the imbalance of representation in favor of independent Palestinians and representatives from the West Bank and Gaza. Alas, this initiative was "rejected by *all* the Palestinian organisations, *all of them*, because it touches on the privilege of many."⁹ This included the non-Fatah factions, anxious to defend their small share in the PLO bureaucracy, the PNC, and the Palestinian unions. In Najjab's view, this system faced a real test:

That is to say, how, in composition and functioning, would these institutions reflect and defend the real interests of Palestinian society, formed of different social classes, with different social interests, but [sharing] a main aim of a real independent democratic state?¹⁰

Najjab attributed Fatah's dominant position within the PLO to its ongoing financial strength, facilitated to a large extent by Arafat's traditionally good relations with the Gulf States and Egypt. He confirmed the concentration of patronage in Arafat's hands, adding that this was a process consented to by all the PLO factions as long as Arafat maintained their privileges. This included a fair share of PLO funding and a guaranteed number of seats on the PNC. In Najjab's words, "The main principle of relations between the different Palestinian military organisations [PLO factions] was how to divide the cake between them."¹¹ He also added that after the first Gulf War the PLO was "in real financial trouble,"¹² and that the defeat of Saddam Husayn represented a disaster for

Arafat's patronage network, compelling the PLO chairman to make sharp cuts in the budget and to actively seek out new sources of revenue.

Najjab also confirmed the significance of the PLO military as a key constituency for Arafat: "When I joined the executive committee, there was an established system or some kind of tradition that gives Arafat a free hand in the budget of the military forces."¹³ This free hand amounted to 40 percent of the PLO's total budget. The financial crisis that followed the first Gulf War proved sufficiently serious to affect Arafat's ability to maintain this arrangement and with it the loyalty of all of the PNLA. An instructive story emerged in this regard during August 1994. *The Jerusalem Post* reported that *Quwwat Badr*, a two thousand strong unit of the PNLA, requested that it be placed under the patronage of King Husayn.

The King said the move was prompted by the lack of attention by the PLO, which had led to a financial crisis for the brigade and a collapse in morale among its soldiers.

In a statement carried by the state-run media, Hussein said he was responding to appeals from the brigade's commander, Brig. Mohammed Abdul-Rahim Kudssiyeh...

The unit, officially known as the Badr Forces, [had] been stationed in Jordan under the command of the PLO for nearly 12 years.¹⁴

The depth of the crisis was explained in a statement issued by Husayn, instructing Prime Minister 'Abd al-Salam Majali to assume responsibility for the brigade.

The commander of the brigade has pointed out that...his unit is undergoing the severest difficulties it has ever faced...

It is suffering paralysis resulting from lack of funds, which has resulted in the forced discharge of its recruits, the undermining of its morale and its destruction as an effective military unit.¹⁵

The defection of PLO forces through financial crisis illustrates the extent of the trauma suffered by Arafat's patronage network at this time. Sayigh provides extensive additional evidence, including salary reductions from September 1990 for both Fatah and the PLO "of 9–12 per cent for civilian personnel and 7 per cent for the military,"¹⁶ very deep cuts in the budgets of the PLO's quasi-ministries, and the closure of several media outlets compounded in December 1991 by thousands of layoffs among the Fatah military in Lebanon, which further impoverished a constituency already experiencing sharp reductions in pensions and welfare services afforded to veterans' families. Not surprisingly, PLO funding channeled to the West Bank and Gaza also dropped, falling to less than 10 percent of its precrisis levels during 1993.¹⁷ With little prospect for improvement, this crisis could only continue to deepen. In the absence of decisive documentation (for example, internal memoranda or probably posthumous memoirs), the precise influence this had on PLO decision making is difficult to gauge. But two facts are indisputable: first, the financial crisis gripping the PLO and Fatah between 1990 and 1993 was acute and did not spare Arafat's key military constituency; second, new and

extensive sources of revenue sprang up quickly—and from some very unlikely sources—upon receipt of the news of the diplomatic break-through in Oslo.

With his seat on the executive committee, Najjab was automatically a member of the PLO's central council, the body vested with the authority of the PNC between sessions and which had ratified the DoP, lending these components of the Oslo framework the "legal" legitimacy of the PLO. The central council had conferred upon the executive committee the right to monitor the negotiations but retained the right to ratify all agreements, an arrangement that was plainly not functioning at that time or several years later. Between the original ratification of the DoP and the legislative elections of 1996 the central council had not met once. In Najjab's view, this was because Arafat did not want it to. Events preceding the al-Aqsa intifada told a similar story, as a central committee meeting to ratify the new Palestinian constitution and discuss final status negotiations was repeatedly postponed.¹⁸ Constitutionally, the PLO chairman was bound to convene the central council so that it could ratify the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the Interim Agreement. Instead, Arafat preferred to rely on the smaller executive committee, boycotted by the PFLP, the DFLP, the ALF, and sometimes by Fatah's own Faruq al-Qaddumi as well as Sulayman al-Najjab for the PPP. The executive committee elected by the twentieth PNC was also short of two of its independent members since the resignations of Shafiq al-Hut and Mahmud Darwish in protest at Arafat's secretive and authoritarian decision making and the content of the agreements he concluded.¹⁹ Distinct from the central council, the executive committee should be considered as "a reference to the PA and the peace negotiations with Israelis,"²⁰ implying that the legitimacy of the PA rests in the authority and the decisions of the executive committee. Beginning with the PA's second cabinet or executive authority, the PLO executive committee began to hold joint meetings with the cabinet to set PA policy.

In the two years that followed the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, even the executive committee convened only five times, with two of the meetings attended by Najjab. Within the executive committee, two-thirds of the membership was required to form a quorum and decisions were then taken by majority. Such a quorum had seldom been present since 1993, and then only when the independent-minded Najjab and Qaddumi attended. In light of these practices, Najjab asserted that Arafat no longer showed much interest in the executive committee, the central council, or the PNC, where he had historically relied on a broad consensus underpinned by the loyalty of the PNLA to legitimate his leadership. Post-Oslo, the chairman no longer needed a broad national consensus to conduct direct negotiations with Israel and the United States or with his more traditional interlocutors in the Arab states. The Palestinian elections in January 1996 lent him a new source of legitimacy, not only as the head of Fatah but as the president of the PA with a direct mandate from the people, and, of course, the initiation of the autonomy project opened up potent new sources of finance. Even the utility of Arafat's own Fatah movement could be questioned, a view that was regularly expressed to the writer by disgruntled Fatah activists on the ground. Arafat retained his position as the titular head of Fatah, yet now as president of all the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza he considered himself vested with a cross-factional legitimacy that reduced his reliance on the movement.

In addition to the new legal legitimacy conferred upon him as president, Arafat relied heavily on the more tangible asset of his reconstructed patronage network, which

extended through the bureaucracy, the security services, and well beyond both. By mid-1996, Salim al-Ta'mari reported that 38,000 PLO cadres, administrative staff, and family members had returned to the autonomous areas, around 80 percent of whom had been incorporated into the public sector. The ready availability of jobs or sinecures set them apart from West Bank and Gazan society at large, where unemployment then reached up to 35 percent, while the rate among returnees was markedly lower at less than 2 percent.²¹ Edward Said was characteristically acerbic when commenting on the scale of this resurrected patronage machine:

His employees plus their dependants give him an impressive network of about 350,000 dependants throughout the territories. If you add to that the number of prospective seekers of employment, businessmen and unscrupulous speculators who must go through Arafat to get projects approved, the number almost doubles.²²

The public sector continued to expand, as did the wage bill, even during the al-Aqsa intifada and despite a sharp downturn in revenue. The World Bank reported that while PA expenditures were cut from an average of \$107 million in the third quarter of 2000 to \$90 million by the second quarter of 2001, salaries actually *increased*.

Indeed, the monthly salary bill, which has been paid each month, increased from around US\$53 million prior to the intifada to US\$58 million by the end of 2001, while the number of civil servants on the payroll rose by almost 10,000 during the same period.²³

Although the consequences for service provision were severe, the Bank added that wages may have been seen by the PA as a way to ameliorate the immediate social and economic hardships arising from the ruin of the private sector by Israel's closure policy.

Further evidence of the patronage network in action emerged through the opaque activities of the al-Bahr company and the monopolies for primary resources granted to senior PA personnel and associates. According to one source al-Bahr was registered to Arafat's wife, Suha,

And other shareholders who handle his private finances...[it] is the new, strictly domestic instrument of Arafat's take-over of the Gazan economy. It complements already existing monopolies, for cement, petrol or flour, which he operates in complicity with the Israelis. For example, out of the \$74 for which a ton of cement is sold in Gaza, \$17 goes to the Authority, and \$17 into his own account in a Tel Aviv bank.²⁴

The activities of al-Bahr certainly attracted a lot of attention, not least of all among ordinary Gazans. The fact that Gazans were all too ready *to believe it to be true* conveys something of the popular mood vis-à-vis the PA. Edward Said also claimed that the IMF had been party to Arafat's personal control of PA finances: "At a donors meeting in Paris on April 25–6 1995, an IMF observer told me that the group voted \$18.5 million to the Palestinian people: \$18 million was paid directly to Arafat, \$0.5 million put in the public

treasury.”²⁵ I put this story to ‘Ali Khadr at the World Bank’s office in al-Ram and he rejected it out of hand, citing the very stringent accounting regulations employed by the World Bank and the IMF. However, Khadr did acknowledge that he could not vouch for the PA’s accounts in general: “There are, at the very least, question marks.”²⁶ The question marks were soon thrust under a spotlight by an official commission of enquiry into the PA’s management of its financial affairs. The final report, published on June 29, 1997, did not appear to implicate Arafat directly (though whether it would dare to have done so is open to question), but it did criticize three ministers: Nabil Sha‘th, Jamil al-Tarifi, and ‘Ali al-Qawasma.²⁷ An earlier audit into PA finances reported that \$326 million “had been squandered or mismanaged...”²⁸

To summarize the main points so far, Arafat and Fatah retained a centrality to the PA, which reflected and indeed magnified their hegemony within the now altogether more marginal PLO. The perpetuation of this centrality was predicated on the receipt of external sources of revenue, some but not all of which was accrued directly by Arafat and disbursed by him to and through Fatah. As the recipient of such substantial state largesse, Arafat could bolster the consensus on his leadership and decision making through a reliance on rent seeking; powers of patronage were employed to good effect by disbursing rent to clients including the PLO military, a key constituency in the PLO and now a key component of the security apparatus of the PA.

The Official Institutional Structure of the Fatah Movement

Central elements in the consolidation of the returnee elite’s authoritative leadership were the Fatah military through the PNLA and the Fatah executive committee chairman’s then unrivaled position as patron. The depth of Fatah’s penetration of the PA means that a sound understanding of the movement’s institutions and personnel facilitates a more nuanced analysis of the institutions and personnel of the PA. The focus of the analysis falls squarely upon formal institutions rather than the informal networks such as the famous *hamula* or extended clan that operate both within and beyond them, and that are particularly visible at the municipal level.²⁹

The General Conference

The general conference (*al-mu’tamar al-‘amm*) constitutes the highest authority within Fatah, just as the PNC constitutes the highest reference point for the PLO. The conference is responsible, among other things, for electing members to both the revolutionary council and the central committee. The Basic Law (*al-Nizam al-Asasi*) governing the movement was promulgated by the fourth general conference in 1980. Article 43 of the Basic Law stipulates that the conference is obliged to meet once every five years at the invitation of the central committee, with the proviso that the conference can be legitimately postponed to take account of circumstance. Since Fatah publicly announced its existence in 1965, there have been five general conferences; four were held in Syria, opening with a burst of activity in 1967, 1968, and 1971. Thereafter they became much more infrequent: the fourth conference was held in 1980 in Damascus and the most recent in Tunis during August 1989. The Tunis meeting was attended by

approximately one thousand delegates.³⁰ Drawn from a variety of institutional positions, delegates include all members of the incumbent revolutionary council, representatives from the worldwide regional committees, members of the general military council of the PNLA, and cadres staffing several Fatah institutions and popular organizations including the trade unions.³¹

The Revolutionary Council

The revolutionary council (*al-majlis al-thawri*) constituted an intermediary body between the central committee and the general conference, rather as the PLO's central council stood between the executive committee and the PNC. Article 50 of the Basic Law empowered the revolutionary council to act as the movement's highest authority between conference sessions, assuming responsibility for matters including oversight of implementation of all policies adopted by the conference and supervision of the military wing, with the exception of clandestine operations. Article 58 stipulated that the revolutionary council is obliged to meet once every three months. In practice it has met less often than that since redeployment, and could not meet as a unitary body at all during the al-Aqsa intifada due to Israel's closure regime. According to Deputy General Secretary 'Adnan Samara,

We couldn't arrange meetings from the first day of the intifada; till now [June 2003] we have not had an official meeting of the revolutionary council. But we have unofficial meetings for members who can attend. When something is important, we have two meetings, one in the West Bank and one in Gaza, and then exchange the information. Now we hold meetings for members who are available; we can't make decisions, but we can make suggestions.³²

Decisions were put on hold because an absolute majority of council members—at that time sixty-five or so votes—could not be mustered in Ramallah or Gaza alone. The impact of internal as well as external closure restricted the council to suggestions for which it relied on the limited number of “available members” (*ida al-majlis al-mutawajidiyyin*). It would eventually reconvene in full session in February 2004.

The council's work is organized by the General Secretariat (*al-Amanat al-'Ulya*), directed by three people elected from among the membership at the council's inaugural meeting. General secretary (*amin al-'amm*) is Yahya 'Ashur (minister of public works and housing from April 2003), and the two deputies (*na'ib amin sir*) are 'Adnan Samara in Ramallah and Sakhr Bsaysu in Gaza (also the governor of North Gaza). The General Secretariat had a total of around twenty employees. Headquartered in Gaza immediately after redeployment, the main office remained there although the majority of the membership now lives in the West Bank. 'Adnan Samara affirmed that the overwhelming majority of council members were now in Palestine: “At first they [Israel] refused [to accept] many people, even myself, but when we had the PNC, Rabin made a deal that every member of the PNC has the permission to go, to come back.” Members not already inside Palestine but in agreement with changing the charter, by far the greater proportion, then came back to cast their votes at the twenty-first PNC in 1996. The minority who did

not, including central committee members Faruq al-Qaddumi and Muhammad Jihad, were consequently still outside. No more than a handful of revolutionary council members remained outside after the PNC, just two or three refugees and PNC members who were “afraid they’ll lose the right to live in Jerusalem.”

The Basic Law stipulated that the council’s membership be established by the general conference in a similar manner and at the same time as membership of the central committee, with each central committee member becoming by default a member of the revolutionary council. Membership of the council should be drawn from up to twenty-one members of the central committee, the chairmen of the financial supervision and membership committees, up to twenty-five representatives of the Fatah military committee, up to fifteen persons chosen directly by the central committee, an unspecified number of persons representing the Fatah leadership within occupied Palestine, and a further fifty elected directly from among the general conference by secret ballot. Samara recalled that fifty were elected in 1989 from the civil or political wing of Fatah, and fifty-one were added from the military: “They have more than the political branch, because we are a military movement in the beginning, and these military people represent the military forces.” Officers relinquishing their commissions would also relinquish their seats, with the new officers assuming seats on the council by right. The Basic Law does not set a limit on membership numbers, and it has increased considerably post-Oslo. In addition to the 101 seats filled at the fifth general conference, the council agreed to add a maximum of forty new members to include nonreturnee cadres into the body. There are an additional eleven members with observer status but no vote.

Samara noted that the central committee had nominated many insiders for membership of the council, but the council itself had “insisted that the number should not be more than forty.”³³ By the council’s twenty-second session (*dawra*) in September 2000, membership had reached 129: eighteen from the central committee (counting the late Faysal al-Husayni who had not been replaced), forty-seven elected by the conference, fourteen qualified professionals (*kafa’at*), two committee heads, twenty-five officers from the military committee, twenty cadres added from the inside, and three detainees. Eight members were women. The official list of council members (*Qa’imat bi-Asma’ A’da’ al-Majlis al-Thawri*) is numbered, with each number correlating to rank. The highest ranked person at any meeting then chairs that meeting. The vast majority of insiders were numbered at one hundred or above. Most of the appointees had been leaders of the Fatah *tanzim* in the major towns of the West Bank and Gaza. The first insider appointee was Jamal al-Shubaki, added during the fourteenth session in July 1996, with sixteen more added by the seventeenth session in January 1997. Among them were four returnees from Tunis: Ramzi Khuri, Salah al-Ta’mari, ‘Abd al-Hay ‘Abd al-Wahid, and Nahid al-Rayyis. Most of the appointees held key positions in Fatah and the PA, while others were added for purely symbolic reasons. The twenty-third session in February 2004 approved five new members including Fatah’s longest-serving prisoner, Ahmad Jbara, released the previous summer after twenty-seven years in jail.³⁴ In Samara’s words, “It is the highest rank in Fatah, as a symbol of trust (*al-thiqa*), that we think of our prisoners.”³⁵

The Central Committee

The central committee (*al-lajnat al-tanfidhiya*) constituted the executive of the movement and ran its day to day affairs. Article 66 stipulated that it should meet at least once a month, and central committee member Hani al-Hasan asserted that it met at least once or twice a week, although it was somewhat diminished in numbers.³⁶ Technically, it was Arafat's position as commander in chief of the Fatah military that allowed him to chair the central committee and hence to lead the PLO. Each member, including the commander in chief, is technically equal in a collective leadership according to the Basic Law.³⁷

Article 71 specified the central committee's responsibilities, which included the following:

- a. Implementing the decisions and political, organisational, military and financial plans of the general conference and the revolutionary council.
- b. Dealing with violations of discipline and the Basic Law.
- c. Directing daily operations and internal, external, political, military and financial policy.
- d. Leading the movement.
- e. Maintaining solidarity.
- f. Convening the general conference and preparing the agenda.

This last point would become a source of considerable tension between the central committee and Fatah cadres from the inside, the former declining to hold the conference, the latter pushing hard for it to be convened.

Article 63 stipulated a maximum of twenty-one members, eighteen elected by the general conference and three assigned by a two-thirds majority within the elected eighteen. Article 70 provided for the replacement of dead, dismissed, or resigned cadres with members of the revolutionary council. The membership line-up had evolved somewhat in the decade and a half since the fifth general conference due to deaths and appointments made to accommodate circumstances post-Oslo. Death and absence had left the central committee rather under-strength; of its seventeen living members in 2003, only a dozen or so were regularly present in Palestine, and the Israeli closure regime prevented those in Gaza from traveling to sessions in Ramallah. Three of the committee's members remained outside Palestine on principle: Faruq al-Qaddumi, Muhammad Ghnaym, and Muhammad Jihad, the latter refused permission to return by Israel. Consistent with his politics, Salim al-Za'nun was in and out at the same time, and 'Abdullah al-Ifranji was posted abroad as the PLO's representative to Germany (see Table 2).

Salah Khalaf and Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid were killed in Tunis by Hamza Abu Zayd, an Abu Nidal assassin, on the eve of Operation Desert Storm, January 14, 1991. Subhi Abu Kirsh died in 1993. Fay sal al-Husayni died of a heart attack in Kuwait on May 31, 2001.

Table 2 The Fatah Central Committee Elected by the Fifth General Conference, Including Subsequent Changes as of 2003 (by Seniority)

-
1. Yasir Arafat
 2. Faruq al-Qaddumi
 3. Mahmud ‘Abbas
 4. Muhammad Ghnaym
 5. Salim al-Za‘nun
 6. Hani al-Hasan
 7. Sakhr (Yahya) Habash
 8. Intisar al-Wazir
 9. Hakam Bal‘awi
 10. Ahmad Qray‘
 11. Muhammad Jihad (Muhammad al-‘Amuri)
 12. Nasr Yusif (Mustafa al-Bishtawi)
 13. al-Tayyib ‘Abd al-Rahim
 14. ‘Abbas Zaki (Sharif Mish‘al)
 15. *‘Abdullah al-Ifranji
 16. *Nabil Sha‘th
 17. *Zakariyya al-Agha
-

*Ifranji and Sha‘th were not elected by the general conference but elevated later in 1990. Agha and the late Fay sal al-Husayni were added in 1991. Four deceased members from the original line-up elected in 1989 were Salah Khalaf, Hayil ‘Abd al-Hamid, Subhi Abu Kirsh, and Khalid al-Hasan.

The Internal Politics of Redeployment: Fatah’s Intifada Generation and Historic Leadership in the PA

Redeployment to Palestine largely resolved the strategic debate over armed struggle versus diplomacy, certainly for the vast majority of Fatah’s historic leadership and, at least for the next few years, for the greater part of the intifada generation too. But there remained plenty of scope for competition within the movement, some of it ideological, some of it a more concrete struggle for influence and material gain within Fatah and, by extension, within the institutions of the PA. The lines drawn were fairly clear, with the returnees in the historic leadership facing the younger generation intifada activists from the West Bank and Gaza, including deportees returning from Tunis themselves. The struggle took on a tentative institutional format, with the historic leadership represented almost to exclusion in the central committee and the revolutionary council, and the intifada generation very much in need of an outlet.

Prior to the Oslo process and redeployment, Fatah activities inside Palestine were coordinated under the umbrella of the Western Sector (*al-Qita‘ al-Gharbi*), commanded with considerable élan by Khalil al-Wazir and then with markedly less success by a committee under ‘Abbas Zaki.³⁸ The Western Sector’s presence in the occupied territories was known as *tanzim Fatah* or *al-tanzim*, simply meaning the Fatah

organization. In 'Adnan Samara's words, "Our *tanzim* is *tanzim* Fatah."³⁹ President of al-Quds University and Fatah member Sari Nusayba put it this way:

During the al-Aqsa intifada Israel presented it as something new and weird ... *tanzim* is just the Fatah operatives in the occupied territories from the beginning [who were] militarised in the seventies and later provided the support base for Oslo in the nineties. The *tanzim* is no more than the organisation of Fatah in the occupied territories as it existed historically.

The extent of organization within the *tanzim* was very limited; "the organisation in the occupied territories was not really cohesive, but rather a cluster of bits and pieces in different places all set up in a relational linear sense with various offices operating abroad." What held true for Fatah as a whole could be illustrated by the example of Fatah in Balata, the largest refugee camp in the West Bank on the outskirts of Nablus:

Fatah in Balata would be linked directly with someone outside with responsibility for the Nablus desk in Amman, but Balata wouldn't necessarily have organisational links with Fatah in the old city or al-'Askr [another refugee camp in the Nablus area]. Rather, each would have a direct link with an operator in Amman.

In Nusayba's opinion, the highest manifestation of *tanzim* cohesion would be to publish a leaflet in the name of Fatah and to distribute it across the West Bank and Gaza with a consistent text.⁴⁰ A plausible etymology of *tanzim* was suggested by Legislative Council member Qaddura Paris, who claimed that the word originally applied to the prisoners' committees established in Israeli jails. Over the years it became "part of our culture, our relations in the movement. When we got released we continued to use the word." Within Fatah the word *harakat* applied to the movement as a whole, whereas *tanzim* meant only those on the inside, united by relationships forged in jail or at risk of it. Paris put it this way: "Because I was in jail I know many people from Ramallah, Tulkarm, Hebron, Bethlehem; I have '*alaqat tanzimiyya* (organisational relations). I can use this to get things done."⁴¹

Once the PLO had taken a clear decision to sanction participation in the Madrid talks, elements in Fatah in both Tunis and Palestine perceived the need for new, more public, and coordinated arrangements. The initiative that resulted in Palestine was the political committees, led in the West Bank by Sari Nusayba. The same held true in Gaza, where Fatah began to organize publicly in 1991 under the auspices of the office of the Palestinian delegation to the Washington talks. As we saw in the discussion of Orient House, this development clearly underlined the hegemony of Fatah personnel over the negotiations even prior to Oslo.

With the advent of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, Fatah personnel abroad could begin returning to Palestine. Foremost among the deportees returning along with the historic leadership was Marwan al-Barghuthi, an energetic and ambitious man determined to capitalize on the new situation. Propelled to stardom during the al-Aqsa rebellion, his much-publicized incarceration in Hedarim maximum security jail and his trial in Tel Aviv, Barghuthi already held impressive nationalist credentials: he had been a former

president of the student council at Bir Zeit University from 1983 to 1987, a pillar of Fatah's *Shabiba* youth movement, a prisoner of the IDF, and a political deportee from 1987 to 1994.⁴² A decade before his high-profile trial, Barghuthi and like-minded cadres around him perceived the need to shift Fatah from a clandestine collection of local units into a visible, coherent institution.

The Higher Committees

The fora that emerged were two Fatah higher committees (*Lajnat al-Harakiyya al-'Ulya*). Fatah's Cairo office chief, Barakat al-Fara, explained that the names and some of the personnel were drawn from the old Western Sector, which had itself established two "higher committees" to lend logistical support to the first intifada: "There was one in Cairo responsible for the Gaza Strip, and one in Amman responsible for the West Bank; when we returned to Palestine, the names were not changed but some people were added from the inside." Certain members remaining abroad were also left out when the committees were reconstituted in Palestine.⁴³ During 1993 the temporary political committees were dissolved and the revamped higher committees came into being, one located on the outskirts of Gaza City and the other in al-Bira, adjacent to Ramallah.⁴⁴ The higher committees had no constitutional position defined in the Basic Law as they only formally emerged post-DoP, four years after the last general conference. For this and other reasons, their role and responsibilities remained rather vague. Committee member Ahmad al-Dik (son-in-law of Khalil al-Wazir) defined their aims as threefold: to further the nationalist agenda by continuing the struggle to establish an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, to help build a Palestinian political regime on the basis of the peace process with Israel, and to underpin democratization in Palestine by helping to build civil society through the Fatah NGOs.⁴⁵ To these ends, the higher committees mobilized Fatah activists from within the occupied territories in support of the PA and the Oslo process. The committees could also provide the intifada generation with a much needed framework: it grouped them into an institution around which they could mobilize, advance their vision and interests vis-à-vis the returnees, and generate an internal debate on the way forward for Fatah and the PA. It is no coincidence that the higher committees were articulating demands for reform long before it became fashionable in Tel Aviv and Washington. Within the fraught realm of factional politics, the committees also afforded Fatah's intifada generation a better chance of defending the Oslo process, on the street and in public, from the secular and Islamic oppositions hostile to it. There were plans from the outset to divide each higher committee into a number of subcommittees addressing finance, publishing, international relations, daily affairs, public relations, and so on, although the actual achievements were rather more limited.⁴⁶

In composition, the Gaza committee managed a blend of returnee and local leadership that was altogether less evident in Ramallah. Barakat al-Fara, for example, was a member on the Gaza committee when resident at his home in Khan Yunis, as were the returnees Yahya 'Ashur and Sakhr Bsaysu, and the long-term deportee 'Abd al-'Aziz Shahin. All three returnees were also members of the revolutionary council. In contrast, a visit to the Ramallah office suggested that the higher committee in the West Bank was composed almost exclusively of insiders plus the odd deportee like Barghuthi. Revolutionary council member Amin Maqbul would later act as Barghuthi's deputy. Committee

member Qaddura Paris recalled that the original higher committee line-up of fewer than twenty members chose Barghuthi to lead them. Then, as Fatah activists were released from prison, Barghuthi appointed around fifty of them to the higher committee, including each of the heads of Fatah in the regions (*iqlim, pl. aqalim*).⁴⁷ In the absence of the sixth general conference, the revolutionary council tried to bridge the institutional gap through appointments, accepting recommendations from the higher committees and incorporating many of its members into the ranks. Samara estimated that this had left no more than half a dozen members of the Gaza higher committee outside of the revolutionary council: “Take all the members we have added to the revolutionary council [since Oslo]; they were members of the HC [higher council].”⁴⁸

The need for institutional adaptation becomes clear when we consider the over-representation of the historic leadership in the better established institutions of the movement and the senior ranks of the PA. Both the revolutionary council and central committee are elected by the general conference, the starting point for influence in Fatah. Due to the diaspora-based nature of Fatah’s senior leadership and the prolonged Israeli occupation, no general conference could be organized inside Palestine prior to Oslo. Not surprisingly, this produced a striking over-representation of diaspora-based personnel in all conferences and a concomitant under-representation of cadres from within. This characteristic holds true for most PLO factions with the exception of the PPP, but Fatah found itself in a quite different position from 1994 with the bulk of its leadership and staff now in Palestine. This point was made very clear by Barghuthi himself, who makes an interesting case in this regard: Deported at the beginning of the first intifada, he did attend the fifth general conference and successfully won a seat on the revolutionary council, a rare thing indeed for an insider. He was joined by fellow deportees ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Shahin (deported after two decades in prison between 1964 and 1985 and ranked very high up in the council, just outside the central committee), and Akram Haniyya, future editor of *al-Hayat al-Jadida*.⁴⁹ Helena Cobban observed that deportees from the territories were not usually incorporated into the higher echelons of whatever faction they belonged to: “In most cases, and especially in Fatah, this took place at levels considerably lower than that of the top leadership.”⁵⁰

Both higher committees were led by a president and a general secretary (see Figure 1), the presidents appointed by Arafat, and the general secretaries chosen by local activists. Both sets of appointments lent the committees a tenuous link with the central committee. The president in the West Bank was Faysal al-Husayni, the general secretary Barghuthi. Husayni represented a traditional notable family from Jerusalem, enjoyed good relations with some local intifada activists (but very poor relations with Arafat), and was appointed to the central committee in 1991. Barghuthi, on the other hand, was quite different, a returned deportee elected to the revolutionary council with a record of student activism. In Gaza the appointed president was Zakariyya al-Agha, representative of another notable family promoted, like Husayni, to the central committee by Arafat in 1991. Gaza’s first general secretary was Salah al-Qudwa, replaced after his death in 1996 by Ahmad Hillis. Hillis was one of the select band of insiders added to the revolutionary council post-Oslo.

For the intifada generation, equitable representation at the general conference is a prerequisite for redressing their under-representation in the senior echelons. Barghuthi acknowledged that it was difficult to arrange given the uncertain circumstances, but understood it as the key to advancing the interests of his constituency: “I think we need in

the Fatah movement a new conference, general conference, to be held here in our homeland to unite the movement here. And of course it is not easy to do that, but I hope we can.”⁵¹ If convened, the conference would almost certainly take place for the first time in Palestine, and Barghuthi hoped to use it to increase the role of the intifada generation by having 50 percent of the delegates drawn from the




Figure 1 Structure of the Fatah movement following the Declaration of Principles and PLO redeployment to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

inside. This would duly elevate a majority of the higher committee members to the revolutionary council.⁵² Previous practice within the PLO or Fatah might have meant that their influence could be tempered by an expansion of both bodies rather than a drastic turnover in personnel, allowing the incorporation of local activists into the senior ranks while retaining a sufficient bloc from the historic leadership at the same time.⁵³ We will return to the struggle for the sixth general conference in chapter 6.

The Bureaucratic Apparatus of the PA

Beyond the official and unofficial structures of Fatah, the most important arenas of competition for power and influence were the bureaucratic and security institutions of the PA. The conclusion of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement contained a double significance for the PLO: first, it established Palestinian autonomy in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, and second it facilitated, in accordance with Article VI (2) of the Agreed Minutes to the DoP, the establishment of Palestinian ministries with responsibility for civil affairs beyond the borders of the original enclaves. Article VI (2) defined the responsibilities as covering “education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and other authorities agreed upon.” The spheres of Palestinian jurisdiction were gradually expanded, first in August 1994 with the Early Empowerment Agreement, and again twelve months later with a Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities, concluded along with the Interim Agreement. As the responsibilities multiplied so did the bureaucracy to administer them, though not necessarily in proportion to functional necessity. Brynen pointed out that research into the PA bureaucracy has been somewhat complicated by the ambiguous nature of the institutions, contradictory accounts of appointments and responsibilities, and the unclear nature of who is actually responsible for what.⁵⁴ His point is neatly illustrated by the immediate establishment of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry, and the Ministry of Planning and International Co-operation, in addition to PECDAR, established prior to the PA by the PLO “as an interim step toward the management of external assistance and the formulation of economic policy...”⁵⁵

PECDAR chief Muhammad Shtayya described it as “the runway on which the PA landed from Tunis.” Regarded for practical purposes as the first Palestinian cabinet, PECDAR was mandated to coordinate with donors, receive donor money, and produce a public investments program. In the absence of ministries, PECDAR took the leading developmental role for three or four years. In the course of disbursing around \$1 billion over a decade, PECDAR established an exemplary reputation for a strictly meritocratic appointments policy, financial transparency, and accountability. In contrast to some ministries, no one at PECDAR was appointed on the basis of family relations, and its staff numbers were not inflated. Drawing on these assets, PECDAR would later take a leading role in the planning and implementation of PA reform.⁵⁶

Back at the ministries, a fierce competition for authority and developmental resources quickly became apparent, as did the blurring of remits and the inflation of the wage bill. Remits may have blurred, but a pattern of appointments to the senior echelons emerged with some clarity. Central to this were the Fatah central committee and the revolutionary council.

Top Strata of the PA Bureaucracy

The senior level of the PA bureaucracy is structured according to a simple scheme of four ranks that remain consistent for each ministry. Each ministry is headed by a minister (*wazir*) with a seat on the cabinet. Second to the minister is the deputy minister or

assistant under-secretary (*wakil*), followed by the assistant deputy minister (*al-wakil al-musa'id*), of which there may be several to each ministry. The fourth, and by far and away the largest, stratum is that of the director general (*al-mudir al-'amm*), below which are the directors (*mudir*) and a further twelve grades of junior executive.⁵⁷

According to Basil Ramahi, director general in the Ministry of Finance, the personnel recruited to staff this fledgling bureaucracy were drawn from three principal sources: returnee PLO personnel from Tunis and elsewhere, Palestinian personnel from the reformulated Israeli Civil Administration, and qualified technocrats, many of whom were drawn from the pool of Palestinian NGOs.⁵⁸ We might add a fourth category that became significant as Oslo unfolded, activists and former prisoners from the first intifada who took posts at the director general level. At the time of the legislative elections, Barghuthi counted fourteen (at that time out of forty-six) West Bank higher committee members with director general rank, and two more elevated to assistant deputy minister level.⁵⁹ Muhammad Shtayya described the director general's rank as "a financial title," remunerating the holder with a modest \$1,500 per month, which, nevertheless, put such a person well above the national average: a policeman might expect to receive \$200 monthly, and by the end of the second intifada average per capita income had dropped to less than \$1,000 per annum, while 70 percent of the population now struggled below the poverty line of \$350 per month per family of four.⁶⁰

Illustrative of the role of the returnee elite, a considerable number of the senior and sensitive positions in the top three ranks have consistently been occupied by cadres from the Fatah central committee and revolutionary council (the council of ministers and six executive authorities plus an emergency cabinet are detailed in Appendix 4). The highest-placed local technocrats in the PA were initially deputy ministers, although this began to change as time passed and pressure for reform grew. Ramahi believed himself to be the highest-placed individual from the Civil Administration (director general), with the remainder of Civil Administration staff occupying intermediate and clerical positions outside the top four ranks. Raja Shihada noted that Article II. B.6. of Annex II of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement stipulated the retention of the Civil Administration personnel in the autonomous areas,⁶¹ and they were duly absorbed into the new institutions in Gaza and the West Bank as the PA's remit spread. According to Walid Salim of the Jerusalem-based NGO Panorama, there were 908 director generals prior to the elections for the Legislative Council,⁶² spread across a total of twenty-one ministries.⁶³ Reuters' Wafa 'Amr believed the majority to have been local recruits. Above them in the top three echelons, Fatah cadres from the central committee and the revolutionary council are a consistent feature, although it should be noted that as time went by, several of the revolutionary council members were appointees from the inside, the proportion steadily increasing.

At the ministerial level, the co-option of local forces also becomes clearer, reflecting the policy on municipal appointments made prior to the election. According to Robinson, "mayors appointed by Arafat prior to municipal elections have often come from the old land-owning class, including the Shawwa family in Gaza and the Natsche family in Hebron."⁶⁴ In the first PA cabinet, the Council of Ministers, Faysal al-Husayni was allotted the role of minister without portfolio, acting as the PA's would-be foreign secretary and receiving international dignitaries at Orient House, a role he retained after the election despite losing his seat in the cabinet. The late Ilyas Frayj, Christian mayor of

Bethlehem since 1972 and a representative of the traditional elite, became minister of tourism in the first cabinet and retained his position in the second until his death. Zakariyya al-Agha, representative of a notable family in Gaza, served as minister of housing in the first cabinet, and Mahir al-Masri, the “chosen son”⁶⁵ of the powerful Nablus-based Masri clan, was allocated a seat in the second cabinet. Masri would become one of the fixtures of future cabinets, although Agha would not. Central committee member and very wealthy businessman Nabil Sha’th was another fixture, as was local contractor Jamil al-Tarifi, who served as minister of civil affairs until his institution lost its ministerial status in October 2002, only to get it back in November 2003. Anyone trying to find it in the intervening twelve months would still have to follow signs advertising it as a ministry.

A pattern is clearly discernible within the bureaucracy, in which cadres from the revolutionary council repeatedly crop up in one of the top three positions in the ministries and in several public sector institutions. Barakat al-Fara saw them as a pool of personnel with three important qualities for Arafat and the central committee: they were all senior cadres in the organizational work of the movement; some of them were properly qualified and experienced professionals in their field; and together they had a collective history of decades of activism that rendered them a key constituency for the returnee leadership as they built the Authority. He added, “Abu ‘Ammar and the central committee want to reward these people because they are important to them, they were courageous and they participated in the struggle against Israel.” The cadres themselves had practical needs too; “in the meantime these people needed work when they returned to the homeland.”⁶⁶ ‘Adnan Samara confirmed that a policy decision had been made regarding the appointments as the PA’s first cabinet was contemplated: “It was decided that central committee members would become ministers and revolutionary council members [would become] deputy and assistant deputy ministers. This was the formula that we had, with some exceptions.” Tables 3, 4, and 5 illustrate the enduring centrality of cadres from the central committee and revolutionary council in the executive, the bureaucracy supporting the various ministries, and in other public sector bodies. The number of seats held by members of the two senior Fatah bodies in each of the six cabinets established by the time of the first cabinet with prime minister in April 2003 varied from a maximum of twelve in 1998 (also the largest cabinet to date) to a minimum of six in the first cabinet of 1994. The number would increase by two to fourteen in the first full Qray’ cabinet of November 2003.

The sixth and most reform-minded cabinet at the time contained four members of the central committee and seven from the revolutionary council, three of the latter appointees. Among the senior Fatah personnel, Wazir had been a fixture at Social Affairs in each cabinet, as had ‘Urayqat (moved from Local Government to Negotiations) and Sha’th (moved from Planning to External Affairs). ‘Abbas, Bal’awi, and Hasan from the central committee took seats for the first time. For the revolutionary council Dahlan, ‘Ashur, and Shubaki made their cabinet debuts.

Table 3 Fatah Cadres from the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council in the First Cabinet with Prime Minister, April 2003

Institution	Position	Name	Rank in Fatah
	Prime Minister and Minister of Interior	Mahmud 'Abbas	CC
	Secretary General to Cabinet	Hakam Bal'awi	CC
Min. of Agriculture	Minister	Rafiq al-Natsha	RC
Min. of Education and Higher Education	Minister	Na'im Abu al-Hummus	Fatah RCO
Min. of External Affairs	Minister	Nabil Sha'th	Fatah CC*
Min. of Information	Minister	Nabil 'Amr	RC
Min. of Local Government	Minister	Jamal al-Shubaki	RC*
Min. of Negotiations	Minister	Sa'ib 'Urayqat	RC*
Min. of Prisoner Affairs	Minister	Hisham 'Abd al-Raziq	RC*
Min. of Public Works	Minister	Hamdan 'Ashur	RC
Min. of Security Affairs	Minister of State	Muhammad Dahlan	RC*
Min. of Social Affairs	Minister	Intisar al-Wazir	CC

Key for Tables 3–5 and 8 in chapter 5: CC=central committee; CC*=central committee appointee; RC=revolutionary council; RC*=revolutionary council appointee post-Oslo; RCO =revolutionary council observer status.

The Opposition in the Bureaucracy

The relative absence of the opposition (both secular and Islamic) from the top strata of the bureaucracy further illustrates Fatah's dominance of the PA. Partly a simple reflection of its larger following, it was greatly enhanced by the opposition's marginalization of itself. The fact that there were no senior civil servants from the opposition factions at that time is largely attributable to their marginalization within the PLO through their refusal to participate in the Oslo process, rather than to any conscious policy of discrimination on the part of Arafat. They were not represented in the senior ranks of the PA because their leadership determined that they should not be. This is true of both the PLO's secular factions and of the Islamic factions outside it.

After an initial boycott of all PA institutions, the PFLP leadership in Damascus decided to review its decision. According to Walid Salim, the PFLP central committee met on December 5, 1996, and decided to open a dialogue with the PA.⁶⁷ The new decision maintained the boycott of the top three ranks (the political level), as this implied responsibility for conducting the negotiations with Israel as part of the Oslo process, the basis of which the PFLP continued to reject. However, the central committee sanctioned the entry of PFLP members into the bureaucracy at the level of director general and below and also lent its approval to cadres joining the Civil Police, but not the intelligence services. Fayiz Khalifa, a member of the PFLP politburo from 1972 to 1992, accepted the

position of director general in the Ministry of Local Government in Jericho, together with seven other PFLP cadres accepting similar

Table 4 Fatah Cadres from the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council in the Senior Ranks of the Ministerial Bureaucracy, 2003

Institution	Position	Name	Rank in Fatah
Min. of Culture	Deputy Minister	Yahya Hassan Yakhluuf	RC
Min. of Finance	Deputy Minister	Muhammad Jaradat	RC
Min. of Interior	Deputy Minister	'Abd al-Hay 'Abd al-Wahid	RC*
	Assistant Deputy Minister	Jamil Shihada	RC
Min. of Local Government	Assistant Deputy Minister	Ahmad Ghnaym	RC*
Min. of Public Works and Housing	Deputy Minister	Marwan 'Abd al-Hamid	RC
Min. of Tourism	Deputy Minister	'Abdallah Hijazi	RC
Min. of Youth and Sport	Deputy Minister	Jamal al-Muhaysin	RC
President's Office	Secretary General	al-Tayyib 'Abd al-Rahim	CC
	Deputy Secretary General	Ramzi Khuri	RC*
	Secretary General to Cabinet	Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman†	RC
	Advisor	Nabil Abu Rudayna	RCO
	Representative	Sulayman al-Sharafa	RC
	Jericho Representative	Sami Musallam	RC

† 'Abd al-Rahman was replaced by Bal'awi in the April 2003 reshuffle.

Table 5 Fatah Cadres Heading PA Agencies and Institutions, 2003

Institution	Position	Name	Rank in Fatah
General Control Institute	Chair	Jarrar al-Qudwa	RC
General Petroleum Corporation	Chair	Harbi Sarsur	RC
Palestinian Civil Aviation Authority	Chair	Fayiz Zaydan	RC
Gaza International Airport	Chair	Fayiz Zaydan	RC
Palestine Airlines	Chair	Fayiz Zaydan	RC
Palestinian Central Election Commission	Chair	Mahmud 'Abbas†	CC
Palestinian Council for Higher Education	Minister	Na'im Abu al-Hummus	RCO
Palestinian National Commission for Education, Culture, and Science	Chair	Jihad Qurashuli	RC

Palestinian Olympic Committee	Chair	Ahmad 'Ali Arafat al-Qudwa	RC
Political Guidance Commission	Head	'Uthman Abu Gharbiyya	RC
Telecommunications and Post Office††	Deputy Minister	Zuhayr al-Liham	RC

† 'Abbas did not continue to hold the post as prime minister.

††The Ministry of Telecommunications and Post was downgraded from ministry status in October 2002.

positions in Gaza. Salim estimated a total of no more than ten PFLP members were working as director generals in the PA. Finally, a number of PFLP members took jobs at lower administrative and clerical levels. In the Ministry of Youth and Sports in Ramallah, Marwan Jilani, director of Planning and Development described himself as a non-active Fatah member, while Jibril Muhammad, chief of the Volunteer Work section, readily confirmed his membership of the PFLP. However, he estimated that no more than eight out of an approximate one hundred employees in the ministry were non-Fatah or non-FIDA cadres (prior to the elections for the Legislative Council, the ministry had been headed by FIDA's 'Azmi al-Shu'aybi), and claimed that positions at all levels were more easily secured for Fatah personnel.⁶⁸ The DFLP took a similar view, while the PPP at the time had one director general, Muhammad Ghadiyya in the Ministry of Planning in Gaza.

Table 6 Governors in the PA and Fatah Cadres in the Revolutionary Council, 2000

Name	Governorate
Zuhayr al-Manasra	Jinin
Mahmud al-'Alul	Nablus
'Izz al-Din Sharif	Tulkarm
Mustafa Liftawi	Ramallah (Mustafa al-Shaykh Ahmad)
Ahmad Sakhr Bsaysu Khan Yunis	(later North Gaza)
Sami Fayiz Musallam	Jericho (director of the president's office)

The Governorates

Operating in parallel with the ministries are the regionally specific governorates (*muhafizat*, *s.muhafiza*). There is no specific provision for the governorates within the Oslo framework, so they might be characterized as the product of elite agency on the part of the PA leadership (see Table 6). They first emerged in the wake of the Interim Agreement and the IDF redeployment it prompted, concurrent with the increase in the PA's territorial reach, and they form a central if changing part of the PA's power structure. The first governorates were established in the West Bank towns of Jinin, Nablus, Ramallah, Tulkarm, and Hebron,⁶⁹ spreading out later as the PA consolidated its grip. In East Jerusalem, the governor's office was established in the former Civil Administration building in Abu Dis.⁷⁰ It was sacked in August 2001 during an IDF raid that coincided with a theatrical paratroop landing on Orient House. In the initial period of

PA expansion, there was no governor for Gaza as Arafat was there himself. In Jericho, the director of the president's office initially served in a similar capacity. Further into the Oslo process as Arafat spent more time in the West Bank, governorates were also established in Gaza. There were four governor's offices functioning in the Gaza Strip (Gaza North, Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and Rafah), and eight in the West Bank (Jinin, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Jerusalem/ Abu Dis). Five governors held seats on the Fatah revolutionary council, as did Arafat's former representative in Jericho.

In Jinin, Zuhayr al-Manasra had spent a long time in exile and was considered by locals as a returnee. Manasra had previously been one of the desk officers responsible for the West Bank as part of the Western Sector committee that took over after the assassination of Khalil al-Wazir. 'Izz al-Din al-Sharif in Tulkarm, Muhammad al-'Alul in Nablus, and Mustafa Liftawi in Ramallah were also former Western Sector desk officers who later became governors.⁷¹ In the upheaval of 2002, security chief Jibril al-Rajub (of whom we will hear more) also got up caught in the changes, hypothetically swapping his post at Preventive Security with Manasra as governor of Jinin. Manasra needed a new job, and Arafat needed to replace him; the governor left the city during Operation Defensive Shield, and the residents who endured without him did not want him back. Graffiti less than complimentary to the PA spread across town, and Arafat himself received a very lukewarm reception on a brief visit there shortly afterwards. Jinin had to be won back to the PA.⁷² But Rajub was not enthusiastic about his new posting, nor was he encouraged to be by Jinin. In the absence of Manasra or Rajub, acting governor was Haydar Irshayd, famous for a day when kidnapped by Fatah offshoot the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades during the summer of 2003.⁷³ He was released unharmed a day or so later, but then left Palestine altogether.

Other governors who survived the al-Aqsa intifada and the Rafah shakeups it prompted included the following. In Gaza, the much abused governorate of Rafah was headed by Sufyan al-Agha who had replaced 'Abdallah Abu Samhadana, while Muhammad Salim al-Qudwa was governor in Gaza City. In North Gaza, Sakhr Bsaysu replaced Zuhdi Sayid, winning the unenviable remit of governing Bayt Lahya and Bayt Hanun, both of which were on the receiving end of IDF assaults throughout the uprising. In Khan Yunis, Fatah stalwart from Kuwait, Husni Zu'arab, took over from the relocated Bsaysu. Over in the West Bank, Muhammad al-Madani (and later Zuhayr al-Manasra) replaced Rashid Ja'bari in Bethlehem, 'Arif al-Ja'bari replaced 'Aziz 'Amro in Hebron, Jamil 'Uthman Nasir kept his title if not his premises in Abu Dis, and Mustafa Malki remained governor in Qalqilya.

Juhar Sayigh, a physician and former communist who had good relations with Force 17 (responsible for, among other things, providing Arafat's bodyguard), took a position in charge of health in the governor's office in Ramallah shortly after it was established in late 1995.⁷⁴ He asserted that the ministries, the security services, all other PA institutions, and coordination with the IDF via the DCOs were to be the responsibility of the governor. The governors, in turn, were responsible directly to Arafat as president of the PA, making them the direct representatives of the president. Similarly, the newly appointed head of Force 17 and the Presidential Guard in Palestine, Fay sal Abu Sharkh, was given responsibility for Force 17 "in the governorates," reinforcing the image of direct presidential authority in this sphere. Hillel Frisch characterized this as a prefecture

system and noted that it raised the question of the role of the Ministry of the Interior. He raised a good point: from the establishment of the PA in 1994, Arafat systematically retained this portfolio for himself, centralizing presidential authority further until mounting pressure for reform obliged him to relinquish it in 2002.

Haytham Arrar of the Ramallah governor's office asserted that the governor himself enjoyed a direct relationship with the president, but the employees of the governorate were under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. The governor's office was physically housed within the ministry building in Arafat's *muqata'* compound and employees received their job descriptions and salaries from the ministry. However, she said that since the advent of the premiership, the governor's office had been separated completely from the Ministry of the Interior and would henceforth be the responsibility of the president's office alone. In line with the rest of the PA, the salaries of governorate staff were now paid directly from the Ministry of Finance, but via the president's office. The new, if embryonic, arrangements were reflected in new letterheads that had just been introduced to the office; they read in descending order, PLO, PA, Governorate of Ramallah, and finally Governor's Office. If the full implications of this change in authority were not yet clear, Arrar herself supported it in principle as it would allow the governorate to focus exclusively on civil work, while the Ministry of the Interior took control over the security services. She was quick to point out that the role of the governorates, as with much else in Palestine, required a new constitution to properly clarify matters, but in the meantime new stationery was a good start.

The Ramallah governorate had fewer than one hundred employees, around thirty civil staff and fifty governorate policemen (*shurtat al-muhafiza*). The police were responsible solely for implementing decisions within the remit of the governor's office, distinct from the civil police responsible for implementing decisions of the courts. Departments in the governor's office included legal administration (*idarat qanuniyya*), an information department (*idarat al-ilam*), NGO/civil society administration (*idarat al-mu'assasat*), and the administration of municipal and village affairs (*idarat shu'un al-baladiyya wa al-qarawiyya*), which coordinated work with the local government and PECДАР on infrastructure. The Ramallah and Nablus governorates possessed an additional department for the administration of refugee camp affairs (*idarat shu'un al-mukhayamat*), of which Arrar was manager in Ramallah.⁷⁵

The work of the legal office illustrated the collision of the modern state-building process with traditional means of conflict resolution.⁷⁶ Selected cases "from the people" were taken by the legal office, which was then responsible for trying to reach a solution in the first instance. Only if the governorate's legal office could not reach a solution would the case then be passed to the courts. Cases to which this applied were mostly emergencies such as murder, rape, and other violent crimes that demanded immediate attention. This gave the legal office first jurisdiction in family honor cases involving sex or rape. If a family abandoned a female member, the office could also step in to help her and mediate with the Ministry of Social Affairs. On behalf of the legal office, the governorate police were empowered to use customary tribal law to reach an out of court settlement (*hal 'asha'iri*) and to ensure the payment of agreed compensation to victims (*al-'atwa*). The system had advantages: out of court settlements could be reached quickly, the governorate police could restore order and prevent inter-family feuds spiraling out of control, and the system kept everyone at a distance from the courts. Familiar and

functional, the procedures of customary law were all the more important given thirty-six years of occupation, the prolonged absence of state structures, and the emasculation of the Palestinian legal system by the IDF and the Civil Administration that combined to leave the Palestinian judiciary in very poor shape. The destruction of PA institutions, the division of territory by closure, and the consequent localization of social and political life since the al-Aqsa intifada began have raised the utility of customary law further still.⁷⁷

The Security Apparatus

One of the defining features of Oslo's seven years is the progress made toward the establishment of a subordinate armed force. The imperatives of state building notwithstanding, the PA's security services were constructed in a framework of transition that greatly encouraged the militarization of the occupied territories. The substitution of unconditional Israeli security for the provisions of international law generated a dynamic, labeled "securitization" by Graham Usher, that came to define the very character of the process.⁷⁸ The language and terms of the Wye River Memorandum seemed to take this to a new extreme, and the Roadmap did little to dissipate the security emphasis.

Article VIII of the DoP called explicitly for the establishment of a "strong police force." The Gaza-Jericho Agreement facilitated the arrival of the first contingent in Palestine, pending the redeployment of the IDF around and within the two chosen enclaves. Article II.6 stipulated, "The Palestinian police shall be deployed and shall assume responsibility for public order and internal security of Palestinians in accordance with this Agreement and Annex I." Article VIII again referred to a "strong police force," as did Article IX.2, which set forth, "Except for the Palestinian Police referred to in this Article and the Israeli military forces, no other armed forces shall be established or operate in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area." Annex I set the timetable for IDF redeployment and established a joint committee for security coordination, the JSC, to be staffed by a select handful of officers from the IDF and the PA.⁷⁹ Joint regional security committees for the regions, JRSCs, were established for the West Bank and Gaza to run the series of DCOs. The PA eventually set up one DCO for each governorate. Each DCO would have one commanding officer and six juniors on the PA's side. This network of IDF-PA coordination was to plan and implement the initial transfer of power and then maintain security on the ground. This would principally mean Israeli-Palestinian joint patrols to keep the roads open, and joint mobile units to respond to security-related incidents at short notice. On the PA's side, the newly formed National Security Force (*Quwwat al-Amn al-Watani*) was responsible for staffing and running the joint patrols.

Beyond the basics of coordination and cooperation, Article III.2 of Annex I provided an outline of the roles the Palestinian police are intended to serve. There is nothing remarkable here, save for the predictable emphasis on "maintaining internal security and public order." Article III.3 outlined the structure and composition of the police force, Article III.4 the nature of recruitment, and Article III.5 the arms and equipment to be supplied. Article III.3 stipulated that the police force is to be "one integral unit under the control of the Palestinian Authority...composed of four branches." These are listed as Civil Police, Public Security, Intelligence, and Emergency Services and Rescue, with an

additional provision for a coastal police unit. Finally, the size of the force is set at an improbable “9,000 policemen in all its branches.”

The Gaza-Jericho Agreement specified that the police would recruit both locally and abroad. For Arafat, this would kill two birds with one stone—reinventing and re-employing his constituency within the PNLA (which, as the delegation to Madrid and Washington well knew, was the only force capable of doing the job), while simultaneously bringing Fatah activists from the inside into the new apparatus. For those returning from the diaspora, Article III.4 stipulated that “the number of Palestinian recruits from abroad shall not exceed 7,000, of whom 1,000 will arrive three months after the signing of the Agreement.” This is followed by the proviso that “the employment of policemen who have been convicted of serious crimes or have been found to be actively involved in terrorist activities subsequent to their employment will be immediately terminated.” The Netanyahu government would raise this issue again, demanding a comprehensive list of the names of the PA’s policemen for vetting.

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement gives further details of the role and structure of the police. These are referred to briefly in Article XIV, which retains the emphasis on “a strong police force,” expanded further in Annex I, the Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements, which revised details on the apparatus referred to generically as Public Security (*al-Amn al-‘Amm*). By now there were six separate branches, listed in the Interim Agreement as the Civil Police, Public Security, Preventive Security, Amn al-Ri,asah [*sic*] (Presidential Security, a revamped form of Fatah’s Force 17), Intelligence, and Emergency Services and Rescue.

**Table 7 The Official Structure of Public Security
(*al-Amn al-‘Amm*), as of the Signing of the
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement,
September 1995**

-
- 1. National Security (*al-Amn al-Watani*)**
 The Coast Guard (*Quwwat al-Bahariyya*)
 Military Intelligence (*al-Istikhbarat al-‘Askariyya*)
 The Military Police (*al-Shurta al-‘Askariyya*)
 - 2. General Intelligence (*al-Mukhabarat al-‘Amm*)**
 - 3. Civil Defense (*al-Dif‘a al-Madani*)**
 - 4. Civil Police (*al-Shurta al-Madaniyya*)**
 Criminal Security (*al-Amn al-Jina‘i*)
 Anti-Drug Squad (*Mukafahat al-Mukhaddarat*)
 Public Order/Riot Control (*Hifz al-Nizam/Mukafahat al-Shaghab*)
 Traffic Police (*Shurtat al-Murur*)
 - 5. Preventive Security (*al-Amn al-Waqa’i*)**
 - 6. Presidential Security (*Amn al-Ri’asa*)**
 Force 17 (*Quwwat al-Sab‘at ‘Ashra*)
-

Nasr Yusif, overall commander of all the branches of Public Security, and National Security in particular, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and ‘Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda, commander of National Security in the Gaza Strip, confirmed a total of six branches with twelve separate forces between them (thirteen if Force 17 is considered distinct from Presidential Security; both officers did list it separately although it has no official

position in the Oslo framework, whereas Presidential Security does). Additional small forces with vaguely defined remits are said to have come and gone since then,⁸⁰ but this remained the official structure of Public Security of which the Governorate Police were not part. The structure of the security apparatus is detailed in Table 7.

Consistent with recruitment policy to the top three ranks of the bureaucracy, Fatah cadres from the central committee and the revolutionary council, most of who were recalled from Tunis, Lebanon, or Libya, have generally dominated the command of Public Security.⁸¹ The original titular head, Hakam Bal'awi, held a seat on the central committee, as did Nasr Yusif. Both heads of National Security, haj Isma'il Jabr and 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda, held seats on the revolutionary council, as did Military Intelligence chief Musa 'Arafat, so unpopular in the mid-1990s for his attacks on Hamas that his house in Gaza was actually better guarded than Yasir's (they were related). The enduring unpopularity of Musa 'Arafat was underlined as the PA attempted to restore order after the Aqaba summit that inaugurated the Roadmap in June 2003: his prison headquarters in Gaza was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade in what everyone agreed had been an unsuccessful assassination attempt.⁸² He would endure further problems as upheaval gripped Gaza in summer 2004. Head of General Intelligence, Amin al-Hindi, had a seat on the revolutionary council, as did his deputy in the West Bank, Tawfiq al-Tirawi, who held observer status. Tirawi would later find himself on Israel's wanted list during the uprising and took refuge with a number of other cadres in Arafat's *muqata'* in Ramallah (*muqata'* is a generic term for district headquarters). Other revolutionary council members with command positions included Women's Police superintendent Fatma Birnawi and head of the Coast Guard, Juma' Musbah Ghali. Force 17 commander Fay sal Abu Sharkh took a seat after assuming his post in 1992. Among the original command of Public Security Ghazi Jabali at the Civil Police and Mahmud Abu Marzuq at Civil Defense did not have seats on the council although Jabali was later added to it, as was Abu Marzuq's replacement, 'Abd al-Hay 'Abd al-Wahid. Of the senior triumvirate at Preventive Security, original titular head Musbah Saqr, West Bank strongman Jibril al-Rajub, and Gaza's Muhammad Dahlan did not originally hold seats, but both Dahlan and Rajub, and the latter's temporary replacement Zuhayr al-Manasra, were appointed to it at the fifteenth session in 1997.

Officers commanding in Public Security are accorded three ranks: *liwa' rukun*, *'amid*, and *'aqid*. Translations vary and seem an imperfect match, but *liwa' rukun* (*pl. alwiyya*) is roughly the equivalent of major general, *'amid* (*pl. 'umada*) colonel, and *'aqid* (*pl. 'uqada*) lieutenant colonel. The order of the posts in Table 8 corresponds to rank: at the top, the heads of Public Security and of National Security in Gaza hold the rank of *liwa' rukun*; the heads of National Security in the West Bank, of the Coast Guard, Military and General Intelligence, Civil Defense, and Civil Police hold the rank of *'amid*; and the remainder, commanding Criminal Security, Drug Control, Public Order/Riot Control, the Traffic Police, Preventive Security, Presidential Security, and Force 17, hold the rank of *'aqid*.⁸⁴

Palestinian analyst Jamil Hilal made the point that it was natural enough for the head of a liberation movement constructing a quasi-state apparatus in trying circumstances to place trusted cadres in sensitive positions; it would be odd if he didn't.⁸⁵ The political logic is evident, but the appointments policy did have negative side effects, not least of all on perceptions of the PA on the Palestinian street. In this respect, Arafat's

appointments policy mirrored his use of financial resources and import monopolies; it may have had a compelling political logic for him, but it served to fuel accusations of cronyism and made a significant contribution to popular alienation from the PA.

Preventive Security and Force 17

Returnee cadres from Fatah's central committee and revolutionary council have dominated the command level of Public Security, but diaspora personnel do not form the only significant group within the security apparatus. The most widely talked about branch is undoubtedly Preventive Security, a force first cited by name in the Interim Agreement of 1995. It is unique in that both senior officers and the rank and file were local Palestinians from the outset. In composition, Preventive Security is highly homogeneous, all ranks coming from broadly the same generation. According to a Palestinian report from 2001, staff at Preventive Security were generally aged between thirty and forty with

Table 8 The Command of Public Security, 2003

Branch	Head	Position in Fatah
	Nasr Yusif	CC
1. National Security	'Abd al Raziq al-Majayda† (Gaza)	RC
	haj Isma'il Jabr (West Bank)	RC
The Coast Guard	Juma' Ghali††	RC
Military Intelligence	Musa 'Arafat	RC
The Military Police	Musa 'Arafat	
2. General Intelligence	Amin al-Hindi	RC*
3. Civil Defense	'Abd al-Hay 'Abd al-Wahid	RC*
4. The Civil Police	Mahmud 'Asfur†††	
Criminal Security	Majid Abu Shamala	
Drug Control	Majid Abu Shamala	
Public Order/Riot Control	Hamdi al-Rifi	
The Traffic Police	Sa'ib al-Rayyis	
5. Preventive Security	Ziyad Hab al-Riyh (West Bank)	
	Rashid Abu Shabak (Gaza)	
6. Presidential Security	Faysal Abu Sharkh	RC
Force 17	Faysal Abu Sharkh	

† As chaos gripped Gaza in July 2004, Musa 'Arafat replaced 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda on Yasir Arafat's orders, prompting even more discontent. The order was duly refused, although Musa 'Arafat was seen to have advanced.

†† Ghali replaced Fathi Razim, implicated in a weapons smuggling operation involving the freighter *Karine A*. Ghali then resigned in summer 2004 in protest at Musa 'Arafat's elevation and was replaced by Jawad Abu Hasan.

††† Former commander Ghazi Jabali later resumed command of the Civil Police in place of 'Asfur. The latter had been appointed by Prime Minister Mahmud 'Abbas and promoted to deputy interior minister, as had 'Abd al-Hay 'Abd al-Wahid at Civil Defense.⁸⁵ Jabali lost his post again in July 2004 after being abducted and accused of corruption. He was replaced this time by Sa'ib al-'Ajiz (revolutionary council).

a fairly uniform experience of the first intifada. It was widely perceived to be the strongest of the PA's security services; there were an estimated 3,000 people on the payroll, 1,500 in the West Bank and 1,500 in Gaza.

In contrast, Force 17 is a returnee Fatah institution established in Beirut in 1974. It was originally intended to serve as a defensive measure to protect the Fatah leadership in light of the impending civil war in Lebanon. Force 17 was first led by Abu Hasan Salama until his assassination by Israel in 1979, and thereafter by his deputy Mahmud al-Natur. In Natur's account, his deputy Faysal Abu Shark was appointed to command Force 17 post-DoP within Palestine, with Natur remaining in charge overall; Abu Shark put *himself* in charge overall and displaced his boss. In composition, Force 17 is much more heterogeneous than Preventive Security. Following redeployment it greatly broadened its base through local recruitment, while senior officers have remained Fatah cadres from the returnee historic leadership. The same Palestinian account noted above put senior officers at fifty to sixty-five years of age with a shared formative experience of the revolutionary days in the diaspora. The majority of the rank and file were closer to those in Preventive Security, aged between twenty and thirty-five with a background in the first intifada. Force 17 may have been larger though not necessarily stronger than Preventive Security, with a total of 3,300 personnel, 2,000 deployed in Gaza and 1,300 in the West Bank.⁸⁶

The original heads of Preventive Security in the West Bank and Gaza, Rajub and Dahlan, respectively, both held impressive service records with Fatah. Rajub had spent seventeen years in prison and Dahlan five before both were deported by the Israeli authorities, after which they were employed by Arafat. They brought substantial knowledge of the local area and activists to their posts. In this respect, Israel's policy of deporting activists before and during the intifada appears to have diluted, but far from dissolved, the dichotomy between inside and outside. According to one profile⁸⁷ Rajub was just over forty when he assumed his post and speaks fluent English and Hebrew. He was arrested in 1968 for a grenade attack on a bus near Hebron. Seventeen years later he "was among the 1,150 prisoners released in exchange for three Israeli POWs" held by the PFLP-GC in Lebanon. He quickly resumed his nationalist activities and was deported to Lebanon in 1988, at which point Arafat called him "to Tunis and made him the PLO's enforcer in the territories." With his service history in Fatah and keen knowledge of the local area, he was like Dahlan in Gaza, the ideal choice for Preventive Security. In addition, Rajub's brother was "the spiritual leader of the Hebron-area village of Dura, where they both grew up," which could have been useful for rallying the pious around Fatah and the PA rather than the Islamist alternatives.

In the West Bank, Preventive Security was first headquartered in the oasis town of Jericho, where the feared security chief was known as Abu Mawzi after the town's famous bananas.⁸⁸ In Gaza, Dahlan began recruiting local Fatah activists with a background and political history similar to his own, while building a real challenge for the anti-Oslo opposition; having formerly hidden from the IDF with Fatah members, Dahlan and his staff knew where to go and get opposition activists when time came for an arrest.⁸⁹ Preventive Security was given the role of "combating terrorism, countering the opposition parties and gathering intelligence on Israel," which included the maintenance of a substantial physical infrastructure of prisons and investigation buildings widely dispersed across the governorates. It was also in charge of "the monitoring of exports and

imports to and from the PA by means of the economic monopolies,” which allowed it to diversify sources of revenue. According to the Palestinian report cited above,

Preventive Security relied on diverse financial resources in addition to the official financial channels of the PA. Preventive Security came to possess other sources of income such as the taxes levied on certain economic sectors, the provisioning of which arose on the basis of the security relationship with Israel, in addition to the activities of some of the economic monopolies and other trading activities inside and outside Palestine.

Dahlan himself benefited from a good working relationship with Arafat’s unpopular financial wizard, Khalid Salam. According to Natur,

From the outset Salam controlled the formation of the monopolies for certain basic commodities such as cement...in addition to a share in the livestock trade in cattle and sheep which were imported by way of the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, the control Dahlan enjoyed over commercial crossing points facilitated his control over trade and the entry of goods as a partner in many companies, for example the ‘Afana Beef Company and al-Hayk Building Supplies.⁹⁰

There are several points of entry into the Gaza Strip: two on the southern border with Egypt at Rafah, three on the eastern border with Israel at Sufa, Kissufim, and al-Mintar (Qarni), and Bayt Hanun (Erez) in the north (see map 2). In stark contrast to Preventive Security, Force 17 enjoyed no such diversity of revenue but depended instead “on official PA channels for the finance of its activities which restricted its ability to develop.”⁹¹ It would seem to follow that as financial restrictions were tightened on the PA, they would also tighten on Force 17, which unlike Preventive Security never enjoyed an official remit within the Oslo framework. Surprisingly, the Israeli banking system upon which the PA was partially reliant had been remarkably unregulated: throughout the Oslo period, “correspondent banks” on the Israeli side simply acted as blind intermediaries for Palestinian banks in the occupied territories. The system started to tighten up considerably during the al-Aqsa intifada, in line with global processes set in motion after September 11, 2001.⁹²

Several years of stability in the senior ranks came to an end during the intifada. Both Dahlan and, later, al-Rajub were replaced but under very different circumstances. Dahlan resigned to take up a role as an advisor in negotiations and was a high-profile presence at Camp David. He was replaced by his deputy of very similar background, Rashid Abu Shabak. Rajub, on the other hand, was sacked by Arafat, ostensibly for surrendering his Ramallah headquarters to the IDF during Operation Defensive Shield in spring 2002.⁹³ The appointment of returnee Zuhayr al-Manasra in his stead, with his own unhappy record from Jinin, sat very uncomfortably with local officers who refused to work with him. A year or so later, Manasra was replaced by Ziyad Hab al-Riyh, a younger man in his forties from Jinin. Hab al-Riyh held a very credible prison record from the first intifada and bore the evocative name of a renowned mandate-era guerilla from Bir Shiba.

He had previously served in Preventive Security under Rajub and was the choice of his peers.⁹⁴ The defiance and ultimate victory of local officers in this matter was one indication of Arafat's diminished capacity for getting his own way. Over at Force 17, Faysal Abu Sharkh remained at his post.

The Black Panthers and the Fatah Hawks

The ranks of Preventive Security and Force 17 were filled with Fatah activists from the inside, many of them former activists in the Black Panthers in the West Bank and the Fatah Hawks in the Gaza Strip. The incorporation of the Hawks into the security apparatus in Gaza was altogether more far reaching than the parallel process in the West Bank, which partially explains why Gaza was spared full-scale reoccupation during the al-Aqsa intifada. The Hawks have been described as “a youth militia loosely allied to... Arafat's Fatah Party,”⁹⁵ a suitable description for both groups. Geographical expressions of the *tanzim*, both groups were independent of Tunis, serving as two semi-independent armed wings of Fatah during the first intifada. Their incorporation into the PA contributed significantly to the subordination of the local resistance, and further illustrates the adaptation of the institution to its structural context. By the same token, the reactivation of Fatah's *tanzim* as a resistance movement during the al-Aqsa intifada captures the impossible strain placed on the tenuous social coalition supporting the PA by Israel's accelerated colonization program.

Late Fatah activist Khalil Sharif located the origins of the Black Panthers in Nablus, dating them to the early days of the first intifada in 1988. The sight at which the IDF assassinated several of the Panthers' founders was commemorated by the Black Panthers' barber shop adjacent to the spot. Formed independently of Tunis, they always retained a large measure of autonomy. According to a famous story circulating in Nablus, late 1988 and early 1989 saw the Panthers execute a number of suspected collaborators. The concern generated by the executions prompted Arafat to send a written message to the Panthers telling them to stop. They reputedly took the note, stuck it on a wall in Nablus, and shot it. One further indicator of autonomy—and hence potential to trouble Arafat—was the source of their weapons. The Panthers were not armed solely with the revolutionary's traditional AK47 and they were not supplied from Tunis; rather, the Panthers' weapons were bought on the local market from Israeli dealers, including M16s from the IDF's arsenal.

The Fatah Hawks were established in 1990 and had an estimated strength of three to five hundred activists, somewhat smaller than the Black Panthers, but accurate figures do not exist. The Hawks served the same role as the Panthers, taking a leading part in the intifada through attacking soldiers and settlers and executing collaborators. Mostly confined to Gaza, the Fatah Hawks developed a presence around Tulkarm and Qalqilya and later in the old city of Nablus. A majority of both groups were quickly recruited into Preventive Security following the redeployment, with others joining Force 17.⁹⁶

For the Fatah hierarchy, the incorporation of the Panthers and the Hawks into the new security apparatus served a dual purpose: first, it disarmed a potential source of resistance to the DoP by giving autonomous activists a stake in the process through the prestige of their positions and the material fact of their salaries; second, as with Rajub and Dahlan, they were deemed the right sort of people for implementing the contentious writ of Arafat

across the occupied territories. In terms of our transitional model, the absorption of these two groups into the security apparatus of the PA greatly facilitated the creation of a subordinate armed force in the early days of the Oslo process.

One particularly interesting case of recruitment to Preventive Security is the story of thirty-something, one-time deputy-leader of Fatah in Nablus, Ahmad Tabuk. After spending ten years in Israeli jails and then splitting with the Black Panthers for reasons unknown, Tabuk declared himself a Fatah Hawk. Mayor of Nablus, Ghassan al-Shak'a, believed the core of the group comprised only Tabuk and three or four friends plus a cohort of fellow travelers. Having met him once, Shak'a acknowledged Tabuk's nationalist motivations but recalled ruefully "he thinks he's saving Nablus and Palestine single handed."⁹⁷ According to a *Jerusalem Post* report, "He began issuing orders to shoot drug dealers, and others considered moral deviants or collaborators. He and his followers killed at least eight people and wounded 40 over the past year [1994–95]."⁹⁸ During the year preceding the Israeli withdrawal, Tabuk held considerable sway over Nablus, dispensing summary justice through execution and kneecapping from his stronghold in the old city.

With the Interim Agreement concluded by September 1995, Nablus opened to the PLO in December, whereupon Arafat moved quickly to assert his authority. According to the *Post's* report, the PLO and Fatah chief, "who understands charismatic leadership, was reportedly dismayed by film footage of Tabuk swaggering through the casbah days before the IDF left, firing in the air and enjoying the adulation of the crowd."⁹⁹

The same point was made by Tabuk's sister: "When Arafat came to Nablus and saw Ahmed's picture on the front page of the newspaper, he was shocked and ordered his arrest... He did not like to see Ahmed on an equal footing."¹⁰⁰ Tabuk initially defied both the newly appointed governor, Mahmud al-'Alul, and Rajub, until a ten-hour siege of the old city finally persuaded him to surrender on December 17, 1995.¹⁰¹ He was arrested, together with forty colleagues and served thirteen months in a Jericho jail. His fate thereafter illustrates the relationship among Preventive Security, the Black Panthers, and the Hawks. During Tabuk's arrest, Rajub's Mercedes had been observed close to the scene and attracted some reporters. Rajub told them, "We have assumed responsibility to ensure security and to act against any Palestinians who want to kill this agreement. I don't want to teach Israelis how to deal with their extremists, and I don't need them to teach me how to deal with ours."¹⁰² Said to be on good terms with Rajub, by March 1997, Tabuk had been rehabilitated, awarded a commission in Preventive Security, and posted to Hebron.¹⁰³

The Operational Role of the Security Apparatus

From one perspective, the role of the security services was determined by the terms of the Oslo process; it was the armed wing of a reluctant institutional innovation that found itself mediating ongoing Israeli control. The terms of transition mandated the PA to protect Israeli security; the suppression of dissent and militarization of the occupied territories suggested that the mandate was being fulfilled. On the other hand, the inter-Palestinian violence witnessed under the PA's rule could also be seen as a normal function of the state-building process, rapid expansion of the security services being a typical feature of this type of project in many places other than Palestine. The sometimes

violent suppression of opposition did indeed consolidate the rule of the PA within Palestinian society, but the security services also displayed some success in finessing their awkward position by turning collaborators, compromising Israeli intelligence, and refusing to extradite Palestinian suspects to the Israeli authorities, all of which also strengthened the hand of the PA in its external relations with Israel as it consolidated the autonomy project at home.

Nasr Yusif was disarmingly forthright when questioned about his mandate: he stated that the PA was broadly concerned to “rebuild all aspects of life in the Palestinian community” but warned that “security is the basis.”¹⁰⁴ In accordance with the terms of the Oslo process and the emphasis on guarantees for Israeli security, coordination between PA security and the IDF preceded by several months the conclusion of the Interim Agreement. A particular role was assigned to Preventive Security. In January 1994, Rajub and Dahlan traveled to Rome to meet with Israeli officers Ya’acov Peri and then deputy chief of staff Amnon Lipkin Shahak.¹⁰⁵ They were there, according to Usher,

To sort out the modalities of their future role, both with Israeli intelligence and with the Palestinian street. Ehud Ya’ari summarized an Israeli view of the consensus that emerged from the meeting. ‘Fatah-armed bands whose members were wanted by the Israeli security services, like the Hawks, will have special tasks’, he wrote in January 1994. ‘They will be charged with putting down any sign of opposition [to the DoP]; the intent is for them to administer show-punishments at the earliest possible stage, aimed at creating proper respect for the new regime.’¹⁰⁶

Within Israel, support for the formula whereby Palestinians repress Palestinians in the name of Israeli security was forthcoming from the highest level; one week prior to the signing of the DoP, Rabin famously justified the agreement:

I prefer the Palestinians to cope with the problem of enforcing order in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians will be better at it than we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Court and will prevent the Israeli Association of Civil Rights from criticizing the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule by their own methods, freeing, and this is most important, the Israeli army soldiers from having to do what they will do.¹⁰⁷

Rabin’s vision was partly fulfilled, yet the Palestinians showed some determination and indeed capacity to see that the relationship was not based solely on repression by proxy. Shin Bet and Preventive Security did cooperate on intelligence matters, but the Palestinians also kept a distance. One commentator noted at the time, “These two secret services routinely exchange information about radical opposition groups, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, the Israelis relying on the Palestinians’ local knowledge to monitor and hunt down underground rivals.” The same article acknowledged, “They don’t let the Shin Bet into their interrogation rooms and we don’t let them into ours. They exchange information all the time. Neither side really trusts the other. But it works very well.”¹⁰⁸

The formal terms of transition notwithstanding, the PA was relatively successful in pursuing its own agenda, suppressing opposition and consolidating its authority. The most notable clash in the state-building process unfolded in the first six months on November 18, 1994, when simmering tension with the Islamic opposition exploded outside the Palestine Mosque, symbolically close to the compound that served as the headquarters of Public Security in Gaza City (*al-saraya*). The Islamic movements had organized a large demonstration centered on the mosque to commemorate the death of Islamic Jihad activist Hani 'Abid, assassinated November 2 by a car bomb. During the funeral popular anger at the assassination, which everyone agreed looked very much like an Israeli operation, resulted in mourners denouncing Arafat—and not for the first time—as a “traitor.”¹⁰⁹ The following week, another Islamic Jihad activist “detonated himself outside Gaza’s Netzarim settlement, killing three Israeli soldiers.” According to Usher, Rabin summoned Arafat to an emergency meeting where he was informed, in no uncertain terms, that “any more incidents like Netzarim and the IDF would ‘fire indiscriminately’ on Palestinians in Gaza ‘regardless’ of the Palestinian police.”¹¹⁰ The acid test for the PA’s security apparatus was about to unfold, and Hamas had determined to provide it.

Ever well-informed, Reuters’ Wafa ‘Amr gave the following firsthand version of events. On the night before the demonstration, Hamas activists advised journalists, but not Islamic Jihad, that there would be an event. According to ‘Amr, PA security were prepared for the demonstration and troops deployed outside the mosque. As the security forces looked on, Hamas banners were unfurled and stones thrown at the police. Stones were met with bullets, although ‘Amr—who was there—is insistent that shots were also fired at the police, resulting in six non-fatal police casualties. The result was thirteen demonstrators killed and many more injured, until Arafat personally gave the order to stop before a massacre of far larger proportions unfolded.¹¹¹ The implications of the Palestine Mosque killings were clear: Hamas had challenged the authority of Arafat and the PA in the heart of autonomous Gaza and it had lost. The security apparatus had demonstrated its readiness to defend the autonomy project. From this point forth, PA-Hamas relations would be tense, but the military strength of the PA determined that for the duration of the Oslo process the relationship would be based mostly on dialogue rather than on direct physical confrontation.¹¹²

Securing the PA’s writ also led to a number of deaths in custody. The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group recorded thirty by mid-2002, with a spike of nine in 1995, which may have reflected an early lack of training and inexperience.¹¹³ In February 1997, *Palestine Report* recorded the death of Yusif Isma’il Baba in Nablus as atypical: “Baba was the eleventh Palestinian to die in PA detention, the second in two weeks. His death is the first without a political motive...”¹¹⁴ According to the report, PA Minister of Justice Furayh Abu Midayn “confirmed on February 3 that Baba had died from injuries caused by the ‘brutal violence’ inflicted on him, and said an autopsy had been ordered. Some of those involved in torturing him have been arrested, Abu Middein said, and will be dealt with severely...”¹¹⁵

Significantly, the Legislative Council “condemned Baba’s death, demanded an investigation into the actions of the military intelligence, and, apparently unappeased by Abu Midayn’s statement, accused the Cabinet of total culpability for the killing.” Furthermore, the report concluded that at that stage “at least 1,600 Palestinians remain in

PA custody, 700 of them held without charge.”¹¹⁶ Human rights advocate Iyad al-Sarraj found himself among the detainees at one point for some fairly innocuous political criticism. During his incarceration he was amazed to hear an interrogation being conducted by a Palestinian officer in Hebrew: many recruits from the Hawks and the Panthers had learned the language in Israeli jails and now continued to relate to it as the language of power and intimidation.¹¹⁷ The random brutality of the PA’s security apparatus has been well documented, but attempts to mitigate it less so. Rajub readily agreed to send officers for human rights training when approached, to the relief of local human rights activists. Another measure intended to reduce the possibility of violence was to use a family member in uniform to arrest a relative wanted for questioning: the merits might seem ambiguous to the detainee, but the presence of a family member at the scene of an arrest or an interrogation could be reassuring, at least within the contorted logic of the Oslo experience in general.¹¹⁸

Inside the security services, a readiness to clash with the opposition revealed a clear differentiation between returnees and insiders; Rajub and Dahlan generally demonstrated a far greater willingness to tolerate the opposition than returnee officers at the highest level.¹¹⁹ Rajub himself went on the record to express his respect for them: “They are nationalists. They care about the Palestinian interests no less than I do.”¹²⁰ In contrast, the most unpopular man in the Gaza Strip was undoubtedly returnee Musa ‘Arafat, the only commander not to stop shooting demonstrators outside the Palestine Mosque.¹²¹ Usher asserts that Nasr Yusif and Ghazi Jabali, both from outside, “favoured a strong-arm approach to crush the Islamists once and for all, Dahlan and Rajub, mindful of Hamas’ base in the territories, urged a policy aimed at splitting the movement’s political and military wings.”¹²² This policy has enjoyed a measure of success, an early example being the inclusion of former Hamas leader ‘Imad al-Faluji into the Legislative Council and the Executive Authority.

