Colonialism & Conflict among Palestinians in ISRAEL

NOT JUST A SOCCER GAME

Magid Shihade

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MAGID SHIHADE

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Introduction

A Soccer Game Turns Violent

On April 11, 1981, a soccer game took place between teams from two neighboring Palestinian Arab towns in Galilee; in northern Israel it was Kafr Yassif, with a predominantly Christian (55 percent) population, and Julis, a predominantly Druze town.[1] The match took place in Kafr Yassif, and it would have decided which team between the two would proceed to the upper soccer league in Israel. During the game, a fight broke out between the fans of both teams, and a person from Julis was stabbed (by his own knife). In spite of that violence, the game continued, and the team from Julis won. The moment the game was over, fighting resumed between the fans, and a man from Julis threw a hand grenade at the fans from Kafr Yassif, injuring a few of them. That night, the man from Julis who was stabbed during the fight died in the hospital. Another teenager from Kafr Yassif, who was injured by the hand grenade, also died in the hospital.

Although violence in sports is common all over the world, none of my friends and I had expected to see these events unfold during the game.[2] We were excited to watch the match, but this excitement turned into grave

1. The Arabs here are Israeli citizens, unlike those persons in the territories occupied after the 1967 war. I will discuss their history in detail in chapter 2, but for the moment it is worth noting that as Druze serve in the Israeli Army, they are armed, whereas Kafr Yassif's inhabitants are from different religious backgrounds with a Christian majority and do not serve in the Israeli Army, so they are unarmed.

2. I attended the soccer game because Kafr Yassif is my hometown, and witnessing these events was a memorable experience for me.

disappointment after seeing people fighting, being beaten, and getting injured. Even the winning team's fans from Julis were beaten up during and after the game. I felt that it must have been humiliating for Julis fans to be beaten, regardless of who started the fight.

During and after that evening, I spent time with family members, friends, and people in the village discussing the consequences of the soccer-game fiasco. There was concern over what the people from Julis would do. We were aware of the arms they had because most of them, being Druze, served in the Israeli military. No one was sure whether they would attack the whole village to take revenge or just attack the people they suspected were involved in the killing of the Julis fan.

We were also aware of the efforts that were under way for achieving *sulha,* a conflict-management method used in Arab tradition to prevent further violence and bring an end to conflicts between parties.[3] For a couple of days after the game, we saw police vehicles around Kafr Yassif, which made us feel that the situation *was* serious. Some were saying that the police guaranteed that there would be no attacks from Julis, whereas others did not believe that claim. Instead, they argued that Druze from Julis would attack and take revenge on the village, and many felt uneasy because they were uncertain whether the Druze from Julis would attack only those persons suspected of the killing.

Feeling unsure about the consequences, some families left the village and sought refuge in neighboring villages with friends and relatives. My father said that we were not going to leave, because he did not believe that random people would be attacked in Kafr Yassif. So my family stayed in the village and decided not to leave town.

My father was both right and wrong at the same time. On Monday, April 14, three days after the game, Druze from Julis attacked Kafr Yassif. My relatives' homes that were located on the main route of the village were

3. *Sulha* is a traditional Arab conflict management that is practiced in Galilee as well as in other parts of the Arab world. In short, it is initiated by leaders in the community called upon by the parties in conflict. Consequently, those leaders, called *jaha,* negotiate a settlement between the two sides to dispute and often manage to prevent violence from taking place, or manage to stop further escalation of violence (Jabbour 1996).

attacked as the assailants proceeded mostly through the main streets. Our house was saved, as we lived in the older part of the village, where narrow alleys make it hard for cars to pass through easily.

I still remember that day, sitting in the classroom at school, when we heard the sound of automatic gunshots. The teacher quickly went to see what was happening outside, as the school was located in the center of the village near the local council. He saw people in a jeep shooting at the local council building. The school director decided that as soon as the shooting stopped, he and the teachers would help the students go home, fearing that if they remained in the school, another jeep with machine guns might get in and put hundreds of students in danger. As soon as we were told by our teachers to leave, I ran home like all the other students, following our teachers' advice to take the narrow alleyways rather than the main streets. I arrived home to find that all my family was safe and that many of my nephews and nieces, whose schools and kindergartens were close to our house, were taking refuge there. For more than an hour, we stayed quietly at home, hearing shots and shouts in the streets nearby. After some time, when the shooting and noise had stopped, we got calls from our relatives saying that they had been attacked by villagers from Julis. Although the attack seemed to be over, we remained at home for a few more hours. Then later I decided to take a walk with my brothers and sisters and see our relatives whose homes had been attacked. We discovered that they had managed to escape from their houses and that none of them was harmed and the damage was restricted to their homes and cars. The streets that we passed through looked terrible. We saw burned houses, cars, and shops that were similar to a postwar scene from the movies. By the time we arrived at my uncles' houses, people in the neighborhood had started to come out and talk about what had taken place. Everyone seemed to be in a state of shock.

For several days after the event, people talked incessantly about how the attack took place and how the police behaved. Those individuals who had had a firsthand experience of the attack were the center of conversations in the village during that time. Some blamed the incident on the people who participated in the fight during the soccer game, especially the ones who were suspected of killing the fan from Julis. Others blamed

the local council for not trying enough to stop further deterioration of the situation. Some argued that if they, like the Druze, had been drafted into the Israeli military, they too would have arms that would have enabled them to defend themselves or acted as a deterrent to the attack. Some blamed the police for not doing what it ought to have done: prevent or stop the attack. Others argued that their families had friends in neighboring villages and kibbutzim who had arms and came to help, but they were prevented by the police from entering Kafr Yassif. Many analyses, and many more questions, were shared among the residents of the village for days, even weeks, after the soccer game.

The tense atmosphere in the village prevailed until the *sulha* took place some weeks later, in May. People were angry at the police and outraged that the government was not allowing an independent investigation into the behavior of the police. Many argued that the government must have been behind this attack or was covering up for some individuals in the Ministry of Interior Security (which is responsible for the police), which was why they were pressuring the residents of Kafr Yassif to accept the *sulha* without the attached condition of an independent investigation. The multiple claims over the causes of the incident, and the role of the state, left many unanswered questions in my mind. The game that turned violent shaped my interest in a deeper analysis of issues of conflict and violence that drive my research.

My aim in this book is to answer questions that I and many others in Kafr Yassif had about the event. The official narratives of police and government were contradictory. On the one hand, they claimed they were surprised and overwhelmed by the events and did not intervene in order to prevent more casualties, and on the other hand, they posited that the event could be explained by the nature of Arab society as inherently violent. However, the latter argument does not pass the test of logical reasoning, because if Arab society was in fact essentially violent, then the escalation of violence during and after the game could not have been a surprise to the "experts" on Arab culture.

Contrary to the claims of police and government officials, the residents of Kafr Yassif argued that the police did not respond more actively because they were actually complicit in the event. Many residents thought

that the police were interested in further infighting between the two towns, as it was in line with the policies of state authorities toward the Arab Palestinian community in Israel. Local residents also pointed out that the relationship between the two towns was actually very friendly before the event, and contrary to dominant claims, the violence could not be characterized as rooted in historical enmity or as an act of revenge between the two communities. Many argued that although fighting and violence are indeed present in Arab society, Jewish society in Israel is actually more violent. And regardless, it should be the duty of the state to safeguard the well-being of its citizens rather than hide behind cultural stereotypes and explanations. These critics also pointed out that the government, if interested, could be capable of preventing and stopping the escalation of violence and that it would never allow such events to take place within the Jewish community.

Since the event, I have had many conversations with a range of people in the village and the surrounding region on multiple occasions. The common analysis of the event was that Druze from Julis were used by the government, with the help of certain leaders in the Druze community, to attack Kafr Yassif and punish it for its history of resistance to state policies. In my interviews with local residents, it was often pointed out that the incident was an example of state authorities' instigating internal violence, instilling fear in the Arab community in order to silence it, and making life much less safe for them, thus forcing the Palestinian Arabs to leave their country as a result of fear and a feeling of insecurity.

My research investigates the claims made by the police and the Israeli government as well as the claims made by the community in Kafr Yassif. I will discuss the findings of the research by attempting to answer the two main questions that emerge from the research: First, were state authorities to blame for the event, as eyewitnesses claimed? Second, was the relationship between the two communities prior to the event really as peaceful as the inhabitants claimed?

Methodology and Framework

The research is multidisciplinary in its methodology and theoretical framework. Thus, it does not fall within the boundaries of a specific

field in the social sciences but rather draws on approaches and methods from different fields, mainly anthropology, history, political science, and studies of ethnic and communal conflict. My approach in this book is influenced by several layers of personal and educational experience. I am much influenced by Ibn Khaldoun's (AD 1332–1406) methodological and epistemological approach, most important his emphasis on logical deduction, that is, examining statements against themselves, analyzing paradoxes within them, and investigating other facts that might challenge such arguments.[4]

Furthermore, my education in the field of law has exposed me to how the law, like many other instruments of knowledge, can be used in the search for justice and truth but can also be used in the services of the opposite. Through my research, I will be using this knowledge more for the former purposes rather than the latter. Additionally, legal studies have taught me to look for holes in a narrative, that is, to seek what is hidden rather than what has been simply declared or stated.

I am also influenced by my study of critical theology, which is another name for liberation theology. This approach has helped me in using knowledge not for the sake of upholding canonical and official interpretations but the opposite: finding ways to use knowledge to help empower the marginalized, whose narrative is suppressed, and revealing how this suppressed narrative is used by dominant forces to perpetuate injustice. In other words, as Enrique Dussel (1985) argues, ethical and liberationist philosophy and knowledge production must be the aim of those persons working in the academy.

Finally, I am also influenced by the field of critical pedagogy and critical scholarship that, among other things, calls upon us to take knowledge production seriously and not to promote ourselves at the cost of the people we write about, suggesting a critique not only of official narratives but also of mainstream scholarship. This project contributes to scholarship

4. An excellent translation of Ibn Khaldoun's enormous work is Ibn Khaldoun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History,* translated and introduced by Franz Rosenthal, abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood, with a new introduction by Bruce B. Lawrence (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005).

that aims at voicing the narrative of the marginalized who in their silencing are hostage to official narratives that serve to maintain and perpetuate power. The powerful have many avenues to air their explanations, which is not the case for the marginalized within any society.

At its heart, this book tackles the issue of state society relations and the question of state policies and their implementations. It offers an alternative perspective to the top-down approach of historiography, in which state narratives and elite voices are dominant. The study contributes to the growing work of the subaltern studies school that complements the narrative of the state and allows for better understanding of the case study here. I draw on archival research, including material from local archives in the Kafr Yassif local council as well as local newspapers that add to information available in government documents and state-centered interpretation. Engaging with the field of anthropology, the research utilizes extended fieldwork, accompanied by intimate knowledge of the Palestinian Arab community under study, and their history and language. I believe that local voices are important to include in researching such incidents, and they are even more important when the historical event has not been studied before, as is the case in this book. As such, this work breaks new ground in the study of communal violence among Palestinian Arabs in Israel.

Furthermore, as there has been little work on Palestinian Arabs in Israel, and none on Palestinian village histories, this work will be an essential addition to existing studies on Israel, its Palestinian Arab citizens, their religious communities and history, and, in particular, their peripheral history rather than the relatively better-documented history of cities and larger population centers. Thus, this research can help us learn about the way these largely ignored groups and neglected issues can contribute to an understanding of the larger history of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the Palestinian Arabs in general, the state of Israel, and the Palestinian-Israeli question.

This book also makes a contribution to the field of ethnic and communal conflict and violence, as the case study examines the relationship between state policies and communal and ethnic identities, conflict and violence, the intertwining of history with modern problems, and the role of external as well as internal factors in creating group violence.

Furthermore, it is common knowledge that states do not declare some policies openly, and researchers often wait for decades until state archives are declassified in order to uncover policies and the actions of states. This secrecy, according to many governments and powerful groups, is justified as necessary for our security, the security of the state, and the well-being of all of us. This research instead suggests that an investigation of state policies can be undertaken by examining the often-repeated actions of state authorities and drawing conclusions from such patterns about undeclared yet discernible policies, especially with regard to issues similar to the issue under investigation. This helps shed light on state policies at earlier moments in history, even though these policies are often practiced without being openly declared. Doing so not only advances our scholarly investigations but also keeps governments and powerful forces in check, challenging their covering up of possible abuses under the pretext of secrecy and classification of documents.

The study also demonstrates how societies attempt to manage violence and conflict when governments or authorities do not, or cannot, intervene. These questions are especially important now that there is an increased interest in research regarding minority-majority relationships around the world, which are considered a serious threat to global security, and such violence, communal or ethnic, is one of the most difficult issues facing many countries around the world (Ghanem and Moustafa 2004, 3).

Finally, I would like to address the methodological concern of possible partiality in my research with regards to two issues. The first is my close relationship with Kafr Yassif, since I grew up there and experienced the attack firsthand. This background might have prejudiced me against the people from Julis. To minimize this bias, the starting point of my argument is that people from both villages were guilty of taking part in the violence. Regardless of the state's role in conflicts, I believe that the Arab community is responsible for dealing with group violence irrespective of the causes or circumstances. There have been many incidents where a fight between individuals from different families, faiths, or villages led to group violence between entire families, sects, or villages. Such issues ought to be dealt with by individuals and leaders in the Arab community. And although members of the community often try to prevent violence

because they believe it is primarily a consequence of government policies and negligence and does not serve the well-being of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the community relies heavily on traditional indigenous methods of conflict management and resolution because it does not trust the state authorities' interventions. This point is discussed in greater depth in later chapters in this book.

Additionally, though I too am a Palestinian Arab from Kafr Yassif, my research is not about assigning blame but rather about understanding why the events took place and dealing with the main two questions I posed at the onset. I am interested in investigating, through historical and empirical research, the claims of the community in Kafr Yassif that the Israeli authorities were complicit in the attack and that the relationship between the two villages prior to the event was neighborly and peaceful and examining what internal as well as external dynamics might have helped to turn the two villages against each other. I believe that both villages are partially victims of history and have been manipulated by leaders and individuals from both within and without. Hence, although my interviews were undertaken only in Kafr Yassif and surrounding villages, this limitation is justified by the focus of the research, which is centered around the witnesses to the attack rather than the perpetrators. In both cases, my argument is not to focus on blaming individuals or the two villages. The aim of the book is to examine how state authorities behaved during the incident and learn whether we can deduce something from their behavior that can tell us more about the larger policy of the state toward its citizens.

As far as a second possible personal bias against the state of Israel is concerned, an objective examination of Israeli state policies remains one of the most difficult issues to tackle in scholarship, especially in the United States, where open discussion of any issue related to Israel is restricted by much anxiety, hostility, and censorship. For some individuals, no matter what one does, it is impossible to take scholarship on Israel seriously and analyze and draw conclusions based on facts and evidence, especially if it means that it might represent Israel and its policies in a negative light. For some, in the academy and beyond, any critique of Israel is taboo. Instead of looking at the research impartially, various kinds of personal attacks,

some coated in "scholarly" language, are directed against anyone who dares to challenge the taboo. This fact is even more true in my case as an Arab Palestinian citizen from Israel who has lived through and experienced Israeli policies firsthand. Yet to bow to fears of such attacks is not only morally questionable; it runs against everything that academic pursuit aims to accomplish, that is, critical thought and scholarship that question power and do not aim to please the prevailing mood of the general public. To be critical of power relations in knowledge production and censorship of thought is thus not only morally but also intellectually necessary in the field of academics. My possible bias is balanced by the findings based on the information drawn from eyewitnesses and archival and media narratives as well as the extensive literature that is discussed in the book.

In addition, I argue that communal and ethnic violence is not a specific phenomenon that exists in Israel alone but happens in many places in the region and elsewhere. Thus, the case in Israel is not an exception with regard to this issue. Furthermore, even though these events happen in many places, and the real or imagined causes for them are often distorted, I argue that in modern times, states are solely responsible for the security of their citizens, whether in India, Spain, Israel, or anywhere else. The modern state has claimed the sole sovereignty over the use of force and the right to defend its citizens that might be harmed from within and from without. For this reason it is crucial to focus on the state as an analytical tool in such questions. My approach argues against the use of cultural explanations for violence, focusing instead on the modern state as the main system that organizes and shapes people's lives. It is the state as the central modern political structure that we need to take seriously when discussing any issue that happens related to its domain of power.

Specifically, at the core of this study is the argument that states bear the main responsibility if violence takes place among groups under their authorities. This point is as true for Israel as for any other country, and it is even more the case for strong states. I will discuss this issue more in chapter 4, but for the moment, I would like to stress that the state, when it is considered a strong one, must be taken as the central explanatory factor for group violence. In weak states, on the other hand, the discussion

is centered on how to address the factors that make the state weak and prevent it from extending protection to its citizens. Furthermore, individuals and groups can always be manipulated to take part in violence against one another, as history has shown, and often it is impossible to understand the motivations for their participation in violence. Since it is commonly accepted among scholars that states are rational, despite some arguments to the contrary in some cases, the focus of inquiry regarding this phenomenon ought to be the state and its institutions, policies, actions, and ability to ensure the safety of its citizens and prevent group violence within its borders.

Furthermore, I will point in the book to similar incidents that took place within the Arab community in Israel at different moments, so that the discussion is not based only on one event that took place in Kafr Yassif. Using other cases, even though with less depth compared to the main case study in this book, will help shed more light on whether state authorities in other villages and towns exhibit similar patterns. I will also situate the event in the context of the general relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens. Putting the incident in this larger context will help shed light on the event and also help examine whether the behavior of state authorities (in this case the police) in the Kafr Yassif incident is an exception or the norm.

Finally, I argue that no community or society, regardless of religion or ethnicity, is immune from violence. Furthermore, all states, regardless of their political system, are also not immune from group violence within populations under their sovereignty. The main concern in this book is to see how the policies of the state affect the relationship between the different ethnic and religious groups. It is not a defense on behalf of any group or an attack on any specific group or state. My hope is that the book and the analysis I offer here will help bring fresh insights to the field of ethnic and communal conflicts and violence.

More on the Framework of Methodology of Research

The book will make use of the work of Ibn Khaldoun (the intellectually versatile and expansive scholar and author of *Al-Muqaddimah*) mentioned earlier, especially his framework for research methodology. Ibn Khaldoun

suggests that in doing scholarly research, the official narratives should not be taken at face value. Thus, one ought to exercise tools of analytical deduction, examining the claims against the truths they posit and aiming to find contradictions in them. Additionally, Ibn Khaldoun emphasizes consulting scholarly work on the subject to see what existing literature can add to the understanding of the question at hand. Furthermore, if possible, one should undertake fieldwork in order to examine issues in their actual and local contexts to draw on the insights of people whose lives are connected to the issues. This methodology and epistemology proposed by Ibn Khaldoun will be the framework that guides this work.

Using Ibn Khaldoun's framework helps in my endeavor of decolonizing knowledge about the events that took place in Kafr Yassif and is also a contribution to the project of decolonizing knowledge in the academy at large, which remains largely Eurocentric and Orientalist in different shades. The Western academy and knowledge production have been organized, as Immanuel Wallerstein (2004) argues, to serve in the maintenance of hegemony of the West and subordination of the rest. It has also been structured to reflect a certain manipulation of global knowledge so that Europe and the West remain at the center. Thus, social sciences and humanities departments in the Western academy teach us that the history of knowledge has its roots in Greek and Roman scholarship from the ancient period. After that era came the Dark Ages, which lasted for hundreds of years, and then came an awakening through European reformation and the Enlightenment. It is generally never explained in this canonical narrative why Greek scholarship is considered more European than Mediterranean, nor are the events that shaped the world for the hundreds of years that were so dark ever discussed. We are not taught about others' contributions to global knowledge from which Europe and the West benefited; rather, these contributions are denied in order to claim supremacy and hegemony through the claims of modernity and rational thought. Using the work of Ibn Khaldoun helps to disrupt this narrative and fill in the fractured structures of knowledge in the Western academy. The paradigms of the Dark Ages will appear not so dark, at least outside of western Europe. The claims of European modernity can also be critically interrogated, for rational thought and research are as modern as Ibn

Khaldoun and others before and after him who developed these ideas without claiming they were "modern." There is hardly any field in the social sciences and humanities that was not touched upon by Ibn Khaldoun in his seminal work, and using his work here is a way to give credit to his visionary thought as well as to acknowledge the heritage of global knowledge production built over thousands of years to which so many minds from all over the world have contributed and continue to do so. The book is thus, in part, an attempt to promote non-Eurocentric scholarship and epistemology and discuss, examine, and deconstruct dominant paradigms that are to a large extent Western and Orientalist.

Organization of the Book

The book is divided into four substantive chapters in addition to the introduction and conclusion.

The following chapter, chapter 1, discusses the case study of the conflict in Kafr Yassif based on my fieldwork (interviews) I conducted and archival research.[5] This chapter provides an overview of the event as narrated and perceived by the locals in Kafr Yassif. It discusses the process of *sulha* and also includes a brief summary of two other incidents of communal violence that took place in the Arab Palestinian community in Israel in order to offer a comparative synthesis of the phenomenon in the community as well as to examine state security and police behavior during these

5. The interviews were conducted over a period of three years. The people I spoke to, fifty-nine in total, were interviewed sometimes several times to follow up on questions or as a result of issues that emerged from interviews with other people. The interviews were open-ended, sometimes taking hours of questions and answers. The main topics were what the interviewees saw during the events. I spoke to some people because of their general experience with such incidents in the Palestinian Arab community. Because of the need for protection of human subjects that is mandated by academic research ethics, the names of the persons interviewed will not be mentioned unless the person in question chose to disclose it. This point is especially important because of the size of the community and the close-knit relations that people have. Moreover, the experience that this community has and the way it has been treated by the Israeli government and authorities necessitate confidentiality. Thus, I chose for the most part to summarize findings and include few, if any, direct quotes, for fear of exposing the identity of the interviewees.

incidents. Thus, we will learn whether there is a pattern that can then help explain more about the relationship between state authorities' conduct and the internal violence among the Arabs in Israel. The third part of the chapter discusses media representation of the incident by investigating how such events are often portrayed by the media and what media reporting and analysis may add to the understanding of group violence.

Chapter 2 discusses the dominant theories explaining communal and ethnic conflicts and violence and suggests an alternative approach to the study of this phenomenon. In addition, each following chapter will return to one or more dominant theories to discuss their applicability or limitations. The discussion of theoretical issues and debates in this chapter could serve as a pedagogical tool in the classroom as well as an aid to scholars doing research on other cases in different sites.

In chapter 3, I provide a general history of Palestinian Arabs in Israel and discuss historical and political developments beginning with the later Ottoman period, the British Mandate, and the establishment of the state of Israel. The chapter provides an overview of the social and economic characteristics of Kafr Yassif and Julis, the relationship between them, and also the Palestinian Arab community's relationship with Israeli authorities. I also briefly discuss the history of communal relations in the region between Druze and Christian communities and examine how historical, economic, social, and political factors shed light on the conflict in 1981.

Chapter 4 discusses the history and nature of the state of Israel, the general policy of the state toward its Arab citizens, and the policies affecting group identities. It explains the ramifications of the political structure for the relationships between different religious groups within the Arab community in Israel. This chapter also examines paradigms in the field of ethnic and communal conflict and violence related to theories of "weak states," "democracy," and "peaceful democracy" to explain communal violence. It provides a discussion of theories of the type of the state, weak versus strong, and political system, democratic versus nondemocratic, by explaining their impact on intergroup relations. Finally, the chapter examines how the origin, history, nature, political system, and policies of the state toward its Palestinian Arab citizens can help in explaining the event in Kafr Yassif and how the police behaved during that explosive incident.

This chapter purposefully draws on many studies of the state of Israel, because analysis of the Israeli state in the US academy is still very limited and is often restricted by attacks waged by those individuals who blindly support the state of Israel and view any critique of it as an attack. In this book, I use many sources—Arab, Palestinian, Jewish Israeli, Jewish American, as well as American in general—to account for possible bias in the study as well as to provide detailed evidence for the arguments here.

Chapter 5, the conclusion, summarizes the main findings of the book and discusses them in light of their larger theoretical and practical significance. The chapter crystallizes my theoretical framework through the lens of the case study and discusses the implications of the argument and findings for the field of ethnic conflict. The book suggests that the transformation of political structures is the most important solution for helping to contain the phenomenon of ethnic and communal violence and ends with a policy-oriented discussion, offering possible solutions that draw on the principles of *sulha.*

Not Just a Soccer Game

1

Violent Encounters under the Eyes of State Authorities

This chapter will provide a summary of the events that took place in Kafr Yassif in April 1981, based on interviews, council archives, and media reports. It covers aspects of information gleaned from my interviews with eyewitnesses and local leaders in the village, as well as leaders from the region who were involved in the *sulha,* that is, the conflict management process, between the two villages. The chapter also draws on research in the local council archives concerning the incident and the Israeli government report on the event. Furthermore, I also explore media coverage of the event to examine how the Arab and Hebrew press represented the event in order to understand whether media reports might add to our understanding of what happened in Kafr Yassif. This examination also provides a window into media representation of events in so-called divided societies, more accurately known as societies where the mainstream media reflect the official line and majority perspectives and where the minority has its own media outlets that report issues from the minority's perspective.

The chapter further goes on to examine two other events involving violence between religious groups within the Palestinian Arab society. From this background, I hope to present a better understanding of conflicts in the Palestinian Arab community in Israel as well as to map patterns of behavior exhibited by state authorities during such incidents in order to better understand the intentions and action taken by state authorities during internal sectarian violence. This critical examination of the actions of the state during such events is important, as it helps us understand official

state policy vis-à-vis sectarianism as states in such cases do not explicitly proclaim their policy of promoting sectarian violence.

The chapter concludes with a summary and discussion of the findings and suggests theoretical insights for the field of ethnic and communal violence and the role and responsibilities of the state for the well-being of its citizens. In the end I will also discuss some important issues regarding media coverage of such incidents and suggest how to deepen our understanding of sectarian violence and its representation, given the reliance on official mainstream narratives that include the embedded biases of the reporters.

Field Report

As mentioned in the introduction, on April 11, 1981, a soccer game took place between two teams from Kafr Yassif and Julis (the two Arab Palestinian villages in Galilee, Israel). Julis, a dominantly Druze village-sectarian group that serves in the Israeli military, and Kafr Yassif, a religiously mixed Arab village with a Christian majority, were competing in this game that would decide which of the two would proceed to the upper soccer league in Israel. As in all soccer games around the country, the Israeli police attended these events in order to prevent violence and secure order. It is a common practice for the police to be present during sport events in Israel, as it is the only security branch that teams coordinate with when they hold matches (soccer or otherwise). Furthermore, allegedly there were threats made to members of the management of the team from Kafr Yassif by Julis the day before the match, warning the team of serious consequences if Julis did not win. The management had therefore called the regional police station and asked for more police officers to be sent to ensure peace during the game.

During the match, as Kafr Yassif scored the first goal, a fight broke out among dozens of fans of the two teams. People from both sides were injured; one person from Julis was taken to the hospital and died there, as happened to one person from Kafr Yassif. Fighting during and about soccer games is common all around the world, but what was different in this situation was that although the police forces (about twenty policemen) were actually present during the fight, they did nothing to prevent

or stop the violence. They just stood watching as people engaged in fistfights, fans from Julis used arms for shooting, and another fan from Julis threw a hand grenade, which killed one person from Kafr Yassif. The police never attempted to stop the fighting or use any warning shots to prevent the escalation of violence.

When news broke of the fighting that had taken place during the game and the unfortunate outcome, the mayor of the local council in Kafr Yassif, Nimer Morcos, telephoned the head of the local council in Julis in order to prevent any further escalation of violence. Morcos apologized for the violence that took place in his village and requested that a meeting be held between the heads of the local councils of the two villages. Julis's mayor initially accepted Morcos's offer to meet but later declined, arguing that "pressure from some families in Julis forced him to change his mind." However, according to Morcos, and also others I interviewed, "It was pressure from Israeli government officials that made the mayor of Julis reject the invitation to meet."

Morcos then called for a special meeting of the local council in Kafr Yassif, which took place on the night of Saturday, April 11. In the meeting, the mayor and council members discussed possible steps that the Kafr Yassif council should take in order to tackle the emergency at hand. Nimer Morcos, a leader in the Israeli Communist Party and a Marxist in his ideology and outlook, was conflicted as to which approach to take. On the one hand, he wanted to appeal to the state and demand intervention to prevent any further escalation of violence, as reports of an imminent attack by Julis were spreading throughout the village. This attitude implicitly suggests a modernist approach to society and conflicts wherein the state is viewed as the primary organ for preventing violence and managing conflicts. On the other hand, being Palestinian Arab in Israel and knowing firsthand the state's policies and attitudes toward the Palestinian Arab community, he had little trust in relying solely on state interventions. Hence, he felt compelled to also rely on *sulha,* that is, the traditional Arab approach in managing conflicts, a tradition that Arab modernists have often critiqued for being archaic and out of step with modern forms of life and the modern state system. In my view, the conflict between invoking tradition and utilizing "modern"

tools to address the issue at hand was resolved by Morcos's employing both at the same time.

Therefore, soon after the local council meeting in Kafr Yassif, the council initiated contact with Palestinian Arab community leaders from Galilee, who usually participate in conflict management when violence occurs within the Palestinian Arab community. Regional community leaders answered Morcos's call and came to his help with the goal of resolving the conflict between the two villages. The committee, called *jaha* in Arabic, was composed of community leaders, who often participate in such cases when called upon by the parties involved. Members of such committees often have social, economic, and or political power, and they are generally poets, politicians, and religious leaders, as well as those individuals who have profound knowledge of *sulha,* and many of them come from large extended families and have broad social networks in the Palestinian Arab community.[1] The reconciliation committee began its work of facilitation talks with leaders from the two villages in order to reach a settlement satisfactory to both parties, in accordance with the principles of *sulha*.

The *sulha* committee initiated contact with leaders in Julis on the night of April 11 and was optimistic after initial conversations with them. However, by the end of the next day, when the *jaha* members left Julis and returned to Kafr Yassif, they informed Morcos that they had failed in achieving a *hudna* (truce), because the demand by leaders from Julis was that the Kafr Yassif council should first identify the killer of the victim from Julis. But according to Morcos, as well as members of the *jaha,* doing so was impossible, since the fighting had taken place between a large number of people from both villages (an estimated two thousand people were involved), the identity of the killer was unknown, and the *jaha* members believed it would be unfair to make such a serious accusation against an individual without being fully confident in who the killer was. The Kafr Yassif council also pointed out that a few people from Kafr

1. I will discuss only the relevant information about this method of conflict management. For more detailed information about *sulha,* see Jabbour 1996.

Yassif had already been arrested and that the police should have been able to identify the killer through their own investigation.

At the same time, leaders in Kafr Yassif initiated multiple contacts with officials on local, regional, and state levels in order to put maximum pressure on the state to take a stand and intervene to prevent further deterioration of the situation. Village leaders and residents at the same time continued to contact the local and regional police stations whenever they saw unusual activities, such as armed men in jeeps driving around the village, and repeatedly asked for more police protection. Simultaneously, the local council and leaders in Kafr Yassif were in communication with the reconciliation committee members and asked them to continue their dialogue with leaders from Julis in the hope of achieving a truce.

The police chief kept promising the local council in Kafr Yassif that no further attacks from Julis would take place, despite what people in the village kept hearing. Yet as soon as the head of the Kafr Yassif local council learned that the reconciliation committee had failed to achieve a *hudna,* he asked the *jaha* members to contact the head of the regional Israeli police headquarters, David Franco, to inform him of the seriousness of the situation and to prevent any further escalation of violence. Many of the committee members contacted Franco, and Morcos himself personally called him to request an increased police presence in both villages, especially after hearing rumors of a possible attack against Kafr Yassif. Despite these pleas, Franco's reply was again dismissive, simply stating that there were adequate forces in the Kafr Yassif police station and there was no need for the regional police branch to send more officers. Morcos then called a Knesset member from the Israeli Communist Party, Mair Vilner and asked him to intervene with the Israeli minister of interior, in order to increase the police force in the area. Vilner complied, and the interior minister promised to take care of the situation. It is important to note that the Israeli political system is very centralized; the government includes an interior minister who is responsible for the different internal security bodies, including the police at all levels. The police force in Israel has a regional branch in addition to different local police stations, all of whom fall under the jurisdiction of the interior minister (there are no states in Israel). Each region is relatively tiny, because Israel is a very small country,

and the police, when called upon, can easily maneuver between the different locations within the region and can quickly redeploy forces within minutes. Thus, it would have been very easy for Franco, the head of the regional police station, to send more forces to Kafr Yassif as Nimer Morcos had requested, and this action might have sent a signal to people in Julis that the police were serious about preventing an attack on Kafr Yassif. Even if Franco would be given the benefit of the doubt in not really anticipating the attack, as the government reports state, he did not send additional police forces even after the attack took place, although he was called by Morcos within minutes after the incident erupted. Franco took neither step, and the attack against Kafr Yassif continued for almost two hours under the eyes of the police force, as the following time line makes clear.

At 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday, April 14, three days after the soccer game, an attack started against Kafr Yassif and lasted until 3:45 p.m. Local sources from Kafr Yassif testify that hundreds of people from Julis participated in this destructive assault; some arrived in vehicles, but the great majority of them arrived on foot and left after the end of the attack (the distance between the two villages is about a half hour on foot). Among the aggressors from Julis, there were a number of individuals wearing the uniform of the Israeli military and the Israeli border security units. Equipment from the Israeli military and different security units were used in the attack, such as vehicles, automatic machine guns, and bombs. These military aspects of the attack heightened the fear of people in Kafr Yassif, who realized that the attack was serious and that the state seemed to be behind it, especially because although police forces were present in good numbers (about forty policemen), they stood watching the violence unfold and did not intervene.

The village of Kafr Yassif has three main entrances. There is one small and narrow entrance from the east that connects Kafr Yassif and Julis, which remained open during the incident and is from which the attackers entered and exited. The other two larger entrances that connect Kafr Yassif to the south and to the north with Highway 70 were closed off by the Israeli police. The blockade of these two entrances on Highway 70 prevented the entry of aid such as ambulances and people from neighboring villages and towns who wanted to enter the village to help and possibly

fend off the attack. Thus, while the police were able to block the two major entrances to the village, interestingly, they could not do so with the smallest entrance to Kafr Yassif, which was the most direct and closest route to Julis and from which the attack proceeded.

The attack on the village started with an explosion in the local council building in Kafr Yassif by an armed group in a jeep that threw bombs into the building and also fired at the building. Next, groups of aggressors spread throughout the main streets of the village, shooting at anyone they saw; bombing and burning houses, stores, and cars; and destroying property. The way this attack unfolded had all the characteristics of a military operation, and it was well organized, suggesting that it was well planned by the attackers and not a spontaneous assault. The attackers communicated with one another with the help of military wireless equipment and coordinated with one another all the way through the attack on how to proceed and retreat. The violence continued for almost two hours without any retaliation from the inhabitants of Kafr Yassif, as they were not armed.

The outcome of the attack on Kafr Yassif was hefty for the village (which had five thousand residents at the time). Two were killed, ten people were injured, eighty-five homes and seventeen stores (among them a pharmacy and a textile factory) were burned and destroyed, thirty-one cars and one tractor were burned and destroyed, and external damage was done to the elementary school, the Catholic church (which is located on the main street), the post office, and a bank. In addition to this destruction, there private libraries that included rare books and two doctoral dissertations were damaged and ruined. Since there were no computers at the time in the village, those scholarly theses by Palestinian Arabs were completely lost as a result. These physical losses affected the village, but so did the psychological terror people in the village suffered. Finally, it is significant to note that the attack targeted mainly Christians in the village, though Kafr Yassif has a mix of religious communities (Christian, Muslim, and Druze).

At that moment, the overlooking of non-Christian houses in the village by the Julis attackers seemed strange. Yet this issue will become clearer in chapter 3, which examines the relationship between the state

authorities and the Palestinian Arab community, and especially the village of Kafr Yassif. What seemed at the time to be chaotic religious or communal violence between Druze and Christians will be revealed to be much more.

Conversations with local eyewitnesses, members of the local Kafr Yassif council, community leaders from the village, and members of the *sulha* process, as well as literature produced by the local council about this incident, point to significant issues regarding the behavior of the Israeli security forces, before and during the event, that shed light on the role of the state authorities in this case study. Three minutes after the start of aggression, Morcos called the regional as well as local police stations asking for immediate assistance to defend the unarmed residents of Kafr Yassif. Morcos had also called leaders from neighboring villages to intervene as well as the ambulance station in the region, asking for immediate help for the casualties in the village. Despite these calls, no additional Israeli security forces came to Kafr Yassif until after the end of the attack, although it lasted nearly two hours and the regional police station in Acre is only ten minutes away. To make matters worse, the Israeli security forces installed blockades and checkpoints at the major entrances of the village, from which possible help could have entered and from which those citizens who wished to flee could have escaped, leaving open only the road that connects Julis with Kafr Yassif, the route through which the attackers entered and exited. Furthermore, the security forces also prevented delegations from neighboring towns and villages, who wanted to try to stop the attack, from entering the village. The police did not even allow ambulances to enter the village to take away the injured.

