


The State of Israel, the Land of Israel

**The Statist and Ethnonational
Dimensions of Foreign Policy**

Shmuel Sandler

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*To Nissan Oren, who taught me to
appreciate the art of politics and
the importance of history*

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FOREWORD

The State of Israel, the Land of Israel is the product of research begun in 1985, following my return from sabbatical at the University of British Columbia. During my stay in Canada the 1984 Israeli elections had taken place. Their results were significant since, despite the Israeli failure in Lebanon and domestic economic mismanagement, the Likud was not electorally defeated and returned to form a national unity government. This reality confirmed my developing conception that Israeli foreign policy had been transformed in a basic way over the last decade.

Indeed, even earlier, following my return from graduate studies at Johns Hopkins University in 1977, I recognized certain changes that had occurred in Israeli society in the five years of my absence. At first I associated these changes merely to the Arab-Israeli conflict taking on an intercommunal character. Indeed, my book, *Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank: A Study in Intercommunal Conflict* (1984), written with my associate Hillel Frisch, was among the earliest academic works to focus on that aspect.

It was my teacher, the late Dan Horowitz, whose studies of the Yishuv era led me to the realization that, in addition to the strategic nature that dominated the Arab-Israeli conflict until 1967, the dispute also had resumed the intercommunal dimension that had characterized it during the Mandatory period. In addition, Daniel J. Elazar, with whom I have been associated for over a decade at the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, led me to a better understanding of the non-strategic dimensions of communal conflict and conflict resolution.

It became apparent that the transformation of the conflict was not limited to the level of conflict interaction, but rather also involved emerging ethnic characteristics that were new to a state which had always approached its foreign policy from a security perspective. Israeli politics and strategic thinking could no longer be explained solely by a purely statist and security rationale.

Looking at other polities, I discovered that the State of Israel was not the only actor whose political texture as well as foreign policy were being increasingly dictated by ethnic politics and historical aspirations. In addition, political science was in the midst of a debate regarding the centrality of the state in relation to the reemergence of

ethnonational politics. Applying the ethnonational framework helped me to better understand the behavior of the Jewish state. It was against this background that I discovered a dearth of literature in this realm of international relations that reflected either neglect or misinterpretation of the national dimension in understanding foreign policy.

Ethnonationalism is an important variable in foreign policy behavior. It is an integral part of the modern nation-state, and is related to the modernization process and modern understandings of the right of self-determination. But most important, ethnonationalism is not congruent with the state and sometimes even contradicts the interests of the state.

At the time I completed this book, the Likud was defeated at the polls and Labor returned to power. It is too early to predict whether the June 23, 1992 election marked a turning point in Israeli politics. But whatever direction Israeli foreign policy takes in the future, students of international politics, in general, and Israeli foreign policy, in particular, must learn not to confuse or ignore the unique role of both the state and the nation in foreign policy. Each has its own rationale and origins, and each must be weighed in political analysis.

Many people have contributed directly or indirectly to the evolution of this book. Out of a long list, I would like to specifically mention those who had the patience and forbearance to read the manuscript and make valuable suggestions. I would like to thank my colleagues Daniel J. Elazar and Stuart Cohen for their comments on the manuscript. Bernard Susser read the theoretical chapter and made helpful comments. Ben Mollov edited large portions of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. The Jerusalem Center provided the intellectual as well as the esthetic environment for writing this book. My special thanks to its Director General, Zvi R. Marom, for his firm support of this project. I would also like to thank Mark Ami-El and Andrea Arbel of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs for their technical assistance in preparing this book for publication. Finally, my wife Channa and my daughters, as usual, made many adjustments to allow me to complete this project and I thank them all for their patience.

Shmuel Sandler

PREFACE

One of the great political issues of our time is how ethnonationalist movements seek to express themselves through statehood and how the two dimensions of statehood and ethnonationalism interact. Dr. Shmuel Sandler of Bar-Ilan University, a Fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, who in an earlier book wrote about the conflicting ethnonationalist claims of Jews and Palestinians expressed in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians over the territories Israel occupied in the wake of the Arab-initiated Six-Day War, here has turned his attention to the interaction of ethnonational and statist considerations within Israel in foreign policy matters. Dr. Sandler points out that Israel is both a strong nation and a strong state.

Jewish nationalism is one of the first of the world's nationalisms, dating 3,000 years and more. Jewish statehood, however, after more than 600 years of independence and, with a brief interruption, 1,500 years of self-governance in their own land, was interrupted by the dispersion of the Jews for at least fifteen centuries. Although Jews settled in Israel in every century, it was only in the latter part of the modern epoch that the Zionist movement initiated the return of the people of Israel to the land of Israel for the unambiguous political purpose of reestablishing a Jewish national home in the land and achieving independent statehood. Thus the very reasons for seeking statehood were clearly ethnonationalist.

Unlike similar ethnonational groups in Europe and elsewhere, the Jews had the dual task of reestablishing themselves in their land and achieving statehood. Not surprisingly, the result was to strengthen both the ethnonationalist and statist elements in the renewed State of Israel. Through historical exploration of these phenomena during the pre-state period before 1948 and analysis of the first forty-plus years of Israel's foreign policy, Dr. Sandler takes a close look at the interaction between these two elements—the roots and demands of each, and patterns of reinforcement and conflict between the two perspectives. As a case study, the Israeli experience helps us understand the interaction of these two phenomena and at the same time

enhances the study of Israel itself. This book provides us with insights into Jewish conceptions of nationalism and statehood and Israel as a Jewish state. Dr. Sandler's book helps us to determine how Israel has reconciled the two dimensions of its character as the state of the Jewish people to increase our understanding of how Israel functions as a state, especially in its foreign relations.

One of the basic tensions built into Israel's founding is between Israel's functioning as a state like all others and its role as the state of the Jewish people. This question is likely to persist until some equally dramatic transformation of the Israeli polity takes place. The continued existence of a Jewish diaspora, essentially worldwide, containing some twice as many Jews as are located in Israel, only exacerbates that tension. This makes the Jewish dimension of Israeli policy more important and real, and more complex to deal with.

The Zionist founders of the Jewish state were strongly committed to the principle that Israel would indeed be concerned with Jewish interests first and foremost. But they also expected that if not all, then the vast majority of Jews in the world would live within Israel's boundaries, thereby reducing the possible distance between Israel as a state and Israel as the state of the Jewish people. As yet, that has not happened. Thus the real Israel and its government must work within the context of the reality they know with all its possibilities and limitations.

This is the first volume of a study that Dr. Sandler and his students are conducting through the Workshop in Jewish Foreign Policy which he has established as a joint project of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and Bar-Ilan University.

In addition to this book's contribution to the study of this growing area of international relations, it is also a contribution to the growing field of Jewish political studies, as the first book-length study of Jewish foreign policy from this perspective. Jewish political studies concern themselves with the phenomena of Jewish political life in theory and practice. Issues of international relations and foreign policy are part and parcel of this subfield of political science and Jewish studies. Here, too, Dr. Sandler's work is informed by recent work in the field that adds another dimension to what he and his colleagues have been studying.

Dr. Sandler's work was and continues to be carried out under the auspices of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, which pioneered in the development of Jewish political studies. We are pleased to

present this work to the public in the knowledge that Dr. Sandler has embarked on an enterprise which should carry him far in his contribution to both aforementioned bodies of knowledge and, in the process, enlighten us all on a major new fact of postmodern international politics.

Daniel J. Elazar

**PART I: SOME THEORETICAL
AND HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTIONS**

THE ETHNONATIONAL AND STATIST DIMENSIONS IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF NATION-STATES

The nation-state is the core unit of world politics and has been ever since it made its first appearance on the world scene, especially since the end of World War I, when its legitimacy became virtually unimpeachable. On a theoretical level, the emergence of a realist school in international relations reflected the centrality of the state in academic perceptions of the world order. The behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 1960s diminished the state's role in political analysis in favor of other conceptual categories such as the political system or the role of perceptions in decision-making. Nevertheless and not surprisingly, because of its overwhelming centrality in world politics, a slow but incomplete return to the nation-state could be detected in the last two decades. The events taking place in Eastern Europe and the rebirth of the old-new nations in that part of the world should make this inquiry even more pertinent.

An inquiry into the components of the nation-state came from two quarters, both outside of international relations and each concentrated on a different element. One source investigated the modern use of the concept of ethnonationalism and raised nation-related questions relevant to international relations. A second source raised issues that bear directly on both international relations and foreign policy. Despite this renewal of interest, no inquiry was made into the nation-state as a unified concept of two elements and its impact on foreign policy. This chapter reviews some of the theoretical literature in international relations and comparative politics in search of some insights that we can use to analyze Israeli foreign policy. In turn, it is hoped that the Israeli case study will produce theoretical insight that we can then employ in analysis of international politics and nation-state foreign policy.

REALISM, WORLD POLITICS, AND THE STATE

The realist school was established following World War II, and many analysts still consider it to be the predominant, indeed the only, paradigm in international relations. It stressed the centrality of the pursuit of power in international politics and the importance of investigating actual rather than morally desirable behavior. This school took for granted the notion that the state was the central actor in international politics. Whether because of their legal status since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), or because of their control over the means of coercion, states constituted the essence of the international system. It can be argued that the state suffered the neglect of being taken for granted. This neglect becomes readily apparent when we compare state-centered research to the prevalent research that focuses on such concepts as power, security, legitimacy, imperialism, and international order.

The “world politics” approach brought attention to the role of the state and saw all of its theoretical predecessors as sharing a central common denominator and a concomitant shortcoming—the state-centric view of international relations. In contrast to the realist school, the world politics position argued that the agenda of interstate relations has not always been dominated by security and power aspirations. Moreover, military force has not always been the sole or even the main means of achieving state goals. The web of global interactions is managed by power considerations as well as by rules and standards that have evolved to accommodate the growing interdependence between states and international organizations.¹

According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the realists were unable to account for relations when complex interdependence existed. In these situations, because of multiple channels of contact among states, power politics was not the predominant feature of interaction. Otherwise, world politics was merely an attempt, as Keohane himself observed, to improve the ability of realist analysis in accounting for international regime change. “We (Nye and I) saw ourselves as adapting Realism, and attempting to go beyond it, rather than rejecting it.”²

By presenting itself as a quasi-competitor of realism, the world politics school has contributed even more than some neorealists to the renewed recognition of the state in international politics. World politics defined the preceding realist paradigm as state-centric and in so doing gave a new focus to realism that had taken the state for granted. Neither the advocates of world politics, who argued that the state’s role was

overestimated, nor the neorealists, who argued that it was the only actor of real significance on the world scene,³ paid much attention to one specific characteristic of the state that was also influential in foreign policy—the nation.

ETHNONATIONALISM, STATISM, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

When Walker Connor, in his famous article “Nation Building or Nation Destroying?,” provocatively contended that it was very doubtful “that any discipline has been more plagued by the improper utilization of its key terms than has international relations,” his real target was, in fact, comparative politics.⁴ Connor observed that, in ten major works on national integration that he had consulted, not one dedicated so much as a section, chapter, or even a major subheading to ethnic diversity. A. D. Smith complemented the picture by listing all the states with fairly large minorities, all the major ethnic conflicts, and the contemporary ethnic movements. At the end of his detailed and formidable list he concluded that “in every continent and practically every state, ethnicity has reappeared as a vital social and political force.”⁵

Both Connor and Smith commented indirectly on international politics. The gap between nation and state, Connor remarked, was especially confusing in international relations because the concept of the state was so central to its analyses. Connor quoted approvingly from *The International Dictionary*, in which state and nation were correctly differentiated and in which it was further observed that “a nation may comprise part of a state, be coterminous with a state or extend beyond the borders of a single state.” And yet, the professional literature, Connor contended, generally used the two concepts confusedly and interchangeably.⁶ Smith went further still: “Today,” he wrote, “ethnic nationalism proposes a radical alternative legitimation and rationale for the world political system to the prevailing statist framework.”⁷ Elsewhere he made the point more fully:

Because the states' system has constituted itself in each part of the globe before the emergence of ethnic self-awareness or nationalist aspirations in many sizeable populations, a whole range of peoples who subsequently discovered their identities through their myth of descent, have failed to receive any kind of political recognition and collective representation. As a result of this historical and structural global situation, conflict is inevi-

table and endemic. It derives from the inherent antagonism between two principles of political organization: the one static and territorial, basing itself upon the sovereignty of bureaucratic states locked into a network and order of mutual dependence, and the other more open, dynamic and cultural, stemming from the unrealized aspirations and claims of ethnic communities residing within or across the territories controlled by these sovereign states.⁸

International relations theory and research has been very slow in reacting to ethnic politics, and very little attention has been given to ethnonational concerns. For example, in international conflict theory where one would expect some reference to ethnicity in light of the substantial number of ethnic conflicts on the world scene, ethnonational concerns seem to be regarded as belonging entirely to the domain of domestic politics. In his exhaustive overview of international conflict theory, Michael Intriligator fails to mention ethnic conflict in any of the sixty-four categories of his matrix framework.⁹ Even in the comprehensive collection edited by Ted Robert Gurr, none of the articles that survey the literature on international conflict mentions the ethnic element.¹⁰

By contrast, some progress is apparent in another major work: David Singer and Melvin Small's *Resort to Arms* (1982). Although their earlier reports on the Correlates of War project were limited to interstate wars, they dedicated an entire section of their 1982 edition to modern civil wars from 1816 to 1980. Nevertheless, the book makes no reference to ethnic violence or conflict and is concerned primarily with internationalized civil wars.¹¹

One significant essay on the centrality of ethnicity to world politics was produced during the late 1970s by K.J. Holsti. To this point, however, the subject has been pursued no further. In a collection of articles focusing on the transformations that are restructuring the international system, Holsti argues that contemporary international politics is characterized, on the one hand, by integration and growing interdependence and, on the other, by disintegration and fragmentation. "If increased interdependence [in regard to communication, trade, etc.] is supposed to create bonds of community between peoples and societies," he asked, "then why does the search for autonomy and separateness continue at the national and the international levels?" He concludes his article with a striking message: the "international relations scholarly community must at least recognize that nationalism is a persisting phenomenon, one that has not been done in by the advent of supersonic aircraft, large trade volumes and international television."¹²

An interesting observation came from a scholar identified with the liberal tradition in international relations. Ernst Haas, reviewing a number of works on nationalism, interpreted nationalism as a rational choice of a society going through the strains of modernization. Haas's main interest was in what we can expect from a state that is caught between the pressures of domestic turmoil, on the one hand, and the requirements of international interdependence, on the other.¹³ Neither Haas nor Holsti related nationalism to foreign policy in regard to questions outside those of integration or interdependence. Both scholars commented on the impact of nationalism from the international system-level perspective. We still need to know: who is the state tout court? More specifically, what is the relation between the nation and the state in the design of foreign policy?

A possible contribution to this issue was a paradigmatic debate that was taking place in political science. What began as an isolated conceptual observation late in the 1960s¹⁴ became a quite significant issue a decade later: a number of studies appeared that reintroduced the state as the central variable in politics.¹⁵ The new approach rebelled against the prevailing political science orthodoxy, emphasizing statist as opposed to pluralist politics.¹⁶

Stephen Krasner noted that the literature on the state was concerned with two central issues: "the extent of state autonomy and the degree of congruity between the state and its environment."¹⁷ Both themes are of interest to international relations. Indeed, most statistes seem to be preoccupied with the relations between state and society. Nevertheless, they have not proceeded to apply this interest to the relationship between the state and the nation, and then to the foreign policy dimension. For example, by choosing the United States as the case study of his book, Krasner limits his research on statism to a polity that by any standard does not represent a classic nation-state. The United States, according to Krasner, may constitute a weak state. This fact may be debatable, but it is definitely a weak nation insofar as ethnic nationalism is concerned.¹⁸

Statistes, like ethnonationalists, neglected the impact of their respective theories on international politics and foreign policy. Therefore, the critical question still to be addressed is how does the combination of state and nation, as two independent variables, influence international behavior? Prior to suggesting some conceptual direction, we must examine the origins of each of these two frameworks.

THE ORIGINS OF THE NATION-STATE

Tracing the origins of the state and its union with the nation provides an indispensable background for understanding the dual character that informs the modern polity. It is critical for comprehending the nature of the nation-state itself and, for our purposes, the unique constellation of factors that go into forging a foreign policy. The birth of the modern state was rooted in the emergence and legitimation of an interstate system that replaced the earlier imperial and feudal orders. Prior to the emergence of the territorial state, legitimacy and effective power had been divided between two entities—the Holy Roman Empire or the Church of Rome, on the one hand, and a host of feudal lords, on the other. Whereas the emperor or the pope was the legitimate head of a united Christian Europe, actual power was decentralized among many feudal potentates. The monarchs of the territorial state to whom legitimacy was granted following the 1648 Peace of Westphalia had already been successful in their quest for a centralized control of power. As heirs to both the Holy Roman Empire and the feudal order, their survival depended on the ability of the territorial states they had created to fulfill the functions previously discharged by these two erstwhile systems of authority.

The new principle that replaced a united Christian Europe under the emperor and the pope was a pluralistic Europe of states, each legitimized by the monarch's divine right to rule. The basis of the feudal structure was the lord's ability to provide security to his subjects and his domain. The doctrine of sovereignty, which developed as the central theoretical principle of the territorial state, was identified with the ability of the political authority to defend its subjects and territory against enemies from without and disorder from within. Sovereignty combined both external autonomy vis-a-vis other rulers and the capacity of the state to impose order on the territory under its control. The "prince" represented the highest secular authority within his territory. Moreover, his rule was contingent on his ability to provide security to the subjects within his territorial domain. Ideas articulated by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes in their celebrated treatises provided the theoretical justification for dynastic sovereignty as well as the contractual logic that formed the basis of the state and the international order.¹⁹

The American and French revolutions destroyed the *ancien regime*, and the two political philosophers who had influenced these revolutions most—John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau—while not articulating the national idea expressly and deliberately, indirectly gave birth to a

new legitimizing principle—self-determination. Principles like inalienable rights that inhered in individuals and “the general will” underwrote the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The dramatic spectacle of a people rising up against their royal oppressor and replacing him with organs of popular sovereignty provided a practice to reinforce these principles.²⁰

In France, Britain, and other polities where the state had already been created, the advent of popular sovereignty implied not a new form of state but rather a new basis of legitimacy. For the rest of Europe replete with stateless ethnic groups, many of whom were carrying collective memories of glorious ancient pasts, popular sovereignty implied an overall political transformation. These ethnic groups were either crowded in with other disparate ethnic groups under the administrative rule of empires or internally fragmented into many separate entities, as in the German and Italian cases. The decline of monarchical legitimacy and the rise of the doctrine of popular sovereignty gave birth to demands for self-rule within a political structure identical to and emerging from the ethnic composition of society.

The nineteenth century was the era of national revolutions during which the ethnic nation gave birth to the state. By contrast to the preceding 150 years when territorial states were established around princedoms, most of the new states represented a common ethnonational heritage. The Balkan nations which revolted against Turkish rule revived identities that had been dormant for hundreds of years and established states on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Italy and Germany, whose fractured political lives had failed to reflect the common traditions that bound them, each merged into a large sovereign state, thereby altering the balance of power in Europe and eventually resulting in two world wars. Belgium, where a state was created in the wake of a common uprising by two different nations as well as by the geopolitical security interests of the Great Powers, remains a divided society to this day. The revolutions of 1848, the “spring of nations,” amply demonstrated that the national movement was an all-European phenomenon—even if its final legitimacy would have to await the post-World War I period. A century after the Congress of Vienna, the right to self-determination was formally accepted as a sufficient ground for claims to sovereignty and this on a global scale. The effects of this recognition influenced not only the domestic structure of states but also their foreign dealings and, consequently, the global international order.

Nobody better understood the implications of nationalism for the international order than did Prince Metternich as seen through Henry Kissinger’s interpretive prism. International order in the post-Congress

of Vienna era was a result of an equilibrium based not only on the European distribution of forces, but also on a balance among the conflicting historical aspirations of the various states and nations comprising Central Europe.²¹ Thus, although Kissinger was writing about the nineteenth century, he was simultaneously searching for a guide to the international politics of his own era.²² As a student of international politics examining the transitional era between the classical territorial state and the modern nation-state, he focused on the changing conceptions of international legitimacy. "It would have occurred to no one in the eighteenth century that the legitimacy of a state depended on linguistic unity. It was inconceivable to the makers of the Versailles settlement that there might be any other basis for legitimate rule."²³ Metternich, the European statesman, understood that international politics was not guided solely by strategic considerations. To Castlereagh the equilibrium was a mechanical expression of the balance of forces; to the continental nations, a reconciliation of historical aspirations."²⁴

LAND, TERRITORY, AND THE NATION-STATE

The new principle of legitimacy that emerged from Versailles was self-determination. The polity that emerged in the wake of World War I—the nation-state—was a merger of two distinguishable authority systems bound together by a common denominator—territory. What distinguishes an ethnic nation from an ethnic group is that (1) the ethnic nation defines itself as such, while the ethnic group is so defined by others, and (2) the nation defines itself in territorial terms. The ethnic community can survive by itself even without a bona fide national existence as long as it is so defined by others. By contrast, a nation is based on self-determination. Even without unifying ethnic bonds, some nations can exist on any territory—as do many modern nations like the United States or Australia. It is the state that enables the nation to control its territory and allows it to participate in international politics. In different terms: both the nation and the state are defined by space. But if the essence of an ethnic nation lies in its historical origin, the state is defined by its functional performance. Based on this distinction, the national interest, the most celebrated concept employed in foreign policy, would need to be reexamined.

The mandate of the state is to provide security. The concern of the nation, rooted as it is in its ethnic character, is its historic mission. Thus, whereas the state component of the polity is prone to define its core

objectives in terms of security and physical survival, the national component requires that short-term goals take into account the fulfillment of historical aspirations. Not every nation-state, by definition, will be motivated equally by both attributes; different categories of nation-states could be constructed according to a priority scale. Some states may rate their security as a core goal and their historical aspirations in long-range terms. Others would integrate their territorial historical aspirations into their core objectives. An ethnonational state would be prone to equate its historical mission with physical survival.²⁵

Territory would usually be a statist concept, whereas land has more of a primordial implication. For the state, territory is the critical condition for functioning as a political entity; for the nation, land represents historical continuity. Territory allows the state to participate in international politics and provides security for its citizens. From a purely statist perspective, factors like natural boundaries and strategic depth determine desirable borders. A national approach, on the other hand, will determine its land requirements by historical memories and loyalties, even by ancient records of national settlement.

The nation and the state are two frameworks of authority that constitute the modern polity and do not always precisely overlap each other. While the nation has its roots in the ethnic community that preceded the appearance of the state, the state is a political-territorial construct. "The modern state," as A.D. Smith defined it, "refers to a set of autonomous and abstract institutions within a given territory; the modern nation refers to a sense of historic community associated with a unique homeland." The nation, which is a modern development of the ethnic community, added the territorial element to the sense of common origin, history, and culture.

Both [the ethnic group and the nation] are founded on the sense of common origin and descent from a founding ancestor, even if he is mythical, and both also refer back to a common place of origin, the group's original habitat...Even where the ethnic community has lost touch with "its" original habitat, the reborn and revived nation requires "its own" territory—as the Turks did Anatolia and the Jews Israel—in which it may flourish.²⁶

THE ETHNONATIONAL AND STATIST DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY

It is against this background that we turn to the central question of this book: What determines the respective impact of the statist and national components on foreign policy? What variables influence the internal distribution between “reason of state” and “reason of nation” in a political community’s external behavior?

One potentially fertile avenue of exploration would be to distinguish between those polities in which the nation preceded the state, for example, Germany or Italy, and polities, such as the United Kingdom and the United States and many of the states that emerged in the wake of decolonization, in which nation-building took place after the state was already in place. It would also be logical to assume that in strong ethnic nations historical aspirations would tend to be predominant and influence the state’s foreign policy goals, whereas the opposite would be true in strong states. In general, the underlying assumption would be that a strong state interacting with a weak nation would likely determine its foreign policy to follow statist goals, while the opposite would be true when the nation is the stronger element in the union.

While both of the above explanatory hypotheses still need to undergo empirical testing through comparative analysis, it is clear that they cannot fully explain cases where both the state and the nation are strong, regardless of which preceded the other. These hypotheses would be especially unsatisfactory in cases where we can identify clear periods of a statist and of an ethnonational foreign policy alternatively. In such cases, an explanation specific to each period would have to be found; why had one component prevailed in one period, only to become subordinate in another?

An historical analysis of the origins of the nation and the state is definitely the first step in understanding the phenomenon. In cases where both the nation and the state emerged as strong authority systems, rather than embark on a search for which preceded which, it would be more pertinent to look at the historical conditions that gave rise to each component. Since the statist and the ethnonational components are integral to some nation-states, both influence the polity’s external behavior. The relationship between the two is not necessarily conflictual; on the contrary, they may well prove to be complementary. Clearly, a state may take advantage of a national claim so as to augment its power; alternatively, a nation might use state security concerns to advance its historical claims. Only when the two do not complement each other is

it possible, even if it is not always practicable, to weigh the impact of each component. Moreover, when they do work at cross purposes, their respective weight will be determined by the relative objective strength of each component at that point in time. The relative weight of each component would be influenced by the setting or the environment in which the nation-state was operating.

Which environmental variables determine the strength of each component in the nation-state and thus influence the polity's external behavior? At the outset we should distinguish between statist and ethnonational settings. The strength of the national component is determined by its own setting. In this setting the two decisive variables for foreign policy are (1) the existence of an historical bond between the nation and the territory on which it dwells or aspires to do so; and (2) the existence of a competing ethnic nation with claims over parts or the totality of the homeland. As pointed out above, ethnic nationalism derives its vitality from historical memories and loyalties as well as from external challenges to its viability and well-being. When historical aspirations, once considered part of the national identity, are reawakened, when the competing national claims of a rival ethnic minority become dominant, it is reasonable to assume that the national component of a polity's character will be energized—even if it has remained dormant until then. In this study we will therefore use the concept of ethnic nationalism or ethnonationalism in reference to a nationalism awakened by ethnic factors.

The variables that determine the state's "weight" in foreign policy determination are classical elements: the external environment, its domestic structure, and its leadership. A pure interstate environment may strengthen the statist elements. A domestic structure composed of strong state institutions, statist parties, elites, and/or statesmen would contribute to the strength of the state. In contrast, when the predominant leadership, ruling elite, or parties that are identified with the state decline or are transformed by external or domestic process, then the state's influence over foreign policy will also decline in favor of the national component. Simply put, a statist foreign policy will be replaced by an ethnonational one. A central question to be answered in this study is, what factors change the distribution of strength between the two settings? Which processes may transform the distribution of strength between the statist and the ethnonational settings?

Samuel Huntington, in his classic study of changing societies, concluded that "Modernization means that all groups old as well as new, traditional as well as modern, became increasingly aware of themselves

as groups and of their interests and claims in relation to other groups.” Although modernization by definition is supposed to erode primordial loyalties, Huntington also discovered that the “early phases of modernization are often marked by the emergence of fundamentalist religious movements.”²⁷

Students of nationalism explained the linkage between modernization and nationalism through the concept of relative deprivation.²⁸ Modernization, by creating self-awareness, on the one hand, and inequality, on the other, promotes value expectations that exceed value capabilities. Frustrations deriving from relative deprivation may generate both a revolt against the statist elite and nationalist passions that can be directed internally or externally against competing ethnic groups. Relative deprivation can also be elevated to the polity level when a whole nation feels that its status in the international community is inconsistent with its expectations. Germany and Italy following World War I could serve as illustrations.

External challenges can also produce traumatic experiences to which the state seems unable to provide an answer. A crisis of confidence in the ability of the state to contend with security or economic challenges may well encourage segments in the polity, especially those intensely exposed to relative deprivation, to turn to those who exploit ethnicity as well as to other sources of legitimacy such as ethnic nationalism.

ISRAEL AS A CASE STUDY

The State of Israel represents a highly interesting case for studying the interaction between nation and state in the design of foreign policy. It qualifies as both a strong state and a strong nation. It sees itself as heir to a history of more than three millennia, an historical memory of a homeland, and a diaspora experience of thousands of years, during which it constituted an ethnic minority in every country in which it resided. Finally, in nineteenth century Europe, it established a national movement for the return to its homeland, for an ingathering of the exiles. It should be clear then that, from virtually every possible perspective, the Jews qualify to be considered in the context of ethnic nationalism. The return to Palestine after almost two millennia and the encounter with the local Arab population hostile to the Zionist idea provide additional elements that qualify the Jewish polity as ethnonational.

Despite the great weight given to the national component, most political scientists agree that the Jewish state that was born out of the Jewish community in Mandatory Palestine (the Yishuv as it came to be known) was indeed a very strong entity.²⁹ Pluralistic and open in an era in which most other national liberation movements had to choose between authoritarian and weak regimes—indeed, sometimes they suffered from both simultaneously—the State of Israel remained a relatively stable democracy. Special consideration should be given to the fact that all this was taking place while the state was absorbing a mass migration that was almost double the size of its own population. This migration came from a diaspora that was spread all over the globe, from a wide variety of cultures, and from all levels of technological and educational development.

The theoretical analysis elaborated here suggests that a state-nation foreign policy analysis must include three elements: (1) analysis of the origins of each component; (2) evaluation of the relative weight of each component as determined by its setting; and (3) understanding of the process of change that may influence the internal distribution between the two settings.

Without taking a stand as to where the roots of the Israeli polity are truly to be found, it is assumed, for the purposes of this book, that nineteenth-century Zionist thought would be the most suitable point of departure for the study of the Israeli nation-state and its foreign policy. Some Israeli political scientists argue that the foundations of the Israeli polity were laid in the Yishuv era. Others would approach modern Israel as the outcome of a Jewish political tradition that extended for thousands of years.³⁰ For a study that concentrates on the tension between state and nation, it is only natural that one look to that period in Western history when the two dimensions fused to create the modern polity. Indeed, the roots of the national and the statist ideas were found in early Zionist thought at least in principle. The potential tension between the two came to the fore only in the twentieth century when they confronted each other in a number of highly-charged debates. The first confrontation took place in 1904, and, ultimately, the nationalist idea gained the upper hand. In the mid-1930s the Yishuv participated in a second debate that involved ethnonational and statist considerations. This time the statist position was victorious. (Chapter 2 covers that era.)

With both the ethnonational and statist perspectives found in original Zionist thought, this book contends with the emergence of a statist foreign policy during the early years of the Jewish state. Part of the answer has to do with the interaction between the statist and the

ethnonational settings. The statist era of the Jewish state is analyzed in the next three chapters; Chapter 3 deals with the ethnonational setting, and Chapter 4 with the statist setting. Chapter 5 analyzes the foreign policy of Israel as influenced primarily by statist considerations.

The reemergence of ethnonationalism during the post-1967 period is explained by the process that transformed the distribution of strength between state and nation. The impact of ethnonationalism on foreign policy in a strong state setting with an established tradition of a statist foreign policy challenges the traditional assumption that Israel had limited flexibility in formulating its security doctrine because of its geopolitical position. The transformation of the Israeli polity and its impact on the foreign policy of the Jewish state is analyzed in chapters 6 to 8.

The overall purpose of this study, both theoretically and empirically, is to understand the foreign policy of contemporary polities as emanating from their dual characters as states and nations. As argued above, in many polities a purely realist-statist or a purely nationalist answer would be insufficient to provide the total picture. To comprehend Israeli foreign policy, our study will prove that both dimensions need to be taken into account. Answering all three questions—the origins of both traditions, the emergence of statism, and the transformation questions—promises to provide a fuller account of the external behavior of the Jewish state. It is hoped that the lessons as elaborated in the concluding chapter may serve as a basis for understanding other polities.

The book focuses primarily on the territorial-land issue in Israeli foreign policy. Territory is an issue that conjoins state, nation, and foreign policy. For the state it provides both a legal condition and survival. In the Jewish context the Land of Israel provided a central dimension of Israel as a Jewish state. Another central dimension was the commitment of Israel to the Jewish people in the diaspora. Unless the Jewish dimension of Israeli foreign policy was found to be directly related to the central argument of the essay, it was intentionally omitted from the study's frame of reference. The subject of Jewish foreign policy is left for a forthcoming study. What the present study tries to accomplish is to highlight the basic tendencies of the state and of the nation, as well as to evaluate their joint contribution to Israeli foreign policy.

NOTES

1. The school of world politics was introduced in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); see chs. 1-3. For prior attacks on the centrality of the state, see John Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics* 9, no. 2 (July 1957); and Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964).

2. Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics, Structural Realism and Beyond," in Robert E. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 160.

3. On the reemergence of realism, see Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*. On the centrality of the state according to neorealism, see also Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 88-89.

4. Walker Connor, "Nation Building or Nation Destroying?," *World Politics* 24, no. 3 (April 1972):332.

5. Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 12.

6. Connor, "Nation Building," p. 333

7. Smith, *The Ethnic Revival*, p. xii.

8. A.D. Smith, "Ethnic Identity and World Order," *Millennium* 12, no. 2 (June 1982):307-327.

9. Michael D. Intriligator, "Research or Conflict Theory," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 2 (June 1982):307-327.

10. Ted Robert Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1981), chs. 8-10.

11. David Singer and Melvin Small, *Resort to Arms* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982).

12. K.J. Holsti, "Change in the International System: Interdependence, Integration and Fragmentation," reprinted in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, eds., *The Global Agenda, Issues and Perspectives* (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 219 and 215. For thinkers from other disciplines who labored to account for the striking resilience of nationalism, see Ernst Gelner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983). See also Dov Ronen, *The Quest for Self-Determination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979). Gelner associates it with industrial society, and Ronen with the individual's desire to express himself. See also John Brenilly, *Nations and the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982).

13. Ernst B. Haas, "What Is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" *International Organisation* 40, no. 3 (Summer 1986):707-744.

14. J.B. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20 (1968):559-592.

15. See Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). Stephan Krasner, *Defending the National Interest, Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) belonged more to the field of foreign policy proper. Central contributions in political science proper were articles in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

16. See Krasner's attack on the pluralists in Stephan Krasner, "Approaches to the State, Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984):227. For a debate between the two approaches, see articles by Gabriel A. Almond, Eric A. Nordlinger, Theodor J. Lowi, and Sergio Fabrini in *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (September 1988):853-901. See also David Easton, "The Political System Besieged by the State," *Political Theory* 9, no. 3 (August 1981):303-325.

17. Krasner, "Approaches to the State," p. 224.

18. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest*; see especially chs. III and IX.

19. This analysis is based on Herz, "Rise and Demise," and Donald J. Puchala, *International Politics Today* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 27-34.

20. Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs* 27, no. 1 (1973):5-11.

21. Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored, Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957). See especially chs. I, IX, and XVIII.

22. Stephan R. Graubard, *Kissinger, Portrait of a Mind* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1974), p. 18.

23. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 145.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

25. K.J. Holsti, *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 129-140.

26. A.D. Smith, "States and Homelands: The Social and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory," *Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1981):187.

27. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). On modernization in ethnic conflict, see Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 96-104.

28. Chong-Do Hah and Jeffrey Martin, "Towards a Synthesis of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism," *World Politics*, 27, no. 3 (April 1978):361-386.

29. See, for instance, Yonathan Shapiro, *Democracy in Israel* (Ramat Gan: Masada, 1977).

30. For the Palestine-centric approach, see Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1988). The Jewish polity approach is reflected in Daniel J. Elazar and Stuart Cohen, *The Jewish Polity: Jewish Political Organization from Biblical Times to the Present* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1985).

THE ETHNONATIONAL AND STATIST ORIGINS OF ZIONIST FOREIGN POLICY

The nation and the state are two different authority systems that came together to create the modern polity. The encounter of the two systems in Europe primarily during the years between the French Revolution and the end of World War I influenced many ethnic peoples residing on the continent, including the Jews. The Jews qualified for an ethnonational definition from every perspective. The relationship of nationalism's legitimacy to egalitarianism and the doctrine of popular sovereignty made Jewish emancipation an important process in shaping Zionism as a national movement. Modernization was another major force in activation of nationalism and therefore must also be evaluated in the Zionist context. An inquiry into nineteenth-century Zionism should reveal how each of these themes expressed itself in the thought and major policy decisions of the Zionist movement at the dawn of the twentieth century when it was challenged to choose between a statist and an ethnonational path.

THE ETHNIC ROOTS OF ZIONISM

Modern Jewish nationalism shared the characteristics of other national movements and was undoubtedly influenced by them; nevertheless, it was distinctive from several perspectives. Unlike other national movements that flourished in nineteenth-century Europe, the Jews did not inhabit the territory they claimed to be their historical land. Moreover, the Jews, in contrast to other nations, did not constitute a majority in any of the countries where they lived.

Being the classical diaspora—an ethnic minority everywhere—the Jews by definition constituted an ethnic group.¹ Carrying with them the memory of their ancient homeland, common origin, founding ancestor, and other ethnic properties, they were, according to their own defini-

tion, a nation in exile. Both *gola* (exile) and *tefutzta* (diaspora) were ordained to be ended through the divine will. The process of redemption was directly linked to the ancestral homeland—*Eretz Israel* (the Land of Israel). It was in the Land of Israel that the Jewish condition—the Jews' dependency on the whim of the gentiles and their frequent persecution—would change and the Jews would escape their diaspora. The association of exile and the return of the Jews to their homeland by divine will was accompanied by a religious link with their land. Contact with the land was kept alive through its inclusion in religious practice.² As a result, the land also received divine attributes, especially when reunited with its people. The Land of Israel was the only place in the world where prophecy could be maintained. Exile was shared by both the Jewish people and the Almighty, who would return to the land only with the return of His people.³

The Jews' possession of a sense of common origins, a unique history, and all the other properties of ethnic communities defined them as an ethnic group. We could go even further and argue that the Jews qualified as a nation even prior to the appearance of Zionism. Their perception of themselves as different and unique and their commitment to a specific and historical territory correspond to the claim that "a nation is a self-aware ethnic group," and the emphasis on the importance of a "homeland."⁴ Because of the religious nature of the Jewish collective identity, it cannot be called nationalism. The traditional Jewish identity was a passive one; the Almighty exiled the Jews from their land and subordinated them to the gentiles, and He will redeem them. The Jews were to patiently await their redemption. Nineteenth-century ideologies and modernization provided the climate for activating Jewish self-consciousness. The societal transformations of the nineteenth century and the ideologies they spawned profoundly affected the Jews, who were facing the new and increased pressures imposed by the changing world around them.

Emancipation and Modernization

Emancipation was undoubtedly the most important influence on nineteenth-century European Jewry. The origins of emancipation can be traced to the gathering of a Sanhedrin by Napoleon Bonaparte on February 9, 1807, when he demanded that the Jews to whom the General Assembly had granted equality should accept the responsibilities of citizenship and abandon separate national identity.⁵ Emancipation, which

spread to other Western European countries and the United States, seemed to present Jewry with an easy choice: full equal rights in exchange for the renunciation of any separate national existence or aspirations.

In reality, the choice was not so simple. For those Jews who preferred to continue practicing traditional Judaism, dropping the belief in redemption through a return to Zion posed a deep religious problem. In addition, it was not clear that abandoning ethnonational notions would guarantee inclusion in the general society. While gentile society was obliged in accordance with the Enlightenment to accept the Jews into their ranks as equal citizens, religious anti-Jewishness was reincarnated in the form of modern anti-Semitism, which found secular reasons to dislike the Jews. One additional factor that limited the transformative powers of emancipation was that it was limited to Western Europe. In Eastern Europe and especially in the Russian Empire where 75 percent of world Jewry lived during the mid-nineteenth century, repression and deprivation of Jews continued unabated.⁶ Despite the high hopes attached to it, emancipation did not resolve the problems for most Jews.

The ideas behind emancipation, which were most often expressed on an individual level, lent themselves to a collective interpretation as well. If the Jew as an individual deserved equality as a citizen, the Jews as a group deserved equality as a nation. Just as the doctrine of self-determination and popular sovereignty grew out of the individual rights doctrine,⁷ so too did the notion of individuals deserving civic rights give rise to the idea of a Jewish right to assert their national identity. This logic, however, contained an internal contradiction: the very force that advocated the expression of individual rights forbade Jewish collective expression. This contradiction split the world Jewish community into two main sentiments. Those who desired to resolve the Jewish problem through individual emancipation supported abandoning the ethnonational characteristics and perceived the Jews merely as another "church." The second group was primarily in the East where individual Jewish emancipation was never instituted but its ideas were spreading. Here the Jews opted for a collective solution. It was Eastern European Jewry that started to develop such ethnonational motifs as the return to the ancestral homeland—Zion—and the national language—Hebrew.

The climate in which nineteenth-century Eastern European Jews found themselves differed from that of Western European Jews in an additional aspect. In the West, a profound sociopolitical revolution engendered the birth of the nation-state within stable territorial boundaries and replaced the *ancien regime* with a new social order. The East,

however, was just embarking on the age of transformation. Ethnic ideas led to the creation of national movements which encouraged the people of the Balkans and of Central and Eastern Europe to rise up against the three surviving empires—Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman—which controlled their destiny. This atmosphere of ethnic territorial and national struggle influenced the Jews who did not have any territorial claims to any land which they occupied to reestablish their link with that faraway land associated with their past. This environment may explain why the two forerunners of the ethnonational revival were the Sephardic rabbi Judah Alkalai from Semlin near Belgrade and Zvi Hirsch Kalischer from Poland, who already in the 1830s and 1840s started writing about the Jewish need to return to their ancient homeland.⁸ Viewing the emancipation of the Jews in the West as an augur in the messianic era, both Alkalai and Kalischer argued that it was the duty of the Jews to speed up redemption by the ingathering of the Jews into the Holy Land. Kalischer explicitly beseeched his people to “take to heart the examples of the Italians, Poles, and Hungarians, who laid down their lives and possessions in the struggle for national independence, while we, the children of Israel, who have the most glorious and holiest of lands as our inheritance, are spiritless and silent.”⁹

In the West Moses Hess articulated Jewish nationalism most clearly. Following an intensive collaboration with the two founders of socialism—Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels—Hess produced one of the earliest Jewish national statements.¹⁰ Hess accepted Giuseppe Mazzini’s conception of a liberal nationalism as a humanistic universal force that would bring harmony to the world. In his works, especially in *Rome and Jerusalem*, Hess asserted that the task of Jewish nationalism was to incorporate social justice within a national-religious entity and thus serve as an example that the whole universe should emulate. Prior to the French Revolution, Hess stated, “the Jewish people was the only people in the world whose religion was at once national and universalist.”¹¹ His writings clearly articulated the notion that only on its land would the Jewish nation be able to fulfill its historic mission. But Hess also sanctified other ethnonational elements such as Jewish history, the Hebrew language, and Jewish rituals—especially those connected with the mourning over the destruction of the Temple, and rituals linked to the Land of Israel.¹² Coming from a non-Orthodox Jew, Hess’s statements may represent the most articulate ethnonational statement in early Zionism, or proto-Zionism as later Zionists liked to refer to the pre-Pinsker/Herzl thinkers.¹³

Ultimately, modernization would transform Jewish self-consciousness from a passive idea to an active force. Ethnic identity by itself, as it had existed prior to the nineteenth century, had not produced a national movement. Emancipation and the emergence of the nation-state permitted the expression of Jewish religious identity, at least in Western Europe, thus relieving some Jews of the need for a state. In effect, modernization captured the latent forces of ethnic identity and utilized the impact of emancipation on the Jews to produce a dynamic national movement.

Ben Halperin explained the appearance of Zionism as a synthesis of the original thesis of traditionalism and its antithesis of modernism. The Zionists, according to Halperin, accepted the Western modernists' idea that there was a Jewish problem that had to be solved rationally, but they rejected their solution—emancipation. Like the traditionalists, the Zionists believed that the Jewish ethnic heritage and culture and the historic myth of Jewish independence and the eventual return of the Jews to their homeland were worth preserving. However, they rejected the traditional notion that since "exile" was a divine punishment, the solution to the Jewish problem was not in human hands and that the only available action was to pray to be relieved and restored to Zion.¹⁴

Halperin's Hegelian analysis must be complemented by the insights regarding modern nationalism discussed earlier. Ernst Haas explained nationalism as a rational response to a society under stress. "Rationalization by way of nationalism, of course, can take two forms: people under stress can seek to resolve it by identifying with the existing state, but they can also look for help by seceding from it. Each course is predicated by principles of rational choice."¹⁵ Samuel Huntington had claimed that modernization could destroy some sources of identity while reinvigorating others.¹⁶ Indeed, after realizing that emancipation did not resolve anti-Semitism, segments of Western Jewry joined their brethren in the East in supporting Zionism. In traditional society, the individual accepts his natural and social environment as given. "Above all," Huntington argued, "modernization involves belief in the capacity of man by reasoned action to change his physical and social environment."¹⁷ Zionism was a distinctly modern movement as it reinvigorated those ethnonational elements that were there but dormant and demanded that Jews take their fate into their own hands. This element brings us to the statist dimension of Zionism.

THE STATIST ORIGINS OF ZIONISM

Unlike proto-Zionism and *Hibbat Zion* (Love of Zion) societies which appealed to sacred ethnonational symbols and saw themselves as continuing the history of the Jewish people, political Zionism tended to view its main task in the creation of a Jewish state as providing an instrument to end Jewish persecution and suffering. Leo Pinsker (1821-1891) and Theodor Herzl (1860-1904), who are considered the two founders of political Zionism, articulated their theory in functional or instrumental terms. The Jewish problem could have been theoretically resolved through the Enlightenment and emancipation, or even assimilation, but in practice it was not. Consequently, the only remedies were the ideas of self-emancipation and the Jewish state. There was nothing sacred about this state, for its purpose was primarily functional. The realities of the nineteenth century dictated that the Jews take their fate into their own hands and create a Jewish territorial state.

Pinsker published a pamphlet entitled *Auto-Emancipation: An Appeal to His People by a Russian Jew* (1882), and Herzl composed *The Jewish State* (1896). These two men had several common characteristics. Both came from secular backgrounds. Neither reached his conclusions because of love of Zion or any other longing for the ancient homeland. Driven to despair over the failure of the Enlightenment and emancipation to resolve the plight of the Jews, and prompted in particular by the outbreak of an anti-Semitic wave—Pinsker by the pogroms of 1881 and Herzl by the Dreyfus trial—both called for establishing a haven from anti-Semitism. Pinsker and Herzl articulated their goal in political terms—namely, that the only solution to the Jewish problem was an independent Jewish state.

Pinsker analyzed the Jewish situation (i.e., their being despised and the pogroms) along rational lines. Anti-Semitism was not some metaphysical phenomenon, he said, but an outgrowth of sociopolitical configurations. Consequently, his programmatic solution was totally detached from mythical-traditional elements:

We must, above all, not dream of restoring ancient Judaea. We must not attach ourselves to the place where our political life was once violently interrupted and destroyed. The goal of our present endeavors must be not the "Holy Land" but a land of our own.... Thither we shall take with us the most sacred possessions, which we have saved from the shipwreck of our former fatherland, the *God-idea* and the *Bible*. It is only these which have made our old fatherland the Holy Land and not Jerusalem of the Jordan.¹⁸

Pinsker also emphasized the importance of the material conditions of the territory: the land had to be accessible to Jews, capable of offering security, and productive. Pinsker stressed the urgency of the situation and the historic conjunction.¹⁹

Ultimately, Herzl was considered the founder of political Zionism. Pinsker's work was a precursor of the full-length feature that Herzl produced a decade and a half later. Herzl's contribution to Zionism came in three installments during a period that was relatively brief (1896-1904) but immeasurable in impact. The three contributions were (1) his book *Der Judenstaat*; (2) the convening of the first World Zionist Congress in 1897 and the chairing of five successive congresses; and (3) his extensive global diplomatic activity until his death in 1904.

The central theme of *Der Judenstaat* is very similar to that of Pinsker; a Jewish state presented the only answer to the problem of modern anti-Semitism. The state would not be a sublimated response to anti-Semitism but a direct cure for its ills. In his preface, after introducing his idea of the restoration of the Jewish state, Herzl observes: "Everything depends on our propelling force. And what is that force? The misery of the Jews."²⁰ Two chapters essentially analyze the causes of modern anti-Semitism and the applicability of the solution, that is, the establishment of the Jewish state. The rest of Herzl's book is a detailed analysis of the ways and means by which the Jews are about to fulfill their plan.

Significantly, Herzl's book does not appeal to ethnonational sentiments. We find statements like "We are one people—our enemies have made us one without our consent....Distress binds us together, and thus united, we suddenly discover our strength."²¹ According to Herzl, assimilation might have been a solution, but anti-Semitism would not let the Jews follow this course of action. Assimilation was not condemned; the establishment of the Jewish state would help the assimilating Jews, for it would eliminate anti-Semitism and thus allow them to assimilate in peace. The official language of the Jewish state need not be Hebrew, but it could be any popular language and the state could be multilingual like Switzerland.²² Although the ancient faith kept the Jews together, religion would be clearly separated from the state.²³

The *state* idea (to distinguish from the land) would attract the Jews. The Jewish state was to be a political entity divorced of ethnic symbols and goals.²⁴ Its *raison d'état* was not to preserve Judaism but to protect Jewish lives and rights. Indeed, to the question "Palestine or Argentina?" Herzl answered, "We shall take what is given us and what is selected by Jewish public opinion."²⁵ Palestine seemed preferable to Argentina only because the masses were more attracted to it. Instead of

claiming historical rights to the territory as a true ethnonationalist would do, Herzl framed his appeal to the Great Powers for a Jewish state in terms of the possible gains they would derive from resolving the Jewish Question.²⁶

Organization and collective action would play an important role in establishing the Jewish state.²⁷ Herzl described in great length the organizational and legal procedures required by the Zionist enterprise. He also detailed the economic institutions that would organize and finance Jewish migration and settlement. A political organ called "the Society of Jews" would mobilize the Jews, organize the technicalities, and negotiate the political details of their departure.²⁸

A major theme of Herzl's book was its emphasis on the harmony of the Jewish interest and those of the world community. At the outset of his work Herzl states: "The Jewish State is essential to the world; it will therefore be created."²⁹ This focus on the usefulness of the Jewish state continues throughout the book. For, as Herzl believed, "In the world as it now is and for an indefinite period, might precedes right."³⁰ Thus, "The movement will not only be inaugurated with absolute conformity to the law, but it cannot even be carried out without the friendly cooperation of interested governments, who would derive considerable benefits from it."³¹ And he concludes: "The world will be freed by our liberty, enriched by our wealth, magnified by our greatness."³²

Herzl devoted the years following the publication of *Der Judenstaat* to the implementation of the goals that he laid out in his book—political organization and world diplomacy. The convening of the World Zionist Congress in 1897, which drew between 200 and 250 representatives from twenty-four countries, was an unprecedented event in Jewish history. One of the most significant aspects of the Congress was the creation of a worldwide mobilizing institution that would meet regularly and publicly demand a political solution for the Jewish people. The World Zionist Congress incorporated the various ideological and geographic segments of the Jewish people within one political-institutional framework. It established the political means for accomplishing the goals of the Zionist movement.

The Congress, and not the colonization process that was going on in Palestine, was for Herzl the key to establishing the Jewish state. Herzl himself was so impressed by the Congress that he wrote in his diary his famous entry, "At Basel I founded the Jewish State." The entry continues: "And with infinitesimal means, I gradually worked the people into the mood for a state and made them feel that they were its National Assembly."³³ The ensuing Congresses oversaw the creation of a set of

institutions and organizations that served as an institutional foundation for the State of Israel. Herzl was actively involved in building all the major institutions, even the Jewish Colonial Bank, in which he invested his own resources.³⁴

Herzl's untiring pursuit of global diplomacy represented his third contribution to political Zionism. He began his personal diplomacy even before the Zionist Congress convened. His first target was the Ottoman sultan, and in the years between 1896 and 1904 he met with leading European aristocrats and diplomats, and even the German kaiser himself during his 1898 visit to Jerusalem. Herzl's persistent diplomatic efforts directed at the sultan's court, the Austrian and German aristocracies, and the British imperial bureaucracy were an expression of his belief that the accomplishment of a Jewish state required the support of the Great Powers. In his encounters with the leaders of the imperial powers, he tried to draw their support for Zionism in accordance with their particular interests. To the Ottomans he offered Jewish financial aid, and to the European rulers (Germany and Russia) he held out hopes for evacuating the Jews whom they despised and for solving the problem of anti-Semitism. To the British imperial bureaucracy he suggested the possibility of diverting Jewish migration from the West to the Middle East and the establishment of a British-oriented Jewish colony there.³⁵ For the founder of political Zionism, the powers of reason and enlightened self-interest were more promising to advance the Jewish cause than to forward a historical right.³⁶

A nineteenth-century liberal who believed in the ability of reason to govern human activity, Herzl introduced the Zionists to global politics, statecraft, and the need to mobilize international support in order to advance their political goals. In addition, he left behind a worldwide Jewish organization, thus educating his people to the importance of institutions, mass mobilization, and collective action. Herzl left an embryo of political organization and a legacy that would be picked up and developed under his heirs' supervision.

SPIRITUAL VERSUS RELIGIOUS ZIONISM

Not all elements of the Zionist movement embraced political Zionism. Asher Zvi Ginsberg, known by his pen name Ahad Ha-Am, the leader of spiritual Zionism, was one of the earliest and most outspoken critics of political Zionism. Ahad Ha-Am felt that the movement's appeal to the private concerns of the individual Jew continued the tradition of the

exile to diminish the collective spirit of the Jewish nation. According to Ahad Ha-Am, the main task of Zionism was to revive the national spirit of the Jewish nation. Distinguishing between the affliction of the Jews (*tzarat ha-yehudim*) and the afflictions of Judaism (*tzarat ha-yahadut*), he recommended that Hibbat Zion concentrate on the latter. Accordingly, the settlement in Palestine should aspire to secure a spiritual center that would radiate inspiration to the Jewish people and thus enable them to live a national life even in the diaspora.

In the wake of the First Zionist Congress, Ahad Ha-Am warned the Zionists of the dangers inherent in succumbing to the illusion that the ingathering of the exiles could be achieved within the near future. He thought that the Jewish people deserved more than just a small state that would be “a plaything in the hands of great neighbors.”³⁷ His solution was therefore to concentrate on a spiritual center that would become “not merely a state of the Jews but truly a Jewish state.”³⁸

Ahad Ha-Am combined both ethnonationalism and an intellectual capability to criticize his movement. Aware of the national spirit that engulfed Europe, Ahad Ha-Am understood that the Jewish people could not continue to maintain their organic culture in the new nationalist climate. The Jews could develop their culture only on their historic land where they could integrate their cultural heritage with the general culture without being overtaken by it. His approach to the historic land was only instrumental, however, and was not idealistic, as was that of other Jewish ethnonationalist thinkers. In this perspective he was closer to political Zionism, but unlike them he did not believe that the diaspora could or even should disappear at once following the establishment of the Jewish state. His idea of a spiritual center in Palestine was both state- and diaspora-oriented.³⁹ He was the first to discern the direction in which political Zionism was pulling. But he was also aware of the problems associated with the ethnonational perspective. Ahad Ha-Am tried to conceive of a framework that would satisfy both the historical and the political dimensions and at the same time find a solution for those Jews who would not accept the Zionist solution and preferred to stay in the diaspora.

Ahad Ha-Am’s cultural approach created a great deal of trouble for the Orthodox members of the Zionist movement, who became an official faction within the Zionist movement—Mizrahi—in 1902. The spiritual Zionists were perceived as a grave threat because they sought to rework the traditional notions of Jewish culture and the essence of Judaism. The position of the religious Zionists is pertinent, for it crystallized both ethnonational and political Zionism.

At the root of the division between the spiritual Zionists and orthodoxy was a dispute over the definition of Judaism. Did the Jews constitute one people because of a divine mission or an ethnic heritage? What was the core of the nation—religion or primordial loyalties?⁴⁰ To a large degree, and especially among the more orthodox and antimodernization elements in world Jewry, all forms of Zionism were heretical. The schism between Zionism as an ethnonational movement and religion may explain why Rabbi Jacob Reines, the founder of Mizrahi, cooperated with political Zionism rather than with cultural Zionism. Indeed, his cooperation with Herzl, which, as we shall see, reached its peak during the Uganda controversy, further crystallized the dividing line between the political and ethnonational approaches to Zionism.

Rabbi Reines's point of departure was similar to that of political Zionism, namely, the deteriorating conditions of the Jews in Europe which required a political solution.⁴¹ Like Herzl and Pinsker, and in contrast to Alkalai and Kalischer who interpreted emancipation and the national era that engulfed other nations as the beginning of redemption, Reines felt that the deteriorating conditions of European Jewry demanded an immediate political remedy. In order to justify cooperation with a movement that suggested a secular and national substitute to the ancient religious belief that redemption would come as part of a divine redemption, Reines drew a distinction between the ultimate messianic redemption and the need to save the Jews from the current physical threat to their existence. The Zionist movement, he believed, was dedicated to resolve the materialistic problems of the Jews, not their spiritual ones, which Judaism could continue to take care of as it had for millennia. As a purely political movement, Zionism therefore did not constitute a substitute for divine redemption.

Cooperation between religious Jews and the Zionist movement was thus limited to political Zionism and not spiritual Zionism, which remained anathema. Reines supported the political Zionists in their struggle against the spiritual Zionists headed by Ahad Ha-Am and the "democratic faction," demanding to exclude cultural issues from the Zionist agenda. Wanting to preserve as broad a base of support as possible and despising Ahad Ha-Am for his criticism of the statist element, Herzl and the other political Zionists accepted the view of the religious Zionists and refused to include cultural matters within the agenda of the Zionist movement. Ultimately, the agenda did include cultural issues, but only after a separation between the religious and progressive independent stream was accepted.

Zionism as a nineteenth-century product, but with roots extending over two millennia, was an ethnonational movement whose territorial demands rested on historical rights. Although the forerunners of Zionism were rabbis, the movement must be distinguished from traditional Judaism. Functioning as a secular rational approach to resolve problems of identity promoted by the surrounding society, Zionism offered a substitute for religion—the traditional basis of Jewish collective existence. The Jews of Europe, influenced by the new ideas in their social and intellectual realm, adopted these secular notions as part of their collective rights for self-determination or as a solution to their problems generated by emancipation or modern anti-Semitism. Demanding a spiritual revival around the historic land threatened the essence of Orthodoxy that it is only through Jewish law that the Jews are a nation. Political Zionism, which perceived the Jewish state as a solution to an impending catastrophe or the material misery of the Jews, was less threatening at least to some Orthodox rabbis.

THE UGANDA CONTROVERSY

If we were to be asked for proof of the tension between the ethnonational and the political approaches in Zionism, we would need look no further than what came to be known as the “Uganda controversy,” an event that almost caused a split in the newly born Zionist movement. All the factions and major figures in the Zionist movement participated in the debate, and when it was all over, the Zionist movement emerged reunited with Eretz Israel as its focus of attention and aspiration. At the same time, the basic dilemma between national aspiration and political realities was not resolved and would continue to plague the movement.

The Uganda or, to be more accurate, the East Africa affair began to develop in 1903 when Herzl seemed to score a breakthrough with Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary. Confronted by a growing Jewish problem in England as Jewish emigres from anti-Semitic Eastern Europe converged on England, and spurred by the desire to modernize and strengthen imperial holdings in Africa, Chamberlain proposed establishing a Jewish settlement in East Africa. In the wake of discussions on a British-sponsored charter for Jewish settlement close to Palestine—El-Arish or Cyprus—Chamberlain suggested the British East Africa Protectorate as a possible destination for Jewish settlement. Herzl rejected the idea when it was advanced in April 1903, but he later *picked up on it when his chief English aide, Leopold Greenberg,

convinced him that Zionism could not afford to pass up this opportunity. Thus, the Sixth Zionist Congress in Basel (August 23-28, 1903) soon became the forum on the question of Jewish settlement in East Africa.⁴²

A careful analysis of the minutes of the Sixth Congress proceedings could not verify whether Herzl viewed East Africa as a viable substitute for Palestine. On the one hand, he presented it as a practical step on the way to Palestine and as a necessity in light of the worsening Jewish situation in Eastern Europe (e.g., the Kishinev pogrom) and the immense migration that was driving the receiving countries to close their gates. Moreover, he did not ask the Congress to abandon its goal of building a national home in Palestine; he only requested the Congress to establish a small committee to look into the matter. On the other hand, following the Sixth Congress, Herzl, aware of the uproar that his policy had created, confided in his closest friends that he planned to resign because of the incompatibility between his idea and the maxims of the Zionist movement. He reminded his friends that he was first a *Judenstattler* (a Jewish statist) and only then a lover of Zion; he had achieved a substantial personal goal, and he could not lead a movement that was not ready to accept his accomplishment.⁴³

While Herzl's intentions may have been unclear, the behavior of the opposition, or as they were called *Tzionesi-Zion* (Zionists of Zion) or *Nein-Sagers* (No-Sayers), left little room for doubt: they clearly indicated what they perceived as the intentions or the results of the Zionist leaders' policy. Despite the absence of the foremost leader of the opposition, Menahem Ussishkin, which stifled their response, a formidable opposition led by the Russian delegation objected to even the appointment of a committee to look into the matter. The tone of the speakers reflected their ethnonational aspirations. Victor Jacobson "insisted that the problem facing the Congress was essentially a simple one requiring a clear, unambiguous answer: yes or no, Zion or Africa....Zionism denoted not only physical redemption but also the (spiritual) regeneration which was inspired by love for the 'land of our fathers.'" Shmarya Levin asked in an emotional address: "If...a people could not have two languages, how could one talk of having two states? Might not the Jewish people fall asleep in the 'African night'? What they needed was not a *Nachtasyle* (night shelter), but a place to enjoy the broad daylight."⁴⁴

The vote on the proposal reflected the split in the movement. At first glance the results suggest a clear victory for Herzl and the *Ja-Sagers* (Yea-Sayers) favoring the sending of an expedition to East Africa. Out of 468 delegates who voted, 292 (62.4 percent) voted yes and 176 (37.6

percent) voted no; 143 abstained or missed the vote. A closer look at the personalities and motives of those who abstained, the pressures exerted by Herzl, and other factors reveals that the abstentions and missing votes should be seen as “no” votes. It follows therefore that the vote was split down the middle.⁴⁵ More significant was the mainstream Russian Zionists’ overwhelming opposition to the resolution.

The campaign against Uganda intensified following the return of Menahem Ussishkin from Palestine where he had organized an assembly to represent the “Jewish people in Eretz Israel.” This act in itself was a challenge to Herzl and the Basel Congress’s authority. In the ensuing months, a series of open letters were exchanged in the press between Ussishkin and Herzl. Ussishkin ended his first letter with a ringing accusation: the “Viennese demonstrated that they could only destroy Eretz Israel but not build it.”⁴⁶ He continued with an open letter to the Congress delegates on October 20, 1903, where he declared that he would not comply with the decision of the Sixth Congress, explaining:

A majority of the Congress may decide questions of ways and means, but not of principles and ideals. And just as no majority in the world can cause me to apostatize from the faith of Israel or the Law of Israel, so no numerical majority totalling two hundred ninety-five will detach me from the Land of Israel.⁴⁷

In the exchange of open letters that followed, the assaults between the two leaders became personal, with each urging the other to resign. Interestingly, and not surprisingly, the issue of Hibbat Zion versus political Zionism recurred, indicating that the two leaders were aware of the origins of the tension between the two camps. In another letter, Ussishkin tried to anchor his approach in *realpolitik*, which he differentiated from the ideological element in his battle against Uganda.⁴⁸ In a letter of resignation to the Jewish people which he never submitted (dated November 11, 1903), Herzl spoke about how he had started as a Jewish statist and had become a lover of Zion, but was now torn between his heart, which remained with the Zionists, and his mind, which agreed with the Africans.⁴⁹ The Russian Zionists formally expressed their rejection of the East Africa project at the Kharkov Conference on November 11-14, 1903. The resolutions reached in Kharkov amounted to an ultimatum ordering Herzl to shift course, or else risk actions that he would not regard favorably. The Zionist movement seemed to be on the verge of a formal split between the two schools of thought.⁵⁰

A split did not take place, however. At the April 1904 Greater Actions Committee meeting in Vienna, both sides attempted to reconcile the differences. What probably motivated Herzl to appease his opposition was the gradual withdrawal of the British government from the East Africa project and the realization that he might have misjudged the depth of emotions attached to Eretz Israel. Herzl's illness might also have influenced his behavior. The Seventh Congress that convened in the wake of Herzl's death in 1904 rejected the East Africa idea.

