The Fall of Jerusalem


AUGUSTA VICTORIA
JERICHO ROAD
MOUNT OF OLIVES
RAS AL AMOUD
GOLDEN GATE
ST. STEPHEN'S GATE
HARAM AL-SHARIF
AL-AQSA MOSQUE
DOME OF THE ROCK
DUNG GATE
HEROD'S GATE
VIA DOLOROSA
DAMASCUS GATE
SULEIMAN ROAD
SION GATE
N
JAFFA GATE
ARMISTICE LINES 1948
JAFFA ROAD
ISRAELI CONTROLLED SECTOR

The Fall of Jerusalem

by Abdullah Schleifer

Monthly Review Press
New York and London

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 79–178713

First Printing

Monthly Review Press
116 West 14th Street, New York, N.Y. 10011
33/37 Moreland Street, London, E.C. 1

Manufactured in the United States of America

To the people of Arab Jerusalem

Jerusalem–Amman–Beirut
1968–1971

Contents

1. The City

The soul of this city rests in Haram al-Sharif—the "Noble Sanctuary" where history and traditions posit the presence of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, Jesus, Mary, and Muhammad.

Here is that rock, that Jebusite threshing floor upon which David built his altar and which Solomon enclosed within his temple, where ancient desert genealogy records the act of worship and sacrifice by Malki Sadek, king of the Jebusites, the "gate of Paradise" where the souls of Believers shall gather on the Day of Judgment.

Thirty-four acres, leveled and tiered, carved to the north out of rocky crest and raised up, to the south, by the fill of time and Herod's ambition, the Haram is guarded by high walls and massive gates through which passage has always been a sacramental or at least a solemn occasion.

The Romans tumbled Herod's walls and turned the sanctuary into a mound of rubble. The Byzantines left it as a refuse dump to be cleared away, in 638 A.D., by the hands of the second caliph, Omar ibn-al-Khattab, and his desert warriors, and restored as the center of worship and pilgrimage in their belief that Islam had come, not as a new religion but as restoration of a timeless prophetic Faith.

The strength of Jerusalem lies in its consistent architectural caution, the beauty of massed, faded gray austere stone catching the white Palestinian light, rather than in that recurring brilliance of detail, artifact, and color which flavors the other "museum cities" of Islamic civilization. So it is possible for a single building, Qubbat al-Sakhrah—Dome of the Rock—with its sparkling blue, green, and turquoise Kashan tiles and golden dome, to dominate an entire city.

When the Umayyad caliph, Abdul Malik ibn-Marwan, built the Dome of the Rock in 691 A.D., he sought for his own political ends a shrine worthy of a site to rival Mecca. But the Haram is more than a setting for Abdul Malik's maneuver: it is both a shrine and a treasure house harboring mosques, ritual pools, koranic schools and courts, arcades, formal gardens and cypress groves, tombs, and open-air prayer platforms, all of which recall in actual carved inscription or undying legend the names of prophets, holy men, kings, emirs, and caliphs.

"It is said that there is not upon the face of the earth a mosque larger than it," wrote Ibn Battutah. The Haram al-Sharif glows by moonlight like a celestial city.

When Omar received the city from the Byzantine Patriarch, he granted security to the lives, property, and churches of the Christians. And in this time the Muslims allowed the Jews—barred by the Byzantines from Jerusalem for all but one day a year—to worship and dwell here.

So the city took its shape over the centuries under this seal—a rolling skyline of countless domes, pierced by minarets and steeples, fixed finally by the city walls that rose in the early sixteenth century during the reign of the Ottoman Sultan, Suleiman the Magnificent.

Only the grid effect along and across the market streets betrays the city's origin—Aelia Capitolina, the Roman colony built upon the ruins of Herod's city and inherited by Byzantium. According to K. A. Creswell, Jerusalem is one of the most perfectly preserved examples of a medieval Islamic city.

"Jerusalem of Gold," the Israelis sing—and they really mean gold as the Dome of the Rock. And the cobbled lanes and massive houses twisted into that organic maze-effect of insect beauty; the shafts of light filtering down through the vented arched roofs of otherwise opaqued bazaars; the free-flowing headdress of the men and flashes of intricate peasant embroidery as the country women in their long-sleeved, ankle-length gowns glide by, baskets of figs balanced on their kerchiefed heads—these, too, are all images drenched in Arab style.

Even the small but long-established and Arabic-speaking communities of religious Jews who lived here within the walls before the 1948 War—generally indifferent or even opposed to Zionist ambitions—were so much a part of the city's Eastern spirit.

When the Crusaders conquered Jerusalem they quartered their horses in the Haram al-Sharif. The Israelis turned it into a motorpool.

It would be unfair not to note the differences. The Crusaders put an estimated 70,000 Muslim and Jewish noncombatants to the sword—"It was impossible to see without horror that mass of dead," wrote William of Tyre—while the Israelis made a special point of not bombarding most of the holy places and of distributing free bread and milk in part of the city the day after their victory. But to the Arab and Muslim world these are but expressions of a different time and its tensions.

Two great powers—Christendom and Islam—confronted each other in that closing year of the eleventh century; the fate of vast territories, not to mention the Holy City, was to be determined solely by the outcome of the unfolding armed struggle. This was a bloody but direct universe without such modifying forces as the Afro-Asian and Communist blocs condemning the conqueror in a world assembly or without the obvious concern for the fate of this city by powerful religious communions not involved in the combat.

And if history today generally describes the Crusaders as "aggressors" and "foreign intruders," or even as usurpers and settler-colonialists, one can either be cynical about the inevitable morality of history that is usually so unkind to the ultimate loser or, like the Arab and the Muslim, smile with knowing charm.

For no man relishes the title of aggressor, and if the Israelis are absolute in denying accusations that they have usurped Palestine—which would by definition make them the aggressors, whatever the particulars of any specific battle or campaign—it would be unfair to the Crusaders to admit a lesser claim to idealism.

The Holy Land was considered the common fief of all Christendom at the time of the Crusades, and the European knights came using violence only to reconquer what had been taken from them by violence. Little more than four hundred years separated the Crusaders from the mythic source—the fall of Byzantine Jerusalem—and not nearly two thousand years.

The Crusaders had endured years of suffering in their treks through the Balkans to Constantinople, across to Asia Minor, and finally into Palestine, sustained by a vision of Jerusalem and the Holy

Land no less intense than that which has served as central fact to the entire Zionist concept of the "Return from Exile."

When they were but in sight of the Holy City, knights and foot soldiers to a man fell to their knees uttering cries of joy and wept without shame. Like Moshe Dayan, Levi Eshkol, and Ben-Gurion before the Wailing Wall, so walked the Crusader Barons: Robert of Normandy, Godfrey of Bouillon, Tancrède, Raymond of Saint-Gilles—"barefoot, with sighs and tears, through the holy places of the city where Jesus Christ Our Savior lived in the flesh. Devoutly they kissed the places where His feet had trod," wrote William of Tyre.

Here rose the Latin or Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem, linked by alliance and marriages of state to the other Crusader kingdoms of the north and stretched along the Mediterranean in a shape so strikingly similar to that of the Zionist state. As one commentator aptly put it, the amazing thing about the creation of this artificial state was the rapid development of a new national consciousness based on the Christian Biblical past. Those who remained were aware that they had become citizens of the real home of all Christians.[1]

Certain of the permanence of their colonization, as convinced of their bastion-like place in the Middle East as any contemporary Zionist, Fulcher of Chartres—historian and chaplain to the first Crusader King of Jerusalem, Baldwin I of Boulogne—wrote in *Gesta Francorum Iherusalem*:

> The Italian and the Frenchman of yesterday have been transplanted and become men of Galilee or Palestine. . . . We have already forgotten the land of our birth; who now remembers it? Men no longer speak of it. Here one now has his house and servants with as much assurance as though it were by immemorial right of inheritance in the land. . . . Every day relatives and friends from the West come to join us. They do not hesitate to leave everything they have behind them. . . .

It is impossible to argue over ideological source—be it Crusader, Zionist, Muslim, or Arab. What is discernible is the way men respond to acts. In the eyes of most Arab Christians as well as of all Muslims, the Crusaders were simply the Franks—Europeans, intruders . . . *al-Ifranj;* and the name sticks to this day in the backwaters of the Middle East for any European or European mannerism affected by an Arab.

The people of Palestine—an Arabian (i.e., Semitic) blend of Amorites, Canaanites, Hittites, Jebusites, Phoenicians, Hebrews, and late-Arabians with Philistine, Roman, Greek, and Frankish flavoring—have lived out their centuries and moved from one Semitic tongue to another in a series of religious-political experiences as animists, as Jews, as Christians, and finally as Muslims. And with the adoption of the language of the Quran (Koran) as their ultimate idiom they have taken as a name for their modern cultural identity, "Arab."

The process has been culturally consistent—an Eastern or Asian development—even during the greatest periods of Hellenization. And it is this consistency, marked by the many hundreds of Palestinian peasant villages where an unbroken chain of families has cultivated the land for several thousand years, that was so visibly marred by the armed intrusion of Western ideologues, regardless of their Crusader or Zionist idealism.

The Israelis rejoice that they have "returned" to liberate Jerusalem. The emotion is obviously a genuine and powerful source of morale and a directive for intelligence. And it is almost irrelevant, in the face of such emotion, to recall that the Diaspora as a voluntary phenomenon predates the destruction of even the first Temple and the modest deportations of Nebuchadnezzar, or to consider the recorded existence of thriving communities of Jews in Mesopotamia, Chaldea, and Egypt during the Persian epoch.

Long before the destruction of Jerusalem the great majority of Jews had left Palestine to populate the urban centers of the Roman Empire; of those Jews still in Palestine at the time of Titus and Hadrian, the majority remained and embraced Christianity and/or Islam in the coming centuries.[2] Today, then, many people can visit this part of the world, be struck by the biblical familiarity of Arab ways, and find the Western, the Zionist, sense of "Return" unbearably abstract.

At work in his fields or market stalls, at prayer in the mosque, or secure with his family beneath fig tree and vine—it is the Arab, his movements, manners, and remnant graces that fix every biblical image to this tortured landscape of prophecy and asceticism.

In prewar days, visitors crossing over from Israel into Jordan would comment that the Middle East began at Mandelbaum Gate, that one-time singular and restricted link between New Jerusalem

and the Old City. Within a few weeks after the June War the gate was gone, along with all other signs of the old cease-fire line dividing the two Jerusalems. New connecting roads sprang up almost overnight, and old routes—atrophied since the end of the British Mandate—were quickly revived by the Israelis. Street markers in Hebrew lettering, carefully produced to complement the Arabic and English-lettered Armenian decorative tiles, were cemented into place above the Jordanian originals throughout the twisting streets of the Old City.

These were the first days of annexation and it was as if the Israelis were exerting all of this amazing civic energy to convince themselves, the Arabs, and the rest of the world that Jerusalem's "unification" was more than a permanent fact; as if all that could conceivably remain of the past two decades, which in turn flows into millennia of Eastern history regardless of ruling regime or dynasty or tribe, was a vague memory of a highly artificial state of affairs.

But the prewar character sticks. The two "sectors" are actually an Asian city plus its vast twentieth-century semicolonial suburb (or European "city"), and both had gone their separate ways for almost twenty years.

The stigmata of modern and provisional occupations are all visible in Jerusalem: the ending of genuine political life and the search for reasonable collaborators; the banishment of outspoken Arab leaders such as the mayor, the chief justice of the Muslim law court, former Jordanian ministers, educators and trade union organizers, Arab nationalist and Communist leaders; and the arrest, imprisonment, and almost inevitable torture of those suspected of resistance.

The prisons fill up, empty, and fill up again. The occupier—by the iron logic of these affairs—becomes increasingly repressive. In the passage of little more than a year several thousand Arabs in Jerusalem alone have already experienced at least temporary detainment.

Think of Paris under a German garrison during World War II—held but not annexed, administered (in time, terrorized) but not Germanized—or of Santo Domingo in the hands of the Marines, and then understand the particular agony of Arab Jerusalem.

Mass evictions number in the thousands. Hundreds of Arab homes demolished, one-third of the land already expropriated and more in-

evitably to come—while new housing springs up for thousands of Israelis prepared to settle in what is now known as "East Jerusalem." Impersonal "laws of the market" and intentional boycott are destroying the local economy. All these are reasonable requirements or historical necessities if Israel, in the words of President Zalman Shazar, "is to make the Old City Jewish."

Not long after the war an Israeli cigarette company with a taste for patriotic appeals placed a series of ads on the front page of the Israeli English-language daily, the *Jerusalem Post.* The ads featured photographs of typically beautiful Old City Arab scenes: the old bazaars, an aerial view of the Haram al-Sharif and the Damascus Gate. Above each photo appears the caption "This is your land," and it is clear to the Arab that the message is not meant for him.

The fall of Jerusalem on June 7, 1967—859 years to the day since the Crusader armies first appeared before the walls of the Holy City—and the occupation that has followed are a microcosm of the fate of all Palestine and of the entire Arab-Israeli conflict. And it is still more.

The idea that Europeans, by nature of any number of superior spiritual, historic, or cultural rights, were justified to directly colonize the rest of the world (and in that peculiarly intense racist manner that seems to run like a profound flaw through Western man) has not been fashionable since the end of World War II.

The last great, shameless conquests or colonizations—India, Egypt, North Africa, the Chinese capitulations, Indo-China, Indonesia, the Malay states, the Tartar emirates, southern Africa, the Congo—were all mainly nineteenth-century affairs.

By the end of World War I the gathering mood already required ambiguity and subterfuge—"mandate," "trusteeship"—rather than admit any unembarrassed right of conquest. In the 1930's, when Italy brought 20,000 colonists to Libya and dug up from under the desert some old Roman columns to prove "historic rights," the world snickered.

Who in Europe, besides the hopeless Portuguese, today dares talk about the white man's burden, about missionaries for the heathen, and about gunboats for missionaries bringing light into the jungle?

The most stable and powerful of the remaining settler-colonial states is the Republic of South Africa, as dedicated to white rule and

apartheid as Israel is to Jewish exclusivity, as ideologically certain of her biblical rights (that business about Ham and Noah and who will forever hew wood and draw water for whom) as David Ben-Gurion thundering on about the Promise to Abraham.

The founder of Zionism—Theodor Herzl—could write without embarrassment in 1895 of his admiration for the "scientific" quality of the colonization of South Africa.[3] But there are nevertheless profound differences in situation and style which have allowed Israel and the Zionist movement to transcend such frankness. The bare bones of Herzl's vision have been fleshed over with a provisional humanism so similar to that other successful venture in twentieth-century liberal empire-building—the American New Deal.

It is not simply a matter of rhetoric and certainly not of cynicism. The cultural formation of the Afrikaner cannot be compared to that of the oppressed European Jew, consciously allied for decades with democratic and even revolutionary movements. There was nothing in the Afrikaner's experience as a European to obscure the hard racial tone inherent in settler-colonialism. And Herzl, who was spared any significant brush with virulent anti-Semitism until the Dreyfus affair, could emotionally afford—unlike his Eastern European followers—to ignore this moral tension.

The South Africans have been stuck with their highly visible natives—unavoidable in a society built on the exploitation of native labor and not, as in the case of Israel, upon the vacated land of the native turned into refugee and upon the abandoned fruits of his labor. (The Israelis have their own economic ambitions for the region that are far more comprehensive, if ever realizable, than the typical Afrikaner's narrow nineteenth-century concept of profit.)

Aside from a remnant of the Palestinians left behind Jewish lines at the end of the 1948 War, the native simply vanished as a calculable element. It is no accident that the "hard" and "hawkish" aspect of Zionism which has plagued the Palestinian for decades has only now become apparent to limited sections of Western public opinion after the June 1967 War, when the Israeli occupation of the remaining portions of Palestine (Jordan's West Bank and Gaza) brought the native back into everyone's focus.[4]

There are vast Anglo-American investments in South Africa; the investors have the power to ensure that anti-apartheid sentiment in

the West is never translated into actively effective measures against South Africa. But there are no large, articulate, and influential communities of Afrikaners in the West, manipulated by Pretoria, and then in turn manipulating public opinion in behalf of Pretoria. Ideologically South Africa has been on the defensive for decades.

South Africa's frontiers are as fixed and as old as its self-image; all the Republic basically seeks is buffer space between itself and the African revolution. But Arab Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, Gaza, and parts of the West Bank are fresh fields. Here is a clinic for case studies in a still dynamic settler-colonialism of the most subtle sort, successful to the degree that it has evaded the colonialist label (at least in the West) throughout an anticolonialist epoch. Only in Palestine is it still possible for liberals to cheer cowboys gunning down the Indians or pushing them back into the badlands.

The people of Arab Jerusalem have committed themselves to a holding action against annexation.

If most merchants now must look to Israeli sources for stock, almost none have entered partnerships or turned over their locations for key money despite the frantic barrage of deals offered by Israeli businessmen in the first months after the war. Local lawyers continue to boycott the Israelized courts while discreetly arranging for "Israeli-Arab" attorneys from Haifa to represent their clients.

Government schools function under Israeli direction, Hebrew is taught as a second language, and both students and parents "welcome" it in the sense of a survival course. But on the first anniversary of the fall of the city a new Arab generation revealed itself as thousands of school-age boys and girls, organized in secret, turned out to march for three tense days. Despite periodic police charges and the use of water cannon, these solemn and disciplined children held their ranks and, bearing wreaths, made their way to the Muslim cemeteries just outside the city walls. The koranic inscriptions wrapped about the wreaths were not evasive: "Those who are killed in the service of Allah are not dead; they are still living."

Most of the people, however, rarely dare consider more than listening to the fedayeen radio broadcasts or closing up their shops on a few politically significant days, and do that with great fear of reprisal.

The cost of living soared when the city was incorporated into the

relatively high-wage and distinctly tax-prone Israeli economy. The Arab banks remain closed (their assets locked away in the Israeli Central Bank), and aside from the souqs selling vegetables and other staples, stagnancy reigns in the business districts.

The hundreds of thousands of pilgrimage visitors from the Arab and Muslim world who came each year to the great churches and mosques of Jerusalem, filling the many modest hotels or renting rooms in private homes throughout the city and staying on to shop in the old markets and in the modern business district outside of the walls, no longer can come. And so much of what remains of the former flow of Western tourists has been taken in hand by Israeli entrepreneurs. Tourist guides, taxi drivers, travel agencies, the touring bus company, and the modern hotels of Arab Jerusalem languish with few customers. The depression spreads in widening circles to the souvenir shops and to the artisans who fashion and carve olive-wood prayer beads and crucifixes.

The men of Jerusalem who work as teachers or technicians in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and the oil-rich Gulf states—but retain their Jordanian citizenship and return home each summer with money for their families—must now apply through relatives in the hope of receiving severely restricted "visitors' " permits to their own homes.

Hundreds of thousands of Israelis poured into the Old City in the first few weeks after the June War to buy up local stocks of American and European canned goods, fountain pens from China, and plastic trifles from Hong Kong and Japan. The sudden availability of low-cost farm produce from the West Bank also brought swarms of Israeli housewives. Within a month the boom was over: those Arab merchants who had not exhausted their imported stock were taxed Israeli-fashion; West Bank farm produce, livestock, and light manufactured products were barred from direct access to the Arab Jerusalem market, which must now deal almost exclusively with Israeli distributors and at Israeli prices. With the passing of great bargains the Israeli shoppers lost interest in the Arabs, and unemployment depressed the merchants' own local market.

Now and then one hears of a neighbor who has gone away to find work in Kuwait, Qatar, or Abu Dhabi. But most stay on; the shopkeepers master Hebrew to better serve what there is in the way of trade, and the unemployed Arab laborers fan out through the Jewish

city to search for work. I know an amazing number of men who once worked as clerks, accountants, or taxi drivers and who now sell soda pop, ice cream, or groceries from little stalls dotting the Old City.[5]

Funds from Amman—loans from friends and family, salaries or grants paid out by the Jordanian government, and bank withdrawals —are carried back by hundreds of Jerusalem residents whom the Israelis allow brief trips across the river, and this invisible income helps keep the Arab city alive.

In the modern business districts within and outside the city walls, retail shops that once sold household appliances or furniture soon began to transform themselves into cafés, bars, restaurants, and nightclubs.

It seems at present that the only viable role for the Arab city within the Israeli economy will be as a night-life quarter to service the Israeli youth who flock to Arab Jerusalem during the Friday night and Saturday Sabbath when the Jewish cities close up. The far-sighted pimps of Tel Aviv and Jaffa have moved their girls here to get in on the boom. The pimps and their women, like all the other underclasses of Israeli life, are invariably Oriental Jews. The Old City could well become a racial tenderloin, like Havana or even Harlem in older times.

But Jerusalem whistles Savonarola's tune. The revolutionary presence so often in the air—grenades exploding in the night, a truckload of dynamite shattering an Israeli-Jerusalem marketplace, a rash of guerrilla attacks not far from the city—makes poor public relations for any solid sort of Arab "sin city." [6]

There are also Arabs to be found who share neither the general discontent nor the will to at least passively resist. Many of the city's very poor—unskilled laborers frequently unemployed in Jordanian times—have found factory or service jobs with Israeli employees at wages far above what was ever possible in the past. A few of these workers rest content unless directly threatened by the waves of land expropriations and sudden evictions.

More typical is the owner of a floundering Arab hotel who eventually hired an Israeli consultant, turned his kitchen kosher, and was immediately rewarded with a stunning summer guest list of eighty-seven visiting teachers and principals from the Hebrew day schools of America.

There is Masswadi, a hardworking if overly ingratiating cook from Hebron whose hommus (boiled chick-peas and sesame oil whip) was considered about the best in the Old City. After the June War someone brought Moshe Dayan to Masswadi's small Oriental restaurant to sample the hommus. Dayan's praises appeared in print and a new age dawned for Masswadi. A rush of Israeli trade, a mysterious source of capital, and he emerged as the owner of a large, modern restaurant and as a new-style effendi, strutting through the streets with his head held high and settling all arguments with his neighbors by invoking the name of his friend Dayan. According to dark Arab rumor, Masswadi has been licensed to carry a gun.

An Arab-Jewish nightclub partnership introduced the striptease to the Old City: "The first floor show in Jerusalem in two thousand years," the Arab partner told me with peculiar pride.

A founder of the Royal Jordanian Air Club turned his struggling suburban hotel into a country club which staged, according to the local press, "chic and daring Arab-Jewish fashion shows" (i.e., Israeli models in streamlined Arab peasant dress). "There's a not-so-ancient saying that Jerusalem is always under curfew. What we mean is that it's dead—completely dead—at night. Too much praying and all that sort of thing," the Arab hotelman told the press. His embarrassed Israeli partner explained: "Reunification also means revitalization!"

Jerusalem has known and thrived upon masses of foreign visitors—at Easter, Christmas, Ramadan, the Feast of Nebi Musa, Eid al-Adha—processionals as great as any of the Israeli crowds that have poured through the city since the war. But then even the most hedonistic made peace with this ascetic, tradition-bound city and saved the partying for Beirut. You would see them, camera-laden and self-conscious, moving through the streets or even within the Haram during brief and regulated visiting hours, transmuted into pilgrims by the dignity of the Arabs and the sight of richly bearded Greek Orthodox clergy, nuns from French, Spanish, and Russian orders, cloaked Franciscans, Armenian priests in their scary black hoods, and turbaned sheikhs of Islamic law, all treading about within the psychic aura of a holy city.

Now, from late morning till past sunset, so many of these narrow streets belong to jostling crowds of Israelis who will not be intimidated by any native's sense of solemnity. Bored or infectiously gay, in

miniskirts or tight slacks, the men often in shorts, they generate a mood worthy of any Western holiday resort or at least the forgotten days of Shanghai and Casablanca. On Friday night the Old City is bursting at the seams, unless an explosion set off in the Jewish city by the Arab underground or a daring fedayeen raid in a nearby suburb has induced a temporary mood of caution.

In the more modern quarters outside of the walls, where the major tourist hotels are found, Israelis crowd the neon-bright sidewalks of the miniature Sunset Strip which mushroomed after the occupation. The overflow pours into the streets, swirling between lines of tightly packed cars and motorcycles and the conspicuous police patrols. The only Arabs in sight here on a Friday night are taxi drivers and club employees.

Arab taxi drivers servicing the night-life trade have been mugged by their customers. They interpret the robberies and beatings (unheard of here before the war) as political acts, not realizing that this sort of assault is basically apolitical, a taste of one of the more disagreeable patterns of Western urban life.

Oriental cafés just within the walls (once the exclusive domain of male water-pipe smokers) fill up with slumming Israeli couples who drop in for tea and some local color.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of a traditional Muslim quarter is the sensory-intense quality of the quiet nights and the relative absence of jarring, uncool public scenes, due in part to the koranic prohibition of alcohol. The Israelis, however, want their beer and there are now enough café and late-hour refreshment-stand owners prepared to sell it. An Arab quarter fast asleep inspires wandering bands of Israeli youth to song, and in the late hours of any Israeli holiday night the stillness that once kept men's voices barely above a whisper is shattered.

Aside from Ben-Gurion, who called for the destruction of the Ottoman Sultan's walls the better to ensure "the unity of the two sectors," the Israeli elite does not consciously seek to obliterate this city's grandeur. The Israeli mayor sounds conscientious about preserving some of the Islamic architectural treasures, landscaping programs already under way under Jordanian rule have been ambitiously enlarged, and more of the city walls are floodlit at night than before.

Yet there is a difference between the vibrations of a living city and a cold piece of restoration; between a community that shares and cultivates the values of a way of life which takes concrete form in the shapes of a particular urban style and the distant appreciation of visitors to a museum. It is all too abstract and bloodless, this sort of refined art-gallery vision of *things*. Art is organic, relevant to whatever sources exist within a given society—or in the end it is nothing. From the earnest, intelligent Hebrew University scholar who has mastered the origins of Old City Mamluk heraldry a thin line descends into the ultimate boredom of an Israeli teen-ager sitting on top of a wall of the Haram al-Sharif and crooning "Strangers in the Night."

It is an index of attitude and things to come that Israeli fashion photographers now pose their models against the quaint setting of Arab street life, like *Vogue* unveiling the latest fashions in the shadows of the Parthenon.

There is also a certain timeless quality inherent to an Arab city that regulates itself by different rhythms than those of the West. But a Sabbath-closing law has been imposed where the predominantly Muslim culture knows no Sabbath, where men once closed their shops at will or whim, or on different days agreed upon by professional guilds. Friday was once the busiest of all market days: the farmers brought their produce in from the villages, shopped in the souqs for supplies, and then joined the merchants and workers for weekly community prayer at al-Aqsa, the city's central mosque within the Haram. Now on Friday the shops are shuttered, the souqs are closed, and aside from the Christian Quarter the city is dead.

In the residential quarters the artisan stalls and the neighborhood barber shops frequently stayed open long after the souqs had closed at sundown. Here small groups of friends would sit together through the evening, and these little shops rivaled the cafés as centers of social life in the Old City. If the hours were long, the pace was easy—coffee and conversation were as important to the proprietor as work. Now only the cafés are allowed open after seven at night.

Nevertheless the city remains solemn because the Arabs have remained. Because neighborhood life is somehow simultaneously a teeming noisy marketplace and a self-conscious stage governed by an ancient sense of the rituals of politeness and discretion. Because the

bombs and dynamite charges of Arab guerrillas shattered suave visions to reassert the more naked truth that this city, though conquered, is Arab.

From the center of the Old City, in the heart of the souq, a road descends to the Haram al-Sharif, ending at the large double gate known as Bab al-Silsileh. Just before the gate there is an elegantly chiseled doorway that opens onto a preparatory school for sheikhs of Islamic law—Madressa Tinkiz'ya—named after Emir Tinkiz, the deputy Sultan of Damascus who built this school in 1328 and was poisoned to death in Alexandria fourteen years later.

The school has also served at different times as a Muslim court and civil governorate; its foundation rests, in part, on ancient vaulting, across the Tyropoeon Valley, built as an extension of the wall of the original Canaanite city of Salem during the reigns of David and Solomon. Before the time of Emir Tinkiz a Sufi lodge stood here, and tough tradition claims this site for the court in which the Sanhedrin sat in the days of Jesus and Paul.

The upper-floor apartment of this aging Mamluk building is built into the top of the western wall of the Haram. Here I have lived since before the war, our rooms overlooking the Muslim sanctuary.

Not long after the war the Israeli Army moved out of the Haram and returned the shrine to the Muslim authorities, who restored the prewar regulations concerning visiting hours, decorum, and fees. But late that first summer former Israeli army chaplain Rabbi Shlomo Goren led a group of disciples into the Haram through the southernmost gate—Bab al-Magharaba—and conducted prayer services within the Muslim shrine. The occasion was the Ninth of Ab in the Hebrew calendar, the date of the destruction of the Temple. After prayer the Rabbi told the Israeli press that he would return on a regular basis and build a synagogue within the Haram. The most articulate and sophisticated circles of Israeli society were deeply embarrassed by Goren's gesture, and under severe editorial attack the Rabbi retracted.[7]

Not so the Rabbi's comrade-in-arms. A few days after the incident the army returned to the Haram, on Dayan's orders, to seize the key to the Magharaba Gate and install a security unit within the gatehouse for unregulated Israeli access to "the Temple Mount area"

where the Muslims, according to the military spokesman, had rights solely to "the mosques in the compound."

Young Israeli couples stroll about the Haram, arm around waist, resting for some tentative moment of romance among the trees or at the edge of a formal garden—more private than Coney Island or Brighton except for the bitter eyes of passing natives. The prayer-platform near the ablution pool is favored by Israeli families for quick picnics, and the children can play hide-and-seek around the *mihrab* (pulpit) facing Mecca.

To Western eyes there is nothing extraordinary here, but to the Arab's heightened sense of style and modesty, so intense that even husbands and wives do not hold hands on the street (much less within the confines of a sanctuary), this is all desecration—as brutal as rolling the head of a pig down the aisle of some synagogue.

An old sheikh has come by the house for a visit and discreet view. We sit at the window.

"Before the war we had thousands of visitors, non-Muslims, and before 1948 many of these were Jews. None ever behaved like this. I'll tell you why these Israelis carry on so. It's because we are in their hands, because they think this is their national park now."

The sheikh wags his head in anger and I think of Usama ibn-Munqidh,[8] that urbane Arab knight and poet who visited the Haram under Crusader occupation and wrote in his memoirs of "their doings and strange mentality."

Usama survived the catastrophes of his time—Crusader sieges, schismatic revolts behind Muslim lines, petty emirs and their ministers as prepared to deal with the Latin kings as with each other, palace conspiracies, and army uprisings, all of which read in the Arab East like yesterday's disorder.

It was with an eye to the past, the visible Arab past, that I first came to this city and struggled to stay on for the peace of Jerusalem. Often, late at night, during the walk home from the local English-language newspaper office where I worked as managing editor, one could hear bursts of automatic rifle fire exchanged along the cease-fire lines that then encompassed almost all of the Arab city. I knew in that abstract sense, which one has from reading (and even editing) the daily press, that war and disaster were always potentially at the

gates ready to overwhelm the city and the style of life we had slipped into those past few years. But there is a psychological weight to these old wrinkled stones I love and the massive, intertwined homes they form; to the buttresses that bridge the cobbled lanes turning streets into tunnels as the houses of Jerusalem rise in the air. A seductive psychology, fed also by the security of familiar neighborhood life.

Now necessity sharpens my eye for the present. Were it so sharp then, I would have feared—each moment of the day—for the peace of the city.

A few days after the fall of Jerusalem the city was swarming with foreign correspondents interviewing anyone who would stand still and talk in a European language. I was finally cornered on the street by one from Toronto—both a Jew and a Zionist.

Only a few days had passed since I had seen napalm rolling over Jordanian positions near Mount Scopus and my wife had discovered that her best friend in Jerusalem had been killed by one of those bombs which the press reported never to have been dropped on civilians within the walls of the Old City. We were Muslims, obviously "pro-Arab" foreigners allowed to remain in an occupied territory only by tolerance of the occupiers. I took refuge in personal diplomacy to avoid either dishonesty or the loss of residence.

But the journalist shrewdly ignored politics, picked up on my family name, and asked whether I was of Jewish origin and, if so, why I had become a Muslim. I told him that years ago, then an atheist and beyond thought of faith, I had become obsessed with roots, with the grace and mysteries of the Semite, and held on to this for some sort of sustenance. Five years before this war I had visited North Africa and discovered in Arab-Islamic thought and gesture the quintessence of the Semitic, and this spirit and the artifacts of the dying religious culture that it informed had been the beginning.

Every strand of sensibility stretched during those jealous months in Tangier, Fez, Marrakesh, and Meknes—pulled taut by weaving calligraphies and the psychic peace of old medinas (cities) counting the time intervals by prayer; by an alabaster fountain placed to catch the sunset's dying ray, to sparkle and then disappear again into shadow like all matter disappearing into eternity; by men and women of every shade walking those backwater streets as brothers

and sisters without the self-consciousness of a world elsewhere obsessed by color . . . each strand—and so many more—led back to Islam.

These are all personal qualifications and criteria which I should have spared the Toronto journalist that day as we stood amid the littered glass and rubble of Salah-al-Din Street, just outside the walls of the city. They are qualifications and criteria which the contemporary Arab revolutionary would probably find almost as "hopelessly romantic" as, let us say, an Israeli would.

And there is no argument here to offer against such a judgment; I know that I had come increasingly to that point where one no longer expects anything from political solutions, or, rather, whatever it was that interested me most directly could not be expected to be solved in this Arab East by "secular" political acts.

Like some contemporary throwback to Ibn Khaldoun shifting from emir to emir, all that had remained for me then, on a political level, was to have faith in intelligence, to seek it, honor it, offer it, and allow that those who see fulfillment for their own best aspirations only within the narrow political eontexts defined in the West over the past few hundred years will worry some day about more ultimate ends.

But now we are all bound together—the Zionist journalist, the Arab revolutionary, and myself—by the fall of Jerusalem, and beyond such personal qualifications the data are fixed and it is well that someone speak.

NOTES

1. Zoe Oldenbourg, *The Crusades* (New York: 1967).
2. The counterpoint to the mass conversion of Jews to Christianity (and, in the case of Palestine and North Africa, to Islam) throughout the Roman and later Byzantine empires is the mass conversion of the Khazars (a Turkic people who lived in the Transcaucasus) to Judaism in the eighth century and the considerable degree of intermarriage and individual conversions to Judaism in the pre-ghetto West. All this may explain why European Jewry bears little racial resemblance to the bedouins—prototypes of those tribes of desert raiders, known as Hebrews, who drifted, like so many other Arabians who came to Palestine, from the wastelands near

what is today Kuwait into the land of Canaan—or little racial resemblance to any of the various "Oriental Jews."

A fascinating review and critique of scholarship on the origin and destiny of the Diaspora is available in Abram Leon, *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation* (New York: 1970). Also of value are two works by Dr. Arthur Ruppin, *The Jews in the Modern World* (London: 1934) and *The Jews of Today* (London: 1912), as well as Dr. Salo Wittmayer Baron's *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York: 1952). Unlike Leon, both Ruppin and Baron are sympathetic to Zionism.

Shocking as the concept may be to conventional Israeli sensibility (or, for that matter, to many contemporary Arabs with their own romance of a seventh-century late-Arabian ancestry), the idea that the Palestinian peasantry passed from either Judaism or Judeo-Christianity into Islam has been recognized by such ardent students of Palestinian history as Yisrael Belkind and former Israeli President Itzhak Ben-Zvi. In the winter 1967–68 issue of *Molad,* Hebrew University scholar A. N. Poliak documents the voluntary nature of these mass conversions in his study "The Origins of the Arabs in Israel."

3. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State,* 5th edition (London: 1967), p. 67.
4. In an article published in *Davar* (the Israeli Labor party—Mapai—daily) on September 9, 1967, Joseph Weitz, who for many years was head of the Jewish Agency's Colonization Department (which supervised the acquisition of land in Palestine for the kibbutz and other settlements), quoted a 1940 diary entry of his: "Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both peoples together in this country. . . . We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is Palestine, at least Western Palestine [the post-1921 Mandate Palestine west of the Jordan River] without Arabs. . . . And there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries; to transfer all of them: not one village, not one tribe should be left, and the transfer should be directed to Iraq, Syria, and even Transjordan. Money, a lot of money, will be found for this purpose. And only after this transfer will the country be able to absorb millions of our brethren. There is no other way out."

Commenting on what he had written in his diary twenty-seven years earlier, Weitz went on to say: "From that point of view, the 'transfer' solution was discussed at the time . . . and some preliminary preparations were made in order to put this theory into practice. Years later, when the UN passed a resolution to partition Palestine into two states, the War of Independence broke out to our great good fortune; and in this war a twofold miracle happened: a territorial victory and the flight of the Arabs. In

the Six-Days' War one great miracle happened: a tremendous territorial victory; but most of the inhabitants of the liberated territories remained 'stuck' to their places—which may destroy the very foundation of our state."

The authoritative biographer of David Ben-Gurion, Israeli historian Michael Bar Zohar, described Ben-Gurion's understanding of the native problem on the eve of the 1947–48 battle: "Ben-Gurion was still sceptical about any possibility of co-existence with the Arabs. The fewer there were living within the frontiers of the new Jewish State, the better he would like it . . . a major offensive against the Arabs would not only break up their attacks but would also greatly reduce the percentage of Arabs in the population of the new state. This might be called racialism, but the whole Zionist movement was based on the principle of a purely Jewish community in Palestine. When various Zionist institutions appealed to the Arabs not to leave the Jewish State but to become an integral part of it they were being hypocritical to some extent." (Michael Bar Zohar, *The Armed Prophet* [London: 1966], p. 109.)

5. By 1971 the dozens of men that I knew in such circumstances immediately after the war had almost all left Jerusalem for employment elsewhere in the Arab world or had found positions with Israeli employers. Some had been deported or imprisoned by the Israelis.
6. From the summer of 1970, guerrilla forces based in Jordan were continuously diverted from launching either military or re-supply operations into the West Bank because of the need to defend their East Bank bases from Royal Jordanian attacks. By July 1971 all known guerrilla bases in Jordan had been liquidated and the guerrilla infrastructure in the cities, refugee camps, and villages either smashed or driven underground. The loss of these positions, as well as the demoralizing effect of this and related developments (Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers Plan and of a cease-fire with Israel, Syria's eventual endorsement of the UN Resolution, etc.) on the West Bank population, has effectively ended armed resistance on the West Bank, including Arab Jerusalem. Guerrilla operations are now confined to portions of northern Israel, the occupied Golan Heights, and Gaza.
7. Since then, however, there have been several other similar episodes within the Haram, organized by ultra-right Zionist groups. At the same time Israeli archaeologists have been excavating at the outer base of the southern wall of the Haram (and directly below the earthquake-prone al-Aqsa Mosque) in search of the outer courtyard of Herod's Temple. The excavations are being carried out on expropriated Awqaf (Islamic foundation) land without permission of the Muslim authorities. All these experi-

ences, coupled with peculiar aspects to the al-Aqsa Mosque fire in August 1969, have intensified Arab fears as to Israel's ultimate intentions toward the Haram, which on a number of occasions has been described by rabbinic circles as "Jewish property."

8. Born in the year that Pope Urban called for a crusade, Usama was witness and resister of its rapid advance. He wrote his memoirs (*Kitab al-I'tibar*) at the age of ninety, retired in Damascus during the reign of Salah-al-Din Ayubi, the Saladin of European romance and symbol of that mass consciousness and renewed sense of solidarity which had slowly risen out of the chaos of Usama's decades. A year before Usama's death in 1188, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem surrendered to Salah-al-Din.

2. Pieces

The fall of Jerusalem took three days; the siege had been under way since 1917.

Having openly sought an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Turks and pledged to the Hashemites (then rulers of the Hejaz) to honor self-determination for the Arab East from the Peninsula up to the Lebanons, the British government secretly agreed to French claims for a portion of the region in any post-World War I settlement and then in turn promised to back a Zionist colonization plan for Palestine to be tied to English rule.

The promise, contained in Lord Balfour's Declaration of November 2, 1917, referred to facilitating the establishment of a "National Home for the Jewish people," which was in no manner to prejudice the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities"—a rather ominous way of referring to the Arab 92 percent of the population of Palestine at the time.

The English preferred such vagaries as "national home," but Herzl (who had formally launched the Zionist movement in 1897) wrote of a Jewish state in Palestine—"a portion of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism." [1]

The Balfour Declaration was a stunning triumph for the diplomatically active but still obscure Zionists, destined to remain a distinct minority movement among the various European and American Jewish communities for at least another two decades and enjoying barely a whisper of comprehension among the then vast communities of Asian Jews. But the Zionists had seized every opportunity since Herzl's first congress in Basle, Switzerland (when the movement rep-

resented, at best, several thousand European Jews), to speak in the name of "world Jewry."

Herzl was dead by the time of the declaration, but his diaries reveal prescience:

> England with her possessions in Asia should be most interested in Zionism, for the shortest road to India is by way of Palestine. England's great politicians were the first to recognize the need for colonial expansion. That is why Great Britain's ensign flies on all the oceans. And so I must believe that here in England the idea of Zionism, which is a colonial idea, should be easily and quickly understood in its true and most modern form.[2]

In press coverage and political weight at influential capitals the Zionists—with their talk of "world Jewry" and "international organization"—thrived in the atmosphere generated by the rise of modern anti-Semitism as a growing phenomenon in turn-of-the-century Europe. From its origins the Zionist movement has been involved in a symbiotic relationship with modern anti-Semitism.

Herzl's vision was of an all-powerful, semisecretive, international "Society of the Jews" seeking the establishment of an "aristocratic republic." And he could write as imperial credo that "universal brotherhood is not even a beautiful dream. Antagonism is essential to man's greatest efforts" [3]—at that very moment in history when Jews barely emancipated from the European ghettos were assuming leading roles in various democratic and socialist movements and pleading the cause of liberal and scientific values.

It was precisely these values which informed the revolutionary upheaval of the times. And to a frightened or profoundly cynical Christian conservative of the day, such as the Russian writer Sergei A. Nilus, who began publishing the anti-Semitic classic *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* in 1905, Herzl and his book *The Jewish State* (which had appeared less than a decade earlier) could have easily provided the archetype for Nilus' adaptation of the French tale, by Maurice Joly, about conspiring Bonapartists. Nilus depicted those sinister, calculating narrators, the "representatives of Zion, of the 33rd degree," who sought—according to *The Protocols*—via liberalism to destroy the conservative Christian social order for their own equally authoritarian but exclusively Jewish rule.

The Protocols fed the already raging Russian pogroms, which in

turn further stimulated the first significant wave of Zionist colonization in Palestine. By 1914 there were at least 10,000 committed Zionists settled in rural Palestine out of a total Jewish population of 70,000 concentrated in the traditional religious (and apolitical) centers of Jerusalem, Hebron, and Safad.

The Protocols achieved scandalous prominence throughout the West in the twenties as the "key" to widespread Jewish sympathy or participation in the Russian Revolution, a distressing affair to most Zionists and anti-Semites. Hundreds of thousands of copies of *The International Jew*,[4] inspired by *The Protocols*, were circulated in America and abroad by Henry Ford as part of the auto millionaire's crusade against communism.

In the thirties *The Protocols* was taken over as an essential document for one of the central slogans of the German-Nazi bid for power: "Struggle against the international conspiracy, the Jewish capitalist-communist alliance." This incredible conception first appeared in Herzl's *The Jewish State*: "When we sink we become a revolutionary proletariat, the subordinate officers of all revolutionary parties; and at the same time, when we rise, there rises also our terrible power of the purse." [5]

Herzl and his lieutenants evoked this specter of the double-edged "Jewish threat" in order to play upon the barely latent anti-Semitic fears of European political leaders whose support was sought for the Palestine colonization scheme.

At the time of the Balfour Declaration the bulk of Central European Jewry was either convinced by the then dominant Jewish arguments that a secular Zionist (rather than a mystical and Messianic) Return was sacrilege, or they had dismissed the concept as irrelevant to their own rapid assimilation into the European mainstream. The Jewish Socialists in Russia rejected assimilation, but from a sense of Jewish self-determination as a people with a European rather than a colonialist territorial destiny.

Yet Balfour granted the Declaration, in part because he was sufficiently superstitious in the anti-Semitic sense to believe Chaim Weizmann (who had inherited the leadership after Herzl) that the Zionists could "deliver" the support of Central European Jewry to the Allies. Again, a decade later, this incredible Zionist bluff reap-

peared as a powerful Nazi accusation—that Germany had lost World War I because it was "stabbed in the back" by its own Jews.

Anti-Semitism of a more subtle, internal sort played a role in the decisive support which the Zionists received at this time from a number of influential and often wealthy American Jews, none of whom had either the desire or the interest to migrate to Palestine. These men were representative of the small German-Jewish community which had migrated to America in the early and mid-nineteenth century (or of even smaller Jewish communities which had come in the eighteenth century), had rapidly assimilated into American life, and numbered many prominent families.

In the very late nineteenth century and in the years preceding World War I, several million Jews poured into the United States as immigrants from Eastern Europe, wretchedly poor and adhering to social-religious patterns that made them appear unassimilable. They crowded into the major American cities and stirred the sort of extreme antipathy that all large-scale waves of impoverished immigrants from non-Anglo-Saxon cultures have always encountered in the United States. Anti-Semitism swept across the United States and the once formally acceptable and prominent Jew of an earlier generation could now find himself barred from the very resort or social club that his father had originally patronized or helped found.

The promise of Zionism to divert the still more millions of Eastern European Jews who might otherwise yet appear embarrassingly upon the shores of America (which maintained an open-door policy until the twenties) attracted these men in much the same fashion that the famous French financier Baron Rothschild found it convenient to finance the first Palestinian colonization scheme in the late nineteenth century, when waves of Eastern European Jewish immigration to France embarrassed the urbane and socially acceptable elite of French Jewry.

In *The Jewish State* Herzl wrote with bitterness of Jewish charitable institutions "created not for, but against, persecuted Jews; they are created to dispatch these poor creatures just as fast and as far as possible. And thus, many an apparent friend of the Jews turns out, on careful inspection, to be nothing more than an anti-Semite of Jewish origin, disguised in the garb of philanthropist." [6]

Herzl went on to explain that since such colonizations aimed simply at "infiltrating" small communities of Jewish settlers into new districts rather than systematically and boldly setting out to seize both territory and state power, they were doomed to fail. He conceded, however, that these ventures represented on a small scale "the practical forerunners of the idea of a Jewish State."

And once Zionism took an organized form, it did not fail to utilize contacts with this class of wealthy Jews. The prominent German-American Jews so peculiarly sympathetic to Zionist colonization, and described to the British as having sufficient influence to bring the United States into World War I on the Allied side, were another of the plums dangled before Balfour.

There were other considerations. A strong Jewish colony in Palestine tied to England would provide the manpower to guarantee the British imperial flank east of Suez. The sole land link between Africa and Asia, and particularly between the Arab East (the Arabian Peninsula and the Fertile Crescent), Egypt, and Sudan, and finally the Maghreb (the Arab "West"—North Africa), is Palestine and Sinai. A Zionist colony here would fragment the geographic unity of any resurgent Pan-Arab or Pan-Islamic movement seeking to challenge British domination.

This was not the first overture to imperial ambition by Zionism. Herzl had offered the Ottoman Empire an autonomous but loyal Jewish state in Palestine that would "undertake to regulate the whole finances of Turkey." [7] He was told by his emissaries that Sultan Abdul-Hamid would always welcome Jewish immigrants to any part of the Ottoman Empire, but in a dispersed manner and providing they became Ottoman subjects.

Herzl was more committed to the colonial idea as an abstract solution to the Jewish problem than he was to the specific objective of colonizing Palestine. Thus he also contemplated (or entered into negotiations for) colonizing charters that would have led to the establishment of a Jewish settler-state in the Sinai, South America, the Belgian Congo, Mozambique (but here only for eventual barter for superior real estate), Cyprus, Libya, and the most publicized alternative—"Uganda" (actually the "White Highlands" of present-day Kenya).[8] Herzl's associate Sokolow sought backing in Berlin before

World War I for an independent Jewish state tied to Germany by cultural affinity and pact.

The two threads of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Zionist tactics—the appeal to imperialism for alliance and the cultivation of anti-Semitic sensibilities—frequently interacted.

In his search for imperial understanding, Herzl sought out the Tsarist Minister of Interior von Plehve (organizer of the great pogroms and the anti-Semitic "Black Hundreds" gangs) and the equally notorious anti-Semitic Tsarist minister Witte. Herzl was particularly proud of the pledges of support he received for the movement from von Plehve and of the way he had impressed the Tsarist minister with the thesis that Zionism was the only viable alternative to an inevitable radicalization of Russian Jewry; this theme, combined with expressions of contempt for socialism, appears again and again in Herzl's own account of his correspondence or audiences with von Plehve and other Tsarist officials, German industrialists, Austrian cabinet members, and the Duke of Baden.[9]

(That same sense of "man-to-man" Zionist ease in the company of European anti-Semites surfaces several decades later in Jon and David Kimche's curiously proud account of a conversation between a Nazi leader and a Zionist agent sent to Berlin to make a deal with the S.S.)[10]

Again, Weinstock refers to Balfour and notes with heavy irony how this honored patron of Zionism "gave an indication of his pro-Semitism by leading a campaign for the Aliens Act (1905), which forbade persecuted Jews access to British territory!" [11]

The final, American, alliance begins with Ben-Gurion. In 1942 the rather uniquely multifaceted Zionist trade union federation—Histadrut—established an investment-seeking corporation in New York known as AMPAL to encourage American financial interest in the economic development of Palestine. Since then AMPAL has provided more than $500 million in loans and investments for Israel while "maintaining a record of growth and uninterrupted dividend payments to its shareholders" and has grown into a group of seven corporations whose assets today exceed $85 million and who provide investment financing for almost every major Israeli economic venture.[12]

Banks, distribution cooperatives, cement works, oil and natural gas industries, land development, tire manufacturing, plastics, electrochemicals, citrus canneries, sugar processing, the leading department store chain, supermarket chains, the Histadrut-owned and internationally competitive construction company Soleh Boneh, and even the industrial enterprises of 150 "socialist" kibbutzim (whose annual production had reached $87 million by 1967) are all associated in some capacity with AMPAL.

That same year—1942—the Zionist leadership of Palestine, Europe, and the Americas met in New York at the Hotel Biltmore to hammer out, under Ben-Gurion's lead, the final program for the establishment of a Jewish state in the postwar period. America now became the center for concentrated political struggle both in the Jewish community and, from that base, in the centers of national political influence guiding a United States already aware, in the early 1940's, that its destiny would inevitably fill the vacuum left by the older, war-broken empires.[13]

By now there are three categories to the American financial stake in Israel: direct government aid, donations and private investments (via direct supplements to Israeli state and party budgets or channeled through AMPAL), and the sale of Israel bonds. The total amount realized from these sources between 1948 and 1965 is estimated to exceed $3.5 billion. Additional donations and investments from America realized during and after the June 1967 War are believed to have passed the half-billion-dollar mark. Donations and bond sales account for two-thirds of the 1948–1965 estimate and are considered tax-free contributions to charity by the American government although they directly finance Israel's armed forces and state budget. (In addition Israel has received approximately $1 billion from West Germany in combined "reparations" and foreign aid credits. Israeli Finance Minister Sapir told the August 1967 "Millionaires' Conference" in Jerusalem that, in all, Israel had received $7 billion in financial aid between 1949 and 1965.)

Like the Crusader kingdoms, Israel (and, before it, the Zionist movement) pursues its own policies but always remains dependent upon the Western power of the time for financial, political, and occasional military support. Herzl understood this from the beginning:

"We should as a neutral state remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence." [14]

But William Yale, a former Standard Oil employee and the only U.S. agent in the Middle East at the time of the Balfour Declaration, predicted the ultimate drift to American influence in a special report to President Wilson.

Yale argued that despite British backing ". . . a Jewish state will inevitably fall under control of American Jews who will work out along Jewish lines American ideals and American civilization, a Jewish commonwealth in Palestine will develop into an outpost in the Orient." [15]

But at the time of the Balfour Declaration it was the British who mattered—not only for their sense of imperial self-interest but also for that earnest, evangelical style then so prevalent, a style quite ready to mysticize Zionist ambition into an Old Testament march by the Children of Israel against the heathen of Canaan and Moab.

In the final phase of World War I, when General Allenby led the British Army into Jerusalem, the London press hailed the progress of this "new Crusade." The *Times* described the "deliverance" of Jerusalem as a "most memorable event in the history of Christendom" and observed that the international character of the forces under Allenby's command—French and Italian as well as English—was reminiscent of that Western unity prevailing at the time of the Crusades.

As for Allenby at the gates of Jerusalem, historians credit him with the boast: "Today ended the Crusades." They did not record if or how this announcement was received by the allied Arab force led by the Hashemite, Emir Faisal, and protecting Allenby's flank.

The British occupation of Palestine was to be rationalized by a League of Nations mandate authorizing Britain to prepare the local population for self-rule while incorporating into the mandate the Balfour Declaration, which could be implemented only by denying self-determination to the same local population supposedly to be prepared for self-rule.

Jewish landownership at the time of the British occupation amounted to 2 percent of the land. By 1948, when the Palestinian war began, Jewish landownership had risen to only a little over 5 percent of the total mandate area and only one-third of the New or

"Jewish" City of Jerusalem; total Jewish landownership in the entire Jerusalem district (old and new cities, suburbs, and surrounding villages) did not exceed 2 percent.

But the colonization policy—encouraged by the British in the twenties and early thirties and moved forward by Zionist momentum and international sympathy when the British began to reconsider their own imperial interests in the rest of the Arab world toward the close of the decade—had changed the population balance by 1948 to approximately 700,000 Jews out of a total Palestinian population of about 2 million, and in the greater Jerusalem district Jews constituted approximately half the population.

Faced with increasing civil unrest, the British turned the problem over to the United Nations, and in November 1947 the General Assembly voted for the partition of Palestine into "Jewish" and "Arab" states linked by economic union. The Jerusalem district was to become an internationalized enclave. Russian support for the measure, coupled with an American campaign of pressure, direct or indirect, upon those countries outside the Muslim world that were known to be either uncertain or opposed to partition, swung the majority.

In 1947 the voting strength of the Afro-Asian bloc was insignificant and the Latin American states yielded to the U.S.-Soviet momentum. From the time the vote was taken until May 15, 1948, when the British Mandate was terminated, Palestine was plunged into a state of war.

The Palestinians and almost every Arab state had rejected partition proposals since the mid-thirties on the obvious grounds that the decision violated the right to self-determination by the majority of the population, which had never been allowed to exercise this right or to express its desire in any referendum on the future of Palestine.

The Emir Abdullah, Hashemite ruler of the British-carved bedouin state of Transjordan (east of the Jordan River), initially indicated a willingness to accept partition provided that a British garrison would remain in Haifa and Jerusalem to prevent bloodshed.

The Emir's compromise proposal also specified that those portions of the Mandate assigned to the Palestinians for a state be instead divided up among the neighboring Arab states: Galilee to Lebanon, the districts of Hebron, Nablus, Jericho, Jenin, and Jerusalem (what is

today known as the West Bank) to Transjordan, and the Gaza-Beersheba area to Egypt.

Like shrewd Muslim emirs in the earliest decades of the Crusades, when the Franks were to prove invincible, Abdullah and the leaders of other neighboring Arab states thought of the issue at stake in Palestine more in terms of a bargain and, if necessary, a war over real estate than as an anticolonial struggle.

The Zionists accepted the UN plan as the most decisive piece of legitimacy handed to them since Balfour, but with qualifications. For despite the defensive rhetorical stance that has been Israel's most successful tactic since the declaration of statehood, Zionist literature from Herzl to Ben-Gurion (including several editions of the official Israel Government Year Book) does not hide the idea that even the most recent territorial acquisitions do not quite fulfill the dimensions of the "greater, historical Land of Israel."

The roots of the June War, more so than the 1956 Suez campaign, go back to this 1948 conflict: at Suez, French participation with British and Israeli forces in the attack on Egypt was motivated as much by Cairo's role in supporting the then raging Algerian Revolution as by the fate of the Suez Canal, and only Israel can be said to have acted against the UAR out of any direct concern for the destiny of Palestine.