According to Morcos, the Kafr Yassif–Julis incident was just one manifestation of a long-standing state strategy to stir up intercommunal tensions and foment violence among Palestinian Israeli citizens. Morcos also argued that the timing of the event was significant and that dividing local Palestinian communities inside Israel had larger political implications, as given developments in the region, the state wanted tensions between Arab communities in Israel to spill over to the situation in Lebanon at the time. The incident in Kafr Yassif in 1981 occurred at a moment when Israel was preparing for the war in Lebanon and wanted to foster Christian-Druze

infighting, hoping that these tensions would exacerbate friction among the Druze and Christians in Lebanon. According to Morcos, Israel hoped that weakening these communities would help provide an advantageous situation for Israel in the war with Lebanon that they were planning to fight in the coming few months. This opinion is also supported by the analysis of why Israel went to war in Lebanon in 1982, as Lebanon-based correspondent Jim Muir observed that one of the reasons for the Israeli invasion was to exacerbate sectarian conflicts in Lebanon. He further argued that the Israelis helped fuel and encourage the Christian-Druze conflict in the Chouf region of Lebanon (Said and Hitchens 2001, 106). This point also illustrates the belief that violence between two religious groups in one country could have ramifications for the relationships between those religious groups in neighboring countries. Thus, fueling sectarian violence seemed to have served internal objectives within the state as well as beyond, among coreligious members of these communities in the region at large. This point is important to keep in mind when thinking of other cases of sectarian conflict and foreign intervention, especially as the US involvement in Iraq has created further frictions between Sunnis and Shi'as there. As I argue in chapter 3, divide and rule is an elementary tool and a goal of colonialism and domination.

Furthermore, as another interviewee argued, the Kafr Yassif event is similar to the massacre in Kafr Qassim in 1956, when Israeli security forces killed and injured many Palestinian Arab citizens before invading Egypt in what became later known as the Suez War. Thus, my interviews revealed how the incident was situated by local residents within the broader historical context of the relationship between the Israeli state and its Palestinian Arab citizens and how it connected to Israeli foreign aggression. Such incidents were viewed as part of governmental attempts, at different moments, to instill fear and cause divisions within the Palestinian Arab community before launching a war with a neighboring Arab country. The difference from the 1956 massacre, according to local residents, was that the attack against Kafr Yassif was made to appear as if it were perpetrated by one Arab village, or Arab religious community, against another, whereas in their view, the attack was clearly orchestrated by the Israeli security forces or at least conducted with their full knowledge.

According to Imam 'Abed, a Muslim religious leader from Kafr Yassif who has participated in many *sulha*-making efforts in the region, the event in Kafr Yassif was the result of a plan by the government, using its functionaries in the village and the region. He observed that the *sulha* was not conducted properly in its overall process but was still initiated after the attack out of fear on the part of Kafr Yassif residents, who were intimidated by the "government's men" in the area; the *sulha* had been forced on them while leaving out the condition they had requested an independent inquiry into the event. Imam 'Abed also thought that leaders in Julis behaved in accordance with government officials' demands, and not according to the tradition of *sulha* making, which is why the initial efforts for the *sulha* failed and led to the attack on April 14.

In many conversations, people pointed to the "government's men" but, often, without naming them. In some interviews, people talked about "the men" from the Prime Minister's Office for Arab Affairs, an office of advisers who are supposedly experts on Arab affairs and advise the prime minister on issues and policies concerning the Arabs in Israel. Most of these men have professional backgrounds in the Israeli military and intelligence. On some occasions, people mentioned the name of Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi, a Druze leader and politician from a neighboring village. His history goes back to the days before the establishment of the state, when he was contacted by Jewish leaders and induced into cooperating with them against the rest of the Palestinian Arab community. In return for his work in securing the Druze community's support of the Zionist movement and later on with Israel, he was awarded many political posts, including a position in the office of the prime minister. He also ran in the national elections representing an Arab party that served to weaken the hold of the Israeli Communist Party, which was the strongest party at the time within the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. He also had a history of unleashing attacks against the Kafr Yassif local council, when it was led by Yani Yani. Yani, as it will be discussed in chapter 3, led a local and regional coalition of socialist and nationalist Arabs in Israel in the 1950s and 1960s, a coalition that aimed at resisting state policies. Thus, Kafr Yassif was always an obstacle to Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi's agenda,

which basically revolved around securing votes from Israeli Arabs for his party, which was allied with the ruling Israeli parties.

Imam 'Abed argued further that the demand of leaders in Julis that the Kafr Yassif mayor name the killer from Kafr Yassif was just as long as the killer was known, yet given the large-scale fighting at the soccer game, it was in reality impossible. The imam further observed that the police had arrested four suspects from Kafr Yassif, and if people from Julis had wanted to take revenge, they could have attacked these four suspects' families, not the entire Christian community in Kafr Yassif that was targeted in the attack. Imam 'Abed argued that this indiscriminate violence is not behavior that the Arab community is generally accustomed to, for although violence takes place, it is often very specific, and group violence has its logic—that is, one attacks the groups that is accused of the wrongdoing, whereas the attack on Kafr Yassif was not just against the four individuals who were arrested in connection with the killing of the person from Julis. Furthermore, the community is often able to resolve disputes, using *sulha,* even when the case is complicated and the killers are not publicly known. He believed that if leaders in Julis were really following the tradition, they would have accepted the apology of Kafr Yassif, keeping in mind that after the soccer game, a person from Kafr Yassif was also killed as a result of the fighting and that the violence had been initiated by fans from Julis. But since the killing had occurred in Kafr Yassif, it was Kafr Yassif that was obligated, according to tradition, to apologize and seek *sulha. Sulha* has often achieved reconciliation at some point in the midst of the conflict without further escalation of violence and counterviolence. Yet if revenge takes place quickly, as Imam 'Abed argued, the target is never collective punishment but specifically those individuals who are suspected of having committed the killing and perhaps their families. But even that notion is a stretch, as revenge takes place according to this tradition only against the publicly known offender(s).

I also had long conversations with Elias Jabbour from Shafa'amr (an Arab town in Galilee), who is well known locally and internationally for the peacemaking efforts he has been involved with in the area. Jabbour is also the author of a book about the principles and mechanism of *sulha*

making, *Sulha: Palestinian Traditional Peacemaking Process* (1996), the first local or indigenous publication on the topic that details the history, process, and dynamics of this process. Our conversations were made more significant and relevant to contemporary events by a shocking incident that coincidentally took place one day while I was present in Shafa'amr. Hours after I had left Jabbour's home in Shafa'amr on August 24, 2006, a Jewish male, wearing an Israeli military uniform and sitting in a bus that goes through Shafa'amr, opened fire (using an army weapon) on the bus riders and murdered four Palestinian Arabs and injured many others from that town. Years later, the state courts sentenced Palestinian Arabs who were on the bus in Shafa'amr that had intervened to stop the criminal from murdering more people, killing him in the process. Thus, the Israeli state's message to Arabs seems to be that when they are attacked, they should not resist, and they must never dare to stop a Jewish criminal from killing Arabs because the state will punish them if they do. This incident reminded me of the fragile reality of the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel who seem to be the target of state authorities as well as groups and individuals armed by the state who go unpunished. Worse, in the case of bus killings in Shafa'amr, the state was pursuing the people who were able to finally stop the Jewish terrorist who was murdering people in their town. Thus, the target for punishment is not the structure of militancy and violence of the state and its members but the victims.

During my discussion with Jabbour about the incident in Kafr Yassif, he commented that the relationship between the two villages was always friendly and neighborly, and he had never heard of any conflicts between the two villages in his lifetime and in local memory. Not only had there been no tensions between the two communities, he and others observed, but many people from Kafr Yassif had actually found refuge in Julis during different periods of political unrest in the area (for example, during the late Ottoman period, British colonization, and the 1948 war). Julis is located on a hill and is harder to reach for traditional armies, whereas Kafr Yassif has traditionally included groups resisting authorities. In fact, my grandfather's house in Kafr Yassif was burned by authorities, and he was accused of aiding "troublemakers" who were fighting foreign rule. My larger extended family had thus at multiple moments in history sought

refuge in neighboring Druze villages, one of which was Julis, when they feared attack by state authorities on the village.

At the same time, Jabbour acknowledged that relations between the religious groups were complex and that there was some resentment by local Palestinian Muslims and Druze toward Christians because of their educational and financial achievements. He also noted that some Palestinian youth of Christians and Muslim backgrounds were critical of Druze and even insulted them on numerous occasions because they served in the Israeli army. In his view, these were factors that might have helped to influence the course of events between Kafr Yassif and Julis.

According to Jabbour, the initial *sulha* making failed because of several missteps in the process. The first mistake was the fact that the killer was not named by the mayor of Kafr Yassif. Although it was difficult to single out one person in a group engaged in violent fighting, and the police did not narrow their list of the three suspects to one, Jabbour thought that Kafr Yassif leaders should have worked harder to find out who the killer was and given his name to leaders in Julis, while seeking *sulha* to prevent an act of revenge against him. The second error was that leaders in Julis did not accept the *diyyah* (sum of money given by one party that if accepted by the other seals a commitment to engage in resolution of the conflict through *sulha*). Their refusal to accept the *diyyah,* according to Jabbour, demonstrated that they were not following the tradition and were not interested in *sulha,* which implies that they were bent upon taking revenge, possibly as a result of intervention by more powerful actors than the *sulha* committee itself. Thus, Jabbour suggested that the *sulha* delegation, or *jaha,* was in reality weaker than some other parties who were involved in the conflict, implying the government and its functionaries in the area. This imbalance of power and these external forces might have affected the effort to bring about conflict management before the situation deteriorated further.

In Jabbour's view, the police were responsible for not preventing both incidents of violence, during the soccer game as well as the attack on Kafr Yassif that took place three days later. Based on an understanding of the traditional Arab approach to conflict, the police ought to have taken seriously the warnings of the Kafr Yassif council that a violent response was

impending, and Jabbour noted that the police in Palestinian Arab areas are quite familiar with such traditions in the community. If the police were genuinely unable to prevent fighting during the game, they should have at least been able to prevent any further violence after the gravity of the situation became apparent. Jabbour noted that the police behavior was similar to their conduct during the events in Al-Maghaar in 2005, when for two days a Druze mob roamed the town, burning the stores and homes of Christian residents while the police stood watching. According to eyewitnesses of the event, some members of the police force even participated in these attacks along with the Druze mob.

Jabbour astutely observed that the state is generally presumed to embody modernity and modern technologies of regulation such as modern law, so it comes as no surprise that the state is not interested in traditional methods of conflict management. In this regard, the state of Israel is not an exception. But moreover, he argued, in the case of the Kafr Yassif attack, the Israeli authorities were not initially interested in supporting traditional methods of conflict management that might have helped reduce tensions and contain conflicts within the Arab community, because a unified Palestinian Arab community is not desired by the state of Israel but rather is seen as a threat. Similar to the views of residents of the village, he also argued that the state of Israel has been working since its creation in 1948 to divide and rule the Palestinian Arab community, and when internal elements, causes, or conditions are available, then a conflict is exploited by the state to deepen fissures and animosity between various religious and familial groups.

Yet after the violence ended, and leaders in Kafr Yassif were outraged by and demanded an independent investigation into police behavior during the event, the state started pushing for *sulha* in order to resolve the case without much controversy and without allowing Kafr Yassif to achieve its main condition, namely, the establishment of an independent investigation of the police conduct. Here we see another paradox in such cases, where the "traditional norm" of conflict management and "modern" norms of peace, justice, and order are selectively used by the state when it suits its interests. On the other hand, the members of the Arab society seem to be wary of the state and its claims of modernization, yet

they seem to pursue both "traditional" and "modern" tools in order to prevent or end violence, when it occurs.

I argue that while supposedly believing in modern norms of conflict management and judicial procedures, both the state and the Arab community resorted to tradition when it seemed convenient for them, yet for different reasons. The mayor of Kafr Yassif sought the traditional conflict-management process because he feared that the "modern" state of Israel was suspect, if not in initiating internal sectarian violence, at least in not preventing it or promoting it by capitalizing on any opportunity available. State authorities were accused of putting obstacles in the path of initial attempts to resolve the conflict between the two villages and pressuring Julis directly and through their "men" in the region, mainly Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi, not to accept the offer to reconcile with Kafr Yassif. Yet after the pogrom took place, and in light of pressure from different politicians as well as fear of international opinion, the Israeli authorities sought to hasten efforts for traditional reconciliations in order to avoid establishing an independent investigation into the behavior of the police.

Thus, a *sulha* was finally achieved a few weeks after the incident because of the pressure from the state and people connected to the government (individuals from the Office of Prime Minister for Arab Affairs, including Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi). According to local residents, this move was a means to preempt the demand made by Kafr Yassif for an independent investigation as a prerequisite for the conclusion of the traditional conflict-management process. Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi and an official from the Prime Minister's Office on Arab Affairs, accompanied by armed men, many dressed in the official uniforms of the Israeli security branches, visited different people in the village, especially citizens whose relatives were killed in the event, and pressured them to drop the condition that Kafr Yassif insisted on the *sulha.* Some people I interviewed were, in fact, present during these visits to these families and leaders in Kafr Yassif and heard Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi and Israeli officials make concealed threats; one individual recalled, "They said, if you do not do *sulha* now, serious consequences might follow because people in Julis are still upset, and some are thinking about another attack." Kafr Yassif's leadership tried to resist these pressures and kept demanding an independent investigation

into how and why the police handled the event in this manner. The Israeli government ultimately refused to allow an independent investigation into the behavior of the police during the incident. Instead, as it often does in such cases, the Israeli government appointed its own investigative committee, which argued that the police behaved in an orderly manner in the incident and were unable to prevent violence from taking place, yet ought to take such cases more seriously in the future.

However, Kafr Yassif leaders finally accepted the *sulha* with Julis because they were worried about further escalation, as news of further attacks spread. Residents from Kafr Yassif with whom I spoke also argued that people in Kafr Yassif did not respond to violence with violence because they were afraid, given that people in Julis were armed and the government appeared to be backing them. Residents of Kafr Yassif, who are mostly Christians and Muslims, do not serve in the Israeli military and have no access to weapons; thus, in comparison to the Druze they are considerably weaker, as the Druze have been serving in the Israeli military and therefore have access to weapons and to the Israeli political system, which is more open to them compared to Christians and Muslim Arab citizens. Because of this power disparity, then, residents of Kafr Yassif could neither retaliate nor defend themselves against an attack. Additionally, many believed that responding to violence with counterviolence would only help the state, which they accused of being interested in internal fighting. Not taking revenge was a rational calculation of costs and power, because the event was seen as exemplifying a plan by the Israeli government to instigate communal violence and residents in Kafr Yassif did not want to fall prey to state strategies aiming to divide the Palestinian Arab community and its different religious communities.

According to the *sulha* agreement that was finally achieved between the two villages, violence was condemned, but no responsible party was assigned guilt. This outcome was a fundamental violation of the process, which is centered on the designation of a guilty party who ought to offer a public apology. Yet another primary condition was met, according to Arab tradition, and the affected residents in Kafr Yassif were each rewarded a sum of money as compensation for the damage they suffered to life or property, which also indirectly designates them the injured

party, even though Julis did not publicly take responsibility for the violence. The amount of money each received depended on the damage that befell that person or family, and this amount was assessed by the *sulha* committee, which is the norm, as such committee members have experience in and knowledge of calculating damages and costs. Thus, some were given a few thousand Israeli shekels (equal to hundreds of US dollars), and others were given much more, especially the families of those individuals who suffered physical injury in the attack. The two families whose members died received the most, each awarded about twenty thousand dollars. These funds are often raised from wealthy individuals within the community, and in this case the government contributed more than half of the money, in accordance with the recommendations of its own investigative committee.[2]

After the attack ended, it is notable that the village of Kafr Yassif did not seek revenge for the damage and fatalities caused by assailants from Julis, but rather sought a truce with the attacking village. The fact that people in Kafr Yassif did not respond violently under such circumstances, even if it was out of fear, shows their rational behavior and ability to calculate consequences to reactions that go beyond mere emotions and the need for revenge. In fact, it would be impossible, even if they wanted to, to take revenge for such a large-scale attack with an attack of similar magnitude. Yet it is also important to emphasize that Arab tradition does not seek "complete justice," as Jabbour points out, because it acknowledges that doing so may not actually help in ending tensions between fighting parties, which is especially important for groups who live in close proximity to one another. Arab tradition does not view the state justice system as sufficient for bringing harmony and peace to society. Thus, Kafr Yassif's response of avoiding revenge and using *sulha* for peacemaking is actually the more common practice in most cases in which violence takes place between individuals, groups, or villages in Arab society. Weaker parties, in particular, often argue to bring closure to disputes even if that may

2. Based on the Israeli government fact-finding committee final report and also the response to it by the Kafr Yassif local council.

seem to some of them unfair, for it does not bring justice to the injured party. Yet in such circumstances, there was nothing better that the people in Kafr Yassif could do than to avoid further escalation.

Media Coverage of the Incident

The power of the media to represent or misrepresent events is crucial to common understandings of Middle East politics and the history of Israel and Palestine. Take, for example, the analysis offered in the documentary film *Peace, Propaganda, and the Promised Land* (2004). The film features analysis by media scholars and critics who compare reports in British and American mainstream media of the same events in Israel and Palestine, showing how viewers might come up with divergent understandings of what really happened or is happening there. The two different interpretations that emerge from media outlets are, as media scholar Robert Jensen argues in the documentary, owing to choice of the story (what is reported on and what is not), use of language (negative and positive vocabulary), biases in the reporting (portraying one side as the victim), missing information (facts omitted from the story, which if included would completely alter the total picture), and lack of political and historical context (which leads to a chaotic portrayal of events). As Edward Said has observed (*On Orientalism* 1998), the bias in media, which are invested commercially and politically in the issue, helps to contribute to the representations of Arab societies as violent and disorderly. Such reporting, or misreporting, does not address the structures of violence within which Arabs live and how these structures illuminate the order of violence prevailing among, or produced by, Arabs. This framework guides this section in analyzing Hebrew and Arab media reports of events in Kafr Yassif.

This section examines media coverage of the Kafr Yassif event and its aftermath in order to analyze the historical record and perspectives of different media sources. In the case of Israel, media representation ought to be seen in the context of a divided society, where the Hebrew press, the media of the dominant majority, and the Arab press, the media of the marginalized minority, play a role that is reflective of the larger political situation in the country. That situation could be similar to other cases in other countries, where ethnic or alternative media are the sites of marginalized

or minoritized issues and perspectives and the dominant or mainstream media are the sites of dominant discourse, that is, of the majority and the state. The discussion of media reports also sheds some light on the event and on the Palestinian Arab community and the relationship between the different religious sects within it, as well as on the relationship of the Arab community vis-à-vis the Jewish community and the state.

My research examines the coverage of the event in print media outlets in the country, both in Arabic and in Hebrew. The newspaper that covered the event in greatest depth was *Al-Ittihad*.[3] The paper's coverage is understandable because it was the only Arabic newspaper in Israel at the time, and its reports are concentrated on issues related to the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. I also analyzed the media coverage in the major Hebrew newspapers in the country, namely, *Ha'aretz, Ma'ariv,* and *Yedeot Ahronot.* These Hebrew publications covered the event for only a week or two after it occurred. Choosing these relatively widely circulating Arabic and Hebrew newspapers will allow us to see how the same event was covered and represented. The media in Israel are highly political; whereas Arab media are critical of the state and focus much of their coverage on local Arab issues, Hebrew media, in general, are less critical of the government, tend to present the official line, and often have negative representations of Arabs.

I will first start by discussing the coverage in *Al-Ittihad* shortly after the event took place and then present my findings from the newspapers in Hebrew. In the report of the event in Kafr Yassif and its aftermath, the main themes that dominated the Arab media reporting were qualitatively and quantitatively different from the arguments in the Hebrew media.

Arab media reported on the event from the perspective of the community itself as a mouthpiece for the people in Kafr Yassif who belonged to the community that had been targeted by the state since 1948. It is interesting to take note of the rhetoric that some commentators used in reaction to the event. In an article published in *Al-Ittihad* titled "Enough

3. *Al-Ittihad* is published by the Israeli Communist Party. As earlier stated, this party was the only organized political voice for the Palestinian Arabs in Israel at the time, and its publications were also a space of expression for many Arab writers, poets, and politicians.

Bloodshed," by Nazir Majalli, a well-known leader and writer in the Arab community, wrote, "We should not help those who wish us evil, and want to ethnically cleanse us from our homeland. The authorities are willing to use their men among us, arm them and fund them so that internal fighting increases. We have resisted internal divisions and fighting for a long time and we ought to stay that way and not fall into the trap placed by the authorities" (April 14, 1981, 6). In this editorial-style article, Majalli is addressing the Palestinian Arab community in Israel and making two points. First, he claims that there is a troubled relationship between the state of Israel and the Palestinian Arab community and that the state aims at harming the well-being and unity of the community. Second, he argues that internal division has long been sought by the state, yet the community has resisted it so far. Although the first point is accurate, the second seems to be more wishful thinking than a reality. It is not that there are no internal divisions being exploited by the state within the community, yet to argue that the whole community is united is a stretch. Such ideal unity and resistance to external power are rare anywhere in the world, and to argue that the Palestinian Arab community is exceptional is more of a myth than a reality. Communities who are targeted by states or a dominant majority often have different views on how to respond to various situations, and groups and individuals from those communities also have different interests, which makes a completely unified and unquestioned front impossible.

It is also interesting to note that Majalli speaks in the form of "we," on behalf of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. This posture of representation was, and still is, very common in Arabic newspapers in Israel, because these newspapers consider themselves to be representing the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. The Arabic print media are the most accessible outlet for their views and speak in the name of the collective Palestinian Arab community, as is the case with publications of many minority groups around the world. It is clear that those individuals who write about the community's relationship to the government are critical of the policies of the state. From these reports, one can sense that there is a strong belief among members of the Palestinian Arab

community in Israel reporting on historical events that the state has been hostile to the community since its inception and is interested in encouraging internal fighting and that the community needs to combat these government policies.

Most reporters and writers published in *Al-Ittihad* are not from Kafr Yassif, yet their articles corroborated the findings of my fieldwork. Also, the reportage showed complete support and identification with Kafr Yassif and its mayor by the leaders in the larger Palestinian Arab community and organizations, including churches. An article titled "Kafr Yassif Massacre Is Planned Against Us All—Christians, Druze and Muslims: The Arabs in Israel Threaten with a Strike If the Government Does Not Allow an Independent Investigation" reported that the Committee for Arab Local Councils, which consists of heads of all Palestinian Arab villages and towns in Israel, declared a strike on Thursday, April 16, in solidarity with the people of Kafr Yassif and their local council who had suffered a massacre while the police were watching (April 17, 1981, 1). It also demanded that the government disarm people who had weapons in their homes and prohibit others from carrying arms beyond and outside their duty. The article indicates that there was broad support among the larger Palestinian Arab community in Israel for Kafr Yassif's position vis-à-vis the government. It demonstrates a concern regarding the arms available to the Druze who either serve in the Israeli military or work in security jobs and bring these arms home with them, often using them against each other as well as against members of other Arab religious groups.

The event and its aftermath were covered extensively in the Palestinian Arab media, and the description of the events' unfolding was identical to the findings of the fieldwork in the village. It was viewed as the making of state authorities in line with state policies that have been detrimental toward the Palestinian Arab community since the creation of the state. The main aim of the state policies was seen as targeting the unity and well-being of the Palestinian Arab community (Majalli, "Enough Bloodshed," April 14, 1981, 6). This point is also supported by the recent work of Hillel Cohen (2010, in Hebrew) on Arabs in Israel that documents the role of the security services in controlling Arab citizens

in Israel and intervening in their affairs.[4] Another *Al-Ittihad* report (April 17, 1981) states that the head of the Arab Local Councils, Ibrahim Nimer, accused the authorities of being behind the event because the *sulha* committee was still working to resolve the issue, and traditionally people do not attack while reconciliation negotiations are in process. Nimer and other Arab mayors also questioned why the authorities, who generally bring a large number of security forces when they are coming to demolish Arab homes, send only a few policemen in such incidents of intra-Arab violence and simply stand around watching. They also asked why, when an Arab is killed in Kafr Yassif or Julis, the police do nothing and when there is harm done to Arabs often claim that they were not prepared. Thus, there was clear indignation about the selective use of force by the Israeli authorities.

The Arab media demanded an investigation into the role of the police and security forces during the events. This demand was rejected by the government, which instead appointed its own investigative committee. The Arab media viewed this move as an attempt by the government to cover up its own complicity, for the guilty cannot judge themselves. This maneuver is a contradictory response, yet it is used by some governments, especially powerful states who believe they are immune from international pressure. The same *Al-Ittihad* report stated that the general commander of the Israeli military police, Arieh Avetzan, admitted in a media conference on April 15 that the police had failed to handle the situation in Kafr Yassif properly, which is, in fact, a self-indictment by a high official in the police. The article also reported that Haika Grossman, a member of parliament from MAPAM, which is a leftist Jewish party, had sent a letter asking the interior minister, Yousif Burg, who claimed the police had acted appropriately, to come to Kafr Yassif and see for himself whether the police acted "properly."

The police were not viewed positively in the Arab media; rather, they were implicated in participating in state policies that aim at harming, rather than protecting, the Arab Palestinian community. The media

4. The English version is forthcoming; see Cohen 2010.

described the police as complicit in state policies and as active participants who allowed the internal violence to take place in Kafr Yassif. There was consistent condemnation of the police for their "inability" to prevent or stop violence within the Palestinian Arab community and their striking ability to perform differently in cases of violence within or against the Jewish community in Israel. *Al-Ittihad* reported on April 17, 1981 (1, 8), that the police force that was present in Kafr Yassif did nothing to prevent or stop the attack. Worse, still, it prevented people from Yirka, a Druze neighboring village, and people from other neighboring villages and kibbutzim[5] from entering the village to help stop the attack. The article also stated that Jewish and Arab solidarity delegations came to visit Kafr Yassif, and a campaign for donations to help the village was launched around the country. The report argued that the local council called not only the police commander in the area but also Knesset members and the interior minister, Yousif Burg, who promised to take care of the issue yet did not prevent the attack. Members of parliament from the MAPAM and Likud parties who came to witness the aftermath of the attack on Kafr Yassif firsthand also supported Kafr Yassif's call for an investigation.

Here it is worth noting that *Al-Ittihad,* which is the publication of the Israeli Communist Party for the Palestinian Arab community took a traditional line of Arab and Jewish cooperation. The article suggested that the support of having liberal and conscientious Jewish officials was still possible, yet this hoped-for cooperation did not materialize. The liberal Jewish parliament members did not put the Kafr Yassif case on the Knesset agenda and did not sufficiently press for the appointment of an independent investigation. This refusal could be because they were less concerned about the Arabs and did not want to possibly implicate the Israeli authorities in the event, because of political electoral calculation since Jewish politicians do not get many votes from the Arab sector, or because they were busy with issues of more immediate concern to their party politics. It is also possible that there were not enough parliament members who were sufficiently strong to push for an independent investigation.

5. Kibbutzim are Jewish collective towns.

Yet it worth noting that an uncomplicated interpretation of communal conflicts within the Palestinian Arab community itself as well as between the Arab and Jewish communities is made problematic by two issues. First, the fact that people from neighboring Druze village tried to enter Kafr Yassif to help shows that the event should not be viewed as simply a Druze-versus-Christians conflict. Second, the fact that neighboring kibbutzim members also came to help the people in Kafr Yassif complicates the image of the Jewish-Arab relationship in Israel, which, too often, is presented as a rigid dichotomy.

In concluding this part on Arab media, the coverage of the events in Kafr Yassif did not imply that the violence was culturally specific to the Arab community but rather was the result of state policies and practices, as discussed earlier. There was clear condemnation of the cultural explanation about the "violent nature of Arab society" put forward by various Israeli officials, who ignored the fact that some individuals who participated in the violence were actually wearing Israeli military uniforms and carrying Israeli military arms, a testament to the militarism of Israeli society. There is compulsory military service in Israel, for Jewish and Druze citizens, and the sight of uniformed and armed Israelis is a common and everyday occurrence in the public sphere.

Coverage about the event in the Hebrew press was brief and often included cultural explanations of what took place in Kafr Yassif. For example, *Ha'aretz* had a front page story by Ilan Shihori (April 15, 1981, 1) with the headline "Blood Revenge for the Killing of a Soccer Fan." The author chose to emphasize the supposed tradition of "blood revenge," blaming Palestinian Arab society rather than the government and police for allowing the attack to happen and investigating their role in the event, as reported by *Al-Ittihad*. Yet Ilan Shihori commented that although calls for revenge were heard during the funeral of the resident from Julis, the police did not take them seriously. Here, Shihori at least hinted at the failure of the police to take seriously warnings of possible revenge by Julis against Kafr Yassif, but he did not see it as systemic police or state behavior regarding violence in Palestinian Arab society, in contrast to the Arabic media. The article also neglected to discuss why Druze in Julis wanted

to take revenge and what factors could have contributed to it. The Hebrew press, in general, focused on the nature of violence in Arab society and ignored the fact that the violence against the fans of Julis's soccer team and the killing of one of them was a major reason that led people from Julis to seek revenge. Given the acknowledgment of group violence and collective revenge presumably present in Palestinian Arab society, the Hebrew media also did not address why government and police officials continued to deny that possibility even after the mayor and leaders in Kafr Yassif called for more police to be sent to the village. Furthermore, the Hebrew press completely evaded the question of how such events continue to occur in a supposedly modern, democratic, and strong state, with its rhetoric of being different from other states in the region and being a state where law and order are the rule of the land, according to many in the Israeli media and government.

Another article in *Ha'aretz* (April 16, 1981, 1) reported that the Arab local councils were striking in protest against the police failure in Kafr Yassif. It is revealing to note that the Hebrew press referred to the heads of Arab local councils and not to the Committee for Arab Local Councils, even though this committee was formed and named as such by elected Palestinian Arab local councils to represent them collectively vis-à-vis the Israeli government and decide on matters of concern to the community. However, the Israeli government has never officially acknowledged local Arab political organizations, given that they are a vehicle of strengthening a collective identity, and the Hebrew press seemed to toe the government line in not referring to the committee by its officially declared name. This point is important to keep in mind, since there is much criticism within the Palestinian Arab community of the bias in the Israeli media regarding issues within the Palestinian Arab community and a view of the Israeli media as being generally very nationalist-Zionist and reflecting the government stance in their portrayal of Palestinian Arabs. This fact is significant because there is generally much talk about the freedom of media in Israel. Although this point might be true in comparison to other places where direct and overt media censorship exists, in reality in Israel, as in many supposedly democratic states such as the

United States, the media often voluntarily and uncritically toe the government line, either through self-imposed censorship or out of nationalistic impulses (Sultany 2003).[6]

An example of how the Hebrew newspapers narrated the specific event or how it turned around or used it to reinforce "internal divisions" within the Palestinian Arab community is in an article by Yehuda Arian (*Ha'aretz*, April 17, 1981, 3), who reported that Julis's representatives accused Kafr Yassif for the failure of the reconciliation committee in a press conference, holding them responsible for killing the soccer fan, for not issuing condemnation of the attack, and for refusing to come to Julis to apologize. Although some parts of this report might be true, as mentioned earlier, the Kafr Yassif local council had indeed condemned the violence against Julis's soccer fans but declared that it was impossible to name the person who stabbed the fan from Julis, because no one had informed the local council about the identity of the killer and because the police were in charge of the investigation. It is also interesting to note here that this report in the Hebrew press seemed to reflect what might be the perspective of people from Julis on this incident, especially regarding the failure to reconcile after the soccer game as being the cause of the large attack on Kafr Yassif. If this point of view was the case, as the reporter claimed, it is not clear why he chose not to report the perspectives of those who were attacked in Kafr Yassif as also relevant to the incident.

Another major Hebrew newspaper, *Yedeot Ahronot*, reported that the suspects in killing and provocation of the incident were arrested in Kafr Yassif, an announcement that appeared belated since the arrests were actually made on April 11, after the soccer game (April 17, 1981, 4). Also, the report seemed to portray the event as merely an internal issue without much involvement of the police or Israeli authorities. Furthermore, reporters hardly gave voice to the victims of the event, who were the residents of Kafr Yassif, not residents of Julis, or the Israeli government officials whom they relied on for information about the events.

6. For a detailed discussion on the Israeli media, its portrayal of Arabs in Israel, and its relations to the official narrative, see Sultany 2003.

An exception to this general coverage in the Hebrew press was a report in *Yedeot Ahronot* on April 15, 1981 (2). This article noted that the attackers on Kafr Yassif jumped out of a military jeep and opened fire on people in Kafr Yassif, leaving the village in shock. The article even mentioned that people from Kafr Yassif described the event as a "pogrom" and that there was a suspicion that the soldiers who took part in the attack belonged to the Druze unit in the Israeli military. It is clear that this report was less biased against Kafr Yassif residents and that it did not put the blame on them, as the previous reports did, directly and indirectly. The report went a step further in linking the Israeli military to the attack through the possible participation of members in the Druze unit from the Israeli military. The article also reported that a high-ranking official in the police described the attack in Kafr Yassif as the worst incidence of violence within the Palestinian Arab community in the history of Israel and that the village looked as if it had survived a war. According to the vice general commander of police himself, there were forty-five policemen present in the village, yet they were unable to prevent the attack. The report vividly described the actual significance of the event as being one of the worse events that took place in the country's history, which is contrary to statements and reports by government officials, who said that the incident was similar to other incidents of violence within the Arab community in Israel.

Ma'ariv, the third major Israeli Hebrew newspaper, reported on the incident under the headline, "One More Dead in Kafr Yassif" (April 15, 1981, 1, 3, 5). The article claimed that "tens" of assailants were involved in the attack (3), thus minimizing the number of people who participated in the attack, which according to eyewitnesses, and the Israeli police as well, was in the hundreds. The article described the killing of the person from Julis during the soccer game as a "murder" (5), even before the police investigation was concluded (which in fact it never was, and no one was ever charged with the killing of the fan from Julis). Yet the report also stated that the police owed Kafr Yassif and the larger public in Israel an explanation for the attack that took place three days later (5). This report is another exception in the Hebrew press, which viewed with suspicion the behavior of the police, especially in the period between the end of the soccer game and the end of the attack on Kafr Yassif three days later.

The day after this article appeared, *Ma'ariv* also reported that police behavior in Kafr Yassif was under internal investigation, but that the interior minister had refused to allow an independent investigation into the event, maintaining that the police acted appropriately (April 16, 1981, 1). It is important to note here that the refusal to allow an independent investigation into the incident led many in Kafr Yassif to be more suspicious of the government, and since there was no independent investigation, it remains difficult to assign responsibility to a certain person in the security apparatus or the government, which implicitly makes the entire government suspect. Yet in Israel, as in the case of many other states, the government sometimes favors this option (undertaking an investigation of one its branches), as it deems it may be embarrassing to let an independent investigation focus on an organ of the state. It seems quite strange for a body that is being accused of wrongdoing to undertake an investigation itself. I argue that although this tactic might appear on the surface to be a good way to assign blame and hold an official more responsible, it is in fact implicating the government in attempting to hide the facts rather than make them open to the public. This situation is also similar to other cases in Israel, as well as other countries, and is particularly evident in the so-called democratic states, where the image of "accountability" must always be maintained to fend off public criticism and help the government in maintaining local and global legitimacy. It could also be owing to the possibility that the official who might be found responsible for the error might turn out to be a high-ranking official, which might embarrass the government or limit the government's actions.

Going back to the few reports in the Hebrew press, Alof Hareoveni authored an article in *Ma'ariv* with the dramatic headline "Two Days After, Blood Is Boiling Between Julis and Kafr Yassif," emphasizing again the presumably "violent nature of Arab society" with its image of anger seething in Arab blood (April 17, 1981, 27). Despite this language, Hareoveni also asked how it was possible that tens of heavily armed people could attack Kafr Yassif and wage havoc for more than an hour without the police being unable to stop them. Although Hareoveni underestimated the number of assailants (which was in the hundreds), he still acknowledged that the attack was horrific and that the police did nothing

to stop it. Another important point, according to the reporter, is that the weapons used in the attack belonged to the Israeli military, and he further elaborated that security forces and general observers were aware that Israeli military weapons can be found in abundance in Druze villages and that it is public knowledge that arms were used in Druze villages in internal disputes.