In retrospect, the Uganda controversy exposed the two streams of the Zionist movement. The First Zionist Congress had united the ethnonational and the state approaches behind one common goal—the building of a Jewish nation-state. The tension between the two approaches lay dormant as long as the movement did not have to face any operational alternatives. The Uganda proposal brought the built-in tension into the open. On one side stood all those whose point of departure was that a Jewish state was the solution to the physical threat hanging over the Jewish people, and on the other were all those whose main concern was the national revival of the Jews. In the wake of the Sixth Congress, Ahad Ha-Am reiterated the differences between the two approaches. Recognizing the difference between Hibbat Zion and his own spiritual Zionism, he then noted: “But both parties stood on a common, rock solid base: belief in the power of the historic bond between the people and the land to reawaken our people to self-recognition.”⁵¹ He argued further: “Yes, there in America there is everything—everything except one thing: the historic base that alone is capable of accomplishing the great feat of sending tens of thousands of peddlers and middlemen to the land and renewing a proper national spirit in the heart of a scattered and divided people.”⁵²

On the other end stood another Zionist leader, Israel Zangwill, who also understood the division between the two approaches. Frustrated with Zionism's minimal emphasis on state issues, he seceded from the Zionist movement following the Seventh Congress and established the Jewish Territorial Organization (ITO). Despite its failure, this movement, dedicated to establishing a Jewish state on any available territory, was a dramatic expression of the rationale of a pure statist Zionist approach.

David Vital summed up the Uganda debate. “Two linked questions had always been at issue...; what was the true and desirable relationship between the Jewish people and other nations; and what was the true and desirable relationship between the Jews and their own historic past?”⁵³ For political Zionism, and especially Herzl and Zangwill, the first

question was of the essence.⁵⁴ For the opposing school of thought the latter received priority.⁵⁵ He concluded:

The Herzlians compared Jews and non-Jews. The anti-Herzlians compared modern Jews with Jews in some former or some ideal condition. They were nothing if not romantics. The original Odessa Lovers of Zion, the Ahad Ha-Amist moralists, the Ussishkinite settlement-first men...all looked forward to a reform of the Jewish condition, but at the same time backward for the elements out of which to reconstruct it. And since...the Land of Israel specifically was of course central to past Jewish history and belief, they ended by seeing Eretz Israel as the pivot on which all would turn.⁵⁶

David Vital argues that in the post-Uganda era, as a result of the debate and its consequences, the Zionist movement crystallized itself around the Yishuv and Eretz Israel. Correct as it may be, from our perspective the inherent tension between the "state" and the ethnonational orientation did not disappear. It was to reappear again, strong as ever, at the next turning point of the Zionist struggle which revolved around whether to accept or reject the partition of Palestine.

THE PARTITION DEBATE

Forty years after the First Zionist Congress in Basel, the Zionist movement was engulfed in a debate that developed in reaction to a British territorial proposal that fell short of the national aspirations of the Zionist movement. Despite the fact that the British government as in the Uganda debate ultimately backed away from proposals initiated by its own high-ranking officials, the proposals nevertheless sparked a major controversy within the Zionist movement. This debate, like the Uganda controversy, did not bear any immediate political consequences, but still it reflected the basic tenets and dilemmas of Zionism and the conflicting outlooks of the Yishuv. It would not be inaccurate to state that the partition idea, which was developed and debated in 1937, legitimized internationally in 1947, and abolished in 1967, has accompanied Israeli foreign and domestic politics ever since. In retrospect, both proposals could be regarded as helping to crystallize attitudes and policies that determined the political behavior of the Zionist movement in the ensuing years. The fact that the Zionists reacted so profoundly to a relatively underdeveloped idea indicated how basic the dilemma was. A semi-official proposal, not yet considered by the British government,

was enough of a spark to ignite a controversy that involved all factions of the movement.

The partition debate took place more than thirty years after the Uganda controversy. During these three decades the Zionist movement had changed drastically in many respects. Looking back, the Zionist movement could claim major diplomatic and territorial achievements. Following World War I, the League of Nations adopted in principle the Balfour Declaration that supported the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine. It became an integral part of the Mandate over Palestine that was awarded to Britain. These statements came close to the international charter that political Zionism had been seeking since its inception. From around 50,000 Jews in Eretz Israel at the turn of the century, the Yishuv grew to around 384,000 by the end of 1936. Land ownership also increased significantly from around 220,000 dunams of Jewish-owned land at the turn of the century to 1.6 million dunams at the end of 1935.⁵⁷

The political map of the Zionist movement was also transformed; it represented the changes in the Jewish world that took place in the intervening years. Geographically, Palestine, the United States, and Great Britain replaced Vienna and Odessa as the centers of Jewish concentration and Zionist activity. In addition, a deep intercommunal conflict developed in Palestine, leading officially to the partition recommendations of the 1936 Royal Commission. It was clear that the Jews were not alone in claiming national ownership or sovereignty in Palestine.

Partition itself deviated significantly from the original conception of the national home for the Jewish people. Having lost a large share of Palestine in 1922 to the Emirate of Transjordan, western Palestine was now to be divided even further. Although what was offered to the Jews in comparison to the past was within the boundaries of historical Eretz Israel, they were nevertheless asked to make a very difficult decision: to give up the heartland of the ancient homeland. Most important was the fact that unlike Uganda it was formal sovereignty, not a protectorate, that was offered to them. Similarly, while the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate spoke about a national home, the Royal Commission explicitly sought the establishment of a Jewish state.

Most important was the network of territorywide organizations that were nonexistent in 1904, which essentially controlled the "national institutions" of the worldwide Zionist movement. The Zionist movement had a territorial institutional center and the leadership eager to

transform a state infrastructure into formal statehood. As such, it was unable to ignore the opportunity contained in the partition proposal.⁵⁸

The partition proposal advanced by the Royal Commission headed by Lord Peel contained three main recommendations: abolition of the Mandate, sovereignty to each of the two national communities dwelling in Palestine, and a detailed map of how to divide the territory. Having heard testimony from all the concerned parties, the commission reached the conclusion that the ethnonational differences between Arabs and Jews were irreconcilable.⁵⁹ By suggesting that the “national home” be converted into a Jewish state, they offered the Zionists national borders and sovereignty. The Jews would have to pay for this sovereignty through ethnonational concessions. The Jewish state would essentially consist of the Galilee and the coastal plain, thus providing them with only 20 percent of western Palestine, not to speak of Transjordan which the Revisionists demanded and the Yishuv leadership never formally abandoned. Moreover, the territory that the Jews were asked to concede included the most sacred historical monuments and areas that had been settled in ancient times by the two leading dynasties that ruled the kingdoms of Judea and Israel. It contained their respective ancient capitals, as well as much of the area of the Second Commonwealth (536 BCE-70 CE). While offered territory in Eretz Israel, the Zionists were not to receive the core of the ancient Jewish historical homeland.

In contrast, the Peel Commission paid attention to instrumental elements and, in addition to offering free Jewish immigration in the future through sovereignty, also offered the fertile portions of Palestine to the Jewish state, thus providing an economic base for absorbing future Jewish immigrants. The drawing of the map was designed to correspond to levels of population and Zionist settlement patterns; the Jews concentrated in the Galilee and the coastal plain, while the mountains were heavily populated by the Arabs and the Jewish population there was relatively sparse. In addition, the proposed Arab state bordered the Transjordan Emirate with which it was designed to be united. The commission perceived the Yishuv as capable of constructing an independent political entity, while the Arab community in Palestine was not considered to be developed enough for such a task. Recommended population transfers between the two states were designed to bring about ethnic homogeneity and to reduce communal tension and conflict—the essence of the partition idea. The view that ethnic hostility was the main cause of the conflict also led the commission to disregard the geostrategic flaws of the plan that provided the Arab state with

control of the high places. It was assumed that separation between the two communities would suffice to promote stability.⁶⁰

The statements made by supporters and opponents of the partition idea do not reveal a clearcut dichotomy between statist and ethnonationalists; a division between right and left is similarly inaccurate as opposition and support crossed ideological boundaries. Each camp advanced statist arguments coupled with realistic considerations. Thus, the Revisionists headed by Vladimir Jabotinsky saw themselves as the heirs of political Zionism, demanding large-scale political action to establish a state that would also contain Transjordan. In their opposition to partition, they were joined by the leftist Hashomer Hatzair and elements from the political center who supported a binational state rather than two separate nation-states. In Mapai (the Israeli Worker's Party), led by David Ben-Gurion, at the beginning of the debate the majority of voices were against partition, supporting their arguments with historical and political reasons. The two General Zionist parties in the center of the political map split on this issue, one favoring and the other opposing partition. In the religious camp, the majority of Mizrahi—which had supported Herzl during the Uganda controversy—now objected to partition. Even non-Zionist Agudat Israel, which was established in 1912 and objected to a Jewish state lest it not be religious, was divided on this issue.⁶¹

A more in-depth analysis reveals a cleavage between the pragmatic supporters of the plan and the more ideological and nationalistic opponents. The supporters of partition believed that the British Mandate had reached a dead end in terms of state-building and that the Zionists could henceforth only expect a turn for the worse. A sovereign Jewish state would continue the process of state-building that had started under the Mandate and would absorb millions of pressured Jews. Establishment of a Jewish state would also demonstrate that, in contradiction of the anti-Zionists' claim, Zionism was not a utopian idea. Many supporters pointed out that the recommendation of the Peel Commission that Arabs would be transferred from the Jewish state would provide legitimacy to population exchanges. Most important to the supporters was the feeling that partition presented the Zionist movement with an historic opportunity that could not be missed because it might not again be offered. Moreover, many argued that partition was only the beginning, which did not preclude the recapturing of Israel's historical domain. Finally, proponents argued that the partition plan essentially reflected the settlement pattern of the Yishuv and as a matter of fact provided it with territories beyond its present control.⁶²

Opponents, like supporters, advanced pragmatic arguments dealing chiefly with the ability of the partitioned state to defend itself and to absorb immigrants. They rejected both the pessimism and yielding attitude of the supporters. Many opponents did not think that the Yishuv had the right to concede parts of the ancient homeland, holy places, and historical statutes. Others argued that Eretz Israel was an historical, integral unit stretching on both sides of the Jordan and could not be partitioned. Opponents from the binational camp argued against the suitability of partition to the ideals of Judaism. Shmuel Dothan, who extensively analyzed the partition debate and compared the opposing views, summarized the opposition attitude in the following words:

...the "hard core" [of the opposers' view] was the assumption that Eretz Israel is the land of the Jews alone, and that the Arabs who had not created anything in it, and to whom it meant nothing...have only the right to reside in it, but not the right to rule it. This view was expressed by many opposers...who were convinced that their right in Eretz Israel was based on attachment, recognition of the nations of the world and on the huge labor that so many Jews invested in it. They were supported by religious and other Jews with attachment to tradition and history who perceived Eretz Israel as the land of their ancestors, and according to them their right can never be nullified.⁶³

Despite the fact that the opposition to partition was comprehensive and encompassed elements from almost every party in the Yishuv and the diaspora, the opponents did not succeed in forming a united front. Even the cool reception of the plan by the British Parliament on July 20-21, 1937 and the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations between July 30 and August 18, 1937, did not produce an effective opposition.⁶⁴ An action committee was formed in Zurich on the eve of the Twentieth Zionist Congress, headed by the veteran leader from the Uganda controversy years, Menahem Ussishkin, as well as Berl Katznelson, the ideologue of Mapai, Dr. Haim Bograshov (General Zionists), and Rabbi Meir Berlin (Mizrahi). Subsequently, they expanded the opposition to include Hashomer Hatzair and the State Party (the Revisionist wing that did not secede from the World Zionist Organization), and American Zionists like Dr. Abba Hillel Silver and Henrietta Szold. Significantly, this most impressive coalition could not counterbalance the weight of the central leadership of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and the Jewish Agency.

By 1935 and following a long struggle, the leadership of the WZO and the Jewish Agency was consolidated in the hands of the statist segment of the Zionist movement. Whereas Dr. Chaim Weizmann retained the presidency and directed the diplomatic activity of the movement, David Ben-Gurion, as chairman of the Zionist Executive, and his colleagues from Mapai controlled the main functions and the process of policy-making. Despite the rivalry between Weizmann and Ben-Gurion, the two leaders united in their acceptance of the partition principle. Thus, while Weizmann mobilized the support of the diaspora representatives, the leader of the Yishuv consolidated the position of Mapai, despite initial opposition among many of its members to partition. Indeed, this alliance was sufficient to bring about a clear majority—299 voted in favor and 160 opposed; 6 abstained and 19 were absent.

On the surface, the vote of the Twentieth Congress was similar to that of the Sixth Congress on East Africa. The formal leadership achieved a majority, despite strong opposition, in favor of a decision that only allowed the Zionist Executive to negotiate with Britain on “ascertaining the precise terms for the proposed establishment of a Jewish state.” The Executive was forbidden to commit the movement to any definite scheme of partition without a resolution of a newly elected Congress. In effect, the resolution was a clear victory for the partition camp. The new Executive elected by the Twentieth Congress was composed of a majority of partition supporters. Moreover, the attempt of the Revisionists to form coalitions with forces who were not members of the WZO, like Agudat Israel, or with forces from within did not materialize. Ussishkin’s attempt to organize a united opposition in the wake of the Congress was a far cry from his 1903-1904 campaign. The failure of the opposition to organize an effective campaign in the immediate post-Congress period was the best indication of the strength of the statist leadership.

The victory of the statist and partition was further confirmed when in 1938 the Jewish Agency proposed a Zionist partition plan. In this proposal the Agency offered an Arab state in what later became the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and the Gaza-Beersheba area. The Negev, the Judean Mountains, as well as parts of Jerusalem, which, according to the Royal Commission, had been suggested to belong to the Arab state, were to remain under the British Mandate. The principles guiding the “borders committee” established in November 1937 were primarily international acceptance, security, economic viability, transportation, demography, and full sovereignty. The ethnonational rationale did not influence the committee’s deliberations.⁶⁵ The Agency’s proposal was submitted to the Woodhead Commission of 1938.

Despite the limits in comparing the Uganda and partition debates because of the different settings and questions, a broad analogy may be made. In both cases a pragmatic political approach confronted a more ideological, ethnonationally oriented approach. Although both approaches based their arguments on a mixture of ethnonational and realistic arguments, the emphasis of each approach was clearly evident. What may be even more important was the severity of the debate; it reflected the tension between the two elements in the Zionist ideology and movement, which accompanied the movement and, later, the State of Israel. The victory of the partition idea in 1937, if compared to the disappearance of the pure statist approach from the Zionist agenda in the post-Uganda years, was the product of the emergence of the Yishuv as a quasi-state organization in the 1920s and 1930s and an elite determined to transform this structure into a formal statist one.

The emergence of a political center in Palestine was the basis of the state that would emerge a decade later. The state structure that developed enabled the victory of the partitioners in the 1937 debate. Achievement of the state had priority over any other value and was to be accomplished at any cost and within any reasonable borders that could sustain the state. A statist elite retained control of the Yishuv and later the state for the next four decades, implementing a statist foreign policy. Thus, despite the defeat of Herzl in the Uganda debate, the essence of his political Zionism was not abandoned and it went beyond the establishment of a Jewish state. It was carried on and materialized in 1917 and remained a central component in Zionist and later in Israeli foreign policy. From the ethnonational perspective, despite the victory of the partition principle in 1937, the question was not the choice of Palestine or any other territory but rather what should be the territorial boundaries of Eretz Israel. The emergence of a statist elite influenced the conduct of the 1948-49 war which did not restore the strength of the ethnonational element. It lay dormant, waiting to reemerge in full strength only in the post-1967 era.

NOTES

1. See a definition of diasporas provided by John A. Armstrong, "Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas," *American Political Science Review* 70, no. 2 (June 1976):393.

2. For the religious aspects of the land, see, for instance, David Vital, *The Origins of Zionism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 5.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Walker Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," *Journal of International Affairs* 29, no. 1 (1973):3. See also Walker Connor, "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a...," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4 (October 1978):380; A.D. Smith, "States and Homelands: The Social and Geopolitical Implications of National Territory," *Journal of International Studies* 10, no. 3 (Autumn 1981):188.

5. For an account of Napoleon's demands, see Howard M. Sacher, *A History of Israel, From the Rise of Zionism to Our Time* (Jerusalem: Steimatzky's Agency Ltd., 1976), p. 3.

6. Ben Halperin, *The Idea of the Jewish State* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 11.

7. Connor, "The Politics of Ethnonationalism," pp. 5-11.

8. On the forerunners of Zionism, see Jacob Katz, "For a Clarification of the Concept of the Forerunners of Zionism," in Jacob Katz, *Jewish Nationalism* (Jerusalem: Zionist Library, 1983), pp. 263-283.

9. Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea* (New York: Atheneum, 1981), p. 114. For further analysis of Rabbi Kalischer's contribution, see Jacob Katz, "The Historic Portrait of Rabbi Zvi Hirsh Kalischer," in Katz, *Jewish Nationalism*, pp. 285-307.

10. On Moses Hess, see Katz, "Clarification of the Concept of the Forerunners of Zionism," pp. 276-279.

11. Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea*, p. 129.

12. Moses Hess, *Zionist and Jewish Writings* (Jerusalem: The Jewish Agency, 1954), pp. 38-42 (Hebrew).

13. For an analysis of the three forerunners of Zionism and the impact of nationalism on their doctrines, see Katz, "The Jewish National Movement: A Sociological Analysis," in Katz, *Jewish Nationalism*, pp. 15-35.

14. Halperin, *The Idea of the Jewish State*, p. 76.

15. Ernst B. Hass, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?," *International Organization* 40, no. 3 (Summer 1986):710.

16. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order and Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 38.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

18. Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea*, p. 194.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

20. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question* (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1946), p. 70.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

24. Although Herzl used expressions like "next year in Jerusalem," it is clear that for him it was the political, not the ethnonational, element that prevailed. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

28. *Ibid.*, chs. 3, 5.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 83.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

33. Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea*, p. 228.

34. Vital, *The Origins of Zionism*, p. 369.

35. On Herzl's diplomacy, see, for instance, David Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), chs. 2-4.

36. See Herzl's own testimony to his political theory in *The Jewish State*.

37. Quoted in Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years*, p. 26.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

39. See, for instance, Ahad Ha-Am, "The Negation of the Diaspora," in Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea*, pp. 270-277.

40. For an in-depth analysis of the contradictions between nationalism and Orthodoxy, see Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years*, p. 225.

41. For a comprehensive study of Rabbi Reines's ideology and politics, see Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Ideology and Policy Formation in Religious Zionism: The Ideology of Rabbi Reines and Mizrahi Policy under His Leadership," *Hatziyonut* 3:105-146 (Hebrew).

42. Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years*, pp. 267-272. Vital dedicates almost one hundred pages of his book to the Uganda quarrel. Besides using the original documents, chapters 9-10 served as a major course for the following analysis.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 307-308.

44. Michael Heyman, *The Minutes of the Zionist General Council, The Uganda Controversy*, vol. II (Jerusalem: Hasifriya Haziyonit, 1977), p. 12.

45. See Vital's analysis in Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years*, p. 303. Heyman's calculations are slightly different but also show a very balanced split vote. Heyman, *The Minutes of the Zionist General Council*, vol. II, p. 18.

46. Heyman, *The Minutes of the Zionist General Council*, vol. II, p. 140.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

50. Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years*, pp. 318-320.

51. *Kol Kitvei Ahad Ha-Am*, p. 337. Translation based on Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years*, pp. 357-358.

53. *Ibid.*

53. David Vital, "The Afflictions of the Jews and the Afflictions of Zionism (The Meaning and Consequences of the Uganda Controversy)," in Stuart A. Cohen and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, eds., *Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Political Life* (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1986), p. 83.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

57. Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Demographic Center, Prime Minister's Office, 1974), pp. 39-41 and p. 399, Table A13. For the land acquisitions, see Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory* (Berkeley: University of California, 1983), p. 43, Table 2.1.

58. For an analysis of the political infrastructure in Palestine during the Yishuv period, see Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1988). See also Shmuel Sandler, "The Socio-Political Origins of the Israel-Diaspora Relationship," in Eliezer Don-Yehiya, ed., *Israel and Diaspora Jewry* (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1990), pp. 143-159.

59. The conclusions and recommendations of the Peel Commission appear in John Norton Moore, ed., *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, vol. III (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 151-183.

60. For further analysis of the partition plan, see Meir Avizohar and Isaiah Friedman, eds., *Studies in the Palestine Partition Plans 1937-1947* (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion Research Center, 1984).

61. Shmuel Dothan, *Partition of Eretz-Israel in the Mandatory Period, The Jewish Controversy* (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1979), pp. 55-58.

62. The two most comprehensive books on the attitudes and debate in the Yishuv regarding the binational idea and partition are Susan Lee Hattis, *The Bi-National Idea in Palestine during Mandatory Times* (Tel Aviv: Shikmona Press, 1979), and Shmuel Dothan, *Partition of Eretz-Israel*. See also Shmuel Sandler, "Partition Versus Sharing in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Governing Peoples and Territories* (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1982); and Yitzhak Gal-Nor, "The Territorial Partition of Palestine: The Decision of 1937," in *Studies in Israel's Independence* (Sde Boker: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, 1991), pp. 211-239.

63. Dothan, *Partition of Eretz-Israel*, p. 315.

64. J.C. Hurewitz, *The Struggle for Palestine* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), pp. 77-78.

65. For a full analysis of the 1938 Jewish Agency proposal, see Yossi Katz, "The Formation of the Jewish Agency's Partition Proposal of Borders, 1937-1938," *Zion* 56, no. 4 (1992):401-439.

PART II: THE STATIST ERA

LAND, COMMUNITY, AND PARTITION

In the original Zionist doctrine as conceived and articulated by political Zionism, no consideration was given to the ethnonational difficulties that the future Jewish state would encounter. According to the original design, the Jews were destined to immigrate to the Land of Israel where they would become a clear majority and achieve sovereignty; those Jews remaining in the diaspora would eventually assimilate and disappear. Thus, the three elements—territory, nation, and state—would overlap with each other almost perfectly. Ahad Ha-Am was unique among the founding fathers in that he had contemplated both problems, namely, that another people was living in Palestine and that not all the Jews would immigrate to Palestine.¹ His forecast was validated by subsequent developments, for once the Zionists started implementing their program, they had to relate to the twin realities of an indigenous non-Jewish population in Palestine and the permanence of the Jewish diaspora.²

Theoretically, ethnonational aspirations should have guided the State of Israel from its inception. The Jewish state, an ethnic state by definition, was faced with the classic incentives of ethnonationalism: a divided land and a state composed of two ethnic communities—Jews and Arabs. Despite these characteristics, the Jewish state, at least for the first two decades of its existence, exhibited hardly any ethnonational aspirations, and its foreign policy was determined primarily by security considerations. A partial answer can be found in the results of the process of partition as it emerged prior to and during the 1948-49 War of Independence. Neither the partition of the land nor the intercommunal division ratio was coincidental; they were predetermined by the Yishuv pattern of settlement and by the Yishuv's leadership that gave precedence to state over ethnonational considerations. Thus, what emerged was an inactive or dormant ethnonational setting alongside a very strong state setting. In this chapter the land and the communal elements will be examined.

THE LAND OF ISRAEL

Although we have no exact historical or even religious map of the boundaries of the Land of Israel, the core of that region is clearly apparent.³ Though territorial variations occurred during different periods in Jewish history, the regions of Judea and Samaria constituted the heart of the ancient Jewish kingdoms. Judea, first with its regional capital Hebron (the burial place of the forefathers and foremothers of the nation) and then with the national capital Jerusalem, was the center of the united kingdom of David and Solomon. Shechem (Nablus) was the burial place of Joseph, the forefather of the competing Ephraim dynasty, and its surrounding mountains were witness to the entrance of the Israelites into the Land of Israel. The Tabernacle was located at Shilo in the Samaritan region, and Samaria was the name of the capital of the Kingdom of Israel which emerged following the division of the Davidic Kingdom. Judea and Samaria were also the center of the Second Commonwealth and the Hasmonaean Kingdom.

Trans-Jordan conquered these very regions during the 1948-49 Israeli War of Independence and subsequently annexed them; these regions became known as the West Bank. What influenced the territorial content of the Jewish state that emerged in 1948? How do we explain the fact that the heart of the historic Land of Israel (Judea and Samaria) was not included in the State of Israel? Part of the answer to these questions is found in the pattern of settlement that emerged prior to the actual achievement of sovereignty in 1948, and another part in the military strategy and diplomacy that followed during the War of Independence.

The Pattern of Land Acquisition and Settlement

The origins of Israel's territorial map can be traced to the pre-1914 period and the settlement conception of Dr. Arthur Ruppin, the head of the Palestine Bureau of the World Zionist Organization.⁴ Two elements present in the pre-World War I period of colonization persisted during the Yishuv era's patterns of settlement. The first element was the establishment of a national institution for colonization—the Palestine Land Development Company (PLDC)—in 1908. The key element introduced here was the idea that the “creation of space” was to be an institutional undertaking to be coordinated by a public body even if later on land was transferred to private hands. This aspect served as the basis

for the next stage when the Jewish National Fund (JNF) stepped in and played the central role in purchasing land.⁵

The second element adopted by Ruppin was the strategic planning of settlements. One principle in the strategic planning was that rather than dispersing land purchases and letting market forces determine areas of Jewish settlement, Ruppin advocated concentrating on certain regions and building adjacent settlements in them, thus creating a local Jewish majority. As the Old Yishuv was concentrated in the four holy cities—Jerusalem, Hebron, Tiberias, and Safed—and in twenty agricultural colonies that had been established in the vicinity of the port of Jaffa between 1882 and 1907, the areas of Lake Tiberias and the southern coastal plain were chosen for planning Jewish settlements.

A second principle connected with Ruppin's settlement strategy was the creation of territorial continuity between the two agricultural blocs in the northeast and southwest. The intent was to prepare a corridor that would eventually link the two distinct blocs by way of the shore and between the Jaffa region bloc and Jerusalem, in which the Jews had comprised the largest religious group since 1840 and a majority since 1880.

The third principle was the avoidance of penetration into densely inhabited Arab regions, which were spread out particularly in the hilly areas and which coincided with the historic areas of Judea and Samaria. The idea of division of space could already be found in this period. In effect, the pre-1914 map presented the embryo of the 1937 partition plan.

Both elements of the early settlement era—institutional colonization and strategic planning—took root and reached their strongest development during the Yishuv period. Institutional colonization expanded with the growth of the JNF, which eventually assumed the major responsibility for implementing settlement policies.⁶ The JNF's relative share grew most rapidly during three critical periods—the world depression, the Arab Revolt (1936-39), and following the 1939 White Paper (see Table 3.1).⁷ The share of the JNF in total Jewish land purchases between 1940 and 1948 grew to almost 70 percent, compared to 8 percent at its outset between 1900 and 1914. The JNF's role was out of any proportion in the establishment of new Jewish settlements; more than 70 percent of the 272 settlements established up to 1944 were on JNF land.⁸

The strategic aspects of settlements became very decisive as the Yishuv progressed. Initially, the JNF's purchase policies were motivated by considerations such as the cultivability of the land, the number of owners with whom they had to negotiate, the number of *fellaheen*

Table 3.1
Estimated Jewish Land Purchases by Period and JNF Percentage of Total (in thousands of dunams)

At end of	Total Land Owned by Jews	Increment Increase	Total Land Owned by JNF	Increment Increase	JNF % of Total
1990	218,000	218,000	-	-	-
1914	418,000	200,000	16,380	16,380	3.9
1922	586,147	170,147	72,360	55,980	12.3
1927	882,502	296,355	196,660	124,300	22.2
1932	1,025,079	142,577	296,910	100,250	28.9
1937	1,244,604	219,525	369,860	72,950	29.7
1940	1,359,857	115,253	505,544	135,253	37.1
5.05.48	2,000,000	640,000	928,240	422,696	46.4

Source: From B. Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory, The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983), p. 43; and Kenneth W. Stein, "The Jewish National Fund: Land Purchase Methods and Priorities," *Middle East Studies* 20, no. 2 (April 1948):191.

(peasants) on the land, and, of course, the availability of land. In time, the location of the land became a special concern. The growing importance of Palestine's security and political problems made the creation of a territorial continuum a dominant consideration in purchasing policy. Arab hostility and the exacerbation of the intercommunal conflict in Palestine also strengthened the tendency to purchase land away from densely populated Arab areas. It was during the early years of the Mandate that the valleys of Jezreel and Zevulun were purchased, thus strengthening the link between the coastal strip and the Jewish settlements around the Sea of Galilee. Most of the land purchases during the

1920s and early 1930s were concentrated in these two regions (the coast and Galilee), the two main cities along the shore—Haifa and Tel Aviv—and their vicinity, and Jerusalem.⁹


With the outbreak of the Arab Revolt and the ensuing partition proposals advanced by the Royal Commission, the strategic logic of the settlement policy proved itself. The ability of the Yishuv to sustain the Arab riots and boycotts, both physically and economically, was definitely related to the soundness of the strategic thinking on which the settlement pattern was based. At the same time, the Royal Commission's conclusions concerning the viability of the Yishuv and its recommendations that a state essentially be established around the contours and concentrations of Jewish settlement and land ownership confirmed the correspondence between the pattern of settlement and aspirations for political sovereignty. This confirmation led to a new wave of land purchases, primarily on the external margins of the proposed partition plan, designed to create *faits accomplis*, and thus broaden the geostrategic space of the partition plans. Fifty-five settlements were established between 1936 and 1939 in this manner.¹⁰

Following the British government's rejection of the 1937 Royal Commission Partition Plan, land purchases and settlement policies were given a new urgency by the 1939 White Paper. This document prohibited the free purchase of land in almost all parts of Palestine except for the narrow coastal strip. The purchase of land and the establishment of settlements became a central device in the struggle against the White Paper.¹¹ In the 1940s settlement policy was based on strategic requirements rather than the availability or cultivability of land.¹² The political and strategic significance of this policy was proven in the partition plan of 1947 and in the War of Independence. As a result of the expanded Jewish presence, changes in the 1947 partition plan favored the Zionists more than had been the case in the 1937 plan, and the territory of the Jewish state expanded even further during the 1948-49 war in comparison to the 1947 partition plan.

The establishment of the state reversed the relationship between state and land. Instead of purchasing land to establish the state, the state was recognized as the most efficient means of increasing Jewish control of land. Ben-Gurion stressed this point in May 1949:

During the 70 years of our activities, from the establishment of Petach Tikva until the establishment of the state, we redeemed around a million and eight hundred thousand dunams of land, an average of around 25 thousand dunams a year. Now we control above 20 million dunams. Had we

Map 1 - The U.N. Partition Plan, 1947



kept the pre-state pace, we would have needed 800 years to reach this size of space.¹³

This attitude, which had already been voiced during the 1937 debates on partition, reflected a satisfaction with the idea of partition and recognition of the importance of the state. As a result of Israel's victories in the war, Israel's territory was 20 percent over what the UN partition plan had designated as the Jewish state. In short, settlement in Palestine was the product of strategic planning, executed by a statist organization designed to set up a state.¹⁴

WAR AND THE PARTITION OF THE LAND OF ISRAEL

The pattern of settlement that had started to develop in 1910 influenced the shape of both the 1937 and 1947 partition plans. However, the actual borders of the State of Israel emerged out of the War of Independence that broke out following Israel's declaration of independence on May 14, 1948, and was concluded by the Armistice Agreements signed with the Arab states between February and July 1949. In addition to Israel's independence, the Arab states and the Jews clashed primarily over four regions: western Galilee, the central mountain and plain region, the southern coastal strip, and the Negev. According to the United Nations partition plan of 1947, the first three regions were to be part of the Palestinian state, while the Negev, which had not been included in the Jewish state according to the 1937 plan, was to become part of the State of Israel. (See Map 1.) As a result of the war, the three regions allotted to the Palestinian state were divided: western Galilee went to Israel, the central mountain and plain region was divided between Israel and Jordan (to become the West Bank), and in the south, while the Gaza Strip ended up under Egyptian control, Israel annexed some territory in the Ashdod and Ashkelon area (Table 3.2). A close look at the evolution of the war would indicate that the geopolitical structure that emerged was not coincidental. Factors associated with the state influenced Israel's war strategy and through this the map that emerged.

Table 3.2
Regional Attributes and Political Results

<i>Attributes</i>					
Region	UN Partition Plan	Arab Population	Utilitarian Assets	Order of Historical Importance	Controlled or Divided by in 1949
Negev	Israel	Hardly any	Land	3	Israel
Western Galilee	Arab state	Dense but declining	Land and water	2	Israel
Southern Coastal Strip	Arab state	Dense	Tel Aviv hinterland	3	Israel and Egypt
Central Mountain and Plain	Arab state	Very dense	Strategic highland	1	Most of the region by Jordan

Note: Except for the Wadi Ara region, the densely populated regions were taken by Jordan or Egypt and the empty regions by Israel.

After securing Israel's emergence as a sovereign state, the Israeli decision-making elite then had to consider the question of what the borders of the state would be once hostilities were concluded. The territorial questions became particularly significant after the first few months of the war, around the time of the first cease-fire, once the military lines were stabilized and sheer survival was no longer at stake. Each of the regions mentioned possessed certain characteristics pertinent to Israel's preferences. Table 3.2 presents four possible attributes that might have influenced Israeli military efforts in conquering these regions. The international perspective is represented in the first column which shows who was designed to control the region according to the UN partition plan. The demographic factor is shown in the density of the Arab population. The third column represents utilitarian factors like land and water, and the fourth shows the order of historical importance.

(Thus columns 1-3 represent the statist perspective while column 4 represents the ethnonational.)

On June 11, 1948, when the first cease-fire was announced, the Palestinian Liberation Army, which had entered from Lebanon, controlled the central part of the upper Galilee. The Negev, which had been included by the 1947 partition plan within the Jewish state, was detached from Israel by the attacking Egyptian forces which crossed the international border on the day following Israel's declaration of independence. By the end of May 1948, Egyptian forces controlled the Majdal and Hebron areas and threatened both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem from the south. In the central mountain region most of the area was controlled by the Arab Legion (the Trans-Jordan Army) and by Iraqi forces. On June 27, Count Folke Bernadotte, the United Nations mediator for Palestine, advanced a proposal for a settlement in Palestine which, *inter alia*, suggested that the Negev should be included within the emerging Arab state in exchange for western Galilee, which should be included in the Jewish territory. Thus, in rough terms, the Jewish state would be composed of the entire Galilee and the coast, while the Arab state would be formed from the central mountain region and the Negev, an outline resembling the 1937 partition plan.¹⁵

What were the demographic characteristics of these regions? While the Negev was primarily an empty territory, western Galilee was densely populated by Arabs, and both the central and southern districts were even more so. The demographic balance was shifting, however, because of the migration that was occurring during the hostilities; western Galilee was losing Arab population, and the Arab population in the central and Gaza regions was growing. In retrospect, it seemed that Israel was not holding back this trend of migration. From a utilitarian perspective each region had different attributes; the Negev had vast but arid land, the Galilee was rich in land and water, the northern parts of the southern coastal strip constituted the hinterland of Tel Aviv, and the central mountain region overlooked central Israel. From a Jewish historical perspective, the central mountain region which contained Judea and Samaria was of prime importance, western Galilee was of secondary importance, and the southern coast and the Negev had the least significance.

An analysis of the military effort will reveal the preferences of the Israeli political elite in terms of either ethnonational or statist considerations. We will show how those preferences were expressed within the context of key decisions taken within the various geopolitical and strategic junctures of the war. Apart from battles over the road to

Jerusalem (which is dealt with separately below), the military efforts during the next two stages of the War of Independence were correlated with the Arab population factor more than with any other attribute. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) invested the least effort in the densely populated Arab areas and most in empty regions like the Negev. Almost an inverse relationship existed between Jewish historical importance and military effort. The low military effort in the very densely populated but strategically important central district must be explained by the Jordanian factor. To fill out the picture, it is pertinent to examine the dynamics of the Zionist-Hashemite relationship.

Contact between King Abdullah and the Zionist movement dated back to 1922 when the emir came to the region and Mandate Palestine was partitioned in order to fulfill some of the promises that the British had made to the Hashemites during World War I. Abdullah, who received the Emirate of Trans-Jordan, saw in the Zionists a potential ally with whom he could cooperate in order to advance his ambitions in western Palestine. Already in 1937, Abdullah had indicated his desire to annex the Arab state as proposed by the Royal Commission.¹⁶ Negotiations between the two sides intensified following World War II, when the idea of a second partition of Palestine was slowly taking root as the only solution to the impasse. In fact, it was the Hashemite king who, following the independence of Trans-Jordan in March 1946, told Eliyahu Sasson, the Zionist emissary to Abdullah, that his aim was to push for the partition of Palestine and the annexation of the Arab part to his kingdom. On the eve of the vote on the partition plan, the king took it upon himself to annex the portions designed to constitute the Arab state. Following the adoption of the partition plan at the United Nations, while the Jews were occupied with repelling attacks by the Palestinian Arabs, Abdullah was involved in attempting to receive a mandate from the Arab League to conquer Palestine. These efforts resulted in a temporary turnabout of the king's position, thus hampering him from honoring his earlier promises to the Zionists.

On the eve of the British exit from Palestine and the anticipated Jewish declaration of independence, the Trans-Jordanian monarch told Golda Meir, who came secretly to Amman to reach an agreement, that he would have to enter Palestine and attack the newly established Jewish state. Despite Jewish disappointment and Golda Meir's threat that under such conditions borders would be decided by force, tactically both sides tried to maintain their partition agreement.¹⁷

The Israel/Trans-Jordan front, with the possible exception of the battle over Jerusalem, could be defined as a case of limited war accom-

panied by tacit understanding.¹⁸ Both sides tried to improve their positions but without allowing the war to become total and erase all the mutual understanding that had been arrived at during the previous negotiations. Thus, the Israeli effort on its eastern front concentrated on ensuring a safe road to Jerusalem. Operation Dani, which took place between July 9 and 18, was an Israeli attack on the Arab Legion designed to conquer the Lod-Ramla area and provide strategic depth for both Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and control of the international airport. Overall, throughout the war the IDF did not launch a major attack against the Arab Legion, thus allowing Trans-Jordan to take over the bulk of the area which later became the West Bank.

Correspondingly, the Arab Legion's military activity against the Israeli Army and Jewish settlements was limited to the Etzion bloc. This area was conquered on the eve of Israel's declaration of independence and was designated according to the partition plan to be within the boundaries of the Arab state. According to the partition plan, settlements along the road to Jerusalem (e.g., Gezer), and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem, were also not designated to be within the boundaries of the Jewish state. Israel initiated two operations on the eastern front: Kedem (east) on July 16-17 and Hahar (the mountain) on October 19-22. The Hahar operation was in the Hebron mountain area, but the battle was primarily against the Egyptian Army and was a clear indication of Ben-Gurion's strategy.¹⁹

On October 6, 1948, the Israeli Cabinet decided to provoke the Egyptians into breaking the truce in order to start a major offensive in the south. Ben-Gurion, who initiated this strategic move and forced it on his cabinet, also rejected the military assessment of Yigael Yadin (acting chief of staff) and the General Staff, who as a whole insisted that such an offensive would draw both Iraqi military units and the Arab Legion to react in the central zone. Having resumed diplomatic contacts with Abdullah in Paris through the Belgian consul in Jerusalem,²⁰ Ben-Gurion anticipated that the political realism of the king would inhibit his interference against Israel while it was engaged against the Egyptians. Both sides shared a common interest—the expulsion of the Egyptian military expedition from Palestine. Ben-Gurion rewarded the king for his military restraint when, following the expulsion of the Egyptian forces, he ordered the Harel division to withdraw from the Hebron area, allowing the Arab Legion to enter the area. In the following months the IDF stood by and allowed the Arab Legion to take over the whole area. In exchange the Israeli Army received a free hand in the south where it repelled the Egyptian Army and conquered the Negev until Eilat.²¹

Israel's "eastern strategy" also decided the contest with a potential Palestinian state. On October 1, the Palestinian National Council, headed by the Mufti Haj Amin al Husseini, declared the independence of Palestine in Gaza. Abdullah, who previously had disallowed establishment of a Palestinian government in East Jerusalem, did not recognize the new government. The removal of the Egyptian Army enabled the Trans-Jordanian monarch to accomplish his goal during the Jericho Conference of December 1-2, 1948, which recognized the Hashemite monarch as the ruler of Palestine instead of the All-Palestine government in Gaza. But almost all the Arab states had recognized the All-Palestine government, while neither any of the Arab states nor the Arab League accepted the Jericho Conference. The separation of the Gaza Strip and the expulsion of the Egyptian forces from the Hebron area by Israel severed the link between the regions and allowed the Hashemite Court to establish itself among the local elites. The way to political annexation of the area by the Trans-Jordanian kingdom was now paved. The mayor of Hebron, Muhamad Ali al-Jabry, the appointed president of the Jericho Conference, and the nobles nominated Abdullah as king of the West Bank. On April 24, 1950, the new Jordanian Parliament decided on the unification of the two banks of the Jordan into one state.²²

Relinquishing both the Hebron mountain area and Samaria to the Hashemites was not an easy step for Israeli decision-makers in general and for Ben-Gurion in particular. Many misinterpreted Ben-Gurion's deliberations as a desire to conquer all of Eretz Israel that was contained by his colleagues. The famous decision taken by the Cabinet during the second cease-fire and dubbed by Ben-Gurion as a "woe for generations" (*behiya l'dorot*) has been advanced to support this thesis. On September 26, 1948, Ben-Gurion suggested that the Cabinet exploit a minor incident by the Arab Legion to break the cease-fire and attack Latrun, an attack that might have led to the conquest of Jerusalem and the Hebron region up to the Jordan River. The proposal was turned down by a vote of 7 (opposed) to 5 (in support). Fourteen years later Ben-Gurion explained that he was aware of the problem of 100,000 Arabs living in the Hebron-Bethlehem region, but he assumed that they would flee just as the other Arabs had fled from the cities that Israel had acquired.²³

On several other occasions, Ben-Gurion also referred to the desire to conquer the land up to the Jordan. Following a visit to Ein Kerem (in south Jerusalem) where he saw the Mediterranean on one side and the Moab Mountains on the other, he wrote in his diary on December 22, 1948: "All the strongholds south of the Jerusalem area spread in front of us....It's difficult not to acquire them. After all, the natural border is

the Jordan. We'll see how things will develop in the Negev in the next few days."²⁴ This statement may be better understood when juxtaposed with a statement Ben-Gurion made during the 1937 partition debate:

Eretz Israel spreads from the Red Sea [Yam Suf] in the south and the Lebanon and Hermon in the North, and between the Mediterranean in the West and the Eastern desert or Syria in the East. And I believe today, no less than I did thirty-five years ago, that this land will be ours. But in the present conditions it is necessary to accept that the unity of the land is a spiritual and not a political fact. One should not mix spiritual concepts with political.²⁵

Following the conquest of Eilat, Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary, "Is it now the turn of the Northern Triangle [Nablus, Jenin, Tul Karem]?"²⁶ Several months later, on a trip to Eilat with officers of the General Staff, Ben-Gurion stopped on the road. Awestruck by the beauty of the Moab Mountains in Trans-Jordan, he turned to one of his young generals and asked: "How would you conquer these mountains?" The general, having started his explanation, stopped and asked with great surprise: "Ben-Gurion, why do you ask? Do you wish to conquer these mountains?" The "old man" answered: "Not I, but you will."²⁷

Ben-Gurion lusted to conquer the whole of Eretz Israel, but he was aware of the political constraints on implementing this option, and he differentiated between the desirable and the possible. The Jordan River may have been the natural border in the east, and even the East Bank of the Jordan was part of the historic Land of Israel, but ultimately political realities must dictate the state's external behavior.²⁸ When Chaim Guri asked Ben-Gurion at the end of the war, "Why did you not liberate the whole land?" he answered, "There was a danger of getting involved with a hostile Arab majority, which would have led either to another Dir Yassin and larger expulsions of Arabs, or to the existence of a million Arabs in the State of Israel. There was a danger of draining the state's treasury."²⁹ Regarding borders, for instance, he once stated:

The country was "whole" only under the rule of foreign conquerors, who ruled both this country and other neighboring countries. The country's borders under Jewish rule constantly changed—beginning with the Judges and ending with Bar-Kochba. There are not many concepts more ambiguous and vague than the concept of "historical" borders. From the beginning, the borders of Jewish independence retreated and advanced in accordance with the ceaseless changes in policy.³⁰

To be sure, it would be inaccurate to assume that Ben-Gurion was indifferent to history. He saw the State of Israel as built on the legacy of biblical or postbiblical heroes as the state sought to materialize the spirit of the prophets.³¹ He linked the origins of the IDF to the periods of King Saul and Solomon, and the idea of combining labor with military defense to the practice followed during the days of Ezra and Nehemia.³² In a speech in January 1949, he stated: "Just as we are rooted in the soil of our homeland we are also rooted in the soil of our past. We shall not be what we should be without constant nourishment from the ancient sources of our existence, without sticking to the roots of our past."³³ Further on in this speech, he emphasized the importance of the study of the Bible and the advancement of the science of archeology in order to discover the past. He asserted that while the State of Israel was the youngest state in the world, it had been established by one of the most ancient nations, one that had survived for 4,000 years.³⁴ In Ben-Gurion's address to the people on the eve of Israel's first Independence Day, he compared this new day of celebration with two other "national" holidays—Passover and Hanukkah.³⁵

Despite this strong sense of history, pragmatism seemed to rule Ben-Gurion's approach to the Land of Israel. His concluding remarks in the above-cited address could serve as an accurate testimony of his approach. He ends his address by drawing his people's attention to the plentiful land that is now empty and available to the Jewish masses. Referring to the south, he focused on the most recent accomplishment of the War of Independence—the conquest of Eilat. After stressing that the nation's ancestors did not appreciate the importance of the sea, he linked the importance of Eilat to King Solomon's attempt 3,000 years earlier to build a navy. When we read these lines, Ben-Gurion's perspective seems to be that the conquest of the Negev and of the sea are the two main challenges facing the Jewish people. Strikingly absent is any reference to the historical soil:

The Negev was given to us by the law of nations, and the IDF implemented this judgement. But only a massive settlement will establish the Negev through the judgement of history, and only the pioneering youth who will know both how to build and defend, will implement the work of history which will stand forever.³⁶

When placed in this context, the Cabinet's rejection, on September 26, 1948, of Ben-Gurion's proposal to conquer the Hebron area up to the Jordan conformed with his approach. A closer look at the process of

decision-making would indicate that the “old man” did not really want his suggestion to pass.

We have several bases for this conclusion. First, at the time, Ben-Gurion must not have seen the decision as a critical one, for the rejection of his proposal appears in his diary only in a very short reference. He minimized the proposal to attack Latrun, adding: “Fortunately for us, most of the offensives we launched during the year were not put to the vote of this group.”³⁷ Thus, Ben-Gurion was confirming that many strategic decisions, those he really wanted to pass, had not been put before the Cabinet. Moreover, he did not try to “prepare” a majority, neither before the Cabinet meeting nor after it. In comparison, ten days later, the decision to attack the Egyptians was prepared first in the party and only then was it put before a vote in the Cabinet. In addition, the proposal to break the cease-fire in the South was put before the Cabinet as the first and primary item on the agenda, which had not been the case for the previous proposal.³⁸ Following the passing of the proposal to attack in the south, Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: “We have made today the most serious decision of the government since the decision to declare the establishment of the state.”³⁹ Finally, it should be noted that the decision not to attack the Arab Legion was made at the same session when it was decided that, if necessary, a partitioned Jerusalem would be preferable to a united but international Jerusalem.⁴⁰ As we turn now to Jerusalem, the thesis will be enhanced even further.

THE PARTITION OF JERUSALEM

No place in the Land of Israel has greater ethnonational significance for the Jewish people than Jerusalem. The city has always combined religious, historical, and political elements. Jerusalem—Zion, the Temple Mount—was where the Temple had twice been built and destroyed. The seat of government for King David and Solomon and the subsequent kings of Judea is identified with the glorious past of the Jews as well as with the future redemption and restoration of Jewish sovereignty. It is the only place in Palestine where a Jewish presence has never ceased to exist and where since the mid-nineteenth century the Jews have constituted the largest religious community in the city. The Zionist movement was named after one of the several names of Jerusalem. The city was the seat of the Zionist Executive (later the Executive of the Jewish Agency), Keren Hayesod, the JNF, the Va’ad Leumi, the Chief Rabbinate, and the

Hebrew University. At the time of independence, 100,000 Jews, who constituted a sixth of the population of the Yishuv, resided in Jerusalem. This background helps us better understand the sacrifice that the Yishuv made when it accepted the UN partition plan which excluded Jerusalem from Israeli sovereignty, conferring on it the status of *corpus seperatum*—or an international city. (See Map 1.)

Israeli thinking concerning Jerusalem during the period of the War of Independence went through four stages: (1) establishing a Jewish state has priority over Jerusalem; (2) half of Jerusalem is preferable to a united but internationalized Jerusalem; (3) the only way to prevent the internationalization of Jerusalem is through partition; and (4) a declaration of West Jerusalem as Israel's capital and the immediate movement of government offices would clarify to the world that the internationalization declaration was void. All of these approaches reflected the tendency of Israel's leadership not to allow ethnonational considerations to halt the establishment of the state. In short, they preferred statist to historical considerations.

Michael Brecher interviewed many individuals involved in the decision-making process of that period, and almost all of them—political figures, civil servants, UN aides, scholars—in essence responded with the same rationale as Ben-Gurion's regarding Israel's acceptance of the internationalization of Jerusalem: "It was the price to be paid for statehood." All the people interviewed also went along with Golda Meir's conclusion: "Had the Arabs gone along with the Resolution, Jerusalem would not have been the capital."⁴¹

The decision that it was more important to establish a Jewish state than a Jewish Jerusalem was already made in 1937 when the Jews accepted the partition plan that had assigned Jerusalem to a British enclave. It was during those years that the Yishuv suggested a divided Jerusalem that would leave the western Jewish part of the city within the forthcoming Jewish state.⁴² Ready to sacrifice Jerusalem for the sake of a Jewish state, Ben-Gurion in early 1948 apparently arrived at the far-reaching conclusion, contrary to King Solomon's famous judgment, that half of Jerusalem under Israeli control was preferable to a united city under international control. Thus, for modern Hebrew Jerusalem he was ready to sacrifice the "Old City" which contained the Jewish holy places and the Western Wall.

Formally, the Israeli Cabinet reached the decision on Jerusalem on September 26, 1948, prior to rejecting Ben-Gurion's "initiative" to break the truce and attack the Arab Legion. Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that the Jerusalem delegation that appeared before the Cabinet

helped to reverse “the stupid decision that had been accepted previously with a 5 to 4 majority — to prefer an international Jerusalem to a Jewish Jerusalem, if the price was to share it with the Arabs.”⁴³ In effect, the partition decision was reached earlier. During a previous Cabinet meeting that took place on June 16, 1948, one minister who apparently knew Ben-Gurion’s position, prior to supporting an international Jerusalem over a divided one, qualified his suggestion by saying, “I’ll say something that is very unpopular.”⁴⁴ At that meeting Ben-Gurion spoke about Jerusalem in strategic terms and made the following remark: “The most important question that I see from a military perspective is that of Jerusalem. From a military perspective the war over Jerusalem is a war over Eretz Israel, not only because of its historic importance but also because of its strategic importance.”⁴⁵

Ben-Gurion’s strategic rhetoric was designed to prepare his Cabinet to accept the statist rationale concerning Jerusalem. He made the above remarks following a series of heavy battles that took place in the period between May 13—the day the British evacuated the city—and June 10. It was during that month that the Haganah failed in three attempts to conquer Latrun, and the Etzion bloc and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City fell to the Arab Legion. In turn, the Haganah consolidated its hold over West Jerusalem and succeeded in opening a corridor from the coast to Jerusalem. At the same time, Abdullah transmitted a message to Israel concerning the self-imposed limitations that the Arab Legion had demonstrated. Although the Arab Legion, after conquering the Old City, launched several offensives such as in north Jerusalem (May 19-30), at Ramat Rachel (May 22-25), and at Gezer (near Latrun on June 10), overall it did not make a total effort to conquer the city. The Arab Legion tried to reach a direct agreement in May 1948 with the Haganah on how to avoid a military confrontation over Jerusalem.⁴⁶ This combination of military and political factors convinced Ben-Gurion that a tacit partition of Jerusalem was possible. Thus, Ben-Gurion opened the Cabinet meeting of June 16 with a declaration that the UN partition decision of November 29 was void and hence so was the internationalization of Jerusalem.⁴⁷ Even more indicative of the subordination of historic to statist aspirations was that he did not change his mind later on when the IDF had the upper hand and the conquest of all of Jerusalem would have been feasible if additional forces had been allocated to that front.

During the second stage of the war, dubbed “the Ten Days,” battles with the Arab Legion took place in two areas: around the two Arab towns of Lod and Ramla, and Jerusalem. Operation Dani, in which those two Arab towns were conquered, was directed at two objectives: to enhance

the Jerusalem corridor and to expand the hinterland of Tel Aviv which also included the only international airport. While conquering the two towns, many Arab inhabitants were encouraged to leave Lod and Ramla. In Jerusalem, units of the Haganah, Etzel, and Lehi accomplished only one out of three objectives: the consolidation of Israeli conquests in the south of Jerusalem. The other two goals—the conquest of the Old City in the east and Sheikh Jarrach (the area separating Mount Scopus from the rest of West Jerusalem) in the north—were not achieved.

A comparison of the order of priorities attached to the two battles would indicate that Operation Dani received priority over Jerusalem, and in Jerusalem the conquest of the southwest was considered more important than the Old City and the northeast. On July 11, Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary: “If both towns—Lod and Ramla—fall, then we shall have to divide these fighting forces...two regiments of tanks, at least, will have to be sent to the South...the rest to Latrun and Jerusalem.”⁴⁸ In other words, Lod and Ramla received priority over the other fronts and only following their conquest did the southern front and then Jerusalem have their turn.

Dan Schueftan makes six points in his attempt to prove that the liberation of the Old City received low priority during the “Ten Days.”⁴⁹ First, a reading of Ben-Gurion’s diary entries during the “Ten Days” indicates that the Old City was hardly mentioned. Second, Ben-Gurion ordered Moshe Dayan and his regiment (of which Ben-Gurion himself had testified that it would be the most fitting to conquer the Old City) to the south. Third, when Ben-Gurion heard that preparations were under-way to conquer the Old City, he became alarmed and telegraphed David Shaltiel, the commander of Jerusalem, several times in an effort to prevent, even by using force, any Jewish harassment of the Christian and Islamic holy places. Fourth, the orders Shaltiel received on July 16 were that if he had to choose between conquering the Old City and Sheikh Jarrach prior to the cease-fire, he should choose Sheikh Jarrach. Shaltiel’s decision to attack the Old City was taken against Ben-Gurion’s order, and he was subsequently relieved of his post. Fifth, if the Israeli Cabinet was looking for excuses to ignore the order of the Security Council to cease firing, there were several incidents that would have enabled Israel to do so. Moreover, Israel had never stopped a military operation that it genuinely wanted to complete because of a UN order. Finally, given Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward the Revisionists’ “private” armies, the fact that the thrust of the operation of liberating the Old City was put on units of Etzel and Lehi indicates that Ben-Gurion was not behind this

attempt. It was doubtful that he would have let them claim the liberation of the Old City.

Ben-Gurion realized that the conquest of the whole city could endanger Israel's hold over half of it. Israel's conquest of the Old City containing Christian and Muslim shrines would have induced the outside world to force Israel to abandon the whole city for the sake of the internationalization of Jerusalem. Only dividing it with Abdullah could release the pressure and ensure Jewish control of West Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion, who also suspected that the second cease-fire in the summer of 1948 could well turn into a permanent one, gave priority to ensuring Israel's control over West Jerusalem. For him, it was worth relinquishing the Old City with its holy places and historical localities and status to an Arab ruler, in order to maintain control of West Jerusalem. One hundred thousand Jews lived in West Jerusalem, which was strategically important because of its location.

Although the Cabinet voted at its meeting of September 26 for a divided Jerusalem rather than an internationalized city, it still was not voting against the conquest of the Old City. It was only voting according to its preferences for a divided city over an internationalized one. At this stage, however, Ben-Gurion had already made up his mind regarding the price of keeping West Jerusalem under Israeli control. The publication of the Bernadotte Plan on September 26, in which the internationalization of Jerusalem was recommended, further strengthened Ben-Gurion's conviction that only a partition of Jerusalem between Jews and Arabs would ensure Israeli control over the Jewish part of the city. It should be noted that it was at this Cabinet meeting that Ben-Gurion's wishes to break the cease-fire and conquer Latrun were rejected. This represents additional evidence that Ben-Gurion did not aim seriously to expel the Arab Legion from Western Palestine. It was geographically impossible to divide the city with the Hashemites without partitioning Palestine.⁵⁰

The preference for a *de facto* partition of Jerusalem was further confirmed during the third and final phase of the War of Independence. At this point the IDF clearly had the upper hand on the battle fronts, and it refrained from liberating the Old City. This period began with an Israeli initiative in the south on October 16, 1948. Operation "Yekev," the only major battle in Jerusalem during this period, took place during October 19-22, 1948. The Harel Division, which defeated the Egyptian forces in the Hebron Mountains, had clear orders to disengage itself from any military encounters with the Arab Legion. Following the collapse of the Egyptian forces in the Hebron area, the road to Jerusalem was open. The IDF, under orders from the government, abstained from

any activity that could have been understood as a threat to areas controlled by the Arab Legion in the Jerusalem vicinity. Even clearer was the situation following the defeat of the Egyptians in the south, when Israel had an army of nearly 100,000 troops which could have been turned almost entirely against the Arab Legion.⁵¹ The total of the Arab armies was around 60,000, with local Palestinian forces reaching 70,000.⁵²

Finally, most indicative of Israeli priorities was the IDF's inaction in Jerusalem during the armistice negotiations. There was a gap of almost a month and a half between the signing of the Armistice with Egypt and Trans-Jordan. Instead of using the opportunity to conquer Jerusalem, the IDF consolidated its hold over the southern Negev and reached Eilat—despite the unilateral declarations of Trans-Jordan that it controlled the area. Besides creating an Israeli maritime link with Africa and the Indian Ocean, the conquest of the southern Negev and Eilat also disrupted the continental link between Egypt and Trans-Jordan. Apparently, these strategic considerations and Eilat were more significant to Ben-Gurion than liberating the Old City.

Abdullah, realizing the new power relations, had to swallow the unilateral Israeli action and limit his reaction to an oral protest submitted to Moshe Sharett.⁵³ Israel also used its military superiority to pressure Abdullah to accept the relocation of the border toward the east along the coastal plain, which it was not ready to do with regard to the Old City. Facing overt military preparations to move into the vacuum created by the exit of Iraqi forces, the king gave in and what later became known as the "Little Triangle" was annexed to Israel.⁵⁴ The value of the "Little Triangle," populated by Arab villages, was strategic. On March 31, 1949, the day the agreement with the king was signed, Ben-Gurion, in a meeting with the General Staff, predicted that the war to keep the road to Jerusalem open would now begin.⁵⁵ As far as he was concerned, however, the war over the Old City was over.

In contrast, with regard to the status of Western Jerusalem Ben-Gurion was a confrontationist. The struggle moved from the battlefield to the diplomatic arena. Pressure from the Vatican and the United Nations was building for Israel to accept internationalization. In response, several times Ben-Gurion announced Israel's defiance of the UN decisions and its determination to keep Jerusalem an inseparable part of the State of Israel. On December 5, 1949, in an attempt to deter an imminent UN resolution reaffirming the *corpus separatum*, Ben-Gurion convened a Knesset session in which he declared the November 29, 1947 UN Resolution on Jerusalem null and void. Two days after the

General Assembly reaffirmed, on December 9, 1949, the internationalization of Jerusalem, the government of Israel decided to make Jerusalem the official capital. In the subsequent period, the Knesset and almost all the ministries were moved to Jerusalem.⁵⁶

Defying the United Nations two years after that body confirmed the partition resolution, which served as the international legitimating act and prelude to the declaration of independence, could be regarded as a show of preference for ethnonational considerations over international political pressures. Ben-Gurion's speech to the Knesset on December 4, 1949, was rich in ethnonational elements. Identifying Jerusalem with the birth of the Israeli nation during the Kingdom of David, he then declared that "Jewish Jerusalem is an organic and integral part of the State of Israel—just as it is an integral part of Israel's history, Israel's religion and the soul of our people. Jerusalem is the core of the heart of the State of Israel." He further said:

And we declare that Israel will not give up Jerusalem voluntarily, just as it did not give up for millennia its religion, its national uniqueness and its hope to return to Jerusalem and Zion—despite persecutions that could not be compared to anything else in history. A nation that has maintained loyally for two thousand and five hundred years the oath that the first exiles took on the rivers of Babylon—not to forget thee Jerusalem—this nation will never accept the separation of Jerusalem. And Jewish Jerusalem will never accept foreign rule—after its sons and daughters have liberated for the third time their historic homeland and redeemed Jerusalem from annihilation and destruction.⁵⁷

The ethnonational element was missing in the prime minister's statement to the Knesset on December 13, 1949, in which he suggested to the Knesset that it move to Jerusalem within the framework of making Jerusalem the capital.⁵⁸ On January 2-4, 1950, the Knesset held a debate over Jerusalem, and Ben-Gurion in his response ignored accusations from both the left and the right as to why the Old City had not been conquered.⁵⁹ Furthermore, in response to Menahem Begin's accusation that Ben-Gurion preferred a small Jewish state over a large one with a large Arab minority, Ben-Gurion confirmed that he would always prefer "a Jewish state in part of the Land over a state controlling all of the Land of Israel but containing an Arab majority, which in reality would be an Arab state."⁶⁰ The rest of the speech was dedicated to a glorification of the war effort in general and the war over Jerusalem in particular. But even though he ridiculed the accusations from the right, the speech made

it quite clear that from a purely military perspective he had a problem explaining why the Old City was not liberated.

THE ISRAELI ARAB COMMUNITY

Ethnicity may be aroused by external stimuli, just as it may be triggered by the historical aspirations of an ancient territory. The existence or the emergence of a competing communal identity may awaken real or imaginary identities in adjacent groups which may feel threatened by or may try to emulate the newly established identity. Thus, Palestinian nationalism was at least partially an outgrowth of the Zionist threat. From its inception Israeli society has been deeply divided, owing primarily to its Arab-Jewish cleavage. Yet, despite these deep cleavages, Israel enjoyed intercommunal tranquility throughout the first period of its independence. In retrospect, the low level of intercommunal tension complemented the partition of the land in lowering Jewish ethnonationalism.

In Palestine between 1917 and 1948 an intercommunal conflict existed between Jews and Arabs who lived together within one government framework, that is, the British Mandate. The two communities were separated from each other by religion, language, ethnic culture, level of development, and geography. Each community developed its own communal institutions and reacted to each other's sporadic violent actions. Between 1936 and 1939, the Arab-Israeli intercommunal conflict escalated into a "civil war," a war that was to shape the future pattern of conflict in the Middle East between Arab and Jew. The Arab uprising in 1936 broke out as a response to the increasing Jewish immigration from Europe following Hitler's rise to power, which was accompanied by large purchases of land. Unlike previous Arab communal violence, this revolt was coordinated by the Arab Higher Committee formed on April 25, 1936, which was the result of a five-party coalition established in November 1935.⁶¹ The Arab protest finally succeeded in mobilizing almost the whole Palestine Arab community for a well-coordinated strike and violent actions aimed at both the British Mandate government and the Jewish community.

Even though the Arab uprising as a mobilizing communal effort was short-lived, the Arab revolt served as a catalyst in the decline of the communal dimension of the Arab-Israel conflict. To the leadership of the Yishuv it illustrated the severity of the intercommunal conflict which the Jewish community was facing. Ben-Gurion and many of his

associates realized that Zionism was involved in a conflict with another community whose national aspirations totally conflicted with those of the Yishuv.⁶² Partition between the two national communities was the only way of accomplishing a state.

Historically, the most central cause of communal conflict in Palestine was the changing demographic balance. The fear of the Palestinian leadership was their being transformed from a majority to a minority, which was exactly what the Zionists aspired to accomplish. Indeed, the Jewish share of the population in Palestine was constantly on the rise, growing from 10 percent of the population in 1921, a year of heavy Arab riots, to 16 percent in 1929, which was also a landmark in anti-Jewish riots and massacres, to 28 percent in 1936, the beginning of the Arab uprising. In the decade that followed, the total Jewish population grew by almost a third—reaching over 649,000 at the time the state was established.⁶³ The Jewish community in Palestine was in a position where the demographic trend was moving in its favor, while the Palestinians, in contrast, were losing their majority.

Despite this impressive rate of growth, the Jewish share of the total population only reached 31 percent by 1947, implying that a status quo in the intercommunal relationship would postpone the achievement of a Jewish majority for decades. In contrast, by August 1948, Jews made up 82 percent of the total population of the State of Israel, and by the end of 1949 it reached 86 percent.⁶⁴ Three major processes combined and transformed the intercommunal demographic balance; they were (1) partition, (2) the War of Independence and the Arab exodus, and (3) sovereignty and Jewish immigration. All three processes were directly linked to the establishment of the state.

Partition, one of the classic devices used to reduce intercommunal strife,⁶⁵ was planned for Palestine; specifically, two states would be established in which each community would constitute a majority. The borders of the Jewish state were drawn in accordance with the Jewish settlement pattern and were intended to create a Jewish majority but would also allow for the existence of a large Arab minority in the Jewish state. Just prior to independence, approximately 778,700 of the 1,280,000 Arabs in Palestine originally lived in the territory that was to constitute the State of Israel (according to the 1949 Armistice Agreements). Outside of the future territory of the State of Israel, the Arab population of Palestine was 501,300.⁶⁶ Thus, the Armistice Agreements themselves, even without the flight of the Arabs, would have reduced the Arab population by almost 40 percent.

