Zionism and Technocracy

The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870–1918

Derek J. Penslar

ZIONISM AND TECHNOCRACY

The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870–1918

DEREK J. PENSLAR

"[*Zionism and Technocracy*] breaks new ground in its method, its meticulous research, and its well-argued conclusions. Penslar has written one of the first 'social histories' of an important aspect of Zionism."
—David Sorkin, St. Antony's College, Oxford

"Thoroughly researched, well written, and persuasively argued, this book focuses on the impact of German concepts of agronomy, colonial development, and social reform upon the Zionist settlement of Palestine. Penslar illustrates how German-trained Zionist administrators interacted with eastern European Zionist pioneers before World War I to develop a policy of national settlement that was central to the establishment of the State of Israel."
—Paula Hyman, Yale University

The creation of a Jewish homeland in modern Palestine represented a monumental technical achievement. This achievement, and the story of the Jewish technocrats who engineered it, is documented here for the first time. Derek J. Penslar traces the origins of Zionism's first settlement engineers and reveals their crucial role in the development of Palestine's fledgling Jewish community during the last decades of Ottoman rule. Whereas the Zionist movement's ideological center of gravity is conventionally placed in Eastern Europe, this book shows that the first

(continued on back flap)

Zionism and Technocracy

The Modern Jewish Experience

Paula Hyman and Deborah Dash Moore, editors

ZIONISM AND TECHNOCRACY

The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870–1918

Derek J. Penslar

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Bloomington and Indianapolis

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

∞™

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Penslar, Derek Jonathan.

Zionism and technocracy : the engineering of Jewish settlement in Palestine, 1870-1918 / Derek J. Penslar.

p. cm. — (The Modern Jewish experience)

Includes bibliographical references (p.) and index.

ISBN 0-253-34290-2 (cloth)

1. Zionism—History. 2. Jews—Colonization—Palestine. 3. Land settlement—Palestine. I. Title. II. Series: Modern Jewish experience (Bloomington, Ind.)

DS149.P424 1991

325'.35694—dc20 90-25043

1 2 3 4 5 95 94 93 92 91

To Robin, Joshua, and Talia

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Since this book originated as a doctoral dissertation written at the University of California, Berkeley, my graduate advisors, Richard Webster and Gerald Feldman, have been constant sources of intellectual stimulation and encouragement. Amos Funkenstein has left his mark not only on this book but on my approach to Jewish history as a whole. Nachum Gross and Jehuda Reinharz read the unrevised dissertation and made valuable suggestions for its revision. David Sorkin labored through an early draft of the dissertation as well as the book manuscript. Many of my colleagues at Indiana University read portions of the manuscript; I owe a special debt of gratitude to Aron Rodrigue, who has always diplayed a keen interest in my research and whose critical eye has passed over virtually everything I have written.

It has been a pleasure working with Indiana University Press. I want to thank Paula Hyman and Janet Rabinowitch for accepting my book into the Modern Jewish Experience series and for their advice throughout the publishing process.

The staffs of Jerusalem's Central Zionist Archive and Central Archive for the History of the Jewish People extended me every courtesy during my visits in 1984-85 and 1988. These visits were made possible through grants from the University of California, the National Foundation for Jewish Culture, the Memorial Foundation for Jewish Culture, the American Council of Learned Societies, and Indiana University.

Portions of Chapters III and VI appeared previously in "Zionism, Colonialism, and Technocracy: Otto Warburg and the Commission for the Exploration of Palestine, 1903-1907," *Journal of Contemporary History* XXV, No. 1 (January 1990); and "Mediniyut ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit 'erev milḥemet ha-'olam harishona" (Zionist Settlement Policy on the Eve of World War I), *Cathedra,* No. 57 (September 1990), respectively.

NOTES ON THE TEXT

Abbreviations

APB	Anglo-Palestine Bank (Palestinian branch of the JCT)
CAHJP	Central Archive for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem
CP	*Commission Palestinienne* (Palestinian arm of the JCA)
CZA	Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem
GAC	Greater Actions Committee (the WZO's plenary executive body)
JCA	Jewish Colonization Association
JCT	Jewish Colonial Trust (the WZO's bank)
JNF	Jewish National Fund (the WZO's land purchase fund)
PC	Palestine Commission (the WZO's exploration commission)
PLDC	Palestine Land Development Company (WZO-sponsored land purchase and improvement company)
SAC	Smaller Actions Committee (the WZO's restricted executive body)
WZO	World Zionist Organization

Measurements

Land: All land measurements are in dunams, an Ottoman unit of measure equal to 1,000 square meters, or approximately one-quarter acre.

Money: The WZO calculated its income and expenditures according to several monetary units. The most commonly used were the German mark, the French franc, and the English pound. During the time period covered in this book, the following approximate foreign exchange rates applied: One pound sterling = twenty German marks = twenty-five French francs = five U.S. dollars

GLOSSARY OF HEBREW TERMS

aḥuza (pl. *aḥuzot*): Small plantation colonies developed by paid laborers in preparation for the absentee owners' immigration to Palestine

'avoda 'ivrit: "Hebrew labor"; a policy of employing only Jews in Jewish settlements and enterprises in Palestine

'Aliya (pl. *'Aliyot*): "Ascent"; a wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine

Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir: "The Young Worker"; Zionist workers' political party established in Palestine in 1905

Haskala: The Jewish Enlightenment, ca. 1770-1880

hityashvut 'ovedet: "Labor settlement"; settlement based on cooperative organizational methods, national landownership, and autonomous labor

Ḥovevei Ẓion: "Lovers of Zion"; international Zionist movement originating in Russia and Rumania in 1882 and formally organized in 1884

Kapai: Workers' fund established in 1912 by the international Po'alei Ẓion

kibbuẓ (pl. *kibbuẓim*): A large collective settlement featuring a division of labor and industrial as well as agricultural branches

kvuẓa (pl. *kvuẓot*): A small collective settlement

maskil (pl. *maskilim*): An adherent of the Jewish Enlightenment

moshav 'ovdim (pl. *moshvei 'ovdim*): A cooperative smallholders' village. In general usage, referred to simply as a *moshav* (pl. *moshavim*)

moshava (pl. *moshavot*): A colony based on private landownership and capitalist agriculture

Po'alei Ẓion: "Workers of Zion"; an international socialist-Zionist movement; its Palestinian branch was founded in 1905 and its World Union in 1907. The former functioned as a workers' political party in the Yishuv

Yishuv: The Jewish community in Palestine up to 1948

Yishuv 'oved: "Laboring Yishuv"; a Labor Zionist commonwealth

Jewish Settlements in Palestine, 1870–1918

INTRODUCTION

This study concerns Jewish social engineering in Palestine during the last half-century of Ottoman rule. Between 1870 and the end of World War I, various international Jewish organizations took the first steps toward the creation of a class of Jewish agriculturalists in Palestine. That class was small and fragile, but its very existence represented a monumental technical achievement. Conventional depictions of Jewish colonization in modern Palestine tend to describe the settlement process in terms of the immigrants themselves, as if they acted without guidance or support from without. Jewish rural colonization was, however, heavily dependent on settlement agencies, some philanthropic and others explicitly nationalist in their orientation. These agencies, in turn, modeled their own activities along the lines of the domestic social policies and international colonial practices of the most developed states of Europe. Unlike imperialist projections of European technology and social norms onto the Middle East, however, Jewish colonization in Ottoman Palestine contained a strong reformist, utopian quality.

The impetus toward Jewish social engineering in Palestine had roots in the very origins of Jewish modernity. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, secularization and acculturation brought about a revolutionary transformation of traditional Jewish mentalities, including the time-honored view of the ancient Holy Land as a hallowed ruin. Under the cold light of the Jewish Enlightenment (*Haskala*), the land of Israel lost its sacred aura and now appeared to be a decrepit relic, in need of externally imposed regeneration. Constructive philanthropy, aimed at the physical improvement of the Holy Land and the moral elevation of its residents, replaced prayer and pilgrimage as the bond linking emancipated Diaspora Jews and Palestine's Jewish community (the *Yishuv*). This activist mentality was particularly strong among Jews in France; as part of its self-imposed mission to instill Western values into Middle Eastern Jewry, the Alliance Israélite Universelle founded the agricultural school Mikve Yisra'el in 1870. The tutelary tone of the Alliance's ideology was present in the philanthropic endeavors of Baron Edmond de Rothschild, whose involvement in Palestine began in 1882, and dominated the worldview of the Paris-based Jewish Colonization Association, whose Palestinian activities date to 1896.

The French Jewish philanthropies were the first to introduce European agricultural technology into the Yishuv on a sizeable scale. French and Algerian

methods of horti- and viticulture promoted a network of Jewish plantations based on luxury as well as field crops. Despite their technical successes, the philanthropies intentionally restricted their Palestinian activities; this limitation stemmed from the philanthropies' goal of individual, not national, regeneration. The philanthropies conceived of colonization as an essentially pedagogic process, targeted at the moral improvement of a select population, which would produce showcase settlements to serve as examples to Jews throughout the Diaspora. But with the founding of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) in 1897 there emerged a quite different approach, which saw in Jewish farmers the basis of an autonomous Jewish national economy. There arose a group of technical experts and settlement activists who possessed the technical and managerial skills needed in order to realize this goal. They were Zionism's first settlement engineers.[1]

The group of settlement engineers consisted of two contingents. The first was Central European and German-speaking; whether from the Hohenzollern or Habsburg empires, they shared common membership in the German cultural sphere (*Kulturbereich*), which provided common intellectual influences. (As used here, the term *German Jew* connotes a Jew raised in a German-speaking environment.) The German Jews, who established and managed the WZO's settlement apparatus, were most influential during the first dozen or so years of the WZO's existence. This contingent consisted of the first architects of Zionist settlement policy: Max Bodenheimer, a leader of early German Zionism, and Theodor Herzl, founder of the WZO. Bodenheimer and Herzl put forth bold programs for Zionist colonization but took only limited steps to implement them. After Herzl's death in 1904, Otto Warburg, a botanist in the German colonial service, initiated a number of projects for the research and development of Palestine. In 1908, Arthur Ruppin led the WZO to found its first training farms and cooperative settlements. From 1909, however, a second contingent, consisting of Eastern European Jews with a German higher education and ties to the Zionist labor movement, began to penetrate the WZO's settlement institutions. By the end of World War I, men such as the engineer Shlomo Kaplansky and the agronomists Yiẓḥak Wilkansky and Akiva Ettinger exercised considerable influence, an influence that was to persist and strengthen during the 1920s.

Whereas the French Jewish philanthropists looked to rural settlement as an act of moral improvement, the German and German-educated settlement engineers saw in it a dual blow for national-economic independence and social reform. In their minds, the "Jewish problem" and the general nineteenth-century "social problem" shared a common root and demanded common solutions. During the 1800s, a threefold increase in the population of Eastern European Jewry had produced an enormous Jewish proletariat, unassimilable and unacceptable in its lands of residence. Standard Zionist doctrine held that these Jews needed to be resettled in a new land. But many of the Zionists who took charge of the resettlement urged that the ills of industrial society not be allowed to spread to the Jewish homeland. One popular school of German political-economic theory of the time had an agrarian orientation and proposed programs of land reform,

cooperation, and internal agricultural colonization that would solve the social problem by strengthening the peasantry.

Accordingly, the settlement engineers argued that a technologically advanced agricultural sector would ensure a stable and healthy national economy, and they conceived a program of social engineering that gave priority to agricultural colonization. In keeping with their Central European origin and education, the settlement engineers envisioned the mixed farm, complete with dairy and poultry farming as well as market gardening, as the primary model for the rural Yishuv. At the same time, given Palestine's tropical location, German colonial agriculture, featuring lush plantations of crops for export, was also a source of inspiration. Dissimilar though these models might be, they shared an important element in common: the role of the state as an agent of agricultural progress. The Central European family farmer received assistance from state-sponsored cooperatives, experiment stations, and itinerant agronomists. The German colonial plantation depended on the state for administrative infrastructure, guaranteed credit, and scientific services. Although the settlement engineers were not equally committed to social innovation, statist tendencies were universal.

Despite Zionism's debt to German social and colonial policy, essential differences remained. Whereas Central European society was dominated by entrenched elites, forcing social policy to work within firmly circumscribed parameters, the Zionist movement sought to create a society *ex nihilo*, thereby allowing social-reformist ideologies to cement themselves in the very foundations of the Yishuv. As to colonial models, there was a qualitative difference between an imperialist power's system of controlling and exploiting colonies for the benefit of the metropolitan government and the Zionist goal of using an international organization to create an autonomous homeland. There took place a wide-ranging transfer of technology from Europe to Palestine; Jews in the Yishuv took an active part in the production and dissemination of scientific knowledge. This process was quite different from normal imperialist practice, where a mere geographic relocation of technology was the rule, and only the colonial rulers had access to sophisticated technical knowledge.[2]

The transfer of technology was engineered by and for Jews, not Palestine's Arab majority. This book's purview is limited to the inner dynamics of the Zionist settlement enterprise, as there is a sizeable body of literature on Zionist attitudes toward the Palestinians as well as Palestinian responses to Zionism.[3] It is important to note, however, that Zionism's settlement planners had few qualms about asserting that the Jewish presence in Palestine would prove to be a blessing to the native Arabs. The Yishuv would, in time, share its Western technology with what the Zionists believed to be a benighted native population. The Arabs would, in turn, overcome their hostility and welcome the Jews as brothers. True, many Zionist notables were acutely sensitive to Arab and Ottoman opposition to Zionism during the last years before World War I, but ironically, the people responsible for the engineering of Jewish settlement were the least likely to call for a reevaluation of Zionist goals in the face of this

hostility. For the most part, the settlement engineers conceived of Arab animosity as but one item on a long list of obstacles to the Jewish return to the soil, obstacles that time, Jewish immigration, and careful planning would clear away. Only Arthur Ruppin failed to share this optimistic view. He appreciated the strength of Arab nationalist resistance to Zionism, though even Ruppin conceived of Palestine as the target of a violent but passing storm, and not the vortex of a maelstrom.[4]

Although interested in winning Arab goodwill, the settlement engineers were most immediately concerned with mobilizing Jewish labor, expertise, and money on behalf of the Yishuv. Skilled Jewish workers were at a premium. The corps of settlement engineers was small and starved of funds. In fact, the WZO was one of the financially weakest colonization agents at work in Palestine during the years before 1918. Between 1882 and 1903, the period of the first wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine, Baron Rothschild spent some sixty million francs on agricultural projects in Palestine. From the time the WZO began colonization activity in 1908 until the end of World War I, it spent approximately four million.[5] As of 1914, the non-Zionist Jewish Colonization Association owned fifty-four percent of the rural Yishuv's 420,587 dunams and private Jewish companies held twenty-seven percent. WZO-owned and -sponsored institutions held nineteeen percent, and the Jewish National Fund's share was only four percent.[6] And yet, although the WZO's settlement engineers worked within the narrowest of frameworks, they had a stimulative effect on the Yishuv far greater than the statistics suggest. More than any other colonization agent, the WZO was the catalyst that enabled the Zionist labor movement to metamorphose from a small and penniless community of pioneers into the hegemonic political force in the Yishuv during the period of British Mandatory rule (1920-1948). The WZO's Palestine Office and Jewish National Fund breathed life into the pioneer community's first experiments in cooperative agriculture; this collaboration between official Zionism and its Labor counterpart constituted a recognition of the latter's unique ability to undertake the building of a new Jewish society in Palestine.

The Eastern European settlement engineers provided a vital link between the WZO and the pioneer community. Whereas their German colleagues were for the most part liberals with utopian yearnings, the Eastern Europeans espoused Social Democratic views, but of a kind associated with the revisionist wing of Austro-German Marxism. The antirevolutionary character of the political thought of the Eastern Europeans enabled them to agree with their German colleagues on certain operating principles. At the same time, the former could muster sufficient socialist rhetoric to endear themselves to the Yishuv's socialist pioneers. The affinity between the Eastern European settlement engineers and the pioneers transcended politics; they shared a traditional Jewish upbringing and a command of Hebrew, thus providing a connection between the WZO and the pioneers that German Zionists, almost always removed from Jewish tradition, could not forge alone.

By 1918, the WZO had formulated two overlapping but conceptually distinct

approaches to settlement policy. The first, "national settlement," traces its origins to Herzl, who originated the idea of a program of publicly funded colonization wherein the WZO would be an agent of social policy akin to a Central European state. Refined by Warburg and Ruppin, this policy had become well-nigh unassailable by 1918. The second, "Labor settlement" (*hityashvut 'ovedet*), was conceived by the Eastern European settlement engineers in tandem with members of the Yishuv's pioneer community. This policy contained all the features of national settlement but went beyond it by calling for public landownership, the exclusion of non-Jewish labor from nationally owned land, and the widest possible application of the cooperative principle, via either a communal arrangement (*kvuẓa*, later *kibbuẓ*) or a cooperative smallholders' village (*moshav*). Labor settlement was the subject of bitter opposition in the prewar WZO, but it emerged triumphant, just as it flourished, again in the face of constant criticism, throughout the Mandate period.

There is little scholarly material available in English on the social and economic development of the Yishuv in Ottoman Palestine. Zionist historians writing in English, whether in the Diaspora or Israel, focus either on Jewish nationalist ideology and its unfolding in the lands of the Diaspora, or on the Yishuv's political history, particularly within the framework of the origins of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Those scholars who do deal with the relationship between international Zionism and Palestine tend to focus on politics in the Diaspora rather than social or economic developments in the Yishuv. To a degree, these emphases are understandable, particularly in so young a field as Zionist historiography, whose methodological foundation is still under construction. Moreover, the process of Jewish colonization in Palestine took place largely within the framework of the Zionist movement; settlement institutions were created and funded only through cooperation with the movement's political apparatus. Given the meager resources available to the WZO and the vast obstacles which it faced, international diplomatic support was indispensable if the Yishuv was ever to become a Jewish national home. Confronted by these realities and by the acutely political nature of what is generally regarded as the most serious challenge to the realization of the Zionist idea—Arab opposition—it is no wonder that the most creative Zionist historiography produced to date has centered around political history. There are exceptions, such as Simon Schama's *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel* (1978), but in general, one must turn to Hebrew sources for detailed information about the Yishuv.

The standard Hebrew reference work, which anomalously does exist in English translation, is Alex Bein's *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit* (1942), published in English under the title *The Return to the Soil*. Bein established the crucial role played by the WZO in general and Ruppin's Palestine Office in particular in the founding and nurturing of the first Labor Zionist agricultural settlements. Bein's work lacked methodological rigor, and its ideological biases were palpable, but the book remains invaluable. This is especially so because subsequent Zionist historiography of the 1940s through early 1970s, dominated by the ideology of the reigning Labor party in the Yishuv and Israel, acknowledged the role of the

WZO and other public colonization institutions in a most parenthetical manner, as part of its general diminution of the contributions of all agents outside the labor movement to the development of the Jewish state.[7]

In the last decade, the changing political climate in Israel has powerfully affected Zionist historiography, one result being a heightened awareness of the array of factors outside the Labor movement that molded the Yishuv in Ottoman Palestine. A sizeable body of Hebrew literature has developed on the settlement activity of the WZO, the Eastern European *Ḥovevei Ẓion* (Lovers of Zion), private land-purchase companies, and French and German non-Zionist philanthropies.[8] In general, this body of work, although of great value for its wealth of documentation and narrative strength, suffers from a purely descriptive approach. There is little insight into the sensibilities of the historical actors, and the settlement enterprise is isolated from the European environment which was a powerful source of inspiration for the engineers of Jewish colonization.[9]

Our goal, therefore, is twofold: to throw light on the settlement engineers' contribution to Zionism, and to place Zionism's technical and administrative element into the broader context of the world in which the Zionist movement took form. Zionism's pre–World War I settlement experts represented the first generation of the Jewish national movement's technocratic elite, an elite that reproduced, albeit on a far smaller scale, the activities of the technically oriented elites in European society in the late nineteenth century.

Like any other abstract classificatory term, *technocracy* lends itself to widely differing definitions. Although coined only in 1919, the term has a long historical pedigree. The concept of a society administered by expert technicians and managers predates the Industrial Revolution; it finds its fullest exposition in the early nineteenth-century writings of the Comte Henri de Saint-Simon and his disciples. But functionally speaking, technocracy began to emerge only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, as governments came to employ technically trained experts as advisors to the makers of public policy. (The line dividing nascent technocracy from a traditional bureaucracy was a fine one, the main distinction being that the legitimizing basis for the service elite's power shifted from juristic to technical knowledge.)[10] By the early twentieth century, the theoretical and functional aspects of technocracy had merged. Western societies increased their commitment to the creation of a technically trained service elite. At the same time, a growing body of theoretical literature, some of it produced by technicians themselves, most by students of sociology and political economy, advocated a central role for technically trained experts in the crafting of social policy.[11]

In order to apply the concept of technocracy to the study of Jewish nation building, it is important to separate the term's theoretical and phenomenological components. When I use the term throughout this book, I do so in a purely operational sense, to describe a system of administration and management by self-proclaimed experts, whose power sometimes overlapped and clashed with that of the Zionist movement's political leadership. Although the protagonists of this book were frequently frustrated by political factionalism and infighting within the WZO, which they believed further sapped the WZO's already limited

abilities to engage in colonization, the settlement engineers did not form a coherent, self-defined group within the WZO that sought power in the name of a technocratic ideal. Although possessed of profound theoretical powers, the settlement engineers used their gifts to construct models and programs for Jewish colonization, not for self-aggrandizing speculation.

The rank and file of the Zionist movement in Europe was quick to acknowledge the special role to be played by experts in the construction of a Jewish Palestine. Engineers, agronomists, and medical doctors were respected for the obvious benefits that their work could bring to the Yishuv. But the Zionist concept of expertise ranged beyond the applied sciences, and the value attached to expertise exceeded its practical benefits. In keeping with the intellectual currents of the time, Zionists understood expertise to mean any type of rational, inductive, and systematic knowledge that promoted the common weal; social-scientific knowledge, particularly that gleaned from the study of political economy, was prized no less highly than that derived from the natural sciences. Although a polymath, Ruppin derived the greater part of his legitimacy from his university training in political economy and law. A number of lesser settlement activists steeped themselves in political-economic jargon in order to justify their Zionist ideology in general and their own favorite approaches to colonization in particular. Zionists unsure of their fledgling efforts at colonization bolstered their confidence by drawing comparisons with the social and colonial policies of the Great Powers. For example, by comparing Zionist colonization to the internal colonization activity of the German and Italian governments, Zionists invoked the spirits of both technological progress and state power. This potent combination also accounts for the influence enjoyed by one of the WZO's most important settlement engineers, the botanist Warburg, whose prestige derived not so much from his scientific accomplishments as from his professorship in Berlin and numerous advisory positions in the German colonial service.

Certain facets of Zionist ideology produced a level of veneration for expertise even higher than the European norm. Zionism contained within it a revolutionary ethos that sought to make radical changes in the social, economic, and cultural structures of European Jewry. Like the adherents of the Haskala, Zionists internalized the eighteenth-century continental Enlightenment's critique of Jews as economically unproductive and in need of an occupational shift from commerce into agriculture and manufacture. What is more, Zionism was in good measure an aggressively secular ideology which developed conflicting and at times deprecatory attitudes toward rabbinic learning, the most esteemed form of knowledge in the traditional Jewish community.[12] Technical expertise, therefore, served two hallowed goals of the Zionist movement: It offered guidance for the great social restructuring that was to accompany mass immigration to Palestine, and it epitomized the secular knowledge that many Zionists felt would existentially transform the Jews into a people like the nations of the world.

The new Zionist immigrant community in Palestine conceived of expertise in terms similar to those employed by Zionist activists in the Diaspora. The ideas of occupational change and secular renewal were central to the ideology

of the socialist pioneer community. Technical knowledge was an essential attribute of a new Jewish ideal type, described by the Labor Zionist ideologue Berl Katznelson as *ha-matmid he-ḥadash*: the Jewish farmer who channels all the passion of a zealous yeshiva student, a *matmid*, into the study of agronomy. Eager to harness the forces of technological progress to the yoke of Zionist ideology, many of the pioneers engaged in scientific experiments and tinkered with new applications for farm machinery.[13] Yet despite this receptive attitude toward technology, the pioneers refused to accept the authority of experts external to the pioneer community. On its most basic level, the conflict took the form of a power struggle between the socialist youths and WZO-appointed farm managers, wherein the former demanded self-rule and easy access to land and farm inventory. However, as the sociologist Shaul Katz has written, the socialist pioneers were also asserting their right to produce and not merely passively accept scientific knowledge.[14] Limitations on autonomy in any form were unacceptable to the pioneers, and the WZO's settlement experts therefore were unable to maintain the lines of authority and deference that routinely characterized the relations between administrators and administered, between experts and laymen, in European society.

Although Zionists granted the need for experts in their national movement, the actual amount of power that experts wielded depended on a number of factors. There was an important distinction between technicians and technocrats within the WZO. The technocrats exercised substantive administrative power and, by virtue of the expertise which they claimed, were often able to act on their own initiative or to persuade the WZO's executive bodies to support settlement projects. The technicians merely applied their knowledge to the tasks with which they were charged. Until shortly before World War I, the WZO's most powerful technocrats were the German Jews Ruppin and Warburg; it was only during and after the war that the Labor-oriented Eastern European Jews rose to technocratic ranks.

One of the problems with the application of the epithet *technocrat* to the subjects of this book is the confusion that reigns in the popular imagination as to the relationship between technocracy, ideology, and politics. Technocracy is often associated with a distancing from ideology, following a purely instrumental as opposed to substantive rationality. Similarly, technocrats are seen as quintessentially apolitical. Such concepts distort reality. Technocrats in any society may support as well as serve ideological and political interests; this century has known revolutionary and reactionary technocrats as well as apolitical ones.[15] Dealing solely with the Zionist movement, nationalism, agrarian romanticism, and social utopianism are only some of the ideologies from which Zionist technocrats drew in order to construct their worldviews. Ideological and psychological factors do much to account for the entry of the settlement engineers into Zionism, especially for those who had attained or could attain affluence and prestige within general European society. We must be careful, moreover, not to adopt a schematic approach which draws a clear line between the realms of politics and administration. Several of the experts featured in this book held executive positions

in the WZO; Warburg, for example, was the nominal WZO president from 1911 until 1920. True, the settlement engineers displayed little interest in political power as such; power was merely a means toward the end of promoting Jewish colonization. But they all engaged in the rituals of modern Jewish politics: producing propaganda literature, riding the European Jewish lecture circuit, and taking an active part in the biennial Zionist congresses. The settlement engineers, therefore, embodied all the contradictory qualities of the modern technocrat: idealism couched in the language of pragmatism, and leadership ability presented in the form of administrative competence.

I.

The French Period

I.

PALESTINOPHILIA AND PEDAGOGY

French Jewish Philanthropies in Palestine, 1870–1908

Historians of Zionist settlement in Ottoman Palestine routinely rely on conceptual tools and frameworks created by the settlers themselves. Fundamental to the newcomers was the concept of immigration as ascent (*'aliya*); just as basic was the assumption that the development of the Yishuv was defined more by the make-up and immigration patterns of the settlers themselves than by any other phenomena. Already by the end of the Ottoman period, Jews in Palestine had created a Zionist chronology, featuring a First and Second 'Aliya (plural, *'Aliyot*), the former a reaction to the pogroms of 1881, the latter both a response to and an internalization of the revolutionary upheaval that shook Russia during the years surrounding 1905. Along with the chronology came a typology. Russian Jewish socialist youths who were the Second 'Aliya's most prominent members bequeathed to history the judgment that the First 'Aliya was bourgeois, unorganized, and sterile, whereas the Second was proletarian, mobilized, and productive.

In this book I wish to suggest both an alternative typology and chronology of Zionist settlement, the latter being the natural outgrowth of the former. If we realize that Jewish farmers in Ottoman Palestine were heavily dependent on aid from abroad for sustenance, it is necessary to explore to what measure the creation of the rural Yishuv fit the contours of the Jewish philanthropic and political organizations that funded it. By defining the construction of a new Jewish Palestine in terms of the subjects of aid and not its objects, the logical starting point for historical inquiry moves back to 1870, when the Alliance Israélite Universelle founded the first agricultural school, Mikve Yisra'el, in Palestine. The founding of Mikve Yisra'el set into motion a dynamic relationship between French Jewish philanthropies and Palestinian Jewry, a relationship that spanned the First and Second 'Aliyot but which had stalled by 1908, after which it was revived by the entrance onto the scene of the World Zionist Organization as a colonizing instrument.

During the period up to 1908, non-Zionist philanthropies were far more successful agents of Jewish settlement in Palestine than the Zionist enterprises sponsored by the Ḥovevei Ẓion (Lovers of Zion). French Jewish philanthropies

enjoyed financial resources and organizational freedoms not found in the Russian, Polish, and Rumanian lands that formed the bastion of Zionist sentiment. The wealth and avowed apoliticism of the French philanthropies put them in a better position than the Ḥovevei Ẓion to deal with Palestine's Ottoman rulers. Moreover, the philanthropic organizations possessed a tutelary, hierarchical quality which rendered them more receptive to the influence of technical authority than was the case with the products of the Ḥovevei Ẓion.

Our concern in this chapter, as throughout the book, is with rural, not urban, settlement. From the beginning of the Zionist movement through the establishment of the State of Israel, rural settlement was far more dependent upon philanthropic or public capital than was its urban counterpart. Urban growth did not require the constant nurturing and investments *à fonds perdus* that characterized agricultural colonization. Given that fully ninety percent of the Yishuv of 1900 lived in cities, it is clear that Palestine's cities had an absorptive capacity that the countryside lacked, and that immigrants could adjust themselves to city life far more easily than to agriculture. What is more, ideological considerations led the agents of Jewish colonization invariably to consider agriculture the most desirable occupation for Palestinian Jewry.

In 1870, the Yishuv numbered approximately 25,000. Conventional historiography, preserving the vocabulary of the Zionist settlers of the late nineteenth century, refers to this community as the "Old Yishuv," although it was not old at all. A minority were native Palestinians of Sephardic descent; the Ashkenazic majority consisted mainly of immigrants who had come from the 1840s on, although some of them could trace their roots to the late 1700s. This enlarged Yishuv created new urban settlements throughout Palestine, and many of its members entered the workforce as merchants and artisans. The Yishuv also benefited from the economic modernization of Palestine that had begun in the mid-nineteenth century as a result of Ottoman administrative reforms and the penetration of European capital. The majority of Palestinian Jewry, nonetheless, was dependent to a degree on charity from the Diaspora. What is more, the influx of pious Ashkenazic Jews helped preserve the Yishuv's traditional self-perception as a community of pilgrim-scholars whose highest duty was the study of sacred texts.[1]

This self-perception was not shared by many of the Palestinian Jews' coreligionists in Western Europe. Already before mid-century, the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala) had done much to weaken the traditional perception of the Holy Land as a sacred ruin, the focal point of Jewish consciousness, and a source of blessing to those who gave alms to its inhabitants. The flourishing of Jewish philanthropic endeavors in Palestine, the most famous being those begun by the English Jew Sir Moses Montefiore in 1839, attests to a continued attachment between Western and Palestinian Jewry. But the nature of the attachment had changed. Emancipated, secularizing Jews, internalizing the values of their host societies, developed a new kind of attitude toward Palestine, a love laced with pity for its impoverished inhabitants and embarrassment that the ancient

Jewish homeland, visited in ever increasing numbers by tourists from the West, should feature so wretched a community. Palestinian Jewry, it was believed, stood in dire need of improvement by the Diaspora's more progressive Jewish communities. Such a view attests to a Copernican revolution that had occurred within the Jewish psyche; Palestine had changed from a sacred subject into a degenerate object.[2]

This Western Jewish attachment to Palestine was not self-conscious. It was an inchoate Palestinophilia rather than a crystalized Zionism.[3] When confronted at the end of the nineteenth century with Zionism, Palestinophiles reacted with hostility. By asserting the Jews' cultural particularism and need for a homeland, Zionism delegitimized the normative desire of Western European Jews to acculturate and integrate into their lands of residence. Paradoxically, it was precisely the lack of cultural or political nationalist motifs that accounted for the developmental activism inherent in Western Palestinophilia. The revival of Hebrew letters produced by the Eastern European Haskala is often portrayed as a source of national awakening, but for the Zionist movement in Russia, destitute, persecuted, and disorganized, cultural activity was as likely to sublimate as to stimulate the desire for practical work in Palestine. Moreover, an influential line of Russian Jewish thought, reaching from the *maskil* Yehuda Leib Gordon to the cultural Zionist Aḥad ha-'Am, proclaimed that the spiritual redemption of the Jewish people, i.e., the development of a radically different cultural orientation, must precede physical redemption.[4] Western Jewish philanthropists possessed the funds and freedoms that Eastern Jews lacked, but they lacked the intimate knowledge of Jewish culture which the Eastern Jews possessed. Deprived of other outlets for the expression of their bond with the Jewish people and its Holy Land, Western Palestinophiles channeled their sentiments into systematic, "regenerative" work among Palestinian Jews.

Central to the concept of the improvement of Palestinian Jewry was the ideology of "productivization," the transfer of Jews from their traditional mercantile and financial occupations into agriculture and handicrafts. Calls for a Jewish occupational transformation were first made in France and the German lands during the late Enlightenment. Physiocratically oriented students of political economy believed that Jewish participation in the production of foodstuffs and manufactured goods would increase the national wealth. Jewish usury, it was argued, sapped the resources of the common people. Gentile demands that Jews adopt the traditional occupations of the non-Jewish masses continued throughout the nineteenth century, despite the fact that industrialization and urbanization promoted the growth of the distributive sector, created a new professional middle class, and weakened the appeal of handicrafts and agriculture as viable livelihoods. French and German Jews frequently accepted the gentile critique of Jewish economic behavior, partly out of a desire for social acceptance, and partly out of a sincere belief in the economic utility of the envisioned transformation. Like their non-Jewish neighbors, nineteenth-century French and German Jews founded vocational and agricultural schools for the economic improvement of the poorest among them.[5]

Also like non-Jews, the managers of Jewish vocational schools believed that occupational training was an act of moral, and not merely economic, improvement. European social reformers, decrying the allegedly demoralizing effects of industrialization on the laboring classes, believed that the skilled trades and farming would promote piety, sobriety, and sexual propriety. Jewish sponsorship of vocational training, then, was to some extent a joining up with the nineteenth century's moral crusade against the "social problem."[6] Yet the Jews' campaign for moral improvement had unique features. It responded not only to general social issues but to a specifically anti-Jewish critique, dating back to the Enlightenment, that centuries of concentration in petty commerce and moneylending had debased the Jewish spirit. Only occupational transformation, so the argument went, would enable Jews to rise up to the moral level of their neighbors.

All the organizations studied in this book absorbed the ideology of productivization and applied it to the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. The first organization to express and apply this ideology systematically was the Alliance Israélite Universelle, a Paris-based organization devoted to the cultural and political advancement of international, especially Oriental, Jewry. In its charter, the Alliance established a strong link between regeneration and education.[7] The Alliance's most enduring creation was a vast network of schools throughout the Middle East; those schools whose curricula did include vocational training employed it as a means of molding children into enlightened and upright citizens as well as productive ones.[8]

The Alliance's equation of philanthropy, education, and moral improvement is of the utmost importance for understanding the development of Palestine's first agricultural school. In the mid-1860s, the leadership of the Alliance began to express interest in the promotion of agriculture among Palestinian Jews as a means of "regenerating" them. In 1869, Charles Netter, a Jewish merchant of Alsatian origin and an Alliance activist, returned from a trip to Palestine with a recommendation that the Alliance found an agricultural school (*ferme école*) in that land. Unlike other Palestinophilic dreamers of his time, who wished to found colonies for native or immigrant Jews, Netter insisted that philanthropic energy be expended on schools for malleable youth, not colonies for adults hardened in their dissolute ways.[9] There was some confusion about the role that such a school in Palestine would play in the Alliance's Middle Eastern program as a whole. Although placed in Palestine and targeted ostensibly at its Jews, the school was seen as a magnet that would attract and regenerate Middle Eastern Jewry as a whole. Netter appears to have seen such a school as the first step toward an eventual large-scale immigration of Oriental Jews into Palestine, an immigration in whose promotion the Alliance was to play a vital role.[10] Such ideas are not surprising given the Alliance's secularized Palestinophilia, which envisioned a regenerated Zion radiating Enlightenment the way the Zion of old radiated Torah.

The Alliance directors accepted Netter's proposal for the school, and in 1870 Netter leased 2,400 dunams of land southeast of Jaffa. The school, named Mikve Yisra'el, opened with little fanfare and was starved for funds during its first

three years. Supported mostly by Netter himself and a couple of benefactors, Mikve Yisra'el was firmly established only at the end of 1873, when Baron Maurice de Hirsch gave the Alliance one million francs, most of the interest on which was allocated to the school.[11] Thereafter, the network of Alliance activists in England and France began to pay increasing attention to the *ferme école.* By the late 1870s, Mikve Yisra'el was on the way to becoming the apple of the Alliance's eye, described by one contemporary as "the most important of the Alliance's vocational institutions, which has cost the greatest sacrifices and attracted the greatest public attention."[12]

The agricultural program developed at Mikve Yisra'el between 1870 and 1882 was determined more by the Alliance's educational goals than by any practical considerations about the effect of the school on the Yishuv. The school's graduates were unable to enter the Arab agricultural labor force and either left Palestine or picked up work as hostlers and porters.[13] Yet despite the school's failure as an institute of vocational training, it was a remarkable success as a source of agricultural innovation. Netter had no agricultural experience, and the farm's original crop pattern, featuring grains, vines, vegetables, and orchards, merely reflected an ideological predilection for subsistence farming. But Netter soon changed his tune and began to explore the prospect of creating a sophisticated export-oriented agriculture based on cash crops. As a result, by 1873 Mikve Yisra'el had planted such luxury crops as strawberries and asparagus, and Netter called for the raising of citrus fruit, perfume flowers, and wine for export.[14]

There were complex motives behind this shift. During Mikve Yisra'el's first year, Netter literally threw himself into his work; he took part in the harvest and threshing of the wheat crop. The exhausting labor, its meager returns, and close contact with the Arab sharecroppers who, for lack of Jewish labor, tilled most of Mikve Yisra'el's grain fields may well have convinced him that it was not the Alliance's goal to transform Jews into dirt farmers. "Wheat," Netter decided, "cannot provide as good results as vegetable gardening and arboreal cultures." Market gardening and fruit culture for export alone would provide the Jew with the standard of living he expects.[15] This may not have been the only reason for the change in program, however. As we will see below in the case of Sejera, the training farm established by the Paris-based Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), profits were valued as proof of the viability of Jewish farming. Moreover, the ideology of productivization, as expressed first by Netter and then by the JCA's administration and staff, saw in profits signs of diligence, thrift, and efficiency, hence of moral regeneration.

In keeping with his educational and developmental missions, Netter brought European technicians to Mikve Yisra'el in the belief that their techniques were superior to native ways. Perhaps the most outstanding technician during the school's early years was a *jardinier* named Beaudrier, who came to Palestine from Nice in 1874. Beaudrier made extensive use of grafting for grape vines and fruit trees, and he shared Netter's enthusiasm for the import of foreign cultures that might flourish in Palestinian soil. The most common sources of these new cultures were meridional France and Algeria.[16] Vines came from both lands; the euca-

lyptus tree, "whose rapid growth attracted the attention of the Algerian colonists," was introduced in 1873.[17] (Unlike technicians in Palestine in the 1890s, Netter and Beaudrier did not see in the eucalyptus a weapon in the fight against malaria; like the *colons* in Algeria, they prized the tree as an abundant source of wood.)[18]

No doubt Mikve Yisra'el's pleasant gardens and nurseries, filled with exotic cultures, impressed the steady stream of Alliance activists who visited from Europe. The school continued to grow under the directors whom Netter appointed after returning to Europe in 1873. But it remained an isolated entity, of little practical benefit to the Yishuv. Its graduates could not transmit their newfound agricultural knowledge because there was no one to whom to transmit it. In 1882, Netter, seeking to expand Mikve Yisra'el's scope, conferred with Baron Edmond de Rothschild, a Palestinophilic philanthropist who was intrigued by Netter's cash-crop scenario for creating well-to-do Jewish farmers. The two planned to establish a small colony at or near Mikve with Rothschild money, but Netter's death in October of that year forced Rothschild to change his plans.[19]

Netter's ideology and agricultural program would live on in the activity undertaken by Baron Rothschild on behalf of colonies founded by Eastern European Jews between 1882 and 1884. Beginning in the mid-eighties, the *ferme école* Mikve Yisra'el would begin to play an important role as the training ground for the technicians and administrators who managed the colonies under Rothschild's control. But before moving on to the next link in the French Jewish chain of tradition, we must pause to consider the new objects of French Jewish beneficence, the Eastern European immigrants of the First 'Aliya.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the productivization ethos born of the Western European Haskala had implanted itself among the Jews of the Russian Empire. Like its predecessor, the Eastern European Haskala valued occupational transformation as a vehicle of economic improvement, moral regeneration, and eventual social integration. Nor did the Eastern Haskala lack the apologetic strain so prominent in the West; antisemitism aroused a yearning to prove to the Slavic host that Jews were capable of performing rigorous manual labor and wresting a living out of the soil.[20] Despite these similarities, productivization ideology developed differently in the East, as did its application to the land of Israel. Whereas nineteenth-century Western Jewry underwent a process of embourgeoisement, Russo-Polish Jewry was largely proletarianized. This desperate economic situation, coupled with the general backwardness of the Russian economy, lent realism and mass appeal to the *maskilim*'s call for a shift into agriculture. (The imperial government was deluged by Jewish responses to its sporadic offerings of farmland in the Pale of Settlement.)[21] For Russian Jewry, therefore, productivization ideology was populist, whereas its Western counterpart was elitist. In the West, the objects of Jewish philanthropy were looked upon as wards of a benevolent guardian; in the East, the subjects and objects were one and the same.

Coupled with the heightened urgency and appeal of Eastern European pro-

ductivization ideology was an attachment to the Holy Land that rarely secularized itself as fully as in the case of Western Palestinophilia. Traditional Jewish beliefs in the sanctity of the physical land of Israel blended with an activist productivization ideology to produce a sentimental yearning for the agrarian life in a land whose soil was inherently fruitful. Moreover, the love of Zion developed from the 1860s by Eastern European Jews and Palestinian Jews of Eastern European origin possessed overt spiritual and at times messianic elements, the latter popularized by the rabbi Ẓvi Hirsch Kalischer in his tract *Derishat Ẓion* (Seeking Zion) of 1862. Orthodox rabbis played an important role during the first years of Russian Zionism, during which the maskilim in the leading ranks of the Ḥovevei Ẓion were more likely to modify than radically transform traditional Jewish attitudes toward the Holy Land.[22]

Such was the cumbersome ideological baggage carried by the founders of modern Palestine's first Jewish agricultural colony, Petaḥ Tikva. In 1878, a group of Ashkenazic Palestinian Jews settled on a parcel of land northeast of Jaffa. On one level, the settlers' mentalities were traditional and their motives pragmatic. Agriculture was perceived as a means of furnishing sustenance to the Orthodox Yishuv and of enabling the performance of biblical commandments connected with the cultivation of the land of Israel (*ha-miẓvot ha-taluiyot ba-areẓ*). In pursuit of these goals, the land could be worked by Arabs so long as its owners and chief beneficiaries were Jews. On another level, however, radical influences were at work in the settlers' psyches. Despite the physical difficulty of cereal culture and an ongoing depression in grain prices, the settlers refused to engage in any form of agriculture save for the cultivation of field crops. They did so because of the Haskala's representation, itself borrowed from the general Eastern European environment, of grain growing as the purest form of agriculture. The founders of Petaḥ Tikva also refused to use local agricultural tools, as they saw the Palestinian Arab peasant as backward and decadent. The Jewish settlers therefore insisted on using European agricultural technology, epitomized by the heavy Central European plow, which was ineffective in the light Palestinian soil.[23]

Petaḥ Tikva was abandoned by 1881, but the social-transformative aspects of its program were perpetuated in a cluster of colonies founded by Russo-Polish and Rumanian Jews during two wavelets of immigration to Palestine, in 1882-84 and 1890-91. (The term *First 'Aliya* refers primarily to these two wavelets but covers the entire time span from 1882 to 1903.) During the two periods, persecution and economic hardship in Russia and Rumania and circumvention of the Ottoman government's restrictive immigration policies caused some 30,000 Jewish immigrants to enter Palestine. Of the 25,000 who stayed in the land, by 1900 approximately 5,000 of them lived in the countryside, either on farms or in plantation colonies.[24] Unlike most of the vast immigrant pool of Eastern European Jewry, the members of the rural Yishuv possessed some capital. They perceived themselves not as refugees from persecution but as a self-sacrificing, idealistic vanguard engaged in an act of national revival (although the exact goal of that revival often remained unclear). The settlers represented the most

adventurous of the Ḥovevei Ẓion, the name attached to an informal network of Jewish nationalist societies that sprang up in the wake of the 1881 pogroms and which was officially constituted in 1884.[25] The Ḥovevei Ẓion were by no means united on the question of the best form that Jewish settlement was to take. As a whole, Eastern European Zionist notables expressed a maskilic and romantic preference for agriculture, and cereal culture in particular, as the occupation of choice for the inhabitants of the new Yishuv. At the same time, merchants such as the tea magnate Chaim Wissotzky were concerned lest Jewish farmers be frozen into economic immobility, and therefore they advocated manufacturing and commercial projects.[26]

Any analysis of the agricultural program of the first Zionist settlers must take care not to assume that the leaders of the Ḥovevei Ẓion spoke for the pioneers themselves or even for the Zionist rank and file in Russia. The settlers conceived of themselves as bearers of an advanced European civilization in a backward land and emulated the German Templars, whose colony Sharona, founded in 1871, featured a sophisticated blend of plantation, cereal, fodder, and orchard crops as well as vegetable and dairy farming. Drawing on the Templar model, Russian agricultural practices, and the biblical agrarian ideal, the colonists planted vines and potatoes as well as grains.[27] Moreover, for all the sentimentality inherent in the biblical ideal of "every man under his vine," those Ḥovevei Ẓion who seriously considered emigration in the early 1890s conceived of agriculture as a commercial enterprise and supported a settlement program, conceived by the agronomist Menaḥem Meirovitch, centered around export-based viticulture.[28]

As a group, the pioneers of the First 'Aliya were woefully inexperienced. There were a few agricultural teachers on hand, but their presence could not save novice farmers struggling to survive in an alien and hostile environment. Infertile land, isolated locations, and malaria all took their toll on the pioneers. Manmade obstacles compounded the natural ones; Palestine's Ottoman rulers imposed harsh immigration and land-purchase restrictions. Bribery could at times circumvent these restrictions, but the costs were high and the results unpredictable.[29] Given these problems, the funds that the settlers brought with them were quickly exhausted, and the Ḥovevei Ẓion could contribute only paltry sums to their maintenance. (Total Ḥovevei Ẓion expenditures on colonization between 1882 and 1899 were approximately two million francs, five percent of the amount invested by Baron Rothschild.)[30] To make things worse, the Ḥovevei Zion's settlement operations were clandestine; the czarist government granted them licit status only in 1890. Those settlers who had looked optimistically at the Templar colony as proof of the feasibility of Palestinian agriculture did not perceive that Sharona was peopled by experienced farmers and adequately funded; even with that, the colony had suffered much during its first years.[31]

All of these problems may have rendered the failure of the first Zionist settlements inevitable. But even if these obstacles had not been quite so overwhelming, the administrative techniques of the colonists and the Ḥovevei Ẓion as a whole would have jeopardized the chances for systematic, successful colo-

nization. The long history of antagonism between the colonists and the administration imposed by Baron Rothschild on the colonies dependent on his largesse testifies to the settlers' zealous anti-authoritarianism and yearning for self-rule. Such sentiments reflected both traditional Jewish communalism and radical populist influences. Unfortunately, this feverish democratic spirit, displayed at the outset of the settlement enterprise, only contributed to the disorder that plagued the first colonies. Samarin (later renamed Zikhron Ya'akov) was to be administered via a chain of command reaching from Rumania to Palestine, but disputes between settlers and the appointed administration broke out almost immediately. Within less than a year the settlers had taken over the management of the colony, which was on the verge of collapse.[32] Moreover, the leaders of the Odessa Committee of the Ḥovevei Ẓion, founded in 1890 to support "farmers and artisans in Syria and Palestine," shared the colonists' distaste for administered settlement. In 1896, the Odessa Committee took over an existing colony and renamed it Be'er Tuvia. Seeking to avoid the kind of oppressive administration found in the Rothschild colonies, the Odessa Committee removed Be'er Tuvia's manager and agronomist after one season, thereby leaving the colony without effective guidance or access to badly needed technical knowledge.[33]

The administrative problems of the Odessa Committee were twofold: it had at its disposal few people with the experience or competence to direct settlement, and people who possessed technical knowledge were not placed in positions of authority. Executive responsibilities were held by belle-lettrists such as Aḥad ha-'Am and Moshe Leib Lilienblum, a man described by the historian Shulamit Laskov as having "no flair for action. . . . He would weigh every matter over and over, grinding it into dust, and a far-reaching program would turn into a minor matter."[34] The Ḥovevei Ẓion did not lack technical advisors. There was a close relationship between the Ḥovevei Ẓion and the agronomist Meirovitch, one of the first pioneers of the New Yishuv and a leading figure at Rishon le-Ẓion. For a period in the mid 1880s, Meirovitch assisted the director of the Ḥovevei Ẓion's Jaffa Office, and in 1903-1904 he served as the Odessa Committee's Palestinian representative.[35] The agronomist Avraham Sussman accompanied Aḥad ha-'Am on his Palestinian tours of 1898 and 1900, and another agronomist, Akiva Ettinger, toured Palestine in 1903 at the Odessa Committee's behest.[36] Yet such men did not substantively influence the Ḥovevei Ẓion's settlement policy. Most intriguing, Menaḥem Ussishkin, an engineer by training and director of the Odessa Committee, paid little attention to the vast technical challenges posed by the attempt to colonize Jews in Palestine. Throughout the period of the First 'Aliya, Ussishkin focused his energies on land purchase and the development of Zionist political and educational institutions, and neglected tasks such as the agricultural training of potential immigrants or the probing of the Palestinian ecology.[37]

Unlike future agents of Zionist colonization, the Odessa Committee did not legitimize technical knowledge as a vehicle for gaining administrative power. The Ḥovevei Ẓion counted technicians among its ranks, but no technocrats. Technocracy is elitist and statist; it presupposes hierarchy, centralization, and

clear lines of authority. But Russian Zionism of the 1880s and 1890s was gripped by a visceral populism, which rejected externally imposed authority of all kinds and demanded that every issue be decided by the tribunes of the people. Unlike mainstream Russian populism, which could maintain a positive attitude toward the state as the partner of the *narod* in the transition to socialism, Jewish populism firmly rejected the statist ideology that had been integral to the Haskala. Jewish populism instead returned to and amplified the traditional Jewish conception of the state as an object of fear.[38] As opposed to the German Jews we will examine later, who identified strongly with the imperial state and eagerly adapted its administrative techniques to the Zionist enterprise, the Russian Ḥovevei Ẓion turned inward for models and inspiration. All these factors account for the antitechnocratic quality of the Russian Ḥovevei Ẓion's programs for Jewish settlement in Palestine. Calling for democratic management of the colonization enterprise, and glorifying the individual bourgeois settler acting entirely out of his own volition, such approaches left little room for systematic planning.

The neglect of technical matters was but one symptom of the Ḥovevei Ẓion's inability to formulate colonization plans that recognized the vast scale and scope of the enterprise which they had initiated. Not only Aḥad ha-'Am and Lilienblum but even the agronomist Meirovitch overlooked the need for public capital in the construction of the Yishuv. The *ba'al bayit*, the bourgeois immigrant with money to invest, was regarded as the pillar of future settlement. An example of the result of such an attitude comes from Be'er Tuvia. Although the Odessa Committee had intended the colony for agricultural laborers without means, Aḥad ha-'Am subjected it to a stubborn and destructive parsimony, to the point of refusing funds for holdings for the colony's grown children.[39]

In a parallel manner, the colonists of the First 'Aliya lacked clear political goals for the Yishuv which they were creating. Unlike those members of the Second 'Aliya who founded the Zionist labor movement, the leaders of the First 'Aliya failed to form effective regional or national organizations that could serve as the nuclei of a new Jewish polity. Many of the settlers who immigrated for idealistic reasons (i.e., they could have gone to Western Europe or America but deliberately chose Palestine) did so out of a mixture of nationalist and religious motivations that had not crystalized into a political form. The idealism of such pioneers was directed toward individual self-realization and national consciousness raising, not political mobilization. For the associations of Jewish agricultural workers that sprang up during the First 'Aliya, the goal of organization was the acquisition of land on which to settle as independent farmers, not, as it would be for the founders of Labor Zionism, the formation of trade unions or political parties.[40]

The case of the Bilu, an organization of radical Zionist youth centered in Kharkov, and which produced the first pioneers of the new Yishuv, presents an exception to this generalization about the First 'Aliya. The Biluim considered themselves to be the avant-garde of a national resurrection that would culminate in the founding of a Jewish state. But out of an organization of five hundred,

fourteen Biluim emigrated to Palestine, and the group's numbers in Palestine never passed fifty or so. Unskilled and penniless, they worked as day laborers at Mikve Yisra'el and Rishon le-Ẓion, until in 1883 the Jerusalem philanthropist Shlomo Pines, using funds from the Ḥovevei Ẓion, purchased land for what would become the Bilu settlement of Gedera. In time, the settlement flourished, but the Biluim themselves founded no new colonies and did not as a group represent a dynamic force in the Yishuv.[41] As the case of the Biluim shows, political vision counted for little without organization, money, and know-how. The material salvation of the rural Yishuv was to come neither from Kharkov nor Odessa but from Paris; the origins of the Yishuv's technical class would come not from the directors of the Odessa Committee but from Baron Edmond de Rothschild.

As mentioned above, in the summer of 1882, Charles Netter met with Baron Rothschild to discuss possible colonization experiments in Palestine. Also present at these meetings was August Dugourd, a Christian agronomist with experience in Egypt and Algeria. The presence of both Netter and Dugourd, the self-proclaimed educator and the colonial technician, points to the complex set of influences and models that would drive Rothschild's colonization activity.

On one level, Rothschild can be seen as a philanthropist who perpetuated the educational ideology of the Alliance while expanding its scope. Like Netter, Rothschild blended a humanitarian concern for impoverished Jews with an interest in fostering economic independence and moral improvement in the objects of his beneficence. Also like Netter, he rejected institutional and ideological Zionism while dreaming of establishing Jewish farmers on Palestinian soil. In keeping with standard Palestinophilic sentiment, Rothschild saw in agriculture the most ennobling form of labor; although at first supportive of crafts at Rishon le-Ẓion, he angrily withdrew his support when he suspected the colonists of seeking to avoid toil in the fields.[42] Unlike the Alliance, for which Mikve Yisra'el and its other Palestinian projects were but part of a vast network, Rothschild was willing to invest heavily in the future of Palestinian agriculture. A little over a year after extending a small grant to Rishon le-Ẓion in 1882, Rothschild assumed control over it and three other floundering settlements. By 1890, nine of the rural Yishuv's eleven colonies were under his control.

Rothschild believed that massive investments in technology and social services were a necessary prerequisite for independent Jewish farmers. Given these needs and the Jewish settlers' inexperience with agriculture, he felt, a centralized, hierarchical administration over the colonies was essential. Rothschild saw no conflict between the enormous sums involved (over nine million francs by 1890) and the fussy, penny-pinching attitude which his administrators often took with colonists. Public expenditure was needed to regenerate the land of Israel; the strictest private economy was needed to regenerate the children of Israel.[43] The ideology of productivization was shared by Rothschild's administrative staff, which, despite its motley origins in the Middle East, Alsace, and Eastern Europe, shared the imprint of an Alliance education. Mikve Yisra'el was a particularly

rich source of administrators, technicians, and agricultural laborers for the colonies.[44]

Even the crop patterns found in most of the colonies by the late 1880s appear to reflect Netter's cash-crop scenario of 1873 and the ideological assumptions behind it. At his meetings with Netter in 1882, Rothschild approved of Netter's plan for export-oriented agriculture. As Simon Schama has argued in his study of Rothschild, the baron displayed an inordinate fondness for growths such as grapes for fine wines, oranges for marmalade, and mulberry trees for silkworms, and ignored his administrators' pleas to lay in legumes and cereals.[45] Yet it should be noted that the transition from a grain- to an export-based agriculture was gradual; despite Rothschild's meeting of minds with Netter in 1882, it took five years or so of poor returns from the grain-based colonies before the transition to large-scale viticulture was made. What is more, even by the end of the decade, by which time the vine had come to symbolize the Rothschild endeavor, cereal crops continued to be widely grown in the original colonies and were often the central crop of new settlements founded by Rothschild himself.[46] In other words, the Rothschild colonies experienced between 1882 and 1887 what Mikve Yisra'el did between 1870 and 1873: disappointing results from grains which prompted a turn to cash crops as a source of a profitable agriculture.

Although Rothschild valued Mikve Yisra'el as a source of agricultural advisors, he extended the rural Yishuv's technical capacity by building up a staff of engineers, botanists, and agronomists. The most influential members of this technical corps were Christians trained in France and with work experience in meridional France or France's African possessions.[47] To a certain extent, Rothschild's technicians attempted to mold the colonies along the lines of their former experience. The horticulturally trained *jardiniers* promoted a wide variety of orchard crops and carried on with the grafting experiments first performed at Mikve Yisra'el.[48] While the *jardiniers* approved of the original colonists' experiments with vines and recommended their extension, oenologists assured Rothschild of the viability of winemaking in the Holy Land.[49] The mixture of vines and field crops found in the Jewish colonies strongly resembles Algerian patterns, for the agricultural modernization of that country in the mid-nineteenth century brought with it the intensification of both cereal culture and viticulture.[50] The systematic research and experimentation carried out by Rothschild's technicians reflect the growth from the early 1880s of French governmental support for experiment stations and model farms.[51]

Given the presence of this technical staff, busily importing French and colonial agricultural technology into Palestine, there is reason to believe that the Rothschild enterprise was influenced as much by foreign models as it was by the internal logic of the Western Jewish ideology of productivization. But one must draw a distinction between foreign models and foreign ideals. Rothschild's vision of prosperous Jewish *propriétaires* did not necessarily correspond to the economic realities confronting the genuine rural folk of the Midi. Blighted by disease and other crises, the vine and the silkworm brought little profit to the southern French peasantry; it was in these regions that subsistence farming remained

strongest.[52] Rothschild's program was based on an idealized Mediterranean cash-crop-based agriculture; his model blended the French ideal type of a stable peasantry with a Saint-Simonian technophilia. And underneath it all lurked the Jewish variant of agrarian romanticism, the ideology of productivization.

The clearest example of the transplantation of foreign technology to the Rothschild colonies is not the vine, which had a place in the original settlers' Zionist vocabulary, but the exotic eucalyptus tree. Introduced into Palestine in 1873, the tree became associated in the following decades with the fight against malaria, which ravaged the Jewish colonies. At the time, a great deal of confusion reigned as to the causes of the dreaded disease. Although the organism that caused malaria had been found in 1880, no one knew how it was transmitted, and the belief persisted that malaria was caused by poisonous emanations from stagnant water. A firm link between the anopheles mosquito and the transmission of the parasite was made only in 1898; no technician working in Palestine up to 1900 seems to have been aware of this discovery. The weapon against malaria most familiar to technicians of the First 'Aliya was the eucalyptus tree. At the time, the eucalyptus was planted in Algeria, Italy, and other malaria-stricken lands both for its unusual absorptive capacity and for what sources of the time called the "aromatic exhalations of its leaves," which were believed to purify "the malarial miasmas."[53]

This murky understanding of malaria and of the eucalyptus's prophylactic powers was transmitted intact into Palestine. The case of Ḥadera, an independent colony whose inhabitants undertook eucalyptus plantings in 1895, provides a useful example. In 1896, the financially strapped colonists turned to Rothschild for aid in their losing battle against swamp fever. The administration at nearby Zikhron Ya'akov both drained swampy land at Ḥadera and ringed it with a *cordon sanitaire* of eucalyptus. In 1898, the administration decided to follow the Algerian model of planting eucalyptus directly in swamps to promote drainage rather than carry out laborious canalization. Throughout this massive operation, involving the planting of 250,000 trees by 1899, the people on the scene offered contradictory, even self-contradictory, opinions as to whether their goal was drainage, the production of healing vapors, or both.[54] But regardless of their precise intentions, it is noteworthy that Rothschild's technicians threw into their efforts the most advanced technology available at the time, and which had been implemented on a global scale.

The Rothschild administration's infusion of money and foreign technology into Palestine created a Jewish foothold in rural Palestine. It was an act of *creatio ex nihilo*, and of inestimable importance for the future development of the Yishuv. But for all its achievements, the Rothschild experiment failed, more for social than for technical reasons. The rigid administrative system robbed the colonists of initiative. When revolts against the administration in the late 1880s were met with threats of a total withdrawal of support, the colonists sank into a sullen docility. The colonies were also notorious for their heavy reliance on Arab labor. This was largely the case because the colonies' vineyards and orchards required far more laborers than the pool of Jewish agricultural workers could provide. It

was in fact a standing Rothschild policy to prefer Jewish to Arab labor. But Jewish laborers began to find work harder to get after the revolts of the late 1880s, which made Jewish workers suspect in the eyes of the colonial administrators. What is more, the baron, feeling that the Jews had bitten the hand that fed them, began in the 1890s to cut back on his own operations, thus throwing many Jews out of work.[55]

Despite Rothschild's efforts to create financially independent Jewish farmers, the opposite occurred, for a variety of reasons. Some of the cash crops, such as citrus, were making a handsome profit by the end of the century, but others, most notably wine, were far too costly to compete in the international marketplace and were bought up entirely by the baron at an inflated price.[56] Grouping the individual farmers within a colony into a single economic unit gave the appearance that the colonies were running in the black. But each colony featured starveling as well as successful farmers, and without the baron's subsidies even the successful ones would have found it difficult to survive. In 1897, one of the baron's technicians called for a restructuring of Petaḥ Tikva into a smallholders' cooperative village, wherein each colonist would receive enough land and seed to raise a particular crop at a profitable economy of scale and then pool his resources with other members of the colony.[57] But here, as in other cases where colonists, plagued by hardships and limited resources, experimented with cooperative agriculture, the baron offered no support.[58] He was downright hostile to the Biluim, the socialist pioneers of the early 1880s, and refused to subsidize their socialist experiments.[59] By the late 1890s the baron had wearied of Palestinian embroilments altogether.

In addition to thwarting initiatives from the colonists, the Rothschild administration limited the constructive potential of the technicians themselves. Out of some forty *jardiniers*, only the five Christian horticulturalists held administrative power. In general, the technicians were subordinate to the administrators, whose levels of technical expertise fluctuated greatly. Besides, Rothschild was as likely to ignore the advice of any member of his staff as he was to take it.[60] His insistence, despite widespread protests from below, on making an expensive fine wine rather than a cheap but potable *vin ordinaire* is but one case in point.[61] After all, the Rothschild machine was nothing but a philanthropy, subject to the whims of the great benefactor, who ruled over his enterprise as the *Herr im Hause*.

The Rothschild administration subsumed technocratic elements, drawn from French and colonial models of the relationship between the state and agriculture, under the unifying structure of a private philanthropy. A belief in the need for infrastructures fueled by public capital, investments in research and development, and the fructifying power of technical knowledge all characterized the Rothschild system, but so did paternalism and autocracy. To a large extent, this mixture of technocratic and philanthropic organizational structures was preserved when, in 1900, Rothschild placed his colonies under the administration of the Paris-based Jewish Colonization Association, which had been founded by the railroad entrepreneur Baron Maurice de Hirsch in 1891. But as we shall see, the JCA

unleashed an administrative and technological revolution in the Yishuv, one at least as great as that caused by Rothschild himself.

Classical Zionist historiography drew a distinction between Rothschild, who emerged as a Zionist *malgré lui* as well as a great benefactor, and the JCA, which was depicted as a thoroughly antinationalist organization obsessed with cutting costs.[62] The JCA bore the onus for slashing or eliminating the subsidies that Rothschild had provided his colonists, thereby forcing some farmers to emigrate, while many who did remain assumed the status of tenant farmers on JCA estates, burdened by ever-increasing debts to the association. More recent accounts note that as administrative expenses shrank, so did the job market for Jewish agricultural laborers. Although the tenants were unable to farm their holdings on their own, the JCA's obsession with rentability discouraged the hiring of Jewish workers, who demanded a higher wage and were less experienced than Arabs. So while the JCA's administrators spoke with one voice against the evils of Arab labor and accused the Jewish settlers of laziness for employing Arabs to do work they could allegedly be doing themselves, Arab labor flourished in the JCA colonies.[63]

Despite its acknowledgment of the JCA's failings, the newer literature tends to be sympathetic, arguing that the JCA sought to realize Rothschild's original vision of independent Jewish agriculturalists but perceived a need to adopt radically different means.[64] The *Commission Palestinienne* (CP), that section of the JCA which administered the Rothschild colonies, not only reduced subsidies and administrative costs in the colonies but also implanted into the Yishuv a more varied and rational agriculture. In the north, the emphasis was on subsistence: grains, legumes, olives, fodder crops, and some dairy farming. In the south, vineyards made way for citrus and almond groves. (In 1914, Petaḥ Tikva accounted for over half of Palestine's citrus exports.)[65] Despite its penny-pinching attitude toward the colonists, the JCA bought land and established new settlements in Palestine, in a never-ceasing quest to make the rural Yishuv a going concern. In pursuit of this goal, the JCA collaborated with Zionist colonizing agents, despite its constant denials of sympathy for Jewish nationalism in any form.[66]

This much is known from the work of other historians; what remains unclear, however, is the degree to which the JCA's activity and ideology developed independently from Rothschild. Although Rothschild was a powerful figure in the CP and funded its operations, one should bear in mind that the JCA had a full Palestinian portfolio that predated the transfer of 1900 and existed alongside it thereafter. Likewise, its approaches to and justifications for Jewish colonization in Palestine were no mere reflection of Rothschild's will. Even more than Rothschild, the JCA operated within the paradigm of the educational ideology of the Alliance; its accomplishments as well as its palpable limitations resulted from a strict application of that ideology to the rural Yishuv. Under the JCA's rule, the teacher-technician became an authority figure, although one still confined within a hierarchical and static framework.

The story of the JCA's Palestinian activity goes back to 1896, the year in which Baron de Hirsch died. Hirsch had designed the JCA to facilitate Jewish emigration from Russia and to construct Jewish agricultural colonies in Argentina.[67] But shortly after Hirsch's death, the new president of the JCA, Narcisse Leven, spearheaded a drive to expand the JCA's scope to include both Eastern European Jewry's homelands and those destinations for immigrants that were considered desirable (i.e., the New World and Palestine, but not Western Europe). Leven was also president of the Alliance, and he lost no time entering into a spirited correspondence with the director of Mikve Yisra'el, Joseph Niégo, regarding possible JCA activity in Palestine and the role that the *ferme école* would play therein. Niégo proposed that Mikve Yisra'el be the seedbed for a wide-ranging colonization program; the JCA immediately pumped 60,000 francs into the school.[68] The ties between the two organizations became even closer at the end of 1897, when Niégo was officially appointed agricultural advisor to the JCA in Palestine. The JCA already had an administrative official in the land, David Haim, who moved to Mikve Yisra'el in order to work more efficiently with his friend and colleague Niégo.[69]

Although the JCA's directorium contained critics of a heavy Palestinian involvement, Leven, invariably allied with Zadok Kahn, the chief rabbi of France, pushed the directorium in the direction he wanted. At such meetings, Leven routinely invoked the reports by Niégo, who toured Palestine and made recommendations about aid to be given to colonies which operated outside Rothschild's umbrella.[70] Niégo recommended both cash loans and additional land purchases to increase the colonies' agricultural bounty. The directorium sometimes whittled down Niégo's figures, but by 1900, the JCA had spent over one million francs on such allocations.[71] A more controversial project, and one with greater implications for the Yishuv, was Niégo's proposal in 1898 that the JCA purchase 50,000 acres of land, to be the site of future settlements, in the Haifa-Nazareth-Tiberias triangle. This proposal produced a tie in the directorium with Leven casting the tie-breaking vote. By 1900, 600,000 francs had been allocated to the purchase of some 9,000 acres, approximately half of which was in the vicinity of the Arab village of Sejera and was to be the site of a training farm for agricultural workers.[72]

Niégo initiated or shaped virtually all the JCA's settlement policies during the pre-Rothschild years. He was the first Jewish technician in Palestine to wield such wide-ranging influence. He won the confidence of the JCA because of both his impeccable credentials (an Alliance education in his native Turkey, followed by studies in Paris and at the viticultural academy in Montpelier) and his peculiar character traits. Niégo appealed to the JCA's hierarchical sensibilities by simultaneously swearing fealty to his *patron* and treating Palestinian Jewry with an appropriate mixture of solicitude and scorn.[73] Moreover, he combined an unbounded developmental spirit with a claim to ideological neutrality. In his reports, Niégo expressed disappointment with the limited nature of JCA involvement in Palestine; he longed to see training farms, estates, and colonies spring up throughout the land. But these outbursts were accompanied by repeated

denials of being "either Zionist or Palestinophile or any other idealist of that ilk."[74] In making these disavowals, Niégo, like the pantomime queen in *Hamlet*, protested too much. Not only did his actions at the turn of the century betray a strong Palestinophilic sentiment, but also he went on to form close ties with Turkish Zionists after the Young Turk Revolution, when he served as president of the Istanbul lodge of B'nai B'rith.[75] During the period with which we are dealing, however, the complexity of Niégo's feelings about Palestine escaped the JCA directors, who regarded the agronomist as an exemplary technician, devoted to human progress, highly skilled, and value-free.

The JCA expressed its approval of Niégo by declaring to its representative Haim that only Niégo, by virtue of his technical training, was competent to pass judgment on settlement matters. Throughout 1898 and 1899, as Niégo continued to shoulder Haim out of decision making, tensions between the two men grew to the boiling point.[76] Finally, in November of 1899, Haim bolted from Mikve Yisra'el and fled to Sejera (taking with him all the JCA supplies, thereby forcing an abashed Niégo to write to his superiors on inappropriate stationery).[77] While at Sejera, Haim composed a systematic plan for the training farm to be established there; he suggested a combination of an administered regime for unskilled workers and a sharecroppers' colony for those who had proved themselves. The JCA angrily dismissed this plan as an act of supererogation on Haim's part.[78] A similar proposal came in April 1900 from Chaim Kalvarisky, an agronomist and a former teacher at Mikve Yisra'el who had been transferred from his post at another colony to administer Sejera. This time the proposal was accepted with alacrity.[79]

Once the JCA got over its pique at Haim and accepted Kalvarisky's proposal, enthusiasm for it mounted quickly. Niégo commented that the idea had been close to Leven's heart for years. As early as 1896, Emil Meyerson, chair of the CP, had suggested the establishment of what he called a "workers' farm" in Palestine; he now wrote that that Kalvarisky's project represented something "entirely new," based on a "very different model from other Palestinian colonies."[80] Throughout the farm's first year, JCA officials referred to the farm as a "nursery of future colonists," the most important as well as the most costly of the JCA's Palestinian domains.[81] The parallels to Mikve Yisra'el, the darling of the Alliance, are obvious. In founding the farm, the JCA hoped to bring to Palestine the same kind of agricultural education that it was making available to Jews in Russia and Argentina. The scale of these operations was impressive; a report of 1898 on the Russian colonies called for the establishment of fourteen model farms, "in which one could demonstrate to the colonists the superiority of a rational exploitation of the soil and an ordered agricultural system."[82] When transferred to Palestine, the purview of the model farm grew to include the training of unskilled immigrant workers. This conflation of *ferme école* and *ferme modèle* characterizes both Haim's and Kalvarisky's proposals.