Besides consolidating the PA within Palestinian society, the security services strengthened the national project vis-à-vis Israel too. They were able to subvert the articles in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement that required the PA to transfer Palestinian prisoners suspected of “terrorism” to Israel, and Rajub in particular was very successful at emasculating the network of collaborators supplying Israel with intelligence from the West Bank. The equation was even partially reversed, with turned collaborators helping Preventive Security gather intelligence on Israel. One can only speculate on the degree of frustration this generated among military and intelligence circles in Israel, and the extent to which it contributed to the eventual full-scale reinvasion of the PA’s pockets of autonomy. It certainly provided an opportunity to loot tons of written records and hundreds of computer hard drives from many PA institutions and NGOs. It also allowed for the arrest of thousands of Palestinians who were then kept under administrative detention, a measure by which Israel allows itself to hold Palestinian prisoners for up to six months at a time (renewable indefinitely) without charge, trial, or sometimes even interrogation. It is another legacy of the British Mandate.¹²³

As the Gaza-Jericho Agreement facilitated the first Israeli redeployment and the establishment of PA jurisdiction, it also contained detailed provisions for the transfer of Palestinians suspected of violent resistance from PA enclaves to Israel (the term “extradition” was not used because extradition treaties could be realized only between sovereign states).¹²⁴ Provisions were listed in Annex III, the Protocol Concerning Legal

Matters. Article II.7 dealt specifically with the Transfer of Suspects and Defendants, of which Article II.7(b) stipulated the following:

Where an individual suspected of, charged with or convicted of an offence that falls within Israeli criminal jurisdiction is present in the Territory, Israel may request the Palestinian Authority to arrest and transfer the individual to Israel.

For all his criticism of the PA leadership, even Edward Said noted, “Arafat, I believe, is correctly banking on the fact that many of the details of the May 4 accord are simply unenforceable.”¹²⁵ He was right: in practice the PA refused to transfer suspects to Israel, generating a great deal of complaint but sparing itself the predictable and highly dangerous reaction on the street. Requests to transfer prisoners for interrogation or trial were summarily rejected or politely ignored. Prior to the conclusion of the Interim Agreement, some seventy Knesset members, among them several from the governing Labor Party, “signed a petition urging the government to halt all further Palestinian prisoner releases”¹²⁶ to pressure the PA to honor the transfer clauses of the agreement. This was most likely just another ploy by Oslo’s opponents to halt political progress. The alternative view, that anyone could seriously expect the PA to routinely hand over Palestinians into Israeli custody, would reveal a grave deficit in comprehension of Palestinian politics.

Handing over Palestinian political or military activists to Israel would be interpreted on the Palestinian street as collaboration, a potentially fatal charge that Palestinians from any walk of life are wise to avoid. Rajub himself was always acutely aware of this, complaining of Israel, “They want me to be another Sa’d Haddad.”¹²⁷ The despised Haddad founded the IDF’s proxy in southern Lebanon, the now defunct SLA. Following the IDF’s withdrawal in May 2000, many SLA officers and recruits were relocated to Israel to avoid trial. The mechanism used to prevent this unhappy outcome in Palestine proved problematic: in-camera trials of suspects through unaccountable state security courts chaired by military officers, a secretive, arbitrary, and much criticized model keenly applied in Egypt. The creation of this extra-legal space in July 1995 served to protect the image of the security services from the charge of collaboration, but drew sharp criticism from human rights groups. It was applauded by former U.S. vice president Al Gore for its contribution to peace, and finally abolished in 2002.

Another device had to be improvised during the al-Aqsa intifada following the assassination of Israel’s controversial but popular minister of tourism, Rehavam Ze’evi. Ze’evi’s Moledet party openly advocated what many Israelis would not privately regret, the wholesale transfer of the Palestinian population. Ze’evi was shot and killed in the Hyatt Regency, a massive edifice newly built in occupied East Jerusalem. His death was revenge for the assassination of PFLP head Abu ‘Ali Mustafa in Ramallah a few weeks earlier. In the wake of the incident, the PA came under tremendous pressure to arrest and transfer the assassins to Israel.¹²⁸ It was a politically impossible demand to meet, even more so in the middle of the al-Aqsa intifada and the popular admiration accorded the mission. Suspects were eventually arrested along with the PFLP’s new general secretary, Ahmad Sa’dat. The issue was finally defused through international mediation, and the

PFLP's avengers, Hamdi Qur'an and Bilal al-Asmar, were incarcerated with two others in Jericho under U.S. and U.K. supervision.¹²⁹

Beyond keeping Palestinians out of Israeli jails, another area where the security services enjoyed a measure of success was in turning collaborators formerly on the Shin Bet payroll. The best account of this was given by Usher, who cites information from Israeli sources suggesting as many as five thousand Palestinians were working for Israeli intelligence as of the signing of the DoP.¹³⁰ Under the terms of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, collaborators were to be "granted amnesty or, in certain cases, Israeli citizenship to enable them to move inside the Green Line."¹³¹ Beyond a small number of elite collaborators absorbed by Israel, most were left to Preventive Security.

Abandoned by their former GSS employers, former collaborators surrender themselves to the Palestinian security forces as a way of gaining mitigation. Some are imprisoned, others tortured. Around five have died while in PA custody. Some, however, have been 'turned', not in the classical sense of becoming 'double agents,' but in the more mundane sense of becoming employees of the PSF [Preventive Security] rather than the GSS.¹³²

It served the PA in several ways. First, the information generated on the Palestinian opposition strengthened the PA's ability to contain dissent and prevent armed attacks against Israeli targets. Second, the Israeli security establishment readily acknowledged the decline in the quantity and quality of the intelligence received from the West Bank and Gaza; no longer able to rely on an extensive network of collaborators, they were rendered more dependent on the PA. Both factors strengthened the PA's negotiating position in the transition process. Third, the institutionalization of internal mechanisms for dealing with collaboration did reduce the summary justice meted out during the first intifada. Fear of collaborators remained very real, but was now assuaged by the knowledge that the collaborators themselves had somewhere to turn to other than Israel and were consequently less desperate. In some of the main urban centers at least, it was recognized as a boon for social cohesion.¹³³

The Security Apparatus in the al-Aqsa Intifada

The eruption of serious hostilities in autumn 2000 found the security services in a quandary: mandated by the Oslo framework to provide Israeli security, their remit required them to restore order to the occupied territories while the revolt gathered pace around them. The PA's capacity to restore calm quickly was undermined by the popular nature of the original demonstrations, the widespread sympathy felt with the resistance, to which many officers either had belonged or still did, and the lack of a coherent central command to tell them what to do. The Israeli response did little to help, a paradoxical policy of degrading the security services' infrastructure ostensibly as a means of encouraging them to clamp down while systematically undermining their capacity to do so. By the time the violence had run its course, familiar and visible symbols of PA power—such as the *saraya* in Gaza City, the *muqata'* in Ramallah and Hebron, along with Jnayd prison in Nablus, and many other installations—had been reduced to

rubble.¹³⁴ Contemplating implementation of the PA's commitments under the Roadmap, then PA prime minister Mahmud 'Abbas reported that the security apparatus in the West Bank had been obliterated entirely, and in Gaza reduced to thirty percent.¹³⁵ The result was a near total breakdown in law enforcement, a return to extra-judicial means of dispute resolution including killing, and a rise in decentralized violence against Israel.

To the surprise of many and the dismay of others, the PA's extensive security apparatus played a very limited role in military aspects of the al-Aqsa intifada; it evinced no coherent policy of repressing the uprising, nor did it engage decisively in fighting the occupation. This was in large part a function of Arafat's systematic personalization of command; force multiplication, a reliance on direct personal relations, and individual access to patronage were tried and trusted methods employed to manipulate politics within Fatah and the PLO over decades. In the PA, they served to keep Arafat at the center of the web by preempting processes of rational institutionalization that might otherwise have developed at his expense. Israeli analyst Gal Luft identified in Arafat's policy the prevention of "the formation of a cohesive general staff with excessive power, along the lines responsible for the overthrow of so many Arab regimes in the Middle East."¹³⁶ Possessed of a familiar political logic for Arafat, it had disastrous operational consequences for the PA's security apparatus, which did neither one thing nor the other. On the one hand, Luft reported frustration among IDF officers trying to defuse tensions in the early days of the uprising because senior PA officers, including 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda and Isma'il Jabr, were simply unable to deliver on the ground:

The Palestinian commanders admitted that they could not exercise control over any security forces not under their direct command. In most countries, all the branches of the military forces submit to the command of a general staff headed by a chief of staff. By way of contrast, Arafat is the only person who controls all of the PA's military bodies. But for seven of the first nine days of the crisis Arafat was away from the battle scene. Rather than managing the crisis from his command post in Gaza, Arafat preferred to travel between Jordan, Egypt, France and Spain.¹³⁷

Bereft of effective central command, the security services' immediate response to the rebellion was to respond barely at all. And far from engaging in the resistance, attacks against the IDF and settlers were left to the various militia including elements of the *tanzim*, some of whom were in the security apparatus or received logistical support from it. But the campaign they fought was neither carefully planned nor properly coordinated, nor was it especially well led.

As the violence spiraled onward, diplomatic attempts to put the genie back in the bottle led the Camp David participants to reconvene in Sharm al-Shaykh in mid-October 2000. External mediation efforts produced three similarly unsuccessful initiatives aimed at resurrecting PA-IDF cooperation. The first was the Sharm al-Shaykh Fact-Finding Committee (later dubbed the Mitchell Committee after chairman and former U.S. senate majority leader George Mitchell), which published its final report in April 2001. Next came the Tenet Plan in June in which CIA Director George Tenet recommended means of implementing Mitchell's ideas. Finally, U.S. General Anthony Zinni strove without success to implement the Tenet Plan. The prescriptions of each initiative called for a

ceasefire, the resumption of security cooperation including reactivating the JSC and the DCOs, IDF withdrawal to the boundaries of September 28, 2000, easing of the closure in the West Bank and Gaza, and a PA crackdown on armed resistance. If the recipe sounds familiar, it should: it would be warmed over for a fourth time in the Roadmap, with similar results. Such PA initiatives as were forthcoming, including carefully negotiated ceasefires or the apprehension of suspects, were either scorned as inadequate or undermined by a suspiciously timed assassination. The apprehension of a ship laden with weapons from Iran and manned by members of the PA's Coast Guard appeared to serve a similar purpose: the discovery coincided precisely with the return of the hapless Anthony Zinni and was used by Sharon to subvert another opportunity for political progress and justify increased violence against the PA.

The spectacular attempt by a faction within the Coast Guard to bolster the PA's arsenal was characteristic of the random and decentralized nature of the PA's very limited military initiatives. Luft reported no hostile action at all by any of the PA's branches for the first seven weeks of the uprising: when something finally did occur in mid-November, it involved a solitary police captain killed while trying to gain entry to the isolated Gaza Strip settlement of Kfar Darom, adjacent to Dayr al-Balah in the middle of the Strip.¹³⁸ Elements in Force 17 attacked the settlement of Netzarim a few months later, and, in general, seems to have taken a more proactive if uncoordinated role in the intifada. It had already drawn Israel's attention for discouraging Palestinians from undertaking land sales to Jewish buyers in and around Jerusalem, and allegedly carrying out at least one extra-judicial killing.¹³⁹ If the accusation were true, it represented a rare response by the PA to the massive Judaization campaign fought against the city's Arab inhabitants by the combined power of the Israeli government, the Jerusalem municipality, and the WZO.

The infrastructure of Force 17 certainly drew a disproportionate share of Israeli firepower down upon its head during the uprising. The first use of F16s against a Palestinian target leveled an attractive nineteenth-century building utilized by Force 17 on the outskirts of Ramallah; the raid killed one officer and knocked out the windows of the expensive Grand Park Hotel. The Palestinian report cited earlier offered an explanation:

Force 17 recruited members who did not necessarily hold organisational rank, making do instead with those who were suitable material for soldiers, which allowed for a rupture to emerge between the majority of young recruits from inside with experience of street clashes during the intifada, and their leadership, the great majority of whom came from abroad with excellent conventional military experience, but who in truth remained alien to Palestinian society.

These considerations combined to weaken the present leadership of Force 17, leaving it without effective control or discipline and allowing for serious security breaches by both Israel and the Palestinian opposition factions and causing Israel to concentrate its military operations on targeting Force 17 installations.¹⁴⁰

Mahmud al-Natur drew the following comparison between the experience of Force 17 and Preventive Security in the al-Aqsa intifada:

There are no precise statistics available on the number of buildings, men and materials lost by Force 17 but it is certain that many bases, buildings and checkpoints have been completely destroyed and much of its manpower arrested, killed or assassinated, particularly in the West Bank. In Gaza, central operations are now run from four caravans in the main square in Gaza City, which gives you some idea of the extent of the damage.

As for Preventive Security, damage to it in Gaza is relatively minor. For example the training center in the main headquarters was damaged when the IDF stormed the building, but the rest of the compound was left intact. Preventive Security offices in Gaza City were abandoned and left vacant at the beginning of the intifada, and the majority of buildings across the governorates in the Gaza Strip suffered no notable damage to speak of. The great majority of Preventive Security officers in the Gaza Strip did not participate in the military operations of the intifada and consequently were not targeted and did not suffer casualties at the hands of the Israelis.

The situation in the West Bank is quite the opposite: Preventive Security there experienced widespread damage as a result of becoming the specific target of Israeli military strikes. Numerous buildings and many individual officers were assassinated and otherwise killed, reflecting the widespread participation of Preventive Security staff in the West Bank in the military aspects of the uprising.¹⁴¹

Preventive Security facilities were not spared the Israeli air raids that began as early as the second week of the uprising and also targeted prisons, including those housing suspects on lists given to the PA by the IDF. In the first attacks on Gaza and Nablus facilities, prisoners either escaped or were released by officers for fear of their safety. A number of policemen were also killed in the attacks.¹⁴² One especially famous incident took place in Hebron, a few days after another air raid on Jnayd prison in Nablus. Fearful that Hebron was next, prisoners' relatives simply stormed the Preventive Security building and released family members themselves. Officers put up some mild resistance before conceding defeat, aware that they could not guarantee that their prison would not be next.¹⁴³ Demolition of the security service infrastructure led to resurgence of extra-judicial killing that had otherwise been on the decline. *Palestine Report* cited the Israeli human rights monitor B'Tselem as counting eighty-four collaborators killed during the course of the second intifada, eighty-two of them by extra-judicial means, including one suspect forcibly marched from the holding cells of the Ramallah courthouse and shot in the head in the town's *al-Manara* square. Another account recalled events in Tulkarm, where eight prisoners had been dragged from the cells and shot in the street. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades also executed for the first time a woman charged with collaboration, after she confessed to planting the bomb that killed local commander Ra'id al-Karmi. A spokesman for the group explained it this way:

To start with it wasn't our strategy to kill all collaborators, but there can be no pity for those involved in the murder of our leaders... Since the Israelis destroyed the Palestinian Authority and its infrastructure, there hasn't been any policing or justice in Palestinian towns, so we've become policemen and judges.

A Fatah representative in Tulkarm echoed the sentiment:

Of course we'd prefer to have an official government, with courts, lawyers, trials and so on. But for the time being they no longer exist here. We don't even have a prison where we can lock up thieves—the Israelis destroyed it.¹⁴⁴

The visitor to Ramallah at around this time could not but notice the almost total absence of uniformed police on streets that were once so full of them. In the West Bank in 2003, you could not find a police officer when you wanted one, and if you did he probably could not do anything with no station, no car, no radio, and an IDF military checkpoint waiting for him in any direction. *Palestine Report* noted that the closure meant cases were going unresolved because local police officers were reluctant to cross IDF checkpoints for fear of arrest. The report quoted a local lawyer on the disintegration of the systems of law and order:

There are no police stations for people to turn to nor are there courts to arbitrate disputes. The fact that court rulings are not implemented leaves it up to people themselves to protect their rights, with no recourse to the law. They must instead depend on force and tribal or factional power.¹⁴⁵

Such remnants of the security apparatus as were left came under consistent U.S. pressure to reform and rationalize lines of command. The key to the process was to place a new and unified command structure under an empowered Ministry of the Interior. In the PA's fourth cabinet formed in June 2002, Arafat eventually agreed to relinquish the portfolio. The hope was that this would lead to a cohesive chain of command. Two Fatah veterans enjoyed brief tenures at the ministry as restructuring was first considered: 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya in the first instance, followed by Hani al-Hasan in the fifth cabinet, formed in October the same year. Both were returnees loyal to Arafat, and both enjoyed tenures that were eventful if brief. Struggling as they were in the midst of the intifada, neither man was in much of a position to see through profound organizational change, but as the war in Iraq loomed large on the horizon, they did seek an end to armed operations amidst fears that 1948 might be about to repeat itself.¹⁴⁶ Yahya was a former Syrian army and PNLA officer in his seventies, known to the Israelis from negotiations in better times and remembered for his gentle manners. His main tasks were to try and engineer an IDF withdrawal from the areas reoccupied since September 28, 2000, and then begin reform in line with CIA recommendations. To this end, the Palestinian daily *al-Quds* reported the establishment of a special continuing committee (*lajnat khasa li-mutaba'a haykaliyya al-ajhaza al-amniyya*) to oversee unification of services and remits under the Ministry of the Interior.¹⁴⁷

Yahya stated repeatedly that the prerequisite for reform was IDF withdrawal, and a tentative way forward eventually emerged in the “Gaza-Bethlehem first plan.” It was an instant failure. The plan called for the IDF to lift the curfew, to withdraw from the center of Bethlehem, and to go back into the settlements in Gaza. In turn, the PA’s security services were to return to rubble that stood where their police stations once had to try to restore a measure of law and order. But Bethlehem remained under closure, Gaza remained trampled by tanks, and IDF raids and assassinations elsewhere in the West Bank, which many felt were not coincidental, undermined the will of the Palestinian resistance to implement a ceasefire. In the same month, new IDF chief of staff Moshe Ya’alon declared the PA to be “a malignant cancer that must be eradicated” and the Palestinian resistance an “existential threat.” It was not an opportune moment for progress at the Ministry of the Interior.¹⁴⁸

Hasan inherited the same unpromising lot. He enjoyed a measure of success in Gaza where the damage had been less severe, but made less progress in the West Bank. Tasked with combating the resistance and securing a unilateral ceasefire, Hasan was party to complex inter-factional negotiations in Cairo. During one round of talks he learned of a bombing in Tel Aviv, responsibility for which was claimed by the Nablus branch of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. An august pillar of Fatah from its earliest days, he was not impressed.

Immediately after the bombing, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades issued a statement saying it had nothing to do with the bombing. The families of the bombers and their friends in Nablus—all Fatah members—were insulted and angry...a statement issued by the Al-Aqsa Brigades warned al-Hassan not to dare go to Nablus. [Shortly afterwards] a second statement was released, also from the Al-Aqsa Brigades, saying the threats were forgeries.¹⁴⁹

Not a man to be intimidated, Hasan went directly to Nablus to make a point. He then chose Nablus as starting point for the deployment of up to two thousand newly trained PA police officers, but Israel denied him the opportunity to use them.¹⁵⁰ His prospects for success were greatly handicapped by the closure of every DCO with the exception of Jericho, and Israel’s continued insistence on labeling the PA a “terrorist authority.”¹⁵¹ To his credit Hasan did oversee the abolition of the State Security Court. But negotiating a ceasefire, reimposing law and order, and rebuilding the security services would remain tasks outstanding for the next administration.

The cabinet marked by the introduction of the prime minister started a prolonged struggle over the Ministry of the Interior; ‘Abbas took the post himself, and won a short-term victory of sorts with former Gaza Preventive Security chief Dahlan—the prime minister’s favored candidate for the Interior Ministry—appointed to a new post of minister of state for security affairs at the State Security Department. Unimpressed, Arafat endeavored to restrict Dahlan’s reach to Gaza by recalling Rajub and making him national security advisor. It was not an unfamiliar tactic. In the meantime, the Roadmap that all parties signed onto reiterated an Oslo-style mandate for the PA’s security services, albeit in language that bore the trite imprimatur of Sharon and the Bush administration:

Rebuilt and refocused Palestinian Authority security apparatus begins sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure. This includes commencing confiscation of illegal weapons and consolidation of security authority, free of association with terror and corruption.

Phase I reforms on an organizational level are quite specific, and the inability of 'Abbas to bring them about would contribute significantly to his decision to resign:

All Palestinian security organizations are consolidated into three services reporting to an empowered Interior Minister. Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials.¹⁵²

If that worked, and for some time there was no reason to assume that Israel would allow it to, a steady improvement in performance by the security apparatus would generate political rewards in phases II and III.

Back in 1994, the PLO leadership had embarked on the construction of a quasi-state apparatus within the constraints of the Oslo framework. Palestinian elite agency adapted the institution to meet the demands of a changing structural context, appropriating the political gains of the first intifada and restoring the authoritative leadership of the diaspora-based elite with some predictable patterns of continuity. Reliance on external sources of revenue perpetuated patterns of rent seeking and patronage that passed readily from one institution to the next, perpetuating the personalization of authority in Arafat's hands and encouraging institutional multiplication and a lack of transparency within the institutions of the autonomy project. The patronage network extended to the bureaucracy supporting the ministries and an array of public sector institutions in addition to the security services. The PLO bureaucracy was transformed through this process into the civil institutions of the PA, with senior Fatah cadres placed in strategic positions. Appointments at a ministerial level co-opted local elites while bureaucratic expansionism secured support from the wider local population. The diaspora-based PNLA was transformed into the security services of the PA, which replicated the pattern in the bureaucracy, with senior returnee Fatah cadres from the central committee and the revolutionary council again placed in command positions. Local Fatah activists established their own preserve, recruited widely into Preventive Security, which contributed greatly to the realization of a subordinate armed force. The expansion of the security apparatus partly reflected the terms of transition and the emphasis on Israeli security. But it also reflected the typical imperatives of state building that characterize a project of this type. Within Palestinian society, the security services co-opted local activists, coerced the opposition, and successfully recruited former collaborators, reducing Israeli intelligence capacities and rendering the IDF more dependent on the PA. The PA's efficacy increased further in light of the CIA's involvement from Wye onwards, and would in fact discomfit Barak to the extent that he sought to downgrade it.

In summary, the institutions of the autonomy project made significant progress during seven years of Oslo, but the contradictions inherent to the framework of transition left them standing on weak foundations. When popular dissent finally broke out, the PA's security apparatus proved unable to contain the rebellion that Oslo's reality had prompted. In the meantime, a formula has been designed and honed to try and restore the autonomy project to its feet. Within Palestine, there are legitimate fears that the reform process will generate a rationalized PA that remains a political innovation administering a population inconvenient to Israel's colonial ambitions. There is little reason to believe that it will be able to do that. In the next chapter, we turn to the social and political foundations upon which the PA's institutional arrangements were meant to, but could not, rest.

6

Socio-Political Foundations

Civil Society, the Legislative Council, and Fatah as Party of State

Stability for the PLO's national project required the institutions of the PA to bed down soundly in Palestinian society. This task, which would have been far from straightforward in any case, was made considerably more difficult by the unfavorable terms of transition and the mandate for social demobilization the PA brought with it. The role of elite agency in securing the national project by adapting existing institutions and improvising new ones to meet socio-political structures inside Palestine and rendering them consistent with Oslo's logic is examined here in four different respects: in the uneasy relationship between the emergent quasi-state apparatus and indigenous socio-political forces in civil society and the NGO community, in the construction and manipulation of the electoral system, in the composition and subordination of the Legislative Council to the executive, and in Fatah's frustrated evolution from liberation movement to prospective party of state.

The PA and the NGOs

Palestinian civil society was, and remains in large part, a society of NGOs, the bulk of them geographically concentrated in the central West Bank between East Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Ramallah. Many of them are affiliated with the secular left. Under Oslo, they found themselves systematically neutralized by the PA through bureaucratic expansionism, recruitment of technocrats and clerical personnel into PA institutions, and the diversion of external sources of finance away from NGOs toward the incipient public sector. NGOs' attempts to retain their autonomy notwithstanding, the role of the non-state sector in the autonomy project could be seen to be tangibly shrinking, pointing to the emergence of a state-centric middle class in common with neighboring Arab regimes.

During the first intifada and throughout the Oslo period, the vibrant nature of civil society was much remarked upon by analysts hoping to see the emergence of a truly democratic state of Palestine.¹ In view of the preference for personalized rather than rational institutional relations, and authoritarian rather than participatory structures of governance in neighboring regimes, civil society in Palestine was seen as a decentralized and pluralistic counterbalance to the incipient state apparatus with a vital role to play in realizing a democratic PA.² The PLO's history of political pluralism was also thought to set a favorable precedent. Muslih wrote,

It is precisely because the state surrogate [the PLO] has sustained political pluralism that it may be inclined to sustain a pluralistic civil society if independence is achieved. That Palestinian civil society is pluralistic bodes well for its ability to sustain a state based on pluralism.³

The pluralism of the PLO factions has indeed been a striking feature of Palestinian political life since the 1960s, a phenomenon that George Giacaman took to constitute a modern political model:

By modern I mean parties not centered around notables, families, or clans, as used to be the case in Palestine in the inter-war years. This feature allows for social and political mobility...without having a traditional powerbase. Individuals from rural backgrounds, from refugee camps, and from the ranks of the poor, could rise to positions of influence in parties...⁴

Much of the hope for a modern and pluralistic PA was invested in civil society's capacity to offset tendencies in the other direction. To explain what actually came to pass, we consider a brief definition of the concept, examine the different elements that constitute civil society in Palestine, and assess the dilemmas raised for them by the transition process undertaken within Oslo's problematic framework.

An active proponent of a role for NGOs in the generation of a civil society, Giacaman defines the concept in a threefold distinction among the state, civil society, and the family:

If the family denotes the realm of the private, and the state the realm of what is public, then civil society subsists in between, occupying a space that is both private and public. It is the space within which individuals and organized groups act in relative independence from the state within a sphere of guaranteed but relative autonomy.⁵

In Giacaman's view, this autonomy pertains to rights in two spheres of public life, civil rights and economic rights, all of which are secured through an autonomous civil society. In the contemporary West Bank and Gaza Strip, this is understood to mean political freedom in the context of the PA and economic freedom in the context of structural dependence on the Israeli economy.⁶

The relationship pertaining to the PLO leadership and the NGOs prior to the establishment of the PA sheds some light on the role of civil society under the PA. In chapters 2 and 3, we saw that civil society in Palestine is in large part a society of NGOs that were often established by or co-opted into the orbit of the PLO to provide services and win adherence to the nationalist agenda. The establishment of the PA and the imperatives of state building then cast the role of the NGOs into doubt. The returnee leadership reclaimed exclusive control over the nationalist agenda, and the PA constructed an expanded bureaucratic apparatus tasked with provision of welfare services on a quasi-state basis. The return of the leadership allowed it to dispense with proxies in the NGOs, too many of which were affiliated with leftist factions in any case, while the

PA apparatus partly displaced the NGOs' service provision functions with the centralized projects such as PECДАР and the ministries. Giacaman lamented the PA's attitude toward the NGOs from the outset:

[It] ranged from the hostile to the indifferent. Hostility stemmed from the perception of competition for funds, from the need to deprive elements from the opposition of an infrastructure for influence, and from the need to assert its authority internally, given its relative inability to assert its authority externally, especially in relation to Israel.⁷

One of the venerable platforms of Palestinian civil society is the health care information provider HDIP, headquartered in Ramallah and led by activist Mustafa al-Barghuthi, formerly affiliated with the PPP and eventual presidential election candidate in January 2005. Ibrahim D'aybis at HDIP reported that almost immediately upon its establishment, the PA under Minister of Social Affairs Intisar al-Wazir openly called for the incorporation of all NGOs into the PA. Another index of PA centralization materialized in November 1995, when all NGOs in the Gaza Strip were issued with a registration form by the PA's troublingly titled Department of NGO and NG Institution's *Security*. The form contained questions such as "have you ever belonged to any Palestinian organisations, has any of your family been charged with spying, do any of your family members belong to a political party, and have you ever been imprisoned for political reasons or others?"⁸ It generated much indignation among those confronted with it, as did the first draft of an NGO law, both of which were seen as unnecessary attempts to regulate and control socially and politically healthy institutions. Relations with the PA were clarified somewhat with a new NGO law in January 2000, stipulating that they henceforth register with the Ministry of the Interior, the nexus of much organizational change within Palestinian institutional life over the next few years.⁹

The relationship between the PA and the NGOs could at best be described as ambivalent: D'aybis did acknowledge that the PA called upon NGOs for professional assistance in some sectors in which ministry personnel had little experience. This allowed the NGOs themselves to finesse the new circumstances through coordination with PA ministries and to provide specialist technical assistance. It included HDIP's acknowledged expertise in the field of health care provision.¹⁰ Mustafa al-Barghuthi actively promoted this model: "what is needed from the authority's side is *coordination with* NGOs rather than *coordinating the* NGOs."¹¹ But the dilemma could be only partly overcome through efforts to make themselves useful to the PA, and the NGOs were quickly hit by a diversion of international funding away from them and toward the PA. In 1995 Rema Hammami noted,

The World Bank estimates that external support for Palestinian NGOs dropped from a high of between \$170 to \$240 million in the early 1990s, to between \$100 to \$120 million post-Oslo—which amounts at the very least to a 40 per cent drop in funding.¹²

The World Bank kept tabs on a trend that gathered pace and saw NGO funding drop further and further away from its pre-Oslo heights as the process unfolded:

NGOs have traditionally played an important role in Palestinian society, and account for a large proportion of health services, rehabilitation for the handicapped, preschool education and agricultural extension and land rehabilitation. In the early 1990s, NGOs were receiving an average annual amount of perhaps US\$120–180 million in official donor/INGO assistance. This had fallen to about US\$52 by 1999.¹³

In short, the transition from liberation movement to national authority tightened the space available to the NGOs from two sides, marginalizing their role in promotion of the nationalist agenda and supplanting their role in the provision of services through the expansion of the apparatus of the PA. The dynamics at work paralleled the suppression of the opposition by the security services, in part a function of a typical state-building process, in part drawn from Oslo's logic of capping the first intifada with a Palestinian apparatus to do what the IDF could not: demobilize the resistance to Zionist settler-colonialism in the West Bank and Gaza. Recruitment into the new quasi-state bureaucracy was again used to good effect, as it was to demobilize Fatah by incorporating the Panthers and the Hawks into the security services.

The contraction of the space available to the NGOs, along with bureaucratic expansionism in the public sector, prompted considerable migration of qualified technocrats from NGOs to the PA. In this respect, the political salience of the professional middle classes previously staffing the NGO sector (a central element in the "counter-elite" identified by Robinson),¹⁴ can be seen to have decreased, along with their capacity for political mobilization. The PA became a very substantial public sector employer, a development enhanced by the legacy of thirty years of Israeli occupation that systematically undermined private Palestinian economic initiative lest it infringe on the interests of the Zionist core economy.¹⁵ The PA expanded, the NGO sector shrank, professionals and technocrats were co-opted into the apparatus of the PA, and the ever-expanding bureaucracy absorbed rank after rank of clerical staff, including many new graduates into its different branches.

The rapid expansion of the public sector and the absorption of the middle classes into it seem consistent with John Waterbury's observations on the state-centric orientation of the Arab middle classes in general:

The middle classes in the Middle East may be particularly dependent upon or absorbed by the state and therefore unable to create space beyond the control of the state. More specifically the private-sector bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia have, to a great degree, been suborned by the state and have made little contribution to the creation of a civil society able to bargain with the state.¹⁶

In this regard, the network of universities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip merit some attention. The university community has expanded considerably since the 1970s and both students and staff have contributed greatly to the struggle for self-determination. Student councils have served as a traditional battleground for factional influence between the various secular-nationalist factions and, since the mid-1980s, between the various secular groups and the Islamists. In the period since the signing of the DoP, secular opposition

factions even joined forces with the Islamists to challenge Fatah. A culture of political pluralism has taken root in these institutions, and student council elections are still fiercely and openly contested. Equally, university staff members, many of them leading lights in the NGO community, have been relatively free to voice criticism of the PLO and the Oslo process (and did so constantly during my four semesters at Bir Zeit). If intolerance of criticism and some early precedents set by intimidation of the press cast doubt on the prospects for a free intellectual climate, a mixed performance by the PA and its subsequent demolition have greatly reduced its capacity to influence or intimidate.

Waterbury attributed the state-centric attitude of Arab state intelligentsias to basic values held in common with the regime. "The coincidence of interests of the intelligentsia and the state goes beyond emoluments, employment, and professional licensing to include a strong sense of identity and shared goals."¹⁷ To an extent, this certainly applied to the PLO and the Palestinian universities prior to the DoP. But the scale of the concessions many feared they saw in Oslo's vague and narrowing framework, compounded by the miserable reality of limited autonomy as most experienced it, questioned how much this remained the case. One indicator of the potential restraint of campus dissent was the Executive Authority's decision in August 1996 to create a special new police force for guarding university campuses.¹⁸ Immediately criticized by the Legislative Council and local human rights groups, *Palestine Report* attributed the move as a response to a heavy-handed raid on al-Najah's campus March 3, 1996, during which "a large number of armed security forces stormed the university campus, wounding 12 students."¹⁹ Minister for higher education, Hanan 'Ashrawi (a former lecturer at Bir Zeit and delegation member briefly co-opted by the PA), said she expected the police to be "deployed outside university campuses and to be called in only 'when needed,'"²⁰ but did not oppose the decision.

Central to the continuing debate over democracy under the PA, the NGO community strove tirelessly to cast their institutions as an essential component in a pluralistic civil society. A year or so into the autonomy project, World Bank officials on the ground appeared to be coming round to the idea that the NGOs might indeed be worth supporting for purposes of democratization.²¹ At the forefront of the campaign was the newly formed Palestinian NGO advocacy network, PNGO, which also launched a quarterly report, *Newsletter: Perspectives on the PNGO Network*. The *Newsletter* details the PNGO's goals, the activities of the member institutions, and the developing relationship between the PNGO and the PA. The front page of one early newsletter stated, "It is our belief that the activities of NGOs make an essential contribution to the promotion of democracy and the establishment of civil society in Palestine."²² Giacaman has argued forcibly in support of this view, stating "for the purpose of the development of Palestinian civil society, it is essential that the continued existence of relatively autonomous forms of association be made secure."²³ The creation of the PNGO was a step in this direction.

However, part of the PA's antipathy toward the PNGO stemmed from the strength of the left in the NGO community. In Hammami's analysis,

The PNGO Network reflects two contradictory strands within the NGO community; the NGO professionals who are mainly concerned with protecting their ability to deliver services; and the politicians who see NGOs as playing more aggressively political roles. This tension is

reflected throughout the PNGO position paper. On the one hand, NGO activities are presented as efficient and complementary to the PNA's, yet, on the other, the document calls for "total [financial and operational] independence from the Authority's structures and institutions."²⁴

The PNGO's position alludes to the profound problems confronting the PLO's secular opposition within Palestine; demoralized by the collapse of the Soviet bloc and marginalized from PLO decision making, the left has almost been *absorbed into* the NGOs, a phenomenon that 'Azmi Bishara called the "'NGO-isation' of the Left."²⁵ To quote Giacaman again, "Opposition politics should be the legitimate work of parties not NGOs."²⁶ Bishara argued in favor of the left's participation in the elections for the Legislative Council.²⁷ Instead, with the exception of the PPP (which failed to win one seat), the Damascus-led groups opted once again for self-imposed marginalization. Throughout Oslo and beyond, the Palestinian left proved itself quite incapable of assuming the role of a viable political alternative.

Beyond the realm of domestic politics, the advantages of a vibrant NGO sector were demonstrated to great effect on the international stage at the NGO Forum of a UN world conference addressing racism and related maladies, WCAR, convened in Durban, South Africa. Opening on August 28, 2001, the NGO Forum was organized to precede and set the tone for the UN WCAR inter-governmental conference it paralleled. An important platform for Palestinians isolated in the midst of the al-Aqsa intifada, it was also extremely sympathetic. The South African NGO Coalition, SANGOCO, had sent a delegation to Palestine not long before, which recognized apartheid when they saw it; cognizant of the brutality and distortion of people's lives it implied, they returned home appalled by what they had seen.²⁸ The NGO Forum's final Declaration and Program of Action, issued in advance of the intergovernmental conference and aimed squarely at it, called for full implementation of the Fourth Geneva Convention in the occupied territories and contained a stinging critique of the Israeli occupation. It included a call for the UN to prepare school materials detailing Israeli policies as they had done for apartheid in South Africa, a call to combat systematic distortion in favor of Israel by the Western global media, and the organization of sanctions against Israel with economic, diplomatic, and military implications. Issued September 4, excerpts from the statement read,

Appalled by the on-going colonial military Israeli occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip), we declare and call for an immediate end to the Israeli systematic perpetration of racist crimes including war crimes, acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing...recognizing that all of these methods are designed to ensure the continuation of an exclusively Jewish state with a Jewish majority and the expansion of its borders to gain more land, driving out the indigenous Palestinian population.

We declare Israel as a racist, apartheid state in which Israel's brand of apartheid as a crime against humanity has been characterized by separation and segregation, dispossession, restricted land access, denationalisation, "bantustanisation" and inhumane acts.²⁹

NGO representatives from over forty caucuses representing some 3,500 civil society groups including non-Zionist Jews lent the statement overwhelming support. It was a triumph of Palestinian and Arab social activism, and an educational and uplifting experience that put the lame efforts of the PA to shame.³⁰

In the prelude to the inter-governmental meeting, Bush had warned darkly that no U.S. delegation would be allowed to attend unless the final UN WCAR Declaration and Program of Action refrained from any reference to Zionism as racism or any attempt to “isolate” or “denigrate” Israel. The same caveat applied to calls for reparations for slavery.³¹ In the event, the United States sent a very low level delegation and then instructed it to withdraw; they were joined as ever by isolated Israeli colleagues, but remained behind to lobby. It was not the first time: the United States had boycotted two earlier conferences in 1978 and 1983 (along with many European countries), due to criticism of South Africa and Israel. To the disappointment of many, the UN WCAR under UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson declined to “receive and endorse the NGO Forum Declaration and Program of Action”³² as had been planned. It did issue a more modest but nonetheless useful statement that reiterated the refugees’ right of return:

We are concerned about the plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation. We recognize the inalienable right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state... We recognize the right of the refugees to return voluntarily to their homes and properties in dignity and safety, and urge all states to facilitate such return.³³

Sadly, the gains of the Durban conference were somewhat overshadowed by events the following week.

On paper, if not in practice, civil society received another boost with the publication of the Roadmap, reflecting the hand of Palestinian civil society figures in its drafting. Phase I makes explicit reference to civil society as one of its five sections, albeit the shortest one, confined to a sentence. It called for “[c]ontinued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/ NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.”³⁴ One such initiative came from HDIP’s Barghuthi, who helped launch the Palestinian National Initiative in June 2002 with veterans ‘Abd al-Shafi and Ibrahim Dakkak. This ambitious project aimed to restructure Palestinian political leadership, remobilize Palestinians at home, and mobilize more effectively those in the diaspora, a singular achievement of Zionism as yet far from properly tapped by Palestinian nationalism. On a political level, the National Initiative calls for a “united national command to act as a framework for organising collective participation, defining our national resistance strategy, and guiding the various forms of struggle and political action, including negotiations.” There are heartening echoes from the social agenda of the left in the first intifada:

The Palestinian National Initiative has called for the energizing of the potentials of the Palestinian people and for the deployment of this potential in the struggle of liberation and independence. To do that, we

must provide sufficient support for the working and disenfranchised sections of the population of the occupied territories.³⁵

Evidently inspired by the Durban triumph, Barghuthi continued: “If we can combine the international solidarity movement and our own national resistance, we will generate a force comparable to that which fought apartheid in South Africa.”³⁶ In light of the PA’s performance during the al-Aqsa intifada, it is hard to argue the case against an empowered civil society as Palestine’s anti-colonial struggle looks for a way forward.

The freedom to mobilize, which the NGOs had sought to defend and the Palestinian National Initiative sought to revive, has a parallel in the capacity of organized labor to take strike action. Two contrasting instances occurred three years into the autonomy project; the first focused on the nationalist agenda; the second addressed a purely social conflict. On February 1, 1997, the Legislative Council met in emergency session to call for a strike to protest the Israeli cabinet’s decision to go ahead with settlement construction on Mount Abu Ghaym (Har Homa), in East Jerusalem. It was one of the executives’ more lamentable failures that they had not taken the initiative earlier themselves. According to *Palestine Report*, the Council “called for a general strike as a means to protest unprecedented settlement activity in Jerusalem which members argued is intended to pre-determine the final status negotiations and change the character of Jerusalem...”³⁷ Their assumptions were correct, and a general strike was organized and widely observed on March 3. Israel bulldozed ahead regardless.

A second strike was organized by the teachers’ union over low pay (23,000 teachers observed it),³⁸ again with the support of the Legislative Council which recommended a 10 percent pay increase to the executive for the beginning of the next school year. The strike endured for three months, despite the actions of the Ministry of Education, which democratically “submitted names of some 50–60 school teachers to PA General Intelligence for questioning.”³⁹ The strike was finally suspended “after members of the Teachers Higher Coordinating Committee were arrested by Preventive Security and ‘forced’ to sign a statement promising to suspend the strike.”⁴⁰ The Council remained supportive of the teachers, but acknowledged that it was powerless to help until a civil service law was in place (at that time the legislation had been formulated but not ratified). If the strike indicated a readiness and ability to defy the Executive Authority, the PA’s response suggested a readiness to use repression as a substitute for a solution:

Human rights organizations have voiced alarm at the crackdown on the teachers, noting that their campaign for better salaries is the first non-partisan social movement to challenge the PA, and did not get a very warm reception.⁴¹

Another strike action gripped the occupied territories in late 1999, an uncomfortable time for the PA, and this trend accelerated into the year to come. In November 1999, taxi drivers went on a three-day strike over tax increases. In Gaza City, residents went on strike en masse for two days over price increases, supported by a further sit-in at the Legislative Council. The protests had sensitive political overtones as they involved basic commodities such as flour and fuel imported through the PA’s monopolies. The same month witnessed a sit-in at the Bar Association to protest new legislation. Judges held a

two-day strike in February 2000 to protest a lack of police protection when issuing an unpopular guilty verdict.⁴² It was indicative of a culture of rebellion and a lack of respect for the law in a territory transformed by Zionist settler-colonialism into a lawless frontier. And this before the institutional devastation meted out by Israel during the second intifada.

Strikes raised the role of the trade union movement under autonomy. In common with other sections of civil society, the union movement had been driven by factional and nationalist politics rather than classical class consciousness. The employment of a large proportion of Palestinian laborers in Israel on a migratory day-to-day basis also compromised opportunities for effective organization as a traditional movement in the Palestinian workplace.⁴³ The effective closure of the Israeli labor market during the al-Aqsa intifada in no way redressed that: laborers just found themselves completely unemployed rather than re-employed by Palestinian capital. The trade union federation nominally meant to represent them, the PGFTU, suffered from some common symptoms—factional division, rivalries between insiders and returnees, a reliance on PA patronage, and a consequently demobilizing political posture. In the words of Nina Sovich, the PGFTU’s local branches “report unrest or serious infractions to the executive committee...they don’t really organize the workers; they monitor them.”⁴⁴ If the economic provisions of the Oslo framework suggested the autonomy project remained subordinate to the Israeli economy, and the proposed industrial zones suggested that Israeli and Palestinian capital were ready to take advantage of a labor force both cheap and relatively powerless, Palestine’s official trade unions were meant to keep them politically quiescent. The subsequent imposition of Israel’s closure regime left them even more widely unemployed, poverty stricken, and desperate.

The social unrest manifest in strike action took on a very political hue in November 1999 with the publication of a petition signed by twenty prominent public personalities, including nine members of the Legislative Council that became known as the Committee of Twenty. The petition was unique in that it dared lament in public not only the failings of the PA but also of its then autocratic president. The former was charged with “corruption, deceit and despotism,” the latter with “opening the doors for opportunists to spread corruption throughout the Palestinian community.”⁴⁵ It expressed no more than the commonly held consensus on the PA and the Oslo process at the time, but the act of publication made it a unique event. It is a crucial document for reading the al-Aqsa intifada: on the one hand, it captured the essential failures of the PA and the process of which it was part, and on the other, it revealed a readiness to express vitriolic dissent at very considerable personal risk. An excerpt read,

More lands are robbed while settlements expand. The conspiracy against refugees accelerates behind the scenes. Palestinian jails close their doors to our own sons and daughters. Jerusalem has not returned and Singapore has not arrived. The people are divided into two groups: that of the select who rule and steal, and that of the majority which complains and searches for someone to save it.⁴⁶

The risks of attaching one’s name to this were real: of twenty signatories, eleven were either arrested and interrogated or placed under house arrest; one was shot in the leg, and

another severely beaten by General Intelligence. The gravity of dissent is suggested by the fact that each of the nine Legislative Council members belonged to Arafat's own Fatah faction, including Bassam al-Shak'a and Ahmad Qatamish. Shak'a had lost both legs in a bomb attack by settlers while mayor of Nablus, and Qatamish spent sixty-six months in administrative detention. These were not lightweight political figures. The Council members could not be arrested on account of their parliamentary immunity, so Arafat convened a special session to censure them and strip them of it. A bitterly divided Council declined to go that far, but a censure motion was passed.⁴⁷ The affair drew major demonstrations in support of the twenty within Palestine, including rallies of five thousand in Ramallah and a thousand in Nablus, and a storm of international condemnation. In Gaza the DFLP, PFLP, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad convened a joint meeting to express their solidarity with the prisoners. Palestinian universities and secondary schools held strikes in protest across the West Bank and Gaza Strip.⁴⁸ Committee of Twenty signatory, veteran nationalist, and victim of the beating, 'Abd al-Jawad Salih, saw the event was a watershed:

It signalled the dangers confronting the Palestinian people and brought down the barriers raised by fear of a confrontation. Palestinian university students, by supporting the Declaration, gave the first indication that something was afoot. Later, their spontaneous protest against Jospin, the French prime minister, when he condemned the Lebanese resistance as terrorists, was another important sign. But the victory of Lebanese resistance, led by Hizbullah, and the eventual withdrawal of Israeli forces from south Lebanon, were the last nails in the coffin of Palestinian despair.⁴⁹

In the eyes of many, the PA had far from distinguished itself, and the Committee of Twenty affair proved one more thoroughly unworthy spectacle. More than that, it presaged what was to come: Palestinian society was stirring.

The Elections for the Presidency and the Legislative Council

In the salad days of Oslo's infancy, the elections for the presidency and the Legislative Council drew an enthusiastic response from civil society advocates, including 'Abd al-Jawad Salih and the leadership of the PPP. For the PLO and particularly for the Fatah leadership at its heart, elections would serve three interrelated purposes. First, in spite of the painful compromises inherent to the process, elections would legitimize the national project initiated in Oslo as candidates agreeing to enter the race would *by definition* have accepted it as a valid diplomatic and political framework. Second, after three decades of exile, the returnee elite could enhance their authoritative leadership by broadening the social basis of the new order and incorporating local allies into the ruling coalition. To this end, they would rely in part on manipulation of the electoral system to guarantee the right result. To secure the PNC's blessing for the national project, the PLO would then appoint all members of the Legislative Council, plus the one hundred closest runners-up to sit on the twenty-first (and twenty-second) PNCs in Gaza, guaranteeing Arafat the two-

thirds majority he needed to revoke the 1968 Palestinian National Charter, so meeting an Israeli condition for continuing toward final status negotiations. Nabil Sha'ath pointed out that the appointments were entirely consistent with the bylaws of the PNC which had always "called for 50 percent of its members to be elected from the homeland, when that becomes possible..."⁵⁰ Third, the host of international observers monitoring the electoral process would grant the PA a measure of democratic legitimacy within the fora of international society.

Agreement to hold elections for a Legislative Council in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was one of the first commitments listed in the DoP. Article I read,

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority, the elected council (the 'Council') for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years...⁵¹

Further details and a timetable appear in Article III.2:

An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.⁵²

There is a commitment to negotiate a further agreement specifying the electoral system, international supervision, and media and campaigning arrangements. These issues were not addressed in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which dealt instead with the establishment of the PA and the transfer of powers to the first, unelected cabinet, the Council of Ministers. Matters of real substance concerning the elections are elucidated in the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement hammered out in Eilat and concluded at Taba.

The Electoral Rules and System

The peculiar circumstances of the elections could be seen in both the election rules and the importance attached to unresolved issues from the nationalist agenda during the campaign. In the first place, as the occupation continued in mildly revised form and millions of refugees remained in the diaspora, who was entitled to vote? According to the Interim Agreement,

- a. The right to vote will be universal, regardless of sex, race, religion, opinion, social origin, education, or property status. Every Palestinian who meets the qualification to vote shall have the right to be registered to vote.
- b. Only a person whose name appears on the Electoral Register...and who is 18 years old or older on the day of the elections, will have the right to vote.⁵³

For the PLO, the question of voter registration was itself a loaded one as it raised the rights of the refugees outside Palestine. With this issue in mind, the DoP secured an agreement not to prejudice the rights of Palestinian refugees "who were registered on 4

June 1967...because they were unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.”⁵⁴ Palestinians resident in occupied East Jerusalem were also granted the right to vote, although in the event both the Israeli government and opposition parties would make every effort to discourage them from exercising their franchise.

Candidates for election were separated into those running for the presidency and those for the Legislative Council. The Interim Agreement revealed the first substantive details of both rules and system, providing separate ballots for the presidency and a single-chamber legislature. Chapter 1, Article 2.1 stipulated, “direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council and the Ra’ees of the Executive Authority of the Council...”⁵⁵ Separate ballots for the president and the Legislative Council⁵⁶ would allow Arafat to draw upon all his nationalist symbolism and to appear to stand above factional politics. As one Israeli commentator shrewdly noted,

This is why many Palestinians who criticise Arafat, and even loathe his De Gaulle persona, will vote for him. De Gaulle was the man of the hour. Like De Gaulle, Arafat became a symbol of his people’s independent spirit...⁵⁷

In the cautious words of Hanan ‘Ashrawi, “He is the most suitable leader—at this time.”⁵⁸

Article III.4 of the Interim Agreement stipulated that both president and legislature “shall be elected for a transitional period not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994.”⁵⁹ Events would determine that those who managed to win office would go on to hold it for much longer than their mandate provided, albeit to little effect. Following the election, Article V.4.(C), stipulated that 80 percent of the new cabinet should be drawn from the elected legislature, although in practice Arafat finally restricted it to 67 percent.⁶⁰ Article V.4.(C) read,

The Ra’ees of the Executive Authority shall have the right to appoint some persons, in number not exceeding twenty percent of the total membership of the Executive Authority, who are not members of the Council, to exercise executive authority and participate in government tasks.⁶¹

This provision ensured a continuing role in government for the four members of the PLO executive committee, besides Arafat, who had held ministerial positions in the previous Council of Ministers, positions they could easily have lost had they been obliged to stand for election.

The Interim Agreement (Annex II, Article 1.3) also called for the establishment of a Palestinian central election commission, the CEC, the electoral engineers tasked with developing and fine-tuning the framework set by the Interim Agreement. Composed of a nine-member panel plus a president, Arafat put Fatah central committee member Mahmud ‘Abbas in charge. Published in Gaza on December 7, 1995, the CEC’s electoral law confirmed the separate ballots for the presidency and legislature and established a constituency system for the latter.⁶²

The electoral law required candidates for the presidency to be over the age of thirty and registered to vote, with a petition of five thousand signatories from among the registered electorate supporting the nomination for any independent candidates. In the race for the legislature, section 3(12) stipulated that candidates had to be “above 30 [years of age] on the day of voting and having his or her name listed in the final electoral register.”⁶³ As with the presidency, candidates could be nominated either by parties registered with the CEC or as independents, with independent candidates being required to submit “an application attaching a list of at least 500 signatories who [were] registered in the election register themselves.”⁶⁴

For the system itself, in the presidential election part V, Article 60.(4) of the CEC’s law stipulated that the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip would be treated as a single constituency. Annex 2 of the Interim Agreement had made several indirect references to a constituency system and it was no real surprise that when the CEC finally published the election law, it confirmed that legislative elections would be held on that basis. Article 5 divided the West Bank and Gaza Strip into sixteen constituencies, “the number of seats in each constituency proportional to the population therein.”⁶⁵ The Israelis eventually agreed in Article IV to an eighty-two member legislature plus president, having tried previously to restrict the Council to twenty-seven seats out of fear that “a large council with legislative powers would be a symbol of sovereignty.”⁶⁶ However, by the time the election came to pass, the legislature had been revised upward to eighty-eight members plus the president. (See Table 9.) Of the five

Table 9 The Sixteen Electoral Constituencies for the Legislative Council

West Bank	Seats Candidates	
Bethlehem	4	30
Hebron	10	72
Jericho	1	6
Jerusalem	7	52
Jinin	6	36
Nablus	8	55
Qalqilya	2	12
Ramallah	7	46
Salfit	1	11
Tubas	1	12
Tulkarm	4	38
<i>West Bank Totals</i>	51	370
The Gaza Strip	Seats	Candidates
Dayr al-Balah	5	50
Gaza City	12	92
Khan Yunis	8	66
Northern Gaza (Jabalya)	7	67
Rafah	5	27
<i>Gaza Totals</i>	37	302
<i>Palestine Totals</i>	88	672

seats added by presidential fiat, two went to Gaza City, giving it 14 percent of the seats for less than 10 percent of the registered voters, seeming evidence of malapportionment in favor of the constituency that at that time served as the base of Arafat's regime.⁶⁷ Special provisions were also made for confessional and ethnic minorities; six seats were reserved for Christian representatives (two in Jerusalem, two in Bethlehem, and one each in Ramallah and Gaza City), and one for the Samaritan community (non-Zionist Jewish Palestinians) in the northern West Bank city of Nablus.

The non-proportional constituency system adopted by the PA reflected the importance attached to delivering a majority for Arafat's Fatah faction and pro-Arafat, pro-DoP independents. In the race for the Council, the mechanism adopted to realize this was a multi-member constituency system with multiple non-transferable (block) votes, with the voters able to choose as many candidates as there were seats in their constituency. Representatives were elected on the basis of a plurality (first past the post) formula. To take Gaza City (with twelve seats) as an example, this simply meant in practice that the twelve candidates with the highest numbers of votes would win seats. Inside the polling station voters would be presented with two separate ballot papers, a red one for the president and a white one listing candidates for the Council.⁶⁸

The decision to adopt a constituency system was contentious in that it clearly favored large notable families and other wealthy individuals with a regional power base. In terms of our framework of analysis, it can be identified as purposive elite agency manipulating institutional arrangements to appropriate social-structural assets for the autonomy project. The constituency system facilitated consolidation of a social basis for the regime by drawing local elites behind the authoritative leadership of the returnees. Critics complained of the lack of regard for national unity and of the advantage bestowed upon the powerful and wealthy. With regard to national unity, Khalil al-Shiqaqi noted that a constituency system might allow for the smooth functioning of government in an established democracy "but when you are coming out of a major national crisis you should have proportional representation."⁶⁹ This would have encouraged the anti-DoP PLO and non-PLO factions to enter the race with some hope of gaining representation. Under the constituency system, as one observer noted, "there is nothing to motivate them if they are virtually guaranteed no seats and no influence."⁷⁰ This point was also made by the leftist Walid Salim, who explained the preference of the PFLP for proportional representation and a national list to guarantee pluralism. Salim also pointed out that the PFLP's representative on the PLO executive committee, 'Abd al-Rahim Malluh, was in favor of PFLP participation in the elections, provided they were based on proportional representation and were considered a prelude to elections among all Palestinians, including the refugees outside Palestine.⁷¹

The second objection concerned the incorporation of powerful clannetworks into the new legislature. Manuel Hassassian of Bethlehem University observed how the division of Palestine into separate constituencies served large local families; confining them to their specific geographical areas served to concentrate notable family influence and ensured they would win.⁷² Shiqaqi confirmed this view, adding that Arafat's preference for a balance between local grass roots and what Shiqaqi called the "commercial bourgeoisie" ensured a role for the wealthy. One prime example among the notables was the co-option of Mahir al-Masri onto the Fatah list in Nablus; as representative of his clan Masri could rely upon an estimated one thousand relatives in Nablus to work for his

electoral success.⁷³ For the non-notable big bourgeoisie, Ramallah businessman Jamil al-Tarifi (widely reviled for allegedly profiteering from settlement construction) could buy electoral success with the promise of patronage to needy local clients. On election day it was impossible to miss the fleet of taxis bearing posters of the candidate and ferrying voters to the polls. The campaign of Nabil Sha'ath in Khan Yunis told a similar story.⁷⁴ The co-option of powerful clan-networks and wealthy individuals into the PA was clearly a cause, and not a consequence, of the constituency system. Among the CEC's engineers responsible for drafting the election law, 'Ali Safarini alluded to its real purpose (whether he meant to or not) when he defended the system on the grounds of its resemblance to traditional models: "Before 1967 this was the system we were accustomed to. It is the system applied in Jordan and Egypt."⁷⁵

Contending Candidates and Parties

In the separate poll for the presidency, Arafat was spared a serious challenge for the position he felt to be his by right. The only candidate capable of mounting a remotely genuine challenge, the Gaza-based nationalist and former communist Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi, declined to do so. Nevertheless, the process was legitimized by the surprise candidacy of the long-standing nationalist campaigner, the late Samiha al-Khalil. Loosely associated with the DFLP⁷⁶ and a member of the PNC, Khalil announced her candidacy on December 21. She ran her campaign from the women's organization she had long led in the West Bank town of al-Bira, *In'ash al-Uusra*. During the first intifada, Khalil had been detained by the Israeli authorities for inciting violence and placed under town arrest.⁷⁷ Never in a position to seriously contest the post with Arafat, Khalil's candidacy at least lent the presidential poll the formal appearance of a contest. Her appeal was largely restricted to secular Palestinians opposed to the Oslo process, but her candidacy did provide a useful outlet for a protest vote. Khalil ran her campaign on the single issue of halting the Oslo process

Until the Palestinians are guaranteed an independent state encompassing all of Gaza and the West Bank, with Jerusalem as its capital...the return of all refugees and the unconditional release of Palestinian prisoners still in Israeli jails.⁷⁸

These themes were consistent with the nationalist agenda of most of the candidates running for the Council. As Jon Immanuel noted: "A look at the election literature...shows that most of them have no program beyond liberating Jerusalem, returning refugees and releasing prisoners."⁷⁹ One might add that this was not surprising, given that the framework of transition hardly resolved the majority of pressing issues facing Palestinian nationalism, either then or nine years later.

The parties contesting the election can be divided as follows: from among the PLO factions represented on the executive committee, the six competitors were the dominant Fatah movement, FIDA, the PPP, the ALF, the PLF, and the PPSF.⁸⁰ Outside of the PLO factions, the Palestinian Ba'ath Party (proSyria) and the Liberation Front (pro-Iraqi Ba'ath Party) put forward candidates, as did a number of newly registered non-PLO groups. Among the new groups were Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi's National Democratic Coalition

(NDC, the only new list to win a seat), the Progressive National Coalition (PNC), the National Movement for Change (NMC), and the Future Coalition Party (FCP). Minor splinters from the Islamic movement included the al-Aqsa Brigades (Islamic Jihad) and the Islamic Liberation Front (Hamas). (See Table 10.)

From among the non-Fatah parties and lists, only FIDA, the PPP, and the NDC stood any chance of winning a seat. FIDA was closely linked to Fatah and submitted candidates on a series of joint lists. The PPP projected itself as the guardian of civil society and, with strong representation among the NGO movement, held some hope of success. In contrast to them and the other marginal PLO factions taking part, the NDC represented a new list centered on the personality of ‘Abd al-Shafi: declining to enter the presidential race, he did succeed in securing a seat in the Council, and was the first to resign from it on a point of principle.

An important illustration of Arafat’s attempts to elevate himself above factional politics and realize a broader coalition was his effort to co-opt the Islamic opposition into the election process. With a history of electoral success in chambers of commerce and student unions, some activists were tempted. However, this particular effort to generate a national consensus

Table 10 Competing Factions and Lists

PLO Factions with EC Representation	New Lists	Islamic Splinters
Fatah*	NDC*	al-Aqsa Brigades
FIDA*	PNC	ILF
PPP	NMC	
PPSF	FCP	
PLF		

* Represented in the Council.

around Oslo was undermined by the decision of the external Hamas leadership in Jordan to boycott proceedings.⁸¹ From Amman, spokesman Ibrahim Ghusha announced that Hamas intended to boycott the elections while speaking via a telephone link-up with a rally at al-Najah University in Nablus, called to mark the eighth anniversary of the first intifada.⁸² Following a prolonged but ultimately inconclusive dialogue between the PA and the *local* Hamas leadership, three senior Hamas activists engaged in the talks—Isma‘il Haniyya, Sa‘id Namruti, and Khalid Hindi—registered as independent candidates, only to withdraw on January 2, just three days after they first registered.⁸³ As they explained it,

We mandated ourselves to be a safety valve when Hamas relations with the Palestinian Authority were in crisis... In nominating ourselves for the forthcoming elections, we believed in serving Islam and the homeland. But due to the eruption of a state of confusion within the Islamic circle... despite our conviction in the value of our beliefs, we have decided to revoke our nominations.⁸⁴

The confusion within Hamas was neatly illustrated by an observation made in *The Jerusalem Post*: “Leaflet 131 called for a boycott last week [week ending January 13,

1996] followed by another leaflet 131 denying there was a boycott.”⁸⁵ Nevertheless, other lower-ranked Hamas and non-Hamas Islamic candidates did stand for election as independents, most notably ‘Imad al-Faluji in Gaza who won his seat and was subsequently made a minister. Faluji was formerly editor of the Hamas weekly *al-Watan*, which Arafat was not averse to closing down periodically, along with arresting the staff.⁸⁶ The confusion with Hamas points to its relatively loose structure, the widespread political dislocation prompted by the Oslo process, and the extent to which its popular support was, at least temporarily, eroded by the reality of living with the PA. To quote *The Jerusalem Post* again, Hamas is a “large, amorphous organisation...[which] had many supporters whose allegiance was to Islam rather than to any organisation.”⁸⁷ Arafat’s apparent success (with the ample help of the security apparatus) in separating the political and military wings of the movement underlined the dilemma confronting the Islamic opposition in the era of a robust PA.

The Fatah Primaries

The politics of transition generated a lively debate and a good deal of friction within Fatah over how to unify the internal and external wings of the movement. The elections to the Legislative Council confronted cadres with an immediate problem in this regard: what would be the basis of candidate selection and how could equitable representation be realized? It was a moment of some fluidity, and in order to meet grass roots pressure for participation, Fatah’s governing central committee sanctioned a series of primary elections to select candidates during November and December 1995. Primaries were scheduled for each of the sixteen electoral constituencies defined by the CEC, although procedures were more successful in some localities than others. There was little opportunity to organize anything earlier as details could only be finalized following the conclusion of the Interim Agreement in September 1995. The primaries were conducted among delegates from Fatah’s *mawqa’* (district), *mantiqa* (area), and *iqlim* (region) committees, as well as representatives of the various unions, university leadership committees, and so forth, providing they fell within the boundaries of the new electoral constituencies. The competition was fought among three loosely defined groups: the returnee historic leadership generally represented by the central committee and the revolutionary council; the younger generation of intifada activists from within the West Bank and Gaza who were widely but not exclusively represented on the higher committees; and wealthy or otherwise influential individuals from the traditionally powerful families and the big bourgeoisie who generally fell outside of formal Fatah structures but whom Arafat wished to co-opt. The primaries brought some clarity to the lines of competition within Fatah and the formation of a social foundation for the PA.

Grass roots pressure to hold the primaries originated with Marwan al-Barghuthi, general secretary of Fatah in the West Bank and the emergent center of gravity for West Bank intifada activists in the Oslo period. Barghuthi characterized his proposal as a means of democratizing Fatah and providing the grass roots membership with a say in candidate selection, which by turns would take Fatah one step closer toward transformation into a modern political party. His initiative was put before the central committee, approved, and transferred to the revolutionary council to finalize details.⁸⁸ Central committee members were then assigned responsibility for supervising the process

throughout the West Bank and Gaza, defusing local pressure for greater involvement, and keeping the intifada generation on board as the ruling coalition coalesced. What Arafat had not foreseen was that an apparently harmless means of keeping the local activists quiescent could turn into something of a fiasco when elections failed to produce the outcome he wanted: in the event, Arafat and the central committee felt obliged to intervene in strength, overturning a series of results in favor of candidates *they* wanted to see on the list, among them figures from the diaspora-based historic leadership and local representatives of influential families and business. Not surprisingly, it generated a good deal of ill will among the ranks of local intifada activists.

The central committee accepted a system whereby each primary conference would elect a list containing double the number of candidates required to compete in each constituency, ranked according to the results of each primary election. These results would then be conveyed to the central committee, which, in turn, would select the candidates they preferred from among the winners. This arrangement, accepted by local activists as consistent with Fatah's official organizing principle of democratic centralism,⁸⁹ also provided a measure of flexibility between the wishes of the senior leadership and the will of the grass roots. In practice, this meant, for example, that the Jerusalem constituency granted seven seats in the new legislature would produce a list of fourteen names in the primaries from among which the central committee could then select its preferred seven candidates. Ramallah, also with seven seats, would again produce a list of fourteen names, while Tulkarm, with four seats, would produce a list of eight. Candidates arose from among the formal Fatah structures of the central committee and the revolutionary council, the local structure that hoped to become formal in the higher committees, and other figures more loosely associated with Fatah. The entire process was supervised by members of the central committee on the ground. The following examples illustrate how, in the event, the process did not run as smoothly as might have been hoped.

The Jerusalem primary included some three hundred delegates drawn from the local movement, including union representatives and student council leaderships. The ballot eventually produced a list restricted to seven candidates. Of the seven selected candidates, only one representative of the intifada generation—first-placed on the list, journalist and former political prisoner Hatim 'Abd al-Qadir—was chosen by the central committee to run for Fatah in the legislative election.⁹⁰ *The Jerusalem Times* reported that by the time a final decision had been made, the "list had undergone several revisions..."⁹¹ To the mind of many local activists, it was revised to the extent that it no longer formed a proper Fatah list at all. Besides 'Abd al-Qadir, only central committee member Ahmad Qray' was considered as another real Fatah cadre, and the list itself had only five candidates. The regional committee accepted Qray' as candidate and did not force him to compete in the primaries out of respect for his seniority, but not without complaint. As one local activist put it, they had nothing against Qray' personally, it was just that "we don't know him."⁹² The remaining three seats were divided up more controversially. Fatah activist Salwa Hadib on the regional committee came in fifth and was unimpressed to be replaced by NGO activist Zahira Kamal, formerly of the DFLP and now of FIDA. Ahmad Zughayr, merchant and farmer from Hebron known to be close to Fatah, took the fourth Muslim seat to secure the vote of Jerusalem's large Hebronite community. Fifth place went to Emil Jarju'i, Christian proprietor of the Christmas Hotel (with other

interests in tourism) to provide Fatah with a candidate for the Christian seat (he was later appointed to the PLO executive committee). As Salwa Hadib put it,

This list does not represent the ambition of the Fatah movement, especially that of the youth leadership... We will vote for those individuals in the bloc who are suitable and qualified but not for all the names mentioned on the list.⁹³

Ahmad Ghnaym, one of Jerusalem's representatives on the higher committee and the second-placed candidate in the primaries, took a more conciliatory line; "maybe there is no consensus, but everybody is committed to Fatah."⁹⁴ Ghnaym was compensated for his loss by appointment to the revolutionary council. He went on to become assistant deputy minister in the Ministry of Local Government, making him the highest-placed member of the West Bank higher committee in the civil institutions of the PA.

A similar situation prevailed in Ramallah, with Fatah again forming a coalition of forces in favor of the PA and the DoP. Senior FIDA member 'Azmi Shu'aybi, minister of sports and youth prior to the election, was placed on the list, together with independent member of the PFLP and Black September veteran Fayiz Khalifa. Campaigning as *Kutlat al-Watan* (the National Bloc), the Fatah input included three cadres well placed in the original primaries, including Marwan al-Barghuthi, Rabiha Diyab (fourth), Ghazi Hananiyya (fifth, Christian, dentist), and Bashir Nafa' (seventh).⁹⁵ Ya'qub Hasuna was brought in to represent local business.

In Bethlehem, 'Imad Ghayaza remarked that the local Fatah leadership chose a list, forwarded it to Arafat, and found it returned in very different shape.⁹⁶ Andoni provides some useful material to support this:

In Bethlehem, consultations resulted in the decision to drop two Fatah veterans, Salah Ta'amri and Daud al-Zir, from the official list in order to include two Christians. According to several senior Fatah officials, the real reason for the change was that Arafat did not want to endorse Ta'amari, who had made a name for himself in Lebanon through supervising the training of young fighters and through his resistance to the Israeli army in 1982. More to the point, Ta'amari had developed since returning to Bethlehem in 1994 a power base well beyond his own mainly bedouin Ta'amareh clan and had asserted some independence from Arafat by outspoken criticism of certain PA policies.⁹⁷

Further south in Hebron, according to *The Jerusalem Report*,

[Arafat] called the local activists and told them not to run. He placed PLO leaders who arrived from abroad at the top of Fatah lists of endorsed candidates. He also made sure that the large affluent families...[were] well represented on the lists.⁹⁸

Events in the north of the West Bank maintained the pattern. In Nablus, as with Jerusalem and Ramallah, approximately three hundred delegates from the local

committees voted for their preferred candidates. Nablus was allocated eight seats in the Legislative Council, with one of those specifically reserved for the Jewish (but neither Zionist nor Israeli) Samaritan community. In the event, five of the top seven candidates from the primaries were chosen for inclusion on the final list, these being first-placed Mahir al-Masri (a representative of the notable family), Sirhan Dukat (second), 'Imad Ya'ish (third), Dalai Salama (fourth, intifada activist from Balata), and Fayiz Zaydan (sixth, revolutionary council). Ghassan Shak'a, former and future mayor of Nablus and representative of a notable clan, was added to the list, although he had done reasonably well in his own right, coming in a legitimate fourteenth (he later joined the PLO executive committee). Amin Maqbul, a returnee Fatah member of the revolutionary council was added by decision of the central committee. Of those who lost their place, seventh-placed Husam Khadr was one of several intifada activists who went on to challenge the Fatah list, win a seat in the Legislative Council as a Fatah independent, and become a persistent thorn in Arafat's side. With Barghuthi, he was one of the high-profile *tanzim* cadres arrested by the IDF during the al-Aqsa intifada.⁹⁹

In Tulkarm, over one thousand delegates chose eight candidates for their four seats. Arafat and the central committee did select three out of four from the first eight: Sulayman Zuhayri (first), al-Tayyib 'Abd al-Rahim (fourth, central committee), and 'Abd al-Nasir Salah (eighth).¹⁰⁰ Unfortunately, this was cold comfort to seventh-placed Ibrahim Khurayshi, who found himself replaced with central committee member Hakam Bal'awi, who was placed, in Khurayshi's view, an inadmissible ninth. For Khurayshi, president of the student council at Bir Zeit University, former UNLU leader, prisoner for six years, and a well-known Fatah activist of long standing, his plight typified the arbitrary nature of the established leadership he had previously campaigned for. It also underlined the need to democratize the movement, Barghuthi's declared aim of introducing the primaries in the first place.¹⁰¹

The Tulkarm primaries were overseen by central committee member 'Abbas Zaki: he had, according to Khurayshi, shown little interest in proceedings from the start. Zaki asked the local leadership to simply give him two names that he could then add to those of his fellow central committee members 'Abd al-Rahim and Bal'awi. When sixty local leaders refused to comply, he insisted they call the election there and then, on the spot, at 6:00 p.m., Friday, December 8, 1995. A major row ensued, the upshot of which saw the primaries eventually held on December 12. The affair left unhealed scars between three indignant members of the central committee and a great many disaffected younger local leaders who still referred to "the battle of holding the primaries in Tulkarm."¹⁰²

Up in Jinin, 1,300 delegates started voting in a process that was finally abandoned due to "technical problems."¹⁰³ Early results gave an initial impression of local feelings and two of the first four candidates, Jamal al-Shati (higher committee) and 'Azzam al-Ahmad (revolutionary council), were selected, with the central committee deciding the other three, among them revolutionary council member Burhan Jarrar. In the smaller West Bank constituency of Salfit, the higher committee's Ahmad al-Dik, son-in-law to Intisar al-Wazir and soon to be elevated to the revolutionary council, was a shoo-in. Jericho was another foregone conclusion as it was the stronghold of local Arafat loyalist Sa'ib 'Urayqat, an insider resident in Abu Dis and appointee to the revolutionary council. 'Urayqat was briefly head of the CEC prior to 'Abbas and enjoyed a long tenure as

minister of local government before moving (and temporarily resigning in pique) to Negotiations Affairs.¹⁰⁴

Events in Gaza were recounted by former prisoner Diyab Alluh,¹⁰⁵ editor of the Fatah newspaper *al-Karama*, and head of the Fatah Media and Culture Department at the Gaza higher committee. Primaries were held among three hundred activists in Gaza City to select a list of twenty candidates for consideration by the central committee, which committed itself to choosing ten of them. Problems arose when they chose only five and Alluh (who came joint second with central committee member Intizar al-Wazir) was not one of them. Joining many fellow cadres in the West Bank, Alluh ran as a Fatah independent, the only one to do so in the Gaza City constituency, and very narrowly failed to win a seat. In Khan Yunis, five out of nine primary winners made it onto the final list: Jawad al-Taybi, Ahmad al-Shibi (future minister), Ahmad Nasir, Zakariyya al-Agha (a notable and member of the central committee), and Ibrahim Abu al-Naja. In Rafah, conversations with Gaza-based activists suggested that the list was decided upon without a vote.

The Fatah primaries convey something of the politics of transition within the PLO's most influential faction. The process suggested that the social and political cleavages were substantial, but could be overcome at least in the short term as long as the movement remained a movement, and retained its flexibility and capacity to innovate. Within the looser confines of a movement, procedures could be improvised and applied selectively to finesse difficulties. The transition to ruling party would likely be much more problematic.

The Election Campaign

Originally scheduled to take place within nine months of the entry into force of the DoP, the elections were finally scheduled for January 20, 1996. Arafat announced that nominations would be open from December 14 to 22, 1995.¹⁰⁶ The Council of Ministers later extended this in Jerusalem, Hebron, Khan Yunis, and Gaza City¹⁰⁷ "to give a final chance to the national and Islamic factions to participate in the elections..."¹⁰⁸ The election campaign was eventually launched by the CEC on January 2, 1996.¹⁰⁹

Article 57 of the election law called for "'equal and fair' campaigning opportunities for each of the candidates."¹¹⁰ In practice, the final tally of 672 candidates, including 506 independents, rendered this improbable.¹¹¹ The radio station *Sawt Filastin* (Voice of Palestine) ran a series of two-minute slots that provided the fairest and most comprehensive platform for electoral campaigning.¹¹² The PPP proved to be the only PLO faction to actively campaign against Fatah, entering twenty-one candidates, while FIDA entered ten on joint lists as part of the Fatah pro-Oslo slate.

The haste with which the election campaign was organized, together with the absence of a substantial, coherent opposition, enhanced Fatah's ability to dominate proceedings. This dominance was particularly obvious in the media, where campaign opportunities were limited not only by finance but by the restricted availability of media outlets. The official Palestinian television station, the PBC, ran a series of election broadcasts, and one enterprising businessman from Jalazun refugee camp set up his own station transmitting purely election material for the duration of the campaign. Newspapers were plastered with pictures of candidates, as was all the available wall space on buildings:

According to a survey published on election day, during the campaign electoral publicity took up about one-fourth of the total newspaper-space; every day electoral advertisements filled 23 of the total 92 pages of the daily papers.¹¹³

This was to cause serious difficulties for *al-Quds* editor Mahir al-'Alami, arrested on Arafat's orders after election adverts on Christmas Day relegated his picture to page seven. The fact that the election campaign was in full swing and *al-Quds* was overwhelmed with front-page advertisements paid for by candidates could not save 'Alami from a week in prison. Arafat had attended Bethlehem for the 1995 Christmas Eve celebrations that directly followed the Israeli redeployment and the PA's assumption of authority. During the festivities, a large video screen in Manger Square conveyed images of Arafat respectfully at mass, the idea being to equate the PLO chairman with 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, the magnanimous Arab conqueror remembered for his protection of the Christian community in Palestine. When pictures intended to flash around the world failed to make the front page in Jerusalem or Ramallah, a furious Arafat ordered an arrest. *Al-Quds* maintained a studied silence throughout the affair.¹¹⁴

For the disadvantaged PPP, Ghassan al-Khatib played down the significance of the media: "We are small communities and the official media is not as essential as in bigger countries."¹¹⁵ Khatib suggested that traditional campaign stumping was more important, but noted that Fatah had a big advantage in this respect too: "Fatah can move easily because of its connection to the PA; Israel gives travel permits according to the recommendation of the Palestinian Authority."¹¹⁶

Freedom of the press served as another index of Fatah's dominance and, perhaps more significantly, of Arafat's autocratic behavior. There were five Palestinian daily newspapers to assess. The two more established dailies, *al-Nahar* and *al-Quds*, were both intimidated into taking a very pro-Arafat, if not pro-Fatah, view. *Al-Nahar* had been noted for its pro-Jordanian sympathies, whereas *al-Quds* possessed solid Palestinian nationalist credentials yet still proved too independent for Arafat. The paper's silence during the detention of its own editor illustrated very clearly the increasing tendency toward self-censorship in the face of intimidation. In addition to the established titles, the local press quickly expanded to include three new daily newspapers following the implementation of the DoP. All three—*al-Ayyam*, *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, and *al-Bilad*—were sympathetic to Fatah and the PA. The editor of *al-Hayat* was Akram Haniyya, one of the deportees elected to the revolutionary council in 1989 and an advisor at Camp David II.

The increasing self-censorship of the Palestinian media was attested to by Ghazi Hamid, managing editor of the Hamas weekly, *al-Watan*. Hamid complained that prior to the establishment of the PA, *al-Quds* represented all the Palestinians secular and otherwise, "but now it cannot permit or allow any article against the Palestinian Authority. They just report Arafat and his Authority."¹¹⁷ Hamid tried many times to publish in *al-Quds*, all of them unsuccessful. Furthermore, his own newspaper had been closed for publishing an article on the security services, and *al-Watan's* editor given a three-year sentence by the State Security Court. After a two-month closure, the paper reopened, printed a small article about Arafat, and was closed again. Hamid compared the situation in Palestine to Jordan: "You can speak about everything but not Arafat. Like

Jordan—you can speak about the government, but not about the king.”¹¹⁸ It was very much the same situation in Egypt under Mubarak, and indeed the rest of the Arab world at that time.

Voter Registration

The constraints inherent in the framework of transition, which in turn impinged upon the election, were visible in the process of voter registration. Hasan Abu Libda, president of the Palestinian statistical agency, PCBS, established in 1993 (by a decision of the PLO executive committee rather than by the PA), was another member of the nine-strong CEC. Abu Libda led a determined and professional campaign of which he was rightly proud in the face of continual Israeli obstruction. Such were the obstacles placed in the way of the PCBS that Abu Libda characterized the elections in Areas B, C, and East Jerusalem as “pseudo-elections.”¹¹⁹ Consistent with the colonial mentality of the IDF and the Civil Administration, every action of the PCBS was subject to Israeli approval: the Israelis only released their population register to the PCBS on December 1, 1994 (after negotiating since February of the same year), and when it did arrive the register was in Hebrew rather than Arabic (raising such complicated problems of translation and transliteration for the software that the PCBS decided to start from scratch); the Civil Administration only released their maps at the last minute—and they were very old and largely outdated. In East Jerusalem, the PCBS employed seven thousand volunteer students and teachers to register as many people as they could in the absence of *any* Israeli provision of information whatsoever.

Mark Mullen, program officer for the democracy advocacy group NDI, the U.S. organization charged with helping to facilitate the election process, confirmed Abu Libda’s account. According to Mullen, the Israelis largely “wrote-off” the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where elections were reluctantly acknowledged as necessary, “but not Jerusalem... They did all they could to hinder things in Jerusalem [and] went to great lengths to make things as unapparent within the municipal boundaries [as redrawn by Israel] as possible.”¹²⁰ This included the process of voter registration, the election campaign, and the final vote itself. Mullen also recalled the logistical difficulties confronting the registration process in the Gaza Strip. One of NDI’s election workers, Nadir al-Khatib, was actually detained by the IDF in the course of his work, while six tons of registration cards were held up at the Erez checkpoint for several days. When the IDF finally allowed the cards into Gaza, election workers were obliged to pass all six tons—by hand—over the concrete barriers that surround the checkpoint. In addition, NDI’s workers in Gaza were never allowed to meet with colleagues in the West Bank. In Mullen’s words, “it’s not easy to coordinate with people you are not allowed to meet.”¹²¹ In the face of all these obstacles, Mullen was effusive in his praise for the PCBS, which got the job done *in spite of* Israel through dedication and professionalism.

