The Zionist Masquerade

The Birth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance, 1914–1918

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Introduction

This book is a re-examination of British policy towards the Zionist movement during the First World War, which resulted in a major turning point in the history of Zionism, Palestine and the Middle East. In the midst of the Great War, during a period of profound crisis, the British Government issued what became known as the Balfour Declaration on 2 November 1917. This letter, sent by A.J. Balfour, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to Lord Rothschild, the Anglo-Jewish figurehead, constituted the first official public statement of support by a nation-state for the aspirations of the Zionist movement that was of consequence. Not only did the Declaration endorse the creation of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, but it asserted that His Majesty's Government would 'use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object'. Soon after, on 9 December 1917, British imperial forces occupied Jerusalem under the leadership of General Allenby, ending just over 400 years of Ottoman rule. In 1922, Britain's occupation of Palestine was given official sanction with the ratification of her Mandate for the country by the League of Nations. This period of rule was to last for almost thirty years and resulted in a fundamental re-drawing of the political landscape in Palestine. Prior to the Great War, the Zionist movement constituted a minority within both world Jewry and in Palestine itself. By the end of the Mandate the founding blocks for Jewish statehood had been established, and the bloody Zionist-Palestinian conflict was firmly entrenched. On 14 May 1948, the final day of the Mandate, the State of Israel was founded and the first Arab-Israeli war ensued.

For many years, the history and purpose of the Balfour Declaration were hotly debated by historians and commentators alike. Recently, however, much less attention has been given to this critical juncture in

the history of Britain and the Zionist-Palestinian conflict. Despite the outpouring of revisionist histories of Zionism and Palestine that began with the work of the 'New Historians' almost twenty years ago,[1] there has been no attempt to give a comprehensive re-assessment of this subject. Seeking to fill this gap, this book provides a new history of the birth of the Anglo-Zionist alliance that challenges the established explanations and myths that have dominated the popular and scholarly literature. It offers a new understanding of the origins, fruition and significance of the Balfour Declaration, by placing it within the context of British policies towards, and perceptions of, ethnic groups, ethnicity and nationalism between 1914 and 1918. In doing so, the book presents a significant re-interpretation of two key questions that have been the focus of historical debate: Why did British policy-makers decide to pursue a pro-Zionist policy and what was the nature of the official Anglo-Zionist relationship that came about as a result?

In the immediate wake of the Great War, perhaps the most influential explanation of the Balfour Declaration was that it stemmed from the genuine idealism and religious sympathy of the Government for the restoration of the Jews to the land of the Bible.[2] This myth has had a lasting impact on the public and scholarly imagination.[3] However, as the serious historical study of British motives for the Declaration developed, the allure of this thesis faded as scholars sought to show that it was the result of carefully considered political and diplomatic motives.

Arguably, this scholarship began in earnest with the publication of Leonard Stein's classic work in 1961, from which all others have followed. Stein suggested two key motives for the Balfour Declaration: to help secure sole British control of Palestine after the war, due to its strategic importance as a buffer to Egypt and the Suez Canal, and to win over Jewish opinion for the Allied war effort, particularly in Russia and the USA.[4] At the point when the decision was finally taken to issue the Declaration it was the latter issue of propaganda that was, according to Stein, uppermost in the minds of British policy-makers.[5] The most important work that came after Stein, with the release of Government documentation in the 1960s, largely ignored the propaganda motive and focused on the question of Palestine.[6] Some studies emphasised the importance of propaganda in Government calculations,[7] but for the most part it was seen as a secondary issue.[8] More recently, however, much greater emphasis has been placed on the British intention to gain the support of Jewry for the war through the Balfour

Declaration, and the anti-Semitic ideas that underpinned this line of thought.[9] Beneath the Government's rationale for using Zionism to influence Jewish attitudes were a series of wholly erroneous assumptions. It was predicated upon a belief in Jewish unity and power, the conviction that Jews were largely pro-German, and that they also constituted a leading force in pacifist and Russian Revolutionary circles. Some have contended that these anti-Semitic perceptions were the driving force behind the decision to issue the Balfour Declaration.[10]

Undoubtedly, the anti-Semitism argument helps us to understand why those behind the Balfour Declaration imagined Jewry to be a hostile international power, which was thought to be conspiring with the enemy forces of Germanism and Bolshevism. Moreover, it has demonstrated that in order to comprehend fully why the Balfour Declaration came to be, it is necessary to go beyond the traditional approach to this subject, in which historians had sought to establish a set of rationally considered political motives.

Following this work, this study considers how the *Weltanschauung* of members of the British Government influenced their policy toward Jewry and the Zionist movement during the war. It is principally concerned, therefore, with the assumptions and considerations of the foreign policy-making elite, a small group of individuals within the British Government and Establishment, which in the main sprang from the same social, educational and cultural milieu.[11] Placing the beliefs of this elite within their broader context, this book explores how prevalent currents of thought and perceptions within British culture influenced the official mind, and shaped Government policy.

The point of departure from previous scholarship, however, is that anti-Semitism does not answer a fundamental question: why did policy-makers so readily and steadfastly believe that Zionism was the key to the Jewish imagination? The idea that the attitude of world Jewry, as a collective entity, could be won over to the British cause through Zionism was based upon the belief that there existed a dominant and unchanging Jewish identity, which was fixed upon the restoration of national life in Palestine. Jewry was therefore perceived to be a very specific type of imagined community, a national community.[12] This perception lay at the very core of the Government's decision to pursue a nationalist policy, which was designed to win the hearts and minds of what was thought to be a nation.

That this mistaken belief has not previously been examined was in part due to the prevailing influence of Zionist thought on historians. The majority of early scholars writing on this subject accepted the idea

that Jewry did indeed constitute a nation, latently yearning for its return to national life in Palestine.[13] To be sure, by the time of the First World War the Zionist movement had spread, as a minority party, across the Jewish world,[14] and witnessed dramatic growth in the years 1914 to 1918 in Russia and the USA.[15] Nevertheless, Zionism was far from being the leading, uncontested voice in modern Jewish politics in these countries. Other influential movements, which were often more popular and diametrically opposed to Zionism, included various strains of socialism, liberalism and Diaspora nationalism.[16] Moreover, as critical students of nationalism and Zionism have persuasively shown in recent years, the idea of an innate Zionist national consciousness is an invention of national ideology,[17] which is belied by the fluid and complex nature of ethnic identities.[18]

To understand why the advocates of the Balfour Declaration held this nationalist view of Jewry and Jewish identity it is necessary to go beyond the Jewish case.[19] The concepts of anti-Semitism or philo-Semitism, which have dominated much of the scholarship on Jewish/non-Jewish relations in the modern period, are not sufficient to explain why Jews were seen as Zionists in the official mind and British society during the war. The perception of Jewry as a nation, and indeed the whole dynamic of the Government's Zionist policy, was part of a wider phenomenon. Whitehall's Jewish policy was not approached in a vacuum. Rather, it was both a product and a reflection of a broader trend in Government foreign policy-making in which there was a profound preoccupation with questions of ethnic power, ethnicity and nationalism in general. Nationalism was, after all, the *idée fixe* of the Great War, not just as a propaganda slogan or a means to mobilise populations, but also as a way of viewing, and eventually, reconstructing the world.

The belief in Whitehall that Jewry was a nation derived from a general imagining of ethnic groups as cohesive, racial entities that were driven by a profound national consciousness. Fundamentally influenced by the racial nationalist thought that came to prominence in British and European culture in the late nineteenth century, the Government officials and politicians behind the Balfour Declaration viewed identity and social relations through this prism. It was for this reason, in the final assessment, that Zionism, as a mirror image of policy-makers' own beliefs and identity,[20] was accepted and embraced as representing the authentic desires of world Jewry. Furthermore, the interest in trying to win over the bogey of Jewish power through Zionism was part of a wider phenomenon of ethnic propaganda politics, in which ethnic

groups were commonly viewed as hostile forces of power, whose allegiance had to be wrested from German and then revolutionary socialist influence through an appeal to their nationalist identities.

This book thus utilises a comparative approach in order to gain a fuller understanding of how and why the Anglo-Zionist relationship was born. In particular, special attention is given to British perceptions of American society and ethnic groups during the war. The USA was the pre-eminent battlefield in the Allies' global propaganda conflict with the Central Powers. The war of words and images, the fight for public opinion, was thought by both sides to be a critical factor in deciding the final outcome of the war. Significantly, the struggle to capture the support of ethnic groups was a major aspect of the propaganda war, and it is as part of this story that the Balfour Declaration ultimately belongs. It is worth emphasising that the Great War was the first bidding war for the hearts and minds of ethnic groups,[21] and that this pursuit was far from being a peripheral aspect of the conflict in the minds of the leadership on both sides.

The decision to issue the Balfour Declaration was not therefore driven by British strategic interests in the Ottoman Empire. The main concern for policy-makers in relation to Zionism was the conduct of the war in the USA and Europe, rather than the future of the Holy Land itself. As such, British policy towards Arab nationalism in the Middle East will not be addressed here in detail.[22] In addition, there is no consideration of the controversial question of whether Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, pledged that Palestine would be part of an independent Arab area after the war in his infamous correspondence with Sherif Hussein of Mecca, the Arab nationalist leader, from July 1915 to March 1916.[23] This matter was not discussed by the makers of the Balfour Declaration in their deliberations, and was raised for the first time in Whitehall in November 1918.[24]

The examination of attitudes towards Jews in their broader context can give, as David Feldman has suggested, sharp relief to wider issues in British history that have been overlooked by scholars.[25] Specifically, this study stresses the degree to which the culture of policy-makers, the world-views through which they perceived reality, determined their political choices and strategy, much more than has traditionally been appreciated by historians of Britain and the Great War. Following James Joll's call to uncover policy-makers' 'unspoken assumptions',[26] this argument builds on the recent work of scholars who have begun to emphasise the influence

of world-views and perceptions on the making of British foreign policy.[27]

Chapters 1 and 2 discuss the perceptions and context that resulted in the British imagining of Jewry as a nation, and the Government interest in publicly supporting the Zionist movement. Chapters 3 and 4 examine how this official mindset, which provided the fertile soil for the Government's Zionist policy, led to the Balfour Declaration, and assess the role of Zionist activists in this process. These chapters therefore take up the second subject that this book seeks to address, the contribution of the Zionists to the making of the Government's policy and the nature of the Anglo-Zionist alliance that followed.

Traditionally, histories of the Balfour Declaration have depicted its issuance as a great Zionist victory. It is generally portrayed as a turning point in the history of the movement, which was the heroic achievement of Chaim Weizmann, who in 1920 became President of the World Zionist Organization, and was later the first President of the State of Israel.[28] Despite the attempts of some to debunk this myth,[29] Weizmann's own version, as embodied in his highly popular autobiography,[30] and furthered by his supporters after his death,[31] came to predominantly influence how this question was seen in both the public sphere and by scholars.[32] When historians have attempted to criticise this deeply entrenched myth, by arguing that the Zionists were used by the British and made no direct contribution to the making of the Balfour Declaration,[33] their work has been severely criticised[34] and has, for the most part, failed to have a discernible impact.[35]

Weizmann's contribution to the rationale behind the British decision to issue the Balfour Declaration was indeed minimal. But, the efforts of a number of other Jewish activists, whose role has been obscured within the Zionist collective memory and historical literature, were of critical significance. Faced with the countless problems of the war, Whitehall was reactive, rather than pro-active, in its development of a Zionist policy. Members of the Government were pre-disposed to accept the logic and need for a Zionist propaganda policy, as the crises of the war developed, and the need for propaganda became ever more acute, but it was wholly dependent upon the Zionists to provide the rationale and impetus. By playing upon policy-makers' perceptions of Jews and ethnic groups, with their portrayal of Jewry as a largely anti-Allied, influential and Zionist Diaspora, they successfully persuaded members of the British Government to pursue a pro-Zionist policy. The path to the Balfour Declaration was, however, complex and, in many ways, fortuitous. It depended upon the cumulative efforts and

diplomatic strategies of a number of individuals, such as Horace Kallen, Moses Gaster, and especially Vladimir Jabotinsky. But despite their importance in the forging of the Anglo-Zionist alliance, the Balfour Declaration was far from being an unequivocal achievement for the Zionists. All that they had persuaded the British Government to do was to use Zionism as a propaganda tool, without committing themselves to anything beyond the deliberately ambiguous and carefully qualified terms of the Declaration.

It is therefore a central contention of this book that the Zionists were undoubtedly used by the Government. They were not, however, unwitting pawns, duped by the British. It was in fact the Zionists themselves who established the rationale for using Zionism as a propaganda weapon, and consistently showed the Government how and why this should be done. This was the only way that they could convince British policy-makers to take an interest in the Zionist movement. Stemming as it did from the wider frame of thought of the Government's ethnic propaganda policies, British advocates for the Declaration were united in their desire to use Zionism to create pro-British propaganda in the USA, Russia, and anywhere where Jews could be found. A few influential politicians, who were concerned with British imperial interests in the Near East, were also interested in using Zionism to bring Palestine into the British imperial orbit after the war. But again, all that this objective entailed in the context of the war was propaganda, with the express need to convince Jewry and the world that Britain was the true champion and protector of the Zionist cause.[36] For the duration of the war, those policy-makers who were behind the Declaration evinced no comparable interest in helping the Zionist movement to achieve their political objectives in Palestine, and committed themselves to as little as possible.

There was, to put it simply, no *quid pro quo*, despite what the Zionists might have hoped. Of course, Britain's public commitment to Zionism in 1917 eventually became the basis for the British Mandate for Palestine, which, in turn, enabled the birth of the Jewish state almost thirty years later. However, these developments were not in any way anticipated, or desired, by the majority of those policy-makers who supported the decision to issue the Balfour Declaration, who at the time were pre-occupied with the task of winning the war. Britain's eventual concrete support for Zionism in the shape of the Mandate, and the Zionist-Palestinian conflict that followed, derived from what was, for the most part, intended to be a wartime propaganda measure, which was based upon a completely erroneous assessment of Jewry and Zionism.

Anglo-Zionist relations during the war can therefore be characterised as a masquerade, in two senses. The picture of Jewry as a powerful, anti-Allied and predominantly Zionist community that was presented to the British Government by Zionists was far removed from the reality of the Jewish Diaspora. Equally, the British Government's limited interest in Zionism was in sharp contrast to the ways in which policy-makers and their Zionist allies publicly portrayed the Balfour Declaration as the opening of a new dawn that would lead to the realisation of the Zionist dream. In the effort to achieve their respective aims, both parties sought to foster an illusion in the name of Zionism, and it was on this basis that their alliance was born.

That the Balfour Declaration was issued primarily to further pro-British propaganda among world Jewry, and that the Zionists were voluntarily used to this end, is underscored in the second part of the book, which focuses on the Government's Zionist policy after 2 November 1917. The Balfour Declaration was only ever intended to be the first step in a worldwide propaganda campaign, from which the Government would attempt to win Jewry to the British cause in the war and the idea of a British Palestine.[37] For the chief architects of Whitehall's Zionist policy, this project was just as important as the publication of the Declaration itself, and therefore merits special attention. The analysis of this propaganda examines a wide range of sources, such as film, photography, pamphlets and books, which have not previously been studied, much of which is housed in the archives of the Imperial War Museum in London. In the attempt to uncover and examine the narratives that were communicated through these materials, these chapters draw upon approaches used by scholars working in cultural studies, and cultural historians of Zionism such as Michael Berkowitz.[38]

The nationalist perception of Jewish identity which had done so much to propel the Government to embark upon a Zionist policy also shaped the ways in which it sought to capture the Jewish imagination after the Declaration. Utilising the vast propaganda machinery and resources of the British Government, British propaganda agencies and their Zionist partners attempted to convince Jewry that the Balfour Declaration, and the British occupation of Palestine, represented the restoration of the Jewish nation in Palestine, and the glorious liberation of the land from the Ottoman Turk. This myth was mediated through the conventions and narratives of Zionist thought and culture, and was disseminated across the Jewish

world through the media and a series of symbolic projects and ceremonies.

As with the events that led to the Balfour Declaration, Zionist activists played a pivotal role in showing the Government how best to persuade Jewry that the Balfour Declaration truly meant the restoration of the Jewish nation in Palestine, and eagerly went about the task of putting this into action. There existed an intimate relationship between the Zionists and the British in this endeavour. However, the parameters of the Anglo-Zionist entente were sharply confined. As Zionists such as Weizmann and Jabotinsky became aware, this alliance no longer applied when it came to helping the Zionist movement in Palestine in practical, political terms. The Government's overriding concern was to create and display the rhetoric of Jewish national return, without tying itself to anything beyond the vaguely worded and definitively non-committal Balfour Declaration.

The creation of the office for Jewish propaganda in the British Government and its efforts to portray the Balfour Declaration as a major turning point in Jewish history are discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 analyses how the occupation of Palestine was used to show world Jewry that the rebirth of the Jewish nation under British auspices was nigh. From the drama of Allenby's orchestrated entrance into Jerusalem to the work of Zionist pioneers, British propaganda depicted the Holy Land as the site of a new Zionist renaissance. Chapter 7 explores the ways in which the Zionist Commission, the Hadassah Medical Unit, the Jewish Legion, and the foundation of the Hebrew University were used to perform the discourse of Jewish national rebirth for the benefit of world Jewry.

Finally, Chapter 8 examines the reality of American Jewry during the war and its reception of the Government's Zionist policy. In sharp contrast to the view in Whitehall, the majority of American Jews were not, and did not become, committed Zionists. Instead of providing a rallying point for the Allied cause among Jewry, the Declaration became a source of great controversy that accentuated the profound divisions within this diverse and complex community. The rationale behind Britain's support for Zionism was, thus, fundamentally mistaken.

Of course, the significant and long-lasting ramifications of the Balfour Declaration were not to be felt in the USA, but in Palestine and the Middle East. The Declaration, however, was born out of Britain's wartime preoccupation with winning over ethnic power in America

and Europe, and was based upon misconceived notions of ethnicity and Jewry. It had very little to do with the Middle East. In part, for this reason, the British Government failed to anticipate the explosive consequences of its policy in the Holy Land, and unwittingly led Palestine into one of the most bitter conflicts in modern history.

1
Perceptions of Jewry and Ethnicity in the Official Mind

At the outbreak of the Great War there was no single Government body in Whitehall that was allocated official responsibility for policy towards world Jewry. In August 1914 the Jewish Diaspora was of negligible interest, if any, to the foreign policy-making elite. As a transnational minority, Jewry was of little relevance to the traditional questions of international politics and the prosecution of war. But as the demands and character of the conflict evolved, the perceived power of Jewry, and its international nature, attracted the attention of a diverse collection of policy-makers. The politicians and civil servants who pushed for the Balfour Declaration as a means of winning over this influence thus came from across the foreign policy-making elite, which during the war experienced significant changes in its composition and *modus operandi*.

At the top of the elite's hierarchy were the ministers in the Cabinet, who had the final say on policy. When David Lloyd George replaced Herbert Asquith as Prime Minister at the end of 1916 he created a streamlined War Cabinet, which had only five ministers, most of whom did not have departmental responsibilities.[1] This official structure did not include the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur J. Balfour. Nevertheless, he frequently attended the War Cabinet's meetings and had a significant role in its decision-making, particularly on matters in which he held a special interest, such as Zionism. It was Lloyd George, however, who dominated the War Cabinet, and he often had a critical influence on the direction of foreign policy.[2] Along with Balfour, and some of his War Cabinet colleagues, the Prime Minister played a crucial part in the events that led to the birth of the Anglo-Zionist alliance.[3]

Before the war, the civil servants of the Foreign Office were the main source of advice for ministers, and were supported by the information,

opinions and diplomacy of their representatives abroad. After the outbreak of hostilities the voice of the Foreign Office was joined by a flood of information and guidance from the services and a host of competing ministries.[4] Undoubtedly, the influence of the Foreign Office declined during the war.[5] Nonetheless, it continued to be a driving force in the making of policy, which was particularly apparent in the case of Zionism.

In addition to the services and the departments of state, the War Cabinet was supported by a secretariat established by Lloyd George, which had an administrative and a limited advisory function. Though the 'ideas branch' of the secretariat had a marginal position in the formal hierarchy of the elite,[6] some of its members had a very significant impact on policy towards the Ottoman Empire and Zionism. This influence stemmed from their reputation as experts on the region, and the unrelenting stream of policy advice that they provided. As Prime Minister, Lloyd George also had his own influential private secretariat of advisers, known as the 'Garden Suburb' after its location in the garden of 10 Downing Street, whose remit included foreign affairs.[7]

Lying beyond Whitehall and the diplomatic service, the final level of the elite, broadly defined, included an increasing number of academics, journalists and interest groups, at home and abroad, who were listened to as the Government attempted to grapple with the manifold issues thrown up by the war. This included the British quality press, especially *The Times*, which had long held an important role as an originator and supporter of Government foreign policy.[8]

The members of the elite who made the most significant contribution to the making of the Balfour Declaration came from Downing Street, the War Cabinet, the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet secretariat. After the Declaration, the Government's Zionist policy was chiefly the concern of the Foreign Office. The propaganda machinery that was set up during the war played a crucial role in the execution of this policy. But the Department of Information, founded in February 1917, and its successor from February 1918, the Ministry of Information, did not direct policy towards Jewry, despite the latter's attempts to do so.[9] In 1918, any new departures in Zionist policy had to be approved by the Cabinet's Middle East Committee, which in March became the Eastern Committee. Chaired by Lord Curzon, a member of the War Cabinet, it included representatives from the Cabinet, the Foreign Office, the India Office, and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The decision to issue the Balfour Declaration was underpinned by a series of assumptions that were shared by all of its principal advocates

in Whitehall. At the heart of their interest in Zionism was the belief that world Jewry constituted a nation that was driven by Zionist ideals. In part, this view stemmed from well-established anti-Semitic portrayals of the Jews as a clannish and perpetually foreign people. At the same time, the firm acceptance of Zionism as being the dream of the Jewish Diaspora was aided by the influence of the Bible in British culture. Fundamentally, though, the idea that Jewry was a cohesive nation that wished to return to Palestine derived from broader perceptions of ethnicity in the official mind. In particular, the policy-makers behind the Balfour Declaration were influenced by the racial nationalist thought that came to dominate British culture during the Great War.

Race, nationalism and identity

In Britain, as across Western Europe, the pseudo-scientific study of race, with the emergent disciplines of anthropology, ethnology and eugenics, had come to prominence in the second half of the nineteenth century.[10] The theory of immutable racial difference embodied in a fixed racial physiognomy and innate character was encapsulated in the idea of the racial type. Despite debates concerning the environmental or innate nature of racial difference, and the inherent flux and arbitrary nature of what constituted a racial type,[11] the principles of racial thought were increasingly accepted.

By the Edwardian period these racial ideas became conflated in Britain and Europe as a whole with the neo-Romantic concept of the nation.[12] From this perspective, the nation, and by extension an individual's identity, was seen in racial, primordial terms. The character of a nation was thought to be defined by biological inheritance, national culture, history and the landscape of the nation.[13] According to this view, individual identity and behaviour were determined to a significant degree by a profound and inherent racial national consciousness. With the advent of the First World War, and even more so during the conflict itself, the belief in the powerful impulse of race nationalism, and the will to national self-determination, became all-pervasive.[14] Crucially, this perception of identity was widely shared by those members of the Government who came to advocate a pro-Zionist policy during the war. They, after all, emerged from an establishment whose self-image was to a great extent defined by these ideas of race, nation and Empire.[15]

Lord Milner, the influential imperialist at the centre of *The Round Table* circle and Minister without portfolio in Lloyd George's War

Cabinet throughout 1917, is a pertinent example.[16] In an introduction to his speeches published in 1913, he wrote:

> Throughout the foregoing statement I have emphasised the importance of the racial bond. From my point of view this is fundamental … [D]eeper, stronger, more primordial than … material ties is the bond of common blood, a common language, common history and traditions.[17]

Milner profoundly believed in 'development along nationalist lines' and the mission of 'the British race'.[18]

In even more explicit fashion, his protégé from his days in South Africa, Leopold Amery M.P., who was made part of the War Cabinet secretariat in 1917,[19] declared the following in an address on imperial unity:

> The whole foundation of Nationalism lies in the realisation of the fact that there are no such things as the independent individuals whom the individualist ideal postulated. Men are what they are, do what they do, wish what they wish, just because they are born of a certain race into a certain society. Race-instinct or patriotism are as much natural emotions as hunger or self-interest.[20]

It was of no small significance that in Amery's draft of what became the Balfour Declaration he replaced the term 'Jewish people' with 'Jewish race' and 'home' with 'national home'.[21]

This racial, nationalist perception of identity and ethnicity was also apparent in the thought of A.J. Balfour. As Jason Thomes has so ably demonstrated, Balfour's conceptions of race and nation played a central part in his *Weltanschauung*, and attracted him to the national ideology of Zionism.[22] However, this did not simply constitute a meeting of ideologies. As we shall see, Balfour's imagining of Jewry within his wider vision of ethnic groups as singular races, bonded by a latent national consciousness, was a fundamental precept for his, and others', decision to pursue a pro-Zionist policy.

Although in the 1890s Balfour had been sceptical about the immutable nature of racial/national types, by 1908 he insisted that it was

> quite impossible to believe that any attempt to provide widely different races with an identical environment, political, religious, educational, what you will, can ever make them alike. They have

> been different and unequal since history began; different and unequal they are destined to remain through future periods of comparable duration.[23]

In an address to the Welsh nationalist Society of Cymmrodorion in 1909, arranged by Lloyd George, Balfour simply declared, 'questions of race' are the 'most important of all'.[24] For Balfour, race lay at the very centre of being, and determined identity, culture and social relations. And not only did he see nations as races, but for him nationality constituted the basis of normative culture in the modern world.[25]

Sir Mark Sykes, the most determined and consistent advocate of the Government's Zionist policy,[26] was equally the individual most influenced by neo-Romantic ideas of race and nationhood. During the course of the war Sykes became one of the most respected Government experts on the Near East, and by 1917 was a prominent member of the War Cabinet secretariat. Not only did he ardently push for a pro-Zionist policy, but he was also a vociferous supporter of the Government's pro-Arab nationalist endeavour, and personally developed a post-war vision of the Near East built upon the principles of Jewish, Arab and Armenian nationalism.[27] Profoundly influenced by racial thought and neo-Romanticism, Sykes commonly perceived ethnic groups to be homogeneous units that were defined and bound by a deep sense of race.[28] Crucially, though, in his mind, the only true manifestation of authentic racial identity was nationalism, the basis of the world order, which he viewed as a natural instinct that was rooted in the depths of history.[29] For this reason Sykes conceived that the key principle of a stable post-war Near East was 'Nationality', which was to replace the pre-war corruption of imperial aggrandisement that had been driven by finance, and the divisive competition between the Great Powers.[30]

Though it was never the all-consuming passion that it was for Sykes, Lloyd George also saw ethnicity and identity, to a great extent, in terms of race and nationalism. As John Grigg has observed, Lloyd George was both 'a product and a prophet' of 'the revival of Welsh national feeling', and was proud of 'Wales's distinctness and cultural identity'.[31] As part of this world-view, he was a firm believer in the importance of race, language and religion.[32] He once declared, 'National feeling has nothing to do with geography; it is a state of mind.'[33] As such, he developed a 'distinct ethnic theory', from which he argued in 1896, 'The Jewish nation had clung to its traditions, language and religion through all the ages.'[34]

Like Sykes, Balfour, Amery, Milner and others, Lloyd George conceived Jewry, in large part, through the lens of race nationalism. Ethnic groups, or races as they termed them, were seen as distinct, unified communities that were held together and driven by a deep and inherent national identity and culture. A nation's character was, according to the official mind, embodied and shaped by its national language, literature and land, and was underpinned by its historical mythologies and culture. This view of ethnicity was just as prevalent in the Foreign Office, as it was in the War Cabinet and Downing Street.[35]

When, as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4, Jewish activists brought Zionism to the attention of members of the British Government during the war, it was readily accepted as representing the identities and yearnings of world Jewry. Primarily this was because Zionism fitted in with conceptions of ethnic identity and normative culture within the corridors of Whitehall. Zionist and official British views of ethnicity were both a product of the same vein of nationalist thought. As Balfour wrote to Lord Beaverbrook, the newspaper magnate and Minister of Information in 1918, '… Zionism is a purely nationalistic question, just as much as that of Poland, Esthonia [sic] or any other of the hundred and one nationalities who now demand our support to secure their self-determination'.[36] In a crucial private meeting with Zionist representatives in February 1917, Sykes is reported to have said, 'the idea of a Jewish Palestine had his full sympathy. He understood entirely what was meant by nationality and there was no confusion on that point'.[37] For Sykes it was natural that Jews aspired for a return to national life in Palestine and that it was rooted in 'the fundamental traditions[,] sentiment and hereditary longings of the Jewish people'.[38] Unlike the assimilated Jews of Western Europe, this innate sense of national consciousness was considered to drive the authentic, uncorrupted Jewish identity of the masses in Eastern Europe and the USA, in which there was 'an instinct to revive the Jewish nation once more in Palestine'.[39] William Ormsby-Gore, a member of the War Cabinet secretariat with Amery and Sykes from April 1917, wrote, 'Their [the Jewish people's] hopes, whatever they may say, are centred in their survival as a people and as a people founded upon the idea of an ultimate restoration of Hebrew civilization in the land that was once theirs.'[40]

The qualification 'whatever they may say' revealed a mind-set in which the national essence of the Jewish people was an objective reality, simply waiting to be exposed and seen, one that positioned other Jewish voices as inauthentic and illusory. The Zionist conception of Jewishness was not, therefore, accepted because of its own merits

within Jewish politics or culture, but how it matched the pre-existing assumptions of British officials and politicians, who projected their own sense of culture and desires onto a mythical Jewry. This shared world-view meant that the vision of Jewish identity that was held by Zionists was easily acknowledged as an established fact and expounded as such by the Government expert. Hence, the following passage by Ormsby-Gore would sit just as comfortably in a popular Zionist pamphlet of the time as it did in his Government memorandum.

> The hope of a return to Palestine has sustained every succeeding generation of Jews scattered in every quarter of the Globe. Palestine has always been regarded by the Jews, not merely as the Land of their ancestors and the place where all that goes to make up the Jewish religion, Jewish consciousness, and Jewish national history as its source, but also as the country of their future, where they will once again find a home and a fresh inspiration. The 'Diaspora' or the scattering of the Jews has always been regarded by them as 'Galuth' i.e. exile, and they have always cherished this hope of a 'return'.[41]

Underpinning Ormsby-Gore's belief that there existed an eternal Jewish national consciousness was his conviction that

> the word 'Jew' neither connotes nor denotes solely or even mainly a religion or a sect … To the vast majority of the Jews of Russia, Poland, Austria and even in Germany – though in the latter to a less extent – 'Jew' denotes and connotes something politically, socially and racially distinctive.[42]

That the 'Jew' was perceived to be distinctive in a social, political and racial sense, and was driven by an instinctive yearning for national redemption, has to be seen within the wider context of racial and nationalist thought from which Zionism sprung and certain members of the British Government derived their own world-view. Ormsby-Gore did not just see the Jews as a people apart, but as a nation whose culture, memory and destiny were unceasingly focused on the desire to return to the land of the nation, Palestine. This leap of imagination, accepting the Zionist representation of Jewish identity as an unquestionable truth, could only have been possible if members of the British Government had the same vision of identity, one that was equally shaped by racial nationalist thought.

However, once we burrow beneath Ormsby-Gore's nationalist vision of Jewish identity and culture, we are left with the question of how and why Jews were believed to be distinct from the rest of society in the first place. The key founding block of the idea that the Jews were a nation was that they constituted a separate ethnic group or race, rather than individual advocates of a religious faith, who were all primarily citizens within the nation-state in which they lived. We must therefore acknowledge and explain Ormsby-Gore's belief that, 'Their consciousness is not our consciousness'.[43]

'The Jew' as an outsider

The anti-Semitic belief that Jews were separate and alien from the rest of the population had deep roots within English culture, dating back to the medieval period.[44] And as a number of scholars have contended over the past two decades, anti-Semitic myths and prejudices concerning Jews survived into post-Enlightenment culture and society in England.[45] However, as David Feldman has argued, the inclusion or exclusion of Jews from the fabric of the English nation was dependent upon a wider, fluid context of national self-definition, which was defined by changing currents in social, political and cultural thought. When the racial, cultural and religious conception of the English nation predominated, Jews were categorised as alien and foreign. Alternatively, the liberal view of the nation was predicated upon the civic liberties of an individual in relation to the state, and necessarily included Jews.[46] Within the political sphere, the liberal conception of the nation held fast prior to the First World War.[47] However, as we have discussed, ideas of race and heredity were increasingly influential in Britain during this period. According to this frame of thought, Jews were not only seen as a perpetually separate entity, or a degenerate alien presence, driven by a racial consciousness dating from biblical times. They were also considered to have a peculiarly strong and tenacious racial self, above and beyond other racial types, which was marked by a perpetual clannishness and exclusivity.[48] Voicing such conceptions of the Jewish race, Balfour, for example, had by 1905 referred to Anglo-Jewry as 'a people apart'[49] and later spoke of 'the age-long miseries created for Western civilization by the presence in its midst of a Body which it too long regarded as alien and even hostile, but which it was equally unable to expel or absorb'.[50] This racial view of Jewry as being immutably different, with an inner identity that was primarily Jewish, was commonly held during the war.[51]

It is apparent, therefore, that the imagining of Jewry as a separate people was rooted within longstanding anti-Semitic perceptions of Jews in Britain. But it was also intrinsically tied to, and dependent upon, a wider frame of racial thought. It is equally clear that in going from the concept of Jewish racial distinctiveness to a Jewish nation, which was focused on restoration in Palestine, there is a substantive leap. It is true that Jews were sometimes represented as being defined by their attachment to the land of their Biblical past and their racial origins as an Oriental or Asiatic people.[52] But, as Bryan Cheyette has argued, racial perceptions of Jews were not static. Rather, they were fluid, and it was precisely the difficulty of categorising the exact racial nature of Jews that troubled many writers in the Edwardian period, and for them, reflected the Jews' threat to the homogeneity and stability that was desired in English culture at the time.[53] Some writers discussed the Jewish race in reference to Zionism and nationalism, while others tried to control the pariah of 'the Jew' through the eyes of 'a civilizing liberalism, or an all-controlling Imperialism, or a rationalizing socialism'.[54] The fact that Jewry was perceived by members of the British Government during the war to be not just a unified racial group, but one that was defined by an innate national consciousness, must be understood in reference to their own wider nationalist perceptions of identity. Nevertheless, advocates of a pro-Zionist policy in the British Government did not accept Zionism as being the authentic representation of the deep yearnings of a nation, simply because it fitted in with their own modular form of identity and culture.

Mythologies of the Jewish nation in British culture

The central tenets of Zionist ideology were widely accepted and asserted within British society during the war,[55] as they were within Whitehall: the portrayal of Palestine as the Jewish national home and the site of its mythical Golden Age up until the fall of Exile in 70 C.E., the negation of the Diaspora as an era of unremitting persecution and degeneration, and the unceasing Jewish desire for Return.[56] To comprehend why Jewry was seen within parts of British society and the Government, more readily than Jewry itself, as being defined by Zionist views of history, culture, space and identity, the resonance of these mythologies in British culture must be explained.

In order to do so, it is necessary to point to the Bible's role in English and then British national identity since the seventeenth century.[57] Since the Protestant Reformation, the narratives, heroes and imagery of

the Old Testament had become a key part of the British cultural fabric. And, as Eitan Bar-Yosef has noted, 'the Protestant Biblical vocabulary – a Chosen people, a Promised Land – was crucial to the forging of British imperialism'.[58]

The deep-felt cultural presence of the Old Testament continued during the nineteenth century above and beyond any literal religious function, as evinced by evangelical and nonconformist movements. It also superseded the decline of the religious authority of the Hebrew Bible in the established Church, with the growing influence of liberal Christian theology from the 1850s and 1860s.[59] The so-called rediscovery of Palestine as the Holy Land from the end of the eighteenth century was driven by, and re-enforced, the original nexus of the Bible and British identity.[60] With the materialisation of antiquarianism and archaeology, historical-geography, the challenge of Biblical criticism, photography and travel literature, the Holy Land was vividly brought to life and generally appropriated as a cultural possession in Britain.[61] As such, the mythologies of the Golden Age and fall of Ancient Israel loomed large in the popular imagination, as did Palestine, which was exhibited as the landscape of this historical drama. The imagery and language of the Bible as a cultural code through which the world was provided with meaning and significance was still evident by the time of the First World War,[62] as was the apparent magnetic hold of the Holy Land in this sense.[63] The result was that the degenerate Jews of the present, as they were widely viewed in Britain, were seen to have a glorious, heroic past in the mythical land of Palestine.[64] Moreover, the idea of the Jewish Restoration in Palestine was also present in British culture. It had been a significant aspect of British Protestant thought, particularly its evangelical component, since the Reformation.[65] Those who actively believed that Britain should support the Restoration of the Jews, so as to hasten the Second Coming, were marginal within British society and the established Church by the time of the First World War. Nevertheless, the concept of Return, beyond any eschatological meaning, was widely known, and held a familiar, almost romantic, resonance.[66]

For those who saw the world through the eyes of race and nationalism, the widespread imagery of the Holy Land and the Bible provided a pre-existing vision of what Jewish national consciousness could mean and aspire to – an instinctive yearning for a Return to its national Golden Age in Palestine. This Biblically inspired view of the Jews was based upon a schema of Jewish history that corresponded with Zionist periodisation: the Golden Age of Ancient Israel, Exile, the decline of the Diaspora, and the future redemption of national restoration.[67]

With this in mind, we can delineate how and why some members of the British Government could so easily accept that Jewry, as a distinct racial group, was driven by a hereditary impulse and traditional desire for Jewish restoration in Palestine.

Lloyd George is perhaps the most obvious example of this point, though the cultural presence of the Bible in British society was such that its influence was not confined to those with a religious background such as his or Balfour's.[68] Lloyd George was raised within 'an intensely religious environment', in the small Baptist secessionist sect, the Disciples of Christ, which focused on the literal interpretation of the Scriptures as the sole basis of Christian belief.[69] Though rejecting these religious beliefs during his childhood,[70] his perceptions of Palestine and Jewry were manifestly filtered through the cultural code of the Old Testament, which continued to have a profound hold on his mind.[71] Hence, in a meeting with the Imperial War Cabinet during the Palestine campaign of 1917, he remarked upon the army's entrance into Gaza, 'We have entered the land of the Philistines … That is very interesting. I hope we shall conquer the Philistines.'[72] As early as 1896, as we have mentioned, he was fixed in his conviction that Jewry was a nation from antiquity, bonded by its 'traditions, language and religion through all the ages'.[73]

That the Bible influenced how Jewry was seen as a nation within Whitehall is also apparent from the fact that the Return, as a pre-existing concept, could be discussed as having a historical or transcendent appeal. Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from 1905 to December 1916, was said to have remarked in November 1914, 'the idea had always had a sharp sentimental attraction to him. The historical appeal was very strong'.[74]

In its most exaggerated form, the veneration of the Bible narrative allowed for Zionism to be seen as a beneficent ideal and regenerative force, which would return the stability and authenticity of the Ancient world. Sykes was probably the sole example of this line of thought, in which his Catholicism,[75] neo-Romanticism and nationalism were intertwined. Imbued with a sense of providence and transcendent mission, he wrote to Nahum Sokolow, the Zionist leader, in May 1918:

> … Your cause has about it an enduring quality which mocks at time; if a generation is but a breath in the life of a nation, an epoch is but the space twixt a dawn and a sunrise in the history of Zionism.
>
> When all the temporal things this world now holds are as dead forgotten as the curled and scented Kings of Babylon who dragged

> your forefathers into captivity, there will still be Jews, and so long as there are Jews there must be Zionism.
>
> We live in an age where mankind is reaping the whirl-wind of its wickedness and folly … In Zionism lies your people's opportunity. In alliance with those other forces of regeneration and illumination which are centred on Jerusalem and which radiates through the world, it may be that you and your ancestors will play a part in establishing a moral order which will enable mankind to combine universal material progress with mutual subjection and charity.[76]

It would be wrong to ignore the particular ways in which Jews were perceived by Sykes and others in the Government, if we are to comprehend why he believed Zionism to have a deep hold over the Jewish psyche. The influence of anti-Semitism must be acknowledged if we are to understand, for example, his assertion that national consciousness was required to improve the 'moral' of the anational Jew, 'which has been impaired by ages of wandering and aloofness'.[77] At the same time, the strong influence of the Bible on his world-view was critical for his unquestionable acceptance of the tenets of Zionist thought and his ever-growing embrace of Zionism as a vibrant national movement, which had emerged out of the deep tradition, sacred literature and mythologies of an ancient nation longing for restoration.

But, despite the particular cultural context of how Jewry was seen in Britain, the belief that the Jews were a Zionist nation was born out of a broader perception of identity and ethnicity. Without appreciating the determining influence of nationalist thought in how society was imagined by members of the Government, it is not possible to explain why other forms of Jewishness were instinctively seen as unrepresentative and inauthentic.

Indeed, the fact that ethnicity and ethnic groups in general, and not only Jews, were perceived through the lens of race nationalism is demonstrated by the British Government's policies towards other ethnic groups during the war, as will be seen in the following chapter. Ethnic groups were commonly considered to be racial entities, whose influence could be won through appeals to their national identities. A fundamental question, though, is why would the British Government be interested in winning the support of ethnic groups, Jewish or otherwise, in the midst of the Great War?

2
Jews, Ethnicity and the Propaganda War in the USA

> Propaganda on both sides probably played a greater part in the last War than in any other.
>
> David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference*, Volume II (1939).

The British Government's interest in using Zionism to capture Jewish support for the war effort was based upon the conviction that Jews wielded tremendous power, particularly in the USA and Russia. In addition, Jews were widely held to be pro-German, and by 1917 were increasingly associated with the rise of pacifism and revolutionary socialism. It is clear that these perceptions derived from a long tradition of British anti-Semitic thought. However, the official interest in Jewish power during the war derived from a much broader line of thinking that predominated among the foreign policy-making elite. Ethnic opinion in general was a prevailing concern within the corridors of Whitehall as Britain engaged in its global propaganda war with the Central Powers. Like the Jews, other ethnic groups were often viewed as hostile forces of influence and power, whose allegiance had to be won over. Within the official mind, there was an exaggerated fear of German influence among minorities, which stemmed from a wider fixation with unseen German power and conspiracy. As per the racial and nationalist views that held great sway in the Foreign Office and elsewhere, it was considered that the most effective way to secure ethnic support was by tying their nationalist aspirations and identities to the British and Allied cause in the war. The sum result of this web of perceptions was a series of nationalist propaganda policies, one of which began with the Balfour Declaration.

This frame of official thought regarding ethnic groups will be illustrated with the case study of British policy in the USA. As will be

shown in the following chapters, American Jewry was the initial and most consistent concern of the makers of the Balfour Declaration. Moreover, the USA was the locus of the propaganda war from its inception, and thus serves as the ideal means to contextualise the origins of Britain's support for the Zionist movement.

'Jewish power' in the context of total war

In the years prior to the war, the image of the influential Jewish plutocrat, the cosmopolitan, wire-pulling financier, attempting to influence politics, press and government policy, had come to prominence in British culture.[1] This myth had a clear impact upon how Jewry was conceptualised by members of the British Government who advocated a pro-Zionist policy. In the imagination of individuals such as Lord Robert Cecil, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lloyd George, Sykes and Ormsby-Gore, Jewry was construed as an influential, international entity. In particular, Jews engaged in the world of *haute finance*, such as the Rothschilds or the American, Jacob Schiff, were seen as part of an international banking group that was attempting to influence governments in pursuance of a common Jewish interest.[2] It is in this sense that we can understand Cecil's opinion that 'it is not easy to exaggerate the international power of the Jews' and his specific reference to their 'vast financial influence'.[3] Similarly, Lloyd George, who had long associated Jews with power in trade, finance and politics,[4] argued in 1917 that 'influential Jews' were working for a premature peace, as they were 'anxious that normal conditions of trade and industry should be re-established as soon as possible'.[5] For Lord Eustace Percy, who worked for the Foreign Office on propaganda in the USA, Jewish financial power was of even greater importance. For him, Jews played a pivotal role in the direction of world affairs.[6] The greater prominence of this myth in Percy's mind was part of his broader preoccupation with Jews, which derived from his Christian millenarian world-view. Indeed, his deeply religious outlook, which set him apart from his Government colleagues, led him to object to a political, or profane, pro-Zionist policy.[7]

However, Jewish influence was not solely viewed, if at all, in economic terms by some advocates of the Declaration. Ormsby-Gore, for example, argued:

> I am not suggesting that we can do anything by propaganda among the wealthy assimilated non-Zionist Jews, but among the middle

> and proletariat class of Jewish intelligentsia whose ranks contain so many of the journalists, teachers, political wire pullers etc of the world.[8]

Prior to the Declaration, Ormsby-Gore was particularly interested in Jewish influence over the provincial press in southern Russia.[9] And Sir Ronald Graham, an Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, like others, considered that the Jewish proletariat was 'the most important factor in the community in Russia', and that it played 'a very important role' in the 'Russian political situation'.[10] After the Bolshevik revolution the most senior civil servant in the Foreign Office went so far as to suggest that if the Balfour Declaration had been issued earlier 'it might possibly have made all the difference in Russia'.[11] Here, the myth of the influential Jewish proletariat and its association with revolutionary socialism was prominent.[12] Indeed, the key interest in Jewish influence by the time of the Declaration was winning the hearts and minds of the so-called Jewish masses, in Russia, but also in America and elsewhere, well beyond the confines of Russian politics.[13]

This contradictory, fluctuating picture of Jewish influence was in part a product of the ambivalent nature of how Jews were perceived, which allowed for, if not determined, such fluid definitions and locations of Jewish power. Moreover, the very nature of Faustian thinking, the idea of subterranean influence, is predicated upon the irrational – an elastic and all-encompassing vision. Sykes' conception of Jewish influence is the most striking example of this phenomenon. He was convinced of the 'inestimable advantages' to the Allied cause of gaining the active friendship of Jewry, a 'world force'.[14] And as part of his wider neo-Romantic vision of the world, which he saw as being shaped and driven by inter-connected forces,[15] this international power and its influence operated in terms that were 'subconscious, unwritten, and wholly atmospheric'.[16]

The precise nature of collective Jewish influence, or how it functioned, was not established in the British Government. Its significance and nature varied depending on the individual and the context of the discussion. There was, though, *a priori,* the idea that the will of the Jewish masses, as a collective group, could and did have an effective influence in wider society, in public opinion and politics.