Hareoveni's article points to four important issues: first, the use of Israeli military weapons in the attack; second, the abundance of arms in Druze villages more generally; third, the use of Israeli military weapons in previous incidents of violence in Druze villages; and fourth, the fact that all this information was not secret but was public knowledge. These four points are very revealing in that they confirm my own findings based on what residents in the area said about the use of Israeli military arms in the attack with the knowledge of Israeli security forces. Here it is important to keep in mind that the Israeli military does not allow the storage of weapons in homes, for although it is true that Israeli Jewish soldiers go home with their rifles, missiles and bombs are not present in large quantities in Jewish towns. Also, it has never happened that these arms were used in attacks in Jewish towns, while the article confirms that these arms have been previously used in Druze towns and villages. This point suggests that the police and Israeli security forces should have taken into account these well-known facts if they really wanted to prevent the attack on Kafr Yassif. Furthermore, that Druze soldiers serving in the Israeli military have used their weapons in internal strife and no one was ever held responsible for such crimes signals tolerance of the Israeli state for such behavior and gives Druze soldiers a sense that they can act with impunity.

Hareoveni also observed that Kafr Yassif's local economy was more dynamic compared to other Arab villages in Israel and suggested that this economic factor might have been one of the reasons for the resentment of Kafr Yassif by people in Julis, despite the prior history of good relations. This observation confirms two issues that emerged in my research: one is that the two villages had a history of amicable relations prior to the event, and the second is that the relative economic wealth of Kafr Yassif might have shaped its relations with neighboring Palestinian Arab villages. It is true also that there may have been discontent because Kafr Yassif had

been providing local services for a long time to neighboring Palestinian Arab villages. For example, high school education, health services, and public transportation were available only in Kafr Yassif until the early 1980s. At the same time, to focus on such broader disparities as a cause for the attack takes away from the responsibility the government has of being accountable for the security of its citizens.

In the same article, Hareoveni stated that the government adviser on Arab affairs for northern Israel, Yoram Katz, claimed that the *sulha* process did not go into effect quickly because the local elders were losing prestige and influence within their community; in Katz's view, a new generation was claiming leadership in the Druze community and was not willing to abide by the older generation's requests or demands. Katz also noted that because Druze serve in the Israeli military, they are resented by other Arabs in Israel. According to Katz, the attack was the result of these internal tensions, in addition to the Arab custom of blood revenge, according to which one is allowed to seek revenge within forty-eight hours of a killing.

The points raised in this article merit further discussion. In view of the fact that such a high-ranking official seems to be aware of these factors, why were more police officers not sent to Kafr Yassif, as he was one of the officials responsible for the Arab sector in the Israeli government? His views and language testify to the "workings" of colonialism and modernity embodied in the nation-state that have a deep impact on the Arab Palestinian community in Israel. Whereas the Israeli state and its leaders have presented the creation of the state as an emblem of modernity, justice, prosperity, and progress, they blame the backward and violent culture of Arabs if things go awry.[7] Thus, colonized natives should be thankful for the "progress" brought to them by the modern European national project, and when the situation deteriorates, they should blame only themselves. It is their own failure that they are unable to free themselves from their backward culture and catch up with modernity. Such statements by Israeli officials and some reporters in the Hebrew press reflect this social

7. For discussion of the rhetoric of modernity and civilizational mission on the part of Zionist and Israeli leaders, see, for example, Massad 2006.

Darwinist and Western-centric view of Arab society (Massad 2006).[8] In a sense, both these issues reflect the paradoxes of modernity and colonialism: the distance between Orientalist rhetoric and reality and the mythical representation of the "Orientals." Yet Orientalist representations and arguments are not completely inaccurate; rather, their problem lies in the half-truth decontextualized arguments and overgeneralizations that are central to the working of Orientalism and colonialism, as Said (1978) has shown. Furthermore, it is also interesting to note how the "Oriental mentality" is often used to explain causes of incidents as a way of shifting blame from "modern" state authorities responsible for order and peace.

Take, for example, the issue of generational differences within the Druze community alluded to by Katz. To some extent, the older generation of leaders might be indeed losing their former control over the community. Yet this shift is overstated, because it is also true that in the case of serious incidents, community elders are recognized and still play an important role even if there are generational differences or power struggles. Furthermore, the extent of this generational shift warrants further research, since it is an area that is still understudied.

Second, it is correct to note that the tradition of blood revenge exists in Arab society. However, it does not happen every time there is a killing, since *sulha* making is often successful in preventing blood revenge. What is also important is that the government adviser was well aware of the existence of this tradition, as was the case with many other Israeli officials, yet it seems that this "tradition" was not taken into consideration by the Israeli authorities after they were informed about the conflict between Julis and Kafr Yassif. So, assuming that it is true that blood revenge is common in the Palestinian Arab society, then it begs the question of why would the Israeli government not send more troops to prevent violence from breaking out, especially after the police and minister of interior were called upon by leaders in Kafr Yassif to do so?

In conclusion of the media coverage in my research, I found that the Hebrew press stopped reporting about the Kafr Yassif event within two

8. Massad 2006 is a response to Bollinger at Columbia University.

weeks. The only newspaper that continued to run articles on the aftermath of the event was the Arabic newspaper, *Al-Ittihad,* although less extensively than it did the first few weeks. By May 1981, *Al-Ittihad* ended its extensive coverage of the Kafr Yassif affair. The Kafr Yassif issue appeared again in the newspaper in November when news broke of the government investigative committee. On November 13, 1981, *Al-Ittihad* reported that the Kafr Yassif local council demanded again that the government set up an independent investigative committee (8). The council also sent a letter to the government committee asking it to release its report and questioned the delay in announcing the findings. The report noted that the local council had never heard from the committee since its appointment by the government in May 1981.

On November 20, 1981, *Al-Ittihad* reported that the government's investigative committee responded to the Kafr Yassif local council that the findings were in print and that the committee would first send the report to the interior minister, who in turn was responsible for providing it to the Kafr Yassif local council (7). On December 8, 1981, *Al-Ittihad* further reported on the findings and noted that the investigative committee had distorted the facts of the incident and freed the police from any responsibility (6). It also blamed the committee for taking at face value the police account of their own behavior over the course of the event and for not meeting with leaders, local residents, and eyewitnesses in Kafr Yassif, whose narratives should have been included in the investigation. This situation was again observed in the pages of *Al-Ittihad* (December 8, 1981), pointing out that the report issued by the investigative committee ignored the testimonies of the Kafr Yassif council and of eyewitnesses and freed the government from the responsibility of paying reparations to the people affected in Kafr Yassif. Another article also recommended that the government give compensation to Kafr Yassif residents because the arms used in the attack belonged to the Israeli army (*Al-Ittihad,* December 8, 1981, 6). The last article in *Al-Ittihad* (on the Kafr Yassif affair) appeared on December 15, 1981, reporting that representatives of Kafr Yassif had renewed their call for an independent investigation, criticized the slow work of the government investigation, and challenged its findings (6).

By way of summary of media representations of the events in Kafr Yassif, it is useful to note a few points. The first is that the Arab press was accusatory toward the government in its handling of this event and presented the event in Kafr Yassif situated in a larger context of the state policy toward the Palestinian Arab community. Furthermore, these reports by *Al-Ittihad* corroborated the findings of my archival work in the village, mainly in the local council, which included documents, statements, announcements, and correspondence of the local council and the mayor, as well as the findings from interviews I did with eyewitnesses and leaders in the village and region.

It is also apparent that *Al-Ittihad* was the only newspaper that covered the event extensively, even though at the time the newspaper was published only twice a week, and whereas the major Hebrew Israeli newspapers were issued daily, they covered the event for only a few days. This discrepancy could be because *Al-Ittihad* was the only Arab newspaper at the time, so it played the role of representing the concerns of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. This fact might also have been a factor in its seemingly harsh criticism of the way the event unfolded and the way the police and government policies were involved. Perhaps this position blinded *Al-Ittihad* from being more critical of the unnecessary violence that took place during that event and prevented it from urging the community to reflect on this phenomenon and confront it more directly. The coverage did not take issue with the fact that the perpetrators of violence were both Arabs. Although the newspaper was right to question the behavior of Israeli authorities during and after the event, it should have also discussed the issue of violence within Arab society. The total absence of criticism of the Arab community in *Al-Ittihad* is quite evident. The Palestinian Arab community is presented as a victim of manipulative government officials who do not wish them well, and this interpretation also presents the community as passive subjects. On the other hand, the fact that the violence did not continue after the event showed that the community was strong enough to resist policies and external pressures.

Here one must acknowledge the fact that *Al-Ittihad*'s coverage of the event and its view of the Israeli government can be better understood

considering the history of the state and its relations with, policies toward, and treatment of its Arab citizens, including those persons working at *Al-Ittihad,* who are mostly Palestinian Arabs and have been through the same experience as the rest of the Palestinian Arab community since 1948. *Al-Ittihad* is also an oppositional voice, similar to other media outlets around the world that are not tied to governments and their official narratives and seek to expose and challenge the power structure in a given society and a state.[9]

Contrary to the *Al-Ittihad* reporting, the reports in the Hebrew press seemed to be in line with the government's narrative, even though there were articles questioning the police behavior during the event.[10] The Hebrew press generally treated the incident in Kafr Yassif as an isolated event, and though the Hebrew press is often not very objective in its coverage of such events in the Palestinian Arab community, as I will discuss later, there was an exception to that rule. There were some dissenting voices in the Hebrew press that were critical of the government and police behavior and the way they handled the event in Kafr Yassif. The difference between the Arabic and Hebrew press in Israel is one of representation as well as interpretation. The Hebrew press, in general, took the official narrative without putting it into the context of the complicated relationship between the state and the Palestinian Arab community. The Hebrew press was very critical of Arab society, implying that its supposedly violent nature and culture were to blame for the event. The Hebrew-language media hardly gave any voice to the affected party, the residents in Kafr Yassif. This neglect might be owing to the greater access they had to government officials, but it also could be that the Hebrew press trusted government officials more than the eyewitnesses in Kafr Yassif.

9. For readers in the United States, it would be useful to think of *Al-Ittihad* as New Media, or a similar news source that is critical of U.S. domestic and foreign policies that are seen as serving certain group(s) of people and harming many unprivileged or discriminated-against groups.

10. For readers in the United States, the media sources I use here are similar to, for example, the *New York Times, Los Angeles Times,* and *Washington Post,* in their coverage and relations to powerful and marginalized groups.

If we look at the history of the Hebrew press in Israel, we can learn more about this issue. According to Mansour, in the first decades of the state, the state directly intervened and controlled the press in Israel. Yet even after the privatization of the media in the 1980s, the state still plays a major role in control of the media (2004, 425). I would add that the Hebrew press in general, even if it is not under state control, is nationalistic and anti-Arab, stemming from a society that is susceptible to anti-Arab racism, as will be discussed further in the following two chapters. It is thus not unusual to see the Hebrew media parroting government narratives about what happened in Kafr Yassif. What are really remarkable in the Hebrew press are the few dissenting voices that seemed able to distance themselves from that line. It is important to keep in mind that both perspectives, whether of the Arabic or the Hebrew press, are better understood in the context in which they operated, that is, of the conflict between the two communities, and the long history of dehumanization that has gone along with it.

In assessing the findings of my research and the media coverage of the event, it is clear that the people in Kafr Yassif blamed the police and state for the event and put it in the larger context of state policy that harms the Palestinian Arabs who are citizens in Israel yet whose well-being and unity are not desired by the state. On the other hand, the government officials seem to put the blame on the violent nature of Arab society and on the long-standing habit of blood revenge and take little responsibility, if any, for what took place in Kafr Yassif. It is also significant that the coverage of the event in these newspapers did not dispute what happened in Kafr Yassif or what is commonly believed in these communities. There were clear expressions of indignation about police and government behavior during and after the event. This was the case both in the Hebrew press, even though their tone was much softer and often referred to state negligence rather than intent, and in Arabic newspapers, which used a strong accusatory tone much more critical of the Israeli government and authorities. In order to add to our understanding of these competing claims and differences in opinions and explanations, of the Arab community and the Israeli government as well as of the media reports, I will discuss in the following section similar incidents that help further clarify these claims.

Similar Incidents

In this section, I will summarize and discuss two violent events that took place between different religious groups within the Palestinian Arab community inside Israel's 1948 borders as well as in the West Bank that fell under Israeli rule in the 1967 war. From these incidents, we can understand more about how violence takes place in Palestinian Arab society and also how Israeli authorities and police behave during such incidents. This discussion builds on my findings surrounding the events in Kafr Yassif and uses these historical incidents as another tool to examine the Israeli government's as well as Palestinian Arab community's arguments regarding group violence within the Arab Palestinian community.

A case from the West Bank is also included, and this case helps draw out the connections, similarities, and continuities between Palestinian Arab communities within Israel's borders of 1948 and of 1967 as well as between Israeli policies toward the Palestinian Arabs under its rule in both areas (inside Israel and its 1967 occupied territories). Although it is not the main thrust of the book, this comparison helps highlight two issues that are present throughout. One is the larger historical context of such incidents, which I argue is important for a deeper understanding of sectarian conflict. Connecting the Palestinian Arab communities occupied in 1967 to those communities within the 1948 borders is important because 1948 is the date of the official start of conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Jews, as I will explain in detail further, and is central to understanding how Palestinian Arab society views successive Israeli governments. It also helps us understand how and why Israeli authorities behave the way they do in relation to violence within Palestinian Arab society under its rule. Although the following two cases will not be as detailed as the main case study in the book, they allow us to reflect on possible continuities in the Israeli governments policies regarding violence within Arab society.

The Taybeh Incident

This incident of interfamily-intercommunal violence between Muslim and Christian families took place in the West Bank near Ramallah, in 2005. It is important to note at the outset that despite the so-called peace

process and the Oslo accords, Palestinian towns and villages in the territories that fell under Israeli rule after 1967 remained largely under Israeli control, and the entrances and exits of these areas are surrounded by Israeli military checkpoints. Furthermore, under international law, Israel as the occupying power is responsible for the safety of its subjects, namely, those person who live under its rule. Fred Bush (2005), an American with extensive connections with people in the Ramallah area, reported on the event and responded to its coverage, and I cite his account in detail below:

> A tragic event occurred between families from the Muslim village of Deir Jarir and the Christian village of Taybeh, both of which are located a few miles northwest of Ramallah. This was presented in the *Jerusalem Post* and also by Daniel Pipes in the *New York Sun* on 13 September as a pogrom by Muslims against Christians, and even as the main reason why Christianity is dying in its birthplace. According to eyewitnesses, there are strained relationships between Islamic extremists and the Christian community and this complicates this relationship further.
>
> For ten years, a Muslim woman named Hiyam from the village of Beit Jarir had been working at a sewing shop in Taybeh owned by a Christian man named Majdi Khourieh. She was thirty-two years old, unmarried and pregnant. One day she was found dead, and someone from her family was suspected of doing that. Her family members accused Majdi Khourieh of being the father, an accusation which he denied. Elders of Taybeh went to Beit Jarir to ask for a period of *hudna* (truce) while that matter was being investigated. The elders of Beit Jarir refused.
>
> On 10 April, tens of young men from Jarir arrived in Taybeh. They set fire to Majdi Khourieh's home, as well as to those belonging to other members of his extended family. All in all, seven houses were torched, but no one was harmed. Residents of Taybeh began calling on Palestinian, Israeli, and American authorities to intervene (several residents of Taybeh are American citizens). The Israelis arrived first in three jeeps, after the first house had been torched, and watched. They did not intervene.
>
> The Palestinian police, coming from Ramallah, had to pass through an Israeli checkpoint to arrive in Taybeh. They were held at the checkpoint for three hours. The United States consulate in Jerusalem persistently

> called the Israeli military to allow the [Palestinian] police to pass through, an intervention that may have facilitated their eventual passage to Taybeh. The Palestinian police arrived after three hours of the attack and dispersed the crowd, arresting thirteen of the young men from Deir Jarir.
>
> The next day, Sunday the 11th, the mayor of Ramallah came to Taybeh, and along with the elders of Taybeh went to Beit Jarir to ask for *hudna* [to avoid further escalation]. The community leaders condemned the attack and agreed to the *hudna* declaration with several stipulations, which after 6 months will lead to *sulha,* conflict management. In the meantime, Palestinian police patrols have remained in Taybeh as needed and the Palestinian Authority has put all its weight into solving the conflict. No violence took place since then.

It is interesting to highlight a few striking aspects of this incident. One, the Israeli military force that entered the village stood watching and did not intervene, which is very similar to the behavior of the Israeli police in Kafr Yassif. Furthermore, it is quite audacious on the part of the *Jerusalem Post* and Daniel Pipes in the *New York Sun* to present the case as a Muslim pogrom against Christians for a couple of reasons. First, contrary to the Orientalist representations of Islam and the Middle East, so-called "honor" and honor-related killings and conflicts happen between and within different communities not just among Muslims, and they even occur in the United States. At the same time, the basis for the attack was an honor-related issue and not a religious one. Second, reports and representations of pogroms against Christians, often from right-wing and Zionist publications and spokespersons such as Pipes, imply that Israel is a safe haven for the Christians compared to those "intolerant" Muslims communities. Yet if Israel really is a safe place, why would the Israeli military stand watching Christians' homes being attacked even though they were called upon by these very Christian families to intervene? Furthermore, as was the case in Kafr Yassif and also in another incident in Al-Maghaar, Christians were actually attacked under the eyes of and with the collaboration of the Israeli police.

Another aspect that mirrors the incident in Kafr Yassif is that the Israeli security forces prevented help from entering the village. By prohibiting

the Palestinian police from entering the village for three hours, they indirectly helped the attack to continue unchecked, because when the Palestinian police were finally allowed to enter (as Bush suggests, possibly under American pressure), they were able immediately to disperse the crowds and arrested thirteen of the perpetrators of the attack.

Furthermore, it is also important to note how the Palestinian authorities worked to utilize *sulha,* deploy police forces in Taybeh to prevent further attacks, and make sure that there was no other attack and violence until the *sulha* was achieved. Here is a stark difference from the Kafr Yassif incident and a noticeable contradiction to the propaganda of Pipe and others. The Palestinian police seem more serious than the Israeli police in trying to prevent internal violence and seem also more serious in preventing or stopping violence against Christians. This fact will become even clearer in the following case of a village in Galilee that has been under Israeli rule since 1948.

The Al-Maghaar Incident

The discussion of the incident in Al-Maghaar is based on media reports of the incident as well as on brief fieldwork that I did in the summer of 2005, when I visited the village and spoke to eight residents who had witnessed the violence. The village in Galilee, a Palestinian territory that fell under Israeli rule in 1948, has about five thousand residents, about 60 percent of whom are Druze and the remaining are Christian Arabs. Similar to Kafr Yassif, most Christians in Al-Maghaar also have a history of political opposition to Israeli state policies, and many are affiliated with the oppositional Communist Party.

The event unfolded on February 11, 2005, when a mob of Druze men attacked shops and homes belonging to Christians from Al-Maghaar. For two days the attackers burned and looted shops and homes of their fellow Christian residents of Al-Maghaar. The incident was initiated when a young Christian boy from the village was accused of posting a photo of a Druze female from the village on the Internet, an accusation that the young man denied. Very soon, an organized assault on Christians' properties in the village took place, and Christian residents were attacked

physically wherever they were found in the village. These attacks lasted for two days, and the Israeli police did not do anything to stop them. In fact, some eyewitnesses even argued that some policemen participated in the attacks. The village was sealed off, and no one was allowed to enter or leave for two days. Palestinian Arab community leaders from the village and the surrounding area started to intervene to stop the violence. A *sulha* procedure took place, and after a few months the dispute was settled by compensating the Christian residents for their material losses.

Sa'id Nafaa', an eyewitness observer reporting on the event in Al-Maghaar, argued that Palestinian Arabs have become accustomed to highlighting their religious affiliation as the Israeli Authorities have taught them to define themselves by religion (http:/www.arabs48.com, *Al-Maghaar . . . Sa'id Nafaa'*). According to Nafaa', the problem that took place in Al-Maghaar was not a personal dispute between individuals. Rather, there is a sizable minority among the Druze who have become accustomed to attacking Christians, just because they are Christians. This attack was not the first time it had occurred, and, in his view, and it would not be the last. Nafaa' further argued that the police who were present during the events were asked to at least throw gas bombs in order to disperse the attackers, yet their response was that they did not have orders to do so. The police were also asked to let the fire department's vehicle enter the village to put out the fire, but the police replied that they did not have those orders either. The conflict subsided only when people from neighboring villages were able to enter the village and calm things down. According to Nafaa', such incidents are related to state policy to put pressure on the Christians to join the military so that they will also be able to have weapons and protect themselves.

One can see how the police behavior in Al-Maghaar is very similar to their conduct in other incidents: not intervening, some even participating in the attack, and closing off the village so that the attack persists and help from the outside cannot enter. Nafaa"s claim that the purpose in allowing violence against Christians is part of a policy of the state to induce Christians to join the Israeli military echoes what I heard from many in Kafr Yassif as well. In fact, a small number of young Christians from Kafr Yassif joined the Israeli military after the 1981 incident and stated that their

reason for doing so was so they could be armed so that it would become more difficult for armed Druze to attack them. Furthermore, there was an increase in the number of Christians from Kafr Yassif who applied and received permits to own arms after 1981, and a good number of them actually became armed.

Commenting on the event in Al-Maghaar, *Al-Ghad* (a well-known Arabic magazine published in Haifa) suggested that there was a plan by the Israeli regime to undermine the unity of the Palestinian Arab community by encouraging internal fighting and violence in order to hurt its readiness for resistance and isolating it from having political influence in Israel (*Al-Ghad*, no. 2 [May 2005], 6). The editorial went on to argue that the Al-Maghaar incident was not an isolated one. In their view, the authorities have gone quite far with this policy on many occasions and fostered violent behavior in Palestinian Arab communities. For example, in Nazareth, with the *shihab al-din* crisis the state created a confrontation between the different religious groups (Muslims and Christians). In that incident, the government had given a permit to the local Islamic movement to start rebuilding a mosque on a site that was simultaneously declared by the Israeli court to be a property of the Nazareth municipal council, setting the stage for a conflict through these contradictory state decisions. The Islamic movement had declared the location to be a holy site of a prior mosque (*shihab al-din*), while the city municipality was planning on building parking spaces in that location for a crowded section of downtown Nazareth in preparation for Nazareth 2000 celebrations. When the Israeli court decided that the lot was the property of the municipality, members of the Islamic movement attacked Christians and their property in the city, while the police stood by watching. This same policy was enacted in Al-Maghaar, where the horrific pogrom took place and tens of houses where burned just because the owners belonged to a certain religious group, and many people fled the town for fear of a possible massacre. The article in *Al-Ghad* warned against falling into what is viewed as a trap that the government has been setting for the Palestinian Arab community. It is also interesting to note that the Nazareth incident referred to in *Al-Ghad* involved large-scale violence instigated by members of the Islamic movement in Nazareth against Christians because the mayor of the city

was Christian (although he belonged to the Communist Party, as did the mayor of Kafr Yassif). Furthermore, while the Israeli court was studying the case brought forward by the Islamic Movement regarding the municipality's plan for the parking lot, Israeli officials frequently issued statements arguing that the land should be given to the Islamic movement to rebuild the allegedly ancient mosque in that same location. Here is not only an example of the interference of the state in the justice system, with contradictory government statements being issued before the court had made its decision, but also an ironic and even cynical instance of Israeli government officials wanting to project an image of caring about the religious sites of non-Jews in Israel, especially Muslims. This stance is ironic and troubling, as there is a long record of the state not only appropriating Muslim Waqf lands but also destroying mosques and even turning some of them into bars. This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5, which explores state policies toward its Arab citizens.

Accompanying its reportage of the event in Al-Maghaar, *Al-Ghad* published a photo of a slogan that had been written on the entrance to the village by local residents after the incident. The slogan was "Welcome to Fallujah, everything happened in the presence of the Israeli police." It is true that it is an exaggeration to equate the incident in Al-Maghaar to the large-scale attack of the American military on Fallujah in Iraq involving almost complete destruction of the town and the killing and injuries of many civilians. Yet the slogan reflects the deep feeling among some in Al-Maghaar of being massacred with government consent and without government intervention or power to resist external forces. Also, in such conflicts, the incident is situated in the context of the longer history of state atrocities against Palestinian Arab citizens, thus magnifying each small incident as part of a long series of attacks, with state consent or because of state neglect.

Another report on the Al-Maghaar event appeared in *Al-Mithaq* (Summer 2005, 33), a publication by a Druze organization that mobilizes against the military draft among the Druze community and is critical of the Israeli state. The report argued that what happened in Al-Maghaar on February 11, 2005, is the final proof that there is a state program to create further division and foster hostility among the Arab community's

different religious groups, as was the case with previous violent clashes in different Palestinian Arab villages and towns. The state authorities planned these attacks or, at least in some cases, were informed of them in advance and did not do anything to prevent them.[11] Here it is important to note that this report is by an organization established by Druze in the 1990s that aimed at creating an official body to represent Druze who oppose state policies and has worked to integrate the Druze with the larger Palestinian Arabs community in Israel, and beyond, in order to fight against state policies segregating Druze in Israel from the rest of the Palestinian Arab community.

Afterthoughts on the Media Coverage

It is clear from the media coverage analyzed here that the Palestinian Arab community and its media outlets faulted solely the police and government for what took place in Kafr Yassif and other such incidents that have taken place in the Palestinian Arab community. Furthermore, each event was put in the context of a larger government policy designed to harm the Palestinian Arab community. The media here did not take a neutral side but rather functioned as a mouthpiece for the Palestinian Arab community, ignoring the existence of group violence within the community and not addressing sufficiently why that violence is still sanctioned. The fact that these incidents do take place in the community was not questioned or challenged in a way that would put some blame on the community, regardless of the government's role in it. On the other hand, the fact that such events took place under the eyes of the police was not questioned nearly enough or investigated adequately by the Hebrew-language media that tends, too quickly, to put the blame on the nature and culture of Arab society by representing it as inherently violent. This position is shared by Israeli government officials as well.

The approaches of both media are not helpful in understanding the causes of such incidents and do not allow sufficient self-criticism and

11. The report also relied on two articles from *Al-Ittihad* and *Fasl Al-Maqaal* on March 23, 2005, to present its case regarding the event.

objective analysis. What they do, rather, results in oversimplification and one-sided reporting, if one were to look at the media alone, although much more detailed additional information about the event appeared in the Arabic press, and there were a few dissenting voices in the Hebrew press.

The analysis of the media here underscores that viewing the media as sources of information that objectively explain events should be treated with caution anywhere. This fact is especially the case when the media representation is of conflicts and parties involved in violence and when we are dealing with marginalized groups in any place that witnesses group violence. A better and complementary way to achieve a more accurate picture and complex analysis is to draw on findings from extended fieldwork, archival work that examines material that has been overlooked, and studies of the history of the communities concerned and the relations between communities and the state. A historical approach to these issues will better help explain what happened in Kafr Yassif and in similar incidents, as will be explored in the following two chapters.

There are several issues that are worth pointing to in light of the findings from the research that involved media analysis, local archival research, and interviews conducted over three years. One is that group violence and collective revenge are indeed present in Arab society. It is also clear that such group violence is partially justified by at least some in the community—otherwise it would not keep happening—yet many Palestinian Arabs I talked with were critical of such behavior. Some observed that since the state seems absent when conflicts and violence take place within the Palestinian Arab community, that is, when Arabs fight Arabs, some people feel immune from legal punishment if they perpetuate violence. Thus, since the state and its modern justice system and security regime seem to abdicate their official role within the Palestinian Arab community, group violence goes on, but so do traditional conflict-management tools that have helped the community to solve and manage internal disputes for centuries.

It is also apparent that the Israeli authorities and police tend not to act to prevent or stop violence between groups within the Palestinian Arab community. Such behavior cannot be accidental, nor can it be owing to the failure or weakness of the state apparatus. As I discussed earlier, Israel is

a strong state with a strong and functioning security apparatus. Israel is also a state that is small in territorial area, and its security forces are large enough to act swiftly if they wish to. This point has been evident in many cases when Israeli officials decided to do just that. On several occasions, Israeli authorities acted swiftly to crush even peaceful Palestinian Arab protests—for example, when Palestinians protested in Galilee in October 2000 against Israeli brutality in the West Bank and Gaza.

Thus, I argue that even if violence in Palestinian Arab society is not created by the state, it is tolerated, and often nothing is done by Israeli security forces to prevent it. The most useful way of understanding this unstated and undeclared official policy is by situating it within the framework presented by Ian Lustick (1980) in his research on Arabs in Israel. Internal group conflict and violence can be better understood in relation to Lustick's concept of control. The police behavior during such incidents and the state's unwillingness to put an end to conflicts can best be understood as part of such a policy of control.

The second element of Lustick's framework is co-optation, for he argues that the state has the ability to co-opt leaders within the community in order to prevent them from investing their energies into mobilizing the Arab community against the state. The other side of the coin in this policy is demobilization, that is, in my view, that co-optation of leaders within the Arab community can also serve in utilizing leaders to help promote government policies even if doing so means harming their own community in the context of violence, conflicts, and infighting. Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi, which was mentioned earlier, is a case in point, as he is a Druze leader very much allied with the Israeli establishment. Not only was he co-opted so that he does not participate in collective Druze or Arab mobilization against state policies, he has also often been used by the state to suppress local politics and at other times to encourage internal fighting, especially between Druze and those individuals or groups who oppose government policies. In the 1950s and 1960s he engaged in an attack himself against the local council of Kafr Yassif, which was at the time led by Yani Yani, who had built a broad coalition against Israeli policies toward its Arab citizens, as well as state policies toward Palestinians and Arabs in general that were seen by many as racist, aggressive, and colonialist.

Furthermore, during the Kafr Yassif incident, many local residents expressed their suspicion about the role of Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi in interfering in the conflict between Julis and Kafr Yassif. He was suspected of encouraging leaders in Julis to not pursue *sulha* with Kafr Yassif but take revenge. As mentioned earlier, Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi helped Israeli government officials pressure families and leaders in Kafr Yassif to accept the state-imposed version of the *sulha* without insisting on an independent investigation. So here the co-optation of leader served as a tool of the Israeli government goals in demobilizing the Palestinian Arab community.

In the next two chapters and the conclusion, I will further discuss Lustick's analysis of Israeli policy toward the Palestinian Arab minority as part of a theoretical framework for understanding violence among different religious groups in Palestinian Arab society. It is important to emphasize that when discussing violence among Palestinian Arabs in Israel, I do not intend to imply or argue that this violence is a particular cultural issue, an approach, in fact, I argue against throughout the book. Group violence happens everywhere, and the communal violence within the Palestinian Arab community is similar, more or less, to what takes place in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. Yet what is interesting here is how Palestinian Arab society deals with group violence. Those individuals working on societies in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere can also demonstrate how these societies try to manage conflicts using both "premodern" and "modern" forms of dispute resolution. While living in a "modern" political entity that is supposed to provide safety and order, and trying to utilize its tools to control violence, such as calling on the police and the government to intervene, community leaders initiate their own process and use their own tools of conflict management to control or prevent violence and the escalation thereof. Although the two cases mentioned here, in addition to the main case study, showed that traditional Arab conflict-management methods were unsuccessful in preventing violence within the community, and mostly because of negative third-party intervention (that is, the government), in general, this method has worked for a long time and has been successful in many other cases. Utilizing indigenous methods while also calling on the modern political structure, the state and the justice system, shows how the society harmonizes notions of tradition

and modernity without giving up on either, a testimony, in my view, to an active civil society.

Another issue that emerges from this chapter is how community members view incidents of communal violence and in what context they situate sectarian conflict. Rather than seeing it entirely as self-made, the community sees such events as the making of the state. It is worth taking into account that the community claimed that the authorities through state officials and links in the community had worked to undermine their traditional conflict-management initiatives and in some of these cases even helped initiate the violence. The claims of the community could be better understood by also contextualizing these incidents within the larger historical relationship between the state and the community. Discussing such phenomenon within the context of intergroup relations and their relations to the state as well as the history of the state and its policies can help further examine the community's claims about the state and vice versa. This same thing is, in fact, what one could also argue about other states and other cases.

Furthermore, although states often do not declare their policies overtly, especially on sensitive subjects, state policies are clearly discernible through an examination of the pattern of behavior of the state authorities (officials, police and security services, and the justice system) during and after group violence. The manner in which the Israeli police and security forces behaved in such incidents could tell us much about the policy of the state, which is true for other countries as well. Such a pattern, whether of an active or inactive role in preventing and controlling violence or of how the justice system and other state apparatuses draw lessons from and take actions after an event, reflects unstated policy. This pattern cannot simply be described as a failure of the state or as a lack of ability to deal with violence. This point is especially true if such incidents are repeated, when no punishment for the people who commit such crimes is pursued, and when no independent investigation into such events is sought or allowed. The rhetoric of the government needs to be examined against these aspects, even more so when particular groups are the target of such violence rather than the society at large.

2

Explaining Conflict and Violence

A Theoretical Framework

The aims of this chapter are twofold. First, we will discuss dominant theories of ethnic and communal conflict and violence in order to see if they can explain what actually happened in Kafr Yassif in 1981 and the broader phenomenon of communal violence among Arabs in Israel. Second, the chapter aims to make an intervention in the larger literature on communal and ethnic violence and the field of conflict management.

Theory and Method: Ibn Khaldoun's Approach

This chapter offers a unique approach to studying social problems by drawing on the method of the famous Arab philosopher of the fourteenth century, Ibn Khaldoun (AD 1332–1406). There are always epistemological questions at stake in any research project, and underlying my use of Ibn Khaldoun in this study is a deeper question of the decolonization of Eurocentric scholarship that dominates the Western and US academy. One of the implications of this paradigm is that rational and scholarly engagement has taken place only following the advancement in sciences in the West after the Renaissance and Enlightenment in the age of modernity, during which Europe supposedly woke up after centuries of ignorance termed the Dark Ages, which in fact were not as "dark" as they are often assumed, neither in Europe nor in other parts of the world. Furthermore, history according to this Eurocentric approach claims Greek knowledge as its origin, which is something to be questioned when Greece was linked more to the Mediterranean and Africa than to Europe.

To exclude the contribution of the "non-Western" world to knowledge production not only disfigures the genealogy of learning and anthropology of knowledge but also makes the contributions of non-Europeans less known to the Western academy and makes the field of knowledge production linear and less enriching. To claim modernity and rationality as the property of Europe and "the West" was part of what Wallerstein (2004) calls a necessary step in the global capitalist system that was structured to put Europe and the West at the center, which the rest of the world ought to emulate or follow.

Not only should the Western-centric claims of rationality in scientific research be questioned, but the central argument in the narrative of Western modernity also ought to be disputed given that the so-called rational thought in the pursuit of scientific research was part of the non-European heritage for centuries before the advent of European modernity. In my view, there is hardly any subject or field in the modern social sciences that does not owe a great debt to Ibn Khaldoun and other non-European scholars who contributed to the accumulation of knowledge and even discussed methodologies of research that are similar to and sometimes even more sophisticated than what is often taught in social science disciplines in the Western academy. These epistemological issues and questions of intellectual history are beyond the scope of this book, but they underlie the book's analysis of colonialism, power, and knowledge at many levels. Using Ibn Khaldoun's insights to frame the methodology of research in this study is a small step in a larger project of decolonizing scholarship.

Ibn Khaldoun actually addressed questions of research methodology in *Al-Muqaddimah,* posing questions such as the following: What are the primary methods to be used in a rigorous inquiry? What are the pitfalls of weak scholarship and of using already available explanations and theories? Ibn Khaldoun warned against research by scholars who do not wish to trouble themselves in finding new frameworks that might challenge established explanations and against dishonest scholarship that hesitates to challenge hegemonic discourses. Ibn Khaldoun critiqued the hegemony of "court scholars," who take dominant discourses at their face value. He also observed that scholars often lean toward already available explanations because they fit into how they see the world themselves.

As mentioned in the introduction, according to Ibn Khaldoun, a sound scholarly inquiry rests on three elements: first, logical deduction based on analytic reasoning of statements, arguments, and theories already available, in which one must look for holes or contradiction in the available arguments; second, fieldwork in the location of inquiry and empirical research if the question is concerned with an event with a group of people or states; and third, an engagement with other scholarly works and sources that deal with the subject. This methodology allows for a fresh understanding of the issue in question and is a better way to examine the validity of current or dominant paradigms.