Following the War of Independence, the estimated number of non-Jews in Israel was 160,000. Deducting 14,000 Druse and the normal mortality rate, it can be estimated that 614,000 to 626,000 Arabs left the territory controlled by Israel.⁶⁷ Thus, the Arab exodus reduced the Arab population of the future State of Israel by approximately an additional 80 percent. The Arabs in Israel, the population that the Jews had to face as the "other community" following partition and the Arab exodus, now declined to just 12.5 percent of the Arab population that inhabited all of Mandatory Palestine.

Both official Arab and Israeli versions explain the motivation and circumstances of the Arab exodus and, as expected, each contradicted the other. The Arabs argued that the exodus was the result of a preplanned Israeli campaign of expulsion. The Jewish explanation, on the other hand, was that the Arab states urged the Arabs of Palestine to flee their homes as a means of justifying the military invasion and facilitating the destruction of the Yishuv. While premeditated Israeli planning of Arab expulsion did not occur, it seems reasonable that at a certain point during the war, the Israeli leadership realized the far-reaching implications of the Arab exodus and therefore did not inhibit a series of expulsion incidents in several towns. Thus, what had started as an inadvertent outcome of the war turned into a policy, once it was realized that the war may have resulted not only in larger territories than offered by the partition plan but also a substantial decrease of the Arab population that dwelled there. Whether or not the exodus was planned, the net result was a drastically lower Arab population—a fact that reduced intercommunal tension in the Jewish state. For the purposes of this study, a clarification as to who was behind the exodus is not required. What is pertinent was how the exodus influenced the demographic balance and the impact of this process on Israeli perceptions regarding their control of the state.⁶⁸

Israel's achievement of sovereignty and the ensuing opening of the gates to large-scale Jewish immigration was the third element that contributed to the drastic change in the Arab-Jewish demographic balance within the State of Israel. The Jewish immigration to Palestine during the Mandatory period (1919-48) was eight times as large as the one that had come during the 1882-1914 period. Nevertheless, the Jews still remained a minority. Over 480,000 Jews immigrated during those thirty years. Within the first half of the year of independence, over 100,000 Jews entered Israel, and almost 250,000 arrived in the subsequent year (1949). In the first three and a half years of independence (May 15, 1948 to the end of 1951), a total of 686,739 Jews immigrated

to Israel, thereby more than doubling the population of the Jewish state (649,000) at the time of its independence (see Table 3.3). Besides fulfilling the Zionist program of ingathering the exiles, the opening of the gates further reduced the weight of the Arab share in the population of the state.

Table 3.3
Immigrants to Palestine and the State of Israel According to Period of Migration

Period	Years	Number of Immigrants
First Immigration	1822-1903	20,000-30,000
Second Immigration	1904-1914	35,000-40,000
Mandatory Palestine	1919-May 14, 1948	482,857
	May 15, 1948-1951	686,739
	May 15-31, 1948	101,819
Post-Independence	1949	239,576
	1950	170,215
	1951	175,129

Source: From Bachi, *The Population of Israel*, ch. 8.

Thus, within three years the establishment of the state increased the Jewish population in the Land of Israel more than the Zionist movement had been able to do in almost seven decades of immigration. Following the establishment of the state itself, the act of sovereignty—the declaration of independence—was accompanied by the removal of any restrictions on immigration and legal acts like the legalization of all persons who had entered Palestine illegally, the Law of Return (1950), and the Law of Citizenship (1952). All were acts of the newly born Jewish state that ended the intercommunal conflict.

The common denominator of partition, the effects of war on the Arab exodus, and the Jewish migration waves is that all three factors that were predominant in determining the intercommunal balance between Jews and Arabs were associated with the "state." These events changed the intercommunal demographic balance within one year from a situation in which the Jews constituted one-third of the population of Palestine to a polity in which the Jews constituted a total majority of 86 percent. In subsequent years, Israel succeeded in maintaining the demographic balance in which the Israeli Arabs, despite their high birth rate, remained a minority hovering between 11 and 14 percent of the population. Continued waves of immigration, especially from Eastern Europe and Northern Africa, contributed to comfortable Jewish demographic trends and further reduced communal fears on the part of the majority. These feelings were further supported by a statist structure that kept the Arab minority relatively passive, thereby allowing intercommunal strife to remain dormant.

The Arabs in a Jewish State

When the War of Independence ended, the Israeli leadership believed that its intercommunal problem was eliminated. Accordingly, during the negotiations with Trans-Jordan Israel insisted on the annexation of the "Little Triangle" which added 31,000 Arabs to the Jewish state's population.⁶⁹ Israel also allowed the return of Arab refugees for the reunification of families, and the Arab population grew during the first year by almost 25 percent.⁷⁰ Nevertheless, the Israeli Arabs did not emerge as a communal problem.

Two years after its establishment, the embryonic military government—five military governors who were appointed on October 21, 1948, and put in charge over areas conquered by Israel beyond the partition borders—was turned into an effective all-embracing administrative structure that was responsible for the Israeli Arabs until its abolition in 1966. Consequently, despite the equal political rights Israeli Arabs have formally enjoyed all along, it would be inaccurate to claim that Jews and Arabs have been in effect equal citizens in the Jewish state. In addition, Israel definitely did not attempt to modernize its Arab society in comparison to its investment in the Jews, many of whom came from Arab states. The combination of military control and economic neglect, on the one hand, and equal political rights, on the other, was interpreted differently by observers of the Israeli Arab community.⁷¹

Pertinent to our study in this debate was the agreement over the result, namely, the low level of ethnicity or communalism among Israeli Arabs.

One objective factor contributing to the low level of communalism and mentioned above was the low ratio of the Arab population in Israel. Hovering around the 11 percent level during the early years of statehood, despite their high birth rate, the Arab citizens of the Jewish state did not constitute a significant communal factor in Israel's political life. The continued influx of Jews promised to keep the Arabs as a marginal community. If the Arabs were perceived as a threat, it was out of fear of their cooperation with the neighboring Arab states during actual or potential situations of war.

Arab communal insignificance was exacerbated by the loss of Palestinian traditional elites who had escaped during the 1948-49 hostilities and settled either in their host countries or in the urban centers of the West Bank. The Arabs who remained were from the poorer and more rural sections of society.⁷² The Israeli Arabs also lacked an external center with which to identify. In effect, there was no center that could have radiated authority over the Israeli Arabs. The "All-Palestine" government that was erected at the end of September 1948 in Gaza disintegrated following the annexation of the West Bank by King Abdullah. The West Bank itself was integrated into the Jordanian kingdom, and its elites were coopted by the Hashemite court. West Bank urban centers stagnated as political and economic development was concentrated by Amman on the East Bank.⁷³ To the extent that various West Bank segments did not identify with the Hashemite kingdom, they turned to pan-Arabism rather than Palestinianism as their spiritual or charismatic center.⁷⁴ The downward trend of Palestinianism, which could be traced to the failure of the Arab Revolt, was intensified in the aftermath of the 1948-49 defeat or "disaster," as the Palestinians referred to it. The dispersion of the Palestinians among three territorial segments—West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Israel—and with the rest going all over the Middle East, paralyzed Palestinian center-building and weakened the esteem of Palestinian identity even further. Pan-Arabism was on the rise especially throughout the 1950s. The Israeli Arabs were separated from the Arab political centers by state borders and the setting of the Arab-Israeli conflict; therefore, pan-Arabism, besides being very elusive in itself, was very abstract, especially for them. However, by serving as a remote charismatic center, pan-Arabism weakened their Palestinian identity. Left without an external center that could express their particularistic identity, the Israeli Arabs could not

easily develop a genuine identity to compete with the comprehensive Jewish state.

Another factor that added to Arab peripheralization was their fragmentation, which resulted both from their inherent social structure and the geopolitical results of the war. Divided along religious lines (70 percent Muslims, 21 percent Christians, and the rest Druse and others), the traditional *hamula* (extended family) structure of society further contributed to internal feuds and segmentation. The escape of the traditional ruling *hamulas* created a vacuum into which new large families desired to enter, thus inciting a power struggle especially in the villages. The Arabs of central and western Galilee, who constituted more than half of the community, were separated from their brethren in the "triangle" (around 25 percent) by the heavily populated Jewish region of the Jezreel Valley. In the previously "mixed" cities they turned into small minorities.⁷⁵ The Military Government which imposed severe movement restrictions added further to insulation.

The relationship between the Israeli Arabs and Israel was determined by the inequality between the two entities. It was an encounter between a nondeveloped society that had gone through an identity crisis prior to having succeeded in developing a socially integrated community, and a society that functioned as a state even prior to receiving formal sovereignty. The Arabs of Palestine constituted a fragmented society prior to the establishment of the State of Israel, and the transformation of a portion of them to citizenship in the Jewish state did not eliminate that problem. Their situation may have worsened as they had to identify with two separate identities that were in conflict with each other—their state and their nation. The conflict between the two identities was also on a personal level—nationality versus citizenship. Adding to their confusion on a personal level was the outcome of the War of Independence which divided the Arabs of Palestine among several countries.⁷⁶

The inequality between the two societies resulted in the economic dependence of the Arabs on the Jewish economy at both the collective and the individual level. Arab dependence was a result of "a typical developing dual economy to be found in Mandatory Palestine."⁷⁷ Economic dependence was accompanied by political underdevelopment in the Arab sector. They did not emerge as a factor on the Israeli political scene despite Israel's political and electoral system which encouraged the political representation of sectoral interests. Instead, the Israeli ruling elite took advantage of the traditional social system. The system of *hamula* head, who served as a middleman between the central government and the population, was inherited from the British who had

inherited it from the Ottomans. Mapai encouraged the establishment of local Arab parties who identified themselves as affiliates of the ruling party. While other Zionist parties also received a share of the Arab vote, albeit a much smaller one, there was no independent Arab party.⁷⁸ One party that fared particularly well in the Arab sector, far beyond its share in the Jewish vote, was the Israeli Communist party (Maki). Maki, which from the outset expressed an anti-Zionist position and supported the establishment of an independent Arab state in Palestine as recommended by the UN partition plan and by Moscow, received a large share of the Arab vote. Nonetheless, it was only in the mid-1960s that it started emerging as an Arab party.⁷⁹ Maki was a party that did not participate in the government coalitions and therefore was not a partner to power-sharing arrangements.

Another perspective from which to consider the political weakness of the Israeli Arabs was its institutional infrastructure, a factor that would also explain the relative success of the Communist party. As a traditional society, the Arabs suffered from a low level of institutional development even during the Mandate period. Although they began developing territorywide frameworks starting in the mid-1930s, these institutions collapsed during the 1948-49 war and the ensuing exodus. In the absence of national elites, the local *hamula*-based institutional framework was strengthened, which added to sociopolitical regression. What could have changed the community's direction was the spillover from the modernization by the dominant Jewish society. But they had no contact or affinity with such institutions as the Jewish Agency or the IDF, and were only partially associated with the Histadrut. Under such conditions the Arabs lacked any instrumentalities for mass mobilization essential for political bargaining and collective action.

Arab institutional weakness explains the Communist success. The Communist party provided an alternative for the Arab voter who could not identify with the Zionist parties and/or state institutions. Unlike the national elites, a large portion of the Palestine Communist Arab leadership—the League for National Liberation—did not escape in 1948 and merged with the Jewish Communist party to establish Maki. Organizational infrastructure had always been the strength of Communist parties. The Communist Arab-language press, which continued its publication, served not only as a communication instrument but also as a communitywide institution. Having been boycotted by the Israeli ruling party as a potential partner in any government, Maki did not have to prove that it was not coopted by the Zionists.⁸⁰

The ethnic composition of Maki was bound to surface, however, and it resulted in internal tension between its Arab and Jewish members. One expression of this tension was the establishment of an all-Arab group named the Popular Front in 1958. Starting off within Maki, and as a result of the Jewish-Arab struggle, the Front split in 1959 and the nationalist section left the Communist party and adopted the name al-Ard ("The Earth," in the sense of land). Trying to establish a periodical, a company, and an association, and always being banned by the authorities, it finally succeeded in gaining a decision by the High Court of Justice, which ordered the registrar of companies to accept al-Ard's request to register as a company.⁸¹ But the High Court of Justice also accepted the government's objection, on different occasions, and prohibited al-Ard from registering as an *association* and/or publishing periodicals. In 1964, al-Ard's legal status was terminated by an order of the minister of defense following the arrest of several of its leaders. In 1965, despite its earlier stance against participation in Israel's national elections on the basis that it provided legitimacy to the state, al-Ard presented a slate of candidates for the Knesset. Appearing as the Arab Socialist List, it was denied a place on the ballot by the Central Elections Commission, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. The rationale provided by the commission and accepted by the majority of the justices was based on the attitudes of the Arab party's leadership, which denied the legitimacy of the Jewish state; it was feared that they would use parliament to advance their purpose of undermining the state.⁸²

The relative strength of the Communists in the Arab sector and the appearance of al-Ard underscored the feelings of alienation prevalent among Israeli Arabs. Undoubtedly, the appearance of al-Ard was influenced by the atmosphere in the Arab world, where pan-Arabism, championed and embodied by the charismatic leader of Egypt, Gamal Abed al-Nasser, was expressed in collisions with Communist parties in Arab countries. The rise of Rakah—the New Communist party—among Arabs in 1965 also indicated that a new pattern was developing. At the same time, neither Rakah nor al-Ard represented Palestinianism, as one represented international communism and the other pan-Arabism.

Finally, in order to get a full picture of the saliency of the communal problem, the collective action dimension as represented by two indicators—the general voting pattern of the Arabs and their protest behavior—will be examined. The voting behavior of the Israeli Arabs in the first four elections indicated some success in their absorption by the Israeli political system. Support for Maki in the Arab sector, which started at over 22 percent in 1949, declined in the 1950s, falling to as

low as 10 percent in 1959. Mapai and its affiliated Arab lists, while climbing to almost two-thirds of the Arab vote in 1951, captured only slightly over half of the vote in 1959. Mapai and Maki were losing to Mapam—a vote that simultaneously signaled discontent and a desire for integration into the Jewish political system. The number of Arab members of the Knesset (MKs) elected on Arab lists associated with Mapai during those years was between four and five. Maki also maintained a Jewish majority among the members of its delegation to the Knesset based on the following proportion: 3:2 (1951), 2:1 (1959), and 3:2 (1961). In the 1961 elections, however, the vote Maki received in the Arab sector again grew and almost equaled its Jewish vote. In the 1965 elections, two Communist parties fought for supremacy; one of them, Rakah, represented a clear nationalist Arab line and won the Arab vote.⁸³ At the same time, despite the Arabization of Rakah, in both the 1965 and the 1969 elections three-quarters of Israeli Arabs continued to vote for Arab parties affiliated with the Labor party or directly for Zionist parties (see Table 3.4). In short, while a nationalist element always existed among Israeli Arabs and expressed itself in the electoral process in the Maki and later the Rakah vote, the majority of Israeli Arabs did not vote against the regime.

Public protest was another indication of the low level of communal collective action among Israeli Arabs. A comparative analysis of the number of public protest events in Israel since 1950 revealed that the Arab citizens of Israel demonstrated much less than the general population. Thus, while their ratio in the overall population exceeded 10 percent, their share in demonstrations was less than 4 percent in the first two and a half decades following the War of Independence (see Table 3.5). A closer look at the demonstrations and their link to particular events provides additional insights. A number of protest events took place in 1950, the year in which the Military Government was established and started taking charge of the population under its control. Another series of demonstrations occurred at the end of the 1950s, which was a period of intensive pan-Arab activity externally together with al-Ard agitation domestically. In 1965, the year in which al-Ard was disqualified from participating in the elections, there were no demonstrations. This fact may be associated with the appearance of Rakah for the first time and the relatively massive electoral support it received from the Arab sector.⁸⁴

In summary, Israeli Arabs did not pose a communal threat either to the Israeli regime or to the polity as a whole during the first twenty-five years in which Jews and Arabs lived together in a state in which the Jews

Table 3.4**The Arab Vote for Non-Zionist Arab Parties and for Those of the Zionist Labor Camp**

Knesset	Zionist Parties		Non-Zionist Parties		
	Mapam	The Israeli Labor Party or the Alignment and Affiliated Arab Lists	Israeli Communist Party	The Progressive List for Peace	Arab Democratic Party
First, 1949	0.2	61.3	22.2	-	-
Second, 1951	5.6	66.5	16.3	-	-
Third, 1955	7.3	62.4	15.6	-	-
Fourth, 1959	12.5	52.0	10.0	-	-
Fifth, 1961	11.0	50.8	22.7	-	-
Sixth, 1965	9.2	50.1	22.6	-	-
Seventh, 1969	-	56.9	28.9	-	-
Eighth, 1973	-	41.7	38.7	-	-
Ninth, 1977	-	27.0	50.6	-	-
Tenth, 1981	-	29.0	37.0	-	-
Eleventh, 1984	-	22.4	33.0	-	-
Twelfth, 1988	3.7	16.7	33.0	14.1	11.2

Source: Calculated from *Statistical Abstracts of Israel, 1988* (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1989).

Table 3.5
Protest Events in Israel, By Year, 1950-86

Year	All Pop.	Arab	Year	All Pop.	Arab
1950	69	5	1976	119	15
1951	50	0	1977	102	11
1952	35	1	1978	112	6
1953	46	3	1979	241	17
1954	56	1	1980	166	21
1955	24	0	1981	162	16
1956	34	0	1982	212	29
1957	23	1	1983	214	27
1958	36	3	1984	198	11
1959	26	2	1985	216	24
1960	26	2	1986	208	32
1961	37	4			
1962	27	0			
1963	52	4			
1964	36	2			
1965	47	0			
1966	76	4			
1967	42	2			
1968	42	0			
1969	45	1			
1970	56	1			
1971	134	0			
1972	122	2			
1973	103	5			
1974	132	4			
1975	150	4			
Total	1,526	51	Total	1,950	209

% of Arab protest to all population protest events—3.3

% of Arab protest to all population protest events—10.7

Source: Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig, *Stiff-Necked People, Bottle Necked System* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), ch. 3, pp.7-45; information on the Arab sector is from Lehman-Wilzig's raw data.

constituted a majority. Other factors contributing to the low profile which the Arab community displayed in Israel were the flight of the elites, the collapse of Palestinianism, and its replacement by pan-Arabism. The encounter between a developed polity and an underdeveloped, fragmented community also explains the low level of communalism during the early years of statehood. Arab economic and political dependence on the Jewish sector further contributed to the acquiescence of the Arab community. The resulting low level of collective action expressed in the lack of an all-Arab radical party, the concentration of the dissident Arab vote in the Communist party which never posed a threat to the regime, and the low level of Arab public protest yielded the general conception that the Arab minority did not constitute a communal threat to the Jewish state. The Jewish majority felt that it was controlling its communal problem. This situation would change in the mid-1970s. The lack of a perceived communal threat complemented the low level of Jewish territorial ethnicity in the wake of partition.

NOTES

1. See Ahad Ha-Am, "The Negation of the Diaspora," in Arthur Hertzberg, *The Zionist Idea* (New York: Atheneum, 1981), pp. 270-277.

2. This study does not cover the division of world Jewry between Israel and the diaspora. Some of these aspects were covered extensively by Charles S. Liebman, *Pressure Without Sanctions* (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson Press, 1977) and other publications by the same author. See also Daniel J. Elazar, *People and Polity* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989) and other studies by the same author.

3. In fact, there is no precise religious definition of the borders. One possible map is that of the twelve tribes that conquered and lived on the land during the premonarchical era. Other maps would be of the Davidic or Solomon kingdoms, the subsequent southern and northern kingdoms of Judea and Israel, the early Second Temple period, the Hasmonean era, or the Kingdom of Herod. For a collection of views (albeit biased) on Labor's approach, see articles in Adam Doron, ed., *The State of Israel and the Land of Israel* (Tel Aviv: Beit Berl College, 1988).

4. In a comparative analysis of the model of German colonization in Posen and the Zionist efforts in Palestine, a very strong influence of Ruppin's native region on his later strategy as head of the Palestine Bureau was identified. See Shalom Reichman and Shlomo Hasson, "A Cross-cultural Diffusion of Colonization: From Posen to Palestine," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 74, no. 1 (1984):57-70.

5. Between 1910 and 1914 the PLDC purchased 5,600 hectares and sold most of it to private enterprises. The JNF purchased 1,600 hectares, which remained in public hands. By 1914, Baron de Rothschild's philanthropic organizations had purchased 25,000 hectares. See *ibid.*, pp. 61 and 67.

6. As Table 3.1 indicates, the JNF's share of the total land acquired by Jews grew from less than 4 percent on the eve of World War I to over 12 percent at the beginning of the Mandate. Within five years it increased to almost a quarter. By the eve of the 1937 partition plan it reached 30 percent, and this despite the influx of a relatively well-to-do immigration in the early 1930s who purchased land privately. In the ensuing years, the JNF's share increased further and reached almost 50 percent on the eve of independence.

7. Starting in 1937, the JNF started buying land from Jewish landowners. This fact is clear when we compare statistics on Jewish ownership of land between 1937 and 1940. The incremental increase of JNF ownership was larger than the total incremental increase of land owned by Jews (see Table 3.1). By purchasing these lands, the JNF prevented the selling of land to Arabs during hard economic times for the Jewish community in Palestine. Especially critical were JNF purchases during the era of the White Paper when Jewish land purchases were legally curtailed by the Mandatory government. See Arieh Avneri, *The Jewish Land Settlement and the Arab Claim of Dispossession (1878-1948)* (Tel Aviv: HaKibbutz HaMeuchad, 1980), pp. 160-161.

8. Baruch Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory, The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics* (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1983), p. 44. In the period 1935-44, out of 114 settlements 99 were on JNF land, and only 6 percent of the land on which a total of 139 tower and stockade settlements were established between 1936 and 1947 was not JNF land. See Avneri, *The Jewish Land Settlement*, p. 257.

9. On the settlements during the Mandate period, see *ibid.*, especially chs. 5 and 7.

10. Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory*, p. 87.

11. Eighty-four settlements were established in the period between 1939 and the end of the British Mandate. Between 1936 and 1947, the years of the Arab Revolt and the White Paper, 139 settlements were established; 53 were in area A where no Jewish land purchases were allowed, and 65 in area B where transfers of land to Jewish ownership was allowed only through special permission from the high commissioner. In the free zones where land was also 'very cultivable, only 21 settlements were established. See Avneri, *The Jewish Land Settlement*, p. 257.

12. It was also significant that 152 settlements out of 181 (84 percent), established by 1944 and located on JNF lands, belonged to the Labor camp. See Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory*, p. 45. Another aspect that Kimmerling pointed out was the tendency to establish kibbutzim in order to solve security problems, or to determine the borders of the Jewish state primarily on land belonging to the Jewish collective. See *ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

13. Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. I (Tel Aviv: Mapai, 1951), p. 149.

14. Reichman and Hasson, "A Cross-Cultural Diffusion of Colonization," p. 65.

15. *Documents of Israeli Foreign Policy*, vol. I, pp. 230-234.

16. Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations* (Jerusalem: Maxwell-Macmillan Publishing Ltd., 1991), p. 41 (Hebrew). The Zionist-Hashemite relationship has been covered by many analysts. One of the most comprehensive books is Dan Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option, The "Yishuv" and the State of Israel vis-a-vis the Hashemite Regime and the Palestine National Movement* (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1986), especially ch. 3. A second approach, also based on primary sources but aimed at an opposite conclusion, is Avi Shlaim, *Collusion Across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

17. Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, pp. 47-58; and Yosef Nevo, *Abdullah and the Palestinian Arabs* (Tel Aviv: n.p., 1975), chs. 1-2.

18. The concepts are taken from Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), especially ch. 4.

19. On Kedem, see *The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion's Diary*, G. Rivlin and E. Oren, eds. (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), pp. 589-596.

20. Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, pp. 90-91. *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*, vol. 1 (Jerusalem: State of Israel, 1981), pp. 533, 563, 576, 611.

21. Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, pp. 83-86.

22. Nevo, *Abdullah and the Palestinian Arabs*, pp. 112-113; and Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, p. 214.

23. Michael Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion, a Biography* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1980), p. 319.

24. Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, p. 894.

25. Quoted in Shmuel Dothan, *Partition of Eretz-Israel in the Mandatory Period. The Jewish Controversy* (Jerusalem: Yad Yitzhak Ben-Zvi, 1979), p. 66.

26. G. Rivlin and E. Oren, eds., *The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion's Diary*, p. 974.

27. Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, p. 331.

28. For a comprehensive summary and analysis of Ben-Gurion's approach to borders, see Reudor Manor, "Images and Decision Making on the Boundaries Issue in Israeli Foreign Policy in the Years 1948-1973," (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1980), ch. 2.

29. Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion*, p. 330.

30. Quoted in Kimmerling, *Zionism and Territory*, p. 62. See also Ben-Gurion's statement in the Knesset in August 1952 where he denied the existence of the concept of historical borders (Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. IV, p. 85).

31. Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. I, p. 183.

32. See Ben-Gurion's famous address to the IDF's Higher Command entitled "Uniqueness and Destiny" which was almost entirely dedicated to the search for roots. See Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. II, pp. 7-47.

33. *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 52.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

37. Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, vol. III, p. 722.

38. Ben-Gurion, *The Restored State of Israel* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), p. 294.

39. Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, vol. III, p. 736.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 722.

41. Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 14-15.

42. For the importance of 1937 in the decision-making with regard to Jerusalem, see Yosi Katz, "The Political Status of Jerusalem in a Historical Context: Zionist Plans for the Partition of Jerusalem in the Years 1937-1938," *Shofar* (forthcoming); Motti Golani, "The Leadership of the Yishuv and the Question of Jerusalem during the War of Independence," *Cathedra* 54 (December 1989):156-157; and Elhanan Oren, "Jerusalem in Jewish Military Policy Prior to Israel's Declaration of Independence," *Cathedra* 54 (December 1989):173-175.

43. Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, vol. III, p. 722.

44. Ben-Gurion, *The Restored State of Israel*, p. 168.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

46. See Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, pp. 133-134; see also Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, p. 383.

47. Ben-Gurion, *The Restored State of Israel*, p. 165.

48. Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, vol. II, p. 581.

49. Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, pp. 141-147.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

52. Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, vol. II, p. 672, n. 4; and *Carta's Atlas of Israel, The First Years, 1948-1961*, p. 54.

53. Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, pp. 178-179.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 185-188.

55. Ben-Gurion, *War Diary*, vol. III, p. 985.

56. On how the Israeli decision-making elite reached the decision on Jerusalem, see Brecher, *Decisions In Israel's Foreign Policy*, ch. 2.

57. Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. II, p. 92.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.

59. After ridiculing Begin, who accused Ben-Gurion of preventing the conquest because of his fear of controlling the "holy places," at the end of his attack, in an attempt to disprove the accusations of the Herut leader, Ben-Gurion added that Israel had acquired Mount Zion. The fact that Ben-Gurion

could not point to a more significant and less controversial "holy place" essentially demonstrated that conquering holy places was indeed not of top priority in his approach to Jerusalem. See *ibid.*, p. 103.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

61. On the political organization behind the Arab Revolt, see Yehoshua Porat, *From Riots to Rebellion, The Palestinian Arab-National Movement, 1929-1930* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1978), pp. 195-200.

62. Shabtai Tevet, Ben-Gurion's biographer, has described what he calls the "force formula" which the leader of the Yishuv developed as a result of the 1936 Arab uprising; see Shabtai Tevet, *Ben-Gurion and the Arabs of Palestine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 366-367.

63. Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Demographic Center, 1974), p. 89.

64. *Ibid.*

65. See, for instance, Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 44-45.

66. Bachi, *The Population of Israel*, pp. 54 and 401.

67. *Ibid.*, pp. 54 and 402.

68. For a comprehensive account, see Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For a critique, see Shabtai Tevet, "Charging Israel with the Original Sin," *Commentary* (September 1989):24-33.

69. Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, pp. 180-188.

70. While there are no exact numbers of how many returned after the Armistice Agreements, it is assumed to be around 40,000. See Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1990), p. 352, n. 10; Sabri Jiris, *The Arabs in Israel* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), p. 289; and Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), p. 62.

71. The explanation given for the low level of communalism can be divided into three main approaches: the nation-building school, internal colonialism, and the domination school. See, respectively, Jacob Landau, *The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); Sammy Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978); Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*; and Emil Zureik, *Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979).

72. *Ibid.*, p. 269.

73. Shmuel Sandler and Hillel Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinian and the West Bank. A Study in Intercommunal Conflict* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984), ch. 3.

74. Shaul Mishal, *East Bank/West Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-67* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 48-50.

75. Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, ch. 2, Table 2.

76. See Ofira Selikter, "Arabs in Israel, Some Observations on the Psychology of the Systems of Control," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 2 (June 1984):247-269.

77. Jacob Metzger, "Fiscal Incidence and Resource Transfer between Jews and Arabs in Mandatory Palestine," (Jerusalem: Falk Institute, 1980), p. 2.

78. Ian Lustick described this process as the cooptation of elitist policies that the Jewish ruling elite adopted toward its Arab minority. Sammy Smooha described a comparable process and called it control of elites. See Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, ch. 6; Smooha, *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict*, pp. 223-224; and Smooha, "Control of Minorities in Israel and Northern Ireland," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22, no. 4 (April 1980):273-274.

79. Eli Reches, "Relations between Arabs and Jews within Maki," *State, Government and International Relations*, no. 27 (Winter 1987):68, Table 1.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

81. Acting as a company and selling shares to finance its activities, it succeeded in increasing its capital from IL 500 to IL 100,000 by March 1963. According to Landau, these assets provided some indication as to its popularity among the Arab population. See Jacob M. Landau, "Al-Ard Group," in Jacob Landau, ed., *Man, State, and Society in the Contemporary Middle East* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1972), p. 207.

82. Landau, "Al-Ard Group," pp. 203-204

83. Reches, "Relations between Arabs and Jews," pp. 69 and 83.

84. On the function of elections in reducing discontent and enthusiasm, see Sam Lehman-Wilzig, "Conflict as Communication: Public Protest in Israel, 1950-1982," in Stuart Cohen and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, eds., *Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Political Life* (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1986), pp. 137-138.

THE STATIST SETTING OF ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

The relative weakness of the ethnonational variables cannot serve as the sole explanation of Israel's foreign policy during the first nineteen years of statehood. In a suitable statist setting, a partitioned land, accompanied by a divided historical capital and the presence of a hostile minority that at least previously had claimed rights to the entire Land of Israel, could have been used to stimulate irredentism. The weakness of the ethnonational factor during the first years of statehood must be further examined in the context of the strength of statism.

The role of the state in foreign policy must be approached from several levels of interaction. K.J. Holsti, when referring to the "level of analysis" problem in international politics, stated that "Each [level of analysis] makes a contribution, but each fails to account for certain aspects of reality that must be considered."¹ He uses each level in his framework for the study of international politics; for Holsti the international system, domestic needs and values, and the individual leader are variables that "explain how and why states act and interact."² Within Israel's foreign policy setting, each level of interaction—international, state, and individual—reinforced the centrality of the state. The new value system was based on the superiority of the state over all other considerations. The centrality of the state reduced the saliency of the ethnonational dimension.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The State of Israel was established while the regional system was in transition. By the end of 1946 all the countries surrounding Palestine had become sovereign states, and the Arab League had been established as an interstate organization. In Palestine the establishment of the Jewish state was accompanied by a transformation of the Arab-Jewish

conflict from an intercommunal to an interstate conflict. The disintegration of the Palestinian Arab community coincided with the declaration of Jewish statehood, and the immediate eruption of an interstate Arab-Israeli war was among the major factors that helped transform the Jewish-Palestinian communal dispute into an interstate conflict. Significantly, during the armistice negotiations the Palestinians stood by as anguished onlookers rather than as active participants.

All the dynamic elements and actors of the Arab-Israeli relationship that emerged following the 1949 Armistice Agreements were purely within the framework of the interstate system. Thus an arms race, recurrent war, and insurgency operations, which were typical of interstate conflict interaction, replaced demonstrations, riots, and intercommunal clashes. The issues of contention were legitimacy of sovereignty, territory, and human resources (e.g., immigration), war refugees, water, trade, and navigation rights.³

The interstate conflict in itself was affected by the structure and dynamics of inter-Arab politics and the larger global conflict. On the regional level, the newly established Arab states were pulled in opposite directions by two contradictory trends. On the one hand, as new states they were very sensitive to maintaining their recently achieved sovereignty and were ready to defend it from any hegemonic drive. On the other hand, they all paid tribute to their common culture and history and committed themselves at least verbally to a greater pan-Arab framework into which they would all merge. The Arab League, established with British encouragement in 1945, was one expression of this supranational structure. Another characteristic of the inter-Arab interstate system was a hegemonic drive countered by a coalition of states aimed at preserving the state system. Egypt's hegemonic drive, galvanized by its charismatic leader Gamal Abed al-Nasser, was followed by a counter-coalition to contain Egypt's hegemonic aspirations. While paying tribute to Arab unity, Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, which were bound to be victims of this drive, or states like Iraq, which perceived themselves as deserving the role of hegemonic contenders, actively objected to Nasser's policies.

One way of escaping the tension between national particularism and pan-Arab universalism was hostility to the foreign element that was implanted in the heart of the Arab nation by the former colonial powers, namely, the State of Israel. Unable to achieve unity and particularism at the same time, the destruction of the Zionist entity thus became an ideological rallying point in inter-Arab politics. Hegemonic powers like Egypt stressed the need for pan-Arab unity as a precondition to the

destruction of Israel. States and regimes that feared and objected to Egypt's aspirations blamed continued inter-Arab rivalry on Israel's existence. They demanded Israel's destruction prior to integration. The goal of the destruction of Israel became an integral part of the inter-Arab state system. The two interstate systems—the inter-Arab and the Arab-Israeli—influenced each other.⁴

In addition to the inter-Arab conflict, the global conflict between East and West also impacted on the Middle Eastern interstate system. The global international system, bipolar in its structure and competitive in its interaction very soon after its inception in the wake of World War II, penetrated into the Middle East. The withdrawal of the colonial powers Great Britain and France left a vacuum that soon attracted the involvement of the two superpowers. It was only natural that the worldwide ideological, political, and military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union would also intrude into and involve the Middle East. Just as natural was the desire of the regional actors to take advantage of this competition to advance their political interests and their resources. Subsequent to the 1956 Suez war in which France and Great Britain still played a role, the role of the two superpowers became predominant in regional interstate politics. The Middle East became an integral part of the global East-West conflict.

The three-tiered conflict structure (Arab-Israeli, inter-Arab, and global) that interacted in the Middle East in conjunction with each other constituted a rigid interstate setting. It was a system of international politics dominated on all three levels—global, regional, and core—by regional hegemonic drives; it was a contest between radical and conservative regimes and it featured arms races and security issues. The Cold War climate on the global level and the inter-Arab rivalry were simply complementary conditions to the Arab-Israeli conflict or “dormant war,” which on several occasions deteriorated into actual interstate warfare. It was an environment in which parties to the conflict in all three tiers opposed each other politically and militarily according to calculations of the military distribution of power, much as states have done since the emergence of an interstate system. In short, it was a state-centric world.⁵

THE STATE LEVEL: THE PARTY SYSTEM

If the external system augmented the “statist” character of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel's statism was further reinforced, on the domestic

side, by the behavior of its political actors and its internal bureaucratic structure. Within Israel's political structure, the role and influence of its political parties is of central importance.⁶ The transformation of the Zionist movement from the diaspora to a territorial polity was carried out by political parties that accumulated power in Palestine and in this way took over the political institutions of the movement and the Jewish people. Moreover, the establishment of parties preceded the establishment of the political system, not only that of the state but also that of the Yishuv. Another facet of Israeli political life is that coalition politics is second only to the role of parties. Since achieving independence and even prior to it, the Yishuv and the state have been ruled by a coalition. Thus, the parties that compose the ruling coalition, and especially the party that enjoys a plurality of electoral strength, have a disproportional share in both political power and in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.

Traditionally, Israel's political map has been analyzed in terms of three camps—labor, civil (center and right-wing parties), and religious. This approach differentiates between the actors according to ideological orientation. Another classification used is a differentiation along coalition-opposition membership categories, distinguishing between parties that have always been in government, those in permanent opposition, and parties that have participated either in government or in opposition.⁷ Both approaches lost some relevancy as the ideological composition of the parties and camps changed and as only the Communist party would qualify as a permanent opposition party. The coalition-opposition party typology, however, was very significant for understanding the newly born Israeli political system. The parties of the inner circle that have ruled the Jewish polity successively since 1935 became identified with the state.

Up to 1961, Mapai, the National Religious Party (NRP; previously Mizrahi/Hapoel Hamizrahi), and the Progressive party composed that core. Following a short disruption between 1961 and 1965, the Progressive party returned to government and continued the traditional coalition with the NRP and Mapai until 1977. These three parties expressed the possible cooperation between the three camps. The two other parties of the Labor camp—Ahdut ha-Avodah and Mapam—which prior to 1948 participated only partially in coalitions of the national institutions, joined the ruling party in the government coalition in 1955. Whereas neither the Progressives nor the NRP as partners of Mapai expressed an independent line in foreign policy, the two socialist parties did. Both

parties joined the government following a lowering of their tones in criticizing Mapai's foreign and security policies.

The common denominator of all these parties was their identification with the central institutions of the Zionist movement and then of the Jewish state. Mapai's strength was related to its command of central institutions such as the Histadrut and, in the prestate era, of the Haganah (the formal militia of the Yishuv). Mizrahi, through its workers' organization offshoot—Histadrut Hapoel Hamizrahi—cooperated with the Histadrut, participated in the national institutions, and accepted the Haganah as the formal militia of the Yishuv even after the founding of the militant Revisionist-controlled Etzel militia. With the establishment of the state, both the secular Mapai and the religious NRP continued to develop their control over the institutional infrastructure and many power bases. Mapai focused particularly on workers' councils, while the NRP concentrated on the religious councils. In addition, the General Zionists ("A" faction), which evolved into the Progressive party and then the Independent Liberals, cooperated in the national institutions and, despite being a free trade party, participated in the elections to the Histadrut through its own organization—the Zionist Workers (Ha-Oved Ha-Zioni). Both the NRP and the Progressive party participated in establishing kibbutzim and moshavim, and institutions that constituted the ethos of the Labor camp.

The Mapai, NRP, and Progressive parties had another element in common: they all represented the centrist-pragmatic element of their respective camps. Thus, Mapai was the most moderate wing in the Labor camp, leaving the ideological fervor to other parties to its left. Mizrahi was the moderate element in the religious camp, while Agudat Israel represented the fundamentalist Orthodox position which disallowed cooperation with secular Zionists. In the civil camp, the General Zionists were oriented to free trade policies, while Herut (the heir of the Revisionists) was more extreme in the area of foreign policy. The common denominator of the "mainstream" socialist, liberal, and clerical parties that allowed them to cooperate with each other as coalition partners was their identification with and support of the central institutions of the state, which was as important to them as their particularistic ideological commitments.

The centrist orientation of all three parties and the fear of their respective ideological rivals within their own camps also generated a political ideological interest to rally around the state. Partnership in the coalition allowed them access to resources that assisted them in gaining favorable conditions against their opponents within their respective

camps. At the same time, the state and its institutions provided them with a legitimizing principle against their more fundamentalist ideological rivals and justification for their pragmatism. In electoral terms Mapam was Mapai's competitor more so than Mizrahi, and Mizrahi saw Agudat Israel as more threatening than a nonreligious party. Jewish sovereignty provided them with an ideological tool against the self-perceived "purist" socialist or Orthodox parties. None of the fundamentalist parties—Marxist Mapam, ultra-Orthodox Agudat Israel, or even Revisionist Herut—could identify with the state and its machinery to the extent that the "core" parties could. Another factor that came into play was that both Mapam and Agudat Israel had a higher authority that overshadowed their loyalty to the state; Herut had been and continued to be a revisionist actor because of the existing borders of the state that did not encompass all the historic Land of Israel. In contrast, the core parties had fewer difficulties in accepting ultimate authority and in identifying with the civic symbols and the rituals of the new state. Ultimately, the coalition partners, while competing against each other, had an inherent interest in not wiping each other out in order to enable the renewal of a coalition in subsequent governments.

These features of the Israeli political map indicate that Israel was ruled by permanent coalition partners from different ideological camps that represented the overarching unity of the state that surpassed ideological segmentation. Indeed, as will be detailed later in this work, the struggle against segmentation was part of the statist philosophy that Ben-Gurion tried to advance. These parties participated in the institutions that fulfilled the function of an authorized allocation of resources prior to and following the establishment of the state. These parties controlled the public service delivery system, whether through the government apparatus, the Histadrut, or the cooperative sector. During those years the politicization of the civil service became an accepted norm in Israeli public life as ministries were identified with certain parties or camps.⁸ Control of the Histadrut by the Labor camp also implied control of health insurance, agricultural marketing, and industrial corporations. The NRP, through its association with Mapai, received its share in economic and social institutions. It was not a coincidence that these parties also maintained a large party apparatus and local party branches throughout the country.

The strength of the state was reflected in its moderating effect and in the linear growth of the coalition. The inner circle of the three pragmatic "core" parties was expanded; the radical socialist parties eventually underwent a process of moderation that enabled them to join the core

parties. Ahdut ha-Avodah, which had controlled the elite units of the Haganah and had opposed partition,⁹ joined the coalition in 1955, merged with Mapai in 1965 in the Labor Alignment, and was totally absorbed by it three years later. Hashomer Hatzair, the Marxist wing of the Zionist movement, opposed partition but supported a binational state. Later, Mapam demanded a pro-Moscow foreign policy orientation and opposed the reparations agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. It also joined the government following the 1955 elections. Although Mapam objected to the Sinai Campaign and the arms link to Germany in the late 1950s, and continued to advocate a dovish foreign policy toward the Arabs, it nevertheless was absorbed by the statist Labor establishment. During 1967-70, when the state was faced with an imminent physical threat, the coalition grew to include almost the entire political spectrum. This joining of the government on the eve of the war was also motivated by the desire of the outsiders to penetrate the core. In Israel, because of the strength of the state in public life, being in opposition implied being doomed to frustration and paralysis.

Two contending theories have been advanced to explain coalition-making in Israel, where the "minimum winning coalition theory" did not apply. One theory, based on the consociational model of political accommodation, perceived coalition-making as conflict regulation between rival ideological camps.¹⁰ Power-sharing arrangements that characterized conflict regulation in the Yishuv period were carried over to the state. A second theory that explains coalition-making in Israel is that of ideological proximity.¹¹ According to this theory, coalition-making was influenced not by an attempt to overcome ideological conflict but rather by the congruence between political attitudes of the coalition partners on various issues, and by the saliency of the issues on which political conflict existed.¹² Obviously, the two theories contradict each other. The "statist" orientation of all the political parties that participated in the government could explain coalition-making behavior according to either one of the two theories.

The consociational model accepts the notion that political accommodation is possible in a plural society only when an overarching loyalty exists. Thus, the coalition among the three parties belonging to different camps was facilitated by their overall acceptance of the centrality of the state in the public life of the Jewish people. While each party ultimately aspired to achieve a different state, the goal of state-building and the mere accomplishment of sovereignty was so overwhelming that they were ready to postpone part of their socialist, liberal, or religious visions of the state. The ideological proximity theory is also enhanced

by the state variable. Parties that maintained that state-building was more important than their disagreement over the relationship between state and religion or socioeconomic questions were able to compromise and form a coalition.

Finally, the strength of the Israeli state cannot be completely understood without some direct reference to Mapai, the dominant party of the Yishuv and the early statehood period. Mapai was a social-democratic party in which the exact proportion between socialism, democracy, and Zionism was determined according to its changing internal composition. The conquest of the national institutions moved Mapai further away from responsiveness to the particularistic needs of the working class toward the needs of the Zionist movement as a whole. The Eastern European socialist background of Mapai induced its statism. Control of territorywide institutions and the Haganah—the Yishuv's militia—further strengthened the statist element. As the pivotal force in implementing partition, accomplishing independence, and controlling the major government portfolios, Mapai became identified with building the state. This identification bolstered its political appeal, especially when the state was absorbing mass immigration of people who were not familiar with a pluralistic political system. For most immigrants coming from either Eastern Europe or the Arab countries, the ruling party and the state were identified as the same. Being identified with the state reinforced Mapai's self-perceived role of state-building.

After independence Mapai, and especially its leader Ben-Gurion, was identified with the policy of *mamlachtiyut*, translated at the time, despite some contextual difficulties, as statism. (To avoid conceptual confusion with the theoretical use of statism in this book, the Hebrew-derived term *mamlachtiyut* will be used.) While this concept is still awaiting full academic treatment, some insightful suggestions have been made. Peter Medding sees depoliticization and state integration as two of the main functions of *mamlachtiyut*.¹³ Horowitz and Lissak define it as the opposite of *tnuatiyut*—ideological particularism.¹⁴ Liebman and Don-Yehiya define *mamlachtiyut* as a civil religion:

Mamlachtiyut expressed the centrality of the state and its superiority to any other factor or value within or outside it. Statism affirms the centrality of state interests and the centralization of power at the expense of non-governmental groups and institutions in terms of symbols and style; statism reflects the effort to transform the state and its institutions into the central foci of loyalty and identification. Statism gives rise to values and symbols that point to the state, legitimate it and mobilize the population to serve its goals.¹⁵

All three definitions saw *mamlachtiyut* as an attempt by Mapai to give the state a new identity that would supersede the previous inherent segmentation.

Mamlachtiyut could be perceived as the Israeli version of state-building in light of the Yishuv's ideological segmentation and the cultural pluralism of the immigrants coming from over one hundred countries. Mapai chose the state framework, its institutions, and the newly accomplished Jewish sovereignty as the value system and central zone around which to integrate the competing loyalties. *Mamlachtiyut* was used in integrating the multiplicity of streams in education and the secular and the religious streams. *Mamlachtiyut* was also important in establishing a line of authority between the civil and the military sectors, between the government and the Histadrut, and between the state and the Jewish Agency. Institutions built during the prestate era, like the various militias, the Histadrut, and the Jewish Agency, became competing centers over which the new state had to impose its authority.

The existential threat also added to the aura of the state. In the area of national security, *mamlachtiyut* implied the promotion of the state, its interests and its survival above any other value. In the name of *mamlachtiyut*, Mapai and especially its leader Ben-Gurion received the legitimacy to disband the ideological militias on the right and left wings of the Israeli political spectrum in the midst of a war for independence.¹⁶ It reached a point where the national security elite in the party received a special status. The party machine—the *Gush*, as it came to be known—when it was challenged by those regarded as the national security establishment, sought an alliance with Ahdut ha-Avodah leaders rather than claiming expertise in this area. Political considerations also gave way to national security issues on the eve of the Six-Day War when Levi Eshkol assembled a national unity government and passed the Defense Ministry on to Moshe Dayan.

The strength of the statist center led by statist Mapai was reinforced by the weakness of the ethnonational camp. The most likely candidates to pick up the ethnonational banner were Herut and the NRP. The NRP was embraced by Mapai from the mid-1930s and it followed the foreign policy line of its senior partner. During the Uganda debate, it sided with the statist. The Mizrahi and its leader Bar-Ilan joined the ethnonationalists during the partition debate, but henceforth it accepted Ben-Gurion's stewardship of foreign policy.

With the ascendancy of Mapai and Ben-Gurion, the Revisionists and their leader Zeev Jabotinsky were the main losers. They were further weakened when Ben-Gurion disbanded their underground organ-

izations—Etzel (Irgun) and Lehi. The Revisionists were caught in the incongruity between state and historic land. They supported both the extension of Israeli sovereignty to the historic boundaries of the ancient kingdoms and the immediate establishment of a Jewish state. The establishment of the state thus put them in a position of an irredentist party. The Revisionists were weak in both settlement of the land and the institutions of the state. Nevertheless, despite its institutional weakness, Ben-Gurion and Mapai sensed that Herut represented the greatest threat to its rule. It was the strength of the ethnonational idea that provided Herut with that potential. Thus, the Zionist establishment's policy of boycott and delegitimization of the Revisionist leadership that had been initiated during the Yishuv was carried over to the state period. Ben-Gurion, by implementing the expression that he formed "a coalition without Maki and Herut," both delegitimized it and kept Herut away from the sources of power. Thus, Herut wandered in the wasteland of the opposition awaiting a turnabout in Israeli politics that would enable it to enter the promised land.

Herut's parliamentary strength was indeed limited during the first years of Israeli independence. The national bloc, which at the beginning was composed only of Herut, hovered between 11.5 and 14 percent of the electorate. With the founding of a Herut-Liberal bloc called Gahal, their power increased to over 20 percent. The price for unification was the downgrading of the demand to unify the land. The achievements of Gahal in the 1965 and 1969 elections did not significantly exceed the separate electoral strength of each of the constituting parties. Toward the end of the second decade of Israel's independence there was no indication of a gradual increase in the strength of nationalist forces. The establishment of Gahal signaled that Herut and its charismatic leader Menahem Begin realized that the land issue would not bring them to power. Further analysis of Herut and its leader will be presented when explaining the Herut ascendancy in the 1970s.

THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL—BEN-GURION AND THE STATE

Henry Kissinger, in summarizing his book on Metternich and the restoration of the European international system, poses the question, "What then is the role of statesmanship?" He responds: "The role of a *statesman*, then, is his ability to recognize the real relationship of forces and to make his knowledge serve his ends."¹⁷ Kissinger believes that the statesman's role is the most decisive factor in the emergence of an

international order based on states. Deliberating on his special case study, he then reaches a final conclusion: "Statesmanship thus involves not only a problem of conception but also of implementation, an appreciation of the attainable as much as a vision of the desirable."¹⁸

The State of Israel had in Ben-Gurion the type of leader that Kissinger was describing. According to Michael Brecher, "Ben-Gurion held a leadership position of towering dimensions. As Prime Minister and Defense Minister from 1948 to 1963, with only a brief interregnum, Ben-Gurion's influence had added institutional authority."¹⁹ It would be difficult to find anybody, whether colleagues, Cabinet members, political scholars who researched that period, or even bitter opponents, who would deny Ben-Gurion's prominence in conceptualizing and implementing Israel's foreign policy. Moreover, Ben-Gurion's influence extended beyond his term in office and was carried on to his heirs as they continued to seek his guidance. This phenomenon was confirmed by Brecher's interviews, and he dubbed it the "Ben-Gurion complex."²⁰

Ben-Gurion's contributions to the national security doctrine and the formation of Israeli foreign policy were multifaceted. There is hardly any area in which he did not express his opinions or actively exert influence. As stated earlier, a main theme in his political philosophy and behavior was the doctrine of *mamlachtiyut* and the centrality of the state.

In a letter Ben-Gurion wrote to Ussishkin in 1936, he complained of the Jews' lack of political talent, which was responsible for the destruction of the Second Temple. Using the word *mamlachti* to describe what the Jews have to acquire in order to build a state, he described it as an art. Distinguishing between the Yavne model, which expressed spiritual existence over sovereignty, and modern Zionism, he wrote: "We want to build a state, and we shall not build a state without political thought, political talent and political prudence."²¹

Ben-Gurion thus connected state-building with political wisdom, viewing politics as an art. For Ben-Gurion, as the letter indicated, *mamlachtiyut* was the obligation to overcome internal division or ideological tribalism, which had a special negative meaning in Judaism and was perceived as the cause of the fall of the Second Commonwealth. Significantly, his first attempt at history writing was entitled *The Restored State of Israel*, thus emphasizing the state in Jewish history. Also significant was the choice of the word *mamlachtiyut* (*mamlacha* means kingdom) rather than *medinatyut* (*medina* means state). *Mamlacha* has a connotation that transcends politics.

Despite his emphasis on the “art of politics,” Ben-Gurion did not disregard the physical power dimension in either the domestic or the international political arena. The biographer of Ben-Gurion concluded that at the time of the Arab Revolt and the Peel Commission, the leader of the Yishuv reached the formula that only force would enable Zionism to accomplish its goals. While reaching the conclusion that only through force would the Arabs accept coexistence with the Jews, he was also flexible in his strategy and was ready to accept partition which required relinquishing most of the historical territory in exchange for a state. “The state was for him an ‘instrument of force’—the ultimate, and most efficient power, to use his language—without which the Jews of Europe and the Jewish Yishuv would be destroyed and Zionism would remain unfulfilled.”²²

The state, Ben-Gurion’s biographer argued, was a means to save the Jewish people rather than a goal in itself, and yet it was important enough to become his main operational goal. The first condition or the means to accomplish a state was the establishment of a Jewish army, for only through force would the state be accomplished. At the same time, the establishment of a Jewish state would allow further strengthening of the army, which in turn would strengthen the Jewish state and so on. State and power, both as ends and means, stood at the center of Ben-Gurion’s doctrine of implementing Zionism.

Similarly, Ben-Gurion’s dedication to the state and its security was translated into principles of power politics that he formulated in terms of a grand strategy doctrine. One such principle that guided him throughout his political career was that of insuring the support of at least one Great Power for Zionism during the struggle for the state and then for state survival. The evolution of this principle was summarized by his biographer:

In 1913, Ben-Gurion decided that Zionism will not be implemented through negotiations and an agreement with the Arabs but through the assistance of the Ottoman government. During the early years of the Mandate, when guided by his class formula, he looked for...the help of the Soviet Union....Subsequently he searched for help for Zionism in Britain. During the struggle for statehood he asked for U.S. assistance. As Prime Minister of Israel he courted France and Britain and then returned to the U.S. What had been at the outset a temporary need became so rooted in his thought that it was transformed into a political principle.²³

Ben-Gurion, as a rule, liked to express his strategy in terms of three goals. While varying the priorities, the goal that was most consistently

the primary one was that of *aliyah* (immigration) and *kibbutz galuyot* (the ingathering of the exiles). Thus, the centrality of *aliyah* in his value system was indeed genuine. Its centrality was also identified by his biographer and by Moshe Sharett.²⁴ As early as 1937, Ben-Gurion compared the value of *aliyah* to that of the integrity of the Land of Israel in Zionism, and stated:

And if we had been offered a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan on one condition, that immigration be limited to one and a half million Jews—and one and a half million Jews would be sufficient to constitute a Jewish majority on both sides of the Jordan, and thus establish a Jewish state—we would have had to reject this offer if we were to remain loyal to the Jewish people and its need for redemption.²⁵

On several occasions, Ben-Gurion asserted that immigration took precedence over other central values. “But neither security nor development of the land are the essence of the state, they are merely necessary conditions for the final goal,” he declared at the Ein Harod convention in 1950. He added: “The ingathering of the exiles is the *raison d’être* of Israel....Our accomplishments in the three generations and the last two wonderful years are but preparation for the ultimate goal — the ingathering of the exiles.”²⁶ And on another occasion he declared:

The War of Liberation and the Declaration of Independence were both preparation for the ultimate goal of Jewish history—the ingathering of the exiles. Our security depends primarily on the ingathering of the exiles....Only the ingathering will build the country....In the ingathering of exiles lie all our historical hopes and the status of Israel in the world depends on it.²⁷

A sovereign state was obviously a precondition to free *aliyah*.

Ben-Gurion’s second most frequently mentioned goal was security. Having confronted the security problem of the Jews in Palestine from the moment he immigrated there, security received first priority in his thinking, especially from the time he realized that military confrontation with the Arabs was inevitable. With the establishment of the state, security as a value took on even greater importance. Aware of the importance of this goal, he insisted on being defense minister in addition to prime minister, and he returned to defense in 1954 prior to again becoming prime minister.²⁸

A third primary goal stressed by Ben-Gurion, particularly during the 1930s, was the creation of a Hebrew labor force (*avodah ivrit*) to the widest possible extent. The Zionist goal of *avodah ivrit* was the trans-

formation of a people detached from the land to one dedicated to the cultivation of the soil. Later, especially with the establishment of the state, Ben-Gurion, who by then was not a laborer but a state leader, emphasized settlement of the land and making the desert bloom. At one point he declared: "if there is something that encompasses one of the fundamental principles of Zionism it is Hebrew labor.... This is Zionism in a nutshell. The Land of Israel without Hebrew labor is like the Land of Israel without Jews."²⁹ Most revealing, however, was a famous statement he made about the function of both Hebrew labor and settlement of the land:

A homeland is not given or taken as a gift, is not built through rights or political treaties, is not bought by gold and is not conquered by force, but is built through the sweat of labour.... The Land of Israel will be ours not when the Turks or the British or the next peace conference will so decide...but when we the Jews will build it.³⁰

It would be inaccurate to call Ben-Gurion an *etatist* who promoted the state to a religious ideal. The state, and especially Jewish statehood and the process of state-building, were supreme values, however. The state, especially a model state, according to his own testimony, was both a goal and a means. Discovering that the concept of the state had no sanctity in Judaism and to the Jewish prophets whom he admired, he tried to synthesize the ideal state of Plato and the prophets' ideal—the unique people (*am segula*). The Jewish people also have to contend with the realities of the modern era and thus integrate the ideal of the "model state" (*medinat mofet*) with that of the "unique people."³¹ In an article entitled "A Model State—A Goal and a Means," written in 1954, Ben-Gurion argued that "the State is the axis of the hope of redemption and its vision."³² In this article he also concluded that the state today is fulfilling the function of religion in the past or "in today's reality Judaism cannot survive without the state."³³

Ben-Gurion was a statesman who articulated a state-centered doctrine and practiced it in both the domestic and the external realms. Contributing to his success was that both realms were compatible with his vision. He acted in an interstate environment and a domestic statist political structure that may have been partially the result of his own making.

NOTES

1. K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p. 16.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Besides the classic study of Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1957), international system characteristics are drawn from Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York: Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 86-90, and Holsti, *International Politics*, pp. 27-29. On the study of issues of interstate conflict, see Holsti, *International Politics*, pp. 403-405, and James N. Rosenau, "Foreign Policy as an Issue Area," in Rosenau, ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 11-50.

4. On the impact of inter-Arab relations and pan-Arabism on the Arab-Israeli conflict, see Nadav Safran, *From War to War* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), ch. 2.

5. On the impact of the Great Powers, see *ibid.*, ch. 3. The concept of the state-centric world is taken from James Rosenau, "Patterned Chaos in Global Life: Structure and Process in the Two Worlds of World Politics," a paper delivered at the 1987 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, pp. 3-6.

6. For the various theories dealing with the impact of the state on foreign policy-making, see Michael P. Sullivan, *International Relations: Theories and Evidence* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), chs. 3-4.

7. On the three camps, see, for instance, Daniel J. Elazar, "Israel's Compound Polity," in Howard R. Penniman, *Israel at the Polls, the Knesset Elections of 1977* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), pp. 9-16. On the coalition-opposition typology, see Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1988), pp. 305-312.

8. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia*, pp. 209-210.

9. Horowitz and Lissak, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity*, p. 96.

10. On the consociational theory and its application to Israeli politics, see Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 129-134, and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Religion and Coalition: The National Religious Party and Coalition Formation," in Asher Arian, *The Elections in Israel—1973* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Academic Press, 1975), pp. 260-264.

11. Lissak and Horowitz, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity*, p. 313.

12. M.M. Czudnowsky, "A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture," *American Political Science Review* 62 (September 1968):878-888.

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17. Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored, Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 324-325.

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19. Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 247-248.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 247-250.

21. See Nathan Yanai, "Ben-Gurion's Conception of Mamlachtiyut," *Cathedra* 45 (September 1987):171. For Yanai's interpretation of Ben-Gurion's *mamlachtiyut*, see the beginning of the article, pp. 169-170.

22. Shabtai Tevet, *Ben-Gurion and the Arabs of Palestine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 366. For a full biography of Ben-Gurion up to the end of World War II, see Shabtai Tevet, *Kinat David* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1986-87), vols. 1-3.

23. Tevet, *Ben-Gurion and the Arabs of Palestine*, pp. 9-10.

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25. Ben-Gurion, *In Battle* (Tel Aviv: Maarachot, 1957), vol. I, pp. 53-54.

26. Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Mapai, 1951), pp. 53-54.

27. *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 292-293.

28. Previously he had abolished the office of commander-in-chief (*Rama*), in order to enable him as minister of defense to control the IDF directly. For more on Ben-Gurion's attitudes toward security, see Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, pp. 265-269.

29. David Ben-Gurion, *Memoirs*, vol. 1 (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1971), p. 512.

30. Ben-Gurion, *From Class to People* (Tel Aviv: Ayanoth, 1955), pp. 4-5.

31. Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. 5, pp. 97-100.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 79.

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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF STATISM, 1949–67

Mamlachtiyut was Israel's predominant value in its first post-independence period. It implied that, while ultimately the state was a means for achieving the redemption of the people, operationally it became the most sacred value of the Jewish people. The impact of *mamlachtiyut* on foreign policy has not yet been researched in depth, because in foreign affairs the supremacy of the state was taken for granted. In Israel this perception took root across the national security elite and guided Israel's external behavior even after the departure of the "old man." Moreover, Ben-Gurion in developing the concept directed it at the domestic arena. The centrality of this concept, however, could not be delimited to the domestic milieu.

Ben-Gurion's conception of Israeli foreign policy required domination of state goals over any other values, including liberating the rest of the Land of Israel or protecting Jewish interests in the diaspora. Both the historic land and the Jewish people all over the world were means to advancing the security of the state rather than vice versa. Thus, security, which became one of the three goals that Ben-Gurion liked to present before his audiences, slowly predominated over the other two—settlement of the land and *aliyah*. In an interview with Michael Brecher in 1966 after his retirement, Ben-Gurion himself stated: "The things I thought about most concerned Security. Other areas of interest were Education, development of the Negev, and population dispersal."¹ This approach was the background to what became known as the security complex of Israel.

Supremacy of the interest of the state over any other value was demonstrated in a series of decisions that were taken during the early years of statehood and concerned the Jewish people and its historic legacy. Both the decision to seek and accept German reparations taken on January 3, 1951 and implemented in the ensuing years, and the establishment of arms relations with West Germany during the late 1950s were clearly cases where the interest of the state outweighed the

norms of the collective memory of the Jewish people.² Ben-Gurion, who had justified Israel's nonaligned orientation based on the existence of the two largest Jewish communities on the two sides of the Iron Curtain,³ abandoned nonalignment when the state interest required an alliance with the United States.⁴ Evidence seems to confirm that, with regard to Russian Jewry, Ben-Gurion avoided confrontations with the Communist superpower over this issue. As one student of that era put it: "To save less than 200,000 Eastern European Jews, Israel tacitly agreed (at least for the time being) formally to ignore the fate of some two million Soviet Jews."⁵ Similarly, Golda Meir, when faced with the dilemma in the early 1960s of assisting North African Jewish immigration at the cost of hurting relations with France, preferred not to endanger the supply of Mirages from France over an increased *aliyah* from Algeria.⁶

A most revealing dimension of *mamlachtiyut* was its impact on the early attitudes of many members of the ruling elite toward the Holocaust. Only now are Israeli scholars studying this subject, which is still awaiting full exposure. Somewhat deviating from the common notion that an understanding of Israel must start with the Holocaust, Israel's ruling elite appeared to distance the Jewish state from the Holocaust. This seems to be the explanation for the Knesset's delay in adopting legislation to commemorate the destruction of European Jewry. To a certain extent, by underplaying the Holocaust, the ruling elite gave up a major educational resource from which to draw symbols for the state and the nation-building process and the justification for a Jewish state. Ben-Gurion and his associates preferred to stress the "new Jew" and positive symbols of Israeli heroism, activism, and statehood rather than identification with Jews who went to the gas chambers as sheep to the slaughterhouse. Only later on, whether as a result of domestic and external Jewish pressure or comprehending the magnitude of the disaster for the Jewish people and state, did Ben-Gurion shift course and Israel adopt symbols of the Holocaust. The capture of Adolf Eichmann was one of the first foreign policy actions that symbolized the shift, a shift in the relation and approach to the Holocaust but not the state.⁷ The Eichmann trial, in which the State of Israel served as a national tribunal judging crimes committed against the Jewish people, also served the interests of the Jewish state which desired to be perceived in this role.⁸

In foreign affairs *mamlachtiyut* was the desire to develop a conception of a normal state that interacts like all the states, and a nation like all the nations, rather than a state that behaves according to the traditional conception of a Jewish particularistic destiny. If *realpolitik* was the name of the game in international politics, these were the rules

according to which Israel should play. Essentially the Holocaust proved in the cruelest way the argument of political Zionism that only peoples who had states could survive in the modern nation-state system. Therefore, one could also find expressions that the destruction of European Jewry was the result of weakness and dependence on other people and as such was not different from the situation of other minorities who found themselves in similar circumstances.⁹ The existence of a Jewish state was anticipated to have changed that situation. The Holocaust was the destiny of the diaspora and a result of the exile, a situation that was supposed to have been changed with the establishment of the state. Relations with the gentiles were not supposed to be based on reviving an image of a weak Jew but rather that of a new heroic Israeli.