The pro-German or pacifist, socialist orientation of this power, as it was conceived by the advocates of the Balfour Declaration, may be explained in part by the threatening and subversive nature of Jews in their imagination. And their concern with this negative Jewish

influence can be seen as part of a singular preoccupation with Jews. However, the wider context of how Jewish power was understood and given importance by members of the Government during the war places a question mark against this interpretation.

British propaganda and ethnicity

The advent of total war had made the public will in all countries a prime concern for governments on both sides. It was thought that mass opinion had a direct impact on a country's ability to fight the war, and its government's policies.[17] The increasing need for financial and material support from neutral countries, particularly the United States, meant that opinion there was of great significance.[18] As the deadlock and losses of trench warfare became ever more acute, the public imagination was increasingly seen in Britain as a crucial weapon to be fought for; securing the will and means to fight in Allied countries, winning support in neutral countries, and de-stabilising the Central Powers.[19] As a result, the First World War, 'the first media war', witnessed on both sides the most organised and prolific propaganda effort yet known, a desperate fight to mould public perceptions.[20] In Britain, the increasing preoccupation with propaganda led to the development of an extensive machinery from 1914, dedicated to shaping hearts and minds.[21] From 1917, the year of the Balfour Declaration, this work was consolidated and expanded under the premiership of Lloyd George, who was strongly convinced of the power and importance of winning over public opinion.[22]

As will be illustrated below, the haunting spectre of mass opinion and all its complexity was ordered in the official mind by breaking it down into distinct groups, stratified in large part along ethnic lines. As derived from racial thought, ethnic groups were generally considered to be homogeneous units, which were driven by their inherent racial consciousness and interests. Crucially, the interlinked spheres of public opinion and politics were thought to be influenced by such mass ethnic sentiment, and the so-called wire-pullers and opinion formers, especially in the press, which existed within each group. Indeed, prior to 1918, the Government's foreign propaganda agencies directed their work primarily 'at the opinion-makers in foreign societies … "the principle being that it is better to influence those who can influence others than attempt a direct appeal to the mass of the population"'.[23] Behind policies towards ethnic groups, however, there lacked a clear distinction between the influence of 'opinion-formers' and mass racial

sentiment, or an exact definition of how their influence worked. Rather, it was simply believed that governments and society were guided and influenced by unseen and yet somehow discernible ethnic power.

These perceptions of ethnicity and ethnic power drove the British Government's interest in winning the support of various ethnic groups. However, what prompted and sustained the concern with such agents of influence, as with British propaganda as a whole from its inception,[24] was a wider conspiratorial mindset, which was in the main driven by a fear of the German menace. Emanating from a pre-war Germanophobia and spy fever, there existed within Government circles an overpowering belief in the all-pervasive influence of German intrigues and duplicity, which was thought to be manipulating the public imagination toward pro-Germanism, pacifism and revolutionary socialism.[25] The German Government did indeed undertake a wide-ranging world policy of trying to induce minorities, both religious and 'national', within the Empires of the Entente to revolt, as well as propaganda within neutral countries.[26] Nevertheless, the Germanophobia among British foreign policy-makers was such that it caused them to see German influence and intrigue far beyond where it existed, and led them to instinctively assume that the German menace had, or was about to, succeed in capturing the supposed power of ethnic groups. Perhaps combined with a projection of anti-alienism,[27] this conspiratorial mindset often led to minorities being viewed from the outset as being hostile, or at least deeply ambivalent, elements that posed a threat to the Allied cause. The preoccupation of foreign policy-makers with gaining the support of ethnic groups was, accordingly, focused upon overcoming anti-British and anti-Allied sentiment and intrigues, and trying to capture ethnic allegiance from the Germans.

Admittedly, some anti-Semitic agitators in the right-wing British press, such as Leo Maxse of *The National Review,* associated the threat of the German menace primarily with the Jews.[28] But for foreign policy-makers engaged in the making of the Balfour Declaration, Jewry was only one subordinate, potentially hostile, force of influence that was aiding or being used by Germany.

It is true that after the Bolshevik revolution the myth of the Bolshevik Jew became all pervasive within British society and the publication of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in 1920 had some initial success in the Conservative press.[29] But, although Winston Churchill famously argued in terms of a worldwide Jewish/Bolshevik conspiracy in 1920,[30] we should not read this back into the minds of

policy-makers in 1917. The Jew-centric focus of the Jewish conspiracy myth, which posits a Jewish desire for world control,[31] is belied in our case by the complex tapestry of conspiratorial subjects, which were, for the most part, manipulated by Germany, that existed within Government thinking at this time.

The perception of Jewry as an anti-Allied power therefore emerged out of a wider frame of thought. The same can be said for the solution, as it was conceived by policy-makers. As we discussed in the previous chapter, the view of Jewry as a cohesive racial group, driven by an innate national identity, was born out of a broader, prevailing conception of ethnicity. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the idea that Jewry could be won to the side of the British war effort through an appeal to its national identity was part of a wider line of policy-thinking in regard to ethnic groups. An appeal to the deep national consciousness of an ethnic minority was instinctively thought to be the means through which their loyalty could be won, and would transmute their subversive and hostile tendencies. Beneath this concept lay the belief that nationalism in and of itself was a transfiguring and beneficent force. Emerging out of pre-war debates regarding racial, urban and societal degeneration, nationalism had been seen by many as the regenerative force *par excellence*.[32] Balfour reflected upon this point in an address given in 1912, stating his view that the 'doctrine of nationality … has played so great and so beneficent a part in the construction and reconstruction of the world'.[33]

In the minds of Balfour, Sykes and others, nationalism,[34] and therefore Zionism,[35] symbolised the principles of order and normative culture. In this sense, it embodied the self-image of the Allied cause, as it was defined against the immoral, destructive forces of the enemy.[36] Sykes put this in a simple equation, in which he cited 'the principle of nationality' as 'the antidote to Prussian military domination'.[37] Thus, in 1918 Ormsby-Gore wrote, 'Politically Zionism has thrown itself wholeheartedly on the side of the Entente powers … because the moral conceptions and ideas of Zionism are essentially shared by Great Britain and her Allies, and are in marked contrast to those of the Central Powers.'[38]

This Manichean vision of the war, in which nationalism was seen as a force for good, was projected by some onto Jewry. Percy, for example, divided Jewry in 1915 into 'the true Israel', defined by its national culture, ideals and religion, which was naturally allied with England, and its opposite; the corruptive, de-nationalised powerful side of Israel, which he equated with Germanism.[39] With the added threat of Russian

revolutionary socialism in 1917, Sykes was also quite clear in his dualist vision of Jewry, which was divided between Zionism, 'a permanent and positive force in world Jewry' and the anti-national, 'cosmopolitan' minority that were corrupted by either high finance or socialist internationalism.[40] By tying the British cause to the dominant, national aspirations within Jewry, the positive influence of nationalism would have a beneficent effect on their attitudes to the war. Given this vision of nationalism and its effects, as it was seen by Sykes, we can understand his assertion that satisfying Zionism would result in 'powerful and impalpable benevolence deflecting hostile forces, calming excitement and transmuting various Pacifist tendencies of thought into friendly political elements'.[41]

Correspondingly, anti-Zionism, as anti-nationalism, represented for Sykes all that was negative, degenerative and threatening in Jewry and the world. It was therefore tied in his mind to the demonic enemies of the 'Prussian Militarist' and the Ottoman Turk, which constituted a united opposition to morality, peace and stability.[42] Anti-Zionists were described by him as 'undisguised pro-Turco Germans' who were working for an advantageous post-war position for the Ottoman Empire, together with pacifists in all Allied countries, international financiers, and Indian and Egyptian seditionists. '[E]ach one of these forces' was described as 'evil, corrupt, and hostile, either to this country or the welfare of mankind'.[43]

That this designation of anti-Zionists as evil, pro-Turk and German was part of a wider world-view is clear. It was in large part defined by Sykes' belief in the inherent good of nationalism, and his conspiratorial view of German and Ottoman influence on world affairs. If we look beyond the peculiar language and mentality of Sykes, the Government's perceptions of, and interest in, Jewry were also drawn from a similar, wider world-view. That is, ethnic groups were commonly viewed as powerful entities, whose hostile proclivities and the threat of German influence had to be neutralised through an appeal to their nationalist identities. This trend in Government thinking was strikingly apparent in British policies towards ethnic groups in the USA during the war.

British policies towards ethnic groups in the USA

As has been noted above, the British Government's foreign propaganda campaign was from its inception primarily focused upon winning public opinion in the USA. Britain's war effort was increasingly

dependent on American financial and material support, which became ever more significant as the prolonged and draining nature of the conflict took its toll.[44] Even after the USA entered the war in April 1917, the need to secure full American support remained a preoccupying concern, particularly with the military deadlock on the Western front and the threat of social and military breakdown in Russia, Italy and France.[45] Within this context, British foreign policy-makers sought to gather American public opinion squarely behind the British plight and the conflict with Germany. Significantly, this propaganda war was motivated by the fear of enemy influence, and was focused on attempting to win the loyalty, or deflecting the hostility, of agents of power in American society and politics. Although American Jewry was considered to be one of these interest groups, public opinion and the corridors of power were generally thought to be influenced by ethnic and religious entities that were hostile or indifferent to the British cause.[46] The focus here is on how ethnic groups in particular were perceived to be powerful social units in society, which were driven by a collective national consciousness and interest. Although Government officials could not ignore the divisions that existed within each group, it was consistently believed that they were fundamentally defined and united as a whole by this all-powerful bond. As Kenneth J. Calder has shown in his work on propaganda policies towards 'Slavic' minorities, particularly Poles, the perceived power of these groups and their aspirations for national self-determination were to be used as 'weapons of warfare'.[47]

In considering British attitudes and policies towards ethnic groups in the USA, the British Ambassador to Washington, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, is a good starting point. Although he discussed Jewry as a largely pro-German, or at least anti-Allied, racial group,[48] they were only one minority that figured prominently in his vision of the American social and political landscape. Spring-Rice generally saw American politics and society as being influenced by anti-British forces that were largely ethnic or religious in nature, and were allied with or used by the Germans.[49] He reported in December 1916: 'At the present moment we are confronted with a situation that the influence of the pro-German elements … of the hereditary enemies of England, of the pacifists, of a large section of the Catholics, are altogether arrayed against us.'[50]

These pro-German elements included, for example, American Swedes, who were driven by 'a strong race sympathy with the Germans' and the Lutheran clergy, who were reported to be 'working in German interests'.[51] Together, pro-Germans and German-Americans were thought to con-

trol the entire media and 'the most prominent and influential members of Congress'.[52]

As part of this struggle with Germany over the American public imagination, there were a number of perceived groups of influence that had to be won over, which were viewed solely in ethnic terms. Heavily influenced by racial thought, Spring-Rice saw these groups as unitary communities whose attitudes to the war were predominantly shaped by their racial identities. These ethnic forces of influence included the imagined bogeys of 'the Jews', 'the Armenians', 'the Syrians', 'the Irish', and 'the Poles'. Spring-Rice wrote the following assessment of American opinion for Balfour, in which he homogenised these complex communities into singular racial groups: 'the attitude of the Irish at the present moment is fanatically hostile … The Zionists are very powerful among the Jews and the Syrians and the Armenians exert a good deal of influence'.[53] He proclaimed in June 1916, 'The Poles and the Irish both seem to be lost to us and this will make a very considerable difference. I don't know yet what pressure is being brought to bear upon the government but no doubt it will make itself felt.'[54]

The interest in these ethnic groups stemmed from their supposed power, with their ability to make 'a very considerable difference' and to pressure the US Government. Crucially, the direction of this power, whether it supported or opposed the British cause, was determined by what was seen to define these groups, their 'racial' identities and interests.

Aside from communities such as the Armenians, who were described as having 'a considerable influence in the countries in which they live',[55] the power of the American Poles and particularly the American Irish were preoccupying concerns. As we have just noted, the Poles, like the Irish, were seen to wield considerable power and were lost to the British cause.

As early as March 1915, under the influence of his friend Lewis Namier, the Poland expert in the office responsible for press and literary propaganda, Wellington House,[56] Percy had drawn up a memorandum on the 'Polish-American Question'. Although he considered that 'if we ever try to form foreign opinion in America the Jews are our job', he asserted the need to have Polish opinion in America as a 'makeweight' to the German vote.[57] This assessment stemmed from the widely held view of the American Polish community as an important political power.[58] However, American Poles were considered to be divided into neutral and pro-Austrian factions, with Austrian and German agents vigorously working to capture the community for the

Central Powers. Up through to 1917, British officials desperately tried to subvert this imagined threat.[59]

The way in which British officials attempted to unify this perceived force behind the British cause is of great significance for our study of Government perceptions of ethnicity and ethnic groups during the war. Percy, Spring-Rice and others firmly believed that Polish-American power could only be captured for the Allies if Russia made public intimations over the future of Poland, which had been split between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany since the late eighteenth century.[60] Spring-Rice commented in early 1915, the 'Poles are still divided on the question of Russia, although they would certainly like if they could to espouse the Russian cause, that is if they could be convinced that Polish aims would receive recognition'.[61] In sum, it was considered that American Poles, as an influential, ethnically defined group, could be persuaded to support the Allied cause by tying it to the national self-determination of the Polish nation.

Beneath this concept lay the fundamental assumption that American Poles were all driven by a profound sense of Polish identity, and an inherent desire for national restoration, one that was so prominent that it could determine their entire attitude towards the war. This idea was axiomatic within the minds of British foreign policy-makers and was never questioned. It governed the entire propaganda campaign towards this community throughout the war.[62] Already in August 1914, a Russian proclamation promising Polish unity and autonomy was used by the Foreign Office for propaganda purposes in the USA.[63] It was considered that, as Calder put it, 'the Polish nation was a weapon which could be used by either side'.[64]

In keeping with the belief in the power of pan-nationalist/racial feeling, the considerations concerning American-Poles were also tied in with pan-Slavism. The group of academics and self-styled experts who were engaged in British propaganda work in relation to Central and Eastern Europe were heavily influenced by ideas of race and nationalism. Based around the journal *The New Europe* and its founder, R.W. Seton-Watson, this group, which included Namier, G.M. Trevelyan and Henry Wickham Steed, the foreign editor of *The Times*, were the most committed champions of national self-determination in government circles. They profoundly believed in the beneficent power of the racial/national bond, especially among their key interest, the Slavs.[65] Hence, Namier argued:

> the only way of approaching 'the neutrals' among the American Poles and of gaining their support for our side is through the inter-

> mediary of the other American Slavs. However impracticable a Slav union may be in Europe it is by no means impracticable in the United States and it might give excellent results.[66]

In his assessment of American Slavs, Spring-Rice went much further and argued in terms of a Slav race whose behaviour in the United States would, in an unspecified manner, 'react upon the struggle in Europe'.[67] The influence of this 'race' was seen to be so great that, according to Percy, a publicised pro-Polish Russian policy, and news of military enthusiasm by Russian Poles, would have 'an important influence in checking German intrigues directed against supplying the military needs of the Allies'.[68] This information was to be given to 'the English speaking population ...[,] the Polish population and to the Bohemian, Slovak, Croatian and Slovenian elements with whom the prominent friendly Poles, especially in Chicago, are believed to be closely in touch'.[69] These suggestions were considered to be of such importance that the British Ambassador to Russia, Sir George Buchanan, was instructed to discuss them with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Sazanov. Buchanan emphasised the British desire to 'win over to our side the Poles' in America, and explained that anything that might favourably 'influence the Polish and Slav elements in the United States would be very useful'.[70] Sazanov, however, did nothing.

The Russian interest in Poland meant that they were not about to make any substantial sacrifices for the sake of winning American Polish opinion. And as an internal Russian affair, the British Government could not act independently on an issue which could risk a breach with her ally.[71] Yet, British propaganda agencies would not stand idly by and proceeded to use Polish and other Slavic nationalist organisations in the USA. They created and distributed pro-British propaganda, sent missions to organise Poles and Slavs against German plots, recruited American Poles to serve in the Canadian army and sponsored Polish relief to the same end.[72] Although it was not possible to make any statements about the future of Poland, any possible opportunity was taken to tie the Polish national imagination to the British cause. After the fall of the Tsar in February 1917, Britain was able to make qualified public statements over the future of Poland. These pronouncements culminated in the Supreme War Council's declaration on 3 June 1918, and contributed to the creation of a Polish national army, both of which were intended to secure Polish support in the face of German intrigue.[73] But by this time, the desperate

military situation in Eastern Europe and the Central Powers' promises over Poland, meant that the prime focus was no longer on American Poles, but on winning the military support of the Polish population itself.[74] Nevertheless, from 1914 to the beginning of 1917, Anglo-Polish relations were principally driven by a concern with American Polish power, the fear of enemy influence, and the frustrated attempt to tap into what was seen to be the nationalist identity of American Poles.

Admittedly, Namier did question the predominant Foreign Office belief in American Polish power. In his memorandum, 'Observations on Polish Activities in America', he wrote:

> My own conviction is that the general political and military importance of the Poles, both in America and Europe, has been hitherto vastly exaggerated … The real attitude of the Poles towards us we can hardly influence at all – and it very questionable to what an extent it is worth attempting it …[75]

However, Namier went on to place his critical stance within the assumptions of the official mindset and maintained that, 'The Poles could become a united and important factor in Europe, and possibly also in America, and would become dangerous to us, if the Central Powers gave them a guarantee of unity and freedom.'[76] So, even as Namier tried to dispel the myth of Polish power, the widespread fear of enemy influence that was prevalent in Whitehall had clearly left its mark on him. As for his colleagues, his doubts failed to have a discernible impact, and were certainly not followed by any questioning of the official nationalist propaganda policy that was pursued among American Polonia.

This policy was carried out despite the bitter divisions that existed even within the Polish nationalist movement itself, with a pitched battle that was fought between the left and right wing factions, led by Roman Dmowski and Józef Pilsudski respectively. This conflict was just one manifestation of a complex diversity that belied any semblance of American Polish unity. As Matthew Frye Jacobson has observed, there were many 'criss-crossing factionalisms in Polish America', including, 'the continuing rivalries among religionists and secularists … and … conflict[s] among monarchists, socialists and liberals'.[77] With regard to the depth and power of Polish national consciousness among American Poles, more Polish Americans served in the U.S. armed forces during the war than in the Allies' Polish army, and 'the Polish-American purchase of liberty bonds exceeded what they donated to

Polish relief'.[78] After the war, only an estimated 3% of the population returned to independent Poland.[79] During the war years the one thing that many American Poles had in common was a commitment to the American war effort, and the felt need to demonstrate their American patriotism, rather than any static, all-consuming gaze toward Poland.

Similar to Jews, therefore, American Poles were considered to be an important factor in the propaganda war. They were mistakenly viewed as a united ethnic group whose significant power had to be won to the Allied cause, so as to draw them away from enemy influence, through appeals to their national identity. Ideally, this was to be achieved through national declarations and the formation of national legions to fight with the Allies. The perceived international bond of ethnic groups was such that American Poles, and others, were also used by the British Government to win over their brethren in the Russian Empire. For example, when it was proposed that a mission of secret agents of influence should be sent to Russia to counter 'pacifist propaganda' in 1917, the plan included Bohemians, Poles and Czechs, as well as Jews.[80]

However, the imagined ethnic bogey in the USA that was of greatest concern to the Foreign Office, the War Cabinet and British diplomats were not the American Poles, Jews, Bohemians or Czechs, but Irish-Americans. His Majesty's Government believed that the situation in Ireland made Irish-Americans the most hostile and difficult American minority to win over to the side of Great Britain during the war. Moreover, the threatening image of the Irish that was prevalent within British culture during this period[81] clearly influenced policy-makers, and fed the perception that the American Irish were the most dangerous and powerful presence facing the British cause in the United States. In one report, written for the Foreign Office in March 1916, it was simply put, 'the Irish-American party … exude poison from every pore'.[82] In alliance with the German menace, this community was thought to be dedicated to undermining British interests in the USA, and in the second half of the war, was consistently seen to be a significant threat to Anglo-American relations.[83]

Concerns over the alleged anti-war activities of Irish-Americans, and their association with the enemy, were expressed in the British Government from early 1915,[84] but came to the fore in the wake of the Irish nationalist Easter Rising in 1916, and in particular, the trial of the nationalist Sir Roger Casement for treason. In some quarters in the Government, the Rising was quickly suggested to have been the result of joint German and Irish-American intrigue, despite the absence of

any evidence to that effect.[85] The spectre of Irish-American power was equally marked in official assessments of American opinion in the wake of the Rising. In Spring-Rice's initial report, he voiced great concern regarding the possibility of a pro-rebellion movement among Irish-Americans. To his mind, such an eventuality could become a very serious problem for Anglo-American relations. In particular, he emphasised that it would be very dangerous to make Casement a martyr.[86] By mid-May, Spring-Rice reported an escalation of opposition to British policy in Ireland. The executions of Irish rebels were said to have had a negative effect and in the interest of Britain's position in the United States he argued that Casement should receive clemency. The Ambassador's suggestions were shown to the Cabinet, which also considered seriously other appeals on Casement's behalf from the USA.[87]

The assumptions of pan-Irish feeling that underpinned Spring-Rice's observations and proposals went unquestioned within Whitehall. Irish-Americans were widely conceived as a racial group whose identity and interests were primarily driven by an acute Irish nationalist consciousness. The inherent anti-British attitude of Irish-Americans was also above dispute in Whitehall, as was their collusion with the Germans. However, the power of the Irish in the USA, and the need to alter British policy in light of their concerns, was vociferously challenged by influential members of the Foreign Office and the Cabinet at this stage in the war. Individuals such as Lord Robert Cecil, who became an avowed supporter of the Government's Zionist policy, repeatedly sought to undermine any suggested change to British policy in Ireland to appease Irish-American opinion.[88] Significantly, though, such efforts did not constitute a sincere rejection of the idea of ethnic power *per se*, or even Irish-American power. Rather, Cecil's opposition, as with others, stemmed from his pronounced Unionist bias regarding Irish affairs, and his opposition to Home Rule.[89]

In the end, all the rebels in question were executed. The Government felt that it had no choice but to do so.[90] For Spring-Rice, this had the most serious ramifications for British interests in the USA. He stated with great pessimism:

> recent events have alienated from us almost the entire Irish party … I hope that you are not in any way counting on American sympathy or support … or doing anything to help us … You would be drawing a cheque where you have no bank account.[91]

Spring-Rice was far from being a lone voice in the Government. Despite the decision to execute Casement, and the opposition that had

been pitted against the Ambassador's recommendations, influential figures were deeply perturbed by the question of Irish-American influence and anti-British feeling. Significantly, nationalism was readily assumed to be the means of pacifying Irish-American opinion. Spring-Rice suggested in June 1916 that a declaration over Home Rule in Ireland would have the necessary effect in the USA.[92] Like Jews and Poles, therefore, it was considered that pro-German sentiment and hostility against Britain could be countered through a pro-Irish nationalist declaration. In part for this reason, the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, instructed Lloyd George, who was then the Secretary of State for War, to try and get an agreement for Home Rule.[93] Although Lloyd George's efforts were not successful, he remained convinced that Irish-American power was of the utmost significance, and that Irish nationalism held the key to gaining their support. In his view, there was a pronounced need to wean the Irish away from German influence.[94] He considered that, in co-operation with the Germans, Irish-Americans had the ability to force the hand of President Wilson himself.[95]

Once Lloyd George became Prime Minister in December 1916 it was widely accepted in the upper reaches of Government that the 'Irish Question' had tremendous consequences for Anglo-American relations. Sir Maurice Hankey, the influential secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence and the War Cabinet, asserted that among other benefits, a settlement of the 'Irish question' would have a significant effect 'in the United States, where the whole financial situation would probably be most favourably influenced, and the insidious propaganda of the enemy countered'.[96] Though Lloyd George was initially reluctant to bring up again the controversial matter of Home Rule, Irish-American power was increasingly seen as a significant barrier to complete US support for the war effort following their entrance into the conflict in April 1917.[97]

While Balfour led the War Mission to the United States in June 1917, he wrote on the 'Irish Question' to Lloyd George, and made clear his belief in Irish-American power and its hostility towards the British cause:

> The Irish question looms very large in the minds of United States politicians. From the domestic as well as from international point of view they are deeply concerned that no solution has yet been found to this ancient problem. From the international point of view they regard it as the one obstacle which stands in the way of a close friendship between their country and ours … its roots have struck so

> deep that even a settlement which satisfied the majority of Irishmen … would scarcely satisfy the Irish-American 'boss'. The interests of so-many wirepullers of the lower sort are involved in the maintenance of the Irish-American party that, if the existing Irish question were solved, a new one would have to be invented![98]

Later the same month, Lord Northcliffe, the head of the War Mission after Balfour, was much more emphatic with regard to the anti-British hostility of Irish-American influence and the extent of its harmful effects. He considered:

> the Irish are more powerful than I thought they were … [T]he settlement of the Irish difficulty would mean a 10% increase of war activity. The Irishmen hurt us in all kinds of ways that are not apparent in England. Apart from their power in the Press they have much to do with various metals used in munitions.[99]

The extent of the problem for Britain was such that C.F.G. Masterman, the founder and Assistant-Director of Wellington House, concluded that, 'Nothing … has caused us more anxiety than the question of dealing with Irish opinion in the United States.'[100]

These assessments of the Irish menace were based upon a series of erroneous assumptions regarding Irish identity and influence. The reality was that a great many Americans opposed Irish nationalism and 'no administration was willing to allow the country's vital interests to be influenced by Irish-American demands'.[101] Even if the role of Irish-Americans in the Church, the political machine and the labour movement are appreciated,[102] they were in no way a united force,[103] and nationalist activity on a large scale was far from the norm. Before the war, most Irish-Americans were preoccupied with their own local concerns, rather than affairs in Ireland.[104] Although the attitude of most Irish-Americans did begin to shift after the Easter Rebellion executions, the vast majority gave their staunch support to the war effort once the USA entered the fray in April 1917.[105] Revolutionary Irish nationalism can only be seen to have been a mass movement in the United States after the war.[106] However, these nuances escaped the attention of British foreign policy-makers who were blinkered by their racial nationalist perceptions and prejudices concerning the Irish. Not only were Irish-Americans considered to be a powerful threat to British interests, but the danger that they posed was seen to be particularly pernicious and harmful. One report for Wellington House went so far

as to refer to the 'the serious Irish evil'.[107] Unsurprisingly, therefore, by July 1917 the Irish-American leadership was said to be working in league with the new enemy of the Allied cause, revolutionary socialism, under the direction of the Germans, in an attempt to disrupt American labour wherever it would hurt the Allies most.[108]

The net result of these misplaced concerns in the British Government was a concerted effort to solve the Irish problem. To this end, Lloyd George proposed an Irish Convention in May 1917, in which the involved parties were to meet and agree upon a solution. At the same time, increased efforts were made to deflect anti-British propaganda through pamphlets, the press and visiting lecturers to the States.[109] One propaganda method that had been used since 1916 retained a similar logic to the attempted recruitment of American Poles and Jews into their own 'nationalist' divisions. It was considered that greater press coverage of acts of valour performed by Irish regiments would have a good effect on Irish-Americans.[110] There were also attempts to further propaganda among the supposedly powerful 'Catholic interest' in the USA, which was thought to be in German-Irish hands, and replete with enemies of the British cause.[111]

The Convention finally reached an agreement at the beginning of April 1918, with a proposal for Home Rule that was opposed by the Ulster Unionists and some Nationalists. Any gains that might have been made by this agreement in the USA were marred by the fact that the German Spring offensive had led to a need to implement conscription in Ireland. There was grave concern within the Cabinet that this measure would lead to serious anti-British agitation by Irish-Americans.[112] The solution that was proposed by Lord Reading, the new Ambassador to Washington since January, echoed that of his predecessor ten months earlier: a pro-nationalist declaration. He wrote, 'Key of situation is I am convinced public declaration … in event of Home Rule'.[113] Due to widespread scepticism among Irish-Americans concerning British intentions, the Government would publicly have to 'stake its existence on passing of [the] measure [and] … its intention to put act into operation at once'.[114] Remarkably, this recommendation was agreed to in principle by Lloyd George and the War Cabinet,[115] despite Unionist opposition from within the Foreign office.[116] Once again, therefore, Irish nationalism was seen to be the key to Irish-American hearts and minds. As Reading put it, 'self-determination is on all lips'.[117] Such plans, however, were cheated by political developments. When Sinn Fein leaders were arrested for allegedly conspiring with the Germans in May 1918, it became clear that there would be no

immediate granting of Home Rule.[118] Nevertheless, the Government's ongoing concern regarding the 'Irish Question' was palpable. When the Colonial Secretary, Walter Long, informed Reading of the current impossibility of a settlement, he wrote that despite this turn of events the British Government remained quite sincere in its desire to introduce Home Rule, and could he please explain all of this to President Wilson.[119] Though he had no influence on Irish policy, Sykes gave his own characteristic prediction of the harmful effects that would follow the dropping of Home Rule. Any resulting violence would, according to him, lead to 'an accretion of strength to Pacifism and Revolutionary movements in … the U.S.A'.[120]

But with the public discrediting of the Sinn Fein leadership as enemy agents, and the increasing demand for patriotism in the USA, it was widely felt in Whitehall that Irish-Americans would ultimately support the Allied cause until the end of the war.[121] In any case, following the collapse of the last attempt at an Irish settlement, there was not much else that could be done. However, Reading warned that such inaction would have major ramifications for Anglo-American relations after the war. He predicted that:

> [The] Irish will be a serious obstacle to [the] continuance of [the] closely intimate relations desired between United States and England. They will join pro-German and anti-British and other Irish and form an even stronger political anti-British element than before the war.[122]

This opinion was the logical corollary of the dominant view of Irish-Americans in Government thinking since the Easter Rising. The myth of an inherently anti-British, Irish-American power, which was committed to furthering Irish nationalist interests, was firmly fixed in the official mind, to the point where it had almost led to the implementation of Home Rule.

In sum, therefore, Irish-Americans were consistently discussed within Whitehall as a homogeneous racial group, whose identity was determined by an unyielding Irish national consciousness. Everything that the Irish-American did or thought with regard to the war was a result of this national identity. Moreover, the Irish-American was seen to be a figure of power, whose subversive anti-British hostility led to an intimate alliance with the German menace. The means to neutralise this threat, and to bring Irish-American power into the Allied orbit, was to tie the unceasing Irish desire for national freedom to the British cause.

This example, as with the case of the American Poles and other minorities, serves to illustrate the ways in which ethnic groups in the USA were seen in a similar way by British foreign policy-makers during the war. They were often viewed as tightly bound races that wielded power in American society and were potentially pro-German and anti-Allied. Time and again, it was considered that these groups were under the influence of the enemy, and that their support had to be captured through appeals to their innate national identities. There is no doubt that the differences between how these groups were perceived are crucial and impossible to ignore. The ways in which each 'race' was seen in British culture had a particular history and dynamic which, in turn, influenced how they were considered within the official imagination during the war. Hence, for this reason, at least in part, the Irish-American figured more prominently in Government considerations than other minorities. And yet, these differences should not be allowed to obscure the very real and significant commonalities in how ethnic groups were viewed. To do so would be to miss the great impact and wider significance of how ideas of race nationalism, ethnic influence and the German menace combined and determined many British propaganda policies during the war. Indeed, the ramifications of this official mindset reached well beyond the confines of the American context. In the final year of the war, it resulted, in part, in the Government's public and covert support of movements for national self-determination in Central and Eastern Europe.[123] As well, from 1915 British support of Arab nationalism was driven by the belief that there existed a united Arab race with deep-rooted national aspirations, which had to be won over before it was seized by the enemy, and to secure the support of world Islam.[124] Of course, in this case, the pre-existing influence of Orientalism contributed to the official vision of a homogeneous Arab world, but it does not account for the rest.

With regard to Jews, it is very clear that the specific nature and history of how Jewry was perceived within British society and culture is of crucial significance. Without acknowledging the influence of anti-Semitism, it would not be possible to explain why Jews in particular were seen to have such influence, or that they constituted a race. In addition, the presence of the Holy Land and the Bible in British culture enabled advocates of a pro-Zionist policy to believe that the Jews constituted a nation that yearned for its return to Palestine. Nevertheless, the perception of the Jews as a nation was dependent upon and determined by broader ideas of race nationalism. Unless it is appreciated that ethnic groups and ethnicity were commonly perceived in this way

by foreign policy-makers, it is difficult to explain why Zionism, and only Zionism, was instinctively thought to be the key to the Jewish imagination. Similarly, the interest in Jewish power and the perceived threat of enemy influence and intrigue among Jews must be viewed in light of the wider phenomenon that has been illustrated above.

This set of perceptions and context set the stage for why the myth of Jewish power came to be of significance in the war and why nationalism, in the shape of Zionism, was so readily accepted as being the means of capturing it as an asset for the British war effort. But it did not make a pro-Zionist policy inevitable.

3

Turning Perceptions into Policy: The Role of Jewish Activists, 1914–1917

The roots of the Balfour Declaration lay in perceptions of Jews and ethnicity in the British Government, and the policy-making elite's tendency to use nationalism as the means of capturing the perceived power of ethnic groups. By themselves, however, perceptions and tendencies were not sufficient for the development of a pro-Zionist policy. The evolution of the Balfour Declaration depended upon the opportunities that were thrown up by the circumstances of the war and the changing needs of policy-makers. As the financial and material support of neutral countries increased in importance, and the military situation on the Western front deteriorated, propaganda became ever more significant, particularly in the USA. As with other ethnic groups, this thrust the Jewish question onto the agenda in the Foreign Office. The possibility of an Allied military campaign in the Near East and the end of the Ottoman Empire also threw open the future of Palestine. Together, these conditions made the advance of a British Zionist policy possible. Even in these circumstances, however, the Anglo-Zionist alliance was not a foregone conclusion. The last critical element was that of human agency, on both the British and Zionist sides. It was undoubtedly of great significance that civil servants and politicians who were pre-disposed to the idea of a Zionist policy were in positions of influence. The most decisive factor, however, was the collective contribution of Jewish activists, who convinced policy-makers of the need to use Zionism as a propaganda tool among Jewry. Throughout the war, the Government was entirely reactive in its formulation of policy towards Zionism, and was prompted at every stage by the initiatives of Jews who understood official concerns and assumptions regarding their community. The key to advancing the Zionist cause in Whitehall was this awareness of the official mindset: the preoccupation

with propaganda, the belief in Jewish power, the exaggerated fears of German influence, and the acceptance that nationalism was the means to win hearts and minds. By playing upon these views, Jewish activists were able to present Zionism as a solution that was seized upon by decision-makers in the British Government.

Much of the political groundwork that led to the Balfour Declaration was done before 1917. During this period, there was little in the way of a co-ordinated Zionist diplomatic effort. Rather, the work of a number of important figures coincided at fortuitous moments, and provided the seeds that would lead to the Declaration. In this process, very little impact was made by the much feted activities of Chaim Weizmann, a prominent Zionist in England, who was engaged in scientific work for the Ministry of Munitions from 1915. Many others, however, successfully made the case for a Zionist policy.

Sowing the seeds for the Balfour Declaration

As is well known, the first time that British support of Jewish settlement in Palestine was considered at Cabinet level during the Great War was in March 1915. This development was the result of the efforts of the Anglo-Jewish Liberal M.P., Herbert Samuel, who was then serving as President of the Local Government Board. Following the decision of the Ottoman Empire to join the Central Powers at the end of October 1914, Samuel had with uncharacteristic alacrity taken it upon himself to agitate for the support of Zionist aims in Palestine from November 1914, and put before the Cabinet a memorandum on the subject in March 1915.[1]

In this memorandum there were two main political arguments which would be developed by Jewish activists in their attempts to persuade the British Government to take up a pro-Zionist policy during the war.[2] The first, which was adopted by Weizmann, emphasised the strategic significance of Palestine for the British Empire, with the need for a British protectorate, favourable to Zionism, that would safeguard Egypt and the Suez Canal from any future menace from another European power.[3] The second argument derived from Samuel's Zionist understanding of world Jewry as a nation that was fixed upon its return to Palestine,[4] and the idea that Jewish influence could be of value for the British Empire.

> The course which is advocated would win for England the gratitude of the Jews throughout the world ... they would form a body of

> opinion whose bias … would be favourable to the British Empire … [H]elp given now towards the attainment of the ideal which great numbers of Jews have never ceased to cherish through so many centuries of suffering cannot fail to secure, into a far-distant future, the gratitude of a whole race, whose goodwill, in time to come, may not be without its value.[5]

Of the two arguments, the former would be of little use in the Zionists' attempt to convince the British Government to support their movement. Rather, it was in Samuel's depiction of Jewry as a nation and a body of influence, which could potentially be of help to the British cause, that we can identify the basis of the successful Zionist diplomacy that led to the Balfour Declaration.

Tellingly, the depiction of Jewry as a nation worth winning over to the British cause went largely unquestioned.[6] Conversely, with the exception of Lloyd George, there was no Cabinet or Foreign Office interest in adding Palestine to the Empire.[7] Preparations for the ill-fated Dardanelles campaign, which began in earnest in March 1915, had indeed raised the question of the future of the Ottoman Empire among the Allies. But, there was ongoing uncertainty surrounding Britain's post-war policy towards the Near East, particularly Palestine, which was marked by a desire to avoid further imperial responsibilities, and a dangerous struggle for territory between the Allied powers. Hence, in June 1915 the De Bunsen Committee on Britain's desiderata in 'Turkey-in-Asia' recommended the maintenance of a de-centralised Ottoman Empire after the war.[8]

With no prospect of a military campaign in the Near East, and the early stage of the war, both Palestine and the will of world Jewry were of little interest to the Foreign Office or the Cabinet. Nevertheless, Samuel's early efforts had revealed a point of fundamental importance. If Jewish opinion did become a matter of concern, and Palestine came into the Allied orbit, it was readily accepted within Government circles that Zionism was the key to securing 'the gratitude of a whole race'.[9]

By late 1915 the situation had changed sufficiently to allow for the consideration of a pro-Zionist policy. British discussions with Arab nationalists and considerations of a military campaign from Egypt had placed Palestine and the rest of the region firmly on the agenda. British and French representatives were busy preparing to discuss their desired spheres of influence prior to any campaign.[10] More significantly, as discussed in the previous chapter, the protracted and draining nature of the war had led to an increasing Government concern with the

opinion of ethnic groups, particularly in the USA. According to the Foreign Office assessment of American Jewish opinion, the community was plagued by a fervent and deep-seated hatred of anti-Semitic Russia. Moreover, these sentiments were, so it was thought, being stirred up by German agents and supposedly pro-German Jewish financiers such as Jacob Schiff. Despite a desire in the Foreign Office to combat this problem, the impossibility of influencing Russia to change its domestic policies meant that there was no apparent solution.[11]

It was out of this context that Zionism was to be seriously considered as an effective means of solving this imagined problem for the Foreign Office. Significantly, however, this proposal did not come from within the Government itself. With propitious and somewhat fortuitous timing, between November 1915 and February 1916, four Jewish activists from the USA, England, Russia and Egypt, Horace Kallen, Lucien Wolf, Vladimir Jabotinsky and Edgar Suares, independently offered such an assessment. Together, they endorsed the increasingly accepted belief in pro-German intrigues and influence among the masses of American Jewry, and the existence of a powerful German-Jewish financial clique. Not only did these activists hold up a mirror to British Foreign Office concerns but they offered a solution which equally fitted in with how certain officials perceived Jewry. They argued that the way to win Jewish support was to aid Jewish national restoration in Palestine. It was this precise reflection of the Foreign Office mindset at this particular point that made British interest in Zionism possible.

The consideration of a pro-Zionist policy by the Foreign Office in 1916 was, therefore, in the main the result of a considered diplomatic strategy on the part of Jewish activists. Moreover, the British decision to approach Zionist representatives in 1917, which eventually led to the Balfour Declaration, was a direct consequence of the events that followed the efforts of Kallen, Wolf, Jabotinsky and Suares. In addition, the Zionist success of 1917 was wholly dependent on the continued application of their strategy.

During the critical period of 1915 and 1916, the majority of Weizmann's largely indirect contacts with Lloyd George were restricted to problems with his scientific work for the Ministry of Munitions, and had very little to do with Zionism.[12] The infrequent discussions that Weizmann did have with members of the Government regarding Zionism were confined to the merits of Zionist ideology, and Samuel's argument for a British protectorate in Palestine.[13] As these matters were of little concern to British policy-makers, Weizmann's meetings

failed to lead to any Government interest in supporting Zionism. Meanwhile, however, others were about to sow the seeds for the Balfour Declaration.

The first concrete step in this direction was a memorandum for the Foreign Office from the young American Zionist leader and social philosopher Professor Horace Kallen, who was then an instructor at the University of Wisconsin.[14] Not only did Kallen's approach prompt the Foreign Office to consider a pro-Zionist policy for the first time, but it was the product of a carefully thought out strategy on his part.

The leading body of American Zionism, the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs in the USA, declared its official neutrality in the war upon its foundation in August 1914.[15] From that point on, Kallen had been engaged in a covert but ardent Zionist and pro-Allied propaganda campaign among American Jewry and the wider public.[16] He was joined in his staunch support of the Allied cause, particularly Britain, by other prominent Zionist figures in or associated with the Provisional Executive, such as Richard Gottheil and the young social progressives, Rabbi Stephen Wise and Felix Frankfurter, who both had access to President Wilson.[17] Similar to his Zionist colleagues in London, Kallen had already conceived that the American Zionist leadership should establish high level contacts with the British Government, whose imperial policy he publicly hailed as being the great example of 'the principle of harmony … posited … upon the voluntary and autonomous cooperation of …[its] component nationalities'.[18]

With Kallen already having sought contacts with the British Government,[19] events started to proceed apace from April 1915. Alfred Zimmern, a member of the highly placed British imperialist *Round Table* group, intimated to his friend Kallen that it was the 'present intention of the "Powers-that-be" to put the Jewish question to the fore, when peace comes.'[20] Kallen promptly informed Louis Brandeis, the *de facto* leader of American Zionism since the beginning of the war.[21] It would appear that soon afterwards Kallen drew up a memorandum for Lord Eustace Percy, who then worked in the Foreign Office News Department. This document called for a public statement concerning a British protectorate over Palestine in favour of Zionism, so as to combat the influence of pro-Germans in American Jewry. That Kallen genuinely believed such a statement could have a serious effect upon American Jewry is readily apparent from his own Zionist *Weltanschauung* and his ethno-centric understanding of identity. Reflecting Government perceptions, he too believed that American society was stratified by unbreakable ethnic bonds that ultimately defined

individual identity, which was particularly evident in the case of the Jews.[22] In addition, like Gottheil and Brandeis, Kallen was well aware that the Allied embassies in Washington, with whom they were in frequent contact, believed that American Jewry was vehemently anti-Russian and pro-German, and feared 'the influence of the International Jewish banking group'.[23]

Although no copy of this memorandum remains, it was the first time that a Zionist suggested to a Government official that Britain could combat German influence through a public declaration of support for Jewish nationalist aspirations in Palestine. Although Percy did not pass the document onto the Foreign Office, on 1 November 1915 Kallen sent another memorandum to Percy via Zimmern, which was then given to the Foreign Office for consideration. Playing upon the Foreign Office fear of German machinations among Jewry, and Jewish power, Kallen stated, 'all [Jewish] opinion is manufactured at a price by German agents who are doing their best to feed the very influential Jewish public in New York with stories of German consideration of Jewish interests and claims'. His solution to this problem was, 'a statement on behalf of the Allies favouring Jewish rights in every country, and a very veiled suggestion concerning nationalization in Palestine'.[24] By this point, the original proposal of a pro-Zionist declaration had been toned down to a 'veiled suggestion'. This was probably due to Percy's earlier protest to Kallen that Palestine was the 'thorniest question in the world', in which Britain had no interest.[25] Nevertheless, the idea of making a public statement concerning the future of Palestine, in order to win over Jewish opinion from the clutches of German influence, had now been put forward to the British Government.

