
ROUTLEDGE STUDIES ON THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT
Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1948
A tale of two cities
Itamar Radai
ROUTLEDGE

Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1948

Between November 1947 and May 1948 war between the Palestinian Arab community and the Jewish community encompassed Palestine, with Jerusalem and Jaffa becoming focal points in the conflict due to their centrality, size, and symbolic importance.

Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1948 examines Palestinian Arab society, institutions, and fighters in Jerusalem and Jaffa during the conflict. It is one of the first books in English that deals with the Palestinian Arabs at this crucial and tragic moment in their history, with extensive use of Arabic sources and an inquiry from the Palestinian vantage point. It examines the causes of the social collapse of the Palestinian Arab communities in Jerusalem and Jaffa during the 1948 inter-communal war, and the impact of this collapse on the military defeat. This book reveals that the most important internal factors to the Palestinian defeat were the social changes that took place in Arab society during the British Mandate, namely internal migration from rural areas to the cities, the shift from agriculture to wage labor, and the rise of the urban middle class. By looking beyond the well-established external factors, this study uncovers how modernity led to a breakdown within Palestinian Arab society, widening social fissures without producing effective institutions, and thus alienating social classes both from each other and from the leadership.

With careful examination of a range of sources and informed analysis of Palestinian social history, *Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1948* is a key resource for students and scholars interested in the modern Middle East, Palestinian Studies, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and Israel Studies.

Itamar Radai is Academic Director of the Konrad Adenauer Program for Jewish-Arab Cooperation and a research fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. Dr. Radai had completed his PhD at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He was a post-doctoral fellow at the Taub Center for Israel Studies, New York University (NYU), and at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace, the Hebrew University.

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21 Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa, 1948
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A tale of two cities

Itamar Radai
Translated by Haim Watzman

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Contents

List of figures viii
List of maps ix
Acknowledgments x

Introduction: A tale of two cities 1

PART I
Jerusalem: The battle for the Holy City 11

1 Jerusalem at war 15

2 The collapse of the middle class: The case of Qatamon 65

3 Jerusalem resists 83

PART II
Jaffa: The bride of the sea in distress 119

4 Jaffa on the eve of the war 125

5 Jaffa as a battlefield 136

6 The fall of Jaffa 168

Conclusion 182

Bibliography 194
Index 205

Figures

I.1	Ibrahim Abu Dayya marching in front of his men with other commanders, probably late December 1947 (first row, carrying a rifle on his shoulder)	2
I.2	King George Avenue, Jaffa, 1940s	5
1.1	Old City of Jerusalem, aerial view, 1931. In the front: Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif	15
1.2	Talbiyya neighborhood in the 1930s	16
1.3	Jerusalem City Hall and Barclays Bank, at Allenby Square, just north of the Old City and Mamilla Road, and east of Princess Mary Avenue	20
1.4	Meeting of the Palestinian Arab Women's Association, 1944	23
1.5	The Holy War Commanders. Standing on the first row, from the right: Qasim al-Rimawi, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, Kamil 'Ariqat. Kneeling third from the left: Ibrahim Abu Dayya	33
1.6	Palestinian Arab leaders gathering at the Jerusalem al-Rawda School, 1929	45
1.7	Making plans – commanders of the Holy War Forces	52
2.1	The Hanna Zananiri house, Qatamon area, 1940s	65
3.1	Armed villagers in the Jerusalem area, 1948	84
3.2	King George Avenue, 1942. On the right: the Jewish Agency building. On the far left: the Terra Sancta School	98
3.3	The Jerusalem Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, aerial view, 1930s	109
4.1	Alhambra (al-Hamra) cinema, Jaffa, 1937	125
4.2	King George Avenue with Alhambra cinema, 1937	130
5.1	Market Place in central Jaffa, with al-Mahmudiyya main mosque in the background, just off the Saray building	139
5.2	Holy War fighters	159
6.1	Aerial view of the Jaffa Harbor, 1937	173

Maps

1	Central Palestine, 1937	xii
2	Jerusalem Old City area, 1939	12
3	Jerusalem center – north, 1939	13
4	South Jerusalem, 1939	14
5	Central Jaffa showing ʻAjami, Jabaliyya, and the Old City, 1945	120
6	Jaffa – Manshiyya and the Old City, 1945	121
7	Jaffa, municipal boundaries, 1945	122
8	Jaffa, general view, 1945	123

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

Map 1 Central Palestine, 1:250,000 (Cropped from original, Survey of Palestine, 1937. All Rights Reserved by the Survey of Israel © 2015. Printed with Survey of Israel permission.).

Introduction

A tale of two cities

> He is indeed a wonderful man. We thought of naming a street … after him, leading from the Damiani house to Abu Mikhar's house, in recognition of his part in the defense of our neighborhood.[1]

So wrote Khalil al-Sakakini of Qatamon, a neighborhood in southwest Jerusalem, in his diary on April 9, 1948. The man this Palestinian educator and author so admired was the commander and defender of Qatamon, Ibrahim Abu Dayya, who came from Surif, a village in the Hebron highlands. Less than three weeks after making this entry, Sakakini and his family had to leave their home forever. Abu Dayya and his remaining fighters retreated from Qatamon, or as Sakakini put it, "Ibrahim Abu Dayya redeployed with his heroic men to another location, close by, in order to resume combat."[2]

During the period between the United Nations General Assembly resolution to partition Palestine, passed on November 29, 1947, and the end of the British Mandate on May 14, 1948, the Palestinian Arab community and the Yishuv—the pre-state Jewish community in Palestine—fought an inter-communal, or civil, war. The fighting encompassed the entire country, urban and rural. The three large cities with mixed populations—Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa—quickly became principal battlefields.[3] This book addresses Palestinian Arab society, institutions, and fighters in Jerusalem and Jaffa during the inter-communal conflict, which ended in Jaffa when the city surrendered on May 13, 1948, and in Jerusalem when the Arab Legion, the army of Transjordan (officially known as "the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan" since 1946), entered the campaign on May 19. I have chosen these two cities as the focus of my study for several reasons. Most important are their centrality, size, and their symbolic importance for the Palestinian Arab community and national movement. Another reason has to do with characteristics that played out during the course of the war—both cities found themselves under attack by the Jews, and their fighting forces in turn took offensive action against the Jews. Furthermore, local residents took up arms in both cases, most of them organized under the banner of the Holy War (*al-Jihad al-Muqaddas*), a militia loyal to the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Alongside these local forces fought volunteers from other Arab countries and in

Figure I.1 Ibrahim Abu Dayya marching in front of his men with other commanders, probably late December 1947 (first row, carrying a rifle on his shoulder) (Palmarch Archive).

some cases from non-Arab countries, most of them as part of the Arab Liberation Army (*Jaysh al-Inkadh*) that was sponsored by the Arab League.[4] In many cases there was no clear distinction between the locals and the foreigners, so when I address the fighting, I look at all the Arab forces active in both cities. Each city displayed a different set of relationships between the fighters and local Arab society and institutions.

Rashid Khalidi has called on scholars to uncover the internal reasons for the Palestinian defeat in 1948, rather than focusing solely on the well-known external reasons—the principal of these being the superiority of the Yishuv's military forces.[5] Taking up that challenge, this book depicts the process of social collapse of the Palestinian Arab communities in Jerusalem and Jaffa, and examines its causes and its impact on the military debacle, through the intensive use of Arabic sources in the first place, unlike previous studies on the 1948 war. The Arabic sources are, naturally, most invaluable for a better historical understanding of the Palestinians in that period.

Mountain city versus coastal city

Despite their similarities, Jerusalem and Jaffa of the late 1940s were fundamentally different in their geographies, economies, and societies. Among the first writers to stress the historical importance of geographic, physical, and climatic factors were the French historians of the Annales school, starting with Lucien Febvre, who was followed by Fernand Braudel. These two scholars traced the development, in the Mediterranean basin, of different social models in mountainous and lowland regions.[6] They advanced a model of mountain versus coast, or mountain city versus coastal city, that has been much used in the field of Middle Eastern studies, particularly in the study of the Levant. This dichotomy parallels the distinction between the orthogenetic city, based on venerable traditions, and the heterogenetic city, which is a melting pot with "rational" economic norms and a higher predilection for modernization.[7]

How can the mountain city versus coastal city model be applied to Palestinian Arab society in Jerusalem and Jaffa in the twentieth century? Salim Tamari categorized the disparities that came into being, beginning in the late Ottoman period, between developing cosmopolitan coastal cities like Alexandria, Port Said, Beirut, Tripoli, Haifa, and Jaffa, and interior cities such as Cairo, Fez, Jerusalem, Nablus, and Damascus, under the title "The Mountain against the Sea."[8] Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal, who used this model in their survey of Palestinian history, viewed Jerusalem as a city with a heterogeneous structure, as opposed to Nablus, Hebron, and Ramallah, which were, they maintained, extensions of village society and therefore typical mountain cities.[9] Yet, while Jerusalem was indeed, in terms of its population and culture, no less heterogeneous than the coastal cities, other elements of the city's economic and social profile fit the mountain type better. According to Ruth Kark, Jerusalem owed its increasing importance and development in the late Ottoman period (1840–1917) to religion and politics, whereas Jaffa's development was in part a byproduct of Jerusalem's, but also of global, regional, and local economic changes that boosted the fortunes of coastal cities of the eastern Mediterranean. According to Kark, geography was neither the source nor the motor of these changes, which were due rather to political, cultural, demographic, and economic development. Yet the physical background did indeed affect these processes. The presence of a natural harbor at Jaffa, the only one on the Palestinian coast south of Mt Carmel, and the availability of level land, an abundance of fresh water, and a relatively well-developed agricultural hinterland encouraged the growth of crafts, commerce, and the first glimmerings of industry. In contrast, Jerusalem's location in the highlands, on the marches of the desert, its shortage of water, and constricted and undeveloped surrounding agricultural land burdened the growth of commerce and manufacturing.[10]

During the British Mandate, the sources of the economic, political, and social power of the old Jerusalem elite—the notables (*a'yan*)—continued to derive from the ownership of farmland, including lands outside the Jerusalem vicinity; their control of Waqf (religious endowment) properties; and the government and local

offices their members held. The latter two, along with the professions, were also the foundation of a growing middle class. In contrast, during this same period most Arabs in Jaffa made their living off citrus farming, light industry, and international commerce through the port. They also maintained closer reciprocal relations with the Jewish community. As such, Jaffa was, as a coastal city, more economically and socially vulnerable to violent conflict than was Jerusalem.[11]

This book examines how the different characteristics of these two urban centers manifested itself during the inter-communal war. Jerusalem was a mountain city, a religious center, and the political capital of the Palestinian Arab national movement of the time; Jaffa, the coastal city, was a port typified by higher social mobility than Jerusalem. These differences would prove critical in determining the fate of the Arab military forces and societies during the 1948 war in each city.

Methodology, research methods, and sources

This study belongs to the field of microhistory, which Giovanni Levi has defined as the close examination, within a limited geographical area, of specific phenomena, for the purpose of drawing inductive conclusions regarding a larger context. Microhistory is aware of different narratives, but rejects absolute relativism about the reality of the past. It recognizes the importance of minimizing the historian's natural biases as the basis for common compilation of information and scholarly discussion.[12] Despite its manifestly historical character, some see an affinity between this type of research and the social sciences and their social theories.[13] In recent decades, microhistory has become an accepted method of research, and several schools of microhistory have come into being around the world.[14] According to Brad Gregory, microhistories can be divided into the episodic and the systematic. The former offer meticulous surveys of an event, a small unit (usually a village), or the biography of an individual of the type who would previously have been considered historically insignificant. Sometimes the microhistorian bases his work principally on a single source, with the intention of discovering new aspects of a past society or culture. Systematic microhistory, in contrast, seeks to recreate systems of social relationships within a limited geographical area, aiming to exploit all available archival sources. This approach may be seen as a branch of social history, whereas episodic microhistory lies closer to cultural history.[15]

Consequently, this study is based on the compilation of historical data, of archival and other natures, with the purpose of using every available store of information about the geographical units under study, Jerusalem and Jaffa. The empirical chapters are of the systematic type of microhistory, while the personal documents left by the residents of Qatamon enable me to offer an episodic microhistory of this neighborhood and its inhabitants, as a test case.[16]

The problem of sources in the study of the Arab side of the 1948 war is well known. On the one hand, the lack of an organized central Palestinian archive, and the inability to access archives covering this period that are located

in totalitarian countries, confront the historian of the period with significant impediments. To this must be added the loss of important archives, collections, and documents as a result of the Palestinian defeat in the war and Nakba (literally "catastrophe," the term the Palestinians use for the war and its consequences for their nation). One example is the loss of the Jaffa municipal archive.[17] On the other hand, the variety of sources that are nevertheless available also confronts the historian with problems and contradictions. The relevant primary sources for the 1948 war include Arabic archival material, Jewish and British intelligence service documents that address the Arab side, newspapers, memoirs, and testimonies in Arabic.[18] The accessible Arab sources include captured documents located in Israeli archives, in particular material in the Israel State Archive in Jerusalem, including the correspondence of the National Committees in Jerusalem and Jaffa, in addition to other sources such as the Jerusalem municipal historical archive. These documents are obviously of tremendous value for historical research, but unfortunately cannot offer a comprehensive picture alone, partly because of the low level of the documentation, its insufficiency, the loss of records, and in part because of the relatively amorphous nature of the Arab fighting forces and institutions.

Another important source are Jewish and British intelligence documents. From a methodological point of view, the problem with using intelligence material for historical research is the many biases that are common in such material. Most of it comes from human sources, that is informers who have a

Figure I.2 King George Avenue, Jaffa, 1940s (Library of Congress).

vested interest in pleasing their operators. This bias is already in place prior to the processing of the information by those operators, who add their own biases, adding a second problematic level to that of other documents a scholar may use. Yet intelligence documents often illuminate events and processes that other sources disregard, or which those sources present in such a way as to conceal flaws and facts embarrassing to their writers and their communities.

I believe it to be of great importance to use and cross-check different kinds of sources in a process of synthesis and integration, in order to form a picture that is as close as one might reasonably get to "what really happened." In order to add the perspective of other Arab sources, vital to a full understanding of the processes at work, I have made use of the plethora of contemporary Palestinian Arab press accounts, diaries, memoirs, and individual testimonies now available in print and on the internet, mostly in Arabic. Such testimonies are, in every sense, a type of oral history.[19] Oral history is central to Palestinian memorialization of the Nakba. But the distance in time between the events and their recounting that affects the testimony, and the technical difficulty of interviewing many of the witnesses, has led me to decide that, rather than conduct more interviews, I would be better off focusing principally on the documentation produced at the time of the events. That evidence is sufficiently rich and comprehensive when supplemented by the existing testimonies.

The reasons for the Palestinian defeat

Historiographically analyzing the reasons why the inter-communal war of 1947–1948 turned out as it did, proposes a number of internal factors such as explaining the Palestinian Arab community's defeat by the Yishuv. Joseph Nevo has pointed to the absence of efficient central control, the lack of accurate evaluations of the scope of the war effort and the quality of the manpower, as well as a lack of money and arms, and internal rivalries.[20] Avraham Sela has stressed the disparity between the Palestinian Arabs' level of political competence relative to the Yishuv. He also cited the influence of the outcome of the Arab Revolt a decade earlier, after which the Palestinian Arab political leadership was deported. Sela explained the mostly low-level and local nature of Palestinian Arab participation in the fighting in 1948 by reference to deep political and social fissures, the weakness of the national leadership, and a tendency to assume that the neighboring Arab states would fight the war for them. The collapse of Arab society and fighting forces in the face of Haganah offensives could be attributed, according to Sela, to military weakness, the fact that senior leaders resided outside Palestine, and the short reach of the emergency institutions established in the cities. In his view, Arab aversion to the prospect of life under Jewish sovereignty, rather than creating motivation to fight, impelled many civilians to flee the country, or at least to take what they believed would be temporary refuge beyond the range of the fighting in Palestine.[21]

Of the few Palestinian scholars who have recently begun to address the internal reasons for the Palestinian defeat in 1948, two are worthy of particular

attention—Issa Khalaf and Rashid Khalidi. The latter has stressed the defeat of the Palestinian Arabs in the Revolt of 1936–1939 as a central factor in their political and military failure in 1948. He has noted that they embarked on war with a divided leadership, limited economic resources, and without a central organizational and military structure.[22] Khalaf has cited the social and factional fractures in Palestinian Arab society as having weakened it and harmed its ability to withstand military pressure. He also delves into the factors that, in his view, were detrimental to the Palestinian Arab community's military readiness—the lack of effective self-government and administrative institutions, political and military inferiority as compared with the Yishuv, and substandard social and technological organization.[23]

One of the Palestinian commanders in Jaffa wrote that "[t]he collapse of Jaffa did not come in surprise, [since] a variety of complex processes paved the way to it, and heralded its arrival."[24] My comparison of two cities, using the model of mountain city versus coastal city shows that Jaffa underwent social change and was more modern than Jerusalem, and that this led to a more rapid then utter collapse of society in that city, which in turn led to military defeat. The areas in Jerusalem that also underwent a large measure of social change and process of modernity—especially those in the city's south, which was the center of the city's Arab middle class—were the first to crumble socially, bringing military defeat in its wake. In contrast, the Old City and its adjacent, more conservative northern neighborhoods stood fast under attack between the British evacuation and the arrival of the Arab Legion, and remained Arab. Social collapse thus stands out as the central factor in the fate of cities of mixed population. The fundamental role played by the rise of the middle class in setting the stage for the collapse also emerges from this study. This is consistent with what is known about Palestinian Arab military inferiority to the Jewish Yishuv, caused by political, social, and economic factors. However, this microhistorical study also underlines the cases of military victories won by the Palestinian Arabs and the Arab Liberation Army during the inter-communal war. True, the military challenges faced by the Arab forces were much greater than those confronted by the rebels of 1936–1939, but in 1948 they had much more manpower and better organization, and thus had greater military competence. A similar picture emerges with regard to local institutions such as the National Committees and the Jaffa municipality, which also faced situations more difficult than those presented by the Revolt, but which met them with a much higher level of organization and achievement.

Rashid Khalidi called for a study of the internal reasons for the Palestinian defeat in 1948. This book shows that the most important internal factors were social, in the form of the changes that took place in Arab society during the British Mandate—internal migration from rural areas to the cities, the shift from farming to wage labor, and the rise of the middle class.

Notes

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4 I refrain from using the term "army" in regard to the Holy War forces, since there is no evidence for the use of this term by contemporaneous sources, or even closer to the events. See e.g., 'Arif al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba: Nakbat bayt al-maqdis wal-firdaws al-mafqud* (Sidon and Beirut: Al-maktaba al-'asriyya, 1956–1960), 41ff.; 'Abdallah al-Tall, *Karithat Filastin: Mudhakkirat 'Abdallah Al-Tal, Qaid Ma'rakat Al-Quds* (Cairo: Dar al-qalam, 1959), 3ff. The term "Army of the holy Jihad" probably evolved in the Palestinian historiography later, see e.g., "Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas," in *al-Mawsu'a al-Filastiniyya* [The Palestinian Encyclopedia] (Damascus, 1984).
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8 Salim Tamari, "The Mountain against the Sea? Cultural Wars of the Eastern Mediterranean," in idem, *Mountain Against the Sea: Essays on Palestinian Society and Culture* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2009), 22–35.
9 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, *Palestinians: the Making of a People*, (New York: Free Press, 1993), Ch. 2, "The City: Between Nablus and Jaffa," especially 38–39.
10 Kark, "The Development of the Cities Jerusalem and Jaffa," 354–355, 373.
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12 Giovanni Levi, "On Microhistory," in *New Perspectives on Historical Writing*, ed. Peter Burke (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 95–98, 110; David S. Landes and Charles Tilly (eds.), *History As Social Science* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), 14–17.
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Part I

Jerusalem

The battle for the Holy City



Map 2 Jerusalem Old City area, 1:10,000 (Cropped from original, Survey of Palestine, 1939. All Rights Reserved by the Survey of Israel © 2015. Printed with Survey of Israel permission.).



Map 3 Jerusalem center, 1:10,000 – north (Cropped from original, Survey of Palestine, 1939. All Rights Reserved by the Survey of Israel © 2015. Printed with Survey of Israel permission.).



Map 4 South Jerusalem, 1:10,000 (Cropped from original, Survey of Palestine, 1939. All Rights Reserved by the Survey of Israel © 2015. Printed with Survey of Israel permission.).

1 Jerusalem at war

Introduction

In 1946 Jerusalem had some 165,000 inhabitants. Of these, nearly 100,000 were Jews (who had been in the majority since the end of the nineteenth century), 34,000 were Muslims, and 31,000 Christians.[1] But the city was home to only about 50,000 Arabs, because the Christians included some 13,000 non-Arabs. Several thousand of them were Eastern Christians, mostly Armenians and Greeks, who maintained their own communities and ties with the lands of their origin. Many, however, assimilated into the Christian Arab community. The rest of these non-Arabs were British subjects and other European Christians.[2] About half of the Arab population, some 27,600 persons, lived in the walled Old City. Conditions were crowded there but less so than, for example, in Jaffa's poor neighborhoods. The Old City's Jews, living in the Jewish Quarter, amounted to about only a tenth of the number of Arabs residing within the walls.[3] Jerusalem's

Figure 1.1 Old City of Jerusalem, aerial view, 1931. In the front: Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif (Library of Congress).

inhabitants generally lived within the confines of their ethnic-social-neighborhood enclaves. Arab society was characterized by social polarization between the families of Muslim notables and the lower strata of Arab society. The notables took care, however, to shore up and expand their influence by maintaining patron-client relations with both Muslims and Christians. Sometimes they even had social relations with members of other classes, whether Muslims, Christians, or Jews.[4]

The Arabs who lived outside the walls resided in two principal clusters. One lay to the north of the Old City, and comprised the neighborhoods of Musrara, Sa'd wu-S'id, Bab al-Zahra, Wadi al-Joz, and Sheikh Jarrah. The other lay to the south, reaching from Qatamon in the west, via the Greek Colony, the German Colony, and Baq'a to Abu Tor in the east. Arabs also lived in a belt of neighborhoods to the west and southwest of the Old City—Mamilla (Ma'man Allah), Jurat al-'Inab (now Hutzot HaYotzer), Shama'a (today the site of the Jerusalem Cinematheque; the name was also applied to the new commercial area in south Mamilla), and Nabi Da'ud (Mt Zion). Arabs also lived in the Romema-Sheikh Badr area on the city's western margins.[5]

The Arab neighborhoods outside the walls were founded at the end of the nineteenth century on the basis of religious and kin groups. The Christian Arabs, the dominant group in Qatamon, Talbiyya, and Musrara, established their neighborhoods, for the most part, as religious-philanthropic or commercial initiatives. The Muslims who left the Old City, in contrast, founded new neighborhoods around structures of religious significance or near the long-standing summer homes of prestigious families. These neighborhoods developed around nucleuses and sub-neighborhoods named for the families who founded them, such as

Figure 1.2 Talbiyya neighborhood in the 1930s (Library of Congress).

al-Husayni in Bab al-Zahra (the area of the American Colony), Nashashibi in Sheikh Jarah, Dajani (Dajaniyya) on Mt Zion and in the German Colony, and al-Wa'ri (Wa'riyya) and al-Nammari (Nammamra or Namriyya) in Baq'a. During the British Mandate the development of the Arab neighborhoods accelerated with the expansion of the city's Arab middle class. Members of different families and religions settled in the existing neighborhoods—including dozens of Jewish families. Arabs also moved into neighborhoods established by European Christians, such as the German Colony (whose German residents were expelled during World War II) and the Greek Colony. Most of the Arab neighborhoods outside the walls were well-off, the exceptions being the tiny Shama'a and Jurat al-'Inab, Wadi al-Joz, and parts of Abu Tor and Musrara. The middle-class neighborhoods featured spacious single-family homes.[6] The Arab neighborhoods to the south of the Old City (not including Talbiyya) had a total population of about 22,000 in 1947, consisting of 9,000 Muslims, 13,000 Christians, and 550 Jews, most of the latter living in the German Colony, Abu Tor, and in Upper Baq'a, close to the Jewish neighborhood of Talpiot.[7]

Despite being a minority in the city itself, Arabs held an advantage over Jews in the city's rural and semi-rural hinterland. The population of the Jerusalem district, comprising the subdistricts of Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Hebron, included 270,000 Arabs, among them 40,000 Christians. A total of 135,000 Arabs lived in the Jerusalem subdistrict itself. This contrasted with the district's 100,000 Jews, only 2,500 of whom lived in the hinterland.[8] About 20,000 Arabs resided in the villages that bordered on the Jerusalem municipal territory—Lifta and Dayr Yasin to the west, 'Ayn Karim, al-Maliha, and Bayt Safafa to the south and southwest, Sur Bahir, Silwan, and 'Isawiyya to the east, and Shu'fat to the north.[9] These villages underwent a process of suburbanization, and some of them gradually lost their rural character. Many of their inhabitants had jobs in the city.[10]

Arab society in the Jerusalem area, as in the country as a whole, was undergoing a transformation. The transition from an agricultural to a proletarian society in which farming became but a secondary occupation, a characteristic feature of the Palestinian Arab village in the twentieth century, accelerated in the 1940s, during and after World War II. The two largest employers of Arab wage laborers in Palestine during this period were the Mandate administration and the British military. Almost as many worked for the latter as there were Arab farmers. Both these employers were proportionately larger in Jerusalem than in other parts of the country. The transition to salaried labor caused, in the absence of sufficiently strong central institutions, the weakening of traditional social ties, on which the Palestinian Arab national movement had also been based. On the other hand, Palestinian Arabs in Jerusalem, as in the rest of the country, were still in an intermediary stage and were still far from consolidating new social institutions or solid class consciousness. One cohesive social group that was an exception to this rule, even if it lacked class consciousness in the Marxist sense, was the upper middle class that began to take form during the late Ottoman period and which flourished under the Mandate. Most members of this class

were Christians, and the largest number were in Jerusalem, home to most Palestinian Arab white-collar workers, including civil servants and professionals such as doctors, architects, lawyers, and teachers. As already noted, the established Jerusalem elite—the notables—derived its economic, political, and social power from the ownership of farmland (some of which lay outside the Jerusalem area) and religious endowment (*Waqf)* properties and, like the middle class, from positions in the Mandate and local administrations.[11]

The non-Jewish population in Jerusalem grew rapidly under the Mandate regime, from about 29,000 in 1922 to some 39,000 in 1931 and 56,000 in 1942. Nevertheless, this was a slower growth rate than in both Jaffa and Haifa, which surpassed Jerusalem in the number of Arab inhabitants during these three decades.[12] Throughout this period, about half the non-Jewish population was Muslim and half Christian, although an official estimate of 1945 counted only 17,000 Arabs, or people whose main language was Arabic, among the Christians. Many Arabs from nearby villages entered the city daily as commuters, but some moved from the hinterland into the city, causing its Arab population to grow beyond the rate of natural increase.[13] Jerusalem stood out for its relatively high level of health services. It was home to several hospitals that served the Arab population, among them the government hospital in the Russian Compound and European mission hospitals. As a result, the mortality rates for Muslim infants and young children were the lowest in the country—a fact that testifies to relatively good socioeconomic conditions, as well as a relatively low population density.[14]

One group of Arab newcomers to Jerusalem whose presence was clearly felt were internal migrants from Hebron. This migration was the product of rapid demographic growth in their home region, accompanied by the ongoing decay of that area's traditional rural occupations of farming and grazing and urban ones of commerce and traditional crafts. The Hebronite community in Jerusalem was characterized by social cohesion and coordinated action, through which they sought to overcome their migrant status and make their way into local commerce and trades. Beginning in the 1930s, Hebronites were appointed to positions on the Supreme Muslim Council and its staff, after the Hebronite leader, Muhammad ʻAli al-Jaʻbari, joined the Husayni-affiliated Palestinian Arab Party. This gave the Hebronites a foothold in the Waqf, the Muslim religious endowment. The Waqf owned most of the buildings in the Old City, including those in the suq, or bazaar, and rented them out to merchants and families. With a voice in the Supreme Muslim Council, the Hebronites could now rent these properties and open stores and businesses. Having done so, they tried to force their competitors out of the markets by coordinating prices and creating an internal credit system. The mufti seems to have welcomed the influx from Hebron, which he viewed as a vehicle for gaining a demographic advantage over Jerusalem's Jews. He may also have seen it as a way of shunting aside his rivals, the other prominent Jerusalem Arab families.[15]

Jerusalem, which served as a marketplace for goods and services from the region, enjoyed a commercial surge in the 1940s. At the same time, the families

of the notables, who held Waqf property, saw the share of businesses they owned decline as the number owned by immigrants from Hebron rose.[16] Before they made their numbers felt in commerce and the crafts, the Hebronites had been a palpable presence in the lowest social stratum, in particular as unskilled laborers.[17] As Husayni loyalists, they also played a prominent role in the Arab Revolt. Some of them set up their own covert organization, al-Huriyya (Freedom), which continued to be active throughout the 1940s, during and after World War II, and specifically in 1947.[18]

Alongside the Islamic echelons that gained strength in Jerusalem during the Mandate period, the Hebronites fortified the city's social and cultural conservatism, and to a certain extent retarded processes of social modernization that had begun during the late Ottoman period and continued into the early Mandate period. Hebronite influence almost certainly contributed to polarization between Muslims and Christians.[19] Jerusalem's relative conservatism as a mountain city, in contrast with Jaffa, could be seen in the absence of night life and nightclubs (even though it had many cafés and restaurants). Only two of the city's cinemas were Arab-owned, the Rex on Princess Mary Avenue (today's Queen Shlomtzion Street) and the Orient in the German Colony (today's Semadar Cinema), which was rented to Arabs only at the end of the Mandate period. Jaffa, in contrast, had six Arab-owned cinemas serving a population of approximately similar size. (Jerusalem had three Jewish-owned movie theaters. The number of cinemas in Tel Aviv, which served both the Arab and Jewish populations, was much larger.)[20]

Jerusalem's importance as the center of Palestinian Arab politics, which developed during the Mandate period, and as Islam's third-holiest city, whose religious importance was stressed during this period by the Palestinian Arab national movement, was discussed in the first part of the previous section of this book. Ironically, despite its position as the country's center of Arab political power, the Arabs lost control of the municipality toward the end of the Mandate period. For most of this time, despite the fact that the Jews constituted a majority of the city's voting public, the mayoralty was reserved for a Muslim Arab. The Muslim and Christian members, who together always constituted a majority because council seats were apportioned on a sectarian basis, consistently opposed the appointment of a Jewish mayor, and the Jews had to make do with the position of deputy mayor. In fact, municipal elections were held only twice during the Mandate period, in 1927 and 1934, and the city was divided into electoral districts of unequal population, which prevented any change in the balance of power in the city council. Nevertheless, Jews and Arabs, and different groups among the Arabs, constantly vied for the mayor's chair. The death of the last Muslim mayor, Mustafa al-Khalidi, on August 27, 1944, led to a crisis. The British did not appoint a replacement, so the Jewish deputy mayor, Daniel Oster, became acting mayor. The leading opponent of the appointment of a Jewish mayor was the Arab Chamber of Commerce, which demanded that the acting British high commissioner appoint a Muslim mayor "because of the city's sanctity and because of long tradition." In response, the British authorities proposed

that the mayor's position be rotated among the three religions. The Arabs, both Muslim and Christian, fiercely opposed this idea. In protest they called a nation-wide strike on March 25, 1945. Three months later, on June 26, the Arab members of the city council resigned. In July the Mandate administration assumed control of the city, appointing a board of British technocrats. The last head of the British municipal administration, Richard Graves (brother of poet and novelist Robert Graves), was appointed in June 1947 and served until just prior to the British evacuation of Palestine.[21]

The eruption of armed struggle

> In the wake of the Jews' crimes, it has been decided to assign a group from the National Guard to patrol the streets [of Jerusalem] to foil these plots. The members of the Guard wear special identifying ribbons. They require suspects to identify themselves and check bags. This morning, the [British] police arrested two members of the National Guard on Ma'man Allah [Mamilla] Road and released them on bail of P£200 each.
>
> (*Filastin*, December 27, 1947)

Earlier, on November 29 of that year, upon receiving the news that the United Nations General Assembly had decided to partition Palestine between the Jews and Arabs, the members of the Arab Higher Committee who were in the country at the time resolved to oppose partition and to fight it by all means available to them. They decided, in coordination with the mufti, to declare a three-day strike

Figure 1.3 Jerusalem City Hall and Barclays Bank, at Allenby Square, just north of the Old City and Mamilla Road, and east of Princess Mary Street (Library of Congress).

beginning on December 2 and, in the longer term, to tighten the economic boycott of the Yishuv and launch civil resistance against the British.[22] Some 2,000 Arab schoolchildren staged a non-violent demonstration in the Old City and northern neighborhoods on December 1, and many Arab adults joined them.[23]

The following day, the first of the strike, an Arab crowd armed with clubs and knives, rioted in the area of Princess Mary Avenue and Mamilla Road. They attacked Jewish vehicles, then broke into and ransacked Jewish stores in the Shama'a shopping center near the walled Old City's Jaffa Gate. The Arab newspaper *Filastin* reported that one Arab was killed and five wounded by Jewish defenders, and that 25 Jews had been wounded. The riots continued the next day and spread to other cities.[24] On December 4 the Arab Higher Committee issued a call to end the strike and to "begin the struggle." The violent contest in Jerusalem took the form of an exchange of fire between Jewish and Arab areas. Jewish transport to and from the city was henceforth conducted in guarded convoys. Arabs opened fire on one such convoy on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road, injuring one of the drivers. Gunfire also struck a convoy of Jewish buses as it passed through Upper Baq'a. Guards on the buses returned fire and a young Arab was critically wounded. As a result of the tense situation, government offices, with their Arab and Jewish employees, moved into the security areas the British had established in central and southern Jerusalem in early 1947 in response to IZL (Irgun Zvai Leumi, a Jewish right-wing splinter organization) and LEHI (Lohamey Herut Yisrael, known also as the "Stern Gang," another Jewish splinter organization) attacks.[25]

The British administration's first impression was that the Arab rioters were largely teenagers armed with non-lethal weapons. The members of the Arab Higher Committee in Jerusalem, Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi and Ahmad Hilmi Pasha 'Abd al-Baqi, tried to calm the situation, stressing that the time was not yet ripe for organized resistance. But Arab informers working for Shai, the Haganah (the main Jewish pre-state paramilitary organization) intelligence service, claimed that the riots were being orchestrated by Amin al-Husayni and his Arab Higher Committee associates Emil al-Ghuri, Hasan Abu al-Su'ud, and the Jaffite Rafiq al-Tamimi. These men seem to have tried systematically to supply weapons to the rioters, and then to have made every effort to organize fighting. Low-ranking Arab Higher Committee officials took part in this effort. Shai agents came to the conclusion that the ostensibly spontaneous riots had been set off by the mufti and his supporters in order to create pressure on the Arab League, which was slated to convene for a discussion on Palestine on December 8. They wanted to force the League to take immediate action. Jewish intelligence reported at this early stage that the Arab Higher Committee planned to starve Jewish cities, especially Jerusalem, by attacking transports and preventing the sale of Arab produce to Jews—this in addition to the boycott already in force.[26]

It should be noted that British and Jewish intelligence agencies both believed that the only way the mufti had of maintaining his status in the Arab world was to launch a rebellion immediately, even though preparations for such an act ideally required a long time. The mufti had a political need to move before the other Arab countries did, and to lead the Arab war effort in Palestine. For this

reason, apparently, he had no choice but to act immediately contrary to his original plan, which had been to begin the fight in the spring of 1948. That time frame was intended to take account of the needs of farmers, who needed the winter to sow their fields and to pick and market citrus fruit. The mufti had also reasoned that the Arab League would act only after the British evacuation.[27]

The Arab Treasury, the economic arm of the Arab Higher Committee, had had little success in trying to raise money through a general tax, a method it instituted before the partition decision. It had managed to collect only P£32,000, whereas it projected a need for P£220,000. Form letters issued by the Treasury called on the wealthy to donate to a special fund. Hajj Amin gave a personal example, contributing his home in Jerusalem, valued at P£25,000. This act, whether real or intended for public consumption, elicited some response from the wealthy men of the city. Big donors were given a letter of gratitude signed by the mufti. On December 1, merchants and wealthy figures gathered at the offices of the Treasury in the Tanus building, in the Mamilla commercial area. According to Jewish Agency sources, the amplified appeal had raised P£25,000 in Jaffa and P£15,000 in Jerusalem by December 21. In other places the appeal was unsuccessful, and it looks as if the money raised did not reach its destination. In Jerusalem, Emil al-Ghuri took, without coordinating with anyone, P£1,500 of the special funds for the National Guard. In other cases, the Arab Higher Committee was required to publish a notice in the press warning against "swindlers who are demanding money in the name of the struggle." By January 31, the special appeal had raised only P£68,000, a sum much lower than the target of P£150,000.[28]

Local organizing for the war began only on December 5, at the end of the strike declared by the Arab Higher Committee. An assembly was held that day in the building of the Arab Youth Organization, *Filastin* reported, attended by more than 400 young men from the Old City. The next day, on December 6, a similar assembly, this one for young people of the outer neighborhoods of Wadi al-Joz, Musrara, Sheikh Jarah, and elsewhere in the city's northeast, was to be held in the in the Muslim Brotherhood building. On December 7 a third assembly was scheduled for the largely Christian neighborhoods of Upper and Lower Baq'a, Qatamon, Talbiyya, and Abu Tor, this time at the Orthodox Club. The Arab Youth Organization issued a call, published in *Filastin*, to the young people in all the northern and Christian neighborhoods to attend these meetings.[29]

Other organization activities were of a community-wide and interconfessional nature. These highlighted managing communal life in this turbulent time and support and care for combatants. The Muslim Brotherhood in Jerusalem announced, as early as December 3, "the opening of a center for general humanitarian issues, primary needs, and all other social services." The Red Crescent flag was raised over the building.[30] The Christians also began to put their affairs in order. The Orthodox Executive Committee held on December 21, in Jerusalem, a meeting of its members from Palestine and Transjordan.[31]

On December 5 a meeting of the Palestinian Arab Women's Association declared that "the women stand beside the men." The women's organization

Figure 1.4 Meeting of the Palestinian Arab Women's Association, 1944 (Library of Congress).

reported to the press that it had received hundreds of telephone inquiries from women in Jerusalem who offered to serve as first-aid volunteers. By December 16, the press claimed, the number of women offering to volunteer had reached 1,000.[32] Efforts were made to organize a system of medical care for the wounded. On December 10, the Palestinian Arab Medical Association put up placards announcing the opening of ten emergency clinics, each with a doctor and support staff. The clinics were in the Old City at Herod's Gate, Damascus Gate, and Jaffa Gate, as well as in Musrara, Sheikh Jarah, Upper Baq'a, Qatamon, Abu Tor, and on Mamilla Road. On December 16 the opening of four more clinics was announced—two in the Old City, one each in Talbiyya and Qatamon. The support staffs consisted of volunteers from the Women's Union and from the Arab Scouts. The emergency clinics were situated in existing clinics such as the Women's Association's clinic at Herod's Gate, the Islamic Clinic in the Old City, and the Orthodox Club clinic in Upper Baq'a, as well as in other private clinics. They were established and operated with the consent and support of the Arab Higher Committee, which was asked to help the Medical Association rent a building for the founding of a hospital in Bayt Jala. In the meantime the wounded were treated in the French Hospital in Jerusalem and in the hospital in Bethlehem. The Medical Association also asked the Arab Higher Committee to provide financial support for its general activities.[33]

Despite these organizing efforts, the state of first aid and medical care for the wounded was far from satisfactory. There was a severe shortage of equipment and materials. The Medical Association's leaders, Dr. Tawfiq Cana'an (a well-known physician and ethnographer) and Dr. Mahmud Tahir al-Dajani, sent

requests for assistance and also for some of the material they lacked to the medical associations in Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Amman, and Tripoli in Lebanon. We do not know whether the help was forthcoming, or whether any assistance at all arrived from these places.[34] Because of the growing need for first aid for the wounded, training courses were offered during December by doctors in the different parts of the city, in cooperation with the Medical and Women's Associations. It is not clear whether the classes were meant just for women, or whether both sexes participated.[35]

In December and January regional-neighborhood committees were organized. These assumed tasks in the civilian and military areas.[36] In Bab al-Zahra about a hundred men gathered in the al-Ibrahimiyya High School, which was owned by the Abu Gharbiyya family. They elected a committee headed by Anwar Nusseibeh, an attorney and a member of one of the most ancient Arab families in Jerusalem. The school's gym teacher, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya, whose family came from Hebron and who was a veteran of the Revolt's secret Huriyya organization and a member of the committee, was named to head the neighborhood's defense. The committee set up subcommittees to oversee financial affairs, armaments, food supplies, social affairs, and defense.[37]

An account from Musrara during this preliminary period of organizing tells of an attempt to mobilize a neighborhood. The National Defense Committee of the Musrara Neighborhood issued forms that were to be filled out by men of military age. It included questions about their experience and willingness to participate in guard duty. Jiryis Anton Jiryis, a 20-year-old Christian electrician, single and without combat experience, recorded on his form that his work made it impossible for him to do guard duty. The questionnaire was sent by the Committee to Tahsin Kamal, a Muslim attorney who served as Musrara's military commander at the beginning of the conflict. According to a report received by Shai, Kamal was at loggerheads with the neighborhood's residents, and "in particular had extorted money from Christians." In another case, when Christian residents voiced to Kamal their objections to his plan to travel to Transjordan and take some of the neighborhood's guards with him, Kamal shot and injured one of the protestors.[38]

The directorate of the Arab Orthodox Club in Baq'a, where the abovementioned meeting of young people was held on December 7, convened further meetings on December 28, 1947 and January 18, 1948. A member of the committee, Raja'i al-Ghuri, reported that his brother, the Arab Higher Committee member Emil al-Ghuri, had appointed two guards to protect the club between six in the evening and six in the morning. The worried committee members decided to authorize Raja'i to thank his brother and inquire as to whether the guards might be able to begin their duties as early as two in the afternoon.[39]

Guards for the Orthodox Club were not sufficient in number to make the residents of Baq'a feel safe. Three brothers, George, Raymond, and Gabi Dib, sons of the Buick importer in Palestine, Shukri Dib, attempted to organize a local guard contingent. They claimed to have enlisted 75 volunteers from the neighborhood's 5,000 inhabitants. Most of the area's other able-bodied men demurred,

offering a variety of excuses, while some of its wealthiest residents had sent their sons to school in Beirut or Amman. At one point the Dib brothers applied to the Arab Higher Committee and hired 28 guards from villages north of Jerusalem, each of whom was paid P£10 per month. These guards were housed in attics and garages and ate in the kitchens of local families. A commander for this force was also hired—'Abd al-Nur Khalil Janho, a 22-year-old Christian who had served as a sergeant in the British army and as a prison guard commander at the central Jerusalem jail. The Dib brothers later recalled that the presence of Janho and his men quickly turned into a nightmare for them (much as Tahsin Kamal had become for Musrara's inhabitants). The first people injured in the neighborhood were victims of a hand grenade set off carelessly by the hired force. Janho and his troops, looking for liquor, ransacked houses abandoned by their owners, and their cavalier use of their guns frightened not only inhabitants of the nearby Jewish neighborhoods but also the residents of Baq'a.[40] Such local military actions were typical in Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods. The neighborhood committees served as the basis for city-wide action and would later, after the National Committee was established, functioned under its aegis.[41]

At this point, however, no National Committee had been formed in Jerusalem, as it had in other cities, a body that would represent all the city's Arabs. The Arab Higher Committee, whether for partisan and family reasons or because it wished to preserve the standing of its Jerusalem members on the municipal level as well, preferred to appoint, as reported in *Filastin*, "an Emergency Committee, on which will sit respected people, and they will be responsible for provisions, first aid, and general order in the city."[42] The Emergency Committee commenced its operations on December 12. As an arm of the Arab Higher Committee it was located in the offices of that body's National Economic Committee on Latin Patriarchate Street in the Old City. The group held meetings with representatives of bakery owners, reaching an agreement with them on arrangements for distributing bread to consumers. It also scheduled office hours when residents could come by to get help with their problems. The Emergency Committee was identified with the Husayni party, and consisted of officials seconded from the Arab Higher Committee and the party, mostly of second rank, unlike the original initiative. When it first went into action, it hoped to extend its influence beyond the Jerusalem district, but it quickly had to restrict its activity to the city and its environs. It tried to manage all the affairs of the Arab public, from health to finances and arms. It made arrests and established an emergency court. A tax of P£1 was imposed on every sale or purchase of a ton of wheat, and P£0.25 on every ton of salt. All Arab stores were required to pay a monthly fee of P£5. These taxes were intended to fund the National Guard (see below). Taxation and the consequent interference in the lives of the populace soon made the Emergency Committee unpopular.[43]

In addition to arranging defense for Arab neighborhoods, the group established a National Guard (*Hars Watani*), which in some places merged with the neighborhood guards. National Guard members manned roadblocks where passersby were checked, and it patrolled major thoroughfares, as reported in

Filastin.[44] In one case 'Isa Majaj, a 21-year-old Christian clerk and member of the National Guard, on the night of December 21, tried to block a British police contingent from patrolling on St George Road. The policemen arrested Majaj and found in his pocket a pistol and a magazine for the Sten submachine gun that lay on the ground next to him. During the arrest one of the policemen was shot and wounded by a sniper firing from the nearby Muslim Brotherhood building. Despite such incidents, the police generally gave the National Guard leeway.[45]

The British authorities viewed the new National Committees, including the Emergency Committee in Jerusalem, as responsible organizations that did not encourage violence. The British assessment was that the National Committees were aimed at building, in Arab areas, organized, law-abiding, and independent communities that would be capable of holding up after the British evacuation. The Mandate authorities noted that the National Committees were involved not only in setting up guard units but also in guaranteeing the supply of food and preventing speculation. The British hoped, in time, to bring the Arab military organization that was coming into being under official oversight. They considered appointing Arab temporary auxiliary policemen who would be charged with responsibility for preserving order in Arab cities and in large villages, somewhat like the Jewish settlement police. It is noteworthy that the Arab auxiliaries who served in the Palestine police force were subject to social pressures following the partition decision and began, as a result, to desert in large numbers, taking their weapons with them. Some auxiliaries took part in thefts of guns and ammunition and attacked Jewish civilians. Many of the deserters went to Syria with the intention of joining the Arab Liberation Army (ALA), which was training to enter the war in Palestine. Desertion also occurred among Arab civilians employed by the British army, who numbered 35,000 in March 1947, a record high. Some of these civilians, such as drivers, who numbered 1,300 at their high point, were responsible for expensive equipment. When hostilities broke out, many of them deserted with their vehicles.[46]

Contradictory orders from the mufti in Cairo caused confusion and consternation inside the Arab leadership in Palestine. When Emil al-Ghuri returned from a visit to the mufti, he brought with him instructions to pursue a tough and bellicose policy. The mufti had told al-Ghuri to encourage violent acts and to work together with and accept orders from Husayni loyalists. On the other hand, unbeknownst to al-Ghuri, the mufti sent, via 'Isa al-Bandak, mayor of Bethlehem, a letter to Husayn al-Khalidi, who was trying to pursue a more conciliatory line. In the letter he claimed that the attacks were meant only as harassment, and ordered that there were not to be any large-scale offensives. According to other information, al-Ghuri returned from Cairo dissatisfied, after his powers were curtailed and after he was told that he could not allocate funds without the approval of Khalidi and Ahmad Hilmi.[47]

Presumably, the mufti's ambivalent policy was a product of the inconsistency between his political needs and the reality in the field, where the Arabs lacked the resources that all-out conflict required. Another reason seems to have been

al-Husayni's divide-and-rule strategy within the Arab public. He thought it in his interest to keep the belligerent forces, even those close to him like those of al-Ghuri, at loggerheads with more moderate figures. These moderates were local leaders and institutions of various kinds who tried to keep tempers low and to prevent "lawless elements" from gaining control of events (the mufti had extreme centralizing tendencies and distrusted even his closest associates, like al-Ghuri). This explains why the British viewed the National Committees as a force for restraint. In Jerusalem, however, that role was played by Khalidi and Hilmi, who sat on the Arab Higher Committee, while the Emergency Committee, of which al-Ghuri, also on the Higher Committee, was nominally a member, took a more combative line.[48]

Civilians, even supporters of the Husaynis, complained bitterly about the tenuous state of public safety. On January 1, 1948, Jamil al-Husayni, one of the family's aging and revered members and a veteran functionary, visited al-Haram al-Sharif (the Temple Mount). He confronted the official in charge of the Holy Compound, his relative Tawfiq Salih al-Husayni, as well as Sheikh Yasin al-Bakri, one of the commanders of the Old City. According to a Shai report, Jamil tried to find out who was responsible for the violence against the Jews. Tawfiq Salih tried to calm down this elderly member of his family and direct him to Husayn al-Khalidi and to Emil al-Ghuri. It was these two men, he said, who were responsible for the recent attacks. Although Jamil opposed sporadic attacks, his son Mahmud al-Husayni served as commander of the Wadi al-Joz and Sheikh Jarrah neighborhoods, and participated in attacks on Jews traveling to Mt Scopus.[49]

The exodus begins

The confusion in the national leadership, along with disorganization on the local level, which did not improve matters, made it impossible to create a sense of stability, safety, and high morale. In addition to the matters noted above, such as security fears and the desire to post guards, along with the low level of response to the call to enlist in these guard units and to pay the Arab Treasury's levy, Jewish and British intelligence took note that Arabs were beginning to leave the country in large numbers, with their families. There was also internal migration—they abandoned mixed Jewish-Arab cities and moved to villages. The Bedouin left heterogeneous environments in preference for homogeneous, all-Arab surroundings.[50]

In Jerusalem, Arabs first left mixed areas like Romema, or Arab neighborhoods bordering on Jewish ones, such as Sheikh Jarrah and Jurat al-'Inab. The same occurred among the Jews, who left homes in Talbiyya, Qatamon, and the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. Nahalat Shimon ("Shimon HaTzadiq"), a Jewish enclave neighborhood in Sheikh Jarrah, was entirely abandoned.[51] On January 10, the Haganah sent warning letters to those residents of the Arab neighborhood of Sheikh Badr who had not left, as their neighbors in Romema and Upper Lifta had done. Coincidentally, apparently, LEHI operatives that same evening blew

up the home of Sheikh Badr's mukhtar. The next day, Haganah personnel reported, the neighborhood's inhabitants all left, by way of the neighboring village, Lower Lifta.[52]

One of the explanations for the Arab exodus from Jerusalem at this initial stage, aside from general feelings of insecurity, might have been the situation in government offices, which were major places of employment. On December 24 it was reported that these were operating at half the usual pace, and by the end of the month some had shut down entirely. In his letters to London, Henry Gurney, chief secretary of the Mandate administration, described what was going on in his usual sardonic way: Jewish officials refused to report to work because of the presence of Arab Legion soldiers who were stationed in their offices, under British army command. Then their Arab colleagues, presuming that the offices would become targets of attack if there were no Jews present, also stopped showing up.[53]

While the wealthy and the predominantly Christian upper middle class were the first to begin leaving, Arab flight soon spread to lower socioeconomic levels. The Arab leadership took a severe view of the phenomenon. Articles condemning it appeared in the press, and Jewish intelligence organizations heard about pressure tactics being used to force people to remain. In the framework of the emergency levy underway for the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Treasury, which was also meant to fund guard contingents for neighborhoods, higher taxes were imposed on Arabs whose families had left the country, or who had resided outside it even before the outbreak of hostilities.[54]

Arab flight under Jewish pressure continued and spread to additional areas. During the Yemin Moshe engagement, a part of the Arab force had circled around and came in from the direction of Talbiyya. On February 11, the day after that battle, a Haganah detachment entered Talbiyya from Rehavia and was fired on by two youths whom it attempted to search. Two men were wounded; the contingent retreated. This seems to have been the first instance of fighting in Talbiyya, but many residents, both Arab and Jewish, had already left. Later that day a Haganah vehicle equipped with a loudspeaker entered the area and called on the inhabitants to leave their homes, warning that a Haganah retaliatory operation was in the offing. Arabs began to flee in large numbers. When they learned of this, Arab governing institutions began to pressure the inhabitants to remain in their homes and demanded of the British that they station forces in the neighborhood. A police patrol arrived and captured the Haganah personnel in the car. According to the Arab press, members of the National Guard who had not previously been deployed there entered the neighborhood at this time, apparently because Talbiyya lay between two British security zones. The British either agreed or turned a blind eye to these new forces, but only for a short time. The efforts of the Arab leadership led, within a few days, to erection of a barbed-wire fence around the neighborhood and its inclusion in the British security zone, guarded by British and Arab municipal police, as well as Jewish "municipal police" who in actuality were Haganah men. Encouraged by this new arrangement, some of the inhabitants returned.[55] The flight from Talbiyya caused much

consternation and anger in the Arab camp. Arab wrath was directed both at the Jews and at the neighborhood's residents, upper middle class Christian Arabs who were charged with collaborating with the Jews. The fear was that the latter would advance southward and take control of the entire Baq'a-Qatamon Quarter, where hostilities were already on the rise.[56]

The fighting begins

During the first half of December 1947, the Old City became the central battlefield. On the second day of the strike, December 3, Jewish and Arab forces fired at each other on the edge of the Jewish Quarter after a Jewish patrol encountered a group of armed Arabs. That same day a Jewish vehicle on its way to the Quarter was beset at the Jaffa Gate. Arabs threw up roadblocks there and at the Zion Gate, the two entrances that served the Jewish neighborhood. From this point and until the British evacuation, the Jewish Quarter's only link to the Jewish new city was by means of convoys accompanied by British forces. Intermittent gunfire continued through December 11, and during this time the local population began leaving under the protection of the British police. Jews who lived on the margins of the Jewish Quarter found themselves surrounded by Arabs and abandoned their homes. At the same time, Arabs who lived on the Quarter's boundaries also fled. A Haganah report called the exodus from the Jewish Quarter "mass flight."[57]

Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya claimed that Arabs living on the perimeter of the Jewish Quarter began fleeing after several of their compatriots were wounded and killed there in attacks by Jewish forces. A Jewish source relates that "Najjada members in official uniforms" were telling Arabs to leave the Jewish neighborhood. Abu Gharbiyya's account indicates that from the first days of the fighting, the Arab military forces in Jerusalem, in which he served, focused their efforts on setting up fixed positions manned by armed fighters around the Jewish Quarter. It seems as though at least one of the reasons they established these positions was that the Arabs who lived around the edge of the neighborhood were leaving. This deployment of fighters helped raise morale on the Arab side. Hebronite migrants played prominent roles in the Arab military effort on the Old City. They included Sheikh Yasin al-Bakri and Hafiz Barakat Abu al-Filat, the two top commanders in the Old City, as well the Abu Gharbiyya brothers. Al-Bakri organized a night-time guard of 40 men, equipped with automatic weapons, deploying them on the Old City walls and on roofs overlooking the Jewish Quarter.[58]

According to Abu Gharbiyya, the Arab offensive against the Jewish Quarter on December 11, in which his brother Subhi, one of the leaders of the attack, was badly wounded, came in response to gunfire from the Jewish Quarter directed at nearby Arab houses, at the nearby Arab villages of Silwan and Ras al-'Amud, and at al-Haram al-Sharif. Subhi Abu Gharbiyya suffered permanent brain damage. His injury at such an early stage of the campaign shook the confidence of the Arab forces. A veteran of the Arab Rebellion, he was one of the

most prominent military figures in Arab Jerusalem. The Arab forces had suffered a number of other casualties as well; on the Jewish side there were two dead and two injured. Following this battle, the British sent two platoons to take up positions between Arabs and Jews in the Old City. Thereafter, until the British evacuation, there were sporadic outbreaks of gunfire but, by and large, the Old City remained quiet.[59]

During this same period, Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya set up defenses in Bab al-Zahra, which had been assigned to him. He received a few rifles and some explosives from the Arab Higher Committee and from the Waqf for the purpose of securing the Waqf building that lay in his sector. Now he established a headquarters and a line of positions facing the Jewish neighborhoods of Mea She'arim and Beit Yisrael, manned by 36 regular troops. Another eight men were available as a regional intervention or quick response force. This contingent was later armed with light Bren machine guns, mid-sized Browning machine guns that had been harvested from World War II Spitfire combat planes and mounted on World War I-vintage Austrian Schwartzlose tripods, and a light 2-inch mortar, sent by the Arab Higher Committee from Egypt. Abu Gharbiyya organized 170 young men from the neighborhood as an emergency force. It was divided into squads of 24 men each that guarded and patrolled their respective neighborhoods once a week, in rotation. This force first used weapons owned by its members, but was later equipped with its own arms, which were transferred from one squad to another. According to Abu Gharbiyya, it was only the lack of weapons for this entire force that kept him from switching from a defensive strategy to the offensive. Even so, he defined four offensive goals. The first two were expulsion of the Jews who lived in the Nahalat Shimon neighborhood and from the Dar al-Halaq building on the border between Bab al-Zahra and Beit Yisrael. These two were achieved. The other two were to block the convoy from the Dead Sea potash factory that came through under British guard each day, and the convoys to the Hebrew University and Hadassah Hospital on Mt Scopus, a Jewish enclave surrounded by Arabs. Despite Arab harassment and repeated attacks on these convoys, Abu Gharbiyya's force was unable to stop them.[60]

The division of the country into combat sectors

On December 8, 1947, the Arab League's Political Committee convened in Cairo to discuss the Palestine question. Its members had before them a report that the Iraqi general, Isma'il Safwat, a senior member of the League's Palestine Military Committee, had submitted on November 27 to the Iraqi army's general staff and to the League's General Secretariat. Safwat's principal finding was that only the regular armies of the Arab states could defeat the Yishuv. He recommended assembling such forces on the borders of Palestine prior to the British evacuation. In the meantime, he proposed, the Arabs of Palestine should be organized and their young men trained so that they could take action in subsequent stages of the conflict:

> To defend themselves against Jewish attacks; to cut off the Zionist forces' transport lines, to attack their convoys, and to disrupt their movements; to attack Jewish farming villages and kibbutzim. In this way many Jewish forces will be kept occupied, which will help the Arab armies and make their mission easier.[61]

Safwat was invited to participate in the Political Committee's meeting, but that body did not accept his recommendation to deploy the Arab armies for war. Instead, it was decided to assign the defense of Palestine to irregular volunteer forces. This decision was a compromise between the demand of the Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Transjordan to send in regular Arab forces after the end of the British Mandate and the demand of the Arab Higher Committee and its leader, Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni, that Palestinian Arab forces alone bear the burden of the entire campaign, from beginning to end. The mufti wanted the Arab countries to offer only material assistance.[62]

On January 1, 1948, Safwat, who had in the meantime been named general commander of the fighting forces in Palestine, issued an order dividing Palestine into three sectors. These were the Northern Front, which extended at its southern end to about 50 miles south of Nablus; the Southern Front, the northern end of which reached up to Jura (today's Ashkelon coastline) on the Mediterranean, to Faluja, and to Hebron, but not including the latter city; and the Central Front, which lay between the two others. Fawzi al-Qawuqji was appointed commander of the Northern Front, with a force composed of units of what would later be known as the Arab Liberation Army (ALA). No commander was appointed for the Southern Front; all that was decided regarding this sector was that volunteer forces of Egyptians, Saudis, and Moroccans would deploy there. Only the Central Front was given to the mufti's loyalists, who were to command the local Palestinians. The Central Front was divided into two subsectors, a western one under the command of Hasan Salama and an eastern one, which included Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Bethlehem, and nominally Hebron, under the command of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni. Safwat and the Military Committee tried to designate as the border between the two subsectors the road that ran down the spine of the central mountain range, from Nablus, through Ramallah, Jerusalem, and Bethlehem, to Hebron. But this ignored the regional unity of the Arab population on either side of the road. In practice, the eastern subsector included the mountain region and the western one the coastal plain and piedmont.[63]

Safwat issued his order in accordance with the Political Committee's decision at its December meeting in Cairo, which divided the country into three regional commands, north, central, and south, and appointed Qawuqji commander in the north and the mufti's partisans Salama and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni to lead the central sector. This decision was a compromise between the Political Committee's desire to appoint experienced officers from Arab armies and the mufti's demand that he receive sole responsibility for all the Arab forces in Palestine. It removed Qawuqji from his post as general commander of the volunteer forces in Palestine, the position he had been given in Damascus by the Military

Committee, under the influence of the Syrian government and with the consent of the Arab League's secretary, 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, on the eve of the Cairo meeting. The mufti's candidate for this post was 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, who was compelled now to make do with a promise of command of the eastern-central subsector. The mufti also failed in his attempt to push through a decision establishing a civilian administration in the Arab areas of Palestine. This initiative also met with opposition from Transjordan and Iraq. Instead, it was decided that the General Command of the volunteer forces would also be responsible for administering the civil affairs of Palestine's Arabs.[64]

'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and the reestablishment of the Holy War forces

On December 27, 1947, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni wrote to his wife Wajiha: "I am now in the village of Surif, next to a [Jewish] colony named Kfar Etzion.… Tomorrow I will set out from this village to carry out a few actions, *inshallah*."[65]

'Abd al-Qadir had returned to Palestine in late December, following a decade or so of absence in the wake of the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. He first appeared in Surif, in the northwestern part of the Hebron subdistrict—although according to some reports, he also spent time in Jerusalem.[66] Abu Gharbiyya wrote that the Arab League's Military Committee initially opposed 'Abd al-Qadir's return to Palestine, but agreed to it in the end on three conditions, all largely consistent with the decisions of the Political Committee in Cairo. First, 'Abd al-Qadir was required to coordinate his activity with the Military Committee and to subordinate himself to its command. Second, he was assigned responsibility only for the Jerusalem region, and was not to extend his activity into any other area. Third, he and his men were forbidden to collect "donations" from civilians, as they had done during the Revolt.[67]

When 'Abd al-Qadir arrived in Surif, veterans who had served under him during the Revolt began flocking to the village, as did military figures from Jerusalem, and apparently, as well, from elsewhere in the country. They came to reaffirm their loyalty and to receive arms. According to Abu Gharbiyya, 'Abd al-Qadir had brought with him from Egypt only a meager supply of weapons, some of them faulty. This disappointed his supporters, who had no choice but to continue to depend on private and commercial sources for arms. There were many complaints about the quality of the guns and ammunition that reached the Arab forces in Palestine.[68] 'Arif al-'Arif reported that on the day 'Abd al-Qadir reestablished the Holy War force, on December 25, 1947, it numbered 25 men. Only one of them, 'Azmi al-Ja'uni, came from Jerusalem. The rest were villagers, most of them from Surif, including Ibrahim Abu Dayya. 'Arif noted that other forces using the identical name were founded at the same time in Jerusalem, Haifa, Nazareth, Jenin, and elsewhere. He named Kamil 'Ariqat as 'Abd al-Qadir's deputy, with Qasim al-Rimawi as his adjutant.[69]

During his stay in Surif, 'Abd al-Qadir set up a training camp for recruits from the area, who were housed in tents next to the village.[70] The commander of