In retrospect the Palestine Arabs now appear almost pathetically dependent on British goodwill in the final days of the Mandate, and popular works such as *Exodus* have hammered out the image of a Zionist national liberation war against a sturdy British Empire. But that colonials have on occasion turned against down-on-their-luck mother countries or patrons is not unknown, and it is difficult to imagine how the American Indians, the Algerians, or the Africans could respectively consider the Continental Congress, the French *colons*, and the white Rhodesians as legions of liberation.

Palestinian Arab morale in 1948 was at an all-time low. In the late twenties and thirties it had been a different matter: the Arabs had responded to British hedging on self-determination by raising a variety of demands ranging from full independence and a one-man one-vote legislature to restriction of Zionist colonization by banning Jewish immigration and the sale of Arab land.[16]

When the British authorities (reinforced by Zionist pressure) denied these demands, periodic Arab riots throughout the twenties developed into an open armed revolt of Palestinian peasants and workers in 1936, sparked by a clash near Jenin between British troops and a guerrilla band led by Sheikh Izzidine al-Qassam.

For three years Palestinian cities were paralyzed by strikes, riots, and urban commando raids while the Arab guerrilla bands dominated much of the countryside. Tens of thousands of British soldiers were to be tied down by the revolution. In the cities the entire Arab community—Christian as well as Muslim—responded to the directives of the Arab Higher Committee political command led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini.

Haj Amin, like most men on the Higher Committee, was a member of one of the prominent landowning families. The power exercised by these urban families over the Palestinian yeomanry and tenant farmers was reinforced by the accumulated prestige of civil and religious posts under Turkish and then British rule. (As Mufti, Haj Amin was the officially designated spiritual leader of the Muslims of Jerusalem.)

Schooled in feudal clan politics and factional maneuver, an opponent of armed struggle until the final hour, Haj Amin, his allies, and his still more conciliatory rivals among the traditional Palestinian elite were able to quickly assume leadership of the rebellion because the peasant guerrillas lacked both coordinated command and revolutionary theory.

The Palestinian elite was also susceptible to the pressures of the Arab kings of Iraq and Saudi Arabia and of Transjordan's Emir Abdullah, who persuaded the Higher Committee to abandon their six-month general strike in the cities during the first stage of the rebellion and to rely "upon the intentions of our friend the British government" without having secured any concrete concessions.

In the fall of 1937 British intentions were confirmed by a Royal Commission report calling for the partition of Palestine. It was now no longer possible for the British to claim that implementation of the Balfour Declaration did not mean "the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine," as had been presaged in Churchill's "White Paper" of 1922. A Jewish state was to be set up in most of the coastal plain and in the Galilee (the richest parts of the

country), while Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and a corridor to the sea would be placed under permanent British rule. What remained of Palestine would be attached to Transjordan and form an "independent Arab state" to receive subsidies from both Britain and the projected Jewish state. As the British writer Neville Barbour pointed out in his extensive study of this period, *Nisi Dominus*,[17] the plan sought to divide between the Zionist movement and the British government "practically every resource—moral and material—which the country possessed."

The proposal was rejected by the Palestinians and every Arab ruler, with the initial exception of Emir Abdullah.

The 20th Zionist Congress meeting in Zurich rejected the particulars of the plan but announced its readiness to discuss the establishment of a Jewish state in part of Palestine. While a minority at the congress rejected even the principle of partition, David Ben-Gurion (then President of the Zionist Executive), in a statement that has stood well over the subsequent decades as an expression of strategic thinking, indicated what meaning any limited frontiers would have:

"The debate has not been for or against the indivisibility of the Land of Israel. No Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the Land of Israel. The debate concerned which of two routes would lead quicker to the common goal." [18]

Barbour noted that this sort of thinking was shared by at least one member of the Royal Commission, Sir Laurie Hammond, who told the Zionists that "the National Home in Palestine, if you can get sufficient [*sic*] in that country to meet immediate requirements as a Sovereign Power, will be the first step, in my opinion, towards getting back into the rest of the country. It will take many years, but it will come." [19]

The Arab Higher Committee and the neighboring Arab rulers had managed to quiet the rebellion for a year, but after publication of the Royal Commission report the Palestinian peasants and workers again resumed the armed struggle. For it was precisely these two sectors of the Palestinian population that were most directly threatened from the beginning of the Mandate by the Zionist policies of evicting Arab tenant farmers from land purchased in the countryside and denying Arab labor employment in the cities. ("The conquest of labor" was the slogan of the Zionist boycott movement.)

It is one of the ironies of the Arab-Israeli conflict that until recent years Zionism has always presented the energetic egalitarianism of its settlements (particularly of the kibbutz movement) as a contrast and alternative to the prevailing corruption, exploitation, and ignorance in feudal-dominated Arab society. Yet invariably it has been with the most self-seeking and "feudal" trend within Palestinian and Arab life that the Israelis have been able to either achieve an understanding or most easily intimidate. And every revolutionary Arab stirring for the sake of a more decent national and social existence has invariably collided with Zionist settler-colonialism.

But the British responded by banning the Arab Higher Committee for refusing to condemn the uprising. The Mufti fled from Palestine to neighboring Arab states, where he reassumed leadership of the rebellion. When guerrilla bands began to burn out police posts and take over large towns, the British poured troops into Palestine, trained and armed Jewish counterinsurgency units, and fenced off the northern borders with Syria and Lebanon to deny the rebels sanctuary and supplies.

By 1939 the combined efforts of British troops and British-officered Zionist paramilitary forces—employing the methods referred to in Vietnam today as "pacification"—had reconquered the Palestinian countryside.

According to Hollywood romance, Moshe Dayan and his comrades who were to make up the officer corps of the Hagana and Palmach (the Zionist paramilitary forces which in time became the Israeli Army) rose like Joshuas from the ranks as freedom-fighters against the British in the final days of the Mandate. But Dayan and Israeli historians know better: it was under the command of the Bible-thumping British officer Wingate, crushing the Arab peasant revolution, that these men gained their flinty experience.

So too did the Arab Legion of Transjordan—which emerged in the 1940's as the best fighting force in the Arab East—take on its significant character in response to the Palestine Revolution.

But the seeds of legionnaire skill inferred future political tragedy, for despite the broad sympathy for the Palestinian revolt on the part of the Transjordanian public, the Legion was transformed from a civil police unit into a military force in 1938 to fight Arab guerrillas seeking sanctuary and rear bases on the eastern bank of the Jordan.

At that moment Hashemite ambition (which leaned so heavily on British financing and promises) veered decisively into the hopeless role of ultimate rival of the Zionists for the enmity of the Palestinian people.

The rebellion and the profound waves of popular antagonism it had set off in the neighboring Arab states toward England had shaken the British and their embarrassed allies—the feudal leadership of these states. In the summer of 1939 the British government issued a new "White Paper" on Palestine: it dropped the partition plan, pledged to limit Jewish immigration and land purchase, and referred vaguely to the distant establishment of an "independent Palestine in which Arabs and Jews share authority." However, the "White Paper" contained no provisions for even the establishment of a Palestinian legislative assembly with the sort of limited powers usually granted by colonialist regimes that have accepted the prospects of eventual independence.

Nevertheless, however theoretical the concessions in the "White Paper" to the Palestinian cry for self-determination, they were sufficient to infuriate the settler-colonialist community, and it is at this point that the Zionist movement moved over to a position of open opposition to the British Mandate. This same spirit of concession was equally sufficient to win over the most conciliatory of the Palestinian elite and the anxious leaders of neighboring Arab states, already deeply compromised by their dependence on Britain. The decimated guerrilla movement was now isolated.

With the fall, in 1941, of the short-lived nationalist regime in Iraq to British and Transjordanian forces, the Mufti was forced to flee once more, seeking shelter and support in Berlin along with other exiled Arab nationalists. This relationship between Haj Amin and the Axis powers had been developing for a number of years; effectively exploited by the Zionists, it was to profoundly compromise the entire Palestinian cause in the eyes of European antifascists for the next decade.

The Arabs were not the only colonized people to flirt with the Axis powers. Gandhi was so inclined at the time of the Japanese advance, and even more militant Indian revolutionaries organized a "freedom army" to fight alongside the Japanese against the West. Sukarno and other Indonesian nationalists collaborated with the Japanese, and

Latin American nationalists who sought to challenge American neo-colonial domination in the forties maintained contacts with Axis representatives.

To the European democrat, fascism meant the repudiation of all civilized decencies. It meant savage racism, extermination camps, slave labor, military occupation and puppet regimes, police state and world empire. But throughout the colonized Third World, where these European agonies of war were conventional peacetime facts of life, there were other reasonable perspectives.[20]

Hated colonial regimes were suddenly staggering in far-off Europe, and to the East the sole significant independent country in Asia—Japan—was not only carving out its own empire but also demonstrating (in the rhetorical name of all Asians) that colored men could fight and overcome the colonial armies of the West.

Among Third World revolutionaries only the Communists consistently opposed the Axis advance, but they were motivated by a far more precise understanding of fascism than the typical nationalist, as well as by concern for the survival of the Soviet Union.

Judged as a man of his times, Haj Amin was a provincial politician who ended up feeding the very force that gave Zionism a bloody raison d'être and sought to confirm Herzl's most racist assumptions about Jews and Gentiles.

So often I wonder about Haj Amin. It was in these very rooms where I now live and work that he lived, as Mufti of Jerusalem, in those turbulent thirties; and it was from the hidden stairwell in my garden that he took flight from the British, spurred on by a moral flaw that was to lead him to Berlin, to those architects of terrible crimes for which a guilty West would yet make innocent Palestine pay.

By the end of World War II, the terror of the genocide that had stalked Europe, the discredited moral standing of the Mufti, and the rapid growth of Zionist influence within the United States—emerging from the war as the strongest world power—created an international political climate which could only appear to the Palestinian as if the one thing all Europeans and Americans were agreed upon was that the Jews were to have his land.

The refusal by the great powers to offer serious resettlement alter-

natives to a displaced European Jewry after World War II illuminates the Palestine crisis. Refugee surveys were taken in the first year after the war; of the several hundred thousand Jewish survivors gathered in displaced persons camps, most preferred the promise of security among kin already established in America and England or the prospect of immigration to new, peaceful lands seeking European manpower (such as Brazil and Australia) rather than to serve as cannon fodder in Palestine.[21]

During the final stages of the war, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had considered drafting a plan to absorb all the displaced Jews into America and other Western societies. Morris L. Ernst, a prominent lawyer and an American Jew, acted as representative in sounding out public (and particularly Jewish) response to Roosevelt's plan. A decade later, during a speech to the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism, Ernst was to disclose how the plan was killed. He had been "thrown out of parlours of friends" when discussing the relief plan, friends who had frankly warned him: "Morris, this is treason—you're undermining the Zionist movement." [22]

"It is precisely the poorest whom we need first. Only the desperate make good conquerors," observed Herzl.[23]

An Anglo-American open-door policy, as originally intended by Roosevelt, would have eliminated Zionism's sole humanitarian—rather than ideological—justification.

So began one more phase of the symbiotic relationship between the Zionist movement and anti-Semitism. When the 1948 Anglo-American Committee (which advocated admitting 100,000 Jewish refugees to Palestine) visited Amman, capital of Transjordan, an American member of the committee was asked by an Arab notable why America itself—with its open and fertile spaces, its wealth and developed economy—did not accept these European people. "There are limits to kindness," the American replied, according to Glubb Pasha.[24]

In the five-month civil-war period between the United Nations decision to partition Palestine and the end of the Mandate in May 1948, the isolated and poorly organized Palestinians, fighting under the discredited and absentee political leadership of the Mufti, lost position

after position to well-organized and comparatively far better armed Zionist paramilitary units receiving support from both American and Eastern European sources.

A liberation army of a few thousand volunteers from neighboring Arab states, backed by the Arab League and led by the hero of 1936, Fawzi al-Kawikji, moved into Palestine ostensibly to assist in the defense of Arab villages threatened by the Hagana and Irgun, but they ended up expending too much energy in attempts to thwart the local Palestinian resistance groups, which were viewed by many neighboring Arab states' politicians as potential rivals in any postwar settlement. After a few disastrous clashes with the Israelis, the liberation forces abandoned the fight.

But in 1947 and early 1948, while the Arab East's leadership sullied their own cynical vows of struggle with obscene boasts of forthcoming massacres and privately maneuvered for pieces of an Arab Palestine never to be born, Al-Jihad al-Muqqadas (The Sacred Struggle) and other hastily organized Palestinian peasant and worker militias fought on, almost hopelessly alone, ill-armed, denied aid, and even subverted by their Arab brethren in positions of power throughout the region.

"They were the faithful Palestinian light in the darkness of 1958," one of the founders of Al-Fatah (the Palestine national liberation movement), Khalil al-Wazir ("Abu Jihad"), was to tell me one day. He spoke with obvious respect for the Al-Jihad al-Muqqadas leader, Abdul-Qader al-Husseini, who had died trying to recapture al-Kastel in the 1948 battle for Jerusalem.

There is an inescapable twist to this history, which will keep repeating itself until the name of Palestine returns to everyone's map. On the southern side of the Wailing Wall, directly across from my house, there stood a complex of some dozen buildings which began within the Haram at Magharaba Gate and extended in a crescent around the southernmost portion of the outer western wall. The buildings were known as the Zaw'iat Abu Saud (the meeting place of Abu Saud) in honor of the Jerusalem clan who lived there and held the family *waqf*, or endowment deed, to the property.

Part of the complex included a mosque, religious school, and meeting hall where Sufis once gathered and where each year the Quran would be read through an entire night of Ramadan—*laylat al-Qadre.*

Any of the Arabs who made their way to the Haram from the southernmost part of the Old City or from Silwan, the village just outside the nearest gate, would pass this complex; and since the Abu Saud clan was by tradition famous for its religious scholars, the buildings assumed something of the aura of the great sanctuary itself.

I write in the past tense because almost all of the Zaw'iat has been destroyed—bulldozed away by the Israelis in order to expose an additional forty meters of Herodian Temple stone to enlarge the Wailing Wall. Within that complex Yasir Arafat lived as a youth—born in 1929, a year of serious rioting between Arab and Jew, sparked by a Zionist procession that raised the future flag of Israel during a march past another, larger Arab quarter adjacent to the Wailing Wall . . . an Arab quarter destined to be bulldozed into nothingness only a few days after this last war.

Yasir Arafat and his brother served in al-Muqqadas during the 1947–1948 struggle, and the young Arafat specialized in running arms in for the militia from Sinai. Now better known in the Arab world by his underground name of the early sixties—"Abu Ammar"—he emerged after half a decade of clandestine life as the leader of Al-Fatah.

The Israelis had prepared for decades for the opening encounter in 1947–1948. Just as the Crusaders had settled their Frankish peasantry and artisans in new towns strategically overlooking Arab Christian, Muslim, or Samaritan villages, so the net of Israeli paramilitary agricultural settlements had spread. Incorporated as a basic element for overall military planning, the settlers were armed and prepared to move out in a disciplined offensive against the invariably poorly armed or undefended neighboring Arab villages.

Between April 19 and May 14, as British troops began to withdraw from Palestine, the cities of Tiberias, Safad, and Jaffa and the Katamon Quarter of New Jerusalem were occupied; the Arab inhabitants were either expelled or encouraged to leave by a variety of inducements, including occasional and well-publicized massacres. And all of these occupations and expulsions took place before the regular armies of any Arab state had stepped on Palestinian soil as combatants.[25]

The Arab Legion[26] was in Palestine at the time, attached to the British command for the purpose of guarding foreign embassies and

installations. However, except for a successful assault in early May on the Kfar Etzion bloc of four Zionist colonies near Hebron, deep in the heart of the territory allocated by the UN to the Arabs, the Legion was not allowed to fight in a single engagement during this period. Glubb Pasha writes that the Legion attacked Kfar Etzion because the colonies were threatening to cut Hebron off from Jerusalem and a Legion convoy with supplies was due back on the Hebron Road two days before the Mandate ended. He notes that the British barred the Legion from interfering elsewhere despite an Israeli offensive that had already pushed well across the UN partition line into designated "Arab" territory.

The British Army had ordered most of the Arab Legion out of Palestine before the end of April, but the infantry garrison companies performing guard duty could not be spared by the British and did not withdraw from Palestine until a few hours before the end of the Mandate.

When the Arab Legion crossed back over the Jordan River and the expeditionary forces from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq entered Palestine on May 15, 1948, they were at best capable of holding only a portion of what had been assigned to the Arabs by the UN; but the Israelis moved on to occupy western Galilee, the Sinai frontier region of the Negev, Beersheba, and a major slice of the West Bank above Beersheba as well as the northern half of the original Gaza Strip.

Glubb Pasha, who had resigned his commission in the British Army in the late twenties to serve the Hashemites under contract, writes that as late as March 1948 the Arab states had neither a plan nor a clear intention of committing units of their regular armies to Palestine and that when the likelihood of Arab League involvement in the fighting finally became apparent in the early spring of 1948, the Legion had neither reserves of ammunition nor reserves of trained manpower because "in its twenty-eight years of life, it had never been contemplated that the Arab Legion would fight an independent war." [27]

Emir Abdullah had been named by the Arab League as commander in chief of all Arab expeditionary forces, but he was never informed of the composition, much less the plans, of the other armies. There was no master plan, no coordination, and, according to Glubb,

the Emir never received or dispatched a single official letter in his capacity as commander in chief.

Including the remnant Palestinian guerrillas and other irregular forces (the Muslim Brotherhood Brigade, the Liberation Army), the total number of Arab soldiers fighting in 1948 in Palestine came to less than 25,000 at the onset of the campaign.[28] Against them were approximately 65,000 trained and armed Israelis. Toward the end of the war (which drifted for a number of months—through two truces and stunning Israeli offensives after each truce ended) reinforcements and Arab Legion recruitment had brought the Arab total up to 55,000. In the final stages of battle the Israelis, with trained manpower and weapons flowing in from Europe and America, were able to field an army and armed reserve of more than 100,000. And conventional history records this war as that moment when young Israel fought off the hordes of five Arab states!

For four months before the end of the Mandate and through the post-civil war period of fighting, the entire Israeli military effort was under the overall supervision of an American colonel and Pentagon planner—David "Mickey" Marcus—who assumed direct command of the Jerusalem front on May 28, 1948, as "Brigadier General Stone." [29] The number of American, Canadian, and South African pilots in the nascent Israeli air force so dominated this service that English was considered the official language.

But the officers seconded to the Arab Legion by an England bound to Transjordan in military alliance were ordered withdrawn on May 30 by London (under pressure from the United States, writes Glubb Pasha), and the Transjordanians found themselves in the middle of a desperate campaign to save the West Bank while stripped of all operational staff officers, the commanders of the Legion's two brigades, all trained artillery officers, and the commanding officers of three out of four infantry regiments.

The other Arab armies, compared to the Legion, were ragged, poorly trained, ill-equipped comic-opera affairs, and generally led by corrupt senior officers. In addition to the Legion, only a highly motivated brigade formed by the Muslim Brotherhood, and an Egyptian unit cut off in the Negev at Falluja (under the command of a Sudanese colonel and numbering among its officers Gamal Abdul Nasser), fought with honor.

It was in the humiliation of this war that young Arab army officers like Abdul Nasser and his counterparts in Syria and Iraq who had also served in Palestine swore to end Western domination of their land and to break forever with a corrupt and collaborating feudal landowning class, which in the case of Egypt had cynically sent its own sons out to die with faulty ammunition.

What has followed since—the turbulent social struggles, coups d'états, assassinations, unifications and secessions, the developing and competing Pan-Arab ideologies, and the emergence, despite the appearance of the most recent catastrophe, of a significantly strengthened Eastern Arab world—are all to be traced in one manner or another to the defeat of 1948.

When the British withdrew from Jerusalem, the Israelis had quickly consolidated their grip on the entire New City and seized the northern approach to the Old City, isolating it from the rest of the West Bank as they were to do in 1967. For four days some 500 Arabs—Al-Jihad al-Muqqadas militiamen and other armed civilians —manned both the outer walls and barricades within the city in a two-front struggle against both a Hagana force that had slipped into the Old City's Jewish Quarter before the British withdrawal and a Palmach (Israeli assault force) offensive from outside the walls that was trying to break through and link up with the Hagana enclave.

Hours before the Legion arrived on May 18, clearing the northern Arab suburbs of Israeli soldiers as they approached the city, the Palmach punched through Bab al-Nebi Daoud and advance elements reached the Jewish Quarter. The legionnaires and militiamen mounted a counteroffensive and sealed the breach in the wall. Then, in ten days of bitter house-to-house fighting they moved in on the Hagana-Palmach force, now cut off within the walls but able from the heights of the Jewish Quarter to fire down upon the rest of the Old City. On May 28 the Jewish Quarter surrendered, and although sniping and mortar-fire exchanges were to keep up for many more months, the lines dividing the district of Jerusalem for the next nineteen years had been drawn.

All that remained in Arab hands out of the 12.5 square miles of the Mandate district was a 2.5 square mile area consisting of the walled city, Silwan village (the biblical Siloam) to the south, the small vil-

lages between the Mount of Olives and Bethany to the east, a few villages to the north between the city and Mount Scopus (which remained an armed Israeli enclave under the guise of a demilitarized zone), and the triangular open area known as Zahera Quarter just outside the walled city between Bab al-Amoud (Damascus Gate) and Bab al-Zahera (Herod's Gate). The shell-scarred eastern strip of the al-Musrara Quarter also remained in Arab hands.

Of the 90,000 Arabs who lived in Mandate Jerusalem, 33,000 remained. A small number were cut off in villages around the city that had fallen to the Israelis, but the bulk fled as refugees during the weeks before and after British withdrawal. Of those remaining in Arab Jerusalem a third had fled here from the New City. Among these refugees was the family of Robert Kennedy's assassin, Sirhan Sirhan, then a four-year-old child.

The New City, within Israeli lines, had been a checkerboard of Jewish and Arab residential quarters, favored by the British as an administrative center, largely owned by Arabs, populated mainly by Jews, and developed by both. The Old City emerged from the war overcrowded with refugees, without government or municipality, its industry and commerce paralyzed or lost, and without financial resources. The city hall—occupied by an Arab mayor from the beginning of the Mandate until World War II ended even this modest form of self-rule—was on the other side, as was the post office and telephone exchange, all hospitals, the bus terminal, sanitation equipment, and the wholesale vegetable market. There was no police force and the Israelis had cut off the water supply and electricity.

For the first few months the city relied on rationed rain water from the old cisterns; there was no electricity for a year. Municipal services were rapidly improvised by an emergency National Committee. Three hospitals were established and primitively equipped by public donation in response to emergency appeals broadcast over the loudspeakers of the Old City's minarets.

The entire Arab press had been lost with the fall of Jaffa. Months were to pass, with the city relying upon a daily stenciled bulletin, before *Falasteen* and *Al-Diffa* were able to resume publication in Arab Jerusalem.

Taxes were quickly imposed on imports to raise funds for the new municipality; and with the Hashemite appointment of a Governor

General for the entire West Bank and the transfer of his headquarters from Ramallah to Jerusalem in 1949, a sense of stability returned. Despite its threatened position Jerusalem slowly began a climb that was to gather increasing momentum throughout the fifties and early sixties.

The overall boom in international tourism and the development of sophisticated airline and highway networks within the Arab world led to increasing numbers of pilgrims and tourists making their way to Jordan. With the exception of Nazareth, Galilee, and the traditional tomb of Nebi Daoud (King David), all the holy places of Palestine are within the West Bank and concentrated in and around Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Hebron. From 8,000 visitors in 1950 the annual number swelled well past a half million just before the June War.

The spurt in the number of pilgrims and tourists encouraged craft industries in the city, villages, and refugee camps. The growing number of "bazaars" in Jerusalem supplemented their stocks, traditionally imported from Damascus and Cairo, with local handicrafts: "bedouin" rugs and mats from the frontier villages, pottery, tiles, embroideries, olive-wood carvings, and inlaid mother-of-pearl work.

Hundreds of merchants who had lost their shops in the New City began again, and within a decade of the war the city's modern business district had risen in the Zahera Quarter alongside the continually increasing number of hotels. The refugee-packed Old City was somewhat relieved with the development of new suburbs just beyond the city wall and further north on the road to Ramallah.

Sheikh Jarrah, the Arab suburb overlooking the northern approach to the city and recovered from Israeli soldiers when the Legion relieved Jerusalem, now flourished as a posh residential quarter and center for consulates. Beit Hanina, a raw suburb furthest to the north, developed as a residential favorite of leading government and business figures; it was most noted for the King's Jerusalem Palace, standing by Ramallah Road like some displaced Miami Beach motel.

The overall trend in Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank has been a shift in population to the eastern side—or for families to remain and the father or sons to find employment in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, or the Gulf states, returning each summer on vacation or with a sufficient stake to remain and begin a business. Many of the

relatively new stone houses that ridge the hill slope sites of countless West Bank villages and surround Jerusalem have been financed by the remittances of these energetic people who in two decades have become the administrators, technicians, educators, engineers, diplomats, journalists, and bankers of the Arab world (particularly in the least developed but booming oil-rich states) and yet remain passionately committed to a sense of being Palestinian.

But work opportunities have also pulled thousands from the West Bank countryside and refugee camps to Jerusalem—particularly from Hebron (Khalil), that Palestinian steppe of traditional style and prolific birthrate.

By June 1967 there were 70,000 Arabs living in Jerusalem (divided equally within and around the walled city) and almost another 30,000 from Jerusalem working abroad but maintaining ties with the city.[30]

Jerusalem's educational system had been the least disturbed of the city's institutions. The Jews had maintained their own communal school systems that were invariably linked to the complex political and paramilitary apparatus of settler-colonial society—the Jewish Agency. Thus the network of Mandate government schools in the Old City and the rest of the West Bank was exclusively Arab. The various Christian communities and missions in the city and in nearby Ramallah maintained a number of well-staffed private schools attended by Muslims as well as Arab Christians.

There is little industry in Arab Jerusalem, but the city thrived as an academic town. American, French, and English schools of archaeology and biblical research were active here, and the private schools drew boarders from Amman and Beirut. Tucked away in the Christian Quarter were numbers of quiet, unassuming scholars—members of many religious orders.

By the mid-sixties there was serious talk of establishing an Arab University in Jerusalem. A number of Pan-Arab professional societies had already pledged themselves to the staffing and financing of faculties, and Al-Azhar University in Caïro had assumed responsibility for the establishment of a medical faculty at the Islamic Makassed Hospital under construction near Mount Scopus and close to completion by the time of the June War.

When the Old City choked with refugees after the 1948 War, the

famous clans abandoned their magnificent Ayyubi or Mamluk houses for suburban life, and refugees or Khalilees (Hebronites)—frequently one family of eight or nine to a room and kitchen—crowded into their place. The old buildings as a rule ran down; the narrow lanes became flecked with litter; garish storefronts and residential renovations appeared, violating overall architectural grace.

Only the Christian Quarter—relatively untouched by the tide of refugees and their legions of children—escaped the brushes of squalor that marred the rest of the Old City.

But in the decade preceding the June War and for a mixture of motives, Arab attention turned again. A refugee camp was opened in a suburb to ease the particularly intense congestion in the old Jewish Quarter. The Armenian tiles which serve as street signs were replaced, the streets were kept cleaner, and a planning ordinance was enforced to bar additional construction, renovation, or the use of materials that disturbed the city's old Arab tone.

And the Dome of the Rock was restored—gilded again in its Umayyad grandeur, the shoddy ceramic of late Turkish work replaced with replicas of Suleiman's original tile, the mosaics and woodwork repaired, the marble wall coverings and floor reinforced, and the foundation grouted.

Without benefit of publicity or massive overseas bond drives, these Palestinians—wastrel bedouins of Zionist legend—renewed their city.

When one considers the population and landholdings of Arabs and Jews, even after the three Mandate decades (when the extensive government landholdings inherited by the Mandate from the previous Islamic state were assigned to the inhabitants prior to British occupation), or when one studies even the demarcations for a UN-partitioned Palestine which disappeared in but a few months of fighting, it becomes clear how much of the fundamental structure of Israeli society is dependent on the housing, cultivated land, and crops left behind by the Arabs.

Entire cities—Jaffa, Ramleh, Lydda, Acre, Beersheba—deserted Arab quarters in Jerusalem and Haifa, and countless former village sites were filled up with new immigrants as rapidly as they could be

recruited or secured by manpower scouts on the prowl in the Jewish communities of Europe and Asia.

Even falafel (fried ground chick-pea balls) and hommus, bannered abroad at international fairs or Sabra restaurants as Israeli national cuisine, were taken from the Palestinians. If there is a governing style for every culture, in Israel that style is theft.

But the 1948 defeat had been a sharp blow to the Arab East leaderships and they were weary, ashamed, and bored with the Palestinians. At each other's throats over the destiny of what little remained in Arab hands, they were all prepared at this point to transform the cease-fire agreements into a conventional settlement, to accept and recognize the existence of this settler-colonial state in the Middle East.

Two conditions—both quite within the norms of international law and the United Nations resolutions dealing with postwar problems (refugees and territorial acquisitions) and both modest, considering the fundamental Arab concession at hand (and at the expense of Palestinian self-determination)—were advanced by the Arab states at the UN and at meetings with the Israelis in 1949: (1) the right of all refugees to return to their homes or, if they chose otherwise, to be compensated for their lost properties; and (2) the negotiations for the establishment of permanent boundaries between Israel and the Arab states would be based in principle on the UN partition resolution of 1947—boundaries "acceptable" to the Israelis before the war.

The Arab states, including the United Arab Republic, continued to define their understanding of a "just and honorable political settlement" in precisely these terms right up to the outbreak of the June War.[31] But the Israeli refusal to seriously consider either condition has been so absolute and persistent since 1949 that all the Arab states quickly came around to a *provisional* commitment ("if Israel continues to refuse these two conditions for a just settlement, etc.") to the liberation of occupied Palestine.

Despite the sheer weight of numbers—close to 100 million Arabic-speaking peoples in Asia and Africa, whose governments are associated in the League of Arab States, and more than 40 million in the most directly involved region of the Arab East—a number of factors have tended in the past to limit the Arab commitment to this provisional and fundamentally rhetorical stance.

An indifference and cynicism bred by the corruption of ruling elites, coupled with underdevelopment, susceptibility to Western pressure, and the difficulty of sustaining "Arab nation" unity (given the bitter clashes of leading personalities and rival Pan-Arab ideologies), disarmed or betrayed even the most modest of Arab intentions. These intentions must then be counterposed to the potential of a striving, incredibly well-financed, literate, skilled Western settler-state whose leadership has almost consistently been able to maintain internal unity and powerful international support by drawing upon "backs-against-the-sea" psychology and the high morale available to any relatively equalitarian (*entre famille*) society in moments of crisis. These factors, along with Israel's finely honed techno-military capacity, have more than compensated for numbers and assured her domination of any orthodox military situation.

And so it was the Palestinians alone who kept the cause. No Arab state actively encouraged armed resistance for more than a decade and a half after the 1948 disaster, with the exception of a short-lived fedayeen campaign from the Gaza Strip which ended with the Suez War and the subsequent presence of UN troops sealing off Gaza as well as demilitarizing UAR fortifications at the Tiran Straits.

Whenever Western commentators attacked Radio Cairo or some other "Voice" of the Arabs for "stirring up the refugees and the Arab masses," they failed to understand that the process has usually been in reverse. After a number of Palestinian guerrilla operations, carried out despite the internal security measures taken by Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon prior to the June War, the Israelis would inevitably strike in open formation at border villages within Arab lines. The relative appearance of official impotence on the part of the Arab governments in face of such attacks invariably resulted in prestige-saving concessions to a popular sentiment increasingly demanding resistance, confrontation, and ultimate liberation of the occupied lands.

Thus all Arab states—be they monarchies or any of the varieties of radical republics—had slowly, at times almost grudgingly, responded to the violations of their territory by moving, in piecemeal fashion, closer to the demands of the dispossessed Palestinians.

For the past two decades most of the involved states have been afflicted by the tension between their own declarations in behalf of Palestine and Arab unity (prompted largely by political necessity)

and the lack of dynamic or even authentic commitment to these declarations. Palestine remained a complex but foreign affair, of importance to internal politics only as one of the most pressing, durable, but abstract issues of the day—a dangerous issue, to be manipulated or ignored as one dared and according to style and ideological taste. In the hothouse atmosphere of Arab East politics, he who ignored the issue was liable as a "traitor" and he who manipulated the issue or even acted in its behalf was guilty of "trading in Palestine."

The Palestinian refugees were a well-submerged minority in most of the host Arab states, subject to stringent internal security restrictions in some cases and always denied the right to independent political association. Even Egypt, which administered the Gaza Strip (a narrow, tightly packed, dusty southern remnant of the UN-designated Arab state), was shielded, when it cared to be, from having to come to serious terms with the problem by the empty Sinai expanse that stood between the Nile Valley heartland and Egypt's finger in Palestine—a vast sand cushion for injured sensibility.

But the Kingdom of Jordan was born out of the 1948 tragedy, and the problem of Palestine has been an inescapable source of almost all genuine internal political tension. Palestinians—whether refugees or residents who remained in the West Bank, saved in 1948 from total Israeli conquest by the Arab Legion—made up the majority of the population. The Hashemites had to decide which of roughly two alternatives they were to pursue when they found themselves and their East Bank emirate suddenly transformed into a new nation incorporating almost all that remained of unoccupied Palestine.

At that moment any choice was theoretically viable. The Mufti, King Abdullah's great antagonist, had failed to return to Jerusalem during the decisive battles and his reputation was now as tarnished, in Palestinian eyes, as any other leader (including Abdullah) to be held responsible.

Succored by the jealousies of Egypt's King Farouk, the Mufti rallied briefly after the war in Gaza to proclaim a short-lived "Government of All Palestine," but the initiative remained with the man whose soldiers had saved the heart of Jerusalem.

Pristine form is the vice of retrospection, and so with this abstract of Abdullah's choice. Today the nuances are unknown or barely guessed; but the situation at the moment of history is always more

felt than understood (and rarely as "choice"), the rich spectrum of complications—motive and human condition—to be washed out by the sorting, the intelligible necessities of some future mind.

Abdullah was shrewd and at least comparable to his rivals of the time as a man possessed of personal virtues. His photos hint at both humor and character. Abdullah preferred prayer to Farouk's dancing girls; his literary style was elegant, his social life modest. He was still close enough to the desert to lack the bureaucratic pretensions of the Levant. But his vision, piety, and intelligence were cramped rather than enlarged by personal ambition. Glubb Pasha writes that Abdullah was pragmatic and for this he admired the man, never comprehending that the "realism" that should inspire tactics instead poisoned the King's basic strategy.

Moral gesture could then (and still today) sweep all in the Middle East—the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan as easily as the Hashemite kingdom of Palestine. In practical terms the choice would never have been considered, given decades of close association with Britain and the absence, at that moment, of any alternative major power ready to part from the World War II-inspired cult of Israel, to help finance a rival militant state without apparent natural resources, burdened by hundreds of thousands of newly dispossessed and saddled with a traditional East Bank export economy of cheap, bulky agricultural produce suddenly barred by an enemy from the former free port at Haifa.

But the alternative was there: to turn government over to the administratively more skilled and anguished Palestinian majority; to strain for a new development/war economy, reoriented along such feasible lines as light manufactured goods (including small-arms factories); to develop Aqaba as a new sea route for exports with the same desperation that the Israelis were to throw themselves into building up Eilat; to restore within months (by ferry) the link between Arab Asia and Africa severed by the loss of the Negev (a project still to be implemented by Egypt and Jordan nineteen years later and now hopeless with the loss of Sinai).

All these massive public works would have required a vast labor force—pathetically all too available in the refugee camps—the educated skills for which the Palestinian had priority even then throughout the Arab world, and an entrepreneurial sense, again Palestinian,

that understands wealth in terms far more productive and demanding than owning land and playing at speculation.

To have done all this . . . to have trusted the Palestinian, depended on the Palestinian, armed the Palestinian . . . to have moved the center of government from Amman to Jerusalem just as Ben-Gurion moved his from Tel Aviv . . . to have dared to do whatever the Israelis have dared is all so inconceivable. And yet only Abdullah, of all the Arab rulers of his time, had the personal fiber and following to have so dared.

Instead the Arab Legion disarmed the peasant militia in October 1948 and the King incorporated the West Bank within a constitutional framework that assured far more representation to the East Bank minority. This drift of the administration was to send hundreds of the best Palestinian minds out of the country in disgust, just as the subsequent lack of serious development sent thousands of skilled workers and technicians abroad in search of employment.

In the winter of 1948–49 Abdullah began his pursuit of a permanent peace settlement with Israel through secret correspondence passed by representatives on the Armistice Commission.

The security of the Hashemite kingdom as a Palestinian state could have rested upon the aspirations of its people to recover the occupied land, as well as upon the ambition of its ruler to rally the Arab world behind him in a long, painful struggle for liberation and national revival. Instead the ultimate logic of the "realistic" alternative, which has dominated Hashemite thinking since the early thirties, demanded that the security of the throne rest upon a permanent understanding with Israel. On July 20, 1951, just after Friday noon prayers, Abdullah was shot to death at the door of al-Aqsa Mosque by a tailor from Jerusalem.

Abdullah's dedicated and popular son, Talal, assumed the throne, but within a year was found to be too ill to reign. In August 1952 he abdicated in favor of his own son, Hussein. Abdullah's line had endured, but his policy was to survive his death only in the most contradictory of forms.

Immediately after the 1948 War thousands of Palestinians had attempted in an unorganized fashion to return to their homes—some in the hope of settling down, others to gather up what remained of their movable property and return to Arab-controlled territory. The Israe-

lis fired upon them at sight as "infiltrators" violating the cease-fire lines.

Within months most of the refugees abandoned hope of Israel ever voluntarily allowing them to return, but there were still many men prepared to risk the run back to their villages on foraging expeditions, either alone or in small groups. Now, however, they went armed in case of interception.

There were other incidents. The cease-fire lines had separated a number of West Bank frontier villages from their farmland, and when the Palestinian farmers crossed over the line to cultivate their fields they, too, were fired upon as "infiltrators."

The traditional caravan route linking Egypt with the Fertile Crescent runs through southern Palestine into the Sinai; traders and smugglers now armed themselves and traveled at night rather than abandon the route. If intercepted, there were sometimes gunfights, with the Israelis reporting the incidents as "clashes with armed marauders."

It was within this developing relationship between refugee and Israeli, or between frontier villager and Israeli, that the Palestinian nationalist leadership recovered its will to resist after the 1948 debacle and began to organize the first fedayeen units from among the refugees on the West Bank and in Syria for sporadic raids through Jordan into Israeli territory.

The Israelis responded with the policy of official reprisals: West Bank frontier villages were assaulted at night by initially small units of the Israeli Army who would shoot up the town, toss grenades, or blow up a few buildings.

The Jordanians chose to struggle on two fronts. Limited quantities of small arms were issued to the frontier villages and Arab Legion NCO's were assigned to train and lead local self-defense teams that were to emerge within a few years—with additional arms and better training—as a 30,000-strong national guard formed at regimental level by clusters of six to eight frontier villages.

The national guard supplemented the Arab Legion, then a highly mobile professional contract army composed mainly of bedouin. The Legion took up positions in centrally situated reserve positions behind the armistice line, with the option of moving up to reinforce any village under attack.

At the same time the government cracked down on all forms of infiltration. Palestinians crossing the cease-fire lines without arms were imprisoned for six months; those carrying arms were given more severe sentences and fired upon if they resisted arrest. By the mid-fifties, according to Glubb Pasha, half of the men in Jordanian prisons were there for attempted infiltration and the government was seeking, through the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), an agreement for cooperation between Jordanian and Israeli police that would have included the mutual right of "hot pursuit" across the cease-fire line in a coordinated drive against fedayeen and other Arab infiltrators.[32]

However, despite the incredible Jordanian offer and efforts by the Amman government to curb these first primitive attempts at guerrilla warfare, the reprisals continued and, given the new ability of the frontier villages to offer some resistance, the destructive intensity of the attacks and the number of Israeli soldiers involved in each operation rapidly accelerated. In the raid on Qibya village in October 1953, a "reprisal operation" for the killing of three Israelis, 75 Arabs were killed and the village demolished.

The two-front policy was tragic: it failed to secure peace along frontiers which the Israeli leadership had never fundamentally accepted as either satisfactory or final borders. (There is a running two-decade-old polemic in Israel over who is to be blamed for the failure to seize all of the West Bank in 1948. Ben-Gurion blames the present Deputy Premier Yigdal Allon, and the latter reciprocates.) All that the two-front policy did succeed in doing was to still further antagonize and alienate the Palestinians from their Hashemite rulers.

Throughout the fifties and sixties Jordanian policy tacked and weaved between the course first charted by Abdullah and the popular demands of almost entire peoples—Palestinian, Syrian, Iraqi, and, with some revolutionary prodding, the once grandly isolated and apathetic Egyptians—for an independent, neutralist Arab national revival capable of transcending those border lines of separate statehood and regional impotence with which England and France had carved up the Arab East.

In neighboring Hashemite Iraq a stance similar to Abdullah's—dependence on Britain and cautious accommodation of Israel—was pursued with rigidity by aging palace politicians. Swept up into the

Cold War, Iraq was assigned a bastion role to play by the West with the formation of the Baghdad Pact—an attempted Middle East extension of NATO. The young Hashemite monarch Faisal (Hussein's cousin) was to pay the terrible price: toppled from the throne by an army coup in July 1958 and torn to pieces by a revolutionary mob that sacked the palace.

But in Jordan the Hashemites survived, almost magically riding the crests—moving away from the Baghdad Pact at the last minute and then abandoning newly discovered neutralism for the Eisenhower Doctrine of American armed intervention in the Middle East. First Hussein Arabized the Legion's command and then purged it of Palestinian and nationalist Transjordanian officers. Free elections were held, providing the Palestinian with his first full political breath . . . followed by the suspension of parliament and the constitution. The Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and British subsidy, renounced for the sake of Arab solidarity (and the promise of necessary financial support), were abandoned in turn for American funding and political isolation.

Only in one basic sense can it be said that Abdullah's policy consistently endured: it was Israel, on its own accord, that inevitably guaranteed the security of Hashemite rule in the past decade and a half by threatening to occupy the West Bank in the event of "any threat to Jordan's status" (i.e., revolution).

When the U.S. Marines intervened in the Lebanese civil war (July 15, 1958) to halt the Arab revolutionary spiral that had brought down the Iraqi monarchy the day before, Israel granted air-transit rights to RAF planes flying across to Amman with British paratroopers from Cyprus to prop up the regime.

And it was in the aftermath of Sammou' (a Jordanian frontier town leveled to the ground by a massive Israeli reprisal raid in the fall of 1966), when an almost insurrectionary situation on the West Bank again threatened the regime after several years of stability, that Hassanein Heykal, the brilliant editorial director of *Al-Ahram* and for many years Abdul Nasser's most intimate friend among Egyptian journalists, admitted the extent of the Israeli guarantee's effectiveness.

Throughout the sixties Egypt had never sought more than an ideological "open field" or sphere of influence in Jordan, Heykal wrote, for fear that a violent or radical change of regime in Amman would

have forced the UAR into an unwelcome military confrontation with Israel over the West Bank.

There was a bitter edge for the Palestinian in Heykal's frank admission. Prior to that cruel eye-opener, the June 1967 War, no other people in the Arab East could rival the Palestinians for simple faith in the UAR—in its massive army and revolutionary promise—as the historic agent destined to recover the lost homeland. More than the Syrian or the Iraqi, the Palestinian would have welcomed nothing less than the political union of Jordan with Egypt, as partner in either of the two attempts at a united Arab republic. Yet it was Ben-Gurion who had stayed the deliverer's hand.

For more than a decade Palestinian guerrilla activity rose and fell in waves, but its repression in Jordan continued as state policy until the eve of the June War. In the minds of the Palestinians the repression was but a chain in the channeling of industrial development projects to the East Bank over the years at the expense of the West Bank and the political predominance of Transjordanians in the national administration. Amman's airport received development priority despite the prestigious possibilities of the airstrip in Jerusalem, and West Bankers who sought to launch small industries on their own claim that they were subject to tremendous pressures by the government to move their operations east.

Whatever the original motivation—security considerations, speculative stimulation of an Amman land boom, or tribal-regional pride—the final effect of these policies, ironically, has been to draw hundreds of thousands of Palestinians seeking work across the river. Amman has mushroomed from a large town in 1948 to a sprawling city of half a million. Even before the June War and the subsequent flow of additional refugees, the East Bank had ceased to be all that solid a secure royalist base. The presence of so many Palestinians in what had been Transjordan cemented "the unity of the two banks of Jordan"—which all the Hashemite rhetoric and repressive measures had failed to do. The June War flow of more than 250,000 refugees has completed the cycle; the majority of the East Bank population now considers itself Palestinian.

In the first months following the June War the Israelis were confident that they would be able to capitalize upon these decades-old resentments and stir the specter of a separatist "Palestine Arab state"

rising up out of the occupied West Bank as a club to force Amman to terms. The English- and Arabic-language press in Israel ran vivid and cluckingly sympathetic reappraisals of the past relationship and hinted at the glorious future assured the Palestinian in his own little West Bank Bantustan, tied by treaty or federation to Israel.

Such sudden concern was particularly amusing because in the previous decade the Israeli press had cultivated a patronizing cult for Jordan's "plucky" or "brave little king" and had done all that was possible to bury the very concept of a Palestinian existence.[33]

With rare exception the West Bank elite and all the people of Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank repudiated the maneuver; the Israelis had ignored the vital Palestinian relationships of family and commerce that now spanned both banks and, above all, the popular belief in the concept of an Arab nation that is nowhere else held so firm.

Since then the Israelis have periodically revived talk of an "autonomous Palestine" (and with apparent American diplomatic backing), and if by now many of the most active opponents of the maneuver have been deported and the older elite that has been allowed to remain behind is more susceptible to conciliation, the fedayeen have flourished in the passage of time, inspiring the masses of Palestinians (and particularly the youth) with a determination to resist whatever tendencies the West Bank elite has toward collaboration.

If the evolving Palestinian-Jordanian relationship is but one element within a regional disorder, sharpened by twenty years of bitter but never decisive or prolonged clashes between Arabs and Israelis—over water rights to the Jordan River and its tributaries, or Israeli encroachment upon demilitarized zones bordering Egypt and Syria, or Israeli participation in the Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956—it is still the most vital, basic element. For by refusing to disappear, it is the Palestinian who has most thoroughly frustrated Zionist ambitions despite the periodic flashy Israeli military triumphs.

And it is the Palestinian who has survived the most intense forms of usurpation still barely experienced by the other Arabs even after this most recent war, and has also understood this suffering as but the first intimation of an Israeli New Order for the entire Middle East and pointed the way to resistance.

NOTES

1. Theodor Herzl, *The Jewish State*, p. 30.
2. Herzl, *The Complete Diaries* (New York and London: 1960).
3. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, pp. 69, 70, 76.
4. *The International Jew*, Introduction and edited by Gerald L. K. Smith (Los Angeles: Christian Nationalism Crusade), n.d.
5. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, p. 26.
6. Ibid., p. 19.
7. Ibid., p. 30.
8. Herzl, *The Complete Diaries*, pp. 1432, 92, 1512, 1487, 1362, 1600.
9. Nathan Weinstock, *Le Sionisme contre Israel* (Paris: 1969), pp. 52–57; Herzl, *The Complete Diaries*, pp. 45, 102, 111, 121, 124, 168–170, 214, 255, 344, 522, 667–668, 672–673, 901, 905–908, 927, 1038, 1043, 1053, 1175, 1179, 1192–1193, 1493–1494, 1525–1526, 1554, 1625.
10. Jon and David Kimche, *The Secret Roads: The "Illegal" Migration of a People* (London: 1954), pp. 15–19, 28–38. According to the Kimches (who frankly describe the Zionists as concerned with selective recruits rather than with rescue work), the Gestapo agreed to assist in increasing the illegal immigration of Jews to Palestine and the Zionist mission in Nazi Germany was allowed to take Zionist youth out of concentration camps and establish special training centers in Germany for their work in Palestine. Kimche specifically mentions Eichmann as one of the partners to the deal. Equally fascinating accounts of other Zionist dealings with the Nazis and of Zionist indifference to the antifascist partisan movements can be found in Ben Hecht, *Perfidy* (New York: 1961); Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report* (New York: 1963); and Yuri Ivanov, *Caution Zionism!* (Moscow: 1970).
11. Weinstock, *Le Sionisme contre Israel*, p. 107.
12. AMPAL, American Israel Corporation President's Report, 1967.
13. The political base for both AMPAL and the unveiling of the Biltmore Program had been broadened in 1941 with the establishment of the American Palestine Committee, described by Alfred M. Lilienthal as "a gigantic pressure group of 700 personalities including six Senators and 143 Representatives." (*The Other Side of the Coin* [New York: 1965], p. 277.) Then, in July 1945, 18 American millionaires met with Ben-Gurion in New York to create the "Sonneborn Institute"—to purchase, at the cost of "millions of dollars," machinery and movable plants for the manufacture of light arms from the United States, where armaments production had been sharply curtailed and whole factories were selling for low sums. (Michael Bar Zohar, *The Armed Prophet*, p. 84.)
14. Herzl, *The Jewish State*, p. 30.

15. Frank E. Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestinian Relations* (Washington, D.C.: 1949), p. 251.
16. The 210,425 acres of Palestinian land acquired by the Jewish National Fund, the Palestine Foundation Fund, or individual Jews during the Mandate—in other words, 3 percent of the land—were largely purchased from Lebanese and Syrian absentee landowners living outside Palestine. At most, 100,000 acres were sold by Palestinians despite the phenomenally high prices offered (reportedly equivalent to New York real estate prices) and the British legislation designed, until the thirties, to facilitate the transfer of land.
17. Neville Barbour, *Nisi Dominus* (Beirut: 1969; IPS reprint of 1946 London edition), p. 176.
18. *Kongress Zeitung: Offizielles Organ des XX. Zionisten Kongress*, as quoted by Barbour.
19. Barbour, *Nisi Dominus*, p. 181 (quoting from *The Jewish Chronicle*, May 13, 1938).
20. Frantz Fanon suggested in one of his essays that fascism was considered so monstrous by Europeans precisely because for the first time in modern Western history one set of Europeans applied the techniques and racialist doctrine of colonialism (previously reserved exclusively for colored peoples) to other Europeans.
21. Jon and David Kimche (*The Secret Roads*, Chapter XIII) describe how more than a thousand emissaries of Bricha (the Zionist organization responsible for bringing immigrants to Palestine) were sent into the camps to fan sentiment for going to Palestine. And General Sir Frederick Morgan (British Senior Officer of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which dealt with the refugees) noted: "The whole business was represented as being the spontaneous surge of a tortured and persecuted people toward their long-lost homeland. I fancy that in reality there were few among the travellers who of their own free will would have gone elsewhere than to the U.S.A. . . ." (*Peace and War: A Soldier's Life* [London: 1961], pp. 234–238, 243–262.)

    According to Alfred Lilienthal, the Klausner report to the American Jewish Conference on May 2, 1948, called for cutting off all aid to Jewish refugees in D.P. camps in the American Zone of Germany and actively harassing the refugees unless they agreed to go to Palestine. Chaplain Klausner observed: "I am convinced that the people must be forced to go to Palestine. They are not prepared to understand their own position or the promises of the future. To them an American dollar looms as the greatest of objectives." Klausner was infuriated because the majority of these refugees had applied for emigration to the United States, and he

concedes in his report that his proposed tactics of coercion and terror were "not a new program" but had been used in the evacuation of the Jewish refugees from Poland. (Alfred Lilienthal, *What Price Israel* [Chicago: 1953], pp. 194–196.)

22. *Council News,* May 1950. For additional discussion of Roosevelt's International Immigration Plan for Jewish Refugees and its sabotage by Zionist groups, see Morris L. Ernst, *So Far So Good* (New York: 1948), pp. 170–177.
23. Herzl, *The Jewish State,* p. 78.
24. Sir John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs* (London: 1957), p. 58.
25. In March 1948 the Hagana High Command prepared a comprehensive operational plan D to replace plans A, B, and C, which had governed their strategy from 1945. Its main objective was to seize as much territory as possible, both within and outside the areas allotted to a "Jewish state by the UN partition resolution, *prior* to the end of the British Mandate and the declaration of Israeli statehood. Out of thirteen military operations launched within the framework of plan D and prior to the presence of Arab regular armies in Palestine (save for the restricted presence of the Arab Legion under British command) eight were carried out in areas allotted to the Arab state." See Netanel Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947–1949* (New York: 1961), pp. 87–89; and Professor Walid Khalidi's analysis of plan D in *From Haven to Conquest* (Beirut: 1971; edited by Khalidi), pp. 755–760 fns. and pp. 856–857.
26. *Al-Jaish al-Arab* should be and is now translated as "the Arab Army." In their time the British were faithful to an imperial tradition that romanticized the native at the moment of patronizing him. Hence such picturesque translations as "the Omani Scouts" or "the Arab Legion." In the 1950's the authorities in Amman responded to nationalist sensibilities by officially adopting the less picturesque of translations. And since other Arab states resented the somewhat all-encompassing title (the name was itself a revival of *the* Arab Army led by Emir Faisal in World War I), the formal name is now the "Jordan Arab Army." In my own account I use both translations, depending on the historical context.
27. See Sir John Bagot Glubb, *A Soldier with the Arabs,* p. 91.
28. Egypt initially sent 10,000; Transjordan, 4,000; Syria, 3,000; Lebanon, 1,000; Iraq, 3,000; Saudi Arabia, 300. (Ibid., p. 94.)
29. Harold M. Ribalow (Ed.), *Fighting Heroes of Israel* (New York: 1967), p. 132.
30. It is estimated that more than 100,000 Palestinians, or one-fourth of the

Jordanian work force, are employed abroad. In recent pre-June War years their remittances have totaled $25 million annually. It is these funds, reinvested at home, which—with tourism—accounted for Jordan's spectacular growth rate prior to the war. But since there have been no serious attempts at systematic development, investment has concentrated overwhelmingly in commerce and construction, and there is little industry to show for all the growth.

31. With the establishment by Egypt, Syria, and Libya of the Federation of Arab Republics in the fall of 1971, Egypt has again changed its name to the Egyptian Arab Republic.
32. The authenticity of Glubb's claim is confirmed in *The Diary of Moshe Sharett,* one-time Foreign Minister of Israel and acting Prime Minister at the time. Excerpts from the *Diary,* which appeared in the *Jerusalem Post,* October 31, 1963, are quoted in Sami Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest* (New York: 1967), p. 242.
33. Thus the symbolic importance to the Palestinian, during those years, of preserving the very word "Palestine," which had disappeared from maps, from so many contemporary histories, and from popular Western consciousness except in the most biblically defined sense. For example, when the Jordanian government consolidated the existing Arabic-language press late in 1966, thereby dissolving the traditionally nationalist newspaper *Falasteen,* the publishers changed the name of our English-language newspaper (which was also consolidated with a rival English-language daily) from the *Jerusalem Star* to the *Palestine News.*

3. Fida'i

Voluble is the Levant, but no one here spoke of the fedayeen except with caution in the final years before the June War.

Fedayeen or guerrilla operations against Israel had begun in the early fifties. Primitive affairs lacking in discipline and revolutionary theory, these earliest attempts at Palestinian action were invariably frustrated by the Israelis and Jordanians.

More successful among the predecessors of Al-Fatah were the fedayeen of Gaza, who were better prepared for those acts of self-sacrifice which have defined the word *fida'i* since the militants of Rashid al-Din Sinan's thirteenth-century revolutionary Ismailite sect made their way west from mountain strongholds to strike terror at Crusader princes and rival Muslin emirs.

The young Egyptian revolutionary regime had reacted very differently than the Jordanians to the Israeli reprisal tactic intended to discourage spontaneous Palestinian refugee "infiltration" in the years following the 1948 War. Early in 1955 Israeli commandos destroyed a border fort in Gaza, killing a number of Egyptian soldiers. The Egyptians, already smarting from the Israeli Army occupation of the demilitarized zone of Al-Auja (which borders Sinai midway on the frontier line running from Gaza to Eilat), authorized, as a riposte, the training of Gaza Strip fedayeen.

