

SOVIET PROPAGANDA

**a case study of the
middle east conflict**

Baruch A. Hazan

A HALSTED PRESS BOOK

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
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FOREWORD

Sovietology as a special area of research and teaching has been one of the paths of study in the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan. The interest of faculty and students in this field has drawn its strength from the global significance of Great Power politics in our time. However, it has also been motivated by the unique involvement of Bar-Ilan University in the fate of Soviet Jewry. Hence everything connected with Soviet studies is bound to appeal to the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan.

Dr. Baruch Hazan is in charge of Soviet studies in his department, and by his publications he is also widely known as an expert in this field.

In this study, Dr. Hazan examines the attributes of propaganda at large, and particularly those of Soviet propaganda, its history, its themes and its methods of operation. Of special interest is the chapter on Zionism and the State of Israel in Soviet propaganda. Attitudes toward Jewish life in the U.S.S.R. and anti-Semitism are also carefully described and analyzed.

Dr. Hazan's present study will certainly enhance further scholarly interest in Sovietology in Israel and the Western world, substantially contributing to a better understanding of the complexities of this area of studies.

Professor Menachem Z. Kaddari
Rector Bar-Ilan University
Ramat-Gan
March 1975

PREFACE

This book began as a small article which later developed into Research Paper No. 1 of Tel-Aviv University's Russian and East European Center (Spring 1973), and finally into its present form. The book's purpose is twofold: firstly, to introduce several new concepts in the general study of propaganda; and secondly, to describe and analyze Soviet propaganda as it relates to the Middle East conflict.

Since propaganda arises out of the same factors as the political, military and economic policies of a country, and pursues the same goals, it develops parallel to external events, responding and reacting to changes and developments in the political, military and economic spheres. It is therefore only natural that increased Soviet involvement in Middle Eastern affairs should lead to an increase in Soviet propaganda on the subject. Consequently, despite the fact that this book encompasses the period since the establishment of the State of Israel (1948-75), the 1960s and 1970s, which marked the peak of Soviet involvement in the Middle East, provide the basis of most of the study's evidence.

While it must be admitted that an author cannot free himself from his own prejudices and, in this case, a value-system very different from that on which the Soviet system is based, I would like to believe that my research has been based solely on sound judgement and scientific analysis.

Many have assisted me in my research. While it is impossible to thank all those to whom I am deeply indebted, at least some must be mentioned. The Research Committee of

Bar-Ilan University, headed by Professor Yehuda Don, not only provided the funds needed for my research, but also put up with my temper and caprices. For this, I am profoundly grateful. My friend and colleague Dr. Yaacov Ro'i of Tel-Aviv University's Russian and East European Center read the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions. A substantial part of my research was facilitated and assisted by the aforementioned Center. Mrs. Aviva Gojden edited the first draft of the manuscript, and also contributed many useful ideas. Mr. Nissim Borochoy was my assistant during the entire period of the research and, was much more than a research assistant; his share in this book is enormous. And finally my wife, Helen, who, though she neither typed, read, nor edited the manuscript did, by her sheer presence, create the warm and placid atmosphere which was so essential for its completion.

INTRODUCTION

Soviet Middle East policy at present is prompted by military, political, economic and ideological considerations. Its main objectives are:

a. to secure the southern and southeastern borders of the U.S.S.R.;

b. to maintain an air and naval presence in the Mediterranean as a counterbalance to the NATO presence there;

c. to neutralize and, if possible, completely destroy Western (largely U.S.) influence in the region;

d. to utilize the Middle East and the Suez Canal as a link between Soviet forces in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean;

e. to utilize the Middle East region as a bridgehead for Soviet penetration into Africa;

f. to achieve at least some measure of control over Arab oil and thus to pressure Western Europe;

g. to assist in establishing "progressive" (i.e., submissive) regimes in the region as a precondition for achieving its other goals.

While active Soviet penetration of the Middle East began in the mid-1950s, the dream of southward expansion had started more than three hundred years earlier, and has dictated Russia's foreign policy ever since.

Muscovite Russia was a landlocked state. Even when Russia had expanded to the Baltic in the north and the Pacific in the East by the 18th century, warm-water ports remained illusive. The Baltic ports were paralyzed by ice for much of the year, while Vladivostok, on the Pacific was,

alas, very far from Moscow. The only unexplored route of expansion lay to the south. The Mediterranean, with its obvious strategic and economic advantages, was so close and yet beyond reach. To attempt a breakthrough toward the Mediterranean meant direct confrontation with the Ottoman Empire, which controlled half of Europe and, what was more important, the vital straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean. Without free passage through the straits the Black Sea remained the mere Pontus Axeinus (inhospitable bridge) of ancient Greek mythology, while the natural disadvantages of the Baltic and Pacific ports were impossible to overcome, it seemed, by the end of the 18th century, that the obstacles preventing Russia from reaching the Mediterranean could be surmounted by sheer military force. Thus, the second half of the 18th century witnessed a continuous battle campaign of Russia against Turkey, its main objective being to consolidate its position as a Black Sea power and obtain free passage through the Turkish Straits.

The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (July 21 [10 old style], 1774) afforded Russia free passage for its commercial vessels through the Turkish Straits. However, by this time Russia's ambitions had increased. With the achievement of one goal new horizons temptingly arose. By the turn of the century Russia's main objective was not merely to challenge Western supremacy in the Mediterranean (by acquiring the right of passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles), but to defend its southern ports by preventing the passage of hostile military vessels from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. Defending its southern flank meant more than controlling the Straits. It required the stabilization of the southern frontier, which in the course of almost a century and a half had moved further south to include Armenia and Georgia, until finally Russia was blocked by British interests in the region. By 1828 the border with Iran on the Caucasus and on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea was stabilized, and further expansion was contained. But for Russia a

secure southern border did not mean much without control of the Straits and penetration into the Mediterranean. The European powers were aware of this. The Crimean War (1854–56) and the Congress of Berlin (1878) eloquently demonstrated the determination of these powers, led by Great Britain, to completely block any further Russian penetration toward the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century it was painfully clear to the Czar that no single policy, no diplomatic move, no military campaign of the previous 70 years had advanced the southern border or facilitated Russia's penetration into the Middle East region. On the contrary, Russia's position seemed weaker while Great Britain was emerging as the protector of the entire area.

Further evidence of the vital importance to Russia of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal was provided by the 1904–5 war with Japan. Russia's Baltic fleet sailed some 20,000 miles to render assistance to the Pacific fleet. Had the Mediterranean and Suez Canal been available, the same route would have taken half the time. Eventually, a Japanese fleet led by Admiral Togo confronted 32 Russian vessels in the Straits of Tsushima (May 27–28, 1905) and destroyed them.

Russian designs on the Turkish Straits became explicit in secret negotiations with Great Britain and France on the eve of, and during, World War I. On March 4, 1915 the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Sazonov, handed the French and British representatives a note claiming for his country – in the event of success in the war – nothing less than Constantinople and a strip of territory along the northern edge of the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, as well as Thrace to the Enos–Midia line, and the Asiatic edge of the Bosphorus to the River Sakaria. Britain, and France rather reluctantly agreed, France inserting the proviso that Constantinople be made a free port and merchant ships be free to pass through the Straits.

All this remained an unfulfilled dream, however. Instead

of acquiring the Straits Russia gained a new regime which, while not losing interest in the Middle East, preferred to concentrate on control of Europe. The European proletariat offered the Bolshevik regime greater attractions than the backward societies of the Middle East. While some half-hearted calls were made on "All 'Eastern' people to see the light emanating from Moscow" and to organize Communist cells wherever possible, the only really serious effort to expand Soviet rule was made in northern Iran, but with no lasting success. Britain's rule in the territories between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf as well as Arab hostility toward the atheistic Communist ideology, and Soviet Russia's concentration on Europe, prevented Moscow from playing a key role in the Middle East. But the dream remained.

Another World War, another secret negotiation, and once again the U.S.S.R.'s Foreign Minister, of what was now the U.S.S.R., this time Vyacheslav Molotov, presented his country's claims to the Communist State's fascist ally Nazi Germany. During a secret visit to Berlin in November 1940, Molotov voiced Moscow's aspirations "south of the national border of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean."¹

When the final victory was in sight, while still engaged in bitter fighting in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union renewed its claims, although this time it addressed them to its Western allies. On various occasions, among them the Yalta Conference (February 1945), the U.S.S.R. claimed the Straits and the provinces of Kars and Ardahan, returned to Turkey in 1921 after annexation by Russia in 1877. These claims were flatly rejected by the Allies.

After the war Moscow tried again. During 1946 the claims were renewed and reinforced by conspicuous naval and military "maneuvers" along the Soviet-Turkish frontier and the Black Sea coast. Only after the U.S.A. had emphatically voiced (and demonstrated) its determination to defend Turkey's sovereignty did Moscow relinquish its ambitions — for the time being.

The Yalta Conference was utilized by the Allied Powers as a public stage for stating their unanimous determination to consolidate the Jewish National Home in Palestine, and to open the doors of Palestine to Jewish immigration in the immediate future.² For more than two years following the Yalta Conference the Soviet Union refrained from issuing any official statements on the Palestine question. However, practical steps were taken to promote the Zionist cause (and undermine the British position in the Middle East), among them aiding and abetting emigration from Eastern Europe, notably Poland, to the Western Occupation Zones of Austria and Germany, with the full knowledge that the final destination of the Jewish refugees was Palestine. Nonetheless, Moscow discretely maintained contacts with various Arab political groupings,³ keeping its options open.

In the United Nations the U.S.S.R. backed the Partition Plan, on several occasions even overriding British and later U.S. reservations. Practical steps in support of the future Jewish State continued, and culminated with the shipment of Czechoslovak arms to Palestine, beginning in March 1948.⁴

Soviet policy at this stage was dictated by the old imperial dream of penetrating the Middle East. Its objective was twofold: establishing a political and possibly even military foothold in Palestine (later Israel), and accelerating the ousting of Britain from the Middle East, cutting the land bridge between British forces based in Egypt and those in Transjordan and Iraq.

The "pro-Israeli" period in Soviet foreign policy did not last long. The enthusiasm aroused among Soviet Jews by the establishment of Israel, the intensified attack on "bourgeois nationalism" and the development of a degree of Soviet isolationalism after the break with Tito's Yugoslavia all combined to curb the pro-Israeli stand of the U.S.S.R. and to inhibit its active involvement in the Middle East.

Stalin's death in 1953 was followed by several innovations in Moscow's foreign policy. Previously Stalin's nega-

tive attitude toward national liberation movements and their leaders had prevented the U.S.S.R. from undertaking any significant initiative in the emerging "Third World." In addition, the predominant "two camps" concept of Soviet political thought, until Stalin's death excluded the possibility of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the newly independent states.

Stalin's death changed the pattern of Soviet foreign policy. New assessments led to the rational conclusion that Soviet penetration into the underdeveloped world could enlarge Moscow's sphere of influence and create a radical change in the global balance of power. The Arab countries in the Middle East were ripe for Soviet penetration. A region of unstable regimes, heterogenous societies, economic backwardness, inequality of wealth and anti-Western passions seemed an ideal object for Soviet penetration. Washington held the same view; hence the Baghdad Pact, which emerged in 1955, a product of Washington's desire to forge a Middle East defense system oriented on the "Northern Tier" states such as Iran and Turkey, and aimed at blocking Soviet penetration in the Middle East. The creation of the Baghdad Pact had many negative consequences for the West. One of them was to create a community of interests between post-1952 "revolutionary" Egypt and the Soviet Union. No such community of interests had existed before. The stage was set for the dramatic Soviet breakthrough into the Arab Middle East. Egypt needed a powerful ally as an alternative to the West, providing economic aid and international support. Moscow was interested in cultivating "progressive" regimes in the Middle East as a counterbalance to the Baghdad Pact. Furthermore, establishing a foothold in Egypt meant overstepping the "Northern Tier" and gaining direct access to the intermediate "Southern Tier" which also included Syria.

The Soviet Union started arms deliveries to Egypt in September 1955. But it was not until the 1956 Sinai Campaign that the Soviet position in Egypt was consolidated. Openly

threatening Great Britain, France and Israel with massive retaliation, and prompting the U.S.A. to apply pressure and bring the fighting to an end, the Soviet Union assumed the role of Egypt's patron and guardian. Subsequently, Arab public opinion saw the U.S.S.R. as the only power friendly to the Arab cause. The Soviet Union had clearly become a major Middle Eastern power.

Despite temporary setbacks, such as the expulsion of Soviet instructors and advisors from Egypt in July 1972, Soviet involvement and investments in the Middle East have continued to increase. "Progressive" pro-Soviet regimes exist in Iraq and Syria. The Soviet political and military presence is apparent in Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and elsewhere. Soviet naval and military bases exist in Syria, Iraq and other Arab countries. The presence of Soviet forces in the Middle East has led to at least one direct confrontation between Israeli and Soviet pilots. The air combat took place in June 1970 and resulted in the downing of several Soviet aircraft. The Soviet stand in the Israel-Arab conflict over the past 20 years has been one of unqualified support for the Arab countries, providing them with military, economic and diplomatic aid, organizing support for the Arab cause throughout the world, and mobilizing world public opinion against Israel. Soviet assistance to Egypt is not only material, but includes the battle for the mind, utilizing the entire Soviet propaganda apparatus in the service of Arab (and, of course, Soviet) interests. In the process, the scapegoat role of the Jew as an individual (alien, isolated and unprotected) has been transplanted to Israel as a state. This particular aspect of Soviet involvement in the Middle East provides the subject of this study.

NOTES

1. Text of "Draft, Secret Protocol No. 1", Nov. 1940, in R.H. Magnus (ed.), *Documents on the Middle East*, Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969, p. 55.

2. Yaakov Ro'i "Soviet-Israeli Relations 1947-54", in M. Confino and S. Shamir (eds.), *The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East*, Israel Universities Press, Jerusalem, and John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1973, p. 123.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 124-125.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

Chapter One

THE DEFINITION

Propaganda is a term which has many definitions. It is also a term which has often been misused, overused and misunderstood. As in every subject which deals with human beings, there is a wide margin of error in the study of propaganda. While almost all definitions appear to agree that propaganda attempts to influence the thinking of people, there is nevertheless a considerable diversity of opinion as to what propaganda really is. That diversity of opinion is the result of emphasis on different aspects of propaganda. Some definitions emphasize the *deliberate* attempt of the propaganda initiator to influence the thinking and behavior of a certain audience according to a previously determined line, conforming to the interests and aims of the propagandist or his employers. Thus, the Propaganda Analysis Institute viewed propaganda as "the expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately designed to influence opinions or actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends."¹ H.L. Childs defined propaganda along similar lines as "an attempt deliberately to influence the minds of other people."²

Two objections can be raised against these definitions. One is the separation of action from opinion (opinion *or* action in the first definition, and the omission of action in the second. It is our opinion that propaganda is an action-oriented process, its aim being to control the *behavior* of its audience by changing or preserving its attitudes and opinions on a certain subject, or by implanting an entirely new set of attitudes or opinions. A second objection has

been raised by those who consider at least some aspects of propaganda to be unplanned and unintentional. Leonard Doob, for instance, ignores the *intent* of the propagandist, and employs the term propaganda "in a neutral sense to describe the influence of one person upon other persons."³ He offers the following definition:

Propaganda can be called the attempt to affect the personalities and to control the behavior of individuals toward ends considered unscientific or of doubtful value in a society at a particular time. . . . The dissemination of a viewpoint considered by a group to be "bad," "unjust," "ugly" or "unnecessary" is propaganda in terms of that group's standards.⁴

Again, two objections can be raised. The first relates to the fact that according to Doob each group or society is to decide which viewpoint is to be disseminated as propaganda. If that assumption were true, then the possibility of reaching a generally accepted, objective definition of propaganda would not exist, for every group will define "propaganda" differently. Furthermore (and this is the second objection), if every influence aiming at diverting a group away from society's standards or values is considered propagandistic, then Doob's definition calls for social conservatism. Every new idea which does not conform to the old, established standards and values will be considered propaganda!

Other scholars of propaganda choose to focus on the instruments and means employed by the propagandist. The most prominent among them is Harold Lasswell. According to him propaganda is an instrument of social control:

Not bombs nor bread, but words, pictures, songs, parodies, and many similar devices are the typical means of making propaganda. Not the purpose, but the method distinguished propaganda from the management of men by violence, boycott, bribery, and similar means of social control. Propaganda relies on symbols to attain its end; the manipulating of collective attitudes.⁵

By choosing to concentrate on propaganda's means and techniques — as he sees them — Lasswell neglected or ignored many modern means of propaganda, especially those employed in order to create a positive attitude toward the propagandist slowly and gradually, without any reference to specific developments or ends.

Other scholars choose to concentrate on the differences between propaganda and other noncoercive instruments of social control, such as education. One of them is E.D. Martin. In his opinion, the main difference between propaganda and education lies in the final result sought in both processes.

Education aims at independence of judgment, 'propaganda offers ready-made opinions for the unthinking herd. Education and propaganda are directly opposed both in aim and method. The educator aims at a slow process of development, the propagandist, at quick results. . . . The educator fails unless he achieves an open mind; the propagandist unless he achieves a closed mind.⁶

Obviously, this is not an attempt to define propaganda, but only to explain some of its objectives. No conclusions are drawn concerning differences in methods – or common methods and techniques – used both by education and propaganda.

T.H. Qualter's definition also concentrates on propaganda's ends:

Propaganda is. . . . the deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of the instruments of communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist.⁷

While Qualter's definition encompasses more aspects of propaganda than other definitions previously cited, still it seems that concentration on the ultimate product of propaganda is misleading. Furthermore, propaganda today is an elaborate and complicated process, which employs much more than "the instruments of communication" to drive home its message.

Many other definitions of propaganda can be found. Some of them emphasize factors or characteristics mentioned in the above definitions. Others stress additional characteristics of propaganda, such as concealment, deception (an end in itself), the impossibility of evaluating its effects, etc. However, we think that the definitions cited suffice to demonstrate the disagreement between the scholars.

At the risk of adding to the disagreement, we offer the following definition of propaganda:

Propaganda is the preconceived, systematic and centrally coordinated process of manipulating symbols, aimed at promoting uniform behavior of large social groups, a behavior congruent with the specific interests and ends of the propagandist.

Some of the elements of this definition should be elaborated.

I. PROPAGANDA IS A PROCESS. It is an interplay of changes, analyzable into unchanging or more slowly changing elements — which might themselves be complex subprocesses or patterns of action — arranged in a specific *structure*, governed, at least partially, by discoverable laws. Since propaganda has become one of the major instruments for conducting international relations, each and every available medium has been exploited and every known technique has been utilized to produce the effect desired by the propagandist.

Each medium penetrates in its own specific way. Each medium is suited to a certain type of propaganda, and reaches different audiences. Each audience reacts in a different way to different media and displays different degrees of vulnerability, resistance, intelligence, etc. All this must be taken into account by those who activate the propaganda process. What makes it a preconceived and systematic process is not only its clearly defined final goals, the audiences it aims at, and the subjects with which it deals, but also the tremendous effort to synchronize all techniques, means and media of propaganda so that the entire process produces the optimal effect. In other words, the propagandist has to decide in advance (and sometimes even in the midst of the propaganda process) which techniques are to be employed, which media activated, which audiences are to be subjected to propaganda, to what degree, and for how long. All decisions must be coordinated and subjected to a scientific

system, so that the final product displays a combination of overall integration, synchronization and uniformity, which in turn characterize propaganda as a *systematic and preconceived* process.

It is obvious that such a process requires a tremendous amount of *organization and control*. The multiplicity of decisions, preferences and calculations, the profusion and variety of media instruments and techniques, the diversity and complexity of the factors involved – all these demand a rigid, effective organization, capable of controlling the process of propaganda. Consequently, every modern state has constructed an administrative framework whose task is to conduct, control and evaluate propaganda. Since the concept of propaganda carries negative connotations (often being associated with lying, deceit, etc.), few states have had the courage to call that framework The Ministry of Propaganda. Most prefer neutral, more euphemistic, and innocuous concepts, such as Information (U.S.A.), Explanation or Clarification (Hasbarah: Israel), etc. Nevertheless, they all have more or less the same structure, and employ the same “specialists of influence” – from sociologists and psychologists to politicians and theoreticians, all of them expected to coordinate propaganda, and to turn it into a preconceived, well-organized, and systematic process.

II. MANIPULATING SYMBOLS. It is impossible to enumerate all the media and instruments used by propaganda. Furthermore, since there is no agreement as to what propaganda is, – there certainly can be no agreement as to whether or not a certain event or communication is propaganda. We intend to show later that Soviet propaganda employs media and means such as ballet and sport which have not generally been considered to be vehicles of propaganda, and this will probably add to the confusion which marks the study of the subject. Therefore, instead of an unsuccessful attempt to enumerate all means and media of propaganda, we prefer to use “manipulation of symbols” or

“manipulation of representation” – both phrases being already used by H.D. Lasswell to describe the propaganda technique of persuasion.⁸ “Manipulating symbols,” an all-inclusive phrase, also implies the manipulative character of propaganda – clearly, one of its basic characteristics. Lasswell perceptively indicates the triple appeal of the ideal propagandist symbol – to the reason (ego), to the love of pleasure (id), and to self-esteem (super-ego) – rational, pleasing and righteous.

III. UNIFORMITY OF BEHAVIOR. The propagandist tries to create specific attitudes which will in turn lead to a specific, preconceived action. He aims at concrete results, usually defined in terms of a special, uniform behavior which accords with the propagandist's goals. To put it simply: the propagandist hopes that his audience will do what he wants them to do. He consciously attempts to control his audience's attitudes – to strengthen, change or eradicate them – according to his interests, so that the final product will hopefully be the uniform behavior of his audience, necessary for promoting the implementation of the propagandist's goals.

IV. LARGE SOCIAL GROUP. This aspect of propaganda will be clarified at some length in Chapter Two. However, a short explanation is essential at this point.

The propagandist does not usually address himself to the individual, mainly because when addressed exclusively – the individual intensifies his resistance apparatus and penetration by the propaganda message becomes very difficult. Furthermore, it is impossible to take into consideration the specific characteristics of each individual and thus strive for “personal influence.” Such concern for personal details and characteristics is time-consuming, useless and anyway, technically impossible. Consequently, propaganda considers individuals in terms of their common denominator. That denominator can be defined in terms of attitudes, emotions,

motivations, common history and traditions, myths, language, etc., which reduce the individuals to an average, weaken their resistance apparatus, and lower their "absorption screen" (see Chapter Two). It is the mass mentality, the common characteristics, the collective emotions, impulses, values and attitudes that interest the propagandist. Thus, the basic propaganda target is the group and not the individual.

Nevertheless, within every society there are various groups whose characteristics, interests, attitudes, etc. differ. Systematic, well-organized propaganda takes these differences into account, and adapts its message to accommodate, and to conform to, the different characteristics of each social group. What follows is differentiation within propaganda, the criteria for differentiation being education, language, income, etc. There is no doubt that this differentiation of propaganda adds to its sophistication, power of penetration and effectiveness.

Thus far, we have tried to define and explain the *concept* of propaganda. We will now proceed to describe the *process* of propaganda.

NOTES

1. *Bulletin of the Propaganda Analysis Institute*, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 1, Oct. 1937.
2. H.L. Childs, *Introduction to Public Opinion*, John Wiley & Sons, New York, p. 86.
3. L. Doob, *Public Opinion and Propaganda*, H. Holt, New York, p. 244.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
5. Quoted by H.L. Childs, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
6. E.D. Martin, in the *Forum*, 1929, Vol. 81, p. 145.
7. T.H. Qualter, *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare*, Random House, New York, 1962, p. 27.
8. H.D. Lasswell, "Propaganda," in E.R.A. Seligman (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, Vol. XII, 1933, p. 521.

Chapter Two

THE FORMATION OF OPINION

As has been said, propaganda is a manipulative process aiming at the formation, change or preservation and reinforcement of certain attitudes, beliefs and values, with the purpose of inducing a specific preconceived behavior. That is to say, propaganda is an attempt to control and guide human conduct. Human conduct is partially determined and controlled by, and subject to, changes in personality. Personality consists of a comprehensive set of attitudes, beliefs and values which every individual has. Consequently, propaganda attempts to direct human behavior by affecting personality – usually by organizing the components of that personality into a system conducive to a certain preconceived pattern of behavior. Hence, the process of propaganda brings about two related results: 1) the modification of attitudes, beliefs, values and opinions; 2) the consequent promotion of behavior suited to and deriving from the change of personality caused by propaganda. In other words, the effect of propaganda is both external (on behavior) and internal (on opinions and personality), the *initial* objective being the creation of certain opinions. The attempt to create opinions often necessitates an attack on specific elements of personality, such as certain beliefs, attitudes, etc. This is a difficult task. The various components of the individual's personality are related to one another, organized in a logical system, one being a reflection of the other, and all together forming an integrated, comprehensive framework for interpreting and responding to the environment, and determining the individual's reaction to every objective situation. Every

attempt to openly influence the individual's values, beliefs and attitudes will be interpreted by him as a threat to his personality, to the delicate apparatus through which he responds to his environment.

Naturally, the individual will try to defend himself against this process, for it endangers his convictions. Sometimes he chooses to ignore the propaganda message, sometimes he tries to modify it so that it will conform to his opinions, and sometimes he seeks refuge in a large social group — finding reassurance amidst individuals who share his opinions. The propagandist is aware of this and tries to overpower the various defence mechanisms. First of all, he tries to present his message in familiar terms (language, accent, etc.). The common ground of the propagandist and his intended victim (the reactor) is emphasized; new ideas are wrapped in familiar concepts and presented as identical or, at least, as very similar to the reactor's opinions. Moreover, the propagandist considers the individual in terms of what he has in common with others, in terms of average or common beliefs, attitudes, values, motivations, etc. By not addressing the individual personally, but only as a part of the mass, the propagandist contributes to the weakening of the individual's defenses. The mass mentality seems to be a convenient channel into the personality. Furthermore, the group's pressure on the individual can often conform to the propagandist's objectives.

However, there is one defensive device which causes the greatest difficulty for the propagandist, and that is the "absorption screen." To explain what the absorption screen is, and what functions it performs, a graphic explanation of the propaganda process must be given.

It seems to us that there are several agents and factors involved in the propaganda process:

I. THE "POLICY-MAKING BODY". This is an administrative unit responsible for determining policy goals, the realization of which is to be facilitated by propaganda: this

is usually the task of the executive, be it a Cabinet, a council or – in the case of the U.S.S.R. – the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Usually the policy-making body does not deal directly with propaganda. The responsibility for molding the propaganda policy belongs to the second agent of the propaganda process.

II. THE PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENT. This department, which may appear under various names – Ministry of Propaganda, Information Agency, Press Bureau, etc. – receives instructions from the Policy-Making Body as to what its goals are, and decides the consequent propaganda policy. This is a very important task, involving decision-making concerning both the *content* and the *form* of the propaganda message. What is to be said, printed, shown or done, to whom, when, how and at what intervals is decided by the Propaganda Department. It is composed both of politicians – capable of understanding and clarifying the Policy-Making Body's instructions as to what the policy goals are, and of "propaganda professionals" – people who are directly involved in transferring the instructions into propaganda messages. The various agents of propaganda – such as the mass media – are directly connected to the Propaganda Department, and are supervised and guided by it.

III. THE INPUT: THE PROPAGANDA MESSAGE OR STIMULUS. This is the propagandist's weapon. It can take innumerable forms: the spoken or printed word, films, TV, telecasts, in short, any manipulation of symbols. Whatever form the propaganda message takes, it always displays two important characteristics:

a. It suits the policy goals of the propagandist. It is the visual or aural representation of what is considered by the propagandist the best and most effective way of molding the opinions, and thus the behavior, of the reactor audience.

b. The propaganda message aims at *manipulation* and not at *information*. It does not transfer neutral information, or

unbiased description or analysis of events. It transfers a pre-conceived, patterned relationship between events, the patterns usually being the fundamental principles of the relevant propaganda policy.

So far, we have not mentioned directly the propaganda audience, which of course does not mean that it has been ignored by the Propaganda Department. Although at this stage of our analysis the propaganda message has not yet reached its audience, many of the decisions concerning the content and form of the propaganda message will have been taken already according to some specific characteristics of the audience (language, education, interests, etc.) — as seen by special agents of the Propaganda Department whose task it is to evaluate these characteristics. Once the propaganda message has been communicated, it is expected to reach and penetrate its audience, despite several obstacles. The message must a) attract the attention of the specific audience to which it is communicated; b) it must be absorbed and accepted by that audience; c) it must be interpreted by the audience in such a way as to induce the formation of opinions conforming to the propagandist's goals and interests; d) it must be incorporated into the propaganda system of values, beliefs and attitudes, and evoke the behavior previously planned by the propagandist. The first two factors are incorporated in the concept of the "absorption screen," the last two in that of "personality screen."

IV. THE ABSORPTION SCREEN. It has already been said that the propaganda message must attract the reactor's attention, and must be absorbed by the audience. To be able to do this, the propaganda message must penetrate the absorption screen.

The absorption screen is a reflection of two factors. It is a projection of the individual's values, beliefs, attitudes, experience, education, etc., that is, a reflection both of the individual's personality and of his immediate environment. The classification of propaganda messages, and the decision

as to which messages should be accepted and which rejected are the main functions of the absorption screen. It must be stressed at this point that *absorption* of a certain message does not necessarily lead to the formation of opinion. The processing of the absorbed message is the function of the personality screen.

Two sets of factors determine which message will penetrate the absorption screen: a) technical factors; b) rational factors.

1. **Technical factors** are not related to the contents of the propaganda message or to the propagandist's personality. A propaganda message will not be absorbed if it is not strong enough, clear enough, or understandable. A poor quality broadcast, for instance, because of disturbances, bad weather, etc., will hardly attract attention and will fail to penetrate the absorption screen; a broadcast, or a printed document whose language is not the one spoken by the intended audience, cannot be expected to penetrate its absorption screen. There are many other examples of this phenomenon of technical hindrance to penetration. Their common denominator is, of course, the fact that the *contents* of the message are here irrelevant to the degree of penetration. Obviously, in the above examples, the message did not penetrate the absorption screen because of reasons unconnected with its contents.

One of the most important tasks of the propagandist is to eliminate, as far as possible, the technical factors preventing the message from reaching and penetrating the absorption screen. More powerful and sophisticated broadcasting equipment is used, and the number of languages in which the message is given is increased. The U.S.S.R. for instance, puts out foreign broadcasts for about 3,000 hours each week in 70 languages.¹ It must be pointed out that in almost all programs announcers broadcast in their mother tongues. Sometimes even the dialect of the reader is adjusted to that of his audience. The Patrice Lumumba Uni-

versity in Moscow is a tremendous reservoir of potential propagandists — in every conceivable language.² Students from other countries study there and provide Soviet propaganda with broadcasters, journalists, etc., capable of disseminating Soviet propaganda messages throughout the world. Thus, many of the technical obstacles to the audience's absorption screen are removed. Incidentally, even today the U.S.S.R. systematically jams the broadcasts of several countries to the U.S.S.R., thus adding to the technical difficulties attending those countries' propaganda efforts.³

Still, it can be assumed that today propaganda means and instruments have become so sophisticated that most propaganda messages reach the absorption screen. Therefore, the rejection or absorption of a message by the absorption screen depends in almost all cases on rational and not technical factors.

2. Rational Factors. Rational arguments provide an important basis for the absorption or rejection of a propaganda message. They relate to the reactor's own thinking habits, his rational way of reaching conclusions and his intellectual acumen. There are three major groups of rational considerations determining the absorption or rejection of the propaganda message:

- a. the characteristics of the propaganda source — as perceived by the reactor;
- b. the content of the propaganda message — as comprehended by the reactor;
- c. personal characteristics and predispositions of the reactor.

In other words, the rational factors involved in the absorption or rejection of a propaganda message by the absorption screen depend on the propagandist, the message and the reactor.

V. THE PROPAGANDIST. By "the propagandist" we mean not only the individual delivering the propaganda mes-

sage, but the very source which initiates the propaganda process. There is no doubt that considerations such as the credibility, intentions, trustworthiness, interests, designs, aims and motives of the propagandist affect the activity of the absorption screen. Trust and confidence in the propaganda source induce ready absorption. The reactor's trust and confidence in the propagandist may result from his perceptions of the propagandist's credibility, sincerity, position, intelligence, values, interests, knowledge, etc. The same perceptions may qualify, or rather disqualify a propagandist as untrustworthy, insincere, unintelligent, ignorant, nonobjective, etc. Often, an unfavorable attitude toward a certain source of propaganda predetermines the action of the reactor's absorption screen. The propagandist's message will be rejected because the reactor is motivated *a priori* to reject any message which comes from a certain source. No effort has been made to comprehend the message. Its source disqualifies it and it is thus rejected by the absorption screen. ("I do not believe anything Moscow says. I do not even listen to them. . . .")

One of the most fundamental problems of Soviet propaganda is inducing favorable attitudes toward its messages. A substantial part of its efforts is devoted to that goal — without any connection whatsoever with current developments, Communist ideology, etc. This characteristic of Soviet propaganda will later be described and analyzed at some length.

VI. THE MESSAGE. Obviously, the content and external characteristics of the propaganda message — as perceived by the reactor — determine its absorption to a substantial degree since no critical intellectual activity, such as thought, meditation, deliberation, study or consideration, is initially involved (these are activities which begin only *after* the message has been received, understood and conveyed to the personality screen.) We are clearly speaking here in terms simply of attracting attention and interest. No intellectual

activity can be stimulated *before* the message has penetrated. A precondition of absorption is attracting the interest of the reactor. That interest can be aroused by either external visual or aural characteristics of the message (color, shape, size of headlines of the message, pictures, the broadcaster's dramatic voice, background effects such as gun shots, applause, bells, etc.) or by its content. If the content of a propaganda message evokes images, which through past experience have become associated with specific emotional states (love, pleasure, hatred, fear, etc.), it can easily attract attention. However, stimulating emotions is only one way in which the propaganda message may attract attention and arouse interest. The alternative path is provoking intellectual curiosity, and generating a desire to learn the facts. Systematic, continuous propaganda tries to create conditioned reflexes in the individual by training him to respond so that certain symbols — words, signs, etc. — will be absorbed through the individual's absorption screen. This also constitutes a major part of Soviet propaganda activity, which will also be described and analyzed later.

VII. THE REACTOR. Finally, there are factors connected with personal characteristics and predispositions of the reactor which may determine the absorption or rejection of a message. Some of these are technical. Obviously, blindness, deafness, etc., can determine, *a priori*, the rejection of a message. But what interests us more are the rational predispositions of the reactor. Some of them are related to his personality factors, such as the degree of his capacity to comprehend messages, the personal interest he has in matters relevant to the message, his need for information, his inclination to compare various sources of information, his sophistication, etc.

Other predispositions of the reactor relate to his identification with a certain social group, affiliation to the value system of that group, its interests, etc. It seems that motives of conformity to the group — in everything connected with

common traditions, beliefs, attitudes, values and interests — to a large extent determine the individual's absorption screen priorities.

Since the task of creating a total monolithic audience, composed of intellectually and psychologically identical individuals is an impossible one, propaganda usually takes the easier route of conformity to the existing characteristics of its recipient audiences. What follows is a phenomenon for which we suggest the term "differentiation of propaganda." Propaganda is not a ready-made suit fitting everybody. It is not a permanent collection of unchanging arguments, means, instruments and techniques applicable everywhere and anywhere, and at all times. Modern systematic propaganda is tailored to the characteristics of its recipients. Obviously, what precedes the actual issue of the propaganda message is the analysis of the group characteristics, sentiments, opinions, predispositions, etc., of intended audiences. It is these factors (among many others) which predetermine the activity of the individual's absorption screen; consequently, systematic propaganda projects *differentiated messages*, the basis of differentiation being the personal and collective characteristics of the recipients.

Finally, it must be remembered that the absorption screen is an apparatus for the selection and classification of propaganda messages. It determines which message will be rejected, and which absorbed and turned into input, for further processing by the personality screen, which in turn transforms them into outputs. The absorption screen is a reflection of the personality screen, and its penetrability is based on past experience, as well as on existing values, beliefs, attitudes, interests and priorities, and changes according to shifts of the personality screen. Current needs also influence the vulnerability of the absorption screen, altering its priorities according to various internal and external developments.

After the propaganda message has been classified as relevant, and absorbed by the absorption screen, i.e., the reac-

tor's attention has been attracted and he has read or heard, the message, it is transferred to the processing apparatus — the personality screen.

VIII. THE PERSONALITY SCREEN. The personality screen is the response-producing unit which processes the propaganda input (the propaganda message) into output, i.e., opinion and action. The formation of opinion is actually a process of categorization and elimination, in which all components of the personality screen participate. During that process, the personality components (beliefs, values, attitudes, concepts, expectations, etc.) relate to the propaganda message, simplify it, classify it according to already existing stereotypes, label it — and produce an opinion, which either conforms to the existing stereotypes, or leads to the creation of new ones. A state of mutual influence exists between the opinion and the personality screen. The opinion formed represents a synthesis of the propaganda message and the various elements of the personality screen. On the other hand, the opinion formed may influence the personality screen, reaffirming its components, rearranging them, changing them, altering their relative weight — or even eliminating them.

IX. THE OUTPUT: OPINION AND BEHAVIOR. The imposition of a preconceived opinion which fulfills precisely the objectives of the propagandist (by the subsequent favorable behavior of the reactor) is the final output (end product) of the propaganda process. Opinion is the "answer" which the individual produces in response to the general "questions" raised by the propaganda message. Propaganda does not create opinions in interpersonal patterns. There is no interaction between the propagandist and the recipient. The opinion formed (if any) is the result of the synthesis of the propaganda message with the personality screen elements, and with environmental factors.

Two sorts of opinion can be created by propaganda. One

is the ready-made "recommended" opinion, and the other the opinion reached independently by the reactor. The "recommended" opinion is included in the propaganda message, which not only raises some critical questions, but also suggests the desired answer, i.e., the "recommended" opinion. The "independent" opinion has also been stimulated by the propaganda message — which suggests a certain mode of thinking, sometimes indicating the possible results of certain behavior — but in any case leaving the recipient to deliberate and evaluate alone and only then form an opinion. The propagandist, of course, hopes that the logic of his message has prompted the "right" opinion, i.e., the opinion which, although not directly suggested by the message, was prompted — sometimes even indirectly indicated — and leads to a specific behavior pattern desired by the propagandist.⁴

The opinion created by propaganda is without value to the propagandist unless it promotes action. The transformation of its audience into an acting crowd behaving according to imposed, preconceived patterns, the progression from belief to action, is the final goal of propaganda.


Propaganda may compel the individual to feel a necessity for some action. It can show him exactly when and how to act, assuring him of the success of his action. In that process the opinion ceases to be something personal, intrinsic, implicit. In the words of Don Basilio —

it . . . begins to murmur
gently softly. . . under the
breath,
it buzzes and flies, too
deftly insinuating itself
into people's ears,
it confounds their understanding
and inflames their minds.
Flowing freely from people's lips
. . . gathering force little by little
. . . it seems like thunder, like the
tempest. . . .