Figure 1.5 The Holy War Commanders. Standing on the first row, from the right: Qasim al-Rimawi, ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni, Kamil ʻAriqat. Kneeling third from the left: Ibrahim Abu Dayya (Palmach Archive).

this facility was Abu Dayya, who was also responsible for Holy War's principal stockpile of weapons, which was also in Surif.[71] Holy War's activity went into high gear with the establishment of its headquarters at Bir Zeit, north of Ramallah, at the end of January 1948. The arms depot and training camp at Surif continued to operate, but the principal training facility and store of materiel was henceforth at Bir Zeit. The reason for the move seems to have been the tenuous support that ʻAbd al-Qadir and the Husaynis had in the Hebron highlands. But Bir Zeit offered a number of advantages that were also factors in the move. One was its location deep in the Arab hinterland, far from British and Jewish forces. ʻAbd al-Qadir preferred to reestablish from this position his authority over the regional commanders in Jerusalem, most of whom had been his men during the Arab Revolt. He did this by making frequent visits to the city, and by requiring his supporters to come to see him in Bir Zeit.[72]

The bombings at the Damascus and Jaffa Gates

IZL operatives detonated a barrel full of explosives at Damascus Gate on December 29—for the second time, after carrying out a similar attack there on December 12. Seventeen Arabs and two British subjects were killed; 27 Arabs

were injured. The casualties included men, women, and children from Jerusalem, Hebron, and Nablus.[73]

The two British casualties at the site were policemen, killed, apparently by enraged Arabs, after one of them was accused of helping the IZL bombers escape in their car. Reprisal attacks spread quickly. A hand grenade was thrown at Jewish employees of Barclays Bank who were, under guard, on their way to work. One was killed and two injured. As a result of the tension, Jewish doctors walked out of the government hospital in the Russian Compound, just outside the Old City. Arabs threw up a roadblock at the entrance to Sheikh Jarrah, and set on fire a Jewish car that arrived there. Another car was attacked near the Waqf building, which lay on the seam between Jewish and Arab Jerusalem, near Damascus Gate. By the end of December three Jewish vehicles had been attacked in this area, with one passenger killed and 21 wounded.[74]

On January 1, 1948, an armored bus belonging to the Hebrew University was attacked as it drove through Sheikh Jarrah. Among the participants in the attack, which originated in the Waqf building, were Abu Gharbiyya and Mahmud, the son of Jamil al-Husayni. This was on the same day that the father had appeared at al-Haram al-Sharif to protest the random attacks being committed by Arab forces.[75] In response, that night the Haganah blew up part of the Waqf building. Fighting at the site resumed the next day, and three Arabs and nine Jews were injured. British forces arrived in response to the gunfire. They conducted a search, arresting Abu Gharbiyya, who was wounded as he resisted capture.[76]

His apprehension did not bring calm. At the end of the same day another convoy on its way to Mt Scopus was attacked, and a Hadassah Hospital nurse was killed. In retaliation, the Haganah attacked an Arab bus on January 3, 1948. The British intervened again, this time arresting Haganah personnel and Jewish inhabitants, and confiscating their weapons. On the night of January 3, the Haganah raided Sheikh Jarrah, setting fire to five houses. The area was quiet for a few days thereafter; Shai reported that the next day, January 4, many residents abandoned their homes. The commander of operations in the Arab neighborhood was Shukri Qutayna. He was a pro-Husayni journalist whose son, Walid, had been killed in the explosion at Damascus Gate, the blast that had led to the escalation in the area.[77]

Following that explosion Arabs stationed sentries at all the gates to the Old City and tightened the siege of the Jewish Quarter. A Jewish Agency official who met with the British at this time received the impression that the Mandate administration had for all intents and purposes ceded control of the Old City, and that the only law that counted there was that of the Arab Higher Committee. The road to the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives was blocked for a short time, until the British agreed to secure it.[78]

Fighting continued and spread throughout the city. On the night of January 5, Arab forces attacked the Jewish neighborhood of Meqor Hayyim, perhaps in response to the bombing of the Semiramis Hotel (see Chapter 2). Attackers penetrated the neighborhood and tried to blow up a Jewish position, but managed only to destroy the wall of a barn. The next day a Jewish truck was fired on as it

drove through the German Colony. In response, on the following night a Haganah force attacked the village of Bayt Safafa. Its local guard managed to repel the attackers. One Haganah soldier died; two were wounded.[79]

Despite these relative military successes, the Arab civilian leadership was in a pessimistic mood as a result of the anarchy that prevailed and also the flight from Sheikh Jarrah, Qatamon, Romema, and Musrara. Emil al-Ghuri and Husayn al-Khalidi each continued to operate independently, while Tawfiq Salih al-Husayni managed al-Haram al-Sharif, stockpiled weapons, and trained fighters, not coordinating with the others. On January 1, al-Ghuri set out again for Cairo to submit to Amin al-Husayni a status report. According to information gathered by Shai, he also intended to give him an ultimatum of sorts. Since the leaders in Palestine were unable to continue to command and organize the war effort, al-Ghuri wanted the mufti to order a temporary moratorium on hostilities until such time as the Arabs could prepare properly. The alternative was to enlist help from outside Palestine and to bring in men like Jamal and Raja'i al-Husayni and Sheikh Hasan Abu al-Su'ud, who had spent just a short time in the country organizing the National Committees.[80]

On the day al-Ghuri left, Husayn al-Khalidi spoke by phone with the mufti, who asked him how things were going:

> Awful. Emil will tell you everything. Sir, we cannot allow the present situation to continue. There is confusion and chaos here. If you don't remedy the situation, in God's name I won't be able to do anything—the situation is dire—there is no order in a city like Jerusalem. Each one of you must return, from the highest to the lowest. We all intend to leave the city if things remain this way.[81]

The day after his colleague left, Dr. Khalidi continued to complain on the phone to the mufti. The civilian population was panicking, he said, especially at the front lines in Qatamon and Sheikh Jarrah. Khalidi complained also about the condition of the ammunition, and the shortage of hospital beds for the wounded. Shai transcripts of further such conversations during January paint a picture of a lack of arms, economic crisis, severe problems with provisions, mass flight, and, trumping everything else, a lack of organization. On top of all this came Khalidi's personal crisis, as he buckled under the burden.[82] According to one Arab source, there was, during the fighting on January 2 in Meqor Hayyim, Bayt Safafa, and Qatamon, "horrible panic" in the Arab Higher Committee "and in the rest of the administrative institutions" (meaning, apparently, the Emergency Committee). Reinforcements from nearby Bethlehem were sent to nearby Bayt Safafa, while Qatamon received help from al-Maliha.[83]

On January 7, IZL operatives robbed an armored car belonging to the Jewish Settlements Police and then, disguised as British personnel, arrived that afternoon at the Jaffa Gate and cast a barrel of explosives into the crowded area next to the National Guard roadblock, near the Gate. Nineteen Arabs and one Armenian were killed; 36 people were injured. Some of the dead had manned the

roadblock. One was a veteran of the Arab Revolt who, apparently, had been the commander of the roadblock. The casualties included the owners of nearby businesses and people waiting for a bus. Two women were among them. British policemen, who fired on the fleeing IZL men, killed three and wounded one.[84]

In the wake of the explosion, Shai reported, Arabs began to walk through the Old City armed, without interference from the police. In retaliation for the attack, Arabs fired at Yemin Moshe, across the Ben-Hinnom ravine from the Old City walls, and gunfire came also from police and British army positions on Mt Zion. According to Jewish sources, contrary to headlines in *al-Difa'*, there was no response. The newspaper claimed that on that same day a Jewish driver was killed and his vehicle burned on the way to Abu Tor, after the National Guard had signaled him to halt and he ignored them. Yemin Moshe, which overlooked Hebron Road, constituted a threat to Arab travel to the neighborhoods in south Jerusalem, and to the area from Jerusalem to Bethlehem, to Mt Hebron, and the rest of the country. Shai said that Arabs feared an attack from Yemin Moshe on the dam at the Sultan's Pool, over which Hebron Road ran. Demolishing the dam would completely cut off the road, and cause severe damage to the Arab homes in Shama'a, a neighborhood on the slopes of the Ben-Hinnom ravine.[85]

On the morning of the Jaffa Gate explosion, Arab forces in Sheikh Jarrah resumed firing on Beit Yisrael and Sanhedria. Mahmud Jamil al-Husayni, in command of about 20 men from that area, was killed.[86] He was the first of the Husayni clan to fall in the war. According to the press, thousands of people, including many notables, attended his funeral, which followed a memorial service on al-Haram al-Sharif.[87] Following the death of his son, Jamil al-Husayni reversed his previous position about fighting the Jews, and began to work to organize the war effort. It is reasonable to presume that this personal blow he suffered was the principal cause of his decision to take up a role in the fighting. In this he resembled Shukri Qutayna, who organized the attacks emanating from Sheikh Jarrah following the death of his son in the explosion at the Damascus Gate.[88]

The death of Mahmud al-Husayni came on top of those of a number of other prominent local military leaders who had been killed or wounded since hostilities broke out in December. Subhi Abu Gharbiyya had been seriously injured, Subhi Barakat was killed in the explosion at the Jaffa Gate, and Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya was wounded and arrested. While this lowered the morale of the Arab forces and the city's inhabitants, these men were replaced, largely from the available cadre of veterans of the Arab Revolt, who were known and loved by the populace. Furthermore, the sense of loss and the desire for revenge brought the armed struggle further recruits.[89]

In the days following the Jaffa Gate bombing firefights between the two sides continued, especially in the Yemin Moshe, Qatamon–Meqor Hayyim–Bayt Safafa, and Sheikh Jarrah–Beit Yisrael–Sanhedria sectors. In this latter area, the Arabs entered the abandoned Nahalat Shimon neighborhood, where they demolished houses. Sheikh Jarrah itself had been largely abandoned. Members of the al-Husayni family, who had lived around the mufti's residence in this

neighborhood, moved into houses in the nearby American Colony. A few returned to the Old City. The mufti's house became a base for Arab combatants, perhaps also a weapons depot. Most inhabitants of the upper part of Qatamon, where it bordered on Kiryat Shmuel, also left, and guns were distributed to the few that remained.[90]

At the end of January, firefights and sniping continued in the same sectors. Light arms smuggled in from the south, through Hebron and Surif, and from the east, via Jericho, caused the price of guns in the Old City to decline. The Arab Higher Committee sold rifles for P£25 and a commitment by the buyer not to resell it on the black market (where prices had also declined). Along with light arms, explosives also arrived. During January Jewish and Arab forces fought over the advance positions held by the Jews. As part of this struggle the Arabs blew up two posts on the edge of the Jewish Quarter. A third position was shattered by British soldiers. All three posts were abandoned after the bombings, replaced by positions located further inside the Quarter.[91] Arab morale, and the prestige of the National Guard in the Old City, rose following the capture, on January 18, of a cab filled with explosives, driven by an IZL operative, at the Guard's roadblock at the entrance to the Jaffa Gate parking lot. The driver was tortured and killed. Now aware that cars were being combed over meticulously at Arab roadblocks, IZL stopped trying to send explosives through them.[92]

The establishment of the National Committee

The disarray evident in both the military and civilian spheres led many in the Jerusalem Arab community to conclude that the Arab Higher Committee, and its arm, the Emergency Committee, were not up to the task of running the city in wartime. It was, they believed, too concerned with national issues and too dominated by the Husayni faction to deal adequately with matters such as food distribution, medical care, and the defense of the neighborhoods. Furthermore, these bodies were not representative of the Jerusalem population. Jerusalem's Arabs saw that administrative bodies called National Committees had been established in other cities to perform these functions, and they wanted one in Jerusalem as well. These bodies, composed of local representatives of neighborhoods, organizations, and sectors, were designed to be more responsive to the public's needs. Public pressure induced the Arab Higher Committee to call in Sheikh Hasan Abu al-Su'ud and assign him the task of organizing a National Committee in Jerusalem. Abu al-Su'ud, a Jerusalemite member of the Arab Higher Committee now residing in Cairo, was the mufti's special envoy in charge of organizing National Committees throughout the country, but so far Jerusalem had lain outside his purview. He ordered the neighborhood committees each to appoint two delegates to a council that would elect the new body. The council convened on January 26, 1948 under his chairmanship. His attempt to dictate a slate of candidates with close ties to the Husaynis failed, and elections by secret ballot were held. The National Committee thus elected represented different groups within the Arab population—there were members from different neighborhoods, Islamic

clergymen, educated Muslims and white-collar Christians, representatives of immigrant families from the Hebron highlands, and relatively small representation for the prestigious families, perhaps because so many of their members had fled. With the election of the National Committee, Jerusalem had for the first time a body devoted to local organization, as opposed to political bodies with a countrywide orientation like the Arab Higher Committee and the Emergency Committee, which was for all practical purposes a branch of the former.[93]

The National Committee set up headquarters at the Greek Orthodox monastery in the Christian Quarter, near the Jaffa Gate, and formulated bylaws that placed most powers in the hands of the Committee's secretary, Anwar Nusseibeh. The bylaws stipulated the appointment of a treasurer, auditor, and office manager, and established subcommittees for defense and security, food supply, first aid and social issues, and neighborhood organization. This latter subcommittee was to serve as a liaison between the National Committee and neighborhood committees. Initially, the former encountered opposition from the Emergency Committee, whose members sought to retain responsibility for military matters. As a result, the National Committee had to concentrate on the unpopular issue of provisions. At the beginning of February 1948 Shai reported that the Emergency Committee's Sa'd al-Din al-'Arif was being invested with broader powers, including command of the National Guard and of distribution of arms to the neighborhoods outside the city walls. Liaison with the British army and police remained in the hands of the Emergency Committee. In the end, however, following several weeks in which they worked in parallel and in competition, the powers of the Emergency Committee were handed over to the National Committee, which proved itself more effective. It did a better job collecting taxes, which were imposed on all types of food and transportation, organizing supplies, and rationing, which for the first time was accomplished in a systematic manner with the use of coupons. The provision of bread was assured via local supply committees in each neighborhood. The National Committee also tried to impose registration of weapons and the need for a permit to bear arms. Even in a situation in which guns and ammunition were freely sold in the Old City markets, the measure succeeded, at least in part. Furthermore, the National Committee helped Arab residents receive property and life insurance payments owed to them from overseas, despite the semi-anarchy in which insurance companies were closing their local offices. On February 25, the National Committee announced regular office hours, advertised on a cautiously worded placard. It condemned highway and train robbery and called on Arabs "to preserve, in their struggle, their historic assets, and not to damage archaeological, historical, or spiritual sites as their enemies do." Another role assumed by the National Committee was coordination with the regional commander, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni. It appointed one of its members to serve as liaison officer between the Committee and the regional command.[94]

The National Committee struggled at first with financial difficulties, due to low allotments from the Arab Higher Committee. Most of the money available flowed through the latter's coffers. The Arab Higher Committee did not like the

idea of another committee operating in close quarters with it, and the Husayni party resented many of the members of the National Committee. As a result, it handed over only tiny sums—P£500 on January 31, P£1,500 on March 16, P£500 on March 27, and P£1,000 on April 7. This was at a time when the National Committee's budget, according to its plans, was P£36,000. Neither did a trip by Anwar Nusseibeh to Cairo help. But when 'Izzat Tanus, Secretary General of the Arab Treasury, joined the National Committee, the economic situation improved. The new body was able to raise P£5,000 from donations and taxation of Jerusalem's inhabitants. In order to compensate prominent members of the Emergency Committee, and also, apparently, as a gesture to the mufti and his party, these men were appointed, at the beginning of March, as officials in the service of the National Committee. Yet a lack of clarity still prevailed as to which body represented the Arab community in Jerusalem. This could be seen in a variety of complaints that continued to stream into the Arab Higher Committee.[95]

March brought a significant rise in the power of the National Committee under Nusseibeh's leadership. In the second half of the month the offices of the Emergency Committee and the Arab Treasury were moved into the building occupied by the National Committee, as part of a concentration of powers in the latter. The Arab Treasury became the fundraising arm of the National Committee, which called on the city's Arabs to cooperate with tax collection. Taxes were imposed, collected by means of coupons required for the purchase of a number of goods—alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, gasoline, and sugar among them. Price controls were imposed on basic items, such as eggs, and the public was told to report price gouging to the National Committee. Arab Treasury stamps and donation cards were distributed on public transportation, at restaurants, in social clubs, and at neighborhood grocery stores. Once the Arab Higher Committee endorsed the Arab Treasury's cooperation with the National Committee, the Treasury's funding for the latter, and for the neighborhood committees under it, increased. The National Committee buttressed its authority, insisting that only its gun licenses were valid. It threatened to confiscate unlicensed weapons and to levy fines on violators. It imposed the same sanctions in an attempt to end wildcat gunfire, in which young men discharged their weapons simply to show off. It even began to issue identity cards to the Arab population, and to compel every male, from small children to the elderly, to carry them. An initiative to issue driver's licenses was canceled after public transportation companies opposed it, and this area remained under the purview of the Mandate's motor vehicles department until the British evacuation. On the other hand, the National Committee issued gun licenses to bus companies, along with an order from the Arab Higher Committee to armor their vehicles. In practice, this injunction was not always observed. The National Committee sought to fill the vacuum that had opened in the civilian sphere as the Mandate authorities contracted their operations with the approach of the evacuation. The vacuum had created an atmosphere of lawlessness. The National Committee, following on the efforts of the Emergency Committee, sought to fill the legal void by establishing a court that

assumed the authorities of the Mandate's court system. Arab institutions stopped cooperating with the Mandate's institutions and went so far as to shove them aside and take their place. When the British acting mayor, Richard Graves, requested the Arab Higher Committee to tell the public to pay municipal taxes, he was turned down. The Committee told him that it viewed the city council as a body that "does not represent the will of the people, and which came into being in opposition to that will." The attempt to take over municipal and, it seems, national tax authority was also manifested in an order that the public pay taxes only to the Arab Treasury. This order was also meant to prevent the collection of protection money by other forces in the Arab sector. Despite the efforts of the National Committee, local leaderships, organized as neighborhood committees, retained considerable power. The National Committee recognized this situation and authorized the committees to impose their own levies, and to provide Arab Treasury receipts for them.

The National Committee also assumed authority over the National Guard, whose name was now changed to the City Garrison (*Hamiyat al-Madina*). The foreign troops flocking into the country at the time made up a large portion of its ranks. Its command structure was clarified and uniforms were standardized. In the week that ended on April 9, the Jerusalem Garrison received P£4,500 from the Arab Treasury, close to half of the Treasury's outlays that week.[96] Despite the National Committee's attempts to put the fighting forces into shape, serious problems remained evident, deriving from disorganization and a lack of resources. In mid-March there were about 1,000 combatants in Jerusalem, including Arab Liberation Army troops but not of the municipal police force (see below). Another approximately 500 fighters in the Ramallah area belonged to the Holy War forces. The latter's local commander, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, had available to him, at the end of March, 19 machine guns, nine located in Jerusalem, plus eight mortars. The National Committee's liaison officer with the Holy War forces, Jawdat al-'Amd, a Qatamon businessman who had been involved in the fighting, described the situation in a report he submitted to the mufti, who was then in Beirut. The fighters, he said, still lacked weapons and ammunition, and what they had was often of low quality and even unusable. Most of the men belonged to the neighborhood militias, and many of them were paid their salaries by the neighborhood committees, in contradiction of the mufti's orders that all payments go through the Arab Treasury. Such salaries were funded by levies of varying rates that were set in accordance with the ability of civilians to pay them. The militiamen's salaries were not paid regularly, affecting their morale and discipline. The situation of the troops who had come from the Arab states was especially bad because there was no coordination between the regional command, the National Committee, and the neighborhood committees. Although 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni had fortified his authority, there was still no unified command and military organization that encompassed all the fighting forces in the city. A National Committee delegation that met with 'Abd al-Qadir on March 14 complained to him about this situation and asked that his command assume responsibility for paying the salaries of all combatants. He

agreed to pay 800 of them, terming the rest "mobile forces from the area's villages." He meant that they were untrained reserve militias composed of villagers who did not require salaries, who were to be called up as needed. Likewise, he announced his intention of concentrating 500–600 men in the al-Rawda School, which had become the central base of the Arab forces in the Old City. It was agreed that his command would supply these fighters with arms and ammunition, but that their room and board would continue to be paid by the neighborhood committees. Al-'Amd viewed this as a positive step, but cautioned that if the city were not supplied with ammunition, machine guns, and mortars, Jerusalem would face a "great disaster" (*karitha*).[97]

The National Leadership and the exodus

Even as the National Committee made these attempts to strengthen Arab military and civilian institutions, Arab civilians continued to flee the city. This was particularly notable among the well-off and upper middle class; in areas of conflict, however, everyone was leaving. The mufti was extremely disturbed by this, and he wrote to the National Committees throughout the country on March 8 in an attempt to prevent or at least limit it:

> The [Arab Higher] Committee views this act of desertion from the field of honor and sacrifice as something that tarnishes the nobility of the holy war movement, besmirches the repute of the Palestinians in the Arab countries, weakens the morale of the Arab peoples with regard to the Palestine problem, and negatively impacts on the economic and commercial state of the Arabs in Palestine as a whole.… The Arab Higher Committee has studied this grave subject in all its aspects and circumstances, and has decided that the national interest requires the Palestinians to carry on with their affairs in their country and not to leave it, except in urgent and vital cases of clear need, such as political, commercial, or health affairs, about which the Arab Higher Committee will decide after consultation with the National Committees.[98]

The National Committees were ordered to warn the Arab population not to travel to other countries. The mufti ordered that anyone who wanted to go to an Arab country for a limited period or as a permanent move should submit a detailed request to the local National Committee, which would discuss the request and submit its recommendations to the Arab Higher Committee in Cairo or Jerusalem. Only if the Arab Higher Committee were convinced that the trip was imperative would it submit to the relevant consul an official request that his country issue a visa. Obviously, this plan required the cooperation of the Arab states. The Arab Higher Committee demanded of Arab governments that they take measures to send back home Palestinians who were residing on their territory. After being approached about the evacuation of women, children, and the elderly, the mufti adopted a compromise. He forbade sending families out of the

country, but affirmed in his letter to the National Committees that "in areas in which women, children, and the elderly are in real danger, they are permitted to leave these areas for other areas distant from the source of the danger." He expected, however, all men of military age to remain where they were to defend their homes and property. This then became the background of an order issued by the Arab Higher Committee to confiscate any furniture that was moved out of homes without an acceptable reason. In Jerusalem, the National Committee went even further—just moving from one house to another in Jerusalem required the approval of the relevant neighborhood committee and the National Committee.[99]

There was one exception to this policy of preventing young men—those who were potential fighters—from leaving. The Arab Higher Committee in Jerusalem cooperated with the high command in Damascus to identify candidates who could be sent to a six-month-long officers' training course in Syria. On March 15, Ahmad Hilmi wrote to the National Committees throughout Palestine, requesting that they locate young high school graduates between the ages of 18–30 to send to Damascus. The National Committees in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Nablus responded by publishing notices in *al-Difa'* calling on young people who met this description to report to their offices. The response was high, perhaps because the applicants were motivated by nationalism, or perhaps because it was an opportunity to leave Palestine. The Jerusalem National Committee set up a special subcommittee to process the requests and, on April 7, after conducting medical examinations, chose ten young men for the course. Most of them came from notable families or from supporters of the Husaynis.[100]

Why was the Arab leadership so willing to send away, for half a year, several dozen educated and militarily fit young men with command potential—precisely the sort who were desperately needed in wartime in the field? The military command in Damascus, which was responsible for the combat forces in Palestine, was undoubtedly aware of how critical the situation was. Nevertheless, it seems that rivalry with the Husaynis for influence in the Palestinian community led it to take this step, which was intended to strengthen its influence over the Palestinian command. Its cooperation with Ahmad Hilmi, one of the two members of the Arab Higher Committee who remained in Jerusalem, may have had its source in the fact that the mufti was far away, and in the growing prestige of the Arab Liberation Army, a company of which had recently arrived in Jerusalem. In any case, the command in Damascus did not simply work through the Arab Higher Committee. In at least one case it sent its own Palestinian representative, Hazim al-Khalidi, directly to the National Committee in Ramallah. The National Committees, for their part, cooperated because none wanted their areas to lose prestige and standing within Palestine. This is clear from the families from which the cadets from Jerusalem hailed, and from their number, which was higher than Jerusalem was asked to provide. The behavior of both the local and national leadership shows that they had not internalized and comprehended the extremity they were in and the scale of the immediate military challenge that they faced.[101]

The response to the officers' course also demonstrated the marginality, at this point, of Christians in the Palestinian Arab war effort. They constituted close to half of the population of Arab Jerusalem, but only one of their number was chosen as a cadet for the course in Damascus. The official position was one of unity. This was particularly true of the principal Christian community, the Greek Orthodox. Most of its adherents were Arabs and they supported the Arab national movement. However, as in the past, Christians voiced considerable trepidation about the impending end of the Mandate and life under the Muslim regime they expected would replace it.[102]

The establishment of the municipal police

Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi of the Arab Higher Committee had been trying, since an early stage, to organize local defense in coordination with the British authorities. They were willing to consider the idea in light of the general deterioration in security. It appeared that the intention was to establish a garrison like those already set up in Tulkarm, where the municipality employed 24 auxiliary policemen who had been laid off by the Mandate government. The government supplied weapons and ammunition, and policemen continued to receive their previous salaries, with the government and the municipality each paying half. A similar transfer took place in most Arab cities, with the boundaries between the municipalities and the National Committees sometimes growing blurred. This created, in practical terms, cooperation between the National Committees and the British authorities (in cities in which the civilian leadership, usually embodied by the municipality, was effective and accepted, the National Committee operated, in practice, as one of its arms).

In Jerusalem, where there was neither an Arab municipal administration nor (at first) a National Committee, negotiations over the establishment of an Arab municipal police force were conducted between the government and the Arab Higher Committee. The latter also demanded that the authorities refrain from searching for Arab weapons or otherwise interfering with Arab defense operations, such as roadblocks. Jewish intelligence learned that an agreement was reached to hand over defense of all Arab parts of Jerusalem, including the Old City, to the municipal police. But the force's establishment was delayed. At a meeting of the Mandate administration's Security Conference on January 23, it emerged that the Jerusalem municipality, which was run by the British, was having trouble arranging for its part of the budget for this force. High Commissioner Alan Cunningham directed that the establishment of the force not be put off for financial reasons, given that it was urgently needed, but the holdup continued. On February 6 the Security Conference decided that the chairman of the appointed municipal council, Graves, would set a target date for its establishment.[103]

During the month of February the final preparatory work was completed. The British authorities did their best to expedite the establishment of the force because of the deteriorating security situation, and they pressured Graves to

hurry. The task was assigned to two Arab police officers, Major Fa'iz al-Idrisi and Inspector Khalid Sharif al-Husayni. The former was a close associate of the Husaynis and acted in coordination with them; the latter was a first cousin of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni.[104]

Following the appointment of Idrisi as chief inspector of the district's Arab police force, he was assigned to choose candidates for the force—300 policemen armed with rifles for Jerusalem, 40 for Hebron, and 50 for Ramallah and adjacent al-Bira. Husayni was appointed commander of the Jerusalem force. The selection of candidates began the second week in February but proceeded at a snail's pace. In the first stage, 150 policemen were chosen. The principal difficulty in enlisting them seems to have been the tiny salary that was offered, lower than that paid to fighters belonging to the other Arab forces. No less a problem was the fear that policemen might desert and take their rifles with them. The recruits included inhabitants of Jerusalem, the surrounding villages, and the Hebron and Nablus highlands. These local policemen replaced the Arab Legion at the guard posts around the municipality building on Allenby Square and manned roadblocks at the Jaffa and Damascus Gates and at a few points in the New City. They also conducted foot patrols in Talbiyya, the Greek Colony, and on Jaffa and Mamilla Roads. The fear of desertion turned out to be well-founded, in part—there was at least one such case in which four policemen absconded with dozens of rifles. At first the Arab municipal police force operated under the command of the British police force in Jerusalem, but the latter recognized these Arabs' close ties to Arab governing bodies.[105]

Changes in the Arab command: The arrival of the Arab Liberation Army

On February 25, the Military Committee in Damascus instructed Fawzi al-Qawuqji, commander of the Arab Liberation Army in the northern region (from Samaria and northward) to send to Jerusalem a retired Iraqi officer, Lieutenant Fadil 'Abdallah Rashid, along with a company of 120 men from the ALA's al-Husayn Battalion. The purpose was to assign him to command the city's defense. Most of the al-Husayn troops were Iraqis, but some were Syrians and Palestinians. The Military Committee resolved on January 1 to establish urban garrisons and to appoint commanders for them. Jerusalem had been given third priority, after Haifa and Jaffa. When the Military Committee convened in Damascus at the beginning of February, it decided to appoint independent commanders for Haifa and Jaffa, directly subordinate to the Committee.[106]

Jerusalem, the Husaynis' power center, was different. Since it had been agreed that the Jerusalem region would be commanded by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, meaning that it would be under the mufti's direct control, an agreement was reached between the Military Committee and the Arab Higher Committee. Under its terms, the garrison in Jerusalem would operate under command of the Holy War forces, and be subject to the Military Committee's orders pertaining to all the city garrisons. These orders required the corps to cooperate with local

forces and the National Committee and to obey the regional commander. Likewise, the Jerusalem Garrison was required to cooperate with Hilmi and Khalidi, the only members of the Arab Higher Committee in Jerusalem at this time. Rashid, the officer chosen to command the Jerusalem Garrison, had been close to the mufti's party since he participated in the rebellion led by Rashid 'Ali al-Kaylani in 1941 in Iraq. Amin al-Husayni had played a major behind-the-scenes role in that pro-German coup d'état. Yet Rashid and his men encountered difficulties in entering the city, and were forced at first to station themselves in Bayt Jala. It seems that the local commanders in the Old City, as well as 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, at first opposed the arrival of the foreign troops. The Arab Liberation Army entered Jerusalem only in mid-March, and took responsibility for the sector lying between the Jaffa Gate and Mt Zion up to the Abu Tor neighborhood. Rashid established the company's base at the al-Rawda School in the Old City's Muslim Quarter. It became, from this point forward, the Arab command center in the city. The Arab Liberation Army entered the building, along with 'Abd al-Qadir's local forces, with the mufti's sanction.[107]

Rashid, whose official title was "commander of the Jerusalem Garrison," was in action by March 8. On that day he conducted observations of Yemin Moshe from Mt Zion and issued an order telling the Arabs who lived near Meqor Hayyim to evacuate their homes, since these were to be requisitioned for military purposes. Soldiers were sent to the evacuated houses to establish positions. Rashid also sent 50 members of the Arab Youth Organization to Upper and Lower Baq'a as reinforcements. The arrival in Jerusalem of the Arab Liberation Army contingent enhanced the esteem in which it was held by the local Arab community, at the expense of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni. The resulting personal

Figure 1.6 Palestinian Arab leaders gathering at the Jerusalem al-Rawda School, 1929 (Library of Congress).

tension between ʻAbd al-Qadir and Rashid probably caused concern in Damascus that, despite the agreement with the Arab Higher Committee, the mufti would send a rival commander to Jerusalem. As a deterrent, when Rashid visited Damascus on March 21 he was promoted to the rank of captain and was equipped with, in addition to light arms, a wireless two-way radio that enabled him to maintain ongoing contact with Arab Liberation Army commands in Palestine and Damascus, and which further enhanced his prestige as a commander. But the foreign soldiers under his command sometimes beat local civilians, and Rashid's personality and military talents were subjects of controversy. Residents' views of the Jerusalem Garrison seem to have been influenced by their attitudes toward the foreign fighters of the Arab Liberation Army in general. One of Rashid's Iraqi compatriots, General Ismaʻil Safwat, described him as one of the best commanders he knew, but some individuals in Jerusalem disparaged him for the way he managed battles. Others viewed him as a weak man who was not up to the task of leading a heterogeneous multinational force. But others lauded his character and noted that he had been wounded in battle. Some charged that his main interest was pillage.[108]

Gradually, over the course of March and April, some 80 members of the Muslim Brotherhood from Syria, who had been trained at the Arab Liberation Army's Qatana camp, near Damascus, joined the Garrison. They were led by Dr. Mustafa al-Sibaʻi, the Brotherhood's leader in Syria and one of the organization's important ideologues. He made his position on the Palestine conflict clear when he declared, just before setting out for the country, that Zionism was an "abscess we wish to expurgate." Two Syrian army officers, Jamal al-Sufi and ʻAbd al-Rahman Maluhi, operated alongside him. Al-Sufi served as Rashid's deputy, and thus the Syrian and the mainly Iraqi forces merged into one more or less unified force. It should be taken into account as well that some of the men of the al-Husayn Battalion were also Syrians and, ideologically and socially, the commanders of both groups (with the possible exception of Sibaʻi), as seasoned army officers, had much in common. The united force was relatively well armed—it had Czech rifles, French light and medium machine guns, and light mortars. According to Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya, al-Sufi and Maluhi frequently complained to him about disciplinary problems. The Arab Liberation Army ranks included soldiers who had deserted or who had been dismissed from other Arab armies. The Muslim Brotherhood fighters included Damascus University students, but 15-year-old boys as well.[109]

The *Palestine Post*, Ben-Yehuda Street, and Jewish agency bombings

On February 1, in the evening, a huge bomb lodged in a British army truck, containing hundreds of pounds of explosives, went off in front of the building that housed the *Palestine Post*, the Yishuv's English-language newspaper. The building was located on HaSolel Street (today's HaHavatzelet Street), in downtown Jewish Jerusalem. The explosion destroyed the editorial offices and the printing

press, as well as the Jerusalem district offices of the Hebrew Settlements Police. Four Jews were killed and 16 wounded. The two adjacent buildings went up in flames, and other buildings too were damaged. Dozens of families were left homeless and lost their property. Shai's intelligence assessments agreed with the common wisdom among the Jewish leadership and public—the British police were responsible for the explosion. Israeli historians long accepted this judgment.[110]

But, according to Arab sources, the truck bomb was put together by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni himself, in Bir Zeit or in 'Ayn Sinya, north of Ramallah. He was assisted by the Holy War explosives expert, Fawzi al-Qutb. The truck with the bomb and an escape vehicle set out from 'Abd al-Qadir's camp in Bir Zeit with three passengers, British deserters from either the army or the police, who had joined 'Abd al-Qadir's forces. They were accompanied by 'Abd al-Nur Khalil Janho, the commander of Baq'a, who had been chosen for the job because of his fluent English. The job of the British men was to enable the convoy to get through British and Jewish roadblocks. Janho was assigned the job of lighting the fuse that would set off the explosive charge.[111] This bombing was the first large act of sabotage carried out by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and his men. It caused consternation in the Arab camp because the Arab Higher Committee in Jerusalem did not want the Arabs to be held responsible. The Committee's public relations department briefed the Arab newspapers accordingly. Yet 'Abd al-Qadir issued statements taking credit for the bombing. The internal debate reached a point at which the public relations department ordered Arabic newspapers not to publicize 'Abd al-Qadir's statements.[112]

On February 22, at 6:30 in the morning, three army trucks blew up on Ben-Yehuda Street, a main artery in downtown Jewish Jerusalem. Four buildings collapsed and others were damaged. A total of 49 people were killed and 140 were injured, extricated from the ruins, and taken to hospitals. The bombers escaped in a fourth vehicle, a British armored police car. The shock waves rocked Jewish Jerusalem, leaving behind them a sense of foreboding and depression. The crowd that gathered at the site blamed the British, whose police and army officers arriving there to investigate the bombing had to leave quickly. IZL and LEHI operatives opened fire on British personnel, killing ten soldiers that day and the next. The British returned fire, killed three Jews and wounding seven. Tension between the Jews and the British climaxed and the British command declared Jewish Jerusalem out of bounds for all ranks. Israeli historians have also held the British responsible.[113]

In this case, too, the bombing was the work of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni's command. It had established contact with the crew of a British armored car and persuaded them, paying them to desert to the Arabs and participate in the operation. The cars that held the bombs, originally stolen from the British, had been taken from the Holy War's warehouses. The bombs themselves were constructed by al-Qutb, the Holy War's explosives expert, and he may well have been assisted by 'Abd al-Qadir himself. In the early morning of February 22, the convoy set out from Bir Zeit and drove via Ramallah, Beit Horon, Latrun, and

through Bab al-Wad by the main road from the coastal plain to Jerusalem. The roundabout route was chosen so as to obviate any suspicion that the cars had come from an Arab area. As in the case of the *Palestine Post* bombing, ‘Abd al-Qadir did not place all his trust in the British deserters. He sent along on the operation two members of his own inner circle. One was a veteran of Surif training camp, ‘Azmi al-Ja‘uni, a Jerusalem native whose fluency in English and fair complexion enabled him to disguise himself as a British policeman.[114]

‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni left for Egypt on the day of the bombing or the day that followed, February 23. That same day, the Cairo daily *al-Ahram* printed the text of a statement he made via telephone. In it he took responsibility for the explosion on Ben-Yehuda Street, terming it retaliation for a bombing committed by IZL in Ramla a few days earlier. The General Command of the Holy War army issued a similar declaration to the Arab press in Palestine, also on February 23. This statement was also broadcast on Arab radio stations and copies were distributed in Jerusalem. Basing itself on wiretaps, Shai reported a rise in Arab morale following the bombing, but also noted that some on the Arab side had condemned the action. Among the latter were the secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, who called it “depravity unfit for the Arab spirit.” The Arab Higher Committee in Jerusalem tried to disassociate itself from the explosion. It issued a denial to the press, stating that ‘Abd al-Qadir had been out of the country for a number of days and thus could not have conveyed a statement to the press in Jerusalem. According to the intelligence gathered by Shai, ‘Abd al-Qadir left the country for the purpose of taking care of financial affairs, and to complain in person to the mufti about Dr. Khalidi’s denial. In response, the Arab Higher Committee in Cairo issued, at the mufti’s behest, an order that only the Holy War declaration, and not the denial, should be publicized. In the end, the newspapers printed both declarations side by side. There seem to have been practical reasons for the denial as well—after the bombing there was fear of retaliation against Arab civilian targets, so Arab forces went on general alert. Additional roadblocks were set up, with police sanction, at contact points with the Jews, such as Princess Mary Avenue. Reinforcements were sent to critical points on Mamilla Road, at Damascus Gate, and at the bus depot behind the Rockefeller Museum.[115]

On March 11, Holy War perpetrated its third large-scale bombing in Jewish Jerusalem. This time the target was the Jewish Agency building, which was heavily guarded by the Haganah. The explosion was the work of a driver from the U.S. Consulate, Anton Da’ud, a Christian Arab from Bethlehem. He used a consulate vehicle to smuggle a 550-pound charge into the building’s courtyard. The guards knew the vehicle and its driver. Da’ud used the excuse that he had come to sell arms in order to leave the car parked in the courtyard. He left. The bomb, fashioned by Fawzi al-Qutb in the Old City with ‘Abd al-Qadir’s knowledge, was set off by timer. It killed 12 and wounded 44. The building suffered considerable damage, but the Haganah command headquarters of the Jerusalem district, on the bottom floor of one of the building’s wings, was left unscathed. Like its predecessors, the explosion dealt a serious blow to Jewish morale and

raised spirits on the Arab side. This time the bombers had succeeded in penetrating the heart of Jewish civilian and military governing institutions. Unlike in the two previous instances, this time it was clear that the British were not involved, and that the attack had been planned and executed by the Arabs. Once again, defenses on the Arab side were augmented.[116]

This string of mega-bombings was part of the urban terror and psychological warfare campaign that is typical of inter-communal wars. The attacks on these carefully chosen targets—the offices of an influential newspaper, the urban center of Jewish Jerusalem, and the Yishuv's governing institutions—stunned and demoralized Jerusalem's Jews. The morale of the city's Arabs rose, giving them a sense that their side was winning and that momentum was in their favor. In Palestinian collective memory and historiography, these bombings are seen as the principal successes of the Holy War in particular and of the Palestinian forces as a whole in the 1948 war. The Arab public, both in Jerusalem and throughout the country, viewed the bombings as unavoidable retaliation for the attacks at the Damascus and Jaffa Gates, the Semiramis Hotel in Qatamon (see Chapter 2), and other Jewish actions throughout the country. At a press conference he held in Jerusalem in mid-March, 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni voiced these sentiments. "The Jews," he said, "thought that they alone could use this weapon [bombs], and they used it dozens of times against the British and Arabs. The Arabs were also compelled to use it."[117]

Escalation and flight, continued: February and March

In early February 1948 the hostilities continued unabated. Arabs blew up Jewish buildings in the Mamilla commercial area and attacked Jewish convoys on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road and on the road connecting Jerusalem with the Dead Sea. In response to the bombings, Jewish forces fired on Mamilla Road and launched 2-inch mortar shells onto the Damascus Gate plaza.[118]

On February 3, the Arabs carried out a carefully planned attack on Meqor Hayyim, descending on the Jewish neighborhood from three directions—from Qatamon, Bayt Safafa, and Baq'a. A total of 90 Arab fighters took part in the attack, under the command of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, Kamil 'Ariqat, and Mahmud al-'Umari, the commander of Bayt Safafa. Following the initial assault the Arab forces retreated, on 'Abd al-Qadir's orders, under fire from the neighborhood's Jewish defenders.[119] Fighting continued in that sector in the days that followed, which included another Arab foray against Meqor Hayyim on the night of February 4. On the night of February 12, two Haganah platoons, covered by mortar fire, attacked Bayt Safafa and blew up three houses, among them the home of the local commander, al-'Umari, who was killed. According to intelligence reports, Bayt Safafa's civilian population had already been evacuated to Hebron and other places, leaving only 40 members of the National Guard. Al-'Umari's death was a heavy blow to Arab Jerusalem and the Arab Higher Committee, which flew black flags over its offices. He was given a massive public funeral, with Committee members Khalidi and Hilmi, delegations from the

region's villages, fighters, and representatives of Arab public institutions in attendance.[120]

Yemin Moshe, at the time a Jewish slum neighborhood, was an enclave nestled between the Arab neighborhoods that formed part of British Security Zone B and the Old City and Mamilla areas. It overlooked Hebron Road which, after the alternative route via St Julian Street was closed by the British, remained the only link between the Old City and the southern Arab neighborhoods and from there to the Arab agricultural and military hinterland in Bethlehem, the Hebron highlands, and further south. Yemin Moshe's isolation from the Jewish part of the city and its topographic inferiority in relation to the Old City walls and Mt Zion gave the Arabs an advantage, including high points from which to observe the neighborhood. But its densely packed buildings and narrow streets, running parallel to the Old City wall, allowed Jewish forces to move unseen and under cover. A series of skirmishes began on December 3, among them a few Arab attempts to strike at the neighborhood. On February 10 Arab vehicles on Hebron Road were fired on from Yemin Moshe, apparently in reaction to Arab barrages against the neighborhood. An Arab bus passenger was killed and another wounded. In response, a large Arab force of about 150 men set out from Jaffa Gate to attack Yemin Moshe. It was commanded by senior operatives from the Old City, including Hafiz Barakat, Salah al-Hajj Mir, and Sheikh Yasin al-Bakri. After several hours of combat, during which the Arabs succeeded in penetrating the margins of the neighborhood, and after both sides had received reinforcements, the British intervened and compelled the Arabs to retreat. All three sides suffered fatalities and injuries. Typically, the casualties included one of the Arab commanders, Bakri. Following the battle the British stationed a permanent garrison in the area.[121] The attack on Yemin Moshe was part of an ongoing escalation of hostilities in the city in which both sides fired on public vehicles and mined roads, tried to take control of positions on the boundaries of Arab and Jewish areas, demolished firing posts and homes, sniped, retaliated against attacks from the other side, and reinforced the organized self-defense forces in each neighborhood.[122] Yemin Moshe continued to be a focal point in the war. On March 21 the neighborhood was attacked once again from Jaffa Gate, Mt Zion, and Abu Tor. Still another attack came on March 23, this one in the form of a car bomb prepared by Fawzi al-Qutb. Two members of the Holy War detonation unit, which al-Qutb had founded earlier that month, pushed the car from the Mamilla area down into the neighborhood under covering fire from Mt Zion. The explosion was deafening, but the block of buildings it affected was half-abandoned and only a few civilians were wounded. This relatively complex operation made a huge impression on the Arab side, where it was reported that the blast had completely razed the Jewish neighborhood.[123]

The Arab command in the Jerusalem region did its best to keep its troops disciplined and well-behaved. A rising tide of complaints flowed into the offices of the Arab Higher Committee, the Emergency Committee, and the National Committee at the end of January and beginning of February. Members of the National Guard, civilians claimed, were plundering stores (both those abandoned and

those still in operation) as well as homes, even breaking in through doors and windows. The Hebronites, who made up a considerable part of the National Guard, became particular targets of these complaints, some of which were referred directly to Hebron's mayor, Muhammad 'Ali al-Ja'bari, and to that city's National Committee. These bodies in turn passed the complaints on to the Arab Higher Committee in Jerusalem. The Arab governing bodies took the matter very seriously and made every effort to capture the offenders and bring them to trial. According to Shai reports, the Arab leadership used harsh interrogation measures, including floggings and torture, and some of the men who were caught in the act were imprisoned and brought to trial in Bir Zeit, before 'Abd al-Qadir—who was known for his severe sentences. To avoid publicity, which was liable to lower morale among the fighters, local commanders took steps to prevent pillage. But corruption and theft by civilian activists seem to have been met with a more forgiving attitude.

Tightened discipline and restoration of order in the city were evident in a notification issued by the Arab command in the Old City after Arabs killed two British policemen, stealing their guns, on February 17. Placards posted around the city, announced that the area within the walls would be under curfew between the hours of ten at night and six in the morning. It also forbade the use of arms without a "military order." The command called on the inhabitants to provide any information they had regarding the murder of the policemen, and threatened that the murderer would be shot dead if he did not turn himself in, and that his family would be exiled to another city. It forbade attacks against British military personnel or civilians and stealing weapons from them, on pain of imprisonment for life to be funded by the prisoner's family. Thieves and coin counterfeiters would be punished likewise. People who opposed the National Guard or who violated the order would be brought before a field court martial. These threats and draconian measures brought about an improvement in discipline and order, both among the troops and among civilians. This, along with the arrival of additional forces in the city and region, led to an improvement in morale.[124]

At the end of February, fighting grew worse following the bombing on Ben-Yehuda Street by the Holy War forces. Battles, with mortar fire, raged along the front lines and on the main north-south roads. On February 23, in a Jewish offensive accompanied by a mortar barrage, seven Arabs, including a couple and their infant, were killed in Musrara. The deaths of an entire family in the barrage shocked the Arab community. They believed, mistakenly, that the attack on Musrara had been meant as retribution for the Ben-Yehuda bombing (they apparently did not know that the Jewish public and its governing institutions held the British solely responsible).[125] In the early morning hours of February 26 a Haganah force numbering 143 troops armed with light arms, explosives, mortars, and machine guns struck at Wadi Joz. The plan was to capture and blow up a number of houses. The Arab Garrison in the neighborhood, some 70 men under the command of Muhammadd 'Adil al-Najjar, spotted the invading force and opened fire. Several dozen reinforcements under the command of Bahjat Abu

Figure 1.7 Making plans – commanders of the Holy War Forces (Palmach Archive).

Gharbiyya arrived from Bab al-Zahra and helped repel the assailants, but not before they had managed to blow up three houses. Despite this relatively successful response by the Arab forces, most of Wadi Joz's residents evacuated their homes after the end of the battle.[126]

The Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road, the only one connecting Jewish Jerusalem to the coastal plain, was closed to traffic, except for large and secured convoys. The route was rendered largely impassable as a result of strenuous efforts by Arab forces which, on 'Abd al-Qadir's orders and in accordance with the plan that he had worked out with the mufti, managed to cut off the road at Bab al-Wad, where it enters the hill country.[127] The attacks on the road were made possible when the British ceased, in February, to designate it an evacuation route. During March larger Arab forces staged more methodical attacks on Jewish vehicles traveling the road. In addition to giving priority to this tactic of attacking Jewish transport on the roads, the Arab leadership made a strategic decision to sever Jewish Jerusalem from the coastal plain. The policy was coordinated between 'Abd al-Qadir's Holy War forces, the civilian leadership in Jerusalem, and the Arab Higher Committee. Three parts of the plan were to cut off provisions heading into Jerusalem from Tel Aviv, additional sniping against Jewish neighborhoods, and cutting off the water supply (although this latter step was not taken until May 12). The goal was to force Jerusalem's Jews to surrender. The

plan may have been connected directly to the mufti's intention of returning to Palestine immediately upon the end of the Mandate. Also, there was Arab hope that such a huge blow would prevent implementation of the partition plan and the establishment of a Jewish state.[128]

British High Commissioner Cunningham, through his chief secretary Gurney, negotiated with Dr. Khalidi to allow food convoys to reach the city, under British oversight. Gurney believed that he had been on the verge of reaching an agreement, but that it was stymied by the Jewish conquest of Qastal, a village overlooking the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road not far from Jerusalem. Khalidi, who had gained some authority during this period, was coordinated with the military leadership on this issue. He seems to have misled Gurney—he apparently had no intention of reaching an agreement, as he declared on the pages of *Filastin* on April 1, where he also rejected Jerusalem's internationalization:

> The campaign currently underway will bring the Jews to a peak of scarcity and convince them that their leaders deceived them when they told them that a Jewish government could be established in Palestine. The Arabs will fight any international force that tries to intervene and establish an international area in Jerusalem after the departure of the British. As for a cease-fire, the Arabs do not accept this solution, because it does not benefit them at all. Only the Jews want it, because they wish to guarantee the safety of 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem.[129]

Despite their plans, the Arabs did not disrupt the supply of water from the coastal plain. It continued to arrive until May 12, even during the battles that raged over the pumping stations at Bab al-Wad. The reason seems to have been, in addition to a British military presence at the pumping stations, the fact that the British administration and army and many Arab residents in the southwestern neighborhoods depended on this water. Otherwise, the Arabs lacked any real motive for not cutting off the water supply from the plain. It would not have been an especially effective tactic since Arab Jerusalem, the Old City in particular, was full of wells and reservoirs, and water also came in through pipelines from the east and south.[130]

Another event that took place on March 27 further exacerbated flight from the neighborhoods north of the Old City, Musrara in particular. Haganah forces commenced heavy bombardment and machine gun fire on key military, civilian, and transport positions in the Arab city—Musrara, Damascus Gate, Jaffa Gate, Mamilla Road, Sheikh Jarrah, the Sultan's Pool (Jurat al-'Inab), and Hebron Road. The barrage lasted for about a quarter of an hour. Most of the Arab casualties were in the Damascus Gate area. According to 'Arif, two Arab residents of Musrara were killed, as well as five others elsewhere, and 40 were injured. On the Arab side the attack, which took place in the afternoon, caused people to think that this was in retaliation for an Arab attack on a Jewish convoy near Dheisheh (known as the Nabi Daniyal convoy). In fact, the operation had been planned earlier.

In response, Arab forces opened fire at several points in the city, among them Yemin Moshe and Ramat Rahel, especially at Mea She'arim and Beit Yisrael. The exchanges of gunfire continued the next day, and further fighting took place on April 1 and 4—when the British intervened. Mea She'arim was targeted by an Arab force from Bab al-Zahra, reinforced by other contingents from the Old City, among them the militiamen of al-Haram al-Sharif, who brought a mortar with them. The Bab al-Zahra force responded vigorously, using a medium machine gun. Despite this determined Arab response, the Jewish attack, which had been preceded by others, prompted nearly all of Musrara's inhabitants to leave. The neighborhood was emptied of women and children; apparently only fighters remained. Since most of the residents of Wadi Joz and Sheikh Jarrah had already fled, the majority of Arab neighborhoods north of the Old City had now been abandoned, leaving behind only the armed forces.[131]

Abu Gharbiyya, commander of Bab al-Zahra, claimed in his memoirs that a British air force officer stationed at the Italian Hospital, between Musrara and Mea She'arim, warned him that if Arab forces continued to fire mortars at civilian targets in the latter neighborhood, the British would intervene with their own artillery. Abu Gharbiyya claims in his account that he told the officer that the Jews were the ones who started using mortars against civilians, at Damascus Gate, and that he warned that "I will respond with even heavier fire if they again attack Musrara." His threat reflected Abu Gharbiyya's rising star, as well as the increasing numbers of his troops. The British had arrested him when hostilities first commenced, but they were unlikely to do so now, given his newfound power and their own dwindling authority.[132]

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54 "In the Arab camp," January 11, 1948, HA 105/142, 2, 3; See also "Tendency of Arabs to leave the country," January 15, 1948, HA 105/215/a; "Weekly intelligence appreciation," January 10, 1948, MEC CM III/1/15.

55 Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah* 165; *Filastin* and *al-Difa'* February 12 and 13, 1948; "Arab newsletter," February 11, 1948, IDFA 2644/1949/353; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, map on 199, 439; Kroyanker, *Shekhunot Yerushalayim*, 30–31; News about the decision to include Talbiyya in the British security zone, *Filastin*, February 18, 1919.

56 "Mood in the Arab camp after the departure from Talbiyya," February 12, 1948, 105/215.

57 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 31–32; Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, 1404; Moshe Ehrnvald, *Matzor be-tokh matzor: Ha-rova ha-Yehudi ba-Yerushalayim ha-atika be-Milhemet ha-'Atzma'ut* (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2004), 36–37. Muhammad Zuhair al-Nammari, "A Jerusalemite Story," at www.jerusalemites.org/nammar.html.

58 Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 149; "The rioters in Jerusalem on 6–7 December," December 8, 1948, HA 105/22; "Weapons and training in the Arab public in the Old City of Jerusalem," December 24, 1948, 105/22, Yasin al-Bakri in "Arab Command in Jerusalem," IDFA 1949/7249/283, 19; "Guards in the Old City," December 17, 1947, HA 105/22; "Turmoil among residents of Al-Wad and Bab Al-Salsala neighborhoods," December 28, 1948, HA 105/22.

59 Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 158–159; Aharon Liron, *Yerushalyim ha-'atika: Ba'matzor u-bekrav* [The Old City of Jerusalem: Under siege and in battle] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1985), 27–31; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin* 32–33; Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, 1404; Subhi Abu Gharbiyya in "The Arab command," IDFA 1949/7249/283, 10, 20; "The condition of Subhi Abu Gharbiyya, December 17, 1947, HA 105/22; "The state of Subhi Abu Gharbiyya's health," December 25, 1947, HA 105/22.

60 Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 157; News from Tenne (Shay), 6 January 1948, HA 105/23.

61 "The second report of Isma'il Safwat, 27 November 1947," in Government of Iraq, *Taqrir lajnat al-tahqiq al-niyabiyya fi qadiyat Filastin* [Report of the parliamentary inquiry committee on the Palestine problem] (Baghdad: Matba'at Al-hukuma, 1949), 141–144.

62 Sela, *She'elat Eretz Yisrael*, 422; see also the position of Amin al-Husayni in his book, *Haqa'iq 'an qadiyat Filastin* [Facts about the question of Palestine], 3rd expanded edition (Cairo: Maktab Al-hay'a al-'Arabiyya al-'ulya li-Filsatin, 1954), 16.

63 Isma'il Safwat, "Establishing forces, defining fronts and their sectors," January 1, 1948, HA 230/general/8. For the appointment of Safwat as general commander, see Sela, *She'elat Eretz Yisrael*, 426.

64 Sela, *She'elat Eretz Yisrael*, 426–428.

65 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni to Wajiha al-Husayni, December 27, 1947, in 'Isa Khalil Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni* [Mother Palestine and her pious son 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni] (Amman: Dar Al-jalil, 1986), 361, 387 (in Arabic).

66 Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 227; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 162; "Weapons and training in the Arab public," December 24, 1948, HA 105/22. "Weekly intelligence appreciation," December 25, 1947, MEC CM II/3/159; "In the Arab camp," December 28, 1947, HA 105/142, 2.

67 Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 162.

68 Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 227–228; "Jaysh Al-Jihad Al-muqaddas," [Army of holy war], in *al-Mawsu'a al-Filastiniyya* [Palestinian Encyclopedia] (Damascus: Al-Mawsu'a Al-Filastiniyya, 1984), 123–127 (in Arabic); Kamil 'Ariqat and Qasim al-Rimawi in "The Arab command," IDFA 1949/7249/283, 6, 38; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal al-'arabi al-Filastini*, 163; Dr. Khalidi complained to the mufti, December 31, 1947, HA 105/23.
69 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 73–74; Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 227–228.
70 IDFA 1948/500/28, December 25, 1948, January 2, 1948.
71 On Abu Dayya as commander of the training camp, IDFA 1948/500/28, January 2, 1948; on Abu Dayya leading the fighters in Surif, IDFA 1948/500/26 January 1948; on Abu Dayya as responsible for the store of weapons, his translated correspondence 25 March 1948–27 November 1948 (one letter in the original Arabic), HA 105/91; compare with Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 186.
72 "News from Tenne," February 2, 1948, HA 105/23/b; "Recruiting commanders and actions," January 26–27, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/353; on "Movements of 'Abd al-Qadir," February 1, 1948, HA 105/23/b.
73 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 189; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 77–78; *Filastin*, December 30, 1947.
74 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 78; Yehoshua Ofir, *Al ha-homot: ha-irgun ha-tzeva'i ha-le'umi be-ma'arkhot 5708 bi-Yerushalayim* [On the walls: IZL in the battles of 1948 in Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Jabotinsky Institute, 1954), 27–28 (in Hebrew); Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 189; *Filastin*, December 30, 1947; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 165–166.
75 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 189; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 158.
76 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 189; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 166–168; *Filastin*, January 3, 1948.
77 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 189; Departure of the Arabs from Sheikh Jarrah, "News from Tenne," January 6, 1948, HA 105/23; "From Hayogev," January 5, 1948, CZA S25/9051; "News of Hayogev," January 2, 1948, HA 105/23.
78 Rosenberg to Myerson, January, 4 1948, CZA S25/4044; "Attack on the funeral procession to the Mount of Olives," January 2, 1948, HA 105/23.
79 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 183; "Conquest of Meqor Hayyim," *Filastin*, January 7, 1948; "Exchange of fire in Jerusalem," *al-Difa'*, January 1, 1948.
80 "In the Arab camp," January 4, 1948, HA 105/142.
81 Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, January 4, 1948, 114.
82 Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 141, 156, 170.
83 Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 114; "In the Arab camp," January 4, 1948, HA 105/142, CZA S25/9051.
84 Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, 1543–1544; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 337–338; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 81–82; Ofir, *Al ha-homot*, 28–32; List of people killed, *al-Difa'*, January 9, 1948; death notices for 'Isa Tumanyan and Mary Majjaj, *al-Difa'*, January 9, 1948; Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 118–119; for the number of dead see also al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 81; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 48, 138, 156, 169–170.
85 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 338; *al-Difa'*, January 1, 1948; "On the matter of events in the Old City," January 11, 1948; "Arabs fear an attack from the Yemin Moshe side," January 11, 1948, "From events in the Old City," January 11, 1948, IDFA 1949/7249/283.
86 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 185; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 189, 435; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 170.
87 *Filastin*, January 9, 1948.
88 "Organization of the activists in the disturbances 1936–1939," January 15, 1948, HA 105/23; see also Jamil Yusif al-Husayni in "The Arab command," IDFA 1949/7249/283, 43.
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92 "Weekly intelligence appreciation," January 20, 1948, MEC CM III/1/5; *Filastin*, January 20, 1948; Ofir, *Al ha-homot*, 32–33; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 338; Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, 1544.

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96 Meetings of the National Committee in Jerusalem, the Treasury and the announcement by the supply division of the National Committee in Jerusalem, regarding the

price of eggs, *al-Difa'*, March 17, 1948; move by the Emergency Committee in Jerusalem, *al-Difa'*, March 18, 1948; poster of the National Committee in Jerusalem, *al-Difa'*, March 19, 1948; poster of the National Committee in Jerusalem and news of the correspondence between Graves and the Higher Arab Committee, *Filastin*, March 19, 1948; Graves, *Experiment in Anarchy*, 145–146 (Mayor's log, February 20, 1948); power of attorney for the neighborhood committees to collect taxes, *Filastin*, March 30, 1948; the Arab Treasury, confirmation of payment of P£1500 to the National Committee in Jerusalem and a receipt from the National Committee, March 16, 1948, ISA 65/529 (in Arabic); Yusuf Sayigh, Comptroller of the Arab Treasury, weekly expense report to the director of the finance department in Beirut, March 20, 1948, ISA 65/529 (in Arabic); confirmation of payment of P£500 Anwar Nusseibeh for the National Committee in Jerusalem, March 23, 1948, ISA 65/529 (in Arabic); confirmations of payments of P£197 to the Mamilla (*Ma'man Allah*) committee via Taher Darwish, March 31, 1948, ISA 65/529 (in Arabic); confirmation of payments of P£200 to the local committee in Musrara and a receipt from Ya'kub Saliba on behalf of the National Committee, March 26, 1948, ISA 65/529 (in Arabic); confirmation of payment of P£250 to Dr. Fawti Frayj for defense of Qatamon and Lower Baq'a and a receipt from Dr. Frayj in the name of the local committee, March 20, 1948, ISA 65/529 (in Arabic); expense report of the Arab Treasury for the week ending April 9, 1948, ISA 65/656 (in Arabic); "Collected Arab news," March 22, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59, 129; al-hajj Badawi al-Damiri on behalf of the Egg and Poultry Association to the Higher Arab Committee in Jerusalem, March 8, 1948, ISA 65/1556 (in Arabic); Establishment of courts, "In the Arab public," March 9, 1948, HA 105/100; allocation of licenses for rifles to public transportation companies and instructions from the Higher Arab Committee to armor buses, "Circular of the Arab Department," JI, Tel Aviv (47), 4–3/7/31kaf.

97 Jawdat al-'Amd, report on the state of Jerusalem's defenses to the chairman of the Higher Arab Committee, Beirut, March 19, 1948, ISA 65/1633 (in Arabic); al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 149–150, 499 n. 2; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 247, reports of 1,000 and 500 fighters in the Jerusalem and Ramallah areas respectively; on Jawdat al-'Amd as a member who was added to the National Committee, see also al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 161; Khalil al-Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya* [Such am I, O world] (Jerusalem: Commercial Press, 1955), 28 March 1948, 387 (in Arabic).

98 The President of the Arab Higher Committee, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni to the National Committees, March 8, 1948 in Cairo, HA 105/257 (in Arabic); compare with al-Husayni, *Haqa'iq 'an qaḍiyyat Filasṭin*, 68–72. See also the photograph of the letter from the mufti to the Prime Minister of Egypt, demanding that he prevent Palestinians from entering Egypt, March 8, 1948, HA 105/257.

99 Ahmad Farraj Tayi', *Safhat matwiyya 'an Filastin* [Forgotten pages on Palestine] (Cairo: Dar Al-sha'b, 1964), 56; "Wealthy Arabs leaving the country," February 4, 1948 and "evacuation of Arab homes near Talpiot," February 4, 1948, HA 105/215; "Collected Arab news," March 22, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59, 129; "Circular from the Arab department," March 14, 1948, JI, 4–3/7/31kaf; "Collected Arab news," March 19, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59.