These Palestinians harassed Israeli settlements and patrols with increasing effectiveness throughout 1955–1956.[1]

But the Gaza fedayeen always remained under Egyptian control, organized as a small paramilitary force without any political structure of its own and rooted to the masses of refugees. It was depend-

ent on the changing necessities of Egyptian policy for its brief existence. In the years that had passed since the 1948 defeat, none of the Arab host countries had allowed the Palestinians to form their own genuinely indigenous and independent organizations—trade unions, political parties, or associations for commercial and professional life.

When the Israelis stormed into Gaza in their 1956 sweep toward the Suez Canal, none of the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians there were prepared to use what arms were available in a systematic defense of the Strip and no one among their own indigenous leadership could lead them against the invaders. However, during the five-month period of Israeli occupation that followed, a rudimentary resistance organization was established by the Palestinian youth. The work was intensely clandestine and the conditions in Gaza were destined to shape the style of Al-Fatah in the next decade. None of the predominantly Gaza-bred leaders of Al-Fatah will forget how on the first day of the 1956 occupation the Israelis were able to uncover a list of fedayeen from the 1955–1956 operations in the files of the abandoned Egyptian administrative center. With this list in hand the Israelis proceeded to round up and execute close to 250 Palestinians living in the Strip; in one mass execution alone, 80 fedayeen were shot down in the courtyard of a Gaza City school.

During this occupation period the rudimentary, almost experimental, clandestine resistance organization brought together such disparate elements as the Islamic fundamentalists of the Muslim Brotherhood, Arab nationalists, apolitical patriots, and Marxists, all of whom transcended their ideological differences for the pressing necessities of day-to-day struggle.

Yasir Arafat, who was working as an engineer at Al-Mahalla al-Kubra in Egypt at the time, was in close contact with this developing movement in Gaza.

Little exists in the way of an official history of either Al-Fatah or Arafat, the best known of its leaders. There is little danger of a personality cult within Al-Fatah; not only have the painful requirements of clandestine style in most of the Arab East until the June War made anonymity an obsession with these Palestinians, but one also senses that they are consciously reacting against one of the most tragic symbols of past Palestinian impotence: that almost hysterical necessity for a people without faith in themselves, after decades of

consistent defeat, to believe in the greatness of distant leaders who will painlessly deliver them from their oppressors.

This balding, oval-faced, soft-spoken man, whose revolutionary pseudonym in time would be whispered about wherever Palestinian refugees were gathered, has at times been called the "Arab Che Guevara," and his role as the link between the militant leadership of a student movement and the formation of a guerrilla cadre is strikingly reminiscent of the origins of the 26th of July Movement which sparked the Cuban Revolution.

Arafat, who had ended up in Gaza as a refugee after the 1948 War, studied engineering at Cairo University (then known as King Fuad University) and served as chairman of the Palestinian Student Federation. During those years in Cairo and especially after the Egyptian Revolution, when the universities were rapidly expanded as free-tuition institutions and their doors flung open by President Nasser to Palestinian students, the refugee youth from the host countries—Jordan, Egyptian-administered Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq—discovered each other and renewed, in behalf of an entire generation scattered by defeat, their own sense of solidarity as Palestinians.

And Arafat again became a guerrilla fighter; he was a training officer for Egyptian and Palestinian student commando units of the Muslim Brotherhood, which fought against the British occupation in the 1952–1953 Canal Zone guerrilla war. In 1956, during the Suez War, Arafat took part in the fighting near Port Said and at Abu Kabir, serving in the Egyptian Army as a demolition expert.

In 1957 Arafat left Egypt for Kuwait, where he rejoined the thousands of Palestinian graduates drawn by the first flush of oil boom and employment possibilities in the Gulf and by a tolerant political atmosphere within Kuwait itself. That summer Arafat, Khalil al-Wazir (to be known within the movement as Abu Jihad), and a dozen other young Palestinians met together on the beach just beyond Kuwait City at sunset to establish a formal organization, the name based on a double acronym: Harakat Tahrir Falasteen (Palestine National Liberation Movement) and Falasteen Tahya Huraa (Free Palestine Lives). Al-Fatah! (Victory) . . . the 48th Sura of the Quran.

Initially the goals were defined by the limitations of the most desperate of all circumstances: the fear that the very existence of a Pal-

estinian people might be forgotten in the wake of Israel's smashing military performance during the Suez War; that a de facto acknowledgment of Israeli power by the Arab states now threatened to freeze the Palestinian problem. Guerrilla warfare was a means to keep the Palestine cause alive despite the contemporary circumstances, and in time to create conditions that would involve the Arab states in a direct confrontation they longed to evade.

All the original founders had been associated, as members or active sympathizers, with the Muslim Brotherhood, which had inspired some of the popular movement throughout the Arab world (particularly in Egypt) in behalf of the Palestinians prior to partition and had organized the most effective force of Arab volunteers during the 1948 fighting. Given the reputation of the Muslim Brotherhood abroad as a right-wing organization—a reputation certainly deserved as the movement evolved (and disintegrated) in the years following the 1954 confrontation between Nasser and the Brotherhood for control of the Egyptian Revolution (or less discernibly but more significantly, in the shifting class loyalties of its changing leadership after the death, in 1949, of its founder, Hassan al-Banna)—its historic origin has proved an embarrassment to Al-Fatah (which officially disavows such origins) and has been exploited by its opponents within and outside the guerrilla movement.

But in the mid-forties the Muslim Brotherhood defied simplistic analysis. A powerful mass movement in Egypt at that time, rooted in the working classes (as well as a force within the student unions), directed by a popularist leadership calling for Islamic socialism, the Brotherhood organized trade unions, credit unions and cooperatives, vocational schools, and workers' education centers. It also struggled against the prevailing quietism, popular superstitions, and medieval scholasticism that had come to typify traditional Islam, and was one of the first groups in Egypt to organize the peasants and call for agrarian reform.

Most significantly—for the Palestinians—the Brotherhood was the only Egyptian political movement committed at that time to Arab as well as Egyptian national identity and to armed struggle against imperialism. Most of the men who founded Al-Fatah had grown up as refugees in Gaza, where their favorable impressions of the Brother-

hood Volunteer Battalions was to be reinforced a few years later when, as students attending Cairo universities, they again observed the Brotherhood rank and file (if not, this time, the leadership) take the lead in armed struggle—fighting the British in the Canal Zone campaign prior to the Egyptian Army coup d'état.

In the vacuum created by sudden Arab Communist passivity or opposition to the defense of Palestine in 1947–1948—reversing two decades of intense and consistent anti-Zionist struggle by the party throughout the Arab East—the Muslim Brotherhood emerged at the time of the Arab-Israeli conflict as the sole Pan-Arab anti-imperialist force.[2]

The Brotherhood was not opposed to Palestinians training themselves for eventual guerrilla operations against Israel, but it argued at the time against the vanguard concept as one that could only lead to premature adventures. Better to wait until the Arab states were prepared and ready to again fight Israel, counseled an important Brotherhood leader present at the Kuwait beach meeting. (It is ironic that the Brotherhood, which by then stood as the most implacable enemy of Abdul Nasser, would adopt a line toward fedayeen work so similar to that raised by the Nasserists several years later.)

The younger men disagreed. They were also convinced that their movement could succeed only as a broadly based liberation front embracing Palestinians of all ideological currents and not—as in the case of the Brotherhood—as a specifically Islamic organization. They were to define the struggle as "Palestinian in focus, Arab in depth."

The evolving stance of Al-Fatah began to emerge in the early sixties in the pages of *Falasteenuna* (Our Palestine)—a seemingly innocuous review edited in Kuwait and briefly printed in Beirut, but in fact the organ of the underground organization—and in internal publications that increasingly reflected a familiarity (acquired through contact with the Algerians) with the theoretical concepts of Frantz Fanon. All Palestinians who were working within the different Arab political parties were called upon to leave these formations and work only (and directly) for the cause of Palestinian liberation.

All Arab states and ruling parties were requested to allow the Palestinians to dedicate themselves solely to this cause rather than to continue to push the Palestinians into raging partisan or interstate

conflicts dividing the Arab world, thus turning Palestinian against Palestinian and diverting their energies from their own liberation struggle.

Al-Fatah also declared that nothing less than Palestinian unity (which would in turn inspire and provide the requirements for a working rather than a theoretical Arab unity) could ensure a framework for liberation. The protracted struggle that lay ahead would inevitably transform the consciousness of the entire Arab East. And above all else, Al-Fatah insisted, nothing less than popular struggle would liberate occupied Palestine.

Other young Palestinians were coming to roughly similar conclusions, but the geography of the Palestinian dispersion and the repressive political atmosphere of the Middle East contributed to separate development. Thus Fatah's initial base was to be found among Palestinian professionals working in the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia.

In April 1959, twenty young Palestinians from Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon met in Syria and formed the Palestine Liberation Front. Damascus had become a bastion for Palestinian resurgence, and by the late fifties the Syrians had created a special Palestinian commando unit, or katiba, within the Syrian Army to penetrate Israeli lines on reconnaissance missions. But Syria was now also a partner in the United Arab Republic, and the harsh methods of the Nasserist strongman in Damascus, Abdul Hamid Sarraj, necessitated the utmost secrecy. Under the leadership of Ahmed Jabril, then a brilliant young Palestinian officer in the Syrian Army, and Fudul Shururu, the PLF began to organize small, carefully selected cadres. Training in guerrilla warfare began in 1961.

The difference in working style between the professionals and intellectuals of Fatah and the Palestinian officers serving in the Arab armies who predominated among the PLF founders was reflected in later years by Fatah's facility for political and information work and the PLF's corresponding weakness but superior military skill.

Both Jabril and Shururu had grown up as refugees in Syria, Jabril attending the military academy and Shururu a student at Damascus University. Neither one was a member of any political party, but Jabril was for a time close to members of the Syrian Nationalist party, which raised the concept of a restored Greater Syria (reuniting Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine) in opposition to Arab nationalism.[3]

Shururu, on the other hand, was in close contact with members of the Syrian Communist party and what was later to emerge as the Marxist wing of the Baath (Renaissance) party. The outbreak of the Algerian Revolution drew their attention away from Arab world party politics and toward armed struggle as the only road back to Palestine. This concern was further sharpened when several of their friends among the Palestinians serving in the Syrian Army went to Gaza in 1955 to join up with the short-lived Egyptian-sponsored fedayeen movement there. In 1958 Jabril (later code-named "Abu Jihad") and Shururu ("Abu Faras") issued their program (distributed clandestinely among Palestinians in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon) for the creation of an independent movement committed to protracted armed struggle; like Fatah, they called on the Palestinians to leave their parties for the sake of a liberation front.

Three PLF members were among the 40 Palestinian officers purged from the Syrian Army by Nasser as "Communists" during the Egyptian-Syrian union. The right-wing "secessionist regime" that took Syria out of the union in 1961 was no less repressive: Shururu and some 70 PLF members were arrested at that time in Syria and in Jordan. But the organization survived.

Then in the early sixties an equally clandestine but revolutionary Pan-Arab party, the Arab Nationalist Movement, took up the idea of fedayeen work. Dr. George Habesh, the leader of the ANM, is a Palestinian Christian from Lydda (an Arab town between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv which fell undefended to an assault force led by Moshe Dayan in the summer of 1948, after the first cease-fire). Habesh was home on vacation from his studies at the American University of Beirut and he was witness to the particularly grim exodus of the Arabs of Lydda and Ramleh.

The ANM grew out of the conviction held by Habesh and some of his classmates at the university that Palestine had been lost because of the decadence and disunity of the Arab world. Only if the Arab states were purged by nationalist revolution, united within the formula of an Arab nation, and set on the path of modern industrial development would a war of liberation be possible against Israel.

As a radical and secular reformulation of classic Pan-Arab vision that dates back to the great Arab revolt against the Turks, the ANM soon assumed the mantle of Nasserism outside of Egypt and by the

early sixties had established itself as a significant political force in Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Aden.

Following Nasser's course, the ANM began to reconsider the vague doctrine of Arab socialism along more precise, Marxist lines, and in recent years has passed Nasser on the left, transforming itself into an indigenously developed Leninist movement. But what then differentiated the ANM from the Baath Socialist party and a variety of other shifting alliances of Arab nationalists resisting Western ambitions for the region and fighting for revolutionary power in the coup-d'état-prone decade preceding the June 1967 War, was the centrality of the Palestine issue as the basis for the ANM's Pan-Arabism.

In 1962 the Palestinian section of the ANM reorganized itself for eventual fedayeen action under the name of "Vengeance Youth" and began a series of missions into Israel to gather intelligence and establish contacts with the Palestinian Arabs who had remained behind. By now both Fatah and the PLF were preparing themselves for military operations that were to begin finally in January 1965. The ANM, however, argued against what it defined as premature action and advanced a five-year plan for running in arms and establishing cells among the Arabs in Israeli territory and adjacent regions, such as Gaza and the Jordanian West Bank, before launching guerrilla warfare.

Along with an obvious tactical logic, however, the proposal carried with it certain fundamental ANM assumptions unacceptable to Fatah and the PLF. The ANM then believed that the Arab people were concentrating around Nasser's leadership and that through this leadership a revolutionary unity in the Arab East could be obtained and provide proper conditions for the liberation of Palestine. The ANM thus saw the fedayeen role as a spearhead coordinating with a unified Arab army that would eventually fight a successful classic war with Israel. Thus the ANM was faithful to its analysis of Nasser as the leading progressive force, even though Egypt had at times treated ANM cadres throughout the world as expendable as that of any other independent grouping.

In contrast to the ANM, both Fatah and the PLF reversed the Nasserist understanding of the relationship between Palestine and Arab revolutionary unity, insisting on the primacy of the Palestinian

struggle. The struggle for Palestine would generate the atmosphere for Arab unity. All the Arab states would have to be dragged to a serious confrontation with Zionism, and the fedayeen did not share the ANM conviction that Nasserist hegemony in the Arab East would necessarily ever mean a war against Israel.

When the Arab heads of state held their first summit meeting in Cairo in January 1964, the issue at hand was how the Arabs were to respond to their latest humiliation at the hands of the Israelis. But by the time the summit had ended, an understanding had been reached to suppress Al-Fatah and any other fedayeen organizations. The understanding was to be vigorously applied by several of the participating states.

The summit had met at a time of crisis over the use of Jordan River waters. The Israelis had already initiated an irrigation project drawing water from the river, whose sources (until the June War) were entirely in Arab territory. Since the diverted water was not even intended for use within the river basin shared with any Arab state, but for use far to the south in the Negev desert to sustain new settlements, the Arabs interpreted the Israeli project as an act of usurpation.

When the Arabs countered with a plan to partially divert the headwaters of the Jordan, the Israelis declared that any attempt to seriously implement this project would be considered an act of war.

Abdul Nasser, a professional soldier with that classic vision of war as a fixed-piece clash of tanks, artillery, and air and sea power, understood commando action as a limited tactic within the overall strategy of conventional warfare—like the American Rangers or British commandos of World War II—and not as the preliminary guerrilla probes of a popular liberation war to be fought decisively and in depth on Arab-held soil. Within the definitions of his understanding, Abdul Nasser knew that the Arabs were not ready, and he called the Arab leaders together to tell them that and to formulate the basis for preparations for the distant day when they would be "ready."

The summit agreed to establish a Unified Command, headed by an Egyptian general, to coordinate the armies of the Arab East. The Palestinian fedayeen, Abdul Nasser argued, would only provide the Israelis with an excuse for picking the time and the place of the next

confrontation, to the disadvantage of the Arabs. A Nasserist newspaper in Beirut was later to take this argument a step further and denounce Al-Fatah as CENTO-backed agents provocateurs. Some of Abdul Nasser's revolutionary critics, however, suggested at this time that he had too much of a taste for American wheat and development funds to ever choose a "time and place" for confrontation with Israel.

But some of the Arab leaders, and particularly Abdul Nasser, understood that immediate concessions had to be made to the Palestinian longing for elementary recognition of their existence as a people. The Egyptian leader already owed much of his prestige among the Palestinians for having demanded, as early as 1959, that each "host" country encourage the Palestinians living among them to establish "a popular representative organization" that would then be merged into one body, the "Palestinian Entity," and be recognized as such by the Arab League. At the same time Abdul Nasser proposed that a Palestinian army be organized in the host countries. The proposals floundered in a three-way dispute in the Arab League between the UAR, its revolutionary rival of the time—Iraq (which offered an alternative proposal for the establishment of a Palestine Republic of the West Bank and Gaza), and Jordan (which considered both proposals as threats to the kingdom's claim to the West Bank). A vague resolution postponing action was finally taken by the Arab League, but the intense debate did prompt Jordan into offering citizenship to all Palestinians living outside of Jordan and also led to the establishment of separate Palestinian military units in the Iraqi and UAR armies.

This time the Arab leaders agreed on establishing the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a quasi-governmental body recognized by the Arab League and designated as an "entity" for Palestinian national identity. Ahmed Shukeiry, a wealthy professional Palestinian politician who had served in the Saudi Arabian diplomatic corps, was chosen to lead the PLO.

The gross, casual style of the typical senior Arab army officer of the time and the recurring inter-Arab feuds—either between revolutionary and pro-Western states (Iraq, Syria, and the UAR vs. Jordan and Saudi Arabia, with Kuwait and Lebanon as wavering neutrals) or within the revolutionary camp itself (Syria vs. the UAR and Iraq)—

doomed the Unified Command to a ghostly, irrelevant existence at its Cairo HQ.

Jordan would not agree to one of the Command's most elementary proposals: the stationing of Iraqi and Syrian troops in Jordan to strengthen vulnerable frontier defenses. Once political warfare had resumed among the Arab states, the Unified Command (like so many other Pan-Arab projects) deteriorated into just another debating group, and then suddenly flickered into a brief life on the eve of the June War—to end there in ashes along with the tanks, artillery, and air power of any Arab's classic military vision.

The PLO had but a slightly different fate. In May 1964 life was breathed into the organization when a Palestine National Congress met in Arab Jerusalem, confirmed the selection of Shukeiry by the Arab heads of state, and formally founded the organization.

By September 1964, Shukeiry was the "official representative" of the Palestinians by appointment of the Arab League; headquarters were established in Jerusalem and recruitment was under way for a Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) to be formed by conscripting Palestinians living in the Arab host states and organizing them into brigades attached to the regular armies of the host state during emergencies.

Jordan refused to allow the PLA to recruit for its army or to bring in any uniformed personnel already recruited among the refugees in the other host states, and in time Hussein was to argue that the organization had far surpassed the nongovernmental limitations specified by himself and other Arab leaders at the summit.

Palestinians belonging or sympathetic to the fedayeen groups participated as individuals in the formation and subsequent work of the PLO, but the clandestine organizations rejected a number of attempts by Shukeiry to absorb them. Highly suspicious of his obligations to the Arab heads of state, they also distrusted Shukeiry's style of speech and work, his "war by press conference."

The Fatah leadership considered the organization of the PLA along the lines of a regular army geared to conventional and frontal warfare as unrealistic, and held that the primary concern of the PLO with the forms of state power was pretentious.

"In the circumstances of a popular liberation war, it was a case of

trying to fly before one could walk . . . on one's own," said Yasir Arafat.

Only a year after the June 1967 War, I visited the Amman headquarters of a chastised PLO: Shukeiry had been purged from leadership and replaced by a collective directorate promised at the time of the original founding congress in Jerusalem but progressively denied, given Shukeiry's predilection for one-man rule; and the post-June War remnants of the PLA now supplemented by an active fedayeen movement—the Popular Liberation Forces—that was particularly active in Gaza. A spirited, informal atmosphere enveloped the Amman headquarters in striking contrast to the cold, smug, ministerial, almost arrogant tone that seemed so dominant during the brief pre-June War tenure of the PLO in Jerusalem.

In its history, financing, and methods of organizing a "revolution from the top" with a passive rather than an active popular base, with its bureaucratic and somewhat corrupt, demagogic style—all of which totally reversed the organic development typical of a national liberation movement—the pre-June War PLO bore a stunning resemblance to its leading patron, the Egyptian Revolution.

Closer in style and methods to the fedayeen was the Algerian Revolution, triumphant in 1962 after a brutal seven-year guerrilla struggle. The Algerian revolutionary leadership allowed Al-Fatah to open an office in Algiers and provided facilities for military training just as the revolutionary regime in Egypt had done for the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) several years before.

Knowledge that the movement was receiving serious training and preparation (as was the Palestine Liberation Front) to initiate fedayeen operations had been a major spur to the establishment of the PLO by the Arab heads of state.

But after the Casablanca summit of Arab leaders (September 1965) and a personal appeal to the then Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella by Abdul Nasser, Al-Fatah political activities in Algiers were restricted and their offices were closed down and replaced by a PLO bureau, although the movement's cadre was allowed to continue military training.

The summit squeeze against the fedayeen, however, was broken by the Arab Baath Socialist government in Syria, which has come closest to articulating the demands of the Palestinians for an immedi-

ate liberation struggle, and in the three years prior to the June War was to tolerate the existence of clandestine guerrilla bases and training camps as well as recruitment work by the fedayeen among the few hundred thousand Palestinians living in Syria.

For security purposes the Palestine Liberation Front divided its fighting forces into three separate organizations: Abdul Kader Husseini Battalion, Izzidine al-Qassam Battalion, and Abdul Latif Shururu Battalion (named after the first PLF militant to fall in action, the brother of Fudul Shururu, director of the political bureau of the Front). Since communiqués and identity cards were issued by each battalion, the pre-June War existence of the PLF has been veiled in comparison to that of Fatah. And even Al-Fatah initially used the name of "Al-Asifa forces" in its military communiqués more as a protective organizational screen for its own first fedayeen operation than as a designation for any distinct military branch.

In 1966 Arab Nationalist Movement cadres not already participating in the ANM's Vengeance Youth took part in the formation of still another fedayeen group, Heroes of the Return, which maintained a shadowy relationship with the PLO. Thus the seeming proliferation of Palestinian guerrilla organizations tolerated in the Arab East only by Syria on the eve of the June 1967 War.

At this stage of fedayeen activity the Israeli (and frequently the Western) press dismissed the guerrillas as "Syrians" or "Syrian-recruited mercenaries." It was a familiar colonial form for dealing with indigenous revolt: describe the native rebel as an outsider and transpose in place of his own quite genuine national identity that of his most conspicuous allies or sympathizers abroad. It is a well-worn routine worked by America in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, by Britain in Aden, by France in Algeria, and by the Russians in Czechoslovakia.

Not only were these first fedayeen groups composed of Palestinian rather than Syrian nationals, but none had direct or ideological ties with the Baath party, although former Baathists participated in the movement. There has, however, always been a particularly intense concern in Damascus for Palestine, which prior to the Mandate had invariably been treated administratively as part of southern Syria during most of the previous 1,300 years of Arab, Mamluk, and Turkish Muslim rule.

And the Baath Socialist party has never been exclusively Syrian; rather, it considers itself a "national" or Pan-Arab movement based either on the formal, if frequently clandestine, existence of "regional" Baath parties in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Kuwait, and Libya or on an ideological understanding with individuals and factions within local nationalist movements in Aden and Algeria.

More than any other movement, it was the Baath that most firmly shaped the pre-June War conceptions of contemporary Arab nationalism; and when Gamal Abdul Nasser discovered himself to be an Arab rather than an Egyptian nationalist a few years after the Revolution, it was the Baath party slogan of "Freedom, Unity, and Socialism" that he raised as his own. And the Baathists initially saw themselves as the logical partners of Abdul Nasser. His most dramatic gestures in the first years of the Revolution—confrontations with the West over arms, the Baghdad Pact, and the funding of the Aswan Dam; support of the Algerian Revolution; nationalization of the Suez Canal; resistance to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion; attempts at nationalization and the welfare state—were all approved by the Baathists and had won Nasser a spectacular following throughout the Arab world, a following which the Baathists, for all their persistent revolutionary work and networks of school-teacher militants, had never been able to achieve.

If there simply were no intellectually respectable ideologues available to advance Abdul Nasser's own notion of Arab socialism, in comparison to the poets and professors of the Baath, the Egyptian President nevertheless shared (and displayed when he spoke) a masterful understanding of the emotional needs of an entire generation of Arabs. And however cruel his struggle for postrevolutionary power with the Muslim Brotherhood had been, he did not cut himself off from the rich vein of Islamic sentiment among the peasants, workers, and artisans as did the more openly secularist Baath.

Abdul Nasser's major political weakness has always been apparent: reliance on a potentially corrupt military elite rather than on an ideologically committed cadre working among the people. The Baath leadership believed that together—Baathist ideological finesse and cadre, conjoined with Abdul Nasser's charismatic leadership—they

could spark an irresistible revolutionary force throughout the entire Arab world.

At the height of their prestige in the late fifties and early sixties the Baathists were at times the dominant force in both Syria and Iraq, but the two attempts at union with Egypt within the United Arab Republic failed and relations between Nasserist Arab nationalists throughout the region and the Baath became deeply embittered.

Both Syria and Egypt laid claim to leadership of the revolutionary trend in the Arab East, and by the summer of 1965 Abdul Nasser was denouncing the Damascus regime as "fascist." The Syrians countered by attacking Abdul Nasser's summit policy of attempted reconciliation with the pro-Western monarchies as a betrayal of the Arab Revolution, but the Baath—its cadres outside of Syria decimated by repression, and with Iraq lost to a cautious Nasserist regime—was rapidly becoming isolated.

If the Baath party had failed on the broad Pan-Arab front, there were still possibilities for the Syrian government itself to regain the respect of the Arab public (including its own), and particularly of the most revolutionary elements among the Palestinian refugees, with a militant stance for popular liberation war against Israel and support (or at least toleration) of fedayeen activities.

Once Fatah and the PLF began guerrilla raids through Jordan from the Syrian rear bases, the Baathist attitude could be contrasted quite favorably both to Egypt's acquiescence (after the Suez War) to the presence of UN troops at the Sinai frontier and along the Gaza Strip sealing off the border with Israel and to the repression of fedayeen activity by the Egyptians in Gaza as well as by the Jordanians and the Lebanese.

In February 1966 the Baath Left wing—a neo-Marxist tendency with roots in the officer corps and trade unions—seized power in Damascus. The French Orientalist Maxime Rodinson believes that the degree of Alawite influence (a schismatic Islamic community in Syria made up mainly of poor peasants) in the officer corps alienated the Sunni (orthodox) Muslim majority from the new Left-Baathist government, and that to overcome this problem and the resistance of the middle class to socialist measures, the regime intensified its Arab nationalist image as the leading opponent of Israel.

Arab critics of the Syrian policy have also pointed out that with its comparatively narrow and heavily fortified frontier positions on the Golan Heights favorably located above the Israeli lines, Syria was relatively free from the immediate Jordanian, Egyptian, and Lebanese fear of casual but bloody reprisal raids. If Israel were ever to attempt a reprisal action against Syria—beyond an artillery barrage of air attack—it would have to engage in an operation so extensive as to be the equivalent of full-scale war.

But the Left-Baathists were also committed—at least on a theoretical level—to Third World revolutionary concepts, to Mao Tse-tung's principle of protracted struggle and Frantz Fanon's understanding of violence as a regenerative principle for the oppressed. The methods of a Palestinian guerrilla movement and the risks implied by Syrian toleration were not at all incompatible with these working doctrines.

In the winter of 1966 the Left-Baathists advanced a fascinating argument against Abdul Nasser's constant counsel for patience in the struggle with Israel and his claim that, with the gradual strengthening of their regular armies, time was on the side of the Arabs.

According to the Baathist thesis, Israel was already at work developing an atomic bomb and within a few years would be capable of waging nuclear warfare. Within the same period the Aswan Dam would have been completed in Egypt. At such a time the Palestine cause would be lost, the Baathists argued, for none of the Arab armies—however strong by then—would even consider the idea of liberating Palestine at the risk of nuclear destruction of every capital in the Arab East and the flooding of the Nile Valley if the Aswan Dam were to be destroyed.[4]

The Baathist thesis also took into account the depth of American commitment in Vietnam and the growing unpopularity within America for any further armed interventions, holding that the U.S.A. would not be in a position to extend any but token support to the Israelis, assuming an Arab advance.

On a theoretical level the Syrian argument was neither reckless nor irresponsible. It was irrelevant, given the absence of any serious cohesive force in the social fabric of the Arab East, an absence not only indicated by Arab military performance during the June War (which can always be explained away by real or imaginary treasons, conspiracies, corruption, etc.) but, even more, by the incredible phe-

nomenon of three Arab countries—with the bulk of their national territory still intact and their administrative apparatus basically undisturbed, with vast reserves of manpower, and with the possibility of active assistance from several of the more distant Arab states—agreeing nevertheless to a cease-fire after six days of war.

NOTES

1. The fate of Al-Auja, which was to be resurrected as a significant aspect of Egyptian-Israeli relations on the eve of the June 1967 War, was gradually taken in hand by the Israeli Army in a campaign that began in the fall of 1950, when Israeli forces first moved into the zone and drove more than 6,000 bedouin into Sinai, establishing a police post and kibbutz in the region. Many of these same bedouin had fled the Beersheba district when it was occupied by the Israelis two years earlier. UN protests, including a Security Council resolution, were ignored by the Israelis. For details, see Sami Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, pp. 141–144.
2. To the degree that some European and acculturated Arab writers have fallen back too easily on models drawn from independent Western industrial societies to interpret Third World phenomena, even this early populist phase has been obscured or dismissed as "clerico-fascist." But radical religious sensibility has appeared over and over again as a motif of Third World anti-imperialist struggle, not only throughout the Muslim world from Libya to Indonesia, but most notably in nineteenth-century China (the Taiping Rebellion), in Vietnam (the Tien Thien movement which allied itself to the Viet Minh), in the primitive Messianic independence movements of the Philippines, in sub-Saharian Africa, and among North American Indians and the sophisticated guerrilla-priests of Latin America.

   Nor does there appear to be any strict correlation between the youthful affiliations of Fatah's leadership and the ideological currents within the movement. Men with Brotherhood backgrounds are to be found as leaders of the various currents or factions within Al-Fatah—the Maoist Left, the Arab Nationalist center, or the Right wing (now largely reinforced by religiously indifferent, highly Westernized Palestinian middle-class and upper-class elements that rallied to Al-Fatah after the June 1967 War).
3. With a turbulent history of assassinations and attempted coups d'état, the party was outlawed first in Syria in May 1955 and several years later in Lebanon, where the party enjoys a following among sections of the Chris-

tian community. The party was also able to attract Palestinian Muslims because of its militant line toward Israel. Now known as the Social Nationalist party (and once more legal in Lebanon), the party has irreconcilably split into a left-wing faction (anti-imperialist, socialist, pro-Palestinian guerrilla, and more conciliatory to Arab nationalism) and a right-wing faction (pro-Western, pro-Hashemite).

4. Israel has an atomic reactor at Dimona, established with French and American assistance several years ago and, according to Israeli sources, operated by a West German-Israeli team. In 1968 an Israeli military expert living abroad predicted in an article written for the Hebrew left-wing publication *Matzpan* that Israel would reveal its nuclear capability within a short time. The prediction was removed from the article by the Israeli military censor. In January 1969 an NBC News report, quoting Washington intelligence sources, claimed that Israel either already has the bomb or would have it soon. At the time of the Baathist polemic, Abdul Nasser declared in reply that if he ever had serious reason to believe that Israel was making atomic weapons he would launch a preemptive attack and destroy the facilities at Dimona.

4. Signs

At times history turns before our eyes in the most minor or personal of ways, and without the underscoring of a decisive military engagement or mass demonstration or the sudden reshuffle of opinion in a poll or election, we miss all significance. I think of Trotsky as historian, and of his observation that the Revolution had triumphed when a Cossack let a worker wiggle away between his horse's legs. Two obscure events in Jerusalem—the unpublicized visit of a French lawyer and the arrival of a letter from an Israeli "emissary of peace"—signaled the prelude to the June War, although this particular deciphering is long after the event.

In the fall of 1965 a French lawyer, Jacques Mansour Verges, who had defended FLN militants in Paris during the Algerian Revolution, arrived in Jerusalem and crossed over into Israel at Mandelbaum Gate. Verges is a relatively well-known figure among French-speaking Arab intellectual circles, and his visit would have ordinarily been noted even in the Jordanian press if only for the fact of his recent marriage to Djamila Bouhired, the heroine of the Algerian Revolution.

But the official press office handling such affairs never sent notice of Verges' arrival and rapid departure to my newspaper, and I read about it all in the Israeli English-language paper (which we received at Mandelbaum Gate in exchange for ours) the following day with great irritation. I had met Verges in Algiers after the Revolution when he edited the FLN weekly *Révolution Africaine* and still later in Paris after he had broken with Ben Bella and begun his own short-lived magazine *Revolution: Africa, Asia, Latin America.* Verges had

returned to Algiers following the Boumediene coup d'état, and, according to the news agencies, had embraced Islam. I was anxious to talk with him about both developments.

Verges' visit had been officially ignored because he was on his way to Israel to defend Mahmoud Bakr Hijazi, a 28-year-old Palestinian refugee (his mother lived in a camp near Nablus) who had entered Israel on January 18, 1965, as an Al-Fatah guerrilla. The official Jordanian indifference was, after all, reasonable: if any of the fedayeen in Jordanian prisons had read about Verges' availability, they also might have demanded his services as defense counsel. I had been able to follow the case by reading Israeli press reports as well as occasional agency dispatches on the affair that came over the ticker.

Hijazi's unit had been intercepted by an Israeli army patrol, and during the clash Hijazi was wounded and taken prisoner. The incident was kept secret by the Israeli authorities for four months; then in June he was brought to trial before a military court under the "Emergency Regulations" (which date back to the British Mandate, at which time they were continually denounced as "fascistic" and "worse-than-Nazi" measures by Jewish lawyers who have since held Israeli portfolios as Ministers of Justice).

Found guilty on four charges of "using firearms against defense forces, infiltration, carrying explosives, and attempted sabotage," Hijazi was sentenced to death by the tribunal. While Israel has never granted the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to captured Arab guerrillas (even when taken in uniform), this was the first occasion for a death sentence. The trial created a stir and should have been taken as an indication of the seriousness of the Fatah challenge to the Israeli military establishment only five months after the launching of their first raids.

A month before the trial Hijazi had requested an Arab lawyer, but the court appointed an Israeli advocate for his defense. The lawyer appealed, and three weeks later a higher military court quashed the sentence on the grounds that Hijazi had not been given the opportunity provided under Israeli law for a man charged with a capital crime to engage a foreign lawyer under special circumstances—the very law that enabled Eichmann to engage a defense lawyer from abroad.

During this time an Israeli intelligence agent named Eli Cohen

had been put on trial in Damascus as a spy. Cohen, an Arabic-speaking Egyptian Jew living in Israel, had been provided with a new Arab cover and had learned the essentials of Muslim prayer; after a brief working-in period among the Arab communities in Latin America, he had "returned home" as a patriotic millionaire repatriating to Syria, where he rapidly infiltrated the Damascus political elite.

When Cohen was exposed and subsequently tried and executed without being allowed to see his French advocates, the question of Hijazi's legal rights became a valuable piece of counterpropaganda, and the Israeli press initially greeted the higher court's ruling as a magnanimous example of Israeli decency.

But the problem of securing a foreign Arab advocate, as Hijazi initially requested, posed a problem for the Arab states either as committed as Israel to repressing Al-Fatah or, as in the case of Syria, Algeria, and Kuwait, unable to send a lawyer to an Israeli court without seeming to have recognized the de facto existence of the Zionist state. Then Verges, with his French passport, entered the case, visited the defendant's family in Jordan, and with their approval crossed over and met Hijazi—who immediately requested that he serve as counsel.

Verges was handled by the Israeli press as an interesting, albeit tainted, celebrity. But the atmosphere rapidly shifted when a local journalist asked him if under the same conditions a Jewish lawyer would have been admitted to Syria to plead for Cohen.

Verges replied that the two cases were not similar. Cohen was an Israeli agent who entered an Arab country with a fake passport for the purpose of espionage, and no international convention protects spies. Hijazi, on the other hand, was a soldier who was captured, arms in hand after open combat, in his own homeland—Palestine—and as a militant protected by the Geneva Convention. Verges also observed that, aside from documents issued by the British colonial office, the only claim to legality that Israel has ever been able to muster is the 1947 UN General Assembly resolution on partition, which designated the region where Hijazi was captured as part of an Arab state.

Hijazi would be defended on a political level as a freedom-fighter, like the Algerian *mujahid* or the Vietnamese Liberation Front soldier, and Verges announced that when he returned with his two col-

leagues (lawyers from Mali and Senegal) he would review the entire Palestine question in the course of the trial as the basis for defense. Israel had signed four cease-fire agreements in 1948–1949—with Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt—but none with the Palestinian people, Verges observed.

The Israelis responded in a state of shock. A Palestine review, the Geneva Conventions, lawyers from Mali and Senegal . . . the whole affair threatened to become an international scandal. Obviously Verges was an agitator in the pay of the PLO, exploiting Israeli decency to give political speeches.

The respectable Tel Aviv daily *Haaretz* argued (and its line was soon picked up by the rest of the press) that if Verges was really sincere and concerned about Hijazi he would abandon his political brief and plead mitigating circumstances: Hijazi had been misguided, seduced into his actions, and now regretted them.

Weeks passed after Verges' departure and Hijazi's request that he be appointed as counsel. The *Jerusalem Post* reported that the application was "still under ministry study in view of his [Verges'] recently rabid anti-Israel political statements published in the Arab press, indicating his intention to exploit the trial for political purposes." What Verges had done was to introduce a new element of international concern into the case; now, even the press of Arab states still repressing Al-Fatah took up the cause of this imprisoned *fida'i.* Hijazi had become an irresistible hero.

But in December, when outgoing Minister of Justice Dov Joseph denied Hijazi's request, it was on the grounds that there were "no special circumstances" to justify the presence of a foreign lawyer and that Hijazi could be adequately defended by an Israeli. Despite a subsequent higher court ruling requiring the Minister of Justice to show cause for his own ruling, Dov Joseph again rejected the request.

When the case returned to the military tribunal for retrial in late winter, Verges flew into Israel to defend his client but was detained at the airport and put on the next plane back to Europe. Hijazi again refused to cooperate with the Israeli counsel. Described in the press for months as an illiterate mercenary, a gangster type, Hijazi stunned the courtroom with an articulate self-defense delivered in flawless classical Arabic.

Sentence was delayed until April 1966, when it was announced in

the Israeli press that Hijazi had to undergo an emergency operation for ulcers. This time the prosecutor asked only for life imprisonment, while the court-appointed defense attorney pleaded the expected mitigating circumstances, declaring that Hijazi was "a wretch, rejected and disowned by his own country" (meaning Jordan).

Hijazi was sentenced to 30 years in prison. The discrepancy between the first and second sentence is perhaps an index of how harrowing and embarrassing the whole affair had become for the Israelis. The case had attracted attention abroad, particularly among some of the European non-Communist Left circles so tenaciously committed to Israel since 1948. Sartre was reported to be "disturbed" and ready to review the entire Palestine question in a special issue of *Temps Modernes.*

What remained after Hijazi was led away was the memory of the Eichmann trial, itself a legal process that was subject to challenge but nevertheless an Israeli procedure that allowed a Nazi mass-murderer the right to a foreign counsel, who in turn developed, in dialogue with the state attorney, such broad political questions as Nazi ideology and the moral responsibility of bureaucrats. Yet Hijazi, an Arab patriot—by Israeli or partisan Western standards, at worst a "terrorist"—was denied this right, and men of conscience who read about the trial abroad began to understand that this was because Hijazi, unlike Eichmann, had a case.

When Verges entered the case, the entire Palestine question—in an obscure but highly symbolic sense—assumed a new dimension. For decades this dispute had been masked, both in the Arab world and abroad, not only by the misplaced efforts of European-American Gentile guilt but by the apparent juxtaposition of forces—of a dozen powerful Arab states supposedly bound together by oath to slaughter the innocent Jewish masses huddling along the coastal line of western Asia and the solitary little Jew, symbol of his brave state about to be crushed by the raised boot of a giant Egyptian or Syrian or Iraqi soldier. And this ugly (as well as false) image had been fed abroad as much by the poster-art ego necessities of warped, guilt-ridden Arab minds as by any Israeli publicist working day and night to achieve a similar effect.

Hijazi and his Al-Fatah brothers were of different stuff than those vicious fancies so in favor on both sides of the frontier. The case of

Palestine and the cause of the Palestinian had surfaced with all of the clarity of any other anticolonial struggle. Too long compromised by what so often and confusingly had appeared—to Israel's advantage—as a complicated clash between two rival and, at best, equally legitimate nationalisms, Israel was to pull this mythology taut with the assistance of Arab demagogy for one last spectacular service on the eve of the June War and there, on the rocky soil and desert of fresh vast conquests, it would crumble.

Nationalism, even at its most liberating moments, is a narrow emotion so easily spilling over into cruel and self-aggrandizing ambition. The limited moral perspective of Pan-Arabism was not capable of reworking the materials of individual Palestinian suffering into a higher social vision—too often in those years between 1948 and 1967 the Palestine cause sounded more like a tasteless vendetta or personal grudge (or even a property squabble over some obscure orange groves) than a liberation struggle.

The Palestinian insistence on justice was undeniable. But without any apparent program or alternative beyond "revenge" (a neotribal Arab affectation as repugnant to the classic Islamic sensibility of the region as to Western humanism), the non-Arab understood the cause as an intolerable proposal to solve one refugee problem (the Palestinian) with hints of massacre or the creation of a new one.

Left to themselves, all the Palestinians had lived together within a multireligious community, and the goals of the rebellion of 1936 included constitutional protection of the Jewish minority's rights in an independent Palestine.

Despite the prevailing official demagogy, the fedayeen movement throughout the fifties and early sixties began to develop implications to the understanding that in the end its enemy was not a "people," but a doctrine—and the colonialist state and racist society fashioned by that doctrine.

From the earliest raw recognition of the full citizenship rights in a future Palestine state for Jews living in Palestine before 1948 there has evolved the concept of a democratic Palestinian society open to all the Jews of Israel prepared to live with the Palestinian Muslims and Christians in a nonsectarian, nonracialist state that is in turn an integral part of the Arab nation.[1]

And Verges was of different stuff than all those "friends of the

Arabs" who had cluttered up this simple cause for decades—either with their colonial-office sympathies for the picturesque enduring bedouin, which so often overlays an indifference to elementary Arab social and national aspirations, or with a snobbish anti-Semitism, so fashionable in the twenties, thirties, and early forties, which projected upon the Arabs an irrelevant and unwanted role as redeemer of Western prejudice.

By the 1950's such support had fallen apart, the imperial romantic repelled by the specter of Arab revolutionaries closing down his cherished military bases, threatening his oil investments, even burning down his favorite hotel, and, above all, rejecting his self-appointed role as guardian spirit and overseer.

By the end of World War II, the Jews of England, South Africa, and the Americas were no longer either socially embarrassing nouveaux riches or wretched urban poor objects of middle-class ridicule. And Hitler, who had played this strand to its most ghastly extreme, was very much the loser. As an ethnic group, Western Jews had moved almost as a class into the dominion of power—wealthy, fashionable, commercially and socially acceptable, integrated within the very fiber of the Western Establishment. And the European anti-Semite, like any snob essentially a coward and bully, now bowed with respect and awe to the new reality.

I remember, in the mid-sixties, reading English-language pamphlets in Cairo produced by the UAR Information Ministry and reeking of a musty European anti-Semitism. Later I was to discover the source, a porcelain Englishman from Oswald Mosley's fascist movement hired as an editor by the Egyptians. By 1967 the Englishman had abandoned Egypt, denounced Nasser and the Arabs, and proclaimed his sympathy for Israel in a book hailed for its veracity by the Anglo-Zionist press. The Jewish reviewers referred to the author's peculiar political persuasion, which had mistakingly brought him to Egypt, as "socialist."

In France the student ranks of Occident—those who had campaigned against Mendès-France by scrawling crosses and "Mort aux Juifs" on Paris subway walls in an earlier political incarnation—were to dance in the streets in ecstasy, screaming "Blitzkrieg!" when Dayan smashed the Arab armies.

"Our Jews," the smug, middle-aged West Germans were to marvel

that June; and only Bonn, whose leading administrative cadres and senior diplomatic corps are staffed by onetime Nazi party members, rivaled Washington in open sympathy and assistance to Israel on the eve of the war.

Henry Ford once distributed hundreds of thousands of copies of *The International Jew*; his grandsons must all contribute generously to the United Jewish Appeal. It was a case of history drifting to its own integrity, which some hopeless Arab publicists scratching away at faded recollections of Western anti-Semitism failed to understand.

At the turn of the century Anglo-Jewish circles in high finance did not support Herzl, contrary to the too-tightly patterned conventional Arab understanding of Zionism. They thought of Zionism initially as an embarrassment that would only serve to alienate them from their fellow Englishmen, and we find these men of high finance denounced in Herzl's diary with a vindictiveness almost worthy of Father Coughlin. The most passionate opposition to the Balfour Declaration within the British World War I Cabinet was to come from a Jew drawn from these circles.

Only years later did this Jewish baronage come around to Zionism out of concern for European refugees, a quickening sense of the eventual possibilities of investment in the Middle East through a Jewish community dominating Palestine, and a barely conscious recognition that, contrary to original fears, nothing has made the Jew more respectable in the eyes of Western racists than his stunning experiences as colonizer of the Third World. The Jew as Zionist had surfaced as the latest, most triumphant version of the conquering White Man . . . and the Arab was his Nigger.

In the summer of 1966 I received a letter addressed to me as editor of the *Jerusalem Star* (to be known in its final transfiguration as the *Palestine News* a few months before it disappeared along with almost every other institutional sign of an Arab presence in the Old City) from Abe Nathan of Tel Aviv, but mailed from abroad.

Nathan was that rather incredible Persian-born Israeli restaurant owner and pilot who had emblazoned his monoplane with the motto "Shalom—Salaam" and taken off in a madcap attempt to reach Cairo and plead with Abdul Nasser for peace and mutual understanding between peoples. While he was still airborne, everyone wondered

which air force—the Israeli or the Egyptian—would be the first to shoot Nathan down. But his flight ended peacefully enough in Port Said, where he exchanged pleasantries and gifts with the Egyptian Governor while his plane was repaired and refueled by UAR mechanics. Sent on his way back to Israel, Nathan was cheered as a hero upon landing by thousands of Tel Aviv youth.

Now Nathan was to write that he had "followed the remarks that your paper had made about my flight to Port Said" (I do not have the editorial at hand, but I recall that we had suggested, somewhat too facilely, that Nathan's mistake was not to have set his course due West and proceeded to a more reasonable existence).

"However, irrespective of these attacks, I do not for one moment intend to stop in my search for a better understanding between us. . . . I feel more than ever convinced that we could easily find a common language between the Jew and Arab, who have for centuries in the past lived in peace with each other."

Nathan went on to describe how shocked the Israeli public was that he had not been shot down or imprisoned and that his one-man bid for peace had "captured the imagination" of the young, to whom he was able to describe "the kind hospitality that was afforded me" and thus convince many young Israelis that "the Arabs were not the barbarians we have been made to feel they were for the past 18 years."

Finally Nathan declared that after the discussion in Port Said and subsequent meetings with Arabs around the world, he had come to the conclusion that it was necessary for his government "to make a gesture of goodwill toward the Arab governments and the refugees." Nathan promised that he would soon start to circulate a peace petition within Israel based on the premise that "there can be no peace unless we pay a price, and I believe this price can be paid."

Nathan requested a reply, and it was forthcoming in our subsequent editorials and commentaries. We followed events in Israel carefully: monitoring "Kol Israel" radio, daily translations from our Mandelbaum Gate copy of *Haaretz* as well as the *Jerusalem Post*, and a subscription via London to a leading Israeli English-language monthly. We were aware that immigration had dried up, that the flow of funds from Jews abroad was appreciably slowing down, and that these two elements combined—the available funds for con-

struction and the investments required by the settlement of hundreds of thousands of new colonists—had been the major spur to Israeli national growth.

Since late 1965 the Israeli economy had been on the slide, unemployment had soared, and a dole rather than even the make-work employment system of past years had to be instituted for the large numbers of men suddenly without work. Industrial ventures, without access to the large regional market surrounding Israel, were failing; others carried on only with impressive subsidies.

We also knew that in 1965 and 1966 more people were leaving Israel than coming to settle, that the number of skilled professionals who had chosen to work and live outside of Israel—50,000 to 100,000, according to Jewish sources—was a scandal to Zionism and a disturbing sign for a country with a Jewish population of little over two million. After the June War an Israeli acquaintance was to tell me that the joke of the previous year was a sign allegedly hanging in Lydda Airport: "Will the last person leaving please turn off the lights."

In the November 1965 elections Ben-Gurion's new breakaway and hard-line Rafi party, most closely associated with the traditional policy of no compromise on territory or refugees and led by the most influential advocates of reprisal raids and preventive war—Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres—had been defeated at the polls despite the dramatic escalation of fedayeen attacks.

In the same election a Tel Aviv publisher, Uri Avneri, whose popular weekly, *Haolam Hazeh*, had made common cause with the same psychological undercurrent delighted by Nathan's flight, was elected to the Knesset as a one-man party pledged to peace with the Arabs, the "de-Zionization" of Israel, and a future role in a "Semitic federation" of the Middle East.

Eshkol's government seemed less inclined to flick out reprisal raids with the same casualness as his predecessor, and a decision was taken to abolish military rule over the "Arab Belt" within Israel (which had effectively denied basic civil rights to 80 percent of the few hundred thousand Arabs who had remained behind Israeli lines in 1948).

There were overtures to the critical Russians, who were praised by Foreign Minister Abba Eban for their mediating role between India

and Pakistan at Tashkent. Rolling his eyes toward Eastern Europe, Eban suggested a Tashkent spirit in the Middle East.

Within this perspective we commented editorially that Nathan's letter indicated a growing despair within Israel; that despite the military conquests and territorial acquisitions of 1948 and 1956, Arab resistance had not been broken but rather had intensified; and that the Arab boycott policy would forever frustrate the possibilities of long-range Israeli growth. We also noted that in the past there had always been men of conscience, often eminent men among the Jews abroad and in Palestine (or later as Israelis), who ultimately came to repudiate the very nature of Zionist conquest as morally indefensible—Albert Einstein, Martin Buber, Judah Magnes, Erich Fromm, and Nathan Chofshi.[2]

But Nathan did not sound like a singular man of conscience; he spoke more with the wisdom of a merchant than a moralist. Nathan's style in no way reflected any sudden insight that the social structure he stood upon, however firm, was based on evil, as much as it did his recognition that the structure was wobbling and a bargain had to be made to set it right.

We speculated that, even assuming better motivations, Nathan was being used by a hedging circle of Israeli businessmen and professionals who sought to redirect their government away from traditional policies which had failed, and that this circle was prepared—unlike the rest of the Israeli Establishment—to make major concessions as far as refugees and possibly even territory was concerned, in the hope of securing a peace that would ensure economic domination of the region.

This sort of editorial speculation, if made too easily (a regional vice), was nevertheless confirmed for me after the June War by a handful of radical Israeli critics who had followed the Abe Nathan phenomenon with curiosity and electioneered in behalf of Avneri.

But how pedestrian all this "correct" analysis was, was proved. What we thought of the thousands of young Israelis cheering Abe Nathan, mobbing his fashionable restaurant, and snickering at the old Zionist ideals of perpetual military service or building new frontier colonies was irrelevant. Our analysis of the causes of Israel's faltering economy and the new, cautiously defensive trend of her for-

eign policy was superfluous. For while we had recognized these signs as significant, none of us at the time understood their ultimate implications.[3]

What mattered was what David Ben-Gurion thought, off in his Negev kibbutz, nursing old grievances—or even more important, what his active protégés Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan thought, banished temporarily from the uses of power but with party ties and influence sunk deep into the Israeli Army officer corps and general staff, with their reputation as the most "modern," most dynamic, most "American" of the Israeli elite.[4]

In their essays on the June War, Rodinson, Isaac Deutscher, and other European Marxists have analyzed all these signs with great care, up to and through a crisis that included (according to materials available to them) the threat of a coup d'état by the Israeli military when Eshkol wavered at the thought of a full-scale war provoked by events set actively into motion largely by that same professional officer corps.

"All of us were swept up into it . . . another 'holocaust' to be averted by self-defense . . . not just people like Avneri but people on the Left, my friends, myself," said Dan Omer, the radical young Israeli poet months after the war.

"Only Tsaba [an Israeli writer and cartoonist now living in self-imposed exile in England] knew what was happening. I remember sitting next to him at a café the day I decided to join my reserve unit and Tsaba laughing at me. . . . 'They've taken you in too, eh . . . this time the Army has really caught everybody . . . you'll see, it will be another Suez but bigger and better.' "

The Syrian and fedayeen crises of late 1966, which eventually unfolded into the June War, could be so easily spurred to a head by the Israeli military establishment and American policy-makers precisely because the idea of another go at the Arabs confirmed basic Zionist conceptions. And the war paid off handsomely—not only with Jerusalem annexed and vast new Arab territories under Israeli control for use as a tough bargaining tool (and Arab leaderships expected either to fall in the wake of defeat or be easily intimidated into a settlement) but with a sudden, fantastic surge in funds from overseas, new immigration, and thus economic growth.

"Who remembers now that only a few months ago there was a

general crisis in faith, long lines in front of foreign consulates in Tel Aviv looking for emigration visas?" wrote the editors of the Israeli monthly *New Outlook* in August 1967.

In Tel Aviv and Herzliya they will talk with delight about the postwar "boomchik" until the next and already visible sag.

NOTES

1. Since the June War, Al-Fatah, in particular, has utilized its prestige among the Arabs to eliminate the traces of several generations of demagogy that too frequently failed to differentiate between Zionists and Jews and evaded an intellectual confrontation with the concept of imperialism by drawing instead upon European anti-Semitic materials for an explanation of the creation of Israel.
2. Nathan Chofshi, a Jewish immigrant from Russia, who arrived in Palestine in 1908 in the same group of colonizers as David Ben-Gurion, wrote in reply to a glowing account of Israel's birth by a touring American rabbi: "If Rabbi Kaplan really wanted to know what happened, we old Jewish settlers in Palestine who witnessed the flight could tell him how and in what manner, we, Jews, forced the Arabs to leave cities and villages. . . . We came and turned the native Arabs into tragic refugees. And still we dare to slander and malign them, to besmirch their name. Instead of being deeply ashamed of what we did and of trying to undo some of the evil we committed by helping these unfortunate refugees, we justify our terrible acts and even attempt to glorify them." (*Jewish Newsletter*, New York, February 9, 1959.)
3. Yet all but buried in the personal memoirs of General E. L. M. Burns, chief of staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (August 1954–November 1956) and then Commander of UNEF following the Suez War, was an acute understanding (and prediction) of the crisis. After discussing the limits to Israeli economic growth, Burns observed: "The relevant fact is that Israel's economic position is likely to deteriorate within the next few years. If it does there will be unemployment, financial stringency, a reduction of the standard of living—a very frustrating state of affairs for a vigorous and highly strung people, accustomed during the last ten years to a continuous rise in living-conditions and the appearance of great progress. Israel's leaders have the habit of putting down her economic difficulties to the boycott of all trade and economic relations maintained by the Arab states, and the pressure they exercise on other

countries to limit trade with Israel. In such circumstances, there seems to me to be a great temptation to find some excuse to go to war and thus to break out of the blockade and boycott—to force a peace on Israeli terms. . . .

"What of the next few years? There is danger that Israel's feeling of being hemmed in by an implacably hostile ring of Arab states, strongly supported by Russia which seems to find it to her interest that the tension in the Middle East should continue, may build up to a state of mind which would induce her to seize any chance of breaking the hostile encirclement. The pre-Sinai mood [referring to the mood prior to the Suez War] may be re-created. But before military action could be loosed, there would have to be a recurrence of the pre-Sinai conditions, when Israel could count on the non-interference if not the assistance of the Western powers." (E. L. M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* [Beirut: 1969; reprint of 1962 London edition], pp. 290, 293–294.)