When the JCA's directorium granted the training farm 148,000 francs for its first operating year, the JCA accomplished something qualitatively different from all that had been done by Rothschild during the previous eighteen years. Until

1908, Sejera was the only institution for adult agricultural training in Palestine. In one sense, then, the JCA was a dynamic and innovative force in the Yishuv, adapting the Alliance's educational ideology to a new plane. Nonetheless, the same ideological structures that engendered the farm also placed constraints on its operation, constraints that ultimately destroyed it.

From the start, the JCA directors and administrators assumed that the farm would make at least a modest profit. Such were the expectations from *fermes modèles* in Argentina and Russia; Palestine was to be no exception.[83] When the farm was found to be running a 20,000 franc deficit toward the end of its first year, the JCA mounted a crusade to reduce operating costs.[84] The deficits were attributed to the lax bookkeeping of the farm manager Kalvarisky. A strong personality, Kalvarisky was distrusted and even hated by the JCA's Palestinian staff, which joined in a chorus of condemnation against him. In the spring of 1901, Kalvarisky was sacked and replaced by Eliyahu Krause, a graduate of Mikve Yisra'el and the deputy director of Or Yehuda, a JCA agricultural school near Smyrna.[85] Krause offered the JCA the regular, exhaustive financial reports which the directorium demanded, but the deficits did not go away. In 1905, the JCA began toying with the idea of reducing the size of the administered farm and increasing the size and number of sharecropper holdings. Reductions began in 1906; by 1913, the farm's holdings had been either divided up among the sharecroppers or sold to a private Jewish plantation company.[86]

How could the JCA praise the training farm in 1901 as its most important Palestinian colony and obliterate it a few years later? The answer has nothing to do with a lack of money; the Hirsch and Rothschild fortunes could absorb the farm's deficits. Rather, the deficits and profits had a powerful symbolic value. To Krause, profits were necessary "*to show* that agriculture, properly carried out, is lucrative. It can consequently sustain the colonist who works diligently."[87] Meyerson insisted that only by following businesslike methods could the farm accomplish its goal of transforming Jews into productive workers:

> Sejera is a private estate and should be managed as such, that is to say, it should produce an income in proportion with the price it cost and the sums that have been expended for its agricultural improvements. . . . It is true that we wish to display humanity and solicitude toward our workers, but we believe this attitude to be consistent with our enlightened self-interest, as proprietors. In no way and at no time can there be a question of creating work because there are workers who lack it; on the contrary, manpower must be . . . as limited and economical as possible; each worker must give his maximum effort. . . .[88]

Underneath this rhetoric lies a profound belief in the moral elevation inherent in the efficient exploitation of the soil. Krause explained that his "principal mission" was to train Jews to "believe in agriculture, to love agriculture." Sejera, although not a school, was a vehicle for both professional and moral education. The training farm sought to banish laziness and parasitism and encourage thrift and industry.[89] A similar concern with moral economy lay behind the subsidy slashing and new crop patterns found in many of the revamped Rothschild

colonies. Meyerson urged that the JCA employ only Jewish laborers who lacked "pretensions," that is, who were willing to work for approximately the same wages as Arabs.[90] As far as Haim, Niégo, and Kalvarisky were concerned, the wine grape might as well have been a lotus petal, lulling the colonists into a stupor. There is no room in Palestine, they wrote, for plantation crops that demand little labor and produce less profit. Only the vigorous culture of field and fodder crops would combat the *schnorrer* mentality which the technicians believed was a characteristic of unregenerate Jews and which Rothschild's practices had unfortunately accentuated.[91]

All the JCA staff mentioned here—Haim, Niégo, Kalvarisky, and Krause—had absorbed the ideology of productivization through their experience as students and/or teachers in Alliance schools. Whereas the ideology had at first pushed Netter toward cash crops, which would make agriculture appealing to and profitable for Jews, the failures of the Rothschild experiment caused Netter's legatees to try a different tack. In both cases, the Alliance's Mikve Yisra'el led the way. Just as the *ferme école* featured plantation cultures before either the First 'Aliya or Rothschild's entry into the Yishuv, so did the school start experimenting with fodder crops more than a decade before the Rothschild colonies' transfer to the JCA.[92]

Like the technicians of the Rothschild administration, the JCA staff put agricultural ideal types into the service of their ideology, but the tropical *colon* and the meridional peasant proprietor made way for a new archetype: the tenant farmer or sharecropper. "In the entire world," wrote Niégo, "the great majority of those who toil in the fields, the true agricultural class, consists of sharecroppers or tenant farmers. It is very rare that the proprietor himself engages directly in agriculture." Niégo proposed a four-stage colonization system which reflected an idealized vision of the social hierarchy in the French countryside of the time. Agricultural laborers trained on JCA farms would be installed as sharecroppers (*métayers*) on JCA estates; after saving diligently they could advance to being rent-paying tenant farmers (*fermiers*), and in time they could enjoy the august status of proprietorship.[93] The advantages of such a system, wrote Niégo, were many. Rents and in-kind payments would cover the costs of land purchase and administration; tenant improvements would increase the value of the property. But Niégo's system was also a pedagogic one:

> Is property a thing so easy to acquire that one gives it wantonly to the first comer? The reward for true workers, the retreat dreamed of by a man who has toiled and groaned his whole life through, the highest hope and the highest ideal of all those who have labored throughout their lives—is property! It must be acquired; it should not be given away.[94]

The JCA's sharecropping system did not work out at all as Niégo and his colleagues had hoped. The agriculturalists' debts mounted; advancement was all but impossible. Tenants in the northern field-crop-based colonies were no more independent than they had been under the Rothschild administration at its height. True, colonists in the southern colonies did, thanks to help from the

JCA in forming cooperative organizations for the sale of wine and citrus products, approach the kind of financial and administrative self-reliance that the JCA had hoped for. But this achievement was based on plantation cultures, which created an elite planter class, not the peasantry of the JCA's dreams.[95]

Despite its novel features, the JCA did not operate within a radically different ideological framework from Rothschild's. The power structures were similar as well; executive authority was vested in the CP, and by and large the administrators did its bidding. Most of the JCA administrators were former teachers and bookkeepers, but there were more openings in the administration for Jewish technicians than in the Rothschild regime. Niégo was the first such case, although his influence declined after the turn of the century, and in 1903 he left Palestine to become a peripatetic JCA inspector.[96] But he had successors. In 1905, the engineer Henri Franck became inspector-general of the Palestinian colonies. The agronomist Jules Rosenheck administered the JCA's Lower Galilean settlements, while Kalvarisky was fired from Sejera only to be made director of the Upper Galilean region.[97] (Despite frequent scrapes with his higher-ups, Kalvarisky went on to shape JCA policy in the Galilee into the Mandate period and became one of the luminaries of the Yishuv.)

The JCA therefore featured a certain blend of technical expertise and administrative power, the hallmark of technocracy, but one cannot stretch this point too far. For although the ideology of productivization respected technical expertise as an engine of regeneration, it also refused to tolerate the high cost of technical education. In 1901, the Alliance eliminated its policy of sending Mikve Yisra'el's most promising students to France for further training. A new emphasis was placed on a rudimentary agricultural education for the sons of colonists. This measure was motivated in part by a desire to make the youth of immediate use to their families, but more important was the Alliance directorship's fear that advanced education stimulated social aspirations to leave the ranks of the simple peasantry and enter other professions. Unlike the Zionists whom we will encounter below, the Alliance placed strict limits on the quantity and quality of scientific knowledge made available to future Jewish farmers. The Alliance's policy in this regard was deeply disturbing to Niégo, who for all his talk about sweat and toil had not meant to create a race of Israelite brutes.[98]

Not only the passion for profits but also the JCA's hierarchical structure and ambivalence toward technical expertise played their part in determining the fate of the Sejera training farm. In 1908, Krause pleaded with his superiors to save the farm, claiming it was the only place where workers could learn the basics of animal husbandry and agronomy. Sejera featured a wide variety of crops, thus providing an exposure not available in the monocultural colonies. Krause pointed out the farm's uniqueness in furnishing women the chance to work in the fields; in time the farm would develop side industries in dairy and poultry farming, traditional occupations for farm wives. Paris responded to Krause's comments with a frosty request not to offer unsolicited opinions and criticism. The existing colonies, the JCA later pronounced, would provide workers with an adequate agricultural training.[99]

The JCA's decision to reduce the size of the training farm came during a new wave of Jewish immigration, the Second 'Aliya (1904-1914), which brought a fresh crop of unskilled, jobless laborers to Palestine. Like the members of the First 'Aliya, the new immigrants found the conditions upon which aid was offered difficult to bear. But unlike their predecessors, the leaders of the Second 'Aliya possessed firm nationalist and socialist convictions. The intense political orientation of the newcomers made inevitable an explosive confrontation with the hierarchical, paternalistic, and non-Zionist philanthropy which was the major source of employment in the rural Yishuv.

The Second 'Aliya consisted of as many as 40,000 immigrants, but our concern is with only a small group, a thousand or so strong, of Eastern European Jews who made up the 'Aliya's core. Only a small fraction of the Jews who immigrated to Palestine between 1904 and 1914 were still in the land by the end of World War I. Many of the immigrants were Sephardic or Oriental Jews; almost half of the laborers in the rural Yishuv were not Ashkenazim. And most of the Ashkenazim who immigrated were not socialists. Nonetheless, certain Eastern European members of the Second 'Aliya founded the Yishuv's first political organizations and trade unions and went on during the Mandate period to become leaders of the Zionist labor movement.[100] For convenience's sake, I refer to this elite group as "the pioneer community" and its members as "socialist pioneers" or simply "pioneers."

From its very beginning, the pioneer community in the Yishuv was devoted to the ideal of "the conquest of labor," the entry of Jews into productive occupations of all types, industrial, artisanal, and agricultural. As of 1908, ideologues in both of the political parties within the pioneer community, the Marxist Po'alei Ẓion (Workers of Zion) and non-Marxist Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir (The Young Worker), believed that this conquest would take place through the capitalist development of the Yishuv, and that a Jewish laboring class would develop over time.[101] There were celebrated exceptions. Manya Wilbushewitch Shoḥat came to Palestine in 1905 and quickly began to advocate "cooperative sharecropping"; Yosef Trumpeldor first wrote of mass collective settlement in 1908, before his arrival in the country. But the mood of the pioneer community was against them; in 1908, Yosef Vitkin urged his fellow members of Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir to initiate settlement on publicly owned land, but his proposal was rejected.[102] Only as the pioneers found opportunities for Jewish employment to be limited did they begin to consider seriously the prospect of settling on the land.

The obstacle in the way of the "conquest of labor" was not so much the scarcity of jobs as the unsuitability of the conditions under which they were offered. Colonists and administrators claimed that work was available to the young laborers but that their rebelliousness and revolutionary fervor made them undesirable workers. Z. D. Levontin, a banker who worked closely with the colonies, wrote that "the [employment] situation would be even better if the workers had of themselves not worsened the relations between them and the farmers with their stinging words in their newspapers and in their speeches, in

their assemblies and the like, which lay down hate, envy, and division between brothers."[103] A number of private Jewish agricultural companies established during the period of the Second 'Aliya made a point of preferring Jewish laborers and paying them more than Arabs, although by doing so they reduced their profit margin considerably.[104]

To a young, idealistic immigrant, however, work in a JCA colony or on the estate of a private company involved submitting to foremen and administrators, something that the rebellious young socialists were loath to do.[105] The presence of mixed Arab and Jewish labor on these lands also presented problems to the pioneers, for economic and for psychological reasons. Given that Arabs were more accustomed to agricultural labor than most of the Jewish immigrants and were willing to work for lower wages, the pioneers began to form the view that only through a policy of exclusive Jewish labor (*'avoda 'ivrit*) could Jews be guaranteed employment.[106] Also, the recent arrivals from Europe were disturbed by the sight of the children of settlers from the First 'Aliya working side by side in the fields with Arabs and speaking Arabic with them. The idealistic immigrants' plans for a new Hebrew language and culture were threatened by the prospect of absorption by the native Arabic way of life.[107]

Both ideological and pragmatic reasons led the pioneers to experiment with various collective living and working arrangements once they arrived in Palestine. As mentioned above, during the First 'Aliya, a scarcity of resources and the hostility of the environment had led to many short-lived experiments in cooperative farming. For the socialist pioneers, these conditions interacted with the same sort of elitist collectivism that had motivated the Biluim.[108] A deep-seated belief in the constructive potential of the commune combined with a fierce disdain for authority to produce the first agricultural collective of the Second 'Aliya, which worked at Sejera for the 1907-1908 agricultural season. The story of the collective is shrouded in legend; only by separating the myth from the reality will it be possible to ascertain the nature of the relationship between the JCA and these idealistic youth.

Virtually all accounts of the collective are based on memoir literature, particularly that of the founder of the collective, Manya Shoḥat.[109] According to Shoḥat and her biographer and fellow pioneer Raḥel Yanait Ben-Ẓvi, Shoḥat turned in 1907 to Yehoshua Hankin, the Jewish real-estate broker *par excellence* in Palestine, and asked him to persuade Krause to allow her to attempt a cooperative experiment at Sejera. Excited by her boldness and enthusiasm, Krause overcame fears for his own career and agreed to the proposal. Krause hired Shoḥat as his bookkeeper; Shoḥat then recruited eighteen people, half the workers at the farm, and they signed a contract with Krause to cultivate 1,000 dunams of wheat for one year. The farm finished that year with a surplus, the first in its history.[110]

At this point the standard account grows hazy. According to the version most commonly found in history books, the collective dissolved of its own accord because its members preferred to work as watchmen for the Galilean settlements and thereby wrest this important function from the Circassians and Arabs who

customarily guarded the colonies.[111] The collective therefore gave way to the celebrated *Ha-Shomer* (The Guard), the Yishuv's first self-defense organization. According to another version given by Shoḥat, however, she was fired and the collective pressured to leave Sejera at the end of the 1908 harvest. Unnamed JCA administrators, she claims, had told Paris that Krause had handed control of the farm to "socialists," who would surely drive it to ruin.[112]

It is true that Shoḥat was fired at the end of the agricultural season, not because she was a socialist but because she was a woman. The JCA directorium in Paris and Franck in Beirut questioned Krause's hiring of a woman as bookkeeper, as it would be her task to replace Krause during his absences from the farm, and it was thought that a woman was incapable of filling so important a role. Although Krause sang her praises, Franck decided in May 1908 to let her go.[113] It is not clear from the existing sources exactly why the other members of the collective left the farm, but one thing is certain: the JCA administration displayed no knowledge that such a collective existed. There is no mention of a collective or its functions in the entire correspondence of the 1907-1908 agricultural season between the JCA and its Palestinian staff; nor did any JCA employee in Palestine mention it in print to a colleague. The farm did not lack official visitors; in November 1907, Inspector-General Franck undertook a thorough tour of Sejera, but he reported nothing about a collective in his remarks to Paris about the state of the *régie directe*. The JCA's published reports are silent on the subject.[114]

This silence is all the more remarkable given publicity that the collective received throughout the pioneer community in the Yishuv. The collective was written up in Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir's newspaper. Arthur Ruppin, director of the WZO's Palestine Office, knew of the newspaper story, and he expressed interest in adapting some of the collective's features to WZO properties on the Sea of Galilee.[115] But unlike the collective experiments on WZO properties which we will encounter below, this undertaking was an entirely ad hoc affair. The members determined their own work schedules and lived communally, but despite the conventional assertions, there was no formal contract.[116]

Regarding the performance of the farm, Krause noted in his annual report that it ran a deficit of 1,219 francs—not a surplus, as Shoḥat always maintained, but nonetheless a marked improvement over previous years. The JCA's own published report for 1908 remarked that the administered farm had outperformed the colonists' holdings during that year.[117] Yet Krause took the greatest pains to hide from his superiors information about a collective system which stimulated agricultural laborers to new levels of productivity. Given the JCA's growing hostility to the training farm and its prior demonstration to Krause that it did not welcome initiative from below, it appears that Krause did not see any purpose in touting the collective to the JCA directorium. It is possible that no amount of support from the JCA could have sufficed to keep the members of the collective down on the farm. Many of them were more interested in organized self-defense than in agriculture, and they demonstrated the wanderlust so typical of the socialist pioneers in their first years in Palestine. Nonetheless, the JCA's total

lack of communication with the young workers or understanding of their mentality proves the impossibility of the two forces, the philanthropic and the socialist-nationalist, forming a working relationship. The JCA's lack of commitment to sustain the pioneers is demonstrated not only by the erosion of Sejera but by the philanthropy's ongoing allocations of funds to shunt redundant Jewish workers out of Palestine and back into the Diaspora whence they came.[118]

For all its organizational and financial troubles, it was the Odessa Committee of the Ḥovevei Ẓion, not the JCA, that first expressed a commitment to creating suitable living conditions for the pioneers. In 1905, Ussishkin, the chairman of the Odessa Committee, wrote *Our Program*, a pamphlet that called for mass immigration to Palestine by Russian Jewish youth. In the pamphlet, Ussishkin assumed that the JCA would provide sufficient loans and grants to immigrants to enable them to build homes and buy farm inventory, and that between the WZO, the JCA, and private companies, land would be available for lease or sale to immigrants on affordable terms.[119] In reality, such aid was not forthcoming, and the Odessa Committee began to act on the immigrants' behalf. In 1906, the committee gave the WZO's Jewish National Fund 20,000 francs to aid in settling young workers, and the fund bought land for a workers' settlement at Fedje, on the outskirts of Petaḥ Tikva.[120] In 1907, the committee established a smallholders' plantation colony, Be'er Ya'akov near Reḥovot, but it did not flourish.

The settlement 'Ein Ganim, built on the land at Fedje, represented an improvement. It was designed not to settle workers on the land but rather to help them survive on wages earned in town. Like the Arab peasant, the Jewish laborer could now supplement his income with the proceeds from the family farm, which his wife and children would tend. 'Ein Ganim was a great boon for the thirty families who lived there, but it had limited applications for the pioneer community as a whole. 'Ein Ganim was designed for families, and many of the young workers were single. The settlers were required to buy their own homes and equipment, and although the Odessa Committee offered credit, a down payment equal to one-fourth of the price of a holding was required.[121]

Other problems were ideological in nature. Although theoreticians of the Zionist labor movement such as Berl Katznelson and A. D. Gordon thought highly of 'Ein Ganim during its early years, its system was doomed to fall out of favor with the pioneers. After 'Ein Ganim had been functioning for five years, Katznelson concluded that "cottagers' settlements" forced laborers to endure poor working conditions in the colonies and did not promote a feeling of rootedness in the land.[122] Members of the Judean Agricultural Workers' Union protested the private ownership of land at the colony for having encouraged speculation.[123] The pioneers' lack of enthusiasm for workers' settlements such as 'Ein Ganim, coupled with their inability to create a Jewish agricultural working class and their refusal to settle on the land as bourgeois planters, pointed to a pressing need to develop a new social form that would meet the requirements of the Jewish agricultural worker and the nascent socialist Yishuv.

That new form was what came to be known as Labor settlement (hityashvut

'ovedet): an agricultural community based on autonomous and cooperative labor and built on publicly owned land. This form of settlement embodied a social and political agenda which the French Jewish philanthropies could not share. Rothschild and the JCA venerated private property; the kind of cooperation they encouraged was that between entrepreneurs seeking to achieve economies of scale in the purchase and sale of goods. The concept of national land assumed the existence of a Jewish nation seeking to create an autonomous Jewish national economy that could sustain an autonomous Jewish polity. Such phrases did not exist within the Palestinophilic vocabulary. The French Jewish philanthropies envisioned a model agricultural community, stable and limited in size, that would be a showcase of regenerated Jewry. The philanthropies employed the most dynamic means available, but they did so to attain a static goal.

In order to create Jewish farmers, the philanthropies marshaled the forces of modern technology. A corps of Jewish technicians was placed into the service of the Yishuv. But the ideology of productivization which justified the experts' presence in the first place limited their authority and range. Deprived of access to managerial power, technicians did not become technocrats; lacking a political self-conception, the technically oriented Jewish philanthropies did not become the agents of a Zionist technocracy. Technocracy exists in a symbiotic relationship with politics; the former supplies the latter with means, while the latter supplies the former with an end. Political Zionism, born in the German-speaking lands of Central Europe, would provide the ingredient missing in the Palestinophilic philanthropies ensconced in Paris.

II.

The German Period

II.

FROM PHILANTHROPY TO STATE BUILDING

Theodor Herzl and the World Zionist Organization, 1897–1904

In August of 1897, a Zionist congress convened in Basel, Switzerland. The congress proclaimed the establishment of a World Zionist Organization, which, according to the organization's official program, was to undertake the political and diplomatic work necessary to create "a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by public law." The Basel Program also called for "the programmatic promotion of settlement of Jewish farmers, artisans, and tradesmen" in Palestine. These two statements were designed to satisfy members of both the "political" and "practical" camps within the WZO. Champions of political Zionism argued that the acquisition of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine should precede the establishment of a Zionist presence in the land. Practical Zionists, believing that sovereignty would be long in coming, called for immediate Zionist activity, including Jewish settlement.

Ironically, it was the political Zionist camp that produced the first theoreticians of national settlement. Practical Zionists, who devoted themselves to a series of ad hoc undertakings, were slow in developing grand colonization strategies. But certain political Zionist leaders, reasoning that international recognition of the Jews' right to dwell in Palestine would usher in an age of mass Jewish immigration, began planning for the mass evacuation to come. It was the task of a Zionist colonization agency, so they thought, to oversee the construction of a flourishing national economy in Palestine, without which the fledgling Jewish state would not survive.

The split between political and practical Zionism ran for the most part along geocultural lines. Although there were exceptions, Central European Jews tended to gravitate toward political Zionism, and Eastern European Jews affiliated with the Ḥovevei Ẓion dominated the practical camp.[1] The Central European environment left its stamp on the settlement theories of two influential political Zionists, the German Max Bodenheimer (1865-1940), a highly placed bureaucrat in the WZO, and the Austro-Hungarian Theodor Herzl (1860–1904), the WZO's founder and first president. The colonization proposals of both men were strongly

statist. Moreover, Herzl could not separate colonization issues from a general striving for social reform through public intervention. In keeping with the political-economic teachings of his era, Herzl charged the WZO with vast social as well as political responsibilities. These responsibilities included not only directing the colonization of Palestine but also ensuring that the new Jewish society would incorporate the latest advances in European social policy. Herzl's vision of a technocratic Zionist utopia was not universally shared, nor was it realizable given the WZO's paltry resources and the political uncertainties that plagued the Zionist movement. By the time of Herzl's death, however, the WZO had taken the first steps toward the formation of settlement institutions designed to assist the Jewish nation in its future mass transplantation.

The Great Powers of Europe provided the WZO with models for settlement. Zionist leaders pondered domestic and colonial policies in order to learn how to erect a new Jewish society in Palestine. Central European Zionists led the way in adapting European models to Zionist concerns. The European nations most often studied were Central European, the lands with whose languages and cultures the Zionists were most familiar. Although Eastern European Zionists would come to play an important, and in time dominant, role in the making of settlement policy, they did so by dealing with the German and Austrian Zionists who held leadership positions in the WZO. What is more, the German language and culture provided a frame of reference that united the WZO during its early decades.

The Germanocentrism of pre-World War I Zionism on both the institutional and cultural levels has long been recognized. Central Europe was the seat of the WZO; Vienna, Cologne, and Berlin each took their turn as the headquarters of the WZO between 1897 and 1914. The political persecution and economic hardships suffered by Eastern European Jewry made it impossible for European Jewry's demographic center, the Pale of Settlement, to become the seat of an international organization devoted to a Jewish national revival in Palestine. Not only was the WZO the creation of Central European Jewry, it was also very much interdependent with the German Zionist Federation, whose leadership overlapped with that of the WZO.[2]

On the cultural level, Western Zionism before World War I, writes Steven Aschheim, "was articulated essentially within the German-speaking cultural world." Zionist spokesmen from Paris to Budapest "wrote in German and appealed to a public whose sensibilities were shaped in its cultural image."[3] As for Eastern European Jewry, Germany had since the Enlightenment been its "window to the West." From the 1880s onward, Russian Jewish students flocked to Central European universities. The associations of Russian Jewish students at these universities became hotbeds of Zionist activity.[4] And yet despite the impression that "German achievement, German discipline, and German power" made on Russian Zionist students such as Chaim Weizmann,[5] these youth tended to draw their inspiration and programs from Hebrew and Eastern European

sources. Eastern Jewish intellectuals and students sojourning in Germany, writes one historian, were "profoundly isolated from German society" and "enmeshed in their own subculture."[6] Most Eastern European Jews at German universities studied medicine or natural science; few undertook coursework in law or philosophy. Exposure to German culture was for the most part limited to private encounters with literature and the arts.[7]

The case was different for Zionist leaders born and raised in the German *Kulturbereich,* especially those who came to Zionism from an acculturated background. German Jewish university students frequently studied law or political economy; early German Zionists were no exception.[8] Leaders of Central European Zionism were far more likely than their Eastern European counterparts to have held positions in law, academia, or government service. More important than any occupational differences between German and Eastern European Zionists, however, were differences in mentality. The early leaders of German Zionism blended Zionist inclinations with a staunch German patriotism.[9] These strong feelings toward their homeland instilled in certain German Zionists a feeling of engagement not only in Jewish society but in the public sphere as a whole. They felt themselves to be party to the actions of a great empire at home and a Great Power abroad. Such feelings of involvement in the host society were more problematic for Eastern European Zionists, thanks to oppression from without and greater cultural cohesion within. The feeling of involvement in the operations of non-Jewish society, coupled in some cases with actual policy-making experience, helped to form a group of German Zionists who thought of Zionist settlement in grand, statist terms.

The attorney Max Bodenheimer, founder of the German Zionist Federation and an instrumental figure in the formation of the WZO bank, the Jewish Colonial Trust (JCT), and its Jewish National Fund (JNF), is prototypical of Herzl and other Central European Zionist leaders in the manner in which German statism influenced his settlement programs. Like many German Zionists, Bodenheimer held a conception of nationhood that was influenced by contemporary German political-economic theories, in which the entire gamut of social and the natural sciences was joined in a seamless web. Bereft of any substantive knowledge of Judaism or Jewish tradition, Bodenheimer turned to Zionism in the late 1880s primarily as a result of his exposure to antisemitism.[10] But he was also influenced by a popular work, *Structure and Life of the Social Body*, by the economist and sociologist Albert Schäffle. In it, writes Bodenheimer, "the development of state and society was represented as analogous to genesis and growth in nature, where all diseased organisms and their products decay and are inexorably rooted out." To become a healthy nation, reasoned Bodenheimer, the Jews must return to agriculture: "All national existence, as well as the existence of every trade, has roots in the soil."[11] This return must occur, in keeping with the "natural development of all peoples," not in scattered locations but in a "national center."[12] This national center must be Palestine, not so much for religious or historical reasons but because "only the strongest ethical purposes

[i.e., the traditional Jewish love of the Land of Israel] would be capable of leading a people excluded from land ownership for almost 2,000 years to agriculture, to find their roots in the soil."[13]

Bodenheimer saw in Zionism a program of national regeneration through normalization. Zionism was a "thoroughly modern national movement based on the sure foundations of national-economic principles."[14] The return to Zion and to agriculture was valuable only insofar as it promoted national-economic values. Thus Bodenheimer wrote of the need for urban as well as rural settlement. And although he appreciated Eastern European Jewry's spiritual attachment to the historic Land of Israel, Bodenheimer believed that both Jews and the Middle Eastern economy would benefit if they were to settle in the commercial metropolises of the area known at the time as "greater Syria," viz., present-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel.[15]

The most effective vehicle of colonization, Bodenheimer believed, would be a colonial society and a philanthropic organization working in tandem. Bodenheimer elaborated on this idea in a proposal of 1891 that he sent to the Baron Maurice de Hirsch, who had recently founded the JCA. Bodenheimer's colonial society, which would be formed as a joint-stock company, would buy and sell land at a profit and invest in a variety of industries. It would also engage in road and railroad building and would employ poor immigrants on these projects. Despite the huge sums of money involved in his proposal, Bodenheimer stressed its purely capitalist nature; the operations of the philanthropic organization would be limited to providing free transportation for the immigrants.[16] Bodenheimer outlined his businesslike approach to Jewish colonization in remarks delivered in 1898 upon the founding of the WZO bank, the Jewish Colonial Trust (JCT):

> The bank serves the Zionist goal through the concentration and economic unification of Jewish capital and Jewish economic power in a certain land, namely, by directing its activity toward the objects of colonization, Syria and Palestine, as its focus. Within these limitations, which are fixed by the purpose of the bank, it is completely free and unhindered in its business activities and administration. Although the bank serves an ideal goal, it is to be administered solely along businesslike principles, as is the *Landbank* in Berlin for the expansion of German national influence in the Polish provinces of Prussia, which buys large estates from Polish nobles and parcels them in order to create German farmsteads. The bank should be an undertaking along the lines of the German colonial societies, which work toward the expansion of German colonial territories, in which they obtain concessions, privileges, title, and sovereignty over overseas lands, lay in plantations, and build railroads. That the bank can work profitably within the limitations placed upon it is proved by the fact that German, French, and English undertakings operate successfully in the same kinds of activity; the Anatolian Railroad, which was promoted by the *Deutsche Bank*, may be referred to as an example.[17]

Bodenheimer unblushingly compared the WZO to a state government and its bank to the great financial institutions of Europe. The problem with Bodenheimer's approach, as we will have occasion to see throughout the coming

chapters, was the mistaken belief that investors would flock to the Zionist colonial enterprise, thereby providing it with sufficient capital to engage in colonization en masse while turning a profit. This false assumption would plague Zionist settlement throughout its history, from the days of the first settlement engineers before World War I to the conflict between Louis Brandeis and Chaim Weizmann after 1918, and beyond.

Bodenheimer's proposal of 1891 to the JCA met with a cool reply.[18] But the publication of a similar proposal in a pamphlet, *Whither Russian Jewry?*, brought Bodenheimer notoriety and some popular support. He corresponded with the land reformer Michael Flürscheim, who saw in persecuted Eastern European Jewry candidates for his envisioned cooperative colonies in Mexico.[19] Bodenheimer's writings also brought him into contact with Gustav Tuch, a wealthy Jewish philanthropist dedicated to the establishment of Jewish cooperative colonies in Germany. Tuch asked Bodenheimer to serve as the colonization expert in the Free Israelite Federation that Tuch had recently formed in Hamburg. In this capacity, Bodenheimer corresponded with the JCA, the Ḥovevei Ẓion, and the Jewish agricultural training school at Ahlem (near Hannover), thereby becoming familiar with Jewish colonization projects throughout the world.[20] Also, in collaboration with David Wolffsohn, a wealthy Lithuanian Jew living in Cologne, Bodenheimer founded a society to collect money to settle Jews in the Middle East.[21]

Bodenheimer's Zionist labors led him to the conclusion that Jewish colonization experiments made to date, both in Palestine and elsewhere, had produced "successes that were not worth the efforts." The key elements missing from these experiments, he believed, were careful planning and a political guaranty for the settlement operation. The political Zionist ethos was expressed in the program of the German National-Jewish Federation, later the German Zionist Federation, which Bodenheimer, along with Wolffsohn and Fabius Schach, founded in 1897. The program called for "the programmatic encouragement of the settlement of Palestine with Jewish farmers, artisans, and tradesmen" but noted that "a content Jewish artisan, a satisfied *Jewish* farmer, is, for economic, political, and psychological reasons, possible only in a secured Jewish homeland."[22] These lines were composed in the year after the publication of Theodor Herzl's *The Jewish State,* which, like Bodenheimer's work, provided a political-Zionist justification for Jewish statehood and a blueprint for its construction.

In *The Jewish State,* Herzl proposed a settlement program similar to Bodenheimer's but broader in scope. Upon receipt of international recognition of the Jewish claim to a homeland, a colonial society known as "the Jewish Company" was to assemble vast amounts of capital from banks and public subscriptions. Additional funds would be gained from the liquidation of the assets of Jews immigrating from the Diaspora. It would plan and construct the entire infrastructure of the Jewish state. It would provide credit, but not alms, to all who needed it, thereby ensuring that the inhabitants of the Jewish state would be hard-working, spirited citizens, not *schnorrers.* Like Bodenheimer, Herzl took it as a matter of course that "the founders and stockholders of the Jewish Company

should make a good profit. . . ."[23] Despite this talk about efficiency and businesslike methods, Herzl's program differed from Bodenheimer's in its provision of vast sums to be invested *à fonds perdus.* The Jewish Company would provide the poorest immigrants with dwellings, food, and even clothes for their first several years in the Jewish state. These workers would not be paid and would be put to work cultivating tracts of land purchased by the Jewish Company. Other workers would be paid to plant forests, build dams, lay telegraph lines, and so on, admittedly at a financial loss to the company. The long-term gain of an army of trained, productive laborers, however, would ultimately result in a "fifteen fold" return on the company's investment.[24]

At the time that he wrote the book, Herzl did not know of Bodenheimer's work, just as he was ignorant of the writings of Zionist theoreticians in general. But Herzl's grand scheme for mass colonization upon acquisition of international recognition of the Jewish state struck a responsive cord in Bodenheimer, who had been calling for "purposeful colonization" for seven years. Accordingly, the ardent political Zionist Bodenheimer became one of Herzl's strongest supporters in the calling of the First Zionist Congress in 1897.[25] In years to come, Herzl would frequently assert the existence of a link between political guarantees and "purposeful" colonization. In 1900, Herzl called the WZO's future settlement work a "national project" based on a "great national concept."[26] The following year, he proclaimed at the Fifth Congress: "Philanthropic settlement has failed; national settlement will succeed."[27] The philanthropic projects of the Baron de Rothschild, Herzl wrote, had cost millions and settled barely five hundred families; efficient, rational colonization based on political guarantees would settle tens or hundreds of thousands.[28]

Bodenheimer and Herzl attest to a logical connection between political Zionism, particularly as expounded by Jews imbued with German culture, and planned colonization. True, this connection was by no means automatic. The celebrated author Max Nordau, one of Herzl's closest associates and 114a fellow product of the *deutscher Kulturbereich,* bitterly opposed any form of Zionist involvement in colonization matters. Throughout Europe, many politically oriented Zionist leaders, including Wolffsohn, Herzl's ally and the second president of the WZO, distrusted settlement strategies to be implemented in the hazy future. Conversely, grand settlement strategies could come forth from Eastern European Zionists, as shown by the case of Leo Motzkin. Motzkin, along with Chaim Weizmann, led a cluster of young Eastern European Zionists who in 1902 formed a "Democratic Faction" in the WZO.

The faction opposed what it considered to be Herzl's dictatorial rule over the WZO. In general, the faction devoted its energies to the democratization issue or to educational and cultural projects, not to colonization. An early draft of the faction's program, written by Weizmann and others, made no mention of settlement at all. But Motzkin, a confirmed political Zionist and a proponent of planned colonization, collaborated with Berthold Feiwel in adding to the faction's program of 1902 a call for national landownership, the extensive application of the cooperative principle, and the formation of a WZO settlement

bureau in Palestine.[29] The faction did not act on this part of its program; as we will see in the next chapter, Motzkin was three or four years ahead of his time in trying to steer Eastern European Zionism toward a coherent colonization strategy. The point, then, is not that Bodenheimer and Herzl laid down patterns of thought that applied to the Zionist movement as a whole. It is, rather, that their statist thinking possessed an internal logic that produced impressive immediate results and had important implications for the WZO's work in the years following Herzl's death.

Although there were widely differing approaches to colonization during the WZO's first years, most Zionist activists concurred that the new Jewish commonwealth would be a social utopia. Along with the formation of the Ḥovevei Ẓion in the 1880s came novels and imaginary travelogues describing the future Jewish Palestine as a technically advanced, socially harmonious, and environmentally pristine land.[30] Enthusiasts of practical work in Palestine imagined that they were creating the nuclei of an agrarian republic. Those who spoke of urbanization and industrialization tacitly assumed that a prophylactic filter would ward off the Old World's social ills. For many Zionists, only a society radically different from the existing order could nurture the new type of Jew which the movement was supposed to produce. This sentiment was particularly strong among German-speaking Zionists for whom Jewish nationalism represented a form of rebellion against their bourgeois environment, including its capitalist ethos. Only by overcoming capitalism could the Jewish homeland wean its citizens from their predilection for commerce and blunt their acquisitive instinct.[31]

German Zionists were not always amenable to social utopianism, as the case of Bodenheimer demonstrates. Bodenheimer's various colonization programs of the 1890s did not address the question of social conditions in the future Jewish state. As a youth, Bodenheimer displayed a mild interest in social problems; during his student days he read Proudhon and Saint-Simon and toyed with a social philosophy of his own. By his mid-twenties, however, social issues were no longer of deep concern to Bodenheimer. Significantly, when the young attorney read Schäffle, he absorbed only the economist's Social Darwinist worldview and missed the call for state-initiated reforms which Schäffle considered the heart of his work. (This reading was quite different from that accorded to Schäffle by such a socially sensitive Zionist as the young Arthur Ruppin, who gushed that the book convinced him that "socialism will triumph, although it may take generations.")[32]

Although Bodenheimer, through his contacts with Flürscheim and Tuch, became familiar with the activities of the German land reform movement, familiarity did not breed sympathy. At the First Zionist Congress, Bodenheimer criticized a proposal for a Jewish national land fund offered by the Russian Ḥovev Ẓion Hermann Shapira. Shapira demanded that the land bought remain the eternal possession of the Jewish people; it could be leased but not sold.[33] Bodenheimer was himself in favor of a national philanthropic agency, but he

felt that Shapira's proposal was "childishly naive"; it was reminiscent of the German land reform movement, the feasibility of whose programs was not at all certain.[34] When he was placed in charge of writing the statutes of the JNF in 1902, Bodenheimer's overwhelming concerns were provisions for a proper legal form, an adequate endowment, and an assured position for himself as its director.[35] After becoming director of the JNF in 1907, it would be several years before Bodenheimer took an active interest in the potential of the JNF to act as a check against land speculation in the young and wild Yishuv.

Theodor Herzl's social thought presents a different case, albeit a controversial one. It has become fashionable in recent years to argue that the primacy of politics in Herzl's thought left little room for a systematic social policy. Taking their cue from the seminal work of Carl Schorske on fin de siècle Vienna, historians have understood Herzl primarily as a dramatist turned demagogue, a man for whom politics was the highest form of theater.[36] When Herzl wrote and spoke about social reform in the future Jewish state, he was grasping "at slogans, compelling images from the corpus of both socialism and imperialism, for whatever cast an aura of imminent success around the national movement or fostered a sense of its possibilities."[37] On the other hand, an older school of Zionist historiography, one which still has adherents, portrays Herzl as a man who, long before his turn to Zionism, was deeply worried about "the social question," sympathetic to socialism, but afraid of the potential for violence and for antisemitism within Europe's socialist parties.[38] Evidence for this view comes, inter alia, from Herzl's proposal of 1892 to the Austrian government that work-aid societies, such as those already existing in France, be set up by the imperial government to provide useful employment for the empire's jobless masses.[39] In his Zionist writings, the argument goes, Herzl incorporated his earlier ideas about work aid into an elaborate settlement scheme that took advantage of state-of-the-art technologies in civil and social engineering.

The two approaches raised here do not necessarily conflict. Herzl indeed possessed a theatrical personality, but he saw in social crises as well as politics the stuff from which life's dramas are made. During the mid-1890s, the time when Herzl's Zionist sentiments crystalized, social issues assumed the utmost importance in the minds of the educated middle classes of Central Europe. As a German contemporary of Herzl's wrote, "the solution of the social question now became the center of attention"; it "was the main interest not only of the Kaiser and his advisers, but also of the political parties, the universities, the press, even the theater."[40] (Gerhart Hauptmann's celebrated play *The Weavers* is but one example of the socially conscious theater of the time.) Herzl was sensitive to such issues; he brooded about them before turning to Zionism, and after his conversion he took great pains to incorporate a full-blown program of Zionist social policy into *The Jewish State.*

The term *social policy* (*Sozialpolitik*) was omnipresent in the German lands at the fin de siècle. *Sozialpolitik* was a protean word, but it normally connoted some level of state intervention into society and the economy in order to correct ills created by an unchecked capitalism.[41] *Sozialpolitik* often had an agrarian ori-

entation, seeking to decrease the state's reliance on agricultural imports and the likelihood of social revolution by strengthening the peasantry. Political economists were haunted by the specter of the agricultural laborers, proletarianized by the growth of capitalist agriculture on great estates, roaming the countryside, or blowing like uprooted plants into the already overcrowded cities.[42] In this vein, Herzl developed a stylized and not wholly accurate view of the Rothschild colonies as forcing colonists to be "dependent on the market price." "The basic, unforgivable mistake was that they were only allowed to produce for the market and not for their own needs. Thus, even with a rich harvest, they will suffer from want, because their product has no price."[43] In contrast, the WZO will turn the settlers "into permanent dwellers on the land, into real freeholders. They shall live on the land and from the land, not like helpless peddlers with an anxious eye on the market prices. They will take to the market only those products which they have in excess of their own needs."[44]

Herzl's settlement philosophy ranged beyond mainstream reformism and, after several years of evolution, came to rest in the realm of utopian socialism. The utopian quality of Herzl's thought emerges from his attitude toward cooperation as a form of social organization. Late nineteenth-century *Sozialpolitik* stressed the importance of the cooperative principle as a weapon against the "social problem." But there was a difference between an appreciation of the economic benefits created by credit, purchase, and consumer cooperatives and a veneration for cooperation as the vehicle that would transport Europe into a utopian age. In general, adherents of the latter view believed in the centrality of producers' cooperatives, in which not only the distributive but also the manufacturing sector, the very heart of the national economy, would be controlled by the grassroots of society.[45] Herzl's utopian inclinations began to reveal themselves shortly after he completed *The Jewish State,* when he wrote in his diary: "[Saul] Landau [an Austrian socialist-Zionist] thinks that I neglected agriculture in the Jewish State. The answer is simply that we shall have agricultural cooperative societies and agricultural small industrialists, both with credit from the Jewish Company."[46] Then in 1899, Herzl came to attach great importance to the word *mutualism* to describe the social system that he wanted to see established in the Jewish state. Mutualism is "a middle way between capitalism and collectivism. Producers' and consumers' cooperatives are only beginnings, intimations of the mutual principle."[47] At the Fifth Zionist Congress in 1901, Herzl proclaimed during his discussion of colonization policy that "each settlement should administer its own affairs as an agricultural productive association [*Produktionsgenossenschaft*] in accordance with the principles which experience and science suggest to us even now."[48] This progression culminated in 1902 with the appearance of Herzl's utopian novel *Altneuland,* which envisioned a New Israel that, in the words of the political scientist Shlomo Avineri, "realize[d] the dreams of 19th-century European utopian socialism."[49]

All land in *Altneuland* is public property, leased only for periods of fifty years; in the fiftieth year (the biblical Jubilee) land reverts to the state. The domestic affairs of the Jewish state are to be managed, Herzl writes, by a "syndicate of

cooperative societies, a large syndicate which comprises all industry and commerce within itself, [which] keeps the welfare of the workers in mind, and fosters the ideal for practical reasons."[50] The European cooperative movement, whose history Herzl nicely traces from its origins during the 1830s to his own day, offers the Jewish state the ideas and methods by which a just society can be attained. The cooperative method "provides the mean between individualism and collectivism. The individual is not deprived of the stimulus and pleasures of private property, while at the same time, he is able, through union with his fellows, to resist capitalist domination."[51]

Following the more utopian line of cooperative theorizing, Herzl looks to agricultural and artisanal producers' cooperatives to streamline the production process and purge it of inequities. Herzl echoes a widely held belief among social reformers in Germany and England that consumer cooperatives would make for a more efficient distribution of goods, as small tradesmen jack up the price of goods and services and thus aggravate the "social problem." Herzl also reflects general currents of economic thought in his acknowledgment that capitalist department stores, by means of their economies of scale, serve a socially beneficial function in the Jewish state, although not as great as that of the consumer cooperative.[52] Thus, although there is no law in *Altneuland* against private commerce and trade, the planned development of cooperative enterprises from the beginning of the Jewish state has discouraged the formation of a commercial lower middle class such as exists in Europe.[53]

Altneuland is a productive land, and thereby the embodiment of the Zionist goal of Jewish occupational transformation as well as the cooperative ideal of creating a just society. The petty trade that does go on in *Altneuland* is handled mostly by "Greeks, Levantines, Armenians and Persians" or by Jews who do not belong to the "New Society," the body politic of *Altneuland.*[54] The Jewish citizen of *Altneuland* is a farmer, worker, artisan, technician, academic, or administrator. Although Herzl does not appear to favor any one of these professions as any more productive or beneficial than the others, it is important to note the importance he attaches to agriculture and to life in the country. Haifa, the world-city of *Altneuland,* is portrayed as a glittering jewel, but most of the inhabitants of the Jewish state live in agricultural cooperatives or workers' villages, not Haifa or the modern Jerusalem. The countryside provides the Jewish state with what Herzl described at the Fifth Zionist Congress as the "broad and solid foundation of a laboring agricultural population" upon which "a modern, habitable structure will arise."[55] It is true that Herzl did not romanticize agriculture as did many leaders of the Ḥovevei Ẓion, Central European Zionism, or the Yishuv itself. Nonetheless, it is not accurate to state, as has Amos Elon in his biography of Herzl, that the Zionist leader "shared none of the romantic notions of resurrecting the 'historical Hebrew peasant' on Palestinian soil," and that "his own scheme aimed at a sophisticated modern industrial society of technicians and scholars."[56]

In his description of Neudorf, a model agricultural cooperative, Herzl stresses the difference between "old-time peasants," who knew nothing of agronomy, economics, or the benefits of cooperation, and the technically enlightened farmers

of Neudorf. It is this distinction between antiquated and advanced forms of agriculture that allowed Herzl to write in *The Jewish State* that "the peasant is a type slated for extinction. . . . Any attempt to create peasants on the old pattern is an impossible and foolish undertaking. No one is rich or powerful enough to turn back the clock of civilization by force." "If the peasantry is artificially preserved," Herzl continued, "this is due only to the political interests that he is supposed to serve."[57] Herzl was referring here specifically to goings-on within the Habsburg and Hohenzollern empires during the mid-1890s, the time when he wrote *The Jewish State*. This was a time of crisis throughout Central Europe, as the owners of Hungarian and East Elbian latifundia campaigned for high agricultural tariffs and the left-liberal and socialist parties fought against them.[58] Herzl sided with the urban laboring class, writing, "the duties on grain can not go on mounting sky high. After all, factory workers can not be allowed to starve either."[59]

Also during the mid-1890s, the German imperial government initiated social policies in order to gain the support of the peasantry, which was radicalized by economic crisis, and which the government wished to preserve as a counterweight against the increasing electoral strength of the Social Democratic Party.[60] Given the corruption of the European social order and the plight of the peasant, concluded Herzl, attempts at Jewish agricultural settlement in the Diaspora would surely fail. Only a technologically advanced agriculture developed in a new land without entrenched interests would allow Jewish farmers to flourish.

If Herzl was so enamored of technological advances, one wonders, why did he desire to create Jewish farmers at all? Herzl himself was aware of the economies of scale created by large estates and of the growing hold of agriculture by the Americas over the world market.[61] Given the steady decline of the agricultural population in the most heavily industrialized nations of Europe, Herzl could easily have argued that a technologically advanced society would be primarily an urban and suburban one, and that agriculture would be a highly mechanized business employing only a small percentage of the labor force. Such arguments were in fact made by one of German Zionism's most inveterate utopians, Davis Trietsch, a student of the Anglo-German Garden City movement and a champion of its application to Palestine.[62]

True, the cooperative farm, according to cooperative theory of the time, would provide the same economies of scale as the large estate, but this argument only begs the question why it is worthwhile in the first place to settle people on the land when they could go to work in industry or services. Herzl's own writings do not provide enough data to answer this question definitely. Part of the answer is that Herzl had a basic ideological predilection toward agriculture as the archetypal "productive" occupation. Such sentiments, as we saw in the previous chapter, were shared by many of his contemporaries among the Ḥovevei Ẓion and the leadership of the Palestinophilic philanthropies. But whereas the agrarian sentiments of the Ḥovevei Ẓion and the Palestinophiles were an overt manifestation of the Jewish ideology of productivization, Herzl's economic philosophy lacked explicitly Jewish roots, and instead drew on the line of contemporary

social thought that proclaimed the peasant to be physically and psychically healthier than the city dweller. As Herzl wrote back in his 1892 proposal on work aid, convicted felons should be placed "in contact with the earth, [where] they will assuredly draw strength and be healed of the large city. In the course of time let them acquire ownership of the piece of land which they cultivate."[63]

In expressing such sentiments, Herzl resembled other Austro-German Jewish utopians such as Flürscheim, Theodor Hertzka, and Franz Oppenheimer. (The latter two, along with the land reformer Henry George, are cited in *Altneuland.*) In general, utopian socialism had a pastoral orientation, and although certain Jewish intellectuals may have been attracted to it for its rejection of the mercantile spirit which antisemites attributed to Jews, Haskala economic programs, conceived within and directed toward the Jewish community, exercised little influence. Oppenheimer did become involved in the Zionist movement, but he did so only after designing blueprints intended for society as a whole. Similarly, although Herzl's utopian sentiments deepened considerably after 1896, years before his turn to Zionism he confronted the social problem in its entirety and sketched out solutions thereto.

Herzl's thought was unique in its blend of political Zionism with a utopian-socialist orientation. The result was a blueprint for colonization that established cooperative agricultural settlement and national landownership as cornerstones of the New Israel. Herzl was, of course, also a statesman, and he had to take an array of factors into consideration before attempting to transform his utopia into a reality.

As mentioned above, the WZO's Basel Program called for "the programmatic promotion of settlement of Jewish farmers, artisans, and tradesmen" in Palestine. Since it was written by a committee of both political and practical Zionists, it is obvious that this program could mean different things to different people.[64] To the politicals, Herzl among them, the program called for planned settlement after a charter had been attained from the Ottoman Empire, not for immediate activity. Herzl commissioned settlement reports at each congress, and each congress had its "Colonial Committee" that discussed settlement matters. The Colonial Committee at the Second Congress announced it would form a commission that would guide settlement operations once permission from Turkey had been received. The committee stated that native Ottoman Jews would be the subjects of the WZO's settlement experiments.[65] This statement is in keeping with Herzl's desire to begin any settlement work by strengthening the existing Yishuv before opening up the floodgates to immigration.[66]

Herzl did work, albeit in a sporadic way, on behalf of Zionist projects in Palestine. He supported the establishment of a Palestinian division of the JCT, the Anglo-Palestine bank, which opened in 1903.[67] In the same year, he agreed to provide a loan from the JCT to Ge'ula, a land-purchase society founded by prominent members of the Ḥovevei Ẓion such as Menaḥem Ussishkin and Yeḥiel Tchlenov. It appears that Herzl did wish to increase Jewish landholdings in

Palestine before the attainment of the charter, in order to provide a foothold for settlement once the proper conditions existed. But he feared the political ramifications of his support for Ge'ula and urged the company to act quietly, to keep Ottoman officials from finding out that a Zionist society was involved in land purchase. Ge'ula's failure, in Herzl's eyes, to act with sufficient caution angered and worried him.[68]

Herzl also helped breathe life into the JNF, destined to become the most celebrated of the WZO's settlement institutions. The story of the establishment of the JNF is a complex one, and it illustrates the variety of intellectual forces, in addition to Herzl's own utopian sentiments, which underlay the WZO's slowly evolving settlement strategies. The intellectual origins of the JNF require careful elucidation, for it is necessary to separate external from internal inspirations, foreign models from uniquely Jewish ideals.

A combination of forces in the Zionist movement, from the political and practical camps alike, could agree on the need for a national fund to purchase land and stimulate settlement projects in Palestine. For political Zionists such as Herzl and Bodenheimer, such a fund was a public treasury, to be used as needed for nation-building projects by the Zionist executive. Bodenheimer's original colonization proposal of 1891 had called for a philanthropic organization as well as a joint-stock company; and although at first he accorded the former only a peripheral function, by 1897 Bodenheimer toed the Herzlian line that a public philanthropy would have to assume the responsibility of erecting the first model colonies in Palestine.[69] For practical Zionists, the fund had a different set of associations altogether. We have already encountered Hermann Shapira's 1897 proposal for a national fund. Shapira had first formulated the idea in 1884, just as the Ḥovevei Ẓion movement was taking form. His proposal reflected the populist Zionist spirit of the era, for its dominant motif was the degree of democratic control that the Jewish people, acting through representatives of various philanthropies throughout the Diaspora, were to exercise over the fund.[70] These motifs dominated the 1897 proposal as well. As to Shapira's call for national landownership, its roots lay in a sentimental veneration for biblical precepts combined with an adherence to traditional Jewish notions of communal solidarity.

Despite the differences in approach, these justifications for the national fund were internally generated; that is, they derived either from Jewish intellectual sources or from the specific needs of the Zionist movement. But there is an obvious similarity between the idea of nationally owned land to be leased in perpetuity and contemporary land reform movements that were most active in Germany but also won adherents in England and the United States. There is no evidence that Shapira was touched by such influences, but it is also true that from the start, the Zionist movement became a forum for land reformers. Articles by Flürscheim and Oppenheimer appeared in the official WZO organ *Die Welt,* trumpeting the gospel that hereditary lease arrangements would impede speculation and lower the cost of farmland.[71] Herzl incorporated national landown-

ership into his blueprint for *Altneuland,* and even Ussishkin, who was not wont to draw on European social models, made an approving remark about the principle of land reform in reference to the JNF.[72]

Utopian sensibilities, traditional Jewish social ideals, and pragmatic justifications were all voiced in debates over the nature of the JNF, debates that prevented any concrete action on its behalf until 1901. At the Fifth Zionist Congress of that year, Herzl used his influence to push through a resolution authorizing the JNF to begin soliciting donations and to prepare the proper legal framework for its operations.[73] As the JNF began its long search for legal and financial standing, two men emerged as the guiding lights of the institution: Bodenheimer and Johann Kremenetzky, an industrial magnate originally from Odessa and living in Vienna. Like Bodenheimer, Kremenetzky was a confidant of Herzl's, a member of the ascendant political Zionist camp. Also like Bodenheimer, Kremenetzky did not have any special regard for the JNF as a tool of social policy. In fact, he displayed no interest in the JNF's operational strategies at all; he devoted himself heart and soul to fundraising.[74] So whatever attraction the idea of land reform may have had for certain public figures in the Zionist movement, it did not inspire the JNF's creators.

Most perplexing about the intellectual origins of the JNF is the fact that the notion of national landownership touted by the JNF enjoyed limited currency in the land reform movement of the late nineteenth century. Following the lead of John Stuart Mill, the intellectual father of land reform, land reformers tended to respect the principle of private property and limited themselves to a call for state intervention to break up an alleged monopoly on real estate by a parasitic landlord class. One stream of the land reform movement, led by the American Henry George, demanded heavy taxation of private landholdings, while in Germany reformers lobbied for state-funded rural colonies (*Heimstätte*) and corporate ownership of urban real estate, to be held via hereditary lease. Nationalized landownership found advocates only among orthodox Marxists and a minuscule circle of radical utopians.[75] Within the Zionist movement, few activists echoed Herzl's call to do away with private landownership in the Jewish state. Many Eastern European Zionists who were the JNF's strongest supporters were also active in private real estate companies such as Ge'ula. For Ussishkin, land nationalization was a secondary goal behind land acquisition; the JNF and private companies needed to work together in order to purchase as much land as quickly as possible.[76] True, there were Eastern European Zionists who took the idea of land nationalization to heart; Nachman Syrkin, a fiery ideologue of socialist Zionism, wished to extrude private capital from the Yishuv completely. But Syrkin's radical message, influential though it was for revolutionary Jewish youth in Russia, was not well received at the Zionist congresses, where the mostly middle-class deputies hooted Syrkin down with cries of "Social Democrat!"[77]

Taken together, this evidence suggests that for the Eastern European Jews who formed the rank and file of the Zionist movement, the JNF was seen primarily as a populist institution, a vehicle of the people's will, but not of any

specific social policy. Among the political Zionists, Herzl's passion for land reform was more the exception than the rule. When Zionist activists campaigning for the JNF referred to national landownership and hereditary lease, they often employed the vocabulary of the land reform movement, but not necessarily its grammar.

The case of the JNF demonstrates that although foreign models played a role in the formation of the WZO's settlement strategies, that role is not always easy to measure. A somewhat clearer example of the adoption of a foreign social-reformist model to Zionism is that of the agricultural producers' cooperative, which, as we have seen, Herzl envisioned as the basis for the Jewish state's rural economy. Also in contrast to the case of the JNF, Herzl took personal charge over the promotion of cooperative settlement and campaigned vigorously for its implementation. The story of Herzl's efforts to set up a cooperative begins in 1901, when Alexander Marmorek, a German Zionist leader and an ally of Herzl's, met the utopian socialist Oppenheimer. Although his ties to Judaism were tenuous, Oppenheimer was attracted to Zionism. He claimed that in the resettlement and occupational transfer of Eastern European Jewry lay a part of the solution of the social problem as a whole. On a more personal note, Oppenheimer longed to improve the image of Jews in the eyes of the gentiles and to make Diaspora Jews proud of their laboring brethren in Palestine.[78] Marmorek got Oppenheimer in touch with Herzl, whereupon Herzl invited Oppenheimer to write about his theories of cooperative settlement in *Die Welt*.

As Oppenheimer argued in his general works on cooperation, so in his Zionist speeches and writings did he blame the ills of capitalist society on land enclosure (*Bodensperre*). Since the late Middle Ages, argued Oppenheimer, the enclosure of land by the wealthy has sent land-hungry peasants either into the cities, where they have formed an oversupply of labor and thereby driven wages down to the starvation level, or into the ranks of the rural proletariat, which is totally dependent on its landowning masters. Oppenheimer's cooperative idea was thus in one sense a child of necessity, for it was a means of mobilizing people with limited capital and know-how. Oppenheimer planned for members to be hired into the cooperative as agricultural laborers, administered by a manager trained in agronomy. The laborers would receive varied wage rates depending on their skills and the nature of their work. Only after the farm began to show a profit could the members begin to buy shares in it and assume ownership over it.[79]

The cooperative was also Oppenheimer's mechanism for increasing the individual laborer's economic and political power. The prosperity of the peasantry, said Oppenheimer, depends on its access to credit. If a peasant has a sound credit base, he can borrow and repay his loans. As was well established by the Schultz-Delitzsch credit cooperatives founded in Germany in the 1860s, farmers who pool their resources extend their credit base; and if peasants were to join together and carry out all their purchases, production, and sales cooperatively, Oppenheimer calculated, they would boost their credit base further.[80] What is more, the administration of the cooperative, although not at first democratic, would grant its members enough of a say to heighten their sense of political

responsibility. Thus the act of maximizing personal freedom and the act of rooting people in the land would be one and the same.

Herzl corresponded with Oppenheimer throughout the writing of *Altneuland,* but their correspondence contains no exchange of ideas.[81] As noted above, Herzl stated his interest in cooperatives as early as 1896, and there is no reason to believe that Oppenheimer influenced him in any fundamental way. Nonetheless, Oppenheimer's articles spurred Herzl to take action on behalf of the cooperative. After reading the last of Oppenheimer's series of articles in *Die Welt* in January 1902, an agitated Herzl wrote in his diary:

> The final appeal, the comparison of the experiment of Rahaline [a cooperative settlement established in Ireland during the 1840s] with the Berlin-Zossen electric experimental railroad struck me, and I immediately decided to carry out Oppenheimer's experiment. I wrote him so at once, but enjoined him to silence for the time being. First, I have to prepare the ground—the AC [Actions Committee, the WZO executive] and the Bank; then too, the JCA with its greater resources would beat me to it. For they would not do it of their own accord, but they *would* do it in order to crush me and eliminate me from competition. As the scene of action I designated Egyptian Palestine to Oppenheimer, on the other side of the "Brook of Egypt," because there I shall be dealing with the English government and thus have no difficulties. . . . I still haven't made up my mind whether I shall make the matter a national affair, i.e., use it for Zionist propaganda purposes—which would have the disadvantage of creating settlers for display, and the advantage *ut aliquid fecisse videamur* [that we would appear to have done something]—or whether I shall get it started in all secrecy.[82]

Although Herzl shared Oppenheimer's self-styled "liberal socialism" and saw in the cooperative a means of increasing human freedom, the above quote reveals that he had pragmatic considerations in mind when he brought Oppenheimer into the WZO. Herzl was engaged in negotiations with the British over the acquisition of territory for Jewish settlement in the Sinai Peninsula or British East Africa. Attracted by Oppenheimer's claim that his cooperative system was viable in all lands, Herzl hoped to establish a cooperative as an experimental settlement in whichever territory the Zionists eventually obtained.

Oppenheimer and certain members of the "practical" opposition did not wish to wait for Herzl's permission before founding a cooperative settlement. In April of 1903, several German Zionists, including Trietsch and Oppenheimer, took action independently of Herzl and established a joint-stock company designed specifically to found "cooperative agricultural enterprises" in Palestine. Herzl was furious at this attack against the principles of political Zionism as well as his own authority. Over the next two months, he coaxed Oppenheimer into withdrawing his support from the society.[83] Despite this clash with Oppenheimer, Herzl wanted the economist to speak at the upcoming Sixth Zionist Congress. The chief subject of the congress, Herzl knew, would be the Uganda proposal. (In April 1903, Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, suggested to Herzl that British East Africa, mistakenly referred to as Uganda, might be

available for Jewish colonization. Herzl, shaken by a horrific pogrom in Kishinev in May, decided to bring the matter before the congress for consideration.)[84] Herzl hoped that Oppenheimer's presence at the congress could help create an atmosphere receptive to the idea of Jewish settlement outside Palestine. After all, Oppenheimer was a "prominent expert" who could speak about the "general principles which . . . naturally with due consideration for any prevailing circumstances, would have to be put into practice in our colonization." And so Herzl deliberately chose Oppenheimer over the Palestinian Jew Hillel Joffe, whom at least one of Herzl's allies had put forward as a likely speaker.[85]

Oppenheimer's speech was well received and occasioned little comment. The official debate over the speech took place the following midnight in a half-empty room.[86] The debates over Uganda had apparently preoccupied and exhausted the delegates. True, the congress voted to name Oppenheimer to the newly formed Palestine Commission, which was empowered to carry out research and exploration in Palestine. But Oppenheimer played no active role in the congress; the prominent settlement expert was treated as an honored guest, not as a member of the family. What is more, few delegates offered a ringing endorsement of Oppenheimer's proposals per se.

Whatever the reaction of the Zionist congress to Oppenheimer's ideas, Herzl cared enough about cooperative settlement to continue lobbying for it in the months and weeks before his death. Perhaps because of the strength of opposition from the previous congress to the Uganda project, Herzl decided to focus his settlement efforts on Palestine, although he maintained his opposition to immigration without political guarantees. He wrote in February 1904: "We intend to acquire through the National Fund a piece of real estate on which a model colony according to the Oppenheimer system can be established, of course not with the elements infiltrating into Palestine [a reference to the Second 'Aliya] but with those that are already present and suitable for this purpose."[87] Sometime before February, Zalman David Levontin, the director of the Anglo-Palestine Bank (APB), had informed Herzl of two desirable tracts that the bank might wish to purchase. Herzl wrote back to Levontin that he sought a tract of at least 10,000 dunams "on which a model colony according to Oppenheimer's system can be erected."[88] Herzl then instructed Otto Warburg, chairman of the Palestine Commission, to arrange an inspection of the real estate in question for its suitability for an Oppenheimer cooperative; Warburg, Soskin, and Oppenheimer responded that one of the two might be adequate for the project.[89] The issue of the cooperative was then brought before the WZO's plenary executive body, the Greater Actions Committee (GAC).

The GAC meeting of 11 April 1904 took place three months before Herzl's death. It is most famous for the near-rupture that took place within the committee over the Uganda issue.[90] But the meeting also featured a momentous, although less hostile, debate over settlement issues. As chairman of the Palestine Commission, Warburg proposed that the WZO build an experiment station, a training farm, and a cooperative farm in Palestine. Warburg was less sure of the success

of the cooperative than of the other two proposals, but Herzl announced his intention to implement and expand the cooperative project if and when funding would permit.[91] He said of the project:

> I consider the cooperative farm an experiment station, indeed a national-economic experiment station, which has at least the importance of the [proposed] agricultural experiment station. Perhaps it is of even greater importance, because there are [agricultural] experiment stations of this kind in other lands, and one could refer to known and similar climactic conditions [to obtain information about Palestine]; while this [cooperative] experiment is of enormous importance. There have been examples of this kind in the forties in Ireland, to which Dr. Oppenheimer refers, and various communistic experiments. But there has never been so modern a settlement attempt on these cooperative principles. For us this is a matter of the utmost importance.[92]

The Oppenheimer plan encountered opposition from both politically and practically oriented members of the GAC.[93] Although opposition to a settlement project was in tune with the principles of political Zionism, such sentiments, when voiced by activists for practical work in Palestine, require an explanation. Ussishkin was disturbed by Herzl's proposal that the Oppenheimer experiment be funded by the JNF. Ussishkin was all for land purchases by the fund and by any other agency that could bring land into Jewish hands. But leaders of the Ḥovevei Ẓion, because of their own ideological leanings and their dealings with the heavy-handed bureaucracy in the Rothschild colonies, opposed administered colonies funded by national capital. Ussishkin saw in the Oppenheimer plan, as well as other projects mentioned by Warburg, the specter of the baronial regime. Ussishkin suggested that the WZO focus not on settlement projects of its own but on boosting the credit supply of the APB. And in a departure from the usual agrarocentrism of the Ḥovevei Ẓion, Ussishkin urged that credit be made available for urban and industrial settlement as well as agriculture.[94]

Ussishkin's references to credit and private initiative may on the surface resemble Herzl's plan for efficient, businesslike settlement as outlined in *The Jewish State* and *Altneuland*. But Herzl's notion of a businesslike and efficient operation was quite different from that held by Ussishkin, who epitomized the antistatist character of the Ḥovevei Ẓion. After all, Herzl called for the creation of a Jewish Company that would put out vast amounts of capital and incur short-term losses in the employment and settlement of poor immigrants. The end result would be a flourishing economy based on a productive laboring class, but this result would be some time in coming.

And what of the social element in Oppenheimer's proposal? Herzl's equation of Zionist settlement with social reform aroused no comment from the leaders of Russian Zionism, Ussishkin and Tchlenov. Yet both of them had gone through populist phases as youths, and Ussishkin in particular went on to develop close ties with the pioneers of the Second 'Aliya.[95] Perhaps because of the authoritarian element in Oppenheimer's cooperative scheme, or because of cultural tensions between German and Eastern Jewry, or simply out of impatience with elaborate

planning while nothing was being done in Palestine, the leaders of Russian Zionism displayed little interest in Oppenheimer's ideas. Of the members of the GAC, only Alfred Klee shared Herzl's belief in the social value of the experiment.[96] But Klee was himself a champion of agrarian reform and a disciple of Oppenheimer's; two years before the GAC meeting, he had completed a doctoral thesis for the sociologist Max Weber on the plight of agricultural workers in Silesia.[97]

At the end of the GAC meeting, the committee passed a resolution instructing the Palestine Commission, in cooperation with the APB, to purchase land for all three projects proposed by Warburg. Although the vote approving the agricultural station and training farm was unanimous, the cooperative received two negative votes out of sixteen cast.[98] Given the mixed feelings aroused by the cooperative project, it seems fair to conclude that had Herzl not brought Oppenheimer into the WZO, and had he not pursued the project in word and deed, the cooperative might not have become an official Zionist policy goal by 1904. Seven years were to pass before the cooperative's establishment, and it would not have come about at all had it not been for the steady pressure of a number of individuals who, not coincidentally, promoted national settlement in various forms in the years following Herzl's death. Herein lies the true significance of Herzl's lobbying on behalf of cooperative settlement. The decision of the GAC would create a legitimate justification in years to come for settlement activists who agreed at least in part with Herzl's plan for publicly funded colonization along social-reformist lines.

Herzl was hardly the only Zionist thinker at the turn of the century who demanded that settlement be publicly financed, or that it be based on nationalized land and the cooperative principle. Such ideas were clearly stated in the manifesto of the Democratic Faction and were expressed even more vociferously by Syrkin. As Aḥad ha-'Am wryly noted in 1903, the utopian landscape depicted in *Altneuland* cast a spell on young Zionists throughout Russia and Eastern Europe.[99] Herzl is unique in that unlike penniless dreamers scribbling in garrets or shouting from the back benches at the Zionist congresses, he had the ability to transform some of his social ideas into policies. During his seven years of leadership of the WZO, Herzl labored to build an infrastructure for cooperative and other forms of national settlement. His activity was severely constrained, however, not only by a lack of money and Ottoman approval but also by the dictates of political Zionism, which impelled Herzl to formulate a sweeping plan for colonization but refrain from implementing it. Herzl began to construct the WZO's settlement apparatus, but he needs to be seen as an architect, not an engineer, a man who wedded Zionism to technocracy on the theoretical and institutional levels, but not necessarily on the level of policy. After Herzl's death, it became the task of practical Zionists to attempt to realize, at least in part, Herzl's dream of an ideal society in a Jewish state. And just as Central Europe produced the first architect of national settlement, so did it produce Zionism's first settlement engineers.

III.

EXPERIMENTS WITH COLONIAL MODELS, 1903–1907

Theodor Herzl's death in 1904 brought with it a change in the course of Zionist settlement policy. The mantle of political leadership of the WZO fell upon David Wolffsohn, who shared Herzl's political orientation but not his interest in planning for the eventual mass evacuation of Eastern European Jewry. At the same time, Otto Warburg (1859-1938) rose to prominence as the leading spokesman of the practical Zionists. The Sixth Congress of 1903 authorized Warburg to found a Palestine Commission (PC), which functioned until 1907. Warburg differed from the vast majority of practical Zionists in his expert knowledge of colonization matters. He was a prominent botanist, a university professor with years of experience in the German colonial service. During his four years of stewardship over the PC, Warburg implanted into the WZO German colonialism's celebrated commitment to scientific research and experimentation. Accustomed to receiving subventions from the German Reich for his colonial activities, he freely spent Zionist public capital on settlement-related projects. By stressing the importance of public capital, Warburg preserved Herzl's conception of colonization as a national endeavor. Not coincidentally, the actions of the PC led directly to the founding of the WZO's Palestine Office in 1908, and with it the direct engagement by the WZO in colonization.

Warburg served Zionism in a number of other fora besides the PC; from 1905 until 1911, he sat on the WZO's restricted executive body, the Smaller Actions Committee (SAC). From 1911 until 1920 he served as its chairman, thus making him nominally the president of the WZO. In fact, however, Warburg did not exercise the kind of control over the WZO wielded by its former and future presidents, Herzl and Weizmann; nor was he even as commanding a figure as Wolffsohn, president between 1905 and 1911. Warburg had no desire for political power within the WZO; he found politics distasteful and devoted all his energies to the economic development of the Yishuv. Although Warburg never sought power, he found himself elevated to positions of executive authority by the practical Zionist camp, which saw in this distinguished professor an influential spokesman for its cause.