100 Ahmad Hilmi on behalf of the Higher Arab Committee in Jerusalem to the National Committee of Jerusalem, "Request to select candidates for officers training in Damascus," March 15, 1948, ISA 65/1631 (in Arabic); the Higher Arab Committee in Jerusalem, recommendation letter for Mario Jabr Khamis from Bayt Jala who was going to Damascus to try out for the officers course, March 25, 1948, ISA 65/1631 (in Arabic); the request of Edmund Michigian, a 19-year-old Armenian from Jaffa who worked as a clerk in the Civil Aviation Department in Lydda to attend the officers course following an advertisement in *al-Difa'*, March 23, 1948 (in English); the National Committee in Ramallah to the Higher Arab Committee regarding the

officers course in Damascus, April 4, 1948, ISA 65/1631 (in Arabic); *al-Difa'*, March 19 and 23 1948; *Filastin*, April 7, 1948.

101 Isma'il Safwat, "Report on the Jews in Palestine," November 27, 1948, and "Report on the actions of the mufti," March 11, 1948, Iraq, *Taqrir lajnat al-tahqiq*, 104–145, 149–150, respectively; Husayn al-Khalidi to the committee in Ramallah, April 8, 1948, ISA 65/1631 (in Arabic); for the sometimes exaggerated self-confidence of the Arab Palestinian public see, "In the Arab public," March 23, 1948, HA 105/100, which reflects the Arabs' successes in March.

102 Farid 'Atallah Cana'an was the only Christian sent to the officers course from Jerusalem; for the tendency to maintain religious homogeneity, see "Collected Arab news," March 23, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59; for fears among the Arab Christians, see Henry Gurney, Diary, March 23, 1948 MEC GUR 1/1, 15.

103 Minutes of the Security Conference, January 23, 1948, February 6, 1948, MEC IV/1/112, 1.

104 Minutes of the Security Conference, February 6, 1948, at MEC IV/1/115; *al-Difa'* February 11, February 17, 1948; "List of the names of Arab police officers in the country," October 27, 1947, HA 105/23/A; Fa'iz al-Idrisi in "The Arab command," IDFA 1949/7249/283, 7; al-Husayni family tree translated into Hebrew, HA 105/22.

105 *Filastin*, February 19, 1948; meeting in the offices of the Higher Arab Committee, February 18, 1948, ISA 65/163 (in English); Graves, *Experiment in Anarchy*, 144, 155–156, 163 (Mayor's log, February 17, 1948, March 9, 1948); for progress in establishing the Arab municipal police force, see "Weekly intelligence appreciation," MEC CM III/1/113, February 23, 1948; selection of 150 Arab municipal policemen, "In the Arab camp," February 29, 1948, HA 105/142; D.S.P. to A.S.P. Khaled Eff. Husseini, "Duties and Training: Arab Section, Jerusalem Municipal Police," JMA, 843/0–2; Superintendent of police to Inspector General Jerusalem municipal police force, JMA, 843/0–2; compare with al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba* 328–329; "On the matter of weapons in the Negev," March 17, 1948, CZA S 25/8996; on "The Arab command," IDFA 1949/7249/283, 3; see also Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal al-'arabi al-Filastini*, 185.

106 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 116, 138; Isma'il Safwat, "General orders to military commanders in Palestinian cities," January 1, 1948, HA 8/general/230; 'Abdallah al-Tall, *Karithat Filastin: Mudhakkirat 'Abdallah Al-Tall, Qaid Ma'rakat Al-Quds* (Acre: Dar el-Jalil, 1968), 10.

107 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 116, 138, 327; John Roy Carlson, *Mei-Kahir ad Damesek: im tzvaot Arav neged Yisrael* [From Cairo to Damascus: with the Arab armies against Israel] trans. Shalom Rosenfeld (Jerusalem: Ahiasaf, 1952), 113; the Commissioner of Volunteers Taha Al-Hashimi to the secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, copy to the commander of the National Guard in Jerusalem, March 8, 1948, ISA, 65/1556 (in Arabic).

108 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 116, 138, 327; "Arab newsletter," February 11, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59; Collection of Arab news items, March 19, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59; Isma'il Safwat, "Report on actions of the mufti," March 11, 1948, Government of Iraq, *Taqrir lajnat al-tahqiq*, 149–150; General orders to the guard forces, HA 230/general/8; Fadil 'Adballah Rashid in "The Arab command," 17, IDFA 1949/7249; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 266; Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 331.

109 Kamil Isma'il al-Sharif and Mustafa Siba'i, *Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi harb Filastin* [The Muslim Brothers in the Palestine War] 2nd, expanded edition (Cairo, Dar al-tawzi' wal-nashr al-islamiyya, 1984), 228–231; Husni Adham Jarrar, *al-Duktur Mustafa al-Siba'i: qa'id jil wa-ra'id umma* [Dr. Mustafa Siba'i: Commander of a generation and leading the nation] (Amman, Dar al-bashir, 1994), 85–90 (in Arabic); al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 326, 436. For his statements about the Zionists, see Mustafa Siba'i to a reporter for the Arab news agency in Damascus, *al-Ahram* (Cairo), March

7, 1948. Commander of the guard in Jerusalem, 10-day leave pass for Syrian soldier Pvt. Muhammad ʻAbd al-Ghani Salim, April 15, 1948, ISA, 65/3147; Jamil al-Sufi, Abdel Rahman Mulawi in "The Arab command," 17, IDFA 1949/7249/283, 43.

110 Levi, *Tishʻah qabin*, 328; Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, 1397; "The Explosion at the Palestine Post building," CZA S25/4020.

111 Al-ʻArif, *Al-Nakba*, 98–99; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 186; Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 331–332; Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 159–162.

112 "In the Arab Camp," February 8, 1948, HA 105/142; "Arab newsletter," February 2, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/353; ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni, interview, *Musamarat al-jib* (Cairo), February 29, 1948.

113 Levi, *Tishʻah qabin*, 300–331; Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer toldot Hahaganah*, 1397.

114 Al-ʻArif, *Al-Nakba*, 113–114; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 192–193; Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 333–335; Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 179–180; "Explosives in the hands of Arabs and their industries," February 2, 1948, HA 105/153.

115 *Al-Ahram*, February 23, 1948; *Filastin*, February 24, 1948; *al-Masri*, February 25, 1948; "Arab newsletter," IDFA 1948/500/59. The humanitarian approach of Dr. Khalidi was also apparent earlier, when he attempted to prevent the Arab forces from firing on funerals, "Since this is customarily not done in any war," see "Collected Arab news," January 2, 1948, IDFA 1948/50/28; Minutes of the Security Conference, February 27, 1948, MEC CM IV/1/121; MacMillan, "Palestine: narrative of events," 11, LHCMA, Stockwell 6/25/1; "Weekly intelligence appreciation," CM III/1/119–120. The explosion in Ramle, to which the message from the Holy War force refers, was perpetrated by IZL, which threw a bomb at the National Committee building in Ramle on February 18, see Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer toldot Hahaganah*, 1554.

116 Levi, *Tishʻah ḳabin*, 201–203; al-ʻArif, *Al-Nakba*, 131–133; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 195–197; Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 197.

117 Al-ʻArif, *Al-Nakba*, 73–74; 114. Al-ʻArif stresses that the hotels were damaged by the explosion on Ben-Yehuda Street, apparently rather than the explosion of the Hotel Semiramis. Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 186; Press conference of ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni, *al-Asas* (Cairo), March 18, 1948; poster of the General Command of the Holy War force, *Filastin*, February 24. 1948; "Arab newsletter," IDFA 1948/500/59.

118 Levi, *Tishʻah qabin*, 438; *al-Difaʻ*, February 3, 1948.

119 Levi, *Tishʻah qabin*, 185; compare with Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 209–311.

120 Levi, *Tishʻah qabin*, 185; on the evacuation of Bayt Safafa, "Arab newsletter," February 11, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/353; articles and death notices on the fall of Mahmud al-ʻUmari, *Filastin*, February 14, 1948; Transjordanian frontier force to the Higher Arab Committee, condolence telegram on the death of Mahmud al-ʻUmari, February 17, 1948, ISA 65/49 (in Arabic).

121 Levi, *Tishʻah qabin*, 198–200; al-ʻArif, *Al-Nakba*, 103; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 187; *Filastin*, February 11, 1948; "Weekly intelligence appreciation," MEC CM III/1/95; Fortnightly intelligence newsletter 61, 13 February 1948, TNA WO 275/64; "Arab newsletter," February 11, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/353.

122 *Filastin*, February 11, 12, and 13, 1948; *al-Difaʻ*, February 12 and 13, 1948; Levi, *Tishʻah qabin*, 438–440; Liron, *Yerushalayim ha-atika*, 94–96.

123 Levi, *Tishʻah qabin*, 200–201; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 232; on the attack using a car bomb, the explosion, shockwaves, covering fire, and retreat, see Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 230–232; for the version of Qasim al-Rimawi, see Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, March 14, 1948, 339–340; *Filastin* and *al-Difaʻ*, March 24, 1948.

124 "Arab newsletter," February 11, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/353; "Arab newsletter," February 2–4, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/353; "Arab newsletter," February 11, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59; Secretary of the National Committee in Hebron to the secretary of Higher Arab Committee in Jerusalem, February 9, 1948, ISA 65/1556 (in Arabic); Muhammad 'Ali al-Ja'bari, mayor of Hebron, to the Higher Arab Committee in Jerusalem, February 22, 1948, ISA 65/1556 (in Arabic); Secretary of the Committee to the secretary of the Emergency Committee, February 12, 1948, ISA 65/1556 (in Arabic); "The trials of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni," February 4, 1948, HA 105/23/b; poster for residents of the Old City, signed by Sheikh Hafiz Abu 'Adnan (Barakat), see Fortnightly intelligence newsletter 62, February 27, 1948 and Fortnightly intelligence newsletter 63, March 12, 1948, TNA WO 275/64, HA 105/334; "In the Arab camp," September 29, 1948 HA 105/142.

125 *Al-Difa'*, February 25, 1948; *Filastin*, February 26, 1948; John Higgins in Jerusalem to his wife Freda, February 24, 1948, MEC Higgins hanging file, 7–8; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 186; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 145; death notices for Farid Ughabi and Elias 'Abud, *Filastin*, February 24, 1948; notice of a memorial for Elias Yusif 'Abud, his wife Rose and their infant son Yusif, "An entire family that fell in a Jewish crime, last Sunday, when mortars were fired on Musrara," February 28, 1948. The notices include pictures of the three, a first for Arab death notices in 1948, Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 192.

126 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 116; descriptions of the battle in *Filastin* and *al-Difa'*, February 27, 1948; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 190–191; for a detailed description of the battle, see Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 193–194.

127 For the mufti's instructions to block the road to Jerusalem, see: "News in brief received from Max," CZA S25/9007; poster from the propaganda department of the Higher Arab Committee in Cairo, March 15, 1948, ISA 65/3618 (in Arabic); "Arab newsletter," February 26, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59.

128 "Weekly intelligence appreciation," March 31, 1948, MEC CM III/2/120; compare to *al-Musawwar* (Cairo), April 2, 1948, 18; see also 'Abd al-Karim al-'Amr, (ed.), *Mudhakkirat al-hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni* [Memoirs of Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husayni] (Damascus: Al-Ahali, 1999), 430 (in Arabic); plan for disconnecting Jerusalem, "Arab newsletter," March 31, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59; "Arab newsletter," April 3, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59. For a discussion of the importance, for the Arabs, of cutting off Jewish public transportation in Bab al-Wad, and the role of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, see al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 493–494. For the connection to the planned return of the mufti, see "In the Arab camp," April 5, 1948, 105/142.

129 *Filastin*, April 1, 1948; Minutes of the Security Conference, April 2, 1948, MEC CM IV/1/131; Gurney diary, April 1, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 30; Gurney to Martin, April 5, 1948, TNA CO 967/102; "Arab newsletter," April 7, 1948, HA 105/142.

130 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 384; Graves, *Experiment in Anarchy*, 180–181.

131 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 200; for the Arab response, see also Levi, 445; Gurney diary, March 27, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 20–21; *Filastin*, March 28, 1948; *al-Difa'*, March 28, 1948; al-'Arif exaggerates in his description of the flight from Mea She'arim as a result of the counterattack, *Al-Nakba*, 144–145; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 201–202; "On the matter of the evacuation of Musrara," April 1, 1948, HA 105/257; "On the matter of the situation in Musrara," April 1, 1948, HA 105/257.

132 Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 201–202; see also "R.A.F. security area on HaNevi'im Street," IDFA 1949/1261/13.

2 The collapse of the middle class
The case of Qatamon

The hostilities begin: The bombing of the Semiramis Hotel

The study of Palestinian society in 1948, though still in its incipient stages, has begun to address the emergence of an urban middle class—practitioners of the liberal professions, clerks, officials, businessmen—within Palestinian Arab society during the British Mandate period, together with the reasons for its collapse in 1948.[1] The educational, occupational, economic, and social profile of the residents of Jerusalem's Qatamon neighborhood typified the Mandate-era Palestinian Arab middle class. They were bourgeois, generally well educated, and engaged in much the same range of occupations typical of the new classes that sprang up in Europe beginning in the late eighteenth century and in the two

Figure 2.1 The Hanna Zananiri house, Qatamon area, 1940s (Library of Congress).

centuries that followed.[2] In addition to being a quintessential Arab bourgeois middle-class neighborhood, Qatamon is worthy of study because of its strategic location, which made it the major locus of the fighting in south Jerusalem. This caused its residents great hardship, though some of them stayed on and tried to maintain a semblance of civilian life in the shadow of the war.[3]

Soon after hostilities erupted, exchanges of gunfire between Qatamon and the adjacent Jewish neighborhoods became commonplace. On the night of January 2, 1948, two LEHI operatives blew up a number of abandoned buildings west of Qatamon. The explosions caused panic in the neighborhood, leading ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni to pay his first visit to Qatamon. According to some accounts, ʻAbd al-Qadir and his men met with residents at the Hotel Semiramis, a small family establishment in the center of the neighborhood, where they made plans to defend the area.[4] Haganah intelligence, apparently getting wind of the event, prompted the attack of the hotel on the night of January 5. The operation was intended as a retaliation against the Arabs for causing the flight of Jews from Qatamon and other areas.[5]

The Qatamon guard force received a report (perhaps a police warning) of an imminent attack. That night most of the force was sent to the neighborhood's northern boundary, facing Jewish Kiryat Shmuel, from where, they believed—correctly, as it turned out—the attack would originate. Seven guards were stationed on the roof of the hotel, which at three stories was one of the tallest buildings in the area. But, toward midnight, a thunderstorm broke out and the guards dispersed. They reasoned that the Jews would not attack in such weather. Shortly after they left, a Haganah force arrived in two vehicles, placed its charges, and withdrew without interference. Arab guards rushed out of their homes and opened fire wildly, to no effect.[6] The explosion illuminated the sky above the neighborhood for several minutes, shaking the walls of houses hundreds of yards away. Frightened residents leaped out of their beds and rushed to take cover in their cellars. Closer to the site of the explosion some people went into shock.[7] The hotel's eastern wing collapsed; 18 people were killed and dozens wounded. Most of the dead were from two Arab Catholic families, Lorenzo and Abu Suwwan, co-owners of the hotel. They had taken refuge there, believing it was safer than their homes in Nikophoria, a nearby Jewish-Arab neighborhood closer to Yemin Moshe, where fighting was already underway.[8]

Few dared to leave their homes in the dead of night to see what had happened. Those who did saw a heap of ruins through which British soldiers were digging in a futile attempt to rescue survivors who might be trapped in the rubble. Hala Sakakini, who remained at home, heard about the event in the morning from a neighbor, Cocone Tlil, who had gone to the site during the night to offer first aid. Hala joined a group of women who went to the Catholic Club, where they prepared dressings and worked on medical equipment in a dispirited atmosphere. Throughout the day they watched as residents, carrying their belongings, entered the British security zone or left for places farther afield. This first wave of departure from Qatamon included Arabs, Armenians, and Greeks.

One resident of the neighborhood, Anton Albina, expressed his profound shock and fear in letters he wrote to the district commissioner, whom he asked, on the day after the Semiramis explosion, to incorporate Qatamon into the security zone. The commissioner, James H.H. Pollock, replied on January 15, assuring Albina that steps would be taken to ensure the security of the area and its residents. This turned out to be an empty promise.[9]

On the day after the explosion a group of about twenty men from the immediate vicinity met at the Sakakini house and resolved to organize to defend their homes. But only four owned rifles and three pistols, and most did not know how to use firearms. They decided to collect money to purchase additional weapons (which were exorbitantly expensive on the black market) and to hire guards. Afterward the group, along with their children and some of the women, erected roadblocks, consisting of barrels filled with dirt and stones, at the two entrances to their semicircular street. Three engineers who lived in the street went from house to house, pointing out vulnerable places and showing the inhabitants where to set up barriers. The group felt confident about first aid, as two physicians lived on the street, who were assisted by women volunteers. It was decided that everyone who owned a weapon would do guard duty that night. Khalil Sakakini summed up developments in his diary, in a note of merriment mixed with sarcasm: "We have turned our neighborhood, which is encircled by a road and is a kind of island, into an entrenched fortress, compared to which the fortresses of Sebastopol, Verdun, Gibraltar and Malta are as nothing."[10] Tension remained high during the days that followed the explosion. The slightest noise at night sent residents rushing into inner rooms of their homes, which were considered safer. The men stayed awake on guard, or to socialize with the fighters; many were afraid to go to sleep altogether. According to Ghada Karmi, daughter of Qatamon resident Hasan Karmi, the guard effort was abandoned soon thereafter, when one man was shot one night, probably from a Jewish outpost or by a patrol.[11]

The attack on the Hotel Semiramis was the most extreme in an unfolding sequence of events that made normal civilian life in Qatamon increasingly difficult to maintain. The exchanges of sniper fire between Arab and Jewish neighborhoods made travel to work or to shopping downtown and in the Old City dangerous, and in some cases the road was cut off. Similarly, the deteriorating security situation meant that villagers could no longer bring in agricultural produce. With basic commodities increasingly difficult to obtain, the neighborhood committee decided at the beginning of January to distribute food in return for coupons. The distribution center was located in the house of an architect, Da'ud Tlil.

Another event that had a profound effect on Qatamon's inhabitants was the killing of the donkey belonging to Mahmud, the milkman, by a stray bullet. The result was that milk, too, was no longer delivered. The Karmi children, Ghada and Ziyad, witnessed the shooting of a Bedouin peddler by a sniper on the threshold of their house. This event compounded the trauma from which the two had suffered since the hotel incident and which was triggered anew by any loud

noise, even the slamming of a door. The anxiety felt by all the children in Qatamon was further heightened after they were forbidden to leave their homes, and when government schools did not reopen after the New Year's holiday.[12]

Middle-class civilians vis-à-vis fighters

In February, ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni appointed Shafiq ʻAways, a Christian and a former police officer, to the post of military chief of Qatamon. One of the few Christians in the Holy War army, ʻAways commanded a force of about 60 composed of Palestinian villagers and volunteers from Iraq and the Hijaz.[13] Their deployment in Qatamon led to an escalation in gunfights with the Jewish neighborhoods.[14] Furthermore, ʻAways soon found himself in conflict with the neighborhood's inhabitants, who opposed his attacks on Meqkor Hayyim. But the underlying cause of the immediately evident friction was apparently the entry into Qatamon of the foreigners and villagers, with their very different habits and way of life. In addition, at least some of the residents realized that the aggressive tactics pursued by the new commander were prompting Jewish retaliation and as such were endangering Arab lives and property. Directly after the Semiramis bombing, Anton Albina wrote to the district commissioner to say that "We do not want innocent people to be butchered in their sleep in the middle of the night and at the same time we are most anxious that no one whomever he may be should be assaulted in this quarter by irresponsible elements who are strangers to the place and do not care of the result of their action" [sic]. In his letters Albina reiterated his opposition to harming civilians, whatever their national identity.[15]

On February 20, LEHI retaliated, with Haganah support. The Jewish force tried to blow up a house in northern Qatamon, adjacent to Kiryat Shmuel, killing a member of the neighborhood committee, Kamil ʻAwayda. Following this, Qatamon's residents took their case to the Arab Higher Committee. Its secretary, Dr. Khalidi, sent the neighborhood committee a letter authorizing it to supervise the Holy War force stationed there, and to choose its commander. Khalidi seems, however, to have been aware that his letter would not make much of an impression on ʻAways and his men. He advised the committee to send a delegation to ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni at his headquarters in Bir Zeit. ʻAways, for his part, sought from ʻAbd al-Qadir an official letter of appointment as commander, and for some time apparently enjoyed the latter's support.[16]

The fighting in the Qatamon area continued, as did the attacks from there on Meqor Hayyim. LEHI carried out a further series of bombings in the north of the neighborhood in coordination with the Haganah, which provided mortar fire as cover. On the night of March 10, LEHI forces planted bombs in the Shahin, ʻAnabtawi, and Budayri houses. The Arab force manned an outpost on the roof of the first of these, which was still under construction, but the bomb failed to explode. The other two bombs did detonate, however, demolishing the two houses and causing serious damage to several others nearby. Among these was the home of Dr. Fawti Frayj, a physician and a member of Jerusalem's National Committee. On March 13, LEHI made another attempt to demolish the Shahin

house, this time succeeding in destroying the post and other parts of the building and another structure as well. The Arab fighters sustained casualties, but apparently the demolished buildings were uninhabited and most of the damage was to property.[17] The rift between ‘Aways and the civilian population again came to the fore during the battle at the Shahin house. The civilians opposed shooting back at the assailants for fear that their own homes would be destroyed as well. Shortly after the attack, ‘Aways demanded a list of the local non-Arab families (Greeks, Armenians, and others) and ordered them to sign a commitment to desist from commercial dealings with Jews. Anyone who refused to sign, he threatened, would suffer “the lot of traitors.” His demand attests to the profound alienation between his forces and the non-Arab Christian population, which found itself caught in a war alien to its own interests.[18]

The Sakakini house continued to be a social magnet for the neighborhood’s residents. It became customary for a few neighbors, some of them relatives, to gather there each evening to pass the tense hours together while conversing, listening together to the radio, playing cards, or otherwise socializing. In some cases the gatherings were disturbed by the combat outside. In her diary, Hala Sakakini described the night of March 13 and the morning after:

> We had just heard the nine o’clock news yesterday evening and were all sitting in the dining room when an explosion took place. It was followed by shooting, so we all ran for safety to the hall. The firing was so strong everybody’s nerves were on edge and we all began ordering each other to take safer positions in the hall. Then two more loud explosions shook our house and we guessed that they were very near. Fadwa Sfeir was almost panic-stricken, so we hurriedly took our coats and some blankets and ran downstairs where we stayed cold and shivering until things began to quiet down around midnight. Sari, Uncle Najeeb and George Sfeir remained upstairs listening to the police station on the radio.… When it had calmed down a little, our neighbors Mr. Daoud Tleel, Mr. Fakhri Joharieh and Mr. Sruji joined us in Sari’s flat and shared our bottle of cognac with us.
>
> Shooting did not cease until morning. It was a terrible night. Today, from early morning, we could see trucks piled with furniture passing by. Many more families from Katamon are moving away, and they are not to blame. Who likes to be buried alive under debris?! The defense system of Katamon is just miserable and no one of the responsible people is doing the slightest thing about it. If strong security measures are not taken immediately, our turn of leaving our home will come soon. We cannot be expected to wait empty-handed for the Jews to come and blow us up.[19]

Following the bombings in March another wave of residents fled Qatamon, after much of the neighborhood had already emptied out in the two preceding months. Those who could afford it headed for Arab metropolitan areas outside Palestine—Beirut, Damascus, Alexandria, and Cairo—where they were accustomed to vacation. Families with lesser means found shelter in the Old City or

made do, for the time being, with ensconcing themselves in the British security zone adjacent to Qatamon.[20]

The community's residents again sent a delegation to the Arab Higher Committee to complain about ʻAways and his men, but Khalidi and Hilmi could do nothing under the circumstances.[21] A second delegation, consisting among others of Frayj, whose house had been destroyed, went to see ʻAbd al-Qadir in Bir Zeit on March 14 and achieved far better results. ʻAways and his men were removed from the neighborhood and transferred to Upper Baqʻa, to be replaced, on March 15, by a force under Ibrahim Abu Dayya, one of the Holy War's most experienced commanders.[22]

To facilitate Abu Dayya's deployment in Qatamon, ʻAbd al-Qadir himself came to the neighborhood again a few days later, accompanied by his deputy, Kamil ʻAriqat, by Abu Dayya and by his second-in-command, Abu ʻAta. The delegation was received warmly at the home of Khalil Sakakini, who had long been on good terms with the Husayni family. Sakakini used the opportunity to ask them to uphold the ever-binding rules of war: to take care of the wounded, treat prisoners well, and turn over the bodies of the dead to their families. He cited to his Muslim guests a *hadith* attributed to Abu Bakr, the first Caliph, who enjoined his warriors not to kill elderly people, women, and children, nor to burn trees, destroy houses, pursue refugees, mutilate the bodies of the dead, or harm clerics (Sakakini had apparently heard rumors that Arab combatants were committing atrocities). He did not note his guests' response in his diary, but he appended a pacifist thought: "Sheath your swords and do not fight anyone, there is enough room in this world for everyone." Nor did he dare utter such a thought to ʻAbd al-Qadir and the others. He concluded the diary entry by invoking Jesus: "My kingdom is not of this world."[23]

Abu Dayya, the new Qatamon commander, was born in 1920 in Surif, a village at the edge of Mount Hebron. He completed elementary school, and after his father's death replaced him as the village barber. He took an active part in the Arab Revolt. From late 1947 he served as commander of the Holy War training camp in Surif, responsible for one of that force's main weapons depots, also located in the village. His prestige as a commander soared after he led the contingent that killed all 35 members of a Haganah force on its way to relieve besieged Kfar Etzion, south of Jerusalem, in mid-January 1948. ʻAbd al-Qadir assigned him to establish an offensive unit called the Third Company, whose well-paid members were carefully chosen from the ranks of army and police veterans. Its core group numbered a few dozen men from Surif and the surrounding villages who had been fighting together since December 1947, having trained with each other at the camp in Surif and afterwards in Halhul. There they were joined by Iraqis, five British army deserters, and ten Yugoslav Muslims who were fortification and mine-laying experts. Abu Dayya's force in Qatamon was about 130-strong. Since he was also Holy War's chief quartermaster, he enjoyed a steady supply of arms, including mortars and light and medium machine guns. He enforced strict discipline and punished violators severely, in some cases expelling them from the unit. He lived among his men, under the same conditions, and led them into battle.

As was the case with many commanders of irregular forces, Abu Dayya's authority derived from his charisma and the enthusiasm he instilled in his troops. In Qatamon he set up a base at the St Simeon Monastery, on the outskirts of the neighborhood. It included a mess that provided his troops with plentiful food so that their needs did not become a burden on the civilian population. He established a fortified line of outposts along Qatamon's boundaries, reinforced by dominant positions within the neighborhood. Qatamon served as a staging ground for his unit's participation in other battles, such as the one against the Jewish convoy at Nabi Daniyal, south of Bethlehem, in late March 1948, as well as the fighting at Qastal at the beginning of April.[24]

Shortly after the arrival of the Abu Dayya force the residents' sense of security improved somewhat, though exchanges of gunfire with the Jewish neighborhoods continued incessantly.[25] Abu Dayya and Abu 'Ata (the mukhtar of the village of Rafat, north of Jerusalem) were popular and admired by some of the residents, owing to their personalities and their spirited nationalism. Following the battle against the Nabi Daniyal convoy, Khalil Sakakini wrote in his diary:

> He [Abu Dayya] is a young man in the springtime of his life, small and lean, but in an emergency is as strong as a lion. Nevertheless, the newspapers do not mention him, as though he is the Unknown Soldier. This young man imposed his conditions on the commander of the British police, who did his bidding.… If this young man were from a city, from this or that family, people would drum and sing and hold parties for him, in his presence or his absence, and ply him with huge sums of money. I am apprehensive that he will notice this himself, or that someone will draw his attention to it, and then we will return to the townsman versus peasant tune and all will fall apart, heaven forbid.… There is someone else, the mukhtar of Rafat, Abu 'Ata, who assumed command of the guard in Qatamon in the absence of Ibrahim Abu Dayya. This mukhtar is imbued with much wisdom, experience, and nationalism. When you talk to him you think he is a graduate of an institution of higher learning: he expresses himself well, his opinions are mature and he has noble ambitions, not only in comparison to other mukhtars, but also in comparison to several members of the AHC [Arab Higher Committee], who as compared to him are ignorant while he is educated.[26]

Abu Dayya's popularity with the Palestinian Arab public reached its zenith in the wake of a stirring address he delivered in the courtyard of al-Haram al-Sharif on April 9, 1948, at the mass funeral of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, who had been killed the day before in the battle at Qastal. Khalil Sakakini wrote in his diary that Abu Dayya, who had been wounded in the battle, had insisted on attending the funeral despite his condition, after the doctors removed bullets and shrapnel from his body.[27] The enthusiastic support for Abu Dayya by the Sakakini family and their circle in Qatamon is also apparent in a letter from Melia Sakakini

(Khalil's unmarried sister, who was a member of his household), to her nephew Sari in Cairo:

> Ibrahim's [Abu Dayya's] health improved and he is busy with his affairs, but he has few dirhams [old silver coins]. Please inform Raja'i [al-Husayni, financial director of the Arab Higher Committee] accordingly and tell him that Ibrahim deserves more [money] than all those who are active in Egypt, and here and there. After [the death of] 'Abd al-Qadir, Ibrahim is all they have left, and it's high time they woke up.[28]

On April 21, a few days before the fall of Qatamon, Hala Sakakini wrote in her diary:

> I am determined to stay here as long as Ibrahim Abu Dayyeh [sic] is here to defend us. I adore that man. He is wonderful, overflowing with patriotism, working day and night tirelessly, not caring for food or comfort. He is intelligent. He is genuine. Abu Dayyeh and Abu Ata drop in almost every evening. We drink coffee and have a little chat together. It is a pleasure to listen to these men talking.

Two days later, Abu Dayya was taken again to the hospital. In the wake of rumors of an impending Jewish attack on the neighborhood, Hala Sakakini made the following diary entry:

> Around six o'clock in the evening, Mr Sruji came in and announced that Abu Dayyeh had run away from the hospital in pyjamas and slippers. It is typical of him. Uncle Najeeb sent him a woollen jumper and Father a pair of woollen socks. About nine o'clock Abu Dayyeh dropped in. His presence among us made the evening most pleasant. He is a character that I shall never forget so long as I live. When he talks he fascinates you. He uses short sentences, his words are powerful, his remarks original and just right. You feel he is capable of overcoming all obstacles.[29]

The ability of Abu Dayya, a relatively uneducated Muslim villager, to integrate into a sophisticated bourgeois urban Christian society was probably attributable not only to his charisma, but also his admirers' romantically idealized notion of village life. Even the rural dialect he spoke, which urban Arabs often disparaged as crude and simple compared with their own speech, came in for praise—Khalil and Hala Sakakini enthused over Abu Dayya's and Abu 'Ata's linguistic prowess. Similarly, the Sakakinis were willing to overlook the considerable disparity of vocabulary between the colloquial Arabic of the uneducated and that of the educated, which drew on literary Arabic when discussing important matters. While adopting a patronizing, sometimes even hostile attitude toward villagers (which was reciprocated), bourgeois urban Arab society tended to take an idyllic view of village life. Thus, for example, townspeople who normally dressed in

European attire liked to have themselves photographed in stylized traditional rural dress.[30] The idealization of the "noble villager" derived from a sense of national identity that pervaded much of bourgeois Arab society and which intensified during the war. The village, with its "authentic" farmers, herders, and craftsmen became a central icon of the Palestinian national movement, much as it had in other national movements.[31]

Though most of those who remained in Qatamon regarded Abu Dayya as their defender and savior and their last hope for being able to remain in their homes, others were highly critical of his belligerency and its consequences. A neighborhood physician, a Christian, wrote in a letter on April 24:

> Yes, I am still in Qatamon; in fact I am the only one who has not yet evacuated his apartment, and I have no intention of doing so. Jerusalem is now a war zone, and filled with irresponsible people carrying Bren machine guns and wearing the *'abaya* [village attire], who shoot at the moon at night and during the day at the horizon. They think they are having a good time.[32]

Hasan Karmi, whose family opposed the mufti—his brother had been murdered by the mufti's henchmen in 1939 as a consequence of the political feud between the Husayni family and its rivals—held the Arab fighters responsible for the escalation of hostilities. Karmi received Abu Dayya in his house cordially, but after he left spoke sarcastically about the commander's self-confident boasting. Such mistrust of the Palestinian Arab forces, together with their habitual reliance on the British, led many members of the middle class to lose their bearings and to expect that salvation would come from outside—from the Arab states, the Arab League, or even from the UN or the British, despite their record of disappointing the Arabs.[33]

The fall of Qatamon

Despite the best efforts of Abu Dayya and his men, Qatamon's Arab population continued to shrink. On the evening of April 13 mortar shells were fired into the neighborhood, a few of them falling near the Iraqi consulate. At the time, the majority of the remaining residents were gathered, as was their habit, in the Sakakini house, which was across the street from the consulate. Khalil Sakakini reacted to this event by noting that:

> It is a good thing that our neighbor Islihit moved to Bayt Jala, and a good thing that Fakhri Jawhariyya moved to the Old City. If the two of them were here in the neighborhood with their families, they all would have been seized by terrible fear.

Over the next few days relatives of the Sakakinis visited them to bid farewell before leaving the country. Day by day the population of Qatamon dwindled. Sakakini had to close his private school, al-Nahda—the number of students had

plunged from 80 at the end of January to only 30. Hala Sakakini described the evenings in the family house during her final days in Qatamon:

> We have a special slogan for the evening nowadays. Not a day passes without Mr Daoud Tleel asking in his sarcastic way, "What do you say, shall we flee tomorrow?" When we are in high spirits, and that is usually after Abu Dayyeh had visited us, we answer in the negative, but when there are explosions and shooting to be heard, we would answer, "Tomorrow we'll leave, that's final!"

A week later, on April 29, she wrote:

> We are now the only family left in Qatamon. The Sruji brothers sent away their wives and children a few days ago. Mr Daoud Tleel and his family and Mr Elias Mansour and his family left for Syria about a week ago. I think Mrs Anton Albina has remained with her husband in Qatamon.

The Sakakinis themselves planned to leave the next morning for Egypt, in their school vehicle. Two of their relatives from the neighborhood decided to stay with them for one more night and bid their farewells in the morning, before leaving for the Old City. In the evening the Sakakinis invited Abu Dayya and Abu 'Ata to their home and socialized with them until 11 a.m. They talked about the possibility of a fierce assault on Qatamon. Abu Dayya said that he expected such an attack imminently but that he was well prepared.[34]

The first Palmach (Plugot Machatz, the Haganah elite squads) attack on Qatamon was staged on the night of April 26. About 150 fighters ascended from the Valley of the Cross toward the St Simeon Monastery. Another platoon, serving as a decoy and holding force, attacked from the northeast. From the beginning of their offensive the force encountered return fire. Fearing that a daytime attack would incur heavy losses, the commander of the Palmach battalion ordered his men to retreat.

Fearing a renewed attack, Ibrahim Abu Dayya immediately requested assistance from the Arab Higher Committee, the National Committee, and the Holy War command in Bir Zeit. Two Arab Legion officers, Captain 'Abdallah al-Tall, who headed the forces in the al-Nahda School on Hebron Road (which had until not long before been headed by Sakakini and owned by him and his partners), and Captain Sulayman Mas'ud, commander of the Legion Company stationed in the el-Alamein camp south of Jerusalem, sent three armored cars equipped with turrets, on which two-pounder anti-tank guns were mounted, and 30 soldiers. Ostensibly, these were designated to defend the Iraqi consulate in Qatamon, but in practice they were sent to supplement Abu Dayya's forces. A further reinforcement consisted of the guards at the Egyptian, Syrian, and Lebanese consulates, which were located close by, on the other side of the fence that marked off the British security zone. At these were stationed 20 Egyptian soldiers under the command of Captain 'Isam Hilmi.[35]

The Palmach force attacked again on the night of April 29, using the same plan. The principal force stormed the monastery and two adjacent buildings. The Arab forces deployed there retreated and took up new positions in residences that overlooked the monastery from the east. From there they opened heavy fire on the monastery area. A blaze broke out on one of the buildings adjacent to the monastery and illuminated the surroundings, helping the Arabs hit their targets accurately. The Palmach force took refuge in the monastery and the flanking buildings.

A lull in the fighting came to an end when Abu Dayya launched an organized counterattack at 4:30 a.m., using two of the armored vehicles he had received from the Legion. These moved from the Iraqi consulate along al-Maliha Road and ascended to the monastery from the south. The Arab fighters moved in from the woods, terraces, and stone fences around the monastery, coming into very close range, and in a series of assaults caused the Jewish forces, now trapped inside the building, a large number of casualties. Abu Dayya and his men charged the monastery tenaciously and fearlessly despite incurring many casualties themselves. 'Arif's explanation is that they knew that "if this neighborhood were to fall, so would the other neighborhoods in the New City." This was also the belief, at the time, of 'Abdallah al-Tall. At 10 a.m. the Arabs began to use 3-inch mortars to shell the monastery, weapons sent by 'Abd al-Hamid al-Rawi (commander of the ALA Garrison in Jerusalem). A Palmach detail's attempt to attack a building called the House of the Green Shutters failed. Soldiers serving as guards at the Arab consulates in the security zone also joined in the fighting. They and the Arab Legion forces wore overalls so as to conceal their military identities. Irregular, untrained Arab, Palestinian, and other fighters from the city flowed into the area (but villagers did not, apparently because they feared reprisals against their villages).[36]

Hala Sakakini described the events of that night from the vantage point of the last Arab residents of Qatamon:

> All of us were sleeping in Sari's flat when at twelve o'clock (the usual hour), not long after our visitors [Abu Dayya and Abu 'Ata] had left us, the attack on Katamon began. It was stronger than ever. The firing was heavy and continuous and it sounded so very near all of us thought that the Jews had reached our street. Every one of us deep down in his heart feared that before morning we would all be dead. When at last morning came the firing had not ceased. It went on and on, loud and strong. At about half past five, as I was standing on Sari's porch (which is protected by sandbags) I saw Abu Ata who had come to use our telephone, as no other telephone in the whole [of] Katamon is working. We asked Abu Ata about the situation and he said that everything was all right and that they were only short of certain bullets. After a while, however, Abu Dayyeh himself arrived in our square. He was nervous and shouting. We understood from him that everything was not all right at all. The Jews had come in very large numbers and they were

> trying to surround Katamon and besiege it. Already fifteen of our fighters had been killed and thirty wounded. The Arab soldiers in the Iraqi Consulate came running across the Consulate grounds to the fence along our street to offer their services to Abu Dayyeh. He began to give them orders. How great this young man standing there in his abaya and pointing out to those trained soldiers the positions they ought to take. His strong personality expresses itself in his every gesture and his every word. I saw some of the Arab soldiers putting away their jackets and taking off their caps and running towards the positions Abu Dayyeh had pointed out to them. I saw other soldiers in the Consulate giving handfuls of bullets to our fighters. All this was thrilling to watch.

To the Sakakinis' surprise, their driver arrived at the appointed time of 6 a.m. They quickly loaded their luggage onto the vehicle (throwing themselves on the ground at one point when a bullet whizzed by) and, after a hasty farewell to the few neighbors and relatives who remained, they departed. After passing through the gate of the security zone they waved to Anton Albina and his wife, whom they saw entering a house beyond the fence in search of shelter. As they drove through the streets of Jerusalem they were still in danger of being hit by a stray bullet; not until they passed Kfar Etzion, on their way south to the Egyptian border, did they feel safer.[37]

By the early morning, about half of the Palmach men had been killed or wounded. The force in the monastery was desperate, its radio connection with the battalion was temporarily not working, and its commanders planned to retreat, blowing up the monastery with the badly wounded soldiers inside, who could not be carried out. At about 1 p.m. preparations began, just as the Legion's third armored vehicle joined the battle and began shelling the building.[38]

Fighting on several fronts, Ibrahim Abu Dayya and his men also ran into trouble that morning. The lengthy battle had cost them many casualties during the early morning, as Abu Dayya told the Sakakinis before they fled. There is no way of knowing whether and in what way the Sakakini's departure at the height of the battle affected Abu Dayya. By the family's account, his nerves were frazzled by then. Later he was lightly wounded himself, just three weeks following the more serious wound he had incurred at Qastal.

A Palmach platoon advanced into the neighborhood from the north toward evening, in the area of Dr. Frayj's house, blowing up houses on the way. According to 'Arif al-'Arif, 35 Arabs died on the monastery front, and 19 died and 21 were wounded in the Frayj House sector—some of whom remained buried under the debris. According to Shai reports, the Arab dead included three Legionnaires. A mortar shell hit the Arab arms depot at the ice factory in southern Qatamon, causing an explosion in which more Arab fighters were killed. The explosion also destroyed arms and mortars. Ibrahim Abu Dayya resolved in the early afternoon to seek a cease-fire and reinforcements. With this in mind he set out for al-Rawda, the main headquarters in the Old City. The senior civilian leaders still in the city at this point were Anwar Nusseibeh, secretary of the Jerusalem National

Committee, and Ahmad Hilmi, a member of the Arab Higher Committee. The latter took the initiative, and telephoned the mufti in Cairo to gain his consent. The mufti pressed Abu Dayya and Hilmi to carry on fighting. Hilmi then contacted the British and asked them to arrange a cease-fire to allow the Arabs to tend to their dead and wounded. The cease-fire did not, however, go into effect that day. Abu Dayya himself was treated at the hospital in Bayt Safafa. Hilmi remained at al-Rawda on the night of April 30 and tried to fire up the troops that remained in Qatamon, but he was too late.[39]

Shai had learned early on, through its surveillance of the telephone calls between Qatamon and al-Rawda, what was happening on the Arab side. The information was relayed, via the Palmach battalion commander, by a reestablished radio connection to the men besieged in the monastery. (At the same time the district commander had the idea of sending a similar cable to the men in the monastery telling them of information received from Meqor Hayyim according to which people had been observed fleeing Qatamon. The information was his fabrication, but after the fact turned out not to have been far from the truth.) These two messages boosted the morale of the beleaguered Jewish fighters. Arab fire gradually diminished and the Legion's armored vehicles fell back toward the Iraqi consulate. An armored force from the Etzioni regional Haganah Brigade's Moriah Battalion entered Qatamon from the north and moved, along with an infantry force, through the neighborhood's streets toward St Simeon. The combined pressure of the three reinforcement forces shattered the remaining Arab resistance. At close to 5 p.m. the reinforcements reached the monastery, and the Etzioni fighters replaced the exhausted Palmach men.

The next day, on May 1, Haganah forces began making their way into Qatamon itself, encountering almost no resistance. A force of between 50 and 60 ALA fighters, commanded by Fadil Rashid, who had arrived at 10:30 the previous night, left in the morning, sensing that the battle was lost. The only significant response to the advancing Jewish forces came at 2 p.m., when the Arab Legion's armored vehicles opened fire from the Iraqi consulate. The Haganah force returned mortar fire. Following this attack, an ultimatum was issued by the commander of the British forces in the area, Brigadier Jones, to 'Abdallah al-Tall, demanding that he remove his forces. Jones's demand came in the framework of the abortive attempt to achieve the desired cease-fire, and spurred the retreat of the armored vehicles and the evacuation of the Iraqi consulate. A furious al-Tall sent a protest cable to King 'Abdallah and asked that he intervene. By the evening and night of May 1, all of Qatamon was under Jewish control.[40] In response the next day, May 2, the king cabled a protest to High Commissioner Cunningham. The king demanded that the Jews evacuate Qatamon and threatened that he would be "compelled to respond." Cunningham responded that steps were being taken to achieve a cease-fire; he asked 'Abdallah not to intervene.

On May 2, the British chief secretary, Henry Gurney, entered the picture and undertook to rapidly achieve a cease-fire. The British feared that the Jewish forces would continue their advance until they reached Hebron Road. That, from the

British view, would have threatened the route they intended to use to evacuate their personnel southward in the direction of Rafah and the Suez Canal. Gurney met that day with Ahmad Hilmi and Anwar Nusseibeh on the Arab side and Eliezer Kaplan of the Jewish Agency. He demanded a 48-hour cease-fire in Qatamon beginning at 4 p.m. Kaplan later called Gurney to convey the Jewish side's consent. Hilmi and Nusseibeh opposed a moratorium on hostilities, but Gurney seems to have presented them with a fact, and the cease-fire went into effect.

Abu Dayya, who had in the meantime been discharged from the Bayt Safafa hospital, managed to organize reinforcements and set out for Qatamon. But he was blocked by the British in the security zone and was even detained for a short time. The Arabs found themselves cut off from Qatamon. Abu Dayya and the remainder of his fighters—about 15 of them—took refuge in al-Tall's headquarters at the al-Nahda School on Hebron Road. According to information obtained by Shai, more than 100 Arabs were killed and wounded in the battle of Qatamon. Another report put the number of Arab dead at 84 and the wounded at 150. The removal of the Arab dead and wounded from the neighborhood was accomplished, on behalf of the Red Cross, by Dr. Hanna 'Atallah. The Jewish forces had suffered 21 dead and 83 wounded. The last of the neighborhood's well-off inhabitants had fled during the fighting. Immediately thereafter Jewish fighters and civilians began looting the neighborhood. They broke into houses and took whatever they could lay their hands on. There were also cases in which commanders brought loot to their bases without receiving sanction to do so. After a few days of plunder, the district command took control of what remained of the neighborhood's Arab property.[41]

As for Abu Dayya, it is interesting to note that his behavior was interpreted, both by the Jews and the British, as desertion and the abandonment of his men. Even if his decision to go to al-Rawda contributed to the collapse of the Arab defense, and his request for a cease-fire was premature, Abu Dayya presumably was not aware of how badly off the besieged Palmach force was. There seems to be no reason to cast any doubts on the personal bravery of a man who was wounded multiple times during the war and who nevertheless returned again and again to the battlefield. Some of the civilians who fled Qatamon did not blame him for the neighborhood's fall and continued to laud him as a hero in exile (as opposed to others who raged against the fighters). The Palestinians have tended to blame their overall defeat, and the loss of Qatamon in particular, on the British. The British, they claimed, prevented Abu Dayya from returning to Qatamon. But they disregard the fact that his attempt to return followed the Jewish capture of the neighborhood. The National Committee issued a statement that placed responsibility for the fall of Qatamon on the British. Abu Dayya enlisted more fighters from Bethlehem for his company, and on May 24 took some of his men, in cooperation with Egyptian forces, to attack Ramat Rachel, the kibbutz that overlooked Hebron Road on the way to Bethlehem. During that battle he was badly wounded and paralyzed below the waist. He was flown to a hospital in Cairo, where he was visited by the mufti and his men, as well as by

the Sakakini family, who remained loyal to him. Abu Dayya was transferred to a hospital in Beirut, where he died in 1952. Palestinian historiography venerates him as the Hero of Qatamon.[42]

Notes

1 See for example, Sherene Seikaly, "Meatless Days: Consumption and Capitalism in Wartime Palestine, 1939–1948" (PhD dissertation, New York University, 2007); Bernstein Deborah and Hasisi Badi, "'Buy and Promote the National Cause': consumption, class formation and nationalism in Mandate Palestinian society," *Nations and Nationalism* 14 (1), 2008.
2 Jurgen Kocka, "The European pattern and the German case," and Eric Hobsbawm, "The example of the English middle class," in *Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, ed. Jurgen Kocka and Allen Mitchell (London: Oxford, 1993), 3–4, and 130ff. respectively.
3 Itamar Radai, "Collapse of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class."
4 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 337; Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, January 4, 1948, 113; for testimony about the visit of 'Abd al-Qadir see al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 81; Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 10.
5 "Hotel Semiramis: A regional Arab base in Qatamon," January 8, 1948, CZA, S25/4013; Berman to Myerson, January 8, 1948, CZA S25/9200.
6 "Foreign document delivered by Yossef, deputy commander of zone 4," (a translation), January 5, 1948, IDFA 1949/2605/3; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 183.
7 Hala Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I* (Jerusalem: Commercial Press, 1987), January 5, 1948, 110–11; Jamil I. Toubbeh, *Day of the Long Night: a Palestinian Refugee Remembers the Nakba* (Jefferson, NC: Macfarland, 1998), 27–28; Ghada Karmi, *In Search of Fatima: a Palestinian Story* (London: Verso, 2002), 86–87.
8 *Filastin*, January 6, 1948; Summary of items on Hotel Semiramis, January 8, 1948, CZA S25/4013; report on two other women who perished in Semiramis, *al-Difa'*, January 9, 1948; obituary reporting that two young Abu Suwwan children, Matiyya and Sharbel lost their parents and uncles, *Filastin*, January 10, 1948.
9 Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, 110–111; Toubbeh, *Day of the Long Night*, 27–28; John Melkon Rose, *Armenians of Jerusalem: Memories of Life in Palestine* (London: Radcliffe, 1993), 182; Albina to District Commissioner, January 5, 1948, JMA 848/5–03/1.
10 Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, 110–112, and entry for January 5, 1948, 379–380, map on the back cover.
11 Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, entry for January 8, 1948, 112, Karmi, *In Search of Fatima*, 90; Toubbeh, *Day of the Long Night*, 29.
12 Karmi, *In Search of Fatima*, 79–80, 91–92, 102, 106; Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, entry for January 8, 1948, 112; Rose, *Armenians of Jerusalem*, 186; "An Arab named Tlil," January 3, 1948, HA, 105/23.
13 Shafiq 'Aways in "The Arab command," IDFA 1949/7249/283, 12; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 291, claims that 'Aways and his fighters arrived in Qatamon even before the Semiramis bombing.
14 Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, entries for February 10, 11, and 12, 1948, 113–115.
15 Albina to District Commissioner, January 5, January 19, 1948, JMA 848/5–03/1; Compare with "Arab newsletter," February 25, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59.
16 "Arab newsletter," March 1, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59. Dr. Khalidi's letter, February 29, 1948, ISA, 65/1634 (in Arabic); On the LEHI attack see Levi, *Tish'a qabin*, 440; *Filastin*, February 21, 1948, and obituary for Kamil 'Awayda, February 22, 1948.
17 Levi, *Tish'a qabin*, 339; Avraham Vered, *Lohamei herut Yisrael*, 73–74; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 133, for the precise location of the houses, see Kroyanker, *Shekhunot Yerushalayim*, 197, 243.

18 "On the matter of Qatamon," March 21, 1948, IDFA 1949/2605/3; "Ban on commerce with Jews," IDFA 1949/2605/3.
19 Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, March 14, 1948, 115–116.
20 Karmi, *In Search of Fatima*, 102–103; Toubbeh, *Day of the Long Night*, 13, 25–26, 30.
21 Khalil Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, March 16, 1948, 384. Sakakini himself took part in the delegation.
22 Report by a member of the National Committee, Jawdat al-'Amd, "Liaison officer with the Holy War forces," to the mufti Hajj Amin al-Husayni on the security situation in Jerusalem, Beirut, March 19, 1948, ISA, RG 65/1633; compare with "Arab newsletter," March 17 and 21, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59; see also Ibrahim Abu Dayya and Shafiq 'Aways, in "Arab Command," IDFA 7249/1949/12.
23 Khalil al-Sakakini, *Yawmiyyat Khalil al-Sakakini* [Diaries of Khalil al-Sakakini] vol. 8, 1942–1952: *al-Khuruj min al-Qatamon* [The Exodus from Qatamon], ed. Akram Musallam (Ramallah: The Khalil Sakakini Cultural Center and Jerusalem: Institute for Jerusalem Studies, 2010); for the sale of postcards showing mutilated corpses of Jews, see Henry Gurney's diary, April 11, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 53; see also M. Kapeliuk, "Atrocity stories on Arabic press," *Davar* (Tel Aviv), April 20, 1948. The Army of Deliverance, on its part, issued orders to its fighters in Jerusalem forbidding the murder of POWs and abuse of their bodies. See "Arab newsletter," April 18, 1948, HA 105/143.
24 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 293; Ibrahim 'Abd al-Fattah Abu Dayya in "The Arab command," IDFA 7249/1949/283, 12; "Arab newsletter," April 13 and 14, 1948, IDFA 500/1948/59; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 176, 238; Ibrahim Abu Dayya, commander of Company 3, to the deputy company commander in the Halhul camp, March 25, 1948 (translated into Hebrew), HA 105/91; "Request to send a Hotchkiss machine gun from Halhul to Qatamon," March 20, 1948, HA 105/91; "Notice on behalf of the commander of Company 3 in the Holy War Force," April 19, 1948, IDFA 65/35 (in Arabic).
25 "Arab newsletter," April 7, 1948, IDFA 500/1948/59; compare with Hala Sakakini in Jerusalem to Sari Sakakini in Cairo, March 30, 1948, in Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, 116–117. Sari Sakakini, who had heart disease, went for treatment in Cairo in late March 1948.
26 Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, March 28, 1948, 286–287.
27 Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, April 9, 1948, 388; compare with Amos Eilon, *Yerushalayim lo naflah: matzor 1948* [Jerusalem did not fall: Siege of 1948] (Tel Aviv: N. Tverski, 1949), 52 (in Hebrew).
28 Melia Sakakini, Jerusalem, April 21, 1948, to her nephew Sari Sakakini in Cairo, "*Akhir risala min Al-Quds*," [Last letter from Jerusalem], in Hala Sakakini, *Personal Archive*, 6–7.
29 Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, April 23 and 26, 1948, 119.
30 Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, illustrations section; compare with "In days like these, every time I go out to nature, I again long for the life of the village. Oh, if I were only a farmer!" in Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, March 2, 1937, 304; Karmi, *In Search of Fatima*, 18–20.
31 See Ted Swedenburg, "The Palestinian Peasant as National Signifier," *Anthropological Quarterly* 63 (1), 1990, 18–30.
32 "Operation of Rakhil/Yair, Arab telegram to America," CZA S25/9209.
33 Karmi, *In Search of Fatima*, 9–14, 93, 101, 112.
34 Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, 389, April 13, 1948; Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, April 24 and 29, 1949; it can be assumed that the exaggerated self-confidence of Abu Dayya is the result of the failed Palmach attack on the night of April 26. As a result of this attack, he requested and received reinforcements from the Arab Legion (see below).

35 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 213–214; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 292–293; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 238; Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 20–21; Tayi', *Safhat matwiyya 'an Filastin*, 3–4. Hilmi was later promoted to the rank of general in the Egyptian army.

36 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 214–218; Ra'anana [the "nom du guerre" of Eliyahu Sela], "Battle of Qatamon," in *Sefer Hapalmach* [Book of the Palmach], ed. Zerubavel Gilead and Matti Megged (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1953), 245–249; Yigal Perach, "Mach mesaper" [A corporal tells], in *Sefer Hapalmach*, 227–28; Uri Ben-Ari, *"Aharai"* ["Follow me"] (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1994), 110–164; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 293–294; Abdallah al-Tall to King Abdallah, May 1, 1948, in Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 21; "Arab newsletter," April 30, May 1, May 2, 1948, HA 105/143; "Fortnightly intelligence newsletter," April 19–May 3, TNA WO 275/64.

37 Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, April 30, 1948, 121; compare with "Lest we forget," in Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, 391–392. The lectures were given in Cairo on October 11 and November 5, 1948.

38 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 214–218; Ra'anana, "Battle of Qatamon," 245–249; Perach, "Mach mesaper," 227–228; Ben-Ari, *"Aharai,"* 110–164; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 293–294.

39 Khalil Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, 389 (Cairo, November 1, 1949), 392 (excerpts from lectures the author gave in Cairo on October 11 and November 5, 1948); Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 238–240; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 292–294; "Arab newsletter," April 30, 1948, HA 105/143. According to this version Abu Dayya returned to the area during the evening hours, when his fighters were already retreating. For the telephone conversation between the mufti and Abu Dayya and Hilmi, see Budeiri, "Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold," 42, n. 1; on the involvement of Hilmi, see David Shaltiel, *Yerushalayim Tashach* [David Shaltiel: Jerusalem 1948], ed. Joseph Shapiro (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1981), 129; see also "In the Arab camp," May 3, 1948, HA 105/142; on the request of the Arabs for a cease-fire see: Gurney diary, April 30, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 87.

40 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 218–219; Shapiro, *David Shaltiel*, 129–130. According to the source, there was indeed a cease-fire of two hours on April 30, in order to allow the Arabs to evacuate the dead and injured. Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 219–220; compare with al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 295, n. 2; message from King Abdallah to General Sir Alan Cunningham received in Arabic at 1530 hours, May 2, 1948, MEC CM III/5/33; for Cunningham's response, which is only partially known, see "Arab newsletter," May 2, 1948, HA 105/143; for the involvement of Syrians from the ALA, see al-Sharif and Siba'i, *Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, 334–335, 352.

41 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 220; for the looting, see inter alia, "Arab newsletter," April 30, May 1, 2, and 3, 1948, HA 105/43; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 295–296, gives different figures for the number of people injured, some consistent with the figures of Shai; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 239; Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 21–22; Gurney diary, May 2, 3, and 4, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 89, 91, 93; Cunningham to UK delegation, New York, May 2, 1948, MEC CM, III/2/42, TNA CO 537/3926; "Fortnightly intelligence newsletter" no. 67, April 19–May 3, 1948, TNA WO 275/64.

42 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 219; Elon, *Yerushalayim lo naflah*, 54; Cunningham to Creech Jones, May 1, 1948, MEC CM III/5/25; Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, 389 (January 1, 1949, Cairo) 389, 392–393 (from lectures in Cairo, October 11 and November 5, 1948); Khalil al-Sakakini to his family, in Hala al-Sakakini (ed.), *A'za'i: Mukhtarat wa-Muqtatafat min rasai'l wa-yawmiyyat Khalil al-Sakakini* [My dear ones: selection and abbreviations from the letters and diaries of Khalil al-Sakakini] (Jerusalem: Al-matba'a Al-tijariyya, 1978); for claims by residents of Qatamon, see "Collected Arab news," May 5, 1948, HA 105/143; for blaming the British for the Arab defeat, see "Weekly intelligence appreciation," April 30, 1948, MEC CM III/4/152; for the claim that Abu Dayya was detained see, al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 295; for the announcement of the National Committee, see "Collected Arab news," May 3,

1948, HA 105/143; for broadcasting the call for residents of Bethlehem to join Abu Dayya's forces, see "Collected Arab news," May 6, 1948, HA 105/142; for the final injury and paralysis of Abu Dayya, see Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 171; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 299; see also the photograph of Abu Dayya paralyzed after his injury, with the mufti and his comrades in al-Husayni, *Ḥaqa'iq 'an qaḍiyyat Filasṭin*, 92; for his reputation as a hero, see Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, 389, 392–393, compare with al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 292–293 and Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 238–240; on the visit by the Sakakini family, see Sakakini, *Jerusalem and I*, June 20, 1948, 125–126.

3 Jerusalem resists

The fall of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni

In the early hours of April 8, ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni was killed in battle at al-Qastal, a tiny village just outside Jerusalem overlooking the road to Jaffa and Tel Aviv. The Haganah captured it on the night of April 2, but fighting continued for several days in the surrounding territory. The fall of this strategically located village, the first to be taken and held by a Jewish military force in 1948, stunned Arab Jerusalem, the Holy War forces and, it seems, Palestinian Arabs throughout the country. Qastal’s fall should not have been seen as such a huge military debacle, since, up to that point, the Arab military effort at the approaches to Jerusalem had been centered on the Bab al-Wad area, to the west of al-Qastal. In fact, the Haganah took Qastal incidentally, while it was emptied of defenders during the fighting at Bab al-Wad, and it compelled the Arabs to divert their forces eastward in an attempt to retake the village.[1]

In ‘Abd al-Qadir’s absence—he had gone to Damascus to obtain more arms and reinforcements—his deputy, Kamil ‘Ariqat, led the efforts to retake the village. But ‘Ariqat was wounded on April 6. ‘Abd al-Qadir returned to Jerusalem on April 7, after headquarters in Damascus turned down his requests and refused to supply additional forces, weapons, ammunition, and in particular artillery to the Jerusalem front. Although he was exhausted, ‘Abd al-Qadir quickly set out for Qastal and spent the night master-minding the continuation of the offensive.[2] The Arab attack was partially successful in achieving its military goals, and regained some posts in the outskirts of the village. But in a failure of coordination with his troops as they withdrew to their base camp, ‘Abd al-Qadir entered an area that was still under Haganah control and was shot. In response to rumors that he had fallen prisoner or that he was surrounded, some 1,000 Arabs from the Jerusalem area (a huge force in this inter-communal war) responded to a *faz‘a*—a general alert calling on all able-bodied armed men to bring their own weapons and join in the battle to save Qastal and rescue their commander. This force attacked the village on the morning of April 8 and retook the village. But, upon discovering the body of the commander they so revered, their victory celebration turned into deep mourning and despair. They quickly transported the body to Jerusalem, accompanied by many of the fighters, leaving only a small

Figure 3.1 Armed villagers in the Jerusalem area, 1948 (Palmach Archive).

garrison behind. The next day the Palmach—the Haganah strike force—attacked the village again and forced the Arabs to beat a rapid retreat. Thereafter, Qastal remained under Jewish control.[3]

Many Arabs, particularly in Jerusalem, anxiously followed the ups and downs of the Qastal campaign. The tension climaxed on April 8. No one knew where ʻAbd al-Qadir was and what exactly had happened to him, and Arab trepidation intensified as rumors spread that Qatamon's popular commander, Ibrahim Abu Dayya, had been seriously wounded. Armed men, among them untrained ones bearing their personal weapons, streamed to the St Simeon Monastery, and from there were sent westward to Qastal, via ʻAyn Karim. Many Arab defensive positions in Jerusalem were left unmanned. In the early afternoon, when there was still no news of the hoped-for victory, gloom spread throughout Qatamon and Baqʻa. Later in the day the Arab Higher Committee and the National Committee announced that Qastal had been taken, and that hundreds of Jews had been killed or fallen prisoner. Pessimism turned into euphoria. Arabs danced in the streets and here and there men fired their guns—including machine guns—into the air in joy. In Baqʻa, a Christian woman, a member of the National Guard, and a storekeeper were all wounded by these ecstatic volleys. ʻAbd al-Qadir was forgotten in the rejoicing. The news that Qastal had been retaken by the Arabs came via the British police, since the Arab fighting force had no radio equipment.