Applying the principle of logical deduction and inference to the case at hand, one can observe that it is not uncommon in the current moment to have violence during sports games, and it is a universal and quite predictable phenomenon in the contemporary period. Yet it is not logical that the police, whose role is to ensure order and prevent violence, would stand by watching while soccer fans were attacking each other. Furthermore, a fight between fans of two soccer teams does not logically or necessarily lead to an organized armed attack days later, and this action appears even less logical if state authorities were asked to increase their presence by local leaders and if a reinforced police force was present at the time of the organized attack three days after the soccer-game incident. It also seems to defy common logic that the police force would not block the entrance between the two villages, from which the attack proceeded, and would instead close off other routes preventing assistance from neighboring villages from entering the village. This situation is part of the local puzzle that the book addresses that will lead to resolving larger analytic puzzles linking communal violence to deeper historical and structural factors as opposed to cultural explanations.

The second research tool, according to Ibn Khaldoun, is fieldwork, which I conducted in Kafr Yassif and in the surrounding region between 2003 and 2005. As mentioned earlier, I met with dozens of eyewitnesses as well as community leaders who were involved in implementing the *sulha.* I conducted archival research in the Kafr Yassif local council and analyzed the local media coverage of the event as well as the Israeli government's investigative report. All these interviews and documents pointed to the failure of the police and state authorities to prevent the incident. The

research also uncovered a similar pattern in incidents of conflict in the region and a disturbingly similar pattern of police behavior. This discovery may sound surprising to some who are familiar with writings about the Israeli state, which is considered a strong state that can successfully implement any policies it decides to follow (Kimmerling 1989). So it is important to investigate why such as a strong state seems to be weak on this specific issue of controlling inter- and intragroup violence among its Palestinian Arab citizens. It also becomes important to question whether this failure is a weakness or the result of something else.

The puzzle that emerged from the Kafr Yassif incident is why the state did not follow a policy of preventing communal violence among its Palestinian Arab citizens. To answer this question, I turned to the third principle of Ibn Khaldoun, that is, examining the literature on the state of Israel, its history, nature, and policies toward its Palestinian Arab citizens, as well as work on the history of communal relationships among Palestinian Arabs in Israel. Finally, I link this literature to the larger body of work on communal and ethnic violence in order to understand what took place in Kafr Yassif in 1981 and what has been taking place in the Palestinian Arab community in Galilee, Israel. I situate the case study in relation to other cases of violent conflict from the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, as well as from Europe and the United States, in order to provide a brief comparative analysis, although the book is not comparative as such in its approach. The comparison, however, allows for a broader understanding of the phenomenon of communal violence that speaks to other regions around the world and demonstrates that communal violence is a global, not a regionally or culturally specific, issue. In the sections that follow, I will briefly summarize four major paradigms that are commonly used to analyze the question of communal violence.

The "Peaceful Democracy" Paradigm

One of the widely accepted theories in the field of politics is the paradigm of peaceful democracy, which argues that democratic states are more peaceful than nondemocratic states both within the state as well as in relations with other states. Despite the general acceptance of this paradigm, it does not hold ground when examined through simple observation—the

logical inference that Ibn Khaldoun advised us to follow because research can contradict commonly held assumptions.

So while certain nation-states are assumed to be democracies, such as the United States, Great Britain, India, and Israel (setting aside for a moment the debate about whether Israel is actually a democracy for Jews), and these states are considered models of democracy to be emulated regionally and globally, these states have been no less, if not more, violent at home and abroad than many other states that are not considered democratic, such as Syria, North Korea, China, or Cuba, to name just a few. Some scholars, who remain in the minority, have challenged this paradigm and argued that democracy is not a guarantee of peace, contradicting the dominant paradigm (Keane 2004). Furthermore, Keane argues that the "peaceful democracy paradigm" ignores the exporting of violence by democratic nation-states to their colonies—for example, by Britain, France, and the United States to Asia, Africa, and the Americas. This view suggests that whereas a nation-state such as Britain, an exemplary democracy, may be seen as relatively peaceful internally, it appears less so when attention is paid to its exporting of violence to its former colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, not to mention next door to Ireland. I would point out further that Great Britain is not so peaceful internally and has had its share of ethnic and communal violence by white Christian Caucasians against African, Caribbean, and South Asian immigrants. Similarly, the US history of violence against Native Americans, African Americans, and people from around the world, such as the violence and racism against Arabs and Muslims in the United States, especially since 9/11 but also long before then, and the savage violence against Arabs and Muslims in Iraq and Afghanistan, is contrary to the "peaceful democracy paradigm." Similarly, Israel's practice of racism and violence against its Palestinian Arab citizens and its violence against Arabs in the Occupied Territories and around the Arab world are other examples that contradict the theory.[1] As Ibn Khaldoun argues, testing claims by these so-called

1. In chapter 5, I will discuss in detail the use of the term *racism* rather than just *discrimination* to refer to Israeli policies. On this issue, Nimer Sultany's work, especially *Citizens Without Citizenship* (2003), is very helpful.

peaceful democracies against the reality and exposing the link between their foreign and domestic policies reveal the contradictions of this paradigm quite sharply. Some American studies scholars have engaged with this idea of linking foreign and domestic policies and critiquing US democracy, which was explored by Ibn Khaldoun centuries ago.

Daniel Ross (2004) further argues that we also must not forget that the very origin of democracy lies in violence, as is evident from studying the historical development of what are known as liberal democratic states. He demonstrates, focusing mainly on Australia and to some extent the United States, that these democracies have a violent foundational history and are built on the obliteration of the natives. Thus, the paradigm of peaceful democracy needs to be reexamined or at least refined, especially because there are so many nation-states that are not considered democratic yet are no more violent than the ones acknowledged to be democracies. The difference here can only be that the violence of democratic states is democratically sanctioned. Still, it is justifiable to argue that the cause of violence lies in factors other than the type of political system, as this project demonstrates.

The "Weak State" Paradigm

James Fearon and David D. Laitin (2003) have argued in much of their work that the defining factor in keeping internal peace is not the political system of the state but rather the type of state and that the strength or weakness of the state and its ability to provide security and peace for its citizens matters more. They argue that the weaknesses of a particular state are the cause of ethnic and communal violence, by allowing certain groups, which the state cannot control, to use violence against other groups. Although this theory has some merit, it is still limited in content and scope, as this explanation does not shed light on ethnic and communal violence in strong states, such as Israel. Even more important, I argue that this approach explains only the surface and not the core of the problem.

Taking as an example the sectarian violence within Iraq since the US invasion of 2003, it is plausible that the weakness of the state, especially the security branch, is partly responsible for the ethnic and communal violence among Iraqis. But such an explanation, if it stops there, skims

just the surface of the issue, failing to address *why* the state became weak in the first place, *when* it became weak, and *who* the state is under in the present circumstances. It is now common knowledge that the United States has since its invasion of Iraq destroyed the pre-2003 state apparatus, armed the militias, and empowered certain Iraqi groups (for example, Kurds and Shi'a) with the aim of undermining the power of groups (Sunnis and Baathists) that were powerful before the invasion. This process has created many states within Iraq, such as groups in Iraq that take the law into their hands when they wish to, without any serious attempt by the United States to check or question these groups. How, then, could the notion of the weak state explain the situation in Iraq, and what can even be considered the state at such a moment, when the sovereignty of Iraq and its people has been hijacked by the United States and its military? I am arguing not that there was no internal ethnic or communal conflict (or both) in Iraq prior to the US occupation but that the current ethnic and communal violence cannot be explained without situating it in the context of the US occupation and colonization of the country.

Another often-cited example of internal violence in contemporary news is the Middle East and in academic debates the escalating intra-Palestinian conflict in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, especially in the Gaza Strip. It is argued by many that the weak Palestinian "state" apparatus has been responsible for growing internal chaos and armed clashes, as well as the violence against Israel. Yet the basic fact that is often ignored is that there was no state, in the real sense, at any time in the Occupied Territories or since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1993, which has functioned more as a "virtual state." The Palestinian Authority was and remains at the mercy and under the control of Israel, first and foremost, and has had very little real autonomy since Israel controls its borders, its freedom of action, and its economy. The Palestinian Authority's sovereignty is not only limited by Israel but also subordinate to the whims of neighboring and nonneighboring states, among which the United States is the most obvious example, which regulates the funding of the Palestinian Authority thus making it very dependent on external entities.

Furthermore, the economic, political, and security pillars of the already limited "sovereign" state represented by the Palestinian Authority

have been under attack continuously by both the United States and Israel. When in 2002 Israel attacked the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Gaza, it targeted the main enablers of these three pillars of government, attacking power stations, roads and bridges, water supplies, the police, and Palestinian Authority security centers and forces. Israel and others states, especially the United States, later asked why these branches of the government were not able to perform their duties, ignoring their own strategy of undermining the already limited authority of the Palestinian Authority. Instead, this strategy was disguised by a discourse that pointed to "corruption" among Palestinian politicians as the root cause of all evils befalling the Palestinians, even though Israel itself is as corrupt as the Palestinian Authority or any other regime in the region, if not more so. To weaken and crush a state or a state in the making, and then to claim that violence was caused by the weakness of the state, is to displace responsibility for the violence, which owes to external and more powerful entities that have hampered or crushed the ability of the state to secure peace for its own people as well as for others in the region.

Thus, the paradigm of weak states sometimes becomes enmeshed with explanations based on political propaganda, at worst, and on symptoms of the problem, at best, rather than based on the core causes of violence. For example, commentators on Lebanon today generally blame Hezbollah for weakening the Lebanese state, or point fingers at Syria or Iran, but never examine the role of Israel, the United States, or France in attacking, interfering in, and weakening the Lebanese state. Lebanon is, after all, a state that was manufactured by French colonialism in the early to mid-twentieth century, creating a confessional political system that inherently works against the creation of a strong, unified state.

Furthermore, theories of weak states are generally applied to states in the global South, as if this phenomenon prevails only in the South and states in the North are orderly and peaceful. They ignore the historical and current conflicts and violence in the United States, France, Britain, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Australia, and many other northern states that have witnessed violence among and against ethnic and religious groups, particularly minorities, for a very long time. It is worth asking here whether the security apparatus in states such as France, United States, Germany, or

Britain would stand by watching if the phenomenon of violence was targeting whites, not Arabs, blacks, Turks, or South Asians. Taking this factor into account not only exposes the underlying Orientalist writings about violence and conflicts in the global South but also makes the case that violence and conflicts are present globally, and as such a global phenomenon cannot be relegated to as a specific region or culture. This critique also helps bridge different area studies that seem to be divided according to the West and the rest. This examination can help bridge studies that link the issue of communal and ethnic conflicts with studies on citizenship, a field that is dominated by works focused on Western countries. In other words, what I am suggesting here is treating the issue of conflict and violence as a problem that exists in all states rather than keep treating it as a problem specific to the Third World alone.

The "Manipulating Leaders" Paradigm

A third dominant explanation for communal violence has been offered for example by Paul Brass (2003) in his work on communal violence in India. Brass argues that the main reason for violence is the role of community leaders who utilize violence in order to gain greater support from their communities, especially during election campaigns, and suggests that this use was a factor in the rise to power of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in India in the late 1980s. This explanation might have a kernel of truth, for it might be possible that leaders of ethnic and religious groups benefit from ethnic and communal violence that bolsters communal identities and compels members of these communities to turn to leaders for protection, especially when people believe that the state is unwilling or unable to protect them in times of internal violence. However, the issue of the belief in the state's ineffectiveness is also the weak point in this explanation. The question ought to be *why* the state is unwilling or unable to intervene in violent conflicts, punish harshly those individuals who commit such acts, and hold officials accountable for such incidents. Though the state is assumed to be neutral and ultimately responsible for the safety of the public, it is let off the hook according to such explanations. I argue that it is the state's neutrality

that needs to be the primary analytical tool for explaining the problem of communal violence.

Furthermore, Brass's theory fails to account for the lack of violence in regions and localities in India where mixed religious communities lived for years in close proximity without experiencing violence, even during election campaigns. The particular cases that Brass uses from India seem to be the exception rather than the rule, so there must be other reasons that are more significant than the role of community leaders. Even more problematic is the implication that the ordinary people who participate in these incidents are passive subjects manipulated and led by their leaders to kill and be killed.

Finally, if the manipulation of ethnic or religious violence is a strategy by political leaders to increase their standing in the polls, why would that strategy not be used to varying degrees in other countries, such as the United States or Canada, given that violent conflicts do occur in these countries at various moments? Or is this communalization of politics and violence just an Indian or Third World phenomenon? It is very apparent that political parties in various Western states do attract particular religious constituencies. For example, the Republican Party in the United States tends to draw its supporters heavily from the Christian Right, and it is well known that the Conservative Party in Canada draws its political power mainly from Catholics, especially in the Quebec region. This tendency is also true for many parties in Israel and Europe that have religious bases or followings, but it seems that the manipulation of leaders for vote banks is not related to violent conflicts in discussions of these other cases. Is this strategy of communalizing politics, then, a cultural explanation? In my view, this cultural or social explanation is not used in many other cases from around the world because it fails to offer a sufficiently complex account of communal violence and ignores the role of the state, which is after all the only legitimate source of power and perpetrator of violence. It is also an explanation that must be questioned in light of an Orientalist perspective that views the non-West and its problems in an ahistorical and culturally specific way, ensuring that there are essential and culturally specific dynamics that can lead to conflicts and violence.

The "Historical Antipathy" Paradigm

Another common explanation for ethnic and communal violence is offered by Donald Horowitz (1985, 2001), who argues that the common cause of ethnic and communal violence is historical antipathy, economic and political. This paradigm is often used to explain violent conflicts in the Middle East by liberal and conservative scholars alike; thus, it is a significant approach to consider in relation to the case study here. I argue that historical antipathy may be a factor that comes into play after a conflict begins to unfold, but it is not the chief cause of conflict and violence and should not be used as a totalizing, ahistorical, and essentializing framework. It is Orientalism, at best, and racism, at worse, to think that non-Western societies are hostage to historical animosities that span hundreds or thousands of years. Thus, when mainstream analysts suggest that the sectarian violence in Iraq is owing to deeply ingrained antipathies, real or imagined, between Muslim sects that stretch back in time, they ignore the idea that if this situation were true, then Shi'a-Sunni violence in Iraq based on religious beliefs should have been taking place for the last hundreds of years instead of being a relatively recent phenomenon. Thus, it is important to historicize conflicts in the region rather than resorting to Orientalist explanations of ancient hatreds that evade analysis of specific temporal and political contexts and frame the problem in a primordialist and essentialist construction of history.

The seemingly "religious" conflict simmering in Iraq is, in fact, a political conflict about power between and among various segments of Iraqi society (Shi'a, Sunni, Kurd) born of the US occupation and colonization of Iraq. As histories of colonialism show, the main principle of colonizing projects is to divide, not unite, and rule. A simple question that can be easily answered can help shed light on the internal violence in Iraq is: Who armed the Iraqi religious factions that are currently fighting one another? Who sanctioned the political power of their leaders and damaged not only the economic, but also the social and political, fabric of Iraq? It would be more accurate to conclude that the violence in Iraq is waged mainly by an insurgency that is fighting US occupation and colonization of Iraq and their local enablers, who tend to be heavily from among

the Shi'a. It is a modern conflict since it revolves around groups fighting for power over state resources, and the state is after all a recent modern construct originating in Europe and spreading around the world through colonial interventions.

It is also important to note that the focus on historical antipathy treats historical actors as permanently static subjects that do not change and evolve. Thus, a Shi'a-Sunni conflict that took place in the seventh and eighth centuries remains the primary explanatory paradigm for Shi'a-Sunni relations in the twenty-first century. Could one offer a similar analysis of relations between Catholics and Protestants in Germany and Europe today and argue that Catholic-Protestant conflicts and wars generally continue to shape their relationship with one another to this day? Are religion and ancient antipathies what really drove the conflict in the former Yugoslavia? If so, then we are hostages to history and the manipulation of the past and lack any agency of our own or any capacity for individual or critical thought. Such explanations tend to frame historical contexts through a primordialist lens, often providing ahistorical historicization. As Mahmood Mamdani (2004) has rightly argued, "cultural talk" tends to obscure political context and historical explanations. Such totalizing theories lump various groups of people together in certain categories without seeing through the differences in time, space, context, and the diversity within such categories, homogenizing groups and freezing them in space and time. It seems that these reductionist assumptions still hold sway, and the profound critique offered by Edward Said in *Orientalism* and by the scholars who have built on his work in many fields has fallen on deaf ears.

Thus, in the case of relations between Druze and Christians in this book, it is often suggested that the historical antipathy between these two groups in Lebanon and Syria in the nineteenth century can explain what happened in Kafr Yassif in the twentieth century. Not only is it problematic to explain the present solely through the distant apolitical past, but it also leads to a misunderstanding of the complexity and context of historical events. It would be more helpful to connect previous events with economic and political developments in order to provide a fuller picture of the issue of "historical antipathy." Thus, the Druze-Christian

schism in Lebanon needs to be understood in the context of historical, political, and economic development of the late Ottoman Empire and the penetration of European colonialism in the region, as Usama Makdisi (1996) has shown.

Prior to the 1850s, there was no history of conflict and violence between these two religious groups in Lebanon. With the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman government signed what were called "submission treaties" with European powers, mainly France, Britain, and Russia. According to the treaties, these European colonial powers were given political, legal, and economic rights in the Middle East and served as "protectors" of different religious groups, precipitating a shift in relations between these communities that led to the emergence of the "Druze-Christian" conflict (for more, see Buheiri 1987; El-Khazen 2000; Khalaf 2002; and Traboulsi 2007). At the time, in the 1850s, the Druze and Christian Maronites were living side by side in Mount Lebanon. When the Christian Maronites were given economic advantage and favored over the Druze in the cotton and silk agricultural trade with France, social and economic tensions between the two communities grew in the region. The Druze felt marginalized in the globalizing economy of that era, which was increasingly dominated by Maronite landowners and large-scale farmers whose newly empowered economic position had been enabled through cooperation with France. Antagonism between the two communities began to surface, and with time, the schism between the two communities widened. In 1854 a conflict between members of both communities developed into a larger conflict that broadened to include Maronites and Druze in today's Lebanon and Syria, bearing in mind that present-day Lebanon was carved by France out of Syria in the early to mid-twentieth century. Thus, there was nothing ancient or primordial about this Druze-Christian violence; rather, it was a result of economic and political developments at particular moments and struggles over resources and power fostered by colonial and capitalist projects.

Furthermore, the violence in that area did not expand to include all the areas where Druze lived, such as Jordan and Israel-Palestine, but was primarily concentrated in Mount Lebanon, bordering the contemporary

states of Syria and Lebanon. Also, the argument of "historical antipathy" ignores the fact that although the conflict was described as a Christian-Druze conflict, it included only Maronite Christians, who were also in conflict with Greek Orthodox Christians in Lebanon, because they stood on opposite sides vis-à-vis French interventions. Additionally, the view of Druze as a homogeneous group ignores the fact the Druze in Lebanon, as elsewhere, have many internal differences and are involved in intra-group conflict. These conflicts are based on historical, political, and economic factors in specific periods in time and have changed shape over time with the changing economic and political situation in the region. The current situation in Lebanon only proves this point further, for there are two main factions of Druze: the Walid Jumblat camp, which sides with Sunni and Maronite political factions, and the Arslan camp, which is part of the opposition in Lebanon and also includes Shi'a, Christians (including Maronites), and some Sunnis (El-Khazen 2000; Khalaf 2002). These alliances continue to shift and are not static.

Similarly, in Israel, Druze and Christians have had no ancient history of conflict and violence, but the situation has changed over time with the onset of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Some Druze leaders in Galilee were able to persuade Druze in Palestine to align themselves with the Zionist movement and, after 1948, with the Israeli authorities. The decision of Druze in Galilee to make alliances with Israel was mainly shaped by political, security, and economic considerations. Yet this alliance of Druze in Israel with the state did not pass without opposition from within the Druze community, which continues to this day (*Al-Mithaq* [Summer 2005]; for more, see also Rogan and Avi Shlaim 2001; and Parsons 2000, 2001).

Christians in Palestine, at large, did not side with the Zionist movement or with the Israeli state later on and thus were part of the Palestinian Arab opposition to the policies of the state of Israel.

It is important to understand the Druze's relationship to the rest of the Arab community in Israel in the context of the Israeli state policies toward various groups existing within the territory of Israel. Religious differences were highlighted and manipulated by the state against its citizens, as part of the Israeli policy of undermining the mobilization of Palestinian

Arab citizens in order to control and suppress them (Cohen 2010).[2] Thus, since 1954 the Druze were drafted into the Israeli military, which further helped differentiate them from the rest of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. Moreover, after being considered Muslims for centuries, the Druze were officially categorized by the Israeli state as a separate religion. Despite the fact that they are Arab, the Druze were defined by the state as a separate national identity, which is stated as such on their identification cards. In time, the state even created a separate branch of the Ministry of Education called the "Druze Education Section," distinct from the "Section for Arab Education," which served to enforce a distinct Druze identity. Interestingly, given the notion of historical antipathy, the state also promoted the notion of a presumably ancient link and friendship between the Druze and the Jewish people. The historical linkage was not fostered with regard to the rest of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, underscoring the notion that the state's aim was not really to create harmony among different groups within the state, but rather a classical-style colonial policy of divide and rule (Betts 1988; Firro 1992). Thus, the two villages in the case study, Julis (a Druze village) and Kafr Yassif (a dominantly Christian one), have to be situated in the larger context of the state-society relationship that is, at root, a colonial relationship. Historically, a large segment of the Arab community has remained in opposition to the state's policies of marginalization, racism, and oppression, while a small segment either did not take a position against the state or collaborated with it in order to improve its own economic condition. It is useful here to draw on Ahmad Sa'di's discussion (1992) of the historical relationship between the state of Israel and its Arab minority, based on a case study of resistance in Kafr Yassif to state policies. The village history of resistance, according to Sa'di, was facilitated through an alliance forged by nationalist and communist residents of the village, who joined together in a coalition formed within the local council. They advocated for the equality of Arabs and equal state funding for Arab local councils and have been protesting against

2. Hillel Cohen's work (2010, in Hebrew) on the Arabs in Israel also discusses the role of the Israeli security services in controlling Israeli Arab citizens and intervening in their affairs.

the state's policies of discrimination, underfunding, and war against its own people since 1948. Another study by Sa'di also showed how Israeli governments tried to divide the political coalition in the village by funding religious parties, in order to undermine the coalition's united political stand against the state and its larger implications for the politics of the Arab community in Israel vis-à-vis the state.

In my own fieldwork in the village and investigation of local documents, I uncovered a visit to Kafr Yassif by Simone de Beauvoir, Jean-Paul Sartre, and groups of European liberals who came to talk to leaders in the village about the history of Arab resistance to the state. This visit was inspired by a campaign that took place in Kafr Yassif in 1951 when the mayor, accompanied by council members and a large number of the village residents, prevented the Israeli army from entering the village through peaceful resistance. The military governor, with a troop of Israeli soldiers, had come to evict Palestinian refugees who had found refuge in Kafr Yassif around the 1948 war, escaping Zionist and Israeli attacks and violence. Yet hundreds of residents headed by the mayor lay down on the street in an act of nonviolent civil disobedience. They handed the Israeli military governor a statement by the Kafr Yassif local council, informing the military governor that that if he wished to evict the Palestinian refugees from the village, he had to first drive the military vehicles over their bodies. The result of the incident was that after some threats and pushing around, the military governor decided to withdraw with his soldiers, warning the mayor that he and the village would pay the price for hindering the army from doing its duty and carrying out Israeli military orders. The attempt of eviction was repeated several times and repeatedly resisted by people in the village.

This incident was but one of many examples where the Kafr Yassif local council persisted in being a source of irritation and a challenge to the Israeli authorities. The village was often described as a hub for Arab nationalists and communists and its high school also branded as a school for "troublemakers" and nationalist activists. It is from this high school that Mahmood Darwish, the most well-known Palestinian poet, graduated. At the school's poetry festivals, that Darwish read his poetry for the first time, including his most famous poem, "Sajjil ana arabi" (Record, I

am an Arab!), in which Darwish reflects on the experience of being called by the Israeli police for interrogations. It is these activities in the village that led Emile Habibi the renowned Palestinian Arab writer in the newspaper *Al-Ittihad,* to call on all Arabs to be "Kafr-Yassifized": to follow the example of people in Kafr Yassif in resisting the state and its policies. With this phrase, he was urging them to follow the path of political praxis developed by Kafr Yassif in resisting hegemony and injustice. The 1951 resistance is one instance of the diverse methods of peaceful resistance enacted by Palestinians, and Arabs more generally, in their fight against injustice. Yet there is very little general knowledge of this nonviolent resistance, and Western populations are often bombarded with media images of violent forms of protest by Palestinians and Arabs that often obscure the violence of the state. This lack of knowledge about the history of the Palestinian Arab community is one of the ambiguous historical dimensions that one needs to keep in mind when analyzing the incident between Kafr Yassif and Julis in 1981, as well as the larger situation of Palestinian Arabs in Israel.

In light of the debate about Arab resistance to state policies in Israel, it is important to consider the pioneering study of the relationship between the state of Israel and its Arab citizens by Ian Lustick (1980).[3] Lustick argues that the relationship between Arab citizens and the state of Israel was born out of conflict between Arab Palestinians and Jewish-Zionists. After its creation in 1948, the state of Israel contained a fraction (about 15 percent) of the Palestinian people within the territories it acquired in the 1948 war. The state was faced with questions about the future of this community and how to deal with it given the circumstances surrounding the conflict developing between Palestine and Israel. Lustick's study demonstrates that the state developed a policy, which was not officially declared, to deal with the Palestinian Arab citizens as part of an enemy nation that was in existential conflict with the Israelis and to be viewed by the state and its security apparatuses as a fifth column. This policy was generally

3. Many Arab scholars wrote about this earlier, such as Jiryis 1969; Kafr Yassif Council 2003; and others.

carried out without written orders and was often implemented by low-level Israeli officials without the need for approval by high-level officials in the chain of command. According to Lustick, the policy was part of a strategy of segmentation, co-optation, and control based on dividing the Arabs from Jews in Israel and, on the other hand, fragmenting the Arabs and co-opting Arab leaders who would serve to pacify the community. The aim of the policy was to control and prevent the mobilization of the Arabs in Israel so they would not pose a threat to the Jewish domination of the state and the implementation of its policies. Although the study was done in late 1970s, the same policy is still evident in Israel today, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Lustick's theory can be extended so that it also connects internal violence among Arabs to this state policy of control and co-optation. This point was made by community members that I interviewed in my research and is also illustrated by the pattern of responses by Israeli police and security branches during incidents similar to the one in Kafr Yassif in 1981. Obviously, one cannot look for evidence of all state policies in written or openly declared statements by governments, especially if these policies could harm the state's public image. Furthermore, if such policies were public, they would defeat their purpose and deter the Arab community in Israel from falling into their trap, but an examination of the actions of state's authorities reveals a clear pattern. Communal and group violence among Arabs in Israel, based on religious, local, or familial affiliations, or linked to local elections, is a recurrent phenomenon. The state has not yet devised any policy to combat this phenomenon, and there is also a pattern of nonintervention to stop or prevent violence, and at times of actual participation in the conflict, as in the case of Al-Maghaar, discussed in chapter 2. In brief, state authorities seem to follow this line: let different communal groups fight, and sometimes let us create something for different communal groups to fight about.

Lustick's theory and its exposure of the relationship between the state of Israel and its Arab citizens is very helpful in understanding the situation of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, yet the use of the theory is limited, as it does not deal with the question of internal violence. Lustick's framework also views the question of the relationship between state and society from

the state's perspective, even though it is critical of the role of the state. In his study, as in many others that fall within a traditional political science framework, the perspectives of the community or society in question are hardly, if ever, taken into consideration. Furthermore, this work is generally framed within the context of policy studies, and I argue that although it is important to offer policy analysis, a policy that is long-standing and pursued by different governments of various political orientations cannot be just a matter of policy but needs to be considered rather as a structural dilemma of the state itself. I argue that the relationship between states and their "minorities," or ethnic and communal groups, cannot be determined only by examining policies, written or nonwritten, openly declared or otherwise, but one must also focus on the nature of state, its origins and historical and political development, and how these factors shape state-society relations. It is important to understand communal violence by looking at state-society relations through a structural analysis, which I argue is the most useful paradigm for studying these questions.

The Structural Paradigm: An Alternative Approach to the Study of States and Societies

In his work on states and societies, Ibn Khaldoun argues that the genealogy of the state and its structure can help explain its development and the way states treat their subjects. This structural paradigm helps explain communal violence by contextualizing its temporal, political, and materialist dimensions and addressing the weaknesses and limitations of the approaches discussed previously. This framework contextualizes the policy of the nation-state toward its minority groups, native or nonnative, through an analysis of the nature of the state and its historical development, taking into account which groups were included and excluded from the national project at its origin. This focus helps ground the attitude of state's authorities toward those individuals or groups who are not included within the state's national agenda.

In the case of Israel and its relations to its Palestinian Arab citizens, it is important to understand the origin and nature of the state of Israel as a colonial-settler state of the Jewish people that was built on the destruction of the Palestinian Arab society; by definition, as a Jewish state, it

excludes those citizens who are not Jewish and leads automatically to their marginalization and subordination. This point is important to keep in mind in order to better understand the relationship of the state to its non-Jewish citizens, as argued by Nimer Sultany (2003, 2004), among others. The state's policies and actions toward its Arab Palestinian citizens are a consequence of the foundational ideology of the state and endemic to its historical development as a settler-colonial state, as many scholars have documented (for more, see Atran 1989; Bishara 2002, 2005; Davis 1987; Shafir 1989; and Zureik 1979). Israel is a project pioneered by the European settlers who came to replace and dominate local native Palestinian Arabs and has at its core a racist nationalism informed by a European colonial mentality. Thus, as Joseph Massad, Ella Shohat, and others have argued and documented, even Israeli Jews who are not European (Sephardim or Arab Jews who originate largely from Arab countries) face racism and discrimination in Israel at the hands of European Jews (Ashkenazim). Thus, those Palestinian Arabs who remained on their lands after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 fell under this European-inspired colonialist and nationalist project, which was not only racist and discriminatory toward them based on religion but also in constant conflict with them as non-European natives facing European settlers. Changes introduced in state policies in Israel do not change much on the ground and are in fact cosmetic facelifts to the underlying aim of marginalizing and displacing the native Palestinian Arabs. These policies toward Palestinian Arabs persist with international economic, political, and military support, and the state in Israel undertakes great effort to avoid a clear-cut and easily recognizable image of genocidal policies. Therefore, the state relies on constant, overt and covert, policies of discrimination, marginalization, and oppression to ensure that the Palestinian Arabs remain under state control and are pushed to leave the country.[4] This issue is very much endemic to settler-colonial states that are premised on the displacement of indigenous people and the subsequent erasure of this foundational violence.

4. I will discuss this issue in more detail in chapter 4 and chapter 5.

As Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen (2005) observe, settler-colonialism, and in my view colonialism in general, should be understood not as an event contained within the past but rather as a structure with long-lasting and interminable ramifications on both colonizer and colonized. Colonialism and settler colonialism are structures within which the marginalization of the colonized is central and is sought in every aspect of the colonized lives: economic, political, social, and cultural. This marginalization has been historically achieved through the principle of divide and rule, as well as divide and quit, as has often happened when direct colonization was no longer possible. And in the latter case, internal divisions along ethnic and or religious lines have remained intact even after the official end of colonization. The ramifications of colonialism are at the heart of all ethnic and religious conflicts and violence in postcolonial nation-states.

In the case of the incident in Kafr Yassif, it is important to mention that people in the community demanded an official investigation of the police behavior in order to expose the racist and discriminatory structure of the state. The Kafr Yassif local council demanded the appointment of an independent investigation, composed of professionals not connected to the government, to inquire into the behavior of the police during the events. The government of Israel initially refused to do an investigation at all and argued that the police report on the event was sufficient. Yet under pressure from the Arab community and parliament members, the government appointed its own investigative committee, which concluded that although the Israeli police and interior minister were informed about the incident and received the requests of the Kafr Yassif local council for more security, the police did not expect an attack to happen. The report further claimed that when the attack took place, the police did not interfere because they lacked adequate forces and because they were of the opinion that nonintervention would avoid more casualties. Thus, the government's own investigation absolved the Israeli police, and also the Israeli government, of any responsibility. The committee's finding were based on reports produced by the Israeli police department and Israeli officials, and the committee never came to Kafr Yassif to meet with the people who were attacked, many of whom were eyewitnesses to police behavior. Nor

did the committee meet with the Kafr Yassif local council members and the mayor, who were in contact with the police during the events.

Thus, to take the words of the fact-finding committee's report at face value would be not just limiting but also naive. If the government was not worried about implicating high-level police officials, its interior minister, and possibly other government officials, why would it refuse to allow an independent investigation? The lack of an independent inquiry points to the existence of something that needed to be concealed. Furthermore, the pretext offered by the police for not intervening because of lack of resources or to avoid making matters worse is not convincing. First, the police did not shoot even once, not even aerial shooting as a warning. The police also claimed they did not have sufficient numbers to stop the attack, but even with their limited strength, they were able to stop a larger number of people from neighboring villages and towns (compared to the attackers from Julis) who came to help prevent the violence and were able to stop ambulances from entering the village. Equally perplexing is the pressured fear of making matters worse by intervening. Were the police really afraid that Druze would shoot back at them, leading to injuries on both parties—police and Druze? It has never actually happened in the history of the state of Israel that Arabs, Druze or non-Druze, have used arms against the police. The lack of a historical precedent for such an event shows that this fear was definitely unfounded. If the police were truly interested in preventing violence, much of their energy and personnel that were deployed at other entrances could have been used instead to block the attack coming from Julis through the shortest route linking the two villages.

Finally, it is very important here, as in other cases around the world, to reflect whether there is a pattern in the behavior of state authorities. As in other cases of group violence among Palestinian Arabs, the pattern of police behavior seems very clear. The unofficial approach seems to be to let the Arabs fight each other, and there is enough evidence to say that internal disputes among the Arabs are exploited to exaggerate the internal divisions and even create new ones. The pattern where police directly or indirectly allow violence to occur is evident by their preventing interventions aimed at halting the fighting, and in some cases they

have even participated in the attack. This pattern is well documented by community leaders and eyewitnesses in many cases and, in my view, leaves no room for further doubt for what the state policy is, even if it is not openly declared.

Conclusion

Ibn Khaldoun's three principles of sound research and logical inference, fieldwork, and the comparative study of literature on the subject have helped shed light on the case study under discussion and the larger subject of ethnic and communal conflict. How could the case of communal violence among Arabs in Israel be explained? By refining Lustick's theory on Israel's policy of control toward its Palestinian Arab citizens and drawing on the study of Ahmad Sa'di on Kafr Yassif, one can understand how internal violence among Arabs could be desirable to the Israeli authorities in the context of the larger state project. Kafr Yassif was historically a major center for resistance to Israeli policies and thus needed to be divided and punished, and the attack in 1981 has to be situated in this broader context. The explanation offered by the government's own fact-finding committee regarding the police behavior is not convincing. The recurrence of such incidents among Palestinian Arabs in Israel is further evidence that the government is, at the least, not interested in ending internal violence among its Palestinian Arab citizens. Group violence between different religious groups, within religious groups, and between families is something that takes place in Israel among the Palestinians, and the state authorities have similar policies toward them (let the violence happen, not intervene, and encourage it at other times). The phenomenon of denying responsibility for internal conflicts is not particular to the Israeli state, because governments in general are hesitant to take responsibility for their failures or ill-intended policies. This point merits an investigation into whether state actions suggest a pattern that be explained as serving their own interests or at the least as not being committed to ending internal violence. The behavior of the Israeli authorities in such cases is a natural reflection of the state, its origins, and its relationship to its Palestinian Arab citizens. As a state created for the Jewish people, Israel's non-Jewish citizens are automatically marginalized. Worse, if the non-Jewish citizens

are by nature at the center of conflict of the state and its historical creation, they continue to be at the center of the state's conflict. Here, the enemy within and the enemy without are conflated for the Israeli state.

What could the case study here tell us about other cases in other countries? Settler-colonial states as well as colonial and postcolonial states are all infected by the colonial mind-set. This mind-set springs from the creation of the European nation-state and its historical developments through colonialism; the exclusionary thought is at the core of any nation-state and was central to the expansion of European nations through colonialism wherein they created states in their own images all around the world and propagated the notion of racial classification. This racial paradigm of thinking views the world through identities based on race that sometimes overlap with ethnicity or religion or both. This phenomenon has plagued not only the colonized but the colonizer as well, since racism is a dynamic process that affects both side of the equation. This book seeks to make an intervention in the larger literature on ethnic and communal violence by arguing that the causes of ethnic, religious, or communal conflict lie in the origins of the state and its patterns of inclusion and exclusion, which lead to conflict and possible violence between groups that are included and excluded, as well as among them. Consequently, modern problems of violence ought to be historicized and appropriately situated in their modern contexts, not viewed through the ahistorical lens of ancient antipathies. The main point of departure for analyzing political problems in modernity is the state system, the legacy of colonization and politicizing of ethnic and religious categories in relation to the ideologies and practices.