Despite this commonality of interests with the practical Zionists, Warburg did not enjoy smooth relations with any but a small group of loyal supporters within

the WZO. Warburg was a classic technocrat, apolitical and elitist, and never found a sure footing in a movement enamored of ideology and committed to democratic management. He was also an enthusiastic entrepreneur, who saw in the expenditure of public funds an act of pump priming for torrents of capitalist investment. This approach aroused the ire of Zionist ideologues whose nationalism was intertwined with social reformism. Conversely, Warburg was frustrated by the impecuniosity of the Zionist movement, which contributed only paltry sums to the plantation societies and commercial enterprises which he founded in Palestine. Nor was he successful in his attempts to draw European finance capital, which flowed to the colonial empires of the Great Powers, to the Yishuv. The story of Warburg's involvement with the WZO, therefore, points out both the value and the limitations of colonial models as sources of inspiration for the planners of Zionist settlement.

Warburg was unusual among the leaders of the early Zionist movement in many respects. First, he was born into great wealth. His father, a silk merchant distantly related to the celebrated Warburg banking family, left his son a fortune of some two million marks. Many of Zionism's founding fathers came from assimilated backgrounds, but Warburg was unique in having received virtually no exposure to Jewish practice and culture. Finally, although fin de siècle Zionism did count some celebrities in its ranks, such as the writers Herzl and Nordau, Warburg stood out for his high level of academic and professional achievement. After attending a classical *Gymnasium* in Hamburg and several German universities, he went on to earn a doctorate in botany from the University of Berlin in 1883. He was fascinated by contemporary botanical discoveries going on in the world's tropical areas and spent the years 1885 to 1889 exploring the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. Upon his return to Germany, Warburg began to publish his findings, and by the end of the 1890s he had acquired an international reputation for his work on tropical plants.[1] His scholarship won him a teaching position at the University of Berlin.

Also during the 1890s, Warburg became involved with German colonialism. It is impossible to understand Warburg's approach to Zionist settlement without examining his colonial activity in depth. His involvement with German colonialism preceded his turn to Zionism by several years, and he continued to participate in colonial projects while working on behalf of Zionist settlement. His principal academic interest was *Nutzpflanzen*—plants that can be of some practical benefit to mankind.[2] Warburg apparently found in the fertile soil of the tropics a perfect opportunity to promote the growth of useful plants. He did so first by aiding in the founding in 1896 of the Colonial Economic Committee (CEC), a private advisory body independent of the German Foreign Office's Colonial Department, which administered the colonies. The CEC soon merged with the German Colonial Society, the general interest group of German colonialism, and served as its technical arm. In 1897, Warburg founded *Der Tropenpflanzer,* a journal devoted to tropical colonial agriculture.[3] Through articles in *Der Tropenpflanzer,* which he also edited, as well as a number of pamphlets,

he soon became a highly regarded colonial publicist. It is important to note the shift in Warburg's career path from pure research to advisory and managerial activity. Like other scientists in the colonial service of the European powers, Warburg became comfortable with administration, fundraising, and public relations.[4] The technician became a technocrat.

Warburg's geographic area of expertise, the earth's tropical zone, coincided with the geographical parameters of the German colonial empire, which was concentrated in Africa and the South Pacific. Warburg considered the colonies' greatest benefit to be the production of raw materials such as cotton, rubber, and palm oils for the home market. He was aware that the colonies produced only a minuscule fraction of the raw materials needed by German industry, but it satisfied him to believe that production would increase over time. Nor was he disturbed by the massive deficits run up by most of the colonies and the amount of state aid they required to function. Warburg shared the view, widely held during this era of European protectionism and tariff wars, that Germany should minimize her dependence on foreign sources of raw materials. To that end, he believed colonial policy must pursue long-term national interests, not short-term profits.[5]

Warburg's national-economic justifications for the colonies did not prevent him from seeing in colonial agriculture a source of profit for the private investor. Warburg was an entrepreneur as well as an advisor; he participated and invested in numerous plantation societies in German Africa. His propagandistic writings glowingly described the high and regular dividends paid by such societies. Nor was Warburg in error; the merchants and planters who exploited the German colonies often made handsome profits. But, as Warburg himself was aware, these profits would not have been made had it not been for a combination of outright grants from the imperial government and infusions of credit from German banks, whose loans themselves were guaranteed by the German government.[6] Through his dealings with the German colonies, therefore, Warburg came to expect that any colonial operation would be able to draw on long-term credit from major financial institutions. With enough credit, a colonial society would be able to begin operations and attract investments. Warburg took it for granted that public capital would be available for certain colonial undertakings that could not guarantee a profit. He carried all of these assumptions into his Zionist activity.

Warburg also brought into the WZO Imperial Germany's celebrated commitment to scientific research and development, both at home and abroad. On the continent, Germany was far ahead of its European neighbors in the development of a system of agricultural education and experimentation, featuring a network of experiment stations, model farms, and extension services staffed by itinerant instructors.[7] The scientific personnel in the German colonies were "the envy of foreign colonial services,"[8] as were the experiment stations they established. Warburg frequently wrote about these stations and praised those European governments that provided aid for them. In addition to experiment stations, felt Warburg, governments or private institutes must construct microbiological institutes for disease control and training farms.[9]

Warburg's general background in colonial affairs was accompanied by a strong interest in the economic development of the Middle East. Warburg, like other advocates of German expansion into the Middle East, saw in the Ottoman Empire a prime source of oil, cotton, and wheat as well as a market for German manufactures.[10] His particular interest was cotton. His work on behalf of its production began as early as 1896. The CEC, which, as mentioned above, Warburg helped found, was the brainchild of a factory owner named Karl Supf, who wished to promote cotton production in Germany's colonies. Supf feared that the German textile industry's dependence on American cotton might have disastrous consequences should the Americans, sensing that they could charge whatever the market would bear, raise cotton prices. The CEC therefore sponsored cotton-raising experiments in Togoland and in German East Africa.[11] In general, however, German colonial enthusiasts in search of cotton had brighter hopes for the Ottoman Empire than the African colonies. In this spirit, Warburg went to work in Anatolia, site of the German-financed Anatolian Railway Company. He was involved in an offshoot of the company known as the German-Levantine Cotton Society (GLCS). Centered along the railway in the province of Adana, the GLCS colonized some 50,000 Circassian and Danubian peasants to supplement the local workforce. The society distributed seed, made credit available to the settlers, and erected a model farm for the training of the Circassians.[12]

The exact nature of Warburg's involvement with the GLCS is not clear. In 1905, he referred to cotton-growing experiments he had carried out in Anatolia "on behalf of a German company." Warburg's first encounter with European Jews attempting to settle in the Ottoman Empire occurred in 1900, while he was visiting Anatolia for unspecified reasons. Once active in the WZO, Warburg lobbied it to invest in the GLCS, and in his petitions he displayed a thorough knowledge of the company's finances and operations.[13] Given this information, one can safely state that Warburg played an active role in the GLCS's operation and was well acquainted with German imperialist practices in the Middle East at the time that he began his Zionist activity.

For Warburg, the agricultural development of the Ottoman Empire meant more than the provision of raw materials to the fatherland. It also presented a professional challenge and an opportunity to use European science in the service of what he believed to be the forces of progress and civilization. At a meeting of the German Asiatic Society in 1905, Warburg and others expressed admiration for the achievements of the English engineer Sir William Willcocks, who had constructed irrigation works along the Nile. The members of the society called upon the Germans to do the same for the territories along the Anatolian Railway and its successor, the Baghdad Railway.[14] From the Anatolian highlands to the Tigris-Euphrates valley, the entire Middle East appeared to Warburg and his kind as wasteland awaiting the reviving touch of *deutsche Wissenschaft.*

In turning to Warburg's activity on behalf of Jewish colonization, the first question that comes to mind is why this mild-mannered scientist got involved

in Zionism in the first place. Warburg's only biographer, his contemporary Ya'akov Thon, surmised that Warburg may have been angered when his father suggested he convert to Christianity in order to receive a professorship. Reminiscing about the early days of Zionism, Warburg spoke of Hamburg as a "stronghold of assimilation" and of the "plague of conversion" that had struck the friends and family of his father-in-law, the prominent German Ḥovev Ẓion Gustav Cohen.[15] A humanitarian compassion for Eastern European Jewry played its part as well. By 1897, Warburg was a leading figure in Esra, a German Jewish philanthropic organization closely tied to the international Ḥovevei Ẓion.[16] While in Anatolia in 1900, Warburg encountered recent Rumanian Jewish immigrants; he supported two Jewish agricultural colonies out of his own pocket and lobbied the JCA to offer assistance.[17] Perhaps the most important influence directing Warburg specifically into the WZO was Cohen, who knew Herzl and arranged for a meeting between the botanist and the journalist in January of 1898.

The meeting did not win Warburg over to political Zionism. He was skeptical about Herzl's ideas about colonization: "He imagined immigration and settlement to Palestine as a technical matter that is relatively easy to carry out; while we Ḥovevei Ẓion knew as a result of the experience of many years of all the difficulty that lay in the nature of Palestine and the nature of the Jews."[18] The meeting did, however, lead to a steady correspondence between the two men. At first, Warburg's contact with Herzl was limited to exchanges of questions and answers about Palestine's flora and climate. But after the turn of the century, Herzl enlisted Warburg's aid in his attempts to acquire land for the Jews in El-Arish (on the northeastern coast of the Sinai Peninsula) and in British East Africa, mistakenly referred to as Uganda.[19] Warburg was not sanguine about either project. The lack of water and arable land in El-Arish would cause any major settlement attempt there to fail.[20] As for Uganda, the presence of a large black population available to perform labor for white settlers would impede large-scale Jewish agricultural colonization.[21]

It is noteworthy that Warburg's opinions about the two proposals were based solely on the suitability of the land and environment under consideration, not on an exclusive love of the land of Israel. True, Warburg did announce publicly that the Uganda scheme lacked "a Zionist sense,"[22] but he did not share the Zionist movement's general sentiment that the WZO's purview was legally and ethically limited to Palestine. A small group of Central European Zionists, including Herzl, Warburg, Trietsch, and Alfred Nossig, felt that the increasingly destructive pogroms afflicting Russian Jewry and the formidable obstacles impeding Jewish acquisition of Palestine justified looking to other lands as either temporary settlements or footholds for permanent agricultural colonization. The lands of the Ottoman Empire, particularly those of the Fertile Crescent, were considered suitable both because of their proximity to Palestine and because they exuded an appropriately Oriental aura.[23] Cyprus was a popular target. From the first days of the WZO, Trietsch advocated colonizing Cyprus, which he saw as an ideal setting for the construction of a network of model villages.

Trietsch pressed on with this plan even after Herzl had given it up in the face of British discouragement. Warburg, in turn, badgered Wolffsohn for WZO funds for an experimental colony on the island, arguing, "In light of the experience gained here at little risk, it will be easier for us afterwards to establish garden cities in the land of Israel."[24]

Whereas Warburg considered the colonization of Cyprus to be of only experimental value, he saw in Mesopotamia (Iraq) a perfect territory for large-scale Jewish settlement. Warburg was hardly the first to come up with this idea; in 1896, the American Jewish leader Cyrus Adler, himself a non-Zionist, had suggested to Herzl that Eastern European Jews settle in Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia, he argued, had a natural absorptive capacity that Palestine lacked. Besides, the Ottoman Empire showed signs of welcoming Jewish immigration into parts of the empire outside Palestine.[25] Unlike Adler, Warburg hoped to combine this philanthropic act on behalf of persecuted Russian Jewry with a patriotic act on behalf of German industry. The meeting of the German Asiatic Society which Warburg attended in 1905, along with the German Colonial Congress of that year, considered the "development of a modern transportation network and the settlement of non-Muslim populations in the countries of the Near East." Shortly after the meetings, Warburg wrote a pamphlet suggesting that Eastern European Jews be settled along the length of the ever-growing Baghdad Railway, from the Anatolian highlands to the Persian Gulf. The Baghdad Railway Company would provide free land to the Jewish settlers, Jewish charities would build them homes, and the settlers would grow cotton for German consumption. Warburg also informed Willcocks, who had begun to raise funds for performing irrigation work in Iraq, of his colonization scheme.[26]

Warburg believed that the two interests he was trying to serve did not conflict. A colonization project for Russian Jews called for land and a great deal of money, more than the WZO could muster. An international colonization society centered around the Baghdad Railway, Warburg figured, would attract investments from English and German sources far removed from Zionist circles. Warburg pursued this proposal avidly until the end of World War I, but he received no support for it from either the WZO or any other source of funding.[27]

Warburg's program for Jewish colonization in Iraq was his sole attempt to make Jewish colonization serve German imperialist purposes. In his work on behalf of Jewish settlement in Palestine, Warburg paid little attention to German interests in that land. Since Germany's interests in Palestine were for the most part cultural and political, not economic, they were of only minor concern to him.[28] Warburg displayed scant interest in the propagation of the German language in the Yishuv's schools. In this regard his position differed from that of the philanthropic *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden,* which established a network of schools in the Yishuv. When the *Hilfsverein* founded a Hebrew high school in Jaffa in 1906, Paul Nathan, the *Hilfsverein's* secretary, favored German as the secondary language of instruction. Warburg, although himself a member of the *Hilfsverein,* advocated the use of English.[29] In 1913, when a bitter dispute broke out between the *Hilfsverein* and the WZO over the language of instruction at

what was to become the Haifa Technion, Warburg sided with the Zionists in favoring the exclusive use of Hebrew. Such a view was opposed to that of Nathan who, motivated at least in part by a desire to appear responsive to German imperial interests, argued that German should be used for scientific and technical instruction.[30] Despite his enthusiastic German patriotism, Warburg felt that the WZO should be flexible in its alliances and enlist the aid of any Great Power that might be of assistance. If anything, Warburg had pro-British leanings, as did much of the WZO leadership during the last years preceding the outbreak of World War I.[31]

Germany's relative lack of economic penetration in Palestine, combined with the WZO's standing commitment to the eventual acquisition of Jewish autonomy in Palestine, led Warburg to develop an agenda for the Yishuv's economic development that had little in common with his colonial program to turn Germany's overseas possessions and parts of the Ottoman Empire into sources of raw materials for the benefit of German industry. Instead, he wished to use colonial techniques to promote nation-building ends. We will treat Warburg's Zionist activities in depth below; here it suffices to note that he strove to develop a well-balanced, productive, and profitable economy in Palestine. As a colonial botanist experienced in the development of native cultures, Warburg hoped to foster the growth of flora that best suited the Palestinian soil and climate. He appreciated the economic benefits of mixed farming and market gardening carried out by smallholders' cooperatives, but as a colonial entrepreneur he also saw a bright future for capitalist plantations concentrating on cash crops for export.[32] Unlike the most influential members of the Odessa Committee of the Ḥovevei Ẓion, he supported commercial and industrial as well as agricultural projects.[33] In sum, Warburg saw the Yishuv as both the target and beneficiary of colonization, as dependent and metropolitan government all rolled up into one.

Warburg's general approach to Zionist colonization was shared by a number of technical experts in the Yishuv and settlement activists within the WZO. His closest colleague was Selig Soskin (1872-1959), a Jew from the Crimea who met Warburg while studying agronomy at the University of Berlin. After receiving a doctorate from Rostock, Soskin traveled throughout Africa and South America, familiarizing himself with the colonial practices of all the Great Powers, especially Germany. In 1894, he wrote an article employing German models, both domestic and colonial, to justify the construction of an agricultural experiment station in Palestine. He emigrated to Palestine two years later, where he administered Be'er Tuvia and then moved to Ḥadera, serving as representative for the society Dorshei Ẓion that sponsored the colony. Soskin and Warburg renewed their acquaintance in 1900, while the botanist was on his first visit to Palestine.[34] As Soskin unraveled his own settlement philosophy, it became clear that the two men shared a common agenda for the economic development of the Yishuv: capitalist investment coupled with public expenditures on research and experimentation. When an accident and illness in late 1902 forced Soskin to return

to Europe, Warburg invited him to Berlin. The two proceeded to collaborate on a variety of Zionist projects; Warburg also put Soskin into the service of German imperialist projects such as the GLCS.[35] The two worked together until 1906, when Soskin left Berlin for West Africa, where he stayed until 1918 as an agricultural advisor in the German colonies.

Warburg's Palestinian journey brought him into contact with two other technicians, Joseph Treidel (1876-1929), an engineer and surveyor, and the agronomist Aaron Aaronsohn (1876-1919). Like Warburg and Soskin, Treidel had a German connection, being himself a Rhinelander and having worked as a scientific advisor in the German African colonies before immigrating to Palestine, where he was employed by the JCA.[36] Aaronsohn's is a different story; brought to Palestine from Rumania as a child, he grew up in Zikhron Ya'akov and developed the Gallic cultural veneer common among the products of the Rothschild colonies. But in this case, cultural differences counted for little. Warburg and Aaronsohn shared common research interests, stemming from a desire to study the Palestinian ecology in a global context, in order both to contribute to and benefit from the international scientific discourse on agriculture in arid regions. Both men enjoyed international renown, Warburg for his work on tropical plants, Aaronsohn for his discovery of wild wheat in the Upper Galilee. Aaronsohn also shared Warburg's entrepreneurial spirit and managerial bent. In addition to participating in many commercial ventures, Aaronsohn, along with Treidel and Soskin, founded in 1901 a surveying office and research service imposingly named the *Agronomisch-Kulturtechnisches Bureau für Palästina.* The office was not a financial success, and it functioned for only two years, but it carried out useful activities and set Aaronsohn thinking about the need for a more rigorous system of agricultural experimentation in the land.[37]

Warburg was most impressed by his three colleagues and sang their praises to Herzl.[38] But that was all he could do, as the WZO refrained from Palestinian involvements at the time. Unable to act, Warburg wrote. Along with Trietsch and Nossig, Warburg set up a "Committee for the Economic Exploration of Palestine" in 1901. The committee was to prepare reports regarding the economic development of the Middle East. It never got off the ground, but Warburg and Soskin contributed frequently to the journal *Palästina,* which Nossig and Trietsch founded in 1902. *Palästina* and its successor after 1904, *Altneuland*, were expressly devoted to the study of Jewish settlement in Palestine in light of other colonization operations throughout the world. Each issue brimmed with information about the Great Powers' doings in the Middle East, and particular attention was paid to the region's growing railway network. The scientific activity of the *Deutscher Palästina Verein* also figured prominently in the journal's pages.

The journal's articles were written either by experts such as Warburg or Soskin, who had a flair for public relations, or by Zionist publicists who compensated for their lack of scientific knowledge with a fine literary style. Nossig and Trietsch clearly fell into the latter camp. Nossig, a Polish Jew from a family steeped in German culture, was a dilettante of the most unfocused sort. His interests included geopolitics and revisionist socialism, about which he wrote tomes.[39]

Both men were impressed by German economic expansion in the Middle East. But, like Warburg, they set a clear line between that expansion and the settlement of Palestine: "To us Palestine is not a distant breadbasket but a homeland."[40] At the same time, Nossig wrote that

> Germany is a land from which we can learn much. If the Germans spread out so energetically today throughout the entire globe, if their agricultural settlements as well as their commercial and industrial undertakings meet with success in all lands and climes, so do the Germans owe this to the fact that they sent out their economists, their professors as pioneers. As in war, so too in the economic struggle, do the Germans win because of their teachers.[41]

The "teachers" to whom Nossig refers are not mere scientists but technocrats or, as he called them, *Agrarpolitiker.* This term defies translation but not definition; Nossig had in mind an administrator cum expert who would plan the agricultural development of a country with that land's long-term political and economic goals in mind. "Just as nowadays the advice of the agronomist is indispensable for a farmer, so does the agronomist need that of the *Agrarpolitiker.*"[42] The use of a form of the word *Agrarpolitik,* or agricultural policy, is significant, for it, like *Sozialpolitik,* enjoyed wide currency in German-speaking Europe at the end of the century.[43] Even more than *Sozialpolitik,* it conflated technology and politics, thereby according the expert a decisive role in the making of policy. Warburg and Soskin, rich in experience in Germany's colonies and sphere of influence in the Ottoman Empire, brought *Agrarpolitik,* in all the fullness of its meaning, into the WZO.

In August of 1903, the two men finally received formal permission and funding from the WZO to begin planning the colonization of Palestine. At the Sixth Zionist Congress, Soskin submitted a resolution, in the name of the German delegation as a whole, that the WZO establish a budgeted commission that would explore Palestine and neighboring lands and set up stations for agricultural experimentation, disease research, and real-estate information. Said Soskin of his proposals, "We need only refer to how the Aryan peoples colonize. I refer to the Germans in the African colonies, etc."[44] The resolution passed, along with a budget request for 15,000 francs per year. Warburg, Soskin, and Oppenheimer were nominated to serve on the new Palestine Commission (PC).[45] The PC quickly set up shop, using Warburg's Berlin home as its office. Soskin and Warburg shouldered virtually the entire burden of the commission's work; Oppenheimer was interested only in the promotion of his cooperative scheme, though he signed letters and approved of projects when called on to do so.

Between 1903 and 1907, the practical work of the WZO was directed by two agents: the PC and the Anglo-Palestine Bank (APB), which operated out of Berlin and Jaffa respectively, and whose respective directors were Warburg and Zalman David Levontin.[46] The two men bickered constantly over the allocation of Zionist funds and the shaping of settlement policy. The contest between them represented more than a power struggle between institutions with overlapping

authority. Rather, the two men differed radically in personality, cultural heritage, and their approach to Zionist colonization.

Levontin was a classic maskil, a product of the Russian-Jewish Enlightenment. His passionate Jewish nationalism propelled him to Palestine in 1881, when he purchased the land for the first Zionist settlement, Rishon le-Ẓion. Forced by family considerations to return to Russia, Levontin spent the next twenty years in banking, rising to the directorship of a commercial bank in Minsk. He leaped at the chance to direct the APB when it was founded in 1903. A fiercely independent man, Levontin relished being the WZO's only man in Palestine. He resented interference from Europe partly because of his temperament and partly because he felt that he had a feel for the country and its needs that the European Zionist bureaucrats did not. Levontin molded the APB into a native Palestinian institution, complete with a staff of Ottoman Jews fluent in Arabic.[47] Clearly, he had little reason to rejoice at the founding of the PC, a European entity directed by an assimilated German Jew.

Added to the cultural gap that separated Levontin from Warburg was a profound difference in their economic philosophies. We have seen that Warburg was an archetypal *Agrarpolitiker* whose colonial experience led him to expect that massive amounts of governmental aid and credit would flow into any colonization operation in its early phases. No doubt Warburg's inherited wealth contributed to the ease with which he disregarded an unfavorable balance sheet. Levontin, on the other hand, was a professional banker and a defender of the middle-class financial values with which he had been raised. As director of the APB, Levontin imposed a strict policy of following businesslike principles in making and collecting on loans to the Jewish colonies. He frowned on the use of public capital for settlement projects, and he did not share Warburg's assumption that the WZO should support a staff of scientific personnel. So although Levontin's bank did much for the development of the Yishuv's capitalist economy, Levontin did little to promote the WZO's settlement institutions.[48]

Levontin may be seen as an exponent of a purely commercialist approach to Zionist colonization, an approach which, as shown above, had some support in the Russian Ḥovevei Ẓion, most notably from the tea magnate Wissotzky. In some ways, Levontin was a forerunner of the businesslike approach to colonization favored by the American Zionist leader Louis Brandeis, who rose to power in the Zionist movement during the First World War. But Levontin may also be seen as a proto-Revisionist, for, like the Revisionist leader Vladimir Jabotinsky, he rejected the ideology of productivization that was central to most formulations of the Zionist idea. Levontin interpreted Zionism as a mass gathering of middle-class immigrants who stood in no need of "productivization" in their new homeland. Rather, thought Levontin, the new homeland must be adapted to its new inhabitants by stimulating the commercial and industrial development of its cities.[49] (Levontin also championed some highly unbusinesslike Zionist programs, such as the construction of historical monuments and a ring of fortresses, to be manned by fighting youth, on the borders of the vulnerable new land.)

Strife within the WZO's settlement institutions, sparked by the conflict between Levontin and Warburg, was compounded by the opposition that both men aroused from the Zionist populist camp, represented by Ussishkin. His manifesto of 1905, *Our Program,* expanded upon the remarks he had made at the April 1904 GAC meeting discussed in the previous chapter. Although the pamphlet weakly echoed Levontin's call for urban and industrial development, its emphasis was agrarian. Unlike Levontin, who distrusted and grew to loathe the socialist pioneers of the Second 'Aliya, Ussishkin embraced them, for he saw in labor squads (he used the Russian term *artel*) of mobilized youth the key to the redemption of Palestine. Similarly, although *Our Program* paid lip service to some of Warburg's proposals for publicly funded ventures, Ussishkin refused to consider expending WZO funds for the establishment of rural settlements. The JNF, he wrote, must buy land but not cultivate it:

> The cultivation of the soil presupposes public administrative labors and efforts, and the supression of private initiative and liberty, that is everything which promises great expenses and small returns. With all available capital, but not with the hard-earned pennies of the Jewish proletariat, may these labors and efforts be made. The land, however dear it might be, remains the capital of the people. The improvements of all kinds upon it may, however, very often be valueless.[50]

To be sure, Ussishkin shared common ground with his Zionist colleagues, and all three were able to collaborate at times. But often Warburg found himself between the Scylla of the APB and the Charybdis of the Odessa Committee, supported by only a handful of colleagues and a 15,000 franc annual budget, of which he actually received barely more than one-third.[51]

Warburg did not intend to use the PC as an agent of colonization. It had neither the resources nor the authority to serve as such. The resolution of the Sixth Congress authorizing the PC's creation limited its activities to research and exploration. In July of 1905, the Seventh Congress did broaden the PC's functions to the promotion of Jewish agriculture and industry in Palestine, but the congress expressly forbade the commission from engaging in settlement per se. Finally, although devoted to practical work in Palestine, Warburg held to the Herzlian idea that a charter should precede large-scale settlement.[52] Warburg and Soskin therefore used their budget to found the journal *Altneuland,* which replaced *Palästina.*[53] In search of mineralogical treasures such as phosphates, Warburg subsidized a three-month trip to the Dead Sea by Aaronsohn and the German geologist Max Blankenhorn. In 1905, the PC sent the surveyor Treidel to investigate irrigation possibilities in the Jordan Valley, and in 1906 the agronomists Aaronsohn and Moshe Berman explored the Galilee and Jordan Valley at the PC's behest.[54]

This was the extent of what the PC could do with its own money. In Warburg's mind, however, the commission's most important functions involved the provision of information and policy recommendations to settlement agencies, including but not limited to the WZO. The parallel to the German Colonial Economic

Committee, which made its services available to the German Colonial Office and private colonial societies alike, is apparent. Warburg also saw the PC as a lobbyist, soliciting Jewish philanthropies and private settlement companies to fund certain projects especially dear to him. At the GAC meeting of April 1904, Warburg requested authority for the PC to search for land suitable for the three projects mentioned in the previous chapter: an experiment station, a training farm for the sons of Jewish colonists, and a cooperative settlement. The JNF would buy the land for these three, and other organizations such as Esra and the JCA would be solicited to pay for the buildings and inventory required. The PC would coordinate the entire operation. The GAC approved Warburg's request and instructed him to cooperate with Levontin's APB in the search for appropriate tracts.[55]

The GAC meeting set off a series of tortuous negotiations, power struggles, and personality conflicts between various branches of the WZO empowered to deal with settlement issues. Rivalry quickly developed between Warburg's and Levontin's agencies over control of the WZO's Palestinian operations. Both men needed the resources of the JNF, but the administrators of the fund had ideas of their own about its proper use. Finally, all three of these bodies were subordinate to the Smaller Actions Committee. Wolffsohn, chair of the SAC and president of the WZO, was financially conservative and distrusted Warburg's costly schemes.[56]

Warburg assumed that his projects would be built on land belonging to the JNF. But in April 1904, the fund owned no land. The Sixth Congress had authorized the JNF to begin land purchase, and it acquired its first tract, at Ḥittin near Tiberias, in 1905. Because Ottoman law prohibited a foreign corporation from buying land unless the title and mortgage were registered in the name of an individual, this tract and the JNF's other early holdings were purchased either by the APB in Levontin's name or by the JCA in the name of Chaim Kalvarisky. By the middle of 1907, the JNF owned Ḥittin, Delaika (near the Sea of Galilee), and two areas near Lod, Ben Shemen (also known also as Beit Arif at the time) and Ḥulda.[57] Theoretically, then, Warburg had land for his projects, and he frequently announced in public that the training farm would be built at Ḥittin, the cooperative at Delaika, and the experiment station on land bought by the JCA at Atlit.[58]

In reality, however, these lands were not clearly designated for Warburg's projects. To start with, there had been disagreement among the members of the JNF's supervisory body about buying land at all before the fund's holdings equaled 200,000 pounds sterling, a precondition imposed when the JNF was established in 1901. Donations were slow in coming; even by 1906, the JNF's holdings reached only 60,000 pounds.[59] Kremenetzky, manager of the JNF, felt uncomfortable about using up its resources prematurely, but most people went along with Ussishkin's call for immediate land purchase.[60] There was far less accord, however, in deciding what to do with the land once acquired. The only settlement project that united the various factions within the JNF's leadership was the establishment of some sort of agricultural school for the children of

Kishinev who had been orphaned by the dreadful pogrom of 1903.[61] On this philanthropic act the representatives of the Ḥovevei Ẓion, on the one hand, and Wolffsohn and the forces of political Zionism, on the other, could agree. It was in the name of this project, and none of Warburg's, that the JNF acquired Ḥittin and Delaika.[62]

By June 1905, it was decided that Warburg's proposed training farm and the Kishinev orphans' farm would be one and the same thing. The APB signed up the agronomist Berman to manage the farm at Ḥittin. The land at Ḥittin, however, turned out to be unusable, as it consisted of a checkerboard of parcels separated by Arab holdings. In the next year, 1906, the JNF invoked the orphans again when it got hold of Beit Arif, but no training farm was set up there either.[63]

As the members of the Actions Committee and the JNF directorium debated endlessly about the Kishinev orphans, Warburg found his own projects for the most part unsupported. His idea for an administered training farm for the benefit of the sons of Jewish colonists, for example, was opposed by both Ussishkin and Levontin. Levontin considered training farms a waste of money, citing the case of the JCA's Sejera as an example of unproductive investment. Warburg and Soskin, on the other hand, considered Sejera a model of a successful training farm. Neither man was troubled by Sejera's deficits. Two years before the WZO set up the training farm Kinneret at Delaika, Warburg wrote, "sooner or later we shall have to establish a training farm at Delaika, whether it is profitable or not."[64] But faced with opposition from the Zionist leadership to and a lack of funds for a training farm, Warburg was forced to consider other possible uses for Delaika. There was an element of urgency to his proposals, as according to Ottoman law, privately owned land not put under the plow was liable to be confiscated by the state. He supported a proposal made by Ussishkin to lease land at Delaika to experienced Jewish farmers from Cherson, in southern Russia. The land of Um Djuni, a smaller tract across the Jordan, could be the site of an experimental venture in sugar beet, cotton, or sheep raising.[65] The Cherson experiment fell through, however, because the tract at Delaika was not large enough for the group.[66] Lest the land at Delaika become an Ottoman domain, it, like other JNF lands, was leased to Arab farmers.

Oppenheimer's cooperative proposal also made little headway between 1903 and 1907, but since Warburg did not consider it as high a priority as his other projects, he complained little about it. As early as March 1906, Warburg suggested placing the cooperative at Um Djuni, the future site of the collective Degania, but he was quick to place Oppenheimer's plan on the back burner when what he considered to be a better use for the land presented itself.[67] Besides, Warburg, like other leaders of the WZO, was withholding judgment as to the workability of Oppenheimer's scheme until results came in from a cooperative settlement Oppenheimer had begun in 1906 at Wenigenlupnitz, near Eisenach, in Saxony. Warburg and Wolffsohn figured among the investors in the settlement. Within a year, the cooperative had collapsed, and with it a good deal of the Zionists' enthusiasm for Oppenheimer.[68]

Warburg had an easier time with the experiment station than with the other projects, largely because he bypassed the WZO and solicited support from Jewish philanthropies. Although he squeezed 30,000 francs out of the JNF, the JCA bought the 1,000 dunams of land for the station, and Esra, no doubt through Warburg's influence, chipped in an additional 10,000 francs.[69] More important, Warburg eventually won financial support for the station from a number of American Jewish plutocrats such as Jacob Schiff and Nathan Straus. The key to gaining the backing of these non-Zionists was the charismatic Aaronsohn, who, while visiting America in 1909, was introduced to these notables via the distinguished agronomist E. W. Hilgard of the University of California and David Fairchild of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. In his meetings with American Jews, Aaronsohn exuded calm self-assurance and an aura of expertise. He impressed them as the very embodiment of the new type of Jew which the Zionist movement wished to create. His stock was all the higher for having been offered a chair in agronomy at Berkeley, only to refuse it in order to carry out research in his beloved Palestine.[70] Thanks to Aaronsohn's appeal, enough money was gathered to start up the station in 1911.

As of 1906, Warburg had no idea whether the experiment station would ever come to be, and he was beginning to despair of the WZO altogether. Frustrated by the WZO's lack of money and its unwillingness to let him spend what little it had, he threatened more than once to quit the SAC and devote himself entirely to private commercial ventures and Esra.[71] Warburg's failures, however, must not obscure his successes, through which the WZO became the sponsor of projects of far-reaching benefits to the Yishuv.

One such success was the arts-and-crafts academy Bezalel, which was founded in Jerusalem in 1906. The academy was the brainchild of the sculptor Boris Schatz, who approached Herzl in 1903 with a proposal to build an art school in Palestine. Schatz turned to the PC with his plan, and Warburg and Oppenheimer set out to transform his envisioned art school into a workshop. Fundraising propaganda put out by the Bezalel Committee stressed the importance of handicrafts as an effective means of Jewish productivization, and as an alternative to agriculture during this early period of Jewish settlement in Palestine.[72] Warburg's desire to make Bezalel a profitable artisans' workshop clashed with Schatz's loftier view of Bezalel as a fine-arts academy. Once the school opened in March 1906, Warburg and his assistant on the Bezalel Committee, Ya'akov Thon, began to pressure Schatz to concentrate on manufacturing crafts for sale, not on artistic experimentation. "It is absolutely necessary," Warburg wrote, "to provide the students an industrial not an artistic training."[73] Warburg's particular interest was rugmaking. While attending the 1905 German Colonial Congress, he heard a glowing speech about the economic potential of the Middle East's rug industry, and in typical fashion he applied this concept to the Yishuv. By 1907, Bezalel was manufacturing rugs for export.[74]

Bezalel quickly became an internationally known and respected Zionist institution. It was a regular topic on the agenda of the WZO's Actions Committee meetings and congresses. Warburg did much to publicize the school's activities

in *Altneuland* and other Zionist journals. Technically speaking, however, Bezalel was not a Zionist undertaking at all. Three-fourths of its funds came from German-Jewish organizations such as Esra and the *Hilfsverein*. But the JNF had purchased the land on which the academy sat; this involvement by the JNF granted the academy the status of a Zionist enterprise and, to some degree, a product of the WZO.[75]

Warburg did not initiate the Bezalel project; it fell into his lap, and he pursued it because it appealed to his interest in the productivization of Palestinian Jewry by any means possible. In the same month that Bezalel opened, Warburg was thinking about creating an experimental auxiliary farm with Jerusalem Jews as subjects; later in the same year he conceived a variety of possible methods for the productivization of the Jews of that holy city.[76] For the most part, however, Warburg tended to think of the productivization of the Jews in Palestine not as a goal to be pursued directly but rather as the natural outcome of the productivization of the land of Palestine. That is, by bringing large tracts of land under cultivation, either through publicly or privately funded enterprises, a Jewish labor force would develop naturally. Such was the rationale behind Warburg's most successful undertaking within the WZO, the Olive Tree Fund *(Ölbaumspende)*.

The Olive Tree Fund, which over time evolved into the JNF's Tree Fund and one of the WZO's most popular institutions, traces its origins to March 1904. Soskin and Warburg published articles advocating the creation of "national domains" *(Volksdomäne)* in Palestine. These domains would be established on land bought by the JNF. A special fund would collect money for the planting of olive trees on these lands, thereby making them "useful . . . for the Jewish people." In addition to olive groves, the domains would be home to technical schools and "thousands of Jewish workers or hereditary leaseholders," who would "find their livelihood on the national domains."[77] Naturally, these domains and their laboring population would be administered by agronomists and other experts.

These bold statements bear the influence of both Warburg's and Soskin's colonial experience and the immediate needs of the JNF in Palestine. The Ottoman government threatened to confiscate uncultivated WZO properties; the planting of olive groves would eliminate this threat. The olive tree, the two *Agrarpolitiker* wrote, is easy to care for, long-lived, and a source of by-products that could support a variety of export-oriented agricultural industries. It could grow in poor soils that would sustain little else.[78] The two men proposed that the PC take charge of the hiring of a technical staff and the first plantings; eventually the matter would be turned over to the JNF. In other words, Warburg and Soskin were proposing that the WZO assume the burden of an expensive and complex operation, one which would make no pretense of being run along businesslike lines.[79] Also of interest are the tacit assumptions that the PC was the ultimate source of decision making on technical matters and that the JNF stood at its disposal, ready to serve as a vehicle for the rational economic development of the Yishuv.

Warburg and Soskin excitedly wrote to the Actions Committee with their plans and discussed them at the April 1904 GAC meeting.[80] Wolffsohn expressed concern that legal technicalities could impede the operations of the Olive Tree Fund, whereas Ussishkin opposed the idea in principle. Mixed with Ussishkin's knee-jerk opposition to any kind of administered settlement were cogent and penetrating criticisms. Ussishkin rightly perceived that the trees would produce no fruit, and therefore no profit, for eight to ten years. He was aware, as Warburg and Soskin were not, that the stream of immigration to Palestine which had begun the previous year required that employment opportunities in the Yishuv be expanded at once, not years hence. What is more, Ussishkin observed that Jewish workers would be unwilling to work as wage laborers for an administered domain, and that they would demand something for themselves. Six members of the GAC voted against Warburg's proposal, but ten others supported it, and the proposal was accepted.[81]

The statutes of the Olive Tree Fund, with Warburg as chairman, were drawn up in January 1905. At the Seventh Zionist Congress in that year, Warburg proposed that the olive groves be named the "Herzl Forest"; in 1906, he unleashed a vigorous propaganda campaign that stressed the association of the Olive Tree Fund with Herzl's name. Warburg also came up with the marketing strategy that urged potential donors to contribute the cost of one olive tree: 6 marks or the equivalent. Through these techniques, the new fund became a success. By the end of 1907, 56,000 marks had come into the Olive Tree Fund, and approximately 90,000 by the end of 1908.[82] The first plantings began in January 1908 at Ben Shemen, under the guidance of the agronomist Berman.[83]

The development of the Olive Tree Fund took it far from its original goals as described by Warburg and Soskin in 1904. As will be shown below, the groves at Ben Shemen and Ḥulda became the seat not of a national domain staffed by thousands of wage laborers but of small nuclei of Zionist pioneers. The Olive Tree Fund itself became associated increasingly with reforestation in general. For now, it is sufficient to note that Warburg himself had something to do with this deviation from his original goals. He said repeatedly that the olive groves would "reforest the now shadeless holy land"; and the propaganda brochures published by the Olive Tree Fund imply, in both words and pictures, that the Jew who made his six-mark contribution would help restore Palestine to its ancient verdancy.[84] One image suggested in virtually all of the propaganda is that of trees providing shade to a parched land. Although it is true that a grove of mature olive trees does provide some shade, such considerations did not enter into any of Warburg's and Soskin's early writings about the virtues of olive culture. And as the JNF's agronomists soon discovered, there are many sources of shade more effective than the olive tree.

The Olive Tree Fund was unique among Warburg's activities in that it sought to bring large tracts of land under cultivation solely through the means of the WZO. Warburg's greatest hope was that the WZO's experimental projects would result in the "creation of the base for private initiative."[85] One such precondition was a land office that would mediate the purchase of, as well as survey and

parcel, real estate on behalf of Jewish purchasers, be they the JNF, other Jewish agencies, or individuals. This was a project upon which the *Agrarpolitiker* Warburg and the banker Levontin could agree. In January 1905, the "Committee of Thirteen," the temporarily enlarged SAC formed after Herzl's death, examined a report about work in Palestine written by Levontin and Soskin. Based on the report, the SAC authorized the establishment of a "land office," "primarily to arrange land purchase and to administer JNF lands." The office would be responsible to Levontin.[86]

The statutes of the Land Office, drawn up by Warburg and Soskin in June 1905, reveal that the two men attributed to it a far broader scope of activities than the wording of the SAC's resolution would suggest, or than Levontin desired. According to the statutes, all Jewish land purchases in Palestine would take place under the auspices of the Land Office, "for the purpose of limiting harmful speculation and encouraging private initiative." The office would administer the property of "Zionist corporations" and private individuals and would offer its expert advice on industrial and agricultural undertakings in Palestine.[87] Aaronsohn, who was to be the office's agricultural expert, saw in the Land Office the "predecessor, or more accurately, the seed, of the future Ministry of Agriculture" of the Jewish state.[88]

Despite these high hopes, the Land Office never made it off the drawing board. Levontin did nothing to develop the office along the lines laid out by Warburg and Soskin. Levontin resented what he considered to be an encroachment on his authority over land purchase, an activity he obviously enjoyed and had no desire to give up. There ensued a power struggle between Levontin and Warburg, which Levontin temporarily won by restricting the Land Office's activity to surveying work by Treidel.[89] Even in its truncated form, the Land Office began to run a deficit only a few months after it opened. Levontin and Warburg traded accusations as to who was responsible, and WZO President Wolffsohn sided squarely with Levontin.[90]

The woes of the Land Office led Warburg to ponder new formats for the organization of land purchase and development in Palestine. In March 1906 he made a suggestion with far-reaching implications. He proposed that the Land Office be not merely a subsidiary of the APB but rather an integral part of the WZO itself.[91] Warburg's call came at a propitious time, for the leaders of Eastern European Zionism were demanding that the WZO step up its practical work in Palestine. At the GAC's annual conference in August 1906, Warburg, Ussishkin, and Chaim Weizmann all spoke of the need for a Zionist farm-credit bank and land purchase fund that, unlike the JNF, would allow individuals to obtain land and credit for private farms. The idea of a centralized coordinating agency for Zionist work in Palestine, an idea raised by Motzkin and the Democratic Faction back in 1902 but neglected since then, now began to gain currency. The Helsingfors conference of Russian Zionists, held in December 1906, passed a resolution calling for the establishment of such an office.[92] Accordingly, by the time the Eighth Zionist Congress convened in August 1907, the Eastern European

Ḥovevei Ẓion and Warburg found themselves in accord over a number of changes that they wished to make in the WZO.

The Eighth Congress witnessed a concerted attempt to wrest power away from Wolffsohn and his allies in Cologne and shift the WZO's power base to Berlin. Berlin was home not only to Warburg but to many Zionists, both German and Eastern European, who stood for expanded practical work in Palestine. The congress passed a resolution that Warburg's PC should become a full-fledged department *(Palästina Ressort)* of the WZO. It was also resolved that a branch office of the WZO be set up in Berlin. Finally, the congress recommended the establishment of a fund for farm credit and a Palestine Office *(Palästina Amt).*[93] By February 1908, the office had become a reality, with a budget of 25,000 francs and a staff of two: its director, Dr. Arthur Ruppin, and his secretary, Ya'akov Thon.[94] Whatever increase in stature the Berlin Zionists may have enjoyed as a result of the congress, it was the founding of the Palestine Office that had the more immediate and significant impact on the Zionist movement. The Berlin branch of the WZO's Central Office lasted for only one year and accomplished little other than the publication of propaganda.[95] Warburg's Palestine Department assumed importance principally as the European connection of the Palestine Office.

Ruppin and his Palestine Office went on to become the linchpin of all WZO settlement activity up to 1914. The next chapter is devoted to Ruppin's story; the question before us here is what Warburg intended to do with the Palestine Office and the other public institutions he helped create. Warburg never deviated from the belief that such institutions were to prepare an atmosphere conducive to massive capitalist investment. Throughout the years 1903-1907, as the PC puttered about with its experiments and the Land Office struggled for life, he set up a number of industrial and commercial projects in Palestine, which, he hoped, would attract international finance capital. Significantly, when Warburg first met Ruppin in 1905, his plan was that Ruppin should become not a WZO functionary but the head of an industrial syndicate that would raise funds from European investors to develop industries in Palestine.[96] Warburg was able to collect enough capital to start up the syndicate in 1906, but it accomplished little. As of 1911, the syndicate's sole feat was the construction of a chemical laboratory in Jaffa. Warburg encountered similar problems with his Palestine Trading Company, founded in 1904 and designed to export Palestinian products to Europe. Neither company attracted investors beyond a small circle of Jews who had a philanthropic or nationalist attachment to Palestine. Even the officers of the Zionist bank, the JCT, were guarded in their support for these ventures; the bank purchased small amounts of share capital but refused to grant Warburg the hundreds of thousands of marks in loans that he requested.[97]

Warburg was somewhat more successful in his work with private real estate companies, all of which bought and some of which developed land in Palestine. Such companies contributed significantly to the growth of Jewish landholdings in the Yishuv; twenty-seven percent of the land in Jewish hands by 1914 had

been bought privately, compared with only seven percent by the JNF and APB.[98] The two largest companies, Ge'ula and Agudat Neta'im, received Warburg's unflagging support, but it would not be accurate to attribute their successes to any specific contribution on Warburg's part. Ge'ula and Agudat Neta'im were based in Russia and Palestine respectively; Warburg propagandized on their behalf in Central Europe, but he did not shape their policies. Warburg's own societies for land development were far less successful than these large land-purchase companies. Warburg had high expectations for his Palestine Plantation Society, which he founded in 1906. A contribution of eighty marks, Warburg reckoned, would make each member part-owner of a plantation. Fifty members would contribute enough to support one Jewish family on the plantation. Despite Warburg's best propaganda efforts, the society succeeded only at founding a 300-dunam plantation in Reḥovot.[99] Only one of Warburg's private agricultural companies actually produced a colony: the Tiberias Land and Plantation Company, funded by wealthy Russian Jews, set up the colony of Migdal in 1910.[100]

It is ironic that Warburg's most lasting contribution to Zionist settlement lay in the construction of public institutions which he felt were merely ancillary to private development. His capitalist projects foundered, but his public ones survived and, in time, flourished. Even Warburg's accomplishments in the Zionist public sector, however, contained serious flaws, at least in the eyes of his fellow activists in the WZO. His capitalist programs sat well enough with the Ḥovevei Ẓion, but his public ones, such as the administered *Volksdomäne,* appeared authoritarian and oppressive. The classic cultural rift between German and Eastern Jews aggravated differences in approach. At times, the conflict between Warburg and his Eastern brethren turned ugly, as in a furious exchange between Warburg and Ussishkin in which the former accused Russian Jewry of anarchic individualism, itself the product of cultural backwardness.[101] If communication between Warburg and his Eastern European colleagues was difficult, an understanding of the socialist youth who spearheaded the Second 'Aliya was out of the question. Unlike the banker Levontin, who was overtly hostile to the socialist pioneers, Warburg was indifferent; to be hostile would have required comprehending something of the pioneers' worldview, which was alien to him. When confronted in 1906 with a group of young, penniless Jewish laborers who wished to lease the land at Delaika and work it collectively, Warburg expressed doubts about the profitability of such a venture and instead preferred forming a cattle-raising society.[102]

Even at the height of his influence, Warburg remained an outsider in the Zionist movement. To his colleagues, he conveyed the impression of being cold and aloof; Wolffsohn claimed that Warburg was not a Zionist in the usual sense of the word.[103] There is some truth to this statement. Although Warburg was deeply committed to Zionism, his commitment stemmed less from a personal attachment to the Jewish nation than from the developmental ethos inherent in the Zionist enterprise. "Warburg," noted the Hebrew writer Shmuel Yosef Agnon, "is as innocent as a child; he looks at flowers as an old rabbi would a halakhic question."[104] Warburg served Zionism precisely through this fascination

with science. Thanks to him, Zionist technocracy progressed from the realm of theory, where Herzl had left it, and took its first steps toward realization. But in a different way, Warburg represented an antithesis to Herzl, as Herzl's flamboyant social reformism found no echo in the botanist's settlement programs. A synthesis of social reformism and technocracy was in the offing. It was to come via the adoption by the WZO of a new set of foreign models: not German colonial operations abroad but German social policy at home, not international colonialism but rather inner colonization.

IV.

INNER COLONIZATION

Arthur Ruppin and the Palestine Office, 1907–1909

Unlike many of early Zionism's settlement experts and activists, Arthur Ruppin (1876-1943) has penetrated the Zionist historical consciousness and has been accorded the status of a founding father of the State of Israel. In the past, scholars acknowledged him with a deferential line or two and then passed on to other matters. More recent scholarship has chronicled Ruppin's activity as director of the Palestine Office, pointing out the breadth as well as the depth of his accomplishments.[1] But although Ruppin's actions have been closely scrutinized, the motivations and intentions behind those actions remain obscure. One particular mystery to historians has been the origins of the understanding that developed between Ruppin, a bourgeois German Jew with no apparent socialist tendencies, and the Eastern European socialist pioneers of the Second 'Aliya. Similarly, despite some attempts at elucidation, the intellectual sources of the Palestine Office's colonization programs have not been accurately traced.

These mysteries have solutions, but in order to arrive at them it will be necessary to delve deeply into Ruppin's intellectual biography before reemerging in the Palestine of 1907. Ruppin's turn to Zionism in his late twenties was preceded by a youth filled with inner turmoil caused by feelings of attraction to and fear of German Social Democracy. His socialist sympathies blended with a strong agrarian orientation, a product of vitalist and agrarocentric political-economic theories that were in vogue in German universities during the 1890s. German *Sozialpolitik* and the work of the Prussian Colonization Commission in German Poland helped form Ruppin's view that Zionist settlement must be in large measure agricultural, publicly sponsored, and planned with an eye toward social reform. Ruppin's conception of Zionism incorporated a vision of social engineering that made him unique among the WZO's settlement activists during the six years of the Palestine Office's activity prior to the outbreak of World War I.

Once at work in Palestine, Ruppin established the Palestine Land Development Company as both a capitalist land-purchase agency and a vehicle for the agricultural training and settlement of immigrants without means. At first, the socialist pioneers were not enthusiastic about what appeared to be yet another

administered colonization enterprise. But by founding the collective settlement of Degania in 1909, Ruppin laid the foundation for an alliance between Labor and official Zionism. The phlegmatic Ruppin proved to the hot-blooded, idealistic pioneers that he was, in fact, one of them.

In his biography of Chaim Weizmann, Jehuda Reinharz has noted that Weizmann's published autobiography, polished and richly detailed as it is, may have served to discourage potential biographers, although lacunae, misrepresentations, and distortions lie within the published account.[2] This assumption is certainly true for Ruppin, whose comprehensive memoirs were published posthumously in Hebrew, English, and German.[3] Biographical treatments of Ruppin are few and rely largely on the memoirs and other published sources.[4] Yet Ruppin's published memoirs reproduce only a small fraction of his original diary and other private writings; materials that have not made their way into print, especially those dealing with the period before 1907, are of the utmost historical importance. The portions of the published memoirs that discuss the period after 1907 were written long after the fact and were based on Ruppin's rereading of archival documents. Equally suspect are Ruppin's own evaluations of his Zionist activity as found in his many published books and articles.

Ruppin's autobiography and the existing literature on him sketch out the external conditions of his life that molded him into a Zionist leader. Unlike other German Zionists we have encountered, Ruppin knew poverty. He was born into a well-to-do family in the small town of Rawitsch, in Posen, but while he was still a child, his father's business began a steady decline. A move from Rawitsch to Magdeburg when Ruppin was eleven only hastened his family's slide into poverty. At the age of fifteen, Ruppin was forced to leave school, where he had been a prize pupil, and go to work in order to help support his family. He became an apprentice to a grain merchant. He displayed an astonishing talent for the business, but the work bored him, and he developed a hearty dislike of the business world. He feared becoming a philistine, a vulgar bourgeois with no ideals save the pursuit of profit. As a young man, therefore, Ruppin possessed not only extraordinary intellectual and organizational gifts but also a burning ambition to do great things in the world.[5]

The other set of factors that, all sources agree, pushed Ruppin into the Zionist movement had to do with his problematic attitude toward his own Jewishness. Although raised in an observant home, Ruppin began to neglect Jewish practices shortly after leaving school for the grain merchant's store. Stung by antisemitic taunts from childhood, the adolescent Ruppin pondered the nature of Jewish identity and sketched out drafts for a book on the "Past, Present, and Future" of the Jews.[6] Such thoughts led in time to his first of many works on Jewish sociology, *The Jews of Today,* in 1904. But it was not enough for Ruppin merely to write about the Jews; his wanderlust and longing to leave his mark on the world led him to Zionism and thence to Palestine.

There is nothing wrong with the established story as far as it goes; it just does not go far enough. Experiences in Ruppin's early life set into motion a

process of intellectual development, a process that was pushed forward by the dynamic relationship that existed between Ruppin and the German environment that enveloped him. To understand Ruppin is to understand this dynamic.

The first aspect of Ruppin's thought to examine is his attitude toward social problems in general and German Social Democracy in particular. From the age of thirteen, when he began to keep his diary, until he began university at twenty, Ruppin consistently wrote about his concern over the plight of and the threat posed by the working classes of Europe. Ruppin was introduced to socialism at an early age; in the 1890 elections, his father voted for the Social Democrats, and on election night he hosted the electoral committee of the local party branch. The precocious thirteen year-old observed that unlike his father, he was "body and soul" *freisinnig,* a supporter of the German left-liberal party.[7] Perhaps Ruppin wrote out of genuine conviction, but it is likely that at this early stage generational rebellion played a major role in determining his political views. Ruppin was deeply ashamed of his father for having failed in business and for frittering away the household money on lottery tickets.[8] As he passed through his teens, however, and both read widely and accumulated a rich experience in the business world, he formed a cogent political philosophy.

As Ruppin matured, his diary carefully charted the political storms of the day, consistently expressing hostility toward the Kaiser and the conservative parties, sympathy for the forces of liberalism, and a mixture of trepidation and attraction toward Social Democracy. Working in the grain business made Ruppin aware of the great German tariff debates of the early 1890s. Although he expressed some sympathy for a policy of protective tariffs on grain, he came down on the side of free trade, as it would ensure lower bread prices and would not enrich the landed aristocrats whom Ruppin loathed.[9] The conservative parties, wrote Ruppin, seek to suppress the constitutional rights of the German people; but by doing so they will only aggravate social tensions and strengthen the Socialist Party.[10] Ruppin's opinions about the German left were formed as the result of close observation; he first recorded attending a meeting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at the age of sixteen, although his comparisons with other meetings suggest a previous familiarity with the party based on either reading or personal experience. Two years later, he attended a meeting of a radical socialist group; after a speaker made an ill-considered remark, the meeting was broken up by the supervising police officer. Ruppin made a hasty exit.[11] Ruppin frequented a tavern catering to a mostly socialist clientele, and he enjoyed talking with the workers about their political views.[12]

Ruppin's contacts with the revolutionary left disturbed him. On the one hand, he sympathized with the basic tenets of socialism and admired the SPD:

> A truly deep-reaching improvement of mankind is not possible on the basis of contemporary social forms. These must rather be rearranged from the bottom up; then the improvement of mankind will follow of itself. This transformation must occur according to the principle that the new social forms be built upon full equality, justice, freedom, and altruism.[13]

Ruppin saw in the SPD the only political party in Germany that addressed social issues in a realistic way and that possessed the organization needed to produce social change. Socialist electoral victories, such as in Belgium in 1893, were sources of wry satisfaction to him.[14] And yet, Ruppin feared the approaching deluge: "The present social order, eroded to the core by Social Democracy, will someday break apart overnight."[15] And what will replace it? Ruppin noted the vagueness and uncertainty of the SPD program and felt that he would become a committed socialist if only he were certain that the new order would indeed accomplish what it purported to do.[16] Ruppin found the anarchist movement all the more unnerving. "Everywhere," he noted darkly, "one hears of dynamite attacks"; the mysterious and violent movement "reigns on every corner." Yet Ruppin admitted that anarchism contained a "kernel of truth. . . . The ideal of freedom of the individual, the complete freedom of man from others—what is wrong with that?"[17]

Although his feelings about Social Democracy fluctuated from day to day, Ruppin displayed more consistency in expressing a desire to devote his life's work to social reform. At fifteen, Ruppin aspired to be a belle-lettrist, but he tellingly chose as the subject of his first attempt at playwriting Arnold von Brescia, who in 1146 incited the people of Rome to rise in rebellion against the Pope. Two years later, Ruppin decided unequivocally that he wanted to work to "quell the hunger of the poor"; "Suddenly the social question stood out in the foreground of my interest, and instead of a poet I saw myself as a future demagogue on the speakers' podium. . . . Yes, a demagogue! Helper of the poor! An admirable goal! . . . and I recognized that only through Social Democracy, the party of the future, is such a position to be reached. . . ."[18] A few months later, Ruppin read Max Nordau's *The Conventional Lies of Our Civilization,* a jeremiad attacking bourgeois society from all fronts. The book moved him to synthesize the various career aspirations he had expressed earlier. Like Nordau himself, he would become a "dramatist, world-improver, and social reformer."[19] Through 1894 and 1895, this self-image did not change, and Ruppin read widely in socialist and utopian literature. At the same time, he decided to study law in addition to economics in order to be best fitted out for practical work in the world.[20]

Ruppin's attraction to social reform stemmed at least in part from an internalization of antisemitic notions about the role of Jews in the German economy. His contacts with Jews in the grain business were not positive and led him to believe that Jews played a disproportionate role in the manipulation of grain prices. Between 1891 and 1893, Ruppin's diary expressed sympathy with the writings and speeches of antisemitic ideologues. Jews "do not work gladly," Ruppin wrote, and should gradually change their livelihoods to agriculture and crafts; antisemites are fully in the right when they accuse the Jews of an abnormal lust for profit.[21] All the while, Ruppin felt it unfair for Jews to be singled out from all the other constituent forces of capitalism. By the time of the Reichstag elections of 1893, Ruppin felt that he had outgrown his attraction to antisemitism; in time, he wrote, the antisemitic parties will lose power, as people realize that

only Social Democracy carries on "the true struggle against Capital." And when the antisemitic Reichstag deputy Otto Böckel announced plans to form a new party designed to combat Jewish and Christian capital alike, Ruppin became so excited that he wrote Böckel and asked if a "patriotic, noncapitalist" Jew might join.[22]

Ruppin felt bedeviled by antisemitism: "[It] is on my mind like never before; I think about it day and night, about its goals, its essence, its consequences."[23] Driven by conflicting feelings of pride and shame in being Jewish, Ruppin began to read Heinrich Graetz's mammoth work on Jewish history, and in 1902 he joined the local *Graetzverein,* a society devoted to the study and discussion of Jewish history and literature. Although he had originally joined the society in order to present his case that Jews must give up their "purse-pride" *(Prozenhaftigkeit),* Ruppin soon found himself taking interest in the discussions of the society in general. What is more, he felt attracted to the position of a Jewish nationalist spokesman, although he protested to his diary that he felt thoroughly German.[24]

The social problem and the Jewish problem weighed heavily on Ruppin's mind when he matriculated at the University of Berlin in 1896. On different occasions, his friend Fritz Fiedler predicted that Ruppin would become "the organizer of the future socialist state" or the "President of the Jewish Commonwealth."[25] During his student years, however, Ruppin considered Jewish concerns a private matter; the social question was the issue around which he planned to build his life's work. "My heart beats for socialism," wrote Ruppin at nineteen; "Lassalle, Marx, and Ruppin—a triptych *(Dreigestirn),*" the young man mused.[26] The German universities of the 1890s could not have provided a more conducive environment for the pursuit of Ruppin's interests. This was a period which, according to one historian, "called the economic discipline to the forefront" of academic life.[27] After the fall from power of Otto von Bismarck in 1890 and the subsequent increase in strength of the Social Democrats, universities became increasingly politicized as academic economists sought to "destroy Marxism by exposing its unscientific nature and by presenting a conservative reformism in its place."[28] Courses in political economy grew in number and popularity. Two of the most politically active German universities were Berlin, where Ruppin attended lectures for one semester, and Halle, where he received the rest of his higher education.[29]

At both Berlin and Halle, Ruppin enrolled in the faculty of law, but he devoted much of his coursework to political economy and philosophy. Ruppin's inaugural dissertation was supervised by Johannes Conrad, a founder of Germany's celebrated *Verein für Sozialpolitik,* an association of academics devoted to scholarly research on social issues. Other members of the dissertation committee included Adolf Wagner, an extreme conservative who supported a policy of economic autarky based on the expansion of agriculture, and the more politically moderate Gustav Schmoller.[30] Ruppin's lecture notes from both universities reveal that he read virtually the entire corpus of socialist texts and criticisms written in the German language from Marx's own lifetime to the 1890s.[31] Outside

the classroom, Ruppin followed the developments within Social Democracy by attending the SPD convention in Gotha in 1896 and by subscribing to *Die neue Zeit,* the SPD's official organ, and the revisionist *Sozialistische Monatshefte.*[32] Ruppin also kept abreast of the anarchist movement and heard the utopian socialist Gustav Landauer speak at an anarchist meeting.[33] In all his doings, Ruppin found sympathy and inspiration for his developing social philosophy in two close friends: Fiedler, an avowed socialist and racialist, and Gustav Wyneken, the future leader of the German youth movement.

All of these influences helped form Ruppin's image of himself as, to use the language of the time, a *Kathedersozialist,* or "socialist of the (academic) chair." The ideal typical *Kathedersozialist* was conversant with all forms of left-wing thought, and perhaps sympathetic to some, but was unwilling to adopt any as a personal credo. He claimed to offer value-free judgments and expert advice on the implementation of cautious, moderate social reforms. Accordingly, Ruppin exhaustively studied the myriad diagnoses of society's ills and prognoses for their future course in the hopes of acquiring the expertise and prestige enjoyed by his august professors. Ruppin did not aspire to dwell in the ivory tower, however; although he wrote of the possibility of becoming a *Privatdozent* (an unsalaried university lecturer), as a youth he appears to have been aware that his religion would have made access to the inner sanctum of the social science faculties extremely difficult. Thus Ruppin envisioned a career path similar to that of other Jewish intellectuals such as Nordau and Oppenheimer—a profession to provide one's livelihood (Nordau and Opppenheimer were originally doctors; Ruppin was to be a lawyer), supplemented, and hopefully at some point supplanted, by income from writing.[34]

Ruppin's social views were strongly influenced by the Social Darwinist theories of human development that were prevalent throughout much of Europe during the late nineteenth century. While in college, Ruppin found himself believing in a form of historical materialism based on Marxist sources, on the one hand, and popular Social Darwinistic works, on the other. For Ruppin, as for many of his German contemporaries, Social Darwinism was not, as is commonly perceived today, a pessimistic philosophy that saw constant struggle as the only possible means of warding off extinction through conquest or entropy. Although it could take on such a coloring, popularizations of Darwin written by Ernst Häckel and others often stressed the importance of altruism and collective aid, not violent struggle, in ensuring species survival. Their deterministic worldview equated evolution with human progress.[35] Ruppin, therefore, expressed quite common sentiments when he wrote in 1897 that Social Darwinism offered assurances of a "steady progress of mankind" and of socialism's eventual triumph.[36]

A purely materialist philosophy of history, however, was ultimately unsatisfying to Ruppin. At the age of nineteen, he had read Ludwig Büchner's materialist manifesto *Power and Matter,* and he was frightened at the prospect of a humanity dependent entirely upon physiology and of a universe bereft of an efficient cause.[37] The optimistic and simplistic Social Darwinism of his college days was a mere interlude; by 1901 he had given it up and was searching for new answers

to the question of how human beings would or could ever come to socialism.[38] Ruppin adopted a more subtle Darwinist philosophy, one that admitted to mankind's biologically determined drives but sought to locate vital forces in the human spirit that would allow man to rise above them and engineer his own improvement. Ruppin's brand of vitalism revolved around two forces: love of country and love of the land. In both cases, the state, not the Reich as it existed but an idealized state in the Hegelian mold, would be the vehicle of social improvement.

In 1898, Ruppin sketched out an idea for a new school system based on what he called a "unity school" *(Einheitsschule).* To some extent, his idea reflects the influence of his friend Wyneken, who was already interested in education in the 1890s and who in 1906 founded a "Free School Association" in the Thuringian forest. Like Wyneken's Free School, Ruppin's was to be the sort that, as the historian Walter Laqueur has described, "combined agricultural work with a modified school syllabus, physical education, and life in community in an attempt to train a new type of man and woman."[39] But whereas Wyneken's Free School was directed at the development of the individual and the community, Ruppin's *Einheitsschule* was to train students for service to the fatherland. Students would be instructed in agriculture, factory work, sport, gymnastics, and military training. Ruppin noted, "The school must become a self-contained organism that constitutes a state in miniature."[40] Ruppin's sense of the need for tutelary institutions in society was also reflected in his judgment of Gustav Landauer. Although impressed by him personally, Ruppin wrote, "Anarchism is nonsense. . . . [A] state without a hierarchical structure is a nonentity, at least for human beings. And we are not dealing with angels. It will take a good deal of work to prepare people for the socialist state. . . ."[41]

Ruppin elaborated on his conception of the individual's relationship to society in his first book, *Darwinism and Social Science,* which was published in 1903, and in an article of the same year entitled "The Modern Worldview and Nietzschean Philosophy."[42] They deserve analysis not for the worth of their ideas, which are far from original, but for their position as a milestone in Ruppin's intellectual development. Ruppin wrote the book for a literary competition sponsored by the Krupp steelworks and judged by three noted German academics, including Häckel. The competition solicited answers to the question: "What can we learn from the Principles of the Theory of the Origin of the Species with regard to the development and inner political constitution of States?" Ruppin's entry, which won second prize, placed strict limits on the applicability of Darwinist theory to human behavior. Reflecting contemporary developments in European social thought, Ruppin rejected determinist Social Darwinism, in both its optimistic and pessimistic forms, in favor of what might be called sociological Darwinism: a belief that man's physical and biological evolution had effectively ceased, but that a creative policy of social engineering could elevate man to new levels of morality and freedom.[43]

The difference between nature and society, argued Ruppin, is that the purpose of life in nature is survival, whereas the purpose of social life is the preservation

of society. Society is preserved by forces that promote cohesion; the greatest of these is the state. The state has the duty to improve society through a number of means. Social welfare and education must be combined with a program of eugenics, in which invalids and the mentally ill will be discouraged, but not prevented, from bearing children. Ruppin stressed that he had no interest in creating a world of physically superior supermen, as he and other readers of Nietzsche believed the philosopher advocated. Rather, Ruppin wrote that the gene pool of the nation-state as a whole, and not of its individual members, must be improved. It is in society's interest to produce physically healthy individuals whose specific aptitudes may lie in any one of a number of areas.[44]

Ruppin's scheme is of a piece with programs dreamed up by a number of eugenics enthusiasts in fin die siècle Germany.[45] Like his contemporaries, Ruppin acknowledged that he was demanding great sacrifices from human beings but believed people would make them of their own accord if convinced of the social utility of their actions. Constraints on the individual would produce enhanced freedom for the collective. In an age of dwindling belief in the immortality of the soul, the individual will

> recognize in his belonging to the state and his actions for the state his share in eternity, in the history of the whole of mankind, and must look up to the state with genuine religious fervor. He must approach the state only as a wave in the ocean, which, barely arisen, quickly passes and sinks without a trace into the sea. . . . So for the peoples of old in honor of gods, so for the individual today may no sacrifice seem too great in honor of the state.[46]

Ruppin's apotheosis of the state clearly bears the mark of his exposure to German philosophy and history, particularly in the form presented by defenders of the Prussian and Hegelian traditions whom he read and listened to while a student. In *Darwinism and Social Science,* Ruppin suggests a modernization of the Prussian tradition of bureaucratic reform in favor of a system of technocratic direction. Improvements in the gene pool of society can be promoted only by people learned in the natural sciences; Ruppin therefore looks favorably upon the gradual entrance of engineers, agronomists, and doctors into the traditional legally trained elite in government.[47] Ruppin's technocratic vision is not a soulless one, however; the mere presence of technical experts in national administration, he cautions, does not grant the Reich government, or the government of any state, the right to undertake a sweeping program of social engineering. If the state is a "tool of a particular class or party," if it is not "a community led solely according to the spirit of justice," Ruppin admits that his demands for sacrifices on its behalf are unjustified.[48]

In his diary, Ruppin made clear the distinction between his ideal state of the future and the present state, which he opposed. Ruppin generally expressed little hope for marked change in the imperial government. And after he left university in 1902 to begin work as a government prosecutor in Magdeburg, his political opposition to the imperial regime soon escalated into an existential protest against the conditions of living and working as a Jew in Germany. At

the time that he completed his education, Ruppin thought of himself as a scholar cum reformer whose work would help solve the social problem in his native Germany. But exposure to antisemitism in Magdeburg left him increasingly unsure that he wished to serve a nation that did not value his services. Ruppin began to form the conviction that he would remain an outsider in German society no matter how much he contributed to it.[49] And so he began to search for a new community that would value the expertise he had worked so hard to acquire.

While at university, Ruppin had accepted a crude racialist theory that posited not only the existence of racial groups but also the inferiority of the Jews and the desirability of assimilation with the gentiles. The Jews' "spiritual and physical regeneration," he wrote, could be overcome only through the end of "inbreeding" and a mixture with "healthy, strong races like Germans and Slavs. Only then will a future possibly exist for the Jewish spirit."[50] But after the turn of the century, although Ruppin continued to think in racial terms, he came to see the Jews in a more favorable light and advocated the strengthening of the race, not assimilation, as a service to mankind. Ruppin began to identify himself self-consciously as a Jew, and he wrote in his diary:

> The individual human being is as such worthless; he is valuable only as the member of a nation. And nations are the means for the elevation of mankind. Work for one's nation is the metaphysical purpose of human beings, which must be placed in stead of the false dream of individual immortality. . . . Jewry has a justification for its existence only if it can exist as a nation and has in itself the power to obtain the basis for the survival of a nation, a territory. Otherwise it deserves to die out. Zionism or complete assimilation—*tertium non datur*.[51]

Ruppin concluded that he must decide to whom he would devote his life—Germans or Jews: "It does not matter *which* nation one belongs to; rather, that one belong to a nation altogether."[52]

Nineteen hundred and two, the year in which Ruppin began writing his book on the improvement of the German nation state, also marked the beginnings of his research and writing on the improvement of the Jewish people. After writing an article for an economic journal about the occupational structure of German Jewry, Ruppin took a leave of absence from the state prosecutor's office in Magdeburg to travel through Galicia and gather data for a book-length study on the sociology of European Jewry.[53] His first exposure to Eastern European Jewry shocked and fascinated him. It convinced him of the existence of a Jewish nationhood as real as that of any other people, but that this nationhood was in grave danger of being extinguished by physical and cultural degeneration. By the end of 1903, Ruppin had decided that socialism had lost its hold over him, and that he would devote all future writing to Jewish subjects.[54] In the fall of 1904, he requested a transfer to the state attorney's office in Berlin in order to accept a post recently offered him by the newly founded Office for Jewish Statistics, a brainchild of Alfred Nossig.[55] In the writing that Ruppin did on

behalf of the office and for many periodicals, Jewish and non-Jewish, he began to do for the Jewish people what he had at one time yearned to do for his native Germany: to be a political economist, whose work would dictate policies for social reform.