In the midst of the confusion, as rumors spread that ʻAbd al-Qadir had been wounded and evacuated to the hospital in Ramla, the Arab governing institutions endeavored to find out what had happened to him. Shai's intelligence operatives, who already knew that the body of a senior Arab commander had been found on the battlefield, concluded after listening in on phone calls between Arab leaders that the body was ʻAbd al-Qadir's. In an act of psychological warfare, they broadcasted the news of his death in Arabic on the Haganah radio station, and word spread quickly. In the meantime, the Arab leadership learned that the commander's body had been brought to the home of his brother in Bab al-Zahra, and it issued an official announcement. Joy turned into communal mourning.[4]

The next day, on April 9, ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni was given a massive public funeral attended by tens of thousands from Jerusalem and its environs. Following a memorial service at the al-Aqsa Mosque, he was buried nearby, on al-Haram al-Sharif, alongside his father, Musa Kazim al-Husayni. The Arab leadership in Jerusalem understood that the interment would be a massive public event, so they quickly formed an organizing committee consisting largely of members of the National Committee, the former Emergency Committee, and the Palestinian Arab Party, among them Anwar Nusseibeh, Ghalib al-Khalidi, Saʻd al-Din al-ʻArif, and Dr. Fawti Frayj. Youths from the Arab Scouts were to keep order among the participants—men and boys only, as Muslim custom dictated. Stores in Arab Jerusalem and everyone from laborers to municipal and government workers to members of the professions left their workplaces to attend the funeral. So did Arab fighters and their commanders from the Jerusalem area, Muslim and Christian religious leaders, members of the Arab institutions in Jerusalem, notables from the city and the region's villages, members of social and cultural organizations, consuls from Arab countries, and a group of Arab Legion officers. Crowds packed the streets, roofs, and the Old City walls.

Despite the efforts to preserve some sort of order, the funeral opened with an embarrassing incident. The procession was led by the coffin, which was wrapped in a Palestinian Arab flag—the flag of the World War I Arab Revolt, which was adopted by the Palestinian Arab National Movement under the Mandate and remains in use as the Palestinian flag. When it began, a group of fighters began to fire their guns into the air in honor of the fallen commander. The crowds panicked, thinking that the Jews were taking advantage of the event to stage an attack. A few were injured by the gunfire, and others were trampled. After order was restored with the help of the Scouts, the municipal police, and the fighters, the funeral procession continued to al-Haram al-Sharif, where the public Friday prayer service was followed by a memorial service in al-Aqsa. Church bells rang, and in the absence of cannons, a mortar salute was fired. This was followed by eulogies in the al-Haram al-Sharif plaza, one read in the name of the mufti and others spoken by representatives of Arab institutions. The speech that most moved the crowd was that given by Ibrahim Abu Dayya in the name of the Holy War General Command. Abu Dayya, who had been wounded in the Qastal fighting and who attended the funeral after the shrapnel he had got at Qastal had been removed from his body, made an effort to raise Arab morale. But the news

that the Jews had retaken Qastal that morning, and the nearby village of Dayr Yasin, too, arrived during the funeral, and plunged the crowd once more into despondency.[5]

The Arabs of Jerusalem and the entire country entered a period of heavy mourning in which neighboring Arab lands also took part. The Palestinian Arab press offered lengthy accounts of ‘Abd al-Qadir’s death and his magnificent funeral. The headlines were replete with heroic language, for example, “A Most Holy End to a Most Glorious Life” (*Filastin*) and “The Heroic Commander ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni Led the Gunfight in the Qastal Mountains: Glory and Victory Were His and He Had the Honor of Falling in Battle” (*al-Difa‘*). In addition to the acclamations that appeared in the days that followed the funeral, the newspapers published an unprecedented number of mourning announcements placed by people and organizations throughout the country, among them the Arab Higher Committee and National Committees around Palestine. According to press and eye-witness reports, there was “mass mourning” in and around Haifa, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla, Nazareth, Nablus, Qalqilya, Tayba, Tira, and Bayt Jala. The grief seems to have struck on a truly national scale—it encompassed areas where the Husaynis had long enjoyed support as well as opposition strongholds. Especially notable was the case of Hebron, where ‘Abd al-Qadir had, in life, received a cool reception. That city’s National Committee declared a period of mourning, and after a public Friday prayer service at al-Haram al-Ibrahimi (the Tomb of the Patriarchs), memorial prayers were recited and sermons given glorifying the man and his deeds. Hebron sent representatives to the funeral and the mayor sent condolence telegrams to the mufti, to the Arab Higher Committee, and to the Arab League. Fawzi al-Qawuqji, who had feuded with the mufti and his men, responded to the news of ‘Abd al-Qadir’s death with the words “We have lost a general.” Opposition figures also offered eulogies at the funeral. The national nature of his loss was also evident in the Arab countries, where funeral services were conducted and whose leaders also conveyed their condolences to the mufti, regardless of political or personal rivalry. Egyptian newspaper correspondents in Palestine were swept up by the communal anguish, writing lengthy accounts, from a pan-Arab point of view, of ‘Abd al-Qadir’s death and funeral. Eventually this emotion transmogrified into the myth of “‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, hero of al-Qastal” in Palestinian national historiography and national and collective memory. The all-encompassing nature of the grief seems to have stemmed from three sources: the disproportionate importance that the Arab community attached to the Qastal engagements; the fact that this was the first time that such a senior commander (who had been recognized as commander of the central sector by the Arab League) had fallen in battle; and the occurrence of other significant events around the time of his death. It coincided with the retaking of al-Qastal by the Jews, the conquest of Dayr Yasin, and the defeat of the Arabs in the western-central sector and in the north at Mishmar HaEmeq during the Haganah’s Operation Nahshon. In Palestinian Arab collective and national memory, the fall of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni became a harbinger of the defeat of 1948 and of the Nakba.[6]

His death left a vacuum in the Arab command in the Jerusalem region. The mufti named a succession of men from his inner circle to replace the fallen commander, among them Hasan Salama, but his candidates were rejected by the Arab League Military Committee, which preferred to appoint an officer from the Arab Liberation Army. The mufti, for his part, refused to accept anyone associated with the Arab League as commander in Jerusalem. He was not on good terms with the Syrian government and the directors of the inter-communal war who operated out of Damascus on behalf of the League. This confusion in Jerusalem prompted the city's Arab leaders to send a delegation to Fawzi al-Qawuqji, Arab Liberation Army commander in the northern sector, that asked him to send forces to Jerusalem and to accept command of that sector as well. News of Jerusalem's plight reached Damascus, where the Military Committee resolved to carry out its original plan to send two new ALA battalions to the central region.[7]

The mufti and his men were clearly dismayed. Emil al-Ghuri returned to Jerusalem and declared himself, on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, commander of the Jerusalem district. Al-Ghuri was experienced at organizing fighting forces and at purchasing and distributing arms, but he had no military training or combat experience. Also problematic was the fact that he was a Christian—and that even other Christians had reservations about his appointment to a military command, fearing what the Muslim reaction might be. He thus found himself struggling to gain recognition in Jerusalem and in short order decamped to the headquarters in Bir Zeit, where he was known from the visits he had paid to 'Abd al-Qadir. The appeal to Qawuqji worried the Husayni party even more. Finally the mufti appointed another member of his family, Police Inspector Khalid Sharif al-Husayni, the commander of the municipal police force, to lead the Holy War forces. But Khalid al-Husayni was not recognized as district commander by the Arab League's Military Commission, nor was he able to impose his authority on the fighters. Apparently, being a former police officer, he did not enjoy the same prestige and or even aura that 'Abd al-Qadir had gained as a commander in the Arab Revolt. He established his headquarters in the Old City's al-Ma'muniyya School building and tried unsuccessfully to compete with the ALA command in al-Rawda. In practice, the commander of the ALA's garrison in Jerusalem, Fadil Rashid, now became the dominant military figure in the city.[8]

Dayr Yasin

In the early morning hours of April 9, 1948, the day of 'Abd al-Qadir's funeral, a joint force of 120 IZL and LEHI fighters attacked Dayr Yasin, an Arab village just to Jerusalem's west, home to about 750 Muslims. The assault had been reluctantly approved by the Haganah's Jerusalem district commander, David Shaltiel. Dayr Yasin was chosen as a target even though it had taken no active role in the hostilities, and despite the fact that it had, in January, signed a local peace pact with the adjacent Jewish neighborhood of Givat Sha'ul. The

agreement had been observed by both sides since then. All the same, the inhabitants organized a local defense force equipped with about 60 rifles and two Bren machine guns. Four Jewish fighters were killed and another four wounded in the operation. After receiving a request for assistance, Haganah forces provided covering machine gun fire as a Palmach contingent penetrated the village from the north, for a short while, and overcame a pocket of resistance. Most of the inhabitants managed to flee during the fighting, but many, including women, children, old people, men, and youths, were apparently shot down indiscriminately in their homes or outside by IZL and LEHI forces. Between 100 and 110 Arabs were killed. (The claim that the dead numbered 254, a figure touted in a report that IZL's Jerusalem commander gave to the press and which was accepted for many years, has since been refuted by Palestinian scholars.) Most of the dead seem to have been non-combatants. In addition, several dozen women and children were taken prisoner and marched through Jerusalem's streets in a victory parade to Arab positions in the city, where they were released.[9]

The Dayr Yasin massacre shocked and frightened the Arab public and its leadership in Jerusalem and around the country. The Palestinian press played it prominently. On April 11, *Filastin* claimed that "the deeds at Dayr Yasin have no parallel in history." The Arab leadership publicized at length in the newspapers details of the killings, including graphic depictions of atrocities, hoping to infuriate the public, the fighters, and public opinion in the Arab world, and boost their willingness to fight. Arab Higher Committee Secretary Khalidi held a press conference in Jerusalem on April 11 in which he reported that 250 people had been killed at Dayr Yasin, most of them women and children. Agitated and shocked, Khalidi then left for Amman and Damascus, where he met with Transjordan's King 'Abdallah and Syria's President Quwatli to brief them on the massacre. The secretary of Jerusalem's National Committee, Anwar Nusseibeh, met Brigadier Jones, British military commander of the Jerusalem district, and informed him of the "barbaric atrocities committed by the Jewish criminals." The British brought bomber planes from Iraq to attack the IZL and LEHI fighters who had captured Dayr Yasin, but decided not to deploy them when it turned out that the village had been handed over to the Haganah. The Arab leadership's maneuvers were reported on the front pages of the Arabic newspapers.[10] But the effect of the Arab leadership's campaign to rouse public opinion turned out to be mostly the opposite of what had been intended, both in Jerusalem and in the country. The rumors spread by the Dayr Yasin refugees themselves exacerbated the fear the attack had created. This came on top of the despair that had followed the death of 'Abd al-Qadir and the loss of al-Qastal, and dealt a severe blow to the morale of the Arab public. The practice of evacuating women and children from combat areas spread. Plans to retake Dayr Yasin from the direction of 'Ayn Karim quickly dissolved. While Arab commanders reasoned that such an operation would be easier than the reconquest of al-Qastal, they believed they would need 300 men to hold Dayr Yasin, an unattainable number under the circumstances at the time.[11]

The Mt Scopus Convoy

On April 13, Arab forces mounted a reprisal attack to avenge the loss of al-Qastal, the death of ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni, and the massacre at Dayr Yasin. The commander of Wadi al-Joz, Muhammadd ʻAdil al-Najjar, planned to hit a convoy that was wending its way, in coordination with the British, to the Hebrew University campus and Hadassah Hospital, which were isolated on Mt Scopus, northeast of the Old City, surrounded by Arab territory. Al-Najjar prepared an ambush at a bend in the road in Sheikh Jarrah.[12]

The convoy consisted of two armored cars, trucks, ambulances, and buses holding dozens of university and hospital employees. Najjar and his men set off a mine in the road and opened fire on the vehicles. Some of the passengers, trapped, were targeted for hours by Arab fighters who streamed there from all over the city. Many of the Jews were killed or wounded. In the end, the Arabs set fire to the two trapped buses, with the passengers still inside. Two managed to escape; others were taken prisoner. Their ultimate fate remains unknown. The Haganah tried to help the besieged victims with machine gun and mortar fire, but decided not to dispatch a rescue force on foot, on the grounds that it had no chance of saving the victims. A British attempt to rescue the trapped Jews also failed. Arab forces turned heavy fire at the British positions. Only when reinforcements arrived hours later were the British able to free seven Jews who had remained in the vehicles. A total of 78 of the 112 people who had traveled in the convoy were killed or presumed killed (the number includes the missing) and another 24 were injured. The dead included many doctors and nurses, including Dr. Chaim Yassky, the hospital's director, and members of the university faculty. The massacre stunned Jewish Jerusalem and the Yishuv as a whole. Both Jews and Arabs grew more resentful of the British. The Jews accused the British of deliberately permitting the attack, intervening only after they had allowed the Arabs to carry out a bloodbath. The British rejected this charge, asserting that their soldiers had risked their lives to evacuate the trapped passengers, at the price of losing two men, with six more wounded. The British, however, in fact accepted the Arab claim that the ambush was a direct response to the Dayr Yasin massacre. Nonetheless, the Arabs accused the British of impeding the retaliation, and trumpeted the fact that, while the British had made efforts to rescue the Jews in the convoy, they had not lifted a finger to intervene in defense of Dayr Yasin and other Arab villages taken since then by the Jews. British and Arab reports of the number of Arabs killed in the convoy massacre varied from 12 to 16. The Arabs claimed that most of their dead had been hit by British bullets. The wounded men included the operation's commander, Najjar, injured before the British intervened. One of the men killed was the journalist Shukri Qutayna, who joined the war effort following his son's death in the Damascus Gate bombing and who, too, was an organizer of the Arab military effort in Jerusalem.[13]

Some Arabs, however, subsequently had second thoughts about the attack. The Arab Medical Association published the following notice in *Filastin* on April 16:

> The Association appeals not to attack first aid personnel, doctors, female and male nurses, whether Jews or Arabs, since they are humanitarian emissaries performing humanitarian work. The symbol for medical vehicles and institutions is the Red Cross or Red Crescent or Red Star of David. The loss of every doctor or medic, Arab or Jewish, is a loss for all humanity.[14]

The Arab doctors were courageous, in the context of their time, to publish such a condemnation of the convoy massacre, even an indirectly worded one such as this. It would seem to indicate that some circles in Arab society were discomfited and, in certain cases, remorseful. ‘Arif would later, in his account, cite the names of Dr. Yassky and the faculty members who were killed, just as he did with the Arab fatalities, and made the apologetic argument that “the professors and physicians” would not have been attacked had they not been accompanied by combatants and had they not been traveling in armored cars. Alongside the above notice from the Medical Association, *Filastin* published a report charging that men of the “Haganah gang” who had driven through Sheikh Jarrah—meaning the convoy—had been on their way to capture Augusta Victoria Hospital on Mt Scopus. According to Shai reports, the Arab leadership was disturbed by the massacre and thus reported that weapons and Haganah personnel had been found in the convoy ambulances. Furthermore, Dr. Mahmud Tahir al-Dajani, director of the Bayt Safafa hospital and an operative of the Arab Medical Association, harshly reprimanded members of the Arab Higher Committee and the National Committee for targeting ambulances and medical personnel (although rumors had it that he had known of the attack in real time and had arrived to care for the Arab wounded). The next day, April 17, an Arab was wounded in Qatamon and an Arab ambulance was unable to reach him. The wounded man was evacuated by the British army. According to a Shai report, an Arab leader, apparently Dr. Husayn al-Khalidi, a pediatrician by training, declared that “an Arab crime was committed at Sheikh Jarrah when they attacked doctors and nurses traveling in ambulances, and no one should roar now if Arab ambulances are hit.”[15]

Confrontation between the commanders of the ALA and the collapse of civilian life

During his visit to Damascus on April 24–25, 1948, the General Command appointed Fawzi al-Qawuqji commander of both sectors of the central region, east and west. He received the promotion over the violent objections of his rival, the mufti. (Qawuqji, it should be recalled, was already commander of the northern region.) With this appointment the General Command and Qawuqji himself apparently sought to shore up his power at the expense of the mufti. It was also aimed at filling the vacuum created in Jerusalem and the central region since the death of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and the deterioration of Arab military efforts in the wake of mounting Jewish attacks.

At that same time, the principal force of the ALA’s Third Yarmuk Battalion joined the advance force that had already arrived in Jerusalem. It was originally

intended to serve as a reinforcement unit under the command of the Iraqi Colonel ʻAbd al-Hamid al-Rawi, directly subject to the headquarters in Damascus. The battalion, made up of Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians, and Transjordanians, entered the city on April 27. Captain Fadil Rashid, leader of the Jerusalem Garrison and the senior Arab officer in the city since the death of ʻAbd al-Qadir, found himself outranked by al-Rawi. The Damascus command ordered Rashid to subordinate himself to al-Rawi, who now became the commander of the Arab forces in Jerusalem. His officers took up positions along the front line on Mt Zion, Abu Tor, Musrara, and Wadi Joz. But Rashid resisted the new commander's authority, and the two men became bitter rivals. This contention between them exacerbated the confusion and lack of clarity that had already prevailed on the Arab side. When Qawuqji informed the command in Damascus of the conflict, the latter resolved, on May 4, to solve the problem by removing al-Rawi from Jerusalem and restoring the city's command to Rashid. But when al-Rawi left, the battalion's morale and organization collapsed to the point that Rashid sought to disband it and discharge its men. Some of them indeed seem to have left Jerusalem, but others remained and were redeployed according to Rashid's orders. The conflict between Rashid and al-Rawi may not have been merely personal. It may also have been connected to the mufti's opposition to Qawuqji's appointment as central region commander and the rivalry between the latter two for preeminence. Local support for the Husaynis seems to have tipped the balance in favor of Rashid, an acquaintance and admirer of the mufti since the time of his exile in Iraq. Rashid emerged stronger from the clash and in his position as leader of the ALA's garrison of 500 men. For all intents and purposes, he was commander of the city.[16]

Confusion and anxiety were evident not only in the military realm, but also on the civilian front. The lives of inhabitants lost all semblance of normality as the fighting grew worse. Gasoline and food shortages began on the Arab side in mid-April and exacerbated the situation. The Arab city was cut off from three sides, and commerce, supplies, and transport continued only via the east, by way of Jericho and Transjordan. The National Committee had no choice but to send emissaries to request that the railroad line from Jerusalem through Wadi Sarar (the Soreq River valley) not be sabotaged by Arab irregulars operating in the area, so that gasoline and kerosene for cooking could be supplied to the residents and to the ever-growing numbers of foreign troops. The appeals were useless—the tracks were cut off and the train stopped running.[17]

By the end of April Wadi Joz, Bab al-Zahra, and Musrara, all to the north of the Old City, practically emptied of their inhabitants. The same was true of Upper Baqʻa and Abu Tor in the south, to the east and south of the railroad tracks. Those few residents of Talbiyya who had not left earlier now fled. Among those who abandoned the southern part of the city were officials and employees of Arab institutions and their families. Some 40,000 Arabs crowded into the Old City, local residents and refugees from the neighborhoods outside the walls and villages in the region. People were packed in eight to a room under worsening sanitary conditions. Many found shelter in churches, monasteries, and convents,

while others moved in with relatives. A certain sense of security for those sheltering there came from the defensive city wall, an overwhelming Arab majority, and the topographic superiority of the Arabs in relation to the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. And it was, of course, the base for the ALA, which was now seen as the principal Arab fighting force.[18]

Another wave of refugees flowed out of Jerusalem. Laid-off government workers and officials left the city in large numbers. Many relocated in Bethlehem and Hebron, while others flooded the Egyptian consulate with visa requests. One of the applicants was a former member of the Emergency Committee, Ghalib al-Khalidi, who gave, as the reason for needing a visa, "I am weary." His brother, Dr. Husayn Fakhri al-Khalidi, secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, left Palestine in the wake of the Dayr Yasin massacre on a diplomatic mission to the Arab states and did not return. The Khalidi family, deeply rooted in Jerusalem for centuries, submitted more than 50 passports to the Egyptian consulate to be stamped with visas. Under the circumstances, the Arab Higher Committee softened its position and allowed the National Committee to grant permits to men so that they could "accompany their families who want to leave the country." Officially, they were required to return within five to ten days and report to the National Committee. The Jerusalem National Committee did its best to stop the flow of refugees by force. It ordered, unilaterally and without coordinating with the Arab Higher Committee, that vehicles be halted on the roads so as "to return the escapees to Jerusalem." It also ordered the "revocation of the rights of the fleeing villagers" in the Jerusalem area. But these measures were of little avail. Jericho's hotels, which served as transfer points for weapons and fighters from the Arab states, filled with refugees from Jerusalem. Some waited for entry permits to Transjordan, while others, former employees of the Mandate administration, for responses from the Arab governments to whom they had offered their services. Hundreds of Jerusalem families from the neighborhoods outside the city walls had arrived in Amman by the end of April.[19]

But white-collar workers were not the only ones who had lost their jobs. Employees of the public works department, for example, were laid off at the beginning of April. By the end of the month civilian life was in such disarray that it was impossible to find an Arab electrician to do repairs. Some of the unemployed joined the fighting forces in the hope of making a living wage. The breakdown of public services and the supply of essentials at the end of the Mandate profoundly worried the Arab institutions and fighting forces, who feared that the burden of looking after the civilians would be detrimental to a military campaign that was likely to stretch on for a long time with no quick resolution. The Arab Higher Committee, meeting in Damascus in the first week of April, decided to call on government service workers to remain on the job in Palestine in anticipation of the British evacuation. The Arab Higher Committee office in Jerusalem, in most cases futilely, conveyed this message to senior officials and the National Committees.[20]

As civil order broke down, armed theft and hijackings of automobiles became epidemic. Private and public property lay unprotected as the ability of the British

administration to enforce the law dwindled with the approach of the evacuation date, May 15. Another type of crime that skyrocketed was theft of guns from security personnel.[21] Still another phenomenon, characteristic of the collapse of governing authority and of law and order, was kidnapping. Security forces on both sides, Jewish and Arab, abducted the other side's civilians in order to demand ransom or exchange them for their own compatriots who had been taken prisoner.[22]

The rise in the number and importance of ALA fighters worsened the friction between them and both local fighters and the civilian population. The "foreigners" had received paltry salaries, P£3 per month, via the Holy War command, from the beginning of April at least. The National Committee had no choice but to include them in the municipal bread distribution program. But the program, plagued by irregularities, did not meet the needs of the fighters. They complained about the quality and quantity of the bread they received and resented the locals they had come to defend as "deserters." Relations between ALA and Palestinian fighters also worsened. According to Shai reports, Iraqi troops complained that Palestinians were joining the force only to be able to plunder. They also accused local men of murdering wounded Iraqi fighters in battle in order to take their weapons. In contrast, when, in one incident, Palestinian fighters came to the aid of Fadil Rashid, he refused to accept their assistance and ordered them to return to their positions. When they refused, his men shot at the local fighters, killing one of them. There were also cases in which Palestinian and ALA fighters cooperated, but the negligence that typified both groups gradually led the Arab leadership in Jerusalem, and the Palestinians in general, to realize that their only hope lay in the regular Arab armies.[23]

On the eve of the British withdrawal

Two companies of Palmach fighters who had been brought to Jerusalem as part of Operation Yevusi attacked Sheikh Jarrah on the night of April 24. Between 20 and 50 Holy War fighters were in the neighborhood at the time, under the command of ʻAdil ʻAbd al-Latif. So were 35 members of the ALA, the vanguard force of the Third Yarmuk Battalion, under the command of First Lieutenant Musa ʻAbd al-Hadi, who largely manned positions in the Nashashibi house and another building.[24]

Faced with a superior force, the Arab fighters retreated southward to Bab al-Zahra. A small group of ALA fighters who fortified themselves on the roof of the Nashashibi building finally surrendered with the mediation of the British. This attack, along with two previous days of firefights between the Jewish neighborhoods of Beit Yisrael and Mea Sheʻarim and the Arab neighborhoods of Bab al-Zahra, Saʻd wu-Sʻid, and Musrara, and the retreat of Sheikh Jarrah's defenders in the face of the Palmach operation, led even more residents to abandon those neighborhoods. Now only combatants remained.[25]

The British viewed the capture of Sheikh Jarrah by the Jews as a threat to their evacuation route, which ran northward out of Jerusalem. The British army

delivered an ultimatum to the Palmach contingent that had occupied the Nashashibi house and to the Haganah command in Jerusalem—they had to withdraw from the neighborhood. The British promised that they would hold it until the evacuation was completed and would not return it to the Arabs. When the Jews did not accede, a British force, aided by a tank and artillery bombardment, stormed the neighborhood, capturing it and the Nashashibi house. The British kept their promise—they allowed neither Jews nor Arabs into the area. Under British protection, Jewish transports to Mt Scopus resumed.[26]

Conditions in Jerusalem grew ripe, at the end of April 1948, for a halt in hostilities. The UN cease-fire commission, consisting of the American, French, and Belgian consuls (the Consular Commission), had been at work since April 23 but had achieved little. But on April 28, talks mediated by the UN's trusteeship council for Palestine achieved a draft agreement for a cease-fire in Jerusalem's Old City. In these talks the Arabs were represented by a delegate from the Arab Higher Committee, Jamal al-Husayni, and the Jews by one from the Jewish Agency, Moshe Shertok (later Sharett). The principle of the agreement was preserving the status quo, especially in order to protect holy sites from damage. On April 30, however, neither the Arab nor the Jewish institutions in Jerusalem had recognized the cease-fire, and ʻAbd al-Hamid al-Rawi, who commanded the Arab forces in Jerusalem for a short time, told the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram* that he had not received any guidelines on the matter from the Arab League. But Haganah forces were given, on May 2, an order to hold their fire in the Old City so long as the other side did. The cease-fire was supposed to continue until the completion of armistice talks. One of the Haganah's demands was free passage to the Old City. For the most part, both sides observed the cease-fire until the British evacuation.[27]

The conquest of Qatamon led to another wave of flight from the southern Arab neighborhoods, Qatamon itself and adjacent Baqʻa and the German Colony. While most of the latter areas were part of British Security Zone A, their inhabitants nevertheless feared that the war would reach them. On the morning of April 30 the three neighborhoods emptied rapidly; most of the refugees headed for the Old City. In the days that followed, despite the end of the battle for Qatamon and the temporary cease-fire, people continued to flee even though the relative calm allowed some government workers to return to their jobs. Talbiyya lost the last of its Arab residents, with the exception of a few members of the upper middle class who stayed on at the Jasmine House Hotel, a small establishment. Many escapees headed for Transjordan, most of them ending up in Amman. Arab fighters in Baqʻa took advantage of the situation to break into and plunder abandoned houses, seizing beds, mattresses, and other property. The Arab Higher Committee building in the German Colony was evacuated and left under guard, its offices transferred to Mamilla. On the night of May 11 the Haganah launched a psychological offensive in the Baqʻa area, using a loudspeaker. A gunfight broke out, and even more inhabitants fled. The Haganah also conducted, during the days that followed, similar psychological warfare operations in the sector to the north of the Old City, broadcasting messages aimed in

particular at the Arab combatants. This enjoyed no little success, but here, too, Arab fighters responded to the loudspeakers with gunfire.[28]

The tenuous position of the fighters, who abandoned their positions and converged on the Old City, spread to the populace as a whole. In addition, the ceasefire in the Old City may well have attracted even more civilians seeking refuge from the fighting. Nevertheless, people were terrified that the Jews would attack and continued to fortify the city gates. With between 50,000 and 60,000 people inside the walls, overcrowding was so serious that people were living 12 to a room. Most of those packed into convents and monasteries were Christians, including refugees from ʻAyn Karim and even residents from Bethlehem, scared that the war might reach them. Anxiety about the impending British evacuation seems to have induced people to seek international protection in religious institutions within the walls, which gave preference to members of their own confessions. The Greek Orthodox patriarchate, for example, took in about 400 of its believers, both Greeks and Arabs. Most of the Muslim refugees, in contrast, sheltered in the homes of family members or friends. Other Muslims fled from the city and its nearby hinterland to villages in areas of homogenous Arab population, far from the arena of battle. The National Committee's food distribution operation ran into difficulties, one reason being the flight of the merchants and storekeepers on whom the program depended. This phenomenon, already familiar from Haifa, now became palpable in Jerusalem. Fearing the anarchy that prevailed on the Palestinian street—on the one hand, the huge numbers of refugees, and robbery by fighters (who demanded "contributions") on the other—proprietors shut up their shops and left. Water was supplied largely from cisterns, mostly those on al-Haram al-Sharif. Poor sanitary conditions led to an outbreak of dysentery, and cases of typhus began to appear. The government health department provided vaccine to the National Committee, which set up an inoculation program in cooperation with doctors.[29]

Many of the refugees in the Old City had arrived from villages close to Jerusalem, which had also been abandoned by large numbers of their inhabitants. An irregular Transjordanian force, the Abu ʻUbayda Company, had deployed in ʻAyn Karim and al-Maliha, from which women, children, and the elderly had been evacuated to Bethlehem and Bayt Jala. The force included a unit of combatants who had already fought in Sur Bahir under the command of ʻAbd al-Latif Abu Qura, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Transjordan, and a Bedouin detachment, headed by Mahmud al-Fa'iz, which had previously seen battle at Bab al-Wad. Al-Fa'iz and Mamduh Sarayra, a civilian employee of the Legion who volunteered to serve in the war, were the deputy commanders of the Abu ʻUbayda Company. The interlopers, who had been invited in by the local leader in al-Maliha, ʻAbd al-Fattah Darwish, now caused him to flee with his men and their arms.[30]

Another irregular Transjordanian force, the Manku Company, under Captain Barakat Tarad, a retired Legion officer, arrived at al-ʻIzariyya, a village just east of Jerusalem, where it received logistical assistance from a local resident, Kamil ʻAriqat, formerly ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni's deputy. Irregular Transjordanian

forces, which went into action in the final stage before the British evacuation, while the Arab Legion hands were for the most part tied, were organized and equipped in Amman. They played, for King ʻAbdallah, a role parallel to that of the ALA for the Arab League and Syria. Jerusalem was not included in the original invasion plans of either of these forces. Both avoided planning a Jerusalem campaign for two reasons. On the diplomatic front, the region (where an unofficial cease-fire had been in effect since May 8) was slated to become a *corpus separatum*, a separate international zone under UN administration. There were military reasons as well. When Palestinian leaders asked ʻAbdallah for help in Jerusalem after the British left, he told them that his army was tied up at the front. He promised that "popular volunteer forces" would do the job. Another irregular Transjordanian force, the Usama Company, indeed arrived in south Jerusalem after the British departed. Once the Legion did, in the end, enter Jerusalem, these forces were integrated into the Transjordanian command. The aid that ʻAriqat provided to the Manku Company seems to have been another sign of the flagging power of the Husaynis and the growing influence of ʻAbdallah as the evacuation date approached.[31]

The National Committee continued to function as the Arab population's principal civilian institution. It established an Arab municipality on May 9, an administrative framework headed by Anton Safiyya, a relatively minor public figure who had worked for the municipality under the Mandate. The position of mayor was left unfilled for the time being. The National Committee sent emissaries to Transjordan to obtain food and fuel, maintained the telephone lines, and arranged mail deliveries to other cities. Beyond the typhus inoculation program, it sprayed central Old City institutions with DDT to prevent the spread of disease. During the fighting at Bab al-Wad, the Committee mobilized bakeries to bake bread and send it to the fighting forces.[32]

On May 5 the National Committee appointed a former officer from the Mandate's Criminal Investigations Department (CID), Munir Abu Fadil, as chief of the Arab police force in Jerusalem. Abu Fadil was a Lebanon-born Christian who had become close to the Husaynis. The appointment seems to have been recommended by Emil al-Ghuri, who remained out of the country during most of the war thus far, and remained so for the time being.[33]

Abu Fadil took over the command from police officer Sulayman ʻAzir of Bir Zeit, following the appointment of its first leader, Khalid al-Husayni, to head the Holy War force. This elevated Abu Fadil to the position of Arab Jerusalem's second most important commander, after Fadil Rashid. He viewed his police force as military in every respect, and refused to take care of criminal cases, which he referred to the civilian police. His force took responsibility for the area around Jaffa Gate, which had been blocked with concrete positions shielded by sandbags, and the Old City citadel. He also took charge of the police station in the German Colony, which the British handed over to him on May 11. The chief of the Jaffa Gate sector was Sulayman ʻAzir, who remained, now under Abu Fadil's command. At this time, apparently, the police force received Bren machine guns from Arab sources, in addition to the rifles given to them by the

British. Seeking to enlarge his force by bringing back men who had absconded, and to obtain additional guns and uniforms, Abu Fadil notified the deserters that they must return to work by May 13, or return their guns and uniforms, under penalty of arrest. He seems to have taken this step as part of his rivalry with Qawuqji, who promised policemen that they could continue to serve and keep their rank, privileges, and salaries, unless they deserted, and issued also a call to police deserters to return their arms and uniforms. Apparently, in his new position he was also considered to be a commander with the Holy War forces. Given the weakness of Khalid al-Husayni, he became a dominant figure in that force as well.[34]

Operation pitchfork or the red days: From the British evacuation to the arrival of the Legion

On the eve of the British evacuation there were about 2,000 Arab fighters in Jerusalem, confronting some 3,000 trained Jewish combatants (although, according to a Haganah source, there were guns for only about half this number). The Arab order of battle was as follows: the Holy War force of about 700 men, officially under the command of Khalid al-Husayni, in practice led by local commanders in different sectors; the ALA's Jerusalem garrison of about 500 men commanded by Fadil Rashid; the municipal police force of about 300 men commanded by Munir Abu Fadil; the Manku irregulars from Transjordan who numbered about 150 men; and other forces and groups, Palestinian and otherwise, not fitting into any of the above categories, totaling from 200 to 500 fighters (Ahmad Hilmi tried, shortly before the British evacuation, to organize these men into clearly defined units). It should be noted that the number of fighters, especially those in the latter category, was fluid and subject to constant change. The totals varied because of deaths, injuries and, most of all, desertion. The arms available to the Arab forces were in no way inferior to that of the Jews. In addition to personal weapons—rifles and Sten submachine guns—as well as dozens of Bren machine guns and anti-tank guns, a few medium machine guns and 2- and 3-inch mortars were scattered through the different sectors. The Arab forces also had seven armored vehicles, a few captured from the Jews, others stolen from the British. All in all the Arab forces had grown considerably stronger since March 1948, before 'Abd al-Qadir's death, despite defeats in the city and its approaches.[35]

The commanders were well aware that the hour of truth was approaching. They took the measures available to them, such as putting their men on emergency footing and high alert, and forbidding them to leave their posts. These measures testified to an effort to maintain some form of operational order and discipline. They ordered fortification of the areas they still held and the construction of barriers to prevent enemy vehicles from breaking through. On May 6 the Jerusalem command held a meeting with local commanders to discuss possible courses of action following the British departure. Abu Fadil proposed a plan to take up a strategic line of positions in the British security zones that were about

Figure 3.2 King George Avenue, 1942. On the right: the Jewish Agency building. On the far left: the Terra Sancta School (Library of Congress).

to be evacuated—consisting of the Italian Hospital, Barclays Bank in Allenby Square (today's Tzahal Square), the Terra Sancta School building, the David Brothers building, the al-'Umariyya School, and the train station. The implication of the plan was that no defense would be mounted of the southern neighborhoods, with the exception of Abu Tor. Even this modest plan was rejected by the other commanders, on the grounds that they were not strong enough to mount an offensive of any sort. A defeatist attitude had spread in the wake of the failures at al-Qastal, Qatamon, and elsewhere in the country. They believed that the Jewish forces were much stronger than they really were. Morale was further eroded by the rivalry for command of the ALA forces. By May 11 the Arabs had abandoned critical defensive positions in the area of the train station, on Hebron Road, and in Abu Tor, and most of the fighters who remained entered the Old City. They placed their hopes in the intervention of the armies of the Arab states.[36]

Implementation of the single operative decision made at the May 6 meeting, that reinforcements be brought in from the Nablus area, the Hebron highlands, and Transjordan, and the issue of additional guns and ammunition, proceeded at a sluggish pace. A small contingent from Jenin under the command of Fawzi Jarrar arrived, and on May 12 a delegation set out to see King 'Abdallah in Amman. It was composed of military and civilian leaders—Fadil Rashid, Munir Abu Fadil, Dr. Da'ud al-Husayni, and Dr. 'Izzat Tannus of the Arab Treasury. They told 'Abdallah that Jerusalem would be at risk if its defenders did not receive priority in the supply of ammunition, guns, and fighters. 'Abdallah replied that, for military reasons, he preferred not to use his army in Jerusalem,

claiming that he planned to attack Tel Aviv instead. In need of support, the delegation made a long-distance appeal to the mufti in Egypt, who managed to requisition two airplanes. These aircraft made three flights from Egypt to Jericho on May 14–20, bringing guns and ammunition that were handed over to Ahmad Hilmi to be distributed in Jerusalem. The airlift was then halted at the order of the Legion's British commander, John Baggot Glubb, who threatened to open fire on the planes. Further arms were purchased in the city's markets, by the fighters themselves.[37]

The British army left Jerusalem in the early morning of May 14, following the high commissioner and the top officials of the Mandate government, who had driven out at dawn. The exit was coordinated in advance with the Haganah, which immediately took action—in what it called Operation Pitchfork (*Qilshon*)—to take control of the British security zone. Forces from the Haganah brigade deployed in the Jerusalem region, the Etzioni, moved into Security Zone C, also known as "Bevingrad," in the city center, which included the Generali Building, the Russian Compound, and the central post office. An Arab force penetrated the zone from the other direction and captured the government hospital in the Russian Compound, but the Haganah ejected it the next day. Security Zone B, which extended from the east side of Rehavia to the King David Hotel and the YMCA building, was also occupied by the Haganah. Another force advanced from Rehavia along Mamilla Road to the edge of the Muslim cemetery. A LEHI force reached the Barclays Bank building at Allenby Square. There it encountered the first sign of Arab resistance as it was fired on from the direction of the Old City wall and the Notre Dame building, which faced the wall from the outside. To the north, along the seam between Mea She'arim and Musrara-Sa'd wu-S'id, Jewish forces captured the Italian Hospital, the Mea She'arim police station, and several structures to the east of the Mandelbaum house. The Italian Hospital and the nearby radio studio afforded the Haganah positions from which they could see those of the Arabs in Musrara on the other side of St Paul (today's Shivtei Yisrael) Road. The Jews opened fire and used a loudspeaker to call on the Arabs to surrender. A Lebanese ALA platoon that manned positions in this sector retreated to the Old City. A Haganah force captured the Sheikh Jarrah police school, which was handed over to IZL as a garrison, moving on to do reconnaissance in Sheikh Jarrah, which it found empty. In the Old City, defenders of the Jewish Quarter had taken control, without resistance, of the British positions that had previously separated them from the Arabs when the British army vacated them on May 13.

In the south, the Haganah captured Talbiyya and began to penetrate the German Colony. But most of Security Zone A, and Upper Baq'a to its south, remained in Arab hands. There an Arab force from Abu Tor even captured the Government Printing Office and the train station. The al-'Umariyya School building, east of Talbiyya, was also captured by an Arab force that traded fire with the Haganah force that held the David building on the other side of the road (now Jabotinsky Street). ALA troops captured the Allenby army base between Talpiot and Baq'a.[38]

Other than these few gains, the Arabs were performing very poorly. They had not known the timing of the British evacuation in advance—it had been set for the morning of May 14 after British jurists determined that the legal force of the Mandate would end that midnight. The Arabs, who expected the withdrawal on May 15, the official date of the Mandate's termination, were thus not prepared for action the previous day. Khalid al-Husayni, commander of the Holy War force, left that morning for the Etzion Block, a Jewish small block of settlements south of Jerusalem that was under attack of the Arab Legion and locals, to work out its surrender arrangements.[39] He was accompanied by a contingent of his men, who, it turned out, were sorely needed in the city.[40]

On May 15 the Jews captured the Allenby barracks after bombarding it with mortars. The commander of the ALA force there tried to call for help by telephone, but his interlocutor at the Rawda told him that the "dogs" were sitting in Yemin Moshe, on the road to south Jerusalem, and that there was no way to send in reinforcements. As had happened in the battle of Qatamon, this conversation was overheard by means of a Shai wiretap. With that knowledge in hand, the bombardment was intensified until the Arab force collapsed and fled. With Allenby in hand, the Jewish forces now proceeded to occupy, almost without resistance, the southern Arab neighborhoods—Upper and Lower Baq'a, the German and Greek Colonies, and al-Nammamra. The road to Hebron was blocked. Arab forces in Abu Tor, the only Arab stronghold remaining in the south, engaged in a fierce firefight with the Haganah detachment that took control of the train station.

In the north, Sheikh Jarrah was again seized by a Jewish force, inflicting many casualties on the Palestinian Arab defenders. With Sheikh Jarrah in hand, Jewish forces could now block the road from Jerusalem to Ramallah. The only artery that connected Arab Jerusalem to the outside world was the eastern road to Jericho and Transjordan. Two Haganah platoons captured Notre Dame and the adjacent French Hospital from the force of about 50 ALA fighters that had held them. A firefight commenced with 36 Arab combatants from different forces who gathered near the adjacent New Gate to the Old City, where they took up positions on the roof of the Latin monastery and the Collège des Frères. Haganah forces entered Musrara and advanced along Mamilla Road, almost reaching the Jaffa Gate. The last remaining Arab civilians fled from the New City, where civilian and commercial life came to a complete halt. Panic swept through the Old City, impelling refugees and locals to seek refuge in monasteries, convents, and on al-Haram al-Sharif, where thousands huddled together.

Fadil Rashid reached the conclusion that the city outside the walls was lost. He decided to concentrate his forces in the Old City, dispatching a written evacuation order to the commanders of his troops. For emphasis, it was also signed by his Syrian deputies, Muslim Brotherhood leader Mustafa al-Siba'i and army officer Jamal al-Sufi. The ALA fighters obeyed. They shut themselves in behind the bolted Old City gates and reinforced the guards on the walls. The commanders of the Holy War forces in the Old City and to its north, Hafiz Barakat and Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya, refused to obey the order and even staged counterattacks,

each in his own sector. These efforts returned Notre Dame, Musrara, the Mea She'arim police station, and nearby positions to Arab hands. The attack on Notre Dame was joined by a reinforcement of 40 ALA fighters. Arab morale rose a bit after the ALA shelled Mea She'arim, the Bukharan neighborhood, and Sanhedriyya from its newly formed artillery positions in Bir Nabala, north of Jerusalem. Reinforcements arrived from the villages to the east, awaiting the intervention of the Arab Legion.[41]

In the meantime, the Arab leadership in Jerusalem pursued a waiting policy, taking advantage of the extended cease-fire negotiations. On May 15 in the evening, 'Izzat Tannus conveyed to the Consular Commission the Arabs' consent to participate in negotiations with Jewish Agency representatives the next morning at 11 at the French consulate—although not, of course, face to face. The Arabs were to be represented by Ahmad Hilmi, the only member of the Arab Higher Committee remaining in the city—in other words, the senior member of civilian leadership—and Fadil Rashid and Khalid al-Husayni of the military leadership. In the meantime both sides agreed to a cease-fire. Characteristically, given the lack of coordination within the Arab leadership, it turned out that the military command opposed the truce, which it argued would allow the Jews to secure themselves in the places they had captured. Faced with this opposition, the Arab leaders notified the Consular Commission that the cease-fire proposal had been conveyed to King 'Abdallah, "who wants to accept the mission of saving Jerusalem." But the Arab military command did not hesitate to take advantage of the night-time lull. The Arab fighters, aware that the Jews enjoyed an advantage of better training in combat in the dark, habitually fell back to positions deeper within their territory at night, thus losing the gains they had made during the day. This time they stayed in place.[42]

In the meantime, the military command saw that the Arab Legion was taking its time getting to Jerusalem. 'Abdallah aspired to annex to his kingdom the Palestinian Arab state to be established in Palestine by virtue of the UN partition resolution. But the Jerusalem region was slated to be an international zone, not part of the Arab state. The king of Transjordan was reluctant to invade a territory that was not meant to be part of the Arab state, let alone one slated to fall under UN administration. Faced with the delay, the commanders in Palestine sent telegrams and delegations to Amman. One of the channels to the king ran through the commander of the Manku Company, which had established itself on the Mount of Olives, just east of the Old City. One of the delegations was composed of Mustafa Siba'i, a deputy of Fadil Rashid's and a leader of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood; National Committee member Hajj Fawzi al-Khayyat, and others. Another delegation included Anwar Nusseibeh, secretary of the National Committee, and Anwar al-Khatib of the Supreme Muslim Council—a Hebron-born leader who was gaining influence at this time. This delegation was charged with informing 'Abdallah that Islam's holy city was on the verge of being conquered by infidels. 'Abdallah advised the two men that he had fully committed his army to the campaign but that he had no soldiers to send to Jerusalem. He promised, however, to send additional irregular forces. Upon their return to Jerusalem,

Nusseibeh and al-Khatib visited Qawuqji's headquarters, which at this point were located in Ramallah. They found him furious and dejected—he had received orders to withdraw his army from Palestine in order to regroup. When Nusseibeh and al-Khatib reached the northern exit from the city, they found it blocked by a raging battle. Nusseibeh was hit by a stray bullet. He was taken to the hospital in Ramallah and from there to the hospital in Nablus, where his leg was amputated. The Arab community in Jerusalem thus temporarily lost another leader at a critical moment.[43]

On May 16 the Arab fighters conducted several offensive operations. Reinforcements from Jenin under the command of Fawzi Jarrar arrived at the Jaffa Gate and took up positions in the Hotel Fast and the old post office (south of today's Tzahal Square). This enabled them to put pressure on the Jewish forces at Barclays Bank, with the help of an Arab force that charged up from St Paul Road under cover from Notre Dame and captured the Dorothy Hotel, just behind the Bank. ALA artillery, stationed at Bir Nabala, again began to bombard the northern neighborhoods, and this time shells fell on the downtown area as well.

The principal offensive, however, came in the Old City, where the Arabs exploited their numerical superiority. The Jewish Quarter went on the defensive on May 15; the next day it was the target of a two-pronged attack. Some 150 troops advanced from the west and 50 from the east under covering fire from Mt Zion, which Fadil Rashid halted after learning that most of the mortar shells had fallen in Arab territory. The Arab fighters penetrated the Armenian Quarter and from there dashed eastward to the Jewish Quarter's Habad Street. They set off explosives and firebombs fashioned by Fawzi al-Qutb's detonation squad, centered in the Old City. The incursion set off a panic among the inhabitants of the Jewish Quarter, most of whom were traditional and ultra-Orthodox Jews. Some of these were evacuated during the fighting to the synagogues in the neighborhood's center. Arab fighters plundered, blew up, and set fire to homes. Rabbis, the leaders of the local residents, told the commander of the Jewish Quarter to surrender; he himself sent cables to the Haganah Jerusalem district headquarters asking for permission to do so. But when evening came the Arabs let up, and in keeping with their practice, at night they fell back. In a radio exchange intercepted by Shai, Fadil Rashid threatened that, after the Quarter surrendered, he would "stand everyone up next to the wall in order to teach the Jews a lesson." To the Consular Commission, in contrast, Rashid declared that he was prepared to guarantee the lives of the Jews if they yielded, and went so far as to present his conditions, which were quite similar to those that were accepted, in the end, when the Jewish Quarter surrendered to the Arab Legion on May 28. They stipulated that the holy places, including the Western Wall and synagogues, would be placed under the oversight of a Muslim religious body, that men from the ages of 15 to 55 would be taken prisoner, and the rest of the population would be handed over to the Jewish part of Jerusalem.

The offensive operations and bombardments helped boost Arab morale, as did the fact that the Jews did not advance that day. Nevertheless, Fadil Rashid and Ahmad Hilmi continued to send cables and place phone calls to 'Abdallah,

pleading for assistance. When a stray ALA artillery shell fell on al-Haram al-Sharif, exploding near a large number of the refugees who had congregated there, Rashid claimed that the Jews were shelling the holy site and that the Arabs in the Old City were in danger of extermination. (Rashid may have sincerely believed that it was the Jews who had fired the shell on al-Haram al-Sharif.) ʻAbdallah was galvanized and for the first time ordered Glubb, commander of the Arab Legion, "to preserve the status quo" in the Old City and on the road leading to it from Jericho. But Glubb did not rush to carry out this vague order.

On the night of May 16 a Jewish force attacked the Mamilla commercial center and occupied the Tannus Building at its extremity, north of Jurat al-ʻInab. The Arabs who remained trapped in northern Mamilla, from Jaffa Road up the Hotel Fast, retreated, after a gunfight, to the Jaffa Gate, and the reinforcement detachment from Jenin took shelter in the Notre Dame building. For the first time the Arabs had been pushed back to the western perimeter of the Old City wall. But a Jewish attempt to break into the walled city through a small side door to take the citadel next to Jaffa Gate was aborted after the attack force arrived late, at dawn. The gate and citadel were defended by a large force of 175 men, most of them municipal policemen but also including Holy War fighters and veterans of the British police under the command of police officer Sulayman ʻAzir. The plaza outside the gate and the roads leading to it were well-controlled from positions on the citadel and wall, and the attack force, arriving in armored cars, found itself under heavy fire. The men were compelled to take shelter during the day in the stores of the destroyed commercial center.[44]

The next day, on May 17, to the displeasure of Glubb (who was present) and the British, the Jordanian cabinet endorsed ʻAbdallah's decision to deploy the Arab Legion in Jerusalem. Later the king, without Glubb's knowledge, ordered ʻAbdallah al-Tall, commander of the Legion's Sixth Battalion, which was encamped on the Jerusalem-Jericho road, to send a company to Jerusalem. That same night this unit took up positions in the village of al-Tur, on the Mount of Olives. On May 17 Arab forces again prepared to attack the Jewish Quarter, where the Jewish line of defensive positions had entirely collapsed. The Arabs opened fire on the remaining positions, to which explosive charges were attached again and again until they were demolished. They penetrated the Jewish Quarter from the west and east, with only 170 meters (186 yards) separating the two forces. The heavy gunfire took its toll on the morale of the defenders. Toward noon the Arabs held their fire for a short time, calling on the Jews over loudspeakers to surrender. They were employing the same psychological warfare techniques that the Jews had used in other sectors. But the latter did not respond, so the offensive was resumed in the afternoon.

Inhabitants of the Jewish Quarter were close to despair. They feared a massacre like that which had happened at Kfar Etzion, a kibbutz south of Jerusalem that was conquered by the Transjordanian Arab Legion and local fighters on May 13. Representatives of the Consular Commission visited Khalid al-Husayni's headquarters that evening. They had already conducted successful negotiations with him over the surrender of the three other Gush Etzion kibbutzim—Ein

Tzurim, Masu'ot Yitzhak, and Revadim. Husayni presented his demands: women, children up to the age of 15, and men above 55 would be exchanged for the Arab civilians who had been taken prisoner in Baq'a and Security Zone A. Jews who surrendered would be forced to enter homes in the Jewish Quarter to see whether they had been mined by the retreating forces. The agreement would be signed by all the relevant bodies—the Jewish Agency, the Haganah, IZL, and LEHI. But the Jewish Agency would not and could not accept these demands.[45]

On the night of May 17, Jewish forces outside the walls attacked the Old City, with the goal of breaking in and preventing the fall of the Jewish Quarter.[46] The principal attack, by the Etzioni Brigade, was directed at the Jaffa Gate sector. This time they used four armored cars, but machine gun fire, mortars, and hand grenades from inside the well-defended wall killed six Jewish fighters and wounded 24, once again repelling the forces.

Two depleted Palmach companies from the Har'el Brigade's fourth battalion had been brought back to Jerusalem, after previously taking part in Operation Yevusi in the city, to participate in the new operation. They moved toward Mt Zion, just south of the Old City in what was intended as a decoy, but which turned into a real attack. Two Arab forces were deployed on this hill—40 ALA fighters of the Third Yarmuk Battalion (Iraqi Kurds of low motivation, who had been stationed there after their short venture into and withdrawal from Qatamon), and 30 defenders who were neighborhood residents, mostly from the Dajani family, which had owned the area for generations. They were reinforced by four British deserters who had assumed the Dajani name as a decoy. By the end of the operation, the Palmach had conquered Mt Zion with relatively few casualties; Arab casualties were much higher.

That night the Etzioni Brigade also attacked Abu Tor, and because the road was cut off the Arabs were compelled to send ammunition to that neighborhood on donkeys. Arab defenders began fleeing. The next day, May 18, the Etzioni force seized most of the neighborhood. The attackers occupied the high western part, while the Arabs later once again took hold of the eastern slope. The conquest of western Abu Tor completed the Jewish takeover of the south Jerusalem neighborhoods. With the exception of a small number of Arab combatants to the north of the city wall, the entire Arab fighting force was now ensconced within the Old City.

At the time of the attack on the Jaffa Gate and Mt Zion, rumors that the Jews had penetrated spread through the Old City. The Arab headquarters sent panicky cables to 'Abdallah, Qawuqji, and the Arab Legion force at al-Tur. Just before morning, 75 Arab Legionnaires from the al-Tur force entered the Old City from the south through the Dung Gate, but the Legion's command was still hoping that a cease-fire that would relieve it of the necessity of putting its main force into the fray. Alarm in the Old City climaxed as large numbers fled their homes to seek refuge on al-Haram al-Sharif. Others congregated around the National Committee offices pleading for travel documents to Jericho, the only refuge that lay open to them. In the confusion one official handed out permits without being authorized to do so, but for the most part the Committee proved itself a capable

body in this difficult situation. It refused to issue permits, sending fighters to detain the owners of private vehicles who sought to escape. Combatants were deployed in the streets to "take care of" rumor-mongers, and messages of encouragement were broadcast over loudspeakers.[47]

On the night of May 18 a small Palmach force broke into the Old City through the Zion Gate, on Mt Zion. It encountered little resistance and joined up with the Jewish Quarter defense force. In parallel, and without coordination, five platoons, one of them an IZL contingent, under Etzioni command, attacked Musrara and Bab al-Zahra with the purpose of capturing the territory up to the northern Old City wall. Another Etzioni armored platoon was assigned to take the Notre Dame building, just north of the Old City, which was manned by 69 Arab fighters, most of them consisting of Fawzi Jarrar and his men from Jenin. Other than this detachment, the only Arab defenders in the area north of the wall were Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya in command of about 100 men. Abu Gharbiyya's original network of positions, in an arc from the American Colony, via the Sa'd wu-S'id Mosque near the Mandelbaum House, up to Musrara, had survived all attacks since the beginning of Operation Pitchfork. He and his men, constituting the only Arab advance force relatively distant from the walls, felt isolated. But they remained determined to hold the territory. Since he believed that the principal Jewish attack, if it came, would be from the area of the Mandelbaum house, he concentrated his heavy guns there, among them a Browning medium machine gun. The attack began late, at dawn, and the morning light revealed the attackers to the defenders. The Arabs fired their machine guns. The Jewish district command decided to cancel the operation and the Jewish force retreated, to the great satisfaction of Abu Gharbiyya and his men. In contrast, Arab commanders in the Notre Dame building were surprised by the armored force that penetrated the building through the gate on St Paul Road, which was guarded by a single sentry. In a room-to-room battle the Jewish force killed ten Arab defenders while the rest fled. The Arabs lost Notre Dame. This was the last action of Operation Pitchfork. In the process, because of the lack of coordination between the district and Palmach commands, the Palmach force also retreated through the Zion Gate, which remained abandoned, on the morning of May 19, without waiting for replacements.[48]

In all of Operation Pitchfork, including the Mt Zion and Jewish Quarter battles, 44 Jewish fighters were killed (among them, 9 of the defenders of the besieged Jewish Quarter). Another 118 were wounded (including 37 in the Jewish Quarter). Another 16 civilians were killed, including one in the Jewish Quarter. The number of Arab casualties is more difficult to establish. Jewish sources report that 71 Arab combatants fell, with 77 wounded, in all these battles. Arab sources do not offer figures, but they indicate that there were many deaths, including those of civilians. In the conquest by the Jews of the area stretching from the Russian Compound to Notre Dame and the southern part of the city, the Arabs were cut off from hospitals, with the wounded evacuated to the Austrian Hospice in the Old City, which the Red Cross had converted into a makeshift clinic. According to Abu Gharbiyya, the Arabs called the five days

between the British evacuation and the entry of the Arab Legion the "Red Days," because of the large number of casualties.[49]

The conquest of most of the Arab neighborhoods outside the walls, in particular in the south, was accompanied by mass plunder, as had been the case in Qatamon. Of the 35,000 people who had lived in this area only 750 remained, most of them Greeks and only 200 of them Arabs, mostly Christians, who were concentrated in Baq'a. Another group of Arabs, numbering about 150, had been captured in the same area. This was the first time in the war that such large numbers had been taken captive. The prisoners were transferred to a temporary POW camp near the small Jewish neighborhood of Neveh She'anan. Some reports stated that the prisoners included both combatants and civilians, among them those of middle age, as well as some women and children. It seems that the women, children, and even middle-aged men were released shortly thereafter. The 88 remaining prisoners were transferred at the end of June to a POW camp at Ijlil (today's Gelilot), north of Tel Aviv, where they stayed until the end of the war.[50]

On the evening of May 18, Glubb was persuaded that intervention in Jerusalem was vital. The Transjordanians interpreted the conquest of Mt Zion not as an attempt to rescue the Jewish Quarter but rather as preparation for conquest of the entire Old City. Glubb was under heavy pressure—a cease-fire was not in sight; the king and his government pressured him to intervene; the fall of Jerusalem and the Jericho road threatened to cut off the Legion from its rear forces; and his Arab soldiers and officers, deeply influenced by the desperate calls for help, were on the verge of rebellion. He told 'Abdallah al-Tall, commander of the Sixth Battalion, to send another company to the city. Tall placed himself at the head of the company, which entered the Old City that night. Hafiz Barakat, the Holy War force's commander in the Old City, asked Tall to secure the Zion Gate, now abandoned by Jewish forces. By the afternoon of May 19 the Legion had taken control of the area, thus renewing the siege on the Jewish Quarter. That same morning a Legion battalion moved into Jerusalem from the north, taking Sheikh Jarrah and continuing southward toward the Old City. Tall conferred with the city's civilian and military leadership—Ahmad Hilmi, Fadil Rashid, and Khalid al-Husayni. They accepted his authority, agreeing to hand over the united command to him, as well as responsibility for defending the city. This ended the inter-communal war in Jerusalem. However, additional irregular forces from Transjordan arrived with the Legion. Tall integrated the Holy War and ALA fighters in the city side by side with his forces, for the most part in defensive and combat-supporting positions. The ALA force under Fadil Rashid's command remained in the city until the period of the first truce (June 11–July 8, 1948). In this it differed from the rest of the ALA, which left the country to reorganize in Syria after the invasion of the regular Arab armies (and returned to combat later in northern Palestine). Rashid's force, too, was transferred to Syria during the first truce. The Holy War forces were not finally dismantled by King 'Abdallah until January 1949. But responsibility for both the war effort and the civilian population was taken out of the hands of the local and national Palestinian Arab leadership and transferred to the Arab Legion, the Transjordanian army.[51]

Conclusion

Immediately following the UN partition decision of November 29, 1947, bloody disturbances and clashes broke out between Jews and Arabs. These quickly escalated, within just a few weeks, into an inter-communal war between the Arab and Jewish areas of the city. Both sides engaged in urban warfare, deploying guns, mortars, and explosives, and attacking border neighborhoods. The Arab forces in Jerusalem, which were deployed as local garrisons in the Old City and the Arab neighborhoods of the New City, were organized as part of the Holy War forces, which were loyal to the mufti. They were headed by 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, commander of the Jerusalem region. The city's Arab forces were largely composed of men from there, who served under mostly local commanders, many of them veterans of the Palestinian Arab Revolt. Hebronite migrants were especially prominent among the fighting men and their commanders. There were also villagers who joined the defense of the city, some of them in command positions. The officer cadre thinned out as the war progressed, and its open positions, and sometimes the vacancies among the fighting men, were occasionally filled by volunteer forces arriving from Arab countries, the most prominent of these being the ALA's Jerusalem garrison, which entered the city in February 1948.

Palestinian Arab society in Jerusalem, which had been relatively cohesive, displayed resilience in the area of the Old City but weakness in the middle class neighborhoods outside the walls. The test case of Qatamon clearly demonstrates the extent to which the Palestinian Arabs (like other national groups) should not be viewed as monolithic. The process that led to the conquest of Qatamon, the collapse of civil society there, and the displacement of its inhabitants was a complex one, and the people who lived there held a wide variety of opinions about the war. Qatamon may be viewed as a microcosm of the Palestinian Arab middle class as a whole. It proves just how disparate were the declared national identifications of some members of the Palestinian Arab bourgeois upper middle class Arabs and their willingness to actually fight and make sacrifices for the national goals that their identities implied. In the end, this population's bourgeois values and way of life, alongside its practice of relying on the British authorities to defend them, led to a lack of will and ability to take part in the war effort. Other groups and individuals displayed no national identification at all, even for public consumption, and self-consciously pursued personal, family, and regional interests. For some, long opposition to the Husayni party prevented them from fully identifying with the political and military struggle led by the mufti. It appeared as though these city dwellers were largely socially alienated from most of the fighters (in areas such as Qatamon), who were primarily of rural origin. There can be no doubt that the Christian affiliation of the majority of the bourgeoisie, along with the presence of a significant Greek and Armenian non-Arab population, had an important impact on the level of national identification, participation in the national struggle, and the willingness of Qatamon's civilian population to make sacrifices.[52]

As the date of the British evacuation approached, civilian life grew progressively more perilous. The institution that was supposed to fill the vacuum created by the dismantling of the Mandate administration, the National Committee, was late in organizing—it did not begin to function until the end of January—because of political conflicts and the mufti's efforts to maintain full control of the city via the Emergency Committee. In Jerusalem, where, unlike Jaffa and other cities, there was no Arab municipality, the National Committee played an especially important role. After enduring birth pangs, it operated effectively under the leadership of Anwar Nusseibeh and teamed up with the Arab Treasury, thus improving its financial position and enabling it to provide necessary services. But the stream of refugees heading from outside the walls and the region into the Old City, which redoubled after the Dayr Yasin massacre on April 9 and the Haganah's victories that month, led to an unbearable state of affairs in the Old City. The flight from the new neighborhoods brought an end to Arab civilian life in the New City.

The transition from localized clashes to broad offensives aimed at achieving victory, which took place as the British evacuation proceeded during April and May, ended in a defeat for the Palestinian Arab forces and the volunteer forces from the Arab countries that had come to their aid. Arab cities and villages attacked by the Haganah quickly collapsed and surrendered, and their populations fled. Recent research paints a picture of civil and military disintegration, caused by internal social frailty, the lack of an effective center of political authority, and military weakness.[53]

The Arabs in Jerusalem likewise suffered from a military debacle in the New City on the eve of and following the British departure. Despite the negligible disparity in military strength between the two sides in Jerusalem, the military and civilian leadership did not believe it could withstand Jewish assaults. Yet, in contrast with other cities attacked by Jewish forces, forces in Palestinian Arab Jerusalem did not collapse. In part, this was due to the relative weakness of the Jews in Jerusalem and the divided command of the Jewish forces, as well as their failure to cut off the eastern approaches to the city. But the determination of the Arab leadership to defend the religiously and historically significant Old City was also a major factor. The local leadership broadcast cries of distress, but it never considered abandoning the city. It did its best to prevent mass flight even at the most difficult moments. Unlike other ALA garrison commanders at critical moments, Fadil Rashid remained in the city at the most difficult junctures and did his best to defend it. One of Rashid's advantages was his ideological identification with the population and local leadership, which supported the mufti and viewed him as their leader. This advantage somewhat relieved the tension between the locals and the fighters from Arab countries. Rashid was aware what the implications would be for him, personally, of a failure to defend Islam's third-holiest city. His relative successes, along with other achievements of the ALA, refute the claim frequently and unjustly found in Palestinian historiography that the ALA's negligence and corruption was a principal cause of the Nakba.[54]

Figure 3.3 The Jerusalem Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, aerial view, 1930s (Library of Congress).