International Support

For all these Israeli obstructions and the inherent shortcomings of the Oslo framework, the elections received the seal of Western and international approval in the form of an extensive contingent of international observers, working in tandem with a larger

Palestinian observation team. The majority of U.S. observers were organized by NDI and the Carter Center. The European Union Election Unit, headed by Carl Lidbom, provided monitors for 150 polling stations, while observers from other countries took responsibility for a further 170 stations. During the weeks preceding the election and particularly on election day itself, the foreign contingent formed a highly visible presence (at least in Ramallah, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Gaza) in their bright blue jackets with *muraqib dawli* (international observer) printed on the back in Arabic.¹²² A total of 650 foreigners and 2,500 Palestinians from the Palestinian Domestic Monitoring Committee were engaged in the observation operation.¹²³ Lidbom was publicly critical of the brevity of the campaign (reduced from twenty-two days to fourteen), the arbitrary expansion of the Council by five seats through presidential decree, and the elusiveness of the CEC president. He also questioned its independence, given the CEC president's senior positions in Fatah and the PLO.

Illustrative of the constrained nature of the entire election campaign, the process of voter registration in Jerusalem was severely handicapped by widespread fears among the Palestinian population of threats to their welfare status. Anxieties centered around the threat of losing the valuable blue Israeli identification cards, a treasured commodity that allowed the bearer access to the city through the IDF road blocks that encircle it, a privilege denied to non-East Jerusalem residents who then carried an orange card for the West Bank, a dark green card for former prisoners, or a red card for residents of the Gaza Strip.¹²⁴ In addition, blue ID card holders were entitled to certain welfare services such as unemployment benefits and national insurance, both of which, the rumors suggested, would be rescinded by anyone choosing to exercise the right to vote. These anxieties were instigated and enflamed by a disingenuous Israeli campaign that included posters in Arabic and Hebrew designed to appear like official municipality publications codifying the trumped-up threats. Likud activists determined to sabotage the poll pasted the posters across East Jerusalem. Furthermore, Israeli restrictions imposed on voter participation on election day required most of the 45,000 registered voters to travel to polling stations outside the city. Altogether, fewer than five thousand voters were actually allowed to cast their votes *inside* the city. Finally, an extremely heavy Israeli police presence throughout East Jerusalem did little to encourage voters to go to the polls.¹²⁵

Election Results: Fatah's Legislative Council

With the furor over candidate selection still fresh in everyone's memory, Fatah went to the polls. Indeed, in the absence of the PFLP, the DFLP, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, almost *only* Fatah went to the polls. This point is well made by Lamis Andoni, who reported that such was the dominance of the whole electoral procedure by Fatah that PFLP spokesman Riyadh Malki labeled the election itself "the Fatah primaries."¹²⁶ Despite the row over candidate selection, official Fatah candidates did extremely well in most constituencies, with a number of Fatah independents also running and succeeding.

Arafat won a predictably resounding victory in the presidential poll with 87.1 percent of the vote, while Samiha al-Khalil took a respectable 12.9 percent. Total voter turnout was 75.86 percent, 86.77 percent in the Gaza Strip and 73.5 percent in the West Bank, reflecting the PA's direct control over much of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and more limited authority in the West Bank. Only 40.5 percent of the eligible

electorate voted in Jerusalem and 66.4 percent in Hebron due to the unmodified Israeli occupation there.¹²⁷ The relatively high turnout clearly legitimized the national project, and lifted the PLO-PA's authoritative leadership to a new level, albeit temporarily.

The strength of Fatah cadres in the Legislative Council was impressive. Of the eighty-eight deputies, official Fatah candidates took fifty seats, but altogether "71 (including 'Imad al-Faluji) are affiliated with Fatah in one way or another—either full-fledged Fatah members, supporters of Fatah, or backed by Fatah in the elections."¹²⁸ From within the formal Fatah structure, eighteen members of the original revolutionary council won seats, six of them members of the central committee. Eight more Fatah legislators were duly appointed to the revolutionary council. From the two higher committees, fourteen cadres took up seats beside them; Barghuthi was already a member of the revolutionary council, and six of his colleagues were among those added to it. Thus was the leadership's ruling coalition of returnee bureaucrats and security personnel, notable families, and big bourgeoisie joined by a substantial bloc of the intifada generation. Table 11 illustrates the election results by party, Table 12 the breakdown of Fatah cadres in the Legislative Council.

The Legislative Council

A Legislative Council dominated by a fissiparous Fatah movement had been established: the question was what would they do with it now that they had it? The Interim Agreement

Table 11 The Election Results

West Bank	Seats Fatah List Independent Other			
Bethlehem	4		4	
Hebron	10	8	2	
Jericho	1	1		
Jerusalem	7	4	3	
Jinin	6	5	1	
Nablus	8	4	4	
Qalqilya	2	1	1	
Ramallah	7	2	4 1 (FIDA)	
Salfit	1	1		
Tubas	1		1	
Tulkarm	4	3	1	
<i>West Bank Totals</i>	51	29	21 1	
The Gaza Strip	Seats	Fatah List	Independent	Other
Dayr al-Balah	5	3		2
Gaza City	12	5		6
Khan Yunis	8	5		3
Northern Gaza (Jabalya)	7	4		3 1 (NDC)
Rafah	5	4		1
<i>Gaza Totals</i>	37	21		15 1
<i>Palestine Totals</i>	88	50		36 2

Table 12 Fatah Cadres in the Legislative Council

Constituency	Name	Position in Fatah
THE WEST BANK		
Bethlehem	Salah al-Ta‘mari	RC*
Hebron	‘Abbas Zaki	CC
	Nabil ‘Amr	RC
	Rafiq al-Natsha	RC
	Jamal al-Shubaki	HC & RC*
	Muhammad al-Hurani	HC
	Musa Abu Subhi	HC
Jericho	Sa‘ib ‘Urayqat	RC*
Jerusalem	Ahmad Qray‘	CC
	Hatim ‘Abd al-Qadir	HC & RC*
Jinin	‘Azzam al-Ahmad	RC
	Burhan Jarar	RC
	Hikmat Zayd	RC
Nablus	Fayiz Zaydan	RC
	Kamal Afghani	HC
	Dalal Salama	HC
Qalqilya	Mahmud Da‘as	RC
Ramallah	Marwan al-Barghuthi	HC & RC
	Qaddura Paris	HC
	‘Abd al-Fatah Hamayil	HC
Salfit	Ahmad al-Dik	HC & RC*
Tulkarm	al-Tayyib ‘Abd al-Rahim	CC
	Hakam Bal‘awi	CC
Constituency	Name	Position in Fatah
THE GAZA STRIP		
Dayr al-Balah	Jamila Say dam	RC
Gaza City	Intisar al-Wazir	CC
	Fakhri Shaqqura	RC
	Nahid al-Rayyis	RC*
Khan Yunis	Nabil Sha‘th	CC
	Ahmad ‘Abd al-Fatah Nasir	HC
Northern Gaza	‘Abd al-Rahman Hamad	HC & RC*
	Hisham ‘Abd al-Raziq	HC & RC*
Rafah	Rawhi Fattuh	RC
	‘Abd al-‘Aziz Shahin	RC

Key for Tables 12 and 13 in chapter 6: CC=central committee; HC=higher committees; RC=revolutionary council; RC*=revolutionary council appointee.

originally stipulated that the Council be elected for a term not exceeding five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement on May 4, 1994; holding its inaugural session in Gaza on March 21, 1996, the new legislature had a mandate of just over three years in

which to make its mark. Reviewing the Council's performance since then, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it proved a real disappointment: despite the high election turnout and popular expectations, polls documented a swift fall in the public's estimation of the body.¹²⁹ This poor performance was in part attributable to reasons beyond the PA's control, in part due to internal Palestinian politics. *Palestine Report's* Amal Hasan assessed the Council one year on from its inauguration and identified two major obstacles that remained true for the some time to come: the restrictions inherent to the Oslo framework and PA president Yasir Arafat.¹³⁰

The terms of the Oslo framework placed severe restrictions on the legislature's authority over important areas of national life: Oslo specifically denied the Council authority to legislate on any of the issues reserved for the final status talks, keeping them the sole preserve of negotiations between the Israeli government and the PLO. This left the Council with no authority to legislate on issues including Jerusalem, Israeli settlements, borders, foreign policy, and refugees, all of which remain defining issues in Palestinian national life. In the seven years between the signing of the DoP and the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada, the PLO made little progress on borders and refugees and oversaw a sharp deterioration in the status of Jerusalem and settlements; Israel launched a massive building campaign in East Jerusalem that mutilated parts of the city beyond recognition, accompanied by an accelerated colonization drive in the rest of the West Bank. Both developments impacted Palestinian daily life to wholly negative effect, with an emasculated Council offering little in the way of resistance. Article XI of the Interim Agreement specified that in Area C the Council would have "civil powers not related to territory," denying it the powers to plan or build. At the maximum extent of its territorial reach from March to September 2000, Area A constituted 18.2 percent of the West Bank, Area B, 21.8 percent. The Council's capacity to legislate for the land and the PA's capacity to plan or build were thus restricted to a maximum 40 percent of the West Bank, with the overlapping remits of the IDF, the Civil Administration, and settlement local governments running the 60 percent that remained. (See maps 1, 2, and 3.) In the Gaza Strip, Israel retained full control of 40 percent from the Gaza-Jericho Agreement onward and never revised it, leaving 60 percent divided by settlements and bypass roads and mired in poverty for the Council. Unable to pass legislation on key issues and barred from legislating for much of the Palestinian territories, the Council was restricted to verbiage. Hasan noted,

The Council has...passed hundreds of resolutions that can more accurately be characterised as political statements, e.g., condemnation of the closure and collective punishment by Israel; of settlement expansion, land confiscation, building of bypass roads, and home demolitions; of failure to release political prisoners and in particular female prisoners.¹³¹

But political statements were no substitute for legislation carried through by an executive at the head of an empowered bureaucracy. Equally, any legislation that it could pass had to be submitted to the Israeli side of the legislative subcommittee before becoming law, further subordinating Palestinian semi-autonomy to the colonial power.¹³² Powerless to legislate much at all or to implement the legislation and resolutions that it could pass, the

Council quickly lost credibility. Deprived of effective procedural mechanisms for redress, it is not surprising that Palestinians eventually returned to non-procedural means instead.

Council members were often powerless to even attend meetings: Israel's ongoing control, externally over land borders and internally through the extensive network of bypass roads, roadblocks, and checkpoints that facilitate closure, allowed the IDF to hinder and even detain Council members at will. Hasan reported,

In April, as six Gaza members were returning home from a session in Ramallah, they were detained by Israeli authorities and accused of transporting Palestinian students from Gaza to the West Bank. In another case, 22 members traveling from Gaza to Nablus were detained for two hours before Israeli officers arrived at the scene to check their briefcases...¹³³

It was not an isolated incident; from spring 1997, the Council was repeatedly unable to establish a quorum due to the IDF's refusal to allow Council members freedom of movement. Members from Gaza were denied permission to cross the Erez checkpoint by IDF soldiers, keeping them from meetings in the West Bank.¹³⁴ This obviously detracted from the work of the Council and it greatly undermined the credibility of Palestine's elected representatives. To help negotiate the labyrinth of roadblocks and checkpoints, Council members were issued with VIP passports by the PA and VIP identity cards by the Civil Administration. At times of tension (which was most of the time), military orders could render the cards useless at the stroke of an Israeli pen, and from the very start of the second intifada no VIP ID cards were renewed at all. Instead, legislators were left to negotiate, via the PA's Administration of Civil Affairs under Tarifi, for individual permission from the Civil Administration, headquartered in the settlement of Beit El on the edge of Ramallah. If permission was granted, the Civil Administration would telephone the checkpoints in question with the vehicle registration number and other details instructing the IDF to allow it to pass for a short, specific window of time. Under these conditions, the Legislative Council could find itself paralyzed as a collective body at any time and for prolonged periods.

Largely defunct as a legislative body, the Council sometimes served as a lightning rod for popular protest. Barred from the Israeli labor market by closure, Gazan workers have petitioned the Council in angry demonstrations that encapsulate the misery of the common people and the powerlessness of their representative institution. In October 2001, tensions became violent in a way not seen for seven years with the Council the focal point. As the first retaliatory strikes rained down on Kabul, Usama bin Ladin released a dramatic statement that caught the attention of the Palestinian street: "I swear by the Almighty God who has raised the skies without pillars, America and those who live in it shall not dream of security until security is a daily fact of life in Palestine..."¹³⁵ Hearing an echo of Saddam Husayn's face-saving attempt at linkage, it drew a warm response from a Palestinian street sick to death of colonial domination. The PA responded with evident distress, rightly wary of being placed on the wrong side of the good against evil "War against Terror" dichotomy. The call prompted a rally of thousands at Gaza's Islamic University, which then marched on the Legislative Council; the demonstration became violent, three protestors were killed by PA police and many

were wounded, after which riots spread quickly across the Strip targeting PA institutions. Interfactual dialogue was quickly expedited to heal the rift.¹³⁶

Unable to effect much in the way of legislation or to direct executive action, the work of the Council's committees, housed in its offices in Gaza City and Ramallah, continue at reduced capacity throughout the uprising. Eleven committees were established in all, illustrated in Table 13.¹³⁷ Fatah central committee and revolutionary council members chaired four of them.

The Land and Settlement Confrontation Committee is of particular interest because, apart from the activities of Force 17, it constitutes the limits of the PA's institutional response to the accelerated colonization project to which it had attached itself. The committee was handed to independent-minded Fatah returnee Salah al-Ta'mari; genuinely popular and no great supporter of

Table 13 Legislative Council Committees and Committee Chairs, 2002

Committee	Chair	Affiliation
Budget and Financial Affairs	Da'ud al-Zir	Independent
Economic Committee	Jamal al-Shubaki	Fatah RC*
Education and Social Affairs	'Abbas Zaki	Fatah CC
Council Affairs Committee	Ahmad Qray'	Fatah CC
Human Rights	Qaddura Fans	Fatah
Interior	Fakhri Shaqura	Fatah
Jerusalem	Ahmad al-Zughayr	Independent (Fatah)
Land and Settlement Confrontation Committee	Salah al-Ta'mari	Fatah RC*
Legal	'Abd al-Karim Abu Salah	Independent
Political	Ziyad Abu 'Amr	Independent
Refugee Affairs	Jamal Hindi	Fatah

* Revolutionary council appointee.

Arafat's, he was rewarded with the rough equivalent of the Northern Ireland office in British politics, but with less prospect of success.

Ta'mari was tasked with confronting the colossal institutional complex and limitless resources committed to propelling the Zionist colonization campaign forward. He was joined by the PARC, a relatively well-established and well-resourced NGO run by the PPP, and lesser NGOs also in the agricultural field. On one occasion he was host to British foreign secretary Robin Cook atop Jabal Abu Ghanyim, site of a new and expanding settlement on the outskirts of Bethlehem.¹³⁸ But the machinery supporting the Palestinian land defense committees was no match for the well-coordinated machinery of settlement confronting them. Ta'mari could not conceal his frustration:

I think we surprised even ourselves with our bad performance. My own sense of frustration does not stem from Israeli practices and policies but from the behaviour of the Palestinian side. Most of the problems I face

don't deal with how to confront settlement expansion but how to deal with the various Palestinian ministries involved.

Our level of performance at the base level is very poor. A minister may comprehend the importance of an issue. But when it comes to implementation, the matter may rest in the hands of an engineer who neither has the vision nor the awareness of the urgency of the matter. If you go to a settlement you'll find it is the elite who live there. On the other side, you have a Palestinian villager whose only weapon is that he is holding on to the land. How can we expect him to confront the sophistication of a settlement when he doesn't even have electricity?¹³⁹

Ta'mari's experience was a common one, emblematic of Arafat's personalization of power through patronage and the systematic demobilization it enabled. One of the architect's of PA reform, Khalil al-Shiqaqi, pointed to three main problems in the PA: "the near absence of political accountability; the lack of clear definition of prerogatives and responsibilities, which results in poor performance; and the weak participation of civil society."¹⁴⁰ All of these failings were nowhere more obvious, or the consequences more disastrous, than in the PA's inability to confront Israel's colonization campaign.

As we saw in chapter 5, during three decades plus at the helm of the PLO, Chairman Arafat had little reason to acquaint himself with good governance, transparency, and accountability, let alone an effective separation of powers. This was natural enough for a revolutionary movement in exile, but it did not sit well with Palestinian civil society and it served the Legislative Council as a body very badly indeed. 'Azmi Shu'aybi regretted the legislature's subordination to the executive:

We continue to work on legislation, but in no way do we constitute a counter-weight to the executive. We are forced to deal with the executive as individuals, not as the legislative branch. We have failed in our efforts to make reforms—we don't even know how to implement our own decisions. The weakness of the legislative branch, too, is a consequence of the absence of the rule of law.¹⁴¹

From the immediate run-up to the elections, Arafat improvised joint meetings of the PA cabinet and the PLO executive committee, emptying the cabinet of any independent political power and detracting from the authority of the Legislative Council it was later partially drawn from. Shu'aybi recalled the objections of Hanan 'Ashrawi and Arafat's response: "'Whoever has a problem in his or her ministry should come see me about it. Why should we discuss these things with everyone and meet as a cabinet?' What this boiled down to was eliminating the cabinet as an institution." The results as summarized by Shu'aybi were those felt by Ta'mari in his lop-sided battle with the settlements: "the absence of collective decision making, integrated planning, and the adoption of general policy lines."¹⁴² It was reminiscent of the scenario confronting the security apparatus at the outset of the second intifada.

This sorry state of affairs prompted Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi to resign his seat in October 1997 "because the council neglected and violated its responsibility as a legislating body and indirectly conceded that responsibility to Arafat."¹⁴³ The Council also suffered from a

lack of media coverage because, it was charged, of Arafat's determination to monopolize it himself. Under closure, there would be little legislative activity to cover in any case.¹⁴⁴

The Legislative Council was indeed subordinate to the executive, but it was not quite the typical Arab rubber stamp. The inaugural session saw Arafat attempt to make all Council members "take their oath of office before [him] alone." Members refused and insisted "on being sworn in in the presence of their colleagues."¹⁴⁵ An altogether more serious row erupted over the Council's refusal to adopt a draft Basic Law presented by Arafat. As Council Speaker Ahmad Qray' attempted to hold a debate on the issue,

He was repeatedly interrupted by Arafat, who insisted that the [Council] should be discussing a draft...submitted by the PLO Executive Committee... When the Council continued with the discussion, Arafat stormed out of the room...¹⁴⁶

Arafat's petulance prompted Qray' to temporarily resign in the first instance, and thereafter adopt a more cautious approach to confrontations with the PA president, experience that would serve him well as prime minister.¹⁴⁷ Qray' was succeeded as speaker by Rafiq al-Natsha, a member of the revolutionary council from Hebron, and later by Rawhi Fattuh, a revolutionary council member from Rafah.¹⁴⁸ Following Fattuh's elevation to interim president in the wake of Arafat's death, Hasan Khurayshi would then temporarily take over as speaker. The Basic Law was eventually steered through the Council in October 1997. The legislature's standing orders then required that the president sign it into law within thirty days. A source of ongoing tension with the executive, it was finally promulgated by Arafat four and a half years later in May 2003.¹⁴⁹ Its provisions would come back to haunt him on more than one occasion.

For the first five months of the second intifada, the Council found itself unable to convene at all, finally meeting in March 2001 to hear Arafat call upon Israel for an immediate resumption of negotiations.¹⁵⁰ It continued to meet infrequently, two of the occasions of note for their institutional consequences, the first in September 2002, the second in March 2003. On both occasions Arafat failed to get his own way. In the first instance the Council threatened to withhold a vote of confidence in the June cabinet, a spirited act of defiance. And it was a threat with some teeth, given that Article 64 of the Basic Law left final approval of new cabinet appointments with the legislature.¹⁵¹ It was also interesting for coming at a moment when the Sharon government insisted on laying responsibility for everything in the occupied territories on Arafat's head: it seemed that the ultimate terrorist mastermind was too busy masterminding terrorism to persuade his own legislature to ratify five new members of his would-be cabinet.¹⁵² An amended line-up eventually passed in late October by fifty-six votes to eighteen; many deputies voting in favor were unenthusiastic, but in the context of a renewed siege on the *muqata'* there were fears that another rejection would appear as local endorsement of U.S.-Israeli plans to remove Arafat altogether. 'Abd al-Shafi took heart from the display: "I consider it a good sign, and I hope it is an indication that the PLC has finally decided to attend to the responsibilities that it has neglected so far."¹⁵³ Husam Khadr was unimpressed by the outcome: "There is no genuine intention to rebuild national institutions on a democratic or even nationalist basis."¹⁵⁴ The Council then took a decision of landmark proportions for Palestinian institutional politics on March 10 of the following year when it agreed to

the creation of the post of prime minister. The measure passed by a two-thirds majority vote of sixty-four to three, with four abstentions among the eighty-four members then participating (down from eighty-eight due to deaths and 'Abd al-Shafi's resignation). Draft amendments stipulating the main prerogatives of office were prepared by the legislature's legal committee and passed to the president. Article 57.1 gave him thirty days to sign or send it back.¹⁵⁵ Not surprisingly Arafat chose the latter path, requesting that the prime minister be obliged to submit his proposed executive authority for presidential approval, that other ministerial appointments require presidential approval, and that the president be allowed to appoint two deputy prime ministers.¹⁵⁶ The president's amended amendments required a similar two-thirds majority vote to become law, and although a majority supported him forty-nine to twenty-two, it was not enough and he dropped the proposals.¹⁵⁷ The post of prime minister was duly created in line with the legal committee's original recommendations on March 18 by more than the two-thirds majority required by Article 57.2 (sixty-nine to one with two abstentions),¹⁵⁸ and the 'Abbas nomination passed by a simple majority. He formally accepted the following day. Much wrangling and a threat of resignation would then ensue before the new cabinet line-up sought and received legislative approval by a simple majority on April 29, 2003.¹⁵⁹ Thus did Mahmud 'Abbas briefly become the new Palestinian prime minister. He was the first person to hold that title since the Arab Higher Committee appointed Ahmad Hilmi 'Abd al-Baqi head of the All Palestine Government back in 1948.¹⁶⁰

In line with a PLO central council decision earlier in the week, the PLO retained responsibility for negotiations with Israel; 'Abbas was the organization's general secretary and head of the PLO's Negotiations Affairs Department, but Arafat would continue to lead executive committee meetings as chairman.¹⁶¹ The council's decision opened the way for publication of the Roadmap the following month and the possibility, however improbable, of a new political horizon. If the parties to the Roadmap were ever to make it beyond Phase I, fresh (if late) elections marked the starting point for Phase II:

Phase II starts after Palestinian elections and ends with possible creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders in 2003. Its primary goals are continued comprehensive security performance and effective security cooperation, continued normalization of Palestinian life and institution-building...ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders.¹⁶²

There is an additional provision for another poll after that: "Further elections, if required, should follow approval of the new constitution."

Fatah: Liberation Movement or Party of State?

In the Legislative Council, official Fatah representatives took up seats next to Fatah independents that had run in the face of explicit instructions from the central committee

not to do so. In 'Ali Jarbawi's view, the success of many independent Fatah candidates would prove a mixed blessing:

The fact that a number of Fatah members ran against the movement's official list, ignoring the party leadership's call to pull out of the race, proves that Fatah's electoral success came at the expense of its coherence. Indeed, the elections saw the final division of the movement into different centers of power.¹⁶³

On the matter of coherence Sari Nusayba took a slightly different view: "I'm not sure it was ever really coherent in the first place."¹⁶⁴ Both make a good point: the primaries and then the legislative elections revealed the extent to which formal structures on the outside and the *tanzim* on the inside were only ever loosely connected, with the *tanzim* itself made up of geographically distinct local units that did not necessarily have much to do with each other, at least before Oslo. The construction of an electoral coalition behind the PLO's national project incorporated different aspects of Fatah into the Legislative Council, and in so doing it shed light on the complex divisions already pertaining within the movement. But it is also true that the process of coalition formation only added to the movement's heterogeneity. The point is alluded to by Fatah's proper name: *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini*, the Palestinian National Liberation *Movement*, an apt title underscored by its traditional role as a national front within the broader national front of the PLO. In Fatah's potentially unruly governing bloc there were vast class divisions encompassing refugee camp activists, wealthy businessmen, and everything else in between—generational divides, divides in political culture, and ideological heterogeneity aplenty. This suggested that a looser structure, focused and united on a broad nationalist agenda, stood a much better chance of remaining intact. In the Legislative Council, Fatah's blocs could generally be relied upon to vote with the executive, at least in sufficient numbers to carry the day, but the Fatah legislators were neither of one mind nor wholly reliable.

Looking to the future, Jarbawi predicted that "Fatah will be able to retain its political effectiveness and power in the future if it is able to transform itself into a political party, with a clear organizational structure and political program."¹⁶⁵ But given the fractures inside the movement that the elections had revealed, it seemed that any *immediate* tightening-up could lead to its division. Marwan al-Barghuthi agreed that the Oslo era would eventually require Fatah to step beyond its loose structure and evolve into a fully fledged political party, addressing more prosaic issues such as economic and social legislation. But this ran the risk of division. For Barghuthi, the first task was to maintain the unity of the movement in order to meet the unfulfilled challenges of the nationalist agenda. Thereafter, when Oslo had unfolded as he then hoped it would, the need for parties could no longer be avoided and the movement might well divide. He explained this quite clearly shortly after the legislative elections:

The main idea is the...unity of the movement, established historically on the idea of unity against the enemy, the occupation. But now we started to be something like a new entity, something like a state, we started to deal

with the administration of education, healthcare, ministries, the economic situation.

You know there were always conflicts in the movement; how to administer it, how to develop it...and till now we kept our unity of our movement. But in the future, I don't know. How will the members deal with issues in the Council? Will they be one bloc or not? I doubt if Fatah members will be one bloc, maybe they will divide into two or three groups.

We have to keep our unity till the establishment of the Palestinian state. If you are going to be a party, there will be many parties.

We are united here in the Fatah movement till now on the national issue, but if we...decide on the social or economic situation, of course there will be some differences between us.¹⁶⁶

The question of institutional coherence remained central for Fatah during the Oslo period and beyond. In the final section of this chapter, we examine the steps taken to try and unify the internal and external wings of the movement and which could also be seen as a basis for building the organizationally coherent party. The driving force behind the initiative was Barghuthi, leading from the front at the West Bank higher committee, striving to democratize and reform Fatah from within, and from there to democratize and reform the PA. The key was convening Fatah's sixth general conference, which could renew the blood of the movement, unify the *tanzim* with returnee structures, and bring organizational coherence to the Fatah movement. The means chosen to achieve this, elections at the grass roots level inside Fatah across the West Bank and Gaza Strip, would promote an open and democratic political culture among Fatah's cadres and advance the transition from liberation movement toward conventional political party.

The Higher Committees: Elections for the Aqalim

Drawing on their experience in the primaries and the legislative elections, the higher committees planned a series of polls inside the movement, starting with the *mawqa'* through to the *mantiqa* and culminating in a series of founding conferences (*mu'tamar ta'sisi*) for leadership committees (*lajnat qiyadiyya*) for each region (*iqlim*). There are thirteen *iqlim* in the West Bank, and five in the Gaza Strip.¹⁶⁷ From late 1997 up to the summer of 2000, the pages of the Palestinian press were replete with news of elections inside the movement, attesting to the scale of the activity. Polls were intended for each and every *iqlim*, as well as the range of public institutions in which Fatah had a presence, such as municipal institutions, universities, hospitals, and popular organizations. It was a dynamic, popular, and ongoing process that gathered considerable momentum, especially in the West Bank.¹⁶⁸

Qaddura Paris explained the initiative's four main goals: to pressure the central committee to convene the sixth general conference; to prepare the higher committees for the conference in case the central committee called it at short notice; to bestow democratic legitimacy on cadres elected at *iqlim* level in support of their case for inclusion in the general conference; and, more broadly, to socialize the people "yata'awud al-nas" into the norms of democracy, such as voting freely and fairly and

accepting an unfavorable result. Paris pointed to elections in Fatah's Shabiba youth wing, which sent two similar messages from the younger generation: "One, we can organise ourselves well and have legitimacy as result of this process; two, we choose a democratic system in Palestine."¹⁶⁹

The elections required something of a sea change in Fatah's political culture, which was not so easy to bring about. Prior to Oslo, membership of Fatah had been enough to earn someone several years in an Israeli prison, and before long it could again. Under occupation the *tanzim* organized on a cell basis (*khaliyya*) with a "thread connection" (*khayti*), one cadre in each cell connecting them to one cadre in another. The shift from this type of clandestine organization to open political work and then democratic elections required careful explanation before it gained acceptance among people used to something very different.¹⁷⁰ It also prompted a change in Fatah's membership profile, a mixed blessing in the view of some of the *tanzim* veterans. On the one hand, open political work drew many new members and the previous emphasis on "quality over quantity" was partly lost; the new generation did not have the same experience and inevitably included the odd collaborator. On the other hand, working in public did allow for greater participation by women, traditional families accepting more readily open and peaceable political activities.¹⁷¹

A prerequisite for elections in the *iqlim* was establishing an authoritative membership register. Dalai Salama emphasized the difficulty of the task:

It took a long time to establish the membership, to get it confirmed or not. It was a very long process before we reached a final membership number, and it is supposed that you have passed a long process. Once you get the form, the ID, you have the right to vote.

This contrasted sharply with the much more improvised poll for the earlier primaries:

We held primaries once. In each constituency Yasir Arafat nominated a supervisory committee to help of four or five members of the central committee and the revolutionary council. Local conferences were held to establish participation, and the names then presented to the supervisory committee. But when we tried to write the names, it wasn't that confirmed, that decisive, we just trusted each other. 'Ok, you are the leaders in Balata, you can nominate fifty people to participate; you are from Bayt Furiq and you can choose fifty-five. So, we gave the leaders of Fatah in Bayt Furiq the right to bring the names themselves, it was a very quick procedure and much closer to being correct. It didn't give anyone the chance to play games.

A debate took place within Fatah about whether the long process of membership registration was really the best way to proceed, some concluding that the smaller, more improvised conferences better reflected the real backbone of the movement: "Anyway, it was an experience. It has a positive impact, but also a negative impact." Whenever elections are next held inside Fatah, the registers can be expected to change again, perhaps to contract: "The elected *iqlim* now has a main duty, again, to look to the criteria

of the membership for the next conference.”¹⁷² Imad Ghayza estimated Fatah’s membership had tripled or quadrupled since the DoP and shared Salama’s sentiments:

Remember, Fatah is not a party, it’s a national liberation movement, it was established for this and it still is. Most of the Fatah people who joined after 1993 think that this political issue, the PA, is a cake and they must have a piece of it. And Fatah is the way to get a piece of the cake.¹⁷³

Over at PECDAR, Muhammad Shtayya maintained a close eye on Barghuthi’s election initiative: “This came from the fact that there is a huge generation gap within the Palestinian movement and society.” In the preOslo days the West Bank and Gaza built their own leadership, “then the structure from Tunis lands on the local structure and people realised that there is a distance, in understanding, in generations.”¹⁷⁴ From the perspective of ‘Adnan Samara: “The higher committee was the central committee in the West Bank and Gaza. Then, when the rest of Fatah came back they were *part* of the leadership, and some were not happy.”¹⁷⁵ All could agree that with no general conference since 1989, there had been a lack of “blood renewal”¹⁷⁶ in Fatah, and it was this that Barghuthi sought to redress. Elections at *mawqa’* and *mantiqa* levels began in 1997, culminating in elections to the *iqlim* between late 1998 and the summer of 2000. The process began in Salfit, which was no coincidence: “Do it in remote areas so that gradually you put pressure on the central figures and push for general elections, the general conference inside Fatah.”¹⁷⁷

Salah Zuhayqa, general secretary of the East Jerusalem *iqlim*, gave the elections an interesting provenance: In happier days the central committee had been keen to make a good-will gesture toward the Israeli government, and Barghuthi’s grass roots elections could be harnessed to that end. The Basic Law put responsibility for this type of work in the hands of the Bureau of Mobilization and Organization in the Homeland (*Maktab al-Ta’bi’a wa al-Tanzim fi al-Watan*), newly arrived from Tunis and headed at that time by Hakam Bal’awi, and subsequently by Hani al-Hasan. Bal’awi took Barghuthi’s initiative forward to demonstrate what Zuhayqa called “glasnost inside Fatah. The idea is to move Fatah from a movement to a party, to make a step toward shifting to a party. This is why we had the election under the sun [in the open].”¹⁷⁸ In Jerusalem, Zuhayqa was one of sixty-two candidates contesting seventeen seats, the number set for each leadership committee. Just over two thousand registered members representing thirty-six *mawqa’* took part, all of them local Palestinians according to Zuhayqa, none of them returnees. Voters came from the old city, East Jerusalem suburbs, outlying villages, and the refugee camps in Shu’fat and Qalandya. The Jerusalem *iqlim* was the first to be held in November 1998, with candidates chosen purely on the basis of popularity rather than political programs; had the normalization process been allowed to mature, political-ideological competition might have been the next step. Arafat himself presided over the opening ceremony. It was held in Ramallah’s Casablanca Hall because some delegates lacked the blue identity cards necessary to cross the IDF checkpoints encircling East Jerusalem, “so we moved it to Ramallah for better media and public participation.” Jihad Abu Znayd from Shu’fat refugee camp came first in the poll, one of three women elected to the Jerusalem leadership committee.¹⁷⁹

Elections were held in four more *iqlim* in the West Bank: Central Hebron, Northern Hebron, Ramallah, and Nablus. The next poll took place in Central Hebron in mid-December 1998; of a registered membership of almost seven hundred, over six hundred turned out to choose another seventeen member committee from fifty-nine candidates. Supervised by a panel of four senior Fatah figures from the Legislative Council and the higher committee, winners included three representatives of families regularly seen at cabinet level, Samur al-Natsha and Fahd and Ayman al-Qawasmi.¹⁸⁰ Northern Hebron followed close behind in February 1999; elections over two days again chose a seventeen-member committee, almost two thousand voters choosing from fifty-two candidates. Prominent family names among the winners included Muhammad Shubaki, and Kayd and Anwar Jaradat. Barghuthi as chairman of the Conference Supervision Committee (*Ra'is Lajnat al-Ashraf 'ala al-Mu'tamarat al-Harakiyya*) hailed them as "the first democratic experience for Fatah at the *iqlim* level in the Hebron governorate."¹⁸¹ Fatah secretary in Central Hebron, Ziyad al-Rajub, explained that in Southern Hebron the process got underway with elections in fourteen *mawqa'* during 2000, but then stalled due to the deteriorating political and security situation vis-à-vis Israel.¹⁸²

Ramallah followed close behind in March 1999, convening in the al-Watani Hotel.¹⁸³ The opening ceremony was again presided over by Arafat, with members of the central committee and revolutionary council supervising the poll. UNRWA's May Kayla and Haytham Arrar from the Governor's Office attended; two of some five thousand delegates they estimated took part. Delegates chose the standard seventeen-member leadership committee from sixty-seven candidates, seven of them women, one successful. 'Imad Ghayaza put the original Ramallah *iqlim* at two or three thousand, later inflated on Arafat's initiative. Delegates included members from several camps, including 350 from Jalazun and many others from al-Am'ari, Dayr 'Ammar, Bir Zeit, Qaddura, and Ramallah camp. Ghayaza estimated 40 percent of the Ramallah *iqlim* were refugees, but only 10 percent resident in camps, roughly the same proportion as Ramallah's migrant Hebronite community. On the leadership committee, Jalazun was represented by 'Imad Safi, al-Am'ari by Jihad Tumliyya, and the Hebronites by Abu 'Ali 'Imtur. Portending challenges to come, Husayn al-Shaykh came first in the poll. The new *iqlim* leadership met shortly afterward at the higher committee offices to choose Muhammad Mansur as general secretary and Husayn al-Shaykh as deputy.¹⁸⁴

The last pre-intifada elections were held in Nablus in June 2000. The poll completed a two-year-long process in the area that began with the *mawqa'* in 1998 and saw twenty-four elections held among a reported 32,000 members of the Nablus *iqlim*.¹⁸⁵ Four and a half thousand delegates from just under six thousand registered voters met over two days to vote in the playground of the Martyr Kamal Junblat Girl's High School. This time they choose a twenty-one member committee, each voter entitled to twenty-one votes consistent with the Legislative Council's multiple non-transferable vote system.¹⁸⁶ The poll was overseen by members of the revolutionary council and central committee, among them Hakam Bal'awi, Amin Maqbul, and Nablus governor Mahmud al-'Alul. Dalai Salama explained why the committee membership was higher in Nablus: "We, the leaders of Fatah in Nablus have worked very hard with President Arafat to establish a quota for women. He agreed to give us four."¹⁸⁷ And so the original provision for seventeen increased to twenty-one thanks to effective feminist lobbying. The results when they came in were not unproblematic; according to Salama, "lobbying and groups

influenced the results and no one from the refugee camps was elected. So the central committee took the decision to add four so the final result was a committee of twenty-five.”¹⁸⁸ The solution was to include those placed twenty-one to twenty-five on the committee, which accommodated two from the camps and had the additional advantage of adding an extra female cadre.

The onset of the polls had been hailed by Barghuthi as “a matter of pride for Fatah that underlined the necessity of following the democratic path in political and organizational work inside Fatah and beyond it in the Palestinian political organizations.”¹⁸⁹ It was a message he relayed again in the press as “positive and rooting the democratic path inside the movement.” But the message did not stop there. A Fatah movement democratized in its organizational work would serve as the means of reforming and strengthening the PA (*rafi’a li-tathbit al-Sulta al-Wataniyya*).¹⁹⁰ PECDAR’s Muhammad Shtayya recalled Barghuthi’s emphasis on PA reform, in particular for recruitment on the basis of qualification. In so doing “he was responding to a really widespread call from Fatah, civil society and some Legislative Council members.” The PECDAR chief accorded Barghuthi’s initiative tremendous significance: “If you reform Fatah you reform the Authority, and if you reform Fatah you also oblige other factions to reform to, with the radiation of it.”¹⁹¹

Qaddura Fans remained disappointed with the results because the *iqlim* initiative did not lead to a discussion of the movement’s internal issues; there was no sixth general conference or discussion of mechanisms of accountability. He also noted that Preventive Security and General Intelligence chiefs Rajub and Tirawi exerted considerable effort to try and influence the results “because they want a friendly address at the *tanzim* in the *iqlim*; if you want to succeed as security, you need the *tanzim* under your arm.”¹⁹² There were obvious advantages for the man who could present himself with the right credentials, the *’alaqa tanzimiyya* with Fatah’s grass roots.

Beyond the inherent merits of democratization and reform, Barghuthi’s agenda helped the higher committees to distance Fatah from the deteriorating image of the PA. Elections to the student council at Bir Zeit University have long been considered something of a political weather vane and one to which Arafat was known to pay attention.¹⁹³ Throughout the Oslo era, Fatah had not fared especially well, losing six out of eight elections between 1993 and 2000. Having dominated the student council for eight years pre-Oslo, Fatah’s Shabiba movement lost in 1993 to an uneasy coalition of Islamic and leftist groups. The Islamists (*Kutlat al-Islamiyya*) then won in their own right in 1994, before Fatah campaigning as the Jerusalem Bloc (*Kutlat al-Quds*) came back in 1995. Islamists won convincingly (twenty-three seats to seventeen) in 1996, before Fatah came back to win narrowly (twenty-two seats to twenty), and for the last time, in 1997. There were three reasons for this rare success, specific to the moment: first, Shabiba students from Bir Zeit had been foremost among the casualties during the tunnel intifada in September 1996, two killed in clashes with the IDF at Samir Amis near the Qalandya checkpoint; second, Shabiba had demonstrated against the PA in support of those arrested during the teachers’ strike; third, Shabiba’s election campaign deliberately distanced it from the PA: the group’s campaign slogan read, “We are with the Authority when it undertakes proper work and against it when it’s wrong.” (*nahnu ma’a al-sulta ’anduma taqawum bil-’aml al-sahih wa nahnu dudha ’anduma takhti.*) The combination delivered

Fatah a victory, but thereafter it lost three straight races until the second intifada prompted the suspension of student union elections altogether.¹⁹⁴

Internal Politics and the Struggle for the Sixth General Conference

The *iqlim* elections were probably the higher committees' finest moment: plans to establish effective subcommittees to draw up and implement Fatah policy did not come to fruition, while the end to the tentative normalization of Palestinian politics threw prospects for the sixth general conference into an uncertain future. Paris had been a leading advocate of committees, but found Barghuthi himself restrict them to discussions, and the policy work of the higher committees never did take off. In so doing Barghuthi may well have been responding to pressure from the central committee. Paris recalled how any signs of activity by the higher committees always prompted an immediate reaction from the Bureau of Mobilization and Organization:

When we are silent, they are silent. When we have a meeting, they call us to three meetings with the Bureau of Mobilization and Organization; nothing is ever decided, just talk. I remember one meeting with Arafat that lasted three hours; he spoke about the struggle in Afghanistan between the King Zahir Shah and Najibullah, about Honnecker, Gorbachev, anything except the higher committee. All [of these meetings are] without any results, without any decisions. I think that the Fatah movement is like a group sleeping in one room: when one wakes up, all of them wake up, when one goes to sleep, they all go to sleep.¹⁹⁵

The organizational, political, and cultural clash between the higher committee and Fatah's returnees took on a personal dimension as central committee members watched Barghuthi's office become the address for visiting diplomats. In the higher committee building one Fatah activist put it bluntly: "They hate him, believe me."

Barghuthi's struggle for the sixth general conference was shared by a number of allies on the revolutionary council, including returnees. According to Deputy General Secretary 'Adnan Samara, the revolutionary council originally wanted to hold the conference prior to the elections for the Legislative Council to lend greater legitimacy to Fatah candidates. They were not successful, but continued to push for a conference as soon as it could be expedited:

We are the dynamo pressing for the general conference. We have been pressing the central committee, but...[some are] not enthusiastic. In every meeting, even with the Bureau of Mobilization and Organization, in every meeting [with the central committee] we speak about the General Conference.

Samara considered it imperative to bring the younger generation into Fatah's upper echelons and warned that the current situation was "dangerous for the movement, very dangerous." He pointed to the minutes of the revolutionary council's seventeenth session in 1997 taken to that end:

I am not speaking theoretically. It is our decisions [from the seventeenth session]; we discussed it in the revolutionary council and the instrument is the decisions taken in 1997. This is a permanent structure until we have the sixth general conference.¹⁹⁶

Samara considered the seventeenth session the most important held in the decade between the signing of the DoP and publication of the Roadmap. The published proceedings of the meeting are interesting for their reformist tone and institutional provisions: they called for a clear separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of the PA; separate and independent meetings of the PA cabinet; the barring from ministerial office of those with business interests; and empowerment of an independent judiciary, all of which seem quite in tune with the higher committees' reformist agenda. They also contain a clear call to the Bureau of Organization and Mobilization to "prepare to convene the movement's general conference."¹⁹⁷ To underline the point Samara added that twenty-five members of the revolutionary council, including at least one member of the central committee and several prominent returnees, had recently appended their signatures to a written petition imploring Arafat and the central committee to hold the conference as soon as possible. The consequences if it were to be held were not lost on the silver-haired deputy general secretary: "Some of us will not be reelected...we must be changed. We [have been here] now fourteen years, it is impossible. I have been a revolutionary council member now for over forty years. It's crazy! All of us should go home."¹⁹⁸

Enthusiasm for the conference would have been welcome over at the higher committee, where all was not well for other reasons. For one thing, Paris suggested that the process of democratization underway in the *iqlim* should be extended to the higher committee itself, with the general secretary elected to office for a limited term of two years. This, according to Paris, had been accepted by Barghuthi who agreed to step down and allow Paris to take his place for a six-month transitional period. Before the deal could be acted upon, Barghuthi found himself in jail once again, and now all agreed it was appropriate for him to remain at the post (with director of communications and revolutionary council member Amin Maqbul acting as deputy).

Another problem soon arose from within the ranks. As *iqlim* elections approached in Nablus, a poll within the seventy members of the West Bank higher committee established the sadly misnamed "organizational committee" (*lajnat al-saha al-tanzimiyya*). It was composed as follows:¹⁹⁹

1. Husayn al-Shaykh (Ramallah)
2. Marwan al-Barghuthi (Ramallah)
3. Ahmad Huza' (Ramallah)
4. 'Isam Abu Bakr (Nablus)
5. Nayif Suwaytat
6. May Kayla (Ramallah)
7. Ahmad Lutfy (Ramallah)
8. Ahmad Ghnaym (Jerusalem)
9. Musa Abu Subhi (Hebron)
10. 'Isa Qaraqat' (Bethlehem)
11. Dalai Salama (Nablus)

The organization committee was not a success, members proving unable to organize a single meeting. Instead, a power struggle erupted, led by Ramallah *iqlim* winner Husayn al-Shaykh, who had topped Barghuthi again in the higher committee election by forty-four votes to thirty-two. Tired of playing second fiddle, Shaykh walked out to establish the *Marji'iyyat Fatah* (Fatah Authority), housed in new but rather quiet offices a couple of kilometers across town. It was a matter of purely personal political rivalry, with no ideological substance.

In so doing Shaykh could draw on two important assets: his solid nationalist credentials, which even skeptics acknowledged matched Barghuthi's, and the patronage of Yasir Arafat. A veteran of the first intifada with a decade in prison behind him, Shaykh had '*alaqa tanzimiyya* of his own in the *iqlim*, which extended well beyond supporters and fellow travelers in Ramallah. They included regional leaders like Diyab Sharabati in Hebron and Kamal Hmayd in Bethlehem. More important, Arafat and the president's office lined up behind Shaykh's initiative: The *Marji'iyya's* nominal staff was housed on two stories of a comfortable new office building, given the latest office equipment, and granted a place in the patronage network in their own right. In the wake of Operation Defensive Shield, Palestinians seeking official redress for vehicles flattened by the IDF could visit the *Marji'iyya* to process the paperwork that helped complete a claim.

If institutional multiplication supported by patronage suited Arafat, the general secretariat of the revolutionary council took a rather different view. Guardians of the organizational propriety of the movement, the council's program from the seventeenth session contained clear guidelines for resolving institutional dissonance. Consistent with happier days, the overall theme is of "participation in building the democratic Palestinian state on sound foundations" and fighting "the battle for construction and peace." On the question of institutional development, the section entitled "The Apparatus of Mobilization and Organization" contained detailed guidelines:

The formation of the Central Bureau of Mobilization and Organization to include the following:

The Bureau of Mobilization and Organization for the regions (*aqalim*) of the homeland

The Bureau of Mobilization and Organization for the regions abroad

The Bureau of Ideological Affairs and Studies

The Bureau of Popular and Professional Organizations uniting Shabiba and the Vanguard

The responsibilities with which the Bureau was charged include supervision of the *iqlim*, implementation of the political program, building up the Fatah membership, and holding local conferences; all very much the tasks that the higher committees had set for themselves. In the process of institutional development within Fatah, the future of the higher committees and the *Marji'iyya* could not be clearer:

The offices of the Bureau of Mobilization and Organization should undertake their tasks immediately upon formation and the higher committees in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, along with any other temporary committees working in that domain should be dissolved.²⁰⁰

Dalai Salama agreed with the program: “it will unify the financial and structural work and unify our reference.” The challenge was to get a solid body of insiders from the intifada generation into the Bureau’s structures.

Plans to incorporate the higher committees into the formal Fatah scheme laid out in the Basic Law provide one more illustration of the problematic politics of transition. Brought back to Palestine on Oslo’s constrictive terms, the returnee elite set about consolidating the authoritative leadership of the PA, systematically demobilizing society’s capacities to struggle independently, either against the new order or against an occupation growing ever more entrenched. Mechanisms of personal rule based on patronage precluded the rational development of coordinated and effective institutions, while the appropriation of society’s mobilizational capacity was ruled out by Oslo’s remit and dependence on external sources of support. In so doing, the returnee elite relinquished a major asset that might otherwise have been appropriated to empower the anti-colonial struggle in Palestine, a path not taken at considerable expense. For the Land and Settlement Confrontation Committee, Salah al-Ta‘mari could attest to the cost.

The creation of a socio-political foundation for the national project was attempted through cooption, demobilization, and the centralization of power in the apparatus of the PA, with the person of Arafat at the center of the web. Rather than harnessing the mobilizational capacities developed during the first intifada and leading resistance to colonization, the PA engineered social control through patronage. The expansion of the PA bureaucracy diminished the political salience of the NGO community—the heart of Palestinian civil society and a stronghold of the left—through centralizing the provision of services, redirecting resources away from the non-state sector, and widespread recruitment from the professional and technocratic middle class. This pointed to the evolution of a state-centric middle class comparable to other Arab regimes, accompanied by a small and state-dependent union bureaucracy. The partial co-option of the middle classes was accompanied by a political alliance cemented in the elite-driven manipulation of the electoral system—a clear example of institutional adaptation driven by elite agency to meet social-structural conditions. The constituency system for the legislature was intended to favor powerful families and wealthy individuals with regional patronage machineries that could be attached to the larger network. The failure of the Legislative Council to assert its independence is not surprising given the framework that delimited its scope and the context into which it was born: ongoing occupation, accelerated colonization, executive-led demobilization, and a patronage regime with a limited interest in constitutionality.

The battle for the primary elections, the presence of independent Fatah cadres in the Legislative Council, and the elections in the *iqlim* showed that the intifada generation could secure a substantial degree of representation in their own right and were determined to secure more, through reform of the movement and the transition toward political party. The key to an equitable distribution of power and responsibility in Fatah and beyond in the PA was the sixth general conference. The *iqlim* election project enjoyed considerable success in socializing the movement’s cadres and popularizing notions of democratization and institutional reform, first across the movement, and from it into the PA. The expansion of Fatah’s membership drew in a good many opportunists, but at the heart of the movement were the committed and principled *tanzim* cadres, supporting the Oslo process while striving for reform of the institutions it generated.

They were joined in this by the distinct forum and older generation of senior returnees in the revolutionary council, a significant proportion of whom shared similar sentiments if not backgrounds, and incorporated a limited number of higher committee cadres into their ranks. The affair of the Committee of Twenty signaled that senior Fatah cadres in the Legislative Council could join with civil society activists to share in a potentially inflammatory reformist agenda.

The tensions inherent to this complex arrangement were just about manageable as long as Oslo offered an acceptable political horizon, some forward momentum, and the prospect of meeting the just demands of the nationalist agenda. The key to socio-political stability were the Fatah *tanzim*: as long as the social milieu they reflected and the *tanzim* cadres themselves could see a future in Oslo and some prospect for reform in Fatah and the PA, stability could be maintained. But the opposite was equally true: if those same constituencies despaired of Oslo and withdrew support, a vacuum at the heart of the PA's arrangements would leave Oslo's political edifice highly vulnerable to collapse.

Oslo Implodes

Seven years after the signing of the DoP, the institutions of autonomy were still taking root; visibly shooting upward, beneath the surface they were struggling in shallow soil. Limited in terms of territory and autonomy, they were also short of legitimacy. The bureaucracy and security apparatus continued to recruit, co-opt, and coerce in order to broaden, deepen, and otherwise shore up the social foundations of a national project struggling to extend its reach and deliver results. Within the framework of transition negotiated by the PLO, devoid as it was of legal anchors, an implementation mechanism, or external leverage with teeth, all further expansion of PA territory, autonomy, indeed any forward momentum at all, required Israeli consent. That consent, in the sense that Israel had seized everything and could choose what, when, and how much of it to give back, was increasingly predicated on the PA's efficacy in policing its own people, still under occupation. The trilateral security model codified in Wye proved a tangible success, with the PA working in effective cooperation with the CIA and Shin Bet.¹ However, autonomy for the majority of Palestinians was colored by demands for elusive reform, visibly uneven economic development, accelerated land confiscation, and an unending wait for relatives and friends stuck in jails, most of them run by Israelis, some now by Palestinians. For refugees living in or outside of the camps, resolution appeared distant at best.

The political gains, self-confidence, and expectations generated by the first intifada had been harnessed through the Oslo framework by the PLO-Tunis and had drawn the nationalist elite back to Palestine. But such were the terms of transition, mediated through the personalization of politics and the use of patronage, that the nationalist elite proved quite incapable of capitalizing on the assets appropriated by it seven years earlier. For the majority in the West Bank and Gaza, and especially for residents of the refugee camps, grim realities post-Oslo rendered the PA an increasingly *unacceptable* national project. As the denouement of final status negotiations approached, the specter of rebellion rose to meet it.

Mustafa al-Barghuthi has defined the Oslo process as a seven-year truce, observed for the most part by the Palestinians, exploited for colonial gain by Israel.² The facts point beyond doubt to the veracity of this assessment. The Israeli colonization project pursued under cover of Oslo merits close attention for two reasons. First, the direction and resources of the institutional machinery driving settlement forward dwarfed the capacities of the PA and underline the extent to which the PLO's national project was rendered a politico-administrative modification of Zionist settler-colonialism in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Second, accelerated colonization, as indeed it has done in every other major revolt in Palestine since the advent of Zionism, so distorted Palestinian social, economic, and political development that it constitutes the single most important cause of the al-Aqsa intifada.

The institutional machinery of accelerated settlement encountered by the PA set the geographical parameters of Palestinian jurisdiction, delimited institutional capacities, greatly restricted the scope for economic development, and undermined the socio-political foundations upon which the PA might otherwise have propped itself up. The settlement enterprise—both literally and metaphorically—pulled the ground from under the PA's feet, while the PA leadership, Oslo remit in hand and tied into structures of colonial dependency that could be breached only at considerable risk, did little to stop it. Palestinian society watched as the prospective territory of the national project was divided by bypass roads, filled in with settlements, and periodically locked down by a sophisticated closure regime. Unready and unwilling to confront colonization and unable to deliver adequate development or progress on the nationalist agenda, the legitimacy of the PA and the Oslo framework that had delivered it were steadily corroded away.

Trapped in this nexus of failure, the mood of Palestinian society turned once again toward rebellion. To conceptualize and explain that mood, Ted Gurr's concept of relative deprivation is helpful. Gurr writes,

The necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative deprivation, defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably entitled. The referents of value capabilities are to be found largely in the social and physical environment: they are the conditions that determine people's perceived chances of getting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain.³

That a serious discrepancy applied between what the Palestinians thought they were entitled to on the basis of justice and international law, and what they were able to obtain within the Oslo framework, is clear. Moreover, Palestinian society has long been highly politicized, possessed of a sharp awareness of the legitimacy of its case and the depth of its violation. Among the more familiar UN resolutions are UNGA 181 and 194, UNSC 242 and 338, and UNSC 446 and 465. They address collectively the burning issues of the Palestinian nationalist agenda, Jerusalem and partition, refugees, occupation, and settlement. The other main legal instrument in the Palestinian arsenal, the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), forbids settlement and a slew of common practices arising from the settlement enterprise, including theft and destruction of property, home demolition, detention without trial (administrative detention), collective punishment, and extra-judicial killing. Valid technical arguments notwithstanding (all of the UNSC resolutions pertinent to Israel/Palestine were passed under chapter VI and constitute non-binding recommendations; none were passed under chapter VII authorizing action), the disparity between perceptions of justice and the experience of colonial reality formed a volatile environment.⁴ A culture and concept of nationhood forged by anti-colonial struggle, and a modest but determined residue of organized resistance embodied in the Fatah *tanzim* and the political opposition, made it more so.

The gaps between Palestinian aspirations and Oslo's results were ratcheted further apart on a daily basis by the accelerated colonization campaign that delimited the

physical context of Palestinian existence through increased Zionist control of land, resources, and movement. Empowered through a network of interlocking institutions, the motive forces propelling colonization forward formed a powerful bloc of vested interests not common to all of Israeli society: well-armed and well-heeled, they have benefited directly from occupation and settlement and stand to lose much from an end to either. It is this powerful machinery of colonization to which the PA found itself attached via Oslo, machinery that paradoxically constituted the institutional antithesis of an acceptable Palestinian national project, a project which by self-definition was confined to the pre-1967 borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Accelerated Zionist Colonization: A Population Moved In

The settlement-building record of consecutive post-DoP Israeli prime ministers does not reveal a significant divide between governments led by either Labor or Likud. It is true that Labor has historically leant more toward the collective farm in the Jordan Valley, and Likud toward the messianic pioneers at sites of alleged significance from biblical mythology in the central mountain range and elsewhere. But both parties have shared an agenda of cordoning off East Jerusalem from its Palestinian hinterland, bolstering the Jewish presence along the Arab side of the Green Line, and maintaining agricultural settlements and military bases along the western side of the Jordan Valley. Since the signing of the DoP, both parties have overseen the construction of a dense network of bypass roads connecting the settlements to each other and to Israel, separating and isolating Arab population centers and consolidating Israel's colonial grip on the occupied territories.

Five years after the 1967 war, Israel had settled 6,900 of its Jewish citizens in East Jerusalem but only 1,500 in the West Bank and Gaza. By 1992, this had reached 141,000 in East Jerusalem and 109,784 in the West Bank and Gaza. By the close of 2001, the number had risen sharply to 176,900 in and around Arab East Jerusalem and 213,672 in the West Bank and Gaza, the latter virtually double the population *in situ* prior to the "peace process."⁵ To accommodate them, 17,190 new housing units were started in the occupied territories between the signing of the DoP in 1993 and the Camp David summit in July 2000.⁶ The precise number of discrete settlements is subject to debate, but sources broadly agree. In 2002 the Foundation for Middle East Peace counted 11 in East Jerusalem, 130 in the West Bank (B'Tselem put the figure at 123) and 16 in Gaza (a map by Jan de Jong shows 18).⁷ Outside of East Jerusalem, as of 2000 the West Bank settlements were governed by 23 local authorities, of which 3 enjoyed municipal status: Ma'ale Adumim (population 24,900), between East Jerusalem and Jericho; Betar Illit (15,800), west of Bethlehem; and Ariel (15,600), between Nablus and Salfit. The remainder was divided into 6 regional councils (comprising 106 local committees) and 14 local councils. The largest regional councils were Mate Binyamin (27,200), which includes the Ramallah area, and Shomeron (17,400), centered between Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Nablus, and Salfit. The largest local council was Modi'in Illit (16,400) situated east of Ramallah, close to the Green Line.⁸ In the Gaza Strip, a total of less than 7,000 settlers reside in three areas: the large southern Katif bloc, the isolated settlements of

Netzarim and Kfar Darom in the heart of the Strip, and a northern bloc that includes the main crossing with Israel at Erez.

It does not take any great insight to recognize the destructive impact that Jewish colonization has had on the prospects for a peaceful, negotiated outcome to the conflict with the Palestinians, and this simple *vérité* has been long recognized at the highest levels of international policy making, even in the United States. Moreover, as the numbers for population growth and new housing units attest, the colonization drive only gained momentum as Oslo unfolded, and it did so consistently under Labor- and Likud-led governments, both of which have deployed state power to provide a range of incentives for colonists including income tax breaks, cheap mortgages, career promotions, and prioritized budget allocations for the settlement infrastructure.⁹

If the heterogeneous settler population as a whole has benefited from cross-party support, the messianic ideologues in the West Bank highlands, Hebron, and elsewhere have formed a privileged constituency for Likud, the party that single-mindedly generated and nurtured them as an electoral bulwark against Labor, and that has a great deal invested in their perpetuation. More recently, Likud played a key role in promoting the “hilltop youth,” mobilized at the behest of Ariel Sharon in the late 1990s and defiant on occasion of the official settler leadership. Protecting, supporting, and increasingly merging with the settlers is the IDF, among which long-term changes in the nature of its officer class, together with the redeployments initiated from the Gaza-Jericho Agreement onward, has drawn closer to the colonists physically, operationally, politically, and spiritually. The IDF also staffs the Civil Administration, the settlement-based bureaucratic machinery administering the occupation in which great power continues to inhere. Established in 1981 to give the occupation a facelift in light of the Camp David peace deal with Egypt,¹⁰ the Civil Administration functions in close cooperation with an array of government ministries and agencies to promote and defend occupation and settlement. Binding this web of colonial self-interest together are the contractors empowered by and profiteering from settlement infrastructure construction through government tenders and private contracts issued by the state and settlement local governments. This self-sustaining institutional network requires close attention because without it we cannot properly understand the course of the Oslo process, the al-Aqsa intifada, or the monumental if not insurmountable challenges facing Palestinian nationalism in the quest for viable statehood.

International Consensus against Settlement

International recognition of the illegitimate and politically destructive character of the settlements has been long established. In July 1977, as colonization first accelerated under Likud, U.S. president Jimmy Carter called for a settlement freeze and was promptly rebuffed by Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin.¹¹ In this respect, with the addition of the separation wall now slicing across the West Bank, little has changed since. In April 2001, the Mitchell Committee published its final report in which it cited a list of policy statements issued by U.S. officials opposed to settlement. The gist of those statements, and a few others beside, are worth reiterating.

Back in 1980, Carter’s secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, restated the U.S. policy line from 1967 onward, which had considered the settlements in violation of international

law, principally The Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907) and the Fourth Geneva Convention. Vance explicitly condemned settlement: “We consider it to be contrary to international law and an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process.”¹² President Reagan was more indulgent, reorienting U.S. policy with the assertion that settlements were not illegal. However, drumming up support for his own Middle East initiative in 1982, Reagan was forced to admit that they were unhelpful:

The immediate adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.¹³

The antagonism expressed by George H.W. Bush and his secretary of state toward settlements is also a matter of record. During his consultations prior to Madrid, Secretary of State James Baker remarked,

Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy. It’s the first thing that Arabs—Arab Governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the territories—whose situation is really quite desperate—the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don’t think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace.¹⁴

Bill Clinton, arguably the most pro-Israeli U.S. president in history, tacitly accepted Israel’s colonial enterprise and strove to keep Oslo at arms length from international law. Nevertheless, even Clinton came to acknowledge publicly that settlements “absolutely” were a major obstacle to peace.¹⁵ His position was reiterated by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in a letter to Arafat that followed Oslo’s last negotiated component, the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum of 1999:

We are conscious of your concerns about settlement activity. As President Clinton has written to you in the past, the United States knows how destructive settlement activity has been to the pursuit of Palestinian-Israeli peace.¹⁶

To the chagrin of the newly incumbent Ariel Sharon, upon whose desk it landed, the Mitchell Report itself could not have been clearer:

The GOI [government of Israel] should freeze all settlement activity, including the ‘natural growth’ of existing settlements. The kind of security cooperation desired by the GOI cannot for long co-exist with settlement activity described very recently by the European Union as causing “great

concern” and by the U.S. as “provocative.” The GOI should give careful consideration to whether settlements which are focal points for substantial friction are valuable bargaining chips for future negotiations or provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.¹⁷

Sharon declared that Israeli consent to the initiative had been a “historical mistake...because no one has the right—no one—to put Israel on trial before the world.”¹⁸ Mitchell’s findings echoed closely those of the EU, that not long before had declared, “all Israeli settlement activities are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to peace.”¹⁹ In principle at least, the findings of the Mitchell Committee represented a gain for the PA, explicitly linking the security situation to the settlement enterprise. Moreover, Mitchell’s report found its way into the official policy of the Bush administration: in his keynote speech of June 24, 2002 (otherwise inordinately hard on the Palestinians), President George W. Bush reaffirmed that “consistent with the recommendations of the Mitchell Committee, Israeli settlement activity in the occupied territories must stop.”²⁰ This position was reiterated in the Roadmap, published two years to the day after the Mitchell Report, on April 30, 2003. The Roadmap called on Israel to immediately dismantle “settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [and] consistent with the Mitchell Report” to immediately freeze “all settlement activity (including natural growth).”²¹ Just how tangible these gains in principle would prove to be in practice remained a moot point.

The Consistency of Accelerated Colonization during the Oslo Years

At the time of the signing of the Interim Agreement in autumn 1995, the anti-Oslo Sharon lauded the role settlements had played in preventing the IDF’s withdrawal from the occupied territories, a withdrawal that, Sharon maintained, Labor would otherwise have undertaken. This assertion is not borne out by the policies or actions of *any* of the three Labor prime ministers in office during the Oslo period. On the contrary, both Labor and Likud promoted extensive colonization, invested considerable sums in property and infrastructure to the east of the Green Line, and formulated final status proposals that annexed “facts on the ground” from East Jerusalem to the river Jordan.

Oslo architects Rabin and Peres oversaw the steady expansion of settlements and a pronounced extension of the settlement infrastructure from election victory in 1992 until defeat in May 1996. In the days of the first Bush presidency, Rabin, as Labor leader in opposition, vocally opposed Shamir’s settlement plans and won himself friends and favor in Washington. In August 1992, as prime minister, Rabin followed up by announcing a freeze on new settlement construction, which drew a sharp response from Israel’s political right. In practice they had little reason to fret; Rabin did not depart from Shamir’s agenda, presiding instead over the full implementation of an order for eleven thousand new housing units placed by Likud. Defending himself against attacks, Rabin clarified his position: “The construction of 11,000 units continues. Is this a freeze? I don’t know whether [Bush] accepts this or not, but he knows this will happen.”²² In fact, Rabin’s “freeze” applied only to entirely new settlements and would not impede the “natural growth” of those already built. As Nicholas Guyatt shrewdly observed,

By 1992, there were already so many settlements in the occupied territories that this provision for natural growth could happily house 50,000 or 500,000 new settlers... As long as one was committed to the expansion of existing neighbourhoods, any freeze on new settlement was worth virtually nothing.²³

Rabin's unwillingness to defy the settler movement was demonstrated by his refusal to evacuate the ultra-militant settlers from Hebron after the 1994 massacre. At a time of cautious optimism over Oslo, coupled with global revulsion at the slaughter, decisive action could have generated tremendous good will among Palestinians and probably carried sufficient public support inside Israel. Rabin's paralysis echoed a precedent-setting decision from his first term as prime minister in the mid-1970s, when he had refused to order the IDF to dismantle an unauthorized outpost at Qedumim, close to the West Bank's Roman ruins at Sebastia. The reality of Labor's position is suggested by the fact that the settler presence in Hebron itself, and on its outskirts in Kiryat Arba (home to the mass murderer Baruch Goldstein), were established by Gush Emunim with the blessings of Labor between 1968 and 1971. In 1976, Labor also granted permission for the construction of a synagogue in Hebron that necessitated the destruction of a Palestinian market.²⁴

Rabin's assassination in November 1995 brought fellow Nobel-laureate Shimon Peres to power, head of a short-lived government that will mainly be remembered for the massacre of over one hundred Lebanese civilians in Qana.²⁵ Back in Palestine, Peres presided over the confiscation of vast tracts of Palestinian land—much of it privately owned and seized by military order—for Israel's bypass road network. By 2002, the bypass roads had grown into "a massive system of twenty-nine highways spanning four hundred and fifty kilometers."²⁶ Each highway is flanked by a margin of fifty to seventy-five meters on either side under full Israeli jurisdiction and within which any building by Palestinians is forbidden. Many roads have since been widened under the pretext of security considerations, prompting further confiscation and home demolition.²⁷ In autumn 1995, as panic-stricken Arab families across the West Bank rushed in vain to appeal the new round of land seizures, Peres stood before the Knesset and issued his own reassurance that Oslo in no way threatened the settlements:

The explicit answer is that nobody has been asked to give up his home. Contrary to Camp David, we conducted negotiations that do not require the evacuation of even one settlement. The edifice we are building is based on a change in relations, not in locations.²⁸

The change in relations foreseen by Peres, managed by the dependent client-regime of the PA, stood little chance of success under these conditions.

The defeat of Peres in May 1996 marked a discernable change in style and a slowdown in diplomatic progress, but made very little difference to settlement policy on the ground. With Netanyahu at the helm and Sharon serving as infrastructure minister and later foreign minister, support for colonization was certainly more explicit, but in substance it was not fundamentally different from Labor. In November 1997, the cabinet asserted that it would take all "the necessary steps to continue the existence and

strengthening of settlements in Judea and Samaria.”²⁹ Likud’s vision of a final status agreement was also published that year in the form of the Alon Plus plan, an elaboration of the map proposed by former Labor minister and head of the Ministerial Committee on Settlements, Yigal Alon, shortly after the occupation first began back in June 1967. Central provisions of the Alon Plus plan included:

Israeli sovereignty in a 15-km-wide belt, including the Jordan Valley and its western mountain ridge, and in the Judean Desert running west from the Dead Sea [toward East Jerusalem].

Expansion of the territorial bridge between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean coast by widening Israeli sovereignty north-west of the city to the settlement of Beyt Horon and south to the Etzion Bloc [west of Bethlehem].

Expansion of metropolitan Jerusalem by annexation of territory north to the settlements of Givat Ze’ev and Beyt El [outside Ramallah], east to Ma’ale Edumim [between Jerusalem and Jericho], and south to the Etzion Bloc.

Disruption of the territorial continuity of the Palestinian entity in the West Bank by the placement of Israeli settlements under Israeli sovereignty and the creation of four transport “corridors” [bypass roads]...running in an east-west direction, connecting Israel to the Jordan Valley.

Disruption of the territorial continuity between the Palestinian population straddling the Green Line...by expanding Israeli sovereignty east [especially from Tulkarm and Qalqilya southward].³⁰

With this vision of a final status agreement in mind, Netanyahu negotiated the Wye River Memorandum, Article V of which stipulated that “neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in accordance with the Interim Agreement.” Directly upon his return, the prime minister approved land seizures for thousands of new housing units, including two hundred in Kiryat Arba, and two weeks later opened the “bidding on construction of a huge housing development”³¹ on Jabal Abu Ghnaym (Har Homa), strategically significant in that it closed the settlement belt separating Bethlehem from East Jerusalem. The cabinet also proposed a new settlement of six thousand new homes south of Jerusalem and the further expansion of Ma’ale Adumim between East Jerusalem and Jericho. Twelve new bypass roads were authorized to secure additional access for West Bank settlers to Jerusalem.³²

It was provocative, but not unique. Improbable as it may seem, the Netanyahu government’s record appears modest in comparison with the Labor-led government that succeeded him under former chief of staff Ehud Barak. Victorious at the polls in June 1999, Barak forged an unstable left-right coalition that included the pro-settlement NRP, to whom he awarded the Ministry of Construction and Housing. The Labor-led government “retained the designation of most of the settlements as areas of highest national priority”³³ (Priority A categorization), entitling residents to the full range of state-subsidized benefits, and picked up the pace of settlement construction: the settler population increased between June 1999 and December 2000 by 22,419, while

government tenders for new settlements totaled 3,499 units in the same period.³⁴ During the first nine months of 2000—the period that included the Camp David II summit and the onset of the second intifada—the number of colonists in the West Bank rose by 13,000. It had previously risen by 12,000 during all of 1999.³⁵ B’Tselem’s detailed study of settlement in the West Bank underlines the point: “The sharpest increase during this period [the entire Oslo process] was recorded in 2000, under the government headed by Ehud Barak, when the construction of almost 4,800 new housing units [in the West Bank] was commenced.”³⁶ Another report added: “This is the highest number since the now Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (Likud) served as Housing and Construction Minister in 1992.”³⁷ Further strengthening his image with the right, Barak appointed Shilo Gal, former head of the Gush Etzion regional council for twenty years, as personal advisor on settlement affairs. It might be said in mitigation that Barak put a ban on new outposts. True. It might be added that he dismantled a handful; true again, but fewer than ten in all, which left at least thirty-two others in place, and he greatly simplified procedures for “legalization,” which made it much easier for outposts to connect to the “official” settlement infrastructure and range of state subsidized essential services.³⁸ Thus did colonization accelerate, *again*, under a Labor prime minister. Thus did each prime minister, and none more readily than Ehud Barak, apply consecutive turns on the screws compressing the Palestinians.³⁹

In an essay on the failed Camp David II summit that caused quite a stir at the time, Robert Malley and Husayn Agha made the point that from Barak’s perspective, these actions were not inconsistent with negotiating a final status agreement with the PLO; Israel was going to annex areas around Jerusalem and along the Green Line anyway, and deep down the Palestinians knew it.⁴⁰ At the same time, it will be recalled that Article 10 of the Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum signed by Barak had explicitly sought to prevent just that, reiterating for a third time the extant clauses of the Interim Agreement and the Wye Memorandum that recognized “the necessity to create a positive environment for the negotiations” and calling on neither side to “initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip...”⁴¹ Barak’s actions, no less than Netanyahu’s, rendered textual reassurances meaningless, and as with each of his Oslo-era predecessors, Barak eroded the trust of the Palestinians. Furthermore, what was true of Barak’s Palestinian interlocutors among the nationalist elite was truer still of the restive Palestinians on the streets and in the camps. Finally, it will be recalled that Barak had made a special contribution as chief of staff, intervening at an early stage to subordinate the Oslo framework to the IDF’s extremely broad conception of Israel’s security. It is not unreasonable to suggest that Palestinians have Ehud Barak to thank for a personal contribution to the bypass roads, cantonization, and the closure regime.

That Ariel Sharon would maintain a commitment to settlement was no surprise, nor was it coincidental that Yusif Barel, appointed by the new prime minister as director of the Israel Broadcasting Authority, “banned the use of the terms ‘settlement’ and ‘settlers’ on radio and television broadcasts.”⁴² In addition to his historical role in settlement and a new departure in censorship, Sharon as prime minister could now manage more effectively the “hill-top youth” and “outposts” first launched during his term as foreign minister in the Netanyahu’s cabinet. Unable to avoid the Wye Memorandum, Sharon had responded by exhorting the colonists to “grab the hills”: “Everyone there should move, should run, should grab more hills, expand the territory. Everything that’s grabbed will be

in our hands. Everything we don't grab will be in their hands."⁴³ The rallying cry issued by "the father of settlement" did not fall upon deaf ears, and outposts appeared swiftly on hilltops overlooking most West Bank towns. As prime minister from March 2001, Sharon continued to coordinate closely with his long-time friend Ze'ev Hever, "the father of outposts" and secretary general of Gush Emunim's executive wing Amana, responsible for coordinating the outpost initiative on the ground. Barak's half-hearted ban was lifted, and the outpost initiative now enjoyed a direct operational link with the head of state himself.⁴⁴

Cobbled together from old caravans, portable cabins, shipping containers, and tents, the settlement outposts are small, mobile, and inherently difficult to count, at least until the apparatus of state moves in decisively behind them. Besides answering the call of Sharon, outposts were established as a willful response to Palestinian resistance attacks on adjacent settlements, and as tactical red herrings diverting attention from their better-established neighborhoods. Estimates vary, but reports from negotiations between Israel and the United States suggest that the Bush administration identified ninety-four outposts constructed since March 2001, when they were declared "illegal" under Israeli law, and thus distinguished from the vast majority now arbitrarily legitimized. The legal conceit does not include those previously established with the blessing of Netanyahu and the indulgence of Barak.

The Machinery of Colonization

At the vanguard of the outpost campaign were students from the religious education program in Beit El, led by Rabbi David Dudkevitch from his seminary on the outskirts of Ramallah. Some of the seminary's alumni have been described in the Israeli press as "the most dangerous and most extreme element in the territories." Blessed with rabbinical mandate, they have demonstrated disdain for even Zionist state authority and rejected all restriction on settlement. Their position on the rights of the indigenous population can be imagined. Such is the threat they have posed, the Yesha Council's own spokesman was forced to admit: "There is a criminal element among them and all kinds of educational mutations that have spread out of control."⁴⁵

Militant youth proved useful, but lasting success required the logistical support of the state apparatus. IDF officers have been ready and able to declare Palestinian land "closed military zones," denying access to Arab owners and securing new tracts for settlement. To keep the settlers safe from the onset of the al-Aqsa intifada, the IDF drew "'no-go' areas between 70 and 500 meters wide around each settlement and every military installation in the occupied territories."⁴⁶ It is indicative of the type of frontier lawlessness typical to colonization in which the border between legal and illegal depends on the self-appointed colonial arbiters of indigenous property; in this case, the IDF in the first instance, with the dismal prospect of the High Court of Justice after that.

According to Amnon Barzilai, the IDF in the West Bank and Gaza is organized into a central and a southern command, each of which operates a division: the Judea and Samaria division runs five brigades; the Gaza division runs two. Each "division has a headquarters, and each brigade has a headquarters, logistics units and emergency storehouses. This whole structure creates a large number of jobs in the career army."⁴⁷ To protect the settlements and administer the occupation, an estimated ten thousand IDF

soldiers were deployed in the West Bank and Gaza *before* the al-Aqsa intifada began.⁴⁸ Amos Harel noted that for ambitious career officers with one eye on the general staff, a command position in either of the central or southern commands is a key rung on the promotion ladder to the top.⁴⁹

One of the founding advocates of settlement, the late general Moshe Dayan conceived of a symbiotic relationship between the IDF and colonization from the very onset of the occupation. For Dayan, settlements were vital “not because they can ensure security better than the army, but because without them we cannot keep the army in those territories. Without them the IDF would be a foreign army ruling a foreign population.”⁵⁰ The fact that it remains just that is beside the point; the colonies were always meant to provide a retroactive justification for perpetual occupation.

The IDF does of course gain some military advantage from settlements in its colonial struggle with the Palestinians: settlements serve as bases for the storage of equipment and garrisoning of military personnel, provide strategic control of space from the hilltops, and serve as centers for intelligence gathering and points of contact for collaborators.⁵¹ But besides protecting civilian settlements, the IDF has played a pioneering role in establishing them, as Lein and Weizman have shown. Within the IDF, the Nahal brigade’s specific mission is to establish and maintain military settlements. The Nahal brigade is not a fighting unit and Nahal troops are not ordinarily expected to take part in combat. Because the soldiers do not technically set up home in the settlements they run, Nahal settlements are legally permissible as temporary manifestations of a temporary occupation, the soldiers returning to homes elsewhere at the end of their tour of duty. But in reality, the Nahal brigade has consistently been used to break new ground and secure territory for colonization over a period of four decades. The majority of Nahal locations were “in practice a preliminary stage in the establishment of permanent civilian settlements on the sites.”⁵² Whether in front of a civilian settler initiative or weighing in directly behind them, the IDF has always been at the heart of settlement operations and a colonizing culture that holds Israel’s psychological border to be well to the east of the Green Line.

It is true that the army has been ordered to dismantle the odd outpost for international media consumption, and it is true that clashes, while rare, are known to have happened between settler and soldier.⁵³ But beyond isolated incidents, a deep symbiosis has taken place in a way that even Dayan did not foresee, rendering the distinction between soldier and colonist ever less meaningful. Article II:3 of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement first stipulated IDF redeployment to the settlements and military installation areas, a process which Article XI of the Interim Agreement sought to intensify in three stages, six months apart (the third of which was never undertaken). Housed in the settlements they were sent to protect, soldiers and settlers live in close proximity, the IDF even paying rent to the settlers for the use of their facilities.⁵⁴ From the start of the al-Aqsa intifada, they have lived and waged a common battle against the anti-colonial resistance.

In keeping with Dayan’s original vision, the IDF’s immediate task in the West Bank and Gaza has been to protect the settlers. Carrying out that task has necessitated a great deal of close cooperation between the two parties, bringing them increasingly close together. Of the IDF’s ostensible mission to the settlements, Amos Harel noted,

The settlers are not just passive recipients of these services. They actively participate in this effort—as soldiers during regular and reserve army duty, as Shin Bet coordinators and Border Police officers, and as civilians placed on alert in their settlements or as security officers for the local authorities.⁵⁵

The settlements' security officers, said to number about two hundred, play an especially pivotal role for regional brigade commanders and are paid for by the Ministry of Defense. Harel observed further,

In the internal dynamics of the brigade command headquarters, the local leadership of the settlers plays a significant role.

Experience and familiarity with the area are also important factors. Brigade commanders serve for at most two years and battalion commanders for six months. Thus, the security officers at the local councils have the longest “organizational memory.”⁵⁶

Physical proximity and operational cooperation and coordination have been further reinforced by an ideological dynamic identified by Uri Avnery:

A negative selection process has been at work. Humanist, liberally-minded people have been going into high-tech and science and not choosing a military career. The kibbutzniks are disappearing, instead settlers and religious nationalists are gradually filling the senior ranks.⁵⁷

The result has been that many IDF officers, “both at the junior and senior levels, are bound head and soul, and in some cases by family ties, to the leaders and rabbis of the settlers.”⁵⁸ This is exemplified by the prestige accorded the Military Preparation College of Rabbi Eli Sadan, run from the West Bank religious settlement of Eli near the Palestinian town of Salfit.⁵⁹ The IDF also takes a hand in the supervision of the religious seminary (*yeshiva*) in the neighboring ideological settlement of Shilo.⁶⁰ In addition, thousands of IDF officers, soldiers, and their families are settlers themselves. For example, Jonathan Cook has reported that over one thousand officers' families live in Alfie Menashe, a large settlement in the northern West Bank and one of those slated to enjoy the protection of the separation wall.⁶¹ Amos Harel has pointed out that these religious officers are moving steadily upward within the command of the IDF:

This is still not reflected in the very top ranks, but in the middle ranks, the proportion of religious officers—most of whom are graduates of pre-military preparatory academies in the territories or are residents of settlements themselves—is close to 40 percent.⁶²

Harel notes that it is only a matter of time before religious-settler officers assume positions at the level of battalion command.

Neither chief of staff during the al-Aqsa intifada quite fit into that category, yet both Shaul Mofaz (subsequently minister of defense), and his successor Moshe Ya'alon, were

politically well to the right. Both were politically in tune with the settlers they were mandated to defend, and both seemed convinced of their capacity to dictate a military solution. That at least seemed to be the case, until quite unexpectedly the very hard-line Ya'alon seemed to undergo a change of heart: in a public row that made headlines in Israel, the chief of staff appeared to acknowledge for the first time that the IDF could not provide security by use of force alone. Ya'alon's suggestion that Israel ease conditions for Palestinians in the occupied territories left him, at least temporarily, publicly at odds with both Mofaz and Sharon.⁶³

Working in tandem with the IDF military is the IDF bureaucracy of occupation, the Civil Administration. Headquartered in Beit El on the edge of Ramallah with branches located in or adjacent to settlements elsewhere (including some of the IDF's DCLs and DCOs), the Civil Administration is staffed by soldiers, many of them settlers. Former director general of Israel's foreign ministry Uri Savir encountered the Civil Administration head-on while negotiating the Interim Agreement; he described it as "a burgeoning bureaucratic monster with a bottomless budget to feed on."⁶⁴ Prior to Oslo, the Civil Administration enjoyed almost total power over the lives of the Palestinians, including the crucial powers to plan and to build, powers used to great effect in the prosecution of the colonization campaign.⁶⁵ The Oslo framework allowed it to hold onto those powers in Area C, an area which, as we saw in chapter 6, never dropped below 60 percent of the West Bank and 40 percent of the Gaza Strip. The al-Aqsa intifada saw the Civil Administration claw back some of its authority through management of the closure regime, exercising full control over Palestinian movement as the DCLs and DCOs were closed and abandoned. The power to bestow or deny permits for building, movement, and other aspects of ordinary life transformed rights taken for granted by most of us into privileges for indigenous Palestinians. The powers inhering in the Civil Administration have also rendered it a potent vehicle for inducing collaboration.