The fruit of Ruppin's Galician journey was the book *The Jews of Today,* published in 1904. It is for the most part a statistical study of Jewish demographics and economics. In a brief final section on Jewish nationalism, Ruppin describes the motivating power of the Jewish "national idea" in much the same way as he had described the vitalizing force of patriotism in *Darwinism and Social Science.* Ruppin states the familiar Jewish nationalist thesis that Western European Jewry is in danger of extinction because of assimilation, conversion, and intermarriage, and that the crisis of Eastern European Jewry is essentially material. But, he adds, the Jews of Eastern as well as Western Europe are in need of a new, secular national culture. Orthodoxy and Jewish ritual cannot preserve Eastern Jewry. Ruppin then leaps from factual analysis to value judgments and argues that only if Judaism has a meaning and value aside from rabbinic religion does it have a right to exist: "The basis for any rational justification for the continued existence of the Jews as a separate people is their superior racial attributes." The Jews' basic racial intelligence "can and will sooner or later produce a high culture from itself." Strong Jewish national feeling, writes Ruppin, might stimulate the formation of such a culture. Zionism, for example, could serve as "a national project," "a firm bond between all Jews and a constant source of national awakening." Palestine, Ruppin figured, could absorb only 600,000 Jews, scarcely five or six percent of world Jewry. But by arousing ethnic feeling throughout the world, Zionist settlement could stimulate cultural regeneration.[56]

Ruppin's conception of Palestine as the center of a Hebrew cultural revival is not unlike that of Aḥad ha-'Am, although the racial element, so prominent in Ruppin's thought, is barely detectable in the writings of the philosopher from Odessa. A more significant difference is Ruppin's idea that the cultural revival of the Jewish people could not occur without shifting the Jewish immigrants to livelihoods in agriculture. In his mind, fully eighty percent of the Jews in Palestine should be farmers. Although in his book Ruppin does not spell out why agriculture would be so important to the new Jewish community in Palestine, he did so in a series of Nietzsche-esque "aphorisms" that he jotted down in a notebook in 1898:

> The Jews of the ancient Jewish kingdom were religious through and through; they had courage and a deep sense for myth and the works of Nature. That is, they were farmers. Since the Jews have stopped pushing the plow, they have become degenerate; they have for the most part lost a natural, human outlook and have become a reflexive people [*Reflexionisten*].
>
> Only a people engaged in agriculture can be healthy, only a state with the majority of its people engaged in agriculture constitutes a firmly bound, organized whole. Agriculture is the wellspring of mankind. England and other states [whose agricultural populations are steadily declining] will always present only an aggregate of individual people who have been haphazardly thrown together.[57]

Just as agriculture was the source of the ancient Hebrews' deep religiosity, so would a return to agriculture in the modern age be the source of a secular national culture.

Ruppin's belief that agriculture would revitalize the Jews emerged from an agrarian orientation toward Germany's social problems, an orientation that first manifested itself even before he began university. At the age of eighteen, Ruppin asked his diary:

> Why does the farmer lead a happier life than the city-dweller, why is he healthier, why is he more content, why is the love of God, long gone for the most part from the city-dweller, still alive in him? Because he lives in inner feeling with nature, to which he strives to adapt as closely as possible, because he has occasion daily to see in the working of nature the hand of God.[58]

In the set of "aphorisms" of 1898 referred to above, Ruppin expressed concern that socialism, like any progressive movement, brings about a distancing of man from nature, but, he admitted, "I know no way out of this."[59] In addition to having a psychological rationale, Ruppin's attachment to agriculture had economic underpinnings as well. In 1897, Ruppin briefly departed from his support for free trade and favored the imposition of price supports for grain. He did so partly because of the importance of state intervention for the future development of socialism, and partly because, he wrote in his diary, "Germany doubtless needs a strong peasant class."[60] In *Darwinism and Social Science,* Ruppin describes the tariff debate between agrarian and industrial interests as the most important question facing Germany. He argues:

> To the prefatory question, whether Germany should try to preserve its agriculture and above all its peasant class, we answer yes unconditionally. Prussia and Germany have grown great and strong supported by the productivity and fighting ability of its peasant class. It is at best uncertain whether an industrial population would provide such a good and firm basis for the preservation and the service of the state.[61]

In Ruppin's Zionist writings, composed after he emigrated to Palestine, economic, psychological, and vitalistic justifications for an emphasis on agricultural settlement become thoroughly intertwined. In the second edition of *The Jews of Today,* published in 1911, Ruppin entitled a chapter "The Creation of a Self-contained Jewish Economic Life through a Return to Agriculture." Here, as in many other writings, he would speak of agriculture as a means of creating a "permanent source of livelihood at the initial stages of a nation's development."[62] Given Palestine's economic immaturity, the economy of the Yishuv would need to develop a strong agricultural base before it could sustain industrial and commercial sectors. But Ruppin writes that the virtue of "the farmer who lives on produce in his field" is not only that he can survive economic crises, "which work havoc with those engaged in business," but also that he can "withstand assimilation": "A true love of home, a feeling of being part of the soil, takes

root only in a people which by its toil has drawn sustenance out of the earth." Finally, only on the land "will the springs of natural feeling [*Naturempfinden*], which are sealed up in the Jews in the ghetto, begin to flow anew."[63]

We have seen that Arthur Ruppin displayed pronounced socialist sympathies and a predilection for agriculture years before he became a committed Zionist. Also, he believed that national feeling and a love of the soil constituted vital forces that could elevate man above his biologically determined nature. Perhaps now it is possible to understand the nature of the understanding that developed between him and the pioneers of the Second 'Aliya. Ruppin frequently wrote of the enthusiasm of the pioneer settlers as Zionism's most precious asset. For example, he described the Yishuv as it existed in 1907 as an "aging organism" that required "renewal of the blood stream" via "the bringing in of young, enthusiastic elements."[64] These young elements were the socialist pioneers, whose "national enthusiasm . . . is a counterpart of religious enthusiasm."[65] In a eulogy of Ruppin written in 1943, Berl Katznelson noted that Ruppin seemed to consider the vigor of the pioneers a form of energy to be channeled and properly exploited.[66] Ruppin saw in the pioneers the vital forces that would rekindle the Jewish national spirit.

Ruppin believed that Zionism and collective agricultural settlement represented "attempts to overcome the everyday economic rules governing the material well-being of the individual by means of nobler passions, by men's love of liberty, of equality, of existence as a nation, and of a fairer order of society."[67] Although Ruppin had lost faith in socialism, he found in Zionism a means of overcoming capitalism and the acquisitive instinct, at least in one small part of the world. Ruppin never ceased thinking of himself as a world-improver; "If I were not a captive of Zionism," he wrote in 1922, "I could not imagine a higher aim in life than to be working in Russia now on a peaceful re-organization of that country."[68] During Ruppin's years of directing Zionist settlement, there were many occasions when Jewish national goals, which would be best pursued by encouraging private capital to undertake urban and industrial development in the Yishuv, ran counter to his envisioned social goals. Not being doctrinaire in his beliefs, Ruppin argued on these occasions that national goals should take precedence, at least in the short run. For the most part, however, his programs for Zionist settlement equated nation building with the employment of advanced forms of social organization.[69]

Before Ruppin moved to Berlin in 1904, he had attended a few Zionist meetings, but he was repelled by the bombast and rhetoric that swirled about him like so much wind. If he could do something practical such as directing the Jewish Colonial Trust, he wrote, he would become involved in Zionism. Once Ruppin arrived in Berlin, his assistant at the Statistical Office, Ya'akov Thon, introduced him to the city's Zionist activists, most of whom were intent on initiating practical work in Palestine. Ruppin began to associate with this group, and he developed a strong rapport with Thon. Contact with his Zionist circle fueled Ruppin's growing desire to go to Palestine. He was bored not only with

the law but with research and writing on Jewish subjects as well.[70] In the spring of 1905, Thon arranged a meeting between Ruppin and Otto Warburg, who was impressed by the young attorney and scholar. After the Seventh Zionist Congress that summer, during which Ruppin gave lectures at the University of Basel, Warburg was convinced of Ruppin's talents and expressed hope that Ruppin would agree to head Warburg's Palestinian industrial syndicate.[71] Both Thon and Warburg encouraged Ruppin to undertake a tour of Palestine. On 19 March 1907, at a meeting of the SAC in Cologne, Warburg discussed the possibility of Ruppin's going to Palestine on behalf of the WZO. After meeting Ruppin, the other two members of the committee, Wolffsohn and Jacobus Kann, decided that Ruppin should investigate the various settlement plans that were currently on the WZO's agenda. In early April, four months before the Eighth Congress authorized the establishment of a Palestine Office, Warburg assumed not only that such an office would be founded but that Ruppin would be its director.[72]

Ruppin arrived in Jaffa on 30 May 1907. His first contacts in Palestine were with the officers of the Anglo-Palestine Bank, Zalman David Levontin and Eliyahu Sapir, and with the agronomists in the employ of the WZO, Moshe Berman and Aaron Aaronsohn. The first issue Ruppin dealt with involved the lands owned by the Jewish National Fund. The bankers and the agronomists differed as to what should be done with them. The agronomists suggested that the WZO administer and improve the lands for several years, at which time they would be leased to native Jews. The bankers, however, expressed a desire to sell off the lands immediately and not get bogged down in a costly administration.

Ruppin wrote to Cologne suggesting that JNF lands that had already been purchased be used for the proposed training farm and cooperative, but that henceforth the JNF should alter its statutes so as to be able to sell, and not merely lease, its rural holdings.[73] Ruppin appeared to have no regard for the statute, considered sacred by many Zionist activists, that land bought by the JNF must remain the eternal possession of the Jewish people. Ruppin's position on this matter is not surprising. His social philosophy was that of a moderate *Kathedersozialist,* not a radical or utopian. As we saw in the second chapter, land nationalization was not among the cures for social ills offered by mainstream social thinkers in Imperial Germany. Although Ruppin did not deal directly with the issue of land nationalization in his early memoranda from Palestine, in later years he would maintain that land nationalization, at least in the short run, was impracticable at best and harmful to the Zionist enterprise at worst.[74]

As to urban real estate, Ruppin took up Levontin's suggestion that the JNF invest heavily via the APB in building cooperatives in urban areas. It should also buy urban real estate on its own, some to be leased to community institutions and some to be sold to individuals.[75] In July, a Jaffa resident informed Ruppin that he and sixty other Jewish families had formed a company, *Aḥuzat Bayit*, to build a new Jewish quarter outside Jaffa. Horrified by the conditions of Jewish life in Jaffa, Ruppin agreed to lobby the JNF for a loan to the real estate

company via the APB. Although he did express concern to the JNF that Aḥuzat Bayit might not take proper precautions to plan for open spaces and gardens in its new development, Ruppin did not stipulate that the JNF should exercise supervisory control over the use of its funds in the building of what would become Tel Aviv.[76]

Ruppin always denied having come to Palestine with any preconceived programs or strategies for settlement. On this point the unpublished sources do not contradict him. And yet he formulated a comprehensive settlement program, calling for the foundation of a Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC), within a few months of his arrival in Palestine. He did so after familiarizing himself with the obstacles blocking the progress of land purchase companies currently working in Palestine. During the time of Ruppin's visit, Meir Dizengoff of Ge'ula and Aaron Eisenberg of Agudat Neta'im were raising the suggestion, in print and at company meetings, that their companies should not only purchase land but improve it as well so as to make it more attractive to individual buyers. Dizengoff raised the idea of leasing land to people unable to buy or of paying agricultural laborers with land grants, but none of these ideas had become company policy by 1907.[77] It is likely that Ruppin learned of the policy debates going on within the two companies. Also, Aaronsohn claims that he suggested in 1907 to "one of the future directors" of the PLDC that a new real estate company be founded that would purchase land and hire poor agricultural laborers to improve, irrigate, and parcel it for resale.[78]

Ruppin's first memorandum on Zionist work in Palestine, composed in November 1907, is a remarkably comprehensive document, including suggestions for the expansion of Jewish commerce and industry in Palestine, the building of railways and highways, and the construction of resort hotels in attractive locations. Its final section, devoted to land purchase, calls for the founding of an "agrarian fund," empowered "to buy land and to make possible the acquisition of this land by Jews without means via an amortization of the purchase price over many years."[79] This proposal, similar to ones Ruppin had already heard in Palestine, was radically different from the rest in one important respect: its principal beneficiaries were to be poor laborers, not well-to-do landowners. Ruppin writes:

> By these means Jewish agricultural laborers in Palestine, who now have no chance for independence and leave Palestine for that reason, will be tied to the land, and new elements will be attracted thereto to be agricultural laborers, in order to be settled by the agrarian fund, after a probationary period of several years, first as tenants and then as owners.[80]

In December, Ruppin refined his idea, and Warburg suggested calling the "agrarian fund" the Palestine Land Development Company. A proposal written for an Actions Committee meeting stated that the PLDC's first administered training farm should be set up at Delaika/Um Djuni, which it would lease from the JNF, and that others should be built in time.[81] For three or four years, laborers would receive a thorough agricultural training. Through a combination

of their wages and a share in the profits of the farm, they would be able to save enough money to purchase a farm inventory. Then they would be settled as tenants on individual plots belonging to either the JNF or the PLDC itself. After several years of tenancy, the farmers would be offered the option of purchasing their lands on a twenty- to thirty-year mortgage. In the entire eight-page document, Ruppin devotes only one sentence to the function of the PLDC as an agent for land sales to well-to-do buyers. The principal function of the company appears to have been the provision of work and land to "the numerous young people, full of enthusiasm and desire to work," who emigrated to Palestine but could not afford to buy land of their own.[82] Yet Ruppin claimed that this company would make a profit. Relying on estimates made by the agronomist Berman, Ruppin stated that the training farm alone would run in the black from the first year. The farm would sell its produce, and it would be designed in such a way as to allow for a gradual shift from extensive to more profitable intensive farming. "In its operations," Ruppin writes, "the company should, although it serves a greater purpose, preserve the character and the business principles of a profit-seeking organization."[83]

Berman, as well as the agronomists Aaronsohn and Soskin, assured Ruppin that a training farm, if properly run, could make a profit. The three men also believed that a successful training farm would encourage private investment in Palestine.[84] But Ruppin had a more general conviction that an agency designed to fulfill a national and social responsibility should strive to proceed along businesslike lines. In chapter 1 we encountered similar assumptions in the Palestinian staff of the Jewish Colonization Association, who developed a graded training-and-settlement program like Ruppin's, and who also assumed that their training farm would be profitable. There were important differences, however, between the likes of the JCA's Niégo and Ruppin. For Niégo, profits were signs of moral improvement, which was the ultimate goal of the JCA's colonization activity. The JCA's focus was the individual Jew, not the Jewish nation as a whole. As the case of the training farm Sejera demonstrated, a poor economic performance was attributed to moral degeneracy and was therefore intolerable. Ruppin's goal, on the other hand, was "national efficiency," to employ a popular catch phrase of the period. In the pursuit of the long-term economic growth of the Yishuv, Ruppin felt, one should strive for efficiency in order to maximize the return produced on resources invested. But losses were bound to occur at certain stages in the process. This national-economic approach, unlike the JCA's pedagogic one, drew overtly on a statist model: the Prussian Colonization Commission in Ruppin's native Posen.

Ruppin's first memorandum to the JNF, in June 1907, casually mentioned that he saw the work of the JNF as "similar to that of the Colonization Commission in Posen and West Prussia. The National Fund will buy land, when it is offered at a good price by non-Jews, and will then sell it to Jews either as a whole or in parcels."[85] Ruppin made a similar reference to the Colonization Commission in the prospectus of the PLDC, and in numerous letters and published articles thereafter.[86] It is doubtful that these references were entirely for-

tuitous. True, Ruppin made no mention of the commission or the issue of internal colonization in any of his unpublished or published writings before his first trip to Palestine. But there is convincing circumstantial evidence that he had undergone years of exposure to German programs of internal colonization.

Ruppin was a native of Posen, and Prussian *Polenpolitik* features prominently in the memoir literature of other Posen Jews.[87] There may be some significance to the fact that one of Ruppin's favorite novels as a youth was Gustav Freytag's *Debit and Credit*, which deals expressly with the German-Polish nationality conflict. (One of the characters is a dissolute Prussian aristocrat who, at the end of the novel, goes to live on his eastern estates, thus "saying in effect," writes George Mosse, "that it is the mission of the nobility to recapture its former strength and virility by colonizing among the Slavs.")[88] But Ruppin's diary entry recording his impressions of the book dwells on its depiction of mercantile life, particularly in the form of the activities of an honest German merchant and a wicked Jewish one, and does not refer to the Polish issue at all.[89] A much more likely source of exposure, given Ruppin's demonstrated concern for the social problem and his familiarity with contemporary critiques of socialism, was contemporary political-economic literature, for the commission was the target of bitter criticism from the Social Democratic press and an object of admiration from proponents of land reform.

The Colonization Commission's avowed goal was the strengthening of Germany's hold over its largely Polish eastern marches. The commission bought estates from Polish and German landowners, parceled them into family farms, and sold them to Germans on the condition that they not employ Polish labor. The commission has come under harsh criticism, both in its day and in our own, for being a racialist institution that set out to expropriate historically Polish lands in the name of Germandom. Critics also accuse the commission of serving as a bailout for Junkers, for it purchased the estates of financially troubled landowners at inflated prices. There is a great deal of truth in this description; no less a figure than the sociologist Max Weber combined an enthusiastic evaluation of the commission's nationalist goals with a scathing criticism of its support for the Junkerdom.[90] But the commission had another side to it, one which attracted a spectrum of political economists ranging from the *Kathedersozialist* Max Sering to the utopians Franz Oppenheimer and Adolf Damaschke.

These scholars displayed little interest in the commission's political program, but they strongly approved of its socioeconomic goal of strengthening the German peasantry through a process of internal colonization that would stem the tide of flight from the land.[91] It was the settlement of 16,529 families, representing 122,000 people, on the land that convinced the social reformers of the utility of the commission. Not only did the commission offer farmland at rents far below market value, it also made credit available for people who wished to found cooperative villages, either near cities if the settlers were artisans or civil servants, or in the countryside if the settlers were farmworkers or shepherds. Finally, the commission subordinated economic to national and social goals: although it demanded 5,000 to 8,000 marks from each settler to pay for his inventory and

buildings, the commission steadily ran a deficit, and it had spent some 340,000,000 marks by 1907.[92]

It would be inaccurate to attribute to Ruppin the intent of applying the Colonization Commission's political goals to Palestine. Unlike apologists for the commission's role in the German-Polish struggle, Ruppin, at least as of 1908, did not believe that Jews and Arabs were locked in mortal combat over a single territory. He did not advocate a program of colonization by the one to expropriate members of the other nationality. True, Ruppin called for the use of Jewish labor as much as possible on lands leased by the PLDC from the JNF, but he did not adopt the dogmatic policy of exclusive Jewish labor on national lands that was advocated by the leaders of the Yishuv's pioneer community. For Ruppin, like the German land reformers, it was the methods and the socioeconomic goals of the Colonization Commission, not its political program, that were worth emulating.

The Zionists' application of the Prussian model to Palestine was more instrumental than substantive. This distinction becomes clear when we see that Polish countermeasures against the Colonization Commission as well as the Prussian commission itself were invoked as models worth emulating. Ruppin normally referred to the Prussian commission as his principal model, but Warburg blithely equated the commission's activity with that of Polish farm-credit banks in eastern Prussia.[93] These banks had been founded by Poles to combat the Colonization Commission's activities, and their vigorous pursuit of real estate resulted in the purchase of more German land than the Colonization Commission's total acquisitions of Polish land.[94] The national origin of models for Zionist settlement was of less importance than their practicability. Although the WZO's settlement activity began by invoking the Prussian model, which was familiar and had an impressive ring to it, it would be only a matter of time, as we will see below, before the Prussian model would yield to other varieties of internal colonization, most notably those practiced in Italy.

When Ruppin first conceived of the PLDC in terms of the Prussian model, he found many supporters who proclaimed the model's value, all while displaying ignorance of the possible political ramifications of its use. Ruppin found Warburg to be conversant with and respectful of the operations of the Colonization Commission. A society for Jewish agricultural colonization within Germany, upon whose supervisory board Warburg sat, had contacts with the commission in 1905-1906.[95] Warburg often invoked the Prussian model in his discussions of the PLDC; moreover, the journal *Palästina* (which replaced *Altneuland* in 1907) published a number of articles concerning German "inner colonization" in Poland.[96] Yet no statement about the PLDC, public or private, referred to the company as an agent of expropriation or acknowledged that it could be viewed as such. Like Ruppin, Warburg and the Austrian Zionist Adolf Böhm, the editor of *Palästina*, did not think of themselves as being engaged in a struggle between nationalities. Therefore, they viewed the PLDC not as a political weapon to be employed against another nationality but rather as a mechanism designed to solve a problem whose origins lay entirely with the Zionists themselves.

No other Zionist settlement project created to date had invited such frequent and deliberate comparisons with a foreign model. Articles in the Zionist press explained the operations of the Prussian commission in detail, as if to demonstrate that the PLDC, if given proper support, could function as smoothly and successfully as an agency of the Prussian government. No doubt the comparisons stemmed in part from a desire to impress the Zionist public, which displayed a general attitude of distrust toward the project. In Palestine, a group of Zionist notables known as the Palestine Council rightly predicted that the PLDC's proposed administered farm would cost far more than Ruppin had projected.[97] The Odessa Committee opposed the PLDC for similar reasons and expressed the fear that it would quickly degenerate into a philanthropic, paternalistic enterprise akin to that of Rothschild and the JCA.[98] In trying to overcome this opposition, Warburg could not conceive of higher praise for a Zionist project than to point to its Germanic roots. So great was Warburg's Germanophilia that he attested to the importance of the Colonization Commission as an agent of land reform, although he had displayed no interest in the subject until Ruppin brought it to his attention. Warburg found himself lecturing Menaḥem Ussishkin, who had traditionally shown far more compassion for the landless agricultural worker in Palestine than Warburg, on the importance of settling Jewish proletarians via the methods proposed by Ruppin.[99]

Warburg displayed a rigid faith that Zionist settlement could and was obliged to proceed according to methods already proved effective by the European powers. He was infected by Ruppin's conviction that a method "used on thousands of estates throughout Europe" would work in Palestine.[100] Also, like Ruppin, Warburg wanted to see a settlement operation preserve the "character and business principles of a profit-seeking organization" even if the organization did not, in fact, turn a profit.

It is important to point out that the methods of the PLDC differed from those of the Colonization Commission in two respects. First, Ruppin stressed the necessity of profit sharing among the hirees during the first stage of agricultural settlement, the years of labor on the training farm. This provision for profit sharing among wage laborers is reminiscent of Oppenheimer's cooperative scheme, in which Ruppin was well versed, but was not employed by the Colonization Commission.[101] Second, this entire introductory stage was missing from the program of the Colonization Commission. Even though some of the people settled by the commission did not have sufficient capital to purchase the necessary inventory and buildings for a farm, at least the German settlers, unlike most of the European Jewish immigrants in Palestine, knew the basics of farm labor. Ruppin's program, therefore, imposed an even greater financial and tutelary burden on the PLDC than that borne by the Prussian Colonization Commission.

After five months in Palestine, Ruppin returned to Europe in the fall of 1907. When he left again for Palestine in April 1908, he was director of the Palestine Office, and the PLDC had been organized as a joint-stock company with a projected share capital of 50,000 pounds, or approximately 1,000,000 marks.

The company leased the parcels at Delaika and Um Djuni from the JNF, and in the spring of 1908 it began preparations to turn the land into a training farm. Unfortunately, by mid-1909 the PLDC had sold only 2,500 pounds in shares; without a loan of 4,500 pounds from the JNF, the company would not have been able to function at all.[102]

In May of 1908, the director of the farm, Moshe Berman, traveled from Ben Shemen, where he had supervised the first plantings of the Herzl Forest, to the Galilee. Earlier that year he had confronted the young pioneers of the Second 'Aliya for the first time. In January 1908, Berman employed Arabs to do the first plantings at Ben Shemen. In March, spirited young immigrants from the Ukraine uprooted some of the saplings in protest over the use of Arab labor. Berman then hired the young Zionists to continue the planting.[103] At the training farm in the Galilee, Berman was to supervise the transformation of laborers such as the group at Ben Shemen into peasant proprietors. Given the human and material resources at its disposal, the PLDC faced a formidable challenge.

As director of the Palestine Office, Ruppin had a number of responsibilities in addition to his work for the PLDC. He managed all of the WZO's interests in Palestine, including educational and commercial projects. The office took on certain governmental and juridical functions in its relations with the Yishuv. Ruppin also collaborated in diplomatic ventures with the WZO's man in Constantinople, Victor Jacobson. Through any agency to which he had access, including the PLDC, he promoted urban development, particularly in Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Jerusalem. Despite this flurry of activity, however, Ruppin did not abandon his belief in the primary importance of agricultural settlement in the early phases of the growth of the Yishuv. One purpose of his monitoring of political events was to watch for changes in Ottoman land law that would facilitate Zionist real estate purchase and enable the founding of a farm-credit bank in Palestine. (The Young Turk Revolution of July 1908 raised the hopes of Zionist leaders that the Ottoman Empire would introduce sweeping legal reforms, but Ruppin soon grew skeptical that such changes were in the offing.)[104] After he had been in Palestine for several months, Ruppin wrote to the American Zionist leader Judah Magnes that the strength of foreign competition and Palestine's lack of natural resources militated against industrial development. Some Jewish light industries could be founded, Ruppin wrote, but agricultural settlement was the first priority, and the construction of a transportation network second.[105] Most tellingly, Ruppin's acceptance of the offer to direct the Palestine Office was conditional on the Actions Committee's approval of the formation of the PLDC.[106]

Between January 1908, when Warburg and Ruppin brought the plan for the PLDC's training farm before the GAC, and June, when the farm Kinneret was formally established at Delaika, Ruppin's program confronted a sea of criticism. In February, the Palestine Council roundly condemned the proposed farm as a waste of public funds. A very different reaction came from *Ha-Ḥoresh*, a group of Galilean agricultural workers, many of whom had worked at Sejera under

Krause. Krause's respectful treatment of the workers and his approval of their cooperative experiments had led members of Ha-Ḥoresh to the understanding that not all administered farms need be oppressive. Also, unlike the businessmen and Zionist officials in the Palestine Council, Ha-Ḥoresh was indifferent to the prospect that the farm would lose money. Indeed, the laborers complained that the farm's budget was too low, as it did not allocate funds for Jewish watchmen and for workers' housing. Ha-Ḥoresh's tolerant attitude, however, soured with the arrival of Berman and a band of laborers from Judea. Partly as a result of rivalries among the workers (all except one of the Judean workers were members of Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir, whereas Ha-Ḥoresh was tied to Po'alei Ẓion), and partly because of Berman's allegedly authoritarian manner, the members of Ha-Ḥoresh vowed to boycott the training farm.[107]

The PLDC faced not only criticism of its training farm but also sluggish sales of its stock. In order to make the company appear more appealing, Ruppin and Warburg wrote articles stressing the businesslike nature of the PLDC and promising dividends. In order to reduce the risk of a financial disaster, Ruppin decided in May to cut the farm budget to one-third of its planned amount.[108] At first, Warburg opposed reducing the size of the farm, arguing that such an act would reduce the quality of agricultural training there and, for reasons he did not specify, would ensure that the farm would indeed make no profit. But when Warburg heard about the boycott by Ha-Ḥoresh in July, he grew so irritated with the pioneers that he proposed cutting the farm at least in half and renting the rest of Delaika to Russian Jews from Cherson, whom Ussishkin had been sponsoring since 1906 and whose petition Warburg had rejected as late as May 1907.[109]

Ever since the Eighth Congress in August 1907, Oppenheimer, Adolf Böhm, and the leaders of the Austrian federation of the international Po'alei Ẓion had been lobbying Warburg to found an Oppenheimer cooperative in Palestine. In January 1908, Oppenheimer requested that the Kinneret farm follow his program, but Warburg said that he considered such action premature. And in June, leaders of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion called on Warburg to discuss the formation of a special fund for cooperative settlement.[110] Pressured by socialists and socialist sympathizers whose ideas Warburg did not share or fully comprehend, the botanist came by July to favor cutting the PLDC off from official Zionism altogether, thereby ridding himself of the Po'alei Ẓion and "our Austrian friends," whom he blamed for ruining the appeal of the PLDC to non-Zionist investors.

Ruppin did not share Warburg's concerns, or at least he did not voice them. Until the workers at Kinneret went on strike in October, Ruppin did not interfere in the internal operations of the farm. During the summer of 1908, he reported that good spirits prevailed there. Berman appeared to be getting along well with the workers; he was receptive to criticism and willing to let them assist in management. By February 1909, Ruppin reported, the number of permanent workers at the farm had grown to twenty, and more than forty could be there at any one time. Also, at some point during Kinneret's first year, Berman allowed

four workers to farm sixty dunams of land collectively, although he retained tight control over the men.[111]

In his memoirs, Ruppin claims that he was surprised to find out at the beginning of 1910 that the farm had run a 20,000 franc deficit. He writes that he, knowing nothing about agriculture, had trusted Berman's estimates of profit and farm performance, especially after they had been confirmed by Soskin. Given the length of the journey from Jaffa to the Galilee (a week by carriage), Ruppin had entrusted the farm entirely to Berman.[112] There are reasons to doubt Ruppin's version of the facts. He would have known, if only from reports in the newspaper *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir*, of the difficulties experienced by the workers during the winter of 1909.[113] In September 1909, Ruppin complained to Warburg of Berman's administrative methods. In October, Thon wrote to Warburg acknowledging the perilous financial status of the PLDC and the likelihood that Kinneret would run a deficit.[114] Whether or not Ruppin knew all along that Kinneret was running in the red, when news of the farm's performance became public, he and Warburg scrambled to find ways to make the deficit appear smaller. In the first of many such performances, Ruppin and Warburg wrote off much of the loss to "improvement" costs. They cited the exhaustion of the soil, harshness of the elements, and hostility of the Arabs as barriers to profitability.[115] Nonetheless, the two men predicted confidently that profits would be forthcoming. Only in 1912 did Ruppin finally admit in print that Kinneret, being first and foremost a training farm, should not be expected to make a profit at all.[116]

By attempting to be both a profit-making and pioneering institution, the PLDC had a limited capacity to serve either function. As Leah Doukhan-Landau has noted in her study of Zionist land-purchase companies, the PLDC lacked the ideological halo that surrounded the JNF and, in years to come, the Cooperative Fund.[117] We shall see in the next chapter that the Cooperative Fund, established after the Ninth Congress in 1909, appealed to the Zionist public much more than the quasi-businesslike PLDC, and that despite a growing disengagement of the PLDC from pioneering functions, it failed to attract investment capital.

As to the agricultural laborers of the Yishuv, the Kinneret farm had the powerful attraction of being a Zionist foothold on the Sea of Galilee, set in an area of intoxicating beauty, as well as a source of agricultural training. At the same time, the format of the administered farm could not help but arouse rebellious feelings. Berman's honeymoon with the workers waned as he affected the life-style of the administrator of a European estate; the farm manager lived apart from the workers in a private house, while the workers were crowded into a dilapidated Arab inn, and he commanded a portion of the farm's produce. Berman also employed Arab labor, which the pioneers opposed on principle. In October of 1909, the workers at Kinneret went on strike for four days; shortly thereafter Ha-Ḥoresh sent an angry memorandum to Ruppin demanding that Berman be fired. Having decided to investigate the goings-on at Kinneret in

person, Ruppin rode to the Galilee, where he and six workers founded a collective settlement (kvuẓa) at Um Djuni, across the Jordan from Kinneret.[118]

Ruppin's collaboration with the workers on the founding of the kvuẓa was a historic act. It was also the result of months of reflection on his part, and not at all spontaneous.[119] In June 1909, Ruppin was aware that several workers at Kinneret had proposed leasing 1,500 dunams at Um Djuni to work cooperatively; they requested a loan for feed and tools. Warburg and Bodenheimer agreed that an arrangement could be worked out for the workers to borrow 12,000 francs, but the two bickered over which institution, the JNF or the PLDC, should shoulder the burden of responsibility for the loan. Neither man was enthusiastic about the matter.[120] In July, Ruppin, who was in Cologne at the time, discussed the proposed cooperative with Nathan Gross, Bodenheimer's secretary in the JNF office and a member of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion. Ruppin told Gross that the agricultural worker question was so desperate that he was willing to attempt any solution, including the Oppenheimer method, which he claimed to "understand precisely." To that end, he had suggested to the Palestine Department that a group of well-qualified workers from Kinneret form a cooperative to farm Um Djuni. Referring positively to the Sejera collective of 1907-1908, Ruppin planned to publicize throughout the pioneer community his plan for a cooperative settlement. His vision, he specified, was for a cooperative agricultural system with individual holdings, not a communal one. Although eager to establish such a settlement, Ruppin warned that if the candidates were not sufficiently skilled, the cooperative would have to wait another year.[121] Indeed, by September, the interested parties at Kinneret had decided to postpone the formation of their settlement.[122]

What did Ruppin mean when he referred to the "desperate" condition of the Jewish agricultural worker? As he explained in different accounts of the founding of Degania, there were no funds available to settle workers on individual holdings; the choice was between communal settlement or none at all. This argument reads history backward. Only a few months before the collective was formed, Ruppin was planning to allot individual holdings to the workers. There is more truth in another of Ruppin's oft-made claims, that "the fact that [settlement] assumed the form of the kvuẓa was due to the colonists themselves."[123] The meeting of minds between Ruppin and the workers at Kinneret probably took the following form: the workers' desire to farm collectively was consonant with Ruppin's wish to get the land of Um Djuni, which had not been part of the original plan for Kinneret and was not being rationally farmed, under the plow.[124] When he went to Kinneret in November or December, Ruppin encountered resistance to the cooperative plan he had in mind, so he gave in to the workers and allowed them to form a communal arrangement. Ruppin broke with the proposals that had been raised by Bodenheimer and Warburg in drawing up a contract that made the workers employees of the PLDC, not lessees from the JNF. Instead of borrowing JNF funds which they would have to repay, the workers were to be paid a salary, with provisions for profit sharing, from the

PLDC. Ruppin then asked the JNF to lend the PLDC the exact amount the workers had originally requested for themselves—12,000 francs.[125]

The collective, known as Degania, earned profits during its first two years of existence.[126] Its success was due in large part to the high level of agricultural training of its workers and its limitation to the cultivation of grain, which entailed less cost and risk than the agricultural program at Kinneret, which included a variety of crops.[127] The stimulating effect of collective labor and living, of course, played a role as well.

Barely three months after the collective was formed, Ruppin suggested in a report to Cologne that the collective be expanded from six to twenty members, and that other collectives be started on other JNF or PLDC properties.[128] Ruppin sensed that he had stumbled across a possible solution to the problem of settling people with no means via institutions with little means. He was intrigued by the collective not because of its utopian aspects but because it was a vehicle for the eventual transformation of Jews into farmers and their settlement on the land. When conventional methods failed, Ruppin was willing to support a social experiment. But to say, as Ruppin often did, that his support for the kvuẓa was *wholly* pragmatic begs the question why pragmatism in his case dictated a course of action that other Zionist leaders, intelligent, perceptive men such as Levontin and Aaronsohn, opposed on pragmatic grounds. Ruppin's openness to social experimentation, his attraction to the enthusiastic pioneers, and his devotion to agricultural settlement reflect a worldview that was well formed before he sailed to Palestine in 1907.

By engaging the WZO in socially progressive activity, Ruppin placed technocracy in the service of a powerful and appealing variety of Zionist ideology. Ruppin's first years of Zionist activity mark a transitional period wherein technical and managerial expertise evolved from an ideologically neutral position, as held by Warburg, to an ever-closer identification with the aims of the embryonic labor movement in the Yishuv. Ruppin was able to make this transition because he represented a radically different type of technocrat from his botanist colleague. His legitimacy as a settlement engineer rested not on natural but on social-scientific knowledge. Like the academic reformers whom he had emulated as a young man, Ruppin laid claim to an expert knowledge of political economy and social pathology. He legitimized Zionist practical work by presenting it as a nation-building enterprise which, for all its unique traits, had parallels in the social policies of the German empire. The Zionist leadership slowly yielded to Ruppin and allowed him to assume policy-making authority, partly out of respect for his diligence and competence, but also out of deference to the type of expertise which he was thought to possess.

After 1909, Ruppin continued to play an instrumental role in the development of publicly funded, socially progressive forms of colonization. But he was no longer alone. The initiative had begun to move to representatives and confederates of the pioneer community in the Yishuv. As both lobbyists within and employees of the WZO, certain labor-oriented activists were pushing the WZO toward the creation of new institutions devoted exclusively to Labor Zionist settlement.



Arthur Ruppin, 1894



Arthur Ruppin, 1908

Otto Warburg



Max Bodenheimer

Menaḥem Ussishkin



Zalman David Levontin

Franz Oppenheimer

Selig Soskin

Shlomo Kaplansky



Yiẓḥak Wilkansky

III.

The Eastern European Period

V.

EASTERN INFLUENCES

The Apparatchik and the Pioneer, 1909–1911

From approximately 1909, Eastern European Jews associated with the Zionist workers' movement began to integrate themselves into the WZO's colonization institutions. The most influential champion of Labor interests in the WZO was the leader of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion, the engineer Shlomo Kaplansky (1884-1950). Kaplansky molded the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion into a bridge between the WZO, on the one hand, and the international Po'alei Ẓion and the pioneer community in Palestine, on the other. Whereas most socialist-Zionist activists in the Diaspora eschewed direct involvement in the WZO, Kaplansky was willing to play the part of a Zionist functionary and mobilize the resources of his own organization on behalf of national settlement. Unlike the leaders of the workers' organizations in the Yishuv, Kaplansky displayed an early and unwavering commitment to large-scale agricultural colonization, not the creation of an urban proletariat, as the essential precondition for the fulfillment of socialism in the Yishuv. As a result of these attitudes and his own location in Vienna, Kaplansky was in constant, direct contact with the leaders of the WZO in Germany. The first fruit of the collaboration between this unorthodox socialist Zionist and the WZO was the cooperative settlement Merḥavia, founded in 1911.

At the same time that Kaplansky was assisting the construction of the WZO's settlement apparatus in Europe, a handful of pioneers with agronomical training began to filter into Palestine. These figures, the most significant of whom was Yiẓḥak Wilkansky (later Elazar-Volcani, 1880-1955), became managers of farms owned by the WZO. In these pioneer agronomists, the Second 'Aliya produced its first technicians, who encouraged social as well as agricultural experimentation on national domains. Like Kaplansky, these agronomists formed a link between the WZO and the pioneer community. Believing that a commitment to Labor Zionist values demanded full participation in the work of the WZO, they obtained public funding to settle workers on the land and strove to convince the Yishuv's wandering socialist youth to strike roots in the soil.

In 1904, when Kaplansky was a twenty-year-old engineering student at the University of Vienna, he and Nathan Gross (1874-1922), a clerk ten years his

senior, founded the Austrian Federation of Po'alei Ẓion. This socialist-Zionist organization, numbering some 2,000 members, was the first national association to bear the name Po'alei Ẓion, although groups of socialist Zionists using this name had been forming in the Russian and Habsburg empires since 1901. In 1905, a federation was established in the United States; Russian and Palestinian leagues were formed in the following year.[1] The Austrian Po'alei Ẓion differed from its Russian and Palestinian counterparts in its indifference to orthodox Marxism. One scholar has suggested that the Austrian federation's ideological flexibility derived on the one hand from its Jewish-nationalist commitment, which vitiated the concept of class struggle between members of the same nationality, and on the other hand from Austrian Marxism's notorious openness toward revisionist socialism in various forms.[2] One might add as a factor the burning nationality struggles in the Habsburg Empire, which stymied brotherly cooperation among the polyglot proletariat.

All these forces seem to have been at work in the case of Gross. Born in Galicia, Gross moved to Vienna as a young man, where he was active in the Austrian Socialist Party until its nonrecognition of Jewish national rights drove him out of the party and into socialist-Zionist activism. He expressed a violent hatred of Austrian Social Democracy, which he believed was financially supported by bourgeois Viennese Jews ever on the lookout for new vehicles of social acceptance and assimilation.[3] Gross's socialist yearnings were powerful but more utopian than reflective of any recognizable variety of Marxist ideology. He once wrote to Franz Oppenheimer that he had been "deeply disappointed by Marxist Social Democracy" but that Oppenheimer had restored his "social optimism."[4] Gross believed that Oppenheimer's cooperative system would perform the great benefit of ridding Jewish workers of their proletarian status and rendering them "independent" (*sesshaft*). Moreover, a systematic policy of cooperative settlement, combined with labor-management agreements in industry, could circumvent the class struggle in Palestine.[5] Gross believed in the social utility of national landownership, which he felt went hand in glove with the vigorous promotion of cooperative farming. As he once explained to Kaplansky, "We must have cooperatives because rich people do not *want* to become renters on JNF land, and poor people *cannot* do so." For all its potential for good, "the 'perpetual ownership' of the JNF is a stupid man's socialism if the cooperative does not succeed."[6] Perhaps the best evidence of Gross's reformist approach lies in his actions. In 1906, Bodenheimer invited him to move from Vienna to Cologne to become secretary of the JNF. Gross took the post in 1908.[7]

Kaplansky is a more complex figure. As early as 1904, he espoused a particular variety of socialist-Zionist ideology which began to spread among the Yishuv's pioneer community some five years later, and which came to be known as "constructive socialism." This ideology downplayed but did not eliminate the concept of class struggle as the means toward the realization of the Zionist ideal. It sought cooperation between the Zionist proletariat and the Zionist bourgeoisie but assumed that the former would over time achieve hegemony in the political apparatus built by the latter. Like many future Labor Zionist theoreticians of

constructive socialism, Kaplansky rejected the reductionism and determinism associated with late nineteenth-century orthodox Marxism. Economic forces may have shaped the social profile of world Jewry, he admitted, but the forces that drove them to Palestine were psychological, deriving from basic needs such as those for homeland and community. Although unable to take comfort in the idea of socialism's inevitability, Kaplansky brooked no compromise with the belief in the need for a fully socialized economy in the Yishuv.[8] This view distinguished him from a progressive nonsocialist such as Ruppin, who saw the public sector as a tutelary and regulating force in a largely capitalist economy. Moreover, Kaplansky expressed strong support for the collective principle and came in time to favor communal over individual or cooperative settlement.

It is difficult to pin down the sources of Kaplansky's Zionist thought. Eastern European populism may have played its part, but Kaplansky's volunteerism and his interest in the psychological sources of human behavior point to the influence of Austro-Marxism and nonsocialist Austrian economic theory.[9] There is strong evidence that he was directly influenced by the liberal utopianism of Theodor Herzl. A personal connection between the two men formed in 1903, when Kaplansky moved to Vienna from his native Bialystok. Kaplansky came into contact with Moritz Schnirer, a prominent Ḥovev Ẓion and a confidant of Herzl. Schnirer introduced the nineteen-year-old student to Herzl, and Kaplansky became a frequent guest in the Zionist leader's home.[10] Kaplansky's own writings reveal that he admired Herzl deeply. Unlike other early theoreticians of socialist Zionism, who treated Herzl's social philosophy with scorn and dismissed it as bourgeois escapism, Kaplansky had the highest regard for the progressive settlement program which Herzl hoped to implement.[11]

For whatever ideological reasons, Kaplansky charted the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion along a different course in its relations with official Zionism from that taken by the other Po'alei Ẓion federations. In its early years, the Russian Po'alei Ẓion sent delegates to the Zionist congresses, but the federation withdrew from official Zionism completely in 1909. The ideological justification for the withdrawal was provided by the leader of the league, Ber Borochov. In keeping with his celebrated application of classic Marxist doctrines to Zionism, Borochov conceived of the WZO as a vehicle for the economic interests of the Jewish bourgeoisie. Left to itself, the WZO would stimulate the capitalist development of Palestine, which was a necessary precondition for the formation of a Jewish laboring class. Any form of socialist participation in the WZO would only impede the flow of private capital to Palestine.[12] (The other precondition, mass immigration, would be fulfilled by Jewish proletarians fleeing economic strangulation in the Diaspora.)

The leaders of the Po'alei Ẓion in Palestine were Russian Jews, some of whom had been involved in the Russian Po'alei Ẓion before immigrating. The influence of Borochov is apparent in the early writings of the chief spokesman of the party, Yiẓḥak Ben-Ẓvi. In 1906, Ben-Ẓvi described the Zionist congress as a meeting ground where the interests of labor and capital might communicate with each other. It is "an institution which expresses the interests of the potential citizens of the country, of the Israeli citizens-to-be." Socialists should therefore attend

the congresses, but there is no question of their attempting to shape Zionist economic policy. Nor should the WZO make any attempt "to interfere with the class struggle."[13] True, even as Ben-Ẓvi wrote these lines, there were voices in the party that favored "systematic, broad work" by the WZO. An article in the party newspaper *Der Onfang* called in 1907 for a Zionist "managing committee in Israel with authority over the bank, JNF, and so on."[14] And in 1909, the party took steps to make this activist stance official policy. Nonetheless, not until 1911 did the Palestinian Po'alei Ẓion make a firm decision in favor of an integral involvement in official Zionism.

The fundamental difference in approach between the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion and the other federations emerged at its founding assembly in 1904. In the platform which they wrote for the federation, Kaplansky and Gross denied that the WZO was, in their words, a "class party." Rather, it was "a representative body of all classes and strata in the Jewish people, which strive to ensure the existence of the nation by means of a safe shelter."[15] Gross likened the Zionist congress to a parliamentary body and the Po'alei Ẓion to a socialist political party. Just as socialists take part in the political life of those nations that give them access to parliament, he argued, so should the Po'alei Ẓion participate in the WZO. Kaplansky argued further that although the Po'alei Ẓion was the vehicle of the Jewish proletariat, it sought the welfare of the Jewish middle class as well. Only cooperation with official Zionist circles would lead to the normalization of the Jewish people as a whole.[16] To be sure, this conciliatory approach toward the WZO was not universally shared. Some opposition to Kaplansky's and Gross's program came from more orthodox socialists and "territorialists," those who derided mainstream Zionism's single-minded devotion to Palestine and who sought a Jewish homeland in any hospitable spot. But the program passed easily and became the basis for the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion's future political activity.[17]

While engaging the Po'alei Ẓion in official Zionism, Kaplansky strove to maximize its political independence within the WZO. Like a socialist political party, the Po'alei Ẓion was to be an autonomous force in national politics. In December 1906, the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion withdrew from the Austrian Zionist Federation and applied for recognition as a separate federation (*Sonderverband*) within the WZO. Other leagues followed suit. The World Union of Po'alei Ẓion, which Kaplansky helped found in 1907, received *Sonderverband* status in 1909.[18]

Kaplansky believed that the World Union, through its own activities and through work within the WZO, would oversee the construction of a socialist Palestine. The Austrian Po'alei Ẓion's vision of how that construction was to take place differed considerably from that of the workers' political organizations in the Yishuv, the Marxist-oriented Po'alei Ẓion and the non-Marxist Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir. Unlike most of the ideologues of the Palestinian Po'alei Ẓion, Kaplansky denied that private capital alone could develop a flourishing national economy capable of sustaining a Jewish labor force. Rather, it would produce "precapitalist and feudal economic forms." Colonial investment would produce a "network of vast estates [*Grossgrundbesitz*], which—in addition to its social

harms—would prevent the Jews from being a majority in the land of Israel. . . ."[19] Therefore Kaplansky called upon his fellow socialist Zionists to form a policy of "national colonization":

> National colonization must not be confused with capitalist undertakings, which are directed toward the exploitation of the land and the creation of new markets, or with philanthropic settlement projects. It is a historical process, whose direction is provided by the economic structure of the people to be colonized and thousands of years of Jewish history.[20]

In practical terms, Kaplansky felt, national colonization entailed finding ways to attach Jews to the soil. Like the other settlement engineers, Kaplansky and Gross believed in the primacy of agriculture; also like the others, the two rationalized that belief solely on political-economic grounds. "I am not an agrarian romantic," Kaplansky declared in 1906; "I am a city man to the marrow of my bones. But I see in the creation of raw materials the basis of a national economy."[21] Moreover, only the development of a Jewish agriculture, featuring prosperous Jewish farmers who paid back their loans promptly and with interest, would ensure the Yishuv access to credit from foreign investors. Finally, a hold on the soil was strategically valuable. Looking to their native Austria-Hungary, both men saw a portent in the escalating ethnic conflicts between urban German enclaves and the Slavic-populated rural areas that surrounded them. The land, the two socialists believed, belonged not to those who owned it but to those who worked and lived on it.[22] These arguments sharply distinguish the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion from its Palestinian counterpart, which contended that the Yishuv's development would be primarily urban and industrial, as well as from Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir, which sought to create a vanguard of mobile Jewish rural workers, not farmers.

The chief problem facing Kaplansky was that private capital invested in the Palestinian countryside would create latifundia, not smallholdings. Therefore he placed great store in the idea of creating a network of publicly assisted cooperative settlements, such as that proposed by Oppenheimer to the Sixth Zionist Congress in 1903. In 1905, Kaplansky wrote a series of articles in praise of the Oppenheimer plan in *Der yidisher arbeter,* the organ of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion.[23] Thereafter, he initiated a campaign to pressure the WZO to implement its Actions Committee decision of April 1904 to set up an Oppenheimer cooperative in Palestine.

Kaplansky and Gross began by making it the official policy of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion to promote cooperative settlement. They encountered little resistance in doing so. It is difficult to determine from the protocols of the party congresses if the two leaders enjoyed the support of the assembled, or if most of the delegates were simply indifferent to the issue and let the party leaders have their way. At the party congresses of 1906 and 1908 there were delegates who questioned the feasibility of the cooperative, but strongly worded resolutions in its favor passed unanimously. The 1908 congress went so far as to declare that the agricultural producers' cooperative was "the only means of connecting incoming workers to the land of Israel to the soil."[24]

Kaplansky then went on to seek an endorsement of the Oppenheimer plan from the second congress of the World Union in 1909. Vigorous opposition to the plan came from the Russian delegation. "The idea of turning the worker into a cooperative landowner is utopian," said Borochov, "for it introduces socialist elements into the capitalist system."[25] Kaplansky retorted that what Borochov termed utopian was "the creative, social-constructive duty" of workers in Palestine. "Class struggle," said Kaplansky, "means the exploitation by the proletariat of all means in order to raise and ensure its class position."[26] Most delegates sided with Kaplansky. His speeches in favor of the cooperative were warmly received by Nachman Syrkin, leader of the American delegation.[27] The delegates from the Palestinian Po'alei Ẓion also endorsed the Oppenheimer plan, although they did not yet share Kaplansky's view of the centrality of cooperative settlement. At the Seventh Zionist Congress in 1905, Ben Ẓvi had opposed any form of cooperative settlement as contradictory to the principles of class struggle. But after spending a few years in Palestine, the party leaders had come to appreciate the weakness of private capital and the strength of Arab competition. Both factors pointed to the need for new methods by which Jewish immigrants could enter the labor force.[28]

Kaplansky's propagandizing did much to create support for the Oppenheimer plan among socialist Zionists throughout the world. This support made it difficult for the leaders of the WZO to ignore Kaplansky when he turned to them with a request to take Oppenheimer's blueprints off the shelf and build something with them.

The story of Kaplansky's battle on behalf of the Oppenheimer cooperative has been told many times. It is well known that Kaplansky and Gross strove first to win authorization from the WZO to found the cooperative and then to raise funds for it.[29] Existing accounts, however, are based on an uncritical acceptance of Kaplansky's particular version of the story. As a result, they smooth out the kinks in Kaplansky's relationship with the WZO leadership, and they pay insufficient attention to the matrix of forces in the WZO which brought it toward a declaration of support for the cooperative in 1909.

First off, it is important to point out that the specific format of Oppenheimer's cooperative scheme, which appealed strongly to Gross, had no hold on Kaplansky. He expressed interest in any form of cooperation that would prove successful under Palestinian conditions. Nor did Kaplansky share Oppenheimer's utopian views, as the former explained at a conference of the Russian Po'alei Ẓion in 1907:

> [The protocol reads:] Without being fully in accord with Oppenheimer on the social question, without seeing in settlement cooperatives a solution to the social problem, and all while considering as utopian the hope that Palestine will be able to pass over the capitalist stage of development—nonetheless, Comrade Kaplansky believes that settlement along cooperative bases will advance the agricultural economy to a semi-industrial level and will ease the entry of Jewish immigrants into agriculture.[30]

For Kaplansky, the chief virtue of the Oppenheimer plan, as opposed to any other cooperative format, was its acceptance by and acceptability to the WZO. Being *salonfähig,* the Oppenheimer plan would enable the Po'alei Ẓion to appeal to the Zionist public for support for a project that would further the progress of socialist Zionism.

Accordingly, in 1908 Kaplansky began to pressure the Actions Committee to implement the Oppenheimer plan. From 1905 to 1907, Kaplansky and Gross had talked about the plan at the Zionist congresses, nothing more. Now Kaplansky and the heads of local chapters of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion began to petition David Wolffsohn directly.[31] During the summer of 1908, Kaplansky met with Warburg, who said that the cooperative could be built only if the Po'alei Ẓion raised 100,000 marks on its behalf.[32] In 1909, Kaplansky provided Oppenheimer a mandate to the Ninth Congress as a delegate of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion. In preparation for the congress, to be held in December, Gross and Kaplansky organized a quasi-academic "Oppenheimer seminar" in Lvov in April.[33] And as mentioned above, they brought the Oppenheimer plan before the World Union of Po'alei Ẓion in September.

Oppenheimer and the Po'alei Ẓion caught the Zionist congress at the right moment. The Zionist public's yearning to see a new Jewish life blossom in Palestine had only been strengthened by the creation the year before of the PLDC and the Kinneret farm. The Ninth Congress witnessed a steady rise in strength of the "practical" opposition to Wolffsohn. As a gesture of solidarity, the congress gave Oppenheimer the support that had eluded him since 1903. The resolution submitted by the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion to set up a cooperative on JNF land passed unopposed. Statements of support came not only from the Po'alei Ẓion but from delegates of all affiliations. Without the prior approval of any members of the JNF directorium, Bodenheimer declared that the fund would lend the cooperative 100,000 francs once it raised the same amount. Even before Oppenheimer rose to speak, 10,000 francs had been pledged for his cooperative; an hour after the speech, 40,000 had been pledged. True, only one-fourth of the pledges were actually paid, but they testify to the congress's excitement about and support for the project.[34]

The passage of the Oppenheimer proposal was the result of the organizational push of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion, on the one hand, and the receptivity of much of the congress to settlement in any form, on the other hand. It would be inaccurate, however, to infer that the nonsocialist delegates were indifferent toward the specifically cooperative configuration of Oppenheimer's plan. On the contrary, the cooperative ideal had influential champions in the nonsocialist Zionist camp. Around the time that Ruppin founded the Palestine Office, there emerged a new kind of Zionist publicist, one who highlighted the social-reformist aspects of Zionist settlement policy in the same way that Alfred Nossig had glorified colonial models during Warburg's years of ascendancy. One such publicist was Daniel Pasmanik (1869-1930), originally from Odessa but domiciled in Geneva. Pasmanik had been a devotee of the Oppenheimer plan since 1904 and had propagandized on its behalf.[35] In 1907, the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion

published a booklet by Pasmanik that evaluated the relationship between socialism and Zionism. Pasmanik rejected Borochovian theory and believed that an alliance between socialist and official Zionism was essential. As he told the Ninth Congress,

> You are bourgeois, and nonetheless you sanctioned an eminent social institution. . . . It is the only means of bringing the Jewish proletariat to Zionism, from which it is now estranged. . . . [I]f we do not have the Jewish proletariat in our ranks, we will not be able to realize Zionism. . . . Through the acceptance of the settlement cooperative, you have demonstrated most properly your social sense.[36]

Pasmanik remained a minor figure in the Zionist movement, but his social orientation was shared by Adolf Böhm (1873-1941), a prolific publicist, member of the GAC, and from 1910 president of the West Austrian Zionist Federation. More than any other settlement activist of the period, Böhm was a disciple of Oppenheimer. As a child, Böhm and his assimilated Bohemian Jewish family had moved to Vienna, where Böhm's father established a prosperous textile factory and put his son to work in the family business. The experience raised the young man's social consciousness, and he ventured into the slums of Vienna to teach poetry to the factory's workers. In the early 1900s, Böhm steeped himself in writings on land reform and joined the Austrian Fabian Society. An enemy of historical materialism and a believer in the power of the will to effect social change, he was drawn to the work of Gustav Landauer. Only in 1905, after a decade of cogitation on social issues, did Böhm turn to Zionism. He did so with the conviction that the Jews, in keeping with their historic charge to be a light unto the nations, would solve the world's social problem by constructing a model society. Böhm's Zionism also had a strong cultural component—he learned Hebrew and avidly read Hebrew literature—but his Zionist writings routinely stressed social issues above all others.[37]

Böhm became active in Austrian and international Zionism in 1906. In his frequent addresses to the Zionist public, he expressed his fear of the Po'alei Ẓion as carriers of "a threatening class struggle in its sharpest form." Böhm acknowledged that only youthful Eastern European socialists had the inner strength required to conquer the land. But these young people, he argued, needed to be led away from the snares of Marxism. Only cooperative settlement would satisfy the young pioneers' justified yearning for social justice without leading the Yishuv to ruin.[38]

Böhm marshaled the support of the German-speaking Zionist community to his cause. In July 1907, an Austrian Zionist congress passed a resolution written by Böhm on cooperative settlement. The following month, shortly before the Eighth Zionist Congress, a review of the European Jewish press showed that only the Austrian *Jüdische Zeitung* and Kaplansky's *Der yidisher arbeter* paid attention to the cooperative.[39] At the Eighth Congress, Böhm chaired the Palestine Committee, which wrote a resolution instructing the Palestine Office to investigate possible sites for a cooperative. Böhm lobbied Austrian and German delegates to vote along with the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion in passing the resolution.[40] After

the congress, as before, Böhm's cooperative gospel enjoyed a wider reception in German- than in Yiddish-speaking lands. For example, at simultaneous conventions of the West Austrian and Galician federations in 1910, the former congress unanimously passed several resolutions written by Böhm regarding the cooperative and the PLDC. The Galician assembly, chaired by Wolffsohn, did not discuss these matters.[41]

The West Austrian Federation's support for Oppenheimer was largely the result of Böhm's unflagging propaganda and lobbying efforts. But support for Oppenheimer among German-speaking Zionists was also a grassroots phenomenon. The leadership of the German Zionist Federation did not share Böhm's excitement about the cooperative; Bodenheimer, president of the federation and no devotee of cooperative settlement, may have had something to do with this. But German-speaking Zionists in the Hohenzollern as well as the Habsburg empires contributed disproportionately to all settlement funds, including that designated for the cooperative. (In 1911-1913, for example, the average JNF donation per member was 33 marks in Germany, 19 in Austria-Hungary, and 5 in Russia.)[42] This phenomenon was due in large part to the relative affluence of Central European Zionists compared with their brethren in the East. But it was also the case that the WZO's settlement bodies were the creations of German Zionists, and the association made by the Zionist public between these projects and German Jews carried with it a host of connotations, both good and bad. German Zionists sustained the Olive Tree Fund in its early years; when the PLDC was founded, Russian Zionists at first refused to propagandize on its behalf.[43] In the case of the cooperative, more than a third of the sum raised for its fund came from Germany alone; Ruppin asserted that almost all its contributions came from Germany or German Austria. Much of the money for the fund was donated by a handful of wealthy Jews such as Johann Kremenetzky, who gave 5,000 marks.[44]

The significance of these donations emerges when one sees that the entire membership of the international Po'alei Ẓion, 7,000 strong, gave a total of 3,000 marks.[45] Po'alei Ẓion leaders claimed that their propaganda encouraged numerous contributions from nonsocialists, but this assertion cannot be tested. Along with the Po'alei Ẓion, the JNF administered an international publicity campaign on behalf of the cooperative, and the PLDC ceased propagandizing in order to focus attention on the Oppenheimer settlement.[46] The Po'alei Ẓion was undoubtedly a powerful political force in the drive for cooperative settlement, but its fundraising value is questionable.

Contributions to the fund were translated into shares in a joint-stock company, "The Cooperative Society 'Erez Israel,'" incorporated on 17 October 1910. Kaplansky did a good deal of the organizational work for the society, but he had only a limited effect on its make-up. Kaplansky hoped to capitalize on the Ninth Congress's declaration that there should be workers' representation in the society. He tried to get three representatives, including one from the Galilean workers' group Ha-Ḥoresh, on the managing committee. But neither Oppenheimer nor the agricultural laborers concurred; the latter resented the cooper-

ative's administered format and resisted cooptation into a bourgeois organization. The workers' interests, therefore, were represented only by Kaplansky and Gross.[47] Kaplansky also sought a close legal relationship between the JNF and Erez Israel, but Bodenheimer, who was director of the society, resisted the attempt out of fear that the cooperative would be a financial burden.[48] Once Erez Israel was incorporated, Kaplansky had little influence over the structure of the Oppenheimer cooperative, called Merḥavia. Bodenheimer and Oppenheimer asserted ultimate authority. But in later years Kaplansky would be influential in expanding the purview of the cooperative society beyond a single settlement.

As for that settlement, the cooperative for which Kaplansky labored for six years achieved a number of successes. It trained scores of Jewish workers, established a Zionist foothold in the Jezreel Valley, and intensified the WZO's involvement in Labor settlement. Unfortunately, it suffered from misfortune and mismanagement. Misfortunes included poor soil, Arab attacks, and an isolated location. Perhaps no settlement could have overcome these obstacles. But it is equally possible that no cooperative, even under the best of circumstances, would have flourished under the administration of Erez Israel and the manager it employed at Merḥavia.

In the spring of 1910, Ruppin bought a 9,500-dunam tract bordering Fule (today, Afula) in the Jezreel Valley. Knowing that the JNF needed land for the cooperative, he bought it on the JNF's account, without prior approval. A peeved Bodenheimer passed the matter along to the JNF directorium, which accepted Ruppin's proposal that the JNF take 3,500 dunams for the cooperative and give the PLDC credit to purchase the rest.[49] Having bought the land, Ruppin was then faced with the problem of finding someone to inhabit it. Preparations for the cooperative were not yet complete. Ruppin suggested that an occupying group hold the land for an indefinite time.[50] The Zionist realtor Yehoshua Hankin made arrangements with Ha-Ḥoresh to supply workers; thirty men and women, many of whom were members of Ha-Shomer, arrived at the tract in December 1910.

Hostility from Ottoman officials and Arab villagers made the work of the occupying group extraordinarily difficult. The Ottoman district commissioner in Nazareth tried to prevent the laborers from going on to the land. Arab sharecroppers refused to vacate their holdings. An Arab villager was killed in an altercation with Jewish workers; three Jews spent a year in jail. On top of these woes, the occupying group faced an unprecedented challenge in clearing the land of thorns and stones. The members of the group sustained their spirits by forming a communal arrangement similar to that of Degania. There was no administrator, and each worker received an equal wage.[51]

Oppenheimer disapproved of the practices of the occupying group. According to his system, settlers would be allowed to manage their own farm only after years of tutelage under an expert manager. During this time they would learn how to farm and would save enough money from their wages to buy an interest in the cooperative. As an incentive, salaries would vary according to the exper-

ience and productivity of each worker. Oppenheimer did not oppose all communal arrangements in principle, and he had no reason to favor dismantling Degania. But he believed that his system was superior, and that the occupying group at Merḥavia would sabotage his experiment. As soon as the occupying group arrived, he wrote: "What we feared is already beginning: the agitation for a farm without an administrator. Here emerges the devil's foot of Marxism." He later accused the group of "revolutionary hysteria and overbearing nationalism" which "cripple[s] the work of the cooperative."[52] Bodenheimer shared Oppenheimer's fears. He demanded total control over the choice of settlers and the farm manager "lest certain workers' groups try to take an undue influence over the running of the cooperative. . . ."[53]

The manager chosen was Salomon Dyk. Born in Galicia, Dyk studied at the German Jewish agricultural school at Ahlem and worked after graduation as director of a Jewish training farm at Steinhorst, near the Ahlem school. Dyk admired Oppenheimer intensely; he claimed to respect the land reformer second only to his father.[54] Employing Oppenheimer's vocabulary and concepts, Dyk believed that the cooperative form of settlement had an educational, social, and strategic value. He was eager to develop mixed farming, fodder crops, and technological innovations that would increase productivity. Experience in European agricultural schools had shown Dyk that deficits were inevitable when inexperienced people first take to farming. He was not disturbed, therefore, by the losses incurred by Merḥavia during its early years. Dyk sincerely believed that Zionism represented a "national regeneration" that would realize "social justice and authentic Judaism."[55]

Unfortunately for Merḥavia, Dyk shared Oppenheimer's distaste for the revolutionary youth of the Second 'Aliya. Dyk derided the "Eastern European communism and collectivism" of the pioneers, for whom "liberal socialism appears . . . not sufficiently just, not sufficiently uniform." Having recently emerged from the confines of Czarist Russia, Dyk wrote, the pioneers indulge in fantasies of unlimited freedom. They do not understand the nature of *homo economicus,* who will work as little as possible for the greatest possible gain. Thus the Oppenheimer system, with its provisions for discipline, rewards, and punishment, must be applied. Besides, the cooperative had a higher purpose than maximizing the freedom of a chosen few: "The cooperative should not be an elitist commune. Rather, in the end it should arrange all productive men in socially and economically healthy relations, in a state of free citizens, to try to bring them a happy life."[56] These sentiments may have endeared Dyk to the students at Steinhorst, but they were not to sit well with the pioneers.

The members of the managing board of Erez Israel were aware that Dyk was a potential source of trouble. At the beginning of 1910, the board found out that he had been fired from Steinhorst and that his former employer did not have a good word to say about him. Rumors circulated that Dyk was homosexual. Once this charge was dismissed, Warburg and Ruppin turned to accusations that Dyk lacked tact, flexibility, and ease in dealing with workers.[57] Warburg noted that Dyk "is supposed to have been neither a Zionist nor a nationalist

Jew until now"; his lack of Zionist commitment could arouse the wrath of the agricultural laborers. An exasperated Warburg called Dyk "the worst leader of the cooperative whom one could imagine."[58] The board members preferred employing Joel Golde, a Russian Jewish agronomist with ties to the Po'alei Ẓion, who was in the act of being hired by the WZO. But at the last minute, Oppenheimer overcame his suspicions of Dyk, and at the end of the year he sent both Dyk and Golde to Palestine with instructions for Ruppin to decide which should go to Merḥavia.[59]

This story demonstrates the acute lack of manpower in the WZO's technical corps. There simply were not enough agronomists to manage the WZO's various enterprises in Palestine. Even after acknowledging Dyk's unsuitability for the post at Merḥavia, Warburg proposed not firing him but placing him in a subordinate position at another WZO property for a trial period.[60] Technicians, even incompetent ones, were considered too precious to lose. As it turned out, Dyk was the only possible choice for Merḥavia. As a result of ongoing labor disputes at Kinneret, Golde, an easy-going fellow and member of Po'alei Ẓion, became the natural choice to reduce tensions at the training farm. Other agronomists in the country either would not or could not manage the cooperative. And so, *faute de mieux,* Dyk went off to Merḥavia.

Sure enough, Dyk's authoritarianism poisoned the atmosphere at Merḥavia. Dyk had hoped to overcome opposition to Oppenheimer's system by hand-picking the first settlers. They came not from the Yishuv but from the JCA agricultural school at Slobodka, in Galicia. Dyk had worked with at least some of them at Steinhorst. Although the members of the Slobodka group were newcomers to Palestine, they proved no more willing to endure an administrator than had been the workers at Kinneret. Within a year after the cooperative began operations, disputes and strikes ensued.[61] Dyk's rigidity affected not only his relations with others but his agronomic abilities as well. The agronomist Akiva Ettinger noted in 1914 that Dyk transplanted German agriculture to Palestine without taking note of local conditions. In some cases, the use of a less advanced technology would have saved money and obtained satisfactory results. For example, Dyk spent vast sums on field animals for dung when he could have experimented with dry farming, artificial fertilizer, and human excrement.[62] Ruppin concurred that Dyk, like Berman, had forced Palestinian agriculture into the procrustean bed of his earlier experience.[63]

Ironically, despite the benefits gained by Zionists from the use of European models of colonization, the case of Merḥavia demonstrates the result of too rigid an application of foreign models. The WZO stood in dire need of agronomists innovative enough to meet the challenges presented by both the socialist pioneers and the land they worked. Fortunately, in the same year that the Ninth Congress resolved to establish an Oppenheimer cooperative, the first such agronomists made their way to Palestine.

By 1912, all the JNF's holdings except Merḥavia were managed by Labor Zionists who had been schooled in agronomy. These people were not mere

technicians but technically trained ideologues sympathetic to the aspirations of the Yishuv's pioneer community. The agronomists—Yiẓḥak Wilkansky, Hanna Meisel (1883-1972), and Eliezer Joffe (1887-1942)—all belonged to the non-Marxist Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir. While the party's ideologues were slow to abandon their belief that Jews should become wage laborers, not settlers, the agronomists argued forcefully for striking roots in the land. Partly because all three had studied agronomy before immigrating, they were a decade or more older than the pioneer laborers who constituted the "core" of the Second 'Aliya. In their relations with the laborers, the agronomists had both education and maturity on their side.