At last it breaks out. . . and produces an explosion. . . an earthquake, a storm. . . . (Beaumarchais — *Barber of Seville*).

Thus, the opinion is projected outside and translated into action.

In a way, this means that successful propaganda can sometimes acquire the functions of a mass leader. In his stead propaganda labels the enemies, points out the necessary course of action, and leads to the implementation of certain goals. Propaganda is also a "personality builder." There is a definite, direct connection between the personality screen and the propaganda outcome. They are linked and influence each other, the opinion and action not only being influenced by attitudes, values, beliefs, etc., but affecting them in turn. The propaganda message stimulates opinions and leads to action. The reactor acts, because he has been influenced by the propaganda message. His action is not a manifestation of his attitudes, but a visual projection of the opinion formed by the propagandist, and influenced by the recipient's personality screen. That screen has processed the propaganda message, translated it into familiar terms, simplified and classified it and thus participated in the creation of the opinion and of any subsequent action based on it. Such action would not have taken place without propaganda. It was not prompted independently by the individual's personality. It was created by propaganda and usually is but a link in a chain of actions. The continuous and automatic action ignited by propaganda creates attitudes that determine further action, and new orientations and attitudes. It also alters the reactor's personality screen. Thus, in addition to the creation of opinions that lead to action, propaganda also influences the reactor's personality, changing some attitudes, strengthening others and implanting new ones. The aim is, of course, the conditioning of the personality screen — an attempt to pre-determine the synthesis of the propaganda message and the personality components — so that the opinion and action



The Propaganda Process (the formation of opinion)

produced will conform even more precisely to the propagandist's interests.

Finally, we maintain that there are two different kinds of propaganda. One is the propaganda aimed at producing concrete specific results, i.e., a predetermined behavior. It is connected with specific issues, raises questions relating to those issues, suggests or recommends the answers, shows the way and the time of action, and guides the audience. This is *operational propaganda*. The second, less obvious, kind of propaganda is the one which is not connected with particular action or with specific issues. It is the kind which aims to influence both the absorption and the personality screen, making the former more amenable to the propaganda source's messages, while influencing the components of the latter to induce a favorable synthesis between these components and the propaganda message. In short, this kind of propaganda strives at infusing its audience with goodwill toward a certain source of propaganda, its specific attitudes and orientation. This is *impregnational propaganda*, which employs means and techniques such as the arts, sports, etc., which until recently have not been viewed as elements of propaganda, and which we maintain to be among the more important constituents of this type of propaganda.⁵

We shall turn now to Soviet propaganda, beginning with a description of the propaganda apparatus, and proceeding to an analysis of the various aspects of that propaganda.

NOTES

1. Radio Moscow in English for South and Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, May 7, 1974, SU/4596/, May 10, 1974.
2. See Chapter Three.
3. One of those countries is Israel. In conversations the author has had with officials of the Israeli Broadcasting Authority, it has been stressed that every single Israeli broadcast to the U.S.S.R. is systematically jammed by special Soviet stations, whose sole task is to disturb foreign broadcasts to the U.S.S.R.

4. For more on opinion and its connections with the propaganda message see Chapter Eight.
5. This subject is discussed at length in Chapter Four – dealing with the impregnational propaganda of the U.S.S.R.

Chapter Three

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA APPARATUS : THE INSTRUMENTS

Communist revolutionary theory assumed that a small group of men, acting as representatives of certain social forces, could bring to the rest of mankind consciousness and enlightenment, could lead it toward infinite human perfection, and toward a new state of society – Communism. The achievement of that ambitious enterprise depended on educating and enlightening the Russian people and mobilizing their minds and efforts by means of mass persuasion. The task of “educating” the masses could be fulfilled only by one single agent – the Communist Party.


Only the Communist Party is able to educate the masses, to eradicate their prejudices, their old-fashioned attitudes, and to instruct and educate them. . . . This is the greatest task of the Party.¹

Contact with the masses was considered vital and essential to the Party itself. It allowed the Party to develop its indoctrinative activities, and thus to mobilize the support of the masses:

The source of our power and our victories – [is] the direct approach and addressing the masses, ability to explain every single wish of the Party to the masses, the art of stimulating the masses, mobilizing their energy, heroism, enthusiasm and efforts for implementation of our tasks.²

The indoctrination of the masses was carried out by propaganda and agitation. Communist ideologists outlined very carefully – and over a long period – the differences between these two concepts. Plekhanov offered Communism’s classic definition:

A propagandist presents many ideas to one or few persons, an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but he presents them to a whole mass of persons.³



The structure of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

The definition includes three important points:

a. Propaganda aims at a selected few, while agitation is addressed to a "whole mass of persons."

b. Agitation must be performed in a great variety of places so that "the masses" can be reached everywhere, while propaganda is an "indoor activity."

c. If a quantity of ideas presented is a criterion of sophistication of the audience, then we can assume that propaganda aims at more sophisticated audiences.

Lenin offered an additional point of difference:

The agitator will strive to rouse discontent and indignation among the masses against [the] crying injustice, leaving a more complete explanation . . . to the propagandist.⁴

Elaborating, Lenin also pointed out the different means used by the propagandist and the agitator: "The propagandist operates chiefly by means of the *printed* word; the agitator by means of the *spoken* word."⁵

With some insignificant adaptations, Stalin carried forward the major lines of Lenin's theory on propaganda and agitation. After his death, however, the distinction between propaganda and agitation was blurred. Khrushchev, for instance, used the concept "propaganda" almost in the same sense traditionally reserved for "agitation."⁶ Furthermore, in his speeches, Khrushchev very conspicuously avoided use of the concepts "agitation" and "propaganda." Instead, "neutral" terms such as "ideological work," "ideological activities," "Communist education," etc. were used repeatedly.

This notion of deliberately blurring the differences between propaganda and agitation was immediately reflected in the relevant Party literature:

What Plekhanov said about propaganda and agitation was right for his times. Today things have changed. Propaganda and agitation have come closer to each other. Agitation has become more profound, and acquired the character of propaganda. Propaganda is now more aimed at a narrow circle of people. The Communist reality turned propaganda to something more massive and accessible.⁷

This tendency continues today. While both concepts are still used, it is often pointed out that they are really identical in meaning and carry out similar functions:

Agitation and propaganda are bound together by an inseparable link. Their aim is the same — to serve the political molding and enlightenment of the masses, to guarantee the connection between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practical struggle of Communism.⁸

The distinction between agitation and propaganda has never been instrumental in Soviet international relations. In the realm of international affairs the active principle has invariably, almost exclusively, been *propaganda* — and that concept was used to cover all aspects of Soviet political communications.

From the very beginning of the Soviet State, international propaganda has been recognized as a major instrument of State power, an effective means of conducting international relations. Ideological weapons — and among them international propaganda — are an inseparable part of the Communist arsenal. Many of the Communist State's battles were actually fought with words, the goal being to attain control over men's thoughts. Apparently, the Communist leaders believed that the weaknesses of the young State and the paucity of effective weapons would be more than counterbalanced by the overpowering influence of Communist propaganda. By way of international propaganda the new Communist State appealed abroad for support, for class solidarity, for the overthrow of "imperialist regimes":

We must pursue the tactics of universal support of the international revolution, by means of revolutionary propaganda, strikes, revolts in imperialist countries, and by propagating revolts and insurrections in the colonies of these countries.⁹

The same task, apparently under Soviet guidance, was also assigned to the Communist Parties of the world:

The Communist Parties in the colonial and semi-colonial countries must carry on a bold and consistent struggle against foreign imperialism and unfailingly conduct propaganda in favor of friendship and unity with the proletariat of the imperialist countries.¹⁰

Thus, despite the importance attached to international propaganda, for three years the Communist regime of Soviet Russia was unable to establish a central organ, charged with the responsibility of guiding and supervising the conduct of propaganda. Towards the end of the Civil War, the Party could finally begin to direct its attention to some organizational matters, among them the creation of a central propaganda organ. In September 1920 a special Department of Agitation and Propaganda (Agitprop) was created by the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Party. It would seem that, at least during the first months of its existence, the scope of Agitprop activity was limited. More than six months after its establishment, there were only 17 members on its staff.¹¹ Nevertheless, the Department soon became entirely responsible for the control of agitation and propaganda. During the summer of 1921 the Governmental Press Bureau's functions were transferred to Agitprop.¹² In the years that followed, Agitprop increased its control over all aspects of Soviet propaganda. Its mandate was very broad and defined Agitprop as the instrument through which the Central Committee was to unite and direct all the Party's efforts related to oral and printed propaganda and agitation.¹³

At the end of 1929, in connection with the general reorganization of the Party apparatus, the Department of Agitation and Propaganda was divided into two sections: a Department of Agitation and Mass Campaigns, and a Department of Culture and Propaganda. The Department of Agitation and Mass Campaigns consisted of four subsections: 1) general agitation; 2) mass campaigns of an industrial character; 3) mass campaigns in agriculture; and 4) mass work among women workers and peasants. The Department of Culture and Propaganda had three subsections: 1) scientific work, education and art; 2) Marxist-Leninist propaganda; and 3) a press section including newspapers and literature.¹⁴ In 1934 the two sections merged once again into the Culture and Propaganda of Leninism

Department, to revert to the Propaganda and Agitation Department (Agitprop) in 1935.¹⁵ In 1939 Agitprop was given the status of a Directorate under A.A. Zhdanov, who turned it again into the principal guiding organ of Soviet Communist Party propaganda, and also into a means of ideological control of the arts. In 1948 the Party abandoned the directorate system and Agitprop became a Department once again.¹⁶ The Department preserved its structure until 1962, when an ideological commission was established in Agitprop's place.¹⁷ During this period Agitprop's organization was rather elaborate, and consisted of several subsections: Central (Moscow) Press, Local (Provincial) Press, Publishing Houses, Films, Radio, Fictional Literature, Art Affairs (theater, music, painting, etc.), Cultural Enlightenment, Schools, Science, Party Propaganda, Agitation (administrative), and Propaganda (administrative).¹⁸

After Khrushchev was ousted the "ideological commission" became the Department of Propaganda and Agitation. This development took place apparently sometime in the spring of 1965. *Sovetskaya Pechat'* No. 2 (February 1965) refers to an official of the Party Central Committee as a "member of the ideological commission." Four months later, *Sovetskaya Pechat'* No. 6 (June 1965, p. 11) referred to the "Department of Propaganda and Agitation." Sometime in the summer of 1966 the organ was renamed once more, this time becoming the Department of Propaganda.

The Department of Propaganda is one of more than 20 departments of the Communist Party Central Committee's secretariat. It consists of several units, each responsible for a specific area of the mass media. Only five of these units have been identified so far: newspapers; magazines; radio and television; publishing and distribution; and printing plants.¹⁹


The Department of Propaganda is the organ through which the C.P.S.U. controls and guides the conduct of its international propaganda. As a *Party* rather than *State* organ, the Department of Propaganda is organized along

Party lines. It appoints Party members — subject to Party discipline — to key editorial and management positions. It processes the directives issued by the Politburo and turns them into propaganda policy. It does not itself engage in propaganda operations. The Department of Propaganda plans, guides, supervises and evaluates the propaganda operations of various Government and “independent” agencies, whose official or implicit task it is to carry out the propaganda instructions of the Party. The overall activity of the Department of Propaganda (and Agitprop before it) is usually supervised by a member of the Politburo. That supervision is restricted mostly to purely ideological material. It seems that, at present, the Politburo member supervising the Department of Propaganda is P.N. Demichev.²⁰

As stated, the Department of Propaganda does not directly engage in propaganda operations. This task is assigned to other agencies, which serve as the tools of Soviet international propaganda. Among them are TASS, Novosti, the Committees on the Press, on Radio Broadcasting and Television, and on Cinematography, various international pro-Soviet organizations, and so on.

I. TASS. On Oct. 26, 1917 at 9 p.m. a detachment of Baltic sailors took over the building of P.T.A. — the Petrograd Telegraph Agency. A subsequent decree was issued by Lenin turning P.T.A. into the “central informative organ of the People’s Commissars’ Council.”²¹ For almost a year P.T.A. functioned side-by-side with the Press Bureau of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Councils of Workers’, Peasants’ and Soldiers’ Deputies.²²

The two agencies were in conflict since neither was an effective instrument of international communication. The Bolshevik regime was quick in its reaction. In September 1918 it created, by decree, ROSTA — the Russian Telegraphic Agency — which took over the two former agencies and operated under the direct supervision of the Central Executive Committee.²³ The newly created agency was



The structure of TASS

expected to perform both the propaganda functions of the Press Bureau as well as the news functions of the P.T.A.

ROSTA was responsible for supplying international and national information to the central and local press. Within a few years the Russian State expanded (continuing a process which had gone on for 400 years, giving it an area 15 times the size of 16th-century Russia). By 1924, the Soviet Union included the Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Georgian, Azerbaidzhan and Armenian republics. In 1925, the Turkmen and Uzbek republics were also added to the Union. ROSTA became inadequate. The new needs of the Communist State necessitated a somewhat more sophisticated and elaborate information agency. Consequently, in July 1925 TASS (Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza) was established.²⁴

After a brief period of adjustment, TASS expanded rapidly. In 1955 it maintained bureaus in almost 40 countries. By the early 1960s TASS was represented in 65 countries, and in 1967 the agency operated 82 bureaus in 79 countries. A year later, TASS was represented in 94 countries.²⁵ In 1972 TASS had bureaus in 101 countries,²⁶ and by the end of 1973 it maintained permanent offices in 115 countries.²⁷

From the time of its inception TASS has been much more than an information agency. As an official agency of the Soviet Government subordinated to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers,²⁸ TASS is the acknowledged authoritative spokesman of the Soviet political apparatus. As such it enjoys tremendous status, not by virtue of its performance as a distribution agency, but through its association with power and authority. Its actual status is that of part of the Soviet political superstructure, and this situation was reinforced on Jan. 10, 1972, when TASS officially received the status of Ministry, and its Director-General, the rank of Minister.²⁹

In the past, the role of TASS was usually defined as the dissemination of information. Its former director, Palgunov, stated that TASS's role is:

... to disseminate truthful, objective information. However, not to disseminate such information, which by its content and character resembles a simple photograph, information which depicts impartially and dispassionately the events of international life, but to disseminate information based on Marxist-Leninist theory, capable of analyzing events, helping the reader penetrate the essence of the events, and the processes presented and elucidated in that information.³⁰

Palgunov had some original ideas about the concept of what information is. He maintained that Soviet-style news could have a purely informative purpose or character:

News must be organized; otherwise, it is news of mere events and happening... news... must pursue a definite purpose... News is agitation by facts. In selecting the subjects, the authors of the report must above all proceed from the realization that the press should not simply report all facts and just any event... News must be didactic and instructive.³¹

Today, in addition to distributing information, TASS's role is also defined as that of a "commentator, observer, analyst, striving not only to report the facts, but to explain them in a clear form and intelligible language."³²

Whatever the various definitions of TASS's role and tasks, one basic fact must be remembered: TASS is a part of the Soviet *political* apparatus. It is its chief spokesman, often fulfilling the functions of other government offices or ministries of information. Consequently, TASS cannot be compared to the world's great news-gathering agencies, such as Associated Press, U.P.I., etc., in matters related to functions or structure. TASS is not only a news agency but, simultaneously, an information gathering and distributing mechanism, and a two-way organ of propaganda. It is the main source of Soviet news for abroad and the main channel of news from abroad for internal Soviet consumption.


Being an integral part of the Soviet political establishment, its official spokesman and chief propagandist, TASS is concerned first of all with the promotion of the Soviet Union's policy goals. In that context, TASS is an extension of the Soviet foreign policy apparatus, acting often as an

intermediary between the Soviet Union and other countries' governments.

An additional role of TASS is to collect information for Soviet military and civilian intelligence organs. In his book *The Two Faces of TASS* (Minneapolis, 1962), T. Kruglak cites several cases in which TASS correspondents were exposed as intelligence agents.³³ In 1956 the U.S. Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, while conducting hearings on the activities of TASS, branded the agency as a "conspiratory agency" charging that "its Russian staff has consisted largely of Soviet military intelligence personnel who are not professional journalists and who operate under aliases and false credentials."³⁴

The structure of TASS reflects the complexity of its activities. It is headed by a Director-General (at present L.M. Zamyatin), who controls the affairs of the agency. In that task he is assisted by a collegium. There are three main editorial divisions: The editorial staff for foreign information (INOTASS), the department for Soviet domestic news, and the department for overseas news (i.e., TASS dispatches for foreign subscribers). The Director-General supervises their activities through his three chief assistants, and his board of 12 editors.³⁵ In addition, there is also an editorial board for sports news, a group of "observers," an information section, a communications section, an international communications section, and an administrative directorate.³⁶

The foreign news department is the heart of TASS's international functions, and consequently is of more interest for this study than other TASS divisions. It is divided into nine geographical sections — for Western Europe, European Communist countries, North America, Latin America, Africa, Arab countries, the Middle East and India, Asian countries, and Southeast Asia. Each regional desk is directed by an editor, who is assigned two assistants and five or six subeditors. The foreign correspondents of TASS are attached directly to the editorial staff for overseas information.³⁷



The structure of Novosti

One is struck by the large number of bureaus that TASS maintains in Africa, Asia and South America. The reason is obvious: TASS is only a part-time information agency. It also has the full-time job of a propaganda agency and is an extension of the Foreign Office and an organization for the collection of intelligence information as well.

Eventually even TASS became inadequate. Its association with the Soviet Government was too obvious. Moreover, its association was not geared to deal with new imaginative forms of propaganda. A new, more effective and more sophisticated mechanism was required. The answer was Novosti.

II. NOVOSTI (APN – Agentstvo Pechati Novosti). Novosti was created on April 3, 1961. Formally, it is a public organization with no direct Government ties. Its “founders” were leading Soviet “public” organizations – such as the Union of Journalists, the Union of Writers, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Contacts with Foreign Countries, and the National Union for Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.³⁸ The common denominator of these “public” organizations is their association with propaganda activities. Furthermore, such organizations are not independent in the U.S.S.R. They are an integral part of the Soviet substructure of social control mechanisms and man-mobilization instruments operating under the guidance and control of the C.P.S.U. Consequently, despite all official definitions, Novosti is in fact another governmental organ.

There is another, more interesting, side to Novosti's creation. The story begins as far back as 1943, when the German army of Von Paulus surrendered at Stalingrad. Among Von Paulus' officers were several experts in propaganda and disinformation. They were soon discovered by the Soviet authorities, and subsequently utilized during the rest of the war, as well as afterward. In about 1958 the K.G.B. (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti – Committee of

TABLE 1. SOVIET NEWS AGENCIES' OPERATIONS ABROAD¹

North America – 1970

Country	TASS	APN	Remarks
Canada	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> and <i>Sel'skaya Zhizn'</i> have correspondents
United States	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> , <i>Trud</i> , <i>Sel'skaya Zhizn'</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Western Europe – 1970 ²			
Austria	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> and <i>Izvestiya</i> have correspondents
Belgium	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> and <i>Izvestiya</i> have correspondents
Denmark	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> has correspondents. APN publishes a daily news and feature bulletin
Finland	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
France	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> , <i>Sel'skaya Zhizn'</i> , <i>Trud</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Iceland	CD	C	
Italy	CD		<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
The Netherlands	C	CD	
Norway	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> has a correspondent
Spain	C		
Sweden	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> and <i>Sel'skaya Zhizn'</i> have correspondents
Switzerland	C	C	
United Kingdom	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> , <i>Komsomol'skaya Pravda</i> and <i>Trud</i> have correspondents

TABLE 1. (continued)

W. Germany	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Africa - 1970			
Algeria	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Burundi	CD	D	APN illustrated English-language monthly published in Uganda, circulates in Burundi
Cameroun	CD		-
Central African Republic	CD		Soviet Embassy publishes an information bulletin
Chad	CD		TASS correspondent in Central African Republic visits Chad occasionally
Congo (B)	CD	CD	
Dahomey	CD		TASS man also credited to Togo
Ethiopia	CD	C	Radio-TV Moscow and Sovexportfilm have correspondents. Daily news bulletin published. <i>Pravda</i> has correspondent
Ghana	CD		<i>Pravda</i> has correspondent
Guinea	CD		
Kenya	CD		Soviet Embassy issues news bulletin. APN correspondent expelled after 1972
Liberia	D		TASS representative transferred 1969; has not been replaced
Libya	CD		
Mali	CD	CD	APN issues daily news bulletin. <i>Pravda</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Nigeria	CD	CD	Soviet magazines <i>New Times</i> and <i>Asia and Africa Today</i> also have correspondents

TABLE 1. (continued)

Senegal	CD	CD	<i>Asia and Africa Today</i> has a correspondent
Sierra Leone	CD		APN correspondent visits regularly
Somalia	CD	CD	Soviets publish news bulletin
Sudan	CD	CD	Soviets publish news bulletin
Tanzania	CD	CD	<i>Izvestiya</i> has correspondent
Togo	D		
Tunisia	CD	CD	APN distributes a news file
Uganda	D	D	
Upper Volta	D	D	
Zaire	CD		
Zambia	CD		
Latin America – 1970 ³			
Ecuador	CD	CD	
Guyana	CD		TASS has stringer
Cuba	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Haiti			No apparent Soviet representation
Mexico	CD		
Panama	C		
Argentina	D	D	Local TASS stringer assists Soviet press officer
Brazil	C	C	Radio-TV Moscow has correspondents
Bolivia	CD	CD	
Chile	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> has correspondent
Costa Rica	D	D	
Peru	CD	CD	APN has bureau staffed by Peruvians. Distributes news file
Uruguay	CD	D	

TABLE 1. (continued)

Venezuela	CD	CD	TASS distributes daily news bulletin to newspapers
Colombia (1969)	CD	D	
El Salvador	D		
Honduras	C		
East Asia and Pacific - 1970 ⁴			
Australia	CD		<i>Pravda</i> has correspondent in Canberra. <i>Izvestiya</i> represented by a stringer
Burma	CD		<i>Izvestiya</i> has correspondent
China (People's Republic)			<i>Pravda</i> has correspondent
Indonesia	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Japan	CD	CD	APN and TASS distribute news files. <i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> , <i>Komsomol'skaya Pravda</i> , <i>Trud</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Malaysia	CD		
Philippines			APN represented by legation press officer
Singapore	CD		<i>Izvestiya</i> has correspondent
Thailand	C		Soviet Embassy issues news bulletin
South Asia - 1970			
Afghanistan	CD	CD	APN publishes daily news bulletins
Sri Lanka	CD	CD	
India	CD	CD	<i>Pravda</i> , <i>Izvestiya</i> , <i>Trud</i> and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents
Nepal	CD		
Pakistan	CD	CD	<i>Izvestiya</i> has correspondent

TABLE 1. (continued)

Near East - 1970

Cyprus	CD	C	
Egypt	CD	CD	<i>Pravda, Izvestiya, Komsomol'skaya Pravda, and Radio-TV Moscow have correspondents</i>
Greece	C	C	
Iran	CD		TASS publishes daily news bulletin
Iraq (1967)	CD	CD	
Israel	CD		
Jordan	CD		
Kuwait	CD		
Lebanon	CD	CD	
Syria	CD	D	
Turkey		D	TASS issues daily news bulletin
UAE	CD	CD	
Yemen Arab Republic	CD		

C = Collects News.

D = Distributes News.

1. Although this list of Tass offices does not total 100 (or 80 for APN) as the U.S.S.R. claims, there is not necessarily a discrepancy between claims and the totals listed in this table. Offices in Communist countries, for example, are not listed here.
2. Until 1975 communist news agencies did not operate in Portugal. Soviet news agencies also operate in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Albania.
3. No known Soviet news agency representation in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Trinidad.
4. There is no known Soviet news agency representation in South Korea, South Vietnam, or Taiwan.

State Security) organized special courses for propaganda and "disinformation." Among the lecturers were several ex-German experts. Around the end of 1960 the courses were completed. In April 1961 Novosti was created. Many of the graduates from these K.G.B. courses found their place in the newly created "information agency," and today they direct a major part of Novosti's work. Furthermore, according to Western sources the editorial staff of Novosti consists primarily of intelligence officers. One of them is the one-time British agent and Soviet spy, Kim Philby, who later defected to the Soviet Union.³⁹

Novosti's officially declared purposes are: 1) to prepare written and photographic material concerning domestic and foreign affairs of the U.S.S.R. for the foreign mass media; 2) to provide the Soviet mass media with information on political, economic, scientific, and cultural developments in foreign countries; and 3) to publish magazines, newspapers, and brochures designed to acquaint foreign readers with the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ In reality, however, Novosti carries the major burden of Soviet foreign propaganda. Its principal goal is to "sell" the Soviet Union to the world, or in the words of *Zhurnalist* — "to spread the truth about the U.S.S.R. in all the continents."⁴¹ And spread it does. According to the same source "Novosti's staff conducts informational propaganda activities in more than 110 countries. It has representatives in 82 countries, and maintains connections with 140 major international and national agencies."⁴² The representatives of Novosti abroad are also used for developing connections with foreign newspapers, particularly in Africa and Asia. These connections are often used to persuade, or even force some of the local journalists (by blackmail) to publish prefabricated items in their newspapers. Once such items have been published, Novosti activates its tremendous propaganda machine and disseminates them throughout the world. Of course, it is always stressed that Novosti itself is not the source, but that the article emanates from a "neutral" source. After a while,

in most cases, the story is proven to be false, by which time refutation is too late to be effective. Novosti has achieved its aim: a foreign source has published the planted item, people have read the false information and have responded to it.

Novosti is built on typical Soviet organizational principles. The top organ is the "Conference of Founders" which meets periodically – at well-spaced intervals. The Conference selects a "council of founders" which officially runs operations between the meetings of the Conference, and reports to it. The organ which really controls and operates Novosti is the Directorate (Pravlenie) headed currently by I.I. Udal'tsov.

Two additional instruments of Soviet international propaganda are the Soviet foreign press, and foreign broadcasts, both closely associated with Novosti.

III. THE FOREIGN PRESS. No other country in the world attaches so much importance to its international press and broadcasts. No other country in the world has special "days" of the press (May 5) and the radio (May 7) as does the U.S.S.R. These are unique phenomena, but, then so are the Soviet press and radio in their role and size.

The Soviet Press is a powerful instrument in the hands of the C.P.S.U. for the education, organization and Communist upbringing of the masses. This is a fundamental principle, which goes back to Lenin's famous slogan: "A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and collective agitator; it is also a collective organizer."⁴³ This short, simple sentence immediately makes clear that the Soviet press is neither a business venture, nor an instrument for expressing individual or public opinion, nor a mirror of public opinion. It is an important centrally directed social force, a major instrument facilitating the achievement of C.P.S.U. goals.

Several basic principles characterize the Soviet press:

a) There is no freedom of the press. All newspapers and journals "belong to the people," i.e., to the C.P.S.U., the

NEW TIMES

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DECEMBER 1974

A POLICY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE
Class Battles in the Capitalist World • United Nations
Assembly: Good Results • Travel Notes from Laos



A SOVIET WEEKLY

NEW TIMES




A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

10

MARCH 1975

ASIAN SECURITY: THE IDEA GAINS GROUND
• Developments in Spain • The Phenomenal Optimism
of Herman Kahn • The Pulse Beat of Dar es Salaam



SOVIET WEEKLY

Published at the 12 P.M. on a Thursday

DISARMAMENT AND PEACE

WORLD CONGRESS REPORTS—inside

SOVIET NEWS
THE WORLD CONGRESS OF PEACE FORCES
Tuesday, September 6, 1973 No. 5112
Published by the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy in London

SOVIET WEEKLY
NEWS AND PICTURES FROM THE USSR
3rd Every Thursday
July 19, 1962 No. 1,068

HERE WE COME!

SOVIET UNION

By air—from Moscow
MOSCOW NEWS
No. 3
\$.42 (1189), Saturday, October 20, 1973 * * WEEKLY

Soviet Military Review
MARCH 1975
June 73 • No 6

NEW TIMES
XX Century and Peace

No. 1,510 January 8, 1971
SOVIET SW WEEKLY (s)
ESTABLISHED IN 1942

ANTI-SEMITISM? OR ANTI-SOVIETISM?
— page 12

Soviet Government, and Party-controlled "public" organizations.

b) Any notion of objectivity is *a priori* rejected. Furthermore, "objectivity" is a "dirty" word in the U.S.S.R. This characteristic of the Soviet press also derives from Lenin, who declared that a man who seeks "objectivity" in explaining any set of facts always risks becoming an apologist for the facts he is explaining. Consequently, Lenin claimed that a Communist must be guided by the principle of *partiinnost**, and must evaluate historical events from the point of view of the revolutionary proletariat.⁴⁴

c) A characteristic already discussed in another context is the Soviet approach to news. News for the C.P.S.U. is agitation by facts.

Furthermore, it is not the event, but the social forces and processes behind the event which are considered newsworthy. Consequently, the Soviet press reports only what is considered necessary for promoting the goals of the C.P.S.U.

Most of the newspapers and journals published for foreign audiences are Novosti publications. They include:

Soviet Land published bi-monthly in India in 12 national languages, including English, in 50,000 copies;

Fakel a bi-monthly published in Hungary;

Al-Magallya and *ash-Shark*, magazines published in Egypt;

The Soviet Union Today, in Japan;

Krai Rad, a weekly published in Poland;

Dnes i Utre, a bi-monthly published in Bulgaria;

Aurora, a bi-monthly published in Romania.

Zemlya Soveta, a bi-monthly published in Yugoslavia;

Tydenik Aktualit, a bi-monthly published in Czechoslovakia;

Soviet Life, a monthly published in the U.S.A.;

Étude Sovietique, published in France;

* "Partiinost" is a concept which has no English equivalent. It means devotion to Party principles and total adherence to Party ideology and the current political line.

Soviet Weekly, published in England;
Urusi Leo, published in Japan;
New World, published in Nigeria;
Orbit, published in the Lebanon;
Polar Star, published in Uganda;
Soviet News, published in Iran;
The Land of the Soviets, published in Syria.

These newspapers and magazines are published within the countries of distribution. Several other foreign-language magazines are published in the U.S.S.R. and are designed for specific audiences:

Anbu Moscu (in Arabic);
Aube Nouvelle (in French for Africa);
Leninist Path (in Korean);
New Path (in Greek);
Neuvosto Karjala (in Finish);
Oeuvres et Opinions (in French).

The magazines which are published in more than one language are much more important. While most of them are brought out in five to seven languages, some appear in more than ten different languages. The record holder is *Soviet Union* published in 19 languages (Russian, English, Arabic, Italian, Hungarian, Spanish, Chinese, Korean, German, Serbo-Croat, Urdu, Finnish, Hindi Japanese, Bengali Vietnamese, French, Mongolian and Romanian). Other magazines of this group are:

Sputnik, published by Novosti in Russian, English, French, German and Urdu, printed in Helsinki — except for the Urdu edition printed in New Delhi;

International Affairs (Russian, English, French);

Latin America (Russian, Spanish);

Far Eastern Affairs (Russian, English, Japanese);

XX Century and Peace (Russian, English, French, Spanish, German);;

Soviet Military Review (English, French, Arabic, Spanish);

Socialism: Theory and Practice (English, French, German, Spanish);

Culture and Life (Russian, English, Spanish, German, French);

Soviet Film (Russian, English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic);

Travel in the U.S.S.R. (Russian, English, French, German);

New Times (Russian, English, Spanish, German, French, Arabic);

Soviet Woman (Russian, English, Spanish, Chinese, Korean, German, French, Bengali, Hindi, Japanese, English);

Soviet Literature (English, Spanish, German, Polish);

Sport in the U.S.S.R. (Russian, English, French, German, Spanish).⁴⁵

The languages in which each magazine is published are functions of Soviet foreign policy and propaganda needs. *New Times*, for instance, first appeared in 1943. It was intended to strengthen understanding between the U.S.S.R. and its allies. (*Soviet Weekly* began to appear a year earlier.) Until the 1950s *New Times* was published in four languages (Russian, German, English and French). By 1953, five more languages were added: Spanish, Polish, Czech, Swedish and Romanian, and by 1955 Hungarian also. Thus, during the turbulent period of 1955-56 in Eastern Europe, *New Times* appeared in almost every East European language. By 1960 Swedish and Hungarian had been dropped, and by 1964 the Romanian edition had been discontinued. In January 1974 *New Times* started an Arabic edition.⁴⁶ Apparently, the appearance of the Arabic edition was connected with developments in the Middle East, which necessitated an intensification of Soviet propaganda, turning the Arab world into one of its chief targets.⁴⁷

In addition to newspapers and magazines in foreign languages, the U.S.S.R. publishes thousands of books in foreign languages. The total publication of books for 1968 was 1,334 million copies, 1,315 million for 1969 and an estimated 1,270 million for 1970.⁴⁸ The foreign-language component of those figures amounted to 28 million copies in

TABLE 2. ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS*

Language	1960		1965		1969		1970	
	No. of News-papers	Circulation in 1,000s	No. of News-papers	Circulation in 1,000s	No. of News-papers	Circulation in 1,000s	No. of News-papers	Circulation in 1,000s
English	1	1,716	1	11,804	2	14,910	2	16,826
German	2	15,779	2	9,624	3	14,450	3	15,184
French	1	1,414	1	2,236	1	2,519	1	2,735
Greek	none		1	638	1	1,222	1	1,243
Arabic	none		none		1	792	1	1,149
Spanish	none		1	572	1	750	1	801

*Source: *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 143

**TABLE 3. TOTAL ANNUAL PUBLICATION OF SOVIET MAGAZINES IN
VARIOUS FOREIGN LANGUAGES IN SELECTED YEARS**

Language	1959		1964		1969		1970	
	No. of Magazines	Circulation 1,000's	No. of Magazines	Circulation 1,000's	No. of Magazines	Circulation 1,000's	No. of Magazines	Circulation 1,000's
English	10	1,948	14	3,727	13	3,844	14	4,048
German	6	2,916	10	2,843	9	2,091	10	2,139
Spanish	7	1,043	11	1,723	9	1,967	9	2,121
Hindi	1	65	1	865	2	1,513	2	1,495
French	7	914	14	812	12	1,255	12	1,176
Arabic	2	320	2	222	2	442	3	537
Vietnamese	none		none		1	304	1	334
Bengali	none		none		1	221	2	348
Japanese	2	130	2	158	2	164	2	230
Urdu	1	33	1	50	1	97	1	90
Italian	none		none		1	79	1	168
Korean	2	568	2	62	2	54	2	58
Chinese	3	4,395	3	1,101	2	50	2	29
Serbo-Croat	1	9	1	20	1	30	1	31
Persian	none		none		1	18	1	40
Swedish	none		1	1	2	11	2	5
Greek	none		none		1	3	1	11

The following table lists the five leading subjects in each language with the number of titles and copies in each subject (in some languages there were fewer than five subjects published):

TABLE 4. BOOK PUBLISHING BY LANGUAGE
AND SUBJECT - 1970

Language	Subjects	Titles	Copies
Afrikaans	Philology, linguistics	1	2,000
Albanian	Philology, linguistics	1	1,000
Amharic	Philology, linguistics,	1	2,000
	literature, folklore	1	1,000
Arabic	Marxism-Leninism,	16	197,000
	literature, folklore,	6	38,000
	natural science, mathematics,	3	35,000
	technology, industry,	3	26,000
	military science	2	17,000
Bengali	Marxism-Leninism,	8	129,000
	literature for children	3	45,000
	literature, folklore,	1	16,000
	philology, linguistics	1	12,000
Burmese	Philology, linguistics	1	Unknown
Chinese	Marxism-Leninism,	5	50,000
	international relations	4	20,000
	Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.	2	15,000
Dutch	Literature for children,	1	6,000
	philology, linguistics	1	3,000
English	Culture, education, textbooks,	161	10,512,000
	philology, linguistics,	130	4,912,000
	Marxism-Leninism,	32	924,000
	Communist construction in U.S.S.R.,	31	714,000
	natural science, mathematics	28	640,000
Esperanto	Philology, linguistics	1	15,000
Farsi	Literature for children	1	Unknown

TABLE 4. (cont.)

Language	Subjects	Titles	Copies
Finnish	Communist construction in U.S.S.R.,	1	20,000
	atheism, science, religion,	1	10,000
	Marxism-Leninism,	2	6,000
	history,	1	5,000
	literature, folklore	4	4,000
French	Culture, education, textbooks,	63	1,963,000
	philology, linguistics,	33	896,000
	Communist construction in U.S.S.R.	15	520,000
	public health, medicine	8	410,000
	art	16	378,000
German	Culture, education, textbooks	120	13,102,000
	philology, linguistics	130	3,461,000
	transportation	18	420,000
	Communist construction in U.S.S.R.	14	326,000
	international relations	5	220,000
Gujarati	Literature for children	3	13,000
	Marxism-Leninism	4	11,000
	literature, folklore	1	3,000
Hausa	Philology, linguistics	1	1,000
	Marxism-Leninism	1	1,000
Hindi	Literature for children	5	130,000
	Marxism-Leninism	4	12,000
	literature, folklore	2	7,000
	culture, education, textbooks	1	3,000
	history	1	2,000
Indonesian	Literature for children	3	45,000
Italian	Philology, linguistics	1	25,000
	natural science, mathematics	1	8,000
	military science	1	1,000
Japanese	Philology, linguistics	4	61,000
	Marxism-Leninism	2	16,000
	CPSU	1	9,000
	literature, folklore	2	8,000
Kurdish	Culture, education, textbooks	1	1,000


TABLE 4. (cont.)

Language	Subject	Title	Copies
Malayan	Literature for children	6	43,000
	literature, folklore	3	9,000
	Marxism-Leninism	2	7,000
Norwegian	Philology, linguistics	1	2,000
Punjabi	Literature for children	4	16,000
	literature, folklore	2	9,000
Persian	Literature for children	1	15,000
	culture, education, textbooks	1	2,000
Portuguese	Philology, linguistics	1	1,000
Serbo-Croat	Philology, linguistics	5	69,000
	Marxism-Leninism	2	20,000
	state and law	1	10,000
Sinhalese	General reference books, encyclopedias	1	1,000
Somali	Philology, linguistics	1	3,000
Spanish	Literature for children,	12	1,355,000
	Marxism-Leninism,	25	399,000
	philology, linguistics,	7	307,000
	culture, education, textbooks,	8	104,000
	natural science, mathematics	7	94,000
Swahili	Marxism-Leninism	1	1,000
Swedish	Communist construction in U.S.S.R.	1	20,000
Tamil	Marxism-Leninism,	6	84,000
	literature for children,	2	32,000
	literature, folklore,	3	29,000
	general reference books, encyclopedias,	1	20,000
	history	1	5,000
Telugu	Literature for children,	5	28,000
	Marxism-Leninism,	1	9,000
	literature, folklore,	1	8,000
	natural science, mathematics,	1	5,000
	history	1	3,000
Urdu	Marxism-Leninism,	4	31,000
	literature for children,	2	15,000

TABLE 4. (cont.)