This issue of racism that informs exclusion and inclusion continues to be at the center of debates that still obscure the legacy of colonial structures. For example, as Karen Armstrong rightly argues, the remarks made in 2006 by the British ex-foreign minister Jack Straw, condemning the *hijab* worn by some Muslim women in the United Kingdom, is not an exception but the rule of British communalism, even if communal politics are hardly ever named as such, especially when they occur in Western "liberal democracies" (interview on *Booktv,* C-SPAN2, November 20, 2006). Armstrong observed that when Catholic nuns started appearing in Britain

with their heads covered, they were also attacked and were portrayed as a threatening fifth column connected to despotic foreign regimes, who unlike loyal British subjects did not fully belong to the state.

Thus, in my view, the violence that took place in Britain against South Asians in the 1980s, or against Turks in Germany in the 1990s, or in France at different moments against North Africans and Africans in general, is at its roots a reflection of the state's nature and historical policies of inclusion and exclusion. This nature is the main problem of the nation-state, the colonizing and colonized alike.

In conclusion, the problem of communal violence and racism is fundamentally a structural one. This kind of analysis is necessary to bring us back to the field of ethnic conflict in order to better understand the phenomenon and move away from blaming the victims of historical structures of colonialism and, by extension, postcolonial nationalism. We need to try to find ways of addressing the problem of ethnic and religious violence through an analysis of the underlying structure of the nation-state and the pillars that enforce this structure, rather than focusing solely on its symptoms.

There is much agreement among scholars that nationalism (as distinct from the nation-state) is the cause for much of ethnic and communal conflicts, since there is hardly any nation-state that is homogenous in either category, race or religion, and thus by nature it must exclude while it includes. The question is whether there is a way to turn the clock back and devise political entities that are not based on exclusion and inclusion. Scholars agree that the nation-state is a modern European phenomenon created not long ago and replicated by European colonialism and imperialism around the globe. Yet there is less reflection on the fact that the root of ethnic and communal conflict and violence is in the structures linked to European and Western colonialism and imperialism, which has created and still creates the same problem over and over again, as witnessed in Iraq in the current moment. Underlying this universalizing mechanism of political systems around the world is a racist mind-set that views itself as a model that others need to follow. At the heart of nation-states, and nationalisms, is the dynamic of inclusion and exclusion that helps create conflicts among those individuals and groups who are included and by

extension empowered and the ones who are excluded and by extension marginalized and dominated.

Focusing the analysis through the framework developed here can help in shaping the project of dismantling colonialism and settler-colonialism in ways that do not replicate exclusionary structures, but hopefully lead to inclusionary ones that might be emulated around the world and might help end the pain and suffering associated with violent conflict within and between states. Thus, the field of ethnic and communal conflict studies should keep its focus on colonial structures that are in motion and are informed by racial thought that had, and still has, an effect on the colonized as well as the colonizer. A focus on the role of racism and its colonial structure might help enable a discussion on how to counter its effects. This discussion is much needed in order to analyze and attempt to find solutions to the phenomenon of communal violence. At the same time, neocolonial forms of power disguised under the slogans of "reform," "liberalization," "democratization," or "war on terror" need to be exposed and challenged in order to allow states and societies to throw off their yoke. One cannot keep making evasive cuts and expect the wounds to heal, especially in most "underdeveloped countries" where the interventions are continuously undertaken under different pretexts, as has been happening recently in the Sudan, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Iraq, among other places.

To ensure a more peaceful ethnic and religious coexistence, the perspective of natives from Palestine, the United States, Ireland, Mexico, and elsewhere around the world who are still fighting settler-colonialism must be integrated into the discussion of solutions to violent conflicts. The discourse of solutions must also avoid colonizing indigenous voices, as modern Western colonialism has done for the past few centuries. A dialogue with natives among those persons interested in resolving conflicts might help in the project of trying to create a political framework that is less divisive, less exclusionary, and not based on displacement, marginalization, and domination. This question is important not only in the area of ethnic and communal violence but also for the larger question of state-society relations, including issues of citizenship, inclusion, and exclusion. This book offers an analysis that can be extended and used as a suggestive

springboard for those persons who are concerned about working on these issues as manifested in different contexts and different states.

The research here suggests that one of the methods for solving this problem lies in the concept of the circle of justice as developed by Ibn Khaldoun and other Islamic and Arab scholars, who argue that we must see our vision for the world not through linear and hierarchical structures and metaphors but as a circle of coexistence where a just economic, political, and social framework shapes the relations between rulers and ruled. Another concept that is necessary for a world that is more peaceful is in line with the concept of *sulha,* the traditional Arab conflict-management method. As Elias Jabbour argues (1996), this method rests on fundamental principles that seek not ultimate justice, that is, an eye for an eye, but a true and honest mechanism for justice that aims at the involvement of third-party mediation composed of disinterested groups or states whose goal is actually solving the conflict without partisanship. It also requires the guilty party to acknowledge its mistake(s), admitting guilt with an official apology so that the injured party feels that the other is honest in its peacemaking. It also demands reparations for damage caused to the injured party. The method is concluded with a detailed written agreement between both parties in conflict, witnessed and signed by the mediating body in order to put the issue behind them and move forward, with a condition that a third party cannot intervene negatively in the affairs of the parties in conflict. This approach will be explored throughout the book, and in the following chapter, I will discuss the history of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel and see how it can help explain further what took place in 1981.

3

Anatomy of Communities

Tradition and History

Historical Background

This chapter explores the history of the two communities involved in the soccer-game conflict in Kafr Yassif, the Christians and Druze, and it provides a larger picture of the place where the community lives and where the conflict took place. Furthermore, the chapter will also discuss the historical context of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. Additionally, I will also provide a general overview of the Druze religion and Druze in Israel, the Arab Christian community, information about the two villages, and the history of communal relations.

This discussion will enable an examination of the claims made by community members and leaders that the incident in 1981 was an exception and the two communities and villages historically enjoyed a good relationship. It will also serve as a basis for discussing and critically examining historical antipathy, one of the dominant theoretical frameworks often used to explain sectarian conflicts and violence.

Palestinian Arabs in Israel

The Palestinian Arabs in Palestine (what became known as the State of Israel after 1948) have lived in this area for centuries. Even though the modern definition of the Palestinian identity did not take hold until the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries, Muslims, Druze, and Christians who have inhabited the area have at times defined themselves according to religious or other political, familial, or regional affiliations (Rashid Khalidi 1997). In the early sixteenth century, the region of Palestine fell

under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and many people came to define themselves as Ottomans as well. Administratively, the region has been divided into different districts at various moments in history.

After World War I and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and France, who were victorious in the war, divided the Middle East between themselves in accordance with their prewar agreements. France ruled over Syria, which was later divided to become two states, Syria and Lebanon, and Palestine fell under the British Mandate. The British government helped to establish a Jewish state in Palestine in line with their prewar promise to the Zionist movement, in what became known as the Balfour Declaration. This arrangement was a clear contradiction of the promise the British had given to the Arabs, or the Hussein-McMahon understanding, which promised the Arabs in the region independence after World War I in return for their support in the war. It was also a clear contradiction of the right of self-determination, a right that the Palestinian Arabs insisted on. After it became clear that the native Palestinian Arabs were opposed to that plan, and as violence erupted between Jews and Arabs, Britain passed the Palestine question to the United Nations in 1947 to decide the future of the land. This move is an example of the classic colonial strategy of divide and rule followed by divide and quit when it becomes impossible for imperial powers to retain control.

In 1947, the United Nations issued a partition resolution for Palestine, according to which two states in Palestine were to be established, one Jewish and one Arab. The Jewish state was to be 54 percent and the Arab state 46 percent of the territory of Mandate Palestine, even though by that date, despite massive Jewish settlement from Europe since the late nineteenth century, Jews constituted only about 30 percent, whereas the Palestinian Arabs were about 70 percent of the population and owned more than 90 percent of the land (W. Khalidi 1984). Here again, colonial plunder was justified through law and legal resolutions imposed on the natives of Palestine, something that Laura Nader argues has been often ignored in history and in policy studies (2007, 35). The Arabs rejected the resolution, seeing it as another attempt to establish a new form of European colonialism and an encroachment on the region and violation of their right for self-determination and self-rule. When Britain withdrew from Palestine,

the Zionist Organization declared the establishment of the State of Israel, and war broke out between the Jews and Arabs.

The Druze community in Israel, in what was seen as a continuation of prewar cooperation by some of their leaders with the Zionist movement, sided with the newly declared State of Israel in the war, despite the opposition to that cooperation by some leaders in the community in Israel as well as in Syria and Lebanon. But as a result of economic and military conditions on the ground, the pro-Israeli faction within the Druze community was able to swing the rest of the community in favor of supporting Israel. Many inherent factors about the Druze community necessitated siding with Israel. For example, the Druze were a farming community, and they needed the permission of Israeli military generals to have access to their fields. Additionally, the large Israeli military presence in the area of Galilee where Druze were concentrated tilted the Druze in the decision to side with Israel. Furthermore, as a small minority that had been marginalized economically and politically, the realization that Israel was the winning party in the war also loomed large for the Druze (Parsons 2000, 2001). Also, during the fighting, the Arab League Army's hostile relation to some Druze villages that did not take a clear stand with the Arab side played a role in encouraging Druze to side with Israel (for more, see Betts 1988; Firro 1992; and Swayd 1998). By the end of the war and the hostilities between the Arab states and Israel, the Druze community in Israel was cut off completely from their coreligious community in Syria and Lebanon, with which they historically had a strong relationship and with whom back-and-forth movement had been common, as there had been no border dividing the community. The rest of the Palestinian Arabs, Muslims and Christians, who remained on the land were either fighting against Israeli troops or not actively involved in the fighting because of lack of arms and because most of the fighting by Arab was managed by Arab armies and led by Arab commanders from the neighboring countries (Rogan and Shlaim 2001).

Many Muslims and Christians in Israel-Palestine were part of the Arab and Palestinian national movement. These two religious groups, both of whom were landowners, and had been part of the political leadership of the country, were opposed to the establishment of Israel, which

they saw as part of Western colonial hegemony in the region, and thus did not collaborate, at large, with the Israeli state.[1] Furthermore, many Christians (Greek Orthodox, Latin Catholics, and Protestants) who were also among the elites in the Palestinian society, as also the case in Arab society at large, had been educated in Western schools that had been established since the nineteenth century in the Middle East, and many of them had pursued their education in Western countries. Through this education, they were exposed to ideas of nationalism, and many of them were among the leaders of the Palestinian and Arab national movement.

By the end of the 1948 war, Israel's border had extended beyond the UN partition plan to include 78 percent of the territory of the Palestine Mandate. Through the conquest of lands that took place during the war, 160,000 Palestinian Arabs remained inside the newly created State of Israel (about 15 percent of the total Palestinian population), a minority equal to 12.5 percent of the new country's population at the end of 1949 (Findley 1995, 90). Thus, the Palestinian Arabs in Israel became a minority overnight and were disconnected from the rest of the Palestinian and Arab people because of the hostile relationship and boundaries created between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors. Even though the land they lived on was not supposed to be part of the Jewish state according to the UN resolution for partitioning Palestine, for Israel went beyond its mandated borders, neither the Arab leadership, Israeli leaders, nor the international community called for Israel to withdraw from those regions. Thus, the status of the Palestinian Arabs within the 1948 borders became a domestic issue of internal Israeli affairs, so that neither they themselves, for not gaining any international support or incentive for such a call, nor the international community called for their right of self-determination, as they were treated as an internal Israeli issue. While the Israeli state wished to have a land without the (native) people, the Arab and Palestinian leadership in the region ignored the presence of what are known as '48 Palestinians. Thus, the only point on which Zionists and Arabs agreed was the issue of 1948 Palestinians whose existence and future were not

1. For more on this issue, see Parsons 2001.

concerns for either party. In fact, Zionists wished that there were no Palestinians "inside," as many studies in Israel have shown, especially since the 1980s with the advent of revisionist scholars such as Ilan Pappe (2006), Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (2001), and others.

The majority of urban elites, including the political, social, economic, educational, and religious leadership of the Palestinian Arab community, left the country, and the people who remained were left almost leaderless except for the organizing of the Israeli Communist Party (Sharqawi 2004, 157). As Ilana Kaufman (1997) has discussed in her study of the Israeli Communist Party, this political party was the only organization in Israel that allowed Palestinian Arabs to become members. It is worth noting here that one of the strongholds of the Israeli Communist Party was in Kafr Yassif. Furthermore, the Israeli Communist Party included Palestinian Arab socialists who believed in the communist ideology and communist struggle as the only solution to the conflict, but the party also included Palestinian Arab nationalists, since it was the only party available for Palestinian Arab activism. With time, other parties allowed Palestinian Arab citizens to become members, first among which was the MAPAM, a left-wing Zionist party that many Palestinian Arabs joined, as they hoped membership would improve the conditions of their daily lives (Asmar 1975).

In the decades after 1948, the number of Palestinian Arabs in Israel increased, which was a factor of natural growth and improved health services, among other reasons, a trend similar to populations in other parts of the world. In 2003, according to the Israeli census, the population of Israel was 6,658,300, out of which 81.6 percent (5,393,223) were Jews and the Palestinian Arabs represented 18.4 percent.[2] The Palestinian Arabs are further divided into 1,004,600 Muslims, 138,500 Christians, and 106,300 Druze (Mansour 2004, 196). It is worth noting here that the Israeli census does not provide subcategories of identity for Jews based on their ethnic identifications (Asian, African, or European) or religious affiliations (Reform, Conservative, or Orthodox Jewish). Yet the census explicitly provides the

2. This number is not totally accurate since it includes Arab residents of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights that Israel occupied in the 1967 war and annexed later.

subcategories for Palestinian Arabs, dividing them according to religious affiliations and ethnicizing religion in some cases, such as the policy with Druze. The Palestinian Arabs live in more than one hundred villages, ten towns or cities, and in six mixed cities. There are about forty Arab villages that are unrecognized officially by the state. Twenty-nine percent of the Arabs live in Arab cities, 8.4 percent live in mixed cities, 56 percent live in Arab villages, and the remainder (about 6.6 percent) live in the unrecognized villages (Rouhana, Saleh, and Sultany 2003, 57).

The Palestinian Arabs who remained within the borders of the state of Israel inherited the conflict over the land between Jews and Arabs, and with that legacy came the baggage of hostilities caused by the violence between Jews and Arabs over the conflict. Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel were under official military rule from 1948 until 1996 and have unofficially remained under the same, as many aspects of military rule such as the restriction of rights and freedoms continued afterward. Thus, Arabs were treated with suspicion and contempt by state authorities from early on, and therefore they have resented the state and its policies (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005, 9).

After 1948, the state of Israel designated those Palestinians who became Israeli citizens (although a third of them remained without citizenship and were categorized as present absentees) as Israeli Arabs, even though many have developed and continue to express a specifically Palestinian identity that maintains a local and religious character alongside citizenship in the state of Israel (Rashid Khalidi 1997; Rouhana 1997). But as Nadim Rouhana (1997) has shown in his study, the development of Palestinian identity has become antagonistic to and alienated from the Israeli national identity as a result of many internal and external factors, and the majority of them define themselves as Arabs or Palestinians rather than Israelis.

Mahmoud Mi'ari, while describing these Palestinian Arabs in Israel, argues that these Palestinians are better understood as a national minority ruled by a Jewish settler majority. Even though most of them are legally considered Israeli citizens, they are an oppressed minority alienated in their own homeland and excluded from active participation in the state and its policy making (Sharqawi 2004, 156). It has also been argued that

the situation of Palestinian Arabs in Israel has many similarities to the circumstances of Palestinians in the territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 war. Both groups share a similarly distorted pattern of development characteristic of many native societies in colonial-settler states (Said and Hitchens 2001, 275). Thus, the Palestinian social structure under Israeli rule can be viewed as an outcome of a system of internal colonialism, resulting in a pattern of dependency upon and development peripheral to the dominant Zionist society, with the Palestinians constituting of a peasantry that is alienated from its land (most of which was confiscated by the state of Israel) and labor class in cities (ibid., 278).

According to Nimer Sultany, Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel are an indigenous minority in a state that at its core regards equality between Arab and Jewish citizens as a threat and impossibility. The state was created for and belongs to Jews who fulfill the very purpose of the inception of the state. This political system and historical reality make it almost impossible for the state, theoretically and in practice, to assume a neutral position toward its citizens. Palestinian Arab citizens continue to be seen as a threat to the state's security and goals, and they remain without full citizenship and political rights in comparison to Jews (Sultany 2003, 10).

Despite relative improvement of their situation with time, the economic development of the Palestinians in Israel is slow. They lost their agricultural basis mainly as a result of the state's policy of confiscation of land, which was taken away and allocated for Jewish settlements. At the same time, the state did not encourage industrialization in the Arab sector, and thus mostly Palestinian Arabs became a source of labor for the Israeli Jewish economy. Even though their living standard has improved, over the years, there is huge gap between the Palestinian Arab and the Jewish standards of living in Israel: the average annual income of Israeli Arabs is about $10,000, whereas for Jewish Israelis it is $15,000 (for more, see Shafir 1989; and Shalev 1992). Additional monetary benefits are allocated to Jewish citizens based on military service, even though religious Jews are legally exempt from serving in the army yet continue to receive these monetary benefits. These benefits, such as housing allocations, loans, and pensions, make the disparity of income between Jews and Arabs even higher than the inequality represented by official numbers.

Even though this socioeconomic profile is true for most Palestinian Arabs, some religious communities have had a slightly different experience. Druze, for example, served in the Israeli army and had different possibilities of access to the Israeli economy and state politics. Druze participated more actively in the Israeli Zionist political parties and had more access to some sectors of employment, especially those jobs connected to security. Despite this access, they have also suffered from land confiscation, low funding for their local councils, and lack of health and educational resources, compared to the Jewish community.

Druze

In this section I will offer a brief overview of the religion and history of Druze communities in the region and specifically in Israel-Palestine (for more, see Betts 1988; Firro 1999; Parsons 2000, 2001; and Swayd 1998). This summary is an important consideration for the Kafr Yassif case study because there is very little research on the Druze compared to other Palestinian Arabs in Israel.

Druze Religion, History, and Politics

Druze are an Arabic-speaking Shi'a-Ismaili Islamic sect with formal origins in the eleventh century (around AD 1017) Egypt that at the time was ruled by the Fatimid caliphate, which espoused the Ismaili branch of Shi'a Islam (Betts 1988, 4). Initially, the Druze religion was adopted by Al-Hakim, the Fatimid caliph, who was seen by Druze as the leader of the community. After his death, the new leadership in Egypt starting persecuting Druze, and most of them escaped to today's Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel (Firro 1992, 5). The induction of new members officially stopped in 1044 (ibid., 21), and as a result of persecution, Druze became a tightly knit community and followed their faith in secret (Betts 1988, 20). Only those members of the community who demonstrate piety and devotion and have withstood the lengthy process of candidacy can be initiated into the teachings of the faith (Swayd 1998, 14). Political and religious Druze leaders share the leadership of the community (Betts 1988, 24).

Druze today live as a religious minority in Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan, and in smaller communities around the world (Swayd 1998). In the

1990s, nearly one million Druze lived in a few countries, four to five hundred thousand in Syria, three to four hundred thousand in Lebanon, and five to twenty thousand in Jordan. There are sixty thousand Druze living in present-day Israel, another fifteen thousand in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and approximately ninety thousand elsewhere around the world (ibid., 5). In the Middle East, Druze live predominantly in the mountainous regions of today's Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. The Druze have their own prayer sites and religious centers that the community utilizes for social gatherings. Only the religious members know the principles of their faith, and the rest are members in the community by birth.[3] There is not much about the religion to add here except for the often-mentioned concept of *taqiyya* (dissimilation), which is defined as hiding one's true faith and acting as a loyal member of the dominant religion wherever one lives. This Druze characteristic is often criticized by many scholars and many Druze as well, because it ignores the economic and political realities that affect the Druze's political decisions (for more, see Betts 1988; and Firro 1992). This fact is especially the case regarding the decision of some Druze to ally themselves with the Israeli government and state since 1948. In other words, there were many factors that led to that outcome, and they have to do more with economics, social issues, and other reasons.

For many Druze, the Druze community is considered Muslim and Arab. The physical buildings of Druze religious sites resemble mosques (Firro 1992, 47), and their religious courts operate according to the Hanafi Sunni religious legal school of Islam (Falah 2000, 146). Additionally, Druze have traditionally played a major role in the social and political makeup of the Islamic and Arabic worlds (Swayd 1998, 5). Yet it is worth noting that despite being a minority religious sect within the majority dominant Sunni Islam (which has historically refused to recognize any new branch of Islam), most Druze accept being defined as Muslim and Arab (Firro 1992, 20).

3. Membership by birth in the religious communities in the Middle East is not particular to the Druze. This birthright is the case with all other communities, since there is no marriage recognized outside the church, and thus children of married couples are registered as having the religion of the parents at birth.

These issues are discussed here not to offer a deterministic judgment of Druze identity but only to counter Israeli representations of Druze, which describe them either as a dissimulating group that conceals its identity in order to avoid the wrath of the ruling majority or as an ancient non-Muslim/Arab group that is similar to the Jewish people and religion (Parsons 2000, 2001). This characterization is a typical colonial representation and strategy of social engineering, similar to the French treatment of the Berbers in Algeria and West Africa. Colonial French administrative and educational policies distinguished between Arabs and Berbers and represented the Arabs as more threatening than the Berbers, hoping this comparison would result in greater loyalty of the Berbers to French rule (Hoffman 2007, 37).

Furthermore, being Arab does not negate the Druze identity and does not contradict the fact that at some point Druze identity was stronger and that both identities (Arab and Druze) have shifted according to different historical circumstances. But to argue that Druze are not Arab, or that the Druze have long and ancient ties to Jews, as suggested by the tenets of Israeli education, is not only a myth but manufactured propaganda that contradicts the history and reality of the Druze community.

According to Swayd (1998), Druze have in general not been among the educated classes, because in general education was available and accessible to only a few. Although the limited access to education was true for most people in the Middle East, it has been more so in nonurban areas such as the regions where most of the Druze populations are found and where formal education was not available in most villages until the twentieth century. Elementary reading and writing skills were often passed informally, from the few educated Druze elders who were trained in the religious doctrine to a small number among the Druze youth who could possibly become initiated into the religion eventually. European missionaries helped establish schools in some parts of the Druze areas during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with villagers paying part of the costs. As in most Middle Eastern societies, the growing availability of formal education and professional training slowly eroded traditional occupations in teaching and education but provided new professions and opportunities for many Druze (Swayd 1998, 6).

Within Druze villages and small towns in Israel, the predominant means of subsistence for several centuries has been agriculture. Until this century, landowners and peasants dominated the Druze economic landscape. Most Druze have been small-scale lessees of land from landowning families, but the increase in the Druze population and decrease in the amount of land have caused some members of the sect to work in nearby cities while maintaining their residence within the villages. These urban jobs have often been in the unskilled sector (Swayd 1998, 5).

Whether in Syria, Lebanon, or Palestine, the traditional social structure of the Druze was based on the extended family, or *hamula* (Firro 1992, 178). Finally, Druze living in mountainous areas were able to distance themselves from central governments and often were able to escape taxation and military conscriptions, which helped them keep their social structure intact (Falah 2000, 135).

Druze in Israel

While there is little information available about Druze in general, there is even less information on Druze in Israel-Palestine, especially during the Ottoman period (1516-1917) and the British Mandate (1917-48). According to Falah (2000), this paucity is owing to the fact that the center of Druze activities was in Lebanon and Syria at that time and most writing was on the Druze communities in these countries, whereas Druze in Palestine were mentioned only in passing. Furthermore, neither the Ottoman nor the British regime recognized Druze in Palestine as a separate religious group, even though in the nineteenth century they did so with Druze in Lebanon and Syria; thus, there is a lack of information about Druze in Palestine in particular (ibid., 57). Finally, another possible reason for the lack of information about Druze in Palestine might be because they were much smaller in number than they were in Syria or Lebanon, or because Druze in Lebanon and Syria were the focus of attention of the Europeans in the prelude to their colonization of the region and Druze in Palestine were viewed as a less important factor in their calculations and planning for the colonization (ibid., 58). Contact with Druze in Palestine was entrusted to the Zionist movement that was promised a state in Palestine by Britain, and it was hoped that Druze

might play a role in either helping the Zionists or at least not taking sides in the war.

In Israel-Palestine, Druze live in a few villages in Galilee and on the Carmel Mountain. In general, Druze have lived in mountainous areas, since these areas were the most defensible (Firro 1992, 4). The exact date for the origin of Druze settlement in Palestine is hard to ascertain, yet from the different sources available, they seemed to have lived there since the establishment of the religion in the eleventh century. Until the creation of the state of Israel, there were different waves of Druze migration to and from Palestine and to and from other neighboring lands (Falah 2000, 56, 63) as a result of different political and economic changes that were taking place in the region (Firro 1992). At the beginning of the British rule of Palestine, the number of Druze was about 7,028 (about 1 percent of the total Arab population), residing mainly in eight villages in Galilee and Carmel Mountain areas. This number increased to 9,148 in 1931 (ibid., 314). During the period of the British Mandate, there were three censuses conducted (1922, 1931, 1945), in which the number of Druze increased from 7,028 out of a total population of 757,182 to 14,858 out of a population of 1,810,037. Yet their percentage in the total population dropped from 1 percent to 0.8 percent with the increase in the number of Jewish immigrants coming from Europe to Palestine, whose percentage of the total population in Palestine increased from 11 percent in 1922 to 31 percent in 1948 (Falah 2000, 68). In 2003 Druze in Israel numbered around 100,000, constituting approximately 1.5 percent of the total population and 9 percent of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel (*Al-Mithaq* [Summer 2005], 25). The huge increase in their numbers over the years has mostly been because of improved health services combined with a high birthrate and because of the inclusion of Druze from the Golan Heights Druze(taken from Syria in 1967 by Israel) in the Israeli census.

Currently, Druze live in Galilee, in northern Israel, in eighteen towns and villages, of which eleven are exclusively Druze, while the remaining seven have other Arab religious groups (Falah 2000, 68). Unlike Druze in Lebanon and Syria, the Druze society in Israel-Palestine was characterized by a relatively equal distribution of small parcels of land among families in a particular village (Firro 1992, 135). The number of Druze

settlements in Palestine was historically larger than today because many of these towns and villages were deserted during migrations and wars. The last of the wars was in 1948, which led to the destruction of some villages and the evacuation of others (Falah 2000, 65).

In Israel, the office of the spiritual head of Druze has for several generations been hereditary and held by the Tarif family in Julis, in western Galilee (Betts 1998, 22). One of the important Druze religious sites for prayers and holidays gatherings is in Kafr Yassif. Druze in Israel lived in a traditional village society (Falah 2000, 110), and not many were educated (ibid., 75). In 1990, there were only 374 Druze academics holding university degrees, of the total Druze population of 66,000, while in Kafr Yassif (a village numbering around 6,000 at the time) alone, there were 476 academic degree holders, a number that is higher than academics in the entire Israeli Druze community altogether (*Al-Mithaq* [Summer 2005], 27). Owing to the absence of schools in their own villages, Druze used to go to the Palestinian Arab high schools in Kafr Yassif, Rameh, Tarshiha, and Shafa'amr for their high school education. Only since 1975 have Druze villages started to have their own high schools (Falah 2000, 201).

After the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the Israeli policy of "divide and rule" has treated Druze differently from other Palestinians by providing them limited upward mobility through military and governmental channels, which are not available to other Arab communities. Serving in the Israeli military has also helped instill in the Druze an identity different from the identity of the rest of the Palestinian Arab community. And during training, serving, and fighting in the Israeli military, many Druze have developed an antagonistic attitude toward the rest of the Palestinian Arab community, as the enemy in training and practice for the Israeli military is Arab and Palestinian (for example, see Firro 1992; Halabi 1989; among others). Despite their role in the Israeli military, Druze still face discrimination in the Israeli job market, in the educational system, and in the military service itself, compared to Jewish Israelis. Most important, nearly 80 percent of Druze land has been confiscated by the Israeli government (Swayd 1998, 6). This has had a devastating social and economic impact on the Druze, as 95 percent of Druze were involved in agriculture in the year 1948, but by 2003 the number had decreased to only

5 percent. This reduction is as a result of the Israeli policy of confiscation of lands belonging to Arabs, including the Druze; the land is reserved for use by Jewish Israelis, which makes the Arab population dependent on the state for a source of living and also makes it possible to co-opt them (*Al-Mithaq* [Summer 2005], 25). In general, the situation could be seen as similar to the one faced by many people in different countries experiencing the process of so-called modernization. Yet what is different here is the fact that lands are confiscated only from Arab citizens, including the Druze, but not from Jewish citizens, because the lands where Jews live are mostly either state-owned lands or lands that are leased on a long-term basis to Jewish international organizations. Thus, the loss of land as a result of the confiscation policy pushed more Palestinian Arabs out of the agricultural sector and also limited their ability to expand the building and development of their villages and towns.

Christians

There is very little written on the Christians in the region and less about the Christians in Israel. But since the attack on Kafr Yassif mainly targeted the Christians, I will provide some information about Christians in the region as a brief background to Christians in the village itself.

Unlike the Druze, Christians in the region have many sects and various churches that have been part of the history of Arab Christianity in the region. Since the establishment of the religion during the Roman period, the Christians in the Middle East suffered persecution until the fourth century when the Roman Empire adopted Christianity as a state religion. Yet even after that time, many eastern Christian churches that did not want to side with Rome were targeted and persecuted, at times by the Roman Empire as well as later by the European conquerors of the region, as during the Crusades.

Christians existed in different countries in the region but especially in the geographical crescent stretching between Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine. In Syria, Christians belong mainly to the Catholic and Orthodox churches. In Lebanon, the majority of Christians are followers of the Maronite Church, which is recognized by the pope, in addition a sizable number of Orthodox Christians. Some Maronites supported the Crusaders between

the eleventh to thirteenth centuries and consequently suffered retribution at the hand of the Muslims after the defeat of the Crusaders. As a result, the Maronites confined themselves to the mountainous areas of Lebanon, where Druze also lived. In Palestine, Christians are predominantly Orthodox; Catholics are the second-largest group, while Protestants are the smallest in number.

During Islamic rule in the region, beginning in the seventh century, Christians were considered an autonomous religious minority with a *dhimmi* status, which meant they were given freedom to run their own civilian and religious affairs and paid a special tax to the state. This toleration of religious affairs did not mean they had legal, political, or even economic equality, yet in historical perspective they enjoyed relative freedom compared to empires of the past that did not tolerate religious diversity. The situation of Christians in the region fluctuated according to the ruling dynasty and according to political changes in the region. For example, when the Crusaders invaded the region, some Christians sided with them, which led to a backlash against them when the Crusaders were defeated. It is worth mentioning here that Christians that were not recognized by the pope were also targeted by the Crusaders.

This *dhimmi* minority status of the Christians continued throughout the Ottoman period under the *millet* system, which gave them increased autonomy. Later on, during the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government introduced reforms, influenced and pressured by European powers, known as *tanzimat,* which granted its subjects legal equality regardless of religion, so Christians started to enjoy more room for economic mobility. Thus, the Muslim majority, which had enjoyed a dominant political and economic status in the empire, faced new competition from the non-Muslim minorities, such as Jews and Christians.

At the same time, the nineteenth century also witnessed the increasing economic and military power of some European countries. Those nation-states were able to extract from the Ottoman Empire protection rights for the different Christian communities in the region. For example, France became the protector of Catholics in the region, Britain of the Protestants, and Russia of the Orthodox community. As a result, the legal status of these religious minorities became more transnational, and

in a sense, their disputes and grievances were no longer under the sole jurisdiction of the Ottoman Empire but involved these other European empires as well. The newly established relations of European powers to the different religious communities in the region brought with them economic and political changes, and some groups came to benefit from those exchanges. This new dynamic also affected the relationship between the different religious communities and the Ottoman Empire. The two main disadvantaged groups in this new context were the Sunni Muslim majority as well as Greek Orthodox Christians, while Jews and Catholics (especially Maronite Catholics in Lebanon) generally benefited, especially from their new relationship to Britain and France, the dominant global economic powers at the time with a colonial presence in some parts of the region.

This economic disadvantage of Muslims and Orthodox Christians might have affected the relationship between them and the European states. Christians in the region, except for Maronite Catholics, played a disproportionate role in the political history in the late Ottoman period and during twentieth-century Arab nationalism. This disparity was more pronounced in regards to Orthodox Christians in Israel-Palestine, who are also the largest Christian religious group in Galilee. Orthodox Christians have supported and often led the Arab nationalist movement (Dawisha 2003), and the espousal of Arab nationalism by Christian Arabs generally might also be because of the fact that as a minority, they preferred to be under a secular political system rather than a religious one. Another factor tilting Christians toward the Arab nationalist camp might be that many Christians attended European schools established by missionaries in the region, and many also studied further in Europe. The exposure to Western education and culture also led to an exposure to European intellectual traditions, among them nationalism. Thus, many Christians participated in the Arab national movement and generally remained oppositional to state policies (for more, see Masters 2001; Mitri 2000; Prior and Taylor 1994). This historical and political development of Arab Christian communities, and of Druze as discussed earlier in the chapter, was also reflected in the two villages in the case study. Whereas Druze and non-Maronite Christians in the region opposed European encroachment,

Druze in Israel-Palestine came over time to ally themselves with the Zionist movement and the Israeli state.

The Two Villages

After the brief discussion of the history of Druze and Christians in the region, and in Israel in particular, the following section will discuss the history of the two villages and help contextualize the event in Kafr Yassif in 1981. Information about Julis is comparatively less readily available than Kafr Yassif. This lack might be because of the different political and economic histories of the two villages and the roles they played in the recent history of the region.

Julis

Julis is an exclusively Druze village located in northwestern Galilee, which has been the seat of the Druze community's spiritual leadership in Israel. The population of the village was about 3,036 in 1983 (Betts 1988, 125). According to Falah (2000), Julis is an old village, as indicated by some Ottoman documents. The local council in Julis was established in 1967. It was only in 1963 that the village was connected to water lines and in 1969 to electricity. Today there are also health clinics and services as well as postal, telephone, and other services (ibid., 95). Until the late 1970s, Julis had only elementary schools and no high school, and students who wanted to continue their high school education came to Yani High School in Kafr Yassif. Since the late 1970s, the Israeli government has established few high schools in Julis and other villages, which freed the residents of Julis from traveling outside the village to seek education, and also meant that they had less contact with other Palestinian Arabs compared to before. Julis today has one high school, one middle school, and two elementary schools. A small number of people have gone on for further education in Israeli universities.

The majority of Druze men in Julis, like other Druze in Israel, serve in the Israeli army, and after their military service many work in security-related jobs, Israeli factories, and government offices, with a few people working in the private business sector. Trade and economic activity in Julis compared to Yirka (a neighboring Druze village) or Kafr Yassif is

much less dynamic, because the village is not as large and as central in its location and did not historically have economic activity such as serving as a marketplace. In contrast, Kafr Yassif was a center for economic activity in the region.

Despite the fact that a large portion of Druze lands was confiscated by the state of Israel after 1948, and there is discrimination against Druze even though they serve in the Israeli military, the village has had a good relationship with the state authorities. Many of its inhabitants are members of the Likud or the Labor Party, as well as Jewish religious parties, and very few support the leftist Jewish political parties. There are hardly any followers of the Arab parties or the Israeli Communist Party in the village. With some exceptions, this involvement is the general trend in the political orientation of Druze villages in Israel and is a product of the history of the political development of the community, especially since 1948. Druze service in the Israeli military, which indoctrinates soldiers into state ideology, is a possible factor in shaping their politics. Service in the Israeli military has also created a space for Druze to be more exposed to the political views of Jews who serve in the army. However, it is also the case that many Druze also join these parties for political and economic benefits. As Michael Shalev (1992) and Gershon Shafir (1989) have shown in their research on the Israeli economy, many of the economic enterprises are state owned. Thus, many employment opportunities in Israel have historically been tied to the Israeli government, especially in the early decades of Israel's existence. In addition, the political parties that participate in the government coalition gain political and economic power that they use to attract supporters to whom they can distribute benefits, and Druze are not an exception in this regard.

Kafr Yassif

Kafr Yassif is located in western Galilee on Highway 70, 12 kilometers (7.5 miles) northeast of the port city of Akka. It is considered to be an important commercial center in the region and links the villages in the area to the highway and nearby cities. The village is built on three hills, situated between the Lebanese border to the north, the Carmel Mountains to the south, and the Mediterranean Sea to the west. Archaeological

remains indicate the existence of an ancient settlement in the village from the Phoenician and Canaanite periods. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, the town also had a Jewish community and has a well-cared-for Jewish cemetery that can be visited to this day. The Jewish community eventually left the village for better economic prospects in nearby cities or went abroad. During the 1870s, the first elementary school of the Orthodox Church was established, and it continued to operate until the end of World War I. In February 1939, the British burned approximately half of the buildings in the village as a reprisal for underground Palestinian nationalist activities against British rule.