Before World War I, the most influential member of this triad was Wilkansky. Wilkansky was a *yeshiva bokher* in a Lithuanian village when he first heard of Theodor Herzl. A committed Zionist, Wilkansky decided to pursue an education in the West. He studied natural science, economics, and philosophy at Bern and Berlin before going to the University of Königsberg, where he received a degree in agronomy. Wilkansky emigrated to Palestine in 1908. He taught briefly at Kiryat Sefer, a private agricultural school, but the school's closure in 1909 left him jobless. He was on the verge of leaving the country when Warburg and Ruppin intervened on his behalf. Warburg suggested that Wilkansky manage an olive grove at Ben Shemen, similar to the one managed by Louis Brisch at Ḥulda for the Olive Tree Fund. The land at Ben Shemen was not being used, and the Ninth Zionist Congress had resolved to plant trees on it. But when Wilkansky took up his post at Ben Shemen in 1909, he had no intention of using the land only for a grove of trees. Rather, he had decided to establish a training farm there, with an emphasis on dairy farming. Wilkansky's ideas appealed to Ruppin, who had long appreciated the need for mixed farming. With the blessings of Warburg and Ruppin, Wilkansky set up the farm. He also assumed the management of Ḥulda.[64]

Ben Shemen turned out to be a far more successful training farm than Kinneret. By 1912, there were some fifty workers at Ben Shemen, and another twenty to thirty at Ḥulda. Given the constant turnover, the number of workers who passed through the farm reached into the hundreds. Like Kinneret, Ben Shemen suffered deficits. But it avoided the controversy that plagued the JNF farms in the Galilee because it made no pretense of profitability. Kinneret, Degania, and Merḥavia were managed by private joint-stock companies that promised a return on investment. Ben Shemen and Ḥulda were managed by the Olive Tree Fund, which promised to do nothing but plant trees. What is more, the Olive Tree Fund was supervised by Warburg in Berlin, not by Bodenheimer in Cologne.[65] Left in relative peace by Warburg, Wilkansky was able to explore new approaches to agriculture. His German training put him in good stead with the Templars at the nearby colony of Wilhelmina, from whom he learned about artificial fertilizers and the use of forage crops.[66] Wilkansky cross-bred European with native cattle to produce a new breed of milk cow. At the same time, he was receptive to native techniques, such as scattering olive trees amid field crops in order to maximize the productivity of the land.[67]

Wilkansky enjoyed excellent relations with most of the workers. He allowed small groups to form temporary kvuẓot which worked under minimal supervision. Although Wilkansky's attitudes were to change, during his early years at Ben Shemen the agronomist was willing to act less like a manager than a technical advisor, providing guidance when needed. Even as unintrusive a farm manager as Wilkansky, however, could not avoid confrontations with the young laborers. In September 1910, ten workers quit the farm after Wilkansky refused to let them bear arms and attempted to discipline an unruly laborer. Significantly, though, this time the pioneer press sided with the farm manager, not with the workers, as it had always done in the past. Displaying its respect for fellow party member Wilkansky, the newspaper of Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir admonished the young workers to cease going on strike "at every little thing."[68]

Looking back on the early years of the Palestine Office, Ya'akov Thon wrote of a genuine partnership that formed between Ruppin, Wilkansky, and himself. Ruppin and Wilkansky both attested to the good working relationship that developed between them.[69] This partnership was the result of a common approach to Zionist colonization. Wilkansky had studied in Königsberg, a center of the Prussian government's settlement enterprise in the eastern marches.[70] Wilkansky detested the Prussian aristocracy, and he decried the Colonization Commission's attempts to rout the Poles from their native land. Yet the agronomist heartily supported the commission for recognizing, or so he believed, that Germany's power derived neither from private capital nor from the military, but rather from "the smallholder, [the nation's] stronghold, its fortress." Like the German social reformers of his era, Wilkansky saw the Colonization Commission as a progressive force, which mobilized the bureaucracy and public capital for the service of the people: "The threat to the nation uprooted the government standing guard on the right and pushed it—to the left! To the left!"[71]

For Wilkansky, the Colonization Commission's relevance to Zionism derived in part from its demonstration that any colonization operation must lay out vast sums of public capital in order to prepare the land for settlement. Wilkansky also believed that the commission's activity represented a first step toward land nationalization, a measure that he believed to be incumbent on the Yishuv as a preventive against speculation. Like Ruppin, Wilkansky acknowledged that private capital would play a vital role in the rural Yishuv, but Wilkansky's social-reformist spirit was more radical than that of his German colleague.[72] Even more than Ruppin, Wilkansky displayed the Janus-faced quality of the settlement engineer who claimed to act pragmatically while striving to construct a social utopia. "We have no business with world reform," he wrote on one occasion,[73] but more typical was the following outburst:

> The beginning of social redemption is not to be seen in the education of men with a herd mentality. The final purpose is absolute, individual freedom. In many respects, the driving forces in industry force the individual, unwillingly and desperately, to efface his own individuality in favor of the collective. Conversely, the driving forces in agriculture push through physical necessity toward the strengthening of individuality, not only for the good of the individual, but to the

> benefit of the entire society. And this phenomenon can only be encouraging. For if some see in the promised world of the future Social Democratic state a procrustean bed for an individual's creations, so does the agricultural future state provide not only bread for satiety but also absolute freedom for the individual's active impulse.[74]

Wilkansky framed his own agricultural theories against the background of the contemporary agrarian debate within German Social Democracy. He attacked the orthodox Marxist conception, set forth in Karl Kautsky's *Die Landfrage,* that agriculture was destined to become mechanized and concentrated to the point of eliminating the peasant class. Following the revisionist socialist Eduard David, Wilkansky posited a qualitative distinction between agriculture and industry. The former is an "organic" while the latter is a "mechanical" form of production. Industry is subject to automation, the division of labor, and the concentration of capital in the hands of a few. But agriculture resists this process. "Agricultural progress has not come to us by means of the machine; for agricultural labor, because it deals with a living thing, is essentially not mechanical but organic. . . . "[75] Farming demands a wide variety of tasks divided over the year, and machinery can be used only on occasion. Wilkansky was by no means hostile to technology; he believed that such European institutions as the experiment station, agricultural school, and extension service were indispensable, and that they provided even more evidence that the smallholding peasant would not disappear.[76]

Wilkansky defended the smallholding as the most efficient form of farming and the pillar of the Yishuv's economy. The more intense the farming, the more people the land could sustain. Large estates, such as plantations, have "no relation with the national economy; but we who are creating farms on the people's account must be careful not to make economic errors with respect to the national economy. . . . " Wilkansky acknowledged that farms are not as profitable as plantations and must be built to serve national, not private, interests. "If we only seek profits we should not create farms. And if we do create farms, we must concentrate all our powers on thereby creating settlement-oriented values [*arakhin yishuvi'in*]." Wilkansky also invoked these values in support of the creation of a network of publicly funded training farms.[77]

Wilkansky's references to political economy cannot conceal his mystical love of the soil. "Agricultural labor," he wrote, "—according to the opinion of the experts—is not an occupation but an art, into which a man always imparts some of himself."[78] The passion that underlies Wilkansky's driest technical articles is but one sign of his ties to the socialist pioneers. Before immigrating, Wilkansky had written for the nationalist Hebrew press; once in Palestine he became a regular contributor to Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir's newspaper. Wilkansky wrote for the pioneers in a flowery Hebrew that deftly combined rabbinic phrases with technical neologisms. Given his familiarity with the languages of both Labor and official Zionism, it is not surprising that he represented Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir at Zionist congresses.

Wilkansky found some support in the pioneer community when he wrote in

1913 of a new kind of agricultural settlement, a cooperative smallholders' village known as a *moshav 'ovdim*. Such a village was to be unlike the sort of cottagers' settlement established by the Ḥovevei Ẓion at 'Ein Ganim in 1908. As mentioned in the first chapter, the cottagers' settlement aimed to provide sustenance to its inhabitants through a combination of wages from day labor and the produce from a small private garden. But Wilkansky envisioned a village consisting of holdings large enough to support a family without recourse to wage labor. Although based on individual holdings, the village would engage in cooperative purchase and sale. Moreover, the community would be built only on nationally owned land.[79] Among those workers taken by Wilkansky's theories were members of a vegetable-growing collective which the agronomist had supervised at Ben Shemen. In 1913, they formed the nucleus for the Ḥovevei Ẓion settlement Naḥalat Yehuda, which was intended to be a cottagers' settlement, but whose residents strove to turn it into an independent moshav 'ovdim.[80] In general, however, the successful realization of the smallholders' village scheme came only after the war, when Eliezer Joffe, another pioneer agronomist, expanded upon Wilkansky's theories and assisted in the foundation of what is conventionally regarded as the first moshav 'ovdim, Naḥalal.

Joffe was one of four agronomists, three of them members of the pioneer community, who had dealings with Kinneret. Conditions here were less stable than at Ben Shemen, where Wilkansky kept his post from 1909 until 1918. The constant financial difficulties of the Kinneret farm spurred Ruppin to experiment with a variety of managers and formats. After the workers at Kinneret went on strike for a second time in February 1911, Ruppin fired the imperious Berman and put Golde, who as mentioned above was affiliated with the Palestinian Po'alei Ẓion, in charge of the farm. As farm manager, Golde did not antagonize the workers, but he did not inspire them either. Ruppin complained that Golde lacked drive.[81] To Ruppin's disappointment, the farm continued to lose money. Ruppin therefore welcomed the opportunity in 1912 to lease it to a group of American pioneers known as *Ha-Ikar Ha-Ẓa'ir* ("the Young Farmer"), led by Joffe. Joffe had studied agriculture at a JCA school in Woodbine, New Jersey. Shortly after immigrating to Palestine in 1910, he set up an experiment station at 'Ein Ganim. Joffe displayed a sophisticated knowledge of farm machinery, an interest in irrigation and vegetable gardening, and a penchant for scientific observation. Nonetheless, the challenges of Kinneret proved too much for the group, and it did not renew its lease.[82]

Kinneret found an agronomist of Wilkansky's stature in Hanna Meisel, who established a women's farm on part of Kinneret's land in 1911. When Meisel immigrated to Palestine in 1909, she encountered a pioneer society that was almost exclusively male. Female pioneers, who like their male counterparts brimmed with youth and enthusiasm, longed to toil in the fields but found their aspirations blocked not only by foremen in the colonies but by the male pioneers. Meisel, who had studied agronomy in France, understood that no agricultural community could survive without the involvement of women. An active member of Ha-Po'el Ha- Ẓa'ir, she was sensitive to the female laborers' desire to perform

the same exhilarating field labor done by the men. At the same time, she perceived the need to instruct women in domestic gardening and home economics. Although Ruppin and Warburg paid lip service to Meisel's request that the JNF set up a women's farm at Kinneret, they did not offer substantive funding for it from the institutions under their control.[83] Support for the farm came instead from the JNF and from the *Verband jüdischer Frauen für Kulturarbeit in Palästina* (Jewish Women's Organization for Cultural Work in Palestine), a philanthropic association consisting mostly of the wives of Zionist leaders.[84] Even though the farm did not receive all the support it might have, it lasted over six years, during which it instructed some seventy women in the rudiments of farm economy.

It is difficult to determine the degree to which pioneer agronomists such as Meisel, Joffe, and Wilkansky influenced or merely anticipated intellectual developments within the pioneer community as a whole. The pioneer agronomists came to Palestine convinced of the need to create a class of Jewish smallholders, skilled in the techniques of intensive, mixed farming. Given enough funding from the Zionist public sector, they believed, Jewish farmers would be able to achieve sufficiently high yields and feature a sufficient variety of farm products to make the rural Yishuv a going concern. To be sure, in 1909, the year Wilkansky and Meisel arrived in Palestine, such views were already held by some members of the pioneer community. But the community also featured prominent ideologues such as Yosef Aharonowitz of Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir, who opposed workers' agricultural settlement on the grounds that it would inhibit the formation of a wage-earning class in Palestine. When the World Union of Po'alei Ẓion approved the Oppenheimer plan, Aharonowitz claimed that his rival party had destroyed "the entire structure reared by the new workers [in Palestine] over the last five years. . . ."[85] After 1909, however, such outbursts became more infrequent. Champions of proletarian Zionism in both Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir and the Palestinian Po'alei Ẓion came to realize that without settlement, there would be no rural Yishuv, and that without the WZO, there would be no settlement. By 1912, the leaders of the sundry workers' parties and labor federations in the Yishuv spoke with one voice in demanding that the WZO broaden its settlement activity.[86]

By the time the Yishuv's workers' organizations issued this demand, the pioneer agronomists in Palestine, along with Kaplansky and Gross in Europe, had successfully directed much of the WZO's colonization resources toward Labor settlement. True, resources were meager, but the groundwork had been laid for the further strengthening of ties between official and Labor Zionism. National settlement, publicly funded and geared toward social reform, was merging ever more closely with Labor settlement, socialist in form and revolutionary in its ideological underpinnings. Although slow in starting, this process was about to accelerate its pace.

VI

THE MEETING OF MINDS, 1911–1918

In 1911, David Wolffsohn fell from the WZO presidency, brought down by a broad coalition of Zionist leaders devoted to intensifying the WZO's practical and cultural activities. Zionist headquarters moved from Cologne, Wolffsohn's hometown, to Berlin, which since Herzl's day had been the bastion of practical Zionism. Warburg became chairman of a new Smaller Actions Committee, which practiced collective leadership over the WZO, with Warburg supervising colonization matters.[1] Under this new administration, collaboration between the WZO and the Yishuv's pioneer community evolved from a hesitant and ad hoc affair to a crystalized policy.

Each group now openly admitted that it needed the other in the effort to build a new Jewish homeland in Palestine. Some of the socialist pioneers, elaborating upon demands for specific types of aid, developed an all-embracing program of publicly funded colonization. At the same time, the WZO's managers and technicians became bolder in conceiving of the WZO as a proto-national government, charged with engaging in a host of pioneering activities in the pursuit of national values. This meeting of minds between official and Labor Zionism manifested itself in significant changes in the policies of the Jewish National Fund, the chief source of Zionist public-sector funding. Thanks to the penetration of socialist Zionists into the JNF bureaucracy, by 1918 the JNF and its affiliated institutions had dedicated themselves to the creation of a Labor-oriented Jewish commonwealth—a *Yishuv 'oved*—at the war's end.

The WZO's policy of national settlement, as it existed by 1914, rested on three pillars: the assumption of pioneering functions, collaboration with the Yishuv's pioneer community, and a commitment to the employment of Hebrew labor on nationally owned lands. The first pillar was the oldest of the three, having its base in Herzl's settlement theories and its extension in Ruppin's establishment in 1908 of the PLDC and the Kinneret training farm. The second was a newer product, rising out of the establishment, in 1909 and 1910 respectively, of the Um Djuni collective and the occupation group at Merḥavia. The third pillar was the most recent. True, from its inception the WZO had decried the dominance of Arab labor in the Rothschild and JCA colonies. But in violation

of the JNF's statutes, which prohibited the resale or lease of its lands to non-Jews, in their first years lands purchased by the fund were leased to Arabs, as the WZO was still formulating plans for their long-term use. More important, the statutes were moot on the issue of employing Arab labor. Much to the dismay of the Jewish pioneers, JNF properties frequently employed Arabs. It was only after 1911 that the WZO's settlement institutions went about establishing a coherent policy on the question of Arab labor on WZO properties.

There was a general consensus among the settlement engineers that Hebrew labor could not flourish in an unregulated economy, and that it was up to the WZO to create conditions under which it could take hold. Therefore, Arabs were to be either partially or fully excluded from the Jewish national economy. But there was a division among the settlement activists between those who tolerated no breach of the policy of Hebrew labor—*'avoda 'ivrit*—and those who took a more pragmatic approach. Those with ties to the labor movement in the Yishuv argued that the Zionists must act as if there were no Arabs in Palestine. Wilkansky and Kaplansky called for the creation of an economy completely independent of Arab influence.[2] Ruppin, on the other hand, accepted the political expedience of employing Arabs on occasion; he also realized that there were times when no qualified Jews could be found to perform certain essential tasks, especially in construction. Bodenheimer and other members of the WZO leadership fell in line behind Ruppin. It is important to point out, however, that Ruppin and Bodenheimer did everything in their power to ensure the use of Jewish labor on projects within their control, and never arranged for the employment of Arabs on political, as opposed to economic, grounds.[3]

Just as the Zionist public sector extruded Arab labor from national lands, so did it evict Arab sharecroppers who happened to live on them. Up to 1910, the eviction of Arab tenants was not an object of concern in the WZO, most likely because the JNF had bought so little land. But Ruppin's Jezreel Valley purchases of 1910 did involve removing Arab sharecroppers. The Zionist realtor Yehoshua Hankin apparently paid them compensation in the form of cash, but Ruppin believed their resettlement should be incumbent upon the Arab seller.[4] Out of all the settlement engineers, only Ruppin seems to have expressed concern about the problem of eviction, just as he was the only one to appreciate the weight of Arab political opposition to Zionism.[5] Much more common was Kaplansky's assurance that the Zionists would drive few Arabs off the land, and that the presence of the Jewish market and the availability of Jewish agricultural technology would strengthen, not weaken, the Arab peasantry.[6]

Despite differences in approach, in practice the settlement engineers acted as a bloc in using WZO funds to increase Jewish landownership and maximize the use of Hebrew labor on those lands. In this regard, they shared common ground with the Yishuv's pioneer community, which had undergone a dramatic change in philosophy since the beginning of the Second 'Aliya. As we saw in the first chapter, most of the socialist pioneers came to Palestine intent on conquering the land with their own resources. Only when presented with the difficulty of obtaining work in the colonies, and the miserable conditions of employment

once obtained, did the pioneer community seek the assistance of official Zionism. At first, the pioneers' demands were not at all systematic. In 1909, Ben-Ẓvi of the Po'alei Ẓion began to make piecemeal requests for housing, agricultural training, and land. Naḥum Twersky and Yosef Aharonowitz of Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir issued similar demands in 1911.[7] After 1911, however, spokesmen for the workers' parties, as well as the politically independent unions of Jewish agricultural workers, embroidered their specific requests into a sophisticated program, described by the historian Matityahu Mintz as one of "non-capitalist constructivism, entailing a union between pioneer forces and national capital."[8]

According to this program, Zionist agricultural colonization would be directed and funded largely by public institutions. Private land purchase would be either forbidden or strictly curtailed; the Yishuv would be built on nationally owned land, provided to settlers on a hereditary lease. It would be the duty of the JNF to build a network of cooperatives, training farms, and experiment stations throughout the land. Only Jewish labor would be permitted on JNF property. Finally, the institutions of national settlement would be subject to the democratic control of the settlers themselves. In other words, the pioneer community would play a dominant role in allocating the resources which the WZO would provide. By 1914, most of the spokesmen of the community's various factions were in accord on the need for an alliance with national capital. The most elegant statement of this program came from Yiẓḥak Shprinẓak of Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir in an article of 1914.[9] Ben-Ẓvi developed the same ideas in a series of public statements between 1911 and 1914,[10] as did Berl Katznelson, leader of the Union of Judean Agricultural Workers. In 1913, Katznelson labored tirelessly on behalf of workers' settlement and declared national landownership a prerequisite for the establishment of a Yishuv 'oved.[11] Katznelson prepared a detailed plan, similar to Wilkansky's, for a smallholders' cooperative village and submitted this suggestion to the WZO's Palestine Office as a model for future agricultural settlement.[12]

The newfound accord between the factions of the pioneer community stemmed from the need to solve two overwhelming problems that confronted it. The first, as demonstrated by the historian Anita Shapira, was that of Hebrew labor. Given the inability of Hebrew labor to penetrate the capitalist plantations, the socialist pioneers came to believe in the need to create an autonomous Jewish rural economy. Based on Hebrew labor and mixed farming, it would be distinct from the monocultural economy of the plantations, which were tied to the market and to Arab labor. The labor economy could flourish only if built on nationally owned land with lease terms prohibiting the use of Arab labor. These national lands would support collective forms of agriculture which did not link wages to productivity. Such an environment could not foster a system of wage labor in which Arabs would have the natural advantage.[13]

The second problem centered around winning control over the institutions of Zionist settlement. The pioneers did not see themselves merely as a new breed of Hebrew laborers but as an elite group charged with a political mission. They

were natural-born leaders, determined to take charge of the construction of a new Jewish polity. As the vanguard of a national movement, the pioneers felt it was both their duty and their right to take charge of the allocation of national capital. Besides, the WZO was the only settlement agency open to the pioneers' influence. In the colonies of the JCA, the socialist youth could do little more than organize strikes, which served only to make Jewish workers less desirable in the eyes of the planters. Within the WZO, on the other hand, the pioneers wielded political clout, for Zionism's most prominent settlement activists believed them to be the only element in the Yishuv capable of realizing the Zionist idea.

As much as the theoreticians of Labor Zionism appreciated the importance of national capital in developing the rural Yishuv, they continued to look to private capital to spur the growth of cities and industry. One must not stereotype the pioneers as agrarian romantics. Especially during the great waves of immigration of the 1920s, but even before World War I, some of the pioneer community's most prominent organizers, David Ben-Gurion among them, considered the labor movement principally an urban affair. Their quest for power within the agency of Zionist rural settlement, the WZO, reflected a broader goal of maximizing Labor's control over the Yishuv's means of production in their entirety.[14]

This quest for power, coupled with an unshakable belief in the justice of their cause, led the pioneers to affect an often hostile attitude toward the WZO even as they collaborated with it. Judging by words alone, it would be difficult to believe that the leaders of the Yishuv's pioneer community felt themselves to be allies of the WZO by 1914. In a stream of public statements, spokesmen of the pioneer community attacked the WZO for its treatment of Jewish workers, accusing it, for example, of not granting workers sufficient managerial authority on the national farms.[15] These diatribes, however, must be understood as a common form of Labor Zionist political discourse that was employed within the pioneer community as well as in confrontations with forces from without. In truth, there was an alliance between Labor and official Zionism by 1914, but it was based on deeds not words.

A number of developments after 1911 gave the pioneer community the sense, in good measure illusory, that it was building powerful new instruments of national settlement and increasing its influence over preexisting ones. In 1912, the World Union of Po'alei Ẓion established a special fund, known by its Hebrew initials as Kapai, to aid laborers in Palestine. In the same year, Kaplansky came to Palestine to administer a Kapai-funded labor exchange. But Kapai's resources were minuscule, amounting to only 21,500 francs in 1915.[16] A similar confusion of symbolic and substantive value emerges from the pioneer community's role in promoting Yemenite Jewish immigration to Palestine. The pioneers believed that Yemenite Jews, who had been part of the new Yishuv since the First 'Aliya, were far more accustomed to manual labor and the Middle Eastern environment than Eastern European immigrants. Articles in the workers' parties' press expressed the hope that the hard-working Yemenites could penetrate the

plantation colonies as the European immigrants had failed to do. But it was Ruppin who took the initiative in this matter, and who asked Shmuel Yavneli of Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir to travel with Palestine Office funding to Yemen to encourage immigration. Since Ruppin had expressed an interest in importing Yemenite Jews into the Yishuv since his first visit to Palestine, it is difficult to determine what influence the pioneer community had on his actions. (In any case, both Ruppin and the pioneers labored under powerful misconceptions regarding the Yemenites. Although their immigration was a demographic success, the Yemenites did not fit the stereotyped image of "natural workers," and they encountered great problems achieving social and economic absorption into the Yishuv.)[17]

The pioneers' direct influence upon Ruppin is less important than the self-image that the Yemenite affair helped create within the pioneer community. The Yemenite immigration provided the pioneers with the impression that they were now in position publicly to suggest settlement proposals for implementation by the Palestine Office. The kvuẓa at Um Djuni had sprung up without fanfare; it resulted from unpublished negotiations between Ruppin and a handful of agricultural laborers, who explicitly requested that the experiment not be publicized.[18] The cooperative Merḥavia was not the work of the Yishuv's pioneer community at all but rather of a collaborative effort between the WZO's settlement institutions and the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion. After the Yemenite affair, the workers' organizations in Palestine felt empowered to take the initiative in colonization matters.

Along with the pioneers' growing political assertiveness came an increased interest in the application of agricultural technology to the embryonic Yishuv 'oved. The pioneer community featured workers who, through either a background in the Jewish agricultural colonies of southern Russia or experience gained in the Yishuv itself, formed an intermediate group between the unskilled laborers and the academically trained agronomists such as Wilkansky and Meisel. Workers such as Noaḥ Naftolski at Kinneret and Gershon Geffner at Merḥavia taught their comrades basic scientific practices such as seed selection and experimentation through multiple observations and the use of control factors. These workers, along with Eliezer Joffe, were particularly innovative in the application of farm machinery, as a less labor-intensive agriculture would be less likely to rely on Arab workers. This scientific spirit then became integrated into Labor Zionist ideology via Katznelson, who immersed himself in agricultural handbooks and who, during World War I, collaborated with Joffe in publishing a journal devoted to vegetable gardening.[19]

The workers' growing thirst for technical knowledge produced yet another source of conflict between them and the settlement institutions of the WZO. For just as the workers' groups saw themselves as agents, not beneficiaries, of WZO policy, so did they wish to be producers, not recipients, of scientific knowledge. A certain tension developed between Katznelson and Wilkansky, for the latter, despite his affiliation with Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir and his relatively good relations with the workers, saw scientific knowledge as something to be disseminated from above, by experts such as himself. In a revealing article of 1917, Wilkansky,

perhaps weary of the passive role which he had assumed at Ben Shemen, expressed discomfort with the limited authority of and lack of respect for the farm director in the pioneers' collective settlements. Although Wilkansky was part of the pioneer community, the agronomist felt that the Jewish workers with whom he dealt were a troublesome lot, and he hoped for the eventual arrival of a less revolutionary crop.[20]

Wilkansky's case demonstrates that even a committed Labor Zionist sometimes found the pioneer community difficult to bear. Far more hostile was a bloc of Zionist activists and notables in the Yishuv who on principle opposed the pioneers and the WZO's collaboration with them. These figures launched a lively but unsuccessful offensive against WZO policies which they considered wasteful and harmful to the economy of the Yishuv.

None of the three pillars of national settlement—the assumption of pioneering functions, the promotion of Hebrew labor, and collaboration with the Yishuv's socialist pioneers—was sacrosanct in the eyes of many in the Yishuv and the WZO. Regarding the first pillar, ever since Herzl's time the WZO's settlement experts had faced opposition from those who believed public colonization projects to be a waste of money. True, by 1911, as the association of the WZO with pioneering functions gained currency, much of the opposition of previous years had melted away. There remained, however, two strongholds of opposition to national colonization: the Zionist bank and the capitalist plantations founded during the First 'Aliya.

The Jewish Colonial Trust and its Palestinian subsidiary, the Anglo-Palestine Bank, remained in the hands of Wolffsohn and his allies even after the creation of the new SAC headed by Warburg.[21] Jacobus Kann, director of the JCT and a close friend of Wolffsohn, led the attack against Ruppin's settlement policies. Levontin, as director of the APB, aided Kann in preparing charges of mismanagement and misrepresentation against Ruppin.[22] Beginning at the Tenth Zionist Congress in 1911, Kann's campaign against Ruppin escalated throughout 1912 and reached a climax at the Eleventh Congress of 1913, when the two engaged in a heated exchange that was the high point of the congress.[23] A professional banker, Kann saw through Ruppin's practice of manipulating numbers to make the national farms appear more profitable than they truly were. Ruppin was wont to claim that the value of the JNF's real estate increased by the amount spent on occupying and improving the land. But Kann pointed out that Ruppin's estimates of the real estate's value did not reflect the fair market price, as no one but the JNF would consider it worth that amount.[24]

Kann knew little about agriculture or methods of colonization, but he found powerful ammunition against Ruppin's policies in testimony from residents of the capitalist plantations. The agronomist Shmuel Tolkowsky, who had recently immigrated from Belgium and settled in Reḥovot, told the Eleventh Congress of the scorn that the colonists felt for all Zionist institutions except the APB.[25] Another resident of Reḥovot, the writer and political activist Moshe Smilansky, considered the Palestine Office's hiring of agronomists an extravagance.[26]

Aaronsohn, now directing his agricultural station at Atlit, did not share this view, but he believed that agriculture should be taught in schools, not at publicly funded training farms that consumed national funds for the benefit of a few.[27]

Kann found another expert witness in the German agronomist Hubert Auhaugen, who was employed by the German Foreign Office in Syria and toured Palestine in 1911 at the WZO's request. Auhaugen decried the inefficient, extensive agriculture (*Raubbau*) practiced on newly occupied lands. More important, he rejected Ruppin's basic assumption that the PLDC must pursue national as well as purely economic goals. Having served on the Prussian Colonization Commission, Auhaugen was well aware of the commission's enormous budget and constant deficit. The WZO, in his judgment, could afford neither.[28] The problem with Auhaugen's criticism was that it offered no workable colonization system to replace the one in use. As Gross bitterly expressed to Kaplansky, Auhaugen was merely a "show goy," possessed of a "pseudo-knowledge of Jewish social problems" but no understanding of the real problems facing Zionist colonization.[29] Ruppin shared Gross's opinion but expressed it in a more polite manner:

> Agricultural colonization is a difficult task everywhere; our colonization is especially so. We are dealing with a settler element that has no peasant tradition, and no agricultural knowledge; we have to root these people through private activity, without governmental aid, into a land with a different climate, an unorganized administration and a dreadful transportation network—all while overcoming the ill-will of the local Arab population and the government. . . .[30]

Even Warburg, who was overwhelmed by Auhaugen and envisioned him as director of all Zionist colonization operations, defended the PLDC in its current form as indispensable.[31]

The second pillar of national settlement, Hebrew labor, was attacked by those who saw in the heavy use of Arab labor a combination of economic, political, and social advantages. Levontin saw in mixed labor a source of political stability.[32] Aaronsohn valued Arab labor for allowing the Jews to develop into an elite group of agricultural experts, not a brutish peasantry. Like other products of the First 'Aliya, Aaronsohn was proud of his knowledge of Arabic and Arab ways, and he saw no reason why Jews and Arabs should not work together, so long as the former dominated the latter.[33] Aaronsohn was hardly alone in believing that Zionist settlement need not be equated with the formation of a class of Jewish menials. No less a figure than Aḥad ha-'Am argued that Jews, unable to compete with Arabs as manual laborers, should content themselves with being landlords and overseers.[34]

More than any other policy, it was the third pillar of national settlement, collaboration with the socialist pioneers, that aroused opposition to the WZO's settlement activities. Not surprisingly, the pioneers' worst enemies during the prewar years were the banker Levontin and the colonist Aaronsohn. Levontin refused to hold strike funds from the workers' unions on deposit at the APB. Aaronsohn refused to hire Jews at Atlit. In a blistering critique of practices at

Ben Shemen, Aaronsohn accused the laborers of ineptitude and negligence in dealing with the farm inventory.[35] Aaronsohn could not forgive Ruppin for allowing the formation of cooperatives at Ḥulda and sympathizing with the workers at Kinneret during their strike of 1911. "Being extremely bourgeois in my views," explained Aaronsohn, "I could not believe in the success of proletarian settlement."[36] Colonists did not have to be ideologically opposed to socialist Zionism to dislike the pioneers; among other reasons, the newcomers were scorned for refusing to acculturate to the Middle Eastern environment. The agronomist Tolkowsky quipped that the pioneers should stop eating herring and start eating beans.[37]

Hostility to the pioneers and support for Arab labor went hand in hand. Oppenheimer derided the "revolutionary-hysterical" Jewish laborers for insisting on a policy of 'avoda 'ivrit; "The overblown nationalism of the Russian terrorists," he warned, "will soon bring us to a dead end."[38] The farm managers Berman and Dyk justified the use of Arab workers not only as a supplement for insufficient Jewish labor but also as a substitute for overzealous and overdemanding Jews. There were, however, important differences between these proponents of mixed Arab and Jewish labor. Whereas Levontin and Aaronsohn confronted the socialist pioneers with an alternative Zionist vision, Dyk and Oppenheimer, who lacked nationalist fervor, conceived of Palestine as a Middle Eastern Switzerland, where Arabs and Jews would labor together in harmony. For the pioneers and their allies, however, the fine points of their opponents' ideologies were of no importance. What mattered, as Kaplansky said, was that Aaronsohn, Berman, and Dyk had a "pathological" aversion to hiring Jewish workers.[39] An unbridgeable gap separated the supporters of the embryonic labor movement from those settlement experts unwilling to accept the pioneers' fundamental values.

Although there was a lively opposition to national settlement by 1914, the opposition constituted a rear guard, protesting decisions over which it exercised no substantive control. What is most striking about the criticism of WZO settlement policy was that it came from outside the settlement institutions themselves. The men whose views were raised here, notables of the Yishuv and the Zionist movement in the Diaspora, had no direct control over the actions of the JNF or any of the numerous agencies that it funded. Aaronsohn was a respected figure in certain Zionist circles and was tied closely to Warburg, but the agricultural experiment station which he directed at Atlit was privately funded and was isolated from mainstream Zionist institutions.[40] Berman and Dyk were indeed farm managers in the WZO's employ, but both were fired, allegedly for technical incompetence, although one could argue that their poor financial performance was at least in part a product of their poor relations with the workers. As to Kann and Levontin, the JCT and its Palestinian subsidiary had their own purview and did not engage in publicly funded settlement ventures.[41] Within the WZO's settlement institutions, however, there was a general accord about the efficacy of national colonization and the value of the pioneer community.

Among both the rank and file and the leadership of the Zionist movement, interest in colonization matters skyrocketed after 1911. Contributions to Zionist settlement institutions increased steadily; between 1908 and 1913, the assets of the JNF almost tripled.[42] News from Palestine commanded increasing amounts of space in the organ of official Zionism, *Die Welt*. At the Zionist congresses, settlement matters began to move toward center stage. The Tenth Congress of 1911 passed a host of settlement-related resolutions, including calls for the establishment of a network of training farms and the hiring of itinerant agronomists to teach throughout the Yishuv.[43]

Another sign, so it would seem, of the WZO's strengthened commitment to settlement was the widespread respect now accorded the PLDC, which had been an object of controversy and abuse when founded by Ruppin in 1908. Such an ambitious project, centering around the establishment of an administered training farm, had aroused fierce opposition from many Zionist leaders who feared that it would quickly degenerate into a philanthropic, paternalistic enterprise akin to those of the Baron Edmond de Rothschild and the JCA. The Russian Zionist leaders Ussishkin and Tchlenov were among the shrillest exponents of this critique, and yet after 1911 they became two of the company's strongest supporters.[44] Support for the PLDC now came from the editor of *Die Welt,* Richard Lichtheim, and from the British Zionist leader Norman Bentwich, who urged the Actions Committee to promote the PLDC, "the only Zionist institution appealing to the masses that has the colonization of the land as its object."[45]

This enthusiasm for the PLDC stemmed not from a newfound respect for administered settlement but rather from the PLDC's gradual shedding of its pioneering functions. The principal cause of the PLDC's disengagement from training-and-settlement activity was a shortage of funds. The company never raised sufficient share capital to support even the most modest nonprofit ventures. The PLDC had been able to begin operations thanks only to an infusion of credit from the JNF. The deficits of the WZO training farm Kinneret consumed most of the PLDC's working capital, and in 1910 it required a second JNF loan. Ruppin still found himself, however, drawing on Palestine Office funds to cover the PLDC's expenses.[46] The PLDC's burden eased slightly when the JNF took over the administration of the kvuẓa Degania in 1911. The communal settlement had begun to run a small deficit after two years of impressive profits. Kinneret, however, stayed in the PLDC's hands.[47] Given the PLDC's chronic lack of funds, it is not surprising that the company curtailed its involvement in training farms and cooperative settlement. From 1911 onward, the company's reports stressed its role in such profitable activities as land purchase, development, and parceling for resale to individuals.[48] By January 1913, the PLDC had even changed the description of its activities on its letterhead. The settlement of poor immigrants, which had previously been featured at the top of the list of the company's activities, was now moved to the bottom.[49]

The PLDC's dissociation from nonprofit enterprises delighted Zionist leaders who had been critical of the company. It is likely that Ussishkin, Tchlenov, Lichtheim, and Bentwich became advocates of the PLDC precisely because of

the turnabout in the company's policies. Tellingly, Lichtheim's writings on the PLDC concentrated on its virtues as an agent of land acquisition, thus serving classic political Zionist goals that were both strategic and economic.[50] As to Ussishkin, he had demanded in 1910 that the PLDC rid itself of training farms and join forces with the private land-purchase company Ge'ula.[51] In 1911, Ruppin decided to pursue this suggestion, and he made an intensive effort to pool the resources of the PLDC with those of Ge'ula and another private company, Agudat Neta'im.[52] At the same time, Ruppin began to agitate on behalf of small capitalist plantation colonies, *aḥuzot,* consisting of individual holdings of citrus trees which could be successfully cultivated by middle-class immigrants with little agricultural training.[53] Because of its connections with the private Zionist ventures, the PLDC played a key role in the bulk of private Jewish land purchases between 1908 and 1914.[54]

Ruppin did not alter policies of the PLDC out of a desire to turn it into a profitable business. Rather, he believed that the PLDC "must be rendered operative under all circumstances . . . and if it must cease activity out of a lack of means, the whole of Jewish colonization in Palestine will stand at a dead end."[55] Even in turning his attention from training farms to land purchase, however, Ruppin continued to attach a higher priority to national-economic and strategic goals than to profit. While private companies such as Ge'ula contented themselves with buying up parcels around the Judean colonies, Ruppin dreamed of buying up the entire Jezreel Valley; he also hoped to purchase contiguous tracts stretching from Gaza to Beersheba.[56] In these long-range projects Ruppin found an unlikely ally in the JCA, whose interest in Palestine was kindled by the successful growth of Zionist colonization. In 1913, the JCA used the PLDC as a purchasing agent for a 7,000-dunam tract. More important, in the same year Baron Rothschild and Ruppin discussed the possibility of the baron's investing heavily in the PLDC.[57]

It would be incorrect to suggest, however, that financial considerations alone led Ruppin to revamp the modus operandi of the PLDC. In part, it was the growing specialization of the WZO's settlement apparatus that allowed him to assign the PLDC's pioneering functions to other institutions. By 1911, Kaplansky's tireless efforts and the pocketbooks of German-speaking Zionists had produced the cooperative society Erez Israel and the colony Merḥavia. At Ben Shemen, the agronomist Wilkansky had transformed what was to be a vast olive grove into a training farm for pioneers. Given these developments, Ruppin now saw in the cooperative society and the Olive Tree Fund the best sources of employment and training for new immigrants without means. In his mind, the PLDC, the cooperative society, and the Olive Tree Fund were the arms and legs of the JNF, whose freedom of action was severely limited by its own statutes prohibiting the resale of purchased lands. It was the duty of the JNF to support its agents, wrote Ruppin, "keeping in mind that a state does not carry out all of its tasks by itself but rather transfers part of its authority to private companies subject to [state] supervision, and the state limits itself to the provision of the necessary budget for such companies."[58] In making this statement, Ruppin

appears, as in his earlier writings on the PLDC, to have had German models of internal colonization in mind. Although the Prussian Colonization Commission in Posen and West Prussia was entirely state-funded, the so-called general commissions, responsible for colonization and land reclamation in Prussia's other four eastern provinces, assigned these tasks to private corporations, in which the state owned approximately half the shares.[59]

Ruppin had come to see the PLDC less as a pioneering than as a quasi-private enterprise. Nonetheless, he believed that it still had an important public function to fulfill. The company was to hire experienced laborers who would form occupation cooperatives to prepare newly purchased lands for cultivation before the owners took possession.[60] Indeed, by 1914 there were at least eleven occupation cooperatives in Palestine: four on JNF properties, and the rest on lands purchased or administered by the PLDC.[61] Moreover, Ruppin was aware of the PLDC's ongoing ties to and dependence upon "the State," i.e., the WZO. The JNF and other public agencies would have to assume some of the pioneering burdens originally designated to the PLDC. As it turned out, Ruppin was correct in assuming that other resources aside from the PLDC were now available for the promotion of national settlement.

One force behind the mobilization of these resources was Kaplansky, who strove to funnel them into Labor settlement. The founding of Merḥavia was only the first step in his quest to maximize socialist-Zionist influence over the WZO. Kaplansky's six-month stay in Jaffa in 1912 as director of the Po'alei Ẓion's labor exchange stimulated contact between the Actions Committee and the international Po'alei Ẓion.[62] After returning to Europe, Kaplansky began planning for the upcoming Eleventh Zionist Congress, at which he planned to use the Po'alei Ẓion's delegation to press for the expansion of the cooperative fund. At the congress, the Po'alei Ẓion's resolution that the Actions Committee consider broadening the purview of the cooperative fund passed without difficulty.[63] And in February 1914, the Po'alei Ẓion placed a representative on the WZO's Greater Actions Committee.[64]

Even more significant than the acceptance of the Po'alei Ẓion into the GAC was Kaplansky's entry into the administration of the JNF. In October 1913, Kaplansky became second secretary of the JNF in Cologne, where he joined his party colleague Nathan Gross. David Wolffsohn had suggested co-opting Kaplansky into the Zionist machinery as early as 1910, but the man most responsible for getting him into the JNF was Gross. A subtle *eminence grise* in the Zionist bureaucracy, Gross privately urged Kaplansky to join him in order to minimize Bodenheimer's influence over JNF policy. Then Gross convinced Bodenheimer of the need to hire Kaplansky, citing the ever-growing burden of work in the Cologne office as a pretext.[65]

Kaplansky entered the JNF with a sense of mission. Both he and Gross saw in the JNF the potential to become Zionism's most powerful agent of settlement. But without proper guidance, they feared, the JNF would become little more than a bank, squandering its resources on credit for middle-class settlers.[66] Both men were determined to intensify the JNF's support for agricultural cooperatives

by broadening the resources of the cooperative society Erez Israel. Unfortunately, Kaplansky and Gross quickly learned that Oppenheimer's system, when implemented at Merḥavia, was of dubious value. The problem was not merely that its administrative format incited the laborers to rebellion. Equally important, Oppenheimer's stress on preparation for permanent settlement produced a complex agricultural plan that was expensive and slow to implement. In Palestine, newly purchased lands had to be brought immediately into Jewish hands, and there was no time for elaborate preparations for the means of settlement. Kaplansky went in search of a cooperative program different from Oppenheimer's and a model to prove that program's efficacy.

Kaplansky found both in Italy, where itinerant "occupation cooperatives" of agricultural laborers had been employed by the state and by estate owners since the 1880s. The Italian government allocated over 200 million francs for land reclamation projects using such cooperatives, and inexpensive credit was made available for groups leasing land on private estates. Although the laborers did not settle on the lands they worked, the agricultural cooperatives served a double benefit of transforming wasteland into farmland and providing a living wage to the workers through a system of profit sharing.[67] Shortly after entering the JNF, Kaplansky began citing the Italian example as part of a new campaign for occupation cooperatives in Palestine. Kaplansky called on the JNF to provide housing and a farm inventory to occupation cooperatives on privately owned lands. He also believed that occupation groups could hold newly purchased JNF lands, but that these should eventually become permanent settlement cooperatives, fitted out entirely by the JNF.[68]

At work in Cologne, Kaplansky did have some success in charting a new course for the JNF. For example, he spread the new Italian gospel to Wilkansky, who responded enthusiastically.[69] Kaplansky, however, found in his superior, Bodenheimer, a man who was, although a valuable colleague, not exactly a kindred spirit. As we have already seen, Bodenheimer lacked social-reformist vision when he assumed control over the JNF in 1907. He also lacked the technical knowledge and capacity for risk taking that characterized the WZO's most dynamic settlement activists. Bodenheimer wrote at great length about returning Jews to the soil, and he had some far-sighted colonization plans of his own, but he was too caught up in the administrative end of the JNF to engage seriously in colonization matters. A fear of losing power, a desire to maximize contributions to the fund, and a sincere belief in the sanctity of his public trust all reinforced Bodenheimer's natural tendencies toward officiousness. And so there was always a good deal of tension between the man responsible for collecting money for the JNF and those eager to spend it.

Ruppin frequently appropriated money from the JNF without prior approval; these irregularities grew more pronounced over time. Bodenheimer feuded constantly with Warburg and Ruppin over the PLDC, which relied upon loans from the JNF but denied Bodenheimer any administrative control over the company.[70] The move of Zionist headquarters to Berlin in 1911 made relations between Bodenheimer and the Warburg-Ruppin axis even worse. Left in Cologne,

Bodenheimer felt isolated and vulnerable. He accurately perceived that control over the JNF was shifting from Europe to Palestine, for Warburg supported Ruppin, and the SAC stood behind Warburg.[71]

Nonetheless, Bodenheimer was a powerful figure in the WZO, and he actively molded the JNF's land policy. Sometime over the period 1907-1910, his attitude toward national landownership changed from skepticism to near-fanatic devotion. In 1907, the JNF had lent 250,000 francs to Aḥuzat Bayit, the private company that purchased land and built houses in what became Tel Aviv. At the time, Bodenheimer's critics had accused him of handing over the treasure of the Jewish people to a handful of bourgeois homeowners. Bodenheimer had justified his actions, arguing that limited funds, Ottoman legal restrictions, and the lack of a coherent land-use program prevented the JNF from pursuing its original goal of land purchase.[72] By 1910, however, Bodenheimer began to have misgivings about using JNF money to promote urban development. He stipulated in 1910 that all future loans to housing companies would be conditional upon the companies' acceptance of national ownership and hereditary lease.[73]

This policy was adhered to in loans made to housing societies in Jaffa and Haifa, proclaimed Bodenheimer, "in order to create a healthy basis for the eventual establishment of garden cities" in the Yishuv.[74] Bodenheimer did not wish to discourage private land purchase, rural or urban, by those with means. But he did hope that the JNF would someday be powerful enough to "counteract, via its socially oriented land policy, the evils and dangers of private landownership, so convincingly depicted by [Franz] Oppenheimer, wherever they may appear."[75] "For social and national reasons," wrote Bodenheimer, the condition of hereditary lease was "absolutely necessary"; and it was of vital importance that the populace of the Yishuv become accustomed to this aspect of Zionist colonization.[76]

It is not clear why Bodenheimer, whose early Zionist writings are notable for their lack of utopian fervor, became so ardent a land reformer in the last years before World War I. Reports of Aḥuzat Bayit's overextension of its credit, speculation, and price gouging may have had something to do with his change of heart.[77] Or it may be that Bodenheimer, consciously or not, adopted the official ideology of the JNF as a means of enhancing his own influence and self-esteem. Whatever the reasons, Bodenheimer emphasized that his policies had no socialist orientation whatsoever, but rather invoked "the arguments . . . [of] the most prominent . . . economists of conservative persuasions." Bodenheimer harkened to municipal land ordinances applied throughout his native Rhineland and in other northern European countries as a routine remedy against speculation.[78] In his mind, some form of corporate possession (*Obereigentum*) was indispensable in the urban centers of a modern state.

This belief was shared by other German Zionists in the JNF's general assembly. In a debate of 1914 over a proposed loan for the development of Haifa, Arthur Hantke, Israel Jacobson and Alfred Klee all expressed support at least in principle of Bodenheimer's point of view. The Eastern European nonsocialist members of the assembly, such as Tchlenov and Motzkin, did not share their

colleagues' faith in the need for *Obereigentum* in Palestine. But the Haifa debate ended with the assembly voting to buy the land in question and, in accord with the practices of the German Zionists' hometowns, to make it available to tenants on a hereditary lease arrangement, wherein the JNF possessed a right of first refusal (*Vorkaufsrecht*) should the tenants wish to sell their homes.[79]

Ironically, one of the sharpest critics of the JNF's new urban land policy was Ruppin. Ever since 1907, Ruppin had considered national landownership to be more a burden than a benefit. As he wrote at the time of the Haifa debate, the JNF could not prevent urban land speculation because the source of speculation was not a lack of land but a lack of housing. Moreover, the capital-starved Yishuv must not frighten off prospective middle-class immigrants by not allowing them to own the land underneath their feet. Understanding the mentality of bourgeois immigrants as well as he did that of the pioneers, Ruppin wrote that the JNF's policy "require[s] a national and above all social idealism that you cannot demand of a group of individuals." Finally, regarding the loan to Haifa, Ruppin believed that nothing should be done to squelch the development of a thriving Jewish center in northern Palestine.[80] (In making these remarks, Ruppin, as was his wont, was separating short-term from long-term goals. Immediately after World War I, although still suspicious of an overzealous land policy, Ruppin included a call for eventual nationalization in *The Building of the Land of Israel,* a book suffused throughout with a utopian glow and representative of Ruppin's idealized vision of the Jewish National Home in the immediate post-Balfour era.)[81]

As it turned out, the Haifa debate was a tempest in a teacup, for after World War I, the JNF did not implement a policy of national landownership in urban areas, restricting itself to the purchase of rural real estate.[82] But the JNF under Bodenheimer's direction did assume a number of new national projects of lasting significance. One such project was the crash program of house building for poor immigrants that Bodenheimer initiated in 1912. The JNF had provided loans for house-building cooperatives since 1907, and early in 1909 Ruppin suggested to Bodenheimer that the JNF go into the construction business itself.[83] By 1911, however, only a handful of houses for married workers had been built in the colonies, and Ruppin's pleas for workers' housing at Degania went ignored.[84] It took the mass immigration of Yemenites in 1912 to get the JNF seriously involved in housing. Taking advantage of an outpouring of public support for the Yemenites, Bodenheimer established a Workers' Dwelling Fund that raised 270,000 francs by 1915, enough money to build over fifty houses and thirteen barracks for rental to Yemenites.[85] Only after the Yemenite housing program was well under way did Bodenheimer give in to Ruppin's demands to build dwellings for non-Yemenite laborers in the colonies and on the national farms.[86] But after overcoming his reservations about broadening the purview of the housing program, Bodenheimer came to consider the JNF's house building an integral part of its colonization system. Accordingly, the JNF directorium voted in 1914 to double the already considerable holdings of the Workers' Dwelling Fund.[87]

Bodenheimer also took the initiative in expanding the JNF's Olive Tree Fund into a massive forestation program. Visiting Palestine in 1912, he noted that the unforested Yishuv desperately needed trees for fuel, building, and land amelioration. At the same time, the olive groves at Ben Shemen and Ḥulda, which Warburg had done so much to promote, were producing little economic benefit. At Bodenheimer's suggestion, the Olive Tree Fund became simply the Tree Fund, which laid the base for the JNF's post-World War I forestation activities on unarable nationally owned lands.[88]

Although Bodenheimer was resolute in his support for such important JNF activities as house building, forestation, and (eventually) land purchase, he was far more hesitant in dealing with the hallmark of Zionist national settlement, the cooperative farm. Acting alone, Bodenheimer would have been slow to intensify the JNF's involvement with training farms, and he would have had nothing to do with workers' cooperatives. But Bodenheimer was gradually moved toward increasing the JNF's involvement in Labor settlement by the Eastern European Labor-oriented Zionists who had made their way into the Zionist bureaucracy: Gross, Kaplansky, and Wilkansky.

At the First Zionist Congress in 1897, Bodenheimer called on the JNF to establish the first model farms in Palestine.[89] Judging by public statements alone, one might gather that by 1911 Bodenheimer had grown even stronger in his convictions. At the Zionist congresses of 1911 and 1913, he defended the cooperative settlements against their critics and spoke of the necessity for training farms like Kinneret.[90] On other occasions, however, he implied that the JNF constructed model colonies only because it was unable to carry out its principal function of purchasing land for lease to qualified farmers.[91] What is more, Bodenheimer wrote privately that he wanted the first colonization experiments to be made by private companies so as not to risk tarnishing the JNF's image.[92] Bodenheimer was sharply critical of the operations of all the national farms in the Galilee. By 1912, the financial problems that had plagued Kinneret since its founding had come to roost at Merḥavia. The cooperative quickly exhausted its original JNF loan, and Ruppin sparred with Bodenheimer throughout 1913 for money for housing and other necessary improvements.[93] Bodenheimer was particularly harsh in his treatment of Degania. He opposed its unsupervised, communitarian form of settlement. He refused to grant it money for improvements, claiming that the kvuẓa's form "provided no guarantee for its stability or for the rational development of the farm."[94]

Merḥavia and Degania eventually got their money, largely because Ruppin appropriated whatever funds were at his disposal and obtained approval after the fact. Ruppin attempted to explain to Bodenheimer that Degania represented "a thoroughly encouraging prospective for the future," and he denied charges that its members were "communists" and "cranks" (*Eigenbrötler*).[95] Kaplansky, too, played an invaluable role in winning funds for the cooperatives. He successfully pleaded Merḥavia's case in front of the JNF general assembly, and he arranged to send Franz Oppenheimer to the United States on a fundraising drive for both cooperatives.[96]

Bodenheimer was more supportive of the JNF's training farm at Ben Shemen, where the financial and emotional environment was more stable than in the Galilean properties. Until his 1912 visit, Bodenheimer had no idea that the so-called olive groves at Ben Shemen had become the site of a thriving training farm. The presence of the farm was a pleasant surprise. Neither the farm's deficits nor its strong Labor Zionist atmosphere disturbed Bodenheimer. No doubt, the avowed nonprofit status of the Olive Tree Fund and its financial strength (it had raised 800,000 francs by 1915) accounted in part for his good humor. But Bodenheimer's opinion of Ben Shemen was also influenced, no doubt, by his rapport with the farm manager, the German-educated Wilkansky. There was much about Wilkansky that appealed to Bodenheimer; Wilkansky's contacts with the nearby Templar colony of Wilhelmina were proudly reported by Bodenheimer in reports to German governmental officials.[97] Ben Shemen also featured another highly respectable staff member in the agronomist M. Zagorodsky, recently hired by the Palestine Office, who had received his doctorate from the University of Berlin.[98] With distinguished personnel such as Wilkansky and Zagorodsky, it would have been difficult for Bodenheimer not to feel that the farm was in excellent hands. As a sign of his confidence, Bodenheimer raised few objections to the farm's budget even after his return from Palestine. The JNF provided the farm with a grant to establish a dairy, and it subsidized the publication by Wilkansky and Zagorodsky of a Hebrew-language journal of agronomy, *Ha-Ḥakla'i*.[99]

While the agronomist Wilkansky strengthened Ben Shemen's position as a laboratory for Labor settlement, the organizer and propagandist Kaplansky created a new public image of the JNF as a staunch supporter of the budding Yishuv 'oved. Almost immediately after Kaplansky went to work for the JNF in 1913, Bodenheimer's business correspondence began to feature glowing references to occupation cooperatives and the Italian example. In letters sent to the members of the managerial boards of Zionism's settlement institutions, Bodenheimer expressed the opinion that "it is impossible to overestimate the significance of these wandering laborers' groups for colonization."[100] JNF propaganda written by Bodenheimer, Oppenheimer, Kaplansky, and Gross drove home the need for a "pioneer fund" to support occupation cooperatives. With land and inventory provided by the JNF, the occupation groups would ameliorate long-neglected lands. Upon completing their task, the literature explains, the groups would be replaced by settlement cooperatives made up of skilled farmers. But those laborers whose wanderlust and pioneering spirit had not dimmed would go on to spread "the borders of culture" further into the Palestinian "steppe."[101]

Bodenheimer made no secret of the political differences that separated him and Kaplansky. But he was pleased by Kaplansky's presence in Cologne and did not resist Kaplansky's efforts to instill pioneering values into the philosophy of the JNF. The settlement programs of Bodenheimer and Kaplansky complemented and did not conflict with each other. In the JNF's propaganda literature of 1914, the approaches of the two men were thoroughly blended into a comprehensive program of national settlement with strong Labor Zionist overtones.

In theory, at least, the JNF became the sort of pioneering institution envisioned by Ruppin in his letter of 1911 on the relations between the JNF and its subsidiary agencies. For example, Bodenheimer began a series of newspaper articles on the JNF by paraphrasing the German land reformer Adolf Damaschke on the social value of the work of the Prussian Colonization Commission. Bodenheimer notes that the Yishuv, too, needs "the positive intervention of a colonizing agent that is led by national and economic considerations. Among peoples who live under ordinary circumstances, this obligation falls to the state." Bodenheimer appears particularly attached to forestation ("a role that the state fulfills in progressive lands"), but he describes the JNF's forests as only one part of a settlement network. Occupation cooperatives begin the colonization process by reclaiming "great stretches of unsettled land." New immigrants work in a national forest and live in a JNF workers' settlement before joining a JNF cooperative or colony. Taken together, all these activities form "the preconditions of national settlement."[102]

There remained a notable discrepancy between the JNF's grandiose manifestos and its actual practices on the eve of World War I. Despite Bodenheimer's praise for occupation cooperatives, he did not approve of Degania and grumbled over the establishment of a "workers' group" at the JNF's holding of Ḥittin late in 1913.[103] Also, he would not accept Kaplansky's demand that the JNF supply workers in occupation cooperatives with their inventory as well as land. Dealing with members of Ha-Shomer who wished to settle on JNF property, Bodenheimer was willing to lend them money for land and dwellings but refused to supply them with inventory or farm buildings, which together amounted to two-thirds of the set-up cost of a farm.[104]

Kaplansky's impact on JNF operations before the outbreak of World War I was limited. But by giving Kaplansky access to the JNF's collection and propaganda machinery, Bodenheimer paved the way for the extension of the JNF's ties to the Yishuv's socialist pioneers during and after World War I. Bodenheimer brought another, even greater, benefit to the cause of Labor settlement in 1914 when he hired the agronomist Akiva Ettinger (1872-1945) as manager of all JNF properties in Palestine.

Born into a well-to-do Belorussian family, Ettinger came under populist influences as a youth and lived for a year on a Tolstoyan cooperative in Switzerland. After completing university studies in agronomy in Russia, he worked on Jewish-owned farms throughout the Romanov and Habsburg empires.[105] In 1902, he toured Palestine under the sponsorship of the Odessa Committee of the Ḥovevei Ẓion. In his report to the committee, Ettinger drew up a comprehensive colonization plan that called for experiment stations, state-of-the-art farm machinery, and a network of Schultz-Delitzsch cooperative lending societies.[106] At this time, writes Ettinger in his autobiography, he was "greatly influenced by [the Russian anarchist Petr] Kropotkin's ideas on the need to strengthen the interrelationship between town and country, on the need to bring city-dwellers to rural suburbs." Thus motivated, Ettinger went to work on the JCA's southern Russian colonies.[107]

Ever since the onset of their Zionist activity, Warburg and Ruppin had known Ettinger and thought highly of his work.[108] Ettinger's journey into the WZO began in 1911, when Warburg and Ruppin, reacting to the expansion of the JNF's activities, recommended that the fund hire a technical administrator for its properties.[109] Warburg proposed hiring Ettinger; Bodenheimer leaped at this suggestion, largely because he saw in this move a perfect opportunity to circumvent his colleagues' authority. Bodenheimer demanded that Ettinger take orders directly from Cologne, not from Ruppin in Jaffa, and be prohibited from working on agricultural matters not related to the JNF.[110] In September 1913, Ettinger was offered the managerial post, and by the summer of 1914, he was in Palestine, inspecting the JNF's holdings and making plans for their more rational use.[111]

The outbreak of war in August 1914 found Ettinger away from Palestine and unable to return. In 1915, he moved to The Hague, where he joined Kaplansky at the JNF's wartime headquarters. These two men subsequently produced a body of work that apotheosized twenty years of Zionist settlement planning and ensured that the WZO's commitment to the pioneer community would persist into the postwar era.

World War I brought chaos to the Yishuv and threatened to paralyze the international Zionist movement. Thousands of Palestine's Jews died of hunger or disease; tens of thousands were expelled from or fled the country. The evacuation of non-Jews from Jaffa, coupled with a clampdown on Zionist activity by the harsh military government, crippled the activity of the Palestine Office. Working first from Jerusalem and then from Constantinople, to which he was exiled in 1916, Ruppin devoted himself to the transfer of financial aid from the Diaspora to the Yishuv. Because the war stifled communication between Zionists in the belligerent European nations, the United States became the de facto center for the WZO's activities.[112]

Despite this fracturing of the prewar order, the established Zionist settlement institutions continued to be a crucial source of support for the Yishuv. The JNF, working out of neutral Holland, funneled 1.5 million francs into its farms; drainage, construction, and terracing projects on its lands provided employment to hard-pressed agricultural workers.[113] Public funding, from the JNF and other sources, supported occupation cooperatives that sprang up in the abandoned Jewish colonies. One influential supporter of emergency collective settlement was Wilkansky, who now enjoyed the title of supervisor of agricultural activity for the Palestine Office. Wilkansky assisted the formation of kvuẓot at Ben Shemen; in the upper Galilee, he collaborated with the JCA's Kalvarisky, who encouraged members of Ha-Shomer to form collectives on unoccupied JCA lands. Eager to wean Jewish laborers away from public-works projects, Wilkansky was receptive to the workers' interest in small vegetable-growers' collectives, which received WZO funding.[114]

Of equal importance to the JNF's practical wartime work was the brainstorming that went on in The Hague between Zionism's newest crop of settlement

activists. Nehemia de Lieme, director of The Hague's JNF office, had a keen interest in settlement theory and in 1915 founded the German-language journal *Erez Israel,* which he published until 1920. In many ways, de Lieme resembled Ruppin: a gifted autodidact, as a young man he had contacts with Dutch Social Democracy, steeped himself in socialist literature, and then adopted a progressive and liberal approach to the social question. There were important differences between the two, however. De Lieme lacked any higher education, while Ruppin had mastered the intricacies of political economy. More important, whereas Ruppin chose not to solve the social question in his native land but channeled his reformist yearnings into Zionism, the latter founded a workers' insurance cooperative and similar enterprises in Holland and subsequently displayed only mild interest in the reformist aspects of the Zionist idea. De Lieme was far more financially cautious than Ruppin and was mystified by the latter's attachment to the young pioneers. Finally, de Lieme was thoroughly rationalist in his world-view and lacked Ruppin's appreciation for the Dionysian qualities in man.[115]

De Lieme contributed little to the pages of *Erez Israel;* his only programmatic article advocated a nonsocialist and relatively nonstatist approach to colonization. De Lieme emphasized that the JNF should carry out only limited proto-governmental functions. National landownership, he claimed, was desirable as a vehicle not of social reform but of state building, a means of discouraging the formation of latifundia and the penetration of Arab labor in the marketplace.[116] A similar cautious progressivism characterized the writings of the Zionist activist Julius Simon.[117] Although such views received a hearing in *Erez Israel,* in general the journal's character was stamped by the contributions of Gross, Kaplansky, Wilkansky, and Ettinger, who were more radical in their approach.

As in his prewar writings, Kaplansky continued to extol the virtues of Italian cooperatives, but he now emphasized the need for the Palestinian occupation groups to advance from their crude level of collective organization to that of what in Italy was known as an *affitanza collettiva,* or leaseholders' cooperative. In such a system, land was leased to a commune via a latter-day version of *emphyteusis,* the ancient Roman practice of hereditary lease. Kaplansky did not, however, envision a European village of smallholding leaseholders. Heavily armed with German political-economic scholarship, he argued for the superiority of large- over smallholdings, claiming that the former were far more amenable to mechanization and economies of scale than the latter.[118] Underneath Kaplansky's pious invocations of Italian models and German scholarship lay a preset agenda. Kaplansky favored collective over individual settlement, and he found sources to support his position. Similarly, as we saw in the last chapter, since 1909 the German-educated Wilkansky had invoked German experts supportive of intensively farmed smallholdings to lend authority to his own preference for individual settlement.

During the war, Wilkansky's views on this subject hardened; he wrote a stinging attack against the kvuẓa, in which he admitted that occupation collectives were useful under emergency conditions but not as a form of permanent settlement. Like Kaplansky, Wilkansky looked to Italian cooperatives for inspi-

ration, but he saw in them a confirmation of his predetermined views that smallholders' cooperatives encourage the development of personal freedom, whereas wageworkers' collectives perpetuate a slave mentality.[119] There developed a noticeable tension between the two men, for Kaplansky felt that the future of collective settlement was being threatened by Wilkansky's sniping.[120]

It is worth emphasizing that Wilkansky's growing disenchantment with the kvuẓa in no way signaled a diminution of the technician's utopian fervor. To be sure, Wilkansky idolized the smallholding, but he conceived of it within the framework of a cooperative pioneer village, an altruistic organism exuding comradeship. One testimony to the strength of Wilkansky's commitment to Labor settlement was his furious opposition to the postwar colonization program of Selig Soskin. In 1906, this close colleague of Warburg had left the WZO and gone to work as an agricultural advisor in Germany's African colonies. Perhaps because Germany's defeat in World War I deprived it of colonies and Soskin of a job, the agronomist found himself back in Zionist circles in 1919.[121] Soskin publicized a new master colonization program based on capitalist horticulture; the rural Yishuv was to blanket itself in small villages structured around intensive market gardening for urban consumption and export. At the Twelfth Zionist Congress in 1921, Wilkansky excoriated Soskin's plan, ostensibly for its unworkability, although his venomous tone suggests that he was irked by the prodigal Soskin's claim to greater wisdom and authority in settlement matters than the battle-scarred Labor Zionist technician.[122]

In the end, the decisive voice among the Labor Zionist technicians was neither Kaplansky nor Wilkansky but Ettinger. Ettinger's colonization program, developed in a stream of wartime reports and publications, both preserved the reformist, Central European character of Zionist settlement theory to date and suggested a radical departure into uncharted intellectual territory. Echoing Herzl's *Altneuland,* Ettinger presented the goal of Zionist colonization as the establishment of a "Cooperative Commonwealth" that embodies economic as well as political democracy.[123] The core of the new commonwealth is the agricultural producers' cooperative that preserves the "holiness of economic variety as opposed to the va-banque of monoculture."[124] Seeking a harmonious balance between urban and rural development, Ettinger developed a system of town planning heavily influenced by the Garden City movement in Germany and England and by both nations' experiments with hereditary lease. Garden cities, he believed, had proved that "health, physically and morally, socially and individually, is a question not of hospitals, but of organization, foresight and careful planning, and above all, of co-operation in every practical direction."[125] As to the creation of a Jewish farmer class, Ettinger looked not only to Prussia but also to England and Scandinavia for models of publicly funded, socially beneficial internal colonization.[126]

This array of references should not conceal the radically innovative quality of Ettinger's creation. He is uncompromising in the demands that he places on the Zionist public sector and the responsibilities he places in the hands of the pioneer community. The JNF is to finance not only public works but also the

envisioned network of agricultural cooperatives. In a supreme effort of social engineering, the WZO must develop an immigration policy that introduces into Palestine a pool of human material representing a healthy mixture of brains and brawn. Ettinger's envisioned agricultural producers' cooperative will be not only a farm but an educational institution as well. Model farms, believed Ettinger, spoil trainees because they operate under ideal conditions. But whereas someone hostile to the pioneer community such as Levontin had favored unstructured on-the-job training in the Jewish colonies, Ettinger assumed that the cooperatives would make room for a number of apprentices, whose instruction would be placed in the hands of the pioneer community. Moreover, Ettinger's cooperative vision accorded an important place to a union of all the Yishuv's workers' organizations—a prototype of the General Labor Federation (*Histadrut*), founded in 1920.[127]

Ettinger was open to a variety of forms of colonization. In 1916, he proposed that individual holdings be set up at Merḥavia alongside the cooperative *Zentralbetrieb*. Yet Ettinger did not share Wilkansky's blanket objections to the cooperatively structured largeholding.[128] After the war he became an enthusiastic supporter of the kibbuẓ, a collective distinguished from the kvuẓa by larger size, a division of labor, and the introduction of industry into the farm economy.[129] Significantly, Ettinger did not share Wilkansky's belief in the need for the presence of an expert manager within a pioneer settlement. Such a presence, argued Ettinger, constrains the settlers' initiative and threatens their advance toward the hallowed goal of self-rule. Instead, the management of the farm should be placed from the start in the hands of a workers' committee, which would make use of extension services and employ outside experts as needed.[130] The two agronomists also formed conflicting timetables for future Zionist settlement. Ettinger advocated the immediate implementation of a large-scale colonization program featuring a variety of approaches, including intensive farming and the settlement of dearly bought land in the Jezreel Valley. Wilkansky, on the other hand, wished to carry out lengthy experimentation prior to mass colonization, and he preferred in the meantime to practice crude, extensive agriculture on inexpensive, unirrigated land in southern Palestine.[131]

Wilkansky's emphasis on scientific direction in his master plan and his comments on collective settlement betray a lingering elitism not displayed by Ettinger. Significantly, during the immediate postwar years Ettinger was the WZO's chief settlement engineer, whereas Wilkansky's contributions lay more in the field of experimentation and the provision of technical advice.[132] For already by the end of World War I, settlement engineering had become a highly politicized affair. Gone were the days when claims to political neutrality and technical expertise were mutually reinforcing. Not only was there little distinction within the WZO's settlement institutions between Labor and official Zionism, but within the Labor movement itself the new generation of experts had begun to fracture along ideologically determined lines. According to the Zionist movement's triumphant technical ethos, rural collectivism, egalitarian, autonomous labor, and Labor Zionist hegemony were predetermined, essential elements of Zionist col-

onization. Foreign models served only to aid the realization of these predetermined ends. The subordination of scientific inquiry to Labor Zionist political ideology enabled Zionist settlement policy to divorce itself from the tutelage of Central European influences and become increasingly eclectic and original. Out of a dizzying array of models drawn from the Western world there emerged a coherent paradigm of Zionist settlement, a paradigm with a character all its own: the pioneering collective, which fulfilled political and educational as well as productive functions. Zionist technocracy had come of age.

CONCLUSION

Like all revolutions, that of the Labor Zionists devoured its parents. This fact, coupled with a tendency to associate the ideological underpinnings of the Yishuv with the Eastern European provenance of its leaders, has obscured the German origins of Zionist technocracy. Yet the early Zionist movement operated within the sphere of the German *Kulturbereich*, which left an indelible mark on Zionism's first settlement engineers, be they native to the German lands or Eastern European Jews with a German higher education. Fin de siècle Central European agrarian romanticism and statism were embedded in the engineers' worldviews; Central European social policy provided them with intellectual sustenance and models for action.

The connection between Central European statism and Zionist settlement policy developed over a period of some two decades, from the appearance of Theodor Herzl's *The Jewish State* in 1896 until World War I. Herzl conceived of the WZO as a tutelary, state-building institution. His melding of Zionism and technocracy took place primarily on the theoretical level, as he objected to Jewish immigration prior to international recognition of the Jewish claim to Palestine. Nonetheless, Herzl played a role in the creation of the WZO's national settlement institutions, and he took the portentous step of tying the WZO to the cause of cooperative settlement. After Herzl's death in 1904, the colonial botanist Otto Warburg, elevated to power by opponents of Herzl's political Zionist ideology, mobilized the WZO's paltry resources in the cause of scientific experimentation and exploration. Warburg's enthusiasm for practical work was, however, matched only by his elitism and his indifference to social issues that were of deep concern to the Zionist movement as a whole. In 1907, Arthur Ruppin precipitated a synthesis between Herzl's utopian technophilia and Warburg's developmental ethos. The first result of this synthesis was the creation of the Palestine Office and Palestine Land Development Company, the principal vehicles of Zionist national settlement up to World War I. The second result was the alliance, forged on the shore of the Sea of Galilee, between the WZO and the Yishuv's pioneer community. The kvuẓa Degania was the cornerstone of what would become the imposing edifice of Labor settlement, an edifice that rested on a foundation of public funds.

Ruppin and the institutions under his control did not determine Zionist settlement policy single-handedly. The Jewish National Fund was the ultimate

source of authorization and funding for national settlement ventures. Although often fractious, the director of the JNF, Max Bodenheimer, was amenable to at least some of Ruppin's goals. More important, functionaries with Labor Zionist affiliations, such as Shlomo Kaplansky, Nathan Gross, and eventually Akiva Ettinger, helped mold the JNF into an institution receptive to the activities and aspirations of the workers' groups in Palestine. Alongside the Palestine Office in Jaffa, the JNF's headquarters in Germany served as a mediating force between the international Zionist movement and the embryonic Labor Zionist commonwealth, cultivating the former's slowly growing financial commitment to the latter. As this commitment strengthened, the Zionist labor movement began its epic struggle to transform the Yishuv from a passive object of aid into an active subject, still heavily dependent on financial assistance from abroad, but confident that such assistance would be unconditional and perpetual.

Two forms of continuity, one a transfer of ideas across space, the other a preservation of ideas across time, linked the settlement engineers with the European and Jewish environment in which they operated. The creation of a Jewish national economy in Palestine was conceived as a great reformist and developmental enterprise of the sort that dominated the landscape of the Western world during the last years of the epoch before World War I. Ruppin and the WZO's other settlement activists therefore considered themselves to be social engineers, attempting to solve a technical problem which was more familiar than unique. True, Jewish agricultural colonization in Palestine presented challenges without precedent in the history of immigration and settlement. Yet the engineers employed terminology and concepts drawn from contemporary European social and colonial policy. Prussian Poland, the German Rhineland, and the Pontine Marshes were but a few of the sites to which the WZO's settlement activists looked in their search for models to emulate. Sometimes these models were invoked merely to shore up sagging confidence, to demonstrate that projects as bold as the Zionist undertaking could indeed succeed. At other times, however, the models were taken seriously as archetypes, providing instructive examples which would in due course be adapted to Palestinian conditions.

Just as Zionism's settlement experts aspired to a contemporary European ideal of social engineering, so did they long to accomplish the goal, first posited by gentile society in the eighteenth century and then appropriated by the Haskala, of altering the Jews' occupational structure along the lines of the nations of the world. According to the ideology of the Haskala, the transfer of Jews from commerce to manufacture and agriculture was a means of moral regeneration and of Jewish integration into their host societies. Zionism accentuated the Haskala's idealization of physical labor and replaced the goal of integration with that of nation building. The intellectual and institutional link between the Haskala and Zionist versions of productivization ideology was the French Jewish philanthropic enterprise in late nineteenth-century Palestine. Combining a productivization ethos with a sentimental Palestinophilia, the Alliance Israélite Universelle, Baron Edmond de Rothschild, and the Jewish Colonization Association sought to bring about an agricultural renaissance of the Yishuv and

created the modern rural Yishuv from scratch. Physically as well as intellectually, therefore, the Zionist engineers worked within previously established frameworks.