Urdu	literature, folklore,	1	8,000
	general reference books,	1	5,000
	philology, linguistics	1	3,000
Vietnamese	Marxism-Leninism,	19	212,000
	literature for children,	2	50,000
	international relations,	5	50,000
	C.P.S.U.	2	35,000

Language	Titles (Books)					Titles (Pamphlets)				
	1956	1960	1965	1969	1970	1956	1960	1965	1969	1970
Afrikaans	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2
Albanian	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Amharic	-	1	10	2	2	-	1	27	3	3
Arabic	7	38	43	62	36	27	212	199	652	372
Bengali	1	29	10	9	13	20	125	38	153	202
Burmese	-	4	-	-	1	-	8	-	-	Unknown
Chinese	-	-	2	5	11	-	-	5	20	85
Dutch	-	5	-	4	2	-	20	-	19	9
Esperanto	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	2	15
English	240	370	480	508	533	7743	14603	18545	20762	21406
Farsi	-	2	1	3	1	-	5	Unknown	8	Unknown
Finnish	43	30	35	19	11	424	Unknown	153	109	49
French	118	178	268	245	267	2261	5492	3685	4861	5899
German	151	221	262	341	359	16990	18489	18134	21035	18374
Greek	-	-	6	-	1	-	-	17	-	2
Gujarati	-	-	-	4	8	-	-	-	19	27
Hausa	-	-	5	-	2	-	-	14	-	2
Hebrew	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	13	-
Hindi	-	37	26	18	15	-	185	220	220	157
Indonesian	-	4	-	-	3	-	35	-	-	45
Italian	-	1	3	4	3	-	10	38	77	34
Japanese	2	3	12	11	9	3	13	84	79	94
Kurdish	-	6	5	3	1	-	6	3	3	1
Malayalan	-	-	-	9	11	-	-	-	100	59
Marathi	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	3	13	-
Norwegian	-	1	2	-	-	-	3	6	-	-
Punjabi	-	1	-	5	6	-	1	-	27	25
Persian	-	14	8	9	3	-	49	174	106	27
Portugese	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	25
Serbo-Croat	4	2	1	3	9	17	10	11	50	104
Sinhalese	-	-	4	2	1	-	-	25	11	10
Somali	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
Spanish	3	87	136	122	124	248	736	2033	2100	1848
Swahili	-	-	17	2	1	-	-	50	4	1
Swedish	8	6	10	2	1	40	40	27	16	20
Tamil	-	3	8	10	14	-	11	48	80	170
Tagalog	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
Telugu	-	-	8	5	10	-	-	37	32	58
Urdu	5	26	1	11	10	60	60	3	100	76
Vietnamese	-	-	14	25	32	-	-	62	335	382
Zulu	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-
Total	582	1073	137	1450	1504	27833	40116	43641	51010	50587



The structure of the Committee on the Press.

11 languages in 1956; 40 million in 24 languages in 1960; 44 million in 27 languages in 1965; 51 million in 31 languages in 1969; and 50.5 million in 36 languages in 1970.⁴⁹ The foreign-language books published in the U.S.S.R. are classified under four broad categories: 1) Marxism-Leninism; 2) culture, education and textbooks; 3) philosophy and linguistics; 4) literature for children. A majority of the books published in foreign languages deal with "permanent" topics — Marxism-Leninism, Communist theory, history of the U.S.S.R., etc. A substantial part, however, is connected with current developments on the international scene. Thus, until 1967 few books dealt with Israel or Zionism, but in the period following the Six-Day War (1967–1973) the U.S.S.R. published 75 books on these topics, mostly in foreign languages. Some of them were published simultaneously in three to five foreign languages.⁵⁰

All publishing activities in the U.S.S.R., including sales are controlled by the Press Committee. This Committee directs the activities of the publishing houses, decides the topics and contents of the publications, coordinates the work of the trading organizations and determines the size of the editions. All foreign sales of books, magazines, newspapers, records, etc. are handled by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, an All-Union association under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga maintains close connections with its customers abroad. Advance announcements of new books and other publications are promptly sent, long before the actual publication date. In many countries, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga has local outlets, such as the Four Continents Book Store in New York. The Soviet Government assists the activities of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga by concluding cultural agreements with other countries, and also by including articles calling for cooperation in the press and publishing fields in international or bilateral treaties.⁵¹

No other country in the world engages in such extensive publishing activity. This is a tremendous propaganda effort, matched only by the propaganda activity of the Soviet radio.

IV. SOVIET RADIO. Radio is one of the most powerful instruments of propaganda. Books, magazines, delegations, films, etc., can be neutralized, simply by stopping them at the border. But radio knows no boundaries and can overcome almost every barrier. No instrument of propaganda can compete with the speed of broadcasting. There is yet another advantage: in the developing countries — and a substantial part of Soviet propaganda is aimed at these countries — the transistor radio is the preferred means of communication. While the written message is often unintelligible — because many people are illiterate — the spoken message “opens the road” for Soviet propaganda.

The Soviet propaganda authorities quickly realized the advantages of broadcasting in international propaganda. Moscow Radio’s studio broadcasts began in 1922, and its foreign-language broadcasts commenced in 1923.⁵²

The table below shows the total transmission time of Radio Center Moscow broadcasts for abroad 1955–1956. The totals are in hours and minutes per week and refer only to output from Radio Center Moscow and not from provincial broadcasting centers.

TABLE 6. MOSCOW’S FOREIGN LANGUAGE SCHEDULES

Language Service	April 1955	October 1955	April 1956
Albanian*	17'30"	24'30"	17'30"
Arabic	14'00"	14'00"	17'30"
Bengali	5'15"	8'45"	8'45"
Bulgarian*	7'30"	7'30"	3'30"
Cantonese	5'15"	5'15"	5'15"
Czech and Slovak*	10'00"	7'00"	7'00"
Danish	7'00"	7'00"	10'30"
Dutch	7'00"	7'00"	7'00"
English (U.K.)	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"
English (North America)	49'00"	49'00"	98'00"
English (Far East)	7'00"	7'00"	Nil

TABLE 6. (continued)

Language Service	April 1955	October 1955	April 1956
English (S.E. Asia)	7'00"	8'45"	8'45"
Finnish	14'00"	14'00"	14'00"
French	21'00"	24'30"	24'30"
German (Austria)	10'30"	12'15"	12'15"
German (Germany)	31'30"	29'45"	33'15"
Greek	14'00"	14'00"	14'00"
Hindi	3'30"	5'15"	5'15"
Hungarian*	8'00"	7'50"	7'00"
Indonesian	7'00"	7'00"	10'30"
Italian	21'00"	21'00"	21'00"
Japanese	21'00"	21'00"	21'00"
Korean	17'30"	17'30"	17'30"
Macedonian	7'00"	7'00"	7'00"
Mandarin*	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"
Mongolian	8'45"	8'45"	8'45"
Norwegian	10'30"	10'30"	10'30"
Persian	14'00"	13'25"	13'25"
Polish*	10'30"	10'30"	7'00"
Portuguese (Brazil)	7'00"	7'00"	7'00"
Portuguese (Portugal)	3'30"	3'30"	7'00"
Rumanian*	18'30"	18'30"	10'30"
Serbo-Croat	14'00"	14'00"	14'00"
Slovene	7'00"	7'00"	7'00"
Spanish (Latin America)	14'00"	14'00"	21'00"
Spanish (Spain)†	14'00"	14'00"	14'00"
Swedish	10'30"	10'30"	10'30"
Turkish	14'00"	14'00"	14'00"
Urdu	Nil	7'00"	7'00"
Vietnamese	7'00"	8'45"	8'45"
Musical programs	7'00"	56'00"	56'00"
	535'45"	607'15"	650'25"

* Including Moscow programs broadcast in the Home Service of the country concerned.

† Including broadcasts in Catalan.

TABLE 7. INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

(hours and minutes per week)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Western Europe											
Eastern Europe	256'00"	250'45"	234'00"	232'15"	186'50"	190'05"	254'25"	264'65"	274'05"	273'40"	278'40"
Middle East (Non-Arab)	88'00"	84'00"	90'00"	91'30"	92'00"	90'55"	90'05"	173'55"	273'00"	283'30"	241'30"
	134'10"	158'40"	158'40"	160'25"	156'20"	155'45"	165'00"	159'00"	161'55"	164'15"	164'15"
Arab World	50'10"	50'45"	50'45"	50'10"	50'10"	53'40"	60'00"	65'10"	75'40"	73'30"	74'30"
South Asia	80'30"	84'00"	71'45"	87'30"	12'00"	119'00"	136'30"	168'30"	202'00"	195'00"	102'00"
Africa (non-Arab)	42'00"	73'30"	112'00"	126'00"	129'30"	143'30"	147'00"	154'00"	164'30"	161'45"	165'15"
East Asia (Pacific)	119'00"	117'00"	180'00"	199'30"	232'45"	238'35"	259'35"	385'35"	399'35"	399'35"	434'35"
North America	158'00"	111'30"	105'30"	109'00"	88'00"	88'00"	111'10"	110'30"	111'30"	111'30"	111'30"
Latin America	56'00"	63'00"	120'00"	81'30"	95'30"	99'00"	132'40"	134'30"	137'00"	139'30"	139'30"
Other (worldwide or target not specific)	63'05"	73'35"	81'10"	199'20"	195'15"	195'45"	210'20"	193'50"	228'20"	229'50"	229'15"
World Total (with duplications)	996'55"	1067'15"	1204'50"	1337'10"	1338'20"	1374'15"	1567'25"	1809'55"	2027'35"	2032'05"	2041'00"
World Total (without duplications)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	1520'05"	1677'45"	1898'35"	1918'15"	1897'30"

TABLE 8. BROADCASTS IN SELECTED FOREIGN LANGUAGES

(hours and minutes per week)

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
Vietnamese	10'30"	10'30"	21'00"	21'00"	21'00"	21'00"	35'00"	35'00"	35'00"	35'00"	35'00"	35'00"
German (to Austria and W. Germany)	54'15"	54'15"	54'15"	54'15"	40'15"	42'00"	42'00"	51'30"* (3'30")	47'30"* (3'30")	47'30"* (3'30")	47'30"* (3'30")	47'30"* (3'30")
Chinese (including Mandarin, Cantonese; and Shanghai to China)	14'00"	12'00"	33'00"	42'00"	70'00"	70'00"	77'00"	182'00"* (70'00")	182'00"* (63'00")	182'00"* (63'00")	203'00"* (80'30")	206'30"* (80'30")
Japanese	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"	31'30"
Portuguese to Latin America	17'30"	17'30"	17'30"	17'30"	17'30"	17'30"	17'30"* (3'30")	17'30"* (3'30")	17'30"* (3'30")	17'30"* (3'30")	17'30"* (3'30")	17'30"* (3'30")
Spanish to Latin America	38'30"	45'30"	101'30" Cuban Missile Crisis	63'00"	76'00"	73'00"	66'30"* (7'00")	73'30"* (7'00")	73'30"* (7'00")	73'30"* (7'00")	73'30"* (7'00")	73'30"* (7'00")

* Includes Radio "Peace and Progress" (shown in parentheses).

TABLE 9. BROADCASTS IN SELECTED FOREIGN LANGUAGES

(hours and minutes per week – including Radio “Peace and Progress” transmissions)

	April 1967	May 1968	April 1969	April 1970	June 1971
Vietnamese	171'30"	178'30"	283'30"	301'30"	297'30"
German (to West Germany and Austria)	222'30"	282'30"	224'00"	231'00"	171'30"
Japanese	301'00"	283'30"	309'45"	336'00"	247'30"
Chinese (including Mandarin, Canton- ese, and Shanghai dialect to China)	1729'00"	1648'30"	1463'00"	2866'30"	2894'30"
Portuguese to South America	165'00"	223'00"	136'30"	84'00"	77'00"
Spanish to South America	350'00"	304'00"	339'30"	294'00"	336'00"

TABLE 10. U.S.S.R. BROADCASTS IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES IN 1974

External Services
(hours and minutes per week)

	Reg.	P&P	M.	Total
A. Broadcasts to Europe	75'15"	3'30"	424'15"	503'00"
B. Broadcasts to East and Middle East and North Africa	91'30"	10'30"	87'30"	189'30"
C. Broadcasts to Africa		7'00"	157'30"	164'30"
D. Broadcasts to South and Southeast Asia	38'30"	39'30"	322'00"	400'00"
E. Broadcasts to Far East		112'00"	253'00"	365'00"
F. Broadcasts to the Americas	26'35"	18'30"	161'00"	206'05"
G. General Service (Fifth Program) Russian for Abroad			211'00"	211'00"
H. Radio "Voice of the Soviet Homeland" in Russian and other Soviet languages			28'00"	28'00"
				2067'05"

Reg. — Regional Centers. P&P — "Peace and Progress". M. — Radio Moscow.

The early appreciation of broadcasting's advantages as the supreme medium, unrestricted by international boundaries, has been reinforced as improvements in technology have expanded the capabilities of the medium. Furthermore, the needs of Soviet international propaganda have also expanded as new audiences had to be reached. Broadcasts in Asian languages began during World War II.⁵³ Africa appeared first on the Soviet broadcasting map in 1958; today broadcasts to Africa are conducted in 14 languages.⁵⁴

No argument testifies better to the ever-increasing appreciation of broadcasting in the U.S.S.R. than the steady growth of Soviet broadcasting. Between 1960 and 1970 the average daily number of hours directed at foreign listeners by Soviet broadcasters doubled, while the number of languages used increased from 45 in 1958 to 84 in 1971.⁵⁵ Another source puts the number at "67 languages of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and 70 foreign languages."⁵⁶ Exactly the same figures are given by yet another Soviet source.⁵⁷ Total broadcasting time in 1973 exceeded 2,000 hours a week.⁵⁸ Virtually the entire world is covered by Soviet radio broadcasting. In the words of Moscow:

The voice of the Soviet Union can be heard all over the world. Radio Moscow carries the truth about the first Socialist State in the world, about the achievements of the Soviet people. Radio Moscow tells its listeners about events in the world and supplies an objective evaluation of these events. The radio waves which emanate from Moscow carry the voice of solidarity of the Soviet people with all the peoples who are building a new life, who are fighting against imperialism and neo-colonialism, for peace and friendship between peoples.⁵⁹

In November 1964 a new Soviet radio station commenced broadcasting. Its name — Radio "Peace and Progress" (the "Voice of Soviet public opinion"). The Soviet Government disclaimed (and continues to disclaim) any responsibility for the content of its transmissions. The station ostensibly is an organization broadcasting under the sponsorship of the Unions of Soviet Writers, Journalists and Composers, A.P.N. (Novosti),⁶⁰ the Znanie (Knowledge)

Society, the Union of Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, etc.⁶¹ Its goals – in its own words – are:

... to mobilize the public in the whole world to promote a solution to such pressing problems for the whole of mankind as general and complete disarmament, repudiating of the use of weapons of mass destruction and banning their production, liquidation of the vestiges of colonialism, repudiating the use of force and threat of employing force in international relations, respect for the sovereignty and national rights of all states and peoples. We are guided by the conviction that the guarantee for success in this lies in the consolidation and unification of the efforts of all the peace-loving countries, of all of progressive mankind. . . .

... Radio "Peace and Progress" openly, and in no uncertain terms, voices class solidarity with the people of labor, it voices the Soviet Union's unswerving support for all those who are struggling for liberation from colonialist and imperialist dictates from fascist regimes, supporting those who want to become the masters of their own homes. . . . This is the voice of a Socialist society whose banner is an irreconcilable struggle against the system of exploitation of man by man, against the system of wars and violence.⁶²

All this amounts to inflammatory propagandistic broadcasts, blatant interference in the domestic political affairs of other countries, and the use of abusive and subversive materials often offensive to foreign governments and leaders.

In August 1974 Radio "Peace and Progress" introduced "Radio Magallanes" – a program for "the Chilean people fighting fascism in their motherland." It was presented as "a means of expression given to Chilean patriots by the U.S.S.R." "Radio Magallanes" was a Communist broadcasting station in Chile during the regime of Salvador Allende. Many of the original station's announcers broadcast now from Moscow, among them Guilleriuo Radez, Volodia Tetelboim and others. The program promised "to help build a great anti-fascist front," to "free Chile," and encouraged the listeners to write to Radio "Peace and Progress so that the program might become "another echo of your tragedy, another report of your struggle. . . ."⁶³

The Soviet radio proudly defines itself as an instrument of foreign propaganda:

Now, we are often accused of being a propaganda station. Well, we are, actually. We are constantly driving home the idea of peace. We uphold action for peace and criticize all actions that go counter to this goal. . . . We believe that everyone has a right to free development and a decent standard of living. We believe in these things and say so in our programs, and that definitely is propaganda.⁶⁴

As with every other Soviet instrument of propaganda, Soviet radio is directed and controlled by the Soviet Government. The governmental organ performing the control function is the Committee on Radio Broadcasting and Television. It derives its legal authority from a decree in 1965 by the Council of Ministers approved by the Supreme Soviet in the same year. This decree also gave the Committee the authority to organize all internal and external broadcasting activities of the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ The Committee is headed by a chairman (presently S.G. Lapin, former Director-General of TASS). He is assisted by four deputy chairmen, each of whom is chief of a functional main directorate (for television, for internal radio broadcasting, for foreign radio broadcasting, and for administration). The Committee also includes the chiefs of the main directorates for local television and radio broadcasting and for external relations as well as several chief editors.⁶⁶ In addition, each main directorate is headed by a committee including the deputy chairman and the leading staff and chief editors who direct and guide their respective activities.⁶⁷

As in the case of printed material, the Soviet Government often includes articles on cooperation in the field of broadcasting in official international bilateral treaties. Such articles are included in treaties with Czechoslovakia, Italy, etc.⁶⁸

Several points of interest, connected with Soviet international broadcasting must be stressed. One of the disadvantages of broadcasting is the inability to maintain a direct connection between the propagandist and the audience, which means that, in many cases, the propagandist

does not know the size of his audience, its reactions, preferences, etc. Soviet radio uses several techniques aimed at improving the connection between broadcasters and the listeners. One of them is encouraging the listeners to write to Radio Moscow or Radio "Peace and Progress." Soviet authorities seldom publish the number of foreign listeners' letters received in a given year – and even when they do, one does not know whether the information is reliable or not.⁶⁹ Thus, in 1962 it was announced that Radio Moscow received 170,000 letters a year from listeners abroad.⁷⁰ Five years later it was reported that 120,000 letters had been received by Radio Moscow from abroad in 1967.⁷¹ Special programs such as "Mail Bag" and "Questions and Answers" also promote connections between listeners and broadcasters.

Another technique for developing contacts is to organize competitions or quizzes on the radio. Thus, in 1963, Soviet Radio held a "competition on Soviet-Iranian relations." The competition was, of course, intended for Iranian listeners. The final results were announced at 1640 GMT on April 26, 1963. The announcer broadcast that, in view of the many "wonderful letters" in which Iranian listeners expressed their pleasure at the improvement in Soviet-Iranian relations, the number of prizes would be increased. The first prize (a camera) went to Huseyn Shaikh Najafi, from Nazi-Abad, Teheran, with a second prize to two more listeners. A further 20 names were mentioned of people who were receiving prizes for good answers, and a further 80 were awarded consolation prizes.⁷²

Similar competitions were conducted for the Arab world⁷³ and for German⁷⁴ and British⁷⁵ audiences.

In addition to competitions, Radio Moscow encourages the establishment of "fan clubs." In 1963 Radio Moscow Listeners' Clubs were established in Nigeria and other African countries.⁷⁶ Later the Nigerian club was referred to as the "Socialist Radio Listeners' Club of Nigeria."⁷⁷

Soviet radio advertises itself in order to enlarge its audi-

ence. *Soviet Weekly* carries the list of weekly programs of the various Soviet stations, urging the British audience to tune in and listen regularly. The listeners are encouraged to write to Radio Moscow:

Did you know that a postcard to Moscow Radio will bring you the music of your choice? Or that a request to Moscow Mail Bag will bring an answer on the air to any question on Soviet life and views?⁷⁸

The listeners are also encouraged to follow the courses in Russian on Radio Moscow, by advertisements which resemble Madison Avenue slogans:

There is a special Russian course for English-speaking listeners, which will enable you to order those exotic dishes when you go to the Soviet Union in the summer on that holiday you have been promising yourself.⁷⁹

To cope with the problem of broadcasting in many foreign languages, Soviet radio employs large numbers of foreigners. In 1962 it was stated by Radio Moscow in a reply to a Danish listener that of those working in Moscow Radio's Danish section half were Danes and the other half Russians. The three permanent announcers were Danes, as was the translator, Erik Carlsen.⁸⁰

Programs featuring the high standard of living in the U.S.S.R., the absence of any racial discrimination, the friendship between African and Soviet students, etc., are the most frequently broadcast. The broadcasts are often embarrassingly puerile. Thus, a student from Mauritius, Jules Hamiol Sbressi, told his fellow countrymen that he had learned to dance with his Russian girlfriend. He added that nobody was surprised to see an African with a Russian girl.⁸¹

Soviet radio programs include news bulletins, political discussions and commentaries. Programs are aimed at a variety of audiences. Thus, there are special programs in English on science and engineering, Soviet geography, music, and request concerts, etc.⁸² For the Arab countries there is even a "Radio University" which clarifies basic concepts in Marxism to Arab audiences. Such a "University" was

activated in 1958⁸³ and again in 1963.⁸⁴ There are special programs for women,⁸⁵ for Russians abroad⁸⁶ and even for Georgians abroad.⁸⁷

In an attempt to give its broadcasts greater respectability Soviet radio (infrequently) presents letters of listeners criticizing some of the programs. The critics usually accuse Soviet radio of broadcasting too much propaganda,⁸⁸ or too much politics.⁸⁹ This, criticism is always rejected very bluntly by the Soviet radio authorities:

Those who systematically listen to Moscow Radio are always better informed and more capable of finding their way in the jumble of events than their compatriots who confine themselves to the information media monopolized by the ruling élite. This is why the number of letters lauding the role of Moscow Radio is growing, whereas the proportion of letters [words indistinct] is very small.⁹⁰

In conclusion, as one would expect, Soviet radio tries to reach as many listeners as possible. The number of broadcasting hours and languages are growing constantly, and more diversified programs are being introduced. The radio authorities proudly display large numbers of letters ostensibly sent by foreign listeners. Nevertheless, it seems that these authorities would very much like to know exactly how many listeners Soviet radio does have. For that purpose, listeners are encouraged to write in, competitions are organized, questions are answered, and even some "unfriendly" letters discussed. Still, according to Western sources, it seems that the effectiveness of Soviet radio is low and that both its audience size and its reliability are much lower than those of the Voice of America. In Tanzania, where listeners were polled, less than 1% of 725 men named Radio Moscow as the station which gives the most reliable information on world affairs; 2% of the same group named V.O.A. Among better educated men 6% named Radio Moscow and 12% V.O.A. In Senegal 41% of a group of 83 Radio Moscow listeners said they believed all or most of its news content while 46% of 260 V.O.A. listeners in the same country replied affirmatively to the same question. Radio

TABLE 11. RADIO MOSCOW AUDIENCE — SELECTED COUNTRIES
(Voice of America (VOA) in Parentheses for Comparative Purposes)

Country (date)	Target	Listened once a week or more often	Listened less often
Cyprus (1970)	Government and political leaders	0% (26) - more than once a month	
	Business leaders	3% (16) - more than once a month	
	Professionals	97% (58) - never listened	
Ethiopia (1969)	Some secondary education	17% (31)	
	Completed secondary education	15% (49)	
	Some university	17% (54)	
	Completed university	14% (61)	n.a.
		(listened at any time)	
France (1969)	Political and government officials	4% (3)	<i>Note:</i> VOA does not broadcast directly to France
	Business executives	6% (6)	
	Media leaders	3% (6)	
	Secondary school teachers	5% (6)	
	University students	6% (6)	
		<hr/> 5% (5)	
Great Britain (1969)	Government and political leaders	less than 1% (1)	5% (5)
	Media executives	less than 1% (less than 1)	5% (6)
	Business industrial managers	less than 1% (less than 1)	3% (7)
	University faculty members	less than 1% (less than 1)	2% (3)
	University students	less than 1% (1)	8% (15)

Honduras (1967)	Tegucigalpa residents	1% (7)	3% (17)
	University students	3% (11)	7% (30)
	Rural residents	1% (11)	2% (22)
Lebanon (1968, 1969)	University students	7% (9)	
	Creative-intellectual leaders	5% (11)	
	Media leaders	4% (4)	
	Combined target groups	1% (8)	n.a.
Nigeria (1969)	Government administrators, university faculty, university students, secondary teachers, media leaders, professional leaders, business leaders, labor leaders	12% (78)	25% (92)
Panama	Panama city residents	1% (5)	3% (14)
	University students	less than 0.5% (7)	1% (21)
	Rural dwellers	1-3% (9-20)	4% (20-40)
El Salvador (1967)	San Salvador residents	2% (8)	3% (20)
	University students	3% (11)	8% (32)
	Rural dwellers	1% (8)	3% (21)
Senegal (1970)	Political and government leaders, secondary school teachers, communications leaders,	13% (71)	
	Agricultural leaders, creative-intellectual leaders, university students	17% (70)	
	Secondary school students	5% (41)	

TABLE 11. (continued)

Country (date)	Target	Listened once a week or more often	Listened less often
Spain (1970)	Political leaders, managers, media executives	1 (2)	6% (3)
	Teachers, students	2% (less than 1%)	8% (3)
Tanzania (1970) English-language broadcasts	Those with elementary school education or lower	less than 1% (2)	
	Those with secondary or higher education	4% (9)	
Tanzania (1970) Swahili language	Those with elementary school education or lower	1% (1)	
Five Latin American countries: Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Mexico (1972) (Transistor contest)	All respondents	8% (89)	4% (4)

Moscow's signal strength was judged to be poorer than that of V.O.A. in such countries as Nigeria, Lebanon and Ethiopia.⁹¹

V. TELEVISION. Soviet propaganda authorities recognize the great potential of television as a medium for international propaganda. They are also aware that Soviet television will have to improve tremendously in order to compete successfully with "Capitalist world television."⁹²

The internal and international activities of Soviet television are controlled by the State Committee on Radio and Television of the Councils of Ministers. It must here be stressed that the international activity of Soviet television is rather small, and is usually restricted to providing Soviet TV films to Western TV stations. Thus, Soviet offerings to Eurovision have fluctuated from a total of 13 hours in 1965 down to 6.45 hours in 1969 and up to 57 hours in 1970.⁹³ The number of Soviet TV hours telecast in the West appears to depend to a considerable extent on current developments on the international scene. The low level of Soviet TV placements in 1969 may have been a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia the previous year, while the higher level of 1970 may be seen as a follow-up to French President Georges Pompidou's visit to the U.S.S.R.

While TV is still an undeveloped instrument of *direct* international propaganda, the U.S.S.R. is already thinking in terms of future use of TV "exclusively at the service of peace and the strengthening of friendship among the peoples." The U.S.S.R. also demands the exclusion from the television programs transmitted by satellite [of] material which harm the cause of peace and security, propagates the ideas of war, nationalistic and racial hatred, and material aimed at interference in the internal affairs of other countries.⁹⁴

It remains to be seen whether the U.S.S.R. will comply with its own demand – and refrain from turning international TV telecasts into another active instrument of international propaganda.

And finally, the coordinative organ. The Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. processes the policy directives of the Politburo and translates them into propaganda policy. That policy is then defined in terms of specific instruction and conveyed to the top men of each propaganda instrument or agency by a special coordinating committee. The members of that committee are the head of the Department of Propaganda (his name has not been published, but it seems that presently P. Demichev holds the position), his deputies A. Yakovlev, G. Smirnov, Y. Sklyarov and V. Medvedev, the chairman of the State Committee on Radio and Television, S. Lapin, the chairman of the Press Committee, B. Stukalin, and probably several more members of the Department of Propaganda. On the receiving end at these meetings are the heads of TASS (L. Zamyatin) and Novosti (I. Udal'tsov), the editors of the principal newspapers and magazines — *Pravda* (M. Zimyanin), *Izvestiya* (L. Tolkunov), *Partiinaya Zhizn'* (M. Khaldeev), *Communist* (A. Egorov), *New Times* (P. Naumov), the top men of the radio and TV, etc.⁹⁵ The main speakers at these meetings are usually leaders of the Party or the Government who clarify the specific goals and tasks of the particular propaganda campaign which is to be initiated to the members present at the meeting. Thus, when the campaign was connected with the Five-Year Plan, the main speaker was the Chairman of Gosplan, N. Baibakov.⁹⁶

It may be assumed that since the coordinating committee does not decide the propaganda *policy*, it deals primarily with the specific propaganda techniques which are to be utilized, the relative contribution of each propaganda instrument, the specific areas of emphasis and various other details.

VI. THE PROPAGANDISTS. The Soviet propaganda machine is activated by two kinds of propagandist. Soviet propagandists — mostly members of the Union of Soviet Journalists — and foreigners, usually utilized in their own coun-

tries, or in broadcasts and magazines aimed at their countries.

1. The Soviet Propagandists. We have tried to present (Table 12) a group of leading Soviet propagandists. Almost everyone connected with propaganda in the U.S.S.R. belongs to the Union of Soviet Journalists, which has more than 50,000 members, About 80% of them are members of the C.P.S.U. and about 82% of them have higher education.⁹⁷

A careful examination of the Soviet propagandists' chart reveals several interesting facts:

a. The "top men" very often lack any journalistic background. L. Zamyatin (Director-General of TASS), I. Udaltsov (Chairman of Novosti), M. Zimyanin (Editor-in-Chief of *Pravda*) and others are actually Party apparatus men. They have served in the past in responsible Party and Government posts, from where they were parachuted into top positions in the propaganda machine.

b. Propagandists of the middle-level key positions are usually journalists (broadly defined. . .), having served in the past abroad, as representatives of TASS, Novosti or other propaganda agencies. Many of them have served in various "Party and Government positions," a common combination which is repeated constantly. This indicates the existence of a consistent pattern, the propagandist preserving a constant connection with the Party, serving it not only through the propaganda machine, but also through its own apparatus.

c. Propagandists in charge of foreign broadcasts or foreign publication departments have usually served abroad in journalistic capacities, often more than once. K. Khachaturov (Deputy Chairman of Novosti and chief editor of the Latin America Department), P. Okumov (Editor-in-Chief of *Soviet Land*), G. Popov (chief editor of the Far East Department of Novosti), S. Losev (member of the TASS board), etc, exemplify this pattern. Apparently, service abroad is

considered vital for understanding the audience's mentality, characteristics and preferences. 'On returning to the U.S.S.R., these propagandists usually serve in positions directly connected with the organizational and operational aspects of international propaganda.

d. It seems that Party higher education is a prerequisite for promotion to top executive positions in the propaganda apparatus. S. Lapin, M. Khaldeev, L. Tolkunov and other top propagandists are alumni of the Party Higher School in Moscow. This is yet another indication of the special relationship between the C.P.S.U. and Soviet foreign propaganda — the Party preparing the executives of the propaganda machine, who in turn direct the machine's activity according to Party lines. It must be remembered that these men are subject to Party discipline, which ties them even closer to the C.P.S.U., its interests and directives.

e. Some special positions in the propaganda apparatus are reserved for typical Party apparatus men, who have no connection whatsoever with journalism. These are the Party "watchdogs," who maintain the links with the C.P.S.U., report to the Party, and supervise the performance of its propagandists. Notable in this group is A. Titov, the relatively young head of Novosti's cadres department. Titov is responsible for mobilizing propagandists, supervising and evaluating them. He has no journalistic background (or talents), and in the past has only fulfilled "responsible Party positions."

In conclusion, it seems that the Party—propaganda connection is undeniable. Soviet propagandists are Party men. While some of them have a journalistic background, others have a mixed Party—journalism background, while yet others have risen through the Party ranks; however, almost all of them are Party members, subjects of the Party propaganda machine and servants of Party will.

2. The Foreigners. Soviet international propaganda employs not only Russians but also foreigners — some of them live in

NAME	University Education	NUMBER OF POSTS HELD	Service Abroad	CURRENT POSTS
Ardanovskii, Vadim P.	★	◇ ◇ ◇	☆ ◇	Head of APN in Italy
Akimov, Yurii P.	★	◇ ◇	◇	Editor-in-Chief, Main Editorial Board Socialist Countries, APN
Alekseev, Pëtr F.	★	◆ ◇ ◇ ◆ ◇ ◇	◇	Editor-in-Chief of <i>Soviet Russia</i>
Beglov, Spartak	★	◇ ◇	◇	Political commentator – APN
Bogomilov, Anatolii V.		◇	◆	“A Party post of considerable importance”
Vlasov, Albert I.	★	◇	☆ ◇	First Deputy of APN, Chairman of the Directorate
Dyakov, Nikolai V.		◇ ◇	☆ ◇	Editor-in-Chief, Main Editorial Board for Study of Methods and Efficiency, APN
Davydov, Mikhail F.	★	◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆	◇	Deputy-Chairman of APN Directorate
Dvinin, Valentin F.	★	◇ ◇	◇	Editor-in-Chief, Editorial Board for Propaganda of the Soviet Radio Foreign Broadcasts
Zhukov, Georgii A.	★	◇ ◇ ◇ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◇ ◇	☆ ◇	Political commentator – <i>Pravda</i>
Zamyatin, Leonid M.	★	◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◇	☆ ◇	General Director – TASS
Zimyanin, Mikhail V.	★	◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆	☆ ◇	Editor-in-Chief – <i>Pravda</i>
Kraminov, Daniil F.		◇ ◇ ◆	◇	Editor-in-Chief – <i>Za Rubezhom</i>

TABLE 12. (continued)

NAME	University Education	NUMBER OF POSTS HELD	Service Abroad	CURRENT POSTS
Losev, Sergei		◇ ◇ ◇	☆ ◇	Editor-in-Chief, foreign news section, TASS
Lomeiko, Vladimir B.		◆ ◇	☆ ◇	Head of APN Bureau in West Germany
Larin, Vladimir Y.	★	◆	◇	Director of APN publishing house
Lapin, Sergei G.	★	◇ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◇	☆ ◆	Chairman of State Committee of Radio and TV broadcasts
Naumov, Pavel A.	★	◇ ◆	☆ ◇	Editor-in-Chief – <i>New Times</i>
Popov, Grigorii P.	★	◆ ◆	◇	Editor-in-Chief, Main Editorial Board Far East, APN
Petrov, Vyacheslav I.		◇ ◆	◇	Editor-in-Chief – radio program <i>Mayak</i>
Pogodin, Aleksander S.		◇ ◇	◆	Editor-in-Chief, Editorial Board for Radio Propaganda to the Western World
Romanov, Aleksei	★	◇ ◇ ◇ ◆ ◆ ◆	◆	Chairman of Committee of Cinematography
Romanov, Pavel K.	★	◆ ◆ ◆ ◆	◇	Director of Committee for Preservation of State Secrets (Chief censor)

Smirnov, Viktor M.	◇ ◇	☆ ◇	Editor-in-Chief, Main Editorial Board Latin America, APN
Stukalin, Boris I.	◇ ◆ ◆ ◇	◆	Chairman of Press Committee
Udal'tsov, Ivan I.	★ ◆	☆ ◇	Chairman of Directorate, APN
Tolkunov, Lev N.	★ ◇ ◆ ◆	◇	Editor-in-Chief – <i>Izvestiya</i>
Fedorov, Mikhail A.	★ ◇ ◇	☆ ◇	Deputy Editor-in-Chief – <i>New Times</i>
Khaldeev, Mikhail I.	★ ◆ ◆ ◇ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆	◇	Editor-in-Chief – <i>Partiinaya Zhizn'</i>
Khazhaturov, Karen A.	★ ◇ ◇ ◇ ◇	☆ ◇	Deputy Chairman, of APN Directorate
Cherniavskii Vitalii G.	★ ◇ ◆	◇	Deputy Director, Main Editorial Board, Capitalist Countries – APN
Shvakov, Andrei V.	★ ★	☆ ◇	Editor-in-Chief, Main Editorial Board Near East and Middle East
Palgunov, Nikolai S.	◆ ◇ ◇ ◇	☆	Former Director-General – TASS
Okumov, Rostislav G.	★ ◇ ◇	☆ ◇	Editor-in-Chief – <i>Soviet Land</i>

★ – University Education

☆ – Service Abroad

◆ – Party Functions

◇ – Journalist and/or Propagandist

the U.S.S.R. while others serve Soviet propaganda in their own countries. One of the centers for training foreign propagandists is the Patrice Lumumba Peoples Friendship University. The University was founded in 1960 "with the aim of helping African, Asian and Latin American countries train highly qualified specialists."⁹⁸ The founders were the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Afro-Asian countries, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the Soviet Trade Unions.⁹⁹ (The very same organizations founded Novosti several months later.) It was announced that tuition, accommodation and medical services would be free, that students would receive grants while studying, and that their fare would be paid to and from their home countries.¹⁰⁰

The Friendship University expanded rapidly. In February 1962 there were already 1,250 students from 75 countries.¹⁰¹ (At the same time, another Soviet source claimed that students from 65 countries were enrolled in Soviet higher educational establishments.¹⁰² A third Soviet source – *at exactly the same time* – maintained that students from 80 countries were studying in Soviet colleges and universities.)¹⁰³ In 1974 it was reported that 40,000 students from 100 countries were studying at Soviet universities.¹⁰⁴ About 5,000 students from 86 countries were studying at the Patrice Lumumba University.¹⁰⁵

The process of admission to the University is unusual, because of the role of the various Communist Parties. Usually, the Communist Party in almost every African, Asian or Latin American country is informed as to the number of available places reserved for that particular country's students. The information comes directly from Moscow – or through the Soviet Embassy. The local Communist Party dispatches to Moscow a list of candidates, and when approval is received, the candidates are sent to Moscow. The travel expenses, fees (if any), etc. are covered by the Communist Party and the educational authorities of the U.S.S.R. At the University, the students live in dormi-

tories and their free time is strictly controlled by the University authorities. The studies encompass a two-year course in Russian, followed by four to five years of intensive study in one particular subject, and political studies. While Soviet authorities usually refute any notion of political indoctrination at the Lumumba University, a Soviet source in 1962 partially admitted that fact:

People may ask whether we study Communism. But this is just like asking students in the United States, France, Britain or West Germany whether they study Capitalism and Colonialism in their universities.¹⁰⁶

Often the students from a particular country are summoned to publicly approve the Soviet Union's policy toward their country. Thus, in February 1974 a conference of Lebanese students was held in Moscow, at which "the Soviet-Arab friendship was hailed as a factor contributing to progress in the Middle East."¹⁰⁷

Throughout their stay in the U.S.S.R. many of the foreign students are utilized by the various instruments of Soviet propaganda. Some of them broadcast, usually to their own countries, while others translate Soviet propaganda material into their mother tongues.¹⁰⁸

Some of these students are officially appointed as announcers. Thus, in a broadcast in Swahili for Kenya, the speaker James Wamatu — a Kenyan student in Moscow — was presented as an announcer of Radio Moscow.¹⁰⁹ Mostly, however, the foreign students are utilized on a non-permanent basis, hailing Soviet policy, living in the U.S.S.R. and criticizing their own country's policy — if it does not comply with Soviet interests. When they return to their countries, their contacts with Soviet radio usually continue through the Soviet-African Friendship Association.¹¹⁰

When Soviet propaganda authorities are interested in intensifying their propaganda effort toward a certain country (or countries), the number of students from that country admitted to the Patrice Lumumba University in-

creases significantly. In the first part of 1974, when the importance of Soviet propaganda to the Arab world was enhanced as a result of improving Egyptian-American relations, and Moscow was obviously in need of personnel knowledgeable in Arabic, it was announced by the Soviet Higher Education Ministry that "at the request of Arab countries Soviet institutes and universities will, in the coming academic year, increase the number of students to be accepted."¹¹¹ At about the same time, whilst reviewing its increased propaganda effort toward the Arab world, Radio Moscow declared:

Radio Moscow is now the cause of anger and fear among all those who still impose repression and aggression in the Arab land and who try to dull the awareness of the Arab peoples in the struggle for the complete recovery of their legitimate rights which the Israeli aggressors have usurped. . . . Radio Moscow will continue this kind of exposure. . . . The efforts of Radio Moscow earned appreciation and respect in the Arab world.¹¹²

Soviet international propaganda also employs foreigners serving Moscow from their own countries. While most of them are admitted members of their native Communist parties, some of them have no visible connection with Communist agents. Many of them belong to various pro-Soviet "front organizations," ostensibly dealing with public matters while actually promoting Soviet interests.¹¹³ When an Israeli Communist "front organization" — "The Israeli Association of Fascism Fighters and Victims of Nazism" — issued a statement against the Zionist Conference in Brussels, it was published by most foreign-language newspapers of the U.S.S.R., and broadcast by Radio Moscow.¹¹⁴

In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israel Communist Party exerts a substantial propaganda effort. Its Secretary-General, Meir Vilner, is often quoted by Soviet newspapers and radio, attacking the policy of the Israeli Government,¹¹⁵ praising Soviet policy in the Middle East,¹¹⁶ condemning Israeli-American Connections,¹¹⁷ deploring Chinese policy in the Middle East,¹¹⁸ praising the Soviet Union for its assistance to the Jews during World

War II and the religious freedom and equality it allows its Jewish citizens,¹¹⁹ and condemning U.S. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Henry Kissinger as a Zionist agent. . . .¹²⁰

The Israeli Communist Party is quoted not only in matters relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In 1963 the Israeli Communists were quoted "condemning the repressions of the new Iraqi Government, maltreating Communists and democrats – patriots of Iraq. . . ."¹²¹

Soviet propaganda also exploits, in addition to Communist Party members, letters-from readers and listeners. It has already been mentioned that Soviet radio has programs such as "Questions and Answers," "The Mail Bag," etc. Every Soviet newspaper or magazine also has a large section devoted to readers' letters. Many of these letters criticize the "anti-Soviet policy" of the writers' countries. In one of these letters, for instance, the Israeli Government was accused by an Israeli citizen of turning Israel into an American base and "strengthening the ties between the Zionist rulers and Yankee imperialism,"¹²²

Sometimes, Soviet propaganda uses misquoted statements of prominent personalities in order to prove or enhance some point. Thus, the Israeli professors J. Talmon, Y. Arieli, N. Rotenstreich and others were misquoted by *International Affairs*, in matters pertaining to the Middle East conflict, and were pronounced "opponents of Zionism."¹²³ As all of them are, in fact recognized Zionists, they protested at the way Soviet propaganda had used their names. Even quotations by various Israeli leaders are sometimes used by Soviet propaganda – if they promote Soviet interests. It is not usually made clear when or where the particular leader made his statement. Thus, the ex-Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir was quoted as stating "his exasperation and anger caused by the steady decrease in the number of immigrants to Israel."¹²⁴ There was no indication as to when or where Mr. Sapir had made this statement.