The Civil Administration generates further jobs and salaries within the IDF and lends the IDF personnel administering the colonization campaign considerable powers of patronage, safe behind an impenetrable veil of military secrecy. It also enhances the capacity of the IDF and the Ministry of Defense to defend the military budget. On the ground in the occupied territories, the Civil Administration is widely staffed by the type of low-level but unaccountable bureaucrat identified by Michael Lipsky as responsible for the real substance of public policy, policy that David Dery paraphrased as "the sum of decisions made in the field by bureaucrats."⁶⁶ Settlers looking to expand the boundaries of a settlement or outpost residents looking to connect to the infrastructure of essential services might readily attest to the power wielded by low-level military bureaucrats in the Civil Administration. Countless Palestinians attempting to move, work, or build could readily attest to the same.

In daily interaction with the colonized Palestinians they administer, the soldier-bureaucrats of the Civil Administration have been seen on occasion to intervene on their behalf. Amos Harel recounted how one Civil Administration officer appointed to Hebron compiled a report that was very critical of Israel's administration of the city—in particular of the way settlers conducted themselves toward the Palestinians. He was duly reassigned.⁶⁷ As the separation barrier threatened hundreds of thousands with ruin, Akiva Eldar reported that Israel's government coordinator in the territories, Yusef Mishev, was "desperately seeking ways to minimize the damage."⁶⁸ On another occasion, Nisim

'Anfus of the PA's Ramallah DCL recalled that Civil Administration officers from Beit El, to whom he was known through his work, were quick to deploy and support him after receiving news that IDF sappers had dynamited his village church.⁶⁹ There are doubtless many instances in which members of the Civil Administration staff have intervened to help a Palestinian for no reason other than that they felt that they should. Their narratives ought to be heard. The collective Palestinian experience of it is essentially negative, but the machinery of Zionist colonization is no more faceless than any that preceded or might follow it. Yet it remains a machinery of colonization all the same, adding what Helena Cobban has called "administrative violence"⁷⁰ to the blunt military violence with which we are more familiar. And independent of ideology, the material self-interest and bureaucratic inertia inhering in the Civil Administration make it a major player: powerful, well-resourced, arbitrary, and opaque, the interests of this formidable bureaucratic instrument of colonial domination are intrinsically dependent on the perpetuation of military occupation and the prosecution of the colonization campaign.

Beyond the support of the Ministry of Defense and the IDF in its combat and bureaucratic forms, colonization has enjoyed the full logistical support of an array of civil state and quasi-state institutions. Documented in detail by Lein and Weizman for B'Tselem,⁷¹ this includes the Ministry of Construction and Housing, which offers prospective colonists cheap mortgages convertible to grants; the Ministerial Committee for Settlement, which encourages Jewish private sector investment in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the Ministry of Education, which guarantees promotion to teachers working in settlements and almost free childcare to young parents bringing up Jewish families in the occupied territories; the Ministry of Industry and Trade, which is empowered to offer grants and tax breaks to individuals and corporations investing across the Green Line; the Ministry of Finance, offering cuts in income tax; the Ministry of National Infrastructure (through the Israel Lands Commission), selling discounted Arab land to Jewish developers; the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, showcasing packages for social workers comparable to settler-teachers; and the Ministry of the Interior, which awards generous grants to settlement local councils greatly in excess of the national average for Israel on the western side of the Green Line. The state water company Merkorot and the state electricity grid also coordinate closely to prioritize the provision of essential services in the occupied territories.⁷² If that were not enough, the state lottery Mifal Hapayis also chips in with millions of dollars in support of settlement projects.⁷³ Outside of the state but partly financed by it, the WZO via its special Settlements Department works to resettle Jews from anywhere in the world in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with considerable success: by 2002 only 42 percent of West Bank settlers were of Israeli origin; 35 percent came from Europe and the United States, 12 percent from Africa, and the remaining 11 percent from Asia.⁷⁴

As Oslo unfolded, it quickly became apparent that the machinery propelling Zionist colonization forward drew on resources that greatly outmatched anything available to the disempowered institutions of the PA. Shrouded in mists of colonial obfuscation, precise figures are impossible to obtain as the matter has deliberately not been addressed in an official government report. Working with available sources that appear to exclude expenditure in East Jerusalem, *Ha'aretz* estimated that by 2003 "unusual civilian expenditures in the settlements is [*sic*] at least NIS 2.5 billion a year [\$0.5 billion]. The total unusual expenditure since 1967 has reached at least NIS 45 billion [\$9 billion]."⁷⁵

The road infrastructure accounted for \$2 billion alone, housing for slightly more. The cost of the separation barrier approached \$1 billion. Meron Benvenisti cited a credible report that suggested

About \$200 million a year was invested during the 1980s in the settlements, gradually growing to half a billion dollars this year [2003]. That means that the settlement adventure has already cost some \$11 to \$12 billion, not counting the direct defense costs.⁷⁶

To put that figure in rough perspective, Muhammad Shtayya calculated that PEC DAR disbursed a total of around \$1 billion⁷⁷ over a decade on behalf of some 3.5 million Palestinians. In the meantime, Israel spent up to half a billion dollars annually, in addition to allocations for East Jerusalem, on 400,000 settlers.

Whatever the precise figure, it is clear that very substantial costs have been borne by the Zionist state apparatus. However, settlement has become far more than just an expense. Benvenisti noted that most settlements have been privatized,⁷⁸ placing major capital assets in the hands of settlers and their representatives on the eastern side of the Green Line. In addition, the construction and expansion of settlements provides ongoing opportunities for private gain. With an intimate knowledge of the occupied territories, the logistical requirements of settlement, the government apparatus, tendering procedures, and contacts with colleagues in the Civil Administration, former IDF generals (some turned politicians) would seem to be well-placed to win contracts. Bypass road planning and sometimes construction has fallen within the remit of the IDF, while the Public Works Authority of the Ministry of Transport has issued tenders and overseen completion of other road projects in the occupied territories.⁷⁹ As Uri Avnery has pointed out, a striking number of Israel's retired or reserve army generals have gone on to become the successful heads of major Israeli corporations.⁸⁰ The relationship between IDF personnel and the contractors building the infrastructure of empire would seem to be one very profitable avenue of future research into Israeli politics during and after the Oslo era.

But opportunities for colonial profit are not restricted to Israelis: U.S. property developers have also been very active in the occupied territories. The most high-profile example is undoubtedly Irving Moscowitz, a multimillionaire bingo impresario operating in Florida and California. Moscowitz is a close personal friend of former prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu, and former Jerusalem mayor Ehud Olmert. Tracked by one of Israel's leading settlement watchers, Akiva Eldar, Moscowitz was observed to build Olmert's tunnel under al-Haram al-Sharif that sparked the tunnel intifada in September 1996. A fierce proponent of colonization, Olmert directed the expansion of the settler population in East Jerusalem and the persecution of Palestinians within the municipality's borders. Described by Benvenisti as "an ethnic rabble-rouser," Olmert oversaw the deterioration of Palestinian infrastructure, confiscation of lands, demolition of homes, and the systematic revocation of residency rights for Arabs in the city.⁸¹ He crowned his tenure as mayor with a contract for a new settlement in the Arab neighborhood of Ra's al-'Amud, a decision greeted with fearful protests by threatened Palestinian residents in the tense months preceding the Camp David II summit.⁸² The company awarded the contract was chaired by Moscowitz's son-in-law.⁸³ The Public Works Authority obliged with a new traffic interchange to serve it at the cost of some \$14 million.⁸⁴ In April 2003, in the

teeth of a public row with Washington, Sharon personally approved the decision to move the first families into the settlement, now named Ma'ale Ha'zeitim. The Israeli court system ruled that Palestinian "squatters" on the site, which had been Jewish land in the nineteenth century, should be removed, just as the Supreme Court ruled that Palestinians were forbidden to "buy property in the Jewish quarter of the city, even if they once lived there."⁸⁵ As for Moscowitz, better known for his generous donations to settlers, close relationships with the Likud now allowed him some return on his investment: Eldar reported that apartments in Ra's al-'Amud were put up for sale at up to \$215,000 dollars each.⁸⁶ The business conducted by the Netanyahu-Olmert-Moscowitz group is a good example of the type of public-private, Israeli-U.S. profiteering from settlement, facilitated by the Zionist court system, that could be deployed to augment the state's colonization campaign.

Drawing a number of these disparate threads together and lending colonization ideological coherence is the Likud, Ariel Sharon's party and long-term political project. If the legacy of Labor during the Oslo era suggested that it had neither the vision nor the intention to decolonize, the prospect of a Likud-led government dismantling the profitable colonial enterprise it has been instrumental in constructing is correspondingly lower still. With so much financial and political capital at stake, the consequences of decolonization for Israel would be truly seismic. For the Likud as the dominant party-coalition of state, they would probably be terminal. This point has been made very clearly by Hannah Kim, in an article that merits quotation at length:

The Likud central committee comprises individuals who are for the most part entrenched in the government ministries, or who contract work through them. The fact that an alternative welfare state was built in the territories at the same time that the welfare state within the Green Line was collapsing—gave them greater power, since it also expanded the government mechanisms from which they gained their sustenance.

The process of separation from the territories means the dissolution of part of those mechanisms, and the liquidation of a sizeable share of the source of the livelihood and power of central committee members...it is not merely a question of their livelihood, but of their homes as well.

Just as members of the British Conservative party supported the continuation of the colonial rule in India for many years, so too do members of the Likud central committee largely support the continued occupation of most of the territories, since they themselves were sustained by their connection to these territories. Sharon's agreement to implement the road map means the liquidation of the wheeler-dealers who are closely linked to industry and construction in the settlements. The end of occupation also means the end of an entire commercial economic system.⁸⁷

Small wonder then that the Roadmap should be allowed to make such little progress, or that a majority of the eleven hundred members of the Likud central committee should pass a resolution completely rejecting the establishment of an independent Palestinian

state: aside from foregoing power, privilege, and opportunities for profit, some of them, should they chose to stay put, might actually have to live in it.⁸⁸

Approaching Implosion

Motivated by biblical mythology, a cheap mortgage, private profit, military planning, and various permutations therein, the colonists enjoyed an awesome degree of institutional support from Zionist state and non-state actors with an interest in the prosecution of the settlement enterprise. Perched on hilltops, propelled down bypass roads, the happy settler could almost be forgiven for imagining that the Palestinian presence was not present at all. But present it was, and happy it was not. Barely resisted by a dependent PA, colonization had consequences: it distorted Palestinian social, economic, and political development; it complicated and poisoned the atmosphere of negotiations, and before long it would play a decisive role in collapsing the precarious political balance cobbled together within the Oslo framework.

Malley and Agha's aforementioned article is important because, together with a piece by Deborah Sontag that appeared at around the same time, it seriously questioned the dominant narrative propagated by Israel and the United States in the post-summit scramble to shift the blame.⁸⁹ In what quickly became accepted wisdom, the world was encouraged to believe that the genial Clinton and well-intentioned Barak could not persuade an intransigent Palestinian leadership to accept an offer of unprecedented generosity. Insatiable and rapacious, the unworthy Palestinians, and principally Yasir Arafat, then went home to plan, provision, and orchestrate a violent uprising against an innocent Israel to better extract an improved deal by force. Barak's submission to the Mitchell Committee, consistent with the campaign of self-justification he launched thereafter, can be summarized thus.⁹⁰ It is far from accurate.

The Malley-Agha and Sontag pieces suggest a range of alternative explanations for what followed, among them hasty preparation, bad personal chemistry, and divergent approaches and tactics that exacerbated misconceptions on either side. Agha had previously engaged in discreet negotiations for Mahmud 'Abbas and knew the substance of the talks. Malley had been at Camp David II as a special assistant to Clinton for Arab-Israeli affairs and broke ranks to present his account. Aaron David Miller shared much of Malley's interpretation; Miller had also been present as former assistant to Dennis Ross and senior advisor on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the U.S. State Department. He added that the United States should have included Arab heads of state at the summit to shore-up Arafat's confidence and to help relieve the PLO chairman's palpable sense of isolation.⁹¹ Sontag interviewed a number of participants after the event and emphasized the extent to which diplomatic activity continued after Camp David II with the full and constructive participation of the Palestinian team. This is important because in the summit's unhappy aftermath it illustrates the extent to which the Palestinian nationalist elite remained firmly habituated to diplomatic means. The problem was that diplomatic means could not easily deliver an acceptable national project within the confines of the Oslo framework. In the few short months between Camp David II and Taba, an outcome approaching the requirements of international legality (and hence acceptable to the

Palestinians) began to take shape, but by then the utility of diplomacy would be thrown into doubt by the election victory of Ariel Sharon.

Questioning the dominant narrative from another perspective is Glenn E. Robinson. Consistent with his earlier analysis, Robinson draws attention away from proximate factors: "Conflicting personalities, bad policies, uninspiring visions, and failures of political summity are insufficient to explain fully the violence and instability wrought by Oslo in both Palestine and Israel."⁹² Instead, Robinson directs us to return to the structural flaws inherent to the process, a line of enquiry that can be usefully developed by considering relative deprivation and the chasm dividing Palestinian expectations from the constrictive colonial reality delivered by the Oslo framework.

Development and Deprivation under Colonization

Oslo's earliest negotiators—the Israeli academics, Norwegians, PLO personnel, and the odd well-intentioned soul in the Israeli Foreign Ministry—had held it as axiomatic that Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation and Palestinian economic prosperity would prove vital to the success of the process. Subverted almost immediately by the IDF, the Israeli Ministry of Finance, and the machinery of colonization in general, the reality quickly proved to be dependence, exploitation, and more settlements. Oslo's original axiom was never put to the test.⁹³

That said, an authoritative World Bank report on Palestinian development throughout the Oslo era points to some progress and counsels against a narrowly economic interpretation of the breakdown of the process:

There are grounds for caution in attributing the al-Aqsa intifada to economic causes: firstly, the Palestinian economy had undergone a tentative revival between 1998 and 2000; secondly, the conventional wisdom that attributes economic distress as a cause of political violence is being questioned.

The World Bank's figures point to an uneven record of economic growth during Oslo; a bumpy ride indeed, but no linear descent into rebellion. Palestinian incomes had dropped to around 85 percent of their pre-Oslo levels by 1996, but rose again from 1997 to approach pre-Oslo levels by 1999. The Bank could report, "By September 2000, the economic decline associated with the violence and closures of 1995–96 had been arrested, and Palestinian economic prospects were relatively positive." A respectable real growth rate of 4.6 percent per annum was realized in the last full year before the intifada broke out.⁹⁴

Another World Bank report found that incomes rose and inequality fell between 1996 and 1998; incomes measured as GNP per capita grew by 11 percent, unemployment fell from 22 to 16 percent, and the proportion of Palestinians living below the poverty line dropped from 26.9 percent to 23.2 percent by 1998⁹⁵ (down to 21 percent in 1999),⁹⁶ even if major gaps remained. Over half the total Palestinian poor were located in Khan Yunis, Gaza City, and Hebron, and much of the affluence concentrated in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Nablus. Each pocket of affluence coexisted in close proximity to immediate

poverty,⁹⁷ a common phenomenon in other countries, exacerbated in Palestine by the presence of so many refugee camps.

If the World Bank's data on economic trends seems to point away from a strictly economic explanation of revolt, so too did the World Bank's analysts note that the validity of the original assumption has itself been questioned. The axiom has come under close scrutiny as the interaction between globalization and political violence has engaged increasing scholarly interest. Echoing Gurr, Joan M. Nelson writes,

The effects of economic pressure on conflict are mediated through a wide array of intervening and interacting variables, including perceptions of fairness, expectations of improvement (with or without violence), group solidarity and capacity and resources for collective action, institutional frameworks for channelling and mediating conflict, and the legitimacy of elites and political institutions.⁹⁸

Nelson concludes that economic pressures are "important but ambiguous and mediated factors."⁹⁹ She goes on to cite Milton Esman: "To argue...that the Israeli-Palestinian struggle [among others] is basically about economic values...utterly trivializes and distorts the meaning and the stakes of these conflicts."¹⁰⁰

Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova make a similar point: they found support for political violence to be largely independent of economic factors, suggesting instead that it might be "more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings (either perceived or real) of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics."¹⁰¹ Krueger and Maleckova cite Nasra Hassan's interviews with families and associates of Palestinian suicide bombers, which pointed to a consistent emphasis on occupation, humiliation, and denial of the Palestinian narrative, rather than to simple economic distress.¹⁰²

In this respect, more physical indices impinging on economic data helped to convey the Palestinian reality under Oslo. Between the signing of the DoP and 2001, Israel seized over 70,000 acres of Palestinian land, continued to deny Palestinians access to 85 percent of the West Bank's water resources, and uprooted close to 300,000 trees.¹⁰³ Between September 1993 and October 2000, sporadic acts of resistance were met with the demolition of over 700 Palestinian homes.¹⁰⁴ Much of the work was carried out using the giant Caterpillar D-9 bulldozer, specially designed by the company for the use by the IDF and responsible for the death of International Solidarity Movement volunteer Rachel Corrie as she tried to defend a Palestinian home in Rafah.¹⁰⁵ Land clearance and home demolition were used by the IDF to extend and refine the closure regime to the point that it was identified by the World Bank as the principal cause of Palestinian economic distress. That economic growth occurred at all in these circumstances is testimony to the scale of donor aid, expansion of the PA's public sector, and jobs created by the Oslo-related high-tech economic boom in Israel.

In short, traditional statistical indices such as per capita income point away from an economic interpretation of the al-Aqsa intifada. In the context of colonization they also fail to capture much of the picture, supporting paradigmatic doubts over the approach. But while socio-economic trends cannot account for the uprising, they do point to developmental disparities in Palestine that suggest connections with an array of political

issues, not the least of which is colonization, left unresolved from the Palestinian nationalist agenda.

Demographic Growth in the West Bank and Gaza

Throughout the Oslo period the Palestinian population staged one particular act of defiance: it multiplied. In 1997 the PA's census recorded 2.8 million in the West Bank and Gaza, rising to 3.1 million by 2000; 2 million in the West Bank, 1.1 million in Gaza. They were growing rapidly, with projections pointing to 4.4 million by 2010, a 42 percent increase in a decade that would render Arabs in mandate Palestine a majority for the first time since the depopulations of 1948.¹⁰⁶ This population has a strikingly young age structure, 47.1 percent under fifteen years of age, creating a distinctly wide-based demographic pyramid. A source of apoplexy for demographers in Israel,¹⁰⁷ it also holds stark implications for Palestinian social stability: such a high proportion of children and youth will place great strain on limited public services, and further tax a job market singularly ill-equipped to cope.¹⁰⁸ If the first three decades of occupation left Palestinian labor dependent on Israel, closure cut them off from it after colonization had precluded the emergence of an adequate indigenous replacement. The dependency ratio of non-earners to earners can be expected to rise, and with it personal strain and social tension.

To put this scenario in context, we might consider the following. In 1999 GDP in Gaza totaled \$1.17 billion, the West Bank \$3.3 billion, and Israel \$105.4 billion. On an individual basis, this translated into an average per capita income (in purchasing power parity) of \$1,060 for Gazans, \$2,050 for West Bankers, and \$18,300 for Israelis.¹⁰⁹ The disparity is proximate, tangible, and fully perceived. Many Palestinians have worked in Israel, speak Hebrew, and watch Israeli television. The contrast cannot be missed. It is also the case that no section of Israeli society has benefited more from the full range of state and non-state support than the privileged and increasing settler population. Located by design on the outskirts of Palestinian towns and villages, the settlements intentionally block the natural horizontal expansion of many population centers. According to Lein and Weizman, settlement built-up areas cover no more than 1.7 percent of the West Bank including East Jerusalem, but settlement boundaries, or non-developed municipal areas, encompass a further 5.1 percent, and land reserves placed under the jurisdiction of regional councils constitute a full 35.1 percent, placing a grand total of 41.9 percent of the territory under the control of the settlements.¹¹⁰ In the Gaza Strip, Israel retained control of some 40 percent of the territory, in which it was calculated that per capita, settlers enjoyed "699 times as much land as the average Palestinian refugee" and consumed up to thirty times as much water, at one quarter of the price.¹¹¹ The implications for Palestinian development are immense, among them unemployment, a consistent housing shortage for frustrated young people, and rising population densities.¹¹²

Refugees in the West Bank and Gaza: A Population Moved Out

Systematically disadvantaged by intensive colonization, Palestinian society at large found itself physically compressed, immobilized, and economically vulnerable. Disaggregating

society, we find the trends and contrasts outlined above amplified considerably among the refugee camp population. In 2000, nineteen camps in the West Bank and eight in Gaza were home to 157,676 and 451,186 refugees, respectively, among whom 28,132 in the West Bank and 71,064 in Gaza constituted Special Hardship Cases, so poor that they were eligible for food distribution assistance. The camps also shared high birth rates of 3.4 and 3.6 percent, respectively, in 1998, with similar but not identical population profiles: 34.05 percent under sixteen in the West Bank and 45.59 percent in Gaza; while 52.9 percent and 63.3 percent respectively were under twenty-six.¹¹³ No social group has been more on the wrong end of differential development in Palestine than the population of the refugee camps. Radwan Sha'ban found residence in a refugee camp to be one of the decisive determinants of per capita expenditure, more so than location in a rural area. Similarly decisive were levels of education, head of household employment in Israel, and district of residence in general.¹¹⁴

Randa Farah documented camp conditions during Oslo and found that rapid rates of population growth, in conjunction with the immobility of camp residents due to poverty, resulted in serious overcrowding to the extent that four out of ten households have "a density of three persons or more per room."¹¹⁵ In contrast to those in Lebanon, refugees in the West Bank and Gaza are not prevented from buying land or building a house within Areas A and B, providing they can muster the resources to do so, but steep rates of unemployment and poverty have closed that horizon to many. For those unable to leave, the horizontal dimensions of the camps remain confined to their 1948 legal boundaries, with individual shelters restricted to nine square meters per person. It does invite comparison with the settlements.

The circumstances in the camps did not improve as tentative resolutions to the refugee issue were formulated. Most immediately, in what was widely perceived as a discouraging signal for refugee rights, UNRWA's budget was sharply reduced. Combining negatively with rising population density, Farah documented a severe strain on infrastructure and services, which included shortages of water and electricity, inadequate waste water management and rubbish collection, and overstretched health and education facilities, all of which added to widespread social and psychological problems.

Indicative of the sensitivity accorded the refugee issue in Palestine, both Ramallah and Nablus governorates established specialized departments for the Administration of Refugee Camp Affairs, distinct from the Administration of Municipal and Village Affairs (*'Idarat Shu'un al-Baladiyya al-Qarawiyya*), which coordinated work with local government and PECDAR on ordinary infrastructure development. Haytham Arrar managed the Ramallah administration, which included three main camps in the governorate, Jalazun, alAm'ari, and Qalandya. Arrar could attest to the lack of services reaching camp residents and to the gaps left by UNRWA post-DoP. It was only natural that camp residents were constantly lobbying the PA to prioritize the right of return and the release of prisoners (to which they had contributed a disproportionate number) in negotiations. The camp administration units were established to create distinct arrangements with the PA; UNRWA's budget cuts left the camps in need of support, but camp residents did not wish to be seen to be dealing with the Ministry of Local Affairs, responsible for ordinary municipal matters. This risked creating the impression of normalization and, it was feared, an additional excuse for Israel to attack the right of return. One visible manifestation was the neatly painted signs planted on the outskirts of

camps during the Oslo era asserting the authority of the PLO's Refugees Affairs Department over the camps, and not the PA.¹¹⁶

The discrepancy between the contribution of camp residents to the first intifada and the rewards they secured from Oslo was also noted by Farah; not only had they sacrificed disproportionately in the first place, they secured disproportionately little reward for it afterward. Fierce bastions of resistance to occupation, the camps had long been subjected to harsh reprisals by the IDF (and soon would be again), with a high proportion of residents killed, disabled, and imprisoned during both intifadas. Camp youth with prison records lost years of schooling, suffered a lack of preparation for normal adult life, and endured higher rates of unemployment, all of which reinforced the poverty trap they were caught in. Farah found depression common to all regardless of age and gender "in the sense that their expectations of the peace process were much higher than what has actually changed..." This was especially true for the youth: "Their role in the Intifada, during which they were rendered 'heroes' empowered them and provided them with authority in their families and communities." Thereafter, in context of the PA, they went "from 'heroes' to 'hooligans'... They had lost their role and feel there is a void in their lives, with no real prospects for the future..."¹¹⁷

Tension between the PA and the camps was one of the more visible features of the prelude to Camp David II, for economic and political reasons both profound and mundane. In October 1999, echoing an explicit call made in Article III.b of the Wye River Memorandum, Barak's government threatened to withhold customs duties accrued on the PA's behalf unless a crack down on car theft from Israel to the Palestinian territories was forthcoming (Israeli insurance premiums are among the highest in the world). Many of the stolen vehicles were sold or recycled as spare parts from within the camps. Raids by PA security services could only drive deeper the wedge between the PA and refugees and ran the very real risk of armed confrontation. Hadil Wahdan researched events in al-Am'ari, home to eight thousand refugees on the edge of Ramallah and an effective no-go zone for non-resident PA security. Under the sway of gangs, residents revealed real disappointment at the failure of negotiations to make headway on refugee issues, fierce resentment of the PA for economic development that bypassed them, and a loss of direction and purpose on the part of former intifada leaders. Gang leaders wanted by the PA were almost always former leaders of the first intifada. In the words of one al-Am'ari resident: "They lost the best years of their lives behind the bars of Israeli prisons. They got out of prison only to face a bitter reality. They have nothing to call their own. All around us is change and development except in the camp." In consequence, "these gangs have reached the conclusion that they are able to achieve status, power and money without the Palestinian Authority or abiding by the law. Their trade in weapons and stolen cars gives them what they need."¹¹⁸ In Shu'fat, Jihad Abu Znayd also underlined the contribution of refugees to both intifadas:

In general, the most active places are the camps. Who suffers most? The refugees. Who has the most prisoners? The refugees. Who has most children in prison? Refugees. Refugees know what the right of return means, [and they] know what statehood means... The fighters are generally aged twenty-five to thirty-five; they gave everything in the last intifada and lost their education [and] childhood.

Having carried a major share of the first intifada, the refugees had invested heavily in the Oslo process, but found instead that their situation deteriorated: "They needed hope and dignity, and Israel gave them less of both."¹¹⁹

In January 2000, the PA arrested a camp leader from al-Am'ari, prompting the temporary closure of the road to Jerusalem by camp youth and serious disturbances in downtown Ramallah. The standoff in al-Am'ari was accompanied by raids on Qalandya and Shu'fat camps at around the same time.¹²⁰ The raids and the clashes were not isolated events. In November 1999, a gathering of six hundred people in the Tulkarm camp pressed the PA to "fight for the refugees' right of return during final status negotiations."¹²¹ In March 2000, a millennial good-will visit by the Pope led to violent clashes in al-Dahaysha (near Bethlehem) between camp residents and PA security personnel over alleged heavy-handed policing of the event.¹²² A few weeks later in Gaza, approximately one hundred PA policemen raided al-Burayj camp, arresting fifty youth for their alleged involvement in a riot at a basketball match.¹²³

In this volatile environment, the imminent approach of final status negotiations prompted a burst of political activity around the refugee and prisoner issues, both of which often applied to the same family. Menachem Klein detected these undercurrents stirring in Palestinian society, and in so doing distinguished himself from Israel's political echelon, which seems to have remained blithely unaware. Klein made the important observation that the protests soon to sweep the West Bank and Gaza were organized at a grassroots level, independently or even in opposition to the PA, often in the camps, and enjoyed cross-factional coordination and support. He noted,

[They] succeeded in placing two issues on the Palestinian agenda: one, the failure of Israel to release the prisoners as promised in the interim agreement, an issue which is relevant to thousands of family members; and two, the perceived willingness of the leadership to make concessions on the refugee issue.¹²⁴

Much of the mobilization was organized to coincide with the concentration of politically sensitive commemorative dates that punctuate the Palestinian spring calendar: Land Day on March 30, Prisoners' Day on April 17, and al-Nakba Day on May 15.¹²⁵ A rally in Nazareth on March 11 drew a crowd of almost one thousand, while a refugee conference in Boston the following month made news in the United States. Former PA minister 'Abd al-Jawad Salih would address another rally of four thousand in the United States, just days before the intifada began.¹²⁶

Tensions became more visible in mid-May, with nationwide demonstrations held to mark Prisoners Week, organized to coincide with the fifty-second anniversary of al-Nakba. Refugees "in the territories and 'internally displaced' Palestinians in Israel for the first time coordinated 'right of return marches,' walking from their present homes to the sites of their destroyed villages." Israeli Independence Day on May 10 saw five thousand Israeli Arabs march "from the village of Kabul in the Galilee to the site of the village of al-Damun, near Haifa, and another 1,000 marched to the site of Umm al-Zaynat." They were followed on May 14 by Palestinians from three camps near Bethlehem, 'A'ida, al-'Azza, and al-Dahaysha, marching to the ruins of their former villages: Bayt Jibrin (now

a camp itself), Bayt Natif, and Zakariyya. Clashes with the IDF across the West Bank and Gaza left one dead and over thirty wounded.¹²⁷

On the occasion of Prisoners' Day on April 17, Fatah central committee member and PA official al-Tayyib 'Abd al-Rahim publicly affirmed that no final status deal could be realized without the prior release of all the Palestinian prisoners. In Gaza, Arafat announced, "We stand firm by the prisoners. We are standing by them and among them until each and every one of them is released from Israel's prisons and detention centres." In addition to organizing demonstrations, "workshops were set up to educate the public in how to pursue activities that could help free the Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails."¹²⁸ In so doing they drew upon the capacity and expertise of eleven Palestinian NGOs then working on the prisoner issue, four of them full time, seven as part of a broader human rights remit.¹²⁹ The results of renewed political mobilization were becoming evident.

Reflecting a heightened degree of coordination, on May 12, the Friday sermon at the al-Aqsa Mosque was devoted to prisoners' issues. On Sunday May 14, church bells rang out to honor the prisoners again. This interdenominational cooperation coincided with a series of demonstrations and a prisoners' rebellion in Megiddo Prison. On the morning of Monday May 15—al-Nakba Day itself—Palestinians observed two minutes silence, accompanied by a second ringing of bells across the occupied territories. In the afternoon, animated by the occasion and the killing the day before, thousands poured onto the streets and fierce clashes were fought at IDF checkpoints in a pattern that very much anticipated the al-Aqsa intifada itself. On the Ramallah-Jerusalem road Israeli helicopters dropped tear gas at the al-Bira junction to break up clashes between stone-throwing youth and the IDF; in the north there were clashes at checkpoints outside Jinin, and around ninety were hurt at checkpoints on the edge of Tulkarm; at Rachel's tomb near Bethlehem 120 were wounded, a further fifty in Hebron; forty were injured at the Netzarim junction, the checkpoint guarding the isolated Jewish settlement in the heart of Gaza, where four months later the IDF would shoot dead Muhammad al-Dura. By the end of al-Nakba week six Palestinians were dead, another six hundred injured.¹³⁰ But the pressure, domestic and international, did not let up. In July a thousand refugees from al-Dahaysha marched again, this time from the camp to Manger Square holding the front-door keys and title deeds to homes inside the Green Line. Graham Usher recalled the uncompromising message on a flyer issued during the march: "The refugees tell the Camp David clique do not bother to return if you are bringing us anything less than the right to return."¹³¹

Klein had identified a crucial dynamic in the breakdown of Oslo that was underway well before either Camp David II or the al-Aqsa intifada began: organized pressure from the grassroots, by no means "terrorists" or "militants" but simply politically conscious Palestinians, confronted the nationalist elite with unmet expectations. Political pressure from the grass roots, led by the *iqlim*, would then stiffen the leadership's resolve at the negotiating table as they sought to defend their own authoritative leadership. Fatah higher committee member and senior UNRWA official May Kayla was well placed to gauge the refugees' mood prior to the summit: "they feared they would be erased from history and lose their rights."¹³² Kayla recalled an address to the *Marji'iyat Fatah* that followed Arafat's return from Camp David. Much had been demanded of him, yet he was at pains

to point out that he had not capitulated on refugee rights or Jerusalem. In consequence, noted Arafat, relations with Israel could be expected to deteriorate.¹³³

Negotiating Colonization: Camp David II and the Myth of the Lost Opportunity

The burst of political mobilization that preceded Camp David II evinced deep disaffection with aspects of the Oslo order, but not insoluble hostility to peace with Israel per se. With regard to the coming negotiations, it demonstrated an acute popular awareness of what constituted legitimate Palestinian rights and an abiding determination not to see them conceded. Popular suspicion that the outcome of the summit would prove unacceptable is readily comprehensible when we consider the pattern of diplomacy that preceded it. Following implementation of the first phase of the Interim Agreement, including the pre-election redeployment and the elections in early 1996, the negotiations had lost almost all forward momentum. The only process showing any real sign of life was Israeli colonization. Mu'in Rabbani summarized Israel's approach to the negotiations thus: "Israel first refuses to implement its own commitments, seeks and obtains their dilution in a new agreement, subsequently engages in systematic prevarication, and finally demands additional negotiations, leading to a yet further diluted agreement."¹³⁴ Rabbani captured precisely the history of the last three components of the Oslo framework: Netanyahu's Wye Memorandum was itself a renegotiation of Rabin's Interim Agreement, and Barak's Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum a renegotiation of Netanyahu's Wye. In the meantime, as diplomacy staggered on, colonization pressed resolutely forward.

The Diplomatic Prelude to Camp David II

Netanyahu's enthusiasm for the Wye River Memorandum was recorded by Rachelle Marshall. As the Knesset finally approved the agreement, a long-faced prime minister moaned that it was "not a day for jubilation." The PA was ordered to arrest an additional thirty suspects on a wanted list compiled by Israel, and the PLO to reconvene the PNC and revoke, for a second time, the articles calling for Israel's destruction. Subsequent IDF withdrawals were then made subject to cabinet approval, almost guaranteeing that no further withdrawals would take place in the life of that government. Wye required that Israel release 750 prisoners; Netanyahu released 250 common criminals and drug dealers. Wye required that Rafah airport finally be allowed to open; it was, but not before the PA was asked to pay \$644,000 "in storage fees for the air traffic and radar equipment now stuck at an Israeli port. The equipment had to be stored because for two years Israel refused to allow the airport to open."¹³⁵

Netanyahu's displacement by Barak augured better, but in truth the new prime minister's credentials were questionable and the results disappointing.¹³⁶ An Oslo skeptic as chief of staff, Prime Minister Barak did not implement the third redeployment stipulated by the Interim Agreement, the commitments of the Wye River Memorandum, or follow through on key promises made of his own volition. Final status talks were postponed, as was the third troop redeployment pending since 1995. In May 2000, Barak

declined to transfer three Palestinian areas on the outskirts of East Jerusalem from Area B to Area A, despite having previously agreed to do so. He also stalled on a further prisoner release from among the near two thousand Palestinians then in Israeli custody.¹³⁷

Discouraged by events at home, Palestinian suspicions were compounded as Barak turned instead to Syria, pursuing an elusive peace deal that culminated in the Geneva summit of March 2000. Only when that failed did final status talks with the PLO take off in earnest, but, in the view of ultimate Oslo veteran Terje Roed-Larsen, “too late and on the wrong footing.”¹³⁸ In the meantime, as they were denied forward momentum in negotiations and marginalized diplomatically for several months, the social and political pressures on the Palestinian leadership continued to grow. The subject of much debate in the Palestinian press, a unilateral declaration of statehood offered one means of diffusing the tension. It was wisely declined, twice, first on May 4, 1999 (the original date for a final status arrangement set by the Gaza-Jericho Agreement), and again in September the same year (on the sixth anniversary of the DoP), for fear that Palestine might gain recognition in its current, constricted dimensions.¹³⁹ Instead, Arafat remained committed to Oslo’s incremental logic in the not unreasonable hope that the raft of modest commitments secured on paper might be transformed into tangible progress on the ground.

Final status talks had formally opened in Taba on May 5, 1996; the opening ceremony established a steering committee and working groups, but bereft of political will, advances were small. Regarded with no enthusiasm by Netanyahu and neglected by Barak, much preparatory work remained undone as Oslo’s deadline came and went. In the immediate run-up to Camp David II (and echoing the Washington/Oslo dichotomy seven years earlier), a discreet channel opened in Stockholm with Quay’ and Dahlan representing the Palestinians. It became public in mid-May, much to the indignation of the talks’ official head ‘Abd Rabbu, who labeled it “an Israeli ploy to create loopholes in the Palestinian position.”¹⁴⁰ Drawn to a peremptory halt, further preparatory work was now subordinated to political considerations that had nothing to do with the Palestinians: Barak’s disintegrating coalition government and Clinton’s expiring presidency. In the midst of the al-Aqsa intifada Quay’ recalled of Barak, “We told him without preparation it would be a catastrophe, and now we are living the catastrophe.”¹⁴¹ The message was relayed via Albright to Clinton just two weeks before Camp David began, but to no avail. Shlomo Ben Ami, Israeli foreign minister during the summit, also acknowledged that a lack of preparation contributed greatly to the summit’s failure.¹⁴² In a report on the summit before the PLO central council, Mahmud ‘Abbas summarized the Palestinian dilemma: “We were faced with two choices: to go knowing very well that the summit will fail and that the Americans may blame us for its failure or to refuse to attend and be accused of sabotaging the peace process. So we took the first choice.”¹⁴³ Denied the preparatory talks they insisted were necessary, the Palestinians were then warned repeatedly that this would be Israel’s final offer. As the summit unfolded from July 11 to 25, 2000, the end game for the PLO’s national project appeared to be a looming Israeli diktat; if the PLO declined it, “unilateral separation”¹⁴⁴ would follow on Israel’s terms. Sharon was later seen to adopt those terms in part, drawing on the contingency planning carried out under Barak for construction of the separation wall and adding a proposal for a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.

Emergent Contours of a Diplomatically Realized National Project

Caution is required when comparing proposals from Camp David II with what followed in Taba during January 2001 because the original offer was never set down on paper and different accounts have emerged of what was said and done. Nevertheless, some of the contours are subject to general agreement, particularly in relation to the territorial basis of what might have constituted the PLO's finalized national project, including possible resolution to the issues of Jerusalem and settlements.

On the matter of accepted territory, Israel refused to countenance a withdrawal to the borders of June 1967 at Camp David. In Malley and Agha's account, final implementation of UNSC 242 would have seen Israel annex 9 percent of the West Bank, with the Palestinians granted a small plot of Israeli territory equivalent to 1 percent of the West Bank in return.¹⁴⁵ 'Abbas noted that Israel listed several security conditions that included interim control of the Jordan Valley for up to twelve years, "maintaining the current military bases and settlements there untouched. The Israelis asked for six bases in the West Bank and three military monitoring areas."¹⁴⁶ Palestinian border crossings, airspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum were also to remain under Israeli control. It is generally agreed that what remained would be northern, central, and southern Palestinian cantons with little authority on, above, or below the ground. These positions were improved upon somewhat in a post-summit proposal from Clinton that reduced the Israeli annexation to between 4 and 6 percent. Geoffrey Aronson and the cartographer Jan de Jong summarized the main territorial implications, and still found them far from appealing:

Both proposals would transform Israel's proverbial 'narrow waist'—the ten miles between the Tel Aviv coast and the Green Line—into a two-pronged, heavily populated metropolitan bulwark extending deep into the West Bank, with one 'finger' that includes the settlement of Ariel and east to Shilo and another that extends from the settlement suburbs of East Jerusalem east to Ma'ale Adumim and the heights overlooking the Jordan Valley border zone.¹⁴⁷

In Taba, Barak insisted on the higher figure of 6 percent, but then offered much better compensation with a small parcel of land on the southern edge of the West Bank, together with a chunk of the Negev Desert adjacent to the Gaza Strip. He also dropped the demand for interim control of the Jordan Valley.¹⁴⁸ The PLO's demurral at Camp David began to appear justified: having been heavily criticized for a lack of creativity and sticking to the lines of June 4, 1967, they could now claim that Israel had moved considerably closer to *their* interpretation of UNSC Resolution 242. With the publication of the Geneva Accord in October 2003, which admittedly enjoyed absolutely no official status whatsoever, the principle of full withdrawal became explicit. According to Article 4, "In accordance with UNSC Resolution 242 and 338, the border between the states of Palestine and Israel shall be based on the June 4th 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis..."¹⁴⁹

Proposals on settlements improved considerably between Camp David and Taba, although neither came close to realizing full decolonization. Camp David kept a clear majority of settlements intact and secured Israeli sovereignty over the main West Bank aquifers.¹⁵⁰ Taba improved on that, conceding eighty-seven settlements to the

Palestinians while retaining forty-one for Israel, placing around one-third of the settler population in PA territory. The remainder would be annexed to Israel.¹⁵¹ The Geneva Accord held out the promise of a more thorough “evacuation” with negotiated exceptions: the IDF would remain in the Jordan Valley for three more years, and the major settlements arcing north to south around Jerusalem, including Givat Ze’ev, Givon, Ma’ale Adumim, and Gush Etzion, would be annexed to Israel. The northern West Bank city-settlement of Ariel would go to the Palestinians, as would Har Homa and Efrat on either side of Bethlehem. The evacuations and the transfer of authority would be completed within thirty months of any such agreement coming into effect.¹⁵²

On the city of Jerusalem, Camp David left much to be defined, but Israel assumed sovereignty over the arbitrarily expanded municipal boundaries. Within those boundaries, a complex formula was suggested wherein the PA would enjoy different types of jurisdiction over different areas. This included sovereignty in selected “outer” neighborhoods in the Arab east and “functional jurisdiction” over some “inner” neighborhoods closer to the old city. Within the old city itself, the Muslim and Christian quarters would fall under Palestinian sovereignty, the Armenian and Jewish quarters under Israeli. The most sensitive spot of all, al-Haram al-Sharif, would be divided between Palestinian “sovereign custody” and Israeli “residual sovereignty.”¹⁵³ This novel solution was refined by Clinton, so that

The border between Arab East and Jewish West Jerusalem would, at the most contested point on earth, flip from the horizontal to the vertical—giving the Palestinians sovereignty on top of the Mount while maintaining Israeli sovereignty below the surface, over the Wailing Wall and the airspace above the Mount.¹⁵⁴

Novel or not, the Palestinians remained unimpressed, aware that they would be held accountable to constituencies well beyond Palestine for what happened to al-Haram al-Sharif and the old city. Akram Haniyya recalled Arafat making the point,

Jerusalem is not only a Palestinian city... It is also an Arab, Islamic, and Christian city. If I am going to make a decision on Jerusalem, I have to consult with the Sunnis and the Shi’a and all Arab countries.... Do you really believe that any of these countries or groups would agree to give legitimacy to Israel’s pretensions, to give up Jerusalem and the Haram al-Sharif?... Do you expect me to hand over my Christian compatriots to Israel?... What would my friend [the Coptic] Pope Shenoudah say if I did this?¹⁵⁵

Jerusalem has since received extensive treatment in Article 6 of the hypothetical solution proposed by the Geneva Accord. The old city would be divided, Israel assume sovereignty over the Wailing Wall, the state of Palestine over al-Haram al-Sharif. The arrangements are to be overseen by a multinational presence that includes the Organization of the Islamic Conference to “monitor, verify and assist” in implementation.¹⁵⁶

Camp David said little about who would be allowed to reside in the prospective Palestinian state. Israel declined to accept any moral responsibility for the human catastrophe its creation necessitated, drawing parallels instead with the Jewish emigration from Arab states that the 1948 war precipitated. It was suggested that compensation for both parties be determined by an international fund, and idea floated earlier in a paper known as the Abu Mazin-Beilin Plan (conceived in 1995 but not made public for five years due to the issue's sensitivity).¹⁵⁷ Regarding the refugee issue, Taba stands in sharp contrast to Camp David. Led on the Israeli side by then justice minister Yossi Beilin, subsequently co-architect of the Geneva Accord, negotiations produced a paper that went some way toward meeting Palestinian expectations. Article 7 read,

Since 1948, the Palestinians' yearning has been enshrined in the twin principles of the "right of return" and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state deriving the basis from International Law. The realization of the aspirations of the Palestinian people, as recognized in this agreement, includes the exercise of their right to self-determination and the comprehensive and just solution for the Palestinian refugees, based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194, providing for their return and guaranteeing the future welfare and well-being of the refugees, thereby addressing the refugee problem in all its aspects.¹⁵⁸

Further articles clarified that any implementation would not be allowed to threaten Israel's demographic security by stipulating control mechanisms and quotas. Utterly rejected by Likud and unlikely to be implemented anytime soon, Beilin's proposals broke new ground. Even so, they fell short of the Palestinian political need for moral recognition of Israeli responsibility for the refugee tragedy and acknowledgment of the right to return, if not its actual implementation. The PLO clarified the point,

Israeli recognition of the Palestinian right of return does not mean that all refugees will exercise that right. What is needed in addition to such recognition is the concept of choice. Many refugees may opt for (i) resettlement in third countries, (ii) resettlement in a newly independent Palestine (though they originate from that part of Palestine which became Israel) or (iii) normalization of their legal status in the host country where they currently reside. In addition, the right of return may be implemented in phases so as to address Israel's demographic concerns.¹⁵⁹

The main lines of the Beilin proposal seem to have re-emerged in Article 7 of the Geneva Accord: it includes a reference to UNGA Resolution 194, but then dilutes it by avoiding any reference to the right of return. What is offered is a menu of choices close but not identical to those suggested by the PLO, with the stipulation that return to Israel "shall be at the sovereign discretion of Israel and will be in accordance with a number that Israel will submit to the International Commission [formed for the task]."¹⁶⁰ Contentious poll results from the Palestinian polling center PCPSR published in July 2003 suggest that this need not be entirely inconsistent with a solution acceptable to at least some refugees. Drawing on previous research that found an overwhelming majority held the "right of

return” to be sacred, PCPSR then “sought to find out how refugees would behave once they have obtained that right...” Polls conducted in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, and Jordan found that an average of no more than 10 percent of those polled would make their first choice a return to Israel and the assumption of Israeli citizenship, although this option was especially popular in Lebanon (23 percent) due to the harsh conditions for refugees induced by the Lebanese government and extant links with relatives still in Israel. In contrast, an average of 31 percent would choose to move directly to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza with compensation for so doing, an average of 23 percent would move to areas inside Israel that would then be swapped in the 1:1 territorial exchange between Palestine and Israel, and an average of 17 percent wished to remain where they were (most popular in Jordan). Other options, including an outright rejection of all those presented, accounted for the remainder. Despite these intriguing findings, the gap between what each side might find an acceptable number of returnees remained vast. PCPSR calculated the number of refugees wishing to return to Israel from the three areas in question (with citizenship or on various other bases) would be over 370,000, although preferences were subject to a range of variables.¹⁶¹ In contrast, figures emerging from Israel suggested a readiness to absorb “around 40,000 refugees over a period of several years.”¹⁶²

In summary, the Camp David summit closed without a deal but not without prospects for one. Cajoled against their own better judgment into a summit they had hoped to avoid, the Palestinians avoided the charge of immediate sabotage by not refusing to attend. Once there, they stuck to the agreed contours of the Palestinian nationalist agenda and retained sufficient agency to decline the offer of unprecedented generosity when it was laid, insofar as it ever was, before them.¹⁶³ The Palestinian position can be interpreted first and foremost as a means of preserving, indeed improving, the standing of Arafat and the authoritative leadership of the nationalist elite by sticking to the commonly agreed contours of the nationalist agenda. It was, in and of itself, a means of restoring authoritative leadership. Notwithstanding the calumny heaped upon them by Israel and the United States, Arafat and his team returned to Palestine as heroes. The Palestinian pessimism preceding the summit was captured by pollsters, who found that only 37 percent had expected the negotiators to reach “an acceptable final agreement” while a full 53 percent had not.¹⁶⁴ Besides restoring authoritative leadership, the appropriateness of the decision is suggested by the improved contours of the national project that emerged as the Palestinians held out. They also retained their hard won international recognition as they did so. Declining the offer did not imply shifting orientation or losing international recognition; the PLO/PA retained both. Arafat’s last welcome in the White House came as late as January 2, 2001, and his official standing in Washington survived up until the Bush speech in June 2002.¹⁶⁵ And productive negotiations with an Israeli government continued for six more months, during which the positions presented as final in July were substantially revised in the PLO’s favor. The Clinton proposals of December 23, 2000, evinced progress, as did Taba the following month. The PLO remained habituated to diplomacy, striving to bring the Israeli position closer to international legality, the PLO’s mandate, and the constituencies they were mandated to represent. Matters quite out of Palestinian hands then snapped the door to diplomacy shut. But as and when the door reopened, and one day it would have to, the

contours of the project to be resumed had been improved considerably between Camp David and Taba.

Anti-Colonial Revolt: The al-Aqsa Intifada

That a deal was not realized at Camp David did not surprise the majority of Palestinians; they had not expected it to, but this did not trigger rebellion. Instead, the likelihood of a second intifada is suggested by turning again to Gurr, in whose work we find identified specific conditions that would “either facilitate or obstruct the expression of the revolutionary potential which is generated by relative deprivation.”¹⁶⁶ Gurr’s criteria include the degree of deprivation, the extent to which opportunities are confounded, the intensity of the commitment to redress, beliefs and traditions legitimizing violence, persistence of anger, and the extent of group support for resistance. Consideration of the Palestinian circumstance in mid-2000 suggests that the criteria were lining up. After seven years in the Oslo framework, the gap between international legitimacy and the results delivered had widened, accelerated colonization prompted differential development and confounded opportunity, political awareness remained high, a history of resistance informed a belief in the right to engage in it still, revived political mobilization gave expression to unresolved grievances, and faith in the Oslo process continued to erode.

But in addition to identifying the preconditions, Gurr also helps us read the shape of the rebellion once it began, directing us to examine “the particular form of violence and its specific targets or victims” and “the use of force and repression by the government in power, the perceived legitimacy of the regime, and the political culture of society.”¹⁶⁷ The bulk of Palestinian violence occurred within the occupied territories and was directed at settlers and the IDF, with most head-on clashes occurring around the checkpoints, on the bypass roads, and at intersections related to the settlement infrastructure, an intensified and prolonged replay of the tunnel intifada of September 1996 and the Prisoners’ Week clashes of May 2000. The Islamist factions in particular also chose on occasion to carry the fight across the Green Line, most often in the form of suicide bombings, a phenomenon that merits attention in its own right. The use of force by the IDF was severe, including use of live ammunition, snipers, assassination, air raids, closure, and finally full-scale military reinvasion with curfew and mass detention. The absolute lack of legitimacy accorded the occupation regime and its methods can be seen in its antithesis, the tremendous moral certainty that is such a striking feature of the Palestinian discourse and that is anchored in a political culture and national idiom specifically forged by prolonged anti-colonial struggle.

Fatah in the al-Aqsa Intifada

At the fore of the latest stage of the struggle were the local Fatah leaders of the *tanzim*. For Sari Nusayba, “Fatah was what made Oslo succeed. Without this, it is doubtful that the whole peace process would have succeeded at all.” The Fatah *tanzim* had mobilized in support of the peace process from the Madrid conference onward, and it had done so at times in the teeth of stiff opposition. One Fatah activist drew an analogy with Israeli

politics that underscored the point: “The entire Fatah organization is basically Peace Now.”¹⁶⁸ In Shu’fat refugee camp, Jihad Abu Znayd explained the role of the *iqlim*: “The mission was to carry the peace agreement. It had been done in the central committee, and now we need to carry it with the people.” Abu Znayd stressed that the mission and the work of the *iqlim* were peaceful, and that she herself had maintained contacts with the Israeli left, including Women in Black and Peace Now, with whom Fatah personnel had cooperated in Durban.¹⁶⁹

The *iqlim* also campaigned for PA reform and, within the parameters of Oslo, on key issues from the Palestinian nationalist agenda. Besides holding elections in public institutions such as universities, hospitals, and municipalities to democratize the movement, the *iqlim* organized demonstrations, petitions, and various awareness-raising sessions. Salah Zuhayqa noted that the position in Jerusalem was a little different from *iqlim* elsewhere: “In Jerusalem we had a different role than in most of the West Bank or Gaza, because we are under occupation and we face [a variety of] Israeli restrictions.” The Jerusalem *iqlim* were obliged to work close to the boundaries of Israeli law and with a much looser relationship to the PA. They organized demonstrations, often but not always with Israeli permission, to put the Palestinian case on Jerusalem and to address settlement expansion, home demolition, Israeli tax collection within the municipality, prisoners, and the right of return, and to mark the Palestinian national days, including the anniversary of the establishment of Fatah on January 1. Zuhayqa emphasized the novelty of the *iqlim* initiative; “we were like people in a laboratory, we don’t know what might happen, what the reaction will be or produce.”¹⁷⁰

Reform, democratization, and peaceful nationalist mobilization were all themes consistent with *tanzim* support for Oslo, but lasting viability required that Oslo lead somewhere, to a better horizon that rewarded commitment with political capital. It did not, and Nusayba watched from within as the mood changed: “Unfortunately, all the people that led the process of support came to the conclusion that Israel is misleading them.”¹⁷¹ Fatah’s West Bank general secretary Marwan al-Barghuthi epitomized this change, losing faith in Oslo and fearing, by extension, for his own political standing. The higher committees had undertaken to build a foundation for peace at the grass roots level, and the general secretary himself had nurtured a great many close relationships on Israel’s left, including senior figures in the Labor party. As for Barghuthi’s efforts inside Fatah, ‘Imad Ghayaza noted, “Everyone knows he worked with the Israelis for peace and established the Fatah youth organisation (Shabiba) [to help facilitate] normalisation.”¹⁷² Another forum for regular elections and a lively debate, Shabiba secured funding from the Norwegian Labor Party for its activities. At the time of writing it was led in the West Bank by Fahmi Za’riri and in Gaza by ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Awad. Prior to the al-Aqsa intifada, Shabiba participated in a quadripartite initiative with the Israeli Labor Party, the youth wing of Egypt’s National Democratic Party, and the royal court in Jordan to promote peace and reconciliation. A series of conferences were held for a Young Leaders Network under the auspices of the Peres Center for Peace. They included simulated negotiations monitored by UNESCO, the last of which was held in Cyprus in late 1999, before a scheduled meeting in Ramallah was canceled in light of local political considerations.¹⁷³ An idea sadly ahead of its time, it was all very much in line with what Barghuthi had been trying to achieve from his position on the Fatah higher committee. In the view of central committee member Hani al-Hasan, “Marwan al-Barghuthi was a

radical supporter of Oslo, a *radical* supporter. I was not.” Hasan added his interpretation of what went wrong: “I am not a rejectionist, but Oslo has no mechanism. I am with phased implementation ... Oslo destroyed the momentum towards the peace after the war. What have we got? A cheap occupation.”¹⁷⁴

As Fatah’s investment in Oslo looked ever more misplaced, local leaders in the *tanzim* began to consider alternatives for reasons both tactical and political. Tactically it seemed as though fresh mobilization might be in order to lend the PLO additional weight in negotiations. Politically, it seemed advisable to put some distance between Fatah and the PA in light of the latter’s poor performance, as had been done in the elections for the Bir Zeit student council. Zuhayqa emphasized how the pressure was building beneath the feet of the returnee Fatah leadership: “It’s not like Arafat pressed the intifada button and says ‘let’s start the intifada.’ No, we had a lot of issues to deal with.”¹⁷⁵ Sa’d al-Nimr, office manager for the Campaign to Free Marwan al-Barghuthi and head of the National Solidarity Campaign with Palestinian POWs, pointed first and foremost to a popular loss of faith in diplomacy: “There is a feeling amongst the people we’ve been run over by all these treaties, and that negotiating became the target of the peace process. Israel just renegotiates each and every part, creating the illusion of peace through the process.”¹⁷⁶ Nimr’s reference to the people was well made: the *iqlim* had been campaigning among the grass roots on popular issues, mobilizing local Fatah constituencies and coordinating with the other factions, raising awareness, and pressing for action and reform. For the *iqlim* leadership it was not just that they felt that they should do; politically, they knew that they had to. And so far they had done it all peacefully.

And then, on Thursday, September 28, 2000, Ariel Sharon insisted on visiting al-Haram al-Sharif in the company of some one thousand IDF troops and policemen. Engaged in a bitter struggle with arch-rival Netanyahu for leadership of Likud, a headline-grabbing assertion of Israeli sovereignty over Islam’s third holiest site appears to have taken place for internal political reasons. But as a needless provocation, it was not unprecedented: fifteen years earlier, having bought a house in the Muslim Quarter of the old city, which he would never use but would always advertise with a huge Israeli flag draped over Arab heads below, Sharon insisted on celebrating Hanukkah in the company of dozens of soldiers and policemen during the opening week of the first intifada. On both occasions the reaction was predictable. For Zuhayqa, Sharon’s al-Aqsa visit “was the straw that broke the camel’s back” (*al-qasha alati qasamat dhahr al-ba’ir*).¹⁷⁷

The day after the visit, Friday prayers led to clashes in the mosque compound that left four unarmed Palestinians dead and over two hundred wounded, many of them from Shu’fat and the neighboring village of ‘Anata.¹⁷⁸ Three weeks of demonstrations followed that were marked by mass participation in clashes with the IDF, border guards, and Israeli police that were mostly, but not entirely, demilitarized on the Palestinian side. In Ramallah, Bir Zeit students joined the demonstration outside Beit El, where they battled for three months. Barghuthi was there with them. As the demonstrations and stone throwing progressed across the West Bank and Gaza, fifteen Palestinians were killed by the end of September, four of them children. They included the twelve-year-old Muhammad al-Dura, shot dead on his way home to al-Burayj refugee camp at the checkpoint guarding the settlement at Netzarim, an icon of the al-Aqsa intifada in more ways than one. Televised images of the slaying prompted demonstrations across the Green Line; ten thousand marched through Umm al-Fahm, and three were shot dead, the

toll rising to eleven nationwide within forty-eight hours. Altogether, thirteen Palestinian citizens of Israel would be killed by the end of October; 102 were killed in the West Bank and Gaza, twenty-eight of them under the age of eighteen.¹⁷⁹ They would soon be joined by Paris 'Awda, a thirteen-year-old captured on film on October 29 at the Qarni crossing as he confronted an IDF tank with a stone: a second icon of the new intifada, he was killed by the IDF ten days later.¹⁸⁰ As with al-Dura and 'Awda, the great majority of Palestinian dead during the first weeks of the uprising had been unarmed.

The argument for resuming armed struggle gained impetus as the casualty toll rose, the ready availability of weapons on the Israeli black market adding to the temptation.¹⁸¹ Nimr had expected a rerun of the first intifada, but suggested that the Barak government's response, in which the IDF replayed its tough stance of September 1996, prompted an escalation: "The Israeli retaliation was so hard, and so harsh they pushed us to retaliate back and militarise the whole thing. Once it began, no one can contain it." He added that the use of overwhelming firepower, including F16s and Apache helicopters (the latter ironically named after a people made famous by their own spirited attempts to resist colonization), helped to induce a sense of utter powerlessness that encouraged suicidal alternatives: "There is no way to directly fight an Apache."¹⁸²

As with the first intifada, the second also started with an eruption of popular anger and was marked by a high degree of cross-class popular participation. But thereafter the rhythm began to change; whereas the first intifada gained real social momentum for a full three years, the second quickly lost it, with "class cleavages becoming more apparent in that it was mainly the poorer segments that took part."¹⁸³ After a while, mass demonstrations were largely confined to funerals, of which there were many as the second intifada became much more violent.¹⁸⁴ On October 12, mourners returning from one funeral found two Israeli soldiers who had strayed into Ramallah; the soldiers were beaten to death, despite the efforts of Palestinian policemen to protect them.¹⁸⁵

Casualty figures vary depending on source, with exceptions drawn according to different criteria and on the basis of different data, but for this analysis I have drawn solely on material from B'Tselem. It is readily accessible to the reader in its original format. In the occupied territories, over the five years and nine months between the beginning of the first intifada in December 1987 and the signing of the DoP, 1,070 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces and another 54 by Israeli civilians, which adds up to 1,124. Thirty-eight Palestinians were killed in Israel during the same period, for a total of 1,162 dead. In less than half that time, two years and nine months between the beginning of the second intifada up to the end of June 2003 (the month that saw the signing of the Roadmap and the negotiations for the unilateral Palestinian ceasefire), 2,081 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security forces and a further 32 by Israeli civilians, adding up to 2,113. Forty-eight Palestinians were killed in Israel (excluding bombers who killed themselves), for a total of 2,161 dead. Roughly speaking, that means that during the second intifada Palestinians suffered almost twice the number of dead in half the period of time. The death toll for Israelis also increased markedly: from December 1987 to the DoP they counted 90 dead in the occupied territories and 70 in Israel, for a total of 160 dead. From the start of the second intifada until the end of June 2003, they lost 355 in the occupied territories and 393 in Israel, for a total of 748 dead, over five times as many, again in half the time.¹⁸⁶ In the macabre arithmetic of the intifadas, the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli dead narrowed sharply, from around eight to

one in the first intifada, to three to one in the second, although the IDF, on instruction from Ariel Sharon, would set about restoring the equation during 2004.

By the time the Roadmap sought to draw it to a close, 'Imad Ghayaza estimated that no more than 5 percent of the Palestinian population were actively involved in the al-Aqsa intifada, although many, many more remained supportive. Ghassan Anduni points to the militarization of clashes (both a cause and a consequence of the rising casualty rate), the confusion of ongoing negotiations, and the ambiguous role of the PA in discouraging mass involvement.¹⁸⁷ The rising toll in Palestinian life was also due in part to the changing cartography of resistance dictated by colonization and the expanded settlement infrastructure, which allowed the IDF to focus, predict, and police the clashes to its advantage.

Fatah began to launch strikes against the settlements in the third week; from mid-October mortars were fired at settlements in Gaza and machine gun fire was directed at the settlements of Gilo and Har Homa from the neighboring Palestinian towns of Bayt Jala and Bayt Sahur. Both were quickly reinvaded. From August 2001 the IDF announced that it was in Bayt Jala to stay, "marking Israel's first reoccupation of West Bank area A."¹⁸⁸ In Gaza, the Area A suburb of Bayt Hanun had already been invaded in April.¹⁸⁹ In one of few instances in which Palestinians actually forced a withdrawal, an Israeli border policeman was killed as the post guarding Joseph's tomb in Nablus was stormed.

In response to the mass demonstrations and a rising death toll, the United States allowed UNSC Resolution 1322 to pass on October 7; it abstained from the vote, but did not deploy the veto. The wording was harsh: "Reaffirming the need for full respect by all of the Holy Places of the City of Jerusalem, and condemning any behavior to the contrary" the Security Council

1. Deplores the provocation carried out at Al-Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem on 28 September 2000, and the subsequent violence there and at other Holy Places, as well as in other areas throughout the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, resulting in over 80 Palestinian deaths and many other casualties;
2. Condemns acts of violence, especially the excessive use of force against Palestinians, resulting in injury and loss of human life;
3. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and its responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
4. Calls for the immediate cessation of violence, and for all necessary steps to be taken to ensure that violence ceases, that new provocative actions are avoided, and that the situation returns to normality in a way which promotes the prospects for the Middle East peace process.

The resolution continued with additional calls for a mechanism of inquiry and a resumption of negotiations that foreshadowed the Sharm al-Shaykh summit in later in the month; the Mitchell Report was commissioned, and a call for an immediate return to the status quo ante issued. But by now calls for a ceasefire were falling on deaf ears; sacrifice demanded reward, and an end to the fledgling al-Aqsa intifada was out of the question. Barghuthi was defiant:

We were calm for seven years in order to give a chance to the negotiations, of which I have been a keen supporter. But the Israelis used that time in order to negotiate interim agreements that were never implemented and to continue their policy of fait accompli on the ground: the new settlements, the expropriations, the confiscation of land, the keeping of prisoners in jails. Why should calm now be restored? So that they can resume the same policy? We have the right to self-determination, like all the peoples of the world.¹⁹⁰

For the *tanzim* cadres dusting down their weapons, the aim was to grind down settler morale through a limited war of attrition. It was a goal that Barghuthi would soon claim was being realized: “We have succeeded in making the lives of the settlers very difficult. Their settlements have become military bunkers rather than homes. Our message is simple: The Israeli people will not feel secure for as long as they continue to occupy our territory.”¹⁹¹ Fatah offices were first rocketed October 30.¹⁹² Then on November 9, *tanzim* cadre Husayn ‘Ubayat was assassinated by an Apache helicopter in Bayt Sahur. Four more Fatah offices were rocketed to mark the November 15 declaration of Palestinian independence, and another *tanzim* cadre, Jamal ‘Abd al-Raziq, was shot to death outside the southern Gaza settlement of Morag the following week. The extra-judicial killings began to mount, especially among middle-ranked *tanzim* cadres, and then on the eve of the new year Israel stepped up an echelon and killed Thabit Thabit, Fatah general secretary in Tulkarm and a renowned peace activist, in what was later claimed to be a mistake.¹⁹³

The odd public statement notwithstanding, Barghuthi’s position had little support in the central committee or the revolutionary council. The handful of serious Oslo rejectionists remained abroad, and the vast majority of returnees evinced little enthusiasm for a renewal of armed struggle. From Fatah headquarters in the smart Ramallah suburb of al-Balu’, Hani al-Hasan recalled a meeting with Barghuthi that followed the start of hostilities: “I told him, armed struggle is finished. Now you have to use the word confrontation (*muwaja*).”¹⁹⁴ A short ride across town in al-Bira, at the now dilapidated and near deserted offices of the higher committee, one Barghuthi sympathizer put it this way:

They [the central committee and revolutionary council] want to live here under normal circumstances, they want to live here [in] a good economic situation, they don’t like problems. They said “enough from us, we have struggled enough, this is our homeland, we must live like other people all over the world.” But for the higher committee, they said “we are under occupation and we must struggle against this occupation.”¹⁹⁵

Within the *tanzim*, a major adaptation to the changing political environment was the formation of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, a wholly local, fully decentralized, and militant response that drew on the overtly religious themes of the second intifada and a socio-political environment conducive to support for Hamas and Islamic Jihad. According to Ghayaza, “it is totally decentralised. [For example], we four, sat around this table decide one night ‘ok, we are al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade in Bir Zeit.’ And so we

are.”¹⁹⁶ The brigades were very much a tactical political response by local Fatah cells to help them keep pace with Hamas. Unlike Hamas or Islamic Jihad, they were not aiming for the strategic goal of an Islamic state. Former PLO official Mahjub ‘Umar stressed the spontaneity of the move and noted that for Fatah, “there was a need for something to come under the banner of Islam, considering the predominant atmosphere.” In the words of one very senior Fatah figure, “Fatah felt that Hamas had taken over the armed struggle and therefore encouraged the creation of the brigades... You have to take into consideration the organisational pride among Fatah members that played a role in that.”¹⁹⁷ The Brigades’ publicity stressed the continuity of the movement within Fatah:

A new stage has started which brings to light men who came with the sun (al-‘Asifa), and ran (Shabiba) toward fast victory (the Black Panthers) and with the ability to soar in the sky (the Fatah Hawks)...the al-Aqsa Martyr’s [*sic*] Brigades was formed...for those who seek martyrdom and want to wear the robe of struggle in studied retaliation and with virtuous conduct.¹⁹⁸

For resources, the Brigades could draw on experienced Fatah cadres for leadership, the *tanzim* for networks, the established Fatah organization for finance, and a ready supply of volunteers for the missions, including the suicide bombing operations they would eventually undertake. On Barghuthi’s role, Ghayaza saw it as very indirect: “He is the address for the youth in Fatah, if you want paper, advice or money, and it’s his constituency. He has to deliver.” Fatah cadres from the villages would present themselves at the higher committee offices in al-Bira and they expected him to help: “He doesn’t know they’re going to buy guns but his duty is to supply Fatah members, from the Fatah budget, their needs.”¹⁹⁹ Barghuthi’s own resources came from Arafat, which in the view of Sa’d al-Nimr was the real reason Israel had put Barghuthi on trial: if they could first get Barghuthi, they might then go after Arafat.²⁰⁰ The charges facing Barghuthi were similar in this sense to those leveled at Fu’ad al-Shubaki, the Fatah official in charge of financing the security apparatus and the only other member of the revolutionary council to be imprisoned within the borders of mandate Palestine.²⁰¹

Following the assassination of celebrated Fatah leader Ra’id al-Karmi in Tulkarm on January 14, 2002, the Brigades ended one of several abortive ceasefires and the first Fatah suicide bombing followed on January 27. The Brigades could also claim the first female suicide bomber in Wafa Idris: two were killed in the operation, and over one hundred were injured.²⁰² Fatah thus began to contribute decisively, if briefly, to the toll on Israeli life within the Green Line; altogether 325 civilians, 64 of them under eighteen, and 68 security force personnel were killed in Israel between the onset of the second intifada and the end of June 2003.²⁰³

Colonization, closure, and disempowerment helped generate an environment increasingly conducive to martyrdom. Danny Rubinstein pointed to deteriorating social and economic circumstances but also to “conditions of continuous daily humiliation because of the Israeli siege, the checkpoints and the punitive raids, searches, and arrests by the IDF...” Rather than seeing an orchestrated campaign, Rubinstein asserted, “The impulse to perpetrate terrorism comes from below, from the embittered Palestinian who

is thirsting for revenge and has become alienated from his leadership...”²⁰⁴ Rubinstein paraphrased Israeli scholar Avishai Margalit:

The main motive for the suicide bombers is revenge... Vengeance is a matter of culture, a search for justice, a value. The suicide bomber pays with his most supreme interest, his life, so the other will suffer... Humiliation has become a key element in Palestinian complaints... Israeli humiliation of the Palestinians in the territories is not only harming their lives, property and livelihood, meaning their interests, but also their human dignity.²⁰⁵

Particularly influential in the north of the West Bank between Jinin, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Nablus, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades phenomenon contributed to the localization of politics and the acute fragmentation of political authority in Palestine. We saw in chapter 5 how the Nablus branch defied Hani al-Hasan, a member of the Fatah central committee, as minister of the interior. Not surprisingly, they were unwilling to act on instructions from Husayn al-Shaykh at the *Marji’iyyat Fatah* in Ramallah. In August 2002, Shaykh announced, “It is not part of Fatah’s strategy to harm innocent people and carry out attacks inside Israel. Our strategy is to set up a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.” The Brigades rejected the statement “unless Israel withdraws from the Palestinian territories, releases Palestinian prisoners and stops assassinating the Palestinian leadership.”²⁰⁶

In the southern Gaza Strip between Khan Yunis and Rafah, Fatah members signed up for a series of popular resistance committees and soon found themselves in a comparable position. Another wholly local and decentralized initiative, the committees were cross factional but dominated by Fatah, which has very deep roots in that part of the Strip. PRC members were drawn from the veteran cadre of the first intifada, many of whom had been recruited into the PA bureaucracy and security services. The *tanzim* had been more thoroughly absorbed into the security services in Gaza and were generally considered “more accountable to Arafat” than those in the West Bank. Because of that, a majority of strikes against Israeli targets in Gaza were conducted by the PRCs.²⁰⁷ The PRCs also counted a high proportion of refugees among their ranks, some fifteen thousand of whom had been moved there thirty years earlier by none other than Sharon himself, then head of the IDF southern command.²⁰⁸ As with the Brigades, the committees were a *response*, in this instance to rising Palestinian casualties in the south of the Strip, which they sought to redress by taking the fight to the occupier. The political message conveyed to the PA was consistent with that of the higher committees: end the political arrest of Palestinians, end security cooperation with the IDF, and reform the PA.²⁰⁹ In other words, break with the structures of dependency engineered by Oslo.

The West Bank and Gaza: Cartography of Colonization and Resistance

The fragmentation of resistance manifest in Fatah was one function of the new cartography drawn by Oslo. Kamil Mansur summarized it thus:

Instead of returning the population to civilian life...this cartography scarred their daily landscape with countless new signs of military control: watch-towers, barbed wire, concrete block barriers, zigzagging tracks, forced detours, flying checkpoints...the new cartography required the multiplication of checkpoints among areas A, B, C, and with Israeli territory. It also required the implementation of an extraordinarily complicated permit system...it made it impossible to link many area A and B enclaves among themselves, making it impossible to build road networks, electricity and telephone grids, agricultural roads, drinking water or sewage systems, and so on.²¹⁰

The fractured map bore witness to a fractured uprising, in which the focal points of confrontation and violence were the checkpoints and settlements imposed on Palestinian space. The World Bank, the Mitchell Report, and the Tenet Plan all drew attention to the newly focused nature of the conflict. The World Bank noted that damage from armed confrontation “is mostly located in border areas in Gaza, near settlements and army positions in various locations, or in and around PA security buildings in several municipalities.”²¹¹ The Mitchell Report explicitly labeled settlements “focal points for substantial friction” and “provocations likely to preclude the onset of productive talks.” Tenet made the connection implicitly with the call for a joint PA-IDF security committee to “identify key flash points” and cooperation between personnel “responsible for each flash point” to manage them. Tenet also called for both sides to

Identify and agree to the practical measures needed to enforce “no demonstration zones” and “buffer zones” around flash points to reduce opportunities for confrontation. Both sides will adopt all necessary measures to prevent riots and to control demonstrations, particularly in flash-point areas.²¹²

For the IDF, the expanded settlement infrastructure delivered another means of securing the colonial enterprise in the form of the internal closure regime. Cited by the World Bank as the single major cause of Palestinian economic decline, the Bank found

A dense network of fixed and mobile military checkpoints has been established on transportation lines within the West Bank and Gaza since September 28, 2000.... Internal closure is not distributed evenly, and is to some extent associated with the various ‘flashpoints’ near settlements and military encampments.²¹³

A map produced by the PA’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation showed 159 checkpoints, 31 in the Gaza Strip and 128 in the West Bank.²¹⁴ An unofficial Israeli report estimated a total of 300 checkpoints, 120 of them staffed.²¹⁵ Following the confirmation of his government in March 2001, Sharon utilized the settlement infrastructure to even greater effect, instructing the IDF to launch Operation Bronze, which further divided the West Bank and Gaza into at least 54 isolated enclaves using checkpoints, roadblocks, and trenches.²¹⁶

Internal closure may have hindered Palestinian attacks, but it certainly could not stop them altogether. Casualties spiked during spring 2002, but continued to accrue even after the reinvasion of Operation Defensive Shield. The distribution of Israeli dead underlines the anti-colonial nature of the violence: as we have seen, of the total 748 Israelis killed by Palestinians resident in the occupied territories between the start of the uprising and the end of June 2003, 393 were within the Green Line and 355 beyond it. But of those 355, 189 were civilians (29 of them under eighteen).²¹⁷ In percentage terms that means that 47 percent of Israeli dead were killed in the occupied territories, 26 percent of them civilian, a vast majority of whom can be assumed to have been settlers. Settlers thus account for up to 25 percent of the dead, from a group that represented slightly less than 8 percent of the Jewish population of the state.²¹⁸ The disproportionate number of settler dead is a reflection of the Palestinian focus on campaigning in the occupied territories: according to Nadav Shragai, it has been calculated that from September 2000 up to the ceasefire in mid-2003, a total of 18,135 attacks of all kinds were conducted by the Palestinian resistance, 17,405 of them in the West Bank and Gaza, and only 730 in Israel. Shragai notes that in percentage terms that puts 96 percent in the occupied territories and only 4 percent in Israel. The rough parity in casualties (355 beyond the Green Line, 393 within it) is due to the much smaller number of attacks within the Green Line being far more likely to be suicide bombings, and hence far more deadly.²¹⁹

Of the total 2,113 Palestinian dead in the occupied territories by the end of June 2003 (386 of them under eighteen), 32 were killed by Israeli civilians, 3 of the victims under eighteen. This type of settler violence (some of it in self-defense) is not a new feature of the colonization campaign, having claimed 145 Palestinian lives since the beginning of the first intifada in December 1987.²²⁰ Besides killing, B'Tselem reported a range of other activities entirely harmful to the Palestinian population. They include

Setting up roadblocks to disrupt normal Palestinian life, shooting at rooftop water heaters, burning cars, smashing windows, destroying crops and uprooting trees, and harassing merchants and owners of stalls in the market. Some of the settlers' violence against Palestinians is intended to force Palestinians to leave their homes or land, so that the perpetrators can take control over the Palestinian land.

During the olive-picking season, in which many Palestinians are at work in olive groves, violent groups of settlers increase their attacks on Palestinians. In these attacks, settlers fire at olive pickers, killing and wounding them, steal their crop, and destroy their trees.²²¹

To the intense embarrassment of many Israelis, former chief rabbi Mordechai Eliahu publicly lent his blessing to crop theft with a ruling issued during the al-Aqsa intifada that claimed "the fruit from the trees planted by Gentiles on land inherited by the people of Israel, does not belong to the Gentiles."²²²

Both the efficacy and wisdom of the Palestinian military campaign have since been seriously questioned; the former given unfavorable comparisons with Hizb Allah, the latter in light of the terrible cost exacted by Israel. Mahmud 'Abbas made the second point in a famous speech given to Fatah cadres in Gaza in which he called for an end to the militarization of the uprising.²²³ But with up to one in four Israeli casualties drawn

from the settler population, the campaign did succeed in making itself felt among the target community. By autumn 2001 *Settlement Report* noted,

The 1,200 kilometers of roads in the West Bank and Gaza have been newly reclassified according to their danger to traveling settlers.... New 'rules of the road' published in February advise settlers not to enter areas B except when traveling on main roads, to avoid all contact with Palestinian police, to travel in vehicles equipped with a communications device and armoured against stones...and to travel in convoys of at least two vehicles

Ten percent of the 1,000 small- and medium-sized settlement-based businesses in the region north of Ramallah, which employ 30 percent of the settlement residents, have closed permanently in the last year, and another 30 percent have stopped operating.²²⁴

By the end of 2002, the Yesha Council's head of security estimated that 140 settlements wanted to erect an electronic fence to secure their perimeter, with total settlement fences approaching five hundred kilometers in length. The IDF tripled the number of soldiers detailed for settlement protection during the same period. The major *Ha'aretz* report on settlements of September 2003 put the cost of security in the occupied territories during the intifada alone at \$0.8 billion.²²⁵

The PA and the al-Aqsa Intifada: "Like a Dancer on the Stairs"

The likely consequences of Sharon's visit to al-Haram al-Sharif were well understood by Arafat and the PA, and, as with the Camp David II summit, they cautioned against it. Barak personally authorized it, and then blamed the PA for the consequences. Government statements just days before the intifada broke out asserted that the PA was "no longer in control of events."²²⁶ On the other hand, as Tanya Reinhart has documented, from spring 2000 much energy had already been invested in conditioning Israeli and international opinion to lay the blame for violence firmly at the PA's door. Reinhart draws particular attention to the publication in November 2000 of a document entitled "Palestinian Authority Non-Compliance: A Record of Bad Faith and Misconduct." It convinced few, but Reinhart argues that it gave a good indication of Israel's intention to destroy the PA.²²⁷ Efforts to traduce the Palestinian leadership grew, especially after September 11, 2001, and were spurred on again in January 2002 by the revelation of the weapons shipment allegedly bound for Palestine aboard the *Karime A* that landed Fu'ad al-Shubaki in jail. Arafat became the Palestinian Usama bin Ladin, and Sharon labeled the PA "a major player in the network of international terrorism spearheaded by Iran and aimed at sowing death and destruction throughout the world."²²⁸

By January 2003, Civil Administration head Major General Amos Gilad declared that all attempts to reach peace were doomed as long as Arafat remained in power, because the PLO chairman would never settle for anything less than all of mandate Palestine. The fact that for all his flaws as a statebuilder Arafat had spent decades struggling to generate a consensus in the PLO based on partition in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 seems to have been missed or discounted. Evident military defeat notwithstanding,

Gilad now suggested that Arafat would rely on demography to achieve what armed struggle could not. The logical conclusion was that the IDF should maintain full control of the occupied territories.²²⁹ It was a convenient view to hold for the man at the head of the Civil Administration. IDF Military Intelligence also weighed in to help with the propaganda war; Aluf Benn documented a greatly expanded role accorded the IDF's intelligence branch after Sharon came to power. Instructed to produce and disseminate anti-PA propaganda for a worldwide audience, officers were routinely dispatched in advance of official trips abroad to pave the political way, stressing "terror" and "corruption" in every sentence with "PA."²³⁰ Narrow, inaccurate, and utterly self-serving, this false analysis conveniently precluded all possibility of a political horizon, the one thing that could truly threaten the cohesion of the Sharon government and the array of colonial vested interests embodied in it.