The key difference between the Zionist engineers and their non-Zionist counterparts was that the former were free to conceive of their work as a statist enterprise with the clear-cut goal of attaining socioeconomic autonomy for Palestinian Jewry. Colonization was a political process, carried out according to publicly regulated, democratic procedures and subordinating short-term benefits to the long-term needs of the national economy. The philanthropies, however, despite their financial superiority to the Zionists, were trapped by the ideology of individual regeneration that had propelled them into Palestine in the first place. Since deficits testified to profligacy, promising undertakings such as the Sejera training farm were not allowed to mature. And since the pedagogic mentality tolerated no breach in the hierarchical relationship between administrator, instructor, and student, the sort of fruitful interaction that developed between the WZO's European headquarters, its Palestinian staff, and the pioneer community found no echo in the philanthropies' activities.

At first glance, there might appear to be a chasm separating the small-scale settlement experiments of the decades before World War I and the process of Jewish state building that began in earnest after the Balfour Declaration of 1917 and the ensuing period of British Mandatory rule in Palestine (1920-1948). But a high degree of continuity existed between the earlier and later periods; the actions described in this book laid the foundations for the state of Israel. As soon as the war ended, the WZO set about fortifying its prewar policy of promoting Labor settlement within a general framework of publicly funded activity on behalf of the rural Yishuv. The British administration did undertake important public works in Palestine, such as afforestation and road building, but the Yishuv was left largely alone to provide for its physical and social development. Zionist public capital filled the breach. Although the WZO (and after 1929 the Jewish Agency) laid out considerable sums for education and social services, between 1921 and 1939 one-third of all Zionist public expenditure was allocated to rural colonization, more than for any other category.[1] The JNF, previously the factotum in the field of national settlement, surrendered its colonizing functions to the WZO's Foundation Fund, established in 1921. The JNF subsequently devoted itself to land purchase, which it pursued on a far greater scale than it had before the war.

The lion's share of the rural-colonization budget, in turn, went to Labor settlement, whose greatest champions throughout the 1920s were members of the WZO's prewar technical corps. During the period of the Third 'Aliya (1919-1923), when tens of thousands of youthful pioneers streamed into Palestine from Eastern Europe, Ettinger stood at the helm of the WZO's Agricultural Settlement Department. Supported by Ruppin, who served in the Zionist Executive, Ettinger encouraged the founding of moshavim and kvuẓot, and he waxed enthusiastic about the group of newly arrived pioneers known as the Labor Battalion *(gedud ha'avoda),* some of whose members founded 'Ein Ḥarod, destined to become the Yishuv's first kibbuẓ.[2] Following in Ettinger's footsteps, Kaplansky directed the

Settlement Department from 1924 to 1927, while Ettinger headed the JNF Lands Authority until 1932.[3]

Just as certain elements of institutional and ideological continuity from before 1914 worked to the benefit of Labor settlement, other elements worked against it. Although guided by public capital, the Yishuv's interwar development occurred mostly through transfers of private capital, which concentrated in the cities, industry, and capitalist plantations. The WZO, although financially stronger than before World War I, was plagued by a chronic shortage of funds. In addition to being financially weak, the Zionist public sector was the target of endless controversy, as an ongoing opposition to the WZO's Labor-oriented settlement policy launched pitched battles over the future of the Jewish National Home. Trenchant critiques of the WZO came from Diaspora Zionists not indifferent to social reform but more deeply concerned with efficiency in and the attraction of private capital to agricultural colonization. The Zionist camp associated with Louis Brandeis, the American Supreme Court justice turned Zionist luminary, acknowledged the need for certain public expenditures *à fonds perdus* and the virtues of extensive land purchase by national institutions, but Brandeis objected to the politicization of the colonization process and indeed of the WZO as a whole.[4] Brandeis's views were shared, inter alia, by de Lieme and Simon, members of the Zionist Executive and chairs of a Reorganization Commission which in 1920 reviewed the WZO's postwar activities and criticized what it believed to be wasteful practices associated with land use and the fitting out of new settlements.[5]

On one level, Brandeis and the Reorganization Commission had much in common with non-Labor settlement engineers such as Ruppin, who ever since 1907 had argued for the greatest possible application of businesslike methods within the settlement mechanism as a means of maximizing national efficiency. But Ruppin, unlike de Lieme and Simon, was not willing to sacrifice the socialist pioneers on the altar of efficiency. On the contrary, he cleaved to them; not only did he pour money into their settlements, he also appropriated leftover wartime relief funds for the establishment of a workers' bank *(Bank ha-Po'alim),* which opened for business in 1921.[6] Ruppin—and *a fortiori* the Labor Zionist technocrats—therefore found themselves in the camp of Chaim Weizmann in his victorious battle with Brandeis for control of the WZO. Weizmann was no utopian, and he described the kvuẓa unflatteringly as a "Tolstoy colony" filled with undisciplined, unruly, and flaming-eyed youth.[7] But Weizmann, like the mainstream of the Zionist movement, appreciated the pioneers' stamina, idealism, and organizational power. Accordingly, national settlement and its Labor component survived intact, and the early to mid-twenties was a period of what the historian Zev Ẓaḥor has called "mutual sustenance" between official and Labor Zionism (albeit often mixed with "mutual scorn and a deep lack of trust").[8]

More serious than the rumblings of the immediate postwar period was the threat to the Yishuv's labor movement that arose during the years 1924-27, when a Fourth 'Aliya consisting largely of petit-bourgeois Eastern European Jews gave the Yishuv a more strongly capitalist stamp, and opponents of Zionist financial

policy gained power in the WZO. In 1927, while the Yishuv wallowed in economic depression, Labor representatives were expelled from the Zionist Executive, and a new regime devoted to cost cutting and adherence to businesslike colonization methods assumed command.[9] But this time, too, the threat was short-lived, although it was disarmed by different means. Whereas in 1918-21 conflict within the WZO's managerial elite resulted in a victory for forces sympathetic to Labor, at the end of the decade the labor movement conquered official Zionism from the bottom up, winning enough electoral support by 1933 to become the dominant faction in the WZO. Labor's conquest of the WZO and its hegemonic position in the Yishuv assured the future of Labor settlement, first in the Yishuv during the tumultuous thirties and forties and then in the newborn state of Israel.

Throughout the Mandate period, Labor settlement served a variety of strategic and political as well as socioeconomic functions. Collectives demarcated and defended the borders of the Yishuv and served as seedbeds for the state of Israel's military leadership. By 1948, the kibbuẓ had become a national hallmark and a powerful educational tool, for it epitomized national mobilization on behalf of the Zionist idea. Mature Zionist technocracy, therefore, like its counterparts throughout the Western world, was characterized not by an ideologically neutral administration by apolitical technicians but rather by a symbiotic relationship between experts and political leaders, wherein the former served as vehicles for the realization of the latter's aspirations. Zionist technicians, in turn, enjoyed an august status in the Yishuv, for they were perceived to be the bearers of the knowledge that would build the Labor Zionist Commonwealth. This cult of the engineer has been a common phenomenon in developing lands and their national movements in our century;[10] but in the Zionist case, the technician was not only a weapon in the struggle for national independence but also a symbol of national existential change. Scientific discourse—spare, practical, and universal—was music to the ears of Zionist ideologues hostile to rabbinic declamation and the shrill cry of the hawker. The technician, alongside the farmer and the warrior, became a Zionist ideal type, the embodiment of the relentlessly pragmatic spirit that Zionists toiled to instill into what would become the Jewish state.

NOTES

Introduction

1. The term *settlement engineers* plays off the sociologist Thorstein Veblen's neologism *production engineers*, which Veblen used to describe the "industrial experts" and "skilled technologists" who he believed were best qualified to administer American industry. *The Engineers and the Price System,* New York, 1940, 52.

2. Cf. Daniel Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940,* New York, 1988.

3. On Zionist-Palestinian relations during the period covered by this book, see Paul A. Alsberg, "Ha-she'ela ha-'aravit bi-mediniyut ha-hanhala ha-ẓionit lifnei milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona," *Shivat Ẓion* IV (1956), 161–209; Ya'akov Ro'i, "Zionist Attitudes to the Arabs, 1908–1914," *Middle Eastern Studies* IV, No. 3 (1968), 198–242; Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929,* London, 1974, 1–69; Neville Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976; Ya'akov Ro'i, "Yaḥasei yehudim-'aravim be-moshavot ha-'aliya ha-rishona," *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona,* Mordechai Eliav, ed., Jerusalem, 1981, I, 245–68; Israel Kolatt, "The Zionist Movement and the Arabs," *Zionism and the Arabs,* Shmuel Almog, ed., Jerusalem, 1983, 1–12; Yosef Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882–1948: A Study of Ideology,*, Oxford, 1987, 11–77; Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism,* New York, 1988.

4. On the evolution of Ruppin's attitudes, see Abraham Bertisch, "A Study of the Political-Economic Philosophy of Arthur Ruppin and His Role in the Economic Development of the Zionist Settlement in Palestine from 1907 to 1943," Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1980, 107–69; and Margalit Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut: ha-Misrad ha-Ereẓ Yisre'eli, 1908–1914,* Jerusalem, 1988, 54–61, 116–20.

5. On Rothschild's spending, see A. Moritz Simon, *Soziales zur Judenfrage,* Frankfurt a.M., 1903, 10. A figure of 40 million francs (1.6 million pounds) is often given for Rothschild's spending between 1883 and 1899; Alex Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit mi-tekufat Herzl ve-'ad yameinu,* 4th ed., Ramat Gan, 1970, 10 n.1. On the WZO, see Arthur Ruppin's estimates for the period 1908–1914, *Three Decades of Palestine: Speeches and Papers on the Upbuilding of the Jewish National Home,* Westport, Conn., 1975 (reprint of 1936 original), 82–83; and Abraham Granovsky's figures for the period 1914–1918, *Land Problems in Palestine,* Jerusalem, 1926, 67–71.

6. Depending on how and what one counts, JNF purchases amounted to anywhere from 16,500 to 24,000 dunams. Cf. Jewish National Fund, *25 Jahre Keren Kayemeth Le-Yisrael (5662–5687),* Jerusalem, 1927, 39; Margalit Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 72; and Ẓvi Shilony, "Ha-Keren ha-Kayemet le-Yisra'el ke-gorem be-iẓuv ha-nof ha-yishuvi shel Ereẓ Yisra'el me-az hakamata ve-'ad li-froẓ milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona, 1897–1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1987, II, 3. For comparative landholding statistics, see Yosef Katz, "Ha-pe'ilut ha-hityashvutit be-Ereẓ Yisra'el shel ha-ḥevrot ve-ha-agudot ha-ẓioniyot ha-pratiyot bein ha-shanim 1900 ve-1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1983, I, 455–57. (Much of the material from Katz's dissertation has been published in two separate works: *Ge'ula titnu la-areẓ: ḥevrat "Ge'ula" li-rkhishat karka'ot, 1902–1914,* Jerusalem, 1988; and *Ha-yozma ha-pratit be-vinyan Ereẓ Yisra'el bi-tekufat ha-'aliya ha-sheniya,* Ramat Gan, 1989. The latter volume appeared after I completed this book.)

7. Cf. *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-sheniya,* Braḥa Ḥabas, ed., Tel Aviv, 1947; Moshe Braslavsky, *Tenua't ha-po'alim ha-ereẓ yisre'elit,* I, Tel Aviv, 1955; Ẓvi Even-Shoshan, *Toldot tenua't ha-*

po'alim be-Erez Yisra'el, I, Tel Aviv, 1963; Yehuda Slutsky, *Mavo le-toldot tenua't ha-'avoda ha-yisre'elit,* Tel Aviv, 1973.

8. The materials most germane to the subject of this book are Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* and Shilo's numerous articles cited in the bibliography. See also the cited works of Ran Aaronsohn, Yossi Ben-Artsi, Dan Giladi, Nachum Gross (whose work stands out for both its scope and depth), Leah Doukhan-Landau, Shaul Katz, Yosef Katz, Moshe Rinott, and Zvi Shilony.

9. As I was completing this book, an English-language work appeared which attempts fo fill this lacuna: Gershon Shafir's *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914,* Cambridge, 1989. Although his book is primarily a sociological analysis of the effect of the presence of the Arab labor market on the fledgling Zionist labor movement, Shafir does attribute great importance to foreign, especially German, models as a source of inspiration to Zionism's settlement planners.

10. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting,* New York, 1973, 348–55; Alvin Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology,* New York, 1976, 250–73; Robert B. Carlisle, *The Proffered Crown: Saint-Simonianism and the Doctrine of Hope,* Baltimore, 1987.

11. Compare William Akin, *Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900–1941,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977, with Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich,* New York, 1984.

12. These themes are sensitively treated in Shmuel Almog, *Zionism and History: The Rise of a New Jewish Consciousness,* New York and Jerusalem, 1987.

13. See the important work by Shaul Katz, "Aspektim soziologiyim shel zemihat ha-yeda' (ve-tahalufato) be-hakla'ut be-Yisra'el: hofa'atan shel ma'arekhot huz-mada'iyot le-hafakat yeda' hakla'i, 1880–1940," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986, chapters 9 through 12.

14. Ibid., chapter 12.

15. These issues are clarified in the works of Bell and Gouldner, as well as Jean Meynaud, *Technocracy,* London, 1968. For a case study, see Herf, *Reactionary Modernism.*

I. Palestinophilia and Pedagogy

1. Nachum Gross, "Temurot kalkaliyot be-Erez Yisra'el be-sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit," *Cathedra,* No. 2 (1976), 111–25; idem, "Sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit, 1902–1918," *Banka'i le-uma be-hithadshuta: toldot Bank Le'umi le-Yisra'el,* Ramat Gan, 1977, 27, 44; Israel Bartal, "'Old Yishuv' and 'New Yishuv': Image and Reality," *The Jerusalem Cathedra* I (1981), 215–31; Yehoshua Kaniel, "The Terms 'Old Yishuv' and 'New Yishuv': Problems of Definition," *The Jerusalem Cathedra* I (1981), 232–45; Yehoshua Ben-Arieh and Israel Bartal, eds., *Ha-historia shel Erez Yisra'el: shilhei ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit,* Jerusalem, 1983, VIII, 194–257.

2. Israel Bartal, "'Tokhniyot ha-hityashvut' miymei masa'o ha-sheni shel Montefiori le-Erez Yisra'el (1839)," *Shalem* II (1976), 231–96; idem, "'Old Yishuv' and 'New Yishuv'"; Shmuel Ettinger and Israel Bartal, "Shorshei ha-yishuv he-hadash be-Erez Yisra'el," *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona,* Mordechai Eliav, ed., Jerusalem, 1981, I, 1–24; Derek J. Penslar, "Subject-Object: The Relationship between European and Diaspora Jewry in the Nineteenth Century," *Eretz Israel, Israel, and the Jewish Diaspora: Mutual Relations,* Menachem Mor, ed., University Press of America, forthcoming.

3. I want to thank my colleague Aron Rodrigue for discussing this concept with me and for encouraging me to explore its concrete manifestations.

4. Cf. Ehud Luz, *Parallels Meet: Religion and Nationalism in the Early Zionist Movement, 1882–1904,* Philadelphia, 1988, 78.

5. On the call for Jewish occupational restructuring and Jewish responses thereto, see Bernard Dov Weinryb, *Der Kampf um die Berufsumschichtung, ein Ausschnitt aus der Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland,* Berlin, 1936; idem, *Jewish Vocational Education: History and Appraisal of Training in Europe,* New York, 1948; Adolf Kober, "Emancipation's Impact

on the Educational and Vocational Training of German Jewry," *Jewish Social Studies* 16 (1954), 3–32, 151–76; Tamar Bermann, *Produktivierungsmythen und Antisemitismus: eine soziologische Studie,* Vienna, 1973; and Jacob Katz, *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770–1870,* New York, 1978. For specific examples of vocational societies see Phyllis Cohen Albert, *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the 19th Century,* Hanover, N.H., 1977, 136–43; David Sorkin, *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840,* New York, 1987, 117–19; Lee Shai Weissbach, "The Jewish Elite and the Children of the Poor: Jewish Apprenticeship Programs in Nineteenth-century France," *Association for Jewish Studies Review* XII, No. 1 (1987), 123–42; and Jay R. Berkovitz, *The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-century France*, Detroit, 1989, 104–10.

6. This point is elegantly argued in Weissbach, "The Jewish Elite and the Children of the Poor."

7. Michael Graetz, *Les juifs en France au XIXe siècle: de la Révolution francaise à l'Alliance Israélite Universelle,* Paris, 1989, 411.

8. Cf. Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925,*, Bloomington, Ind., 1990.

9. On the origins of the *ferme école*, see Narcisse Leven, *Cinquante ans d'histoire: l'Alliance Israélite Universelle, 1860–1910*, Paris, 1911–1920, II, 296–300; Josef Shapira, *Me'a shana Mikve Yisra'el: 5630–5730, 1870–1970,* Tel Aviv, 1970, 59–67; Georges Weill, "Charles Netter ou les oranges de Jaffa," *Les Nouveaux Cahiers* XXI (1970), 16–17. On the question of education versus colonization, compare the views of Netter, expressed in his report of 11 January 1869, *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle,* 1e semestre 1869, 55–65, with those of Shimon Behrman, a Galician Jew who worked briefly with Netter in Palestine in the establishment of Mikve Yisra'el. Shapira, *Me'a shana*, 84–85.

10. *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance*, 1e semestre 1868, 2–3; 1e semestre 1869, 26–27, 55–65; Netter to the Alliance, 15 November 1867; Adolphe Crémieux to Netter, 18 January 1868, reproduced in Weill, "Les oranges de Jaffa," 32–33.

11. Shapira, *Me'a shana,* 72–75; Weill, "Les oranges de Jaffa," 20–21.

12. *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 2e semestre 1878, 17. See also 2e semestre 1872, 75, 78–79; 2e semestre 1875, 29; and 1893, 93.

13. Leven, *Cinquante ans d'histoire,* II, 293, 310. Of twenty-one students who left Mikve Yisra'el in 1884, only five stayed in Palestine. *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 2e semestre 1885, 38.

14. On the original agricultural program, see Shapira, *Me'a shana,* 85–87. On its evolution, compare the *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 2e semestre 1870/1e semestre 1871, 20–27; and 1e semestre 1874, 95.

15. *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 1e semestre 1873, 153.

16. Contract between Netter and Beaudrier, 16 March 1874, CZA J41/430; Schamash to Alliance, 21 May 1874, CZA J41/84; Alliance to Schamash, 1 July 1874, CZA J41/8; *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 2e semestre 1874, 42–44; 1e semestre 1876, 29; 2e semestre 1876, 44.

17. *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 2e semestre 1874, 95. This source confirms the assertions about the introduction of the eucalyptus to Palestine found in Aharon 'Ever ha-Dani, *Ḥadera (5651–5711, 1891–1951): shishim shenot koroteiha,* Tel Aviv, 1951, 96.

18. Cf. "Eucalyptus," Pierre Larousse, ed., *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle,* Paris, 1865–1890, VII, 1097; and 'Ever ha-Dani, *Ḥadera*,, 96.

19. Ran Aaronsohn, "Tokhnit Netter-Rothschild: teḥilat pe'ulato ha-yishuvit shel ha-Baron be-Ereẓ Yisra'el," *Cathedra,* No. 44 (1987), 55–79.

20. The development of productivization ideology among Eastern European Jewry is throughly studied in Mordechai Levin, *Arkhei ḥevra ve-kalkala ba-ideologiya shel tekufat ha-Haskala,* Jerusalem, 1975.

21. Ẓvi Livneh, *Ḥakla'im yehudiyim be-Russiya,* Tel Aviv, 1972; Bernard Dov Weinryb, *Neueste Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden in Russland und Polen von der 1. polnischen Teilung bis*

zum Tode Alexander II, Hildesheim, 1972, 161–218; Levin, *Arkhei ḥevra ve-kalkala,* 187–256; Michael Stanislawski, *Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia, 1825–1855,* Philadelphia, 1983, 167–68.

22. Israel Bartal, "Petaḥ Tikvah—bein shorashim ra'yonim le-nesibot ha-zeman," *Cathedra,* No. 9 (1978), 54–69; Shaul Katz, "'Ha-telem ha-rishon': ideologiya, hityashvut, ve-ḥakla'ut be-Petaḥ Tikva be-asor ha-shanim ha-rishon le-kiyuma," *Cathedra,* No. 23 (1982), 57–124, especially 80, 121–22; Luz, *Parallels Meet,* chapter 2. I want to thank Dr. Katz for his conversations with me on these and related issues.

23. Bartal, "Petaḥ Tikva," 58–60, 65; Katz, "'Ha-telem ha-rishon,'" 68, 78, 82, 86–88.

24. Gross, "Sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit," 29. On the relations between these newcomers and the existing Yishuv, see Yehoshua Kaniel, *Hemshekh u-temura: ha-yishuv ha-yashan ve-ha-yishuv he-ḥadash bi-tekufat ha-'aliya ha-rishona ve-ha-sheniya,* Jerusalem, 1981.

25. Standard sources on the Ḥovevei Ẓion include Israel Klausner, *Ḥibat Ẓion be-Rumania,* Jerusalem, 1958; and idem, *Mi-Kattowitz 'ad Basel,* II v., Jerusalem, 1965. The fullest account in English is in David Vital, *The Origins of Zionism,* Oxford, 1975, 65–200. The Ḥovevei Ẓion's settlement activity is the object of numerous specialized studies, cited below.

26. Katz, "Ha-telem ha-rishon," 102–103.

27. On the Templars, see Alex Carmel, *Hityashvut ha-Germanim be-Ereẓ Yisra'el be-shilhei ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit: ba'ayoteiha ha-mediniyot ve-ha-bein-le'umiyot,* Jerusalem, 1973, 31–33. On the Jewish colonists, see the following works by Ran Aaronsohn: "Hakamatan vereshitan shel Zikhron-Ya'akov ve-Rishon le-Ẓion ke-moshavot ḥakla'iyot," M.A. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1979, 123–30; and "Tefisot ha-hityashvut shel mekayemei ha-moshavot ha-rishonot be-Ereẓ Yisra'el," *Hagira ve-hityashvut be-Yisra'el u-ve-'amim,* Avigdor Shinan, ed., Jerusalem, 1982, 225–32. See also Shmuel Aviẓur, "Terumata shel Petaḥ Tikva le-kiduma ha-ḥakla'i ve-ha-ta'asiyati shel ha-areẓ ba-shelavim ha-rishonim le-kiyuma (1878–1918)," *Cathedra,* No. 10 (1979), 129–41.

28. Yossi Ben-Artsi, "Tokhnito shel M. Meirovitch u-makoma be-toldot ha-hityashvut ha-kefarit ha-yehudit," *Ẓion* LIII, No. 3 (1988), 273–90. The colonies of Reḥovot and Ḥadera, founded by independent societies of Eastern European Jews in 1890 and 1891 respectively, both used Meirovitch's program as a model.

29. Neville Mandel, *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976, 2–8, 21–24, and passim; Alex Carmel, "Ha-yishuv ha-yehudi, ha-shilton ha-'Ottomani, ve-ha-konsoliyot ha-zarot," *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona,* I, 97–116.

30. Alex Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit mi-tekufat Herzl ve-'ad yameinu,* 4th ed., Ramat Gan, 1970, 10 n.1.

31. Carmel, *Hityashvut ha-Germanim,* 45.

32. Aaronsohn, "Zikhron-Ya'akov ve-Rishon le-Ẓion," 14–19. See also Arieh Kornfeld's letter to *Ha-Maggid,* reproduced in Shulamit Laskov, ed., *Ketavim le-toldot Ḥibat Ẓion ve-yishuv Ereẓ Yisra'el,* Tel Aviv, 1984, II, No. 223, 109–13. (This five-volume work is a revised, amplified, but as of yet incomplete edition of the original collection assembled by Alter Druyanow and published in III v. in Odessa and Tel Aviv between 1919 and 1932.)

33. Dan Giladi, "Ha-moshava Be'er Tuvia (Kastina)—sipur shel kishalon hityashvuti," *Ẓionut* III (1974), 109, 111.

34. Shulamit Laskov, *Ha-Biluim,* Jerusalem, 1979, 240.

35. See the biographical information in Moshe Smilansky, *Mishpaḥat ha-adama,* Tel Aviv, 1951, III, 144; Laskov, ed., *Ketavim le-toldot Ḥibat Ẓion,* I, 592; and Ben-Artsi, "M. Meirovitch."

36. On Sussman see Giladi, "Be'er Tuvia," 113; on Ettinger, see the second volume of his memoirs, *'Im ḥakla'im 'ivrim be-arẓeinu,* Tel Aviv, 1945, 34–35.

37. On Ussishkin's activity during the First 'Aliya, see Joseph Klausner, *Menachem Ussishkin: His Life and Work,* London, 1944, 25–29.

38. On the origins of Jewish populism in the Russian Empire, see Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917,* Cambridge, 1981; and Eli Lederhendler, *The Road to Modern Jewish Politics: Political Tradition and Political Reconstruction in the Jewish Community of Tsarist Russia,* New York, 1989. On Russian populism's ambivalent attitude toward the state, see Andrzej Walicki, *The Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists,* Oxford, 1969, 86, 104, 119–20.

39. Giladi, "Be'er Tuvia;" Israel Kolatt, "Po'alei ha-'aliya ha-rishona," *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona,* I, 337–82.

40. Vital, *The Origins of Zionism,* 88–108; Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 114–32; Kolatt, "Po'alei ha-'aliya ha-rishona," 379–81.

41. Vital, *The Origins of Zionism,* 79–88; Laskov, *Ha-Biluim;* Joseph Salmon, "Tenua't ha-Biluim," *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona,* I, 117–40.

42. Dan Giladi, "Rishon le-Ẓion be-ḥasut ha-Baron Rothschild," *Cathedra,* No. 9 (1978), 135; Aaronsohn, "Tokhnit Netter-Rothschild," 79.

43. This argument is based on a synthesis of a number of sources: Israel Margalith, *Le baron Edmond de Rothschild et la colonisation juive en Palestine, 1882–1899,* Paris, 1957; Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel,* New York, 1978; Giladi, "Rishon le-Ẓion"; Ran Aaronsohn, "Ha-moshavot ha-'ivriyot be-reshitan u-terumat ha-Baron Rothschild le-hitpaṯḥutan ha-yishuvit, 1882–1890," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1985; and idem, "Tokhnit Netter-Rothschild."

44. *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 1888, 2e semestre, 60–61; 1892, 101; 1901, 154; Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 68–69, 79; Aaronsohn, "Ha-moshavot ha-'ivriyot," 175.

45. Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 68, 110.

46. Aaronsohn, "Ha-moshavot ha-'ivriyot," 109–15, 157.

47. Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 63–80; Aaronsohn, "Ha-moshavot ha-'ivriyot," 184–200, 479–85.

48. Elie Scheid, *Zikhronot, 1883–1899,* Aharon Amir, tr., Jerusalem, 1983, 103, 221.

49. Giladi, "Rishon le-Ẓion," 147; Shaul Katz, "Aspektim soẓiologiyim shel ẓemiḥat ha-yeda' (ve-taḥalufato) be-ḥakla'ut be-Yisra'el: hofa'atan shel ma'arekhot huẓ-mada'iyot le-hafakat yeda' ḥakla'i, 1880–1940," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986, chapter 6.

50. Pierre Boyer, *L'évolution de l'Algérie médiane (ancien département d'Alger) de 1830 à 1956,* Paris, 1960, 312–32; Kolleen Cross, "Evolution of Colonial Agriculture: The Creation of the Algerian 'Vignoble,' " M.A. seminar paper, Northern Illinois University, 1988.

51. Although far behind Germany in the development of state-supported agricultural experimentation and education, Third Republic France did begin to make strides forward in the 1880s, mostly as a response to the phylloxera crisis which was wreaking havoc on French viticulture. "Without a doubt the phylloxera crisis created a precedent in the field of state action at least comparable to that of laying railroad track during midcentury and after or of modernizing the major cities during the Second Empire. The disbursement of public money was massive. . . . This money was spent for research, subsidies for chemicals, root stock, and grafting schools, and miscellaneous activities among government agencies." Leo Loubère, *The Red and the White: A History of Wine in France and Italy in the Nineteenth Century,* Albany, 1978, 172. See also Michel Augé-Laribé, *La politique agricole de la France de 1880 à 1940,* Paris, 1950, 124–31.

52. Roger Price, *A Social History of Nineteenth-century France,* London, 1987, 14–27.

53. The quotations are from Larousse, *Grand Dictionnaire,* X, 998; and Hermann Julius Meyer, ed., *Meyers Konversations-Lexicon,* 5th ed., Leipzig and Vienna, 1895, VI, 14–15. Other useful sources of evolving views of the causes of malaria and the role of the eucalyptus in combating it are *Brockhaus' Konversations-Lexicon,* 14th ed., Leipzig, 1894, XI, 518–19, and VI, 402; *Meyers Konversations-Lexicon,* 6th ed., 1906–1913, XIII, 160–63; and John Croumbie Brown, *African Fever and Culture of the Blue Gumtree to Counteract Malaria in India,* Aberdeen, 1890. The history of the medical profession's fight against the disease

is related in Leonard Jan Bruce-Chwatt and Julian de Zulueta, *The Rise and Fall of Malaria in Europe: A Historico-Epidemiological Study,* Oxford, 1980.

54. Selig Eugen Soskin, "Notes sur les plantations d'eucalyptus à Ḥadera," dated December 1900, AJCA 258. See also the following correspondence between the Jewish Colonization Association and its Palestinian representative, David Haim, regarding the planting operations: JCA to Haim, 11 March 1898, AJCA 257; Haim to JCA, 17 March and 12 April 1898, AJCA 254; Haim to JCA, 16 February 1899, pp. 28–30, AJCA 255; and Haim to JCA, 20 October 1899, AJCA 257.

55. Dan Giladi, "Ha-Baron Rothschild u-mishtar he-ḥasut shel ha-pekidut," *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona*, I, 188–91, 194–99; Kolatt, "Po'alei ha-'aliya ha-rishona," 375–81.

56. Gross, "Sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit," 48.

57. Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 116–19.

58. Aharon 'Ever ha-Dani, *Hityashvut ba-Galil ha-taḥton: ḥamishim shanot korotav,* Tel Aviv, 1955, 192; Yehuda Slutsky, *Mavo le-toldot tenua't ha-'avoda ha-yisre'elit,* Tel Aviv, 1973, 148; Laskov, *Ha-Biluim,* 208, 210.

59. Giladi, "Ha-Baron Rothschild," 184; Salmon, "Tenua't ha-Biluim," 131.

60. Aaronsohn, "Ha-moshavot ha-'ivriyot," 159–66, 196, 247–57.

61. Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 80.

62. Cf. Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 23–27; 'Ever ha-Dani, *Ḥadera;* idem, *Galil taḥton,* idem, *Mishmar ha-Yarden: moshevet ha-sefar she-nafla, 5644–5708, 1884–1948,* Tel Aviv, 1965; and Ben-Ẓion Mikhali, *Sejera,* Tel Aviv, 1973.

63. Cf. Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 148–53, 160–71; Kolatt, "Po'alei ha-'aliya ha-rishona," 379–81.

64. Cf. Doris Angst, "Nichtzionisten in Palästina. Die Rolle der Jewish Colonization Association, 1900–1924," M.A. thesis, Universität Zürich, 1977. See also Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* chapter 5; Ran Aaronsohn, "Shelavim be-hekmat moshavot ha-'aliya ha-rishona u-ve-hitpaṭḥutan," *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona,* I, 74–81; Katz, "Aspektim soẓiologiyim," chapter 7; Shulamit Laskov, "Ḥovevei Ẓion be-ma'avak 'im Rothschild 'al penei ha-yishuv," *Ẓionut* XII (1987), 29–71; and Yossi Ben-Artsi, *Ha-moshava ha-'ivrit be-nof Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1882–1914,* Jerusalem, 1988, 39–44.

65. Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 156.

66. Angst, "Nichtzionisten in Palästina," 62, 93–99; Anne Ussishkin, "The Jewish Colonization Association and Rothschild in Palestine," *Middle Eastern Studies* IX, No. 3 (1973), 347–57.

67. Works on Hirsch and the origins of the JCA include Kurt Grunwald, *Türkenhirsch: A Study of Baron Maurice de Hirsch, Entrepreneur and Philanthropist,* Jerusalem, 1966; Theodore Norman, *An Outstretched Arm: A History of the Jewish Colonization Association,* London, 1985; and Kennee Switzer-Rakos, "Baron de Hirsch, the Jewish Colonization Association, and Canada," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook XXXII* (1987), 385–406. On the JCA's Argentinian activity see Ḥaim Avni, *Argentina, "ha-arez ha-ye'uda": mif'al ha-hityashvut shel ha-Baron de Hirsch be-Argentina,* Jerusalem, 1973.

68. Niégo to Leven, 27 November 1896, AJCA 279; Jewish Colonization Association, *Séances du conseil d'administration,* Paris, 1896–1901 (hereafter, *JCA Séances*), 17 January 1897.

69. Haim to JCA, 23 December 1897, AJCA 254; *JCA Séances,* 26 December 1897.

70. *JCA Séances,* 15 October 1896, 21 February, 21 March, 21 May, and 26 December 1897, 17 April 1898. Niégo to JCA, 27 October and 16 November 1896, AJCA 254; numerous reports from Niégo to the JCA from September through November 1896, AJCA 279.

71. For examples of Niégo's recommendations passing smoothly through the *conseil d'administration,* see JCA to Niégo, 1 November 1897; Haim to JCA, 3 and 13 January 1898, AJCA 254. Protests over Niégo's recommendations are revealed in JCA to Niégo, 5 February and 17 August 1897, AJCA 254; and JCA to Haim, 1 April 1898, AJCA 257. The figure of one million francs is from JCA to Pariente, 5 November 1900, AJCA 262.

72. Niégo to Leven, 27 April 1898, AJCA 279; *JCA Séances,* 5 June 1898; JCA to Haim, 18 June, 21 October, and 14 November 1898, AJCA 257. The land purchase figures come from JCA to Pariente, 5 November 1900, AJCA 262, and 'Ever ha-Dani, *Galil taḥton,* 18. By 1914, about 15,000 acres had been purchased. Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 158.

73. Niégo to Leven, 3 February 1897, AJCA 279; *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 1901, 152–56, reproduced in Aron Rodrigue, *De l'instruction à l'émancipation: les enseignants de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle et les juifs d'Orient, 1860–1939,* Paris, 1989, 91–92. For biographical material on Niégo, see his *Cinquante années de travail dans les oeuvres juives: allocutions et conférences,* Istanbul, 1933.

74. Niégo to Leven, 30 June 1897, AJCA 279. These sentiments are echoed in his letters to Leven of 27 April 1898, AJCA 279; October 1898, AJCA 254; and 6 February 1901, AJCA 270c.

75. Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews,* 134–35.

76. JCA to Haim, 17 June, 12 August, 5 September, 18 October, and 21 October 1898, AJCA 257; Haim to JCA, 22 January 1899, AJCA 255.

77. Niégo to JCA, 10 November and 12 December 1899, AJCA 257.

78. Haim to JCA, 3 December 1899 (two letters) and 4 January 1900; JCA to Haim, 22 December 1899, AJCA 257.

79. *JCA Séances,* 9 June 1900; Meyerson to Kalvarisky, 29 June 1900, CZA J15/7141; 'Ever ha-Dani, *Galil taḥton,* 18; Mikhali, *Sejera,* 38.

80. Niégo to Leven, 6 February 1901, AJCA 270c; Meyerson to Kalvarisky, 29 June 1900, CZA J15/7141; JCA to Pariente, 22 May 1901, AJCA 262. On Meyerson's early interest in Jewish colonization in Palestine see the doctoral dissertation (in progress) by Yoram Maniuk, deputy director of the Central Zionist Archives.

81. Pariente to JCA, 18 February 1901, AJCA 258; JCA to Pariente, 22 April and 11 December 1901, AJCA 262.

82. The quote is from p. 65 of the report on the Kherson colonies, dated 29 December 1898, AJCA 277. For more information about the development of the JCA's educational infrastructure in Eastern Europe, see *JCA Séances,* 14 October 1896 and 21 February 1897; in Argentina, see Haim to JCA, 17 May 1900, AJCA 255.

83. Haim to JCA, 4 July 1898, AJCA 254; report on Kherson colonies of 29 December 1898, AJCA 277; JCA to Shalit, 22 June 1900, AJCA 257; Meyerson to Kalvarisky, 29 June 1900, CZA J15/7141.

84. JCA to Pariente, 12 and 22 April 1901, AJCA 262; *JCA Séances,* 16 June 1901.

85. On Kalvarisky's dismissal, see JCA to Shalit, 22 June 1900, AJCA 257; Shalit to JCA, 30 August 1900, AJCA 256; JCA to Pariente, 9 November 1900, AJCA 262; Niégo to JCA, 17 January 1901, AJCA 258; Niégo to Leven, 6 February 1901, AJCA 270; JCA to Pariente, 12 and 22 April 1901, AJCA 262; and Pariente to JCA, 23 April 1901. For Krause's biography, see Raḥel Yanait Ben-Ẓvi, *Eliyahu Krause: avi ha-ḥinukh ha-ḥakla'i ba-arez,* Jerusalem, 1963.

86. JCA to Pariente, 24 March, 3 and 27 November 1905, AJCA 262; JCA to Franck, 23 August, 18 October, and 10 December 1907, AJCA 256; JCA to Franck, 24 April 1908, 27 September and 21 December 1910, AJCA 262; JCA to Krause, 27 January and 31 March 1911, AJCA 272; JCA to Starkmeth and Bril, 13 June, 9 July, and 9 October 1913, AJCA 262. See also Selig Eugen Soskin in *Altneuland* III, No. 1 (1906), 11–12.

87. Krause to JCA, 16 September 1901, AJCA 270a; emphasis in original.

88. JCA to Pariente, 23 April 1903, AJCA 262.

89. Krause to JCA, 16 September 1901, AJCA 270a.

90. JCA to Pariente, 14 December 1900, AJCA 262.

91. Niégo spells these views out in his reports to the JCA of October 1898, AJCA 254; 26 December 1898, AJCA 280; and 6 February 1901, AJCA 270. Haim expresses similar sentiments in his letters to the JCA of 26 May and 4 July 1898, AJCA 254; and

16 February 1899, AJCA 255. For Kalvarisky's condemnation of the colonists as a "tribe of *schnorrers,*" see Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 161–68.

92. *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 1900, 162–63; 1901, 154–55.

93. Niégo to Leven, 6 February 1901, AJCA 270c, pp. 9–14; cf. Price, *Social History,* 149–57.

94. Niégo to Leven, 6 February 1901, AJCA 270c, p. 9.

95. Angst, *Nichtzionisten in Palästina,* 69–70, 73–80.

96. JCA to Shalit, 15 June 1900, AJCA 257; *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 1903, 221.

97. Schama, *Two Rothschilds,* 150.

98. *Bulletin semestriel de l'Alliance,* 1901, 155–56.

99. Krause to JCA, 1 March 1908; JCA to Krause, 7 April 1908; JCA to Krause, 28 December 1908, AJCA 271; JCA to Franck, 27 September 1910, AJCA 262.

100. Looking forward to the 1930s, one finds that sixteen of the twenty members of the central committee of the labor movement's chief political party, Mapai, were Ashkenazic veterans of the Second 'Aliya. Yosef Gorny, "Changes in the Social and Political Structure of the Second Aliyah between 1904 and 1940," *Zionism* I (1975), 49–101.

101. Israel Kolatt, "Ideologiya u-meẓiut bi-tenua't ha-'avoda be-Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1905–1919," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1964, 89–100, 106–107; Yosef Gorny, "Ha-ideologiya shel 'kibbush ha-'avoda,'" *Keshet* X (1968), 66–79; Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 373–74, 387–90.

102. Shoḥat in *Ish ha-adama: le-rabi Eliyahu Krause, la-ḥazi yovel shanim mi-yom bo'o lekhahen ki-menahel be-Mikve Yisra'el,* Tel Aviv, 5669 (1939), 55–62; Kolatt, "Ideologiya u-meẓiut," 106–107; Shulamit Laskov, *Trumpeldor: sipur ḥayav,* Haifa, 1972, 39; Raḥel Yanait Ben-Ẓvi, *Manya Shoḥat,* Jerusalem, 1976; Shulamit Reinharz, "Toward a Model of Female Political Action: The Case of Manya Shohat, Founder of the First Kibbutz," *Women's Studies International Forum* VII (1984), No. 4, 275–87.

103. Zalman David Levontin, *Le-ereẓ avoteinu,* III v., Tel Aviv, 5684–5688 (1923/24–1927/28), II, 154. On Levontin, see Dalia Hurwitz, "Roshei ha-mosadot ha-ẓioniyim be-Ereẓ Yisra'el ve-she'elat ha-'avoda ha-'ivrit bi-tekufat ha-'aliya ha-sheniya," *Ẓionut* VII (1982), 124–31, and chapter 3 below.

104. Private Jewish plantation companies provided employment to approximately one-fourth of the agricultural laborers of the Second 'Aliya. Yosef Katz, "Ha-pe'ilut ha-hityashvutit be-Ereẓ Yisra'el shel ha-ḥevrot ve-ha-agudot ha-ẓioniyot ha-pratiyot bein ha-shanim 1900 ve-1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1983, 288–89, 294, 394–99; idem, "Mif'al ha-'aḥuzot' be-Ereẓ Yisra'el 1908–1917," *Cathedra,* No. 22 (1982), 143.

105. For a powerful evocation of the free-spiritedness and wanderlust that struck the young pioneers, see Anita Shapira, *Berl,* Tel Aviv, 1981, I, 59.

106. Gorny, "'Kibbush ha-'avoda.'"

107. Eliezer Livneh, *Aaron Aaronsohn: ha-ish u-zemano,* Jerusalem, 1969, 155–59.

108. The motivating forces behind the Zionist pioneers' collectivist experiments are a subject of unending controversy. The historiographical debate is summed up in Henry Near, "Ideologiya ve-anti-ideologiya," *Cathedra,* No. 18 (1981), 124–29; and idem, "Ish ve-Degania Ilo," *Cathedra,* No. 29 (1983), 63–78.

109. E.g., 'Ever ha-Dani, *Gailil taḥton,* 192–93; Ben Ẓion Dinur et al., eds., *Sefer toldot ha-hagana,* I, 1, Tel Aviv, 1954, 205–207, 706; Ẓvi Even-Shoshan, *Toldot tenua't ha-po'alim be-Ereẓ Yisra'el,* Tel Aviv, 1963, I, 108–109; Mikhali, *Sejera,* 177–80; and Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 394–95. Shabtai Teveth has looked into those JCA archives germane to the collective; see the first volume of his biography of Ben-Gurion, *Kinat David: Ben-Gurion ha-ẓa'ir,* Jerusalem, 1976, 135–39, and the notes to p. 138 on p. 514.

110. Mikhali, *Sejera,* 179; Shoḥat in *Ish ha-adama,* 55–82; Yanait Ben-Zvi, *Manya Shoḥat,* 49–67.

111. Many members of the collective belonged to the organization Bar-Giora, a self-defense squad patterned along the lines of Russian Socialist Revolutionary commando

groups, and which saw itself as the armed vanguard of the Jewish national revival. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 394–96.

112. Shoḥat in *Ish ha-adama,* 61–62. It is not even clear from the secondary accounts how long the collective lasted. According to 'Ever ha-Dani, it lasted one season; according to Raḥel Yanait Ben-Ẓvi, it went on through Passover of 1909. 'Ever ha-Dani, *Galil taḥton,* 192–93; Yanait Ben-Ẓvi, *Manya Shoḥat,* 62–71.

113. JCA to Franck, 29 November 1907, AJCA 256; Franck to Krause, 18 December 1907 and 19 May 1908, CZA J15/6557. Shoḥat was still at the farm in the late summer of 1908; it is not clear when she left. Franck to Krause, 2 August 1908, CZA J15/6559; Krause to JCA, 13 September 1908, CZA J15/6571.

114. Franck report of 12 November 1907 in CZA J15/6571; Jewish Colonization Association, *Rapport de l'administration centrale au conseil d'administration pour l'annee 1908,* Paris, 1909, 115–17.

115. *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir,* Nisan-Adar 5668 (1908), Nos. 7–8, pp. 5–6; Ruppin to Thon, 28 July 1909, CZA L2/307; Raphael Frankel, "Yosef Busel, ha-komuna ha-Ḥaderatit, ve-hivaẓrut ha-kevuẓa," *Ẓionut* IV (1976), 53 n.15.

116. Cf. Teveth, *Kinat David,* 514.

117. Krause's report for the year 1907–1908, dated 25 March 1909, in AJCA 270; *Rapport . . . pour l'année 1908,* 115.

118. Angst, "Nichtzionisten in Palästina," 86–92.

119. Menaḥem Ussishkin, *Our Program,* New York, 1905. On the impact of this pamphlet on Russian Jewish youth, see Klausner, *Menachem Ussishkin,* 66–87; and Simcha Kling, *The Mighty Warrior: The Life-Story of Menachem Ussishkin,* New York, 1965, 45.

120. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 12 July 1906, CZA Z2/630; Warburg to Bodenheimer, 22 December 1908, CZA A24/92.

121. Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 96–97, 172–74; Adolf Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung,* I, Tel Aviv, 1935, 410; and Curt Nawratzki, *Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas,* Munich, 1914, 272, 278.

122. In his speech of 1912, Katznelson did describe 'Ein Ganim as a completely successful colony, but only because by that time it had changed form and turned into a proto-moshav, largely independent of Petaḥ Tikva. A summary of Katznelson's speech is in *Die Welt* XVII, No. 2, 10 January 1913, 49–50. On Katznelson's attitudes toward the founding of 'Ein Ganim, see Shapira, *Berl,* I, 53; for A. D. Gordon, see Slutsky, *Mavo,* 208. On the changes in 'Ein Ganim over the prewar years, see *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir,* 6 Tevet 5672 (27 December 1911); and *Die Welt* XVI, No. 3, 19 January 1912, 84; XVII, No. 4, 24 January 1913, 115.

123. Bodenheimer and Nathan Gross to Adolf Böhm, 12 Feburary 1914, CZA A141/17.

II. From Philanthropy to State Building

1. Perhaps the most celebrated exception is Leo Pinsker, a Russian Jew who proposed a political solution to the Jewish problem in his tract *Autoemancipation* (1882). But there were others. Prominent German Zionists such as Willy Bambus and Davis Trietsch were archetypal practical Zionists, and Leo Motzkin, a leader of the Eastern European opposition to Herzl, was a staunch political Zionist.

2. See Richard Lichtheim's biased but informative work *Die Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus,* Jerusalem, 1954, especially 140–48. For recent evaluations on German Zionism's general contribution to the Zionist movement, see Jehuda Reinharz, *Fatherland or Promised Land: The Dilemma of the German Jew, 1893–1914,* Ann Arbor, 1975; idem, "Ideology and Structure in German Zionism, 1882–1933," *Jewish Social Studies* XLII, No. 2 (1980), 119–46; and Stephen M. Poppel, *Zionism in Germany, 1897–1933: The Shaping of a Jewish Identity,* Philadelphia, 1976.

3. Steven Aschheim, *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German-Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923,* Madison, Wis., 1982, 81. The creation of a German-

language Zionist culture before World War I is thoroughly treated in Michael Berkowitz, "'Mind, Muscle, and Men': The Imagination of a Zionist National Culture for the Jews of Central and Western Europe, 1897–1914," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1989.

4. Jehuda Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader,* Oxford, 1985, 27–44; Jack Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers: East European Jews in Imperial Germany,* New York, 1987.

5. Quote from Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error,* New York, 1949, 165.

6. Wertheimer, *Unwelcome Strangers,* 106, 114.

7. Ibid., 63, 105–15; also S. Adler-Rudel, *Ostjuden in Deutschland, 1880–1940,* Tübingen, 1959, 11–18. For a sophisticated analysis of the fine line that often separated the "Eastern" from the "German" Jew, and of the relationship between both and German culture, see Shulamit Volkov, "The Dynamics of Dissimilation: 'Ostjuden' and the German Jews," in *The Jewish Response to German Culture,* Jehuda Reinharz and Walter Schatzberg, eds., Hanover, N.H., and London, 1985, 195–211.

8. David Lawrence Preston, "Science, Society, and the German Jews, 1870–1933," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1971, 105.

9. Cf. Ben Halpern, *The Idea of the Jewish State,* Cambridge, Mass., 1969, 139; Reinharz, *Fatherland or Promised Land,* 100–101.

10. Max Isidor Bodenheimer, *Prelude to Israel: The Memoirs of M. I. Bodenheimer,* New York, 1963, 56–65. Bodenheimer wrote this autobiography at an advanced age. In writing it, he relied heavily on documents from his own personal archive, now organized as A15 at the Central Zionist Archives.

11. Ibid., 61, 200. Schäffle's work appeared in four parts between 1875 and 1878.

12. *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des vierten Zionisten-Kongresses,* Vienna, 1900, 136–37.

13. The quote is from *Prelude to Israel,* 64–65, but similar sentiments may be found in Bodenheimer's *Wohin mit den russischen Juden?,* Hamburg, 1891, 9, 15; and the *Flugblatt Nr. 1 der Nationalen Jüdischen Vereinigung für Deutschland,* written in 1897 and reproduced in *Der Durchbruch des politischen Zionismus in Köln, 1890–1900,* Henriette Hannah Bodenheimer, ed., Cologne, 1978, 204.

14. Fourth Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 137.

15. Such references are made throughout *Wohin mit den russischen Juden?* See also the *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des achten Zionisten-Kongresses in dem Haag,* Cologne, 1907, 156.

16. "Provisional Draft for a Colonization of the Southern Galilee or the Bekka by an Agrarian and Industrial Bank," 4 August 1891, CZA A15/II/1. Reproduced in H. Bodenheimer, *Der Durchbruch des politischen Zionismus in Köln,* 78–83.

17. *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des zweiten Zionisten-Kongresses,* Vienna, 1898, 140–41.

18. JCA to Bodenheimer, 18 August 1891, CZA A15/II/1; Bodenheimer, *Prelude to Israel,* 77.

19. Flürscheim to Bodenheimer, 12 July, 22 July, and 2 December 1891, CZA A15/II/4. The archives do not contain Bodenheimer's response to these letters.

20. See the correspondence between Bodenheimer, Tuch, Alexander Simon, director of the Ahlem school, and others in CZA A15/II/5 and A15/II/8.

21. Reinharz, *Fatherland or Promised Land,* 99.

22. *Flugblatt Nr. 4 der Nationalen Jüdischen Vereinigung für Deutschland,* reproduced in H. Bodenheimer, *Der Durchbruch des politischen Zionismus in Köln,* 209 (emphasis in original).

23. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State,* New York, 1970, 77.

24. Ibid., 59, 62–64, 87.

25. The correspondence between Herzl and Bodenheimer regarding the convening of the First Zionist Congress has been reproduced in *Im Anfang der zionistischen Bewegung: eine Dokumentation auf der Grundlage des Briefwechsels zwischen Theodor Herzl und Max Bodenheimer von 1896–1904,* Henriette Hannah Bodenheimer, ed., Frankfurt a.M., 1965.

26. Herzl, "The Rothschild Settlements" (1900), *Zionist Writings,* Harry Zohn, ed. and tr., New York, 1975, II, 142.

27. "Opening Address at the Fifth Zionist Congress" (26 December 1901), *Zionist Writings,* II, 173.

28. Herzl, "The Rothschild Settlements."

29. See Motzkin's speech on colonization at the Second Zionist Congress, 99–127; the manifesto of the faction in *Palästina* I (1902), 180–81; and Israel Klausner, *Oppozizia le-Herzl,* Jerusalem, 1960, 174–85. On the faction's political and cultural work, see David Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years,* Oxford, 1982, 189–98; Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann,* 99–101; and Ehud Luz, *Parallels Meet: Religion and Nationalism in the Early Zionist Movement, 1882–1904,* Philadelphia, 1988, 182–90.

30. Yosef Gorny, "Utopian Elements in Zionist Thought," *Studies in Zionism* V, No. 1 (1984), 19–27.

31. Joachim Doron, "Ha-ẓionut ha-merkaz eyropit mul ideologiyot germaniyot bein ha-shanim 1885–1914: hakbalot ve-hashpa'ot," Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 1977; idem, "Social Concepts Prevalent in German Zionism, 1883–1914," *Studies in Zionism,* No. 5 (1982), 1–31.

32. Compare Bodenheimer, *Prelude,* 61, with Ruppin's unpublished *Tagebuch,* entry for 30 January 1897, in the CZA. On Schäffle's social thought, see the *Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften,* Erwin v. Beckerath, ed., Stuttgart, 1956, IX, 103–104; and the *Staatslexicon,* Görres-Gesellschaft, ed., Freiburg, 1957–1963, VI, 1096.

33. Shapira's proposal was printed in *Die Welt* I, No. 12, 20 August 1897, 1. On Shapira see his *Ketavim ẓioniyim,* Jerusalem, 1925, and Israel Klausner, *Karka' ve-ruaḥ: ḥayav u-fo'olo shel Professor Ẓ. H. Shapira,* Jerusalem, 1966.

34. First Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 137–48. Bodenheimer's characterization of Shapira's proposal as naive comes from "The Jewish National Fund—A Recollection," typed manuscript dated 1917, CZA A15/I/5. On the relations between the two men, see their correspondence reproduced in *Toldot tokhnit Basel. Milḥemet ha-de'ot lifnei ha-kongress ha-ẓioni ha-rishon lefi ḥalifat ha-mikhtavim bein Prof. Hermann Shapira u-vein Dr. Max I. Bodenheimer,* Henriette Hannah Bodenheimer, ed., Jerusalem, 1947.

35. Henriette Hannah Bodenheimer, "The Statutes of the Keren Kayemeth: A Study of Their Origin, Based on the Known as Well as Hitherto Unpublished Sources," *Herzl Year Book VI* (1964–65); Mascha Hoff, *Johann Kremenetzky und die Gründung des KKL,* Frankfurt a.M., 1986, 56–64.

36. Carl E. Schorske, "Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Triptych," *Journal of Modern History* XXXIV (1967), 343–86, reprinted in *Fin de Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture,* New York, 1980; Desmond Stewart, *Theodor Herzl,* New York, 1974; Jacques Kornberg, "Theodore Herzl: A Reevaluation," *Journal of Modern History* LII (1980), 226–52; Ernst Pawel, *The Labyrinth of Exile: A Life of Theodor Herzl,* New York, 1989.

37. Kornberg, "Theodore Herzl: A Reevaluation," 252.

38. Alex Bein, *Theodore Herzl,* Philadelphia, 1941; Moshe Shaerf, "Herzl's Social Thinking," *Herzl Year Book III* (1960), 199–206; Joseph Adler, "Herzl's Philosophy of New Humanism," ibid., 175–97; Amos Elon, *Herzl,* New York, 1975; Shlomo Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism: Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State,* New York, 1981, 94–100; Doron, "Social Concepts," 24–30; Ben Halpern and Jehuda Reinharz, "Nationalism and Jewish Socialism: The Early Years," *Modern Judaism* VIII, No. 3 (1988), 235. For an interpretation that synthesizes the varying approaches, see Robert S. Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph,* Oxford, 1989, 421–57.

39. The letter of April 1892, addressed to the president of the Austrian *Reichsrat,* Johann Freiherr von Chlumetzki, was reproduced in *Theodor Herzl: A Memorial,* Meyer Weisgal, ed., New York, 1929, 187.

40. James Sheehan, *The Career of Lujo Brentano: A Study of Liberalism and Social Reform in Imperial Germany,* Chicago, 1966, 115. See also Rüdiger vom Bruch, ed., *Weder Kommunismus noch Kapitalismus: bürgerliche Sozialreform in Deutschland vom Vormärz bis zur Ära Adenauer,* Munich, 1985, 113.

41. Vom Bruch, *Weder Kommunismus noch Kapitalismus,* 65–66.

42. Cf. Kenneth Barkin, *The Controversy over German Industrialization, 1890–1900,* Chicago, 1970.

43. This quote comes from a portion of Herzl's manuscript of his address to the Fifth Congress that was not in the stenographic protocol. It is not clear whether or not Herzl spoke these lines. *Zionist Writings,* II, 302–303.

44. "Opening Address at the Fifth Zionist Congress," *Zionist Writings,* II, 173–74.

45. Helmut Faust, *Geschichte der Genossenschaftsbewegung: Ursprung und Aufbruch der Genossenschaftsbewegung in England, Frankreich, und Deutschland sowie ihre weitere Entwicklung im deutschen Sprachraum,* Frankfurt a.M., 1977.

46. Theodor Herzl, *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl,* Rapahel Patai, ed., and Harry Zohn, tr., New York, 1960, I, 305 (entry for 23 February 1896).

47. Ibid., III, 852 (entry for 21 June 1899).

48. "Opening Address at the Fifth Zionist Congress," 174.

49. Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism,* 97.

50. Theodor Herzl, *Old-New Land (Altneuland),* New York, 1960, 291.

51. Ibid., 86.

52. Herzl, *The Jewish State,* 89–90; idem, *Altneuland,* 78–87, 98–101, 142–53, 288–89. Cf. Paul Göhre, *Das Warenhaus,* Frankfurt a.M., 1907.

53. Ibid., 99.

54. Ibid., 101.

55. "Opening Address at the Fifth Zionist Congress," 174.

56. Elon, *Herzl,* 223.

57. Herzl, *The Jewish State,* 45–46.

58. For Germany, see Hans-Jürgen Puhle, *Agrarische Interessenpolitik und Preussischer Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich (1893–1914): ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Nationalismus in Deutschland am Beispiel des Bundes der Landwirte und der Deutsch-Konservativen Partei,* Hannover, 1967; and Barkin, *The Controversy over German Industrialization.* For Austria-Hungary, see Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918,* v. I, *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung,* Alois Brusatti, ed., Vienna, 1973, 453–54, 493, 586–90. Also see n. 60 below.

59. Herzl, *The Jewish State,* 46.

60. John Alden Nichols, *Germany after Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890–1894,* Cambridge, Mass., 1968, 74–80; Gerhard A. Ritter, *Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich: die Sozialdemokratische Partei und die Freien Gewerkschaften, 1890–1900,* Berlin, 1959, 20–35; Dirk Stegmann, *Die Erben Bismarcks: Parteien und Verbände in der Spätphase des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands. Sammlungspolitik 1897–1918,* Cologne, 1979; Geoff Eley, *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck,* New Haven, 1980.

61. Herzl, *The Jewish State,* 45–48.

62. Davis Trietsch, "Die Gartenstadt," *Altneuland* II, Nos. 11–12 (1905), 349–83.

63. Weisgal, *Theodor Herzl: A Memorial,* 187.

64. Bodenheimer, *Prelude,* 102–104; Vital, *The Origins of Zionism,* 366–68.

65. Second Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 128, 195.

66. Chaya Har-El, "Ha-tenua' ha-ẓionit ve-ha-yishuv be-Ereẓ Yisrael be-shilhei ha-'aliya ha-rishona," *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona,* Mordechai Eliav, ed., Jerusalem, 1981, I, 386–88.

67. Bein, *Theodore Herzl,* 351; Nachum Gross, "Sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit, 1902–1918," *Banka'i le-uma be-hitḥadshuta: toldot Bank Le'umi le-Yisra'el,* Ramat Gan, 1977, 20–21.

68. Michael Heymann, ed., *The Uganda Controversy,* I, Jerusalem, 1970, 20–22; and Har-El, "Ha-tenua' ha-ẓionit ve-ha-yishuv," 404.

69. First Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 137–48; Bodenheimer's speech of 22 June 1898 for the *Freie israelitische Vereinigung,* in H. Bodenheimer, *Der Durchbruch des politischen Zionismus in Köln,* 99.

70. I. Klausner, *Karka' ve-ruaḥ,* 39, 57, 61–64.

71. Flürscheim in *Die Welt* I, No. 26, 26 November 1897, 1–2; and No. 27, 3 December 1897, 4; Oppenheimer in *Die Welt* V, Nos. 50 and 51, 13 and 20 December 1901, 3–6 and 6–8; and VI, No. 4, 24 January 1902, 4–6.

72. Ussishkin in *Die Welt* VII, No. 6, 6 February 1903, 4–5.

73. Bodenheimer, "Statutes," 158; Hoff, *Kremenetzky,* 65–76. For a general history of the formative years of the JNF, see Getzel Kressel, *Megilat ha-adama. Sefer rishon: korot,* Jerusalem, 1950.

74. Kremenetzky's report at the Fifth Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des fünften Zionisten-Kongresses,* Vienna, 1901, 265–71; Kremenetzky in *Die Welt* VII, No. 34, 21 August 1903, 7–9; Hoff, *Kremenetzky,* 77–89.

75. Gustav Tuch, *Der erweiterte deutsche Militärstaat in seiner sozialen Bedeutung,* Leipzig, 1886, 287–92; Max Harteck, *Damaschke und die Bodenreform: aus dem Leben eines Volksmannes,* Berlin, 1929; "Unearned Increment," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences,* XV, New York, 1935; and Sigmund von Frauendorfer, *Ideengeschichte der Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik im deutschen Sprachgebiet,* Munich, 1957, 411–13; Paolo Grossi, *An Alternative to Private Property: Collective Property in the Juridical Consciousness of the Nineteenth Century,* Chicago and London, 1981; Samuel Hollander, *The Economics of John Stuart Mill, Volume Two: Political Economy,* Toronto, 1985, 825–55.

76. Menaḥem Ussishkin, *Our Program,* New York, 1905, 18.

77. On Syrkin, see Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism,* 125–38; Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 288–328; and Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years,* 394–96.

78. Oppenheimer in *Die Welt* VII, No. 10, 8 March 1903, 3–4; idem, "Der Zionismus," *Wege zur Genossenschaft: Reden und Aufsätze, Erstes Band,* Munich, 1924, 214–29; idem, *Erlebtes, Erstrebtes, Erreichtes: Lebenserinnerungen,* Düsseldorf, 1964, 210–12.

79. *Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft: Versuch einer positiven Überwindung des Kommunismus durch Lösung des Genossenschaftsproblems und der Agrarfrage,* 1896, 2d ed., Jena, 1913.

80. Such was the emphasis of his speech at the Sixth Zionist Congress, reprinted in *Erlebtes, Erstrebtes, Erreichtes,* 281–96.

81. Alex Bein, "Franz Oppenheimer and Theodor Herzl," *Herzl Year Book VII* (1971), 74–75; idem, *Theodore Herzl,* 401.

82. Herzl, *Diaries,* III, 1203 (entry for 25 January 1902).

83. *Bericht der Jüdischen Orient Kolonisations-Gesellschaft in Palästina, Palästina* II (1903), 61–63; Bein, "Correspondence between Franz Oppenheimer and Theodor Herzl," 98–117; Oskar K. Rabinowicz, "Davis Trietsch's Colonization Scheme in Cyprus," *Herzl Year Book IV* (1961–62), 178–79.

84. The literature on the Uganda episode is extensive; see in particular Robert G. Weisbord, *African Zion: The Attempt to Establish a Jewish Colony in the East Africa Protectorate, 1903–1905,* Philadelphia, 1968; Heymann, *The Uganda Controversy;* idem, "Herzl ve-ẓionei Russiya—maḥloket ve-haskama," *Ẓionut* III (1974), 56–99; Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years,* chapters 9 and 10.

85. Herzl to Oppenheimer, 14 July 1903, in Bein, "Correspondence between Franz Oppenheimer and Theodor Herzl," 116–17; Herzl to Victor Jacobson, 4 July 1903, in Heymann, *The Uganda Controversy,* I, and Heymann's comments on p. 24.

86. *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des sechsten Zionisten-Kongresses,* Vienna, 1903, 307–16.

87. Herzl to Warburg, 22 February 1904, CZA L1/24.

88. Herzl to Levontin, 22 February 1904, CZA L1/24. The sites were the future JNF properties of Ben Shemen and Ḥittin, purchased after Herzl's death.

89. Herzl to Warburg, 22 February 1904, L1/24; Palestine Commission to the Actions Committee, 25 February 1904, CZA Z1/553.

90. Bein, *Theodore Herzl,* 493–99.

91. Typed ms. of the stenographic protocol of the meeting, CZA Z1/198, 724.

92. Ibid., 759–60.

93. From the political camp, Marmorek opposed the cooperative experiment altogether, and Victor Jacobson considered it the least pressing of Warburg's three proposals. Ibid., 762, 770.

94. Ibid., 781–89.

95. Klausner, *Menachem Ussishkin: His Life and Work,* London, 1944, 20, 66–67; anonymous typed ms., "Dr. Tchlenov, sein Leben und Werk," CZA Z3/421; Tchlenov's obituary in *Die Sozialistische Monatshefte,* 1918, 316; Simcha Kling, "Yehiel Tschlenow," *Herzl Year Book VI* (1964–65), 83–108.

96. CZA Z1/198, 782.

97. Klee's dissertation, *Die Landarbeiter in Nieder- und Mittelschlesien,* Tübingen, 1902, is in CZA A142/7. Klee sent Oppenheimer a copy of the work. Oppenheimer to Klee, 24 February 1903, CZA Al42/64. On Klee, see Doron, "Ha-ẓionut ha-merkaz eyropit," 294–95.

98. CZA Z1/198, 898–99.

99. "Ẓionut ve-tikun 'olam," *Kol kitvei Aḥad ha-'Am,* Jerusalem, 1961, 223–25.

III. Experiments with Colonial Models

1. *Sefer Warburg: korot ḥayav, divrei-ha'arakha, mikhtavim, ne'umim u-ma'amarim,* Ya'akov Thon, ed., Jerusalem, 1948, 14, 15. Thon's lengthy introduction to this collection of Warburg's letters and Zionist writings is the only biographical study of the Zionist leader.

2. Interview with Professor Naomi Feinbrun, a former colleague of Warburg's, Department of Botany, Hebrew University, 9 January 1985.

3. Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 18; W. O. Henderson, *Studies in German Colonial History,* London, 1962, 39; Woodruff Smith, *The German Colonial Empire,* Chapel Hill, 1978, 40, 128–29.

4. Compare Warburg with Melchior Trub, director between 1877 and 1911 of the botanical garden Buitenzorg on Java. Daniel Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940,* New York, 1988, 220–22. On colonial publicity, see John M. Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880–1960,* Manchester, 1984; and Thomas G. August, *The Selling of the Empire: British and French Imperialist Propaganda, 1890–1940,* Westport, Conn., 1985.

5. Otto Warburg, *Die aus den deutschen Kolonien exportierten Produkten und deren Verwertung in der Industrie,* Berlin, 1896 (found in CZA A142/67); idem, "Die Landwirtschaft in den deutschen Kolonien," *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1905,* 587–600, and the discussion of this speech on p. 604; idem, "Ergebnisse und Aussichte der kolonialen Landwirtschaft," *Der Tropenpflanzer* X, No. 1 (April 1906), 1–15; idem, untitled address in the *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1910,* Berlin, 1910, 840. For background see Percy Ernst Schramm, *Deutschland und Übersee: der deutsche Handel mit den anderen Kontinenten, insbesondere Afrika,* Braunschweig, 1950, 458; Henri Brunschwig, *L'expansion allemande outre-mer du XVe siècle à nos jours,* Paris, 1957, 164; Henderson, *Studies,* 134; and Robert Cornevin, *Histoire de la colonisation allemande,* Paris, 1969, 42, 72.

6. Warburg, *Die aus den deutschen Kolonien exportierten Produkten;* idem, "Die Landwirtschaft in den deutschen Kolonien"; plantation company documents in CZA L1/70 and A12/90. For background see Henderson, *Studies,* 21, 39–40; Smith, *The German Colonial Empire,* 75–90; Albert Wirz, "The German Colonies in Africa," *European Colonial Rule, 1880–1940,* Rudolf von Albertini and Albert Wirz, coauthors, Westport, Conn., 1982, 400; and Horst Gründer, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien,* Paderborn, 1985, 146, 240.

7. Compare Abraham Werber, "Das landwirtschaftliche Bildungswesen in Bosnien und Herzegowina," *Erez Israel,* No. 4 (1920), 73–83; Michel Augé-Laribé, *La politique agricole de la France de 1880 à 1940,* Paris, 1950, 124–28; Heinz Haushofer, *Die deutsche Landwirtschaft im technischen Zeitalter* (v. V of *Deutsche Agrargeschichte*, Günther Franz, general ed.), Stuttgart, 1963, 157–58; and Karl Kinklage, "Die landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung," *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918,* Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., v. I, *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung,* Alois Brusatti, ed., Vienna, 1973, 440–50.

8. Smith, *The German Colonial Empire,* 135.

9. Warburg, "Die Notwendigkeit einer Versuchstation für Tropenkulturen in Usmabora und ihre Kosten," *Der Tropenpflanzer* II, No. 6 (1898); idem, *Warum ist die Errichtung eines wissenschaftlich-technischen Laboratoriums in den botanischen Garten zu Viktoria erförderlich?,* Berlin, 1899; idem, "Über wissenschaftliche Institute für Kolonialwirtschaft," *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses,* Berlin, 1902, 193–205.

10. Warburg, "Deutsche Kolonisations-, Wirtschafts- und Kulturbestrebungen im türkischen Orient," *Altneuland* II (1905), 161–77, 225–38, 268–77; Paul Dehn, *Von deutscher Kolonial- und Weltpolitik,* Berlin, 1907, 77–102; Hugo Grothe, *Auf türkischer Erde. Reisebilder und Studien,* Berlin, 1903; Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism,* New York, 1923, 445–52.

11. Henderson, *Studies,* 39; Smith, *The German Colonial Empire,* 128–29.

12. The history of the GLCS is chronicled in a clipping from the *Kölnische Volkszeitung,* 4 March 1917, found in CZA A12/99. See also Grothe, *Auf türkischer Erde,* 251; Earle, *Turkey,* passim; Karl Theodor Helfferrich, *Georg von Siemens: ein Lebensbild aus Deutschlands grosser Zeit,* III v., Berlin, 1923, II, 75–78; Henderson, *Studies,* 81; and Lothar Rathmann, *Berlin-Bagdad. Die imperialistische Nahostpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschlands,* East Berlin, 1962, 77–78.

13. Clippings from the *Vossische Zeitung,* 18 November 1905, and the *Morning Post,* 20 November 1905, in CZA A12/45; Warburg to Ussishkin, 28 September 1906, CZA A24/92; SAC meeting of 1 November 1906, CZA Z2/223; Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 23.

14. See the newspaper clippings cited in the previous note.

15. Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 17, 20.

16. Esra Verein, *Festschrift zum 25. Jubiläum des "Esra," Verein zur Unterstützung ackerbautreibenden Juden in Palästina und Syrien, nebst Bericht für die Jahre 1906, 1907, 1908, und 1909,* Berlin, 1909, 2–10; Jehuda Reinharz, "The Esra Verein and Jewish Colonization in Palestine," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook XXIV* (1979), 261–89.

17. Jewish Colonization Association, *Séances du conseil d'administration,* meetings of 10 June and 29 October 1900, 11 May 1901, 28 September and 8 November 1902.

18. Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 17.

19. Warburg to Herzl, 28 October 1899, 28 October 1900. Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 77, 79.

20. Warburg to Herzl, 6 January 1903, ibid., 80–81.

21. Warburg to Herzl, 12 and 16 October 1903, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 77–79; L. Kessler to Warburg, 27 September 1903, and Warburg and Oppenheimer to Kessler, 2 October 1903, CZA A15/III/6; Warburg to Klee, 24 October 1903, CZA A142/67; Warburg to Weizmann, 15 November 1903, in Henriette Hannah Bodenheimer, ed., *Im Anfang der zionistischen Bewegung: eine Dokumentation auf der Grundlage des Briefwechsels zwischen Theodor Herzl und Max Bodenheimer von 1896–1904,* Frankfurt a.M., 1965, 317.

22. Warburg at the WZO's annual joint meeting of the SAC and GAC (*Jahreskonferenz*) of 17–19 August 1904, CZA Z1/170, 23.