A very interesting case in the way the subject of Soviet Jews and immigrants to Israel has been used in the service of

Soviet propaganda. (This particular aspect of Soviet propaganda will be discussed later.)

We have tried to cover the major instruments of Soviet international propaganda, and intentionally bypassed many others: films, sports, exhibitions, delegations, conferences, congresses and many, many others are actually instruments of Soviet foreign propaganda. While it is impossible to deal with them all in one single study, the activities of at least some of them will be analyzed in the following chapter.

NOTES

1. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Progress, Moscow, 1965, Vol. 43, p. 94.
2. *Ibid.*, Vol. 24, p. 432.
3. Cited in V.I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, Pechatnyi Dvor, Leningrad, 1930, p. 380.
4. V.I. Lenin, *What Is to Be Done?*, International Publishers, New York, 1969, p. 67.
5. *Ibid.*
6. F. Barghoorn, *Politics in the U.S.S.R.*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1966, pp. 114-115.
7. L. Ilyichev et al. (eds.), *Partiinaya Propaganda i Sovremennost*, ("Party Propaganda and Present Times"), Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1963, p. 50.
8. A. Efimov and P. Pozdnyakov, *Nauchnye Osnovy Partinoy Propagandy* ("The Scientific Foundations of Party Propaganda"), Mysl', Moscow, 1966, p. 19.
9. Nikolai I. Bukharin, *Programme of the World Revolution*, No. 18 of a volume of pamphlets, Socialist Labour Press, Glasgow, p. 63, quoted by Vera A. Micheles, in "The U.S. and Russia," *Foreign Policy Information Service*, Vol. IV (1928-29), No. 25, p. 482.
10. J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, International Publishers, New York, 1942, p. 653, quoted in Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff," *American Political Science Review*, March 1950, p. 72.
11. *Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta*, No. 28, March 1921.
12. *Ibid.*, No. 36, Dec. 15, 1921.

13. A. Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967, p. 32.
14. *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, No. 2, 1930, pp. 70-72, Nos. 3-4, 1930, p. 86.
15. A. Inkeles, *op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.
16. John Clews, *Soviet Propaganda Techniques*, Methuen and Co., London, 1964, pp. 12-13.
17. Mark Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union*, Pegasus, New York, 1970, p. 140.
18. L. Nemzer, "The Kremlin Professional Staff," *APSR*, March 1950, pp. 73-76.
19. These units were mentioned apparently by *Sovetskaya Pechat'* (Nov. 11, 1966, p. 3). While they apparently cover almost all aspects of the mass media, it seems to us that there must be at least two or three more units. The absence of a film unit, for instance, would be surprising.
20. One of the indications that Demichev is in charge of propaganda is the fact that he chaired the IV Congress of the Union of the Soviet Journalists (*Zhurnalists*, No. 1, 1972, p. 2).
21. *Zhurnalists*, No. 12, 1973, p. 29.
22. N. Palgunov, *Osnovy Informatsii v Gazete, TASS: ego rol'* ("Bases of Information in the TASS Gazette: Its Role"), Moscow University Press, Moscow, 1955, p. 27.
23. *O Partiinoi i Sovetskoi Pechati: sbornik dokumentov* ("Party and Soviet Press: Collected Documents"), Politizdat, Moscow, 1954, pp. 180-181.
24. *Zhurnalists*, No. 12, 1973, p. 29.
25. Data compiled from: Palgunov, *op. cit.*, p. 29; *World Communication*, Paris, 1966, p. 366; *Zhurnalists*, No. 1, 1967, p. 77; and TASS International Service, Jan. 8, 1968.
26. *Zhurnalists*, No. 1, 1972, p. 5.
27. *Zhurnalists*, No. 12, 1973, p. 31.
28. A. Lunev, *Administrativnoe Pravo* ("Administrative Law"), Publishing House of Juridical Literature, Moscow, 1967, p. 96.
29. *Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1972.
30. N. Palgunov, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
32. *Zhurnalists*, No. 12, 1973, p. 31.
33. T. Kruglak, *The Two Faces of TASS*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962, pp. 189-210.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
35. T.I. Vlasov et al. (eds.), *Gazetnyi Mir* ("World Gazette"), Politizdat, Moscow, 1971, p. 118.

36. *Ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 116, 117.
38. N.G. Bogdanov and B.A. Vyazemskii, *Spravochnik Zhurnalista* ("Journalist's Manual"), *Lenizdat*, Leningrad, 1965, pp. 166-171.
39. *Newsweek*, March 8, 1971, p. 13.
40. N. Bogdanov et. al. (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 169.
41. *Zhurnalist*, No. 1, 1972, p. 5.
42. *Ibid.*
43. V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Progress, Moscow, 1965, Vol. IV (1), p. 114.
44. *Small Soviet Encyclopedia* (2nd edition), Vol. VII, pp. 634-635.
45. *Periodicals of the U.S.S.R.*, 1975. In addition to these, each Soviet Embassy abroad publishes a periodical *News Bulletin* in the local language.
46. Information compiled from *New Times*, 1943-74.
47. It should be pointed out that the Arab edition of *Soviet Union* began to appear by the end of 1956 - immediately after the Sinai Campaign (E. Kirkpatrick, *Year of Crisis*, MacMillan, New York, 1957, p. 137).
48. *Zhurnalist*, No. 9, 1972, p. 2 puts the number as "more than 1,320,000,000 copies yearly."
49. *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, USIF Research Service, Washington, 1972, p. 45.
50. *Jews in Eastern Europe*, Vol. V, No. 3, Aug. 1973, pp. 64-67.
51. Article 6 of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation of May 27, 1971, as published in the *New York Times* of May 28, 1971, is an example of governmental assistance to *Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga*.
52. Radio Moscow in English for South and Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, May 7, 1974, *SU/4596/*.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Radio Moscow in French for Africa, 1800 GMT, May 7, 1974, *SU/4596/*.
55. *Problemy Televideniya i Radio*, Nauka i Tekhnika, Moscow, 1971, pp. 201, 202.
56. *Zhurnalist*, No. 9, 1972, p. 2.
57. Radio Moscow in English for South and Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, May 7, 1974, *SU/4596/*.
58. *U.S.S.R. External Services Schedule 1973/74*, *BBC 160/73*, Oct./Nov. 1973.

59. Radio Moscow in English for South and Southeast Asia, 1100 GMT, May 7, 1974, *SU/4596/*.
60. The association of Radio "Peace and Progress" with Novosti is very obvious. Not only are the founders, the manner of establishment and the style identical, but the people broadcasting through R.P.P. are usually Novosti men.
61. Editorial report, *SU/2320/*, Nov. 1966.
62. Radio "Peace and Progress" in English for Abroad, 1030 and 1530 GMT, May 7, 1974 (also in French for Southeast Asia and in English for Central America), *SU/4596/*.
63. Radio "Peace and Progress" in Spanish for Latin America, 0130 GMT, Aug. 23 and 24, 1974, *SU/4688/*.
64. Radio Moscow in English for Great Britain and Ireland, 1900 GMT, May 7, 1974, *SU/4596/*.
65. A. Lun'ev, *op. cit.*, pp. 423-424.
66. *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, USIF Research Service, Washington, 1972, pp. 24-25.
67. *EBU Review*, No. 117 B, Sept. 1969, p. 21, cited in *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, p. 25.
68. S. Romanovskii, *Menhdunarodnye Kul'turnye i Nauchnye Svyazi SSSR* ("International Cultural and Scientific Relations of the U.S.S.R.") Mezhd. Otnosheniya, Moscow, 1966, pp. 186, 195.
69. Radio Moscow in Albania 1900 GMT, May 7, 1963, *SU/w213/* declared that it received 245,000 letters from abroad during 1962.
70. Radio Moscow in Hungarian, 2030 GMT, May 7, 1962, *SU/w161/*.
71. B. Myasoedov, *Ideinoe Bogatstvo Narodu* ("The Ideological Wealth of Nations"), Statistika, Moscow, 1970, p. 69.
72. Radio Moscow in Iranian, 1640 GMT, April 26, 1963, *SU/1236/*.
73. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1730 GMT, Sept. 13, 1963, *SU/1353/*.
74. Radio Moscow in German, 1630 GMT, Feb. 24, 1962, *SU/881/*.
75. *Soviet Weekly*, July 9, 1959.
76. Radio Moscow in English for Africa, 1700 GMT, Feb. 24, 1963, *SU/1185/*.
77. Radio Moscow in English for South Africa, 1700 GMT, Sept. 8, 1963, *SU/1348/*.
78. *Soviet Weekly*, May 27, 1972.
79. *Soviet Weekly*, Jan. 6, 1973.
80. Radio Moscow in Danish, 1930 GMT, Jan. 17, 1962, *SU/848/*.
81. Radio Moscow in French for Africa, 1700 GMT, Dec. 23, 1963, *SU/1439/*.

82. *Soviet Weekly*, May 27, 1972.
83. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1730 GMT, Dec. 12, 1958, *SU/986/*.
84. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1730 GMT, Sept. 12, 1963, *SU/1352/*.
85. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1000 GMT, Feb. 21, 1962, *SU/879/*.
86. Radio Moscow in Russian, 2000 GMT, Oct. 20, 1963, *SU/1385/*.
87. Radio Moscow in German, 1812 GMT, Nov. 18, 1973, *SU/4455/*.
88. Radio Moscow in German, 1633 GMT, March 24, 1973, *SU/4256/*.
89. Radio Moscow in English for Africa, 1830 GMT, Feb. 25, 1973, *SU/4323/*.
90. Radio Moscow in German, 1633 GMT, March 24, 1973, *SU/4256/*.
91. *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, USIF Research Service, Washington, 1972, pp. 30-31.
92. *Zhurnalists*, No. 10, 1969, pp. 28-29.
93. *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, USIF Research Service, Washington, 1972, p. 33.
94. TASS in Russian for Abroad, 0545 GMT, May 14, 1974, *SU/4600/*.
95. While the existence of the coordinating committee has not been admitted by Soviet authorities, careful examination of the "In the Department of Propaganda" column of *Zhurnalists* (which periodically reports "information meetings" with the top men of the propaganda apparatus) leads one to the conclusion that such a committee does exist.
96. *Zhurnalists*, No. 3, 1971, p. 5.
97. *Zhurnalists*, No. 1, 1972, p. 5.
98. J. Fondem, "Moscow's Friendship University," *New Times*, No. 8, 1962, p. 20. At exactly the same time, another Soviet source - *Soviet Union*, No. 4, 1974, p. 4 - published an interview with V. Yelyutin, the U.S.S.R. Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. Yelyutin stated that "The Soviet Union is currently educating about 39,000 foreign students . . . from 123 countries. . . ."
99. *Soviet Weekly*, March 3, 1960.
100. *Ibid.*
101. J. Fondem, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
102. Radio Moscow in French for Europe, 1930 GMT, Jan. 25, 1962, *SU/1856/*.
103. *Soviet Weekly*, Feb. 22, 1962.
104. TASS in English, 2121 GMT, Aug. 12, 1974, *SU/4681/*.

105. "Friendship University - Tenth Graduation," an interview with the Rector of the University, Prof. V. Stanis, *New Times*, Nos. 18-19, 1974, p. 23.
106. J. Fondem, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
107. Radio Moscow in Arabic, Feb. 21, 1974, *SU/4532/*.
108. Much of the information concerning the Patrice Lumumba Friendship University was imparted to the author by Carlos, a Latin American who had spent six years at the University.
109. Radio Moscow in Swahili, 1530 GMT, June 3, 1963, *SU/1269/*.
110. Radio Moscow in French for Africa, 1700 GMT, Oct. 31, 1963, *SU/1396/*.
111. Radio Moscow in Arabic; 1600 GMT, March 29, 1974, *SU/4565/*.
112. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1600 GMT, May 7, 1974, *SU/4595/*.
113. The "Front Organizations" will be discussed at some length in Chapter Four.
114. TASS International Service in English, 0615 GMT, Feb. 24, 1971, *Daily Report*, Feb. 25, 1971.
115. *Soviet Weekly*, April 17, 1971.
116. TASS in English, 1633 GMT, Jan. 8, 1973, *SU/4190/*.
117. *Ibid.*
118. TASS in Russian for Abroad, 0545 GMT (and in English 1723 GMT), Dec. 5, 1973, *SU/4469/*.
119. TASS in English, 1633 GMT, Jan. 8, 1973, *SU/4190/*.
120. Radio "Peace and Progress" in Arabic, 1430 GMT, May 21, 1974, *SU/4607/*.
121. TASS in English, 0644 GMT, Feb. 18, 1963, *SU/1179/*.
122. Shimon Rosen, "The Source of Israel's Troubles," *New Times*, No. 20, 1959, pp. 11-12.
123. L. Medvedko, "Zionism and Israel," *International Affairs*, No. 1, 1971, p. 63.
124. TASS in Russian for abroad, 1620 GMT and in English, 1745 GMT, July 1, 1974, *SU/4641/*.

Chapter Four

THE IMPREGNATIONAL PROPAGANDA OF THE SOVIET UNION

As has been said, one of the most crucial stages of the propaganda process is penetration of the audience's absorption screen. In Chapter Two, we tried to indicate that the vulnerability of the absorption screen depends on technical and rational factors. We termed as "technical factors" such characteristics of the propaganda message as are not connected with its contents or identity of source. Strength, clarity, audibility, intelligibility, etc., are all "technical factors." "Rational factors" we defined as characteristics of the propaganda source, the propaganda message's content and the audience, which all contribute to the degree of vulnerability of the absorption screen. The image of the propaganda source as conceived by the audience is probably the most important rational factor in the propaganda process. There can be no doubt that considerations concerning the credibility and motives of the propagandist — or of the propaganda source — affect the degree of vulnerability of the absorption screen. It can also not be doubted that trust and confidence in the propaganda source facilitate absorption, whilst unreliability and fallaciousness resulting in disbelief, increase the resistance of the absorption screen. The way in which the reacting recipient conceives the propagandist's sincerity, credibility, intelligence, interests, motives and values, determines whether or not a particular propaganda message will penetrate the absorption screen — and this often without any bearing on the propaganda message itself. Furthermore, since the absorption screen is but a projection of the individual's personality, it can *a priori* be set

by the reactor to automatically reject the messages of a source considered untrustworthy. No attempt is made to comprehend or even note the message, since its source has already been disqualified by the reactor as unreliable and untrustworthy.

Consequently, one of the most important problems confronting every propagandist is how to induce favorable attitudes toward his message. This is actually a long-term investment which is aimed at facilitating penetration of the audience's absorption screen by operational propaganda effort, comprising its impregnational stage.

A substantial part of Soviet propaganda is directed at weakening the anti-Soviet defenses of its prospective audience's absorption screen. It aims at facilitating the penetration of its operational propaganda by "drilling pro-Soviet holes" in the audience's absorption screen or, more probably, at turning that screen pro-Soviet. This is done by utilizing all possible channels of human communication, such as art, sports, literature and music, in a major effort to create a positive image of the U.S.S.R. Here is one of the great paradoxes of Soviet propaganda. *While the operational propaganda of the U.S.S.R. is ostensibly completely dissociated from Soviet interests or national purposes, and claims to promote altruistic ideas of international importance and universal, humanist appeal, such as peace, friendship, justice, etc., the impregnational propaganda of the U.S.S.R. concentrates on building up a positive image of the Soviet Union. While it also promotes — occasionally — the same ideas and ideals dealt with by operational propaganda, its major effort is directed toward building up goodwill toward the U.S.S.R., something which Moscow apparently hopes will make the Soviet State a more trusted source of propaganda.*

Apparently the line of thought followed by Moscow is that a positive attitude toward a country's art and culture is conducive to a generally positive image of that country. Spreading impregnational propaganda through cultural rela-

tions not only acquaints people with the historic, traditional and cultural heritage of the U.S.S.R., but also promotes a better understanding of Soviet culture and therefore also of the Soviet way of life. A better understanding of Soviet *cultural* life and ideas is capable of producing a better understanding of Soviet *political* life and ideas, which will subsequently increase trust and acceptance of Moscow as a source of political ideas and so will facilitate the operational propaganda of the U.S.S.R.

The employment of art and culture for propaganda goals is not a new idea in the U.S.S.R. Their importance as a means of propaganda was recognized long ago by Lenin¹ and since then has been repeatedly emphasized by his heirs, the majority of whom regarded themselves as connoisseurs and patrons of the arts. Since the establishment of the Soviet regime artists have been considered "frontline fighters in the ideological struggle,"² entrusted with the vital function of creating the Communist consciousness of the people.³ Furthermore, they have openly and officially been defined as propagandists:

Scientists, artists, writers, painters, musicians. . . as well as radio and television workers, are active fighters on the ideological front, passionate and insatiable propagandists of Communist ideas.⁴

The process of impregnational propaganda depends on two preconditions: the maintenance of official cultural ties between the U.S.S.R. and other countries, and the existence of pro-Soviet organizations (front organizations and friendship societies) which advance the Soviet cultural offensive.

I. CULTURAL AGREEMENTS. "Cultural agreements" as conceived by Moscow encompass a broad range of activities such as science, education, literature, the graphic arts, music, public health, sport, tourism and disaster relief.⁵ Since the U.S.S.R. is a centrally planned and controlled political system, so is its international propaganda. Hence the cultural ties between the U.S.S.R. and other countries are also conducted on a centralized, planned basis. As with

all other aspects of life in the U.S.S.R., it is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which "plans, conducts and broadens the cultural associations of the U.S.S.R. with other countries."⁶ The CPSU officially declares that these ties "supplement the battle of ideas fought by the Communist regime of the U.S.S.R."⁷ Consequently, Moscow strives to broaden its cultural relations with other countries as much as possible. By the end of 1973 it was disclosed that the Soviet Union maintained cultural ties with "about 120 countries." In the case of over 70 countries these contacts were founded on legal bases (in the form of cultural agreements, protocols, programs and plans).⁸ Another Soviet source at about the same time stated that cultural relations with only 50 countries were based on governmental agreements.⁹ In addition, the U.S.S.R. participates in 250 international cultural organizations.¹⁰

More than 17,000 Soviet "cultural workers" visit foreign countries annually.¹¹ In all cases, Soviet "cultural activity" is coordinated and conducted by the Cultural Relations Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹² The arrangements concerning cultural exchanges are usually made by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Culture. During 1972 alone this Ministry arranged trips abroad for "167 performing arts companies and groups, 150 experts in the cultural field to work on long-term contracts, and for more than 700 prominent cultural workers who met with their colleagues. More than 130 Soviet exhibitions were held abroad."¹³

The cultural agreements concluded by the Soviet Union and other countries on a bilateral basis can be grouped into three categories:

1. Agreements with Communist Countries. These are broad and vague agreements, usually unlimited in time. As a rule they include a mutual pledge:

... to assist the further development of cooperation and exchange of experience in the area of education, science, literature and art, cinema, press, radio, television and also in the area of public health, physical culture and sport.¹⁴

The operational clauses of this category of agreements are also very broad – apparently in order to ensure complete freedom of action to the U.S.S.R.

2. Agreements with the West. These agreements tend to be more specific and detailed, explicitly stating what cultural exchanges will take place, when and for how long. The duration of the agreement is specified (usually from one to three years), and each side reserves the option of prolonging it. Sometimes, as in the case of the Soviet-French agreement of 1966, a permanent mixed commission is established. The commission meets biennially to determine exchanges for the succeeding two-year period, to review exchanges currently in effect and to make any necessary changes.¹⁵

3. Agreements with the Countries of the Third World. These are the most interesting types of cultural agreements. Actually they go beyond the bounds of what can reasonably be conceived as a “cultural agreement” and are tailored to guarantee the U.S.S.R. the freedom to employ any conceivable instrument for conducting impregnational propaganda. Furthermore, the other country’s share in the agreement usually consists of sending students or journalists to the U.S.S.R., which in fact also serves the propaganda goals of Moscow. Certainly some of these visitors are utilized by Soviet radio’s international broadcasts and the foreign-language newspapers, and on their return home they activate the pro-Soviet Front or friendship organizations and societies of their native country. A typical example is the 1962 cultural agreement with Mali. In accordance with the agreement, the U.S.S.R. sent to Mali teachers and specialists to work in the educational system of that country, a group of circus and variety artistes, a football team and sports coaches. Soviet specialists helped in the “field of culture and arts,” and lectured on the system of higher and secondary specialized education in the U.S.S.R. A photographic exhibition – “Physical Culture and Sports in the U.S.S.R.” –

**TABLE 13. COUNTRIES WITH WHICH THE U.S.S.R. HAS
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS**

Afghanistan (1960)	Kenya (1964)
Albania (1956)	Kuwait (1967)
Algeria (1963)	Mali (1961)
Belgium (1956)	Mexico (1968)
Bolivia (1970)	Mongolia (1956)
Bulgaria (1956)	Morocco (1966)
Burundi (1964)	Nepal (1961; renewed 1964)
Cambodia (1957)	Netherlands (1967)
Cameroun (1962)	Nigeria (1962; renewed 1967)
Central African Republic (1965)	North Korea (1956)
Chad (1966)	North Vietnam (1957)
Chile (1966; renewed 1970)	Norway (1956)
China (Communist) (1956)	Pakistan (1965)
Colombia (1970)	Poland (1956)
Congo (Brazzaville) (1964)	Romania (1956)
Cuba (1960)	Rwanda (1966)
Czechoslovakia (1956)	Senegal (1962)
Dahomey (1963)	Sierra Leone (1965)
Denmark (1962)	Somalia (1961)
East Germany (1956)	South Yemen (1962)
Ethiopia (1961)	Sri Lanka (1958)
Finland (1948)	Sudan (1967)
France (1957)	Syria (1956; renewed 1962)
Ghana (1960)	Tanzania (1963)
Great Britain (1959)	Togo (1965)
Guinea (1959)	Tunisia (1963)
Hungary (1956)	Turkey (1964)
Iceland (1961)	Uganda (1965)
India (1960)	U.S.A. (1958)
Indonesia (1960)	United Arab Republic (1957)
Iran (1966)	Upper Volta (1967)
Iraq (1955)	Yugoslavia (1956)
Italy (1960)	Zambia (1966)
Jordan (1967)	

was arranged in Mali and samples of teaching aids, textbooks and programs were also sent. The Mali Republic sent 35 young people to study at Soviet higher educational institutions and technical colleges. A writer was expected to lecture at the African Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, a scientist to study the research organization in the U.S.S.R., and a group of musicians to study musical life in the U.S.S.R. and to establish contacts with musicians.¹⁶

An even clearer example is the 1974 program of cultural cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and Nigeria. "The program provides for broad cooperation in films, literature and the arts. The U.S.S.R. will offer Nigeria 100 scholarships to colleges, compared with 45 ten years ago." The document also pointed out that "there are 27 Soviet doctors working in Nigeria."¹⁷ The last part of the agreement is the most interesting, for it reveals the real intentions of Moscow, hidden behind the various "cultural agreements." In the words of Radio Moscow:

A large group of Nigerian newspapermen are expected in the U.S.S.R. this year to study the Soviet way of life at first hand. This is exceedingly important since few of them have visited the Soviet Union before, and quite a few of the articles in the Nigerian press indicate an insufficient acquaintance with the Soviet Union, as well as being evidently influenced by Western propaganda, which deliberately distorts the Soviet image. . . .¹⁸

The "cultural program" with Nigeria is an excellent illustration of Soviet impregnational propaganda at work. Nigerian journalists are being brought to Moscow, with the explicit intention of neutralizing the effects of "Western propaganda." It is clearly stated that the visit is intended "to acquaint them with the Soviet way of life" and thus to improve their impression of the U.S.S.R. which has been distorted by Western propaganda. The amazing fact is the Soviet admission that previous Soviet attempts to influence the Nigerian press had proven futile.

The Soviet-Nigerian "cultural program" and many similar treaties and agreements provide the legal basis for the U.S.S.R. to conduct impregnational propaganda. However,

they are only documents which outline the framework of future Soviet "cultural" activity in the respective countries and are but the first step in the Soviet impregnational propaganda process. The *implementation* of the cultural agreement's clauses, the *realization* of its goals are the crucial stages in the impregnational propaganda process. The major operational apparatus, which Moscow uses to facilitate the implementation of cultural agreements, and to assist in the achievement of Soviet impregnational propaganda goals, consists of the various pro-Soviet "Friendship Societies" and Front Organizations.

II. FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES. In 1972 there were 60 Soviet Friendship Societies in other countries.¹⁹ United under the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Friendship Societies are expected "to develop and strengthen the friendship, mutual understanding, confidence and cultural cooperation of the Soviet people with the people of foreign countries."²⁰

The supreme organ of the Union of Soviet Societies is the All-Union Conference, which meets every four years. The Conference elects a Council which functions between conferences. In turn, the Council selects a presidium which is the executive organ.²¹

The Union acts through its branches and cooperates with more than 6,500 cultural and mass organizations and many thousands of individuals in 134 countries and territories of the world.²² While Moscow claims that associations and societies for friendship and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. exist in nearly all countries, at the last All-Union Conference (October 1972) delegates from only 70 countries gathered in Moscow.²³

As usual, all activities of the Union are coordinated and guided by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Its present president, Nina Popova, is also a member of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee.²⁴ The holder of the top posi-

tion in each Friendship Society is one of the leaders of the local Communist Party.²⁵

The various Friendship Societies are actually the first-line regiments on the impregnational propaganda front. The range of their activities is rather broad, although there is always a common denominator: the promotion of some Soviet interest on the international scene. Several distinct activities of the Friendship Societies can be discerned:

1. Promoting Friendship with the U.S.S.R. This is the official *raison d'être* of the Friendship Societies and is doubtless one of their important activities. Friendship with the U.S.S.R. is usually served by organizing mutual visits, celebrating national holidays, developing ties with public organizations abroad, and acquainting people with the Soviet and Russian cultural heritage.²⁶ For this reason on the board of each Friendship Society there are always familiar writers, musicians and artists. Thus, the Soviet board of the Anglo-Soviet Society includes the poet Aleksei Surkov, Secretary of the Board of the Soviet Writers Union,²⁷ and the composer Dmitrii Kabalevskii.²⁸ Promoting friendship is rarely a goal in itself. For the U.S.S.R. it is usually a means for the achievement of other goals. This brings us to the other activities of the Friendship Societies.

2. Negotiating Cultural Agreements. While there can be no doubt about the question as to who initiates the agreements and works out the details, often it is the Friendship Society with a particular country which ostensibly handles the negotiations. In May 1974 a delegation of the Soviet Association of Friendship with the Peoples of Africa visited the Congolese People's Republic. It was announced that:

... the delegation engaged in a wide exchange of experience and discussion on ways to intensify cooperation between the two Associations. The Soviet visitors saw several enterprises in the areas of Brazzaville and Pointe Noire. They were received everywhere with great hospitality. A plan of cultural cooperation for 1974 was signed at the end of the visit; the two Associations are to have

regular exchanges of delegations; exhibitions are to be held in both countries. The Soviet Association will continue to assist in training Congolese experts; scholarships will enable young Congolese to study in the U.S.S.R.²⁹

A similar agreement was negotiated with Sierra Leone.³⁰

Since it can hardly be assumed that it is the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship which decides the number of foreign scholarships for studying in the U.S.S.R., or other issues connected with training foreign specialists in the U.S.S.R. it is obvious that the Union acts as a proxy of the C.P.S.U.

3. Promoting the Soviet Union's Immediate Interests in International Politics. This is an activity of obvious crucial importance to the U.S.S.R. Since Moscow frequently initiates "international campaigns" with the purpose of demonstrating the vast support its policies enjoy, the Friendship Societies' services are often needed to display that support publicly. Thus, during 1969, the Union

... actively participated in campaigns in support of the Vietnamese people in the struggle against the aggression of the U.S.A., [showed] solidarity with the struggle of the Korean people for the removal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the peaceful unification of the country on a democratic basis, and solidarity with the struggle of the Arab peoples for the liberation of their territory from Israeli occupiers, and supported the Greek patriots.³¹

Clearly, this is the area in which the Friendship Societies pass beyond the borders of impregnational propaganda, and openly participate in the Soviet operational propaganda effort. This is especially the case in Soviet-Arab relations. The House of Friendship in Moscow (the official center of the Union) is often used as a scene of political declarations and statements connected with Soviet-Arab relations. A ceremony at the House of Friendship to mark the 15th anniversary of the Soviet-Arab Friendship Society was utilized by the Jordanian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. to thank Moscow for its support of the Arab cause in international gatherings, and for Soviet economic and military assistance, as well as

for the support the U.S.S.R. rendered the Arabs during the 1956 and 1967 wars.³²

The same platform was also used by Yemen's Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. "to express profound gratitude to the Soviet Union for its firm support in the struggle of the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression and fanning up the flames of war, and on behalf of the establishment of a just and lasting peace."³³

On another occasion, the Egyptian Deputy Minister of Power, Abd-as-Salam Nahib, Secretary General of the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Society, who headed an Egyptian delegation taking part in a conference of the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Society "denied Western suggestions that the High Dam (Aswan) had not been worth the cost of construction, and claimed that an additional benefit had been the experience gained in industrial techniques."³⁴

Additional examples of the operational propaganda activities of the Friendship Societies in the Israel-Arab conflict will be cited later.³⁵

4. Promoting the Study of Russian Abroad. This activity warrants separate treatment apart from the category of promotion of friendship and cultural ties, because of the unusual significance which the U.S.S.R. attaches to it. The study of Russian is conceived by Moscow as "a means of facilitating mutual understanding and communication,"³⁶ but it is actually more than that. The study of the Russian language is a part of the long-term program of Soviet impregnational propaganda, designed to increase receptivity to Soviet and Russian culture, to improve understanding of, and receptivity to, Soviet aims and policies. It seems that the desire of foreigners to study Russian is also considered by the Soviets as evidence of an increase in Soviet prestige abroad. Provisions for arranging the study of Russian abroad were included in a declaration signed during the visit of the late French President Georges Pompidou to Moscow in October 1970; in a Soviet-Italian communiqué published in

October 1972 after a visit to the U.S.S.R. by D. Andreotti, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Italy; in a Soviet-American communiqué issued after the meetings between Soviet leaders and President Richard M. Nixon in May 1972; and in a Soviet-German agreement of May 1973.³⁷

Usually the Friendship Societies are the agents which organize the study of Russian abroad. In Great Britain, for instance, the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society provides Russian-language teachers for British schools and universities.³⁸ Sometimes the Union of Friendship Societies organizes preparatory courses for foreigners visiting Moscow by teaching Russian abroad. A Soviet source reported in August 1973 that "activists of the Soviet-Finnish, Soviet-Swedish and Soviet-Danish Societies met — at Friendship House — participants in the 8th International Seminar of Russian-Language Teachers from the Scandinavian countries."³⁹ In addition, Soviet universities offer educational institutions in Western countries assistance in expanding and improving Russian-language teaching. Often Soviet teachers and specialists on teaching methods are sent to work in West European universities.⁴⁰

The unusual significance which Moscow attaches to studying Russian abroad is the result of the officially stated conviction that such study "facilitates mutual understanding and communication." The study of Russian abroad clearly fits into the Soviet impregnational propaganda effort. It develops interest not only in the language itself, but also in the U.S.S.R. in general, and hopefully, "promotes better understanding." Of course, it also makes available enormous quantities of propaganda material in Russian to Western audiences.

5. Mobilizing Those who Sympathize with the Soviet Union. The Friendship Societies' premises abroad, which include libraries, "cultural centers," reading rooms, clubs, etc., are focal points for discovering, and nurturing pro-Soviet leanings. When they function unrestricted by local

authorities, the Friendship Societies aim their activities at all levels of the local population. They attract such fermenting elements as youth, activists in the peace movement, pacifists, etc., and try to direct their enthusiasm in the "right" direction, i.e., toward support of the Soviet cause. Some of them are activated in the various international "campaigns" initiated by the U.S.S.R., while others are sent to Moscow to study — and then return and act as agents of Soviet propaganda and/or form subversive organizations. Often they are utilized by the various instruments of Soviet international propaganda.⁴¹ Delegations of Friendship Societies visiting Moscow often broadcast over Radio Moscow. In such cases, the event is announced well in advance to ensure larger audiences in their home countries. When a delegation of the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society visited the U.S.S.R. in 1959, they broadcast several times over Radio Moscow to Britain. In all cases, the broadcasts were advertised in advance, specifying time and wavelength.⁴²

Members of the Friendship Societies studying in the U.S.S.R. maintain their connections with the Union of Friendship Societies. They participate in political seminars and discussions at Friendship House, and maintain organizational frameworks of "activists" within their home countries.⁴³

Thus, in 1963 the African Students' Association in the U.S.S.R. started a seminar under the title "U.S.S.R.—Modern Africa." It was to meet once a month, the Soviet-African Friendship Society cooperating in the seminar's work.

In this manner foreign students, members of the Friendship Societies, are constantly kept abreast of recent developments in international affairs, of Soviet interests, and of their specific tasks when they return home.

In conclusion, the Friendship Societies are created, sustained and directed by the Soviet propaganda apparatus. While ostensibly their only goal is the development of peaceful and friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. the Friend-

ship Societies are designed and expected to reach audiences normally unreceptive to Soviet operational propaganda. The idea was conceived in the 1920s, when Otto Kuusinen, addressing the Sixth Plenum of the 1927 Executive Committee of the Communist International, emphasized the need for creating non-Party mass organizations for specific purposes.⁴⁵ Since then, the Friendship Societies have become a major instrument of Soviet impregnational propaganda. They spread Russian language and culture, organize Soviet exhibitions, "days" or "weeks" of friendship, send students and delegations to the U.S.S.R. (and host such delegations) and above all, take an active part in various international campaigns which are initiated by the U.S.S.R. and are intended to further Soviet interests. The Friendship Societies are the fingers of the outstretched hand of Soviet propaganda, lowering and weakening the barrier of critical judgment of the recipient audience's absorption screens, and thus preparing the ground for Soviet operational propaganda.

Incidentally, the activities of Friendship Societies' members are highly appreciated by Moscow. A special Order of Friendship among Peoples was created, to be awarded to those "who have made great contributions to the strengthening of friendship among nations."⁴⁶ One of the recipients, for instance, was Raymond Marquie, member of the Presidium of the Franco-Soviet Friendship Society.⁴⁷ "Active members" of the Societies are often awarded prizes for their work⁴⁸ (usually trips to the U.S.S.R.).

The Friendship Societies' activities are supplemented by the more specific and vocal actions of the pro-Soviet Front Organizations.

III. THE FRONT ORGANIZATIONS. By "Front Organizations" we mean international Communist-sponsored public organizations which seem to have no connection with the C.P.S.U. and are actually designed to mobilize and unite individuals in as many countries as possible (on the basis of

profession, age, sex, etc.) in support of Soviet causes. These organizations are usually called "Front Organizations" because their purpose is to mask the fact of Soviet sponsorship and to conceal the real source and direction of their activities, which are usually propagandistic in nature. They also serve as recruiting grounds for local Communist Parties or provide a front for Communist activities in those places where the existence of Communist Parties is forbidden.