Palestinian and Israeli historians have frequently claimed that ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni’s death on April 8 created a leadership vacuum, particularly in Jerusalem and among the Palestinians as a whole, one that was not filled for the duration of the war. It led, in this view, to a chronic shortage of troops, materiel, and funds. The civilian institutions, represented by Husayn al-Khalidi and Ahmad Hilmi of the Arab Higher Committee, are in their accounts depicted as helpless and cut off from the military command.[55] The evidence presented here contradicts much of that. There was indeed a command vacuum after ‘Abd al-Qadir’s death, but the Arab forces in and around the city in fact grew stronger with the entry of additional ALA units, and thanks to Munir Abu Fadil’s organization of the police as a fighting force. Despite ‘Abd al-Qadir’s gains during the initial period of his command, the ills that plagued the Arabs were apparent during his tenure. In fact, at the time of and following his death, the financial and administrative situation improved. When the National Committee and the Arab Treasury established common cause in April, they were able to outfit the Arab forces in a far superior fashion than had been the case just a month before. Contrary to the common wisdom, neither did Palestinian Arab Jerusalem lack a civilian leadership. The shoes of the absent members of the Arab Higher Committee had, since the end of January, been gradually filled by young, educated, and energetic leaders, the most prominent of whom was Anwar Nusseibeh. These younger figures shunted aside the functionaries of the pro-Husayni Palestinian Arab Party, through whom the mufti attempted to run Jerusalem, and established a fairly effective local administration. The exception to the rule was the elderly Ahmad Hilmi, who remained in the city throughout this period. Notably different

from the other members of the Arab Higher Committee, he was a businessman who did not hail from one of the notable families, unlike most of the established Palestinian leadership of the Mandate period. The relative solidarity of Arab society in the mountain city of Jerusalem, which included a cohesive immigrant Hebronite community integrated with it, differed notably from what could be found in the coastal cities with their heterogeneous populations. The New City fell mostly because of the lack of organization, technological means, and military weakness of the Arab forces (before the arrival of the Arab Legion, Arab forces in the Old City had but a single radio, in the Rawda headquarters). This weakness also manifested itself in a complete lack of intelligence-gathering at all levels, which led to an inflated fear of the enemy, far out of proportion to its real strength. And it led to an inability to carry out a coordinated large-scale operation of the type that the Jews implemented in Operation Pitchfork. The Jewish forces, by contrast, were far better equipped in means of communication, had well-developed military intelligence and intelligence services, and displayed in most cases better organization and hence, military performance even when firepower was nearly equal. The principal reasons for the weakness were structural. The Arabs as a whole lacked the military knowledge and resources that they required in Jerusalem, as well as in the rest of the country.

Notes

1 "Arab response to the conquest of Al-Qastal," April 8, 1948, IDFA 1924/2644/353; The National Committee in Jaffa, "Notice expressing outrage at the conquest of the village and confidence in victory there," *Filastin*, April 6, 1948 (The publication of a notice dealing with a subject outside of the National Committee's "jurisdiction" is rare and evidence of how seriously they considered the incident.); for a description of the news reaching 'Abd al-Qadir who was in Dasmacus, see al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 169; for the progress of the battles, see Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 146–149; for the version of the news provided by Ibrahim Abu Dayya as transmitted to Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 207–209; "Arab newsletter," April 3, 4, and 6, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59.

2 In Palestinian histography and literature memorializing 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, the heads of the Arab Legion and their military commanders were accused not only of abandonment but also of his "betrayal," and thus being responsible for his death, and even the Nakba in general, see al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 159–161; Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 362–372.

3 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 161–165; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 214–217; "The battle for Al-Qastal on 8 April," IDFA 1949/2644/353.

4 "Al-Qastal and the Arabs' mood," April 11, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/253; "Results of the Arabs' joy over 'conquering' Al-Qastal," April 12, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/253; Gurney diary, April 8, MEC GUR 1/1, 45; Carlson, *Mei-Kahir ad Damesek*, 177; "Arab newsletter," IDFA 1948/500/59; "In the Arab camp," April 11, 1948, HA 105/142; "The last assault on Al-Qastal," *al-Difa'*, April 9, 1948; for psychological warfare used by Shai, see Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 397.

5 *Filastin*, April 9 and 10, 1948; *al-Masri*, April 11, 1948; for an additional report on the funeral and photograph of the crowds on and north of the walls of the Old City, see *al-Musawwar* (Cairo), April 23, 1948; "Arab newsletter," April 9, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59; "In the Arab camp," April 11, 1948, HA 105/142; for workers striking and leaving their work to attend the funeral, see the testimony of Shimon Azulai, in

Yanait *et al.*, *Ha-Haganah be-Yerushalayim*, 126; for the workers attending the funeral, the release of municipal employees to attend, and the commotion at the funeral, see Graves, *Experiment in Anarchy*, 176; for the commotion, see also *al-Musawwar*, April 16, 1948; Carlson, *Mei-Kahir ad Damesek*, 118–120, describes the commotion in a grotesque and obviously exaggerated manner; see also Gurney diary, April 9 and 10, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 46, 50; Sakakini, *Kadha Ana, Ya Dunya*, April 9, 1948, 388; Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 380–382.

6 *Filastin*, April 9, 10, 11, 12, and 16, 1948; *al-Difa'*, April 9, 12, and 13, 1948; *al-Masri*, April 10 and 11, 1948; *al-Ahram*, April 9 and 11, 1948; *al-Musawwar*, April 16 and 23, 1948; Muhsin, *Filastin al-umm wa-ibnuha al-bar*, 378–405; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 214, 216.

7 Haldun Sati' al-Husri, ed., *Mudhakkirat Taha al-Hashimi* [Memoirs of Taha al-Hashimi] (Beirut: dar Al-tali'a, 1978), 211–213; "Jerusalem district command after the death of 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni," April 19, 1948, HA 105/104; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 179, 183, the author was a member of the delegation to Qawuqji on April 11; broadcasts of the Army of Deliverence's radio station on April 12; for the visit of the delegation from Jerusalem and Ramallah to Qawuqji, "In the Arab public," April 13, 1948, HA 105/100; Khayriyah Qasimiyah, *Filastin fi Mudhakkirat Fawzi al-Qawuqji* [Palestine in the Memoirs of Fawzi al-Qawuqji] (Beirut: Markaz Al-Abhath wa-Dar Al-Quds, 1975), 167–168.

8 "In the Arab camp," April 19, 1948, HA 105/142; for the Christians' response to the appointment of al-Ghuri and denial of the appointment by the Higher Arab Committee, "Collection of the Arab news," April 23, 1948, HA 105/143; "The Arab command," iv, v, 5 IDFA 1949/7249/283; Nabil Khalid al-Agha, *Qadiyat Filastin fi sirat batal: al-shahid al-hay 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni* [The Palestine problem through a hero's biography: The living martyr 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni] (Beirut: Al-Mu'assasa Al-'arabiyya lil-dirasat wal-nashr, 1980), 197; on the appointment of Khalid al-Husayni, see al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 179; on the appointment and response in Jerusalem, Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 227–228; Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 246–247; "Collection of Arab news," May 11, 1948, HA 105/143.

9 The events in Dayr Yasin and the reverberations they caused, and continue to cause, are discussed at length in both Palestinian and Israeli historiographies. See al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 169–176; Sharif Kana'ana and Nihad Zaytawi, *Dayr Yasin* (Bir Zeit: Documentation Center of Bir Zeit University, 1987) (in Arabic); Walid Khalidi, *Dayr Yasin: al-Jum'a, 9.4.1948* [Deir Yassin: Friday, April 9, 1948] (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999) (in Arabic); quotations from an interview with the IZL commander in Jerusalem, in Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 345–340; Yoav Gelber, *Komemiyut venakba* [Independence and Nakba] (Or Yehuda: Dvir, 2004) 154–161 (in Hebrew); Benny Morris, "The historiography of Deir Yassin," *The Journal of Israeli History* 24 (2004), 79–101; for the version of the IZL personnel involved, see Ofir, *Al ha-homot*, 50–65.

10 *Filastin*, April 11, 1948; "The crime in Dayr Yasin," (main headline), *Filastin*, April 13, 1948; "Dr. Khalidi at a press conference in Jerusalem," *al-Difa'*, April 12, 1948; *al-Difa'*, April 11 and 13, 1948; "Response of the 'Higher Arab Committee' (i.e. the mufti)," *al-Masri*, April 12, 1948; "The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State, April 13, 1948," in *Foreign Relations of the United States V*, part 2, (Washington: Department of State, 1976), 817.

11 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 174–175; compare with Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 222; for the trend to evacuate women and children, see "Collected Arab news," April 10, 1948, IDFA 1949/2644/351; for the plan to reconquer Dayr Yasin, see "Arab newsletter," April 10, 1948, IDFA 1948/500/59.

12 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 187–188; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 194–195; *Filastin*, March 31, 1948, mentions remarks by 'Abd al-Qadir in its report on another assault from Mt Scopus on Wadi Al-Joz; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 225;

Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!*, 281; 'Adil 'Abd al-Latif in "The Arab command," 21, IDFA 1949/7249/283.

13 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 192, 197; testimonies of Yehoshua Ben-Yishaya and Tzvi Sinai in Yanait *et al.*, *Ha-Haganah be-Yerushalayim*, 131–132; Dov Yosef, *Qirya ne'emana: Metzor Yerushalayim 1948* [Faithful City: Siege of Jerusalem 1948] (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1960), 82 (in Hebrew); al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 188–189; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 226; "In the Arab camp," April 19, 1948, HA 105/142; "Collected Arab news," April 17, 1948, HA 105/143; obituary for Shuqri Qutayna, *al-Difa'*, April 14, 1948; *Filastin*, April 14, 1948; for the British position, see Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 281–282; Crawford, "The 71st in Jerusalem, 1947–48, part 2," *The Highland Light Infantry Chronicle*, XLV (1949), 13–15; Macmillan, "Palestine: Narrative of events," 11–12, LHCMA, Stockwell 6/25/1; Macmillan, "The general position in Palestine," April 21, 1948, MEC CM V/4/101; Graves, *Experiment in Anarchy*, 179–180; See also the discussion in Kadish and Ehrnvald, *Keravot Yevusi*, 81–86.

14 *Filastin*, April 16, 1948.

15 *Filastin*, April 16, 1948; "In the Arab camp," April 19, 1948, HA 105/142; "Collected Arab news," April 17, 1948, HA 105/143.

16 Fauzi al-Qawuqji, "Memoirs, 1948," *Journal of Palestine Studies 2*, 9–12; "Collected Arab news," April 27, 1948, HA 105/143; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 39, 182, 197, 200, 329; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 228–241; *Al-Ahram*, April 30, 1948; "In the Arab public," May 12, 1948, HA 105/100 compare with "In the Arab camp," May 11, 1948, HA 105/142; "Pass for leaving the camp," Commander of Company 2 in the Third Yarmuk Battalion, May 14, 1948, ISA 65/2334 (in Arabic).

17 "In the Arab camp," April 5, 19, and 26, 1948, HA 105/142; Gurney to Martin, April 13, 1948, TNA CO 967/102; "Review of the economic situation in Jerusalem (mid-April)," May 5, 1948, HA 105/143; "In the Arab public," April 13, 1948, HA 105/100; MacMillan, "The general position in Palestine," April 21, 1948, MEC CM V/4/101; " Minutes of security conference," April 23, 1948, MEC CM IV/1/139.

18 "Mood and evacuation of Arabs in Jerusalem," April 27, 1948, HA 105/257; "Arab newsletter," April 17 and 24, 1948, HA 105/143; "The Old City," April 21, 1948, HA 105/257; "Evacuation of the Arabs," April 29, 1948; al-Nammari, "A Jerusalemite Story," Ch. 7.

19 "Residents of Jericho," April 2, 1948, HA 105/257; "Refugees from Palestine in Amman," April 23, 1948, HA 105/257; High Commissioner to the Secretary of State, April 21, 1948, MEC CM III/3/120; the Khalidis' request for a visa, "In the Arab camp," May 3, 1948, HA 105/142.

20 "Conversation at the YMCA (April 30, 1948)," May 4, 1948, CZA, S25/9209; on the call for commanders to stay, see "Telegram from Mr. Broadmead, Damascus," April 7, 1948. TNA FO 371/68369; Secretary of the Higher Arab Committee to the secretary of the National Committee in Ramallah, April 8, 1948, ISA 65/1634 (in Arabic).

21 "Collected Arab news," April 17 and 18, 1948, HA 105/143; Carlson, *Mei-Kahir ad Damesek*, 154; Gurney diary, April 17 and 18, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 64–66; Graves, *Experiment in Anarchy*, Mayor's log April 20, 1948, 186–184.

22 *Ha'aretz*, April 7, 8, and 11, 1948; *al-Difa'*, April 9 and 11, 1948; Jacques de Reynier, *A Jerusalem: un drapeau flottait sur la ligne de feu* [In Jerusalem: A flag flew over the line of fire] (Neuchatel: Editions de la Baconière, 1950), 64–68; "Collected Arab news," April 20, 1948, HA 105/143.

23 "Arab newsletter," IDFA 1948/500/59; "Collected Arab news," April 21, 1948, HA 105/143; "The relationship between the Iraqi volunteers and the civilian population in Jerusalem," April 7, 1948, HA 105/257; "Resentment among the foreign fighters," April 14, 1948, JA 105/257; 'Arafat Salim al-Bitar to Ahmad Hilmi, Jerusalem, April 21, 1948, IDFA 1949/1944/504 (in Arabic); al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*; Higher Arab

Committee, National Guidance Department, "Daily poster," Jerusalem, April 29, 1948, ISA 65/2657 (in Arabic); From 'Ajjaj Nuwayhid in Amman to Ahmad Hilmi in Jersualem, April 27, 1948 in Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hut (ed.), *Sittun 'aman ma'a al-qafila al-'arabiyya: Mudhakkirat 'Ajjaj Nuwayhid* [Sixty years with the Arab convoy: memoirs of 'Ajjaj Nuwayhid] (Beirut: dar Al-istiqlal, 1993), 309–310.

24 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 109; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 234; " Minutes of security conference," April 23, 1948, MEC CM IV/1/139.

25 "Peulot Sheikh Jarah: Zroa Dromit (doch)," [Operation in Sheikh Jarrah: Southern arm (Report)], in *Sefer Hapalmach*, ed. Gilead and Megged, 237; Itti Amichai, "Kibbush Sheikih Jarah" [Conquest of Sheikih Jarah], in *Sefer Hapalmach*, ed. Gilead and Megged, 238–242; Crawford, *The Highland Light Infantry Chronicle*, *XLV* (1949), 42 (I am grateful to Prof. Alon Kadish for making this source available to me); al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 109–191; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 234–237; "Collected Arab news," April 21, 1948, HA 105/143; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 212, 450.

26 MacMillan, "Palestine: Narrative of events," 12, 14, LHCMA, Stockwell 6/25/1; Crawford, "The 71st in Jerusalem," 42–44.

27 Avraham Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War: Myth, Historiography and Reality," *Middle Eastern Studies 28* (1992), 642; Gurney diary, April 24, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 75, 85; "Cabinet conclusions no. 30," April 29, 1948, TNA CAB; *al-Ahram*, April 30, 1948; " Minutes of security conference," April 30, 1948, MEC CM IV/1/141; "Weekly intelligence appreciation," April 30, 1948, MEC CM III/4/15; Liron, *Yerushalyim ha-atika*, 136–137, 165–166; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 454–452.

28 "Collected Arab news," April 30, May 2, 3, 5 and 6, 1948, HA 105/143; "Evacuation of the Arabs," April 30, 1948, HA 105/142; "In the Arab camp," May 3, 1948, HA 105/142.

29 For Christian refugees compared to Muslim refugees, "Collected Arab news," May 7, 1948, HA 105/142; Constantine Mavrides, "Diaries (May 15–December 30, 1948)," in *Jerusalem 1948*, ed. Tamari, 262–267; "Arab economic news from 20 April through 12 May," HA 105/237; "Transfer of the Higher Arab Committee offices to Mamilla," in "Collected Arab news," May 11, 1948, HA 105/237; "Confiscations" and looting, "In the Arab camp," May 11, 1948, HA 105/142; "Fortnightly intelligence newsletter," no. 67, April 19–May 3, 1948, TNA WO 275/64; for the fear of an attack on the Old City and reinforcing gates, see "In the Arab public," May 5, 1948, HA 105/100; Gurney diary, May 3 and 10, 1948, MEC GUR 1/1, 91, 102–103; al-Nammari, "A Jerusalemite Story," Ch. 7; "Collected Arab news," May 7, 1948, HA 105/143, reports that it was the National Committee that gave the vaccines and the Health Department only provided the serum; on psychological warfare and flight in Baq'a, see "Collected Arab news," May 12, 1948, HA 105/143; for the use of loud-speakers in north Jerusalem, see Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 264.

30 "Collected Arab news," May 5 and 6, 1948, HA 105/143; 'Abd al-Fattah Darwish in "The Arab command," 32, IDFA 1949/7249/283; for the Abu-'Ubayda Company and Darwish, see Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 166, 173.

31 "Collected Arab news," May 7, 1948, HA 105/143; Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 158, 166–167; Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War," 647–648; on the Palestinians' meeting with 'Abdallah , see al-Khatib al-Tamimi, *Ma'a Salah al-Din fi al-Quds*, 118; for the weakening of the Husaynis and the strengthening of Abdallah, see "In the Arab public," HA 105/100; Kamil 'Ariqat "Collected Arab news," May 6, 1948, HA 105/100.

32 "In the Arab camp," May 11, 1948, HA 105/142; "Collected Arab news," May 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12, 1948, H 105/143.

33 Munir Abu Fadil, Truman Institute, Hebrew University, information on Arab personaliites (HIS), 3/366; "In the Arab camp," May 11, 1948, HA 105/142; Hasan Fa'iz bek al-Idrisi and Munir Abu Fadil in "The Arab command," 7–8, IDFA 1949/7249/283; Sela, *She'elat Eretz Yisrael*, 454.

34 "Collected Arab news," May 7, 10 May, May 11, 1948, HA 105/143; Munir Abu Fadil in "The Arab command," 18, IDFA 1949/7249/283; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 262–263, 267; Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 74, 430 n. 2; Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 107; a photograph of the municipal policemen at their posts near the Jaffa Gate, in Muhammad Abu Shilbaya, *Musalsal al-taqsir wal-khiyana* [The series of failure and treason] (Jerusalem: n.p., 1989), 198; "Report on events within the walls," 10 May 1948, HA 105/143.

35 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 325–330; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 265–267; Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 241; platoon roster, no date, ISA 65/2300 (in Arabic).

36 Standby orders from the commander of the Jerusalem guard Fadil 'Abdallah Rashid to commanders of the platoons and companies, May 7, 1948, ISA 65/3283 (in Arabic); "Strict military order" from the Abu Tor neighborhood headquarters of the Holy War Forces, May 11, 1948, ISA 63/990/P/35 (in Arabic); "Order from the district headquarters of the military police," "Collection of Arab news," May 8, 1948, HA 105/143; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 262–263; compare with "Political action and military discussion," in "Collected Arab news," May 6, 1948, HA 105/143; "Moods" in "Collected Arab news," May 5, 1948, HA 105/143; Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 330–333; Qawuqji, "Memoirs;" for the departure, gathering in the Old City and abandonment of Abu Tor and the railroad station, see "Collected Arab news," May 11, 1948, HA 105/143.

37 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 232–325; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 263–264, 289–287; al-Husayni, *Mudhakkirat*, 93–94.

38 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 228–231; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 276–277; Elon, *Yerushalayim lo naflah*, 88–97; "Collected Arab news," May 14, 1948, HA 105/143; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 334–338; testimonies of Arie Shor and Mordechai Levin in Yanait *et al.*, *Ha-Haganah be-Yerushalayim*, 244–251; see also Benny Morris, *1948: The First Arab-Israeli War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 163; Golani, *Yamim ahronim*, 93.

39 Kfar Etzion, the Block's largest settlement, had been taken the previous day by an Arab Legion force, which massacred most of the settlement's defenders. In the wake of the massacre, Jewish authorities in Jerusalem sought to save the defenders of the other three settlements in the block. They negotiated with the only Arab authority available—Khalid al-Husayni. As a former police officer, he was prepared to negotiate (although not directly) and accept the surrender. But the defenders refused to submit to the irregular al-Husayni. In the end they surrendered to the Legion and were taken captive rather than killed.

40 Even the Arab Legion headquarters did not know that the evacuation had been moved earlier, see Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War"; for the fighters' travel to Gush Etzion, see also Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, 1579. Following the massacre perpetrated by the Arab Legion, with the participation of local villagers, during the conquest of Kibbutz Kfar Etzion a day earlier, despite the efforts of fighters there to surrender, residents of the settlements remaining in the bloc pressured headquarters in Jerusalem to negotiate for an "orderly surrender," and thereby be spared an additional massacre. Since the Arab Legion forces had already withdrawn to Jerusalem, in preparation for the departure of the British (to whom they were still subordinate, at least on paper), the negotiations were held with the irregular headquarters represented by Khalid al-Husayni with the French consul serving as a mediator. Husayni, it will be remembered, was a former police officer and wanted to manage the surrender himself. Therefore, he went to Gush Etzion but the residents initially refused to surrender to an irregular commander. Eventually, they did surrender to the Arab police from Hebron and two squads from the Arab Legion, who appeared without any officers. Amidst the prevailing anarchy, four captives were killed and several were injured but the remaining were taken prisoner unharmed and a mass massacre, like the one at Kfar Etzion (129 dead) was

avoided. See, "Collected Arab news," May 14, 1948, HA 105/143; see also Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 112–114.

41 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 231–232; Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, 1579–1580; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 337–338, 413; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, "Collected Arab news," May 15, 1948," HA 105/143; for the panic in the Old City on May 15, see also Nuwayhid al-Hut (ed.), *Sittun 'aman ma'a al-qafila al-'arabiyya*, 214–215.

42 On the issue of the cease-fire see "Collected Arab news," May 16, 1948, HA 105/143; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 273; for the delay see, Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War," 646; for the calm in Jerusalem after the Arab counterattacks, see Kirkbride from Amman to Foreign Office, "Palestine situation report," May 16, 1948, 11:00, TNA FO 371/8372.

43 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 434–435; al-Khatib, *Ma'a Salah al-Din fi al-Quds*, 118–221.

44 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 45–46, 231–232; Liron, *Yerushalayim ha-atika*, 191–197; Ehrnvald, *Matzor be-tokh matzor*, 189–202; Yehuda Wallach and Gershon Rivlin (eds.), *The Karta Atlas of the History of the Haganah* (Jerusalem: Karta, 1991), 120; testimony of Nathaniel Lorch in Yanait *et al.*, *Ha-Haganah be-Yerushalayim*, 267–269; "Collected Arab news," May 16, 1948, HA 105/143; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 429–430, 435. For the mistaken attack by the ALA on *al-Haram al-Sharif* (the Temple Mount), al-'Arif, 431 n. 3; for the threat made by Rashid, see Liron, *Yerushalayim ha-atika*, 147; on contacts between Rashid and the Consular Commission, see "Collected Arab news," May 17, 1948, HA 105/143. See also comments by his liaison officer Father 'Ayad that the Jews had fired on Al-Haram Al-Sharif; on the petitions to Abdallah and his response see Sulayman Musa, *Ayyam la tunsa: al-urdun fi harb 1948* [Unforgettable days: Jordan in the 1948 war] (Amman: Matba'at al-quwwat al-musallaha al-urduniyya, 1982), 135–137.

45 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 47–48; Liron, *Yerushalayim ha-atika*, 230–273; Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War," 651–652; "Collected Arab news," April 17, 1948, HA 105/143; on the negotiations between the Consular Commission and Khalid al-Hussayni, see also al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 442.

46 For description of the situation in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City during the siege and fighting after the British departure until it fell, see Ehrnvald, *Matzor be-tokh matzor*, 175–242.

47 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 49–51, 232–233, 456; Ben-Ari, *"Aharai,"* 244–269; Uzi Narkis, *Hayal shel Yerushalayim* [Soldier of Jerusalem] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1991) 92ff; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 444–448. See there also the testimony of Kamal al-Din al-Dajani, one of the fighters whose brother Ala al-Din had been killed in battle; for the situation in the Old City, see "Collected Arab news," May 18, 1948, HA 105/143, Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War," 652–653. Qawuqji, for his part, following the request that he received from the Legion headquarters and another attempt to prevent intervention, returned his artillery battery to the area after it had been removed toward Nablus in order to leave the country, and bombarded northern Jewish Jerusalem again.

48 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 53–57, 233–234; on the identity of the defenders of Notre Dame, see al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 435; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 287–290. Abu Gharbiyya reports that he and several fighters decided, "To fight to the death," that he bought chocolate and distributed it to his fighters saying, "eat so we die sweetly." This seems to reflect the isolation and threat that they felt outside of the walls.

49 Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 454–456; Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 269–270; on the Red Cross evacuation of the injured to a hospice and its conversion to a hospital, see Mavrides, "Diaries," 264.

50 On the civilians who remained, see Golan, *Shinui merhavi*, 35; on the looting and capture of civilians, see Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 279; on taking civilians captive on Mount Zion, see Ben-Ari, *"Aharai,"* 254; on the issues of looting and captives, also see the letters of complaint written by Dr. Werner Senator, admistrative

director of the Hebrew University, to David Shaltiel and David Ben-Gurion, June 3, 1948, CZA, S 25/9186. Senator criticized the mass looting in the Arab neighborhoods and said that he had received secondhand information under difficult conditions in the Neveh She'anan camp, "where prisoners of war and civilians are being held together, including several women of all ages.… Some of the captives, especially the women, were taken in Qatamon and other neighborhoods. These are middle-class people and apparently had no connection to the events." He proposed compiling an organized list of the captives. It is likely that the complaints led to changes, since a few days later a list of captives was submitted to the Red Cross. See, "Y. Golan to Mr. Jacques de Reynier, a list of 106 Arab prisoners of war in camp 101," June 8, 1948, CZA, S25/8180. The list contains only two names that are unequivocally those of women (numbers 11 and 41) and it does not contain any children other than a few teenage boys (ages 13–16). It includes one man who was 69 years old and a few other men over the age of 50. The serial numbers of the prisoners reach 147 and it can be assumed that some had already been released. All but a few of the prisoners were from Jerusalem, mostly from the southern neighborhoods but also from Mount Zion, Musarara and the Notre Dame area. A few were from the Old City, apparently fighters, based on their ages. Conspicuous on the list is Yusif Sayigh, the Arab Treasury's auditor, a resident of the German Colony (32 years old, number 24); for his being taken captive see "Collected Arab news," May 17, 1948, HA 105/143. On May 13, two days before the German Colony was conquered, Sayigh was still participating in the negotiations with the Consular Commission. See "Collected Arab news," May 13 and 17, 1948, HA 105/143. On this isue see also Sayigh's own memoir: Rosemarie Sayigh (ed.), "Prisoner of war: Yusif Sayigh, 1948–1949," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 29, 2007, 13–32. There is also information that women from the Deeb family and two Greek families were taken captive, and they do not appear on the list. Collins and Lapierre, *O Jerusalem!* 335; the elderly wife of Shukri Dib remained in the family's home in Baq'a until her dying day, three years after the war; on the hundreds of civilians, mostly Greeks, who remained see the testimony of Ahmad 'Ashur, the mukhtar of Upper Baq'a, in al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 416. 'Ashur was taken captive, released and remained in the neighborhood for another eight months; see also al-Nammari, "A Jerusalemite Story," Ch. 7, the cousin and uncle of the narrator remained in their home in the Al-Namamra neighborhood and were taken captive. They appear on the list sent to the Red Cross; on the transfer of 88 prisoners to Ijlil, see Aharon Klein, *Ha-shevuyim ha-Aravim be-milhemet Ha'atzmaut: He-hayim be-mahanot ha-shevuyim* [The Arab prisoners-of-war in the War of Independence: Life in the prison camp] (M.A. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2000), 12; the prisoners from Jerusalem, who were mostly educated, took control of camp life and 'Adil Zawati (age 26, number 104 on the list of prisoners in Camp 101), a former government employee who was arrested while in the YMCA building was elected leader of the prisoners; see also the testimony of Jacob Yehoshua in Jacob Yehoshua, *Talbiyah: sipurah shel ahat ha-shekhunot he-hadashot bi-Yerushalayim* [Talbeya: The story of one of the new neighborhoods in Jerusalem] (Jerusalem: Reuven Mass, 1979) 60–61. Yehoshua helped his acquaintance Zawati obtain release, see also Aharon Klein, *Ha-shevuyim ha-Aravim be-milhemet Ha'atzmaut* in *Milhemet ha-'Atzma'ut, 5708–5709: Diyun mehudash* [Israel's War of Independence 1948–1949: A reconsideration], ed. Alon Kadish (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2004).

51 Sela, "Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 War," 653–654, on the intervention of Transjordan in the battles in Jerusalem, see also Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (Oxford and New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 238–242; and Joseph Nevo, *King Abdullah and Palestine* (London: Macmillan Press and New York: St Martin's Press, 1996), 135–137; for the progress of the battle see Levi, *Tish'ah qabin*, 57, 240–242; for the request by Barakat, see Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 287–288; on the

transfer of command and the incorporation of the regular forces, see Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 103, 107; for their integration see also Abu Gharbiyya, *Fi khidamm al-nidal*, 291–296; 299. Abu Gharbiyya and his men replaced the Legion soldiers holding Sheikh Jarah until it was conquered on 19 May. Abu Gharbiyya was injured there that day and transferred to the hospital in Nablus. He later became an active opponent of the Jordanian regime, but nevertheless tells how he stressed to his men when they visited the importance of cooperation with the Legion; on taking up the positions compare with Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya in "The Arab command," 18, IDFA 1949/7249/283; on the activity of the irregular forces after the entrance of the Arab Legion, see for example Mordecai Abir, "Arabs of the Jerusalem area in 1948," research paper, IDF History Branch, 1956–1957, IDFA 1046/70, 11–14; for the withdrawal of the ALA, under the command of Rashid, from Jerusalem see Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 238; on the dismantling of the Holy War forces, see Tall, *Karithat Filastin*, 365–366.

52 For more detail see Itamar Radai, "The Collapse of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class," 961–982.

53 Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine*, 231–248; Avraham Sela, *Ha-Aravim ha-Falastinim be-milchemet 1948* [The Palestinian Arabs of in the 1948 war], in Moshe Ma'oz and B.Z. Kedar (eds.), *Ha-tenuah ha-leumit ha-Palestinayit: Me-imut le-hashalamah?* [The Palestinian National Movement: From Confrontation to Reconciliation?] (Tel Aviv: The Ministry of Defense, 1996), 20 (in Hebrew).

54 On the victories of the ALA in the battle of Nebi Samwil, in the Neve Yaakov-'Atarot sector and the area from Latrun to Bab al-Wad, see Itamar Radai, *Ha-kohot ha-bilti sdirim ve-ha-hitarganut be-azor Yerushalyim* [The Palestinian Arab irregular forces and community organization in Jerusalem] (M.A. thesis, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2002), 151–122, 134–136, 140; on the claims of Palestinian historiography, see al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 462–463; al-Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 107.

55 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 177–180; Nuwayhid al-Hut, *Al-qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat*, 584–595.

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Part II

Jaffa

The bride of the sea in distress

Map 5 Central Jaffa showing ‘Ajami, Jabaliyya, and the Old City, 1:12,500 (Cropped from original, Survey of Palestine, 1945. All Rights Reserved by the Survey of Israel © 2015. Printed with Survey of Israel permission.).

Map 6 Jaffa – Manshiyya and the Old City, 1:12,500 (Cropped from original, Survey of Palestine, 1945. All Rights Reserved by the Survey of Israel © 2015. Printed with Survey of Israel permission.).



Map 7 Jaffa, municipal boundaries, 1:12,500 (Cropped from original, Survey of Palestine, 1945. All Rights Reserved by the Survey of Israel © 2015. Printed with Survey of Israel permission.).

Map 8 Jaffa, Survey of Palestine, 1945 (Cropped from original, Survey of Palestine, 1945. All Rights Reserved by the Survey of Israel © 2015. Printed with Survey of Israel permission.).

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4 Jaffa on the eve of war

A society in flux

In 1947 Jaffa was home to 71,000 people. It was the largest Arab city in Palestine,[1] the major Arab port, and the Palestinian Arab community's principal commercial and industrial hub. It was also the center of the community's social and cultural life, and a leading political center as well—although in politics it remained secondary to Jerusalem. Most of the citrus fruit grown by the country's Arab farmers reached Europe via Jaffa's wharves. The country's two major Arabic daily newspapers, *Filastin* and *al-Difa'*, were published there, as were other dailies and weeklies at various times. From a national and symbolic point of view, Jaffa was for Palestinian Arabs second only to Jerusalem in importance; they dubbed it "Bride of the Sea" or "Bride of Palestine."[2]

By May 1948 nearly all of Jaffa's Arabs had fled. Yet their feelings about the city have not faded since then. On a symbolic level, Jaffa still looms large in the

Figure 4.1 Alhambra (al-Hamra) cinema, Jaffa, 1937 (Library of Congress).

Palestinian consciousness. In fact, it has become the most salient symbol of the Nakba in that people's collective memory. Suffused with an aura of idealized depictions, Palestinians envision it as a kind of lost paradise, an ideal that they often contrast with its woeful physical appearance today.[3] It embodies Palestinian Arab development, prosperity, and modernization, all cut short in 1948.[4] Its centrality is hardly coincidental, given that a number of important Palestinian leaders, activists, and prominent figures were born and educated in Jaffa, or moved there—among them leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) such as Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Faruq al-Qaddumi, and Shafiq al-Hut; scholars such as Hisham Sharabi and Ibrahim Abu Lughod; and journalists like Mahmud Abu al-Zuluf, *al-Difa'* correspondent and later founder and editor of the most important Palestinian daily newspaper, *al-Quds*. The events of 1948, in the country as a whole and in Jaffa in particular, were decisive in the lives of these men, instrumental in molding their personalities as well as Palestinian collective consciousness.[5]

According to the UN partition plan approved on November 29, 1947, Jaffa was to become an enclave, part of a projected Arab state, but surrounded on three sides by a Jewish state and on the fourth by the sea. The Jewish cities of Tel Aviv lay to the north, with Bat Yam and Holon to the south. Only through a narrow corridor to the east, between the Jewish neighborhood of Hatikva and the Mikveh Yisrael agricultural school, where the Jaffa-Jerusalem road ran past the Arab village of Yazur, was Jaffa connected to the Arab countryside, but even this road was to remain in Jewish hands under the partition plan. The city was home to some 54,000 Muslims and 17,000 Christians. The territory on which another 40,000 Muslims lived in 50 villages in the Jaffa subdistrict was slated to become part of the Jewish state. The same was true of the Arab suburbs of Manshiyya and Abu Kabir. The city's geographic weakness was reinforced by demography—in 1947, the Jews constituted a decisive majority in the Jaffa subdistrict, comprising 264,000 of the region's 373,000 inhabitants. The large Jewish settlements included Petah Tikva and Rishon Letzion. The Lydda district, which included the Jaffa and Ramla subdistricts, also had a Jewish majority, with 293,000 Jews as opposed to 208,000 Arabs, of whom 185,000 were Muslims. The Lydda district and the Jaffa subdistrict were the only administrative divisions in Palestine in which the Arabs were a minority. This geo-demographic situation was already imprinted in the consciousness of the region's Arabs.[6]

Jaffa is one of the world's most ancient port cities. It has been razed and rebuilt, and has seen times of poverty and prosperity. Its unique geography ensured that after each defeat and destruction it was resettled—it is the only natural harbor on the Palestinian coast south of Mt Carmel—and the hill that overlooks the harbor confers a defensive advantage. The present-day city began to take form in the late seventeenth century and principally in the eighteenth. This new zenith followed centuries of neglect that began when the Mamluks destroyed the city, as well as the port, at the end of the Crusader period, in order to deny European armies an entry point into the country. At the

end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century Jaffa was captured and destroyed several times, including once, in 1799, by Napoleon Bonaparte, whose soldiers plundered and devastated it and massacred its inhabitants.[7]

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the city's Ottoman governor, Muhammad Abu-Nabut, worked to rebuild Jaffa and its defenses. He oversaw the construction of new marketplaces and of the Mahmudiyya Mosque, which to this day serves as the city's most important Muslim place of worship. He also built elegant drinking fountains that became urban landmarks. The city recovered during the nineteenth century, and in the period between 1882 and 1914 it experienced dramatic expansion and development. It grew from a town of 2,750 inhabitants on an area of some 25 acres at the beginning of the nineteenth century to one of 50,000 inhabitants on an area of some 375 acres on the eve of World War I. The growth was due largely to immigration, from both within Palestine and from outside it. This influx made the city a particularly heterogeneous one. It was home to Arabic-speaking Muslims from Egypt, the Levant, and North Africa, Central Asian Muslims, Arabic-speaking Christians from Syria and Lebanon, Armenians, Greeks, Germans, and a Jewish community numbering about 10,000. The city's spread prompted its rulers to knock down its walls and fill in its moat. The line the two followed became 'Ajami (today's Yefet) Street. This thoroughfare led from the city center—Clock Square, the location of the Great Mosque and the Saray building, the new seat of the Ottoman administration—to the 'Ajami neighborhood to the south of the Old City, a Christian area that sprang up during this same period. Population pressure induced expansion to the south and north (most of the land to the east consisted of citrus orchards and farmland), along religious-ethnic lines. The Christians settled in 'Ajami in the south and the Muslims moved northward to the Manshiyya Quarter. The Jews, for their part, went northeast to the neighborhoods of Neveh Tzedek and Ahuzat Bayyit, founded in 1909, which became the nucleus of Tel Aviv. *Saknat*, farming settlements established around the city by Egyptian immigrants during the period of Egyptian rule from 1831 to 1840, such as Saknat Abu Kabir, Saknat Darwish, and Manshiyya, metamorphosed into suburbs. Jaffa's position as the gateway to Jerusalem and the rest of Palestine, along with its geographical advantages, made it by the end of the Ottoman period the most important economic center in the country. Politically, however, it was the capital of a subdistrict, not of a district, as was Jerusalem, and thus it ranked second to the latter in political terms. Another factor in the city's development was its agricultural hinterland, which included Arab, German, and Jewish farming villages. It also saw the ongoing improvement in its infrastructure and in means of transport. Jaffa's residents were masters of commerce, crafts, and traditional industry (such as soap and fabrics), and modern industry was also beginning to appear.[8] The city owed a good part of its wealth to citrus fruit, which the inhabitants of the city and the surrounding villages began to export to Europe. Arab citrus growers were soon supplemented by Jewish ones living in the farming settlements set up by the first Zionist immigrants to Palestine in the late nineteenth

century. The soil and climate of the Palestinian coast were excellent for citrus farming and, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, improvements in sea transport and in the port helped make this crop profitable. Jaffa served not just as the port from which oranges, grapefruit, and lemons were exported, but also as the sector's logistic and commercial hub.[9]

The population's exceptionally heterogeneous character militated against the establishment of a coterie of notable families of religious prestige and national consequence, as was the case in Jerusalem. This does not mean that there were not families in Jaffa who were important in the city and region. Members of the Sa'id and al-Bitar families served as mayor under the British Mandate, and the Abu Khadra and Dajani (not identical to the clan of the same name in Jerusalem) families, among others, also wielded influence. These families acquired large tracts of land during the land registration period, thanks to the area's relatively sparse population at the time, and later converted them into profitable citrus groves. Some of these families had lived in Jaffa since the beginning of the nineteenth century, or even before that. Others were collateral branches or annexes of prominent families from other cities, such as the mountain cities in the country's interior, Jerusalem in particular, or cities on the coastal plain like Lydda, Ramla, Gaza, Acre, and Haifa. Other families arrived from neighboring countries or even farther afield.[10]

Jaffa underwent a major metamorphosis under the British Mandate, after recovering from the crisis it suffered during World War I. Its rapid growth attracted migrants, especially Muslim Arabs, from rural areas, as well as a more limited number of immigrants from the surrounding countries. The city's population grew at a much higher rate than that of natural increase. In 1922, Jaffa's Arab population numbered 27,437 (the population had declined during World War I). By 1931 it had reached 44,657, and by 1942 it was 62,600.[11]

This rapid urbanization led to the appearance of shantytowns on the city's margins, rife with poverty, densely populated, and filled with flimsy tin or even cardboard structures. These marginal neighborhoods lay adjacent to Jewish areas—Manshiyya and Abu Kabir next to Tel Aviv, and Tall al-Rish and Jabaliyya next to Holon and Bat Yam. Some 20,000 Arabs lived in Manshiyya (as did 10,000 Jews in that part of the neighborhood that bordered on Tel Aviv), and another 6,000 Arabs in Irshayd, a neighborhood that lay between Jaffa's Old City and Manshiyya. Another 4,000 lived in south Jabaliyya and 5,400 in Abu Kabir. These poor neighborhoods were even more densely populated than the old quarters of the country's cities, which were notorious for their overcrowded conditions. An average of 81 people lived on each dunam (quarter-acre) in Manshiyya, 93 in Abu Kabir, and 111 in southern Jabaliyya, as opposed to only 55 in Jerusalem's Old City and 56.7 in Jaffa's Old City, which had a total of about 7,000 inhabitants.[12] Most of the Arabic literature about Jaffa projects an idyllic tone that is sustainable because it omits depictions of these neighborhoods. A Tel Aviv municipal publication from 1938 offers a portrait of the Arab-Jewish "cardboard" shantytown that lay between Manshiyya and the Tel Aviv neighborhood of Kerem Ha-Teimanim:

> There are no sidewalks or streets. Fetid slops are thrown into the public space, garbage piles up in heaps, waiting for the always belated sanitary service supplied by the Jaffa [municipality] to come collect it. Hundreds of children play in the filth on the streets and in the garbage. During the riots of 1936 about 200 houses and shacks burned down, but new rickety shacks are being built in their place, made of boards and pieces of planks, lacking all comfort. Instead of windows there are only shutters, reeking primitive latrines, and right next to them the arrangements for cooking—so-called "kitchens"—made of a few cinderblocks with a bonfire burning between them.[13]

This description, as patronizing and even Orientalist as it might be, apparently offers a more or less reliable account. A contemporary Jewish writer described Tall al-Rish, where 2,000 people lived, along with Jabaliyya, as a collection of structures built of metal, wood, and clay, along with some unfinished stone buildings. Tall al-Rish and Abu Kabir, which were initially rural villages, retained some of their agricultural nature. Many residents of Tall al-Rish, Jabaliyya, and Abu Kabir worked in Holon, Bat Yam, and Tel Aviv respectively. They sold produce and offered themselves as day laborers and domestic servants, and worked in Jewish-owned factories.[14]

By the end of 1946, a full 70 percent of Jaffa's Arabs lived in these poor neighborhoods or in the Old City. Many of them were internal migrants of rural origin who had found employment in the city as unskilled laborers. In many cases they resided there only on a temporary basis. Notable among those who had come from outside Palestine were Arabs from Hawran in southwestern Syria, who served as cheap laborers at the port, in industry, in construction, and at odd jobs. They developed a particularly negative reputation and sometimes were involved in altercations, growing out of economic and social conflicts, with Palestinian Arabs. Like some other communities in developing countries around the world, in the Middle East in particular, the rural migrants in Jaffa lived on the margins of urban society, suffering from the structural weaknesses typical of a community in transformation. Traditional social institutions grew weak and ineffectual, but no modern institutions that could take their place had yet emerged. Many of the migrants felt threatened by the contradictions between the conservative and traditional way of life of the mountainous regions from which they came and the mores of the coastal city, which was more open to outside and cosmopolitan influences. On top of this came the dominant Jewish presence in the region and the sense of alienation from Jaffa's established population, with the feeling that the latter discriminated against the migrants.[15]

Despite the widespread poverty, Jaffa was considered one of the most prosperous cities in Palestine. It was home to a group of wealthy men who had made their fortunes in the citrus sector, in commerce, and in industry, and to white-collar professionals who offered services to the wealthy.[16] The city had well-off quarters where the rich and educated middle-class populations lived. These neighborhoods, such as 'Ajami and north Jabaliyya and the modern Nuzha

Figure 4.2 King George Avenue with Alhambra cinema, 1937 (Library of Congress).

Quarter (the area around what was then King George Avenue, now Jerusalem Avenue) flourished during the Mandate. The first two consisted of spacious private homes built of stone and marble and adorned with inscriptions and wooden and metal decorations. Nuzha, in contrast, was an area of public buildings, such as city hall, the central post office, cinemas, hotels, cafés, and social clubs.[17]

During the Mandate, Jaffa was led by several mayors, elected or, since the 1936–1939 Revolt, appointed by the Mandate authorities. In 1945 the British appointed Dr. Yusif Haykal, a public figure and one of the city's leading intellectuals, to the post.[18] Haykal demanded municipal elections and the British consented, scheduling voting for the summer of 1947. Haykal and his city council won by a large margin, making him Jaffa's first (and last) elected mayor, since the Revolt. He acted to strengthen the municipality's powers, reduce dependence on the British, clean up and beautify the city's outdoor spaces, improve its water and sewage systems, and pave streets. He also fostered social and cultural activity and promoted modernization. In addition, Haykal hired an urban planner, the Egyptian architect 'Ali al-Maliji Mas'ud, who prepared a modern master plan.

It included the construction of a grid of streets in the area of the citrus groves, a garden neighborhood south of Jabaliyya, and a program whereby the poor neighborhoods would be evacuated and rebuilt. Ideologically, the mayor was a pan-Arabist with close ties to King ʻAbdallah of Transjordan, who was welcomed in the city during his frequent visits to Palestine, with all due ceremony. Members of the city council were mostly affiliated, in nationwide Palestinian politics, with the opposition to the Husayni party.[19]

Several large social clubs operated in Jaffa. The most important were the Orthodox Club and the Islamic Sports Club, which sponsored athletics and social activities, libraries, and lectures. The two were rivals on the playing field and in cultural activities. Both founded successful theater troupes. One of the plays staged by the Islamic Sports Club was *Cyrano de Bergerac* (translated into Arabic and novelized by the Egyptian writer Mustafa Lutfi al-Manfaluti, whose version was dramatized by Haykal himself). Jaffa enjoyed a cultural flowering on all fronts. As already noted, it was where the major Palestinian Arabic newspapers were published, and it was home to six cinemas (in contrast with Jerusalem's two, serving an Arab population of about the same size), among them the Alhambra (Al-Hamra on King George Avenue), the Nabil (today's Noga Theater), and the Apollo. Four large night clubs hosted theatrical performances and other forms of entertainment, including appearances by famous performers from around the Arab world, such as the singers Umm Kulthum, Farid al-Atrash, and Muhammad ʻAbd al-Wahab.[20]

The city's modernity distanced it from its Arab surroundings, and in some areas modern Jaffa seemed more like Tel Aviv than the Arab hinterland. For example, there was in Jaffa in 1937 one automobile for every 55 inhabitants, as opposed to 33 in Tel Aviv and 320 in the Palestinian Arab community as a whole.[21] Jaffa had several hospitals, among them a government hospital, a French hospital, and the Dajani Hospital, the first private Arab hospital in Palestine. This latter institution was founded during the Mandate period by Dr. Fu'ad al-Dajani, one of the country's first Arab physicians. Toward the end of the era some 30 Arab doctors worked in the city and there were 23 pharmacies. The improvement in medical services led to a sharp 53.3 percent decline in infant and child mortality, the most dramatic improvement in any Palestinian Arab city under the Mandate and one of the largest in Arab cities anywhere. But these mortality rates were still high, both absolutely and relatively to other Arab cities in Palestine, even toward the end of the Mandate, due to the low socioeconomic level of most of the city's Arab population. In comparison, infant and child mortality at the beginning of the Mandate period in Jerusalem were more or less the same, even lower, than the rates in Jaffa at the end of the period.[22]

The large disparity in social status badly impaired the cohesion of Jaffa's Arab community. It caused unrest among the poor that manifested itself particularly in times of crisis, such as during the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. The poor did not vent their frustrations only against the British and Jews. They also harassed and sometimes even attacked well-off Arabs, especially Christians.[23] Those features of all walks of Jaffa society that were detrimental to its ability to

stand up to the British and Jews were amplified at times of crisis and hostility. Furthermore, many of Jaffa's Arabs, especially the less well-off, were employed by Jews, a situation that did not prevail in the rest of the country. All these characteristics had amplified Jaffa's vulnerability in its confrontation with the Yishuv.[24]

Disengagement from Tel Aviv

Jaffa first became a focal point of the Jewish-Arab conflict at the beginning of the twentieth century. It was the major port of arrival for Jewish immigrants, many of whom ended up settling in or near the city. The city's Arabs were thus sharply aware of the "Zionist threat," and many were hostile toward the in-coming Jews. In May 1921 bloody riots broke out when Jews conducting a May Day parade entered Manshiyya. The incursion was misinterpreted by the neighborhood's Arabs as an attack, and the Arab leadership seems to have taken advantage of the situation to incite the masses. Dozens of Jews were murdered, among them a major Hebrew novelist and essayist, Yosef Haim Brenner. Some 100 Jews were injured, much Jewish property was destroyed or stolen, and hundreds of Jews fled to Tel Aviv. Dozens of Arabs were killed by the British army as it restored order, and by Jewish avengers. Further riots, on a smaller scale (in Jaffa), broke out in 1929.

On October 27, 1933, Jaffa's Arabs, under the leadership of Musa Kazim al-Husayni, president of the Palestinian Arab Executive Committee, staged a massive demonstration against Jewish immigration. The rally emerged from the Great Mahmudiyya Mosque and headed toward the offices of the district governor. The British police blocked their advance at Clock Square. A violent confrontation ensued in which 25 Arab demonstrators and one Arab policeman were killed and dozens injured, among them the elderly Musa Kazim, who was clubbed by policemen. He died the following March; his supporters claimed that the beating had hastened his demise. The curfew imposed following the protest and fear of more demonstrations led to a further exodus of Jaffa's Jews to Tel Aviv.[25]

The riots of 1921 touched off a process of disengagement between Jaffa and Tel Aviv and between Jaffa and the Jewish community as a whole. In May 1921, in part as a response to the riots, the Mandate administration recognized Tel Aviv as an autonomous entity within the Jaffa municipality and granted it de facto autonomy. Between 12,000 and 13,000 Jews lived in Jaffa prior to the riots; by 1922 only some 5,000 remained. In 1934 the process was completed when the British accorded Tel Aviv the status of a separate and autonomous municipality. Thanks to immigration from overseas, the Jewish city flourished both demographically and economically. It became the center of a Jewish metropolitan area and soon overtook Jaffa and Jerusalem to become Palestine's largest city.[26]

The Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 again placed Jaffa at the center of the conflict. One incident that stoked the fires prior to the Revolt took place in Jaffa in

October 1935, when a barrel being unloaded at the port, ostensibly part of a cargo of cement, fell apart to reveal to the astonished Arab longshoremen that it contained weapons and ammunition. The event was widely reported in the Arab press, reinforcing the common (and often correct) belief by the Arab public that Jewish military organizations were arming themselves. On April 19, 1936, severe disturbances broke out in Jaffa. Jews working or visiting the city were attacked and murdered. Outlying Jewish settlements were attacked and fighting broke out in several places where Arab neighborhoods bordered Jewish ones, especially in Manshiyya, Abu Kabir, and Hatikva. The following day Jaffa's Arabs declared a general strike that spread throughout the country; attacks on Jews continued. Within a short time 12,000 Jewish refugees from outlying regions had arrived in Tel Aviv. The British had difficulty regaining control of Jaffa from the rebels, especially in the Old City's narrow, winding alleys. In July 1936 the British army broke into the Old City and blew up a large number of homes. The soldiers forced out hundreds, perhaps even thousands of Arabs, some for a short time, some for good. (The claim that appears in Arab sources, according to which 6,000 Arabs were left homeless, seems exaggerated, based on the total number of inhabitants in the Old City, not all of whom lost their homes.) The British built three broad roads through the area, together forming an anchor-shaped perimeter as part of what they maintained was a beautification project. Their real purpose was, however, to enable military forces to control the area. The huge amount of destruction involved stunned Jaffa's Arabs. From this point onward the city remained largely quiet, with large-scale riots not breaking out again until 1938, during the Revolt's second stage.[27]

When the Revolt was suppressed and World War II broke out, inter-communal relations improved. Jews again visited Jaffa and Arabs Tel Aviv, patronizing each other's economic and cultural institutions. In January 1940 the Alhambra cinema even hosted a gathering of about a thousand Arab and Jewish citrus growers to discuss cooperation. But this did not change the basic fact that from 1936 onward the two communities had been decoupled, residing in separate neighborhoods. The city's Jewish population recovered and grew to about 30,000 by 1940, but they lived only in their own areas bordering on Tel Aviv, and in practice received some of their municipal services from the Jewish city, to the chagrin of Jaffa's own city administration. Relations between the two municipalities were tense, hostile, and competitive.[28]

Notes

1 "Settled Population, by Town and Sub-District (Estimated as at 31 December, 1946)," in Government of Palestine, *Supplement to Survey of Palestine* (Jerusalem: Government of Palestine, 1947), 12–13.
2 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 268, 273; Shimoni, *Aravei Eretz-Yisrael*, 233.
3 Tahir Adib Qalyubi, *Risalat 'ishq ila Yafa* [A love message to Jaffa] (Amman: Matba'at al-Sanabil, 2002); Salim Tamari, "Bourgeois Nostalgia and the Abandoned City," in Tamari, *Mountain against the Sea*, 56–70; Lila Abu Lughod, "Return to Half-Ruins: Memory, Postmemory, and Living History in Palestine," in *Nakba:*

Palestine, 1948, and the Claims of Memory, ed. Lila Abu Lughod and Ahmed H. Sa'di, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 77–104.

4 Rassem Khamaisi, "*Yafa: Me-ir merkazit le-shechunat shulaim be-Tel Aviv-Yafo*" [Jaffa: From central city to marginal neighborhood in Tel-Aviv-Jaffa], in *Tel Aviv-Yafo: Mi-parvar ganim le-'ir 'olam, me'ah ha-shanim ha-rishonot* [Tel Aviv-Jaffa: From a garden city to a world city: The first century], ed. Baruch Kipnis (Haifa: Pardes, 2009), 174, 179, 189. (in Hebrew).

5 See e.g., Hisham Sharabi, "Introduction," and Shafiq al-Hout, "From Jaffa we will begin to march," in *Yafa: 'Itr madina* [Jaffa: The scent of a city], ed. Imtiyaz Diyab (Nazareth and Beirut: Dar al-fati al-'Arabi, 1991), 13–18, 21–26, respectively (in Arabic).

6 Map of the fronts in the Tel Aviv District in Avraham Ayalon, *Hativat Giv'ati be-milhemet ha-Komemiyut* [The Givati Brigade in the War of Independence] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1959), 76 (in Hebrew). "Settled Population, By Town and Sub-District," in *Supplement to Survey of Palestine*; Mahmud Fahmi Darwish, *Karithah Filastin* [Palestine disaster] (Baghdad: Jam'iyat Inqadh Filastin, 1949), 88–89 (in Arabic); Arnon Golan, "Milhemet Ha-'atzmaut ve-yetziratah shel Tel Aviv-Yafo" [The War of Independence and creation of Tel Aviv-Jaffa], in Kipnis, *Tel Aviv-Yafo*, 90.

7 Ruth Kark, *Yafo: Tzmihata shel ir 1799–1917* [Jaffa: Growth of a city, 1799–1917] (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, 1985), 1–3 (in Hebrew).

8 Kark, *Yafo: Tzmihata shel ir*, 262–273.

9 Amiram Gonen, "Keytzad hayta Tel Aviv-Yafo lemercaz ha-ironi harashi be'eretz Yisrael" [How Tel Aviv-Jaffa became the main urban center in the land of Israel], in Kipnis, *Tel Aviv-Yafo*, 158 (in Hebrew).

10 Tahir Adib Qalyubi, *'A'ilat wa-shakhsiyyat min Yafa wa-Qada'iha* [Families and personalities from Jaffa and its district] (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya, 2006), 30–200 (in Arabic). Shimoni, *Aravei Eretz-Yisrael*, 224–225; Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab National Movement, 1918–1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), 15.

11 Shimoni, *Aravei Eretz-Yisrael*, 421–422.

12 *Survey of Palestine*, 693–694; Yosef Waschitz, *Ha-aravim be-eretz Yisrael* [The Arabs in the Land of Israel] (Merhavia, Israel: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1947), 378 (in Hebrew). Aerial photograph of the Abu Kabir neighborhood and neighboring shanties in Yosef Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah: Prakim be-toldot ha-haganah al Tel Aviv* [From Events to War: Chapters in the history of the defense of Tel Aviv] (Tel Aviv: Haganah Command/IDF Cultural Service), 192 (in Hebrew).

13 "*Yediot iriyat Tel Aviv*" 7:1–2 (September–October 1938), 33, quoted in Ya'akov Shavit and Gideon Biger, *Ha-historia shel Tel Aviv, II: Me-ir medina le-ir be-medina (1936–1952)* [History of Tel Aviv, vol. 2: From a city-state to a city in the state: (1936–1952) (Tel Aviv: Ramot Tel Aviv University, 2007), 218 (in Hebrew).

14 Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah*, 100. Yosef Olitzky, *Bat Yam: 1918–1950* (Bat Yam: Municipal Council Press, 1950), 95 (in Hebrew); Hanna 'Isa Malak, *Al-judhur al-Yafiyya* [The Jaffite Sources] (Jerusalem: Matba'at al-sharq al-'Arabiyya, 1996), 36 (in Arabic).

15 *Survey of Palestine*, 691–696; Rachel Taqqu, "Peasants into workmen," 269–270; Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Political economy of the Jabal Nablus, 1920–1948," in *Studies in the Economic And Social History of Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, ed. Roger Owen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 90; Olitzky, *Bat Yam*, 52; Malak, *Al-judhur al-Yafiyya*, 27.

16 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 231, n. 1; Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-Milhamah*, 257.

17 Malak, *Al-judhur al-Yafiyya*, 33–35.

18 Yusif Haykal, Truman Institute Library, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Card file 868, series B; Qalyubi, *'A'ilat wa-shakhsiyyat min Yafa*, 367–368.

19 Malak, *Al-judhur al-Yafiyya*, 37–39, 45, 80; Yusif Haykal, "Jaffa in its last years," in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 29–38; 'Ali al-Maliji Mas'ud, "Jaffa: Urban planning initiative," in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 29–38.
20 Malak, *Al-judhur al-Yafiyya*, 82–85, 97–99; Jawwad al-'Azzuni, "Schematic map of Jaffa in 1948," in Qalyubi, *Risalat 'ishq ila Yafa*, 40; Testimony of Y'akub Hananiya in Hadara Lazar, *Ha-mandatorim: Eretz Yisrael, 1920–1948* [The Mandatorians: Palestine 1920–1948] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1990), 183–186 (in Hebrew).
21 Waschitz, *Ha-Aravim be-Eretz Yisrael*, 379.
22 Malak, *Al-judhur al-Yafiyya*, 100–103; *Survey of Palestine*, 710–714.
23 Yehoshua Porath, *The Palestinian Arab National Movement, From Riots to Rebellion, 1929–1939* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), 267–269.
24 Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine,* 48–49; Jacob Metzer, *The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 44–48, 51–57, 105, 124; Jacob Metzer and Oded Kaplan, *Meshek Yehudi ve-meshek Aravi* [The Jewish and Arab economies] (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 1990), 144–154 (in Hebrew).
25 Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979) 204–206; Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin: Fi Al-diyar al-Yafiyah* [Our country Palestine: Vol. 2. In the Jaffa region] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1965), 260–280 (in Arabic); 'Ali Hasan al-Bawwab, *Mawsu'at Yafa Al-jamila* [Encyclopedia of the beautiful Jaffa] (Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya Lil-dirasat wal-nashr, 2003) 193–196; Gideon Biger and Jacob Shavit, *Ha-historia shel Tel Aviv, I: Me-shechunot le-ir (1909–1935)* [The History of Tel Aviv, vol. 1: From neighborhoods to a city (1909–1939)] (Tel Aviv: Ramot Tel Aviv University, 2001), 117–119 (in Hebrew).
26 Biger and Shavit, *Ha-Historia shel Tel Aviv I*, 118; Gonen, "Keytzad hayta Tel Aviv-Yafo" [How Tel Aviv-Jaffa became the main urban center], in Kipnis, *Tel Aviv-Yafo*, 155, 160–161.
27 Porath, *From Riots to Rebellion*, 141, 162–164; Biger and Shavit, *Ha-Historia shel Tel Aviv II* 47–52; al-Dabbagh, *Biladuna Filastin: Fi al-diyar al-Yafiyah*, 269–279; Mark LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography: Jaffa, Tel Aviv, and the Struggle for Palestine, 1880–1948* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 112–113; Matthew Hughes, "The banality of brutality: British Armed Forces and the repression of the Arab revolt in Palestine, 1936–39," *English Historical Review* 124 (507, April 2009), 322–323.
28 Biger and Shavit, *Ha-historia shel Tel Aviv II*, 53; Moshe Naor, *Be-Hazit ha-Oref* [On the Home front] (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi Press, 2009) 150 (in Hebrew); LeVine, *Overthrowing Geography*, 107–109.

5 Jaffa as a battlefield

The fighting begins

> In fact, Jaffa never surrendered, but rather fought in all sectors, in the south and in the north, and the Jews were not able to penetrate it. It had fighters from Turkey and Yugoslavia who came to Jaffa to defend it, and it held its own after the partition [resolution].
>
> (Faruq al-Qaddumi)[1]

A short time after the partition resolution, Arabs and Jews once again began to clash on the seam between Jaffa and Tel Aviv. On November 30, the day after the UN vote, life still seemed to be proceeding normally. The marketplaces were open, Jewish vehicles continued to drive through Jaffa on their way to Jerusalem and the south, and Arab transportation to the surrounding villages and the north continued to wend its way through Tel Aviv and other Jewish settlements. But when news spread that Jewish buses had been attacked by Arabs, each community stopped driving through the other's territory. Tensions grew high, especially where Jewish neighborhoods bordered Arab ones. In the wake of violent confrontations in Shuk HaCarmel, a large open-air marketplace on the seam between the two cities, Arab produce merchants and hawkers abandoned their stands and Jews fled. A bomb went off in Tel Aviv's Neveh Tzedek neighborhood, but no one was hurt. Jews and Arabs who lived on the boundary began leaving their homes. The three-day strike declared by the Arab Higher Committee on December 2 was interpreted by Jews—who remembered the (much longer) strike that had opened the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939—as a declaration of armed conflict.[2]

In the days that followed Arabs continued to evacuate the border neighborhoods of Manshiyya and Abu Kabir. Members of the Arab Youth Organization, founded by the mufti, encouraged some of this flight. The organization's Jaffa branch was led by the former Najjada founder and commander Muhammad Nimr al-Hawwari. As soon as hostilities broke out, he sent armed patrols into the border neighborhoods to evacuate civilians from a belt of homes on the line of conflict. Hawwari seems to have done his best to calm tensions and prevent escalation, instructing his men to avoid confrontations with the Jews and to preserve

the peace. In meetings with Haganah representatives he conveyed a message of restraint. His moderate approach and his opposition to the mufti's supporters in Jaffa led him to cooperate with Mayor Haykal, who was also an opponent of the Husaynis.[3] Haykal represented his city on the national and inter-Arab political fronts while Hawwari focused on military activity. In contrast, the Arab Higher Committee under the mufti's leadership took a militant line and, when the strike ended, declared to the Arab public: "We have concluded our strike and we begin our [armed] struggle [*nidalna*]."[4]

The initial escalation was at first haphazard and uncoordinated, inspired by the mufti but not guided by him. Jewish and Arab criminals, along with unemployed men from the poor neighborhoods on the seam, seem to have carried out acts of robbery, plunder, and arson against inhabitants of outlying settlements. *Filastin* reported on December 13 that four "Yemenite Jews" (apparently residents of Tel Aviv's Kerem Ha-Teimanim neighborhood) attacked and set fire to a café owned by Mahmud Adib al-Silawi (probably a migrant from a rural area). One of the attackers was seen making off with the café's radio. Veteran Arab criminals and young hoodlums took advantage of the situation to rob and loot both Jewish and Arab homes and establishments. The rise in crime on both sides caused an escalation of hostilities and exacerbated tensions.