In the official consideration of Kallen's memorandum by the Foreign Office there were no initial criticisms of his picture of American Jewry. At first, there was no apparent sense of urgency to act upon the matter, but it had clearly stirred some interest. Cecil, who evinced a sharp interest in Jewish opinion, particularly financiers, wished to look further into the issue.[26] He remarked that Lucien Wolf, the representative of the Jewish Conjoint Foreign Committee, which liaised with the Government on behalf of the Board of Deputies and the Anglo-Jewish Association, had views on the subject. Wolf was asked to communicate them to Sir Gilbert Parker, the head of the Government's extensive propaganda campaign in the USA.[27] A few days later Wolf sent for the attention of Parker a memorandum entitled 'Suggestions for a pro-Allied propaganda among the Jews of the United States.'[28]

In his analysis of American Jewry, Wolf confirmed Kallen's assertions regarding their influence, but also gave a much more explicit endorsement of the benefits of a pro-Zionist policy as a means of winning over their support to the British cause. Although Wolf was an avowed opponent of political Zionism, he saw this as an opportunity to regain favour within the eyes of the Foreign Office, and to wrest control of the Palestine issue from the Zionists.[29] As an experienced and shrewd diplomat, Wolf used the Government's belief in American Jewish power and pro-Germanism to try and achieve these objectives.[30]

Wolf wrote to Parker, 'in the United States the Jews number over 2,000,000 and their influence – political, commercial and social – is very considerable'. Pointing to the apparent victory of the Zionists in gaining widespread support in the campaign for a democratically elected American Jewish Congress,[31] a body that was intended to represent the interests of American Jews, Wolf asserted that in 'any bid for Jewish sympathies today, very serious account must be taken of the Zionist movement'. He exclaimed, 'This is the moment for the Allies to declare their policy in regard to Palestine.' Specifically, Wolf contended that, 'what the Zionists would especially like to know is that Great Britain will become mistress of Palestine'. At this stage, however, the officials involved were not convinced. Parker responded to Wolf's scheme in a markedly uninterested tone, 'What view does Spring-Rice take? From my own view it is largely if not solely a matter for him.'[32] Wolf's memorandum was sent to Washington almost two weeks later.[33]

Prior to Spring-Rice's reply, a proposal by a Zionist and highly respected journalist from Russia, Vladimir Jabotinsky, had reached the Foreign Office. Although his solution was fundamentally different from that of Kallen or Wolf, Jabotinsky's assessment of the problem posed by American Jewry for the British Government was the same. Being an astute journalist and political observer Jabotinsky had a marked appreciation of Government concerns and realpolitik. Throughout his discussions with members of the British Establishment and Government for the duration of the war, his petitions were designed to meet what he had accurately identified as their principal political need concerning Jewry, winning over their opinion to the side of the Allies. He wasted no time or verbiage discussing the plight and troubles of Jewry or Zionist ideals, but focused on what the British could materially gain from supporting his Zionist plans. Jabotinsky's skilful diplomacy was of central importance in the Government's adoption of a pro-Zionist policy.[34]

He had arrived in England from Italy, via France, in April 1915 to try and gain British support for the creation of a Jewish Legion. The Legion was to build on the Zion Mule Corps that had been raised in Egypt by Joseph Trumpeldor, the Russian Zionist and decorated veteran of the Russo-Japanese war, and would serve with the British Army in any future campaigns in Palestine.[35] Armed with an introduction from Count Alexander Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador to London, and the support and advice of Colonel J.H. Patterson, the former Commander of the Mule Corps, Jabotinsky had been engaged in a vigorous campaign, petitioning for British Government support for Zionism and the Legion. By January 1916 he had already gained the backing of the influential foreign editor of *The Times*, Henry Wickham Steed, and Arthur Henderson, the head of the British parliamentary Labour party and the President of the Board of Education.[36]

On 26 January 1916 Jabotinsky wrote to C.F.G. Masterman, the Assistant-Director of Wellington House, whom he had arranged to meet the previous week.[37] Echoing Kallen and Wolf, Jabotinsky began with a statement that embodied the perception of American Jewry prevalent among British propaganda and Foreign Office officials. 'The Jews of America, especially those of New York (1,250,000), represent a political factor of serious influence, even from the standpoint of international politics.'[38] Noting that German agents were using the persecution of Jews by Russia against the Allies, Jabotinsky argued that, 'The only sentiment strong enough to counterbalance this rancour is the Zionist ideal.' From a mind that was heavily influenced by European neo-Romantic nationalist ideas, Jabotinsky himself conceived that among the Jewish masses there existed an inner attachment to Palestine, the land of the nation.[39] Summing up his position he wrote, 'This [Zionist] belief and only it, can form the base and point d'appui for a systematic pro-Entente propaganda in the [sic] American Jewry.'[40]

Believing that under the present conditions of the war the British Government was not able to offer any promises concerning the future of Palestine, Jabotinsky offered an alternative solution. Influenced by the militarist nationalist ideas of the time, he believed that a Jewish Legion for service in the Near East would constitute a visible and powerful symbol that an Allied victory would be favourable to Zionist aims.[41] Again pre-empting the sensibilities and concerns of British propagandists, Jabotinsky offered to create a pro-British Jewish propaganda office in New York.[42] Overall, it was not surprising that Jabotinsky's assessment of American Jewry, his awareness of British interests and his practical proposal, based upon a nationalist con-

ception of Jewry, was well received by Masterman and his colleagues in Wellington House. Explaining to Hubert Montgomery of the Foreign Office News Department, E.A. Gowers wrote, 'he made a considerable impression on Masterman and myself'.[43] Indeed, Masterman became 'very anxious' to act upon Jabotinsky's scheme in order to create propaganda for use among American Jewry.[44] Jabotinsky's influence upon him was clear. From this moment until the official decision of the War Cabinet to issue a declaration in October 1917, Masterman remained a strong and convinced supporter of the concept of using Zionism to win over American Jewish opinion.[45]

By January 1916 the young Conservative M.P. Leopold Amery, then working for the War Office, had been petitioned by Patterson and was also greatly enthused by Jabotinsky's proposals. Writing to Cecil in the Foreign Office he readily asserted that 'anti-Russian feeling' had been 'used by the Bosche' and considered that a Zionist legion 'might turn things the other way'.[46] But as useful as Amery's help and advice would be for Jabotinsky later in the war, the War Office objected to the Legion idea, given that it could implicate the Government in a wider Zionist policy.[47] Indeed, aside from Amery and Wellington House there was no great enthusiasm for Jabotinsky's proposal, which without clear Jewish or even Zionist support, a Palestine campaign, or an agreed pro-Zionist policy, was understandable.[48]

But even though Jabotinsky's proposal for a Jewish Legion was turned down by the Foreign Office, his depiction of a pro-German, influential and Zionist American Jewry had served to endorse their pre-existing perceptions, and the assessments provided by Kallen and Wolf. The rejection of the Legion scheme was in no way due to Jabotinsky's analysis of the problem, rather his solution.

Prior to the rejection of Jabotinsky's scheme, Wolf had put forward a different formula to the Foreign Office, an Anglo-French declaration[49] that would recognise the historic interest and rights of the Jewish community in Palestine, if that country came within their spheres of influence during the war.[50] Only ten days before the submission of the Wolf formula, the Foreign Office had received a record of an interview with the leader of the Jewish community in Alexandria, Edgar Suares, a self-proclaimed 'anti-Zionist'.[51] Suares stated, 'with a stroke of the pen, almost, England could assume herself the active support of the Jews all over the neutral world'.[52] Adding great urgency to his appeal he stressed that with 'the sympathy of the British Government today [for Jewish aspirations in Palestine] he would have secured the support of the whole Jewish and German-Jewish community in America within

perhaps one month; and at most three … This was war, and time was more than precious'. Suares' statement struck home in a concise and dramatic manner. It again confirmed that Jewish opinion was an issue, that it could be won through the Jews' attachment to Palestine, and that time was of the essence.

By February 1916, the need to act had become clear. With regard to the necessary remedy, both Wolf and Suares had suggested a public declaration as the best way forward. Although Kallen's suggestion to the same effect had not been acted upon in December, by late February the conception that publicly supporting Zionism was the way forward had crystallised in the minds of certain officials. Some were overtly enthusiastic, such as Hugh O'Beirne, a former Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires in Petrograd and Sofia,[53] while others, such as Lord Crewe,[54] Grey's deputy, were more reactive, tempted by the prospect of a tool that may or might not hold the solution to perceived problems that faced Great Britain at a time of crisis. Their views may have varied, but they were all driven to consider using Zionism as a result of the cumulative efforts of Kallen, Wolf, Jabotinsky and Suares.

By the time of Wolf's Palestine formula a week after the Suares statement, the resulting momentum was such that the Foreign Office decided to approach officially France and Russia, with whom the post-war future of the Near East was being discussed in Petrograd. Lord Crewe, speaking for Grey, noted that this matter of a Zionist declaration should not be put aside. O'Beirne asserted that they could persuade the French to acquiesce if they explained 'the political object which we hoped to attain by turning in our favour the Jewish force in America, the Near East and elsewhere, which is now preponderantly hostile to us'.[55]

Despite these hopes, both the Russian and French Governments objected to the whole scheme in March, spelling the end of the endeavour. Neither Government was persuaded that American Jewry could be won over through Zionism.[56] In any case, the ongoing discussions over the future of the Ottoman Empire, and the prospective Arab Revolt, meant that the French were not about to add a further complication to the issue, particularly one that might obstruct their own strong ambitions in Palestine.[57] Faced with these objections, together with a growing distrust of Wolf[58] and the British Government's own interest in not compromising the Arab Revolt, the declaration was quietly dropped in June.[59]

In sum, it is readily apparent that the decision to consider using Palestine as a means of winning Jewish opinion, particularly in the

USA, was a direct result of a carefully devised strategy on the part of at least Kallen, Wolf and Jabotinsky, whose independent efforts came together at just the right moment. Their success was fundamentally drawn from their ability to understand the nature and importance of the Government's preoccupation with propaganda, and within that context, to use foreign policy-makers' beliefs in Jewish influence, the threat of German intrigue, and the beneficent power of nationalism as the key to the Jewish imagination. The reasons why this did not result in a Government policy in 1916 did not lie in the strategy itself, but in the wider context of the war and the resulting concerns of the Government. Circumstances would change dramatically as the year turned to 1917, making a pro-Zionist policy both possible and necessary. By then the Arab Revolt had come to be a grave disappointment, a new Government had been established which included individuals who were more inclined to pursue fervently a pro-Zionist policy, the need for propaganda had become all-consuming, and the decision to conquer Palestine had been taken. Nevertheless, any success that did come to the Zionists as a result of these developments was dependent upon the continuing use of the methods that were utilised by Kallen, Wolf and Jabotinsky. Jabotinsky himself was to become the most successful proponent of this diplomacy, as he built upon the tactics he had honed in 1916.

Conversely, the years 1915 and 1916 had seen Weizmann going down a completely different road with no possible claim of having influenced policy-makers to pursue a pro-Zionist policy. He was apparently ignorant of how the issue of propaganda prayed upon the official mind, and that this was the key to their possible interest in Zionism. When, for example, Weizmann met Cecil, he extolled the strategic benefits of a British Palestine and the regenerative effects of national restoration for Jewry.[60] Cecil was not interested in the use of a British Palestine as a bulwark for Egypt or the restoration of the Jewish people for its own sake. For this reason, he made no effort to consult with Weizmann in relation to the Wolf formula. In 1916 the trusted referent with regard to Zionism, for at least Cecil and Lord Crewe, remained Herbert Samuel.[61]

The deliberations over the Wolf formula had one major ramification – the stirring of Sir Mark Sykes' interest in using Zionism to advance British interests.[62] It was the eventual result of this development that Sokolow and Weizmann would in February 1917 become the Government's official liaisons, as Sykes sought to capture the Zionist movement for the British cause. This turn of events did not stem

from any new found realisation on Weizmann's part of what drove the Government's concern with Zionism, or any of his past attempts at diplomacy. It was, rather, the product of his own power building in Zionist circles, and the removal of a Zionist representative who had accurately understood and cultivated Sykes perceptions of, and interest in, Jewry and Zionism.

Sir Mark Sykes and Moses Gaster

It is quite clear from the historical record that Sykes, who had not shown any prior interest in Zionism, quickly came to see its benefits for British foreign policy as the Wolf formula was under consideration. In February 1916, prior to his departure for Petrograd, where he was to negotiate with French and Russian representatives over the future of the Near East, which culminated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Herbert Samuel had given him a copy of his memorandum of March 1915.[63] Evidently, it had an impact upon Sykes,[64] who after receiving news of the Wolf formula, promptly discussed the subject, much to the annoyance of the Foreign Office, with François Georges-Picot, the French representative, and Sazanov, the Russian Foreign Minister.[65] Despite Samuel's emphasis on the benefits of a British protectorate in Palestine, this aspect of his memorandum was not of concern to Sykes at this time.[66] Rather, his chief interest in Zionism, like the Foreign Office, was winning the influence of world Jewry. In this regard, Samuel's depiction of Zionism and the rationale behind the Wolf formula had tapped into his preconceptions regarding Jews. He was easily convinced that this hostile power could be pacified and used by the Allied cause by gaining the support of the Zionist movement. Sykes wrote to Arthur Nicolson, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:

> with 'great Jewry' against us there is no possible chance of getting the thing thro' … assume Zionists satisfied the contrary is the case, of that I am positive … if the Zionists think [?] proposal good enough they will want us to win – If they want us to win they will do their best which means they will a) calm their activities in Russia b) Pessimism in Germany (c) Stimulate in France England & Italy (D) Enthuse in USA.[67]

When Sykes returned to London he asked Samuel to put him in touch with a Zionist leader with whom he could hold discussions. Samuel recommended the Chief Rabbi of the British Sephardic community,

Haham Moses Gaster, a somewhat tempestuous but widely respected figure of considerable stature in England and abroad,[68] who he had known for many years.[69] Samuel evidently admired Gaster as an impressive spokesman for the Zionist ideal and a man with adroit political sensibilities.[70] Despite having met Sokolow and Weizmann,[71] it was Gaster who Samuel decided would be most suitable and appropriate at this critical juncture to meet Sykes.[72] It was him alone, 'at least in the first instance', who Samuel felt could be trusted to deal with this matter which had to 'be kept absolutely confidential'.[73]

This was the first time that a Zionist had been approached by a Government representative, rather than the other way around, with an eye to pursuing a pro-Zionist policy during the war, and marked a highly significant turning point. But, if Sykes had already been persuaded of the need to gain the support of Jewry through Zionism, what was the use of meeting Gaster, or indeed any other Zionist? Firstly, due to his conception of their influence, it was necessary for them to be carefully sounded out and kept in hope of a sympathetic decision in their favour, as it was 'in their power' to overthrow the project.[74] Secondly, in order to persuade the French and the Allies as a whole the Zionists would need to 'give some demonstration of their power'. He considered that, 'accentuation of German financial straits and glow of pro-allied sentiment in certain hitherto anti-ally neutral papers would be sufficient indication'.[75] Overall, and most crucially, Sykes needed to see a Zionist movement that reflected his own preconceptions, to discuss the issue with a Zionist who grasped and echoed the nub of the matter as he saw it. After all, it would have been very easy for a Zionist to present to Sykes the divided reality of world Jewry, a collection of fragmented communities that if anything at all negated any conception of Jewish power. Indeed, if we look at some of Gaster's writings and correspondence concerning the state of world Jewry we see a distinct appreciation that unity was 'the rarest thing in Jewish history'.[76]

Significantly, however, Samuel had emphasised to Gaster and Weizmann in December 1915 the importance of demonstrating to the British Government that any proposal had emanated from and was backed by 'international Jewry'.[77] Moreover, since 1914 Gaster himself had already been aware of the keen British desire to use propaganda to win over Jewish opinion. At the recommendation of Israel Zangwill, the writer and Jewish political activist, Gaster had been commissioned by Wellington House to write articles for Rumanian Jewry to this end.[78]

In his discussions with Sykes in May 1916 and later with Picot it is apparent that Gaster had fundamentally grasped their key interest, what they wished to hear about the power of Jewry and Zionism, particularly in the USA, and the degree of importance to which they had begun to attach to gaining the support of the Zionist movement. After his first meeting with Sykes, in which he advised that Jewish opinion could be won by a *fait accompli*, British soldiers occupying Jerusalem, Gaster phoned Sokolow and noted in his diary the need to 'prove our assertions & to work on America'.[79] In his talks with Picot, Gaster continued to emphasise the importance of bargaining for Zionism and world Jewish opinion, stating, 'Against positive assurances [regarding Palestine] we would do our best for creating public opinion favourable to France.'[80] Combined with such efforts, Gaster continued to focus Sykes' vision of Jewry through the lens of Zionist ideology.[81]

Gaster had impressed Sykes, so much so that he had been entrusted with highly confidential and delicate matters and had been introduced by Sykes to his French counterpart, Picot, who had originally been quite reluctant to admit the importance of Zionism.[82] Gaster had understood and played upon the issue that could be used to advance the Zionist cause with these influential personalities. He had endorsed and consolidated their conception of what was at stake, Jewish influence, and how it could be tied to the Allied cause, Zionism.

Gaster's contacts with Sykes diminished after July 1916. This was not due to a lack of faith in Gaster's political abilities, but was in line with the wider Foreign Office decision to step back from a pro-Zionist policy, due to official French objections and the Arab Revolt. As the Revolt had failed to lead to the destabilisation of the Ottoman Empire, and had not been followed by an Allied military campaign in the region, there was simply no point in meeting with Gaster.[83] But when the Lloyd George coalition replaced the Asquith government on 6 December 1916, and the Prime Minister quickly decided to pursue a campaign in Palestine,[84] Zionism was back on the agenda. Sykes thus wished to see Gaster again at the beginning of January.[85] Now a political secretary in the War Cabinet secretariat, charged with Near Eastern affairs, Sykes sought to advance a pro-Zionist policy.

At around this time, Sykes had discussed with the well-connected Armenian National Delegation representative in London, James A. Malcolm, the issue of an alliance between Zionists and Armenian nationalists.[86] As a result of these considerations, Malcolm took the opportunity to probe into the wider machinations of the Zionist movement and it was through Malcolm's friend, and Gaster's long time and

bitter adversary, Leopold Greenberg,[87] that Weizmann and then Sokolow were strongly recommended as Zionist representatives for negotiations with Sykes.[88] At this time Gaster was still trusted by Sykes and had confided in him as to what urgent action would need to be taken with the immediate prospect of British occupation of Palestine.[89] But once Greenberg, Weizmann and others, such as James de Rothschild, had the ear of Malcolm and Sykes, Weizmann was misleadingly identified as the 'Chairman' of British Zionists. Gaster, who they wished to replace, was strongly criticised as dictatorial, peripheral to the Zionist leadership and as having kept his negotiations with Sykes secret[90] – something that Weizmann and Sokolow themselves were to be accused of later in the year.[91] In addition, it seems that for Picot at least, Gaster, who had always sought to put Zionist concerns first lest they become used as a pawn in Great Power politics, was too extreme.[92] In 1917 the representatives of the imperial powers wanted Zionists who would be willing to submit limited requests, not demands, which were subservient to and constrained by their interests. Sokolow and Weizmann filled that space.

Together, these factors resulted in the decision that Sokolow, the recognised Zionist leader of the World Zionist Organisation in London,[93] would continue the negotiations with Picot and Sykes.[94] Gaster was ostracised, and referred to his displacement as a *coup d'état*.[95] Weizmann was appointed as President of the English Zionist Federation to aid his position,[96] and was to work with Sokolow as the conduit between the Zionist movement and the Government. Sokolow's position as a member of the Executive of the Zionist Organisation had made him the logical choice to head negotiations at this point, but it did not necessitate Gaster being discredited with Sykes or his complete removal. With regard to Weizmann, his new position was not the result of any of his previous meetings with Government officials. Nor was it a consequence of his supposed stature within Government circles, which is said to have stemmed from his scientific work for the Ministry of Munitions,[97] but was never mentioned by Sykes. Rather, it was the product of political manoeuvring among a small coterie of Zionists in London, and his power building in these circles since the outbreak of war.

4
The Making of the Balfour Declaration

The appointment of Weizmann and Sokolow as liaisons with the British Government marked the beginning of official relations with Zionism in 1917. Whether Weizmann and his senior colleague Sokolow would succeed in securing a pro-Zionist policy depended upon their ability to continue the strategy of those who had preceded them, Kallen, Wolf, Suares, Jabotinsky and Gaster, as the dire developments in the war made the Government interest in Jewry ever more acute and a Palestine campaign made it possible. The success of this work relied upon an accurate understanding and manipulation of the Government's perceptions of Jewish power and identity.

The road to the Balfour Declaration was highly complex, and was dependent upon the critical and intersecting work of a number of Zionists. In particular, a decisive role was played by the diplomacy of Vladimir Jabotinsky, and the strategy and achievements of Russian and American Zionists, especially Louis Brandeis. Despite the change in Government in December 1916, which included Lloyd George as Prime Minister and Balfour as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Balfour Declaration was by no means guaranteed. It was dependent upon the Zionists to show why Zionism was of increasing importance, to give a sense of urgency to the proceedings, and to overcome any uncertainties that did arise by providing the Government with a vision of Jewry that appeared to endorse their preconceptions.

Establishing the motives for a pro-Zionist policy

At the beginning of 1917, as had been the case in 1916, the principal motive for gaining Zionist support had been to win over American Jewish opinion.[1] This was already well established. However, the March

revolution in Russia placed a question mark against Turkey being driven out of Palestine very quickly, and there was a cooling of Government interest in Zionism.[2] But by the time of the second attempt to take Gaza on 17 April by General Murray, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force,[3] the desire to create pro-British propaganda in the USA had grown and combined with other foreign policy concerns, so as to firmly impress the need for a pro-Zionist policy among its main advocates.

Between January and April 1917 the interest in Jewish influence in the USA was accompanied by a preoccupying concern with winning the support of Russian Jewry, which, in the wake of the March revolution, was considered to be influential, pro-German, and highly involved in pacifist socialist propaganda.[4] This picture of Russian Jewry was readily accepted by a number of officials and ministers in the Foreign Office and War Cabinet. Equally, they were predisposed to consider that Zionism was the key to this situation. However, it was only after Zionism was proposed as the solution by Zionist representatives that policy-makers then considered the Russian situation as a pressing reason for publicly supporting the aims of the Zionist movement. Crucially, this idea was not advanced by either Weizmann or Sokolow, but was the brainchild of Jabotinsky.

With the aid and advice of Amery, now a member of the War Cabinet's secretariat, Jabotinsky had recommenced his lobbying for a Jewish Legion in January, and had placed a memorandum before the War Cabinet, which was finally discussed in April.[5] He also discussed the matter in person with Lloyd George.[6] As in 1916, Jabotinsky had attempted to secure support for his project by tying it to foreign policy-makers' interest in capturing Jewish backing for the British war effort. He stated that this could only be achieved by visibly wedding the innate Zionist ideal of the masses to the British cause. In his memorandum, co-written with Joseph Trumpeldor, Jabotinsky stressed the 'particular importance inherent to the Jewish question in connection with this War', and the need to combat German accusations of the Entente's utter indifference to the 'tragedy of the Jewish Nation'.[7] Drawing particular attention to the importance of Jewry in American society, Jabotinsky emphasised that the only means of winning Jewish sympathy was to give 'a certain official recognition to the old Zionist ideal of the Jewish people and to call the Jewish youth to fight on the side of the Allies for the liberation of Palestine'.[8]

Although this diplomatic strategy might have been intended to further the Legion scheme alone, its rationale justified a pro-Zionist

policy as a whole. Indeed, Jabotinsky had argued in his petition to the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet that the creation of a Legion should be accompanied by an official recognition of the Zionist ideal, which would make use of 'such language as … would be favourable to Zionist aspirations'.[9] For this reason, the Legion was later perceived by its Government supporters as being intrinsically linked to a public declaration. As couched by Jabotinsky, they were two different methods of attaining the same goal. Accordingly, Jabotinsky's successful diplomacy did not just win backing for the Legion among influential figures such as Wickham Steed and Geoffrey Dawson, the foreign editor and editor of *The Times* respectively. Through their agitation in Whitehall they necessarily endorsed the reasoning for a declaration as well.[10] Similarly, Jabotinsky's efforts had significant consequences in Downing Street itself, which had been convinced by April to support the Legion. For Lloyd George, who had a profound interest in the propaganda aspect of the war in 1917,[11] Jabotinsky's arguments regarding the Legion clearly helped to establish the political logic of using Zionism to win Jewish influence. Philip Kerr, the foreign affairs specialist in the Prime Minister's private secretariat, later explained:

> He [Lloyd George] thinks that there are the strongest reasons for pressing on the proposal [of the Legion] as rapidly as possible on political grounds. Jewish circles, which exercise a great deal of influence all over the world, are divided in regard to the War … The project of creating a Jewish Legion with special reference to the liberation of Palestine, in great measure gained his support because he felt that the creation of a definitely fighting unit for use in Palestine would create a most valuable rallying point in favour of the war among Jews all over the world.[12]

In the wake of the March revolution, Jabotinsky acted quickly to underscore the need for a Zionist policy by using Government concerns and perceptions regarding Russian Jewish opinion. In this regard, he met with Sykes in early April and then wrote to the Foreign Office, impressing upon them that 'one of the greatest dangers of the moment is the pacifist demagogy in Russia', and that 'the importance of this factor should not be overlooked this time'. Although he claimed that this was not solely a Jewish movement, it contained Jews who were 'active and clever men'. It was therefore necessary to establish a 'counter-current within the Jewish community itself – a tendency for the prosecution of the war'. Such a goal could only be Palestine, with a

Jewish unit fighting in Palestine for Zionist ideals. This would 'immediately counterbalance the pacifist tendencies so far as Russian Jewry is concerned'. If Jabotinsky and his friends were to be given this 'powerful pro-war argument' they would endeavour to make 'the united Jewish influence [in Russia] ... in favour of a war to the end'.[13]

Jabotinsky's arguments were also relayed by Leopold Greenberg to the Foreign Office. This prompted Cecil to propose a public declaration in favour of Zionist aims, and to ask for the views of Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd.[14] It was only at this point that the Foreign Office decided to consider a declaration, as a direct result of Jabotinsky's efforts. Although Buchanan flatly rejected the idea that Russian Jews were mostly pacifist or Zionist, this picture was instinctively accepted by Sykes, who dismissed Buchanan's criticisms out of hand.[15] Evidently, Sykes and others in the Government were already inclined to accept the benefit of using Zionism in Russia. But it was only after it had been proposed by Jabotinsky that they came to relate the situation in Russia to their policy towards the Zionist movement, which drove them into action. This was probably the most important achievement of a Zionist representative in England during 1917. Once this argument had been advanced by Jabotinsky it was crucially adopted and endorsed by Weizmann, who tentatively followed his lead during Sokolow's extended absence in France and Italy.[16] The same argument was also put forward by others, such as the leader of the pro-British intelligence ring in Palestine, Aaron Aaronsohn, in his discussions with Sykes in Egypt.[17] For those such as Milner, who was not persuaded by Weizmann, other Jewish activists used the same tactic to great effect.[18] The end result was that this rationale for pursuing a pro-Zionist policy was firmly accepted by those who became its principal proponents within the Government: Sykes, Sir Ronald Graham, the new Foreign Office liaison with the Zionists,[19] Amery and Ormsby-Gore, who were both recent additions to the War Cabinet secretariat,[20] Kerr, Cecil, Lloyd George and Balfour.[21]

With regard to the importance of this development, it has been suggested that the Government's interest in Russian Jewry was the sole consideration behind the decision to issue the Balfour Declaration.[22] There is no doubt that as the situation in Russia worsened prior to October 1917 it became an increasingly urgent factor. But it did not constitute the whole picture. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the need for propaganda in the USA only increased after her entrance into the war in April 1917.[23] The desire to win the support of Russian Jewry merely strengthened the need to capture the weapon of American

Jewry, who were thought to wield a powerful influence over their brethren.[24] Indeed, the Foreign Office attempted to use American Zionists, who themselves feared and fed the bogey of pacifist revolutionary Jews,[25] to try and dissuade these supposed anti-war agitators.[26] As such, both before and after the Declaration, Government officials referred to the need to convince 'the Jews in the United States and Russia to lend their whole-hearted support in favour of carrying the war through to a successful conclusion'.[27] The joint interest in both Russian and American Jewry was a natural outcome of the logic behind a pro-Zionist policy that was adopted by a Government in the midst of a total war in crisis.[28] The belief in Jewish influence, and the hold of Zionism on the Jewish imagination, meant that wherever there were Jews, there was a potential asset to help the British cause. Hence, as will be discussed in the following chapter, the propaganda that was created to capture Jewish opinion after the Declaration was not just distributed in Russia and the USA, but throughout world Jewry.

The need to win Jewish opinion in Russia and the USA, as the core justification for a pro-Zionist policy, was first firmly established in April 1917. But, for Lloyd George in particular there was an additional benefit to using Zionism which was also clarified at this time: ensuring sole British control of Palestine after the war. Unlike Balfour, Cecil and Graham in the Foreign Office,[29] Lloyd George was fixed upon securing this imperial desideratum, which had been endorsed by the Imperial War Cabinet committee on territorial aims in the war.[30] Due to the perceived post-war threat of German ambitions in the Near East, it was felt that Palestine had to be secured as a British possession, so as to protect Egypt. As a result, Britain would have to extricate itself from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, which had envisioned an international administration. As France continued to stake its claim in Palestine and clung to the Agreement, it was proposed that Britain could use the Zionists' apparent desire for British suzerainty to justify its position, without harming the Entente.[31] As much as Lloyd George believed that Britain would in the end remain in Palestine,[32] he could not risk a breach with France on this issue or underestimate the difficulty of securing this aim at a post-war peace conference that may well come without a definite Allied victory.[33] It is true that by June, Nahum Sokolow had with marked diplomatic skill received an unprecedented declaration of support for Jewish national aspirations in Palestine from the French,[34] which due to the apparent Zionist desire for a British protectorate could be used as a means of justifying sole British

suzerainty.[35] Nevertheless, in order for this manoeuvre to be effective it was still necessary to ensure that the public support of world Jewry and Zionism was firmly behind Great Britain in preparation for the eventual peace conference. In addition, the need to cloak British ambitions in Palestine under the guise of Zionism was exacerbated further by the 'no annexation' peace policy of President Wilson and elements within the new Government in Russia. By depicting itself as a champion of national self-determination, the British Government could use Zionism here too to justify its suzerainty in Palestine.[36] As Sykes put it in May 1917, 'Our only weapon with these people is the theory of racial individuality and the argument that we cannot abandon conquered races to incurable oppressors like the Turks and Germans.'[37] For Sykes, who had worked to secure British control of Palestine only after he had been instructed to do so in April by Lloyd George and Lord Curzon,[38] Zionism, like Armenian and Arab nationalism, had become both 'big Entente War assets and Conference assets'.[39] Within his mind, both uses were interlinked as they arose from his belief in the power of Zionism, which he thought could determine the outcome of the Palestine issue at the prospective peace conference.[40] Later than Sykes, Amery also became interested in using Zionism to secure a British Palestine, which stemmed from his broader preoccupation with post-war imperial security.[41] But unlike his colleague in the War Cabinet secretariat, this devoted imperialist was quite clear in his mind that the priority motive for supporting Zionism had, at least by September 1917, become the use of a Jewish presence in Palestine so as to protect Egypt from any future 'German-Turkish oppression'.[42]

The role of the Zionists in directly establishing the imperial motive for British support for Zionism appears to have been negligible.[43] Although Samuel's strategic argument had been adopted by Weizmann in his effort to persuade members of the Government to support Jewish national aspirations, he appears to have been unaware of Lloyd George's thinking on the issue of Palestine as it came to the fore in April 1917. He had to be informed by Balfour in March that the Prime Minister had an interest in gaining Palestine after the war.[44] In his ensuing meeting with Lloyd George, Weizmann's opposition to both an international and an Anglo-French administration[45] may have inspired the Prime Minister to consider using Zionism to win British control of the Holy Land. This meeting was on 3 April and it was later that day that Lloyd George instructed Sykes to try and secure 'the addition of Palestine to the British area' and emphasised 'the importance of not prejudicing the Zionist movement and the possibility of its development

under British auspices'.[46] But if Lloyd George had seized upon the idea of using Zionism to abrogate the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and secure a British protectorate, this was certainly not the result of a deliberate effort by Weizmann. He was still unaware of the existence of the Agreement.[47]

Nevertheless, the absence of a direct Zionist contribution to this motive by no means negates the critical importance of individuals such as Jabotinsky in persuading the Government to adopt a pro-Zionist policy. This reason for using Zionism was only shared by a minority, albeit an important one, among its supporters in the Government, namely Lloyd George, Sykes and Amery. And with the exception of Amery it was not a clear priority in their considerations. Although it is difficult, if not wholly illusory, to deduce what was the primary factor in the minds of Lloyd George and Sykes, it is readily apparent that propaganda was considered to be of the utmost significance. Lloyd George's personal interest in generating pro-British propaganda across the world was profound.[48] And, most significantly, it was this interest in using Zionism as a propaganda tool, as opposed to the imperial motive, that was shared by all of those who pushed for an official policy in favour of Zionist aims. In this regard, the work of Jewish activists since Kallen's letter of 1915 had been decisive.

Securing the Balfour Declaration

By April 1917, the expectation of a successful campaign in Palestine, along with the increasing need for propaganda in Russia and the USA had, thanks to the work of Zionists in London, combined to convince important members of the Government to actively pursue a pro-Zionist policy. In particular, Lloyd George and Balfour had already committed themselves to giving public support for Zionist aspirations.[49] By May it was considered in Downing Street that a qualified declaration of sympathy with Zionist ideals, along with the creation of a Jewish Legion, would produce the required effect among Jews in Russia and America.[50] Thanks to the declaration from the French in June, the prospect of French objections, which had proved to be such a problem in 1916, had been removed. Finally, therefore, in the middle of June Balfour requested a draft formula from Zionist representatives, to be sent to him from Lord Rothschild.[51]

Even at this stage it was by no means certain that these steps would definitely culminate in an official Government declaration, which was agreed to by the War Cabinet. Indeed, the jump from considering a

Zionist declaration in April to the actual decision to put it into action only came about with yet another example of a Zionist activist who managed to tap into the imagined concerns of Government officials at the right moment. On this occasion, the Zionist concerned was Weizmann. It was at this point that he made a particularly important contribution, by sharply exacerbating the fears of Government members who already advocated a declaration. This was achieved, as had been done by Zionists since 1915, by drawing on the Government's fear of the German menace.

In early June, Weizmann asserted to Graham and Ormsby-Gore that the German Government was seeking to use Zionism to influence Jewish opinion, especially in America and Russia.[52] Playing upon their fear of German intrigues among Jewry, Weizmann also raised the spectre of an international ring of pro-German Jewish financiers in Hamburg, Berlin, Vienna, Paris and New York.[53] Unsurprisingly, the Foreign Office was quick to accept the veracity of this mistaken information.[54] Given their mindset at this juncture, the British would have almost expected such a move from their opponents. As such, Weizmann's intimations were endorsed by consular reports from Switzerland and the Hague, and were echoed by James Malcolm and then Wickham Steed in his agitation at the War Office for a Jewish Legion.[55]

The image of a potentially pro-German Jewry that could be swept up by a German initiative at any moment had added an even greater sense of urgency, and pushed Balfour to request a draft declaration from the Zionists. Yet, as in March 1916, the doubts that had been expressed by officials such as Buchanan had caused hesitation among some of his colleagues in Whitehall,[56] which could still have scuppered the possibility of a War Cabinet decision. In addition, Andrew Bonar Law, the leader of the Conservative party and the House of Commons, Lord Curzon and in particular Edwin Montagu, the new Secretary of State for India, were all to raise opposition in the War Cabinet to any public declaration.[57] Voices of dissent were also heard in the Foreign Office and the Department of Information.[58] These problems were compounded even further, and in part resulted from, a vigorous public and diplomatic campaign by the Conjoint Foreign Committee (CFC) and prominent figures in Anglo-Jewry.[59] In short, a long shadow was cast over Zionist prospects in the summer and early autumn of 1917, which was not aided by the delay in the Palestine campaign.[60] Consequently, there was a clear sense of frustration that was felt by those in the Foreign Office who were anxious to pre-empt the Germans and secure

a propaganda initiative that would win American and Russian Jewish opinion.[61]

One major obstacle was removed when the War Cabinet was informed in August that General Allenby, who had replaced the failing Murray in June, would finally obtain by the middle of September the necessary troops and material needed to take Jerusalem.[62] Allenby launched the third battle of Gaza by assaulting Beersheba on 30 October. The obstacle posed by the CFC, however, was much more threatening to the hopes of the Zionist leadership in London. The protests of Wolf and others challenged the very basis of the Government's Zionist policy. They consistently attempted to reveal to the British Government and the public the fallacy of a policy which was based upon the idea of a united, nationalist world Jewry.[63] Hence, in the summer and autumn of 1917, it was absolutely critical that Sokolow, Weizmann and Jabotinsky, among others, presented the British Government with a Jewry that was focused upon the future destiny of Palestine. Although the *Weltanschauung* of certain policy-makers made them ready to accept such a viewpoint, and the crisis context of the war made the question of Jewish influence increasingly relevant, it had to be endorsed for the more sceptical, if not opposed, members of the Government to accede to an official policy.

Fortunately for the Zionists in London, the public spectacle of intra-Jewish divisions over the question of Zionism in the UK was essentially neutralised when the Board of Deputies voted to censure the CFC's public polemic against Zionism. This was largely due to a power struggle within the elites of Anglo-Jewry.[64] Even though the vote had been passed by a very small margin, the Foreign Office willingly accepted it as a sign of Zionist strength and gladly witnessed the apparent downfall of Lucien Wolf.[65] The continued opposition by Wolf, Montagu and their supporters was surpassable so long as their protests could be demonstrated to be the death-throes of a privileged elite that was out of touch with the sentiments of the masses in the UK, but more importantly, in the USA and Russia.[66]

By October the Zionist leadership, through a campaign by the English Zionist Federation,[67] had managed to obtain for the attention of the Government a substantial list of some 250 organisations and synagogues in the UK that had supported a resolution favouring the reconstitution of Palestine as the home of the Jewish people. No attempt was made by the Foreign Office to verify the representative nature of these resolutions, which were belied by the reality of a largely non-Zionist Jewish community.[68] The Zionists' picture of Anglo-Jewry

simply reflected what those responsible already believed and wished to see. Graham wrote, 'Outside a small influential clique Jewish feeling appears almost unanimously favourable to the Zionist idea.'[69]

Despite the force of such beliefs held by Graham and his like-minded colleagues, the small group of self-appointed Zionist representatives in London alone could not have finally succeeded in depicting a world Jewry that was Zionist and could be won over through a British declaration. Indeed, they were very aware of their precarious position and the need to try and create a consensus within the international leadership. Great efforts were made to inform and gain the support of the Smaller Actions Committee, the executive body of the Zionist Organization,[70] the leadership in both Russia and America,[71] and individuals such as the revered, symbolic figure of political Zionism, Max Nordau.[72] As Sokolow wrote to Harry Sacher in July 1917, who had cited a need for even more inter-communication, 'The idea that cohesion and unity of purpose and method between ourselves and our Russian friends are indispensable is too much of a truism to require special emphasis ... The importance of being in unison with our American friends is also obvious.'[73]

Nevertheless, Zionist leaders in Russia did not abandon the official neutral policy of the Smaller Actions Committee, which greatly disturbed Zionists in London,[74] and were highly sceptical of their colleagues' overt focus on Britain.[75] However, the apparent demonstrations of Zionist strength in Russian Jewry that were organised through mass conferences and the like were sufficient for British officials to see what they had anticipated, and to believe that their Zionist contacts accurately reflected Russian Jewish opinion.[76] Such work by Russian Zionists, who had themselves gained the sympathy of the Russian Government, was essential.[77] The perceived edifice of a nationalist world Jewry had to have some kind of tangible manifestations which could be used to endorse the pre-existing assumptions of Government officials. This was even more so in the case of American Jewry, which had been the original and ongoing concern for those who had become interested in gaining the support of Zionism.

As discussed in the previous chapter, elements in the Zionist leadership in the USA had pro-actively pursued a policy of winning the sympathy of the British Government since the beginning of the war. However, Brandeis, the leader of American Zionism, differed substantially from his fellow Zionists in London with regard to strategy. He passionately believed that political work could only be effective if it was combined with a substantial growth in the membership and

finances of the movement itself. The practical and the political were intrinsically linked. Zionists abroad were told, 'The Zionist tendencies must be developed into effective organization so that the masses of our Jewish population may become a real power.'[78] It was this practical work and its apparent results which allowed American Zionism to be seen as a dynamic force that was capturing the hearts of American Jewry. Of particular significance in 1917 was the Zionist leadership's skilful handling of the elections to the American Jewish Congress in June and its postponement, so as to prevent any public display of the sharp communal divisions that existed regarding Zionism. The Congress could therefore be pointed to as a tangible symbol of Zionist strength.[79]

The deliberate attempt to safeguard the image of a united Jewry under the banner of Zionism was no coincidence. Correspondence from London, transatlantic trips by English and American Zionists, and their joint participation in the Morgenthau peace mission[80] of June 1917 were all used by both sides to be kept as informed as possible, and helped them to present a united front.[81]

When Balfour visited the USA during April and May he met Brandeis, who was thought by the British to have the ear of President Wilson.[82] Brandeis readily advocated 'a national home for Jews in Palestine' under a British protectorate.[83] In addition, American Zionists enlisted the support of Canadian Zionists, and arranged for them to present a memorandum in agreement with the position of English Zionists in their meetings with Balfour's mission.[84] As a show of Zionist strength to help their colleagues in London in the struggle with their opponents, a concerted attempt was also made to bring Jacob Schiff publicly into the Zionist camp, whose alleged pro-Germanism had been a prominent symbol of Allied fears.[85]

Great efforts were made by Wise, Brandeis and his secretary, Jacob De Haas, to persuade Wilson to privately endorse Zionism and the attitude of the British Government from April 1917.[86] It has been said, however, that in the final stages, when Wilson was requested by HMG to approve the Declaration in September, 'their direct attempts to influence American policy at the fountainhead were decidedly restrained'.[87] It is true that Brandeis in particular felt constrained by American interests and did not consider it wise to place overt political pressure on Wilson. Moreover, he had his eye more firmly fixed on American influence at the final peace conference. In addition, his wartime policy was fundamentally based upon the importance of practical work, and the building up of the Zionist organisation in real terms.[88] But, it was precisely

Brandeis' faith in the overriding importance of establishing practical facts on the ground, as opposed to the machinations of secret diplomacy, which was absolutely decisive. To suggest that Brandeis did not have a thought out political strategy[89] would be to overlook the essence of his approach. Brandeis' aims were based upon a very real understanding of the role that was played by mass opinion in shaping government foreign policy during this period. In fact, Brandeis was correct. British interest in Zionism from 1916 was in part a direct product of his endeavours. From the very beginning of the Foreign Office interest in Zionism, the marked growth in the American organisation was a fundamental starting point. When in April 1917 Zionists in England were confronted with the need to endorse their claims with 'the organization of the Zionist will, and its assertion in a concrete form',[90] an issue which they had ignored throughout the war,[91] the American Zionist political committee could state that 'the demonstration is in process and is being proven through Shekel payers, organized membership and a free giving of money'.[92]

As a result, by 31 October 1917, when the British War Cabinet finally approved the publication of a declaration, the Zionists in London had been able to provide their supporters in the Government with sufficient evidence of Zionist influence throughout world Jewry.[93] In the absence of Montagu, who had departed for India, and with the received approval of President Wilson,[94] the War Cabinet had agreed upon a Declaration to capture the war asset of Zionism. Though he had initially opposed a declaration, due to the size of the Arab population in Palestine and the unrealisable aims of Zionist colonisation (a charge countered by Sykes[95]), even Curzon had acknowledged 'the important political reasons' behind such a policy.[96] Accepting the arguments behind the declaration, he stated that Zionism 'appears to be recommended by considerations of the highest expediency, and to be urgently demanded as a check or counterblast to the scarcely concealed and sinister political designs of the Germans'.[97] Finally, on 31 October Balfour concluded:

> everyone was now agreed that, from a purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was desirable that some declaration favourable to the aspirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be made. The vast majority of Jews in Russia and America, as, indeed, all over the world, now appeared to be favourable to Zionism. If we could make a declaration favourable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and America.[98]

He was then authorised to issue the declaration, which was written on 2 November 1917:

> Dear Lord Rothschild,
>
> I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.
>
> 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use its best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'
>
> I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.[99]

The decision to issue the Balfour Declaration was a direct result of the effective diplomacy and political strategy of a number of Jewish activists, whose efforts had combined in a highly complex, cumulative and somewhat fortuitous manner. At every stage, the Government's interest in using Zionism derived from proposals put forward by Jews, who conceived the rationale and objectives of this policy. Their success was reliant upon whether they understood and how they responded to the wider propaganda needs of foreign policy-makers as the war developed, and the perceptions that underpinned official thinking on this matter. Fundamentally, they influenced policy by endorsing the Government's image of Jewry as a hostile power that had to be won to the British cause, and by providing a solution that was equally in tune with the Government mindset, Zionism. From this perspective, Weizmann's contribution to the fruition of the Government's pro-Zionist policy was of minor significance. He followed rather than led the formulation and application of an effective diplomatic strategy. Whereas, Kallen, Wolf, Suares, Gaster and especially Jabotinsky were pioneers who successfully seized upon what was required. Clearly, it was essential that Weizmann eventually grasped what was necessary. But even then his ability to secure the Declaration, which required the visible display of a united Zionist Jewry, was reliant upon the previous work of other Zionist leaders, particularly Brandeis. Thanks to this team effort the Balfour Declaration was won. But what in essence had been achieved?

The main advocates of the declaration had clearly been convinced of how they could use Zionism for their own ends, and win over Jewish influence, particularly in Russia and the USA. For Sykes, Lloyd George and Amery this also meant manipulating the will of Jewry so as to secure British control of Palestine at the prospective peace conference. In short, the Zionists had shown the British Government how they could be used to further British interests. This is quite apparent if we consider what exactly they received in return.