Gilad's message in fact predated his turn at the head of the Civil Administration. From 1996 to 2001, he was head of the research division at IDF Military Intelligence, a powerful position from which he wielded considerable influence. The mendacious narrative that he peddled suited well the self-serving Barak, as well as the hard-line colonial agenda of Sharon, Mofaz, and Ya'alon. But as time passed, Israeli journalists found that the case put by Gilad was increasingly coming into question, not least of all from elements at IDF Military Intelligence itself. Perhaps most significantly, prominent Israeli critics of the Gilad narrative include Amos Malka, himself a former head of the IDF's intelligence branch. Malka was adamant: "I say, with full responsibility, that during my entire period as head of Military Intelligence, there was not a single research department document that expressed the assessment that Gilad claims to have presented to the prime minister." Unfortunately, there was no shortage of ears ready to hear the Gilad message, and no shortage of colonial interests well-served by it: "What Gilad said suited them better, and therefore they adopted it."²³¹

Israeli propaganda aside, how might the agency of the PA leadership during the al-Aqsa intifada be properly characterized? On one point at least, almost every observer, Palestinian or otherwise, can agree: unimpressive. Neither Arafat nor the broader nationalist elite at the head of the PA initiated the al-Aqsa intifada; it began as a popular reaction to provocation in the context of deep frustration with colonialism and a raft of unmet expectations related to a failed attempt to modify colonial rule. As we saw in chapter 5, the demonstrators, and shortly thereafter the political factions resuming armed struggle, were emphatically *not* joined by systematic military cooperation on the part of the PA's security services. Limited, decentralized operations were undertaken, and Force 17 in particular almost obliterated for its efforts, but there was no strategic campaign. For 'Abd al-Jawad Salih, the security forces were often drawn in, unable "to stand idly by, their hands tied behind their backs, while young people were being killed... The police were forced to be involved in response to people's demand for protection."²³² Politics made it very difficult to tightly police the clashes or the resistance, besides which, relying on patronage and personalization, Arafat had seen to it that rational command structures were not in place. But the PLO's news agency, WAFA, made the official position quite clear: "Only by political means shall we achieve our goals, by the use of rocks to fight the Israelis, on the roadblocks and in the settlements, not inside Israel, and not using firearms."²³³

The ambivalent security posture notwithstanding, a more serious charge might be that once it had started, neither Arafat nor the PA did much to provide political leadership either. This was one of several accusations leveled at the PA by Haydar ‘Abd al-Shafi as the intifada approached its second anniversary: “The leadership has a duty to organize the Intifada. The leadership’s failure to uphold this responsibility left the Intifada to proceed in a disorderly manner that played into Israel’s hands.”²³⁴ Did the PA really fail to uphold its responsibilities? And if so, how do we account for the lack of political leadership in this most critical of critical junctures?

Kamil Mansur delineated three options available to the PA: one, throwing its full weight into renewed armed struggle with Israel; two, throwing its full weight into policing the new intifada; and three, blending armed struggle with broader civil disobedience. For Mansur the first option was “as ridiculous as it [was] suicidal,” the second too but at the hands of its own people, and the third impossible, a choice of which the PA was “structurally incapable” given that it would have required

Forming a coalition of all the organizations active on the ground, anticipating the Israeli response by having some go underground, dismantling its security services and merging them into the population in a reconstituted form, and, finally, sacrificing a good part of the official institutions and administrative apparatus that grew out of the Oslo process.²³⁵

In light of the esteem in which many from civil society and the left had come to regard the PA, voluntary self-dissolution may not have been such a bad thing: it offered a sort of “honorable way out” of the failed national project, and would seriously have restructured Palestinian politics in favor of the opposition. On an ideological level, it afforded a rare opportunity to articulate an alternative political vision. But it cannot have been a surprise that it did not come to pass. Institutions, be they colonial, anti-colonial, or otherwise, rarely choose to fall on their own swords.

And so, for the PA leadership, neither decisively containing nor directing the intifada (either politically or militarily) seems to have become a substitute for a more properly proactive policy. In light of the unappetizing menu of choices before them, it is explicable. Sayigh saw it as one more example of a tried and tested Arafat tactic, *al-hurub ila al-amam* (escape by running forward), wherein Arafat seized an opportunity not of his own making “to obscure and escape a strategic predicament, and then sought to intensify and prolong that event as a means of gaining ‘crisis dominance’ and ultimately of inducing an outcome to his advantage.”²³⁶ In this scenario, Arafat could take a hands-off approach to Fatah’s remobilization in the hope that reprisals and crisis escalation would draw in external intervention, ideally a much more substantial and empowered version of the TIPH in Hebron that had been formed in the wake of the 1994 massacre.²³⁷ International intervention would also have the advantage of redressing the gross asymmetry in power between the two sides. It is another example of a sound idea that is highly unlikely to take place, in this case due to resolute Israeli opposition.

Bir Zeit’s ‘Imad Ghayaza drew on a colorful Egyptian proverb to capture the PA’s predicament: *mathal alati raqasat ‘ala al-silim: la ilifawq sama’uha wa la ili taht sha’ifuha*. “Like one who dances on the stairs; those above cannot hear her, and those

below cannot see her.” He added, “This is the tragedy of the Authority.” Ghayaza’s choice of metaphor is apposite: in terms of our original framework, the nationalist elite can be said to have remained habituated to diplomacy and the Oslo process that created it, seeking to protect such institutional interests and achievements as had been established from the DoP and the Gaza-Jericho redeployments onward. On the other hand, aware of its dented legitimacy, the PA leadership hoped to bolster or at least to maintain a relationship with the society it purported to lead and the leadership in the field without which it could not hope to govern. As the toll on human life continued to rise, it was not in much of a position to arrest or otherwise confront the local cadres who dared to resist the occupation, be they Fatah or otherwise. Not surprisingly, the policy that resulted appeared inconsistent or even incoherent. Ghayaza recalled: “Today fight, tomorrow be realistic; they were always jumping up and down.”²³⁸

‘Azmi Bishara regretted the lack of PA-led mobilization just prior to the intifada; “confrontation—the staging of demonstrations at checkpoints, besieging an Israeli settlement in Gaza, raising tensions in Hebron—remains within the dependent relationship.”²³⁹ Such PA initiative as was forthcoming never really escaped the structures of dependency that Oslo had tied them into. One visible development was the establishment in November 2000 of the cross-factional *Lujnat al-Wataniyya al-Islamiyya al-‘Ulya*, a higher committee combining national and Islamic elements, the NIHC. Composed of fifteen PLO and non-PLO factions, it published messages and instructions for the masses, “providing direction rather than actual leadership.”²⁴⁰ Ghayaza put it this way: “it has spokesmen only, some people sit and talk. It was established to solve [inter-factional] conflict and present a united front.”²⁴¹ Usher suggests that Arafat originally deferred to the *tanzim* on this point, authorizing them to found and lead it in “a deliberate move to prevent the protests from coming under the wing of the Islamists.”²⁴² As a vehicle for lending the intifada coherence, it was of some use, issuing statements across the territories and providing a website for a window onto the intifada from outside. Its second role as a means of institutionalized cross-factional communication was perhaps the more important. For example, following the riots and deaths that shook Gaza in October 2001, Arafat deployed Fatah to mend the fence: “In an emergency...meeting with the other Palestinian factions, including Hamas, a ‘unified’ statement was agreed... National and Islamic Forces...stated that ‘what happened today in Gaza was against our intifada’ and the PA agreed to establish an enquiry.”²⁴³ The institutionalization of interfactional cooperation was a vital asset when negotiating a unilateral ceasefire: Usher notes that Barghuthi “managed to forge a ‘strategic unity’ with the Islamists, wielding enough influence to make them abide by national decisions like the 16 December [2001] ceasefire.”²⁴⁴ In this and other ways the NIHC could contribute and carry out its limited mandate, but it in no way constituted an authoritative leadership for the al-Aqsa intifada. It was never meant to. In Ghayaza’s words, “the Authority doesn’t want another authority.”

Decisive engagement required elite readiness to breach with the structures of dependency at considerable risk to its assets. In the southern Gaza Strip, the PRCs showed some appreciation of this, while insisting that they be left alone to carry forward the fight:

We are aware that there are limitations on what the PA can do and say as a result of international pressure and we don't expect them to necessarily conduct themselves with full militancy. Likewise at the same time, we do expect to take our own liberty and fulfil our responsibility to defend our homes and children and resist the occupation.²⁴⁵

It was always a difficult arrangement, and in April 2001, under rising pressure to act, Arafat ordered the PRCs to disband. The PA arrested PRC head Yasir Za'nun, a local Fatah leader of some note, and required all Fatah members and PA policemen to withdraw. Demonstrations followed in Rafah, and with his finger on the pulse of the street once again, Barghuthi was outspoken in his criticism of the move. The PRC issued leaflets "saying that if the PA was 'embarrassed' that Palestinian fighters were members of the PSF, 'we are ready to tender our resignations from these institutions.'"²⁴⁶ As with the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades' defiance of Hasan, the incident with the PRC illustrates again the dilemmas confronting the PA.

Another illustration can be found in the tortuous history of the ceasefires. The Sharm al-Shaykh formula from October 2000 set the tone, calling for a ceasefire, Israeli withdrawal from the PA's areas, and a resumption of security cooperation. Both the Mitchell Report and Tenet Plan then essentially reworked the same formula: Mitchell called for an "unconditional cessation of violence," the immediate resumption of "security cooperation," and a "cooling off period" accompanied by "additional confidence building measures";²⁴⁷ the Tenet Plan, somewhat optimistically, took as its "operational premise... that the two sides are committed to a mutual, comprehensive cease-fire."²⁴⁸ The original Egyptian venue was accompanied by a continuing role for Egypt in truce negotiations: they were regularly but not always held in Cairo, and often mediated by Egypt's *mukhabarat* chief 'Umar Sulayman, a man with the ear of President Mubarak and a plausible candidate to succeed him.²⁴⁹ The Sharm al-Shaykh formula ran directly counter to the goals of the *tanzim* and the other factions newly re-engaged in the struggle, not to mention public opinion, and the PA balked. In Sayigh's analysis, the temptation of garnering fresh diplomatic leverage from the violence may have been an additional consideration: elite agency appropriating the latest anti-colonial shudder to its advantage.

In the meantime, Arafat and the PA elite trod a narrow path. Official television broadcast images and honored the martyrs of the intifada on the one hand, and carried regular calls for restraint on the other. Eight months into the uprising, in May 2001, Sharon declared a "unilateral cease-fire" in which Arafat showed some interest; contacts were permitted between PA and Israeli security, but no official cease-fire call emerged.²⁵⁰ It did, however, on June 2, the day after a Hamas suicide bomber killed twenty-two outside the Dolphinarium nightclub in Tel Aviv. Facing the prospect of international pariah status, Arafat read a statement in public "condemning the bombing and ordering an immediate and unconditional ceasefire."²⁵¹ Fatah and the NIHC agreed to it, while taking it to mean an end to attacks inside Israel but not the occupied territories; it was after all an anti-colonial struggle.

This was the moment when the Tenet Plan might have kicked in, but Sharon's insistence on a six-week cooling off period free entirely of any act of resistance rendered prospects for success unlikely. For the PA, the hopes for international observers were not

forthcoming, proactive security steps led to clashes with their own people quite unappreciated by Israel, and the six-week stipulation was practically impossible to meet.²⁵² It was probably meant to be. So the situation deteriorated with no prospect of change for the better. Then in September 2001, Arafat attempted to seize the moment, signing on for a second time to the same terms in the hope that the United States would help him by pressuring Israel.²⁵³ It was too late, and with world audiences glued to TV replays of the images from New York, Arafat found himself equated with bin Ladin as Sharon began to hammer the Palestinians with renewed intensity. In comparison to its explosive start in autumn 2000, the al-Aqsa intifada's fatality figures reveal a drop in the number of Palestinians killed by Israeli security services for the first eight months of 2001: between January and August an average of twenty-six Palestinians were killed per month. In September it was sixty-two, and in October eighty-two, the highest figures prior to the full-scale reinvasion of spring the following year.²⁵⁴

The story of the ceasefire suggests that prevarication notwithstanding, when the PA did seem ready to act, Israel seemed ready to ensure that they fail. The most common method was through extra-judicial killing of a leading Palestinian figure, usually from Hamas; correlation is not causation, but at the very least there is a case to answer. The Sharon cabinet first set unlikely conditions for political progress: from eight weeks of calm to a ten-day cessation of violence to be followed by six weeks of calm, and finally a scaled-down insistence on a violence-free week. Tenet duly struggled to take hold. In July 2001, Israel assassinated Hamas political leaders Salah Darwaza, Jamal Mansur, and Jamal Damuni in Nablus.²⁵⁵ It didn't help. On November 23, Israel assassinated Hamas leader Mahmud Abu Hanud, prompting a fresh round of suicide bombings and the premature assertion that Arafat was now "irrelevant," just as U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell was trying to encourage the ceasefire then resought by Arafat since September. On December 16, Arafat took the plunge again, announcing: "I today reiterate the complete and immediate cessation of all military activities, especially suicide attacks which we have always condemned."²⁵⁶ The IDF did nothing to reciprocate, and then pointed to the *Karine A* and launched a new wave of incursions. In March 2002, the PA announced that it was "fully ready" for the "strict implementation of the recommendations in the Tenet plan and Mitchell Report."²⁵⁷ But Israel had other ideas. The Arab League summit opened in Beirut, Arafat was not allowed to attend as the unwelcome Saudi peace plan emerged, and a bombing in Netanya on March 27 opened the door to the well-planned Operation Defensive Shield (March 29-May 10, 2002). On July 23, Israel assassinated Salah Shihada in an air strike that killed fifteen people including most of his immediate family, just as painstaking negotiations had come to fruition on another ceasefire initiative.²⁵⁸ Ibrahim al-Makadma was killed during March 2003, as the PLO central committee and the Legislative Council considered creating the post of prime minister and approving the 'Abbas appointment. In negotiations preempted by the Shihada assassination, ceasefire moderates in the local Hamas leadership had been led by Isma'il Abu Shanab; Israel assassinated him as the Roadmap limped out of the blocks, just as it tried for the first time to assassinate Hamas firebrand 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi and spokesman Mahmud al-Zahar, who lost his son in the attack.

Fatah was by no means immune to assassination, with 'Ubayat, Thabit, and Karmi prominent among the dead. In August 2001, Barghuthi aide Muhind Dirya narrowly escaped an attempt that may or may not have been meant for Barghuthi himself.²⁵⁹ Some

twelve months later the NIHC convened in Gaza, led for Fatah by the same level of cadre that had regularly been targeted, to lend new coherence to the “aims and means” of the intifada: “Fatah pressed for a clear acknowledgment that the goal of the national struggle was the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and that resistance, armed and popular, should be confined to these territories.”²⁶⁰ Resistance and restraint: the overlaps and ambiguities among the *iqlim*, the *tanzim*, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the PRC, and the NIHC all point to Fatah’s complex and conflicted role under the PA. On the one hand, Fatah provided a degree of institutionalization between the PA elite and the grass roots that provided vital channels of communication, generated political support, and offered effective means of conflict mediation. It mitigated serious civil strife Within the Palestinian polity. Later, when the unilateral ceasefire that temporarily accompanied the launch of the Roadmap finally emerged, it was *tanzim* cadres, most of them now in prison, who delivered it. On the other hand, Fatah local cadres had proved ready and able to mobilize in defense of their own political standing as well as on principle, regardless of the negative consequences such mobilization might hold for their official leadership. In the circumstances prevailing by autumn 2000, Fatah *tanzim* cadres actively sought a breach with Oslo’s dependent framework, in part on principle, in part because of the political need to distance themselves from Oslo’s failed formula. When the *tanzim* moved back into the field they left a political vacuum behind them; there were no alternatives to fill it, and Oslo’s tenuous arrangements began to implode.

Returning to Table 1, at root the al-Aqsa intifada can be understood as a result of Oslo’s critical failure to deliver a successful transition to statehood. It provided, for a time, the means of self-maintenance for the nationalist elite, but resulted in a tangible increase in repression and a reformulation of authoritarianism based on patronage and demobilization in order to render Palestinian society consistent with the Oslo framework. Mandated to neutralize society’s capacity to resist, the PA served as reluctant colonial proxy. But as colonization advanced, the autonomy project lost kudos to the point where it ceased to constitute an acceptable national project. The early grounds well of people against it could be seen in the grumbling of civil society, mobilization in Fatah, and the persistence of opposition to these arrangements. Calls for democratization and reform had broken spectacularly to the surface in the affair of the Committee of Twenty, and were gaining momentum within Fatah itself.

Colonial rule by proxy alienated constituencies and cadres, particularly in the refugee camps, towns, and villages outside the urban centers of relative affluence, to the point where Fatah at least in part had become an *insubordinate* armed force, capable of bringing retaliation and reprisal down upon the heads of its nominal—but not necessarily authoritative—leadership. The wholly disproportionate use of force by the IDF only made matters worse, with the *tanzim* re-entering the fray in a lopsided anti-colonial struggle, and the PA caught in the middle, between trying to maintain its assets dependant on the relationship with Israel, and its credibility challenged by the popular movement of people. And so it vacillated. For Israel the critical moment had arrived and the PA had failed the test, unwilling and incapable of fulfilling its role as guarantor of the colonization drive. In so doing the recalcitrant PA rendered itself a failed institutional modification of Zionist colonial rule and so became a legitimate target. Institutions were assaulted and territory reclaimed. Barak employed force to encourage the PA to act as

had been intended by its Labor architects. Sharon employed more force to try and encourage the same, and then when that failed and circumstance permitted, employed still more in an effort to obliterate an institutional innovation that should never have been allowed to take root in the first place.

8

After Arafat, on to al-Aqsa

Palestinian Institutions Face the Future

The PLO's trajectory has been conceived of as a transitional route, composed of overlapping but distinct stages describing movement toward a diplomatically realized institutional solution to the issue of Palestinian self determination. The elite-driven adaptation of the institution was shown to have gradually established a credible quasi-state apparatus, with admission to a meaningful diplomatic process finally secured in 1993.

The Oslo framework resecured the authoritative leadership of the nationalist elite in exile, secured a fresh role for the bureaucracy and armed forces of the PLO, and established a measure of accepted territory for the establishment of the new national project. The DoP similarly enhanced the PLO's international recognition through the unequivocal adoption of a pro-Western orientation that realigned the institution with its international structural context. At a time of considerable vulnerability, the DoP also allowed for a quick fix in a tight spot: within the Palestinian polity, it denied the delegation to Madrid and Washington the kudos that an alternative national project might have lent them, even one which *of necessity* would have returned the diaspora-based institutions to Palestine; it seriously wrong-footed the opposition, both secular and Islamist; and it allowed for the co-option of semi-independent local Fatah militia into the apparatus of the new autonomy project. Funding from the international community then provided the means and patronage the tried and trusted method to consolidate the new arrangements; thus did the diasporabased elite resecure their authoritative leadership within the Palestinian polity.

From the first redeployments to Gaza and Jericho and the establishment of the PA in 1994, the aim of the transition process became the consolidation of the national project and the conversion of the attributes of limited autonomy into sovereign Palestinian statehood. But the terms of transition set by the Oslo framework reflected the structural context in which it had been negotiated and the weakened condition of the PLO at point of entry into the process. The PLO leadership then proved signally unable to transcend the limitations of the Oslo framework; several years of process did little to bring agreement on the final contours of the national project any closer, and deadlines for a final status agreement passed. From the perspective of the PLO's mandate (not to mention Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation), Oslo's failure was systemic and comprehensive, a degree of failure for which high-drama, last-minute summitry could not reasonably be expected to compensate. Negotiations from Camp David to Taba were then interrupted by Israeli electoral politics. In the meantime, tensions inhering in the structures of Palestinian society, which had first helped draw the PLO back to Palestine and then been contained by it, were set to break free. Accelerated Zionist colonization

and the concomitant failure to realize an acceptable national project collapsed the socio-political foundations of PA rule; Oslo imploded as the new intifada broke forth.

The colonizing power then visited massive destruction on the PA and collective punishment on Palestinian society, the former for failing to quell the revolt, the latter for lending support to it. Palestinian institutions were reduced to rubble, local leaderships decapitated, communities isolated and impoverished. The latest U.S.-led war on Iraq then suggested a moment in which Israel might choose to finish the depopulation of mandate Palestine it had initiated in 1948. Palestinian fears were widespread and tangible, lent credence by the service record of the incumbent prime minister and the official platforms and public statements of elements in his second coalition government.¹ But it did not happen. Even with the target population duly immiserated it would have been difficult work: painful lessons had been absorbed at all levels of Palestinian society since 1948 and 1967, the borders of the frontline Arab states were somewhat more resilient, the operation would have been impossible to conceal from the world's media, the Israeli military-political elite were cognizant of the improving reach of international legal redress for war crimes, and carnage on the scale necessary might have induced the type of international intervention consistently rejected by the IDF.² Considerable strain would also have been placed on the fabric of Israeli society (and not just its Palestinian component), and the low standing of the United States in the region dragged to previously unfathomable depths. Insofar as there was a will, there was not much of a way. Besides, "evacuation by choice" remained an alternative: destruction of property, calibrated assassinations and random casualties, closure, unemployment, poverty, disease and malnutrition might yet work in the long run without attracting unmanageable media attention.

In the meantime, and despite being shorn of institutions and leadership, immobilized and cast into poverty, most of Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza remained in the West Bank and Gaza as major combat operations in Iraq were formally, if somewhat prematurely, announced to have come to an end.³ Israeli policies continued to induce Arab emigration and those with the motivation and means to do so continued to leave, but the bulk of the Palestinian population remained on the land as what had seemed a propitious moment to shift it *en masse* came and went. If cost/benefit calculations in Israel do not radically alter, if Benny Morris' "apocalyptic" circumstances are not realized and "acts of expulsion" not found "entirely reasonable,"⁴ then what remains of the Palestinian population in its pre-1948 borders will one way or another have to be governed where it is. Referring to the occupied territories, Sharon himself made an unwelcome statement to this effect before the Likud central committee:

The idea that it is possible to continue keeping 3.5 million Palestinians under occupation—yes, it is occupation, you might not like the word, but what is happening is occupation—is bad for Israel, and bad for Palestinians, and bad for the Israeli economy. Controlling 3.5 million Palestinians cannot go on forever. You want to remain in Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah and Bethlehem?⁵

This might be said to constitute the principal assumption of the Roadmap.

The official launch in Aqaba marked an internationally sponsored attempt to restart the process of Palestinian institution building. It is a three-phase plan for the realization—in one form or another—of the PLO's second transition from PA to statehood. There are important internal modifications to be sure, but arrangements and personnel were, for the most part, as they had been prior to Oslo's inward collapse. The major difference to the process was that the end point had now been unequivocally stated to include Palestinian statehood. But the Roadmap's track was a narrow one, and it accorded the Palestinian nationalist elite very limited scope for the exercise of elite agency. Limited, but not zero: they could hold on to the document, reform institutions, co-opt opposition, appeal to sponsors, and continue to point to a case well made in international law. The passing of Arafat then seemed to lend them a new opportunity to capitalize on those assets. And if they so chose, they could also draw on a people with a proven capacity for mobilization, as long as they were confident of being able to channel it in a peaceful yet productive fashion. The transition to statehood remained far from complete, the dimensions and details bitterly contested, and the toll on Palestinian life would continue to climb. But as it did so, the contours of an end-point for the PLO's national project—a project with renewed if often ineffectual international support—could in part be discerned as the constituent parts began to emerge from the rule of Yasir Arafat and the convulsions of the al-Aqsa intifada.

Authoritative Leadership

Developments in authoritative leadership were layered between faction and quasi-government institutions, tightly interwoven with several other criteria from Table I, and profoundly affected by Arafat's death. On the factional level the Fatah movement, whose project Oslo was and whose foot soldiers were mandated to carry it, looked severely battered. On the quasi-governmental level so did the PA, while the PLO retained its unfulfilled mandate to lead the process to some sort of conclusion. Analysis of all three led to Yasir Arafat: for all the upheaval, he had retained the leadership of Fatah, the presidency of the PA, and the chairmanship of the PLO up until his death on November 11, 2004, at the age of 75.⁶

Fatah

Pre-intifada grass roots pressure for reform had long presented a challenge to Arafat's personal domination of Fatah and through Fatah of the PA. The goal of the sixth general conference promised a watershed moment from which a reconstituted movement might emerge. The central committee had sanctioned elections, the bureau of mobilization and organization supervised the process, and Arafat personally presided over more than one opening ceremony in the *aqalim*; returnee institutions certainly exercised leverage, but the higher committees' agenda of reform and renewal presented a coherent alternative to Arafat's pivotal and largely unaccountable management of the movement. The sixth general conference, had he lived to see it, would surely have returned him to the central committee, but not to the same central committee and not on the same basis. The al-Aqsa intifada stalled the process; it redirected grassroots pressure away from internal politics

and back onto occupation, and caused a regression from public to clandestine work. It might be said that the renewal of anti-colonial resistance—if more by accident than design—served to dissipate organized pressure for change within the movement; it had worked to Arafat's immediate advantage, and as with diplomacy so within Fatah, the uprising was a resource to be appropriated. When the uprising began to wind down, Arafat prevailed for as long as his health permitted, still chairing meetings until physically removed to Paris for treatment.

But he had come to prevail within a movement that was now a ghost of its former self. The central committee was effectively reduced to a rump of personalities focused in Ramallah. It would still convene regularly, and always prior to important sessions of the Legislative Council to give Arafat some leverage,⁷ but Oslo's failure, the trauma of Israel's response to the uprising, and the politics of reform were dividing senior cadres with one eye on the battle for succession. The creation of the post of prime minister added to the stress, particularly the struggle for the Ministry of the Interior and by extension for control of parts of the security apparatus. A similar story prevailed in the revolutionary council, still in the albeit partly reluctant grip of an aging if once capable vanguard, some of whom hoped to retire, some of whom hoped for elevation to the central committee. Fatah's Cairo office chief Barakat al-Fara credited the revolutionary council with initiative but not success: "There is no doubt that the leading institutions of the movement, and in particular the revolutionary council, tried several times to put forward concepts of reform, but these attempts have not succeeded and have instead 'gone the ways of the wind' [*dhahabat adraj al-riyah*]." He went on to predict dire consequences if matters were not addressed:

We issue a warning that Fatah as it stands, without fundamental reform and a reconsideration of all of its programmes, will not be able to surmount the coming historical phase. It is even possible that both masses and members will disassociate themselves from it, leaving behind "nothing but the thrones" [*khawiyya 'ala 'urushihi*] and a void to be filled from outside the movement.⁸

The higher committees gave added ground for fear; in the West Bank, the once-bustling hub in al-Bira was gutted, its cadres subject to heavy losses, its computer hard drives carried off by the IDF, and its charismatic figurehead resting in Eshel jail in Bir Shiba. The Gaza office remained isolated, the regional *aqalim* immobilized by closure as momentum for the sixth general conference was lost.

Revolutionary council deputy general secretary 'Adnan Samara recognized the gravity of the situation: "We are in a very dangerous situation for our movement, *very* dangerous." But he also recognized the way out and was hopeful that it might be realized: "We'll see if we have a political solution [with Israel] or not. When we have a political solution, we *must* have the sixth general conference." Samara attributed Arafat's reluctance to convene it as a means of keeping the rejectionists outside Palestine inside the movement; he had not wished to hold a conference that they could not attend. On the other hand, a final status agreement appeared distant, even as the Roadmap made its debut, and it was hoped that a conference might be expedited. For Samara this would have two great advantages: blood renewal and the dissolving of local resentment at

arbitrary appointments made in lieu of elections, two common complaints among local cadres.⁹ Haytham Arrar extended the analysis to the higher committees, observing that the engine of reform itself had never been properly elected either. She pointed to Hani al-Hasan's initiative from the bureau: selected cadres from the *iqlim* and the higher committees were being appointed to it by the central committee; it was simply impossible to add everyone who wanted to be added, the appointments system was not just in the eyes of many (specifically the majority who were not appointed), and nothing less than the conference could solve it.¹⁰ Problems were exacerbated by the fact that the bureau as a unit had been and still was led from Tunis by Muhammad Ghnaym (Abu Mahir), a very capable man but so far unwilling to return to Palestine. Dalai Salama pointed out that prior to Oslo no insiders had worked in the bureau: "There is always a problem...the bureau on the ground here is not active and Abu Mahir is abroad."¹¹ Hasan was charged with preliminary steps to redress that, but several months after his plans for restructuring first saw the light of day, organizational reality remained far removed from the intricate design on paper.¹² (See appendix 5.)

The challenges confronting Hasan were immense. To the pressing need for a merger between inside and out were added fragmentation by closure and a splintering into local militia. Some utilized the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades brand name, some did not bother, but all were reverting to kinship and other informal ties over formal organization that facilitated cooperation with local allies more readily than obedience to the nominal Fatah leadership. This seems to have been especially true in the north of the West Bank. The PRCs in southern Gaza told a similar story, as did the Abu Rish Brigades, also in the Strip. Hasan recalled an incident from a refugee camp near Nablus. Having received a letter from twenty-two cadres informing him that they had left the movement for Islamic Jihad, he had the records checked and found that salaries had not been forwarded for two or three months. Hasan made a point of sending the overdue money, before calling upon them in person. "I was amazed," he recalled, "they sent the money back, with the reply 'Hani, our leader [in Islamic Jihad] gave us guns. We don't want money.'"¹³

If the sixth general conference could finally convene, external and internal institutions finally mesh, and a democratically reconstituted Fatah with a freshly legitimized leadership and functional, participatory institutions emerge, it might be in some position to resume the transition from faction to party. Barakat al-Fara called for a "revolution within the revolution" that included a feasibility study for completing the transition from movement to party.¹⁴ Sari Nusayba issued a similar call for an "internal intifada" and a Fatah relaunch as party rather than movement.¹⁵ If that could be realized, Fatah might reassert its authoritative leadership on a new, coherent and politically focused basis. But it looked a tall order. In February 2004, the need to do something had prompted the twenty-third session of the revolutionary council, the first in nearly four years. The session took four days, with the opening postponed for a day in order to muster an absolute majority. These issues were addressed, but not to the satisfaction of many. Just days after four hundred West Bank members resigned in despair, it was agreed that "the sixth general conference will be convened within a year of the date of this session"¹⁶ and that the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades would restrict all military operations to the West Bank and Gaza. Council member and minister of communications 'Azzam al-Ahmad was heard to declare, "Anyone violating this decision will not be a member of Fatah."¹⁷ But it seemed eminently likely that both decisions would have limited effect, the first due to

ambivalence at the top, the second due to the loss of command and control in the context of closure, fragmentation, and regression to informal networks.

The post-Arafat era opened up contrasting scenarios for Fatah that reflected quite closely the prospects for the PA at large: accelerated reform, improved inclusion of the intifada generation and consequently improved cohesion and efficacy, or (in the absence of the center embodied by Arafat) accelerated fragmentation. There was certainly no shortage of will to see that the former scenario prevailed, and given the extent to which Arafat's patronage network had already been undermined, the ground had in some respects already been prepared. The degree of factionalism in the Gaza Strip appeared problematic, but the likely amelioration of the IDF's closure regime due to international pressure to facilitate elections held out the possibility of political progress. On an organizational level, it remained to be seen if the new circumstances would entice bureau chief Muhammad Ghnaym back to Palestine, and if so to what effect.

In the short run, the Fatah hierarchy followed protocol and gave their second-ranking member, Faruq al-Qaddumi, responsibility for chairing meetings of the central committee. Qaddumi was the last surviving member of Fatah's original five founders, now in his seventies. As he was an opponent of Oslo and still seemingly unwilling to return to Palestine, it was unclear how effective he would be in leading the movement. Nevertheless, protocol was seen to be followed, the central committee majority on the inside effectively co-opted their senior colleague on the outside, and Qaddumi was quick to lend his support to 'Abbas as the official Fatah candidate in the upcoming elections for president of the PA. If Marwan al-Barguthi were to challenge 'Abbas from prison, he would be obliged to do so as a Fatah independent. Many felt his moment had yet to come, and Barguthi decided against this contest.

Internal problems and sudden new challenges notwithstanding, Fatah retained a firm grip on what remained of the PA. The resignation of Prime Minister Mahmud 'Abbas on September 6, 2003, had prompted the installment of an emergency cabinet under Ahmad Qray'; of the eventual nine members, three held seats on the central committee, and an additional four on the revolutionary council. Of the full Qray' cabinet established in November, four were members of the central committee including the prime minister himself, the minister of the interior, and the minister of external affairs. Ten more were on the revolutionary council, of whom six were appointees. At fourteen this gave Fatah's two senior bodies their highest cabinet representation to date (see Table 14). Of the total of twenty-four ministers now permitted by the revised Basic Law (Article 65 originally, if not very effectively, set a ceiling of nineteen), nineteen were Fatah members. Trends suggested that senior portfolios tended to go to members of the central committee (finance being the main exception), and just under half the remainder to members of the revolutionary council, which seemed if anything to be strengthening its representation as prominent local cadres were incorporated.¹⁸ Prizes for durability were due to Sha'th and 'Urayqat, who could claim to have held a seat in each of the eight cabinets. The same was more or less true of Wazir; she continued to head Social Affairs and had been in all but the short-lived emergency cabinet in October.¹⁹

Table 14 Fatah Cadres from the Central Committee and the Revolutionary Council in the Qray‘ Cabinet, November 2003

Institution	Position	Name	Rank in Fatah
Prime Minister’s Office	Prime Minister	Ahmad Qray‘	CC
Information	Minister		
<i>Awaqf</i> and Religious Affairs	Minister		
Communications	Minister	‘Azzam al-Ahmad	RC
Culture and Arts	Minister	Yahya Yakhluuf	RC
Education and Higher Education	Minister	Na‘im Abu al-Hummus	RCO
External Affairs	Minister	Nabil Sha‘th	CC*
Interior	Minister	Hakam Bal‘awi	CC
Justice	Minister	Nahid al-Rayyis	RC*
Local Government	Minister	Jamal al-Shubaki	RC*
Negotiations Affairs	Minister	Sa‘ib ‘Urayqat	RC*
Prisoner Affairs	Minister	Hisham ‘Abd al-Raziq	RC*
Public Works and Housing	Minister	‘Abd al-Rahman Hamad	RC*
Social Affairs	Minister	Intisar al-Wazir	CC
Sport and Youth	Minister	Salah al-Ta‘mari	RC*
Transportation	Minister	Hikmat Zayd	RC

Key: CC=central committee; CC*=central committee appointee; RC=revolutionary council; RC*=revolutionary council appointee post-Oslo; RCO=revolutionary council observer status.

PA

Immediately prior to his death, Arafat’s position in the PA had seemed roughly comparable to his position in Fatah: still in charge but surrounded by ruin. Upon his departure, and consistent with the provisions of the Basic Law, Arafat was succeeded as PA president by the speaker of the Legislative Council, Rawhi Fattuh, for a period of sixty days. As with the Fatah central committee, it was a heartening example of Palestinian institutions functioning as they were meant to. Fattuh, a member of the Fatah revolutionary council with the respect of his peers but not a political heavyweight of national standing, declined to enter the race himself. He visited Arafat in Paris, attended his funeral in Cairo, and otherwise held the reins on a symbolic level in lieu of elections on January 9, 2005, whereafter ‘Abbas became third president of the PA.

For the PA, major institutional change had already come during Arafat’s twilight with the amendments to the Basic Law in March 2003. Revision to Article 62 secured for the president the right to hire and fire a prime minister:

The President of the National Authority shall select the Prime Minister, and task him to form his government. The President shall have the right to remove him, and to accept his resignation, as well as ask him to invite the Council of Ministers to convene.²⁰

But the office of prime minister had now come into existence, and it held considerable power. It was meant to. Insertion of a new article after Article 71 made the prime minister responsible for forming and modifying of PA cabinets, presiding over weekly cabinet meetings, and monitoring the work of ministries and other PA institutions. The prime minister in turn is required to submit proposed cabinets to the Legislative Council for approval by absolute majority.²¹ It was an institutional revolution of sorts, and it found Arafat engaged in a protracted struggle for authoritative leadership right to the last, disputing the multiple vagaries suddenly churned up by constitutional revision and the rebalancing of PA structures.

Internal challenges drew strength from popular pressure, but they were heavily reinforced from outside. An ambivalent response to the uprising (but repeated condemnation of attacks across the Green Line), compounded by an ungracious lack of recognition every time he had tried to rein things in, had left Arafat an Israeli target, if not for assassination, then at least for marginalization. Images of a besieged Arafat, trapped in his ruined *muqata'* compound illuminated by candlelight and in touch with the outside world by no more than a borrowed cell phone were among the most striking of the al-Aqsa intifada. It is indeed a fitting, if temporary, resting place. The Roadmap saw Israeli military force and wishful U.S. diplomacy take on textual precision. The preamble required a PA "leadership acting decisively against terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy." It stipulated "unambiguous acceptance by both parties of the goal of a negotiated settlement," a call for a return to solely diplomatic means that in practice seemed to apply to the Palestinians but not Israel. Besides the appointment of an "interim prime minister or cabinet with [an] empowered executive authority," institutional reform measures include the ongoing "appointment of Palestinian ministers empowered to undertake fundamental reform" and "further steps to achieve genuine separation of powers, including any necessary Palestinian legal reforms for this purpose." The changes initiated in phase I are then to be formalized in a new constitution for phase II.²²

U.S.-Israeli Roadmap diplomacy may have sought to undermine Arafat, but it did precious little to empower the first chosen alternative, and 'Abbas had given up after four months in office. His premiership had been directed to two main objectives: coordinating the security apparatus and a corresponding unilateral Palestinian ceasefire (*hudna*) that included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. Short of political instinct and driving ambition, a popular mandate, or a local clan network to offset it, he struggled.²³ He also confronted a president not commonly noted for his readiness to share power. Qray' had demonstrated rather more verve, and with a seat in the legislature could draw on an albeit limited constituency in the local community. He managed Arafat better than 'Abbas had, and maintained his distance from Israel and the United States; whereas 'Abbas met Sharon four times in four months, Qray' had not met him once during twelve months in office, although a planned meeting had been aborted in March 2004 after a double suicide bombing in Ashqelon. Qray' was endeavoring to preserve political capital until the investment seemed likely to show some return. He also tried to condition his stewardship on renewed engagement by the Quartet. If that were forthcoming, his bid for authoritative leadership might gain recognition. If Israel and the IDF were obliged to permit political progress, it would be strengthened again. But as long as the Sharon government maintained it had no credible negotiating partner, political progress with Israel—the ultimate point of authoritative leadership in the Palestinian transition toward

statehood—would elude him.²⁴ He looked set to remain prime minister in the interlude between elections for the PA presidency and the Legislative Council. Again, consistent with Fatah protocol, Qray‘ was not selected as a candidate for the PA presidency, but gave way to ‘Abbas, his senior in the movement’s hierarchy.

PLO

In the PLO, ‘Abbas as general secretary would quickly inherit Arafat’s role as chairman of the executive committee. It would alter again the dynamics prevailing within Palestinian institutions. In the period between the onset of the al-Aqsa intifada and his death, Fatah and the PA had presented their own problems, but in the PLO Arafat had been able to rely on an old and familiar friend. The organization retained its role as the ultimate reference point for Palestinian national politics; it presented Arafat with opportunities for tactical advantage, and had undergone a modest revival accordingly. The joint PLO-PA “leadership meetings” were no longer held, but ‘Abbas and Qray‘ had both known that a PLO executive committee meeting chaired by Arafat would follow every PA cabinet meeting chaired by them. It could even meet up to twice a week if need be.²⁵ From the twenty-first PNC in 1996, ‘Abbas had been general secretary (in place of Jamal al-Surani), and so was expected to attend executive committee meetings. Qray‘, on the other hand, was not a member, but he was on the 124-person PLO central council.²⁶ It retained considerable standing, and convened several times to consider issues of national importance including the revocation of articles in the charter, the case for a unilateral declaration of statehood, and creation of the post of prime minister. In line with practice in the Fatah central committee, it could also be called upon prior to a session of the legislature to help set the tone of the vote.²⁷ It was in fact a legitimate practice given the PLO’s ongoing status as the official reference point for Palestinian national politics. The PLO’s highest authority, the PNC, convened twice during Oslo in order to annul the requisite articles of the charter, and in the event of a settlement the revised third draft of the Palestinian constitution reserves the right of approval for the PNC. If it cannot convene, the central council may do so instead.²⁸ For finance, the PLO’s national fund continued to draw a 5 percent tax on Palestinians remaining in the Gulf and Libya, and 3 percent on those it could reach living on more modest salaries in Egypt, but the bulk of its finances now came from the PA.²⁹

The realm of negotiations and diplomacy remained in the PLO’s care, and in the era of “cohabitation” it was agreed that both president and prime minister would sit on a PLO committee to set the parameters of talks that Arafat had been barred from attending. This need not have been problematic given that ‘Abbas originally signed the DoP on the PLO’s behalf and had long been in charge at the PLO’s negotiations affairs department. On the other hand, the higher committee for negotiations (*al-lajnat al-‘ulya lil-mufawwadat*), which originated in the PLO, now fell within the orbit of Minister of Negotiations Affairs and ultimate Arafat loyalist Sa‘ib ‘Urayqat.³⁰ Backing up its mandate the PLO retained a respectable array of diplomatic assets, including a hundred or so diplomatic missions abroad (the greater proportion as embassies, others as special or general delegation or simply PLO offices), and there were functioning permanent missions to the Arab League, the OIC, and the UN.³¹ They were staffed by a diplomatic corps led by Qaddumi at the political department. Despite Qaddumi’s remaining in self-

imposed exile, the diplomatic corps had been working for the most part in close coordination with Arafat and the Fatah hierarchy in Palestine.

‘Abbas had appointed Nabil Sha’th to represent the PA abroad (as *wazir al-kharijiyya*, translatable as minister of either external or foreign affairs), and Qray’ had kept him, but both found that Qaddumi remained a force to be reckoned with if Arafat wished it so. This emerged in a speech ‘Abbas made to the Legislative Council just after his resignation. He declared his hope that the contents would not become public; they were published the same month in a collection of speeches, statements, and documents entitled *Trial of One Hundred and Thirty Days: Achievements and Obstacles*.³² It was extraordinarily revealing, and among a litany of complaints was the claim that Arafat had undertaken to explain the Sha’th appointment to Qaddumi, but didn’t. “The victim,” lamented ‘Abbas, “is Palestinian diplomacy, because nothing can be done: two suites and two cars and opposing positions between the cabinet and the PLO’s political department.”³³ In New York, the PLO’s observer mission to the UN continued under Arafat’s nephew, Nasr al-Qudwa, from where he put forward the Palestinian case to some effect, as he did at the International Court of Justice in The Hague when hearings opened on the separation wall.³⁴ Like several of the PLO’s senior diplomats, Qudwa held a seat on the Fatah revolutionary council. Among five new members added by the February 2004 session were Zuhdi al-Qidra at the PLO embassy in Cairo and Muhammad Sbayh at the Arab League.³⁵ As the Fatah central committee continued to avoid a clear position on the Geneva Accord and the PA remained confined to bits of the West Bank and Gaza, circumstance underlined the extent to which the PLO, and only the PLO, could give legitimacy to a final agreement that dealt with refugees, borders, and the remaining final status issues.³⁶

But the PLO joined Fatah and the PA in being well overdue for renewal. The Fatah general conference was due every five years, but had not been held since 1989. The Interim Agreement stipulated that the term of the PA presidency and Legislative Council be restricted to five years from the signing of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, according to which their mandate expired in May 1999. One immediate result of Arafat’s death would be the renewal of the PA presidency, with elections to the legislature set to follow. The PNC was supposed to be held every three years;³⁷ it had last met in 1998, but not elected an executive committee since 1996. In each case the need for renewal in Palestinian nationalist institutions was pressing: Israel’s post-Roadmap assault against Hamas, the freezing of the group’s assets as part of the “war on terror,” and the EU’s compliance in labeling it a terrorist organization suggest that it would not easily assume the mantle of authoritative leadership in the nationalists’ stead. Of the PA’s immediate neighbors, Egypt has the biggest investment in re-engineering the assertion of authoritative leadership by Fatah and the PA; a thaw in relations during 2004 notwithstanding, both chaos and Islamism are anathema to Cairo, and Gaza is right on the border. In addition, long-term relations with Fatah’s historic leadership added to Cairo’s stock in Washington.

As the clouds of mourning began to lift over Palestine, the future of authoritative leadership gradually came into focus. For the Fatah central committee, senior ranking member Faruq al-Qaddumi now chaired meetings, but only from a distance. For the PA presidency, in line with the provisions of the Basic Law, Rawhi Fattuh was elevated from speaker of the Legislative Council to the presidency for an interim period of sixty days

until new elections could be arranged. The Fatah central committee were quick to agree on 'Abbas as the movement's official candidate for PA president in the forthcoming poll, a contest that he comfortably won. Ahmad Qray' continued as PA prime minister in the interim. In the PLO, 'Abbas made a smooth transition from general secretary to chairman. In the short run, Palestinian institutions appeared to have functioned rather well in the immediate post-Arafat era, at least in the sense of filling the key positions vacated at such short notice. But the prospects for the new leadership in the medium term would depend on renewed progress in negotiations within the framework of the Roadmap generating real political dividends and some real political capital. That would be a much bigger challenge, and one over which they exerted rather less agency.

Bureaucracy

The Roadmap had two main points for the PA bureaucracy: that it should continue to exist and that it should continue to reform. On an existential level then, the Roadmap was qualified good news, with phase I calling upon the government of Israel to refrain from the "destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure." Duly preserved, phase I calls for "comprehensive political reform" that includes "drafting a Palestinian constitution, and free, fair and open elections upon the basis of those measures." The PA tentatively scheduled presidential, legislative, and municipal elections for June 2004; voter registrations were updated and put to the test more than once during 2005. Phase II looks to extend and embed the reforms with the "ratification of a democratic Palestinian constitution, formal establishment of the office of prime minister, consolidation of political reform, and the creation of a Palestinian state with provisional borders." Phase III aspires to move from provisional arrangements to a permanent status solution, within which the "consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions" is made good. In so doing the Roadmap gave voice to the international consensus on the desirability of allowing the PA to survive, an outcome seemingly at odds with Israeli actions, which steadily reduced much of the PA and its environment to rubble. Internal security minister in the first Sharon cabinet Uzi Landau stated the goal quite clearly: "We must strike at them militarily and economically, at the prestige and authority and stability of the Palestinian Authority until it collapses."³⁸

Collapse had indeed appeared imminent with the launch of Operation Defensive Shield, during which the destruction reached such levels that a coalition of normally restrained UN organizations felt obliged to issue a joint statement decrying "a humanitarian crisis without precedent in its destructive impact on the Palestinian people and its institutions."³⁹ The IDF descended with a traditional arsenal augmented by Caterpillar D-9 bulldozers, sledgehammers, and a will to destroy. Government came to a halt in Ramallah and in municipalities across the West Bank. The *muqata'* compound housing the president's and governor's offices and parts of the Ministry of the Interior was severely degraded, and the Ministries of Agriculture, Civil Affairs, Culture, Education, Finance, Information, and Social Affairs were occupied, as were the offices of PCBS and the Legislative Council.⁴⁰ The loss of records in the Ministry of Finance left one director general wondering how long it would be before they could resume payment of public sector wages and pensions.⁴¹ The reoccupation revealed a pattern of "seizure of

records and financial resources and destruction of technical infrastructure.”⁴² Public and private TV and radio stations were also prominent targets in what seemed to be a policy of “de-institutionalizing all Palestinian media.”⁴³ NGOs engaged in agricultural development, cultural work, education, human rights, prisoner support, specialized health care, and women’s rights were similarly occupied, vandalized, and looted. On the inside IDF soldiers set fires, destroyed computers, smashed furniture, and broke windows. On the outside IDF tanks and bulldozers churned up roads, demolished water mains, knocked down walls, and crushed cars. Universities and schools became improvised prisons for thousands netted in door-to-door searches as mass detention became reality in Palestine once again. Service provision collapsed below the minimal level to which it had already been reduced by closure. When IDF soldiers withdrew and curfews were lifted they left behind a trail of theft, vandalism, human excrement, and graffiti that included “Fucking Arabs don’t mess with us again” and “Instructions: Eat. Drink. Destroy.” One unit tried to leave on a different note with a polite message that read, “We are greatly sorry for the damage. We all hope to meet you in better times.”⁴⁴

So the Roadmap’s assertion that PA institutions should be allowed to continue to exist was not to be taken lightly. However, future international engagement and support were predicated on a continuing commitment to reform. PA reform then suddenly became headline news, and as it did so Gershon Baskin noted that the word meant quite different things to the different parties employing it. For ordinary Palestinians and grass roots activists, reform had been a popular demand long before it became fashionable in Tel Aviv and Washington. Marwan al-Barghuthi had been careful in this respect, continuing to pay his own mortgage on a modest flat as the villas popped up around him. Menachem Klein dates the spirit of reform captured by Barghuthi back as far as the secular left’s critique of PLO (and Fatah) methods during the 1980s.⁴⁵ Baskin stressed that in Palestinian terms, reform meant real democratization throughout their institutions, “clean and streamlined government,” an executive composed of “professionals and technocrats and not petty politicians,” and a security apparatus that provides *them* with protection and not the settlers. On the other hand, for Israel (whose own prime minister and sons endured substantial corruption scandals of their own) PA reform boiled down to “weakening or replacing Arafat” and creating a quisling regime ready to accede to the bulk of Israel’s colonial agenda. For the Bush administration (which awarded massive contracts to rebuild Iraq to corporations with impeccable Republican connections such as Halliburton and Bechtel), reform generally meant reorganization of the security apparatus in line with the broader goals of “the war on terror” and “a situation whereby the Palestinian Authority will not be able to escape responsibility by saying that they don’t have control.” For the EU as major donor and with its own history in mind, reform meant a transparent, accountable, and professional PA capable of administering the substantial levels of donor aid that the EU hoped to invest for the sake of political stability in the east Mediterranean.⁴⁶ The influence of these various agendas and priorities comes through in the hybrid document that is the Roadmap.

With Palestinian momentum already behind it, the drive for reform could hit the ground running. The Fatah higher committees had long been calling for it, as had the revolutionary council. The Legislative Council had been demanding it since the critical auditor’s report back in 1997, and in May 2002 the Council issued a statement detailing comprehensive measures for “the reconstruction and activation” of the PA’s institutions

“and in order to rectify the mistakes.”⁴⁷ Partly in response to internal pressure, and partly in anticipation of Bush’s keynote speech of June 24, the PA launched the One Hundred Day Reform Plan of the Palestinian Government on the same day.⁴⁸ PA officials were then engaged by an International Task Force on Palestinian Reform, which the Roadmap duly mandated to set and monitor progress according to “administrative, judicial and economic benchmarks.”⁴⁹ For donors, budget support is henceforth to be channeled “through the Palestinian Ministry of Finance’s Single Treasury Account.” This is to be supported by a “revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in accordance with [an] agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism.”

The One-Hundred-Day Plan had already stipulated the depositing of all “taxes, fees, profits from commercial and investment activities, foreign aid in grants and loans”⁵⁰ into one account in the Ministry of Finance. Salam Fayyad, a respected economist formerly with the World Bank and the IMF, and head of the Arab Bank in the West Bank, was chosen to make it happen. In conjunction with the single account, Fayyad saw through to completion the consolidation of multiple PA investments into a single holding company investment fund, the PIF. The PA had undertaken to do this in cooperation with the IMF just prior to the start of the al-Aqsa intifada. As part of the same initiative, the PA also listed the equity holdings of the commercial services company, PCSC, and indicated the PA’s intention to transfer them to the PIF; equity held by the PA would then be sold, and publicly held companies gradually privatized.⁵¹ By February 2003, Fayyad could publish a lengthy report, compiled with the help of accountants Standard and Poors, that detailed the unification of seventy-nine separate enterprises worth over \$650 million into the PIF’s single account.⁵² The Jericho casino, a cement company, and a landline and cellular telecommunications company were among the principal PCSC equity holdings transferred to the PIF. Even the infamous al-Bahr company was handed over to Fayyad’s stewardship.⁵³ Of the monopolies addressed by Fayyad’s reforms, fuel and cement were among those abolished. ‘Abbas himself reported that ending the monopoly on fuel alone increased PA income by \$6 million a month.⁵⁴

Fayyad’s immediate impact is suggested by the fact that by July 2002 Israel began transferring some of the estimated \$600 million of VAT and customs revenue then owed the PA for purchases made in or goods imported through Israel.⁵⁵ Transfers would continue, with some interruption, directly to the unified Ministry of Finance account. For al-Quds University’s Mundhir Dajani, Fayyad had done a fine job in the ministry: he needed to, because prior to his arrival “it was like a vegetable market.”⁵⁶ The workings of the ministry were now accountable and transparent, Fayyad’s influence had transformed the attitude of the employees, but his biggest single achievement in his first year had been the centralization of the payment of salaries. Even so, Israel continued to claim that “Arafat was channelling EU funding to terrorist organizations,”⁵⁷ and in April 2003 the EU officially shifted policy with an announcement that direct monthly budget support would be replaced by funding for specific reforms. In each case the main target of the phase I financial reform was clear: the single account, the consolidation of holdings, and the end of monopolies were major threads pulled from Arafat’s patronage network; it would not unravel entirely, but there was not much left by the time of his departure. The president’s office maintained a clear (and legitimate) line in the PA’s accounts, and the IMF estimated that Arafat had still managed up to 8 percent of the budget.⁵⁸ Additional income could still be derived from private investments managed by Muhammad Rashid

(who was granted a seat on the board of the PIF), and with Fatah, the PLO, and a Paris- and Tunisbased wife and daughter to maintain, he could certainly have used it.

Fayyad's standards and his standing with donors were mirrored in Muhammad Shtayya, managing director at PECDAR. Directly and confidently funded by the World Bank, PECDAR had managed a varied mandate but focused on infrastructure development. Neat scale models of completed schools, hospitals, and roads adorned the organization's headquarters. PECDAR also facilitated the privatization of the telecommunications infrastructure establishing the Palestinian Telecommunications Company with accountants KPMG. Electricity was next on the list. PECDAR also established the Palestinian Monetary Authority. With a solid reputation for accountability, transparency, and professionalism, and a strong record of project completion, PECDAR was a natural place to look for local help with reform. The organization already held useful experience in training: as early as 1997, PECDAR had undertaken training in ministries and municipalities. Shtayya explained that for every project in a given municipality, PECDAR would put a representative of the municipality on the steering committee "so that they could learn on the job." PECDAR was also in the process of establishing a Palestinian public administration institute. When, in response to growing pressure, Arafat first established a ministerial committee for reforms in summer 2002, it was not surprising that Shtayya should be given (and retain) one of the half-dozen or so seats on the body, along with Fayyad, Nabil Qassis, Yasir 'Abd al-Rabbu, and Mahir al-Masri.⁵⁹

Retraining the PA's human resources, which by mid-2003 had risen to 132,000 personnel (40,000 in security), presented its own special challenge. The greater proportion was either returnee PLO bureaucrats numbered by Shtayya at 13,000, or former prisoners, many from the first intifada. The skills deficit was uneven, but the need for training substantial. The greatest obstacle came from people not wanting to learn: in Shtayya's words "they think they know." Many were not so young, having spent up to forty years working for the PLO "and now we are asking them to undertake training." Different challenges came from the former prisoners: "Imagine, someone has spent sixteen years in jail and is now director general. It's not easy to accept that they need training."⁶⁰

The inertia inhering in elements of the PA bureaucracy was high on the list of complaints to emerge in the 'Abbas resignation speech: he failed with plans to revoke a tax on PA employees, he failed to introduce a civil service pension law, and he failed to replace the head of the civil service bureau. On taxes he recalled,

We made decisions on various taxes imposed on PA officials, up to 15 percent. Personally I don't know where these funds go. When we wanted to cancel them, they told us: "You're harming the intifada." What do taxes have to do with the intifada and why are national claims being raised on every issue?

The pension law would have set a mandatory retirement age of sixty and was consequently unpopular among some of the older returnees. 'Abbas was clearly stung by the response:

They said awful things about me. Although every state has pension laws, they said, “The United States is hoping they will fire some of the old PLO warriors. Until when can you employ the grandfather, his son and grandson in the same ministry when we have 18,000 university graduates?”

Just days before he resigned, he tried to replace ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Abu Shariyya’ at the recalcitrant civil service bureau. Sakhr Bsaysu was the designated successor, the governor of northern Gaza, and a man with a reputation for honesty and competence who had previously held a comparable position in the PLO under Qaddumi. Bsaysu initially returned from Tunis specifically to assume this post. But Arafat preferred to keep him as governor (from where he received orders directly), and was outraged at ‘Abbas attempting to replace an important appointment without his say so. In the event, Bsaysu’s posting was overturned by the intervention of dozens of armed men from a local al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades franchise. ‘Abbas complained that the brigades of Abu Shariyya’ “cannot occupy the offices and prevent an appointment.”⁶¹ But they did, which raised a question of Dahlan: founding head of Preventive Security in Gaza, minister of state for Security Affairs, and supposedly the most powerful man in the Strip, might he have intervened to uphold the decision for ‘Abbas had he wanted to?⁶² Summing up the impossible task that confronted him, ‘Abbas recalled,

The embassies are not within our responsibility, so why a foreign minister? The governors are not our responsibility, so why an interior minister? And the airport is not our responsibility, neither is the port in Gaza. A minister cannot appoint a deputy or director-general without Arafat’s approval. The ministers have no control over who is hired and who is fired. It all reverts to the Ra’is [Arafat].

The elevation of ‘Abbas to the chairmanship of the PLO executive committee, together with his nomination and success as the official Fatah candidate for the presidency of the PA with Qaddumi’s express approval, would seem to augur well for a rationalization of Palestinian diplomacy in the new era.

Two closing points need to be made concerning the PA bureaucracy: the extent to which it had always been subordinate to the Israeli Civil Administration and the extent to which that subordination increased during the al-Aqsa intifada. This is nowhere more evident than in the realm of Palestinian population movement. The Oslo process allowed the PA Ministry of the Interior to issue two travel documents, an identity card (*bataqa hawiyya*) and a passport (*jawaz safr*). The *hawiyya* replaced the different colored ID cards formerly issued directly by the Civil Administration. It came in a uniform pale green jacket, and it bore the logo of the PA, but the number remained the old number issued by the Civil Administration, or in the case of a new applicant, a new number issued by the Civil Administration. It was impossible to receive a PA *hawiyya* without Civil Administration approval. In the words of Hasan ‘Alawi, the PA official whose signature the *hawiyya* carried in the West Bank: “I myself cannot renew my *hawiyya* without the approval of the Israelis and cannot even give my kids...[an] ID without the approval of the Israelis.” That same number also appeared in every Palestinian passport;

every holder of a *hawiyya* was entitled to apply “but there is nothing without Israeli approval.” The *hawiyya* number was also stamped into every foreign passport carried by a Palestinian with dual nationality, providing the Civil Administration could identify them. And with Israel in control of international borders and the borders of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, neither PA *hawiyya* nor PA passport were enough to get one very far. The bearer would also require a magnetic ID card (*hawiyya mumagh nata*) issued by Civil Administration and only to applicants without an IDF security record.⁶³ With *hawiyya* and *hawiyya mumagh nata* in hand, the bearer might then apply for a travel permit (*tasrih*), also issued by the Civil Administration: even prior to Oslo’s collapse, transit from the West Bank and Gaza required it, whether for commercial, educational, medical, or other reasons. Indicative of Palestinian economic dependency, the commercial permit (*tasrih tujari*) was only ever issued on presentation of a letter from an Israeli business partner confirming that the applicant would buy Israeli merchandise and import it into the occupied territories. In 2002, a new permit was introduced, the “Special Travel Permit for the Internal Checkpoints in the Area of Judea and Samaria” (*tasrih tanaqul khas fi al-hawajiz al-dakhiliyya fi mantaqat yahuda wa al-samara*), referred to locally as the *tasrih dakhili*. It was required of anyone bearing a *hawiyya* who wished to travel *within* the West Bank, now divided into eight different zones around the eight major towns.⁶⁴ When Oslo still functioned, *tasrih* applications would normally be handled by the PA’s DCLs and via them by the Civil Administration. But it could now take distinctly longer to acquire a *tasrih* from the DCL office than it could from the Civil Administration in the settlement direct. It was not a coincidence. Encouraging Palestinian contact with the Civil Administration generated more windows for collaboration and devalued the PA bureaucracy. In the Ramallah DCL, Nisim ‘Anfus summarized the effect: “Sometimes the soldiers make it easier for some people who go directly to Beit El, to show “we can make it easier for you, easier than the Authority.” [It is] to show people that our office is weak.”⁶⁵

Subordinate Armed Force

In line with the PA bureaucracy, the Roadmap sought to preserve and reform the security apparatus, consistent with Bush’s June 2002 speech that first called for “clear lines of authority and accountability and a unified chain of command.”⁶⁶ One year later the prescription was more specific, requiring the consolidation of the security apparatus “into three branches reporting to an empowered Interior Minister” and the resumption of effective security cooperation with Israel to be undertaken “with the participation of U.S. security officials.” The Roadmap’s aim was to generate a centralized and streamlined subordinate armed force, resourced directly by the Ministry of Finance, retrained by the United States, Jordan, and Egypt, and placed in the hands of an empowered, Arafat-independent executive that was ready and willing to confront Palestinian dissidents, principally Hamas. The prescription includes “visible efforts on the ground to arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere” and “sustained, targeted, and effective operations aimed at confronting all those engaged in terror and the dismantlement of terrorist capabilities and infrastructure.” U.S. priorities were put into a wider “war on terror” context by Secretary

of State Colin Powell in conversation with 'Abbas when he opined: "We really have to get to the point...where the only ones with guns and military force in any nation has to be the government."⁶⁷ With "reformed civil institutions and security structures" and the requisite leadership "acting decisively against terror" phase II promises the Palestinians "the active support of the Quartet and the broader international community in establishing an independent, viable, state."

The protection afforded the security apparatus was in principle significant, given that it had been targeted even more readily than the bureaucracy from the very outset of the intifada: as early as the first week of October 2000, Israeli helicopters had rocketed police stations in Rafah and other targets in Gaza, and by the second week were using sea and air power against PA installations in Gaza City and four cities across the West Bank.⁶⁸ The early start to the demolition was followed by wave after wave of assault until by 2003 the cumulative damage was enormous. Lack of infrastructure and capacity joined a considerable list of practical difficulties confronting Yahya, Hasan, and later 'Abbas and Dahlan, and then Qray' and Bal'awi as they sought to restore law and order but avoid a civil war.

Historical analogies seemed ominously valid in the 2003 context: Palestinians with "illegal" weapons could point to previous campaigns to disarm them, first by the British from 1937 to 1939, and again by the Jordanians prior to the Six-Day War. In each case, the assertion of state power induced an inability to resist that contributed to the depopulations of 1948 and 1967. It was not unreasonable to fear that it might happen again under cover of the chaos in Iraq.⁶⁹ Beyond scars in the collective memory, there was little incentive to relinquish weapons that not only provided some capacity to withstand ongoing Zionist colonization but also lent major inter-factional bargaining power to those that held them. The prospect of civil war was avoided due to efforts on both sides; it was a war which in any case the PA was in no position to win. Addressing the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, the PA tried co-option over coercion in a repeat of the largely successful policy adopted from 1995. Funding again came from the EU and the United States. Reports surfaced of generous offers to buy up unofficial weapons and hire cadres into the security apparatus. Dahlan denied it, but was said to be offering a \$6,000 fee for a rifle and a further \$6,000 minimum signing-on fee for joining the security services.⁷⁰ Israeli military pressure on Hamas and Islamic Jihad was reinforced by U.S.-led international attacks on financial assets that quickly undercut the groups' ability to provide essential welfare services. Arab states were called upon to help by severing "public and private funding and all other forms of support for groups supporting and engaged in violence and terror."

Non-military measures were prudent given that Israeli degradation had left the security apparatus in need of building repairs, vehicles, radios, riot gear, personnel, and training. One of the most striking changes for the visitor to Ramallah at this time was the almost total absence of a uniformed presence in what had previously resembled a garrison town. Israeli military orders prohibiting all Palestinians, including security service personnel, from carrying weapons further encouraged a low profile. Deputy Foreign Minister Majdi al-Khalidi estimated that the PA needed "about \$500 million to reequip the police and security services and reconstruct buildings and infrastructure, which have been destroyed in IDF operations."⁷¹ The EU made an early offer of €47 million, only to withdraw it in protest at U.S. insistence (under IDF pressure) that they be prevented from assuming any

role in monitoring implementation of the security aspects of the Roadmap. Instead, the EU offered to fund administrative reforms and welfare services and pay off the PA's loans to private creditors.⁷²

Beyond degradation and the need to minimize inter-Palestinian strife, security apparatus efficacy was not enhanced by the unresolved division of labor between president and prime minister. Article 55 of the original Basic Law had simply stipulated, "The President is the commander in chief of the Palestinian forces."⁷³ Given that Article 55 was specifically *not* modified, the president was said to retain responsibility for national security.⁷⁴ But the amendments did complicate matters, the revised Article 72.7 awarding the cabinet "responsibility to maintain public order and internal security."⁷⁵ Juxtaposing changes to the Basic Law with the provisions of the One-HundredDay Plan suggests where the boundaries would fall. "In the Domain of Public Security" the plan set out to

1. Restructure the Interior Ministry and modernize its apparatuses as befits the requirements of the present situation.
2. Attach the Preventive Security Services, the police, and civil defense to the Interior Ministry so that this ministry will be in charge of all matters relating to internal security according to the law.
3. Activate the role of the Interior Ministry and its apparatuses in the enforcement of court rulings.⁷⁶

In light of these changes, the appointment of minister of the interior suddenly assumed added significance. For the 'Abbas cabinet, Arafat tried in vain to impose Hani al-Hasan, who reflected magnanimously on Dahlan's appointment: "They [the Israelis] want to have someone ready to make a Palestinian civil war. They *think* they have one." But they were to be disappointed: "We are," noted Hasan, "an educated movement."⁷⁷ With Hasan gone, it was then agreed that the prime minister himself would hold the post, but irked by an Arafat ploy to undermine his authority, 'Abbas attempted to transfer full control over the security apparatus to Dahlan at the State Security Department before backing down.⁷⁸ Qray' nominated Nasr Yusif for the emergency cabinet. But Yusif wanted real power, and on learning that Arafat had no intention of conceding any, fell out with him.⁷⁹ Former PLO ambassador to Tunis and Fatah central committee member Hakam Bal'awi finally took it with Arafat's blessing. He retained it thereafter. Within his remit fell Preventive Security, the four branches of the Civil Police (Criminal Security, the AntiDrug Squad, Public Order/Riot Control, and the Traffic Police) and Civil Defense. The president retained the three branches of National Security (Military Intelligence and the Military Police under kinsman Musa 'Arafat, and the Coast Guard), General Intelligence under Amin al-Hindi, and Force 17/ Presidential Security under Faysal Abu Sharkh, the remit of which was after all the president's personal protection.⁸⁰

The president's losses were somewhat offset by the inauguration of the Palestinian NSC, mandated to set strategic security policy and the initiative that had so irked 'Abbas. It had been preceded by the HCNS, up and running since 1994 and drawn from "the heads and deputy heads of all police sections" but to no great effect. Sayigh described it as "unwieldy and relatively inefficient" and Barakat al-Fara asserted that over one hundred persons might attend any given meeting, including himself, were he present in town at the time.⁸¹ The NSC was established at the Legislative Council session that

approved the prime minister's cabinet. It met on an ad hoc basis, was chaired by Arafat, had a much smaller membership than the HCNS, and required the prime minister to report to it. Membership fluctuated, but the majority were drawn from an almost exclusive line up of Fatah heavyweights. For the 'Abbas premiership the NSC included six on the central committee and six on the revolutionary council. They were Arafat in his capacity as president; 'Abbas as prime minister; the overall head of Public Security, Nasr Yusif; head of National Security in Gaza, 'Abd al-Razaq al-Majayda; the heads of General and Military Intelligence, Amin al-Hindi and Musa 'Arafat; advisors Hakam Bal'awi, Hani al-Hasan, and Jibril al-Rajub; Nabil Sha'th as minister of external affairs; Sa'ib 'Urayqat as minister of negotiations; and Dahlan as holder of his short-lived portfolio as minister of state for security affairs. They were joined by minister of finance and the only non-Fatah member Salam Fayyad.⁸² 'Abbas addressed the limits of his authority directly in his resignation speech:

Many say that I intended to take control of the security forces, and wrest them from Arafat. This is a fabrication; it did not happen. I didn't ask for even one of the security mechanisms, but when I was asked, I said that efforts of the security services, not the services themselves, should be unified. All we were demanding was coordination between the organizations, nothing more. The Palestinian Basic Law, the foundation of the government's existence, states that only internal security mechanisms are under the prime minister's control, and all we ever asked was coordination among the services, nothing more. When the Americans demanded that the forces be unified, we rejected their demand.⁸³

Interpretations of the goal of security service coordination differed. The United States saw it in light of the post-September 11 "war on terror"; Israel demanded a crackdown on the opposition the like of which IDF and IAF actions had rendered impossible; while the PA, degraded, weak, and unable to move freely due to occupation and closure, undertook to do what it could: negotiate a ceasefire, co-opt where it might, and confiscate unlicensed weapons at PA checkpoints so far as was possible.⁸⁴ They were in no position to confront the dissidents head-on, and they knew it. The ninety-day unilateral ceasefire initiated on June 29 was a policy with promise if nurtured. But Israel saw that it failed; refusal to enact substantial withdrawal, refusal to dismantle checkpoints or lift the siege on Arafat, refusal to release substantial numbers of prisoners, and refusal to stop killing Palestinians, among them political and military opposition figures but also many civilians and often refugees, provoked retaliation: with settlements multiplying and bulldozers continuing to dig through the land, the enterprise was abandoned by late August.

The unilateral Palestinian ceasefire failed, but reform pressed forward. Security service personnel working for the Ministry of the Interior now received checks from the Ministry of Finance where once they had been paid in cash. Elsewhere the new arrangement met resistance, not least of all from Arafat, who stood to lose a hold on those he was probably allowing to benefit from the arrangement. The 'Abbas speech touched on the issue: "Why can some policemen get their wages in a bank and others in bags?... So far the issue has not been solved and the result is that interested parties and people receiving illicit benefits are still in business." Arnon Regular reported that after "attempts

to regulate security operations and pay wages directly to policemen, the Palestinian treasury offices in Gaza were broken into and vandalized. Two demonstrations were held, calling Finance Minister Fayad a traitor.”⁸⁵ Amos Harel followed the issue, which came to a head under Qray‘: in the midst of a crippling financial crisis Qray‘ forced a decision through the cabinet and then threatened to resign if Arafat didn’t comply “saying bluntly that the PA coffers are empty and that without transparency regarding how salaries are paid to security officials, the European Union won’t provide much-needed funding.”⁸⁶ Early victims were local authorities, for whom central finance dried up entirely. Indicative of the extent of institutional breakdown, mayor of Nablus, Ghassan Shak’a, resigned as his city degenerated into a state of anarchy paralleled elsewhere in the West Bank and increasingly in the Gaza Strip.⁸⁷

The pattern repeated itself in the PA judiciary, long afflicted by a lack of investment, a shortage of judges and staff, Israeli colonial rule, and Arafat’s neo-patrimonial regime, and now further undermined by the demolition of the security apparatus, including its prisons, and closure. One month after ratifying the Basic Law, chapter five of which stipulated judicial independence, the president finally signed specific legislation to that effect after years of procrastination.⁸⁸ It was a positive step, but as with reform in other branches of government, in the context of occupation, colonization, and closure we might ask, to what effect? The sheer inability of the security apparatus to implement judicial writ is captured by the case of PFLP head Ahmad Sa‘dat, imprisoned in a Jericho jail under U.S. and British supervision. The PA’s High Court ruled there were no grounds to detain him and ordered him released. “In response, the IDF sent tanks toward Jericho, declared Jericho a closed military zone, and warned that it would kill Sa‘dat if he were freed.”⁸⁹ That being so, the cabinet agreed it would be best if he stayed where he was.

The hasty reorganization prompted by Arafat’s death saw Qray‘ as prime minister assume responsibility for chairing meetings of the NSC, lending him a potentially effective hand over the security apparatus and underlining the extent to which the Fattuh presidency was a symbolic, interim measure. ‘Abbas, Qray‘, and Fattuh made a point of being seen to stand shoulder-to-shoulder, and even as Arafat faded away in Paris, the new-old order quickly announced their intention to relaunch efforts to establish law and order across the PA’s semi-autonomous zones, putting into effect a plan drafted back in March.⁹⁰ They would need to if Israel were to redeploy to something akin to the lines of September 28, 2000, and facilitate elections. With this in mind, Qray‘ was then quick to encourage reconciliation between two feuding factions of the security apparatus in Gaza; an outbreak of lawlessness earlier in the year had seen Musa ‘Arafat promoted by presidential fiat in place of ‘Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda as the head of National Security in Gaza, a move that exacerbated tension with Preventive Security under Rashid Abu Shabak. Subsequent backtracking and juggling of remits left Musa ‘Arafat director general of National Security in the Strip (now on par with Jabr in the West Bank) and the feud unhealed. As new head of the NSC, Qray‘ personally oversaw an attempt to patch up relations between ‘Arafat and Abu Shabak’s former boss, Dahlan.⁹¹ The divisions pitting one branch of the security apparatus against another closely reflected the worsening divisions in Fatah and across Gaza in general. To underline the danger, ‘Abbas saw two security personnel killed as he was fired on while attending a mourning ceremony for Yasir Arafat in the Strip.⁹² The different factions in Fatah and the various

branches of the security apparatus would need to stand together if the descent into anarchy were to be reversed.

Accepted Territory

Three points can be made regarding the PA's foundation of accepted territory for the realization of self-determination: in principle they still had some, in practice Israel had reoccupied most of it, and in the future it might be seen to increase, but not to dimensions consistent with PLO's mandate, Palestinian expectations, or international law. The Oslo concept had been predicated on the land for peace formula, but the process saw that mutate into land for security.⁹³ The Roadmap explicitly cites the "land for peace" formula, but otherwise reflects the latter idea rather more: phase I ties IDF withdrawal to the raft of PA reforms and a "comprehensive security performance" and then stipulates progressive withdrawal "from areas occupied since September 28, 2000." There is to be a return to the status quo ante, with the redeployment of Palestinian security personnel and a restoration of the administrative jurisdiction gradually acquired between 1994 and the last redeployment of March 2000. There is also a call for the "implementation of prior agreements," which implies completion of the third further redeployment set by the Interim Agreement for October 1997 but never carried out, and the IDF is enjoined to withdraw in such a way as "to enhance maximum territorial contiguity" for the prospective Palestinian state. On the heels of fresh elections, phase II proffers an international conference to launch negotiations on the option of "an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders," and phase III a second conference to endorse the provisional borders and launch negotiations toward "a comprehensive permanent status agreement...through a settlement negotiated between the parties based on UNSCR 242, 338, and 1397, that ends the occupation that began in 1967." The invocation of UNSC Resolution 242 sees the Roadmap pay at least lip service to the principle of the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force and hence Israeli withdrawal, however conditional, and from albeit unspecified "territories occupied." The reference to "the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah—endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit"—annoyed the Sharon government immensely, calling as it did for acceptance of Israel "as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive settlement" that included *full* withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967. The machinery of colonization is required to dismantle all "settlement outposts erected since March 2001" and to freeze "all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements)." In summary, the Roadmap aims to restore and expand the PA's accepted territory and to lend it contiguity as the viable basis of a prospective Palestinian state.

In so doing, the Roadmap set itself the Herculean task of reversing the near full-scale reoccupation crowned by Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002. To protect the Israeli public from the consequences, Minister of Defense Binyamin Ben Eliezer issued an order forbidding Israeli TV crews from accompanying the troops into urban centers.⁹⁴ In the central West Bank the seat of government in Ramallah was sacked, as was Bethlehem. Under IDF curfew on April 7, Michel Jansen reported, "for the first time since the fourth century, Sunday prayers were not performed in the Church of the Nativity."⁹⁵ The siege lasted five weeks, during which the neighboring towns of Bayt Jala and Bayt Sahur were

also locked down by closure. In the north the IDF entered Nablus on April 3. Five days of air raids on the old city, together with dynamite and Caterpillar bulldozers, destroyed much of its architectural heritage.⁹⁶ Further north in Jinin stiff resistance left fifty-four Palestinians and twenty-three IDF soldiers dead. Four hundred and fifty Palestinian families found themselves homeless as the IDF razed a large section of the town's refugee camp.⁹⁷ The cacophony of international criticism prompted early withdrawals for the benefit of television cameras; troops left Tulkarm and Qalqilya, but stayed on the edge of town and would frequently return.⁹⁸ In one incident during the war on Iraq, the IDF ordered all men between fourteen and forty to gather before driving two thousand away in trucks. Residents pondered if Jinin had been a test to see how long it took to destroy and depopulate a refugee camp.⁹⁹

In the south Hebron was dealt with separately by the wide-ranging Operation Determined Path. Launched on June 19, tanks first rolled back into Jinin, Qalqilya, and Nablus.¹⁰⁰ They would continue to roll back and forth, keeping Palestinians off balance in what was referred to locally as *al-Jahim al-Mutadarij*, which might be translated as "progressively advancing hell."¹⁰¹ The oasis town of Jericho was the only major population center spared fullscale reoccupation. Home to the Allenby Bridge and the principal transit point between Palestine and Jordan, it was overwhelmed with people in flight. The tide of human traffic led the Jordanian authorities to reduce the daily quota of passes "from three thousand to a few hundred" per day, and required those that did pass "to show a return ticket."¹⁰²

The reinvasion of the Gaza Strip took a different form. There was no equivalent of Operation Defensive Shield, largely because Israeli public opinion, and in particular the reservists that would have been asked to fight it, seemed unwilling to countenance the probable Israeli losses. Troops took up positions in the northern governorate towns of Bayt Lahya and Bayt Hanun, and prolonged operations were carried out in the south at Rafah. Repeat incursions were made into Khan Yunis and even Gaza City and elsewhere in the Strip. In general the tactics used were more akin to Operation Determined Path, with troops rolling in and out of specific neighborhoods or camps but rarely remaining for long.