In a report, Shai, the Haganah intelligence service, blamed the violence on "a number of armed men who lean toward the Husaynis." Shai reported that both Jews and Arabs were congregating and sometimes getting into fights, setting fires to stores and stands (owned by both Jews and Arabs) in Shuk HaCarmel, stoning and shooting at vehicles, engaging in acts of robbery, and sniping. Further, it said, grenades were being thrown into Jewish neighborhoods, and there were Arab attacks on Jewish homes in outlying areas. An Arab brothel on Shlush Street in Neve Tzedeq was torched, as was the 'Ali Sambo Café in Manshiyya—which the Haganah believed to be an armed Arab position. Many of the clashes took place in the Arab-Jewish "cardboard" neighborhood north of Manshiyya, next to Kerem Ha-Teimanim, where the inhabitants were especially poor. Similar reports appeared in the Arab press. *Filastin* claimed that the crowding in the confrontation areas was the major cause of death and injury, and it called on Arab civilians to stay away from these flash points. Dozens of men and women of all ages were wounded, and several were killed in clashes in those areas. British army and police units imposed a curfew in Manshiyya and Abu Kabir for several days in the hopes of halting the deterioration in the situation. But even during the curfew arson continued, especially in the "cardboard" neighborhood, where the many cardboard and wooden structures were prime targets. Jews and Arabs each established defensive lines, with the British in the middle. Manshiyya and Abu Kabir became no-man's-lands. The daylight hours were generally quiet, but as soon as night fell the two sides exchanged heavy gunfire, mostly without injuring or killing people.[5]

From the beginning of hostilities, Arab snipers had been shooting at Jewish passersby from positions on roofs and upper floors overlooking Tel Aviv in Abu Kabir and Manshiyya, as well as on Holon and Bat Yam. Snipers positioned in

the minaret of Hasan Bek Mosque in Manshiyya targeted Tel Aviv's Hayarkon Street, and others were able to stop traffic on Ha'Aliyah and Herzl streets. (Some of these snipers seem to have been Polish mercenaries who had deserted from the Anders Army, a Polish force established by the Soviet Union in World War II that eventually reached Palestine.) The sharpshooters hit not just pedestrians but also private and public vehicles traveling the unprotected roads. The Haganah built protective walls, blew up several buildings from which Arab snipers had been firing, and deployed snipers of its own who sought to take out the Arab riflemen, and who also shot at Arab civilians in the border region. These actions of both sides helped escalate the conflict, dealing a heavy blow to the morale of Jewish and Arab citizenry. When the Haganah demolished an Arab sniper post in Abu Kabir in the attic of a building containing private dwellings and a café, large numbers of Arabs congregated there. But the action's main effect was to send a shock wave through the neighborhood that prompted some of its residents to leave. This was the first building in Jaffa to be destroyed during the war.[6]

Most of the Arab attacks during this period seem to have been carried out by small bands of armed young men who acted on their own initiative and moved from one place to another without any central coordination.[7] The forces in Jaffa had only small quantities of arms at their disposal. The city's inhabitants seem to have owned several hundred guns, most of which were used, at first primarily for self-defense. They increasingly took part in attacks on Jews. As the demand for armaments grew, the city developed a lively market for guns and ammunition, and sales and purchases became common. Gun prices shot up until they were beyond the capacity of most of the population to afford—£P70–100 for a rifle, six to eight times the average monthly salary. As elsewhere in Palestine, most of the arms at the disposal of the organized Arab forces were brought in from Egypt, primarily by the mufti's supporters. And, as elsewhere, they were handed over to people close to the Husaynis, in accordance with political and family criteria, rather than military need.[8]

On the Jewish side, the most notable offensive initiatives came from IZL, which was particularly popular among the Jews in the border areas. IZL's operations seem to have been a major cause of escalation.[9] It staged ever more daring and violent attacks. On December 7, IZL forces attacked Abu Kabir, torching some of its homes. Jewish fighters disguised as Arabs or British personnel also operated in the Arab rear. In one notable operation on December 13, camouflaged IZL members rolled a barrel full of explosives out of a vehicle next to the Alhambra cinema, near the Jaffa municipal building on King George Avenue. It came to a halt next to the adjoining Café Venetzia. Some of the patrons noticed the approaching barrel and took cover in the kitchen or escaped through the back door. The ensuing explosion killed 16 and caused major damage to the cinema. That same day IZL fighters blew up houses in 'Abbasiyya-Yahudiyya and Yazur, killing seven Arabs. On December 30, IZL again attacked behind Arab lines—it sent teams in boats to stage attacks on Arab cafés in the port. This operation was beaten back by Arab fighters stationed in the area, apparently with no Arab loss

of life. The next day IZL forces disguised as Arabs again penetrated Jaffa, where they hurled a bomb at another Arab café.[10]

LEHI launched similar attacks. On December 11, members of this group threw a bomb into a café in Yazur, and in January 1948 a LEHI contingent blew up several houses that had served as sniper positions in Manshiyya. In another

Figure 5.1 Market Place in central Jaffa, with al-Mahmudiyya main mosque in the background, just off the Saray building (Library of Congress).

operation, they cut the railroad tracks to Jaffa and, for a short time, trains were unable to reach the city. On January 4, two LEHI operatives entered the city in a truck carrying a cargo of oranges—and half a ton of explosives. They parked the car next to the Saray, the Ottoman administrative building that now housed the National Committee, in Clock Square, the heart of Arab Jaffa. Apparently the building was unguarded at the time. Its five regular guards had walked off their jobs after not receiving their paychecks for a month. When the truck exploded it completely demolished the building, killing 28 people. Nearby buildings were also damaged and some collapsed, among them the Barclay's Bank, the Ottoman Bank, and the Arab Bank. Most of the dead were not connected to the National Committee. They were passersby and staff at the Jaffa municipality's social services department, which ran, in the Saray, a food distribution and a tutoring project for poor children. Fortunately, it was a Sunday and most of the children were not around. The National Committee moved into the Orthodox Club in the 'Ajami neighborhood, then to an adjacent house that was renovated for the purpose.[11]

The National Committee and the municipality

Jaffa's National Committee was elected at a public meeting held on November 22, 1947 at the initiative of supporters of the mufti and members of the Arab Higher Committee—Rafiq al-Tamimi, the only Jaffite member of that body, and Hasan Abu al-Su'ud (whom the mufti had sent from Egypt as his special envoy, charged with establishing National Committees). Despite the mufti's well-known centralizing tendencies, he did not, and apparently was unable, to dictate the membership of the group. The mufti's supporters and the opposition, led by Haykal and Hawwari, battled each other for control of the new body. They finally agreed on a slate of 18 candidates, out of which 15 were chosen by the members of the committee that oversaw the commercial boycott of Jews declared in 1946, and by representatives of the city's clubs and other civic associations. It should be noted that, while the boycott committee was appointed and controlled by the Husayni party, the members of the other bodies that participated in the election were public representatives, in many cases elected by the membership of the bodies they represented.[12]

As it was constituted, the National Committee reflected the entire spectrum of political, religious, and social forces in the city. Its members included two Orthodox Christians and a Catholic, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and a representative of the Islamic Youth Club. It included white-collar professionals, such as physicians and lawyers, a citrus merchant and a delegate from the Arab Workers Congress. Five of its members were clearly identified with the mufti, while another five were clearly identified with the opposition. These ten members were chosen by agreement between the two factions. Within a short time, five new members were added, one each from five nearby villages, most of them not associated with any party.[13]

Some of Jaffa's residents voiced dissatisfaction with the way the Committee was chosen, arguing that members should have been popularly elected. Yet it

was generally agreed that even had such elections been held, the final result would not have been much different (except that Haykal would no doubt have been elected had he decided to run). The Committee's members decided not to choose a chairman. Instead, they appointed, from among their members, a city councilman, Amin 'Aql, as secretary. Mustafa al-Tahir was chosen as his deputy, Mahmud al-Hindi as comptroller, and another city councilman, Ahmad Abu Laban, was made treasurer. The latter two were supporters of the mufti.[14]

Within the space of a few days the Committee set up subcommittees to administer civilian affairs, the war effort, and defense of the city. Their members, too, were appointed according to a political key, in an effort to strike a balance between the Husayni party and the opposition. The subcommittees were as follows: a Villages Committee, chaired by a mufti supporter from the village of 'Abbasiyya-Yahudiyya; a Health Committee, chaired by physicians who were members of the National Committee, and assisted by the secretary of the Jaffa Arab Medical Association; an Economic Committee, chaired by the chairman of the Jaffa Commerce Chamber, responsible for civilian matters; a Licensing Committee, entrusted with overseeing the import and export of goods and food, and issuing travel permits; a Finance Committee, responsible for financing the war effort; a Fighters' Supply Committee; a Defense Committee, charged with overseeing the construction of fortifications and furnishing combatants with guns and ammunition; an Armor Committee that succeeded in producing six armored vehicles during the war; and an Armaments and Mines Manufacture Committee, which set up workshops to manufacture light weapons, hand grenades, and mines.

Most of these subcommittees seem to have been in operation by the end of December 1947.[15] In addition to the National Committee and its subcommittees, local committees were set up in each neighborhood and in nearby villages. The latter were subordinate to the Villages Committee that operated under the National Committee, and were represented on the latter by their leaders and prominent activists.[16]

While the Jaffa National Committee was nominally subordinate to the Arab Higher Committee, it in fact had no contact with the Jerusalem offices of the latter body, and its two active members, Husayn al-Khalidi and Ahmad Hilmi. The mufti himself preferred to issue orders directly from Cairo to his loyalists in Jaffa, those on the National Committee and those outside it. Even Tamimi, the only member of the Arab Higher Committee who resided in Jaffa, had no contact with his colleagues in Jerusalem.[17] Funding for the National Committee arrived from Egypt through the Jaffa branch of the Arab Treasury, which gave the Committee a grant of P£2,000 as soon as it was founded, providing another P£16,000 during its first two months of activity. But this channel proved to be problematic and at the end of January the Jaffa Committee made a new arrangement with the Arab Higher Committee according to which the monies collected by the Arab Treasury in Jaffa would be transferred directly to the Jaffa Committee rather than sent to Cairo. The Jaffa Committee promised to allocate some of the tax revenues collected in Jaffa, which was relatively well-off, to other parts of the

country. From this point onward the Jaffa Committee imposed taxes, such as a fuel tax, customs, an export tax, a port warehouse tax, and a travel tax. It collected large sums and expanded its activities into the areas of food provision, armaments, and care for the wounded and the families of the dead. After reaching the compromise between the mufti's men and the opposition that enabled the National Committee to be established, it and the municipality tried to work in parallel, and even held joint meetings (there was some overlap in their memberships). But these quickly demonstrated that there were serious disagreements and conflicts between the members of the two bodies regarding the administration of the city and the war effort.[18]

The National Committee supported civilian organizations, taking them under its wing. This was the case, for example, with women's groups such as the Palestinian Arab Women's Association and several other women's societies. The groups established a joint board, collected donations for the wounded and their families, and organized first-aid classes for women and men in cooperation with the Palestinian Arab Medical Association. This latter opened emergency treatment centers at a number of locations in the city, principally in 'Ajami and Nuzha, far from the front, and operated an ambulance that had been donated by a Christian Arab inhabitant of the city. Together with the Health Committee it converted the Anglican Mission Hospital into a facility for those injured in the fighting. To symbolize Muslim-Christian cooperation, it was renamed The Crescent and the Cross; the same name was used for the city's first-aid operations.[19]

Despite its diverse membership, the National Committee as a whole took a militant line from the time of the strike, when it pushed for the deployment of fighters in the neighborhoods at the front. Nevertheless, some of the fighters, as members of the youth organization, were assigned, under Hawwari's orders, primarily to defensive missions.[20]

The National Committee had also, since the strike, assumed responsibility for civilian well-being, filling a vacuum being created as the British administration wound down. The Committee informed the Jaffa public of the end of the strike by broadcasting the message over loudspeakers. From then on it organized food supply. This activity was overseen by the chairmen of the Economic and Finance Committees, Hajj Zafir al-Dajani and Ahmad Abu Laban, as well as Mahmud Khayr al-Bahlul, chairman of the Soldiers' Supply Committee. These three men seem to have acted as a provisions committee, in cooperation with the municipality and the Chamber of Commerce, which Dajani headed. The Chamber established an executive committee for this purpose. Its members included the city's major businessmen: Rashed Cana'an, 'Abd al-Hamid Bibi, Wahba Tamari, Kamal Tarazi, and Dajani himself. They demonstrated a flair for logistics and proved themselves able to ensure that the city's residents were relatively well provided for throughout the war period. At the demand of the Arab Higher Committee, which wanted, by the time the British left, to build up a store of provisions sufficient for six months, the municipality prepared central supply depots where basic goods such as flour, sugar, and rice were stored. The municipality instituted rationing, issuing cards to the populace, in particular to those who had

evacuated the border neighborhoods, and set up food allocation sites. The evacuees continued to be served by their longtime storekeepers, who moved to the new locations that appeared on the list; this relocation seems to have been organized and systematic. Those who remained in the border neighborhoods received basic necessities from the Economic Committee. The end of commerce with Jews led, ironically, to surpluses of vegetables, fruit, eggs, and meat produced by Arab villages, which had, before the war, marketed a large part of their production in Tel Aviv. Prices for these items, which had gone up during the strike, now fell below their previous levels.[21]

But, despite the Committee's efforts, the supply of food to the fighters on the front was inefficient. The daily rations for Arab combatants manning positions in Jabaliyya and Manshiyya consisted of cheese and a pita for breakfast, citrus fruit and a pita for lunch, and white cheese with a pita and olives for supper. Meat was not on the menu. The fighters complained to Rafiq al-Tamimi and threatened not to report for guard duty. Tamimi asked Khayr al-Bahlul, who was responsible for provisions, to enlarge the rations and include meat on occasion, but was sent away empty-handed. This happened at a time when there was plenty of meat available in the city. It seems likely that some of the food meant for the combatants found its way into private storerooms or was sold on the market by those responsible for provisions. This led to incidents in which bands of fighters took supplies from city warehouses by force.[22]

Another difficulty confronting the National Committee was the high cost of ammunition. Operations along the front required an average of P£300 in ammunition per night. The supply difficulties led the Committee's secretary, 'Aql, to propose at a joint meeting in mid-January that the municipality assume responsibility for provisioning the fighters. This led to a conflict between the municipality and the National Committee about who was responsible for paying the militia's operating costs. Some of the fighters belonged to the municipal police force that had been established in places evacuated by the British with joint funding from municipalities and the Mandate government. This force's rapid and unsupervised expansion led to a situation in which some of its personnel, for example in Jabaliyya and Tall al-Rish, received food at the city's expense, while in other places policemen continued to be dependent on the National Committee. The residents of some well-off neighborhoods, such as 'Ajami and north Jabaliyya, did not want to depend for their defense on guards provided by the National Committee (which, in fact, did not supply any for these neighborhoods in the rear). Instead the inhabitants held meetings, formed committees, bought arms, and organized their own guard forces. Some of them hired private watchmen who were responsible for protecting the residents from gangs of robbers. These men bore armbands that identified them as neighborhood guards, enabling residents to differentiate between them and thieves—a distinction that was otherwise difficult to make.[23]

It appears that LEHI's bombing of the National Committee's offices at the Saray on January 4 induced the public to identify more strongly with that body and to unite behind it. Following the bombing, the British army helped build

concrete barriers on the roads leading to Jaffa. This cut off all avenues into the city except for the Jerusalem-Jaffa road, which was open during the day under British responsibility, and Manshiyya Road, which continued to be under curfew. The barriers made the people of Jaffa feel more secure, but the cost and responsibility for guarding them became another point of contention between the municipality and the National Committee, despite their overlapping memberships. The conflict seems to have induced Hajj Zafir al-Dajani, head of the Chamber of Commerce and chairman of the Economic Committee, to resign from the National Committee. In mid-January Mayor Haykal went to Egypt in an effort to resolve the crisis and receive clear instructions on who governed the city, the municipal leadership or the National Committee. The mufti ordered him to accept the Committee's authority, and Haykal had no choice but to make his peace with the rival body. After this trip Haykal ceased, for a time, to be involved in running the city; chaos spread as a result.[24] In the wake of the chronic crisis into which Jaffa's institutions descended in a short time, the mufti's emissary, Sheikh Hasan Abu al-Su'ud, arrived again in Jaffa at the end of January. He quickly tried to institute a number of reforms. At his recommendation, Rafiq al-Tamimi was forced to leave the city in the same way that Hawwari had been—by being ordered to appear before the mufti in Cairo, then not being allowed to return.[25]

It quickly became clear that the National Committee was incapable of running either the city or the war effort without the organizational infrastructure that the municipality provided. On February 9 the city council met and decided to establish subcommittees to oversee bread distribution, the food supply, and taxes. The council also decided to ask for British help on manifestly military matters, such as Jewish attacks on the cemeteries in south Jabaliyya. Two days later Haykal convened neighborhood mukhtars and discussed security issues with them. He announced that municipal taxes would be raised to pay for defense needs. In mid-February the municipality called on the city's inhabitants to pay their taxes without delay because "the municipality bears a heavy responsibility beyond its routine responsibilities, including security." On April 19 Haykal organized an assembly of the city's notable citizens, where he reported on trips he had made to Amman and Damascus. He said that he had succeeded in obtaining the funds needed to double the ranks of the city garrison. The municipal police, he said, would have to be funded through taxes and tariffs on goods entering the city by sea or land. He urged the members of his audience to pay their assessments.[26]

The municipal police force grew rapidly and assumed, for a time, principal responsibility for the sensitive Manshiyya sector. This perpetuated the rivalry between the National Committee and the municipality. The latter had the advantage of its organizational infrastructure, which had developed during the Mandate, and authority that derived from its legal status and democratic elections. On the other hand, the National Committee had the backing of the national institutions, the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Treasury, which were entirely under the mufti's control.[27] As the municipality grew stronger, residents and merchants from Bustrus and King Faisal Streets (today's Raziel and Yehuda

Hayamit Streets), as well as the shipyards, asked Mayor Haykal to increase the number of guards and offered to help pay for them. Fearing further car bombs, they also asked that the city's commercial center be blocked to motor traffic.[28]

The municipality made good use of its administrative reach to distribute basic supplies to the inhabitants when needed. This occurred, for example, toward the end of February, when a bread shortage led to long lines at bakeries. Bread was a basic and the principal food for the Jaffa population. The shortage was an artificial one—the owners of the bakeries were hoarding flour. In response, the municipality took control of the allocation of flour and sent its employees to distribute bread from the bakeries at a reduced price. It set up six regional distribution centers, on al-Mahata (Train Station) Street, at the al-Salahi market (today part of the flea market), and in the Old City, Nuzha, ʻAjami, and Jabaliyya. Quantities were determined by the number of members in each family. In addition, bread was supplied directly to schools and distributed also to villagers visiting the city. The municipality also looked after the non-Arab communities, such as the Greeks and Armenians, supplying them with bread via the storekeepers who served them. In this way the municipal administration managed to frustrate the food speculators who had made profits from shortages.[29]

Jaffa society: Between Hammer and Anvil

Palestinian Arab Jaffa's mood following the UN partition decision was largely listless, but there was also fear, tension, confusion, and uncertainty about what the future held in store.[30] The British figured that most Palestinian Arabs recognized the mufti as their leader, but that many, especially Christians and "moderates," in other words the upper middle class, were uncomfortable with the Husayni party's militancy. This group was apprehensive of the approaching British evacuation. Their departure threatened to overturn the established economic, social, and military order. Within this sector, support for King ʻAbdallah of Transjordan began to grow. They viewed the Hashemite monarch as the only man who could guarantee stability. But, fearing the Husaynis, their support for ʻAbdallah remained largely passive.[31]

As in elsewhere in Palestine, mainly in the large cities, Arab civil servants and police officers feared the loss of their jobs. As a result, they hoarded food, purchased weapons for self-defense, and obtained visas to nearby countries. The prevailing wisdom in the city was that in the case of inter-communal strife Jaffa would be, because of its location next to the principal Jewish city, the first to suffer. The border areas of Manshiyya, Abu Kabir, Tall al-Rish, and south Jabaliyya were considered extremely dangerous. Rumors spread that the Jews planned "to bomb all of Jaffa and demolish it." The villagers from the surrounding area, which was slated under the partition plan to be part of the Jewish state, evinced confusion and foreboding. They said that they would refuse to accept Jewish rule or obey Jewish officials, even if they had to oppose them with force. Yet most of the villagers were apprehensive about fighting the Jews, who enjoyed both a numerical and military advantage in the district.[32]

Most of Jaffa's inhabitants complied with the three-day strike called by the Arab Higher Committee. But many participated reluctantly and without enthusiasm.[33] Fearing that it would drag on, they cleared the store shelves of provisions and kerosene. Opponents of the strike staged a demonstration on its final day, and people broke into the bakeries and food depots. Many Jaffites withdrew their deposits from the Arab Bank and the Nation Bank, both of them under Palestinian Arab ownership.[34] When the strike was announced on December 1, a day before it began, prices of basic items, like pita bread, kerosene, and sardines, tripled and even quadrupled. The spike in prices caused resentment, especially among the less well-off. Indignant residents of the city sent a petition to the Arab Higher Committee in which they called for the strike to be cut short, even before the date that had been set. People were also angry at the lack of clear instructions and coordination among institutions. Despite this, only street peddlers and a few cafés dared break the strike. Demonstrations against the partition plan were staged by Hawrani Arabs and schoolchildren, the latter bearing placards reading "Turn the schools into army camps!" The two demonstrations merged and the total number of participants was estimated at 1,500, about a third of them from Hawran.[35]

During the strike and the days that followed it, Arabs and Jews continued to leave the border neighborhoods. The Arab evacuees took refuge in safer areas in Jaffa, or left the city to return to their native villages. Some inhabitants of the villages that lay within Tel Aviv's municipal territory, like Sumayl and Jamasin, left their homes for Jaffa or al-Shaykh Muwannis, a village north of the Yarkon (al-'Auja) River. The last of Jamasin's inhabitants left the village on December 9. In the absence of an organized response to the influx, most of the refugees in Jaffa slept unsheltered on the streets, their presence exacerbating the already heavy foreboding. The hostilities largely shut down Tel Aviv's HaCarmel Market and the workshops and factories of south Tel Aviv, Holon, and Bat Yam. Construction largely ceased as well. The residents of the poor neighborhoods on Jaffa's margins, among them many Hawranis, demonstrated in front of city hall, this time demanding bread. They were dispersed by members of the Arab Youth Organization, who were called in by Mayor Haykal to serve as a police force. The Hawranis, bereft of their jobs at the port, in factories, and without occasional work either, had no means of supporting themselves and became an explosive force within the city. Morale was very low—few people left their homes, and cafés and other places where people normally spent their leisure time began to close early. The preacher at the Great Mosque called in his Friday sermon to raise money to buy arms and to deploy more defenders in the marginal neighborhoods and villages. Some worshippers condemned the speculators and the politicians, "who are liable to bring catastrophe on the city."[36]

Life ostensibly returned to normal after the strike but, fearing for their safety, few people traveled outside the city. Manshiyya nearly emptied of its inhabitants; close to 2,000 families left the neighborhood. It looked like a disaster site after homes and businesses were plundered by Jews and Arabs alike. Refugees filled the city's hotels, took shelter in schools, and many remained on the street.

Manshiyya and other border neighborhoods became the preserve of contingents of armed youths. The Jaffa municipality did its best to hearten the refugees. In posters and personal conversations with area mukhtars and inhabitants, Mayor Haykal tried to persuade them to return to Manshiyya "for the good of the city," and to help get the city back to normal. These pleas seem to have had little effect on the refugees, most of whom were penurious villagers who probably cared little about wealthy Jaffa. When the British forces lifted their daytime curfew a certain measure of normal life returned to Manshiyya—schools reopened, buses ran, and Friday prayer services were held at the Hasan Bek Mosque, under the protection of armed positions erected on the border with Tel Aviv. But at night arson attacks continued. Arabs who tried to return to the "cardboard" shantytown to collect their belongings were attacked by Jews in broad daylight. Insecurity, along with the economic collapse, led the civilian population to leave Manshiyya, turning it into the sole preserve of armed forces.[37]

After the bomb attacks on Café Venetzia on December 13 and the Saray building on January 4, additional waves of inhabitants fled the city. The explosions left a heavy imprint on the memories of Jaffa's inhabitants for many years thereafter.[38] In a telephone call intercepted by the Haganah's wiretapping division a short time after the Saray explosion, the speakers were alarmed and despairing. A lawyer, Sa'id Zayn al-Din, Nimr al-Hawwari's partner, spoke to a member of his family in Khan Yunis, near Gaza:

ZAYN AL-DIN: I can't in any way offer a description [of how the explosion happened]. The situation here is very bad. All of Iskander 'Awad Street [today the western part of Raziel Street] has been destroyed and there are many wounded and dead, more than a hundred.
THE MAN IN KHAN YUNIS: Why don't you come here?
ZAYN AL-DIN: We'll come, we can't suffer any more.

A journalist who spoke to the editorial offices of *al-Difa'* related:

JOURNALIST: They are still transporting the wounded in buses. They think that there are many people under the rubble. The veteran who owns the barber shop was found under a pile of debris at his shop, poor man. There is not a single store along the whole street in which the door was not blown off its hinges. All the storekeepers plan to transfer their merchandise [to secure places] because they have no doors and windows.
EDITOR: Oh my God! Two more explosions like that and nothing of Jaffa will remain!

A conversation between two other Jaffites testified to the depth of the trauma:

> I'm really not afraid of shooting [by snipers], I can manage with bullets, but I am terrified by one thing … by what Stern [LEHI] does. I'll tell you an interesting case, on the day of the bombing of the bank and the National

> Committee I stood beside Hajj Ibrahim [Jabr], who was speaking to another man. They were arguing where it was safest to sit and conduct their affairs. Hajj Ibrahim insisted that the safest place was behind the Saray, where no bullets could reach, and they agreed to go there. And by [Prophet] Muhammad I swear that just a few minutes later Hajj Ibrahim was under the wreckage.[39]

A number of unfounded rumors began to spread after the bombings. According to one, the Jews were excavating a tunnel underneath Manshiyya with the intention of filling it with explosives and "blowing all Manshiyya up into the air." Other people blamed the British for the explosions. As a result, some Arabs even interfered with British army and police forces working to rescue the wounded and extricate them from the rubble. Another rumor was that Arab collaborators with the Jews had set off the bombs.[40]

Rumors and accusations about alleged spies, traitors, and collaborators, real and imagined, were rife among the Arabs during the inter-communal war. Some Arabs informed on others to further their own personal, economic, or other interests. In Jaffa, as elsewhere, the mufti's supporters accused the opposition of "treason," both in public and behind closed doors. Indeed, many of Shai's Arab informers were motivated by political and personal rivalries with the Husayni party leadership.[41]

Well-known figures in Jaffa were well connected with Shai agents and the Jewish Agency's Political Department. Among them was Nimr al-Hawwari, the city's first military commander. After he was sent away from Jaffa, others, among them leading journalists, continued to pass on information to Haganah intelligence. Shai's informers included Palestinian Arabs of all walks of life, including veterans of combat with both the British and Jews.[42] The National Committee's Press and Propaganda office asked 'Adil Najm al-Din, who was slated to arrive in the city to command the garrison, to conduct an investigation to uncover the spies.[43] Hawwari, for his part, later attributed to a journalist of the mufti's family, Munif al-Husayni, the statement that "We will not suffer any damage [even] if 30,000 speculators and land sellers [i.e. 'traitors'] among Jaffa's inhabitants are killed. With their blood we will save the country and prepare the way for casting the Jews into the sea." In a speech he made before his men in Jaffa, Hawwari accused the Arab Higher Committee (in other words, the mufti) of deliberately not arming Jaffa and of "sacrificing its people so that they get massacred by the Jews." The purpose, Hawwari claimed, was to induce the Arab countries to take action against the partition plan.[44] Since the opposition was dominant in Jaffa, these accusations reinforced the general pessimism about the likelihood of success in the fight against the Jews and of frustrating the partition plan. For example, teachers at al-'Amiriyya High School engaged in fierce debates with their nationalistic and militaristic pupils. One of them, a history teacher named Zuhdi Jarallah, from a well-known opposition family, predicted that the partition plan would be accepted by the UN General Assembly. While he did not dare say so in public, his pupils knew that he believed that the Arabs

should agree to the partition on the grounds that they would most likely lose a war against the Jews. His pupils, however, believed that this position represented his political and even personal preferences.[45] Some Jaffites, though not many, seem to have argued that "the number of Jews in the country has equaled that of the Arabs" (this was not true, but the large number of Jews in the Jaffa region may have given that impression), and therefore "partition is a just solution."[46]

Public figures were charged with corruption and placing their personal interests before the public interest. In a telephone call intercepted after the Saray explosion, a Jaffite accused Mayor Haykal of having given himself 25 bodyguards, which he requisitioned from among only 50 municipal policemen active at that early stage. (In fact, most of these guards seem to have been deployed to protect municipal buildings, such as the water reservoir and pumping stations, the slaughterhouse, the farmers' market, and city hall.)[47] In another phone call, two women from a well-off neighborhood maligned the character and deeds of their neighbor, Rafiq al-Tamimi. They were deeply concerned about the lack of security and spoke cynically about the war, the national struggle, and the sacrifice both required:

THE WIFE OF [MUHAMMAD?] 'ABD AL-RAHIM: Today I also saw Rafiq Tamimi coming home early, at 7:15, which proves that he didn't sleep at home.

NEIGHBOR: I also saw him and his wife, too, coming to their home early in the morning. They don't sleep in their home at night. They're hiding something.

'ABD AL-RAHIM'S WIFE: They're those kind of people, their whole life is secrets and deception. Why doesn't Rafiq Tamimi inform us that the house is in danger so that we can also leave here at night?

NEIGHBOR: Are you sure that the danger is only at night?

'ABD AL-RAHIM'S WIFE: We are in danger during the day, too. It's impossible to say that we are safe at night. Who are they afraid of?

NEIGHBOR: Of both. Of the Jews and the opposition Arabs. Can you imagine what a shock it was for us when a grenade was thrown at his house?

'ABD AL-RAHIM'S WIFE: I heard that he plans to run away to Egypt, but that his passport was stolen along with all the other mail from the train.

NEIGHBOR: Right, and you know what? They set the fire and then run away.

'ABD AL-RAHIM'S WIFE: And what do you have to say about the wife of [Raghib al-] Dajani, she doesn't look upset at all over her son's death? I didn't know that she was such a nationalist. She's always talking about the people, the homeland, and all that.[48]

The conversation mixed facts and emotions. The grenade thrown at the Tamimi home was apparently cast by Arab members of the opposition, in November 1947. Tamimi asked one of the military commanders to place guards at his house, promising in return to supply more arms. But the main reason Tamimi was planning to travel to Egypt seems to have been that the mufti was pressuring him to do so, in order to keep him away from Jaffa.[49] Raghib al-Dajani's son,

Ghalib, was the city's social services director and was killed in the Saray explosion. His father was one of the leading members of the Dajani family in Jaffa, which unlike the family of the same name in Jerusalem, was known to support the Husaynis.[50] Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahim, a citrus grove-owner and member of the National Committee, whose wife was apparently a participant in the above conversation, was also a leading Husayni supporter in Jaffa during the Mandate period, and served too as the chairman of the Palestinian Arab Party's Jaffa branch. But at the beginning of February he was dismissed from the National Committee under pressure from its more militant members, after he demanded action to restore calm, including a cessation of hostilities. As the conversation indicates, his wife probably agreed with him.[51]

Citrus farmers, merchants, and dealers all tended to oppose war. As early as August 1947 figures in this business tried to exert their influence to halt hostilities. Militant Arabs were attacking Jews in response to a retaliation operation by the Haganah in the Abu Laban citrus grove. (The Haganah's retaliation was a response to a murder at the Gan Hawaii Café.) In November they again strove to cool tempers, following an attack on a Jewish bus on its way to Holon, in retaliation against the killing of five young men of the Shubaki family by LEHI gunmen (who were in turn taking revenge because one of the members of the family had informed to the British about LEHI activities). The citrus sector managed to stymie another round of retaliations against the Jews.[52]

The citrus harvest began at the end of November 1947 and continued through the end of March. When the strike was declared, the citrus farmers demanded that it be postponed until after the harvest, and be rescheduled for March 5. Their representatives on the Jaffa National Committee supported them. But the mufti and the Arab Higher Committee decided to begin the strike despite the objections. Yet pressure from the growers seems to have been one of the reasons that the strike was scheduled to last for only three days, in contrast with the lengthy strike of 1936. The shooting war with the Jews blocked the access roads to the Jaffa and Tel Aviv ports from which the fruit was exported, and placed the harvest, packing, and marketing efforts at risk. The growers' position received support at a meeting of the Jaffa Chamber of Commerce, where speakers voiced their fears that they would not be able to meet their financial obligations, and proposed postponing hostilities in Jaffa.[53]

Arab and Jewish citrus farmers and exporters, who were accustomed to cooperate, endeavored to conclude, through British mediation, a "citrus treaty" under which both sides would agree not to damage the other's citrus groves, shipping, and export facilities. An unwritten agreement of this sort indeed seems to have gained, thanks to pressure from Jewish farmers, the tacit consent of the Haganah command in Tel Aviv. But the Haganah's national command took exception to the pact, as did the Arab national leadership. In the end, the contacts succeeded in keeping clashes in areas of citrus groves at a low level through the end of the harvest, but were unable to achieve a stable cease-fire.[54]

Still, the Arab growers managed to complete the harvest and send their produce off to Europe, primarily to Great Britain (the British ruled that the

produce must reach them first; British mediation in the citrus issue was not altruistic). By the beginning of February 2.25 million crates of citrus fruit had been shipped out of the Jaffa port, as opposed to only 0.75 million from Tel Aviv's port. (Another 3.5 million, both Arab and Jewish, went through Haifa.) The only halts in the harvest and in export were not due to war, but rather to inclement winter weather. The export from Jaffa's port proceeded in an orderly fashion until the end of the harvest in April 1948.[55] During the 1947–1948 harvest season a total of 3,657,000 crates of fruit were exported from Jaffa, more than in any other year since the outbreak of World War II, an impressive achievement given that an inter-communal war was raging and that Jewish farmers, who were now wholly dependent on the Tel Aviv port, had trouble getting their fruit out of the country.[56]

Arab citrus growers and the upper middle class were the backbone of the opposition in Jaffa, which was led by Hawwari and Haykal. It was the economic interests of these groups, along with those of other businessmen, that led them to oppose hostilities. But working-class Arabs and day laborers, who lost their jobs as a result of the war, also opposed confrontation with the Jews. So did villagers, who feared Jewish retaliation that would wreak havoc on their farms, the source of their livelihoods. To this should be added the tacit resistance of most of the middle class, who were also in danger of losing their livelihoods as a result of the collapse of public order. Members of the opposition placed their hopes in King ʻAbdallah, but except for some occasional assistance provided by his army, Arab Legion, which was deployed in Palestine under British command until the end of the Mandate, ʻAbdallah did little but provide moral support.[57]

Another important stage in the disintegration of Jaffa society was the flight of the city's well-off residents to Arab areas that were considered safer, and even to neighboring countries. The travails of the middle class were exacerbated by animosity between them and the inhabitants of the poor neighborhoods, who during the strike had looted Christian-owned stores on Bustrus Street. The British army fired on the plunderers to disperse them and imposed a curfew. The looting prompted a large portion of the city's middle class inhabitants to leave the city. Widad, the Anglican daughter of Judge Salim Shehadeh and the wife of a lawyer, ʻAziz Shehadeh, recalled in December 1947 "walking up the street and counting the empty homes belonging to friends I used to visit." According to a Shai report, 60 percent "of Jaffa's wealthy Christians," as well as many Muslims and most of the inhabitants of Jabaliyya, the northern part of which was well-off, abandoned the city during the first month of fighting. According to one source, some 15,000 Arabs had left Jaffa by mid-January, about 20 percent of the population. Many of them left by sea, which was thought to be safer than the overland route that went by Jewish Mikveh Yisrael. Some went to Gaza or to Acre, while others traveled as far as Egypt or Lebanon.

Another important element in destabilizing social solidarity was religious conflict. Relations between Muslims and Christians grew more strained as social tensions worsened, since many members of the middle class were Christians. According to a Christian Shai informer, the Muslims accused the Christians of

being less than enthusiastic about the national struggle, and of evading the war with the Jews. Someone even checked and discovered that only one of the dead from the explosions at Café Venetzia and the Saray was a Christian, even though Christians made up 23 percent of Jaffa's Arab population. Of course, the bombing of the Saray occurred on a Sunday, and clearly the bomb did not discriminate between people. But the very fact that someone thought it worth calling attention to the disproportionately low Christian casualties says something about Muslim-Christian relations. Similarly, the Christians were hardly the only ones to avoid the fighting. Many Palestinian Arabs, and Jaffa's Arabs in particular, especially the well-off and those of the middle class, were indifferent about or even reluctant to fight the Jews. But their opposition was of the passive sort, limited, at most, to speaking their minds, and even this quite rarely. These opponents, among whom numbered a large portion of Jaffa's notable citizens, found themselves caught between hammer and anvil. On the one hand the economy and the security situation were collapsing at the same time that extremists were pressing for the war to continue, and on the other hand the Jewish war effort was pressing forward.[58]

At the end of January it turned out that, despite the efforts of the National Committee and the municipality, Jaffa's economy had suffered a mortal blow. Businesses had been hit hard and unemployment was growing. The rise in prices of basic commodities led to a sharp plunge in the consumption of other goods, a decline of 30 to 50 percent in some areas. Industry suffered from a shortage of fuel. Light industry, which employed mostly Arabs, was one of the principal victims. Most of the textile shops were working at half their usual production, and some had laid off between two-thirds and three-quarters of their workers. Nur, a Jewish-owned factory located in an Arab area that manufactured matches, shut down, resulting in a general shortage of this product. The city government fell into financial crisis. Mayor Haykal notified schoolteachers that there was no money to pay their salaries, and that Jaffa's schools might shut down forthwith. Groups of unemployed rural and Hawrani laborers loitered on the streets, and fear and panic reigned. The city's street life came to an end before seven in the evening, even in central areas. At this same time, life in nearby northern and central Tel Aviv continued normally into the late night hours. The social and cultural life of the rich ceased. Leisure and entertainment institutions that, before the war, had been open until late now shut their doors. The streets became the preserve of armed bands of young men who stopped passersby and examined their identity cards.[59]

Attempts to reach local peace agreements

Common economic and local interests engendered attempts to reach local peace agreements, or at least a cease-fire on the Jaffa front (as well as in other parts of the country). Tel Aviv's mayor, Yisrael Rokach, contacted the National Committee's treasurer, Ahmad Abu Laban, a supporter of the mufti, through the mediation of the British district governor, William Fuller, and asked for a truce.

But Abu Laban did not reply, or according to another account responded that only the Arab Higher Committee could agree to a truce, and that it was not within his own powers to conclude one. Rokach then, on December 7, 1947 wrote to his Jaffa counterpart, Haykal, proposing that they issue a joint call for a cessation of hostilities and for the return of both Arab and Jewish refugees to their homes. News of Rokach's proposal appeared in the Arab press, garnering no little support. On December 9 Haykal responded in the affirmative (although his letter blamed all the hostilities on the Jews). Rokach then set off for Cairo to urge the mufti to approve a cease-fire. Al-Husayni seems to have refused. He may have been ignorant of the harsh realities in Jaffa, or have been unconcerned about the city's fate, or even have wanted the conflict to escalate. In any case, he vetoed the move to achieve a truce between the two cities.[60]

Eliezer Perlson, Rokach's deputy and, after Rokach's departure on December 23, acting mayor,[61] vainly tried to arrange a meeting with Haykal. Fuller and the Jewish district officer, concluded that Jaffa would not survive without an agreement, leading them to attempt to mediate between Perlson and Haykal, but both sides said that they needed authorization by their respective national leadership. When the Arabs proposed that the cease-fire include the villages Yazur and Beit Dajan, David Ben-Gurion told Perlson to demand that Ramla also be included—which would largely have neutralized the Arab district commander, Hasan Salama. The Arabs, apparently, rejected that categorically. Evidently seeking to stay aligned with the National Committee, or perhaps under its direct orders, the Arab negotiators demanded the evacuation of a Jewish border neighborhood, Maccabee, which had been abandoned by its civilian inhabitants and was now occupied solely by Haganah fighters. The Jewish leadership rejected this condition. The attempt to achieve a local truce failed, being inconsistent with larger developments on the countrywide level.[62]

Similar attempts to reach agreements between Jabaliyya and Bat Yam and between Tall al-Rish and Holon ultimately went nowhere, although these did not need to be sanctioned by higher authorities. On December 16, Jabaliyya's notable citizens asked to meet with the chairman of the Bat Yam local council. In his office they complained that "hotheaded youths are bringing catastrophe on Jaffa and destroying the peace between the cousins, Jews and Arabs." The two sides signed an agreement that included the continued supply of water from Bat Yam to Jabaliyya. The neighborhood notables promised to use their influence to prevent gunfire from Tall al-Rish as well, and to return the body of a Haganah soldier, Ya'akov Katz, who had been killed in the first battle between Holon and Tall al-Rish. The supply of water and electricity to Jabaliyya was resumed forthwith, but 72 hours later the truce was violated when Arab combatants fired into Bat Yam. When the Haganah commanders in the field inquired why the agreement had been violated, they received a hostile answer from the Arab partisans on Jabaliyya's outer perimeter. These, apparently, were the "hotheaded youths" that Jabaliyya's notables had referred to. At this same time, Haim Kugel, chairman of the Holon local council, set out for a meeting that the British had arranged with two mukhtars from Tall al-Rish. The mukhtars proposed

"to institute peace between Holon and Tall al-Rish." Kugel proposed both a permanent peace agreement between Holon and the Arab neighborhood and a regional truce for the neighboring Arab and Jewish villages. The mukhtars, however, were prepared to agree only to a provisional truce, on the grounds that, in the wake of the UN partition decision, it would be impossible to establish a permanent peace. Two hours of negotiations led to a cease-fire agreement. The Arabs also agreed to allow a group of Ya'akov Katz's comrades to excavate in a search for his body. They were accompanied by Arab and British policemen, but the body was not found. This agreement was breached just a few hours later, when heavy Arab fire cut Holon off from Tel Aviv. Once again, the perpetrators seem to have been militants who, under pressure from Hasan Salama, disregarded the agreement signed by the mukhtars.[63]

Nimr al-Hawwari's brief command

Muhammad Nimr al-Hawwari was appointed commander of the forces in Jaffa by his rival the mufti on December 6, 1947. In the confusion that characterized the beginning of the war, the mufti sought internal stability, which led him to name Hawwari as chief of "general security in Jaffa." The mufti's representative in the city and member of the Arab Higher Committee, Rafiq al-Tamimi, delivered to Hawwari a letter containing instructions from the national leader. This seems to have been one more attempt, following the failed merger of the Najjada and Futuwwa youth movements, to enlist Hawwari and his supporters in the national war effort and to subordinate them to the Arab Higher Committee. The mufti apparently intended to grant Hawwari responsibility for internal security and public order, while leaving command of the defensive and offensive efforts on the borders in the hands of his loyalists. The mufti's supporters in Jaffa's National Committee viewed him as merely the chief of a domestic police force. But Hawwari interpreted the mufti's missive as appointing him to be Jaffa's military commander—and he acted accordingly.[64] Hawwari and his youth movement loyalists continued to function as a stabilizing force, in contrast with the mufti's largely militant supporters.[65]

Hawwari's first move as commander was to set up his own 20-member committee, which he called the Security Council (*Majlis al-Amn*), to serve as a counterweight to the National Committee. Like the latter, Hawwari's Security Council also had subcommittees, which were responsible for security, guarding, first aid, finances, supplies, transport, and intelligence. The Council put up placards calling on the city's inhabitants to preserve order and refrain from plundering Arab property, to obey the Council's members, assist them, and focus on defense. The declaration hinted that, at a later stage, there might also be attacks against the Jewish side. Hawwari, who was a gifted orator, on December 10 spoke at a public gathering, held to mark the founding of the Security Council. He called on all the city's sectarian groups to unite behind a banner that was "non-partisan, non-sectarian, and non-family." He also announced a decision by the Security Council's finance committee to impose a "popular tax" on heads of

families and the owners of businesses and factories, for the purpose of funding military outlays. His speech was received with applause.[66]

The Security Council divided Jaffa into defense sectors and mobilized several retired army officers, among them Hasan Hasuna, who worked to improve the guard operation, establish battle positions, put in place a training program, institute first aid and supply services for the front, create reinforcement units, and organize the registration of privately owned firearms.[67] But Hawwari's efforts to set up a tax collection authority independent of the National Committee collided with the agendas of the existing institutions. Tamimi told Hawwari that he had overstepped his authority as defined in the mufti's letter.[68]

The latter, who maintained contacts with the Haganah, was aware of the efforts of Rokach and Haykal to achieve a local truce. He was thus not surprised when, a few days after his appointment, he received from the Haganah a proposal to meet to seek an understanding on a cessation of hostilities in Jaffa. The meeting took place in mid-December at the Qasr al-Bahr (Sea Palace) Café on the Jabaliyya beach, in full view of the café's other clients and passersby. The Haganah's representative at the meeting was a veteran Shai officer, Yehoshua "Josh" Palmon. Hawwari knew him well, and the two men agreed to a cease-fire that would quiet the area and restore normal activities.[69]

The National Committee and the mufti's supporters soon heard about the meeting. They accused Hawwari of treason, and even of providing the Haganah with information about Jaffa's defenses. The National Committee had no compunctions about disseminating information it had about Hawwari's past connections with the Haganah. In the wake of this publicity, Hawwari received implicit and explicit threats on his life. Through Tamimi's mediation, he was summoned to Cairo. He left for that city on December 24 to report on his actions to the mufti. In practice, this meant that he went into exile—but it may well have saved his life. Immediately following Hawwari's trip, the mufti dismantled the Security Council, giving a direct order by telephone to a meeting of that body. Hawwari himself was forbidden to return to Palestine. The mufti sent him to the western desert to collect weapons from Bedouin tribes, a mission where he would supposedly use his organizational and rhetorical gifts, far from Jaffa.[70]

When news of Hawwari's agreement with the Haganah and his dismissal was published in Jaffa, a large part of the public viewed him as a traitor. His "treason" led to a crisis and the morale of many of his supporters declined. They thought that in going to Egypt he was running away, and this reinforced the rumors about his alleged treason. Hawwari quickly lost all of his influence in Jaffa. According to some accounts, he was apprehensive about returning to Palestine after his meeting with the Haganah officer had become public knowledge. His men were unable to withstand the pressure from the National Committee, caved in on the independence of the Security Council and agreed to conjoin it with the Committee. In other words, Hawwari's loyalists surrendered and the mufti's supporters won a victory. It was a heavy blow for Hawwari's and Haykal's camp who lost much of their influence, or at the very least their ability to act independently. Hawwari's short tenure ended in disappointment and

embarrassment. The "treachery" of this charismatic commander was much spoken of in Jaffa during the weeks that followed, and its reverberations lasted much longer.[71]

Hasan Salama and the Al-Aqsa defenders army

On December 7, 1947, Hasan Salama arrived in the village of Salamah. It seems to have been his first public appearance during the war in the Lydda district, and in the Jaffa area in particular. Salama, a mufti loyalist who had served as the commander of the Lydda-Ramla-Jaffa region during the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, had been appointed by the military commission in Damascus to the command of the western sector of the central zone, comprising the Lydda district, which included Jaffa.[72]

Born in 1912 at the village of Qula, northeast of Jaffa, Salama came from a poor background. In his youth, he worked as a laborer in a workshop, at a stable, and had also engaged in criminal activity, according to rumors. During the Palestinian Arab revolt (1936–1939), he became a band leader and commander of the Lydda-Jaffa area, known as a loyalist to the mufti. After the Revolt he traveled to Germany, where he received military training during World War II. In 1944 he was a member of a squad of paratroopers, who were landed by the Germans near Jericho. He managed to escape the British security forces, and found refuge in Syria.[73]

Salama returned to Palestine from Syria, accompanied by two bodyguards and a small group of supporters who were to serve as the nucleus of the force he was charged with establishing. He presented himself as the regional commander on behalf of the mufti, and urged the inhabitants to organize a fighting force in the rural region and to launch an offensive against the nearby Tel Aviv suburbs. The next day Salama reached Jaffa itself, where he met with members of the National Committee and pro-mufti activists. Other figures were also there, among them Nimr al-Hawwari, Salah al-Nazir, and Mustafa Tahir. The meeting was conducted in Hawwari's office. The latter had received his letter of appointment from the mufti that very same day. Salama seems to have tried to put Hawwari in his place and to assert his standing as the senior commander in the region and as having the mufti's ear. During the meeting Salama proposed several plans, among them an attack on the Jewish settlements in the district. The purpose was to push the Jews back into Tel Aviv. He proposed that women and children should be evacuated from Jaffa in anticipation of a Jewish offensive. Hawwari and Tahir, for their part, made it clear that the sole responsibility for Jaffa lay with them, by the mufti's sanction. Salama realized that he would not be able to set up his headquarters or center his activities in Jaffa, but instead would need to locate these in Lydda. In fact, Salama did not even spend the night in Jaffa, where he felt threatened by his opponents. He went among the villages and slept in the homes of influential supports of the mufti, or in his home village of Qula, where he stayed with his family. Everywhere he went he demanded an offensive against the Jews.[74]

During Salama's visit to Salamah, his host, Mukhtar Musa Abu Hashiyya, acceded to his plea to set out the next day to attack the adjacent Jewish neighborhood of Hatikvah. Salama planned the action, which took place on December 8. Hundreds of Arab fighters from near and far—Salamah, 'Abbasiyya-Yahudiyya, Ramla, Lydda and, apparently, even Nablus—took part. The forces were commanded by Abu Hashiyya and leaders from 'Abbasiyya and Lydda. Some of the assailants staged a decoy attack at a number of points along a kilometer-long sector, while the principal force stormed Beit Ya'akov, an extension of Hatikvah that reached out toward Salamah. In this latter sector the attackers managed to seize, loot, and burn several huts in this poor quarter, which had been largely vacated by its inhabitants in obedience to orders from the Haganah. Haganah reinforcements from Tel Aviv repelled the attackers, killing many of them. According to different accounts, the number of Arab dead ranged from 16 to 23, with most of the dead from Salamah and 'Abbasiyya.[75]

In the villages near Tel Aviv, the mufti's supporters, Salama in particular, lost much of their luster in the wake of the failure of the Hatikvah attack. In an assembly held a week later in Qula, attended by Abu Hashiyya and other representatives of the villages, Salama tried to press for more attacks against Jewish settlements. He even demanded that Abu Hashiyya and his men attack Hatikvah once more. The villagers turned him down flat. They complained of a shortage of money, weapons, and ammunition, and noted that calm prevailed in other areas of the country. Salama retorted that the mufti was sending arms and money "in time of need," and would continue to do so. In the final analysis, Salama seems to have had only limited influence, both because of the botched attack on Hatikvah and because of the villagers' fear of retaliation from the Jewish settlements, which had a clear advantage in the area. He could do no more than pressure those who were vacillating to arm themselves, and engage in political propaganda against the opposition, in particular against the leader they supported, King 'Abdallah of Transjordan.[76]

Salama's problematic personality was most apparent when he engaged in train robberies. He justified this activity by claiming that the cargo he was stealing belonged to Jews or was being sent to them. But it turned out that it actually belonged to Arab traders from Jaffa, who demanded that their merchandise be returned. Salama claimed that his men had already sold the goods. The Jaffa National Committee demanded that he desist from robbing trains because it was harming Arab merchants and disrupting the supply of food to the city. By the end of January Salama was on bad terms with the inhabitants of Salamah, Abu Hashiyya included, after they learned that he had been slated to receive a large shipment of guns and bullets from Egypt to be distributed to them. When he joined the revolt in 1936, Salama was known as a criminal and thief. It was rumored that he had pocketed some of the money he had received from the villagers to purchase arms. He claimed that the inhabitants of Lydda had appropriated the shipment. Apparently it was this allegation that got him in conflict with them, and their neighbors in Ramla as well. They refused several times to take part in operations he organized. In the end he had to conduct a series of peace councils with the region's notables.[77]

After his failure in the village region and following Hawwari's dismissal, Salama was able to make Jaffa the focal point of his activity in mid-January 1948. He became the dominant commander in the city, though he still had many opponents. He still avoided staying in Jaffa on a regular basis, and set up quarters in 'Abbasiyya-Yahudiyya.[78] Salama continued the reorganization of the city's defenses that had begun during Hawwari's brief tenure. Jaffa's city limits were divided into 13 sectors with a garrison assigned to each one: Jabaliyya, Karm Suwwan, Saknat Darwish, and Tall al-Rish in the south; Taso, Himo, and Karm al-Tut in the east; Abu Kabir, the slaughterhouses, al-Basa, the train station, and Manshiyya in the north, and the port in the center. These regional garrisons, each of them consisting of several dozen soldiers, together totaled 375 troops. Their principal concentrations were in Abu Kabir in the north and on the Jabaliyya-Saknat Darwish-Tall al-Rish front on the south. The units were organized as a militia called the al-Aqsa Defenders Army (*Jaysh Humat al-Aqsa*), which had originated as a small group under a retired military officer, Hasan Hasuna. It was founded toward the end of the Mandate period, playing a central role in the attacks on Jews following the UN partition decision on November 29. The force consisted largely of former workers, both Palestinian Arab villagers and Arabs from neighboring countries, who upon finding themselves unemployed enlisted in the war effort so that they could earn a salary. Salama tried his best to bring into the al-Aqsa Defenders Army all the other armed groups in Jaffa, such as 60 men loyal to 'Abd al-Rahman Siksik, the 30 members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and about 60 municipal policemen. All together, these auxiliary groups numbered 165 and were meant to serve as a reserve force. In practice, however, their allegiance to the al-Aqsa Defenders Army was only nominal, and this contributed to the militia's instability. It suffered from desertions, and fighters frequently moved from one garrison to another at their own initiative. By the end of December it was a force of 540 paid fighters. The Jewish forces in the Tel Aviv district had 1,107 paid troops and another 953 who were unpaid.

The Jaffa forces had available to them, according to figures cited by 'Arif al-'Arif, 284 guns—242 rifles, 6 machine guns, and 36 Sten and Thompson submachine guns. Of these, 127 rifles, 3 machine guns, and 24 submachine guns were in the hands of the regional forces. An Arab in the post office department set up field telephone lines that connected outposts with headquarters. The soldiers were trained by three men with army or police experience—the head of the National Committee's Defense Committee, Salah al-Nazir; Hasan Hasuna, who operated alongside al-Nazir, as he had alongside Hawwari during the latter's command; and another commander, Muhammad Nimr 'Awda. Later, Hasan Salama appointed al-Nazir, a Haykal supporter who had joined up with Salama after Hawwari's dismissal, to the post of "inspector" of the al-Aqsa Defenders Army, which in practice made al-Nazir the military commander of Jaffa.[79]

The mufti and the Arab Higher Committee viewed the al-Aqsa Defenders Army as a force under their command, ordering that the Committee's seal be imprinted on the documents produced by the Jaffa militia's command. Hasan

Figure 5.2 Holy War fighters (Palmach Archive).

Salama maintained direct contact with the militia's headquarters in Jabaliyya, and issued it daily instructions. The al-Aqsa force seems not to have been counted as part of the Holy War forces for reasons connected to the delicate balance between the mufti's supporters and opponents in Jaffa. Nevertheless, it was under Salama's control, and since Salama was one of the senior commanders of the Holy War forces, alongside 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, commander of the Jerusalem region, it was clear that he himself, like the mufti and his associates, viewed the al-Aqsa Defenders Army as the Jaffa branch of their forces.[80]

In mid-January the Haganah upped the pressure on Jaffa. The Kiryati Brigade in Tel Aviv and the Givati Brigade in the south transitioned gradually from a defensive to an offensive strategy, exploiting the Jewish advantage on the Jaffa front. Among other things, they dispatched intelligence scouts and sent out teams to blow up houses that served as sniper nests and combat positions in Salamah and Tall al-Rish. Following the failure to achieve local cease-fires with Holon and Bat Yam, Arab militants had taken the lead on the southern front. Many of the inhabitants abandoned the area and Tall al-Rish and southern Jabaliyya were virtually deserted except for the Arab militiamen, who fired regularly on Holon and Bat Yam. The Haganah carried out a series of retaliation operations, among them demolishing the "red house" on December 24 and the "white house" on January 17, two buildings in Tall al-Rish that had served as Arab positions. One

of the most noteworthy combatants in that sector was Michel al-'Isa, a Jaffa-born Christian Arab and a retired officer of the Transjordan Frontier Force. He was the nephew of *Filastin*'s publisher, 'Isa al-'Isa.[81]

Michel al-'Isa was active in 'Abd al-Rahman Siksik's organization. Siksik was a member of the city council who had declared himself Hawwari's successor. Like Hawwari, Siksik was a lawyer. He tried to organize the city's youth clubs under his command. Like Hawwari, he founded a "security council" of his own, composed of 'Isa and other men of military experience. He even opened a military training course in the Orthodox Club. Siksik, like Hawwari before him, seems to have successfully gathered hundreds of young and teenage admirers around him, but only a few dozen took part in the fighting. Hasan Salama demanded that Siksik not act independently. The latter agreed to cooperate on condition that Salama's men refrain from operations detrimental to the middle class, to which he belonged, as had occurred during the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939. The city's civilian institutions and military command were weak and could not prevent the activity of marginal forces like Siksik's organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, and independent neighborhood militias. The Brotherhood tried to exploit the situation to impose its values on the city's inhabitants, and to rid the city of alcohol and prostitution. Armed bands stole merchandise from the port, claiming, falsely, that the goods were meant for the Jews. This semi-anarchy intensified the confusion and insecurity of the city's civilians, as well as its fighters.[82]

On January 22, a contingent of 40 Bosnian Yugoslavian troops arrived in Jaffa under the command of Hasan Salama, who accompanied them, remaining in the city for about ten days. The Bosnians were experienced soldiers and knowledgeable in laying mines, preparing explosive charges, and building fortifications. (They were probably veterans of the Muslim division of the Waffen-SS, enlisted in Yugoslavia with the mufti's assistance.) Their arrival led to a resurgence of Arab military activity, but it also reinforced the city's penchant for relying on outsiders—such as migrants from the Hejaz, Yemen, Syria, and Transjordan who had come to the city as laborers and were now unemployed. A short time after the force's arrival, Salama issued two leaflets, one styling himself as the "general district commander." He demanded that Jaffites who owned weapons register so that their arms could be requisitioned when needed. Only a small number of civilians who owned rifles and submachine guns responded to this call, as did a few dozen pistol owners. Salama told the city's inhabitants that "Jaffa is the Zionists' first target," and urged them to enlist in the war effort, to refrain from congregating, and to avoid spreading panic during battles. He tried to create an impression that the city's defense was being conducted according to a systematic military plan that justified placing trust in the existing military apparatus. It is difficult to know to what extent Salama and his declarations aroused the confidence of the Jaffite public, but his presence in the city seems to have strengthened the National Committee, and perhaps prevented the collapse of its authority. The municipality and the opposition, whose members looked askance at Salama's political affiliation, were prepared to let him try to upgrade the city's defenses.[83]

Notes

1 See www.fqaddomi.com/qaddomicv.htm. I thank Prof. Hillel Cohen for bringing this source to my attention.
2 "In Jaffa when partition passed," December 5, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Summary of events on 30 November 1947," YTA 3/1/15; see also Arnon Golan, *Shinui merhavi: Totza'at milhamah: Ha-shetahim ha-Arviyim le-she'avar bi-Medinat Yisrael, 1948–1950* [Wartime spatial changes: Former Arab territories within the State of Israel, 1948–1950] (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2001), 75–76 (in Hebrew); Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah*, 32–33.
3 Hillel Cohen, *Good Arabs: The Israeli Security Services and the Israeli Arabs, 1948–1967* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 53–58; Report, December 1, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "The Situation in Jaffa, A Conversation with Arye (Nimr Al-Hawwari)," December 11, 1947, CZA, S25/4011; Avraham Noham, "Yafo be-milchama," [Jaffa at War] (History Branch, 1959) 8, IDFA 246/922/1975; "Announcement of the Higher Arab Committee," *Filastin*, December 5, 1947.
4 "Summary of events," December 3, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "News of the day," December 4, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "News of the day," December 6, 1947, IDFA 136/8275/1949; "News of the day," the borders of Jaffa, December 6–7, 1947, HA 61/105; "Riots on the borders and their organizers," December 9, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "From events in Jaffa," December 10, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; *al-Difa'*, December 12, 1947; *Filastin*, December 4, 12, 13, and 16, 1947; Alon Kadish, "Hatzava ha-Briti be-Manshiyya" [The British Army in Manshiyya] in *Ha-mordim: Ma'avak ha-IZL ba-Britim* [The Rebels: The IZL's Struggle against the British], ed. Jacob Markovizky (Jerusalem: Ministry of Defense, 2008) (in Hebrew).
5 *Al-Masri*, December 20, 1947; General Staff-Operations Division, "Circular No. 1: Lessons from activities through the end of December 1947," YTA 7/1/15; Yehuda Slutzky, Ben Zion Dinur, and Shaul Avigur, *Sefer Toldot ha-Haganah* [History of the Haganah] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1972), 1373 (in Hebrew); Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah*, 41–43, 193. For the Haganah snipers, see Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah*, 193.
6 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 226; Shafiq al-Hout, "Reflections on al-Nakba," *Journal of Palestine Studies 109* (1998) 26.
7 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 226; "Meeting about Semitic (Arab) matters," January 1, 1948, YTA 4/45/15 (Yisrael Galili documents); "Miscellaneous," January 2, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; Abu Iyad, (Salah Khalaf), *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle* (New York: Times Books, 1981), 31; see Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah*, 50.
8 "From the news log," December 8, 1947, YTA 136/8275/1949; "Concentrations of the IZL in the Shapira neighborhood and border streets," December 8, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "To all managers," December 9, 1947, YTA 136/8275/1949; "Acts of retribution and punishment in the Tel Aviv District (December 1947)," JI 19/7–4kaf; See also the petition by residents of the Tikva and Ezra neighborhoods, calling on the IZL to come to their assistance, December 12, 1947, JI 19/7–4kaf.
9 *Al-Difa'*, December 14, 1947; *HaBoker* (Tel Aviv), December 8 and 14, 1947; *HaTzofe* (Tel Aviv), December 14, 1947 in JI 19/7–4kaf; "Acts of retribution," [December 1947], JI 19/7–4kaf; testimony of Eliezer Sudit ("the beggar") "The attack on Abu Kabir on 21 March 1957," JI 19/7–4kaf; *HaBoker*, December 30, 1947, JI 19/7–4kaf; Yehuda Slutzky *et al.*, *Sefer toldot ha-Haganah*, 1543.
10 For the number and identity of the people killed, see *al-Sarih* (Jaffa), January 5, 1948; *al-Difa'*, January 5, 1948; *Filastin*, January 6, 1948; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 229. See, for example, the testimony of Ismael Abu Shahada in Adam LeBor, *City of Oranges: Arabs and Jews in Jaffa* (London: Bloomsbury, 2006), 106. On the explosion, see also Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer toldot ha-Haganah*, 1545 and the note on p. 1809

(in Hebrew). "Exploders of the National Committee building in Jaffa," January 7, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; "In Jaffa," January 7, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; District Commissioner's Offices, Lydda District, Jaffa, "Fortnightly Report for the Period 1–15.1.1948," TNA CO 537/3853. On the initiative to distribute food to children, see *Survey of Palestine*, 688.