23. Michael Heymann, "The Zionist Movement and the Schemes for Jewish Settlement in Mesopotamia after the Death of Herzl," *Herzl Year Book VII* (1971), 129–74; Shmuel Almog, "Alfred Nossig: A Reappraisal," *Studies in Zionism,* No. 7 (1983), 1–29; Yosef Katz, "Maḥloket panim ẓionit 'al hityashvut yehudit mi-ḥuẓ le-Ereẓ Yisra'el: 'parshat Turkiya,' 1911–1912," *Ẓion* XLIX, No. 3 (1984), 265–88.

24. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 25 February 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 95–98. See also Oskar K. Rabinowicz, "Davis Trietsch's Colonization Scheme in Cyprus," *Herzl Year Book IV* (1961/62), 119–206; David Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years,* Oxford, 1982, 139–40, 146–47.

25. David Dalin, "Cyrus Adler, Non-Zionism, and the Zionist Movement: A Study in Contradictions," *Association for Jewish Studies Review* X, No. 1 (1985), 55–87.

26. Flier published by the German-Asiatic Society, year only (1905), CZA A12/90; *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1905,* 773–807; Warburg, *Die Baumwollkultur im Gebiete der Bagdadbahn in Verbindung mit der Kolonisation osteuropäischer Juden,* Berlin, 1905; Warburg to Willcocks, n.d., CZA A12/45.

27. Warburg, "Die türkische Landwirtschaft und ihre Bedeutung für Deutschland," *Asien. Organ der Deutsche-Asiatischen Gesellschaft* XV, No. 3, 12–17, 49–51; Heymann, "Mesopotamia."

28. Cf. Mordechai Eliav, "German Interests and the Jewish Community in 19th-Century Palestine," *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period,* Moshe Ma'oz, ed., Jerusalem, 1975, 423–41.

29. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 25 February 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 95.

30. Flier entitled "Im Kampfe um die hebräische Sprache," introduced by Tchlenov and Warburg, n.d., in CZA A12/22. On the *Sprachenkampf,* see Ernst Feder, "Paul Nathan: The Man and His Work," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook III* (1958), 60–80; Moshe Rinott, *Hevrat ha-'Ezra li-Yehudei Germaniya bi-yeẓira u-ve-ma'avak: perek be-toldot ha-hinukh ha-'ivri be-Ereẓ Yisra'el u-ve-toldot yehudei Germaniya,* Jerusalem, 1971, 184–226; Yehuda Eloni, "Ẓionei Germaniya u-'milḥemet ha-safot,'" *Ẓionut* X (1985), 53–86.

31. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 25 February 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 97; Warburg, *Syrien als Wirtschafts-und Kolonisationsgebiet,* Berlin, 1907; Paul A. Alsberg, "Mediniyut ha-hanhala ha-ẓionit mi-moto shel Herzl ve-'ad milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1957, 85.

32. Warburg, *Die Zukunft Palästinas und unsre Aufgaben daselbst,* Vienna, 1906; Warburg's speech at the Fifth Assembly of the Austrian Zionist Federation, *Die Welt* XI, No. 27, 5 July 1907, 12–14.

33. Warburg's review of Ussishkin's *Our Program* in *Die Welt* IX, No. 17, 28 April 1905, 2–3.

34. Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 22–23; Shaul Katz, "Aaron Aaronsohn: reshit ha-mada' vereshit ha-meḥkar ha-ḥakla'i be-Ereẓ Yisra'el," *Cathedra,* No. 3 (1977), 9; Shmuel Aviẓur, *Mamẓiyim u-me'ameẓim,* Jerusalem, 1986, 154. Soskin's article of 1894 was reprinted in *Palästina* II, Nos. 1–2 (1903), 38–44.

35. Soskin in *Altneuland* I, No. 5 (1904), 129–40; No. 6, 170–81; Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 22–23; Eliezer Livneh, *Aaron Aaronsohn: ha-ish u-zemano,* Jerusalem, 1969, 58, 74. At the Seventh Zionist Congress, Soskin stated that he spent the time from November 1904 to January 1905 in Asia Minor and northern Syria on an inspection tour sponsored jointly by the PC and the GLCS. *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des siebenten Zionisten-Kongresses in Basel,* Berlin, 1905, 196.

36. JCA to Haim, 16 June 1899, CAHJP 257; Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 80.

37. Correspondence of 1901 between the *Kulturtechnisches Bureau,* Eliyahu Krause, and Chaim Kalvarisky, in CZA J15/6576; Warburg to Levontin, 15 January 1904, CZA Z1/553; Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 54–60, 78, 98–105; Katz, "Aaronsohn," 8–12, 20.

38. Warburg to Herzl, 6 and 23 January 1903, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 80–82.

39. Almog, "Nossig," 5–6.

40. *Palästina* I, No. 1 (1902), 5.

41. Ibid., 107.

42. Ibid., 106.

43. Robert Koehl, "Colonialism inside Germany, 1886–1914," *Journal of Modern History* XXV (1953), 271.

44. *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des sechsten Zionisten-Kongresses,* Vienna, 1903, 272.

45. Ibid., 271–72, 328.

46. A thoroughly researched Israeli doctoral thesis traces the activity of the PC and APB during this time: Ẓvi Shilony, "Ha-Keren ha-Kayemet le-Yisra'el ke-gorem beiẓuv ha-nof ha-yishuvi shel Ereẓ Yisra'el me-az hakamata ve-'ad li-froẓ milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona, 1897–1914," Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1987. Shilony and I carried out our research independently, and our narrative structure, interpretations, and analytical frameworks differ.

47. Zalman David Levontin, *Le-ereẓ avoteinu,* Tel Aviv, 5684–5888 (1923/24–1927/28), I, 6–9, 41, 45, 64–67. See also the lively description of Levontin's personality and programs

in Nachum Gross, "Sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit, 1902–1918," *Banka'i le-uma be-hithadshuta: toldot Bank Le'umi le-Yisra'el,* Ramat Gan, 1977, 8–100.

48. Nachum Gross, "Yozma pratit ve-ẓiburit be-hitpathut Ereẓ Yisra'el lefi Z. D. Levontin," *Riv'on le-Kalkala,* No. 116, 5743 (1983), 488–94.

49. Compare Levontin, *Le-ereẓ avoteinu,* I, 88; and Gross, "Yozma pratit," with the discussion of revisionist social thought in Ya'akov Shavit, *Me-rov li-medina: ha-tenua' harevizionistit, ha-tokhnit ha-hityashvutit, ve-ha-ra'yon ha-ḥevrati, 1925–1935,* Tel Aviv, 1983; and idem, *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement, 1925–1948,* London, 1988, 272–309.

50. Menaḥem Ussishkin, *Our Program,* New York, 1905, 16.

51. *Die Welt* X, No. 13, 30 March 1906, 3.

52. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 9 June 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 104.

53. Warburg, Soskin, and Oppenheimer to Herzl, 25 November 1903, CZA Ll/24. Warburg and Soskin attached great importance to the journal, but its circulation stood at only 500 by April of 1904. Warburg at the GAC meeting of April 1904, CZA Zl/198, 708; and his speech at the 1906 *Jahreskonferenz,* 17–19 August, CZA Z1/170.

54. Soskin at the Seventh Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 193–99; Warburg at the 1906 *Jahreskonferenz,* CZA Zl/170; Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 77–78.

55. CZA Zl/198, 708–23, 898–99.

56. For Wolffsohn's political biography see Mordechai Eliav, *David Wolffsohn: ha-ish u-zemano. Ha-tenua' ha-ẓionit ba-shanim 1905–1914,* Tel Aviv, 1977.

57. On Ben Shemen, see Zionist Central Office to Warburg, 23 December 1906; and Warburg to Zionist Central Office, 24 December 1906, CZA Z2/630. On Delaika, see the protocols of the SAC meeting of 18/19 March 1907, CZA Z2/615. On Ḥulda and Ḥittin, see the report by Levontin and Warburg of October 1906 on the state of JNF lands, CZA Z2/615; and Zionist Central Office to Levontin, 27 June 1905, CZA Z2/615.

58. E.g., Warburg at the Tenth Congress of the German Zionist Federation, *Die Welt* X, No. 28, 8 June 1906; Warburg at the 1906 *Jahreskonferenz,* 31 August, Zl/170.

59. Jewish National Fund, *25 Jahre Keren Kayemeth Le-Yisrael (5662–5687),* Jerusalem, 1927, 26; Getzel Kressel, *Megilat ha-adama. Sefer rishon: korot,* Jerusalem, 1950, 48.

60. For Kremenetzky's views, see his remarks at the April 1904 GAC meeting, CZA Z/198, 672–78; and his article in *Die Welt* VII, No. 34, 21 August 1903, 7–9. For Ussishkin's views, see *Die Welt* VII, No. 6, 6 February 1903, 4–5.

61. GAC meeting of April 1904, CZA Zl/198, 725–46.

62. See the following chain of correspondence in CZA Zl/548: Levontin to the SAC, 30 January 1905; SAC to Levontin, 10 February 1905; Soskin to SAC, 14 February 1904; PC to SAC, 2 March 1905; SAC to Levontin, 12 May, 1905.

63. SAC meeting of 1 November 1906, CZA Z2/223; *Die Welt* X, No. 36, 7 September 1906, 8; also Warburg to Wolffsohn, 14 September 1908, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 106–107. A few orphans did, in fact, live for a year in an agricultural school set up privately in Ben Shemen by Israel Belkind, but the project fell apart. Eliav, *Wolffsohn,* 201.

64. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 25 February 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 97; Soskin in *Altneuland* II, No. 1 (1905), 5; and *Altneuland* III, No. 1 (1906), 11–12. For Levontin's views, see his survey of JNF holdings, dated October 1906, CZA Z2/615.

65. Warburg to Bodenheimer, 22 December 1906, CZA Ll/25. Warburg to Ussishkin, 28 September 1906, 22 December 1906, CZA A24/92; Warburg to Wolffsohn, 28 September 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 107–109.

66. Warburg to Zionist Central Office, 22 May 1907, CZA Al07/614; JNF directorium meeting of 22 August 1907, CZA KKLl/657.

67. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 24 March 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 102–103; PC to Oppenheimer, 12 April 1907, CZA L1/25.

68. CZA W/61 contains a flier by Oppenheimer detailing the operations of the cooperative society and its financial report for 1907–1908. See also Shlomo Kaplansky and Nathan Gross in *Die Welt* XI, No. 47, 22 November 1907, 18; and Oppenheimer, "Ein

gescheitertes sozialpolitisches Unternehmen," *Wege zur Genossenschaft: gesammelte Reden und Aufsätze, Erstes Band,* Munich, 1924, 252–59.

69. See the protocols of the January 1905 GAC meeting, CZA L1/4; Warburg at 1906 *Jahreskonferenz,* CZA L1/170; also at the Tenth Congress of the German Zionist Federation, *Die Welt* X, No. 28, 8 June 1906, 8–9; Warburg/Levontin report on JNF lands, October 1906, CZA Z2/615; Zionist Central Office to Warburg, 24 December 1906; and Warburg to Zionist Central Office, 30 December 1906, CZA Z2/630.

70. Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 100, 127–37, 152–54. Aaronsohn had a similar effect on Louis Brandeis when they met in 1912. Allon Gal, *Brandeis of Boston,* Cambridge, Mass, 1980, 178–80.

71. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 6 and 22 March 1906, 9 June 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 99–105.

72. Oppenheimer in *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 1905, No. 28, along with an appeal signed by the "Bezalel Committee."

73. Warburg to Schatz, 15 October 1906, and Thon to Schatz, 9 November 1906, L42/56.

74. *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses 1905,* 800–804; Warburg at the GAC meeting of 6/7 January 1908, *Die Welt* XI, No. 2, 10 January 1908, 8.

75. See Bezalel's "Erster Bericht," *Altneuland* III, No. 11 (1906), 307–22. On the JNF's connection with the school see Warburg to Schatz, 19 February and 4 April 1906; Wolffsohn to Schatz, 5 September 1906; Warburg to Schatz, 21 June 1906 and 4 September 1906; Thon to Schatz, 9 November 1906, CZA L42/56; Zionist Central Office to Warburg, 24 December 1906, W/139.

76. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 24 March 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 102–103; Warburg to J. Rosenheim, 24 July 1908, CZA L1/6.

77. Soskin and Warburg, "Volksdomäne in Palästina," *Altneuland* I, No. 3 (1904), 65–66; and Soskin, "Die Ölbaumspende," ibid., 66–71.

78. Cf. entry for "zayit," *Enzyklopedia le-ḥakla'ut,* Ḥaim Halperin, ed., III, Tel Aviv, 1967, 871.

79. Handwritten draft by Warburg of a reply to Levontin's annual APB report for 1905, CZA A12/50.

80. Soskin to Actions Committee, 2, 11, and 25 March 1904, CZA Z1/536; Marmorek to PC, 21 March 1904, CZA L1/24; Warburg at April 1904 GAC meeting, CZA Z1/198, 817–27.

81. CZA Z1/198, 858–60, 898.

82. Statutes in CZA Z1/537; Warburg at the Ninth Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des neunten Zionisten Kongresses,* Cologne, 1910, 171; flier published by the *Ölbaumspende* in 1908, CZA KKL1/449.

83. Alex Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-zionit mi-tekufat Herzl ve-'ad yameinu,* 4th ed., Ramat Gan, 1970, 42–43.

84. Quote from Warburg's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Austrian Zionist Federation, *Die Welt* XI, No. 27, 5 May 1907, 12–14. See also Warburg at the Ninth Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 174; *Ölbaumspende* flier of 1908 in CZA KKL1/449; the collection of brochures in CZA KKL1/458; and the brochure of 1914 in CZA KKL1/452, which speaks of planting 100,000 olive trees that will provide shade for the land.

85. Warburg at the Seventh Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 202.

86. CZA L1/4.

87. CZA Z1/546; also letter to APB of 10 April 1905 in the same file.

88. Aaronsohn to PC, September 1905 (no day), CZA A12/61.

89. Unofficially, however, Treidel did carry out negotiations with Turkish officials over possible land purchases. Warburg in *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 1906, No. 35, 522–24; Warburg to Ussishkin, 25 January 1909, CZA A24/92.

90. Wolffsohn to Warburg, 9 March 1905; Warburg to Wolffsohn, 30 April 1905, CZA A12/50; Treidel to PC, 24 May 1905, CZA A12/61; Warburg to Wolffsohn, 13 October

1905, 9 June 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 89, 104–105; Warburg to Wolffsohn, 6, 12, and 24 July 1906, CZA Z2/630. For Levontin's side of the story, see Eliav, *Wolffsohn,* 120–21.

91. *Die Welt* X, No. 13, 30 March 1906, 4.

92. Warburg to Ussishkin, 10 July 1906, CZA A24/92; Eliav, *Wolffsohn,* 95; Jehuda Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader,* Oxford, 1985, 289–317.

93. Handwritten protocol of the meetings of the congress's Palestine Committee in Z2/85; published account of the committee's resolutions in *Die Welt* XI, No. 34, 23 August 1907, 10.

94. Eliav, *Wolffsohn,* 132–34.

95. See the minutes of the meetings of the branch in CZA Z2/343.

96. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 7 January 1906, Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 89; Warburg to unknown recipient, 3 April 1907, CZA Z2/630.

97. On the Palestine Trading Company, see the minutes of its first board meeting of 3 March 1904, CZA Z1/553. On the industrial syndicate, see Warburg and Soskin to Wolffsohn, 17 August 1906, CZA Z2/630; Warburg to SAC, 20 October 1906, and Warburg to Ussishkin, 23 October 1906, CZA A24/92; SAC meetings of 1 November 1906 and 18–19 March 1907, CZA Z2/223; *Bericht des Actionskomitees der zionistischen Organization an den 10. Kongress. Basel, 9 bis 15 August, 1911,* Berlin, 1911, 74.

98. Yosef Katz, "Ha-pe'ilut ha-hityashvutit be-Erez Yisra'el shel ha-ḥevrot ve-ha-agudot ha-ẓioniyot ha-pratiyot bein ha-shanim 1900 ve-1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1983, esp. 210–19, 231–43, 294, 455–57; idem, *Ge'ula titnu la-arez: ḥevrat "Ge'ula" li-rkhishat karka'ot, 1902–1914,* Jerusalem, 1988. See also Leah Doukhan-Landau, *Ha-ḥevrot ha-ẓioniyot li-rkhishat karka'ot be-Erez Israel, 1897–1914,* Jerusalem, 1979, 172–213.

99. Warburg at the Tenth Congress of the German Zionist Federation, *Die Welt* X, No. 28, 8 June 1906, 8–9; Warburg at the GAC meeting of 6 and 7 January 1908, *Die Welt* XII, No. 2, 10 January 1908, 5–6, 8.

100. Katz, "Ha-ḥevrot ha-pratiyot," 361–63.

101. *Die Welt* XII, No. 21, 29 May 1908, 3–5.

102. Warburg to Ussishkin, 28 September 1906, CZA A24/92.

103. Heymann, "Mesopotamia," 162.

104. Shmuel Yosef Agnon, *Esterlein yekirati: mikhtavim 5684–5691 (1924–1931),* Jerusalem, 1983, 76.

IV. Inner Colonization

1. Margalit Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut: ha-Misrad ha-Erez Yisre'eli, 1908–1914,* Jerusalem, 1988; and Shilo's other works cited infra.

2. Jehuda Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader,* Oxford, 1985, viii.

3. *Pirkei ḥayai,* III v., Alex Bein, ed., Tel Aviv, 1968; *Arthur Ruppin: Memoirs, Diaries, Letters,* Alex Bein, ed., London and Jerusalem, 1972; *Tagebücher, Briefe, Erinnerungen,* Shlomo Krolik, ed., Königstein/Ts., 1985.

4. The most sensitive portrayal of Ruppin remains that of Alex Bein, "Arthur Ruppin: The Man and His Work," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook XVII* (1972), 117–41. See also Abraham Bertisch, "A Study of the Political-Economic Philosophy of Arthur Ruppin and His Role in the Economic Development of the Zionist Settlement in Palestine from 1907–1943," Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1980; and Ya'akov Reuveni, "Soẓiologiya ve-ideologiya: 'iyunim be-mishnato shel Arthur Ruppin," *Kivunim,* No. 23 (1984), 25–48. The only work that ventures into the archival sources is Joachim Doron, "Ha-ẓionut ha-merkaz eyropit mul ideologiyot germaniyot bein ha-shanim 1885–1914: hakbalot ve-hashpa'ot," Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 1977. Doron accuses Ruppin of succumbing to *völkisch* ideology, an accusation which, although not groundless, is overstated.

5. *Pirkei ḥayai,* I, passim; Bein, "Ruppin." I heard essentially this same narrative from Rafi Ruppin, Arthur Ruppin's son, in an interview conducted at Moshav Mikhmoret on 2 March 1985.

6. Bein, "Ruppin," 123.

7. *Tagebuch* (in Ruppin's private archive, CZA A107), 20 February 1890; 23 November 1890; 27 July 1892.

8. *Pirkei ḥayai,* I, 69–91.

9. *Tagebuch,* 13 December 1891, 4 February 1892, 15 February 1893, Part I, 4 and 15 April 1893, Part I (in 1893 only, Ruppin's diary was divided into two parts, the first containing political and philosophical observations, and the second covering personal matters), 11 April 1894, and the *Anhang* to the diary volume for 1894.

10. Ibid., 13 December 1891; 27 January, 30 January, 27 September, and 25 December 1892; 20 February 1895.

11. Ibid., 12 July 1892; 18 June 1894. See also the entry for 14 June 1893, Part II, where Ruppin writes of an evening when he planned to go to a socialist meeting but met up with friends with whom he pursued a lighter form of entertainment.

12. Ibid., 15 June 1893, Part II; 3 June 1894.

13. Ibid., 3 June 1894.

14. Ibid., 21 April and 12 June 1893 (Part I); 8 June 1894.

15. Ibid., 4 June 1893, Part I.

16. Ibid., 12 February and 20 October 1893, Part I, 16 June 1894.

17. Ibid., 25 April and 1 May 1892; 18 June 1894. See also the entries for 30 December 1892, 30 May and 26 June 1894. (The last refers to the assassination of French President Sadi Cornot.)

18. Ibid., 3 November 1891; 12 June 1893, Part I.

19. The quote is from the diary entry for 1 December 1894. See also the *Anhang* to the volume for 1893 and the entry for 16 June 1894.

20. Ibid., 1 December 1894.

21. Ibid., 3 June, 25 November, and 12 December 1891.

22. Ibid., 15 April 1893, Part I.

23. Ibid., 7 December 1892.

24. Ibid., 13 December 1891; 7 February, 24 April, 25 May, and 25 June 1892. The statutes of the *Graetzverein* are in CZA A107/447.

25. Quoted in Bein, "Ruppin," 121.

26. Ibid., 23 October, 23 and 31 December 1896.

27. Otto Hintze, cited in Kenneth Barkin, "Adolf Wagner and German Industrial Development," *Journal of Modern History* XLI, No. 2 (1969), 144.

28. Konrad Jarausch, *Students, Society, and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Academic Illiberalism,* Princeton, 1982, 185.

29. Rüdiger vom Bruch, ed., *Weder Kommunismus noch Kapitalismus: bürgerliche Sozialreform in Deutschland vom Vormärz bis zur Ära Adenauer,* Munich, 1985, 114–17.

30. Arthur Ruppin, *Die Wertlehre Thünens und die Grenznutzentheorie,* Halle, 1902, in CZA A107/170. For background on Ruppin's professors, see James Sheehan, *The Career of Lujo Brentano, A Study of Liberalism and Social Reform in Imperial Germany,* Chicago, 1966; Herman Lebovics, "'Agrarians' versus 'Industrializers': Social Conservative Resistance to Industrialism and Capitalism in Late Nineteenth Century Germany," *International Review of Social History* XII (1967), 31–65; Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933,* Cambridge, Mass., 1969; Barkin, "Adolf Wagner"; idem, "Conflict and Concord in Wilhelmine Social Thought," *Central European History* V, No. 1 (1972), 55–71; vom Bruch, *Weder Kommunismus noch Kapitalismus.*

31. The notes are in CZA A107/200 and 209 through 213 inclusive.

32. *Tagebuch,* 11 and 14 October 1896; 12 February 1897.

33. Ibid., 6 May 1897.

34. Ibid., 1 December 1894 and 31 December 1903. Ruppin presents a somewhat

more sanguine view of his career choices in his published memoirs; see *Pirkei ḥayai,* II, 38.

35. Alfred H. Kelly, *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860–1914,* Chapel Hill, 1981.

36. *Tagebuch,* 30 January 1897; also 16 and 22 February 1897.

37. Ibid., 10 January 1895.

38. Ibid., 31 December 1900; 1 April and 1 October 1901.

39. Walter Laqueur, *Young Germany: A History of the German Youth Movement,* New York, 1962, 54.

40. *Aphorismen,* A107/217, 13 January 1899.

41. *Tagebuch,* 6 May 1897.

42. Arthur Ruppin, *Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft,* Jena, 1903; idem, "Moderne Weltanschauung und Nietzsche'sche Philosophie," *Der Gegenwart* LXIII, No. 10, 7 March 1903, in CZA A107/150.

43. Cf. Frank E. Manuel and Fritzie P. Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World,* Cambridge, Mass., 1979, 773–87.

44. Ruppin, *Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft,* 31, 36, 45–46, 84, 91–92, 123; idem, "Moderne Weltanschauung und Nietzsche'sche Philosophie."

45. Kelly, *Descent of Darwin,* 106–107; Sheila Faith Weiss, *Race Hygiene and National Efficiency: The Eugenics of Wilhelm Schallmayer,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987.

46. Ruppin, *Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft,* 92.

47. Ibid., 11–12.

48. Ibid., 92.

49. *Pirkei ḥayai,* I, 183–84, 188–91, 200–202, and 222. In a draft of his memoirs, Ruppin noted and then deleted a comparison between himself and Walter Rathenau, the German Jewish industrialist and statesman assassinated in 1922. Compare the draft in CZA A107/355 with the text in *Pirkei ḥayai,* II, 38.

50. *Tagebuch,* 5 April 1897. On German Jews' appropriation of racial thinking, see Joachim Doron, "Rassenbewusstsein und naturwissenschaftliches Denken im deutschen Zionismus während der Wilhelminischen Ära," *Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche Geschichte* IX (1980), 389–427; George L. Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism,* New York, 1978, 120–27.

51. *Tagebuch,* 2 April 1903.

52. Ibid.

53. "Die soziale Verhältnisse der Juden in Preussen und Deutschland," *Conrads Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik* LXXVIII, 374–88, 760–85, in CZA A107/150.

54. *Tagebuch,* 31 December 1903. The manuscript of Ruppin's notes from his Galician journey is in CZA A107/353.

55. Ruppin was offered the post in April 1904 (*Tagebuch,* 26 April 1904); by July he was in Berlin, working for the statistical office.

56. Arthur Ruppin, *Die Juden der Gegenwart: eine sozialwissenschaftliche Studie,* Berlin, 1904, 271, 283–92.

57. Entry dated 28 August 1898, CZA A107/217.

58. *Tagebuch,* 17 September 1894. See also his reading list for 1898 in CZA A107/142.

59. Entry dated 5 September 1898, CZA A107/217.

60. *Tagebuch,* 15 June 1897; also 5 September 1897.

61. Ruppin, *Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft,* 135.

62. The quote is from Bertisch, "Arthur Ruppin," 30. For statements by Ruppin that his emphasis on agriculture was dictated by pragmatism alone, see Arthur Ruppin, *Der Aufbau des Landes Israel: Ziele und Wege jüdischer Siedlungsarbeit in Palästina,* Berlin, 1919, 96; Zionist Organization, *Economic Activities in Palestine: Report Submitted to the 12th Zionist Congress Held at Carlsbad, September, 1921,* Jerusalem and London, 1921, 8–9; and Ruppin, *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine,* Westport, Conn., 1976 (reprint of 1926 original), passim.

63. Ruppin, *Die Juden der Gegenwart,* Cologne and Leipzig, 1911.

64. Address at the Eleventh Zionist Congress, September 1913, reprinted in Ruppin, *Three Decades of Palestine: Speeches and Papers on the Upbuilding of the Jewish National Home,* Westport, Conn., 1975 (reprint of 1936 original), 36.

65. Ruppin, *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization,* 143.

66. "'Al Ruppin," reprinted in Ruppin, *Pirkei ḥayai,* I, 9–31.

67. Ruppin, *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization,* 144.

68. Bertisch, "Arthur Ruppin," 224. Ruppin went to the Soviet Union in 1927 and disliked it.

69. Ibid., 223. Cf. Jacob Metser, *Hon le'umi le-bayit le'umi, 1919–1921,* Jerusalem, 1979, 23: "Ruppin saw the capitalist period in the Yishuv as an essential transition period, on the way toward the formation of a government that would be based on the principles of equality and social justice (along the lines of the German 'Socialists of the Chair'), which he saw as a goal for the long run."

70. *Tagebuch,* 31 December 1902, 3 March 1903, 31 December 1903, 21 July 1904, 30 December 1904, 16 July 1905. Much of this material was reproduced in *Pirkei ḥayai,* I, 189–91, 200–202, 222, and 231–35.

71. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 7 January 1906, *Sefer Warburg: korot ḥayav, divrei-ha'arakha, mikhtavim, ne'umim u-ma'amarim,* Ya'akov Thon, ed., Jerusalem, 1948, 89; Ruppin, *Pirkei ḥayai,* I, 189–90, 231–32.

72. Warburg to unknown recipient, 3 April 1907, CZA Z2/630; 1 April 1907; Ruppin, *Tagebücher, Briefe, Erinnerungen,* 136.

73. Ruppin to JNF directorium, 18 June 1907, CZA Z2/615.

74. Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 23 April 1914, CZA Z12/77; Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 13 February 1914, CZA A12/75; Ruppin, "Die Nationalisierung des Bodens," *Erez Israel,* No. 3 (1919), 47–56; see also chapter 6 below.

75. Ruppin to JNF directorium, 28 June 1907, CZA Z2/615.

76. Ruppin to JNF directorium, 21 July 1907, 1 September 1907, CZA A111. On the origins of Tel Aviv, see Yosef Katz, "Ideology and Urban Development: Zionism and the Origins of Tel Aviv, 1906–1914," *Journal of Historical Geography* XII, No. 4 (1986), 402–424.

77. Yosef Katz, *Ge'ula titnu la-arez̤: ḥevrat "Ge'ula" li-rkhishat karka'ot, 1902–1914,* Jerusalem, 1988, 87.

78. Aaron Aaronsohn, "Die französische Kolonisation in Nordafrika," *Palästina,* Nos. 1–2, January 1911, 16–24.

79. CZA A148/34.

80. Ibid.

81. The document is in CZA Z2/639, and a duplicate may be found in A107/663.

82. Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 74–78, offers a conflicting interpretation of the original program of the PLDC, which implies that the early emphasis on agricultural training was the product of functional circumstances, and that the company's ideal goal was, from the start, private land purchase. But the documents excerpted here clearly depict Ruppin's early program as embodying a statist, social-reformist ideal. Over time, he learned that it could not be implemented and therefore modified it. Besides, although the PLDC did, after 1911, disengage itself from pioneering functions and concentrate on land purchase, it did so only because of the growth of other WZO institutions which assumed the PLDC's public-sector burden. See chapter 6 below.

83. See n. 80 above.

84. Ruppin, *Pirkei ḥayai,* II, 73–75; Thon, *Sefer Warburg,* 53–55.

85. Ruppin to JNF directorium, 18 June 1907, CZA Z2/615.

86. Prospectus for the PLDC in *Die Welt* XII, No. 5, 28 January 1908; Ruppin, "Die Landarbeiterfrage in Palästina," *Palästina* IX (1912), 64–75; Ruppin to Zionist Central Office, 28 July 1912, CZA L2/26/II; Ruppin to JNF, 19 December 1912, CZA A15/VI/7. The connection between the PLDC and the Prussian Commission was first posited

by Shalom Reichman and Shlomo Hasson, "A Cross-cultural Diffusion of Colonization: From Posen to Palestine," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* LXXIV, No. 1 (1984), 57–70. On the physical resemblance between the creations of the Prussian Commission and Zionist agricultural settlements, see Ẓvi Shilony, "Ha-Keren ha-Kayemet le-Yisra'el ke-gorem be-iẓuv ha-nof ha-yishuvi shel Ereẓ Yisra'el me-az hakamata ve-'ad li-froẓ milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona, 1897–1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1987, I, 297, 319, 397–402.

87. See the memoirs of Molly Dienemann and Ernst Herzfeld, in *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland: Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte,* Monika Richarz, ed., Stuttgart, 1979, II, 232, 374.

88. George L. Mosse, "The Image of the Jew in German Popular Literature: Felix Dahn and Gustav Freytag," *Germans and Jews: The Right, the Left, and the Search for a "Third Force" in Pre-Nazi Germany,* London, 1971, 68.

89. *Tagebuch,* 16 September 1894. See also his reading list for 1898 in CZA Al07/142.

90. Max Weber, "The National State and Economic Policy," *Nineteenth Century Europe: Liberalism and Its Critics* (University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization, v. VIII), Jan Goldstein and John Boyer, eds., Chicago, 1988, 438–60. For examples of vulgar nationalist and racialist invective, see Emil Stumpfe, *Polenfrage und Ansiedlungskommission: Darstellung der staatlichen Kolonisation in Posen-Westpreussen und kritische Betrachtungen über ihre Erfolge,* Berlin, 1902; and Otto Richard Tannenberg, *Gross-Deutschland. Die Arbeit des 20. Jahrhunderts,* Leipzig, 1911. Critical scholarly accounts of the commission include Robert Koehl, "Colonialism inside Germany, 1886–1914," *Journal of Modern History* XXV (1953), 255–72; Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Krisenherde des Kaiserreichs, 1871–1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte,* Göttingen, 1979, 184–202, 208; and William W. Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772–1914,* Chicago, 1980, chapter 5.

91. Max Sering, *Die innere Kolonisation im östlichen Deutschland,* Leipzig, 1893; Franz Oppenheimer, *Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage: Versuch einer neuen Grundlegung der Gesellschaftswissenschaft,* Berlin, 1898, 478, 482–83; *Damaschke und die Bodenreform: aus dem Leben eines Volksmannes,* Max Harteck, ed., Berlin, 1929, 273–303.

92. Oberregierungsrat von Both, "Die staatliche Ansiedlungstätigkeit in Westpreussen und Posen," *Die Ostmark,* Waldemar O. E. Mitscherlich, ed., Leipzig, 1911, 75–94; Dr. jur. Hartmann, "Die deutschen Betriebsgenossenschaften in der Provinz Polen," *Die Ostmark,* 130; Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland,* II v., Oxford, 1981, II, 129; Richard Blanke, *Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871–1900),* New York, 1981, 60–74; Hagen, *Germans, Poles, and Jews,* 338.

93. Warburg to Ruppin, 26 March 1909, CZA L1/96.

94. Davies, *God's Playground,* 129; Wehler, *Krisenherde,* 192.

95. *7. Jahresbericht des Vereins zur Förderung der Bodenkultur unter den Juden Deutschlands,* 5–6. Leah Doukhan-Landau, in *Ha-ḥevrot ha-ẓioniyot li-rkhishat karka'ot be-Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1897–1914,* Jerusalem, 1979, 145, asserts that Warburg actually served on the Colonization Commission but offers no evidence to substantiate this claim; nor could I find any. Cf. Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914,* Cambridge, 1989, 159.

96. Warburg in *Die Welt* XII, No. 5, 28 January 1908; flier for PLDC, with Warburg's signature, dated April 1908, CZA Al2/70; open letter of Warburg to Ussishkin, *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 17 July 1908, 277–78; Warburg to Ussishkin, 17 December 1908, CZA L2/21/I; collection of PLDC propaganda literature in CZA Ll/70; *Palästina* IV, Nos. 6–8 (1907), 219–20; Adolf Böhm, "Eine Siedlungsgenossenschaft in Palästina," *Palästina* VII, Nos. 6–7 (1910), 107–13; "Innere Kolonisation," *Palästina* VIII, Nos. 1–2 (1911), 51–53. Other Zionist activists cited the Prussian model with approval. See Tchlenov at the Ninth Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 149; and Norman Bentwich in *The Zionist Banner,* Sivan, 5670 (Spring 1910), 44–47.

97. *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 17 July 1908, 278–80.

98. *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 26 June 1908, 247–48; *Die Welt* XII, No. 21, 29 May 1908, 3.

99. Warburg to Ussishkin, 17 December 1908, CZA L2/21/I. For other signs of Warburg's newfound interest in settling immigrants without means, see the April 1908 flyer for the PLDC with Warburg's signature, CZA A12/70. See also Warburg to Ruppin, 10 December 1908, CZA L2/21/I; and Warburg to Ruppin, 26 March 1909, CZA L1/96.

100. Ruppin in *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 17 July 1908, 280.

101. See the exchange between Oppenheimer and Ruppin at the GAC meeting of 6/7 January 1908, *Die Welt* XII, No. 2, 10 January 1908, 6.

102. As of 30 June 1909, the PLDC had sold 2,533 pounds in shares and had received the JNF's loan. Zionist Organization, *Bericht des Actionscomité an den IX. Zionisten-Kongress in Hamburg, 25–30 December 1909,* p. xviii. See also Alex Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit mi-tekufat Herzl ve-'ad yameinu,* 4th ed., Ramat Gan, 1970, 39–40.

103. Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 42–43.

104. See Ruppin's report on his trip to Constantinople of September 1909, CZA A15/IV/23. Ruppin was a member of the WZO's Agrarian Credit Commission, which had been founded in March. CZA A15/IV/23 contains minutes of the commission's meetings and related correspondence.

105. Ruppin to Magnes, 22 January 1909, Magnes Archive, CAHJP 783.

106. *Pirkei ḥayai,* II, 39–40.

107. Margalit Shilo, "Ha-tokhniot le-hekmat ḥavat ha-limud ha-ḥakla'it ha-ẓionit ha-rishona ve-ha-bikoret 'aleihen," *Cathedra,* No. 19 (1981), 181–204.

108. Ruppin to Warburg, 1 May 1908, CZA L1/96.

109. Warburg to Ruppin, 13 May 1908, CZA L1/98; Warburg to Ruppin, 8 July 1908, CZA L1/98.

110. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 23 June 1908, CZA Z2/634; Warburg to Ruppin, 18 August 1908, CZA L2/21/I.

111. Margalit Shilo, "Ḥavot ha-limud shel ha-Misrad ha-Ereẓ Yisre'eli 1908–1914," M.A. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1977, 63–71.

112. Ruppin, *Pirkei ḥayai,* II, 75.

113. Shilo, "Ḥavot limud," 74.

114. Ibid., 121; Thon to Warburg, 4 October 1909, CZA Z2/634.

115. Warburg to Ruppin, 7 and 9 February 1910, CZA KKL/100/A.

116. Ruppin, "Die Landarbeiterfrage in Palästina."

117. Doukhan-Landau, *Ha-ḥevrot ha-ẓioniyot li-rkhishat karka'ot,* 117.

118. Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 127–28, 141–42.

119. Margalit Shilo, "Degania: degem rishon le-hityashvut shitufit 'al karka' ha-le'um," *Cathedra,* No. 39 (1986), 87–98.

120. Warburg to Bodenheimer, 10 June 1909; Bodenheimer to Warburg, 15 June 1909; Warburg to Bodenheimer, 27 June 1909, CZA L1/29.

121. Gross to Kaplansky, 28 July 1909, CZA A137/121; Ruppin to Thon, 28 July 1909, CZA L2/307.

122. Ruppin to Thon, 11 August 1909, CZA L2/307; Thon to PLDC, 12 September 1909, CZA L1/96.

123. Ruppin, *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization,* 131, 136; idem, "Twenty-five Years of Palestine: A Resumé of Jewish Effort and Achievement," *Theodor Herzl: A Memorial,* Meyer Weisgal, ed., New York, 1929, 195–210; idem, "The Kvutzah," *Three Decades of Palestine,* 131–41.

124. See Berman's report to Ruppin of 1 December 1909, which attributes much of Kinneret's deficit to problems encountered in farming Um Djuni. CZA Al2/52.

125. Ruppin to PLDC, 10 December 1909, CZA L1/96.

126. Degania's profit was 4,437 francs during its first year and 2,064 francs during its second. Ruppin to JNF, 16 November 1910, CZA KKL2/8; PLDC annual report in *Die Welt* XVI, No. 1, 5 January 1912.

127. On the skill of the first group of workers at Um Djuni, see Shaul Katz, "Aspektim soẓiologiyim shel ẓemiḥat ha-yeda' (ve-taḥalufato) be-ḥakla'ut be-Yisra'el: hofa'atan shel ma'arekhot ḥuẓ-mada'iyot le-hafakat yeda' ḥakla'i, 1880–1940," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986, 162–72.

128. Ruppin to Zionist Central Office, 13 February 1910, CZA Z2/634.

V. Eastern Influences

1. Adolf Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung,* II v., Tel Aviv, 1935, I, 359; Israel Kolatt, "Po'alei Ẓion," *Encyclopedia Judaica,* XIII, 656–60; Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917,* Cambridge, 1981, 370.

2. Shabtai Unger, "Po'alei Ẓion ba-Kaisarut ha-Ostrit, 1904–1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 1985, 35–40; see also Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 400.

3. Gross in *Die Welt* X, No. 40, 3 October 1906, 8–11; Mendel Singer, *Be-reshit ha-ẓionut ha-soẓialistit: perakim u-demuyot,* Haifa, 1958, 444.

4. Gross to Oppenheimer, 16 March 1914, CZA A161/1.

5. Eighth Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 310.

6. Gross to Kaplansky, 17 December 1911; also Gross to Kaplansky, 30 January 1909, CZA A137/121.

7. Max Bodenheimer, *Prelude to Israel: The Memoirs of M. I. Bodenheimer,* New York, 1963, 211.

8. Unger, "Po'alei Ẓion," 111–15, 273–74.

9. William Johnston, *The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History, 1848–1938,* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972.

10. Mendel Singer, *Shlomo Kaplansky: ḥayav u-fo'olo,* Jerusalem, 1971, I, 34–35.

11. See the memorial pamphlet written shortly after Herzl's death: *Dr. Benyamin Theodor Herzl: zeyn leben un maysim farn yidishe folk,* CZA A137/4. Also "Herzls soziales Denken," *Die Welt* XII, No. 28, 17 July 1908, 6–7; "Kapitalbeschaffung für Palästina," *Erez Israel* III (1919), 72–82; and miscellaneous citations in Singer, *Kaplansky,* I, 79–83, 282.

12. Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung,* I, 368–73; Matityahu Mintz, "Ber Borokhov," *Studies in Zionism,* No. 5 (1982), 44–47.

13. Yiẓḥak Ben-Ẓvi, "'Al shum ma anu mishtatfim ba-Kongress ha-ẓioni?" *Zikhronot u-reshumot: me-ha-ne'urim ve-'ad 1920,* Jerusalem, 1965, 360–63.

14. Israel Kolatt, "Ideologiya u-meẓiut bi-tenua't ha-'avoda be-Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1905–1919," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1964, 155–56.

15. Singer, *Kaplansky,* I, 43, 59–60.

16. Kaplansky, *Ḥazon ve-hagshama,* Merḥavia, 1950, 113.

17. Unger, "Po'alei Ẓion," 51, 80–88.

18. Kaplansky to Wolffsohn, 8 December 1907, CZA Z2/490; GAC meeting of 15–17 March 1909, CZA Z2/251; Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung,* I, 364.

19. Seventh Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 245.

20. From the third assembly of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion, reported in *Die Welt* X, No. 44, 2 November 1906, 9.

21. *Va'idat Krakov shel mifleget Po'alei Ẓion be-Russiya, 1907 (te'udot),* Matityahu Mintz, ed. and tr., Tel Aviv, 1979, 51.

22. Kaplansky, "Ba'yot ha-ẓionut" (1907), *Ḥazon ve-hagshama,* 25; Gross at the Eighth Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 306.

23. Singer, *Kaplansky,* I, 44.

24. *Die Welt* X, No. 44, 2 November 1906, 9; XII, No. 24, 12 June 1908, 3–6; Kaplansky, *Ḥazon ve-hagshama,* 412.

25. Singer, *Kaplansky,* I, 159.

26. *Die Welt* XIV, No. 2, 14 January 1910, 42–43.

27. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 430.

28. Kolatt, "Ideologiya u-meẓiut," 135–93; Mintz, "Ber Borokhov."

29. See the accounts in Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung,* I; Alex Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut*

ha-ẓionit mi-tekufat Herzl ve-'ad yameinu, 4th ed., Ramat Gan, 1970; Getzel Kressel, *Franz Oppenheimer,* Tel Aviv, 1972; Mordechai Eliav, *David Wolffsohn: ha-ish u-zemano. Ha-tenua' ha-ẓionit ba-shanim 1905–1914,* Tel Aviv, 1977; Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics;* Unger, "Po'alei Ẓion."

30. *Va'idat Krakov,* Mintz ed., 51.

31. Kaplansky to Wolffsohn, 4 January 1908, CZA Z2/490; Wolffsohn to Warburg, 12 June 1908, CZA L1/28; Czernowitz Po'alei Ẓion to Central Zionist Office, 7 August 1909, CZA Z2/490; Boryslaw Po'alei Zion to Central Zionist Office, 28 August 1909, CZA Z2/490.

32. Warburg to Wolffsohn, 23 June 1908, CZA Z2/234; Warburg to Ruppin, 18 August 1908, CZA L2/21/I; Warburg at SAC conference, in *Die Welt* XII, No. 33, 21 August 1908, 11.

33. String of letters from Bodenheimer to Oppenheimer in May 1909, CZA KKL1/461; Singer, *Kaplansky,* I, 162, 178.

34. Ninth Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 195–212; *Die Welt* XIII, 1909, *Sonderheft Nr. 4,* 1206; *Sonderheft Nr. 5,* 1221; Bodenheimer to Tchlenov, 26 January 1910; Tchlenov to Bodenheimer, 9 February 1910, CZA KKLII/6; Nordau in *Die Welt* XVIII, No. 14, 3 April 1914, 340.

35. Oppenheimer to Pasmanik, 18 April 1904, CZA A86/4/1; Pasmanik in *Altneuland* II (1905), 79–83; *Die Welt* IX, No. 11, 17 March 1905, 1–3; No. 21, 24 May 1912, 624.

36. *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 250.

37. See the lengthy memoir on Böhm by Leo Goldhammer in Hebrew and German manuscripts in CZA A141/31. Böhm alludes to many of his intellectual influences in articles written for *Die jüdische Zeitung* (Vienna) and *Selbstwehr* (Prague), collected in CZA A141/18. See also the references to land reformers in Böhm's pamphlet *Der JNF—ein Instrument zur Abhilfe der Judennot,* 1910, in CZA KKL1/454. A revised version of this pamphlet was published under the title *The Jewish National Fund* in The Hague in 1917.

38. Böhm in *Die Welt* XI, No. 24, 21 June 1907, 7–8; at the Fifth Congress of Austrian Zionists, *Die Welt* XI, No. 27, 5 July 1907, 9–11; "Zum 10. Zionistenkongress," *Palästina* VII (1911), Nos. 7–9, 169–75.

39. *Die Welt* XI, No. 27, 5 July 1907, 9–11; *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 16 August 1907, 335.

40. Minutes of the meetings of the Palestine Committee, CZA Z2/85; *Die Welt* XI, No. 34, 23 August 1907, 9–10; Kaplansky, *Ḥazon ve-hagshama,* 94; Singer, *Kaplansky,* I, 94, 156.

41. *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 8 April 1910, 161.

42. *Bericht des Action-Comités der Zionistischen Organization an den XI. Zionisten-Congress,* Berlin, 1913, 177.

43. Warburg in *Die Welt* XII, No. 2, 10 January 1908, 9; Warburg to Ruppin, 10 December 1908, CZA L2/21/I.

44. *The Zionist Banner,* London, Elul, 5670 (September 1909); *Aufruf* for the cooperative signed by Bodenheimer, Hantke, Oppenheimer, et al., CZA KKLI/452; Ruppin at meeting of the managerial committee of Erez Israel, 3 September 1913, CZA A12/83.

45. *Tätigkeitsbericht des universellen Jüdischen Sozialistischen Arbeiterverbandes Poale Zion für die Zeit von Januar 1910 bis Ende Mai 1911,* CZA Z2/491; *Bericht des Action-Comités der Zionistischen Organization an den 10. Kongress, Basel, 9 bis 15 August 1911,* Cologne, 1911.

46. KKL to all European JNF branches, 27 February 1910, CZA KKLI/461; 14 July 1910, CZA KKLI/462; Warburg to JNF, 18 April 1911, CZA A15/VI/6.

47. Kaplansky to Bodenheimer, 14 January 1910, CZA KKLI/461; Oppenheimer to Ruppin, 17 February 1911; Oppenheimer to Kaplansky, 18 January and 13 February 1911, CZA A137/119; Yiẓḥak Ben-Ẓvi, "Ha-hityashvut ha-meshutefet ve-ha-po'alim" (1912), *Zikhronot u-reshumot,* 441–44.

48. Warburg to Bodenheimer, 16 January 1910; Bodenheimer to Kaplansky, 21 January 1910, CZA KKLI/461.

49. Treidel to Warburg, 23 January 1910, CZA L2/21/I; Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 1 June and 4 July 1910, JNF directorium meeting of 1 August 1910, CZA KKLII/9.

50. Warburg to Bodenheimer, 6 October 1910; Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 7 October 1910; Warburg to Bodenheimer, 14 October 1910; Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 23 October 1910, CZA KKLII/6; PLDC to Palestine Office, 7 December 1910; unknown sender to Ruppin,, 10 January 1911, CZA L2/21/II.

51. Rachel Katznelson Shazar, ed., *The Plough Woman: Records of the Pioneer Women of Palestine,* New York, 1932, 39; Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 60–61.

52. Oppenheimer to Ruppin, 1 December 1910, CZA A161/1; Oppenheimer to Kaplansky, 16 January 1912, CZA A137/119.

53. Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 1 December 1910, CZA KKLII/6.

54. Dyk to Warburg, 30 June 1910, CZA A12/6; Dyk to Oppenheimer, 25 September 1915, A161/1.

55. Memorandum by Dyk, 8 January 1911, CZA Z2/646; Dyk's reports on Merḥavia dated 18 December 1912 and 28 November 1913, CZA KKLII/9; Dyk in *Die Welt* XV, No. 44, 3 November 1911, 1156–58.

56. Dyk, "Aus der Siedlungsgenossenschaft," *Palästina* XI, No. 5 (1912), 121–26.

57. Eugen Katz to Warburg, 6 January 1910; M. Zagorodsky to Oppenheimer, 21 February 1910; S. Rosenheck to Warburg, 26 February 1910, CZA A161/13; Warburg to Ruppin, 21 October 1910, CZA L2/21/I; Ruppin to Oppenheimer, 29 October 1910, CZA A161/1.

58. Warburg to Bodenheimer, 6 October 1910, CZA KKLII/6; Warburg to Oppenheimer, 6 October 1910, CZA A161/13.

59. Oppenheimer to Ruppin, 20 October 1910, CZA A161/1; Oppenheimer to Bodenheimer, 15 November 1910, CZA KKLII/6; Bodenheimer to Oppenheimer, 6 and 17 November 1910, CZA KKLII/6; Warburg to Golde, 25 November 1910, CZA KKLII/6; Oppenheimer to Ruppin, 1 December 1910, CZA A161/1.

60. Warburg to Oppenheimer, 16 October 1910, CZA A161/13.

61. Only in 1914 was the Oppenheimer system finally abandoned and the cooperative allowed to become a kvuẓa akin to Degania. Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 74–83.

62. Ettinger report of 27 July 1914, CZA A12/70. Dyk's reports do, in fact, suggest an inflexible application of German agronomical models. See his reports of 18 December 1912 and 28 November 1913, CZA KKLII/9.

63. Ruppin, "The First Agronomists," typed manuscript in CZA A107/448.

64. On Warburg's esteem for Wilkansky, see Warburg to Thon, 16 June and 14 July 1909, CZA L2/21/I. Wilkansky's entrance into the WZO is chronicled in Margalit Shilo, "Ḥavot ha-limud shel ha-Misrad ha-Ereẓ Yisre'eli, 1908–1914," M.A. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1977, 193–95.

65. Shilo, "Ḥavot ha-limud," 189–90, 201–202, 230–33.

66. Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 83–90.

67. Wilkansky to Ruppin, 1 Tammuz 5673 (6 July 1913), CZA Z3/450.

68. *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir,* 30 Av 5670 (4 September 1910), 16. On Wilkansky's relations with the workers, see Shilo, "Ḥavot ha-limud," 199–220.

69. Thon in *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir,* 13 Shevet 5710 (31 January 1950), 9–11; Wilkansky, "Arthur Ruppin, Architect of Action," typed manuscript dated 1926, CZA A107/69; Ruppin, "The First Agronomists," typed manuscript in CZA A107/448.

70. Noted by Israel Kolatt, "Yiẓḥak Wilkanski (Volcani): mi-maniḥei ha-yesod shel ḥakla'ut yehudit modernit be-Ereẓ Yisra'el," *Ha-yishuv ba-'et ha-ḥadasha: ẓiyunei derekh be-terem medina,* Shmuel Stempler, ed., Jerusalem, 1983, 189–204.

71. Wilkansky, "Hitnaḥlut pratit ve-hitnaḥlut le'umit" (1913), *Ba-derekh,* Jaffa, 1918, 24–28.

72. Wilkansky in *Palästina* VI, Nos. 7–8 (1909), 173–74; *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir,* 16 Sivan 5670 (22 June 1910), 4–6; *Die Welt* XVII, No. 8, 21 February 1913, 242; No. 13, 28 March 1913, 405- 409.

73. Cited in Kolatt, "Ideologiya u-meẓiut," 273–74.

74. Wilkansky, "Der Grossbetrieb," *Erez Israel,* No. 2 (1917), 80. Similar sentiments are expressed in *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir,* 16 Sivan 5670 (22 June 1910), 4.

75. Wilkansky, "Ḥefẓeiha le-kapitalim" (1909), *Ba-derekh,* 13–23.

76. Compare "Ḥefẓeiha le-kapitalim" and "Hitnaḥlut pratit ve-hitnaḥlut le'umit" with the discussion of David and Kautsky in Sigmund von Frauendorfer, *Ideengeschichte der Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik im deutschen Sprachgebiet,* Munich, 1957, 409–10; and Keith Tribe and Athar Hussain, eds., *Marxism and the Agrarian Question,* Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1981, I, 102–31.

77. *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir,* 29 Elul 5674 (1 October 1913), 49–50.

78. Wilkansky, "Ḥefẓeiha le-kapitalim."

79. Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 175–76.

80. Uri Sheffer, "Moshav-'ovdim be-Naḥalat-Yehuda (1913)," *Cathedra* 53 (1989), 85–106.

81. Shilo, "Ḥavot ha-limud," 184–86.

82. Margalit Shilo, "Niẓanei ra'yon ha-moshav—'ha-ikar ha-ẓa'ir,' ha-kevuẓa ha-amerikanit ba-'aliya ha-sheniya," *Cathedra,* No. 25 (1982), 79–98; Shaul Katz, "Aspektim soẓiologiyim shel ẓemiḥat ha-yeda' (ve-taḥalufato) be-ḥakla'ut be-Yisra'el: hofa'atan shel ma'arekhot ḥuẓ-mada'iyot le-hafakat yeda' ḥakla'i, 1880–1940," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986, 165–66, 192–97.

83. Margalit Shilo, "The Women's Farm at Kinneret, 1911–1917: A Solution to the Problem of the Working Woman in the Second Aliyah," *The Jerusalem Cathedra,* No. 1 (1981), 246–83.

84. On the origins and activity of the *Frauenverband,* see the *Frankfurter Israelitisches Familienblatt,* 13 May 1908, clipping in CZA A12/38; Sara Thon in *Die Welt* XVI, No. 20, 17 May 1912, 605; and the protocol of the *Frauenverband* board meeting of 27 April 1911, CZA A12/63.

85. Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics,* 431; see also Aharonovich's comments in the stenographic protocol of the fourth meeting of the Palestine Committee at the Eighth Zionist Congress, CZA Z2/85.

86. Kolatt, "Ideologiya u-meẓiut," 125, 130, 164, 176–88.

VI. The Meeting of Minds

1. Jehuda Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader,* Oxford, 1985, 345.

2. E.g., Wilkansky to Ruppin, 1 Tammuz 5673 (16 June 1913), CZA Z3/450; Kaplansky to Erez Israel, ? July 1914 (corner of document torn off), CZA A137/87.

3. For Ruppin's views, see Ruppin to Central Zionist Office, 28 July 1912, CZA L2/26/II, 26–27; as well as Dalia Hurwitz, "Roshei ha-mosadot ha-ẓioniyim be-Ereẓ Yisra'el ve-she'elat ha-'avoda ha-'ivrit bi-tekufat ha-'aliya ha-sheniya," *Ẓionut* VII (1982), 95–134; Abraham Bertisch, "A Study of the Political-Economic Philosophy of Arthur Ruppin and His Role in the Economic Development of the Zionist Settlement in Palestine from 1907–1943," Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1980, 133–46; and Margalit Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut: ha-Misrad ha-Erez Yisre'eli, 1908–1914,* Jerusalem, 1988, 114–15. For other views, see Bodenheimer's report on his 1912 visit to Palestine, CZA A15/VI/8, 42; Ussishkin in *Die Welt* XVII, No. 13, 28 March 1913, 403–404; SAC meeting of March-May 1914, CZA A12/53, and at the GAC meeting of 7–8 June 1914, *Die Welt* XVIII, No. 24, 12 June 1914, 573–76.

4. Arieh L. Avneri, *Ha-hityashvut ha-yehudit ve-ta'anat ha-nishul, 1878–1948,* Tel Aviv, 1980, 92, 208–12; and Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 67–68.

5. Cf. Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 54–61, 116–20. See also the material on Ruppin in Paul A. Alsberg, "Ha-she'ela ha-'aravit bi-mediniyut ha-hanhala ha-ẓionit lifnei milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona," *Shivat Ẓion* IV (1956), 161–209; Ya'akov Ro'i, "Zionist Attitudes to the Arabs, 1908–1914," *Middle Eastern Studies* IV, No. 3 (1968), 198–242; and Yosef Gorny, *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882–1948: A Study of Ideology,* Oxford, 1987, 57–66.

6. Kaplansky, "Ba'yot ha-ẓionut" (1907), *Ḥazon ve-hagshama,* Merḥavia, 1950, 32; Kaplansky at the Tenth Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 82.

7. Yiẓḥak Ben-Ẓvi, *Zikhronot u-reshumot: me-ha-ne'urim ve-'ad 1920,* Jerusalem, 1965, 170; Israel Kolatt, "Ideologiya u-meẓiut bi-tenua't ha-'avoda be-Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1905–1919," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1964, 125–30.

8. Matityahu Mintz, "Ber Borokhov," *Studies in Zionism,* No. 5 (1982), 50.

9. Y. Shprinẓak, "Tekufat ha-ma'avar be-'avodat ha-Misrad ha-Ereẓyisre'eli," *Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir,* 8 and 15 Av 5674 (31 July and 7 August 1914).

10. Ben-Ẓvi, "She'elot ha-hityashvut ha-shitufit," *He-Aḥdut,* 11 and 18 Tamuz 5671 (18 and 25 July 1911); "Le-maẓav moshavot ha-palḥa ba-Galil ha-taḥton" (1912), *Zikhronot u-reshumot,* 438–40.

11. Katznelson in *Die Welt* XVII, No. 2, 10 January 1913, 49–50; Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 118; Anita Shapira, *Berl,* Tel Aviv, 1981, I, 66, 85–89; Uri Sheffer, "Moshav 'ovdim be-Naḥalat Yehuda (1913)," *Cathedra* 53 (1989), 89–90.

12. The document, dated 20 Tamuz 5674 (14 July 1914), is in CZA L2/144.

13. Anita Shapira, *Ha-ma'avak ha-nikhzav: 'avoda 'ivrit 1929–1939,* Tel Aviv, 1977, 27–29.

14. Cf. Yonatan Shapiro, *The Formative Years of the Israeli Labour Party: The Organization of Power, 1919–1930,* London, 1976.

15. See, for example, David Ben-Gurion, "Ha-pekidut ve-ha-po'alim," *He-Aḥdut,* 24 Adar 5671 (24 March 1911), 1–5; Ben-Ẓvi, "Hityashvut meshutefet ve-ha-po'alim" (1912), *Zikhronot u-reshumot,* 441–44.

16. Ben-Ẓvi, "Ẓorekh ha-sha'a" (1911), *Zikhronot u-reshumot,* 378–81; "Pe'ulat ha-lishka" (1913), ibid., 400–403; Kaplansky in *Die Welt* XVI, No. 41, 9 October 1912, 1270–71; and No. 43, 25 October 1912, 1335–36; Kaplansky in *Der Jude* I, No. 7 (1916), 493–96.

17. Compare the different treatments of the subject in Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917,* Cambridge, 1981, 417–19; Nitza Druyan, *Be-ein marvad kesamim: 'olei Teiman be-Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1881–1914,* Jerusalem, 1981, 116–19; and Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 162.

18. Ruppin to PLDC, 10 December 1909, CZA L1/96.

19. Shaul Katz, "Aspektim soẓiologiyim shel ẓemiḥat ha-yeda' (ve-taḥalufato) be-ḥakla'ut be-Yisra'el: hofa'atan shel ma'arekhot ḥuẓ-mada'iyot le-hafakat yeda' ḥakla'i, 1880–1940," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986, 163–72, 183–86, 192–97, 207–12.

20. Wilkansky, "Der Grossbetrieb," *Erez Israel,* No. 2 (1917), 73–82; Eliezer Livneh, *Aaron Aaronsohn: ha-ish u-zemano,* Jerusalem, 1969, 173; Katz, "Aspektim soẓiologiyim," 221.

21. Mordechai Eliav, *David Wolffsohn: ha-ish u-zemano. Ha-tenua' ha-ẓionit ba-shanim 1905–1914,* Tel Aviv, 1977, 302–309.

22. Levontin to Kann, 26 December 1912, CZA A121/93/II.

23. Tenth Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 37–40; Ruppin to Kann, 16 October 1911, CZA L1/144; Kann to Ruppin, 13 June 1913; Ruppin to Kann, 17 June 1913, CZA A107/689; Eleventh Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 229–31, 259.

24. Kann to Ruppin, 13 June 1913, CZA A107/689.

25. Eleventh Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 254–59.

26. Ruppin to B. Goldberg, 7 October 1913, CZA A12/75.

27. Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 144–47, 166–68.

28. Auhaugen's report of January 1912, CZA A121/93/II; biographical material on Auhaugen in Warburg to Zionist Central Office, 21 July 1911, CZA L2/21/II.

29. Gross to Kaplansky, 17 December 1911 and 6 January 1912, CZA A137/121.

30. Ruppin to Zionist Central Office, 28 July 1912, CZA L2/26/II.

31. Warburg to Zionist Central Office, 21 July 1911, CZA L2/21/II; Warburg to GAC, 25 February 1914, CZA W/141/I.

32. Hurwitz, "She'elat ha-'avoda ha-'ivrit," 124–31.

33. Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 155–59.

34. Aḥad ha-'Am, "Be-sakh ha-kol," *Kol kitvei Aḥad ha-'Am,* Jerusalem, 1961, 421–30.

35. Hurwitz, "She'elat ha-'avoda ha-'ivrit," 124–31; Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 162–63.

36. Aaron Aaronsohn, "Die französische Kolonisation in Nordafrika," *Palästina* VIII, Nos. 1–2 (1911), 24; Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 169–70, 176–77.

37. Eleventh Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 254–59.

38. Oppenheimer to Bodenheimer, 11 July 1912, CZA A15/VI/7; also Oppenheimer to Bodenheimer, 15 September 1911, CZA KKLII/6.

39. Kaplansky in *Die Welt* XVI, No. 36, 6 September 1912, 1108–09.

40. Livneh, *Aaronsohn,* 127–54; Shaul Katz, "Aaron Aaronsohn, reshit ha-mada' vereshit ha-meḥkar ha-ḥakla'i be-Erez Yisra'el," *Cathedra,* No. 3 (1977), 3–29.

41. Cf. Nachum Gross's history of the APB, "Sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit, 1902–1918," *Banka'i le-uma be-hitḥadshuta: toldot Bank Le'umi le-Yisra'el,* Ramat Gan, 1977, 8–100.

42. The assets increased from RM 1,348,000 to RM 3,224,000. *Bericht des Action Comités der Zionistischen Organization an den XI. Zionisten-Congress,* Vienna, 1913, 57.

43. Compare the *Bericht des Action-Comités an den IX. Zionisten-Kongress in Hamburg,* 1909, to the committee's *Bericht . . . an den X. Kongress in Basel,* 1911; see also the Tenth Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 52–63, 257–65.

44. Tchlenov in *Die Welt* XVI, No. 36, 6 September 1912, 1104; Ussishkin in *Die Welt* XVII, No. 13, 28 March 1913, 403–404.

45. Norman Bentwich, "Bericht über zionistische Palästina-arbeit," typed manuscript dated 1911, CZA Z2/646; English translation in CZA Z3/1516.

46. Bodenheimer to JNF directorium, June 1910, in CZA A15/VI/5; *Bericht . . . an den X. Zionisten-Kongress,* 41ff.; Ruppin to PLDC, 5 September 1911, CZA L1/97. As late as 1912, credit from the JNF constituted approximately 30 percent of the PLDC's 300,000 marks of share capital. Curt Nawratzki, *Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas,* Munich, 1914, 235.

47. *Bericht des Direktoriums des PLDC,* 30 December 1912, CZA Z3/1516.

48. Reports dated 28 December 1911 and 30 December 1912, CZA Z3/1516; reports covering the first half of 1912 and the second half of 1913, CZA Z3/1517. See also Gross to Kaplansky, 17 December 1911, CZA A137/121.

49. For example, PLDC to Hantke, 10 January 1913, CZA Z3/1516.

50. *Die Welt* XVI, No. 36, 6 September 1912, 1102; *Die Welt* XVII, No. 4, 24 January 1913, 107.

51. *Die jüdische Rundschau,* 20 May 1910, 235–36.

52. Yosef Katz, *Ge'ula titnu la-arez: ḥevrat "Ge'ula" li-rkhishat karka'ot, 1902–1914,* Jerusalem, 1988, 166–74.

53. Arthur Ruppin, "Die Anglage von Pflanzungen in Palästina," *Palästina* VIII, Nos. 1–2 (1911), 34–42; Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 93–96; Yosef Katz, "Mif'al ha-'aḥuzot' be-Erez Yisra'el, 1908–1917," *Cathedra,* No. 22 (1982), 119–44.

54. Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 106–107.

55. Ruppin to PLDC, 5 September 1911, CZA L1/97.

56. Ruppin to the Actions Committee, 25 May 1914, CZA Z3/1527.

57. Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 101–105; Katz, *Ge'ula,* 174–76.

58. Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 22 October 1911, CZA W/140.

59. H. Albrecht, "Die Kleinsiedlung in Deutschland mit Beschränkung des Eigentums am Grund und Boden," *Erez Israel,* No. 3 (1919), 17–38.

60. Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 22 October 1911, CZA W/140; Ruppin, "Die Landarbeiterfrage in Palästina," *Palästina* IX (1912), 64–75.

61. Ruppin to Actions Committee, 1 July 1914, Z3/1527; Adolf Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung,* Tel Aviv, 1935, I, 439, and chart on 710–13; Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 117; Yehuda Slutsky, *Mavo le-toldot tenua't ha-'avoda ha-yisre'elit,* Tel Aviv, 1973, 242.

62. Warburg and Hantke to Ruppin, 24 January 1912; Hantke and Sokolov to Ruppin, 29 January 1912, CZA L2/26/II.

63. Kaplansky at the Sixth Congress of the Austrian Po'alei Ẓion, in *Die Welt* XVI, No. 43, 25 October 1912, 1335–36; Eleventh Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 367.

64. GAC meetings of 3 January and 27–28 February 1914, CZA Z3/464.

65. Wolffsohn to Kaplansky, 30 January 1910, CZA A137/122; Gross to Kaplansky, 6 October 1911, CZA A137/121; Bodenheimer to Warburg, 29 October 1913, CZA A12/79; Gross to Pasmanik, 2 March 1914, CZA KKLI/464.

66. Speech of 1913 by Kaplansky in Mendel Singer, *Shlomo Kaplansky: ḥayav u-fo'olo,* Jerusalem, 1971, I, 282–87; Kaplansky and Gross to Oppenheimer, 5 February 1914, CZA A161/1.

67. See Kaplansky's review of W. D. Preyer's *Die Arbeits und Pachtgenossenschaften Italiens* in *Die Welt* XVIII, No. 9, 27 February 1914, 206–10. For a general discussion of the Italian cooperatives, see Edward Archibald Lloyd, *The Co-operative Movement in Italy, with Special Reference to Agriculture, Labour, and Production: A Short Study,* New York, 1926, 79–96.

68. Kaplansky speech reproduced in *Die Welt* XVI, No. 40, 2 October 1912, 1243–44; No. 43, 25 October 1912, 1335–36; and at the Fourth Congress of the World Union of the Po'alei Ẓion, *Die Welt* XVII, No. 40, 1 October 1913, 1371–72; and No. 41, 8 October 1913, 1404.

69. Bodenheimer and Gross to Böhm, 12 December 1914, CZA A141/17; Wilkansky, "Ha-ḥavurot be-Italiya" and "Ḥavurot ha-hitnaḥlut be-Italiya" in *Ba-derekh,* Jaffa, 1918, 149–66.

70. Warburg to Bodenheimer, 18 April 1911, CZA A15/VI/6.

71. Bodenheimer to the Actions Committee, 27 July 1914, CZA A12/77.

72. Getzel Kressel, *Megilat ha-adama. Sefer rishon: korot,* Jerusalem, 1950, 50–53. The JNF's land policy before 1914 (or lack thereof) has been thoroughly treated by Ẓvi Shilony, "Ha-Keren ha-Kayemet le-Yisra'el ke-gorem be-iẓuv ha-nof ha-yishuvi shel Ereẓ Yisra'el me-az hakamata ve-'ad li-froẓ milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona, 1897–1914," Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1987; and summarily by Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 25–28, 69–72.

73. Meeting of the JNF directorium, 11 April 1910, CZA Z2/611.

74. *Bericht . . . an den X. Zionisten-Kongress,* 47; cf. Bodenheimer at the Tenth Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 113.

75. From Bodenheimer's debate with Davis Trietsch in *Die Welt* XVIII, No. 28, 10 July 1914, 718–20.

76. Bodenheimer to Warburg, 13 February 1911, CZA KKLII/6. Cf. Bodenheimer to Warburg, 3 March 1910, CZA A15/VI/5; and Bodenheimer to Oppenheimer, 11 March 1910, CZA KKLII/6.

77. On the company's misuse of the JNF grant, see Levontin to Wolffsohn, 24 May 1909, CZA A15/IV/3. On Bodenheimer's awareness of speculation at Tel Aviv, see Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 3 June 1914, CZA A12/77; at 'Ein Ganim, Bodenheimer to Odessa Committee, 4 February 1914, CZA A12/75.

78. Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 3 June 1914, CZA A12/77.

79. Meeting of the JNF directorium, 9 June 1914, CZA KKLII/2.

80. Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 23 April 1914, CZA Z12/77; see also Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 13 February 1914, CZA A12/75.

81. Cf. Ruppin, "Die Nationalisierung des Bodens," *Erez Israel,* No. 3 (1919), 47–56, and *Der Aufbau des Landes Israel: Ziele und Wege jüdischer Siedlungsarbeit in Palästina,* Berlin, 1919, 153–54.

82. Shilo, *Nisyonot be-hityashvut,* 184–86.

83. Bodenheimer, *Bericht über die erste ordentliche Generalversammlung des JNF,* 6 May 1907, CZA A15/VI/1; SAC meeting of 24 December 1908, CZA Z2/225; Ruppin to JNF, 23 February 1909, CZA Z2/634; Ninth Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 165.

84. JNF general assembly meeting of 11 April 1910, CZA Z2/611; SAC meeting of 14 April 1910, CZA Z2/225; Zionist Central Office to Ruppin, 18 April 1910, CZA L2/26/I; Ruppin to JNF, 22 May 1911, 8 June 1911, CZA L1/97.

85. *Bericht . . . an den XI. Zionisten-Kongress,* 115; "Die Aufgaben des NF," *Erez Israel, Wolffsohn Gedenknummer,* 1915, 14–19. The construction operation featured one characteristic that would become all too familiar in the future history of the relations between Diaspora Zionism and the Yishuv: Bodenheimer was forced to warn prospective donors to the dwelling fund that donors could not have commemorative name plates installed on the doors of the houses. JNF Central Office to Ruppin, 8 October 1913, CZA A12/75; JNF Central Office to Austrian NF Central Office, 16 July 1912, CZA KKLI/609.

86. *Die Welt* XVI, No. 38, 20 September 1912, 1180; *Bericht . . . an den XI. Zionisten-Kongress,* 115–16.

87. Bodenheimer and Gross to Böhm, 12 February 1914, CZA A141/17; meeting of JNF directorium, 3 May 1914, CZA KKLII/2.

88. Bodenheimer's report in CZA A15/VI/8; Akiva Ettinger, *The Tasks of the Jewish National Fund,* The Hague, 1917, 10–11; Abraham Granovsky, "Der Staat und die Privatinitiative in der Aufforstung," *Erez Israel,* No. 4 (1920), 14–35; report on JNF activities in *Erez Israel,* No. 5 (1920), 43–46. There are insightful comments on this issue in Shilony, "Ha-Keren ha-Kayemet," I, 142–46, II, 6–7.

89. First Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 137–48.

90. *Bericht . . . an den X. Zionisten-Kongress,* 41; Eleventh Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 183, 279–82.