For Gaster, the Balfour Declaration had been the fulfilment of his worst fears. In 1916 he had been extremely anxious that if Zionists did not play upon what he understood to be the Allies' desperate desire to win over world Jewry, then Zionism could easily be used and would lose the chance to gain in any concrete sense.[100] Thus, he saw the Declaration as a deliberately vague and tenuous document that was issued to justify British occupation of Palestine and gain the support of Jewry in the war, but did not constitute any tangible achievement of the goals of the Zionist Organisation. He observed with bitter irony that 'it was [now] the time for the Jews to crawl upon their bellies and to express unbounded gratitude [for] a mere platonic non-committal declaration'. He lamented that for the Great Powers, 'we are only food enough, as food for the trenches, or as pawns in their own political game'.[101] But what is clear is that the Zionists themselves had proposed and readily acquiesced to a non-committal British policy. Ironically enough it was Jabotinsky himself, who later became such a vociferous critic of Zionist subservience to Britain, who had originally suggested this line of policy. In his petition to the War Cabinet in January 1917 he had argued for using 'such language as – perhaps without tying the Government down to a particular form of political settlement for the future of Palestine, would be favourable to Zionist aspirations'.[102] This line of thought clearly predominated within the Government itself, with the consideration that 'the British Government can affirm their sympathy for Zionist ideals without committing themselves to the full Zionist programme'.[103] This development was hardly surprising given the basic premise of Zionist diplomacy in the fruition of the Balfour Declaration. The Zionists had not persuaded the Government to support Zionism for its own sake, but as a propaganda tool, a means to alter Jewish perceptions of the war.

There was undoubtedly a sense among members of the War Cabinet that the Government's declaration would, in some way, be followed by the development of the Zionist project in Palestine after the war. It was for this reason that the potential of Zionist colonisation was hotly

debated, and a proviso was added to the Declaration stating that, 'nothing should be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine'.[104] There was, however, no agreed definition as to what would constitute the 'national home for the Jewish people', nor how the British Government would facilitate its establishment. Indeed, the questions of what this terminology actually meant, and the precise nature of the obligation to the Zionists that was embodied in the Declaration, were not discussed in the War Cabinet until they were raised by Curzon in a memorandum that he distributed on 26 October – just five days before the Declaration was approved. With his special interest in the Middle East, as the Chair of the War Cabinet's policy committee on the region, Curzon was the only minister who focused on the possible negative consequences of the Declaration in Palestine itself. He stressed, 'we ought at least to consider whether we are encouraging a practicable ideal, or preparing the way for disappointment and failure'.[105] Pointing to the inconsistency of Zionist statements on their ambitions in Palestine, he was particularly perturbed by those who suggested that the Zionist goal was to establish a Jewish State. In response, during the final deliberations regarding the Declaration on 31 October, Balfour said that he understood the words 'national home', 'to which the Zionists attach so much importance', to mean:

> some form of British, American, or other protectorate, under which full facilities would be given to the Jews to work out there own salvation and to build up, by means of education, agriculture and industry, a real centre of national culture and focus of national life. It did not necessarily involve the early establishment of an independent Jewish State, which was a matter for gradual development in accordance with the laws of political evolution.[106]

There was no Cabinet consideration, let alone agreement, regarding how, if at all, any of this might be achieved. Curzon explicitly questioned the likelihood of Balfour's predictions for Zionism in Palestine, and feared that, in fact, the Declaration would raise 'false expectations which could never be realised'.[107] These discussions, however, were to a great extent beside the point, and, thus, there was no attempt to resolve them. The significant issue was not the future of Palestine, which was left undecided, but the altogether more pressing matter of using Zionism to win over Jewish power for the Allies.[108] On this point everyone in the War Cabinet was in agreement.

5
The Anglo-Zionist Propaganda Machine

The Balfour Declaration was only considered to be a first step that would enable the British Government to entreat the sympathies of world Jewry, for the Entente war effort and a British Palestine. To that end, the Government quickly embarked upon an elaborate and extensive propaganda campaign. This endeavour was undertaken with the ever present advice and work of Britain's Zionist supporters in London. Together, British officials and Zionists sought to create and disseminate the myth that the Jewish nation was about to be reborn in Palestine under British auspices, which would capture the Jewish imagination but would in no way commit the Government to anything beyond the vague terms of the Balfour Declaration. This was the sum of British policy towards the Zionist movement for the remainder of the war and the extent of the Anglo-Zionist alliance, as it was originally conceived by the British Government.

The Jewish Section of the Department of Information

In the immediate aftermath of the Balfour Declaration, the first concrete measure that was taken to further pro-British propaganda was to send Zionist representatives to North America and Russia, though the latter was prevented by the Bolshevik revolution.[1] However, a much more systematic and far-reaching method of creating pro-British sentiment was necessary if the Government was to make full use of its Zionist policy.

At the beginning of October 1917 Vladimir Jabotinsky had submitted a proposal for a special bureau for Jewish pro-Entente propaganda to John Buchan, the head of the Department of Information. Buchan was sympathetic to Jabotinsky's suggestion, but was troubled by the lack of

Jewish unity on the Zionist question.[2] Despite Buchan's understandable concerns, Jabotinsky was well aware that such fears were not shared by many influential members of the War Cabinet and Foreign Office. After all, the concept of an organised Jewish propaganda office that was Zionist in orientation met their desire to win the hearts and minds of world Jewry, particularly in Russia and America, and their perception that this could only be achieved through Zionism. Jabotinsky's proposal again revealed his awareness of the primary concerns and mindset of these individuals. He anticipated their needs and followed them through to their logical conclusion. In light of Buchan's unsure position Jabotinsky proceeded to entreat the support of the main backers of the Balfour Declaration and the Jewish Legion.[3]

In his covering letter Jabotinsky argued that a bureau for Jewish pro-entente propaganda was 'only a natural sequel to the Jewish Regiment scheme'. He wrote:

> I need hardly remind you that what attracted your sympathy to the … [Legion] was mainly its obvious value for purposes of pro-entente and pro-victory propaganda among the non-assimilated Jewish masses of America, Russia and the neutral countries.[4]

Jabotinsky added a sense of urgency to his appeal, and played upon the anxiety of those members of the Government who were already convinced of the need to use Zionism to win Jewish support for the war. He asserted that, 'the necessity of influencing Jewish opinion in Allied and neutral countries in favour of a war to complete victory is now, more evident than ever, and every wasted day means an appreciable loss for the cause of the Entente'.[5]

Jabotinsky's portrayal of Jewry and the urgent need for a special bureau for Jewish propaganda were readily accepted. Amery, Kerr, Ormsby-Gore and Masterman all wrote or spoke to Buchan in support of the plan.[6] Ormsby-Gore explained to Jabotinsky that Buchan very much welcomed the project but noted that 'the one obstacle … are the activities of the anti-nationalist Jews'.[7] As Ormsby-Gore saw Zionism as the only authentic manifestation of Jewish identity, he was perplexed by these Jews, 'who seem to object to anything distinctively Jewish, & who deny that they are anything but, Russians, Englishmen, Dutch, etc as the case may be'.[8] The objections of liberal English Jews to a British Zionist policy had resulted in the qualification of the final text of the Balfour Declaration. In Balfour's original draft of August 1917 it was stated that 'Palestine should be reconstituted as the national home

of the Jewish people'. In the final version it read, 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people', with the caveat, 'it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice … the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country'.[9] But once the War Cabinet had decided to pursue a Zionist policy on 31 October 1917, the protests of liberal Jews could not put off the group behind the Declaration from their determined attempt to wage a pro-British propaganda campaign throughout world Jewry.

The Declaration was, after all, designed specifically for this purpose. As Masterman explained to the War Office: 'Some of us – Mark Sykes, Amery, the "Times" and others … have been pressing for some time for some such statement as this for months past – especially to influence American (& New York) and Russian feeling.'[10] The end product was therefore described as 'a most important piece of propaganda among Jewry throughout the world'.[11] Merely publishing the Declaration was not enough. By its very nature the Government's Zionist policy necessitated that the Declaration would be followed by a far-reaching propaganda campaign. Those behind the Declaration had considered it to be the starting point, rather than the culmination, of their Zionist propaganda policy. As Ronald Graham put it, 'If the War Cabinet gives the assurance [regarding Zionist aspirations] we can then, at last, make full use of Jewish propaganda wherever it will be useful to use.'[12]

As a result, it was not long before Jabotinsky's proposal was taken up by the Foreign Office. But, Jabotinsky's preoccupation with the Jewish Legion and his desire to enlist and travel to Palestine meant that he declined the offer of running it.[13] Instead, it was Albert Hyamson, a civil servant in the Post Office and a Zionist activist, who took the post.

During the First World War, Hyamson had been one of the most active Zionist propagandists in England. He had written material that had been published by the Anglo-Zionist lobby group, the British Palestine Committee, the Zionist leadership in London, and also in the secular British press.[14] Lloyd George claimed that it was an article in the *New Statesman* written by Hyamson that had, in part, stirred his interest in Zionism.[15] This was no minor achievement. In 1917 Hyamson became the editor of *The Zionist Review*, the semi-official monthly publication of the English Zionist Federation.[16] He considered that his work at the Post Office had prevented him from being more actively involved in Zionist work and since April 1917 had been pressing Weizmann to facilitate a move to the Foreign Office.[17] Hence,

when Jabotinsky turned down the opportunity to head the new Jewish Section of the Department of Information, Hyamson was the logical choice. He already worked for the Government, had considerable experience and interest in propaganda, and did not have the commitments of his more senior Zionist colleagues. From the Government's perspective, Hyamson was a staunch supporter of the British war effort and had already been active in publishing propaganda material that sought to justify and explain the relationship between Zionism and Great Britain.[18]

Hyamson began his work as the head of the Jewish Section of the Department of Information in the first few weeks of December 1917. He operated under the broad assumptions that had underpinned the international propaganda which had been conducted by the London Zionist Bureau since April 1917, with the active support of the British Government and the machinery of its secret service.[19] This collective effort had sought to popularise the idea of a Jewish Palestine under British auspices, particularly in America, and to undermine German and Ottoman influence among Jewry. The objective had been to 'win world Jewry, not only to the Zionist cause but also to the side of the Entente'.[20]

Hyamson began by distributing news items that demonstrated the support of the British Government for Zionism and the growing influence of Zionism among world Jewry.[21] At this early stage of his work, Hyamson and the Foreign Office were only beginning to form an established method of effective distribution for Jewish news and did not have a clear or systematic approach.[22] With regard to his work in America, which was the initial and main focus of his office, Hyamson began with a limited distribution of his cables to two English language Jewish weekly newspapers, *The American Hebrew* and the *American Jewish Chronicle*, which he considered to be 'the principal American Jewish newspaper'.[23]

Along with Foreign Office attempts to improve its Jewish publicity operation rapidly,[24] a propaganda committee was created by the London Zionist Bureau to formulate an overall strategy of work with the Department of Information. The first meeting of the committee was held on 14 December 1917 with Hyamson elected as chairman. The other members of the committee were Simon Marks, Leon Simon and Shmuel Tolkowsky, with Samuel Landman as Hyamson's secretary. In the main, the committee focused on three areas, '(1) propaganda by means of the press (2) Publication of books and pamphlets (3) Lectures and visits to Jewish and non-Jewish audiences'.[25] The organisation,

methods and objectives of this work were outlined by Hyamson in a scheme that he devised in mid-December 1917, for agitation in the USA.

The objectives of the Jewish branch of the Department of Information were, according to Hyamson's definition, two-fold. Firstly, he was to conduct British propaganda among Jews in all parts of the world, 'giving it specific tone required by Jewish temperament'.[26] Secondly, the Jewish branch was to promote the Zionist movement.[27] With regard to the latter, it had been agreed by the founders of Hyamson's office that it was not only to gain support for the Government's 'Zionist programme', but also to develop a 'sentiment friendly to the Zionist idea'.[28] The War Cabinet had made the decision to support the Zionist movement precisely because it was assumed that the majority of Jews already favoured Zionism. Hyamson's branch, however, intended to use the resources of the British Government to further the Zionist cause among what was the disparate and divided reality of world Jewry. From its inception, it was suggested that the branch should 'as far as practicable cooperate closely with Jewish bodies especially Zionist organizations'.[29] In particular, Hyamson's office was run in very close contact with the London Zionist Bureau. Most of the material that was to be produced by the Jewish Section, in terms of pamphlets, newspaper articles and the supply of news cables, was in the main written by members of the Bureau. This was in keeping with the Department of Information's policy of attempting to mask the official nature of its propaganda.[30] At the same time, however, it served to give Zionists a free hand to produce material to promote their movement, which was distributed in neutral and Allied countries by the British Government's extensive propaganda operation. As late as June 1918, Hyamson explained that in the USA, Zionist propaganda was in full swing with the distribution being managed by American Zionists. With regard to non-Zionist British propaganda, however, he noted, 'I have no organisation'.[31] Nonetheless, after the Balfour Declaration, the promotion of Zionism and Britain were, of course, inextricably linked. It was, after all, the Declaration together with the prospect of a British Palestine which represented the new Zionist claim to being a serious and recognised movement. Hence, in July 1918 Hyamson lauded the fact that the *American Jewish Chronicle* had come out strongly in favour of an exclusively British protectorate of Palestine after the war. He wrote that British control 'is the English Zionist solution, not without favour at the F.O., and one of the functions of the Jewish Branch is to bring the Jews of the world to this view'.[32]

With regard to the forms of propaganda that were initially proposed, Hyamson and the Zionist Propaganda Committee paid special attention to visual media such as film, picture postcards, posters, illustrated lectures and Yiddish plays.[33] The attempt to engage the Jewish reader through visual material had been an integral part of Zionist propaganda since the beginning of the movement.[34] The means and resources to produce and distribute such materials on a significant scale were, however, provided by the British Government. Visual propaganda was an important component of the propaganda work of the Department of Information.[35] In particular, the founder of British propaganda during the war, C.F.G. Masterman, was an ardent believer in the power of the image to alter the attitudes of the masses.[36]

As part of Hyamson's propaganda strategy he planned to use these materials to infiltrate the Jewish public space, particularly in the United States, and thereby shape Jewish perceptions of Britain, the war and Zionism. To that end, he sought to gain access to all Jewish periodicals, press, clubs, libraries and literary societies. In addition, public opinion in major Jewish centres, and attitudes towards Zionism, were to be closely monitored, so that the Government's propaganda could respond and adapt as and when it was necessary.[37]

The objectives of Hyamson's ambitious plan seemed to have been attained by the middle of 1918. According to the Zionist Propaganda Committee's report on the period from December 1917 to June 1918, pro-Zionist news was being systematically published each week and almost daily in Jewish and non-Jewish press, in 'every Jewish centre throughout the world'.[38] The committee sent a weekly bulletin of news to 'every Jewish periodical whose existence is known' and telegraphed news items that were considered to be of particular importance.[39] This work was greatly facilitated by cooperation with Zionist publicity offices abroad, especially in the USA.[40] In a report from Harold Killock, Publicity Secretary of the Zionist Organization of America, it was estimated that one story, released in February 1918, was published in one hundred cities.[41] By July 1918, A.H. Fromenson, Killock's Publicity Director, had all news relating to Palestine, Zionism or Jewish conditions in Europe disseminated through him via the British Military Mission in Washington D.C. Fromenson considered that his mailing list included every Anglo-Jewish weekly published in the USA and some 200 secular dailies, as well as the Associated Press and the International News Service. Fromenson informed Simon Marks in London that 'by a system of "releases", I secure simultaneous

publication in the great bulk of this list for almost every item issued'.[42] Significantly, the official nature of these news stories remained hidden. Hyamson made sure that they were 'received indirectly from a source which shows no British official connection'.[43]

The wide-ranging impact of Zionist news distribution was only possible due to the financial and organisational support of the Department of Information, which in February 1918 became the Ministry of Information, headed by Lord Beaverbrook.[44] The stark transformation in the ability of the Zionist office in London to extend its influence, in order to undertake its work for the Government, was evident from the distribution of its official publication, *The Zionist Review*. Prior to the formation of the Jewish Section, Hyamson had struggled to have a thousand copies of the journal printed.[45] By 1 February 1918, the Foreign Office was printing half a million copies for distribution outside of Great Britain.[46] As a report of the Zionist Propaganda Committee put it, in a rather understated manner:

> The propaganda Committee had the good fortune from the commencement of its work of having one of its members in charge of the Jewish Department of the Ministry of Information. As a result, the great facilities of the Ministry of Information in the way of distribution of news, printing of pamphlets, etc, were able to be utilised by the Committee ... The small amount expended in proportion to the large output of propaganda material is accounted for in this way.[47]

The number of pamphlets that were either in preparation or had already been printed and distributed by the British Government in the first half of 1918 numbered just over one million.[48]

This propaganda campaign was intended to have an impact across the geographical, social and linguistic spectrum of the Jewish Diaspora. Pamphlets were printed in a wide array of languages, which ranged from Ladino to Swedish.[49] In particular, Yiddish was seen by Hyamson and members of the British Government to be the transnational language of the Jewish masses in Europe and the USA,[50] which were an on-going focus in the attempt to counter supposed pacifist and revolutionary sentiment.[51]

Inevitably, the sheer volume and vigorous nature of the Anglo-Zionist propaganda campaign across world Jewry meant that Zionist imagery, news and literature came to infiltrate the Jewish public space in 1918. Nevertheless, much of Russian Jewry lay outside of the reach

of Hyamson's bureau. The breakdown in communications that followed the Bolshevik revolution and the German occupation of Southern Russia in February 1918 made it impossible for British propaganda agencies to operate there. For those British politicians who had advocated a Zionist policy to try and combat revolutionary activity in Russia, this development was particularly frustrating. Russian Jewry had continued to figure prominently in British assessments of the changing situation in Russia into early 1918.[52] Intelligence at the Department of Information considered that the Jews of South Russia, particularly the Ukraine, were of great importance, as 'the connections between Russian and German Jews makes the Jews the natural channel for the exploitation of Russian resources by the Central Powers'.[53] But by March 1918 it was conceded that, 'the greater part of Russian Jewry is cut off from communication with England. In these circumstances nothing is to be immediately expected from the Zionist movement in Russia'.[54] British intelligence clung onto the belief that the Zionist movement in Russia was always a 'latent force' with considerable influence.[55] Nevertheless, Russian Jewry was out of the reach of the Ministry of Information. A full-scale propaganda campaign with unrestricted distribution of news, pamphlets, film and images could only have been achieved in neutral and Allied countries. Even so, there was a strong effort, keenly supported by the Foreign Office, to try and disseminate propaganda in the states of the Central Powers.[56]

Wherever it was possible, the Jewish Section of the Ministry of Information had succeeded in establishing a systematic and extensive apparatus for covertly infiltrating the Jewish world with its propaganda. This far-reaching project, which was designed to reach across the Diaspora, from South America to North Africa, was commissioned and developed by the British Government as the means through which it used the Balfour Declaration to win the support of world Jewry, for the war and for a post-war British Palestine. This was, to a large extent, the purpose for which the Declaration had been created.

By extending our analysis of the Government's Zionist policy beyond the making of the Declaration, the degree to which the Zionists worked to serve British interests is quite apparent. They were not only supported by the British Government but were incorporated within it. Armed with British financial and material resources, they embarked upon the ambitious task of shaping the ways in which world Jewry viewed Zionism, the war and the future of Palestine. As defined by the nature of the Government's Zionist policy, this joint propaganda enterprise was the crux of the Anglo-Zionist alliance and the

cooperation that was evinced here was far and above any reciprocal British interest in helping the Zionists to build up a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine during the war.[57] As the Jewish Section was busily undertaking its work on behalf of the British Government in February 1918, the Foreign Office reassured the War Cabinet that to 'the Jews' we are 'bound only by the limited assurances given to Lord Rothschild in Mr. Balfour's letter.'[58] For those policy-makers who had worked for the Balfour Declaration, it was propaganda that was their fundamental concern, rather than the actual development of the Zionist project in the Holy Land.

To be sure, the Jewish Section and the Government's Zionist policy was not attributed with such importance, or even supported, by every significant foreign policy-maker or official in the Government. For example, it was decided by Lord Reading, as the British Ambassador in the United States, not to launch a special Jewish branch in New York, which had been suggested by the Ministry of Information.[59] Much more significantly, in September 1918 Beaverbrook tried to close the Jewish Section. He was opposed to so-called 'religious' propaganda and had been influenced by the anti-Zionist League of British Jews.[60] Moreover, the newspaper magnate was suspicious of the supposed Russian parentage of Hyamson's staff.[61] However, the chief advocates of the Declaration circumvented Beaverbrook's opposition and simply re-housed Hyamson's office in Lord Northcliffe's department for Enemy propaganda in Crewe House.[62] Hyamson's office was described as 'a weapon which has been carefully prepared', and it was considered 'nothing short of a tragedy that Lord Beaverbrook should lightly throw away so important an instrument'.[63] Ormsby-Gore went so far as to say that, 'there is no more important branch of propaganda than Jewish propaganda'.[64] He explained:

> [Jews] may play in the future – as they have often played in the past – a big part in guiding the course of human history and we should leave no stone unturned to encourage those elements [read Zionist] which wish to guide it aright and in accordance with our ideas and our interests.[65]

The historicisation of the Balfour Declaration

Through the propaganda materials that were disseminated across world Jewry, Government officials and their Zionist allies sought to provide the Balfour Declaration with meaning for the Jewish audience. The ways in which the text of the letter to Lord Rothschild was perceived

by Jewry was of course shaped by Jews' pre-existing views of Zionism, Great Britain and the war. However, the Anglo-Zionist propaganda machine attempted to dominate the Jewish public space and determine the meanings and significance of the Declaration for the Jewish reader. Due to the perception that Jewry was imbued with an inherent attraction to the Zionist ideal, this goal was to be achieved by framing the Declaration as the realisation of the Zionist dream, with the imminent restoration of the Jewish nation in Palestine. As history played such a pivotal role in communicating and endorsing Zionist thought and culture,[66] the Declaration was attributed with significance by placing it within the Zionist framework of Jewish history, and by drawing on its historical metaphors and language.[67] In line with the Zionist teleological view of the Jewish past, which was supposed to be marching toward the redemptive point of national Return,[68] the Declaration was portrayed as its dramatic climax. The Government's public support for Zionist aims was claimed to be bringing an end to the period of Jewish exile from Palestine, and all that was seen to represent in Zionist ideology and culture. The 2,000 years of the Jews' unremitting physical, spiritual and cultural degeneration and suffering was to be no more. The meaning of the Declaration was thus provided by placing it within this Zionist historical narrative of fall and anticipated redemption. The British Government was signified as being nothing less than the agent of national deliverance. The redemptive essence of this narrative for the Jewish reader was in part communicated through the use of Messianic language and metaphor, which was a common rhetorical device within Zionist culture.[69]

The pamphlet that was most widely distributed by the Ministry of Information as part of its effort to put across this narrative was *Great Britain, Palestine and the Jews: Jewry's Celebration of its National Charter*.[70] By June 1918, over 300,000 copies had been printed in several languages, with another 250,000 in preparation.[71] This pamphlet unequivocally framed the Balfour Declaration as heralding the imminent restoration of Jewish national sovereignty in the Holy Land. The qualified letter from Balfour to Lord Rothschild was transformed into the consummation of Jewish history, as it was seen through Zionist eyes. In the words of the British Zionist Joseph Cowen in one of the speeches of celebration that was printed in the text, 'the Declaration was Restoration; it was perhaps the one thing which, say 500 years hence, would be singled out as the most historic act of this world-war, it seemed so transcendently important not only to Jews, but likewise to the world'.[72] This rhetoric was baldly summed up for the reader in the

introduction to the pamphlet, 'The Declaration … constitutes the greatest event in the history of the Jews since the dispersion.'[73]

In part, the text strove to endorse this image of the Declaration as a major turning point in Jewish history through its depiction of an elated world Jewry that was instinctively overcome by 'boundless enthusiasm and overflowing gratitude'.[74] This imagery provided the individual reader with guidance as to how they should respond to the Declaration, as a member of this international, imagined community. The pamphlet thereby represented the Declaration as the answer to the yearnings of the Jewish nation, not just by means of its own rhetoric, but through its exhibition of the nation's response.

As a whole, 'The House of Israel' was said to be 'fully conscious of the high significance of the pledge of the British Government concerning its restoration'.[75] Balfour's letter had, after all, proclaimed 'the forthcoming fulfilment of what has always been a religious ideal in Jewry; and it was therefore but right that the letter should have been read in numerous synagogues during the Sabbath service and formed the text of countless sermons'.[76]

The extent of the inspiration that was felt by the Jewish nation in the face of this historical event was shown by the responses that emerged across the divisions created by the war and the entire spread of the Diaspora. The pamphlet quoted the resolutions and statements of Zionist and other Jewish organisations in North Africa, America and Europe. The rest of the text consisted of selected quotations of praise for the British Declaration from international Jewish press, and speeches given at celebratory demonstrations that had been held in London, New York, Odessa and Alexandria. The audience at these rallies were not absent from the text. In one speech the desired response from the reader was encouraged by Sykes' insertion of 'such cries as "We will, we will," and … cheers at the proper places'.[77] The overall impression was of a unified Jewry that felt itself to be on the crest of a new dawn, ushered in by the historic act of the British Government. As one example, Judge Julian W. Mack, a member of the American Zionist leadership, declared:

> American Jews … rejoice with the Jews of all countries that the British Government has issued this epoch-making Declaration.
>
> The dreams and prayers of twenty centuries, embodied in the famous Basle Zionist declaration that Palestine may again become the homeland of the Jewish people … is approaching realisation.[78]

The representation of the Declaration as the beginning of a new future for the Jewish people was also a salient theme in the pamphlet, *A National Home for the Jewish People: The British Government's Recognition of the Zionist Movement*,[79] published in December 1917. It was reprinted from the *Jewish Chronicle* and was probably penned by its editor, Leopold Greenberg, who worked in his editorial capacity as a propagandist for the British Government.[80] In a revelatory and Messianic tone the writer exclaimed, 'The declaration of His Majesty's Government as to the future of Palestine ... marks a new epoch for our race ... [it] must have effects, far-reaching and vital, upon the future of Jews and Judaism.'[81] This depiction of the Declaration as heralding a new epoch in Jewish history was again mediated through the narrative of the Diaspora as a period of oppression and suffering, which was now being brought to an end with the return of national life: 'there has thus arisen for the Jews a great light. It is the perceptible lifting of the cloud of centuries, the palpable sign that the Jew- condemned for two thousand years to unparalleled wrong- is at last coming to his right'.[82] This redemption of the anational Jew of Exile would, as a result of the British Declaration, allow him to be able to 'stand proud and erect, endowed with national being.' The transformative effect of the Declaration for Jewry was such that it would release 'the soul of our people' which had been 'cramped and bound' by life in the Diaspora.[83] Overall, the Declaration was hailed as an invitation to collective normalisation and emancipation, with which Jewry would enter into 'the family of the Nations of the Earth endowed with the franchise of Nationhood'. Viewed through this Zionist lens, the Declaration was presented as opening a new epoch in Jewish history: 'The Government declaration marks the definite opening of a new chapter, we believe a great and glorious chapter, in the history of our people. It is a memorable day for Israel: "This is the day the Lord hath made; we will rejoice and be glad therein."'[84]

A fundamental element of this narration of the Declaration as 'the greatest event in Jewish history' was that it was born out of the British Government's genuine intention to bring about the rebirth of Jewish national life, and to rescue Jewry from the fall of Exile. But in order for this myth to be conveyed persuasively, the motivation behind the Declaration and its origins had to be explained. This required a narrative that demonstrated the Government's authentic commitment to Zionism. Only then could the British Government and her Zionist allies hope to convince Jewry that their destiny was intrinsically tied to

the pursuit of a British victory in the war, and that Britain was the natural protector of Zionism in Palestine.

To some extent, this goal was attempted by portraying the Declaration as an act of benevolence, which was driven by a mixture of idealism, religious belief and a desire to redress the past suffering of the Jewish people. At the London Opera House demonstration on 2 December 1917, Ormsby-Gore, for example, exclaimed, 'I support it [the Zionist movement] as a member of the Church of England. Sir Mark Sykes has spoken as a Roman Catholic principally … and I feel that behind it there is the finger of Almighty God.'[85] Whereas, Moses Gaster declared, 'the British Government had now made itself the champion of reparation to the Jewish people for the wrongs done to them by the world'.[86] This particularist concern for Jewry was said to be the result of Great Britain's universal commitment to securing freedom and peace throughout the world, as a nation whose spirit was the very embodiment of justice and liberty. Nahum Sokolow stated, 'England is the main propulsive force of the world's destiny … [T]here is no free people to-day that has not fed from Great Britain's experience and copied her institutions'.[87] Ormsby-Gore put it more explicitly, 'it [the Declaration] shows that Britain is not out for gain for herself, but is out in a greater spirit for the ideal of freedom, of self-development, and nationality'.[88]

A crucial aspect of this depiction of the Declaration as a product of British benevolence, as opposed to realpolitik, was that the British had a natural and deep-rooted concern for the rights of Jews and specifically their national restoration, which was an ingrained part of British culture and history. Presented in this way, the Declaration was shown to be a natural, almost pre-ordained event. Hence, Zionism was presented not just as the *telos* of Jewish history but also of British history. The tendency of nationalist and Zionist histories to develop towards a single point of destiny and redemption allowed for, indeed required, such an explanation. The myth of British 'proto-Zionism', which has had such a longstanding influence on the historiography of the Balfour Declaration, was thus produced, so as to serve the needs of Zionist propagandists working for the British Government.[89]

To this end, Hyamson wrote and published the pamphlet, *Great Britain and the Jews*.[90] In the first paragraph of the text, he stated:

> To those to whom the History of the Jews in England is familiar the adoption by the British Government of the Zionist cause … will not have come altogether as a surprise, for both as regards the

> restoration of the Jews to Palestine and the position of the Jews in the Diaspora, without as well as within the British Empire, successive governments ever since the time of Oliver Cromwell have been consistently sympathetic …[91]

Hyamson then proceeded to document the role of successive English kings and governments in protecting the rights of Jews since Cromwell. With regard to recent times, he drew together a chain of events and personalities that served to endorse his claim of modern day British philo-Semitism, from Lord Palmerston and his response as Foreign Secretary to the Damascus Affair of 1840 to British support for Jewish rights at the Berlin Congress of 1878, and beyond. In reference to Zionism, Hyamson wrote, 'Great Britain is by no means a recent convert. The British Government's declaration of policy of November 1917 is in fact the coping-stone of an edifice which has been in process of construction for the past seventy years'.[92]

In his effort to depict a long tradition of genuine British sympathy for Jewish restoration, Hyamson crafted an imposing gallery of British Zionists and drew attention to their efforts to bring about Jewish restoration in the Holy Land. His genealogy of Anglo-Zionism included, among others, the Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, the Victorian reformer and Evangelical, Palmerston, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, the Foreign Secretaries Lord Salisbury, Lord Rosebury and Sir Edward Grey, and Laurence Oliphant, the author, traveller and diplomat, who in the late 1870s tried to gain Ottoman support for Jewish resettlement in Palestine. In addition to these personalities, Hyamson emphasised the 'historic occasions' of the El Arish project of 1902, and the offer of territory in British East Africa for an autonomous settlement in 1903. He wrote that the latter was 'but one event in the full stream of Britain's historic tradition'. The use of the metaphor of a 'full stream' to describe this British historical tradition connoted a continuing and interconnected current which flowed towards the British national destiny of facilitating the national redemption of the Jewish people. With reference to the Declaration, Hyamson referred to it as the 'latest link in the Anglo-Jewish chain'. Although it was described as 'the strongest' link in that chain, the main point was that it was part of a clear and natural historical development, the next logical step of a predetermined and progressive view of the past, present and future. According to this historical narrative, the Declaration was but the culmination of a long and ingrained process, 'Crowning the work and aspirations of two and a half centuries'.[93] This portrayal of the

Declaration as the outcome of historical destiny was a common motif in Anglo-Zionist propaganda.[94] In *The Zionist Review* of December 1917, for example, Messianic rhetoric was used to hail the British as the destined agent of Return:

> [I]f there be such a thing as manifest destiny it is in this initiative which England has taken in the redemption of the Jewish nation. It is a turning point in the history of our people, and it is a turning point in the history of the British Empire and of humanity.[95]

Added to this linear history, the significance of the Declaration was also demonstrated by associating it with a past myth of Return from Jewish historical tradition. This reflected the cyclical as well as linear ways in which history was used to communicate Zionist ideology.[96] For this purpose, the Balfour Declaration was compared to the edict that was given by Cyrus, the King of Persia, which had ended the Babylonian exile and inaugurated the building of the Second Temple in 539 B.C.E.[97] Hyamson wrote, 'Britain to-day occupies the position of Persia in the days of Cyrus and of Ezra, how through the agency of Great Britain we, the Jews are once more on the threshold of our ancient home.'[98] And Dr Joseph Herman Hertz, Chief Rabbi of Great Britain and the British Empire, declared at the celebration of 2 December 1917 at the London Opera House:

> For the interpretation of their true feelings to-day ... [the Jewish people] must turn to Scripture. Twenty-five hundred years ago Cyrus issued his edict of liberation to the Jewish exiles in Babylon ... Theirs was a similar feeling of joy and wonder ... that caused them to explain: 'We shall see it done, and done consummately, the thing so many have thought could never be done!' (Cheers.)[99]

The invocation of this parallel in Jewish history connoted that just like the edict of Cyrus, the Balfour Declaration would also result in national restoration and deliverance, and warranted a response of 'joy and wonder' that at least matched that which had been felt by their ancestors. As one Zionist observer wrote in 1918, the Declaration was 'history repeating itself', and Cyrus's declaration was 'the historical present'.[100] There had thus arrived, thanks to the British Government, 'the set time, to which Israel had been looking forward through 2,000 years of anguish and tribulation'.[101]

This historicisation of the Balfour Declaration as a turning point in Jewish history was dependent upon the Zionist history of the Diaspora as a period of suffering and Exile. In addition, the portrayal of the Declaration as an event of glorious liberation for Jewry and Palestine was endorsed through the creation of another climactic narrative. As influential figures such as Lloyd George wished to ensure British control of Palestine after the war, the period of Ottoman rule was depicted as an era of unremitting oppression for the Jewish population in Palestine. This history drew upon the pre-existing Orientalist image of the Turk[102] as an innately despotic and barbaric race,[103] and was part of the wider propaganda campaign that had been requested by Lloyd George, under the slogan 'The Turk Must Go', to prepare public opinion for the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire.[104] For this purpose British propagandists had been instructed to pen an 'historical argument', which included an 'account of the recent treatment of the Jews' and 'the history of Palestine'.[105]

Therefore, combined with the loaded refrain of 2,000 years of Jewish Exile, the 400 years of Ottoman rule in Palestine were also pointed to as a period of oppression and misrule from which the British were going to emancipate the Jews. That this narrative can be seen as a re-conceptualisation of the Ottoman period, at least within Hyamson's mind, is apparent from his earlier writings. In early 1917 he considered that despite certain drawbacks, 'Turkish rule is by no means unfavourable to the Jewish development in Palestine, and a change may very well be for the worse.'[106] But under his authority, the Jewish Section strove to paint the Ottoman Empire as a despotic and murderous regime.[107] The Balfour Declaration was created as an event that signalled liberation from both Exile and Ottoman oppression.

The immutable iniquity of the Turk and the need for British suzerainty in Palestine was one aspect of the British Government's effort to justify the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire as a whole. As a result, the British Government and the Zionist leadership in London also sought to convey the importance, and historical authenticity, of an *entente cordiale* between Jews, Arabs and Armenians,[108] the oppressed nations of the region. Within this context, the Government's Zionist policy was shown to be part of the restoration of the Near East to its pre-Ottoman Golden Age.[109] In his speech at the London Opera House, Nahum Sokolow argued:

> we are one with the Arabs and Armenians to-day in the determination to secure for each of us the free choice of our own destinies. We

> look with fraternal love at the creation of the Arab kingdom, re-establishing Semitic nationality … and our heartiest wishes go out to the … Armenian nationality for the realisation of their national hopes in their old Armenia. Our roots were united in the past, our destinies will be bound together in the future.[110]

Once again, therefore, Sokolow, together with his Zionist colleagues in London, communicated propaganda messages through the invention of historical myth. In this particular narrative, Jewish restoration was portrayed as but one manifestation of a wider return to national freedom across the Near East, which had been previously repressed by the Ottomans, but was now possible under the benevolent tutelage of Great Britain.

The construction of these narratives and their dissemination across world Jewry by the Department of Information and the Zionist leadership was one part of an extensive and far-reaching propaganda campaign undertaken for, and in intimate partnership with, the British Government. This project was the nub of the British Government's ongoing wartime Zionist policy after the Balfour Declaration. The chief purpose of the Anglo-Zionist entente was to capture Jewish opinion for the British cause and a post-war British Palestine, by creating the illusion that the Balfour Declaration genuinely meant the restoration of the Jewish nation in Palestine.

6
National Space and the Narrative of a New Epoch in Palestine

The British occupation of Jerusalem and southern Palestine at the end of 1917 was the great coup for the Anglo-Zionist propaganda effort. Sykes confidently remarked, 'Palestine and our Zionist declaration combined gives us and the Entente as a whole a hold over the vital, vocal and sentimental forces of Jewry.'[1] In and of itself the capture of Jerusalem suggested that the future of Palestine and Zionism were now in the hands of the British Government. The promise of the Balfour Declaration thus had a very real chance of being realised. However, the precise meaning of this promise and the implications of British success in the Holy Land had to be crafted and communicated by British and Zionist propagandists. The goal was to convince Jewry that a tremendous victory had been won for the Zionist cause, and that a new epoch for the Jewish nation had been inaugurated. In addition to the medium of history, the geography of Palestine was used to this end. Within both Zionist and British imperial culture, depictions of landscape and society were well established as important means of projecting ideology and rhetoric.[2] Before the war, visual and textual representations of Palestine were used by the Zionist movement to show the Jewish Diaspora that a new Jewish national society had been established, one that was busily redeeming the land and the nation. Hyamson's office drew upon this Zionist imagery and rhetoric to communicate its message. From the orchestrated spectacle of General Allenby's entrance into Jerusalem, the space of the Holy Land was used to demonstrate that the Zionist project had been liberated from the oppression of the Ottoman Turks, and that Jewry was on the cusp of national rebirth under British tutelage.

The aims and content of this propaganda were driven by the Zionist conception of Jewish identity that was held in Whitehall. This belief was

always the basis of the Government's Zionist policy. The fate of Zionist colonisation and Jerusalem were thought to be of critical significance for Jews the world over. The decisive influence of this conception of Jewish identity on the Government's policy is clear from the broader context of Britain's Zionist propaganda. The future of the Jews was only one theme in the media bonanza that followed the occupation of Jerusalem, in which different visions of the land were constructed to appeal to the perceived identities of ethnic and religious groups across the world.

The capture of Jerusalem

Lloyd George pushed for a military campaign to take Jerusalem soon after he became Prime Minister in December 1916.[3] Though the occupation of Palestine was designed to further military and imperial objectives in the Middle East,[4] the capture of the Holy City was essentially a propaganda measure. The General Staff did not consider that Jerusalem had any conventional strategic value.[5] Lloyd George, however, believed that this city cast a magnetic hold over the imagination of Christians, Jews and Muslims. The Holy Land was, to his mind, 'engraved on the hearts of the world'.[6] In one fell swoop, therefore, he thought that the occupation of Jerusalem could be used to boost pro-British sentiment among these groups across the globe. To be sure, it was also used to spur morale in Britain.[7] But, the intentions of Lloyd George and his Middle East advisers were much more ambitious. The capture of Jerusalem was to be the biggest propaganda spectacle of the war.

This endeavour was the most striking example of the Government's attempts to capture the supposed power of ethnic and religious groups through propaganda, which was discussed in Chapter 2. Sykes, who directed much of the media offensive, argued that victory in the Holy City would lead to 'much atmospheric advantage' wherever the 'influences' of Zionism, the Vatican and the Orthodox Church 'have effect'.[8] He was convinced that this campaign could be used to whip up pro-British and Allied sentiment among such diverse communities as Irish-Americans, Russian and Greek Orthodox, Indian and Algerian Muslims, and of course, 'Jews throughout the world'.[9] Behind these considerations lay the assumption that there was a powerful relationship between the landscape of the Holy Land, its monuments, shrines and very soil, and ethno-religious identities. The geography of the land itself was therefore to be at the centre of the Government's propaganda.

In the run up to the capture of Jerusalem on 9 December 1917, a great effort was made to place the space of the Holy City at the forefront of world attention, and to emphasise to the international press the significance of General Allenby's impending victory. Imagery of the old city and its surrounding areas were widely disseminated in neutral and Allied countries, alongside pictures of Allenby himself, who was being constructed as the heroic and iconic symbol of liberation.[10] The main theme of the drama that was being composed in Whitehall was of Ottoman oppression and civilised British liberation, which was encapsulated in the widely distributed illustrated poster, 'Jerusalem Captured: The Holy City Wrested from the Turks'.[11] This message, and the ensuing propaganda campaign, was intended to inspire support for the British war effort, but it also served to justify Lloyd George's long-term imperial goal of British control of Palestine after the war.

The centre-piece of the Government's propaganda was the official entrance of Allenby into the old city through the Jaffa Gate on 11 December 1917. This performance used the architectural symbols and familiar monuments of the old city to visibly demonstrate and voice the nature and intentions of Britain's victory. The ceremony was carefully choreographed by the Foreign Office in co-operation with the British authorities in Egypt. To emphasise British humility and reverence for the Holy City, Allenby was asked by the Director of Military Intelligence to enter by foot, which was considered 'the sort of touch which appeal[s] to Eastern feeling', and a marked contrast to the Kaiser's ornate and arrogant entrance by horseback in 1898.[12] Despite a particular will to stress British respect for Islam, so as to prevent any Muslim hostility in the British Empire,[13] the overall intention was to depict Britain as the selfless champion and protector of the sanctified landscape of the Holy City, and religious rights for all, in sharp contrast to the Ottoman Turk.

Under the careful instructions of Lloyd George himself, this message was conveyed through Allenby's proclamation of martial law, which was given at the foot of the Citadel of David, the symbolic seat of Jewish and Ottoman power,[14] and his reception of the notables of the city, and the heads of the religious communities.[15] Allenby's proclamation, which was read in seven languages, declared:

> Lest any of you should be alarmed by reason of your experience at the hands of the enemy who has retired, I hereby inform you that it is my desire that every person should pursue his lawful business

> without fear of interruption. Furthermore since your city [Jerusalem] is regarded with affection by the adherents of the great religions of mankind … every sacred building, monument, Holy spot, shrine, traditional site, endowment, pious bequest, or customary place of prayer, of whatsoever form of the three religions, will be maintained and protected…[16]

Through the figure of Allenby, therefore, the rhetoric of Britain's act of liberation was visually displayed against, and expressed through, the landscape of the Holy City.

This ceremonial entrance was used by British propaganda agencies to put across a carefully devised image of the liberation of Jerusalem as having ushered in a new dawn of freedom for the Holy Land. The entrance was created as an event and provided with meaning for its global audience through the visual media of film, art and photography [Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3] by official British personnel who had been sent to Jerusalem for this purpose, and was documented in reports that were composed in Palestine and London.[17] This imagery did not simply record what happened in Jerusalem. These written and visual representations were deliberately crafted to produce the meaning that was required in Whitehall, and to turn this ceremony into an historical and iconic event. The sheer size of the propaganda campaign, in which the British Government used its imposing propaganda organisation to place this occasion at the centre of the world's attention, quickly turned Allenby's entrance into a spectacle of mythical renown.[18]

The explicit message of this ceremony, as it stood, was one of liberation and championing religious freedom and independence, not giving overt attention to, or more to the point, not alienating, any individual interest group.[19] But, in order to entice the support of specific target audiences the capture of Jerusalem was portrayed by British propagandists as having special, if not redemptive, meaning for the perceived identity of each community. In sum, the liberation of Jerusalem was simultaneously presented as heralding a new epoch for Jews and Christians (relayed in differing ways for Roman Catholics, and the Russian and Greek Orthodox), whilst also attempting to demonstrate British respect for Muslim religious sensibilities.[20]

Particular attention was paid to maximising the effect upon the Jewish audience. By October 1918 Ormsby-Gore felt it necessary to caution that, 'it is very important that Palestine should not become the "exclusive" interest of the Jewish Section of the Ministry of Information or the source of pure Jewish propaganda'.[21] Although this

Figure 6.1 'General Allenby's official entry into Jerusalem, 11th December 1917.' Q.12614. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.