The village is 1,715 acres in area, half of which are covered by olive trees. Only 37 percent of the area of the town is under the control of the local council; the remaining area is under the state and quasi-state authorities such as the Jewish National Fund. In 1988, Kafr Yassif's total population was 5,163, and in 2000 it was 9,000 (Betts 1998, 125). The village is composed of Christians (55 percent) (mostly Greek Orthodox, followed by Latin Catholics and a minority of Anglican Protestants), Muslims (40 percent), and Druze (5 percent). Kafr Yassif has one of the major religious sites belonging to the Druze (Falah 2000, 171). Approximately 30 percent of the residents came as refugees from other destroyed villages in Galilee during the war of 1948, which added to an increase in the population.

Today residents of the village work as wage laborers; in offices, schools, businesses, and factories; as owners of shops, clinics, and other forms of independent economic activity; and a small minority in farming. Kafr Yassif is one of the first villages in Galilee to have its own local council, which was established in the 1920s, at a time when the village had 870 inhabitants (ibid., 82).

The village now has three elementary schools, one middle school, and one high school, all of which have been in existence for more than fifty years. Kafr Yassif also has a cultural center, a library, a senior citizens' center, a sports hall, and playing fields. The religious institutions include five churches, two mosques, and a Druze prayer center. There are two banks, a post office, and various social centers. Health services in the town include a large general health clinic, a family health center, and two first-aid clinics, in addition to the many private clinics that physicians from the village

have established. Kafr Yassif clearly enjoys a relatively good economic situation compared to the neighboring Palestinian Arab villages. This advantage might have been one of the sources of tension for the people in Julis, despite the fact that the two villages, approximately a mile away from each other, have had a history of good relations ("Two Days After, Blood Is Boiling Between Julis and Kafr Yassif," *Ma'ariv,* April 17, 1981, 27). Some interesting information about the socioeconomic and political background of the village comes from a document published on the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the local council in November 1975, by the Kafr Yassif branch of the Israeli Communist Party.

According to the publication, landownership in Kafr Yassif was not concentrated in the hands of a few families during the Ottoman and British periods, as was the case with other towns and villages. This situation allowed many families to own small pieces of property and enabled many to get their children educated, which later created a pool of individuals who obtained higher education.[4] The British repression of the village in 1939 and the burning of many houses by British troops, as a punishment for helping anti-British revolts, helped to foster nationalist and political awareness among the residents. Thus, education, on the one hand, and British policies of repression, on the other, helped shape the development of progressive politics in Kafr Yassif (Israeli Communist Party, Kafr Yassif Branch, 1975, 4).

A branch of the Communist Party was established in Kafr Yassif in 1948, which alongside other progressive political groups such as the Arab Popular Front fought against the military regime imposed by the Israeli government on Palestinian Arabs. One important event that marks the political history of the village took place in 1949, when a mass protest took place wherein leaders and residents from the village laid down on the ground, preventing military trucks from entering the village when the military government came to evict refugees from neighboring villages that had taken refuge in Kafr Yassif is response to attacks by Zionist forces

4. Israeli Communist Party, Kafr Yassif Branch, 1975, 2. Even though this publication might be influenced by its relation to the Communist Party, its account does not contradict the other sources of information about the village and its history.

in 1948. This tactic of resistance was repeated on numerous occasions and helped to limit the government's ability to deport refugees who found shelter in Kafr Yassif (ibid., 6). Such incidents were publicized in local and international media.

According to the Communist Party's publication, the political activities of the village against the state policies of oppression, such as ethnic cleansing and land confiscation, and mobilization against the terror of the military government made Kafr Yassif prominent in the minds of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel in nationalist politics (ibid., 6). The publication also mentions that poetry festivals have been taking place in Kafr Yassif since the 1950s, in which many prominent Palestinian poets participated, such as Rashed Hussein, Hanna Abu Hanna, Samih Al-Qassim, and some who had even attended school in Kafr Yassif, such as Mahmoud Darwish. This history makes Kafr Yassif widely known within the country as a center for Palestinian Arab cultural activities (ibid., 15). Furthermore, the publication notes that a coalition of the Kafr Yassif Democratic women's organization, the Arab Popular Front, the local council, and the local branch of the Communist Party waged a campaign to protest against the government-imposed military regime and national oppression of Palestinian Arabs in Israel and against the arrests, deportations, and waves of political and economic intimidation targeted at many people in the village (ibid., 17).

The head of the Kafr Yassif local council in the 1950s, Yani Yani, along with others, initiated a campaign to create a national political body that could unite progressive groups to fight against government policies of national oppression, discrimination, land confiscation, house demolitions, and terrorizing of the public by the military regime. This campaign led to the creation of the Popular Front, through a strategy of building alliances that was emulated in other Palestinian Arab towns, uniting many leftist and nationalist political groups and mobilizing the Palestinian Arab community in its opposition to the state's racist policies (ibid., 19).

In an article in the *Arab Studies Quarterly* on the political history of the village during the 1950s and 1960s, Ahmad Sa'di (2001) confirms local narratives about the political history of coalition building and resistance to government policies in the village. Sa'di discusses the politics of the

village and its relationship to the state since the late 1940s and early 1950s, observing that since the establishment of the state, the policy of MAPAI (the governing Israeli Labor Party) was that of co-opting local leaders and instigating conflicts among various Palestinian Arab factions. Yet, according to Sa'di, the Kafr Yassif mobilization against military rule proposed an alternative to the official paradigm of a "co-opted acquiescent minority."

Sa'di argues that Kafr Yassif was an unusual case among Arab villages, for it was the only village with an elected local authority that continued to exist even after the establishment of the state of Israel. Its local authority was established by the mandate government on December 1, 1925. Yani Yani, who had been mayor before 1948, was able to forge a coalition after 1949 between nationalists and Communists and lead the local council for another decade. The Popular Front played a major role in defining Palestinian Arab politics beyond the local council in Kafr Yassif by offering an example of unity among the Palestinian Arabs in Israel, demanding the state to recognize them as such, and pressuring for a change in the policies of the state against its Palestinian Arab citizens and a solution for the problems of internal and external refugees.

Sa'di points out that this political behavior of the Kafr Yassif leadership angered the state authorities and its functionaries in the area, and they worked to change the political atmosphere in Kafr Yassif, fearing it would influence other Palestinian Arab villages and towns. The government tried to create fissures and disputes among the different political factions in the village and encouraged religious factions to participate in the elections in order to undermine the nationalist politics of the village and its local council. Ultimately, however, the political stance taken in Kafr Yassif led to its punishment by state authorities in the 1950s and 1960s through political and economic repression.

In conclusion, it is clear from this background information about the two villages that there is much more writing and documentation about Kafr Yassif than Julis, partly because Kafr Yassif had its own local council much earlier and had much more economic and political activity than Julis. The village played an important role in the local politics of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel and in shaping the politics of coalition

building and resistance to state policies. Kafr Yassif was a site where many important leaders who became part of the national politics of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel received their education. It is also clear from this historical discussion that, contrary to the case of Julis, Kafr Yassif had a contested and oppositional relationship to the Israeli authorities.

History of Communal Relations

In this section, I will discuss the relationship between the Druze and other religious groups in the Palestinian Arab community in the region in general as well as between the two local communities in Galilee. The sources used here are both firsthand and secondary, as I draw on conversations with local leaders over many years as well as the few available secondary sources on the subject prior to the event in 1981.

On some occasions, when I have presented the case study of the two villages at conferences in the United States, I have heard the argument that the relationship between Druze and Christians in the region, revolving around Druze-Maronite conflicts, might have had an impact on Druze-Christian relationships in Galilee. Such observations lump together different groups, especially when discussing the politics of the Middle East, and thus warrant a brief discussion and rebuttal. The main question here is whether Druze-Christian conflicts in Lebanon and Syria since the nineteenth century should be taken into account when discussing Druze-Christian relations in Israel in the late twentieth century. This statement requires some careful clarification and contextualization.

First, the conflict between Druze and Christians in Lebanon specifically involved Maronites, who were the only Christian community that lived side by side in Mount Lebanon with Druze. This relation between the Maronites and the Druze turned into direct conflict and violence because of different factors, which will be discussed later. In Israel, the majority of Christians are Greek Orthodox, which is especially the case in Kafr Yassif. While Christians in Lebanon were for some time a religious majority in that geographic area, in Israel-Palestine both Christians and Druze have been religious minorities for centuries. Even when violence between Druze and Christians spread to other parts of present-day Syria and Lebanon, it did not expand to Galilee in Israel-Palestine.

It is also generally argued that Druze have a tradition of strong communal identification binding them together that has over time helped them act in a unified manner in times of peace and war (Betts 1988, 13; Swayd 1998, 15). This same thing could also be said about other religious communities in the region, as religious identity has historically been a dominant factor in shaping the actions of individuals in those communities, an orientation that the modern state system further reinforced. Another point in the history of Druze that might help explain the solidification of their identity is their political history. For example, during the eighteenth-century Ottoman rule in the region, Druze led by the Druze Ottoman governor of Mount Lebanon, Fakhr Al-Din Al-Ma'anni, succeeded in establishing a semiautonomous principality. However, this situation did not last for long, as the Ottomans were able to regain control of the area. The Druze were still able to continue to play a major role in the politics of the region, as was evident with the rise of the Druze sultan Pasha Al-Atrash who fought along with and led the Arabs against the Ottomans and later (after the end of World War I) against the French colonial rule. Yet except for the Al-Ma'anni period in the eighteenth century, Druze never had any politically organized territory under their own rule but, like many other religious communities, were governed by other regional and global powers.

At the same time, it is important to note that the Druze community, like the Christians, has not been completely unified or lived peacefully with itself at all moments. In fact, there are many examples that prove the opposite. There were competing political powers among Druze who had fought against one another since the nineteenth century, which is still the case in Lebanon, where competing leaders from different families and political orientations have tried to dominate Druze politics. Currently, the most dominant Druze leader in Lebanon is Walid Jumblat, whose father, Kamal Jumblat, was a major political figure in Lebanon from the 1950s to the 1970s and who is an Arab nationalist and pro-Nasser in his political orientation.

Yet despite these political divisions within the community, one can justifiably speak of a "Druze politics," as one can speak about Shi'a, Sunni, or Christian politics in Lebanon, without dismissing the different camps

within each religious community. Yet especially in Lebanon, where the political structure is based on a confessional arrangement that was put into practice by the French colonial regime beginning in the 1920s after France created Lebanon as a modern political entity, confessional identity is still the dominant category. In Syria, Druze do not play a political role as a group, as the Baath nationalist party that has been in power has been dominated since the 1970s by the Alawites, who are another Shi'a sect, and because Baath politics has suppressed religious politics in Syria (Rogan and Shlaim 2001). In other words, religious communalism in Syria, unlike in Lebanon, has thus far been successfully repressed. In Israel, as discussed earlier, Druze at large were co-opted within the Israeli political system and political organizations. However, Druze in the Syrian Golan Heights, occupied by Israel in the 1967 war, do not serve in the Israeli army and have refused to accept Israeli identity cards, or the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, as they remain loyal to Syria and hope to be reunited with the rest of the Druze community in Syria.

In addition to these political configurations, it is sometimes argued that the strict observance against intermarriage between the Arab religious communities (Falah 2000, 112) makes it more difficult to establish crosscutting relations across social boundaries. This dynamic makes it easier for group leaders to manipulate politics from within and appeal to group solidarity, and it also makes communities vulnerable to manipulation from outside actors who communalize politics, especially in times of conflict. This barricaded identity, religious or ethnic, does not allow easy entrance and exit to membership and can be negatively exploited in times of crises between different groups (Chirot and Seligman 2001).

Strict social boundaries between the religious communities are not a new or recent phenomenon. They have existed since the beginning of established monolithic religions in the region. In this context, Firro argues, the Druze community, since the establishment of the sect, evolved within a framework that allowed it to preserve its traditional characteristics as a close-knit religious community. This situation continued within the Ottoman economic, political, and administrative structures, and the prevailing decentralization policy prevented an aggregation of several communities forming one linguistic ethnic group (Firro 1992, 353). Twentieth-century

colonial rule did not change that situation, and, in fact, colonial regimes further exploited religious differences—for example, France pushed for the creation of religious states in Syria and Lebanon in order to control them more easily.

Yet generally, despite such defined communal boundaries and periodic warfare among different religious groups, intercommunal relationships were usually not considered hostile or violent. Communal relations were arguably more violent in Europe than elsewhere, as is evident in the long history of wars between Catholics and Protestants. As far as the relationship between the religious communities are concerned, Druze were known for their tolerance to other religious groups (Falah 2000, 110) and historically lived peacefully with all other religious communities (ibid., 176). This argument is also supported by a few available sources from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries from European travelers, who observed that Druze in Palestine had amicable relationships with other religious communities (ibid., 58).

Yet in the mid-nineteenth century, clashes between Druze and Christian Maronites took place in Mount Lebanon and spread to neighboring areas in Syria. The conflict began as a quarrel that erupted between individuals and later spread to include larger-scale violence. The background to these clashes is rather complex, but scholars seem to agree that the root of the conflict was the Ottoman policy of establishing the *millet* system, which was meant to give autonomy to different religious communities. It is argued that this system helped to create more friction than unity among the different religious groups in the Middle East (Firro 1992, 231), and the Ottomans exploited religious differences and power struggles among elites from these communities, playing one against the other (ibid., 235).

Furthermore, the political and legal equality that was instituted by the Ottoman reforms in the nineteenth century, under pressure from European powers, provided Christians (especially Maronites) more room for economic gain as a result of increased trade opportunities with Europe. This development took place as the economic influence of European powers on the Ottoman Empire was simultaneously increasing. A symbol of increased power was seen in the privileges received by these countries that allowed them protective rights toward different religious

communities in the region (Falah 2000, 59). The Catholic Maronites in Lebanon came under the protection of France, and later the European powers pressurized the Ottomans to relinquish control of North Lebanon to the Maronites and the South to the Druze (Swayd 1998, 29-30). Through land-registration reforms enforced by the Ottomans in the nineteenth century, and the increased interest of European countries in the region, mainly France, which was interested in the silk and cotton industries, the Druze felt economically and politically alienated from their neighbors in those areas, while the Christian Lebanese Maronites benefited from this new reality. The rise of the Maronite Christians to economic power because of their favored trade links with France helped displace the long-standing economic and political power of the Druze in that region. These economic and political shifts led to a charged relationship between the Druze and Maronites, and the conflict between individuals from these groups spread to the rest of the communities in 1854. These tensions also rippled into Syria and marked a strong point in the collective memory of these two communities and consolidated their religious identities.

The Druze in Lebanon and Syria came to be considered as separate political as well as religious entities as a result of the reforms under late Ottoman rule, the intervention by Western powers, and later colonization (Falah 2000, 48). From the nineteenth century on, the differences and conflicts between the Druze and Christians were further exploited and manipulated by European colonial powers (Firro 1992, 257-58). For example, in Lebanon the Europeans exploited both communities, Druze and Christian, and nourished hostility between the two groups (Swayd 1998, 30). In sum, conflicts and violence erupted between these religious communities in the mid-nineteenth century as a result of historical developments, the late Ottoman policy of divide and rule, and the interference of European powers that were eager to establish a base in the Middle East (Swayd 1998). Thus, sectarian differences were strengthened to develop spheres of influence in the region.

With the end of World War I, and the establishment of the French Mandate system in Syria, the French created modern Lebanon and established a sectarian governmental arrangement that favored the Christian Maronites and remained in place after the end of French colonization of

Lebanon in 1946. This sectarian and Western-oriented model of modern Lebanon became a source of contestation, especially with the rise of Arab nationalism dominated by Egyptian leader Jamal Abd-Al Nasser. Thus, the conflict was not only sectarian in nature but also emerged from the orientation of Lebanon within the region and globally. In 1958, this conflict led to unrest in the countries between forces that wanted to maintain a Western-oriented, sectarian Lebanon and those that wanted an Arab-oriented, nonsectarian Lebanon, leading to an intervention by the United States that finished off the unrest, keeping Lebanon within Western influence. The sectarian government system was, and remains, a source of discontent and conflict in Lebanon and has played a role throughout the history of the Lebanese state in different periods of conflict and direct violence between the religious groups, culminating in the Lebanese civil war that took place between 1975 and 1989. During the civil war, influenced by economic and political dissatisfaction with the confessional arrangement of the political system in Lebanon, political and religious groups fought against as well as among each other. Each group fought in order to gain more power and worked to change the system to its own advantage. The civil war was also equally influenced by internal and external factors, such as the presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and its growing impact on the country. This development was not favored by Syria, which had wanted Lebanon to be solely under its influence. Syria then intervened to help crush the Palestinian Liberation Organization's growing influence to ensure a regime that would be loyal to Syria. The war that ensued involved many political and religious groups in Lebanon, each fighting to maximize its influence within the country. Israel, which had sought for a long time to establish a "friendly" regime in Lebanon and was unhappy about the space that the Palestinian Liberation Organization was creating for itself there, was also involved in the war and invaded Lebanon on several occasions.

During the civil war in Lebanon, the Druze fought at different times against various groups, and Christian-Druze violence also occurred. The two main camps were the Christian Maronites and leftist and nationalist groups, supported at various times by Syria, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Shi'a Muslims according to shifting political crises. At

times, parties from the same camp fought against one other (for more, see Buheiri 1987; El-Khazen 2000; Khalaf 2002; and Traboulsi 2007). This picture was even further complicated with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978, and later in 1982, that aimed at crushing the Palestinian Liberation Organization and securing a regime that would be politically favorable to Israeli security interests. During the Israeli invasion and occupation of southern Lebanon, the Druze were approached by Israel and asked to cooperate, yet this proposal failed (Atshi 1995). Furthermore, Israeli interest in creating a system with Maronite hegemony was contrary to Druze's historical antipathy to that group. In addition, political competition among Druze factions might have encouraged Druze of the Jumblat faction to refuse to cooperate, fearing that a possible Israeli withdrawal might lead to the Arslan faction's prominence in leading and representing the Druze in Lebanon.

This situation was very different from what took place in Israel-Palestine. When the clashes erupted between Jews and Arabs as a result of conflicts over land and resources (Falah 2000, 72), some Druze were part of the anti-Zionist Arab political camp in Palestine, and many Druze played leading roles in the national movement (ibid., 82-83). Yet when the conflict between the Zionist movement and the Arabs intensified after World War II, some Druze supported the Jews (Firro 1992, 320-21). As elsewhere in the region, colonial authorities sought to establish relationships with individuals from each community, especially minorities, in order to use them when possible to undermine the Arab national movement's quest for unity and liberation from colonialism (Betts 1988, 83; Firro 2000, 310-11). This treatment was the case with the early Zionist and later Israeli government policies that aimed at separating the Druze from the rest of the Arabs and convincing them that they were a distinct ethnic group (Betts 1988, 24-25), similar to classic colonial policies of social engineering elsewhere. This situation is what is different, for example, between Druze in Syria and Israel. The Syrian government's espousal of Arab nationalism led to the suppression of confessional and minority identities, as it attempted to integrate all groups within the Syrian Arab nation. On the other hand, Israel, as a colonial state ruling an Arab indigenous population, sought to highlight religious and other identities in order to further

divide the community under its rule and help prevent collective mobilization against Jewish rule and supremacy.

Furthermore, Druze in Galilee became much more marginal in number and economic wealth after being cut off from traditional leadership in Lebanon and Syria. Some local Druze leaders cooperated with Israel (the Zionist movement at the time) and used the violent attacks at the hands of Arab fighters that some Druze villages faced during the 1930s and 1940s to win the loyalty of the general Druze community to the Israeli side, as argued by Kais Firro. This development was also helped by economic and military considerations. According to Laila Parsons (2000, 2001), Druze mostly worked in farming and needed the permission and help of the Israelis to access and farm their lands during the military upheaval of 1947-49, as the Israeli forces controlled that area. These factors helped leaders in the Druze community, such as Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi from Yirka, to persuade the community to support Israel. Additionally, since the creation of the state of Israel, the compulsory military service imposed on the Druze as well as the separate educational system have helped create a distinct Druze identity that is less connected to the larger Arab society compared to 1948 (Firro 2001; Halabi 1989).

This historical development might explain why the Druze in Israel became more separated from other communities over time, whereas in Syria the Druze were able to associate and harmonize their Druze particularism with Arab nationalism without losing their communal identity (Firro 1992, 353). Furthermore, it was only after the creation of the state of Israel that Druze in Israel-Palestine became recognized as not only a separate religious but also a distinct ethnic community (Falah 2000, 75). The separation of the Druze from Arab Palestinian citizens was sought and encouraged by Israeli authorities and has been considerably successful. The Israeli authorities tried to promote the notion that the Druze are a distinct ethnic group different from Christian and Muslim Palestinian Arabs (Betts 1988, 13). This goal has been achieved through the enforcement of military service for the Druze, creation of a separate educational system for them, and the official designation of the Druze community as an ethnic and religious group through an inclusion on their identity cards and official census data. Before the creation of Israel, Druze were considered

Muslim Arabs, treated as such, and acted accordingly by taking part in Muslim and Arab political, religious, and national life.

Firro argues further that this desire for affiliation between the Israeli state and Druze was not one-sided. Although it is true that the Zionist movement was interested in establishing good relations with Druze to delink them from the larger Arab community, this move was coupled with the interest of some Druze leaders. These Druze leaders wanted to benefit from the shifts in power and thus established a special relationship with the state of Israel (Firro 1992, 323). This is not to understate the efforts of the Zionist movement that actively worked to divide the different Arab religious communities and to create discord between the Druze and other groups (ibid., 244-45, 324-31). Even prior to 1948, as documented by Firro, when there were some clashes between Druze and non-Druze and community leaders engaged in *sulha,* through its agents in the community the Zionist movement tried its best to sabotage these efforts at reconciliation (ibid., 347-49). Although Firro's research demonstrates this trend in the pre-1948 period, many community members comment that this policy still holds true today and argue that it recurred during the conflict between Kafr Yassif and Julis in 1981.

In Israel, the Druze were encouraged by the state of Israel to adopt a separatist identity in relation to Arab or Palestinian nationalism through several policies (Falah 2000, 55; Firro 1992, 363). With the help of some Druze individuals, Israel was able to enforce military conscription on Druze in 1957 and also used Druze leaders in its tactics to divide the different Palestinian Arab religious communities and to further depoliticize them. In 1961 the Israeli authorities recognized Druze in Israel not just as a separate religious community but also as a national group to further distance them from other Palestinian Arabs (Falah 2000, 55-56; Firro 1992, 363-64).

After being recognized as a separate religion in 1957, Druze were also allowed to establish their own religious courts in 1961 (Falah 2000, 145; Halabi 1989). In 1975, the Israeli government authorized the separation of the Druze section from the general non-Jewish minority affairs department that administered all areas of lives of Israeli non-Jews, including education (Falah 2000, 164; Firro 1992, 363-64). Since 1975, the Israeli

government, worried about Druze youth losing this distinct identity, also established a segregated educational system that enforced a separate Druze identity (Falah 2000, 164). So now Druze are no longer just a religious sect among many within the Arab society, as was the case before 1948, but rather a national religious and ethnic group that has its own educational system that instills in them an antagonism toward Arabs and a mythical "exceptional relationship with the Jewish people that goes back to millennia, where both were targets of prosecution even by the Arabs" (Firro 2001), thereby ignoring the history of tolerance the Jews enjoyed within Arab and Islamic civilizations and inventing a special and ancient relationship between Jews and Druze.

Through Israeli military service, which helped to create a bond between the conscripts, Jews and Druze, an antagonistic relation to Arabs and Palestinians is strengthened not only though the training and exercises, where a virtual enemy must be imagined, but also through real experiences of wars and daily practices of colonial violence against Arabs and Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, Syria, and Lebanon that have been taking place since 1948. It is worth mentioning here that Israeli security services (mainly composed of Druze and Jewish Israelis) treat Palestinian Arab citizens with similar violence and contempt, as was the case in the massacres in Kafr Qassim in 1956, during the Land Day Strike in 1976, and during the demonstrations of 2000, all cases where Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel were killed in cold blood for peacefully demonstrating against state policies, or as in the case of Kafr Qassim for not obeying curfews that were imposed on the village without the knowledge of its inhabitants. All these actions and policies of separation did not pass without opposition on the part of some Druze, but the Israeli state, with the help of its loyalists in the Druze community, was able to crush any new leadership from forming a strong alliance with non-Druze Palestinian Arabs (Falah 2000, 364).

The Druze organization Al-Judhour (the association for the protection and strengthening of the cultural Arab roots of Druze in Israel) issued a publication, *Al-Mithaq,* in the summer of 2005, on the state of Druze in Israel. It argued that the obstacles that prevented Israeli Druze from maintaining and strengthening their Arab identity were, first, the nature of the

state of Israel as a state for the Jewish people rather than for all its citizens, which inhibits the growth of Druze as a part of the Arab community; second, the compulsory military service that diminishes Druze's Arab identity and separates them from the rest of the Arab community; and third, the Israeli educational system that has worked to de-educate Druze about their national identity and to instill in them a separate identity as a group in the service of the state, leading to low self-esteem and low educational achievement among members of the Druze community (2-3).

According to Al-Judhour, Israeli authorities have been using Druze against the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories since the imposition of the mandatory military service in 1955, which has undermined the unity of the Palestinian Arab community (ibid., 3, 5). It further argued that since the number of Druze in Israel does not exceed 100,000 (1.5 percent of the total population in 2003), and in 1948 Druze numbered thirteen thousand out of a population of one million, the imposition of military service on them was not a military or security necessity but a need for propaganda about inclusion of Palestinian Arab citizens to bolster Israel's "democratic claims" abroad as well as to create further divisions within the community within Israel (ibid., 5). Furthermore, the state has worked against any attempt to unify the Druze community within the larger Arab community and found collaborators from within the community to help in these policies of divide and rule (ibid., 10).

The report in *Al-Mithaq* points out that the Druze educational system designed by the state has promoted a distinct image of Druze values that emphasizes peacefulness and love of and loyalty to Israel, highlighting the Druze participation in the security of the state and the special relationship between the Druze and Jews. The guide for teachers in Druze schools issued by the Israeli Ministry of Education designates separate Druze holidays, even though in the past Druze considered themselves to be part of Islam and celebrated their holidays along with the rest of the Muslim community (ibid., 16).

These different policies of creating separations have helped to deepen fissures between Druze and non-Druze Arabs in Israel and, in my view, were an important underlying factor in the violent clashes that began in the 1980s. It is true that violence had taken place before the 1980s between

the different religious communities in Israel-Palestine, but such large-scale attacks by Druze against Christians in the Arab villages in Galilee were not common previously.

These outbreaks of violence between religious communities are often followed by long and reflective discussions in the Arab community about their causes. While living in Israel I had many conversations with members of the local community about this phenomenon, and some of my respondents believed that particular individuals were responsible, namely, those persons or groups who were collaborators with the state and worked on behalf of the government to incite violence and divisions. Others accused zealots from different families or religious groups of exploiting histories of religious, economic, and political antagonism. Many have attributed the increase of violence within the Palestinian Arab community to overcrowding, poverty, and the lack of social and cultural resources in the Palestinian Arab villages and towns. Some argued that this increased violence in the Palestinian Arab community is a symptom of a besieged minority whose oppressed members turn against one other violently because they have no hope of changing their subordinate status within the Israeli political system and the state encourages this phenomenon. Yet others thought that as the state does not provide an inclusive national identity, it fosters local and religious identities to compensate as a recognizable vehicle of belonging in modern society. But according to some, the internal conflict and violence also reflect the failure of the community itself to achieve an overarching unified identity that can override local, familial, and religious identities. At the same time, internal group conflict and violence occur when states do not furnish historically divided groups with a civil, secular, and unified identity, as has happened in many other countries in the Middle East and beyond.

According to one view, incidents such as the ones in Al-Maghaar (the case discussed in chapter 2) illustrate the weak relationship between the different religious groups in the Palestinian Arab community (ibid., 19). Although it is true that a national identity was still strong until the 1970s (Bishara 2002, 176), in the 1980s and 1990s, religious identities were enforced in the Palestinian Arab community in Israel as a result of internal and external forces. These factors are regional and global in scale, as

in the 1980s a stronger religious identification was asserted by people the world over because of global economic, social, and political trends. This trend exists all over the Muslim world and in many other countries.

Although there has been a shift toward religious identity regionally and even globally, Azmi Bishara argues that the cause for this situation is that Israel failed to create a collective civil society (ibid., 162). Bishara argues further that although Israeli anthropological studies on the identity of Palestinian Arab citizens conclude that they are more attached to locality or religion, this research ignores the fact that Israel itself does not allow the development of an Arab national identity for this group. The Israeli state was not created as a national homeland for the Palestinians, and thus the feeling of alienation resulting from the nature of Israel as a Jewish state and from Israeli policies has pushed its Palestinian Arab citizens toward other identities, local or religious, as a place of safety under such conditions (ibid., 146). In addition, as argued by Adeeb Dawisha (2003), the regional resurgence of religious identity resulted because of the failure, or defeat, of Nasserism and Arab socialism, particularly with the defeat in the 1967 war, that left the entire Arab world looking for new ways out of its predicament. Yet this situation was further aggravated by what Robert Dreyfuss (2005) describes as the "devil's game," namely, how the United States, Europe, and Israel, with the help of their allies in the region, tried to promote religious and fundamentalist identities to weaken secular, socialist, and nationalist politics in the region.

To sum up, the increased religious tensions within the Palestinian Arab community in Israel are a reflection of the situation that this community has found itself in, and there are many internal and external factors that affected it. First, historical religious divisions between the different religious groups have managed to remain a powerful and sometimes primary identity for many. Second, the Palestinian Arab community has failed to create a solid unified national identity that can overcome other subidentities. Third, the ambiguous status of citizenship of the Palestinian Arab community excluded them from the state. Fourth, state policies enforce divisive communal identities that undermine a strong unifying identity for Palestinian Arabs. Among the internal factors is the political competition within the community local elections since it is the only space

that Palestinian Arabs have had to claim some power or authority, as their participation in national Israeli politics is limited and marginalized by the nature and policies of the state (Mansour 2004, 242-43). Interestingly, some of the same factors have been at work in other Arab countries, thus leading to increasing religious polarization in the region at large. Ironically, Palestinian Arabs in Israel are not only subjected to the power of the Israeli state but also moved by some of the same forces affecting the entire region.

In concluding this chapter, which examines the history of relations between the Christians and the Druze in Israel including the two villages in question, it is apparent that Israeli authorities built on colonial histories and tactics and have manipulated the relationship between the different communities. And in the case of the Druze, they have helped to create a much more divisive relationship, recognizing the Druze as a separate religious group, then as an ethnic and national group, conscripting the Druze into the army, and creating separate offices in the government for them. Also, there are several instances, some of which are discussed in this book, when Israeli authorities have allowed violence to take place between Druze and other religious Arab communities without any redress toward the Druze and have also intervened to sabotage internal attempts at indigenous conflict management. Thus, antagonism between the Druze and Christians in Israel results because of political differences that arose between Druze and non-Druze Arabs in Israel after 1948. I also argue that the shift to increased violence between Druze and non-Druze Arabs in Israel could be understood as part of the state's policy, which Ian Lustick (1980) has defined as a policy of control.[5] As a result of this policy, which was discussed in chapter 2, Israel's policies and its relationship toward its Palestinian Arab citizens will be explored in the next chapter, which will help contextualize Lustick's framework of the policy of control.

To see the effects of the state, colonial or not, in the making of such problems of violence, I turn in the next part of the book to the study of

5. A recent work by Hillel Cohen (2010) updates Ian Lustick's framework to show how Israeli policies of security are used to manipulate Arabs—Christians, Druze, and Muslims—on the microvillage level.

the state as the most important variable in the question of sectarian conflicts and violence. Put differently, the argument about ancient or historical antipathy presumes that modernity is not at work in these conflicts. It is often assumed that modernity is intertwined with conformity and homogenization, yet, as I will show in the following chapter, the nation-state, the symbol of modern political organizing, is in fact responsible for division, conflict, racism, and exclusion. The state of Israel, as a settler-colonial state, serves as an example of how states by their very nature are about everything but homogeneity and have a major and negative role in modern sectarian and ethnic conflicts and violence.

4

Anatomy of the State

Modernity and Structure

History, Nature, and Policies of the State

This chapter will discuss the history and the policies of the Israeli state toward its Arab Palestinian citizens in order to evaluate claims about the 1981 event being embedded in the larger context of state policies made by members of the Palestinian Arab community in Kafr Yassif. The people I interviewed considered the attack on Kafr Yassif as only one example of a long-standing Israeli state policy that aims at undermining the Palestinian Arab community and dividing it and impeding any indigenous attempt at unity to make it easier to control the Palestinian Arab citizens. Thus, the discussion in this chapter can help make sense of observations made by community members about the role of the state and will also help in contextualizing the state authorities' behavior in the incident.

This discussion will also help examine the central argument I make in this book: that the state is the most important factor in studying issues of racism and sectarian violence, influenced by the political thought of Ibn Khaldoun, who centuries ago argued that the analysis of any society must focus on the political structure under which it lives. In his view, the origin and nature of the state shape a state's treatment of its subjects.

The state, as an analytical unit, and especially as a causal factor, has been largely marginalized in the field of ethnic conflict and resolution. Instead, there has been much more focus on either the effects of globalization, thereby letting the state off the hook, or the communities involved, that is, their mind-set, religion, culture, and identity. In my view, such

analyses also implicitly provide the state with tools to control communities through information about potential fissures and can be placed in a longer tradition of knowledge gathering in the service of colonial interventions. In my view, some studies in this field use a problematic approach that exhibits the conscious or unconscious patronizing and parochial predispositions of some scholars. To think that it is only culture or group identity that causes conflict is to say that the absence of violence can only be where there are more tolerant and flexible cultures and identities. Against such a cultural approach, I argue that, as Mahmood Mamdani rightly suggests, within the post-9/11 debates on "Islamic terrorism" and violence, "culture talk" does not provide a deeper understanding of such events but rather obscures the historical, political, and economic causes of violence. Instead of focusing on "culture" in its common definition associated with worldview or religion, it is more productive to look at the state—its nature, origin, development, and structure, which may create and reinforce racism, intergroup conflicts, and violence. It is true that people have their own agency, but people are free to act within the limits of the structure within which they live. The nation-state as a political organizing structure has often been imposed on populations through the dynamics and development of modernity in Europe, colonial and neocolonial dictates, and anticolonial resistance, which ended up producing and developing the present-day state system prevalent around the world. Only a critical view of the nation-state, which is a product of Western theories and actions of nationalism, colonialism, and race-based theories of inclusion and exclusion or marginalization and domination, can help shed light on intergroup conflicts, violence, and racism in colonizing, colonized, and postcolonial contexts.

The theoretical framework I outline in this chapter also draws on Ian Lustick's argument about Israeli policies toward its Palestinian Arabs citizens (policies of segregation, co-optation, and control, as mentioned in chapter 1), an argument that I expand on to include other mechanisms of control, such as espousing inter- and intragroup conflict and violence among the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. Israel's policy toward its Arab Palestinian citizens is understudied and undertheorized, and thus this work aims to make a contribution to research this area. This topic is useful to develop the academic study of state and society in Israel,

and also in general beyond the Middle East in order to contribute to the larger field of state-society relations and questions of democracy in an ethnic and religious state. Israel as a self-described Jewish and democratic state (often touted as the only democracy in the Middle East) has been examined generally from the state and dominant-group perspective. Less research has been done from the perspective of critics of such a polity, including members of the Palestinian Arab community in Israel who are subjects of, and marginalized by, that system.

Engaging with theoretical debates in the field of ethnic and communal conflicts and violence, this chapter examines theories of weak and strong states, democracy, and how these issues relate to internal violence. It also frames statecraft and colonialism, in the case of Israeli settler-colonialism, as important factors in shaping internal group relations. In the section that follows, I will provide a brief overview of three main aspects of the historical development of the Israeli state: its creation and nature, its general policies toward Palestinian Arab citizens, and finally its policies related to the identity of the citizens of the state. In my view, all these issues reveal how the state views and treats its citizens—in this case, the Palestinian Arabs. In other words, this chapter will elaborate on the structural framework of the state, which examines the origin and development of the state and its ramification for internal group relations. The general theory I develop in this study does not exclude other factors that play into ethnic and communal conflict and does not exclude possibilities of particular differences between specific cases. Yet using the example of Israel to focus on core questions about the state could serve as an example for theorizing about ethnic conflict and violence in general.