The planned restoration of the PA's accepted territory made an inauspicious start. It opened with a resurrected Gaza and Bethlehem first plan, and the IDF did begin to redeploy from northern Gaza in late June and Bethlehem in early July.¹⁰³ But momentum was quickly lost, and IDF incursions remained the norm. The closure regime survived too; as television crews descended on the Surda checkpoint between Ramallah and Bir Zeit in July 2003, Sa'ib 'Urayqat was dismissive: "They have removed three and left 159 others in place. This means that it will take another 53 meetings between Bush and Sharon to remove all the remaining roadblocks."¹⁰⁴ Far from being restored, the PA's accepted territory remained occupied and fragmented. It certainly did not expand: a handful of tiny outposts were dismantled amid much hullabaloo, but most remained intact. In the meantime, the Israeli foreign ministry chipped in with a donation to the settlers of portable cabins freed up by a move to a permanent new site, and the government issued several new tenders for more homes in settlements, a handful in Gaza, the majority in the West Bank. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics could claim "a 35 percent increase in the number of new building starts in the settlements in 2003,"¹⁰⁵ Mildly embarrassed, the Bush administration granted Israel another \$9 billion in loan

guarantees but insisted on subtracting the amount that Israel diverted for colonization of the occupied territories. The efficacy of the policy was remarked upon by Akiva Eldar: “The ingenious invention enables the government of Israel to maintain excellent relations with the U.S. administration, keep on building settlements, and pay a ridiculously low financial price—slightly higher interest on some borrowed money.”¹⁰⁶

The colonization project was then greatly consolidated by construction of the separation barrier:

In most areas, the barrier is comprised of an electronic fence with dirt paths, barbed-wire fences, and trenches on both sides, at an average width of 60 meters. In some areas, a wall 6–8 meters high has been erected in place of the barrier system.¹⁰⁷

Early planning for unilateral disengagement that included the construction of a western separation barrier proximate to the Green Line had been conducted by Labor. The plan was adopted by the Sharon government during 2002, but the route adjusted eastward to safeguard the colonization project. B’Tselem estimated that on completion the barrier would encompass 54 of the 124 West Bank settlements recognized by the Ministry of the Interior, plus 12 in East Jerusalem, accounting between them for almost 80 percent of the West Bank settler population.¹⁰⁸ The line of the barrier is consequently erratic, its final length anticipated at some 650 kilometers in comparison with 350 kilometers for the Green Line.¹⁰⁹ Stage one began north of Jinin and ran south of Qalqilya.¹¹⁰ To the surprise of many, plans were then announced for an eastern separation wall to run from the north of Jinin to Tayasir in the Jordan Valley. On a trip to the site of the barrier, one Israeli minister was heard to remark that in combination the “eastern and western walls will cut off big parts of the Palestinian state he [Sharon] is planning to establish.” Another remarked, “Sharon is simply taking the state from them.”¹¹¹ Back in the west, stage three received government approval in October 2003 and continued the southward march toward Ramallah. Stage four planned to run from the settlement of Gilo toward Hebron. The “Jerusalem Envelope” would complete the barrier around the capital. In total, 548 kilometers of barrier were anticipated, augmented by 106 kilometers of “secondary barriers” around Palestinian towns and villages in the border area. B’Tselem estimated that the barrier would affect 16.6 percent of West Bank land.¹¹² Palestinians labeled it the Racist Separation Wall (*al-Jadar al-Fasl al-‘Unsari*), and predicted the demolition of fifty thousand homes, further catastrophic loss of land, loss of access to water resources, and loss of markets.¹¹³ Amnesty International asserted that “the construction by Israel of the fence/wall inside the Occupied Territories violates international law and is contributing to grave human rights violations.”¹¹⁴ The organization “repeatedly called on the Israeli authorities to stop the construction of the fence/wall *inside* the Occupied Territories” and predicted

Severely negative consequence for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, notably unprecedented disproportionate and discriminatory restrictions on their movements within the Occupied Territories and other violations of their fundamental rights, including the right to work, to food, to medical care, to education, and to an adequate standard of living.¹¹⁵

The International Committee of the Red Cross added that in its opinion “the West Bank Barrier, in as far as its route deviates from the ‘Green Line’ into occupied territory, is contrary to [International Humanitarian Law].”¹¹⁶ Major population centers close to the barrier such as Tulkarm, Qalqilya, East Jerusalem, and Bethlehem, as well as neighboring villages already entangled in knots of settlements, bypass roads, and military checkpoints, could choke altogether. B’Tselem estimated that over 260,000 Palestinians would “be trapped in enclaves to the east and west of the main barrier,”¹¹⁷ plus over 200,000 in East Jerusalem. A further 400,000 to the immediate east of the barriers “will need to cross it to access farmland, jobs or health services.”¹¹⁸ In short, almost 900,000 Palestinians would be directly affected. It was in these circumstances that Benny Morris pondered transfers past: “There are circumstances in history that justify ethnic cleansing... It was necessary to cleanse the hinterland and cleanse the border areas and cleanse the main roads. It was necessary to cleanse the villages from which our convoys and our settlements were fired on.”¹¹⁹

That Israel under Sharon would strive to subvert the Roadmap ought to have surprised no one; its terms were inconsistent with his life’s work as soldier and colonizer, the politics of his party, and the vested interests in the machinery of colonization that he represented. But what did cause considerable surprise were public statements on the contours of future arrangements that he might seek to impose as part of unilateral disengagement. In April 2003 the well-worn cliché of “painful concessions” was invoked once again; it was largely familiar stuff, but specifically citing Bethlehem, Shilo, and Beit El in that context was not. These were sites of supreme symbolic significance in religious-Zionist mythology. They were in part maintained or inhabited by settlers previously relocated with compensation from Yamit in April 1982.¹²⁰ Headlines were generated again when Sharon proposed a unilateral evacuation of some 7,500 settlers from the settlements in the Gaza Strip and four settlements from the northeastern corner of the West Bank.¹²¹ The passing of Arafat called the logic of unilateralism into question, but the plan seemed likely to be implemented in one form or another nonetheless. It was a move likely to find approval with a majority of Israelis, for whom, surmised Bradley Burston, “Gaza bears little biblical or other emotional significance, except as the Philistine-held stronghold whose temple Samson brought down on his own head.”¹²² As Sharon explained it, “The aim is to move settlements from places where they cause us problems or places where we won’t remain in a permanent arrangement.”¹²³ It would not come cheaply: the Gaza settlements were also homes to former settlers from Yamit, and based on compensation awarded them in 1982 of up to \$500,000 per family, the bill over two decades later would likely be very much higher.¹²⁴ Palestinians were unimpressed, and Jonathan Cook explained why: the settlers would to be relocated to the West Bank (Maale Adumim, Ariel, Gush Etzion); IDF bases and soldiers would remain in Gaza; all evacuated premises would be demolished rather than handed over to the PA; settlements on the strip’s northern border would be annexed to Israel; and the navy would maintain its blockade of the coast. The PLO executive committee rejected it as “a recipe for a takeover of most of the territories of the West Bank.”¹²⁵ In the meantime, trucks from Netzarim carted away the sand from the beach just as they had done with the top soil from southern Lebanon prior to withdrawal.¹²⁶ More seriously, the IDF set out to ensure that Palestinian perceptions of victory were entirely Pyrrhic; Israeli security forces had

killed over six hundred by mid-October 2004 as Operation Days of Penitance pushed the death toll ever upward.¹²⁷

The rough contours of a Likud-imposed arrangement seem likely to resemble the Alon Plus Plan, the provisions of which are inconsistent with the Roadmap's call for the freezing of "all settlement activity (including natural growth)" and "maximum territorial contiguity" for the Palestinian state. On the contrary, Alon Plus requires the continued expansion of settlements and the systematic disruption of territorial contiguity for the Palestinian entity. To realize it, settlement construction had to advance in and around East Jerusalem and along the Green Line and secure the retention of the West Bank highlands and the Jordan Valley; carved into three from north to south, the bypass road network could finish the job from west to east.¹²⁸ Immediately upon taking office, Sharon had declared that the most he was likely to offer would be "a non-belligerency agreement, for a lengthy and indefinite period" that awarded the Palestinians "the necessary minimum" of somewhere between 40 and 45 percent of the West Bank.¹²⁹ It suggested a project of what Sari Hanafi termed "spacio-cide," a policy of depopulation that "targets land for the purpose of rendering inevitable the 'voluntary' transfer of the Palestinian population primarily by targeting the space upon which the Palestinian people live."¹³⁰

Acceptable National Project

Sponsored by the Quartet of the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia, the Roadmap expressed broad international consensus on the continued acceptability of the PLO's national project: the development of the national authority as a transitional step toward a two-state solution and an independent Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. That goal was now the explicit end-point of the process and had garnered official U.S. and (qualified) Israeli support, and the practical steps toward realizing it were mapped out. The PA indicated acceptance of the third draft on December 20, 2002. Israel took rather longer, subject to yet another election and negotiating its objections in Washington. The second Sharon administration finally adopted it by a majority of one (twelve to seven with four abstentions) on May 25, 2003. It marked the first time that the state of Israel had officially endorsed the creation of a Palestinian state in Palestine (as opposed to Jordan), a decision seemingly at odds with the character of a government described by *The Jerusalem Post* as "so rightwing that Mr. Sharon sits on its left."¹³¹ The cabinet's lack of enthusiasm was reflected in fourteen reservations appended to the decision. They began with "the war against terror" and a call on the PA to dismantle and reform its security apparatus in order to wage a campaign of "arrests, interrogations...investigations, prosecution, and punishment" that ensures the complete "dismantling of terrorist organizations and their infrastructure [and] the collection of all illegal weapons." There is a rejection of timelines in favor of "performance benchmarks"; another call for "a new and different leadership in the Palestinian Authority"; a monitoring mechanism under "American management"; and a note that the final settlement, to be reached through direct bilateral negotiations, must include "the waiver of any right of return for Palestinian refugees to the State of Israel." On the alarming deterioration in Palestinian development indices, there is a rejection of

the recommendations to the Bertini Report “as a binding source document within the framework of the humanitarian issue.” Bertini identified the closure regime as the main problem, and called on Israel to facilitate Palestinian movement, improve access for international aid workers, and release monies owed to the PA.¹³² Pertinent to the PA’s accepted territory, point ten of the cabinet’s fourteen objections implicitly rejects mention of the Saudi initiative and the implication of full withdrawal:

A settlement based on the Roadmap will be an autonomous settlement that derives its validity therefrom. The only possible reference should be to Resolutions 242 and 338, and then only as an outline for the conduct of future negotiations on a permanent settlement.

On restoring the PA’s territory, point twelve was ominous:

The deployment of IDF forces along the September 2000 lines will be subject to the stipulation of Article 4 (U.S. monitoring) and will be carried out in keeping with the changes to be required by the nature of the new circumstances and needs created thereby. Emphasis will be placed on the division of responsibilities and civilian authority as in September 2000, and not on the position of forces on the ground.¹³³

The reservations may not have enjoyed legal status, but as a statement of intent they were clear; at the Aqaba summit Sharon declared, “The Government and people of Israel welcome the opportunity to renew direct negotiations according to the steps of the roadmap *as adopted by the Israeli government* to achieve this vision” (emphasis added).¹³⁴ Notwithstanding the Roadmap’s reference to “agreements previously reached by the parties,” this line was consistent with previous Sharon statements that “Oslo is not continuing; there won’t be Oslo; Oslo is over” and “Oslo doesn’t exist, Camp David doesn’t exist, Taba doesn’t exist; we are not going back to those places.”¹³⁵ Events would show that it was one thing for external coercion to oblige Israel to officially adopt the project, and quite another to see that it carried it through. The Palestinian mood was captured by pollsters. Asked if the United States was serious about the Roadmap, 55.6 percent somehow managed to say yes. But asked “will Israel implement the Roadmap?” a resounding 72.9 percent said no.¹³⁶

The PA, which did manage to secure one mention in the Roadmap, welcomed a restatement of its acceptability in the international arena. But domestically it still faced a sea of troubles, from outright opposition to skepticism and plain contempt. There was much to be done if it were to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the Palestinian public, especially given that grass roots calls for reform and the mobilization that preceded the al-Aqsa intifada marked a rejection of Oslo’s failings that included the PA’s current composition and methods of governance. ‘Abbas had acknowledged this during his speech in Gaza that called for an end to the uprising: he noted that “people can see the PA men receiving their salaries, when everyone else has nothing to eat... How can we lead them and convince them of our national project, and how can they possibly obey us?”¹³⁷ The Roadmap acknowledged it too; both the new constitution and the elections were intended to reform and relegitimize the PA. Phase I stipulates several measures to

relegitimize the PA and the political process. Israel is called upon to take “all necessary steps to help normalize Palestinian life”; there are to be “no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property”; and a marked improvement in “the humanitarian situation” is to be realized through “lifting curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods and allowing full, safe, and unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel.” This is to be accompanied by a “major donor assistance effort” followed in phase II by the first international conference that will “support Palestinian economic recovery” and generate an atmosphere conducive to final status negotiations in phase III. The promise is made of “continued donor support, including increased funding through PVOs/NGOs, for people to people programs, private sector development and civil society initiatives.”

It all looked so very different on the ground. Early progress was minimal to the point that even the IDF admitted that it might have done more to generate public support for ‘Abbas and his program.¹³⁸ Civilian casualties and home demolitions remained the norm. Closure was subject to minor cosmetic adjustment. IDF redeployment was minimal. The majority of settlement outposts were left intact, new homes in settlements were built with impunity, and the settler population continued to expand. In a sign of what was to come, on June 10, less than a week from the Aqaba summit, Israel had tried to assassinate ‘Abd al-‘Aziz al-Rantisi; it led to a wholly predictable cycle of suicide bombing and assassination that sank the *hudna* and carried on to the death of Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and then Rantisi himself in spring 2004. As the cycle of violence unfolded, failure was ensured by Israel’s intransigence on two issues that were not even mentioned in the Roadmap: the separation barrier and Palestinian prisoners.

Two aspects of the prisoner issue confronted ‘Abbas: the number and factional composition. His public standing, never especially high, fell much lower the day of the Aqaba summit for a speech that counted prisoners among several of its ill-advised omissions.¹³⁹ In consequence, it became even more important that a substantial number were released and that they included Hamas and Islamic Jihad members. It was an issue of tremendous sensitivity nationwide. Just prior to the intifada, one estimate put the number of Palestinians processed by the Israeli jail system since June 1967 at 850,000.¹⁴⁰ The PLO asserted that this constituted “the highest rate of incarceration in the world—approximately 20 percent of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has, at one point, been arbitrarily detained or imprisoned by Israel.”¹⁴¹ In his capacity as head of the National Solidarity Campaign with Palestinian POWs, Sa’d al-Nimr underlined the point: “You can hardly find a family in Palestine that escaped this ordeal, and yet there is a huge silence outside Palestine concerning this issue.”¹⁴² Intensified clashes with the IDF, widespread arrests at home, at work, or at checkpoints, in conjunction with abductions from Area A, saw the prison population skyrocket. The PLO estimated that 8,500 were arrested during February and March 2002 alone.¹⁴³ The renewal of mass detention was such that it strained the eleven facilities routinely used to house Arab prisoners to bursting point. The Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners counted eight central prisons, all within Israel proper and managed by the General Prisons Administration, a division of the Israeli police. They were augmented by three military detention centers, Megiddo in Israel, Ofer near Ramallah, and Ansar III (Ketziot), an infamously grim facility in the Negev Desert, closed in May 1995 but

reopened in April 2002. They were augmented by seven interrogation centers, three in Israel and four in the West Bank, and the cells of countless police stations.¹⁴⁴ The settlement infrastructure lent support in the form of military courts located in Ariel, Beit El, and the Ofer detention center.¹⁴⁵ In an under-resourced and over-strained system, conditions were unsanitary and bleak; inmates in tents were exposed to extremes of heat and cold, those in cells to severe overcrowding. The PA's minister of prisoners' affairs Hisham 'Abd al-Raziq estimated that five hundred inmates were seriously ill.¹⁴⁶

The Mandela Institute counted 5,803 Palestinian and other Arab prisoners in Israeli jails at the onset of the unilateral ceasefire; thirty-six were non-Palestinian, seventy-five were women, and 195 were minors. The number had fallen to 5,569 by the end of August,¹⁴⁷ a paltry drop with the few releases offset by ongoing sweeps and detentions. Nine administrative detainees were released July 2, having been held without charge or trial. Thirty-four were released a day later, among them Sulayman Abu Mutlak from Dahlan's senior staff in Gaza. Israel's grand gesture came on August 6, when it released 355 prisoners, the vast majority of them also administrative detainees or approaching the end of their sentence. Some were simple convicted criminals. A further sixty-nine saw their sentences commuted a few days later.¹⁴⁸ It was far too little to help 'Abbas, and the number of minors in custody actually rose during his term. One study suggested up to two thousand children passed through the Israeli prison system between 2000 and 2003. It documents a policy both "deliberate and institutionalized" that encompasses "wrongful arrest, torture, imprisonment, and lack of access to legal representation, as well as family." The study concludes that Palestinian children are routinely subjected to "extreme forms of physical and psychological abuse" intended "to frighten, intimidate and disorient" the younger generation.¹⁴⁹

And so renewed demonstrations demanding the release of prisoners joined others condemning construction of the separation barrier, Israel's assassination policy, and the closure regime. Undone from within by Arafat, the prime minister and his program were undone from without by Israel. The United States looked on from the sidelines, keeping Europe at arm's length as it did so. By the end of September, U.S. envoy John Wolff, the official placed in charge of monitoring Roadmap compliance, had packed his bags and flown back to Washington. He returned four months later, but to no obvious effect. Former U.S. envoy Anthony Zinni had been skeptical of the Roadmap's prospects from the start: "If you take such a narrow path and one step fails, the whole process is in danger."¹⁵⁰ And as with Oslo, there was no implementation mechanism with teeth; it was a Herculean task without Hercules. So for all the browbeating, the Roadmap gave Israel an enormous tactical advantage: a variety of measures were available (incursion, assassination, abduction, land confiscation) with which to provoke a response; the response could then be blamed on the PA, and progress, the like of which might have imperiled the colonization campaign, precluded. The Roadmap's early failure to progress was a resounding triumph for Ariel Sharon and his government; the greater part of the right-wing coalition held together until Labor stepped in to help, realization of Alon Plus or something like it grew closer by the day, closure continued to strangle the Palestinians, and Palestinians continued to leave. Gaza tottered on the brink of chaos as government weakened and factional rivalry intensified, first in the shadow of unilateral disengagement, and then again in the post-Arafat struggle for the inheritance. The unending misery in prospect might have been designed to redraw Palestinian expectations

to the point where they come into line with the contours of a project the colonial power considers acceptable: a truncated, disempowered statelet set to ail from birth. It is an irony of the Roadmap that just as Israel granted *official* consent to the goal of the PLO's national project, the *policies* of the government that did so looked ever more set to empty that project of meaning. For the Roadmap to lead to something akin to the Geneva Accord was still so controversial that neither Fatah, the PA, nor the PLO could officially endorse it. For the Roadmap to lead to a Sharon-inspired diktat raised the question of alternative strategies, and senior PLO figures were beginning to suggest openly that the goal of a two-state solution would soon be unworkable and a return to the democratic state for all its citizens in prospect. That would find even fewer supporters in Israel.

To preclude less palatable scenarios and maintain the impression of political movement, the Israeli government pressed ahead with preparations for the Gaza withdrawal and its minor West Bank add-on during 2004. Sharon then indicated that he might be prepared to coordinate the move (which he maintained, without much conviction, fell squarely within the terms of the Roadmap) with the new post-Arafat administration in Ramallah. 'Abbas and Qray' remained justifiably wary and yet understandably keen to get reengaged: if the new-old leadership could first secure a popular mandate via elections and second a renewal of negotiations, their leadership claims would be somewhat legitimized as the political horizon opened before them. But whoever aspired to lead the Palestinians knew well enough the contours of a national project that fell within the terms of international legitimacy and hence stood some chance of being deemed acceptable. It would essentially have to be a deal similar to that which Arafat would have negotiated himself: a sovereign Palestine state in all of the Gaza Strip and most of the West Bank, with some corresponding territorial exchange, East Jerusalem as its capital, and recognition of the right of return for Palestinian refugees, subject to agreed implementation in line with the formulae discussed in chapter 7. And it does bear repeating that this scenario could not be readily squared with accelerated, illegal Zionist colonization of Palestinian land and the realization of the Alon Plus Plan.

International Recognition

When Bush and Sharon posed with Mahmud 'Abbas at the Roadmap's launch in Aqaba, the pictures really had spoken volumes. The text of the document they signed contained repeat references to the "Palestinian leadership," "Palestinian institutions," or simply "Palestinians," but not to anyone in particular, and Yasir Arafat, then still very much alive and in charge as *ra'is* of the PA, was conspicuously absent. A sole reference to the PA was inserted at EU insistence,¹⁵¹ and the PLO not mentioned at all. But the PA did now constitute the agreed transitional step to Palestinian statehood, while the PLO retained the recognition of international society with a mandate to negotiate final status arrangements; 'Abbas was still PLO secretary general, a member of the PNC, and a member of the Fatah central committee. The U.S. monopoly on monitoring Roadmap compliance was another indication of recognition of the project's validity in Washington, and the option of a state with provisional borders is set to receive Quartet help in promoting "international recognition of [the] Palestinian state, including possible UN membership."

But Arafat's international standing, particularly with Israel and the United States where he then needed it, was not faring well at all. Israel seemed to want him expelled if not dead. The United States wanted him alive but peripheral. The Ze'evi assassination in 2001 had presaged the first siege of the *muqata'*; the second saw closure reinforced on Ramallah and Bethlehem and the president kept from Christmas Eve mass in the Church of the Nativity; a third intensified siege lasted for thirty-four days during Operation Defensive Shield—it was lifted briefly, allowing Arafat to make flying visits to Jinin, Nablus, and Bethlehem during the spring 2002, but then reimposed for a fourth time after another suicide bombing followed the Shihada assassination in September. In parallel with the failure of the Gaza-Bethlehem first plan, the IDF destroyed most of what remained of the *muqata'* and demanded the surrender of nineteen wanted Palestinians, including West Bank *Mukhabarat* chief Tawfiq Tirawi.¹⁵² The IDF withdrew but continued to menace, and Arafat chose to confine himself to the compound for fear a journey out might be his last. On the heels of the collapse of the 'Abbas government and two more suicide bombings that killed twenty Israelis, a decision was taken by the inner cabinet to "remove" him "in principle." Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert announced that killing Arafat was "definitely one of the options." It did wonders for the president's standing at home: tens of thousands demonstrated outside the *muqata'* and in towns and camps across the West Bank and Gaza. Declarations of support were even issued by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Mass rallies in Lebanon and Jordan sent the same message.¹⁵³ PCPSR pollsters found Arafat's popularity at its highest level for five years.¹⁵⁴ The EU, the Arab League, and the UN expressed strong condemnation of Israel's threat, while the Bush administration issued an uncharacteristic appeal for caution, fearing that chaos would ensue and carry the moribund Roadmap (and the remnants of administration prestige) away with it. Powell was emphatic: "The U.S. does not support either the elimination or exile of Mr. Arafat. It's not our position; hasn't been. The Israeli government knows it." But his representative at the UN did exercise the U.S. veto on the Security Council (for what now approached eighty occasions) due to what was claimed to be a lack of balance in the resolution's draft.¹⁵⁵

Relieved on paper by the Quartet and the Roadmap, reform offered the PA at large the clearest route to rebuild its credibility with the international community. Six months prior to Aqaba, the British government organized a conference to that effect with representatives of the Quartet, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. But Graham Usher noted that two major parties were absent:

Israel didn't attend. It hadn't been invited. The Palestinian Authority had been invited but didn't attend. Five Palestinian ministers nominated by Yasser Arafat to represent the PA were barred by Israel from leaving the occupied territories after Palestinian suicide bombers killed 23 in Tel Aviv on 5 January. The ministers had to make do with a video link-up to London from their disconnected enclaves in Gaza and Ramallah.¹⁵⁶

The international community seemed possessed of some will to see PA reform and the Roadmap succeed. Israel under Likud less so, and the onset of political stalemate contributed to the dangerous phenomenon of donor fatigue. Substantial sums had been poured into the project, but to what effect? Corruption accounted for some of it, but the

sums involved were not great on a global scale and the devastation wrought by Israel counted for a lot more. International aid was then needed to support Palestinian society just as colonization destroyed its capacity to support itself. Donor fatigue seemed to threaten the international patronage lines that kept the PA alive; and in so doing, it could have proved more dangerous to the PA than had the IDF. Not everyone would lament its passing, and not all of them for negative reasons: the PA facilitated an arrangement, in the context of colonization and closure, that Meron Benvenisti labeled “a deluxe occupation, in which the occupier takes no responsibility for the fate of the occupied population, and gets off scot-free from all the terrible results of brutal policing and collective punishment.”¹⁵⁷ It raised the alternative of a return to direct occupation, which Israel rather than international donors could start paying for.

It did seem possible in the weeks after Arafat’s death that the costs of reoccupation might combine with an increase in external pressure (including the hypothetical threat of international intervention) to encourage Israel to take a more positive approach to the institutions and leadership of the PA. The post-Arafat PA elite would need a great deal of international support if its quest to consolidate its legitimacy were to succeed: first, to persuade Israel to lift the closure and facilitate elections that included Palestinians in East Jerusalem; second, to finance a marked improvement in the delivery of services that might be possible if closure were lifted; third, to avoid a repeat of the ‘Abbas premiership, which meant releasing substantial numbers of prisoners among other confidence-building measures; and fourth, if Israel were ever to allow it to happen, to push for an acceptable final outcome to negotiations via the second and third stages of the Roadmap. British prime minister Tony Blair, who stood to benefit by assuaging domestic constituencies alienated over Iraq, was seen to prompt Bush. An impromptu meeting of the Quartet in Sharm al-Shaykh followed, as did an all too rare visit to Palestine by outgoing U.S. secretary of state, Colin Powell, who turned up in Jericho to meet a delegation of Palestinian worthies including ‘Abbas, Qray’, Fattuh, Sha’t’h, ‘Urayqat, Fayyad, and ‘Abd Rabbu.¹⁵⁸ Formal international recognition of Palestinian leadership and institutions were suddenly granted new validity by the United States, but could the Palestinians translate it into real political capital and deploy it effectively in the anti-colonial struggle with Israel?

Orientation Congruent with the International Balance of Power

The Palestinian nationalist elite had maintained a steady pro-U.S. position throughout the Oslo years, but the “no” at Camp David II, followed by an ambivalent response to the al-Aqsa intifada, saw them pulled out of alignment with their international structural context. They had been pulled there by a groundswell of popular and factional alienation from Oslo and the colonization campaign it facilitated. To propel the revolt, Palestinian opposition factions could still draw on some external sponsorship, but it was diminishing fast: Islamists looked to Saudi Arabia and Iran; the *Karine A* weapons ship was also said to have sailed from Iran, under direction of elements in Fatah; the ALF under Rakad Salim looked to Iraq—funds were transferred to help families of those killed by the occupation and on suicide operations, and Salim was arrested in October 2002—to join PFLP, DFLP, and other secular (and Islamist) opposition figures and many Fatah cadres

in jail.¹⁵⁹ But no matter what resources they mustered they would always fall far short of the capacities of the machinery of colonization and the IDF in and behind it. This abiding asymmetry convinced many of the folly of armed struggle, even as the essential anti-colonial stimulus gained ground.

In the meantime, Palestine's international environment continued to deteriorate; untrammelled U.S. hegemony in the Middle East, now wielded by a very modern neo-conservative clique with an ambitious program of change, continued to show almost unswerving support for Israel under its hard-line prime minister. September 11 gave Washington a justification to put its contentious program into action, and the world watched as regime change was effected in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In this context 'Abbas had sought to realign the PA decisively with the United States. He would do so through Roadmap implementation, but through negotiation with the opposition not force. The hope was that the United States would then pull Israel into alignment and political progress would result. Bush publicly stated support for a Palestinian state just a few weeks after the attacks on New York and Washington; he would reiterate it on several occasions, and UNSC Resolution 1397 and the Roadmap underlined it. The Roadmap delivered alignment on paper, but Israel's colonial agenda precluded it on the ground.

Confronted with an unfinished colonization campaign and an adversary determined to see it through, 'Abbas had been dependent on the first term Bush administration for support, progress, and legitimacy. His rewards were familiar, scant, and depressing: the summit in Aqaba and a single trip to the Bush White House that was closely followed by the president's "man of peace," Ariel Sharon, on his *eighth* visit in just over two years. The Bush administration failed 'Abbas and the Roadmap appeared to go the way of Oslo before it; diplomatic access translated into negotiation and textual advance but the results were negated by colonization. The U.S. president's State of the Union address in January 2004 made no mention of the Roadmap: 'Urayqat read it as sign that this will be "a year of American disengagement." 'Ali Jarbawi foresaw the result:

This year, Sharon will force his political agenda on the ground and impose the settlement of the conflict he wants with the blessing of the US administration... The roadmap is a US invention, and not mentioning it at all is a sign of failure, the failure of the United States in pushing for peace efforts here.¹⁶⁰

The U.S. presidential election approached, and 'Azmi Bishara noted that Bush was showing more interest in Mars than the West Bank or Gaza.¹⁶¹ At times one could be forgiven for believing that the United States had reconciled itself to an Israeli-Palestinian conflict in which the sole source of agency was Likud. The true extent of U.S. commitment to Zionist decolonization was suggested by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, heard to refer to the "so-called settlements" in "the so-called occupied territories."¹⁶² No wonder Edward Said once remarked, "The United States is the source of our problems, not the source of a solution. It is beyond my understanding as to why [there is] that incredible illusion and that repeated gesture of obeisance and pleading."¹⁶³

Illusion or not, the Palestinian leadership were clearly tempted to believe that a Bush administration in its second term, in search of a legacy and seized of a post-Arafat

moment in Palestine, might bring pressure to bear constructively on Israel and so actually do something with the Roadmap. There were clearly grounds for circumspection: the timetable had already faltered, with Bush now acknowledging that his hopes for a Palestinian state extended into 2009,¹⁶⁴ and the machinery of colonization would chew through a lot more Palestinian land in the interval if no one intervened to stop it. Perhaps there was no harm in hoping, but there was little ground for real optimism.

In the meantime, trends in international politics were seen to be reflected in the realm of international law, an arena in which Palestine still held some major resources. But these resources, like others we have considered, required stewardship by the Palestinian nationalist elite. Jean Allain has suggested that “the door to self-determination” may be closing and with it the right to use force by non-state actors; most cases of self-determination have now been resolved, and in context of “the war on terror” states are assertively trying “to reclaim their monopoly on the use of force.”¹⁶⁵ Allain suggested the consequences for Palestine: “There is in law a right to struggle against foreign occupation and to self-determination. The struggle appears to extend to the right to use force.”¹⁶⁶ It does not, however, extend to the right to attack civilians, acts which undermine “both the nature of that struggle as one of ‘national liberation’ and fail in the arena of public opinion.”¹⁶⁷ Mindful of the legitimacy accorded the cause, Allain counsels an exclusive focus on IDF targets in the occupied territories. The PA’s Basic Law stated that “the birth of the Palestinian National Authority on the land of the Homeland, Palestine, the land of fathers and forefathers, comes within the context of a bitter continuing struggle.”¹⁶⁸ However, they choose to conduct it, a decade or more after the signing of the DoP, the struggle for Palestine is anything but over.

Appendix 1

The PLO Executive Committees Elected by the 20th and 21st Palestine National Council Sessions

**Table 15 The PLO Executive Committee Elected
by the 20th PNC, Algiers, September 23–28,
1991**

Name	Affiliation
Yasir Arafat	Fatah
Mahmud 'Abbas	Fatah
Faruq al-Qaddumi	Fatah
'Abd al-Rahim Malluh	PFLP
Taysir Khalid	DFLP
Yasir 'Abd Rabbu	FIDA
Sulayman al-Najjab	PPP
Samir Ghusha	PPSF
'Ali Ishaq	PLF
Mahmud Isma'il	ALF
Yasir 'Amr	Independent
Mahmud Darwish	Independent
Jawid al-Ghusayn	Independent
'Abdullah Hurani	Independent
Shafiq al-Hut	Independent
Iliyya Khuri	Independent
Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi	Independent
Jamal al-Surani	Independent

Source: Documents and Source Material, Journal of Palestine Studies 21, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 155–156.

**Table 16 The PLO Executive Committe Elected
by the 21st PNC, Gaza, April 22–26, 1996**

Name	Affiliation	New	Resident Pre-PA
Yasir Arafat	Fatah		
Mahmud ‘Abbas	Fatah		
Faruq al-Qaddumi	Fatah		
Faysal al-Husayni	Fatah	*	*
Zakariyya al-Agha	Fatah	*	*
‘Abd al-Rahim Malluh	PFLP		
Taysir Khalid	DFLP		
Yasir ‘Abd Rabbu	FIDA		
Sulayman al-Najjab	PPP		
Samir Ghusha	PPSF		
‘Ali Ishaq	PLF		
Mahmud Isma‘il	ALF		
Yasir ‘Amr	Independent		
Emil Jarju‘i	Independent	*	*
Riyad al-Khudri	Independent	*	*
Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi	Independent		
As‘ad ‘Abd al-Rahman	Independent	*	
Ghassan Shak‘a	Independent	*	*

Fatah increased its representation from three to five seats. Independents were reduced from eight to six seats. Five representatives residing in Palestine pre-Oslo were newly elected.

Source: Journal of Palestine Studies 25, no. 4 (Summer 1996):146.

Appendix 2

Palestine National Council Sessions

Table 17 Regular Sessions of the PNC, 1964–1996

Session No.	Year	Date	Venue
1st	1964	May 28–June 2	Jerusalem
2nd	1965	May 31–June 4	Cairo
3rd	1966	May 20–May 24	Gaza
4th	1968	July 10–July 17	Cairo
5th	1969	Feb. 1–Feb. 4	Cairo
6th	1969	Sept. 1–Sept. 6	Cairo
7th	1970	May 30–June 4	Cairo
8th	1971	Feb. 28–March 5	Cairo
9th	1971	July 7–July 13	Cairo
10th	1972	April 11–April 12	Cairo
11th	1973	Jan. 6–Jan. 12	Cairo
12th	1974	June 1–June 9	Cairo
13th	1977	March 12–March 20	Cairo
14th	1979	Jan. 15–Jan. 23	Damascus
15th	1981	April 11–April 19	Damascus
16th	1983	Feb. 14–Feb. 22	Algiers
17th	1984	Nov. 22–Nov. 28	Amman
18th	1987	April 20–April 24	Algiers
19th	1988	Nov. 12–Nov. 15	Algiers
20th	1991	Sept. 23–Sept. 28	Algiers
21st	1996	April 22–April 26	Gaza
22nd	1998	Dec. 10–Dec. 14	Gaza

Sources: The first to seventeenth PNCs are recorded in Gresh, *The PLO*, Appendix III. Details for the eighteenth PNC are from Faruq al-Qaddumi, “Assessing the Eighteenth PNC,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 17, no. 2 (Winter 1988):3. Dates of the nineteenth PNC are from Nassar and Heacock (ed.), 223, and the twentieth from the *PASSIA Diary 1996*, 307 and *Journal of Palestine Studies* 21, no. 2 (Winter 1992):151–155. The dates for the twenty-first PNC are recorded in the *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, April 29, 1996. The dates for the twenty-second PNC were kindly provided by Laura Mills, assistant editor, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, correspondence with the author, September 23, 2003.

Appendix 3

PLO and Non-PLO Factions

Principal Palestinian Political Factions

Constituent Factions of the PLO Represented on the Executive Committee

Fatah: Founded in Kuwait in the late 1950s by Yasir Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalaf, Faruq al-Qaddumi, and Khalid al-Hasan, it established a functioning central committee in the early 1960s. Fatah spokesman Yasir Arafat became PLO chairman at the fifth PNC in February 1969. The largest PLO faction, Fatah increased its representation to five at the twenty-first PNC. Fatah's Palestinian nationalist but nonideological agenda lent it a broad appeal and allowed it to become the most popular faction by some margin. The majority of the Fatah leadership returned to the West Bank and Gaza Strip post-DoP. Qaddumi assumed leadership of the movement after Arafat's death.

The *tanzim* (organization) refers to the original Fatah infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza. The al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (*Kata'ib Shuhada al-Aqsa*) are a decentralized local phenomenon of the al-Aqsa intifada to compete with the rising popularity of Hamas.

PFLP: Established in Beirut in September 1967 through a merger of the Arab Nationalist Movement with like-minded left-leaning factions, it was led by Orthodox Christian physician George Habash from Beirut and Damascus until his retirement, to be succeeded by Abu Ali Mustafa in July 2000 (assassinated by Israel in al-Bira in August 2001) and then Ahmad Sa'dat. The PFLP has maintained membership of the PNC but periodically suspended participation in the central council and the executive committee. It became famous for a series of hijackings, including the daring-do of Layla Khalid, which triggered the clashes of Black September. Military operations were orchestrated by Wadi' Haddad from South Yemen until his death in 1978. Officially Marxist-Leninist in ideology, the PFLP retains a significant if diminished following.

DFLP: Established in 1969 after seceding from the PFLP over doctrinal differences, it was originally entitled the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). The group changed its name to the DFLP in 1974. The DFLP has been led from inception by the Jordanian Christian Nayif Hawatma. It retains a modest following in Palestine. The group's representative on the PLO executive committee, Taysir Khalid, was arrested by the IDF during the al-Aqsa intifada.

FIDA: This faction emerged from a split in the DFLP during 1991, ostensibly over participation in the Madrid Conference. Led by Yasir 'Abd Rabbu and Secretary General Salih Ra'fat, FIDA is based exclusively in the West Bank, where it retains limited support.

PPP: Formerly the Palestinian Communist Party, it joined the PLO and took a seat on the executive committee at the seventeenth PNC in 1987. Collapse of the U.S.S.R.

prompted a change of name to the Palestinian Peoples' Party in 1991. It was led by Bashir al-Barghuthi until his death in 1998, to be succeeded by a collective leadership of Mustafa al-Barghuthi (who later resigned), 'Abd al-Majid Hamdan, and Hanna Amira. The PPP is unique among PLO factions for having been established *inside* Palestine, where it retains a small but articulate following. PPP members have had a particularly strong presence among Palestinian NGOs such as HDIP, PARC, and the related land defense committees. PPP general secretary Bassam al-Salhi was the party's candidate in the 2005 presidential elections.

PPSF: This faction seceded from Fatah in 1969, led by Samir Ghusha. Originally leftist-Ba'thist in orientation, the leadership returned to the PLO after Syria prevented participation in the seventeenth and eighteenth PNCs. It has almost no following in the occupied territories.

PLF: The PLF originally split from the PFLP and later from the PFLP-GC in 1977. The group was pro-Iraqi, with members in both Syria and Iraq. Originally led by Muhammad Zaydan (Abu al-'Abbas), the PLF was responsible for the *Achille Lauro* hijacking in 1985 and the abortive assault on a Tel Aviv beach that led to the suspension of the U.S.-PLO dialogue in 1990. Zaydan was detained in Iraq following the U.S. occupation and died in U.S. custody in March 2004. The pro-Syrian wing of the PLF returned to the PLO in 1987 at the eighteenth PNC. Umar Shibli succeeded 'Abbas as head of the PLF.

ALF: Established in 1969 to represent the Iraqi Ba'th Party within the PLO, this faction was led by 'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad. It established little following in the occupied territories, but gained popular credit for distributing Iraqi funds to the families of those killed during the al-Aqsa intifada. ALF head in the West Bank, Rakad Salim, was arrested by the IDF in 2002.

Constituent Factions of the PLO Not Represented on the Executive Committee with Seats on the Central Council

PFLP-GC: This group was established via a split from the PFLP in 1969. It is based in Damascus and led by Ahmad Jibril, a former officer in the Syrian army. It does not participate but has two seats reserved on the central council.

Al-Sa'iqa: Established in 1968 by the Syrian Ba'th Party to represent Syria's Ba'thist regime within the PLO, it was led by 'Isam al-Qadi from Damascus. Formerly second only to Fatah in size and influence, al-Sa'iqa is now marginalized after participating in the Syrian assaults on Palestinians in Lebanon. Sa'iqa operates solely in Syria and has no following in the occupied territories. It does not participate but has two seats reserved on the central committee.

Also represented with the minimum two seats are the Palestinian Arab Liberation Front and Islamic Jihad, according to *PASSIA Diary 2003*, 314.

Non-PLO Factions

Fatah Intifada: Formerly the Fatah Provisional Command, it split from Fatah in 1983 in the rebellion led by Sa'id Musa Maragha. It is based in Syria with no following in the occupied territories.

Fatah-Revolutionary Council: Also known as the Abu Nidal group, it split from Fatah and was expelled from the PLO in 1974. The group was led by Sabri al-Banna until his death in Baghdad in August 2002. Banna had been sentenced to death by the PLO for treason. The group was responsible for the death of leading Palestinian moderates, including 'Isam al-Sartawi and most prominently Salah Khalaf, and carried out the attempted assassination of Israeli ambassador to London Shlomo Argov that was used as a pretext for the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The group was variously supported by Iraq, Syria, and Libya.

Hamas: Emerging from the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas was formally established in Gaza in August 1988 to enable the Brotherhood to take a proactive role in the first intifada. Hamas considers all the territory of mandate Palestine to be Islamic *waqf* property that should be reclaimed and governed according to Sharia' law. The 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades (*Kata'ib 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam*) constitute the group's military wing. The movement's founder and guide was Shaykh Ahmad Yasin, assassinated by Israel in March 2004. Hamas has a collective leadership distributed among Palestine and other Arab countries. In Gaza, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi held seniority after Yasin, until his own assassination the following month.

Islamic Jihad: This faction split from the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1960s and was originally led by 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Awda. Leadership was then assumed by Fathi al-Shiqaqi from 1988 until his assassination in Malta in 1995, and thereafter by Ramadan 'Abdullah Shalah. Islamic Jihad has always viewed Palestine as the center of the Islamic struggle and has taken a traditionally proactive stance on military operations against Israel, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood, which traditionally placed greater emphasis on social and spiritual renewal within the Muslim community as a precursor to birth of the "Jihad generation." The Jerusalem Brigades (*Kata'ib al-Quds*) constitute the group's military wing.

Sources: PASSIA Diary 2003; Sayigh, Armed Struggle; Gresh, PLO; Cobban, The PLO.

Appendix 4

Palestinian Authority Cabinets, 1994–2003*

Table 18 The Council of Ministers, May 1994

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Civil Affairs	Jamil al-Tarifi	Independent	Local WB
Culture and Arts	Yasir 'Abd Rabbu	FIDA	Returnee
Economy, Trade, and Industry	Ahmad Qray'	Fatah CC	Returnee
Education	Yasir 'Amr	Independent	Returnee
Finance and Agriculture	Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi	Independent	Returnee
Health	Riyad al-Za'nun	Fatah	Local GS
Housing	Zakariyya al-Agha	Fatah CC*	Local GS
Interior	Yasir Arafat	Fatah CC	Returnee
Justice	Furayh Abu Midayn	Fatah	Local GS
Labor	Samir Ghusha	PPSF	Returnee
Local Government	Sa'ib 'Urayqat	Fatah	Local
Planning and International Cooperation	Nabil Sha'th	Fatah CC*	Returnee
Social Affairs	Intisar al-Wazir	Fatah CC	Returnee
Telecommunications	'Abd al-Hafiz al-Ashhab	Independent	Local WB
Tourism and Antiquities	Ilyas Frayj	Fatah	Local WB
Transport	'Abd al-'Aziz al-Haj Ahmad	Fatah	Deportee WB
Waqf and Religious Affairs	Hasan Tahbub	Independent	Local WB
Youth and Sport	'Azmi al-Shu'aybi	FIDA	Deportee WB
Secretary General	Al-Tayyib 'Abd al-Rahim	Fatah CC	Returnee

The Council of Ministers was established on May 28, 1994, following the conclusion of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the beginning of redeployment to Palestine. The Council exercised executive power prior to the elections for the presidency and the Legislative Council in January 1996. The portfolios and ministers presented here are as they stood prior to those elections. *Sources:* Brynen, *Palestinian Elite Formation*, 39. "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19, no. 1 (Autumn 1989):142–143, & 25, no. 4 (Summer 1996):146–147. Andoni, "The Palestinian Elections," 5–16. Rubin, *Transformation*, 203–205.

Note: For Tables 18–25, the following abbreviations are used: CC=central committee; CC=central committee appointee; RC=revolutionary council; RC*=revolutionary council appointee post-Oslo; RCO=revolutionary council observer status; GS=Gaza Strip; WB= West Bank.

Table 19 The Executive Authority, May 1996

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Agriculture	ʿAbd al-Jawad Salih	Independent	Local WB
Civil Affairs	Jamil al-Tarifi	Independent	Local WB
Culture and Information	Yasir ʿAbd Rabbu	FIDA	Returnee
Economy and Trade	Mahir al-Masri	Fatah	Local WB
Education	Yasir ʿAmr	Independent	Returnee
Finance	Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi	Independent	Returnee
Health	Riyad al-Zaʿnun	Fatah	Local GS
Higher Education	Hanan ʿAshrawi	Independent	Local WB
Industry†	Bashir al-Barghuthi	PPP	Local WB
Interior	Yasir Arafat	Fatah CC	Returnee
Jewish Affairs	Moshe Hirsch	Independent	New York
Justice	Furayh Abu Midayn	Fatah	Local GS
Labor	Samir Ghusha	PPSF	Returnee
Local Government	Saʿib ʿUrayqat	Fatah	Local
Planning and International Cooperation	Nabil Shaʿth	Fatah CC*	Returnee
Public Works and Housing	ʿAzzam al-Ahmad	Fatah RC	Local GS
Social Affairs	Intisar al-Wazir	Fatah CC	Returnee
Supply	ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Shahin	Fatah RC	Deportee GS
Telecommunications and Post	ʿImad al-Faluji	Independent (Islamist)	Local GS
Tourism and Antiquities	Ilyas Frayj	Fatah	Local WB
Transport	ʿAli al-Qawasmi	Fatah	Local WB
Youth and Sport	Tallal Sadir††	Independent (Islamist)	Local WB
Waqf and Religious Affairs	Hasan Tahbub	Independent	Local WB
Without Portfolio (Jerusalem)	Fay sal al-Husayni	Fatah CC*	Local WB
Secretary General	Al-Tayyib ʿAbd al-Rahim	Fatah CC	Returnee

†The Industry portfolio would be reunited with Economy and Trade under al-Masri.

†† Sadir replaced ʿAzzam al-Ahmad at Youth and Sport during January 1997.

Sources: Brynen, Palestinian Elite Formation, 39. "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19, no. 1 (Autumn 1989):142-143, & 25, no. 4 (Summer 1996):146-147.

Andoni, "The Palestinian Elections," 5-16. Rubin, *Transformation*, 203-205.

Table 20 The Executive Authority, August 9, 1998

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Agriculture	Hikmat Zayd	Fatah RC	Returnee
Civil Affairs	Jamil al-Tarifi	Independent	Local WB
Culture, Information, and Arts	Yasir 'Abd Rabbu	FIDA	Returnee
Economics and Trade	Mahir al-Masri	Fatah	Local WB
Education	Munthir Salah		
Environment	Yusif Abu Safiyya	Fatah	Local GS
Finance	Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi	Indep	Returnee
Health	Riyad al-Za'nun	Fatah	Local GS
Higher Education	Munthir Salah	Independent	
Housing	'Abd al-Rahman Hamad	Fatah	Local WB/ GS†
Industry	Sa'di al-Krunz	Fatah	Local GS
Interior	Yasir Arafat	Fatah CC	Returnee
Justice	Furayh Abu Midayn	Fatah	Local GS
Labor	Rafiq al-Natsha	Fatah RC	Returnee
Local Government	Sa'ib 'Urayqat	Fatah RC*	Local WB
Parliamentary Affairs	Nabil 'Amr	Fatah RC	Local WB
Planning and International Cooperation	Nabil Sha'th	Fatah CC*	Returnee
Prisoner's Affairs	Hisham 'Abd al-Raziq	Fatah RC*	Local GS
Public Works	'Azzam al-Ahmad	Fatah RC	Returnee
Social Affairs	Intisar al-Wazir	Fatah CC	Returnee
Supply	'Abd al-'Aziz Shahin	Fatah RC	Deportee GS
Telecommunications and Post	'Imad al-Faluji	Independent (Islamist)	Local GS
Tourism and Antiquities	Mitri Abu 'Ita	Independent	Local WB
Transport	'Ali al-Qawasmi	Fatah	Local WB
<i>Waqf</i> and Religious Affairs			
Youth and Sport Without Portfolio	Yasir 'Amr	Independent	Returnee
	Hasan 'Asfur	Independent	Returnee
	Bashir al-Barghuthi	PPP	Local WB
(Jerusalem)	Faysal al-Husayni	Fatah RC*	Local WB
(Bethlehem 2000)	Nabil Qassis	Independent	Local WB
	Tallal Sadir	Independent (Islamist)	Local WB
	Salah al-Ta'mari	Fatah RC*	Returnee
	Ziyad Abu Zayid	Independent	Local WB

†Hamad was born in the East Jerusalem suburb of Bayt Hanun and represents the Gaza Strip district of Jabalya in the Legislative Council.

Under pressure to reform for the first time, a cabinet reshuffle produced a new line-up by August 9, 1998. A majority of ministers in the major ministries retained their posts. The main features were the replacement of 'Abd al-Jawad Salih following his principled resignation and the inflation of the cabinet from twenty-six to over thirty, making this the PA's largest cabinet to date. Both 'Ashrawi and Salih declined to accept portfolios.

Source: Rubin, *Transformation*, 204–205. “Documents and Source Material,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 1 (Autumn 1998):145–146.

Table 21 The Executive Authority, June 9, 2002

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Agriculture	Rafiq al-Natsha	Fatah RC	Returnee
Civil Affairs	Jamil al-Tarifi	Independent	Local WB
Culture and Information	Yasir 'Abd Rabbu	FIDA	Returnee
Economy, Trade, and Industry	Mahir al-Masri	Fatah	Local WB
Education and Higher Education	Na'im Abu al-Hummus	Fatah RCO	Local WB
Finance	Salam Fayyad	Independent	Local WB
Health	Riyad al-Za'nun	Fatah	Local GS
Interior	'Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya	Fatah	Returnee
Justice	Ibrahim al-Dughma	Independent	Returnee
Labor	Ghassan al-Khatib	PPP	Local WB
Local Governance	Sa'ib 'Urayqat	Fatah RC*	Local WB
Planning and International Cooperation	Nabil Sha'th	Fatah CC*	Returnee
Public Works and Housing	'Azzam al-Ahmad	Fatah RC	Returnee
Natural Resources	'Abd al-Rahman Hamad	Fatah RC*	Local WB/GS
Social Affairs	Intisar al-Wazir	Fatah CC	Returnee
Supplies	'Abd al-'Aziz Shahin	Fatah RC	Deportee GS
Telecommunications and Post	'Imad al-Faluji	Independent Islamist	Local GS
Tourism	Nabil Qassis	Independent	Local WB
Transport	Mitri Abu 'Ita	Fatah	Local WB
Youth and Sport	'Ali al-Qawasmi	Fatah	Local WB
<i>Waqf</i> and Religious Affairs			

It was notable as the first cabinet in which Arafat did not hold the portfolio of minister of the interior himself.

Source: Miftah. <http://www.miftah.org/htm>. “Documents and Source Material,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 1 (Autumn 2002):158.

Table 22 The Executive Authority, October 29, 2002

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Agriculture	Rafiq al-Natsha	Fatah RC	Returnee
Culture and Information	Yasir 'Abd Rabbu	FIDA	Returnee
Economy, Trade, and Industry	Mahir al-Masri	Fatah	Local WB
Education and Higher Education	Na'im Abu al-Hummus	Fatah RCO	Local WB
Energy and Natural Resources	'Abd al-Rahman Hamad	Fatah RC*	Local WB/GS
Finance	Salam Fayyad	Independent	Local WB
Health	Ahmad al-Shibi	Fatah	Local GS
Interior	Hani al-Hasan	Fatah CC	Returnee
Justice	Zuhayr al-Surani	Independent	Local GS
Labor	Ghassan al-Khatib	PPP	Local WB
Local Government	Sa'ib 'Urayqat	Fatah RC*	Local WB
Planning and International Cooperation	Nabil Sha'th	Fatah CC*	Returnee
Prisoner's Affairs	Hisham 'Abd al-Raziq	Fatah RC*	Local GS
Public Works and Housing	'Azzam al-Ahmad	Fatah RC	Returnee
Social Affairs	Intisar al-Wazir	Fatah CC	Returnee
Supplies	'Abd al-'Aziz Shahin	Fatah RC	Deportee GS
Tourism and Antiquities	Nabil Qassis	Independent	Local WB
Transport	Mitri Abu 'Ita	Fatah	Local WB
<i>Waqf</i> and Religious Affairs			
Secretary General to the Presidency	Al-Tayyib 'Abd al-Rahim	Fatah CC	Returnee
Secretary General to the Cabinet	Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman	Fatah RC	Returnee

The former cabinet resigned September 11, 2002, in anticipation of a vote of no confidence in the Legislative Council.

Four former ministries were redesignated to non-cabinet level: Civil Affairs, which continued under Jamil al-Tarifi, the Commission of NGO Affairs under Hasan 'Asfur, the Environmental Quality Authority under Yusif Abu Safiya, and Telecommunications and Posts under Zuhayr al-Laham.

Five PLO officials were included in the cabinet at non-ministerial level: Samir Ghusha of the PPSF and Sari Nusayba for Jerusalem Affairs; 'Abd al-Aziz al-Haj Ahmad continued at Health Affairs; 'Abdallah al-Hurani took Refugee Affairs; and 'Abd al-Hafiz al-'Ashhab was without portfolio.

Source: *Ha'aretz*, (October 29, 2002) and *PASSIA Diary 2003*, 12–19. "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 2 (Winter 2003):159.

Table 23 The Executive Authority, April 29, 2003

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Prime Minister and Interior	Mahmud 'Abbas	Fatah CC	Returnee Safad, Israel
Agriculture	Rafiq al-Natsha	Fatah RC	Returnee WB, Hebron
Cabinet Affairs	Yasir 'Abd Rabbu	FIDA	Returnee Jaffa, Israel
Cabinet Secretary	Hakam Bal'awi	Fatah CC Tulkarm	Returnee WB
Culture and Arts	Ziyad Abu 'Amr	Independent	Local GS, Gaza City
Economy, Trade, and Industry	Mahir al-Masri	Fatah	Local WB, Nablus
Education and Higher Education	Na'im Abu al-Hummus	Fatah RCO	Local WB, Bir Zeit
Energy	'Azzam al-Shawwa	Fatah	Local GS, Gaza City
External Affairs	Nabil Sha'th	Fatah CC*	Returnee Safad, Israel
Finance	Salam Fayyad	Independent	Local WB, Tulkarm
Health	Kamal al-Shirafi	Independent	Local GS, Jabalya
Information	Nabil 'Amr	Fatah RC	Local WB, Hebron
Interior			
Justice	'Abd al-Karim Abu Salah	Independent	Local GS, Khan Yunis
Labor	Ghassan al-Khatib	PPP	Local WB, Nablus
Local Government	Jamal al-Shubaki	Fatah RC*	Local WB, Hebron
Negotiations Affairs	Sa'ib 'Urayqat	Fatah RC*	Local WB, Jerusalem
Planning and International Cooperation	Nabil Qassis	Independent	Local WB, Ramallah
Prisoner Affairs	Hisham 'Abd al-Raziq	Fatah RC*	Local GS, Rafah
Public Works and Housing	Yahya (Hamdan) 'Ashur	Fatah RC	Returnee GS, Gaza City
Security Affairs	Muhammad Dahlan (Minister of State)	Fatah RC*	Local GS, Khan Yunis
Social Affairs	Intisar al-Wazir	Fatah CC	Returnee GS, Gaza City
Tourism	Mitri Abu 'Ita	Fatah	Local WB, Bethlehem
Transportation	Sa'di al-Krunz	Fatah	Local GS, Nusayrat
<i>Waqf</i> and	'Abd al-Fattah Hamayl	Fatah	Deportee WB, Kufr

Religious Affairs (Minister of State) Without Portfolio	Malik
--	-------

The first cabinet with a prime minister was also notable for introducing Dahlan as minister of state for security and including more locals and technocrats.

Source: Miftah. "Meet the New Palestinian Cabinet," April 28, 2003, <http://www.miftah.org/htm> (accessed May 4, 2003). "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):173-178.

**Table 24 The Emergency Cabinet Sworn in
October 7, 2003**

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Prime Minister	Ahmad Qray'	Fatah CC	Returnee WB, Jerusalem
Education and Higher Education	Na'im Abu al- Hummus	Fatah RCO	Local WB, Bir Zeit
External Affairs	Nabil Sha'th	Fatah CC*	Returnee Safad, Israel
Finance	Salam Fayyad	Independent	Local WB, Tulkarm
Health	Jawad al-Tibi	Fatah	Local GS, Khan Yunis
Interior†	Hakam Bal'awi	Fatah CC	Returnee Tulkarm
Local Government	Jamal al-Shubaki	Fatah RC*	Local WB, Hebron
Public Works and Housing	'Abd al-Rahman Hamad	Fatah RC*	Local WB/GS, Jerusalem
Without Portfolio	Sa'ib 'Urayqat	Fatah RC*	Local WB, Jerusalem

†Bal'awi was appointed by Arafat on October 13, 2003. Qray' had championed Nasr Yusif for the post, but Arafat refused. In the wake of the 'Abbas resignation, installation of the emergency cabinet with both prime minister and minister of the interior made it more difficult for Israel to remove Arafat, as it was then threatening to do.

Source: al-Quds. <http://www.alquds.com/htm> (accessed October 13, 2003). Ha'aretz (October 13, 2003).

**Table 25 The Executive Authority from
November 12, 2003**

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Prime Minister, Information, and <i>Waqf</i> and Religious Affairs	Ahmad Qray'	Fatah CC	Returnee WB, Jerusalem
Cabinet Secretary	Hasan Abu Libda	Independent	Local WB
Civil Affairs†	Jamil al-Tarifi	Independent	Local WB, Ramallah
Communications	'Azzam al- Ahmad	Fatah RC	Returnee Jinin
Culture and Arts	Yahya Yakhluf	Fatah RC	Returnee Galilee, Israel

Economy and Trade	Mahir al-Masri	Fatah	Local WB, Nablus
Education and Higher Education	Na'im Abu al-Hummus	Fatah RCO	Local WB, Bir Zeit
External Affairs	Nabil Sha'ath	Fatah CC*	Returnee Safad, Israel
Finance	Salam Fayyad	Independent	Local WB, Tulkarm
Health	Jawad al-Tibi	Fatah	Local GS, Khan Yunis

Portfolio	Name	Affiliation/Rank	Background
Interior	Hakam Bal'awi	Fatah CC	Returnee WB, Tulkarm
Justice	Nahid al-Rayyis	Fatah RC*	Returnee GS
Labor	Ghassan al-Khatib	PPP	Local WB, Nablus
Law	Sulayman Abu Snayna (Minister of State)	Fatah	Local WB, Hebron
Local Government	Jamal al-Shubaki	Fatah RC*	Local WB, Hebron
Negotiations Affairs	Sa'ib 'Urayqat	Fatah RC*	Local WB, Jerusalem
Planning and International Cooperation	Nabil Qassis	Independent	Local WB, Ramallah
Prisoner Affairs	Hisham 'Abd al-Raziq	Fatah RC*	Local GS, Rafah
Public Works and Housing	'Abd al-Rahman Hamad	Fatah RC*	Local WB/GS††
Social Affairs	Intisar al-Wazir	Fatah CC	Returnee GS, Gaza City
Sport and Youth	Salah al-Ta'mari	Fatah RC*	Returnee WB, Bethlehem
Tourism	Mitri Abu 'Ita	Fatah	Local WB, Bethlehem
Transportation	Hikmat Zayd	Fatah RC	Returnee WB, Jinin
Women's Affairs	Zahira Kamal	FIDA	Local WB, Jerusalem
Without Portfolio	Qaddura Paris (Minister of State)	Fatah	Local WB, Ramallah

†Civil Affairs was restored to ministerial status.

†† Hamad was born in the East Jerusalem suburb of Bayt Hanun and represents the Gaza Strip district of Jabalya in the Legislative Council.

Note: Tracking PA cabinets can be an imprecise business due to conflicting accounts of appointments, changes of ministers between official reshuffles, and ministers declining or resigning posts. State agencies may be elevated to ministerial status or ministries downgraded to state agencies, while signs and stationery may continue to assert something else. Every effort has been made to cross-check references and to present as accurate a picture as possible.

It should also be noted that the local/returnee dichotomy is less than watertight. For instance,

it can be difficult to distinguish between a deportee and a returnee: many returnees spent a decade or less abroad, some three decades or more, and are consequently less attached. Use of the dichotomy elicits a visceral response from the returnees themselves, while locals seem much more ready to stress it.

Source: Palestinian National Authority.

http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/gov/2003_2_oct.asp. (accessed November 18, 2003). Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations,

<http://www.palestine-un.org/counc.html> (accessed November 18, 2003).

Appendix 5 Proposed Fatah Structure, 2003




Figure 2: *Source:* Passed to the author by Hani al-Hasan, Commissioner of Fatah Office of Mobilization and Organization, Ramallah, June 15, 2003. Author's own translation.

Appendix 6

Members of the Fatah Revolutionary Council Elected by the 5th General Conference with Amendments as of November 2002, Plus Five New Members Added by the 23rd Session in February 2004

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. Yasir 'Arafat | 27. Fatma Birnawi |
| 2. Faruq al-Qaddumi | 28. Sufyan al-Agha |
| 3. Mahmud 'Abbas | 29. Nabila al-Nimr |
| 4. Muhammad Ghnaym | 30. Jamila Saydam |
| 5. Salim al-Za'nun | 31. Mustafa Sa'ada |
| 6. Hani al-Hasan | 32. Muhammad Abu Khalil |
| 7. Yahya Habash (Sakhr Habash) | 33. Akram Haniyya |
| 8. Intisar al-Wazir | 34. Anis al-Khatib |
| 9. Hakam Bal'awi | 35. Samir Abu Ghazala |
| 10. Ahmad Qray' | 36. Waji Hasan Qasim |
| 11. Muhammad al-'Amuri
(Muhammad Jihad) | 37. 'Azzam al-Ahmad |
| 12. Mustafa al-Bishtawi (Nasr
Yusif) | 38. Muhammad Nasir al-Qudwa |
| 13. al-Tayyib 'Abd al-Rahim | 39. Walid Sa'd Sayil Sulayman |
| 14. Sharif Mish'al ('Abbas Zaki) | 40. Muhammad Da'ud 'Awda |
| 15. 'Abdullah al-Ifranji | 41. Mu'in al-Tahir |
| 16. Nabil Sha'th | 42. Mustafa al-Shaykh Ahmad
(Mustafa Liftawi, Abu Firas) |
| 17. Fay sal al-Husayni | 43. Salwa Hilmi Abu Khadra |
| 18. Zakariyya al-Agha | 44. Burhan Jarrar |
| 19. Yahya 'Ashur | 45. Bakr 'Abd al-Man'am |
| 20. Ahmad Sakhr Bsaysu | 46. Jihad Muhammad Qurashuli |
| 21. 'Adnan Samara | 47. Miryam al-Atrash |
| 22. Jarrar al-Qudwa | 48. Hikmat Zayd |
| 23. Deleted | 49. Mahmud al-'Alul |
| 24. Harbi al-Sarsur | 50. Khalid Mismar |
| 25. 'Abd al-'Aziz Shahin | 51. Muhammad Sa'd al-Razzam |
| 26. Zuhayr al-Wazir | 52. Madni Muhammad Malik |
| 54. Haydar Ibrahim Qubha | 53. 'Abdullah Hijazi |
| 55. Jamal Muhaysin | 91. Yasin Ahmad Qasim |
| 56. Najla 'Adil Yasin | 92. Deleted |
| | 93. Mutlaq Hamdan Abu Taha |

- | | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| 57. Sulayman Hasan ‘Abd al-Raziq | 94. Ibrahim ‘Abd al-Qadir Saydam |
| 58. Zakariyya Ibrahim ‘Abd al Rahim | 95. Fu’ad al-Shubaki |
| 59. ‘Arif Mahmud Khatab | 96. Khalid Yusuf Sultan |
| 60. Jamil Muhammad Jabr Shihada | 97. Sa’ib Misbah al-‘Ajiz |
| 61. ‘Izz al-Din al-Sharif | 98. Marwan Rida ‘Abd al-Hamid |
| 62. ‘Abd al-Karim Nisar | 99. Sami Fayiz Musallam |
| 63. Rawhi Fattuh | 100. Hindi Hijazi al-Shubaki |
| 64. Nabil Ma’ruf | 101. Zuhayr Ibrahim al-Manasra |
| 65. Yahya Husayn Yakhluif | 102. Ghazi al-Jabali |
| 66. Marwan al-Barghuthi | 103. Faysal Abu Sharkh |
| 67. Usama Musa al-‘Ali | 104. Jamal al-Shubaki |
| 68. Nabil Sulayman Ramlawi | 105. Jibril al-Rajub |
| 69. Sulayman al-Sharfa | 106. Muhammad Dahlan |
| 70. Fathi al-Qudwa | 107. Hisham ‘Abd al-Raziq |
| 71. Amin Fawzi al-Hindi | 108. Ahmad Nasr |
| 72. Rafiq Shakir al-Natsha | 109. Ahmad Hillis |
| 73. Muhammad Salama Jarrada | 110. Muhammad Lutfi |
| 74. Ghazi ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni | 111. Amin Maqbul |
| 75. ‘Uthman Abu Gharbiyya | 112. Rabiha Diyab |
| 76. Ahmad ‘Abd al-Rahman | 113. Ramzi Khuri |
| 77. ‘Umar al-Khatib | 114. Salim al-Zari’i |
| 78. Nabil ‘Amr | 115. Diyab Alluh |
| 79. ‘Imad Ya’qub Shaqur | 116. Ahmad Ghnaym |
| 80. Ahmad Ibrahim ‘Afana | 117. Sa’ib ‘Urayqat |
| 81. Ahmad ‘Ali ‘Arafat al-Qudwa | 118. ‘Abd al-Rahman Hamad |
| 82. Isma’il Hasan Jabr (al-haj Isma’il) | 119. Samir Shihada |
| 83. Mahmud Ahmad Da’as | 120. Muhammad al-Hurani |
| 84. ‘Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda | 121. Ahmad al-Dik |
| 85. Fakhri ‘Umran Shaqura | 122. Salah al-Ta‘mari |
| 86. Musa ‘Arafat al-Qudwa | 123. Samih Nasr |
| 87. Juma’ Misbah Ghali | 124. Raji al-Najmi |
| 88. Mahmud Ahmad al-Natur | 125. Abu Ta’an |
| 89. Fayiz ‘Arif Zaydan | 126. Nahid al-Rayyis |
| 90. Zuhayr Muhammad al-Laham | 127. ‘Abd al-Hay ‘Abd al-Wahid |
| | 128. Abu Sa’id |
| | 129. Sultan Abu al-‘Aynayn |

New Full Members Added by the 23rd Session (February 2004)

1. Ibrahim Abu al-Naja
2. Zuhdi al-Qidra
3. Muhammad Sbayh
4. Ahmad Jbara
5. Ahmad Haza’ Sharim

Observer Members

- | | |
|--|-----------------------------|
| 1. Ahmad Muhammad Salim
Shinyura | 6. Mazin 'Izz al-Din |
| 2. Fu'ad al-Bitar | 7. Tawfiq al-Tirawi |
| 3. Isma'il Muhammad Yasin Abu
Shamala | 8. Fayiz 'Arafat |
| 4. Ibrahim Drishm | 9. 'Abd al-Fattah al-Ja'idi |
| 5. Abu al-Fatah | 10. Nabil Abu Rudayna |
| | 11. Na'im Abu al-Hummus |

Note: Names deleted signify members who were deceased or incapacitated.

Notes

Preface

1. Suad Amiry and Mouhannad Hadid (eds.), *Earthquake in April* Monograph series on the architectural heritage of Palestine, no. 5. (Ramallah: Riwaq Center for Architectural Conservation and the Institute of Jerusalem Studies, 2002), 33. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, June 26, 2003, *Ha'aretz*, October 13, 2003.
2. The operation ran from December 16, 2003 to January 6, 2004. *The Guardian Weekly*, February 5, 2004.
3. Sharon enlisted in the Hagana Zionist militia in 1945. In 1953, he was put in command of Unit 101; prominent operations included a raid into al-Burayj refugee camp in Gaza and against the West Bank village of Qibya. In January 1970, he became head of the IDF's southern command charged with the suppression of the Gaza Strip. Sharon was minister of defense during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the occupation of West Beirut, and the massacres in Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. The report of the Commission of Enquiry into Sabra and Shatila (the Kahan Commission) found that Sharon bore "personal responsibility" and suggested he resign. Adnan Abdelrazek, "Insight Report," *The Jerusalem Times*, May 11, 2001. Sharon was prime minister during the destruction in Jinin refugee camp in 2002.
4. *Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements. Israeli-Palestinian Peace Documentation Series* 1, no. 1, Jerusalem: Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), 1994.
5. For injuries to and attacks against journalists, see Reporters without Borders, *Israel/Palestine: The Black Book*, (London, Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2002), especially chapter 4, Israeli Violations of Freedom of the Press, 52–57 and chapter 8, The Israeli Army Turns on the Media, 29 March–15 June 2002, 108–112.
6. The BBC came in for repeated official Israeli government criticism and, somewhat improbably, even CNN was not immune.
7. Numerous Palestinian websites were inaccessible for periods of time following Operation Defensive Shield, but much information did still get out. Khaled Amayreh reported the IDF's closing down of al-Quds University's server in "In Constant Fear," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 18, 2002. On aid workers see Jonathan Cook, "Restricting Humanitarian Aid," in the same edition. U.S. ISM volunteer Rachel Corrie was killed in Rafah. U.K. volunteer Tom Hurndall later died of injuries received there. The BBC produced a documentary entitled "When the Killing Is Easy" following the death of cameraman James Miller, also in Rafah. From April 2003 access for aid workers in Gaza grew more difficult; a waiver was introduced in May to absolve the IDF of responsibility for injury, and access denied to all bar diplomats later in the month. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):136.
8. *Ha'aretz*, July 25, 2002.
9. Poverty rate citing the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS); unemployment from UNSCO; malnutrition and anaemia from a study by The Johns Hopkins University. Catherine Bertini, *Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the Secretary-General Mission Report 11–19 August 2002*, <http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/bertini-report.html>. (accessed February 29, 2004).

10. Helena Cobban, "Shin Bet Ex-Chiefs Speak Out," *Just World News*, November 15, 2003, <http://justworldnews.org/archives/000354.html>. *Ha'aretz*, September 25, 2003 (accessed December 2, 2003).
11. Iyad al-Sarraj, "Psycho-Political Aspects of the Palestinian Intifada," lecture at The American University in Cairo, May 12, 2003.
12. Conversations with other friends, Ramallah, August 2001 and June 2003.
13. Youssef Courbage, "Reshuffling the Demographic Cards in Israel/Palestine," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 4 (Summer 1999):21–29.
14. Muna Hamzeh, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 10, 2003.
15. Hamzeh reports that the conference was "organized by the right wing Moledet Party to promote the policy of population transfer. During the same month, Moledet leader and Minister of Tourism Benny Elon met with US senators and congress people as well as with American Jewish organizations to promote the idea of transfer of Palestinians to Jordan." *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 10, 2003.
16. In October 2002, Elon joined DeLay at a convention of the Christian Coalition in Washington, during which he openly called for the transfer of Palestinians, to the delight of the crowd. DeLay addressed the Knesset on July 30, 2003, with a speech in which he dismissed the efforts of then Palestinian prime minister Mahmud 'Abbas to achieve a ceasefire as a "90 day vacation" for "terrorists." Prior to his trip he opined on the prospects for Palestinian statehood: "I can't imagine this president supporting a state of terrorists, a sovereign state of terrorists." Ali Abunimah, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 7, 2003.
17. Benny Morris interviewed by Ari Shavit, *Ha'aretz*, January 9, 2004. For a fine analysis of the content of this interview, see Gabriel Ash, "Diagnosing Benny Morris," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, February 12, 2004.
18. *Ibid.*
19. Sari Hanafi, "Targeting Space through Bio-Politics: The Israeli Colonial Project," *Palestine Report* 10, no. 32, February 18, 2004.
20. For the text of the Roadmap, see the Press Statement from the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Washington DC, April 30, 2003 *A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*. Press Statement from the US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, Washington D.C. April 30, 2003, <http://www.state.gov/t/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062pf.htm> (accessed August 2003).

Chapter 1

1. For the last word on the history of the armed struggle, see Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
2. The term "anti-colonial revolt" to characterize the al-Aqsa intifada is from Graham Usher, "Returning to the Cause," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, April 26, 2001.
3. James Mahoney and Richard Snyder, "Rethinking Agency and Structure in the Study of Regime Change," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 34, no. 2 (Summer 1999):16. The authors cite Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), especially chapter 1.
4. By "human agency" I mean the will to act on the part of individuals or a collective of individuals. According to Hay, the notion of human agency implies an actor (or intentional agent) located in a specific structural context that defines the constraints and opportunities for action open to that agent. Colin Hay, "Structure and Agency," in *Theory and Methods in*

- Political Science*, eds. David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), 189–206.
5. Mahoney and Snyder.
 6. *Ibid.*, 17.
 7. *Ibid.*, 16. The authors cite Paul A. David, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY,” *American Economic Review* 75:332–37.
 8. David Potter, David Goldblatt, Margaret Kiloh, and Paul Lewis (eds.), *Democratization* (Cambridge: Polity Press, in association with the Open University, 1997), 18.
 9. *Ibid.*, 10.
 10. Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), cited in Potter et al., *ibid.*, 19.
 11. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, E. Stephens, and J. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), cited in Potter et al., *ibid.*, 20.
 12. Mahoney and Snyder, 24–25.
 13. *Ibid.*, 25.
 14. *Ibid.*, 20 (citing Collier and Collier).
 15. Glenn E. Robinson, *Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), x–xi.
 16. Foremost among the many Palestinian critics were civil society advocates Mustafa al-Barghuthi and George Giacaman in Ramallah and head of the Palestinian Red Crescent and veteran campaigner Haydar ‘Abd al-Shafi in Gaza.
 17. The term “demobilization” is from Yezid Sayigh. “For the Record: PR Interviews Yezid Sayigh,” *Palestine Report* 7, no. 37 (March 7, 2001), <http://www.jmcc.org/media/report/01/Mar/1.htm>. (accessed December 3, 2003).
 18. Potter et al., 10.
 19. Yezid Sayigh, “Arafat and the Anatomy of a Revolt,” *Survival* 43, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 47–60.
 20. Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model,” *Comparative Politics* 2, no. 3 (April 1970):337–63.
 21. G.L.Munck, “Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 3(1994):355–75, cited in Potter et al., 23.
 22. Mahoney and Snyder, 25.
 23. *Ibid.*, 24.
 24. Rustow, 350.
 25. Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S.Migdal, *The Palestinian People: A History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 7.
 26. On the formative early development of Palestinian nationalism, Lesch draws particular attention to the general strike of 1936 and the revolt against the mandatory power from 1937–1939. William Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). Khalidi argues that it can be traced back further, to the combination of Ottoman defeat, Zionism, and the British Mandate from 1917 to 1923. Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
 27. The AHC’s call for the establishment of a Palestinian government was thwarted by the ambition of King ‘Abdullah of Transjordan. In December 1948, ‘Abdullah and Great Britain jointly sponsored the Jericho Conference to decide the future of the West Bank. The Palestinian delegation was composed of pro-Jordanian notables such as the Nashashibis, Dajanis, and Tuqans who opted for incorporation into the Hashemite kingdom in order to break the power of their political rivals, the Mufti and the Husayni family of Jerusalem. The West Bank was duly annexed in 1950, and Palestinians granted Jordanian citizenship in 1954. ‘Abdullah was assassinated by a Palestinian on July 20, 1951. For further details of the

- Jericho Conference, see Pamela Ann Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians 1876–1983* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 89–91.
28. The All Palestine Government was led by Ahmad Hilmi ‘Abd al-Baqi until his death in 1963, after which Palestinian representation at the Arab League was assumed by Ahmad al-Shuqayri, shortly to become the first chairman of the PLO. Moshe Shemesh, *The Palestinian Entity 1959–1974: Arab Politics and the PLO* (second ed.), (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 32–33.
 29. Laurie Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 4.
 30. *Ibid.*, 13.
 31. Rustow, 355.
 32. Potter et al., 14.
 33. Rustow, 356.
 34. Potter et al., 14.
 35. Rustow, 358.
 36. Karen L. Remmer, “Theoretical Decay and Theoretical Divergence: The Resurgence of Institutional Analysis,” *World Politics* 50, no. 1 (October 1997):50.
 37. *Ibid.*, 54.
 38. *Ibid.*, 51.
 39. Brand, 6.
 40. Following the guerrillas’ assumption of power, the PLO became a complex rather than a unitary organization, an “umbrella” composed of a coalition of factions that constitute institutions within its framework, with most factions having a seat on the executive committee, the intermediary central council, and the Palestinian legislature, the Palestine National Council. The formal institutional structure of the PLO is described in detail by Sami Musallam, *The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Function and Structure* (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1990).
 41. Yezid Sayigh, “Armed Struggle and State Formation,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 26, no. 4 (Summer 1997):23.
 42. *Ibid.*
 43. Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated and edited with an introduction by H.H.Gerth and C.Wright-Mills (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), 48.
 44. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (second ed.), (Kernel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 59.
 45. Joel S.Migdal, *Strong States and Weak Societies: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), cited in Buzan, *ibid.*, 59.
 46. Aaron David Miller, *The Washington Papers (no. 99): The PLO and the Politics of Survival* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 66.
 47. Thanks to Paul Cammack for his input at the design stage of Table 1.

Chapter 2

1. Gabriel Ash, “Diagnosing Benny Morris,” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, February 12, 2004.
2. Fatah was established in the late 1950s in Kuwait. The ANM merged with two smaller factions to form the PFLP in 1967. Splits in 1969 led to the creation of the PDFLP (renamed the DFLP in 1974) and the PFLP-General Command.
3. According to Adel Samara, in 1990 the support of wealthier Palestinian businessmen in the diaspora for the Fatah leadership was represented in the *al-Taawoun* group. Adel Samara,

Industrialisation in the West Bank: A Marxist Socio-Economic Analysis (Jerusalem: Al-Mashriq Publications for Economic and Development Studies, 1992), 37.

4. P.A.Smith, 115.
5. Brand, 117.
6. *Ibid.*, 107.
7. P.A.Smith, 116. One such example of a particularly wealthy and influential Palestinian cited by Smith is 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Qattan, who made his fortune in Kuwait and was elected president of the PNC, "partly as a result of his substantial support for Fatah since the late 1950s." *Ibid.*, 127.
8. The 1977 Arab Summit in Baghdad established a Joint Committee, administered by the PLO and Jordan, for the disbursement of funds in the occupied territories. The fund was intended to provide for Palestinian "steadfastness" (*sumud*) in the wake of the Camp David Accords and the expansion of Israeli settlements under the Likud government. According to Samara, Jordan attempted to bolster the position of the notable class through the provision of funds for investment in agriculture, aimed at securing the support of the large land-owning families such as the Masris and the Tuqans in Nablus. Similarly, the West Bank merchant-bourgeoisie was given incentives to cooperate with Jordan through trade arrangements. Samara, *Industrialisation*, 37.
9. Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1988). In 1977, "28 percent of the West Bank work force and 35 percent of Gaza's were employed in Israel... The inflow of migrant workers' wages amounted to 25–28 percent of the territories' GNP over the years 1974–1976. Sara Graham-Brown, "The Changing Society of the West Bank," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 8, no. 1, (Summer 1979):149.
10. Robinson, *Building*, 14.
11. Rene Maunier cited in Maxime Rodinson, *Israel: A Colonial Settler State?* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973), 92.
12. Samara, *Industrialisation*, 5–18.
13. Sara Roy, "De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society since Oslo," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 3 (Spring 1999):64–82.
14. Perhaps the exemplar of traditional structural change theory is the Lewis two-sector model, wherein "labor transfer and modern-sector employment growth are brought about by output expansion" in the modern urban industrial sector. Michael P.Todaro, *Economic Development* (seventh ed.) (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley Longman, 2000), 84.
15. The most pertinent military orders have been analysed by the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center in *Israeli Obstacles to Economic Development in the Occupied Territories* (second ed.) (Jerusalem: JMCC, 1994).
16. Sahliyeh, *Leadership*, 52.
17. Robinson, *Building*, 36.
18. Joshua Angrist, "The Economic Returns to Schooling in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," *American Economic Review* (December 1995):1066–68.
19. Muhsin D.Yusuf, "The Potential Impact of Palestinian Education on a Palestinian State," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 8, no.4 (Summer 1979):70.
20. Alan B.Krueger and Jitka Maleckova cite Angrist's work in *Education, Poverty, Political Violence and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?* NBER Working Paper No. w9074 (National Bureau of Economic Research, July 2002), 18, <http://papers.nber.org/papers/W9074/htm> (accessed August 2003).
21. The Committees for Democratic Action, *Autonomy versus Statehood—Gaza and Jericho First: A New Phase in the Struggle of the Palestinian People* (Jerusalem: Hanitzotz A-Sharara Publishing House, 1994), 33.
22. Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity*, 59–73.
23. Sayigh, "Armed Struggle and State Formation," 22.

24. Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1992). For an interesting approach to PLO-Arab state relations, see Mohamed E.Selim, "The Foreign Policy of the PLO," in *The Foreign Policies of the Arab States: The Challenge of Change*, eds. B.Korany and A.E.H.Dessouki, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 260–309. Selim calculated that almost 75 percent of all PLO foreign policy actions involved conflict rather than cooperation, with PLO-Arab states interactions averaging at almost 60 percent conflictual, while interactions in the PLO-Soviet dyad were 87 percent positive. *Ibid.*, 289–93.
25. Fatah sent seven representatives to participate in the first PNC, which established the PLO, yet chose not to join any of the PLO's institutions.
26. Patrick Scale, *Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1988), 121.
27. Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, *Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution* (London: W.H.Allen, 1990), 36. Inspired by the FLN's triumph, Fatah adopted the Algerian model of self-liberation, "theoretically" underpinned by the work of Frantz Fanon in his influential book, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963).
28. Cobban records that preparation for the launch of Fatah's armed campaign had been underway "at least since December 1962, when a heavyweight delegation of Fatah leaders including Arafat, Wazir and Faruq al-Qaddumi had travelled to Algiers at the invitation of President Ahmad Ben Bella, hero of the newly victorious FLN." Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 31. The first operation was launched under the pseudonym *al-'Asifa*, and January 1, 1965, subsequently canonized as the birth of the Palestinian Revolution. The operation was no great success. Cobban records that every member of the first unit was arrested in Gaza before they could even embark on the mission, while the second operation ended with the first Fatah martyr being shot dead by a Jordanian soldier. The first Fatah casualty following the launch of the "revolution" was Ahmad Musa. His colleague, Mahmud Hijazi, was captured by the Israelis. *Ibid.*, 33, Gowers and Walker, 45.
29. On the night of March 21, 1968, the IDF crossed into the East Bank to liquidate a fida'iyyun base in the refugee town of Karama. Contrary to the logic of guerrilla warfare, the four hundred-strong fida'iyyun force chose to stand their ground and inflicted twenty eight fatalities on the Israel unit, thanks in large part to the intervention of the Jordanian army. The fida'iyyun lost ninety eight men in the battle and the role of the Jordanian army was neatly glossed over in the ensuing propaganda, but such details were beside the point. News of the battle thrilled the Arab world and catapulted the fida'iyyun to the forefront of Arab popular consciousness. Casualty figures are taken from Gowers and Walker, 61. Cobban gives the slightly different figures of three hundred fida'iyyun suffering one hundred twenty casualties at the hands of fifteen thousand Israeli troops. Cobban, *The PLO: People, Power and Politics*, 42. The officer in command of Jordanian forces was General Haditha. For a more extensive account of the battle and the events that preceded it see John Cooley, *Green March, Black September: The Story of the Palestinian Arabs* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), and Cobban, *The PLO: People, Power and Politics*, 41. Cobban also makes the point that Karama rather fortuitously means honor (or dignity) in Arabic, *ibid.*, 42. A number of shops bearing the name *Karama* can still be found in Palestine, including shops in East Jerusalem. The PCP eventually took a seat on the executive committee in 1987.
30. For an examination of Jordan's position on the establishment and early development of the PLO up to 1967, see Shemesh, 44–47 and 67–80. A useful summary of PLO/Jordanian relations up to 1987 can be found in R.D.McLaurin, "The PLO and the Arab Fertile Crescent," in *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organisation*, eds. A.R.Norton and M.H.Greenberg (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 22–31.