4. Among the directors of the Rafi party were three former Israeli Army chiefs of staff—Dayan, Zvi Zur, and Yaakov Dori—and former Deputy Minister of Defense Shimon Peres.

5. The Trap

Throughout 1966, fedayeen activity accelerated. In response, Israel resumed her attacks on the site of a Syrian water diversion project and Israeli chief of staff General Rabin threatened full-scale military intervention. Syria was to be held unconditionally responsible for all future fedayeen activity, Tel Aviv declared. The new Left-Baathist government turned to Abdul Nasser for reassurance. Talks began, and in November 1966 a joint defense agreement between Syria and the UAR was signed.

I was in Cairo at the time, and the Egyptian Establishment seemed relaxed in light of the sudden fraternal turn in UAR-Damascus relations. The Egyptians share the regional prejudice that Syrians are "troublesome" by nature; but now, with encouragement from the Soviet Union—as much, if not more, the sole significant source of financial and military assistance to Syria as it is to Egypt—there was an obvious belief in Cairo that the pact assured greater Egyptian influence for "moderation" in Damascus and a powerful deterrent to Israeli ambition.

In February 1966, ten months before the defense pact, 200 U.S. Patton tanks had been delivered to Israel. And when Eshkol returned from Washington and a talk with President Johnson, he brought back at least the promise of rapidly delivered Skyhawk fighter-bombers. Seven months after the June War, Eshkol was to describe his visit to the U.S.A. as having "laid the groundwork for the victory achieved in the Six-Day War." [1]

In the 1950's Israel had secured its major armaments from France. America was rapidly developing new Arab contacts in a Middle East

largely abandoned by Britain, and Washington preferred arrangements in that fashion. Since 1960 West Germany had also become a major supplier of arms and equipment to Israel, and much of this was simply redirected American war matériel handled by Bonn in accord with the U.S. policy of obscuring its close ties with Tel Aviv.

But now American policy within the Middle East was becoming increasingly polarized alongside such unquestionably pro-Western regimes as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, and was opposed by their more adventuresome and most immediate respective revolutionary antagonists—Syria, Egypt, and Algeria. The Vietnam War and the Dominican intervention had contributed to the polarization; the war was profoundly unpopular among the masses of Arabs who increasingly identified their own struggle against colonialism and imperialism with that of the Vietnamese (a sentiment reciprocated by North Vietnam, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front, and People's China—all of whom offered aid to the PLO and later to Al-Fatah).

The revolutionary Arab states openly articulated this concern, and even in Jordan, then dependent on America for arms and direct subsidy as well as for development aid covering half the budget, words of caution or gentle reprimand were the most our newspaper was ever to receive from the Information Ministry when our headlines seemed too taken up by Viet Cong triumphs.

In Israel popular sentiment veered toward the American intervention—perhaps the typical Israeli saw Vietnam as some sort of anti-guerrilla test case for Israel as well as the United States. Moshe Dayan toured the Vietnam battlefronts as a "correspondent" in Israeli uniform, a guest of the U.S. Information Service, to study anti-insurgency techniques.

However tantalizing the initial U.S.-Arab relationship in the early fifties—and the hopes of renewal during the first Kennedy months—Arab nationalism was irritatingly and increasingly cramping the governing American style by the mid-sixties; and for men like President Johnson and his advisers—the Rostows—irritations are dealt with by a "bold" course of action.

In Southeast Asia, the Dominican Republic, and Panama this commitment to a bold course had meant intensified U.S. military interventions. But there were also other options. Reporting from Israeli

Jerusalem on June 11, 1966, *New York Times* correspondent James Feron provided an indication of how the Israelis understood the options:

> This is the way a foreign office official put it: "The United States has come to the conclusion that it can no longer respond to every incident around the world, that it must rely on a local power, the deterrent of a friendly power, as a first line to stave off American direct involvement." In the Israeli view Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara outlined this approach last month, just a few days before the Skyhawk deal was announced.
>
> In a major address in Montreal, one that attracted considerable attention in high quarters here, Mr. McNamara reviewed American commitments around the world and said, "It is the policy of the United States to encourage and achieve a more effective partnership with those nations who can and should share international peace-keeping responsibilities."
>
> Israel feels she fits that definition, and the impression that has been conveyed by some government officials is that Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Mr. McNamara conferred over Skyhawk details in the context of this concept when the Israeli diplomat was in Washington last February.

Maxime Rodinson reports there were rumors in Europe by the end of 1966 "that the close relations established between the USSR, Egypt and Syria had led to a 'rude awakening' in Washington. The Americans were supposed to be in the process of working out a new strategy for the 'defence of the Near East' based on the two pillars of Turkey and Israel." [2]

Even the iconoclastic but popular Tel Aviv weekly published by Avneri was worried that America and Israel were embarking upon a dangerous course.

> The Israeli government intends to become a servile satellite of a foreign power. This foreign power demands of the government actions that completely contradict the country's national interests. . . . The attempted coup in Syria has failed. This was the final attempt of the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States to "save" the Syrian state from what the CIA qualifies as the first step toward Syria's turning into a people's republic within the framework of the Soviet bloc. . . . Should the counter-revolution have won in Syria there would have been no need to use Israel. But after the aborted coup the U.S. has decided to stake everything on an intervention from outside. Israel was the only choice.[3]

But when an Al-Fatah mine exploded on an Israeli road near the Jordanian frontier in November 1966, killing three Israeli soldiers and wounding six, the reprisal raid came—not against Syria, as had been promised, but against Jordan.

The Cairo-Damascus Pact and the repeated assertions of Soviet concern for Syria may have troubled Eshkol, or the raid was simply intended as an exemplary strike for Syria's ultimate benefit. The target was Sammou', the Jordanian West Bank frontier village closest to the scene of sabotage.

A column of 80 Israeli tanks, armored vehicles carrying a considerable force of infantry and heavy weapons squads, all screened by a dozen Mirage aircraft, crossed the Jordanian frontier and destroyed the village. When an Arab Army unit bearing small arms rushed to the scene by truck, it was wiped out. Eighteen Jordanians were killed and 134 injured in the operation. Arab sources charged that the Israeli spearhead had been formed by the recently and directly acquired U.S. Patton tanks.

The implications seemed all too obvious to the Palestinians of Jordan. Israel had feared Syria—protected by UAR and Soviet concern and equipped with relatively modern Russian weapons—and had turned instead upon Jordan, isolated from her natural Arab allies by the dominant policy of the Palace and the then Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal.

Jordan, the Palestinians charged, was uselessly "protected" only by the guarantees of Israel's chief patron and by obsolete American arms, just as once the Arabs had been protected by British promises at the very moment England had become the patron of Zionism.

Demonstrations demanding arms for self-defense, reconciliation with Egypt, and the entry of PLA units and other Arab armies into Jordan swept the West Bank. Jordanian security forces were sent in, and the slogans turned openly against the regime. Shukeiry threw one of his few remaining chips into the popular struggle and called for a revolution against Hussein, pitting a nonexistent PLO mass base in Jordan against the throne. PLO headquarters in Jerusalem were closed, and Shukeiry's apparatus was either jailed or allowed to slither away. But the UAR and Syrian radio stations—more effective than Shukeiry—honored and thus encouraged the rebellion. Nablus

was in a state of open insurrection and had to be sealed off by the Jordan Arab Army. Finally, after a number of casualties, strikes, a few explosions, and sniping incidents, order was restored. Hussein rather curiously blamed the Russians for stirring up trouble in the Middle East.

America appeared as embarrassed and infuriated as the Hashemite monarch, and the U.S. delegate at the U.N. Security Council joined in the general condemnation of Israel for its "inexcusable action" at Sammou', pointedly letting Israel know that the American government was "confident that the Kingdom of Jordan in good faith fully adheres to and respects its obligations under the General Armistice."

In retrospect, how similar to Suez this all seems now, but with the United States filling in for Britain. First the provisional and quite gratuitous Israeli thrust at Jordan (throwing everyone off balance), a firm British declaration in behalf of the Hashemite kingdom, and then a few months later the Anglo-Israeli involvement with France in an attack on Egypt.

For just as there had always been an "Arabist" section, within the British Establishment, which had argued (at times quite successfully) that British identification with an emerging Jewish state would more likely compromise than protect Britain's political and economic stake in the rest of the Middle East, so too were American oil companies and leading officials in the State and Defense Departments convinced, on the eve of the 1948 partition, that American support for the creation of Israel would only hopelessly jeopardize opportunities for U.S. economic interests in the region.

Instead, both the American share in the exploitation of Middle East oil and the American stake in the oil-fed, increasingly expanding commercial activities in the Arab world rose rapidly during the fifties, when the British presence receded.

The same tensions between the rival strategic understanding of Zionism as a "guardian" or an "embarrassment" that could be observed in British policy from the Mandate until the failure of the 1956 Suez campaign (marking the U.S.-assisted eclipse of significant British influence in the region) were also apparent in American policy, particularly during the Eisenhower years. But as the former CIA man, Miles Copeland, notes, by the late fifties American businessmen

operating in the Middle East were increasingly coming to the conclusion that revolutionary Arab nationalism posed the most immediate threat to their interests.[4]

What has repeated itself is not a tightly elaborated broad conspiracy which so many Arabs, and particularly those most opposed to the Hashemites, are always prepared to see, but the highly patterned working out of somewhat contradictory patronage relationships by the dominant Western imperial power of the day.

The annual Israeli spring cultivation of the demilitarized zones bordering on Syria generated additional tension early in April 1967. The Syrians had withdrawn from these zones—predominantly Arab-owned land occupied in part by the Syrian Army during the 1948 War—after the armistice agreement with Israel had specified the areas as demilitarized. Shortly after the Syrian Army withdrew, the Israelis assumed full sovereignty over the zones, barred the return of Arabs who had fled during the fighting, and began to expel those who remained.

The Syrians complained to the Security Council in 1951; the United Nations criticized the Israeli measures and requested compliance with the rulings of the cease-fire-enforcing Mixed Armistice Commission (MAC). But the chief of the Israeli-Syrian MAC had already been informed by the Israelis that they considered the zones to be Israeli territory and would not tolerate Syrian interference in the internal affairs of Israel.

The Security Council resolution was never implemented, and Israeli settlements were established in the disputed zones. Israeli attempts to cultivate and defend this land were understood by the Syrians as an ongoing attempt at expansion. Thus the "cruel shelling" of the Israeli valley settlements duly reported each year by the foreign press.

This time the customary artillery exchange soon developed into an all-day affair, with Israeli planes carrying the air duel as far as Damascus and inflicting a sharp defeat on the Syrians.

On April 12 an Israeli patrol crossed the cease-fire line north of Tiberias and was engaged by the Syrians. From late April into early May, Palestinian fedayeen activity intensified and displayed an increasing sophistication: a mortar attack on the Israeli settlement at

Manara (the first use of mortars by Al-Fatah), a water pipeline cut in the Jordan River basin, highways mined, a bridge blown.

When leading members of the Israeli military and political establishment warned repeatedly of ambitious measures against the Syrian regime in late April and early May—a warning confirmed, according to the Egyptians, by Soviet intelligence reports of troop concentrations and an invasion planned for May 17—the cycle had reached its most explosive point since the Suez War.

In a May 12 dispatch actually based on a briefing by the Israeli Army intelligence chief, Brigadier General Aharon Yariv, *New York Times* correspondent James Feron filed:

> Some Israeli leaders have decided that the use of force against Syria may be the only way to curtail increasing border terrorism. Any such Israeli reaction to continued infiltration probably would be of considerable strength but of short duration and limited in area. . . .
>
> Premier Levi Eshkol warned Syria yesterday. . . . He spoke of the "gravity of recent incidents" and said there had been fourteen such cases in the past month. The nature of the operations, he said, suggested the work of Syrian Army commandos rather than the mercenaries previously employed for infiltration and sabotage. . . .
>
> It has been suggested that the use of military force may be the only way to bring Syria to the kind of modus vivendi that Israel has with her other Arab neighbors, Jordan, Lebanon and the UAR. The observations being heard in recent weeks and especially since last weekend are stronger than those usually heard in responsible quarters. . . .

The Associated Press dispatch from Tel Aviv dated May 12 was even more specific:

> Military force appears to be the only way to halt commando raids from Syria against Israel, an Israeli source threatened Friday.
>
> The source said there were alternatives ranging from guerrilla war against Syria and the invasion and conquest of Damascus.
>
> The source said that the only sure and safe answer to the Syrian problem was to launch a military operation of sizable strength. . . .

The *Jerusalem Post* military correspondent on May 14, datelined Tel Aviv, wrote:

> A major clash with Syria now seems inevitable unless the sabotage campaign is called off forthwith. . . . Military experts here believe that Israel

> is prepared to risk Egyptian intervention in its determination to put an end to Syrian aggression. . . .
>
> Apart from the growing public demand for action to stop the Syrians, it is thought that Israel has to strike now or risk the spread to other parts of the Arab world of the Syrian concept of "guerrilla war now" as opposed to the Egyptian line of "when we are ready." Another danger is the possibility of the re-emergence of the "Palestinians" as a national factor. . . .

And in the same issue, again credited to the *Jerusalem Post* military correspondent:

> The Damascus propaganda machine has helped build up an image of the invincible Syrian Army which has, in subsequent tangles with the Israeli Defense Force, suffered repeated defeats. It may, however, take a larger conflict to finally defeat the glorified conception of the Syrian Army—and with it the eagerness for battle now shown by Syrian soldiers.

However, the Israelis denied there were any troop concentrations along the border, and while U Thant voiced his concern over the Israeli verbal threats, a UN observers' inspection report released in New York appeared to back up the Israeli denial. The Israelis promptly invited the Soviet ambassador to tour the border area and made the most of his refusal.

But Israel's armored strike force is moved to frontier concentration points from hidden reserve areas by mechanized tank carriers. It has been the experience of members of the Mixed Armistice Commission over the years that by the time they have informed Israel that an investigation of the Israeli side of the cease-fire line is desired and actually get to the area in question, armor concentrated along the frontier has been withdrawn several kilometers to the rear and beyond the jurisdiction for any UN cease-fire line inspection.

Long after the war the Beirut *Daily Star* carried the report of an anonymous United Nations military observer stationed on the Syrian side of the armistice line in April 1967. The writer claimed that he and his fellow UN officers had observed dozens of Israeli tanks that month "hiding behind the tree lines of the roads and kibbutz fields in the Hula Valley north of Galilee" and within the defensive area from which tanks and other armored vehicles are prohibited by the armistice agreement.[5]

During this same period he spent a brief leave at Tiberias in Israel

and on several evenings observed tank carriers ferrying Israeli tanks on the road northward to the Hula Valley, as well as movements of artillery and armored personnel carriers. All these observations were reported to UN headquarters in Jerusalem, which notified New York, but no action was requested, according to the military observer, until the second week of May. By the time this request for an inspection of the Israeli border areas opposite Syria was received at UN headquarters in Tiberias, the Israelis had already withdrawn their assault force concentrated in the Hula Valley and in the hills to the west. Thus the United Nations report finally issued in New York did not mention any concentration of Israeli forces.

U.S. State Department officials also reportedly expressed their concern to Israel, but Johnson, his administrative spokesmen, his advisers, and his Secretary of State maintained a thunderous silence.[6]

The late-April coup d'état in Greece to forestall an expected Left-Center electoral victory (credited in European and Arab radical circles to the CIA) and a dispute between Syria and the American oil pipeline company Tapline (a subsidiary of ARAMCO) over transit royalties had done little to calm the worst Syrian and Egyptian fears.

Then early in May an internal crisis in Syria was set off when an article advancing atheism appeared in an official Army publication and provoked popular rage. The cadet and editor responsible for the article were given life sentences at hard labor as "CIA agents attempting to defame Syria's respect for religion," but the situation remained tense and the regime feared that its vulnerability would attract further blows.

The Israeli threats and troop movements in this period are of particular importance, not only in the obvious sense of understanding the immediate historical development of the crisis, but in the way they were comprehended by conventional American public opinion, which, like public opinion anywhere else in the world, invariably reflects the political calculations, prejudices, and conscious manipulations of its Establishment except at the gravest moments of internal political crisis or debate.

Even in Jordan, where ruling circles had always been inclined to consider republican Syria rather than Israel as the Hashemites' paramount opponent, these stories made their way to the front page despite initial efforts by the government to play the crisis down. For al-

most every resident foreign correspondent on either side of the frontier, the June War crisis began at this point.

And yet by the first week of June, these events of late April and early May no longer existed in conventional American comprehension, which only "understood" that Abdul Nasser had closed the Straits of Tiran in a calculated gesture to "strangle" Israel while the Arab wolf pack closed in for the kill. The rest was strictly Miracle, a superlative performance "almost as good as the Marines," as Leon Uris (author of *Exodus*) was to write.

Probably the two most commercially successful books published in America on the June War—*Six Days in June*, by Robert J. Donovan and the staff of the *Los Angeles Times* (June 1967), and *Strike Zion*, by CBS-TV newsman William Stevenson and Leon Uris (July 1967)—reflected and reinforced this overall prewar conventional comprehension.

Both books barely touch on this period, both briefly quote Eshkol (and Donovan interpreted his remarks as a bid for peace), and neither quotes the Israeli intelligence chief or Israeli military correspondents whose words so impressed the resident foreign press corps.

The crisis, according to both books, developed because the wretched Arabs, misguided by vicious men and cheered on by sinister Russia, want to exterminate Jews and periodically try.

The same phenomenon, though to a lesser degree, is noticeable in popular British materials of the time and, of course, within Israel. The one noteworthy exception was a plainly bound, fascinating little book issued not long after the fighting by the Israeli Ministry of Defense Publishing House—*The Six Days' War*—and dismissed quite sharply by Israeli reviewers for its "lack of color." Tucked away at the end, like somebody's favorite old teacup, is an essay by "Colonel Orientalist," the sheepish intelligence analyst who writes in the Israeli Defense Force weekly *Bamachaneh*.

The colonel serves up a piece on the significance of Al-Fatah and a quite accurate understanding of its Palestinian composition and ideology, the nature of its independent relationship with Syria, the extent of Arab disunity prior to the war, and the manner in which the regional crisis was sparked by Israeli threats to Damascus. The rest of the essay, including hints at postwar prospects for Israel and Amer-

ica, is equally interesting and one is left with the impression that the colonel could tell us so much more.

A year after the June War, the *Jewish Observer*, a magazine published in London by the Zionist movement and read by far more Western Jews than will ever pick up on "Colonel Orientalist," attacked *Le Monde* correspondent Eric Rouleau for continuing to insist (the *Observer* quotes Rouleau) that "the Israeli General Staff had precise plans to occupy some Syrian territory which dominated the Israeli frontier. 'The objective,' Rouleau maintains, 'was not so much to prevent the infiltration of the fedayeen . . . as to cause serious difficulties for the Damascus regime, which had been guilty of encouraging the Palestine commandos—if not its overthrow.' "

"The remarkable thing about this formulation [the *Observer* continues] . . . is that it revives the discredited idea that Israel was preparing to 'intervene' in Syria."

The sudden favorable turn in relations between Cairo and Damascus in November 1966 had still further repercussions that were to feed the June War crisis. Since at that time the Syrians were the most vocal opponents of Hashemite rule in Jordan, the Cairo-Damascus pact only further stirred up bitterness between Hussein and Abdul Nasser.

This parting of "the brothers who had together fashioned the Arab summits" first became noticeable in 1966, at the time of King Hussein's adherence to Saudi Arabia's call for an "Islamic summit." This had been an openly anti-Nasserist conception of King Faisal's, according to which the immediate influence of the revolutionary Arab states would be outflanked by introducing Iran and Turkey—relatively powerful and pro-Western states—into a formerly all-Arab regional definition. The Islamic summit call was again so reminiscent of the Western push for a Baghdad Pact prior to Suez.

King Faisal was Abdul Nasser's consistent antagonist in the struggle over Yemen, Aden, and the Gulf states. Amman's strengthening of ties with Saudi Arabia had been reciprocated by Cairo's approval of the West Bank insurrection that followed Sammou'. By late 1966 even the Palestinian fedayeen (who had known no greater opponent than Gamal in 1964 and 1965) were now treated decently, at least in

the pages of the Egyptian press, if only as a weapon against Hussein. Thus, when the Israelis attacked Sammou' in the fall of 1966 and King Hussein found himself hard pressed by the Egyptian-blessed West Bank insurrection that followed the Israeli raid, he asked rather pointedly in public where the Egyptian Army had been during the battle. The answer provided by his own press was that it had been "hiding" behind the UN blue-beret troops in Gaza and evading its responsibility to bar Israeli shipping through Arab territorial waters by tolerating a UN presence at Sharm el-Sheikh.

But when Egypt failed to react to the Israeli-Syrian border fighting in April 1967, even Syria began to openly speculate about Egyptian promises. The Jordanian Establishment had never eased the pressure. "What Steps Has Cairo Taken?" demanded *Al Quds*, the Arab Jerusalem daily, following the April air battle over Syria. The editorial went on to accuse the UAR of fighting in Yemen against "brother-Arabs" rather than rallying to brave Syria's side to confront Israel.

The author of this particular commentary was a pleasant Syrian Nationalist party exile who thought of the Baath as Evil Incarnate and would have been delighted in their overthrow by anyone. His editorial was encouraged by official Jordanian circles that had consistently resisted coordination with other Arab armies to strengthen the Eastern front with Israel. But the maneuver, typical of Establishment politics of the time, was duplicated in every capital of the Arab East.

This sort of "Pan-Arab" demagogy—so striking before the June War and only since challenged by the slow, uneven, but inevitable rise of a new fedayeen-inspired political morality—is "political" in the broad cultural sense. It afflicts both Right and Left, the "revolutionary" as well as the "moderate." The beginning of any genuine national revival rests upon the ability of men to honor relatively objective criteria, whether it involves immediate political profit or not. The inability of the Arabs to comprehend this concept has been one of the great self-defeating psychological facts of Middle Eastern life and has been mercilessly exploited by Israel.

The Egyptian Army and the Cairo-based Unified Arab Command had failed to respond either at the time of Sammou' or during the all-day April air and artillery battle. But now the pressure on Abdul Nasser must have been intolerable, and the Israeli threat to occupy

Damascus was the final thrust at a man who had thrived on his reputation among the Arabs as the twentieth-century Salah-al-Din called to redeem the occupied homeland.

On the evening of May 14, UAR Chief of Staff General Muhammad Fawzi flew to Damascus for consultations on defense, and on the morning of the 15th the UAR began highly publicized troop movements through Cairo toward Alexandria and the Canal Zone, while Cairo's authoritative daily *Al-Ahram* spoke of measures being taken to implement the defense pact with Syria.

On the same day Israel marked its nineteenth anniversary with a military parade through New Jerusalem. Since the parade was a violation of the armistice agreement and the New City's status as the capital of Israel was an old violation of UN resolutions on Jerusalem, most foreign diplomats were conspicuously absent. Also conspicuously absent was the sophisticated military hardware which Eshkol had promised would be revealed at the parade. The Arabs assumed the Israeli armor was still in the north.

The Egyptian mini-mobilization was the most obvious of maneuvers available to remove pressure on the Syrians. It was also, for the Israelis, highly predictable, for in early February 1960 a strikingly similar crisis had flared up between Israel and the Arabs in the aftermath of an Israeli raid against the Syrian border village of al-Tawafiq following a dispute over farming rights in the demilitarized zone. The Israeli Minister of Agriculture at the time was Moshe Dayan.

The Arabs were convinced then that the Israelis were dissatisfied with the results of their raid and that another, even more intense offensive was imminent. According to foreign press reports, Soviet intelligence had confirmed an Israeli buildup for such an assault. At the time of all this scrambling around the demilitarized zone, which involved land and air forces as well as artillery fire, Syria was part of the United Arab Republic and the necessity for an effective Egyptian response that would deter the Israelis was as much a requirement then as in April–May 1967.

The UAR canceled all leaves for "Southern Command" (Egyptian) soldiers and proclaimed a state of emergency. Truckloads of troops drove through Cairo heading toward Sinai. This move was followed by the ordering up of additional men and transport. On February 19, 1960, the UAR informed the Arab League that it had mobilized for

defensive purposes. Israeli press reports at the time estimated the strength of the advance Egyptian force at three divisions, including an armored division equipped with "hundreds of Russian-made tanks" and massed in northeastern Sinai near the Israeli border, in Al-Arish, Abu Ageila, and Quseima as well as in Gaza. And Radio Cairo spoke of the Arabs' determination to liberate Palestine.

Nasser demanded that the UN forces along the frontier with Israel abandon their positions and pull back to rear bases. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld complied and UNEF troops kept to their encampments for a month.

Although tension rose in Israel, the then Minister of Justice Pinhas Rosen quite accurately declared: "There is nothing to fear. The government is convinced that there will be no war, because we have no intention of attacking anyone and our neighbors will not care to attack us." [7]

In a series of diplomatic contacts, the Israelis called upon the great powers to "restrain Abdul Nasser from adventurous action," and most of the Israeli press emphasized the responsibility of the big powers to maintain peace in the area. The *Jerusalem Post* declared that Israel was "alert to any eventuality but [was] not to be easily drawn by Arab provocation." [8]

In March 1960 the crisis ebbed, and Egyptian troops were gradually withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula as UAR information media proclaimed that the Egyptian concentration had deterred the Israelis from launching an aggression against Syria.

If at the time of the al-Tawafiq crisis the Arab East was customarily divided in bitter political dispute, in May 1967 external political conditions were so grave that Egypt, more than ever before, had neither thought nor capability for actual war. More than a third of the UAR Army was bogged down in the Yemeni civil war. The hard-currency reserves crisis confronting Egypt (triggered by Johnson's cutoff of American wheat sales for "soft" Egyptian currency) was so intense that a number of major development projects had been postponed or liquidated. Nor had the Soviet Union, Egypt's banker and supplier in any possible war effort, ever approved of either the establishment or the professed goals of even the PLO. For all of their own verbal attacks on Israel, the U.S.S.R. had always specified that it was opposed to the "pro-imperialist, militaristic" line of the Zionist leadership and

not to the fundamental legitimacy of a state it had helped to establish.

Egyptian political concerns seemed to have shifted away from the Fertile Crescent to the Arabian Peninsula; the Egyptians actively backed one of two rival nationalist movements struggling for the independence of South Yemen, and the UAR air force in the Yemen Republic was bombing along the Saudi Arabian border to break up Royalist concentrations. The Egyptian Army there seemed to be waiting almost in reserve for those decisive encounters that were then expected by everyone in Cairo to soon determine the political future of Yemen, the Aden protectorates, the oil-rich Persian Gulf emirates, and possibly the entire Peninsula—to the great distaste of England and America.

Ideological warfare between the Arab Left and Right was intense. Even at the height of the crisis a mysterious and bloody explosion at Remtha, the Jordanian checkpoint at the border with Syria, was to prompt Amman to sever relations with Damascus less than two weeks before the June War. Such moods have always meant the postponement of any number of Pan-Arab ventures—from a projected Common Market to the most elementary attempts at a unified military stance.

This time the entire anti-Nasserist Arab press (which included significant journals in Beirut as well as in Amman, Kuwait, Sudan, Riyadh, and Rabat) and the radio commentators of Jordan and Saudi Arabia rushed in to ridicule the mini-mobilization as another Egyptian bluff more likely aimed at bolstering Syria's campaign against the Hashemites than at intimidating Israel.[9]

In what was to appear regionally as an almost off-the-cuff response to the Arab right-wing press attacks, the then UAR First President and deputy commander in chief, Field Marshal Abdul Hakim Amer, called for the "withdrawal of the UN force from the international frontier between Egypt and Israel."

The careful phrasing of the declaration (as well as the decision to attribute the declaration to Amer) was decided upon by Abdul Nasser and his closest associates as the opening phase of what Nasser believed would be a tightly executed political maneuver. To prevent any misunderstandings abroad, the task of publicizing the declaration was entrusted for exclusive publication to *Al-Ahram* editor Has-

sanein Heykal, thereby ensuring it would appear, word for word, as drafted by the Egyptian leadership.

At the same time Egyptian Chief of Staff General Muhammad Fawzi was authorized to send a letter of implementation of the Amer declaration to the UNEF commander, General Indar Jit Rikye, who immediately reported the request to U Thant.

All this has been obscured in subsequent histories, since the UN documents that have become standard source material on the crisis leading up to the June War curiously make no reference to the Amer declaration, which, as reported from Cairo by foreign news agency pickups from the May 17 issue of *Al-Ahram*, contained all the details (as intended by Abdul Nasser) that were so lacking in Fawzi's cryptic letter.

The *Al-Ahram* story, as we ran it in the *Palestine News*, quoted Amer requesting the United Nations to concentrate its forces in "the narrow Gaza strip along the Mediterranean and keep away from the Egyptian border . . . so that it may not face any threat in case of military operations breaking out. . . . UAR forces had gathered in Sinai on the UAR's eastern frontier with Israel."

No mention was made, either in the *Al-Ahram* account of Amer's declaration or in the Fawzi letter, of the demilitarized position at Sharm el-Sheikh overlooking the Tiran Straits. Far from Egypt's eastern frontiers with Israel, Sharm el-Sheikh is more than a hundred miles to the south at the tip of Sinai, guarding the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba which slips northeast like a deft long finger to separate the Sinai and Arabian peninsulas.

Meanwhile in New York, having received word from Rikye of the Egyptian request as it appeared in the Fawzi letter, U Thant called in UAR Ambassador to the UN Muhammad al-Kony to ask for more details. The Secretary General told al-Kony that if the Egyptians were requesting temporary withdrawal of UNEF troops from the cease-fire line or part of it, this would be unacceptable "because the purpose of the United Nations force in Gaza and Sinai is to prevent a recurrence of fighting, and it cannot be asked to stand aside in order to enable the two sides to resume fighting."

U Thant specified that if the request was intended, however, to mean a general withdrawal of UNEF from Gaza and Sinai (which the Amer declaration had made clear it was not), then the Secretary

General, upon receiving a correctly addressed request directly from the Egyptian government, would immediately comply; and he repeated that he would consider a formal request from the UAR for only a temporary or partial withdrawal as tantamount to a request for complete withdrawal from all of Gaza and Sinai.[10]

U Thant's response came as a jolt to the Egyptians. They had pointed in the direction of a provisional or temporary restaging, and now U Thant was insisting that the only alternative to UN troops remaining on the armistice line (in other words, immediate retraction of the Egyptian request) would be their total withdrawal from all of Sinai and Gaza.

The Egyptians had also assumed that any change in the status of UNEF forces would be preceded by time-consuming discussion, consultation, and negotiations. Instead U Thant had inferred instant compliance as well as the unrequested total withdrawal.

This moment was the actual critical point in determining the future of UNEF and not, as inferred by the subsequent furor in the American press, the question of whether or not Abdul Nasser had the authority to demand—as he did the next day in response to this ultimatum—a total withdrawal by UNEF and whether U Thant had the right to then comply without United Nations discussion.

This critical point was still further obscured by the role forced on the Egyptians during this latter controversy within and outside the United Nations. For if the Egyptians had privately assumed and counted on slow-moving UN compliance to their initial request (for provisional restaging), the subsequent public challenge, by Israel and various Western countries, of Egypt's sovereign rights to determine whether or not UNEF forces could remain on its territory forced the Egyptians to harden their public position still further.

According to both UN and Israeli sources, it was U Thant's American assistant—the UN Undersecretary for Special Political Affairs, Dr. Ralph Bunche—who insisted that the UN Secretary General treat the original (Amer-Fawzi) request as a "test case" and present the Egyptians with the very ultimatum that transformed the crisis.

Bunche had been to the Middle East only three months before, inspecting the UNEF installations under Rikye's command. He assured U Thant, in arguing for the ultimatum, that Nasser did not want the UN forces completely withdrawn and would therefore "have to go in

reverse." [11] But it has been an axiom among "old Middle East hands" ever since the Suez Canal nationalization that Abdul Nasser never backs down to a public ultimatum.[12]

Bunche was also responsible for drafting the Secretary General's official reports, which made no reference to the highly publicized Amer declaration and which, in final postwar form (A/6730 Add. 3, June 25, 1967), relegates both the Fawzi text and the text of U Thant's ultimatum to annex references while obscuring the substance of both. On the other hand, the Secretary General's reports contain detailed accounts by Rikye of verbal conversations and alleged incidents of Egyptian troops pressing around UNEF observation posts along the cease-fire line by May 17.

Egyptian sources insist that Rikye highly exaggerated this situation in his reports, and they note that for all of his claims that UNEF forces could not withstand Egyptian Army pressures, a large contingent of UNEF troops was still comfortably sitting in Gaza when war finally broke out, almost two weeks after U Thant ordered immediate compliance, in part on the basis of the UNEF commander's reports.

In the interval between publication of the first U Thant Report (May 18, 1967) and the better-known postwar report of June 26, 1967, a minor controversy, obscured and outdistanced by the dramatic pace of events, was to flare up in the pages of the *New York Times* over Nasser's original intentions for Sharm el-Sheikh. The controversy was prompted by a report in which Nasser indicated that it had been his intention at the beginning of the crisis to keep UNEF forces at Sharm el-Sheikh.[13]

A few years later Nasser was to be more specific in an interview with *Observer* correspondent Robert Stephens, pointing out: "It was not in our plan to close the Gulf of Aqaba at that time. When we moved our troops into Sinai we sent to U Thant asking him to withdraw the UNEF from Rafeh to Eilat (the length of the Sinai border) and to keep the UNEF in Gaza and Sharm es-Sheikh. We decided on this step in order not to force complications about the Gulf of Aqaba. . . . But we received the answer from U Thant in which he said 'either we keep all the UNEF or we withdraw all the UNEF.' I think this was Bunche's idea. . . . There was no choice in front of us except to ask him to withdraw all the UNEF. So we found suddenly the problem of Sharm es-Sheikh. It was not in our plan to send troops to

Sharm es-Sheikh and we hastily prepared some troops to go there." [14]

Ralph Bunche, in a letter to the *New York Times* on June 11, 1967, denounced Nasser's version of Egypt's intentions, saying there was "not a shred of truth to it."

In the course of repeating all the arguments of the May 18 U Thant Report to bolster his interpretation that the Fawzi letter referred to the withdrawal of UNEF forces "unquestionably from Sharm es-Sheikh," Bunche repeated Rikye's reports of Egyptian military pressure on the UNEF forces (less than a platoon) at Sharm el-Sheikh on May 18 but conceded that UNEF forces there, for all of the alleged demands, threats, and dangerous pressure, remained at their positions "for six more days"—in other words, until May 24, 1967, the day on which Nasser was in fact to order his troops to take over at Sharm el-Sheikh.

Then, in the second U Thant Report (which followed Bunche's letter) on June 26, 1967, there appeared a lengthy account of how Egyptian Brigadier Mukhtar *verbally* informed General Rikye that he must order an immediate withdrawal of UNEF forces from Sharm el-Sheikh at the time when Brigadier Mukhtar was delivering General Fawzi's letter to Rikye. This alleged message from Brigadier Mukhtar, never mentioned in the original May 18 U Thant Report, now replaced the Fawzi letter in lengthy treatment and central importance almost as thoroughly as the Fawzi letter had completely replaced the original declaration by Marshal Amer (which had so clearly limited the Egyptian withdrawal request to the "international frontier between Egypt and Israel," thereby excluding Sharm el-Sheikh) in the May 18 U Thant Report.

Both Rikye and Bunche worked closely together in the previous great UNEF fiasco in the Congo, which resulted in the CIA-managed overthrow of Patrice Lumumba and his subsequent murder. General Carl Von Horn, who served with both men in the Congo as head of UN troops and was by no means a Lumumbaist, describes their curious methods of work there in his book *Soldiering for Peace.*[15]

While U Thant was waiting for a reply to his ultimatum, inter-Arab reactions were speeding up.

Jordanian Prime Minister Sa'ad Juma'a placed the Arab Legion on

alert on May 17 and announced that his country was "on the side of its sisterly Arab states against the common danger." Prince Khaled Ben Abdul-Aziz, Saudi Regent in the absence of King Faisal (who stayed abroad throughout the crisis), declared that any Israeli aggression upon any Arab country—and he went on to specify Syria—would be considered an attack upon Saudi Arabia.

Concern at the possible danger to Syria and excitement over the initial Egyptian request to the UN had risen so sharply throughout the Arab world that the pro-Western states, however intolerable their relations with Damascus or Cairo, had to respond. There was, however, still some political play remaining for the Right. At the same moment that the Arab Army was placed on alert, Jordanian newspapers and radio urged Abdul Nasser "to demand the complete withdrawal of UNEF from Egyptian territory and from the Gaza Strip, not only to request the grouping of these forces in the [Gaza] Strip."

The following day the Jordanian press and radio escalated their demand: Abdul Nasser could prove his sincerity by standing up to U Thant's challenge, requesting total UNEF withdrawal, and reimposing the pre-Suez War blockade on Israeli shipping through Tiran . . . and he could, of course, withdraw his troops from Yemen. Again the cry was picked up by the conservative press throughout the Arab world.

Like the original demands that Egypt rush to the aid of Syria, this latest challenge to Abdul Nasser was an exercise in cynicism by pro-Western Arab ruling circles which had strenuously opposed taking any of the economically painful but necessary steps required for a serious confrontation with Israel, steps that would have invariably tarnished their relations with the West and particularly with the United States.

On May 18, while advance units of the UAR Army were moving with an exaggerated fanfare into prepared defensive positions in Sinai and along the armistice line, U Thant received Abdul Nasser's formal request from the Egyptian Ambassador for UNEF withdrawal.

Even before then Israeli forces were already moving south. But the next day—May 19—with the announcement of U Thant's order for

immediate UNEF withdrawal, Israel declared what was then described as a "partial" mobilization and immediately sent an estimated 50,000 men to the Sinai front.

For a frank but postwar Israeli description of the size of "Nasser's army" in Sinai at the time of Israeli mobilization, we turn to "Colonel Orientalist": "In fact, at this stage far fewer forces were brought to Sinai than the Egyptian propaganda machine would have had the world believe. . . . The force initially concentrated in Sinai could not hope of defending the area in the event of war." [16]

The Israelis also rejected U Thant's critical proposal that Israel allow UNEF forces to serve on their side of the frontier. The Israeli rejection, which was generally buried in the Western press, is significant since a shift of UNEF forces to the Israeli side of the frontier would have frozen the situation and provided the Egyptians with a sufficient paper "victory" to have cooled down the crisis while taking the edge off the theoretical "threat" of a UAR military buildup along the frontier, which the world was to hear so much about before the blockade of Sharm el-Sheikh had even become a problem.

But the Israeli refusal was at least consistent. After the Suez War, when the idea of a UN military presence sealing off the Sinai and Gaza frontiers emerged as part of the political solution, Israel had refused to allow UNEF to die stationed on its side of the border.

Chain reaction had begun, and within the Arab world the generally neutral leaderships in Kuwait and Lebanon (which now barred the U.S. Sixth Fleet from a Beirut port call) rallied rhetorically to Abdul Nasser's camp along with his obvious allies—Syria, Algeria, Yemen, and Iraq.

The pro-Western Arab states were becoming increasingly isolated; there was little to do now but complain about the lack of unity, publicize internal "emergency measures," and demand more insistently that Sharm el-Sheikh be closed.

The official Arab Left thrived on the situation. "Progressive forces" alone would deal with any Israeli aggression, Radio Cairo declared, and the open inference of the time was that Jordan and Saudi Arabia were party to the American-Israeli conspiracy against Syria. When a top officer of the Jordan Arab Army flew to Cairo to consult with the Unified Command and returned without an audience, Egyp-

tian sources announced that Egypt was not prepared to reveal her military secrets to governments in the pay of the CIA and the British Intelligence Service.

In Damascus the commander of the Popular Militia defined the overthrow of King Hussein as part of the forthcoming battle with Israel. Even after the closing of Sharm el-Sheikh, when Jordan finally announced its readiness to receive Iraqi and Saudi troops, Iraq refused for the sake of inter-Arab political factors. It was "too late," the Iraqis said, and they reprimanded Amman for not abiding by Unified Arab Command decisions in the past.

U Thant was on his way to Cairo on May 23 when Abdul Nasser announced that the Straits would be closed. Speaking to pilots at an air base in Sinai, the Egyptian President declared he was ready and waiting for Israel. "Let them come," he said; and when he laughed, what seemed like recklessness to the Westerner sent shivers of joy and pride up and down every Arab's spine.

What had begun as a conventional deterrent move in behalf of Syria and had been accelerated by internal Arab political conflict now blossomed with undreamed-of inter-Arab dividends for Abdul Nasser. In London, King Faisal was sufficiently on the defensive to pledge that Saudi Arabia would cut off oil if the West were to intervene. Hussein was desperately trying to stave off radio attacks from Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad by calling for Arab unity.

But if only for this, it was clear to anyone in or close to leadership roles anywhere in the Arab East, Israel, and America—if not to the now increasingly expectant, passionate masses of Arabs, Israelis, and Americans—that there still was not the slightest "danger" to Israel.

None of the conditions existed for any serious Arab defense, much less a conventional offensive, conditions with which the Israeli Army (as indicated by the analysis of "Colonel Orientalist") were quite familiar. Not only was much of the Egyptian Army still in Yemen, but outside of popular sentiment in the streets there was no unification of Arab ranks, no functioning Unified Arab Command, and no Arab land or air forces reinforcing the key but numerically weak Jordanian sector of the Eastern front. Any conventional assault by a unified Arab force would have to come through Jordan—Abdul Nasser had said it, and the Israelis have always known that geographically this was their most exposed sector.

In Cairo, U Thant and Abdul Nasser agreed on steps to prevent the crisis from accelerating. Since one of these steps involved the delivery of strategic materials to Israel via Haifa in order not to force any immediate test of the Tiran Straits "blockade," the Americans and the Israelis would have had to have been immediately informed by U Thant of the content of these talks.

And despite the heady rhetoric in the Arab press and radio—a "mobilization" of the imagination just beginning at this point throughout the Arab world, swelling to hypnotic proportions during the final week of the crisis and long after the Arab fate was sealed—nothing serious militarily was being done by the Arabs.

Everywhere in the Arab East administrative and commercial activities continued without the new directives or the reordering of priorities indicative of mobilization. Civil-defense rehearsals were lackadaisically carried off to produce a photo for the press. Even by the end of the week, after three days of screaming headlines about blockade, about waterways supposedly mined and ships being searched, the foreign press corps (and all others truly concerned) knew that nothing had happened—neither mines nor searches—in this blockade whipped into life each morning on the front page of *Al-Ahram.* And because they knew nothing had happened, they believed that nothing would happen.

Nevertheless the Arab leaderships were aware that even a verbal or paper blockade was "provocative" in the sense that Israel had always declared that any attempt to restore the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba to that prevailing before the 1956 Suez War would be considered *causa belli.*

But whatever the intentions of Israel, or even of the White House or the CIA, toward an isolated Syria, the problem posed by the presence of Egyptian troops in Sinai and a rallying Arab world was assumed by the Arab leaderships to be another matter. If Israel were to take any serious steps, the entire region might be at war, and certainly—the Arab elite reasoned—neither America nor the Soviet Union would allow this affair to reach such a point.

Alternatives would be discovered, and Abdul Nasser's dramatic gesture at Tiran might yet provide the beginning for a serious dialogue between Israel and the Arabs via the great powers, but based

on the rapidly evolving surfacing of Arab unity and thus from an apparent position of strength so lacking these past two decades.

In Jerusalem everyone worried about the effect of the intensifying crisis on tourism: a few more days like this and cancellations might ruin the summer season. And I worried about my family still in Cairo. I had returned from Egypt to Jordan and to my job as editor of the Jerusalem paper in the early spring of 1967 after a six-month stay in Cairo, but my family had remained for the end of the school year, and now I feared that the inevitable confusion of troop movements and mobilization would delay their momentary departure.

In Amman the Minister of National Economy prepared to leave for Washington for talks with the World Bank about the "potash loan," plans for next week's Independence Day banquet were announced by the Prime Minister's office, and the press found space to report on the Bethlehem Frères' Annual College Field Day.

In Cairo the Arab League Council approved its 1967–68 budget, and General Mortagi told an *Akhbar Al-Youm* correspondent at "his secret underground headquarters somewhere in Sinai" that battle would not begin when "a single bullet is fired" by the Israelis but only if they launch "a big, serious attack."

In Algeria some 70 "leading Arab progressive politicians, intellectuals, and journalists" were converging for a week-long seminar on Arab socialism. Among the participants expected were the Egyptian Planning Minister and a leading UAR editor, the Syrian Education Minister, and a Palestinian Baath party leader.

All these plans and the assumptions they rested upon—the fancies and stuff of ghosts: we were already dead men and none of us knew it. Three days earlier (May 19–20), before Abdul Nasser had decided to close the Straits of Tiran (May 21) or hinted at his intention (May 22) or declared it (May 23) or completed the occupation of the Sharm el-Sheikh position (May 23–24) required to implement any blockade of Eilat, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol (after receiving pressing reports from his own army) had authorized full mobilization, not the "partial" call-up that was fed to the press.[17]

David Ben-Gurion, isolated from leadership and the drift of events, raged at his rival when General Rabin called on the former Prime Minister the following day. Ben-Gurion understood better than any man the tactical logic of the carefully prepared and expen-

sive currency reserve drain, that coiled spring known in Israel as mobilization. To touch that coiled spring meant war, and in his old age Ben-Gurion apparently wondered if it was at all necessary and worth the expected casualties.

If the whole army had not been called up, Nasser would perhaps have returned his forces and the crisis would have ended, Ben-Gurion insisted. And Eshkol's full-mobilization directive was, in his opinion, a crime against the nation.[18]

While the Israeli mobilization was proceeding, U.S. Undersecretary of State Eugene V. Rostow (with his brother, the *éminence grise* of the Johnson administration's foreign policy) received Israeli Ambassador Avraham Harman and told him that Israel was not to use force unless the UAR closed the Tiran Straits . . . and even then not to hurry to the attack.

If you want American help to bail you out of trouble, Rostow advised Harman, we must be consulted when you take your first action.

On May 23, with U Thant on his way to Cairo and the Straits just then verbally closed, Eshkol met with Rabin, Air Force Chief Mordecai Hud, and other military leaders; they all promised the Israeli Prime Minister that overwhelming victory was assured. Eshkol had also received word from Johnson, counseling patience. That night the United States and Israel took off together.

Speaking but a few hours apart in New Jerusalem and Washington, Eshkol and Johnson denounced the blockade. Any interference with shipping in the vital Gulf of Aqaba would amount to an act of aggression against Israel, Eshkol told the Knesset, and he called upon the major maritime powers to act without delay "for the maintenance of the right of free passage to our southern port."

President Johnson declared: "The United States considers the Gulf to be a free international waterway and feels that a blockade of Israeli shipping is illegal and an obstacle to the cause of peace." The President went on to describe this issue as of "vital interest to the international community" and criticized U Thant for his hasty decision. Johnson made no reference to the original context of Abdul Nasser's request or to the ultimatum served on Nasser, all of which preceded U Thant's "hasty decision." "We have always opposed—and we oppose in other parts of the world at this moment—the efforts of other nations to resolve their problems with their neighbors

by aggression. We shall continue to do so. And we appeal to all other peace-loving nations to do so."

Johnson also repeated the doctrine developed by Eisenhower and Kennedy: "The United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine."

That same night in Cairo, according to agency reports quoting authoritative Egyptian sources, U.S. Ambassador to Cairo Richard Nolte delivered a special note to Abdul Nasser from Johnson, warning the UAR that "America considers the barring of the Tiran Straits an act of aggression." "The U.S. did not exclude the use of force if all other measures fail," the note said.

But if legality were really the question—and if the World Court, which Johnson failed to mention, not the White House, were the place to settle international legal disputes—then Egypt had a strong juridical case.

- While the UN Partition Plan of 1947 designated the narrow Palestinian coastline on the Gulf of Aqaba as part of the Jewish state, nevertheless, at the time of the UN-imposed truce of July 1948, Israel was not in possession of it or of its then-existing approaches—the town of Beersheba and the Al-Auja bulge, both designated by the UN plan to be part of the Arab state and both held by the Egyptian Army at the time of the July truce.

In October 1948 the Israelis secured both of these approach areas by breaking the truce; despite Security Council resolutions (in October and November) ordering the Israelis to withdraw from this territory and return to their previous lines, the Israelis kept both Beersheba and Al-Auja. As in the case of dozens of similar resolutions passed over two decades, there was no attempt by the Security Council to enforce its ruling, and on February 24, 1949, a General Armistice Agreement was concluded between Egypt and Israel to incorporate these last two Israeli conquests.

The Armistice Agreement thus created a new status quo that still left the Aqaba Gulf strip out of Israeli territory. On March 10, 1949, the Israelis swept down on the southern Negev and onto the coastal strip; they occupied the Arab village of Umm Rashrash, expelled its inhabitants, and set about establishing the port town of Eilat. There-

fore, it could be argued, the very presence of Israel at Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba is illegal by the standards of international law, even if the UN mediator at Rhodes responsible for the Armistice Agreement—none other than Dr. Ralph Bunche—first allowed the Israelis to consolidate, within the Armistice framework, their hold on territory seized in violation of Security Council resolutions and then ignored the post-Armistice Israeli offensive.

- The entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, far to the south of the Israeli presence at Eilat, is less than nine miles wide and is therefore within the twelve-mile limit recognized by many states, including Egypt, as the legal limit for territorial waters—in this case the coastal states of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. At the Straits of Tiran, above the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, the passageway between the islands of Tiran and Sanafiri and the UAR coastline is only three miles wide (the alternative legal limit for territorial water claims), and only some 500 yards of passageway are navigable and these are still closer to the UAR coastline. The passageway between the islands and Saudi Arabia is not navigable.
- The 1949 General Armistice Agreement signed by both Egypt and Israel signified the suspension of hostilities between the two states in the former Mandate of Palestine; it did not end the state of war (which can only be done by peace treaty or declaration of nonbelligerency). Because a state of war remained, Egypt barred the passage of Israeli ships through the Straits until 1956, an action that went unchallenged by the maritime powers or the World Court.

But in May 1967, after a decade of Israeli access, the Western press ridiculed Egypt's claim that the formal state of war dating back to 1948 was legal justification for the blockade, hinting that if such a legal situation did indeed prevail, then Israel—as one of the powers involved in that state of war—had the right as a belligerent to open the Straits by force. The press failed to note the differences between an armistice and a peace treaty.

What no one mentioned is that, as early as August 1948 and even after the 1948 War had ground to a halt, but before Eilat had yet become Israeli territory by armistice violation (March 1949), Israel informed the United Nations that the then 900,000 Palestinian refugees who had fled during the fighting of the preceding six months would be barred from returning to their homes because "a state of

war exists." The Israelis went on as early as then to state their general principle that the very question of refugee return would be dealt with as "a part of the general settlement" (i.e., a peace treaty).[19]

To refuse to allow a civilian population to return to their homes after hostilities and then subsequently to seize all of their properties —the patrimony of almost an entire nation—because the refugees had become "absentees," and then to sell or lease this property, has never been recognized by international law or by any UN resolution passed since 1949 which specifically called upon the Israelis to allow the refugees to return. But curiously no Western state has ever recognized the Arab contention that this ongoing Israeli violation was *causa belli* for a liberation war.

• The amendment to Article 16 of the International Maritime Law governing "innocent passage of foreign ships through straits that are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state"—which was to be quoted continuously during the crisis—was adopted in 1958 after the Suez War and was tailored to the Gulf of Aqaba situation as a retroactive reward for Israeli military prowess as partner in the Anglo-French attack on Egypt. International covenants such as these are binding in international law upon those states that have ratified them. Egypt and the other Arab states have not ratified this amendment.

The Egyptian case and the apparent danger of a world war were strong enough for de Gaulle to immediately oppose any military explosion over the Tiran Straits blockade and to call for a four-power meeting to resolve this issue. (One of the many remaining mysteries of the June War is why the Russians so curtly ignored his proposal and then finally expressed interest only after the initiative had long passed to the Americans.)

But did any of this really have to do with international law—particularly when uttered by the president of a country that has not hesitated to bar passage through the Panama Canal to its enemies during both world wars, that would still bar passage through the Panama Canal to the ships of People's China, and did not hesitate to impose an *open seas* blockade on Cuba during the missile crisis?

The issue at hand was not international law; it was the Israeli use of power and the creation of a favorable international atmosphere by

Johnson and the American Establishment for that power to be put into play.

In the final week before the war, when a thinly stretched and militarily meaningless Arab unity was finally to come into existence and the hypnotism of self-defeating Arab political warfare was at its height, Arab leaders were convinced that together they could absorb and withstand what they finally knew (but could never quite believe) would be an inevitable Israeli offensive and, in the political aftermath of an equally inevitable cease-fire agreement, also secure at least some political victories.

The one element, then, that could upset this final complex fantasy plan would be direct American intervention. The note from Ambassador Nolte and the talk in the West of a "blockade-busting" maritime armada—which was to fill the days between the "closure" of the Tiran Straits and the beginning of the war—seemed to pose such a threat; and when plans for the armada appeared finally to have fallen apart, the Arabs were relieved.

And it was to avert direct American participation that the threats against U.S. interests in the Middle East were made, without any concrete measures being taken against those interests.

The Arabs were worried about American intervention at the moment of an Israeli offensive. The idea of defensive U.S. intervention in behalf of a hard-pressed Israel did not pose itself as an urgent tactical problem since the Arabs assumed that a UN-ordered cease-fire would be imposed if the possibility of a serious Arab counteroffensive into Israeli territory were to arise.

The Soviet pledge, issued as a Tass statement at the same time that Eshkol and Johnson were speaking, promised that "he who would venture to unleash aggression in the Middle East would encounter not only the united strength of the Arab countries but also that of the Soviet Union and all peace-loving states. . . ." This pledge assumed great significance to the Arab leaderships in the final week to come for, again, it would clearly inhibit any direct American role in the Israeli attack.

The Soviet statement was interpreted in a somewhat less sophisticated manner by masses of Arabs who assumed that the pledge was directed at Israel, acting with or without American assistance. Since

millions of Arabs accepted the initial report that British and American planes had directly intervened in the fighting, Soviet inaction during the war was even more demoralizing than expected and the immediate setback in Russian prestige, on the popular level, was profound.

Considering the ties between the American Establishment and Israel—ties that are emotionally far stronger than any binding America to the squalid generals of Saigon or Kinshasa or to the conservative leaderships of the Dominican Republic or Panama—and the ease with which Johnson intensified these old interventions or sallied forth into new ones, Arab fear of American intervention seemed reasonable.

When it became increasingly apparent that the United States would not involve itself in the potentially approaching battle, Arab self-confidence soared and millions of pro-Israeli Americans, swept up by the cautious requirements of Johnson's policy, were infuriated at the time by the same appearance of American passivity.

But the burden of the American thrust in the Middle East is much more of a complex, rope-walking affair than in Latin America or almost anywhere else in the Third World. Neither settler-colonialist states nor colonial administrations have existed in any significant sense in Latin America since the middle-to-late nineteenth century. The will to an independent national existence directly confronts an intense and intransigent American political-economic domination. Madero, Zapata, Villa, Sandino, Cárdenas, Perón, Vargas, Arbenz, Goulart . . . Latin American history is rich in nationalist politicians or armed rebels who have attempted to challenge this domination decades before Fidel Castro and have tasted American intervention in the forms of boycott, subversion, or military expeditions.

In the Middle East, however, an independent, energetic settler-colonialist state does exist, and America has interests not only in that state but in many of the states formed by the indigenous peoples who are increasingly hostile to Israel. While there are no cultural-political ties between America and the Arabs that can even be compared to those binding the U.S.A. to Israel, the economic-political interests in the Arab world (as oil producers for American companies selling to overseas companies and as a vast, if overall insignificant, market for U.S. exports) are far greater than those in Israel.

According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, Arab oil is responsible for an annual net transfer of about $2.5 billion from nonreserve currencies to the U.S. dollar or the pound sterling; of this total, nearly $2 billion flows annually into the United States. In the Persian Gulf, U.S. interests amount to 54 percent of the total Arab oil interests. By 1966, estimated gross fixed assets of American companies in the Arab world were well over $20 billion, representing 40 percent of U.S. total investment overseas.