Similarly, the logic of a state-centered approach also explains the change that took place in the 1960s when the downplaying of the Holocaust approach was transformed. The philosophy that a state should use all the resources it has at its disposal naturally led to a discovery of the lessons and symbolism of the Holocaust by the Jewish state. Instead of distancing itself from the Holocaust, the destruction of European Jewry could serve Israel. A decision was made that the time had come to open those wounds and look into the past. The Holocaust was a historical trauma around which the Jewish state could mobilize the Jewish masses both abroad and in Israel. It was a lesson with which to educate Israeli and Jewish youth abroad. It was a scenario to encourage Jews either to immigrate to Israel or at least support it economically for the sake of their own interest. It was a demonstration that Israel did not forget or forgive despite the German reparations. And it was important to remind the world community of its inaction in the face of Hitler's destruction of European Jewry, especially when the Arab states threatened the State of Israel with destruction.

The Jewish dimension of Israeli foreign policy deserves more research and separate treatment.¹⁰ Moreover, the concept of statism being used in this study must be distinguished from that of Ben-Gurion's *mamlachtiyut*; statism is used here as a conceptual framework for foreign policy, a statist foreign policy as distinguished from an ethnonational one. It was no coincidence, however, that the product of *mamlachtiyut* was a state-centered foreign policy and a rigid national security doctrine. In this chapter, analysis of the impact of state centrism on foreign policy will be restricted to two areas. The first area is the international orientation of Israel in both its global and regional manifestations. The second area is Israel's national security policy with special attention given to territory and war.

THE INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION

Two main elements of the international orientation of the Yishuv and the newly born State of Israel were introduced in previous chapters. The principle of assuring the support of a Great Power was propounded by political Zionism and augmented by Ben-Gurion. On the local level, the Jewish Agency Executive and, later, the provisional government, both headed by Ben-Gurion, responded and even initiated a bilateral understanding with the Hashemites of Trans-Jordan, which resulted in the partition of Palestine/Land of Israel between the two newly established states. Both elements became the axis of Israel's foreign policy until 1967.

K.J. Holsti provides both a definition and a typology of international orientations. An orientation is "a state's general attitudes and commitments toward the external environment and its fundamental strategy for accomplishing its domestic and external objectives and for coping with persisting threats." Holsti outlines three fundamental orientations: (1) isolation, (2) nonalignment, and (3) coalition-making and alliance construction.¹¹

A Zionist international orientation definitely excluded an isolationist international orientation. From the outset the founding fathers of Zionism and the leaders of the Yishuv pursued international support, especially that of the Great Powers. Courtship of the Great Powers and assurance of their support had been a cornerstone in Herzl's doctrine and had been adopted by Weizmann as expressed in his British orientation. As indicated above, Ben-Gurion actively looked for almost every Great Power that showed interest in and could influence Middle Eastern politics. Thus, Israel's nonaligned orientation during the early years of statehood must be explained against this foreign policy tradition. But in addition the transition to a Western orientation must receive attention, for it implied more than a tactical change or even a change in alliance. According to the typology presented above, both the adoption of nonalignment and its abandonment in favor of a pro-Western orientation implied a fundamental change. Moreover, if nonalignment was perceived as serving Israel's foreign policy interests, why did the Jewish state abandon this orientation in the midst of the Cold War when many of the new nations were adopting nonaligned orientations?

Ben-Gurion, the man who dominated Israel's foreign policy when Israel's international orientation was being formulated and acted upon, had developed a personal orientation toward one of the parties to the global conflict. His critical comments on the Soviet Union were clearly

expressed throughout his public life, starting long before he became prime minister. His attitude was comprehensive and consistent, and supported by a well-developed value system.

Five main elements comprised Ben-Gurion's attitude toward the Soviet Union. First, he despised the Soviet regime, stating publicly: "and this regime which destroyed, shattered and uprooted all of human dignity, all of worker's rights, all of human freedom, and is sustained by terror and a secret police calls itself government of the workers...or a Socialist republic."¹² Second, unlike his references to Lenin, which were mixed and sometimes even very positive, his view of Stalin was totally negative; he even compared him to Mussolini and Hitler.¹³ Third, Ben-Gurion perceived international Communism as an instrument of Russia's world hegemony aspirations, and the Israeli Communist party—like all other Communist parties in their countries—as Moscow's agents in the accomplishment of this goal in Palestine and, later, Israel. "Since the foundation of the Catholic Church in Rome and the establishment of the universal rule of the Popes—there has not arisen a force in the world that demanded for itself global and absolute authority like that which the leaders of the Bolshevik party demand," he claimed.¹⁴ The Soviet Union deserved special condemnation because of its anti-Zionism and even anti-Semitism, which was the fourth element in his attitude. He regarded the arbitrary detachment from the rest of the Jewish people inflicted on Soviet Jewry as a national disaster, even comparing it to a second Holocaust.¹⁵ Finally, the Soviet Union scored badly when compared to the West in general and to its chief rival, the United States. On several occasions he drew comparisons from different perspectives, and almost on all accounts the West and the United States came out ahead.¹⁶

The attitudes of most of the foreign policy elite were very similar to those expressed by Ben-Gurion. Although their image of the Soviet Union may not have been as developed and comprehensive as that of their leader, they despised the regime and the Communist leadership and regarded it as basically hostile to Zionism. Moshe Sharett, Israel's first foreign minister, expressed a Western *weltanschauung*. Golda Meir, Israel's first envoy to the USSR, while expressing clear anti-Soviet feelings and negative beliefs, warned against trusting the Soviets even following Gromyko's much-celebrated pro-Zionist address at the United Nations. In general, the Mapai ruling elite indicated pro-Western and especially pro-American attitudes. They perceived Western control of the Middle East as the rightful one and Soviet penetration as imperialist. While the United States was accepted as the natural successor to Great Britain, the Soviets' Middle Eastern foreign policy was regarded as the

continuation of the imperial policies of Czarist Russia. In the long run, Mapai's leaders saw Israel as belonging to the West even if they did not trust the United States to support Israel's requests and supply its needs. To be sure, the Israeli left contained a large bloc that demanded a pro-Moscow orientation, or at least neutralism in the global conflict.¹⁷ This camp included the Israeli Communist party as well as the United Workers party—Mapam. But Ben-Gurion's reaction to the international orientation of the left was consistently negative.

Israel's nonaligned orientation may therefore not have been associated with ideological or personal attitudes. The tradition of alignment in Zionist foreign policy, the basic anti-Soviet attitude of the ruling elite, especially that of the prime minister, and Ben-Gurion's consistently vicious attacks on the foreign policy demands of the pro-Moscow parties, indicate that we must look for another explanation. It is also difficult to associate Israel's nonalignment with the structure of the international system and the general trend of the newly established states, or the Third World. There are no verbal indications of such a philosophy among Israeli decision-makers. Moreover, Israel abandoned nonalignment in the early 1950s just as the Third World was emerging as an international actor. Israel's geographic location, Holsti's third influence on a state's international orientation, could not explain both the adoption and the abandonment of nonalignment.¹⁸

Israel's nonaligned orientation must therefore be seen not as a genuine lack of desire to identify with any side in the global struggle, but rather as a wish not to exclude any potential ally that could increase Israel's security.¹⁹ London's pro-Arab policies and its decline as the major power in the Middle East created a vacuum in Israel's international orientation. Israel's search for new allies among the Great Powers was motivated by the diplomatic and military needs of the newly established Jewish state. While the Americans refused to support Zionist foreign policy goals, shifted their policy at the United Nations, and imposed an arms embargo during Israel's War of Independence, the Communist bloc supported the establishment of a Jewish state at the United Nations and sent arms to the emerging Israeli Army. Moreover, the migration of Jews from Eastern Europe was allowed because the Soviet Union allowed it to take place and Ben-Gurion was aware of this. As mentioned above, Ben-Gurion was very careful not to put the issue of Soviet Jewish migration on the agenda of the two states.²⁰

Nonalignment was abandoned during the early 1950s. The government of Israel's decision of July 2, 1950, to support UN resolutions and actions in response to the outbreak of the Korean War marked the

beginning of the abandonment of the policy of nonidentification with one of the major blocs.²¹ Israel's *de jure* recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) accorded on January 9, 1950, as well as the government's decision on April 24, 1955 to authorize Sharett to convey Israel's wish for diplomatic relations with the PRC, could not cover the change in Israel's international orientation.²²

Israel's vote on Korea and failure to establish relations with China while China was still interested implied losing Soviet and Third World support. Two security considerations influenced this turn to the West. One was a search for American patronage, whether in the form of a regional alliance or a direct guarantee to Israel. Both the Ben-Gurion and Sharett governments sought such a guarantee. For Ben-Gurion the main calculation was one of security; an Israeli-American alliance would induce the Arab countries to abandon their dream of destroying Israel and thus lead them to accept the Jewish state.²³ The second consideration was that of arms supplies. France began supplying Israel with arms in August 1954, thus becoming Israel's closest ally in the 1950s. Although the United States refused to become an arms supplier, West Germany complemented France in arms sales to Israel, counterbalancing the steady weapons flow from the Soviet Union to the Arab countries. Israel's foreign policy on the global scene during the 1950s was heavily influenced by its constant search for sources of arms in order to stabilize the balance of forces. This consideration also influenced two major decisions of the 1950s: German reparations and the Sinai Campaign.²⁴

In the ensuing years, given the Soviet Union's solid military support of the Arab states throughout the 1960s, a Western orientation was Israel's only choice. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol succeeded in establishing a formal relationship with the United States accompanied by arms supplies. Ben-Gurion, loyal to his approach, warned Israel during the May-June 1967 crisis not to attack the besieging Arab armies. Despite the grave military implications of Israeli inaction, Ben-Gurion saw a greater threat in the government's inability to insure the support of at least one Great Power. In reality, it was the search for U.S. and other Western support by the Eshkol government that *inter alia* was responsible for the Israeli delay in responding to the Egyptian provocation, starting on May 15, 1967.

Both nonalignment and its opposite—the turn to the West by the Jewish state—was thus not influenced by ideological or domestic political considerations. Israel's global orientation was ingrained in political Zionist maxims and in Ben-Gurion's doctrine of mobilization of Great

Power support for the Jewish national enterprise. When Soviet Union and Israeli interests converged, while those of Israel and Great Britain clashed, nonalignment was adopted. Similarly, the abandonment of nonalignment and the turn to the West was influenced by balance-of-power and deterrence considerations. The fate of Russian Jewry played hardly any role in these decisions.

The Tacit Alliance

The Zionist-Hashemite relationship, like the Great Power principle, was a basic foreign policy element that was formulated prior to the establishment of the State of Israel. As elaborated above, the provisional Israeli government and King Abdullah tacitly cooperated during the 1948-49 war, despite the official state of war between the two countries and military clashes between the IDF and the Arab Legion. The territorial result of that cooperation was the partition of Palestine and Jerusalem between Israel and Trans-Jordan against the dictates of the United Nations resolutions. In the years following the Armistice Agreement of 1949, both states had a common interest in disregarding the UN resolutions. Both had conquered territories that the international organization had designated for an independent Arab state, and between them they divided a city that was intended to be internationalized.

Between November 1949 and February 1951, the two governments secretly held intensive negotiations that were designed to lead to a Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty. Although the Jordanians backed off from that goal fearing the reaction from other Arab states and a domestic Palestinian backlash, on February 24, 1950, the two sides initialed a five-year nonaggression agreement. This agreement also included provisions regarding Jordanian access to the Mediterranean and economic cooperation. Under pressure from his own government, accompanied later on by external pressures, Abdullah was forced to withdraw from this agreement. On April 1, 1950, the Arab League Council issued a decision forbidding any member to negotiate or sign any treaties with Israel. At the end of the month the Jordanian Parliament decided to unify the two banks within one state, a decision that was met with an Arab uproar. Consequently, the king's ability to renew the dialogue between the two countries was further hampered. Although King Abdullah informed Israeli delegates Reuven Shiloah and Walter Eitan, who visited him occasionally but secretly in Amman, that he intended to go forward and pursue cooperation with the Jewish state, it became clear

that his capability to implement his intentions was seriously hampered. His assassination in July 1951, caused primarily by his negotiations with Israel, doomed that process to failure.²⁵

Following the removal of the king, the Jordanian government, which had always been opposed to peace with Israel, terminated the negotiating process. King Hussein, who was present at his grandfather's murder and came to power following his father's disqualification, soon understood the dangers inherent in maintaining a relationship with the Jewish state. The Hashemite regime had to undergo two painful processes: the absorption of a large population, most of whom were refugees from Palestine, that exceeded the entire population of Trans-Jordan; and the legitimacy crisis following the assassination of the founder of the monarchy. In addition, the Arab world was going through a wave of internal changes unfavorable to both monarchies and ethnically foreign regimes. Under such circumstances, the Jordanian-Israeli relationship required a new basis for continuation.

On the surface, there was indeed very little to induce Israel to proceed with its traditional policies toward the Hashemite kingdom. With Abdullah gone the chances for a peace treaty, which had already been slim, were now reduced to nil.²⁶ Moreover, in the ensuing years, Jordan became a base for Palestinian terrorist incursions against Israeli border settlements. Between 1949 and 1956, a total of 7,850 incidents occurred on the Jordanian border; and in the years 1951–56, Israel suffered 266 casualties on its Jordanian border, occurrences that created a domestic atmosphere that called for retaliation.²⁷ Unlike his grandfather, King Hussein avoided secret meetings with Israeli representatives to coordinate bilateral problems. Thus, while it may have been assumed that Jordan was not behind these acts of insurgency, there was no way of testing it. Unable to seal the border hermetically, Israel adopted the doctrine that the country from which these acts originated was responsible for preventing them from taking place. If Israeli policy-makers desired to "liberate" the West Bank, the Jordanian border was definitely volatile enough to provide them with sufficient cause.

Jordan enjoyed the support of a Great Power—Great Britain—a factor that may only partially explain why Israel did not attack Jordan in response to the acts of insurgency originating from its territory, and thereby fulfill the aspirations of some strategic thinkers, like Yigal Allon and Moshe Dayan, who demanded that the Jordan River be established as Israel's eastern border.²⁸ Israel's policy toward Jordan was influenced primarily by a calculated preference for the Hashemite regime over other alternatives. It was part of a Jordanian orientation on

the regional level that Israel had developed, despite the fact that Ben-Gurion never developed any special admiration for the Hashemites. One expression of this orientation was in Israel's retaliation policy. Realizing the potential threat to the royal regime, Israel adopted a controlled retaliation policy vis-a-vis Jordan following the Qibyah operation in October 1953 when an IDF unit retaliated against an Arab village and mistakenly killed about 70 civilians. A similar rationale guided Israel's thinking when it allowed British forces to fly over its territory in July 1958 in order to save the Hashemite regime in Jordan. Ben-Gurion resisted two chiefs of staff—Dayan and Haim Laskov—who submitted operational plans to attack Jordan and detach the West Bank from the Hashemites. Dayan suggested that this operation take place on the eve of the Sinai Campaign when Israel was concentrating its troops on its eastern border in order to mask the forthcoming attack on Egypt; Laskov suggested carrying it out in 1958 when the revolution that toppled the Hashemites in Iraq also endangered the Jordanian branch of the family. The fear of annexing more than a million Arabs to the Jewish state was a major consideration in Israel's refraining from conquering the West Bank.²⁹

Ben-Gurion's "eastern" policy was basically motivated by balance-of-power considerations. In a conversation with his aides, he stated that the rationale behind letting the British fly over Israeli territory and thereby save Hussein was that a weak Arab state on the eastern border was preferable to a strong Arab state controlling the West Bank following the disintegration of Jordan.³⁰ His understanding of the nature of power implied that power was relative rather than absolute. The addition of territory accompanied by a hostile population or, alternatively, exchanging Jordan for a strong nationalistic neighbor on the eastern border, did not necessarily translate into more power.³¹

The statist character of the Hashemite regime also contributed to the Jordanian-Israeli relationship. Established by an imperial power, who imported a foreign ruler, out of pure imperial considerations and lacking any ethnonational characteristics besides being part of an overall Arab identity, the Emirate of Trans-Jordan was statist by definition. The survival of Jordan as a Hashemite kingdom, especially after the annexation of the West Bank and absorption of Palestinian refugees from the parts that became the State of Israel, depended on the predominance of the statist over the ethnonational element. At the time of annexation, the Palestinians were not only more numerous and better educated than the Jordanians, but also more politicized and economically developed, and were thus threatening to both the regime and the non-Palestinian ruling

minority. Suffering from a weak and yet undeveloped Jordanian identity, the state—the royal court in Amman and the ruling elite—became the central identity which the regime wanted to strengthen.

As part of its state-building scheme for Jordan, the Hashemite regime concentrated its effort on the East Bank and subordinated the Palestinian West Bank. This policy suited Israeli interests. Through a concentrated effort, the government in Amman preferred to invest in developing industry and public service delivery systems east of the Jordan, while allowing the West Bank to specialize in agriculture and tourism. East Jerusalem, an administrative center in Mandatory Palestine, lost out to Amman, which was a desert town during that period. Jerusalem's stagnation, accompanied by similar policies in other West Bank towns, was part of a deliberate policy of downgrading Palestinian nationalism and enhancing the Amman center. At the same time, through a policy of supporting traditional elites, on the one hand, and absorbing them into the administrative structure of the state, on the other hand, the regime in Amman secured their pacification and loyalty, thus aborting the emergence of an indigenous Palestinian center. Politically, it implied the supremacy of the Jordanian state over the West Bank Palestinians.³²

Israel must have been aware of the control measures that Amman imposed on the radical forces in West Bank society. The two countries shared another common threat—the identity that the Palestinians adopted, namely, pan-Arabism, which at the time was identified with Egypt. Pan-Arab parties, identified as Nasserite, Baathist, or Communist, were closely controlled by the Jordanian security services.³³

Finally, a functional issue connected the two countries—the Jordan River waters. One of Israel's main sources of water was the Jordan River, whose headwaters, the Banyas and Hasbani Rivers, were controlled by Syria and Lebanon. The water issue linked Israel and Jordan in two ways. First, the national water carrier that Israel was planning to build in order to divert water from the upper Jordan River to the Negev was bound to reduce the amount of water in the part of the river which Israel and Jordan shared. In turn, Jordan shared control of the Yarmuk River at its upper level with Syria and at its lower level with Israel, prior to its flowing into the Jordan River which divided the two countries. In its continuation, the Jordan River flowed as an internal Jordanian river separating the East and West Banks down to the Dead Sea. Jordan's intention to build a high dam at Maqarin and its agreement with Syria to share the Yarmuk water was bound to affect Israel. In order to overcome these conflicting trends and even try to promote resolution of political problems through economic cooperation, in 1953 President Eisenhower

appointed Eric Johnston as his personal envoy to induce the development of a regional program of sharing the Jordan River's resources. In the two years that ensued, Johnston hammered out a "unified plan" that almost received acceptance and implied formal cooperation and *de facto* recognition of Israel by the Arab states. Ultimately, following Syrian pressure, the Arab League Council and the concerned Arab states rejected cooperation with Israel on a regional water plan. Significantly, Israel designed its diversion project in accordance with its water allocation in the "unified plan," and Jordan abided by the water quotas of that plan in its diversions. In effect both countries tacitly accepted sharing and cooperation.³⁴

The role of the "Jordanian option" must also be weighed against any other option that was available to Israel. Given the Israeli aspiration for Arab recognition, should not Israel have courted Egypt, the most influential Arab state with whom it did not have a real territorial dispute, rather than Jordan which had territorial aspirations in Palestine? There is evidence that starting in the midst of the War of Independence, a tentative Egyptian option had existed. In contrast to the issue of global orientation, neither the Hashemite nor the Egyptian orientation was ever debated in any of the appropriate political institutions.³⁵

On the eve of the resumption of fighting on the Egyptian front, in mid-October 1948, and even during the offensive in the south, King Farouk sent peace signals to Israel. The Egyptian option became even more realistic while negotiations in Rhodes and later in Lausanne were taking place. Peace with Egypt implied Israeli concessions in the southern Negev and legitimation of Egyptian control of the Gaza Strip. While rejecting the first proposal, Ben-Gurion was ready to consider the annexation of the Gaza Strip to Trans-Jordan. Why did Ben-Gurion reject the Egyptian proposals and prefer Abdullah who aspired to control, if not all of Palestine, then at least the heart of it and especially Jerusalem? With the Egyptians, who despised the British presence on their soil, he theoretically could also find a common enemy. Trans-Jordan was a British client.³⁶

Ben-Gurion preferred annexation of the Gaza Strip to Trans-Jordan rather than Egypt because he considered Egypt to be the most powerful state in the region. Therefore, he opposed their gaining any hold in the Land of Israel.³⁷ Geostategic considerations thus superseded any consideration of the Egyptians' ability to provide Israel with acceptance by the Arab world. Egypt and not Abdullah, as both Ben-Gurion and Sharett understood, was the key to the realization of that goal.³⁸ But Israel had

to make a choice between Egypt and Trans-Jordan, with the two regimes being in rivalry.³⁹

An Egyptian as opposed to a Hashemite orientation never took root within the Israeli establishment in the subsequent era. If there was a debate concerning relations with Israel's southern neighbor, it was interwoven in the struggle between the two national security schools, and it came to be known as the activist Ben-Gurion approach versus the diplomatic Sharett school.⁴⁰ The controversy extended beyond the personalities involved and represented two approaches, each one with its adherents in government and the bureaucracy. Both schools, however, were rooted in a statist approach and did not express aspirations or objections to liberating the Land of Israel. The debate took place within the ruling party and represented the clash of two different personalities. Indeed, when the struggle came to an impasse, Sharett was forced to resign in order to clear the way for the Sinai campaign against Egypt in October 1956. The struggle did not divide Israeli society and its polity as would happen two decades later.⁴¹

The Western orientation on the global level and the Jordanian on the regional became founding principles of Israeli foreign policy, influencing its national security doctrine as well.

ISRAEL'S NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE AND WARS

From the outset the Arab-Israeli conflict was characterized by broad inequalities on the strategic level. The Arab states enjoyed a quantitative advantage in almost all the tangible elements of power. There was also an asymmetry between the goals of the two sides. Israel's goal was to achieve legitimacy and acceptance by its rivals, whereas the Arab states sought the liquidation of the State of Israel. Moreover, Israel suffered from geostrategic disadvantages as a result of its geopolitical disposition. These imbalances were detrimental to Israel's interests and influenced its national security doctrine.

The population ratio between Israel and the Arab states, even when limited to what came to be known as the confrontation states, was extremely unfavorable to Israel. Even though the ratio improved after 1948 when it stood around 50 to 1, it was still 20 to 1 in 1967. A brief look at the Middle East map indicates the territorial disproportion in favor of the Arab states. The ratio between the territory of the Arab confrontation states and Israeli territory was 63 to 1. Most significant in this disproportion was Israel's lack of strategic depth as measured by the

ratio between territory and border. The ratio between Israeli territory and the Armistice lines was 13 to 1, whereas Egypt's ratio was 2,407 to 1.⁴² In terms of natural resources, Israel was a poor country heavily dependent on imports, without the capability enjoyed by several Arab countries of balancing off their overall poverty in natural resources with one strategic commodity—oil. The Arab states also enjoyed a diplomatic advantage as the growing number of independent states was translated into broader influence over the international community, resulting in broader strategic flexibility than that enjoyed by the State of Israel alone. The Arab numerical advantage was expressed in their representation at the United Nations, and in their ability to maneuver between the two blocs and alliances.⁴³

In addition to these disadvantages Israel suffered from an acute geostrategic inferiority. The 1949 Armistice lines provided the Arab states with several comfortable geostrategic advantages with which they could threaten Israel's viability without opening a full-scale war. The West Bank, which was located at the narrow "waistline" of Israel where the total width of the state reached 8 to 10 miles, was one spot from which Arab-mobilized armies could threaten to cut Israel into two parts. Without actually opening hostilities, the concentration of large enemy troops close to the border constituted a threat that the Jewish state could not tolerate for an extended period of time. Moreover, the West Bank bordered on Israel's industrial center and thus controlled the most populated region of the country stretching from Haifa (the largest port) in the north, to Tel Aviv (the business center) and Jerusalem (the capital and seat of government) in the center. A similar situation, though not as pressing, existed in the south where the Gaza Strip, occupied by Egypt, created an enclave at a distance of 40 miles from the city of Tel Aviv and the Dan region, the state's largest urban concentration.

Both areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, strategically situated in relation to Israel's population centers, were densely populated by Palestinian refugees who either on their own initiative or with the encouragement of their host country waged an insurgency war against Israel. Upgrading this warfare to a level unbearable to Israel eventually became a second advantage for the Arab states: in this way, without declaring formal war, they could compel Israel to face the choice of either submitting to their demands or escalating to full war. A third strategic area was the Sinai Desert. Concentration of the Egyptian Army along the southern border would have put Israel in an inferior position. Since the backbone of the IDF was its reserve forces, Israel could not counterbalance an Egyptian military move for prolonged periods of

time. Again, it would have had to face the choice of either attacking or submitting.

Another strategic spot was Sharm el Sheikh and the Straits of Tiran from which the Egyptians controlled the shipping to Israel's southern port—Eilat. By doing so they were able to strangle Israel's international trade with Africa and the Far East. By closing the Suez Canal to Israeli navigation, the Gulf of Aqaba became Israel's only link to the Indian Ocean. Development of Eilat was very dear to Ben-Gurion because of the importance he attached to the Negev as the "new frontier" for Israeli society. Ben-Gurion overtly declared that the closure of the Straits of Tiran would be considered a *casus belli*.

Syria controlled yet another strategic spot. In July 1953 Israel undertook to build a water carrier whose origin was in the demilitarized zone near the B'not Ya'akov bridge, which was designed to bring water to the south, especially to the Negev. The Security Council's decision opposing the construction of the canal, followed by U.S. sanctions, convinced Israel to cease work. Following the formal refusal of the interested Arab states to accept American emissary Johnston's plan, toward the end of 1958 Israel decided to shift the location of the water carrier from the B'not Ya'akov bridge to the northwest corner of Lake Tiberias. It was designated as a national project with all the commensurate priority and importance.

Arab threats and Syrian attempts to divert the two rivers did not prevent Israel from completing the national water carrier project in June 1964. The strategic importance of water to the development of the state and the major investment in the project led to Israeli actions against Syrian diversion work, which convinced Syria to cease its acts. Nevertheless, Syria continued to control the Golan Heights from which it could make life in northern Israel unbearable. The combination of the two threats gave Syria important strategic leverage over Israel.⁴⁴

Israel was vulnerable because, in addition to its lack of strategic depth, especially when compared to that of the Arab states, it had to rely on a reserve army in time of war. Lacking strategic depth, Israel was unable to adopt a defensive strategy in the event an Arab invasion threatened its population and industrial centers. Mobilization of the reserve army for long periods of time meant economic paralysis as most of the civilian work force was called up. The combination of these two factors implied that in order to deter a potential aggressor from taking any of these unilateral steps, Israel had to convince him of assured defeat.⁴⁵ An outbreak of hostilities that would end with a stalemate and

thus without putting an end to the aggressive acts would have constituted an Israeli defeat.⁴⁶

Based on these considerations, Israel's national security doctrine was influenced by three dimensions involving the distribution of power: actual, potential, and geographic.⁴⁷ On the actual level, given the Arabs' inherent advantage in tangible elements of power, the IDF had to maintain a qualitative edge and develop a military doctrine that would allow these elements to determine the outcome of a military contest. Elements such as surprise, determining the battlefield, and dictating the pace of warfare were essential components of this doctrine. The lack of territorial depth also required that Israel develop an offensive doctrine that would prevent war from taking place on Israeli soil but rather would transfer the battlefield to the enemy's territory.

With regard to the potential level, the fact that the Arab goal was not only the conquest of a disputed territory but also the elimination of the Jewish state altogether imposed a special burden on Israel to act and abort potentially detrimental trends in power relationships when they were developing. Thus, watching the potential balance of power assumed special significance in the Arab-Israeli equation. The existential threat to Israel emanating from the goals of the Arab states forced Israel to watch potential changing power differentials closely, and act on them ahead of time. In operational terms, Israel had to adopt a preventive war doctrine and act on it, once an irreversible future shift in power was anticipated.

The third dimension of the balance of power was related to the ability of the Arab states to transform the geostrategic balance unilaterally over a short period of time. In order to deter the Arab states from undertaking any unilateral step that might tip the balance in their favor, Israel had to declare a strategy of *casus belli*, or "red lines," which if crossed would require an Israeli response prior to a clear, open aggression. This rationale contributed to Israel's preemptive war doctrine.

Thus, the rationale of the three-tiered balance of power required that, despite Israel's basic defensive posture, it adopt an offensive military strategy. On the strategic level, Israel developed a preventive and preemptive war doctrine that was an outgrowth of the balance-of-power doctrine developed by Israel's national security elite.⁴⁸ This doctrine induced Israel to adopt an active retaliation policy and initiate war twice—in 1956 and in 1967.⁴⁹ On the operational level, Israel adopted an offensive doctrine that was directed not only at the containment of the enemy but also at his punishment and destruction.

THE STRATEGY OF RETALIATION AND WAR

Three major wars took place in the period between 1948 and 1967. The 1948-49 war, already analyzed above, had been initiated by the Arab states and thus was clearly a defensive war. In contrast, the Sinai Campaign was launched by Israel and had been planned in collusion with two Great Powers—Great Britain and France. Similarly, the first shot in the Six-Day War was fired by Israel on June 5, 1967. Between 1948 and 1967 Israel also adopted a policy of controlled retaliation in response to insurgency acts from across the border—from Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. Israel's response was not always proportional to the provocation, exceeding it on many occasions. The declared rationale of the retaliation operations was to induce the country in which the provocation originated to act against that type of warfare. However, it was established that other calculations were involved in executing this policy. Israel's retaliation and war strategies were influenced by its international and regional orientations as well as its national security doctrine.

The Strategy of Retaliation

Violence had been taking place throughout the period prior to and following the outbreak of war. Arab acts of insurgency from across the border were met by a policy of retaliation that was directed and controlled by the Israeli government and its defense establishment. What was the strategy behind these actions?

One study of Arab-Israeli interaction during the 1948-67 period concluded: "The violent actions of Israel and each Arab country can best be explained by the violent actions of the country's enemy."⁵⁰ When viewed from an Israeli perspective, the conclusion implied that Israel's policy of retaliation was just a reaction to the other side's violence and as such did not contain a broader conception or result from strategic thinking. A study of Israel's retaliation strategy, though not rejecting this conclusion, namely, that at certain points an action-reaction pattern might have evolved, found that Israel's overall retaliation strategy was a substitute for full-scale war. While aimed at fulfilling other functions as well, for example, the domestic political needs of the ruling elite, or signals to the Great Powers, the retaliatory actions were controlled by

the political level in order to alleviate the pressures for escalation to war.⁵¹

A comparative analysis of the borders where most of the acts of insurgency took place and the targets of the retaliatory acts supports the contention regarding the strategic nature of Israel's retaliation policy. For most of the period, the Jordanian front was the most active one in terms of both the number of Israeli fatalities (over 50 percent of total casualties) and the number of border incidents (over two-thirds) that took place in the period 1949-56.⁵² Despite the high number of casualties on its eastern border, retaliation against Jordan was restricted in scope. The main aim of Israeli retaliation policy was to force the Jordanian government to act against infiltrations from its territory. The only two incidents in which the scope of the retaliatory action exceeded the original plan were Qibyah on October 1, 1953, and Qalquilia on October 10, 1956. The excess in the first was the result of decisions made at the local military level, and the second resulted from unanticipated tactical problems in extracting the Israeli force. In contrast, retaliatory actions in the south were planned against the Egyptian Army and other military targets, despite possible and perhaps even anticipated political ramifications for the regime. Unlike the action in Qibyah which was executed while Ben-Gurion was on leave, the retaliation in Gaza in 1956 (which according to Nasser convinced him to turn to the Soviet Union for arms) was planned and executed immediately after Ben-Gurion returned to the Cabinet as defense minister. Ben-Gurion, loyal to his orientation, distinguished between and applied a double standard toward Jordan and Egypt.

Another illustration involved the Israeli-Syrian incidents in the context of Syria's attempts to divert the Jordan River. Following Israel's activation of the National Water Carrier in June 1964, Syria, with the formal support of summit conferences of the Arab states, began diverting the sources of the Jordan River originating in its territory. In response, Israel activated its tanks and destroyed the mechanical diversion equipment. The Syrians' attempt to divert the sources far from the border with Israel, accompanied by a very low profile along the border, did not mislead the IDF, and in a series of incidents during March-April 1965 the Syrian equipment was again destroyed. Nasser's advice that the diversion be postponed until the Arabs were ready for confrontation did not dissuade the Syrians, and they moved the diversion attempts to a distance which the Israeli tanks could not reach. In retaliation against a mining incident, the Israeli Air Force was activated on July 1966 and

destroyed the heavy diversion equipment. At this point, the Syrians gave up on their diversion work.⁵³

Israel's retaliatory actions were thus motivated not by pure feelings of revenge, in the tradition of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth," but rather by strategic goals. The distinction between the fronts indicated that Israel's retaliatory actions were definitely guided by political considerations. One goal of the Sinai Campaign was to eliminate the insurgency warfare originating in Egypt. Israel's decision not to launch a similar major military campaign against Jordan in October 1956 confirms the existence of political factors in the retaliatory actions.

An additional dimension of these actions was their contribution to the development of an offensive war doctrine. Anticipating the transformation of the Armistice Agreements into peace treaties, Israel adopted a defensive approach in its military doctrine. Ben-Gurion encouraged the erection of a chain of settlements along the borders with the Arab states in which many of the immigrants were settled. Trying to revive the pioneer spirit of the prestate period, he also induced the development of the Nahal (a Hebrew acronym for "pioneering fighting youth") program. This program was intended to combine military service with the erection of new settlements along the borders. Although envisaged as the continuation of the Palmach units—the Yishuv's elite strike units which also combined agriculture with military service—in effect Nahal became the backbone of Israel's spatial defense system. In addition, a network of regional headquarters coordinated from the general staff and termed Hagmar (the Hebrew acronym for spatial defense) was established.⁵⁴ The failure of the settlements and Hagmar to stop penetration from across the border exposed the limits of a defensive static approach. Failure by regular Israeli infantry troops to strike within Arab territory induced the development of special strike forces (Unit 101). Later, this offensive spirit was also incorporated into the IDF by the newly appointed chief of staff, General Moshe Dayan. After three years of active offensive retaliatory warfare, the offensive approach spread to the entire army and was tested in the full-scale war that broke out in 1956.

The Sinai Campaign

Israel's decision to attack Egypt in 1956 was determined primarily by considerations involving the distribution of military power and objective geostrategic constraints that dictated Israel's deployment of forces. As Table 5.1 indicates, the Czech-Egyptian arms deal announced in

September 1955 implied a major potential tilt of the Egyptian-Israeli balance of forces in favor of the Arab side. Without going into a detailed analysis of power relationships and ratios of power differentials between Israel and its Arab neighbors, the table clearly indicates the impending shift in power that Israel was facing in the wake of the Czech-Egyptian arms deal. The strongest Arab state was about to more than double its strength in almost all branches of its military. The quality of weaponry introduced a new era of war technology into the Middle East. Israel was faced with the choice of either matching the Egyptians' new potential (an arms race) or disturbing its development through war. Israel tried both routes.

Israel's security concerns were compounded by the evacuation of the British Army from its bases along the Suez Canal, thus removing any buffer between Egypt and Israel. The United States, the heir of Britain in the Middle East, governed by the Eisenhower administration, declined Israel's requests for an alliance in October 1955. On September 12, 1955, Egypt's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was strengthened and broadened. The Egyptian-Syrian military pact signed on October 20, 1955, and the joining of Jordan a year later to a tripartite military command, contributed further to perceived threats to Israel's security. At the same time, the French, who countered the Soviet arms supply with a large-scale arms sale, also offered to cooperate militarily against Nasser. The arms deal included 72 Mystere IVs and 200 AMX-13 tanks. France's offer for a military alignment was submitted in September, and on October 16, the anti-Egyptian alignment was extended to include the United Kingdom. The Treaty of Sevres, which provided a Franco-Israeli-British coordinated attack against Egypt, was signed on October 24.⁵⁵

The infusion of arms restored the military balance of power that had been disturbed by the Soviet arms deal, and thus could have acted to arrest the incentive for war. The military alignment was built for other purposes, however; it was a collaboration designed to attack Egypt and remove its charismatic leader—Nasser. The arms supplies and the invitation for collaboration came from the same source. Although the decision to attack was reached only in the fall, whereas the arms had arrived during the summer, the two actions could not be separated. The French arms shipments were not directed at establishing a balance of power and thus preventing war, but rather to strengthen Israel, Egypt's foe, and serve the French interest of constraining or removing Nasser, who was supporting the Algerian national liberation movement.⁵⁶

Table 5.1
The Distribution of Military Power in Israel and Egypt at the End of 1955

Equipment	Israel	Egypt	Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal
Formations	14 infantry + 2 armored brigades	20 brigades (12 infantry + 3 armored)	
Medium and heavy tanks	200 Sherman M-3 & M-50	200 Sherman M-3 & AMX	230 T-34 & Stalin
Tank destroyers and light tanks	50	173	100
Jet fighters	48	80	125 (115 Mig-15 & 10 Mig-17)
Jet bombers			40 Ilyushin-28
Destroyers			2
Frigates	3	6	
Torpedo boats	9	18	12
Artillery	230	375	500
Armored troop carriers	400	400	260
Additional			150 heavy vehicles, radar systems, 15 mine-sweepers, 2 submarines

Source: Calculated on the basis of figures found in *Carta's Atlas of Israel, The First Years, 1948-1961*, p. 124; and Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*, p. 33.

From an Israeli perspective, the war against Egypt was consonant with its international orientation and its national security doctrine. Unlike Jordan, Egypt did not enjoy the open support of any Western power. Collaborating with France and the United Kingdom gave Israel the support of two Great Powers and also complemented Israel's interest in maintaining Jordan's integrity. Israel also achieved strategic superiority. Besides having potential help from the Great Powers' troops which were put on alert in Cyprus and Malta, Great Britain's participation neutralized the Arab Legion, which was under British influence, and the French assured the safety of the Israeli rear by stationing 60 Mystere IV and F-84 planes and pilots. Enjoying the element of surprise and initiative, Israel succeeded in isolating Egypt and cutting it off from its other Arab neighbors. A comparison of the forces on the battlefield reveals that Israel not only enjoyed a qualitative edge, but also almost closed the quantitative gap, and this despite the need to station the IDF along three additional borders. (See Table 5.2.)

The critical factor in Israel's decision to strike was that, while it enjoyed an actual military advantage, the future was not promising. In Israel's perceptions, Nasser's Egypt represented a threat to its existence. The largest and strongest Arab state, led by a charismatic pan-Arab leader, was being armed with the most advanced weapons (see Table 5.1). The combination of several trends—(1) the modernization to which the new regime in Egypt was committed, (2) the potential of the new leader to mobilize Arab masses in other Arab societies through pan-Arab slogans (a situation that was traditionally Israel's nightmare), and (3) the backing of a superpower whom Ben-Gurion and many of the ruling elite never trusted—constituted an acute strategic threat. The extreme anti-Israel oratory emanating from Cairo, the rejection of the Eisenhower-sponsored Anderson peace initiative, and the continuous *fedayeen* (irregular forces) warfare indicated to much of the leadership that Egypt was acquiring both the will and the capability to destroy Israel.

The temporary constellation of international forces and interests seemed to provide Israel with the means to rectify the grim long-term trend it faced. The British and French anti-Egyptian attitudes and their readiness to act in accordance with these attitudes were not inherent in their national interest but rather were transient ones. Consequently, the Israeli leadership had to solve the classic dilemma facing decision-makers who, in order to prevent a threat that might materialize in the future, must take risks in the present. The leaders must weigh, to use the language of a recent study on preventive war, "the uncertainties inher-

Table 5.2
The Distribution of Israeli and Egyptian Forces along the Sinai Front on the Eve of the 1956 War*

Equipment	IDF Southern Command	Egyptian Eastern Front
Formations	2 divisions	2 divisions
Infantry	5 brigades	6 brigades
Paratroopers	1 brigade	
Armor	3 brigades	1 regiment
National and border guard		2 brigades + 4 regiments
Tanks	250	58 + 55 tank destroyers
Airplanes	81 jet fighters and bombers	109 jet fighters and bombers
Artillery	192 cannon	110 cannon

Source: Adapted from *Carta's Atlas of Israel: The First Years, 1948-1961*, p. 126.

* In addition, we must take into account the military power of the two Great Powers involved. The British assembled a force of around 50,000 soldiers and the French around 30,000. Both put together a naval task force of around 130 warships, hundreds of landing craft, 80 cargo boats, and hundreds of bombers and jet fighters.

ent in a war fought now and the uncertainties involved in delay.”⁵⁷ In the summer of 1956 Israel acquired military capabilities that seemed sufficient to deter an imminent Egyptian attack, but not to assure the balance in the long run when France’s interests would likely change. The alliance that was formed gave Israel an opportunity to reverse this trend, minimizing its war risks.

A preventive war doctrine supports the balance of power even though it can be abused for aggressive and imperial purposes. The preventive war temptation was described as one

to fight a war under relatively favorable circumstances *now* in order to block or retard the further rise of an adversary and to avoid both the worsening of the status quo over time and the risk of war under less favorable circumstances later....They [states] are more likely to fight to maintain an existing status quo than to change the status quo in their favor. Preventive war is more concerned with minimizing one's losses from future decline than with maximizing one's gains by fighting now.⁵⁸

The classification of the Sinai Campaign as a preventive war can be supported by Ben-Gurion's decision to withdraw from the Sinai. A day following the short victory speech to the Knesset on the evening of November 7, 1956, in which he evoked territorial and historical claims, Ben-Gurion announced Israel's decision to withdraw, in principle, from occupied territory. Eisenhower's decision to exert pressure on his two European allies and the State of Israel, in combination with military threats from the Soviet Union, posed threats to Israel that Ben-Gurion apparently found to be too high. The readiness of Israel's coalition partners to yield to the pressure of their senior partner, the United States, added to Ben-Gurion's decision to withdraw several hours after his victory and historical claim speech. This decision was clearly not easy to make, but it was in accordance with his maxim of insuring the support of at least one Great Power for Israel's military actions. Historical claims were means for strategic goals. Thus, when a historical claim confronted the state interest, he did not hesitate to withdraw from historic land.

In summary, the decision to initiate war in the fall of 1956 was motivated primarily by the preventive war rationale linked to Israel's balance-of-power doctrine. Having demonstrated its military superiority, Israel had been able to restore its deterrence capability. Based on the goals that motivated Israel's war initiative, its leaders felt that the goals with the highest priority had been accomplished, and thus withdrawal was possible. Since international realities prohibited Israel from imposing a peace treaty or demanding the removal of Nasser as conditions for an IDF withdrawal, from the point of view of a statist orientation what was left to ensure was that the geostrategic balance would be fortified. Indeed, in the intervening months between the decision to withdraw in principle and its implementation, achieving those elements that would stabilize the geostrategic balance was Israel's main concern. Ben-

Gurion sought to put an end to insurgency actions from the Gaza Strip, to obtain guarantees for Israel's freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, and to obtain a UN buffer in the Sinai that would discourage the Egyptian Army from threatening Israel's southern border. Equally important was the fact that, despite the challenges on its eastern border, Israel did not take the opportunity to attack Jordan but rather preferred to address its security problems on the southern border.

The Six-Day War

Israel's national security doctrine as outlined above required a military response in the event that the balance of power was disturbed in one of two ways: if a potential threat developed to what Israel considered a stable balance of power, or in the event the other side undermined the geostrategic balance of power along the borders to the extent that this became a *casus belli*. The May-June crisis of 1967 was an example of the second case.

The threats that brought about the crisis and eventually triggered the actual hostilities were very similar to those that had been anticipated by Israel's national security doctrine.⁵⁹ After a lull of almost a decade, insurgency actions into Israel, especially across its northern border, were resumed and were accompanied by shelling from the Golan Heights. Both actions signaled the start of a potential war of attrition. It was anticipated that Israel would not be able to hold off a broad military operation for long. In May 1967 the major protagonists among the Arab states conducted a series of actions that came to constitute a geostrategic threat to Israel's national security. On May 14, 1967, Egypt abruptly began concentrating its army in the Sinai along the Israeli border and asked for the removal of the UN forces. On May 22, Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation and to all ships carrying strategic material to Israel. On May 30, King Hussein signed a treaty of common defense with Egypt, placing the Jordanian Army under Egyptian command in the event of war, and agreed to the entrance of Iraqi troops into Jordan.

From the perspective of a purely military balance of power, neither side had any incentive to initiate war. The Arab quantitative advantage (see Table 5.3) in the tangible elements of military power was well balanced by Israel's qualitative advantage in the intangible dimensions, namely, military leadership, motivation, technical skills, and so on. Following Egypt's poor performance in 1956, Israeli national security

Table 5.3
The Arab-Israeli Military Balance, June 1967

	Egypt	Jordan	Syria	Iraq	Total	Israel	Ratio
Armed Forces	250,000	56,000	70,000	80,000	456,000	275,000	1:1.6
Tanks	1,300	270	550	630	2,750	1,093	1:2.5
Artillery	840	184	460	600	2,084	681	1:3
Fighter-Bombers	299	24	94	151	568	247	1:2.2

Source: Derived from *Carta's Atlas of Israel, The Second Decade, 1961-1971*, p. 52.

experts as well as its political leadership were not concerned about a military shift in the power of its southern neighbor that would endanger the existence of the Jewish state in the foreseeable future. It was assumed that the same was true for the other Arab states. Only a coalition led by Egypt could endanger Israel.⁶⁰

The Six-Day War broke out because of the threat to the geostrategic balance of power whose effect was to undermine the credibility of Israel's deterrence. Complementing Israel's deterrence doctrine was the preemptive war strategy; Israel must preempt when war becomes inevitable. At a certain point, apparently because of Israel's reluctance to respond to the Egyptian provocations, Nasser misinterpreted Israel's reluctance as a sign that he was dealing with a weaker enemy than had previously been assumed. Moreover, Nasser had maneuvered his country into a situation from which it would not be able to withdraw without suffering a major blow to its prestige in the Arab world. Therefore, to many Israeli policy-makers it was only a question of time before an Egyptian attack would be launched, even if Israel had been willing to abandon its retaliation doctrine. Under such circumstances, the question of who would strike first was critical according to Israel's strategic conception. The IDF's demand for a first strike was constrained by the principle inaugurated by Ben-Gurion that war was conditioned on

insuring the support of at least one major power. Ultimately, the Eshkol government succeeded in insuring the United States' tacit support and initiated war without impairing Israel's national security doctrine as it had evolved over the years.

The Eshkol government's foreign policy largely conformed to the guidelines adopted during the Ben-Gurion era. Accordingly, despite the continuous provocations coming from Jordan and the pact with Egypt, Israel had no intention of attacking the Hashemite kingdom, occupying the West Bank, and liberating the Old City. Jordan's disregard for its promises to allow Jews to visit the holy places also was allowed to stand without any retaliation. In contrast, Syria's disregard of the Armistice Agreements was met with a clear response. Undoubtedly, had there been significant irredentism in Israel concerning Judea and Samaria, enough incidents had occurred along the Jordanian border since 1965 to have justified an Israeli invasion.

The pattern that developed was clear; Israel did not hesitate to retaliate to threats to its development as a state, but did not seek to conquer historical land. In the early 1960s the Jewish state did not hesitate to retaliate against Syria, even using the Air Force to insure that the National Water Carrier would carry water to the south. In contrast, an attempt was made to convince King Hussein, prior to his joining the security pact with Egypt and even on the first day of hostilities, to abstain from war and thus avoid the risk of losing Jerusalem and the West Bank. The fact that these promises were conveyed to the king through the United States, accompanied by American assurances to that effect, proves that it was not merely a trick to postpone the attack by Jordan, and that the Eshkol government intended to abide by them. Moreover, the first attack against the Jordanians took place only on the afternoon of June 5, following their conquest of UN headquarters in Jerusalem, shelling along the front, and attacks by Jordanian planes on Israeli civilian and military targets.

In effect, while accepting the basic principles of the statist doctrine, Prime Minister Eshkol deviated in certain respects from his predecessor. These tactical deviations turned out to bear strategic implications. Following a mining incident in which three Israeli paratroopers were killed, on November 13, 1966, the IDF retaliated in a broad offensive that included paratroopers, armored forces, mobile artillery, and engineering units. In contrast to previous retaliatory actions, this action was executed in broad daylight, thus denying the Jordanian Army an excuse not to intervene. The action was planned against the Jordanian village

of Samoa, although it had been clear that the mining was against Amman's wishes. The clashes with the Jordanians also included use of the Air Force and unexpected casualties on both sides. The Samoa incident led to large demonstrations in the West Bank that almost toppled the Hashemite regime. This action may have influenced Hussein's decision in 1967 to join Egypt.

Another example of Eshkol's attempt to emulate Ben-Gurion's tough style in security affairs without being sensitive enough to the nuances was his possible overreaction to Egypt's transfer of troops across the Suez Canal. On February 18, 1960, following an Israeli action in Tawfiq and the subsequent transfer of Soviet intelligence to Nasser regarding an imminent attack on Syria, Nasser ordered 50,000 troops and 500 tanks to cross the Suez. The move took Israel by surprise; with merely 30 tanks on hand to face them, the Israelis detected the Egyptian force only when it was very close to the border. Without evaluating what caused Egypt to withdraw and not take advantage of the surprise, we can conclude that Ben-Gurion's low-key reaction to the Egyptian move and his decision to keep his plans to visit the United States in the middle of the crisis deescalated the tension and allowed Nasser to withdraw without losing face. Under very similar circumstances in May 1967, Eshkol, lacking Ben-Gurion's reputation and being accused by Ben-Gurion of neglecting security, reacted in a more panicky manner, thus intensifying the crisis.

In the long run, at least from the perspective of this book, the conquest of the West Bank in 1967 was the most significant policy decision undertaken by the Eshkol government. Once Israel's deterrence policy was challenged, Israeli strategic doctrine dictated the decision to destroy the Egyptian Army.⁶¹ In contrast, a decision to expel the Jordanian Army from the West Bank was not as inevitable. There is no evidence to suggest that Israel's decision was motivated by historical aspirations; rather, it seems to have been a natural response to Jordan's aggression. The danger of the presence of Arab, non-Jordanian armies in an area that was adjacent to Israel's industrial and population center was a major factor motivating the conquest of the region. Although we will never be able to prove it conclusively, it could be argued that a statesman understanding the attributes of the doctrine that had guided Israel since its establishment might have refrained from conquering all of the West Bank. The West Bank, in addition to being a strategic zone, contained population centers that Israel traditionally had no interest or desire to control. Eshkol and other of Ben-Gurion's heirs, while accepting the

“old man’s” wisdom, were unable to refuse opportunities that were not dictated by Israel’s state interests.

Less than two decades after its establishment, the Jewish state seemed to have accomplished more than it ever had anticipated. The defeat of all the Arab armies without any external help within six days confirmed the evaluation that Israel was a reality that the Arab states would have to accept. Under such circumstances, the Arab states were expected to make peace with the Jewish state if they wanted any of their territories back. Israel for its part was in control of all the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, which included united Jerusalem, and all the strategic zones that had constituted its security nightmares. Domestically, it was governed by a national unity government, which included all segments of the Labor camp, the Revisionist Herut and their Liberal partners, and the NRP. Externally, the Jewish communities in the diaspora who were awakened by the crisis and the victory exhibited an unprecedented solidarity. Even Russian Jewry, after 50 years of revolution and separation, was awakening. The United States, unlike the case in 1956, did not pressure Israel to withdraw from the territories in the absence of secure borders and a formal peace. The Jewish state finally seemed secure. Eshkol and his colleagues even seemed to have outdone their traditional leader, David Ben-Gurion. In effect, although the Jewish state was stronger than ever, Israeli society was about to be transformed and ethnonationalism to be revived.

NOTES

1. Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 381. See also Brecher’s concentric circles model of Ben-Gurion’s foreign policy concerns (Figure 8, p. 382).

2. For extensive research on this decision, see Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), ch. 3.

3. Shmuel Sandler, “Ben-Gurion’s Attitude toward the Soviet Union,” *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 21, no. 2 (December 1979):153. See also Uri Bialer, *Between East and West, Israel’s Foreign Policy Orientation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), ch. 4, and pp. 211-212.

4. Brecher, *Decisions in Israel’s Foreign Policy*, ch. 4; on the change in Israel’s orientation, see Bialer, *Between East and West*, ch. 10.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

6. Yitzhak Mualem, “The Politics of the World Jewish Congress” (M.A. Thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 1988), p. 195.

7. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Mamlachtiyut and Holocaust," in *B'Shvilei HaTehia A* (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1983), pp. 174-177.

8. Moshe Zak, "Jewish Motifs in Israel's Foreign Policy," *Gesher* 1/110 (Spring 1984):32-43. See also Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, pp. 238-240.

9. Don-Yehiya, "Mamlachtiyut and Holocaust," pp. 177-182.

10. See Shmuel Sandler, "Is There a Jewish Foreign Policy?," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 24, no. 2 (December 1987):115-121.

11. K.J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p. 98.

12. S.S. Yariv, *On the Communism and Zionism of Hashomer Hatzair* (Tel Aviv: Davar, 1953), p. 102.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-118.

14. Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. 2 (Tel Aviv: Mapai, 1951), p. 23.

15. *Ibid.*, vol. 3, p. 197.

16. For a more elaborate analysis of Ben-Gurion's attitude and its relationship to his value system and conceptual framework, see Sandler, "Ben-Gurion's Attitude toward the Soviet Union," pp. 145-160.

17. For further analysis, see an unpublished master's thesis written under this author's direction and based on primary sources and interviews: Gad Barzilai, "Israeli Foreign Policy, 1947-1950" (M.A. Thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 1982). Barzilai did not find evidence of the impact of Mapam on Ben-Gurion's foreign policy.

18. Holsti, *International Politics*, p. 98.

19. Uri Bialer defined Israeli foreign policy as being guided by the principle of "knocking on any door." See Bialer, *Between East and West*, p. 14.

20. Barzilai, "Israeli Foreign Policy," pp. 131-136 and 224-232.

21. Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, p. 112.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-161.

23. Israel's clear turn to the West during those years was even more surprising in light of Ben-Gurion's suspicions of Great Britain's intentions in the Middle East. Similarly, Israel's first prime minister was sensitive to the Soviet Union's concerns about a Middle Eastern anti-Russian alliance. See Bialer, *Between East and West*, pp. 228ff.

24. Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, chs. 3 and 6.

25. For a detailed account of the bilateral negotiations based on primary sources, see Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations* (Jerusalem: Maxwell-Macmillan Publishing, Ltd., 1991), ch. 4; and Dan Scheuftan, *A Jordanian Option, The "Yishuv" and the State of Israel vis-a-vis the Hashemite Regime and the Palestine National Movement* (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1986), chs. 10-11. For a different approach, see Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), chs. 17-20.

26. On Ben-Gurion's evaluation of Abdullah's chances to deliver a peace treaty, see Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan*, pp. 518-520 and 575-576. It

is by now agreed that Abdullah's intent to sign a nonaggression pact was a way of offering it in place of the peace treaty; see, for instance, Scheuftan. *A Jordanian Option*, p. 207.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 260, n. 13.

28. Apparently, Ben-Gurion and members of his close circle must have contemplated this option and at one point even reached the stage of more than contemplation. On October 22, 1956, Ben-Gurion formally suggested to the French that Jordan be divided between Israel and Iraq. According to this plan, in exchange for absorbing the Arab refugees and signing a peace treaty with the Jewish state, Iraq would have received Trans-Jordan, while Israel would have annexed the West Bank. See Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, p. 260.

29. Michael Bar-Zohar bases his argument on primary sources like Ben-Gurion's personal diaries and meetings with his personal advisers. See Bar-Zohar, *Ben-Gurion, a Biography* (Jerusalem: Keter, 1980), pp. 1333-1342.

30. Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option*, p. 265.

31. On the relative nature of power, see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, pp. 143-144.

32. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank*, ch. 3.

33. Eliezer Be'eri, *The Palestinians under Jordanian Rule — Three Issues* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1978), pp. 28-50. See also Amnon Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Hashemite Regime* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1980) (Hebrew).

34. Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, ch. 5. See also *Haaretz*, May 1, 1992, p. 2.

35. Shlaim argued that on both levels—the political and the foreign office—there was support for an Egyptian orientation, but by controlling the agenda, Ben-Gurion succeeded in preventing this debate from taking place; see Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan*, pp. 318-319. Rabinovich argues the opposite; Ben-Gurion supported an agreement with Egypt, but his advisers saw Jordan as the key to a peace with the Arabs; see Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken*, pp. 102-104.

36. Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan*, p. 318. An Egyptian option was also a way of punishing both the Jordanians and the British, a fact with which Foreign Minister Sharett tried to attract his prime minister. See Ben-Gurion, *Ben-Gurion's War of Independence Diary*, in G. Rivlin and E. Oren, eds. (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1982), p. 740.

37. Ben-Gurion, *Ben-Gurion's War of Independence Diary*, vol. 3, p. 739.

38. Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan*, p. 320.

39. Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken*, p. 102.

40. This debate was quite extensively covered by studies of Israeli foreign and security policies, and by political biographies of the two statesman. In addition, neither tried to conceal their opposing world-views and presented them in their diaries, personal correspondence, and interviews. See, for instance, Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, ch. 12; Uri Bialer, "David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett, The Conceptualization of Two Na-

tional Security Orientations in Israeli Society," *Medina U'Memshal* 1, no. 2 (Autumn 1971):71-84; and Daniel Ben-Horin, "The Crystallization of Two Orientations to the Arab-Israel Conflict: David Ben-Gurion and Moshe Sharett" (Haifa: Haifa University, Dissertation submitted May 1991).

41. For further data on Israeli-Egyptian relations during those years, see Ernest Stock, *Israel on the Road to Sinai 1949-1956* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 118. See also Ben-Gurion's remarks following General Mohammed Naguib's revolution in *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. 4, p. 78.

42. On the population ratio between the confrontation Arab states and Israel, see Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, p. 69. On the territorial and strategic depth ratios between Israel and its Arab neighbors, see Steven Rosen, "Military Geography and the Military Balance in the Arab-Israel Conflict," *Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems* 21, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1977), p. 12.

43. On Ben-Gurion's perception of Israel's treatment in the United Nations, see, for instance, Ben-Gurion, *Chazon V'Derech*, vol. 5, p. 126; and an article by Moshe Dayan, "Israel's Border Problems," *Foreign Affairs* 33, no. 2 (January 1955):258. On the elements of power, see Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, ch. 9.

44. The analysis of the second and third strategic imbalances is based on Dan Horowitz, "Warfare Without War, the Nature of the Conflict 1949-1967," *Molad* 27 (June 1971):36-46.

45. Alexander George and Richard Smoke defined deterrence as "the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits." Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 11. Under regular circumstances, in order to deter aggression it is sufficient for the side supporting the status quo to enjoy equality. Everything else being equal, a rational actor would not undertake aggressive initiatives if it was clear that the opponent would be able to abort them. In contrast, in a situation where one side could take unilateral steps that would put the burden on the other side to respond, an equal distribution of power served the aggressor. Another way of approaching the Arab advantage is to consider the distinction between compellence and deterrence. The ability of the Arabs to take unilateral steps implied that Israel would be faced with the need to compel the Arab side to withdraw. Compelling or persuading an aggressor to withdraw requires more power than deterring or dissuading him from acting. While compellence is associated with offensive action, deterrence is by definition defensive and therefore requires less coercive power. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69-86. See also J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," *American Political Science Review* 17 (1963):420-430.

46. Even when we consider the fact that decision-makers act under conditions of uncertainty and their behavior is influenced by their "risk taking"

tendencies, we find that the ability to take unilateral steps that would transfer the task of restoring the status quo to the other side was a significant advantage to the side that wanted to change the existing situation. See Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 33-36.

47. Dan Horowitz, "Israel's National Security Conception (1948-1972)," in Benjamin Neuberger, ed., *Diplomacy and Confrontation, Selected Issues in Israel's Foreign Relations 1948-1978* (Tel Aviv: Everyman's University, 1984), pp. 133-143.

48. Avner Yaniv, who argued that since its inception Israel had adopted deterrence as the essence of its strategy, distinguished between two periods, or two "strategic packages." Adopting Schelling's differentiation between deterrence and compellence, he described Israel's national security conception as evolving from deterrence by denial (i.e., defensive strategy) to deterrence by punishment (i.e., offensive strategy). Linking the earlier strategy with a defensive posture and the defensive with an offensive one, he associated both the 1956 and the 1967 wars with the failure of deterrence. Horowitz, who argued that only in the 1960s had Israel adopted deterrence as the main component of its national security doctrine, found that the art of compellence without actually activating force had already been developed prior to the establishment of the state, and was accepted by both the activist and the anti-activist schools in the Israeli establishment. See Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb, The Politics of Israeli Strategy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 20 and chs. 2-3; Horowitz, "Israel's National Security Conception," pp. 124-134.

49. On the relationship between balance-of-power considerations and preventive or preemptive war, see A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), ch. 12; and A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), chs. 1 and 3. Jack Levy distinguished between preventive and preemptive motivation; see Jack Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," *World Politics* 40, no. 1 (October 1987):90.

50. See Jeffrey S. Milstein, "American and Soviet Influence, Balance of Power, and Arab-Israeli Violence," in Bruce Russett, ed., *Peace, War, Numbers and International Relations* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 139-166.

51. Shlomo Ahronson and Dan Horowitz, "The Strategy of Controlled Retaliation—The Israeli Example," *Medina U'Memshal* 1, no. 1 (1971):77-99; and B.M. Blechman, "The Consequences of Israel's Reprisals on Behavior of the Bordering Arab Nations Directed against Israel," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 16, no. 2 (June 1972):155-181.

52. The calculations of casualties and border incidents are based on data in Yehuda Wallach and Moshe Lissak, eds., *Carta's Atlas of Israel: The First Years 1948-1961* (Jerusalem: Carta, 1978), p. 189.

53. See "The War on the Water" in *Carta's Atlas of Israel: The Second Decade 1961-1971*, p. 25 (Hebrew).

54. For the rationale of spatial defense, see Yigal Allon, *Curtain of Sand* (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz HaMeuhad, 1968), pp. 65-68 (Hebrew).

55. Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, pp. 262-274.

56. See, for instance, Michael Bar-Zohar, *Suez Ultra-Secret* (Paris: Fayard, 1964).

57. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," p. 102.

58. *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

59. See interpretations by Shimon Peres, Yigal Allon, and Gideon Rafael, in Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb*, pp. 86-87.

60. This evaluation is confirmed by Nadav Safran, *From War to War* (New York: Pegasus, 1969), pp. 315-320; Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy*, pp. 324-325; and Yaniv, *Deterrence without the Bomb*, pp. 75-81.

61. It seems that Nasser understood that Israel had little choice but to open war. He miscalculated the exact time and the strength of the IDF, but he and his close adviser Muhamad Hasnin Heikal anticipated that Israel had no other alternative; see Safran, *From War to War*, pp. 299-302; and Brecher, *Decisions In Israel's Foreign Policy*, p. 393.

**PART III: THE RETURN OF
ETHNONATIONALISM**

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ISRAELI POLITY

Students of Israeli society and politics generally agree that the Six-Day War represented a momentous turning point in the history of the Jewish state. From the perspective of international politics the changes were indeed drastic. On June 4, 1967, the small State of Israel faced a siege by almost all its neighbors who were preparing to launch a devastating blow that would terminate what the Jews called the "Third Commonwealth." Abandoned by the Western powers, especially by the United States and France, Israel was left to remove the threat to its survival alone. Out of the crisis Israel emerged as the great victor who had defeated the Arab states singlehandedly, conquering territories on each front and removing the major geostrategic impediments that had plagued the Jewish state since its inception. For the first time in its history, the Jewish state also gained bargaining chips that it could presumably exchange for Arab acceptance. Seemingly, all the Israeli leaders had to do was to await a "phone call" from the Arab leadership. In reality, only a portion of Israeli expectations materialized, even from the perspective of a decade later when the Jewish state signed a peace treaty with Egypt, the largest Arab state. The Arab-Israeli conflict, at large, was not terminated, and it even expanded.¹ Change did take place, however, and it was the Israeli polity that was transformed, and consequently its foreign policy as well.

In 1967 Israel was ruled by a veteran Labor elite that continued to believe that Jordan was the key to a political settlement, especially with regard to the West Bank. A decade later Israel was governed by a coalition of nationalist and religious elements that considered the Jordanian option dead and was dedicated to extensive settlement in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza region. The Israeli government no longer regarded the West Bank and Gaza Strip as collateral to be exchanged for peace but as an integral part of the Land of Israel, to be settled and developed by the Jewish people as part of their historic mission. As far as Labor was concerned, the territories served two purposes: as a

bargaining card to be exchanged for peace with the Arab states, and as a strategic zone that would provide greater security. To the coalition that came to power in 1977, Judea and Samaria were no longer means for attaining objectives; rather, they were an end in themselves. The territories were an integral part of the historic Land of Israel and as such could not be returned or relinquished to any foreign sovereign.