31. The idea of creating a Palestinian entity was adopted by the first Arab Summit meeting in Cairo in late 1963. The first PNC was held in Jerusalem in May 1964, and the twentytwo states composing the Arab League recognized the PLO as the spokesman of the Palestinians during the second Arab Summit (also held in Cairo) in September 1964. See McLaurin, 23. The People's Republic of China was one of the first non-Arab states to accord the PLO diplomatic status. See Raphael Israeli, "The People's Republic of China and the PLO: From Honeymoon to Conjugal Routine," in Norton and Greenberg (ed.), 141.
32. Sameer Abraham, "The Development and Transformation of the Palestine National Movement," in *Occupation: Israel over Palestine*, (second ed.) ed. Naseer Aruri (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American Graduates, 1989), 619.
33. To cite Abraham once more, "governmental collapse was so complete in Jordan that the movement no longer found it necessary to operate clandestinely." *Ibid.*, 628. Moreover, from the perspective of armed struggle, the collapse of all institutional power in Jordan and the Israeli army's vulnerability along the new border with the River Jordan presented the guerrillas with an outstanding opportunity. Far from being deterred by the Arab states' defeat, Arafat understood the opportunity for what it was and successfully persuaded the rest of the Fatah leadership to resume raids against Israel. Cobban writes that the Fatah leadership met in Damascus firstly on June 12 and again on August 20, whereupon they decided to resume operations by the end of that month, Cobban, *The PLO: People, Power and Politics*, 36–37.
34. Nasir's original choice as chairman, Ahmad al-Shuqayri, was replaced in December 1967 by Yahya Hammuda, who continued to hold the reins (more or less on the guerrillas' behalf), until Arafat took over. Gowers and Walker, 58–69. On the fourth PNC see Alain Gresh, *The PLO, the Struggle Within: Towards an Independent Palestinian State* (London: Zed Books, 1985), 11, and Cobban, *The PLO: People, Power and Politics*, 43–44.
35. Article 9 of the Charter is quite unequivocal:

Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not tactics. The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute resolution and abiding determination to pursue the armed struggle and to march forward toward the popular revolution, to liberate its homeland and return to it...

Extracts in Cobban, *The PLO: People, Power and Politics*, 267–68. Articles 7, 8, 9, 10, 15, 21, 26, and 30 also make explicit reference to armed struggle as the means of achieving national liberation. The 1968 version of the Charter was revoked only under Israeli pressure in April 1996, *The Guardian*, April 25, 1996.

36. Despite the inauspicious beginning and negligible military impact on Israel, Fatah's operations even prior to Karama did have an important psychological impact on Israel and duly among Palestinians. From this point forth, additional guerrilla operations were launched sporadically from Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, contributing to the increased tensions that led to the Six-Day War in June 1967.
37. Interviews with Nizar 'Amr, Gaza, February 5–7, 1996. Nizar 'Amr was the PLO's first ambassador to Iran after the Islamic Revolution, served as "National Security Advisor to the PLO, as head of the Unit for Informational Analysis and Evaluation, and head of the Israeli Studies Department at the PLO Planning Center. [Also]... a member of the Palestinian negotiating teams to the bilateral and multilateral talks on arms control and regional security, the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Security Committee, and the conference of Arab interior ministers." (This profile is from a photocopy of an unspecified article provided by 'Amr.) He was also involved in negotiations with the United States in Tunis together with Salah Khalaf

- and is a member of Force 17 and close to Nasr Yusif. Pinhas Inbari, *The Palestinians between Statehood and Terrorism* (Brighton: Sussex University Press, 1996), 201–202. ('Amr's office in Gaza is just down the corridor from Nasr Yusif's.) Following the establishment of the PA, he was given a military rank and appointed director of the Department of Planning, Organization and Studies for PA Public Security.
38. Mahoney and Snyder, 26.
 39. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 292–99 and 354–55. Patrick Scale, *Abu Nidal: Gun for Hire* (London: Arrow Books Ltd., 1993). *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 22, 2002.
 40. Bard O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 9.
 41. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 290–91.
 42. Robinson, *Building*, 13.
 43. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 222.
 44. The policy of non-interference is optimistically enshrined in the 1968 Covenant. Article 27 reads: "The Palestinian Liberation Organisation will cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its capacities, and will maintain neutrality in their mutual relations in the light of, and on the basis of, the requirements of the battle of liberation, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state." Italics added, Cobban, *The PLO: People, Power and Politics*, 268.
 45. According to McLaurin, Syria initially viewed Fatah rather as Egypt saw the PLO, i.e., their Palestinian movement. McLaurin, 14.
 46. For an explicit outline of the left's confrontational approach to Arab regimes, see *A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine* (Amman: PFLP Information Department, 1969), 25–46.
 47. Brand, 171.
 48. P.A.Smith, 179–180.
 49. Lisa Taraki, "The Development of Political Consciousness among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, 1967–1987," in *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads*, eds. Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 58. Dakkak prefers to call this the Palestinian Patriotic Front (PPF), translating *wataniyya* as "patriotic" rather than "national." I have stuck with PNF to avoid confusion, as this is the appellation generally used to describe the body in most texts. Ibrahim Dakkak, "Back to Square One: A Study in the Re-emergence of the Palestinian Identity in the West Bank 1967–1980," in *Palestinians over the Green Line: Studies in Relations between Palestinians on Both Sides of the 1949 Armistice Line since 1967*, ed. Alexander Scholch (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), footnote no. 47, 95. The PNF issued its statement calling for "the solidarity of all sincere sons of our people under the banner of the PLO" on December 12, 1973, Dakkak, 77. Its three representatives on the executive committee were 'Abd al-Jawad Salih, Walid al-Qamhawi, and 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar. Gresh, 170.
 50. Dakkak, 77–78.
 51. Sahliyah, *Leadership*, 62.
 52. *Ibid.*, 63.
 53. Robinson, *Building*, 12.
 54. Sahliyah, *Leadership*, 81.
 55. The Institute for Palestine Studies, *Monograph Series No. 25: Palestinian Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness* (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies. First published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1970), 32–33.
 56. This period has been characterized by Abraham as "the period of quasi-state development." Abraham, 636. For a list of the PLO's diplomatic missions as of the early 1980s, see Norton and Greenberg (eds.), "Appendix: List of PLO Offices Abroad by the early 1980s," 209–12.
 57. SAMED was originally established in Jordan, and then relocated to Lebanon after the PLO's expulsion between 1970 and 1971. SAMED provided jobs for an estimated five thousand

- Palestinians who were otherwise prevented from gainful employment by discriminatory Lebanese employment laws. Selim, 269. Further details on SAMED can be found in Musallam, 46–49.
58. On the establishment of the PRCS, see Brand, 39. For further details see Musallam, 37–42.
 59. Cheryl Rubenberg, *The Palestinian Liberation Movement: Its Institutional Infrastructure* (Belmont, MA: The Institute of Arab Studies Inc., 1983), 35.
 60. Full details on the array of PLO institutions can be found in Rubenberg, *ibid.*, and Musallam.
 61. Zagorin estimated in 1989 that the PLO's diplomatic missions cost around \$10 million per annum. In addition, "\$52 million is allocated to a fund for disabled Palestinian fighters; \$18 million for Palestinian universities and scholarships; \$20 million for the Palestinian Red Crescent... and some \$46 million for a variety of other activities." Adam Zagorin, "Auditing the PLO," in *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organisation*, eds. A.R.Norton and M.H.Greenberg (Carbondale: South Illinois University Press, 1989), 197–98.
 62. *Interview with Samir Sinjilawi*, Fatah Youth Organization activist in Ramallah, January 27, 1996.
 63. Further information on the bureaucratization of the PLO can be found in two articles by Jamil Hilal: "PLO Institutions: The Challenge Ahead," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 1 (Autumn 1993):46–60, and "The PLO: Crisis in Legitimacy," *Race and Class* 37, no. 2 (October-December 1995):9–11. PLO finances, as with the PA's finances years later, were a murky business, about which accurate figures are hard to find. Zagorin noted that the cash reserve of the PNF was "probably" around \$1.5 million, with an annual income of \$125–\$150 million, including \$87 million from Saudi Arabia and \$10–\$15 million from the "liberation tax" paid by Palestinians, particularly those resident in the Gulf. The PNLA (fourteen thousand strong) was estimated to require \$87 million annually. Soldiers' salaries were around \$200 monthly, rising to between \$360 and \$1,150 for officers. Not surprisingly, Arafat's personal control of Fatah finances was highly secretive. Zagorin suggests that Fatah's assets were probably larger than the PNF's: "Responsible estimates of the size [of] the Fatah fund run as high as 7 billion to 8 billion dollars, although a lower figure may be more realistic. Managed by a small group of loyal employees, the Fatah account also receives contributions from Arab governments..." Zagorin, 196–205.
 64. Zagorin estimated the PLO bureaucracy numbered "at least five thousand, including accountants, secretaries, drivers, bureaucrats, and others, whose wages are divided into at least eight pay grades. At the top, Arafat and other senior officials determine high policy—for which they are paid about \$900 per month plus a cost of living allowance." *Ibid.*, 199.
 65. The burden of maintaining a state of war with Israel was reflected by the fact that by 1973, Egypt's military budget accounted for 25 percent of GNP, up from 13 percent in 1969. This has been estimated to have been the highest in the world: Israeli military spending accounted for some 20 percent of GNP, compared with around 7 to 8 percent for the United States. These figures, and a thorough account of Egyptian and Syrian motives for launching the war, were compiled by the Insight Team of the *Sunday Times*, *The Yom Kippur War* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1975). Another good account of the war is given by Scale, *Asad*, 185–225.
 66. Gresh, 168. The same author also gives a good account of the debate and the initiative that ensued, *ibid.*, 156–175.
 67. William Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 257.
 68. UNGA Resolution 3236. These developments in the UNGA represented a rare favorable comparison with the contemporary liberation movement of SWAPO in Namibia. In 1976 the General Assembly "gave its support to the armed struggle, and [also] accorded SWAPO observer status." David Sogget, *Namibia: The Violent Heritage* (London: Rex Collins, 1986), 177. UN General Assembly Resolution 31/146, passed on December 20, 1976,

- granted SWAPO the status of “sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people.” Peter H. Katjavivi, *A History of Resistance in Namibia* (London: James Curram Ltd., 1988), 100.
69. Rustow, 356.
 70. *Ibid.*, 357.
 71. The Rejection Front included the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, the ALF, and the PPSF. Gresh, 170.
 72. Quandt, *Reflections on American-Palestinian Dialogue* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994), 4. Elsewhere, Quandt provides details of the U.S. response to Black September, including the mobilization of the 82nd Airborne Division, the deployment of transport planes and fighters to Turkey, and the deployment of the Navy’s Sixth Fleet. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 105–27.
 73. David Yallop, *To the Ends of the Earth: The Hunt for the Jackal* (London: Corgi Books, 1994), 47.
 74. Adel Safty, *From Camp David to the Gulf* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1992), 180–81.
 75. *Ibid.*, 219.
 76. The Joint Committee was established in 1978 at the ninth Arab Summit meeting in Baghdad as part of an overall initiative to bolster the front-line states following the Camp David Accords. Jordan terminated the committee following the failure of the Amman agreement, and closed a number of PLO offices in Amman during 1986.
 77. See Helena Cobban, “The PLO and the Intifada,” *The Middle East Journal* 44, no. 2 (Spring 1990):216–19.
 78. The Likud victory in the 1977 Israeli election foreshadowed attempts to annihilate the PLO and generate an alternative Palestinian leadership in the West Bank and Gaza. Ariel Sharon, then defense minister, declared that “the PLO must cease to exist.” Michael Jansen, *The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon* (London: Zed Press, 1982), 11.
 79. Khalil al-Wazir’s personal control of the Western Sector was repeatedly emphasized in personal interviews with activists, including Marwan al-Barghuthi, Juhar Sayigh, and Diyab Alluh. Interview with Marwan al-Barghuthi, former head of Bir Zeit University student council, former prisoner, deported during the intifada, member of the Fatah revolutionary council and general secretary of the Fatah higher committee in the West Bank, Legislative Council member for Ramallah, Ramallah, February 3 and 10, 1996. Interview with Juhar Sayigh, physician, Fatah operative in the Western Sector and former prisoner, now employed in the Governorate of Ramallah, Bir Zeit, January 23, 1996. Interview with Diyab Alluh, Fatah cadre released in the 1985 PFLP-GC prisoner exchange, editor of *al-Karama* (Fatah weekly publication), head of the Media and Culture Department in the office of the Fatah higher committee in the Gaza Strip and higher committee member, Gaza, October 24 and 26, 1995 and February 5, 1996.
 80. Ziad Abu Amr, *The Intifada: Causes and Factors of Continuity* (second ed.), (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994), 10.
 81. Robinson, *Building*, xi.
 82. On Hamas and the intifada, see Ziad Abu Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 63–89.
 83. The vital leadership role of PLO cadres in the organization and leadership of the intifada is explored by Hillel Frisch, “The Palestinian Movement in the Territories,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 2 (April 1993):254–74. Frisch includes details of the role played by cadres released through the 1985 prisoner exchange between the PFLP-GC and Israel. The eighteenth PNC met in Algiers, April 20–24, 1987. For an interpretation of the significance of the meeting, see Faruq al-Qaddumi (member of the PLO executive committee and Fatah central committee), “Assessing the Eighteenth PNC,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 17, no. 2 (Winter 1988):3–14.
 84. Abu Amr, *Intifada*, 26.
 85. Cobban, “Intifada,” 209–11.

86. Ali Jarbawi, "Palestinian Elites in the Occupied Territories," in *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads*, eds. Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock (New York: Bir Zeit University and Praeger Publishers, 1991), 288.
87. Robinson, *Building*, 99.
88. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 651.
89. For further details see Gresh, 239–40. The principal plank of Abu Musa's challenge arose from Fatah's indifferent military performance outside Beirut and the subsequent promotion of officers who reputedly failed in the face of the enemy. The accusation was made that Arafat used these promotions to bolster his position within Fatah. There does appear to be some truth in this. Most notably, haj Isma'il Jabr, now the PLO's senior commander of Palestinian forces in the West Bank, is widely acknowledged among West Bank Palestinians as having "retreated" in the face of the enemy during the unsuccessful attempt to confront the IDF as a conventional army. Isma'il's reputed court martial was frequently recounted to the author by West Bank Palestinians. Cobban also notes his being subjected to an internal enquiry following the invasion, in Cobban, *The PLO: People, Power and Politics*, 121. Edward Said seems to have this incident in mind when he speaks of a senior officer in the PA having previously been court martialled for desertion and cowardice, in Edward Said, *Peace and Its Discontents: Gaza-Jericho 1993–1995* (London: Vintage, 1995), xxvii.
90. Gowers and Walker, 226. Yezid Sayigh reports that the rebellion was facilitated by the election of three rebel leaders to the Fatah central committee in 1980 under Syrian pressure, and assisted by the assassination of Sa'd Sayil, the PLO chief of staff, almost certainly with Syrian complicity, in September 1982. Yezid Sayigh, "Struggle within, Struggle without: the Transformation of PLO Politics since 1982," *International Affairs* 65, no. 2 (Spring 1989):247–71.
91. Interview with staff at the Fatah higher committee offices, Gaza, October 25, 1995, and with 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda, commander of Public Security, Gaza, October 25, 1995. Majayda was a career PL A officer who crossed the Suez Canal with the Egyptian army in 1973. The merger of the various PLO military forces into the PNLA is detailed in Musallam, 30, and the consolidation of Arafat's position within Fatah, and Fatah's position within the PLO, has been explored in detail by Sayigh, "Struggle within, Struggle without."
92. Ritchie Owendale, *The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars*, (second ed.), (London: Longman, 1992), 267. For the text of the agreement see *The Middle East and North Africa 1998*, (London: Europa, 1998), 117. We might note that Walid Khalidi takes issue with the prevalent interpretation of the Amman Summit as a deliberate snub to the PLO: "the West has misinterpreted the significance of the Amman Summit's preoccupation with the Iran-Iraq war and the green light it gave for the resumption of relations with Egypt. This summit was a special session, summoned specifically to address the Gulf War." Walid Khalidi, *Palestine Reborn* (London: I.B.Taurus, 1992), 138.
93. Owendale, 257.
94. Quandt, *American-Palestinian Dialogue*, 3–4. Quandt suggests that "Kissinger himself made this commitment without thinking that it would tie the hands of the United States in any serious way, because the wording said only that negotiations and recognition were out of the question. But it did not prevent contact and communications of other sorts..." 4.
95. See Rashid Khalidi, "The Resolutions of the 19th Palestine National Council," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19, no. 2 (Winter 1990):29–42. For the full text of the "Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine" issued by the nineteenth PNC, see *The Middle East and North Africa 1998*, 117–120.
96. According to Inbari, the real significance of the dialogue rested on its intended impact within Fatah and, through Fatah, within the rest of the PLO. Inbari, 109.
97. Cobban, *The PLO: People, Power and Politics*, 113.
98. *Ibid.*, 131.

99. According to Rubin, senior Fatah member Hani al-Hasan pointed out that “in speaking of UN resolutions...the Jordan-PLO agreement ‘means including 150 of them’ and was designed to avoid endorsing 242.” Barry Rubin, *Revolution until Victory: The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 72. Further details of these diplomatic initiatives can be found in Emile F.Sahliyeh, *The PLO after the Lebanon War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986). A succinct account of PLO decision making during this period is provided by Allon Groth, *The PLO’s Road to Peace: Process of Decision-Making, RUSI Whitehall Paper Series 1995* (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1995), 15–22.
100. *Ibid.*, 71.
101. For further reading on the U.S.-PLO dialogue see Mohamed Rabie, “The U.S.-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 19, no. 4 (Summer 1992):54–66; William Quandt, “The U.S. and Palestine,” in *Palestinian Statehood* (Washington, DC: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1994), 45–48; and W. Khalidi, 141–71.
102. The operation of May 1990 was the work of the PLF, a tiny PLO faction, led at the time by Abu al-‘Abbas, who subsequently resigned his seat on the executive committee over the affair. The PLF was also responsible for hijacking the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* on October 7, 1985, seemingly on Syrian orders in an attempt to abort the U.K.-PLO dialogue then being promoted by Margaret Thatcher. See Yallop, 286–87.
103. The first official PLO statement was issued on August 19, outlining a policy that Mattar summarized in four key points: a call for a mediating role for the PLO between Iraq and Kuwait; an Arab solution to the crisis; rejection of foreign intervention; and support for the Iraqi linkage of withdrawal from Kuwait with Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Philip Mattar, “The PLO and the Gulf Crisis,” *The Middle East Journal* 48 (Winter 1994):31–46.
104. “According to the PLO, its annual support had consisted of \$72 million from Saudi Arabia, \$48 million from Iraq, and \$2 million from Kuwait. These figures do not include the PLO ‘tax’ on Palestinians in Kuwait, which was estimated at \$50 million annually, nor gulf grants to the occupied territories, nor Palestinian remittances.” *Ibid.*, 44.
105. *Ibid.*, 42. A range of indices illustrating the PLO’s financial crisis at this point are provided by Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 656–57.
106. *JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 3 on Palestinian Attitudes on the PLO-Israel Agreement*, September 1993, <http://www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/1993/no3.htm> (accessed July 2002).
107. Told to the author by friends in the West Bank during 1994–1995.
108. *JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 3*.
109. Christopher Parker, *Resignation or Revolt: Socio-Political Development and the Challenges of Peace in Palestine* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1999), x. The term “New World Order” was actually first coined by Gorbachev, during an address to the UN in December 1988: “Further world progress is possible only if we seek universal consensus in the movement towards a New World Order.” In August 1990, Bush announced: “I think we do have a chance at a New World Order, there could be a chance for peace all through the Middle East.” “New World Order? Seven Writers in Search of an Ideal,” *Guardian Studies Vol. 1*. (London: *The Guardian*, April 1991).
110. The World Bank, (main authors, Sébastien Dessus and Nigel Roberts), *Fifteen Months—Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment* (The World Bank, March 18, 2001), 1.
111. Rex Brynen, *A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza* (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2000), 82–83.
112. Yifat Susskind, “Palestinian Political Prisoners,” *Middle East Report* (October–December 1996):10.

113. Thirty-three percent both supported and opposed it at the same time. *CPRS ElectionDay Exit Poll Results* (Nablus: CPRS, 1996).
114. Thanks to Barakat and Haya al-Fara for this insight. Conversations, February 2004.
115. Roy, "De-development," 71.
116. Interview with Muhammad Shtayya, managing director, Palestinian Economic Council for Reconstruction and Development (PECDAR), president of the Palestinian Center for Regional Studies. Ramallah, June 14, 2003.
117. Brynen has shown how initial bureaucratic expansion received crucial budgetary support from the donor's Holst Fund, but adds that by 1999 the World Bank had recommended the Holst Fund could be dispensed with, not least of all because PA revenue collection was improving decisively as the urban centers came under PA control. Brynen, *Political Economy*, 95. Much had been reversed by 2003. See Akiva Eldar, *Ha'aretz*, November 18, 2003.
118. Mourid Barghouti, *I Saw Ramallah* (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2000), 110.
119. Akiva Eldar reported that both civil police and judiciary "have ceased functioning in Jenin and Nablus." *Ha'aretz*, November 18, 2003.
120. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, 1.
121. Gurr was originally concerned with rebellions within societies, whereas we are explaining strife between two different societies, one colonized, the other colonial. However, Gurr's later work did address this type of conflict specifically. See Ted Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).
122. Ivo K.Feieraband, Rosalind L.Feieraband, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Anger, Violence and Politics: Theories and Research* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), 3.
123. "The idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is respected." U.S. Department of State, October 2, 2001, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/summit/1002bush.htm>. (accessed March 2004). The vote passed fourteen to nil with Syria abstaining. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 21, 2002.
124. On Sharon's history of plans for the West Bank, see Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs. *The Palestine Question in Maps 1878–2002* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, August 2002), 94.
125. It was issued in November 1999. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000): 118.
126. Barry Rubin, *The Transformation of Palestinian Politics: From Revolution to State Building* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 184. Twenty-eight of the charter's thirty-three articles were repealed.
127. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 13, 2001.
128. *Ibid.*
129. In May 2002, Bush was still pushing for PA reform but refraining from open calls for Arafat's marginalization. In June, CIA director George Tenet met with him to discuss reform of the security apparatus. Chief of staff Ya'alon asserted in mid-July 2003 that Arafat should "either be killed or deported." *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 17, 2003.

Chapter 3

1. The breakdown of nationalist institutional order is discussed by Graham Usher, *Palestine in Crisis: The Struggle for Peace and Political Independence after Oslo* (London: Pluto Press in association with TNI and MERIP, 1995), 18. It contrasts with the organizational expansion of Islamist networks, which was in part facilitated by Israel. Prior to the emergence of Hamas as the Islamist reaction to the intifada, Israel had granted the Muslim Brotherhood a certain degree of latitude in the hope that it would weaken the influence of the

- PLO within the occupied territories. See Abu Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 35–37, and Jean-Francois Legrain, “The Islamic Movement and the *Intifada*,” in Nassar and Heacock (eds.), 175–89.
2. Muslih divides modern Palestinian history into three phases and notes the contribution of social organizations during each. The first phase covers the British Mandate from 1917 to 1948, during which “a wide array of civil associations existed, including religious groups, clubs, labor unions, women’s societies, charitable organizations, town cafes, and village guest houses. These associations emerged outside the framework of British authority, and they articulated the interests of their respective sectors.” The second phase covers the era of Jordanian and Egyptian authority from 1948 to 1967, during which “Palestinians formed social organizations of students, professionals, workers, and women’s groups... Although the associations tried to serve their particular interests, they also worked for the national cause, and, in many instances, work for the national cause was paramount.” Muhammad Muslih, “Palestinian Civil Society,” *The Middle East Journal* 47, no. 2 (Spring 1993):260–61.
 3. Joost Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 44.
 4. *Ibid.*, 5
 5. Eqbal Ahmed cited by Hiltermann, *ibid.*, 13.
 6. Glenn Robinson, “The Role of the Professional Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society: The Medical and Agricultural Committees,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 25(1993):309. Robinson notes that the total amount channeled to the occupied territories by the Joint Committee between 1979 and 1985 reached approximately \$400 million. Of the \$30 million channeled into Agriculture, most of it benefited the landed class to buy political loyalty for Fatah.
 7. As Muslih put it, “Palestinian leftists watched indignantly as Fatah took control of a labor movement they had nurtured. By the early 1990s, Fatah-supported units, acting under the umbrella of the Workers Youth Movement, represented about 70 percent of the membership in the executive of the Palestinian Federation of Trade Unions.” Muslih, 264.
 8. Neil Partrick, *Democracy under Limited Autonomy: The Declaration of Principles and Political Prospects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Jerusalem: Panorama Center for the Dissemination of Alternative Information, 1994), 24. Robinson dates the formation of the UPMRC to 1979, Robinson, “The Role of the Professional Middle Class,” 304.
 9. Rema Hammami, “NGOs: The Professionalisation of Politics,” *Race and Class* 37, no. 2(1995):54–55. Robinson gives details of some of the institutions affiliated with each faction: affiliated with the PCP were the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees and the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committee; the PFLP claimed the Popular Committees for Health Services and the Union of Agricultural Work Committees; the DFLP organized the Union of Health Care Committees, the Technical Center for Agricultural Services (which split from the PFLP’s organization and also aligned itself loosely with Fatah), the Union of Palestinian Farmers Committees, and the Women’s Action Committee, while Fatah claimed the Health Services Committee, the Women’s Committee for Social Work, and enjoyed influence over the Technical Center for Agricultural Services. Robinson, “The Role of the Professional Middle Class,” 301–26.
 10. Groth has illustrated the decline of the PLO’s diplomatic status, noting that “on 25 December 1990 the GCC (Gulf Co-operation Council) summit omitted the usual reference to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Arab states of the Coalition did the same on 16 February 1991 and the EU ‘froze’ contacts with the PLO 26 February.” Groth, 38.
 11. Soviet Jewish immigrants to Palestine totaled 250,000 by May 1991. Groth, 24. Since then, the community had grown to 780,000, constituting a powerful group within Israeli politics which, under the leadership of Nathan Sharansky, has currently aligned itself with the Likud, *The Guardian*, July 2, 1997.

12. For the debate over Camp David within Israel, see Yaacov Bar-Siman Tov, *Israel and the Peace Process 1977–1982: In Search of Legitimacy for Peace* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 137–53, and Shmuel Sandler, *The State of Israel, the Land of Israel: The Statist and Ethnonational Dimensions of Foreign Policy* (West Port, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). Sandler also details another abortive Likud project to generate an alternative leadership which was the Village Leagues scheme of Menahem Milson, appointed by Sharon to head the Civil Administration in November 1981. The scheme did little but generate inter-Palestinian violence and was quickly abandoned. Sandler, 223–28.
13. Labor's final attempt to implement a solution involving Jordan took place in April 1987. In his capacity as foreign minister in the National Unity government of both Labor and Likud, Shimon Peres held secret talks in London with King Husayn. An agreement was reached to hold an international conference concerning peace in the Middle East, without the knowledge of the prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir. It was quickly subverted, at Shamir's behest, by Arens. Moshe Arens, *Broken Covenant: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis between the U.S. and Israel* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 22–23.
14. During the 1980s, Israeli politics produced two governments of National Unity, the first from 1984 to 1988, the second from 1988 to 1990. From June 1990 until June 1992, Likud formed the senior coalition partner in an exclusively right-wing government. Yitzhak Shamir took the premiership from Peres following the agreed rotation of office in 1986, retaining the post until the elections of June 1992.
15. Arens, 18. Following the fall of the National Unity government in March 1990, Shamir headed an ultra-right, ultra-nationalist, and ultra-religious coalition constituting, at that point, the most right-wing government in Israel's history. Somewhat improbably, elements of this government considered *Shamir* too left-wing. By extension, the election plan was condemned as a sellout.
16. *Ibid.*, 223–24.
17. During the coup, the PLO's official voice, Radio Palestine, made the position clear: "What happened in the USSR proves that the [struggle against the West] is natural and inevitable, and that perestroika was the anomaly." The PLO also announced that it "viewed this experiment with perestroika with great scepticism, and with trepidation mingled with sadness." FBIS Report cited in Benjamin Netanyahu, *A Place among the Nations* (New York: Bantam Books, 1993), 235.
18. Hanan Mikhail Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 85. Ashrawi has also commented on the difficulty of defining who is and is not a member of the PLO. Under conditions of Israeli occupation, people did not carry membership cards. Furthermore, beyond the more narrow institutional structure of each faction, membership can be a fluid affair. How does one distinguish between a cadre and an active sympathizer? People also change factions and levels of activity can vary over time. This point was also made in interview with delegation member Kamil Mansur who, while not an official member of any faction, insisted that he absolutely considered himself a member of the PLO for the duration of his participation in the negotiations. Interview with Kamil Mansur, legal advisor to the Palestinian delegation during the Madrid Conference and the negotiations in Washington, now director of the legal center at Bir Zeit University, Bir Zeit, December 6, 1995.
19. Despite the initial insistence on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, the Palestinian team immediately asserted their independence. The Jordanian team were by all accounts cooperative in this regard, and the Israelis recognized the need to negotiate along two tracks during the first talks in Madrid. Kamil Mansur, "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Overview and Assessment," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 3 (Spring 1993):10.
20. *Ha'aretz*. March 10, 2003.
21. Interview with Albert Aghazarian, director of the Palestinian press center during the Madrid Conference and head of the Public Relations Office at Bir Zeit University, Bir Zeit,

- December 12, 1995. Aghazarian described the organization of the delegation during Madrid as “Bir Zeit operation,” and fondly recalled the Palestinian media initiative as “my finest hour.”
22. Lamis Andoni wrote at the time, “Even though PLO officials do not say it publicly, the fact that the American proposals give Jordan a high-profile role has revived historic fears that Jordan might act as spokesman for the Palestinians.” *Middle East International*, August 30, 1991.
 23. Interview with Dr. A. Kafanani, member of the Jordanian delegation to the peace talks with Israel, advisor in the prime minister’s office, and director of the Department of Palestinian Affairs for seven years up to 1991, Jordanian prime minister’s office, Amman, August 14, 1995. For further details of the Jordanian attitude towards the negotiations, including Husayn’s scepticism regarding the potential for success, see Mohamed Heikal, *Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations* (London: Harper Collins), 412–15.
 24. Interviews with Nizar ‘Amr. Arafat quoted in *al-Nahar*, February 23, 1992, in Inbari, 139–51.
 25. Interview with Ghassan al-Khatib, spokesman for the PPP, delegate to the Madrid Conference, and director of the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, Bir Zeit, May 25, 1995.
 26. Details of the Palestinians’ snub to Schultz can be found in Ashrawi, 80. Also see Cobban, “Intifada,” 221.
 27. Kamal’s activities included the Palestine Federation of Women’s Action, the Women’s Studies Center, the Women’s Center, for Legal Aid and Counseling, the Jerusalem Women’s Center and Women’s Action Committee.
 28. Cobban made the observation that Palestinian intellectuals and personalities in East Jerusalem were natural interlocutors for Western diplomats: “By virtue of their presence in the avowedly unified city and their relatively easy access to its large body of Western diplomats, Jerusalem intellectuals had more freedom to pursue normal political activity than their colleagues living in the West Bank and much more than colleagues living in the distant obscurity of Gaza.” Cobban, “Intifada,” 219.
 29. Interview with Aghazarian.
 30. Ashrawi, 82–83.
 31. Interview with Haydar ‘Abd al-Shafi, founding member of the PLO, PNC member, president of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society in Gaza, and head of the Palestinian negotiating team in Madrid and Washington, Gaza, December 14, 1995.
 32. Interview with Khatib.
 33. Interview with Mansur.
 34. The Palestinian negotiating team lined up in October 1991 as follows: Haydar ‘Abd al-Shafi (head of Red Crescent), Mamduh al-‘Aqr (physician), Ghassan al-Khatib (lecturer and media analyst), Sami al-Kaylani (professor of physics), Zakariyya al-Agha (surgeon), Ilyas Frayj (mayor of Bethlehem), Mustafa al-Natsha (agricultural engineer and mayor of Hebron), Nabil al-Ja’bari (dentist), Samih Kan’an (former prisoner, close to Fatah), ‘Abd al-Rahman Hamad (dean of faculty of engineering, Bir Zeit), Sa’ib ‘Urayqat (lecturer and columnist), Ahmad Yazji (physician), Furayh Abu Midayn (head of Gaza Bar Association), and Nabil Qassis (professor of physics, Bir Zeit). Dawud Kuttab, *Middle East International*, October 25, 1991. The delegation was referred to rather unkindly by Faruq al-Qaddumi (PLO foreign minister) as an “arbitrary fistful,” Ashrawi, 174.
 35. Inbari, 139–51.
 36. Mahmud ‘Abbas (Abu Mazin), *Through Secret Channels* (Reading: Garnet Publishing Limited, 1995), 87.
 37. Interviews with Mamduh al-‘Aqr, former member of the ANM, physician, and delegate to the Madrid Conference and Washington negotiations until the twelfth round, absent during

- the tenth due to the Israeli deportation of 415 Islamists to Lebanon on December 17, 1993; Ramallah, December 5 and 9, 1993.
38. On initial contacts and decision making see Ashrawi, 79–80. For a profile of Haniyya, see 97.
 39. The PLO's decision to authorize participation in Madrid unfolded gradually. The PLO central council rejected an international conference on April 21, 1991, but authorized Arafat to pursue proposals based on pertinent UN resolutions, *Middle East International*, May 3, 1991, 14. The twenty-first PNC in September authorized Palestinian participation, but did not make "a full commitment to take part in the proposed international conference," *ibid.*, October 11, 6. The central council eventually decided in favor of participation, whereupon Arafat authorized Husayni to inform Baker of the decision, *ibid.*, October 25, 4. A more detailed analysis of decision making within PLO institutions during this period can be found in Groth, 24–40.
 40. Interviews with 'Aqr.
 41. Interview with Jack Khanu, Union of Medical Relief Committees, Bayt Hanina, July 18, 1995. Khanu was one of the few PPP members of the technical committee staff, and as such was very aware of the essentially Fatah character of the Orient House operation. According to Khanu, technical committee heads close to Tunis who later took senior positions in the PA include Hasan Abu Libda, subsequently head of PECДАР, Atif 'Alawna, deputy minister in the Ministry of Finance, and Mutawakil Taha, former head of the writers union and now director general in the Ministry of Information. Khanu also worked in the media committee which was later replaced by a new committee organized directly in Tunis. Although somewhat aggrieved himself, he noted that most of those around him simply did not question the establishment of a new committee from Tunis, which seems to support the view that Orient House was clearly subordinate to the diaspora-based leadership.
 42. Interviews with 'Aqr.
 43. 'Abbas, *Through Secret Channels*, 88.
 44. Interviews with 'Aqr.
 45. Interview with 'Abd al-Shafi.
 46. Interview with Mansur.
 47. Interview with 'Abd al-Shafi. While stressing the executive committee as their reference point, he also noted, "Ultimately it is the Palestinian people... That meant that ...the delegation reserves the right to disagree and if need be to absolve itself from this responsibility."
 48. The multilateral negotiations were organized into five working groups, covering refugees, economic development, water, the environment, and security. Mansur, "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 24.
 49. The restrictions on the PLO's public role in the talks meant that Qray', despite heading the multilateral negotiations, could not actually attend them himself. "Although he was leading the multilateral negotiations and the teams assigned to them, he did not attend meetings in a physical sense, as the agreement had stipulated that there should not be a PLO official at the negotiations. (This ban also applied to Nabil Sha'ath who supervised the Palestinian delegation to the Washington bilaterals but was not permitted to meet the Israeli delegation.)" 'Abbas, *Through Secret Channels*, 12.
 50. Ashrawi, 84. Arafat's anxieties were confirmed firsthand by Nizar 'Amr, who described the specter of an alternative leadership as "a very big concern" for the PLO chairman. 'Amr emphasized the impact of the delegation's popularity in the occupied territories, citing specifically the public prominence of 'Ashrawi, Husayni, and 'Abd al-Shafi. Interviews with Nizar 'Amr.
 51. Interview with Mansur.
 52. Interviews with 'Aqr.
 53. *Ibid.*

54. Interview with Mansur.
55. Inbari, 143.
56. Cobban, assessing the viability of an alternative leadership in 1989, concluded that Husayni qualified better than most through his genuinely close relationship with the mass movement. Cobban, "Intifada," 224–25. However, I found limited evidence of this during interviews and informal conversations with activists in East Jerusalem; moreover, Husayni's power base would seem to be restricted to East Jerusalem, whereas Arafat remained an icon of Palestinian nationalism across the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
57. Cited by Avi Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1994):29.
58. Interview with Mansur.
59. Interview with 'Abd al-Shafi.
60. Interview with Aghazarian.
61. Interview with Mansur.
62. Mansur, "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 15.
63. Interview with Mansur.
64. Interviews with 'Aqr.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. An analysis of the ensuing dispute between the delegation and the PLO over the deportations can be found in Groth, 42–43.
69. Ibid., 44.
70. Interviews with 'Aqr.
71. Ashrawi, 256–59.
72. A detailed account of the Rabin government's evolution in thinking toward the PLO can be found in David Makovsky, *Making Peace with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press in cooperation with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996).
73. According to Inbari, those involved included "Yossi Alpher, the director of Tel Aviv University's Jaffee Center [*sic*], and from the Palestinian side... Nizar Ammar." Inbari, 201–2. Nizar 'Amr added the Israelis Shlomo Gazit and Ze'ev Schiff to the list, and Ahmad Khalidi and Yezid Sayigh for the Palestinians. Interviews with Nizar 'Amr.
74. For a detailed account of the Oslo negotiations, see 'Abbas, *Through Secret Channels*, 111–41. For an analysis of PLO decision making during this period, see Groth, 41–63.
75. Interview with Mar'i 'Abd al-Rahman, director general of the PLO's Department of Arab and International Affairs, Ramallah, December 30, 1995.
76. 'Abbas, *Through Secret Channels*, 202.
77. *Ha'artez*. January 20, 2003. Interview with Aaron David Miller, former assistant to Dennis Ross and senior advisor on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the U.S. State Department. Robert Malley and Hussein Agha. "Camp David: Tragedy of Errors." First published in *New York Review of Books*, August 9, 2001, reprinted in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):72.
78. Graham Usher, "Facing Defeat: The Intifada Two Years On," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 2 (Winter 2003):24.
79. Edward Said, "Total Rejection and Total Acceptance Are Equivalent," *The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After* (updated edition), (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 57.
80. Geoffrey Aronson, "Palestinian Leadership Fails to Understand the Importance of Settlements," *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories* 8, no. 4 (July-August 1998), Foundation for Middle East Peace, <http://www.fmep.org/reports/v8n4.html>. (accessed August 2003).

81. Eyal Weizman, "The Politics of Verticality," April 25, 2002, <http://www.openDemocracy.net/html> (accessed November 2002).
82. B'Tselem. (main authors, Yehezkel Lein with Eyal Weizman), *Land Grab: Israel's Settlement Policy in the West Bank* (B'Tselem, 2002), 14.
83. 'Abbas, *Through Secret Channels*, 112–15.
84. *Ibid.*, 75.
85. Groth, 54.
86. Interviews with 'Aqr.
87. Interview with Mansur.
88. Following the announcement of the DoP, over thirty states committed a total of \$2.7 billion to the autonomy project, to be disbursed by the World Bank. As of June 1997, the PA had received \$1.5 billion: \$207 million from the United States, \$230 million from the EU, \$232 million from Japan, \$66 million from the World Bank, \$83 million from Saudi Arabia, \$90 million from the Netherlands, \$89 million from Germany, and \$31 million from Spain. *The Financial Times*, June 5, 1997.
89. Interview with 'Abd al-Shafi.
90. Interviews with 'Aqr.
91. Interview with 'Abd al-Shafi.
92. Interviews with 'Aqr.
93. Interview with 'Abd al-Shafi.

Chapter 4

1. *The Roadmap*.
2. Nathan Lerner and Alan Baker quoted by Moshe Goral, *Ha'aretz*, September 11, 2003.
3. UNGA Resolution 181 was passed on November 29, 1947. It called for the partition of Palestine into two separate Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem granted special status under the administration of the UN.
4. Ovendale, 258. UN Security Council Resolution 242 was passed on November 22, 1967, and Resolution 338 on October 22, 1973. Arafat's address in Geneva took place on December 14, 1988.
5. Arafat cited in Rabie, 65.
6. Burhan Dajani, "An Alternative to Oslo," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 4 (Summer 1996):8.
7. Mouin Rabbani, cited in Usher, *Palestine in Crisis*, 14.
8. Burhan Dajani, "The September 1993 Israeli-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1994):5–23. Dajani points out that one of the letters was not actually signed until September 10. The text of the three letters together with the text of the DoP, the Cairo Agreement, and the Gaza-Jericho Agreement are taken from: Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information (IPCRI), *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Documentation Series* 1, no. 1 (Jerusalem: IPCRI, 1994).
9. "Arafat's letter to Rabin," (listed under DoP), *ibid.*, 26
10. Jmaysil's assassination remains a murky affair, commonly attributed to Syria. He was not assassinated directly for abandoning Palestinian rights, but was ensnared in a contentious alliance with Israel at the time. Equally, Sadat's assassination owed as much to the affront caused to Islamists by his Westernization of Egypt as it did to his abandonment of Palestine. Nevertheless, both leaders were perceived to have betrayed the Palestinian cause in the context of broader policy considerations, which resulted in their deaths.
11. Interview with 'Abd al-Shafi.
12. *The Jerusalem Post*, November 6, 1995.

13. Ibid.
14. *The DoP*, 11.
15. The law of treaties was codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969. According to Akehurst, "Article 2(1)(a)...defines a treaty, for the purposes of the Convention, as 'an agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments, and whatever its particular designation.'" Michael Akehurst, *A Modern Introduction to International Law* (sixth ed.), (London: Unwin Hyman, 1987), 124. The full text of the Vienna Convention can be found in Ian Brownlie (ed.), *Basic Documents in International Law* (third ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 349–86.
16. Dajani, "The Israeli-PLO Documents," 18.
17. Ibid., 6.
18. Raja Shehadeh, "Questions of Jurisdiction: A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 23, no. 4 (Summer 1994):19.
19. "Arafat's Letter to Rabin," *Three Letters of Mutual Recognition*, 26.
20. "Arafat's Letter to Holst," *Three Letters of Mutual Recognition*, 28.
21. *Palestine Report*, January 12, 1996, 13.
22. "Arafat's Letter to Rabin," *Three Letters of Mutual Recognition*, 26.
23. Dajani notes that "the letter does not say that these provisions *will become* inoperative, but that they *are* inoperative. Article 33 of the Palestine National Charter requires that any amendment receive a two-thirds majority within the Palestine National Council (PNC)..." Arafat only asks for their approval to a commitment he has already made. Dajani, "The Israeli-PLO Documents," 8.
24. "Rabin's Letter to Arafat," *Three Letters of Mutual Recognition*, 27.
25. *The DoP*, 9.
26. Ibid., 11.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., 10
29. Ibid., 12.
30. Ibid., 17.
31. Ibid., 18.
32. Ibid., 16.
33. Ibid., 10.
34. Ibid., 11.
35. Ibid., 17.
36. Ibid., 14.
37. Sherif S. Elmusa and Mahmud El-Jaafari, "Power and Trade: The Israeli-Palestinian Economic Protocol," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 2 (Winter 1995):28.
38. Ghassan al-Khatib, in JMCC, *Israeli Obstacles to Economic Development in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (Jerusalem: JMCC, 1994), viii–ix.
39. The Committee for Democratic Action, 25.
40. *The DoP*, 12.
41. Ibid., 13.
42. The Committee for Democratic Action, 30. For further details of this noble project, see Shimon Peres with Arye Naor, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993).
43. The Committee for Democratic Action, 31.
44. Dajani, "The Israeli-PLO Documents," 11.
45. Yediot Aharanot, Magazine Section, September 15, 1993, cited in The Committee for Democratic Action, 27.
46. Samir Hazboun, Tariq Mitwasi, and Wajih El-Sheikh, "The Economic Impact of the Israeli-PLO Declaration of Principles on the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Middle East Region," *Israel/Palestine Issues in Conflict, Issues in Cooperation* III, no. 1 (January 1994), 5.

47. *The DoP*, 19–20.
48. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, 27.
49. Samara, *Industrialisation*, 347.
50. *Ibid.*, 344.
51. *Ibid.*, 348.
52. Study of Palestinian banking produced by The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), reported in the *Jerusalem Times*, October 6, 1995.
53. MAS report, cited in the *Jerusalem Times*, July 7, 1995.
54. *Ibid.*, October 6, 1995.
55. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, 30, citing the Palestinian Monetary Authority.
56. MAS report, cited in the *Jerusalem Times*, July 7, 1995.
57. *Ibid.*, June 30, 1995.
58. *Ibid.*
59. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, 29.
60. *Ibid.*, 6.
61. *Ibid.*, 29.
62. Interview with Muhammad Shtayya.
63. Hazboun et al, 10.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *The Jerusalem Post*, Money Magazine Section, December 6, 1995.
66. According to *The Jerusalem Post*, the minister of planning and economics, Nabil Sha‘th, together with Muhammad Nashashibi in the Finance Ministry, opposed the project on the grounds that it would delay developments in Gaza, which were more independent of the Israeli economy. On the other hand, Ahmad Gray’, then in the Ministry of Trade and Industry, took a different view. For him, a seaport in Gaza and other related projects were unnecessary. According to the report, “In an apparent gesture to Sha‘th, the first of nine suggested ‘border estates’ has been designated for the Kami site, outside Gaza City, closer to where a Gaza seaport would hopefully be dug, rather than at the Erez checkpoint, which leads to Ashdod.” *Ibid.*
67. *Palestine Report*, July 5, 1997.
68. Uri Savir, *The Process: 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East*, (New York: Random House, 1998), 82.
69. *Ibid.*, 117.
70. *The Cairo Agreement*, 3.
71. *Ibid.*, 2.
72. *Ibid.*, 3.
73. *Ibid.*, 3–4.
74. Savir, 142. He also adds: “The only Israeli who warned of the negative effects of our policy was the Foreign Ministry’s representative to the economic talks, Oded Eran. The independent-minded Oren...rightly if unsuccessfully argued for granting the Palestinians far greater economic independence.” 100.
75. For distinctions between the two models, see Todaro, 523.
76. Elmusa and El-Jaafari, 28.
77. *Ibid.*, 20.
78. *Ibid.*, 23.
79. The monopolies were researched by Aisling Byrne for *News from Within* (June 1996), cited by Parker, 120–21. Parker cites a U.S. State Department report that gives a figure of twenty-seven operational monopolies.
80. Brynen, *A Very Political Economy*, 145.
81. *Ibid.*
82. Interview with Shtayya.
83. Shehadeh, “Questions of Jurisdiction,” 18.

84. *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area*, 3.
85. *Ibid.*, 14.
86. *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area*, 2.
87. *Ibid.*, 2.
88. *Ibid.*, 3.
89. Graham Usher, "Bantustanisation or Bi-Nationalism: An Interview with Azmi Bishara," *Race and Class* 37, no. 2, (October-December 1995):46.
90. *Ibid.*, 46–47.
91. Shehadeh, "Questions of Jurisdiction," 19.
92. Shehadeh noted, "The seriousness of the concession made by the Palestinian side in the 4 May agreement's Article VII.9—which perpetuates, with Palestinian consent, the occupiers law—may not have yet been fully grasped by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership, which as we shall see is quite astonishingly inattentive to legal niceties." *Ibid.*, 19.
93. The basis of the formal jurisdiction of Palestinian civil courts in the West Bank, including the impact of Israeli military orders issued during the occupation, is outlined by Shehadeh, *ibid.*, 19–20. For a study of the legal situation in the West Bank from Ottoman times to the DoP, see Raja Shehadeh, *The Declaration of Principles and the Legal System in the West Bank* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994).
94. Shehadeh, "Questions of Jurisdiction," 20. *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area*, 23.
95. *Ibid.*
96. Shehadeh, "Questions of Jurisdiction," 20.
97. *Ibid.*, 21–22.
98. *Ibid.*, 21–22. *Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area*, 20–21.
99. Brynen, *A Very Political Economy*, 57.
100. Naseer Aruri, "Early Empowerment: The Burden Not the Responsibility," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 2, (Winter 1995):33–39.
101. *The DoP*, 12.
102. Savir, 208.
103. *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 15.
104. Figures from *The Middle East*, November 1995, 5.
105. B'Tselem, *Land Grab*, 87.
106. During these extensive clashes, eighty-six Palestinians were killed by the IDF, the majority by live ammunition. The impact of closure crippled economic activity and effectively rendered Palestinians prisoners within their allotted zones. *Palestine Report*, September 27 and October 4, 1996, *JMCC Press Service*, September 28, 1996. Personal correspondence with friends from Bir Zeit.
107. *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 20.
108. *Ibid.*
109. Graham Usher, "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 2 (Winter 1996):21–34.
110. *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 20.
111. *Ibid.*, 17.
112. Figures from *The Middle East*, March 1997, 6–8.
113. The full text of the Hebron Agreement is drawn from *Palestine Report* (special ed.), January 17, 1997.
114. *Ibid.*, no page number included.
115. *Ibid.*
116. *Ibid.*

117. Rachele Marshall, "Special Report: In the Aftermath of Wye, Israelis Grab More Hills," *Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs*, (January/February 1999), 9, <http://www.washington-report.org/backissues/0199/9901009.html> (accessed August 2003).
118. "The Wye River Memorandum," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 2 (Winter 1999): 136.
119. Naseer H. Aruri, "The Wye Memorandum: Netanyahu's Oslo and Unreciprocal Reciprocity," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 2 (Winter 1999):18.
120. Development of the CIA's role from David Sharrock and Ilene Prusher for *The Guardian*, October 20, 1998, and August 3, 1999.
121. Roy gives the example of the November 9 closing of the Anaqa' Islamic Women's Society in Bethlehem, which included an "outpatient health clinic and kindergarten," apparently deemed part of the terrorist infrastructure. Roy, "De-development," 79.
122. Aruri, "Unreciprocal," 18. Ami Ayalon, quoted in *Ha'aretz* April 6, 1998, cited by Tanya Reinhart, "Evil Unleashed," *Tikkun*, March/April 2002, <http://www.tikkun.org/magazine/index.cfm/action/tikkun/issue/tik0203/article/020312b.ht> (accessed August 2003).
123. "Wye River Memorandum," 136.
124. *Ibid.*, 137.
125. *Ibid.*, 138.
126. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):118.
127. Roy, "De-development," 78.
128. "Wye River Memorandum," 138.
129. Brynen, *A Very Political Economy*, 109.
130. Roy, "De-development," 79.
131. "Wye River Memorandum," 138.
132. Marshall, 9–10. The IDF eventually dismantled the embarrassing edifice, against the will of the colony's residents, on December 29, 1999. "Chronology," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):175.
133. "The Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum (Wye II) and Related Documents," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2000):143.
134. "Chronology," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2000):175, no. 3 (Spring 2000):176; and no. 4 (Summer 2000):175.
135. "The Sharm al-Shaykh Memorandum (Wye II) and Related Documents," 144 and "Chronology," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2000):184.
136. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):117. As for procedure, passengers hoping to use public transport were required to apply to the PA for a permit, whereupon the PA transferred a list to Israel, which then returned its own list of approved applicants to the PA within forty-eight hours. Anyone hoping to travel in their own car had to submit an array of documents including driving license, vehicle registration documents, and insurance policies. Subject to approval by Israel, permits were to be issued within five working days and were valid for a period of three months. On the actual day of the journey, passengers would carry a special magnetic card and a permit. Private vehicles were allotted ninety minutes, public service vehicles two hours. Anyone exceeding the appropriate time limit would be subject to investigation and possible detention by the Israeli authorities. "Israel and the PLO, Safe-Passage Protocol, Jerusalem, 5 October 1999," "Special Document File," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2000):152.
137. *Ibid.*, (Winter 2000):145.
138. "Chronology," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2000):174; and 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):175.

Chapter 5

1. The first contingent of PLO forces crossed the Rafah checkpoint from Egypt into the Gaza Strip on May 10, 1994. The al-Aqsa Brigade of the PLA took over in Jericho on May 13, 1994. *PASSIA Diary 1996*, 273.
2. Ashrawi notes that Arafat wanted to establish a provisional government, “but neither the Americans nor the Israelis would accept it...” Ashrawi, 276–78.
3. Gresh, 168.
4. Ashrawi provides a brief account of the decision-making process concerning PLO ratification of the DoP and the decision to establish the PA. Ashrawi, 276–78. Also see Usher, *Palestine in Crisis*, 14. The PLO central council (107 members in October 1993), approved the DoP and the establishment of the PA by a vote of 63 to 8, with 11 members abstaining and 25 members boycotting the session. *Palestine Report*, October 8–14, 1993.
5. Rex Brynen, “The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 24, no. 3, (Spring 1995):38.
6. Roger Owen, especially chapters 2 and 3. Paul Cammack, David Pool, and William Tordoff, *Third World Politics: A Comparative Introduction* (second ed.), (London: The Macmillan Press, 1993).
7. Jill Crystal, “Authoritarianism and Its Adversaries in the Arab World,” *World Politics* 46, no. 2 (January 1994):269.
8. Interview with Sulayman al-Najjab, PPP member of the PLO executive committee since 1987, re-elected by the 21st PNC in April 1996, Jibya (near Bir Zeit), February 2, 1996.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. *The Jerusalem Post*, August 19, 1994.
15. Ibid.
16. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 656.
17. Ibid., 656–57.
18. “Peace Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):119
19. Edward Said quotes Hut as saying “that Yasir Arafat had become an autocrat whose personal handling of Palestinian finances was a disaster and, worse, accountable to no one.” Said, *Peace and Its Discontents*, 3.
20. Interview with Najjab.
21. Salim Tamari, comments on Jill Tansley, “*Adaptation*” in *the West Bank and Gaza: Discussion Paper*. Refugee Working Group Intersessional, April 1996. Middle East Peace Process/PRRN: Research Materials/ ICAS. Website, McGill University, Montreal, <http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/papers/tamaril.html>. (accessed August 2003).
22. Said, *Peace and Its Discontents*, 170–71.
23. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, 20. In the meantime, spending on emergency services had dropped to around eight million dollars per month by the end of 2001.
24. *The Guardian*, April 21, 1997. Precisely who has been granted which monopoly is unclear, but according to Edward Jenkinson, the monopoly for importing gravel into the Gaza Strip was awarded to Mohammed Dahlan, head of Preventive Security in Gaza. Clearly this is not an easy area to research, but the subject does merit further attention. Said quotes Julian Ozane from the *Financial Times* who reported that the bank in question was Bank Leumi; Said, *Peace and Its Discontents*, 169.
25. Ibid.
26. Interview with ‘Ali Khadr, World Bank office in al-Ram, West Bank, February 1996.

27. Sha'th is a leading Fatah returnee and a wealthy businessman in his own right. Tarifi is a prominent member of the local bourgeoisie co-opted by Arafat. He reputedly made a substantial fortune building Israeli settlements. We will return to him later.
28. *The Financial Times*, July 30, 1997.
29. On hamulas see Parker, 30–32 and Robinson, *Building*, 71–74.
30. This section is also based on the author's translation of Fatah's *Basic Law, Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini* (The Palestinian National Liberation Movement—Fatah), *al-Nizam al-Asasi* (The Basic Law) (no place of publication, publisher or date). This latest version of the Basic Law was adopted in 1980 and the author's copy obtained from the Fatah higher committee office, Gaza, February 1996. Marwan al-Barghuthi and Jamil Shihada, two members of the Fatah revolutionary council suggested 1,200 delegates, while Barakat al-Fara thought 950 a more accurate number. Interview with Barghuthi. Interview with Jamil Shihada, Ministry of the Interior, Ramallah, January 22 and 25, 1996. Interview with Barakat al-Fara, Fatah office, Cairo, March 2, 2003.
31. As noted in chapter 1, the PNLA is a result of the merger between the military wing of Fatah, sometimes referred to as *al-'Asifa* (The Storm), and the PLO's regular forces, the PL A, which took place in 1983. This was made clear to me during an interview with 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda, commander of Palestinian general security in the Gaza Strip, who emphasized that it was inappropriate to draw a distinction between Fatah and the PLA. Interview with 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda.
32. Interview with 'Adnan Samara, deputy general secretary of the Fatah revolutionary council, offices of the revolutionary council secretariat, Ramallah, June 16, 2003.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Interview with Fara. Fax from Sakhr Bsaysu in Gaza to Barakat al-Fara at the Fatah Offices, Cairo, November 3, 2003. The official list of council members received by fax from northern Gaza, November 3, 2002.
35. In separate interviews both Shihada and Barghuthi agreed on the figure of 111 as of early 1996. The list received by the author in November 2002 contained 129 names. Samara said that this had increased to 133 by June 2003. *Al-Karama*, February 29, 2004. Interviews with Shihada, Barghuthi, and Samara. Details of Jbara's release from *The Jerusalem Times*, June 6, 2003. He is commonly referred to as Abu Sukkar.
36. Interview with Hani al-Hasan, Fatah central committee, former minister of the interior in the PA, head of the Fatah Bureau of Mobilization and Organization, Ramallah, June 15, 2003.
37. Article 67 of Fatah's Basic Law stipulated that the central committee is "collectively in charge of the movement's activities." Jean-Francois Legrain, "The Successions of Yasir Arafat," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 4 (Summer 1999):7.
38. According to Sayigh, Zaki's committee enjoyed "no authority and rarely met." Later it was more or less dissolved as Arafat redistributed Wazir's staff across the PLO, before handing responsibility for the Western Sector over to Force 17, which met with no more success either. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 634–35.
39. Interview with Samara.
40. Interview with Sari Nusayba, president of al-Quds University, Fatah member, East Jerusalem, June 11, 2003.
41. Interview with Qaddura Fans, former prisoner, member of the Legislative Council for Ramallah and the West Bank Fatah higher committee, Legislative Council member's office, Ramallah, June 14, 2003.
42. Interviews with Barghuthi.
43. Those remaining in Cairo included Muhammad Sbayh, Zuhdi al-Qudwa, Sa'id Kamal, and latterly Fara himself. Interview with Fara, 2003.
44. Interviews with Alluh and Fara, 2003.

45. Interview with Ahmad al-Dik, member of the Fatah higher committee in the West Bank, Legislative Council member for Salfit, married to the daughter of Khalil al-Wazir, Fatah office, Ramallah, November 6, 1995.
46. Interview with Sinjilawi. Interview with Husam Shahin, Fatah activist and employee in the Palestinian Center for Non-violence, Jerusalem, January 19, 1996. At the time of fieldwork, the higher committees comprised forty-seven members in the West Bank and thirty members in Gaza. Interviews with Barghuthi, Dik, and Alluh.
47. Interview with 'Abd al-Rahman al-Turk, sociologist at al-Najah University, PNC member, close to the Fatah higher committee in the West Bank, Ramallah, June 19, 2003. Interview with Paris.
48. Interview with Samara.
49. The Labor Party in particular favored deportation. Cobban suggests that up to 15,000 Palestinians from Gaza were deported to Egypt immediately after the 1967 occupation, and a further 1,150 from the West Bank and Gaza between 1967 and 1978. Rabin later employed deportations as a central plank of his "Iron Fist" policy from 1985. However, the policy had unforeseen consequences. In Cobban's words, "Like most Palestinians who preceded and succeeded them into political exile, the community leaders deported before the intifada were immediately incorporated into the command structures of the various PLO groups..." Cobban, "Intifada," 227. This explains the Likud's general reluctance to rely on deportations as a means of suppressing nationalist dissent. According to Sayigh thirty-five senior activists were deported in the batch that included Shahin and Haniyya. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, 609 and 889.
50. Cobban, "Intifada," 227.
51. Interviews with Barghuthi.
52. Ibid.
53. Fatah and PLO institutions have a habit of growing over time in order to accommodate more and more figures into their ranks. Former PNC member Ibrahim Abu Lughod made this point with regard to the PNC. Interview with Ibrahim Abu Lughod, PNC member from 1977–1991, head of the Palestinian Curriculum Development Center, Ramallah, December 20, 1995.
54. Brynen, "Elite Formation," 43.
55. Prem Garg and Samir el-Khoury, "Aiding the Development Effort for the West Bank and Gaza," *Finance and Development*, September 1994.
56. Interview with Shtayya.
57. Interview with Jibril Muhammad, PFLP member, head of the voluntary work section in the PA's Ministry of Sports and Youth, Baytunya (near Ramallah), September 10, 1995.
58. Interview with Basil Ramahi, former Civil Administration employee, director general in the PA's Ministry of Finance, Ramallah, February 11, 1996.
59. The two assistant deputy ministers were Ahmad Ghnaym and Samir Shihada. Interviews with Barghuthi.
60. Interview with Shtayya.
61. Shehadeh, "Questions of Jurisdiction," 22. Article II. B.6 of Annex II reads as follows: "The Palestinian Authority assures that it shall keep employing the present Palestinian Civil Administration employees in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area and shall maintain their rights."
62. Interview with Walid Salim, former prisoner accused of holding a senior position in the leadership of the PFLP, currently a journalist and board member of the Center for the Dissemination of Alternative Information (Panorama), a left-leaning research center in East Jerusalem with sponsorship from various Palestinian sources, the Swiss and Canadian consulates, and the Dutch Socialist Party. The head of Panorama is Riyad Malki, professor at Bir Zeit University and official spokesman for the PFLP in the West Bank. Panorama, Jerusalem, January 19, 1997.

63. *PASSIA Diary 1996*, 7–9.
64. Robinson, *Building*, 178–179.
65. *BBC World Service*, January 17, 1996.
66. Interview with Fara, 2003.
67. Interview with Salim.
68. Interview with Marwan Jilani, director of planning and development in the Ministry of Sports and Youth, Ramallah, September 10, 1995. Interview with Muhammad.
69. The first four governorates were recorded in the *PASSIA Diary 1996*, 10. The more recent establishment of the Hebron Governorate is noted in the *Palestine Report*, November 15, 1996.
70. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1996.
71. Interview with ‘Imad Ghayaza, imprisoned eight times by Israel, former teaching assistant, now professor at Bir Zeit University, and former Fatah activist from Nahalin near Bethlehem, Bir Zeit, June 12, 2003.
72. “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 1 (Autumn 2002):135. Graffiti included “No to the Authority whose symbols are corrupt,” recorded by Annie Higgins, international volunteer, in a public lecture at AUC, March 19, 2003.
73. List of governorates and governors from the *PASSIA Diary 2001*, 25 and 2003, 26. The names of revolutionary council members from “Membership List by Name of the Revolutionary Council” (*Qa’imat bi-Asma’ A’da’ al-Majlis al-Thawri*), 2002, courtesy of Sakhr Bsaysu in the North Gaza governorate and Barakat al-Fara at the Fatah office in Cairo. The lack of popularity or presence accorded Rajub in Jinin was attested to by Annie Higgins, *ibid.* The first governor of Jinin was Hikmat Zayd. Hillel Frisch, “Modern Absolutist or Neopatriarchal State Building? Customary Law, Extended Families, and the Palestinian Authority,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29(1997), 351. Zayd was a senior member of the revolutionary council. Irshayd’s kidnapping was reported in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 24, 2003.
74. Interview with Sayigh.
75. Interview with Haytham Arrar, manager of the Refugee Camp Affairs Administration in the Ramallah governor’s office, and member of Fatah regional committee for Ramallah, Ramallah, June 17, 2003.
76. This has been addressed in greater detail by Frisch, “Modern Absolutist or Neopatriarchal State Building?” Also see Viktoria Wagner, *Palestinian Judiciary and the Rule of Law in the Autonomous Areas: An Introduction* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 2000).
77. Interview with Arrar.
78. Usher, “Internal Security.”
79. There were five to seven officers from each side.
80. Usher reported the Special Security Force was headed by General Abu Yusif al-Wahadi in 1995. “Formally authorized to protect Arafat during his visits to Jericho...its actual function may be to gather intelligence on and monitor the PA’s other security services.” Usher, “Internal Security,” p. 24. Luft adds the Aerial Police (*Shurta al-Jawiyya*), drawn from Fatah’s Force 14. Gal Luft, “The Palestinian Security Services: Between Police and Army,” *MERIA* 3, no. 2 (June 1999): 2, <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1999/issue2/Jv3n2a5.html>. (accessed February 6, 2003). Sayigh also adds the Ariel or Aviation police as well as Customs and Border Police. Yezid Sayigh, “The Palestinian Paradox: Statehood, Security and Institutional Reform,” *Conflict, Security and Development* 1, no. 1(2001):103–4, <http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk/Publications/assets/PDF%20files/Sayigh.pdf> (accessed October 2003).
81. Interview with Wafa ‘Amr, Reuters journalist, Jerusalem, November 29, 1995.
82. The attack took place on July 24, 2003.
83. “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 1 (Fall 2003):129.

84. Personal correspondence with Mahmud al-Natur, former commander of Force 17, Cairo, May 2003.
85. Interview with Jamil Hilal, Palestinian writer closely involved in the PLO's media department, former member of the DFLP, now close to FIDA, Ramallah, February 1996.
86. *Muqarana bayn al-Quwwat al-Saba'tash wa al-Amn al-Waqa'i*. [Comparison between Force 17 and Preventive Security], September 17, 2001 (no author or place of publication cited). Unpublished document passed to the author in Cairo by Mahmud al-Natur. Personal correspondence with Natur.
87. Steve Rodan and Bill Hutman, "Order in Jericho," *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, May 19, 1995, 10–15.
88. *Mawz* is the Arabic for banana, from conversations with Palestinians 1994–1996.
89. Interview with Wafa 'Amr.
90. Personal correspondence with Natur.
91. *Muqarana bayn al-Quwwat al-Saba'tash wa al-Amn al-Waqa'i*. [Comparison between Force 17 and Preventive Security]
92. Amos Harel in *Ha'aretz*, December 23, 2002.
93. The surrender was part of a compromise negotiated by the United States that allowed Rajub's staff to leave the building unharmed. Six Hamas members were handed over into Israeli custody. Rajub had been sacked previously in 1997 for refusing to arrest Hamas political leaders on Arafat's orders. *The Jerusalem Post*, June 10, 2003; *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 11, 2002.
94. Interview with Ghayaza, June 2003.
95. *The Guardian*, February 22, 1997.
96. Much of the material on the Black Panthers comes from several informal conversations held with Khalil Sharif during 1994–1996. Also see *The Jerusalem Post*, December 18, 1995. Nasr Yusif confirmed that Preventive Security in Gaza was composed almost entirely of former Fatah Hawks. Interview with Nasr Yusif, senior figure in Force 17, member of the Fatah central committee, overall commander of PA Security Services in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, August 30, 1995.
97. Interview with Ghassan al-Shak'a, mayor of Nablus and subsequently Fatah member of the Legislative Council, elected to the PLO executive committee by the 21st PNC, Nablus municipality, Autumn 1995.
98. *The Jerusalem Post*, December 18, 1995.
99. *Ibid.*
100. *The Guardian*, February 22, 1997.
101. *Palestine Report*, December 29, 1995.
102. *The Jerusalem Post*, December 13, 1995.
103. *The Jerusalem Post*, December 18, 1995 and *The Guardian*, February 22, 1997.
104. Interview with Yusif.
105. *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, May 19, 1995. Usher notes the meeting in *Palestine in Crisis*, 66, although he dates it to December 1993.
106. *Ibid.*, 66.
107. *Ibid.*, 71–72.
108. *The Guardian*, January 22, 1997.
109. Usher, *Palestine in Crisis*, 70.
110. *Ibid.*
111. Interview with Wafa 'Amr.
112. Ghazi Hamid, editor of the Hamas weekly newspaper *al-Watan* (circulation around 9,000), confirmed the readiness of the PA to pursue Hamas' military wing, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, together with the killings at the Palestine Mosque, had forced Hamas into a dialogue with the PA. Nevertheless, despite the dialogue, *al-Watan* continued to be regularly harassed by security services (various branches of it), and Hamid himself had

- regularly been on the wanted list. Interview with Ghazi Hamid, managing editor of *al-Watan*, Gaza, October 26, 1995.
113. The Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, <http://www.phrmg.org/html> (accessed September 6, 2003). Deaths in custody per annum: 1994, 1. 1995, 9. 1996, 3. 1997, 6. 1998, 2. 1999, 1. 2000, 1. 2001, 5. 2002 (until July), 2. Six executions were carried out during the same period.
114. *Palestine Report*, February 7, 1997. Baba died on February 1, 1997.
115. *Ibid.*
116. *Ibid.*
117. Iyad al-Sarraj, "Psycho-Political Aspects of the Palestinian Intifada," Lecture at AUC Cairo, May 12, 2003. Sarraj was high commissioner of the Independent Palestinian Commission for Citizen's Rights and head of Gaza's Mental Health Center. He was first arrested on December 7, 1995.
118. Informal conversations with human rights workers in Ramallah during 1995 and with Palestinian friends in Ramallah, 2003.
119. Usher, *Palestine in Crisis*, 68.
120. *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, May 19, 1995.
121. Interview with Wafa 'Amr and informal conversations with Palestinian friends and UN staff, Gaza.
122. Usher, *Palestine in Crisis*, 68.
123. Palestine Emergency Committee, *Destruction of Palestinian Public Institutions*, Ramallah, April 14, 2002, <http://www.miftah.org/display.cfm?DocId=710/html> (accessed May 2002).
124. *Jerusalem Report*, September 21, 1995, 26.
125. Said, *Peace and Its Discontents*, 70.
126. *Ibid.*, 27.
127. *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, May 19, 1995, 10. Haddad was the original commander of the SLA, later led by Antoine Lahad. It was disbanded after the IDF's withdrawal during Barak's premiership. In January 2000 the PA did hand over Hisham Najm for the rape and murder of a child near Nablus. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):117.
128. Abu 'Ali Mustafa was killed when Israeli helicopters rocketed his office in al-Bira August 27, 2001. Ze'evi was shot dead October 16, 2001. On Sharon's reaction see *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 18, 2001.
129. Qur'an received eighteen years for intentional killing, Asmar twelve years for participation, Majdi Rimawi eight years for planning, and Ahid Ghulmi one year for hiding the fugitives. Sa'dat and later Fatah's Fu'ad al-Shubaki made for a total of six inmates. Addameer Prisoners Support and Human Rights Association (March 31, 2004), <http://www.addameer.org/paprisoners/index.html>.
130. Usher, "Internal Security," 25.
131. *Ibid.*, 25.
132. *Ibid.*, 26.
133. Informal conversations with Palestinians, June 2003.
134. The Saraya was destroyed in air raids during February 2002. The IDF laid siege to the *muqata'* on at least three occasions. It was bulldozed in stages during 2002.
135. *Ha'aretz*, May 28, 2003. The bulk of the damage was sustained between June 2001 and April 2002. Sharon ended the "policy of restraint" at the end of March 2001.
136. Luft, "Security Services," 4.
137. Gal Luft, "Palestinian Military Performance and the 2000 Intifada," *MERIA* 4, no. 4, (December 2000):4-5, <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/meria/meria00-lug01.html>. (accessed February 16, 2003).
138. Luft, "Military Performance," 4.

139. Reuven Paz, "Force 17: The Renewal of Old Competition Motivates Violence," *CIAO Policy Briefs*, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Peace Watch 316. (April 5, 2001):2, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/index.htm>. (accessed March 23, 2003).
140. *Mugarana*.
141. Personal correspondence with Natur.
142. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 19, 2000. Eleven policemen were killed when an F16 bombed Nablus prison again as it tried to assassinate Mahmud Abu Hanud on May 18, 2001. Saleh Abdel-Jawad, *The Israeli Assassination Policy in the Aqsa Intifada* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, 2001), 55.
143. Jnayd was attacked on February 7, 2002, and Hebron stormed four days later. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, February 14, 2002.
144. *Le Monde*, in *The Guardian Weekly*, October 31, 2002. The woman involved confessed to planting the bomb that killed Ra'id al-Karmi on January 14, 2002. He was a senior figure in the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades.
145. *Palestine Report*, August 6, 2003.
146. The fears were very real. Hasan warned of the possibility of another nakba under cover of the war in Iraq. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, February 13, 2003.
147. *Al-Quds*, June 14, 2002.
148. On Gaza-Bethlehem first see *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 22, 2002. On August 20 the IDF shot and killed Muhammad Sa'dat, brother of Ahmad, then imprisoned Ze'evi for assassination. Ya'alon's comments were made on August 25 to rabbis. In combination, the events appeared designed to preclude inter-factional support for the Gaza-Bethlehem first plan. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 29, 2002. *Ha'aretz*, August 9, 2002.
149. Danny Rubinstein in *Ha'aretz*, February 10, 2003.
150. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, February 13, 2003. The police officers were trained in Egypt and Jordan with the assistance of the CIA.
151. The DCOs were first closed on November 23, 2000, following a mortar attack in which an IDF officer was killed.
152. *The Roadmap*.

Chapter 6

1. On the origins of the debate over "civil society," Giacaman writes, "The phrase civil society gained popular currency beginning nearly two decades ago. In the Western media it was mainly used to describe the forces active against communist regimes first in Poland, and later in other East European countries. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the phrase gained currency in other parts of the world, including the Arab world, and by extension, among many Palestinians." George Giacaman, "The Role of Palestinian NGOs in the Development of Palestinian Civil Society," paper presented in Jerusalem at a conference on the future of Palestinian NGOs, March 1995. Muslih also cites the collapse of the East European communist bloc as the starting point for debate as to how civil society might provide answers "to the questions of how individuals can pursue the common good, and how society and state can interact and reinforce each other in a manner that creates and sustains a democratic system." Muslih, 258. Both authors cite Adam Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1992). Muslih is among the authors who sought to extrapolate the political pluralism of the PLO into a democratic order following independence. For a similarly optimistic approach, see Hiltermann.
2. The problems of discussing "democracy" in the context of limited autonomy and the absence of national self-determination have been discussed at length by Neil Partrick.
3. Muslih, 272.

4. Giacaman, 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 5.
8. I obtained a copy of this form during fieldwork.
9. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):119.
10. Interview with Ibrahim D'aybis, official at the Health Development Information Project, Ramallah, July 10, 1995.
11. Mustafa Barghouthi, *Palestinian NGOs and Their Role in Building a Civil Society* (West Bank: The Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees, 1994), 8.
12. Hammami, 59.
13. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, 55.
14. Robinson, *Building*.
15. For an succinct analysis of the calculated subordination of the West Bank and Gazan economies to the needs of Israel, see Samir Abdallah Saleh, "The Effects of Israeli Occupation on the Economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip," in Nassar and Heacock (eds.), 37–51. For the economic decline of the Gaza Strip, see Sara Roy, "Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 4 (Summer 1993):20–31.
16. John Waterbury, "Democracy without Democrats? The Potential for Political Liberalisation in the Middle East," in *Democracy without Democrats: the Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, ed. Ghassan Salame (London: I.B.Taurus, 1994), 33.
17. Ibid., 27.
18. The decision was taken by the Executive Authority on August 31, 1996. *Palestine Report*, September 13, 1996.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Interview with 'Ali Khadr.
22. Palestinian NGO Network, *Newsletter: Perspectives on the PNGO Network* 1, no. 2 (1995).
23. Giacaman, 6.
24. Hammami, 60.
25. Interview with 'Azmi Bishara, lecturer at Bir Zeit University, July 1995.
26. Giacaman, 5.
27. Interview with Bishara. Usher, "Bantustanisation or Bi-nationalism?, 47–48.
28. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 30, 2001. The UN inter-governmental conference ran from August 31 to September 7.
29. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 6, 2001. Groups from the Zionist Jewish Caucus predictably tried to get it condemned as anti-Semitism. It was a silly charge, rejected by all the other groups who let them walk out of the forum to chants of "free Palestine."
30. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 13, 2001.
31. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 30, 2001.
32. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 13, 2001.
33. Ibid.
34. *The Roadmap*.
35. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 10, 2003. The participation of 'Abd al-Shafi and Dakkak from "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no.1 (Autumn 2002):137.
36. Ibid.
37. *Palestine Report*, February 7, 1997.
38. Ibid., April 18, 1997.
39. Ibid., March 21, 1997.
40. Ibid., May 2, 1997.

41. Ibid.
42. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):118.
43. In April 1993, the West Bank-based Democracy and Worker's Rights Center calculated that Palestinian laborers totaled 339,000, of which 189,000 were employed in Israel, 90,000 in the West Bank, and 60,000 in the Gaza Strip. Cited by Usher in *Middle East International*, June 23, 1995.
44. Nina Sovich, "Palestinian Trade Unions," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 4 (Summer 2000):70. The insiders were represented by Hasan Ibrahim, returnees by Shahir Sa'ad.
45. The petition was published November 27, 1999. Jean Shaoul, "Palestinian Leader Yassir Arafat Clamps Down on His Critics," World Socialist website, December 9, 1999, <http://www.wsws.org/> (accessed March 2003).
46. Ibid.
47. Agreed to by thirty three votes to eight, while thirty-seven declined to attend in protest and three abstained.
48. World Socialist Website, <http://www.wsws.org/>; *The Jerusalem Times*, December 24, 1999; "Peace Monitor" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):118-19. Of the nine, Nablus representative Mu'awir al-Masri was shot in the leg outside his home, and Ramallah representative and former minister of agriculture Jawad Abd al-Salih was badly beaten by General Intelligence officers in Jericho. The Human Rights Action Program at Bir Zeit University weighed in on the side of the twenty, and the program coordinator Hanan El Masu was knocked unconscious by a stone thrown at her at night.
49. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 19, 2000.
50. The announcement that members of the Legislative Council and the 100 best runnersup would be added to the PNC was made by Sha'th during a lecture at Tel Aviv University. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 3, 1996.
51. *The DoP*, 9.
52. Ibid., 10.
53. *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*. Annex II, article II (I).
54. *The DoP*, annex I: 16.
55. *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 11.
56. Israel and the PLO reached agreement on separate ballots during talks ending February 13, 1995, in Jericho. *The Jerusalem Times*, February 17, 1995.
57. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1996.
58. Ibid.
59. *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 12.
60. *Palestine Report*, January 17, 1997. The composition of the Executive Authority can be found in Appendix 4.
61. *Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip*, 13.
62. As'ad Ghanem, "Founding Elections in a Transitional Period: The First Palestinian General Elections," *The Middle East Journal* 50, no. 4 (Autumn 1996):516. Ghanem provides a comprehensive technical account of the electoral procedure.
63. *The Palestinian Election Law* (Law No. 15 of the year 1995 regarding Elections), section 2(9) and section 3(12). Unofficial translation published in *The Jerusalem Times*, December 15, 1995.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. *The Jerusalem Post*, December 27, 1995.
67. The figure of eighty-two members stipulated in the Interim Agreement was revised twice, firstly to allow a representative of the Nablus Samaritan community to hold a reserved seat, and secondly following a personal request from Arafat to the Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres for a further five seats in December 1995. The figure of eighty-two seats seems to have

- derived from “the number of West Bank and Gaza Palestinians who sat in legislative councils under Jordan and Egyptian rule before 1967.” *The Jerusalem Post*, December 27, 1995. Presidential decree no. 2 of December 14, 1995, added the Samaritan seat. Four more seats were added on December 28, one each for Khan Yunis, Gaza City, Hebron, and Jerusalem. Decree no. 6 added another to Gaza City on December 29. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), *Palestinian Elections, January 201996, Pre-Election Report*, (Washington, DC, NDI, 1995), 25.
68. Section V, article 60 of the Election Law.
69. *The Jerusalem Post*, June 16, 1995.
70. *Ibid.*
71. Interview with Salim.
72. *BBC World Service*, January 17, 1996.
73. *Ibid.*
74. The author was present in Jerusalem and Ramallah on election day. Report from Khan Yunis from Haya al-Fara, informal conversation, Cairo, November 2002.
75. *The Jerusalem Post*, June 16, 1995.
76. “Two of her four sons, who served jail sentences in Israel and were deported, are DFLP members now living in Jordan.” *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, January 5, 1996.
77. *Ibid.*
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.*, January 19, 1996.
80. *Palestine Report*, January 5, 1996, 10–11. This report also lists the Islamic Jihad al-Aqsa Brigades, although the group was not formally represented on the PLO’s EC.
81. The decision was eventually taken by the Hamas leadership resident in Jordan. *The Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 1995.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, January 3, 1996.
84. *Ibid.*, January 19, 1996.
85. *Ibid.*
86. Interview with Hamid.
87. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1996. My own impressions from field work suggest that the *Post*’s assessment is correct and factional loyalty rather more fluid than might be assumed. During a visit to Gaza in early 1996, I stayed with a Palestinian family that had been generally sympathetic to Hamas, but now had a son in the security services. As the father of the household put it, “I was Hamas, now I’m Fatah!” Another Palestinian friend from Bir Zeit University had spent four years in prison as a member of the PFLP, subsequently joined Islamic Jihad, and now worked for the security services with the rank of a major. In addition there did seem to be a tendency to claim allegiance to Hamas simply because it appeared to be more militant than Fatah, rather than through a deep commitment to political Islam.
88. On Barghuthi’s initiative see *The Jerusalem Post*, January 5, 1996. The central committee’s approval was confirmed by Diyab Alluh, and the revolutionary council’s role mentioned by Jamil Shihada. Interviews with Shihada, Alluh, and Barghuthi.
89. *The Basic Law*, 15.
90. Interview with Shahin.
91. *The Jerusalem Times*, January 12, 1996.
92. Interview with Shahin.
93. *The Jerusalem Times*, January 12, 1996.
94. *Ibid.*
95. Interview with Sinjilawi and other activists, Fatah office, Ramallah, January 27, 1996.
96. Interview with Ghayaza, February 1996.