Figure 6.2 'General Allenby at the steps of the Citadel (entrance to David's Tower) listening to the reading of the Proclamation of Occupation in seven languages.' Q.12618. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

Figure 6.3 'General Allenby receiving the notables of the city and heads of religious communities in the Barrack Square.' Q.12619. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

was certainly not the case in the immediate wake of the capture of Jerusalem, the degree of attention that was placed on Zionism in the public sphere by British propaganda agencies was said to have created suspicion and resentment among Catholics in Spain and the United States.[22]

The discourse that was created for the Jewish reader led Zionists to see the British capture of Jerusalem as heralding the imminent realisation of the Balfour Declaration, and the beginning of a new era for the Jewish nation in Palestine.[23] In contrast to the rhetoric of a new dawn for Christianity in the Holy Land, the British endeavoured to use the capture of Jerusalem as a symbol of their commitment to Zionism. In the attempt to win Jewish sympathy for the Allies, the capture of Jerusalem was considered by British intelligence to be their 'bird in the hand'.[24] The city was perceived to be the spatial centre of Jewish identity, and its occupation was thus considered to have given the British 'an incalculable advantage in the historic-religious sphere'.[25] For the Jewish audience, Allenby's victory was depicted as a victory for the Jews, an event that signalled a turning point in their history. In one article, the Russian Zionist leader Yehiel Tschlenow, exclaimed with Messianic fervour, 'Brethren! The moment is now arriving. The deliverance of Jerusalem heralds a new dawn. Great Britain has announced to the whole world the destiny of the land to be rejuvenated … "Judea must be given to the Jews"'.[26]

In addition to press releases and newspaper articles, the Jewish Section of the Department of Information utilised the medium of film to appropriate the occupation of Jerusalem with meaning for Jewish audiences. By relating Allenby's occupation to the Balfour Declaration and a discourse of national redemption, this event was transformed from a British military victory into the liberation of Palestine for the Jewish nation, with, for example, the title of the film, ordered by Hyamson, 'The British Re-conquering Palestine for the Jews'.[27] As part of this attempt to depict Allenby's entrance into Jerusalem as an event of great importance for Jewry, an edition of the film of his entrance was made with Hebrew subtitles, which was dispatched to a large number of Jewish centres around the world, from Buenos Aires to Salonika.[28] Through the use of Hebrew language, the Zionist symbol of national renaissance, the film emphasised the relationship between Allenby's entrance and the return of the Jewish nation to Palestine.

Despite the extensive work that was carried out by Hyamson's office, at the beginning of 1918 some British policy-makers feared that not enough was being done to ensure the complete support of Jewry.[29] This

sense of uncertainty was compounded by reports that the Turkish and German Governments were attempting to formulate their own pro-Zionist policy.[30] In light of this news the Department of Information's Intelligence Bureau compiled a report to assess the threat that was posed to Britain's Zionist policy.[31] In their analysis, the British Declaration and the occupation of Jerusalem had 'produced an enormous impression of the Jews of Russia and neutral countries [and] have evidently affected Jewish opinion in the Central Empires as well'. It was therefore stated that, 'the cards seem to be in our hands, and it ought to be easy for us to dispose of … [this] scheme by counter-propaganda'. However, it was concluded, 'we cannot afford to leave it unanswered'.[32]

Different visions of Palestine

The continuing need to create pro-British sentiment among Jewry was met, in part, by utilising the space of Jerusalem and Palestine to communicate visually the myth of a new era of national rebirth. This was one element of a wider policy in which the geography of the land, in terms of landscapes and urban spaces, was used to create differing visions of Palestine to appeal to Christian, Muslim and Jewish audiences. The rhetoric of British liberation was communicated to these groups by playing on the ways in which they were thought to relate to, and see, the Holy Land. The choice and use of these imagined ethnic geographies was determined by how British officials understood the identity of each audience.

For the Christian world, Lloyd George, along with other senior policy-makers, wished to emphasise the 'sentimental, romantic and religious' aspect of this part of the war.[33] It was believed that in the USA in particular the general public had an historical and religious fascination with Palestine, which could be used to create support for the Entente.[34] The visual imagery that was created for the Christian audience thus drew upon the religious and Orientalist representations of Palestine that had come to prominence in Europe and the USA during the late nineteenth century.[35] Allied troops were portrayed as fighting on the unchanged landscape of the Bible – a geographical space that was frozen in time.[36] [Figure 6.4] Whereas, for the Muslim audience, the British occupation of Palestine was visualised through photographs and film of Imperial Indian Muslim soldiers guarding the Dome of the Rock, a symbol of British respect for Islam.[37] [Figure 6.5]

In addition to such imagery, Sykes and the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee, which decided on policy in the Middle East, considered

Figure 6.4 'Hebron. The wooded hill is said to have been the ancient stronghold of David.' Q.12599. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

Figure 6.5 'Changing the Mohammedan Guard outside the Mosque of Omar [sic], Jerusalem.' Q.12633. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

that it was absolutely essential that a Christian journalist be sent 'to write up Jerusalem', who should be 'interested in archaeological, historical, and theological problems from the Christian point of view'.[38] In direct contrast, the visualisation of Palestine that the British Government wished to create for and about Jewry was through the prism of modern nationalism in the shape of Zionism, due to policy-makers' Zionist perception of Jewish identity. Sykes, who joined the Foreign Office as Acting Adviser on Arabian and Palestine Affairs in January 1918, explained:

> Rivet Britain onto Holy Land, Bible and New Testament. Jam Catholics on Holy Places … Fix Orthodox on ditto … Concentrate Jews on full details of colonies and institutes and wailing places. Vox humana this part … Rally Moslems on absolute Moslem control of Mosque of Omar.[39]

As such, the Department of Information instructed Hyamson that in addition to the Christian journalist who was to be sent to Palestine, 'the other ought to be a clever Jewish journalist with Zionist proclivities'.[40] Rather than overtly direct the style and content of what these writers would produce, the Department of Information commissioned individuals who genuinely saw the world in the way that they wished it to be seen for a particular audience.

Palestine as the site of Jewish national transformation

The geography of Palestine played a critical role in Zionist culture. For many Zionists, the essence of the Zionist project was the cultural, spiritual and physical regeneration of the Jew through the rekindling of its bond with the soil of its ancestors.[41] The result was to be the creation of the 'New Jew', and the redemption of both the nation and the land. Prior to the Great War, visual and written representations of Palestine were used to convince the Jewish Diaspora that this transformation was underway, with the restoration of a complete Jewish national society and culture. The return to nature and agricultural life, the creation of embryonic Jewish cities, national education institutions, the use of science and technology, were all used to demonstrate visibly the successful realisation of a European nationalist society, and thereby engender the identification of Western Jewry with Zionism.[42] Together with this depiction of Palestine as the site of Jewish national rebirth, Zionism was represented as an agent of

European civilisation in the backward Orient, which justified its settlement of the land and de-legitimised Palestinian Arab society through the intertwining discourses of Orientalism and colonialism.[43]

This pre-war Zionist discourse was used by the Jewish Section of the Ministry of Information to exhibit the achievements of the Zionist movement for its Jewish audience, and also for the non-Jewish public. By depicting Zionism as an agent of European civilisation it was shown to be a national movement that represented the values of the imperial enterprise. At the same time, Zionist colonisation was displayed as an oppressed, fledgling movement, which required the tutelage of Great Britain to safeguard the transformation from a degenerative Diaspora to a rooted and developed nation.

At the suggestion of Hyamson, Vladimir Jabotinsky, who was about to leave for Egypt with the 38th Royal Fusiliers, was made the official British journalist for Zionist affairs in Palestine. As intended, Jabotinsky's portrayals of Palestine, which were published anonymously, along with the writings of other Anglophile Zionists in the Holy Land, reflected and drew upon mainstream Zionist thought.[44] To be sure, Jabotinsky's accounts were influenced by his own particular world-view, with, for example, his idiosyncratic equation of Zionist settlement with Futurism, the Italian artistic movement which hailed the aesthetics of modern urbanisation and industry.[45] For the most part, however, Jabotinsky and his fellow propagandists in Palestine invoked the myths and metaphors of Zionist culture to 'create a vision of a new chapter of Jewish history which is yet to be written in this fertile land'.[46] In particular, the Zionist colonies, Tel Aviv and the flowering of the 'New Jew' were salient themes.[47] These icons embodied the values and desired self-image of Zionist discourse, and were believed by Sykes to be the focus of the Jewish gaze towards Palestine. This was despite the fact that the majority of the Jewish population, which tended to be religious and non-Zionist, lived in Jerusalem.[48]

The colonies were depicted as vehicles of Western progress and society, as reflected by the aesthetics of order, planning and utilitarianism. Jabotinsky wrote that the Jewish colony was 'certainly no dream, but a real bit of Europe[49] – beautiful straight rows of orange trees, regular canals running along even squares, plantations, lovely neat little houses on a hill in the background'.[50] He proudly stated that this model of society provided 'thousands of British soldiers … [with] the only chance of civilised intercourse, and redeem[ed] what would otherwise be practically no change from the desert of Sinai'. In this representation of Palestine Jabotinsky did not make explicit reference to

Palestinian Arab society, but through its omission it was portrayed as the opposite of the Jewish colony, 'the only chance of civilised intercourse'. With the metaphor of 'the desert of the Sinai', the sum of Palestinian Arab society was depicted as backward, inert and barren, to be redeemed by the Jewish colony, a microcosm of European civilisation. Furthermore, the Jewish colony was described as being the arbiter of Zionist national culture and an embryonic 'state within a state'. Zionist settlements were said to 'speak to the foreign deliverer in clear language, showing what the Jewish colonist would be capable of had he only been given a full chance'.[51]

In addition to the colonies, Tel Aviv was used as a symbol of Zionism's civilising endeavour, with its hygiene, self-government, and democracy.[52] As 'the first Hebrew city' was a suburb of the largely Arab town of Jaffa, the two spaces were commonly contrasted by Zionists to signify the imagined polarity between the essence of Hebrew and Arab being.[53] As one Government sponsored pamphlet declared, 'Tel-Aviv is, at the doors of the Orient, a true model and object-lesson of western cleanliness and hygiene.'[54] For Hyamson, in his widely circulated *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*, the message of the city was abundantly clear. Tel Aviv, according to him, was 'the finest illustration of the benefits the recent Jewish colonization of Palestine has brought to the land'. Conversely, 'the squalid Arab streets and houses' merely served to show the 'traveler' the character of the Holy Land 'before the Jews arrived'.[55]

The Jewish agricultural colony, as the rural embodiment of this Zionist discourse, of Jews redeeming the desolation of the land, was also the subject of two short films that were produced for the Ministry of Information. The first was entitled 'Jewish Colonies in Palestine: Rishon le Zion' and was filmed in Autumn 1917 during the Palestine campaign. It begins with the brass band of the Australian Light Horses playing on a band stand, surrounded by children of the colony. It portrays the youth of the colony relaxed, if not perplexed by the spectacle of the Entente forces. It then cuts to a shot taken from the top of the refrigerator building where the wines that were produced in the colony were kept, and pans across the white, ordered courtyard of the colony and across the vista of palm trees that surrounded it. Through this brief film, the viewer was presented with a glimpse of the achievements of the colony, as defined by both Zionist and Western discourses of civilisation, utilitarian settlement and the colonialist redemption of Palestine, its land and society.[56]

The second film made to depict life in the Jewish colonies was also set in Rishon le Zion and was a step-by-step documentary of its wine

Figure 6.6 'Grape Pickers in the vineyard at Richon le Zion.' Q.12904. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.



Figure 6.7 'Richon le Zion Wine Industry. The freshly extracted juice is pumped into the vats for preliminary fermentation.' Q.12908. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

making industry.[57] The film, from which a series of still photographs were also produced (Figures 6.6 and 6.7),[58] begins with scenes of workers in the vineyard picking grapes and working amicably with one overseer, who at one point stand together and smile for the camera, connoting the contentment and ease of the agricultural Jewish worker with manual labor and the soil. It then cuts back to a container full of grapes, a symbol of the success, health and vibrant life of the colony, and is followed by further scenes of the colonists at work. At one point the camera pauses on a close up of a woman carrying a basket on her head, whilst she stands still, holding and encouraging the gaze of the viewer, signifying the power and presence of the mythical new Jewish woman of the colonies.[59] It then cuts to men off-loading the baskets of grapes from a cart, who proceed to pour the crop into a large vat. The view of the camera finally shifts to the inside of the building in which a large number of vats are systematically arranged, which suggests a scientific, systematic modern industrial process. This *mise en scène* is the final image of the text.

This film documented the praxis of Zionism for the western voyeur. The need to display the process of Zionist industry step-by-step was a product of visual imperial culture, through which, as Timothy Mitchell has argued, the spectacle of the world 'was being ordered up as an endless exhibition'.[60] This exhibitionary order 'sought to use visual imagery to represent the grand narratives of the imperial world-view both to domestic populations and also to subject peoples'.[61] The colonial visualisation of the Orient was in the main used to demarcate it as backward or exotic. This film, however, sought to portray Zionist colonisation as a vehicle of western civilisation, the antithesis of its polar opposite, the Orient, and in that sense a part of the colonial project. By representing the Zionist movement as part of the colonial order, such imagery justified British and western support for its civilising mission. As a whole, the visualisation of a systematic and scientific Zionist agriculture, with the Jew at ease and at home with the land, showed Zionist colonisation to be a developed, practicable movement. Zionists were seen to be already in the process of building the national home, which substantiated the Zionist will and capacity to realise its mission of national regeneration. At the same time, however, the portrayal of Zionist achievements was used to depict it as a movement of inherent potential, rather than an accomplished fact. Zionist colonisation was represented as having been held back and oppressed by Ottoman rule, a narrative that justified the need for a British protectorate that would champion the rights of national self-determination.

The Zionist landscape and the narrative of British liberation

The landscape of Palestine was used as an aesthetic metaphor to mediate the narrative of Ottoman oppression and British liberation. Lloyd George instructed the head of the Department of Information in February 1917, 'See that articles are disseminated throughout the world as to … [h]ow the Turk, by his rule, made all the arts of industry and husbandry impossible, and how these once rich lands of the [Ottoman Empire] have become a wilderness.'[62] In his work, *With the Turks in Palestine*, Alexander Aaronsohn, the pro-British Zionist propagandist from the Yishuv,[63] wrote:

> When one crossed the boundary from Turkish Palestine into the [formerly autonomous] Lebanon province, what a change met his eyes! – peaceful and prosperous villages … immense plantations of mulberry trees and olives … beautiful vineyards … and young girls and women with happy laughter and chatter working in the fields.[64]

Lebanon was cast here as a healthy, blossoming landscape that mirrored the peace, prosperity and freedom of a country that was not inflicted with the oppressive domination of the Ottoman Turk.

In the Zionist collective memory it was the rupture of Exile, the separation of the Jewish nation from its soil, which resulted in the land of Palestine losing its fertility and becoming a neglected and barren expanse.[65] But in the propaganda that was created to justify the expulsion of the Turks from Palestine, the period of Ottoman rule was portrayed as the agent of this desolation. In a statement of his thoughts on the liberated parts of Palestine, Ormsby-Gore described the devastation of 400 years of Ottoman rule in which rivers had been turned into swamps, hill terraces had been washed away, and trees had disappeared. He referred to Palestine as a 'valley of dry bones', whose only hope were the 'oases' of the Zionist colonies under 'an enlightened government'. The Jewish colonists, who were said to regard the British as 'liberators of the country', 'show that the apparently barren lands can be cultivated and can produce magnificent crops of fruit, almonds, vines, corn, and forage'.[66]

In an article on the Jewish colonies, Jabotinsky placed the blame for the fact that Zionist colonisation had not been more successful squarely at the door of the Turkish authorities, and advanced the maxim of British propaganda with regard to the Middle East, 'Turkey must go'. He wrote, 'Little as it is it [Zionist Colonization] shows firstly

that the Jewish Nation possesses quite first-rate colonising capacities, secondly that Turkey must disappear from the land.'[67] He continued to paint a picture of the Turkish authorities in Palestine as an anti-Zionist regime, and narrated the suffering and atrocities against Jews during the war in his article 'To be Avenged'. Fulfilling the desire of American Zionist leaders to 'embroider news regarding atrocities perpetrated on Jews',[68] Jabotinsky described the fate of members of *HaShomer*, the Jewish watchmen organisation that protected Zionist settlements: 'Over a hundred young men and several women were brought to Nazareth and Zikron Jacob, and a horrible orgy of tortures began until their heels were lumps of ragged flesh and blood.'[69]

This graphic and bloody description was part of the wider attempt to depict Ottoman Palestine as the site of an all-pervasive reign of unremitting terror and persecution. To that end, written accounts and testimonies were used to disseminate the narratives of Ottoman despotism, immorality and the negation of its right to rule.[70] Faced with the savage and untiring brutality of the Ottoman oppressor, the Yishuv was depicted as being essentially powerless: 'Whenever the Turkish authorities wished, the horrors of the Armenian massacres would live again in Zicron-Jacob.'[71]

This juxtaposition of the Armenian genocide of 1915 with the fate of the Yishuv was a common theme in the effort to claim that the Ottoman Turk was violently intent on wiping out the sum of Jewish national life and slaughtering the population. From early 1917 the newly created Department of Information was told to use the Armenian tragedy as a means of creating anti-Turkish propaganda.[72] This work did not solely focus on the Armenian genocide itself but was used to paint the Turk as being innately murderous.[73] According to this rhetoric, the massacre of the Armenian population was portrayed as being symptomatic of the Ottoman character, the nature of its rule and desire.[74] As a result, the fate of the Armenians was used as evidence of what would sooner or later befall the Yishuv.

The forced evacuation of Jaffa that was ordered by the Turkish Commander Djemal Pasha on 9 April 1917 was used as proof of the Ottoman intent to wipe out Jewish life in Palestine. It was discussed as the prelude to an 'Armenian policy' against the Jews.[75] The evacuation, as presented through the rhetoric of impending massacre, was widely publicised throughout the Jewish world by Zionists in London and the British Government.[76] Ormsby-Gore wrote to Sykes, 'we ought to use pogroms in Palestine as propaganda. Any spicy tales of atrocity would be eagerly welcomed by the propaganda people here [in London] –

& Aaron Aaronsohn could send some lurid stories to the Jewish papers'.[77] In anticipation of the British occupation of Palestine, the Turk was thus depicted as the antithesis of the civilised British liberator, who sought to free the oppressed. In order to perpetuate and underscore this narrative following the British capture of Jerusalem, it was suggested that writers in the Holy Land should discuss atrocities that had taken place under the Ottomans.[78] The Jewish community in Palestine did experience tremendous material suffering and fear during the war, though, arguably, it fared much better than many parts of the Ottoman Empire.[79] As a massacre never took place, Jabotinsky's efforts stretched to descriptions of the starvation and depravation that had affected the Yishuv, particularly in Jerusalem.[80] Indeed, the 'blight of the Turk'[81] was said to have affected almost every symbol of Zionist culture in Palestine.

One of the quintessential elements of the Zionist project was the invention of Hebrew culture, which by the time of the war had become a unifying source of cohesion in the Zionist movement and was held up as a symbol of national regeneration.[82] For many Zionists, including the leadership in London, the revival of Hebrew as the national vernacular was an integral part of the Jewish national renaissance, in which language, land and culture were thought to be the interlinked vessels of the 'Hebrew spirit'.[83] As such, the myth of the Hebrew revival was used by Hyamson's office as a sign of the development and success of Zionism, and a symbol of the narrative of Ottoman oppression and British liberation. Alongside depictions of Jewish life in the colonies under the British, the Jewish Section aimed to highlight 'Hebrew education and the expansion of Hebrew'.[84]

The focus of Jabotinsky's article on the growth of Hebrew was the success of Hebrew education in Palestine, with a particular emphasis on the iconic status of the Hebrew teacher. He depicted the Hebrew revival in the Diaspora as an abstract ideal that was only made a reality by 'the Palestinian teacher'.[85] This depiction of the Palestinian teacher served to emphasise that the national renaissance could only be achieved in the ancient homeland, the space of productive national being, where pioneers could perform miracles. When these teachers arrived, 'there were no school-books, no proper terminology for profane science, no trace of a Hebrew speaking milieu in or outside the schools, and in addition his own Hebrew sounded as yet timid, poor and stuttering'. Yet, as a result of the perseverance and devotion of the Palestinian Hebrew teacher there existed 'a strong and natural Hebrew-speaking milieu', which had a radiating influence throughout the Diaspora.

As with Jabotinsky's other articles on Jewish life in Palestine, he drew attention to the ways in which the Turkish authorities had badly affected Hebrew education. He stressed the fact that the Hebrew Gymnasium in Jaffa, a key symbol of Zionist culture,[86] and schools in Jerusalem, had remained closed since the Turkish authorities expelled or deported all their teachers and male pupils. In the wake of British occupation, Jabotinsky claimed that efforts were being made to re-open educational institutions.[87]

As Hebrew was a symbol of national life in Palestine, the British were portrayed as its protector, whilst the Ottoman Turks and Germans were cast as a corporeal threat to its very existence. To that end, Wellington House printed and distributed the pamphlet *The German Attack on Hebrew Schools in Palestine*, which recounted the struggle over the language of instruction at schools that were run by the liberal German-Jewish philanthropic organisation, *Hilfsverein der deutschen Juden,* and particularly the Haifa *Technikum* that was founded in 1913.[88] The pamphlet contended that in the few years before the war the *Hilfsverein* had undertaken a policy of displacing Hebrew with German and that this 'policy was due to secret pressure exercised by the German Government with a view to making the Jewish schools nurseries of Prussian "Kultur"'. According to the text, the sinister designs of the Germans were defeated by the heroism of Palestinian Jewry and their unceasing commitment to the defence of Hebrew, their 'most holy possession'.[89] The idealism and self-sacrifice that was evinced by Palestinian Jewry in this struggle, when it was 'still under the blasting rule of the Turk', led the author to state, 'with what passionate devotion will they not foster their national culture when they rejoice in the blessings of freedom!'[90] Yet again, Zionist culture was used to mediate the narrative of Ottoman despotism and the victory of liberty under the British, the champion of national self-determination.

Jabotinsky's article on Hebrew in the Yishuv was not confined to criticising the former Ottoman administration. He also berated the work of schools in Jerusalem that were run by the philanthropic institutions the Anglo-Jewish Association and the *Alliance Israelite Universelle*, in which English and French were the main languages of instruction.[91] The main subject of his criticism, however, was the reluctance of 'extreme Orthodoxy' to join the Hebrew revival as they still clung 'to their obsolete jargons'. He referred to their objection to the renaissance of the national language, which he saw as a hallmark of European culture, as 'one of the puzzles of the tortuous oriental mentality'.

Sykes described this attack on the Orthodox as 'unnecessarily bellicose'.[92] Such a divisive article was far from the type of propaganda material that Hyamson and the British authorities wished to disseminate. Sykes considered a similar piece penned by Jabotinsky, in which he referred to Orthodox Jews as 'professional beggars', to be 'bad and controversial' and thought that it should be suppressed.[93] Hyamson was said to have remarked that, 'the time is near when Lt. Jabotinsky should return to the fighting ranks!'[94] Jabotinsky's article may have expressed the divisions that were felt between Zionists and the Orthodox community in Palestine but it did not portray the positive, unified image of Zionism and the Yishuv that was required. In the texts that were created by members of the British Government and the Zionist leadership in London, Palestine was to be depicted as the space of an advanced Jewish national culture that had been repressed by the barbarous and despotic rule of the Ottoman Turk, but was to witness an irrepressible renaissance in the wake of British liberation. This narrative did not allow for discussions of the contested and divided reality of the Yishuv, particularly in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem was considered to be the centre of the Jewish imagination, and was therefore depicted as a pre-eminent seat of the rebirth of the nation that had been inaugurated by the Balfour Declaration. Contrasted with Jabotinsky's suppressed article, a piece entitled 'The Jewish Schools of Jerusalem' described the pre-war growth of Hebrew school education and the tenacious spirit that had kept it alive.[95] There was no reference to the religious institutions of the Orthodox, let alone their opposition to what they saw as profane secular education. Rather, Jerusalem was framed as the guardian of the national spirit and the seedbed of its restoration that was to come following British liberation: 'The schools of Jerusalem are the solid foundation on which the future of Jewish culture will be built in the new era of the *Geulah* [redemption] which this Passover feast proclaims to all Jewry.'[96]

This article was one part of the British Government's attempt to use the space of the land of Palestine to communicate the message of a new epoch for the Jewish nation. Before, during and after the British capture of Jerusalem in December 1917, British and Zionist propaganda agencies had sought to create it as an event that would signify 'the new era of *Geulah*'. This display of Zionist achievements, Ottoman brutality and British liberation set the stage for the performance of the myth of Jewish national rebirth.

7
Performing the Rebirth of the Jewish Nation

> 5678 will remain memorable for all time in Jewish annals. It will be for ever known as the year which for Jews not only made history but unmade it, the year for which generations have prayed and wept in vain, the year which saw the re-birth of the Jewish nation.
>
> '5678', Editorial, *Jewish Chronicle*, 6 September 1918.

In addition to the conduits of history and the landscape of Palestine, the discourse of Jewish national rebirth was relayed through performance – it was visibly acted out for world Jewry. The British Government and its Zionist allies sought to create visible symbols that signified a new era of national life through spectacle and theatrical performance on the stage of Palestine.[1] The protagonists in this drama, cast as the physical representation and agents of British policy, were the Zionist Commission, the American Zionist Medical Unit and the Jewish Legion.[2] Each were used by the British Government to communicate one overarching discourse of Jewish national rebirth, which was mediated through visual and written texts. The nature of this performance, and the edifices that were chosen to represent the Jewish national revival, were determined by what was believed to signpost national life in the interlinked realms of European nationalist and Zionist thought during this period,[3] and was communicated through Zionist discourses of culture, history, space and gender. In particular, the Zionist landscape of Palestine, its urban and agricultural sites of national transformation, and its population of pioneers, the quintessential symbol of the Zionist project, were used as the stage and actors to represent visibly and validate the narrative of rebirth and liberation under British auspices.

The propaganda effect of the Zionist Commission, the Medical Unit and the Jewish Legion was the primary reason why they were permitted to go to Palestine by the British Government. Reflecting the limits and objectives of the Government's wartime policy towards the Zionist movement, these Zionist ventures would not be permitted to undertake any political steps that might further commit the Government to Zionism, and complicate its relations with the majority Arab population in Palestine. This deliberate obstruction was not, as has previously been thought, a product of the ambivalence, if not outright anti-Zionism, of the British military administration in Palestine, the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (South).[4] Rather, this policy was wholly in accordance with the wishes of the War Cabinet, whose pre-eminent concern during the war was to convey the impression that the Balfour Declaration meant the restoration of the Jewish nation in Palestine, rather than actually helping to advance the Zionist movement in tangible, political terms in the Holy Land.

A visible symbol of the Anglo-Zionist entente

To persuade world Jewry of the British Government's genuine commitment to the realisation of the Zionist programme a visible symbol and agent of the Anglo-Zionist alliance had to be created. To this end, a Zionist Commission was dispatched to Palestine in March 1918, and arrived on 3 April. It had been proposed by the Zionist leadership as early as November 1917 and had specified practical objectives, such as coordinating relief work in Palestine and to help ameliorate relations with the Arab population and the French authorities.[5] However, its departure was considered to be necessary and urgent by the War Cabinet's Middle East Committee primarily because of its propaganda value. Due to the 'important political results' that were thought to have followed the Declaration, there was, according to the Committee, a need to put its 'assurance' into practice.[6] As Weizmann explained to the Foreign Office, a Commission 'would give a clear indication to the Jews that the Declaration … is being put into effect, and … would have a far reaching effect, especially in Russia'.[7]

Given the Commission's symbolic function, its membership was of great significance. With Weizmann as President, the Commission included British Zionist officials, as one would expect, but also members of organisations that were formerly known for their antipathy to Zionism, such as the *Alliance Israelite Universelle*. The broad make up of the Commission served to create the impression of a unified Jewry that stood firmly behind Britain's Zionist policy.[8] Crucially, though,

the Commission had no official representatives from American or Russian Jewry, due, respectively, to the opposition of the U.S. State Department, as the country was not at war with Turkey, and the difficulty of leaving Russia at that time.[9] This glaring absence was a great handicap to the propaganda that the Anglo-Zionist alliance wished to create for Russian and American Jewry. In particular, it was American Jewry that was of concern, as Russian Jewry was considered to be paralysed in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution.[10]

Exhibiting the American Zionist Medical Unit

With the lack of official American Zionist participation, the British Government looked to the American Zionist Medical Unit as an alternative way of focusing the gaze of American Jewry on British policy in Palestine. As early as May 1917 Zionists in the USA had proposed to send a medical unit to be attached to the British Army in Egypt for the advance into Palestine.[11] Initially the War Office stated that such a unit would be of no military value and its transportation would be too problematic. This opposition was soon withdrawn in the face of Balfour's insistence that, 'the employment of this Unit … would … have a political effect of a far reaching character not only in the United States but among the Jewish communities throughout the world'.[12] By 1918 the Medical Unit had not yet been organised, but the British desire to show its commitment in the wake of the Declaration, and enemy efforts to win Zionist support, meant that the Foreign Office was especially keen for it to be sent to Palestine.[13]

The Medical Unit was established by Hadassah, the American women's Zionist organisation, and finally left for Palestine, via London, in July 1918.[14] In total, the Unit had forty members, including nurses, physicians, specialists and representatives of the Zionist Organization of America and Hadassah. The British Government and its Zionist allies endeavoured to use the Medical Unit as a means of endorsing the myth of national rebirth. When the Unit visited London on its way to Palestine it was ceremoniously displayed for this purpose. On 14 July 1918 a mass meeting was held to welcome officially the Medical Unit at the London Opera House, the venue of the original celebration of the Declaration, which in itself was used to link the Unit to the idea of national restoration.[15] The event was represented in the press as a re-affirmation of the Balfour Declaration.[16] It included speakers from the War Cabinet, the House of Commons, the Zionist leadership in London, and the Medical Unit itself.[17]

Through this display, the Medical Unit was presented as a totem of both British and American support of the regeneration of Palestine through Zionism, and a tangible result of the Balfour Declaration. Behind this perception of the Unit as a significant instrument and symbol of regeneration lay the conception that Western knowledge of science, health and hygiene constituted the basis of a modern nation, if not civilisation itself. This idea was a fundamental part of the Zionist self-image, of a Western movement civilising the backward Orient, and was utilised by speakers at the Opera House, as they sought to highlight the importance of the Unit in the restoration of the Jewish nation.[18] Colonel Josiah Wedgewood, the Liberal M.P., exclaimed during his speech of welcome, 'For twenty centuries the Jews have survived in spite of every persecution … You are to lay a foundation-stone to convert a race into a nation – more than a nation, an inter-nation.'[19]

Performing the myth of national liberation in Palestine

Despite the attention that would be given to the Hadassah Medical Unit in Anglo-Zionist propaganda,[20] it was the Zionist Commission that was utilised as the pre-eminent symbol of Jewish national restoration. With a meeting between Weizmann and King George V before its departure, the Commission was portrayed as the official representative body of the Zionist movement and the paramount icon of its entente with the British Government.[21] Through a series of theatrical acts in Palestine, the Commission served as the standard bearer of the Anglo-Zionist alliance, and the fruits of British liberation for the Jewish nation. As the visual element was a fundamental aspect of the Commission's performance, film and photographic representations were of particular significance for the Ministry of Information. These images were not used to convey transparently what took place in Palestine, but to create specific messages for Jewry via a selective representation of the Commission's activities. Utilising the codes and iconic language of Zionist visual culture, these texts helped to convey the rhetoric of Jewish national restoration under British auspices. One aspect of this process was that through this imagery, the spectators of the events in which the Commission participated served as significant actors who provided testimony to the message of the Government's propaganda. The response of the Yishuv was used to inspire the Jewish reader and to substantiate the image of the British as the welcomed liberator, which justified the permanent expulsion of the Ottoman Empire. As Sykes remarked with regard to visual propaganda for the

Christian audience, 'Line should be to explode theory of Turkish indispensability and exhibit simplicity of our task owing to general goodwill.'[22] Thus, Hyamson wrote to Weizmann that as part of 'the general demand for Palestine information' there was a necessary need for Palestine films, 'especially of demonstrations in which [the] Commission participates'.[23]

The Zionist Commission was filmed and photographed from the very moment that it stepped foot on the soil of the Holy Land, which served to underline its historical significance.[24] Following urgent requests by the Foreign Office for reports on the Commission, the act of arrival was feted by propagandists as a cause for national celebration.[25] The photographic and film propaganda that followed documented a series of staged spectacles that vividly showed the enthusiasm for the Commission and what it was said to represent in the agricultural and urban centres of the embryonic Jewish national home.

This effort to represent the Yishuv as being overwhelmed in its enthusiastic response to the symbol of British support for the Zionist project was soon undertaken after the Commission's arrival in

Figure 7.1 'The tour of the Zionist Commission through the Jewish Colonies. Outside the school at Nes Zionah. 16th April 1918.' Q.13192. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

Palestine in April 1918, with an organised tour of the Jewish colonies. A consistent theme of the reports of these staged events was of a joyful and rapturous welcome.[26] In keeping with the Zionist emphasis on youth and the educational institutions that were forging the 'New Jew' in Palestine,[27] the Commission was photographed at a school at Nes Zionah. [Figure 7.1]

In this image, Weizmann, along with other members of the Commission, is shown at the centre of a crammed gathering of Jewish youth, the future of the national home. Standing next to Weizmann is Edwin Samuel, who was attached to the Commission as a liaison officer to the army. Dressed in military uniform, he visually represented the British army of occupation. The image of him smiling, holding a baby, at ease with and welcomed by the Jewish community, was in direct contrast to the ubiquitous characterisation of the brutal Ottoman soldier. It implied that the Zionist project, as encapsulated in the 'New Jew' that was born and educated in Palestine, was safe and happy in the hands of the British soldier. The overall impression of this picture was of a community that welcomed British occupation as a glorious liberation for the Zionist cause.

In addition to Zionist schools, the Commission visited the agricultural heart of the settlements. On 16 April 1918 it attended a large banquet in Rishon le Zion, which was held in its honour and was prepared and served by the 'fair maidens'[28] of the colony, as per the hierarchical separation of gender roles in Zionist and European nationalist culture.[29] The feast was held in Palm Alley under the vines, amidst the palm trees and greenery of this part of the settlement. The photographs that were taken of this event again re-enforced the ideals of Zionism and the desired image of Jewish life in Palestine. Figure 7.2 depicts a vibrant colony at one with a blooming, green natural environment, symbolising the redemption of the land.[30] The purity of the colonists, in touch with and transformed by nature, was signified by the woman to the right of the picture, dressed in a white tunic that is tied with a belt adorned with leaves and flowers. This ceremony of celebration for the Commission thus presented the seed of the new society, the mythical *halutz* [pioneer], as a visible endorsement of the new bond between Zionism and imperial Britain.

The 'New Jew', whether a school child or colonist, was a consistent and prominent character in the symbolic visits and acts of the Zionist Commission that were documented by the photographers and cinematographers who accompanied them. In the Commission's public visits to urban centres the 'New Jew' was represented by the parti-

Figure 7.2 'Zionist Commission in Palestine. Banquet in the Palm Alley under the wine cellars. Rishon-le-Zion. 16th April 1918.' Q.13194. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

cipation of the Maccabee youth, the Zionist athletic organisation. In line with Max Nordau's call for *Muskeljudentum* [muscular Jewry], of steely eyed, strong men, in response to the anti-Semitic characterisation of the Jewish male as effeminate and weak,[31] sport and gymnastics had come to be an important part of Zionist culture and the creation of the new Jewish man.[32] However, in the ceremonial demonstrations that accompanied the Zionist Commission the Maccabee did not act solely as a sports association, but as the symbolic guardians of the new Jewish national home. This imagery was encapsulated in its very name, Maccabee, after the Maccabean warriors who regained Jewish national sovereignty from the Hellenising rule of Antiochus Epiphanes in the second century B.C.E.

The symbolic role of the Maccabee youth was central to the ceremonial march in Tel Aviv on 6 April that was performed to signify the welcome of the Zionist Commission and the inauguration of an era of national rebirth. Reflecting the narrative of Return, the Torah scrolls that had been hidden outside of the city during the war were paraded from a triumphal arch that was erected at the gates of Tel Aviv. The Maccabee youth, dressed in their white uniforms, welcomed the

Commission with this march through the town, carrying banners, draped in nationalist symbols and slogans.

In Figure 7.3, the chapter from the Jewish settlement Petah Tikvah holds aloft its banner, proudly depicting the Magen David and the motto, 'Healthy Body, Healthy Soul'. The visual representation of this procession depicted important tenets of Zionist ideology: Jewish empowerment, pride, and a healthy, idealistic Jewish youth that was produced and lived on the national soil. Moreover, it marked Tel Aviv, the new Jewish city, as both the theatrical stage and embodiment of this new Zionist culture, a space that imbibed the idealism and purity of the white clad Maccabee youth. Primarily, though, this image functioned as a visual document of the spontaneous and elative response of the pioneers of Zionist culture and society in Palestine to the Zionist Commission, which symbolised the Balfour Declaration and British support of the Zionist movement.[33]

The theatrical celebration of British liberation was also acted out in a ceremony that was held in Jerusalem on 24 May 1918. The militarist depiction of the Maccabee youth was explicit in this carefully choreographed reception of the Jewish community for General Allenby and the British forces.[34] During the ceremony, the Maccabee maintained

Figure 7.3 Procession in Tel Aviv. Q.13203. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.



Figure 7.4 'The Reception to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir E.H.H. Allenby, in Jerusalem, by the Jewish Community, 24th May 1918. Guard of Honour of the Members of the Makkabi Athletic Association (Jewish Boy Scouts [sic]).' Q13211. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

order and in Figure 7.4, which was distributed by the Ministry of Information, were framed as Allenby's 'Guard of Honour'. In this image they are shown in uniform, standing to attention and saluting the British General. Behind them a large banner is held aloft with the words *bruhim haba'im* [welcome]. These motifs of military ceremony communicated explicitly the fundamental message of British liberation and the close alliance between Britain and Zionism.

This image also served to appropriate and represent the Jewish community and the city of Jerusalem as a Zionist space, which marginalised both the non-Jewish population but also the non-Zionist religious Jewish population. The traditional Jews of Jerusalem made up the majority of the Jewish population of this city that featured so prominently in the Western imagination of Palestine. Not only were they not Zionist, but within Zionist ideology they were seen as the opposite of the 'New Jew' that was being created in the Zionist colonies.[35] The Orthodox Jews of Jerusalem were commonly described as being weak, idle, and living in unsanitary conditions.[36] Given these negative perceptions it is not surprising that the Zionist Commission used a Maccabee 'Guard of Honour', the proud product of the Zionist colony, to welcome officially General Allenby in Jerusalem. The Zionist nature of the ceremony as a whole allowed Weizmann to describe it as 'a magnificent Jerusalem display'.[37] But, the orchestrated nature of this representation of Jerusalem as the epicentre of the Zionist renaissance under the British was clear from the film of the ceremony that was made for the Ministry of Information. Behind the lines of pristine Maccabee youth, one sees a throbbing crowd made up of traditionally dressed Orthodox Jews.[38]

Through the carefully cropped photographs of this event the reader saw a different, Zionist Jerusalem. This is not to say that Jerusalem was devoid of Zionist activity and work. After all, some of the most significant symbols of pre-war Zionist culture, the Bezalel School of Arts and Crafts, the Jewish National Museum and the National Library, were located in the city.[39] But in the main, the centres of Zionist activity were in the agricultural colonies and Tel Aviv, where, tellingly, the Zionist Commission had its headquarters. However, much was to be gained for the Zionists by appropriating Jerusalem through visual and written representation for non-Jewish as well as Jewish audiences. Such ceremonies should be seen in the wider context of the Zionist Commission's efforts to establish a set of *fait accompli* that would constitute the *de facto* basis of the national home, and would help to influence the outcome of the expected Peace Conference in its

favour.[40] These included a land acquisition scheme in southern Palestine and the symbolic recognition of Jerusalem as the centre of the national home, through the purchase of the site of the Wailing Wall and the foundation of the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus.[41]

But despite Weizmann's efforts to persuade Balfour of the propaganda value of the land acquisition and Wailing Wall schemes, the Foreign Secretary wished to avoid such politically charged moves.[42] Instead, he felt that the foundation of the Hebrew University was a sufficient 'visible sign to the world' of a 'new era in Palestine', which was suitably vague and involved no clear political commitment.[43]

The depiction of Jerusalem as the centre of the national home that was promised by the British Declaration was therefore reduced to the laying of the foundation stones of the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus on 24 July 1918. The idea of a Jewish University dated back to the second Zionist Congress in 1898, and was resurrected on the eve of the war.[44] In line with the thinking of the time in Europe, the University was discussed by Zionist writers and Anglo-Zionist propagandists as a powerful symbol of national life, culture and civilisation.[45] Similar to the perceived relationship between the Berlin University and German national culture, a Hebrew University was seen to be the ultimate emanation of the national spirit, bringing together the essential elements of national culture, the soil, *Bildung*, language and national genius in the renaissance of the nation.[46]

The theatrical ceremony of the laying of the foundation stones was therefore utilised as a key symbol of Jewish national rebirth, with film and photographs of the event being taken and distributed by the Ministry of Information.[47] Amidst a heaving crowd, and with the participation of Jewish communal leaders, Zionist and British officials, twelve stones were laid, which represented the twelve tribes of ancient Israel.[48] The ceremony thus connected the Golden Age of national sovereignty with this moment of national revival. Befitting the rhetoric of a seminal turning point in the history of the Jewish people, the last stone was laid by four young boys and girls who represented 'the next generation', a touch which was described by one onlooker as 'a delicious and prophetic climax'.[49] At the culmination of the ceremony, a Zionist band performed the emerging ritual of the singing of the Zionist and British national anthems, which expressed the bond of Zionism and the British nation.

The significance of the ceremony was marked by its location on Mount Scopus, overlooking Jerusalem and the surrounding sites of the national past.[50] The idea of national rebirth was validated by the

landscape of ancient national myth, the vessel of the national spirit. Weizmann wrote, 'There was the Dead Sea spread out before us and the mountains of Judaea and Ephraim and Moab looking as if they were amazed at what was taking place.'[51] Significantly, Mount Scopus was also the place from which Titus had launched his attack on Jerusalem, which symbolically marked the end of national sovereignty. Weizmann declared in December 1918, 'Here we were, on the very mountain from which Titus destroyed Jerusalem, laying the foundation-stone of this institution which will rebuild a regenerated Judaea.'[52] This ceremony was thus constructed for the Jewish audience as a principal symbol of restoration, and the beginning of a cultural renaissance that would have a radiating effect on Jewish consciousness throughout the Diaspora.[53]

Alongside the Zionist Commission's attempts to perform the restoration of the Jewish nation it intended to portray Zionism as a movement that was at peace and had common cause with the indigenous Arab population. Juxtaposed uneasily with the rhetoric of Zionism as a western civilising force, the narrative of 'the Jew' as part of a Semitic race, rooted in the culture and landscape of the Middle East,[54] was used to rationalise the entente cordiale between Jews and Arabs that the British Government and the London Zionist Bureau had emphasised since the Balfour Declaration. The Hebrew nation of the future was framed as contributing to 'the problem of harmonising the divergent conceptions of East and West'. Zionism was to wed the 'eastern passion for righteousness, for ideas, for God' with the civilisation of the West, giving their Arab kin the benefits of modernity, as defined by the Western Orientalist mind.[55]

Despite this rhetoric, however, the Arab population of Palestine had shown great disquiet in the wake of the Declaration, and feared that the Zionists wished to take control of the country. One of the main purposes of the Commission was to allay these fears and establish good relations with the Arab community.[56] Notwithstanding Weizmann's own Orientalist conception of Arabs as qualitatively inferior to Jews and his belief that there was no Arab national people in Palestine,[57] he attempted to show publicly that the Zionist movement had no intention to form a Jewish state after the war. He told Arab leaders that the Zionists wished 'to live at peace with all, on the basis of mutual regard and respect'.[58] But instead of making an official agreement about future Arab-Zionist cooperation with Palestinian notables, Weizmann sought to forge an alliance with Prince Feisal, the son of the Sherif of Mecca and leader of the Arab Revolt.[59] As a result, the discourse of national

Semitic brotherhood was visually performed through the display of Weizmann and Feisel, the embodiment of the national and therefore regenerative Jewish and Arab types, following a meeting in June 1918.

Standing next to Feisal, Weizmann was photographed wearing a *Keffiyah,* the traditional Arab headdress, which signified respect and a cultural bond through this marker of Oriental culture and identity.[60] [Figure 7.5] This picture was not, however, disseminated by the Ministry of Information. Despite its political utility for the British, the discourse of Semitic brotherhood was not deemed to have a strong appeal to the collective memory and identity of the Jewish reader in the Diaspora. Though it remained a theme in the speeches of Zionist leaders such as Sokolow and Weizmann, the idea of the Semitic bond did not feature significantly in the propaganda that was intended to inspire Jewish support for the British war effort and its future control over Palestine. Significantly, however, the resurrection of the Hebrew warrior, bearing the national flag and fighting on the landscape of

Figure 7.5 Chaim Weizmann and Emir Feisal, June 1918. Courtesy of Yad Chaim Weizmann, Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel.

ancient national self, was a central part of the theatrical performance of national rebirth.