The Israeli foreign policy that emerged in the post-1977 era (to be outlined in the next chapter) could not be explained from a pure state interest perspective. Annexation of the West Bank to Israel would not clearly add to Israel's power or security. The addition of a million and a half Arabs to the Jewish state would endanger its internal communal balance, whereas security through strategic depth could be achieved through devices other than annexation. The ethnonational element that had always existed in the Zionist movement, and was dormant for a long period of state-building, must be taken into account in explaining Israel's foreign policy. In this chapter both the rise of the ethnonational variable and the decline of the statist setting will be explained. It was the interplay between the two settings that resulted in a new foreign policy.

ETHNONATIONALISM ASCENDANT

Ethnonationalism was dormant in pre-1967 Israel. In the 1965 election campaign even nationalist Herut, which was traditionally committed to the Land of Israel on both sides of the Jordan, reduced its commitment to the liberation of ancient parts of the homeland when it formed a joint electoral list with the Liberal party, called Gahal in that campaign.² Ahdut ha-Avodah, the hawkish branch of the Labor camp, joined a moderate Mapai led by Prime Minister Eshkol in an Alignment without any reference to aspirations in the east. Two years before the actual reunification of the Land of Israel, no party in the Israeli multi-party system actively sought a drive to liberate ancient land. A decade later, however, the Land of Israel was to become the salient issue in Israeli politics.

Naturally, Israeli society could not remain indifferent to renewed contact with the core of the Land of Israel.³ Of these territories, first in importance was the ancient part of the city of Jerusalem in which the Western Wall—the last remnant of the Temple—was standing, where access to Jews had been forbidden since 1948. The outpouring of emotion elicited by the conquest of east Jerusalem inspired the Eshkol government to act quickly and decisively. The city was formally an-

nexed less than three weeks after its conquest. But cities like Hebron, Bethlehem and Shechem (Nablus), which contained the tombs of the Patriarchs and Matriarchs and were associated with chapters in Jewish history, also evoked emotion. Furthermore, almost every Arab village was connected to a biblical or Second Temple Jewish settlement. These included places such as Shiloh, where the Tabernacle was located, or Jericho, Beit Horon, and Gibeon, where miracles took place at the time of Joshua. As noted earlier, the regions conquered in 1967 constituted the ancient homeland even more so than areas within the State of Israel's 1949 armistice lines.

Renewed ethnonationalism was evoked by contact with the ancient homeland, but yet another process was generated by the outcome of the Six-Day War. The reappearance of an intercommunal conflict that was absent from Israeli sociopolitical life since the establishment of the state and the Arab exodus in 1948-49 was the other contributor to the ascendancy of ethnonationalism. In effect, the Six-Day War undid the territorial segmentation of the Palestinians that had emerged following Israel's War of Independence. As a result of that first war, the Palestinians, in becoming refugees, were divided primarily among three states—Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. In the last two countries, where they enjoyed citizenship, they were divided between the East and the West Banks of Jordan, and in Israel they were divided primarily between the Galilee and the Triangle. In the wake of the June 1967 war, the three largest concentrations of Palestinian Arabs suddenly found themselves under one political framework—that of the State of Israel. The “open bridges” policy that Israel enacted between the administered territories and Jordan permitted their continued communications and ties with the fourth largest Palestinian concentration. The assembling of the Palestinians in a structure that resembled the Mandate era was bound to create new communal realities. The fact that the Jewish community was also the governing authority only intensified the conflict.⁴ Although it is impossible and fruitless to evaluate what might have happened had the Six-Day War not occurred, it is clear that the war halted the Jordanization process of the Palestinians in the West Bank, as it stopped parallel Israelization processes among Israeli Arabs (whose transformation will be analyzed separately).⁵ Undoubtedly, the 1967 war produced a new Palestinian communal structure.

The Palestinians who resided in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip prior to 1967, although they inhabited territories that had been part of Mandate Palestine and lived within an Arab environment, enjoyed status neither as a territorial unit nor as a national minority. In the Gaza Strip

under Egypt, the Palestinians had refugee status only, and in the West Bank under Jordan, while granted Jordanian citizenship, they were not allowed to express a separate identity. Some of the obstacles to Palestinian assertiveness disappeared when these two territories were brought together under one administration. An important boost to "Palestinianism" resulted from the contact with an alien society. Since they lived under Arab rule, their identity—centered on the goal of reconquering Palestine—was absorbed in pan-Arab ideologies dedicated to the same cause. Conversely, under Israeli control, the encounter with a society based on a totally alien national, religious, and linguistic identity inevitably crystallized Palestinian awareness of their own separate particularity.

Economic and social changes were also significant. The economic integration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip brought them into contact with the advanced Israeli economy and a developed political system.⁶ A spillover effect of economic growth and political modernization from the more advanced system to the less developed one took place, resulting in Palestinian assertiveness and the building of national institutions. By the mid-1970s a territorywide network of newspapers and universities propounding Palestinian ideas was established. The freely elected municipalities superseded their local mandate and assumed national functions. Demonstrations and strikes broke out on national memorial days. In short, the Palestinians were swiftly becoming a distinct territorial community with ethnonational aspirations, slowly separating themselves from the Jordanian framework and the Hashemites' ambitions.⁷

While these processes were taking place in territories adjacent to Israel, the Palestinians were also developing a national center abroad. Founded in 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was designed to be an overall institution speaking for the Palestinians. The national covenant that this organization adopted defined the Palestinians, asserted the imperative of the replacement of Israel with a secular democratic state, and detailed the means by which this goal was to be achieved.⁸ But it was the Six-Day War and its fallout that gave the PLO prominence. The failure of the Arab states to achieve Israel's destruction led to calls for the Palestinians to take their fate into their own hands, and the PLO was a natural vehicle for doing so. Yasser Arafat, the head of Fatah, the largest guerrilla force, escaped from the West Bank in 1968 and became the chairman of the PLO in 1969. In the ensuing years, in the wake of a most devastating beating from the Jordanian Legion, the PLO reestablished its headquarters in Beirut.

The Yom Kippur War gave the Arab states self-confidence and economic power on the world scene from which the PLO also extracted benefits for itself. The 1974 Rabat Conference that proclaimed the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people was followed by Arafat's invitation to address the UN General Assembly, the granting of observer status to the PLO at the United Nations, and its inclusion in all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly. At the time of the PLO's international ascendancy, many African and other Third World countries broke diplomatic relations with Israel while allowing the PLO to send delegations to their countries. The peak of the PLO's successes came when the United Nations adopted its infamous "Zionism Is Racism" resolution. The PLO produced a semiconstitutional document (the National Covenant) and established an impressive organization resembling that of a government in exile, while constantly achieving greater international legitimacy and status. The only critical element missing that qualified it as a state was that of a territory. The PLO did not hide its intentions as to where that state should be erected.

The accomplishments of the PLO had a revolutionary impact on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians. Thus, while the traditional leadership had been loyal to the Hashemites and had demonstrated its continued power in the 1972 municipal elections, a younger and more vigorous leadership that was proclaiming its loyalty to the PLO pressed a challenge.⁹ The institutions of higher learning that were just beginning to take root with Israeli encouragement were being identified as PLO strongholds. The West Bank press identified openly with the PLO, reporting closely on its international achievements.¹⁰ In the 1976 municipal elections, the National Bloc list composed of PLO supporters won a landslide victory across the West Bank. They won the majority of mayoralties and city council seats in the larger towns.¹¹ The PLO now had a territory whose population, they could claim, accepted it as its sole representative, and the Palestinians in the territories had a center that represented their identity and national aspirations.

The combination of the transformations taking place in the Palestinian communal structure and the Yom Kippur War had a profound impact on the Israeli polity. Israel emerged from the Six-Day War jubilant and self-confident. The collective expectation was that peace was at hand. This mood began to change with the outbreak of the War of Attrition in 1968 which took place on the borders and included guerrilla warfare in the territories. Although the IDF succeeded in handling all these challenges, optimism began to fade as time passed and still peace appeared

to be no closer. The traumatic experience of the Yom Kippur War shook Israeli self-confidence. While from the standpoint of the 1967 war Israel seemed to be winning each of its wars more decisively, the October war appeared to indicate a reversal of the trend. The appearance of a national movement claiming the same territory and receiving growing international legitimacy paralleled the direction of the military curve. Israel, which once enjoyed broad international support, was now losing it to its enemy. Particularly insulting was the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism, which even the Israelis, who had been accustomed to UN cynicism, were unable to swallow. Under such circumstances, Israeli society turned to its historic roots for legitimacy and national reassurance.

Under certain circumstances, an ideological threat may in fact be more dangerous than a physical one, particularly to ideological societies such as Israel. With the decline of normative socialist Zionism which had provided the central value zone or a civil religion to Israel as an ideological society, Israel required a new value system.¹² When the threat was primarily a physical one, state centrism as a value system was sufficient. But when postsocialist Israel was confronted by a compound (ideological and physical) threat, *mamlachtiyut* had already been weakened and thus was not adequate to bolster the national foundations. Ethnonationalism was a rational response, to use Haas's terms, to a society under stress, which evoked "the specification of core values of order and predictability for the collectivity."¹³

The ascendancy of ethnonationalism went beyond the Palestinian communal threat and could be explained in relative deprivation terms. Relative deprivation as a promoter of nationalism was mentioned in our theoretical introduction.¹⁴ The disappointments with the international community that Israel experienced during the early 1970s pushed it toward a rejection of the demands of the international system. Rejection of the non-Jew's understanding of the Jews implied a turning toward traditional Jewish values such as the Land of Israel. Ethnicity often implies a tendency of a collective to close itself from foreigners. At times of disappointment with the external world, it is natural to seek out the family or the tribe where one is understood and judged according to familiar values.

Charles Liebman once examined the idea of *or l'goyim* (a light unto the nations) in Zionist ideology. *Or l'goyim* was a reversal of the traditional approach that postulated a suspicion of the gentiles and was based on the gentiles' hatred of the Jew. From this perspective, no matter what actions the Jew takes and how nice he would try to be, "Esau

would hate Jacob.” Zionism transformed this classical ethnic myth, and in its place adopted the norm that, with the return of the Jew to his land and the reconstruction of the Jewish commonwealth, the Jewish state would serve as the prophetic ideal of “a light unto the nations.” This idea started disappearing from Zionist terminology in the late 1950s. Among the reasons the author gives are: responses to the Holocaust (“we don’t owe the world anything after that”) and the feeling that if the world condemned Israel for its retaliatory actions, which were responses to aggression, then either it did not understand the Jewish state or it did not want to.¹⁵

Zionism also adopted the idea that Israel ought to be a “nation like all the nations.” Political Zionism, as explained in Chapter 2, believed that anti-Semitism stemmed from the abnormal situation of the Jews who were a people without a land and dispersed among the nations of the world. It assumed that anti-Semitism would disappear once the Jews established their own state where they could constitute a majority and become a normal nation in control of their own territory. Thus, normalization of the Jewish condition would once and for all resolve hatred of the Jews. The idea of transforming Israel into a nation like all nations was a reversal of the traditional diaspora Jewish condition where they had desired not to base intergroup relations on might and power. As such, the idea was consistent with the Israeli statist view. Indeed, “a nation like all the nations” was the accepted norm of the first two decades of Israeli life. By the third decade, however, the norm of “a nation that dwells alone” gained currency, replacing the previous two aspirations.

Implicit in this description of Israel’s relationship with the world was the idea that the Jews were fated to remain isolated from the other nations. This was the Jewish manifest destiny. Although the biblical prophecy “a nation that dwells alone” was offered by a gentile—Bilam—the message was accepted. To its adherents, Bilam’s origin may have loaded the observation with even more determinism. Even though the King of Moab hired Bilam to condemn the Israelites, the believers in this prophecy were undeterred. Many saw the second half of Bilam’s prophecy, “and shall not be reckoned among the nations,” as suiting contemporary times.¹⁶ In Hebrew, this phrase could also be understood as saying that the Jews should not take into account what the nations think.

The roots of this new attitude toward Israel’s foreign relations could be traced to the traumatic experience of the period preceding the Six-Day War.¹⁷ An Arab military siege in May-June 1967 declared its intention to destroy the Jewish state, while the international community

stood by, despite previous commitments, particularly from the United States, to come to Israel's assistance and ensure free navigation. This turn of events brought out all of Israel's traditional fears and distrust of other nations. More decisive in creating the notion of a "nation that dwells alone" was the Yom Kippur War and its aftermath.

Israel's victory in June 1967 was well received in world public opinion, and the Jewish state gained from the world's inaction. In October 1973 the Jewish state was almost defeated and suffered heavy casualties because its government wanted to make it clear to the nations of the world that the Arabs were the aggressors. In return for this sacrifice, the Jews received the following responses: U.S. intervention that prevented the IDF from capturing the Egyptian Second Army, condemnation from the international community, and U.S. pressure for withdrawal from parts of the Sinai, despite the military victory for which Israel paid so dearly. The ensuing international condemnation from all directions and the breaking of relations with almost all the African states, while the Arabs were gaining diplomatic victories at the United Nations, added to a mood that became the title of a popular song: "the whole world is against us."

Although the international anti-Israel mood could have been explained by the leverage many Arab states enjoyed as a result of the oil crisis, accompanied by a windfall of petrodollars, to many Israelis and Jews all over the world it brought home a different message—that of anti-Semitism in the disguise of anti-Zionism.¹⁸ For the national liberation movement of the Jewish people to be condemned as racism by nations that hardly had any historic roots indeed seemed very cynical. Adding insult to injury was the fact that this accusation was formulated against a people who three decades earlier during World War II had suffered the most barbaric destruction ever advanced by a racist doctrine. The fact that delegations from the entire international community applauded Arafat at the United Nations while he was addressing the General Assembly with a gun on his hip seemed so surrealistic that a simple *realpolitik* explanation seemed insufficient.

The anti-Semitic interpretation ascribed to these developments came from the Jews' experience of two thousand years living as a persecuted minority, including having to contend with nineteenth-century secular anti-Semitism, an ideology that was translated into the Holocaust. According to political Zionist doctrine, establishing a Jewish state was supposed to eliminate anti-Semitism. Political Zionists expected their state to be treated according to the rules of international politics and not as a despised minority. The fact that it was not, as many perceived it, was

essentially proof of a unique Jewish destiny and by default refuted the political Zionist thesis that a Jewish state would be treated according to the normal rules of international politics. In short, the conclusion to many was a clear *ethnic* statement—the gentile nations could not be trusted—not because in international politics one is not supposed to trust anybody, but rather because special rules have always been applied to Jews.

Thus far, we have dealt with the impact of the Six-Day and Yom Kippur Wars on Israel's world-view from the perspective of Israeli society at large. The combination of renewed contact with ancient land, the emergence of the Palestinians, and the disappointment with the international treatment of Israel in the wake of the October 1973 war brought out the ethnonational element that had been latent in the Jewish state since its inception. In retrospect, the Yom Kippur War was apparently the more influential of the two wars in precipitating ethnonationalism, in accordance with the relative deprivation thesis. These feelings that had been dormant were now awakened. The situation was further compounded when those feelings that were shared at the macro level were complemented by transformations at the micro or sectoral level—the various segments constituting Israeli society.

ETHNONATIONALISM AND THE SEGMENTS OF ISRAELI SOCIETY

The transformation of Israeli society and its polity had become a clear reality by the late 1970s and found its political expression in the May 1977 elections with the Likud victory. Israel's transformation was just as puzzling as was the Labor party's dominance until 1977, despite the large waves of immigration that followed the establishment of the state. Israel's political stability was to a large extent related to the dominance of Labor's value system.

One interpretation attributed Labor's decline to the abandonment of its own educational stream for the sake of state education; while the left watered down its ideology for the sake of integration and state-building, the right had some of its values accepted. In the ideological confrontation that took place when the Land of Israel fell into Israeli hands in 1967 and Revisionist ideology became a realistic possibility, Labor was bound to lose.¹⁹ According to another interpretation, the seeds of Labor's failure were sown during the process of the absorption of the immigrants

when the ruling elite was unable to establish a gradual political socialization process, and instead the masses of new immigrants were absorbed through a political apparatus. That apparatus preserved Labor's formal dominance but failed to instill socialist values.²⁰ Yonathan Shapiro, who cited the political realism of the founding fathers as being responsible for their success, saw the second generation of the founding fathers as lacking that talent.²¹ A liberal explanation linked the decline to the Labor movement's failure to implement its vision of a new egalitarian socialist order and project it effectively as the essence of Israel's mission to the nations of the world. Realities at home, as well as the rejection of Israel by the so-called "progressive" world and the New Left, doomed socialist Zionism.²²

While these explanations looked at the process of change from the top, transformation must also be sought at the subsystem level of Israeli society. In the social realm, change at the bottom must be examined within the framework of the three main cleavages that have traditionally characterized Israeli society: the religious-secular, Sephardi-Ashkenazi, and Jewish-Arab. From the outset, the Labor elite has been secular, Ashkenazi, and, of course, Jewish. These characteristics represented the majority of Israelis at the establishment of the state, but they slowly diminished with the large influx of Sephardi immigration. Nevertheless, Labor continued to rule since it represented the founding of the state and each segment accepted Labor's predominant status. Even though each segment had its own indigenous characteristics, their value systems varied from that of the ruling statist elite. Together, they represented a transformed Israel. Most significant was that transformation among the religious, the Sephardi, and the Arab sectors was triggered by the same events and a similar process taking place in the early 1970s.²³

The Religious Camp

More than any segment in Israeli society, Jewish ethnonationalism was advanced by the national religious sector. Most of the followers of the national religious ideology generally identified with the Mizrahi movement, a movement that had been the most loyal partner of the ruling Labor elite but in the mid-1970s started breaking ranks with that camp. The new attitude of the national religious public was indicative of the transformation of the Israeli polity. Mizrahi, which had been inactive in foreign affairs for most of the first two decades of Israeli independence, suddenly appeared to distance itself from the ruling elite and provided

an alternative approach to that of the establishment that had been considered the national security elite. Gush Emunim (bloc of the faithful)—a movement that originated in the national religious camp—accused the Labor movement of abandoning the spirit of pioneering and defined itself as the new vanguard of the Zionist revolution.

The religious sector in Israeli society accounts for an estimated 25 percent of the Jewish population.²⁴ This large percentage, together with the NRP's effective control of the state religious trend in education (close to a quarter of the elementary schools), indicates the significance of this sector in Israeli public life. To many members of Israeli society, the religious sector represented the link with the characteristics and norms of Jews of the past. The ability of the national religious movement to ally itself with either the left or right, as well as with the ultra-Orthodox sector, positioned them at the center of the political and social map, enabling them to contribute to national unity. In the mid-1970s the religious parties found themselves in a position to determine which of the two camps would enjoy a majority. Thus, the transformation of the national religious segment was not a marginal change. It represented a major change in Israeli society.

Mizrahi was an integral part of the Zionist movement since its inception. After cultural activity was adopted as part of the Zionist agenda, the religious camp split into religious Zionist (Mizrahi) and non-Zionist (Agudat Israel) factions. While the non-Zionist faction secluded itself from the majority of secular Zionists, Mizrahi cooperated with Herzl during the Uganda crisis and later became a constant ally of the Labor movement in implementing the Zionist enterprise in Eretz Israel. Cooperation between the two movements extended beyond the political realm and was translated into what over the years was termed the "historic partnership." As long as conflicts from a religious perspective were not involved, Mizrahi and especially its labor offshoot Hapoel Hamizrahi accepted norms that originated in the Labor camp. The two movements shared values like *halutziut* (pioneering), the productivity of Jewish workers—Hebrew labor, and *hagshama* (personal realization). The socioeconomic frameworks of the religious movement emulated those of the socialist camp. Thus, there were religious kibbutzim, moshavim (both cooperative and non-cooperative), and a youth movement (Bnei Akiva) that educated its graduates to self-fulfillment in kibbutzim.²⁵

The two camps were separated, however, in the area of education. In 1902 the Zionist Congress resolved that education was to be an integral part of the Zionist enterprise. But recognizing the incompatibilities of

the secular and the Orthodox world-views, it established a double system of education. Thus, two equal streams were recognized: the traditional and the progressive.²⁶ In the long run this decision implied autonomy in education for the religious sector at large. Once autonomy in education was granted to the religious Zionists, then it was difficult not to grant autonomy to other streams that did not share with the Zionist majority the value of the centrality and sanctity of the state. Alongside the state and state-religious education streams, an independent (ultra-Orthodox) stream was established.

The national religious movement found itself positioned between the ultra-Orthodox and the secular segments of Israeli society. In many aspects of daily life, especially in the public realm, national symbols, and organizational activity, the national religious person was an integral part of the larger Israeli society. However, he was separated from the surrounding secular society in personal matters and schooling. While accepting the symbols of Israel's secular state, the religious Zionists were also deeply attached to the values that were cherished by ultra-Orthodox Jewry, even if the ultra-Orthodox did not identify with the values of the state. The national religious graduate sought recognition and looked for approval according to the standards of both the secular Zionists and Orthodoxy. One manifestation of the attempt to reconcile this dilemma was the establishment of *yeshivot hesder*, a program that combined compulsory military service with talmudic studies. While the nonreligious high school graduate served in the army for three years and the ultra-Orthodox talmudic student immersed himself in full-time learning instead of army service, the *hesder* soldier-student combined both within a four-year program.²⁷

"Walking on both sides of the fence" produced frustration among national religious youth, which one observer described in the following words: "These youngsters had decided they were less Orthodox than Agudat Israel and less nationalist than secular movements. They felt they were falling between two stools."²⁸ Influenced by many of their rabbis and leaders in the youth movement, they were educated in effect to strive to be best in both military service and religious studies, even if it required performing a double job in two noncomplementary areas. Consequently, a special group was created, highly motivated, with a very strong national identity that was committed to both Jewish and Zionist original values. This youth that felt deprived of its status by both the secular and the ultra-Orthodox communities was in search of an idea in which they could excel. Eretz Israel represented such an idea. It was

around Eretz Israel that they could demonstrate their dedication to both nationalism and religion.

Modernization was another process that influenced the national religious youth. In many respects, Mizrahi or the national religious movement was the Israeli version of modern American Orthodoxy. Both movements perceived themselves as a religious alternative to fundamentalist Orthodoxy which expressed itself politically in Agudat Israel. While modern Orthodoxy in the United States became the moderate or even liberal wing of Orthodox Jewry, its equivalent in Israel expressed itself as a nationalist movement. A central feature of modernity is the belief that an individual or a collective can influence its own fate.²⁹ As articulated in Chapter 2, whereas ultra-Orthodoxy stipulated that in order for Jews to hasten the coming of the Messiah they must remain passive, the religious Zionist ideology proposed the opposite—active redemption.

Moreover, modernization also implied exposure to the study of Jewish history, a classical reviver of ethnic nationalism, an element that was absent in the educational curriculum of traditional Orthodoxy. Traditional Orthodox education was heavily based on the study of the Talmud and neglected the study of Jewish history and even the Bible. The talmudic interpretation of Jewish history was to a large extent antinationalistic and supportive of a passive approach to a Jewish renaissance. In contrast, the modern Orthodox curriculum included, in addition to the Talmud and Torah, the other books of the Bible and history. The exposure of the student in the state-religious stream to the study of the First and Second Commonwealths, the heroic figures and conquerors, and the geography of the Land of Israel strengthened nationalism.

The ideological roots of the new tones of religious Zionism and Gush Emunim could be traced to two forerunners of Zionism, Rabbis Kalisher and Alkalai (see Chapter 2). Rabbi Jacob Reines, the founder of Mizrahi, represented the pragmatic approach in the movement. Rabbi Bar-Ilan, one of the later Mizrahi leaders, adopted the ethnonational line and during the debate that took place in the mid-1930s was among those who objected to partition on ideological grounds. The Reines line was nevertheless the predominant one in Mizrahi-Hapoel Hamizrahi up to the Six-Day War. The nationalist tradition that was revived subsequently was identified with Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook and his son Rabbi Zvi Yehuda who, more than anybody else in recent years, left their impact on the ideological discourse of religious Zionism and particularly that of Gush Emunim.

It would be difficult to demonstrate conclusively what opinion Rabbi Avraham Yitzhak Kook, the first Chief Rabbi of the Jewish community in Palestine, would have expressed with regard to a contemporary political settlement. The Rav, as his disciples called him, passed away in 1935, two years before the question of partition was raised in the Yishuv. Eliezer Don-Yehiya made several observations on the link between the Rav and Gush Emunim. First, Gush Emunim perceived the Rav as its spiritual source and mentor. Second, many of the leaders of Gush Emunim received their education at Mercaz HaRav, the yeshiva that was established by the Rav, and were influenced by the values taught at this institution. Third, Gush Emunim leaders were influenced by Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook, who was the head of the yeshiva. He influenced them directly through his own writings, his oral teachings and spiritual expositions, and his claim that his teaching was a commentary on his father's ideas. Aside from these connections, Don-Yehiya was very skeptical about the possibility of grounding Gush Emunim ideology in the Rav's writing.³⁰

A basic motive in Rav Kook's teaching, which his son developed much further, was the idea of holiness. One of Judaism's basic assumptions is that the Jewish people, the Land of Israel, and the Jewish state are holy. In accord with the kabbalistic tradition that sparks of holiness were spread all over the universe, the Rav wrote that three main types of holiness are found in the universe: in man, space, and time. They reveal themselves in a concentrated manner in the Jewish people (man), the Land of Israel (space), and the Jewish holidays (time).³¹ Even those Jews who are not observant, without realizing it, are motivated by an inner divine spark. Jews who were redeeming the Holy Land were holy and were merely waiting for the inner holiness to emerge. Advancing a unitary approach to the universe, the Rav argued dialectically that secular matter was also holy and that the two complement each other and just await reunion. By leaving the diaspora and redeeming the land through agriculture and physical labor, the Jews were essentially advancing the union between the secular material world and the holy spiritual one.³²

Rav Kook's philosophy provided an alternative rationale for cooperation with secular Zionism to that of Rabbi Reines. While Rabbi Reines based secular religious interaction on necessity and rationalism, Rav Kook idealized it. Cooperation with secular Zionism was sanctified, redeeming the land was holy, and the forthcoming Jewish state would be an ideal one.³³ Moreover, the Rav also instilled a messianic idea by defining the process that was taking place in the Land of Israel

as the beginning of redemption. According to him, the Balfour Declaration was a divine sign that redemption had begun, although the real signs had appeared four decades earlier with the beginning of settlement in the Land of Israel and the flourishing agriculture that was taking place there. Even the unfolding of events in world history indicated that Jewish redemption was near.³⁴

The national religious movement in general and the rabbinical students of Mercaz HaRav in particular adopted many of Rav Kook's themes. Mizrahi accepted him as its spiritual leader, and he remained so even after his passing. On the basis of his teachings, the renewal of Jewish sovereignty was interpreted as the beginning of redemption, and the state as holy. Mercaz HaRav was unique in its curriculum in comparison to other yeshivot, for, in addition to Talmud and Torah, the study of the Bible and Jewish thought (*machshevet Israel*) was included and encouraged. Great attention was given to the writings of Nahmanides, Yehuda Halevi, and the Maharal, all of whom over the ages expressed religious aspirations to Zion with tinges of mysticism.

The Six-Day War was a major event in the transformation of religious Zionism. Rav Zvi Yehuda Kook, who emerged as the most authentic interpreter of his father's writings, applied them to the events taking place during the war and its aftermath.³⁵ Obviously, for the religious community the liberation of the holy parts of the Land of Israel, the reunification of Jerusalem, and the miraculous victory of the IDF over a combination of at least four Arab armies threatening to destroy Israel was seen as a heavenly sign. For many and especially for the students and graduates of Mercaz HaRav, the messianic era was progressing as predicted by the late Rav Kook and as reemphasized by his son.

It is difficult to identify the exact point in time at which an ideological movement is born. Students of religious Zionism have differed on what was the precise catalyst leading to the emergence of Gush Emunim.³⁶ However, the fact that Gush Emunim was not formally founded until after the Yom Kippur War in 1974, even if it had been brewing before, was significant. It was the threat to the integrity of the Land of Israel and the messianic process that urged Rabbi Zvi Yehuda's disciples on to become the vanguard of the Zionist enterprise. It was the atmosphere of doubt following the Yom Kippur War, in contrast to the post-1967 confidence, that prompted and legitimized the appearance of Gush Emunim and helped it win acceptance within the public at large.

The appearance of Gush Emunim in the wake of the Yom Kippur War explains the tremendous impact it had on Israeli society as a whole. In effect, Gush Emunim's ideology received widespread support even

within nonreligious segments of Israeli society. Its relative success was attributed, *inter alia*, to its link to the organizational infrastructure that the national religious camp put at its disposal. A contrasting explanation was its ideological strength, especially in light of the vacuum that was created following the decline of socialist Zionist ideology. Neither interpretation, however, fully explains how Gush Emunim succeeded in popularizing its ideas and gaining acceptance within nonreligious circles much more than the National Religious Party (NRP) ever did. Why were people more receptive to the message of maintaining the Land of Israel even at the expense of "peace" than to religious legislation designed to keep the nation "Jewish"? The acceptance of Gush Emunim should not be confused with the state becoming more religious.³⁷ Gush Emunim's increasing attractiveness at a time when the NRP began to decline illustrated that Israeli society was becoming more susceptible to ethnic and nationalistic motifs but not necessarily to religious ones.

The thesis of the impact of the Yom Kippur War is supported in the transformation process of religious Zionism. The NRP, the most natural candidate to support a "Greater Israel," remained a very dovish party even after the Six-Day War. M.H. Shapira, the leader of the party at the time, and his colleagues led the antiwar faction on the eve of the war, and until his death in 1970 he remained firm in his attitudes, hoping that Israel would be able to preserve Jerusalem under its control. Significantly, the national religious sector, the most susceptible sector to nationalism, was transformed only in the mid-1970s. The national religious sector may have changed faster and in larger numbers than the secular segment; however, its transformation was parallel to that of Israeli society.

Palestinian ethnonational claims and other developments on the international scene that were disturbing the progress of Jewish redemption presented a particular challenge to religious Zionism. In response to this threat, Jewish ethnic symbols, identities, and aspirations were emphasized, especially among national religious Jews, a fact that many members of secular Israeli society apparently welcomed. The national religious Israelis felt that no one was better equipped than they to raise the national flag. Gush Emunim was expressing the Zionist response to Palestinian international successes following the Yom Kippur War. "The wide tolerance and even encouragement which the movement has received from the Israeli population," wrote Janet O'Dea, was explained by the fact that "Gush Emunim represents a recrystallization of attitudes, a resolute stance around certain ideas, and a reconstruction of social solidarity in the face of *anomie* experienced after the Yom Kippur

War.”³⁸ Gush Emunim, which felt threatened by the setback to Jewish redemption caused by the Yom Kippur War, raised flags that were welcomed by many in the general population.

The transformation of the national religious sector (or subculture, as some referred to it) from its passive role in Zionism to that of a leader was thus significant from several perspectives. First, it represented a broad sector of Israeli society, even if only a minority. Second, unlike the Revisionists, for instance, the national religious sector has always been part of the ruling Zionist center. They control a large share of the institutions and a whole “stream” in education. Third, Gush Emunim, the outgrowth of religious Zionism, perceived itself as the vanguard of contemporary Zionism and was receiving support from wide circles in Israeli society at large, exceeding the religious camp. Relative deprivation also spurred the revival of ethnonationalism in the religious sector. “Those groups which experience the highest levels of relative deprivation may be expected to be the most nationalistic.”³⁹

The Sephardim

A major feature in the transformation of the Israeli polity and society during the 1970s was the rise in power of the Jews from Afro-Asian origin, or the Sephardim as they were known historically. Their ascendancy, though unrelated directly to international events, influenced Israel’s ethnonational setting and, ultimately, its foreign policy. During those years the Sephardim came to comprise over 50 percent of the Jewish population of Israel.⁴⁰ Understanding the background of the Sephardim and especially their political influence is essential to understanding Israel.

The vast majority of the Sephardim were Jews who came to Israel from Arab Islamic countries, with small groups coming from Mediterranean European countries such as Greece, Yugoslavia, and Italy. Some of the Sephardim were Jews who lived in Palestine throughout the ages or migrated there from the Iberian Peninsula following the Expulsion from Spain in 1492. The distinction between Sephardi and Ashkenazi Jews in the Middle Ages was based on different rabbinic traditions concerning certain rituals and interpretations of the religious code. In Israel, however, the distinction of the two communities became synonymous with geographical origin—Jews immigrating from Europe and the United States (Ashkenazim) and those whose origin was in Northern Africa and Western Asia (Sephardim). The image of European and

American culture as modernized and advanced in contrast to the perception of an underdeveloped Islamic-Arabic civilization was applied to the immigrants to Israel from those parts of the world.⁴¹

The inferior status of the Sephardi Jews in Israel during the early years of independence must be seen in a broader framework. Although the original "old Jewish settlement" in Palestine was composed primarily of Sephardi and Ashkenazi religious Jews, the ruling elite of the Yishuv and, later, of Israel was composed primarily of immigrants from Eastern and Central Europe, most of them secularized. The modernization and nationalism that characterized the Zionist movement prevented the traditional elements of the Old Yishuv from integrating into the new forces that were at the forefront of state-building. The fact that most of the Zionist organizational and diplomatic activity in the diaspora was pursued in Europe and later in the United States did not help change the situation as far as the Sephardim were concerned. In comparison to the Orthodox elements, the Sephardi attempts to build political parties were much less successful. Although during the Yishuv era there were some Sephardi and other *landsmanshaft* political parties, organization along ethnic lines, in general, was perceived as divisive. Rivalry along class lines, secular-religious axes, or foreign policy orientation was laudable; ethnic diversity was not.⁴²

To a certain extent, the Sephardim also suffered from their cultural proximity to the Arabs. To the European Jew, Sephardi music, food, and customs as well as appearance were close to that of the Islamic and Arabic civilization with which Zionism was in conflict. On the normative level, the largely Ashkenazi elite advocated the integration of the Jews coming out of the Arab countries, but they envisioned it taking place within the predominant European social and ideological culture, and not as a synthesis between two Jewish cultures. In reality, therefore, despite the ideal of ingathering the exiles and their integration, Sephardim and Ashkenazim were culturally segregated. Moreover, the "Zionization" of the Sephardim was to be achieved according to the doctrines of the European Zionist ideologies like the productivization of the Jewish people by transforming them from merchants and holders of other unproductive trades into laborers and peasants. Since the majority of the immigrants from Asia and Africa were the most recent arrivals and lacked managerial or industrial skills, they were also natural candidates to join the lowest strata of the labor market. In social terms this implied that they became the majority of the working class. With Israel abandoning the ideal of the rule of the proletariat, the working class became equivalent to the lower class.

Clearly, the Sephardi vote brought about the turnabout of 1977, resulting in the decline of Labor and the victory of the Likud. The tendency of Afro-Asian Jews to vote for Herut was already in evidence during the 1960s, but it became more pronounced in the mid-1970s.⁴³ While in the beginning Mapai won pluralities among both Sephardim and Ashkenazim, it sustained its position only among the Ashkenazim and lost its dominant position among the Sephardim. Public opinion surveys indicate that second-generation Sephardim deserted Labor earlier and faster than their elders did. In 1981 the ratio of Sephardim preferring the Likud over Labor was 2 to 1 and that of the Ashkenazim favoring Labor the reverse.⁴⁴ The significance of analyzing the Sephardi vote for our purposes is in understanding the motivation behind this trend.

The Sephardi Likud Vote

Researchers of Israeli ethnicity advanced six theories in attempting to explain Sephardi support for the Likud. Two theories explain Sephardi electoral behavior as a protest vote against Labor (one theory suggests that the protest was directed at Labor owing to its role as the establishment, and the other points to the revolt of the working class against Labor, which was identified with the upper classes). Organizational theorists relate Sephardi support for the Likud to the ability of that party to accommodate Sephardi ethnic entrepreneurs in comparison to the failure of others. The other three theories link Sephardi support for the Likud to the hawkish attitudes of Sephardim on foreign policy issues, their rejection of socialism and secularism, and, considering their status as descendents of traditional societies, their preference for the Likud as a body that projected authority.⁴⁵

These theories can be divided into two main groups, the first three emphasizing deprivation and the others, culture. The deprivation theories assume that the Sephardi vote for an opposition party was contingent on their political status and not on their being Sephardi. In this sense, it is related to power transition; the relatively deprived Sephardim voted for the party that was out of power—Herut—and the leader that embodied deprivation and opposition—Menahem Begin. Likud's ability to maintain an anti-establishment image even after being in power kept the Sephardim in the national camp. A cultural approach would link the voting behavior of the Sephardim not only to feelings of deprivation

but also to their particular identity, history, and values, and therefore their approach is more "ethnic."

What did Herut possess in ethnic terms that attracted Sephardi voters more so than Labor? Herut's top leadership was definitely more "Polish" in both origin and behavior than any other party in Israel. Thus, why were Menahem Begin's Eastern European manners and rhetoric more appealing to the immigrants from Asia and Africa than those of other party leaders, be they socialist, liberal, or even religious? If it was socialism that alienated them, than why did they not turn to the right-wing Liberal party? If it was secularism, why had they not massed around the religious parties? Moreover, why did the Sephardi tendency to vote for nationalist parties increase in the 1970s and 1980s?

One theory advanced related Sephardi voting behavior to the strong anti-Arab attitudes prevalent among immigrants from Arab countries. Since most of the Afro-Asian immigrants came from Islamic and Arab countries where they were discriminated against by the host majority, they developed anti-Arab attitudes that found their best expression in the foreign policy platform of Herut and its leader Menahem Begin. Anti-Arabism was also a way of rejecting the Arab propaganda that claimed Sephardi Jews were Arabs by nationality and Jewish by religion, and therefore would be welcomed back to their homelands. Nationalism may also have been a way for the Afro-Asian Jews to demonstrate their separateness from Arab culture. Herut and other nationalist parties that expressed anti-Arab attitudes and emphasized nationalist symbols attracted the support of Sephardi Jews.⁴⁶

Sephardi anti-Arab attitudes could also be associated with socioeconomic proximity.⁴⁷ Their animosity toward Arabs was a way of demonstrating their own socioeconomic advancement and modernization in comparison to that of the Arabs, especially the Israeli Arabs. One would assume that if this theory were true, then with the socioeconomic advancement of Sephardim their anti-Arabism would decline and their electoral behavior would change accordingly. Despite Sephardi socioeconomic advancement, there is no evidence pointing to a change in their voting preferences in recent elections.⁴⁸

Although hawkishness, compared to other intervening variables, was the most important factor in the Likud vote, thus far none of the existing empirical evidence has confirmed that anti-Arabism by itself could account for the high correlation between Sephardi origin and support for the Likud.⁴⁹ Almost all existing research suggests that anti-Arabism is an insufficient explanation. The authoritarian theory explaining the Sephardi vote for the Likud was disproved by their continued support in

the wake of Begin's departure and Yitzhak Shamir's heading the list. For a fuller understanding of cultural variables, we must thus turn to the Sephardi vote for Sephardi parties in recent years.

The Sephardi Ethnic Vote

Besides the vote for the Likud, another feature in Sephardi electoral behavior that emerged in the wake of the 1977 political upset was the relative success of two Sephardi lists—Tami (Israel's tradition movement) starting in 1981, and Shas (Sephardi Torah Guardians) starting in the 1984 elections. In 1988 Shas, the ultra-Orthodox Sephardi party, managed to emerge as the strongest party in the religious camp. The failure of Sephardi parties in Israeli political life during the large immigration from Asia and Africa and their success three decades later were not incidental. Both were indicative of the transformation of the Israeli polity.

One possible explanation of the failure of Sephardi ethnic parties during the earlier period could be their lack of political structure; their later success can be said to be the result of having established themselves in Israeli public life. The early failure of pure ethnic parties to emerge as formidable forces could also be related to the stigma attached to ethnicity at the time of the Sephardim's arrival in Israel in contrast to the later era. A possible intervening variable in influencing their later success as compared to their early failures may have been the religious variable; after 1981 the Sephardi parties succeeded only in combination with religion, which was always legitimate in Israeli politics.

Was the success of the two Sephardi parties the result of the success of several ethnic entrepreneurs to organize political alliances and thus mobilize electoral support, unlike their predecessors, or was it an indication that ethnic politics had received legitimacy? The fact that Tami was the result of a breakaway faction of the NRP, and that Shas was the outgrowth of a Jerusalem municipal list, on the face of it, seemed to support the political organization theory. Tami's poor showing in 1984, after four years in the Knesset and the coalition, and its eventual disappearance, whereas the inexperienced Shas was successful, indicated that organization and political resources were not sufficient in explaining ethnic politics. Tami's mistake was that it abandoned its ethnic message in 1984. Analyzing in detail the clear ethnic messages used in both the 1981 and 1984 elections, Hannah Herzog concluded that ethnicity had indeed gone through a process of destigmatization in the

decade preceding the 1984 elections. Whereas previously it had been perceived as segmentation and as contradicting the melting pot ideology of the state, this notion was losing its validity. Ethnic entrepreneurs, instead of using ethnicity in order to gain leverage within the regular parties, decided to establish Sephardi parties.⁵⁰

The acceptance of Sephardi ethnicity two decades after the immigration waves of the 1950s reflected another facet of the transformation of Israeli society. Looking at the answer from an ideological perspective, like the strengthening of Gush Emunim, we can associate the legitimization of ethnicity with the decline of the traditional ideologies, especially socialism and *mamlachtiyut*. Because it emphasized the state at the expense of the class, *mamlachtiyut* reduced class consciousness and permitted a "right-wing proletariat" identity to emerge.⁵¹ In turn, the decline of *mamlachtiyut*, whose main goal was to encourage integration at the expense of segmentation, reduced the stigmatization of ethnic identity.

What was the significance of the fact that both party lists that succeeded in breaking the taboo on ethnic parties were also religious parties? Interestingly, Tami, the more moderate religious party, eventually disappeared from the political map, and its leaders were absorbed by either the Likud or even Labor. In contrast, ultra-Orthodox Shas even increased its power in the 1988 elections. Perhaps separatism along religious lines was not perceived as segmentalist, and thus religion assisted in legitimizing the ethnic list.

Because of its religious character, Shas portrayed a profound ethnicity. Secular Sephardi ethnicity could not constitute an ideology, especially since these Jews came from many countries with different cultures and levels of development—just as being an Ashkenazi could not qualify as an ideology for those Jews who came from Romania, Germany, or the United States. Shas appealed to the ethnic identity that was common to all Sephardim. What Shas portrayed was a return to the historic roots of Sephardi Jewry. Slogans like "restoring bygone glory" or "giving Israel back its soul" stressed the roots and appealed to the pride of Sephardi Jewry. Through its religious messages, Shas provided a Sephardi past, holding up the image of an identity of which they were not ashamed. The ethnic appeal included a recalling of the great rabbinic scholars and sages (like Maimonides, Nahmanides, Alfasi, and Caro) which Sephardi Jewry had produced, while suggesting that the situation in contemporary Israel in which 90 percent of the prison inmates were Sephardim could not be an accurate reflection of Sephardi worth. The discovery of

a glorious past, especially in view of a gloomy present, and the portrayal of a bright future is the essence of ethnicity.⁵²

The strength of Shas's ethnic appeal is reflected in its electoral support which did not come solely from religious Sephardim. The fact that a religious-cultural message was transmitted on television also proves the ethnic appeal of the party, since the audience that Shas leader Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz was addressing was not the genuine ultra-Orthodox who avoid watching television. In these TV messages, Shas leaders attacked modernity and secularization through the very medium that epitomized those two processes. Their statement that a genuinely pious Sephardi mother had more wisdom to offer than scores of university professors implied praise for the traditional family structure, family warmth, and the romantic past—all ethnic-associated elements. In contrast to the Likud, Shas not only raised the issue of the material condition of Sephardi Jewry but also lamented its spiritual decline. By doing so, Shas spoke to the feelings of inferiority that Afro-Asian Jews suffered from or had instilled in them by the dominant culture since their immigration to Israel. Interpreting the current situation as a decline while bringing out the glorious past relieved them of those feelings of inadequacy. Recalling the Middle Ages was also significant, for it was in that era that Sephardi Jewry was more advanced spiritually than Ashkenazi Jewry. The case was being made subliminally that the current social and economic situation was the product not of inherent Sephardi shortcomings but of the absorption process.

Most of the Sephardim, however, as the polls indicated, voted Likud, and even those who voted Shas made it clear that they preferred a Likud prime minister. Thus, they forced their party to join a Likud-led government.⁵³ By supporting the Likud, the Sephardim demonstrated that they were not segmentalist but rather stood for the nation. By voting for, or supporting as a group, a party that stood for the national cause, the Sephardim rallied around the flag and thus displayed that they were more Israeli than the traditional elite. The Arabs who were the stranger were the enemy. Likud, the nationalist party, was their party, for more than two-thirds voted for it, and this party was a ruling party, not a minority party. It was the party that stood for the Land of Israel and national security, whose colors, blue and white like the flag, contrasted with the red flag of Labor.

The extent of Sephardi ideological commitment to the integrity of the Land of Israel is unclear. The Sephardim have been definitely underrepresented in Gush Emunim and the settlements in Judea and Samaria.⁵⁴ Labor and other parties of the left believed that the integrity

of the Land of Israel was not rooted in the Sephardi value system. In their campaign they stressed that the investment in settlements in the administered territories was made at the expense of the development towns. In effect, Gush Emunim provided the vanguard and the Sephardim the votes that kept the national camp in power. While the settlements did not attract them, the Sephardim did not voice opposition to their erection. While Gush Emunim and the Sephardim did not see each other as competitors, the inhabitants of the development towns scorned the kibbutzim and moshavim, whom they identified with the Labor movement. They saw them, and not the settlements, as competitors in the slicing of the national pie.

The rise of the Sephardim as a sociopolitical force in the “post-statist” era thus represents the emergence of ethnicity in an integrationist society. The initial failure of ethnic parties to remain viable forces was in part a result of the overall stigma against segmentation, especially when based on ethnic origin. The immigrants from Asia-Africa apparently accepted the integration idea but felt deprived when it remained limited to the normative level. Their vote for the opposition party in growing numbers allowed them to express both their ethnicity and their desire for integration. From their perspective, Herut and later the Likud, while representing their ethnic interests, were also associated more strongly with the national Jewish cause than was the secular Labor establishment. Their vote for the Likud may have been influenced by anti-Arab attitudes prevalent among Sephardim, probably because of their past experiences in Arab countries. In part, however, it was an expression of their nationalism. For some, the vote for religious Sephardi parties, especially Shas, reproduced their glorious past within a framework that was legitimate in Israel—religious parties.

Undoubtedly the political behavior of the Sephardi Jews was motivated by socioeconomic and organizational factors. They supported those whom they perceived as the anti-establishment party. At the same time, the cultural motivation of Sephardi electoral behavior cannot be denied. They remained loyal to traditional Sephardi symbols. Although their vote sent an ethnic message, they supported the party that highlighted national pride and not only a particularistic ethnic cause. By so doing, they strengthened the ethnonational rather than the pure ethnic forces in Israel. More significant was the fact that legitimation of ethnic culturalism and politics came in the wake of two main processes: the conquest of the territories and the resulting contact between the Jewish and Arab societies, and the decline of the dominant Labor social orientation. Like Gush Emunim, the Sephardi Jews legitimized their

claims at a time when a debate over the territories and over relations with the Palestinian Arabs was gaining momentum. It was also at a time, as we will see, when the national identity of Israeli Arabs was awakened.

The Israeli Arabs

Just as the Jews of Israel were affected by the encounter with the historical parts of the Land of Israel following the 1967 war, so the Israeli Arabs were influenced by their contact with the Palestinian Arabs who lived in these parts of the land. Following Israel's convincing victory, the Israeli Arabs, who had been separated from their brethren in the Arab world for nineteen years, came into contact with the two largest territorial concentrations of Palestinians in the Middle East. A year after the final abolition of the military government in Israel, which ironically signified the acceptance of Israeli Arabs into the Israeli state as equal citizens, they encountered their kin in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip who were now placed under the control of an Israeli military government. Like the rest of Israeli society, their ethnic nationalism was expressed only in the mid-1970s, a fact that links their activation to the Yom Kippur War and the ascendance of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). It can also be assumed that Jewish ethnonationalism also influenced their self-perception, while changes in the attitudes and political behavior of the Israeli Arabs influenced Jewish positions.

As noted above, following the 1948 war the Israeli Arabs had been overwhelmed by the power of the Jewish state and failed to develop a separate collective identity and communal organization. Their minority status, their isolation from the geopolitical centers of Arab nationalism, and their predominantly rural lifestyle inhibited their political activity. The low status of the Palestinians following 1948 further hampered the building of a Palestinian identity. The military government, segmentation along *hamula* (extended family) lines, and the absence of a nationwide Arab party also inhibited their emergence as a viable active community in the Israeli polity. Moreover, there was always the unspoken fear that, because of the intensive Arab-Israeli conflict, a mobilized Arab community would be suspected and trigger an Israeli reaction resulting in expulsion.

The Six-Day War transformed many of these elements. Contact with the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip exposed the Israeli Arabs to Palestinianism which previously had seemingly been dissolved

within pan-Arabism or the hosting Arab states. The rise of the PLO and the Palestinian cause on the global scene and the acquisition of a Palestinian identity by the inhabitants of the territories generated support for the Palestinian cause among the Israeli-Arab public that was caught in the apparent paradox of being both Arab and Israeli. Indeed, if one needs an example of ethnonationalism as separate from state nationalism, the Israeli Arabs constitute a clear case. Israeli Arab self-assertiveness expressed itself in three areas: self-identity, collective action, and political organization.

Despite the paucity of longitudinal studies of Israeli Arab self-identity, some empirical evidence on the transformation of the Israeli Arab community could be deduced from recent studies. Based on these studies, the following trends were discerned among Israeli Arabs since 1967: (1) a clear decline in Israeli identity among Israeli Arabs; (2) a dramatic increase in their Palestinian identity; and (3) "a longitudinal trend toward a highly conflictual perception of the Palestinian/Arab and the Israeli identity."⁵⁵

The conflict between the Palestinian and Israeli identities was reflected in the attitudes of the two communities on various national issues. Based on a July 1980 national representative survey conducted among both the Jewish and the Arab sectors of the country, Sammy Smootha and Don Peretz found clear divergences between the two communities. Substantial majorities among the Israeli Arabs favored Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders, opposed Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and supported recognition of a Palestinian nation with the PLO representing that nation, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories. These attitudes were in sharp contrast to views held by the Jewish public. Looking at the operative Jewish consensus (taken to be the Likud and Labor positions), they found that, whereas 88 percent of the Jewish public and 86 percent of the leadership fell within that consensus, 83 percent of the Arab population fell outside it, and the great majority of the Arab leadership did likewise. Smootha and Peretz also reported that a growing proportion of Israeli Arabs identified with the PLO as the political symbol of the Palestinian people.⁵⁶

The "Palestinization" process of the Israeli Arabs, as it came to be known, was translated into collective action. The most salient event took place on March 30, 1976 (now known as Land Day), when, in response to government plans to expropriate land held by Israeli Arabs, the National Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands called a general strike that ended in violent clashes with the Israeli police. Land Day

became a memorial day for Israeli Arabs and has been commemorated henceforth every year. Looking at more cumulative data would reveal some interesting conclusions.

As part of his nationwide investigation of protest behavior in Israel, Sam Lehman-Wilzig has also identified some pertinent changes in the protest behavior of Israeli Arabs. The mean of Arab protest activity jumped from 1.7 events per year during the 1950-66 period and 1.8 events between 1967 and 1972 to 9.5 events per year during 1973-79. The year of the Land Day strike (1976), which marked a peak in protest activity, was surpassed in 1979 when 17 events took place. In addition, Lehman-Wilzig also discovered that while the Arab demonstrations came to involve more people protesting over longer periods of time, they also became more peaceful. This finding led him to conclude that Arab protest behavior was comparable to Jewish protest behavior in Israel. Arab protest behavior resembled Jewish protest behavior in yet another respect—its upward trend over the years. While becoming more Palestinian in their attitudes, they were also becoming more Israeli in their civic behavior. Most significant from our perspective was that, whereas from 1950 to 1975 the ratio of Arab protest to all the population was 3.3 percent, between 1976 and 1986 it constituted 10.7 percent (see Table 3.5).⁵⁷

Collective action and protest are manifested politically at the polls. Rakah, later renamed the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (DFPE), following the Six-Day War increased its share from 23 percent of the Arab vote to 28 percent in the 1969 elections. From its inception, the DFPE was in effect an Arab party despite the attempt, because of its Communist ideology, to preserve a semblance of its image as a Jewish-Arab party. Already in the 1969 and 1973 elections, its Jewish vote was hovering around 1 to 2 percent of its total vote. The breakthrough came in 1977, a year after Land Day and the PLO landslide victory in the West Bank, when the DFPE received 50 percent of the Arab vote. The DFPE's climb was accompanied by a parallel decline of support for Labor and its associated Arab lists from over half to around a quarter of the Arab vote.⁵⁸ The DFPE also took control of local Arab councils.

Arab dissent was also exhibited by the decline in participation in the elections from a level of over 80 percent in the 1950s to 74 percent in 1977 and 69 percent in 1981.⁵⁹ The growth in abstention among Israeli Arabs could be seen as either an expression of protest or even as a rejection by a growing number of Israeli Arabs of the legitimacy of the Israeli political system. It might have been influenced by the fact that on the eve of the 1981 election the PLO spokesman called on Israeli Arab

voters to abstain.⁶⁰ Arab participation began climbing again in the 1984 and 1988 elections with the appearance of the Progressive List for Peace (PLP), an Arab-Jewish party that, unlike the Communists, was headed by an Arab and whose main concern was to advocate Israeli recognition of the PLO.⁶¹ In 1988 the PLP was joined by the Arab Democratic Party (ADP) with a similar program but with no Jewish candidate on the ticket; the PLP received 14.1 percent of the Arab vote and the ADP 11.2 percent (see Table 3.4).⁶²

The Israeli Arabs expressed their political preferences when, in reaction to the Likud victory, the Arab vote for Labor increased from 11 percent in 1977 to 29 percent in 1981, while the DFPE declined to 37 percent. In 1984 both parties declined among the Arab voters, the DFPE to 33 percent and Labor to 22.4 percent, while the PLP gained 18 percent of the Arab vote. In 1988 while the Communists held their share—a third of the vote—Labor declined to 17 percent. In total, in 1988 the non-Zionist (mainly) Arab parties—all supporting a Palestinian state in the West Bank and recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people—received 58 percent of the Arab vote. If we add to this the over 8 percent of the Arab vote for two leftist Zionist parties—Mapam and the Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM)—which also advocated negotiations with the PLO, two-thirds of the Israeli Arabs voted for parties supporting negotiations with the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian state.⁶³

Advocating Palestinian causes through Arab parties implied a process of national institution-building. In the pre-1967 period the Arab parties that emerged were associated with either Mapai or satellites of Moscow, or, at most, genuine Arab groups advancing pan-Arabism (i.e., al-Ard). In contrast, the Arab parties of the 1980s supported a Palestinian state and strove to attain a formal national minority status, thus qualifying to be defined as ethnic if not national parties.

The new Arab parties were actually preceded by the building of a network of countrywide Arab organizations that developed in the mid-1970s. The most prominent of the organizations was the National Committee of Arab Heads of Local Councils established in 1974, which eventually assumed the role of a quasi-national assembly. Also prominent was the National Committee for the Defense of Arab Lands which was established by the DFPE in 1975. Other organs established by the DFPE were the National Committee of Arab Students and the National Committee of Arab High School Pupils. Parallel to them a string of radical organizations arose, including Abna al Balad (Sons of the Land) and the Progressive National Movement which occasionally even con-

trolled the Arab student organizations at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Haifa University. While the Progressive National Movement eventually became the PLP and participated in the political process, Abna al Balad totally rejected the existence of the Jewish state. Arab student associations demanded official status parallel to but separate from the Israeli student organizations.⁶⁴ One result of the new organizational network was the adoption of the "June 6 Document" in September 1980, which, among other things, demanded the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Another development was the plan to convene an Arab Congress of Israeli Arab representatives in December of that year.⁶⁵

As the elections of 1984, 1988, and 1992 all showed, Israeli Arabs remained fragmented in their voting behavior.⁶⁶ At the same time, they expressed ethnonational feelings that were mirror images of the Israeli Jewish consensus.⁶⁷ They disagreed over the existing national character of Israel and the future national character of the territories acquired in 1967. What was novel was that the national opposition came from Arabs living within the "green line." This national minority totaled one-sixth of the state's population, who were not hesitant to express their views in public through collective action and generate an institution-building process unprecedented in the pre-1967 period.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE STATIST SETTING

The ascendance of ethnonational forces in Israeli society at large was accompanied by the transformation of the statist setting. While the rise of ethnonationalism was related to feelings of relative deprivation in the society at large and among sectors that felt deprived, the transformation of the state setting was the result of processes rooted in the political realm. The decline of the statist parties in turn gave further momentum to the rise of ethnonationalism.

Foremost among the changes that took place in the Jewish polity after the establishment of the state was the collapse of the ruling Labor elite in 1977 in what was defined as a *mahapach*. *Mahapach* may be translated into English as turnabout or upheaval. The concept referred to the fact that May 17, 1977 marked the end of the dominance of a party that had ruled Israel even prior to its establishment and with it the political system of the dominant party. Mapai and its leadership controlled and came to be identified with the national, socioeconomic, and governmental institutions of the state, thus creating a dominant elite whose power

overlapped that of the state. Whether the state would be identified with the ruling elite, the political institutions, or the bureaucratic apparatus, to use Krasner's concepts for the state, or the political system, to use the pluralists' approach, the 1977 *mahapach* in essence implied a radical change of the Israeli polity, a process that in an authoritarian system could have been accomplished only through a revolution.⁶⁸ Understanding the 1977 *mahapach* and the political process that brought down the elite identified with the state is essential for understanding the rise of ethnonationalism. The transformation of the Israeli polity will be explained as the equivalent of a revolution that resulted in the transfer of power from one elite to another.⁶⁹

The Decline of Labor

The decline of Labor can be associated with major events in Israel's history like the setbacks during the Yom Kippur War or the revelations of corruption that were exposed during the Meir-Rabin governments that ruled the state following the 1973 elections. Without underestimating the significance of those events, it would be too simplistic to relate the collapse of Labor, whose power was so comprehensive and which had survived scandals throughout its rule, to the events immediately preceding its collapse. A full explanation must look for structural changes and long-term processes.

The rule of Mapai was attributed at least partly to the inability of its opposition to unite and form an alternative to that of the ruling party. The seeds of change were planted in the coalition formed after the 1961 elections and were related to a struggle for power in the ruling elite. In the negotiations to form a new government that were headed by Levi Eshkol, contrary to Ben-Gurion's advice, Ahdut ha-Avodah was preferred as a coalition partner over the Liberal party (a merger of the Progressives and the General Zionists, both from the civil camp). The veteran leadership of Mapai feared that the Dayan-Peres ascendancy would prepare an alternative cadre of leaders who enjoyed expertise in defense affairs. Yigal Allon, Yisrael Galili, and other leaders of Ahdut ha-Avodah could fill that gap. The political result of these and ensuing maneuvers was that the Liberals joined Herut and formed Gahal, which represents a landmark in the formation of the Likud a decade later. In addition, the social democratic parties joined and formed the Alignment, and two large blocs surfaced—one on the left and the other on the

right. The party to lose from the new structure was Mapai which had previously been the only major party.

Another departure from the previous strategy took place on the eve of the Six-Day War when a national unity government, including Herut, was formed. In doing so, Labor provided Menahem Begin and Herut with legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate instead of the ominous irresponsibility and stigma that Ben-Gurion successfully attached to the right-wing nationalists. Begin stayed in the government even after the emergency was over, and he participated in the 1969 coalition under Golda Meir until it broke down in 1970. Enjoying the new legitimacy, Begin formed the Likud which comprised all the forces of the national right. One group that joined the Likud was the Movement for the Integrity of the Land of Israel, many of them ex-members of the Labor camp. Many of the traditional voters of the NRP also began supporting the Likud. Begin himself started cooperating in the Knesset with the young leaders of the NRP, thus preparing the way for a potential coalition. Hawkish generals and war heroes like Ezer Weizman and Ariel Sharon, none of whom came from a Revisionist background, following their retirement from the army joined the Likud which was no longer perceived as a permanent opposition party. Ironically, the State List, the remnants of Rafi, the party formed by Ben-Gurion following his departure from Mapai, ultimately joined the Likud as part of a new party called La'am. In short, Begin, whom Ben-Gurion had castigated as an extremist and a menace to Israeli democracy, was gaining respectability, enabling him to assemble a coalition crossing into the religious and even the Labor camp and including ex-members of Mapai and Mapam.⁷⁰

It took several elections for these subtle changes to be translated into visible political realities. Eshkol won the 1965 elections over Ben-Gurion's Rafi list and Begin heading the Herut-Liberal bloc. In 1969 the Labor Alignment received 46.2 percent of the vote against Gahal (Begin's bloc) with only 21.7 percent. Even following the disastrous Yom Kippur War, in the 1973 elections Labor managed to stay in power with almost 40 percent of the vote and 51 Knesset members, compared to 30 percent and 39 Knesset members for Likud. But the significance was that for the first time in Israel's electoral history a viable alternative to Labor had emerged on the scene, even if the Likud could not yet win a plurality and assemble a majority in the Knesset.

As is often the case with declining elites, collapse came from within; the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), many of whose rank and file members came from Labor, contributed decisively to Labor's decline. Revelations of corruption accompanied by intensive internal

struggles for power strengthened the distrust toward Labor that surfaced following the Yom Kippur War setback. The DMC's platform in foreign affairs, especially on the territorial question, was very similar to that of Labor.⁷¹ In 1977 the DMC received 11.6 percent of the vote. Two-thirds of its support came from those who had voted in 1973 for Labor; among first-time voters it scored second to Likud. Defectors from Labor to the DMC were found to be highly educated and upper class, and of European extraction.⁷²

The upheaval of May 1977 was not confined to Labor. The former Progressive party (Independent Liberals) was almost wiped out in the 1977 elections. The NRP, which had already maintained a relationship with the Likud, now officially deserted its traditional ally and with Agudat Israel enabled Begin to form a government without the DMC, thus spoiling the DMC's hope to hold the balance of power. By deserting Labor, they prepared their own decline, since the leadership profiles of the NRP, the DMC, and even Agudat Israel were very similar to that of Labor. It was primarily an Ashkenazi elite who had participated in the process of state-building and the formation of the central institutions of the polity. Jointly, they controlled the power centers of the state. Without realizing it at the time, by defecting from Labor, both the DMC and the NRP did more than transfer power to a competing elite; they participated in an upheaval. The DMC disintegrated, and in the 1981 elections its remnant, Shinui (Change), received 1.5 percent; the NRP's vote was cut to half; and the Independent Liberals disappeared, as did Poalei Agudat Israel.⁷³

The 1981 elections confirmed that the decline of Labor was an indicator of profound change and that the previous election results were not a fluke. Although the Alignment recuperated to win 47 seats in the Knesset, the Likud increased its power from 43 to 48 seats. Even more indicative was that Peres with the support of the Citizens' Rights Movement and Shinui could hardly assemble 50 members of the Knesset (MKs) to support him for prime minister. Besides winning in the plurality contest, the Likud also enjoyed the support of a majority which consisted of the religious, the national, and the ethnic parties, resembling the direct voters of the Likud. In the four years that elapsed between the two elections, Begin did not disappoint most of his constituency. The Likud government launched a major settlement drive in the West Bank, advanced religious legislation, and initiated Project Renewal, which benefited primarily the less developed neighborhoods in the cities and the development towns—bastions of Likud supporters. The Likud's growth in 1981 was impressive in light of the competition

from two new parties, each with appeal to potential Likud supporters—nationalist Tehiya and Sephardi Tami. Each one won three mandates in the Knesset.⁷⁴

The 1984 elections became the test of the new majority; the coalition held together and denied Labor the opportunity to rule by itself and send the Likud into opposition. Likud won 41 seats in the Knesset compared to Labor's 44, despite the collapse of the stock market which threatened to bring down the whole banking system, a hyperinflation of 600 percent annually, and an unpopular war in Lebanon. Likud's relatively small slide could only be explained by the existence of a large loyal constituency that did not judge the ruling party by standards of state governance. Labor's inability to assemble a majority to form a government despite winning a plurality was the best proof of the transformed polity. The growth of Tehiya, the appearance of Shas, and Rabbi Meir Kahane's 1.2 percent indicated that defectors from the Likud moved to the right rather than to Labor.