97. Lamis Andoni, "The Palestinian Elections: Moving toward Democracy or One-Party Rule?" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 3 (Spring 1996):9.
98. *The Jerusalem Report*, January 25, 1996.
99. Interview with Husam Khadr, former prisoner, political deportee, member of the higher committee until January 1994, and Legislative Council member for Nablus, Balata Refugee Camp, January 28, 1996.
100. Conversations with Fatah student activists at Bir Zeit University, January 1996. Interview with Ibrahim Khurayshi, Fatah activist, former prisoner, president of the Bir Zeit student council, and participant in the Tulkarm primary, Bir Zeit University, February 3, 1996.
101. Interview with Khurayshi.
102. Ibid.
103. Interview with Jamal al-Shati, higher committee member and member of the Legislative Council for Jinin, Fatah office, Jinin, February 1, 1996.
104. Under Jordanian rule, Jericho fell within the borders of Jerusalem. However, Jerichobased 'Urayqat created a new constituency and duly became its representative.
105. Joint interviews with Alluh and Sufyan Abu Ziyad, member of Fatah higher committee in the Gaza Strip, Fatah higher committee office, February 5–6, 1996.
106. *The Jerusalem Times*, December 15, 1995.
107. Ghanem, 516.
108. *The Jerusalem Post*, December 10, 1995.
109. According to information released by the CEC, there were 1,013,325 registered voters, including 76,400 in Jerusalem. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 3, 1996. Another report suggested 80,051 registered voters in the Jerusalem constituency, of whom an estimated 49,500 possessed Israeli-issued Jerusalem identity cards. A total of 672 candidates stood for election across 16 constituencies, 27 of them women (4 percent). *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1996.
110. Ibid., December 31, 1995.
111. These figures are taken from *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1996. Ghanem gives a total of 725 candidates but has got his addition wrong. His own figures actually add up to 672. With this in mind, the figure of 506 independents taken from *The Jerusalem Post* is considered more reliable than the higher figure of 559 suggested by Ghanem. Both agree on a figure of 76 Fatah candidates.
112. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1996.
113. Ghanem, 522.
114. *The Jerusalem Post*, December 27 and 31, 1995.
115. *The Jerusalem Post*, December 31, 1995.
116. Ibid.
117. Interview with Hamid.
118. Ibid.
119. Interview with Hasan Abu Libda, president of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics and member of the CEC, Ramallah, February 3, 1996.
120. Interview with Mark Mullen, program officer for NDI, Jerusalem, January 29, 1996.
121. Ibid.
122. I met several of the international observers during the course of the campaign and on election day itself, including representatives from the United States, Japan, Belgium, and the Israeli human rights group B'Tselem. Also see Ghanem, 523.
123. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 19, 1996.
124. Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem have found it increasingly difficult to retain their blue ID cards since the onset of the Oslo process. NDI generally employed holders of the blue ID cards because they found it so much easier to travel in the course of work than regular West Bank residents without one. Interview with Mullen. As the PA developed, the

- different colored cards issued by the Civil Administration were replaced by a uniform Palestinian light green one.
125. *The Jerusalem Post*, January 10, 1996. The author saw these posters stuck on walls across Jerusalem during the electoral campaign. Hebrew translation by Edward Jenkinson. The author visited the polling stations at the Salah al-Din Street and Jaffa Gate post offices on polling day and witnessed the extraordinarily heavy police presence as well as one bomb scare, which disrupted polling. Two personal acquaintances recalled how they had arrived at the designated polling station only to find that their names were not on the list of registered voters.
 126. Malki quoted by Lamis Andoni, 8.
 127. Ghanem, 525.
 128. Lamis Andoni, 14.
 129. Hasan cites a JMCC opinion poll from as early as December 1996: “only 24 percent of the public believe that the Council represents the Palestinian people well; 48 percent of Palestinians believe that the Council represents them but with no effect. Finally, 14 percent believe that the Council represents them poorly.” *Palestine Report*, January 17, 1997. However, the Council’s ratings appeared to improve somewhat three months later. A CPRS poll suggested that “50 percent of those polled viewed the Council’s work as positive, compared with 24 percent...” from the poll in December. *Palestine Report*, March 21, 1997.
 130. *Palestine Report*, January 17, 1997.
 131. *Ibid.*
 132. *Ibid.*
 133. *Palestine Report*, January 17, 1996.
 134. *Ibid.*, April 18, 1997.
 135. The statement was released on October 7, 2001. “Documents and Source Material,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31 no. 2 (Winter 2002):134.
 136. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 11–17, 2001.
 137. *PASSIA Diary 2003*, 22.
 138. The Palestinian National Authority, http://www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/gov2003_2_oct.asp. (accessed November 18, 2003).
 139. Foundation for Middle East Peace, “Palestinian Leader Laments Response to Settlement Growth,” in *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*. Reprinted from *Palestine Report*, May 8, 1998.
 140. Khalil Shikaki, “Comment” attached to ‘Azmi Shu’aybi, “A Window on the Workings of the PA: An Inside View,” IPS Forum, *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 95.
 141. Shu’aybi, 94.
 142. *Ibid.*, 90.
 143. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 26, 2002.
 144. According to Hasan in spring 1997, “The Al-Quds Education Channel began airing the Council’s weekly sessions live on local television. However, after coverage of only six sessions, the broadcasts have been jammed off the airwaves, in what some Palestinians are calling yet another ploy by the Palestinian Executive Authority to diminish the role of the LC [the Council] and infringe the freedom of the press...most sources concur that the EA [Executive Authority] and the Palestinian Broadcasting Company [PBC, supervised by Nabil ‘Amr] had a hand in keeping Al-Quds off the air, and did so in order to diminish the role of the Council.” *Palestine Report*, May 16, 1997.
 145. *Palestine Report*, 17 January 1997.
 146. *Ibid.*

147. As a sign of good intention from the Barak government, Gray' had visited the Knesset while speaker in 1999 at the invitation of his opposite number Avraham Burg. *The Guardian*, July 27, 1999.
148. Natsha beat rival Burhan Jarrar fifty-three to ten. *al-Quds*, November 4, 2003. Khurayshi's appointment from *Palestinian Report*, November 24, 2004.
149. *The Palestinian Draft Basic Law* passed its third reading by the legislature on October 3, 1997. An unofficial translation was provided by LAW—Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment. It is available, with a preamble by LAW, at http://www.mopic.gov.ps/key_documents/Basic_law.pdf (accessed March 21, 2004).
150. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):119.
151. Article 64.1 requires the president to submit his proposed cabinet "to the Council to obtain its approval." 64.2 allows that "In the case where the absolute majority of the Council moves for a no confidence vote for the Cabinet or one or more of its members, the President of the PNA shall present the alternative during the second session on the condition that the period of time shall not exceed two weeks from the date of the first session." 64.3 adds "When conducting a ministerial amendment, joining one of the members or occupying a vacant position for any reason, the new ministers shall be presented to the Council in the first session in order to vote on their confidence." *The Palestinian Basic Law*, Ibid. Arafat ratified the Basic Law at the end of May, 2002. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no.1 (Autumn 2002):136.
152. The old cabinet resigned in anticipation of a vote of no confidence on September 11, 2002. *Ha'aretz*, September 15, 2002. The vote was held on October 29, 2002, and passed after a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv.
153. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 26, 2002.
154. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 31, 2002. Ministers accused of corruption: 'Abd Rabbu, 'Urayqat, Khatib, Sha'th, and Shahin.
155. PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, "The Palestinian Prime Minister," March 12, 2003, <http://www.miftah.org/> (accessed March 21, 2004).
156. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):138.
157. PNA citing the Palestine Media Council, "The Palestinian Legislative Council endorsed powers of the PM," March 19, 2003, http://www.pna.gov.ps/subject_details.asp?subject_id=483 (accessed March 21, 2004). "Quarterly Update," Ibid. The full text of the draft amendment, prepared by the Palestinian Legislative Council, Eighth Term-First Period, First Session Held in Ramallah and Gaza simultaneously on March 10, 2003 can be found on the Palestine Media Council website, <http://www.palestine-pmc.com/pdf/10-5-03.pdf> and <http://216.239.51.104/search?q=cache:xmlL71FhPDiQJ:www.palestine-pmc.com/pdf/10-5-03.pdf+Palestinian+Authority+amendments+%22Basic+Law+%22+-human+-rights&hl=en&ie=UTF-8>. (accessed March 21, 2004).
158. PNA citing PMC, "Legislative Council," Ibid. A vote of sixty-nine to zero with one abstention is given in "Quarterly Update," Ibid.
159. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):137-38.
160. PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, "The Palestinian Prime Minister." 'Abd al-Baqi was appointed in Gaza, September 22, 1948. See Shemesh xiii and 33.
161. *Ha'aretz*, March 10, 2003. PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, Ibid.
162. *The Roadmap*.
163. Ali Jarbawi, "Palestinian Politics at the Crossroads," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 25, no. 4 (Summer 1996):35.
164. Interview with Nusayba.
165. Jarbawi, 36.

166. Interviews with Barghuthi.
167. The *iqlim* in the West Bank are 1. Jerusalem; 2. Nablus; 3. Ramallah; 4. N.Hebron; 5. S.Hebron—These five held elections. 6. Tulkarm; 7. Bethlehem; 8. Salfit; 9. Qalqilya; 10. Tubas; 11. Jinin; 12. Jericho; 13. S.Hebron—These eight did not hold elections. The *iqlim* in the Gaza Strip are 1. Gaza City; 2. Northern Gaza (Jabalya, Bayt Hanun, Bayt Lahya); 3. Middle refugee camps; 4. Khan Yunis; 5. Rafah.
168. *Iqlim* elections were held in parts of Gaza. Barakat al-Fara recalled that Khan Yunis was divided into two areas, the camps plus the city, and eastern Khan Yunis. Fara estimated one thousand people took part in the polls there, under the auspices of the higher committee. The *iqlim* leadership committees in Gaza were to follow the higher committee; they did not replace it. Interviews with Fara.
169. Interview with Paris.
170. Interview with May Kayla, Fatah higher committee for the West Bank, and UNRWA, Bir Zeit, June 13, 2003.
171. Interview with Jihad Abu Znayd, women's rights activist, member of the Fatah regional committee for Jerusalem, Orient House representative for Prisoners' Affairs, Shu'fat Camp, Jerusalem, June 11, 2003.
172. Interview with Dalai Salama, Legislative Council member for Nablus, member of the Nablus Fatah regional committee, Legislative Council offices, Ramallah, June 15, 2003.
173. Interview with Ghayaza, 2003.
174. Interview with Shtayya.
175. Interview with Samara.
176. Interview with Shtayya.
177. Ibid.
178. Interview with Zuhayqa, former journalist on *al-Fajr*, general secretary of the Fatah regional committee for East Jerusalem. East Jerusalem, June 10, 2003.
179. Interviews with Zuhayqa, Kayla, and Abu Znayd. *Al-Ayyam*, November 17, 1998.
180. Telephone conversation with Ziyad al-Rajub, Fatah regional committee for Central Hebron, June 18, 2003. Of 697 registered voters, 616 voted. *Al-Ayyam*, December 12, 1998.
181. *Al-Quds*, March 23, 1999.
182. Telephone conversation with Ziyad al-Rajub. 1,913 voted from a membership of 2,339. *Al-Ayyam*, February 15, 1999.
183. Fatah members gave differing accounts of when exactly this took place, and a search through the press and visits to three Fatah offices did not help clarify it. *Al-Quds*, March 23, 1999, reported that the elected *iqlim* leadership committee held its first meeting, March 22.
184. Interview with Kayla. *Al-Quds*, March 23, 1999.
185. *Al-Ayyam*, June 21, 2000.
186. Of 5,920 registered to vote, 4,508 turned out for the poll. *Al-Ayyam*, June 21, 25, and 28, 2000.
187. Interview with Salama.
188. Ibid.
189. *Al-Ayyam*, December 12, 1998.
190. *Al-Ayyam*, April 2, 1999.
191. Interview with Shtayya.
192. Interview with Fans.
193. 'Imad Ghayaza reported Arafat as saying, "Bir Zeit students saved me three times in my life." The three occasions when the student body made public its support for Arafat were in 1979 with rejection of the Camp David Accords and affirmation of the PLO as their "sole legitimate representative"; in 1983 during the Abu Musa rebellion; and again in 1985 during clashes with the Hashemite monarch over the Independent National Decision. Interview with Ghayaza, 2003.

194. The Islamic bloc would win again, albeit narrowly, in 1998 (22 seats to 20) and retain control of the union in 1999 (23 seats to 19) and in April 2000 (22 seats to 20). The left has campaigned as a coalition known as the Progressive Democratic Student Pole since 1995 (*al-qubt al-talabi al-dimuqrati al-taqadumi*), picking up somewhere between 15 and 25 percent of the vote, <http://www.nigelparry.com/> (accessed August 2003), visits to Bir Zeit University, 2001 and 2003.
195. Interview with Paris. Honneker ruled the German Democratic Republic from 1971 to 1989 before exile to Chile. The pro-Soviet Muhammad Najibullah governed Afghanistan until he was ousted in 1992. He was executed by the Taliban in 1996.
196. Interview with Samara.
197. *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini, al-Majlis al-Thawri, Amanat al-Sir, al-Dawra al-Sab'a 'Ashara lil-Majlis al-Thawri* [the proceedings of the seventeenth session of the revolutionary council] (Gaza: December 1997), 10.
198. Interview with Samara.
199. *Al-Ayyam*, June 19, 2000. The report suggests that the committee was to be nine strong. May Kayla and Qaddura Paris made it eleven, and agreed on the membership line-up.
200. *Seventeenth session*, 9.

Chapter 7

1. Established under Netanyahu, the mechanisms involving the CIA were viewed less favorably by incoming Labor prime minister Barak, who expressed reservations about extensive U.S.-Palestinian cooperation holding consequences for Israeli operational freedom. Barak considered reducing it, before allowing the relationship to develop. The CIA's role was clearly restated at the Sharm al-Shaykh summit in October 2000. Anthony H. Cordesman, "Peace and War: The Israeli-Palestinian Balance," Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 12, 2000, <http://www.csis.org/stratassessment/reports/IsraelPalestine.pdf> (accessed July 29, 2002).
2. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 10, 2003.
3. Ted Robert Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," in *Anger, Violence, and Politics. Theories and Research*, eds. Ted Robert Gurr, Ivo K. Feierabend, and Rosalind L. Feierabend. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1972), 37–38.
4. *The Economist*, October 10, 2002. On the Fourth Geneva Convention see Allegra Pacheco "Flouting Convention: The Oslo Agreements," in *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid*, ed. Roane Carey (London: Verso, 2001), 181–206.
5. All figures are from Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Special Report: Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories: A Guide*, March 2002, 8, except for East Jerusalem in 2001, which comes from B'Tselem, *Land Grab*, 17. <http://www.fmep.org/reports/2002/sr0203.html> (accessed November 2003).
6. Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Special Report*, 8.
7. *Ibid.* B'Tselem, *Land Grab*, 18.
8. *Ibid.*, 69. Similar and additional information can be found in the *PASSIA Diary 2003*, 271–74.
9. *Ha'aretz*, January 23, 2003, carries a summary of findings reported to Peace Now by Dror Tsaban, former budget official and assistant director general of the Finance Ministry. Also, see B'Tselem, *Land Grab*, especially ch. 5.
10. Andoni dates the establishment of the Civil Administration to 1979. Sandler puts it at 1981. Ghassan Andoni, "A Comparative Study of Intifada 1987 and Intifada 2000," in *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid*, ed. Roane Carey (London: Verso, 2001), 209; Sandler, 233.

11. Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Special Report*. "At Camp David in 1979, Carter thought that he had won an Israeli commitment to a five-year freeze. But Begin only agreed to halt construction for three months. And he forgot to tell Carter that the 'thickening' of existing settlements, whose population then numbered 50,000, would continue." "Settlement Report," July-August 2001, cited in "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):126.
12. Cited in the *Sharm al-Shaykh Fact Finding Committee Final Report (Mitchell Report)*. April 30, 2001, f.n. 25, <http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/mitchell.htm>. (accessed November 2003).
13. *Ibid.* Reagan's remarks were made at the announcement of *The Reagan Plan*, September 1, 1982. Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Special Report*, 2.
14. Cited in the *Mitchell Report*, f.n. 25, comments from May 22, 1991.
15. *Mitchell Report*, f.n. 25. Clinton's remarks from a press conference on December 16, 1996.
16. Letter dated September 8, 1999. "U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Letter of Assurance to Yasir Arafat, Washington, 8 September, 1999," "Special Document File" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29 (Winter 2000):147.
17. *Mitchell Report*.
18. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):117.
19. The statement was issued on April 4, 2000. "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):132.
20. *Guardian Unlimited*, "Full text of George Bush's speech on Israel and a Palestinian state," Tuesday June 25, 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,743503,00.html>. (accessed June 26, 2002).
21. *The Roadmap*.
22. "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):126. Guy att adds, "The new prime minister's embarrassed excuse, when some commentators questioned the compatibility of a settlement freeze, was that these contracts had been signed by previous governments and would be hard to cancel." Nicholas Guyatt, *The Absence of Peace: Understanding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (London: Zed Books, 1998), 53.
23. Guyatt, 54.
24. On Qedumim, see Boas Evron, "The Rabin that Failed." *Palestine-Israel Journal* 2, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 50–55. In 1968 Rabbi Moshe Levinger took up residence in the Palestinian Hotel Park and refused to leave. Other settlers were allowed to take over a former army base in the same year. It became Kiryat Arba in 1971. For the history of the Hebron settlers and Kiryat Arba, see <http://www.tiph.org/Page.asp?title=Hebron+Settlements>. (accessed August 10, 2003).
25. Qana massacre April 18. Guyatt notes how TV images of around one hundred people "burned alive or blown to pieces, being carried from a building flying the blue flag of the UN prompted many people to reassess the dovish claims of Shimon Peres." Guyatt, 58.
26. Eyal Weizman, "The Politics of Verticality," *openDemocracy*, April 25, 2002, 15, <http://www.opendemocracy.net/>.
27. *Miftah*, <http://www.miftah.org/htm>. (accessed March 2003).
28. Cited by Guyatt, 56. Peres' remarks from Knesset session, October 23, 1995.
29. Brynen, *A Very Political Economy*, 68.
30. "Netanyahu Presents His 'Alon Plus' Final Status Map" "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, no. 1 (Autumn 1997):126–8.
31. Marshall, 9–10.
32. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):119.
33. Didi Remez, "The Settlements under Barak," *Peace Now* website, January 21, 2001, <http://peacenow.org.il/English.asp?Redirect=4&CategoryID=45&ReportID=44>. (accessed March 6, 2003).
34. "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):134.

35. "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 3 (Spring 2001):142.
36. B'Tselem, *Land Grab*, 16–17.
37. Miftah quoting *Ha'aretz*, March 5, 2001, <http://www.miftah.org/htm>.
38. "Chronology," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 176. *Ha'aretz*, June 10, 2003. Didi Remez, "The Settlements under Barak," January 21, 2001 and "15 New Settlements since the Elections," May 20 2001, *Peace Now* website, <http://peacenow.org.il/English.asp?Redirect=4&CategoryID=45&ReportID=44> and <http://peacenow.org.il/English.asp?Redirect=4&CategoryID=45&ReportID=49>. (accessed March 6, 2003).
39. Acknowledgments to Eric Hobsbawm for the metaphor, *The Age of Revolution 1789–1848*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962, reissued 1995), 162.
40. Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, "Camp David: Tragedy of Errors." *New York Review of Books*, August 9, 2001. Reproduced in "Special Documents" "The Palestinian-Israeli Camp David Negotiations and Beyond" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):63.
41. "The Sharm-al Shaykh Memorandum (Wye II) and Related Documents," 145.
42. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, June 27, 2002.
43. In Sharon's defense, David Bar Ilan denied there was any conflict with U.S. calls for a halt to settlement construction "because Sharon referred only to hilltops next to Jewish settlements that Israel already claims." Sharon's remarks are from November 15, 1998 (November 16, 1998), <http://www.cnn.com/>.
44. *Ha'aretz*, June 25, 2002 and June 10, 2003.
45. *Ha'aretz* October 25, 2002. The Yesha Council's spokesman was Yehoshua Mor-Yosef, a resident of the settlement of Ofra who was himself threatened by youths determined to protect the outposts when, under cumulative pressure from the Mitchell Report, the Bush speech, and the impending Labor primaries, defense minister Ben Eliazar moved to dismantle a handful of the outposts.
- Other key figures in the settler leadership include Chairman Benzi Lieberman, Vice Chairman Shaul Goldstein, and Director General Adi Mintz. The settlement movement's headquarters are in the Ramat Eshkol neighborhood of Jerusalem. The umbrella group coordinating the movement is the Yesha Council, an acronym for Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip that spells the Hebrew word for salvation. The Yesha Council gathers together the heads of eight regional councils in the West Bank plus Gaza. One of the most prominent regional councils is Binyamin, headed by Pinhas Wallerstein. Yesha's spiritual support is supplied by the Yesha Rabbis Committee, including Shlomo Aviner of Beit El, Zalman Melamed, head of the Beit El Yeshiva, Dov Lior of Kiryat Arba, David Dudkevitch (considered the rabbi of the "hilltop youth"), and Eli Sadan of the military preparation college in Eli.
- Ha'aretz*, June 13, 2003.
46. *Ha'aretz*, November 20, 2002.
47. Senior IDF officer quoted by Barzilai, "Military Spending/An Extra Command and Several Brigades," *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2003.
48. Moti Bassok and *Ha'aretz* Staff, "The Extra Civilian Price Tag: At Least NIS 2.5 Billion a Year," *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2003.
49. Amos Harel, "The Ties That Bind," *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2003.
50. Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Special Report*.
51. Saleh Abdel-Jawad, *The Israeli Assassination Policy in the Aqsa Intifada* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, 2001), 47–48.
52. B'Tselem, *Land Grab*, 40.

53. In October 2002 troops and settlers famously clashed as the IDF sought to dismantle a West Bank outpost named Havat Gilad.
54. In excess of two million dollars per year “for buildings used by soldiers to protect the sites.” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, June 26, 2003.
55. Harel, “The Ties That Bind.”
56. *Ibid.*
57. Uri Avnery, “The Army Has a State,” *Media Monitors Network*, July 20, 2002, <http://www.mediamonitors.net/uri79.html>. (accessed July 25, 2002).
58. *Ha’aretz*, October 25, 2002.
59. *Ha’aretz*, June 13, 2003.
60. See Shilo website: <http://www.shilo.org.il/is.htm>.
61. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 27, 2003.
62. Harel, “The Ties That Bind.”
63. On the Mofaz/Ya’alon split see Amram Mitzna in *Ha’aretz*, November 2, 2003.
64. Savir, 207.
65. B’Tselem, *Land Grab*, chapter 6 “The Planning System,” 85–90.
66. Interview with David Dery, the School of Public Policy in Hebrew University, June 11, 2003. Dery questioned the role of vested interests in perpetuating the occupation, but did emphasize the role of the bureaucracy on the ground in policy implementation. He paraphrased Lipsky’s definition of policy in reality as “the sum of decisions made in the field by bureaucrats.” See Michael Lipsky, *Street Level Bureaucracy* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1980).
67. Harel, “The Ties That Bind.”
68. Akiva Eldar, *Ha’aretz*, November 18, 2003.
69. The church of St. Barbara was in the village of ‘Abud. It was blown up by the IDF during the al-Aqsa intifada after soldiers spotted camp fires at night and suspected the Palestinian resistance were using it as a hideout. The story was also brought to the attention of EU special envoy Moratinos. Interview with Nisim ‘Anfus, manager of Administrative Affairs, District Civil Liaison, Ramallah, June 18, 2003.
70. Helena Cobban, “Shin Bet Ex-Chiefs Speak Out,” *Just World News*, November 15, 2003, <http://justworldnews.org/archives/000354.html>. (accessed December 2, 2003).
71. B’Tselem, *Land Grab*, 74–84.
72. *Ha’aretz*, June 10, 2003.
73. Bassok and *Ha’aretz* Staff, “The Extra Civilian Price Tag: At Least NIS 2.5 Billion a Year.”
74. Figures on settler origins from *PASSIA Diary 2003*, 271, citing PALDIS, Ideological Settlement in the West Bank, Report, July 2002.
75. “The Price of the Settlements,” *Ha’aretz*, September 26, 2003.
76. Meron Benvenisti in *Ha’aretz*, September 25, 2003.
77. The figure of \$1 billion included \$265 million in salary support. Between 1994 and 1996 PECDAR paid all PA salaries in the absence of a ministry able to perform the task. PECDAR’s disbursements reached up to \$100 million annually, but then declined to \$50 million by 2002 as the capacity of the ministries increased. Interview with Shtayya.
78. Meron Benvenisti in *Ha’aretz*, September 25, 2003.
79. Anat Georgi and Moti Bassok, “Roads/Paved with Gold,” *The Settlements*, *Ha’aretz*, September 29, 2003, (October 16, 2003).
80. Avnery, “The Army Has a State.”
81. Meron Benvenisti in *Ha’aretz*, February 28, 2003.
82. A demonstration was organized for Land Day on March 30, 2000. *The Jerusalem Times*, March 31, 2000.
83. Akiva Eldar reports that Arye King is a member of the Moledet Party, which seeks the transfer of the Palestinian population and runs the Kedumim construction firm. *Ha’aretz*, March 18, 2003.

84. Georgi and Bassok, "Roads/Paved with Gold."
85. Chris McGreal in *Guardian Unlimited*, April 7, 2003. The strategic significance of the site was that it cut off direct Palestinian access to the holy sites inside the old city.
86. *Ha'aretz*, March 18, 2003. Eldar also draws attention to the interesting website, <http://www.stopmoscowitz.com/>, which details his activities and settler philanthropy.
87. It should be noted that despite her analysis, Kim finds grounds for optimism that are not shared by this author. Hannah Kim, *Ha'aretz*, June 10, 2003.
88. The vote was initiated by Netanyahu in May 2002 and passed by 669/445. *Ha'aretz*, May 13, 2002.
89. Malley and Agha. Deborah Sontag, "Quest for Middle East Peace: How and Why It Failed," *New York Times*, July 26, 2001. Reproduced in "Special Documents" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no.1 (Autumn 2001):75–85.
90. "The GOI [government of Israel] asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the 'widespread appreciation in the international community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse.' In this view, Palestinian violence was planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at 'provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative.'" *Mitchell Report*, "What Happened?" and footnotes 7 and 8, quoting GOI First Statement.
91. *Ha'aretz*. January 20, 2003. Interview with Aaron David Miller, former assistant to Dennis Ross and senior advisor on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the U.S. State Department.
92. Glenn E. Robinson, "The Peace of the Powerful," in *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid*, ed. Roane Carey. (London: Verso, 2001), 112.
93. Savir, 100. Savir singles out Oded Eran in the Foreign Ministry as articulating a much more generous vision of Palestinian economic independence.
94. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months. CIA Factbook: West Bank and Gaza*, <http://www.usisrael.org/jsource/Peace/ciawb.html#Econ>. Israel enjoyed an economic growth rate of 2.1 percent in 1999. *CIA World Factbook*, <http://www.sitesatlas.com/maps/factbook> (accessed August 2002).
95. The World Bank, *Poverty in the West Bank and Gaza*, Middle East and North Africa Region. (The World Bank, January 2001), 6.
96. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, Table 6.
97. The World Bank, *Poverty*, 6.
98. Joan M. Nelson, *Poverty, Inequality, and Conflict in Developing Countries*, Project on World Security (Rockefeller Brothers Fund Inc., 1998), <http://www.rbf.org/pdf/poverty.pdf>. (accessed August 2003).
99. *Ibid.*, 26.
100. Milton Esman, *Ethnic Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994) 234, cited by Nelson, 25.
101. Krueger and Maleckova, 1, in a comparison between Palestine and Lebanon.
102. "Over and over, I heard them say, 'The Israelis humiliate us. They occupy our land, and deny our history.'" Nasra Hassan, "An Arsenal of Believers," *The New Yorker*, November 19, 2001, cited by *Ibid.*, 9.
103. *Miftah*. "282,000 trees uprooted in the West Bank. Israeli Settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank." (Updated) August 17, 2002, <http://www.miftah.org/>.
104. Peace Now counted 740 homes between 1994 and September 2000 excluding East Jerusalem. <http://peacenow.org.il/English.asp?Redirect=4&CategoryID45&ReportID=44>. (accessed March 6, 2003).
105. Corrie was killed on March 16, 2003. Report by Khaled Dawoud, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 27, 2003.
106. 3,169,000 in 2000; 4,403,000 in 2010. Courbage, 29.

107. Exemplified by Haifa University professor Amnon Sofer, who has suggested Israel transfer areas of Arab population density to the PA. The Palestinian citizens of Israel are concentrated in three main areas; Galilee in the north, the Wadi Ara-Triangle in the center and al-Naqab in the south.
108. UNDP, Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Population Fund Proposed Projects and Programmes: Recommendation by the Executive Director: Assistance to the Palestinian People, DP/FPA/PAPP/2, November 20, 2000, <http://www.unfpa.org/>.
109. *CIA World Factbook*, <http://www.siteatlas.com/Maps/Factbook/is.html>, and <http://www.siteatlas.com/Maps/Factbook/gz.html>.
110. B'Tselem, *Land Grab*, 116. The figures include both metropolitan and municipal Jerusalem.
111. PASSIA, *The Palestine Question in Maps*, 86.
112. B'Tselem, *Land Grab*, 43. The authors draw particular attention to the impact of Ariel on the town of Salfit in a valuable case study, 117–32.
113. The camps accounted for 27 percent of the total registered refugees in West Bank and 55 percent in Gaza. UNRWA statistics as of June 2000, <http://www.unrwa.org/>.
114. Radwan Shaban, *Living Standards in the West Bank and Gaza* (Palestine Economic and Policy Research Institute [MAS], Ramallah, 1997), cited in The World Bank, *Poverty*, 15 and 70.
115. UNRWA classrooms in Gaza accommodate fifty pupils per classroom, PA classrooms forty-three, while a camp doctor receives an average of 118 patients per day. Randa Farah, *A Report on the Psychological Effects of Overcrowding in Refugee Camps in the West Bank and Gaza Strip*. Prepared for the Expert and Advisory Services Fund—International Development Research Centre (Canada), April 2000. (accessed November 2003), <http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN/farah.html>.
116. Interview with Arrar.
117. Farah.
118. Hadeel Wahdan, “Refugee Robin Hood.” *Palestine Report* 7, no. 6 (July 26, 2000). Wahdan quotes Bashir Nafa’, former head of a now defunct part of the security apparatus.
119. Interview with Abu Znayd.
120. “Chronology,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2000):176.
121. *Ibid.*, 168.
122. March 22. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 4 (Summer 2000):175.
123. May 7, 2000, “Chronology,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 184–85.
124. Menachem Klein, “The Origins of Intifada II and Rescuing Peace for Israelis and Palestinians,” Foundation for Middle East Peace, Washington, October 2, 2002. Reproduced in *Current Analysis*. Foundation for Middle East Peace (January 30, 2003), http://www.fmep.org/analysis/klein_origins_of_intifada_II.html. Klein writes of Israel’s political leadership: “No one in the cabinet or sub cabinet, as far as I know, and I have queried them, was aware of what was going on in the field, inside Fatah or about the creation of the new opposition. There was total blindness.” 5.
125. Land Day commemorates the death of six Palestinians with Israeli citizenship who were killed protesting land confiscation in northern Israel in 1976. The other concentration of commemorative dates falls in November, with Independence Day on November 15, al-Quds Day on November 21, and International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People on November 29.
126. “Peace Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 4 (Summer 2000):131–32. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 19, 2000.
127. “Peace Monitor” and “Chronology,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 29, no. 4 (Summer 2000):131–32, 186.

128. *The Jerusalem Times*, April 21, 2000.
129. Interview with Sa'd al-Nimr, campaign office manager, Free Marwan al-Barghuthi Campaign, Ramallah, June 14, 2003.
130. *The Jerusalem Times*, May 12 and May 19, 2000.
131. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 20, 2000.
132. Interview with Kayla.
133. Ibid.
134. Mouin Rabbani, "A Smorgasboard of Failure," in *The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid*, ed. Roane Carey (London: Verso, 2001), 72.
135. The airport did open in November 1998. Marshall, 9–10.
136. Barak had commanded Sayeret Mitkal, the IDF unit responsible for political assassination and in which Netanyahu also served. He personally killed the Palestinian poet Kamal Nasr in Beirut. During the first intifada and then as chief of staff from 1992, Barak directed the *mustararavim* assassination teams that killed extensively in the West Bank and Gaza. Barak had been an angry Oslo sceptic in the early days under Rabin and in the negotiations for the Cairo and Gaza-Jericho agreements had helped subordinate all considerations to the IDF's security concept. Later as minister of the interior in Rabin's cabinet, he abstained from the vote on the Interim Agreement. As we saw earlier, as Prime Minister Barak built settlements faster than Netanyahu. If one wanted to give Barak the benefit of the doubt and credit his intentions as sincere, the man's career and life experiences suggested he had a lot to overcome. On Barak's career, see Abdel-Jawad.
137. The three areas to be transferred were the suburb of Abu Dis and the villages of alAzariyya [Bethany] and Sawahara al-Sharqiyya). Barak authorized Clinton to convey the offer to Arafat, and then retracted it, much to Clinton's annoyance. Malley and Agha, 66. Klein recorded 1,894 prisoners still held by Israel in May 2000, 4.
138. Sontag, 80.
139. For 'Azmi Bishara, the danger was twofold: first, the PA might gain recognition in its cantons; and second, it might then find itself engaged in negotiations focused on borders and sovereignty rather than settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees. In his words, the Palestinians "would become prisoners of their very achievement." Azmi Bishara, "4 May 1999 and Palestinian Statehood: To Declare or Not to Declare?" *Journal of Palestine Studies* 28, no. 2 (Winter 1999):12.
140. *The Jerusalem Times*, May 19, 2000.
141. Sontag, 80.
142. Ben Ami also stressed that Barak's reluctance to negotiate directly with Arafat added to the misconceptions: had he done so, he might have realized that this time the nationalist elite were not desperate to reach a deal at any cost. "Camp David: Two Years Later," *Bitter Lemons* Edition 26 (July 15, 2002), <http://www.bitterlemons.org/>.
143. Mahmud 'Abbas (Abu Mazin), "Report on the Camp David Summit, Gaza 9 September 2000." Excerpts in "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 2 (Winter 2001):168.
144. Camp David Peace Proposal of July 2000: Frequently Asked Questions, by PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, <http://www.miftah.org/display.cfm?DocId=702>.
145. Malley and Agha, 70.
146. 'Abbas, "Report on the Camp David Summit," 169.
147. "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 3 (Spring 2001):145.
148. PASSIA, *The Palestine Question in Maps*, 92.
149. *The Geneva Accord*, published by *Ha'aretz*, October 20, 2003.
150. On ground and surface water in the West Bank, see PASSIA, *The Palestine Question in Maps*, 136–38.
151. Ibid., 92.

152. *The Geneva Accord*, Article 4:5, and Article 5:7. Settlement data from Arnon Regular, Yossi Verter, and Mazal Mualem, “*Ha’aretz* Poll: Narrow Gap between Geneva Deal’s Supporters, Detractors,” *Ha’aretz*, December 1, 2003.
153. Akram Hanieh, “The Camp David Papers.” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 2 (Winter 2001):96.
154. Weizman, 13.
155. Hanieh, 86.
156. *The Geneva Accord*.
157. The Abu Mazin-Beilin Plan was known formally as Framework for Conclusion of a Final Status Agreement between Israel and the PLO, discussed by Muna Hamzeh in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 10, 2003.
158. *Ha’aretz*, July 11, 2002. The paper was presented on January 23, 2001.
159. Camp David Peace Proposal of July 2000: Frequently Asked Questions, by PLO Negotiations Affairs Dept., <http://www.miftah.org/display.cfm?DocId=702>.
160. *The Geneva Accord*.
161. Two percent wished to emigrate outside of the Arab world, 13 percent refused all the options and 5 percent held no opinion. Results of PSR Refugees’ Polls in the West Bank/Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon on Refugees’ Preferences and Behaviour in a Palestinian-Israeli Permanent Refugee Agreement. Press Release, July 18, 2003 (October 27, 2003), <http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/refugeesjune03.html>.
162. The figure of forty thousand is from Regular, Verter, and Mualem, “*Ha’aretz* Poll: Narrow Gap between Geneva Deal’s Supporters, Detractors.”
163. ‘Abbas, “Report on the Camp David Summit,” 168–170. Clinton, who had been absent for four days (July 20–23 for the G8 summit in Japan, during which no progress was made), returned to the realization that a final deal was impossible and the summit ended two days later, with the U.S. president arranging to meet the parties again separately in September during the UN millennium summit in New York.
164. *JMCC Public Opinion Poll No. 38 On Palestinian Attitudes Towards the Camp David Summit*, July 2000, <http://www.jrncc.org/publicpoiresults/2000/no37.htm>. (accessed August 2002).
165. During this meeting Arafat gave qualified acceptance to the Clinton proposals. Reservations included the lack of an explicit reference to UNSCs 242 and 338 or a satisfactory reference to UNGA 194.
166. Gurr, “Psychological Factors in Civil Violence,” in *Anger, Violence, and Politics*, 37.
167. Gurr et al., 3.
168. Sufyan Abu Zayida in Barry Rubin, *The Transformation of Palestinian Politics*, 166.
169. Interview with Abu Znayd.
170. Interview with Zuhayqa.
171. Interview with Nusayba.
172. Interview with Ghayaza, June 2003.
173. Interviews with Rida Fu’ad al-Mawi and Sharif al-Jabri, National Democratic Party youth secretariat members in the Giza governorate, Cairo, March 14 and 17, 2001.
174. Interview with Hasan.
175. Interview with Zuhayqa.
176. Interview with Nimr.
177. Interview with Zuhayqa. *Ha’aretz*, December 12, 2002. The historical analogy was uncovered by Akiva Eldar, quoting an *Ha’aretz* editorial from December 11, 1987, two days after the outbreak of the first intifada. The editorial concluded: “Sharon’s presence in the Muslim Quarter reflects his determination to provoke Arab residents everywhere possible, without any consideration of their feelings and fears. For many, and not only Muslims, it’s a hint of the final goal: to make the lives of non-Jewish residents miserable until they get fed up with their lives and finally leave their homes. There’s no way of knowing if and when this

- goal will be achieved, but meanwhile, we can expect years of tension, clashes, and— hopefully we'll be wrong—bloodshed.”
178. B'Tselem, *Illusions of Restraint: Human Rights Violations during the Events in the Occupied Territories 29 September–2 December 2000*. B'Tselem, December 2000. *Interview with Abu Znayd*. Around two hundred residents of Shu'fat and the neighboring village of Anata were arrested during the first week of the intifada, with the camp recording five fatalities by June 2003. The number would have been much higher (and in other camps it was) but for operational restrictions: as part of municipal Jerusalem the IDF required civil permission for military action in the camp, unlike the rest of the West Bank where it enjoyed operational freedom.
 179. B'Tselem, “Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada, Data by Month,” http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Al_Aqsa_Fatalities_Tables.asp. (accessed November 27, 2003).
 180. Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari, “The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning?” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 2 (Winter 2001):15.
 181. On arms sales, see Abdel-Jawad Saleh in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 3, 2002.
 182. Interview with Nimr.
 183. Kamil Mansur, “The Impact of 11 September on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 2 (Winter 2002):8.
 184. *Ibid.*
 185. B'Tselem, “Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada, Data by Month,” (June 29, 2003), http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Al_Aqsa_Fatalities_Tables.asp. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 19, 2000.
 186. B'Tselem, “Palestinians Killed in the Occupied Territories (including East Jerusalem) since the Beginning of the First Intifada (December 9, 1987) until the end May 2003.” <http://www.btselem.org/>. (accessed November 27, 2003).
 187. Interview with Ghayaza. Ghassan Andoni, 211–12.
 188. “Peace Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 2 (Winter 2002):102.
 189. “Peace Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):114.
 190. October 26, 2000 to *Le Monde*, in “Settlement Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):136.
 191. “Settlement Monitor,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):127–29.
 192. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, November 2, 2000.
 193. Abdel-Jawad, 51–53.
 194. Interview with Hasan.
 195. Interview with 'Abd al-Rahman al-Turk.
 196. Interview with Ghayaza, June 2003.
 197. Ranwa Yehia, *Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades: The Islamization of Fatah*. Unpublished research paper. Cairo, December 19, 2002, 6. Mahjub 'Umar, formerly of the PLO Planning Center, interviewed by Ranwa Yehia, Cairo, December 1, 2002.
 198. Fateh, <http://www.fateh.tv/aboutus.htm>.
 199. Interview with Ghayaza, June 2003.
 200. Interview with Nimr.
 201. Shubaki was imprisoned in Jericho with four members of the PFLP charged with responsibility for the Ze'evi assassination. *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2003.
 202. Usher, “Facing Defeat,” 31. The first suicide attack of the intifada occurred on November 3, 2000, in Jerusalem.
 203. B'Tselem, “Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada, Data by Month,” (November 27, 2003), <http://www.btselem.org/>.
 204. *Ha'aretz*, January 19, 2003.
 205. *Ha'aretz*, January 5, 2003.
 206. Graham Usher in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 15, 2002.

207. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):120.
208. Sharon held the post from January 1970. His excesses as head of the southern command brought international opprobrium on Israel, and eventually his acrimonious resignation from the IDF. Adnan Abdelrazek, *The Jerusalem Times*, May 11, 2001.
209. "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):138–39. Usher, "Facing Defeat," 27–28.
210. Kamil Mansur, "Israel's Colonial Impasse," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):85.
211. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, 6.
212. *The Tenet Plan: Israeli-Palestinian Ceasefire and Security Plan*, proposed by CIA Director George Tenet, June 13, 2001, <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal/tenet.htm>.
213. The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, "The Causes of the Damage," 1.
214. This map is dated September 15, 2001, and reproduced in The World Bank, *Fifteen Months*, 6–7.
215. Danny Rubenstein in *Ha'aretz*, November 3, 2002.
216. UNCTAD Secretariat, "Report on UNCTAD's Assistance to the Palestinian People," Geneva, August 2001, cited in UNSCO, "The Impact on the Palestinian Economy of Confrontation, Border Closures and Mobility Restrictions 1 October 2000–30 September 2001," 7, f.n. 11, http://www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/UN/UNSCO/impact_closures.pdf. (accessed November, 2003).
- The UNCTAD report actually notes fifty-four checkpoints; another source suggests that Gaza and the West Bank together were divided into sixty-three closed military zones. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 6, 2001. The figure of sixty-four is suggested by "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):112.
217. B'Tselem, "Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada, Data by Month," (November 27, 2003), <http://www.btselem.org/>.
218. The Jewish population of the state as of 2000 was some 4,890,000. Courbage, 29. The settler population in 2001, including East Jerusalem, was 390,000.
219. Nadav Shragai, "Two Out of Five," *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2000.
220. B'Tselem, "Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada, Data by Month," (November 27, 2003), <http://www.btselem.org/>.
221. B'Tselem, "Violence of Settlers against Palestinians," (October 27, 2003), <http://www.btselem.org/>.
222. Reported by Ze'ev Schiff, *Ha'aretz*, October 30, 2002.
223. On the unfavorable analogy with Hizb Allah see Yezid Sayigh, "For the Record: PR Interviews Yezid Sayigh" *Palestine Report* 7, no. 37, (March 7, 2001), <http://www.jmcc.org/media/report/01/Mar/1.htm>. (accessed December 3, 2003). The speech by 'Abbas came in the shadow of the looming war on Iraq, the demolition of the PA's bureaucratic and security apparatus, and fears of a reinvasion of the Gaza Strip. It was republished in Arabic and English and widely circulated. "Mahmud Abbas's Call for a Halt to the Militarization of the Intifada," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 2 (Winter 2003):74–78.
224. "Settlement Report" in "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):128.
225. Statement attributed to Eliezer Hisdai, head of security in the Yesha Council, *Ha'aretz*, December 31, 2002. Length of fences from *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2003. In June 2002 during a Knesset committee meeting, a Defense Ministry official "admitted that there were three times the number of soldiers guarding the settlements and outposts as before the intifada. At the same meeting the army demanded an extra \$250 million for settlement

protection." *Al-Ahram Weekly*, June 26, 2003. Figures on costs (converted from NIS at NIS 5/U.S.\$1) from *Ha'aretz*, September 26, 2003.

Amnon Barzilai provided details of Israel's state budget for 2003: The budget total came to NIS 270 billion (\$54 billion), of which defense accounted for NIS 43.5 billion (\$8.7 billion), some 16 percent of the total. Barzilai adds, "The defense budget includes a shekel-denominated outlay (NIS 28.4 billion in 2003) and a dollar-denominated outlay (\$2.1 billion). Only about one-fourth of the American aid (in dollars) is spent in Israel, so the defense budget (in shekels) totals about NIS 31 billion." *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2003.

226. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 28, 2000.

227. Tanya Reinhart, "Evil Unleashed," *Tikkun* March/April 2002, <http://www.tikkun.org/magazine/index.cfm/action/tikkun/issue/tik0203/article/020312b.html> . (accessed July 2002). Reinhart's thesis has since been put forward in a book, *How to End the War of 1948* (Seven Stories Press, 2002) reviewed by Jonathan Cook for *Al-Ahram Weekly*, "Books Monthly Supplement," no. 49, May 2003.

The original document by Independent Media Review Analysis, *Palestinian Authority and PLO. Non-Compliance with Signed Agreements and Commitments: A Record of Bad Faith and Misconduct*, IMRA, November 20, 2000. (accessed November 2003), can be found at <http://www.netanyahu.org/palautandplo.html>.

228. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, January 10–16, 2002. The *Karine A* was seized in the Red Sea, January 3, 2002.

229. *Ha'aretz*, January 17, 2003.

230. *Ha'aretz*, February 6, 2003.

231. Malka's objections, together with those of other critics of the Gilad narrative, were reported by Akiva Eldar in *Ha'aretz*, June 11, 2004. See also, Yoav Stern, *Ha'aretz*, June 13, 2004, and Danny Rubinstein, *Ha'aretz*, June 16, 2004.

232. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 3, 2002.

233. Wafa editorial in "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):129.

234. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 26, 2002.

235. Mansur, "The Impact of 11 September," 10.

236. Sayigh, "Anatomy of a Revolt," 49.

237. *Ibid.*, 56.

238. Interview with Ghayaza, June 2003.

239. Bishara, 9

240. Hammami and Tamari, 19.

241. Interview with Ghayaza, June 2003.

242. Usher, "Facing Defeat," 25.

243. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 11–17, 2001.

244. Usher, "Facing Defeat," 35.

245. "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):138.

246. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4 (Summer 2001):120.

247. *The Mitchell Report*.

248. *The Tenet Plan*.

249. In one scenario the aging but fit Sulayman, who is very close to Husni Mubarak, could square the army for Jamal Mubarak to follow him.

250. Usher, "Facing Defeat," 28–29.

251. "Peace Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 1 (Autumn 2001):104–5.

252. Ibid., 105–8.
253. Usher, “Facing Defeat,” 29.
254. B’Tselem, “Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada, Data by Month,” (November 27, 2003), http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Al_Aqsa_Fatalities_Tables.asp.
255. On Sharon’s ceasefire conditions see *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 118. Darawza was killed by tank fire on July 25. Mansur and Damuni were killed along with six others, two of them children, when an Apache rocketed the Hamas media office. Abdel-Jawad, 57–58.
256. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, December 20, 2001.
257. Usher in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 21, 2002.
258. Akiva Eldar, “If There’s Smoke, There’s No Cease-Fire,” *Ha’aretz*, July 30, 2002.
259. *Ha’aretz*, August 5, 2001.
260. Usher, “Facing Defeat,” 36.

Chapter 8

1. Arafat warned of just such a possibility before the Legislative Council on March 10, 2003. *Ha’aretz*, March 11, 2003.
2. Sayigh does not explicitly address depopulation, but suggests that in his military response to the uprising, fear of international intervention probably obliged Sharon, “contrary to type,” to stay his hand. Sayigh, “Anatomy of a Revolt,” 56.
3. President George W. Bush made the announcement aboard the aircraft carrier *USS Abraham Lincoln*, May 1, 2003. *Time*, October 6, 2003.
4. *Ha’aretz*, January 9, 2004.
5. *Ha’aretz*, May 27, 2003.
6. For a technically accomplished account of Arafat’s various positions, see Jean-Francois Legrain, “Successions.”
7. “Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32 no. 4 (Summer 2003):138.
8. From a list of twenty-one recommendations for reforming Palestinian institutions, Fara’s ideas for Fatah include the effective restriction of terms on the central committee to facilitate elevation of younger generations, a strengthening of the revolutionary council *vis-à-vis* the central committee, and a reduction in the role of the military within the revolutionary council. Barakat al-Fara, ‘*Min ayna yabda’a al-Islah wa kayfa min Harakat Fatah am al-Sulta al-Filastiniyya*’ [Where does reform start—with the Fatah Movement or the Palestinian Authority?] (Media and Information Center), March 14, 2003. (March 8, 2004), <http://www.mic-pal.info/article/details.asp?id=128>.
9. Interview with Samara.
10. Interview with Arrar.
11. Interview with Salama.
12. Interview with Barakat al-Fara, February 23, 2004.
13. Interview with Hasan.
14. Barakat al-Fara, *Min ayna yabda’a al-Islah wa kayfa min Harakat Fatah am al-Sulta al-Filastiniyya*. [Where does reform start—with the Fatah Movement or the Palestinian Authority?]
15. Interview with Nusayba. He had previously discussed these ideas in public forums including the leading daily, *al-Quds*.
16. *al-Karama*, Fatah weekly newspaper ‘*nata’ij ijtima’at al-majlis al-thawri: khutwa ‘ala al-tariq al-sahih*’: bayan al-majlis al-thawri liHarakat Fatah, [Results of the revolutionary

- council meeting: a step on the road of reform.] February 29, 2004, see *al-Karama* online <http://www.alkrama.com/> (accessed February 27–29, 2004).
17. Khaled Amayreh, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 4, 2004. Amayreh notes that a member of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades dealt the PA a PR disaster by blowing himself up and killing eight Israelis just as the International Court of Justice began hearing testimony on the separation barrier.
 18. Combined central committee/revolutionary council representation in the eight cabinets to date was, respectively, 6, 7, 12, 8, 12, 12, 7, and 14.
 19. Among prominent independents, Tarifi could claim to have run Civil Affairs from inception, but the institution had lost ministry status for three cabinets before getting it back under Qray'. Masri endured at Economy from the second cabinet onward.
 20. Article 62 was renumbered Article 44. Palestine Media Center, <http://www.palestinepmc.com/>. (accessed March 2004).
 21. Article 71 was renumbered Article 67; Article 64 became Article 65.
 22. *The Roadmap*.
 23. The 'Abbas family are refugees from Safad in Israel proper, not the West Bank or Gaza. The lack of clan-based support was highlighted by Danny Rubinstein in *Ha'aretz*, March 16, 2003.
 24. Jean-Francois Legrain addressed the succession question prior to the al-Aqsa intifada. He pointed to 'Abbas, with a seat on the Fatah central committee and the PLO executive committee, but his standing seemed low post-premiership. Legrain also notes that Qray' (then speaker of the Legislative Council) is "potentially well positioned for the presidency of the PA," an assessment reinforced by his elevation to prime minister. But Qray' did not hold one of Fatah's five seats on the executive committee of the PLO, although he was on the central council. Besides Arafat, among the Fatah members, Faysal al-Husayni was dead, Zakariyya al-Agha had no base even in Gaza, and 'Abbas looked wounded. He was no longer attending meetings of the Fatah central committee, the revolutionary council meetings or the PLO central council. Faruq al-Qaddumi had long been opposed to Oslo and remained in self-imposed exile. Legrain, "Successions," 19; *PASSIA Diary 2003*, 314.
 25. Interview with Fara, 2004. 'Abbas was a member of the PLO executive committee; Qray' was not.
 26. Qray' was one of twenty members brought in from the PA Legislative Council.
 27. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):138.
 28. Article 185, The Revision of the Third Draft of the Constitution of the State of Palestine. Palestinian National Authority, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mopic.gov.ps/constitution/english%20constitution.asp>.
 29. Interview with Fara.
 30. 'Abbas himself requested that the PLO establish such a committee during his struggle with Arafat. Interview with Fara, 2004. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no.1 (Autumn 2003):129. 'Abbas did eventually accept 'Urayqat's resignation, but he was not long absent from the post.
 31. The PA's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lists 101 Palestinian diplomatic missions of one type or another at http://www.mofa.gov.ps/diplomatic_missions/index.asp (accessed March 21, 2004).
 32. Mahmud 'Abbas, *Tajriba al-Mi'a wa Thalathin Yawman: Injazat wa 'Araqil* (no place or publisher cited, September 2003).
 33. *Ha'aretz* translation. Reported by Arnon Regular, September 14 and 15, 2003.
 34. "On 8 December 2003, exercising its power under Article 96 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN), the UN General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to issue an Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the construction by Israel of the fence/wall inside the Occupied Territories. (1) The ICJ set the

- date of 23 February 2004 for the opening hearing.” Amnesty International, *Israel and the Occupied Territories: The Place of the Fence/Wall in International Law*, February 19, 2004, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGMDE150162004>. (accessed March 2004).
35. They joined several other ambassadors with seats on Fatah’s revolutionary council. They included ‘Abdullah Ifranji in Germany, who was also a member of the central committee, and representatives in Canada, Cyprus, Romania, and Spain and at the UN in New York and Geneva. *PASSIA Diary 2003*, 9–12. *Qa’imat* [The official list of council members]. Interview with Fara, 2004.
 36. The sensitivity of the refugee issue was underlined again by the reception accorded a paper prepared by Arafat’s favorite lightning-rod, Sari Nusayba, and former Shin Bet chief Ami Ayalon. It was deemed hostile to refugee rights, Nusayba “internally defeated,” and the initiative “a stab in the heart of the Palestinian leader Yasser ‘Arafat, who holds fast to the national consensus, foremost of which is the right of refugees to return in accordance with UN Resolution 194.” “Statement issued by the Popular Refugee Committees—Gaza Refugee Camps,” October 11, 2002, <http://badil.org/Press/2002/press275-02.htm>. (accessed December 12, 2003).
 37. Legrain, “Successions,” 6.
 38. *PASSIA, The Palestine Question in Maps*, 94.
 39. Joint statement on the humanitarian crisis in the Occupied Territories, from United Nations organizations, including UNDP, UNFPA, World Health Organization, UN High Commission for Refugees, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent and UNRWA, among others, republished by the Palestine Emergency Committee in its communique *Destruction of Palestinian Public Institutions*. Also see Amiry and Hadid.
 40. Palestine Emergency Committee.
 41. “The general director suggested that the main destruction and loss was of the ministry’s financial records and accounts. The ministry is in charge of disbursing salaries, health and pension payments to all government employees including teachers, hospital workers, the police as well as government bureaucrats. The GD says that given the loss of information, public sector employees face not getting paid in the foreseeable future until the records can be re-established.” Interview with General Director Mr. Sami Ramlawi in Palestine Emergency Committee, 8.
 42. Palestine Emergency Committee.
 43. *Ibid.*
 44. Looted equipment included computer hard drives, monitors, printers, lap-tops, digital and video cameras, projectors, TVs, VCRs, surveying equipment, telephones, fax machines, and petty cash. The campus of al-Quds University in Ramallah served as a prison. Of the graffiti, the first message was left in the offices of the Mattin Group, a human rights NGO, the second in the Palestine Hydrology Group and al-Quds Educational Television, Palestinian NGO Emergency Initiative in Jerusalem, *Destruction of Non-Governmental Organizations in Ramallah*, April 22, 2002, <http://electronicintifada.net/features/destruction.reports/ramallahngo.pdf>. The apology was left in Amwaj radio station, along with a tin of sardines suspended by string in a vase of water and the injunction “p.s. don’t forget to feed the fish,” Amiry and Hadid, 158.
 45. Sa’d al-Nimr, Lecture on Palestinian Prisoners of War, The American University in Cairo, October 27, 2003. Klein also notes the emphasis on reform as a precondition for liberation. Klein, 3.
 46. Gershon Baskin, “A Note About Reforms,” June 2, 2002, <http://www.ipcri.org/files/reforms.html>. (accessed March 22, 2003).
 47. Palestinian Council, Statement on Reform of PA Institutions, Ramallah, May 16, 2002 in “Documents and Source Material,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 31, no. 4 (Summer 2002):184–186.

48. "The One-Hundred Day Reform Plan of the Palestinian Government," Ramallah, June 23, 2002 (excerpts) in "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 1 (Autumn 2002):159–161.
49. Joint PA-Task Force meetings were already taking place by 2002.
50. "The One-Hundred Day Reform Plan of the Palestinian Government."
51. Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, "West Bank and Gaza Economic Policy Framework Progress Report," Lisbon, June 7–8, 2000 (excerpts) in "Documents and Source Material," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 1 (Autumn 2000):144–147.
52. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):139.
53. The Jericho casino and hotel were owned by CAP, a holding company of which the PA owned some 30 percent. The PA also owned 100 percent of the cement company, 35 percent of Palcell, and 8 percent of PALTEL. Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 147. Austrian businessman Martin Schlaf, a close friend of Ariel Sharon, was also among the shareholders. *Ha'aretz*, March 2, 2003. Information on al-Bahr from interview with Munthir Dajani, Department of Political Science, al-Quds University, Jerusalem, June 11, 2003.
54. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 1 (Autumn 2003):130. Mahmud 'Abbas, *Trial of One-Hundred and Thirty Days: Achievements and Obstacles*, translation from *Ha'aretz*, September 14 and 15, 2003. He added that due to the fuel monopoly, "\$72 million was being stolen annually."
55. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 1 (Autumn 2002):135.
56. Interview with Dajani.
57. *The Jerusalem Post*, June 17, 2003.
58. IMF, *Economic Performance and Reforms under Conflict Conditions*, September 15, 2003, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/med/2003/eng/wbg/wbg.pdf>. (accessed March 2004). The sums involved were not great: the president's office budget was said to be \$74 million, of which \$34 million went in "transfers," some for scholarships, medical treatment, and poverty alleviation, and some to "claimants and organizations" of "politically favored networks."
59. The original line-up also included 'Urayqat and Sha'ah.
60. Interview with Shtayya.
61. 'Abbas, *Trial of One-Hundred and Thirty Days*.
62. Interview with Fara, 2004.
63. Interviews with Bir Zeit residents, June 13, 2003. Interview with Hasan 'Alawi, director general of Civil Registration, Ramallah, June 17, 2003.
64. The IDF announced the division of the West Bank into eight zones on May 7, 2002. They were Jinin, Tulkarm, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem, and Hebron. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 1 (Autumn 2002):132.
65. Interview with Nisim 'Anfus.
66. *Guardian Unlimited*, "Full text of George Bush's speech on Israel and a Palestinian state," June 25, 2002.
67. The remark was made on June 20, 2003, in Jericho. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, June 26, 2003.
68. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, October 5–19, 2000.
69. Conversations with Palestinians in Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bir Zeit, June 2003.
70. According to Khaled Abu Toameh, "Dahlan's offer is considered generous if one takes into account the price of rifles on the Palestinian market. A U.S.-made M16 sells for nearly \$5,000, while the price of a Kalashnikov assault rifle is estimated at \$2,000." *The Jerusalem Post*, June 8, 2003.
71. *Ibid.*

72. EU financing of the PA was detailed in a statement issued April 30, 2003. *The Jerusalem Post*, June 17, 2003.
73. *The Palestinian Draft Basic Law*.
74. It was elevated to Article 38 in the revised Basic Law. Palestine Media Center, <http://www.palestine-pmc.com/>. (accessed March 2004). PLO Negotiations Affairs Department, "The Palestinian Prime Minister," March 12, 2003, <http://www.miftah.org/>. (accessed March 21, 2004).
75. Palestine Media Center. The revised article is then listed as Article 68.
76. "The One-Hundred Day Reform Plan."
77. Interview with Hasan.
78. "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):138–9.
79. Danny Rubinstein reported that they sank to the level of cursing and even spitting at each other. *Ha'aretz*, September 14, 2003.
80. Arnon Regular in *Ha'aretz*, September 15, 2003.
81. Sayigh, "The Palestinian Paradox," 105. Interview with Barakat al-Fara, 2004.
82. Correspondence with Barakat al-Fara, Fatah offices Cairo, November 2003. A slightly different line-up appears in "Quarterly Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):138–9.
83. Arnon Regular in *Ha'aretz*, September 15, 2003.
84. "Chronology," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no.1 (Autumn 2003):185.
85. Arnon Regular in *Ha'aretz*, September 14, 2003.
86. Amos Harel, *Ha'aretz*, February 20, 2004.
87. Local authority financial crisis from *Ha'aretz*, *ibid*. The mayor's brother had been shot dead the previous year. A senior returnee and Arafat advisor in Gaza, Khalil al-Za' ban, was shot dead the same week Shak'a resigned. Khaled Amayreh in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 4, 2004.
88. The limitations of the judiciary are discussed by Viktoria Wagner, "Chapter 5. The Effectiveness of the Palestinian Judicial System," in *Palestinian Judiciary and the Rule of Law in the Autonomous Areas*, 73–112. Also see Reporters without Borders, chapter 13, "Shortcomings of the Palestinian Justice System," 175–180.
89. "Quartely Update on Conflict and Diplomacy," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no.1 (Autumn 2002):136.
90. *al-Jazeera*, November 7, 2004.
91. *al-Ayyan*, November 21, 2004.
92. *Ha'aretz*, November 15, 2004.
93. Aruri shows how the mutation began with a document issued by the Legal Division of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 19, 1997, four days after the Hebron Protocol, in which further IDF redeployment is conditioned on the PA persuading Israel that it is "capable and willing to comply with its security responsibilities." The principle was endorsed by U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a letter attached to the Hebron Protocol, and gained full expression in the Wye Memorandum. Aruri, "The Wye Memorandum," 19–20.
94. Reported by Khaled Amayreh, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 25, 2002.
95. Michel Jansen, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, April 11, 2002. The IDF first reoccupied Ramallah in October 2001. Operation Defensive Shield ran from March 29 to May 10, 2002. The siege of the Church of the Nativity ran from April 2 to May 10. Some two hundred persons were initially trapped inside the church. The siege ended with an agreement to deport thirteen "most wanted" Palestinians to the EU via Cyprus. Twenty-six others were sent to Gaza. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 15, 2002. It had become customary for Arafat to attend midnight mass at the church on Christmas Eve, but he was not permitted to do from 2001 and the advent of the Sharon-led governments.

96. One air raid buried almost the entire Shu'bi family alive in the old Yasamina quarter. Wreckage included the eighteenth-century Tuqan palace and the Kan'an and al-Nabulsi soap factories, which were dynamited for no military reason. The seventeenth-century al-Wakalah al-Farrukhiyya caravanseri and the thirteenth-century al-Khadra mosque were other targets, as was the Greek Orthodox church and monastery. Amiry and Hadid.
97. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 25, 2002.
98. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, April 11, 2002.
99. The incident took place on April 2, 2003. Muna Hamzeh, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 10, 2003.
100. The operation was launched on June 19, 2002 (BBC News, June 19, 2002).
101. Conversation with Kifah Fanni, Ramallah, June 15, 2003.
102. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 18–24, 2002.
103. Withdrawal from Bayt Hanun took place on June 29, and from Bethlehem on July 2, 2003.
104. Sa'ib 'Urayqat in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, July 31, 2003.
105. The Foreign Ministry's contribution to the outposts was reported in *Ha'aretz*, May 21, 2003. The homes in Gaza were for Neve Dekalim. In the West Bank, tenders were first issued for 600 homes, 530 in Betar Illit near Bethlehem and the remainder for Ma'ale Adumim and Ariel. A further 100 were expected to be added to Efrat. The Ministry of Housing then tendered for 300 more divided between Karnei Shomeron near Nablus and some 200 in Givat Ze'ev near Jerusalem. *Ha'aretz*, July 31, 2003, October 2 and 23, 2003. *Ha'aretz* reported that by late October, Peace Now counted tenders for 1,627 housing units during 2003. The rise in construction in the West Bank reported by Moti Bassok, *Ha'aretz*, March 3, 2004.
106. Akiva Eldar, *Ha'aretz*, November 18, 2003.
107. B'Tselem, "The Separation Barrier" (accessed February 17, 2004), http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation_Barrier/Background.asp.
108. B'Tselem, "Statistics on the Separation Barrier" (February 17, 2004), http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation_Barrier/Statistics.asp. The first stage from Salam near Jinin to Ilqana south of Qalqilya set the trend when it accommodated the settlement of Alfie Menash to Qalqilya's southeast. The second westward stage from Qalqilya toward Ramallah was expected to take in Qedumim, Immanuel, and Ariel. Jonathan Cook, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 27, 2003. When complete the barrier would include "all the settlements of western Samaria, the Modi'in bloc, the Etzion bloc and southern Hebron Hills." *Ha'aretz*, October 3, 2003.
109. This point was first made by Anat Georgi and Moti Bassok, "Roads/Paved with Gold," *The Settlements*, *Ha'aretz*, September 29, 2003.
110. In August 2002 approval was granted for stage one, running from Salim north of Jinin to Ilqana, a distance of some 138 km. Stage two runs from Salim to Tayasir for sixty km, stage three from Ilqana to Ofer is 186 km, stage four from Har Gilo to Carmel (near Hebron) 114 km, and the "Jerusalem Envelope" 50 km, in addition to which there are an additional 106 km of secondary barriers, for a total of 654 km. B'Tselem, "Statistics on the Separation Barrier."
111. *Al-Quds*, March 18, 2003.
112. B'Tselem, "Statistics on the Separation Barrier."
113. *Al-Hayat Al-Jadida*, April 1, 2003.
114. Amnesty International, *The Place of the Fence/Wall in International Law*.
115. *Ibid*.
116. International Committee of the Red Cross, "Press Release 04/12," February 18, 2004, <http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList4/F06BB484D900B227C1256E3E00324D96>. (accessed March 2004).
117. B'Tselem, "Map of the Separation Barrier" (February 17, 2004), http://www.btselem.org/English/Separation_Bairier/Map.asp.
118. B'Tselem, "Statistics on the Separation Barrier."

119. *Ha'aretz*, January 9, 2004.
120. *Ha'aretz*, April 13, 2003. On the role and relocation of the Yamit settlers, see Israel Harel, *Ha'aretz*, April 16, 2003. Rachel's tomb is on the outskirts of Bethlehem. It is alleged to be the site at which Rachel, wife of third patriarch Jacob, died in childbirth. The prophet Samuel is said to have heard the voice of God at Shilo, and according to the settlement's website, it is where "3000 years ago the children of Israel gathered to erect the Tabernacle and to divide by lot the Land of Israel into tribal portions." Shilo website, <http://www.shilo.org.il/is.htm>. Visitors are referred to the Book of Judges (21:19) for directions. Beit El is where Jacob reputedly dreamt of his ladder.
121. *Ha'aretz*, February 4, 2004. The four West Bank settlements in question were Ganim, Kadim, Sa-Nur, and Homesh. *Ha'aretz*, May 29, 2004.
122. Bradley Burston, *Ha'aretz*, February 4, 2004. On the religious justification for remaining in Gaza, Burston quotes Rabbi Yossi Alnekaveh of Neve Dekalim: "Gaza was the first city captured by Yehoshua Bin-Nun... The city of Gaza is one of the four holy cities in which Jewish settlement was preserved during our years in exile... There was an ancient synagogue in Gaza, for 3,000 people, and 400 years ago, when it was impossible to go up to Jerusalem because of 'mortar attacks,' people would go to that synagogue to pray." Tradition says that Bin Nun was one of twelve sent by Moses to spy on the land of Canaan following the exodus from Egypt.
123. Reported by Yoel Marcus in *Ha'aretz*, February 3, 2004.
124. There were approximately nine thousand settlers in Yamit prior to evacuation. Families received between \$100,000 and \$500,000 in compensation. Many used the money to buy new homes in settlements in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Larry Derfner, *The Jerusalem Post*, June 8, 2003.
125. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, February 12, 2004.
126. The sand was taken to Israel via the Mintar crossing. *Palestine Report*, August 6, 2003.
127. B'Tselem, "Fatalities in the al-Aqsa Intifada: Data by Month," http://www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Al_Aqsa_Fatalities_Tables.asp. (accessed November 26, 2004).
128. Sharon made it clear early on to U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell that Israel would retain both the Jordan Valley and the West Bank mountain ridge: "We learned a lot from you Americans. We saw how you moved West using this method." From *Ha'aretz*, February 26, 2001, reported in "Settlement Monitor," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 30, no. 4:136.
129. PASSIA, *The Palestine Question in Maps*, 94.
130. *Palestine Report* 10, no. 32, February 18, 2004.
131. *The Jerusalem Post*, May 26, 2003.
132. Bertini, "Recommendations," in *Personal Humanitarian Envoy of the Secretary-General Mission Report*.
133. Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council, "Update from AIJAC. Israeli Cabinet Accepts Roadmap," No 05/03 # 10, May 27, 2003, <http://www.ajiac.org.au/updates/May03/270503.html#Article%20%201>.
134. Sharon speech from *Ha'aretz*, July 31, 2003.
135. *Ha'aretz*, October 18, 2001 and September 6, 2002 in Ma'ariv, reported in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 12, 2002.
136. Conducted by Bir Zeit University Development Studies Program, reported in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 32, no. 4 (Summer 2003):140.
137. "Mahmud Abbas's Call for a Halt to the Militarization of the Intifada," 78.
138. Uzi Benziman in *Ha'aretz*, October 30, 2003.
139. The speech acknowledged "the suffering of the Jews throughout history" but said nothing of the right of return or Jerusalem. Palestinian prime minister Mahmud 'Abbas' speech to the Aqaba summit, June 4, 2003. *Ha'aretz* (July 31, 2003).

140. Ghazi Bani Odeh citing The International Support Organization for Human Rights, *The Jerusalem Times*, April 21, 2000.
141. PLO Negotiations Support Unit, "Palestinian Political Prisoners" (February 20, 2004), <http://www.nad-plo.org/faq/p.php>.
142. Sa'd al-Nimr, Lecture on Palestinian Prisoners of War, The American University in Cairo, October 27, 2003. The figure of six thousand was Nimr's estimate.
143. PLO Negotiations Support Unit, "Palestinian Political Prisoners." The PLO's figures are supported by the ICRC, which reported that 7,600 were still in custody, 300 of them minors, over one year later in April 2003. ICRC figures from Jason Keyser, Associated Press, "Hundreds of Palestinian Minors in Custody," *The World Revolution*, April 17, 2003, <http://www.worldrevolution.org/article/815>.
144. Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners, "Statistics," (February 19, 2004), <mailto:www.mandela-palestine.org>. The figure of eleven facilities is also cited by the International Support Organization for Human Rights, reported in *The Jerusalem Times*, April 21, 2000. Amos Harel and Baruch Kra reported strained relations between the IDF and General Prisons Administration over who was responsible for what in *Ha'aretz*, October 8, 2002.
145. On the IDF and the civil Prisons Authority see *Ha'aretz*, October 8, 2002. It is astonishingly easy to find a Palestinian familiar with prison conditions. Beating, hunger, overcrowding, and lack of toilet facilities were reported by Jason Keyser, Associated Press, "Hundreds of Palestinian Minors in Custody." The role of the settlements was noted by Sa'd al-Nimr, Lecture on Palestinian Prisoners of War.
146. Randa Hamad in *The Jerusalem Times*, June 7, 2003.
147. Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners, "Statistics."
148. Khaled Amayreh reported that of 424 prisoners released in the August gesture, 82 were convicted criminals and 159 had been kept under administrative detention. Of the 183 convicted prisoners, all but one had been given terms that were about to expire. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 7, 2003. "Chronology," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 33, no. 1 (Fall 2003):183-9.
149. Catherine Cook, Adam Hanieh, and Adah Kay, *Stolen Youth: The Politics of Israel's Detention of Palestinian Children* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), reviewed by Julien Dacey, "Targeting Children," *Cairo Times*, vol. 7, no. 48 (February 19, 2004):28. Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners, "Statistics." If Sa'd al-Nimr's experience is anything to go by, the policy is unlikely to work. First arrested at the age of fifteen, Nimr was given a three minute trial, condemned by testimony of an IDF soldier, and given a statement to sign in Hebrew that he couldn't read. In prison he was "adopted" by the older, political prisoners, rearrested not long after release, recruited, and before long became a recruiter himself during a total of eight years in prison completed by the age of twenty-four. Sa'd al-Nimr, Lecture on Palestinian Prisoners of War.
150. Nathan Guttman, *Ha'aretz*, May 8, 2003.
151. Aluf Benn, *Ha'aretz*, December 22, 2002.
152. Danny Rubinstein in *Ha'aretz*, February 23, 2003. The tightening of closure from July 2002 crippled security service reforms then underway with Jordanian, Egyptian, and U.S. trainers in Jericho. *Ha'aretz*, September 22, 2002.
153. *Ha'aretz*, September 14, 2003.
154. PCPSR "Public Opinion Poll #9," October 7, 2003, <http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/p9a.html>. (accessed October 27, 2003).
155. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, September 18, 2003.
156. Usher in *Al-Ahram Weekly*, January 16, 2003.
157. *Ha'aretz*, March 13, 2003.
158. *Al-Ayyan*, November 24, 2004.
159. Margot Dudkevitch in *The Jerusalem Post*, October 9, 2002.

160. *Khaleej Times*, January 22, 2004.
161. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, January 22, 2004.
162. *Al-Ahram Weekly*, August 15, 2002.
163. *Palestine Report* 8, no. 12, August 29, 2001.
164. "Bush Says Palestinian State 'Possible' by 2009," <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=11879> (accessed November 29, 2004).
165. Jean Allain, "Chapter Two: 'Terrorism' in International Law: One Man's Terrorist Is Not Another's Freedom Fighter," in *On Achieving Palestinian Statehood: Concepts, Ends and Means from the Perspective of International Law*, Lectures delivered at the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies, April 2002 (Bir Zeit: Ibrahim Abu Lughod Institute for International Studies, 2002), 23.
166. *Ibid.*, 39.
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- Nizar 'Amr (Nazih Hilmi al-Mubashir), PLO's first Ambassador to Iran after the Islamic Revolution, served as "National Security Advisor to the PLO, as head of the Unit for Informational Analysis and Evaluation, and head of the Israeli Studies Department at the PLO Planning Center. (Also)...a member of the Palestinian negotiating teams to the bilateral and multilateral talks on arms control and regional security, the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Security Committee, and the conference of Arab interior ministers." (this profile from photocopy of unspecified article provided by Nizar 'Amr). He was also involved in negotiations with the United States in Tunis with Salah Khalaf, member of Force 17 and close to Nasr Yusif (Inbari). Following the establishment of the PNA, he was given a military rank and appointed Director of the Department of Planning, Organization and Studies for PNA Public Security, Gaza, February 5, 6, and 7, 1996.
- Wafa 'Amr, Reuters journalist, Jerusalem, November 29, 1995.
- Haytham Arrar, Manager of the Refugee Camp Affairs Administration in the Ramallah governor's office, and member of Fatah regional committee for Ramallah, Ramallah, June 17, 2003.
- Nisim 'Anfus, Manager of Administrative Affairs, District Civil Liaison, Ramallah, June 18, 2003.
- Marwan al-Barghuthi, former head of Bir Zeit University Student Council, former prisoner, deported during the Intifada, member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council and General Secretary

- of the Fatah Higher Committee in the West Bank, Legislative Council member for Ramallah, Ramallah, February 3 and 10, 1996.
- 'Azmi Bishara, lecturer at Bir Zeit University, July 1995.
- Mundhir Dajani, Department of Political Science, al-Quds University, Jerusalem, June 11, 2003.
- Ibrahim D'aybis, official at the Health Development Information Project, Ramallah, July 10, 1995.
- David Dery, School of Public Policy, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, June 11, 2003.
- Ahmad al-Dik, married to the daughter of Khalil al-Wazir, member of the Fatah Higher Committee for the West Bank and Legislative Council member for Salfit, Ramallah, November 6, 1995.
- Kifah Fanni, poet, Bir Zeit, June 15, 2003.
- Barakat al-Fara, Fatah office, Cairo, March 2, 2003 and February 23, 2004.
- Qaddura Paris, former prisoner, member of the Legislative Council for Ramallah and the West Bank Fatah higher committee, and Legislative Council member, Ramallah, June 14, 2003.
- Hillel Frisch, academic, Hebrew University, January 29, 1996.
- Rida Fu'ad al-Mawi and Sharif al-Jabri, National Democratic Party youth secretariat members in the Giza governorate, Cairo, March 14 and 17, 2001.
- 'Imad Ghayaza, imprisoned eight times by Israel, former teaching assistant, now professor at Bir Zeit University and former Fatah activist from Nahalin near Bethlehem, Bir Zeit February 1996 and June 12, 2003.
- Ghazi Hamid, Managing Editor of Hamas newspaper *al-Watan*, Gaza, October 26, 1995.
- Nabil Hammad, Office Manager for Husayn al-Shaykh, Marja'iyat Fatah, Ramallah, June 19, 2003.
- Hani al-Hasan, Fatah central committee, former minister of the interior in the PA, Commissioner of Fatah Office of Mobilisation and Organisation, Ramallah, June 15, 2003.
- Jamil Hilal, Palestinian writer closely involved in the PLO's media department, former member of the DFLP, now close to FIDA, Ramallah, February 1996.
- Marwan Jilani, Director of Planning and Development, PNA Ministry of Sports and Youth, Baytunya (near Ramallah), September 10, 1995.
- A.Kafanani, member of the Jordanian delegation to the peace talks with Israel, advisor in the Prime Minister's office and Director of the Department of Palestinian Affairs for seven years up until 1991, Amman, August 14, 1995.
- May Kayla, Fatah higher committee for the West Bank and UNRWA, Bir Zeit, June 13, 2003.
- 'Ali Khadr, World Bank official, al-Ram, West Bank, February 1996.
- Husam Khadr, former prisoner and deportee, member of Fatah Higher Committee until January 1994, now an "independent Fatah" member of the Legislative Council, Balata Camp near Nablus, January 28, 1996.
- Jack Khanu, member of PPP, employee at the Medical Relief Committee, Bayt Hanina, and former worker in Orient House during the Madrid Conference and the Washington negotiations, Bayt Hanina, July 18, 1995.
- Ghassan al-Khatib, spokesman for the PPP, delegate to the Madrid Conference, and Director of the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, Bir Zeit, May 25, 1995, Jerusalem, July 22 and 27, 1995.
- Ibrahim Khurayshi, Fatah activist, former prisoner, President of Bir Zeit University Student Council and participant in the Tulkarm primary, February 3, 1996.
- 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda, PNLA officer, now a member the Fatah revolutionary council and Commander of Public Security in the Gaza Strip, Gaza, October 25, 1995.
- Kamil Mansur, legal advisor to the Palestinian during the Madrid Conference and the negotiations in Washington, now director of the legal center in Bir Zeit University, Bir Zeit, December 6, 1995.
- Jibril Muhammad, PFLP member and head of the voluntary work section of the PNA Ministry of Sports and Youth, Baytunya (near Ramallah), September 10, 1995.
- Mark Mullen, NDI Program Officer for Civic Education, Jerusalem, January 29, 1996.
- Khadr Mustafa Ma'aruf, PNLA officer now on the staff of Major General 'Abd al-Raziq al-Majayda (head of PNA Public Security in the Gaza Strip), Gaza, October 25, 1995.

- Sulayman al-Najjab, PPP member of the PLO Executive Committee since 1987, re-elected by the 21st PNC in April 1996, Jibya (near Bir Zeit), February 2, 1996.
- Sa'd Nimr, Campaign Office Manager, Free Marwan al-Barghuthi Campaign, Ramallah, June 14, 2003.
- Sari Nusayba, president of al-Quds University, Fatah member, East Jerusalem, June 11, 2003.
- Ziyad al-Rajub, Fatah regional committee for Central Hebron. Telephone conversation, June 18, 2003.
- Basil Ramahi, former Civil Administration employee, Director General in the PNA Ministry of Finance, Ramallah, February 11, 1996.
- Dalai Salama, Legislative Council member for Nablus, member of the Nablus Fatah regional committee, Legislative Council offices, Ramallah, June 15, 2003.
- Walid Salim, former prisoner accused of holding a senior position in the PFLP, currently a journalist and board member of The Center for the Dissemination of Alternative Information (Panorama), Jerusalem, January 19, 1996.
- 'Adnan Samara, Deputy General Secretary of the Fatah revolutionary council, offices of the revolutionary council secretariat, Ramallah, June 16, 2003.
- Juhar Sayigh, Physician, Fatah operative in the Western Sector and former prisoner, now employed in the Governorate of Ramallah, Bir Zeit, January 23, 1996.
- Husam Shahin, Fatah activist and employee at the Palestinian Center for Non-Violence, Jerusalem, January 19, 1996.
- Ghassan al-Shak'a, Former Mayor of Nablus and subsequently Fatah member of the Legislative Council, elected to the PLO Executive Committee by the 21st PNC, Autumn 1995.
- Jamal al-Shati, Fatah activist, member of the West Bank Higher Committee and official Fatah member of the Legislative Council, Jinin, February 1, 1996.
- Jamil Shihada, member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council and Assistant Deputy Minister in the PNA Interior Ministry, Ramallah, January 22 and 25, 1995.
- 'Azmi al-Shu'aybi, former DFLP activist, now a senior figure in FIDA. Minister of Sports and Youth in the original Council of Ministers and later Legislative Council member for Ramallah, Baytunya (near Ramallah), October 11, 1995.
- Samir Sinjilawi, Fatah activist involved in the Ramallah primaries and the reformulated Fatah youth movement, the Fatah Youth Organisation, Ramallah, January 27, 1996.
- Muhammad Shtayya, Managing Director, Palestinian Economic Council for Reconstruction and Development (PECDAR), president of the Palestinian Center for Regional Studies. Ramallah, June 14, 2003.
- 'Abd al-Rahman al-Turk, sociologist at al-Najah University, PNC member, close to the Fatah higher committee in the West Bank, Ramallah, June 19, 2003.
- Nasr Yusuf, senior figure in Force 17, member of the Fatah Central Committee, currently overall commander of all PNA security services in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, August 30, 1995.
- Husni Zu'arab, Fatah member since 1960, senior Fatah organizer in Kuwait prior to the second Gulf War, member of 20th PNC, currently Director General in the PNA Ministry of Education in Gaza. Gaza, August 30, 1995.
- Salah Zuhayqa, former journalist on al-Fajr, General Secretary of the Fatah regional committee for East Jerusalem. East Jerusalem, June 10, 2003.
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