The first international pro-Soviet organization was International Workers' Aid, formed in the 1920s as a relief organization to collect funds in Europe and America for sending food to the U.S.S.R. Soon, however, the priorities of I.W.A. changed, and demonstrating international solidarity with the U.S.S.R. became its chief activity. The chairman, Willi Münzenberg, a German Communist, soon recognized the enormous propaganda potential of international pro-Soviet organizations, and in 1928 proposed to the Comintern a six-point program, the principles of which have not changed since then. They are:

- a. to arouse the interest of "those millions of apathetic and indifferent workers" who are not interested in Communist propaganda. They must be attracted in new ways;
- b. to act as "bridges" for those who sympathize with the Communists, but who have not taken the final step and joined the Party;
- c. by means of mass organizations to extend the Communist sphere of influence;
- d. to provide an organizational link with those sympathizing with the Soviet Union and with the Communists;
- e. to counteract the work of anti-Communist organizations;
- f. by means of such sympathetic and mass organizations to provide training for "cadres of militants and officials of the Communist Party possessing organizational skill."⁴⁹

Since the 1920s there has been a proliferation of pro-Soviet front organizations, a fact which speaks eloquently of their importance for the U.S.S.R. Thus, in the U.S.A.

alone, by January 1962 there were 663 organizations which had been cited as Communist or Communist fronts by various Federal Agencies and 155 organizations cited as such by State or territorial investigating committees.⁵⁰ All of them are affiliated to ten major pro-Soviet organizations, which are:

a. *The World Peace Council (W.P.C.)*, established in 1950 with headquarters in Helsinki. It publishes *Perspectives* and the *Information Bulletin*, a monthly in English, French, Spanish and German.

b. *World Federation of Trade Unions (W.F.T.U.)*, established in 1945, with headquarters in Prague. It is very strong organizationally, claiming a membership of about 140 million highly disciplined members. It has a sizeable following in France and Italy. The W.F.T.U. publishes a number of magazines, bulletins and pamphlets including: *World Trade Union Movement*, published six times annually in eight languages and with a circulation of about 45,000, distributed in 70 countries; *the Trade Union Press*, published monthly in six languages and distributed in 125 countries; *News in Brief*, a monthly news bulletin in four languages.

c. *The World Federation of Democratic Youth (W.F.D.Y.)*, founded in London in 1945, with headquarters in Budapest. In 1969 the W.F.D.Y. claimed a membership of 101 million from 200 youth organizations in 97 countries. Its major publications are: *World Youth*, a quarterly magazine in three languages; *W.F.D.Y. News*, a monthly news-sheet in three languages; *Youth Information*, a monthly news bulletin.

d. *The International Union of Students (I.U.S.)*, founded in 1946, with headquarters in Prague. In addition to supplementing W.F.D.Y. activities among students, the I.U.S. acts as a recruiting and clearing house for student scholarships to educational institutions in Communist countries. Its publications include: *World Students News* in five languages (a monthly journal); *I.U.S. News Service* in four languages (a bi-weekly bulletin); *Sport*; and *Young Film and Theater*.

e. *The Women's International Democratic Federation* (W.I.D.F.), established in 1945, with headquarters in East Berlin. The Federation in 1969 included organizations from 88 countries. W.I.D.F. publishes *Women of the Whole World*, a quarterly in five languages.

f. *International Association of Democratic Lawyers* (I.A.D.L.), organized in 1946, with headquarters in Brussels. It claims to have members from 40 countries, and publishes semi-annually the *Review of Contemporary Law*.

g. *The World Federation of Scientific Workers* (W.F.S.W.), founded in 1946, with headquarters in London. It purports to unite trade unions and creative organizations of scientific workers from 27 countries. Its official organ — *Scientific World*, a bi-monthly — is published in seven languages.

h. *The International Organization of Journalists* (I.O.J.), founded in 1946, with headquarters in Prague. It claims to unite 55 national organizations of journalists from many countries. In May 1970 its total membership was given as 150,000.

i. *The International Radio and Television Organization* (O.I.R.T.), established in Brussels in 1946. In 1969 the organization claimed 25 member countries.

j. *The International Federation of Resistance Fighters* (F.I.R.), formed in 1957, with headquarters in Vienna. It functions only in countries formerly occupied by the Nazis.

All Front Organizations are headed by international celebrities and are sprinkled with well-known Communist figures. They are actually run by general secretariats, composed of Communist activists, and controlled by the C.P.S.U.⁵²

The activities of the Front Organizations are mixed in character. While the majority clearly belong to the operational propaganda category, many of the means and methods of the impregnational propaganda arsenal are utilized. In this respect, the Front Organizations actually resemble the Friendship Societies, although their activity is much

more specific-issue oriented. Thus, at a Congress of I.U.S., held in Leningrad, the following resolutions were submitted and approved:

- a. a resolution on students' role in the struggle for peace;⁵³
- b. a resolution calling attention to the signs of an increasingly militaristic content of the education of youth in Western Germany;⁵⁴
- c. a resolution on colonialism;⁵⁵
- d. a special resolution on "the question of Jordan";⁵⁶
- e. a resolution on the state of education in Spain.⁵⁷

Similar resolutions, declarations, proclamations, etc. are frequently issued by the Front Organizations, on every issue of international importance, the common denominator of their activities always being:

- i. unreserved support for the Soviet stand on the issue involved;
- ii. close cooperation between the Front Organizations themselves, and between them and other Communist-controlled parties and unions;
- iii. getting enthusiastic, friendly publicity in the entire Communist-oriented press throughout the world;
- iv. use of printing and publishing facilities of local Communist Parties;
- v. unqualified loyalty to the U.S.S.R. and the C.P.S.U.;
- vi. undisclosed means of fund-raising and spending.

The connection with Moscow becomes obvious and categorical whenever a broad international campaign is inaugurated by the C.P.S.U. When the October 1973 war broke out in the Middle East, all pro-Soviet Front Organizations denounced Israel within a period of a few days, often in exactly the same words. The W.P.C. "protested against the barbarous actions of the Israeli Military" and expressed "its solidarity with the Arab peoples who [were] fighting for the liberation of their territory."⁵⁸ The W.I.D.F. "resolutely denounced the Israeli aggression against Arab countries" and "expressed anger and indignation against barbarous [Israeli] bombing."⁵⁹

The I.A.D.L. declared that the war was "a consequence of Israel's aggression."⁶⁰ All Front Organizations demanded that "all public organizations in all countries launch a wide campaign in protest against the barbarous actions of the Israeli Military."⁶¹

Similar unity and unanimity were demonstrated on issues such as the Vietnam war, Angela Davis, and many others.

It is obvious that the Front Organizations clearly belong to Soviet operational propaganda; but they employ many of the Friendship Society methods of impregnational propaganda, such as exhibitions,⁶² "Days of Solidarity,"⁶³ etc. Of greater significance is the fact that many of the Front Organizations' members are actually mobilized by the C.P.S.U. — or the local Communist Parties — through these organizations. It is to utilize them that the front is established. While many of them usually think that membership in the Front Organizations promotes goodwill among nations, peace, understanding, etc., they actually become pawns of Soviet propaganda.

The pro-Soviet Front Organizations should not be judged by their names, but by their aims and objectives, and the interests they promote. Their primary goal is to conduct pro-Soviet and pro-Communist propaganda, regardless of their official title or interest.

We shall now examine some of the Soviet impregnational propaganda media and methods.

IV. FILMS. It was Lenin, again, who first grasped the tremendous propaganda potential of cinematography. As far back as March 1911 he spoke of "democratic cinematography."⁶⁴ and in May 1913, of "propaganda through cinematography."⁶⁵ The nationalization of the film industry was one of the first acts of nationalization by the Communist regime. Propaganda films started to appear at once, and foreign markets were sought for their distribution. Thus, in an unusual letter to the Commissar of International Trade Lezhava, dated December 5, 1921, Lenin demanded

TABLE 14. FILM EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

1000s of Dollars

	Exports				Imports			
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1967	1968	1969	1970
Exports	5309	5478	4874	5075				
Imports					3790	4133	6977	5562
Communist Countries								
Bulgaria	342	364	431	404	120	94	234	214
Hungary	181	221	205	198	269	323	541	301
North Vietnam	6	60	83	68	0	0	0	0
E. Germany	490	472	535	500	857	877	1882	1651
Cuba	120	79	120	210	19	43	60	12
Mongolia	265	422	546	390	0	0	0	0
Poland	318	246	155	307	301	157	498	190
Romania	295	240	245	257	206	241	226	288
Czechoslovakia	275	220	88	341	420	251	212	158
Yugoslavia	150	90	108	100	246	194	223	157
Non-Communist Countries								
Great Britain	42	71	32	55	0	46	54	84
Italy	131	92	72	108	167	124	169	176
Canada	71	26	22	17	1	23	35	46
Mexico	35	67	46	12	19		8	1
U.S.A.	1019	886	804	442	212	838	1212	808
United Arab Republic	152	152	170	126	41	97	119	134
W. Germany	98	149	154	154	88	182	406	496
France	191	209	278	154	467	241	536	377
Japan	368	656	257	676	71	43	181	139

that Soviet films be sold *fast* to an Italian visiting Soviet Russia.⁶⁶

Since then, and until today, films have been recognized by the Soviet authorities, as by all governments, as an important medium for transmitting ideas and influencing the masses. They are considered as a "special phenomenon in the realm of the arts. . . capable of educating the masses and sharpening their consciousness by means of artistic expression of politics."⁶⁷ Furthermore, cinematography, according to First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, "can contribute to the strengthening of peace, mutual aid and trust among nations."⁶⁸ And finally, film has officially been declared by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to be an effective weapon of international propaganda:

. . . today, when reactionary bourgeois propaganda does not refrain from using all possible means, striving to increase international tension and discrediting the peace-seeking internal and international policy of the U.S.S.R., it is imperative that our cinematography intensify its efforts, become more offensive and create effective films of burning ideo-political issues of reality.⁶⁹

It is decrees and resolutions of the Central Committee, such as the one cited above, which coordinate film activities with other information and propaganda activities of the U.S.S.R. The specific cinematographic activity is directed and controlled by the Committee on Cinematography of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. That Committee executes the Party's directives on the quality and ideological content of films, organizes the production of all types of films, directs the international distribution of films, controls international contacts in the area of cinematography and determines which foreign films will be acquired and shown in the U.S.S.R.⁷⁰

Since the quality of most Soviet films does not allow them to compete on the free market, many Soviet films reach Western audiences by a number of rather unusual routes. Some of them (usually those considered "classics" — such as *Battleship Potemkin*, *Mother* and others) are donated, on occasion, by Soviet Embassies to cinema clubs

and similar organizations.⁷¹ Others are shown under the auspices of the local Friendship Society. In these cases, the screening is usually accompanied by additional impregnational activities, such as a Soviet exhibition on the movie-theater premises, or a lecture on the U.S.S.R., etc.⁷² Often there is no admission charge.⁷³ Sometimes the screening is accompanied by a guest lecture by a prominent Soviet leader. Thus, when the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society sponsored a two-day screening of films devoted to Lenin, the Soviet Ambassador Mikhail Smirnovskii delivered the opening address.⁷⁴ Another method of reaching vast audiences is the promotion of Soviet film "weeks" or even "months." Such events are organized annually by the Friendship Societies in the U.K.,⁷⁵ the U.S.A.,⁷⁶ and many other countries. The Soviet foreign press usually reports these events (and advertises them well in advance), stressing that "the interest in Soviet films is yet another proof that people want to know more about the Soviet Union and its people. *Such knowledge helps promote friendship.*"⁷⁷ This confirms the point that art (including films) is used by the U.S.S.R. for weakening the anti-Soviet or anti-Communist defenses of the reactors' absorption screens, creating positive attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. — by means of "knowledge [which] helps promote friendship."

Since 1959 Moscow has held annual international film festivals — under the auspices of the Soviet Committee on Cinematography and the Union of Cinematographers.⁷⁸ The festival has become a large and important affair. A recent one, held in September 1973, was attended by delegations from 86 countries, and addressed personally by Brezhnev.⁷⁹ The festival serves both the impregnational and operational propaganda of the C.P.S.U. The impregnational value of these occasions is evident when statements such as the following are amplified in all the media:

You Russian people are so warm-hearted that you have thoroughly spoiled us (said by the British Actress Kay Walsh).⁸⁰

It is people that are important. If people learnt to understand each other there would be no wars (R. Neame, a British film producer).⁸¹

Nevertheless, the operational value of the film festival should not be overlooked. The operational propaganda thrust of the festival can be inferred from the awards made. Thus, the 1971 festival awarded a prize to the film *Angela* fined — *Portrait of a Revolutionary* for what the jury de-ined as “the authentic, expressive demonstration of a revolutionary feat.”⁸² Another award went to a film “showing the moving story of the heroism of the Vietnamese people and their irresistible unity in the struggle with the aggressors.”⁸³ The U.S.-made film *Only the Beginning* was praised for “demonstrating the moving story of the evil deeds of the aggressors on the lands of Indochina and the protest movement of former soldiers in the American Army.”⁸⁴

In conclusion, Soviet films are one of the most widely used instruments of Soviet impregnational propaganda. Whilst some of them are actually a part of Soviet operational propaganda, many of them have no obvious political content, and aim mainly at increasing interest in the Soviet Union and general knowledge of Soviet affairs, people and way of life. The distribution of Soviet films abroad is carried out by agencies of Soviet impregnational propaganda, such as the Friendship Societies, and their screening is accompanied, and supplemented, by other means of impregnational propaganda, such as exhibitions, lectures, etc.

V. EXHIBITIONS. Soviet participation in international fairs and exhibitions and the organizing of their own exhibitions provides Soviet propaganda with excellent opportunities to publicly demonstrate Soviet achievements in art, science, industry, etc., as well as the appropriate facilities for conducting additional propaganda activities.⁸⁵ The planning and coordination of Soviet exhibits abroad, in which the U.S.S.R. is the sole exhibitor, is usually a function of the Section for Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also handles the bilateral negotiations involved. The theme of the exhibition determines which other Party, Government or public organiza-

tions will participate in assembling the exhibit and presenting it abroad.⁸⁶

The U.S.S.R. claims huge attendances at its exhibits. Thus, the exhibition *Soviet Art from the Scythians to the Present*, held in Paris in 1971, was attended according to a Soviet source by 300,000 visitors. The same number visited the *U.S.S.R. in Pictorial Photography* exhibition displayed in the U.S.A., and 150,000 visitors saw the *U.S.S.R. in 50 years*, organized in West Germany.⁸⁷

Soviet exhibitions are always linked to a specific theme, and purpose. They not only display their various items but are also intent on proving something – usually the high standard of life in the U.S.S.R., the progress the State has made, etc. Thus, a “Soviet Culture Week” was organized in June 1973 in Egypt. Among the various events of the “Week” there was also an exhibition of Soviet paintings “whose intention was to refute the idea implanted by imperialism that when art became the property of the masses it became stunted and artificial; art in the U.S.S.R. has become deeper and more meaningful.”⁸⁸ The “additional” tasks of Soviet exhibitions should not surprise anyone, since Soviet painters “have an historic mission to show the truth about the Soviet people, its aims and ideals, to sharpen the Communist consciousness of the masses.”⁸⁹

As already stressed, the exhibitions’ premises are utilized for additional impregnational propaganda activities. A list of the “additional events” at a Soviet exhibition at Earls Court, London, in August 1968 included:⁹⁰

August 8

Discussion: *Estonia Today*.

Discussion: *Soviet Science*

Filmshow: *Othello*, and *Down the Moscow River*

August 9

Discussion: *The Soviet Baltic Republics*

Filmshow: *No One Wanted Today*

Variety: *Concert of Lithuanian Artists*

August 10

Meeting with Bristol Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society members.

Discussion: The Soviet Union and Space.

Filmshow: *Kidnapping, Caucasian Style, and Russian Sable*

August 12

Discussion: Soviet Trade Unions

Filmshow: *The Amphibian Man*

August 13

Discussion: The Soviet Health Service – with films

Filmshow: *My Pal Kolka*

August 14

Lecture: The Soviet Economy (by Prof. A. Mukkin)

Lecture: Soviet Literature (by A. Cheknolis)

Filmshows: *Maxim Gorky, My Dearest Man, Monuments of Architecture*

August 15

Lecture: Industrial Electron Accelerators (by Prof. E. Abramyan)

In addition to these, August 19 was marked as "Day of the Baltic Republics," August 16 as "Day of Tourism," and August 17 as "Day of British-Soviet Friendship."⁹¹

A "Lenin Exhibition" at the British Museum actually turned into an exhibition of Communist books and documents relating to the second, third and fifth congresses of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, all of which were held in London, with Lenin in the chair.⁹²

Soviet authorities keep a close track not only on the number of visitors, but also on their impressions of the exhibition. This is usually done by offering the public a visitor's book in which to record impressions. A few examples picked at random from the visitor's book of the Exhibition of Soviet Books held in London in 1960 and visited by 20,000 people reveal that Soviet impregnational propaganda had indeed scored a success at that exhibition:

Examples of great progress from an illiterate nation to a great Union of Republics – M. Hutchins.

Sputnik 1 opened people's eyes. Now these books open people's minds – Parkinson of Surrey.

Very glad to have seen this exhibition. Now we must learn Russian – Barbara Gostin.⁹³

The exhibitions show the industrial and technological achievements of the U.S.S.R., as well as the high level of its arts. However, they also provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity for conducting impregnational propaganda. The main idea is to acquaint vast foreign audiences with Soviet achievements and successes, with Soviet life in general – and thus facilitate the formation of a positive Soviet image, which in turn will assist the penetration of Soviet operational propaganda.

VI. LITERATURE. We have already dealt with Soviet periodicals and books as instruments of international propaganda at some length in Chapter III. We will here restrict ourselves to examining the place Soviet Literature occupies in the Soviet impregnational propaganda effort.

Literature is, of course, "a major source of knowledge about the life of other countries and peoples."⁹⁴ Since one of impregnational propaganda's major objectives is to promote general knowledge of the U.S.S.R., Soviet life and people, it is clear that literature is a crucial means of impregnational propaganda. Vast amounts of bibliographical information on Soviet books and periodicals are available in bookstores all over the world specializing in selling Soviet books and other items. The various foreign-language journals of the U.S.S.R. often publish on their back covers lists of these bookstores. In addition, exhibitions of Soviet books are often organized, in an attempt to attract as many readers as possible.

All Soviet foreign-language periodicals publish systematically and frequently lists of new Soviet books for sale in the bookstores in the different countries. There are an astonishing number of children's books printed (and broadly advertised) by the U.S.S.R. For Soviet impregnational propa-

TABLE 15

IMPORTS OF PUBLICATIONS

1000s of Dollars

	1967	1968	1969	1970
Total	16,626	16,718	17,220	18,672
Communist Countries				
Bulgaria	2035	1981	2081	2299
Hungary	1098	1073	874	1098
E. Germany	3340	3335	3590	3978
China	61	19	11	6
Poland	3978	4362	4687	5006
Romania	672	649	532	692
Czechoslovakia	1832	1836	1486	1616
Mongolia	54	60	73	67
Cuba	120	84	109	149
N. Korea	66	66	46	91
N. Vietnam	192	152	205	246
Total	13,440	13,618	13,794	15,250
Exports	13,880	14,436	18,787	16,360
Net Balance	440	262	193	990
Non-Communist Countries				
Great Britain	626	586	660	565
W. Germany	187	192	194	248
France	542	526	616	515
U.S.A.	668	707	782	856
Japan	71	50	66	77
Total	2095	2060	2318	2261
Exports	1636	1663	1739	1868
Net Balance	460	397	580	392

TABLE 15 (continued)

EXPORTS OF PUBLICATIONS

1000s of Dollars

	1967	1968	1969	1970
Total	17,279	17,750	17,424	19,998

Communist Countries

Bulgaria	2429	2509	2686	3136
Hungary	1062	814	740	922
E. Germany	1532	1692	1783	2239
N. Korea	293	101	178	205
China	590	474	259	227
Cuba	259	413	655	784
Poland	4170	4884	4883	5430
Romania	634	644	563	752
Czechoslovakia	2179	1938	1400	1799
Mongolia	456	576	492	576
N. Vietnam	276	385	348	290
Total	13,880	14,436	18,787	16,360

Non-Communist Countries

Great Britain	156	152	194	172
U.S.A.	724	686	658	660
W. Germany	186	241	235	247
France	343	365	415	449
Japan	227	218	236	341
Total	1636	1386	1739	1868

TABLE 16. SOVIET BOOK PRODUCTION FOR ABROAD 1956-1960*
(books of 50 pages or more)

Languages	No. of Titles			No. of Copies		
	1956	1958	1960	1956	1958	1960
German	151	173	221	16,990,100	12,667,300	18,488,500
English	240	258	373	7,743,250	11,560,600	14,602,600
French	118	117	178	2,260,500	2,329,500	5,491,500
Bengali	1	17	29	20,000	217,500	125,000
Spanish	33	32	87	248,000	149,700	735,500
Hindi	-	19	37	-	146,800	185,400
Arabic	7	13	38	83,915	81,500	211,600
Finnish	43	25	30	424,400	55,500	n.a.
Persian	-	7	14	-	44,600	48,500
Urdu	5	9	26	59,500	38,000	60,000
Dutch	-	5	5	-	28,400	20,000
Swedish	8	4	6	39,500	17,000	40,000
Esperanto	-	1	-	-	10,000	-
Japanese	2	2	3	3100	9500	12,500
Kurdish	-	4	6	-	4000	5500

Norwegian	-	1	1	-	2500	2500
Italian	-	-	1	-	-	10,000
Serbo-Croat	4	-	2	17,000	-	10,000
Portuguese	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greek	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkish	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesian	-	-	4	-	-	34,500
Farsi	-	-	2	-	-	4500
Farsi-Kabul	-	-	2	-	-	1700
Tamil	-	-	3	-	-	10,900
Tagalog	-	-	1	-	-	3000
Punjabi	-	-	1	-	-	1200
Amharic	-	-	1	-	-	500
Burmese	-	-	4	-	-	8000
Totals	613	687	1075	27,892,265	27,371,900	40,113,400

*J.C.Clews, *Soviet Propaganda Techniques*, Methuen and Co., London, 1964, p. 127.

ganda is programmed to reach every possible audience, and to realize long-term objectives, such as developing pro-Soviet attitudes in young children, in order to benefit from the results when they grow up. Neither is purely political literature considered unimportant. Thus, in 1973, Progress Publishers, Moscow, which issues books in 30 languages, announced four new series in English entitled: *Socialism Today*; *Current World Problems*; *Third World Problems*; and *Theories and Critical Studies*.⁹⁵

Soviet authorities keep a close watch on the translation and publication of Soviet books by other countries. When Mikhail Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don* was republished by Putnams, London in 1966, the U.S.S.R. angrily accused the British of "mutilating a masterpiece." The major charges were: abridging the book, deleting vital documents from the book, omitting tens of pages dealing with the British invasion of Soviet Russia in 1918-1920, etc.⁹⁶ In March 1975 R. Medvedev was prohibited by Moscow from publishing an exposé of Sholokhov's doubtful authorship.

In order to increase the number of readers of Soviet books and periodicals Soviet propagandists resort to advertising their wares as "gifts for young and old to enjoy and treasure,"⁹⁷ Christmas gifts,⁹⁸ etc. Free books are given to new subscribers to Soviet periodicals (usually Lenin's works, which amazingly appear to grow more numerous with each anniversary of his death),⁹⁹ and there are free subscriptions for those who buy Soviet books. Owners of bookstores, bookstalls or kiosks receive awards from Soviet propaganda authorities for "successful promotion effort," "best window display," etc.¹⁰⁰ Free coupons for the Russian shop in London are given to *Soviet Weekly* readers, and a special 15% discount on all purchases is also announced - "for *Soviet Weekly* readers only. . ."¹⁰¹

Soviet broadcasts in foreign languages also participate in this enormous promotion effort. Soviet foreign-language publications are frequently reviewed, and listeners are en-

couraged to acquire them. Sometimes the exact place where the books or journals can be purchased is stressed. In a broadcast in French, a new issue of *Aube Nouvelle*, a monthly magazine in French published by Novosti for Africa, was reviewed and the listeners were told that the magazine was on sale in the bookshops and kiosks in their countries. It was also emphasized that the magazine (and other material) could also be bought at the Soviet Cultural Centers and Novosti offices in Africa.¹⁰²

Soviet records, albums,¹⁰³ and similar wares are also broadly advertised by the various Soviet propaganda instruments.

And finally – the price. Soviet books and magazines are among the cheapest in the whole world. This makes them, of course, more accessible to students and to poorer people. Some of the books, and especially the classics of Marxism-Leninism, are often donated to public and university libraries, apparently in an attempt to expose receptive minds to basic Marxism.

VII. SPORTS. No other country in the world attaches as much importance to sport as does the U.S.S.R. The reason for this emphasis is first and foremost political. Soviet sportsmen are sent abroad to augment other Soviet impregnational propaganda efforts. Their major task is to demonstrate to large foreign audiences, many of which are unattracted and imperceptive to other forms of Soviet propaganda, the superiority of the Soviet social system. Soviet sportsmen are also expected to enhance Soviet prestige abroad and to promote goodwill toward the U.S.S.R.¹⁰⁴ While Soviet propaganda usually states that “points, of course, are not important, the main thing is that the score is in favor of friendship between sportsmen,”¹⁰⁵ the political importance of sport is often stressed:

One cannot isolate sport from society by erecting some sort of glass show window for outstanding record-holders capable of winning several medals. Sport has come to belong to the masses and one

automatically thinks of the social conditions in which it is developing, of society's attitude to sport. A few days before the opening of the [Olympic] Games, a well known West German politician urged that victory should not be regarded as a sign of the superiority of any social system. Now, of course, no one proposes to reason so puerilely. The victory or defeat of a particular sportsman is a matter of individual performance. But victories and defeats do form certain patterns, and that is where one cannot avoid comparisons.¹⁰⁶

The U.S.S.R. strives for the right to organize as many international sports events as possible. Such events are considered an appropriate occasion for subjecting the visiting sportsmen to a concentrated campaign of impregnational propaganda. When Moscow organized the Universiade-'73 Games, "a diversified program was prepared for the guests outside the stadiums." Young people of Moscow, industrial enterprises and educational establishments "adopted" each of the delegations of sportsmen.

Interesting meetings, concerts and parties were held at the International Club. The foreign athletes went on excursions, visited theaters, cinemas, exhibitions, etc. Everything has been done so that our guests could become better acquainted with the Soviet way of life and spend their spare time usefully.¹⁰⁷

The exceptional efforts made by Moscow to secure the right of hosting the 22nd Olympic Games were noteworthy. Leading politicians and State and public organizations coordinated their efforts to convince the International Olympic Committee that Moscow is the most appropriate place for holding the 22nd Games.¹⁰⁸ One of the most spectacular persuasive endeavors was an official note from the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to the International Olympic Committee, proposing a visit to Moscow of 80 members of the I.O.C. in an attempt to convince them to decide in favor of the U.S.S.R.¹⁰⁹ Incidentally, since according to the Soviet official attitude "sports, like any other public movement cannot develop independently of the international situation," the International Olympic Committee was encouraged "to join the struggle for friendship among the nations and world peace. . . and join the noble

activity of the World Peace Council. . . .”¹¹⁰ The amazing fact is that Moscow objected to holding the 20th Olympic Games in Munich because “this is the town where Radio Liberty, founded by U.S. intelligence, continues to function, broadcasting slanderous propaganda against the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries. . . .”¹¹¹

We have shown that Soviet propaganda often utilizes methods of impregnational propaganda for operational propaganda campaigns. Sport is no exception to this practice. The most recent case was connected with the overthrow of Salvador Allende’s regime in Chile. Chile and the U.S.S.R. played in the same preliminary group of the World Cup Football Championship, the winner gaining the right to participate in the finals in June 1974 in Munich. The Chilean team surprised the Soviet national team in Moscow and the match ended in a draw. The chances were that the Soviet team would have lost the return match in Santiago — and the Chilean team would then have qualified to play in Munich. Several weeks before the match in Santiago, the Allende regime was overthrown. The U.S.S.R. took immediate advantage of the situation, and afforded football a central place in its campaign against the new Chilean regime. The Soviet Football (Soccer) Federation demanded that the return elimination match between the teams of Chile and the U.S.S.R. be held not in Santiago, but on the territory of some third country,¹¹² an arrangement which would also have neutralized the Chilean advantage of the home stadium. The official reason for this demand was given as “the fact that the National Stadium in Santiago, where the match was to have been played, was turned by the military junta into a concentration camp — a place where Chilean patriots were tortured and murdered.”¹¹³ The Soviet propaganda machine was immediately geared to amplify developments. Sportsmen from the U.S.S.R. and the entire Eastern bloc rallied behind the Soviet demand, declaring that “it would be unpardonable for a Red sportsman to appear in the field stained with the blood of the patriots.”¹¹⁴ When Chile sug-

gested that the match be played in *another* Chilean stadium, the U.S.S.R. refused on the grounds that "under the conditions prevailing in Chile, even foreign diplomats are not guaranteed personal security."¹¹⁵ When the International Football (Soccer) Association (F.I.F.A.) declared that Soviet refusal to play in Chile would eliminate the Soviet team from further participation in the World Cup, Soviet propaganda initiated a smear campaign against F.I.F.A. President Stanley Rous. Moscow quoted unidentified "... international sports circles, believing that in the dispute over the Chile-U.S.S.R. match, S. Rous was pursuing certain selfish aims. It is believed that by refusing to change the venue of the match, he planned to "kick" the Soviet team out of the World Cup, thereby provoking those teams from the Socialist countries which had qualified for the finals to boycott the championship."¹¹⁶ Eventually, the Soviet team refused to play Chile, and was eliminated. No East European team chose to demonstrate solidarity with the U.S.S.R. Bulgaria, Poland and Yugoslavia participated in the finals in Munich.

Finally, it should be stressed that sport is an export article in the U.S.S.R. In 1971 56 Soviet coaches were working in 15 countries, including the United Arab Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea, Iraq, Iran, Burma, Kuwait and Mongolia.¹¹⁷

VIII. PERFORMING ARTS. As far as impregnational propaganda is concerned, there is no difference between Soviet artists performing abroad and Soviet sportsmen competing abroad. The appearances of both kinds of impregnational propaganda agents are carefully coordinated, and are expected to attract large foreign audiences unreachable by other methods of Soviet propaganda. Both are considered to be not simply artists and sportsmen but ambassadors of a superior social system, a living proof of that system's advantages,¹¹⁸ a means of enhancing Soviet prestige abroad.¹¹⁹ Soviet sources openly define them as "passionate propagandists of Communist ideas."¹²⁰ Every single Soviet artist

abroad (and there were 120,000 Soviet artists abroad in 120 countries during the period 1963–1972)¹²¹ is expected to contribute his share to the impregnational effort of Soviet foreign propaganda. There is no field of arts exempted from this task:

The theater is one of the most potent forces in the world for bringing people together. . . for social progress and a peaceful and better world.¹²²

Painters have an historic mission – to tell the world the truth about the U.S.S.R., its people's ideals and aims. . . .¹²³

An Association of Musicians of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries was formed today. Tikhon Khrennikov, head of the U.S.S.R.'s Composers' Union, was elected its President. The art of music has now become a powerful instrument of ideological struggle and the education of the broad masses, an instrument for improving relations among nations and of strengthening peace. The substantial changes in the international situation create favorable conditions for a qualitative new stage in the activities of the community of musicians, says a resolution adopted by the meeting.¹²⁴

During 1972 167 art companies and groups and more than 700 "prominent cultural workers" were sent abroad by the Soviet Ministry of Culture¹²⁵ to promote friendship, bring people together, contribute to social progress and world peace and tell the truth about the Soviet people. They also performed before foreign audiences.

Careful observation of Soviet artists' performances abroad reveals several interesting characteristics:

a. Soviet artists' tours abroad are always organized by the Ministry of Culture of the U.S.S.R., which also approves the repertoire of all theatrical and concert enterprises and all artistic spectacles. The details of the foreign tours are negotiated by *Goskontsert* – the Soviet institutional impresario. The C.P.S.U. controls all cultural activity through the Cultural Section of the Central Committee.¹²⁶

b. While the U.S.S.R. has world-renowned performers in almost every field of the arts. there is a special category of groups and individual artists, such as the Bolshoi Theater and Ballet, the Moscow State Symphony Orchestra, The

Soviet Army Ensemble, D. Oistrakh, L. Kogan and V. Ashkenazi (who later moved to England), which actually forms a class on their own. All of them have appeared twice as many times in "Capitalist" countries as they have in the neighboring Socialist countries.¹²⁷ It seems that the reason for this phenomenon is twofold: firstly, impregnational propaganda is less important in Socialist countries than it is in the West; and secondly, the West pays better and in better currency.

c. As in so many other areas of pro-Soviet activities, the various Friendship Societies play a major and spectacular role in organizing the tours of Soviet artists abroad. Again the strings lead to Moscow. The Union of the Soviet Friendship Societies has several sections, each of which is in charge of some art. Viktor Komissarzhevskii, for instance, author of the already quoted article "The Mission of the Theater," is Vice-President of the Theatrical Section of the Union of Soviet Friendship Societies.¹²⁸ It appears that each section controls — to a certain degree — the performance of the relevant artists abroad. This is usually done through the branch of the Friendship Society in the country in which the artist is performing.¹²⁹ The Lenin Centenary Concerts in England were sponsored by the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society.¹³⁰ When a troupe of dancers from Kiev came to Britain, the same Friendship Society offered a 5% reduction for those who booked more than 12 seats.¹³¹

Finally, as in the case of so many other means of impregnational propaganda, close cooperation among the various instruments of that propaganda can be observed. The Soviet foreign press advertises the performances of Soviet artists abroad intensively, while Soviet international broadcasts review the performances and cite enthusiastic letters from listeners. The ultimate goal behind this complex process is to create a widespread impression of a country whose people are capable — because of its social and political system — of stunning achievements in the arts as well as in any other field.

IX. TOURISM. Tourism is viewed by the U.S.S.R. as another form of international cultural exchange and a means of strengthening peace and good neighborly relations. It is also an excellent instrument of impregnational propaganda. There is no better opportunity for demonstrating to the tourists visiting the U.S.S.R.

... the remarkable achievements in the construction of Communism, the rich treasure troves of the culture of the people of the U.S.S.R., the variety of Soviet art, unique historical monuments, and the exceptional variety and richness of nature.¹³²

All this is always explained to foreign tourists in terms consistent with the current Party line.

There are several characteristics of foreign tourism to the U.S.S.R.

a. Individual excursions are discouraged by the U.S.S.R. Group tourism (preferably based on profession) is preferred.

b. Often a special purpose is attached to the visit – to turn it into a “specialized tour.” In 1969 *Soviet Weekly* advertised a “Lenin Tour,” a “Trade Union Tour,” an “Art Tour,” a “Religion in the U.S.S.R. Tour,” etc.¹³³ ; and in 1972 a “Miners’ Tour,” and “Industrial Workers Tours,” etc.¹³⁴ The purpose seems obvious. We have already stressed that one of the basic principles of propaganda is its differentiation, i.e., adapting the propaganda message to the specific audience’s characteristics, such as level of education, interests and profession. By encouraging “specialized tours” to the U.S.S.R., Soviet propaganda gains a tremendous advantage for itself: instead of bringing the propaganda message to a specific group – the same group is brought to the message! Since Soviet propaganda authorities know in advance the types of tours planned, they can prepare suitable penetration material, corresponding to the group’s characteristics.

c. Visits of youth are strongly encouraged and carefully organized. While some of these visits do not differ from other group visits (except for the age of the visitors), some of the young people’s visits are organized in a different

NAME (capitals, please)

ADDRESS

I GET SOVIET WEEKLY BY POSTAL SUBSCRIPTION*/FROM THE FOLLOWING NEWSAGENT*

.....
* delete where inapplicable

MY ANSWERS:

1. Name the German river where Soviet troops met their western allies, shortly before VE day
2. Name the Soviet city to which King George VI presented a sword of honour
.....
3. Leningrad was besieged for 300-600-900 days. Which is correct?
4. On which day in May 1945 was the Act of Military Surrender signed?
.....

Printed by Papers and Publications (Printers) Ltd (T.U.), Banbury, Oxon

Sample questionnaire published by *Soviet Weekly*, first prize being a trip to the U.S.S.R.

manner, and combine elements of operational propaganda. This is usually done in "International Youth Camps." Young men and women from 23 countries "and of different viewpoints" spent their holidays in the U.S.S.R. in an "International Working Youth Camp" in Moldavia in 1962. During their stay in the camp they held lively debates "on the struggle for national independence and the role of youth in this struggle. . . ." ¹³⁵ Similar camps were even organized for children. ¹³⁶ Often youth visits are utilized for other propaganda purposes. Thus, Egyptian youth participated in the "Week of Friendship of Soviet and Egyptian Youth," held in Azerbaidzhan in April 1973. ¹³⁷

d. The Friendship Societies' share in organizing the group visits to the U.S.S.R. is obvious. The Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society has a tours department, whose task is to organize and book visits to the U.S.S.R. ¹³⁸ The Society also organizes "Study Tours" (the tourists are supposed to learn Russian while they are in the U.S.S.R.). ¹³⁹ The Italian-Soviet Friendship Society engages in similar activity, although in this case the stress is on organizing the visits of clergymen. ¹⁴⁰

Attempts are made to utilize foreign visitors to the U.S.S.R. for propaganda purposes; they may be asked to broadcast or write their impressions of Soviet life. While most of those impressions are positive and sterile (being checked and rechecked before their publication), broadcast impressions sometimes offer surprises. When Catholic journalists and American clergymen visiting the U.S.S.R. were asked in a live broadcast to give their impressions they made some negative remarks concerning the freedom of religion in the U.S.S.R. Soviet propaganda authorities immediately issued a reply which was supposed to refute the impressions of the clergymen. ¹⁴¹ Such surprises are rare, for Soviet propaganda leaves very little to chance.