91. See Bodenheimer's pamphlet, *Was bedeutet uns der NF?,* in CZA A15/I/4; Bodenheimer at JNF central committee meeting, *Die Welt* XVI, No. 37, 13 September 1912, 1127–29.

92. Bodenheimer to Warburg, 13 February 1911, CZA KKLII/6.

93. Bodenheimer to Oppenheimer, 5 February 1913; Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 16 April 1913; Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 30 April 1913, CZA KKLII/9; Bodenheimer to Oppenheimer, 9 May 1913; Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 21 May 1913, CZA A12/83.

94. Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 11 February 1914, CZA A12/74; see also Bodenheimer's report on his 1912 visit, CZA A15/VI/8.

95. Ruppin to JNF, 7 February 1912, CZA A121/91/II.

96. Bodenheimer to members of the board of Erez Israel, 28 October 1913, CZA KKLII/333; JNF central office to Judah Magnes, JNF United States, 23 September 1913, CZA KKLI/464.

97. Bodenheimer to Freiherr von Mirbach, Imperial Oberhofmeister, 28 May 1912; Bodenheimer to Foreign Ministry Secretary von Kiderlen Wächter, 29 May 1912, CZA A15/VI/7.

98. Impressed by his work on tropical agriculture, Warburg brought Zagorodsky into the Zionist Organization, touting him as "similar to Wilkansky." Warburg to Ruppin, 21 October 1910, CZA L2/21/I; Warburg and Hantke to Wolffsohn, 22 February 1912; Warburg and Hantke to Bodenheimer, 22 February 1912, CZA W/140. Once hired, Ruppin sent him to Ben Shemen. Ruppin to Actions Committee, 21 January 1912, CZA Z3/1447; Zionist Central Office to Shmaryahu Levin, 11 March 1912, CZA L2/26/II.

99. Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 7 January 1914, CZA A12/76. On *Ha-Ḥakla'i,* see Zagorodsky to Ruppin, 8 February 1912, CZA L2/3/III; *Die Welt* XVI, No. 31, 2 August 1912, 932; Adolf Böhm, *The Jewish National Fund,* The Hague, 1917, 31.

100. Bodenheimer to Erez Israel, 28 October 1913, CZA KKL1/333; see also Bodenheimer and Gross to Böhm, 12 February 1914, CZA A141/17; Bodenheimer and Kaplansky to Oppenheimer, 17 February 1914, CZA KKLI/464; Bodenheimer to JNF directorium, 2 June 1914, CZA A12/77; Bodenheimer to Erez Israel, 4 June 1914, CZA KKLII/2.

101. "Die Aufgaben des NF," *Erez Israel. Wolffsohn Gedenknummer,* 14–19; see also Gross in *Erez Israel,* No. 2 (1917), 113–20. A "Pioneer Fund" was set up during the war, but it raised only 50,000 francs. JNF report in *Erez Israel,* No. 5 (1920), 12.

102. *Die Welt* XVIII, No. 7, 13 February 1914, 173; No. 10, 6 March 1914, 247–49; and No. 12, 20 March 1914, 296–97.

103. Bodenheimer to Warburg, 16 November 1913; meeting of JNF directorium, 25 November 1913, CZA A12/75.

104. Bodenheimer to Warburg, 16 November 1913; meeting of the JNF directorium, 25 November 1913, CZA A12/75; JNF to Jacobson, 26 May 1913; Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 10 December 1913 and 8 January 1914; JNF to unknown recipient, 5 February 1914, all in CZA L2/68/II; Bodenheimer to G. Zipper, 3 April 1914, CZA KKLII/19.

105. Akiva Ettinger, *'Im ḥakla'im yehudiyim ba-tefuẓot,* Merḥavia, 1942, 13.

106. Ettinger, *'Im ḥakla'im 'ivrim be-arẓeinu,* Tel Aviv, 1945, 34–36; see also the documents on his visit in CZA A111/21a.

107. Ettinger, *'Im ḥakla'im 'ivrim be-arẓeinu,* 41.

108. Warburg to Herzl, 6 September 1903, in *Sefer Warburg: korot ḥayav, divrei-ha'arakha, mikhtavim, ne'umim u-ma'amarim,* Ya'akov Thon, ed., Jerusalem, 1948, 83; Ruppin to Warburg, 30 July 1911, CZA L1/44.

109. Warburg to JNF directorium, 20 April 1911, CZA L2/21/II; Ruppin at the Eleventh Zionist Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 248.

110. Ruppin to Bodenheimer, 3 March 1914; Bodenheimer to Ruppin, 16 March 1914 and 28 April 1914, CZA KKL2/69. See also the remarks of Bodenheimer, Warburg, and Tchlenov at the JNF directorium meeting of 3 May 1914, CZA KKL2/19, pp. 11–12.

111. Ettinger to Actions Committee, 23 November 1913, with reference to the Actions Committee's letter to Ettinger of 6 September 1913, CZA KKL2/69; Ettinger, *'Im ḥakla'im 'ivrim be-arẓeinu,* 42–43.

112. On Yishuv-Diaspora relations during World War I, see Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung,* I, 643–50; and Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 115–39. On American Zionism during the war, see Melvin Urofsky, *American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust*, Garden City, N.Y., 1975, esp. 195–245.

113. Jewish National Fund, *25 Jahre Keren Kayemeth Le-Yisrael (5662–5687),* Jerusalem, 1927, 39.

114. Wilkansky to Thon, n.d., 1917, CZA L2/33; *Erez Israel,* No. 1 (1916), 67; No. 2 (1917), 102–104; No. 3 (1919), 114–16; Ẓvi Even-Shoshan, *Toldot tenua't ha-po'alim be-Ereẓ Yisra'el,* Tel Aviv, 1963, I, 283–84; Simon Schama, *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel,* New York, 1978, 216, 221–22; Nakdimon Rogel, *Ha-yoẓim el ereẓ ẓafon: reshitan shel kevuẓot ha-po'alim be-eẓba'-ha-galil, 1916–1920,* Jerusalem, 1987, 59–60.

115. Abraham Granovsky, "Nehemia de Lieme," *Palestine Review,* 22 November 1940, in CZA A202/163; Alex Bein, *Nehemia de Lieme,* Jerusalem, 1950 (Hebrew).

116. De Lieme, "Über die Palästinaarbeit," *Erez Israel,* No. 1 (1916), 5–31.

117. Julius Simon, "Kapitalbedarf, Erbpacht, und Nationalfonds," *Erez Israel,* No. 2 (1917), 86–94.

118. Shlomo Kaplansky, "Landarbeiterfrage und Genossenschaft," *Erez Israel,* No. 2 (1917), 3–28.

119. Wilkansky, "Der Grossbetrieb," *Erez Israel,* No. 2 (1917), 73–82.

120. Kaplansky to Oppenheimer, 22 December 1916, CZA A161/1.

121. Undated notice in CZA A121/103; de Lieme to Ussishkin, 16 January 1920, CZA A24/145/1(1).

122. Twelfth Congress, *Stenographisches Protokoll,* 342–51, 392–96. For an elaboration of Soskin's plan, see his *Small Holding and Irrigation,* London, 1920; and Nehemia de Lieme's review of the book in *Erez Israel,* No. 4 (1920), 93–102.

123. See "A Jewish Palestine: Proposals for Organized Settlement," typed manuscript dated May 1918, CZA A111/3; two unpublished reports by Ettinger, one undated, the other dated December 1917, in CZA A15/VI/17; and Ettinger, *The Tasks of the Jewish National Fund.*

124. Akiva Ettinger, "Die Bodenkultur bei den Juden," *Der Jude,* July 1916, 237–43.

125. Ettinger, *A Jewish Palestine,* p. 118, CZA A111/3.

126. Akiva Ettinger, *Methoden und Kapitalbedarf jüdischer Kolonisation in Palästina,* The Hague, 1916, 16–25; "Die praktischen Vorteile der Erbpacht," *Erez Israel,* No. 1 (1916), 32–41; "Landpacht und Agrarkredit in Australien und Neuseeland," *Erez Israel,* No. 3 (1919), 38–46.

127. Akiva Ettinger, undated wartime report in CZA A15/VI/17; "Die ländliche Arbeitergenossenschaft in Palästina," *Erez Israel,* No. 2 (1917), 29–45; "Zur Frage der praktischen Vorbereitung für den landwirtschaftlichen Beruf," *Erez Israel,* No. 3 (1919), 80–82.

128. Ettinger to Oppenheimer, 19 December 1916, CZA A161/1.

129. Ettinger, "Die ländliche Arbeitergenossenschaft in Palästina"; *'Im ḥakla'im 'ivrim be-arẓeinu,* 66–67.

130. Ettinger, "Die ländliche Arbeitergenossenschaft in Palästina," 42.

131. Böhm, *Die zionistische Bewegung,* II, 186–99, 217–26; Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 152–56.

132. On Ettinger, see the Conclusion, below. On Wilkansky's postwar activity, see Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* chapters 4 through 6 passim; and Kenneth Stein, *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917–1939,* Chapel Hill, 1984, 94.

Conclusion

1. Nachum Gross and Jacob Metser, "Public Finance in the Jewish Economy in Interwar Palestine," *Research in Economic History* III (1978), 87–159, especially 120. See also Gideon Biger, *Moshevet keter o-beyit le'umi? Hashpa'at ha-shilton ha-briti 'al Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1917–1930,* Jerusalem, 1983; Nachum Gross, "The Economic Policy of the Mandatory Government of Palestine," *Research in Economic History* IX (1984), 143–85.

2. *Zionist Work during 1921/22: Reports of the Executive of the Zionist Organization to the Annual Conference,* Carlsbad, 1922, 84; Alex Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit mi-tekufat Herzl ve'ad yameinu,* 4th ed., Ramat Gan, 1970, 234–38; Ḥagit Lavsky, *Yesodot ha-takẓiv la-mif'al ha-ẓioni: va'ad ha-ẓirim, 1918–1921,* Jerusalem, 1980, 81–99.

3. Bein, *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit,* 278–79.

4. Cf. Evyatar Friesl, *Ha-mediniyut ha-ẓionit le-aḥar haẓharat Balfour, 1917–1922,* Tel Aviv, 1977; Jacob Metser, *Hon le'umi le-bayit le'umi, 1919–1921,* Jerusalem, 1979.

5. Lavsky, *Yesodot,* 99–114.

6. Ruppin, *Tagebücher, Briefe, Erinnerungen,* Shlomo Krolik, ed., Königstein/Ts., 1985, 296–98, 319–20, 331–32.

7. Weizmann at the GAC meeting of 17 February 1920, CZA Z4/252/7.

8. Zev Ẓaḥor, *Ba-derekh le-hanhagat ha-Yishuv: ha-Histadrut be-reshita,* Jerusalem, 1982, 265–66. On the complex relationship between Labor, Weizmann, and the WZO during the 1920s and beyond, see Ẓaḥor, 265–87; Yosef Gorny, *Aḥdut ha-'avoda, 1919–1930: ha-yesodot ha-ra'yoniyim ve-ha-shita ha-medinit,* Tel Aviv, 1973, 265–95; and idem, *Shutafut u-ma'avak: Chaim Weizmann u-tenua't ha-'avoda ha-yehudit be-Ereẓ Yisra'el,* Tel Aviv, 1976.

9. See the sources cited in the previous note as well as Henry Near, *Ha-kibbuẓ ve-ha-ḥevra: ha-Kibbuẓ ha-Me'uḥad, 1923–1933,* Jerusalem, 1984, 193–94.

10. Daniel Headrick, *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940,* New York, 1988, 345 and n. 118 ad loc.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

A. Archival Sources

1. Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem:

A. INSTITUTIONAL ARCHIVES

Z1: Central Zionist Office—Vienna, 1897–1905
Z2: Central Zionist Office—Cologne, 1905–1911
Z3: Central Zionist Office—Berlin, 1911–1914
L1: Committee for the Exploration of Palestine and the Palestine Department, Berlin
L2: Palestine Office, Jaffa
L42: Arts and Crafts Academy "Bezalel"
KKL1: Jewish National Fund, Vienna–Cologne–The Hague
KKL2: Jewish National Fund, Cologne–The Hague
KKL3: Jewish National Fund, Jaffa–Tel Aviv–Jerusalem
J15: Jewish Colonization Association

B. PRIVATE ARCHIVES

A12: Otto Warburg
A15: Max Bodenheimer
A24: Menaḥem Ussishkin
A104: Davis Trietsch
A107: Arthur Ruppin
A111: Akiva Ettinger
A137: Shlomo Kaplansky
A141: Adolf Böhm
A142: Alfred Klee
A148: Ya'akov Thon
A161: Franz Oppenheimer
A210: Yiẓḥak Elazar-Volcani (Wilkansky)

2. Central Archive for the History of the Jewish People, Jerusalem:

Archive of Judah L. Magnes
Archive of the Jewish Colonization Association

B. Printed Sources

1. Journals. Articles that appeared in the following journals are not cited separately in the bibliography:

Altneuland ([*Palästina*], Berlin, 1904–1912)
He-aḥdut (Jerusalem, 1910–1914)
Erez Israel (The Hague, 1916–1920)
Die jüdische Rundschau (Berlin, 1902–1914)
Palästina (Berlin, 1902–1903)
Ha-Po'el Ha-Ẓa'ir (Jaffa, 1907–1914)
Der Tropenpflanzer (Berlin, 1897–1914)
Die Welt (Vienna and Cologne, 1897–1914)

2. Books, articles, pamphlets, and collections of documents:

Agnon, Shmuel Yosef. *Esterlein yekirati: mikhtavim 5684–5691 (1924–1931)* (My Dear Little Esther: Letters, 1924–1931). Jerusalem, 1983.

Aḥad ha-'Am. *Kol kitvei Aḥad ha-'Am* (Collected Writings of Aḥad ha-'Am). Jerusalem, 1961.

Alliance Israélite Universelle. *Bulletin semestriel*. 1868–1914.

Archiv für Innere Kolonisation. IX v. Berlin, 1908–1917.

Bein, Alex. "Correspondence between Franz Oppenheimer and Theodor Herzl." *Herzl Year Book VII* (1971), 89–127.

Ben-Ẓvi, Yiẓḥak. *Zikhronot u-reshumot: me-ha-ne'urim ve-'ad 1920* (Memoirs: From My Youth to 1920). Jerusalem, 1965.

Bodenheimer, Henriette Hannah, ed. *Toldot tokhnit Basel. Milḥemet ha-de'ot lifnei ha-kongress ha-ẓioni ha-rishon lefi ḥalifat ha-mikhtavim bein Prof. Hermann Shapira u-vein Dr. Max I. Bodenheimer* (The History of the Basel Program: The Clash of Opinions before the First Zionist Congress According to the Correspondence between Professor Hermann Shapira and Dr. Max Bodenheimer). Jerusalem, 1947.

———. *Im Anfang der zionistischen Bewegung: eine Dokumentation auf der Grundlage des Briefwechsels zwischen Theodor Herzl und Max Bodenheimer von 1896–1904*. Frankfurt a.M., 1965.

———. *Der Durchbruch des politischen Zionismus in Köln, 1890- 1900*. Cologne, 1978.

Bodenheimer, Max Isidor. *Wohin mit den russischen Juden?* Hamburg, 1891.

———. *Prelude to Israel: The Memoirs of M. I. Bodenheimer*. New York, 1963.

Böhm, Adolf. *The Jewish National Fund*. The Hague, 1917.

Brockhaus' Konversations-Lexicon. 14th ed. Leipzig, 1894.

Brown, John Croumbie. *African Fever and Culture of the Blue Gumtree to Counteract Malaria in India*. Aberdeen, 1890.

Dehn, Paul. *Von deutscher Kolonial- und Weltpolitik*. Berlin, 1907.

Deutscher Kolonialkongress. *Verhandlungen*. Berlin, 1902, 1905, 1910.

Dinur, Ben Ẓion, et al., eds. *Sefer toldot ha-hagana* (The History of the Hagana). I, 1. Tel Aviv, 1954.

Esra Verein. *Festschrift zum 25. Jubiläum des "Esra," Verein zur Unterstützung ackerbautreibender Juden in Palästina und Syrien, nebst Bericht für die Jahre 1906, 1907, 1908, und 1909*. Berlin, 1909.

Ettinger, Akiva Jacob. *Methoden und Kapitalbedarf jüdischer Kolonisation in Palästina*. The Hague, 1916.

———. *The Tasks of the Jewish National Fund*. The Hague, 1917.

———. *'Im ḥakla'im yehudiyim ba-tefuẓot* (With Jewish Farmers in the Diaspora). Merḥavia, 1942.

———. *'Im ḥakla'im 'ivrim be-arẓeinu* (With Hebrew Farmers in Our Land). Tel Aviv, 1945.

Göhre, Paul. *Das Warenhaus*. Frankfurt a.M., 1907.

Granovsky, Abraham. *Land Problems in Palestine*. Jerusalem, 1926.

Grothe, Hugo. *Auf türkischer Erde. Reisebilder und Studien*. Berlin, 1903.

Ḥabas, Braḥa, ed. *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-sheniya* (The Book of the Second 'Aliya). Tel Aviv, 1947.

Harteck, Max, ed. *Damaschke und die Bodenreform: aus dem Leben eines Volksmannes*. Berlin, 1929.

Hartmann, Dr. jur. "Die deutschen Betriebsgenossenschaften in der Provinz Posen." *Die Ostmark*, Waldemar O. E. Mitscherlich, ed. Leipzig, 1911, 118–31.

Helfferich, Karl Theodor. *Georg von Siemens: ein Lebensbild aus Deutschlands grosser Zeit*. III v. Berlin, 1923.

Herzl, Theodor. *Old-New Land (Altneuland)*. New York, 1960.

———. *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, Raphael Patai, ed., and Harry Zohn, tr. New York, 1960.

———. *The Jewish State.* New York, 1970.
———. *Zionist Writings,* Harry Zohn, ed. and tr. II v. New York, 1975.
Heymann, Michael, ed. *The Uganda Controversy.* Jerusalem, v. I, 1970; v. II, 1977.
Ish ha-adama: le-rabi Eliyahu Krause, la-ḥazi yovel shanim mi-yom bo'o lekhahen ki-menahel be-Mikve Yisra'el (Man of the Earth: In Honor of Eliyahu Krause, on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of His Arrival to Serve as Administrator of Mikve Yisra'el). Tel Aviv, 1939.
Jewish Colonization Association. *Rapport de l'administration centrale au conseil d'administration.* Paris, 1896–1914.
———. *Séances du conseil d'administration.* Paris, I, 1896–1899; II, 1900–1901.
Jewish National Fund. *25 Jahre Keren Kayemeth Le-Yisrael (5662- 5687).* Jerusalem, 1927.
Joffe, Eliezer. *Yesud moshvei 'ovdim* (The Foundation of Smallholders' Cooperatives). Jaffa, 1919.
Kaplansky, Shlomo. *Ḥazon ve-hagshama* (Vision and Fulfillment). Merḥavia, 1950.
Katznelson Shazar, Rachel, ed. *The Plough Woman: Records of the Pioneer Women of Palestine.* New York, 1932.
Larousse, Pierre, ed. *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle.* Paris, 1865–1890.
Laskov, Shulamit, ed. *Ketavim le-toldot Ḥibat Ẓion ve-yishuv Erez Yisra'el* (Writings on the History of Ḥibat Ẓion and the Settlement of the Land of Israel). V v. Tel Aviv, 1982–1988. (Original series edited by Alter Druyanow, III v., Odessa and Tel Aviv, 1919–1932.)
Levontin, Zalman David. *Le-erez avoteinu* (To the Land of Our Fathers). III v. Tel Aviv, 5684–5688 (1923/24–1927/28).
Meyer, Hermann Julius, ed. *Meyers Konversations-Lexicon.* Leipzig and Vienna, 5th ed., 1895; 6th ed., 1906–1913.
Mintz, Matityahu, ed. and tr. *Va'idat Krakov shel mifleget Po'alei Ẓion be-Russiya, 1907 (te'udot)* (The Cracow Conference of Po'alei Zion in Russia [Documents]). Tel Aviv, 1979.
Niégo, Joseph. *Cinquante années de travail dans les oeuvres juives: allocutions et conférences.* Istanbul, 1933.
Oppenheimer, Franz. *Grossgrundeigentum und soziale Frage: Versuch einer neuen Grundlegung der Gesellschaftswissenschaft.* Berlin, 1898.
———. *Die Siedlungsgenossenschaft: Versuch einer positiven Überwindung des Kommunismus durch Lösung des Genossenschaftsproblems und der Agrarfrage.* 2d ed. Jena, 1913.
———. *Gesammelte Reden und Aufsätze.* II v. Munich, 1924–1926.
———. *Erlebtes, Erstrebtes, Erreichtes: Lebenserinnerungen.* Düsseldorf, 1964.
Richarz, Monika, ed. *Jüdisches Leben in Deutschland: Selbstzeugnisse zur Sozialgeschichte.* III v. Stuttgart, 1979.
Ruppin, Arthur. *Darwinismus und Sozialwissenschaft.* Jena, 1903.
———. *Die Juden der Gegenwart: eine sozialwissenschaftliche Studie.* Berlin, 1904. 2d ed., Cologne, 1911.
———. *Der Aufbau des Landes Israel: Ziele und Wege jüdischer Siedlungsarbeit in Palästina.* Berlin, 1919.
———. *The Agricultural Colonization of the Zionist Organization in Palestine.* 1926. Reprint, Westport, Conn., 1976.
———. "Twenty-five Years of Palestine: A Resumé of Jewish Effort and Achievement." *Theodor Herzl: A Memorial,* Meyer Weisgal, ed. New York, 1929, 195–210.
———. *Three Decades of Palestine: Speeches and Papers on the Upbuilding of the Jewish National Home.* 1936. Reprint, Westport, Conn., 1975.
———. *Pirkei ḥayai* (Chapters from My Life), Alex Bein, ed. III v. Tel Aviv, 1968.
———. *Arthur Ruppin: Memoirs, Diaries, Letters,* Alex Bein, ed. London and Jerusalem, 1972.
———. *Tagebücher, Briefe, Erinnerungen,* Shlomo Krolik, ed. Königstein/Ts., 1985.
Scheid, Elie. *Zikhronot, 1883–1899* (Memoirs, 1883–1899), Aharon Amir, tr. Jerusalem, 1983.

Sering, Max. *Die innere Kolonisation im östlichen Deutschland.* Leipzig, 1893.
Shapira, Ẓvi Hermann. *Ketavim ẓioniyim* (Zionist Writings). Jerusalem, 1925.
Simon, A. Moritz. *Soziales zur Judenfrage.* Frankfurt a.M., 1903.
Singer, Mendel. *Shlomo Kaplansky: ḥayav u-fo'olo* (Shlomo Kaplansky: His Life and Work). II v. Jerusalem, 1971.
Soskin, Selig Eugen. *Small Holding and Irrigation.* London, 1920.
Stumpfe, Emil. *Polenfrage und Ansiedlungskommission: Darstellung der staatlichen Kolonisation in Posen-Westpreussen und kritische Betrachtungen über ihre Erfolge.* Berlin, 1902.
Tannenberg, Otto Richard. *Gross-Deutschland. Die Arbeit des 20. Jahrhunderts.* Leipzig, 1911.
Thon, Ya'akov, ed. *Sefer Warburg: korot ḥayav, divrei-ha'arakha, mikhtavim, ne'umim u-ma'amarim* (The Warburg Book: Biography, Testimonials, Letters, Speeches, and Articles). Jerusalem, 1948.
Tuch, Gustav. *Der erweiterte deutsche Militärstaat in seiner sozialen Bedeutung.* Leipzig, 1886.
Ussishkin, Menaḥem. *Our Program.* New York, 1905.
Verein zur Förderung der Bodenkultur unter den Juden Deutschlands. *Jahresberichte.* 1898–1914.
von Both, Oberregierungsrat. "Die staatliche Ansiedlungstätigkeit in Westpreussen und Posen." *Die Ostmark,* Waldemar O. E. Mitscherlich, ed. Leipzig, 1911, 75–94.
Warburg, Otto. *Die aus den deutschen Kolonien exportierten Produkten und deren Verwertung in der Industrie.* Berlin, 1896.
———. *Warum ist die Errichtung eines wissenschaftlich-technischen Laboratoriums in den botanischen Garten zu Viktoria erförderlich?* Berlin, 1899.
———. "Über wissenschaftliche Institute für Kolonialwirtschaft." *Verhandlungen des deutschen Kolonialkongresses.* Berlin, 1902.
———. *Die Baumwollkultur im Gebiete der Bagdadbahn in Verbindung mit der Kolonisation osteuropäischer Juden.* Berlin, 1905.
———. *Die Zukunft Palästinas und unsre Aufgaben daselbst.* Vienna, 1906.
———. *Syrien als Wirtschafts- und Kolonisationsgebiet.* Berlin, 1907.
———. "Die türkische Landwirtschaft und ihre Bedeutung für Deutschland." *Asien. Organ der Deutsch-Asiatischen Gesellschaft.* XV, No. 3 (1917), 12–17, 49–51.
Weber, Max. "The National State and Economic Policy." *Nineteenth Century Europe: Liberalism and Its Critics* (University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization, v. VIII), Jan Goldstein and John Boyer, eds. Chicago, 1988, 438–60.
Weisgal, Meyer, ed. *Theodor Herzl: A Memorial.* New York, 1929.
Weizmann, Chaim. *Trial and Error.* New York, 1949.
Wilkansky (Elazar-Volcani), Yiẓḥak. *Ba-derekh* (En Route). Jaffa, 1918.
Zionist Organization. *Stenographisches Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Zionisten-Kongresses.* I, Vienna, 1897; II, Vienna, 1898; III, Vienna, 1899; IV, Vienna, 1900; V, Vienna, 1901; VI, Vienna, 1903; VII, Berlin, 1905; VIII, Cologne, 1907; IX, Cologne, 1910; X, Berlin, 1911; XI, Berlin and Leipzig, 1913; XII, Berlin, 1922.
———. *Bericht des Action-Comités der Zionistischen Organization an den Kongress:* IX, Cologne, 1909; X, Berlin, 1911; XI, Berlin, 1913.
———. *Economic Activities in Palestine: Report Submitted to the 12th Zionist Congress Held at Carlsbad, September, 1921.* Jerusalem and London, 1921.
———. *Zionist Work during 1921/22: Reports of the Executive of the Zionist Organization to the Annual Conference.* Carlsbad, 1922.

C. Interviews

Naomi Feinbrun, Department of Botany, Hebrew University, 9 January 1985.
Rafi Ruppin, Moshav Makhmoret, 2 March 1985.

Secondary Sources

Aaronsohn, Ran. "Hakamatan ve-reshitan shel Zikhron-Ya'akov ve-Rishon le-Ẓion ke-moshavot ḥakla'iyot" (The Establishment and the Initial Development of Zikhron

Ya'akov and Rishon le-Zion as Two of the First Jewish Colonies in Palestine, 1882-1883), M.A. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1979.

———. "Shelavim be-hekmat moshavot ha-'aliya ha-rishona u-ve-hitpaṭhutan" (Stages in the Development of the First 'Aliya). *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya), Mordechai Eliav, ed. Jerusalem, 1981, I, 25–84.

———. "Tefisot ha-hityashvut shel mekayemei ha-moshavot ha-rishonot be-Ereẓ Yisra'el" (Conceptions of Settlement of the Founders of the First Colonies in Palestine). *Hagira ve-hityashvut be-Yisra'el u-ve-'amim* (Immigration and Settlement in Israel and among the Nations), Avigdor Shinan, ed. Jerusalem, 1982, 225–32.

———. "Ha-moshavot ha-'ivriyot be-reshitan u-terumat ha-Baron Rothschild le-hitpaṭhutan ha-yishuvit, 1882–1890" (The Jewish Colonies at Their Inception and the Contribution of Baron Rothschild to Their Development, 1882–1890). Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1985.

———. "Tokhnit Netter-Rothschild: teḥilat pe'ulato ha-yishuvit shel ha-Baron be-Ereẓ Yisra'el" (The Netter-Rothschild Program: The Beginnings of Rothschild's Settlement Activity in Palestine). *Cathedra,* No. 44 (1987), 55–79.

Adler, Joseph. "Herzl's Philosophy of New Humanism." *Herzl Year Book III* (1960), 175–97.

Adler-Rudel, S. *Ostjuden in Deutschland, 1880–1940.* Tübingen, 1959.

Akin, William. *Technocracy and the American Dream: The Technocrat Movement, 1900–1941.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1977.

Albert, Phyllis Cohen. *The Modernization of French Jewry: Consistory and Community in the 19th Century.* Hanover, N.H., 1977.

Almog, Shmuel. "Alfred Nossig: A Reappraisal." *Studies in Zionism,* No. 7 (1983), 1–29.

———. *Zionism and History: The Rise of a New Jewish Consciousness.* New York and Jerusalem, 1987.

Alsberg, Paul A. "Mediniyut ha-hanhala ha-ẓionit mi-moto shel Herzl ve-'ad milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona" (The Policy of the Zionist Executive from Herzl's Death to the First World War), Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1957.

———. "Ha-she'ela ha-'aravit bi-mediniyut ha-hanhala ha-ẓionit lifnei milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona" (The Arab Question in the Policy of the Zionist Executive before the First World War). *Shivat Ẓion* IV (1956), 161–209.

Angst, Doris. "Nichtzionisten in Palästina. Die Rolle der Jewish Colonization Association, 1900–1924." M.A. thesis, Universität Zürich, 1977.

Aschheim, Steven. *Brothers and Strangers: The East European Jew in German and German-Jewish Consciousness, 1800–1923.* Madison, Wis., 1982.

Augé-Laribé, Michel. *La politique agricole de la France de 1880 à 1940.* Paris, 1950.

August, Thomas G. *The Selling of the Empire: British and French Imperialist Propaganda, 1890–1940.* Westport, Conn., 1985.

Avineri, Shlomo. *The Making of Modern Zionism: Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State.* New York, 1981.

Aviẓur, Shmuel. "Terumata shel Petaḥ Tikva le-kiduma ha-ḥakla'i ve-ha-ta'asiyati shel ha-areẓ ba-shelavim ha-rishonim le-kiyuma (1878–1918)" (The Contribution of Petaḥ Tikva to the Agricultural and Industrial Progress of the Land in the First Phases of Its Existence, 1878–1918). *Cathedra,* No. 10 (1979), 129–41.

———. *Mamẓiyim u-me'ameẓim: meḥolelei ha-mahpekha be-darkhei ha-yiẓur ba-areẓ* (Inventors and Adapters: Initiators of the Production Revolution in the Land). Jerusalem, 1986.

Avneri, Arieh L. *Ha-hityashvut ha-yehudit ve-ta'anat ha-nishul, 1878–1948* (Jewish Settlement and the Claim of Expropriation, 1878–1948). Tel Aviv, 1980.

Avni, Ḥaim. *Argentina, "ha-areẓ ha-ye'uda": mif'al ha-hityashvut shel ha-Baron de Hirsch be-Argentina* (Argentina, "The Promised Land": The Settlement Enterprise of the Baron de Hirsch in Argentina). Jerusalem, 1973.

Barkin, Kenneth. "Adolf Wagner and German Industrial Development." *Journal of Modern History* XLI, No. 2 (1969), 144-59.

———. *The Controversy over German Industrialization, 1890–1900.* Chicago, 1970.
———. "Conflict and Concord in Wilhelmine Social Thought." *Central European History* V, No. 1 (1972), 55–71.
Bartal, Israel. "'Tokhniot ha-hityashvut' miymei masa'o ha-sheni shel Montefiori le-Erez Yisra'el (1839)" (Settlement Proposals from the Time of Montefiore's Second Palestinian Journey of 1839). *Shalem* II (1976), 231–96.
———. "Petah Tikva—bein shorashim ra'yonim le-nesibot ha-zeman" (Petah Tikva—Between Intellectual Roots and Circumstances of the Time). *Cathedra,* No. 9 (1978), 54–69.
———. "'Old Yishuv' and 'New Yishuv': Image and Reality." *The Jerusalem Cathedra* I (1981), 215–31.
Bein, Alex. *Theodore Herzl.* Philadelphia, 1941.
———. *Nehemia de Lieme.* Jerusalem, 1950 (Hebrew).
———. *Toldot ha-hityashvut ha-zionit mi-tekufat Herzl ve-'ad yameinu* (The History of Zionist Settlement from Herzl's Period to Our Days). 4th ed. Ramat Gan, 1970.
———. "Arthur Ruppin: The Man and His Work" *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook XVII* (1972), 117–41.
———. "Franz Oppenheimer and Theodor Herzl." *Herzl Year Book VII* (1971), 71–89.
Bell, Daniel. *The Coming of Post-industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting.* New York, 1973.
Ben-Arieh, Yehoshua, and Bartal, Israel, eds. *Ha-historia shel Erez Yisra'el: shilhei ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit* (The History of Erez Israel: The End of the Ottoman Period). Jerusalem, 1983.
Ben-Artsi, Yossi. *Ha-moshava ha-'ivrit be-nof Erez Yisra'el, 1882–1914* (Jewish Moshava Settlements in Palestine, 1882–1914). Jerusalem, 1988.
———. "Tokhnito shel M. Meirovitch u-makoma be-toldot ha-hityashvut ha-kefarit ha-yehudit" (The Program of M. Meirovitch and Its Place in the History of Jewish Rural Settlement). *Zion* LIII, No. 3 (1988), 273–90.
Berkovitz, Jay R. *The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-Century France.* Detroit, 1989.
Berkowitz, Michael. "'Mind, Muscle, and Men': The Imagination of a Zionist National Culture for the Jews of Central and Western Europe, 1897–1914," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madison, 1989.
Bermann, Tamar. *Produktivierungsmythen und Antisemitismus: eine soziologische Studie.* Vienna, 1973.
Bertisch, Abraham. "A Study of the Political-Economic Philosophy of Arthur Ruppin and His Role in the Economic Development of the Zionist Settlement in Palestine from 1907–1943." Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1980.
Biger, Gideon. *Moshevet keter o-beyit le'umi? Hashpa'at ha-shilton ha-briti 'al Erez Yisra'el, 1917–1930* (Crown Colony or National Home? British Influence on Palestine, 1917–1930). Jerusalem, 1983.
Blanke, Richard. *Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871–1900).* New York, 1981.
Bodenheimer, Henriette Hannah. "The Statutes of the Keren Kayemeth: A Study of Their Origin, Based on the Known as Well as Hitherto Unpublished Sources." *Herzl Year Book VI* (1964–65), 153- 81.
Böhm, Adolf. *Die zionistische Bewegung.* II v. Tel Aviv, 1935.
Boyer, Pierre. *L'évolution de l'Algérie médiane (ancien département d'Alger) de 1830 à 1956.* Paris, 1960.
Braslavsky, Moshe. *Tenua't ha-po'alim ha-erez yisre'elit* (The Zionist Labor Movement in Palestine). IV v. Tel Aviv, 1955–1962.
Bruce-Chwatt, Leonard Jan, and de Zulueta, Julian. *The Rise and Fall of Malaria in Europe: A Historico-Epidemiological Study.* Oxford, 1980.
Brunschwig, Henri. *L'expansion allemande outre-mer du XVe siècle à nos jours.* Paris, 1957.
Carlisle, Robert B. *The Proffered Crown: Saint-Simonianism and the Doctrine of Hope.* Baltimore, 1987.

Carmel, Alex. *Hityashvut ha-Germanim be-Erez Yisra'el be-shilhei ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit: ba'ayoteiha ha-mediniyot ve-ha-bein-le'umiyot* (German Settlement in Palestine at the End of the Ottoman Period: Its Political and International Problems). Jerusalem, 1973.

———. "Ha-yishuv ha-yehudi, ha-shilton ha-'Ottomani, ve-ha-konsoliyot ha-zarot" (The Yishuv, the Ottoman Government, and the Foreign Consulates). *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya), Mordechai Eliav, ed. Jerusalem, 1981, I, 97–116.

Cornevin, Robert. *Histoire de la colonisation allemande.* Paris, 1969.

Cross, Kolleen. "Evolution of Colonial Agriculture: The Creation of the Algerian 'Vignoble.'" M.A. seminar paper, Northern Illinois University, 1988.

Dalin, David. "Cyrus Adler, Non-Zionism, and the Zionist Movement: A Study in Contradictions." *Association for Jewish Studies Review* X, No. 1 (1985), 55–87.

Davies, Norman. *God's Playground. A History of Poland.* II v. Oxford, 1981.

Doron, Joachim. "Ha-zionut ha-merkaz eyropit mul ideologiyot germaniyot bein ha-shanim 1885–1914: hakbalot ve-hashpa'ot" (The Impact of German Ideologies on Central European Zionism, 1885–1914). Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 1977.

———. "Rassenbewusstsein und naturwissenschaftliches Denken im deutschen Zionismus während der Wilhelminischen Ära." *Jahrbuch des Instituts für deutsche Geschichte* IX (1980), 389–427.

———. "Social Concepts Prevalent in German Zionism, 1883–1914." *Studies in Zionism,* No. 5 (1982), 1–31.

Doukhan-Landau, Leah. *Ha-hevrot ha-zioniyot li-rkhishat karka'ot be-Erez Yisra'el, 1897–1914* (Zionist Land-Purchase Companies in Palestine, 1897–1914). Jerusalem, 1979.

Druyan, Nitza, *Be-ein marvad kesamim: 'olei Teiman be-Erez Yisra'el, 1881–1914* (Without a Magic Carpet: Yemenite Immigration to Palestine, 1881–1914). Jerusalem, 1981.

Earle, Edward Mead. *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism.* New York, 1923.

Eley, Geoff. *Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck.* New Haven, 1980.

Eliav, Mordechai. "German Interests and the Jewish Community in 19th-Century Palestine." *Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman Period,* Moshe Ma'oz, ed. Jerusalem, 1975, 423–41.

———. *David Wolffsohn: ha-ish u-zemano. Ha-tenua' ha-zionit ba-shanim 1905–1914* (David Wolffsohn: The Man and His Time. The Zionist Movement between 1905 and 1914). Tel Aviv, 1977.

———, ed. *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya). II v. Jerusalem, 1981.

Elon, Amos. *Herzl.* New York, 1975.

Eloni, Yehuda. "Zionei Germaniya u-'milhemet ha-safot'" (German Zionists and the "Struggle of the Languages"). *Zionut* X (1985), 53–86.

Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Edwin R. A. Seligmann, ed. New York, 1931–35.

Enzyklopedia le-hakla'ut, Haim Halperin and Yizhak Arnon, eds. IV v. Tel Aviv, 1966–81.

Ettinger, Shmuel, and Bartal, Israel. "Shorshei ha-yishuv he-hadash be-Erez Yisra'el" (The Roots of the New Yishuv in Palestine). *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya), Mordechai Eliav, ed. Jerusalem, 1981, I, 1–24.

Even-Shoshan, Zvi. *Toldot tenua't ha-po'alim be-Erez Yisra'el* (The History of the Zionist Labor Movement in Palestine). I. Tel Aviv, 1963.

'Ever ha-Dani, Aharon. *Hadera (5651–5711, 1891–1951): shishim shenot koroteiha* (Hadera, 1891–1951: Sixty Years of Its History). Tel Aviv, 1951.

———. *Hityashvut ba-Galil ha-tahton: hamishim shenot korotav* (Settlement in the Lower Galilee: Fifty Years of Its History). Tel Aviv, 1955.

———. *Mishmar ha-Yarden: moshevet ha-sefar she-nafla, 5644–5708, 1884–1948* (Mishmar ha-Yarden: The Border Settlement That Fell, 1884–1948). Tel Aviv, 1965.

Faust, Helmut. *Geschichte der Genossenschaftsbewegung: Ursprung und Aufbruch der Genossenschaftsbewegung in England, Frankreich, und Deutschland sowie ihre weitere Entwicklung im deutschen Sprachraum.* Frankfurt a.M., 1977.

Feder, Ernst. "Paul Nathan: The Man and His Work," *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook III* (1958), 60–80.

Frankel, Jonathan. *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917.* Cambridge, 1981.

Frankel, Raphael. "Yosef Busel, ha-komuna ha-Ḥaderatit, ve-hivaẓrut ha-kevuẓa" (Yosef Busel, the Ḥadera Commune, and the Origins of the Kvuẓa). *Ẓionut* IV (1975), 44–71.

Friesl, Evyatar. *Ha-mediniyut ha-ẓionit le-aḥar haẓharat Balfour, 1917–1922* (Zionist Policy after the Balfour Declaration, 1917–1922). Tel Aviv, 1977.

Gaisbauer, Adolf. *Davidstern und Doppeladler: Zionismus und jüdischer Nationalismus in Österreich, 1882–1918.* Vienna, 1988.

Giladi, Dan. "Ha-moshava Be'er Tuvia (Kastina)—sipur shel kishalon hityashvuti" (The Colony Be'er Tuvia [Kastina]: A Story of Failed Settlement). *Ẓionut* III (1974), 100–51.

———. "Rishon le-Ẓion be-ḥasut ha-Baron Rothschild" (Rishon le-Ẓion under the Patronage of the Baron de Rothschild). *Cathedra,* No. 9 (1978), 127–52.

———. "Ha-Baron Rothschild u-mishtar he-ḥasut shel ha-pekidut" (Baron Rothschild and the Patronage System of His Administration). *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya), Mordechai Eliav, ed. Jerusalem, 1981, I, 179–206.

Gorny, Yosef. "Ha-ideologiya shel 'kibbush ha-'avoda'" (The Ideology of "The Conquest of Labor"). *Keshet* X (1968), 66–79.

———. *Aḥdut ha-'avoda, 1919–1930: ha-yesodot ha-ra'yoniyim ve-ha-shita ha-medinit* (Aḥdut ha-'avoda, 1919–1930: Its Intellectual Bases and Its Political System). Tel Aviv, 1973.

———. "Changes in the Social and Political Structure of the Second 'Aliya between 1904 and 1940." *Zionism* I (1975), 49–101.

———. *Shutafut u-ma'avak: Chaim Weizmann u-tenua't ha-'avoda ha-yehudit be-Ereẓ Yisra'el* (Partnership and Struggle: Chaim Weizmann and the Jewish Labor Movement in Palestine). Tel Aviv, 1976.

———. "Utopian Elements in Zionist Thought." *Studies in Zionism* V, No. 1 (1984), 19–27.

———. *Zionism and the Arabs, 1882–1948: A Study of Ideology.* Oxford, 1987.

Gouldner, Alvin. *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology: The Origins, Grammar, and Future of Ideology.* New York, 1976.

Graetz, Michael. *Les juifs en France au XIXe siècle: de la Révolution française à l'Alliance Israélite Universelle.* Paris, 1989.

Gross, Nachum. "Temurot kalkaliyot be-Ereẓ Yisra'el be-sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit" (Economic Changes in Palestine at the End of the Ottoman Period). *Cathedra,* No. 2 (1976), 109–25.

———. "Sof ha-tekufa ha-'Ottomanit, 1902–1918" (The Close of the Ottoman Period, 1902–1918). *Banka'i le-uma be-hitḥadshuta: toldot Bank Le'umi le-Yisra'el* (Banker to a Nation in Revival: The History of Bank Le'umi le-Yisra'el). Ramat Gan, 1977, 8–100.

———. "Yozma pratit ve-ẓiburit be-hitpatḥut Ereẓ Yisra'el lefi Z. D. Levontin. (Private and Public Initiative in the Development of Palestine According to Z. D. Levontin)." *Riv'on le-Kalkala,* No. 116 (1983), 488–94.

———. *The Economic Policy of the Mandatory Government in Palestine.* Discussion Paper No. 816 of the Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel. Jerusalem, 1982.

Gross, Nachum, and Metser, Jacob. "Public Finance in the Jewish Economy in Interwar Palestine." *Research in Economic History* III (1978), 87–159.

Grossi, Paolo. *An Alternative to Private Property: Collective Property in the Juridical Consciousness of the Nineteenth Century.* Chicago and London, 1981.

Gründer, Horst. *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien.* Paderborn, 1985.

Grunwald, Kurt. *Türkenhirsch: A Study of Baron Maurice de Hirsch, Entrepreneur and Philanthropist.* Jerusalem, 1966.

Hagen, William W. *Germans, Poles, and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772–1914.* Chicago, 1980.

Halpern, Ben. *The Idea of the Jewish State.* Cambridge, Mass., 1969.

Halpern, Ben, and Reinharz, Jehuda. "Nationalism and Jewish Socialism: The Early Years." *Modern Judaism* VIII, No. 3 (October 1988), 217–48.

Handwörterbuch der Sozialwissenschaften, Erwin v. Beckerath, ed. XII v. Stuttgart, 1956–65.

Har-El, Chaya. "Ha-tenua' ha-ẓionit ve-ha-yishuv be-Ereẓ Yisra'el be-shilhei ha-'aliya ha-rishona" (The Zionist Movement in Palestine at the End of the First 'Aliya). *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya), Mordechai Eliav, ed. Jerusalem, 1981, I, 383–406.

Haushofer, Heinz. *Die deutsche Landwirtschaft im technischen Zeitalter* (v. V of *Deutsche Agrargeschichte,* Günther Franz, general ed.). Stuttgart, 1963.

Headrick, Daniel. *The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–1940.* New York, 1988.

Henderson, W. O. *Studies in German Colonial History.* London, 1962.

Herf, Jeffrey. *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich.* New York, 1984.

Heymann, Michael. "The Zionist Movement and the Schemes for Jewish Settlement in Mesopotamia after the Death of Herzl." *Herzl Year Book VII* (1971), 129–74.

———. "Herzl ve-ẓionei Russiya—maḥloket ve-haskama" (Herzl and Russian Zionists: Conflict and Concord). *Ẓionut* III (1974), 56–99.

Hoff, Mascha. *Johann Kremenetzky und die Gründung des KKL.* Frankfurt a.M., 1986.

Hollander, Samuel. *The Economics of John Stuart Mill. Volume Two: Political Economy.* Toronto, 1985.

Hurwitz, Dalia. "Roshei ha-mosadot ha-ẓioniyim be-Ereẓ Yisra'el ve-she'elat ha-'avoda ha-'ivrit bi-tekufat ha-'aliya ha-sheniya" (The Leaders of the Zionist Institutions in Palestine and the Question of Hebrew Labor during the Period of the Second 'Aliya). *Ẓionut* VII (1981), 95–134.

Jarausch, Konrad. *Students, Society and Politics in Imperial Germany: The Rise of Academic Illiberalism.* Princeton, 1982.

Johnston, William. *The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History, 1848–1938.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972.

Kaniel, Yehoshua. "The Terms 'Old Yishuv' and 'New Yishuv': Problems of Definition." *The Jerusalem Cathedra* I (1981), 232–45.

———. *Hemshekh u-temura: ha-yishuv ha-yashan ve-ha-yishuv he-ḥadash bi-tekufat ha-'aliya ha-rishona ve-ha-sheniya* (Continuity and Change: The Old Yishuv and the New Yishuv during the Period of the First and Second 'Aliyot). Jerusalem, 1981.

Katz, Jacob. *Out of the Ghetto: The Social Background of Jewish Emancipation, 1770–1870.* New York, 1978.

Katz, Shaul. "Aaron Aaronsohn, reshit ha-mada' ve-reshit ha-meḥkar ha-ḥakla'i be-Ereẓ Yisra'el" (Aaron Aaronsohn: The Origins of Agricultural Science and Research in Palestine). *Cathedra,* No. 3 (1977), 3–29.

———. "'Ha-telem ha-rishon': ideologiya, hityashvut, ve-ḥakla'ut be-Petaḥ Tikva be-asor ha-shanim ha-rishon le-kiyuma" (The First Furrow: Ideology, Settlement, and Agriculture at Petaḥ Tikva during the First Decade of Its Existence). *Cathedra,* No. 23 (1982), 57–124.

———. "Aspektim soẓiologiyim shel ẓemiḥat ha-yeda' (ve-taḥalufato) be-ḥakla'ut be-Yisra'el: hofa'atan shel ma'arekhot ḥuẓ-mada'iyot le-hafakat yeda' ḥakla'i, 1880-1940" (Sociological Aspects of the Growth and the Turnover of Agricultural Knowledge in Israel: The Emergence of Extra-scientific Systems for the Production of Agricultural Knowledge, 1880–1940). Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1986.

Katz, Yosef. "Mif'al ha-'aḥuzot' be-Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1908–1917" ("Aḥuza" Projects in Palestine, 1908–1917). *Cathedra,* No. 22 (1982), 119–44.

———. "Ha-pe'ilut ha-hityashvutit be-Ereẓ Yisra'el shel ha-ḥevrot ve-ha-agudot ha-ẓioniyot ha-pratiyot bein ha-shanim 1900 ve-1914" (The Colonization Activity in Palestine of Zionist Private Companies and Associations between the Years 1900 and 1914). Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1983.

———. "Maḥloket panim ẓionit 'al hityashvut yehudit mi-ḥuẓ le-Ereẓ Yisra'el: 'parshat Turkiya,' 1911–1912" (The Controversy over Jewish Settlement outside Palestine: "The Turkish Affair," 1911–1912). *Ẓion* XLIX, No. 3 (1984), 265–88.

———. "Ideology and Urban Development: Zionism and the Origins of Tel-Aviv, 1906–1914." *Journal of Historical Geography* XII, No. 4 (1986), 402–24.

———. *Ge'ula titnu la-areẓ: ḥevrat "Ge'ula" li-rkhishat karka'ot, 1902–1914* (The Land Company "Ge'ula," 1902–1914). Jerusalem, 1988.

———. *Ha-yozma ha-pratit be-vinyan Ereẓ Yisra'el bi-tekufat ha-'aliya ha-sheniya* (Private Initiative in the Building of Ereẓ Israel during the Second 'Aliya). Ramat Gan, 1989.

Kelly, Alfred, H. *The Descent of Darwin: The Popularization of Darwinism in Germany, 1860–1914.* Chapel Hill, 1981.

Klausner, Israel. *Ḥibat Ẓion be-Rumania* (Ḥibat Ẓion in Rumania). Jerusalem, 1958.

———. *Oppoziẓia le-Herzl* (Opposition to Herzl). Jerusalem, 1960.

———. *Mi-Kattowitz 'ad Basel* (From Kattowitz to Basel). II v. Jerusalem, 1965.

———. *Karka' ve-ruaḥ: ḥayav u-fo'olo shel Professor Ẓ. H. Shapira* (Land and Spirit: The Life and Work of Professor Z. H. Shapira). Jerusalem, 1966.

Klausner, Joseph. *Menachem Ussishkin: His Life and Work.* London, 1944.

Kling, Simcha. *The Mighty Warrior. The Life-Story of Menachem Ussishkin.* New York, 1965.

———. "Yehiel Tschlenow," *Herzl Year Book VI* (1964–65), 83–108.

Kober, Adolf. "Emancipation's Impact on the Educational and Vocational Training of German Jewry." *Jewish Social Studies* 16 (1954), 3–32, 151–76.

Koehl, Robert. "Colonialism inside Germany, 1886–1914." *Journal of Modern History* XXV (1953), 255–72.

Kolatt, Israel. "Ideologiya u-meẓiut bi-tenua't ha'avoda be-Ereẓ Yisra'el, 1905–1919" (Ideology and Reality in the Labor Movement in Palestine, 1905–1919). Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1964.

———. "Po'alei ha-'aliya ha-rishona" (Jewish Laborers of the First 'Aliya). *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya), Mordechai Eliav, ed. I, Jerusalem, 1981, 337–82.

———. "Yiẓḥak Wilkanski (Volcani): mi-maniḥei ha-yesod shel ḥakla'ut yehudit modernit be-Ereẓ Yisra'el" (Yiẓḥak Wilkanski [Volcani]: One of the Founders of Modern Jewish Agriculture in Palestine). *Ha-yishuv ba-'et ha-ḥadasha: ẓiyunei derekh be-terem medina* (The Yishuv in Modern Times: Landmarks before Statehood), Shmuel Stempler, ed. Jerusalem, 1983, 189–204.

———. "The Zionist Movement and the Arabs." *Zionism and the Arabs,* Shmuel Almog, ed. Jerusalem, 1983, 1–34.

Kornberg, Jacques. "Theodore Herzl: A Reevaluation." *Journal of Modern History* LII (1980), 226–52.

Kressel, Getzel. *Megilat ha-adama. Sefer rishon: korot* (Scroll of the Soil. Book One: History). Jerusalem, 1950.

———. *Franz Oppenheimer.* Tel Aviv, 1972 (Hebrew).

Laqueur, Walter. *Young Germany: A History of the German Youth Movement.* New York, 1962.

Laskov, Shulamit. *Trumpeldor: sipur ḥayav* (Trumpeldor: The Story of His Life). Haifa, 1972.

———. *Ha-Biluim* (The Biluim). Jerusalem, 1979.

———. "Ḥovevei Ẓion be-ma'avak 'im Rothschild 'al penei ha-yishuv" (The Ḥovevei Ẓion in Conflict with Rothschild over the Character of the Yishuv). *Ẓionut* XII (1987), 29–71.

Lavsky, Ḥagit. *Yesodot ha-takẓiv la-mif'al ha-ẓioni: va'ad ha-ẓirim, 1918–1921* (The Budgetary Bases of the Zionist Enterprise: The Zionist Commission, 1918–1921). Jerusalem, 1980.

Lebovics, Herman. "'Agrarians' versus 'Industrializers': Social Conservative Resistance to Industrialism and Capitalism in Late Nineteenth Century Germany." *International Review of Social History* XII (1967), 31–65.

Lederhendler, Eli. *The Road to Modern Jewish Politics: Political Tradition and Political Reconstruction in the Jewish Community of Tsarist Russia.* New York, 1989.

Leven, Narcisse. *Cinquante ans d'histoire: l'Alliance Israélite Universelle, 1860–1910.* II v. Paris, 1911–1920.

Levin, Mordechai. *Arkhei ḥevra ve-kalkala ba-ideologiya shel tekufat ha-Haskala* (Social and Economic Values in the Ideology of the Haskala Period). Jerusalem, 1975.

Lichtheim, Richard. *Die Geschichte des deutschen Zionismus.* Jerusalem, 1954.

Livneh, Eliezer. *Aaron Aaronsohn: ha-ish u-zemano* (Aaron Aaronsohn: The Man and His Time). Jerusalem, 1969.

Livneh, Ẓvi. *Ḥakla'im yehudiyim be-Russiya* (Jewish Farmers in Russia). Tel Aviv, 1972.

Lloyd, Edward Archibald. *The Co-operative Movement in Italy, with Special Reference to Agriculture, Labour, and Production: A Short Study.* New York, 1926.

Loubère, Leo. *The Red and the White: A History of Wine in France and Italy in the Nineteenth Century.* Albany, 1978.

Luz, Ehud. *Parallels Meet: Religion and Nationalism in the Early Zionist Movement, 1882–1904.* Philadelphia, 1988.

Mackenzie, John M. *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880–1960.* Manchester, 1984.

Mandel, Neville. *The Arabs and Zionism before World War I.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976.

Manuel, Frank E., and Manuel, Fritzie P. *Utopian Thought in the Western World.* Cambridge, Mass., 1979.

Margalith, Israel. *Le baron Edmond de Rothschild et la colonisation juive en Palestine, 1882–1899.* Paris, 1957.

Metser, Jacob. *Hon le'umi le-bayit le'umi, 1919–1921* (National Capital for a National Home, 1919–1921). Jerusalem, 1979.

Meynaud, Jean. *Technocracy.* London, 1968.

Mikhali, Ben-Ẓion. *Sejera.* Tel Aviv, 1973 (Hebrew).

Mintz, Matityahu. "Ber Borokhov." *Studies in Zionism,* No. 5 (1982), 33–53.

Mosse, George L. "The Image of the Jew in German Popular Literature: Felix Dahn and Gustav Freytag." *Germans and Jews: The Right, the Left, and the Search for a "Third Force" in Pre-Nazi Germany.* London, 1971, 61–76.

———. *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism.* New York, 1978.

Muslih, Muhammad. *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism.* New York, 1988.

Nawratzki, Curt. *Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas.* Munich, 1914.

Near, Henry. "Ideologiya ve-anti-ideologiya" (Ideology and Anti-ideology). *Cathedra,* No. 18 (1981), 122–29.

———. "Ish ve-Degania lo" (To Each His Degania). *Cathedra,* No. 29 (1983), 63–78.

———. *Ha-kibbuẓ ve-ha-ḥevra: ha-Kibbuẓ ha-Me'uḥad, 1923–1933* (The Kibbutz and Society: The United Kibbutz, 1923- 1933). Jerusalem, 1984.

Nichols, John Alden. *Germany after Bismarck: The Caprivi Era, 1890–1894.* Cambridge, Mass., 1968.

Norman, Theodore. *An Outstretched Arm: A History of the Jewish Colonization Association.* London, 1985.

Pawel, Ernst. *The Labyrinth of Exiles: A Life of Theodor Herzl.* New York, 1989.

Penslar, Derek Jonathan. "Zionism, Colonialism, and Technocracy: Otto Warburg and the Commission for the Exploration of Palestine, 1903–1907." *Journal of Contemporary History* XXV (1990), 142–60.

———. "Subject-Object: The Relationship between European and Diaspora Jewry in the Nineteenth Century." *Eretz Israel, Israel, and the Jewish Diaspora: Mutual Relations,* Menachem Mor, ed. University Press of America, forthcoming.

———. "Mediniyut ha-hityashvut ha-ẓionit 'erev milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona" (Zionist Settlement Policy on the Eve of World War I). *Cathedra,* No. 57 (September 1990), 79–104.

Poppel, Stephen M. *Zionism in Germany, 1897–1933: The Shaping of a Jewish Identity.* Philadelphia, 1976.

Porath, Yehoshua. *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929.* London, 1974.

Preston, David Lawrence. "Science, Society, and the German Jews, 1870–1933." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1971.

Price, Roger. *A Social History of Nineteenth-century France.* London, 1987.

Puhle, Hans-Jürgen. *Agrarische Interessenpolitik und Preussischer Konservatismus im wilhelminischen Reich (1893–1914): ein Beitrag zur Analyse des Nationalismus in Deutschland am Beispiel des Bundes der Landwirte und der Deutsch-Konservativen Partei.* Hannover, 1967.

Rabinowicz, Oskar K. "Davis Trietsch's Colonization Scheme in Cyprus." *Herzl Year Book IV* (1961/62), 119–206.

Rathmann, Lothar. *Berlin-Bagdad. Die imperialistische Nahostpolitik des kaiserlichen Deutschlands.* East Berlin, 1962.

Reichman, Shalom, and Hasson, Shlomo. "A Cross-cultural Diffusion of Colonization: From Posen to Palestine." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* LXXIV (1984), 57–70.

Reinharz, Jehuda. *Fatherland or Promised Land: The Dilemma of the German Jew, 1893–1914.* Ann Arbor, 1975.

———. "The Esra Verein and Jewish Colonization in Palestine." *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook XXIV* (1979), 261–89.

———. "Ideology and Structure in German Zionism, 1882–1933." *Jewish Social Studies* XLII, No. 2 (1980), 119–46.

———. *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader.* Oxford, 1985.

Reinharz, Shulamit. "Toward a Model of Female Political Action: The Case of Manya Shohat, Founder of the First Kibbutz." *Women's Studies International Forum* VII (1984), No. 4, 275–87.

Reuveni, Ya'akov. "Soẓiologiya ve-ideologiya: 'iyunim be-mishnato shel Arthur Ruppin" (Sociology and Ideology: Studies in the Thought of Arthur Ruppin). *Kivunim,* No. 23 (1984), 25–48.

Ringer, Fritz. *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933.* Cambridge, Mass., 1969.

Rinott, Moshe. *Ḥevrat ha-'Ezra li-Yehudei Germaniya bi-Yeẓira u-ve-ma'avak: perek be-toldot haḥinukh ha-'ivri be-Ereẓ Yisra'el u-ve-toldot yehudei Germaniya* (The *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden:* Creation and Struggle). Jerusalem, 1971.

Ritter, Gerhard A. *Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich: die Sozialdemokratische Partei und die Freien Gewerkschaften, 1890–1900.* Berlin, 1959.

Rodrigue, Aron. *De l'instruction à l'émancipation: les enseignants de l'Alliance Israélite Universelle et les juifs d'Orient, 1860–1939.* Paris, 1989.

———. *French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860–1925,* Bloomington, Ind., 1990.

Rogel, Nakdimon. *Ha-yoẓim el ereẓ ẓafon: reshitan shel kevuẓot ha-po'alim be-ezba'-ha-galil, 1916–1920* (Those Who Went Forth into the North Country: Origins of the Workers' Collectives in the Galilee Panhandle, 1916–1920). Jerusalem, 1987.

Ro'i, Ya'akov. "Zionist Attitudes to the Arabs, 1908–1914." *Middle Eastern Studies* IV, No. 3 (1968), 198–242.

———. "Yaḥasei yehudim-'aravim be-moshavot ha-'aliya ha-rishona" (Jewish-Arab Relations in the Colonies of the First 'Aliya). *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya), Mordechai Eliav, ed. Jerusalem, 1981, I, 245–68.

Salmon, Joseph. "Tenua't ha-Biluim" (The Bilu Movement). *Sefer ha-'aliya ha-rishona* (The Book of the First 'Aliya), Mordechai Eliav, ed. Jerusalem, 1981, I, 117–40.

Schama, Simon. *Two Rothschilds and the Land of Israel.* New York, 1978.

Schorske, Carl E. "Politics in a New Key: An Austrian Triptych." *Journal of Modern History* XXXIV (1967), 343–86.

Schramm, Percy Ernst. *Deutschland und Übersee: der deutsche Handel mit den anderen Kontinenten, insbesondere Afrika.* Braunschweig, 1950.

Shaerf, Moshe. "Herzl's Social Thinking." *Herzl Year Book III* (1960), 199–206.

Shafir, Gershon. *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914.* Cambridge, 1989.

Shapira, Anita. *Ha-ma'avak ha-nikhzav: 'avoda 'ivrit 1929–1939* (The Futile Struggle: Hebrew Labor, 1929–1939). Tel Aviv, 1977.

———. *Berl.* II v. Tel Aviv, 1981 (Hebrew).

Shapira, Josef. *Me'a shana Mikve Yisra'el: 5630–5730, 1870–1970* (100 Years of Mikveh Yisra'el, 1870–1970). Tel Aviv, 1970.

Shapiro, Yonatan. *The Formative Years of the Israeli Labour Party: The Organization of Power, 1919–1930.* London, 1976.

Shavit, Ya'akov. *Me-rov li-medina: ha-tenua' ha-revizionistit, ha-tokhnit ha-hityashvutit, ve-ha-ra'yon ha-ḥevrati, 1925–1935* (From Majority to State: The Revisionist Movement, Its Settlement Program, and Its Social Thought, 1925–1935). Tel Aviv, 1983.

———. *Jabotinsky and the Revisionist Movement, 1925–1948.* London, 1988.

Sheehan, James. *The Career of Lujo Brentano: A Study of Liberalism and Social Reform in Imperial Germany.* Chicago, 1966.

Sheffer, Uri. "Moshav-'ovdim be-Naḥalat Yehuda (1913)" (The Smallholders' Village at Naḥalat Yehuda [1913]). *Cathedra* 53 (1989), 85–106.

Shilo, Margalit. "Ḥavot ha-limud shel ha-Misrad ha-Erez Yisre'eli 1908–1914" (Training Farms of the Palestine Office, 1908–1914). M.A. thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1977.

———. "Ha-tokhniot le-hekmat ḥavat ha-limud ha-ḥakla'it ha-ẓionit ha-rishona ve-ha-bikoret 'aleihen" (The Programs for the Establishment of the First Zionist Training Farm and the Criticism against Them). *Cathedra,* No. 19 (1981), 181–204.

———. "The Women's Farm at Kinneret, 1911–1917: A Solution to the Problem of the Working Woman in the Second Aliyah." *The Jerusalem Cathedra,* No. 1 (1981), 246–83.

———. "Niẓanei ra'yon ha-moshav—'ha-ikar ha-ẓa'ir,' ha-kevuẓa ha-amerikanit ba-'aliya ha-sheniya" (Buds of the Idea of the Moshav: "The Young Farmer," the American Kvuẓa in the Second 'Aliya). *Cathedra,* No. 25 (1982), 79–98.

———. "Degania: degem rishon le-hityashvut shitufit 'al karka' ha-le'um" (Degania, Prototype of Collective Settlement on National Land). *Cathedra,* No. 39 (1986), 87–98.

———. *Nisyonot be-hityashvut: ha-Misrad ha-Erez Yisre'eli, 1908–1914* (Experiments in Settlement: The Palestine Office, 1908- 1914). Jerusalem, 1988.

Shilony, Ẓvi. "Ha-Keren ha-Kayemet le-Yisra'el ke-gorem be-iẓuv ha-nof ha-yishuvi shel Erez Yisra'el me-az hakamata ve-'ad li-froz milḥemet ha-'olam ha-rishona, 1897–1914" (The Jewish National Fund as a Factor in the Shaping of the Colonized Landscape of Palestine from the Time of Its Founding until the Outbreak of the First World War). Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1987.

Singer, Mendel. *Be-reshit ha-ẓionut ha-sozialistit: perakim u-demuyot* (The Origins of Socialist Zionism). Haifa, 1958.

———. *Shlomo Kaplansky: ḥayav u-fo'olo* (Shlomo Kaplansky: His Life and Work). Jerusalem, 1971.

Slutsky, Yehuda. *Mavo le-toldot tenua't ha-'avoda ha-yisre'elit* (Introduction to the History of the Israeli Labor Movement). Tel Aviv, 1973.

Smilansky, Moshe. *Mishpaḥat ha-adama* (The Family of the Earth). Tel Aviv, 1951.

Smith, Woodruff. *The German Colonial Empire.* Chapel Hill, 1978.

Sorkin, David. *The Transformation of German Jewry, 1780–1840.* New York, 1987.
Staatslexicon, Görres-Gesellschaft, ed. VIII v. Freiburg, 1957–1963.
Stanislawski, Michael. *Tsar Nicholas I and the Jews: The Transformation of Jewish Society in Russia, 1825–1855.* Philadelphia, 1983.
Stegmann, Dirk. *Die Erben Bismarcks: Parteien und Verbände in der Spätphase des Wilhelminischen Deutschlands. Sammlungspolitik 1897–1918.* Cologne, 1970.
Stein, Kenneth. *The Land Question in Palestine, 1917–1939.* Chapel Hill, 1984.
Stewart, Desmond. *Theodor Herzl.* New York, 1974.
Switzer-Rakos, Kennee. "Baron de Hirsch, the Jewish Colonization Association, and Canada." *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook XXXII* (1987), 385–406.
Teveth, Shabtai. *Kinat David: Ben-Gurion ha-za'ir* (David's Zeal: The Young Ben-Gurion). Jerusalem, 1976.
Tribe, Keith, and Hussain, Athar, eds. *Marxism and the Agrarian Question.* II v. Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1981.
Unger, Shabtai. "Po'alei Ẓion ba-Kaisarut ha-Ostrit, 1904–1914" (Po'alei Ẓion in the Austrian Empire, 1904–1914). Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University, 1985.
Urofsky, Melvin. *American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust.* Garden City, N.Y., 1975.
Ussishkin, Anne. "The Jewish Colonization Association and Rothschild in Palestine." *Middle Eastern Studies* IX, No. 3 (1973), 347–57.
Veblen, Thorstein. *The Engineers and the Price System.* New York, 1940.
Vital, David. *The Origins of Zionism.* Oxford, 1975.
———. *Zionism: The Formative Years.* Oxford, 1982.
———. *Zionism: The Crucial Phase.* Oxford, 1987.
Volkov, Shulamit. "The Dynamics of Dissimilation: 'Ostjuden' and the German Jews." *The Jewish Response to German Culture,* Jehuda Reinharz and Walter Schatzberg, eds. Hanover, N.H., and London, 1985, 195–211.
vom Bruch, Rüdiger, ed. *Weder Kommunismus noch Kapitalismus: bürgerliche Sozialreform in Deutschland vom Vormärz bis zur Ära Adenauer.* Munich, 1985.
von Frauendorfer, Sigmund. *Ideengeschichte der Agrarwirtschaft und Agrarpolitik im deutschen Sprachgebiet.* Munich, 1957.
Walicki, Andrzej. *The Controversy over Capitalism: Studies in the Social Philosophy of the Russian Populists.* Oxford, 1969.
Wandruszka, Adam, and Urbanitsch, Peter, eds. *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848–1918.* V. I, *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung,* Alois Brusatti, ed. Vienna, 1973.
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. *Krisenherde des Kaisserreichs, 1871–1918: Studien zur deutschen Sozial- und Verfassungsgeschichte.* Göttingen, 1979.
Weill, Georges. "Charles Netter ou les oranges de Jaffa." *Les Nouveaux Cahiers* XXI (1970), 2–36.
Weinryb, Bernard Dov. *Der Kampf um die Berufsumschichtung, ein Ausschnitt aus der Geschichte der Juden in Deutschland.* Berlin, 1936.
———. *Jewish Vocational Education: History and Appraisal of Training in Europe.* New York, 1948.
———. *Neueste Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Juden in Russland und Polen von der 1. polnischen Teilung bis zum Tode Alexander II.* Hildesheim, 1972.
Weisbord, Robert G. *African Zion: The Attempt to Establish a Jewish Colony in the East Africa Protectorate, 1903–1905.* Philadelphia, 1968.
Weiss, Sheila Faith. *Race Hygiene and National Efficiency: The Eugenics of Wilhelm Schallmeyer.* Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1987.
Weissbach, Lee Shai. "The Jewish Elite and the Children of the Poor: Jewish Apprenticeship Programs in Nineteenth-century France." *Association for Jewish Studies Review* XII, No. 1 (1987), 123–42.
Wertheimer, Jack. *Unwelcome Strangers: East European Jews in Imperial Germany.* New York, 1987.
Wirz, Albert. "The German Colonies in Africa." *European Colonial Rule, 1880–1940,*

Rudolf von Albertini and Albert Wirz, coauthors. Westport, Conn., 1982, 388–417.

Wistrich, Robert S. *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph.* Oxford, 1989.

Yanait Ben-Ẓvi, Raḥel. *Eliyahu Krause: avi ha-ḥinukh ha-ḥakla'i ḇa-areẓ* (Eliyahu Krause: Father of Agricultural Education). Jerusalem, 1963.

———. *Manya Shoḥat.* Jerusalem, 1976 (Hebrew).

Ẓaḥor, Zev. *Ba-derekh le-hanhagat ha-Yishuv: ha-Histadrut be-reshita* (On the Road to Yishuv Leadership: The Formative Years of the Histadrut). Jerusalem, 1982.

Zmarzlick, Hans-Günter. "Social Darwinism in Germany Seen as a Historical Problem." *From Republic to Reich: The Making of the Nazi Revolution,* Hajo Holborn, ed. New York, 1972, 435–74.

INDEX

DEREK J. PENSLAR is Assistant Professor of History and Jewish Studies at Indiana University, Bloomington.

(continued from front flap)

settlement engineers, most of whom were native to or educated in German-speaking lands, attempted to transplant contemporary Central European social policies to Middle Eastern soil. Their overwhelmingly agrarian orientation gave rise to colonization programs centered on the creation of a Jewish peasantry and a self-sufficient Jewish national economy in Palestine.

Zionism and Technocracy brings together social, intellectual, and institutional history in a pathbreaking study of the geographical transfer of ideas and of attempts to fulfill a utopian vision. The historic alliance between the World Zionist Organization and Labor Zionism, which nurtured Labor's rise to hegemony in interwar Jewish Palestine and the State of Israel, is best understood within the context presented in this book.



DEREK J. PENSLAR is Assistant Professor of History and Jewish Studies at Indiana University, Bloomington.

The Modern Jewish Experience—Paula Hyman and Deborah Dash Moore, editors

Indiana University Press

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
BLOOMINGTON AND INDIANAPOLIS

ISBN 0-253-34290-2