11 "The National Committee in Jaffa," November 30, 1947, HA 67/105; "Assembling the Popular (National) Committee in Jaffa," December 2, 1947, HA 67/105, See also the poster of the National Committee in Jaffa in *al-Sha'b* (Jaffa), November 24, 1947 in Bayan al-Hut, *Al-qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat al-siyasiyya fi Filastin* [Political leaderships and institutions in Palestine]: 1917–1948. (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-dirasat al-filastiniyya, 1981), 834.

12 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 226–227; Muhammad Sa'id Ishkuntana, *Asrar suqut Yafa* [The secrets of Jaffa's fall] (Jerusalem: al-Matba'a al-faniyya, 1964), 10–11 (in Arabic); "Assembling the Popular Committee," December 1, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Selection of the Popular Committee," December 2, 1947, YTA 4/1/15.

13 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 227–228.

14 Ishkuntana, *Asrar suqut Yafa*, 13; see also the description by a Jewish source, JI kaf-4, 15/7/31.

15 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 229–230; See also *al-Difa'*, December 11, 1947 in HA 67/105.

16 See, for example, about the committees in the Irsheid, Nuzha and Al-Qazzaza neighborhoods, *Al-Sha'b*, December 11, 1947; "National Committee in Yazur," *al-Difa'*, December 11, 1947; "National Committee in Saqiya," *Filastin*, January 1, 1948 in YTA 5/1/15; "National Committee in Salama," *al-Difa'*, December 21, 1947' "Meeting of village representatives on the National Committee with the District Commissioner and Officer," *al-Difa'*, December 21, 1947.

17 David Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah: Milhemet ha-Atzma'ut tashah–tashat* [The War Diary: The War of Independence, 1948–1949] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982) 63 (December 2, 1947); Telephone conversation between "Ya'kub" from Jaffa and Dr. Khalidi, Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 133 (January 4, 1948).

18 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 230–231; see also the transfer of the P£3,000 to the National Committee, telephone conversation between Rafiq Tamimi and Amin Bek 'Aql, December 6, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; telephone conversation between Rafiq Tamimi and Amin Bek 'Aql, JI 9/8 4kaf; "Taxes levied by the National Committee," February 8, 1948, YTA 1/2/15.

19 *Al-Difa'*, December 19, 1947. Delegations from 17 organizations and clubs participated in the assembly on December 19; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 230. See also the description of Dr. Herbert Pritzke, a German physician who fled from a British POW's camp near the Suez Canal, and served as a doctor in the Arab forces on the Jaffa front: Herbert Pritzke, *Bedouin Doctor*, trans. Richard Graves (New York: Dutton, 1957), 156.

20 "In dangerous areas in Jaffa," *Filastin*, December 4, 1947.

21 *Filastin*, December 5, 7, 17, 20, 21, and 23, 1947. Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-Milhamah*, 258; Telephone conversation, January 10, 1948, JI kaf4–9/8. The flour warehouses, which were in the port area, were plundered by the Arab population in early May 1948. See Kadish, "Hatzava ha-Briti be-Manshiyya."

22 Telephone conversation, January 6, 1948, JI 9/8–4kaf; see also Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-Milhamah*, 258.

23 "Organizations by neighborhood in Jaffa," February 2, 1948, YTA 1/2/15.

24 "In Jaffa," January 13, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; Telephone conversation, January 14, 1948, JI 4kaf–9/8; conversations on January 15, 1948, JI 4kaf–9/8; District Commissioner's Offices, Lydda District, Jaffa, "Fortnightly Report for the period 1–15 January 1948," TNA CO 537/3853; conversation with Robinson, Director of the Citrus Supervision Board, January 21, 1948, YTA 15/1/7; "In Jaffa," January 21, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; Kadish, "Hatzava ha-Briti be-Manshiyya."

25 Telephone conversation from Jaffa to the mufti in Cairo, Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 169 (January 21, 1948).
26 *Al-Difa'*, February 17 and 19, 1948; *Filastin*, February 11 and 20, 1948.
27 *Filastin*, February 11, 1948.
28 *Filastin*, February 24 and 25, 1948.
29 *Al-Difa'*, February 23, 1948; *al-Mizan (Yafo)*, February 28, 1948.
30 "Apathy in Jaffa to approval of the Partition Plan," December 1, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Mood among the Arabs," December 1, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Mood in Jaffa," November 30, 1947, YTA 3/1/15.
31 W.A.C. Mathieson to J.E. Cable, December 3, 1947, TNA CO 537/3956; CID Headquarters, Jerusalem, to Chief Secretary, October 11, 1947, TNA CO 537/3956; Joseph Nevo, *King Abdallah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition* (New York: Macmillan with Oxford: St Antony's, 1996), 125–127.
32 "In the dangerous places in Jaffa, don't gather!" *Filastin*, December 4, 1947; "Mood among the Arabs," December 1, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Miscellaneous," December 1, 1947, YTA 4/1/15.
33 Meeting of the Higher Arab Committee, November 30, 1947, ISA, 65/3283 (Arabic).
34 "In Jaffa when partition passed," December 5, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "News of the day", December 4, 1947, HA 61/105.
35 "The Situation in Jaffa," December 2, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Bitterness among the general public in Jaffa," December 3, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "News of the day," December 2, 1947, HA 61/105.
36 "Mood among the Arabs," December 1, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Abu Kabir, Manshiyya and Sumeil neighborhoods," December 2, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Evacuating women and children from Jamusin," December 2, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Arabs' conversations about current events," December 8, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "News of the day," December 6, 1947, HA 61/105; Noham, "Yafo be-milchama," 3–4.
37 "Situation in Jaffa after the strike," December 12, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; See also Golan, *Shinui merhavi*, 95; Olitzky, *Bat Yam*, 95; poster issued by the Jaffa municipality in Manshiyya, *Filastin*, December 12, 1947; meeting between Haykal and the mukhtars of Manshiyya and the carton neighborhood, *al-Difa'*, December 10, 1947; poster issued by the Jaffa municipality *al-Difa'*, December 12, 1947. For the ongoing arsons and deterioration in Manshiyya, see *Filastin*, December 16, 1947.
38 See, for example Raja Shehadeh, *Zarim ba-bayit* [Strangers in the House] trans. Michal Zuckerman (Tel Aviv: Yedioth Sefarim, 2004), 15; Muhammad Hallaj, "Jaffa: Oranges and Explosives," in "Palestinian Voices: Recollections of the Nakba Through a Teenager's Eye," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 38 (Autumn 2008), 66–67.
39 Telephone conversations on January 4, 1948, YTA 15/1/6; see also another version of the same conversations on January 14, 1948, JI 4kaf–9/8; *al-Difa'*, January 5, 1948.
40 Conversations on January 9, 1948, YTA 1/1/6 .
41 Conversations on January 2 and 3, 1948, YTA 6/1/15. For a discussion of who was considered a "traitor" or "collaborator" in Palestinian Arab society during the Mandate period, see Hillel Cohen, *Army of Shadows: Palestinian Collaboration with Zionism, 1917–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 45–63.
42 Yoav Gelber, *Nitzaney ha-havatzelet: Ha-modi'in be-milhemet Ha-Atzma'ut I* [Budding the fleur-de-lis: Intelligence in the War of Independence, 1948–1949, I (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publications), 38–39; Cohen, *Army of Shadows*, 238.
43 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Umari, a member of the Press and Public Relations Office of the National Committee in Jaffa, to the commander of the Garrison and members of the National Committee in Jaffa, February 18, 1948, ISA 65/2616/peh-377 (in Arabic).
44 For Hawwari's speech, see Muhammad Nimr al-Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba* [The secret of the catastrophe] (Nazareth: Matba'at al-Hakim, 1955), 54 (in Arabic); Ishkuntana, *Asrar suqut Yafa*, 10.
45 Ibrahim Abu Lughod, "After the Matriculation," *al-Ahram Weekly*, May 6, 1998.

46 "Miscellaneous," January 2, 1948, YTA 15/1/6; Yusif Haykal, *Jalsat fi Raghadan* [Meetings in Raghadan (King 'Abdallah's palace)] (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1988), 13 (in Arabic).
47 Conversations on January 4, 1948, YTA 15/1/6; for another version of the same conversations, see JI kaf4–9/8. For the deployment of the municipal police, see *Filastin*, December 18, 1947.
48 Telephone conversations between 'Abd al-Rahim's wife and a neighbor, January 10, 1948, JI 4kaf–9/8.
49 Conversations between Rafiq al-Tamimi and 'Adil Effendi (commander of the fighters), January 9, 1948, YTA 15/1/6; conversation between Rafiq al-Tamimi and the mufti in Cairo, January 4, 1948, YTA 15/1/6; Ishkuntana, *Asrar suqut Yafa*, 7.
50 News item on the recovery of Ghalib al-Dajani's body from under the wreckage and obituary published by his family, *Filastin*, January 6, 1948.
51 For the family of 'Abd al-Rahim, see Qalyubi, *'A'ilat wa-shakhsiyyat min Yafa*, 317–318. For his death, see "In Jaffa," February 10, 1948, YTA 1/2/15; List of active Arab personalities responsible for inciting the Arab crowds, and all anti-Jewish activity in Jaffa and its subdistricts, January 7, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; testimony of Ahmad 'Abd al- Rahim, see Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 122–123.
52 Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah*, 21–24; "Murder of the al-Shubaki family," November 1947, YTA 4/1/15; poster of the National Committee in Jaffa in *al-Sha'b (Yafo)*, November 24, 1947 in al-Hut, *Al-qiyadat wal-Mu'assasat*, 834.
53 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 228, n. 1; see also the conversation with Ra'uf Halabi at Shefayim, December 8, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; News about the citrus crisis, *Filastin*, December 9–10, 1947; *al-Difa'*, December 10, 1947. For a detailed discussion see Shmaryahu Ben-Pazi, "Katif ha-hadarim ve-hashpa'ato al ha-Milhamah ha-bein-kehilatit be-Eretz Yisrael" [The citrus harvest and its influence on the inter-communal war in Palestine 1947–1948], in *Am be-milhamah* [Citizens at war], ed. Mordechai Bar-On and Meir Chazan (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi and Weizmann Institute, Tel Aviv University, 2006) 155–187; see also Golan, *Shinui merhavi*, 76. For the meeting of merchants, see "In Jaffa," December 10. 1947, YTA 15/1/4.
54 Ben-Pazi, "Citrus harvest," 155–187; Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah*, 257; Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 29 (December 29, 1947); "Consultation on the (citrus) arrangement between Tel Aviv and Jaffa," with the participation of David Ben-Gurion, Gad Machnes, Yosef Jacobson, Yisrael Galili, Levi Shkolnik (Eshkol) and Moshe Dayan, January 25, 1948, Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 184–185; "Meeting about Semitic (Arab) matters," with the participation of the aforementioned people and others, January 1–2, 1948, YTA 4/45/15 (Yisrael Galili documents).
55 High commissioner for Palestine, "Economic Report No. 48," January 1948, MEC CM III/1/104; *Filastin*, February 5, 11, 17, 24, and 27, March, 13, 17, 21, and 31, April 8 and 10, 1948; *al-Difa',* March 4 and 19, April 19*,* 1948.
56 Shmuel Avitzur, *Nemal Yafo be-ge'uto ube-shki'ato* [The Tide and Decline of the Port of Jaffa] (Tel Aviv: Milo, 1972) table 24, (in Hebrew).
57 "In Jaffa," January 4, 1948, YTA 15/1/6, "Weekly intelligence report," No. 143, January 2, 1948, TNA WO 275/120; documents from *Al-watha'iq Al-Hashimiyya: Awraq 'Abdallah bin Al-Husayn* [The Hashemite documents: Papers of 'Abdallah son of Husayn] vol. 5, part 1, Palestine 1948 (Amman: Jami'at Al al-Bayt, 1995); Ahmad al-Saqa's request for assistance from King 'Abdallah, Jaffa, January 10, 1948, and the king's response in which he calls for patience, January 12, 1948, docs. 9–10 (236–32, 33) 32; Rajb Barzaq from Jaffa, a request for assistance in the name of "Arab Palestine," April 21, 1948, doc. 32 (53–229) 49; Husn al-Qassim, Secretary of the Women's Union in Jaffa, message of support, March 27, 1948, doc. 32 (494–22) 139, and the encouraging response from the head of the Hashemite Royal Council, April 8, 1948, doc. 26 (494–23) 140; Dr. Hasan Far'un, Secretary of the Arab Medical Association in Jaffa, message of support and request to save the city, April 27, 1948, doc. 47

(53–24) 58; and an additional telegram from the above, May 1, 1948, doc. 51 (53–41) 59–60; Muslims of Jaffa and the district ask for help, April 10, 1948, doc. 153 (53–278) 120; Dr. Hamdi al-Taji al-Faruqi, Jaffa, April 23, 1948, request for assistance and congratulations on the Legion's attack on Neve Ya'akov, doc. 72 (53–181) 361; Food Recipients' Association in Jaffa, April 28, 1948, telegram about the reception for the delegation, doc. 75 (53–324) 363 (in Arabic).

58 Noham, "Yafo be-milchama," 2; see also the statements of Gad Machnes and Eliyahu Sassoon in "Meeting about Semitic [Arab] matters," January 1, 1948, YTA 4/45/15; "Miscellaneous," January 2, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; "In Jaffa," January 14, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; telephone conversations on January 16, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; "According to a Christian Arab: The mood after the explosion in Jaffa," January 16, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; testimony of Widad Shehadeh in Shehadeh, *Zarim ba-bayit*, 14.

59 High Commissioner for Palestine, "Economic Report," No. 48, January 1948, MEC CM III/1/104; "According to Dr. Matsliah," January 20, 1948, CZA S25/4015/A; "Event in the Lydda District," January 21, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; "In Jaffa," January 27, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; "Mood after the explosion in Jaffa," January 26, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; David Ben-Gurion at an assembly of the heads of the Jewish settlements, January 22, 1947, Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 171. For nightlife in Tel Aviv during the war, see Haim Fireberg, "*Digmei bilui be-Tel Aviv be-tekufat Milhamet ha-Atzmaut*" [Entertainment patterns in Tel Aviv during the War of Independence] in Bar-On and Chazan, *Citizens at war*, 380.

60 Yisrael Rokach to Yusif Haykal, December 7, 1947, TAMA 4/592/alef/3/8; Haykal to Rokeah, December 9, 1947, TAMA 4/592/alef/3/8; "The Jews ask for a truce," *Filastin*, December 11, 1947; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 229, n. 2; Ishkuntana, *Asrar suqut Yafa*, 11. For Haykal's flight, see Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 35 (December 10, 1947); see also "Surrounding the negotiations for a ceasefire," December 10, 1947, YTA 4/1/15.

61 On December 23, 1947, Rokach left on a mission on behalf of the Jewish National Fund, to raise funds in North America, See Naor, *On the Home Front*, 113.

62 Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 173, 178 (January 22, 1948).

63 On the proposal from Tall al-Rish, see "Daily summary," December 16, 1947, YTA 5/1/15; "Cease-fire between Tall al-Rish and Holon," December 16, 1947; YTA 5/1/15; "Summary of information from Alex," December 16, 1947; YTA 5/1/15; "Negotiations between Holon and leaders of Tall al-Rish," December 17, 1947, YTA 5/1/15; "Negotiations for peace with Tel al-Arish," December 19, 1947, YTA 5/1/15; "Shooting at Holon from Tel al-Arish resumes," December 18, 1947, YTA 5/1/15. For the cease-fire between Jabaliyya and Bat Yam, see, "Daily risk," December 17, 1947, YTA 5/1/15; "Meeting between the representatives of Bat Yam and the representatives of the Arabs to make peace," December 19, 1947, YTA 5/1/15; see also Olitzky, *Bat Yam*, 96–98; Aryeh Krishek, *Niktav ba-hol: Sipura shel Holon* [Written in Sand: The Story of Holon] (Tel Aviv: Reshafim, 1986), 132 (in Hebrew).

64 Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 38; Noham, "Yafo be-milchama," 7; compare with "The Situation in Jaffa," January 1, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; see also "Report," December 9, 1947 in Ezra Danin, *Tzioni ba-khol tenai I* [Zionist on without any conditions I] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1987), 207 (in Hebrew).

65 Noham, "Yafo be-milchama," 1, 7; "Riots on the borders and their organizers," December 9, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Report," December 9, 1947 in Danin, *Tzioni ba-khol tenai*, 207.

66 Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 38–39; "Meeting of the Security Council in Jaffa," *Filastin*, December 11, 1947; Poster "The Security Committee [Council]," Jaffa, December 10, 1947, YTA 4/1/15.

67 "The Arab camp in our region: A brief summary," March 15, 1948 (describing the situation from December on), YTA 139/8275/1949; see also "The situation in Jaffa," January 1, 1948, YTA 6/1/15.

68 Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 39–40; Noham, "Yafo be-milchama," 7–8.
69 Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 41. For the fishermen's version see Ishkuntana, *Asrar suqut Yafa*, 12; testimony of Yehoshua Palmon in Lazar, *Ha-mandatorim*, 81–82.
70 "The situation in Jaffa," January 1, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 52–55; Ishkuntana, *Asrar suqut Yafa*, 12–13.
71 "The National Committee in Jaffa thanks the members of the Security Council for their efforts," *al-Sarih*, December 25, 1947; "Miscellaneous," December 26, 1947, YTA 15/1/15; "From statements by 'Yogev,'" "Miscellaneous," January 2, 1948, YTA 15/1/6; "Miscellaneous," January 16, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; see also the description of Fatah leader Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), a native of Jaffa and member of al-Najjada in his youth, Abu Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, 32–33; Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 4–12.
72 Isma'il Safwat, "Establishing forces, defining fronts and their sectors," January 1, 1948, HA 230/general/8.
73 Hasan Salama, TI, 329/B/49; on the German paratroopers in Jericho see TNA KV 2/400; "Hasan Salameh," in "The Arab command in Jerusalem: Chief commanders in the Land of Israel," IDFA 283/7248/1949, 4.
74 "Sheikh Hasan Salama," December 9, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Hasan Salama" December 10, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Events in Jaffa," December 10, 1947, YTA 4/1/15; "Miscellaneous," December 18, 1947, YTA 5/1/15; Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 41–43; "Conversation with Arye" [Nimr al-Hawwari], December 11, 1947, CZA, S25/4011.
75 "Establishment of the National Committee in Salamah," *al-Difa'*, December 21, 1947; "From the news log," December 8, 1947, IDFA 136/8275/1949, see the comments there about the "dissidents;" Noham, "Yafo be-milchama," 9; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 227, 274, 277; "In Jaffa," December 18, 1947, (by Muhammad 'Atiyya, a journalist for *al-Difa'*) YTA 5/1/15; HQ Palestine, "Fortnightly intelligence newsletter," No. 57, December 6–18, 1947, Appendix A, 3, TNA WO 275/64; Slutzky, *et al.*, *Sefer toldot Ha-haganah*, 1376–1378.
76 "Conversation with Aryeh," December 11, 1947, CZA, s25/4011; "Meeting of Husayni loyalists with Hasan Salama," December 19, 1947, YTA 5/1/15; "Miscellaneous," December 19, 1947, YTA 5/1/15; "News about the Arabs," December 23, 1947, YTA 5/1/15. For accusations against King 'Abdallah, see "Miscellaneous," December 25, 1947, YTA 5/1/15.
77 "News from Jaffa," January 13, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; "About events in Salama," January 28, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; "Hasan Salama," January 28, 1948, YTA 7/1/15.
78 "The Arab camp in our region: A brief summary," March 15, 1948 (Nimr al-Hawwari), YTA 139/8275/1949; "Fortnightly intelligence newsletter," No. 58, December 18, 1947–January 1, 1948, TNA WO 275/64; "Miscellaneous," January 11, 1948, YTA 6/1/15.
79 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 231–234; Muhammad Nimr al-Khatib, "Min athr Al-Nakba," [Of the outcome of the catastrophe], in *Be-einei oyev* [In the eyes of the enemy], trans. Shmuel Sabbagh (Segev) (Tel Aviv: IDF Press, 1954), 30–31 (in Hebrew); Smadar Spector-Danon, "Darko ha-politit shel Ha-va'ad ha-'Arvi Ha-elyon ve-hakhanotav hatzva'iyot likrat milhemet 1948" [Politics of the Arab Higher Committee and its military preparations for the 1948 war]. (MA dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1986), 272–274 (in Hebrew); see also "Miscellaneous," January 2, 1948, YTA 6/1/15; "In Jaffa," (according to Muhammad Taha, a reporter for *Filastin*), January 4, 1948, YTA 6/1/15. According to Taha, the number of fighters on the southern front was higher (240). For the municipal police (city guard), see "Miscellaneous," YTA 5/1/15. For Nazir, see Ishkuntana, *Asrar suqut Yafa*, 13. For the number of Jews drafted in the district, see Kiryati to Yadin, "Summary from 7 January 1948 to 19 January 1948," YTA 7/1/15.
80 Spector-Danon, "Darko ha-Politit shel ha-Va'ad ha-'Arvi," 272–274; al-Khatib, "Min athr Al-Nakba," 30–31; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 73–74, 231–234; Pritzke, *Bedouin Doctor*, 147–156.

81 Kiryati to Yadin, "Summary from 7 January 1948 to 19 January 1948," YTA 7/1/15; "News from Tenne" (Shai), January 19, 1948, YTA 7/1/15; Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-Milhamah*, 97–104, 134–142; Ayalon, *Hativat Giv'ati*, 102–116.

82 "Security matters" (according to "Yogev," 'Abd al-Ghani al-Karmi) February 8, 1948, YTA 1/2/15; "The Arab commands in Jaffa" (according to "Yogev"), February 6, 1948, YTA 1/2/15; about the activities of the Muslim Brothers and other armed groups, see Yoav Gelber, *Komemiyut ve-nakba* [Independence and Nakba] (Or Yehuda: Dvir, 2004), 147 (in Hebrew).

83 "Miscellaneous," January 28, 1948, YTA 1/7/15; "Salaries and subsistence for guards in Jaffa," "Yugoslavia and Muslims in Jaffa," February 1, 1948, YTA 1/2/15; "Arab commands in Jaffa," February 2, 1948, YTA 1/2/15; "In the Arab camp: summary of information," February 8, 1948, HA 142/105; Hasan Salama, "To the brave residents of Jaffa," CZA S25/4015/A (in Arabic); General District Commander Hasan Salama, "To the honorable residents of Jaffa," undated, CZA S25/4015/A (in Arabic); Lists of weapon owners, Jaffa 1948, in "Lists of Arab fighters in Haifa," TI; Alon Kadish, Avraham Sela, and Arnon Golan, *Kibush Lod, Yuli 1948* [Conquest of Lydda, July 1948] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2000), 20–23.

6 The fall of Jaffa

The ALA arrives

At the beginning of February 1948, Hasan Salama left Jaffa for Damascus in order to attend a meeting of the Arab League's Military Committee. The purpose of the meeting, which began on February 4 and lasted three days, was to determine, once and for all, who was in charge in Palestine. It reconfirmed Salama's commission as supreme commander of the Lydda-Jaffa district, but in practical terms it divested him of direct command in Jaffa, and his influence there dwindled. Salama established his headquarters near Sarafand, west of Ramla, in a former British army facility. In operation "Nachshon," on April 5, 1948, the building was blown up by the Haganah. Salama, who was absent, thus survived, but the explosion eroded his prestige and his status as the area commander. He reestablished his command post in ʻAbbasiyya, but his scope of activities dwindled, and it seems that he avoided Jaffa since then, even in its time of dire need. On May 31, 1948 Salama was injured in battle at Ras al-ʻAyn, northeast of Jaffa, and on June 2 he died from his wounds. Despite the controversy of his image, he is remembered as a prominent Palestinian military leader in 1948, second only to ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni. His son, ʻAli Hasan Salama, known as "the red prince," continued in his footsteps as chief of operations for the Palestinian organization "Black September," and was believed to be responsible for the massacre of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972. ʻAli Hasan Salama is believed to have been assassinated by the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, in Beirut on 1979.[1]

Immediately following Hasan Salama's demise from Jaffa in February 1948, an Iraqi ALA officer, Major ʻAbd al-Wahab al-Shaykh ʻAli, was sent to the city along with 80 troops, also Iraqis, to serve as the nucleus of the city's ALA garrison-in-formation. But al-Shaykh ʻAli resigned his command a few days later. Once he learned of his problematic starting position he refused to take responsibility for the city. On February 15 the Military Committee appointed in his place Lieutenant Colonel ʻAdil Najm al-Din, also a retired Iraqi army officer. He arrived in Jaffa four days later along with another contingent of officers and troops, Iraqis and Yugoslavians, and took command.

This last enlargement of the garrison seems to have come in part in response to the request made by Mayor Haykal to the Military Committee. From this point

on, until the city fell in April, foreigners rather than Palestinian Arabs commanded the city. The ALA's garrison took control of the al-Aqsa Defenders Army and in fact replaced it for all intents and purposes, becoming the dominant military organization in Jaffa. Local commanders, such as Salah al-Nazir, were integrated into the new force in support and advisory positions. Through the end of March further foreign reinforcements arrived, among them Iraqis, Syrians, Yugoslavians, and even a small group of Germans who were considered experts in explosives and fortifications. The foreigners shunted aside the Palestinian Arab fighters. While individuals and groups of soldiers frequently deserted, the number of troops rose to 1,500. Yet, despite this considerable enlargement of the city's armed forces, the Jews continued to enjoy a decisive advantage in the region—at this time, the Haganah had 4,500 active troops deployed on the Jaffa front, and more than 12,000 personnel, men and women, in the Tel Aviv district.[2]

Jaffa's inhabitants, in particular those who opposed the mufti, initially welcomed the ALA. 'Abd al-Ghani al-Karmi, a journalist with close ties to King 'Abdallah, along with inhabitants of Salamah who had been at odds with Hasan Salama, drafted a letter of complaint to the ALA command. They demanded that Salama be expelled from Jaffa and the region, that the ALA Force in Jaffa be expanded, and that several members of the National Committee, whom they said had been interfering with Najm al-Din, be dismissed. Among them were the National Committee's secretary, Amin 'Aql, his deputy, Mustafa Tahir, Ahmad Abu Laban, and Muhammad Khayr al-Bahlul, originally a supporter of Hawwari.[3] The daily press also displayed sympathy for the ALA, printing admiring articles about Qawuqji when he entered the country, as well as about Najm al-Din and other officers.[4]

But the ALA's arrival in Jaffa was in fact a turning point in the relations between the city's inhabitants and the combatants defending them. True, up to this point many Jaffites had evinced little interest in the armed forces, but the fighters had been members of the community, not foreigners. A short time after the ALA's arrival, this attitude changed. The new forces were increasingly seen as corrupt, indifferent strangers who treated the locals with condescension and fleeced them of their possessions. At the beginning of April, Najm al-Din established a military court that began to impose fines on civilians who bore arms without a license (the ALA carried on Salama's registration of firearms held by the population) and used them unnecessarily. It even took action against unrecognized forces. Some of this effort to impose order, including the dissolution of volunteer forces and the confiscation of unlicensed weapons from the city's inhabitants, was interpreted by the latter as detrimental to the war effort. This was especially true after it was learned that some of the confiscated arms had found their way into the markets in neighboring countries. Combatants from al-Hama, in Syria, who arrived in Jaffa in March, made an especially bad impression—they robbed and looted and soon left Jaffa for the Wadi Sarar military camp, which had recently been evacuated by the British army. They continued to rob and plunder the local population under the leadership of one of Najm al-Din's

Iraqi officers, ʻAbd al-Jabbar al-Shammari, who became notorious for his treatment of the civilian population.

In other cases fights broke out between locals and foreign fighters, occasionally ending in injury and even death on both sides. Sometimes the fights were over provisions, despite the plentiful food available. On April 9, for example, when a group of about 50 Iraqi combatants stationed at headquarters did not receive meat, four of them went out to the market and stole four sheep from local butchers. A fight broke out that ended without serious injury only because a commander (apparently Najm al-Din) intervened. Not surprisingly, this and other such cases weakened morale among the foreign forces and lessened their motivation to defend the locals. Many of the foreigners viewed the Jaffites as "fifth columnists collaborating with the enemy," as Najm al-Din himself put it in his press release announcing the establishment of the military court.[5]

The arrival of the foreigners also produced a change in the nature of the fighting, and led to an increasing number of attacks on the road leading to Jerusalem, as well as on the borders with Tel Aviv, Holon, and Bat Yam. At the end of February Arab forces staged an organized and coordinated attack on three Jewish positions that threatened Arab traffic on the Jerusalem road—the HaYotzeq and Spirt factories at the Holon junction and the Keren Kayemet building (the Hazbun House) next to Beit Dajan. The offensive failed, but British forces evacuated the Jews from the HaYotzeq position after a British force was fired on from there. Ten Jewish fighters stationed there, whose arms were confiscated by the British, were left defenseless and were, as a result, killed by the Arabs. The Haganah then abandoned the Spirt position and Arab forces demolished the buildings there and erected their own positions on the ruins. The Keren Kayemet position held out against frequent attacks, even after the house itself was destroyed on March 19. The Jewish defenders had dug new positions in advance. The British demanded that these positions be abandoned as well, but in the end a compromise was reached and a British force was stationed adjacent to it and prevented further hostilities.[6]

The Arab forces first fired mortars at the beginning of March in the Manshiyya sector. They also staged organized attacks on Jewish positions along the border. In response, the Haganah attacked Abu Kabir on March 13 and al-Basa (today the area of Bloomfield Stadium) on March 24. The attacks caused few fatalities, but houses were demolished and the barrage of mortar shells dealt a serious blow to the morale of the civilian population. The exhilaration that initially followed the arrival of the reinforcements faded as the public mood grew dismal. The city's inhabitants received the (mistaken, perhaps) impression that the Haganah forces that had attacked al-Basa could have, had they wished, reached the adjacent King George Avenue in the heart of Jaffa, and that the Arab forces could not have stopped them. As a result, many Jaffites fled their homes during the engagement—not just those in al-Basa and Abu Kabir, but also those living in the Nuzha area, around King George Avenue. Abu Kabir was abandoned by most of its residents, leaving the neighborhood largely empty except for soldiers. The Haganah's home-made mortar, called the "Davidka," terrified

the Arab civilians, even though the damage caused by these shells was much less impressive than the noise they made. The use of longer-range weapons prompted more and more Jaffites to flee to the center of town, where there was a shortage of public buildings to house them. Some who could not afford to rent apartments squatted in the homes of well-off Jaffites who had fled the city. Public services—banks, mail, telephone, and public transportation—fell into disarray. Most of these services had stopped functioning during April. Fuel and medicines were in short supply. The flow of civilians out of the city increased. Most left by sea from the port, since the land routes were by that time considered too dangerous.[7]

The National Committee tried to prevent people from leaving by sending young and educated volunteers who had just completed their high school graduation exams (which had been moved up by the British authorities because of the situation) to the port. These young people, who included Ibrahim Abu Lughod and Shafiq al-Hut, were instructed to harangue those who were leaving and try to persuade them to remain in the city. If they did not agree, the volunteers were to collect an exit tax to be assessed according to the number of family members and amount of luggage. But the volunteers tended to be considerate of the fleeing families, many of whom they knew or were even related to, and to set the tax as low as possible. The travelers were also required to present documents showing that they had paid the augmented municipal taxes. The municipality, for its part, tried to improve the supply of bread at the distribution centers that had been founded in February. On April 22, it even began to distribute white bread, which was considered more desirable, as part of its battle against speculation. The National Committee endeavored at the same time to ensure a supply of kerosene and gasoline that would end the crisis regarding these items. But it was not successful and the shortages grew worse. The string of Arab defeats since the beginning of April, the massacre at Dayr Yasin (Jaffa schoolchildren collected money for the victims), and the fall of Haifa on April 22 all lowered morale. In the end, the National Committee had to accept that the exodus was a fact. Since the Mandate administration had ceased to issue passports, the Committee began to issue laissez passer documents that would be accepted in Arab countries. On April 23 a delegation of Jaffa residents left Jaffa for Transjordan via the Lydda airport. The delegation was composed of some of the city's top leaders, members of the National Committee and others—Muhammad ʻAbd al-Rahim, Francis Jallad, Sheikh Shakir Abu Kishk, Edmund Ruk, Kamil al-Dajani, and Committee Secretary Amin ʻAql and his deputy Mustafa Tahir. The delegation's mission was "to present the situation in the city to His Highness," King ʻAbdallah. Once the citrus season had ended and the Citrus Council had been disbanded in preparation for the end of the Mandate, these leaders seem to have had no particular reason to remain in the exhausted city. Neither was Mayor Haykal in Jaffa, having set out on a similar journey to Iraq, Syria, and Transjordan. It looked as if everyone who had the means to do so was leaving the city. For example, the editor and owner of the weekly *al-Sarih*, Hashim al-Sabaʻ, announced he was leaving for Amman, "on account of the political events and meetings … to supply accurate reports."[8]

Social and military collapse

> The entire garrison has deserted … the Jews control the Jaffa-Ramla road. Life in the city has ground to a halt, the inhabitants and the deserters from the garrison are looting houses and stores. There is no force that can prevent them. Only 20 percent of the doctors and hospital workers are still on the job. The sick are extremely miserable. We have difficulty finding anyone to bury the dead. I urgently demand to receive explicit and clear instructions.[9]

So wrote Captain Michel al-'Isa, now the ALA's commander, on May 2, 1948. The Jaffa-born al-'Isa, who left the city to enlist, train, and organize his troops in Syria and returned on April 28, was Jaffa's last Arab commander. His cable was addressed to Fawzi al-Qawuqji, now commanding officer of the Central Front, and to the members of the Arab League's Military Committee in Damascus. The Committee was powerless to save the crumpling city. On the eve of its surrender, the remaining population consisted, according to various estimates, of only 35,000–45,000 Arabs, out of the 70,000 who had lived there at the beginning of hostilities in December 1947.[10]

Jaffa's final and rapid collapse began on April 25 when IZL forces attacked the northern Manshiyya neighborhood, which had been emptied of its civilians, and was occupied only by fighters. The offensive lasted for three days and ended with the Jewish forces overcoming stiff resistance to take the neighborhood. To break through the line of Arab positions, which had withstood the attack during the first two days, the IZL forces used an old-new tactic in urban warfare. They blazed access roads from house to house through the walls instead of fighting their way through alleys, doors, and windows, and thus were able to reach the seashore on April 28.[11]

The IZL offensive was accompanied by mortar barrages into the central parts of the city, creating panic and wreaking havoc. As a result, huge numbers of Jaffites fled from the port on rowboats and ships—4,000 on the first day of the attack. Yet it seems that there was no mass killing relative to the size of the population. By the morning of April 27, a total of 40 had been killed and another 100 injured (combatants killed in the Manshiyya front and Jaffite civilians together), according to the Haganah reports, that on other occasions, such as in Dayr Yasin, had been augmenting in exaggeration the number of Arab casualties inflicted by the IZL.[12] This caused Ishaq Khurshid, who experienced the attack, to estimate, in retrospect, that the shelling had been meant "more to frighten than to kill." Also in retrospect, Menachem Begin, IZL's commandant, confirmed that the shelling of Jaffa's rear had been meant to demoralize the population.[13]

The panic sometimes produced absurd sights. Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahim described how he and his father Muhammad, the well-known citrus grower (who seems to have returned from his brief sortie to Amman), encountered a group of men, women, and children sitting inertly with their belongings on the beach, just a few meters away from their homes, looking desperately out to sea for a ship to come and take them away.[14] Future Fatah leader Salah Khalaf, "Abu Iyad," fled

Jaffa as a boy by sea together with his family during the bombardment. He later offered an account of the panic and flight, and the impression it made on him:

> Not yet fifteen, I was overwhelmed by the sight of this huge mass of men, women, old people and children, struggling under the weight of suitcases or bundles, making their way painfully down to the wharfs of Jaffa in a sinister turmoil. Cries mingled with moaning and sobs, all punctuated by deafening explosions.[15]

Other eye-witnesses provided accounts of the crowds of hundreds and even thousands of frightened people packed into the tiny port. Hoping to reach any seagoing vessel that might take them far from Jaffa, the refugees crowded into the rowboats that were normally used to bring goods in from cargo ships anchored outside the shallow harbor.[16] Rumors spread that Egyptian ships were on their way to evacuate them, but in fact only two freighters anchored outside the port, one Swedish and one Egyptian, let the refugees on board, where they were packed in very harsh conditions. Many of the refugees set sail in improvised vessels, such as sailboats or the port's cargo boats, which were tied two or three together to be towed by motor boats south to Gaza and Port Said or north to Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut. The sailors who piloted the boats demanded high payments. The craft were packed with refugees, often without water or food, and

Figure 6.1 Aerial view of the Jaffa Harbor, 1937 (Library of Congress).

there appear to have been cases of drowning. It seems that the majority of the 25,000 refugees who fled Jaffa between April 25 and May 1 left by sea under these horrendous circumstances.[17]

In Operation Hametz of April 28–30 the Haganah captured the Arab villages to Jaffa's east. This rural region had served as the city's hinterland and its loss meant that the city was completely encircled on land. Despite the intervention of the British, who halted the IZL advance from the north and imposed a cease-fire that went into effect on May 1, the shelling, the fall of Manshiyya, and the conquest of the villages caused civilian morale to collapse entirely. The mass exodus continued, by sea, on ships and boats, and by land on trucks traveling the Jaffa-Ramla road, which was now under British control.[18]

As a result of the exodus, those local institutions and services that had still been functioning collapsed. Some of them were of nationwide importance. For example, the newspapers published in the city coordinated a shutdown in late April (and resumed publication in East Jerusalem in 1949). According to Mayor Haykal, who returned to the city on April 28 from his three-week effort to enlist assistance in Iraq, Syria, and Transjordan, the city's streets were deserted and its homes bolted shut. The municipality ceased to function; city hall was abandoned. The few city officials who had not fled moved into the Cliff Hotel in the northern part of the 'Ajami neighborhood, close to the port, and tried to run the crumbling city from there. Only a few members of the city council and the National Committee remained in Jaffa.[19]

Haykal was not the only one to return to the city when the fighting ceased. A number of testimonies confirm that, in the days between the inception of the cease-fire and the surrender of the city, from May 1 to 13, a number of its inhabitants temporarily went back. These were largely men who left their families behind in their places of refuge. Principally, they returned to seek out their property and to retrieve what they could. Finding a desolate city that seemed to them a ghost town, they left as quickly as they could, sometimes not even bothering to take those belongings that they could have taken with them now that the British army had reopened the land route into the city.[20]

Reinforcements, 250 troops from the ALA's Ajnadayn Battalion under the command of Michel al-'Isa, arrived on April 28 with the mission of averting the city's impending defeat. They were mainly Palestinian veterans of the disbanded Transjordan frontier force, organized by 'Isa and trained at the Qatana military base, near Damascus. Manshiyya had already been conquered, but 'Isa's force helped the garrison retake Tall al-Rish, the village-suburb and front position that had fallen to the Haganah just a few hours before. The Haganah's plan had been to take Tall al-Rish and Saknat Darwish on the city's southern outskirts, to establish itself there and then to launch an attack on the Arab headquarters, located in the Bibi family's house in Jabaliyya. The plan failed thanks to the fortitude displayed by the garrison and its counterattack on Tall al-Rish. According to a British report, on April 28 'Isa and his men stabilized the line of positions south of Manshiyya after the IZL offensive was frustrated by the British army (a part of 'Isa's battalion may well have operated on both fronts, Manshiyya and Tall

al-Rish). Jaffa's inhabitants cheered the reinforcements, although both civilians and combatants feared that it was not sufficient to save the city. The tension within the garrison, whose spirit had not been broken even during the IZL and Haganah offensives, subsided and the front lines stabilized.[21]

Yet the impression that Jaffa's inhabitants received from the fighting was that without British intervention the city would have been unable to defend itself.[22] Soon thereafter the garrison suffered a heavy blow when its commander, 'Adil Najm al-Din, refused to accept Qawuqji's order to transfer command of the city to 'Isa, his inferior in rank. In reaction to the order, Najm al-Din left the city with many of his men.[23] On April 30, 'Isa notified Qawuqji and the Military Commission that the garrison had collapsed and that the rift between it and the civilian population had widened as never before:

> 'Adil [Najm al-Din] is leaving the city without having given [me command of the garrison] and refuses to hand it over. The garrison has collapsed, and its arms have been scattered. The city and the garrison are in a state of total anarchy. 'Adil's approach to this is negative, and it may well be that he is actually pleased by it. Yesterday the soldiers [of the ALA] looted many stores. No one can control the situation without the help of a regular army. Eighty percent of the city's population has left and the flood of departure is continuing tragically. The National Committee is not capable of continuing to operate because it no longer has any income.[24]

Najm al-Din was determined to leave Jaffa despite the pleas of Mayor Haykal and members of the city council and National Committee. According to Salah al-Nazir, 'Isa himself was willing to accept Najm al-Din's authority if he would only stay.[25] On May 1, 'Isa resumed his depiction of the city in another telegram:

> 'Adil has left the city by sea with all the Iraqis and Yugoslavians [although 'Isa did not know this, Najm al-Din resorted to the sea route after the British had prevented him and his men from leaving Jaffa by the land route with their arms]. The city has been nearly deserted by its inhabitants following today's departures. The city's ability to provision the remaining garrison troops will end tomorrow. The British commander has ordered a cease-fire between the sides until the middle of the present month [and the end of the Mandate]. If the Jews refuse to comply, I do not have [sufficient forces] to face them. The plague of desertions has spread to the Ajnadayn [Battalion]. I await your urgent orders.[26]

Many of the garrison men left the city with their weapons, after receiving their salaries.[27] On May 5, 'Isa and his remaining troops who had not deserted also evacuated Jaffa, leaving the city defenseless.[28] A day earlier Mayor Haykal had departed, after his hopes that King 'Abdallah would send his Arab Legion to save Jaffa were dashed. Haykal was accompanied by his remaining loyalists, the

senior municipal officials who had remained in Jaffa. Only a few leaders stayed behind after the departure of most of the members of the National Committee and city council, with Christians like Amin Andraus and Nicola Saba prominent among them. The others were Salah al-Nazir, Ahmad Abu Laban, Ahmad ʻAbd al-Rahim, Hasan Barakat, and Saʻid Abu Ziyyad. These men organized an Emergency Committee that accepted the proposal of the British district commissioner, William Fuller, to declare Jaffa a neutral city that was not involved in the fighting. As the Emergency Committee was organizing itself, all contact between Jaffa and the rest of the Arab world was cut off, as were the telephone lines to Jerusalem. The Committee thus operated in isolation and in fear for their very lives as the British evacuation approached.[29]

In the end the Emergency Committee had no alternative but to commence negotiations with the Haganah command, which would, after the British departure, control the territory. The negotiations were conducted in Tel Aviv with the Haganah's regional commander, Michael (James) Ben-Gal. The four members of the Emergency Committee who took part in the talks, Nazir, Abu Laban, ʻAbd al-Rahim, and Andraus, were left with no alternative but to sign Jaffa's surrender. It was May 13, a day before the British evacuation and Israel's Declaration of Independence.[30]

The next day, on May 14, 1948, in accordance with the surrender agreement, Haganah forces entered Jaffa and took control of the city without encountering resistance. At the time of the surrender only some 3,000 people remained there.[31] The population was placed under military rule and transferred to the ʻAjami Quarter. Jewish soldiers and civilians plundered the city on an individual and organized basis, and shortly thereafter tens of thousands of new Jewish immigrants were settled in Jaffa, changing its character and turning the Arabs into a minority. In June 1949 the military government was disestablished, and in April 1950 Jaffa was annexed to Tel Aviv. In August of that year the Israeli Ministry of the Interior decided that the united city would officially be called Tel Aviv-Jaffa, in order that Jaffa's historic name be preserved. Jaffa turned into a poor and underprivileged quarter of Tel Aviv.[32]

Conclusion

> The truth is that after the battle of al-Qastal and the fall of ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni [on April 8, 1948], there was a general collapse. The collapse was said to be in all of Palestine, but I felt that it occurred in Jaffa in particular.

This testimony, from the veteran Jaffite Ishaq Khurshid, reflects the impression that the critical events of April 1948 made on the city's inhabitants.[33] The picture offered here of the fighting, and of Jaffa's Palestinian Arab institutions and civil society in the period from December 1947 to April 1948 is complex and full of contradictions. On the one hand, a National Committee was established and, for a time, proved impressively capable of organizing the city's economy and logistics, in cooperation with the municipality and the Chamber of Commerce.

Nevertheless, the war situation led to anarchy, confusion, and lack of coordination, progressively paralyzing commerce and intensifying the flow of refugees out of the city. Political institutions, in particular the city council and the National Committee, were plagued by internal conflict, and this became the most salient phenomenon in the city's public life.

The Jaffite civilians suffered in particular. Jaffa's characteristics as a coastal city, and the social changes it was experiencing, seem to have contributed to its rapid downfall. In particular, it had attracted large numbers of villagers, who lived in alienation from the established urban society and remained unorganized among themselves. When hostilities began, this large population suffered from high unemployment. The wealthy and the middle class largely opposed the war for economic and apparently also social reasons. Their exodus from Jaffa considerably weakened the city and deprived it of its principal social and cultural forces. The military picture was ambiguous as well. Hasan Salama and local activists like Salah al-Nazir succeeded in organizing the al-Aqsa Defenders Army, based on regional units deployed along Jaffa's borders. But, in practice, the war effort was conducted in a decentralized manner by a number of different groups that often did not accept the authority of the central command and the National Committee.

The incident of Nimr al-Hawwari's appointment as commander of Jaffa's forces was typical of the time and place. Founder of the Najjada youth movement and leader of Jaffa's Arab Youth Organization, charismatic and energetic, he had the potential to oversee the city's defense and to succeed. His humiliating dismissal was emblematic of the extremism that overtook the political and military leadership, with nationalist forces loyal to the mufti shunting aside the moderate leadership and undermining the broad public legitimacy that it had enjoyed. Similarly, the mufti and local militants subverted all attempts to achieve local truces with the Jews. Hasan Salama, appointed regional commander by the mufti, played a central role in escalating the inter-communal war. The escalation, however, was reciprocal and was urged on by a number of Arab and Jewish organizations. The range of opinions in Jaffa about the war with the Jews displays the heterogeneity that was characteristic of Palestinian Arab society, in Jaffa in particular. This society consisted of many groups with differing economic, religious, social, and national interests. These differences hampered the Palestinian Arabs' ability to mobilize from within the resources and sacrifice that the war effort required. This was not unique to Jaffa—the same thing happened in all the country's large cities. These fissures widened with the arrival of the foreign military forces, Arab and non-Arab, that flowed into the city from February onward. They alienated a large portion of Jaffa's population from the war effort and its leaders. The resulting weakness preceded and was a major cause of the city's rapid collapse.

The cables sent by the city's last commander, Michel al-'Isa, seem to testify to a parallel and mutually reinforcing social and military deterioration. But Jaffa society began to crumble following the eruption of the inter-communal war and disintegrated even before the breakdown of the military forces. Furthermore, the

combat units withstood the attack on the city despite the fall of Manshiyya, received reinforcements, and conducted a successful counterattack in Tall al-Rish. Jaffa was not conquered by Jewish forces—it surrendered, and the military collapse, which began on April 29 or 30, occurred only after civilian life had practically ceased to exist. 'Isa himself mentioned as the main causes of collapse the mortar barrages "which caused panic and flight among the city's inhabitants, who are not accustomed to shelling of this sort." He also wrote that the mass exodus of the city's residents, "devastate[ed] the morale of the garrison."[34]

Since 'Isa was a Jaffite and well acquainted with Jaffa society, his testimony is most likely reliable. If so, social collapse preceded and catalyzed the military collapse. A similar conclusion was reached by Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahim, who wrote that the arrival of 'Isa and his men on April 28, "while the Iraqis are still here," was largely useless, since Jaffa was already a "deserted city." Mayor Haykal, who returned on April 28 from pressing the city's case in Arab capitals, offered a similar account.[35]

The profound distrust between the civilian population and the garrison clearly served as a factor in the deterioration of Jaffa society. Many residents of Jaffa had sought to avoid military conflict from the start. Now they found themselves between a rock and a hard place and responded by leaving the city, hoping to return after hostilities ceased. Because of the mass departure, social, municipal, and national institutions were no longer able to function. In collapsing, Jaffa's society pulled the rug out from under the feet of the fighting forces, in terms of both logistics and morale, and paved the way for the failure of the military effort.

Notes

1 Ayalon, *Hativat Giv'ati*, 392–422; Pritzke, *Bedouin Doctor*, 164–169; Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya*, Fi khidamm al-nidal,* 308–309; "Middle East: death of a terrorist," *Time Magazine*, February 5, 1979.

2 Al-Husri ed., *Mudhakkirat Taha Al-Hashimi*, 198–202; *Filastin*, February 7, 1948; al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 237–245. For the resignation of al-Shaykh 'Ali and the reason for it, see also the testimony of Sa'ada Jallad in Shehadeh, *Zarim ba-bayit*, 43–44; Commissioner of Volunteers Taha al-Hashimi, "Order appointing Lt. Col. 'Adil Najm al-Din," February 15, 1948, ISA, 65/2631, container peh-378 (in Arabic); Letter from Lt. Col. 'Adil Najm al-Din, commander of the Jaffa Guard to Commissioner of Volunteers February 21, 1948, ISA, 65/3370/peh-399 (in Arabic); Report on Jaffa: "The military situation," circa February–March, IDFA 817/1/1957 (in Arabic); "Reinforcements for Jaffa," March 16, 1948, YTA 4/2/15; The High Command to the forces in Palestine, "Movement order to the commander of Company 3, Qadisiya Battalion," March 25, 1948, ISA, 65/2631/peh-78 (in Arabic); "Movement order 10, Hattin Battalion," March 29, 1948 ISA, 65/2631/peh-378 (in Arabic); For the personnel situation in the Haganah, see Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-Milhamah ot le-Milhamah*, 63. These numbers do not include fighters from the IZL and the LEHI.

3 "From 'Yogev': Friction between followers of the mufti and followers of Fawzi al-Qawuqji," YTA 3/2/15. See also "Selections from conversations with Yogev," February 11, 1948, HA 105/344 for the initial response of the residents of Jaffa to the Arab Liberation Army's entrance into the city.

4 *Filastin*, March 9 and 10, 1948; *al-Difa'*, March 9 and 10, 1948. For a sympathetic review of Najm al-Din's activity, see for example, *al-Difa'*, March 14, 1948; *Filastin*, April 11, 1948. See also the article about the activity of 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Shammari, who visited the wounded in Al-Dajani Hospital, *al-Difa'*, March 23, 1948.

5 Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 239–245; "Military Court of the Jaffa Command," *Filastin*, April 6, 1948; "Jaffa," March 30, 1948, YTA 4/2/15; "Daily summary from 2318.00 to 2418.00," April 25, 1948, YTA 5/2/15; "Brawl between butchers and the soldiers in the National Guard," April 18, 1948, HA 105/257.

6 Olitzky, *Mi-me'ora'ot le-milhamah*, 263–275; Slutzky *et al.*, *Sefer Toldot Hahaganah*, 1447–1550; *al-Difa'*, March 1, 1948; *al-Ahram*, March 2, 1948.

7 "From the events of 6 March 1948 on the Jaffa-Tel Aviv border," YTA 3/2/15; "From the events of 7 March 1948," YTA 3/2/15; "Mortars in Manshiyya," March 7, 1948, YTA 3/2/15; "Summary of the mood of Arabs in Jaffa and surrounding villages," March 18, 1948, YTA 4/2/15; "Jaffa-Misc.," March 23, 1948, IDFA 648/922/1975; "Jaffa," March 30, 1948, YTA 4/2/15; "Jaffa-Misc.," April 2, 1948, IDFA 1949/8275/123; "Fortnightly Intelligence Newsletter, TNA WO 275/64; Golan, *Shinui merhavi*, 84–86; Gelber, *Independence and Nakba*, 163, 174; *Filastin,* March 28 and 31, 1948.

8 Abu Lughod, "After the Matriculation," *al-Ahram Weekly*, May 6, 1998; *Filastin*, April 14, 20, 22, 23, and 24, 1948 (last edition).

9 Telegram of Michel al-'Isa to Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the military committee, May 2, 1948 in al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 260. Cf. Letter of Dr. Hasan Far'un Secretary of the Arab Medical Association in Jaffa to King 'Abdallah in Amman on May 1, 1948 in *Al-Watha'iq Al-Hashimiyya:* doc. 51 (53–41) 59.

10 Golan, *Shinui merhavi*, 86; "Bulletin No. 5, from events in the Arab camp in Jaffa and adjacent villages," April 25, 1948, YTA 6/2/15.

11 Benjamin Runkle, "Jaffa, 1948: Urban Combat in the Israeli War of Independence," in *City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World War II to Vietnam*, ed. John Antal and Bradley Gericke (New York: Random House, 2003), 289–313; Chaim Lazar-Litai, *Kibush Yafo* [Conquest of Jaffa] (Tel Aviv: Shelah, 1951), 127–135, 170–171; David Niv, *Ma'archot ha-Irgun ha-Tzeva'i ha-Le'umi* [Campaigns of the IZL] (Tel Aviv, Klausner Institute, 1980) part 3, 101–106.

12 "Echos of the IZL's attack on Jaffa on 25 April 1946," YTA 6/2/15; "IZL's attack on Jaffa," April 25, 1948, YTA 6/2/15; "Summary of news as of 10:00 hours," April 27, 1948, YTA 6/2/15; "The IZL's activities in Jaffa on 25 April as of 15:00 hours," April 27, 1948, YTA 6/2/15.

13 Testimony of Ishaq Khurshid, in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 121; Menachem Begin, *Ha-Mered* [The Revolt] (Tel Aviv: Ahi'asaf, 1974), 439.

14 Testimony of Ahmad 'Abd al- Rahim in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 121.

15 Abu Iyad, *My Home, My Land*, 23. Abu Iyad reports that he fled with his family on May 13, the day that Jaffa surrendered. However, his description is of events that happened during the attack on Manshiyya and the mortar attack on the city.

16 'Abd al-Qadir Yassin, "Ghost City," *al-Ahram Weekly* (Cairo), May 6, 1998; Shukri Salama, "Cleansing Jaffa: A detailed eye witness account," in: www.palestine remembered.com/Jaffa/Jaffa/Story202.html.

17 Avitzur, *Nemal Yafo*, 185–186. Compare with the description of Abu Iyad, who describes a case of drowning while fleeing, at the outlet of the Port of Jaffa. For fleeing by boat, cargo ship, and sailboat, see the testimonies of Mahmud Qattan, Nimr Hamuda Muhaysin, and Hasan Nimr Yasir in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 229, 237, 239–241; "IZL's attack on Jaffa," Summary of news from April 24, 1948, as of 14:30 hours," YTA 6/2/15; "IZL's activities on 25 April 1948," YTA 6/2/15.

18 "Mood of Arabs in the surrounding villages after the explosion at Hasan Salama's headquarters," HA 105/31; High Commissioner to Secretary of State, "Weekly intelligence appreciation," April 30, 1948, MEC CM III/4/152; "Operation 'Hametz,' "

undated, YTA 6/2/15; "Moods (concerning Operation Hametz)," April 28, 1948, IDFA, Dispatch 8275/1949, file 162; Darwish, *Karithah Filastin*, 97–99; Kadish, "Hatzava ha-Briti be-Manshiyya"; Yonah Bandman, "Hitarvut Hatzava ha-Briti be-Manshiyya: hatzava ha-Briti be-hatkafat haetzel be-Manshiyya" [Invention of the British army in the IZL's attack on Manshiyya] in *Iyyunim be-tekumat Yisrael 2* [Studies in the Establishment of Israel 2] (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 1992), 295–300; Motti Golani, *Yamim aharonim: Ha-mimshal ha-mandatori – pinui ve-milhamah* [Last days: The Mandate government – evacuation and war] (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2009), 80–89.

19 Testimony of Raja al-'Isa (son of the founder of the newspaper *Filastin* and an active member of the editorial board) in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 103; testimony of Yusif Haykal in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 49–53.

20 Testimony of 'Aziz Shehaden in Shehadeh, *Zarim ba-Bayit*, 22–25. The description of journalist Hashim al-Saba', who returned to Jaffa during the final days before its fall, together with his colleague Da'ud al-'Isa, in Hashim al-Saba', *Dhikrayyat suhufi mudtahid* [Memoirs of a persecuted journalist]. (Jerusalem: Matba'at dayr al-rum al-urthudhux, 1951), 53; testimony of Hafiz al-Dajani in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 159.

21 "Movement order for the Hittin Battalion," April 27, 1948, IDFA, Dispatch 1957, file 2062 (in Arabic). The battalion was asked to lend a company to the Ajnadayn battalion. The order includes details about the movements of the reinforcements for Jaffa. For the Haganah's plan, see "Operation 'Hametz," April 27, 1948, YTA 6/2/15; "From events in Jaffa, summary of 28 April 1948, 9:35–11:05 hours," YTA 6/2/15; "Comprehensive survey of events in Jaffa on 28 April 1948," YTA 6/2/15; unknown author (probably Salah al-Nazir), "Report on the fall of Jaffa to the Jews," in al-Bawwab, *Mawsu'at Yafa Al-jamila,* 208. For the British report see Kadish, "Hatzava ha-Briti be-Manshiyya," 7, n. 50. For a detailed description of the attack on 'Isa and his men at Tel al-Arish, see Ayalon, *Hativat Giv'ati*, 508–518.

22 Telephone conversation between Dr. Haykal and the mayor of Lydda, May 3, 1948 in Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 388–389 (May 5, 1948).

23 Telegram from Qawuqji to Najm al-Din, ISA, 65/3370/peh-399 (in Arabic); "From events in Jaffa," April 30, 1948, YTA 6/2/15.

24 Telegram of Michel al-'Isa to Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the military committee, April 30, 1948 in al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 259–260.

25 "Report on the fall of Jaffa to the Jews," in al-Bawwab, *Mawsu'at Yafa Al-jamila*, 211.

26 Telegram of 'Isa to Qawuqji and the military committee, May 1, 1948, in al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 259–260. For the failed attempt of Najm al-Din to leave by land, see the testimony of Haykal in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 53.

27 Telephone conversation between Dr. Haykal and the mayor of Lydda, May 3, 1948 in Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 388–389 (May 5, 1948).

28 Michel al-'Isa, "Report of the Jaffa Guard Corps," May 6, 1948 in Walid Khalidi, "Selected Documents on the 1948 Palestine War," *Journal of Palestine Studies 27*:3 (Spring 1998), 102–105.

29 Letter from the Jaffa Emergency Committee to the District Commissioner, May 9, 1948 in al-Saba', *Dhikrayyat suhufi mudtahid*, 51–52. See also the diary of the District Commissioner William Fuller and Mayor Haykal's letter to the Commissioner, both in Fuller hanging file, May 5–10, 1948; See also the testimony of Haykal in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 54–56. For the relative conspicuousness of Christians and the feeling of the Emergency Committee, see the testimony of Ahmad Abu Laban in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 107. For the identities of the members of the Emergency Committee, see also Malak, *Al-Judhur Al-Yafiyya*, 23.

30 "Minutes of the meeting between the Haganah commander in Tel Aviv and his aides and representatives from Jaffa in Tel Aviv on May 12, 1948, "Second meeting between the Haganah commander in Tel Aviv and representatives of the Emergency Committee of Jaffa in Tel Aviv on May 13, 1948," IDFA 1948/321/97.

31 "Daily summary," Intelligence office of the Kiryati Brigade, May 11, 1948, YTA 3/1/15; see also the telephone conversation on May 3, 1948 between "Dr. Musa" from Jaffa and "Dr. Burdusian" (Bedrosian?) from Ramla in Ben-Gurion, *Yoman ha-Milhamah*, 388 (May 5, 1948).
32 Morris, *1948*, 154–155; Gelber, *Independence and Nakba*, 404–406. For the annexation to Tel Aviv, see Golan, "Milhemet Ha-'atzmaut ve-yetziratah shel Tel Aviv-Yafo," 96–100.
33 Testimony of Ishaq Khurshid in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 191.
34 'Isa, "Report of the Jaffa Garrison." To the best of my knowledge, no one placed the blame on 'Isa himself, who arrived in the city at the height of the civil disintegration and whose men participated in the attack on Tall al-Rish.
35 Testimony of Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahim, in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 126; testimony of Yusif Haykal, in Diyab, *Yafa: 'Itr madina*, 49.

Conclusion

Jerusalem, Jaffa, and other cities: A comparison

Some 450,000 Palestinian Arabs lived in cities in 1947. Nearly 120,000 of them were Christians, while 330,000 were Muslims. This urban population accounted for about a third of Palestinian Arabs as a whole. About 135,000, that is about a third of the total urban population, were evenly divided, more or less, among those living in Jerusalem and Jaffa. But the political, economic, social, and cultural importance of these two cities for the Palestinian Arabs was disproportionate to their populations. The Palestinian Arab viewpoint regarding events of the 1948 war can thus not be comprehended without understanding these two communities. By the end of the inter-communal war, in mid-May 1948, some 68,000 Arabs had been compelled to leave Jaffa and 30,000 had fled western Jerusalem. The difference between the two numbers is a good indicator of the differential outcomes of the war in these two cities. In Jaffa, Palestinian Arab society and military defenses collapsed utterly and the Arab city for all intents and purposes dissolved. In contrast, the Arab military forces and local institutions in Jerusalem proved able to defend the Old City and some of the northern Arab neighborhoods. They averted social collapse, thus forestalling the departure of the entire population prior to the arrival of the Arab Legion. In consequence, East Jerusalem remained under Arab rule until 1967, and has in fact remained Arab to this day.