In the 1988 elections Labor came in second with only 39 Knesset seats compared to Likud's 40. Labor's inability to win after Shimon Peres's very successful two-year term as prime minister between 1984 and 1986 and Yitzhak Rabin's popularity as minister of defense again confirmed Labor's changed status among the Israeli electorate.⁷⁵ Labor's decline was again demonstrated when three months later, in February 1989, the Likud accomplished what it had not succeeded in doing even following 1977; it defeated Labor in the municipal elections, winning a majority of the councils and mayoralty contests, and overturning the leadership in many traditional Labor strongholds. Yet Labor maintained control of its last bastion, the Histadrut, in the November 1989 Histadrut elections.⁷⁶

The New Ruling Elite

From its inception in the mid-1920s the Revisionist movement headed by Zeev Jabotinsky considered itself as constituting the only alternative to the ruling party for political and ideological hegemony of the Zionist movement. Fifty years later out of all the parties that competed for power it was Herut—the heir of the Revisionists and the main component of the Likud—that stood in the center of the 1977 upheaval and symbolized the transfer of power from one elite to the other. Indeed, previous transfers of power could be considered as personal and generational, differing in style, emphasis, or even orientation. The transfer

from Labor to Likud symbolized a radical change from one opposite to the other. Herut appeared to be the antithesis of Mapai and its leader Menahem Begin the opposite of the Labor leaders. What was it that distinguished Herut, more than all the other parties, from the previous regime?⁷⁷

Herut's political behavior, like that of its leader Begin, must be seen as a combination of two streams—romanticism and political realism. On the one hand, Herut's political platform was nationalistic, influenced by romantic notions imported from Poland, where most of its leadership was socialized.⁷⁸ Herut's public appeal tended to come from its emphasis on symbols, external appearance, oral and public expression, and mobilization through mass demonstrations and gatherings. On the other hand, we cannot ignore the careful and persistent political strategy that Herut and its leader initiated at their transformation from a small underground group—Etzel—to a political party, a strategy that within less than thirty years allowed them to assume governmental leadership through democratic means. During those years Begin, while expressing himself in mass gatherings and zealous speeches, marches, and demonstrations, was also piecing together both a social and a political coalition that ultimately was translated into a ruling majority. While emphasizing *hadar*, dignity and self-respect, the leader of Herut also exhibited readiness to swallow his pride, court many of his potential allies, and compromise on some of his principles. Herut's road to power, while resulting from dramatic events like the Yom Kippur War which triggered the upheaval, was also the culmination of a slow shift in the distribution of power in which Begin was consistently increasing his share.

The complexity of Herut and its inner inconsistencies were rooted in the ideology of the Revisionist movement. On the one hand, the movement saw itself as an heir to political Zionism and Herzl's continuing legacy. On the other hand, it emphasized the historic borders of Eretz Israel. While pressuring the Zionist movement to declare openly its demand for a state and not just a national home, and even ready to break away from the movement on this principle, Revisionism was not ready to compromise on borders. It was even prepared to postpone the establishment of the state in order to ensure the complete integrity of the Land of Israel. While supporting liberal democracy, Jabotinsky was demanding the establishment of a Jewish state even before the Jews achieved a majority. Another contradiction could be found in the Revisionists' international orientation: Jabotinsky saw Britain as the Great Power that would assist the aspirations of Zionism, while the Etzel and Lehi, which

saw themselves as continuing his doctrines, fought the British Empire as a colonial power. In 1948 Begin disobeyed the authority of the provisional Israeli government and continued to import arms on a private basis, though when he realized that Ben-Gurion's efforts to seize the Altalena arms ship might escalate to a civil war he gave the order not to resist. Begin, who headed a violent demonstration against the German Reparations Agreement, threatening upheaval and revolt, retracted when he realized the determination of the government. The man who was perceived as a menace to democracy proved himself a hard-working parliamentarian par excellence.

Herut's dualism was also manifested in other aspects of its ideology and political behavior. Jabotinsky's political and social thought was a complex mix of ardent liberal and nationalistic elements accompanied by humanistic and militaristic features.⁷⁹ Begin exposed similar mixtures; he would speak in one breath of his desire for both peace and for the integrity of the entire Land of Israel. He would display hawkish views on issues of international politics and yet address himself continuously to principles of international law; he would appease his rivals and yet be intolerant of internal opposition, a bitter enemy of Ben-Gurion who insisted that he should be called back to lead the government during the May 1967 crisis. Was this dualism inherent in Herut, or was it part of a strategy adopted in order to gain political power?

Yonathan Shapiro analyzed Herut's road to power according to the status politics theory developed by Joseph Gusfield and others. Trying to explain the European radical right and Latin American populism, these theoreticians discovered that, instead of struggling to obtain material goods for their followers, these movements mobilized them by stressing their secondary status in society. Those groups, which lost power or were denied power to begin with, were mobilized through the use of symbols and myth rather than political and organizational mobilization. Political dialogue involves emotional deliveries in mass assemblies and instigation of those who feel deprived.

This was the legacy that the Herut leaders had brought with them from Poland where Betar, the Revisionist youth movement, was established. This fact was elaborated by Yaacov Shavit who wrote on the influence of Polish nationalism and culture on the style of Israel's right.⁸⁰ It stands to reason that the leaders of Herut as Revisionists felt deprived of their rightful share of the leadership during the Yishuv period, and even more so after 1948. Believing that it was the Irgun that expelled the British from Palestine, the leaders of Herut who continued to be stigmatized as radicals felt deprived not only of their rightful share

of power but also of their share in history. Herut would have stayed in opposition if not for the internal decay of Labor, according to Shapiro. This was indeed proven by the fact that in the two elections following Herut's merger with the Liberals, despite the combined strength in the Knesset, the new bloc declined or stayed stable. Following 1973, the two groups suffering from feelings of status deprivation—Herut and the Sephardim—fused and tipped the balance in favor of the Likud.⁸¹

Herut's rise to power was also interpreted as the outcome of a deliberate and consistent struggle for legitimacy. Suffering from a stigma of irresponsibility and adventurism, Herut adopted a strategy of parliamentary and electoral alliances with shrinking parties in order to break out of the confinements of illegitimacy. Herut and its leader Begin gave up Knesset seats to these parties in exchange for a new image. Most important, this type of alliance politics allowed Herut to shatter the politics of excommunication applied against the party and its leader and to maintain its ideological principles at the same time. Thus, when the political climate changed and Herut's ideas no longer seemed irrational, the road to power was open.⁸² Both approaches agree that Herut came to power without modifying its basic ethnonationalist ideology. Considerations of historic land constituted the essence of Herut's foreign policy.⁸³

A major difference between Labor and Herut lay in their bureaucratic structure. While Labor was the party of apparatus and institutions, Herut was a mass party galvanized by symbols and its leader—Menahem Begin. Both elements suited Israel of the 1970s.⁸⁴ The fact that a party lacking organizational means defeated the bureaucratic parties and emerged as the leading party in Israel was significant for understanding the transformation of the Israeli polity. In the Israel of the mid-1970s, party organization gave in to charismatic appeal; ethnic symbols were more powerful than institutions and organization, thus reflecting the weakening of the state. In the mid-1930s, Ben-Gurion defeated Jabotinsky, who overshadowed him as a charismatic leader, *inter alia*, because of the Labor leader's control of the organizational infrastructure that Mapai developed in Palestine and that extended abroad as well.⁸⁵ In the mid-1960s Eshkol, lacking any charisma but controlling the party apparatus, defeated Ben-Gurion. In the 1980s the bureaucratic parties were losing out to parties that were appealing with ethnic or ethnonational symbols. The ascendancy of symbolism and ethnicity in Israeli politics could be arrived at by a comparative analysis of the performance of small parties. (See Table 6.1.) Among the new parties that succeeded in passing the 1 percent electoral threshold in the 1980s, the religious, nationalistic, or ethnic parties performed better than the

others. Moshe Dayan's Telem party which won two seats in the Knesset in 1981 and Ezer Weizman's Yahad which gained three seats in 1984, both headed by war heroes and former ministers of defense, were dissolved very rapidly. Even in the Arab sector the Communist party, that enjoyed a bureaucratic structure, was starting to decline in the 1980s in favor of the two newcomers, the Progressive List for Peace and the Arab Democratic party.

Table 6.1
New Parties in Israeli Politics in the 1980s

Party:	Nationalist	Ethnic	Religious	Arab	Others
1981	Tehiya (3)	Tami (3)	Tami		Telem (2)
1984	Morasha (2) Kahane (1)	Shas (4)	Morasha Shas	PLP (2)	Yahad (3)
1988	Moledet (2) Tzomet (2)		Degel Hatorah (2)	ADP (1)	

Note: In parenthesis is the number of seats in the Knesset that the party received in its first appearance.

As pointed out earlier, the Likud attracted votes from three sources by using symbols that attracted ethnic, religious, and nationalist voters. Herut, headed by a charismatic leader and the more religious/ethnic/nationalist force in the Likud, swallowed the Liberal party which had an extensive party apparatus but no ethnic appeal, stood for anticlericalism, and was more moderate on the territorial question. It was also the Likud which, lacking a party machine, was able to democratize its nomination process to the Knesset list. Thus, it was also able to force the Labor party machine in 1988 to follow and in 1992 to adopt a "primaries" system.

In summary, the rise of ethnonationalism was compatible with the weakening of the statist setting of the Israeli polity. The Yom Kippur War, which brought out relative deprivation and status inconsistency feelings on the collective level and thus induced ethnonationalism, also undermined the ruling Labor elite. The collapse of the elite that had ruled the institutions of the Jewish polity even prior to the establishment of the state enabled the takeover of the polity by an ethnonational elite

that was composed and supported by a coalition of minorities who felt like outsiders to the political center. Processes in the social and the political realm thus coincided and transformed the Israeli polity and, hence, its foreign policy.

Prior to entering a comparative foreign policy analysis, we must qualify this conclusion. Although the state setting was weakened with the decline of the Labor elite, it was not broken. The state structure that emerged was relatively solid, especially when compared to other newborn states whose state institutions were developing at the same time. Moreover, the Labor elite, though losing its dominance in the political system, did not disintegrate; it remained a viable political force as the 1981 and ensuing elections have demonstrated. Most important, the Likud as a new ruling elite, despite its different texture, was ultimately a political actor. It should be remembered that Begin and the Herut party had adopted a strategy of legitimization and coalition building that was compatible with the rules of the game that Labor had laid down. Their strategy showed that they were not strangers to the requirements of pluralistic politics and were influenced by the political culture of the Jewish state. At the same time their ethnonational foreign policy rationale, as we will see in the next chapter, was distinguishable from the foreign policy rationale of their predecessors.

NOTES

1. On the expansion of the conflict, see Shmuel Sandler, "The Protracted Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 4 (November 1988).

2. Giora Goldberg, "The Struggle for Legitimacy—Herut's Road from Opposition to Power," in Stuart Cohen and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, eds., *Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Political Life* (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1986), pp. 161-162.

3. For an eloquent book on the national position in Israeli society and the meaning of the Land of Israel, see Harel (Harold) Fisch, *The Zionism of Zion* (Tel Aviv: Zmora, Bitan, 1982), see especially chs. 10, 11, and 13 (Hebrew).

4. On intercommunal conflict in polities composed of two communities, see Dan Horowitz, "Dual Authority Polities," *Comparative Politics* 14, no. 3 (April 1982):329-349; and a special issue on bicomunal polities, *Publius* 18, no. 2 (Spring 1988).

5. Shaul Mishal, *West Bank / East Bank, The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978).

6. Contact between developed and underdeveloped economies usually results, at least in the short run, in rapid economic growth for the less developed economy. Charles Kindleberg, *Economic Development*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), p. 57.

7. On political development and institution-building in the West Bank, see Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank*, ch. 4.

8. See Articles 19-22 of the covenant and a full analysis of the document in Yehoshafat Harkabi, *The Palestinian Covenant and Its Meaning* (London: Valentine, Mitchell, 1979).

9. Shaul Mishal, "Judea and Samaria: An Anatomy of Municipal Elections," *Ha-Mizrah He-Hadash* 24, nos. 1-2 (93-94) (1974):63-67 (Hebrew).

10. On the role of the universities and the press in political mobilization, see Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank*, pp. 62-65.

11. On the new leadership, see Yehuda Litani, "Leadership in the West Bank and Gaza," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 14 (Winter 1980):100-109.

12. On Israel as an ideological society, see, for instance, Daniel J. Elazar, *Israel: Building a New Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), chs. 1 and 3. On the role of civil religion as value system, see Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

13. Ernst Haas, "What is Nationalism and Why Should We Study It?" *International Organization* 40, no. 3 (Summer 1986):710.

14. See Chong-Do Hah and Jeffrey Martin, "Towards a Synthesis of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationalism," *World Politics* 9, no. 2 (July 1957):380-381.

15. Charles Liebman, "The Idea of 'Or L'goyim' in Israeli Reality," *Gesher*, no. 4 (81) (December 1974):88-93.

16. *Numbers* 23:9.

17. This is the opinion of Amnon Rubinstein, *From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1980), ch. 7.

18. For an expression of such feelings, see, for instance, Jacques Givet, *The Anti-Zionist Complex* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: SBS Publishing, 1982).

19. Ze'ev Shternhal, "The Basic Problems of the Political System," *B'tfutzot HaGolah*, nos. 81/82 (Summer 1977):171-172.

20. Dan Horowitz, "The Impact of Structural Processes and Conjectural Phenomenon on the Election Results," *B'tfutzot HaGolah*, nos. 81/82 (Summer 1977):169-170.

21. Yonathan Shapiro, *An Elite Without Continuation* (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Hapoalim, 1984).

22. Rubinstein, *From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back*, p. 106.

23. For the role of these cleavages in Israeli society, see Elazar, *Israel, Building a New Society*, chs. 7-9.

24. The religiously observant population was estimated to be around 23 percent, the secular 40 percent, and the rest traditional; see Yehuda Ben-Meir and Peri Kedem, "An Index of Religiosity for the Jewish Population in Israel," *Megamot* 24, no. 3 (February 1979):353-362. Another index for measuring religiosity is the distribution of students in elementary schools according to streams. The percentage of students attending the state religious and the "independent" (ultra-Orthodox) streams was 25.8 percent in 1985. See Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia*, Table 2, p. 93.

25. Members of the Histadrut Hapoel Hamizrachi were affiliates of the General Kupa Holim (Sick Fund). For further analysis of the historic partnership, see Shmuel Sandler, "The Religious Parties," in Howard R. Penniman and Daniel J. Elazar, eds., *Israel at the Polls, 1981* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 110-120.

26. David Vital, *Zionism: The Formative Years* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 167.

27. Although religious women were totally exempt from military service, most of them either enlisted in the army or volunteered for nonmilitary "national service."

28. *The Jerusalem Post Magazine*, March 12, 1982, p. 3.

29. On the active element in religious Zionism, see Aviezer Ravitzki, "Exile in the Holyland: The Dilemma of Haredi Jewry," in Peter Medding, ed., *Israel State and Society, 1948-1988*, Studies in Contemporary Jewry, vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 89-125, especially pp. 96-98.

30. Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Jewish Messianism, Religious Zionism and Israeli Politics: The Impact and Origins of Gush Emunim," *Middle East Studies* 23, no. 2 (April 1987):225-227. See also Ehud Sprinzak, "Gush Emunim: The Iceberg Model of Political Extremism," *State, Government, and International Relations*, no. 17 (Spring 1981):22-49.

31. Zvi Yaron, *The Philosophy of Rabbi Kook* (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1974), pp. 87-89.

32. *Ibid.*, ch. 6, especially pp. 107-109 and 121-123.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 319-320.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 272-273 and 277-280.

35. On the eve of Independence Day in 1967, Rabbi Zvi Yehuda gave a sermon in which he lamented the fact that parts of the Land of Israel and Jerusalem were under Arab rule, and he prophesied that this situation would soon be changed. The next day Nasser started pouring troops into the Sinai Desert, thus initiating a process that eventually led to the outbreak of the Six-Day War. This event had a great impact on his disciples.

36. One writer went back as far as the establishment of the Hesder Yeshivot. Eliezer Goldman, "Simplistic Messianism," *B'tfuzot HaGolah*, no. 79/80 (Winter 1977):112-113 (Hebrew).

37. The new culture was termed by Amnon Rubinstein as a mixture of "Dizengoff" and Judea and Samaria—not a more Orthodox Israel. Rubinstein, *From Herzl to Gush Emunim and Back*. Don-Yehiya and Liebman have

identified the emergence of a more traditional civil religion, though one very distant from Orthodox Judaism; see *Civil Religion in Israel*, especially the concluding chapter. See also Charles S. Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Israel's Civil Religion," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 23 (Spring 1982). The organizational explanation of Gush Emunim's success is that of Sprinzak and the ideological explanation was made by Don-Yehiya; see above, n. 30.

38. Janet O'Dea, "Gush Emunim: Roots and Ambiguities, The Perspective of the Sociology of Religion," *Forum*, no. 2 (25) (1976):45. Coming from a person who would soon become a leader of "Peace Now" and one who could not be suspected of sympathy to this movement, this observation is even more significant. See also Don-Yehiya, "Jewish Messianism," pp. 231-232.

39. Hah and Martin. "Toward a Synthesis of Conflict," p. 381.

40. In 1972 first- and second-generation Sephardim constituted 51.8 percent. See Roberto Bachi, *The Population of Israel* (Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, 1974), p. 266, Table 14.3.

41. The distinction started with a geopolitical separation between Jews dwelling in Spain (Sepharad in Jewish terminology) which was ruled by Islam and those dwelling in the Christian parts of Europe, primarily the German (Ashkanaz) and Slavic parts. The Sephardim were those Jews who accepted the code of Rabbi Joseph Caro, and the Ashkenazim were those who accepted that code only after it was modified by Rabbi Moses Isserlish to fit Ashkenasi rituals and traditions; see Daniel J. Elazar, *The Other Jews, The Sephardim Today* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), ch. 1.

42. Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *The Origins of the Israeli Polity* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1988), pp. 101, 103, 107.

43. Asher Arian, "Electoral Choice in a Dominant Party System," in A. Arian, ed., *The Elections in Israel, 1969* (Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1972).

44. Michal Shamir and Asher Arian, "The Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Elections," A. Arian and M. Shamir, eds., *The Elections in Israel* (Tel Aviv: Ramot, 1982), p. 96.

45. These theories are gleaned from Shamir and Arian, "The Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Elections," pp. 100-103; Yochanan Peres and Sarah Shemer, "The Ethnic Vote in the Elections to the Tenth Knesset," *Megamot* 28, nos. 2-3 (1984):329-330 (Hebrew); Chana Ayalon, Eliezer Ben-Rafael, and Stephen Shrot, "Ethnicity and Politics," *Megamot* (1987):333-334 (Hebrew).

46. Peres and Shemer explained the clear ethnic-electoral nexus by the Sephardi-Arab variable in "The Ethnic Factor in the Elections to the Tenth Knesset," pp. 316-331. The findings of Shamir and Arian that hawkishness, especially on the territorial issue, was the clearest indicator influencing the Israeli voter's behavior also support this explanation. See Shamir and Arian, "The Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Elections," p. 106.

47. Following the late Rabbi Meir Kahane's electoral success in 1984, a theory was advanced that the Sephardim hated the Arabs because they were competing with them for employment. See Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, "'Thorns in Your Eyes': The Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Sources of

Electoral Support of Rabbi Kahane," *State, Government and International Relations*, no. 25 (Spring 1986):115-130 (Hebrew).

48. On the ethnic vote in the 1984 elections, see, for instance, articles by Efraim Torgovnik and Hannah Herzog in Elazar and Sandler, eds., *Israel's Odd Couple*, and for the 1988 elections the article by Eliezer Don-Yehiya in Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., *Who Is the Boss in Israel? Israel at the Polls, 1988-89* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992).

49. Shamir and Arian, "The Ethnic Vote in Israel's 1981 Elections," p. 106.

50. Hannah Herzog, "Between Political and Cultural Ethnicity: An Analysis of the 'Ethnic Lists' in the 1984 Elections," in Elazar and Sandler, eds., *Israel's Odd Couple*, pp. 87-118.

51. Yael Yishai, "Israel's Right Wing Proletariat," *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 24, no. 2 (1982):87-97.

52. For an analysis of the ethnic message of Shas in the 1988 elections, see Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "Religion, Social Cleavages, and Political Behavior: The Religious Parties and the Elections to the 12th Knesset," in Elazar and Sandler, eds., *Who Is the Boss?*

53. In 1984 the tie that emerged after the elections resulted from Shas joining Shamir's camp, thus forcing Peres to form a national unity government. See Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, "The Two-Bloc System—A New Development in Israeli Politics," in Elazar and Sandler, eds., *Israel's Odd Couple*, pp. 12-14. For their 1990 behavior, see Chapter 8 in the present volume.

54. The low representation of Sephardim in the Gush Emunim leadership has been noted and was confirmed by the editor of *Nekudah* magazine, Israel Harel, in a political science departmental seminar at Bar-Ilan University on February 27, 1990. In general, Ashkenazim and Israeli-born were more salient in ideological movements like Gush Emunim or Peace Now.

55. Ofira Seliktar, "The Arabs in Israel," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 28, no. 2 (June 1984):262. These trends are based on Sammy Smootha's empirical studies of the Israeli Arab community (1976-80), and Seliktar's analysis of less representative studies from previous years. See also Sammy Smootha, "The Orientation and Politicization of the Arab Minority in Israel" (Haifa: University of Haifa, 1980), New Series, no. 2.

56. Sammy Smootha and Don Peretz, "The Arabs in Israel," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 3 (September 1982):451-464, especially 452-460. The Israeli Arabs whom Seliktar finds still lacking in intracommunal perception and consensus, however, scored high on consensus "with regard to the demand to recognize the Palestinians as a people." A more moderate consensus was revealed with regard to the proposition that Zionism was a racist movement and to a demand for redefining the State of Israel through amendment of the Law of Return. See Seliktar, "The Arabs in Israel," pp. 264-266.

57. See Sam Lehman-Wilzig: "Copying the Master: Patterns of Israeli-Arab Protest, 1950-1979," unpublished paper.

58. Majid Al-Haj and Avner Yaniv, "Uniformity or Diversity: A Reappraisal of the Voting Behavior of the Arab Minority in Israel," in Arian and Shamir, *The Elections in Israel, 1981*, Tables 2 and 3.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

61. In 1988 Arab participation was 74 percent compared to 80 percent in the overall population. Since the figures of eligible voters included voters who were outside of the country, most of whom according to the Central Bureau of Statistics were Jewish, the participation of the Jewish population was estimated at around 90 percent. State of Israel, *Press Bulletin*, Jerusalem, December 7, 1988.

62. For the platforms and the performance of the two new Arab parties, see Hillel Frisch, "Between Instrumentalism and Separatism: The Arab Vote in the 1984 Knesset Elections," in Elazar and Sandler, eds., *Israel's Odd Couple*, pp. 119-134, and by the same author, "If Things Are So Much Better How Come They Are Worse: The Political Fragmentation of the Arab Community and the Marginalization of Arab National Politics," in Elazar and Sandler, eds., *Who Is the Boss?*

63. Data based on the *Israeli Statistical Monthly* 39, no. 12 (December 1988):97-120, and Al-Haj and Yaniv, "Uniformity or Diversity," Table 2, and pp. 153-155.

64. *Ibid.*, 150-160.

65. Smootha and Peretz, "The Arabs in Israel," p. 470.

66. See Frisch, "If Things Are So Much Better."

67. A survey taken in July 1980 revealed that 73 percent of the Jews perceived Israel as the homeland solely of the Jews; 97 percent desired to maintain a Jewish majority; 76 percent wanted Hebrew to be the dominant language of the country; 72 percent supported the Law of Return as it was; and 93 percent favored continuation of Aliyah. In comparison, the same survey revealed that only 5 percent of the Arabs saw Israel as solely the Jewish homeland; 18 percent were willing to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel; 2 percent agreed to Hebrew being the dominant language; 6 percent were ready for the Law of Return to stay untouched; and only 7 percent favored continuing Aliyah. Sammy Smootha, "Tolerance of the Jewish Majority in Israel toward the Arab Minority," in Alouph Hareven, ed., *Is It Really Difficult to Be an Israeli?* (Jerusalem: Van Leer, 1983), p. 98. See also Smootha and Peretz, "The Arabs in Israel," pp. 454-460.

68. Stephen Krasner, "Approaches to the State, Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics," *Comparative Politics* 16 (January 1984):224.

69. For the struggle between elites, see theories of collective political violence and revolution in Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence," in T.R. Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1981), pp. 135-166.

70. Benjamin Akzin, "The Likud," in Howard R. Penniman, ed., *Israel at the Polls, The Knesset Elections of 1977* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), pp. 91-104.

71. Leaders of the DMC included Yigael Yadin, a former chief of staff who had been offered ministerial posts by Labor and served as Eshkol's military adviser; Meir Amit, an ex-chief of the Mossad and head of the Histadrut's industrial conglomerate; Meir Zorea, a former chief of military operations in the General Staff, a kibbutz member and head of the Israel Lands Authority; Shmuel Toledano, the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs; and Aharon Yariv, ex-head of army intelligence and a former Labor minister. See Efraim Torgovnik, "A Movement for Change in a Stable System," in Penniman, ed., *Israel at the Polls, 1977*, pp. 154-155.

72. Asher Arian, "Conclusion," in Penniman, ed., *Israel at the Polls, 1977*, pp. 65-66.

73. Poalei Agudat Israel was an offshoot of Agudat Israel. On the decline of the NRP in the 1981 elections and its relation to the decline of Labor, see Shmuel Sandler, "The Religious Parties," in Penniman and Elazar, eds., *Israel at the Polls, 1981*, pp. 105-127.

74. Ilan Greilsammer, "The Likud," in Penniman and Elazar, eds., *Israel at the Polls, 1981*, pp. 64-105.

75. Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, "Governing under Peres and Shamir," in *Israel's Odd Couple*, pp. 221-230.

76. For analysis of the 1988-89 elections, see various articles in Elazar and Sandler, eds., *Who Is the Boss?*

77. See Yaacov Shavit, *Revisionism in Zionism, The Revisionist Movement: the Plan for a Colonizatory Regime and Social Ideas* (Tel Aviv: Hadar, 1983). The whole first chapter and Chapter 7 are dedicated to the ideological and political differences between the two movements. Many other sections of the book are also dedicated to that debate and conflict.

78. See, for instance, Yaacov Shavit, "Eretz-Israel and Poland as a Political Polysystem," *State, Government, and International Relations*, no. 25 (Spring 1986):149-150.

79. On Jabotinsky's political thought, see Raphaella Bilski Ben Hur, *Every Individual Is a King, The Social and Political Thought of Zeev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1988).

80. Yaakov Shavit, "Between Pilsudski and Mizkevitch: Messianic Policies in Zionist Revisionism in Poland," *Zionism* 10:7-32.

81. Yonathan Shapiro, *Chosen to Command, The Road to Power of the Herut Party—A Socio-Political Interpretation* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1989).

82. Giora Goldberg, "The Struggle for Legitimacy," in Cohen and Don-Yehiya, eds., *Conflict and Consensus in Jewish Political Life*, pp. 146-169.

83. Shapiro also makes the distinction between Herut's ideology and Labor's foreign policy which was formulated either on political realities (Ben-Gurion) or military considerations (the military technocratic view of the second Labor generation). Shapiro, *Chosen to Command*, pp. 169-170.

84. On the organization of the Revisionists, see Shavit, *Revisionism in Zionism*, ch. 3. Herut's health service organization—the National Workers Organization—that was tailored along the corporatist idea of harmony between classes that unite around the nation, was undermined by Begin repeatedly, and on several occasions its leaders even broke away from the party.

85. Besides Chapter 3 above, see also Shavit, "Eretz-Israel and Poland as a Political Polysystem," pp. 148-160.

THE COMPOUND FOREIGN POLICY: FROM STATISM TO ETHNONATIONALISM

The results of the 1967 war had a profound impact on Israeli society and its polity, which in return influenced the national security doctrine and foreign policy of the Jewish state. These changes came to fruition only a decade later when the ruling elite was transformed and the influence of ethnonational elements on the political scene grew. In retrospect, the new ruling elite did not achieve the degree of dominance that its predecessors had and was unable to pursue a purely ethnonational foreign policy. The fact that Labor ruled Israel for a whole decade after the acquisition of the territories left its imprint. The necessity to share power with Labor for several years also strengthened the strategic element in a government that desired to pursue ethnonational goals. All this resulted in a doctrine and policy composed of a mixture of statist and ethnonational elements that could be defined as a compound foreign policy.¹

In the period 1967-90 Israel was governed by three different coalitions: a Labor-dominated coalition (1967-77), a Likud-dominated coalition (1977-84), and two national unity governments (1984-90). These phases provide us with a unique opportunity to compare the foreign policy of a Labor government with that of an ethnonational-oriented government, including a phase of a joint rule.² For purposes of comparison, the foreign policy of Labor, Likud, and the national unity governments are presented separately here according to their order historically. This chapter analyzes the first two types of government, and the following one examines the foreign policy of the national unity government. The foreign policy of each government is subdivided into a political dimension and a strategic military dimension. The purpose of this division is to demonstrate the strength of the ethnonational component on Israeli thinking, which even affected the military dimension of Israeli foreign policy. Its significance is most pertinent in the Israeli context in which military policy has traditionally been considered an objective function of the security situation.

**ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY AND THE TERRITORIES,
1967-77**

Israel's conquest of Sinai, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights was not a planned event. It came in response to a security threat to the existence of the Jewish state. In the wake of the war, Israel was faced with two challenges: (1) to formulate a political solution to the conflict, including the final borders, and (2) to devise a policy toward the territories that would answer its security needs and would not contradict a political settlement with the Arabs. The proposals and policy that emerged reflected the strategic orientation of the ruling elite.

Two plans emerged in the aftermath of the 1967 war; one was advanced by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Allon, and a second by Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Both ministers were identified with the activist (hawkish) elements in the Labor camp; both were retired generals and contenders for the post of prime minister. Both proposals had a major impact on the Labor-led government's policies in the territories and abroad. In time, the two plans, particularly those relevant to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, came to be known by their sponsors' main principles; the Allon plan became known as the territorial compromise solution and Dayan's plan as the functional compromise.

Common to both plans was the principle that Israel must control strategic points on the Golan Heights and in the Sinai Peninsula. The strategic need for some Israeli hold of the Heights, because of the narrow space, did not leave much room for concessions. In contrast, in the Sinai, Israeli strategic needs could be met by Israeli presence in two areas—Sharm al-Sheikh and an area south of the Gaza Strip. While the first region was necessary to provide Israel with control of the Tiran Straits, the second would distance potential threats from northern Sinai directed at the Tel Aviv urban area. The establishment of the Rafah salient, which consisted of the town of Yamit and surrounding settlements, was designed to provide a belt that would cut off the Gaza Strip from Egypt. The idea behind that salient was that of a "trip wire" similar to the model in Central Europe.³

The most distinctive element of the Allon plan was the proposal for a security zone along the Jordan River and the western shores of the Dead Sea. These two regions of the West Bank were not densely populated by Arabs and were part of the Syrian-African Rift; they constituted a natural barrier between Jordan and western Palestine/Eretz Israel. In exchange for a peace treaty, Israel would evacuate most of the West Bank and return it to Jordan, which would also control the

Gaza Strip. The security zone consisting of the Jordan Valley and the Judean Desert adjacent to Hebron was to be split down the middle, creating a corridor between Jordan and the rest of the West Bank, through the town of Jericho. In contrast to the partition principle of the Allon plan, the Dayan plan left the region undivided. Instead, it recommended a functional division between Israel and Jordan in which Israel would control regional security while Jordan would be responsible for administrative and civic functions. Control of security would provide Israel with the strategic depth of the West Bank without the need to partition the region, which, according to Dayan, Jordan would be unable to accept.⁴

Despite the contrasts between the two plans, both approaches were guided by a similar rationale; they aspired to achieve strategic control over the West Bank while relieving Israel of the communal problem that accompanied it. Whereas Allon thought this objective could be accomplished through the annexation of strategic zones and the return of populated areas, Dayan estimated that it was more realistic to accomplish the same goal through a division of functions. In both cases, the West Bank was to become a buffer zone between Israel and its Eastern Front, provide Israel with strategic depth, and maintain the Jordan River as its security border. In accordance with the tradition of Labor, the appropriate partner with whom to partition the land or share functions was the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. While Israel would improve its strategic posture and achieve peace, Israel and Jordan were to divide or share the land, with Jordan controlling the Palestinian population.

In the absence of Jordan's formal interest in these plans, what emerged in the West Bank was tacit joint control between Israel and Jordan. The structure that grew out of ad hoc responses to daily needs was also guided by the Dayan and Allon plans. In addition, the economic, social, and institutional policies adopted in the territories were influenced by the government's perception of the solution within a Jordanian framework.

The vision that the territories were to serve as bargaining chips to be exchanged for peace was translated into a decision in the economic sphere not to allow the territories to become a net budget burden. This determination could be satisfied only by allowing the market forces to promote a natural equilibrium between the separated economies. Consequently, in 1968 the government abolished the economic barriers between the Israeli, West Bank, and Gaza Strip economies. As a result of the economic disparity between the markets and the free flow of means of production, the two less developed economies developed a

dependence on the Israeli economy. As early as 1968, imports from Israel constituted 77 percent of the territories' total imports, and in 1977 it reached 91 percent. In order to finance these imports, the territories in exchange exported labor to Israel. In 1974, when earnings from such employment reached their high point relative to total economic activity in the West Bank, they accounted for roughly 27 percent of the West Bank's gross national product (GNP). Given the multiplier effect, they in effect accounted for half the incremental growth of the West Bank's GNP in the years 1968-73. The annual growth rate in those years as measured by GNP was 14.5 percent in the West Bank and 19.4 in the Gaza Strip.⁵

Assuming that, ultimately, the West Bank would return to Jordan, Israel had a political interest in seeing that the two economies did not grow apart from each other. This rationale allowed the development of the "open bridges" policy between the West Bank and Jordan. While not competing with Israeli agriculture, this policy assured the West Bank economy an additional market for its product. Jordan served as an outlet for employment in times of slack in Israel or in fields where Arab workers could not compete with Israeli labor.⁶ In any event the West Bank and Gaza Strip economies were to remain dependent on both the Israeli and Jordanian economies.

In the social realm, Israel did not challenge Jordanian authority. It was taken for granted that Israel as a Jewish state could not conceive of integrating or even coopting the Arab elites within the Israeli polity. Jordan was therefore to continue exercising the sociopolitical influence it had wielded so effectively during the years of its rule over the West Bank. In order to assist Jordan and convince King Hussein of Israel's sincere intentions regarding cooperation, the traditional leadership was preserved, localism was reinforced, as was cooptation through traditional *hamula* (familial) channels. The process was reinforced by the open bridges, which also allowed for the transfer of funds from Amman to the municipalities where the traditional elites ruled, or to the educational system where the Jordanian curriculum was retained (except for the omission of anti-Semitic literature). Thus, Amman also continued to pay salaries to 40 percent of the civil servants and teachers in the West Bank. Both the municipalities and the educational system constituted a major source of continued Jordanian influence.⁷

Finally, Jordan's institutional role was also maintained, as it continued to provide the only legal identity possessed by West Bank Arabs. Jordanian passports allowed a mobile community of West Bank Arabs the ability to travel, work, and study abroad; acquisition of Israeli

passports would have denied them entrance to the Arab states. Jordan was allowed to continue as the official registrar of all profit and nonprofit organizations which provided Jordan with control over relationships between individuals and groups in the West Bank. Jordanian control over the transfer process of the *sumud* (steadfastness, resistance) monies of Arab states was yet another source of influence. Jordan has always been the major connection between the West Bank and the rest of the Arab world.⁸ But Israel, as the military ruler of the area with a state of war existing with Jordan, could have cut off or severed that link and thus weakened Amman's influence. The government decided against such a step because it believed that Jordanian control was in its state interest.

The division of labor between Israel and Jordan in the governance of the West Bank was in essence a tacit joint control system. Although Israel allowed the local population to run its daily life, especially in economic affairs, the main power centers were controlled either by the military administration or tacitly by Jordan.⁹ While Israel dominated coercive resources, Jordan provided an institutional-legal identity for the West Bank population, with both states sharing control of instrumental resources. However, neither of the centers could provide a central value system with which the Palestinians could identify. The lack of such an expressive function was especially felt in a society that came into contact with Israeli society which was highly identified by its national texture.¹⁰

Labor's Jordanian orientation was accompanied by the expansion of its American orientation. In the period following the Six-Day War, Israeli-U.S. relations reached new heights. In contrast to the U.S. embargo on military arms to Israel in 1948 and the pressure exercised on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai in 1957, the United States now supported the Jewish state openly. While the friendly Kennedy administration was ready to supply Israel only with ground-to-air Hawk missiles and President Johnson limited arms supplies to the sale of Skyhawk planes, in the wake of the French embargo following the 1967 war the United States virtually opened its arms arsenal to the IDF. In addition, at the United Nations, Washington objected to a resolution ordering Israel to withdraw from the territories without a peace treaty and even organized a blocking group of states. The Israeli-American relationship improved still further during the Nixon years. With time, American administrations saw Israel not only as deserving of a special relationship, but also as a strategic ally worthy of receiving the top line of American aircraft and other weapons systems.¹¹

The Israeli-American alliance and the Israeli-Hashemite tacit understanding were tested during the September 1970 crisis and Jordan's ensuing crackdown against the PLO. On September 15, Syria decided to intervene against Jordan, moving 300 tanks into that country and conquering the town of Irbid. Hussein turned to Israel through an intermediary—Great Britain—which passed the message to the United States. In a bargaining process between Henry Kissinger, Yitzhak Rabin, then Israeli ambassador to Washington, and Prime Minister Golda Meir, Israel agreed to intervene against Syria on the condition that the United States would commit itself to guard Israel from an Egyptian and Soviet military assault. The coordinated U.S.-Israeli action ultimately convinced Syria to back down after having been contained on the ground by Jordanian armored forces while witnessing the movement of Israeli forces to the front. Syria's withdrawal, accompanied by Soviet and Iraqi inaction, who were apparently deterred by the combined American-Israeli moves, allowed Hussein to smash the PLO commando infrastructure in Jordan. The September 1970 cooperation between the United States, Jordan, and Israel was an example par excellence of a policy guided by purely state interests. It was not coincidental that the main players in this drama were Kissinger, King Hussein, whose rule was based on a statist definition of Jordan, and Labor leaders like Rabin and Golda Meir. Ariel Sharon perceived the saving of the Hashemite regime as a blunder and argued that a Palestinian takeover of Jordan would have relieved Israel of the Palestinian problem and allow it to control the West Bank.¹²

Three years later, during the October 1973 war, the benefits of cooperation did not accrue to either Israel or Jordan as in the previous crisis. Israel paid very dearly, as a result of U.S. constraints, for abandoning its preemptive attack doctrine. In compensation, however, the United States supported the Jewish state throughout the war with military supplies at an unprecedented level. While it is unclear what precisely motivated the king not to intervene directly against Israel and open a third front during the Yom Kippur War, Hussein was not rewarded for his inaction: his was the only neighboring Arab state that did not receive any territorial concession in the aftermath of the war. A proposal to grant the Jordanian monarch a foothold in the West Bank at Jericho and thus start implementing the Allon plan was considered but never materialized. The Rabin government, under siege from Gush Emunim which vehemently demonstrated against the interim agreements with Egypt, was unable to offer any further withdrawals in Judea and Samaria. Yigal Allon, who as foreign minister ostensibly had an

opportunity to start implementing his plan, failed to do so. It was evident that the statist of this generation lacked Ben-Gurion's vision and resoluteness.

This was not the first time that the king had been turned down by Israel. An earlier disappointment for Hussein was Golda Meir's out-of-hand rejection of his 1972 proposal to reunite the East and West Banks within a federal framework.¹³ In contrast, as a result of tacit cooperation, Israel and Jordan were the real winners in the 1972 municipal elections in which all the mayoralties, except three to which PLO supporters were elected, were won by the traditional elements.¹⁴ This municipal victory again proved that when the two states cooperated both benefited.

In retrospect, although there is no conclusive evidence, Israel's failure to bring the king back in after the 1973 war further eroded Jordan's influence and allowed the landslide PLO victory in the 1976 municipal elections, a result that was in sharp contrast to the 1972 elections. The PLO victories, which were followed in 1977 by the Likud electoral upheaval, marked the end of Israel-Jordan joint control in the West Bank, as well as the tacit cooperation between the Hashemites and the Labor elite.

THE STRATEGIC-MILITARY DIMENSION

Israel's victory in 1967 transformed some of the basic elements of its security doctrine. Israel's convincing victory stabilized the potential balance of power. Its territorial gains in 1967 rectified the geostrategic weak points along its borders, thus stabilizing the geostrategic balance of power. But the balance of power was disturbed by the growing involvement of the Soviet Union. On July 30, 1970, Israeli planes shot down four Migs flown by Soviet pilots.¹⁵ Soviet participation in local direct fighting implied a new equation of power.

In strategic terms these realities elevated the political factor in Israel's national security conception.¹⁶ The stabilization of the potential and geostrategic balances of power implied a reduced weight for preventive and preemptive war doctrines, in which military considerations tended to have the upper hand. Therefore, their decline allowed political considerations to play a more prominent role in strategic thinking. The growing involvement of the superpowers further strengthened the role of political factors in strategic decision-making. Similarly, Israel's approach that the territories would be returned only in exchange for peace also helped strengthen political factors in time of war. This

consideration dictated Israel's presence at the extremities of the post-1967 cease-fire lines, even if military issues might have required a different posture. Indeed, Dayan as minister of defense had doubts regarding the military wisdom of those lines; in this regard he was proven correct during the Yom Kippur War.¹⁷

This new balance between political and military considerations did not change following the Yom Kippur War and was actually even enhanced. Israel's growing dependence on U.S. diplomatic and military support, which put heavy constraints on its military options during the war, increased in its aftermath when Israel was condemned and isolated on the international scene. Consequently, despite the heavy price it paid by not preempting, the IDF did not revert to its pre-1967 doctrines. Israel's strategic depth did not change even after the interim agreements were completed. Therefore, there was no need to establish a new *casus belli* doctrine. The strategy that was adopted in the wake of the war consisted of a mixture of defensive and offensive elements.¹⁸

A second strategic outcome of the Yom Kippur War was the erosion of the preventive war doctrine. The realization that the Arabs could rebuild their armies rapidly, as demonstrated in the short period between June 1967 and October 1973, diluted the effectiveness of the preventive war option. The fact that the Arabs could lose a war militarily and win it politically, as they did in 1973, also helped diminish the preventive war option. Israel's attrition as a result of three wars within six years and the subsequent War of Attrition in the north with Syria during the early months of 1974 also contributed to a weakened desire for Israeli-initiated wars.

A third casualty of these realizations was Israel's deterrence doctrine, which was based on the assumption that a high cost would convince the Arabs to abandon their policy of aggression. A year after its military was destroyed by Israel in June 1967, Egypt initiated the War of Attrition. The two-year war (1968-70), in which the cities along the canal were destroyed and Egypt's interior cities were bombarded, did not deter Anwar Sadat from initiating a war three years later. There was little in the political results of the Yom Kippur War to dissuade the Arabs from resuming attacks.

Another casualty of the war was Israel's assumption that Arab motivation was a direct function of Israel's geostrategic vulnerability. The logical deduction was that the less strategic territory Israel controlled, the more vulnerable it was, and hence the more tempted were the Arabs to attack the Jewish state. Flowing from this deduction was the idea that the more territory Israel controlled, the less the Arabs would

be motivated to attack Israel. This belief was expressed by Foreign Minister Yigal Allon:

The most cursory glance at the map is sufficient to ascertain how little the armistice lines of 1949...could be considered defensible borders. And even the most superficial fingering of the pages of history should be enough to demonstrate how attractive these lines have been to the Arab states as an encouragement to try their strength again against us.¹⁹

The short interval between the 1967 and 1973 wars, in comparison to the pre-1967 period, demonstrated the strength of the irritation factor that apparently was more powerful than the temptation factor in linking territory and war motivation. This factor pushed Arab states that lost territories to enter war even when the military action involved a high cost to the attacking state. While not undermining the assumption that vulnerable borders invited aggression, control of territories also did not automatically translate into reduced Arab motivation for war.²⁰

The erosion of Israel's deterrence was the background to the nuclear debate that erupted in the wake of the Yom Kippur War. Helping to prompt this debate was the new Arab economic strength brought about by petrodollars. This enhanced economic power assured them of the upper hand in any arms race, thus threatening the future balance of power. In light of these trends, the argument was advanced that the only solution to Israel's defense problems was to introduce the ultimate deterrence—nuclear weapons. The reduced role of the territories in deterrence even led some analysts to suggest an Israeli-declared nuclear option in exchange for territorial withdrawal.²¹

In summary, Israel's post-1967 war foreign policy reflected a continuity in maintaining the statist orientation as far as territory was concerned. The role of territory was restricted to ensure the strategic interests of the state. American support for secured borders and territories for peace enhanced the special relationship and an American orientation on the global level. The regional tacit cooperation with Jordan was retained when it emerged as a partner in controlling the Palestinian population. The Israeli-Jordanian cooperation was translated into a joint control framework over the West Bank.

The new elements that transformed the national security doctrine still remained within the realm of the statist approach. An ascendancy of political at the expense of military considerations in the shaping of national security policy was reflected in Israel's insistence on exchanging territories for peace and its readiness to go to war in order to protect

these assets. The diminished role of the potential and geostrategic balance-of-power conceptions was accompanied by the preventive war as well as preemptive war doctrines losing ground. Moreover, the erosion of Israel's deterrence doctrine created the need to consider a new response. After deterrence failed in three wars in the span of six years, with the Arabs capable of outspending Israel in the arms race, a turn to nuclear deterrence was being debated.

While the value of territories in enhancing deterrence was debatable, their value as bargaining chips, namely, to be exchanged for peace, remained the cornerstone of the Labor government. For Labor, excluding certain strategic spots, like parts of the Golan Heights, strips along the Jordan River, or the Rafah salient, the territories did not constitute a pivotal element in the balance of power. This conception changed after May 1977.

THE ETHNONATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

Between June 1977 and June 1984 Israel was led by governments whose main participants were committed to the integrity of the Land of Israel. These commitments were reflected in both foreign policy and national security policy. Changes in foreign policy affected the regional orientation, the territorial question, and the international strategic posture of Israel. Complementing this dimension in the military arena were changes relating to the defense establishment: approaches to the questions of war and peace, and military doctrine. Together, the new approach resulted in the war in Lebanon that was initiated during the second Likud administration.

THE FOREIGN POLICY DIMENSION

The foreign policy that the Likud government adopted differed from that of its predecessor in three significant ways. It abandoned the Hashemite orientation, it officially preferred a shared-rule arrangement for the heavily populated areas rather than territorial partition; and it sought a new basis for the U.S.-Israel relationship. All three elements were designed to serve the final goal of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Land of Israel which was expressed in the political formula of preventing foreign sovereignty west of the Jordan River.

The Regional Orientation

In the mid-1970s Jerusalem and Amman had strong incentives to strike a deal. Hussein, who had been assured that if and when a political settlement would take place most of the West Bank would be returned to Jordan, was faced with the PLO whose legitimacy was now accepted by the Arab world at the 1974 Rabat Conference. In order to undo the harm, the king used Israeli willingness to relinquish territories in favor of Jordan but not the PLO in his presentation before the Rabat Conference. Israel and Jordan thus had a similar incentive to that of Ben-Gurion and Abdullah to preempt the Palestinians with a territorial compromise. The partial agreements between Egypt and Israel and between Israel and Syria should also have alarmed the king to the possibility that he might again be left behind in deals between his neighbors and Israel.

The new American administration's Middle East policy was an additional incentive for Israel and Jordan to cooperate against Palestinian ascendancy. Influenced by the Brookings Report that essentially called for mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestinians, the Carter administration in March 1977 came out with a declaration that was regarded as the Palestinian equivalent of the Balfour Declaration. The announcement in Clinton, Massachusetts, that the Palestinians should be granted a homeland indicated that Carter, in contrast to the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger approach, perceived the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict within a Palestinian framework. In the summer of 1977 it was clarified to Begin that the United States envisioned a solution that would ensure Palestinian self-determination. Moreover, in the fall of 1977 Washington and Moscow reached an agreement concerning the reconvening of the Geneva international conference co-chaired by the two superpowers. The declared purpose of the conference was to reach a comprehensive settlement that would address all the outstanding issues, including the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Resolutions 242 and 338 were deliberately not mentioned in order to pave the way for PLO involvement. With the Soviet Union present as co-chairman and the United States' new convictions, it was anticipated that the Palestinian claim would receive full support and Israel would be isolated.²²

Jordan and Israel, the two parties that had the most to lose from the PLO's ascendancy, did not cooperate to counter their common enemy, despite the grim prospects. Instead of an Israeli-Jordanian rapprochement, Begin and his foreign minister Dayan chose to court Egypt. Begin

went through the formalities and agreed to a covert meeting between Dayan and Hussein in London on August 22, 1977, from which the Israeli foreign minister came out convinced that there was no common ground for a settlement. This conclusion was influenced not only by the king's positions but also by Begin's preferences. A deal with Hussein would have involved paying with territory that Begin considered to be the historic land of the Jewish people. All efforts were instead directed to Sadat. On September 4, Dayan secretly visited Morocco and asked for a meeting with a senior Egyptian representative. On September 16 he met with Dr. Hassan Tohami, the Egyptian vice premier. Sadat was informed that Israel was ready for major territorial concessions in the Sinai in exchange for peace.²³

A deal with Egypt contained several paramount advantages that would have induced any Israeli government to aim at achieving a comprehensive peace with that country. As the largest Arab country and the center of pan-Arabism, Egypt constituted a powerful military and ideological foe whose pacification would imply a potential paramount change in both the balance of power and the psychological barriers between Israel and the Arab world. At the same time, the price for such a peace in strategic assets for Israel was bound to be tremendous. It would include withdrawal from a territory more than two and half times the size of Israel, relinquishment of oil fields especially at a time when oil prices were skyrocketing, abandonment of three modern airfields capable of threatening the heart of Egypt, and loss of control of Sharm al-Sheikh over which Israel had twice gone to war. Peace ultimately included the removal of settlements and the handing over of the Rafah salient, which, as pointed out above, was built according to a strategic rationale of separating the Gaza Strip from the Sinai Peninsula.

Begin, however, insisted on keeping the Gaza Strip, even though it was inhabited by over half a million Palestinians, while he agreed to abandon the Rafah salient which had hardly any Arab population and required the removal of Jewish settlements. The strategic importance of Gaza could have been better served through the Rafah settlements. The only explanation for his preference was that he considered Gaza to be part of the Land of Israel while historically the Rafah region belonged to Egypt. Instead of strategic or demographic considerations, and the precedent of removing Jewish settlements, the principle instituted was the international border between Palestine and Egypt.²⁴

Indeed, the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was motivated by ethnonational aspirations. Begin sought to exchange the Sinai for Judea and Samaria, even though Samaria included a foreign ethnic group that

constituted a demographic threat to Israeli society. The rationale guiding the Likud leader was not to increase the territory of the Jewish state but rather to support the historic aspirations of the Jewish people, to gain, to use the Hebrew term, *Nachlat Avot*, the land of their ancestors. It was the exact reversal of Ben-Gurion's strategy during the War of Independence when he preferred to focus his military efforts in the south and conquer the empty Negev Desert at the price of allowing Abdullah to conquer populated areas that eventually became the West Bank. It should also be recalled that Ben-Gurion did not raise too much objection when pressured twice—in 1949 and 1957—to abandon the populated Gaza Strip.

Autonomy

How did Begin plan to deal with the explosive demographic problem of the Arab population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? Autonomy, presented to Presidents Carter and Sadat in December 1977 by Begin, was designed to produce a shared-rule arrangement that would constitute an alternative to partition.²⁵ Autonomy had been posed by Labor as an intermediate arrangement, and in certain respects the autonomy idea was also similar to the functional compromise suggested by Moshe Dayan. However, there was a distinct difference between Begin's idea of autonomy and that of the Labor leaders. Whereas they ultimately saw autonomy either under Jordanian control or sharing power with Jordan, Herut's leader saw the region under Israeli control.²⁶

Dayan acknowledged the importance of the biblical roots that have connected the Jews to Judea and Samaria, but he was also sensitive to the presence of another people in the territories who did not wish to be integrated into the Jewish polity. Furthermore, he also recognized that the annexation of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza would create a severe demographic problem for the Jewish society. Thus, even after Begin nominated him as foreign minister, Dayan proclaimed that "if an objective situation would have emerged in which I had to choose between annexing Nablus to the State of Israel or withdrawing from Nablus and thus prevent the creation of a large Arab minority among us—I would have given up Nablus."²⁷

Dayan's functional compromise was in effect motivated by his assessment of a lack of a geographic line that would satisfy Israel's security needs and to which the Arab states would officially agree. A functional division was therefore a solution that would not endanger

Israel's social and political fabric since the Arabs would continue to be Jordanian citizens and maintain their social links with that country. Jordan was the state with whom Israel would divide *de facto* control of the West Bank. Israel must share the running of daily life with the inhabitants of the West Bank and their local leadership, again without any formal agreement. A formal agreement would entail negotiations with the PLO which would imply the creation of a Palestinian state and the demand for the return of the Palestinian refugees—conditions totally unacceptable to Israel. Dayan's approach, despite being the reverse of partition, was nevertheless rooted in the Labor tradition, even though he served in a Likud government.²⁸

In contrast, Begin's scheme was based on the ideas of Revisionist founder Zeev Jabotinsky who advocated autonomy and self-rule. At the beginning of the century, many liberal thinkers advocated autonomy as a solution to the problem of the incongruence between the nation-state framework and the reality of many ethnic entities which, because of political or economic realities, could not achieve sovereignty. Autonomy was meant to provide these peoples with self-expression without sovereignty. It was against this background that the Russian Zionists adopted the Helsingfors program in December 1906, a program that Jabotinsky had helped mold.²⁹

In 1912 Jabotinsky wrote his master's thesis on "Self Rule of a National Minority." Choosing this topic for a master's thesis in law indicates its centrality in his thinking. In this work, however, Jabotinsky recommended a narrower definition of autonomy. Self-rule, as distinct from autonomy, was totally detached of any territorial rights. It was also not written as a solution to the Jewish problem, as had been his previous "Letter on Autonomism" from 1902, but rather as a legal theoretical document. It was a proposal based on cultural autonomy as contrasted with territorial autonomy, consisting of administrative self-governing institutions as opposed to political legislative organs that implied some form of sovereignty, even if a shared one.

The application of autonomy to Palestine for the Arab population came only in his later writings. Application was not a result of downgrading the Arabs; rather, it followed a realization that the Arabs were a living nation. Autonomy was to provide the solution to the problem of the Arabs living in Eretz Israel on both sides of the Jordan River. He argued that the Zionists must clearly show the Arabs that their goal was to become a majority, and therefore the local inhabitants would become a national minority. Although the Arabs would violently object to this program, ultimately, according to Jabotinsky, they would have to com-

ply. Besides the physical factor of Jewish determination (the "iron wall" idea) that would convince them to accept Zionism, the offer of autonomy, on the one hand, and the fact that many Arab states express the Arab national identity, on the other hand, would also induce them to settle for less than full sovereignty.³⁰

Begin's conception of autonomy and its similarity to Jabotinsky's version could be found in a radio interview from June 7, 1975, two years before Begin assumed power. Presenting his peace plan to the interviewer, Begin suggested that

to the Arab nation in the Land of Israel whom we recognize we ought to give a cultural autonomy. We the Jews when we were a minority in various countries always demanded cultural autonomy for ourselves. We should give them cultural autonomy, namely enabling them to educate their sons according to their tradition, their language, according to their religion and everything indicated by this concept.

In response to the interviewer's question, "what about national autonomy?" he responded:

Cultural autonomy is what we ought to give to our Arab neighbors; the Land of Israel belongs to the Jewish People by right, there is a Jewish majority today and there is an Arab minority... we recognize the Arab nation, we give to that Arab minority cultural autonomy. And I emphasize the adjective [cultural] and not only the noun [autonomy].

During the interview several times he reiterated the notion that there were many Arab states and only one Jewish state, and the Arabs of the Land of Israel would be able to express themselves through both the Arab states and the cultural autonomy given by Israel.³¹

Indeed, what Begin had in mind in his autonomy plan was a combination of cultural autonomy and self-rule. The fact that this combination was similar to what the founder of Revisionism envisioned for the Arab minority even at a time when the Jews were only a minority legitimized it further for Begin, even though ideologues like Israel Eldad attacked it as a distortion of Jabotinskian thought.³² It was a scheme that was popular at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Begin's political biographer described his approach to autonomy in the following words:

It has been said that at the cabinet meeting that dealt with the autonomy plan in advance of the negotiations with Egypt, Begin was moved to tears and

sunk at times into long silences....Menahem Begin had no intention of altering his beliefs concerning Judea and Samaria. The autonomy was designed to defend his principles against a reality that was threatening at home and abroad. He was fully confident,...that his vague term was a real political tool and would serve as a solid bridge to Israeli sovereignty in the future.³³

The resignation of Dayan during the autonomy negotiations further illustrated the gap that existed between Begin's expectations of autonomy and those of his foreign minister. Dayan, who had made his joining the Likud government in 1977 conditional on Israel's abstention from the annexation of Judea and Samaria, realized where Begin's autonomy scheme was heading. Begin, from his perspective, sensed the gap between the two approaches and demanded full accountability from his foreign minister prior to any forwarding of ideas on autonomy by Dayan to the Egyptians. In addition, NRP leader Interior Minister Yosef Burg was nominated to head the Israeli team to the autonomy talks with Egypt. Nominating the interior minister to head the autonomy talks was indicative of what Begin had in mind. The domain of the Interior Ministry in Israel consists of the municipalities and local government. Dr. Burg was known as a minister loyal to the prime minister no matter who that person might be—the opposite of the maverick Dayan. Begin's swift acceptance of Dayan's resignation and the appointment of Yitzhak Shamir as foreign minister, a hardliner who voted against the Camp David Accords, was another indication as to where Begin wanted the autonomy idea to proceed.

Upon his resignation, Dayan started to campaign for his idea of unilateral autonomy. He still contended that many arrangements between Jews and Arabs that could not be agreed upon formally could be put into motion informally; he tried to apply this approach to autonomy. Dayan speculated that the dynamics of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship prior to 1967 as well as the "open bridges" policy in the aftermath of the Six-Day War could be replicated between Israel and the Palestinians in the territories. But this implied an Israeli withdrawal from the cities and a concentration of the army in strategic zones. Begin, who saw in Judea and Samaria an integral part of the Jewish home that could not be shared with foreigners, was not interested in a scheme based on strategic considerations which implied constraining the settlements.

Begin's Settlement Drive

Begin's vision of autonomy in Judea and Samaria was exposed by the settlement drive that was undertaken in the wake of the Camp David Accords. The prime minister belonged to a movement that did not have a rich history of settling the land as did those of the socialist movements or the national religious movement. Betar, the youth movement of Herut, never developed as a mass settlement movement and was not an integral part of the ethos of pioneering that characterized the socialist and religious youth movements. In addition, Herut's partners in the Likud, the Liberals, were urban-based, and their past participation in settlement was not impressive. This poor record did not stop Begin as head of the opposition from supporting the efforts of Gush Emunim to settle in Judea and Samaria against the wishes of the Rabin government in the mid-1970s. The controversy focused on the establishment of Elon Moreh in Samaria. One of Begin's first declarations was: "there will be many more Elon Morehs." Following the signing of the Camp David Accords, of which autonomy was an integral part, the prime minister made it clear that his agreement to halt settlements was limited to only three months. Both Presidents Carter and Sadat, despite oral protests objecting to this interpretation, essentially went ahead and pushed for the peace treaty that was ultimately signed on March 26, 1979. By that time, an unprecedented settlement drive had already begun.

The settlement drive that developed under the Begin government was different than the one that had been undertaken under the Labor government in three respects: (1) the area of settlement; (2) the type of population; and (3) the pattern of settlement. These three differences reflected the ethnonational goals of the government. Spearheading the drive were Gush Emunim associated with the national religious movement, Ariel Sharon and some of his assistants, as well as Matityahu Drobles, head of the Settlement Department of the World Zionist Organization (WZO), who came from the small but experienced settlers' nucleus of the Herut party. Common to all three groups was the conviction shared by the prime minister and most of his Cabinet that Israel must control all of the Land of Israel.

Areas of Settlement

The settlements established during the Labor government were concentrated primarily in three regions—the greater Jerusalem area, the Etzion Bloc, and the Jordan Valley. The reunification of Jerusalem and the

extension of the municipal boundaries under the Labor government engendered the establishment of new residential neighborhoods in order to alter the borders of the city. Following the establishment of neighborhoods that secured a Jewish presence around Mount Scopus and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City—two areas lost to the Arab Legion in 1948—a chain of new neighborhoods around Jerusalem was erected. The rationale in establishing these neighborhoods (Ramot in the northwest, East Talpiot in the east, and Gilo in the south) was strategic, for they were built on high ground and surrounded the city. The Likud government went a step further, and a chain of satellite towns was built around Jerusalem—Givat Zeev in the north, Maale Adumim in the east, and Efrat in the south.³⁴

Another area approved for settlement during Labor's rule was the Etzion Bloc which had been lost to the Arab Legion during the War of Independence. In 1948 the Bloc that connected Jerusalem with Hebron consisted of four settlements, three of which belonged to the national religious movement. With the NRP a senior partner of Labor and the area bordering on the pre-1967 borders, it was only natural that this region was marked as destined to be annexed to Israel, and five settlements were established there prior to 1977. A Jewish settlement was also established in Qiryat Arba adjacent to Hebron. Labor approved it hesitantly after support was given by Yigal Allon who perceived Qiryat Arba as a southern outpost of the Etzion Bloc or a western point of the Judean Desert, both of which were to be annexed to Israel according to the Allon plan. Under the Likud government, the settlement drive was broadened toward the Judean Mountains in the east. By 1984 there were twenty-four settlements in the Jerusalem-Etzion-Hebron region as opposed to the five built under Labor. By contrast, in the Jordan Valley, Labor's strategic strip, which consisted of seventeen settlements in 1977, only five more settlements were added during the Likud-sparked settlement drive.³⁵ (See Table 7.1.)

Samaria was the region in which the settlement drive was most extensive. When Labor left office in 1977, only two temporary settlements in Samaria had been founded by Gush Emunim—illegally—and they were reluctantly accepted by the Labor government. In 1984 there were forty-four settlements, twenty-four of them in northern Samaria and twenty in western Samaria (the region closer to Tel Aviv).³⁶ In the Judean Mountains there were fifteen settlements as compared to one in 1977. (See Table 7.1.) Besides the difference in numbers, it was significant that the areas in which most of the new settlements were built were in the Arab-populated regions of the West Bank. Instead of the empty

Table 7.1
Jewish Settlements in the West Bank by Region and Period

Region	1967	1984	1986
Jordan Valley	17	22	24
Judea:			
Jerusalem	7	26	27
Massif S.	1	15	16
Samaria:			
Samaria W.	1	20	24
Massif N.	1	24	27
Total	27	107	118


Source: Benvenisti and Khayat, *The West Bank and Gaza Atlas*, p. 33.

and strategically important Jordan Valley, which extended the border of Israel eastward, resources were now directed to the central massif that controlled Judea and Samaria. Whereas the Jordan Valley and the eastern slopes of the mountains were important for deterring an attack from the east (strategic control), the massif was important for communal control of the population.³⁷ In addition, settlement in two other areas that grew massively under the Likud—Jerusalem and western Samaria—were influenced by the communal control factor. (See Map 2.)