State History and Background

The state of Israel was created in 1948 by the Zionist movement, a colonial movement of European Jews aided by Britain and other Western countries (Segev 2001). Thus, Palestine experienced a double colonization project, as Jeremy Salt (2008) defines it. Britain, which was the colonizing power in Palestine after World War I, helped to establish a state for the Jewish people in Palestine without consultation with or the consent of the native Palestinian inhabitants of the land. Palestinians rejected

subjugation as another form of colonialism, whether by Britain or by the Zionist movement, and insisted on the right to self-determination that had been proposed by US president Woodrow Wilson as a way to proceed in the postimperial and postcolonial world. The British Mandate in Palestine was justified at the League of Nations (the international institution preceding the United Nations) as helping the people in Palestine to build institutions to govern themselves—a familiar discourse of "benevolent colonialism." Yet while Britain promised the Arabs independence, it also made a secret agreement with the Zionist movement to create a "national home for the Jews in Palestine." The conflicting claims of both Arabs and Jews were not possible to accommodate, or, more accurately, the promises made by the British to both sides were difficult to realize in practice, at a time when British colonial policies of control seemed to be failing and Britain was struggling to maintain its empire in the post–World War II world. Britain took the case to the United Nations in order to find a more multilateral solution to its debacle in Palestine, especially given that Britain had its own interests in the region and did not want to be seen as openly supporting the Zionist movement in a region that viewed Zionism as another outpost of Western colonialism.

Although the vast majority of people in Palestine wanted a single unified state, the United Nations issued a plan in 1948 to partition Palestine into two states: one Jewish, on territory representing more than 54 percent of Mandate Palestine, and the other Arab, on the remaining territory, even though Jews actually constituted less than one-third of the population at the time and owned less than 10 percent of the land. This resolution came with the blessing of major European powers and with the explicit support of the United States, contrary to the wishes of the majority of people in Palestine and region. This point speaks volumes for the prevailing rhetoric at the time of democracy, equality of nations, and the right to self-determination, which seemed to have been conceived by Wilson and others not as universal but rather as applicable only to the peoples in the West. When the Zionist movement declared the independence of the state of Israel in Palestine and Palestinian refugees started pouring into neighboring Arab countries, popular Arab pressure forced some Arab governments to take action against the expanding Israeli military. A war erupted

between Israel and the Arab states that ended in 1949 in the Armistice Treaties, and the two sides have been engaged in conflict ever since (for more, see Rogan and Shlaim 2001; Said 1980; and Segev 2001).

The borders of the state of Israel after the war included about 78 percent of Mandate Palestine, for Israel annexed more land than the UN partition plan had officially allocated to Israel. Israel also incorporated Arab villages in Galilee, which had actually been designated as part of the Arab state in Palestine, according to the UN partition plan. Yet this additional annexed land on which Palestinian Arab people were living was not considered occupied territory, neither by the international community nor by the Arab states at the time that spoke about Palestine in general and abstract terms as a conflict over a land devoid of people. This rhetoric echoed the oft-repeated statements of the Zionist movement about the need for a land without a people (Palestine) for a people without a land (Jewish Europeans). The problem is that there were indeed people in Palestine, who were, as Ilan Pappe has argued in his recent work (2006), ethnically cleansed in 1948 from their land to make room for an exclusively Jewish nation. Yet this policy of ethnic cleansing did not succeed completely, and about 20 percent of Palestinians remained in the part of Palestine that became the state of Israel.

As a result of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 with boundaries that extended beyond the partition plan, most of the 160,000 Palestinian Arabs living within the 1948 borders, mainly concentrated in Galilee, became Israeli citizens. Approximately one-third of them were considered by the state of Israel to be internal refugees and were categorized by Israel as Present Absentees (that is, present physically but not legally). These Palestinian Arabs suddenly became a minority in their own country after having been the majority there for a long time. They found themselves subjects of a state that was created primarily for the Jewish people and came into being as a result of a war with Palestinians and Arabs, the communities to which this group belonged. The conflict further complicated the relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens, as discussed below.

Since 1948, there has been much discussion in public discourse as well as in academic scholarship about the nature of the state of Israel and the

important role it has played in shaping the relationship between the state and its non-Jewish minority. The paradigm describing Israel as the only democracy in the region that treats its citizens with equality of rights has been discounted by many scholars as being politically motivated, and thus I will not dwell on it at length here, but the following discussion will help expose this fallacy.

The main paradigms used by various scholars to describe the nature of the state of Israel in relation to its Arab minority range from describing it as an apartheid state, a colonial settler-state, a system of control, an ethnic democracy granting some rights to the Palestinian minority, or a minimal-nominal democracy (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005, 5-6). I will discuss various interpretations of the Israeli state that are debated in the literature and examine the cluster of concepts that recur in the work of several analysts. Yet as these approaches generally use similar explanations but differ on the question of categorization, rather than divide the chapter according to the categories mentioned above, discussion will weave these arguments, explanations, and categories together, as a way to understand the nature of the relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens, which is in my view more important than getting bogged down in the issue of categorization. Furthermore, as I will show, the labeling of the Israeli state, or any other state for that matter, is secondary to the deeper analytical meaning of this terminology, which can be better understood from the point of view of the application of the policies of the state and how groups under its control, who are at the receiving end of these policies, labels, and justifications, view and experience them. I am interested in the concrete outcomes of the application of these policies on Israeli citizens.

Baruch Kimmerling (1989) argues that Israel's relationship to its Arab citizens is better described as based on a system of control that enforces rule through military and police force rather than as simply a state with a "deeply divided society," as Smooha (1998) suggests.[1] Zureik

1. The notion of "divided society" is a theoretical approach to the study of multi-ethnic-religious states, which often assume the neutrality of the state to the various groups under its control, a kind of plane field of competition among them about the policy and

(1979) describes it as a system of "internal colonialism" affecting Palestinian Arab citizens who not only have difficulty in unification and mobilization but also tend to be internally divided, with each group trying to appease the Israeli authorities and often turning against one other to gain the state's favor. The state, as the carrier of carrots and sticks, uses its leverage to induce and punish individuals and groups based on their "good behavior." Haidar, on the other hand, argues that the Israeli state's historical realities have led to the building of a highly centralized political system that is concerned foremost with security, and this emphasis on security has shaped the state's relationship to the indigenous population (Haidar 1997). However, Sultany argues that it is not security concerns but the nature of Israel as a state created for the Jewish people that makes it impossible for it to reconcile the existence of non-Jews among its population. As a result, the state sees the native Palestinian Arabs as a demographic threat to its Jewish character while encouraging Jewish immigration to Israel (2003, 142).

As far as the type of political system in Israel is concerned, there is no agreement among scholars about whether the state of Israel can be considered a democracy or what form of democracy it is. Some studies on the nature of the political system in Israel define it as a theodemocracy, and others describe it as an ethnocracy. I will discuss these claims later, but what is crucial to emphasize here is that both the notions of "ethnic ethnocracy" and "religious theodemocracy" are based on the Judaization of the state and the marginalization of the Arab minority within the state's political and geographical borders as well as the legal status of Jewish organizations abroad that have property rights and legal rights within Israel. In other words, the state is fully democratic for its Jewish citizens, and most concerned with their well-being and with Jews around the world, yet it cannot be considered fully democratic for its Arab citizens, as it curtails many of their legal, political, social, and economic rights.

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direction of the state, and the state is often presented as being not hostile naturally to any specific group.

There are also those individuals who define Israel as an undemocratic state (Ghanem and Moustafa 2004, 5) and argue that since Israel is defined as a Jewish state concerned with the welfare of the Jewish people, to whom its resources are primarily devoted, it obviously cannot be considered a democracy for all its citizens. Ghanem, Rouhana, and Yiftachel (2001) agree with this definition and argue further that the state is concerned not only with the well-being but also with maintaining the dominance of the (Jewish) majority and the marginalization of the (Arab) minority. For example, the law of immigration privileges Jews, as does the law of landownership and state funding for local councils. Furthermore, there are everyday practices of cultural domination that reinforce the Jewish character of the nation and the state. Some argue that it would be better to define the system as an ethnocracy because being Jewish is treated as an ethnic matter, not just a religious one, and nonbelieving Jews are not differentiated by the state according to their religious beliefs or practices.

Nimer Sultany argues that Israel is a democracy only in form (2003, 108), an analysis that is offered even by the Israel Democracy Institute. Israel shares certain characteristics of democratic states, which makes Israel a formal democracy but because it is not inclusive and neutral toward all ethnic and religious groups living within it, it is not a full democracy in practice. Israel is by definition a Jewish ethno-religious state in Haidar's view, and there is a clear policy of exclusion of those citizens who are not Jews (1997, 11). Sultany further observes that fundamental democratic principles, such as the principle of complete equality, are not yet accepted in Israel (2003, 16). Israel's exclusive character as a Jewish state does not allow non-Jews to be equal citizens, neither as individuals nor as a group, according to Findley (1995, 93), as evidenced in the marginalization, discrimination, and practices of inclusion and exclusion against non-Jewish Arab citizens that negatively affect the economic, social, cultural, national, and political aspects of their lives (Ghanem 2003, 20).

Whereas democracy is based on two major principles, the equality and well-being of all citizens, including minorities, Mansour argues that if these two principles are not upheld, the state can be described as an apartheid state (2004, 75). This notion is supported by the work of Uri Davis (1987) and others on the dual, separate, and unequal system of rights and

privileges for Jews and Arabs in Israel. It is further argued that Israel cannot be defined as a democratic state, because it does not separate religion, nation, and state, and because undemocratic principles are evident in legal and constitutional realms that are central to the definition of democracy, such as the principle of citizenship, as observed by Azmi Bishara (2005, 16). The Zionist leadership has mixed Jewish religion and political ideology, according to Kook, thus creating a hybrid religious-national state that is culturally and politically exclusive to Jews (2002, 8). Kook warns against confusing the appearance of democracy with other forms of government and argues that even if the state uses democratic mechanisms of exclusion, the state cannot be considered fully democratic (ibid., 4).

Davis (1987) is one of many scholars who view the Israeli state as a Jewish settler state that was created after the 1948 conquest and whose settler character has been enforced by subsequent waves of Jewish immigration and appropriation of native lands (Mansour 2004, 3).[2] Davis argues further that Israel is a colonial settler project based on the displacement of non-Jews (Palestinian Arabs) and on the segregation of Jews and non-Jews. In other words, since Jews mostly came from outside the country as settlers and aimed at creating a state in Palestine, where Palestinian Arabs had been living for centuries, domination and displacement became a central project in the creation and development of the state. According to Davis, Israel ought to be defined as a Jewish settler-colonial state that is in practice an apartheid system discriminating between Jews and non-Jews through laws and parliamentary legislation (ibid., 9, 15). The exclusion of non-Jewish citizens from many benefits and rights such as land purchase, among other things, has been masked by legal structures in order to avoid being branded as an overtly apartheid state (ibid., 53). Davis argues that apartheid regulations in Israel are different from the experience of apartheid South Africa, yet the overarching legal reality that determines the quality of everyday life and circumstances of inhabitants is similar (ibid., 55). Whereas in South Africa apartheid was imposed by whites on blacks,

2. Shafir 1989 uses the same definition as well. See for example his chapter "Settler Citizenship in the Jewish Colonization of Palestine," in Elkins and Pedersen 2005, cited in chapter 1.

in Israel it is practiced by Jews against non-Jews (ibid., 26). However, the apartheid system in Israel was veiled by ceding the critical areas of immigration, settlement, and land administration to international Zionist organizations that are constitutionally committed to promoting the interests of Jews only, so the state was not directly involved in the exclusionary practices of management of population and property (ibid., 60). Yet Israel's need for, and reliance on, international public support and external financial and military aid has made it difficult to openly declare it an apartheid system (ibid., 25).

These internal and external factors that defined the course of Israeli policy toward its Arab citizens is explained by Haidar (1997), who points out that Israel's sensitivity to international public opinion has in some ways contained Israeli policy toward its non-Jewish citizens, motivating Israel to grant official citizenship to the non-Jewish population and limiting Israeli plans for the expulsion of the Palestinian Arab minority. These external constraints have also prevented Israel from using openly racist laws to discriminate against the Palestinian minority. As a result, Israel has created laws that are ambiguous and flexible, allowing the government to discriminate against the Palestinians without appearing to be overtly racist (ibid., 11). Furthermore, the size of the remaining Palestinian community in Israel (11 percent at the time of the creation of the state) was also a factor encouraging the Israeli government to grant citizenship to the Palestinians within its 1948 borders. Since the population was viewed as too small to constitute a real threat to the state, there was a perception by various Israeli officials that it could be easily dominated and controlled (ibid., 12). A second internal factor that explains the granting of Israeli citizenship to the Palestinian minority was the existence of liberal Jewish groups that were interested in giving the Palestinians political and civil rights, though with some limitations.

On the other hand, the official recognition given to the state of Israel by the international community since 1948 has led to the suppression of the issue of the minority within its borders, even though Israel had exceeded its mandated geographic borders as stipulated by the United Nations' 1947 partition plan. The implications of these historical annexations and erasures are that the situation of the Palestinian community in

Israel has been constructed as a local issue to be addressed only within the framework of minority rights, rather than as also a significant international issue of national self-determination (ibid., 12), which would challenge the image Israel has created for itself as the "only democracy in the Middle East."

Yet, according to Bishara, all attempts to define the nature of democracy in Israel, by using terms such as *ethnic democracy* and *theodemocracy,* disguise the true nature of the state. In his view, attempts are still made to create a particular theory to describe the specificity of Israeli democracy, rather than applying the theory of democracy and testing it in the case of Israel (2002, 57). Bishara thus argues that instead of attempting to examine whether democracy actually exists by testing its various elements and conditions in the case of Israel, scholars have been doing the opposite, that is, defining the Israeli state sometimes as a democracy, ethnic democracy, or theodemocracy, and thus normalizing it as an abnormal case. This exercise is a common practice when it comes to any state that has the power to dominate international public opinion or is protected by other powerful states that help shield it from external pressure. The politics of theorizing includes also all kinds of justifications for states' failures, mistakes, and sometimes atrocities. For example, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) has discussed the politics of naming in the use of terminology such as *war crimes, genocide,* or *ethnic cleansing* that has been a feature of discussions in the United States regarding the violence in Darfur, Sudan. Mamdani questions why these same categories are not applied to the actions of the United States in Iraq, where the violence fits within the definitions of these terms and could even be seen as worse than what is taking place in Sudan. Yet in the United States the work of "court scholars," as Ibn Khaldoun would have described them, has since the era of the cold war provided theoretical explanations for atrocities around the world in order to provide a "context" for US actions, rather than offering honest scholarship with consistent definitions, devoid of tweaking by "context," against which violence and terror by states are to be judged. There are numerous apologists in academic and public domains for Israel and other powerful states, and the politics of "theorizing" and "contextualizing" often serves as a cover for state violence rather than scholarly critique.

In summarizing the different analyses of the nature of the state of Israel and its political system, it is important to point out that despite disagreement on the definition of the state, most scholars agree that Israel can be considered fully democratic for only some of its citizens (Jews), not all, and although it is not fully democratic for Palestinian Arabs. Further, the nature of the state and its historical development, on the one hand, and its reliance on international support, on the other, are two issues that influence the decision making, policies, and practices of the state regarding its Palestinian Arab minority. The historical development of the state of Israel, as a Jewish state, and the political system it produced, has led, whether by default or by design, to a disadvantage for those individuals (Palestinian Arabs, who are at odds with the essence of the state. It also produced a state that by its very nature is concerned exclusively with the Jewish people and hostile to anything Arab or Palestinian. This conclusion can be seen from the discussion of different policies that the state has initiated toward its Palestinian Arab citizens since 1948.

General Policies of the State

There is a broad agreement among scholars that the major problem facing many states is the issue of minorities, which is often considered more serious than any danger from external sources, and that the issue of minority-majority relations is not particular to Israel, as observed by Kimmerling (1989). Yet this issue is generally more acute when these minorities are not only discriminated against, but also seen as illegitimate elements, within presumably democratic societies (Kimmerling 1989, 134). An added layer to this issue in Israel is that the Palestinian Arab minority in Israel became a minority through the creation of the state in 1948, a state that has been at war since then with its fellow Palestinian and Arab peoples from whom they have been cut off.

This situation is the context in which the Palestinian Arab community lives and struggles in seeking legitimacy in Israel for its political, cultural, and economic demands. These demands are both internally and externally focused. Internal demands ask for economic, political, and cultural equality with the Jewish citizens, and external demands are focused on demands for justice for the Palestinian people living as

refugees in the Occupied Territories and elsewhere and for a change in the political culture of the state so that it coexists in peace with its Arab and Muslim neighbors.

According to Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker, the economic stagnation, underdevelopment, unemployment, and poverty in the Palestinian Arab community in Israel are inextricably linked to long-standing government policies of neglect and discrimination (2005, 7). One could add here that *neglect* is not fully an accurate term to describe Israeli policies, since these policies are quite intentional rather than as a result of lack of state interest in the Palestinian Arab community. As Said and Hitchens argue (2001), Israeli policies toward Palestinian Arab citizens are better understood as part of a larger pattern of domination within a colonial-settler system, where Palestinian Arab citizens of the state live under economic and racial domination by Jews. Israel has a centralized political and economic system, in which most political and economic resources are distributed through the central government (in cooperation with the world Zionist organizations that own land and resources in the state); the state was the largest employer in the country at least until the 1980s, as well as the body that distributes economic resources to regions and municipalities in the country. The Arab regions and municipalities have been underdeveloped and underfunded,[3] and the state's control of labor exchanges and economic development policies has ensured that Palestinian Arabs remain outside the developing sector of the economy and within an institutionalized secondary labor market. Economic discrimination is a major aspect of the lives and struggles of Palestinian Arab citizens that shapes their overall experience of marginalization and exclusion (Said and Hitchens 2001, 275-77; Shafir 1989; Shalev 1992).

These processes of institutionalized exclusion have been discussed in the work of Sabri Jiryis (1976), who has provided one of the earliest detailed accounts of legal and other forms of discrimination practiced by the state against the Palestinian community in Israel, ranging from land

3. More data will come later in the chapter. But a good source that is updated regularly can be found at http://www.adalah.org.

confiscation to legal exclusions from benefits. In a similar vein, Kretzmer (1990) argues that discrimination against Palestinian citizens in Israel is enacted by legally favoring Jewish over non-Jewish citizens. Thus, rather than promulgating laws that are openly anti-Arab, discrimination is often executed through legislation that favors and empowers Jews and their domination in the state structure while at the same time disfavoring non-Jews (Palestinian Arabs) and keeping them marginal in the system. Israeli "policies of segmentation, cooptation and control of the Arab citizens," as Lustick describes them, have been used by the state since its inception to undermine Palestinian Arab attempts at mobilization in order to achieve national, economic, political, and social equality with Jewish citizens (1980, 77). The method of control exercised by Israel over the Palestinians generally falls into two main categories according to Lustick: segmentation and co-optation. Segmentation between Jews and non-Jews has been in the areas of residential segregation, educational funding, and economic discrimination, supporting Jewish economic and land development while simultaneously confiscating land from the Palestinian Arabs. Co-optation has been practiced through some "willing" Palestinian Arab leaders through the state's patronage system of favors and punishments embedded in dependence on the state and the Jewish sector, in which the Arabs are the main labor providers (Said and Hitchens 2001, 277). Here I would add that this policy of co-optation, segmentation, and control can be further qualified, shedding light on the event in Kafr Yassif, for the policy of segmentation was also practiced within Palestinian Arab society, not only between Jews and Arabs. For example, laws and regulations that the Israeli government enacted during the military regime against its Palestinian Arab subjects from 1948 to 1966 made it more difficult for people from different villages to meet and cooperate because they were subject to a permit system that undermined their spatial mobility. Furthermore, the policy of punishing those Arab individuals and villages that opposed state policies, while rewarding the ones who fell in line, has helped the Israeli state control unification within the Palestinian Arabs. In this context, Druze villages received higher funding than non-Druze Arab villages. And leaders who were co-opted by the state were given status and privileges that played a major role not only in making sure that

the Palestinian Arab community did not mobilize against the state but also in creating further frictions within the community, as illustrated by the role played by Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi in the Kafr Yassif events, according to Nimer Morcos. Morcos further argued that Kafr Yassif had indeed been punished by the state through underfunding, and the 1981 incident was part of a longer history of political punishment of the village and local council that continued to pioneer protest policies among the Palestinian Arab community in Israel.

Given these policies, the question is whether the state of Israel can be described as a police state in regard to its policies and treatment of its Palestinian Arab citizens. Abu-Nimer argues that the strong state-sponsored security inspection network exists among Palestinian Arabs in Israel that prevents them from expressing their political views freely, for fear of losing employment opportunities (1999). In contrast, despite his discussion of discriminatory state policies of discipline and punishment, Lustick argues that Israel cannot be called a repressive police state. I would argue that the placing of Palestinian Arab citizens under military rule (officially from 1948 until 1966 and unofficially since then), the banning of political organizing deemed a "security threat" to the state, the repression of political leaders (as in the recent case of Azmi Bishara), the killing of demonstrators on various occasions, and the imprisonment of students and community leaders are all practices of a police state. Many scholars have documented the repressive policies that the Israeli state inflicts on its Palestinian Arab population, concluding that there is a pattern of political repression and violence against Palestinian Arab citizens that cannot be considered random. These actions are part of a consistent strategy of instilling fear among the Palestinians in Israel, such as massacres by police of Palestinian Arab citizens committed in Kafr Qassim in 1956, on Land Day in 1973, and during the demonstrations in October 2000. All these events involved cracking down on, shooting, and killing Palestinian Israeli citizens for peacefully protesting against state policies (Davis 1987, 7).

Sultany (2003) argues that the policies of the state are often manifested in the treatment of Palestinian Arab citizens at the hands of Israeli security, which is sometimes more brutal than others. For example, during the

mass protests that took place within the Palestinian Arab community in Israel in October 2000, the Israeli authorities killed thirteen Palestinian Arab citizens in response to the demonstrations, an act of brutal repression that is similar to its practices in the Occupied Territories. In this context, one can understand how the residents in Kafr Yassif view the police.

Sultany observes that the behavior of police and Israeli authorities during the 2000 events serves as another reminder that Palestinian Arab citizens lack meaningful citizenship in the state of Israel and has brought to the fore processes of exclusion, alienation, and delegitimization of Palestinian citizens that impact not just political expression but all areas of life in Israel. Furthermore, Sultany argues, since 2000 laws have been enacted that restrict the political rights of the Palestinian minority and its ability to exercise already limited political power by virtue of the definition of Israel as a Jewish state. This military-like system of control is not an exception to the history of the relationship between the state of Israel and its Arab citizens but rather the rule. In fact, following the establishment of the state of Israel, the so-called Israeli Arabs were placed under a military regime that regulated every aspect of their political, economic, social, and personal lives from 1948 to 1966 (ibid., 36). The military regime had authority over all Palestinian Arab inhabitants under the governance of the state and practiced arbitrary detentions, deportations, house arrests, closure of areas, restrictions on movement, seizures of land from non-Jews, forfeitures and demolitions of property, and land confiscations (ibid., 66-67). Many of these military rules and policies are still enforced against Palestinian Arabs in Israel, even though the military rule officially ended in 1966.

When the military administration ended in 1966, the mechanism for controlling and overseeing the Palestinian Arab minority changed from an openly declared military regime to a covert one, and the General Security Service (GSS) (also known as the Shabak or the Shin Bet) became the primary body involved in these tasks (ibid., 87-88). Government advisers on Arab affairs, who frequently come from the security agencies, often view the Palestinian Arab citizens as a fifth column, providing a pretext for the exclusion and marginalization of Palestinian Arab citizens and making them a target of hatred and racism. As Sultany points out, the

government's decision-making process on policies toward the Arab Palestinian citizens often involves individuals from Israeli security agencies, reflecting the powerful role of the GSS, which is under the administrative control of the Prime Minister's Office. The GSS appears to dictate fundamental policies on many matters related to Palestinian citizens of Israel, policies that frame Palestinian Arabs as a security problem (ibid., 116). Davis argues that, ultimately, this militarization of governance is linked to the fact that the state of Israel is committed to the Judaization of the state and internal suppression of non-Jews. It is a state that openly speaks of policies and goals of Judaization of the land, which is a term used for the ethnic cleansing, dispossession, or dislocation of Palestinians in favor of Jewish settlements and resettlements (1987, 7). It is thus a settler-colonial military regime that has the appearance, as well as elements of, democratic governance that allows Palestinian Arabs to vote and be voted into the parliament yet still remain outside the dominant political structure that governs their lives.

Furthermore, Kook observes that the military regime has continued informally, since the basic principle of military rule and emergency laws is still in place for the Palestinian Arab community in Israel. This principle can be invoked by the state at any time and results in the destruction of homes, confiscation of land, and other forms of discrimination (2002, 68-71), and the politics of exclusion of Palestinian Arab citizens persists through the privileging of Jews. One of these mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination is not drafting the Palestinians into the Israeli army as a way to exclude Palestinian Arab citizens from the benefits and rights that are awarded to those citizens who serve in the army (Findley 1995, 90). It is also worth noting here that religious Jews who do not serve in the army still enjoy these privileges because they are exempt from military service on religious and not national grounds.

According to Kook, if there have been changes in policies toward the Palestinian Arab minority over time, such as the formal ending of the military regime in 1966, these apparent shifts toward democratic policies of inclusion are best understood as part of an effort to stabilize the regime, or as a tactic of developing better international public relations, and not as a radical shift in Israeli state ideology or thought (2002, 182). Kook suggests

that changes in practices of inclusion and exclusion of democratic states anywhere in the world should be viewed not just through society-centered explanations but as attempts of states to ensure political and economic stability in response to external and internal conditions (ibid., 183).

In addition to the complex question of citizenship and exclusion discussed in the previous section, there is also debate among scholars about the role of the law in relation to repression and regulation of the minority population. Covert and overt legal mechanisms of discrimination against non-Jews (Palestinians) in Israel have been acknowledged and documented by both Israeli and non-Israeli analysts (ibid., 82). In contrast to the view that Israel has had ambiguous and covert discriminatory laws and policies, Davis argues that there have outright violations of religious and minority rights in Israel (1987, 24). Similarly, Kook argues that the national and political exclusion of Palestinian citizens has been a fundamental part of Israeli democracy (2002, 6). According to Kook, this exclusion is evident in the Israeli legal code; for example, in Israel and according to the supreme court ruling, the principle of equality is a relative and not an absolute one (ibid., 81). Furthermore, immigration law is also important to consider, as it favors Jews over non-Jews. Kook points out that Palestinian citizens are considered a demographic burden and a problem for the Jewish Israeli state, so a central pillar of Israeli policy is bringing in more Jews to Israel and making it harder for Arabs to expand. The immigration of Jews to Israel/Palestine has the greatest impact on the Palestinian community, since these Jewish immigrants replace Palestinian Arabs in the labor market and also provide a pretext for the state to expropriate more Palestinian Arab land (ibid., 171). Expropriation of land owned by Palestinian citizens has been practiced by Israel since 1948, even though the right to property ownership is considered a fundamental right and is one of the main pillars of a democratic system (Findley 1995, 92).

According to Sultany, racism and discrimination against Palestinian Arab citizens are processes that are deeply entrenched in Israel ideologically as well as in practice (2003, 12). This prejudice is apparent when one considers several instances when laws were actually reversed by the state so that Palestinian Arab citizens would not benefit. For example, the Israeli legislature passed new laws responding to the demands of the relatively

disadvantaged Oriental Jews, but when some of these laws were found to benefit Palestinian Arab citizens, they were quickly revoked. Similarly, the Encouragement of Large Families Law was speedily rescinded when the state realized that Palestinian Arabs would be the primary beneficiaries of the law. In another instance, university admission policies were adopted to accommodate underprivileged populations in the state and bring them into the higher education system. However, when it was discovered that Palestinian Arabs, rather than the targeted residents of Jewish development towns, were the primary beneficiaries of these changes, the universities reverted to their original admission policies (ibid., 16).

Another tangible policy of discrimination is the refusal of housing and property ownership to Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel because they are not Jewish, mandated as necessary by the charter of the Jewish National Fund, which was adopted by the Israel Land Agency (Kook 2002, 3). Kook points out that strategies of exclusion were implemented through the curtailment of central civic, political, and property rights in Israel (ibid., 6), and that this tactic is enforced legally and politically by the state (ibid., 8). Also, Palestinians have been excluded from membership in the Israeli cabinet and from every single ruling coalition in the Israeli government (ibid., 59).

In sum, according to Findley, discrimination against the Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel is endemic to the state and is embodied in Israel's laws and government regulations (1995, 91). This discriminatory approach is evident not only at the formal level of the political system. A number of public opinion surveys, conducted by leading Israeli research institutes and the press, indicate a pervasive attitude of hostility, prejudice, and hatred toward Palestinian Arabs among Jewish Israelis and a discourse of hate that is readily apparent and dominates public debate, public consciousness, and reality itself (Sultany 2003, 9-10). At the core of the state's relationship to its Palestinian Arab citizens is what some scholars describe as a politics of transfer, exclusion, and domination (for more, see Masalha 1992). In fact, though it may seem startling, the notion of the "transfer" of Palestinian Arab citizens is viewed as an appropriate solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by the majority of Jews in Israel (Ghanem and Moustafa 2004, 4). Another important dimension of the relationship

between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens is the question of identity, a central question of the nation-state and its relationship to communities within its borders. In my view, this issue is the litmus test of the state's treatment of these groups and also indicates the final intent of the state toward them, as will be clearer in the next section.

Policy on Identity

In this section I will discuss the policies of the state toward the Palestinian Arab community in regard to their identity, as they affect experiences of inclusion and exclusion, and the ways that identities are constructed for Palestinian Arabs by the state.

Kook argues that the Israeli legal code clearly reveals the boundaries of Israeli national identity and formally distinguishes between Jews and Palestinians, as in the case of the Law of Return/Law of Nationality and Citizenship that governs public and property ownership and political association and assembly (2002, 82). The nationality of the state of Israel is officially declared as Jewish, and the nationality of Palestinian Israelis is stated as "Arab," not Israeli, as printed on identity cards issued by the state (ibid., 60, 67). Thus, the exclusion of Palestinian Arabs from the state's main privileges and national identity is related to the core principle of the state's self-definition, that is, a state of and for the Jewish people, which includes even those Jews who do not reside within the state itself. Thus, a Jew, wherever he or she resides, has citizenship rights and is included in the national identity, belonging to a category privileged over the non-Jew (Arab Palestinian).

This state policy of exclusion has worked on many levels. First, the state has segregated two groups, Jews and Palestinians, from each other. It has also worked to solidify a unified national identity for its Jewish citizens, while excluding non-Jews. The identity of Palestinian citizens in Israel lies outside of the homogenized core identity of the nation that defines itself as Jewish and Zionist, according to Kook (2002), and the state has attempted to construct a fractured identity for the Palestinian Arabs because their unity is seen as a potential threat to the state. The Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel are classified according to religious identification categories such as Arab, Muslim, Christian, or Druze, and

these classifications appear on their government-issued identification cards (Haidar 1997, 16), so, as Abu-Nimer (1999, 31) observes, the boundaries dividing Arabs as Muslims, Christians, or Druze are legally emphasized by the state. On the other hand, there is no similar differentiation among the different religious affiliations of Jews (Conservative, Orthodox, and so on).

Religious affiliation is, in fact, the prime marker of national membership in Israel (Kook 2002, 8). The fact that Palestinian Arabs are not Jewish, or Zionist, means that they do not and cannot belong to the nation. Instead, the Israeli authority has constructed for them the category of "Israeli Arabs," trying to accommodate them somehow into the identity of the state yet simultaneously excluding them (ibid., 67). Underlying this policy is an attempt to erase identification with anything Palestinian by creating a hybrid identity that is neither Arab Palestinian nor simply Israeli. Finally, the use of labels such as *Israeli Arab, Druze, Muslim,* and *Christian* helps to undermine the existence of any political or national identification; the use of the term *minority* also denies the Palestinian Arab citizens a distinct cultural and national identity (ibid., 67-68). This point is especially poignant since this "minority" was a native majority of Israel/Palestine before the Israeli state was created. Since its inception, the state and its institutions have worked to weaken the national identity of the Palestinian Arab community (Sharqawi 2004, 7). For example, Israel has banned many political associations that Palestinian Arab citizens tried to form since the 1950s (Kook 2002, 97). Although the right to political association of citizens is fundamental to a democracy, it cannot be practiced freely in Israel by its Palestinian Arab citizens (ibid., 98). Thus, this Israeli system of control does not allow the Palestinian Arab citizens to develop an alternative center for mobilization around Palestinian or Arab identity (Kimmerling 1989, 266).

Another tool that the state has used to further fragment the identity of Palestinian Arabs is policies of birth registration. In the process of registering the births of Jews, it is not required to declare what is called the confession of the religious affiliation of the newborn child (such as Orthodox or Reform Jewish), but Palestinian Arab citizens are registered according to their religious affiliations (Muslim, Druze, or Christian).

Furthermore, the citizenship of a Jewish child is registered at birth as Israeli, whereas the citizenship of the Palestinian Arab is left blank (Davis 1987, 26). Religion and nationality are included in the same box on the birth certificate for Palestinian Arabs (for example, Christian Arab), whereas they are listed as two separate categories for Jewish citizens (Jewish, Israeli) (ibid., 29).

The state has also controlled and manipulated the relationship among different groups within the Palestinian community and often exaggerated differences and conflicts (ibid., 19), as in the case of Kafr Yassif. Sami Mir'i observes that Israeli authorities have always aimed to transform the collectivity of Palestinian Arabs in Israel into a fractured set of religious communities and to diminish national Palestinian Arab identity (Sharqawi 2004, 47). The state has tried to divide Palestinian Arabs in Israel through many practices, from the treatment of Palestinian Arabs as religious minorities in the tradition of the Ottoman *millet* system (which was not an Israeli invention) to the drafting of the Druze into the military and denial of their identity as Palestinian Arabs. As discussed previously, Druze identity is constructed by the state not only as a separate religious category but as a national identity distinguishing Druze from the rest of the Arab community (Bishara 2002, 108), which never occurred before 1948.

Furthermore, Israel imposed military rule on Palestinian Arab citizens until 1966, dividing Palestinian Arab villages in Israel into distinct, closed areas and prohibiting their inhabitants from moving between areas without the permission of the military governor. Military rule thus increased the distance among members of the community and undermined connections and cohesiveness. In general, the state imposed on Palestinian citizens the old colonial policy of divide and rule and encouraged internal differences, based on familial, geographic, or religious backgrounds (ibid., 157-58). Bishara points out that although it is true that Palestinians Arabs always had religious and other identities, the state as a presumably modernizing agency has not helped to create a unified identity for them since 1948 through the vehicle of citizenship. There arose a need among Arabs to counter their exclusion from national identity by emphasizing forms of identification that were (made) available, such as religious, local, or familial identities (ibid., 70-71), especially because the state did not recognize

them as a national minority. Bishara makes an interesting observation that an additional factor was the destruction of urban cultural centers of Palestinian Arabs by Israel, as it is urban culture that generally helps to diminish, or even replace, local and religious identities with broader and more inclusive, or cosmopolitan, affiliations (ibid., 157-58). To some extent, one could argue that Israel thus succeeded in creating new identities to replace a single unifying identity for Palestinian Arabs.

Bishara also points out that although many Palestinian Arabs believe that religious and family conflicts were aggravated by the designs of the state and the colonialist regime, it must also be acknowledged that it was not colonialism that created these sectarian divisions and that the pre-colonial period cannot be idealized as being completely free of internal antagonisms or conflicts (ibid., 153). However, it is also true that colonialist policies highlighted religious identities and politicized them (ibid., 154) and at times invented new identities, as was the case with Druze in Israel. What is important to note is that in the context of the nation-state, these identities became endowed with political and economic rights, creating further seeds of conflict rather than unity and equality, as proposed by theories of democracy. Furthermore, the state of Israel constructs its Arab citizens not as a national group but as a collection of minority groups, in line with the colonial policy of "divide and rule," as history has shown (ibid., 158). The Israeli government denied Palestinian Arab citizens their full and equal civil rights as individuals, so they were encouraged to address their grievances at the level of the group, whether familial or religious. It is also true that when Palestinian Arab leadership in Israel attempted to build a unifying national Arab identity, the state was quick to crush and sabotage these efforts (ibid., 163).

In general, Israel perpetuated the system that was present under the British Mandate regarding non-Jewish communities, a system modeled on the Ottoman *millet* system that considered its subjects as individuals belonging to distinct religious communities. However, British Mandate rule in Palestine established after World War I released the Jewish community from that system, and its legal status changed after 1948 when it got a monopoly over state authority. Thus, the state of Israel abolished the *millet* system for the Jewish community and enforced it on the other

religious groups (Mansour 2004, 10), extending it by creating a new religious and ethnic identity for Druze that had not existed in the past. It is an interesting policy for a state embedded in the rhetoric of modernity that came to liberate people from archaic social and political organizing.