Before summing up we may mention several other quite important means of impregnational propaganda — festivals, visits of famous Soviet personalities (such as Yuri Gagarin,

TABLE 17. NUMBER OF STUDENTS, GRADUATE STUDENTS AND PROBATIONERS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES OF THE NEAR EAST, NORTH AFRICA, SOUTH ASIA, AND EAST ASIA IN HIGHER AND SPECIAL SCHOOLS OF THE U.S.S.R., 1 JAN. 1970

Country	Accepted for Training in 1969 (without Probationers)	Finished Studies in 1969	In Higher Technical Schools	In Preparatory Faculties	Higher Educational Institutions	Graduate Students	Probationers	Total (Does not Include Cols. 1 and 2)
Algeria	59	12	4	144	175	18	7	348
Afghanistan	79	110	42	79	318	56	26	521
Burma	1	44	7	-	54	20	4	85
North Vietnam	1298	307	39	928	2838	484	259	4548
India	80	69	5	58	185	111	29	388
Indonesia	16	138	5	1	154	23	34	217
Jordan	79	6	10	119	183	9	2	323
Iraq	45	76	3	69	108	93	16	289
Yemen Arab. Rep.	42	42	31	51	140	4	4	230
South Yemen	57	3	8	106	98	-	-	212
Khmer Republic	5	11	12	-	28	4	1	45
Cyprus	55	23	31	43	136	5	3	218
Kuwait	8	-	-	9	13	-	-	22
Laos	14	14	4	11	59	-	5	79
Lebanon	70	28	5	90	265	5	9	374
Morocco	19	11	4	28	70	3	5	110
Mongolia	236	354	187	260	1264	41	34	1786
Nepal	47	37	4	52	201	4	5	266
U.A.R.	154	75	92	23	80	329	20	544
Pakistan	13	2	-	17	12	23	3	55
Syria	210	111	1	136	543	166	52	898
Sudan	102	42	5	94	328	22	3	456
Tunisia	5	6	20	8	48	3	2	81
Sri Lanka	18	34	5	24	122	5	12	168
National Front South Vietnam	217	9	9	152	655	124	21	961

Yevgeny Yevtushenko and others) abroad, and the use of religion for propaganda purposes.

Admittedly, it is unconventional to label different sorts of cultural activities, sport and tourism as propaganda. However, we hope we have demonstrated that the Soviet authorities themselves assign unusual tasks to these activities, and carry them out through unconventional means and channels such as the Friendship Societies. While it may be pointed out that every country of the world is interested in improving its image and promoting goodwill and friendship, it can also be emphasized that *no other country in the world attributes so much operational political importance to these issues. No other country strives so vehemently to promote the study of its language abroad, to demonstrate its achievements in culture, sports and arts, to prove its superiority, or to enhance its prestige.*

What lurks behind this tremendous effort is an unusual attempt to facilitate the action of Soviet operational propaganda. In other words, to further Soviet foreign policy objectives and to project the best possible image of the U.S.S.R. Success in achieving the latter objective simplifies and facilitates the task of achieving the former. The image of the U.S.S.R., as created by Soviet impregnational propaganda, is intended to appeal to individuals throughout the world. It is the image of a peace-loving country, friendly to any other peace-loving country, having no egoistic interests and no selfish goals on the international scene. The general idea is to create the impression that the U.S.S.R. plays no part in international conflicts. Its stand is the stand of justice, friendship and respect toward other countries' rights. Once this impression is created the absorption screen is overcome. It is painted red, holes are drilled through it and operational propaganda encounters no obstacles in penetrating an audience so affected.

This process cannot even begin unless the attention of foreign audiences is attracted. And this is the task specially assigned by Moscow to the arts, sports and tourism. These

are the first-line troops of Soviet international propaganda. They appeal to diversified audiences, many of whom were (and will probably remain) beyond the reach of regular Soviet operational propaganda channels. And for some of them the magic works. They are impressed, they are curious, they are interested in hearing more, in learning more about the Soviet Union; the impregnational propaganda process is on its way. Friendship Societies, the Soviet press, broadcasts, books, exhibitions, etc., are ready to serve them, to tell them more, to enhance their impressions, and eventually the path is cleared for the "hard stuff" – Soviet operational propaganda.

NOTES

1. No name, *Samoe Vazhnoe iz Vsekh Iskusstv* ("The Most Important of the Arts"), *Iskusstvo*, Moscow, 1973, p. 13; also *Pravda*, May 26, 1973.
2. *Pravda*, Nov. 22, 1972.
3. G. Davidiyuk and V. Bobrovskii, *Problemy Massovoi Kul'tury; Massovoi Kommunikatsii* ("Problems of Mass Culture and Mass Communications"), *Nauka i Tekhnika*, Minsk, 1972, pp. 185–186.
4. F. Krotov, *Leninskaya Teoriya Propagandy i 'Sovremennost'* (Leninist Theory of Propaganda and Present Times), *Politizdat*, Moscow, 1972, p. 123.
5. S. Romanovskii, *Mezhdunarodnye Kul'turnye i Nauchnye Svyazi SSSR* ("International Cultural and Scientific Relations of the U.S.S.R."), *Mezhd. Otnosheniya*, Moscow, 1966, p. 3.
6. *Pravda*, Sept. 5, 1973.
7. *Ibid.*
8. V. Sofinskii, "Cultural Ties: Soviet Viewpoint," *Soviet Union*, 12, 1973, p. 26.
9. *Pravda*, Sept. 5, 1973.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Department of State Bulletin*, No. 59, 1968, p. 154.
13. V. Larin, "We Are for Exchange of Ideas," *Soviet Union*, No. 5, 1973, p. 1.

14. From the 1966 agreement with Czechoslovakia, cited in S. Romanovskii, *op. cit.* p. 185.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-210.
16. TASS in English, 1947 GMT, Feb. 16, 1962, *SU/847/*.
17. Radio Moscow in English for Africa, 2030 GMT, May 6, 1974, *SU/4596/*.
18. *Ibid.*
19. V. Rosen, "Friendship Conference," *New Times*, No. 42, 1972, p. 14.
20. *Sputnik*, No. 4, 1971, p. 142.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
22. V. Rosen, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Materialy XXIV S'ezda KPSS* ("Proceedings of the Twenty-fourth C.P.S.U. Congress") p. 318.
25. Each Friendship Society has at least two branches. One in Moscow, the other in the capital of the other country. Often there are additional branches in other cities. Each one of the principal branches is headed by a board, the non-Soviet one usually presided over by a member of the local Communist Party.
26. *Soviet Weekly*, June 29, 1968, p. 5.
27. *Moscow News*, Oct. 13, 1973, p. 8.
28. *Soviet Weekly*, June 29, 1968, p. 5.
29. Radio Moscow in French for Africa, 1700 GMT, May 6, 1974, *SU/4596/*.
30. Radio Moscow in English for Africa, 1330 GMT, May 8, 1974, *SU/4596/*.
31. *Ezhegodnik BSE 1970* ("1970 Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia"), p. 35.
32. Radio "Peace and Progress" in Arabic, 1900 GMT, April 26, 1973, *SU/4282/*.
33. *Moscow News*, Oct. 20, 1973, p. 9.
34. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1700 GMT, April 26, 1973, *SU/4282/*.
35. The Union of Soviet Friendship Societies was among the first Soviet organizations to condemn Israel during the October 1973 war. (TASS in English, 0755 GMT; also TASS in Russian, 0812 GMT, Oct. 12, 1973, *SU/4424/*.)
36. V. Sofinskii, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
37. *Ibid.*
38. *Soviet Weekly*, June 23, 1968, p. 8.
39. *Moscow News*, Aug. 25, 1973, p. 9.
40. V. Sofinskii, *op. cit.*, p. 27

41. In a new program for Ethiopia Soviet Radio inaugurated the "Radio Friendship Society." The new program was sponsored by the U.S.S.R.-Ethiopia Friendship Society, the announcers being Ethiopians - members of the society. 1630 GMT, April 25, 1963. *SU/1236/*.
42. *Soviet Weekly*, Oct. 22, 1959, pp. 3, 6.
43. *Moscow News*, Oct. 13, 1973, p. 8.
44. Radio Moscow in Swahili, 1530 GMT, Jan. 10, 1963, *SU/1148/*.
45. L. Nemzer, "The Soviet Friendship Societies," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer 1949, p. 266.
46. *Moscow News*, Oct. 20, 1973, p. 11.
47. Radio Moscow Home Service, 2330 GMT, June 27, 1973, *SU/4333/*.
48. Radio Moscow in English for Africa, 1530 GMT, Feb. 16, 1974, *SU/4531/*.
49. Cited in J. Clews, *Soviet Propaganda Techniques*, Methuen and Co., London, 1964, p. 92.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
51. The list of pro-Soviet Front Organizations is based on Appendix D of *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, USIF Research Service, Washington, pp. 109-115.
52. Arthur Koestler, *The Invisible Writing*, Macmillan, New York, 1954, p. 198.
53. TASS in English, 2045 GMT, Aug. 25, 1962, *SU/1035/*.
54. TASS in English, 1134 GMT, Aug. 29, 1962, *SU/1035/*.
55. TASS in English, 1138 GMT, Aug. 29, 1962, *SU/1035/*.
56. TASS in English, 1530 GMT, Aug. 28, 1962, *SU/1035/*.
57. TASS in English, 2044 GMT, Aug. 27, 1962.
58. TASS International Service in English, 1250 GMT, Oct. 11, 1974.
59. TASS International Service in English, 1709 GMT, Oct. 12, 1974.
60. TASS International Service in English, 1757 GMT, Oct. 15, 1974.
61. TASS International Service in English, 1421 GMT, Oct. 11, 1974.
62. A. Grachov, "Internationalists," *Soviet Union*, No. 7, 1973, p. 26.
63. Radio "Peace and Progress" in English for Africa, 1430 GMT, March 21, 1973, *SU/4252/*.
64. *Samoe Vazhnoe iz Vsekh Iskusstv (Lenin o Kino)* ("The Most Important of the Arts: Lenin on the Film Industry"), *Iskusstvo*, Moscow, 1973, p. 11.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 13, also *Pravda*, May 26, 1973.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
67. *Zhurnal*, No. 5, 1974, p. 30.
68. Brezhnev's speech at the VIII Film Festival in Moscow, *Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1973.
69. Decree of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. "On Measures for Further Development of Soviet Cinematography," quoted by Brezhnev, *Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1973.
70. Lunev, *op. cit.*, p. 421-423.
71. *New York Times*, Sept. 24, 1969.
72. *Soviet Weekly*, March 17, 1973.
73. *Soviet Weekly*, Oct. 29, 1959, p. 6.
74. *Soviet Weekly*, March 28, 1970, p. 3.
75. *Soviet Weekly*, Feb. 3, 1973, p. 15.
76. *New Times*, No. 42, 1973, p. 1.
77. *Ibid.*
78. An additional Afro-Asian film festival is held infrequently. The first one was held in 1958 in Tashkent and was seen as "an effective method for the expansion of friendly relations between Asian and African peoples." Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1230 GMT, Sept. 29, 1958, *SU/961/*.
79. *Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1973.
80. *Soviet Weekly*, Oct. 29, 1959, p. 6.
81. *Ibid.*
82. *Pravda*, Aug. 4, 1971.
83. *Ibid.*
84. *Ibid.*
85. More than 130 Soviet exhibitions were held abroad during 1972. V. Larin, "We are for an Exchange of Ideas," *Soviet Union*, No. 5, 1973, p. 1.
86. Lunev, *op. cit.*, pp. 426-427.
87. *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, No. 8, 1971, p. 54.
88. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1900 GMT, June 28, 1973, *SU/4332/*.
89. *Pravda*, Nov. 22, 1972.
90. *Soviet Weekly*, Aug. 10, 1968, p. 3.
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Soviet Weekly*, March 28, 1970, p. 3.
93. *Soviet Weekly*, Feb. 25, 1960, p. 9.
94. V. Sofinskii, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
95. *Soviet Weekly*, Jan. 20, 1973, p. 3.
96. *Soviet Weekly*, Nov. 16, 1968, p. 13.
97. *Soviet Weekly*, Dec. 10, 1959, p. 9.
98. *Soviet Weekly*, Dec. 19-26, 1970, p. 3.
99. *Soviet Weekly*, March 14, 1970, p. 3.

100. *Ibid.*
101. *Soviet Weekly*, Nov. 9, 1968, p. 13.
102. Radio Moscow in French for Africa, 1700 GMT, March 30, 1974, *SU/4566/*.
103. In 1973 Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was exporting discs to 83 countries. "In view of the growing demand for Soviet records," the record firm Melodiya introduced a subscription plan for its records. People wishing to acquire Soviet discs abroad were encouraged to apply to the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga agents in their countries, or to firms maintaining contact with this Soviet organization. *New Times*, No. 42, 1973, p. 31.
104. Soviet sport is controlled and directed by a Committee for Physical Culture and Sport in the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., which also supervises the performance of Soviet athletes abroad.
105. *Soviet Weekly*, Sept. 10, 1959, p. 10.
106. L. Bezymenskii, "After the Olympics," *New Times*, No. 38, 1972, pp. 6-7.
107. *Moscow News*, No. 34, 1973, p. 15.
108. *Soviet Union*, No. 5, 1974, p. 5.
109. *Ibid.*
110. *Sovetskii Sport*, May 26, 1962; also TASS in Russian for Abroad, 0908 GMT, *SU/956/*.
111. G. Gurkov, "Only Don't Photograph Anybody or There Will Be Trouble," *Soviet Union*, No. 1., 1972, p. 26.
112. *Soviet News*, No. 5712, Nov. 6, 1973, p. 472.
113. TASS in English, 2331 GMT, Nov. 20, 1973, *SU/4457/*.
114. TASS International Service in English, 1407 GMT, Nov. 6, 1973.
115. TASS International Service in English, 1410 GMT, Nov. 6, 1973.
116. TASS in English, 2331 GMT, Nov. 20, 1973, *SU/4457/*.
117. *Soviet Weekly*, April 24, 1971, p. 5.
118. It must be remembered that Marxism considers culture an integral part of the social superstructure, a projection of its economic basis.
119. Winning awards in international contests and festivals contributes, so the U.S.S.R. thinks, to its prestige. *Pravda* of Oct. 3, 1972 proudly announced that, since 1966, young Soviet artists had participated in 69 international contests, winning 78 first prizes!
120. F. Krotov, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
121. *Pravda*, Oct. 3, 1972.

122. Viktor Komissarzhevskii, "The Mission of the Theater," *Soviet Weekly*, Dec. 12, 1970, p. 15.
123. *Pravda*, Nov. 22, 1972.
124. TASS in Russian for Abroad, 1639 GMT (and in English 1740 GMT), March 24, 1975, *SU/4864/*.
125. V. Larin, *op. cit.*, p. 1.
126. Lunev, *op. cit.*, pp. 416, 417.
127. *BSE* ("Great Soviet Encyclopedia") 3rd ed., 1970, Vol. 5, p. 546.
128. *Soviet Weekly*, Dec. 12, 1970, p. 15.
129. Sometimes the local Friendship Society programs a political discussion with a concert, thus combining again impregnational and operational propaganda., *Soviet Weekly*, Oct. 11, 1963, p. 3.
130. *Soviet Weekly*, March 28, 1970, p. 4
131. *Soviet Weekly*, Jan. 16, 1971, p. 11.
132. S. Romanovskii, *Mezhdunarodnye Kul'turnye i Nauchnye Svyazi SSSR* ("International Cultural and Scientific Relations of the U.S.S.R."), *Mezhd. Otnosheniya*, Moscow, 1965, p. 129.
133. *Soviet Weekly*, Dec. 20-17, 1969, p. 3.
134. *Soviet Weekly*, March 18, 1972, p. 11.
135. *Soviet Weekly*, Dec. 7, 1962, p. 6.
136. *Soviet Weekly*, Sept. 21, 1961, p. 4.
137. Radio Moscow Home Service, 1800 GMT, April 9, 1973, *SU/4268/*.
138. *Soviet Weekly*, Jan. 11, 1969, p. 13.
139. *Soviet Weekly*, March 22, 1962, p. 6.
140. Radio Moscow in Italian, 1730 GMT, Oct. 26, 1963, *SU/1390/*.
141. *Ibid.*

Chapter Five

SOVIET OPERATIONAL PROPAGANDA : THE THEMES

We now turn to the “operational” part of this study – Soviet operational propaganda and the Middle East conflict. We will concentrate on two aspects: the subjects or themes of that propaganda, and its tools and tactics.

A word of caution and apology: the themes of Soviet operational propaganda connected with the Middle East conflict are numerous and often interchangeable. Whilst it is not possible to mention them all, one can easily confuse or misidentify them, and thus risk duplication and repetition. We shall try to avoid these hazards by reducing the multitude of themes to several major ones, namely:

- a. the true nature of the conflict;
- b. the nature of Zionism;
- c. the involvement of the Western Powers, NATO and several other countries in the conflict;
- d. the nature of Soviet involvement in the conflict;
- e. the cruelty of Israeli soldiers; the resemblance between methods and devices employed by the Nazis and the Israelis;
- f. the internal situation of Israel;
- g. the relations between Israel and the African countries; the African countries’ stand in the conflict.

I. THE TRUE NATURE OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. Soviet propaganda has always conceived of the Middle East conflict not in terms of a separate local conflict but rather as a component part of a worldwide struggle between differing systems of life, or between “forces of reaction” and “forces of progress.” From the very beginning of the conflict two constant viewpoints were adopted:

a. that the conflict is a link in "world imperialism's general policy aimed at suppressing national liberation movements";¹ and b. that the conflict is instigated and exploited by the U.S.A., Great Britain and other countries representing "the imperialist forces of reaction."²

For two decades the Middle East has been a battlefield between the forces of colonialism and those of national liberation, a military-political struggle which is part of the struggle for the "Third World". . . .

American imperialism is fighting in the Middle East to combat any trend toward Socialist and socially progressive ideas. . .³

There is a third element, or a third viewpoint, in Soviet propaganda's treatment of the nature of the Middle East conflict — namely, the identification of the "forces of progress" and "forces of reaction" in the conflict. This is a crucial point, which underwent a radical transformation. Surprising as it may seem today, at the outbreak of the conflict, the U.S.S.R. saw the State of Israel as the progressive factor in the Middle East, and the Arab states as "serving the interests of reactionary forces."⁴ The Arab countries were rebuked for their attack on Israel, in terms which today are reserved exclusively for Israel:

But in their armed attack undertaken at outside instigation, on the State of Israel the Arab countries are not fighting in defense of their national interests or for their independence.

The Soviet public, which has always expressed its sympathy with the national liberation movement of all peoples, including the Arabs, emphatically condemns the aggression of the Arab states against Israel and the efforts forcibly to prevent the Jews from forming their own state in accordance with the General Assembly's decision.⁵

Since then, not only has Israel become the "aggressor" and "the force of reaction," but Soviet propaganda's treatment of the 1948–49 events has changed in accordance with the present "reactionary" image of Israel promoted by the Soviet propaganda apparatus:

Let us look back to events some years ago. . . .to better understand the essence of the Arab-Israeli conflict. . . .

The State of Israel appeared on the map on May 15, 1948. . . .

TEL AVIV'S DANGEROUS DELUSIONS

Zionism Against Détente

Nikolai Borodin

Final article in the series by Yuri Dmitriev on the way forward in the Middle East

WORLD AFFAIRS

ISRAEL'S PRETEXT FOR MURDER

Today face the... decision... have near... proposals... should be... for a general... Washington... on the re...

That is precisely what is taking place at present, as no-where else in the world... try to use this... (The...)

ISRAEL SHARPENS SITUATION — SAYS 'Pravda'

ISRAEL RESPONSIBLE FOR MOSQUE FIRE — ZASS

ISRAEL IGNORES UNO

by Boris Banner

The report on the Middle East situation which UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim submitted to the Security Council, indicates...

The Israeli leaders have developed since an effective tool... A few weeks ago, Israel established diplomatic relations with the Yemen regime. And not longer ago, than the Tel Aviv newspapers... This... request for...

ISRAEL'S FLAGRANT OBSTRUCTION

From NIKOLAI BORODIN

COUNTRY — the... City Council... condemning... of Lebanon... bar att...

The... remains un... imperialist... USA and...

The Zionists are the shock forces of world imperialism

ZIONISM

by a Soviet Jewish General

Here we summarize an article published in Pravda last week by an eminent Soviet Jew, Lt. Gen. Dmitry Dragomirsky. General Dragomirsky, who commands an MP in Georgia.

TION of new con... the East... U.S. im... forces... to forget it... New

U.S.S.R. — TRUE FRIEND OF THE ARABS

MASMAN AL-AZHAR,
Representative of the National Leadership
of the South Party of Iraq

...the first step is to ...
...the second step is to ...

The Arab people have ...
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HELP FROM THE USSR

—without s

EGYPT AND THE USSR: FRIENDSHIP IN ACTION

Support the Arab Peoples Can Count On

The firmness of the lofty ideals of Soviet-Arab friendship and cooperation

SOVIET-ARAB FRIENDSHIP

by Vladimir Lenin

SOVIET-EGYPTIAN CO-OPERATION

SOVIET-IRAQ CO-OPERATION GROWING RAPIDLY

...the Arab people ...
...the Soviet Union ...

...the Arab people ...
...the Soviet Union ...

But already then, with the creation of Israel, its rulers, in addition to the 14,000 sq. km. fixed for the country by the U.N. decision, "took" 7,000 sq. km. more with the help of arms and never afterward showed any intentions of returning these lands to the Arabs.⁶

No mention of an Arab attack, Arab aggression or the Israeli right of self-defense. Present needs – as in many other cases – dictate the view of the past given by Soviet propaganda.

While in 1948 the U.S.A. and Great Britain were accused by the U.S.S.R. of promoting their own imperialist interest through the Arab attack against Israel,⁷ later on they were accused of "creating the State of Israel. . . in order to further their own aggressive ends in the Middle East. . ." ⁸ However, the accusation of their direct involvement in the conflict did not change.

Since Soviet propaganda regards the Middle East conflict as an integral part of the worldwide struggle between national liberation movements and "forces of reaction" trying to suppress them, comparison with other international conflicts became inevitable. In most cases, the Vietnam War served that purpose, the common denominator of both conflicts being "the American aggression against national liberation movements." Yet there is a slight difference, which is frequently emphasized by Soviet propaganda:

The only difference is that in Indochina they [the Americans] are crushing the freedom of the peoples with their own hands, whereas they have preferred to let the Israeli extremists do the dirty work for them in their struggle against the Arab national liberation movements.⁹

Thus the Middle East conflict is described in Marxist terms as a struggle between imperialistic "forces of reaction" and national liberation movements. The State of Israel – a proxy of American imperialism – engages in constant aggression against Arab states, "the progressive force" in the Middle East. The aggression is of a socio-political nature, whose national, racial or religious connotations cannot conceal its true character.

II. THE NATURE OF ZIONISM. The campaign against Zionism is the major theme of Soviet propaganda in relation to the Middle East conflict. While this campaign started almost immediately after the establishment of the State of Israel, for years it lacked the ideological formulation, anti-Jewish zeal and paranoic connotations which were acquired after 1970. Apparently, the activities of the Jewish Defense League and the worldwide campaign for the liberation of Soviet Jews suddenly transformed Zionism (according to the Soviet view) into one of the main enemies of the U.S.S.R., the Socialist countries and progress in general.

Before the Six-Day War, Soviet propaganda described Zionism as "the ideology and political banner of the Soviet bourgeoisie . . . which sets out to achieve two objectives: to assemble the world's Jews from the Diaspora, or "Dispersion," and concentrate them in Israel, and to consolidate Israel as the bulwark of Zionism."¹⁰ No ambitions, or worldwide goals were ascribed to Zionism. Thus, when Israel was attacked for "its economic, political and military ties with NATO"¹¹ or its relations with African countries,¹² Zionism was not mentioned at all. It was Israel "that was used by the colonialists for penetrating Africa."¹³ Still, "the [alleged] connection between Zionism and the owners of the big banks and stock exchanges of New York and London"¹⁴ was frequently stressed. There were also a few hysterical outbursts against Zionism during the period of the trials of Jewish Communist leaders in Eastern Europe, and at the "doctor's trial" in Moscow, when Zionism was accused of being a branch of the American Secret Service.¹⁵ "Zionist leaders" – but not "Zionism" – were sometimes charged with contacting Nazi officials in Europe.¹⁶

The Six-Day War was a turning point in the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign. Articles, news bulletins, commentaries and broadcasts relating to the war often vaguely accused "international Zionism" of its planning. The change in the tone and substance of accusations became apparent a year after the war, in a major article by K. Ivanov, "Israel, Zionism and

International Imperialism.”¹⁷ Ivanov is an “old hand” at Middle Eastern problems. In 1958, he had already published a book, together with Z. Sheinis, *The State of Israel – Its Situation and Policy* (Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1958), in which he established himself as a specialist, of sorts, on the Middle East. Ten years later, continuing the line he had begun in 1958, Ivanov presented Israel as a servant of foreign capital and interests. This time, however, Zionism played a central role in his article, graduating from “the ideological banner of Israel” to “an agent of International Imperialism.”¹⁸ During 1968–69, other articles appeared which had the same common denominator: Zionism as a servant of International Imperialism and foreign capital, its focus of activity, however, being limited to the Middle East.

In 1970 there was a striking change obviously prompted, as has been stressed already, by the activities of the Jewish Defense League and the intensification of the campaign for the liberation of Soviet Jews. The new anti-Zionist line was appropriately introduced by the ideological organ of the C.P.S.U. – *Komunist*.¹⁹ The article was immediately reprinted and explained at length in other journals and newspapers. (*Soviet Weekly* reprinted the article in four consecutive issues in Sept.–Oct. 1970.) A new definition of Zionism was presented:

Zionism today is not so much the Jewish nationalist movement it used to be as an organic part of the international – primarily American – imperialist machinery for the carrying out of neocolonialist policies and ideological subversion.²⁰

Other articles of the same period ran along the same lines although they were often more radical. In them, Zionism was presented as:

. . . a deadly enemy of the Soviet State from its very beginning . . . [which] collaborated with imperialist intelligence agencies, organized sabotage and subversion, set up numerous societies as centers for anti-Soviet activity.²¹

All of a sudden it emerged that Zionism had always engaged in “terrorist sallies . . . direct interference in the internal affairs

of the U.S.S.R. . . . undisguised espionage and subversive activities."²²

Its activities, limited until then to the Middle East, expanded, according to Soviet propaganda, "beyond the Middle East."²³

The ever-increasing crescendo of the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign attributed new characteristics to Zionism, such as "bellicose chauvinism and anti-Sovietism,"²⁴ "militant chauvinism and anti-Communism,"²⁵ and ultimately "anti-Communism and anti-Sovietism."²⁶

A major effort was directed at proving the connection between the U.S.A., "American capital," "American imperialism," etc., and Zionism. In this particular aspect, the campaign struck familiar anti-Semitic tones, using interchangeably "Zionism" and "Jews" or "Judaism," and accusing Jews of "owning 35% of privately-owned Capitalist firms in the U.S.A.,"²⁷ "governing significant positions in the apparatus of the State in a number of Capitalist countries, including the U.S.A. and Holland . . . and trying to lay down the policy of the entire Capitalist world,"²⁸ "controlling half of all the papers and magazines published in the United States, half of all the radio stations, three-quarters of the foreign correspondents' offices of papers and news agencies,"²⁹ etc.

The ever-increasing shrillness of the Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda campaign sometimes reached paranoic proportions. Zionism was to blame for practically everything which displeased the Soviet Union, the Middle East conflict fading somewhat into the background. The major allegations were that:

1. Zionism Collaborated with Nazism. Soviet propaganda often compares the alleged cruelty of Israeli soldiers with Nazi behavior during World War II. On such occasions it is often stressed that there have always been connections between Zionism and Nazism:

The Israeli Zionists have followed right in the footsteps of the Nazis, and little wonder. In general, the Zionists are ardent advocates of

racism and have been known to collaborate with the Nazis on many occasions.³⁰

Concepts related to Nazism, such as "genocide,"³¹ "racism,"³² etc., are also frequently used to describe various Zionist activities.

2. Zionism Provokes (and Fakes) Anti-Semitism. One of the most paradoxical allegations of Soviet propaganda is the thesis that Zionism needs anti-Semitism to flourish. Since anti-Semitism is not always forthcoming – claims Soviet propaganda – Zionism strives to provoke it! When Zionism fails to provoke anti-Semitism, then it resorts to desecrating synagogues, maintaining that this is the work of anti-Semites! Thereby, immigration to Israel is stimulated. . . .³³

3. Zionism Engages in Espionage throughout the World. This particular allegation was undoubtedly aimed at disrupting the free existence of Zionist organizations in various countries. These organizations were accused as follows:

At present practically every Zionist organization, in whatever part of the world it may be active, is a link in the far-flung network of imperialist espionage organizations. . . . At present hundreds of thousands of Israeli agents from among the fanatical Zionists in the pay of International monopolies supply information from all countries, infiltrate all the fields of national life, hiding under masks of scientists and engineers, businessmen, doctors, journalists, and even actors.³⁴

4. Zionism – a Trojan Horse of Imperialism and Racism in the Third World. Soviet propaganda claims that Zionism has an ideological affinity with South African racism . . . based on anti-Communism and aggression against the national democratic countries.³⁵ Zionists advocate in independent African countries a "dialogue" with South Africa . . . as a part of the global strategy of imperialism aimed against the liberation movements."³⁶ Since, in the capacity of an agent of imperialism, "Zionism is carrying on broad-scale subversive activities in the Third World countries,"³⁷ the U.S.S.R. con-



The Soviet attitude to current events can best be judged from the nature of their cartoons.

sequently decided to help those countries fight Zionism. In 1974 a collection of documents and articles was published under the title *Against Zionism and Israeli Aggression*. The book "exposed the goals and means of international Zionism . . . analyzing the neocolonialist role of Zionism and the State of Israel in Third World countries."³⁸

Many more sub-themes of the Soviet anti-Zionist campaign can be listed. Soviet propaganda accuses Zionism of connections with Ukrainian nationalism,³⁹ the late King Feisal,⁴⁰ Communist China,⁴¹ the Vietnam War,⁴² of having a monopoly of international capital,⁴³ of attempting "to drive a wedge into the friendship of the Soviet family,"⁴⁴ of organizing the defeat of Senator Fulbright in the 1974 primary elections in Arkansas,⁴⁵ etc. Seldom has Soviet propaganda conducted an international campaign so zealously and intensively. Virtually all instruments of international propaganda have been mobilized to battle Zionism. Various groups of Soviet Jews were organized and their protests were broadcast, televised, and printed by the numerous means at the disposal of Soviet propaganda.⁴⁶ Films were also produced on the subject. Thus, in April 1971 the Soviet Central Documentary Film Studio released a documentary film called *Zionism's Criminal Line*. As Moscow was interested in distributing this film abroad to Western countries but did not always meet with success in this effort, Radio Moscow instead described the contents of the film in its foreign-language broadcasts. Seventy-five books dealing with Zionism and Judaism were published between 1967-1973.⁴⁷ Most of them appeared simultaneously in several languages.

In an attempt to dissociate large segments of the Israeli population from Zionism, prominent professors of The Hebrew University were pronounced "opponents of Zionism."⁴⁸ As we have said, all of them are actually well-known Zionists.

The campaign against Zionism is the closest that Soviet propaganda comes to revealing official prejudice against Jews and Jewish nationalism. Sometimes it even crosses the line.

Hatred of Jews and Israel is displayed often; frequently, in an obvious attempt to avoid accusations of anti-Semitism, stress is laid on the fact that the authors of some of the most radical anti-Zionist articles are themselves Jews – such as J. Shraiber, Z. Sheinus, R. Scholom and others. The anti-Zionist propaganda of the U.S.S.R. extends far beyond the borders of the Middle East conflict. Zionism is even turned into a scapegoat for Soviet failures such as the 1968 developments in Czechoslovakia.⁴⁹ It is branded as the enemy of the working people of all countries, including the working people of Israel!

Another theme of Soviet propaganda, somewhat related to Zionism is:

III. THE CRUELTY OF ISRAELI SOLDIERS, ISRAELI TERROR AND ITS RESEMBLANCE TO NAZI METHODS. “Israeli cruelty” is a relatively new theme of Soviet propaganda. Prior to the Six-Day War, allegations of this sort were restricted to accusing the Israeli authorities of discriminating against Israeli Arabs and treating them as second-rate citizens. Even during the Sinai Campaign, only French and British soldiers were accused of committing atrocities against Arabs. Israeli soldiers were on rare occasions scornfully admonished and then mostly for conducting a “scorched earth” policy in the Sinai Peninsula⁵⁰ and for unlawfully governing the Gaza Strip.⁵¹

The only exceptions to this trend were reports of retaliatory actions by the Israeli Army. These reports were often garnished with vivid allegations of Israeli soldiers’ cruelty. It was usually stressed that these retaliatory actions served imperialist circles, and were aimed at intimidating the Arab countries.⁵² Nevertheless, the accusations did not reach the proportions of a well organized propaganda campaign until the Six-Day War.

Immediately after the Six-Day War Israel was accused vaguely of “committing monstrous crimes.”⁵³ Soon, the

accusations were elaborated, specified, and grouped into three categories:

1. Atrocities in Israel-occupied territories;
2. Atrocities committed by Israeli soldiers across the border in neighboring Arab states;
3. Terrorist activities against Palestinian leaders all over the world.

1. Atrocities in Israel-Occupied Territories. Soviet propaganda attempted, immediately after the Six-Day War, to ascribe an ideological basis to the alleged Israeli acts of terror, the explanation usually being that Zionist ideology implies terror:

Racial self-segregation, racial purity and racial exclusiveness are the three principal tenets of the reactionary Zionist ideology subscribed to by the Israeli ruling element. The Zionist credo of racial self-segregation does not permit co-existence in the "holy land" of Jews and non-Jews. The latter must be ejected from Palestine so that the "chosen people" might fulfill their "special mission." This is Zionist ideological justification for the virtual war against the Arab population of the captured territories.⁵⁴

This line of propaganda was sometimes taken to extreme lengths; "the Zionists" were accused, for instance, of "putting into effect their criminal plan of liquidating the Palestinian people in the territories, which, by their reckoning would be incorporated in this state [Israel]. . ."⁵⁵

Sometimes the same idea is presented in a modified form: Zionist plans, monstrous by their brutality, envisage the creation of unbearable conditions for all non-Jews and even expelling them all from the country.⁵⁶

In an attempt to prove its point, Soviet propaganda accuses Israel of "expelling *en masse* Palestinian Arabs from territories incorporated in Israel,"⁵⁷ "humiliating the Arab population by exploiting Arab workers,"⁵⁸ "persecuting and terrorizing the Arabs,"⁵⁹ etc. The most excessive of these absurd fabrications were the alleged "collective executions in (Arab) village squares with the population forced to

witness them as a warning,"⁶⁰ and "the criminal act committed by the Tel-Aviv militarists, namely, the killing of the population of the Arab village of Aqrabah by herbicides."⁶¹

The lack of any actual evidence compelled the Soviet propaganda machine to use an unfortunate incident in February 1973 – the shooting down by Israel Air Force pilots of a Libyan airliner which had strayed off course over military installations in Sinai – as an example of "a pre-determined provocation," "a part of the Israeli policy of terror and force."⁶²

There are several characteristics of the "Israeli cruelty" theme. The reports of alleged Israeli atrocities usually emanate from Cairo or Amman, and are presented as facts. No attempt is ever made to give the Israeli version of the event reported. Since this would seldom contribute to the credibility of the reports, Soviet propaganda often resorts to the already mentioned practice of utilizing renegade Jews and Israelis. Thus, V. Ladeikin's article "Criminal Policy of the Israeli Extremists," which makes some of the most extreme accusations (genocide, public executions, etc.) cites in support a number of Israelis, such as Eli Lobel, Uri Avneri, and Dr. Israel Shahak, all of them well-known political radicals, some of whom, like Dr. I. Shahak, are connected with Arab terrorist organisations.⁶³

Very often the source of information is the guerrillas themselves; only their version is quoted, and the entire report is presented as though it were fact.

The Israeli authorities have committed a fresh crime in the occupied Arab lands. On Oct. 7 an Israeli army unit opened fire on a group of civilians – Palestinians in Khan Yunis, Gaza sector, killing 8 and wounding 20 people. This was stated today by a representative of the Palestinian military command.

The Palestinian representative pointed out that by such measures, the Israeli occupation authorities take vengeance on the civilian population of the occupied territories for the losses they are suffering from Palestinian guerrillas.⁶⁴

Wide use is made of cliché images, trigger words and

phrases such as "aggressors," "oppressors," "Israeli policy of terror," "genocide," "Nazis," etc. An attempt is often made to invoke certain associations in the reactors:

In a bid "to maintain order" in the captured territories and crush the resistance of the Arab population, Israeli military authorities frequently resort to undisguised terror. People . . . are imprisoned and subjected to cruel torture. The Israeli Defense Minister, Dayan, ordered his soldiers to open fire on any gathering of civilians. Israeli border units, the "Green Berets" famous for their punitive operations and cruelty, are called out to deal with the patriots.⁶⁵

The listeners were supposed to be struck by the association with the American Green Berets – a term never used in Israel for the border units.

What is often so astonishing is not only the similarity of Soviet reports and their repetitious terminology, but even the similarity of article titles: "Israeli Outrages" (V. Tulyakov, *International Affairs*, No. 6, 1970); again, "Israeli Outrages (V. Katin, *New Times*, No. 40, 1971); "Crime Raised to the Rank of Policy" (*Moscow News*, No. 38, 1973); "Criminal Policy of the Israeli Extremists" (V. Ladeikin, *International Affairs*, No. 1, 1972), and many other similar examples.

This is an additional indication of Soviet propaganda's central planning and control. It seems that propaganda authorities in the U.S.S.R. determine not only the propaganda line, but also the terminology and imagery used in each case. Since Soviet propaganda is carefully planned and centrally supervised, its numerous inconsistencies and inaccuracies, for instance, in connection with the theme of alleged Israeli cruelty, are surprising. Thus, the number of Arabs living in Jerusalem before the Six-Day War is given as 100,000 by one source⁶⁶ and 300,000⁶⁷ by another. The number of "Arabs expelled from Jerusalem" is variously given as 60,000,⁶⁸ 230,000,⁶⁹ 70% of the population,⁷⁰ and 10,000.⁷¹

How many Arab prisoners are "languishing in Israeli jails"? According to Tulyakov 17,000.⁷² Radio Moscow maintained in a broadcast in Turkish that the number was

12,000.⁷³ Apparently, when translating this into English something was lost in the process for in the English broadcast the number dropped to 2,500.⁷⁴

The scope of Israeli construction work in Jerusalem was in one case reported as "3,000 residential houses in the eastern part of Jerusalem and 850 in other parts of the city,"⁷⁵ and by another source as "35,000 houses."⁷⁶ The number of Arabs to be expelled from Gaza (under a secret Israeli plan) was 200,000 when Radio Moscow broadcast in Russian,⁷⁷ and 300,000 when the broadcast was in English.⁷⁸

The number of Arab houses destroyed by the Israelis was announced to be "over 8,000" in March 1971.⁷⁹ Apparently, during the following weeks some of them were reconstructed, since the number dropped to "7,300 damaged or demolished."⁸⁰

Many similar instances of contradictions, discrepancies and inaccuracies may be quoted. Obviously Soviet propaganda is somewhat careless where numbers and facts are concerned.

2. Atrocities in Arab Countries. The alleged atrocities and policy of terror of the Israeli Government, the Israeli Army and "Zionists" in general, is not limited to Israel and the occupied territories. The same methods are applied across the border, in the various retaliatory actions and punitive operations by Israeli soldiers. The terminology and allegations of Soviet propaganda do not vary. Again, the Israelis are accused of "smashing doors and breaking into houses, kicking out women and children and blowing up houses,"⁸¹ "demolishing homes, schools, hospitals, mosques and cinemas,"⁸² "killing children, women and old men,"⁸³ etc. "Barbarians," "vandals," "pirates" and "aggressors" are the most frequently used terms to describe Israeli soldiers when reporting Israeli operations across the border.