The Population

A major shift took place in the type and size of population that settled in the West Bank during the Likud's settlement drive. The original Jordan Valley settlers were primarily youth movement or kibbutz graduates linked with Labor or the NRP who came to protect the eastern border of the State of Israel. The same was true with regard to the settlers on the Golan Heights; upper Galilee kibbutzim had a special interest in Israeli control of the Golan, for they had suffered most from the Syrian shelling prior to 1967. The Gush Etzion settlers and those in Qiryat Arba

Map 2 — Jewish Settlement in Judea and Samaria (West Bank), 1967-92



- ◆ Jewish Settlement 1967 - May 1977
- Jewish Settlement June 1977 - 1984
- ▲ Jewish Settlement 1985 - 1992

- - - Green Line
- Road
- ▨ Arab Town

0 10 20 Km

(Hebron) came primarily from the national religious sector, many of them motivated by a desire to renew Jewish settlement in areas that had been settled by religious Jews prior to the War of Independence.³⁸ Under Likud, Gush Emunim became the spearhead of an ideological settlement drive to be joined by urban dwellers who penetrated the territories in the 1980s for more pragmatic reasons. The combination of Gush Emunim ideology and suburban pull resulted in an increase in Jewish population in the territories from less than 5,000 at the time Labor left office to over 35,000 or even 44,000, according to some accounts, by 1984.³⁹

The Gush Emunim settlement drive that had started in 1975 against the wishes of the Rabin government picked up with the victory of the Likud. The prime minister-designate received a plan from Gush Emunim for the establishment of twelve settlements within six months, to which he reacted positively. The person put in charge of implementing the government's support for the Gush was Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon. Immediately upon taking office, in the first meeting of the government's and Jewish Agency's Interinstitutional Committee for Settlements, the settlements of Elon Moreh and Ofra in Samaria, and Adumim in the Jerusalem area, received official status, thus making them eligible for help from these institutions. In November 1977 Sharon invited Gush Emunim to become an official settlement movement, making them eligible for assistance from the government and the WZO. Gush Emunim responded and established Amana, a movement that started with the organization of the settlement drive. In addition, they founded Moetzet Yesha (Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza), which was manned mostly by Gush Emunim people. Within four years the combination of an ideological drive and organizational means resulted in twenty-one communal settlements established directly by Gush Emunim.⁴⁰

While appreciating Gush Emunim's idealism and its willingness to settle in difficult, undesirable spots, Sharon was aware of an ideological movement's limitations in terms of mobilizing large numbers. Consequently, after the Gush was encouraged to settle in all the historic spots that they desired, including the environs of populated Arab urban centers like Hebron and Nablus, Sharon unleashed a new social force—the desire of city dwellers to own a home in the country while working in the city. Realizing the potential of the population centers along the coastal plain, the government initiated a massive settlement drive on the other side of the “green line” (as the pre-1967 border was dubbed) adjacent and parallel to the Haifa-Tel Aviv-Jerusalem urban centers. In addition, a chain of roads was paved on an east-west axis (suiting

integration) in Judea and Samaria instead of the north-south conception (suing defense) that had prevailed during the Labor government.⁴¹ Public financial support that had been previously reserved for development towns was now extended to the territories. Annual investment in the territories doubled, and by 1981 twelve urban centers were in existence. The ratio of urban settlers, whose number was very small during Labor's rule, to rural settlers increased to 57.7 percent in 1982 and to over 80 percent in 1984.⁴² (See Map 2.)

Sharon published a plan in 1981 that presented the rationale for his settlement policies.⁴³ He maintained that a principal requirement for Israeli security was the establishment of Jewish settlements on the Samaritan mountain plateau overlooking both the Jordan Valley and Israel. But as we have seen, settling western Samaria was attractive to Sharon because of its location close to Gush Dan (the greater Tel Aviv region). Here the most mobile element of Israeli society—young families—for the price of an apartment in the city could build a house in western Samaria and continue to work in the city. An important goal in creating this chain of bedroom communities was also to erase the “green line.” The more massive but nonideological population required for this mission was different from the Gush Emunim settlers, even though many of the Gush Emunim group did not reject the idea of building comfortable suburban homes. But to attract this new type of population a new pattern of settlement was required.

Pattern of Settlement

The Labor settlements took into account three considerations: security, density of surrounding Arab population, and economic viability. The main objective of locating settlements in the Jordan Valley was to create a tripwire that would constitute a defense boundary between Israel and Jordan. The fact that the region was free of Arab population was considered an advantage for the supporters of the Allon plan. The organizational structure of the settlements in both the Jordan Valley and the Etzion Bloc replicated the agricultural settlement pattern that had been successfully created in Israel prior to 1967. Experience showed that success depended on the existence of regional planning, human resources, and investment capital. Thus, the availability of cultivable land and water resources, and the anticipation of growing tropical vegetables and fruit as a result of the mild winter influenced the regional planning of settlements in the valley. Developing a cluster of agricul

tural settlements around a larger service center was also part of the regional planning concept. Usually members of these settlements were youth from paramilitary units (Nahal) whose mandatory national service combined military and pioneering duties. In time, these settlements became fully functional civil settlements either in the form of kibbutzim or moshavim. Economic support from the settling institutions was available to provide these settlements with an initial boost and later to bridge over bad times. Ultimately, however, the settlements were intended to become economically self-sufficient entities.⁴⁴

The pattern of settlement advanced by Gush Emunim and Sharon was the exact opposite of that of Labor. The area to be populated was to be on both sides of the Samarian watershed and western Samaria—exactly the regions where the Labor government had avoided settling. Instead of focusing on the local unit, the regional planning concept was now extended to include the entire West Bank. Jerusalem and its surrounding towns, the Etzion Bloc, and Qiryat Arba were to be regional centers for Judea, and the Tel Aviv metropolitan area and several midsize towns like Ariel and Emmanuel were to constitute the regional centers for northern and western Samaria. Together, they would control the entire West Bank. Another element introduced in order to assure regional control was the effort to divide the Arab population centers into scattered blocs. It was also anticipated that scattering the settlements would make any territorial withdrawal impossible without removing Jewish settlements.⁴⁵

Since the type of population that was targeted was not agricultural, and in the absence of land suitable for cultivation, the *yishuv kehilati* (communal settlement) was established. This offered a communal social framework in a rural environment while allowing members to maintain urban employment. Continued commuting to the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem metropolitan areas required the paving of a network of highways and roads that connected the region with Israel's economic centers. Investment of scarce resources in communication and electric infrastructure in the territories rather than in Israel proper suited the ideology of a movement and a government that saw in the region the core of the homeland.⁴⁶

But the social base of the communal settlement was limited. The Likud needed masses not only as obstacles to a partition solution but also as constituencies that had an inherent interest in voting for the Likud or other parties of the national camp. For this the Likud needed urban centers; the urban element provided a large pool of potential voters.

The pattern of settlement was also related to landownership considerations; the government needed control of land to advance an aggressive settlement policy. In contrast to the Labor government that seized land primarily for military purposes in accordance with the Hague regulations regarding occupied territories, the Likud government never accepted the Israeli presence in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza as an occupation. Following a High Court decision in the Elon Moreh settlement case in 1979, which rejected confiscation of land unless justified by military considerations, the government had no choice but to find a substitute to confiscation—namely, either settle on empty land or purchase land. One action was a declaration that all vacant land was state land, defining vacant land as such according to two tests: cultivation and registration. Land lacking both requirements was mapped and defined as state land. In addition, the Likud government lifted the ban on private land purchasing by Jews on the West Bank that had existed under Labor. Consequently, a rush of land purchasing was initiated, resulting also in speculation and forgeries. The result was that the lands made available were mostly rocky areas unfit for agriculture. The only option was the urban and communal settlement pattern.

Once land was available, the greatest problem in attracting settlers to the West Bank was now security in both its political and physical senses. The hostility of the local population and the lack of international legitimacy were the main contributors to the insecurity of a region that from a purely location economics perspective enjoyed all the ingredients for success. A Likud government allowed a military presence of the standing army at the expense of training or reserve soldiers whose mobilization implied an economic tag. Indeed, the Jewish population in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza grew dramatically (see Table 7.2). Although this was below the government's goal, it still constituted by far the fastest growing region in Israel. Whereas the Jewish population in Israel hardly grew during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Jewish population in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza more than quadrupled.⁴⁷

Undoubtedly, the settlements were one of the best indicators of Begin's determination and commitment to preserve Jewish control of Judea and Samaria, leading inevitably to the collapse of the autonomy talks between Israel and Egypt. The settlement drive was accompanied by the military dimension, which was also put into the service of the Likud's ethnonational aspirations.

THE MILITARY DIMENSION OF ETHNONATIONALISM

The military dimension of the Likud's national security doctrine took shape only during the second Likud administration of June 1981. Having been absorbed in the peace process, and with the defense portfolio for most of the period in the hands of Ezer Weizman—a hawk turned dove—and even though following Weizman's resignation the prime minister himself became minister of defense, Begin did not institute a basic change in Israel's security conception. With the appointment of Ariel Sharon to defense, a new security doctrine was introduced.

Besides Sharon, Begin's key appointments included Shamir as foreign minister, Moshe Arens as ambassador to Washington (both Shamir and Arens had abstained from voting for their prime minister's endorsed Camp David Accords), and General Rafael Eitan (Rafal) as chief of staff of the IDF—all replacing more moderate personalities who had often been identified with the Labor establishment. These dedicated believers in the integrity of the Land of Israel constituted a hawkish combination that allowed for the crystallization of a new security doctrine. The new security conception, leading to the war in Lebanon, was influenced by Sharon's personal views and ambitions. Nevertheless, it was a product of the Likud's overall foreign policy goals and approach to national security affairs. It was so, not only because it was approved by the prime minister, but also because it was a natural outgrowth of the ethnonational goals of the government. According to most of the available evidence, Begin was a full partner in the planning and initiation of the war and even produced what came to be known as the "war by choice" doctrine. Sharon's December 19, 1981 address at the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies and his policy in the West Bank support the assumption that what was conceived was a comprehensive national security package to be implemented on several fronts.⁴⁸

The objective that guided the military dimension of the Begin-Sharon strategy was the same one that guided the Camp David Accords, namely, the preservation of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The swapping of all of Sinai for the West Bank required a complementary move—the eradication of the PLO. This doctrine was introduced by Ariel Sharon and was implemented in two interrelated directions—in Lebanon and in the West Bank.

Table 7.2
Jewish Population in the Territories, 1976-92

Year	Population	Growth in Pop.	Growth (in pct.)	Era
1976	3,176			End of Labor rule
1977	5,023	1,847	58.1	Likud government
1978	7,361	2,338	46.5	
1979	10,000	2,639	35.8	
1980	12,424	2,424	24.2	
1981	16,119	3,695	29.7	Second Begin government
1982	21,000	4,881	30.3	
1983	27,000	6,500	30.9	Shamir government
1984	44,146	16,646	60.5	
1985	52,960	8,814	20.0	National unity government
1986	60,500	7,540	14.2	
1987	70,000	10,500	15.0	
1988	75,000	5,000	7.5	
1989	81,200	6,200	8.2	Second national unity government
1990	96,000	14,800	18.2	Nationalist government and Sharon Minister of Housing
1991	112,000	16,000	16.0	
1992 (est.)	141,000	26,000	26.0	

Source: West Bank Data Project and Moetzet Yesha, as reported in *Haaretz*, December 27, 1991, p. B2.

The Sharon Address

In December 1981, newly appointed Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon prepared a statement that could be defined as a national security doctrine. The address was divided into two main parts. One part dealt with the challenges facing Israel, namely, the enemies that presented a strategic threat to Israel. The second part was an analysis of the balance of power required to meet those challenges. Each part was very significant and should be read very carefully.

In the first part, Sharon identified three main enemies that threatened Israel's existence: the radical Arab states, the PLO, and the Soviet Union. By giving equal weight to each of these three threats, Sharon was introducing new elements into Israel's strategic thinking. The PLO, whose aspirations had always been taken seriously, had not been conceived previously as a strategic threat to Israel's existence, for its capabilities were far from those of the confrontation Arab states. Similarly, the Soviet Union, while viewed as hostile to Zionism and capable of destroying the Jewish state, was never perceived as aspiring to do so. The traditional Israeli view was to avoid dragging the Red Army into the Arab-Israeli confrontation. Why, then, was Sharon expanding Israel's security equation to include parties who either did not possess the means (PLO) or an interest in destroying the Jewish state?

Regarding the PLO, Sharon stated: "the PLO poses a political threat to the very existence of the State of Israel and remains one of the main obstacles to the resolution of the Palestinian problem on the basis of the Camp David Accords."⁴⁹ When Sharon was nominated to be Israel's minister of defense in August 1981, he was aware of the challenge that the PLO posed to Begin's conceptual framework. It was the PLO veto that prevented West Bank leaders from joining the autonomy negotiations in the aftermath of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. Begin insisted on referring to the PLO as "the so-called" or "the organization that calls itself." Indeed, after the Likud came to power, two major military encounters between the IDF and the PLO took place, with the PLO's political status remaining intact. One was the 1978 Litani Operation in retaliation for an attack on an Israeli bus on the Haifa-Tel Aviv highway. The second occurred in July 1981 following Begin's second election victory when two weeks of consecutive artillery exchanges on the northern border between Israel and the PLO in Lebanon ended following an American mediation of a *de facto* cease-fire agreement. Having headed the settlement drive in the West Bank as minister of

agriculture, Sharon was now articulating the military aspect of the ethnonational aspirations toward Judea and Samaria.⁵⁰

Sharon's elevation of the Soviet Union to the status of a major enemy was more complex. After describing Soviet penetration of the Middle East and Africa as reaching as far as Afghanistan, Angola, and the Congo, and their strategic expansion in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, Sharon stated: "Soviet ambitions in these areas, which constitute the strategic hinterland of Israel, have clearly been the underlying motive and factor in the military assistance given to Arab countries for their preparations for war against Israel."⁵¹ Nobody before Sharon had described Israel's strategic hinterland as reaching that far. Continuing further, he indeed reiterated and argued that "Israel's sphere of strategic and security interests must be broadened to include in the 1980s countries such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, and regions such as the Persian Gulf and Africa."⁵²

A large section of the address was dedicated to attributing Soviet expansionism to Western inaction, with the concluding thought that "Soviet expansionism has...become a common national security challenge to all free countries. I believe that strategic cooperation between Israel, the United States and other pro-Western countries in these areas...is the only realistic way to prevent further Soviet encroachment."⁵³ Why was Sharon positioning Israel at the head of an anti-Soviet coalition in contrast to the traditional Israeli abstention from direct campaigns against the Soviet Union lest the Russian bear be drawn militarily into conflict with the Jewish state?

Israel had been searching for areas of American-Israeli strategic cooperation that would divert the United States from its objection to the Likud's aspirations in Judea and Samaria. Realizing that a U.S.-Israeli special relationship based on a proximity of values and the support of the American Jewish community would not include support for Israel's historical aspirations, the Likud government sought additional reinforcement on which to base the relationship. It was very unlikely that annexation of a million and a half Palestinians could be sustained by the shared democratic values of the two states. Ready to be mobilized behind a cause that implied removal of an existential threat to Israel, on the issue of the territories American Jewry was at best as divided as the Israeli public. Sensing the anti-Soviet bent of the newly elected president, Ronald Reagan, as well as his secretary of state, Alexander Haig, Israel's new minister of defense tried to anchor his doctrine in this approach.

On November 30, 1981, an "American-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding" was signed by Sharon and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. The memorandum stated explicitly that it was not directed at "any state within the region," thus clearly positioning Israel against Soviet involvement in the Middle East. It was offered as an Israeli-American alliance against Soviet penetration into the region without any complementary U.S. pledges of assisting Israel against Arab aggression. While it was a well-known American position that a U.S. guarantee against its neighbors was possible in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal from the territories, Begin and Sharon were not inclined to accept such a proposal. The only possible benefit of becoming a Soviet target in a possible Great Power confrontation was to reduce American pressure on the Likud's aspirations in Judea and Samaria. For the first time in its history, the Jewish state intentionally positioned itself in direct conflict with a Great Power capable of wiping it out.⁵⁴

A similar rationale could be discerned in the second part of the address, which dealt with Israel's security needs. On the surface, the Sharon doctrine seemed to resemble traditional Israeli security concepts rooted in the balance of power and deterrence. But Sharon applied concepts like "lack of territorial depth," which were required in the old borders, to the territories. Accordingly, Israel's geostrategic inferiority, even in the new borders, required the formation of a territorial defense system based on settlements in "Judea, Samaria, the Gaza Sector, the Golan Heights, the Galilee and the Negev."⁵⁵ Sharon's concept of territorial defense differed sharply from that of the Labor government which confined territorial defense to the actual borders while Sharon broadened it to spatial defense. In the 1973 war many of the settlements became a burden on the military, which was required to shift forces from the offensive effort to defend the civilian population. During the Sharon-Rafal years, the ever expanding new settlements were incorporated into the territorial defense system, and many settlers were transferred from their reserve units to form the spatial defense units.⁵⁶

Sharon divided the balance of power into three levels: conventional, geostrategic, and nuclear. Because of the asymmetry between Israel and its neighbors on the conventional level, Israel was required to maintain qualitative and technological superiority, a preventive strike doctrine, and a suitable mass of territory.⁵⁷ Israel's geostrategic posture required that it maintain an "ability to prevent the disruption of the territorial military status in neighboring countries." Using the "safety valve" concept, Sharon revamped the pre-1967 *casus belli* doctrine and with it

the preventive and preemptive doctrine of war. In addition to the traditional Israeli concerns in the Sinai and the Golan Heights, the entrance of Iraqi or Syrian forces into Jordan proper, Iraqi forces into southern Syria and the violation of the status quo ante in southern Lebanon were deemed *casus belli*. In the address Sharon made it clear that for him the territorial status quo meant the existing borders between Israel and the neighboring countries. He explicitly declared that because of technological and other qualitative changes in Arab military capabilities "we face on our present borders the very same defense problems we had on our 1967 lines."⁵⁸ On the nuclear level Sharon confirmed Israel's antinuclear posture, a policy that had been applied half a year earlier against Iraq, namely, that Israel would prevent its neighbors from acquiring a nuclear capability. Here Sharon was more cautious since an explicit Israeli nuclear option could have been used as an argument for Israeli territorial withdrawal.

The Sharon address presented a new, expanded conception of national security and offered clues as to how and where that doctrine might be made operational. As his actions demonstrated, Sharon planned intervention in Lebanon to accomplish three objectives: to confront the Syrians, which would bring about their withdrawal from that country; to establish a strong pro-Israeli government in Lebanon; and to eradicate the PLO presence from Lebanon. Obtaining the last goal to a certain extent depended on accomplishing the previous goals. The following statement made before a party forum prior to the war indicated the details of Sharon's plan:

The issue in Lebanon is not only one of artillery...a political solution must be brought about as well. Such a solution entails the establishment of a legitimate government in Lebanon that will...sign a peace treaty with Israel....Such a government is not possible as long as the terrorists control the south and two-thirds of Beirut, and as long as the Syrians control large portions of Lebanon. Thus, it would be impossible to resolve this issue without also taking care of the Syrians.⁵⁹

In order to accomplish its political goals in Lebanon, the operation had to be executed before September 23, 1982, the last date for Lebanon to elect a new president. Sharon already had a candidate for the presidency: Bashir Jemayel, who had maintained contacts with Israel for a long time and was supported militarily by Israel. Sharon needed a PLO provocation in order to legitimize both domestically and externally a broad military operation in the north. Following the cease-fire agreement of July 1981, the PLO was quite careful not to provide such an

excuse. The government's position was also contingent on at least tacit U.S. approval. "Cooperation" was also needed from the Syrians who would react to an Israeli conquest of Lebanon. The Syrians were stationed behind the lines that Israel had signaled as "red lines" which, if crossed, would be considered an act of aggression, and behind the PLO artillery positions aimed at Israeli border towns.

According to the Israeli security doctrine, initiation of war was legitimate only within a defensive framework, and not as a means of achieving political goals. Only a threat to Israeli existence justified going to war prior to being attacked by the other side. Since in Lebanon the PLO did not constitute an existential military threat, and especially since they were more or less honoring the cease-fire agreement, there was no justification for initiating war. The shooting of Israeli Ambassador Shlomo Argov in London on the eve of the war could justify a limited military operation. In his address Sharon sought to present a new doctrine of preventive/preemptive war partly to legitimize the anticipated war in Lebanon. The political nature of the war was confirmed by the attempt put forward by the prime minister who had to explain why the war was extended beyond the limited goals that had been presented to the public and the Cabinet. By doing so, the prime minister confirmed that the war in Lebanon had been initiated by the government regardless of the provocation in order to accomplish political goals.

Begin's War by Choice Doctrine

In the midst of the war in Lebanon in August 1982, Prime Minister Begin, in an address to Israel's National Security Academy, outlined what could be described as a new strategic doctrine.⁶⁰ With the IDF involved in besieging Beirut and thus exposing the deception of the "40 kilometers" slogan that had been publicly set as the goal of Operation Peace for Galilee and behind which a broad consensus was assembled, and with the toll of casualties climbing from that of an operation to that of a war, the prime minister was required to explain the political rationale for the war. While attempting to portray the war as rooted in Israel's traditional national security doctrine, the prime minister in effect reinterpreted it. Contrary to the view that presented Begin as being deceived by his minister of defense, this address indicated that he was indeed involved in conceiving the strategic goals of the war.

In the address Begin distinguished between two types of war: "no choice wars" and "war by choice." While trying to root his classification

in modern international history, he categorized Israel's wars into these two types, associating the War of Independence, the War of Attrition, and the Yom Kippur War with "no choice wars," and the Sinai Campaign, the Six-Day War, and the Lebanon War with the "war by choice" class. An element common to the second type of war was that Israel was the first to start violent action in order to remove security threats in the long run. In both previous wars of this type fought under Labor governments, theoretically Israel had a choice not to open hostilities and take risks such as the deterioration of the balance of power or the weakening of deterrence. In the summer of 1982, according to the prime minister, Israel was also faced with a similar dilemma and therefore had the obligation to engage in a war designed to remove those threats.⁶¹

In this address, Menahem Begin also argued that "war by choice" was even more just than waiting for immediate peril to dictate a "no choice war." He asserted that had France initiated war in 1936 when Hitler entered the Rhineland, World War II could have been prevented. The Israeli war experience indicated that "no choice wars" caused heavier casualties than "wars by choice." The conclusion he drew based on both the international and national experiences was

that there is no commandment to wage war only...out of no choice. There is no moral obligation that a nation must or may fight only when its back is turned to the sea or the wall....On the contrary, a free sovereign nation, which hates wars, loves peace, and cares for its security, must create conditions in which war, if needed, should not occur under conditions of no choice.⁶²

Begin's rationale was criticized by most of Israel's strategic analysts. Aharon Yariv, the head of military intelligence during the Six-Day War, argued that the Lebanon War was distinctly different from the 1956 and 1967 wars which had been guided by a preventive and preemptive logic, while the goals of the 1982 war were to impose a new order on Lebanon. While some justification, from a *jus ad bellum* doctrine, could be found for the declared goals of the war, namely, the removal of the PLO artillery and the destruction of its military infrastructure along the northern Israeli border, these were not the real aims of the war. The hidden goals of the war did not concern Israel's immediate security or existence.⁶³

Indeed, Israel's strategic environment in the early 1980s was quite secure. With Egypt out of the military equation and Iraq bogged down in the Persian Gulf War, both the southern and eastern fronts were

nonexistent, and the balance of power was most favorable. Globally, strategic conditions were also supportive, for the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan was growing and the United States increasingly viewed Israel as a strategic asset. Syria's presence in Lebanon was not an advantage since the Syrian Army, besides maintaining order in the war-torn region, was faced with the problem of two fronts, one in the Golan Heights and one in the Baqa'a Valley. The transformation of the PLO from a guerrilla army to a structure resembling a regular army actually indicated the failure of the PLO's strategy. While in its new structure it was far from constituting a military threat to Israel, the PLO was all the more vulnerable to destruction by the IDF.⁶⁴

On December 20, 1981, Sharon outlined the operation termed "Big Pines" before the Cabinet. Begin, apparently sensing the strong opposition it would evoke, did not ask the Cabinet to vote on the plan. Subsequently, the General Staff was asked to prepare a plan more limited in scope, designed to remove the PLO's threat to the Galilee from South Lebanon. Essentially, as General Avraham Tamir, head of national security planning in the Ministry of Defense, testified, it was clear that the new operation was planned in such a way that it would not be difficult for it to expand into the larger campaign when the opportunity arose. According to Tamir, who participated in the negotiations with Lebanese Christians and in the strategic planning of the war, the prime minister, the defense minister, and the chief of staff were all in favor of the larger plan.⁶⁵

The portrayal of the war as limited in scope was influenced not only by domestic considerations but also by the U.S. position. It seems that Washington had agreed to a limited Israeli operation in Lebanon. Sharon's report to Begin that Secretary of State Alexander Haig gave him a "green light" was not accurate. The secretary of state even conveyed his objection to a broad operation in Lebanon to the prime minister in a special letter following Sharon's May 1982 visit. Begin had already received similar signals from President Reagan, presidential envoy Philip Habib, and U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis.⁶⁶

Despite retrospective attempts to exonerate Begin from responsibility for the big plan, it seems clear that, although he may have been deceived on tactical questions by the minister of defense and chief of staff whom he had appointed, he was a full partner in setting the goals of the Lebanon War, which exceeded the more limited public goals of Operation Peace for Galilee—this in spite of being warned by Chief of Military Intelligence General Yehoshua Saguy that the Christian militias were not trustworthy. A former chief of staff, General (Res.)

Mordechai Gur, cautioned Begin that the war would “snowball” beyond the limited goals set by the Cabinet. Indeed, it was exactly this “snowball” effect that Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan (Raful) was counting on.⁶⁷ Rafal never hid his support for Israeli annexation of Judea and Samaria, even though officers on active duty traditionally did not expose their political beliefs.

From the start, the Lebanon War was an operation planned to exceed the limited goals that were presented to the Cabinet and to the public. Begin’s attempt to classify it together with the 1956 and 1967 wars was designed to legitimize it and broaden public consensus. While these wars were guided by a preventive or preemptive rationale—an outgrowth of balance-of-power and deterrence approaches—the 1982 war was motivated by the ethnonational goals of the Likud government.

The Lebanon War

The actual goals of the war were confirmed as the war progressed. One consideration was the upcoming presidential election in Lebanon. The promotion to power of a Maronite government friendly to Israel in Lebanon was designed to achieve two main political goals: the total military and political destruction of the PLO in Lebanon with a consequent decline of its influence in the West Bank, and the signing of a peace treaty with a second Arab state. Lebanon, unlike Jordan, had no claims in Judea and Samaria. Both ends were discussed with Bashir Jemayel prior to the initiation of the war. Sharon’s well-known approach to the solution of the Palestinian problem within a Palestinian state on the eastern bank of the Jordan replacing the Hashemite regime may also have played a role in the decision. It may have been anticipated that refugees from Lebanon would enter into Jordan. Sharon and his Maronite allies also discussed the expulsion of the Palestinians from Lebanon.⁶⁸

The aim of actually establishing a pro-Israeli government in an Arab state was an unprecedented war aim for Israel. When the agreement with Jemayel that the Maronites conquer West Beirut (following the IDF’s arrival at their lines on June 13, a week after the outbreak of the war) was not fulfilled, the IDF was ordered to conduct a siege on an Arab capital, an action it had always avoided. The presidential elections took place under the guns of Israeli forces on August 23, two days after the PLO had agreed to evacuate its forces from Beirut. But even President-elect Jemayel, who met confidentially with Prime Minister Begin on Septem-

ber 1, 1982, rejected Begin's demand to sign a peace treaty. Jemayel explained to Begin that such a move would alienate the Muslim majority in Lebanon and the Arab world of which Lebanon was an integral part.⁶⁹

Sharon and Begin persisted in trying to accomplish both goals—expelling the PLO and concluding a peace treaty with Lebanon, even following the assassination of Bashir Jemayel on September 13. Under the pretext of the Jemayel assassination, Sharon ordered the conquest of Beirut and a mopping up of all PLO elements that were left in the Lebanese capital. It was during this period that the massacres in Sabra and Shatilla took place. The Lebanese Christian Phalange militia that executed the massacres might have calculated that, in addition to avenging Jemayel's murder, Sharon would not have objected to a Palestinian exodus should it have ensued. Whether an exodus was indeed Sharon's expectation is doubtful. But his determination to conquer Beirut even following the departure of Arafat and the PLO indicates that the war against the Palestinians went beyond tactical military objectives. The conquest of Beirut was another measure designed to force Lebanon into signing a peace treaty with Israel. For the first time in its history, the IDF moved to conquer an Arab capital as a means of subsequently negotiating a full peace treaty with an Arab state.

The peace treaty that was signed with Lebanon in May 1983 was canceled in March 1984 by President Amin Jemayel as a result of pressure from Syria, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states. The multinational force that replaced Israel in Beirut also withdrew as a result of domestic pressures aroused by the casualties inflicted by pro-Syrian elements in Lebanon—the Druse and the Shiites. After their departure, West Beirut was immediately taken over by these elements, as well as by elements from the various Palestinian organizations. The IDF was now exposed to attacks, including suicide operations, from all those elements. Against this background, the national unity government under Shimon Peres that came to power in 1984 decided to withdraw after establishing a security zone in southern Lebanon that was sufficient to secure Israel's security interests.⁷⁰

The Lebanon War, in essence, reflected the rationale of a policy formulated on the basis of ethnonational considerations. The Lebanon War was the only war in Israel's history in which its goals went beyond those of state survival and security. The PLO was in no way able to threaten Israel's existence even after the disclosure of all its weaponry in southern Lebanon. The attempt to inflict a mortal blow on the PLO was motivated by aspirations related to Judea and Samaria. The war undermined one of Israel's most important sources of nontangible

elements of power: its population's motivation to fight recurrent wars based on the conviction that there was no alternative (*ein breira*). In the wake of Lebanon, this belief could have been shattered.

The ambition to force Lebanon, through armed intervention, to become the second state to sign a peace treaty with Israel was also unprecedented. Recognizing the limits of Israeli military power in achieving goals such as a peace treaty, none of the previous governments saw war as a means of achieving such a goal. Territory for peace seemed more realistic. Applying this principle to Jordan would have involved a heavy price for Begin—a territorial compromise in Judea and Samaria. Lebanon was the only state with which there was no conflict over borders. Moreover, this strategy involved the sacrifice of Israeli lives for the Maronites' interests. This was a very extreme measure from the standpoint of the Israeli ethos which believed that only the nation's existence warranted the spilling of Israeli blood. Furthermore, it was unrealistic to assume that weak Lebanon would be able to do what the most powerful Arab state, Egypt, was able to do only by achieving the return of all its territories while sustaining the alienation of the entire Arab world. A Christian Lebanon was in no position to do what Egypt, the center of Arab identity, had dared to do. Indeed, while Egypt, despite all the criticism and scorn heaped upon it, implemented the peace accords, Lebanon was unable to sustain similar pressure and the peace agreement eventually collapsed.

The calculation that the destruction of the PLO base in Lebanon would eventually result in a Palestinian transfer to Jordan that would ultimately engender their takeover of Jordan was not only speculative but it also bore a strategic threat to Israel. An irredentist Palestinian regime—with aspirations to conquer what it considered real Palestine or the homeland—would join either Syria or Iraq, or both, and reestablish a threatening Eastern Front that always constituted a military nightmare for Israeli strategic planners. It was always convenient for Israel to share its longest border with a regime that also feared a takeover from the east or the north. The assumption that a Palestinian state in Jordan would relieve the pressure to turn the West Bank into a Palestinian homeland and thus permit Israel to annex those territories was motivated by ethnonational aspirations, not realistic calculations. It was far from realism to involve Israel in a war whose success was dependent on an unreliable ally such as the Maronites who did not fulfill any of the expected and agreed upon tasks. Instead they executed massacres that ultimately forced the IDF to withdraw under international and domestic pressure. Israel found itself in the midst of an intercommunal war that

was of no concern to the Jewish state. Entering the war in order to destroy Palestinian terrorism, the IDF found itself fighting a new enemy—Shiite terrorism.

Finally, the assumption that a blow to the PLO would result in Palestinian acquiescence in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip with their acceptance of a personal autonomy was also not based on realistic calculations. A weakened PLO would create a vacuum in the territories that would either be filled by Jordan or the Palestinians in the West Bank—two options that neither Begin nor Sharon favored. Ultimately, the weakening of the PLO resulted in the local residents taking their fate in their own hands and declaring an uprising—the *intifada*. The war in Lebanon, however, contained an additional dimension— an assault on the West Bank.

The Attack on the PLO in the West Bank

During the first Likud administration, Sharon involved himself in the West Bank from his base as minister of agriculture and executed an intensive settlement drive that changed the map of the region.⁷¹ In the second Likud administration, the West Bank was within his jurisdiction as minister of defense. Whereas his predecessors promoted a policy of de facto coexistence, Sharon's approach was confrontational. All previous ministers of defense—Dayan, Peres, and Weizman—not wishing to intervene in the daily lives of the inhabitants, attempted to promote a moderate local leadership. Begin, who took over the defense portfolio after Weizman's resignation, was essentially a caretaker and as such did not introduce any new policy. Sharon intended to replace the local leadership with a new leadership that would accept and implement the Camp David agreements. In essence, his policy in the territories was a direct continuation of his policy as minister of agriculture and complemented his strategy in Lebanon. Sharon was unable to complete his plans in the West Bank because he was forced to resign by the Cahan Commission in the aftermath of the Sabra and Shatilla incident, even as the goals of his strategy could be discerned.

The first sign of the Likud's intentions to transform the administrative and political structure of governance in the territories was the institution of the Civil Administration. Introduced in 1981 as the first step in implementing the autonomy principle agreed upon in the Camp David Accords, the move was to a certain extent the Likud's response to Dayan's view that without Jordanian or Palestinian participation the

only route left was unilateral autonomy. Thus, a civil administration could have been seen as the Likud's way of implementing autonomy. At the same time a civil administration was also a sign that Israel did not perceive the territories as conquered territory.

Sharon appointed Professor Menahem Milson to head the Civil Administration and as such to be in charge of implementing Sharon's radical plans. Milson's views on how to achieve peace with the Palestinians had been articulated prior to his nomination and thus were well known to the minister of defense. Milson was no stranger to the territories, for he had served as the government's Adviser on Arab Affairs. His views were known to be contrary to those of Professor Amnon Cohen who was Dayan's adviser. On various occasions Milson blamed previous Israeli policies, especially those formulated by Dayan, for the "conquest" of the West Bank by the PLO. In an article appearing in May 1981, he argued that "continued political domination of the territories by the PLO will guarantee that organization's continued legitimacy within the Arab world, not to mention its power to veto any Arab move in the direction of Camp David."⁷² One could learn of Milson's confrontational attitude from a previous statement: "Regarding the details of the ways and means of the struggle against the PLO's domination in the territories, it is not a matter for public debate. Just as we don't publicize operational plans and tactics in the course of a military struggle, we should not publicize the means of a political struggle."⁷³

Indeed, the attack on PLO domination of the West Bank was carried out almost as a military operation. First, it was camouflaged by the announcement of a liberal policy, with one of its expressions being the return of Nadim Zaro, a former Ramallah mayor who had been expelled by Dayan. Second, as in a military campaign, prior to the frontal attack on the PLO leadership in the West Bank, the enemy's power centers and supply lines were barraged. In addition, a supposedly alternative leadership was prepared.⁷⁴ The political conquest of the West Bank was to be complemented by the military attack against the PLO in Lebanon.

The first targets of the new minister of defense and the head of the Civil Administration were the universities and the press—institutions that helped ferment Palestinian nationalism.⁷⁵ Immediately after the opening of the 1981 academic year, Bir-Zeit University was closed for two months because of its role as the center of PLO activity. The university's subsequent refusal to cooperate with the Civil Administration was followed by a cycle of further closures and demonstrations. Hardly any academic studies took place throughout the 1981-82 aca-

demic year at Bir-Zeit. Concerning the Arab press, new rules of censorship were implemented; the "Weizman rule," which allowed all articles published in the Hebrew press to be published in the Arab press, was abandoned. Previously, this had been a way of evading Israeli restrictions. Arab editors would tip Israeli journalists to Palestinian-inspired news and then rewrite the stories that had appeared in the Israeli press. *Al-Fajr* and *Al-Sha'ab*, the two dailies closely identified with the PLO, suffered more than the establishment paper *Al-Quds*, and their distribution was banned on several occasions. In March 1981 editors Hanna Siniora of *Al-Fajr* and Mahmoud Y'aish of *Al-Sha'ab* refused to sign new applications for operating licenses because of the new restrictions. Abu-Zuluf, the editor of *Al-Quds*, also complained about unprecedented crackdowns by the censor.⁷⁶

In addition to the universities and the press, Sharon cracked down on transfers of funds from the PLO to the West Bank. Weizman's rule that as long as these monies were not directed to purchasing explosives the transfer need not be stopped, was canceled. Sharon forbade any transfer of money that was suspected of having originated from the PLO. By doing so, Sharon blocked the transfer of money from the Joint Jordan-PLO Fund that was established in Baghdad in 1979 to undermine the autonomy plan. The new policy took aim at the United Palestine Appeal which was founded in the United States with the clear intention of emulating the United Jewish Appeal. Accompanying measures included a redistribution of the Civil Administration's budget between the cities, towns, and villages in favor of the villages (on the role of the villages see below), and a closer inspection of the universities' budgets. It was clear that the intention was to tighten the screws on institutions identified with the PLO. To complement this siege, an order existing since 1968 that forbade any encounter, while abroad, between the territories' inhabitants and hostile organizations was suddenly enforced.

The main target was the leadership. Following the victory of the pro-PLO mayors in the 1976 elections, the military government "discovered" that side by side with the towns in the West Bank there existed an underdeveloped population constituting almost 70 percent of the inhabitants. Under Israeli rule, the mayors of the cities and towns became administrative representatives of the villages in their district, thus undermining the status of the village head (*mukhtar*). An attempt to build up the village leadership had started in 1978 during Milson's first tenure in the West Bank. But under Weizman this policy never assumed more than local proportions. In November 1981, with Sharon's appointment of Milson, a territorywide strategy to promote a structure of village

leagues (*rawbit al-kura*) was adopted. In addition to the Hebron Village League, six more leagues emerged in the districts of Bethlehem, Ramallah, Jenin, Nablus, and Qabatiya, and in the village of Habla.⁷⁷ A clear policy of shifting the identity of the intermediary between the government and the inhabitants, a very powerful position in the West Bank, could be discerned. The Civil Administration did not make any effort to disguise this new policy of preferences for the leagues as opposed to the municipalities.

Both the PLO and Jordan reacted clearly to the Sharon-Milson policy. Yusuf al-Khatib, head of the Ramallah Village League, was assassinated on November 17, 1981, and assassination attempts were made against other heads of the leagues as well. Jordan's Prime Minister Mudar Badran issued a military order giving the leaders of the village leagues one month to resign or face possible confiscation of their property or even the death penalty. Israel's response was unprecedented: members of the village leagues were armed and trained in self-defense. Acts of violence occurred against the Bethlehem municipality, Bethlehem University, and East Jerusalem newspapers, with indications pointing to members of the village leagues as the perpetrators.⁷⁸

The novelty in the Sharon-Milson approach was that it was not merely a tactical move of divide and rule; rather, it reflected organically the strategic conception of the Begin administration. Jordan was the only viable legitimate contender for the West Bank besides the PLO.⁷⁹ Yet, Sharon preferred to support a rural leadership whose widespread support by the West Bank population had still to be proven over pro-Jordanian elites who could have counterbalanced PLO influence more effectively. For an administration that had given up Israel's Jordanian orientation, there was no sense in supporting pro-Jordanian elites.

Then came the direct assault on the pro-PLO leadership. On March 11, 1982, the National Guidance Committee, the informal leadership institution of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, was outlawed. The challenge to the pro-PLO leadership had been the establishment of the Civil Administration. Sharon used the mayors' boycott of the Civil Administration as an excuse to implement more severe measures. On March 18, Ibrahim a-Tawil, the mayor of al-Bireh, was dismissed, and his municipal council was disbanded because the mayor refused to meet with the head of the Civil Administration. The municipalities called for a three-day strike, but none of the mayors, realizing what the administration hoped they would do, resigned. On March 25, the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah, Bassam Shak'a and Karim Khalaf, respectively, were dismissed despite their protests. In the following month other

mayors were fired, leaving moderate Elias Freij of Bethlehem as the only elected mayor from the 1976 municipal elections.⁸⁰

In most towns, local inhabitants refused to take over municipal affairs, and Israeli officials were appointed in their stead. This policy also marked a significant departure from the official Israeli policy in place since 1967. The two main accomplishments of Israeli policy in the territories had been the holding of scheduled free elections and the management of daily life by local inhabitants. What emerged was a de facto division of labor between the military and the local leadership. Under the Civil Administration's policy of managing the towns through Israeli officials, more friction was created between the Israeli administration and the civil population.

But friction was not limited to the West Bank inhabitants and the civil and military administrations. By 1982 another layer of friction had been created, based on the settlement drive that had been undertaken by the Likud's first administration. Erection of settlements was undertaken in proximity to Arab population centers like Nablus and Ramallah, and within Arab towns such as Hebron. For the Palestinians, having Jewish settlers dwelling in their midst became a problem they confronted at their doorstep. With a civil administration running their towns, and settlers in their midst, what was initially a conflict between a local population and a military administration was now transformed into a full-scale communal Jewish-Arab confrontation.

A cycle of intercommunal attacks and counterattacks was underway, including the murders of six yeshiva students in Hebron. On June 18, 1980, explosive devices were planted in the cars of Bassam Shak'a, mayor of Nablus, and Karim Khalaf, mayor of Ramallah, members of the National Guidance Committee, maiming both. Attacks on an Arab bus and the Islamic College in Hebron in which Arab citizens were murdered resulted in the disclosure of the existence of a Jewish underground, some of them members of Gush Emunim. Others were members of Kach, Rabbi Kahane's extreme nationalist group which demanded the "transfer" of Palestinians from the territories. With this the cycle of ethnic violence was completed; it included Arabs and Jews, sucking in citizens, inhabitants, and settlers in all the Land of Israel.

In summary, a clear distinction could be made between the two types of Israeli foreign policies that were adopted in the wake of the Six-Day War. In the first decade following the war, both the political and the military dimensions of Israel's national security policy reflected the pre-1967 statist foreign policy. The Likud in the second decade shifted foreign policy to reflect its ethnonational maxims. Thus, they aban-

doned the Jordanian option and relinquished the Sinai in favor of maintaining Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, searched for a strategic relationship with the United States, and adopted a "war by choice" doctrine. In addition, the settlement drive in the West Bank and the assault on the PLO power centers replacing the previous benign neglect policy were all functions of the Likud's ethnonational foreign policy goals.

NOTES

1. The "compound" concept is borrowed from federal theory. See, for instance, Daniel J. Elazar, "Israel's Compound Polity," in Howard R. Penniman, ed., *Israel at the Polls, the Knesset Elections of 1977* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 7, and n. 11.

2. On the functioning of the national unity government and its fall, see Dan Margalit, *Message from the White House* (Tel Aviv: Otpaz, 1971) (Hebrew).

3. On the "tripwire" concept, see Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 47-48.

4. The general framework of the Allon plan was presented in Yigal Allon, "Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," *Foreign Affairs* 55, no. 1 (October 1976):38-53. For Dayan's views, see *Jerusalem Post*, May 15, 1973. For a comparative analysis of the two plans, see Shmuel Sandler, "Partition Versus Sharing in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Governing Peoples and Territories* (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1982), pp. 234-245. See also Michael Brecher, *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 460-462.

5. Shmuel Sandler with Hillel Frisch, "The Political Economy of the Administered Territories," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Judea, Samaria and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future* (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 135 and Table 5; and Van Arkadie, *Benefits and Burdens, A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip Economies, since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977), pp. 163-164.

6. Abba Lerner and Haim Ben Shahar, *The Economics of Efficiency and Growth: Lessons from Israel and the West Bank* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975), pp. 169-174.

7. See, for instance, Sasson Levi, "Local Government in the Administered Territories," in Elazar, ed., *Judea, Samaria and Gaza*, pp. 103-122.

8. Menahem Milson, "How to Make Peace with the Palestinians," *Commentary* 71, no. 5 (May 1981):32.

9. This division of labor is elaborated in Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank*, chs. 4-5.

10. Shmuel Sandler, "Israel and the West Bank Palestinians," *Publius* 18, no. 2 (Spring 1988):49-53.

11. Israel suited the Nixon Doctrine. On the Nixon Doctrine, see George Liska, "The Third World: Regional Systems and Global Order," in Robert Osgood, et al., eds., *Retreat From Empire?* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 279-343.

12. Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (New York: Dell, 1975), pp. 227-240.

13. Zvi Al-Peleg, *Hussein's Federation Plan: Causes and Reactions* (Tel Aviv: Shiloah Institute, 1977) (Hebrew).

14. Shaul Mishal, "Judea and Samaria: An Anatomy of Municipal Elections," *Hamizrah Hehadash* 24 (1974):63-67 (Hebrew).

15. Avner Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb, The Politics of Israeli Strategy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 176.

16. Dan Horowitz, *Continuity and Change in Israel's Security Doctrine* (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University, 1982).

17. Yaniv, *Deterrence Without the Bomb*, pp. 136-137 and 181-182. Another consideration that played a role in Israel's presence along the Suez was the American interest in the closure of the Canal to Russian navigation as long as it was involved in Vietnam.

18. Efraim Inbar, "Israeli Strategic Thinking after 1973," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 6 (March 1983):41-45. See also Ariel Levite, *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989).

19. Yigal Allon, "Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," p. 44.

20. For further development of the temptation-irritation relationship, see Sandler, "Partition Versus Sharing," pp. 234-242.

21. On the nuclear debate following the Yom Kippur War, see Efraim Inbar, "Israel and Nuclear Weapons since October 1973," in Louis Rene Beres, ed., *Security or Armageddon, Israel's Nuclear Strategy* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1986), pp. 61-78. See also Horowitz, *Continuity and Change*, pp. 48-54.

22. For the primary sources of information in this and the above sections, see Dan Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option, The "Yishuv" and the State of Israel vis-a-vis the Hashemite Regime and the Palestine National Movement* (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1986), pp. 366-376.

23. Nathan Yanai, ed., *Moshe Dayan on the Peace Process and the Future of Israel* (Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense and Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1988), p. 34.

24. In a written response to a student writing his master's thesis under this author's guidance, Begin wrote that he gave up the Rafah salient and its settlements because it was not Eretz Israel.

25. On autonomy arrangements in various countries, see Daniel J. Elazar, *Federal Systems of the World* (London: Longman, 1991), especially the author's Introduction. See also Daniel J. Elazar, "Arrangements for Self-Rule and Autonomy in Various Countries, The Situation in 1979," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Governing Peoples and Territories* (Philadelphia: ISHI, 1982), pp. 153-

168. See also Yoram Dinstein, ed., *Models of Autonomy* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981).

26. On Labor's positions on autonomy, see Efraim Inbar, *Peace and War in Israeli Politics, Labor Positions on National Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Reinner, 1991), pp. 106-110.

27. Yanai, *Moshe Dayan on the Peace Process*, p. 47.

28. This material is taken from speeches delivered when Dayan was foreign minister in a Likud government; see, for instance, *ibid.*, pp. 45-49.

29. The autonomy idea in this program was essentially an attempt to reconcile the aspiration to build a Jewish sovereign state in their historic homeland with the reality of Jewish communities scattered all over the globe. Jews who would not move to their national territory even following the establishment of the Jewish state were expected to ask for autonomy. On Jabotinsky's role in this conference, see Joseph B. Schechtman, *Rebel and Statesman, The Life and Times of Vladimir Jabotinsky, The Early Years* (New York: Eshel Books, Aronoff Special Edition, 1986), pp. 114-117.

30. For an elaborate analysis of Jabotinsky's views on autonomy, see Raphaella Bilski Ben Hur, *Every Individual is a King, The Social and Political Thought of Zeev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky* (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1988), pp. 136-148 and 281-291.

31. *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, an anthology prepared by the Israeli Ministry of Education (Jerusalem: Maalot, 1988), p. 211.

32. Sasson Sofer, *Begin, An Anatomy of Leadership* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 135.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

34. For a comparative analysis of the patterns of settlement, see Elisha Efrat, "Spatial Patterns of Jewish and Arab Settlements," in Daniel J. Elazar, ed., *Judea, Samaria, and Gaza*, pp. 9-43.

35. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank*, p. 139, and Table 6-5.

36. Meron Benvenisti and Shlomo Khayat, *The West Bank and Gaza Atlas* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post, 1988), p. 33.

37. Arye Shalev, *The West Bank: Line of Defense* (Tel Aviv: Center for Strategic Studies—Tel Aviv University and Hakibbutz HaMeuchad, 1982), pp. 37-38.

38. Although some of the future heads of Gush Emunim—Hanan Porat and Rabbi Moshe Levinger—became notorious in their push for the establishment of these settlements, some of the most prominent leaders of Gush Emunim came to the fore in the struggle for Jewish settlement in Samaria. The Elon Moreh nucleus group led by Benny Katzover and Menahem Felix struggled against the Labor government headed by Rabin and ultimately forced him to approve semi-official settlements in Samaria like Ofra and Qadumim. They became the spearhead of the future Gush Emunim leadership, and the institutional infrastructure that mobilized the masses. On the story of the Elon Moreh group, see Aharon Dolav in *Maariv*, October 26, 1979; the importance of the

Elon Moreh group is drawn from conversations with Gush Emunim leaders as well as a Bar-Ilan University Department of Political Studies seminar given by Israel Harel, secretary of the Yesha Council of Jewish Settlements and editor of *Nekudah*, on March 20, 1990.

39. These numbers are based on data compiled by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1986*, Table 9.2. According to the West Bank Data Project, the number of settlers was over 44,000 in 1984; see Benvenisti and Khayat, *The West Bank and Gaza Atlas*, p. 32, and Table 7.2.

40. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank*, pp. 14-140.

41. Benvenisti and Khayat, *The West Bank and Gaza Atlas*, pp. 34-35. The rationale of a north-south axis was primarily for strategic purposes while east-west axes were important for control.

42. Benvenisti and Khayat, *The West Bank and Gaza Atlas*, p. 33.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

44. On the rationale of the Jordan Valley settlements, see Efrat, "Spatial Patterns of Jewish and Arab Settlements," pp. 21-23.

45. Benvenisti and Khayat, *The West Bank and Gaza Atlas*, p. 64.

46. David Newman, "Ideological and Political Influences on Israeli Rurban Colonization: The West Bank and Galilee Mountains," *Canadian Geographic* 28, no. 2 (Summer 1984):142-155; see also Juval Portugali, "Jewish Settlement in the Occupied Territories, Israel's Settlement Structure and the Palestinians," *Political Geography Quarterly* 10, no. 1 (January 1991):26-53.

47. Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1989*, Tables II/5 and II/8, pp. 42 and 51.

48. The speech Sharon was to deliver at the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies was never presented owing to other commitments. It appeared in Hebrew in the appendix of Yariv's *War by Choice*. For an English version, see the appendix of Efraim Inbar, *Israel's Strategic Thought in the Post-1973 War* (Jerusalem: IRICS Papers, September 1982).

49. Inbar, *Israel's Strategic Thought*, p. 25.

50. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *A War of Deception* (Tel Aviv: Schocken, 1984), pp. 28-31.

51. Inbar, *Israel's Strategic Thought*, p. 25.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 27. Sharon incorporated principles from the Ben-Gurion "periphery" doctrine into his conceptual framework, but for different goals.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

54. On this memorandum, see, for instance, Ilan Peleg, *Begin's Foreign Policy, 1977-83* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1987), pp. 201-202.

55. Inbar, *Israel's Strategic Thought*, p. 27.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 8 and 17.

57. In a televised interview, Sharon declared that Israel could no longer compete in the quantitative arms race. Israel Television, May 23, 1982.

58. Inbar, *Israel's Strategic Thought*, p. 28.

59. Schiff and Yaari, *A War of Deception*, p. 37.

60. Sofer, *Begin*, p. 202.

61. For an attempt to place the Begin doctrine within Israeli security doctrine, see Efraim Inbar, "The 'No Choice War' Debate in Israel," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 12, no. 1 (March 1989):22-37.

62. *Maariv*, August 20, 1982.

63. For an analysis of the war according to a Clausewitzian mode of thinking, see Inbar, "The 'No Choice War' Debate in Israel," p. 33. Begin himself apparently rejected Clausewitz's rationale.

64. Mao Tse Tung, the doctrinaire of strategic guerrilla war, had always cautioned against premature transformation of a guerrilla army into a regular force, for wrong timing could allow the government army to destroy the popular army. The conventional structure may have led Sharon to the conclusion that the IDF would be able to close in and destroy that army, an option that was remote in the previous structure.

65. Avraham Tamir, *A Soldier in Search of Peace* (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1988), p. 158.

66. Schiff and Yaari, *A War of Deception*, pp. 88-91; and Sofer, *Begin*, p. 207.

67. Arye Naor, *Cabinet at War, The Functioning of the Israeli Cabinet during the Lebanon War (1982)* (Tel Aviv: Yediot Ahronot, 1986), especially pp. 34-36.

68. Details of the alliance between Sharon and Jemayel are discussed in detail in Schiff and Yaari, *A War of Deception*; see especially chs. 3, 10, and 11. This theme is confirmed by General Tamir who participated in the talks; see Tamir, *A Soldier in Search of Peace*, pp. 152-158 and 178-182.

69. Schiff and Yaari, *A War of Deception*, pp. 289-291; and Tamir, *A Soldier in Search of Peace*, p. 182.

70. *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

71. On Sharon's functioning in the territories as minister of agriculture, see Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank*, pp. 132-140.

72. Menahem Milson, "How to Make Peace with the Palestinians," *Commentary* (May 1981), p. 35.

73. Menahem Milson, "The PLO, Jordan, and the Palestinians: Why Are They Not Ready to Participate in the Peace Process," in Alouph Hareven, ed., *Is There a Solution to the Palestinian Problem?* (Jerusalem: Van Leer Foundation, 1982), p. 43 (Hebrew).

74. In the middle of the attack on the mayors on April 7, 1982, Amnon Cohen wrote an article in *Maariv* entitled "Israel's Re-conquest of Judea and Samaria."

75. On the role of these institutions, see Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank*, pp. 61-66.

76. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 152.

78. Particularly suspect was the Kumisa family heading the Bethlehem Village League. See *ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

79. Amnon Cohen publicly criticized Milson's policies on the basis that the only potential political alternative to the PLO were King Hussein's supporters. See *Ma'ariv*, April 7, 1982. See also Yehuda Litani in *Ha'aretz*, March 22, 1982, and an article by Binyamin Ben Eliezer, the previous military governor of the West Bank, in *Maariv*, March 22, 1982.

80. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians and the West Bank*, pp. 154-155.

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PERES AND SHAMIR, 1984-92

Between September 1984 and June 1992 Israel was led by three types of government. The first type was a national unity government which functioned from September 1984 to November 1988. Following the 1988 elections, it was succeeded by a Likud-led national unity government which survived until March 1990. The two major parties, the Likud and Labor, were the principal partners in this arrangement, while the religious parties constituted a third (junior) partner in both governments. Shimon Peres initially served as prime minister between 1984 and 1986 and later as foreign minister for two years; Yitzhak Shamir was foreign minister for two years and served as prime minister starting in October 1986, serving for almost six years. Both Shamir and Peres, while serving as prime minister or deputy prime minister under the other, dedicated most of their time to foreign affairs. In the previous chapter, we examined the particular characteristics of governments led by each of the two major camps. The national unity governments provide us with an opportunity to examine an attempt to reconcile ethnonational and statist elements. The third type, the last Likud-dominated government of 1990-92, and its failure at the polls on June 23, 1992, will close our study of the ethnonational era in Israeli foreign policy.

THE FIRST NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

Israel in the mid-1980s was a polity equally divided between two opposing ideological blocs. This resulted in a political deadlock as each bloc was led by a major party committed to a different solution for the future of the territories, and neither bloc could assemble a firm majority coalition in the Knesset. Furthermore, Israel in mid-1984 faced a severe economic crisis, bringing it almost to the brink of economic collapse. This development was accompanied by an unpopular war in Lebanon

that was taking a heavy toll in casualties. Popular demand grew for a national unity government that would pull the Jewish state out of its distress, and pressure mounted on the leaders of the two major parties to form a partnership despite their deep differences on foreign policy issues. The first national unity government was divided into two equal portions, with Peres serving as prime minister for the first twenty-six months and Shamir for the second portion. The government succeeded in resolving the two main crises that had led to its formation: the acute economic crisis and the Lebanese quagmire. In addition, with regard to other problems including foreign policy issues it was able to function relatively well. However, there was one area in which the two partners could not reach a compromise: on issues relating to Judea, Samaria, and Gaza.

The 1983 collapse of bank shares on the stock exchange endangered the whole banking system of Israel. In August 1984 the monthly rate of inflation reached 24.3 percent, and the 1983 balance-of-payments deficit was almost \$4 billion.¹ The economic plan introduced in the summer of 1985 drastically reduced the annual rate of inflation from 400 percent to approximately 20 percent and the balance-of-payments deficit to \$864 million in 1985. The share of defense expenditures in the overall budget was sliced from 28 percent in 1983-84 to 25 percent in 1984-1985 and 23.6 percent in 1985-86.² Rabin's influence as defense minister, together with the withdrawal from Lebanon, undoubtedly helped to reduce Israel's defense budget. The Labor-controlled Histadrut allowed the introduction of drastic slashes in the worker's purchasing power and governmental budgetary cuts, despite the danger that it would produce unemployment. The government also benefited from support from the United States which provided special grants in addition to an annual \$3 billion assistance package.

The war in Lebanon, which was initially supported by public opinion and in the Knesset, became a protracted, unpopular war. For the first time in Israel's history, a government faced enormous public pressure for withdrawal in the midst of a war, much as the United States had experienced during the Vietnam War. This was a serious situation in that public confidence in matters of war and peace was critical for a country that experienced recurrent active military warfare. After examining several options proposed by the General Staff, the Peres government, despite the opposition of Foreign Minister Shamir, decided in January 1985 to withdraw from Lebanon unilaterally, leaving a narrow security zone guarded by the South Lebanese Army (SLA) and backed by the IDF. On June 10, the IDF completed its withdrawal from Lebanon.

Trying to advance the peace process, Peres, through a series of governmental crises and despite Shamir's opposition, convinced the government to agree to a process of arbitration on the Taba border dispute, the last outstanding territorial disagreement in the Sinai which had soured relations between Israel and Egypt. A summit meeting between Peres and Egyptian President Husni Mubarak was held, and the Egyptian ambassador was returned to Tel Aviv. But these issues concerned tactical differences between Likud and Labor; once Peres moved to the core value areas dividing Labor and Likud, namely, when Peres turned to Jordan, an insurmountable conflict erupted.

Having phrased the concept of "the Jordanian option," the Labor prime minister tried to make progress toward a peace treaty with the Hashemite monarch. With the PLO defeated in Lebanon and a Labor prime minister in Israel, it seemed that the two traditional parties to the partition of the Land of Israel were again in a position to reach a political settlement. Such a window of opportunity had not existed since 1976 when the PLO mayors swept the polls in the West Bank elections and May 1977 when the Likud came to power. During a series of secret encounters, Peres and Hussein negotiated a formula for an international umbrella for public bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. On February 11, 1985, with Egyptian mediation, Yasser Arafat and Hussein reached a formal agreement in which the PLO leader gave the Jordanian monarch the power to negotiate on his behalf with the object being a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. But the PLO aspired to an independent state within a weak confederal structure. When the Hussein-Arafat agreement was suspended in the winter of 1986, the PLO offices that had been moved to Amman following the organization's expulsion from Beirut were closed, and guerrilla commanders were expelled.³

In the context of Labor's Amman orientation, Rabin attempted to strengthen Hashemite influence among West Bank Arabs at the expense of the PLO. One such step was the nomination of pro-Jordanian Zafir al-Masri as mayor of Nablus. The PLO reacted decisively: the mayor was assassinated, thus sending a clear message not only to residents of the West Bank, but also to Amman. While King Hassan of Morocco invited Peres to his country, thus becoming the second Arab leader to publicly meet an Israeli leader, Hussein never admitted to meeting with Israeli leaders even though these encounters were well known. The king's hesitation to act decisively, the PLO actions in the West Bank, and the Likud's lack of support for the entire process resulted in Peres finishing his term without having started a formal peace process with Jordan.

The London Agreement

On October 20, 1986, Shamir was sworn in as prime minister in accordance with the rotation agreement signed twenty-five months earlier. Peres in turn became deputy prime minister and foreign minister. This arrangement had been designed to assure that the two major parties shared control over foreign affairs. For the same purpose the inner Cabinet was composed of ten ministers and divided equally between Labor and Likud. Shamir, however, now enjoyed the advantage of the prime ministership and thus was able to set the government's agenda.⁴

Peres as foreign minister tried to advance the "Jordanian option" that had been revived under his stewardship. Mubarak, who had refused to meet Shamir, met with Peres in February 1987 and concluded the details of a plan for an international conference.⁵ The actual breakthrough came on April 11, 1987, when Peres and Hussein met in London and signed what came to be known as the "London agreement." In this accord "between the Government of Jordan, which has confirmed it to the United States, and the Foreign Minister of Israel, ad referendum to the government of Israel," it was agreed that an international conference would be convened in which "participation...will be based on the parties' acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terrorism."⁶ This agreement implied the exclusion of the PLO, which did not fulfill these conditions. Again it seemed, for a moment, that the two traditional partners to partition had found a way of circumventing those objecting to such an approach.

Peres tried to conceal this meeting between himself and Hussein from Shamir. When the prime minister found out that it was to take place, he tried to abort it when two days before the meeting he warned publicly against an international conference. On April 12, Peres did not inform the Israeli government at its weekly meeting about the London agreement of April 11, but told Shamir about it the next day. The prime minister rejected it. When the principles of the agreement were officially presented to Shamir by the American ambassador, as they had been agreed upon by Hussein and Peres, Shamir in response composed nineteen points of reservation and sent them to Secretary of State George Shultz. In the subsequent weeks, despite a variety of assurances that were received from the secretary of state, Shamir rejected the agreement. On May 20, the London agreement was discussed but not approved by the Cabinet, half of whose members were Likud ministers.⁷

The PLO response was also negative. The Executive Committee of the PLO announced the nullification of its agreement providing for political coordination with Jordan, and insisted that no one could replace the PLO as a representative of the Palestinians. Three days later at the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Algiers, it was announced that Palestinian participation in a Jordanian delegation was unacceptable. On April 29, Hussein, for his part, reassured the PLO about their role in any negotiations and denied any meetings with Peres. A direct meeting between Hussein and Shamir and a letter from the Egyptian president also did not change the prime minister's mind. In September, in a speech before the UN General Assembly, Peres disclosed the London agreement. But the agreement was doomed with both the PLO and the Likud against it, and without help from Hussein who was afraid to expose himself, or even Secretary Shultz who was not very enthused about the idea of an international conference, lest it give a role to the Soviet Union. Shultz's attempt to organize a direct Israeli-Jordanian meeting in Washington was rejected by Hussein.⁸ It was at this juncture, at the end of 1987, that the Intifada broke out and closed the Jordanian-Israeli dialogue.

On July 31, 1988, King Hussein went on Jordanian television and announced Jordan's disassociation from the West Bank and the transfer of the claim for that territory to the PLO. A year after the London agreement, the Jordanian monarch himself closed the "Jordanian option." The Likud and other parties of the national bloc saw the Jordanian move as confirmation of their belief that the Jordanian option had never been a viable one. Labor in turn blamed the Likud for the impasse that had triggered both the Intifada and the Jordanian move. It was the frustration of the local inhabitants while awaiting a political solution to their plight that pushed them to riot. The Likud responded by asserting that Peres's call for an international conference invited external pressure. It also, according to the Likud, signaled an end to Israeli rule that raised the expectations of the local inhabitants and in this way encouraged them to revolt.

In terms of internal Israeli politics, both Hussein's announcement and the Intifada were slaps in the face of Labor and did not help the proponents of partition in the forthcoming elections. Parties to the right of Likud called for annexation of the West Bank, utilizing the opportunity of Jordan's abdication of its claim to those areas. Those to the left of Labor called for recognition of the PLO by Israel as a partner for dialogue, thus further weakening the Jordanian option's legitimacy among Israelis. Therefore, when Hussein appeared on the American

“Nightline” TV program together with Peres on the eve of the November 1988 Israeli elections and confirmed the London agreement in principle, it was too late.

Peres’s inability to convince Shamir to accept the London agreement and the Likud-Labor debate over the international conference were indicative of the vast gulf that separated the two parties. The partners to the national unity government had reached decisions before on controversial issues. Economic policy, the decision to cancel the Lavi jet fighter project, the Pollard case, and even the response to the Intifada, while highlighting differences between the two camps, nevertheless were settled through an internal mechanism of bargaining. Even Taba, which was a territorial issue but did not touch directly on the historical parts of the Land of Israel, was ultimately settled.⁹

In contrast, the London agreement implied negotiations over the future of Judea and Samaria. Labor, which perceived the ultimate solution as involving a territorial compromise, envisioned the international conference turning into an Israeli-Jordanian dialogue that would lead to a new partition between the two partners, who had first done so in 1949. For Shamir and the national camp which objected to repartition of the Land of Israel, an Israeli-Jordanian compromise was unacceptable. The Camp David Accords that promised autonomy to the Palestinians were preferable to a repartition of the Land of Israel.

The Intifada

If the Lebanon War was the first Israeli-Palestinian war, the Intifada was the second. In fact, it was the first purely intercommunal war since the Arab Revolt of 1936-39. Unlike the Lebanon War, the Intifada that broke out on December 9, 1987, took place within one polity—Israel. It erupted within the geographic boundaries of the Land of Israel/Palestine and without any direct involvement of regular armies of any Arab state as had been the case in 1948 and 1982. In addition, a few exceptions notwithstanding, the weapons employed were those classic to a civilian uprising—with stones, knives and Molotov cocktails from the Arab side being met with rubber bullets and tear gas from the Israeli security forces. Demonstrations, riots, and strikes were countered by administrative arrests, beatings, and curfews. During thirty-five years and four wars, the two communities in conflict over the Land of Israel hardly met each other in direct military struggle. Now, within the span of five years—1982-87—Jews and Palestinians managed to fight twice.