The Jewish Legion: 'a political performing company'

From its inception, symbolism was the *raison d'être* of Jabotinsky's proposal of a Jewish Legion fighting with the British Army for the liberation of Palestine. In a letter to Herbert Samuel in March 1916, he wrote, 'evidently I realize that a Jewish Legion will not be able to "conquer" Palestine, and I do not even exaggerate its importance in helping the Allies to conquer it'.[61] Instead, Jabotinsky considered that of all the possible manifestations of Zionism that could advance the cause, 'the Jewish Legion would be one – perhaps the clearest, the most palpable, the most easily understood by Christian minds'.[62]

Jabotinsky's belief that a Jewish fighting force would be the most effective symbol of nationalism that would resound with the Western mind was perhaps influenced by his Futurist sensibilities. Marinetti's Futurist manifesto had declared, 'We will glorify war – the world's only hygiene – militarism, patriotism …'[63] But although this intrinsic link between nationalism, militarism and war was particularly explicit in Futurism from 1909, by the time of the First World War it had become a dominant theme in European and British nationalist culture in general.[64] The belief that heroism on the battlefield justified the existence of a nation had led other nationalist movements such as the Poles and Czechs to raise legions to fight with the Great Powers in the war.[65] Since the late nineteenth century participation in war had increasingly been seen as the greatest measure of the national type. Battle was the apotheosis of the values of the nation: manliness, honour, pride, camaraderie, strength, discipline, sacrifice and heroism.[66] Thus, a national army in time of war and peace was seen as the symbol of the inward nature of the nation. With regard to Jewish nationalism, the need to demonstrate overtly the attributes of the nation that were represented by a national legion was of particular importance. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Jewish man had been represented as the antithesis of nationalist bourgeois values in European culture, and was commonly portrayed as weak, bent over, cowardly and feminine.[67] A national army could therefore be seen as a collective symbol of the regeneration and normalisation of the Jewish man, and thus the nation,[68] through the nexus of nationalism, militarism and masculinity, which was prevalent in Britain during the war.[69]

But in order for the Legion to be conceived as a genuine signifier of Jewish national rebirth it had to be portrayed for both Jews and other nations as part of the authentic tradition of the national Jew. For this reason, the myth of the Maccabees, which was well established in Zionist culture, was central to the imagery of the Jewish Legion. Although the Maccabean revolt was only one episode in the long span of Jewish history, it served to endorse the desired self-image of 'the Jew' as a natural warrior. Despite the temporal leap, the Maccabeans were emphasised as the ancestors of 'the Jew' and as a result, their honour, heroism and manliness were seen as a dormant, but eternal part of the national Jewish spirit which would return during the time of national rebirth.[70]

It was believed by Jabotinsky, and his Government supporters such as Lloyd George, that such imagery of Jewish warriors, fighting for Palestine with the British, would inspire Jews in Russia and the USA to support the Allies.[71] Zionist symbolism that recalled the age of the Maccabees and Ancient independence was thus absolutely critical to the Jewish Legion project. Influenced by neo-Romantic nationalist thought, Jabotinsky, like Herzl,[72] considered that nationalist symbols and colours had a particular power that tapped into the Jewish national imagination. They could impact upon an individual's emotions and behaviour, and would inspire national consciousness. He explained to the War Office that the Jews were a 'symbolically minded people', who would be attracted to enlist in the Legion by the use of the Star of David, with the lion of Judah at its centre, as its military badge, and the 'colours of the Jews', blue and white, on the collar of the khaki jacket.[73] Jabotinsky considered that the combination of fighting in Palestine with a Jewish name and badge was essential in order 'to infuse the men with a full and undiluted feeling of Jewish national responsibility'.[74]

The nationalist symbolism of the proposed Jewish Legion's name and badge met with vociferous public opposition from influential non-Zionist British Jews, who saw it as an official endorsement of Zionism and a threat to their British identity.[75] Despite pressure from a number of British politicians, including Lloyd George, and Zionist activists, the decision was made to placate those who had publicly opposed the idea.[76] There was to be no Jewish name or badge. Instead a battalion, the 38th Royal Fusiliers, was formed exclusively for Jewish troops. This decision cut at the very essence of Jabotinsky's Legion as a visible symbol of the revival of the Jewish nation under British auspices. But as Jabotinsky noted, 'it still holds, if properly presented, a powerful

appeal to Jewish sentiment throughout the world.'[77] As a result, an unofficial system of imagery, language and symbols were created to portray the 38th Royal Fusiliers as the return of the national Jewish warrior and the Golden Age of national life.

With regard to the name of the Battalion, the War Office had been convinced to allow it to be referred to in the Jewish press as 'the Judeans'.[78] Although the Maccabeans had been the preferred moniker, it was considered by Jabotinsky that the Judeans would be 'agreeable to all sides'.[79] This appellation cast the members of the 38th Royal Fusiliers as the national type of the ancient kingdom of Judaea, whose dissolution by the Roman Empire in 70 C.E. was seen as the moment of national fall and exile. Hence, as the Judeans, the Jewish Battalion could be perceived as the vanguard of national Return and the epoch of national renaissance. This theme was strikingly portrayed in a medal that was given to recruits. It was based upon a Roman coin, *IVDEA CAPTA* [Judaea captured], that was minted to display Titus Flavius Vespasian's defeat and emasculation of the Jews. In the medal for the 'Judeans' this icon of national degradation was transformed into a symbol of Return that articulated their historic destiny. Above the Hebrew title of *Yehuda Hamishtahreret* [Judah being liberated], it depicted a fleeing Roman soldier, and the feminised figure of Israel rising from the subjugation of exile and defeat.[80] [Figure 7.6]

The role of the soldiers themselves as standard bearers of this discourse of national redemption was further augmented by the per-

Figure 7.6 'Medal given to every recruit.' Q.12684. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

mission for them unofficially to use the Star of David as their flag, and on armbands worn by recruits.[81] Most importantly, it was to be stated publicly that the Battalion was to be sent to Palestine.[82] The significance that was attached to the symbolic effect of the Jewish Battalion was such that Lord Reading, the British Ambassador in the United States, suggested that the mere publication of its departure to Palestine would 'help to stimulate pro-British sentiments throughout the Jewish community' in the USA.[83]

Along with the 38th Royal Fusiliers two other battalions were to be formed, the 39th and 40th. As the focus of Anglo-Zionist propaganda was directed at winning over American Jewry, efforts had been made to recruit a battalion in the United States.[84] However, as was the case with the Zionist Commission, American neutrality with Turkey meant that the State Department had not allowed its citizens to participate.[85] Instead, Jews who did not have American nationality or were under age for American service were permitted to join the 39th Battalion.[86] The 40th Battalion was mainly made up of recruits from the Yishuv.

The battalions were from their inception utilised for propaganda purposes. Given the focus on the visual symbolism of the Legion, photographs and film were to play a prominent part. As early as September 1917, the News Department of the Foreign Office wished to obtain a photo of a Jewish battalion on parade in order to 'produce fraternizing sympathy' with American Jews 'of whom there are a great many on the slacker side'.[87] In the same report it was noted that the cinematograph had an excellent effect in terms of propaganda in general and had done 'a good deal of good in reaching people who cannot well be reached in any other way'.[88] In December 1917 the 38th Battalion was promptly photographed and filmed during its training in Plymouth.[89]

Together with members of the British Government, Jabotinsky believed in the effects of the aesthetics of military ceremony, with the disciplined parade of troops in uniform, on national consciousness.[90] Hence, the 38th Royal Fusiliers were used to act out the narrative of national Return through military performance, or as one recruit put it, 'self-advertising marches'.[91] The centre-piece of this propaganda was the march of the Battalion through London on 4 February 1918, the day before its departure for Egypt. Adding to the symbolic importance of the event, the Battalion was quartered in the Tower of London the previous night and was granted the exceptional privilege of bearing fixed bayonets in their march through the City. The Battalion marched in full uniform carrying their arms and was preceded by the band of the Coldstream Guards, from the East End to the City of London, where

the Lord Mayor received their salute.[92] The Battalion carried both the Zionist flag and the Union Jack, which signified the alliance between Zionism and Great Britain, and was cheered by large crowds waving flags adorned with the Star of David. This event, which was filmed by the Ministry of Information, visibly documented the proud return of the Jewish warrior male and the nation.[93] The *Jewish Chronicle* referred to the 'the throngs of girls who hung out of windows frankly admiring the lads', and asserted that the Jewish soldiers had 'gained a certificate of manhood which they had been brutally told they had forfeited'.[94] The choice of the site for the march also had its own message. At the heart of the British Empire, amidst the landscape of imperial monuments and power, the ceremony explicitly emphasised the fundamental role played by Britain in this revival of the Jewish nation and the importance that she attached to its fulfilment.

Although the stage of this march was significant, the destination of the 38th Royal Fusiliers was considered by those behind the Battalion to be of greater importance. The depiction of a Jewish fighting force being sent to help the Entente to liberate the ancient homeland was central to the symbolism that was created around the Jewish Battalions.[95] This message was conveyed by the title of the film of the London march, 'To Garrison Jerusalem?'[96] Infused with Messianic rhetoric, one writer went much further, and suggested that the parade brought forth in the mind's eye of the watching crowd visions of the Exodus from Egypt, in which '[p]erchance they saw … the heralding of the real Advent'.[97]

Once recruits started to arrive from the USA they were also photographed on parade, as were Jews recruited for the Palestinian Battalion.[98] The enthusiasm for joining the Palestinian Battalion and fighting with the Allies was a prominent motif of the photographs that were taken and distributed among Jewish press in countries such as the United States.[99] As was the case with the pamphlets that were produced for Jewish audiences on the subject of the Declaration, the intention was to play upon the supposed shared identity of world Jewry, in which the attitude of the individual could be influenced by the collective response of the nation. Jabotinsky and his supporters in Whitehall were convinced that the Legion would act as a 'as a live link connecting every Jew with the fortunes of the war'.[100] Thus, in August 1918, Ormsby-Gore recommended that the 'recruiting movement' in Palestine, which exemplified the pro-British sentiments of Palestinian Jews, should be exploited as a source for 'British-Zionist propaganda' in neutral and enemy countries, though it was also used in the United States.[101] Through photographic, film and print media Anglo-Zionist

propagandists sought to show that the men of the Yishuv, with the fervent support of their families, were joining up to fight with the British with tremendous enthusiasm and pride, due to their belief in Britain and its commitment to Zionism.[102] [Figure 7.7]

In an article entitled, 'The Jewish Volunteer Movement in Judaea', Ormsby-Gore summed up the narrative that the British wished to communicate.[103] He portrayed the Yishuv as being caught up by a fever of enthusiasm for the Jewish Battalion. He wrote that as soon as the recruiting offices were open there was a rush to the doors with scenes that were reminiscent of the outbreak of war in England in August 1914. To illustrate his case, Ormsby-Gore quoted a message from some of the volunteers: 'This war and Balfour's declaration have made us a sister nation of England … the soul of the Maccabees has not dried up and … we know how to countersign Balfour's Declaration with our own blood.'[104]

In contrast to this picture of the Jewish Battalions being so enthusiastically celebrated by the Yishuv and their portrayal as a symbol of the honourable, proud and strong spirit of the Maccabeans, their actual record proved to be a grave disappointment for Jabotinsky. With regard

Figure 7.7 'Some of the 1,000 recruits for the 40th (Palestinian) Battalion, Royal Fusiliers, obtained in Jerusalem, Summer 1918.' Q. 12672. Photograph courtesy of the Imperial War Museum, London.

to recruitment, it is true that among the nucleus of volunteers there was a sense of fervent idealism and will to enlist.[105] But in Jerusalem, in particular, the Jewish Legion also found itself up against both indifference and active opposition, especially among the Orthodox population.[106]

Aside from this opposition, the reality of the Jewish Battalions, compared to Jabotinsky's vision of the foundation of a heroic Jewish Army, proved to be a frustrating failure. Many recruits were stationed in Egypt and never fought in Palestine, let alone for its liberation. Those who did see combat were confined to peripheral action in the Jordan Valley and were attached to other battalions, with large numbers of soldiers being struck down by malaria.[107] Reflecting the great gulf between the mythology that was created around the Jewish Legion and its actual record, Jabotinsky wrote to Sykes in November 1918, 'The American recruits, who have been so officially fêted in America and England, feel … discouraged and humiliated.'[108] Confronted with the bitterness and despondency of Jewish volunteers who had travelled from 'two hemispheres' to participate in the revival of the Jewish warrior and the liberation of the national home, Jabotinsky was left in a state of utter despair. He exclaimed, 'I feel like shooting myself when I think of this, shooting myself for my blunder in believing in fair play.'[109] Jabotinsky lamented to Weizmann, 'No name, no badge,[110] no mention, quartered outside of Palestine or in Rafa – this is the sum total of my, of our efforts to lay the foundation of a Jewish Army.'[111]

Jabotinsky had apparently failed to see the inherent incompatibility of what he had persuaded the British Government to create, a symbolic performer to inspire the Diaspora, with his desire for a real, independent Jewish Army. The British Government had supported the formation of a Jewish Legion solely for its propaganda value. Their only concern was to create an image of a Jewish fighting force that could be used to demonstrate their commitment to the Zionist cause. It was established in order to provide the Jewish reader with a tangible manifestation in Palestine of the perceived link between Zionist hopes and the outcome of the war. As Jabotinsky was said to have put it, 'We are not merely a regiment – we are a political performing company!'[112] The British Government certainly had no intention of creating a serious Jewish fighting force in Palestine that could complicate its ability to dictate events on the ground or the future administration of the region. The Jewish Battalions were created to appeal to Jews in the Diaspora, particularly in America. In Palestine itself, the British authorities were more concerned with placating the Arab population and

their own geo-political considerations. Hence, the actions of the Jewish battalions in the Jordan Valley were not mentioned in the official dispatch that was published in Egypt, but were lauded in the dispatch released in the West.[113] The military administration's efforts to prevent the Jewish Legion from seeing combat, or being stationed in Palestine, were fully in line with the Zionist policy of the War Cabinet.

In sum, throughout 1918 the British Government and the Zionist leadership based in London attempted to endorse and act out the myth of an epoch of national rebirth, as inaugurated by the Balfour Declaration. The staged activities and display of the Zionist Commission, the American Zionist Medical Unit, and the creation of the Jewish Battalions were used to signify the revival of a national society and culture. This propaganda was the primary purpose of the Government's Zionist policy during the war. Hence, in contrast to the resources that were ploughed into the show for world Jewry, there was no corresponding effort to lay the foundations of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, whatever that might have meant. Indeed, the decision was taken to avoid making any further commitments that went beyond the deliberately vague Balfour Declaration, and to circumvent Zionist attempts to create facts on the ground in Palestine that would have antagonised the Arab population. The stark divergence between Whitehall propaganda and the reality of British policy is underscored by the remarkable fact that from August 1918 the War Cabinet was seriously considering handing over Palestine to the USA after the war.[114]

On the eve of the armistice, the empty nature of the Government's Zionist policy was finally becoming apparent to even the most ardent supporters of the Anglo-Zionist entente. In October 1918, the *Jewish Chronicle* complained, 'nearly twelve months have elapsed [and] not a single syllable concerning the policy whereby the Declaration is to be carried into effect has yet been vouchsafed'.[115] By 8 November, the newspaper protested, 'the majestic visions of other days seem to have shrunk to such an extent that it must indeed be difficult, we imagine, for the average Zionist to envisage the "Home" or decry its "National" character'.[116]

8

Perception vs. Reality: American Jewish Identities and the Impact of the Balfour Declaration

> Jewry is composite in character. Differences therein are so great and so various that welding the parts into a harmonious whole would prove a superhuman task. It is characteristic of the Jew that he adheres tenaciously to his views … since tribal days Israel has never been in agreement … Their conceptions of Judaism are scarcely less diverse than are their views on other affairs of life …
>
> Alfred M. Cohen, *Jewish Comment*, Baltimore, 10 May 1918.

The extensive propaganda campaign waged by the Anglo-Zionist alliance undoubtedly had a significant impact upon world Jewry, but it evolved somewhat differently to what was anticipated by Whitehall. The underlying assumption of Britain's Zionist policy, that the Jews were united by a collective sense of Zionist identity, was incorrect. Not only was Zionism a minority movement, albeit a growing one, among Jewry, but there was no such thing as an innate Jewish consciousness, Zionist or otherwise. Jewish identities were contingent, fluid and highly contested. Moreover, the Jewish component of an individual's identity was by no means a priority for many in their day-to-day lives, as was assumed to be the case in the British official mind. Jewry was splintered by class, geography, age, gender, politics, culture and religion, with a resulting myriad of competing Jewish identities and levels of interest in Jewish affairs.[1]

Due to the tumultuous state of Russian Jewry after the Bolshevik revolution, American Jewry was, as discussed above, the main focus for British propagandists, and serves as the best case through which to assess the impact of the Balfour Declaration and the ensuing Anglo-Zionist propaganda. Unlike the picture that was held in Whitehall,

American Jewish identities were complex and diverse. Certainly, with Europe ravaged by war and revolution, the United States emerged as the most important centre of support for the Zionist movement by the war's end. Nonetheless, the majority of American Jews did not become heartfelt Zionists, either before or after the Declaration.[2] In addition to providing aid for Jews in war-torn Europe, the issue that did unite many Jews during the war was the need to demonstrate their American patriotism, due to the demands that were placed upon ethnic minorities by American society.[3] Rather than unifying Jewry, the Declaration and Zionism actually posed a threat to those who feared the accusation of dual-loyalties, and exacerbated the cleavages that already stratified a diverse community that was suffering from the pressures of nativism and war. At the same time, there were significant numbers of Jews, particularly within the Yiddish-speaking immigrant community, who continued to see Zionism as a peripheral concern.

Zionism and American Jewry before the Balfour Declaration

Despite the expansion of the Zionist movement from the beginning of the war and its success in the elections for the American Jewish Congress in June 1917,[4] by the time of the Balfour Declaration it was still a mass movement in the making. As late as December 1917, Jacob De Haas, the secretary of the leading body of American Zionism, the Provisional Executive Committee for General Zionist Affairs, remarked; 'To our mind there is no miraculous plan by which all the Jewish people can be made Zionists.'[5] In the minds of British policy-makers, of course, the Declaration was issued in large part because Zionism was thought to already have a hold over American Jewry. In a reversal of British expectations, however, it was the Declaration and British policy that provided the Zionist movement with a powerful platform to try and further its influence and to claim that the tide of history, and the Entente, was on its side.

From 1914 Zionism experienced significant growth in the United States under the aegis of Louis Brandeis, primarily through his effective organisation and direction of the movement, aided by the nationalist environment of the period, the prestige of the new Zionist leadership, and a general rise in Jewish self-awareness.[6] At the outbreak of war there were 7,500 members of Zionist societies, which increased by 1918 to more than 30,000.[7] But, the Zionists were far from being the leading voice of American Jewry. A month after the Balfour

Declaration, De Haas explained to Weizmann, 'You will readily understand that, dealing with a population of three million Jews scattered over about twenty-five hundred places, this is not a light task. We are, however, today in actual touch with 1,000 centers, large and small in which Jews live.'[8] It was only after the Balfour Declaration in 1918 that Zionist membership grew by a very significant margin, reaching a peak of 144,235.[9]

Combined with the great challenge of significantly increasing its membership, those at the head of the Zionist movement had to contend with divisions in their own ranks.[10] In addition, the leadership faced vociferous opposition to political Zionism from the majority of the liberal and Reform movement.[11] Just as important was the organised part of American Jewry that was defined by its socialism, whether expressed through trade unionism, Jewish socialist groups, or as part of the American socialist movement. These were powerful forces indeed and were strong expressions of Jewish ethnicity.[12] Together, the various streams of socialism and liberal Jewry represented a very significant part of organised American Jews, and tended to be either indifferent or opposed to political Zionism.

In the face of this diversified political and ethnic milieu, it is important to document the doubts held by Zionists regarding their strength, which they hoped to combat through carefully devised propaganda work and extremely organised campaigning. In January 1917, De Haas feared that the Zionists could only gain one fifth of the delegates for the national organisations at the American Jewish Congress, which they could perhaps increase by relying on the support of groups such as the fraternal body, the International Order of the B'nai B'rith. In short, De Haas was 'not at all too sanguine' as to the reach of the Zionist movement and spoke of the need to bring out 'every ounce of possible influence'.[13] To increase the growth of the movement during the war, the Zionists campaigned with tremendous organisation, driven by Brandeis' slogan, 'Men, Money, Discipline!'[14] The aim was to bring 'Zionist propaganda' directly to 'every Jewish man and woman in the United States'.[15] In 1917, the Zionist movement was striving to dominate American Jewry. But this was still far from the case. As Brandeis himself put it in April 1917, since the beginning of the war, 'The organization has shown possibilities'; but its expansion was still a question of 'definite plodding work'.[16]

There were sharp geographical variations in support for Zionism, and where Zionist campaigners focused their energies. Special atten-

tion was paid to Jewish communities in the southern and mid-western states, where it was thought that Zionism held a strong attraction.[17] In addition, New England and California were perceived to be bastions of Zionist support. The same could not have been said, however, for New York, the very heart of American Jewry.[18] Only a minority of the Yiddish-speaking Jews of the Lower East Side, the so-called Jewish masses, came out in favour of the movement. During the campaign for the American Jewish Congress, De Haas expected that the Zionists would gain just one quarter of Jewish votes in New York.[19] Despite the establishment of a special regional bureau, by 1919 there were just 6,400 members of the organisation in New York City, which had a Jewish population of one and a half million.[20]

In the effort to try and rivet the 'mind of the mass of Jews' on the realisation of the Zionist programme, De Haas acknowledged the challenge that faced the movement:

> the average individual, … has a thousand things to think of that relate to his daily life, his business, his family and local matters. Can he be drawn out of these matters to give up so much of his time, of his means, to become an organized Zionist?[21]

This picture of American Jewry could not have been further from the one that was held by British policy-makers, who believed that an individual's sense of ethnicity lay at the fore of one's identity and life experience. Moreover, the British officials and politicians who sought to gain the support of Zionists in America since 1916 worked under the assumption that the latter's dominance of Jewry was a *sine qua non*. But as one pro-Zionist weekly complained just after the publication of the Balfour Declaration:

> Jewry is still divided on the question of Zionism. We still have too many who are opposed to it and are cavailing at it; too many who are apathetic and indifferent to it; too many who are still ignorant about it, and who prefer to remain so.[22]

For the Zionist movement to gain influence and membership in the USA during the First World War it had to be fluid and respond to the dominant trends within the majority culture that had altered with the onset of war, and the views of other powerful parts of American Jewry.

Patriotism and Jewish identities in wartime America

The significant issue that many American Jews faced during the First World War, over and above communal politics, was patriotism. The need to demonstrate overtly their American colours, literally and figuratively, was paramount. Nativism, the profound opposition to foreign minorities, reached a new level of virulence and ubiquity with the beginning of the Entente's struggle with Germany. The focus of this prejudice was the German-American population. However, there soon emerged a more general attack against the 'hyphenated American'. Moreover, after the declaration of war in April 1917, there was a widespread shift to '100 per cent Americanism', which called for a vociferous commitment to the nation above all else.[23] With regard to ethnic groups, there was an important caveat to this trend. Those minorities that were not German-American were accepted as long as they demonstrated their all-American credentials through their expression of loyalty and patriotism. The most powerful of all the symbols of loyalty was military service.[24] The pervasiveness of these ideas resulted in an equal, if not obsessive, concern with the call to national duty and service among the Jewish community.[25]

The Zionist leadership at this time was very sensitive to, and shared, the preoccupation of many Jews with asserting their American identity,[26] and attempted to mould Zionist culture and ideology to these values. After all, the nature and reach of Zionism in America did not derive from an innate Zionist instinct, which had been the basis of the British approach to American Jewry. The movement had to adjust its values, strategy and thought in line with the majority culture, and thus the wider concerns of Jews.[27]

As the movement's leading light during this period, and the first Jewish Judge on the Supreme Court, Louis Brandeis was the very embodiment of the attempt to wed Zionism and Americanism, which he sought to express through the axiom – 'To be good Americans we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews, we must become Zionists.'[28] Although there had previously been a tendency to demonstrate the link between Americanism and Zionism, it reached new heights during the First World War.[29] Zionists had no choice but to respond to the question of national loyalty, which plagued American Jewry throughout the war. After all, the Zionist principle of a Jewish nationality that was centred on Palestine could have been seen to fly in the face of the call for '100 per cent' Americans, whose loyalty was undivided and beyond question. For many Jews, therefore, Zionism posed a profound

threat to the assertion of their American patriotism during the war. This issue provided a tremendous obstacle to the growth of the Zionist movement, and, as we shall see, was at the core of much of the opposition that it faced in the community. For those who were sympathetic to Zionism, the difficulty of responding persuasively to the challenge of 'dual-loyalties' was a very real one. As late as September 1918, one communal leader remarked: 'We can not fail to recognize that public feeling is at least impatient, if not rankly intolerant, of fine-spun distinctions … which seek to co-relate our Zionism with our Americanism … [T]he enemies of American Israel, all too numerous, … are inclined to regard the Zionist agitator in America as citizen in name and alien at heart.'[30]

Aside from the need for Jews to display their loyalty to America, the spectre that hung most heavily over the heads of Zionists such as Brandeis was the perception that Jews were over-represented in the radical, pacifist movement.[31] Jewish radicals who were anti-war and anti-nationalist constituted the complete antithesis to the values held by middle-class American Jews such as Brandeis, Stephen S. Wise and the rest of the Zionist leadership. Radicals were seen as going against the grain of national unity in the face of war. The scorn that was poured on them by '100 per cent Americans' was second only to the hatred of the 'hyphenated German'. Indeed, perceptions of radicals and Germans came to be interwoven.[32] American Jews were faced with the added problem of being associated with the German cause, and were seen as the driving force behind socialist internationalism.[33]

The Zionist leadership was acutely aware of the strength of socialist sentiment among parts of American Jewry. But, despite the rhetoric of a unified Jewry represented by the Zionist movement, this world was outside of the purview of mainstream Zionism. Institutions such as the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU), the United Hebrew Trades, the Jewish Socialist Federation and the *Forverts* Association constituted a world of Jewish labour, albeit without a common ideology,[34] that had its own values, public space and icons.[35] The Zionist leadership held a profound but often unrealised desire to achieve some kind of influence over this part of American Jewry.[36] Although Zionist socialists made great gains among immigrant Jewry in the elections to the American Jewish Congress, this victory was more apparent than real, and was largely due to the miscalculations and divisions among non-Zionist socialists.[37] Months after the elections, Wise, who was always considered an outsider on the Lower East Side,

vented his frustration at the views of immigrant Jewry, which he was apparently unable to influence:

> The miserable, – if I were a layman such as you I would say damned, – Yiddish press has completely poisoned the mind of the Yiddish-reading Jews of America. There seems to be only the faintest understanding of the meaning of the war among the great multitude of the Russian immigrants to America.[38]

Despite the fears of the Zionists, however, significant numbers of immigrant Jews were in fact greatly preoccupied with the question of demonstrating their American patriotism. Over 30,000 Jewish immigrant families spent one third of their wealth during the war on Liberty Bonds and Saving Stamps.[39] In addition, an overwhelming concern for fellow Jews who were affected by the war, particularly in Eastern Europe, led to an unprecedented level of non-sectarian fundraising and organisation for war relief.[40] In contrast, however, Zionist membership and activism remained remarkably low within the major immigrant communities up until the end of 1918.[41]

As well as the various groups that came under the broad umbrellas of mainstream Zionism and Jewish socialism, the liberal/Reform camp was a very considerable force in American Jewry.[42] This group had a strongly defined *Weltanschauung*, culture and organisational structure. Once again, against the backdrop of the tensions that permeated American society at this time of national crisis, this group had differing concerns and priorities to the other two groups cited above. Not all liberal Jews were members of the Reform movement, nor did they share the same opinions on Zionism. But together they were united by the ideology of 'American Israel', according to which Jews were primarily citizens of America, the new Israel, with Washington as the New Jerusalem, and were staunchly opposed to political Zionism. The ideology of maximalist Zionism challenged the very basis of 'American Israel', which its adherents were desperately trying to protect in the face of the nativist threat.

Jacob H. Schiff, the great philanthropist, financier and American Jewish communal leader was perhaps the most well-known and influential individual associated with the ideology and culture of the 'American Israelite'.[43] One contemporary observer described him as 'the "grand old man" of Jewry, the idol of thousands'.[44] Although Schiff was respected and admired by Jews from across the political and social spectrum, his views were firmly rooted in his liberal vision. For

him, the desire to demonstrate one's loyalty to America was all consuming.[45]

Due to his great standing and iconic status in the eyes of American Jewry, and the need to demonstrate the strength of American Zionism for their colleagues in London, the Zionist leadership attempted to appropriate Schiff to their cause from May 1917.[46] To do so, the Zionists had to accommodate Schiff's commitment to preserving his unquestioned American loyalty, and his resulting opposition to political Zionism. The Zionists had to compromise to such a degree in their definition of the Zionist programme to gain his support that in the end it was abandoned. As Wise asked De Haas, 'have we won Schiff to Zionism, or has Zionism been won over to the Schiff point of view?'[47]

This dilemma represented a fundamental challenge to Zionists at the time in the USA. They had somehow to create a consensus on the question of Zionism among a divided Jewry without abandoning the Basle Programme. The way in which to reconcile Zionism with these conflicting beliefs was not a minor issue, as liberal Jews, and their leaders such as Schiff and Louis Marshall, commanded a great deal of influence within the community. Wise went so far as to say that if the Schiff statement concerning Zionism was published, 'with all its many qualifications … [it] will get more publicity in America than the Balfour Declaration'.[48]

Prior to the publication of the Balfour Declaration, then, the stage was set for the tensions between 'one hundred per cent Americanism', Jewish radicals, Zionism and liberal Jews to erupt. Each of these groups was seen as a threat to the others' identity within the fishbowl of American society. Although the elections to the American Jewish Congress had brought many of these issues of division to the fore, the Congress had been put off until after the war.[49] Indeed, its postponement stemmed in part from the Zionist leadership's fear that the Congress would lead to public exposure of its own internal disagreements and opposition to the Zionist programme.[50] But as the Balfour Declaration was designed to capture the support of American Jewry, the British Government and its Zionist allies were determined, as we have seen, to push the Zionist issue in every possible medium in the United States. In addition, the British occupation of Jerusalem and the recognition of the movement by the Allies led to the impression, as had been intended by Anglo-Zionist propagandists, that the realisation of Zionist aims was a *fait accompli*, which raised the stakes to a much higher level. The eventual success of Britain's rhetoric of Jewish national rebirth was such that nothing less than a Jewish State was

thought to be on the horizon. As one writer put it on the eve of the armistice, 'the time has come when every Jew, even the indifferent Jew, must be either for or against a Jewish State'.[51]

The impact of the Balfour Declaration

In the immediate aftermath of the Balfour Declaration, the British Government was quickly persuaded that its publication had been met with spontaneous and overwhelming elation across world Jewry. The Zionists had certainly created that impression. Zionist demonstrations of support for the Declaration were held around the globe. As many groups as possible sent the British Foreign Office celebratory telegrams, confirming British expectations of profound gratitude from a Zionist Jewry.[52] In reality, however, the Balfour Declaration failed to have much of an initial impact on American Jewry, which appeared to be much more focused on the Bolshevik revolution. The initial lack of enthusiasm following the Declaration did not escape the attention of the Zionist leadership. In his report on Zionism in the United States written for Weizmann, De Haas wrote, 'For the first few days it did not seem as though, outside of the intense Zionists, anybody understood it.'[53] The 'mass demonstration'[54] that was held at Carnegie Hall in New York on 23 December 1917, and organised by the Zionist movement, was more of an attempt to show Zionist strength amidst a melee of opponents rather than a reflection of the rapturous reaction that was anticipated by the British Government. As De Haas remarked ten days earlier, 'we have only used this method where it was desirable to make a display in order to overbear the Jewish opposition'.[55]

Despite the Zionists' attempt to create enthusiasm within American Jewry for the Declaration the liberal Jewish establishment appeared to remain indifferent. The American Jewish Committee, the bastion of the American German-Jewish 'aristocracy' and composed mainly of leaders of the liberal/Reform camp, was rebuked by Zionists for ignoring the Declaration completely, despite the suggestion of a resolution to mark the 'great event'.[56] In reference to the left, the *Forverts*, the daily newspaper, asserted that a Jewish national home 'will not put an end to economic class conflict'.[57] In any case, according to the senior figure in the Jewish labour movement, Avrom Lesin, only a minority of Jews would go to Palestine.[58] Turning the Zionists' positive comparison between the Balfour Declaration and that made by Cyrus on its head, he discussed both in negative terms and asserted the superiority of Jewish life in the Diaspora.[59]

> That the most holy songs can also be sung on foreign soil too, has already been shown in the diaspora in Babylon. The holy spirit left, not when the Jews went into the diaspora, but rather when they returned from there.[60]

Such predictably understated responses by opponents to Zionism were combined with suspicions within the community regarding the real intentions behind the Declaration.[61] In the *Forverts* it was asserted that the Declaration was made only for the benefit of England, which was to be the real boss in Palestine. *Eretz Israel* was to be but a buffer state between the English and the Arabs.[62]

The general absence of a significant impact upon American Jewry continued into 1918. The journals of the Reform movement, such as *The American Israelite,* remained largely silent on the issue.[63] Such a response to the Declaration was understandable. After all, *The American Israelite*, and the organisations and individuals to which it purported to represent, were in an awkward position. Their nation's ally in the war, Great Britain, had publicly endorsed the Zionist movement. On the one hand, this development presented a direct challenge to the essence of their world-view. But at the same time they would have been reluctant to criticise what appeared to be the official policy of Great Britain, which must have been at least tacitly approved by the American Government. Moreover, in their struggle to fit into American society, this part of American Jewry wished to avoid a conspicuous clash with other sections of the community. However, with greater British gains in Palestine and a Zionist propaganda department in full swing, the Zionist threat came to be seen in a more serious light.

Already in November 1917 some Zionist supporters had started to bring the fight to Reform Jewry. The *Jewish Advocate*, published in Boston and edited by De Haas, criticised the 'very childish' response of the Reform press to the 'greatest event in modern Jewish history'.[64] In contrast to the low profile of other Reform and liberal journals, the *Jewish Comment* responded with a relatively forthright campaign. They asserted, 'We refuse to accept the Zionistic policy of retreat, which rests in a despair of the continuous triumphs of the principle of freedom and fair play for all.'[65] In the face of what became an all-pervasive and aggressive Zionist propaganda campaign, this publication continually tried to make its voice heard and protest the Zionist position. As one observer remarked later in 1918, '[B]y means of a marvellous system of propaganda, the Zionists have been able to "blanket" the country, so to speak, with their movement.'[66]

In the months that followed the Declaration the Zionist movement had sought to further its highly organised campaign, begun in September 1917, to bring Zionist propaganda directly to every American Jew. This constant agitation aimed at committing individuals and local communal organisations to the movement, which merely exacerbated tensions and created a fear of being overrun by the Zionist machine. Moreover, Zionist workers were accused of deliberately misleading Jews in order to further their campaign. They were said to be securing sums of money by claiming they were to be used for charitable purposes or spreading the cause of Judaism in Palestine.[67]

Similar to Zionist efforts earlier in 1917, public demonstrations were used as a means of asserting Zionist influence in communities in the wake of the Balfour Declaration.[68] One such rally in Baltimore, held in December 1917, was billed as an expression of gratification for the British declaration. However, the local community soon perceived this to be an ostensible reason for the rally. It was believed that the 'real function' of the meeting was as 'a sort of jubilation over what Zionists interpret as the crowning victory of their cause'. Further, it was considered that the meeting was an attempt to 'commit the Baltimore Jewish community as a body to the Zionist program'. As a result, organisations such as the Baltimore branch of the Council of Jewish Women refused to attend. In the wake of this opposition, the tone and content of the meeting was altered and it became a qualified stand against what was perceived to be a Zionist attempt to dictate the local Jewish agenda. The editors of the *Jewish Comment* wrote that the chair of the meeting, Sigmund Sonneborn, 'made it perfectly clear that, while we are for Palestine as a homeland for Jewish people, our loyalty as American citizens is above suspicion'.[69]

While liberal Jews such as those of Baltimore perceived British policy to have created a *fait accompli*, they strove to make the distinction that Palestine was one of many homes for Jews and not the only Jewish homeland. This had long been the line held by individuals such as Louis Marshall and Jacob Schiff.[70] But, as long as Zionists could portray this as an endorsement of the Basle Programme, and that the liberal opposition were willing to have it portrayed as such, then a compromise was possible. Even the *Jewish Comment* had declared that on 'Mr Sonneborn's platform Zionists and non-Zionists could well unite'.[71] The Basle Programme was elastic enough for such an accommodation and the general will to portray some kind of Jewish unity meant that agreement could be achieved. Before this could occur, however, the tensions that arose from the Zionist will to lay claim to

American Jewry would result in bitter polemics and division. Only once these tensions reached a certain public and divisive level did a desire for a perceived unity win through.

Already by December 1917 some of the disputes that had arisen as a result of the Declaration were reaching new heights. The commentator Ralph P. Boas asserted in *The New York Times*, 'In its attempt to force unity upon all Jews, whether they like it or no, Zionism is on the brink of splitting Judaism irreconcilably.'[72] The increasingly hostile battle between some Zionists and the opponents to their movement led the *Jewish Comment* to object to 'libellous attacks' that bordered on 'defamation of character' and called for unity for the sake of the Jewish community.[73]

The Zionists, however, were not about to let their greatest victory and endorsement go unnoticed, and were under pressure from London to make as much political capital out of the Declaration as possible. Moreover, the Zionist Commission to Palestine, the Zionist Medical Unit for Palestine and the American Jewish Battalion resulted in an ever growing flow of images and print propaganda that were disseminated throughout the USA. In addition, the Zionists received a new weapon in their arsenal in January 1918, with the arrival of Sir Rufus Isaacs, Lord Reading, the esteemed Lord Chancellor, as the new British Ambassador to America. He was quickly appropriated by American Jewry as a proud symbol of Jewish success.[74] Five months later he publicly declared his support for the Zionist movement, despite his personal ambivalence on the issue.[75] Given that Reading had become something of an icon for American Jews, his open declaration of support for the Zionist movement only added to the impression that the tide was in favour of the Zionists which made their opponents feel that they were being backed into a corner.[76] Some felt the need to come out fighting, whilst others attempted to establish a consensus.

Combined with the Anglo-Zionist alliance's propaganda campaign, those who opposed political Zionism continued to face an onslaught from some parts of the pro-Zionist press, particularly the *American Jewish Chronicle*. Requesting that Zionist leaders put an end to such attacks by some of their 'enthusiastic but unbalanced followers', one publication complained of the 'insane violence' of this abuse, and brought attention to statements that, for example, referred to Reform Jews as 'a cancer in the Jewish body'.[77] In a hopeful statement in June 1918, amidst this climate of bitter division and recrimination, Felix Frankfurter claimed that the imminent Zionist Convention at Pittsburgh 'should convince the world that the Jewry of America speaks as with one voice'.[78]

The potency of the threat that was posed to non-Zionist Jews by the Balfour Declaration was, for them, palpable, as it threatened their identity as American patriots. These concerns were expressed by Morris Jastrow, Professor of Semitics at the University of Pennsylvania, when he wrote of the 'danger of a hyphenated citizenship' for a symposium in *The Menorah Journal* on 'the future of Jewry after Palestine has been restored as a Jewish Homeland'. Recalling the suffering that had been endured by German-Americans, he feared that 'the organization of a Jewish State will lead to the creation of a new hyphen, the Jewish-American', which would not be tolerated by the American Government, with its just requirement 'that all its citizens should be 100 per cent'.[79] Along with Jastrow's argument that the Jews had no title to Palestine, the Zionist respondent, David Werner Amram, Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, accepted this point, but tried to minimise the ambitions of Zionism, to show that they did not conflict with Jews' American identity. For Amram, sound Zionist doctrine claimed that the Jews of the world were not a nation, but had certain religious, racial or historical ties that made a nation in Palestine possible. All the Zionists were looking for, according to him, was an international guarantee of protection for those who wished to go to the Holy Land in the future.[80] Another contributor to the ongoing symposium explained later in the year, a 'Jewish State cannot hope to achieve sovereignty'. It would merely be a 'protected sphere of activity' for Jewish national identity in Palestine. There was, therefore, 'no danger of disloyalty'.[81]

Due to the level of Jewish liberal opposition to a maximalist Zionist platform, along with the Zionists' own fear of being accused of having 'dual-loyalties', they presented such diluted outlines of Zionist aims. As a result of this bridge-building approach, and the liberals' belief in Britain's commitment to Zionism in Palestine, there was a certain space for a middle ground. The overriding aim of conciliation and cooperation that was felt by parts of both the Zionist and liberal leadership, meant that such an attempt to meet each other half way became necessary, even if it was on a superficial level. Public divisions could only attract negative attention in the nativist milieu in American society. At the same time, liberal leaders were under pressure to qualify publicly the meaning of the Declaration for American Jews, and thereby mitigate any suggestions of dual-loyalty, or indifference to what appeared to be the policy of the Entente.[82]

After much debate, on 28 April 1918 the American Jewish Committee adopted a carefully worded statement on the Balfour Declaration that

sought to present a platform that recognised both Zionist and liberal sentiments. The statement underlined the national allegiance of American Jewry, but recognised that there were Jews everywhere who yearned for a home in the Holy Land, an ideal that had the full sympathy of the Committee. Of course, the statement continued, the majority of Jews wished to remain where they were already established as patriotic and committed citizens. This pronouncement was seized upon by both ardent liberals and Zionists, who claimed that it supported their point of view.[83] The crucial point, however, was that it provided a framework for co-existence between the liberal leadership and Zionism, though it is important to add that it did not mark a significant departure for the former. The image rather than the substance of unity was key.[84] Indeed, Judge Julian W. Mack, the only Zionist on the Committee, resigned over the wording of the statement, after his request to refer to Palestine as a 'national home for the Jewish people' was over-ruled by his colleagues who insisted on their formula of a 'center for Judaism'.[85]

Two months after the statement of the American Jewish Committee was issued, another step was taken towards diffusing the communal storm, with a resolution by the annual 'Central Conference of [Reform] American Rabbis'. Similar to the A.J.C., the Conference adopted a resolution in which they thanked the British Government for the Declaration but stated, in much starker terms that, 'We are opposed to the idea that Palestine should be considered THE homeland of the Jews. Jews in America are part of the American nation.'[86] But despite this very strong qualification, the fact that the resolution approved of the Declaration was an unprecedented step for the American Reform Rabbinate.

Nonetheless, the traditional Reform opposition to political Zionism continued to make itself felt. Much to the dismay of the liberal leadership, the opposition, led by Dr David Philipson, the editor of *The American Israelite*, went so far as to call for an anti-Zionist conference in New York City in September 1918. However, soon after Philipson had made his announcement, President Wilson appeared to come out in favour of the Zionist movement, following petitions from Stephen Wise.[87] In a letter to the latter at the end of August, Wilson expressed his satisfaction with the progress of the Zionist movement since the Balfour Declaration.[88] Zionists took this letter as confirmation of Wilson's full support for the movement. Of tremendous significance, it made it possible to identify, beyond any question, American patriotism and loyalty with the Zionist project.[89] It was now almost impossible for

liberal Jews to claim that Zionism was un-American. Indeed, the opposite was now true, and vocal opposition to Zionism was seen as an affront to the Allies and a danger to the Jewish community. Tremendous pressure was thus placed on Philipson to cancel the conference, which he did.[90] By October 1918, the need for consensus was such that even Philipson was calling for an 'Entente Cordiale to Reconstruct Palestine'.[91] By the end of the war it appeared that Zionism had, therefore, been widely accepted by its liberal opponents. However, the perceived consensus regarding Palestine was not the result of a swing towards Zionism on the part of liberal Jewry. Rather, it was born out of the diktats of American patriotism at the time, and the willingness of the Zionists to dilute their declared aims.

Although the Zionists would never renounce the political part of their nationalist project, it could be allowed to fall into the background. With an impending peace conference it was more important to gain communal agreement in order to demonstrate the popularity of Zionism to the Great Powers. Moreover, the Zionist leadership was well aware that the proclamation of a Jewish State after the war was out of the question. Weizmann's statement to that effect in December 1918 again helped to bring on board non-Zionists, and to facilitate the image of what the San Francisco based paper, *Emanu-El*, described as 'a united front in Israel'.[92] The semblance of unity did not last long, however. Although much of the liberal leadership continued to respond in a measured way to the new reality that was evolving in Palestine, anti-Zionist stalwarts such as Philipson re-commenced their public agitation against the movement within a few months of the war's end, and continued to do so into the following decade.[93]

The response of immigrant Jewry

Similar to liberal Jewry, there were apparent signs among the Yiddish-speaking immigrant community, particularly in labour circles, that there was a groundswell of support for Zionism and the Balfour Declaration, just as the British Government had hoped. The Declaration had indeed prompted the small labour Zionist party, *Poale Zion*, to adopt a pro-war stance for the first time.[94] And, as one would expect, pro-Zionist Yiddish newspapers such as *Der Tog*, *Di Varhayt,* and *Dos Yiddishe Folk* received the news of the Declaration in celebratory fashion.[95] More significantly, in February 1918 the *Arbeter-Ring*, the immigrant mutual aid society, made what has been seen as a sympathetic statement on Zionism, and was soon followed by the Amal-

gamated Clothing Workers of America and the ILGWU in May 1918. The Zionist mood, or so it appeared, was such that a call went out in April 1918 for a Jewish Labour Congress for Palestine, which was supported by senior members of the Amalgamated, the Cap Makers Union, the ILGWU, and, of course, *Poale Zion*. Over 200 Jewish labour organisations sent delegates to the conference that was held in New York on 6 June.[96] Together, this turn of events could be seen as evidence of immigrant Jewry's rediscovery of its latent Zionist impulse, and a wave of enthusiasm that resulted from the Balfour Declaration.[97] But, in fact, there was no deep-seated affinity with Zionism in what was a highly complex and diverse immigrant community, in which indifference and opposition to Zionism continued unabated after the Declaration. As Sholem Ash, the Yiddish writer, admitted in December 1917, American Jewry did not respond to the Declaration with 'the enthusiasm which we anticipated'.[98]

A closer look at the broader context and meaning of the Palestine Congress and the union resolutions shows that the apparent pro-Zionist trend that they signalled among immigrant Jewry was illusory. The Congress was called by figures such as Chaim Zhitlovsky and Nachman Syrkin, who were already established proponents of the Zionist cause. Traditional socialist opposition to Zionism remained, and led, for example, to the influential United Hebrew Trades to reject an invitation to participate, on the grounds that, 'Zionist goals were too ethereal'.[99] Although there was a wide array of responses to Zionism among organised Jewish labour most trade unionists remained either opposed or indifferent to the aims of the movement.[100]

Given that only a minority of Jewish socialists were Zionist it should not be surprising that most were more concerned with the Bolshevik revolution than the Balfour Declaration. Hence, it was primarily the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and fears for the threat posed to the revolution by Germany, along with Wilson's Fourteen Points, and not the Declaration, that led many Jewish radicals who had previously been ardent pacifists to support the Allied war effort.[101] Moreover, the nativist atmosphere that had been at the forefront of liberal and Zionist minds also contributed to the eagerness of radicals and unions to adopt a pro-war stance at this time.[102]

The union resolutions that endorsed a Jewish homeland in Palestine must also be seen in the wider context of the war and the international socialist movement. Following the March revolution in 1917, the Russian Provisional Government, influenced by the Petrograd Soviet, had advocated a post-war peace with 'no indemnities' or 'annexations', and was

committed to self-determination for oppressed small nations. From this point on, the cause of oppressed small nations had come to the fore in justifications for the war by labour groups across Allied countries. The support for free Jewish settlement in Palestine was adopted as one part of this wider programme, and was included in the platforms of the influential British Labour party and Inter-Allied Labour.[103] Once Zionism was perceived to be an entrenched part of Allied war aims, as well as the wider labour movement in Europe and the USA,[104] it had become difficult to ignore.