Israel has used many tools to undermine the national identity of Palestinian Arabs, one of which is the educational system (Haidar 1997, 79). The state established a centralized educational system with a separate branch for the (Palestinian) Arab sector, and later also a separate section for Druze, as discussed earlier. The educational system and school curriculum in Israel are structured to instill nationalist pride among Jewish students, whereas for Arab students, who generally study in separate Arabic medium schools, they are used for pacification of dissent and cultivation of loyalty to the state of Israel. The curriculum neglects Palestinian Arab history, culture, and identity (Abu-Nimer 1999, 33), and even after fifty years, the Israeli educational objectives, programs, and curricula designed for Palestinian Arab schools still fail to reflect the community's identity as a Palestinian Arab national minority (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005, 8). Through this centralized Israeli educational system, identities such as "Israeli Arabs," Druze, and Bedouins were reinforced, and subidentities, especially religious identities, were promoted as the dominant category (ibid., 13). Thus, the Israeli education system was used to uproot the Palestinian Arabs' national, cultural, and historical identity (ibid., 15).

Policy Conclusions and Implications

The overview of state policies presented here makes it clear that the relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens is problematic and has been deeply entangled with the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The policies discussed in this chapter provide a background to the history of the state's relationship to Arab communities in order to better understand the behavior of state authorities during the event in Kafr Yassif and situate it in the context of the historical, structural framework suggested in the introduction. The scholarly research has helped shed light on the behavior of the police during the soccer-game conflict, underscoring that the police in Israel represent a state institution, within a very centralized and strong state, and thus its relationship

to Palestinian Arab citizens needs to be understood in that context. As mentioned in the previous chapter, it is important to keep in mind that the police in Israel fall under the authority of the Ministry of Interior and thus obviously represent the government. Also, it must be noted that Israel has a small territory with a large number of security forces relative to the size of the country and the population. Security forces have historically allowed violence to take place among Palestinian Arabs and, as stated earlier, also do not hesitate to use violence against them, in contrast to their behavior when it comes to violence within or against the Jewish community (http://www.arab48.com, May 17, 2005). Drawing on the research literature, it has been demonstrated that discrimination and racism by state police, state prosecution, and court actions have been evident since Israel's establishment (Rabinowitz and Abu-Baker 2005, 8).

Although it is difficult to find concrete proof of government policies and actions that are not publicly declared (Burton 1984, 72), there is enough evidence, offered by many scholars cited in this chapter, of state policy that clearly discriminates against Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel. Even if the government does not admit its role or the role of its security forces in incidents involving Palestinian Arabs, it is possible to deduce the aims of the state by examining the pattern of ongoing behavior of the state and its security apparatus toward this minority group. Although it is possible that the police may fail at some moments to bring order and enforce the law, if the negligence of police recurs in the case of the same community, this laxness must be contextualized as part of the policy of the state. As Lustick (1980) has argued, these policies of repression and control were also carried out by low-level government officials without the need for permission of superiors and were automatically accepted as part of state policy. Based on the discussion of the nature of the state of Israel and its relationship to the Palestinian Arab community, it is fair to argue that the incident in Kafr Yassif is part of a policy of the Israeli state that serves as a means of control and demobilization of the Palestinian Arab community against the state, by allowing various forms of violence within the Palestinian Arab community, such as violence between and among religious groups, fighting among *hamula* (extended families), and postelection conflicts. This history cannot be understood

as anything other than a policy by default, if not a policy by intent.[4] It is true that Israeli policies toward its Palestinian Arabs are not uniform and fluctuate in their negative intensity depending on internal Israeli political calculations as well as on regional and global factors, yet such fluctuation does not change the larger picture of racism and discrimination against Palestinian Arab citizens of the state.

The most important change in Israeli policy toward its Arab citizens after 1966 is that the policy of national discrimination was officially acknowledged, putting an end to the debate about whether such a policy even existed (Bishara 2002, 38). There were modifications and changes in the conditions of the Palestinian Arabs in Israel over time after 1966, yet these changes left three major aspects of state policies intact. The first is the continued discrimination in allocation of resources and funding of the Palestinian Arab vis-à-vis the Jewish sector. Second, the state of Israel remains the state of the Jewish people in its nature, essence, and practice. Third, Palestinian Arabs in Israel are still not recognized by the state as a national group but continue to be viewed as a collection of different religious communities (ibid., 53). This exclusion is a product of an Israeli identity built on Zionist principles that is similar to European ethnic-national identities and based on concepts of territory, militarism, "secularism," and animosity to everything "Eastern," especially Arab (Ghanem 2003, 44). Israeli identity is a Jewish, Western, Zionist identity based on the exclusion of the native Palestinian, as Stasliulis and Yuval-Davis (1995) observed (ibid., 50). This hostility toward Palestinian Arab citizens is on the level of not only the state but also civil society, as a clear majority of Israeli Jews support the status quo in Israel and there is no change in sight, as the formal and practical exclusion of Palestinian Arab citizens in Israel has not changed much since the inception of the state in 1948 and has been practiced by all Israeli governments, whether Labor or Likud (ibid., 184-85).

The incident that took place between citizens of Kafr Yassif and Julis in 1981, and group violence occurring among Palestinian Arabs in Israel more generally, needs to be placed in this context, that is, within the history

4. Records and data on these issues can be found at http://www.adalah.org.

and nature of the state as a settler-colonial state in conflict with the natives that aims to include and empower Jews, even noncitizens, and excludes and marginalizes Palestinian Arabs because of the rationale behind the creation of the state. Such an analysis offers a better understanding of inter- and intragroup violence in the Arab community in Israel.

Finally, critical research on Israeli state policies often provokes complaints that such critiques are not sufficiently "objective," which is part of a larger effort to maintain the status quo. Yet, as Israeli scholar Baruch Kimmerling argues, it is true objectivity that will help us to see more clearly the picture of the state of Israel, its society and its policies regarding the Palestinian Arab community, since 1948 an objectivity that is unfortunately missing in much academic and media discussion in the United States. This point is crucial given that research in this area is considered controversial and often attacked as being biased if it is at all critical of the Israeli state. Kimmerling advises us to free ourselves from Israel-centric and Zionist-centric approaches, arguments, and explanation when discussing Israeli state and society (1989, 239). I find Kimmerling's argument to be true even beyond the Israeli case, for it also applies to research that explores minority-majority issues and critiques nationalist narratives of foundational mythologies in contexts where dominant groups do not accept criticism easily and try to discredit alternative narratives. I argue that it is only by inclusion of these suppressed narratives that one can better arrive at a fuller understanding of the issues in question. If the aim is to achieve a more peaceful and just world, critical research is sorely needed, so that suffering, racism, and discrimination do not continue and conditions do not explode to the detriment of all parties, even those groups who are dominant and powerful at the moment.

5

Conclusion

Violence, Modernity, and Culture Revisited

In concluding this book, it is important to emphasize again that violence is not specific to any region, and that no society, religion, or political system is immune from violence, despite the pervasiveness of cultural explanations linking violence to specific groups and communities. In the political reality of modernity, it is the state that is the sole body that is endowed with the legitimate use of violence and responsible for the safety and security of its subjects. Thus, it is crucial to explain violence through historical and political contexts by focusing on state policies and actions rather than looking for the answers only in the type of political system or to seek explanations by looking at groups' cultures. The effect of state policies and actions on different religious or ethnic communities under its authorities is often a critical variable. The focus of inquiry thus ought to be on state perception of its citizens and the various religious and ethnic communities under its authority, the levels of accommodation that state systems have for distinct groups (that is, whether these systems are inclusive or exclusive), and what policies states initiate toward minority and majority groups.

The argument made by some is that although antagonisms among different groups exist in many places in the world, that violence is not present in every case, or even in most of them (Fearon and Laitin 2003). This argument is interesting, but it is not sufficient, as it is important to reflect on how we define and categorize conflicts and violence when considering the assumptions underlying the implications of such statements. Western-centric approaches to the study of violence and conflicts focus

mainly on these phenomena in non-Western countries and describe them using terms such as *sectarian* or *communal violence,* while similar phenomena in the West are termed *anti-immigrant violence* or *interracial riots,* for example, even if violence and conflict erupt between different religious and ethnic groups. Such approaches frame conflict with and violence against Turks in Germany as violence between immigrants, but do not call it ethnic or communal violence, even though many Turks in Germany are not immigrants but have been born in the country or have lived there most of their lives. As Said argues, the Orientalist worldview presents the "West" and the "East" (the Orient) as unified categories, lacking nuance and having little to do with reality (Said 1979). Thus, the West is presented as peaceful, democratic, and orderly, whereas the Orient is represented as chaotic, despotic, violent, and disorderly. Scholarship inflected by Orientalism, as Said argues, is often a tool or justification for colonial and imperial interventions when it legitimizes or offers the perspective that the disorderly, violent non-West needs the help of the orderly, peaceful West. The conceptual limitations in the field of ethnic and sectarian conflicts and violence are at least partially because of the influence of such Orientalist perceptions and because of blind spots within Western scholarship that do not allow these theories to reflect on problems that are as present in Western societies as they are in non-Western ones. This work, then, is partially about gazing back at the West and at Israel, since it is a self-defined Western state.

As Ibn Khaldoun proposed centuries ago, analyses of social problems or phenomena such as conflicts must not view culture through a narrow lens to explain them, but rather must focus on the political system within which people live. We can better theorize and understand this issue only if we view ethnic conflict and violence as a modern global phenomenon that is deeply linked to conflicts over state power and resources. As conflict is intertwined with issues of state power and resources, it can only be understood as a modern formation, beginning with the rise of the nation-state in Europe and the replication of that political structure around the world through European colonial, economic, and political expansion. In addition, even after colonization has formally ended (at least in most countries), colonial power has continued through other forms of influence

and (neocolonial) domination. States do not exist in isolation from one another, and this fact is even more the case with the intensification of globalization, a system that is heavily dominated by Western states, with the United States in a leading position. Thus, understanding violence in any state must include an analysis of how violence in the non-West has been and continues to be shaped by Western interventions, as conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine and elsewhere attest. Hence, in my view, postcolonial studies, world system analysis, and dependency theories are most useful to explain problems in the "Third World," because these approaches to scholarship do not treat the recent past as disconnected from today's problems that plague the Third World and because they do not assess developments in these regions in isolation from their location within the global system of power.

Furthermore, many scholarly analyses call for Western intervention in certain conflicts in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America as the only solution to their vows while presenting non-Western societies as passive and helpless awaiting rescue by the West, thus ignoring the role that Western countries played in shaping the development of these conflicts. Additionally, such calls for intervention ignore the fact that many societies have developed and utilized indigenous conflict-management methods, such as the *sulha* in Palestinian Arab society. These methods have been for the most part successful in managing, stopping, or preventing violence and the escalation thereof. The modern political organizing framework is making this process more fraught at the moment, as the nation-state, as the case in Kafr Yassif (among the other cases discussed) illustrates, aims at imposing its will and policies on its citizens and leaves little room for freedom of self-organizing or self-rule and independence. It is the duality and paradoxes of modernity that make this issue more complex. Whereas modernity makes claims of inclusion, equality, justice, and bringing an end to violence and arbitrary punishment by nonelected rulers, in practice the state has merely replaced the ruler and has often practiced the same things that it claimed to uproot. One must not forget here that international, that is, Western, intervention has often led to conflict and violence rather than preventing or stopping it. The case of Palestine is just one example. From its start, the conflict was imposed on

people in the region by Western countries' support for a colonial Zionist, Jewish supremacist regime in Palestine and continues to support and protect it. This global dictatorship of modern origins has been practicing antidemocratic policies often against the weaker and darker nations. On the one hand, the United Nations, and before it the League of Nations, led by Western states, forces its resolutions on people of the Third World (for example, through the Palestine Partition Resolution), and when Third World countries vote in the United Nations to implement a UN resolution on the same conflict (Palestine), Western states block its implementations through their dance between abstaining from voting and vetoing the resolution in the Security Council. The message of such policies has been that democracy means the will of the powerful, even if it might cost many lives among those groups who are weaker. When weaker groups respond, they are called "violent" and accused of not respecting the "rule of law," which is better stated as the "rule of the powerful."

The West, through its modern colonial history, has pushed the nation-state system on the rest of the world as the only possible outcome other than to continue to live under colonial rule, although some people still live under colonial state rule (for example, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan, among other cases). Thus, if the nation-state is the only available form of political governance, the only body with a legitimate use of violence, and the one responsible for the order and the safety of its citizens, then it ought to be the main tool of analysis when groups that fall under its authority use violence against one another. As such, the state cannot claim legitimacy of governance and at the same time be, with the aid of explanations reifying the cultures of groups under its authority, excused when chaos and internal violence take place. Furthermore, if the state is really weak and unable to provide security and peace, as is the case in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, regional and global dynamics and interventions must also be taken into account. Although groups' leaders might play a role in agitating for violence against other groups, according to tenets regarding the nature of modern political organizing the state has the sole responsibility for security and is the main body to be blamed for allowing violence to take place. States cannot claim legitimacy and sovereignty, levy taxes, organize social life, go to war, and utilize violence

against their own citizens but be excused in the case of violence by blaming only a few individuals.

In a similar vein, those critics who argue that historical antipathy between groups is a central variable for explaining ongoing group conflicts and violence forget that hostilities among groups are present all over the world, yet group violence does not happen everywhere. Explaining that it is simply because of cultural or historical antipathy is racist, obscures the political and historical contexts of violence, and lets states off the hook. Such explanations are not sufficient, as the case study in this book has demonstrated.

With regard to the incident of violence among Palestinian Arabs in Israel, the question is not actually how a soccer game turned violent between the fans from the two teams, because violence in sports is so common everywhere. The primary question is why the police, who were present during the game, did not try to stop the fighting, and no steps were taken to prevent or halt the attack from Julis three days later on Kafr Yassif, an attack that lasted almost two hours and caused much damage to property, death, and injury to a number of residents. The Israeli security forces at the same time blocked the other two entrances to the village where help from neighboring villages and towns was coming to try to stop the attack. This seemingly paradoxical "inability" of Israeli police to prevent one group from attacking, and their ability to prevent other groups from entering the village to help stop the violence, is not so difficult to understand. The historical research discussed in this book suggests that the behavior of the Israeli security forces is not actually an anomaly, as uncovering similar incidents reveals; rather, it is policy by design, not neglect or inability. Especially in light of the Israeli state's being considered a strong state when such incidents continue to take place without punishment or policy changes, perpetrators feel safe to act with impunity, and such cases continue to pass without independent investigation into the role of the government and its security forces.

I have presented the government's account of what took place in Kafr Yassif, namely, that police and government officials claimed that the authorities did not expect the attack against Kafr Yassif, that the police acted appropriately, and, finally, that such violence is part of the

Palestinian Arab culture. Such claims are contradictory, if using Ibn Khaldoun's approach of logical deduction to examine official and dominant narratives. If the Palestinian Arab culture is a violent one, as the government officials claimed, then as "cultural experts" they should have expected the attack and deployed more police force, as requested by the mayor and local leaders in Kafr Yassif.

Furthermore, if the police and Israeli officials had acted properly, why would the government refuse to appoint an independent investigation? Instead, under pressure from and criticism in the media by the Kafr Yassif council and leaders, it appointed its own investigative committee, which reiterated the claims of the police and government. This self-investigation was not only an instance of hypocrisy and a cynical tool of truth evasion but very much expected. Israeli governments have acted in a similar fashion on other occasions when killing of Palestinian Arabs has taken place, failing to bring any responsible party to justice and often blaming the victims and their culture, as they did in the case of Kafr Yassif as well as in 2000 when after a demonstration thirteen Palestinian Arabs were killed by the Israeli police force. Worse, officials accused of being responsible for the killings or for allowing the violence to unfold have often been promoted in the Israeli political and security systems (Habibi 1982). Such a system of justice only adds insult to injury, giving a signal that violence against and among Palestinian Arabs is not only tolerated but also rewarded. As is evident from my fieldwork and from comparison with other incidents, the state's policy of allowing or actually encouraging the continued sectarian violence, and group violence in general, among its Palestinian Arab citizens, may not be openly declared but is very much in line with Lustick's analysis (1980) of the Israeli policy of control. In this work, I have expanded Lustick's framework of control to include incitement of internal violence, showing how the incident in Kafr Yassif fits into a tradition of state behavior toward Palestinian Arab communities.

As I have discussed in this book, there were also internal factors that led to the violence. Although there has been a history of recent antagonism between Druze and Christians in the region, especially in Lebanon, born out of colonial and Western interventions since the nineteenth century, and this history might have had ramifications on those communities

in neighboring regions, I found no evidence to support that theory in my fieldwork in Galilee. Historical research reveals that political tension related to the Zionist movement intensified after 1948, when Druze in Israel sided with the state, while Christian Palestinians stood in opposition and played a prominent role in the Palestinian national movement before and after 1948. Another factor is that among both Christians and Druze, religious identities can be considered "barricaded," in Jowitt's terminology (1992). Drawing on Jowitt's work, such identities are easily manipulated in group violence and collective revenge. Druze in Julis might have thought that the beatings and the killing of one of their soccer fans in Kafr Yassif was actually an attack on the entire Druze community in Julis and thus justified revenge against the Christian community in Kafr Yassif. Distinct religious identities are enforced further in the modern state system of Israel, as marriage outside one's religious institution (civil marriage) is not recognized by the state, and thus one is born into a religious community by birth and not by choice.

Furthermore, Brass's analysis of communal violence in India (2003) would suggest that there were local politicians who exploited the incident to foster their power within the Druze community. Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi, the Druze leader, did not work to contain the emotions of people in Julis; to the contrary, as reported by some local residents, he encouraged revenge against Kafr Yassif, a community that had historically been an obstacle to his goal of dominating the Palestinian Arab community. Yet Jaber Dahesh-Mu'addi could not and did not act on his own but worked in tandem with Israeli officials or the so-called "experts on Arab affairs" who were present in both villages after the incident. These officials did their best to pressure people in Kafr Yassif to accept the end of the conflict without insisting on an independent investigation, or face worse consequences. This policy toward Kafr Yassif is not new and has its roots in the early years of the state, which has retaliated against the political mobilization of the village against its policies and even encouraged sectarian politics to help demobilize the community there, as Ahmad Sa'di (2001) documented.

According to other theories of ethnic violence, such as Horowitz's work (1985), the following preconditions were present: a historical antagonism

(especially after 1948) and a precipitating incident. Furthermore, it is critically important that there was a sense among the perpetrators of violence that they were going to get away with their crimes. Some Druze had previously engaged in violence against one other, using heavy arms but always without any legal ramifications. The perpetrators felt even more confident that the violence against Christians in Kafr Yassif would not be risky, as Druze were armed and allied with the state, whereas Christian Palestinians were unarmed and in political opposition to state policies. Finally, what Horowitz calls "bad" policing was also evident in the incident. This last point leads me to the issue of state responsibility and Lustick's framework of control, while allowing room for other theories that help explain group violence among Palestinian Arabs in Israel.

Thus, I argue that the police behavior should be contextualized in what Lustick has shown to be a long-term, consistent Israeli policy of control toward the Palestinian Arab community designed to restrict mobilization against the state. According to Lustick, this policy of control has gone undeclared, and low-level government officials did not even need to turn to their supervisors for approval. In this context, the government's refusal to allow an independent investigation makes the behavior of the police even more suspicious. Consequently, it is difficult to ascertain who was responsible and whether the police behavior was in accordance with orders from a local commander or higher-echelon officials in the government or whether it was a result of undeclared policy. As I discussed in an earlier chapter, Sa'di's research on Kafr Yassif twenty to thirty years before the incident (2001) sheds light on the troubled relationship between the state of Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens, especially the role played by movements in Kafr Yassif since 1948 in resisting state policies. Sa'di documents the state's encouragement of local sectarian politics attempted to break up the political mobilization vis-à-vis state policies that had existed in Kafr Yassif for a long time and had become a model to emulate in other Palestinian Arab villages and towns. Thus, Sa'di's research highlights that Palestinian Arab communities were not necessarily passive and always available for co-optation, as Lustick's approach suggests. Yet Sa'di's work on resistance is not contradictory to Lustick's framework of control, for just as Hegel, Marx, and long before them Ibn Khaldoun

argued, history is the result of the play of dialectical forces, and in this case control and resistance.

When comparing the event in Kafr Yassif with the other two incidents discussed in chapter 2, one cannot but conclude that there is a pattern of behavior of the Israeli security forces when violence takes place within the Palestinian Arab community. It is not far-fetched to suggest that this policy was an invention of the state, whether declared as policy or not. The encouragement of sectarian politics is well documented by scholars and nonscholars alike (Dreyfuss 2005). These studies have shown that Western governments and their allies in the region, including Israel, have encouraged communal politics for decades and armed and financed religious groups, or turned a blind eye to their activities, in order to suppress nationalist, secular, and socialist forces. Consequently, sectarian identities, politics, and violence came to dominate secular, nationalist, and socialist politics in the region.

This conclusion, thus, builds on and extends Lustick's theory in new directions. One of the methods of impeding the mobilization of a group against the state is internal divisions within that community. Research has shown that the Israeli state has allowed violence associated with interreligious tensions, *hamula* conflicts, and electoral politics, among other issues, to take place within the Palestinian Arab community.[1]

In this study, it was helpful not to rely solely on official and dominant narratives about the event and to examine their merits by testing the actions of the state in similar incidents. Rather, it was very valuable to incorporate local voices through field research and literature pertaining to the specific incident and other events that took place in the Palestinian Arab community as well as the views of community members about the state's responsibility, policies, and actions toward the Palestinian Arab community and the relationship among different religious communities in Palestinian Arab society. It is unlikely that I would have been able to have access to this kind of information if I

1. As documented by Nimer Sultany (cited earlier), as well as by Adalah (http://www.adalah.org).

had not been a native of this region and a longtime resident who grew up hearing many stories about the event. Familiarity with Arabic and Hebrew also helped me while working with and translating materials from the local council archives, government archives, and print media in both languages. By comparing the narratives in documents, interviews, published accounts, and conflicting statements by the various parties involved, it became increasingly clear that a coherent explanatory narrative could be constructed. First-person narratives can complement official or media narratives and open new windows on the history of states and their policies. Relying solely on official statements can limit our knowledge, as this case has shown, and can lead to misinformation and erroneous conclusions about how and why certain incidents occurred. At the same time, it is important to incorporate factors that the community itself overlooks in pointing always to external causes of violence. Thus, the inclusion of local voices, the voices of the people affected, is very valuable in this case, as in other cases in the region and beyond. This approach is very much in keeping with the research methodologies suggested by Ibn Khaldoun.

The explanations for violence that were explored in the book, whether expressed by the Palestinian Arab community or media, Hebrew press, or Israeli officials, should be situated within the context of the relationship between the Palestinian Arab community and the state of Israel as a result of the historical conflict between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. It is possible to see from the history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that the Israeli state is not neutral toward the different religious or ethnic groups living under its authority. It is a state for the Jewish people that exists solely to further the welfare of the Jews, not the Palestinian Arab minority. It is also well documented that Israeli governments have allowed large-scale group violence to take place in the Palestinian Arab community without taking any steps to stop or reduce it, and in the case of the Druze, they continue to allow them to keep large stocks of arms that have frequently been used in group violence against one other or against other Palestinian Arabs religious groups.

On the issue of state policies, I have argued that they ought not to be taken at face value; rather, they must be assessed through the way they are

practiced on the ground. I believe this approach to governance is not cynical but rather a very realistic way to test government policies and statements by the way they are implemented, and not just according to official statements aimed at local and international opinion. The other issue is what to do when states do not declare certain policies publicly, which is very common, especially when it comes to issues of violence, discrimination, and oppression of minorities as governments try to conceal their actions or mask their intentions. Waiting for decades until state archives might allow access to documents possibly revealing some of these policies is not very helpful because of the time that will have to elapse, especially since these policies concern the lives of people that could be sacrificed and violence that could risk not only the groups concerned but also the state itself, the region, and beyond.

Thus, it is more effective and sometimes necessary to investigate current government policies toward minorities by examining the nature of the state and the ways it views its minority groups, the general policies of the state toward the minority and majority, and patterns of behavior of governments toward minority groups. Scholars ought to investigate how the state's security bodies behave during and after an incident of group violence. If the state is strong, as is the case with Israel, the nature of its intervention and its consistent "failure" to intervene in cases of intercommunal violence reflect more general policies related to fostering or enabling communal conflict.

On the other hand, it is also true that the Palestinian Arab community in Israel was unable to create a unifying identity beyond local, familial, and religious boundaries. While the state has been exploiting and manipulating differences, the community has failed to overcome these divisions, which is why conflicts between individuals have turned groups against one other on several occasions. Furthermore, from some of the incidents discussed in the book, it is apparent that group violence is sanctioned or at least still tolerated by the community; this reality is something they cannot blame on anyone else, and such behavior ought to be challenged by community members and leaders. This issue and the justification of collective revenge can also be seen in other places of the world, and there are many incidents one could compare to this case.

Regarding religious conflict and group violence in Palestinian Arab society, what are the prospects for deterioration or improvement in group relations? Will Muslim, Druze, and Christian communities be able to create a unifying identity that can overcome familial, religious, and regional sentiments? Can Palestinian Arabs in Israel end group violence and hostility toward one other? The strict social boundaries between the different religious communities in the Arab society ought to be overcome by allowing all religious groups to develop and prosper, without intimidation, repression, and discrimination. In my view, religious affiliation needs to be contained within the personal and private sphere, even when the state does not work toward such a goal or even works against it. There is much more than religion that can unify the Palestinians in Israel through their shared history of experiencing state violence, discrimination, and neglect.

But as religion is not an abstract concept, and religious people do not live in a vacuum but rather as subjects of states that create policies that can shape individuals and groups, it is the state that holds the main responsibility in pursuing policies of justice, peace, and equality. This duty is even more necessary in states that call themselves democratic, modern, and liberal. As the case study here involves Palestinian Arab citizens of the state of Israel, it is up to the state to decide whether it will remain a settler Jewish state that separates Jews from Arabs and excludes the native Palestinian Arabs from equally participating in and shaping the national agenda of the state or become a state that is inclusive to all its citizens, regardless of one's ethnic or religious affiliation, so they can equally participate in the duties of citizenship and enjoy its benefits.

If under the current political circumstances the state of Israel does not see this equality as possible, it could at least improve the security of all its citizens by acting promptly when violent incidents take place within the Palestinian community. In the end, internal fighting among the different religious groups will not bring any good to the nation-state as a whole. It does quite the opposite, because if violence is allowed to escalate, it is likely to radicalize young Palestinian Arabs and make them more threatening to the state. Here, there is much to learn from other cases in the region and beyond. Encouraging sectarian and group violence with the goal of demoralizing, or demobilizing, groups and movements or winning time

to solve larger problems does not help in the long run. Fomenting chaos, whether controllable or not, can never be a healthy recipe for peace, prosperity, and security from a realistic perspective and is abhorrent morally. Furthermore, a self-professed democratic state that is, in reality, based on religious or ethnic supremacy of the majority is not only a hoax theory of democracy but also a recipe for instability. Sooner or later, this imbalance will lead to disastrous results for all parties concerned, both regionally and globally.

The argument in this book is not that conflicts are always preventable or that this phenomenon can ever disappear. The main concern is how and when these conflicts among ethnic and religious groups turn violent, and how these conflicts or differences can be manipulated from within and from without. Probing these dynamics helps to achieve two goals. First, it helps to unveil the essentializing culturalist argument about violence, according to which there is no solution to this phenomenon. Second, it focuses on political and historical questions, which can help explain incidents by drawing attention to material factors and can deepen our understanding of this phenomenon currently in future moments.

Why are some states able to prevent ethnic and communal violence and others not? If the weakness of the state in its mechanisms, ability, and intentions are the key issues of analysis, then we can, perhaps, develop approaches to help eliminate many such incidents. Yet, as I have argued here, explanations based on the weakness of state alone without taking into account what made the state weak obscure several internal and external factors and thus do not help fully explain the picture. Furthermore, this paradigm does not help explain the phenomenon of group violence in strong states.

This book demonstrates how qualifying and extending previous theories of conflict in general, and in Israel in particular, help to bring the issue into a new light. It illustrates the inadequacy of currently available explanations such as democracy, weak state, historical antipathy, and manipulation of leaders. Scholarship in this field also seems to be entrenched in the discourse of modernity, which is not sufficiently interrogated and is conflated with Westernization, assuming that the West is the example to be followed if peace and stability are desired. What is ignored are the

origins of the state in the non-Western world, which is for the most part colonial Western in creation and design and subject to neocolonial intervention and control.

Using a historical, structural analysis of conflicts is productive because without singling out a specific state and taking the rhetoric of modernity at its face value, it illustrates that modernity did not bring peace and stability. Nation-states, which are the hallmark of modernity and are maintained through the structure of the international political system to this day, have been the cause of instead of the solution to group conflict and violence. Finally, I hope that this work demonstrates how important it is to use multiple methods and interdisciplinary research, as they help to complement gaps that each discipline or methodology might have when studying such questions. Human relations are too complex to be understood through a singular disciplinary approach. Using a multidisciplinary framework allowed me to bridge the gap between mainstream political science, history, sociology, anthropology, and personal experience. This approach helped explain why a seemingly small incident at a particular moment really reflected a much larger problem and a historical process, and why this incident, in turn, revealed something very important about the nature of intercommunal violence in the Middle East, and perhaps elsewhere as well.

My hope is that this book will be a contribution to knowledge about the region, especially about Israel and its Palestinian Arab citizens. Although there has been much work on Israel, its role in sectarian violence among Palestinian Arab citizens is barely discussed. Even when it is addressed in research, Israeli origins as a colonial-settler state, which aims at unifying and empowering its Jewish citizens, are not addressed. This foundation has by its very nature worked to marginalize its non-Jewish citizens and to undermine their unity and possible mobilization. Similarly, the histories of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Israel have been marginalized in the scholarship. Neither Israeli, Arab, nor regional scholarship has paid sufficient attention to this group, and my hope is that this work will be useful to more work on this topic in the future.

As for the field of ethnic conflict, studies of communal violence, and social sciences in general, this book offers a few interventions, not least by

suggesting a shift away from reliance solely on state narratives, whether in the realm of domestic or foreign policies. Rather, one should examine state policies alongside the narratives of the experiences of the groups affected, the actions of the state rather than just its rhetoric, and the historical structural development of the state. Learning from European colonial experiences in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere, the United States too has been pursuing a policy of divide and rule in Iraq, this time pitting Sunni and Shi'a against each other.

Last, but not least, the work is an attempt to show how central colonialism still is to the problem of sectarianism. Treating colonialism as an event of the past, rather than as an ongoing process, ignores the long afterlife of colonialism and the role of neocolonial interventions that enforce colonialist structures. Iraq today can serve to illustrate this point clearly, for many of its ills were created first by British colonialism and persist through neocolonial regional and global structures. Since recolonization of Iraq by the United States, the violence of the occupation and the structures that have been generated by the United States in Iraq have reinforced the original structure of the state in Iraq. Even if the Americans leave, which they will sooner or later, the structure will not be dismantled easily. Similarly, the sectarian structure in Lebanon created by France has been in place, with little modification, for almost a century and continues to be the major source of internal conflict and violence.

Furthermore, scholars have tended to ignore how neocolonialism is really cloaked colonialism, as it serves the same function of divide and rule and continues to exploit and manipulate the formerly colonized. This point is vividly captured in a biographical film about the anticolonial struggle in Congo, *Lumumba* (2000). Even when Belgian colonialism formally ended in the Congo in 1960, it left in place an economic, political, and military structure and presence that achieved the same goals. When the democratically elected prime minister, Lumumba, tried to overcome sectarianism and dependency and create a more unified and independent nation and course of history, he was deposed through a coup orchestrated by Belgium and the United States, which suppressed movements for true independence and also democracy in many countries in which they had strategic interests.

This work demonstrates the inadequacy of current theories and explanations for ethnic and communal conflicts and violence, but I do not argue that we should discount internal factors in group violence. However, I believe that focusing too much on internal factors, as has often been the case in many studies, lets external factors and larger powers off the hook. Local factors, leaders, and groups certainly have a role to play, but they are also constrained by historical structures put in place by European colonialism in the name of modernity and later by the international dynamics of neocolonialism. The nation-state has remained the only organizing political structure accepted for participation in global systems, and any alternative to that paradigm has not been accepted yet.

Robert Dreyfuss's work (2005) illuminates how Europe, the United States, and their allies in the Middle East, including Israel, sponsored fundamentalist Islam to create divisions and to defeat secular, leftist, and nationalist movements in the Middle East as part of their cold war policies. Whereas Dreyfuss argues that this activity resulted in blowback for the United States and its allies, as evidenced in the events of 9/11, I think the argument requires slight amendments. One is that this policy hurt the people of the region more than anyone else. Second, this policy is not just tied to the cold war, but as we have seen since the end of that era, is an ongoing strategy that has long-term ramifications in the region and beyond. This point reveals that we should be wary of declared justifications for such policies (such as defeating communism), especially now that we are living with the policy of "war on terror," an Israeli policy and slogan for a long time that has been adopted since 2001 by the United States and other states around the world.

Finally, my aim in this book is to show that to speak about any issue in modern world history requires a historicized critique along with a critical stance on modernity. As this book demonstrates, violence among Arabs in Israel has no "ancient" roots. To the contrary, conflict and violence between the two communities were results of the post-1948 modern reality. This factor illustrates a central paradox of modernity and modernization discourse and the claims associated with them. Whereas Zionist and Israeli leaders have often used claims of bringing peace, prosperity, progress, equality, and justice to the barbaric Orient, as Joseph Massad (2006) and

others have argued, in reality quite the opposite has been taking place. Living through incidents such as this one gave me a clear understanding of the picture about the rhetoric of Western modernity and how deceiving it can be. It was a visceral and intense experience, even though a small incident compared to some other events, which showed me how violent "modernity" and "democracy" can be and what is, potentially, at stake in these questions.

Another lesson from the study of this incident is the problematization of the binary of "tradition" and "modernity" and how aspects of "tradition" can be used to realize peace, justice, and equality in sometimes unexpected ways. This book offers *sulha* as one example of a progressive "tradition." Elias Jabbour (1996) shares his insights into the question of group conflicts through the concept of *sulha* that can be used to manage violence between individuals, groups, and states and between states on a regional level as well as global scale. The concept of *sulha* begins with the principle that human beings have never existed without conflict and violence and that an idealized justice or peace is not the norm of our lives in the past, present, and, consequently, future. At the same time, as neither groups nor states can live in isolation, especially in this increasingly globalized world, the aim is to limit the possibilities of conflicts and their violence. This approach can be useful in the case of intergroup violence, between states and groups or, as in the case of Palestinian Arabs in Israel, between people and states. The basic philosophy of *sulha* is that what goes around comes around, and that we all need to live, coexist equally, and prosper. There is no powerful person, group, state, or empire that is an exception to this truth and remains hegemonic. Peace, justice, equality, fairness, and decency are the core sustenance for our world to continue, and injustice and domination will never last.

In conclusion, I return to Ibn Khaldoun and his concept of the circle of justice. The notion and significance of the circle have been discussed in many debates within Islamic and Arab medieval philosophy. Ibn Khaldoun's concept views history as continuous and circular as opposed to linear and does not give primacy to any specific civilization, culture, religion, or genealogy of knowledge. It aims at tackling questions of conflicted violence in an egalitarian way, with less certainty than modernity's

discourses often assume. Ibn Khaldoun argued that for peace, justice, and prosperity to be realized, those individuals who rule must keep in mind the circle when dealing with their subjects, because otherwise the stability and future of those persons they rule will not last long, as injustice breeds resentment and resistance from within and without. Viewing societies, states, regions, and the globe in the frame of the circle of justice can help us in promoting peace, not war.

Glossary

dhimmi: non-Muslim religious communities in the Ottoman Empire that gave these communities legal protection and autonomy.

diyyah: money or compensation paid by the guilty party in dispute.

hamula: extended family.

hijab: head scarf worn by the women of Islamic faith.

hudna: cease-fire; cessation of violence.

jaha: delegation that negotiates between disputing parties.

kibbutzim: Jewish cooperative towns.

Shi'a: Shi'a Islam is the second-largest denomination of Islam, after Sunni Islam. The followers of Shi'a Islam are called Shi'as.

sulha: Arab traditional conflict-management method.

sunni: Sunni Islam is the largest denomination of Islam. The word *Sunni* comes from the word *Sunnah,* which means the words and actions or example of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad.

tanzimat: centralization reforms initiated in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire.

taqiyya: hiding one's true beliefs.

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