Soviet propaganda usually explains "Israeli terror in neighboring Arab states" as part of a carefully planned

“policy of violence and villainy toward its Arab neighbors.”⁸⁴ It is often stressed that internal politics (mostly Government-Opposition relations) determine Israeli policy across the borders.⁸⁵

Acts of terrorism against Israel, such as the murder of Israeli sportsmen at the Munich Olympic Games in September 1972, and of about 30 children in the Israeli village of Ma'alot in May 1974, could not be entirely ignored by Soviet propaganda. Immediately after their occurrence they were mildly condemned by Moscow, using vague and neutral terms when naming the guilty side. However, when Israel retaliated, Soviet propaganda accused Israel of using the Munich⁸⁶ and Ma'alot⁸⁷ murders as a “pretext for committing murder across the border . . .” Later, Soviet propaganda bluntly accused Israel of actually having staged both the Munich⁸⁸ and Ma'alot⁸⁹ murders in order to justify mass murder in Arab states. . . . To the same category belong the accusations that Israeli pilots frequently drop children's toys containing explosive devices in raids over Arab countries.⁹⁰ Not even a fabrication of such a toy has ever been displayed either by Soviet or Arab authorities.

Needless to say, the U.S.S.R. constantly condemns every act of “Israeli terrorism,” but, at a time of “detenté,” misses the opportunity to stress that these alleged acts were, presumably, carried out using American weapons. . . .⁹¹

3. Alleged Israeli Terror against Palestinians all over the World. This particular theme of Soviet propaganda was developed in the 1970s. Moscow offered the following explanation of “Tel Aviv's terrorist policy in Europe”:

Tel Aviv's terrorist policy is an element of the Zionist-imperialist conspiracy against the freedom, independence and territorial integrity of Arab states. By assassinations, bomb explosions and other violence, the Zionist leaders seek not only to deprive the Palestine resistance movement of its leaders but to blackmail Arabs and force them to accept the annexation of their lands. . . .⁹²

Another explanation given is that "Israel's main objective in these campaigns of murder is to sabotage completely all efforts, inside and outside the U.N., to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East."⁹³

The ultimate explanation is that:

Israel fights Arabs anywhere and on any front. . . . The Zionists intend to spread their bandit activities even to Western Europe and other parts of the world, wherever Palestinian refugees find asylum.⁹⁴

Thus, according to Soviet propaganda, a common purpose unites Israeli terror in occupied territories and abroad, namely genocide of the Palestinian people.

Moscow maintains that Israeli terror against Palestinians abroad is assisted by U.S. agents, who supply information,⁹⁵ operate sophisticated U.S. electronic equipment⁹⁶ and thus facilitate the murderous activities of Israeli agents abroad.

In addition to all this information (unsubstantiated), Moscow also "knows" that a special Israeli terror organization — The Wrath of God — led by General Aharon Yariv, "carries out sabotage operations against the Palestinian Resistance in cooperation with agents of Israeli intelligence abroad."⁹⁷ No evidence was offered to back this allegation.

One last aspect of the "terror" theme is the "Nazi variant." This is the accusation that Israel employs systems invented and perfected by the Nazis.

One of the first articles which clearly spelled out the Nazi motif was "The Arab Peoples' Just Cause," which stated:

Tel-Aviv's outrageous territorial appetites make it necessary to pay serious attention to the policy of the Israeli aggressors in the occupied Arab territories. This policy involuntarily [!] brings to mind Nazi practices during the Second World War. There is the same immediate appointment of Gauleiters for the newly-occupied areas; the ruthless treatment of POW's and the native population; the terrorism and eviction of the population from their old homeland; the plunder and "development" of occupied territories . . . all . . . sickeningly reminiscent of Hitler's "new order in Europe."⁹⁸

Moscow News immediately picked up the motif. The Israeli justification for the Six-Day War (preventive action) was compared to "the Nazi theory of the preventive blow." Moshe Dayan was described as an adherent of the "Lebensraum" theory and an apt pupil of Field Marshal Rommel.⁹⁹

Since then, comparison with various Nazi atrocities — always underlined with "appropriate" concepts, such as "genocide," "concentration camps," "deportations," etc. — has become one of the favorite themes of Soviet propaganda. Thus, for instance, in February 1971 Radio Moscow described to its Turkish listeners a "typical concentration camp in Israel." It staged that there are huge concentration camps in Sinai, where 12,000 Arabs live in hunger and thirst, and are subjected to beatings and torture. The broadcast goes on:

This is how Israeli guards at a concentration camp on the Mediterranean coast amuse themselves: they tell the Arabs to go to the beach to bathe. The people, who are fed up with the filth and misery of the concentration camp, go to the sea, and the Israeli troops then open fire on them.¹⁰⁰

This particular type of allegation was never repeated in Soviet broadcasts to any other country.

By the end of 1969, the Nazi analogy was elaborated and used with greater sophistication. The timing is, of course, significant as it coincides with the increased activity of the Jewish Defense League. Thus, though the stories of Israeli cruelty continued unabated, a new concept was introduced, viz., "Zionist racism," often in combination with "nationalist chauvinism."

Various broadcasts, mainly in English, introduced the new line. At about the same time, *New Times* told its readers that the *Memoirs* of the Nazi Otto Skorzeny had been translated into Hebrew, thereby providing the Israelis with yet another textbook. . . .¹⁰¹ By the beginning of 1971 "master race" and "chosen people" were among the most frequently used emotive trigger phrases of Soviet propaganda. The following broadcast of Radio Moscow is typical:

Racist ideology is the substance of Zionism. The doctrine of the chosen people, which is the basis of the false thesis about the right of all Jews to live in Israel, contradicts the rights of the peoples to independence, it is like the Nazi doctrine about the master race.¹⁰²

Later it was claimed that Zionism practices racism against Jews in all countries of the world, who do not support the Zionist idea.¹⁰³

The excesses of Soviet propaganda included comparing Moshe Dayan to Adolf Eichman,¹⁰⁴ and implying that the Ma'alot tragedy "reminds us of the incidents which took place during the occupation of Poland when the Hitlerites killed German citizens for provocative reasons. . . ."¹⁰⁵

As usual, the most radical and absurd allegations are made by renegade (or blackmailed) Jews — a prudent gambit to avoid accusations of anti-Semitism. Thus, in one single article three different Jews condemn Zionism and compare it with Nazism: Moshe Menuhin pronounces the Zionists "Jewish Nazis," the French Professor R. Leibovich calls Israel "a country which is rapidly turning fascistic," and the Odessa Rabbi I. Shwarzblat maintains that "the policy of the Zionists does not differ from the policy of Hitler."¹⁰⁶

There are two basic conclusions concerning the Nazi theme of Soviet propaganda:

a. This is one of the subjects in connection with which the differentiation of Soviet propaganda is most obvious. While stories of Israeli cruelty are broadcast indiscriminately by Moscow, the conceptualism employed differs from one place to another. Concepts such as "Nazism," "concentration camps," "Gauleiters," "Herrenvolk," etc., are used mainly in articles and broadcasts aimed at European audiences. "Racism," "discrimination," and plain sadism are reserved for African audiences, which are generally not acquainted with Nazi terminology. Stories about racism practiced against all Jews who oppose the Zionist idea are directed at places where, in fact, there are practically no Jews — such as Southeast Asia.

b. The treatment of this theme underwent some changes at the beginning of 1970. As with all other themes of Soviet propaganda, the entire subject, in general, was conceived to serve the needs of Soviet foreign policy. When these needs increased, treatment was intensified. When a swift change was required — a change designed as appropriate counteraction against the activities of the Jewish Defense League — the entire subject of Nazism was transformed to include accusations of racism, chauvinism, etc.

And finally, a general conclusion concerning the entire theme of "Israeli cruelty and terror." This is a highly emotionally charged theme, carefully designed to invoke certain associations and to stir certain emotions in a pre-conceived direction. Despite its importance for Soviet propaganda, the subject as presented by Moscow suffers a severe defect: the numerous inconsistencies, discrepancies and inaccuracies of Soviet propaganda, the consistent presentation of only one side of each development, automatically blaming and condemning only Israel or Zionism — all this, when there is a constant lack of hard facts to substantiate the version presented — considerably diminish the credibility of Soviet operational propaganda. Furthermore, it reveals some of the real intentions of Soviet propaganda, and discloses the actual position of the U.S.S.R. as a very interested party in the Middle East conflict.

IV. THE INTERNAL SITUATION OF ISRAEL. This is a much-used theme of Soviet propaganda, with several distinct characteristics. The internal situation of Israel has always been presented as terrible, the cause of which is the Capitalist system and imperialist influence (until 1967), and the militaristic policy of the Government, which impoverishes the population (after 1967). Another constant element is emphasis on the role of "the forces of progress" in Israel, chiefly the Israel Communist Party, the racial discrimination practiced by the authorities against Sephardic Jews,

and later – the discrimination against Soviet Jews who have immigrated to Israel.

Soviet propaganda has always blamed the U.S.A. for the economic situation of Israel:

One gets the feeling the whole economy is under American control. This state of affairs is a natural outcome of the Government's self-elected dependence on U.S. aid.¹⁰⁷

American financial aid has constantly been presented as an American investment in militaristic ventures:

The ruling circles of Israel try to present the American financial contribution as charity, yet the people see that millions of dollars go not for improving living standards, but for the preparation of the American imperialists' military adventures.¹⁰⁸

The consequence of this situation is "a state where people do not live, but only exist,"¹⁰⁹ "a land of humiliation and abuse... where human dignity is cheaper than dirt. . . ."¹¹⁰

The only positive factor in this situation was "the progressive elements in Israel":

The working masses of Israel are increasingly demanding an end to the aggressive policy of the ruling circles, the unemployed organize demonstrations under the slogan "Bread and Work"; the Communist Party members and other progressive elements in the country go on with their fight.¹¹¹

After the Six-Day War, "the June 1967 adventure" received its share of the blame for the internal situation of Israel:

In spite of maintaining a huge army, unemployment is soaring, living standards are falling rapidly and strikes are breaking out. One can imagine how costly the June adventure was for Tel-Aviv and the subsequent maintenance of the occupation regime on the Arab territories.¹¹²

In the mid-1960s the Israel Communist Party split into two factions. One – predominantly Jewish – retained the name Israel Communist Party (its leaders were the late M. Sneh and S. Mikunis), while the other – mostly Arab – called itself the New Communist List and was led by Meir Vilner. After the Six-Day War, Moscow chose first to ignore the Israel Communist Party, and later branded it as a

“collaborator” with the Israeli Government. On the other hand, Meir Vilner and his friends became “the real avant-garde of the anti-war movement”:

Today the Communist Party of Israel [meaning the New Communist List – Rakah] is upholding the internationalist positions of the country's progressive forces, coming out strongly against Zionist ideology and practices. . . . Their internationalism managed to counter and gain the upper hand over the chauvinism of the factionalists, the Mikunis-Sneh group.¹¹³

By the beginning of 1970, the theme had undergone several changes. Three factors were responsible:

1. The intensified campaign against Zionism, which developed at the same time, affected reports on the Israeli internal situation. Zionism became the cause of Israel's “economic and social disintegration.” Thus, Zionism actually overshadowed the U.S.A. and “the criminal policy of the Israeli Government” as the main reason for Israel's “unbearable internal situation.”

2. International protests against the treatment of Soviet Jews by the Government of the U.S.S.R. reached their peak in 1970. With the increased attacks against Zionism, it was only natural to intensify the dramatic descriptions of Israel's internal situation. The reports on Israel grew blacker and more vivid. Soviet Jews, and those who protested the policy of the U.S.S.R., which restricted immigration to Israel, had to be informed of the “true” situation, i.e., that Israel was by no means a fit place for Soviet Jews who aspire to live there.

3. There were certain developments in Israel's internal situation which in fact provided material for Soviet propaganda. The late 1960s and early 1970s were a period of social ferment, strikes, violent demonstrations of the “Israeli Black Panthers,” etc. While these developments had no direct connection with the Middle East conflict, or the foreign policy of the Israeli Government, still they were presented as protests against “the militaristic policy of the Zionist Government,” as it is usually referred to by the Soviet press. Since these demonstrations provided a unique

opportunity of displaying photographs, descriptions, reports, etc., which could be considered *real evidence*, Soviet propaganda used them extensively, intensifying the theme of Israel's internal disruption.

Following these developments, Soviet propaganda commenced a determined and continuous effort to demonstrate cleavages in Israel society. Among these "cleavages" were:

- a. the newcomers against other citizens;
- b. "Black" Jews against other Jews;
- c. the people against their Government;
- d. civilians against the military establishment;
- e. religious Jews against secular Jews;
- f. workers against Trade Union leaders.

To deal with each of these points in turn:

Soviet propaganda announced that "former Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality had been subjected in Israel to discrimination and oppression."¹¹⁴ According to another broadcast, "they [Soviet Jews] were treated in Israel as second-rate citizens and were given only low-paid and difficult jobs."¹¹⁵

And yet, Radio Moscow announced in its Israeli transmission that there is broad discontent and anger among Israeli citizens because of the *preferential treatment* Soviet Jews receive in Israel.

There were indeed some Soviet Jews who did not find their place in Israel, and who returned to the U.S.S.R. Soviet propaganda used them extensively for its own purposes.* Articles ostensibly written by them were published in various Soviet newspapers and their participation in broadcasts and public meetings was given prominence. Some were taken aboard, to be presented in public, and to describe there — personally — what they saw in Israel. Soviet Radio and the press then reported these conferences at length:

* The use of Jews and Israelis by Soviet propaganda is described in Chapter Six.

Samokhvalov told this at a press conference in Geneva: "My fate is typical of immigrants from the Soviet Union. Many of them have no work and starve. Israel is a country with savage and unhuman mores. Dominating there is the principle that "if you don't care for yourself nobody will."¹¹⁶

According to Moscow, it is not only Soviet Jews who are discriminated against in Israel. "Black Jews" (i.e., Jews from North Africa and Asia) also suffer discrimination at the hands of the Israeli authorities.

From the first days of their life "Black Jews" found themselves in the position of rightless pariahs and outcasts intended only for one purpose – to satisfy the whims and needs of "white, civilized" Jews. High posts in State, public and private institutions are barred to them, and their lot is arduous physical labor.¹¹⁷

The circle grows ever wider:

But all of a sudden the outward calm. . . was exploded by Jews – by immigrants from the countries of the Arab East; from North Africa, the Pyrenees, the South of France and the Balkan Peninsula. United by the semiderogatory name of Sephardi, they are perhaps one small step higher than the Arabs on Israeli society's social ladder.¹¹⁸

Soon, the entire subject was to be presented entirely in terms of ideology:

The racist ideology of the Zionists is taking the shape of a division of Jews into two sorts. The lower sort are Jews of North African and Asian extraction. . . They suffer from discrimination in housing while the Israeli church [?] bans marriage between Jews of European and non-European extraction.¹¹⁹

The "cleavage" between the people and their Government was illustrated by quoting numbers and names of protestors, by reports of huge anti-Government demonstrations, etc. One of the most regularly used methods is to convey shocking descriptions of Israeli leaders. The usual target – but by no means the only one – was Moshe Dayan. *New Times* of January 1970 maintains that Dayan is a war criminal. His characteristics are listed as follows:

- a. neither an outstanding tactician, nor even a reliable commander;
- b. according to General Yitzhak Sadeh (the creator

and first commander of the Palmah – the strike force of the Haganah) – “the most dangerous man in Israel”;

- c. an admirer and imitator of Field Marshal Rommel;
- d. an accomplice of U.S. Capitalists;
- e. a passionate collector (and merchant) of intelligence information.¹²⁰

In another article, Moshe Dayan – together with Abba Eban – is accused of being a British spy.¹²¹

Never missing an opportunity, *New Times* mentions (and portrays in an ugly cartoon) Dayan’s passion for archeology:

Moshe Dayan’s love of ancient art objects is so great that he has already excavated \$700,000 worth of them.¹²²

In one single broadcast several Israeli Cabinet members were dealt with. Among them:

- a. a swindler of no mean order, a rogue of the top class, whose ministerial portfolio never had any room for official papers, so full was it with bribes;
- b. a great lover of antiquity who had trained soldiers to carry out archeological excavations in occupied territories, extracting for him various ancient valuable objects to the value of several million dollars;
- c. a devout Minister, who had organized a bookshop specializing in the sale of pornographic literature in the very center of Jerusalem and had derived immense revenues from circulating these publications.¹²³

All this is usually contrasted with the “gloomy situation” of the rest of the Israeli population.

The attempt is made to prove that there is some sort of military élite in Israel, a situation which has dire repercussions on the general population:

The spirit of militarism implanted by Israel’s Zionist rulers goes cheek by jowl with the armed forces’ direct interference in various spheres of State activity. Retired officers, retaining their contacts with the army, hold important offices in the Government apparatus and State and private companies. Israeli economist Perlmutter says that 37.6% of the retired officers work in the ministries, 12.2% in state and 22.4% in private corporations. There is mounting opposition to the Government’s militaristic policy among the general mass of the public.¹²⁴

The division between religious and secular Jews is thus explained by *New Times*:

Yet in Israel, too, only the orthodox Judaist ranks as a full-fledged citizen. The whole fabric of life is dominated by religious dogma in this country, which the West holds up as a center of progress" in the backward Middle East.¹²⁵

This sounds peculiar when compared to a later Soviet broadcast which claimed that:

In the Soviet Union there is no great amount of synagogues but those that do function provide practically every Jew who so desires with the opportunity to attend services regularly, pray, observe religious holidays and so on. But in Israel if a person does not get into the Jerusalem area and the fanatically-minded community there, there is very little left of religion. The immigrant finds that in an atmosphere where business comes first, religious feelings are left way behind.

There is frequently only a semblance of religious feelings. The most essential religious traditions are violated and nobody pays attention to the aspects of life which a religious Jew feels should come first. So, the religious-minded note with bitterness that in the Soviet Union where the freedom of religion is established under the Constitution and guaranteed in practice, they had found a much greater degree of religiousness and much less religious hypocrisy than in Israel, where the very conditions of life facilitate the emergence of a cynical attitude to religious ideals. . . .¹²⁶

Industrial unrest, as interpreted by Moscow is directed — among other things — against the leaders of the Israeli Trade Unions:

If we are to consider the fact that the working people of Israel are living under oppressive barrack-type discipline and that the leaders of the biggest Trade Union Federations are connected with the Government by a system of Zionist organizations, it becomes clear that the recent strikes are a pointer to still deeper and sharper contradictions in Israeli society than those seen on the surface.¹²⁷

After the October 1973 war Soviet propaganda launched a new campaign aimed at describing the internal situation of Israel in the darkest colors. Numbers, percentages, charts and tables were employed to depict "the sad fruits reaped by that country, above all by its ordinary citizens, as a result of the adventuristic foreign policy of its ruling élite."¹²⁸

The unstable political situation (the resignation of Golda Meir's Cabinet, and the difficulties Yitzhak Rabin encountered while trying to form a new Cabinet) was analyzed repeatedly. Frequently it was implied that:

In these circumstances, it is the task of all progressive and peace-loving organizations and elements in Israel to join forces in the struggle for a radical reconsideration of the futile "from-the-position-of-strength" policy and for the establishment of a just, lasting and real peace in the Middle East.¹²⁹

Soviet Jews were warned daily not to repeat the mistake of those "who have been lured by Zionist propaganda. . . promised a heaven on earth. . . . Instead they found themselves facing a life deep in poverty and crime. . . . The promised heaven turned out to be a real hell."¹³⁰

Many of the Jews who decided to return to the U.S.S.R. (and were allowed to do so) were interviewed repeatedly. The main idea expressed in these interviews was that Israel is a "Zionist hell," where Soviet Jews "live as miserable pariahs deprived of all rights," a state "which does not need people but soldiers for imperialist aggression against the territory of neighboring states."¹³¹

A close examination of interviews and articles written by Soviet Jews on their unfortunate experiences in Israel reveals an amazing similarity in content and style.

These Jews have always been "lured by Zionist propaganda,"¹³² or have fallen "under the influence of Zionist poison,"¹³³ or were "misled and tricked by Zionist propaganda,"¹³⁴ etc. Instead of the "promised land,"¹³⁵ "heaven on earth,"¹³⁶ "Zionist paradise,"¹³⁷ and so on, they found "a world of Capitalism, predators and exploiters,"¹³⁸ "an ordinary Capitalist country, an ordinary Capitalist world."¹³⁹ Almost identical phrases are used to describe the internal situation of Israel, and the difficulties awaiting Soviet Jews; they describe the "chauvinism," "racism" and "militarism" of Israel in identical terms, as they describe their appeals to Soviet authorities ("save our souls, help us to return to the motherland");¹⁴⁰ they "write tearful

letters,"¹⁴¹ "write thousands of despairing letters and petitions," etc.¹⁴²

It is even more perplexing to compare the above-quoted broadcasts and articles with similar interviews with returning Soviet Jews in 1963¹⁴³ and even 1957.¹⁴⁴ The unavoidable conclusion is that even if the articles, broadcasts and letters are genuine, it seems that Soviet Jews employed by Soviet propaganda have been briefed in advance as to what is to be stressed, where and how. Evidence shows ¹⁴⁵ that, at least in some cases, Soviet Jews were promised permission to return to the U.S.S.R. in return for participating in the U.S.S.R. propaganda effort, especially with respect to Israel's internal situation.

As in other themes of Soviet propaganda, factual errors, contradictions and misleading half-truths abound. As always, it is the numerical data which give the lie to the reliability of Soviet reporting. M. Krenlin in an article "Israel: Ultras at Work," gives the age of the late Levi Eshkol as 72.¹⁴⁶ It must have been a very difficult year for Eshkol, for only six months previously he was allegedly 76.¹⁴⁷

The number of people living "on or below the poverty line" in Israel was given as 800,000,¹⁴⁸ 750,000¹⁴⁹ and 850,000.¹⁵⁰

Similarly with the number of "Black Jews" in Israel; sometimes they comprise 65% of the population,¹⁵¹ at other times 42%,¹⁵² or "half the Israeli population."¹⁵³

Despite its concentration on the subject, Soviet propaganda displays an amazing ignorance (or is it ignorance?) of all facets of the socio-political life of Israel. The term "Sephardic Jews" — a term used for centuries to describe Jews from North Africa, the Balkans and Asia — is transformed into a "semi-derogatory name"¹⁵⁴ by Soviet propaganda.

Another example of distortion is the following:

Occupied Arab towns and areas have been given Israeli names: the Western bank of the Jordan, for instance, has been divided into two parts and renamed Judea and Samaria, the Golan Heights are now called Hagolan Heights. . . .¹⁵⁵

These names were not changed. Judea and Samaria are place-names in the Bible; in Hebrew "Hagolan" means "The Golan." Hundreds of examples of misspellings, misunderstandings and sometimes "sheer imagination" can be listed ("Arab women are systematically sterilized in Israel").¹⁵⁶ All these indicate a very superficial knowledge of the Israeli socio-political scene, or malicious intent.

Finally, Soviet propaganda often takes concepts of Soviet political reality and uses them to describe the situation in Israel. While accusing Israel frequently of being a Capitalist society, it is still often claimed that "Jews from Arab countries are given the hardest work."¹⁵⁷ Apparently Soviet propaganda believes that in Israel the State or the Government assigns jobs to the people — a common practice in Socialist society.

Accusations of racism and discrimination are frequently used in another theme of Soviet propaganda — the relations between Israel and the African states.

V. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AFRICA.

The African continent occupies a crucial place in Soviet propaganda. It provides both a subject for that propaganda (Israel-African relations) and a target for Moscow's output. Although these two elements may appear separate, they are integral parts of a well-organized campaign, with two basic purposes:

- a. To sever the relations between Israel and as many African countries as possible;
- b. To induce or convince the African states to take an active and vocal anti-Israel stand on the Middle East conflict.

During the 1950s relations between Israel and Africa were not a significant part of Soviet propaganda. However, when the number of independent states in Africa increased, and friendly relations developed between them and Israel, Moscow began its African campaign. The first major outburst was early in 1962, when it was revealed that Portu-

guese soldiers fought in Mozambique, armed with Israeli-made submachine guns. Israel was immediately branded as "neo-colonialist"¹⁵⁸ and "a servant of imperialism in Africa."¹⁵⁹ Specific accusations were made stressing that "Israel masks U.S. infiltration in Africa,"¹⁶⁰ being "a tool of U.S. expansionism in Africa,"¹⁶¹ and so on. All of a sudden relations between Israel and Africa were presented as "a new role for Israel assigned to it by imperialism."¹⁶² Israeli aid to the African states was described as a simple transaction of American capital, with Israel merely serving as a bridge for the Western Powers' investments in Africa.¹⁶³

... But that, incidentally, is the chief factor in Israeli "aid" which is obviously being rendered on instructions from the Western Powers. They want to turn Tel-Aviv into a transit point for their investments. The monopolists realize, of course, that it is easier to penetrate the newly developing countries under the "neutral" Israeli signboard than under their own.¹⁶⁴

Soon, Soviet propaganda's "African campaign" was linked to the Middle East conflict. In a commentary "Israeli Expansion in Africa and the Interests of the Arabs," Radio Moscow claimed in its Arab broadcast:

... The Israeli politicians, while carrying out the wishes of their U.S. masters [in Africa], do not forget their own private interests. With the help of loans, investment of capital and conditioning people, the government circles in Israel hope to force some African countries to support Israel's expansionist policy in the Middle East. . . . Israel wants to exploit the increasing international reputation of the young independent African states to achieve its own goals. Therefore, we see that Israel's expansion in Africa, with all it might result in, also directly affects the national interests of the Arabs.¹⁶⁵

Soviet propaganda continued along the same line until 1967. Sometimes the usual reports of Israel being "the servant of imperialism and neocolonialism" were accompanied by reports of "discriminating African students in Israel."¹⁶⁶ "driving a wedge between the Arab Maghrib and Black Africa,"¹⁶⁷ etc.

Following the Six-Day War, the African theme gradually intensified, and by the late 1960s reached an unusual degree

of vehemence. By the end of 1970, Israel was accused of planning to expand into Africa:

It is hardly by chance that according to the original Zionist plan the "Jewish National Home" was to be located not in Palestine but in West Africa, in the area of the Fouta Djallou heights (now in the Republic of Guinea). Another plan envisaged the founding of a Jewish state in Uganda, then a British colony. Although these projects were subsequently abandoned, the Zionists have not given up the idea of neocolonialist expansion on the African continent.¹⁶⁸

Israel was accused not only of facilitating imperialist penetration into Africa by the U.S.A. and other countries, but also of using the African continent as an "experimental laboratory" for various Israeli enterprises. Several Israeli construction companies were accused of speculating with African money, and Israeli authorities of "selling untested and unproven vaccines and other medicines. . . having the effect not so much of curing the patient's ailments as of emptying his pockets."¹⁶⁹

Acting as "agents of imperialism", Israelis in Africa allegedly fulfill their chief purposes of subversion and intelligence activity:

A great many technical advisers, doctors, agronomists, military instructors, tradesmen, businessmen, trade union officials and youth organizers are engaged in activities which appear absolutely harmless at first sight, but are actually quite the opposite.¹⁷⁰

The Israelis, as brokers for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, were accused of selling weapons to the Portuguese in Angola,¹⁷¹ helping Biafra,¹⁷² organizing subversive activities in Congo, Brazzaville,¹⁷³ participating actively on the Portuguese side in Angola (and even having casualties there), and of subversion in Ghana, the Ivory Coast Republic, the Sudan, etc.¹⁷⁴

Soviet propaganda had the following evidence to present in confirmation of the allegations listed above:

a. The large number of Israeli advisers and technicians in Africa;

b. The frequent visits of Israeli politicians to the African continent;

c. The close relationship between Israel and South Africa;

d. The association between the Rothschild family and certain African leaders.¹⁷⁵

e. The "large number of former military men amongst Israeli diplomats in Africa," was presented as an indication of "their real task, namely, the organization and direction of subversive activities and espionage against the African states."¹⁷⁶

f. The "large number of Jews among the Peace Corps in Africa," who, according to Moscow, by being Zionists, "will provide Israel with agents in countries which she cannot otherwise penetrate."¹⁷⁷

The most persistently repeated of these allegations was the one about the "Israeli-South African Axis." The relationship between the two countries was usually described in terms of a conspiracy aimed against other African states. The motive for Israeli-South African cooperation, as seen by Moscow, was two-fold: South Africa was one of the countries which benefited from the fact that the Suez Canal remained closed.¹⁷⁸ Both Israel and South Africa pursued racist policies:

Respect and mutual understanding between the Israeli aggressors and the South African racists is not a coincidence. The alliance between Tel-Aviv and Pretoria, which is constantly being strengthened, is based on the ideological community of the Zionists and racists and the community of their political aims in Africa.¹⁷⁹

The "ideological community," "spiritual affinity,"¹⁸⁰ "sinister alliance,"¹⁸¹ etc., between Israel and South Africa was presented as the reason for "South African support for the notorious theory of 'Great Israel',"¹⁸² "fighting together national liberation movements and suppressing guerrillas,"¹⁸³ "jointly developing nuclear weapons and new toxic agents,"¹⁸⁴ etc.

During 1973 this African theme became one of the most important in Soviet propaganda. The apparent reason was the severance of diplomatic relations between several

African countries and Israel. Moscow saw this development as "a fiasco of Israel's policy in Africa,"¹⁸⁵ and redoubled its efforts to persuade more African countries to break off relations with Israel. A concentrated effort was made to convince African states that

... literally every Israeli expert, every teacher and businessman, in addition to his or her official job, carried out the unofficial mission in the African States of a spy and saboteur, which very frequently turns out to be their main job. Israel has penetrated into the military, State and political departments of the independent African countries.¹⁸⁶

The "main aim" of Israel in Africa came under a new light:

However, while the Israelis were gaining footholds in Africa, the Africans were coming to realize the true nature of the Israeli State and its genuine political goals. (Israel's main objective [being] to cut off the African countries south of the Sahara from the Arab world.) Israel wanted to turn them into a hinterland hostile to the Arabs and gradually draw the African countries which had just begun their independent development into the Western imperialist plot. . .¹⁸⁷

The same allegations were repeated frequently during 1973, and the African countries were encouraged by Moscow to break off relations with Israel, and take a united stand behind the Arabs in the Middle East conflict.¹⁸⁸

During the October 1973 war Moscow enthusiastically hailed every African state that broke off relations with Israel, and encouraged (and pressed) other countries to follow suit. By the end of the war Moscow could proudly announce that:

An unprecedented wave of solidarity with the Arab peoples has swept the Israeli presence out of Africa. . . Independent Africa thus stands firmly by the just cause of the Arab peoples, and this cannot but have an important bearing on the prospects of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.¹⁸⁹

The severance of diplomatic relations between Israel and the African countries did not mean an end to the African theme of Soviet propaganda. The old sub-plot — relations between Israel and South Africa — was still used infrequent-

ly, pointing out the "close military cooperation between the two countries":

The racists of Pretoria more than once used automatic rifles marked "Made in Israel" in fighting the African nationalists. The South African rulers do not hesitate to explain that they manufacture napalm under license, and this has been used by the Israelis on a large scale during the raids on the Palestinian refugee camps.¹⁹⁰

In addition, a new sub-theme developed, namely that "Soviet-Egyptian friendship accords with the interests of Africa."¹⁹¹

The idea presented was that "the strengthening of peace in the Near East is the work of all peoples, Arab and African, and there is evidence that the cooperation between the young states and the Soviet Union plays an important role in the accomplishment of that task."¹⁹²

In conclusion, today it seems that Moscow views relations between Israel and Africa as a minor aspect of Soviet foreign propaganda. In a way, this is a theme that has almost "withered away" due to circumstances. Nevertheless, one final observation must be made: In view of the particular historic and social heritage of the African countries, Soviet terminology is geared to their consumption. "Fascist," "Nazi," and "Hitlerite" concepts, which are widely used in other themes of Soviet propaganda (mainly in broadcasts aimed at Europe), are almost never used in Africa. On the other hand, "racist," "colonialist," "neocolonialist" and "imperialist" epithets are much used in Africa, as can be seen in all the quotations cited above. Thus, the terminology of Soviet propaganda serves both the specific goals of the U.S.S.R. at a certain moment, and the needs of the audience to which it is directed.

VI. ISRAELI-AMERICAN COOPERATION. Since the Middle East conflict has always been described by the U.S.S.R. as a component of the worldwide struggle between imperialism and national liberation movements, it is only natural that the U.S.A. should be granted a central role in Soviet

propaganda related to that conflict. However, while the U.S.A., "American imperialism," "American capital," "Wall Street," etc., have always been an integral part of Soviet propaganda, the specific theme of Israeli-American cooperation developed gradually, and became a major theme only in the 1960s.

From the very onset of the Arab-Israel conflict, American interests in the Middle East were described by Moscow in terms of oil and strategic position:

American business circles have never concealed the United States' special interest in Middle Eastern oil. . . . Palestine has no oil of her own, but she lies on the road leading to some of the world's richest oil fields. . . . The American expansionists made for Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Libya, Syria and the Lebanon in order to capture important strategic positions.¹⁹³

The U.S.A. was originally accused of "organizing the Arab armies' attack on Israel and the occupation of territory allotted to the Arab state in Palestine."¹⁹⁴

During the early 1950s Israel and Zionism were infrequently presented as "American servants" or "American agents,"¹⁹⁵ but there were no specific accusations. At that time U.S. interests in the Middle East, as seen by Moscow, were allegedly focused on Turkey, Iraq and Iran, but seldom on Israel.

During and after the Sinai Campaign Moscow accused the U.S.A. of "backing the aggression against Egypt":

Another thing to remember is that when Britain, France and Israel launched their criminal attack on Egypt the U.S.A. adopted a very strange position on the subject. State Department officials, who always have so much to say about their love of freedom, justice, independence and the like, suddenly became very quiet and restrained. Then, when all upright men and women the world over indignantly denounced the aggression against Egypt and demanded its immediate cessation, the State Department officials were busy drawing up plans to help — no, not the victim of aggression — but the aggressors themselves.¹⁹⁶

Gradually, but consistently, the theme of Israeli-American military cooperation was developed in the late

1950s. In 1958 a typical article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, broadcast in several languages, accused the U.S.A. of "arming Israel and inciting her to launch an aggression against the Arab countries."¹⁹⁷

However, a year later it was admitted that "American arms deliveries [to Israel] are at present inconsiderable."¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, Israel was already "the outpost of U.S. imperialism in the Middle East."¹⁹⁹

Two years later Soviet propaganda accused Israel of "turning into an imperialist base,"²⁰⁰ "constructing a port at Ashdod to be used as a base for the U.S. Sixth Fleet,"²⁰¹ etc. The U.S.A. was blamed for the "military hysteria" in Israel and for "driving Israel into the path of anti-Arab provocations."²⁰² At that time the Middle East conflict was already connected by Soviet propaganda with other foci of tension such as Cuba, West Berlin and the Far East. The idea presented was that Israeli-American military cooperation in the Middle East actually served the aims of American foreign policy in other parts of the world.²⁰³

Since it was impossible to substantiate any claim that Israel was receiving American weapons (at that time there were no American weapons in Israel), Soviet propaganda usually explained that "Israel is buying French jets of the Mirage and Mystère types with American money,"²⁰⁴ or that "according to recent press reports [never specified] the Americans *intend* to give Israel two submarines and two destroyers." Incidentally, Moscow claimed that "Israel received a long-term loan of \$5,000,000 for the purchase of French jets of the Mirage and Mystère types, as well as two British submarines."²⁰⁶ With that loan Israel could actually have bought at that time two Mirages.

This line persisted until the Six-Day War, the only development being to accuse Israel of cooperating with the U.S.A. in other parts of the world. Thus, in 1966 it was announced that "according to the foreign press [again, no further specification] the Israeli military authorities are planning, on orders from overseas, to take part in U.S. im-

perialism's aggression against the people of Vietnam. . . ."207

Immediately following the Six-Day War, instinctively, but only temporarily, Soviet propaganda supported the Egyptian accusation of direct American participation in the military engagement. Even a usually serious journal such as *International Affairs* speculated about American involvement in combat, both on the ground and in the air:

According to Western estimates,²⁰⁸ Israel had only five armored divisions. Actually, however, eight armored divisions went into battle on the Sinai front alone. The same source stated just before the flare-up that Israel was unable simultaneously to deploy more than 200 aircraft against each one of her Arab neighbors. Actually, however, on the morning of June 5, as many as 500 war planes attacked the U.A.R. According to Egyptian sources, shortly before the war some 1,000 American "volunteers," military fliers and pilots, who had formerly served in American units in Europe or the United States, arrived in Israel."²⁰⁹

While the story of the "direct participation" was soon dropped, a new version appeared, which maintained that the U.S.A. participated directly at an earlier stage, in the various preparations for the war (planning, information, weapons, etc.) although they took no part in actual combat. This was the major theme of a book (*The Launching of the Dove*), as well as of several articles published during 1968-69. The usual explanation was that "the U.S.A. planned the restoration of colonialism in the Middle East which they themselves were unable to realize in the past."²¹⁰

This trend proved persistent, and exists even today. Something also remained of the "direct participation" charge — namely the allegation that American (and other) mercenaries serve in the Israeli army.

The "mercenaries" sub-theme was revived about the end of 1969. The timing was significant. Between September 1969 and June 1970 the war of attrition had reached its climax. The entire period represented not only the most dangerous phase of military activity (in the course of which several Mig-21 jets flown by Soviet pilots were shot down

by Israeli planes),²¹¹ but also the heyday of Soviet propaganda. This was the peak of Soviet involvement in the Middle East conflict, a period during which about 15,000 Soviet specialists, advisers and instructors assisted Egypt in the war of attrition.²¹² Against this background the "mercenaries" sub-theme was developed. A full-scale propaganda campaign was launched by the Soviet propaganda machine with the allegation that Israel recruited foreign volunteers for its air force. Said Radio Moscow:

More pilots are being recruited in the United States, in Western Europe, and even South Africa for aggressive Zionist purposes; moreover, pilots who have combat experience, those who have already killed thousands of people in Vietnam, in the Congo and East Nigeria. And these pilots are being paid fantastic sums. A thousand dollars and even more for every flight and bombing of settlements in the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan. And Tel-Aviv has enough money to foot the bill.²¹³

Various channels of Soviet propaganda repeated the allegations, and added new details. Thus TASS claimed that there were 20,000 Americans serving in the Israel Defense Forces.²¹⁴ *New Times* maintained that 20% of Israel's pilots were Americans.²¹⁵ It also claimed that there were special "camouflaged agencies" in America and West Germany whose real purpose was to recruit mercenaries for Israel:

Encouraged by Washington, Israel has set up in America a network of centers to recruit mercenaries, notably pilots, for the Israeli army. Besides their regular salary, the mercenaries are paid for every combat mission or ground action they take part in.