Seen in this context, it is understandable that the unions and the *Arbeter-Ring* made pronouncements regarding Palestine. They were, however, very limited endorsements of Jewish settlement in Palestine that did not demonstrate a significant departure from their previous views. Citing the position of 'International socialist and labor movements' the ILGWU only went so far as to express its sympathy for the 'rehabilitation of Palestine as a physical center of Jewish life and culture'.[105] The Amalgamated, which referred to the programme of British and Inter-Allied Labour, merely recommended that Palestine 'may form a Free State, under international guarantee, to which such of the Jewish people as desire to do so may return and may work out their own salvation free from interference by those of alien race or religion'.[106] These resolutions certainly did not reflect any new found enthusiasm for Zionism. In addition, the *Arbeter-Ring*'s position was particularly ambivalent. In an editorial of its journal, *Fraynd*, on the subject of Zionism it was stated that:

> there is no doubt that the greater majority of the A.R. *[Arbeter-Ring]* was always unfavourably disposed towards the Zionist movement, but the A.R. as an entity did not take any decisions against the Zionist movement … We would say that the A.R. as an organisation has approached Zionism like religion. It is a private affair.[107]

In addition to those parts of Jewish labour that responded either positively or indifferently to the question of Palestine, significant forces remained defiantly opposed to any definition of Zionism. As late as July 1918, Chaim Zhitlovsky, who at this point in his career was a labour Zionist activist,[108] was still struggling to counter the arguments made against Zionism by unconvinced Jewish workers and a socialist Yiddish press that he considered to be polemical and belligerent.[109] Much of the sharp opposition to Zionism that Zhitlovsky was trying to overcome came from the *Forverts*, which continued to wield tre-

mendous influence among immigrant Jewry, above and beyond anything that the Zionist movement could muster.[110] Claiming that there was a distinction between the press and the workers themselves, Zhitlovsky tried to allay the latter's principal concerns: the incompatibility of Zionism with the class struggle, and the threat that it posed to the rights of Arabs in Palestine.[111] As Ben-Tsiyon Hofman (Zivion), the prominent left-wing journalist, argued, the Jews would want the same land that the Arabs inhabit and work on already.[112] Whilst the desert may be turned into a fruitful land with the right technology, Hofman asked, where would the necessary billions for such work come from?[113] This scepticism reflected the utopian nature of Zionism for many Jewish socialists. Hofman wrote that if Palestine was to be annexed it would be by non-Jews, and it would be naïve to think that the war was being fought for Jewish interests.[114] In any case, for him the aims and rhetoric of political Zionism, and the anticipation of a Jewish State were unrealistic and misleading. Only a few hundred thousand would emigrate to Palestine, which would not be enough to constitute a majority. For many years, in Hofman's estimation, it would only be possible to talk about Jewish colonisation, and not a State. For the time being, he wished to emphasise, there were hardly any Jews in Palestine.[115] The 'tide of jubilant shrieking about a Jewish State', Hofman concluded, comes from 'false prophets', and the 'trumpeting about the arrival of Jewish redemption' emanates from the '*shofar* [ram's horn] of false messiahs'. All of this, in his view, could 'only bring harm to the Jewish people'.[116]

The carefully worded resolutions of certain trade unions in the context of the war did not, therefore, represent a full embrace of Zionism by immigrant Jewry. Although the miscalculations and confused policies of anti-Zionist Jewish socialists, such as the Jewish Socialist Federation, led to their failure to make their presence fully felt in the American Jewish Congress,[117] this should not detract from the continuing influence of anti-Zionism in Jewish labour circles. The impact of the Balfour Declaration on the hearts and minds of previously anti-Zionist Jewish socialists and trade unions was altogether negligible.[118] The transient and superficial nature of these declarations was clear from the lack of overt support for the Zionist movement among Jewish labour in the years that immediately followed the war. The eventual warming of relations with Zionist labour in Palestine that did emerge during the inter-war period was only gradual, and derived from socialist Zionist achievements in the Holy Land and the 'coincidence of interests between Zionism and anti-Fascism'.[119] Hardly a ringing endorsement of the Zionist enterprise, this relationship

was pragmatic, and had very little to do with any profound attachment to Palestine among the Jewish proletariat, as had been imagined by the British foreign policy-making elite.

Overall, it is clear that the Declaration, the Anglo-Zionist propaganda campaign, the public support from international labour and President Wilson gave the Zionists a powerful position from which to further their influence in American Jewry. However, this could not have been further from the effect intended by the British Government. The Balfour Declaration was certainly not meant as a tool to aid the growth of the Zionist movement, or to exacerbate communal divisions. Its issuance was supposed to reflect a shift that had already taken place within world Jewry, but in fact was responsible for the Zionists' claim to legitimacy and leadership. The perception held by members of the British Government that the Jews were a Zionist community, and the policy that they pursued as a result, thus went along way in imposing that identity on American Jewry, whether it was welcome or not. In sharp contrast to the British belief in Jewish power, Jewish identity and politics during the war were influenced to a great degree by such external forces. Hence, the societal pressures of the war drove former opponents of the movement to accept Zionism publicly, in a very qualified form, and even to thank the Allies for their support for the movement, despite their personal views.

Unsurprisingly, the perceived dominance of American Jewry by the Zionist movement did not survive into the inter-war period.[120] This decline was not paradoxical, as some have thought,[121] but entirely consistent with the undercurrents of wartime American Jewish identities. Despite the marked growth of the movement by the end of 1918 in the USA, and the enthusiasm that was felt by many, the vast majority of Jews had not undergone a radical change of heart in favour of Zionism. Even for those who had joined the movement, the reality of post-war Palestine must have been a massive anti-climax following the redemptive vision that had been disseminated by the British Government and its Zionist allies. Notwithstanding the very significant, though somewhat erratic, progress of the Zionist project in Palestine in the 1920s, Zionism continued to be a minority pursuit among American Jews. With regard to liberal Jewry, Wise's question, 'have we won Schiff to Zionism, or has Zionism been won over to the Schiff point of view?', was perhaps more pertinent than he would have liked to admit. The Zionist masquerade that began with his colleague Horace Kallen in November 1915 had thus come full circle.

Conclusion: The Consequences for Palestine

In her study of the forty years of Britain's dominance of the Middle East that began during the Great War, Elizabeth Monroe reflected that when 'measured by British interests alone', the Balfour Declaration was 'one of the greatest mistakes of our imperial history'.[1] That it was a mistake has been a principal argument of this book, though its eventual consequences were much more portentous and long lasting for Palestine and the Middle East than they were for the British Empire.

The Balfour Declaration was the result of misplaced notions that held sway within the British official mind during the First World War regarding not just Jews, but ethnic minorities in general. The cultural mind-set of the foreign policy-making elite, which derived from broader discourses that prevailed within British society at the time, saw ethnic groups in racial and nationalist terms. Moreover, the belief in and fear of Jewish power was part of a wider conception in Whitehall of minority influence in foreign societies, and the very significant increase in conspiratorial thinking during the war. These perceptions combined with developments in the war and the efforts of policy-makers and non-government activists to produce a series of nationalist propaganda policies that were designed to win the allegiance of ethnic groups – one of which began with the Balfour Declaration. The Declaration was issued primarily to enable a global Zionist propaganda campaign to capture the support of world Jewry for the British war effort. This elaborate, but largely overlooked, propaganda operation was at the heart of the Government's wartime Zionist policy, and its fate lays bare the erroneous assumptions that the foreign policy-making elite held regarding Jewish identity and influence. In particular, the Anglo-Zionist propaganda campaign had unforeseen but very significant consequences for the British in Palestine and the development of the

Zionist-Palestinian conflict, which have not previously been recognised.

The attempt to show that the Balfour Declaration was to lead to the restoration of the Jewish nation in Palestine did not result in a wave of overwhelming enthusiasm across American Jewry. The conscious use of the conduits of Zionist ideology – culture, history, space and ceremony – to communicate the Government's message did not have the desired effect because, to put it simply, the majority of American Jews were not Zionists. But although the rhetoric of Jewish restoration did not find the audience that was expected, it was certainly persuasive. The Anglo-Zionist alliance succeeded in convincing Zionists and their opponents alike that the significance of the Declaration was to be far-reaching. It was no accident that after November 1917 both Zionist and anti-Zionist Jews frequently referred to the prospect of the establishment of nothing less than a Jewish State in Palestine.[2] Despite protestations by Government figures such as Lord Curzon that the Zionists were running away with themselves,[3] this belief was a result of the Government's propaganda, and had major ramifications for Zionist-Palestinian relations.

From the publication of the Declaration, British authorities on the ground in Palestine were keenly aware of the fears that were held by the local population regarding Zionist ambitions, and tried to either hide or tone down Britain's professed support for Zionism.[4] But in the Diaspora, the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information were trying to play the Zionist card for all it was worth, and their rhetoric soon found its way to the Zionist rank-and-file in the Holy Land, and the Palestinian Arabs.[5] To be sure, foreign policy-makers in Whitehall prevented the Zionist leadership from pursuing any practical initiatives in Palestine that could cause concern among the Arab population – such as land acquisition, or the purchase of the Wailing Wall. But this avoidance of explicit measures was irrelevant when the Government's propaganda utilised such overblown Messianic rhetoric and imagery: the redemptive return of the Hebrew warrior to liberate the Holy Land, the foundation of a national university on the site where Jewish national sovereignty had come to an end, the parades and ceremonies of the Zionist Commission up and down the country, and the general effort to present the Declaration as a turning point in the history of the Jews. It simply was not possible to wage a global campaign to mobilise Jewry behind this banner of Jewish national rebirth, with Palestine as the stage on which it was performed, and then expect the Jews to keep quiet in Palestine, and the Arabs not to see what was happening.

The attempt to create different messages for different audiences regarding the future of the same place, as had been attempted since the fall of Jerusalem, was untenable.

The end result was that an already suspicious Arab population, which had been acutely aware of Zionism before the war,[6] was convinced, as many Jews were, that the Declaration was to lead to Zionist control of the country.[7] No amount of private or public assurances by Zionist leaders, which were requested by Whitehall, could overcome these fears. The sense that the Zionists and the British were really aiming for Jewish statehood poisoned Anglo-Arab and Zionist-Arab relations from the start, and continued to hang over Palestine for the duration of British rule in the country. None of this was helped by the Government's wartime propaganda regarding the future renaissance of the Arab nation, and the publication of the Sykes-Picot Agreement by the Bolsheviks and the Ottomans.[8] The fundamental problem of a lack of trust, and a feeling that the Declaration meant much more than the British claimed, made it almost impossible for the Arab leadership to accept officially the British Mandate for Palestine and its support for Zionism. Of course, there was no reason why the Palestinian Arabs would have supported an administration that sponsored Zionism, however qualified its objectives may have been. It can be said, however, that some sort of accommodation would have been more likely without the nagging fear that the aim of the British Government and the Zionists was a Jewish State, or at the very least Zionist dominance of the country. That being said, the Government's wartime Zionist propaganda could not have been watered down sufficiently without undercutting the principal purpose of the Balfour Declaration. The whole point was to maximise the propaganda effect of the Declaration among world Jewry. The imagined international power of the Jews was of much greater significance for the war effort than Palestinian Arab sentiment. But once the war was over, Britain's Zionist propaganda came back to haunt the administration in Palestine. Not only were the Arabs stubborn in their suspicions of British intentions, but many Zionists came to see the Mandate as a grave disappointment, if not a betrayal of the promise of the Declaration. This popular Zionist belief was entirely understandable given the expectations that were fostered by the Government's propaganda. As an assessment of British policy in Palestine, however, it was completely wrongheaded. The basis of the Mandate was not a step back for the Zionists, but was a massive leap forward that went well beyond the vague and non-committal Balfour Declaration.[9]

The terms of the British Mandate for Palestine, which were approved by the League of Nations in July 1922, legally committed the British Government to secure the establishment of a Jewish national home in cooperation with the World Zionist Organisation. Notwithstanding the British attempts to abandon the national home policy in 1930 and 1939, the Zionists succeeded under the Mandate in building up the infrastructure that made the eventual Jewish State possible, with an established machinery for self-government, healthcare, education, land purchase, industry, and an army. None of this could have been achieved without either the active support or facilitation of the British administration.[10] Without this Anglo-Zionist alliance, therefore, the State of Israel could not have come into being. However, the alliance of the mandatory period was very different from its beginnings during the First World War.

The primary interest of the War Cabinet in issuing the Balfour Declaration was to convince Jewry that Britain was genuinely committed to the Zionist cause, without tying the Government to anything beyond a very vague and limited assurance of support for Zionist aspirations. It is true that the Declaration was very much the product of the initiatives of Zionist activists, from Horace Kallen to Vladimir Jabotinsky, who skilfully prompted the Government to use Zionism for propaganda purposes. But for all these efforts to aid the British, the Anglo-Zionist alliance was very one sided. The British Government gained much, or so they thought, with the full cooperation of the Zionists in their joint effort to capture the support of world Jewry for the British cause. For the Zionists, however, the concrete benefits of the alliance at the war's end were very hard to find.

There is no doubt that towards the end of 1918 there was a general assumption within the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet's Eastern Committee that the Zionist programme would develop in Palestine after the war.[11] After the Declaration and a year of propaganda that emphasised Britain's backing for Zionism, it was felt that the Government was committed to supporting the progression of the movement in some way in the Holy Land.[12] However, there was no discussion as to what that would actually mean in practical terms, or what Britain's role might be, and there was certainly no expressed enthusiasm for advancing the Zionist project.[13] The exceptions were perhaps Balfour, who nevertheless championed the idea of US control of Palestine until the middle of 1919, Sykes, who died of influenza in February of the same year, and Lloyd George, though he typically left little evidence of his views.[14] Even in these quarters, there was a

palpable absence of a consistent and steadfast commitment to building up Zionism in a British Palestine. In 1921 Lloyd George and Balfour claimed in a meeting with Weizmann that by the Declaration they had always meant an eventual Jewish State.[15] But to his private secretary at the beginning of 1919, Lloyd George stated in no uncertain terms, 'If the Zionists claim that the Jews are to have domination of the Holy Land under a British Protectorate, then they are certainly putting their claims too high.'[16] In the same month that the Prime Minister talked to Weizmann about his desire for an eventual Jewish State Richard Meinertzhagen, the former Chief Political Officer in Palestine, complained that Lloyd George had only 'sporadic outbursts of keenness' regarding Zionism, and failed to appreciate its value or moral advantages for Britain.[17] Conversely, Balfour's private interest in Zionism was beyond question. In February 1918 he was asked whether at the back of his mind the Declaration was 'a charter for ultimate sovereignty in Palestine'. He paused for some time, choosing his words carefully. 'My personal hope', he said, 'is that the Jews will make good in Palestine and eventually found a Jewish State. It is up to them now; we have given them their great opportunity'.[18] Balfour's personal hope, however, did not reflect the aims of Government policy, or even his own conception during the war of how that policy should develop in the future. Hence, just after the war he refused to endorse Zionist proposals for the Holy Land that included a British trusteeship and the objective of an eventual Jewish Palestine.[19] In his explanation of Britain's position on Palestine to Lloyd George two months later he merely stated that the Government conceived that the Jews had a historic claim to a home 'in their ancient land; provided that home can be given to them without either dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants'.[20] Beyond this basic formula, Balfour gave no indication as to what should be the precise direction of Britain's Zionist policy.

To put an end to Arab and Jewish uncertainty about the future of Palestine, in November 1918 Sykes had recommended issuing a second, more explicit declaration. It was to specify Government policy regarding the functions of the future 'Tutelary Administration' with respect to immigration, language, land transactions and the maintenance of civic equality, 'with a view to giving full scope to the Zionist movement while safeguarding [the] economic and political interests of [the] non-Jewish population'. For the first time, this statement would have outlined a clear, tangible Government programme for the development of the Zionist movement in the Holy Land. At the same time, it would have provided much greater protection for the Arab population than the

Balfour Declaration, with its emphasis on their political and economic interests, rather than just civil and religious rights. Sykes' proposal, however, was turned down. According to Allenby, who had the last word, a further declaration would lead to an era of bitter political rivalry, and could only be made when 'the future of Palestine has been settled'.[21] It is worth emphasising that at the end of 1918 the War Cabinet, and not just Balfour, was seriously considering giving Palestine to the United States, which had made no formal commitment to Zionism.[22] Although a consensus quickly re-emerged behind the need for a British Palestine,[23] this did not necessitate the kind of support for Zionism that emerged in the final terms of the Mandate. There was certainly no talk of needing Zionism to keep the French out of the Holy Land. Thus, when Britain's commitments and objectives in the Middle East were finally assessed in preparation for the peace conference, the Eastern Committee's resolution on Palestine made no mention of the Balfour Declaration. The only reference to Zionism was in relation to the future choice of the mandated power for Palestine, of either the USA or Britain, which should be decided 'in accordance with the expressed desires (a) of the Arab population, (b) of the Zionist community in Palestine'.[24]

The decision to adopt a British Mandate for Palestine that was committed to, and focused upon, building a Jewish national home in partnership with the Zionist Organisation did not therefore result directly from Britain's wartime Zionist policy. Instead, it stemmed from a concerted campaign by Zionists in London, who took advantage of the general drift and confusion of British policy-making regarding Palestine, as the Government faced the manifold problems of the post-war peace.[25] Unlike the making of the Balfour Declaration, Chaim Weizmann led this successful fight for the pro-Zionist terms of the Mandate, as he consolidated his position at the head of the Zionist movement. As Malcolm Yapp has argued, whilst the spectre of revolution in Europe and its association with Jews was used by the Zionists to advance their case, it was principally the reactive nature of British policy, and the persistent agitation of the Zionists, that made the eventual terms of the Mandate a political reality. Once the Mandate was in place the obligation to Zionism could not be discarded by Britain without running the risk of losing control of Palestine, and of sacrificing imperial honour and prestige.[26]

Similar to much of the post-war peace settlement, the nature of the Palestine Mandate was thus, to a great degree, the product of the complex and chaotic nature of the period that immediately followed

the armistice. The promises of national self-determination that were born out of the war crisis provided a number of solutions that made sense at a time when nationalism was seen as a panacea, and was wrongly thought to be the abiding concern for many populations. Based upon such incorrect perceptions, the re-invention of the maps of Europe and the Middle East were made along nationalist lines, and sowed the seeds of tensions and conflicts that came to cast a shadow over much of the twentieth century. In this sense, the Palestine Mandate and its underlying assumptions, like the Balfour Declaration before it, was much more typical of the time than has often been thought.

As with India, Egypt, Iraq and elsewhere, the makers of British foreign policy were confident that nationalism in Palestine could be managed, although it would not be easy, by effective imperial control. What they did not realise was the extent to which they had created the essential problem that faced them in the first place, with their mistaken views of nationalism, Jewry and Palestine. The establishment of Zionism as a potent force in Palestine, and to a great extent in the Diaspora as well, was in many ways Britain's creation, as was the serious radicalisation of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict. And as the Mandate unfolded, British perceptions of the Jews as an advancing nation that was firmly rooted in Palestine continued to favour in important ways the development of the Zionist project, which it was thought would benefit the local population. In contrast, negative views of the Palestinians as a backward Oriental people resulted in policies that did much to stymie their progress, and promote division.[27] In all of this, the cultural preconceptions of many senior British officials on the spot, and of policy-makers in Whitehall, contributed significantly towards developments that led to the Jewish State, and the defeat of the Palestinians. In this sense, there was a certain continuity between the history of the Mandate and the making of the Balfour Declaration. However, the eventual result of the Mandate, in which the Zionist movement came to undermine and supersede the rule of its protector in less than a generation, could not have been further from the aims of those who were responsible for the letter that became known as the Balfour Declaration.

Notes

Introduction

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2 On the origins of this myth, see pp. 85–87.

3 In particular, see Barbara Tuchman, *The Bible and the Sword: England and Palestine from the Bronze Age to Balfour* (New York: New York University Press, 1956), pp. xiv, 311–312, 337; Franz Kobler, *The Vision was There: A History of the British Movement for the Restoration of the Jews* (London: Lincolns-Prager, 1956), pp. 117–124; David Fromkin, *A Peace to End all Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Avon Books, 1989), pp. 267–268, 283, 298; Ronald Sanders, *The High Walls of Jerusalem: A History of the Balfour Declaration and the Birth of the British Mandate for Palestine* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1983), pp. 73–74, 615.

4 Leonard Stein, *The Balfour Declaration* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 1961).

5 Ibid., pp. 549–550. In his explanation of the Balfour Declaration David Lloyd George himself had emphasised the importance of the need for pro-Allied propaganda among Jewry. David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference,* Vol. II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), pp. 723–724.

6 Mayir Vereté, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 6, 1 (Jan. 1970), in Norman Rose (ed.), *From Palmerston to Balfour: Collected Essays of Mayir Vereté* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), pp. 1–38; Isaiah Friedman *The Question of Palestine, British-Jewish-Arab Relations: 1914–1918* (New Jersey: Transaction, 2nd ed., 1992).

7 Jon Kimche, *The Unromantics: The Great Powers and the Balfour Declaration* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Published under the auspices of the Anglo-Israel Association, 1968), pp. 34, 39, 43; Conor Cruise O'Brien, *The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), pp. 123–126; idem. 'Israel in Embryo', *New York Review of Books*, 15 Mar. 1984, pp. 34–38.

8 David Vital, *Zionism: The Crucial Phase* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), pp. 269, 299–301; Frank Hardie and Irwin Herrman, *Britain and Zion: The Fateful Entanglement* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1980), pp. viii–ix. For a recent exposition of this argument, see D.K. Fieldhouse, *Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914–1958* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 130–147. For an early exception that dismissed the Palestine issue, see D.Z. Gillon, 'The Antecedents of the Balfour Declaration', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 5, 2 (May 1969), pp. 131–150.

9 Vital, *Zionism: The Crucial Phase*, pp. 190–191; Jonathan Frankel 'An Introductory Essay – The Paradoxical Politics of Marginality: Thoughts on the Jewish Situation During the Years 1914–1921', *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 4 (1988), pp. 13–18; Elie Kedourie, 'Sir Mark Sykes and Palestine 1915–16', in idem. *Arabic Political Memoirs and other Studies* (London: Frank Cass, 1974), p. 239; Chimen Abramsky, *War, Revolution and the Jewish Dilemma* (London: H.K. Lewis 1975), pp. 12–16; Ephraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East 1789–1923* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 252.

10 Mark Levene, 'The Balfour Declaration: A Case of Mistaken Identity', *English Historical Review,* 107, 422 (Jan. 1992), pp. 54–77; idem. *War, Jews, and the New Europe: The Diplomacy of Lucien Wolf, 1914–1919* (Oxford: Published for the Littman Library by Oxford University Press, 1992), Chs. 4 and 6; Sharman Kadish, *Bolsheviks and British Jews: The Anglo-Jewish Community, Britain and the Russian Revolution* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), Ch. 4; Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs under the British Mandate* – Translated by Haim Watzman (London: Little, Brown and Company, 2000), pp. 33–49.

11 The concept of the foreign policy-making elite was first advanced by Donald Cameron Watt. D.C. Watt, *Personalities and Policies* (London: Longmans, 1965), pp. 1–18. For recent studies of British foreign policy that have furthered this approach, see Keith Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), and idem. *Britain, the Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Versailles Settlement, 1919–1941* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). On the homogeneity of the Foreign Office during this period, see Zara Steiner, *The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 19–20, 174, 210.

12 In this study I will draw upon Anthony D. Smith's typology of a national community – a singular collective body of individuals, or mass, which is perceived to have a particular character or soul, intrinsically linked to and defined by its national landscapes, language, culture and historical mythology. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 170–208.

13 See Kimche, *Unromantics*, p. 40; Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, pp. 55, 289, 291–292, 296, 299; Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, pp. 577–578.

14 Walter Laqueur, *A History of Zionism* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 161–162. On the dilapidated condition of the World Zionist Organization prior to the outbreak of war, see Vital, *Zionism: The Crucial Phase*, Chs. 1 and 2.

15 Melvyn I. Urofsky, *American Zionism: From Herzl to the Holocaust* (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), Chs. 4 and 5; Zvi Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: the Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917–1930* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 71–72.

16 See Ezra Mendelsohn, *On Modern Jewish Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Jonathan Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism, and the Russian Jews, 1862–1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Gitelman, *Jewish Nationality*, pp. 71–82.

17 See, in particular, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 2nd ed. 1991); Homi Bhaba (ed.), *Nation and Narration* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990); Laurence J. Silberstein, *The Postzionism Debates: Knowledge and Power in Israeli Culture* (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), Chs. 1, 4–6.

18 See, for example, Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 1992), pp. 9–11, 123; Etienne Balibar, 'The Nation Form: History and Ideology' in idem. and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), pp. 86–87, 93–97.

19 This effort to contextualise British perceptions of Jews follows the work of David Feldman on Jews and English society before the First World War. David Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews: Social Relations and Political Culture 1840–1914* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994).

20 In her analysis of 'non-Jewish Zionism' and why British policy-makers were attracted to the Zionist ideal, Regina Sharif has also emphasised the significance of racial and nationalist ideas. However, Sharif does not connect these views to the political rationale behind the Balfour Declaration, which she sees as a product of British imperialism. See Regina Sharif, *Non-Jewish Zionism* (London: Zed Press, 1983), pp. 4, 43, 75–84.

21 I am most grateful to Mark Mazower for discussing this point with me.

22 On this subject, see in particular, Elie Kedourie, *England and the Middle East: the Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921* (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956); Jukka Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914–1920* (London: Athlone Press, 1969); B.C. Busch, *Britain, India and the Arabs, 1914–1921* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

23 See Elie Kedourie, *In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and its Interpretations, 1914–1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), and Isaiah Friedman, *Palestine: A Twice Promised Land? Vol. I, The British, The Arabs and Zionism, 1915–1920* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2000).

24 Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, pp. 209–212, 216–220.

25 Feldman, *Englishmen and Jews,* pp. 10–13.

26 James Joll, *1914: The Unspoken Assumptions: An Inaugural Lecture* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968).

27 See, in particular, Zara Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Office before the Great War', in B.J.C. McKercher and D.J. Moss (eds), *Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895–1939: Memorial Essays Honouring C.J. Lowe* (Edmonton, Alberta: University of Alberta Press, 1984), pp. 19–55; Neilson, *Britain and the Last Tsar*; idem. *Collapse of the Versailles Settlement*; T.G. Otte, 'Eyre Crowe and British Foreign Policy: A Cognitive Map', in idem. and C.A. Pagedas (eds), *Personalities, War and Diplomacy: Essays in International History* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 14–37. Much of the growing body of work on culture and foreign policy-making has been on the USA, and has largely overlooked Britain. For an instructive overview of the literature, see Andrew J. Rotter, 'Culture', in Patrick Finney (ed.),

Palgrave Advances in International History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 267–299.

28 Stein, *Balfour Declaration*; Jehuda Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); idem. 'The Balfour Declaration and Its Maker: A Reassessment', *Journal of Modern History*, 64, 3 (Sept. 1992), pp. 455–499; Friedman, *Question of Palestine*; Sanders, *High Walls*; Norman Rose, *Chaim Weizmann: A Biography* (New York: Viking 1986), Chs. 7–8; Barnet Litvinoff, *Chaim Weizmann: Last of the Patriarchs* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1976), Chs. 5–6; Kimche, *Unromantics*.

29 Max Nordau published a critique of the Weizmann myth as early as 1920. Israel Kolatt, 'Chaim Weizmann's Rise to Leadership', in Isaiah Berlin and Israel Kolatt (eds), *Chaim Weizmann as Leader* (Jerusalem: The Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University, 1970), p. 46. Also see Oskar Rabinowicz, *Fifty Years of Zionism: A Historical Analysis of Dr Weizmann's 'Trial and Error'* (London: Robert Anscombe, 2nd ed. 1952) and Josef Fraenkel to the Editor, *Jewish Chronicle*, 12 Nov., p. 28, and 24 Dec. 1976, p. 14.

30 Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1949), Chs. 11–18.

31 See, for example, Isaiah Berlin, *Chaim Weizmann* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Cudahy, 1958); Charles Webster, *The Founder of the National Home: Chaim Weizmann Memorial Lecture* (Rehovot: Yad Chaim Weizmann, 1955).

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33 Vereté, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', pp. 1–38; idem. 'Further Reflections on the Makers of the Balfour Declaration', in Rose, *Palmerston to Balfour,* pp. 204–226; Vital, *Zionism: The Crucial Phase*, pp. 90, 223–224, 235–236.

34 Isaiah Friedman, 'Zionist History Reconsidered', *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 6 (1990), pp. 309–314; Evyatar Friesel, 'David Vital's Work on Zionism', *Studies in Zionism*, 9, 2 (Autumn 1988), pp. 219–225; and Reinharz, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Maker', p. 493.

35 See, for example, Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), pp. 5–7.

36 This argument is different from my earlier work. James Renton, 'The Historiography of the Balfour Declaration: Towards a Multi-Causal Framework', *The Journal of Israeli History*, 19, 2 (Summer 1998), pp. 109–128.

37 For previous discussions of the Government's post-Declaration propaganda, see Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, pp. 567–569; Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, p. 215; Doreen Ingrams, *Palestine Papers 1917–1922: Seeds of Conflict* (London: John Murray, 1972), p. 19; Aharon Cohen, *Israel and the Arab World* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls), p. 124; Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman*, pp. 213–214.

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Chapter 1 Perceptions of Jewry and Ethnicity in the Official Mind

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3 On the importance of Lloyd George, also see Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, pp. 284–285; Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, p. 144; Vereté, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', p. 26.
4 David French, *The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Ch. 1.
5 Warman, 'Foreign Office'; Zara Steiner, 'The Foreign Office and the War', in F.H. Hinsley (ed.), *British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 516–531.
6 Turner, 'Cabinets', pp. 73–74.
7 John Turner, *Lloyd George's Secretariat* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
8 Watt, *Personalities and Policies*, pp. 10–13.
9 See p. 81.
10 George Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1978), Ch. 5; Christine Bolt, *Victorian Attitudes to Race* (London and Toronto: Routledge & Kegan Paul, University of Toronto Press, 1971), Ch. 1; G.R. Searle, *Eugenics and Politics in Britain 1900–1914* (Leyden: Noordhoff International Publishing, 1976). On the influence of the colonial encounter on racial thought, see Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Colony and Metropole in the English Imagination, 1830–1867* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002); Paul B. Rich, *Race and Empire in British Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed. 1990), Ch. 1.
11 Bolt, *Victorian Attitudes*, p. 206.
12 Mosse, *Final Solution*, pp. 94–95; Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ch. 4, pp. 108–109; Searle, *Eugenics and Politics*, p. 39. For an example of how nations such as the English or French were considered as races, with hereditary traits, character and a particular soul, see Cyril Scott, 'The Genius of French Music', *New Statesman*, 8 Sept. 1917, pp. 543–544.
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14 See, in particular, Ben Peter Gidley, 'Citizenship and Belonging: East London Jewish Radicals 1903–1918' (Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 2003), Ch. 7. Also see George Robb, *British Culture and the First World War* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 5–11; Kenneth J. Calder, *Britain and the Origins of the New Europe 1914–1918* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
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Journal of British Studies, 37, 1 (January 1998), pp. 54–90. On the impact of nationalist and imperial thought on the Foreign Office before the war, see Steiner, 'Elitism and Foreign Policy', pp. 26–31.

16 On the importance of Milner in the fruition of the Balfour Declaration, see Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, p. 312.

17 Lord Milner, *The Nation and the Empire: Being a Collection of Speeches and Addresses – with an introduction by Lord Milner, G.C.B.* (London: Constable and Company, 1913), p. 39. On Milner and race, see Rich, *Race and Empire*, p. 15.

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Chapter 2 Jews, Ethnicity and the Propaganda War in the USA

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122 Reading to Murray, 15 Apr. 1918, Lloyd George Papers, PA, LG/F/60/2/56.

123 Calder, *New Europe*, Chs. 4–6. For a succinct discussion of the use of national self-determination in the propaganda war fought by both sides in Central and Eastern Europe, see Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century* (London: Allen Press, 1998), pp. 45–46. Also, see Marc Ferro, *The Great War, 1914–1918*, translated by Nicole Stone (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 98–105; Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

124 Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace*, Chs. 23, 28, esp. pp. 188, 219, 275. On the mistaken belief in the power of pan-Islam among British and German policy-makers, and how it influenced their wartime Arab policies, see, in particular, Donald M. McKale, *War by Revolution: Germany and Great Britain in the Middle East in the Era of World War I* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1998). On Germany's policy of using Islam and then nationalism to foment revolution among the Muslim populations of the Entente, as part of its global strategy from the onset of war, see Strachan, *First World War*, Ch. 9.

Chapter 3 Turning Perceptions into Policy: The Role of Jewish Activists, 1914–1917

1 See Bernard Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel: A Political Life* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 200–211.
2 Also see his earlier draft, Herbert Samuel, 'The Future of Palestine', Jan. 1915, TNA:PRO CAB 37/123/43.
3 Samuel, 'Palestine', Mar. 1915, TNA:PRO CAB 37/126/I.
4 See 'Note on discussion with Sir Edward Grey, with an appendage concerning a meeting with Lloyd George, 9 November 1914', Samuel Papers, PA, SAM/H/1. Also see Samuel, 'The Future of Palestine', Jan. 1915, TNA:PRO CAB 37/123/43.
5 Samuel, 'Palestine', Mar. 1915, TNA:PRO CAB 37/126/I.
6 The major exception was Samuel's cousin in the Treasury, Edwin Montagu. Minute by Montagu, 16 Mar. 1915, Lloyd George Papers, PA, LG/C/25/14/1. Also, Prime Minister Asquith was wholly uninterested in, and perplexed by, Samuel's plans. Wasserstein, *Herbert Samuel*, p. 211.
7 'Note by Herbert Samuel', 7 Feb. 1915, Samuel Papers, PA, SAM/H/1.
8 Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, pp. 19–21; V.H. Rothwell, *British War Aims and Peace diplomacy 1914–1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 26–27.
9 Samuel, 'Palestine', Mar. 1915, TNA:PRO CAB 37/126/I.
10 Adelson, *Mark Sykes*, pp. 197–202; Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East*, pp. 25–36.
11 Levene, *War, the Jews, and the New Europe*, pp. 50–51, 59, 63.
12 See, for example, C.P. Scott to Lloyd George, (?) June 1915, 27 Oct. 1915, Lloyd George Papers, PA, LG/D/18/15/2; Diary of C.P. Scott (Typescript Copy), 8 and 22 May, 26 July 1916, Guardian Archive, John Rylands University Library, The University of Manchester [hereafter JRUL]. On his scientific work, see, Jehuda Reinharz, 'Science in the Service of Politics: The Case of Chaim Weizmann During the First World War', *English Historical Review*, 100, 396 (July 1985), pp. 572–600.
13 Minute by Cecil, 18 Aug. 1915, Grey Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/95; Weizmann to Achad Ha'am, 14–15 Dec., 1914, no. 68, Stein, *Letters and Papers*, p. 82.
14 See Drummond to Davies, 6 Nov. 1915, Grey Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/112.
15 Urofsky, *American Zionism*, pp. 197–199.
16 Kallen used the secret Zionist fraternity organization, the *Parushim*, which he had founded in 1913, to this end. Sara Schmidt, *Horace M. Kallen: Prophet of American Zionism* (New York: Carlson, 1995), p. 81.
17 Kallen to Weizmann, 16 Dec. 1915, Harry Barnard Papers, Box 1, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati [hereafter AJA]; Ben Halpern, *A Clash of Heroes: Brandeis, Weizmann and American Zionism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 153–155; Urofsky, *American Zionism*, pp. 138–139.
18 Horace Kallen, 'Democracy versus the Melting-Pot: A Study of American Nationality', *The Nation*, 100 (18 Feb., 1915) in Werner Sollors (ed.), *Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical Reader* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 91.
19 Kallen to Frankfurter, 17 Sept. 1914; Frankfurter to Kallen, 21 Sept. 1914, Kallen Papers, Box 10, Folder 5, AJA.

20 Kallen to Louis Brandeis, 9 Apr. 1915, Kallen Papers, Box 4, Folder 10, AJA.
21 Ibid.
22 Kallen, 'Democracy versus the Melting-Pot', pp. 78, 86–87.
23 Gottheil to Kallen, 19 and 30 Oct., 10 Nov. 1914, Kallen Papers, Box 12, Folder 1, AJA. Concerning the British Ambassador, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, see Gottheil to Kallen, 22 July 1915, ibid.
24 Kallen to Zimmern, 1 Nov. 1915, Kallen Papers, Box 32, Folder 20, AJA.
25 Percy to Frankfurter, 23 May 1915, Frankfurter Papers, HLL; Zimmern to Kallen, 19 Aug. 1915, Kallen Papers, Box 32, Folder 20, AJA.
26 Levene, *War, Jews, and the New Europe*, p. 59.
27 Minute by Cecil, 12 Dec. 1915, TNA:PRO FO 371/2579/187779; Wolf to Cecil, 6 Dec. 1915, TNA:PRO FO 371/2835/37215.
28 Wolf, 'Suggestions for a Pro-Allies Propaganda among the Jews of the United States', 16 Dec. 1915, TNA:PRO FO 371/2579/193902.
29 Mark Levene, 'Lucien Wolf: Crypto-Zionist, Anti-Zionist or Opportunist par-excellence?', *Studies in Zionism*, 12, 2 (Autumn 1991), pp. 137–141.
30 Levene, *War, Jews, and the New Europe*, pp. 15–16, 84–87; Levene, 'Balfour Declaration', p. 64.
31 On the Congress, see Jonathan Frankel, 'The Jewish Socialists and the American Jewish Congress Movement', in Ezra Mendelsohn (ed.), *Essays on the American Jewish Labor Movement*, *YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science,* 16 (1976), pp. 202–257; and Urofsky, *American Zionism*, Ch. 5.
32 Sir Gilbert Parker to Cecil, 16 Dec. 1915, TNA:PRO FO 371/2579/193904.
33 Minute by Cecil, 24 Dec. 1915, TNA:PRO FO 371/2579/193904. The memorandum was sent to Spring-Rice for comment on 29 December.
34 On his diplomatic skills during the war, also see Sanders, *High Walls*, p. 427; Shmuel Katz, *Lone Wolf: A Biography of Vladimir (Ze'ev) Jabotinsky*, *Volume I* (New York: Barricade Books, 1996), Chs. 10–13, esp. pp. 215–216.
35 Ibid., pp. 163–168; Joseph Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman: The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story*, Vol. I (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1956), pp. 207–215.
36 Jabotinsky had been in touch with Wickham Steed since April 1915, following an introduction from the historian Charles Seignobos. Katz, *Lone Wolf*, p. 168; Wickham Steed to Jabotinsky, 25 Apr. 1915, Jabotinsky Papers, Jabotinsky Institute, Tel Aviv (hereafter JI), A1–3/3.
37 G.I. Norris to Jabotinsky, 20 Jan. 1916, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/3.
38 Jabotinsky to Masterman, 26 Jan. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2835/18095.
39 Michael Stanislawski, *Zionism and the Fin de Siècle: Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism from Nordau to Jabotinsky* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 171, 179–181, 210–211.
40 Jabotinsky to Masterman, 26 Jan. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2835/18095.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Gowers to Montgomery, 26 Jan. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2835/18095.
44 Minute by Montgomery, 26 May 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2835/98116.
45 Norris to Jabotinsky, 6 Mar. 1916; Masterman to Jabotinsky, 31 May 1916, JI, A1–3/3; Masterman to Alfred Read, 7 Nov. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2.

46 Amery to Cecil, 11 Jan. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2835/18095. Amery later met with Cecil and the two 'discussed the matter exhaustively.' Cecil to Jabotinsky, 10 Feb. 1916, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/3.
47 War Office (WO) to Guy Locock, 17 Jan. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2835/18095.
48 It was finally decided by the Foreign Office in May 1916 to 'leave this alone'. Minutes by Hardinge, c. 27 May 1916 and A. Nicolson, 27 May 1916; Wolf to Montgomery, 22 May 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2835/98116; Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, p. 47.
49 Wolf was probably driven into action due to an erroneous rumour that Lloyd George had made an assurance to Chaim Weizmann regarding Zionism and the future of Palestine. Levene, *War, Jews, and the New Europe*, p. 93.
50 Draft from Wolf to Georges Leygues in Wolf to Lancelot Oliphant, 3 Mar. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2817/42608.
51 What prompted Suares to approach the British authorities and make the case for a pro-Zionist propaganda policy still remains a mystery.
52 'Record of an interview between Sir Henry McMahon and Edgar Suares, received on 23 February 1916', TNA:PRO FO 371/2671/35433.
53 See memorandum by O'Beirne, 28 Feb. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2671/35433. On O'Beirne's belief in the political power of Jewry, particularly in the Ottoman Empire, see Vereté, 'Further Reflections', p. 219; Levene, 'Balfour Declaration', pp. 65–66.
54 Minute by Crewe, 3 Mar. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2671/35433. For a more sceptical view, see minutes by Arthur and Harold Nicolson, 23 Feb. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2671/35433.
55 Minutes by O'Beirne and Crewe, 8 Mar. 1916, ibid.
56 Buchanan to FO, 14 Mar. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2817/49273; Lord Bertie to Grey, 13 Mar. 1916, Grey Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/59; Bertie to FO, 22 Mar. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2817/54791.
57 Levene, *War, Jews, and the New Europe*, p. 97. On French aims in Palestine see, Christopher M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, *France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981), pp. 74–77, 89, 95–96, 100–101.
58 Minute by Crewe, 8 Mar. 1916, minute by Cecil, 14 Mar., 1916, minute by Oliphant, 27 June 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2817/43776. Spring-Rice had gone so far as to call Wolf a German agent. Spring-Rice to Drummond, 30 Jan. 1916, Grey Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/86.
59 Minute by Oliphant, 27 June 1916. Also, see minute by George Clerk, 29 June 1916, minute by Grey n.d., minute by Oliphant, 4 July 1916, and De Bunsen to Wolf, 4 July 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2817/130062.
60 Note by Cecil, 18 Aug. 1915, Grey Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/95.
61 Minutes by Cecil and Crewe, c. 29 June 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2817/130062.
62 Levene, *War, Jews, and the New Europe*, pp. 95–98.
63 Sykes to Samuel, 26 February 1916, Samuel Papers, PA, SAM/H/1. Aware of Sykes' discussions and the Wolf formula, Samuel had again sent his memorandum to the Cabinet. 'Item No. 10. Interview with Mr Herbert Samuel, M.P.', Report of the CFC, No. 6, 7 April 1916, Reel 6, Frame 133,

Mowschowitch-Wolf Collection, YIVO Archives, New York; Sykes to Samuel, 26 Feb. 1916, and Samuel memorandum and note for the Cabinet, 16 Mar. 1916, Samuel Papers, PA, SAM/H/1.

64 It has been argued that Sykes was drawn to the benefits of Zionism by Captain Reginald Hall, the Director of Navy Intelligence. Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, pp. 110–112, 119; Jacob Rosen, 'Captain Reginald Hall and the Balfour Declaration', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 14, 1 (1988), pp. 56–67. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Hall had spoken to Sykes on this subject, or that Sykes had read Hall's brief allusion to Jewish political interests in Palestine.

65 Grey was still opposed to Samuel's proposal for a British protectorate in Palestine. Minute by Grey, c.15 Mar. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2767/49669.

66 See his reference to a Belgian protectorate. Sykes to Samuel, 26 Feb. 1916, Samuel Papers, PA, SAM/H/1. For an alternative interpretation, which claims that Sykes' interest in Zionism derived from his wish to secure British control of Palestine, see Vereté, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', pp. 9–10, 14.

67 Sykes to Nicolson, 18 Mar. 1916, Nicolson Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/381.

68 Josef Fraenkel, 'Chaim Weizmann and Haham Moses Gaster', in Raphael Patai (ed.), *Herzl Year Book: Essays in Zionist History and Thought*, Vol. VI (New York: Herzl Press, 1964–1965), pp. 183–237; Renton, 'Reconsidering Chaim Weizmann and Moses Gaster', p. 143.

69 Samuel to Gaster, 14 Dec. 1905, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/2; Gaster to Moser, 25 Jan., 1915, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/220.

70 When drafting his memorandum for the Cabinet, he had met with Gaster who, among others, provided him with articles and essays on Zionism. Gaster to Samuel, 12 Jan. 1915, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/220.

71 Diary of C.P. Scott, 27 Nov. 1914, Guardian Archive, JRUL; 'Report submitted to the members of the Executive of the International Zionist Organisation', 7 Jan. 1915, No. 95, Stein, *Letters and Papers*, p. 116; and Gaster to Weizmann, 20 Dec. 1914, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/220.