A comparison of Arab society and institutions in these two cities during the inter-communal war shows that they were much alike. But they differed as well, inasmuch as one was a mountain city and the other a coastal city. National Committees were established in each at the behest of and under the direction of the Arab Higher Committee. These bodies were supposed to fill the vacuum created by the gradual cessation of the Mandate government's activities. The National Committees were the leading institutions established during the inter-communal war; local neighborhood committees operated under their aegis.[1]

Previous research has argued that the weakness of Palestinian Arab institutions and leadership was one of the fundamental causes of that community's defeat in the war. Palestinian Arab historiography has also branded local leadership as weak and helpless.[2]

I have shown in this work that the reality was more complex. This book demonstrates that microhistorical research is vital to understanding events. The Palestinian Arabs were unquestionably less well organized economically than the Yishuv. Yet the National Committees in Jaffa and Jerusalem scored real achievements in the areas of taxation, provisioning, and rationing, as well as in their attempts to maintain civil order by, for example, registering privately owned guns.[3] The committees took under their wing previously existing civil society organizations, in particular women's associations, helping them to run first-aid operations in cooperation with the Palestinian Arab Medical Association. The Jaffa National Committee assumed responsibility for the provision of basic food and household items in cooperation with the Chamber of Commerce and the municipality. Jaffa's mayor, Dr. Yusif Haykal, the most prominent leader in the city at the time, used the municipality's organizational infrastructure to set up food depots and distribution points, collect taxes, and set up a municipal police force. Despite competition and contention between the National Committee and the municipal administration, in most cases the two proved able to cooperate. They did so under the direction of the Economic Committee, composed of the city's leading businessmen, which was set up for precisely this purpose. Jaffa was an Arab city and the municipal government was thus under Arab control. And, since it was the economic nerve center of Palestinian Arab society, the city's leading citizens had acquired considerable commercial knowledge and experience. Both these factors, along with the city's modernizing tendencies, meant that Jaffa Arabs proved able to organize themselves relatively well to face the crisis of war.

In Jerusalem, by contrast, the National Committee was dependent on and had to join forces with the Arab Treasury, the national Palestinian Arab financial institution. The head of the National Committee, Anwar Nusseibeh, displayed real leadership and set up a system that was able to continue to function during the final days before the British evacuation, when the Committee organized a typhus vaccination program in the crowded Old City. Nusseibeh and his colleagues kept up their efforts following the evacuation, when their concerted activity during the battles that preceded the arrival of the Arab Legion prevented mass flight from the city. The events in Jerusalem demonstrate the capabilities of the new leadership that emerged during the war and which continued to serve the Arab city for many years afterward. This leadership was able to take advantage of the fact that Jerusalem, as the Palestinian Arab political center, was able to mobilize institutional and economic (in the form of the Arab Treasury) support, as well as the political and military underpinning that prevented the city from falling into Jewish hands. The leadership also took advantage of the city's central position for the Palestinian Arab community to enlist financial and military support, for which they exploited, too, its religious significance for the Arab and Muslim worlds.

The National Committees' achievements were owed primarily to the talents and exertions of some of its members. But they did not accomplish their principal objective—organizing Arab communal life and filling the void left by the

shutdown of the Mandate's governing institutions. There were many reasons for this failure. Some were external, such as the lack of resources and the political and military situation. But there were also internal factors deriving principally from the structure of Palestinian Arab society. About 70 percent of Jaffa's population (according to British figures) lived in poor neighborhoods. Many were internal migrants from rural areas of the country who made their living as unskilled workers. The economic crisis that accompanied the hostilities devastated this population. Many of these Arabs lived on the borders with the Jewish cities of Tel Aviv, Holon, and Bat Yam. When hostilities broke out, they were the first to flee the border zone; later they abandoned their neighborhoods entirely. The municipality's attempts to convince them to return to their homes as the military situation stabilized were fruitless because of these migrants' alienation from the city's established residents, whom the municipality represented.[4]

The behavior of the remaining population was typical of the upper middle class that had emerged among Palestinian Arabs in the later Ottoman and, especially, Mandate periods. Christians, who made up 24 percent of Jaffa's Arab population (as opposed to close to 50 percent in Jerusalem), were a majority in the bourgeoisie. These people tended to be alienated from and frightened of the Muslim majority, especially in time of crisis. There was a discrepancy between their declared national identification and their willingness to fight and make sacrifices for the national cause. Finally, the bourgeois lifestyle and values they wanted to maintain had depended on the sponsorship and protection of the British, who were now leaving. This is illustrated by the test case of Qatamon. There thousands of members of the upper middle class were in fact Greeks and Armenians. They were integrated into Christian Arab society but quite naturally felt little identification with the Palestinian Arab national cause. This exacerbated the breach between the middle class and the national movement. A similar pattern could be discerned in Jaffa during the early stages of the inter-communal war, most notably in the fact that Christians and members of the middle class there largely refrained from taking part in the fighting. This, on top of the alienation felt by the impoverished strata of the city's society, meant that a majority of Jaffa's population sat out the national and military struggle. In Jerusalem, where the largest proportion of the Palestinian Arab bourgeoisie resided—many of them white-collar professionals and government workers—the middle-class neighborhoods in the city's south fell apart relatively quickly. The Christians and middle class took little part in the combat, even in places like Qatamon, where the war literally reached their doorsteps.[5]

These social and class interests were supplemented by commercial interests. The war curtailed business activity and threatened to prevent the harvest and export of citrus fruit, the city's most important industry. Attempts to reach local peace pacts with the Jewish adversaries, of the type concluded in many other places in the country, failed. In some cases the national leadership refused to endorse the agreements, as with the pact between the Jaffa and Tel Aviv municipalities reached in December 1947. In other cases Arab militants violated

agreements in short order, as they did with the truces reached that same month between Bat Yam and Jabaliyya and between Holon and Tall al-Rish. The "citrus agreement" mediated by the British and initiated by Jewish and Arab citrus farmers and exporters stipulated that each side would refrain from attacking the orchards and transports of fruit toward export. It collided with the reservations of the national leadership and in the end was only partially implemented, toward the end of the harvest, late in March 1948. The end of the season removed one of the last impediments to departure for many of the better-off residents.[6]

This flight highlights a significant difference between the two cities. Jaffa society, with its heterogeneous composition, displayed internal weakness. Half its members, some 35,000, left the city prior to the final offensive against the city, on April 25, 1948. No precise figures are available regarding the number of people killed in the city during the entire period of the inter-communal war. According to the figures cited by 'Arif al-'Arif, they numbered about 600, a figure that includes both fighters and civilians (at their maximum, the fighting forces in Jaffa numbered about 1,500 men). Of these, some dozen were probably killed in the IZL attack and that organization's bombardment of the city center. More than 100 were wounded. There are no figures on the number of injuries sustained by Jaffites during this entire period.[7]

The numbers are certainly high, but they amount to less than one percent of the prewar population (which was the proportion of losses sustained by the Yishuv and State of Israel during the 1948 war). Furthermore, the dead and wounded included non-native fighters who arrived in the city during the war. This hardly seems sufficient to explain the mass flight. According to these same sources, 600 people were killed in Jerusalem, although over a longer period.[8] Panic ensued in Jaffa at the beginning of the IZL offensive and shelling, leading to mass flight via the port, and the escape continued even after the British brought about a cease-fire. The goal of the shelling was to demoralize the population, and it succeeded. The mass departure from the port became one of the emblems of the Nakba. So did the flight from the port of Haifa, another coastal city with a profile similar to Jaffa's. There about half the Arab population left prior to the final attack on April 21–22.[9] The principal cause of the rapid social collapse in Jaffa, in my view, was the particular makeup of Jaffa's heterogeneous population and the impact of modernity. Deep fissures were exacerbated by a lack of social uniformity, created by modernity, that further split an already divided population.

Jerusalem was, by contrast, closer to tradition and more conservative. Many Arabs in the Old City panicked when the Jaffa and Zion Gates were attacked by Jewish forces on May 18–19, but the large numbers who fled their homes did not try to leave the city on the road that lay open to the east. They massed rather on al-Haram al-Sharif, the Temple Mount, which they believed was secure against attack. The National Committee proved its mettle by refusing to issue travel permits (the very fact that Jerusalem's Arabs applied to the National Committee under these circumstances is an indication of how its authority was accepted).

It also sent armed men to prevent flight and to deal with rumor-mongers, and used a loudspeaker to broadcast encouragement to the inhabitants. Jerusalem displayed the characteristics of a more united and traditional mountain city, especially with regard to its Muslim population. These traits, along with the city's religious importance, helped its Arab population survive a harsh struggle. Jaffa's modernity, in contrast, proved to be its bane under the same pressures, because it created a situation in which two principal population groups, inhabitants of the poor neighborhoods and the middle class, felt little identification with the Palestinian Arab national movement's leadership of notables. Jerusalem's relative conservatism meant that its Arab population found it easier to unite behind the religious-national leadership of the mufti, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, a Jerusalem native whose prestige in the city remained intact despite his long sojourn outside the country and the fact that he spent the period of the inter-communal war in Egypt and Syria. In contrast, most of Jaffa's influential personages, such as Mayor Haykal and the former Najjada leader Muhammad Nimr al-Hawwari, supported King 'Abdallah of Transjordan, the mufti's great rival for political hegemony among Palestine's Arabs. Modernists like Haykal seem to have been inclined to support the king because their nationalism was of a pan-Arab hue, as opposed to the mufti's exclusive Palestinian national approach.

A comparison of the military situation in each city shows more similarities than differences. In Jaffa the fighting forces organized themselves more sporadically at first than in Jerusalem, a stronghold of the Holy War forces, who were loyal to the mufti. In December 1947 the mufti appointed his rival al-Hawwari as commander of Jaffa, but the appointee made the mistake of meeting openly with an operative from Shai, the Haganah intelligence service, in an effort to arrange a cease-fire. When the meeting became common knowledge, al-Hawwari lost stature and the mufti banished him from Jaffa. His place was taken by Hasan Salama, whom the mufti had previously named commander of the Lydda district, and whose status was recognized by the Arab League's Military Committee in Damascus. Salama was a well-liked commander, a veteran of the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939, but he had a problematic personality and had spent time in the criminal underworld. He reorganized the fighting forces in Jaffa under the rubric of the al-Aqsa Defenders Army, a local militia that operated under the aegis of the Holy War forces. Jaffa's borders were divided into 13 sectors, with a militia unit assigned to each one. This deployment was preserved through further changes in military strategy until the city's fall. Salama was partially successful in bringing into the militia, which numbered about 500 men, all the armed groups that were active in the city. But some of them joined the force only nominally. Salama, responsible for the entire district, appointed Salah al-Nazir, a member of the city's National Committee, as his personal delegate and representative in Jaffa, who supervised the al-Aqsa Defenders, and Nazir functioned in practice as the city's military commander.

Jerusalem originally organized its defenses on a neighborhood-regional basis under the leadership of veterans of the Revolt acting in concert. They worked under the umbrella of the Holy War force, which was reconstituted in Jerusalem

with the return to Palestine, in December 1947, of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, a beloved and charismatic commander from the Revolt who was also a close relative of the mufti. ‘Abd al-Qadir established his headquarters in Bir Zeit rather than Jerusalem, but he visited the latter frequently and was active there. The city’s regional commanders accepted his authority.

The fighting in Jerusalem and Jaffa during the inter-communal war took similar forms—sniper shots and long-range exchanges of gunfire. (Sniping was a tactic used more between Jaffa and Tel Aviv, because of the flat terrain that made it possible to shoot at distant targets from high buildings. Jerusalem’s complex topography made this more difficult.) In both cities forces attacked isolated enemy neighborhoods and blew up homes in border areas. Attempts to detonate booby-trapped vehicles or other bombs in enemy territory sometimes succeeded. All these tactics were used in cities of mixed Arab-Jewish population throughout the country up until April 1948, while the British army was seeking to preserve the territorial status quo.[10]

In both cities the fighting escalated steadily, pushed to ever higher levels by the major bombings committed by both sides (at the Saray building and Café Venetzia in Jaffa, the Jaffa and Damascus Gates in Arab Jerusalem, the Palestine Post building, on Ben-Yehuda Street, and the Jewish Agency building in Jewish Jerusalem). ‘Abd al-Qadir proved better able than Salama to carry out such reprisal attacks. In Jaffa, in contrast, the escalation was characterized by ever greater disorder, and occurred largely as a result of the actions of extremist groups rather than of the will of the Jaffites as a whole. The city’s inhabitants abandoned the border areas, which remained in the hands of the fighting forces. Criminal elements were also active, and it was sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two (to a certain extent this was also true on the other side, in Tel Aviv’s border neighborhoods). Some similar phenomena were evident in Jerusalem as well, as the case of Qatamon demonstrates, due to the entry of fighting forces that included outsiders and foreigners—Palestinian villagers and volunteers from Arab countries. Such was the case in other cities of mixed population as well.[11]

Hasan Salama was removed from Jaffa at the beginning of February by the Military Committee of the Arab League, which reconfirmed his appointment as commander of the Lydda district (which it called the “western sector of the central region”) and named ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni commander of the Jerusalem district (which it called the “eastern sector of the central region”). In practice, however, it removed Jaffa from Salama’s purview. The Military Committee sent an Arab Liberation Army garrison to the city under the command of Iraqi officers who reported directly to the Committee, in accordance with its original plan to defend the Arab cities in Palestine beginning on January 1, 1948. The relative ineffectuality of the al-Aqsa Defenders Army produced a situation in which the new unit took control of the forces in the neighborhood sectors. The new soldiers, most them from Iraq, Syria, and the Muslim parts of Yugoslavia, took the place of local Palestinian fighters. Their local commanders, Nazir among them, were integrated into the new deployment as supporters and

advisors. Further ALA reinforcements who arrived during the month of March brought the number of fighters in the Jaffa Garrison to 1,500, despite a chronic desertion problem. But this group was still vastly inferior in numbers to the Jewish forces on the Jaffa front, where the Haganah had deployed 4,500 men. This imbalance did not prevent the garrison from initiating attacks and bringing into use long-range weapons—mortars and machine guns—that led to further escalation. The Jews shelled Jaffa with their own mortars, causing even more of the city's inhabitants to leave, this time people living further away from the front.[12]

In Jerusalem, the Husayni stronghold, the garrison was placed under the Holy War command from the start. Fadil Rashid, an Iraqi officer acceptable to the mufti, was appointed its commander. Only in March did the ALA succeed in ensconcing itself in the Old City. Its commanders established their headquarters at the al-Rawda School, which became the site of the central Arab command in Jerusalem. This force was made up of an Iraqi company of 120 men and 80 more who were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. People had disparate opinions of Rashid. He was welcomed into the city, and some continued to admire him and his men. But others claimed that the ALA's commanders used their men to further their personal interests by, for example, plundering the homes of Arab civilians. In the big picture, it seems that the commanders' ideological identification with the Husayni party helped them to maintain reasonably good relations with the local population.

In Jaffa, in contrast, after an initial warm welcome, the ALA found itself seriously at odds with the local residents. The garrison's officers, it turned out, lorded it over the locals, suspecting them of collaboration with the Jews (which was true in some cases). They pillaged civilian property and confiscated privately owned guns only to sell them on the black market. Some of the officers turned out to have particularly problematic personalities—one deserted the city at the head of a band of Syrian fighters. It is not clear whether Jaffa's inhabitants were aware of the foreign troops' role in escalating the conflict with the Jews. In Qatamon, however, some upper middle class Arabs complained about how fighters from outside the neighborhood were exacerbating the conflict. Some even opposed Ibrahim Abu Dayya, a native of the village of Surif and perhaps the most popular ALA commander after ʻAbd al-Qadir al-Husayni. Abu Dayya and his rural fighters were deployed in the neighborhood in mid-March in the wake of the grievances voiced by Qatamon residents against the previous commander. In general, the Muslim villager Abu Dayya succeeded in gaining the approbation of many of those who remained in Qatamon, including the bourgeoisie, most of whom were Christians. One Qatamon woman wrote on April 21 that, following the death of ʻAbd al-Qadir, "no one remains … but Ibrahim."[13]

ʻAbd al-Qadir's death on April 8, 1948, in the battle of al-Qastal at the approaches to Jerusalem, has been perceived by Palestinian historians as a turning point that marked the beginning of the end for the Palestinian war effort. These historians have presented ʻAbd al-Qadir as a sterling commander who could not be replaced. According to this narrative, his forces crumbled following

his death.[14] The massacre perpetrated the next day at nearby Dayr Yasin cast a pall over the Arab population and was perceived as part of the same turn for the worse. I have shown in this work that ʻAbd al-Qadir's death indeed created a leadership vacuum in the Holy War force, as a result of the inappropriate appointment of another relative of the mufti, Khalid al-Husayni, as commander. But the fighting forces in Jerusalem continued to grow in strength, numbering 2,000 fighters by the beginning of May. In Jerusalem, unlike Jaffa, the Arab-Jewish force ratios were close to even (the Jews had 3,000 men mobilized, but they had guns for only 2,000).

Rashid, the ALA officer, became the dominant commander in Jerusalem after ʻAbd al-Qadir was killed. Both Jaffa and Jerusalem Arabs thus reached the war's decisive phase under foreign command. But there was one huge difference, deriving from the relations that each commander had to the local population. In Jerusalem, Rashid, a mufti loyalist, was accepted by a majority of the population and by most of the local fighters. But Jaffa's inhabitants, in contrast, hated Lieutenant Colonel ʻAdil Najm al-Din, the Iraqi officer appointed by the Military Committee in Damascus to command the city's defenses. Both civilians and local fighters perceived him as condescending and abusive. This difference was also evident in the outcome of the contention over the top command that took place in both cities. At the end of April Lieutenant Colonel ʻAbd al-Hamid al-Rawi, also an Iraqi, arrived in Jerusalem at the head of the Third Yarmuk Battalion and immediately assumed command, outranking as he did Rashid, who was a captain. But the two men vied for authority anyway, and when this was reported to headquarters in Damascus, it was decided to remove al-Rawi from the city and to restore the command to Rashid. When he departed, his battalion disintegrated and many of his men left with him. Others remained, however, under the command of Rashid. He gained greater authority over his fighters, who now numbered 500. Rashid demonstrated leadership during the decisive battles between the British evacuation and the arrival of the Arab Legion on May 19. Rashid's judgment that the New City was lost and his order to retreat into the walled Old City may have been in error, but he was ever conscious of Jerusalem's religious significance and never entertained the thought of retreating from the city. In this he may be contrasted favorably with ALA commanders elsewhere in the country, many of whom abandoned their posts at critical moments.

Rashid's conscientiousness stood diametrically opposed to the way Najm al-Din conducted himself in Jaffa. On April 28, following the conclusion of the IZL attack on Manshiyya and the Haganah offensive against Tall al-Rish, both of which ended with the Jewish forces occupying the Arab neighborhoods, ALA reinforcements from the Ajnadayn battalion arrived in Jaffa. They numbered 250 men, most of them Palestinians from the Transjordan Frontier Force, which had been disbanded by the British at the beginning of 1948. Its commander was Michel al-ʻIsa, a Jaffa-born Palestinian and a former officer in the Frontier Force. He had already seen combat and been involved in organizing Jaffa's defenses. ʻIsa and his men were sent immediately to attack Tall al-Rish, which they succeeded in retaking—one of the most impressive victories for the Arab forces

during the inter-communal stage of the war, and one in which both foreign ALA fighters and Palestinians (who in this case fought in the ALA ranks) stood shoulder to shoulder. In the wake of this success, the central region commander at this stage, Fawzi al-Qawuqji appointed ʻIsa commander of Jaffa. Najm al-Din, who outranked ʻIsa, refused to hand over the command, and the two men were soon at loggerheads, as Rawi and Rashid had been in Jerusalem. But in Jaffa the result was that Najm al-Din simply packed up and left the city with most of his men, leading to the collapse of the local garrison. Presumably the social breakdown that occurred in Jaffa at just this time influenced Najm al-Din's behavior, leading him to conclude that the city could not hold out in any case. The enmity that prevailed between him and the inhabitants was no doubt also a factor in his attitude. Unlike Rashid, who viewed Jerusalem as a city of national, religious, pan-Arab, and pan-Muslim importance, Najm al-Din seems to have considered Jaffa as being only of local significance. He was thus unwilling to sacrifice himself and his men to save it. His behavior was typical of that of ALA commanders in other cities in Palestine, adding to the negative impression that the ALA and its leaders made on the Palestinian population.[15]

This negative view of the ALA was translated into the common view expressed in Palestinian historiography and memoirs, namely that the ALA's negligence and corruption were a central reason for the Nakba.[16] The relative success of Rashid and the Jerusalem Garrison, the Ajnadayn battalion's retaking of Tall al-Rish, and other ALA victories in Nabi Samuel (also by Ajnadayn), in the Latrun-Bab al-Wad area, and against the Jewish settlements ʻAtarot and Neveh Yaʻakov, north of Jerusalem, refute this claim.[17] The ALA played a central role in saving Arab Jerusalem during the inter-communal phase of the war. Its failure in Jaffa was principally due to difficult starting conditions, along with the social collapse that occurred while the garrison was still holding out and had even managed to stabilize a new line of defensive positions (under the protection of the British army) after the fall of Manshiyya.

An overall view of the Arab war effort in both cities shows that it enjoyed successes throughout the conflict, the exceptions being the ones noted above. Arab fighters in Jerusalem and Jaffa were successful in establishing a line of defensive positions and held them until the critical battles. In north Jerusalem and at the Old City wall, they held fast until the Legion arrived. In Jaffa they held the line (except in Manshiyya) up until the city's social collapse. From its own point of view, one of the ALA's successes in Jerusalem was its ability to carry out three huge bombing attacks in the heart of Jewish Jerusalem. Another was its achievement in the campaign to control the road to Jerusalem at Bab al-Wad, in March 1948, turning it into a decisive battle (prior to the Arab defeat the following month). Still another achievement was the counteroffensive that maintained Arab control over some of the neighborhoods to the north of the Old City during Operation Pitchfork. The Arab forces also triumphed in the battle for the Old City's Jewish Quarter, which was on the verge of surrendering even before the Arab Legion arrived.[18] An examination of the conduct of the Palestinian Arab commanders shows that many were killed in battle, including two leading

figures, ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni and Hasan Salama (who was wounded in the battle of Ras al-’Ayn and died on June 2, 1948). Others were wounded and returned again and again to the battlefield. These fighters included Ibrahim Abu Dayya and Bahjat Abu Gharbiyya, the commanders of forces in Jerusalem’s Bab al-Zahra neighborhood. Of the latter, *Filastin* wrote that he was “a man who bore arms and was wounded, then [again] bore arms and was wounded, then [again] bore arms and continues to fight.”[19] This surely reflected high motivation, firm belief in the cause for which they fought, and a readiness for self-sacrifice, at least on the part of those who were veterans of the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939.

Thus, we are presented with other dimensions of Palestinian history in 1948. Beshara Doumani has called upon researchers to “write Palestinians into history.”[20] While Doumani did not refer to that period in the first place, by writing about the Palestinians in Jerusalem and Jaffa in 1948, this book has taken upon itself the challenge to write Palestinians into the most crucial and formative moment in their history.

Notes

1 There was a similar organizational structure of local and neighborhood committees in Haifa, see Tamir Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah* [Arab Haifa in 1948] (Sde Boqer: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Press, 2006), 88 (in Hebrew).

2 Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine*, 231–248; Sela, “Ha-Aravim ha-Falastinim be-milchemet 1948,” 170 (in Hebrew); Avraham Sela, “*Hevra ve-mosdot be-kerev Arviyey Falastin be tekufat ha-mandat*” [Society and institutions of the Palestinian Arabs during the Mandatory Period] in *Calcala ve-hevra be-yemei ha-mandat* [Economy and society in the days of the mandate], ed. Avi Bareli and Nachum Karlinski (Beer Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press, 2003), 342–344 (in Hebrew); al-‘Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 177–180; al-Hut, *Al-qiyadat wal-Mu’assasat al-siyasiyya fi Filastin*, 585–594.

3 The findings of local research on Haifa portray a similar, complex picture of successes and failures, especially in the military realm where the National Committee in Haifa played a more important role than the National Committees in Jerusalem and Jaffa, but also in the civilian realm, as a result of general collapse. See Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, 48–58, 187–188; Tamir Goren, “Ha-milhama al ha-arim ha-meoravot be-tzfon ha-aretz” [The war for the mixed cities in the north of the country], in *Milhemet ha-‘Atsma’ut, 5708–5709: Diyun mehudash* [Israel’s War of Independence 1948–1949: A reconsideration], ed. Alon Kadish (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 2004), 189 (in Hebrew).

4 On the tendency of migrants to be among the first to leave during periods of tension and danger see also Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, 189–190 and note 4.

5 Polarization between Christians and Muslims, the Christians’ tendency to stay out of the fighting and their almost separatist tendency, based on a desire to remain outside of the cycle of violence, was also apparent in Haifa, despite the heterogeneous nature of the community and the inter-communal tolerance that characterized the city. (In Haifa, Christians were more than 40 percent of the Arab population, mostly Greek Catholics who tended to identify with Arab nationalism less than the Greek Orthodox, who were the largest group in the rest of the country, including Jerusalem and Jaffa.) See Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, 39, 90–91; spatial separation between Christians and Muslims was also evident in Lydda, see Kadish, Sela, and Golan, *Kibush Lod*, 15.

6 The December cease-fire agreement in Haifa was violated after two days while in Tiberias the agreement that was signed on 9 March was effective for nearly one month, until it was violated by militant, apparently local, elements. See "The sixth meeting of the National Committee in Haifa," December 11, 1947, CZA 100/60, quoted in Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, Appendix of sources 4, 259–260; Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, 84–86; Goren, "Ha-milhama al ha-arim ha-meoravot," 175; Mustafa Abbasi, "The end of Arab Tiberias: The Arabs of Tiberias in the battle for the city in the 1948 war," *Journal of Palestine Studies, 36*(1), 14–15.

7 There are no accurate and certain data on the number of Palestinian Arab casualties in 1948. The most comprehensive source is al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, *6: Sijill al-hulud: asma' as-suhada' alladina stashadu fi ma'arik Filastin* [The catastrophe, vol. 6: Memorial listing of the names of those who fell in the battle for Palestine] (Sidon and Beirut: al-Maktaba al-'asriyya, 1962) (in Arabic). Al-'Arif divides the Palestinian deaths on his list into three categories: (A) those for whom he knows their name, the date, and place of death (in this section he presents a complete listing, based on the names published in newspapers, personal testimony he heard, and personal lists he kept during the war): total 1,953 from the entire country; (B) victims whose names he did not know but he knew their number, date, and place of death: total 4,004 in the whole country. Obviously this is an estimate, based on descriptions that appear in the book. In my opinion, this number can be accepted as a reasonable estimate; (C) those for whom he knew neither the name nor the date of their death but only the place where they were killed, which he claims is "an estimate made after extensive research." He estimates this number to be 7,034, making a total of approximately 13,000 Palestinian dead during the war. In my opinion this estimate might be exaggerated and it is reasonable to assume that the estimate for category B is more realistic, meaning there were approximately 6,000 Palestinian deaths throughout the country, close to the number of deaths in the Jewish settlements and the State of Israel. Al-'Arif does not distinguish between civilian and military deaths; see his comments on page 7. Based on his numbers for Jaffa, al-'Arif claims that 1,191 people were killed in the city, including 134 in category A, 457 in category B, and 600 in category C. (The round number supports my opinion that this is an unfounded estimate.) See the table on page 120. In my opinion, only the first two categories should be considered, even though category B is also an estimate. Therefore, I conclude that approximately 600 Palestinians were killed in Jaffa. Regarding the number of killed and injured in the IZL attacks, see above Chapter 3, section 10. Al-'Arif presents numbers regarding the number of dead from Arab countries that are similar to or even lower than those presented by Benny Morris, *1948*, 406–407.

8 The war in Jerusalem continued until December 1948. The numbers presented by al-'Arif for Jerusalem include 280 dead in category A; 379 in category B, and 200 in category C. (It is likely that the number for the last category is relatively low because of the author's physical proximity, hence better knowledge of the events.) Al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 120.

9 Rashid al-Hajj Ibrahim, *Al-Difa' 'an Hayfa wa-qadiyat Filastin* [Defending Haifa and the problem of Palestine] (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyah, 2005), 109–112 (in Arabic); Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, 227–231. Goren brings evidence of the Jewish Haganah's attempt to prevent mass flight from Haifa. (During the Mandatory Period, Haifa was an exceptional city in the land of Israel, where a good relationship prevailed between most of the Arab population and the Jews.) See also the memorandum authored by Stockwell, the British commander in the north. Unlike events in Jaffa and the disorderly flight from the city there, the British Navy and police organized the people fleeing via the Port of Haifa and helped them reach their destination, Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, Appendix 111, 453.

10 Compare with Goren, "Ha-milhama al ha-arim ha-meoravot," 171.

11 Compare with Shmaryahu Ben-Pazi, "Hamihalma ha-bein kehilatit be-eretz-Israel, 1947–1948: Hazit hatichon ke-miqre bohan" [The Inter-communal war in Palestine, 1947–1948: the Middle Front as a Case Study] (PhD dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2006), 18–61, 62–108 (in Hebrew). The first two chapters, "Arab criminal gangs during the inter-communal war" and "From neighbors to war: Security dilemmas in rural regions," present the escalation as a spiral model of action and reaction. For another example on the municipal level, see the escalation in Tiberias, in Goren, "Ha-milhama al ha-arim ha-meuravot," 174.
12 A similar phenomenon, of reinforcing the fighting force with the arrival of foreigners from the Army of Deliverance and their tendency to initiate conflict with the Jews, sometimes despite objections of the local people, also occurred in Lydda, see Kadish, Sela, and Golan, *Kibush Lod*, 22–23; the arrival of foreign fighters led to escalation in Tiberias and Acre as well, against the desires of the local population. See Goren, "Ha-milhama al ha-arim ha-meuravot," 173–174; Sela, "*Tzeva ha-Hatzala ba-Galil be-milhemet 1948* [The Army of Deliverance in the Galilee in the war of 1948], in Kadish, *Milhemet ha-'Atsma'ut: Diyun mehudash*, 118 (in Hebrew).
13 Radai, "Collapse of the Palestinian-Arab Middle Class," 973.
14 A similar phenomenon was evident in Haifa after the Transjordanian commander of the city garrison, Muhammad Hamad al-Hunayti, was killed on March 18, 1948. See Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, 120–121; al-Hajj Ibrahim, *al-Difa' 'an Hayfa wa-qadiyat Filastin*, 89–90.
15 This happened in Haifa, when Amin 'Izz al-Din, who replaced Muhammad Hamad al-Hunayti, left the city in the afternoon of April 21, as the decisive battle was beginning. See Goren, *Heifah ha-aravit be-tashah*, 190; the commander of Arab Safad, Sari al-Funaysh, left the city on May 9, three hours before the Jewish offensive began, see Mustafa Abassi, "The Battle for Safad in the War of 1948: a Revised Study," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, 1, February 2004, 21–47; 'Ali Beq, commander of the town garrison in Lydda left town in early May, perhaps when the ALA left to reorganize in Syria. (It should be noted that Fadil Rashid and his forces remained in Jerusalem despite the arrival of the Legion, until the first cease-fire.) See Kadish, Sela, and Golan, *Kibush Lod*, 23.
16 See e.g., 'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 462–463; al-Hawwari, *Sirr Al-Nakba*, 107.
17 See Radai, *Ha-kohot ha-bilti sdirim*, 134–140.
18 Al-'Arif was the first to note this, despite the political ramifications of writing under Jordanian rule. See al-'Arif, *Al-Nakba*, 130; See also Joseph Nevo, "Hapalestinayim ve Hamedina Hayehudit, 1947–1948" [The Palestinians and the Jewish State, 1947–1948], in *Hayinu ke-holmim: kovets mehkarim 'al Milhemet ha-Komemiyut* [We were as dreamers: A collection of articles on the War of Independence], ed. Yehuda Wallach, (Tel Aviv: Massada, 1985), 315 (in Hebrew).
19 *Filastin*, undated, quoted in Qalyubi, *'A'ilat wa-shakhsiyyat min Yafa*, 42.
20 Doumani, "Rediscovering Ottoman Palestine," 5–28.

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www.jerusalemites.org
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Index

Page numbers in *italics* denote tables.

‘Abbasiyya-Yahudiyya, village 138, 157, 158, 168
‘Abd al-Rahim, Ahmad 172, 176, 178
‘Abd al-Rahim, Muhammad 150, 172
‘Abdallah, King of Transjordan: and Jaffa 131, 145, 151, 171, 175; and Jerusalem 77, 88, 96, 98–9, 101, 102–3
Abu al-Zuluf, Mahmud 126
Abu ‘Ata 70, 71, 72, 74, 75
Abu Dayya, Ibrahim 1, *2*, 32–3, *33*, 70–9, 84, 85–6, 188, 191
Abu Fadil, Munir 96–9, 109
Abu Gharbiyya, Bahjat 24, 29, 30, 32, 34, 36, 46, 51–2, 54, 100–1, 105, 191
Abu Gharbiyya, Subhi 29–30, 36
Abu Hashiyya, Musa 157
Abu Kabir, Jaffa 128, 129, 133, 136, 137, 138, 145, 158, 170
Abu Khadra family 128
Abu Laban, Ahmad 141, 142, 152–3, 169, 176
Abu Lughod, Ibrahim 126, 171
Abu-Nabut, Muhammad 127
Abu Tor neighborhood, Jerusalem 17, 22, 91, 98, 99, 100, 104
Abu ‘Ubayda Company 95
al-Ahram newspaper 48
‘Ajami neighborhood, Jaffa *120*, 127, 129–30, 143, 176
Ajnadayn Battalion (ALA) 174–5, 180, 189–90
Albina, Anton 67, 68, 76
Alhambra cinema, Jaffa *125*, *130*, 133, 138
Allenby barracks, Jerusalem 100
Allenby Square, Jerusalem 99
al-‘Amd, Jawdat 40, 41
American Colony, Jerusalem 17, 37, 105
al-‘Amiriyya High School, Jaffa 148–9
‘Anabtawi house, Qatamon 68–9
Andraus, Amin 176
‘Aql, Amin 141, 143, 169, 171
Al-Aqsa Mosque 85
al-Aqsa Defenders Army, Jaffa 158–60, 169, 177, 186, 187
Arab Higher Committee in Jaffa 126, 137, 140, 141, 142, 146, 148, 150, 153, 154, 158–9
Arab Higher Committee in Jerusalem: and Arab Treasury 22, 28, 39; and bombings 47, 48; and the British 34, 40, 92; and cease-fire talks 94, 101; and convoy attack 90; criticisms of 37; and Dayr Yasin 88; and death of ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni 86; Emergency Committee 25, 37, 38; and exodus from city 41–3, 92; and guards 24–5; and government workers 92; leadership of 109–10; and medical facilities 23; and military commanders 87; and Military Committee 44–5; move offices 94; and municipal taxes 40; and National Committee 37–9, 42; and outside help 31; panic in 35; and police 43; and Qatamon 68, 70, 71, 74, 77; raising money 22, 28; and strike 20–1; and supplies 52–3; and troop discipline 50–1; and weapons 30, 37
Arab League 2, 21, 22, 30–1, 32, 87, 168, 172, 186, 187
Arab Legion of Transjordan 1, 28, 44, 74, 75, 77, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106
Arab Liberation Army (ALA) 2, 7, 26, 31; in Jaffa 168–71, 174–5, 187–8, 189–90; in Jerusalem 40, 42, 44–6, 87, 90–3, 97, 98, 99, 100–1, 102, 103, 104, 106, 108, 109, 188, 189, 190; in Qatamon 77

Arab Orthodox Club 24–5
Arab Revolt (1936–1939) 6, 19, 132–3, 156
Arab Scouts 23, 85
Arab Treasury 22, 28, 39, 40, 108, 109, 141, 183
Arab Youth Organization 22, 45, 136, 146
archives 4–5
al-ʻArif, ʻArif 32, 53, 75, 76, 90, 158, 185
al-ʻArif, Saʻd al-Din 38, 85
ʻAriqat, Kamil 32, *33*, 49, 70, 83, 95, 96
Armenians: in Jerusalem 15, 35, 66, 69, 107, 184; in Jaffa 61n100, 127, 145
ʻAways, Shafiq 68, 69, 70
ʻAyn Karim, village 95
ʻAzir, Sulayman 96, 103

Bab al-Wad 52, 53, 83, 190
Bab al-Zahra neighborhood, Jerusalem 24, 30, 54, 91, 93, 105, 191
al-Bakri, Sheikh Yasin 27, 29, 50
al-Bandak, ʻIsa 26
Baqʻa neighborhood, Jerusalem 21, 22, 23, 24–5, 45, 84, 91, 94, 99, 100, 104, 106
Barakat, Hafiz 50, 100–1, 106
Barclays Bank building, Jerusalem *20*, 34, 98, 99, 102
al-Basa neighborhood, Jaffa 170
Bat Yam 153, 159
Bayt Jala, 23, 45, 61n100, 73, 86, 95
Bayt Safafa, village 35, 36, 49
Begin, Menachem 172
Beit Dajan, village 153, 170
Beit Yaʻakov neighborhood, Tel Aviv/Jaffa 157
Beit Yisrael neighborhood, Jerusalem 30, 36, 54, 93
Ben-Gal, Michael (James) 176
Ben-Gurion, David 153
Ben-Yehuda Street, Jerusalem 47–8, 51
Bethlehem 23, 26, 31, 35, 48, 50, 71, 78, 92, 95
Bir Zeit, village 33
al-Bitar family 128
Bosnian Yugoslavian troops 160
Braudel, Fernand 3
British Mandate and Jaffa: and bombings 148; and cease-fire 152, 174, 175; and citrus treaty 150–1; and curfew 137, 147; and elections 130; and fall of the city 170, 174–5; and Jerusalem-Jaffa Road 143–4; metamorphosis of city 128; as neutral city 176; and the Old City 133; and riots 132; and Tel Aviv 132; and withdrawal 145, 176
British Mandate and Jerusalem: and bombings 33–4, 47–8; civil resistance to 20, 21; and control of the city 20; and convoys 29, 30, 47, 53, 89; and Dayr Yasin 88; as employer 17; establishment of security areas 21; and exodus of civilians 27, 28, 29; and expansion of middle classes 17; interventions 34, 36, 37, 50, 54; and mayor 19–20; and National Committee 26, 27, 38, 39–40; in the Old City 30, 34; police 26, 29, 34, 36, 43–4, 51; in Qatamon 66, 67, 77–8; resentment growing 89; and taxes 40; and water supply 53; withdrawal from city 93–106
Budayri house, Qatamon 68–9

cease-fire: in Jaffa 152–4, 155, 174, 175; in Jerusalem 53, 76–8, 94, 95, 101
Christians: in Jaffa 126, 127, 140, 142, 151–2, 184; in Jerusalem 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 43, 48, 68, 69, 73, 87, 95, 103–4, 107, 18
citrus growers 127–8, 133, 150–1, 184–5
coastal cities 3–4; and Jaffa as a coastal city, 7, 129, 179; and Haifa as a coastal city, 185; versus mountain cities, 7, 182
Consular Commission (UN) 94, 101, 102, 103–4
convoys, attacks on 21, 30, 52–3, 89–90
crime 92–3; kidnappings 93; looting 78, 94, 106, 137, 151, 169, 172, 175; train robberies 157
culture: Jaffa 19, 130–1; Jerusalem 19
Cunningham, Alan, High Commissioner 43, 53, 77

al-Dajani, Ghalib 149–50
al-Dajani, Hajj Zafir 142, 144
al-Dajani, Dr Mahmud Tahir 23–4, 90
al-Dajani, Raghib 149–50
Dajani family, Jaffa 128, 150
Dajani family, Jerusalem 17, 104
Damascus Gate, Jerusalem 33–4, 49, 53
Darwish, ʻAbd al-Fattah 95
Da'ud, Anton 48
Dayr Yasin, village 86–9, 189
Dib brothers 24–5
al-Difaʻ, newspaper 36, 42, 86, 126, 147
Doumani, Beshara 191

Egypt 30, 32, 48, 72, 74, 99, 138, 140–1, 144, 149, 151, 155, 186
Egyptian: troops 31, 74, 78, 81n35; correspondents 86; *see also* migrants

Emergency Committee, Jaffa 176
Emergency Committee, Jerusalem 25–6, 27, 35, 37, 38, 39, 108
Employment and unemployment: in Jaffa 127–8, 129, 146, 152; in Jerusalem 17–19, 28, 92
espionage 148
Etzioni brigade (Haganah) 77, 99, 104, 105

al-Fa'iz, Mahmud 95
Febvre, Lucien 3
Filastin, newspaper 20, 21, 22, 25, 53, 86, 88, 89–90, 137, 191
first aid 23–4
food supplies: in Jaffa 142–3, 145, 171; in Jerusalem 25, 38, 39, 53, 67, 93, 95, 96
Frayj, Dr. Fawti 68, 70, 85
fuel shortages 91, 152, 171
Fuller, William 152, 153, 176

Garrisons: in Jerusalem 40, 44–6, 50, 75, 87, 91, 97, 99, 107, 190; in Wadi Joz neighborhood, Jerusalem, 51; in Jaffa 144, 148, 168–9, 172, 174–5, 178, 187–8, 190; in sectors of Jaffa, 158; in Tulkarm 43; in Haifa 44, 193n14; in Lydda, 193n15; in Qastal village, 84
German Colony, Jerusalem 16–17, 19, 35, 94, 96, 99, 116n50
German military experts, Jaffa 162n19, 169
German paratroopers, WWII: Hasan Salama 166n73
Germans 17, 127
Germany 156
al-Ghuri, Emil 21, 22, 24, 26–7, 35, 87, 96
al-Ghuri, Raja'i 24
Givati Brigade (Haganah) 159
Glubb, Brigadier John Baggot 99, 103, 106
Graves, Richard 20, 40, 43–4
Greeks: in Jerusalem 15, 16, 69, 95, 106–7, 116n50, 184; in Jaffa 127, 145
Greek Colony, Jerusalem 16–17, 44
Greek Orthodox community 43
Gregory, Brad 4
Gurney, Henry 28, 53, 77–8

Haganah forces in Jaffa 137–8, 150, 153, 155, 157, 159–60, 168, 169, 170–1, 174–5, 176
Haganah forces in Jerusalem: fighting begins 27–8, 29, 34–5, 48, 49, 51, 53; and al-Qastal 83–4; in Baq'a 94–5; and British withdrawal 94, 99, 100; and cease-fire 94; and convoy attack 89, 90; and Dayr Yasin 87–8; psychological offensive 94–5; in Qatamon 66, 68, 70, 74–5, 77
Haifa 18, 32, 44, 95, 128, 171, 185, 191n5, 192, 192n9, 193n14, 193n15
Hanna Zananiri house, Qatamon *65*
al-Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount) Jerusalem *15*, 27, 29, 34, 35, 36, 54, 71, 85, 100, 103, 104, *109*
HaSolel Street, Jerusalem 46–7
Hasuna, Hasan 155, 158
Hatikvah neighborhood, Jaffa 157
al-Hawwari, Muhammad Nimr 136–7, 140, 142, 148, 151, 154–6, 158, 177, 186
Haykal, Yusif: appointment of 130–1; and fall of Jaffa 168, 171, 174, 175, 178, 183, 186; fighting begins 137, 140, 144, 147, 149, 151, 152, 153, 155
HaYotzeq factory, Holon 170
Hebron Road, Jerusalem 36, 50, 53
Hebronite community, Jerusalem 18–19, 29, 51, 86; *see also* migrants
Hilmi, Ahmad (Ahmad Hilmi Pasha 'Abd al-Baqi) 21, 27, 42, 45, 70, 77, 78, 97, 99, 101, 102, 106, 109–10, 141
Holon 153–4, 159
Holy War forces (*al-Jihad al-Muqaddas)*: detonation unit 50; early days in Jerusalem 40, 44–5, 48, 51, *52*; and Qatamon 68, 70; reestablishment of 32–3, *33*, 186–7; resistance in Jerusalem 87, 93, 97, 100–1, 103, 106, 107
hospitals: in Jaffa 131, 142, 172; in Jerusalem 18, 23–4, 34, 89, 90, 99, 105
al-Husayn battalion (ALA) 44, 46
al-Husayni, 'Abd al-Qadir 31–3, *33*, 40–1, 45–9, 51, 52, 66, 68, 70, 71, 83–7, 109, 187, 188–9
al-Husayni, Da'ud 98–9
al-Husayni, Hajj Amin (the Mufti): and Jaffa 137, 140, 141, 144, 148, 150, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158–9, 177, 186; and Jerusalem 18, 21–2, 26–7, 31–2, 35, 36–7, 40, 41–2, 45, 46, 48, 53, 77, 87, 90, 99, 186
al-Husayni, Jamal 94
al-Husayni, Jamil 27, 34, 36
al-Husayni, Khalid Sharif 44, 87, 96, 97, 100, 101, 103–4, 106, 189
al-Husayni, Mahmud 27, 34, 36
al-Husayni, Munif 148
al-Husayni, Musa Kazim (Pasha) 85, 132

al-Husayni, Tawfiq Salih 27, 35
Husayni party 25, 39, 87, 107, 131, 140, 141, 145, 148
al-Hut, Shafiq 126, 171

al-Idrisi, Major Fa'iz 44
intelligence documents 5–6
intelligence-gathering 110; *see also* Shai
Iraq 31, 32
Iraqi consulate, Qatamon 74, 75, 76, 77
Iraqi combatants (ALA) 44, 93, 104, 168, 170, 187, 188
al-'Isa, Captain Michel 160, 172, 174–5, 177, 178, 189–90
Italian Hospital, Jerusalem 99
IZL (Irgun Zvai Leumi): in Jaffa 138–9, 172, 174–5, 185, 189; in Jerusalem 21, 33–4, 35–6, 37, 47, 87–8, 99, 105

Jabaliyya neighborhood, Jaffa *120*, 128, 129–30, 143, 145, 151, 153, 155, 158
al-Ja'bari, Muhammad 'Ali 18, 51
Jaffa: and Arab Liberation Army 168–71, 174–5, 187–8, 189–90; and Arab Revolt 132–3; characteristics of 3–4, 7, 125–30; citrus farming 127–8, 133, 150–1, 184–5; civilians flee 136, 146, 147, 151, 170–1, 172–4, 177, 182, 184, 185; compared with Jerusalem 182–91; culture 19, 130–1; on eve of war 125–33; fall of 7, 168–78; fighting begins 136–40; and al-Hawwari, Muhammad Nimr 154–6, 177; historical development of 3, 126–7; importance of 125–6, 127; lack of cohesion 131–2, 185, 186; local peace agreements 152–4; maps *120–3*; modernization of 130–1, 186; municipal elections 130; National Committee and municipality 140–5; nature of the fighting 187; population of 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 172; poverty 128–9, 131–2; religious mix of 126, 127, 128, 151–2; and Salama, Hasan 156–60; shantytowns 128–9; social and military collapse 172–8; society during the battle 145–52; society in flux 125–32; successes of war effort 190–1; surrender of 176; and Tel Aviv 132–3, 136, 176; three day strike 146, 150
Jaffa Gate, Jerusalem 29, 35–7, 53, 96, 102, 103, 104
Jaffa Harbor, *also* Jaffa Port 3–4, 125–6, 128–9, 132–3, 138, 142, 146, 151, 158, 160, 171–4, *173*, 185
Jaffa Road, Jerusalem 103
Janho, 'Abd al-Nur Khalil 25, 47
Jarallah, Zuhdi 148–9
Jarrar, Fawzi 98, 102, 105
al-Ja'uni, 'Azmi 32, 48
Jawhariyya, Fakhri 73
Jerusalem: and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni 32–3, 83–7; and Arab Liberation Army 40, 42, 44–6, 87, 90–3, 97, 98, 99, 100–1, 102, 103, 104, 106, 108, 109, 188, 189, 190; bombings 33–7, 46–9, 187; British withdrawal 97–106; as center of Palestinian Arab politics 19–20; characteristics of 3–4, 7, 15–19; civilians flee 27–9, 41–3, 49–54, 91–3, 94, 104–5, 108, 182, 185–6; collapse of civilian life 90–3; compared with Jaffa 182–91; culture 19; Dayr Yasin 87–8; early fighting 20–7, 29–30, 34–7; escalation of hostilities 49–54, 187; eve of British withdrawal 93–7; Hebronite community 18–19; historical development of 3; maps *12–14*; medical convoy 89–90; middle class 65–79; municipal police established 43–4; National Committee established 37–41; organizing for the war 22–4; population of 15, 17, 18; Qatamon case study 65–79; religious mix of 15–16; resistance of 83–110; social cohesion 186; successes of war effort 190–1; tactics 187
Jerusalem-Tel Aviv Road, *also* Jerusalem-Jaffa Road 52–3, 144; *see also* Bab al-Wad
Jewish Agency 34, 78, 94, 101, 104
Jewish Agency building, Jerusalem 48–9, *98*
Jewish Quarter, Old Jerusalem 29, 34, 37, 99, 102–4, 105, 106, 190
Jones, Brigadier 77, 88

Kamal, Tahsin 24
Kaplan, Eliezer 78
Kark, Ruth 3
al-Karmi, 'Abd al-Ghani 169
Karmi, Ghada 67–8
Karmi, Hasan 73
Karmi, Ziyad 67–8
Katz, Ya'akov 153, 154
Keren Kayemet (Hazbun) building, Jaffa 170
Kfar Etzion, Kibbutz 32, 70, 76, 103, 114n39, 114n40
Khalaf, Issa 7
Khalaf, Salah (Abu Iyad) 172–3

al-Khalidi, Ghalib 85, 92
al-Khalidi, Hazim 42
al-Khalidi, Dr. Husayn Fakhri 21, 26, 27, 35, 43, 45, 48, 53, 68, 70, 88, 90, 92, 109, 141
Khalidi, Rashid 2, 7
Khalidi family 92
al-Khatib, Anwar 101–2
Khayr al-Bahlul, Muhammad 142, 143, 169
Khurshid, Ishaq 172, 176
Kimmerling, Baruch 3
King George Avenue, Jaffa 5, *130*, 138, 170
King George Avenue, Jerusalem *98*
Kiryati Brigade (Haganah) 159
Kugel, (Dr.) Haim 153–4

Lebanese combatants (ALA) 91, 99
LEHI (Lohamey Herut Yisrael): in Jaffa 139–40, 143–4, 150; in Jerusalem 21, 27–8, 47, 66, 68–9, 87–8, 99
Levi, Giovanni 4
Lifta, village 17, 27–8
looting 78, 94, 106, 137, 151, 169, 172, 175
Lydda 86, 156–7, 193n15

al-Mahmudiyya mosque, Jaffa 127, 132, *139*
Majaj, ‘Isa 26
al-Maliha, village 17, 35, 95
Maluhi, ‘Abd al-Rahman 46
Mamilla quarter, Jerusalem 49, 103
Mamilla Road, Jerusalem *20*, 21, 49
Manku Company 95–6, 97, 101
Manshiyya neighborhood, Jaffa *121*, 127, 128, 132, 133, 136, 137–8, 139, 144, 145, 146–7, 148, 170, 172, 174
Mas‘ud, Ali al-Maliji 130–1
Mea She‘arim neighborhood, Jerusalem 30, 54, 93, 99, 101
medical care/facilities: in Jaffa 131, 142, 172; in Jerusalem 18, 23–4, 34, 89–90, 99, 105
Meqor Hayyim neighborhood, Jerusalem 34, 35, 45, 49, 68
methodology 4–6
microhistory 4
middle class: collapse of 65–79, 107; and destabilization of Jaffa society 151–2; expansion of 17, 65–6; fear for the future 145; in Qatamon 65–79, 184, 188; neighborhoods in Jaffa 129–30; neighborhoods in Jerusalem 17; opposition in Jaffa 151–2, 177, 184
Migdal, Joel 3
migrants *also* immigrants 128–9; Egyptian 127; Hawrani 129, 146, 152; of Arab countries 128, 160; internal Hebronite 18–19, 29, 38, 107, 110 (*see also* Hebronite community); internal rural 128, 137, 184, 191n4; Jewish *also* Zionist 127, 132, 176
Military Committee (Arab League) 31, 32, 44–5, 87, 168, 172, 187
military court 169
morale: in Jaffa 138, 146, 170, 171, 174; in Jerusalem 29, 36, 37, 40, 48–9, 51, 85–6, 88, 98, 101, 103
mountain cities: versus coastal cities 3–4, 7, 182; and Jerusalem as a mountain city 19, 110, 186
Mt Scopus convoy, Jerusalem 89–90
Mt Zion, Jerusalem (Nabi Da’ud) 36, 104, 106
Muslim Brotherhood 22, 46, 95, 101, 140, 158, 160
Musrara neighborhood, Jerusalem 24, 51, 53, 54, 91, 93, 99, 100, 101, 105

Nabi Daniyal convoy 71
Nablus 34, 42, 86, 102, 157
Nahalat Shimon neighborhood, Jerusalem 27, 30, 36
al-Najjar, Muhammad ‘Adil 51, 89
Najm al-Din, ‘Adil 148, 168, 169, 170, 175, 189–90
Nakba (Catastrophe) 5–6; and Jaffa as a symbol, 126
Nashashibi family 17
Nashashibi house, Jerusalem 93–4
National Committee, Jaffa: achievements of 183–4; calls for dismissal of members 169; and citrus farmers 150; and civilian organizations 142; delegation to Transjordan 171; and exodus from city 171; failure of 184; few members remaining 174, 176; financial issues 141–2, 175; and al-Hawwari, Nimr 154, 155; membership of 140–1; relationship with municipality 140–5, 176–7; role of 142–3, 182–3; and Salama, Hasan 156, 157, 160; subcommittees of 141; and supplies 142–3, 171; and truce 152–3
National Committee, Jerusalem: achievements of 183–4; and Arab Higher Committee 37–9, 42; and British authorities 26, 27, 43–4; and Dayr Yasin 88; establishment of 37–41; and establishment of Arab municipality 96;

National Committee, Jerusalem *continued* and exodus of civilians 41–3, 92, 104–5, 185–6; financial issues 38–9, 109; and medical convoy 90; membership of 37–8; and mourning for ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni 86; and officers’ training 42–3; and police 43–4; and Qatamon 78; role of 38–9, 108, 182–3; and supplies 91, 93, 95, 96
National Guard, Jerusalem 20, 25–6, 28, 37, 38, 40, 50–1
al-Nazir, Salah 156, 158, 169, 175, 176, 177, 186
neighborhood committees, Jerusalem 24–5, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 67, 68
Nevo, Joseph 6
New City, Jerusalem 75, 100, 108, 110
Notre Dame, Jerusalem 99, 100, 101, 103, 105
Nusseibeh, Anwar 24, 38, 39, 76–7, 78, 85, 88, 101–2, 108, 109, 183
Nuzha quarter, Jaffa 129–30, 142, 145, 170

officers’ training 42–3
Old City, Jaffa *120*, *121*, 128, 133
Old City, Jerusalem *12*, *15*; Arab command center 45, 188; and British withdrawal 99, 100–1, 102, 103, 104–6, 108; cease-fire 94, 95; civilians sheltering in 91–2, 94–5, 108; clinics 23; early fighting in 29–30, 34, 36, 37, 41, 50; population of 15–16; resilience of 107, 108; sprayed with DDT 96
Operation Hametz, Jaffa 174
Operation Pitchfork, Jerusalem 97–105
oral history 6

Palestine: division into combat sectors 30–2, partitioning of 20, 101, 126, 145, 146, 148–9, 154
Palestine Post building, Jerusalem 46–7
Palestinian Arab Executive Committee 132
Palestinian Arab Medical Association 23–4, 89–90, 142
Palestinian Arab Women’s Association 22–3, *23*, 142
Palmach forces 74–5, 76, 77, 78, 84, 88, 93–4, 104, 105
Palmon, Yehoshua 155
Perlson, Eliezer 153
Police (municipal): in Jaffa 132, 143, 144, 158; in Jerusalem 26, 28, 36, 43–4, 47, 96–7, 103, 109
Pollock, James H.H. 67
Princess Mary Avenue, Jerusalem 19, *20,* 21, 48
prisoners of war 88, 106, 115n50

al-Qaddumi, Faruq 126, 136
al-Qastal, village 53, 83–5, 86, 87, 88
Qatamon neighborhood, Jerusalem 107, 184; and Ibrahim Abu Dayya 1, 70–8; and Arab Higher Committee 35, 68, 70, 72; cease-fire 76, 77–8; exodus from 66–7, 69–70, 73–4, 76, 78, 94; fall of 73–9; foreign troops 188; hostilities begin 65–8; looting in 78; and middle class civilians 67–73; reinforcements 74; residents in conflict with military chief 68, 69, 70; residents’ security concerns 68–71; strategic location of 66
al-Qawuqji, Fawzi 31, 44, 86, 87, 90–1, 97, 102, 169, 172, 175, 190
al-Quds, newspaper 126
Qula, village 157
Qutayna, Shukri 34, 36, 89
al-Qutb, Fawzi 47, 48, 50

railroads 91
Ramallah 102
Ramat Rachel, Kibbutz 78
Ramla 48, 85–6, 153, 157
Rashid, Captain Fadil ‘Abdallah 44, 45–6, 77, 87, 91, 93, 98–9, 100, 102–3, 106, 108, 188, 189–90
al-Rawda School, Jerusalem 41, 45, *45*
al-Rawi, Colonel ‘Abd al-Hamid 75, 91, 94, 189
research methodology 4–6
al-Rimawi, Qasim 32, *33*
Rokach, Yisrael 152–3, 155

Safiyya, Anton 96
Safwat, Isma‘il 30–1, 46
al-Sa‘id family 128
al-Sakakini, Hala 66, 69, 72, 74, 75–6
al-Sakakini house, Qatamon 67, 69, 73–4
al-Sakakini, Khalil 1, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74
al-Sakakini, Melia 71–2
al-Sakakini, Sari 69, 72, 75
Salama, Hasan 31, 87, 153, 154, 156–60, 168, 169, 177, 186, 187
Salamah, village 156, 157, 159, 169
Sanhedria neighborhood, Jerusalem 36, 101
Saray building, Jaffa *139*, 140, 143–4, 147, 148, 152
Sarayra, Mamduh 95
al-Sarih, weekly 171
Sayigh, Yusif 116, 116n50

Security Council, Jaffa 154–5
Sela, Avraham 6
Semiramis Hotel, Qatamon 66–7
Shahin house, Qatamon 68–9
Shai (Haganah intelligence service): and Jaffa 137, 148, 151; and Jerusalem 21, 24, 27, 34, 35, 36, 38, 47, 48, 51, 76, 77, 78, 85, 90, 93, 100, 102
Shaltiel, David 87
Shantytowns, Jaffa 128–9
Sharabi, Hisham 126
al-Shaykh ʻAli, Major ʻAbd al-Wahab 168
Shehadeh,ʻAziz 151
Shehadeh, Widad 151
Sheikh Badr neighborhood, Jerusalem 16, 27–8
Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, Jerusalem 34, 36–7, 89–90, 93, 99, 100, 106
Shubaki family 150
Shuk HaCarmel, Tel Aviv/Jaffa 136, 137
al-Sibaʻi, Dr. Mustafa 46, 101
Siksik, ʻAbd al-Rahman 158, 160
Silwan, village 17, 29
snipers 67, 137–8, 187
social collapse 2, 7, 90–3, 107–8, 182, 190; and Jaffa 7, 172–8, 185; and Jerusalem 107–8; and Qatamon and middle class 65ff, 107; and military collapse 107–8, 182, 190
sources 4–6
Spirt factory, Holon 170
St Simeon Monastery, Qatamon 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 84
strikes 20–1, 29, 133, 136, 137, 146, 150
al-Sufi, Jamal 46
supplies: food supplies in Jaffa 142–3, 145, 171; food supplies in Jerusalem 25, 38, 39, 53, 67, 93, 95, 96; fuel 91, 152, 171; Jewish 52–3; water supplies 53, 95
Supreme Muslim Council 18, 101
Surif, village 32–3, 70
Syria 32, 42, 46, 87, 169
Syrian combatants (ALA) 44, 46, 63n109, 81n40, 91, 100–1, 169, 188; *see also* Muslim Brotherhood

al-Tahir, Mustafa 141, 156, 169, 171
Talbiyya neighborhood, Jerusalem *16*, 28–9, 91, 94, 99
al-Tall, Captain ʻAbdallah 74, 75, 77, 103, 106
Tall al-Rish neighborhood/village, Jaffa 129, 145, 153–4, 158, 159, 174–5, 189–90
Tamari, Salim 3
Tamari, Wahba 142
al-Tamimi, Rafiq 21, 140, 141, 143, 144, 149, 154, 155
Tannus, ʻIzzat 39, 98–9, 101
Tarad, Captain Barakat 95
taxes: in Jaffa 141–2, 144, 154–5, 171; in Jerusalem 22, 25, 28, 38, 39, 40
Tel Aviv 132–3, 136, 137–8, 146, 150, 151, 152, 176
Temple Mount (al-Haram al-Sharif), Jerusalem *15*, 27, 29, 34, 35, 36, 54, 71, 85, 100, 103, 104, *109*
Terra Sancta School, Jerusalem *98*
Third Yarmuk Battalion (ALA) 90–1, 93, 104
Tlil Cocone 66
Tlil (Tleel), Da'ud, 69, 74
Transjordan 31, 32, 96, 101; irregular forces 95–6, 97, 106; *see also* ʻAbdallah, King of Transjordan; Arab Legion of Transjordan

al-ʻUmari, Mahmud 49–50
United Nations 20, 94, 96, 101, 102, 103–4, 126, 154
upper middle class *see* middle class
Usama Company 96

villagers: in Jerusalem and its area 32, 41, 67–8, 72–3, 75, *84*, 92, 107, 114n40, 187–8; in Jaffa and its area 145, 147, 151, 157–8, 177

Wadi al-Joz neighborhood, Jerusalem 17, 22, 27, 51–2, 54, 89, 91
Waqf buildings, Jerusalem 18–19, 30, 34
water supplies 53, 95
weapons: ammunition, cost of 143; 'Davidka' 170–1; in Jaffa 138, 141, 143, 158, 169, 170–1; in Jerusalem 30, 32, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 46, 70, 96, 97, 99; poor quality 32, 40; registration of 38, 39; smuggled in 37
women's organizations 22–3, *23*, 142

Yazur, village 138, 139, 153
Yemin Moshe neighborhood, Jerusalem 28, 36, 45, 50, 100

Zayn al-Din, Saʻid 147
Zion Gate, Jerusalem 29, 105, 106