The purely economic American interests in Israel and in the Arab world are not at all contradictory. American involvement in Israel is concentrated in development investment and in extensive aid and loans to both private and public sectors of production; in the Arab world, in the extraction and marketing of natural resources and limited aid projects to improve the infrastructure and social services.

As competitive markets for American exports, both sides even out: Israel's Western European level of per-capita income and its development policy, which stresses concentration on import expenditure for expensive capital goods or materials (required by Israel's many assembly-plant industries or even integrated factories in light industry and armaments) rather than on light consumer goods, places Israel's value to America as an export market almost on a par with the entire low per-capita income Arab East.

The contradiction exists solely in political terms: the direct confrontation between the Palestinians (and ever increasingly the rest of the Arabs as they, in turn, become "Palestinianized") and the Zionist state. This is the great danger to American interests, the great dilemma for American policy in the Middle East.

Thus America has consistently encouraged an accommodation between the Arab states and Israel and, failing that, has always sought (with all its political influence and measured application of financial aid) to reduce the possibilities of Arab confrontation. The Johnson plan for Arab-Israeli cooperation in Jordan River water use; periodic attempts through UNRWA at Palestinian refugee resettlement; persistent appeals to Israel to take back a symbolic 100,000 refugees as a gesture to assist Jordanian accommodation; the construction for Jordan of a vital $20-million irrigation system, using highly vulnerable elevated concrete channels easily knocked out by artillery fire rather than the less exposed sunken or tunnel techniques only a hundred

yards from Israeli territory; and even the initial American flirtation with Abdul Nasser in the hope that a "nationalist strongman" would be more capable than the traditional Arab elite in imposing a settlement with Israel on his own people—all these were expressions of this policy.

Even if this policy of accommodation was threatened by Arab revolutionary currents (as it was so obviously when the Syrians extended support to the Palestinian guerrilla movement), to intervene militarily in behalf of Israel would be both self-defeating—placing American interests, and the Arab ruling elites most responsive to those interests, at the mercy of potentially revolutionary public reaction—and, at the time of June 1967, not at all necessary.

Instead, what was at work was a process, a sometimes fumbling, sometimes intuitive mesh of two allied Establishments whose upper echelons engaged at least in continuous coordination, jockeying for their own state interests as they saw them, within an overall agreed-upon (and possibly even unspoken) context. However, it is also possible that only the most surface aspects of that coordination are as yet on record.[20]

(Hence the particular tragedy in the Arab accusation of direct Anglo-American military intervention during the June War, when the Jordanian misreading of radar signals, faith in the Egyptian claim to have destroyed 75 percent of the Israeli first-attack strike force, and the efficiency with which Israeli ground crews "turned around" returning squadrons led Nasser and Hussein to assume that planes based on British and American carriers had participated. The accusation and its subsequent repudiation still further blurred Arab and international understanding of the American role; at first Johnson was blamed for a military intervention he never intended, and then his administration was in effect indirectly exonerated for the tactical directives and political warfare that provided cover for the Israeli attack and the ensuing occupation of additional Arab territories.)

In the week and a half that remained from the time Johnson and Eshkol defined the suitable context for an Israeli assault upon Egypt, diplomatic maneuvering intensified, UN debate raged on, Abba Eban made his quick Paris-London-Washington tour, and the idea of a maritime armada to break the blockade rose and fell in the public mind as a possibility.

Of all the Arab leaders, only Shukeiry (who did not command an army) threatened to fire the first shot or launch a "preemptive attack." Up until the very morning of the war Abdul Nasser, Hussein, and the most significant Arab political analysts were to continually repeat that the first blow, if it came, would be from Israel. Somehow this elementary fact, so clear to everyone in the Middle East, was thoroughly transformed in the West, where mass "consciousness" was to be brought to the point of hysterically waiting for an Arab offensive that had never been planned.

The one common conviction that did arise among the masses of Arabs, Israelis, Europeans, and Americans—and, in the most immediately paralyzing sense, throughout the Arab elite in the final hours —was the belief that a formidable Arab war machine did indeed exist. In the case of educated Arab conviction, this Arab armed force was considered sufficient to withstand any Israeli assault and to mount a limited counterattack, but the broader Arab public imagined a sweep to Tel Aviv. In the carefully cultivated understanding of the Western and Israeli publics, this Arab force was poised for Nasser's signal to rush in and exterminate every Israeli.

This misinterpreted surge of Arab confidence, this Arab optimism, this very image of Arab might, was the trap set and then sprung on the morning of June 5.

NOTES

1. *Jerusalem Post*, December 29, 1967.
2. Maxime Rodinson, *Israel and the Arabs* (London: 1968), p. 183.
3. *Haolam Hazeh*, November 26, 1966 (as quoted and translated in a Tass dispatch).
4. Miles Copeland, *The Game of Nations* (New York: 1969), pp. 228–234.
5. For complete text of this report, see "How the Six-Day War Was Provoked," *The Arab*, London, Vol. 2, No. 29–30, June–July 1969.
6. David G. Nes, who was U.S. chargé d'affaires in Cairo before and during the June War, charged in a statement to the American press immediately after leaving his post that the State Department had refused to heed the warnings from its embassy on the gravity of the Middle East situation; he was referring to the Egyptian belief, in early May, of a threat to Syria. The State Department denied this accusation, and at a

press conference President Johnson described Nes' views as "parochial." In February 1968 Nes resigned from the foreign service. (INA dispatch from Washington, no dateline, *Jerusalem Post,* February 11, 1968.)

7. *Haaretz,* February 28, 1960.
8. *Jerusalem Post,* February 26, 1960.
9. The American University of Beirut scholar, Dr. Yusef A. Sayegh, is convinced that the Israelis calculated as much upon the initial response by Jordan as upon the predictable Egyptian responses.
10. *Report of the Secretary General on the Withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force,* A/6669, May 18, 1967.
11. Michael Bar Zohar, *Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues Behind the Six-Day War* (New Jersey: 1970), p. 33. Bar Zohar quotes UN sources.
12. As the man who personally drafted the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine's Majority Report (the Partition Plan) in 1947, and later as UN mediator in Palestine responsible for the "successful" conclusion of the Arab-Israeli armistice talks in Rhodes in 1948, Bunche certainly qualified as an "old Middle East hand."
13. James Reston, *New York Times,* June 4 and 5, 1967.
14. Robert Stephens, *Nasser: A Political Biography* (London: 1971), p. 474.
15. Von Horn's most serious charge was that Bunche either "doctored" or suppressed his (Von Horn's) cables back to the then UN Secretary General Hammarskjöld. As a test case Von Horn sent back a traceable cable to a UN official. "I quote it in full," Von Horn wrote, "because it was later suppressed by Ralph." (General Carl Von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace* [London: 1966], pp. 171, 181, 205, 226.)
16. *The Six Days' War,* Israeli Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 1967, p. 165.
17. More than a year and a half after the June War, Mapai party member Moshe Gilboa called an extraordinary press conference in Jerusalem to charge that General Dayan and the intelligence chief, General Aharon Yariv, had "considerably exaggerated" the scale of Egyptian troop concentrations in their reports to Eshkol.
18. The account of prewar developments in Israel and the United States, unless otherwise noted, is based on material originally published (in Hebrew) in the Israeli press serialization of *The Longest Month,* by Dr. Michael Bar Zohar, prior to its then-scheduled publication in the fall of 1969 by the Lewin Epstein Publishing House. The book has since been translated into English as *Embassies in Crisis: Diplomats and Demagogues Behind the Six-Day War.* The authoritative biographer of Ben-Gurion (*The Armed Prophet*), Bar Zohar has written an account of

Anglo-French-Israeli collusion (*Suez: Ultra Secret* [Paris: 1964]), one of the most valuable studies of the 1956 war. Bar Zohar is close to the men in the Rafi party and reportedly was with Dayan through most of the crisis.

Immediately after the war he interviewed a number of other leading Israeli and American officials involved in the crisis. Like Dayan, Bar Zohar is capable of a frankness (within the limits set by Israeli security requirements) that is inconceivable to pro-Israeli American writers.

19. And even then, the Israelis argued, Palestinian refugee claims could be considered only within the context of Israeli counterclaims for war damages and reparations for Arab "aggression," all of which would only then determine "to what extent and under what conditions the former Arab residents of the territory should be allowed to return." (*Progress Report of the Mediator,* United Nations document UNFAOR, A/648.)

20. According to David G. Nes, former U.S. chargé d'affaires in Cairo, "during the months prior to the June 1967 hostilities, the military intelligence requirements levied by Washington upon the Cairo Embassy, CIA and military intelligence staffs were very largely based on Israeli needs. The effectiveness of the Israeli war strikes on June 5, 1967, was assured in part, at least, by information on Egyptian airfields and aircraft disposition provided through U.S. sources. With respect to political and economic information, it was State Department practice at that time to provide the Israeli embassy in Washington with copies of those Middle East embassy reports considered of interest." (David G. Nes, "Israel—The 51st State?", *New York Times,* June 5, 1971.)

Still further light may be shed on the extent of the American role in the June 1967 War when additional "Pentagon Papers" reach the public eye. Among the papers that will make interesting reading are a report (prepared between 1967 and 1968) by Julius Holms, a high-ranking State Department official, at the request of President Johnson (it dealt with Middle East "security"; Defense, Treasury, and CIA officials assisted Holms in the study); a report prepared by McGeorge Bundy in the days following the 1967 War; reports by the Rand Corporation on the political and economic aspects of the Middle East situation; and reports prepared by the Department of Defense concerning the U.S. role in the Middle East. According to scholars at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut (which enjoys close ties with members of the American academic community), the U.S. government is aware that unauthorized, private copies of the above documents have been made despite their classified nature. They believe that the discovery of this break in security was one of the reasons that prompted CIA Chief Richard Helm to visit Israel in the summer of 1971.

6. Dictums

British Minister of State George Thomson left London for Washington the night Johnson and Eshkol spoke. Abba Eban left Israel the next morning for Paris.

Eban prepared carefully for his meeting with de Gaulle, picking as his phrase for the day "the choice for us is resistance or surrender"—from de Gaulle's World War II radio broadcast. But Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville told Abba Eban that France knew exactly how many ships Israel had going through the Gulf of Aqaba —very few, possibly less than a dozen a year. De Gaulle agreed that the blockade was no justification for war.[1]

De Gaulle insisted that the question of Israel's right of passage was only one legalistic aspect to the entire complex problem of Israeli-Arab relations. At their second meeting, pressed by de Gaulle as to Israel's intentions, Eban whipped out his phrase and talked ambiguously of resistance. Finally he told the French President that Israel had decided to talk with the great powers and would not force the issue for the next three days.

De Gaulle now relaxed; he would be able to assure Abdul Nasser and Kosygin that Israel would not go to war, not understanding that when Eban spoke of resistance he meant launching an offensive.

In Amman the Arab Army completed its call-up of trainee reservists, and Prime Minister Juma'a declared Jordan's full support of the UAR's "restoration of regional sovereignty in the Gulf of Aqaba." Hussein continued to appeal for Arab unity.

In New York the President of the National Maritime Union threatened an American seamen's boycott of all U.S. ships destined for

Egypt, calling on the longshoremen's union (ILA) and other maritime unions to join up while the Security Council met to consider the situation.

In Baghdad, Iraqi Defense Minister Major General Mahmoud Shukri—just back from Cairo—was reported as quoting Abdul Nasser that Egypt could instantly mobilize two million men.

In Damascus the Arab Labor Federation's central committee called upon Arab workers to destroy oil field installations and pipelines in the event of war.

In Washington a White House spokesman began to hedge on the previous day's threat of American intervention.

In London for a stopover, Abba Eban's reception was much warmer. Wilson expressed the belief that the blockade would be costly to Nasser, and he informed Eban that Thomson was in Washington to coordinate British action with the Americans. But Eban's statements to the press increasingly took on the tone of a man speaking for a frightened but dignified country in desperate need of outside assistance, a tone reminiscent of pre-World War II Czechoslovakia at the time of Munich.

And in Moscow, Bar Zohar claims, the Soviet leaders informed British Foreign Minister George Brown that they did not agree with the decision by Abdul Nasser to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping, that they did not want war, and that they hoped the crisis would be resolved in a peaceful manner. If this Israeli account is correct, then at that moment the initiative had completely passed over to Johnson.

When Minister of State Thomson, accompanied by a British admiral, arrived in Washington, he had with him a plan for breaking the blockade. Thomson and his admiral met with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Undersecretary of State Rostow and revealed their plan for a three-stage operation involving a UN Security Council call upon Egypt to end the blockade, to be followed—if this first step failed—by the organization of a Maritime Council of Nations to affirm the international character of the Tiran Straits and their intention to use it, and then—if the UAR still persisted in its blockade—to send an armada of warships through the Straits.

The plan was turned over to the White House and the Pentagon, and the American military was asked to prepare for this campaign,

but with modifications involving the use of Allied paratroopers to seize positions in Sinai and with support shelling provided by the armada.

At the same time Pentagon planners brought out their contingency defense plan in the event of an actual Arab penetration into Israeli territory. The plan had been prepared in light of both Johnson's promise to Eshkol in May 1964 and equivalent promises by past presidents. Between 30,000 and 100,000 U.S. airborne troops were to be flown into Israel from the Sixth Fleet and from military bases in Germany and America to establish at Beersheba a "military wall to separate" the Israeli and Arab forces. In precautionary implementation of this plan, Marine reinforcements joined up with the Sixth Fleet the next day (May 25).

The contingency plan was but a necessary formality of military life. Pentagon computers had evaluated military possibilities in the Middle East as recently as January 1967, and reported that in all conceivable circumstances Israel would win with a strong attacking strategy involving a massive aerial assault on Arab air bases and an aggressive armored offensive into Arab territory—General Rabin's "mailed fist."

Israeli Ambassador Harman was called to the State Department on May 25. Briefed on the British plan by Eugene V. Rostow and Lucius Battle and told that it would take ten to fourteen days for implementation, Harman was extremely annoyed. Expressing his shock at the delay, he reminded them that the Israelis had originally been asked to wait forty-eight hours, and now this was being stretched out to fourteen days. The Americans explained that Pentagon adjustments would require greater military involvement; it was therefore necessary to move with greater military care.

But the Pentagon was not dawdling at Israel's expense. According to Joseph Geva, Israeli military attaché in Washington at the time, "on the eve of the Six-Day War Pentagon men worked day and night to organize the delivery to Israel of supplies (and prior to the danger) they canceled their vacations just to help us." [2]

In Tel Aviv, Eshkol met with Rabin and the generals at the Ministry of Defense. Israeli Army intelligence had claimed that the Egyptians were planning to attack the next day, and the generals pressed

for immediate action. The Army was in final positions, prepared to strike the next day and waiting only for the expected signal.

Eshkol sent Eban two messages, the first of which said that he was to talk not only about the situation at the Straits of Tiran but about threatening Arab military activity . . . the UAR units in Sinai, the Egyptian Army preparing to return from Yemen, troop movements in Jordan, Syria, and Iraq. The second message was sent after the meeting with the generals and declared that Israel feared imminent attack by Egyptian and Syrian forces. The message contained a "test" or ultimatum: if Johnson would not announce that an attack on Israel would be considered as an attack on America and place U.S. troops on a regional alert, Israel would obviously have to strike now.

President Johnson had left Washington earlier for a meeting with Canadian Premier Lester Pearson. But when Eban received the messages from Eshkol, he requested an emergency meeting with the President. Accompanied by the Israeli Ambassador, Eban met Rusk, Battle, and Eugene Rostow and presented Eshkol's demands.

By now Johnson had returned from Montreal; shown the messages, he decided to check out the Israeli claim with National Security Agency computers, to ask the Soviets to restrain the UAR, and to send a message of his own to the latter, insisting upon restraint and that Egypt not be the first to open fire or there would be serious consequences.

The Egyptian Ambassador, Dr. Mustafa Kamel, was called to the State Department and told by Rostow that Johnson wanted a message sent to Abdul Nasser—there were rumors about Egyptian intentions and the President, in accord with the UN Charter, could only emphasize that the United States was against anyone firing the first shot. The United States would honor its pledges, but the status quo must be reestablished in the area. Rostow further underscored the risks to Egypt if Israel were attacked.

While Rostow talked with Kamel, a team of five Israeli diplomats was going over plans with their American counterparts on the sixth floor of the State Department.

When Eban saw Rusk again in the evening, he was told that American intelligence had no indication of any Egyptian preparations to attack. The UAR Army in Sinai (which now included the Fourth Ar-

mored Division ordered in between May 24 and 25) was moving into defensive positions.

In Cairo, U Thant ended his talks with UAR leaders and flew back to New York with Abdul Nasser's promise (leaked to the foreign press by the Egyptians) that the UAR had no intention of attacking Israel but would strike back in full force if Israel attacked any Arab territory. The agency dispatch received at the *Palestine News* buried the pledge in the ninth paragraph of the story. The agency report also buried the first hint by Abdul Nasser of his plan to cool off the crisis.

According to the same authoritative Cairo sources, U Thant carried with him an Egyptian offer to again serve on the Israeli-Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission if Israel would agree to its revival. The proposal also called for the stationing of the Commission and UNEF personnel in the originally demilitarized zone of Al-Auja along the Sinai-Negev frontier line, initially occupied and then gradually settled by the Israelis from 1950 through 1955. Al-Auja had been specified as headquarters for the Mixed Armistice Commission prior to the Israeli military take-over.

To the Egyptians, the proposal was reasonable: it involved an Israeli concession (the presence of UN personnel on the Israeli side of the frontier) in a demilitarized area that should never have been occupied by the Israeli Army in the first place, according to UN resolutions and the Israeli-Egyptian armistice agreement. The Egyptians felt that this compromise would pave the way for restoration of UN forces along all frontiers and demarcation lines to supervise the withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian troop concentrations in Sinai, while the issue of Israeli passage through the Gulf of Aqaba would be submitted to the International Court.[3] Unpublicized at the time (but reported in Bar Zohar's account and confirmed after the war by leading Egyptian officials), U Thant also secured Nasser's promise to allow the passage of ships bound for Israel through the Straits provided they were not Israeli flagships and were not carrying strategic goods.[4] It was also made apparent to U Thant that counterproposals were considered by Cairo to be in order. And on the basis of Nasser's commitments, U Thant prepared his own proposals: a two-week truce on the question of Israeli passage (no Israeli flagships to attempt to sail through the Straits and no interference with non-Israeli

ships going to Israel) to allow time for further negotiations and de-escalation of the crisis.

But U Thant's mission had already been effectively undercut by an emergency Security Council debate on the blockade, a debate that still further inflamed the crisis at the very moment U Thant was negotiating to end it. The meeting was called to consider a Canadian-Danish resolution (considered by everyone at the UN to have been introduced at the prodding of the United States), which "expressed full support to the efforts of the Secretary General" and requested member states "to refrain from taking any steps which might worsen the situation."

The Arab view, shared by the Soviet Union, France, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and India, was that there was no need for an emergency session until U Thant returned from his peace-making mission. The American and British representatives, Arthur Goldberg and Lord Caradon, used the resolution as an opportunity to threaten Egypt for daring the blockade, despite an appeal by the Ethiopian delegate not "to pour oil on the flames of the crisis by resorting to invective."

In Vatican City, Pope Paul prayed for peace in the Middle East.

In Damascus the chief of the Arab Boycott Office warned of an Arab counterboycott of all American ships if the NMU carried out its threat to boycott ships destined for Egypt.

In Amman the Minister of Public Works announced that construction would start June 1 on the new Ma'an–Mudawara highway. In Jerusalem the *Palestine News* reported that large groups of tourists were still in the country, but the local Society of Greek Women had decided to cancel the annual ball planned for later that week "in view of the current conditions."

On the morning of the 26th, Israeli desert commanders were in possession of first-strike orders; Israeli jets were loaded with 12-foot guided bombs.

In Washington, Eban continued to press Rusk for an American declaration promising direct intervention; since the UAR blockade at Tiran was an act of war, only a declaration from Johnson could prevent an imminent explosion. He must see Johnson and then return to Israel. It was impossible to wait until the next day; it would be too late.

Johnson had not welcomed the visit from the beginning for fear that it would lend weight to accusations of Israeli-American collusion, but he finally agreed to meet Eban that evening when U.S. intelligence confirmed that Israel was poised for immediate attack.

Eban, accompanied by the Israeli military chargé d'affaires, was still talking about the danger of a UAR attack at a "War Board Room" conference with Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, the U.S. chiefs of staff, and Presidential Special Assistant Cyrus Vance. General Earl G. Wheeler was blunt: the UAR could not win a war against Israel, and Israel would win in any confrontation, whatever form it took. This had been confirmed by every study run of the problem (and from every angle) by Pentagon planners and intelligence.

Eban questioned Wheeler: what if the Arabs were the first to attack the Israeli airfield? Wheeler assured him that the Israelis would win, regardless of which side made the first move.

Wheeler and his associates told Eban that hard intelligence and computer analysis indicated in all circumstances that the Israelis would be able to smash the air force of four Arab states within three hours and conquer the Golan Heights, Sinai, and strategic parts of Jordan within eight days.[5]

Later Rusk and McNamara analyzed the situation for Johnson. There were only two policy alternatives: work to secure the broadest possible participation in a multinational maritime "police force" to open the Straits in accord with the American-adjusted British plan . . . or let Israel act alone.

According to CBS newsman William Stevenson's account, Johnson counseled patience when he met with Eban that evening and emphasized the political problems:

> If Israel's armies moved at this critical juncture they might (indeed, almost certainly would) lose the sympathy of the Western world. There might well be a repetition of the events of 1956 when Israel reacted powerfully to Egyptian provocation and found herself suddenly and inexplicably condemned for seizing the Sinai Peninsula and inflicting an embarrassing defeat on Nasser. Then as now, said the U.S. President, it was no use Israel asserting that Egypt made the first move. The public's memory was short and many people would condemn Israel as a militant nation, only too ready to grab extra territory. He asked Israel to postpone action.[6]

And in Tel Aviv a foreign office spokesman invoked Eban's trembling style and told the world press that while time was a very important matter, "Israel was not issuing an ultimatum or setting a time limit." That same day Eshkol and the cabinet were waiting for Eban to return to decide whether to order the poised Israeli Army over to the attack.

In Moscow the Soviet Union called upon the United States and Britain to use their influence to halt Israeli provocations, and expressed its belief that the UAR and Syria were doing their best to preserve peace in the Middle East.

In Oxford, Jordan's Crown Prince Hassan, returning from a London embassy function, told the press he would stay on until June 7—the end of the school term—before returning home.

In Cairo, Abdul Nasser received the message from Johnson (actually two messages: a direct communication in addition to the one forwarded by the UAR Ambassador in Washington) urging restraint and threatening serious consequences if Egypt were the first to open fire.

The messages were unnecessary, as the Pentagon well knew, but the effect (intentional or not) further strengthened the conditioning of an overconfident Egyptian psychology already set in motion by Eban's running public performance. Much later (3:30 A.M. local time that night) the Egyptian President was to be awakened to receive the Russian Ambassador, who "strongly requested" (according to Abdul Nasser) that Egypt not be the first to open fire.

In the morning Abdul Nasser had met with the Armed Forces Supreme Command; later he addressed the Pan-Arab Workers Federation General Council that had come from Damascus to meet the Egyptian President. He told the trade unionists that there was now complete military coordination between Egypt and Syria and hinted broadly that he did not approve of the destruction of Western oil installations in the event of war. But, said Nasser, if Israel were to attack either Syria or Egypt, the result would be full-scale war.

He accused the United States of being the chief defender of Israel and described Britain as "America's lackey," and then recalled the Soviet pledge to join the Arabs in resisting "any interference or aggression." The entire front surrounding Israel should become one front, but it was impossible to cooperate with spies for the British

and Americans, Abdul Nasser said, referring openly to political figures in Jordan.

The President also now took credit for the closing of Sharm el-Sheikh as part of a plan authorized by the Arab Socialist Union's Supreme Committee. The day before, Abdul Nasser told Egyptian pilots that the plan to deter the Israeli threat to Syria (without any mention of Sharm el-Sheikh) had been prepared on May 13. The contradictory delicacy with which the blockade was treated at this time in the writing of one of his closest associates barely veiled the fact that Nasser was not at all above transforming accident into examples of his own consistent calculation. Boastfulness now replaced what might otherwise have been an attractive, albeit dangerous, form of patriotic spontaneity.

Throughout the Arab East late that Friday morning, millions of Muslims heard their sheikhs carefully speak of the meaning and obligations of *Jihad* (The Struggle). *Jihad* is perhaps the most original conception in Islamic thought; in military and political terms the concept carries that moral weight of social responsibility we have come to understand in Western secular terms as the popular liberation war.

The Quran condemns wars (*harb*) of extermination or territorial conquest. But it is a religious duty, according to the Quran, for the entire Muslim community—women as well as men—to fight in self-defense of their lives, property, and freedom. The "Greater *Jihad*" is any strenuous, serious individual effort—intellectual, spiritual, physical—for the good. The two forms of *Jihad* relate in Islamic theology on the battlefield; to the degree that men are disinterested in the "Greater *Jihad*," they are incapable of successfully waging (or are even disqualified from) the "Lesser *Jihad*."

But the press, radio, and television reports circulating throughout the West that weekend simply described *Jihad* as "Holy War" (who, after all, on a daily paper in London or New York is particularly concerned with the subtleties of Islamic theology?), and the image conjured up among millions was of a fanatical Saracenic horde preparing to sweep down upon the Children of Israel.

Several hundred thousand Arabs (with radio rebroadcasts, possibly millions) also look forward to Friday for the weekly editorial commentary by Hassanein Heykal in *Al-Ahram*, the most popular news-

paper in the Arab world. Although Heykal writes in a highly personal, reflective style, he is considered by all but the most Marxist-oriented circles in Cairo as the authoritative interpreter of the Egyptian Revolution, and his writing frequently reflects Abdul Nasser's thinking.

How best to neutralize America, to ensure that the confrontation, if inevitable, occurred solely with Israel, and if possible—through America—not at all, was the context within which Abdul Nasser fashioned his tactics in the final hour. They were revealed, as has often happened before, in an indirect manner that morning by Heykal and his long commentary is perhaps the most important Arab document available for any understanding of Arab thinking at the time of the June War crisis.

Heykal quickly declared his belief that an armed clash, which could occur at any moment and at any number of places between the UAR and Israel, was inevitable. He noted the economic importance of Eilat to Israel—not so much at present but as a vital element in long-range plans to expand profitable trade with the Afro-Asian world (a point also raised by Eban in rebuttal to de Gaulle).

But the decisive factor that would compel Israel to attack the UAR, Heykal observed, was psychological:

> One thing is clear: the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli navigation and the ban on the import of strategic goods, even when carried by non-Israeli ships, means first and last that the Arab nation represented by the UAR has succeeded for the first time, vis-à-vis Israel, in changing by force a *fait accompli* imposed on it by force. This is the essence of the problem, regardless of the complications surrounding it and future contingencies. . . .
>
> Israel has built its existence, security, and future on force. The prevalent philosophy of its rulers has been that the Arab quakes before the forbidding glance and that nothing deters him but fear. Thus Israeli intimidation reached its peak. Provocation went beyond tolerable bounds. But all of this, from the Israeli point of view, had the psychological aim of convincing the Arabs that Israel could do anything and that the Arabs could do nothing; that Israel was omnipotent and could impose any accomplished fact, while the Arabs were weak and had to accept any accomplished fact. Despite the error in this Israeli philosophy—because even three million Israelis cannot by military force or by myth dominate a sea of eighty million Arabs—this philosophy remained a conviction deeply

embedded in Israeli thinking, planning, and action for many disturbing years, without any Arab challenge capable of restoring matters to their proper perspective.

Now this is the first time the Arabs have challenged Israel in an attempt to change an accomplished fact by force and to replace it by force with an alternative accomplished fact consistent with their rights and interests.

The opening of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel was an accomplished fact imposed by the force of imperialist arms. This week the closure of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel was an alternative accomplished fact imposed and now being protected by the force of Arab arms. To Israel this is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation. . . . Therefore it is not a matter of the Gulf of Aqaba but of something bigger. It is the whole philosophy of Israeli security. It is the philosophy on which Israeli existence has pivoted since its birth and on which it will pivot in the future. . . .

As of now, we must expect the enemy to deal us the first blow in the battle. But as we wait for that first blow, we should try to minimize its effect as much as possible. The second blow will then follow. But this will be the blow we will deliver against the enemy in retaliation and deterrence. It will be the most effective blow we can possibly deal. . . .[7]

Heykal then reviewed the history of the Arab summits, which had been called to prepare and implement a long-range unified defense strategy, and the reason for their failure due to "Arab reactionary rancor and because reaction had greater hatred for Arab social progress than for the Israeli enemy, which wants to humiliate all the Arabs whatever their social views."

Recalling the sharp Israeli threat to Damascus, made despite the mutual defense pact, Heykal wrote that the enemies of Egypt ("imperialism, Arab reaction, and Israel") had finally come to believe their propaganda claims that the Egyptian government was floundering; convinced that there would be no decisive Egyptian retaliation, these enemies persisted in their plans. In other words, Heykal (and presumably Abdul Nasser) believed that the Israelis had been "completely surprised" by the Egyptian reaction. (It is also highly significant that at this late stage in the crisis Israel is still listed last in Heykal's ordering of the enemies of the Arab Revolution.)

In face of the sudden threat to Syria, Egypt had to respond immediately; and if Egypt was not prepared for this specific contingency, Heykal argued curiously, it was prepared for all contingencies, including one such as this.

In Heykal's account of the restaging request to UNEF, he too defines the area of requested withdrawal to "the Egyptian borders with Israel" (in accordance with the Amer declaration), which does not include Sharm el-Sheikh; but then he avoids dealing with the ticklish ultimatum from U Thant and moves on to the Egyptian response, which is only then followed by "the advance on Sharm el-Sheikh." Heykal also touches on the UAR rejection of U.S. initiatives (described in the same issue of *Al-Ahram* as a five-point plan submitted by U.S. Ambassador Nolte to restore the precrisis situation).

The immediate Egyptian response, according to Heykal, accomplished two goals in two developing stages: it frustrated the plot against Syria and then once again closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israel. Yet "the problem has not ended but rather has hardly begun."

Heykal observed that Egypt had been able to exercise its power and achieve its objectives without as yet resorting to arms. But Israel had no alternative if it wished to exercise power. Having achieved so much, Egypt must now wait, even though it waits for a blow: "This is necessitated also by the sound conduct of the battle, particularly from the international point of view. Let Israel begin. Let our second blow be ready. Let it be a knockout."

Heykal had a precise understanding of Israeli psychology, but not of their strategy, and his analysis broke down at the critical intersections of military and political judgment. He assumed that Israel had so openly threatened Syria out of conviction that Egypt was in no position to implement the defense pact. Nor did he consider the possibility that Israeli Army circles—far more aggressive and provocative in their briefing sessions and articles than Eshkol or any of the other civilian cabinet members were in their statements—may have concentrated troops and spoken so openly precisely in order to force Egypt to implement the pact.

The UAR maneuver at the time of al-Tawafiq indicated the predictable Egyptian response.[8] Maxime Rodinson, in *Israel and the Arabs*, even quotes an anonymous French general with "private sources of information" to the effect that Israeli Army intelligence deliberately planted false information (concerning an imminent attack in mid-May against Syria) by means of radio messages exchanged via a fictitious operational network and intercepted by Soviet ships patrolling in the Mediterranean as well as by Syrian and

Egyptian listening posts, thereby stirring up a regional crisis behind its own government's back to drag Abdul Nasser to an apparent brink and themselves to power.

The improvised manner of Egyptian response was also implicit in Heykal's concept of contingency as a form of agile maneuver. When the war finally did come, there had been no serious preparation for alternative defensive postures west of the canal to be manned by Egyptian reserves and by token forces that were to arrive from Algeria, Sudan, and Kuwait. Confronted by an Egypt that neither sought nor would accept a cease-fire, the Israelis would have been forced to carry the war still further into the Nile Valley and its great concentrations of civilian population.

It was precisely at such a point that the invaders of Egypt in 1956 encountered difficulties—not from the regular Egyptian Army, either smashed or in disarray falling back from Sinai, but from the urban guerrilla war fought by the Egyptian popular resistance in the streets and suburbs of Port Said.

For reasons which we can only begin to guess at, the leaders of the Arab East were incapable of conceiving of Port Said's spontaneous example in 1956 as the basis for overall contingency planning in 1967—however obvious it was to the revolutionary commands in Algeria and Cuba. Both Boumediene and Castro were shocked when the Egyptians were to agree to a cease-fire on the evening of June 8.[9]

In the immediate postwar period, Abdul Nasser was to tell his associates that the alternative posed by his revolutionary critics would have meant probable destruction of much of Egypt's industry and terrible suffering for the civilian population. He said he could not bear to contemplate such possible losses, particularly since he was confident that intense Soviet efforts at the UN would force the Israelis to quickly withdraw from the newly occupied territories in return for modest concessions resembling those made by Egypt in 1956.

The problem, before and after the war, is that the Egyptians have disastrously reversed Mao Tse-tung's dictum: "Despise the enemy strategically, but never tactically."

NOTES

1. The relative importance of Eilat to the total number of ships arriving at the four other Israeli principal ports (Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jaffa, Ashdod) was 2.20 percent, 2.46 percent, 2.65 percent, and 2.91 percent for the years 1966, 1965, 1964, and 1963, respectively; while the percentage of net tonnage registered at Eilat to the net tonnage registered at the other four ports was 1.90 percent, 2.48 percent, 1.71 percent, and 1.55 percent for the same years, respectively. (*Statistical Abstract of Israel 1967.*)
2. *Maariv Supplement*, June 4, 1971.
3. Abdul Nasser's proposal for adjudication of the Gulf of Aqaba question was repeated, publicly, as late as May 30.
4. Bar Zohar, *Embassies in Crisis*, p. 102.
5. Specific details of this conversation and the timetable appeared in the original Bar Zohar manuscript and were read by a *Matzpan* sympathizer then employed as a proofreader at the Yediot Ahrenot print shop; but they were removed prior to publication in the Hebrew newspaper by the Israeli Army censor. However, a similar account of Wheeler's estimate appears in Donovan's book and in other American versions, but as an isolated fact and not as an intricate aspect of official Israeli-American conversations.
6. William Stevenson, *Strike Zion!* (New York: 1967), pp. 7–8.
7. Hassanein Heykal, *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, May 26, 1967; translated in Walter Lacqueur, *The Road to War: The Origin and Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1967–1968* (Baltimore: 1969), Appendix 5, pp. 298–303.
8. See p. 105.
9. Most mysterious is Syrian behavior; unlike Nasser and Hussein, the Baath government was at least rhetorically committed to the idea of popular liberation warfare, which by definition is a protracted affair fought in depth. Possibly by June 9, with the UAR and Jordan out of the war and the entire Israeli effort focused upon them at Golan, they felt too isolated and lost nerve; possibly Soviet pressure was a factor. The closest the Syrians have come to an explanation is the Damascus treason trial accusation (October 1968) that at the very moment of confrontation with Israel "a CIA-inspired coup d'état plotted by exiles in Jordan and with the assistance of certain Jordanian elements was launched against the Syrian Revolution." The inference is that Syria felt its first duty was to "protect the Revolution."

7. Omens

U Thant called for time when he addressed the emergency Security Council session on Saturday, May 26.

"Freedom of navigation" was not the only issue in the region, he noted, recalling both the problem of Israeli behavior in the demilitarized zones and fedayeen activities. His remarks read like an obvious attempt to soften the *causa belli* mood over the Tiran Straits being generated by Washington, London, and Tel Aviv. The Secretary General alluded to the possible compromise measures developed during his talks with Abdul Nasser and called for an Israeli return to the Mixed Armistice Commission as a means of cooling down the crisis and preserving peace.

In a letter to the Security Council President requesting that the Council debate the entire history of Arab-Israeli relations that very evening, the Egyptian UN representative also sought to turn the edge of events back to an overall review of the Palestine problem.

But despite U Thant, the UAR ambassador, and the representatives of the other Arab states who were to address themselves to the overall problem during the UN debate in the following days, the drive to fix all public thought on the Straits of Tiran and to define the new situation as an arbitrarily aggressive and strangulating step gained momentum.

With words of praise for U Thant, U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg dismissed the Secretary General's compromise proposals in his speech to the Council on May 29 and reinterpreted the idea of a "breathing spell" as a demand that Egypt reopen the Straits to Israeli shipping.

What is so remarkable about Goldberg's argument in retrospect is the ease with which America could declare at this time the impossibility of any general settlement or even of a discussion of the overall issues generated by the Palestine case unless Egypt returned to the status quo ante (no blockade), and then immediately after the June War announce that for Israel to return to the status quo ante (withdrawal from the newly occupied territories) prior to a general settlement, or at least a discussion of overall issues, would not be conducive to peace in the Middle East.

In Israel the army activists were taking internal political initiatives in compensation for the last-minute military delay decided upon by the cabinet. A campaign against Eshkol and Eban, destined soon to bring Dayan and former Irgun chief Menachem Begin into a broad war cabinet, was under way, and according to Israeli sources quoted by Rodinson the generals hinted at a coup d'état.[1]

In Yemen, advance elements of the 80,000-strong contingent of Egyptian forces only now began to evacuate for reconcentration in the Sinai. A senior U.S. State Department official sent to Cairo at Egypt's request received assurances from UAR Foreign Minister Mahmud Riad that Egypt had no intention of attacking Israel, that all of Egypt's initial moves were prompted by a desire to deter Israel from attacking Syria, but that now the situation was getting out of hand. Riad's tone recalled the earlier discussion between Abdul Nasser and U Thant over possible arrangements to soften the edge of the Tiran Straits blockade.

Jordan was still neither prepared nor seriously preparing for war. Highly visible troop movements in the Jordan Valley and royal decrees to register trained volunteers for service in the army and to arm frontier villages may have sounded impressive abroad, but in Jordan they were overwhelmed by the prevailing tones of actual indifference. Even sharper was everyone's focus upon the increasingly critical political isolation of the kingdom within the Arab world.

In Jerusalem the mood was bizarre. The people were hopeful that the escalating crisis would mean return to Palestine; yet beneath that naive current they were always questioning each other—not as to the outcome of any conflict, for that was already determined in everyone's mind (assuming that America stayed out), but as if they were still not quite convinced that the whole thing would come off.

Arab confidence hung in the air like some horrible omen. The dominant mood had little in common with the archetype of London during the blitz or Cuba at the moment of invasion, when men, accepting the possibility of death for the sake of their beliefs or simple decencies, proceed to enter into a massive struggle with circumstance, employing all the tools they can fashion or find at hand. And it is precisely this attempt to master circumstance with will and fortitude that creates such incredible élan.

In Jerusalem, however, the atmosphere was magical. No one did anything but stand around, congratulate each other, and praise Gamal Abdul Nasser. Somehow this one man, by sheer weight of his audacity, was going to overwhelm the enemy in an amazing manner that could in no way affect the life-style or activities of people most intimately involved in the struggle.

"Beforehand everyone was depending on us . . . now everyone is depending upon himself and this is much healthier," Nasser was to say himself after the war.

If we took editorial satisfaction in the *Palestine News* that the Israelis were engaged in panic-buying, grabbing up supplies to such an extent that a black market in staples had already appeared in Tel Aviv, how much more devastating was the mad confidence that swept over the West Bank, where no one seemed to even consider the logic of modest hoarding, if only to stock up on necessities for obvious air-raid shelter needs. But then no one—not just those of significant responsibility—seemed to be thinking of air-raid shelters, civil defense, or popular resistance except for a handful of radical nationalists in deep official disfavor since the Sammou' semi-insurrection.

Only the municipality appeared to be taking even the most conventional of precautions. Mayor Rouhi al-Khatib had ended his vacation in Geneva, canceled plans to visit Austria and Iraq, and arrived back in the city on the 24th to quickly and quietly check out water reserves and order an immediate boost in fuel supplies for a five-month reserve. When the war came, at least the pumping stations and the suburban electric station were sandbagged and observation towers were under construction.

Production fell rather than rose, as should have been the case, for everywhere the men stood about listening to the radio and talking

politics; the work at hand had no relevance in their minds to the possible tasks ahead.

The work at our print shop seemed sluggish, and I ran over from our editorial office a few blocks away to find that the very men who were most euphoric about the possibilities of war were indignant that our crisis coverage entailed an additional late hour's work. In face of their irritation I fumbled around hopelessly in Arabic for standard mobilization talk about "the battle of production" and how "every tool is a weapon employed against the enemy"—and they looked at me with unbelieving eyes.

The war was potentially all around them and yet it wasn't; it was on the radio tuned to "Voice of the Arabs" or a thousand miles away in the vocal cords of Nasser, and all they wanted to do was to go home or to their cafés and enjoy that war.

And to what degree could I blame them? A pressroom full of six fit men, and none knew how to work a rifle; a festival at Aqaba two weeks earlier at the height of the threats against Syria, and the King allowed by his advisers to spend the day at the resort reviewing water skiers and beauty queens.

To be the only hysteric in a city of calm and cool madmen! Jordan's isolation was increasing at every minute, and the King and his people moved, in their respective ways, like somnambulists to their separate slaughters.

This was a time when respectable nationalists would warn me that an editorial on popular resistance was impossible, for the implication behind such a program was the realistic assumption that the Israelis would overrun the West Bank in any conflict, and whoever would even suggest such a possibility would be denounced by the people as a traitor. In Amman, voices of authority vetoed the column as "premature."

In the streets, nothing but talk of an abstract war—the inability of the people to relate this possibility to their own immediate lives conditioned by the absence of genuine concern in the leading structures of the society. And yet on a personal, nonoperative level within these very institutions—at the palace, at police headquarters, in the executive offices and ministries—there, too, the talk was now only of the possibility of war and everyone listened to Radio Cairo.

"And who can blame them?" Jerusalem's tough Governor Anwar al-Khatib said in despair early on the morning of May 30, not knowing at that moment that the King was secretly on his way to Cairo. I sat in his office—an inflamed oracle; a little wild-eyed, I am sure, like a long-gone Sufi suddenly returning to the marketplace for a piece of the action—and he listened.

Before I had finished the Governor made up his mind, picked up the phone, and issued instructions for an emergency meeting, early that afternoon, of civic notables, representatives of the army, police, and civil government, and radical nationalist leaders to discuss the establishment of popular resistance councils throughout the city and adjacent villages.

A bitter argument flared up at the meeting when Izzal-din Tal, head of the local radio station, questioned the wisdom of arming the people, a step demanded by the nationalists if "popular resistance" was to have any meaning. Khatib was caught in the middle: he had responded with an emotional directness to my most extreme proposals a few hours earlier and yet he knew that the concept went against Jordanian traditional order, of which he had become so very much a part.

The Governor had opened the meeting by noting the lack of both preparation and communication between the people and the authorities, but now Izhak Duzdar—one of the nationalists—lashed out at Anwar Bey as well as at Tal for sharing responsibility for the void. "There is no relationship, no ties, no trust or common identity between the people, on the one hand, and the army and the government on the other," he declared.

It was an old theme for Duzdar. A Jerusalem tourist agent, he had expressed it while campaigning for parliament in the early 1960's (one of those rare Middle Eastern free elections) and had won, only to be imprisoned and sent briefly to Jefir—the desert detainment camp—following the dissolution of parliament.

The argument might have broken up the meeting but for the Governor, who sloughed off the bitterness as a misunderstanding: the disturbing prospect involved the arming of untrained people rather than the principle of popular resistance. And Izzal-din Tal had his own patriotic credentials: he had fought in 1948 as a Transjordanian volunteer and had been wounded at Safad. Arms for the people was

a reasonable request, the Governor said. The police chief and Army liaison officer agreed and Tal withdrew his objection, but the incident spoke of the tragic suspicion that had crippled relations between Transjordanians and Palestinians.

News that the King was in Cairo, had reconciled with Abdul Nasser, and signed a mutual defense pact came over the radio in the Governor's office as popular committees for transport, supplies, resistance, civil defense, and communications were being formed.

With an available governmental structure, civil-defense operations, however primitive, rapidly mobilized. Headquarters were established by Musa Bitar at the Umayyed School within the northern wall of the Haram al-Sharif on the Via Dolorosa and via telephone communication with four other centers throughout the Old City, including one in the school on the ground floor of my house.

In the afternoon the resistance committee met, headed by Bahjet Abu Gharbiyeh, a lean, serious teacher and careful phraser—qualities to be appreciated in this overstuffed Levant.[2] Three Palestinians who had served as officers in Arab armies were called in as advisers to the committee and asked to immediately draft a plan for defense of the district, detailing arms and training requirements as well as recruitment potential.

But if arms were not yet in the hands of the people, news of the King's visit and the defense pact seemed weapon enough. That afternoon Hussein returned from his six-hour Cairo visit. There were massive ovations in Amman. Young men who had cursed his name the day before now lifted his car up from the street and carried the monarch and his Mercedes for a few steps of symbolic triumph.

Ahmed Shukeiry was part of the bargain; he returned to Amman with the King, having hailed Hussein as "leader of the Palestinians" at the Cairo defense pact conference.

Instantaneous transformation: Abdul Nasser's picture alongside that of Hussein blossomed on street walls, in shops and cafés, and on newspaper front pages for the first time in two years. In Jordanian villages, soldiers and civilians danced the *debke;* in Jerusalem, at the Bab al-Zahera, an old refugee in village dress and carrying sword and shield moved through the steps of an ancient Arab war dance to the cheers of a thousand youth.

Beneath the war cries and martial music blasting from the radio

the dreaminess remained. When appeals for blood donors finally were voiced over Radio Amman, one of my colleagues at the paper made his way to the Red Crescent center in the Old City. The center was empty, and the director and nurse could not quite fathom why my friend had suddenly appeared. Had there been an injury in his family? At which hospital was the patient? Forty-five minutes passed before Nabil could finally yield his patriotic pint.

And in the end there was a certain hidden wisdom to all the somnambulism, to the apathetic interior radiating rays of militant optimism—for the whole project was hopeless. And it was this fundamental lack of personal involvement, which in responsible or "political" terms directed the energies of Arab society, that had paved the way for the imminent defeat, at least on an individual basis, and was a cushion that saved any number of lives from useless slaughter.

Damascus Radio was silent, as stunned by the Egyptian-Jordanian reconciliation as the Western press. Despite the scare headlines on Tel Aviv front pages, the more sophisticated Israeli commentators were remarkably cool, merely noting that "the possibility that King Hussein would jump on the Egyptian bandwagon was foreseen some time ago and taken into account in the overall defense plans of this country."

Perhaps now Jordan had "the answer to its query of Monday [May 29]," the *Post* political reporter wrote, "as to why the U.S. diverted the freighter 'Green Island,' which was en route to Aqaba with a cargo of American arms for the Jordanian Army. The ship was diverted to Ethiopia."

In the same May 31 issue of the *Post* an agency dispatch quoted a Defense Department spokesman in Washington on the shipment of four tons of 50-caliber machine gun ammunition from a Missouri arsenal to Israel; there were also Arab reports of the frantic transfer of heavy military equipment from the U.S. Wheelus air base in Libya to Israel for the fourth day running. The equipment included antitank guns and spare parts for weaponry. Also reported: three El Al Boeing commercial jet liners had flown to Bordeaux the night before to load up with "spare parts and equipment" from Dassault Aviation Company, then the leading supplier of fighter aircraft and rockets to Israel.

Robert Anderson, former Secretary of the Treasury during the Eisenhower administration, arrived in Cairo on May 31, the same day that UAR Ambassador al-Kony was submitting to the Security Council, in the form of a draft resolution, Abdul Nasser's proposal to reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. Anderson has corporate ties to the oil companies and is linked by rumor to the CIA's "Arabist" section, which enjoyed close relations with Abdul Nasser during the first few years of the Revolution.

In 1955 Anderson had acted as the secret intermediary in an unsuccessful attempt by Eisenhower to reconcile Abdul Nasser and Ben-Gurion, and his visit now was considered significant in Cairo.

Anderson was to see the Egyptian President the following day, and arrangements were set in motion for UAR Vice-President Zakaria Moheidden to visit Washington on June 6 or 7 for negotiations—after the idea of having Vice-President Hubert Humphrey visit Cairo had been discarded for reflecting too much of an "image" of obvious American pressure. Convinced that the Moheidden mission could secure a "breakthrough" to ease the crisis, Abdul Nasser repeated to Anderson that the UAR would neither seek nor initiate a war.

Moheidden is considered abroad as "pro-Western"; he enjoyed a reputation with Western oilmen for "sensible administration" during his turn as Prime Minister, and as head of Security had cracked down hard on Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood.[3]

Anderson was not the only U.S. emissary to leave Cairo with a bundle of conciliatory commitments from Egypt. According to David G. Nes, who was U.S. chargé d'affaires in Cairo at the time, the senior American diplomat—Charles Yost—who had arrived in Cairo in the final days of May, had "succeeded in obtaining from Nasser an undertaking—not to be the first to attack; *not physically to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba pending a decision on its status by the World Court; to effect a partial withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Sinai;* to cooperate in the reinstatement of a Military Mixed Armistice Commission on both sides of the UAR-Israeli border and *to send his Vice-President Moheidden to Washington on June 7 to tie up these assurances in a more formal agreement.*" [4]

Rumor, and then the subsequent (June 4) official confirmation of the projected visit to Washington by Moheidden, sent a sigh of relief through the Arab élites, Russian diplomats, and unknowing State De-

partment Arabists stationed throughout the Middle East: the Americans had obviously committed themselves to restraining the Israelis.

But the final decision to launch an attack on June 5 had been taken sometime between the morning of June 1 (according to Eban's version a year later) and June 2 (according to Dayan-favored sources), following the formation of the coalition war government. The Israeli military and intelligence chiefs, who had first forced the crisis, had also been able to force its pace during cabinet debates with the more cautious civilians such as Eban, largely on the basis of a critical report brought back from Washington by the head of the Israeli intelligence service, Meir Amit. Amit made his secret visit to Washington shortly after Eban's own visit.[5] The Israeli Army timetable, if not the final cabinet decision to attack on June 5, had been worked out even earlier, for when Hussein met Abdul Nasser on May 30 he was able to warn the Egyptian President that the Israelis were planning to attack sometime around June 5.

Hussein received this warning from the United States, in all probability from the American Ambassador who visited him on May 29, and it was this warning which must have spurred Hussein to fly to Cairo the following day. This warning, which reestablished a certain official American credibility among the Arab leaders in the final week of the crisis, can only be understood when approached with the respect due any particularly brilliant piece of cynicism.

The Yost and Anderson missions to Cairo, and the openings to a compromise that they appeared to represent in the minds of the Egyptian and other Arab leaders, had a curious lack of impact on the American public's understanding of the crisis developments.

Anderson's mission was kept secret, and the prevailing U.S. public understanding, if any, of Yost's mission (typically reflected and reinforced in Walter Laqueur's postwar apologetics) was that the Ambassador's "dispatches were not encouraging; his talks with the Egyptian foreign minister had made no progress." [6]

In Israel the disparity at this point between the officially cultivated mood and the drift of events on the diplomatic level was still more significant to the outcome of the crisis. Bar Zohar implies that the Israeli government knew before, on June 2 (when the final decision to strike was taken), that the UAR had by then privately assured the

United States that Egyptian artillery would not open fire upon any Israeli ship escorted through the Tiran Straits by an international armada.[7]

But born as it was as a vague Anglo-American alternative to the inevitable Israeli thrust, and intensely publicized during the last week of May (despite the unattractiveness of the scheme to most other maritime powers), the proposal for an international armada had served as the ultimate rivet to define the entire crisis as the result of "Egyptian belligerency" in denying Israel the right of free passage through Tiran, and then had quietly faded away.

The postwar Cairo trials, with their revelations of belly-dancer parties for Egyptian officers on the eve of the Israeli attack, were to shift attention to what was only a manifestation of the overall lowering of Arab guard in the final days.

The "Moheidden mission" maneuver was the more pertinent political fact, a maneuver reinforced in its effect by the credibility acquired by the American government's earlier warning to the Arabs of an Israeli timetable for attack.[8] The maneuver was viable and succeeded in lowering the Arab guard because the Egyptian leadership had wandered from their earlier anxious misconception—concerning the threat of an American military intervention—to a still more dangerous and exhilarating one: that the United States, once firmly aware of Egypt's desire to avoid war, would welcome and be party to a last-minute settlement.

In Jerusalem the resistance committee met early in the morning and received from its advisers a request list for 10,000 assorted small arms and ammunition and an unlimited number of grenades and mines. The figure was based on the availability of 10,000 men in the district with some degree of military training—ex-servicemen, veterans of the 1948 militia, and high-school students—who had been receiving elementary instruction in drill and small arms on a casual weekly basis for the past few years. A number of the ex-servicemen were veterans of the original National Guard, officially integrated into the regular Army in the late 1950's but actually dissolved for political-security considerations.

The names and total numbers were easily available, for as early as

May 18, when the Jordanian Army was placed on a state of alert, the government had ordered each *Mukhtar* (neighborhood or village district leader) to prepare lists of men capable of using arms.

Duzdar took the arms list to the Governor, and Anwar Bey whistled at the size of the request and the promise by Duzdar that this was but the beginning. As soon as the committee could secure and distribute these arms and establish militia units throughout the district, additional weapons would be requested for the thousands more expected to volunteer for training. The Governor forwarded the list to the Army command through channels.

Throughout the week the resistance committee organized command centers in the Old City and in the immediate suburbs in preparation for the arms delivery: twelve commands within the city walls and five outside—al-Musrara, Zahera Quarter, Wadi Juz, Sheikh Jarrah, and Abu Tur. Additional commands were to be structured in all surrounding villages with the exception of Beit Iksa and Nebi Samuel, both strategic centers under direct control of the Jordan Arab Army.

Ahmed Shukeiry had been in Jerusalem since Wednesday (May 31), attempting to pick up the loose strands of the PLO that he had either severed himself or thrown to Hussein's scissors for the sake of gesture the previous winter.

On Friday Governor Khatib met Shukeiry at the Ambassador Hotel and took him to the Haram al-Sharif for *Juma'a* (Friday) prayer. A few hundred of Shukeiry's retainers from all over the West Bank and a few hundred more of the local youth waited in the courtyard outside of al-Aqsa to cheer the late arrival of the PLO leader; the commotion interrupted prayer in the crowded mosque and soured whatever audience Shukeiry hoped to find.

With the final *rakaat* said, Shukeiry—obese and pompous in his military tunic—waddled forward to mount Salah-al-Din's *mihrab* (pulpit), and hundreds of those hopelessly transistorized young minds raced into the partially emptying mosque, so excited that a few forgot to take off their shoes at the door and had to be forced to a halt. The crowd clamored for Shukeiry and the microphone was taken from Sheikh Asad Bayard, a fiery preacher who had done his time as a Jordanian political prisoner and usually delivered an informal ser-

mon after prayer—with a policeman in attendance as incentive to restraint.

H., a middle-aged local businessman who rarely came to prayer, took me aside. He had passed the Mandate struggles against the British and the Zionists in the arms of his Jewish mistress (his family were "leading Arab moderates" of the time) and is one of the few men of his generation I have ever met who is still infatuated with Hitler.

"If war comes we will finish them. I'll take you into the New City and we will have their women."

My throat turned dry with disgust—at H., at the mindless mob, at the gross vulgarity of Shukeiry. The scene stank of a hysterical disorder that must accompany all dishonorable defeats. And Anwar Khatib, close to Shukeiry as they moved to the front of the mosque, thought: "We shall be punished for this."

Saturday morning Anwar Bey went to Amman to see Sherif Nasser, the King's scandal-shrouded uncle who was serving as deputy commander of the Army. Although General Habes Majali then held the higher rank as commander, it was common knowledge that Sherif Nasser was the power to deal with in the Arab Army, and since the Governor had not received any response through channels to his request for arms, he decided to deal with the problem directly.

"Please don't even talk about such matters; we have five brigades to defend Jerusalem. Everything is arranged," said Sherif Nasser when Khatib asked for his 10,000 rifles.