The uprising was triggered by the classic factors that usually ignite civilian revolts.¹⁰ Israel's inability to combat civil strife in Lebanon and its constraints in using brute force against a civil population reflected the vulnerable points of Israeli democracy. The decline of the IDF's deterrent capability following the war in Lebanon was complemented by growing frustration and feelings of relative deprivation on the part of the Palestinians. During twenty years of living within one political entity, the Palestinians began comparing their achievements to those of the Jews and felt deprived. They now channeled their frustration into civil strife. Ironically, the destruction of the PLO's military and political structure in Lebanon left a vacuum that induced the frustrated Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to step in and lead their own struggle. Little relief was expected from a weakened and physically remote PLO, while Israeli settlements were continuing to penetrate throughout the West Bank. Palestinian frustration prompted collective action.¹¹

Given its character as an ethnonational uprising, the Intifada threatened to spread to the two largest Palestinian concentrations outside of the territories—the Israeli Arabs and the Jordanian Palestinians. Although refraining from violent demonstrations, most of the time the Israeli Arabs showed public demonstrative and sometimes even instrumental support for the uprising of their brethren in the West Bank and Gaza. Violent demonstrations took place in May 1990 in response to the actions of an Israeli madman who murdered seven Palestinians; some Israeli Arabs also joined sporadically in the burning of forests. Instrumental assistance took the form of collections of food and medical supplies, blood donations, and verbal support in the Knesset by Arab MKs demanding investigations into alleged improprieties by the IDF against Palestinian prisoners. One of Hussein's motivations for announcing his abrogation of any claim to or responsibility for the West Bank, six months after the breakout of the Intifada, was the hope that the separation of the two banks of the Jordan would stop the spread of the uprising to his kingdom where a majority of the population was Palestinian. Israel's inability to put down the uprising quickly and brutally led Hussein to suspect that the Likud purposely wanted the uprising to boil over to such a point that it would justify population expulsions in the direction of Jordan.¹²

Israel's response to the Intifada reflected the views of the minister of defense who was from Labor and those of IDF Chief of Staff Dan Shomron. Yitzhak Rabin, who as defense minister had responsibility for the territories, once he realized the country faced a sustained uprising,

responded according to his statist orientation and approached the Intifada as a war in which political and military aspects were interwoven.¹³ Thus, following the immediate period in which hard measures were adopted, Rabin transformed his strategy into a “long-haul approach.” Asserting that the only viable solution was a political one, based on negotiations, the Intifada was soon fought as a limited war. General Shomron, following a short period in which he believed that the disturbances could be terminated quickly, declared that the IDF itself could not totally eradicate a violent struggle of a civilian population.¹⁴ The task of the army, according to the chief of staff, was to reduce the violence to a manageable level and to provide the government with maximum leverage in reaching a solution. In strategic terms, Shomron was stating that the role of the army was to eliminate the pain that the other side aspired to inflict in order to coerce Israel to accept its positions.¹⁵

The IDF's strategy was criticized by the right wing of the government and the Jewish settlers who demanded a military solution to the Intifada, namely, total eradication of the uprising rather than a political solution. From their ethnonational perspective, this was a war over core values. For the ministers supporting them, as well as for the settlers, a political solution implied territorial concessions or ceding functional powers in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Furthermore, it could be argued that the Intifada showed the settlements to be a strategic liability; providing security for the settlements required the IDF to divert personnel and resources from regular military training. Despite the bad press that Israel received abroad as a result of the tough measures that the minister of defense had ordered to put down the uprising, Likud ministers blamed the continuation of the Intifada on the “soft hand” of the military. It was instructive that the military was more moderate in its approach to the use of force in the Intifada than civilians in the Cabinet. This anomaly of generals arguing for a political solution while civilians demanded a military one was a result of the strategic rationale that guided the military as compared to the ethnonational goals of the critics.¹⁶

The Rabin strategy of combining military and political means began to bear fruit when the Palestinian leadership in the territories who initiated the Intifada realized that they, even more than Israel, could not achieve their goals through military means. They therefore pressured Arafat to come forward with a political initiative.¹⁷ On November 15, 1988, the PNC in Algiers adopted a series of resolutions that included a Palestinian declaration of independence and a call for the convening of an international conference “on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the guaranteeing of the legitimate national

rights of the Palestinian people.”¹⁸ These statements did not satisfy U.S. conditions for opening a dialogue with the PLO, nor did an address by Arafat before the UN General Assembly a month later that included the PNC’s resolutions. Thus, Arafat convened a press conference in which he responded to Washington’s demands. In his clarifications, he formally accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 as a basis for negotiations with Israel and the right of all parties to the Middle East conflict, including Israel, to exist. In addition, Arafat also renounced all forms of terrorism. On the same day Secretary of State Shultz announced that “as a result, the United States is prepared for a substantive dialogue with PLO representatives.”¹⁹

The events between July 31 and December 15, 1988, symbolized the new realities of the Arab-Israeli conflict. While Israeli soldiers and Palestinian youth were fighting each other directly in a type of civil war, the two partners to partition—the Hashemites and the Labor party—had no choice but to step aside. Hussein announced his formal abdication of any claims to the West Bank, while three months later his partner to the London agreement, Shimon Peres, was defeated at the polls. One year after its beginning, the Intifada led the PLO to finally utter an acceptance of Israel and in turn facilitate a U.S.-PLO dialogue. The partners to the conflict and the forthcoming negotiations following the November 1988 elections were again the ethnonationalists on both sides. Jordan and the Labor party were called in to help out but not to head the negotiating teams.

THE SECOND NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT

Unlike the 1984 national unity government, the formation of the 1988 government did not arise out of electoral necessity. Yitzhak Shamir, whose Likud party won a plurality of the vote (40 MKs compared to 39 for Labor) on November 3, 1988, enjoyed the solid endorsement of all the parties in both the religious and the national camps, translating into the support of 65 Knesset members compared to 55 for Shimon Peres. After having consolidated his coalition and signed agreements with the religious and the nationalist parties, Shamir made an about-face and signed a coalition agreement with Labor. Since there was no immediate national crisis to prompt the major parties to unite in a national unity government, the only rationale for Shamir’s action may have been in his desire to solidify a broad consensus behind his ethnonational goals.

The government that took office was composed of Likud, Labor, and all the religious parties, thereby totaling 97 members of the Knesset. The opposition of 23 MKs consisted of small parties from the right, the left, and the Arab parties. This majority, which seemed to provide solid support to the government, soon became paralyzed over the peace process. The collapse of the government in a no-confidence motion on March 15, 1990, demonstrated the depth of the cleavage in foreign policy.

The Rationale and Structure of the Shamir Government

Significantly, the government that was sworn in in December 1988 was distinguished from the national unity government of 1984-88 in that Shamir was to be the prime minister for the full term of the government. This fact provided him with control over agenda-setting—the main prerogative of the prime minister. Labor, however, was a senior partner and thus received the same number of ministers as the Likud. The religious camp parties—Shas, the NRP, and Agudat Israel—represented the third pillar of the coalition.²⁰ The Likud enjoyed a built-in majority as the religious parties had expressed a preference for Shamir over Peres in consultations with President Chaim Herzog following the elections.

Shamir's emphasis in the area of foreign affairs was expressed by his insistence on denying Peres the foreign ministry. Instead, Labor received finance and defense, the two most powerful ministries in resource allocation, while Shamir and Moshe Arens as foreign minister commanded the arena of foreign affairs. The inner Cabinet consisting of ten ministers (equally divided between the two major parties) was established as the central decision-making organ in national security affairs and was theoretically designed to provide Labor with veto power. Shamir's readiness to share power with the Likud's most powerful rival when the electoral results did not dictate such an arrangement confirmed the value that he placed on the Land of Israel. For in order to have the strongest possible domestic political position to resist the confrontation he anticipated over the territories, he betrayed his natural allies—the Tehiya, Tzomet and Moledet parties—with whom he had signed coalition agreements only to disregard them later. Promises made to the religious parties were also broken, thus undermining the partnership with the religious camp that had kept the Likud in power since 1977.²¹

With the Intifada into its second year and international pressure intensifying, coupled with Arafat's November 1988 recognition of Israel and the commencement of a U.S.-PLO dialogue, Shamir feared a forthcoming combined attack on Israel's hold over Judea and Samaria. A right-wing/religious coalition seemed an invitation to pressure from the United States and condemnation from the international community. Dependence on the three ultra-Orthodox parties would have alienated American Jewry whom he needed now more than ever.²² Moreover, Shamir knew that the right-wing parties would support him on foreign policy in any case while Labor would not. Through the two ministries, defense and finance, he hoped to "buy" Labor's support in foreign policy.

The price that Shamir paid to maintain control over foreign policy decision-making, and especially the process that would determine the future of Judea and Samaria, was indeed high. The Finance Ministry was normally a powerful asset for a ruling party, given the need to control the budget. But Shamir yielded to Labor resources that were very important to Labor as a bureaucratic party. Labor needed the Finance Ministry, especially when Koor, the large Histadrut conglomerate, was on the verge of bankruptcy, the kibbutzim's debt to the banks reached over a billion dollars, and Kupat Holim—the Histadrut sick fund—was also in a heavy financial crisis. Control over the education, health, and agriculture ministries was also very important to a party associated with these economic sectors. Shamir thus gave up the two most important portfolios to a ruling party—defense and finance—because the future of Judea and Samaria was at stake.

From the outset, the Shamir-Rabin axis constituted the basis of the second national unity government. Rabin, as one of the architects of the broad coalition government, was consistently in favor of maintaining the national unity government. On a personal basis there was less friction between him and Shamir than with Peres who had undermined Rabin's leadership as prime minister in 1974-77. Although each person represented a different world-view on the future of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, they cooperated because of common political interests and because both men also objected to a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria governed by the PLO. Shamir was aware that in the last days of the previous national unity government Rabin had floated an idea of elections in the territories that would promote a local leadership with whom Israel would negotiate. This option was compatible with the Camp David Accords and the autonomy plan. As long as there was no genuine option for a territorial compromise, there was no obstacle to cooperation

between Rabin and Shamir. But when it came down to the specifics of advancing the peace process, the Rabin-Shamir axis could not surmount the differences of their respective parties and outlooks.

The Shamir-Rabin Peace Plan and the Baker Principles

The Israeli peace initiative that was adopted on May 14, 1989, was an outgrowth of Rabin's ideas that had been presented formally on January 30 of that year and informally even before that date. In presenting his plan before the Labor party Knesset faction, Rabin reiterated his consistent support for a partition solution to the conflict. In response to the uprising, he stated that Israel must teach the Palestinians that by violence they would not achieve their goals, while at the same time he wanted to present the Palestinians with a political option. Stating explicitly that the rationale behind his plan was to strengthen the local Palestinians, he forwarded four elements: contraction of the uprising, elections in the territories for a political representation that would negotiate with Israel on autonomy, a transition period, and multilateral negotiations on the final status of the territories. Rabin indicated that his plan was in accordance with the autonomy portion of the Camp David agreement. Three months later, Shamir presented an Israeli peace plan based on these principles to the new U.S. Bush administration. As in Camp David, Israel committed itself to the agreement that, once autonomy was instituted for a period of three years, negotiations on the final status of the territories would be launched. But while the minister of defense saw the final status of most of the territories in a federation with Jordan, Shamir, when testifying before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, stated that in the negotiations over the West Bank Israel would demand sovereignty over the region.²³

The Bush administration warmly welcomed the Israeli peace initiative. Having inherited a dialogue with the PLO that had been started in November 1988 by the previous administration, it felt that the Shamir proposal included elements that would permit a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians. Since it accepted the Israeli proposal as an opening position, the new administration felt that the Israeli government would ultimately give ground. American experience showed that the best strategy to move Israel was to let it formulate a plan, like Begin's peace plan of December 1977, and then modify it to be accepted by all sides. Indeed, all three major plans that originated in Washington never went anywhere. This was the fate of the 1969 Rogers Plan, the 1975 Brookings

Plan that guided the Carter administration, and the September 1982 Reagan Plan. It was anticipated that after a long process of bargaining, as in Camp David, an Israeli-Palestinian conference would result in a peace treaty in exchange for Israeli territorial concessions.

The Americans and the Egyptians, aware of Shamir's aspirations, planned to modify Israeli positions through Labor. Plans like the "ten points" of President Husni Mubarak and the "five points" of Secretary of State Baker were designed to achieve similar goals. Labor leaders accepted both plans, while the Likud rejected them. Thus, the first split came in September 1989, when Rabin, after a visit to Cairo, accepted Mubarak's ten points while Shamir rejected them, reflecting the division between the Likud and even the hawks in Labor. Rabin, representing the hardliners in Labor, was able to accept principles like "territories for peace" or a freeze on Jewish settlement in the territories; Shamir was not.

A more severe split between Shamir and Rabin occurred in mid-March 1990, when Labor again accepted Baker's five points, which included principles such as the participation of East Jerusalem Arabs in the elections for autonomy and the participation of deported Arabs in the negotiations. Shamir, though feeling less urgency about rejecting Baker's plan since it did not include the "territories for peace" principle, still was unable to accept it, and in the ensuing domestic crisis the government fell.

Shamir rejected the plan despite signals from the White House of what could happen if Israel did not comply with American demands. Information about Israeli-South African military cooperation was leaked to the media. So were details of Israeli nuclear capabilities and how the country had supposedly achieved those weapons. A third signal was the suggestion floated by Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole, encouraged to do so by the president, to reduce foreign aid given to Israel in light of the needs of the new democracies in Eastern Europe. Finally, the president came out with statements comparing the legal status of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem to those in the West Bank at large. The fear that the United States intended to bring the PLO into the negotiations through the back door and that the status of Jerusalem would be part of the agenda of negotiation allowed Shamir to reject the Baker Plan because opposition to these two steps enjoyed a broad consensus in Israel.

The Americans were aware of the ethnonational motif in the Likud's position. A year earlier, Secretary of State Baker told the pro-Israel lobby, AIPAC, that the government must abandon its "Greater Israel"

dream. Even when Shamir and other Likud leaders spoke in terms of security, they were not trusted because they were not ready to accept the principle of territory for peace. Labor's territorial demands, on the other hand, even though not always accepted, were regarded as being motivated by security considerations. Shamir, realizing that in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Cairo he would meet a united American-Egyptian-Palestinian front demanding territorial withdrawal, asked Peres to sign an agreement that the Israeli delegation would enter the negotiations as a united team. The Labor leader rejected the proposal and demanded that Shamir answer positively to Baker's proposals. With Labor not ready to fulfill its role in the national unity government, Shamir had no further use for the coalition, and he allowed the government to fall.

The Failure of Realignment

The March-April political crisis, the five-week period during which Peres was mandated by Israel's president to try and put together a coalition, confirmed the transformation of the Israeli polity.²⁴ The coalition of nationalist, religious, and Sephardi voters held. On April 27, the day Peres returned his mandate to the president following his failure to form a majority of 61 MKs, Rabin reflected that, when he had made the rounds trying to convince the ultra-Orthodox leaders to topple the government, he then realized that Peres's conception of rebuilding the Labor-religious axis had no chance of materializing.²⁵

Shimon Peres was a true Laborite not only in his belief in the Jordanian option but also in his adoption of the idea that the only way for Labor to return to power was to restore the axis between the religious and Labor camps. The moderate standing of Shas's spiritual leader Rabbi Ovadia Yosef with regard to a territorial compromise, disclosed after a visit to Egypt, seemed to open the way for a new alliance. As a result of the 1988 elections, Shas increased its parliamentary strength by 50 percent and doubled its ministerial strength to two portfolios, thereby emerging as the strongest religious party. The exit of Agudat Israel from the coalition, as a result of a quarrel with Shamir, posited Shas as the holder of the balance between Labor and Likud.

Peres may have been influenced by an additional calculation. During the November 1989 Histadrut election campaign, Labor leader Israel Kessar won the endorsement of many religious leaders, especially those who were Sephardi. On the surface it appeared that the historic Labor-

religious alliance could be restored, but this time with the new upcoming forces in Israeli public life—the Sephardim and the Haredim (ultra-Orthodox). Peres ignored the fact that the head of the Labor list in the Histadrut was a Sephardi and traditionally oriented as well.²⁶ More important, in the Histadrut elections the future of the territories was not at stake; the main issues were economics and workers' rights.

When the domestic political crisis began following Shamir's prolonged delay in positively answering Baker's five points, in the no-confidence motion in the Knesset, the ultra-Orthodox Degel Hatorah party decided to support Shamir. Shas strongman Arye Deri, who preferred that Degel Hatorah pull the rug out from under the government, had no choice but to come out of the closet as Peres's ally. Shamir and Peres were invited to meet with Shas's spiritual leader, and when Shamir refused to sign a document for Rabbi Ovadia Yosef accepting the Baker Plan, the order came to the Shas MKs not to support the government. Their absence from the Knesset was sufficient for Labor to topple the government. On the surface it seemed that Peres had succeeded in building a coalition with portions of both the Haredim and the Sephardim.²⁷

In the thirty-six days that Peres tried to form a government, he encountered the inherent difficulties Labor was having with the Sephardi and Haredi communities. Only three out of the five MKs of Agudat Israel, embittered by Shamir's previous behavior toward the religious parties, were ready to join Labor. Both of the Agudat Israel MKs who refused to join Labor were believers in the integrity of the Land of Israel. Peres's attempts for over a month to "buy" the one MK needed to bring him over the 60-vote threshold all failed, for they were counterbalanced by deserters from his own camp.²⁸ (See Table 8.1.) Ultimately, Shamir succeeded in bringing the Agudat Israel party back to his camp.

Most indicative of the persistence of Labor's isolation from the Orthodox public was the "Rabbi Shach Speech." Ten days after the fall of the government on March 26, the 93-year-old head of Degel Hatorah, Rabbi Eliezer Shach, delivered a "spiritual" speech that was expected to disclose his political preferences. In the 60:60 standoff between the two blocs, the two MKs of Degel Hatorah were the votes that could have swung the balance. The much heralded speech contained two elements: the settling of an historical account with the Labor camp whom he declared responsible for the secular character of the Jewish state; and a rejection of the linkage between Jewish nationality and the control of territories, interpreted as an attack on the Likud's foreign policy with

Table 8.1
Distribution of Power in the Knesset, March-April 1990

Camps/Blocs	Likud Bloc	Labor Bloc	Desertions
National Camp	Likud - 40 Tehiya - 3 Tzomet - 2 Moledet - 2		4 ex-Liberal members form a new party
Religious Camp	Shas - 6 NRP - 5 Degel Hatorah - 2	Agudat Israel - 5	Two MKs of AI refuse to join Labor
Labor-Liberal Camp		Labor - 39 CRM - 5 Mapam - 3 Shinui - 2	
Arab parties		6	
Total	60	60	

regard to the Land of Israel. Soon, however, it became clear that the influential rabbi preferred Likud over Labor, despite his ideological proximity to Labor's foreign policy. Labor was rejected because of its explicit secularism and because it was identified with the state and as such considered responsible for the dominant secular culture. Likud's ethnonationalism was more compatible with religion.²⁹

Labor was also to experience its disappointment with Shas. Deri's flirtation with Labor was contrary not only to the wishes of Rabbi Shach whose leadership he accepted, but also to the wishes of Shas's grass-roots constituency. The message the leaders of Shas were receiving from their voters was that implicit in their vote was the expectation that their party support a Likud government. Peres's overtures to Shas to join a Labor government were turned down. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef had no choice but to back off from his earlier demand to support the Baker Plan, and to order Shas MKs to support a Likud government.

The March-June 1990 political crisis also exposed the weakening of the state and activated social forces, and civic and non-executive state

institutions. The aborted and senseless process of turmoil into which the political system was thrown triggered the emergence of a protest movement in favor of changing the electoral and governance system. Hunger strikes, petitions exceeding half a million names, and a mass demonstration in Tel Aviv, the largest since the Lebanon War, occurred. Significantly, the main demand that emerged was for direct election of the prime minister, a change that would strengthen the executive and consequently the state. The weakness of the government activated institutions like the state comptroller and the presidency, institutions that in the past had hardly any influence on the state.³⁰ The most powerful institution to be activated during the crisis was the Supreme Court. In the absence of a formal constitution, over the years Israel's Supreme Court has played an important and expanding role in the development of the state's constitutional law and its interpretation. The Supreme Court judges traditionally did not intervene in the political system, especially where the two other branches of government were concerned.³¹ This time, on May 8, 1990, the Supreme Court ordered the Likud and Labor parties to disclose the secret coalition agreements that they had signed either with other factions or individual MKs. The Supreme Court's intervention was not limited to this incident and was subsequently continued.³²

The weakness of the state was caused partly by the termination of the dominant party system. The system that suited a dominant party system was not appropriate for the new distribution of power. The return of the small parties since 1984 indicated that the system was not bipolar but rather a diffused-bloc system—a system divided between two major parties, each gaining approximately a third of the vote, and the rest diffused among small parties, each ideologically identified with one of the major blocs. Factionalism within each of the major parties hampered effective leadership.³³ A national unity government could not resolve this problem, for a major feature lacking was control by the leaders over their parties and constituencies, which is a basic requirement of any consociational arrangement. The weakness of the state, as argued above, was related to the emergence of ethnonationalism.

On June 11, 1990, Prime Minister Shamir presented his new government to the Knesset and received the support of 62 MKs. It was a government supported by the religious and ethnonational parties of the Knesset. The two key positions of foreign and finance ministers were filled by David Levy and Yitzhak Modai, both of whom were forced on the prime minister. So was Ariel Sharon who now became housing minister and head of the immigration cabinet. The fact that these

ministers were promoted instead of being disciplined for previous political exploits signified the price Shamir was ready to pay for his foreign policy. Shamir chose this government because after a year and a half he realized that sharing power with Labor required unacceptable ideological compromises. The crude remarks by Secretary Baker, two days after the presentation of the government, telling Israel to call him when it was ready for peace, confirmed that the United States was unhappy with the new government. With Labor in opposition, Shamir could also anticipate strong criticism from within. But his foreign policy beliefs did not leave Shamir much choice in coalition partners.

THE ETHNONATIONAL-RELIGIOUS GOVERNMENT OF 1990-92

The government that emerged in June 1990 was composed of two camps: the national and the religious. With the inclusion of ultra-Orthodox Agudat Israel and the "transfer party," Moledet, during the Gulf War, the government included all the parties from those two camps. With Labor in opposition and the religious parties preoccupied with securing financial support for their institutions, the way seemed open for the Likud to advance its nationalist program. Shamir was also saved by the international environment which was relatively convenient for national initiatives. Yasser Arafat's support for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the pro-Iraqi stance of King Hussein relieved Israel from American pressure over the West Bank. The domestic and international settings allowed the Likud to broaden the settlement drive in Judea and Samaria, as the Begin government had done between 1979 and 1982.

Israel's behavior during the Gulf crisis was dubbed a "low-profile" policy. Shamir's government abstained from any provocative action or even declarations, despite Saddam Hussein's announcement in April 1990 that he would burn half of Israel with his chemical weapons and his building of an army that was considered the fourth largest in the world. Israel's low-profile policy allowed the United States to assemble an international coalition that included Arab states and thus was appreciated by the Bush administration. Undoubtedly, this policy was the result of the recognition that Israel's security interests would best be served by an American assault on Iraq. In addition, Saddam presented himself as

the champion of the Palestinian cause and demanded a linkage between Kuwait and the occupied territories. Shamir thus had no interest in raising this linkage on the international agenda. The low-profile policy did not change following the outbreak of the war when Israeli cities were attacked and damaged by Scud missiles fired from western Iraq. Demands from within and outside the government to retaliate against Iraq's missile attacks were rejected by Shamir who had been swayed by the United States' request that Israel abstain from any action that might endanger the participation of Arab states in the coalition.

Israeli inaction during the crisis, especially after being attacked and following public commitments to respond, went against the rationale of the deterrence doctrine developed by Israel during its statist era. As noted earlier, retaliation was a basic concept in Israel's national security doctrine. The two hawks who opposed the Camp David Accords—Shamir and Arens—prime minister and minister of defense, respectively, during the Gulf crisis and the Gulf War, restrained Israeli retaliation when some Labor figures called for such action.

One possible explanation may have been that the government's behavior was influenced by the fact that the prime minister, defense and foreign ministers, as well as the other ministers, were not socialized in the tradition that had been developed under previous Labor governments of the centrality of deterrence in Israel's security doctrine. It was not a coincidence that the ministers in the Likud government who demanded retaliation, as well as the voices from Labor requesting Israeli retaliation, all came from a similar background—the security establishment—and all demanded it in the name of the credibility of Israel's deterrence.³⁴

Another possible explanation was that in a right-wing coalition government the Likud was put in a centrist position. The turn to the center was already evident in the electoral strategy of the Likud in the 1988 elections, which was directed to the center of the political map.³⁵ A major trend in the 1988 elections was a Likud gain across the board in middle-class neighborhoods, the traditional strongholds of Labor, and a decline of Likud in favor of the right-wing and religious parties in its traditional base—the lower-class neighborhoods and the development towns.³⁶

Both the Likud's turn to the center and its behavior in foreign affairs during the Gulf crisis must be assessed as part of its ethnonational aspirations. We must recall that the autonomy plan was also presented as a compromise solution equivalent to territorial compromise, while in

essence it was a device to insure the ethnonational goals of Likud, namely, the preservation of the integrity of the Land of Israel. Similarly, nonretaliation against Iraq, while contrary to Israel's deterrence doctrine, did not pose a threat to the future of Judea and Samaria. In contrast, going against the wishes of the American president might have drawn attention to the territories.

In the meantime, Shamir was aware that time was limited and that once the Gulf crisis was over the United States would resume its pressure to advance the peace process. Thus, he tried to enhance the Jewish settlements in the territories. As in the previous settlement drive, the appointment of Sharon to the Ministry of Housing was felt in the territories. By the end of 1989, the Jewish population in the territories had reached 81,000 and it is estimated that by 1993, as a result of Sharon's latest construction efforts, the Jewish population will more than double, reaching 185,000. While the annual growth rate of the Jewish population in the territories was about 8 percent in 1988-89, it jumped to 18 percent in 1990 and was expected to exceed 26 percent in 1992.³⁷ While in May 1989, 900 housing units were under construction, in 1990-92 the government started to build 16,500 units in the territories. This process was halted in one of the first actions of the newly elected Labor government on July 16, 1992.³⁸

Moreover, while in 1986, 85 percent of the settlers lived in the vicinity of the Jerusalem and Tel Aviv metropolitan areas, by the end of 1991 their share declined to 60 percent. Thus, most of the growth was deep inside the West Bank, making territorial compromise even more difficult. Another facet was the growth of the Jewish urban population in the heartland of the West Bank: Ariel (11,150), Emmanuel (4,350), and Qiryat Arba (6,250), totaling about 22,000. An additional 29,000 lived in the satellite towns of Jerusalem: Givat Zeev, Maale Adumim, Efrat, Betar, and less than 17,000 in the bedroom communities of Tel Aviv (Karnei Shomron, Alfei Menashe, Elkana, Oranit and Beit Aryeh).³⁹ (See Table 8.2.)

In contrast to the 1979-82 settlement drive, in the 1990-92 drive public opinion was moving in the opposite direction. Public opinion studies found a turn to the center even among Likud voters. Most significantly, a May 1990 poll found that:

Table 8.2
Distribution of Settlements in 1992

	No. of Settlements	Population	Average per Settlement
Close to Israeli Metro. (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv areas)	29	65,000	2,240
West Bank Heartland	113	47,000	415
Total	142	112,000	

Source: Based on data from *Haaretz*, December 21, 1991.

no less than 40.7 percent of the Likud supporters were in favor of dovish permanent solutions, 25.7 percent favored dovish interim arrangements, 41.3 percent expressed dovish attitudes toward the settlements in the territories, 21.8 percent were in favor of talks with the PLO, 25.8 percent preferred a softer treatment of the terrorist organizations, 29.9 percent favored using very limited, or even no force at all, in the intifada, 79.7 percent expressed a dovish orientation on war initiatives, 79 percent feel a sense of urgency about solving the conflict, and 30.2 percent of them think that solving the Palestinian problem would bring an end to the whole Arab-Israeli conflict.⁴⁰

Another trend that was discovered was a decline in the threat perception of the PLO and the Palestinians in the territories. Two studies conducted in May 1990 and June 1991 found a 35 percent decline in Israeli fears of the PLO and a 25 percent decline in fears of the Palestinians in the territories. Even more significant was the low support of the status quo: less than 5 percent supported the status quo as an interim solution and only 2.4 percent supported it as a permanent solution. The Likud's policy of stalling was definitely not consistent with the public's desire to promote change in the relations between Israel and the territories.⁴¹

Shamir was not ready to change his attitude on the territories. He repeatedly made it clear that he did not intend to give up any part of the Land of Israel.⁴² When accused of undermining the Camp David Accords, he stated that he was implementing Begin's political will, which was based on the rationale that Israel would give up the Sinai and in exchange would keep Judea and Samaria.⁴³ Two months before the elections, Shamir stated that "the Israeli governments since 1977 perceived Judea, Samaria, and Gaza not as collateral to be exchanged in negotiations but rather an integral part of the Land of Israel."⁴⁴

These attitudes were complementary to the attitudes evident in the period preceding the Madrid Peace Conference which opened at the end of October 1991. After Secretary of State James Baker visited the region eight times and virtually coerced Shamir into continuing the peace process, the conference was opened in accordance with the Likud's conditions, namely, no "territories for peace" formula, and no representation of the Palestinian diaspora or East Jerusalem. (At the time, the Likud was leading in the polls against Labor by a ratio of 2 to 1.) While Shamir delivered a moderate speech in Madrid, the conference subsequently became bogged down in procedural matters in Washington. The main question was that of the conference location. When it was finally resolved that the conference would take place in Rome, it was already too close to the Israeli elections of June 23, 1992. Two days after his defeat, Shamir was reported to have confirmed his intention to negotiate on autonomy for ten years and in the meantime to increase the Jewish population in Judea and Samaria to half a million people.⁴⁵

Shamir's attachment to the Land of Israel was tested when the issue of Russian Jewish immigration was placed against the question of settlements. The two values clashed when Washington conditioned \$10 billion in U.S. loan guarantees, requested by Israel to help settle the new wave of Jewish immigrants, to a freeze on new construction in existing Jewish settlements. While an earlier request for a \$400 million guarantee was approved in October 1990 under a promise that the funds would not be used for construction in the territories, in the summer of 1991 the U.S. administration insisted on a construction freeze. Shamir refused to succumb on this issue and while the settlement drive continued, the prime minister turned to the U.S. Congress to override the American president and force him to provide the guarantees immediately. President George Bush reacted on September 12 by appearing on national television to ask the American public to back him against Israeli pressure. At his press conference, Bush painted himself as "one lonely guy" facing the powerful Jewish lobby that mobilized a thousand

volunteers who had come to Washington to work to override him. Despite warnings from Washington, Shamir refused either to slow down Sharon's construction in the West Bank or to withdraw his request, endangering the two most powerful pillars of Israeli support in Washington: the Congress and the Jewish lobby. In the winter of 1992 the White House refused to consider a congressional compromise favoring the administration's position; rather, it demanded a total freeze on housing starts.⁴⁶

While confronting Washington, Shamir was more forthcoming toward his domestic allies whom he courted for the sake of the Land of Israel, a fact that may have cost him the 1992 elections. In December 1991 two right-wing parties left the coalition because of Israeli readiness in the wake of the Madrid conference to negotiate autonomy with the Palestinians. The ultra-Orthodox parties again found themselves in a privileged bargaining position and demanded large resources in the 1992 budget. Shamir gave in on January 29, 1992, thus damaging his standing with the electorate. On February 10, Shamir convinced his party to object in the Knesset to the reform bill for direct election of the prime minister, another unpopular move. A week later Rabin won his party's nomination as candidate for prime minister in a direct primary election by party members, while a day later Shamir won his party's renomination at the hands of the Likud party central committee. In a series of contests held by the Likud central committee to select its Knesset list, the supporters of David Levy, who had competed against Shamir for the nomination, now lost out to the Shamir-Arens camp. Levy only achieved 19th place in the popularity contest, and, subsequently, his supporters were pushed to the end of the Likud's list of Knesset candidates. Levy charged Shamir and his camp with anti-Sephardi motivations and resigned on March 29, 1992. Shamir gave in, betraying Arens, and Levy withdrew his resignation. But the Likud's image as the Sephardi party was damaged, thus alienating an important constituency that had kept Likud in power.

In contrast to the Likud, Labor held its Knesset list primaries on March 31, again through a direct membership vote, contributing to Labor's image of a vigorous party headed by a united, democratically elected leadership. On April 13, the state comptroller published an annual report that contained severe accusations of corruption, especially against the Ministry of Housing headed by Sharon. Nobody was asked to resign, and Labor, which had been expelled from power in 1977 as the party of corruption, now attacked Likud on the same grounds.

What are the implications of the Likud's defeat in terms of the transformation of the Israeli polity and the ethnonational dimension of its foreign policy? First, it must be emphasized that Labor, aware of its weakness as a "leftist" party, adopted a campaign strategy that stressed two main themes: the candidate for prime minister—Rabin—who was identified with the right wing of his party, and autonomy—an arrangement that had been identified with the Likud—as an interim solution for the territories, thus avoiding the issue of partition. Rabin, who as minister of defense had pursued an "iron fist" against the Intifada, also stressed throughout the campaign that the future of the territories would not be decided during the tenure of the forthcoming government. Likud fell into the trap and, instead of focusing on the territories or on Labor, attacked Rabin's personality. Thus, it helped Labor turn the 1992 campaign into the closest version Israel has ever witnessed of a direct vote for prime minister. In short, the June 23 elections could not be perceived as a test of where the Israeli public stood on foreign policy.

Nor did the electoral accomplishments of the contesting camps point to a clear decision. While Labor and Meretz (a coalition of parties to the left of Labor) received 44 percent of the vote, the nationalist camp (including the NRP) received 40 percent. If we add the vote of the Haredi parties, which declared in advance their support for a Likud-led government and who received over 8 percent, the national-religious bloc totaled 48 percent of the vote. The three Arab parties received 127,000, or 4.8 percent of the vote.⁴⁷ In light of these results and the fact that the Likud had been in power for fifteen years, we must conclude that, while the Likud lost the elections, the national-religious bloc was not defeated. Although the Begin-Shamir era came to a close, it would be premature to make any final conclusions regarding the role of ethnonationalism in Israeli foreign policy.

NOTES

1. *Maariv*, October 3, 1986, pp. 13-14 and 16-19. Data come from this issue which offered an evaluation of the first half of the national unity government.

2. *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1986*, no. 37, p. 525, Table xx/9; *Maariv*, October 3, 1986. On the defense budget, see also Yakir Plessner, "Defense Expenditure, Debt, and Devaluation, The Dilemmas of Israel's Economy," *Jerusalem Letter*, no. 45 (January 1986).

3. See Dan Schueftan, *A Jordanian Option. The "Yishuv" and the State of Israel vis-a-vis the Hashemite Regime and the Palestine National Government* (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1986), pp. 471-477; Shmuel Sandler, "Hussein and Arafat—The Troubled Partnership," *Survey of Arab Affairs*, no. 3 (February 1986):1-4.

4. On the structure of the national unity government and the process of decision-making, see Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, "Governing under Peres and Shamir," in Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., *Israel's Odd Couple: The 1984 Elections and the National Unity Government* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990), pp. 222-226.

5. Avraham Tamir, *A Soldier in Search of Peace* (Tel Aviv: Edanim, 1988), pp. 281-282.

6. *Maariv*, April 15, 1990, p. B3.

7. The details of the interaction appeared in *Maariv*, April 15, 1990.

8. *Ibid.*, and Zeev Schiff and Ehud Yaari, *Intifada* (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1990), pp. 300-301.

9. When the international tribunal decided that the international border passed east of Taba, the Likud accused Peres of agreeing to arbitration. Labor argued that it was under Menahem Begin that Israel agreed in Article I(2) of the 1979 peace treaty that the border between Israel and Egypt would resemble the international boundary between Egypt and Mandatory Palestine. Obviously, the implication here was that this formula might be applied to Judea and Samaria. See Elazar and Sandler, "Governing under Peres and Shamir," in *Israel's Odd Couple*, pp. 221-241.

10. For a summary of theories of revolts, see Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Violence," in T.R. Gurr, *Handbook of Political Conflict. Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1981), pp. 135-166.

11. See Arye Shalev, *The Intifada, Causes and Effects* (Tel Aviv: Center for Strategic Studies, 1990) (Hebrew), ch. 1; and Schiff and Yaari, *Intifada*, chs. 2-4. For an additional view, see Emmanuel Sivan, "The Intifada and Decolonization," *Middle East Review* 22, no. 2 (Winter 1989/90):2-7.

12. Schiff and Yaari, *Intifada*, pp. 279-280.

13. Efraim Inbar, "Israel's Small War: The Military Response to the Intifada," *Armed Forces and Society* 18, no. 1 (Fall 1991):31.

14. Arye Shalev, *The Intifada*, p. 114.

15. Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 12-18.

16. For an analysis of the debate between the generals and the ministers, see Schiff and Yaari, *Intifada*, ch. 5.

17. In 1987 Feisal al-Husseini, the most prominent leader of the PLO in the West Bank, had already initiated a dialogue with the Likud leadership, through members of the Likud party central committee. Hussein preferred the Likud over Labor since Labor was identified with the Jordanian option. Moshe

Amirav, the Likud official who served as the middleman, was expelled from the party.

18. Shalev, *The Intifada*, Appendix 18, p. 246.

19. *Ibid.*, Appendix 20, pp. 258-259, and Appendix 21, p. 261.

20. Agudat Israel received a ministry headed by a vice minister, and Degel Hatorah received financial allocations for its institutions. Shas was allocated two portfolios, and the NRP was awarded two ministers and one portfolio.

21. Shamir himself admitted that he had not kept promises; see *Maariv*, March 15, 1990.

22. American Jewry feared the demand of the Orthodox parties to change the Law of Return to conform with the strictures of Jewish law.

23. For the full text of Rabin's address, Shamir's plan, and the government peace plan, see Shalev, *The Intifada*, Appendices 22-24, pp. 266-279.

24. On the politics of realignment, see Nathan Yanai, "The Resumption of a Communal Coalition Tradition," in *Israel's Odd Couple*, pp. 169-192.

25. *Maariv*, April 27, 1990.

26. See Giora Goldberg and Shmuel Tzabag, "The 1989 Histadrut Elections: Thunder before the Storm?" in Elazar and Sandler, eds., *Who Is the Boss in Israel?*

27. The details of the crisis were summarized in *Maariv*, March, 16, 1990, by Menahem Rahat and Yosef Harif, part 2, pp. 1 and 3.

28. MK Avraham Sharir, who felt betrayed by Shamir, was persuaded to desert, bringing Labor up to 61 MKs. Sharir's desertion was balanced by the desertion of an MK from Agudat Israel who received an order to that effect from Rabbi Schneersohn, head of the Habad Hassidic movement which supported a right-wing position on the territories.

29. For a more elaborate interpretation of Rabbi Shach's address, see Baruch Kimmerling in *Haaretz*, March 30, 1990.

30. For the powers of the president, see "Basic Law: The President of the State," in *The Constitution of the State of Israel* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 1988), pp. 43-48. For analysis, see Allan Shapiro in the *Jerusalem Post*, May 11, 1990.

31. Typical of that policy was the Supreme Court's statement of March 15, which criticized the Knesset deputy speaker's decision to schedule the no-confidence motion a day later in order to allow the Labor ministers' resignation to go into effect. The Court nevertheless abstained from imposing its opinion on the Knesset.

32. See, for instance, law professor Ariel Rosen-Zvi's analysis in *Haaretz*, May 9, 1990.

33. The diffuse-bloc system concept is borrowed from systems theory. See K.J. Holsti, *International Politics, A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 88-90.

34. From the right wing it was Generals (Ret.) Ariel Sharon, Yehoshua Saguy, Rafael Eitan (Tzomet), Rehavam Zeevi (Moledet), and Colonel (Ret.)

Yuval Neeman (Tehiya). From Labor, demand for Israeli retaliation came from Generals (Ret.) Ezer Weizman, Mordechai Gur, and Yanush Ben-Gal.

35. On this turn and strategy, see the introductory article by Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler and the analysis of the Likud strategy by Giora Goldberg, in Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., *Who Is the Boss in Israel? Israel at the Polls 1988-89* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1992).

36. *Ibid.*, based on an analysis of the returns.

37. *Haaretz*, December 12, 1991, p. B2.

38. *Haaretz*, July 17, 1992, p. A4.

39. *Haaretz*, December 12, 1991, p. B2.

40. Giora Goldberg, Gad Barzilai, and Efraim Inbar, "The Impact of Intercommunal Conflict: The Intifada and Israeli Public Opinion," *Policy Studies* 43 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1991):52.

41. Gad Barzilai and Efraim Inbar, "Do Wars Have an Impact?: Israeli Public Opinion after the Gulf War," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 1 (1992):48-64.

42. On the eve of Baker's visit to Jerusalem, in an interview to *Le Monde's* Mark Halter, Shamir said, "I, with my personal past and my ideals, will never give up the territories....I do not want to enter my nation's memory as one who sold part of Israel's land." See *Maariv*, April 23, 1991, p. 1. See also *Haaretz*, May 15, 1992, p. B3, and the report of Shamir's appearance before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in *Haaretz*, March 11, 1992, p. A4.

43. *Ibid.*

44. *Haaretz*, April 22, 1992, p. A3.

45. *Maariv*, June 26, 1992, Shabbat section, p. 2.

46. See a summary of the U.S.-Israel clash in the *Jerusalem Post*, March 20, 1992, p. 5A. On leaks by the United States concerning the sale of American weapons technology by Israel to third countries and Baker's use of a vulgar Anglo-Saxon verb in regard to the Jews, see the *International Herald Tribune*, March 10, 1992, p. 3, and March 17, 1992, and the *Washington Post* editorial in the *International Herald Tribune*, March 3, 1992, p. 6, entitled "Israel and America."

47. These calculations are based on the election results in *Haaretz*, June 28, 1992, p. A2. The rest of the vote went to small, ideologically unidentified parties that did not pass the 1.5 percent threshold.

THE ETHNONATIONAL DIMENSION OF ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

The international community of states has been moving for several decades in two contrary directions: integration and interdependence, on the one hand, and the reawakening of primordial national aspirations, on the other. These two concurrent tendencies undermine the state-centered approach by questioning its main assumption—to wit, that international politics is determined purely by state objectives. While the first trend toward cooperation and the growing importance of nonstate actors on the world scene has enjoyed broad attention in the “world politics” approach and was debated in the literature, the role of ethnonationalism in foreign policy and international politics has hardly been noticed. Neoclassical approaches like neorealism and neoliberalism, the first identified with state-centrism and the second with transnationalism, neglected the nation-centered rationale. Realism did not treat the ethnonational dimension as an independent variable, perceiving it mostly as a means whereby states could increase their power in international politics, ignoring reversed situations where historical aspirations are disguised as guided by a strategic rationale. Thus, power politics should not be confused with the genuine desires of nations to express their identity on their historical land. Neither should the reason of nation be identified with the reason of state.

The Israeli case study is a suitable starting point for any theory-building on the role of ethnonationalism in foreign policy because it contains both a strong state and a strong nation. Already in the prestate era, crucial turning points can be identified where the statist and the ethnonational rationale confronted each other and the Zionist movement had to make a choice between insisting on its historical aspirations or pursue its statist goals. Clearly, the saliency of the two perspectives—the statist and the ethnonational—found their expression in different periods in the history of the Jewish state. Moreover, the ethnonational perspective dictated international and regional orientations, national security strategies, and approaches to war and peace that were distinct

from the statist rationale. At the same time, Israeli foreign policy is a limited case study as far as interdependence is concerned. In the absence of regional networks, Israeli foreign policy has thus far been dictated either by ethnonational or statist considerations, but not by a rationale of regional cooperation. Interdependence principles may have been pertinent to the Israeli relationship with the Jewish people, a dimension excluded from our study.

Limiting our study to the distinct impact of each component of the nation-state, we identified three elements as pertinent: the origins of the two components of the polity; the distribution of relative strength between the domains of the nation and the state; and processes of change that transform the internal distribution between the strength of the nation and the state. The consideration of all three elements was limited to their impact on foreign policy. It is within this framework that the study of Israeli foreign policy was conducted: reviewing the origins of the state and the nation, explaining the lack of ethnonationalism during the era of statism in Israeli foreign policy, and later describing the reemergence of the ethnonational dimension in determining Israeli foreign policy. We will start with a summary of the main findings of the Israeli case study and then turn to some theoretical concepts that were either confirmed or derived from this study.

This study took for granted the assumption that ethnonational elements were inherent in the Jewish political tradition. The fact that Jewish consciousness predated the appearance of modern nationalism and that a Jewish polity had existed thousands of years in the Land of Israel prior to the appearance of the modern territorial state influenced the Jewish reawakening. Memories of an ancient land that constituted the national habitat of the Jews—the locale from which it came and where it was bound to return—provided the central pillar of Jewish ethnonational aspirations. The continuous insecurity of Jewish existence in a diaspora, whether because of religious persecution or Judaism's status as an ethnic minority, induced the search for physical security. Thus, the search for a state was built into Jewish aspirations in their spiritual and physical senses, and as such these aspirations were bound to influence the external behavior of the Jewish state.

Modern Zionism was also related to the nationalist revolutions that were spreading throughout Europe and beyond. Equally important was the impact of modern anti-Semitism, which generated the demand for a Jewish state that would provide security for the Jews. The realization by many modernized Jews that emancipation had not solved their problems of Jewish collective existence influenced the Jewish outlook that they

should and could return to their homeland and resolve their problems through the establishment of a Jewish state. Thus, the Jewish reawakening contained both ethnonational and statist elements, and the polity that emerged out of the Zionist idea contained historical aspirations with regard to the ancient land alongside strategic demands. The fact that Israel was termed the Jewish state reflected the duality. The Uganda and partition debates, as well as the political decisions taken in their aftermath, reflected these motives and the clashes between them.

The Zionist movement set the stage for the emergence of a strong state in organizational and leadership terms. In contrast to conventional wisdom which would relate a strong state with expansionism, the strength of the statist component in the Israeli case study curtailed the ethnonational dimension of Israeli foreign policy. The political leadership, led most notably by David Ben-Gurion, was determined to establish a state that would meet the growing existential threat to the Jewish people, even at the cost of giving up historic Jewish land. The polity that emerged was established on a partitioned land, and its capital, Jerusalem, was also divided; both were the result of realistic considerations. The weakness of the communal threat posed by Israeli Arabs helped lower the ethnonational element and caused it to remain dormant. The character of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the nature of the elite and the state institutions, and the personal views of the statesmen ruling Israel also reinforced the ascendancy of the statist dimension of foreign policy. The mere achievement of a state after two millennia also contributed to satisfaction, thus reducing feelings of deprivation that should have been generated by the Holocaust. The fact is that to a certain extent the ruling elite ignored the destruction of European Jewry and concentrated on state-building.

Israel's foreign policy, especially with regard to territory, was until 1967 totally determined by purely strategic variables. Israel's national security doctrine was dictated primarily by considerations such as deterrence and the preventive or preemptive rationales that triggered the wars in 1956 and 1967, respectively. In 1948 Israel in effect stopped short of conquering the Old City, and in both 1948 and 1957 it withdrew from the Gaza Strip. Indeed; despite its strong national origins and the Jewish definition of the Israeli polity, as long as the balance between the statist and the ethnonational variables favored the statist, foreign policy was formulated and directed according to purely strategic considerations.

Partition of the land was terminated in June 1967, an event that had not been planned or initiated by the Jewish state, but rather was a response to Arab aggression. The lack of territorial aspirations to the historical habitat lying next to its borders that characterized the pre-1967 era did arouse ethnonational sentiments in some circles, but overall this mood continued for a while in the aftermath the Six-Day War. The ethnonational dimension was fully aroused only after the Yom Kippur War. Two variables were identified in explaining the rise in nationalism and ethnicity, thus confirming the hypotheses presented in our theoretical chapter. The Israeli conception that the international community at large treated Israel unfairly in the wake of the Yom Kippur War generated feelings of relative deprivation that engulfed Israeli society. The rise of Palestinian identity and the political status of the PLO in the mid-1970s, both on the international scene and in the territories, presented a competitive challenge to the Jewish claims on the Land of Israel and thus compounded the Arab states' traditional physical threat to Israel's security. The turn to ethnonationalism explained the ascendancy of a movement like Gush Emunim which, despite its limited base, enjoyed unprecedented, broad public support. Ultimately, it was translated into a political shift of power from Labor to the Revisionists and other proponents of the Land of Israel ideology.

The decline of the Labor party, which after over forty years of dominance was punished at the polls in 1977 and displaced from the seat of government by the nationalist Likud, went beyond a mere political transition of power from one major party to its rival in line with the tradition of a Western democracy. It also represented a new balance between state and nation. Frustrated over Israel's international standing, the Israeli polity "revolted" against Labor's rule, which represented a policy of placating the "gentiles" instead of standing up to them as Begin, the flamboyant leader of the Likud, promised to do. Feelings of relative deprivation that existed within Israel also came to the fore, activating those elements of Israeli society that felt they were outside of the center. The revolt of the "outs" spread throughout the polity in the ensuing elections, allowing the Likud to continue to rule and pursue its foreign policy goals despite its poor performance in governing. The Likud's success in the ensuing elections and Labor's failure indicated the weakening of the state. Even in opposition, Labor was identified with the state institutions, while the Likud was perceived as trying, without much success, to take over the Labor-dominated "state" apparatus; therefore, it was not to be blamed for its failures. From a foreign

policy perspective, the main result of this process was the rise of ethnonationalism at the expense of purely statist considerations.

No foreign policy issue preoccupied the agenda of the State of Israel in recent years as much as that of the territories. Shlomo Avineri, one of Israel's most respected political scientists and a former director of the Foreign Office, went so far as to argue that since their acquisition the territories had totally controlled the government's agenda.¹ None of the great issues facing the nation and the Jewish people in the social and economic realms received a profound examination by any of the Israeli governments. The "other issues" were either pushed aside as secondary or were considered in the context of the territories. The territories became identified with the essence of Jewish statehood and nationhood, peace and war, and the result was that the territorial issue became a new cleavage, dividing Israeli society and its polity.²

The deep division within Israeli society was expressed in electoral behavior as well as in coalition politics. The ethnic Jewish elements—Sephardim, religious and nationalists—voted for the Likud or those parties which expressed support for the Likud candidate for prime minister in advance. In contrast, two-thirds of the Ashkenazim, the anticlerical Jews, and almost all the Arab vote was cast for either Labor or those parties that expressed in advance their objection to a Likud-led government. Moreover, since 1977 the nationalist, the Sephardi, and all the religious parties (except Agudat Israel in the 1990 governmental crisis) remained loyal to the Likud even when Labor enjoyed a plurality. The Israeli polity was in effect divided into two blocs: the national and religious camp as against the Labor camp and the Arab parties.

The territorial issue separated the Likud from Labor in the area of foreign policy. This dividing line produced two distinct foreign policies. The departure point for the dichotomy was the role each party perceived for the territories and especially those that were considered an integral part of the Land of Israel. As we can see in Table 9.1, which summarizes the variations in Israeli foreign policy along a statist versus ethnonational axis, this basic departure point influenced the cardinal assumptions and principles of Israel's foreign and defense policies. The split over the territorial question led to opposing views concerning regional orientation, the basis for relations with the United States, and strategic issues, as well as approaches to peace and war. To be sure, the attitudes of the leadership of both parties as well as their supporters were scattered along a continuum rather than the ideal-type dichotomy presented in Table 9.1. But if assembled in an aggregate composition, a dichotomy was apparent, especially when positioned one against the other.

Table 9.1
Foreign and Defense Policy Principles: Statist Versus Ethnonational

	Statist	Ethnonational
Role of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza	Bargaining cards and security zones	Nachlat Avot (Inheritance of our Fathers) Land of Israel
Regional orientation	Jordan	Egypt (Begin)
Basis for US support	Special relations	Strategic asset
Strategic line	Jordan River	Mountain ridge
Settlements	Along the Jordan Valley	In the midst of Arab population
The role of war	Balance of power or deterrence	Instrumental for national goals
Justification for war	Defensive (1948, 1973) Preemptive (1967) Preventive (1956)	Instrumental (Sharon) War by choice (Begin) (1982)
Political solution	Partition	Personal autonomy

Despite the rise of ethnonationalism, the statist dimension in Israel's foreign policy did not totally disappear. What emerged was a compound foreign policy, namely, a policy designed to fulfill strategic needs and historical aspirations. Labor's rule for part of the period, and its sharing of power with the Likud in the national unity government for another part, prevented the ethnonational rationale from dominating Israeli foreign policy. Labor's foreign policy also encompassed an ethnic element: it supported withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza because of ethnic considerations, namely, to secure the Jewish character of the state. Between 1977 and 1981 the Likud's foreign policy was not fully implemented, despite its ethnonational rhetoric, for some of the key ministers in defense and foreign policy were closer to the Labor rather than the Revisionist tradition, and the composition of the government was more pluralist. Between 1981 and 1984 the Likud and the nationalist

parties had a free hand in foreign policy. Indeed, this was the period in which the logic of ethnonationalism was fully expressed, resulting in the war in Lebanon. While, traditionally, Arab-Israeli wars were guided by purely security considerations on the strategic level, the Peace for Galilee Operation was designed to achieve a clear national goal: the destruction of the PLO that would allow Israel to solidify its control over the territories.

A similar government to that of 1981, consisting of the Likud and all the other nationalist parties, was assembled following the March-May 1990 government crisis. The government resumed building Jewish settlements in the territories and refused to end this drive, even when leading Arab states offered to abolish the Arab boycott in exchange for a freeze on settlements. Nor did the government bend when Secretary Baker made such a freeze the condition for approval of \$10 billion in loan guarantees to help finance the absorption in Israel of Russian Jewish immigrants.

The Shamir government's behavior during the Gulf War confirms our thesis that a distinction between hawks and doves would not be sufficient to understand Israeli foreign policy. As was the case with regard to territorial concessions in the Sinai during the Camp David Accords, Begin gave up settlements that had been built under Labor for strategic reasons for the sake of preserving Judea and Samaria. The imperatives of the Land of Israel are different from those of a deterrence doctrine. The logic of deterrence dictated the Six-Day War, whereas the maxims of the Land of Israel dictated the Lebanon War. Similarly, a deterrence rationale required an Israeli retaliation for the Scud missile attacks from Iraq, whereas an ethnonational rationale did not.

The impact of the reason of state versus the reason of nation could be tested in a situation where the ethnonational and the statist rationales collided with each other head on. Such a situation might arise if the United States and Israel confronted each other on the land issue, and Israel would have to choose between continued American assistance and friendship or territorial concessions. Another example of a collision would be the demographic question. The ethnonational impetus to maintain the integrity of the Land of Israel clashes with the interest of the state not to absorb a hostile Arab population that may become a majority. This contradiction deterred the Likud government from annexing Judea and Samaria immediately after coming to power in 1977. So far they have solved the dilemma by adopting the idea of personal autonomy. In the long run the demographic question may force the

Jewish polity to choose between fulfilling historical territorial aspirations and maintaining the state's Jewish character.

Could Israeli ethnonationalism be reduced? If ethnonationalism was generated by feelings of relative deprivation, an improved Israeli international position might bring about such a change. Israel's improved international standing, expressed in the restoration of diplomatic relations with almost all the African states, renewed relations with all the Eastern European states and many of the former Soviet republics, and the establishment for the first time of diplomatic relations with China and India, may have generated a process of change of attitudes toward the international community. The defeat of Saddam Hussein by the United States and its international coalition may have had similar effects on Israeli society. Even though the United States attacked the Iraqi war machine because of its own global interests, for the first time in the history of the Jewish state other powers thwarted an Arab threat. The ethnic slogan "the whole world is against us," coined after the Yom Kippur War, may thus have been diluted.³ This consideration may have induced Washington to push for the abolition of the UN resolution equating Zionism with racism in the fall of 1991. Such steps by the international community may help reduce the discrepancy between what many Israelis feel they deserve and what they receive from the outside world, and consequently reduce their ethnonational drive.

The Palestinians' national aspirations were identified as another stimulus to Israeli ethnonationalism. The Palestinian threat that reappeared only in the wake of the Six-Day War and intensified after the Yom Kippur War became interwoven with the Arab military threat on the interstate level to produce a compound conflict, that is, a conflict composed of interstate and intercommunal dimensions.⁴ In contrast, the Intifada decoupled the two conflicts; for the first time since 1967, Jews and Palestinians were confronting each other directly without the intervention of the Arab states. Recent opinion polls have indeed detected a dovish trend with regard to the territories in the wake of the Intifada, a trend that has been explained as being related to the separation between the interstate and the intercommunal conflicts.⁵ It would be more difficult to discern the impact of Israel's improved international position, unless we take Labor's victory in 1992 as confirming this trend.

At the same time, indigenous Israeli ethnonationalism should not be underestimated. These aspirations transcend both the strategic threats from the Arab states and the communal Palestinian rivalry. To a large portion of Israeli society, the entire Land of Israel is indeed an integral part of their collective existence and thus could not be exchanged for the

most secure international borders and guarantees accompanied by the most genuine reconciliation with the Palestinians. The Land of Israel per se is a permanent value that personifies the essence of the Zionist revolution and the Jewish right to self-determination in their ancient homeland.⁶ To many Jews the integrity of the land of Israel under Jewish control has a higher value than peace or security. As one settler remarked to a Canadian journalist, just as you do not sacrifice your wife and children for peace, you do not sacrifice your homeland for peace.⁷ This hard-core element would try to undermine any movement to effect a territorial compromise that might entail partition of the land. To them the Land of Israel as a value transcends that of the state. Others who settled in the territories because of government subsidies by now have developed an economic interest in maintaining Israeli control over these regions.

Studying ethnonationalism from an international perspective is important not only in order to understand the difficulties and obstacles in achieving international solutions but also to avoid disputes after an agreement has been reached. For polities with a strong ethnonational component, a pure statist solution may not resolve the problem unless the factors that arouse primordial aspirations are also treated. Thus, an imposed political solution, even if implemented, may collapse if historical aspirations are not reconciled and the causes of their reappearance or reoccurrence are not eliminated. Statesmen from polities that lack an ethnonational motive in their national experience may not be sufficiently sensitive to such aspirations and therefore may look only for interstate mechanisms. Henry Kissinger identified a comparable gap between the insular and the continental experiences when he studied nineteenth-century Europe:

To Castlereagh the continental nations were aspects of a defensive effort: but to the continental nations general equilibrium meant nothing if it destroyed the historical position which to them was the reason of their existence. To Castlereagh the equilibrium was a mechanical expression of the balance of forces; to the continental nations a reconciliation of historical aspirations.⁸

American policy-makers should take this lesson into consideration when approaching Middle East negotiations.

Turning from conclusions concerning policy to theory, let us look at the theoretical insights that we can draw from this study and apply to other polities. The concepts used throughout this study were adopted

from comparative and international politics. Two Israeli scholars aware of the tension between the nation and the state have drawn the distinction between Israel and other Western polities, stating that "Israel... understands the state as the institutional incarnation of the nation; the liberal pluralist democracies, by contrast, understand the nation as that form of human association, however serendipitous, which is created by the sovereign framework of the state."⁹

Is Israel *sui generis* among the developed countries? It is perhaps special in the degree to which its core foreign policy goals are still influenced by ethnonational aspirations, whereas other Western democracies have reached a more stable balance between their historical and political definitions. Israel, however, is not the only Western democracy divided along ethnic lines. Canada and Belgium, too, are divided along ethnic lines, even though no particularistic ethnonational foreign policy is evident. In addition, the United Kingdom is involved in an ethnonational conflict in Northern Ireland. Neither is Israel the only state in the West that ever forwarded historical territorial claims. Europe in the nineteenth century and the first half of this century is filled with examples of territorial claims related to aspirations rooted in historical memory. It was only following World War II and the inception of the Cold War that most of the European states settled for their borders. Other contemporary democracies such as Western Germany, Greece, Turkey, and India have been involved in interstate conflicts motivated by historical territorial claims. The foreign policies of these states regarding these disputed territories cannot be explained by considerations of security or power.

Beyond the circle of democratic states, Israel is not an exception. Africa and Asia are replete with conflicts motivated by ethnonational aspirations. For many polities that are emerging in the wake of the end of the Cold War in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, and in the Commonwealth that replaced the Soviet Union, the turn to historical legacies in their foreign policies may be very attractive. The implications of this study thus transcend the case of the Jewish state and may be extended to world politics.

In theoretical terms, this study confirmed some hypotheses regarding nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Ethnic nations indeed carry an attachment to land that they consider their historical habitat. Therefore, a renewed contact between the people and the land will awaken old memories and create new desires. The role of feelings of relative deprivation in the revival of nationalism was another assumption that was confirmed. Also important was the linkage between the revival of

ethnonationalism as translated into foreign policy and domestic ethnicity. The role of a competing ethnic community with claims to the same territory will also stimulate and regenerate historical territorial claims as a response to the external challenge. Significant to our study was the capability of ethnonationalism to transform a foreign policy that previously had been directed primarily by strategic considerations.

In conceptual terms, by now it should be clear that the "reason of state" and the "reason of nation" are not congruent. Each realm would therefore produce its own set of orientations and foreign policy goals. Ethnonationalism must be separated from statism and studied further. The phenomenon of a strong state as a constraint on nationalism should also be tested in other polities. The building of strong state institutions and the existence of a statist elite will thus result in the subordination of historical aspirations to purely strategic ones, while the opposite may occur when the state is weakened. The classical assumption that the state uses national claims to advance territorial aggrandizement must be modified. In our case study, the state inhibited or at least moderated historical territorial aspirations. It was also asserted that under certain circumstances the national component would use strategic claims to justify its historical ambitions. Finally, principles of deterrence or other strategic considerations will sometimes produce other and even more extreme territorial demands than those of a nationalist ideology. Kissinger noticed this potential when he remarked that a state's desire for absolute security in a world of relative security may result in insecurity for others.¹⁰

This book did not deal with a whole Jewish ethnic dimension: the Jewish dimension of Israeli foreign policy. The normative Jewish approach to foreign policy, the role of the diaspora, the impact of the Holocaust, the immigration of Soviet or North African Jewries, and other dilemmas in which the state interest has conflicted with the Jewish mission of the State of Israel were either hardly mentioned or not treated at all and are still awaiting exploration.¹¹

NOTES

1. Shlomo Avineri in an address to the 1989 Conference of the Israel Political Science Association.

2. For an analysis of this cleavage, see Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, "The Two Bloc System—A New Development in Israeli Politics," in Daniel J. Elazar and Shmuel Sandler, eds., *Israel's Odd Couple* (Detroit:

Wayne State University Press, 1990), pp. 11-26. See also Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia* (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1990), ch. 2 in the English edition and ch. 3 in the Hebrew edition.

3. This trend may be confirmed by a public opinion survey conducted after the Gulf War. See *Haaretz*, May 1, 1991, p. A4.

4. Shmuel Sandler, "The Protracted Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Jerusalem Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 4 (November 1988):72-73. An exposition of this structure took place during the Gulf crisis when Saddam Hussein tried to advance his interstate ambitions by demanding a linkage with the Palestinian issue. Bush and Baker's double-track policy was intended to overcome that nexus.

5. G. Goldberg, G. Barzilai, and E. Inbar, "The Impact of Intercommunal Conflict: The Intifada and Israeli Public Opinion," *Policy Studies* 43 (Jerusalem: Leonard Davis Institute, Hebrew University, 1991), particularly pp. 32 and 58-60.

6. For further research on ethnonational attitudes, the researcher is advised to read journals like *Nekuda* and *Nativ*. Public expressions in this direction by Prime Minister Shamir appeared in *Le Monde* and were quoted in *Maariv*, April 23, 1991. See also *Maariv*, April 19, 1991.

7. *The National*, CBC, August 6, 1991. On October 28, 1991, the Israeli right wing demonstrated in Tel Aviv in support of Shamir not giving in to U.S. pressures under the slogan "You don't sell your mother."

8. Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace 1812-1822* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 145.

9. Bernard Susser and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, "The Nation v. the People: Israel and the Decline of the Nation State," *Midstream* (November 1989):14.

10. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 147.

11. For some preliminary work in the area of Jewish foreign policy, see Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 229-244; Moshe Zak, "Jewish Motifs in Israel's Foreign Policy," *Gesher* 1/110 (Spring 1984):32-43; Charles S. Liebman and Mala Tabory, *Jewish International Activity: An Annotated Bibliography* (Ramat Gan: Argov Center, Bar-Ilan University, 1985); Shmuel Sandler, "Is There a Jewish Foreign Policy?" *Jewish Journal of Sociology* 29 (December 1987):115-121; Aaron Klieman, *Israel and the World after Forty Years* (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1990), pp. 52-54; and Efraim Inbar, "Jews, Jewishness and Israel's Foreign Policy," *Jewish Political Studies Review* 2, nos. 3 & 4 (Fall 1990):165-184.

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