72 Gaster to Samuel, 27 Apr. 1916, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/220.

73 Samuel to Gaster, 20 Apr. 1916, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/227.

74 Sykes to FO, 16 Mar. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2767/49669.

75 Sykes to FO, 14 Mar. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2767/49669.

76 Gaster to Jacob De Haas, 14 May 1916, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/220. Also see Moses Gaster, 'The Evolution of the Modern Jew – The Dawn of Jewish Emancipation in the West', *American Jewish Chronicle*, 5 Oct. 1917, pp. 582–583; idem. 'The Situation of Our People', *American Jewish Chronicle*, 29 Mar. 1918, pp. 553, 599.

77 Report for the Zionist Executive, 7 Jan. 1915, No. 95, Stein, *Letters and Papers*, p. 116.

78 Claude Schuster to Zangwill, 14 Oct. 1914, Israel Zangwill Papers, CZA, A120/514.

79 Diary of Moses Gaster, 2 May 1916, Gaster Papers, University College London. For Gaster's attempts to strengthen Sykes' anxiety to win over Jewry through Zionism, see Gaster to Sykes, 24 May 1916, Copies from the Sledmere Papers, Yad Chaim Weizmann, The Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Israel [hereafter WA]; and Gaster to Sykes, 3 July 1916, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/221.

80 Diary of Moses Gaster, 10 May and 7 July, 1916, cited in Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, n. 10 and 11, p. 288. Also see François Georges-Picot, 'Les Origines de la Déclaration Balfour', *La Question D'Israel*, *Anneé* 17(1 Sept. 1939), p. 677.

81 For example, he sent Sykes a copy of *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, which he quickly proceeded to read. Gaster to Sykes, 24 May 1916, Copies from the Sledmere Papers, WA; and Sykes to Gaster, 5 July 1916, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/228. The book in question was a collection of essays by Zionists that portrayed the sum of Jewish history and life in the Diaspora through the prism of Zionist ideology. Harry Sacher (ed.), *Zionism and the Jewish Future* (London: John Murray, 1916).

82 Sykes to FO, 14 Mar. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2767/49669.

83 Kedourie, *Anglo-Arab Labyrinth*, pp. 133–137; Nevakivi, *Britain, France and the Arab Middle East*, p. 45; Vital, *Zionism: The Crucial Phase*, pp. 203–205.

84 'Minutes of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street on December 28, 1916', Papers of John Campbell Davidson, PA, DAV/46; Rothwell, *British War Aims*, p. 128; David Woodward, *Lloyd George and the Generals* (Newark and London: University of Delaware Press and Associated University Press, 1983), p. 128.

85 Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, p. 361.

86 Diary of C.P. Scott, 26–30 Jan., 1917, Guardian Archive, JRUL; Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, pp. 363–367.

87 Stuart A. Cohen, *English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895–1920* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 110–113.

88 Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, pp. 363–367; Malcolm to Sykes, 3 and 5 Feb., 1917, Copies from the Sledmere Papers, WA.

89 Diary of Gaster, 30 Jan. 1917, quoted in Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, p. 367; Gaster to Jacob De Haas, 31 Jan. 1917, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/268; Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, p. 368; Gaster to Sykes, 1 Feb. 1917, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/279. The only evidence that Sykes had decided to seek out alternatives to Gaster is a record of a conversation between Sykes and Aaron Aaronsohn in April 1917. 27 Apr. 1917, Diary of Aaron Aaronsohn, quoted in Anthony Verrier (ed.), *Agents of Empire: Anglo-Zionist Intelligence Operations 1915–1919: Brigadier Walter Gribbon, Aaron Aaronsohn and the NILI Ring* (London and Washington: Brassey's Ltd, 1995), p. 260. However, this was long after Sykes and Malcolm had been persuaded that he had been talking with the wrong man, and would seem to have been an attempt to show that he had not been duped by Gaster. In fact, it is quite apparent that even after Sykes had met with Weizmann and Sokolow, he trusted Gaster and planned with him alone what actions would need to be taken in preparation for the British occupation of Palestine.

90 Malcolm to Sykes, 3, 5 Feb., 1917, Copies from the Sledmere Papers, WA.

91 See comments by Ahad Ha'am and Shmuel Tolkowsky, 23 Nov. 1917, Diary of Shmuel Tolkowsky, Tolkowsky Papers, CZA, A248/2.

92 See, for example, Gaster to Dr Victor Jacobson, 15 Mar. 1916, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/219; Gaster to Weizmann, 20 Dec. 1914, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/214; Picot, 'Origines de la Déclaration Balfour', pp. 677–678.

93 See British Palestine Committee to Sokolow, 27 Jan. 1917, Sokolow Papers, CZA, A248/16; Weizmann to Gaster, 9 May 1917, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/132; 'Nahum Sokolow' Tribute Committee to Gaster, 19 Mar. 1918, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/244; 26 June 1917, Tolkowsky Diary, Tolkowsky Papers, CZA, A248/2; note by Graham, 21 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3052/82982.
94 Memorandum by Sokolow on the meeting of 7 Feb. 1917, Sokolow Papers, CZA, A226/30/1; James de Rothschild to Gaster, 7 Feb. 1917, A203/233; Gaster to James de Rothschild, 9 Feb. 1917, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/299.
95 Gaster to Weizmann, 10 May 1917, Gaster Papers, A203/241; Gaster to Sokolow, 7 Dec. 1917, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/132.
96 He replaced Joseph Cowen on 11 February 1917. Cowen to Nordau, 3 July 1917, Max Nordau Papers, CZA, A119/247.
97 Reinharz, 'Science in the Service of Politics', pp. 600–603.

Chapter 4 The Making of the Balfour Declaration

1 Diary of C.P. Scott, 26–30 Jan., 1917, Guardian Archive, JRUL.
2 'Interview with Lord Milner', 16 May 1917, Claude Montefiore Papers, CZA, AK 46/1.
3 The first battle of Gaza in March 1917 had been a complete disaster. See Matthew Hughes, *Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East 1917–1919* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), pp. 18–19.
4 Consular reports sent by Buchanan to Balfour, 22 Dec. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2995/811; Graham to Ormsby-Gore, 9 June 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3012/1130308. Also see 'Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report', 12 April and 17 May 1917, TNA:PRO CAB 24/143.
5 Amery to Jabotinsky, 22, 25 Jan., 16 Feb., 26 Mar., 3 and 13 Apr. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/1; Minutes of the War Cabinet, 5 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353; Amery to Derby, 5 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
6 David Davies, 'Palestine and the Zionists', 23 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
7 Jabotinsky and Trumpeldor, 'Memorandum for the War Cabinet', 14 Jan. 1917, enclosed in Trumpeldor to Sykes, 15 Feb. 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 34, MECA.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 See, for example, Wickham Steed to Derby, 7 Sept. 1917, TNA WO 32/11353; Steed to Jabotinsky, 8 Sept. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2; Wickham Steed to Northcliffe, 14 Oct. 1917, Balfour Declaration File, MECA.
11 See p. 26.
12 Kerr to Derby, 22 Aug. 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
13 Jabotinsky to Graham, 20 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3101/81775. Also see Jabotinsky to Graham, 6 May 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353, and Derby to Lloyd George, 9 Apr. 1917, Lloyd George Papers, PA, LG/F/14/4/34.

14 'Extract from Private Letter by: Mr L.G. Greenberg Editor Jewish Chronicle', 16 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3052/82982; FO to Buchanan, Lord Bertie and Sir R. Wingate, 24 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3053/84256.
15 Sykes to Graham, 28 Apr. 1917, PRO: TNA 371/3053/87897.
16 See minutes by Graham, 11 and 24 May, 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/2996/94865 and TNA:PRO FO 371/3012/102649. Even by this stage Weizmann had continued to focus on the strategic importance of Palestine. See Weizmann to Scott, 23 Mar. 1917, no. 323, Stein, *Letters and Papers*, pp. 346–347; and 'Notes of an interview with Lord Robert Cecil', 25 Apr. 1917, Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/1586.
17 See Sykes to FO, 5 June 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3013/112186.
18 Milner was persuaded by information from Alshevsky, a Siberian-born, former member of the Jewish Colonization Association. Milner to Cecil, 17 May 1917, Cecil Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/198; Milner to Lloyd George, 31 May 1917, Lloyd George Papers, PA, LG/F/38/2/6.
19 Graham to Ormsby-Gore, 9 June 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3012/110308.
20 Ormsby-Gore returned from Egypt in April 1917. Whilst there he had met with Aaronsohn and had become convinced of the importance of Zionism in world Jewry as a pro-British force. See Ormsby-Gore, 'Zionism and the Suggested Jewish Battalions for Egyptian Expeditionary Force', 14 Apr. 1917, Cecil Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/198; Ormsby-Gore to Graham, 30 May 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3012/110308.
21 See minute by Cecil, 29 May 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3055/132608; Kerr to Graham, 5 May 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3101/81775.
22 Levene, 'Balfour Declaration', pp. 168–170.
23 See p. 30 and Renton, 'Historiography of the Balfour Declaration', pp. 120–123.
24 Ormsby-Gore, 'Appreciation of the Attached Eastern Report', 12 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO CAB 24/143.
25 'Interview with Professor Gottheil of Columbia University', 24 May 1917, Wiseman Papers, Box 11, Folder 277; Gottheil to Wiseman, 9 July 1917, Wiseman Papers, Box 11, Folder 278, YUL.
26 Telegram to Wiseman, 10 Apr. 1917, cables from Wiseman, 13, 14, 18, 19 Apr. 1917, Box 11, Folder 277, Wiseman Papers, YUL; Gottheil to Wiseman, 15 April 1917, Box 10, Folder 255, Wiseman Papers, YUL.
27 Graham to the Secretary of the Army Council, 7 May 1917, TNA:PRO 371/3101/81775; Masterman to Alfred Read, 7 Nov. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2; memorandum by Graham for Balfour, 24 Oct. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3054/207495; minute by Balfour, c. 20 Oct. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3054/202261; Balfour to Lloyd George, 25 Oct. 1917, Lloyd George Papers, PA, LG/F/3/2/34(a).
28 On the sense of defeatism and crisis as a driving force in Government foreign policy thinking by the middle of 1917, see Brock Millman, *Pessimism and British War Policy 1916–1918* (London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), Chs. 2–5.
29 Scott to Lloyd George, 5 Feb. 1917, Lloyd George Papers, PA, LG/F/45/2/4; minute by Cecil, 20 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3061/24367; and minute by Balfour, c. 19 June 1917 cited in Stein, *Letters and Papers*,

n. 17, p. 442; minute by Graham, 17 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3052/78324; minutes by Graham, 21 Apr. 1917 and Hardinge, n.d. TNA:PRO FO 371/3052/82982.

30 'Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Sub-Committee of the Imperial War Cabinet on Territorial Desiderata in the Terms of Peace', 19 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO CAB 21/77; 'Report of Committee on Terms of Peace (Territorial Desiderata)', 28 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO CAB 21/77.

31 Ibid.; Vereté, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', pp. 17–18.

32 See his comments to Lord Bertie on this subject in April 1917, Bertie of Thame, *The Diary of Lord Bertie of Thame 1914–1918*, Vol. II (London: Hodder and Stoughton 1924), p. 123.

33 Vereté, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', pp. 17–18; Renton, 'Historiography of the Balfour Declaration', pp. 115–118.

34 For an account of these negotiations see Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, Ch. 9.

35 Sykes had sought to help Sokolow for this purpose. Sykes to Hankey, 7 Apr. 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 42a, MECA.

36 Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, pp. 287–288.

37 Sykes to Sir Percy Cox, 23 May 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 42c, MECA.

38 'Notes of a conference held at 10 Downing Street', 3 Apr. 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 40, MECA.

39 Sykes, 'Memorandum on the Asia Minor Agreement', 14 Aug. 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 75, MECA.

40 See, for example, Sykes to Wingate, 3 Mar. 1918, Sykes Papers, TNA:PRO FO 800/221.

41 Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, pp. 172–174; French, *British Strategy and the Lloyd George Coalition*, pp. 175–176.

42 Amery to Edward Carson, 4 Sept. 1917, quoted in John Barnes and David Nicholson (eds), *The Leo Amery Diaries*, Vol. I: 1896–1929 (London: Hutchinson, 1980), pp. 170–171; L.S. Amery, *My Political Life*, Vol. II (London: Hutchinson, 1953), p. 115.

43 Vereté, 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers', pp. 4–7, 15, 18; 'Further Reflections', pp. 210–211; Vital, *Zionism: The Crucial Phase*, p. 236.

44 Weizmann to Scott, 20 Mar., 1917, no. 321, Stein, *Letters and Papers*, p. 344.

45 Weizmann to Sokolow, 4 Apr. 1917, no. 329, ibid., pp. 350–351 and p. 351, n. 5.

46 'Notes of a conference held at 10 Downing Street', 3 Apr. 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 40, MECA.

47 He was informed by Harry Sacher on 14 April, who had been told by C.P. Scott. Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman*, p. 135.

48 See p. 26.

49 Note by Graham for Hardinge, 21 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3052/82982.

50 Kerr to Graham, 5 May 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3101/81775.

51 Minute by Balfour, c.19 June 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3058/123458.

52 Memorandum by Graham, 13 June 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3058/123458; minute by Ormsby-Gore, 10 June 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 55, MECA; minute by Harold Nicolson, 9 Oct. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3053/193643.

53 Minute by Ormsby-Gore, 10 June 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 55, MECA.
54 Isaiah Friedman, *Germany, Turkey, Zionism, 1897–1918* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2nd ed. 1998), pp. 326–328.
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79 Frankel, 'Jewish Socialists', pp. 302–308.
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88 Ibid., p. 75. See Urofsky, *American Zionism*, Ch. 4.
89 See Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Statesman*, pp. 142, 144, 145, 166.
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91 Cohen, *English Zionists and British Jews*, p. 279.
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94 Vital, *Zionism: The Crucial Phase*, pp. 285–289.
95 Ibid., p. 292.
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105 Lord Curzon, 'The Future of Palestine', 26 Oct. 1917, TNA:PRO CAB 24/30/GT 2406.
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107 Ibid.
108 For a similar interpretation, see Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, pp. 546, 552.

Chapter 5 The Anglo-Zionist Propaganda Machine

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6 Ormsby-Gore to Jabotinsky, 29 Oct. 1917; Amery to Jabotinsky, 30 Oct. 1917; Kerr to Jabotinsky, 31 Oct. 1917; Masterman to Jabotinsky, 30 Oct. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2.
7 Ormsby-Gore to Jabotinsky, 29 Oct. 1917, ibid.
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9 Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, pp. 520 and 548.
10 Masterman to Alfred Read, 7 Nov. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2.
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12 Minute by Graham, 22 Oct. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3055/201862.
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15 Diary of C.P. Scott, 27 Nov. 1914, Guardian Archive, JRUL.
16 Hyamson to Weizmann, 22 June 1917, Weizmann Papers, WA.
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20 Ibid.
21 FO to Mr Bayley, 14 Dec. 1917, minute by Hyamson, 14 Dec. 1917, Buchan to Butler, 22 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/86/237667.
22 Geoffrey Butler to Buchan, 19 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/86/244217.
23 Minute by Hyamson, 18 July 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/12718.
24 Butler to Buchan, 19 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/86/244217.
25 Memorandum by Hyamson, c.13 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/86/237667; 'Early Proposal for Propaganda Department', n.d., Papers of the London Zionist Office, CZA, Z4/3824.
26 Memorandum by Hyamson, c.13 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/86/237667.
27 Ibid.
28 Draft letter from Sokolow to Sykes, June 1918, Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/177 IV.
29 Memorandum by Hyamson, c.13 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/86/237667.
30 Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda,* p. 169.

31 Minute by Hyamson for Colonel Woodwark, 11 June 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/213/242073. This is not to suggest that there were no efforts to create pro-British propaganda among Jewry that did not relate to Zionism or Palestine. See, for example, *Jews Among the Entente Leaders* (London: R. Clay and Sons. Ltd, 1918), no. 1083, WHS.
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33 Memorandum by Hyamson, c.13 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/86/237667; 'Early Proposal for Propaganda Department', n.d., Papers of the London Zionist Office, CZA, Z4/3824.
34 Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, Ch. 6.
35 See Ch. 6.
36 Meiron and Susie Harries, *The War Artists: British Official War Art of the Twentieth Century* (London: Michael Joseph in association with The Imperial War Museum and the Tate Gallery, 1983), p. 7.
37 Memorandum by Hyamson, c.13 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/86/237667.
38 'Report of Meeting of Propaganda Committee, 14th December–30 June 1918', Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/243.
39 Ibid.
40 On the distribution arrangements in the USA, see minute by Hyamson for Colonel Woodwark, 11 June 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/213/242073.
41 Ibid.
42 A.H. Fromenson to Simon Marks, London, 1 July 1918, Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/177 IV.
43 Memorandum by Hyamson, 18 July 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/12718.
44 Sanders and Taylor, *British Propaganda*, pp. 78–89.
45 Hyamson to Weizmann, n.d., Weizmann Papers, WA.
46 'Notes on Zionism – The Communications of the Zionist Organization in 1917', 1 Feb. 1918, MS. Milner dep. 140, BL.
47 'Report of Meeting of Propaganda Committee, 14 December–30 June 1918', Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/243.
48 Ibid.
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50 Beak to H. Rumbold, 7 Mar. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/202/44452.
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53 'Memorandum on the Attitude of Enemy Governments towards Zionism', Intelligence Bureau, Dept. of Information, 13 Feb. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3388/29730.
54 Ibid.; 'Notes on Zionism – Communications of the Zionist Organization II, January–March 1918', 19 Apr. 1918, MS. Milner dep. 140, BL.

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56 Hyamson to Jabotinsky, 21 Dec. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2; Ormsby-Gore to Nicolson, 21 Sept. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3409/156603.
57 See Ch. 7.
58 H.G. Nicolson, 'Synopsis of Our Obligations to our Allies and Others', 6 Feb. 1918, TNA:PRO CAB 24/45/3917.
59 Butler to Lt-Col. G.C. Bryan, 18 June 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/12718.
60 Friedman, *Question of Palestine*, p. 297; Cohen, *English Zionists and British Jews*, pp. 303–312.
61 Hyamson to Nicolson, 12 Sept. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3409/156603.
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82 Ibid., p. 4.
83 Ibid., p. 10.
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85 *Great Britain, Palestine and the Jews*, p. 33.
86 Ibid., p. 26.
87 Speech given at a demonstration in Manchester, 9 December 1917, printed in ibid., p. 50.
88 Ibid., p. 33.
89 On the marginal nature of Victorian Christian Zionism, see Bar-Yosef, *Holy Land*, Ch. 4. One of the most influential expositions of this myth was Nahum Sokolow's *History of Zionism*, which was conceived as a propaganda tool to justify Jewish support for Great Britain. Minute by H.A. Cumberbatch, 13 Apr. 1916, TNA:PRO FO 371/2817/54791.
90 Albert Hyamson, *Great Britain and the Jews* (London: The Edinburgh Press, 1918), no. 936, WHS.
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92 Ibid., p. 8.
93 Ibid., p. 12.
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96 See Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots*, p. 7.
97 On the widespread use of this analogy by Zionists in the wake of the Declaration, see Yaacov Shavit, 'Cyrus King of Persia and the Return to Zion: A Case of Neglected Memory', *History and Memory*, 2, 1 (Fall 1990), pp. 51–83.
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99 *Great Britain, Palestine and the Jews*, pp. 23–24.
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101 'A Sermon of the Week', *Jewish Chronicle*, 23 Nov. 1917, p. 15.
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106 Hyamson, *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*, p. 278.

107 See pp. 104–108.
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Chapter 6 National Space and the Narrative of a New Epoch in Palestine

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3 See above, p. 128.
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12 Ibid.; minute by Graham, c. 19 Nov. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3061/221385; Bar-Yosef, 'Last Crusade', pp. 100–101.

13 Ibid., pp. 98–99.
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28 W. Arthur Bartham to Hyamson, 3 May 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/202/59467; Sir Reginald Tower to FO, 24 Sept. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3399/186715; McKernan, *Topical Budget*, p. 60.
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30 Friedman, *Germany, Turkey, and Zionism*, pp. 378–382, 386–388, 395–398, 405–413. The Germans had also set up their own Jewish propaganda section in the Berlin Foreign Office. See Stein, *Balfour Declaration*, p. 603;

Adolf Böhm, *Die Zionistische Bewegung bis zum Ende des Weltkrieges*, vol. I (Berlin: Juedischer Verlag, 1935), p. 675.

31 'Memorandum on the Attitude of Enemy Governments towards Zionism', Intelligence Bureau, Dept. of Information, 13 Feb. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3388/29730.

32 Ibid.

33 News Dept to Benson, Magdalene College, Cambridge, 10 Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/139/79335.

34 Dept of Information to Riddell, 26 Jan. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/21732; margin note by Drummond, on Amery to Balfour, 16 Aug. 1918, Balfour Papers, British Library Add. MS 49775.

35 See, for example, Yeshayahu Nir, *The Bible and the Image: The History of Photography in the Holy Land, 1839–1899* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985).

36 For textual propaganda in this vein, see William Canton, *Dawn in Palestine*, Preface by Lord Bryce (London: The Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge published for The Syria and Palestine Relief Fund, 1918), pp. v–vi.

37 'Changing the Mohammedan Guard outside the Mosque of Omar [sic]: Jerusalem', Q.12633, Photograph Archive, Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM); IWM 45, Film Archive, IWM; minute by S. Gaselee, 2 Feb. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/152/236464.

38 Gaselee to Hyamson, 24 Jan. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/13683; Dept of Information to Riddell, 26 Jan. 1918. TNA:PRO FO 395/237/21732.

39 FO to Wingate, 16 Jan. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3383/9333.

40 Gaselee to Hyamson, 24 Jan. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/13683.

41 Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, pp. 116–118, 145–146, 168–169.

42 Ibid., Chs. 5–7.

43 Ibid., p. 147; Silberstein, *Postzionism Debates*, pp. 85–87, 182–183, 191. This is not to equate Zionism solely with colonialism. See Derek J. Penslar, 'Zionism, Colonialism and Postcolonialism', *The Journal of Israeli History*, 20, 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 2001), pp. 84–98.

44 Jabotinsky's writings were complemented by other Zionists working in Palestine, such as Leon Simon, whose reports were disseminated for propaganda purposes by the London Zionist Bureau. See his articles in *The Zionist Review*, 2, 3 (July 1918) – 2, 6 (Oct. 1918). Father Waggett, the 'Christian journalist' sent by the Government to Palestine, was also published in the Jewish press. Minutes by Sykes, n.d., and Gaselee, 26 July 1918, TNA:PRO 395/237/123903.

45 Vladimir Jabotinsky, 'With the Jewish Regiment – The Jewish Colonies', c. March 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/60273. On Futurism and nationalism, see George Mosse, *Confronting the Nation: Jewish and Western Nationalism* (Hanover and London: Brandeis University Press, 1993), Ch. 6.

46 Leon Simon, 'With the Zionist Commission. (1) First Impressions', 8 April 1918, *The Zionist Review*, 2, 3 (July 1918), p. 39.

47 On the 'New Jew', see George Mosse, 'Max Nordau: Liberalism and the New Jew' in idem. *Confronting the Nation,* pp. 161–175, Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, pp. 2–3, Ch. 4.

48 Alexander Schölch, 'Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century (1831–1917 A.D.)', in Kamil J. Asali (ed.), *Jerusalem in History: 3000 BC to the Present Day* (London: Kegan Paul International, 2nd ed., 1997), pp. 231–232.
49 Jabotinsky saw Zionism as an expression of European culture, which was superior to the backward Orient. Shlomo Avineri, *The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State* (New York: Basic Books 1981), p. 179.
50 Jabotinsky, 'Jewish Regiment', TNA:PRO FO 395/237/60273.
51 Ibid.
52 Shmuel Tolkowsky, *The Jewish Colonisation in Palestine* (London: The Zionist Organization, London Bureau, 1918), No. 933, WHS, p. 8, *passim*.
53 Barbara Mann, 'Tel Aviv's Rothschild: When a Boulevard Becomes a Monument', *Jewish Social Studies*, 7, 2 (Winter 2001), pp. 2–3. On how Tel Aviv was also later discussed in Zionist culture as an Oriental space, see Joachim Schlör, *Tel Aviv: From Dream to City* (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), Ch. 4.
54 Tolkowsky, *Jewish Colonisation*, p. 8.
55 Hyamson, *Palestine: The Rebirth of an Ancient People*, pp. 85–87; 'Report of Meeting of Propaganda Committee, 14th December–30 June 1918', Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/243.
56 'Jewish Colonies in Palestine: Rishon le Zion', IWM 18, Film Archive, IWM.
57 'Wine Industry and the Laying of the Foundation Stone of the Jewish University', IWM 35, Film Archive, IWM.
58 The photographs included a picture of the chemical laboratory which was not seen in the film. See Q.12909, Photograph Archive, IWM.
59 On the myth and reality of women pioneers in the colonies, see Sylvie Fogiel-Bijaoui, 'From Revolution to Motherhood: The Case of Women in the Kibbutz, 1910–1948', in Deborah Bernstein (ed.), *Pioneers and Homemakers: Jewish Women in Pre-State Israel* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), pp. 211–218.
60 Timothy Mitchell, 'Orientalism and the Exhibitionary Order' in Nicholas Mirzoeff, *The Visual Culture Reader* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 294.
61 Nicholas Mirzoeff, introduction to 'Race and identity in colonial and post-colonial culture', in ibid., p. 283.
62 Memorandum by Lloyd George, 19 Feb. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/139/42320.
63 See, Gaselee to Captain P. Kenny, 8 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/152/239839; Auron, *Zionism and the Armenian Genocide*, p. 174.
64 Alexander Aaronsohn, *With the Turks in Palestine* (London: Constable and Company, 1917), p. 83.
65 Zerubavel, *Recovered Roots*, p. 28.
66 'Major Ormsby-Gore and the Future of Palestine', *The Zionist Review*, 2, 6 (Oct. 1918), p. 90.
67 Jabotinsky, 'Jewish Regiment', TNA:PRO FO 395/237/60273.
68 Bayley to FO, c. Jan. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/12461.
69 Vladimir Jabotinsky, 'To be Avenged', TNA:PRO FO 395/237/60273.
70 Aaronsohn, *With the Turks in Palestine*, pp. 52–55; Canton, *Dawn in Palestine*, p. 89.

71 Aaronsohn, *With the Turks in Palestine*, p. 55.
72 Memorandum by Lloyd George, 19 Feb. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/139/42320; Akaby Nassibian, *Britain and the Armenian Question, 1915–1923* (London: Croom Helm, London: St Martin's, 1984), pp. 69–70, 73–88, 112–116, 119.
73 See, for example, Canton, *Dawn in Palestine*, pp. 76–77.
74 Ibid., p. 73.
75 Boris Goldberg to Copenhagen Zionist Office, 5 May 1917, quoted in Friedman, *Germany, Turkey, Zionism, 1897–1918*, p. 354.
76 Ibid., pp. 354–355.
77 Ormsby-Gore to Sykes, 8 May 1917, Sykes Collection, No. 47, MECA.
78 Bayley to FO, c. Jan. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/12461.
79 Auron, *Zionism and the Armenian Genocide*, p. 95, Ch. 2. On the Yishuv during the war, also see Mordechai Eliav (ed.), *Siege and Distress: Eretz Israel during the First World War* [Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi, 1990).
80 Jabotinsky, 'To be Avenged', TNA:PRO FO 395/237/60273.
81 This is taken from a chapter heading in Canton, *Dawn in Palestine*.
82 Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture,* Ch. 2.
83 Jehuda Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 39 and Ch. 5; Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, pp. 48, 63, 68–69; Leon Simon, 'The Hebrew Revival', in Sacher, *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, pp. 99–116.
84 Hyamson to Jabotinsky, 22 May 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/91941.
85 Jabotinsky, 'Hebrew Schoolwork', c. Aug. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/146793.
86 See Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, pp. 154–155.
87 Jabotinsky, 'Hebrew Schoolwork', c. Aug. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/146793.
88 See Emile Marmorstein, *Heaven at Bay: The Jewish Kulturkampf in the Holy Land* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
89 Israel Cohen, *The German Attack on Hebrew Schools in Palestine* (London: Offices of the 'Jewish Chronicle' and the 'Jewish World' 1918), No. 951, WHS, pp. 18–19. There is no proof to suggest that the policy of the *Hilfsverein* was influenced by the German Government. Friedman, *Germany, Turkey, Zionism 1897–1918*, p. 161.
90 Israel Cohen, *German Attack on Hebrew Schools*, p. 19.
91 Jabotinsky, 'Hebrew Schoolwork', c. Aug. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/146793.
92 Note by Sykes, n.d., TNA:PRO FO 395/237/146793.
93 Jabotinsky, 'No Idlers', c. July 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/125849. In contrast, see the well received article by Father Waggett, 'Haluka', TNA:PRO 395/237/123903.
94 Minute by Sykes, n.d.; minute by Gaselee, 26 July 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/125849. By this point, Jabotinsky's infrequent writings were failing to find favour in the Foreign Office and the Jewish Section of the Ministry of Information. Jabotinsky spent months trying to find out what his remuneration would be only to discover that his services were no longer required. Minute by Ormsby-Gore, 30 Oct. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/241537; Katz, *Lone Wolf*, pp. 430–431.
95 Watchman, 'The Jewish Schools of Jerusalem', *The Zionist Review*, 2, 3 (July 1918), pp. 38–39.
96 Ibid. p. 39.

Chapter 7 Performing the Rebirth of the Jewish Nation

1 On the use of performance and space as a means of communicating discourse, see Edward Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London: Penguin edn, 1995), p. 63; Felix Driver and David Gilbert, *Imperial Metropolis. Landscape, Space and Performance in London, 1850–1950* (London: University of London, 1997); and idem. (eds), *Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

2 The Jewish Legion also had a domestic purpose in Britain. It was used, quite unsuccessfully, by the Home Office as a way of enlisting Russian Jews who did not wish to join the British army. Kadish, *Bolsheviks and British Jews*, pp. 223–226. On the Medical Unit and the Jewish Legion, also see Donald H. Miller, *A History of Hadassah, 1912–1935* (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1968), Ch. 4; Elias Gilner, *War and Hope: A History of the Jewish Legion* (New York: Herzl Press, 1969); Martin Watts, *The Jewish Legion and the First World War* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

3 On the integral relationship between Zionism and European culture, see, for example, Avineri, *Making of Modern Zionism*, and Derek J. Penslar, *Zionism and Technocracy: The Engineering of Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1870–1918* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991).

4 See, for example, Bernard Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the Arab-Jewish Conflict 1917–1929* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2nd ed. 1991), pp. 11–12, Ch. 1, esp. pp. 24–26 and 41–42.

5 Weizmann to Graham, 17 Dec. 1917, no. 34, Barzilay and Litvinoff, *Letters and Papers*, pp. 28–29.

6 Minutes of the Middle East Committee, 19 Jan. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3394/19932.

7 Weizmann to Graham, 17 Dec. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3054/239129.

8 Ibid.; Sokolow to Sykes, June 1918, Papers of the Zionist London Bureau, CZA, Z4/177 IV.

9 'Notes on Zionism – Communications of the Zionist Organization II, January–March, 1918', 19 Apr. 1918, MS. Milner dep. 140, BL.

10 Weizmann to Brandeis, 14 Jan. 1918, No. 63, Barzilay and Litvinoff, *Letters and Papers*, p. 48; Weizmann to Ormsby-Gore, 30 Jan. 1918, No. 86, ibid. p. 74; Sykes to Clayton, 24 May 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3392/93985.

11 Mr Barclay to FO, 30 May 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3057/108146.

12 Secretary to the Army Council to FO, 20 June 1917, and reply from Graham, 25 June 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3057/122874; FO to Spring-Rice, 24 July 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3057/143608.

13 Under-Secretary of State for Foreign of Affairs to Macdonogh, 6 July 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3392/117497.

14 Anon., report, 4 July 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3092/118026.

15 This point was made in the speech given by Nahum Sokolow. 'Re-Affirming the Declaration: British Government Welcomes the Hadassah Unit', *The Zionist Review,* 2, 4 (Aug. 1918), p. 65.
16 Ibid. Also see 'A Notable Declaration', *Jewish Chronicle*, 19 July 1918, p. 5.
17 'Re-Affirming the Declaration', pp. 64, 65.
18 See the comments by Lord Rothschild, Leon Simon and George Barnes, the Labour member of the War Cabinet, ibid., pp. 64–66.
19 Ibid., p. 66.
20 'Report of Meeting of Propaganda Committee, 14th December–30 June 1918', Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/243.
21 FO to Wingate, 13 Feb. 1918, Reginald Wingate Papers, Sudan Archive, Durham University (hereafter SAD) 148/5/3; Weizmann to Aaron Aaronsohn, 16 Jan. 1918, no. 66, Barzilay and Litvinoff, *Letters and Papers*, p. 56.
22 FO to Clayton, 21 Mar. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/52848.
23 Hyamson to Weizmann, 5 Apr. 1918, Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/177 II.
24 'The arrival of members of the Zionist Commission at G.H.Q. Palestine, 3rd April 1918', Q.13184, Photograph Archive, IWM; 'Arrival of Zionist Commission', IWM 30 – Reel 2 and 'The New Zionist Commission in Palestine', IWM 45 – Reel 2, Film Archive, IWM.
25 Sykes to Ormsby-Gore, 20 Mar. 1918, Wingate Papers, SAD 148/7/19; Jabotinsky, 'The Zionist Commission in Palestine', Apr. 1918, TNA:PRO 395/237/67362; 'The Commission in Palestine', *Jewish Chronicle*, 26 Apr. 1918, p. 11.
26 Walter E. Myers, 'Visit of the Zionist Commission to the Judean Colonies', Tel Aviv, 24 May 1918, Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/1731; idem., 'Assistant to the Chairman of the Commission, The Colonies of Liberated Judaea – Notes on a Trip Made by the Zionist Commission Through Some of the Judaean Colonies', *The Maccabaean* (Oct. 1918), pp. 295–296.
27 Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, Chs. 4 and 6.
28 Leon Simon, 'With the Zionist Commission – IV. The Judean Colonies', *The Zionist Review*, 2, 6 (Oct. 1918), p. 94.
29 Silberstein, *Postzionism Debates*, pp. 198–199; George L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe* (New York: Fertig 1985), Ch. 5, pp. 90–113.
30 See Q.13193–5, Photograph Archive, IWM.
31 Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality*, p. 144; Daniel Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct: The Rise of Heterosexuality and the Invention of the Jewish Man* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 277.
32 Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, pp. 99–118.
33 See Leon Simon, 'With the Zionist Commission. (1) First Impressions', 8 Apr. 1918, *The Zionist Review*, 2, 3 (July 1918), p. 39.
34 For a description, see Chaim Weizmann to Vera Weizmann, 26 May 1918, no. 207, Barzilay and Litvinoff, *Letters and Papers*, p. 196. For the official film and photo images of the ceremony, see Q.13206–11, Photograph Archive, IWM and 'Arrival of Zionist Commission', IWM 30 – Reel 2, Film Archive, IWM.

35 Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, p. 160.
36 See, for example, report by Ormsby-Gore, 26 Aug. 1918 TNA:PRO FO 371/3339/147225.
37 Chaim Weizmann to Vera Weizmann, 26 May 1918, no. 207, Barzilay and Litvinoff, *Letters and Papers*, p. 197.
38 See 'Arrival of Zionist Commission', IWM 30 – Reel 2, Film Archive, IWM.
39 See Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, pp. 139–142, 160.
40 Report by Ormsby-Gore, 26 Aug. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3339/147225.
41 See Weizmann and Israel Sieff to Sokolow, 18 Apr. 1918, no. 165, Barzilay and Litvinoff, *Letters and Papers*, p. 141; Weizmann to Balfour, 30 May 1918, no. 208, ibid., pp. 197–206.
42 Weizmann to Balfour, 30 May 1918, no. 208, Barzilay and Litvinoff, *Letters and Papers*, pp. 204–205. Although the Wailing Wall was not bought by the Zionist Organization it was still used as a symbol and site of national return in the wake of British liberation. See, IWM 45, Film Archive, IWM.
43 Balfour to Weizmann, 26 July 1918, TNA: PRO FO 371/3395/125475.
44 See Reinharz, *Chaim Weizmann: The Making of a Zionist Leader,* pp. 375–401. Also see Myers, *Re-Inventing the Jewish Past*, Ch. 2.
45 See, for example, Bertram B. Benas, 'The Meaning of a Hebrew University', in Sacher, *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, pp. 190–195; Ben Zion Mossinsohn, 'A Hebrew University in Jerusalem', *The Menorah Journal*, 4, 6 (Dec. 1918), pp. 329–336; Jabotinsky, 'The Hebrew University', c. Aug. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237/146793.
46 Sacher, *Hebrew University*, p. 10; Mossinsohn, 'Hebrew University', pp. 329–336.
47 'Laying the twelve foundation stones of the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus near Jerusalem. Arrival of Major General Sir A.W. Money, Dr. C. Weizmann, and others. 24 July 1918', Q.13212, Photograph Archive, IWM; 'Wine Industry and Laying of the Foundation Stone of the Jewish University', IWM 35, Film Archive, IWM.
48 At the ceremony an extra stone was laid by Weizmann 'in the name of Zionism'. Segev, *One Palestine, Complete*, p. 74.
49 Captain Redcliffe N. Salaman, Cairo, to Mrs Salaman, 28 July 1918, in Redcliffe Salaman M.D., *Palestine Reclaimed: Letters from a Jewish Officer in Palestine – with an introduction by The Hon. William Ormsby-Gore, M.P.* (London: Routledge, 1920), p. 36.
50 Arthur A. Goren, 'Sanctifying Scopus: Locating the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus', in E. Carlebach, J.M. Efron, D.N. Myers (eds), *Jewish History and Jewish Memory: Essays in Honor of Yosef Hayim Yerushalmi* (Hanover and London: Brandeis University Press, 1998), p. 331.
51 Chaim Weizmann to Vera Weizmann, 27 July 1918, no. 236, Barzilay and Litvinoff, *Letters and Papers*, p. 238. Also see descriptions of an earlier official visit to Mt. Scopus by the Commission. Ivri, 'A Palestine Letter', *The Zionist Review*, 2, 2 (June 1918), p. 26, and (July 1918), p. 41.
52 'Dr Weizmann's Report', *The Zionist Review*, 2, 8 (Dec. 1918), p. 141.

53 Speech delivered by Chaim Weizmann at the foundation ceremony of the Hebrew University, quoted in 'Palestine Notes and News', *The Zionist Review*, 2, 6 (Oct. 1918), pp. 96–97; Jabotinsky, 'Hebrew University', c. Aug. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 395/237; 'The Jewish University. Foundation Stones Laid. Brilliant Ceremony', *Jewish Chronicle*, 2 Aug. 1918, p. 10; 'The Jewish University. Laying of the Foundation-Stones. Dr. Weizmann's Address', *Jewish Chronicle*, 9 Aug. 1918, p. 6.

54 On earlier expressions of this narrative in European Jewish culture, see Ivan Davidson Kalmar, 'Moorish Style: Orientalism, the Jews, and Synagogue Architecture', *Jewish Social Studies*, 7, 3 (Spring/Summer 2001), pp. 68–100.

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56 Minutes of the Middle East Committee, 19 Jan. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3394/19932.

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58 'Speech given at a dinner in Jerusalem held by the Military Governor on 27 April 1918', Clayton to Balfour, 7 May 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3395/98470.

59 Wasserstein, *The British in Palestine*, pp. 29–31. On the antagonism that developed between Weizmann and Palestinian Arab notables soon after his arrival, also see D.E. Knox, 'Weizmann's First Visit to Palestine', *Wiener Library Bulletin*, 28, 33 (1975), pp. 5–12.

60 On the use of the *keffiyah* in Orientalist representations of Jews, see Ivan Davidson Kalmar, 'Jesus did not Wear a Turban: Orientalism, Christianity and Western Art', in idem and Derek J. Penslar (eds), *Orientalism and the Jews* (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University Press, 2004), pp. 3–31.

61 Jabotinsky to Samuel, 19 Mar. 1916, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–2/6.

62 Ibid.

63 Umbro Apollonio (ed.), *Futurist Manifestos* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), p. 22.

64 George L. Mosse, *Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), Chs. 2 and 4; Anne Summers, 'Edwardian Militarism' in Raphael Samuel (ed.), *Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National Identity,* Vol. I History and Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pp. 236–256; Mark Girouard, *The Return to Camelot: Chivalry and the English Gentleman* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 276–282.

65 Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires*, pp. 146–152.

66 Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality*, Ch. 6.

67 Ibid., Ch. 7, pp. 133–152.

68 See Louis Metz to Jabotinsky, 26 Aug. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2.
69 Berkowitz, *Western Jewry*, pp. 10–11; Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality*, p. 114; Stanislawski, *Zionism and the Fin de Siècle*, pp. 194–197, 202; M. Adams, *The Great Adventure: Male Desire and the Coming of World War I* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990); Robb, *British Culture*, pp. 33–36.
70 See Jabotinsky, *The Right Way*, c. Aug. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 371/3101/172257; Norman Winestone, 'Marching on to Palestine', *The Maccabaean* (May 1918), p. 131; 'The American Judaeans in England', *The Maccabaean* (Sept. 1918), pp. 271–274; Boyarin, *Unheroic Conduct*, pp. 273–274; Anita Shapira, *Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881–1948* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 14.
71 Jabotinsky to Graham, 6 May 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353; Kerr to Derby, 22 Aug. 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
72 Berkowitz, *Zionist Culture*, pp. 24–25.
73 Minute by A.C. Geddes, c. Apr. 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
74 Jabotinsky to Colonel French, 2 Jan. 1918. TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
75 Sanders, *High Walls*, pp. 567–568.
76 Derby to Kerr, 22 Aug. 1917; Amery to Derby, 1 Sept. 1917; Wickham Steed to Derby, 7 Sept. 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353; Wickham Steed to Jabotinsky, 8 Sept. 1917; C.P. Scott to Jabotinsky, 3 Sept. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2; 'Statement by Israel Zangwill', 5 Sept. 1917, Derby to Kerr, 22 Aug. 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
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78 Leopold Greenberg to Geddes, 21 Dec. 1917, War Office to Greenberg, n.d. TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
79 Amery to Jabotinsky, 5 Sept. 1917, Wickham Steed to Jabotinsky, 8 Sept. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2; Jabotinsky to Colonel French, 2 Jan. 1918, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–2/7.
80 I am most grateful to Iris Abramovici-Tevet for her comments on this medal. For the original coin from the IVDEA CAPTA series on which this medal was based, see Arie Kindler (ed.) *Coins of the Land of Israel: Collection of the Bank of Israel – A Catalogue* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1974), p. 115.
81 Report by Gershon Agronsky sent to Samuel Landman, Lag B'Omer, 5769 (1918), Papers of the London Zionist Bureau, CZA, Z4/17.
82 Jabotinsky to Colonel French, 2 Jan. 1918, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–2/7.
83 Reading to FO, 13 Feb. 1918, TNA:PRO FO 371/3399/28940.
84 Copy of cable from Lewin-Epstein and De Haas to Weizmann through the British Consul, 28 Aug. 1917; De Haas to Brandeis, 1 Aug. 1917, Brandeis Papers, Microfilm Reel 2866, AJA.
85 Brandeis to Weizmann, 31 Dec. 1917, Brandeis Papers, Microfilm Reel 2866, AJA.
86 'Notes on Zionism – Communications of the Zionist Organization II, January–March 1918', 19 Apr. 1918, MS. Milner dep. 140, BL.
87 Butler to Buchan, 27 Aug. 1917 and unsigned minute, 28 Sept. 1917, TNA:PRO FO 395/80/185484.
88 Ibid.

89 Patterson to Jabotinsky, 1 Dec. 1917, Jabotinsky Papers, JI, A1–3/5/2.
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91 Horace B. Samuel, *Unholy Memories of the Holy Land* (London: Hogarth Press, 1930), p. 13.
92 Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Patterson, *With the Judaeans in the Palestine Campaign* (London: Hutchinson & Co. 1922), pp. 43–44.
93 IWM 662a, Film Archive, IWM. There was also a version made with Spanish subtitles. See IWM 651c, Film Archive, IWM.
94 M.J.L., 'Some Impressions on the Way', *Jewish Chronicle*, 8 Feb. 1918, p. 16.
95 For Jabotinsky's own lyrical account, see Vladimir Jabotinsky, *The Story of the Jewish Legion*. Translated by Shmuel Katz with a foreword by Colonel J.H. Patterson (New York: Bernard Ackerman 1945), p. 104.
96 IWM 662a, Film Archive, IWM.
97 M.J.L. 'Some Impressions on the Way', *Jewish Chronicle*, 8 Feb. 1918, p. 16. On how Patterson saw the Legion as the re-enactment of the Exodus from Egypt, and the fulfillment of prophecy, see Alyson Pendlebury, *Portraying 'the Jew' in First World War Britain* (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2005), pp. 131–133.
98 See, for example, 'The American Judaeans in England: Glimpses of the Life of the American Jewish Legionaries previous to their Departure for the Battlefield in Palestine', *The Maccabaean* (Sept. 1918).
99 See the pictorial section of *The Maccabaean*, October 1918 with pictures such as 'Recruits on Parade in Jerusalem. Street Scene' and 'Relatives of Recruits throng the Station'. *The Maccabaean* (Oct. 1918), pp. 299–300.
100 Jabotinsky to Graham, 6 May 1917, TNA:PRO WO 32/11353.
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Conclusion: The Consequences for Palestine

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Chaim Weizmann Papers
Copies from the Sledmere Papers, University of Hull

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