But the Governor persisted. Jerusalem needed those weapons, and finally Sherif Nasser said that if Anwar Bey would assume personal responsibility (in the form of a written request) for the distribution of arms to the public, the Army would send him 10,000 rifles.

Khatib left Sherif Nasser and went to the Prime Minister's office, where he saw the King and told him that he wasn't satisfied with Sherif Nasser's assurances . . . that he was still disturbed by the situation. The King smiled and told Anwar Bey not to worry. And he hinted that a political solution was more likely than war.

Late in the afternoon the Governor returned to Jerusalem and called Duzdar to report that the Army had agreed to supply arms and that he could come to Khatib's office immediately. Duzdar and

Abu Gharbiyeh went to the Governorate; Anwar Bey told them that he had sent a formal letter of request by motorcyclist to Amman and within hours the arms would be arriving in Jerusalem.

By now the resistance committee had established and staffed a headquarters with telephone at the Qadisieh School in the Bab Hutta Quarter within the walled city, not far from Bab al-Zahera. (The school was to be shelled with amazing precision by the Israelis during the war.) Duzdar and Abu Gharbiyeh returned there to wait for the arms.

In the evening the various popular defense committees established earlier in the week met in Jerusalem. The meeting was chaired by the chief justice of the city's Islamic Court, Sheikh Abdul Hamid Sayeh, whom the Israelis deported to Amman a few months after the war for leading the civil resistance to the occupation.

A program for a public rally on Monday afternoon (June 5) by the entire Popular Defense movement was prepared. A statement announcing the rally and including an open appeal to Amman's authorities for arms was issued to the press and appeared the next morning in the *Palestine News.*

When the meeting had ended, Duzdar approached Brigadier Ata Ali, commander of the brigade defending the entire district of Jerusalem, and demanded to know why the arms had not been delivered: "According to tactical requirements, an army advances or retreats, but for us who live here we must stay on and fight, so it is we, the people—if armed—whom the army should depend on in all circumstances and not the other way around."

Duzdar did not receive a direct reply but he had touched the Brigadier's sense of honor. "Our orders are not to budge one centimeter. We are to die defending Jerusalem," Ata Ali said.

That same evening (June 3) Moshe Dayan's first press conference statement as newly appointed Israeli Minister of Defcnse came over the ticker at the newspaper office. When the night editor had read and subheaded the copy, he turned it over to me for reading. Dayan's words were remarkably mild; he talked about waiting for international diplomatic efforts and admitted to an Israeli loss of military initiative. "The government—before I became a member of it—embarked on diplomacy; we must give it a chance," Dayan said.

The Israeli Defense Minister had also sent several thousand Israeli

soldiers on "leave"; they were photographed for the press as they relaxed on the beaches of Tel Aviv during the weekend. These final touches by Dayan reinforced the overall feeling among foreign correspondents (already aware of throbbing diplomatic lines of contact between Cairo and Washington and the paper "blockade" at Tiran) that the crisis was about to ebb.[9]

But in Arab Jerusalem that Saturday evening Dayan sounded too much like Ben-Gurion offering to go to Cairo for direct peace talks with Abdul Nasser at the very moment that Israeli troops were moving out to begin the 1956 Suez War.

We laughed at the idea of running the Dayan story under the headline: "Israelis About to Attack." It was part of a running, bitter private joke of ours: how the Arab nationalist always threatened blood, thunder, and ruin and then did nothing while the Israelis talked softly, spoke of peace and reconciliation, and struck straight for the jugular vein. That evening the night editor put to bed the last issue of the *Palestine News.*

Shukeiry had driven to Amman with the Governor Saturday morning after a press conference and an official reception, where he reiterated his usual theme of how few survivors there would be in Israel after the war and the role his army would soon play in firing the first shot. Since everyone knew that the PLA was not under his command but attached to the UAR, Iraqi, and Syrian armies, Shukeiry's demagogy was shameless. Amman was furious because he had omitted any mention of the Jordan Arab Army in his speech earlier that Friday at the mosque.

In the afternoon Shukeiry returned to Jerusalem alone and met with former Jordanian members of the PLO Executive Committee, whom he had previously purged from office. He had come to Jordan to reopen the PLO office and reconcile himself with these men; on Sunday, when he accepted their demands for collective leadership and regional initiative, Bahjet Abu Gharbiyeh, Izhak Duzdar, Yehya Hamoudah, and others agreed to serve on a revived Executive Committee.

There were six Jordanian air force pilots on the Sunday evening flight to Amman from Beirut; they were returning from the U.S.A., where they had been in training as instructors for the Starfighter jets

promised to Jordan. Also on board was Hazim Khalidi, director of tourism in Arab Jerusalem. Little more than a year before, Khalidi had returned home after a thirty-year absence from Palestine as an officer in the British Army during World War II, an instructor at the Syrian Army Staff College, and then an executive with a British oil company.

The Khalidi clan had provided Jerusalem with scholars and jurists for centuries, had sent their men to Istanbul as cabinet ministers and army officers for the Ottomans, and during the Mandate made their way to Oxford or Cambridge for education. Hazim Bey's long years abroad were so typical of the hundreds of educated Palestinians who had provisionally abandoned what remained of the country after 1948 rather than endure the narrow intellectual possibilities of provincial Hashemite rule. Khalidi had finally made his own private peace and returned to Jordan and public service.

Now he sat and talked with one of the returning pilots, who was deeply disturbed about the latest developments. The small Jordanian air force, equipped with slow-flying British Hunters, would not last an hour in the air alone with the Israelis. The only hope, if war came, would be the presence, in Jordan, of UAR and Iraqi MIG fighter squadrons. A group of Jordan air force officers was waiting on the tarmac when their plane landed.

"Did they come?" was the pilot's first question to his comrades. "None," they replied, and Khalidi read horror in his companion's face.

In Amman earlier that afternoon King Hussein met the foreign press at the palace; before a gallery crowded with newsmen and TV crews he appeared in combat dress, with all the calm of a modest but confident military leader. It has always been at such moments of great tension that Hussein appears at his best. His remarks were disciplined: repeated appeals to the Western powers to restrain Israel or at least maintain strict neutrality. Most of the foreign correspondents present were attracted by the King's public style, but the idea of war starting within forty-eight hours, which Hussein suggested as a possibility at the conference, sounded too incredible.

The conference was briefly interrupted when the King was called from the room. It was Abdul Nasser on the telephone, and when the King returned to the conference he announced that the UAR Presi-

dent had just called to report that Iraq had also signed the defense pact with Egypt. The King, however, declined to comment on the persistent reports of heavy troop movements to Jordan from neighboring Arab states.

In fact only one Iraqi brigade (3,000 to 4,000 men) was to enter Jordan, crossing over that night far to the east of the front. Two Egyptian commando battalions (1,200 men), flown into Amman on Saturday evening and Sunday morning, were now on their way to the West Bank.

Two Saudi Arabian battalions never to see combat were to reach Al-Mudawwarah, the southernmost part of Jordan near the Saudi frontier, on the second and third day of the war; and a Syrian brigade, requested during the fighting by the Egyptian commander, General Abdul Mone'm Riad, crossed into East Jordan on the third day and was ordered back by Riad on Friday, when Jordan was out of the war and Syria under attack.

This, then, was the extent of that massive Arab pincer whose frightening theoretical squeeze had been going on in the Israeli and Western press for more than a week.

The press had lounged about the palace grounds for more than an hour before the conference, coalescing into small groups of European and American journalists and local Arab reporters and editors.

I had already been told by a few foreign correspondents visiting Jerusalem that my dread of an approaching war was an indication of how susceptible I was to Arab hysteria. The tensions were easing, the decisive moment had passed; possibly in a few months, if negotiations failed and the provisional Arab unity faded away, the Israelis would then strike. This view was even more dominant that afternoon.

The Arab journalists, however, sounded far more convinced of the possibility of war. They also sounded cheerful and confident—except for one of my publishers who had lived and traveled in the West, had fought as a volunteer in Palestine in 1948, and had sufficient understanding of the performances to be expected in any classic confrontation involving highly technological warfare.

We stepped aside from the other local newsmen and his own hearty smile disappeared.

"If war comes the Israelis will smash the Egyptian Army in Sinai and occupy Sharm el-Sheikh," he said.

I disagreed: "No, that's just a feint or maybe a secondary objective. The West Bank's the real target. They'll go barreling down into the Jordan Valley, cut off Jerusalem, and then the entire West Bank. This is what they want, Mahmoud, and they've always wanted it."

And so we went on for five minutes, marshaling our facts in a hopeless argument.

My family had arrived from Cairo only six days before the war, and except for the absence of tourists who would ordinarily be strolling through the markets or following the Stations of the Cross, nothing about the city seemed to them to have changed.

The slight signs of military activity were almost all outside the walls of Old Jerusalem; within the walls the only soldiers to be seen were members of a communication unit laying wire for field telephones and a small encampment on high ground next to Bab al-Zahera, which had always served as a military post.

There were none of the customary signs—sandbagging, requisitioned houses, rooftop machine-gun and mortar posts, stockpiling of barbed wire and other barricade materials—that would have indicated any serious plan to fight, if necessary, from within the walls of the city.

Between newspaper work and settling my family, I had no time to tour the rest of the West Bank; but if Jerusalem, so coveted by Israel and militarily the most exposed Jordanian city, was so unprepared for meeting an invasion, I assumed correctly that nothing had been done in Nablus or Hebron.

We took our own precautions. By Sunday night I had on hand an extra stock of canned goods, batteries, and candles. All that remained was to secure a jerry can's supply of kerosene for a primus stove and lamp to be used if the electricity failed and the kitchen was too exposed to fire. Jagged holes in the metal window shutters and outer wall of our rooftop apartment were reminders of other times when Old Jerusalem had been a battlefield.

NOTES

1. *Le Monde* correspondent Eric Rouleau refers to an accusation by Eshkol that Dayan entered the cabinet on the eve of the war because of a "sort

of putsch." The accusation, according to Rouleau, appeared in an interview with Eshkol, published shortly after his death, by the Israeli Labor Youth magazine *Ramzor* in March 1969.

2. After the war and the collapse of Shukeiry's leadership, Abu Gharbiyeh briefly assumed a prominent role in the PLO. He is now the leader of the Popular Struggle Front, one of the smaller guerrilla groups affiliated to the PLO, and serves as a member of the PLO executive committee.
3. Abdul Nasser named Moheidden as his replacement when he briefly resigned from office at the end of the war. "Platt's Oilgram" of June 12, 1967, described Moheidden as ". . . particularly known in oil circles for having laid the groundwork for the return of foreign oil companies to Egypt." As early as June 6 the *Wall Street Journal* had foreseen the possibility that "having suffered such losses Nasser would rapidly lose leadership of the Arab world. . . ."
4. David G. Nes, "Sharm el-Sheikh Blocks the Way to Peace," *Middle East International,* June 1971. My emphasis.
5. Walter Laqueur, who has excellent Israeli sources, implies in one of his obscure references to the secret visit that it was Amit who brought back the assurance that "the administration would not be too offended if Israel decided to solve the problem alone." (*The Road to War*, p. 237.) But when a Rand Corporation scholar questioned Eugene Rostow (after the war) about the nature of Amit's visit, Rostow denied knowing even that Amit had been in Washington.
6. Walter Laqueur, *The Road to War*, p. 171.
7. "In fact, on the day after the closing of the Straits, Egypt had secretly informed representatives of the great powers that the troops stationed in Sharm el-Sheikh would not fire on any ship that was trying to force the blockade under the protection of foreign warships. The American government knew of this promise." (Bar Zohar, *Embassies in Crisis,* p. 177.)
8. According to Miles Copeland, whose familiarity with the Egyptian leadership dates back to the first years of the Revolution, Nasser's plan for this mission called for Moheidden (in Nasser's name) finally "to back down magnanimously (over the Straits of Tiran issue) in response to appeals from the United Nations." (*The Game of Nations,* p. 277.)
9. "News of the World" special correspondent Winston S. Churchill returned to London from Israel the day before the war began; early the next morning—the morning of the attack—a *Sunday Times* news team also returned to London, according to Churchill.

8. The Siege

Monday morning, June 5. . . . At 0850 an aide-de-camp called the Palace in Amman to report to King Hussein Radio Cairo's communiqué that Israel had attacked Egypt. By 0900 the Egyptian General Abdul Mone'm Riad—who had arrived in Amman with a small group of staff officers to take command of the Jordanian front a few days before the war began—had received a coded message in Amman from UAR Field Marshal Amer. The UAR, the message said, had put out of action 75 percent of the Israeli planes that had attacked the Egyptian airports, and the UAR Army, having met the Israeli land attack in Sinai, was going over to a counteroffensive. "Therefore Marshal Amer orders the opening of a new front by the commander of the Jordanian forces and the launching of offensive operations according to the plans drawn up overnight." [1]

A little after 0900, on my way to the grocer for fuel, I found out from my neighbors that Egypt was under attack. A few storekeepers were already shuttering their shops, but Jerusalem was still quiet and relatively calm at 0930, when I reached the newspaper office outside the city walls.

Izhak Duzdar and Bahjet Abu Gharbiyeh were at the Governorate demanding arms in the name of the civilian resistance committee. The Governor, Anwar Bey, had already called the army and had been promised they would be delivered that day. The two men returned to the Old City to wait with the rest of their staff at resistance committee HQ.

And at 0910 hours, according to the Churchills' account (based on the Israeli war diaries), the Israeli commander of the Central front,

General Uzzi Narkiss, was on the telephone on the other side of the cease-fire line, talking with Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Israeli Jerusalem: "It's a war, but everything is under control. You may well be Mayor of a united Jerusalem."

"We have no aim of territorial conquest," said Israeli Defense Minister Dayan at 1040 in a public message to his army.

"Our only desire is to remove from our borders any threat of sabotage and every danger of aggression, to safeguard our security and the fullness of our rights," said Levi Eshkol in a radio broadcast.[2]

An early-morning Egyptian land and air offensive had started the war, Israeli spokesmen said, briefing the foreign press in Tel Aviv and New Jerusalem, and they described their own action as a "counterattack." *For the next fifteen hours Western public opinion understood the war within that context.*

President Johnson condemned the war as "needless and destructive," and State Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey said: "Our position is neutral in thought, word, and deed." Since the American public had not received the prewar analysis from the Pentagon that Abba Eban had, and since no one in America aside from the Pentagon, the CIA, the White House and, at most, the upper echelons of the State Department could have known for at least fifteen hours after the war began that Israel had destroyed the Egyptian air force between 0745 and 0900 local time, hepped-up American public opinion was outraged and the White House found it necessary to clarify McCloskey's statement to mean "nonbelligerency" rather than "indifference." "Indeed, indifference is not permitted to us," Secretary of State Dean Rusk said later in the day.

(The combination of the Israeli Information Department's cool silence and the most incredible Arab radio claims—Tel Aviv and Haifa were being bombed by Arab planes while the Israeli countryside was laid waste by Arab artillery fire; New Jerusalem was falling to the Jordanian Army; etc.—further intensified the effect. Most people throughout the world assumed that the Arabs were off and winning. Only some fourteen hours after the Israeli offensive had begun did BBC's Jerusalem correspondent Mike Elkins announce that the Israelis were on their way to a stunning victory.)

At 1020 firing broke out along the length of the Mandelbaum Gate-Nablus Road frontier positions in Jerusalem. Both sides were

using machine guns, and bullets whined through the air as Hazim Khalidi dashed over to the Governorate. Every shop was shuttered and dozens of businessmen were driving off from the commercial quarter to their homes in the surrounding suburbs.

The Governorate was almost deserted. A policeman remained on guard at Governor Khatib's door and security men were still in their first-floor offices, but everyone else had dashed off to get home.

The Governor's liaison officer from the Jordan Army had also disappeared. Anwar Bey rang up Brigadier Ata Ali and they agreed that he should join the forward command post staff at Kaem al-Alani, the police compound just north of the modern commercial quarter and overlooking Wadi al-Juz.

Khalidi asked the Governor how many soldiers were defending the district.

"We have five brigades . . . what does that mean in numbers of men?"

"Between 15,000 and 20,000 soldiers . . . are you sure?" Khalidi asked.

The Governor said he was certain. He had been told this two days ago by Sherif Nasser. But he looked disturbed. Khalidi told Khatib not to worry.

"If we have that many we can take the New City, and if we don't do that we could hold out here for a month." They set out for the police compound.

Rouhi al-Khatib's municipality within the Old City was in better shape. All personnel and department chiefs remained at work and many were to stay through the night. Outside the walls municipal employees remained at their posts—at fire brigade HQ just northeast of Herod's Gate, at the electric company, at the generator house, and at the three electric substations outside of the district.

By 1100 hours the first casualties were coming in at St. Joseph's Hospital in Sheikh Jarrah near the Ramallah Road. A few days earlier all the private hospitals had been contacted by the Ministry of Health and told that in case of war they would receive direct assistance from the central headquarters of the Red Crescent. An army officer had visited the hospital to evaluate its facilities, and at 0900 Musa Bitar detailed a five-man civil-defense volunteer squad to the hospital to help out. The volunteers were untrained but brave, and

during the fighting they were sent out under fire to bring in the wounded lying in nearby streets.

The chief surgeon at St. Joseph's was Dr. Loran Gaspar, Apollinaire Prize poet, sportsman, and contributor to *Démocratie Nouvelle.* He brooded with gallicized Hungarian concern over the quality of Arab socialism and was the most gracious foreigner in town. When Gaspar reported to the hospital that morning, he found Dr. D., secretary of the local medical council (who had been posted by the government as supervisor for the emergency), in an office glued to the radio. There Dr. D. was to stay for the next seventy-two hours, interrupting his radio vigil only for sleep while the hospital staff worked on through two nights and three days of war, operating at one point by flashlight when a nearby Israeli bombing run knocked out the hospital generator. Dr. D. was well known for his patriotic view that foreign doctors were not needed in Jerusalem.

At the forward command post Khatib and Khalidi found Brigadier Ata Ali, chief of police Colonel Muhammad Sarif, two Army sergeants from the Signal Corps manning three telephones, and an artillery sergeant and two policemen operating a wireless radio in contact with Amman headquarters. A jeep with wireless radio was parked outside the post for contact with field commanders.

The police station compound had not been fortified. There were no sandbags in sight, nor were there any soldiers dug in to provide security. The policemen had been issued helmets and rifles but they moved about without any apparent orders, and later in the morning a drove of foreign correspondents were allowed to pour into the cramped command post. At Anwar Bey's request, Khalidi was to usher the press outside, promise occasional briefings at the compound gate, and then order the police to bar journalists from entering the compound in the future.

The Brigadier was issuing orders by telephone and wireless for the disposition of troops, and Khalidi realized minutes after he had entered that Ata Ali did not have five brigades. There were no staff officers present as liaison for other brigades, and Ata Ali was directing the movement of platoons and companies, not battalions. Khalidi drew the Governor aside to explain the situation but Anwar Bey, though obviously disturbed, refused to believe him.

Khatib was called to the telephone. The King was on the line in

Amman; he wanted Shukeiry to come to the capital. The Governor told Hussein that Shukeiry and PLA chief General Madeni had left the Ambassador Hotel at 0930 and were on their way. Hussein also wanted to know about public morale; Khatib reported that it was high. The Governor was not exaggerating: hundreds of young men were flocking to police and civil-defense posts throughout the district and demanding arms, the Jordanian positions appeared to be dominating the small-arms fire fights, and the Radio Cairo communiqués were exhilarating.

But the King had sounded depressed over the phone, and Khalidi suggested to Anwar Bey that this might mean the spectacular radio claims were not true.

"You always look at things in a pessimistic manner and exaggerate dangers, like thinking we don't have five brigades," the Governor said.

They argued the point and the Governor pressed Khalidi to speak up; he was a military man and it was not the time for niceties.

As soon as Ata Ali was off the phone, Khalidi told the Brigadier that despite the Governor's assurances he could not believe there were five brigades defending the district. He gave his reasons.

Color drained from the face of Ata Ali.

"We will have five brigades here by this evening. This is part of the war plan for defending Jerusalem, but we have been caught unaware."

One brigade—three infantry battalions, one artillery regiment, and a field engineers company—was stretched about the district of Jerusalem like a wobbly amoeba attempting to contain the narrow Israeli territorial thrust into the West Bank known as the Corridor and crowned by Jewish Jerusalem.

The southern perimeter was broken in the middle by the demilitarized pocket on Jebel Muqaiba, where General Odd Bull and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) were headquartered at Government House; at the bottom half of this perimeter a battalion (500 men) was positioned at Sur Bahir—a high ground village that overlooked the main road linking the northern and southern parts of the West Bank. A company (120 men drawn from the battalion assigned to the Old City) held the upper half of the southern perimeter at the village of Abu Tur.

The central perimeter consisted of less than one battalion manning the walls of the Old City from Bab al-Amoud (Damascus Gate) to Bab al-Nebi Daoud (Sion Gate)—approximately 480 men. And out of this number a platoon (36 men) was drawn to hold the Augusta Victoria area lying between the Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus, overlooking the walled city to the northeast.

The soldiers in the Old City (and the company and platoon drawn from their battalion and positioned at Abu Tur and Augusta Victoria) were reservists who had received their three months of training in early spring and had been called up shortly before the war. The Reserve training program, which had been initiated as a concession to the popular West Bank demand for arms and military training of civilians following the November 1966 Israeli attack at Sammou', had barely begun to function by the time of the June War. These reservists in Jerusalem, fresh from the Hebron district, were unfamiliar with either the city or its suburbs.

The northern perimeter, held by one battalion, began at Bab al-Amoud and ran along the no-man's land stonework and trenching to Mandelbaum Gate and along Nablus Road to the UNRWA building (the former police training school compound) and Ammunition Hills —the only seriously fortified Jordanian position in the Jerusalem district. This was an elite unit—the Second King Hussein Battalion—recruited from the East Bank and Palestinian peasantry. Still further to the north a company of reservists (in all likelihood attached to the Battalion) covered the approach road to Jerusalem from Ramallah at Nebi Yacoub; less than a platoon of infantrymen were drawn from this company to defend the critical position of Nebi Samuel, which guarded the entire northern flank of the district.

Two 120-mm mortars drawn from the heavy mortar company attached to brigade HQ were also positioned within the walled city, one set up beside the Indian Hospice near Bab al-Zahera (Herod's Gate) and the other near the Armenian Quarter. Additional artillery consisted of eighteen 25-pound field guns concentrated in positions north of the city. There were no antiaircraft guns in or around the city, no tanks or heavy artillery, or any antitank weapons heavier than the 106-mm recoilless.

Although the brigade commander was at the forward command post in Jerusalem, his staff officers were at Azzerriya Junction several

miles to the southeast. The brigade itself was part of the West Bank command of Major General Muhammad Ahmed Salim, headquartered at Beit Ein near Ramallah and more than fifteen miles to the north of Jerusalem.

Also under his command was the Khalid ibn-Walid Infantry Brigade defending the northernmost West Bank district of Jenin; the Aliah Infantry Brigade defending the Nablus district and the Qalqilya-Tulkarm sector of the frontier; the Hashimiya Infantry Brigade headquartered at Ramallah and responsible for the vital Latrun sector, as well as for the defense of the critical northern flank approaches in any attempt by the Israelis to encircle Arab Jerusalem; the Hattim Infantry Brigade in the Hebron district; the Immam Ali Infantry Brigade at Khan al-Ahmar between Jericho and Jerusalem; and the 60th Armored Brigade between Jericho and Nebi Musa.

A tank battalion drawn from the 40th Armored Brigade had been positioned in the northern sector of the West Bank between Jenin and Nablus, and on the eve of the war the bulk of the 40th was still on the East Bank between Amman and the Jordan River.

The Kadisiah Infantry Brigade straddled the river between Jenin and Irbid. Also to be held in reserve on the East Bank for the duration of the war was the Royal Palace Guards Brigade that garrisoned the capital, as well as additional infantry and security forces in the Irbid district north of Amman and the Ma'an-Aqaba region to the south.

Less than 5,000 men defended Jerusalem out of an army of approximately 56,000. Against this one brigade three Israeli brigades were to be ranged: the local "Jerusalem" Infantry Brigade and a paratrooper brigade (both with tank support), plus an armored brigade, all under the central command of General Uzzi Narkiss.

The Jordanian soldier carried either the American M-1 Garand or M-1 carbine—semiautomatic, short-clip loading rifles that were considered obsolete at the time of the Korean War and replaced in the U.S. Army with automatic rifles by the late 1950's. These weapons were supplemented by the use of Bren automatic rifles.

Except for Jordanian Special Forces and some of the Amman garrison forces which have been equipped with automatic rifles supplied to Jordan by the United Sates in the spring of 1970 for obvious use in any confrontation with the Palestinian guerrillas, the Jordan Arab

Army still remains one of the few "combat-ready" armies in the world fighting with semiautomatic weapons.

The Israelis all carried automatic weapons: either the Israeli-manufactured Uzzi submachine gun or the standard NATO automatic rifle known in the U.S.A. as the M-16.

At 1130 hours, on orders from West Bank HQ, Ata Ali opened up artillery fire on the Israelis. In reply to his requests for air cover the Brigadier was told by Amman that all planes were engaged in a battle for air supremacy but would come in due course. A few hours later, after one cursory strafing and bomb run over Israel, the Jordanian air force was caught on the ground refueling and destroyed. A few U.S. Starfighters, reportedly unarmed and intended as training planes, had been flown out of Jordan to Turkey earlier in the morning.

General Odd Bull was working for a cease-fire in Jerusalem. Between 1130 and 1530 hours, when the telephone lines were finally cut, Colonel Murray Stanaway at the Mixed Armistice Commission HQ near Mandelbaum Gate attempted three times to arrange a cease-fire. Each time he called, the Jordanian MAC representative accepted the request but on condition that the Israelis cease-fire first because they had initiated the artillery duels earlier in the morning farther north and Jenin was under heavy Israeli fire. The Israelis also agreed to the cease-fire but the shelling continued.[3]

Shortly after noon, according to King Hussein, Abdul Nasser called Amman and urged the Jordanians to gain as much ground as possible since he expected a cease-fire within a short time. "I have learned that the Security Council will intervene this evening to end the conflict," the Egyptian President said.[4]

General Riad, still functioning on the assumption of inevitable Egyptian or Jordanian air cover, had ordered a shift of the two Jordanian armored brigades on the West Bank toward the south; the 40th Brigade—in the north-central region midway between Jerusalem and Nablus—was ordered to Jericho to relieve the 60th Brigade, which would then be freed to move down to Hebron from where, theoretically, it would spearhead the limited Arab counteroffensive into Israel toward Beersheba.

The choice of Beersheba is an indication of how inherently defensive even Arab "counteroffensive" planning was. Beersheba is the

gateway to the Negev, which, in turn, is the gateway to Sinai. A Jordanian thrust at Beersheba would have eased Israeli pressure on Egyptian forces in the Sinai and theoretically might have forced a rapid withdrawal by the Israelis (if the Egyptians were holding firm) to avoid entrapment. But prior to the June War Israel's strategic nightmare had always been the possibility of an Arab thrust across the narrow central plains from the Jordanian West Bank frontier cities of Qalqilya and Tulkarm, which are but 12 kilometers from the sea. In theory an Arab penetration of 12 kilometers at that point (not south toward Beersheba) would then cut Israel in half, cutting off Tel Aviv and New Jerusalem from Haifa, Tiberias, and Galilee.

A little after 1100 hours, word circulated in Jerusalem at the forward command post that arms were about to be distributed to the public. A frantic search was under way to locate the *Mukhtar* (leader) of Isawiya village, which is perched on the approach to the Israeli-held "demilitarized" zone of Mount Scopus. A plan had been prepared to arm the villagers and have them storm the Hadassah Hospital-Hebrew University enclave on top of the hill, which tactically commanded most of the Old City and the road to Ramallah. The villagers had no military training but they were to be given artillery support.

Mount Scopus was a legitimate and vital objective; if the attack, as planned, had ever occurred, it would have been a massacre. During the 1948 War, when the Jordanians decided to silence the energetic Israeli garrison cut-off on Mount Scopus with mortar and artillery fire prior to overrunning it, an outcry rose in the American press: Arabs were shelling a hospital and university financed by influential Americans. Rather than assault and risk further Western wrath, Jordan agreed to the demilitarization of the area under UN control; the agreement conceded the Israelis only the right to maintain civil police in the enclave to protect equipment and buildings, as well as the right to bring in weekly supplies and relief squads by convoy through Jordanian lines.

But the "policemen" were soldiers, the UN officials were barred from inspecting (much less administering) the zone, and heavy weapons and ammunition stocks were smuggled in over the years.

Later in that first day of fighting, when a wounded Jordanian soldier was brought to St. Joseph's Hospital from a position opposite the

enclave, he told the nurses: "When we fire one mortar shell at them, they send back four."

According to the original Jordanian defense plan, Mount Scopus was one of three limited-offensive objectives in the event of war with Israel. The other two objectives were to have been the capture of New Jerusalem "in order to shorten the defense line" and a hill on the Israeli side of the cease-fire line just opposite Jenin.

By noon Jordanian artillery in the district was scoring on the roof of the Dormition Church on Mount Sion, a heavily sandbagged Israeli Army observation and artillery post for the past nineteen years.

Governor Khatib telephoned Sheikh A., a leading businessman and chairman of the Popular Defense Supply Committee, who told the Governor that he couldn't get into town from his suburban house—could the Army fetch him? But there were no armored cars in the city, and Anwar Bey could only urge him to drive in with his own car despite the danger of small-arms fire. The Sheikh was not to be convinced. Aside from Musa Bitar of civil defense, who had organized his relief center and continued caring for casualties until after the end of the war, and the men waiting at resistance committee HQ within the walled city for arms, all the other Popular Defense committees had melted away.

The West Bank Command HQ ordered the immediate occupation of Government House shortly after noon. Ata Ali called his battalion commander at Sur Bahir village and told him to commit two of his three companies to the attack by 1300 hours, promising artillery cover in the event of an Israeli counterattack.

The Governor asked the police chief to check with Amman and find out whether the Prime Minister knew of this attack order; from a political point of view, both Khalidi and Governor Khatib feared that an assault on UNTSO headquarters would provide the Israelis with a strong propaganda point and have international repercussions. Fifteen minutes later Amman called back to report that Prime Minister Sa'ad Juma'a knew of the order. Khalidi cursed.

The attack was to be a haphazard affair. There had been no prior planning; there were no tanks or other armor in Arab Jerusalem, and the only antitank guns available in case of counterattack would be three short-range 106-mm recoilless rifles mounted on jeeps.

The Jordanians could expect to take Government House with min-

imal or no resistance from the UN Command and be in defensive position within half an hour. But within a short time after that the Israelis could be expected to mount a counterattack in strength, spearheaded by tanks. The recoilless rifles could at best take out two tanks each before being located and destroyed and the position overrun.

Khalidi suggested that the attack be delayed until 1700 hours and mines planted on the approaches in the meantime. The Israelis might then hesitate to launch a night attack, and this would leave time to reinforce the position with troops due to arrive in Jerusalem that night. Ata Ali rang up the company of engineers headquartered near the Haram and found that none of its officers could be located immediately and that there were no armored personnel carriers available to carry the mines. Khalidi suggested calling upon the civilian population to carry the mines—they could still be placed in time.

But Ata Ali needed quick results; he still intended to attack at 1300 hours. He could incorporate new ideas into his existing orders but was incapable of revising them.

By 1330 Government House was in Arab hands, and all posts in the district were reporting Jordanian domination of the artillery and small-arms fire fights. A low-flying Israeli reconnaissance plane was shot down by a machine-gun crew in the Augusta Victoria area and crashed near the Inn of the Good Samaritan. Communiqués from Amman police HQ were becoming increasingly meager, but Amman Radio was broadcasting that long-range guns at Tulkarm were shelling Tel Aviv and Lydda Airport, that 40 Israeli planes had been downed over Jordan and 189 (according to UAR reports) over Egypt. Jubilant was the atmosphere at the forward command post.

However, according to authoritative Israeli sources—who had every reason to exaggerate the extent of the Jordanian bombardment, since it was the supposed justification for the Israeli invasion of the West Bank—only one shell fell in the Tel Aviv area and that was not fired until 2100 hours on Monday. And more than a year after the war the London correspondent of the *Jerusalem Post* reported on a study (by Major D. D. Campbell for the official journal of the Royal Artillery) of the use of artillery in the June War:

> The British gunnery expert appears most surprised by the behavior of Jordanian artillery on the central front where "great opportunities were

missed. Once hostilities had started, all the main Israeli air bases . . . were within range of the Jordanian 155-mm guns. Had they taken on these vital targets, the Jordanians could have caused havoc amongst the Israeli aircraft refueling; they may well have missed a vital opportunity to change the course of the war."

Equally curious are reports of orders received on the first morning of the war by the artillery section attached to the Immam Ali Infantry Brigade at Khan al-Ahmar east of Jerusalem to abandon their prepared positions and move forward to new "superior firing positions." By early afternoon, when the Israeli-Jordanian artillery battle had begun in earnest, the guns of the Immam Ali Brigade were dispersed in unprepared, vulnerable sites.

None of the UN personnel had been injured when the Jordanians took Government House and, according to the battalion commander, all had been taken to the basement for shelter. A member of Odd Bull's staff was put on the phone to speak with the Governor, who assured the officer that UN personnel would be safe in Jordanian hands. Anwar Bey expressed his regret that he could not do anything else for them but suggest that the best channel for protest would be through the office of the Jordanian representative on the Mixed Armistice Commission.

At 1500 hours an Israeli tank battalion and infantry units from the local brigade began the counterattack. Twelve tanks led against the Sur Bahir position and twelve against Government House. The remaining Jordanian company at Sur Bahir, lacking antitank weapons, withdrew to the next hill. The Israelis had cut off the road to Bethlehem.

But the first Israeli assault against Government House failed. Two of the tanks were destroyed and six others hit. In exchange, the three Jordanian recoilless rifle jeeps had been wiped out. Within half an hour six of the tanks that had taken Sur Bahir moved up to renew the attack, and by 1545 they were pounding Government House unopposed.

The Jordanian commander was in a tight spot: his men, taking casualties, had fallen back into Government House. His wireless operator was dead and the position about to be encircled.

"Hold firm, hold firm!" Ata Ali kept telling him over the wireless.

"I'm not worried about dying for myself or my troops," the battalion commander said, "but what about those poor bastards from the UN? If I can get these UN people out of here, even by giving them to the Jews, I'll die here."

The battalion commander sent two men out of the building under a white flag to negotiate, but they were fired upon by the Israelis.

In the forward command post Ata Ali paced the floor. "What can I do? The man must hold."

"Tell him to use his common sense," Khalidi said.

"He'll withdraw!" the Brigadier replied.

So the commander withdrew. With the help of a Jordanian platoon to the east to cover his retreat, he and his men went out the back door of Government House. When his unit regrouped, he reported back 139 dead or missing out of 400; a number of his men had either lost their way or deserted when the position fell.

Earlier in the afternoon 260 Enfield rifles, 20 Sten (submachine) guns, 20 Bren guns, and ammunition were delivered to Bahjet Abu Gharbiyeh at a secret arms center maintained by the resistance committee. Some of these arms were distributed in the immediate suburban districts already in danger, and almost none within the walled city where thousands were waiting for weapons. Part of the consignment was set aside to be distributed later, under cover of darkness, to some of the more distant outlying villages of the district, already cut off from the city by small-arms and artillery fire. An additional 100 weapons were distributed directly by the Army in small consignments to a few selected civilian centers in Jerusalem and Abu Tur. The weapons came from the Army's Old City armory. One thousand additional small arms, to be brought in by convoy with the reinforcements expected by nightfall, were promised to the committee.

At approximately the same time that they were moving against Government House, the Israelis opened up on selective targets outside the walled city with their heavy mortars and artillery. Several shells landed close to the forward command post. Izzal-din Tal raced over from the radio station to report that the building had been hit and the station knocked off the air. He had reason to be disturbed: the Israelis had the position so well sighted-in that they had scored with their first shell. Tal went on to Ramallah to see what could be

done at the transmitter, while the staff in Jerusalem set up an emergency studio in the basement and in a short while resumed broadcasts.

A few hours after the fighting began I had run over to the station, arriving as the men were wiping the last bits of protective grease off the dozen Sten guns delivered by the Army. The girls on the staff were loading cartridges into the few dozen ammunition clips that had come with the weapons. An army machine-gun squad on the roof (to be pulled out later and thrown into the line) protected the building, and a few foxholes dug in the front garden were manned by armed civilians from the station.

Most of the men had never received military training. Neither directions nor authorized communiqués for English-language broadcast were being phoned in from the main station in Amman, and the staff could only improvise rhetorical "spots" to announce between selections of martial music and recorded bursts of machine-gun fire (which someone obviously considered just the thing to panic the Israelis).

There were no sandbags available to buttress the building and until Tal and I toured the station, men were taking up firing positions behind closed and untaped windows and metal grillwork.

I rang up the newspaper office to arrange for news agency copy from the teleprinter to be sent over to the station for use until communiqués came through from Amman, and discovered that someone had turned the machine off to economize on paper. Our editorial office was a hundred yards from the front, and wild machine-gun fire was whizzing and ricocheting overhead a half hour later when our circulation manager, Abdul Ghenni, dashed across the commercial quarter to the radio station with copy.

A little before sundown, firing suddenly died away. The publisher and most of our staff had remained at the office all day waiting for arms; now, despite the lull in town, the road to the suburbs north of the city where most of them lived was still under fire. I walked with them over to the National Hotel (not far from the command post), where they would stay, before making my own way into the Old City.

At least half a dozen foreign correspondents and a number of local journalists were already at the hotel; and on the basis of radio broad-

casts and the tone of the battle so far in Jerusalem, everyone still assumed that the Arabs were winning.

At the nearby forward command post an elderly local notable suffering from gout was carried in dressed in breeches and armed with pistols, dagger, and rifle.

"We will dine in Tel Aviv," he said.

But at 1700 hours the Israeli armored brigade commanded by Colonel Uri Ben-Ari had already begun to assault the barely defended mountain ridges north of Jerusalem between the city and Ramallah, key to control of the entire Judean Hills area. During World War I thousands of Turkish and British troops had died in bitter prolonged fighting for possession of Nebi Samuel, the uppermost position along these ridges, which also protected the rear of the Jordanian positions at Latrun, where the Arab line bulged toward the Israeli corridor to New Jerusalem.

The Jordanians had mined the approaches, but the positions at Sheikh Abdul-Aziz, Radar, Beit Iksa, and Nebi Samuel were either abandoned or barely manned. The Israelis had begun mine-clearing in the afternoon, and by midnight their tanks were to be well within Jordanian territory.

None of this was known at the forward command post in Jerusalem, and one of the great mysteries of the war on the West Bank was this sort of breakdown in accurate communications—also reflected throughout the brief campaign by grossly exaggerated casualty figures fed to the Egyptian commanding officer, General Riad, at his Amman HQ by top Jordanian commanders.

But Khalidi was disturbed by the heavy rate of Jordanian artillery fire in the city; he worried about supplies of ammunition and the ease with which the Israelis had by now pinpointed the few Jordanian artillery pieces in the district.

Ata Ali reassured him. There was plenty of ammunition, more was coming that evening, and the gun positions were well fortified. The Brigadier had no fear that the Israelis would knock his artillery out.

"It isn't enough to fortify gun positions. Approaches to the guns for ammunition and personnel can be harassed as well, so you must have alternative positions," Khalidi argued, but the Brigadier, a very stout, very solid, intelligent, but barely literate Syrian bedouin, who

had risen from the ranks to command over a number of years of faithful service, considered this Palestinian World War II staff officer pedantic. By dawn, Tuesday morning (June 6), there was not to be a single Jordanian gun position left in the district.

The *Mukhtar* of Isawiya village turned up at the command post after sundown. Heavy fire, he said, had forced him to detour around the city and it had taken him all day to reach the post. Ata Ali decided to postpone arming the village and assaulting Mount Scopus until the following day.

By 1800 hours all telephone lines outside of Jerusalem were cut; by 1930 the Ramallah radio transmitter was knocked out and the Jerusalem station forced off the air. Electric lines were also down, but the local electric company crews managed to get out of the city under fire and make repairs that were impossible for the Communications Ministry employees. Once again it was the local or indigenous Palestinian institutions which held up under the strain of war while the more flashy bureaucracies and infrastructure of the central government collapsed or failed to perform.

By nightfall all hope in the forward command post centered around the idea of four relief brigades. Public morale remained high, and volunteers seeking arms continued coming to the police compound as well as to police and civil-defense posts in and around Jerusalem only to be told there were still no weapons available.

Ata Ali and Khalidi discussed the situation and assumed that if reinforcements were assembling in Jericho after sundown and were given an hour for organization, two hours en route, and an additional two-hour margin of error, they would enter the city between 2200 hours and 0100 Tuesday morning, leaving a minimum of three hours for dispersal before dawn.

The police compound and the forward command post (the only fortified structure in the compound) were now under heavy artillery fire, and the thirty-odd policemen around headquarters sought shelter in the small underground post. No one had instructed the police in digging foxholes and trenches. Khalidi and a few of the army men in the post pushed them out of the impossibly overcrowded shelter, and for the next five hours, like some grimly pathetic form of hide-and-seek, the policemen would keep trying to slip back in despite the orders—finally—for them to dig holes.

Depression was mounting in the forward command post, but the real battle had not yet begun. Communication outside of the city was now possible only by wireless. "Reinforcements are coming," Amman kept repeating; but the forward command post was unable to make contact with the West Bank HQ of Major General Salim. Only later were they to discover that the headquarters staff, responsible for the command of all Jordanian forces committed to the West Bank, had withdrawn after sunset that first evening.

About 2100 hours, flares could be seen falling in the distance, followed by the sound of bombs bursting in back of and beyond the Mount of Olives. It was the Israeli air force smashing the relief column—a tank regiment drawn from the 60th Armored Brigade and one infantry battalion (all that remained at Khan al-Ahmar of the Immam Ali Infantry Brigade).

Much of the Immam Ali Brigade had already dissolved in the chaos of the first day's fighting. Around noon the Usama Battalion had been ordered to move up to Jerusalem and reinforce the Jordanian units at Sur Bahir preparing to assault Government House. But Radio Amman announced that Government House had been taken shortly after the battalion moved out from Khan al-Ahmar and was broken up on the road by Israeli air strikes. Scattered elements from the battalion reached Sur Bahir by late afternoon.

Not long after the Usama Battalion had moved out, the Immam Ali Brigade commander was ordered to send a second battalion toward Jerusalem to participate in the projected attack against the Mount Scopus enclave. Then orders were changed and the battalion was halted, near Azzerriya. There the battalion waited, without cover, and was easily broken up and dispersed by Israeli air strikes.

As for the rest of the 60th Armored Brigade, it had been ordered to remain in the Jericho region (even though initially relieved by the 40th early in the day) when General Riad sensed the pressure mounting on the Jerusalem-Jericho axis as well as Israeli armored pressure far to the north. The 40th Armored Brigade was ordered back to the north to reinforce the Jenin district, there to be broken up by Israeli air strikes on the following day.

By 2300 hours all was quiet to the east; there were no longer flashes across the skyline. Brigade HQ at Azzerriya informed Ata Ali that the relief column had been wiped out. The Brigadier was shaken

to the bone. Khalidi advised Ata Ali to request support from the Hitteen Infantry Brigade to the south in the Bethlehem-Hebron region, and that an additional infantry brigade be moved down from the north. Azzerriya HQ replied that the brigade in Hebron was braced for an attack and could not move. The same was true for units being held in reserve in the Ramallah area.

At this point the Brigadier was so confused that Khalidi, informally and temporarily, took over. The command post wireless, which worked only on the police frequencies, was unable to broadcast on the Amman Army HQ band, so Khalidi told Ata Ali to have the Azzerriya Brigade HQ inform Amman Army HQ that every soldier in Jerusalem was committed and would not be able to stand for more than 48 hours.

An infantry brigade drawn from reserves concentrating around Jericho and driven as far and as fast as possible by truck, and then forced-marched to evade Israeli interception, could still reach the city by morning. The response from Amman HQ was favorable and the forward command post began to live again on hope.

Inside the Old City no one knew how desperate the situation had become, and the lulls in firing in the early evening were disarming. The resistance committee staff had decided to leave their HQ for their homes and return early in the morning in the hope of an arms delivery. Both Duzdar and Abu Gharbiyeh, who slept outside the walls of the city, were cut off before dawn. From early Tuesday morning civilian resistance was to become a purely personal, unorganized affair and at least a hundred armed civilians were to die fighting in Wadi al-Juz, on the city walls, or as isolated snipers in the final minutes of battle.

Ahmed, a handyman who worked at the Islamic Society next door to my apartment, had waited with my family until I returned in the evening. He had moved a few mattresses and supplies to a well-buttressed empty chamber of three small rooms (once servant quarters for the Grand Mufti) just off the stairwell between the two floors of our building; we used it as a shelter for that night and the next, returning to the apartment during lulls in the fighting outside the walls.

In a modern open-end city under attack, the sound of battle advances or recedes like the motions of a fluid front in the countryside. But within the Old City, for the next thirty-six hours—dividing my

time between the shelter and visits to civil-defense and command centers, walking through almost empty streets with only occasional patrols in sight or CD teams racing with boxes of ammunition to a threatened portion of the wall—the feeling was distortedly medieval, the ludicrous sense of an old-fashioned garrison under siege in a war fought with supersonic jets, napalm, and tanks.

A little after 2300 hours the Israelis opened up with all their mortars and heavy artillery, and searchlights from the New City and the Mount Scopus enclave sought out targets for incoming fire. It was well past midnight when an observer on the roof of police headquarters next to the command post noticed that the searchlight beams were now meeting on empty spots of terrain and fixing there for minutes at a time without any incoming fire following up the exercise.

The Israelis were fixing hovering points for helicopters to discharge troops; and within fifteen minutes of the sighting, people from Wadi al-Juz were reporting to the forward command post that a small force of copter-borne paratroopers was landing on the slope above Wadi al-Juz in an attempt to outflank the frontier positions along Nablus Road, the UNRWA building, and Ammunition Hill. At least forty paratroopers were brought in behind Jordanian lines in four separate drops, and the sound of hovering helicopters could be heard even in the forward command post.[5]

Ata Ali ordered a platoon off Ammunition Hill and into the wooded area northwest of the British Military Cemetery on Mount Scopus to cut off the advancing paratroopers. A band of armed civilians operating in loose coordination with the Second Battalion, which was holding the now threatened northern perimeter, was sent into Wadi al-Juz to open fire on the paras' flank. The paratroopers were soon pinned down not far from St. Joseph's Hospital by intense fire from the Jordanian interceptor platoon.

Tuesday morning, 0100 hours. . . . Conditions had become unbearable at the forward command post. The compound was still being shelled and it was necessary to use physical force to keep the policemen out. The Governor was so infuriated by the scene that he stormed out of the post and went into the abandoned police station. Khalidi followed after him and escorted Anwar Bey to the Ritz Hotel, 100 yards away, where they tried to sleep for a few hours.

At 0200 hours the Israeli paratrooper brigade began its push against the northern perimeter. Artillery fire concentrated on the Jordanian emplacements, and two Israeli battalions, one operating in the UNRWA building area and the other against the Nablus Road defenses, moved across no-man's-land behind tanks. Searchlights enabled the Israeli aircraft to fly support missions against the UNRWA building compound and Ammunition Hill, bombing and strafing the Jordanian lines.

Whenever the Israeli planes appeared—to strafe infantry fortifications or to rocket and bomb out artillery positions—the Jordanians opened up with what automatic rifles they had and the bullets from their Bren guns arched over the Old City and Augusta Victoria like a playful fireworks display . . . not the angry, hopeless gesture that it was, of an army deprived of antiaircraft weapons.

The sound was deafening. A mile away in the heart of the Old City, I thought the walls were being assaulted.

Khalidi woke up when the barrage began and called the command post. The situation was desperate, Ata Ali said. The paratrooper platoon brought in by helicopters had broken out of ambush and was moving up against the UNWRA compound at the very moment the Nablus Road defense line was about to be overrun.

Ata Ali was wrong. Somehow this one Jordanian battalion (joined by a handful of armed civilians after many officers fled the scene) fought on for five hours despite intense artillery and tank fire, air strikes, and the advance—at two concentration points—of two, and then three, Israeli paratrooper battalions. Outgunned by superior Israeli small-arms fire, the Jordanians held in their trenches and bunkers, meeting the Israeli rushes with fixed bayonet, forcing the paratroopers back until rushed again—their bunkers blasted by dynamite charge or artillery and tank fire, their trenches overwhelmed.

From Mandelbaum Gate, along Nablus Road to the UNRWA compound and Ammunition Hill, the front became fluid. Israelis would pour through the Jordanian line only to be cut down in the streets by Arab soldiers and armed civilians who had fallen back to take up new positions at windows and on roofs of neighboring houses.

Everywhere else—on the West Bank, in Sinai, and on the Golan Heights—the "mailed fist" tactic of fast-moving armor and infantry breakthroughs, following in the wake of air strikes, effectively demor-

alized both Arab regulars and any potential, albeit unorganized, civilian resistance once the initial assault had punched its way through static Arab frontlines placed well outside the cities.

But in Jerusalem the tight geography of the 1949 armistice line meant that along the northern perimeter the Israelis were up against committed soldiers and individual armed civilians able to fall back from their punctured line to fight in a nearby built-up area. Here, according to the Israeli Defense Ministry account, was the scene of "the toughest fighting of the war"; here, in proportion to the number of troops committed, the Israelis took their most severe casualties, during this sole instance of serious house-to-house combat during the June War.

The Israelis were to nickname Nablus Road "Death Alley." Tank fire was directed against Jordanian snipers whenever possible, and in the confusion of battle Israeli tanks opened fire against the American Consulate at the intersection of Mandelbaum Gate and Nablus Road, scoring seven direct hits.

The U.S. Information Officer and the Deputy Consul were stretched out on the first floor of the building, with kitchen pots covering their heads, and as soon as the bombardment ended they ran to the window in time to see paratroopers fixing a dynamite charge to the iron front gate. Draping themselves in a giant American flag, the two diplomats staggered out into the garden to meet the Israelis spilling onto the consulate grounds. The paras demanded and received permission to search the building for Jordanian snipers. To my knowledge no outraged Congressional soul in Washington demanded intervention in defense of American installations and nationals that day.[6]

Israeli planes finished off the few remaining Jordanian artillery positions that had slowed down the assault shortly after dawn. A three-man Jordanian mortar squad set up in an open lot behind the Jerusalem Cinema in the Zahera commercial quarter was knocked out with two rockets. The position had been firing continuously since late Monday morning; there had been plenty of ammunition, but the soldiers had been sent into battle without food rations or water (this seemed to have been the rule for the entire brigade defending Jerusalem) and the men had been fed by people in the neighborhood.

The last center of Jordanian resistance on Nablus Road—Ghazak's

gas station opposite the consulate—was wiped out by a column of seven Israeli tanks; they then pushed down the road to Bab al-Amoud (Damascus Gate) and opened close-range fire against Jordanian positions on the wall. The return fire from the Arab soldiers and civilians manning the wall was intense and the tanks withdrew to rejoin the main paratrooper thrust past the Palestine Museum.

The Ambassador Hotel at the top of Sheikh Jarrah was turned into Israeli Army HQ. Months later the first Israeli military governor was to describe in a *Jerusalem Post* article how the Army had been planning to occupy and utilize this hotel as HQ since 1956, when preparations were made to seize the Old City in the event Jordan entered the Suez War on the side of Egypt.[7]

The Jordanian field pieces and mortars positioned in the Beit Hanina-Shufat area—the most distant and northern suburbs of the city—had maintained heavy fire all through the night until, after several hours of napalming by Israeli planes, they were silenced. Before the battle for Jerusalem was to end, the Israelis were to use napalm in Sheikh Jarrah, Mukaiyber, Sur Bahir, Augusta Victoria, Mount of Olives, the Ras al-Amoud area, and Bethlehem, as well as against a number of convoys caught on West Bank roads.

At 0500 hours Tuesday an Arab woman out on the road near Beit Hanina noticed tanks moving down to the Ramallah Road from Beit Iksa. She thought they were Iraqis and cheered them.

"*Allah yunsurk'um!* God give you victory!" she cried. The soldiers hanging on to the sides of the tank shouted back in Arabic: "*Ruch min hon!* Get out of here!" The correct and nonguttural feminine case is *ruhhi,* and the old lady knew they were Jews.

By morning the entire Israeli armored brigade that had cut through the Beit Iksa-Nebi Samuel ridge line to the north had taken Beit Hanina without resistance and was sitting astride the main north-south road, in command of almost all routes leading north to Ramallah, south to Arab Jerusalem, and east to Jericho.

At the same time a separate column of tanks and mechanized paratroopers, originally attached to the armored brigade, had split off and taken the Latrun salient, slightly north and far to the west of Jerusalem. Latrun had been the scene of the most critical and impressive defensive fighting by the Arab Legion nineteen years earlier,

when two Arab battalions holding entrenched positions overlooking the plains had repelled several Israeli attacks—launched in brigade strength—and inflicted high casualties in a series of battles from late May until mid-June 1948. In the years that followed, the Jordanians had heavily fortified these defensive positions.

But this time, according to the Trappist monks whose monastery overlooked the Jordanian position, the Jordanian Army had withdrawn by sunset Monday, without firing a shot; and when the Israeli column rolled into Latrun in the morning, the positions were sparsely manned by an improvised militia drawn from neighboring villages and stiffened by some of the Egyptian commandos who had arrived in Jordan on the eve of the war. Resistance was overcome with relative ease by the Israelis.

The commander of the Hashimiya Infantry Brigade responsible for the defense of the ridge line beginning at Abdul-Aziz and for the Latrun bulge was Colonel Kamal al-Tahir. As one of the Jordanian officers considered particularly close to Sherif Nasser, Kamal had suppressed West Bank civilian unrest at the time of Sammou' with the ferocity of a tiger, cutting off electricity and water supplies and imposing shoot-on-sight curfews when the West Bankers had rioted in the winter of 1966 to demand arms to fight Israel.

In a postwar analysis the Egyptian commander of the Eastern front, Abdul Mune'm Riad, was to raise the basic question of how it was possible for this brigade, officially committed to fighting the Israelis in the Abdul-Aziz sector, to have withdrawn intact so rapidly to Jericho more than 40 kilometers away. "This must have been the fastest movement in military history," Riad said.

In Jerusalem, just after dawn on Tuesday, Ata Ali called the Governor at the Ritz Hotel and reported the breakthrough on the city's northern perimeter. The Israelis were already at Schmidt's Girls' College opposite Bab al-Amoud, had pushed through the center of the Zahera commercial district to seize the Palestine Museum, and were threatening Salah-al-Din Street, the last main street in Jordanian hands leading back to the Old City. The Brigadier was going to withdraw into the Old City before being cut off, and he advised the Governor to stay where he was since he doubted that Anwar Bey could make it.

By now an Israeli flag was flying from St. John's Hospital in Sheikh

Jarrah. The suburbs were lost. The Governor was prepared to stay behind, but Khalidi persuaded Khatib that he could get him to the Old City. With two other friends they moved out, running from doorway to doorway to the National Hotel, which had been overrun and passed by the paratroopers moving on to the Museum an hour earlier. Israeli soldiers were already moving cautiously down Salah-al-Din Street, so the four men made their way down a parallel side street, through the partially constructed shell of a new tourist hotel into the lower rear entrance of the post office building opposite Bab al-Zahera (Herod's Gate).

The Israelis occupying Schmidt's Girls' College at one end of the broad avenue known as Suleiman Street, which ran the length of the wall from Bab al-Amoud past Bab al-Zahera to the northeast corner of the walled city, and those occupying the Palestine Museum at the other end could cover Bab al-Zahera with heavy fire. But the angle was such that only the last 25 yards of any dash from the post office to the gate would be exposed to clear fire.

Khalidi called out across to the defenders on the wall to open the gate and provide covering fire. They would cross one at a time. Khalidi was the first to go and he made it through the gate before the Israelis could open fire. The two men who had accompanied them from the Ritz Hotel went next. Then came Anwar Bey. He ran—but in that processional way one might expect the Governor of Jerusalem to run. And somehow he was saved despite the hundred or so rounds of automatic fire directed at him. A tracer had passed an inch from Khatib's neck, and his dark suit was white with powder showered off by the round. The next man across, who had joined up with Khatib's party at the post office, was shot down and killed ten yards from the gate.

Major Mansour Kraishan, commander of the elite Second Battalion, was at the gate and told Khatib and Khalidi that aside from a company drawn from his unit and now dug in on Shufat Hill (known to the Israelis as "Hamivtar"), there were only 69 men left under his command. He had been bombed out of his own HQ next to Rashidiya College opposite Bab al-Zahera and had moved with the remnants of his magnificent battalion into the walled city. Kraishan, a tall, handsome man in his early forties, was a brave officer; he survived the war with rare honor, but died along the Jordan on Febru-

ary 14, 1968, during an all-day Israeli artillery attack against the eastern valley refugee camps and villages.

Ata Ali had established his headquarters in the basement of the Armenian Convent on the Via Dolorosa, next to the Red Crescent Society and Buchariya Hospice, but the Governor, in great emotional distress, refused to go there. If Jerusalem was to fall he would wait in Beit al-Majlis, a building near the Haram. So Khatib, Khalidi, and an escort of policemen made their way to the Haram al-Sharif and into the almost deserted Awqaf building a few hundred yards from my house and turned it into the last civilian command post.

Outside the city walls the Israelis pressed on with their mopping-up operations against isolated Arab snipers who continued to harass them throughout the day. At 0700 Khalidi left the Awqaf building to join Ata Ali at Army HQ. Brigade HQ at Azzerriya had reported no sign of the forced-march relief column.

Ata Ali reviewed the situation. All his gun emplacements had been napalmed out except for two within the Old City, which were still firing. He had 500 soldiers left from the brigade within the walled city (many of whom were reservist trainees) and plenty of ammunition. The only positions outside the walls still in Jordanian hands were Shufat Hill, cut off from Jerusalem by the Israeli paratroopers north of the wall and in Sheikh Jarrah and on Ammunition Hill; the Augusta Victoria position between the Mount of Olives and Mount Scopus; and the upper-southern perimeter—Abu Tur, al-Tur, and Ras al-Amoud (a reinforced police post on the southernmost slope of the Mount of Olives).

The Brigadier believed that the Old City could still hold out. Khalidi agreed and returned to the Awqaf civilian command post to brief the Governor.

During this second morning of the war the Israeli armored brigade sitting in Beit Hanina and commanding the approach to the city from the north began to move against remaining elements of the Jordanian army cut off between Jerusalem and Ramallah.

A battalion of Jordanian tanks, held in reserve in the Jericho area at the outbreak of the fighting, had managed somehow to evade earlier Israeli air strikes and had taken up positions in the Shufat area. Most likely they were the remnant of the relief column broken up by air attack on the way to Jerusalem.

The Israeli air force and armored brigade now destroyed or scattered most of these tanks to the east, but at least three Jordanian tank commanders broke through to the south in a desperate attempt to fight their way to Jerusalem. At 1000 hours they could be seen from St. Joseph's Hospital at the top of Sheikh Jarrah, moving up the Ramallah Road to the city.

Israeli tanks occupying the immediate area maneuvered out of their open positions and behind the hospital into the narrow street between St. Joseph's and St. John's Ophthalmic hospitals. Then from either end of this shielded corridor the Israeli tanks would rumble out into a barely exposed firing position, open up on the advancing Jordanian tanks, and then quickly reverse-drive back into the corridor to evade Arab fire.

From the roof and windows of the forward hospital, Israeli paratroopers directed automatic fire and antitank rockets at the Jordanians, and the advancing tanks were forced to open fire on the hospitals. Within minutes the battle ended, the lead Jordanian tank in flames and blocking the road, knocked out by an antitank recoilless rifle. The two other tanks withdrew under heavy fire, to be wiped out in all probability within a short time by Israeli planes.

When the Governor arrived at Ata Ali's command post late in the morning with Khalidi, the brigade staff at Azzerriya HQ had finally discovered the extent of the rout and retreat and were radioing back their panic to the Brigadier. The Hitteen Brigade in Hebron—which never entered combat—had withdrawn, as had the Ramallah Brigade. An Israeli armored column was moving on the Mars Elias monastery west of the Jerusalem southern perimeter and gateway to Bethlehem, and elements of the Israeli armored brigade from the north had moved against Tel al-Ful and would soon be in a position to cut off the Jerusalem-Jericho Road, encircling the brigade HQ.

Ata Ali told Azzerriya to contact the remains of the battalion that had fought in the Government House-Sur Bahir southern sector and had fallen back to the east from the stormed village Monday evening to an adjacent position, and order them to join up with the company defending Abu Tur just south of the walled city.

The plan worked out by Ata Ali and Khalidi sought to maintain diversionary strong points at Abu Tur, Ras al-Amoud, Augusta Victo-

ria, and Shufat Hill and keep the Israelis busy all through Tuesday and thus delay any concentration against the Old City, whose defenses were reeling. The plan worked.

At 1200 hours, after unopposed air attacks to soften up the exposed position, elements of the Israeli armored column moved against the Jordanian company on Shufat Hill (which had been reinforced in the early hours by survivors from the Wadi al-Juz and UNRWA compound-Ammunition Hill battles of the night before). The first Israeli assault wave swept into the lower trenchwork only to be hurled back by the Jordanians, who had held their ground despite the preparatory pounding and had then fallen upon the Israeli infantrymen as they entered the trenches. At the sight of serious resistance the Israelis withdrew; but shortly after noon their second assault carried the hill and the position fell.

Abu Tur, defended by combined Arab elements not quite equivalent to a battalion, fell to the Israeli local infantry brigade, but not before three Jordanian strong points in this southern suburb had held up the Israeli advance for several hours. And throughout the day the Jordanians on the wall kept up intense small-arms fire directed at the Palestine Museum (turned into a strong point and brigade HQ by the paratroopers) and at any other visible Israeli concentrations.

During lunch at Ata Ali's command post, the Brigadier asked Khalidi to quote to him "what the book says" about surrender. Hazim Bey was alarmed by the question, but he reviewed all contingencies for Ata Ali. The Governor, also deeply disturbed by the Brigadier's attitude, said nothing until after lunch, when he was alone with Khalidi.

Only 23 officers remained with the army within the walled city, and the Brigadier had called them all in from their posts for consultation during lunch. They were tense and irritable at the table.

There was still a considerable stock of ammunition on hand, but medical supplies were exhausted and the situation at the hospitals was desperate. St. Joseph's, Augusta Victoria, and the Government Hospital at the old Austrian Hospice within the walls had run out of blood by Monday afternoon, and when they called the Blood Bank they were told there was nothing. Calls to the Ministry of Health for bandages and antibiotics on the same day brought promises, but again nothing was to come.

Everywhere staff members took turns giving transfusions, yet three patients died at St. Joseph's (which handled the burden of casualties from the Nablus Road-UNRWA compound battles) due to loss of blood. According to the St. Joseph's staff, there were no officers there among the army wounded.

On the Via Dolorosa, Musa Bitar's C.D. unit and the nuns of the Sisters of Sion and the Companions of Jesus holy orders cared for the wounded; here, too, shortages made conditions unbearable. But at the Government Hospital it was impossible even to estimate the number of soldiers and civilians who died for lack of blood and other supplies. There was nothing here but a charnel house: no bandages, medicine, food, or even bread . . . only a desperately harried staff and rooms of wounded and dying men cursing their officers for deserting under fire, cursing the King and his uncle Sherif Nasser for their lack of rations, for defective ammunition, for the absence of reinforcements.

When Governor Khatib and Khalidi visited the hospital as part of a tour of the city later in the day, they fled—not from the horror of dead and wounded crowded together on the slippery floors of hospice rooms and corridors, but from the bitter political talk.

In the afternoon the Auxiliary Latin Bishop (assistant to the Patriarch) arrived at the Awqaf; in graceful diplomatic fashion he suggested to the Governor that he surrender the Old City rather than see it destroyed. On the previous morning, when war had broken out, the Pope had appealed in an official statement that Jerusalem be regarded as an open city; I do not know whether any Roman Catholic prelates also approached the Israelis and asked them not to storm the Old City. Khatib and Khalidi ushered the Bishop out with equal politeness and grace.

At the command post Ata Ali had just received a message from King Hussein by wireless relay: a counterattack to relieve Jerusalem would be launched that night. The Governor decided to call a meeting of municipal council members within the walls and senior army and police officials to discuss the situation. But by 1600 hours only the Mayor, Rouhi al-Khatib, Musa Bitar, and Abu Ali an-Natchi (a popular city council member and glass merchant originally from Hebron) were to be located and brought to the Awqaf. Since there was no quorum it was decided to postpone the meeting until 0800 the fol-

lowing day. Anwar Bey invited the Mayor to stay at the Awqaf but Rouhi decided to return to the municipality where a number of his staff remained.

Far to the north that day the only other battles of the war had begun early in the morning when the three brigades of the Israeli Northern Command Division (two armored and one infantry) reached Jenin; they occurred after a diversionary feint to the east from Beit Sha'an by smaller elements the previous day to draw the Jordanian armor back toward the river. At the same time, infantry drawn from the Israeli Central Command had pushed with ease across the northern frontier at the Qalqilya-Tulkarm sector.

The Aliah Infantry Brigade defending this sector had already fallen back to Nablus and had then been ordered on Tuesday morning to retreat to the East Bank. Halfway between Nablus and the Jordan River, the brigade was ordered to halt and return to Nablus. The commander was informed by Amman that a cease-fire was coming and they were to return to their positions. But when the brigade reached Nablus in the afternoon, it was again ordered to fall back to the East Bank.

With still an additional armored brigade committed on Tuesday morning to the relatively unopposed northern offensive, the Israelis now began to close in on Jenin, Tubas, and Nablus.

Sunset, Tuesday—June 6. . . . The Israeli paras moved out from their concentration point near the Palestine Museum in an assault on the Augusta Victoria position. While Israeli tanks stationed near the Museum shelled the hillside, another (and reduced) tank battalion spearheaded the advance of two paratroop battalions and a reconnaissance scout unit moving against the reinforced platoon of Jordanian reservist trainees holding the heights.

The Wadi al-Juz road in back of the Museum drops down to the eastern Valley of Kidron separating the Old City from Mount Scopus and the Mount of Olives. Here it intersects with Suleiman Street, which also runs down from the city to feed a number of roads, including the Jericho Road—a highway running past the eastern stretch of city wall, with its own approach road climbing back up from the highway to Bab al-Asbat (St. Stephen's Gate) directly opposite the Augusta Victoria ridge on the other side of the valley. An-

other road leads away from the city and up to Augusta Victoria by the northern slope. The Israeli main force took the latter route, but a lead reconnaissance unit made the wrong turn and came under blistering fire from Jordanians manning the northeast and eastern city walls.

At the same time the men dispersed over the Augusta Victoria area opened fire on both the main Israeli column and the recon unit, now trapped in a Jordanian cross fire. Two tanks and a number of reconnaissance jeeps were destroyed. After two hours of fighting and mounting casualties, the Israelis fell back.

At 2200 hours the Jordanian counterattack from the east began, a desperate but hopelessly delayed and doomed attempt by the Arab Army to save Jerusalem. This time, when the Israelis opened up on the relief column moving up from Jericho, it was not only possible to see flashes of fire and flares as on the previous night but to hear the sound of battle, for now the Israelis were in the Beit Hanina area and were able to direct artillery fire against the column from the north as well as to call in air strikes.

As the sound of the battle drifted back to the Old City, religious fervor seized the enlisted men and civilians manning the wall. "*Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar* . . . God alone is Great," they chanted for two hours until the fire died down after midnight and the city understood that the counterattack had failed.

The relief column, its advance section shattered by air strikes and artillery fire, had consisted of a Jordanian brigade. They had not heeded the original proposal for a night's forced march, taking evasive measures, but had come straight up the road with tanks and trucks, and the napalm-blackened wreckage of their own armor had blocked the road and barred any further advance.

At 0030 hours Wednesday morning, shortly after the sound of battle had died down to the east—to be replaced by intensified Israeli machine-gun and mortar fire aimed at and over the walls—Ata Ali went to the Awqaf building and told Governor Khatib that all but two of his officers had deserted earlier in the night. Major Kraishan and Lieutenant Majali, son of the Mayor of Kerak, had remained with the troops. The Brigadier went on to say that under such circumstances and with the troops on the walls profoundly demoralized by the desertions, by fatigue, and by hunger, he could not continue

fighting. Since the rest of the army in most of the West Bank seemed to have withdrawn, he felt that he, too, had to withdraw. Khatib asked the Brigadier to try and hold on, but Ata Ali described what he considered to be the difficulties involved in controlling troops without officers.

The Governor then suggested mobilizing popular resistance and using notables in the city as officers.

"All you'll be doing is destroying Jerusalem. Jerusalem will definitely be assaulted by dawn, and my troops are in no condition to resist," the Brigadier declared.

Ata Ali invited Khatib to withdraw with him. The Governor refused.

"You are the military commander and you decide military behavior, but Jerusalem is my adopted city and I'm not ready to leave it that way. If it is the Will of Allah that I should die, I would not want to die anywhere else," Khatib declared.

A group of NCO's arrived at the Awqaf at 0100 and reported to Ata Ali that some of the men were beginning to abandon their posts. A group of about thirty civilians was standing around in the Awqaf, and in order not to disturb them Ata Ali told the NCO's to follow him back to their posts. Instead, he went to the walls and passed word for the soldiers to abandon their posts and quietly assemble at Dung Gate. From there they slipped away.

Shortly afterward the firing died down and the Israelis broadcast a loudspeaker appeal in Arabic for the defenders to throw away their weapons and for civilians to place strips of white cloth by their doors.

Ata Ali's departure had left the Governor speechless, and after five minutes of silence, Khalidi—fearing Anwar Bey would have a heart attack—gave him sedatives. Khatib asked to be alone for fifteen minutes and told Khalidi to act on his behalf until then.

A tremendous furor broke out at the door to the Awqaf as the civilian volunteers poured into the building to report that the troops were pulling out. There were about a hundred men in the crowd but not all of them were armed. Khalidi restored order and told the volunteers that while the Governor knew nothing about this, he could do nothing—you cannot force people to fight, and instead of shouting they had better man the walls.

The volunteers calmed down and moved off to take up the aban-

doned positions. When the Governor rejoined Khalidi and the policemen standing by, he asked Hazim Bey to take over military affairs and consider the remaining possibilities of defense. Then Khatib wrote down the names of the municipal council members and told a policeman to bring these men to the Awqaf for an emergency meeting.

A few minutes later twenty policemen appeared at the Awqaf to turn in their arms. By 0230 hours more policemen, volunteers, and individual soldiers—who had either been left behind at their posts or decided to desert—began to hand in their weapons. A few other soldiers had also decided to stay behind, but to fight.

The Governor had hoped to have his emergency meeting by 0200, but only three men were immediately available: the *Qadi* (Islamic judge)—Sheikh Sa'id Sabri—Musa Bitar, and Abu Ali an-Natchi. In addition the local director of education and the chief of police could attend. It was agreed to wait until 0800 for the scheduled meeting.

Thirty miles to the east and far below the Judean mountain range, panic spread through Aqabat Jaber and the other refugee camps of Jericho with the news that the army had withdrawn to the East Bank. For two days the refugees had demanded weapons at the local police station and were told to rely on the army. By 0300 the camps were emptying as thousands rushed by foot and car toward the river. Israeli planes appeared at sunrise over the harsh valley, strafing and bombing around Jericho, speeding the exodus on its way.

For the rest of Wednesday the Israeli air force, artillery, and armored columns were to break up or overrun what Jordanian forces had remained on the West Bank, massed to the west of Nablus and at Qabatiya Junction; by 1000 hours, when the Israeli Northern and Central Command armored units linked up at Damiya Bridge, the entire West Bank had fallen.

In Jerusalem there were still one hundred armed men, civilian volunteers, and a few soldiers manning the walls at 0800 hours, mainly clustered at Bab al-Amoud and Bab al-Zahera. But the city was finished, and while some of the youth threw their briefly acquired arms into open doorways of civil-defense centers, the wiser ones began to dig hiding places for their weapons.

The Mayor and a handful of councilors had returned to the Awqaf

for the meeting in the Qadi's office while more than a hundred civilians milled about the building and outside the door. Khalidi analyzed the situation. The army had withdrawn but there was a considerable stock of arms and ammunition in the city. Despite the lack of discipline or training, despite the odds, the city could fight on if it decided to, but not for long. He believed that it might be possible to hold the walls until nightfall, but by then it would be necessary to fall back and fight through the streets, house to house.

"You all must realize that if we fight the city will be destroyed because the enemy, to protect his own troops, will shell and bombard us."

Khalidi had barely finished his analysis when a squadron of Israeli fighter planes swept low over the Haram to drop high explosives and napalm upon the Augusta Victoria positions. The wind was blowing to the east, and the dust from the explosive charges appeared to be rising over the Israeli enclave on Mount Scopus. The Awqaf was filled with the sound of wild cheers—the people thought it was the Israelis who were being bombed by Iraqi planes. Armed volunteers in the lane outside the Awqaf began to fire off their rifles into the air, overjoyed by this sudden promise of deliverance.

Khalidi tried to explain that the planes were Israeli, but he only succeeded in infuriating members of the crowd and someone accused Hazim Bey of being a British agent. The meeting had already dissolved into the general chaos flooding the building, there was still no quorum of councilors, and the Governor began to fear for Khalidi's safety. He adjourned the meeting until 1200 hours, and Khalidi sat down to prepare a plan for improvised house-to-house resistance.

But the view of Augusta Victoria and the splashes of napalm boiling down the hillside slope had been clear enough from my garden. Whatever remained of a single platoon of Jordanian reservists, fighting under the command of a sergeant, having held up an Israeli paratroop brigade the day before, had now been wiped out from the air. When the dive-bombing had ended, the paras advanced under heavy artillery cover against the desolate position from Mount Scopus and directly up the Mount of Olives road from Wadi al-Juz. Tanks, APC's, and recoilless rifle-mounted jeeps swept across the ridges unopposed, while an additional armored element from this bri-

gade moved from the Museum directly down to Jericho Road to take up an assault position in the valley below Bab al-Asbat.

A few hours before the assault, a Jordanian sergeant and two soldiers who had abandoned the city earlier in the morning reappeared at the Awqaf. They had reached the Mount of Olives in time to see the sun rise over Jerusalem, its rays catching on the Dome of the Rock, the vast platform of the Haram bathed in sudden light before their eyes—and they could go no further. They had returned "to seek martyrdom."

The sergeant was from the Nablus region. The other two soldiers were also Palestinians. They drew a bazooka and eight rockets from the store of arms and went over the eastern wall into the Muslim cemetery hugging Jerusalem high above the Kidron Valley. Here they dug a trench less than a hundred yards below the blocked-up Golden Gate—the gate of Mercy and Repentance—and waited for the assault to knock out two of the paratroopers' tanks before an Israeli plane could napalm their position.

Linking up at Augusta Victoria by 0930, the two Israeli battalions turned sharply toward the city, and the tanks and artillery of the entire brigade opened up on the northeastern Muslim Quarter of the Old City. Billows of smoke and dust rose above the walls; I thought the city was on fire. The barrage lasted ten minutes, killing at least 100 civilians and injuring several hundred more.[8]

I could not see the single plane which now dive-bombed the Indian Hospice area just within Bab al-Zahera (Herod's Gate). Until late Tuesday night a heavy Jordanian mortar had fired from an emplacement nearby. For more than nine hours the gun had been silent, the position abandoned, but apparently as a precaution the Israelis found it necessary to napalm the Hospice itself, killing three civilians and badly burning another dozen.

Since the Israelis admitted only to shelling the Old City and Dayan specifically denied bombing it, all "authoritative" reports after the war make no mention of this raid, and I have since met many Israelis (and Americans resident in Israel) who will become quite livid at the suggestion. But Solomon Steckel, an archaeologist and journalist covering the battle for a Canadian paper, is one Israeli I know who says he saw the air attack, confirming Arab eyewitness accounts.[9]

By now the walls were deserted, except for a solitary Jordanian soldier who had remained to climb up into the Bab al-Asbat minaret; armed with a Bren gun, he opened fire as the brigade of paratroopers advanced upon the city, their APC and tank machine guns working furiously.

Like Godfrey of Bouillon leaping first upon the wall, the Israeli commander jumped into his half-track and led the armored spearhead through the gate for that "frenzied, reckless, mad race into the city, etc."

Ten to fifteen armed civilians and Arab soldiers scattered throughout the city and sniped at the paratroopers pouring into Jerusalem. A few fought and died around the Via Dolorosa; others made their last stand near Damascus Gate or found their solitary deaths on rooftops and in obscure alleys in the center of the city. Outside the city the handful of armed civilians who had taken over the abandoned al-Tur–Ras al-Amoud position were shelled and quickly overrun by the paratrooper recon company that had continued south along the Mount of Olives ridge.

Along the southwestern wall of the city a few snipers opened small-arms fire upon the Israeli infantry brigade sweeping down from Mount Sion and into the Old City through Dung Gate. Forty-five minutes after the artillery barrage had ended, the entire city was silent and in Israeli hands.[10]

The Israelis are shrewd—but it is the wisdom of Harvard Law School, not of Solomon. For all the biblical publicity puffs, they had fought here in Jerusalem, as everywhere, with all the cautious, long-range planning and reliance on technology of any modern industrial state—their combat style and manner of movement, however improvised the logistics, were reminiscent of the American army.

When the paratroopers drove into the city, their leading elements swerved sharply to the left and pushed on into the Haram al-Sharif. Heavy armor could not pass even through this most northernmost and accessible gate, so the men stormed the shrine by foot and in jeeps, and with a tremendous roar which told us at the other end of the Haram that the city had fallen.

Within minutes they were in the Awqaf to take as prisoner the Governor, the Qadi, and Khalidi. Directly across the lane leading

from the Awqaf gateway into the Haram is the African Hospice—for pilgrims from Sudan and Chad who settled generations ago in Jerusalem. The Israelis were rounding up all the men they could find, and here they fell upon the deputy governor, the chief of police, and his deputy, who had abandoned Khatib in a last-minute bid to evade capture. Both the chief of police and his deputy had thrown away their uniforms, and they cringed with fear and embarrassment as they were led out of the Hospice wearing the outrageously misfitted civilian clothes they had grabbed there. The men were first frisked and then marched with their hands above their heads two hundred yards down to the lower platform of the Haram directly beneath the windows of my apartment and told to face the wall.

The Qadi was wearing a heavy *jibba*—the cleric-like coat favored by Azhari-trained sheikhs—and each time his arms would begin to fall the Israeli guards jabbed him lightly with their bayonets. But the Qadi never lost his composure. Within a few minutes they were brought before the paratroop commander, Colonel Mordecai ("Motta") Gur, who had established his HQ next to the Dome of the Rock. A swarm of photographers replaced the guards.

Khatib told the Colonel that a meeting had been scheduled for 1200 hours, at which time the city could be formally surrendered. Gur replied that while he welcomed any measure that would save him the trouble of putting down resistance, everyone should understand that his first duty was to his soldiers. If resistance came from any house, they would destroy it. But at the same time he stressed that his soldiers had strict orders not to molest or destroy either persons or property except in self-defense.

The spot from where Gur stood and spoke with the Governor and his party afforded one of the most exquisite views of the Haram. A little to the south, the high platform they stood upon fell away for the broad stairs—*Mawazin* (The Scales)—framed by unattached arcades and descending to the pool and cypress-groved compound of al-Aqsa Mosque. The door of al-Aqsa had been blasted open by a bazooka shell that also damaged the upper façade. There had been no snipers in the mosque.

Below the platform, hundreds of Arabs were being marched in for detainment, interrogation, and occasional beatings as the Israelis continued to round up men at random throughout the city. Hundreds

of these men, many of them my neighbors, were passed off to foreign correspondents as captured soldiers who had thrown away their uniforms.

An Arab dressed in khaki and limping on his deformed leg was brought in. His khaki shirt and pants—the war surplus that afforded cheap and popular dress to the poor—were covered with blood. The paras, assuming that it was Israeli blood, began kicking and beating him with their rifle butts until the cripple was close to death. The blood splattered on his clothes had come from the bodies of his two children whom he had just dug out of the ruins of his shelled house when he was seized as a prisoner and sent off to the Haram. If any of the detained men moved awkwardly or implied defiance, they too were beaten.

Outside the city a similar roundup was under way. Near the Ambassador Hotel in Sheikh Jarrah, *New York Times* correspondent Terry Smith noticed several hundred Arab civilians squatting with their hands over their heads, facing a wall. But three Arabs, who were described to Smith as Jordanian soldiers, were separated from the other prisoners, bound and gagged, and stretched out on the gravel bed before the hotel. Periodically the Israeli guards would grind the faces of these prisoners into the gravel.

Just before sundown the middle-aged and elderly men were sent home. The young were shipped off to detainment centers inside Israel and released within days or weeks. For three days the men from the radio station and other prisoners were kept on an open hillside—at machine-gun point, and without food or cover; they were threatened continuously with summary execution and then released.

The paratroopers reached my building within minutes after they had stormed the Haram. I suddenly remembered my own military training and the conventional wartime method of entering suspect buildings. I raced to open the door as soon as I heard them on the stairs. One of my neighbors failed to move as fast and is now deaf from the grenade tossed into his hallway.

When the paras burst into the house, their eyes burning brightly, scanning the long hall with doors leading off everywhere and leveling their submachine guns at my chest, I understood immediately that these men, who had taken the walled city by storm with much fire but barely a necessary shot (losing only four dead once within the

walls, according to their commander) and now had me with my hands above my head, were terrified.

"We're Americans, Americans!" I shouted out of my own inner terror—my family looks anything but "American" and I feared for my own secret—and waved my passport at their faces like the talisman that it is.

They told me to shut up, several times, in terrible English and demanded to know which was the way out to the roof. "I don't know," I shouted back as a matter of honor and then, crazier still, pointed to a barred window and said, "Out there!"

"The roof . . . shut up . . . the roof!" they shouted, looking even wilder. And finally I showed them the metal French doors right next to where they stood. The paras left us huddling on a mattress and ran out onto the roof to work a few bursts of their submachine guns from our garden, while I remembered how terrifying is that meeting of prejudice and fresh sensibility for any European who finds himself for the first time in the middle of a twisting medieval Arab city.

If Jerusalem (or any other West Bank city) had been prepared, if there had been serious resistance, the almost infinite lanes and narrow streets, the tunnels, the intersecting roofs and buttressed houses, the culs-de-sacs and the half-forgotten vaults and caves supporting the visible urban crust, the rooms sunk beneath the street like cellars at one end that opened out upon roofs at the other end—all this would have provided the cover and confusion to have held off a division for days.

And if this hypothetical possibility had been duplicated systematically—a West Bank population armed and provided with elementary militia-guerrilla training—Jordan could have posed the one problem the Israeli Army never was to confront, not even during the one night of stiff fighting outside the walled city of Jerusalem along Nablus Road: the necessity to assault and capture any number of built-up areas in protracted door-to-door and hand-to-hand combat against opponents who knew every twist and turn of the urban terrain.

It is difficult to estimate, this side of fantasy, what the effect would have been upon the result of the June War if the advancing Israeli Army had faced armed and resisting Arab enclaves within the walled city of Jerusalem, in Nablus, Jenin, Hebron, Ramallah, Beit Jala,

Bethlehem, Qalqilya, Jericho, and the refugee camps, as well as the threat of armed bands of peasant partisans from the villages harassing their communication lines in the event of the prolonged hostilities that such popular resistance might have provoked.

Powerful moral and political factors come into play when the energies of an entire people are called upon in the defense of their own land, factors that cannot so easily be calculated by Pentagon computers or CIA analysis.

But would the Israelis have spared this particular city, for its shrines and wonder, if they knew that only fire and destruction awaited their storming? Would they have come in anyway, to storm with small arms and bayonets and take losses in the thousands to spare at least the shell of Jerusalem? Or would they have turned the cannon and mortars, which set the northeast walls trembling for ten minutes, upon the entire city in the name of "historic rights"?

No Arab should even ask these questions.

Twice as shameful as the Israeli bazooka shell that smashed the door of Masjid al-Aqsa was the Arab machine-gun post never to be mounted on its roof. It is a sign, not of respect but of loss, when men cease to fight for their shrines. Museum keepers are not the stuff that built cities of shrines and wonder.

The shooting from my garden was finished in a minute, and seven more paratroopers stomped up the stairs and out onto the roof. Later I saw their work: the blue and white flag flying above the Wailing Wall.

Still later I read how Lt. Colonel Moshe Peles, deputy commander of the paratroopers, had tied the flag to the sharp horizontal spikes on the iron fence sealing off the end of the garden, to the cheers of his men below, to the cheers of all Israel and, as the telephotos flashed away, to the cheers of Europe and America.

How proud Peles must have been, clamoring around this Arab roof. Never before had the Israelis been so triumphant or convinced that the Arab East was finally at their feet. That day Moshe Dayan told the press that he supported a confederation of Israel and Jordan. "The only country that can protect Jordan is Israel," he said.

As for the Lt. Colonel, he was killed fourteen months later near

Tubas, in the Nablus region, when his detachment was ambushed by Al-Fatah fedayeen.

NOTES

1. Extract from Jordanian war diary as published by Hussein in *Hussein de Jordanie: Ma "Guerre" Avec Israel* (Paris: 1969), p. 74 (as told to Vick Vance and Pierre Laver).
2. Randolph S. and Winston S. Churchill, *The Six-Day War* (London: 1967), p. 128.
3. The Churchills, quoting from the Israeli Central Command (General Narkiss) Diary, provide an idea of what happened to Odd Bull's cease-fire: "1200 [hours]—the United Nations asked for a cease-fire. Narkiss agreed. 1210—Narkiss spoke to Barlev (Deputy Chief of Staff) and told him: 'I think we must act. I consider the Jordanians would like only to be able to say that they have fought, then they will shut up. But I would very much like to get in and take the positions mentioned.' " (Randolph S. and Winston S. Churchill, ibid., p. 129.)
4. As quoted by Hussein in *Ma "Guerre" Avec Israel.*
5. There is no account of this action in the many books and articles in English based on Israeli Army sources that I have read, including the otherwise very authoritative, if discreet, Israeli Defense Ministry edition of *The Six Days' War.* It may be that helicopter techniques utilized so dramatically in raids beyond the post-June War cease-fire lines since the war were considered classified material in 1967.
6. During the June War the American communications ship U.S.S. *Liberty* was accidentally attacked fifteen miles off the Sinai coast by Israeli torpedo boats and jet fighters. Thirty-four American sailors were killed. According to a UPI dispatch (July 30, 1967), Captain William McGonagle told newsmen that following the strafing run he saw boats bearing down at high speed. " 'I gave the machine gunners orders to fire.' . . . McGonagle said he first thought the jets were Egyptian, but later saw the Israeli flags on the torpedo boats. He said he attempted to change his order to fire on the boats but the forward machine gun had already begun to spray the vessels."
7. Still more recently, Joseph Geva, who had served as Israeli Army commander of the Central District prior to his assignment to the embassy in Washington, described how files were prepared for the eventual *admin-*

istration of the West Bank some six years before the war. "I realized that when we would occupy these places we would be in need of information concerning electric power, the names of the head of the municipal council and town notables, food stores, etc." (*Maariv Supplement*, June 4, 1971.)

8. In Israeli Jerusalem there were shelters, trenches, and foxholes and far fewer civilian casualties than in the Arab city, despite an entire day of Jordanian shelling on Monday. The Jordanians also apparently used antipersonnel fragmentation shells against what they believed to be troop concentrations moving through the New City streets (the impact damage from such shells is relatively negligible). A number of the Jordanian shells were also duds, according to the soldiers.
9. The Israeli paratrooper commander in Jerusalem also declared emphatically after the bombardment that "none of the holy places were hit." Months after the war, when I called the attention of a leading Israeli tourist guide to the gaping hole in St. Anne's Church near Bab al-Asbat (St. Stephen's Gate), he suggested this only proved how far Jordanian artillerymen would go in their desire to discredit Israel.
10. It is difficult to say how many Jordanian soldiers died in the battle for Jerusalem or, for that matter, in the entire West Bank. I would estimate, on the basis of Awqaf burial records and eyewitness accounts, that a little more than 200 Jordanian soldiers died in the Jerusalem area and that many of these dead were trainee reservists. At the time of the cease-fire, Amman sources were quoted as saying that the entire army had been "destroyed" on the West Bank. A few days later this figure had dropped to 7,000 dead and missing.

    The unofficial figure now available in Amman from quite respectable political and military circles is 193 dead, but this figure does not include the trainee reservists. Considering that the only infantry battle of the entire Jordanian-Israeli part of the war was fought in Jerusalem, I assume the truth lies very close to this last figure.

    What is so fascinating about Arab casualty figures is how the respective reputations which Abdul Nasser had to live up to and King Hussein had to live down made the former obscure his great losses and the latter exaggerate his minor losses.

    (And it is also clear, from the series of cables exchanged by Nasser and Hussein immediately after the war, as well as from the peculiar, frequently tense entente that nevertheless survived the war, that the two leaders sensed their mutual interest in covering for each other.) (Sa'ad Juma'a, *Al-Mu'amenā wa Mu'rakat al Masin* [Beirut], pp. 236–263. Sa'ad Juma'a was Jordanian prime minister at the time of the June War.)

9. The Fall

In the suburbs the looting began early Tuesday morning. Israeli reservists who had moved in behind the paratroopers and the armored brigade broke into most of the shops along Ramallah Road, shooting the locks off the metal shutters and smashing their way into empty houses whose occupants had fled. They took radios, jewelry, TV sets, cigarettes, canned food, and clothes.

On the sidewalk outside the King's Jerusalem Palace a young Israeli girl soldier danced about in an evening gown while her comrades ripped into Hussein's liquor stores in the basement.

Paras swarmed into the Ecole Biblique, center of French archaeological scholarship on Nablus Road. The male Jordanian servants were bound and hustled off into a truck to be kept at a detainment camp for the next 25 days. Two machine guns were set up and trained on the remaining prisoners: priests, students, and Jordanian women and children. The paras, harassed by a handful of Jordanian army and civilian snipers operating in the neighborhood, were convinced that the fire had come from the Ecole Biblique and they were tense and tough. Only late in the afternoon were the priests allowed to return to their quarters on condition that two of their number always stay behind as hostages with the other prisoners.

"If a single shot comes from that building, these two men will be shot instantly," the Israeli in command warned. After sundown the students and Arabs were allowed to find shelter in the school basement.

One of the Jordanian prisoners at the Ecole Biblique was a Mrs. Mattar, the war-widowed wife of the elderly warden of the nearby

Garden Tomb, a tranquil wooded retreat considered by many Protestant sects as the true burial place of Jesus. On Monday evening the Mattars and their German assistant had left their residence just within the Garden and taken shelter in the Tomb itself.

Early Tuesday morning, during a lull in the bombardment, the warden left the Tomb to make tea at the house and was crossing the compound when the paras outside began banging at the gate; he greeted the Israelis in English and was cut down by a submachine-gun burst.

The paras raced through the Garden and fired into the Tomb. When they paused to reload, the German girl dashed screaming out of the Tomb and the men fell back toward the gate, shooting up the house on their way out. Friends returned with Mrs. Mattar to the shrine a few days later to bury the warden in the Garden, and they found the residence looted and the dead man's wallet gone.

The modern retail shops of Port Said and Salah-al-Din streets were looted all through Tuesday and Wednesday: Israeli soldiers backed up trucks to some of the storefronts and cleared out refrigerators, stoves, furniture, and clothing not damaged in the fighting. The Chassidim of nearby Mea Shearim swept across the former no-man's-land, braving land mines to loot UNRWA headquarters in Sheikh Jarrah.

The most isolated quarter just outside the city walls is called Musrara; it is the Jordanian remnant of a once-grand Arab neighborhood that fell to the Israelis in 1948. Left without sandbags or shelters and exposed to the intense small-arms fire sweeping the frontier on Monday, most Musrara residents had sought refuge with friends and family elsewhere in the city. A few days later they returned to homes looted bare. But whenever families remained in their houses, the looting was usually confined to whatever cash and jewelry could be quickly scooped up and carried off in the course of continuous "arms searches." Within the walls of the Old City even this form of looting was very limited.

Other famous cities (or even Jerusalem in other times) have fallen to far crueler hands. I know, for example, of no case of rape. But atrocities almost invariably accompany war and I have accounted for some that happened in Arab Jerusalem because of the refusal of most

of the Western press, bathing in the radiance of "David's miraculous victory over Goliath," to deal with these disorders at the time—and also because there are interesting political nuances to some of the incidents.

The Palestine Archaeological Museum, which had been seized by the Israelis during the late hours of Monday night's fighting, was quickly and officially surveyed for spoils. The Jordanian Dead Sea Scrolls were taken out of what the leading American archaeologist in the city described as a virtually impregnable storage area, and driven across to the other side while fighting was still going on in Jerusalem. The new Israeli director of the Museum says this was done to protect the Scrolls—which have yet to be returned to the Museum.

With the annexation of the Arab city, the Museum was declared an Israeli institution; all its properties (including the Jordanian share of the Dead Sea Scrolls) became Israeli properties. Later the Lachish Letters, possibly the most prized possession of the Museum, were to be removed and sent across for display in Israel, and it is difficult to estimate what other materials have been similarly shipped into Israel.

The new "Temple Scroll"—revealed long after the June War and treated as the latest Israeli archaeological find—was taken by Israelis from the Bethlehem residence of Kando, a famous Arab dealer in antiquities, while the war was still in progress. Kando, who has since sued for payment in an Israeli court, will not say whether he gave consent or whether the scrolls were taken at gunpoint, as the reasonable rumor goes. But even if Kando takes money for these scrolls, their possible purchase and removal from Jordan without Amman's permission is still simple theft according to international law.

Within the walled city the occupation was initially far more decorous. There had been one or two back-alley knifings, and the Israelis hesitated to enter the maze-like compounds, concentrating their forces within the Haram and at the occasional wider intersections of Old City lanes and market streets.

On Thursday morning I braved the curfew with my European looks and American passport, walking slowly through the Old City past the tense Israeli checkpoints and muttering nonsense about the American embassy.

Outside of the walls the streets were littered with broken glass,

snapped telephone lines, burnt-out military vehicles and civilian cars, and occasional signs of rubble to honor those houses where the Jordanian Army had stood and fought.

Along Nablus Road the stiff, bloated bodies of the Second Battalion were being pulled out of almost every gun pit. A tough old bearded Israeli, hardened from his days in the Stern Gang, directed the Arabs pressed into their miserable task. Flies swarmed, many of the bodies were shattered pieces, and the stench was horrible. The Arabs all ended up retching, yet the old man never blinked.

But beyond Nablus Road and Salah-al-Din Street, the commercial district and suburbs were barely scarred. The plate-glass window of Christmas House Hotel had been smashed by looters, who had then methodically stripped all 24 rooms of radios, cigarette lighters, and furniture. S., a former journalist who owned the hotel, was standing in his wrecked lobby, pouring a shaky drink from what remained of hotel stock into the glasses of two wandering armed Israelis, forcing a grin and squeezing out a periodic "shalom."

I was quite taken aback by my friend's dismal style, but then S. led me upstairs to the conference room where I found my publisher and our staff and heard how half an hour earlier they had all been held up at the hotel by three Israeli policemen. Two of the Israelis had stood by the door covering them with their Uzzi submachine guns while the third carefully searched the group, taking cash, rings, and lighters.

Trembling, S. now managed his "shaloms" in fear. It was in the nature of such comic encounters that the Israeli and world press saw signs of "Arab-Jewish reconciliation in a unified Jerusalem" and babbled on about the "hopeful encounter of these two peoples" in those first twisted days of occupation.

At noon the curfew lifted for a few hours, and I walked my friends home to Sheikh Jarrah. By the following day permits were required even for foreigners to move about, and my movements became as limited as those of my neighbors.

Thursday night the sound of generators drifted up from the Wailing Wall to our quarters. The curfew was still sufficiently enforced for me to hesitate going out in the garden, but from my bathroom window I could see Israeli workmen installing a giant searchlight at the base of the wall. I heard what sounded like a power drill at work.

The sound continued through the evening, and that day's entry in my diary reads: "I fear that the houses closest to the Wailing Wall are about to lose their gardens for the sake of enlarging the lane."

All night long and working by generator light, two bulldozers moved from house to house. And by morning half of the Quarter was gone. About six hundred occupants had been ordered to leave shortly after sundown and given one hour's grace to carry what they could out of their homes. Many of the men of the Quarter were off in Israeli detainment camps, so the women and children struggled hopelessly with mattresses and heirlooms and then disappeared into the city, seeking shelter with friends and relatives. An old deaf woman, living alone in a small house, was buried that night under the rubble by the impatient wreckers.

The job was finished within days in time for the Shavuot Festival, and 50,000 Israelis swarmed into this sudden raw plaza to stand in the dust of these Arab homes and praise God.

Bab al-Magharaba had been a pleasant and architecturally distinctive quarter of freshly whitewashed roof terraces, gardens, and neat unattached houses built in North African style several hundred years ago to house Moroccan soldiers garrisoning Jerusalem for the Ottomans. There were more than 130 buildings in the Quarter, including two mosques, in an area equivalent to three square city blocks.

The day the bulldozing began, the Quarter was described in the *Jerusalem Post* as a slum; two days later it was reported as having been by and large abandoned during the siege. I expect in time that its existence will vanish altogether from the pages of developing Zionist history.

But such moments cry out for record, and the next morning I made my way to the American Consulate to report the incident. A week later J., a prominent American-Jewish businessman I had known in the States, arrived in Jerusalem and looked us up. He was concerned that we were well, and he enjoyed the view from our garden. Later, alone in my study, he told me that he and the Israelis had heard from their "people" in the State Department of a detailed report on the Magharaba Quarter demolition sent to Washington by the local consulate staff.

"They tried to protect their source, but we knew it could have been only one man. One more trick like that and out you go," he

said, without vindictiveness but with a cool commitment that I could not help but almost admire. May I be as cool tomorrow night or next week when the fedayeen dynamite a house in the New City.

I ran through every reasonable change to buy a year of time and in a while our visitor was sufficiently relaxed. J. was halfway through his own routine about the uniquely Jewish ethic of humane occupation when some of our neighbors rushed up to report Israeli looting of the religious school and mosque on the ground floor.

I raced downstairs in time to stop a soldier and two young civilians from carrying away armsful of books. These Israelis were capable of shame; they were not hoodlums. One muttered in embarrassment that he was a student and thought the Arabs didn't "need" the Korans and the collections of *Hadith* (traditions of the Prophet) he had gathered up. I assumed he thought the building had been abandoned. His attitude was obviously political rather than criminal, and part of that same consciousness that was to bring dozens of Israeli sightseers to our door and the doors of our neighbors in the coming days. If the door was not firmly locked, they would walk in unannounced and suddenly we would discover a family of Israelis calmly strolling about our apartment, looking out of the windows at the view or examining the rooms. If the door was locked, they would knock and demand entry "to look around."

It was as if the Arabs (and presumably people like ourselves who lived among them) were but phantom caretakers of a vast Israeli Museum of the Imagination—the rights of the Arabs to their homes and their obvious relationship to almost all the urban artifact of Jerusalem unacknowledged by the Israelis at an emotional level that, at best, inferred provisional tolerance for the physical presence of the caretakers.[1]

The three Israelis I had stopped at the door were ready to return the books, but I held them in conversation until J. appeared and asked him to explain in Hebrew why it was not humane to steal from a mosque.

A large crowd of Israeli sightseers had gathered by now in the courtyard and when J. began, embarrassingly, to speak of that unique Jewish ethic, the crowd hooted. I do not understand Hebrew, but the flush that filled J.'s face could only have been worthy of an overseas warlock, scorned in Zion as an "Arab-lover."

Before sundown we walked out of the Old City together, avoiding the Souq al-Qatan, that cavernous hall the Turks allowed to run down close to rubble and which Creswell described as the finest example of marketplace architecture in all of Syria. The British had saved the structure, but it had never been fully restored to its ancient Mamluk glory; to this day it remains a dark, grim passageway from al-Wad into the Haram al-Sharif.

That day little gasoline lights flickered within the hall: dozens of the several hundred poor Arab families driven out of the Old City's "Jewish Quarter" at the end of the first week of occupation had sought temporary shelter here. Dozens more had continued on to Bab al-Amoud (Damascus Gate), where they could board the Israeli buses and trucks ever available those first weeks for a ride to the river and the new refugee camps waiting on the other side. Even during hours of strictly enforced curfew, Arabs were allowed to move about Jerusalem if they could prove they were on their way to board the refugee bus.

Instead we walked up to Mount Sion, climbing the road running up from the void of the Magharaba Quarter and the newly opened square facing the Bab al-Nebi Daoud (Sion Gate). The area had been carved out of the city, again by Israeli bulldozer, and only rubble remained in place of a plastics factory employing 200 Arab workers, a small Armenian tile shop, and an UNRWA refugee food center.

We passed out of the Old City and onto Mount Sion. As I turned to glance back, Jerusalem blushed its own spectacular sunset rose, the time and its own tint I most love—when great swarms of swallows tumble and swerve in the fading light around the city's domes, and the minaret loudspeakers, juiced into life with an appallingly amplified click that is forgiven a moment later, send forth a sunset call to prayer across Jerusalem.

I asked J. if the rumors of imminent annexation were true. He said they were.

"Then there will be no peace," I said.

"That may be so," J. replied, "but Israel must have this city."

Within the Old City the business of burying the dead had been assumed by Subhi Ghoshi—a popular Arab physician who directed a free medical clinic and a night school for peasants and workers (and

had spent most of the previous year in a Jordanian prison for his leading role in the revolutionary Arab Nationalist Movement)—and by the Companions of Jesus, a small, radical Catholic order whose founder, Father Paul Gauthier, lived in that part of the Muslim Quarter of the Old City bombarded by the Israelis. The Companions sought, through work and prayer, "the liberation of all enslaved and oppressed people, the poverty-stricken and exploited Third World." Here in the Middle East, the Companions had committed themselves to work for reconciliation of Arab and Jew, maintaining hospices in Bethlehem, Arab Jerusalem, and Nazareth.

Shortly after the June War the Paris weekly *Temoignage Chrétien* published the diary of a member of the order, Sister Marie-Thérèse. I knew neither the sister nor Father Paul, and by the time a copy of her diary, *War in Jerusalem*,[2] was in my hands it was impossible to meet them, for the Companions had disappeared from Jerusalem. Later I heard from Arab church circles and French residents that they had left the occupied area on leave shortly after the war and were advised by high Vatican authorities not to return after publication of the diary and complaints to Rome by the Israelis.

During the fighting they had staffed an improvised hospital at Lithostratos, one of the convents along the Via Dolorosa. A compassionate Israeli medical officer had provided them with a permit to move freely about in the city and in the rest of the West Bank.

"It is necessary to state unambiguously that the first wave of Israeli soldiers were decent, humane, and courageous, doing as little damage as possible," Sister Marie-Thérèse wrote. "The second wave was made up of thieves, looters, and sometimes killers, and the third was even more disturbing since it seemed to act from a resolute desire for systematic destruction."

Sister Marie-Thérèse and Father Paul reached Bethlehem on Friday to find tanks still parked in front of the Basilica, their guns pointing toward the town. Israeli cars were driving through the streets, announcing in Arabic over their loudspeakers that the people had to leave Bethlehem and flee to Amman. If they remained, their homes would be shelled.

"These inducements and psychological pressure to force the Arabs to flee were extremely severe. We began to think the Israelis might

well have used the same methods the first time [1948], creating the refugee problem." [3]

A few days later they crossed over to Nazareth, hired a car, and returned to the West Bank via Jenin and Nablus, shuttling the wounded from the surrounding villages to the Arab hospitals whose ambulances had been requisitioned by the Israelis. Everywhere they saw looting.

> In Nablus we saw hundreds of families seeking shelter under the olive trees, sleeping out in the open. We were told they came from Qalqilya and were not allowed to go back to their town. We went there to see what was happening.
>
> The Israelis were blowing up the town with dynamite. Israeli civilians came to loot, two of them walking down the street wearing skullcaps and carrying suitcases. All three of us watched them as they came nearer; one of them put his finger on his submachine gun. Not seeing his gesture, I pointed to the suitcase and asked him in Hebrew, "Is it heavy?" We stood face to face for a second, then they turned around and left. The devil was on the prowl.
>
> A young Israeli officer driving at great speed stopped his car in front of us. We asked him, looking as stupid as we could, where we were in that area. He looked at us arrogantly and said in Hebrew, "This was Qalqilya; it is now Kfar Saha" (Kfar Saha is the nearest Israeli settlement to Qalqilya).[4]

They turned back to Jenin and discovered the hospital there without any antibiotics or antigangrene, and the International Red Cross still barred by the Israeli Army from entering and working in the area.

In nearby Tulkarm, 15,000 Arabs had been taken from the city by truck or driven out on foot and told to "go to Hussein." Many took refuge with friends or family in the Nablus district and eventually returned to their homes, but thousands more pushed on in straggling groups, barred from entering villages by curfew-enforcing Israeli patrols who prodded them on to the east and the river and often provided rides on Israeli trucks driving down to the Jordan Valley.

Like Tulkarm and Qalqilya, but considerably smaller in size and population, the four Latrun district settlements of Amwas, Beit Sira, Yalu, and Beit Nuba and the three Hebron district villages of Beit Awa, Beit Mersin, and Zeita are all frontier Jordanian villages lo-

cated on or near the 1948 cease-fire line. More than 20,000 Palestinians lived in these villages.

All seven villages were demolished a few days after the war ended; all are located within the broad stretch of fertile land which runs the length of the old frontier and which almost every Israeli leader agrees must be formally ceded to Israel by Jordan in the event of any peace settlement. This is the territory that would be subject to what the American State Department refers to as "minor border rectifications."

Amos Kenan, a well-known Israeli writer, was serving in one of the army units assigned to "straighten the border at Latrun." His account of the demolition of Beit Nuba was sent by private letter to Israeli politicians, Knesset members, and newspaper editors.[5]

Kenan charged that his unit was ordered to force out of the area any Arabs who had remained behind and to bar those who would be returning from their hideouts to the village after having heard Israeli radio broadcasts urging them to go home. Then the bulldozers were brought in.

"The chickens and doves were buried in the rubble. The fields were turned into wasteland in front of our eyes. The children who went crying on the road will be fedayeen in nineteen years, in the next round."

"Thus we have lost the victory," ended the letter.

The Hebron (Khalil) villages were not "discovered" until late June by a Swedish mobile medical unit that toured the frontier area once a month. The Swedes found several thousand Arabs huddled in improvised tents and cave dwellings in and around the ruins of their villages. But the Khalilees were fortunate: while driven off the first day like the thousands of peasant families further north, those who did not immediately flee to the east were allowed to return and haunt the ruins, living on wild plants and whatever could be salvaged from beneath the wreckage of their homes. And after a few months of a bad press, the Israelis agreed to allow them to rebuild their villages.

At Latrun the press and almost everyone else were kept out and the villagers chased away. Not until Father Paul and Sister Marie-Thérèse were finally able to enter the district on July 2 (and then only by driving on back roads after the Area Commander had re-

fused them entry) did definitive word of what had happened make its way back to Jerusalem.

Tractors from Israeli kibbutzim on the other side of the old frontier were already cultivating the villagers' fields when the French priest and nun reached the monastery at Latrun. The Trappist father in charge described all that had happened, and his account is identical to Kenan's and the testimony of villagers.

But if in 1967 there was pressure, terror, and mass demolitions, at least the Arabs were spared the calculating massacres and far more numerous expulsions of 1948. Possibly the presence of hundreds of foreign correspondents—some of whom did their best to evade the Israelis and rove about the occupied territories on their own—may have been one of the incentives for relative restraint. And the world situation has changed so profoundly in two decades. There were simply no great powers then—like France and the Soviet Union today—that were willing to respond politically to Arab suffering and were prepared at least to argue the point at the United Nations or, like China, to openly endorse the Palestinian cause. But what did happen in June 1967 gave those of us who had only the tales of old villagers and rare books to go on, a vivid sense of what 1948 must have been like, however pale this echo.

In the spring of 1968, more than ten months after the war, I drove out to Latrun with Louis Lomax and his wife, who had come to do a television documentary on Israel. By then bulldozers had smoothed tons of dirt over the ruins of these villages; grass and wild flowers were already covering the raw surface following a winter of rain. Only the occasional sight of rusting iron-reinforcing rods sticking up from a slight rise betrayed the illusion of undisturbed meadow.

The Israelis from nearby kibbutzim had also planted saplings—the fast-growing eucalyptus—in the regular patterns of a formal afforestation scheme, across the entire expanse of each leveled village. Solid stone houses surrounded by orchards of plum, olive, vine, and apricot had once stood here. Among the fruit trees had been those carefully tended vegetable beds that the Palestinian peasantry has managed so patiently to create out of this ancient, rocky soil.

In a few years a young forest will rise from the graves of Yalu, Amwas, and Beit Nuba; and Israeli tourist guides will point to these

sites with pride and tell their busloads of visitors: "See how we have made the desert flower!"

Mayor Rouhi al-Khatib had remained within the walled city at the Latin Convent until Thursday afternoon. When the curfew lifted briefly, he toured the city to survey the mess. Friday morning he was back at the municipality, along with a number of his staff, when two Israeli Army officers appeared and asked what they could do to help get Arab Jerusalem running again. The municipality would look after the water supply and sanitation, which meant removing bodies and war debris, as well as almost a week of garbage and rotting perishables stinking up the markets. Rouhi's staff would also assist in the work to restore electricity, but all the city cars and trucks had been taken by Israeli soldiers and the Mayor asked that a liaison officer be posted at the municipality to arrange transportation and deal with equivalent problems.

More than a week was to pass before water and electricity were restored to all of Arab Jerusalem; outside of the walled city all the lines were down, the pumping station pipes damaged, and the electric stations smashed up by grenades.

The following week the Mayor was called to the headquarters of the Israeli Military Governor and ordered to instruct the civilian population to hand in all weapons. When Khatib replied that this problem was not within his jurisdiction but an affair for the district Governor and police, the commanding officer screamed at him to obey directives and ordered him out into streets humming with the sound of a thousand *shaloms*. "All we want is peace," the Israelis kept saying as they strolled about Jerusalem. *Shalom, shalom, shalom* . . . and the word soured in the tight guts of the Arabs.

On June 21 soldiers ran the Israeli flag up over the municipality as part of the preparations for an official visit by Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Israeli Jerusalem, accompanied by the new Military Governor for the Arab city. When they arrived at the city hall, Rouhi protested the flag-raising and the Israelis agreed to remove their banner on the following day.

"Cities do not wage war on each other. . . . Let us live in peace as neighbors," Kollek said to Khatib. "Possibly after a few years we will unify Jerusalem."

Serious Israeli political initiatives began quickly enough. Within a week after the war the West Bank Military Governor, Chaim Herzog, called at the home of the former Jordanian Ambassador to London, Anwar Nusseibeh, who had returned to Jerusalem shortly before the war. Herzog wanted Nusseibeh's opinion of the possibility of a separate peace settlement between the West Bank Arabs and Israel, within the context of an Arab Palestine state to emerge out of the occupied territories.

Herzog hinted that such a West Bank state would be bound by treaty and economic ties to both Israel and Jordan. Nusseibeh told Herzog that he had neither the responsibility nor the inclination to deal with such a question as an individual, but that he would call a broadly representative private meeting of the city's Arab leadership to discuss the proposal. On June 18, Anwar al-Khatib, Dr. Subhi Ghoshi, Izhak Duzdar, Dr. Daoud Husseini, and a number of other former ministers, muncipal council members, and popular political figures in the city met at Nusseibeh's house to receive Herzog.

Before the Military Governor arrived, the men agreed upon a common position: nothing of a political nature was to be discussed with the occupying power; the people of Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied West Bank were inseparable from the rest of Jordan; in accord with the Geneva Conventions they were prepared to deal with the occupying authorities only in the field of services and civilian requirements; and in the future these problems could be dealt with through Mayor Khatib.

This final clause was somewhat of a political probe, for although the annexation of Arab Jerusalem was still several days away the Israeli press was already full of talk about "unifying the city" and the local Arab leadership was convinced that Jerusalem would be the proving ground for Israeli objectives and future relations with the Arabs.

For many at this meeting it was a first reunion since the catastrophe. The Governor was still in a state of political shock. "I cannot understand how this could have happened to us," Khatib told the group.

But for a few of the radical nationalists, defeat had come like those vicious dawns confirming earlier-hour nightmares.

"It happened because for twenty years we have been building up a

regime and destroying a nation—the Palestinians—while on the other side they have been building a state, not a personal regime. Now everybody can see the results," one of the men replied.

Herzog appeared with his secretary and a representative of the Foreign Affairs Ministry to announce that everything should be open to discussion; presumably this meant such formerly taboo subjects as repatriation of refugees and border rectifications in favor of the Arabs.

Throughout the entire dispute, Herzog conceded, it was the Palestinians and the Israelis who were the serious ones. During the June War the only persistent opposition in Gaza had come from the Palestinian contingents attached to the UAR Army, he said. These forces had fought very bravely, taken many casualties, and imposed losses upon the Israelis. The Palestinians, he admitted, were, after all, the owners of this land in which the Israelis, however, also had a share, so it was up to these two peoples to settle their problems. Herzog said nothing about Jerusalem.

Considering the prearranged stance, there was little to say when Herzog finished except to thank him for his remarks and present the common position. Instead, Governor Khatib offered to bring the Israeli proposal to the attention of King Hussein and, after slight hesitation, was granted permission by Herzog to cross the river for consultations in Amman.

The situation here—one that was to define itself with increasing precision over the next few months as the Israelis spurred on whatever elements were available into discussion of a West Bank state (in turn magnified by self-conscious Israeli press campaigns)—was rich in irony. Those Palestinians who had most steadfastly opposed the Amman regime on the basis of any number of alternative orientations—nationalist, socialist, communist, Islamic fundamentalist—or had held elective office but always struggled to maintain an independent "local" or Palestinian posture, were now the men most insistent upon the unity of all Jordan, who engaged in political struggle within the Arab community to preserve this point, and who paid for the effort in Israeli prisons or by deportation.

But those elements within the West Bank that had been closest to the regime were so frequently prepared to go beyond Governor Khatib's cautious consultation and openly abandon Jordan. Sheikh Mu-

hammad Ali Jabari, perpetual Mayor of Hebron and King Abdullah's closest ally in the Hashemite annexation of the West Bank following the 1948 War, now slaughtered sheep to fete Israeli conquerors, scorned the King in statements to the press, and announced his readiness to cooperate in the formation of a West Bank state. Bethlehem, prosperous West Bank island of pro-Western, pro-Palace sentiment, wavered more consistently than any other community toward the Israeli separatist proposals.[6]

Those first few weeks were the best of times for Israeli maneuvers. Those of the West Bank Establishment who identified so unquestioningly with either Amman or, a bit more daringly, with Cairo were initially too stunned by the defeat to consider alternatives short of surrender. I recall educated men who would not tolerate a word of criticism of Abdul Nasser before the war now cursing his name and furious at my expressions of modest postwar sympathy for him. Were the Israelis not so ill-mannered and land-lecherous among a people of exquisite politesse and reasonable jealousies, they would have harvested a convention hall of prominent Arab quislings late that June.

Instead they annexed Jerusalem.

On June 27 the Knesset passed enabling legislation for administrative annexation. On the 28th the Israeli Minister of Interior carried out the measure. On the 29th, Mayor Khatib and available members of the municipal council were summoned by military police to the Gloria Hotel next door to the Arab city hall and informed by the Assistant Military Governor of Jerusalem, Yakoub Salman, that the municipality and council of Arab Jerusalem had been dissolved.

For the next three weeks the Arab councilors and Mayor Khatib met together to consider their response to both the dissolution order and the follow-up request by the Israelis to each individual councilor to sit as a member of an enlarged Israeli Jerusalem municipal council. On July 22 their formal reply was delivered to Raphael Levy, Israeli Assistant Administrative Governor of Jerusalem:

> Inasmuch as the mere fact of discussing the possibility of joining the Jerusalem Municipal Council under Israeli rule, in the form in which it was announced by the Israeli authorities, would from our point of view as Arabs constitute an official recognition on our part of the principle of the attachment of Jerusalem to the sector of Jerusalem occupied by Israel, which we neither accept as a *fait accompli* nor acknowledge, we regard it

as an infringement of the United Nations Charter and of the Resolutions adopted at its last Extraordinary Session, as a violation of international law and an illegal measure, and we demand the restoration of the status quo that existed before 5 June 1967.

We therefore find ourselves regretfully unable to accept your invitation to discuss this matter.

The document was signed by the Mayor, Deputy Mayor Ibrahim Talil, and six councilors: Fayik Barakat, Ali al-Taziz, Dr. Rashid al-Nashashibi, Musa Bitar, and Abdul-Ghani al-Natsha. Two other councilors were in Amman at the time and a third was "ill." Copies were delivered to the press and foreign consulates, and smuggled across to Amman. The civil resistance had begun.

NOTES

1. The lyrics of "Jerusalem the Golden" (in other words, Arab Jerusalem), an Israeli pop hit tune a few months before the war, went as follows:

   How dry are the deep wells,
   How empty the marketplace!
   No one climbs the hill of the Temple
   In the Old City.
   The wind howls through the rocky caves
   No one goes down to the Red Sea
   Anymore over the road to Jerusalem.
2. Sister Marie-Thérèse, *War in Jerusalem*, traanslated from the French and published in English by the Ministry of Information, Amman, Jordan, 1967.
3. Ibid., p. 22.
4. Ibid., pp. 25–26.
5. Kenan requested that the document not be made public since he did not want to embarrass the government, but an "underground" radical press (*Israel Imperial News*), run by Israeli expatriates in London, secured and printed the account without Kenan's permission many months after the war.
6. Hashemite attitudes toward "Palestinian autonomy" in the West Bank (and conceivably Gaza) have greatly fluctuated in the years since the June War. Immediately after the war, when Hussein expected a rapid peace settlement, he opposed such talk; then late in 1968 the King began to flirt with the idea of allowing his own supporters among the older West Bank

Palestinian notables to engage in independent negotiations with Israel in order to spare Hussein the increasingly difficult task of having to deal so openly with the Israelis about a settlement. But by late 1969 Hussein had reason to fear that the Big Powers were considering the creation of a Palestinian statelet—enlarged to include what remained of Jordan but without the Hashemite throne—as a means of reconciling the Palestinians to an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. By the summer of 1971 Hussein had broken the back of the guerrilla movement in Jordan and could now afford to resume consideration of such a statelet as the key to a Jordanian-Israeli settlement. The issue has been further complicated by the rise, in the West Bank, of an equally conciliatory but rival younger Arab elite prepared to settle with Israel but not with Hussein.

10. Games

Less than a month after the war the number of Arab refugees fleeing east from the West Bank had reached 200,000. Television crews and foreign correspondents followed the exodus across the river and on into Amman. Thousands of refugees moved in with friends and family or found new quarters of their own, but the thousands more without means or family poured into schools, mosques, and public buildings serving as emergency shelters. Then, within days, the refugees were transferred to the hot, sand-swept tent cities raised up by the government in the eastern Jordan Valley with the assistance of UNRWA.

International concern and fear that these people would now be barred from returning to their homes, as had happened to the refugees of 1948, were rapidly souring the heroic press image reaped by Israel during the six days in June.

On July 2, in response to pressure from Britain and America—who saw the blossoming of a new refugee problem as a grave impediment to that peace settlement between Jordan and Israel so imminently expected in those days—the Israeli government announced that West Bankers who had fled during or after the June War would be allowed to return. Family applications, to be handled by the International Red Cross, would be forwarded to Israel from Amman, and unless there were active security objections those refugees who wished to return would be allowed back.

By late August the story of the new refugees had lost its sharpness. According to Amman, forms covering 160,000 refugees had been filled in and returned via the Red Cross. But by the Israeli-imposed

deadline time—August 31, 1967—only 14,027 refugees had returned and at a far lower crossing rate than appeared possible. The results seemed meager, anticlimactic, and already stretched out by what the Israelis claimed to have been Jordanian quibbling over the heading on the forms presented to Amman in the first stage of the operation.

The Israeli press offered a number of conflicting explanations. The refugees had been coerced into signing the forms by the Amman authorities; the refugees themselves preferred to stay on the East Bank —or the Amman authorities sought to use these new refugees as pawns in a play for international support against Israel and had therefore sabotaged the repatriation program. None of the explanations seemed reasonable at the time but at the end of August, when I was able to briefly leave Jerusalem and fly to Amman via Cyprus and Beirut and meet with ministry and Red Crescent officials, the full story (already hinted at by Red Cross officials in Jerusalem and the Israelis themselves) emerged.

The first delay in the repatriation operation had occurred when Israel rejected the use of standard International Red Cross repatriation forms acceptable to Jordan. The Israeli committee handling the operation told the Red Cross that they required a form soliciting more detailed information. When the Israelis submitted their own form, it was headed "Government of Israel" and thus unacceptable to the Jordanians. After further delay the Jordanians proposed a compromise form headed by the "Government of Israel," the "International Red Cross," and the "Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan." The Jordanian reaction had been predictable, and the relevant question was why the Israelis had replaced the original Red Cross heading with their own.

When the agreed-upon forms finally arrived in Amman, Red Cross and Jordanian personnel registered the refugees seeking repatriation in what had become a desperate race for time. But for the approaching deadline, UN as well as Jordanian officials assured me, the number of applicants would have come even closer to the 200,000 figure.

By the time the program ended, permits covering the repatriation of 18,236 refugees (the Israelis give the figure of 20,658) had been issued by Israel and less than 15,000 of these had been returned, for the Israelis in almost all cases had selectively approved the return of householders or property-owners—the very refugees who could in-

variably afford to scatter, taking rooms and apartments throughout Amman, Salt, and Irbid, and thus administratively the most difficult to reach and transport on the 24-hour notice provided by the Israelis, who submitted daily permit lists during the final stage of the operation.

And even among this relatively select group, the Israelis had frequently issued permits for only part of the family unit. Many families which decided at that moment to risk temporary separation, with the older sons or father remaining in Amman in the hope of rapid implementation of a "family reunion program," are still stranded in Amman or in East Bank camps. Several thousand other Arabs awarded these conditional permits (barring the return of part of their families) simply refused to cross.

UNRWA officials also reported that of all those repatriated only 4,000 were registered refugees from the 1948 War, and that none of this category lived in the West Bank refugee camps. UNRWA had been particularly anxious to see the repatriation of this last group: they provided the bulk of the tent city dwellers, had the least resources or connections on the East Bank and, already concentrated in the tent cities, would have been administratively the easiest group to repatriate.

The other notable absence on the repatriation list was that of any residents from Arab Jerusalem and Bethlehem, a fact that confirmed the gravest fears as to Israeli intentions for the population of the already annexed Arab city.

The director of the Israeli side of the operation had told the press that because of the Jordanian inability to even meet the daily permit quotas before the deadline, the Israelis had not bothered to issue permits for a number of otherwise approved applications. When I returned to Jerusalem I called the director and asked him for the total number of refugees whose applications had been approved, whether issued permits or not. He gave me the figure of 25,000, and then confirmed that 1948-registered refugees living in West Bank camps before the war were not considered eligible for return, although as a category they accounted for more than two-thirds of the total number of new refugees. He refused to comment on the question of repatriation to Jerusalem.[1]

Misunderstanding does not end even there. When the Israelis an-

nounced the repatriation program on July 3, 1967, they also specified that any Arabs who chose to cross over to the East Bank after July 4, 1967 (unless given special travel permits), would be barred from return. Since then at least another 200,000 from the West Bank and Gaza have crossed to swell the number of June War refugees in Jordan to 400,000. Even less publicized are the 120,000 Arabs from Golan Heights (almost the entire district's population) who sought refuge in unoccupied Syria, and at least 40,000 refugees from the occupied towns of northern Sinai who were either sent across the Canal directly to Egypt or crossed the Jordan River and made their way to Cairo by air via Amman.

Several thousand West Bankers tried to return on their own in the first months after the war. The Jordan River is easy to ford during the summer; small groups of refugees, guided by bedouin of the valley, would cross after sundown and then walk for hours, evading patrols, until they reached a town where they could take a bus to Nablus, Hebron, or Jerusalem.

The men who made it had exciting stories to tell, but there were ugly rumors of mass graves dug along the Jordan by Israeli soldiers to bury those who did not. That fall an obscure, hopelessly isolated but brave group of Israeli New Left students and writers published in their "underground" Hebrew newspaper *Nimas* (Fed-Up) an anonymous account of guard duty along the Jordan by a troubled reservist. According to the editor, his story has been corroborated by other soldiers whose names they could not reveal:

> Every night Arabs cross the Jordan from east to west. We blocked the passages (i.e., the places where the river is shallow and can be crossed by foot) and were ordered to shoot to kill without warning. Indeed, we fired shots every night on men, women, and children. Even during moonlit nights when we could identify the people, that is, distinguish between men, women, and children. In the mornings we searched the area and, by explicit order from the officer on the spot, shot the living, including those who hid or were wounded. After killing them we covered them with earth or sometimes left them lying there until a bulldozer came to bury them.
>
> Some of these people are intelligence agents, some are armed infiltrators, some are smugglers. Mostly though they are former inhabitants of the West Bank who have not received an Israeli permit to return. There were some cases I'll never forget. One morning we found two men, unwounded. The officer ordered us to kill them and we shot them on the spot.

> Once we found two men wounded in their legs. We talked to them, took their papers, and then the officer ordered us to kill them. They understood from our gestures what went on and desperately pleaded for their lives. We all left the place except one who volunteered to kill them. He had to fire six times before they were dead.
>
> The stories are many. I'm only telling of events I saw with my own eyes, but stories by other soldiers are abundant. I heard of soldiers setting fire to heaps of bodies.
>
> One morning I saw bodies in a heap and among them was a young girl. On another occasion an Al-Fatah man pleaded for his life; when he saw it was useless he cursed us and took the bullets. One night a group of about twenty crossed. We shot them. In the morning we found eleven bodies. Some were found hiding, unharmed. We caught them and sent them back to the East Bank unharmed.
>
> During the time of my service, long after the war, we fired shots in our sector every night. Every night people were shot, every morning the wounded were killed. So, too, were those who were caught unwounded.
>
> I am disclosing this information in the hope that it will become known to as many Israeli citizens as possible. Perhaps some could influence these events and stop them.

No Israeli bookstore would carry the paper. When the editors tried to sell it themselves on the streets of Tel Aviv, they were arrested for distributing "obscene literature." [2]

Late in the winter of 1967 the number of Arabs leaving the West Bank as refugees declined sharply—the bulk of the population had decided not to abandon the land. Even among families whose homes were demolished either by Israeli security forces practicing "collective punishment" in the vicinity of a guerrilla operation or to make way for Jewish settlement in Arab Jerusalem, a tenacious desire to hold on had taken root.

But in Gaza, packed with refugees since 1948, the Israelis are more ambitious, and their January 1968 announcement that Jews now had the right to purchase Arab land in the Strip came at the height of a mass terror campaign. A month earlier Israeli Army officers had called a meeting of Gaza refugee camp leaders and ordered them to lead the refugees out of the Strip and into the now deserted UNRWA camps in Jericho, on the West Bank. When the camp leaders refused to comply with the order, the terror began.

Refugee camps suddenly were subjected to total curfew and cut

off from food and other supplies for two or three days at a time. Movement within the camps was so restricted that no one could move out of his house even to use the communal latrines. Several thousand men from Shati Camp were rounded up during a camp curfew, marched to the beach, and forced to lie at the water's edge during a storm—without food and at machine-gun point until half-submerged by the incoming tide.

Camp leaders were requested to submit lists of refugees with income-earners living abroad in the Arab states for "census purposes." Hundreds of families listed were then rounded up, put onto trucks, driven to the Jordan, and pushed across to the East Bank in a nasty inversion of the "family reunion" program promised to the West Bank refugees.

Hundreds of Gaza's young men detained on suspicion were offered the alternative of prison terms or deportation to Jordan. Any Gaza family prepared to abandon the Strip received free transport, a box lunch, and a modest cash bonus. In the late winter and spring of 1968, thousands of Gaza people streamed across the bridge at the Jordan until the Amman authorities finally barred any more Gaza refugees from coming—a policy established only after two clashes at the bridge with the Israelis.

More than 50,000 Gaza residents had been forced out of the Strip.

The Israelis talked of security precautions when they launched their campaign in Gaza, but at the time resistance had been no more intense than in most parts of the West Bank in those first shell-shocked months following the war—at most, an occasional grenade tossed at an Israeli jeep or a patrol route mined.

A UN official who must remain anonymous could tell a group of British correspondents visiting Gaza in late December 1967 that the "only danger to security in Gaza comes from the determined and brutal attempt by the Israeli Army to force these people out of the Strip."

The five-day curfew at Shati and the Israeli demolition of fishing boats and storehouses were justified by the explosion of a TNT-filled Pepsi Cola bottle set off near the marketplace without causing casualties. On Wahda Street in Gaza Town a firecracker thrown from the window of a house at passing Israelis was cause for the di-

rect demolition of four homes; the explosive charge set off by Israeli Army sappers accidentally brought down another eight homes.

Today Gaza is one of the leading centers of armed resistance, the crowded city a casbah of defiance that Israelis dare patrol only in fast-moving jeeps. At night the Strip becomes a stalking-ground for fedayeen ambush parties and mine-laying expeditions. Gaza seethes with a visible hatred for the occupier, and if a visitor asks an Israeli why, he will be told about the "twenty years of Egyptian propaganda."

For twenty years the West has found it convenient to accept the Israeli claim that the 1948 refugees left on their own accord and upon instructions of the Arab leadership of the time.

The British writer Erskine Childers made a remarkable study of this claim, which he described in his article, "The Other Exodus," in *The Spectator* of May 12, 1961. Childers listened at the British Museum to recordings of Arab radio broadcasts throughout the spring and summer of 1948 as monitored by both BBC and an American company. He wrote that he could not find "a single order, or appeal, or suggestion about evacuation from Palestine from any Arab radio station inside or outside Palestine in 1948." There is the monitored record of repeated Arab appeals, "even flat orders, to the civilians of Palestine to stay put." Childers writes that during a visit to Israel he requested the authorities to present any evidence to the contrary, which they failed to do. The only documented exception that Israeli counterstudies have produced is the evacuation from Haifa, despite an apparently sincere appeal by its Jewish Mayor to the Arabs to remain.

But equally incredible has been the widespread acceptance of the related assumption that if such a falsehood—"voluntary flight"—is truth, then the Palestinian people somehow no longer have claim to their homeland.

In 1967–1968 this peculiar process of comprehension has, however, worked in reverse: out of the painfully slow awareness that Israel had again barred Palestinians from their homes, the understanding arises of how this people came to be refugees in 1948 and why they have renewed their struggle on a far greater scale than ever before.

NOTES

1. However diplomatic the language, the facts of this episode are recorded in the *Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East* (*UNRWA*), *1 July 1966–30 June 1967*, No. 13, A/6713.
2. Some of the young Israelis involved in editing *Nimas* and associated with the Matzpan group were again arrested and given six- to eight-month prison terms in late 1968 for painting anti-occupation slogans on the wall of the Knesset.

11. The Struggle

Into the void stepped the fedayeen, rivals to the bedouin and to the Israeli clean-up squads for the harvest of arms and ammunition from Sinai and Golan.

All of Palestine was now under occupation, and the prevailing myths of a classical "war of revenge"—myths that had hindered fedayeen organization among the people—were shattered as badly as the Arab armies.

On June 20, 1967, representatives of Al-Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Front, and the Palestinian sections of both the Arab Nationalist Movement and Left faction of the Baath Socialist party met and agreed to establish a secret office to coordinate the resumption of fedayeen activities. But within two months the Baath (which had always had difficult relations with the rival Pan-Arab and socialist ANM) withdrew to concentrate on its own organization.[1] Al-Fatah soon followed, convinced that it was important to immediately revive the armed struggle.

What remained—an alliance of the ANM's two fedayeen groups (Vengeance Youth and Heroes of the Return) with the Palestine Liberation Front—was to take the name of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), with veteran fedayeen leader Ahmed Jabril and his PLF cadre assuming the military command of the Front while the ANM leadership assumed responsibility for PFLP political work.

Jabril had disagreed with Al-Fatah's insistence on immediately resuming armed struggle. He believed that the underground cells being formed by all the fedayeen groups during the first summer of occupa-

tion were not sufficiently developed, that the cadres to be sent were insufficiently trained, and that not enough arms had been gathered to begin operations without endangering the entire nascent underground. It was the hope of being able to transform the already established cells of West Bank and Gaza militants belonging to the radical Pan-Arab parties that had drawn Jabril to the idea of the popular front in the first place; and the ability of the PFLP to subsequently carry out a number of daring urban commando operations, utilizing pre-June War ANM cadre, somewhat confirmed Jabril's thesis.

But when Israeli intelligence rounded up several members of the resistance in the late summer of 1967, Al-Fatah argued that it was better to begin fighting immediately since the Israelis were not going to wait until the underground was ready. Once Al-Fatah resumed operations, the PFLP soon followed.

In a sense both Al-Fatah and the PFLP were correct for different reasons. Premature armed action by poorly trained fedayeen did lead to the rapid destruction of guerrilla bases and most urban cells throughout the West Bank in the fall of 1967. By winter both guerrilla groups had fallen back to the East Bank for sanctuary to begin more carefully planned raids from across the Jordan while new cadre began rebuilding the urban cells.

But the early operations (however primitive and costly in losses) succeeded in stiffening the morale of an otherwise broken West Bank population and acted like grits of sand thrown within the wheels of Israeli maneuvers to enroll the West Bank elite as active collaborators during the relatively liberal initial stage of occupation.

The price paid by the movement for that first split in the coalescing ranks of the guerrillas has been the proliferation of fedayeen organizations. When the idea of the guerrilla was to finally seize hold of the imagination of the entire Palestinian people less than a year after the June War, there was no unified front of guerrilla fighters available to absorb every possible expression of Palestinian participation. By the summer of 1968 there were close to twenty fedayeen groups in the field.

And despite a number of subsequent mergers, two factions—the Popular Struggle Front and the Action Organization—broke off from Al-Fatah. The PFLP proved to be still less stable, splitting into four groups. Jabril and the old PLF cadre quarreled with the ANM politi-

cal leadership and withdrew under the name of the Popular Front-General Command (PF-GC). One of Jabril's best officers—the former Jordanian Army officer Ahmed Zaroor—then split away and formed the Palestine Arab Organization.

Although the Arab Nationalist Movement had evolved through the middle and late sixties into a Marxist-Leninist organization, a "leftist" faction—formed by the younger elements in the ANM leadership who took credit for this trend—broke away from both the ANM and the PFLP in the early spring of 1969 to form the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP), a small but intellectually influential group. Despite all these splits, the PFLP retained its reputation as the second most important guerrilla group after Al-Fatah, and public support of the guerrilla idea was to so intensify that each of these groups, particularly Al-Fatah, would rapidly increase in size and strength.[2]

The new tent cities along the Jordan River's eastern bank sheltering June War refugees had quickly become recruiting grounds for the fedayeen, despite sporadic interference by Jordanian security forces. However, intense Israeli artillery barrages throughout the winter and early spring of 1967–1968 soon made these valley floor campsites untenable for civilians. The Israelis considered the evacuation of the refugees further east to the highlands flanking Amman a victory—the further away these fedayeen-spawning camps from the occupied territory, the better.

But with the refugees the seed of Palestinian struggle went further east toward the cities of Amman, Irbid, Jerash, and Zerqa, sharpening the popular sense of armed struggle among the Palestinians who were now a majority on the Jordanian East Bank. And when fedayeen operations continued, the Israelis threatened King Hussein (already under pressure from Western embassies) with border war.

The frequently shelled, largely deserted valley town of Karameh had become a major jumping-off base for the three guerrilla groups then operating: Al-Fatah, PFLP, and the Popular Liberation Forces of the PLO. In February 1968 a Jordanian security force was sent into the town to disarm the guerrillas, but when the bedouin police, the *bedawi*, reached the center of Karameh they found themselves surrounded by the guerrillas.

For two decades the bedouin had dispersed the periodic riots of

unarmed Palestinians with barely the flick of an automatic Bren-gun trigger. Now they were surrounded by a new breed: Palestinians prepared and capable of fighting back. The bedouin withdrew without firing a shot.

To avert a cabinet crisis and strain on the postwar alliance with Abdul Nasser (who thought of the still thin-ranked guerrillas as a potentially effective irritant that would help speed up a reasonable settlement with the Israelis), Hussein seemed to reverse ground. But a month later Jordanian tanks under the command of Colonel Jassim Luksus encircled Karameh and the 500 guerrillas based there. Arafat, Jabril, and Abu Gharbiyeh (then leader of the PLF-PLO forces) decided that to appeal to the government in Amman would be interpreted by palace circles as a sign of weakness. A show of force was required. The fighters of all three groups were placed under Jabril's command.

Most of the guerrillas began digging trenches within sight of the tanks; the rest infiltrated through the Jordanian lines and took up positions behind the tanks. Then Jabril went out from his own lines to meet with the colonel and his officers.

Speaking more for the benefit of Luksus' officers, several of whom were Palestinian, Jabril reviewed the history of the Palestine cause and the disappointing role played over the years by the Jordanian Army. He accused Luksus of encircling Karameh to help the Israelis, informed him that his tanks were surrounded by fedayeen, and ordered him to leave the area. Luksus cursed Jabril and the fedayeen. They had been the cause of the June War and now they were giving Israel the chance to take the East Bank, which Luksus described as "our land" (meaning Transjordanian.)

Jabril was committed to a desperate bluff: he told Luksus that unless the army withdrew within twelve hours the fedayeen would attack. While Jabril boasted of the size of the forces supposedly under his command and threatened civil war, groups of guerrillas approached the Jordanian tanks and fraternized with their crews, appealing to the soldiers to join hands with the fedayeen and together fight the Israelis. The next day the colonel withdrew from Karameh.

The job was now left to the Israelis, and in the early morning hours of March 21, 1968—less than twelve hours after King Hussein had confided to American journalist Louis Lomax that he was about to

personally take the initiative in reaching a peaceful settlement with the Israelis—three armored columns, several thousand in strength, began to move across the Jordan to seal off the eastern valley floor before converging on Karameh.

Israeli planes bombed and strafed valley roads and suspected guerrilla concentration points. The planes also dropped leaflets addressed to the Jordanian soldiers, calling on them not to intervene in what was described as a "limited police action" against "the terrorists."

To Jordanian artillerymen and tank crews, dug in along the Gilead range, the valley is a vast theatrical tableau observed from the best of balcony views. It is inconceivable that the Israelis (however overconfident their June War victory had made them) would step so casually onto such a vulnerable field unless convinced that the Jordan Arab Army would let them pass.

It is possible that the Israelis assumed that the Jordanians would not risk an air attack on their artillery and on what remained of their tanks, but the guerrillas and left-wing critics of the Hashemites charge that the Israelis had been assured of noninterference via the American Embassy in Amman.

The PFLP and most of the PLF-PLO guerrillas had moved out of Karameh and other bases in the valley the day before in expectation of the attack, and had taken up positions on the hills overlooking the town to the east. Helicopter-borne Israeli paratroopers, who were landed in back of Karameh to complete the encirclement in the opening phase of the attack, were cut down by guerrilla small-arms and bazooka fire from these protected positions.

Inside the town, in violation of the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare, the bulk of Al-Fatah's forces remained to engage an obviously far superior encircling force. The decision was a calculated one. After two decades of defeat, the fedayeen had to prove to the Arab world—and particularly to the traumatized masses of Palestinians—that Arab fighters could stand and hold in the face of overwhelming odds.

When Arab resistance was finally overrun and silenced, the Israelis dynamited Karameh's two schools, the mosque, the pump house, and the field irrigation unit, as well as UNRWA food storage buildings. But while Karameh had technically fallen, a legend was about to be born.

The Jordanian artillery and tank forces overlooking the valley were under the direct command of Chief of Operations General Mashhour Haditha. The guerrillas are convinced that Haditha disregarded orders from the palace when he ordered Jordanian artillery and tanks to open fire on the converging Israeli columns.[3] One of the three main Israeli forces crossing the Jordan never actually entered the immediate combat zone because of the Jordanian artillery fire.

The original Israeli timetable had called for the capture of Karameh and for mastery of the entire central valley by 1100 hours, and for withdrawal in the early afternoon. A large contingent of Israeli and foreign correspondents was to be brought in from Tel Aviv and Jerusalem by bus for a quick tour around noon. But even after the town was taken and despite heavy Israeli air activity, Jordanian artillery continued to pound the roads to Karameh and the promised press tour never materialized. Instead, the journalists were diverted to an Israeli observation post overlooking the valley from the occupied West Bank.

It was clear to all of us, standing on that hillcrest above Jericho, watching puffs of smoke rising up and down the eastern bank, that the Israeli officer assigned to brief us was as confused as we were by developments in the fighting. In 1956, and again in 1967, foreign newsmen had been allowed to race along at their own risk at the very front of those spectacular Israeli advances. This time we piled into our buses and went back to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv.

At 1630 the Israelis requested a cease-fire through diplomatic channels; but by now the scent of victory had inflamed even the most hesitant nostrils in the palace, and Hussein refused. (The next day the King triumphantly toured the battlefield accompanied by his uncle Sherif Nasser, whom the guerrillas held primarily responsible for the attempt to keep the army out of the fighting.)

Whatever hopes the Israelis had of salvaging the operation were shattered in the late afternoon and early evening when reorganized guerrilla elements moved back down into the valley to mine roads, set up sniping posts, and penetrate Karameh in order to harass the Israeli withdrawal.

Jordanian shelling slowed down the withdrawal to a painful, casualty-prone pace since the Israelis were trying to tow back all of their damaged equipment, a standard procedure in Israeli reprisal raids.

But this time a number of tanks, half-track troop carriers, transport vehicles, and command jeeps were abandoned under fire and on the following day were paraded through the streets of Amman before cheering crowds.

Pictures of the captured equipment flashed across the Arab world and even penetrated—courtesy of Jordanian television—Israeli homes. A new psychological fact had been created. Within days thousands of young Palestinians were enlisting in the fedayeen. The turning point for the guerrilla movement had arrived.

NOTES

1. At a party congress in September 1966 the "Syrian" (or Left) faction of the Baath reaffirmed the principle of popular liberation war as the means for the recovery of Palestine. The Palestinian section of the party was subsequently authorized to organize a specifically Baathist guerrilla group, although the Syrian government continued to tolerate and assist the other fedayeen organizations. The Baathist group, best known by the name of its fighting arm, Al-Saiqa (The Thunderbolt), began recruiting and training early in 1967, but did not begin guerrilla operations until sometime after the June War. A year and a half after the June War, the "Iraqi" faction of the Baath party organized its own fedayeen group—the Arab Liberation Front.
2. In the wake of the September 1970 civil war in Jordan and the successful conclusion of King Hussein's military campaigns to destroy the guerrilla presence less than a year later, the Popular Struggle Front, the Action Organization, and the Palestine Arab Organization have collapsed and the Arab Liberation Front has ceased to operate as an effective organization. Also, a successful coup (in November 1970) by the "pragmatic socialist" military command in Syria against the neo-Marxist faction of the ruling Baath Socialist party has led to significant changes within Al-Saiqa. Ultimate authority over Al-Saiqa has been transferred from the party to the Syrian Army, the original commanders have been purged, and the organization has abandoned its previously leftist stance within the guerrilla movement. In March 1972 a new guerrilla group came into existence when middle cadre in PFLP sections in Lebanon and Syria split off to form the Popular Revolutionary Front. In their condemnation of PFLP hijacking tactics and of the "inability" of the older "rightist" PFLP leadership to transform the PFLP into a Marxist-Leninist movement, the PRF

cadres have echoed many of the original arguments of the DPF leader Naif Hawatmeh at the time his faction split from the PFLP.

3. On the eve of the September 1970 Jordanian civil war, General Haditha, who had subsequently risen to chief of staff, resigned his post and was then retired from the army. His removal had been preceded by an extensive purge of junior officers who, in Hashemite eyes, possessed a similar misplaced sense of duty.

Beirut-Amman Postscript

For the first time since those Palestinian peasant bands harassed British army installations and Zionist colonies in the mid-1930's, the "Arab-Israeli conflict" resumed with a potentially revolutionary perspective. A sense of the possibilities of popular resistance, based upon a strategy of protracted struggle fought in that depth of numbers and space that have been the Arab world's most obvious and least employed weapons in the last few decades of conflict with Israel, began to spread among the people. The hard truth that any decisive battles with Israel would have to be fought someday in the streets of Damascus or Amman or even Cairo struggled for recognition in this Arab East, which for two decades had fed on cheap fantasies of some painless victory.

Only to the degree that the Arab leaders understood that the guerrilla movement might generate enough pressure on the Israelis to make a "reasonable" peace settlement possible (return of the 1967 occupied territories) did they support or tolerate the movement. But to the degree that the movement suggested revolutionary possibilities to their own people, the Arab leaders have attempted to restrict, hinder, and repress the guerrillas.

Since the summer of 1970, when Egypt accepted U.S. Secretary of State Rogers' proposals for a Middle East settlement and agreed to a cease-fire, ending its share of the guerrilla-inspired border war that had proved so costly to Israel, this spectrum shifted radically against the guerrilla movement.

(In the fall of 1969, Israeli Defense Minister Dayan—quoting his own highly contested statistics—noted that postwar Israeli casualties

had increased from an average of 50 a month in the first year following the June War to a monthly average of 157 by the third year. Relative to the size of population this would be the equivalent of American casualties, dead and wounded, of more than 15,000 a month in Vietnam. In May 1970, on the eve of the Rogers Peace Plan, admitted Israeli losses rose still higher, and both *Time* and *Newsweek* published reports from Israel about a crisis of confidence.)

In Jordan the contradiction between the ruling family (which has come to share with Israel both a vested interest in the dismemberment of Palestine and an informal alliance with the United States) and the revolutionary potential of the fedayeen in a predominantly Palestinian society was most acute. When the spectrum shifted, the Hashemites ordered their army into battle against the guerrillas with a tenacity and calculation never displayed in any confrontation with the Israelis.

The Palestine Revolution is struggling desperately to survive. Its future will be determined by its ability to overcome internal divisions and to develop a strategy capable not only of withstanding Hashemite repression but also of reversing the momentum building up in the Arab East (and encouraged by the Soviet Union as well as the United States) for a peaceful settlement with Israel.

The Arab regimes are "realistic"—i.e., unwilling or unable to mobilize their populations for the sacrifices required by any protracted struggle with Israel that would, under present circumstances, only jeopardize their own privileges or rule; thus they are incapable or unwilling to function outside of the support-systems of the United States and the Soviet Union.

After twenty years of rhetoric there are, of course, certain gestures that must be made in the name of "Palestinian rights," but these are "rights" that can theoretically be disposed of in time by generous, internationally funded compensation for the refugees, by symbolic repatriation (to what is now Israel) of tens of thousands out of the more than one million, and by resettlement and possible Bantustan-like statehood for the rest in Gaza and the West Bank.

The crucial issue, then, for both the Arab states and Israel would seem to be territory—the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. In the years that have passed since the June War, this issue has been churned over and over again, both by the Israelis in their de-

mand for "secure and recognized borders" (which implies that the Israelis are so naive as to consider an extra 25 miles here and 50 miles there as the basis for a secure relationship with the Arab world) and by the Arabs in their denunciation of Israeli "expansionism," which implies that a settler-state content with its original territorial pickings is no danger to the region.

So the Israelis speak of the Jordan River as an eventual "security border, if not a political border," to be assured by Israeli military bases on the West Bank, and of the impossibility of relinquishing the Sharm el-Sheikh to Al-Arish corridor in Sinai or the western crown of the Golan Heights in any peace settlement. On the other hand, the Arabs point to the network of more than two dozen Israeli settlements established in the occupied territory, the permanent tourist facilities going up at Sharm el-Sheikh, and of course the ongoing de-Arabization of Jerusalem.

The ease with which the Israelis now refer to the West Bank as Judea and Samaria, to Tiran as Yotvat, to Sharm el-Sheikh as Mifratz Shlomo, has not escaped the Arabs. A literature of expansionism has flowered in the Arab press, culled from the most flamboyant remarks by Israeli politicians to reach the columns of foreign newspapers. A classic example of the genre is Dayan's declaration:

> Our fathers had reached the frontiers which were recognized in the Partition Plan. Our generation reached the frontiers of 1949. Now the Six-Day Generation has managed to reach Suez, Jordan, and the Golan Heights. This is not the end. After the present cease-fire lines there will be new ones. They will extend beyond Jordan—perhaps to Lebanon and perhaps to central Syria as well.[1]

But just as the pre-June War Israeli literature of Arab extermination vows conveniently obscured the real issue of a people dispossessed by settler-colonialism and demanding the liberation of their homeland, so the official Arab literature concerning Israel as territorial predator tends to obscure the far more complex relationships that are actually at stake in the Middle East.

Immediately after the June War most of Israeli opinion was convinced that the present Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian leaderships were close to collapse, that along with the neighboring Arab armies the Palestinian will to resist had been decisively broken, and that a

sweeping peace settlement was imminent—certainly with Hussein and either with a chastised Egyptian and Syrian leadership or their expected heirs.

At that moment, aside from the annexation of Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol resisted taking more than the most provisional measures in the occupied territories, despite pressure from the extreme annexationists within his national coalition government. And yet at that most confident moment, when a peace settlement seemed so close to most Israelis, Eshkol and his government insisted on direct talks, which the Arabs, and particularly Egypt, refused.

This issue has subsequently faded into a projected compromise. The Israelis have been brought around to participation in "indirect talks" during the initial phases of negotiations, and the Egyptians have indicated privately that in the final stages a formula similar to the 1948–1949 Rhodes Armistice talks would be acceptable. The Rhodes formula (negotiating teams stay in the same building but meet officially in separate rooms with a mediator as go-between) is also acceptable to the Israelis. As for King Hussein, he has already met secretly with Israeli leaders on at least three occasions since the June 1967 War.

The initial insistence by the Israelis on direct talks and the insistence by the Arabs on indirect negotiations were not sly evasions, as both sides have charged. They were significant formal expressions reflecting two strongly contrasting concepts of a Middle East peace settlement.

Since the June 1967 War the position of most Arab states has basically been that a Middle East peace settlement can be achieved by a simple exchange: Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories in return for renunciation by the Arab states of the more than two-decade-old state of belligerency with Israel.

When Egypt and Jordan accepted the UN Security Council Resolution of November 1967, the Arab portion of the exchange was defined to encompass the "termination of all claims or states of belligerency, and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence" of Israel and its right "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force," as well as a guarantee to Israel of "freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area"

and guarantees of military security for Israel "through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones."

All that remained, then—from the point of view of the Arab states—was for a third party (either the big powers or a UN mediator) to secure from both sides an agreed-upon timetable for Israeli withdrawal and Arab termination of belligerency.

All the dramatic Arab concessions since then—assurances that an Arab-Israeli peace would specifically mean Israeli use of the Suez Canal, a demilitarized and internationally policed Sharm el-Sheikh to guarantee Israeli shipping through the Gulf of Aqaba, diplomatic recognition of Israel—have been but embarrassing translations, into concrete terms, of the general phrasing employed in the UN resolution or tactical retreats regarding priorities in the projected exchange of territory for nonbelligerency. The signing of a peace treaty (another Arab "concession") would mean a contractual declaration of these points, as well as a specification of whatever "minor" border "rectifications" had been agreed upon in bargaining over the issue of Israeli withdrawal.

The Arabs, in turn, have pressed the Israelis to make similar concrete translations of that portion of the UN resolution which emphasized the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" and called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." But the Israeli position has always been that the discussion of Israel's fixed and final frontiers is inseparable from the negotiation of "all other questions involved in achieving a lasting peace" in which Israel can "live in security." The standing inference has always been that the more secure the Israelis feel, the less likely they are to require large portions of the occupied territories.

Thus the seeming contradiction between the stream of often conflicting reports in which Israeli leaders have spoken of keeping not only already annexed Arab Jerusalem, but also the Golan Heights, Sharm el-Sheikh, parts of the West Bank or military bases along the Jordan River, Gaza, and the Al-Arish to Sharm el-Sheikh corridor, while insisting on Israeli willingness to sit down with the Arabs and negotiate unconditionally "on all questions" involved in achieving a lasting peace.

To the Israelis (as Abba Eban has so softly put it) "peace" is a

word describing intense "regional partnership": open borders for trade, tourism, capital investment, and cultural exchange, as well as conventional forms of diplomatic recognition, envoy exchange, and mutually recognized borders. It is the sort of arrangement that can emerge from the bargaining table only between the most trusting of allies or between an empire and its prospective neocolonies.

These are not conditions for negotiation, but an Israeli definition of the very goal of negotiations. If demanded as conditions, they could be rejected; instead they are the very stuff, however obscured by the squabble over territories, of the unconditional peace talks the Israelis insist on.[2]

The Israelis have always claimed that if the Arabs would only "sit down and talk," they would discover the Israelis to be very generous at the negotiating table. Assured "regional partnership" by peace treaty, Israel could indeed afford to be generous on such questions as compensation to refugees, aid for their resettlement and symbolic repatriation, Arab access to Mediterranean ports, joint desalination projects, and Jordan River diversification schemes, in the same fashion that one might say the United States has always been generous to Latin America. Israel might even offer the Arabs her own version of the "Alliance for Progress" and a Jewish "Peace Corps."

For if there is any vaguely equivalent pattern to Israeli-Arab relations, it is to be found in the history of the two Americas: the European colonial and immigrant society in the North, which disinherited and destroyed the indigenous Indians and its ultimate prey in the South—underdeveloped, largely Indian-stock societies wrecked by colonialism, saddled with unstable military regimes, oligarchies, or at best proud but inevitably impotent nationalist leaderships who responded as well as they could to an unfulfilled continental vision of nationhood based on one language and a common culture.

"What we aspire to is not the relationship which exists between Lebanon and Syria; it is far more akin to the relationship between the United States and the Latin American continent; relations of good neighborliness, of regional cooperation, of economic interaction, but across a frankly confessed gulf of historic, cultural and linguistic differences," says Abba Eban.[3]

The perspectives of power, however, are not drawn quite so clearly in the Middle East. The Israelis lack the natural resources and

vast domestic market with which the United States cultivated its own strength prior to any but peripheral southern adventures. The Israeli per-capita income is at least three times as high as that of the neighboring Arab states, and equivalent to that of Italy or Belgium but without the industrial productivity of either European state. There is a quality of artifice, or sleight of hand, to this economy whose major sources of *earned* income are tourism, citrus exports, diamonds (imported for cutting and overseas resale), and light weapons.

American aid, German reparations, but above all the persistently vast financing provided by Western (and particularly North American) Jewry in the forms of gifts, loans, and investments, have covered the gap between a modern techno-economic infrastructure and lack of productivity.

When there were waves of immigration to settle and house, the infrastructure could simultaneously develop and perform; it was then that Israel enjoyed its brief booms and high growth rates, building today's "development towns" for tomorrow's unemployed. When there is war the infrastructure can again perform, and the heightening of a semipermanent but frequently dormant emergency mood pumps new life into overseas fund-raising for months or even years.

A "reasonable" peace that ends belligerency without guaranteeing Israeli access to nearby Arab markets or resources would only mean the death of that "threatened-bastion" psychological stance with which the Israelis preserve their internal unity and squeeze their living out of Western Jewry, for regional economic expansion must necessarily compensate for the inevitable loss of overseas funds.

It is precisely this conventional peace which Dayan denounced, during a peace scare in early January 1969, as an "unacceptable state of unwar" and then bluntly remarked that there could be no peace settlement with the Arabs unless there is trade with the Arabs. It is what Prime Minister Golda Meir meant when she said there would be peace in the Middle East when she could get into her car in Tel Aviv and drive to Cairo to do her shopping.

Unlike nineteenth-century America, Israel cannot hope to become an industrial power until she first achieves the modern equivalent of empire. And the sophistication of the Israeli infrastructure, the available skills of her overwhelmingly literate labor force, and the vast po-

tential sources of overseas capital are economically irrelevant unless they are conjoined with the opportunity to overwhelm the underdeveloped Arab bourgeoisie in a "regional partnership."

The silent Israeli retail boycott of West Bank manufactured goods at the very moment that a flood of Israeli consumer products replaced no-longer-available imports on the shelves of Arab retailers, and the steady decline of local Arab industry in face of these and other competitive measures, prove that Israeli publicists had a grim point when they claimed, shortly after the June War, that "Israeli-Arab collaboration" in the occupied territories would serve as a shining example of future possibilities for the entire region.

"Regional partnership" also means the sole opportunity to reverse Israel's double-edged immigration and labor problems. A dynamic, expanding industrial economy producing for and investing in the markets of the Middle East means that the 50,000 to 100,000 skilled professionals and top managerial types of European origin who have left Israel in the last two decades for lack of work or attractive pay would be able to return, and the Zionist ideal of significant Jewish immigration from America, England, Western Europe, and South Africa— a hopeless dream at present, given the relatively lower standard of living in Israel and the lack of security—might become a reasonable possibility.

At the same time, Israeli shortages of low-wage unskilled or semiskilled labor could be filled by the vast labor reservoirs in the neighboring Arab states. Since the June War this low-cost labor shortage has already led to the employment of tens of thousands of Arabs from Gaza and Arab Jerusalem as farm workers, semiskilled and unskilled factory hands, day laborers on construction and road maintenance crews, or in such service occupations as dishwashers, waiters, gardeners, and handymen—the nascent emergence of the classic native subproletariat in a settler-state.

Abba Eban suggests the following perspective:

> If you imagine railway communications running from Haifa to Beirut, Damascus and Istanbul in the north, to Amman and beyond in the east and traffic resumed on the Haifa-Cairo line, you can see at once that trade and commerce of the area, as well as its cultural interchange, would be strengthened beyond measure. Similarly, resumption and expansion of road communications between Cairo, Jerusalem and Beirut and between

> Haifa and Baghdad would stimulate the life and commerce of the Middle East above any level so far attained.
>
> In the context of a peace settlement there would be no justification for portraying the southern part of Israel as though it were some kind of a "wedge" between various parts of the Arab world. . . . Indeed, within the context of the settlement which I am here presenting, Israel would regard itself as a bridge, not as a wedge.[4]

In any regional development effort, the Arabs "could have no better partners than the Israelis, their ancient cousins, who have struggled for centuries to preserve their culture and adapt it to the tasks of modern life," observed Eugene V. Rostow in his essay (in the winter of 1968) on the Middle East as a "region of promise."[5]

Shortly after Rostow's position paper appeared, I remarked to an American diplomat that Rostow's vision of regionalism would inevitably mean the loss of American products on the Arab market, with Israel the gainer. The diplomat conceded the point and then noted that the American share of the Arab market was declining anyway in face of Japanese and Eastern European competition; the Arab East represented a relatively minor portion of American overseas commercial sales, and if sacrificing this market to the Israelis was the price for "regional stability," it was well worth it.

"Regional stability" fundamentally means the preservation of dominant American interests in the exploitation of Arab petroleum and the preservation of those regimes that acquiesce to this situation. Israel's projected role in the Middle East would then resemble the future role charted for Japan by the United States in Southeast Asia: policeman and favored partner of Western industrialism.

What the diplomat had failed to mention or imply was the present role and future potential of American investment within an Israel producing the relatively lower labor-cost and low transport-cost goods that would overwhelm all other competition for the Arab market.

And when Bob Sheer of *Ramparts* interviewed Abba Eban shortly after the June War, he was shocked to discover that the "socialist" Israeli foreign minister did not consider the idea of foreign capital controlling Arab oil as imperialism. Sheer's problem was his own inability to understand "foreign capital" or imperial ambition in any but its most obvious and officially American form, whereas Eban excelled in the tolerance of ambitious men.

But if all this does sound like empire to some, the Israelis understand the bargain on an emotional level much differently. What is the point of making fundamental sacrifices, they ask, unless there is a meaningful and genuine peace (i.e., regional partnership)?

It is difficult to understand this Zionist sense of sacrifice or loss unless one grasps from the beginning that Israel is as much a state of mind, continually imposing and transforming itself into reality, as it is a conventional country with fixed boundaries or membership in the United Nations.

Seventy-five years ago, when Palestine existed as a sleepy Arab part of the Syrian province of the Ottoman Empire, "Israel" existed as pure ideology in the minds of those small, barely emerging Zionist groupings scattered throughout Europe. Given the will and circumstance, that consciousness went on to transmute itself into partial form and "build the state of Israel in part of the historic Land of Israel" (to quote any standard Zionist text).

History here may be taken to mean the biblical record of God's promise to the seed of Abraham or the hazy dimensions of David's kingdom—in any case, it involves considerable amounts of additional Arab territory, certainly all of the original Palestine Mandate, including much or all of the remaining Jordanian East Bank, as well as the already occupied West Bank and portions of Lebanon and Syria. According to the proposed boundaries sought by the Zionist delegation to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, there is also hint of an undefined stretch of Sinai.[6]

This vision of "Eretz Israel," in distinction to the partition plan of 1947 or even the pre-June War limits of the State of Israel, tints the very fabric of Zionist belief and recurs continually as a theme in the speeches of most Israeli leaders, even when they consciously resist demands for additional annexations. Along with the hard realities of the occupation, it is the basis for the Arab obsession with Israel as territorial predator.

But territorial objectives and internal political struggle—from the time Herzl first sought his bargain with the Caliph in Istanbul, through the Balfour Declaration, the UN partition plan, and the 1956 Sinai-Suez campaign—have always operated creatively within a field of tension bound by the limitations of realpolitik, on the one hand, and this ultimate ideological source on the other. The Israelis realize

that a permanent peace with the Arab states means irrevocable abandonment of such visions, and this is the fundamental "sacrifice."

The post-June War Israeli internal tensions, particularly between Eshkol and Dayan or between the government as a whole and such openly annexationist nonpartisan groups as the "Greater Land of Israel Movement," reflect the problem of inhibiting the basic ideological thrust when there is little to show in the way of progress to a "meaningful" peace settlement. These movements, which quite simply call for the permanent retention of all the recently occupied Arab territories, appear to enjoy considerable support from the Israeli public and have been treated with distant but obvious respect by most of the Hebrew press. They reflect the same honing of Israeli sensibility at the ideological source in the face of intensifying Arab resistance as those Israeli public-opinion polls during the period of escalating guerrilla activity which placed Dayan as the most favored choice for prime minister.

As for the religious parties and the traditional expansionist sects that openly claimed all of Palestine-Transjordan for Israel decades before this recent war, the pledge to "keep everything forever" assumed liturgical significance. "What God has given us, no Jew has the right to return," a prominent rabbi declared with passion in paid newspaper advertisements. But more typical in style was the letter in the Israeli press from a schoolgirl during a low in the search for a peaceful settlement: "If we have no right to Hebron or Jericho, what right do we have to Jaffa or Akka [Acre]?"

Nervous Western liberals have misread Israeli ambivalence into a "dove"-"hawk" equation of their own making, assuming that all the trouble lies in the struggle between those Israelis who want "more territory" and those who want "peace." But consider, instead, an indigenous image, an Israeli elite in which each man carries a symbolic scale of weights within his head—one tray is labeled "historic rights to more territory"; the other, "regional partnership." The first tray is weighted with the prizes of war—past, present, and future; the second tray, with that signed peace treaty assuring or leading to open frontiers, access to Arab markets, resources, and investment opportunities which Eban included within his nine-point "Vision of Peace" in a postwar speech at the United Nations.

The quarrel of domestic Israeli life, then, has always been over how best to read and manipulate the "scale within."

What is so peculiar is that most of this is still lost on most of the Arab leaders. The Arab elite cannot, or will not, comprehend that an Israeli presence or stake in the occupied territories is being assured by a dynamic process, whether they are to be "returned" to the Arabs or not. Ultimately Gaza's integration into the Israeli economy will be more significant than the question of whether the Israelis are to hold on to the Strip, turn it over to Jordan, or let it be linked with the West Bank as part of the miniature Palestine "state." The same can be said about the economic integration of the West Bank.

The most apparent purely territorial barrier to settlement is, of course, Arab Jerusalem, and even the *formal* status of this extraordinary city may yet prove sufficient to frustrate all the forces at work to "stabilize" the Middle East.

Nevertheless, it is significant that all the advocates of a peaceful settlement who insist that the present Israeli-annexed status of the Old City is unacceptable (be they Arab or Western writers) concede that whatever final formal status is to be secured by the exercise of pressure upon Israel—international enclave, co-dominion, return to Arab sovereignty, or some combination of these alternatives—the "unity" of the two sectors will be preserved by free access and integrated municipal services.

So even here (assuming the most difficult of Israeli "concessions") the overall political-economic relationship between a treaty-bound Jordan or a Palestinian statelet and Israel, along with the already rapidly changing population patterns in the Arab city, will ultimately prove almost as significant in determining the future character of Arab Jerusalem as formal Israeli occupation.

Until now it has been pride, not intelligence, that has saved the Arab elite and spared an entire people from a peace settlement that would be equivalent in effect to the Latin American's economic and cultural servitude. But this pride, whether rooted in some archaic wonder of desert virtues or in the flashy formica nationalism so endemic to "progressive" Third World regimes, is wearing thin. During the September 1970 Jordanian civil war, the Hashemites made little attempt to hide their hope of an Israeli intervention if that was what saving the throne required.

The Arab elite desperately craves a settlement because they lack the energy, historic ambition, and faith in themselves and their people to conceive of a viable alternative.

When Abba Eban talks of regional partnership, most of the Arab press is silent out of incomprehension or indifference; they consider this to be an Israeli literary flourish and not the real serious business at hand. The Arab elite ignores Rostow's vision or the nuances of Nixon's talk of "something more than paper peace" and then wonders what it is that America really wants. Some do understand, however, and are prepared to share, as Arab compradors, in the profit.

NOTES

1. As quoted in the *London Times*, June 25, 1969.
2. In a speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 1, 1952, Eban listed six major aspects to an agenda for direct peace talks: "Security Questions, Territorial Questions, Refugee Questions, Economic Questions, Regional Cooperation, Diplomatic and Juridical Relations." He then went on to discuss the Economic Question, which meant the "replacement of present boycott and blockade by normal economic relations." As an illustration Eban suggested that Israel would provide a market for "the perishable agricultural products of Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, the meat of Iraq, the cotton of Egypt," while "there is no doubt that our own manufacture could yield a varied range of products to be available to Arab countries close at hand." Eban also stressed "cooperative efforts in the exploitation of raw materials." (Abba Eban, *Voice of Israel* [New York: 1957], pp. 87, 93, 94.) Following the June 1967 War, Eban restated the above points in still another speech at the United Nations.
3. Ibid., p. 63.
4. Ibid., pp.95–96.
5. As quoted in the *Jerusalem Post* extract, "Obstacles to Peace," February 20, 1968. As for W. W. Rostow, only a few days after the June War had ended, he was to tell graduating seniors at Middlebury College in Vermont that while regionalism was the basis for economic development and national security and was promoted by the United States, "the one region in the non-Communist world" where regional institutions and the regional spirit had not yet emerged was the Middle East. (*New York Times*, June 13, 1967.)

6. The proposals of the Zionist delegation were reproduced by the then former British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, in his book *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* (Vol. 2). The text, as quoted in Neville Barbour's *Nisi Dominus* (p. 104), reads:

"The boundaries of Palestine shall follow the general lines set out below:

"Starting on the North at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity South of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon as far as Jisr el Keraon, thence to El Bira, following the dividing-line between the two basins of the Wadi el Korn and the Wadi el Taim, thence in a southerly direction following the dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes of the Hermon, to the vicinity West of Beit Jenn, thence Eastward following the northern watersheds of the Nahr Mughaniya close and west of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the Gulf of Aqaba.

"In the South a frontier to be agrecd upon with the Egyptian Government.

"In the West the Mediterranean Sea."

DATE DUE

AP 7 '77			
GAYLORD			PRINTED IN U.S.A.