Similar recruitive centers have been set up in West Germany, mainly with an eye to the personnel of the U.S. forces there. American servicemen are offered short-term, five-to-six week contracts, and those who sign are regarded by the U.S. military authorities as "absent without leave." This formula is invoked in the eventuality of such a mercenary being taken prisoner in the Middle East. It enables the U.S. authorities to declare him a "deserter" and disclaim all responsibility for his action.²¹⁶

At exactly the same time a different version was presented by Radio Moscow to its African audiences:

What is more, it has become known that the Pentagon is sending to Israel not only pilots of Jewish nationality, but persons of other

nationalities serving in the U.S. Armed Forces. In particular, [sources] claim that recruiting so-called volunteers to take part in the fighting against the Arabs is carried out among the enlisted men serving in Indochina and having considerable fighting experience. . . . During their stay in Israel, the U.S. servicemen are considered as continuing their service in Indochina, and, in case they are killed, their families will receive the same remuneration as if they were killed in Vietnam or Laos.²¹⁷

The Soviet Union was never able to substantiate its claim. Both American and Israeli officials have emphatically rejected this accusation. Moscow apparently had some difficulties in deciding what the number of foreign mercenaries in Israel ought to be. For in July 1970 TASS reported "20,000 mercenaries in Israel."²¹⁸ Two months later Radio Moscow obviously reappraised the situation and lowered the number to "7,500 volunteers,"²¹⁹ A year later, the number had grown again to "15,000 officers from Western countries serving Israel."²²⁰ In September 1972 the number given by Moscow was "15,000 to 20,000 officers, termed volunteers, serving in the Israeli Army."²²¹

During the war of October 1973 the "mercenaries" theme gained renewed impetus. By October 10 TASS was claiming that "volunteer pilots are now being recruited in the U.S.A."²²² On October 13 Radio Moscow disclosed that "U.S. aircraft piloted by U.S. pilots took part in the barbarous air raids on civilian targets in Damascus." The same source quoted Arab spokesmen, declaring that "on October 12 an aircraft was shot down near Damascus bearing U.S. Air Force markings."²²³ On October 17 Moscow was already prepared to come up with numbers. Quoting unspecified "news agencies," Radio Moscow spoke of "30,000 so-called volunteers, Americans of Jewish nationality to be dispatched to Israel."²²⁴

The "mercenaries" theme began gradually to fade during 1974, although the subject was mentioned infrequently (without numerical specification) in several Moscow broadcasts to Arab countries.²²⁵

While Israeli-American cooperation is usually described in

broad terms of military and economic aid, promoting a policy of imperialism in the Middle East, etc., Soviet propaganda still emphasizes several specific areas of collaboration:

a. *Scientific Cooperation.* According to *Soviet Weekly* in 1971, scientists at 48 centers in Israel were working on 226 research projects to the orders of U.S. Government agencies.²²⁶ It was also reported that "the Israeli-held Sinai Peninsula is now being used very extensively as a Pentagon test range."²²⁷

b. *Intelligence Cooperation.* This is a relatively old topic, which has been in use since 1953.²²⁸ From that time on Moscow has claimed that there is close cooperation between the Israeli and American secret services, which extends far beyond the Middle East.

The Central Intelligence Agency is using the Israeli Intelligence Service for penetrating into Africa, for operations against the progressive governments and the national liberation movements in the continent, for controlling the political developments, the local armed forces and the economy for the interests of American imperialism. . . . In return, the U.S.A. presents Israel with financial assistance and sends its experts to help the Israeli Intelligence Service, whenever necessary.²²⁹

Among specific cases of intelligence cooperation were listed the Israeli raid in Beirut in April 1973,²³⁰ cooperation in alleged Israeli terror in Europe, aimed against Palestinian leaders,²³¹ and Israeli assassins in the service of the C.I.A. in South America.²³²

c. *Israel an American Base.* Often, usually in broadcasts to Africa, it is stressed that "the weapons supplied to Israel by the U.S.A. could be used not only against the Arab peoples but also against the national liberation movement in Africa."²³³ Details were provided concerning the construction of a special unit (357) of the American Air Force. "Since unit 357 has 40 sub-units, it is clear that the entire unit is to be used in Africa (one sub-unit for each progressive African country).²³⁴

According to Soviet propaganda, Africa was not the only

target of Israeli-American cooperation. The Far East is also frequently mentioned:

By widely employing Israel's war industry and researchers, the Pentagon tests new weapons systems and material, which are subsequently supplied to Israel under the "military aid" program and used against national liberation movements in other parts of the world, Indochina in particular.²³⁵

Incidentally, Moscow implied many times in the late 1960s and early 1970s that under American orders "the Israeli Government was contemplating direct military and technical assistance to Thieu."²³⁶ Nevertheless, direct Israeli involvement in Vietnam was never claimed.

The Israeli-American cooperation theme, during and after the October 1973 war, displayed the characteristics and nuances already described. The U.S.A. was accused of both indirect (weapons, money) and direct involvement. Quoting a Syrian spokesman, Moscow maintained that "an aircraft bearing U.S. Air Force markings was shot down near Damascus. The pilot was a U.S. citizen who had fought in Vietnam."²³⁷ The U.S.A. was accused of conducting a policy aimed not at achieving a peace agreement, but at furthering American imperialistic interests.²³⁸ It was reported that "the chief reason for the U.S.A.'s continued support for Israel lies in the fact that the U.S. imperialist monopolies try with all their power to maintain the exploitation of the natural resources in the Arab countries."²³⁹ As in 1967, Moscow again accused the C.I.A. of supplying Israel with vital information regarding data about the armed forces of the Arab countries.²⁴⁰ Alleged Israeli-American cooperation was claimed in the Persian Gulf area²⁴¹ and other parts of the world.

Finally, Soviet propaganda does not merely "describe" and "analyze" the relations between Israel and the U.S.A. Considerable time and effort are invested in the attempt to disrupt these relations. This is done in two ways:

a. By frequent reminders to the U.S. Government of its vast oil interests in the Arab Middle East — interests which

are being jeopardized by the assistance which America renders to Israel:

The trend of events cannot but alarm the U.S. ruling circles, whose strategic and oil interests in the Middle East are too great to be sacrificed to the narrow nationalistic aspirations of the Israeli rulers.²⁴²

b. By trying to discredit those Senators and other politicians who constitute, as Moscow puts it, the "Israeli lobby in Washington." "Israeli" or "Zionist lobby" is a favorite Soviet expression which has been used virtually hundreds of times both during²⁴³ and after²⁴⁴ the October 1973 war. The members of the "Zionist lobby," according to Moscow, are Henry Kissinger, Arthur Goldberg, Senator Henry Jackson, and actually every Senator or member of the House "who want to get the Jewish vote at the elections."²⁴⁵ The prime target, however, is "the Senator from Tel-Aviv" – Jacob Javits:

The American Senator Jacob Javits . . . is correctly called the head of the Israeli lobby in Washington and sometimes the "Senator from Tel-Aviv." He is a brother of the Israeli "hawks" and is their man in Washington.²⁴⁶

The broadcast (not by coincidence aimed at North America) described at length "the connections between Javits and the Israeli Government." "His liberalism," claims the broadcast "is nothing but a camouflage of his real intentions. Actually, he simply tries to attract more votes, and thus keep his position in Washington, which he uses for his selfless service to Israeli interests."

The conclusion to the broadcast is predictable:

Senator Javits . . . is an odious Washington figure whose loyalty to his spiritual fellow-travelers in Tel-Aviv, as evidenced by his own deeds, has long exceeded the loyalty demanded of him by the fact that he is a citizen of the U.S.A., not an ordinary citizen, but a member of the U.S. Senate.²⁴⁷

Similar allegations were directed against Henry Kissinger, who is frequently labeled a "Zionist agent"²⁴⁸ by Soviet propaganda.

Zionist influence in the U.S.A. is strongly emphasized.

According to Moscow, "The influence enjoyed by Zionist organizations in American political life may be witnessed by the fact that Israel's Independence Day is marked in the U.S.A. in such a way as to leave the impression that Israel is another American state. . . ." ²⁴⁹

Sometimes, Soviet propaganda goes to extremes and maintains that:

. . .advocating the collection of money for Israel is a deliberately anti-American and openly subversive activity by the Zionist lobby, which is influential in the U.S.A., and the direct agent of the Israeli Government, who are sacrificing the national interests of the American people on the altar of Tel-Aviv's Near East aggression. ²⁵⁰

American citizens are not only reminded of "the large sums of money the U.S.A. is contributing to or lending Israel," but are also told of "Zionist influence in American internal political life." Thus, Senator Fulbright's defeat at the primaries in Arkansas was attributed to "influential Zionist elements." ²⁵¹

In conclusion, American-Israeli relations are presented by Moscow in terms of "give and take." The broad economic and military aid rendered to Israel by the U.S.A. is viewed as "an investment of American imperialism, which uses Israel as a tool of aggression in the Middle East." ²⁵² The total dependence of Israel on the U.S.A. turned Israel into an American base used by international imperialism for aggression against Arab states, national liberation movements, Africa, Indochina, etc. Israel, on the other hand, assures the continuation of American aid by developing an influential net of Zionist organizations in the U.S.A., which control the mass media, many politicians and military men, and thus direct American policy along a path desired by the Israeli Government.

VII. ISRAEL'S OTHER PARTNERS. According to Soviet propaganda, Israel has several partners in its Middle Eastern ventures, the most notable among them being NATO, West Germany and Great Britain.

NATO. Even before the 1956 Sinai Campaign Moscow was speaking in terms of a NATO interest in the Middle East conflict.²⁵³ By 1957 Israel was "directly linked with NATO."²⁵⁴ From that point on, Soviet propaganda has persistently linked Israel with NATO, describing Israel as "NATO's chief weapon against the Arabs."²⁵⁵ The port of Ashdod, which a year earlier was supposedly (according to Moscow) serving the U.S. fleet,²⁵⁶ was described in 1962 as a "NATO base."²⁵⁷

The Israeli victory in 1967 was attributed to the support of NATO, which not only rendered Israel military assistance,²⁵⁸ but also "put the finishing touches to the plan of the Israeli attack."²⁵⁹

During the October 1973 war NATO was accused of assisting Israel directly by allowing the use of its bases in Portugal²⁶⁰ and Cyprus.²⁶¹

As with the Israeli-American cooperation theme, the links between Israel and NATO extend beyond the Middle East. Soviet propaganda maintains that there are specific NATO-Israeli plans for operations in Africa (according to which Israel will purchase an aircraft carrier from NATO).²⁶² Cyprus is being turned into an Israeli base — with NATO's knowledge and approval.²⁶³ Israel figures in NATO's plans to penetrate the Third World.²⁶⁴

All these allegations are based on the posited struggle between imperialism and national liberation movements and this, Moscow contends, is the basic cause of the Middle East conflict. In this context "NATO is placing its stakes on Israel in a desperate attempt to hold on to what still remains here [in the Middle East] from the military strategic presence of imperialism, and to regain what was lost. . . ." ²⁶⁵

Relations between Israel and West Germany are described in a similar vein.

West Germany. In 1958 West Germany was accused by Moscow of "sending strategic material to Israel," "shipping

arms" and "directly training the Israeli armed forces."²⁶⁶ Since then, West Germany has been described as one of Israel's major partners, which "carries out military programs on Israeli soil... produces and tests in Israel various weapons,"²⁶⁷ etc. Bonn was also accused of "inciting Israel to commit provocations against Arabs."²⁶⁸

Immediately after the Six-Day War West Germany was accused of participation in the conflict.²⁶⁹ "Seven thousand West German mercenaries as well as 4,000 West German army specialists" allegedly served in the Israeli army at that time.²⁷⁰ It was also stated that "West Germany has long been using Israeli territory for nuclear research, and has given that country effective help in establishing its own nuclear industry."²⁷¹

The reason for this alleged Israeli-German cooperation (seldom supported by any evidence) was given as:

An attempt... to strengthen Bonn's position in NATO, the military and political organization which offers it so many advantages. Bonn approves of the Israeli aggression because it has given it a new ally in its drive to recarve the map of the world.²⁷²

Great Britain. Another accomplice of Israel, according to Soviet propaganda, is Great Britain. While the heyday of Israeli-British (and Israeli-French) cooperation was 1956-57, Great Britain is still regarded by Moscow as a major Israeli partner. What is the reason for the alleged British involvement in the Middle East conflict?

Britain's ruling quarters attach much importance to the development of their allied relations with Israel. British imperialism is strengthening Tel-Aviv's economic and military potential with the clear idea of using Israel as an instrument to achieve its neo-colonialist aims in the Middle East.²⁷³

In September 1971, after the expulsion of Soviet spies from Britain, the anti-British theme (with Israel's role well to the fore) was intensified:

It is not by chance that Britain actively took part with the U.S.A. in preparing the Israeli militarists for the treacherous assault against the Arab countries in June 1967 and then, whether openly or

secretly, sent tanks, guns and ammunition to the aggressor to enable him to entrench himself in the occupied Arab territories and to retain the frontiers he had usurped. . . . The Arab strugglers for liberation. . . are also aware how British bullets, bombs and napalm have brutally killed the Arabs.²⁷⁴

During 1972-73, the theme waned, the only allegation made in that period being that Britain was selling arms to Israel, "which made Britain in common with the U.S.A. an accomplice in the Israeli aggression against Arab countries."²⁷⁵

In the October 1973, war, and after it, Great Britain was usually accused merely of assisting Israeli propaganda.²⁷⁶ No allegations of direct or even indirect involvement were made.

While the U.S.A., NATO, West Germany and Great Britain are described as Israel's major partners, Soviet propaganda often mentions other countries as Israeli accomplices. Thus, in 1972 it was disclosed that "Israel recruits mercenaries on a wide scale in France, Britain, Holland, Argentina, Brazil and particularly in South Africa."²⁷⁷ As in the case of the U.S.A., Soviet propaganda attempts to disrupt the relations between Israel and its alleged accomplices. Thus, in 1971, it was revealed that "Israeli agents collect secret information for the C.I.A. . . . in some Western countries."²⁷⁸

The numerous articles in *New Times*, *International Affairs* and *Moscow News*, as well as the broadcasts pertaining to the theme of "Israel's partners" all show a similar propensity to present fiction as fact, to bury fact under interpretation and to deliberately distort well-known facts. No hard evidence, or evidence of *any* kind has ever been able to demonstrate the presence of German or American volunteers, specialists or advisers in the Israeli army. Even when Soviet newspapers or journals quote some other source, that source is never fully identified. Usually, it is the "Western press" or "Western sources." Sometimes, the source is mentioned, but then it is either a small newspaper

somewhere in Africa, or, if it is a well-known newspaper, there is no date or issue given. These are instances of the process of disinformation. If small newspapers are easier to persuade one way or another to print a news item fabricated by Soviet propaganda, better-known, Western newspapers are not such easy prey – but then it is always possible to misquote them. Despite refutation (if it comes), the publicity given to the matter is enough.

One last example will suffice. Quoting the newspaper *Zeitung*, organ of the Communist Party of Luxembourg, Radio Moscow says:

Shipments of war material [are] being made under the cover of a newly set up private American company which bought from NATO warehouses in Europe spares for jet planes and different equipment valued [by whom?] at about 50 million dollars. In reply to questions [who answered?] from progressively-minded people in Luxembourg [such as?] who feel concerned over arms shipments to Israel from the territory of their country, it is said in informed circles [which circles?] that the shipments involve NATO's "military surpluses and discarded material."²⁷⁹

Such items are broadcast all over the world.

VIII. THE U.S.S.R. AND THE ARAB WORLD. This is one of the only two subjects (the other being Jewish immigration) on which Moscow is somewhat on the defensive. After attacking the U.S.A. and the West for their involvement in the Middle East conflict, it is only natural that Soviet propaganda should go to great lengths and spare no effort to explain Moscow's own relations with the Arab world. Usually, it endeavors to establish the point that the U.S.S.R. helps the Arabs from disinterested motives of peace and justice. There is no narrow Soviet interest involved, and the assistance would have been given even if there were no tension in the Middle East, for it is an integral part of the assistance rendered by the U.S.S.R. to "progressive" regimes engaged in independent national development, and struggling against imperialism and aggression.

The theme of Arab-Soviet relations was developed in the

mid-1950s. It must be remembered that until 1952 no Arab regime qualified as "a progressive regime engaged in national liberation." Thus in 1948 Soviet sympathy obviously was not directed at the Arab states:

In their armed attack undertaken at outside instigation on the State of Israel the Arab countries are not fighting in defense of their national interests or for their independence.

The Soviet public, which has always expressed its sympathy with the national liberation movement of all peoples, including the Arabs, emphatically condemns the aggression of the Arab states against Israel and the efforts forcibly to prevent the Jews from forming their own state.²⁸⁰

After the overthrow of the monarchy in Egypt the theme of Soviet-Arab relations, and later of Soviet-Arab cooperation, began to develop, and gradually became one of the central themes of Soviet propaganda. Three important elements of the Soviet-Arab relations theme could be discerned immediately:

a. The U.S.S.R. is always guided by the principle of equality of all nations, big and small, and by respect for the national interests and aspirations of the small states. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. pursues no selfish interests in the Middle East;

b. The West is eager to disrupt the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Arab world; it therefore spreads rumors of "Soviet menace" or "Soviet aggressiveness" in the Middle East. Hence, the Arab states are cautioned to realize who is their real friend, and to ignore "Western propaganda";

c. Complimentary comments on Soviet aid to the Arabs are usually attributed to non-Soviet, frequently Arab, sources.

These characteristic elements appeared in 1954,²⁸¹ and since then have become the most important components of the Soviet-Arab relations theme. In addition, it is stressed that Soviet-Arab cooperation strengthens the national independence of Arab countries and promotes peace in the Middle East.²⁸²

During 1956, with the intensification of the Middle East

conflict and the increase of Soviet involvement in Egypt, the Soviet-Arab relations theme became unusually important. While the basic elements of that theme remained generally unchanged, the methods of Soviet propaganda improved. In May 1956 the Arabic section of Soviet radio organized a reception in honor of Soviet-Arab friendship. Arab Ambassadors accredited to the U.S.S.R. were the guests of honor. The entire event was recorded and the main speeches were broadcast to the Arab world.²⁸³ The Ambassadors praised Soviet assistance to the Arabs in lavish terms. Said the Egyptian Ambassador:

As a representative of Egypt, one of the Arab states, I rejoice when I see my country working and contributing her share to strengthening relations between the Arab States and the U.S.S.R.; she does this work because she considers it essential and useful. . . . The Arab's awakening and liberation from foreign influence keep pace with these peoples' desire for friendship with the U.S.S.R. Our aims in foreign policy agree with those of the Soviet Union with regard to peaceful coexistence and friendship between peoples and cooperation between states.²⁸⁴

Visits of Arab leaders to Moscow were also utilized for propaganda purposes. Thus, both the arrival and departure of the Deputy Premier of Yemen, Emir Al-Bader, were broadcast and accompanied by extensive interviews with the guest. The subject of the interviews was Soviet-Yemeni friendship.²⁸⁵

Several Arab cultural delegations visited the U.S.S.R. During the summer of 1956 similar Soviet delegations visited Egypt, Lebanon and other Arab countries. The visits were broadly publicized and members of the delegations took part in Soviet broadcasts to the Arab world.²⁸⁶

The Sinai Campaign provided the U.S.S.R. with a tremendous opportunity to improve its position in the Arab world. Its unqualified political, diplomatic and military assistance to Egypt was heralded by the Egyptian Ambassador in Moscow (and repeatedly broadcast by Radio Moscow) as "a new stage in the strengthening of Egyptian-Soviet relations and in the growing cooperation between our two countries.

Egypt has learnt who is her true friend. Events have confirmed the noble sincerity of the Soviet Union.”²⁸⁷ The major elements of the theme are readily discernible: the U.S.S.R. is the real friend of the Arabs; its assistance is noble and sincere – all this via an Arab source.

An unprecedented propaganda campaign was initiated under the slogan “Hands off Egypt.” Protest meetings were organized throughout the U.S.S.R.; the main speeches were broadcast by Radio Moscow in Arabic, and printed by Soviet newspapers and journals in foreign languages. Protest telegrams were sent to Israel, France, Britain, the U.N. and the U.S.A. Well-publicized solidarity demonstrations were held in front of the Egyptian Embassy – with the Ambassador thanking the demonstrators.²⁸⁸ It was implied that Arab countries such as Iraq and Jordan also planned to revise their relations with the U.S.S.R. and place them on a more friendly basis.²⁸⁹ A special exhibition was organized in Moscow contrasting Soviet friendship with the Arab countries with the “horrible picture of the crimes carried out by the aggressors.”²⁹⁰

After 1956 Soviet propaganda stressed the economic aspect of Soviet aid to Arab countries. As usual, Arab sources were quoted, comparing Soviet and Western aid. Thus, when an economic agreement between Syria and the U.S.S.R. was concluded in October 1957, the Syrian Premier was quoted as saying:

The policy of the Socialist Soviet state toward the Arab countries is quite different from that of the Western imperialist Powers: the gulf is as wide as that between earth and sky. The Western imperialist Powers have no aim but to preserve their positions in the Arab East, so that they may be free to exploit the national wealth of the Arab peoples and make use of the territory of Arab countries as military bases directed against the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has no economic or other designs on the Arab East; all it desires is to strengthen peace in this area.²⁹¹

Often it was stressed that the Soviet Union had no *oil* interests in the Middle East – again in contrast with the

Western Powers.²⁹² In general, it was explained that the West was not interested in the economic development of Arab countries, because weak and impoverished they could not resist the West. Against this background was presented the "gift of the Soviet people to the people of Egypt" — Soviet cooperation in constructing the Aswan Dam.²⁹³ From this point on, and virtually until today, *Aswan* became a key concept of the Soviet-Arab cooperation theme. Thousands of articles and broadcasts were devoted to the subject, frequently stressing that Egypt receives more Soviet aid than any other country.²⁹⁴ Gradually, Aswan became a symbol, the trademark and visual embodiment of Soviet assistance, the subject of songs, poems and novels.

Moscow also stressed the political and diplomatic facets of its aid to Egypt, and comments on that subject were forthcoming from Gamal Abd al-Nasser²⁹⁵ and Nikita Khrushchev.²⁹⁶ Its aid to other Arab countries (Iraq,²⁹⁷ Syria,²⁹⁸ Libya,²⁹⁹) was also emphasized. Moscow often claimed with modesty:

There is hardly an Arab state whose history does not record important victories secured by the Arabs due to Soviet-Arab cooperation. . . .³⁰⁰

From a military point of view the period between 1957 and 1966 was a relatively quiet one. With the exception of minor clashes along Israel's borders and infrequent retaliatory acts, there were no major military campaigns. Nevertheless, after every border incident, at every meeting of the Security Council, the U.S.S.R. found an opportunity to state its support of the Arab cause. As usual, the conflict was described in terms of struggle between the Israeli agents of imperialism and the Arab national liberation and national independence movement. Unqualified support was invariably pledged by the U.S.S.R.:

For its part, the Soviet Union had rendered, and will always continue to render, comprehensive aid to the victims of imperialist intrigues, violence and repression.³⁰¹

The June 1967 war intensified Soviet propaganda. The

economic aspects of Soviet aid to the Arabs became less important. Since the Arabs lost the war, the military aspects of Soviet aid were seldom mentioned. The dominant theme became the political assistance the U.S.S.R. renders the Arabs:

The Soviet Union declared its full support of the Arab peoples on June 5, as soon as the news of the Israeli aggression. . . The Arabs have received further proof that the only power they can turn to for support against Israel is the Soviet Union. . . .³⁰²

New slogans appeared, "the elimination of the consequences of Israel's aggression" being the predominant one. The U.S.S.R. declared that it supported and would continue to support the Arab countries "in their just struggle to eliminate the consequences of aggression."³⁰³

Since military aid was seldom, if ever, mentioned, economic assistance (along with political support) once again held a key position in the Soviet-Arab cooperation theme. "Aswan" became so central that when the U.S.S.R. described its assistance in the construction of a dam on the Euphrates, in Syria, Soviet propaganda described the project as "Syria's Aswan."³⁰⁴

The July 1972 expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt led to several important developments in the theme of Soviet-Arab cooperation.

a. "Reactionary Capitalist propaganda" was accused of "perversely interpreting the return of Soviet military specialists from Egypt."³⁰⁵ It was emphasized that "the specialists were sent for a limited period — and had returned because their mission was fulfilled."³⁰⁶

b. It was pointed out that Soviet aid to the Arab world was a natural step aimed at preserving Arab independence, and was provided at the request of the Arabs:

For the Arab peoples, who have taken the road of strengthening their independence and of carrying out progressive reforms, the assistance and support of the Socialist community is not a factor imposed from outside.

It is an objective necessity stemming from the very nature of things, from that social demarcation which is now proceeding in the world.³⁰⁷

c. Soviet aid to Arab countries other than Egypt was markedly increased. Among the states mentioned most often were Syria and Iraq. Arab leaders – usually Syrians and Iraqis – were quoted as praising the U.S.S.R. as the true friend of the Arabs. These leaders included Hassan al-Amiri (of the Ba‘th Party of Iraq),³⁰⁸ Syria’s President Assad,³⁰⁹ the Lebanese Minister of State Ali al-Khalil³¹⁰ and many others.

d. And yet a sour note was discernible. Soviet propaganda emphatically branded Arab criticism of the U.S.S.R. as “immoral”³¹¹ and declared:

We do not intend to gloss over the fact that there are in the Arab world people who have seen at this very time a chance to deride the Soviet Union crudely. . . . This is being said about a country whose people have provided and are providing the most important, the widest and most comprehensive support for the Arab peoples in their just struggle.

The Soviet people . . . have made the greatest sacrifices on the altar of struggle against every oppression and enslavement, and for peace, freedom and progress. Now they are also helping the Arab peoples, consciously denying themselves material things. Why? For those very ideals – peace, freedom and progress on Earth. What are the ethics of those who try to cast blame on those Soviet people?³¹²

e. Israel and the U.S.A. were accused of “undermining the Soviet-Arab friendship”:

“The imperialist forces in the U.S.A. and their propaganda machinery are doing their utmost to preserve and consolidate Washington’s positions in the Arab countries. U.S. imperialist circles know full well that promotion of the ties of friendship and fruitful cooperation between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union has been and continues to be an important factor impeding their efforts in this direction. Therefore, it has become the aim of the U.S.A. to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship by any means, and to obstruct, if only a little, Soviet foreign policy toward the Arab countries.”³¹³

Arab publicists who criticized the U.S.S.R. were charged with “acting in the interests of Israel, and playing into the hands of Zionism.”³¹⁴ (This particular accusation was

directed at Hasanayn Haykal, then editor of the Egyptian newspaper *al-Ahram*.)

During the October 1973 war, Soviet propaganda wasted no time in declaring that the "U.S.S.R. is on the side of the Arabs just cause."³¹⁵

Hundreds of Arab and other sources were cited praising Soviet assistance to Egypt and Syria. Among them the Egyptian Minister of Labor Resources, Salah Garib,³¹⁶ the Egyptian journal *Rose al-Yūsūf*.³¹⁷ and the Indian newspapers *National Herald*³¹⁸ and *Patriot*.³¹⁹ Typical are the words of the Iraqi newspaper *al-Jumhūrriya* quoted by TASS:

During these decisive days in our history, the Soviet Union has demonstrated once again its support for the liberation struggle of the Arab peoples. Now, as never before, the strength of Arab-Soviet friendship, the firm and unshakable position of the U.S.S.R. in regard to the Israeli aggression has been confirmed.³²⁰

One major development of the Soviet-Arab cooperation theme during and after the October 1973 war was the appearance of the subject of Soviet weaponry. Until then, Soviet propaganda either flatly denied that the U.S.S.R. was supplying the Arabs with arms,³²¹ or "refuted false charges" about certain kind of weapons being shipped to Arab countries.³²² Since Soviet weapons in Arab countries could not be hidden, the U.S.S.R. stopped denying charges of providing the Arabs with weapons, but refused to say anything positive on the subject.

Moscow chose to present the October 1973 war as a great Arab victory achieved chiefly through superior Soviet arms.

During the second week of the war Moscow proudly announced:

The myth that Soviet weapons were unsuitable for military operations against Israel exploded as soon as the war started. Reports from the front prove that Soviet weapons are capable of being successfully used against Israeli weapons and that SAM missiles have completely destroyed the might of Israeli air supremacy.³²³

Syrian pilots were quoted praising "the superior qualities of the Mig."³²⁴ Other sources commended Soviet rockets, and anti-aircraft weaponry.³²⁵

Eight months after the end of the war Moscow continued to maintain that:

The armed forces of the Arab countries which had modern Soviet weapons dealt severe blows against the Israeli *invaders*, to whom neither the millions of U.S. dollars they received, nor the huge *defensive positions* were of any avail. The legend of the superiority of the Israeli Army was destroyed – and forever.³²⁶ [Italics mine, B.H.]

So proud was Moscow of Soviet weapon performance, that it carelessly let slip that Soviet arms were used by the Arabs as early as 1956, something consistently denied by Soviet sources previously. A Syrian war veteran, interviewed by Radio Moscow, disclosed:

We have come to learn about effective Soviet weapons since 1956. . . . These weapons were proved a real success. . . . From that time onward the Soviet Union supplied us with various weapons. . . . I know that all the weapons in the army are now Soviet weapons – tanks, guns, aircraft, and personal weapons.³²⁷

In addition to the subject of the effectiveness of Soviet weapons, there were two other major elements of the Soviet-Arab cooperation theme after the October 1973 war. The first element was the attempt to prove and emphasize the Soviet involvement in the process of peace negotiations in the Middle East.

The disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel is the result of the courageous struggle on the Syrian people, which has the continuous support of the Soviet Union. . . . In the course of the contacts which took place during preparation of the agreement on the disengagement of troops, the Soviet Union and Syria acted in unison. . . .³²⁸

The Soviet Union has also materially contributed to the disengagement of troops of the Syrian Front The role of the Soviet Union in resolving this matter derives from the generally acknowledged fact that the Soviet Union must take part at all stages and in all spheres of the settlement directed at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.³²⁹

When unable to demonstrate (and boost) its direct participation in an agreement (as was the case with the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement), Moscow cautioned the Arabs not to attribute too much importance to the agreement “for

it is only the first step," and urged them "to closely coordinate their further steps, at all stages, with the U.S.S.R."³³⁰

The second, and probably the most important, element that developed after the October 1973 war was the defensive note, which became the dominant tone of Soviet propaganda on the subject of Soviet-Arab cooperation. Time and again, Moscow found itself on the defensive, trying to justify itself, or to rebuff accusations from Arab sources. Within a period of months after the war, Soviet propaganda accused Arab newspapers such as *al-Ahram*,³³¹ *Akhbār al-Yawm*,³³² *al-Fajr-al-Jadīd*,³³³ Arab leaders such as the late King Faisal³³⁴ and the unavoidable "Zionist and imperialist circles," of "attempts to cast doubt on the value of Soviet aid to Egypt,"³³⁵ to "drive a wedge in Arab unity and raise doubts about Soviet-Syrian relations,"³³⁶ to "use Nixon's Middle East trip against the U.S.S.R.,"³³⁷ of "attempts to undermine Soviet-Arab cooperation,"³³⁸ etc. Long articles in the Soviet foreign-language press hailed "Soviet-Arab solidarity and cooperation," usually reviewing the past with stress on all occasions when Arabs had benefited from Soviet assistance. Detailed plans for expanded cooperation with Libya,³³⁹ Syria³⁴¹ and many other Arab states were published.

At present this is the line pursued by Soviet propaganda on the subject of Arab-Soviet cooperation. It is aimed primarily at the Arab countries themselves. Apparently Moscow is aware of the fact that certain sections of Arab society are uneasy about Soviet penetration of the Middle East, and it directs a substantial part of its propaganda at assuaging their anxieties.

These are the major, but by no means the only, themes of Soviet propaganda related to the Middle East conflict. Minor themes include:

IX. U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS. This theme usually accompanies those concerning the true nature of the conflict, U.S.-Israel relations and Soviet-Arab cooperation. The main

idea is to present the U.S.A. as a mortal enemy of the Arab countries, a black-hearted colonialist power, pursuing nefarious imperialistic aims in the Middle East, such as seizing strategic positions and bases, plundering Arab oil and undermining the national independence of the Arab states. The Arabs are constantly warned that

American "friendship" . . . is no more than a ruse to win their confidence and weaken their resistance to schemes which would bring them under American subjugation and make them tools of America's military plans.³⁴²

American aid to Arab countries was always presented as "hypocrisy"³⁴³ or "a dishonest political weapon. . . merely a means of giving effect to U.S. imperialist policy in the small countries. . . and ensuring the subjugation of those countries to Washington's orders."³⁴⁴ Even when the U.S.A. offered the Arab countries food as a part of the "Food for Peace Program," Moscow warned the Arabs that

. . . the U.S.A. is attempting to pose before the Arabs as a good upright uncle The main point is that large quantities of surplus agricultural produce are accumulating in U.S. storehouses. This surplus could be disposed of inside the U.S.A. by reducing prices . . . but the U.S. monopolies do not wish to give up their profits . . . In an attempt to assist the monopolists to sell this surplus, the U.S. Government has prepared this ill-famed "Food for Peace Program," and "the U.S. brokers are now compelling the Arabs to buy the wheat and maize and other foodstuffs"³⁴⁵

After October 1973 Soviet propaganda intensified the American-Arab relations theme. The role Kissinger played in achieving a cease-fire and the subsequent disengagement agreements prompted an immediate reaction from Moscow. The task was two-fold: first, to convince the Arabs that the U.S.A. had not changed its policy and interests in the Middle East, and that no "dramatic shifts" or "unexpected miracles"³⁴⁶ had come about:

The Arab nations are sufficiently mature politically to take sober stock of lessons of the recent past and the modifications the U.S.A. is obliged to introduce currently in its Middle East policy.³⁴⁷

The second task was to present the entire U.S. policy in

the Middle East after the October 1973 war as an "imperialist plot aimed at undermining Arab fighting potential"³⁴⁸ and as "an attempt to isolate the Arab countries from the Soviet Union."³⁴⁹

Apparently, Moscow feared an Arab-American rapprochement, and concentrated its propaganda effort on "clarifying the true nature of American intentions in Arab countries." The Arabs were reminded that "the destruction of Arab countries was caused by American armaments."³⁵⁰ The American University in Beirut for example was branded as a "U.S. Intelligence Net"³⁵¹ and "a center for training spies."³⁵² American participation in cleaning the Suez Canal was described as "an excuse to deploy naval military forces in the eastern Mediterranean. . . to influence the situation in Egypt. . . and apply direct military pressure on Arab countries which do not accept Israeli territorial claims."³⁵³ American aid to Egypt was presented either as minimal,³⁵⁴ or simply "unfit for general use."³⁵⁵

On at least one occasion the U.S.A. was accused of bestowing on the Egyptians "poisoned gifts" such as soap (dangerous to health), poisoned wheat, etc.³⁵⁶

It seems that in the event of further improvement in U.S.-Arab relations at the expense of the Soviet position in the Arab world, the U.S.-Arab relations theme will develop into one of the major themes of Soviet propaganda, the effort being directed at disrupting, or at least slowing down, the pace of Arab-American rapprochement.

X. CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT. This theme is one of Soviet propaganda's paradoxes. It was developed in the late 1960s, and is obviously a reflection of the Sino-Soviet rift, much more than the result of direct Chinese involvement in the Middle East conflict.

After the Six-Day War China attempted several independent steps in the Middle East, such as training Arab commandos, supplying light weapons to several Arab terrorist

organizations, etc. Moscow was quick to react. In one single article,³⁵⁷ China was accused of:

- a. holding a position that does not essentially differ from that of "war-lusting" quarters;
- b. attempting to impose patronage on certain nationalistic Palestine Arab groups;
- c. aspiring to the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula;
- d. whipping up anti-Sovietism in the Arab countries;
- e. having secret trade deals with Israel;
- f. driving a wedge between the Arab countries and the Soviet Union;
- g. being unable to render any of the assistance that had previously been promised to the Arabs.

Since then, and until October 1973, Peking was frequently accused by Soviet propaganda of direct involvement in the Middle East conflict — in favor of Israel. The reason for this policy, as explained by Moscow, was China's anti-Sovietism:

The Peking leadership has been prompted to move closer to Israel by its anti-Soviet policy and its desire to put pressure on the Arab countries to obey the policy of the Chinese leadership. Obviously, the Israeli ruling clique is very satisfied with Peking's policy of sowing dissension within the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist front. This policy objectively helps Tel-Aviv to forcibly occupy Arab territories.³⁵⁸

According to Moscow the Chinese-Israeli cooperation reached far beyond the Middle East:

Now that the disturbances have subsided in connection with the recent bloody events in Burundi, observers are trying to sum things up, to clarify exactly who was behind the attempted coup in that country and what purposes it pursued. Many observers were of the opinion that the bloody slaying, as a result of which it was reported over 150,000 people in Burundi, the Hutus and Tutsis, were slaughtered, had been provoked by Israel and China.³⁵⁹

Soviet propaganda offered ready-made conclusions about alleged Israeli-Chinese cooperation.

In words Peking supports the Arabs and denounces the Israeli Zionists and their imperialist bosses, but at this stage it is also interested in consolidating Israel's position. Moreover, the Chinese are reason-

ing that the stronger Israel is the more the Arabs will be obliged to request aid, including Chinese aid which it has lately been offering to the Arab countries. This in turn will increase the dependence of the Arabs on Peking and will bolster Maoist influence in the Middle East.³⁶⁰

On several occasions during the October 1973 war Moscow accused China of "directing feverish propaganda against the U.S.S.R. in an attempt to cause dissension between the Arabs and the U.S.S.R.,"³⁶¹ of "having an ambiguous position toward the Palestine resistance movement. . . and taking up the U.S. position in the conflict,"³⁶² of "fabricating lies about the low quality of Soviet weapons,"³⁶³ etc.

The same line continued after the war, with Peking being frequently branded as "distorting Arab-Soviet relations,"³⁶⁴ "maintaining contacts with Israel,"³⁶⁵ "supporting Zionist expansionism and aggression,"³⁶⁶ etc.

The "Chinese involvement" theme is a minor part of Soviet propaganda related to the Middle East. It is apparently a peripheral topic of the general anti-Chinese propaganda of the U.S.S.R., and will inevitably disappear when relations between the U.S.S.R. and China improve.

XI. ARAB OIL. This is a very old theme of Soviet propaganda related to the Middle East conflict, the importance of which increased during and after the October 1973 war. Even in 1948 Moscow was accusing "Western monopolies," "Western Powers" and "American imperialism"³⁶⁷ of instigating the crisis in the Middle East. Since then, Moscow has persistently emphasized "the economic aspects of the Middle East conflict." According to the U.S.S.R., the entire American policy in the Middle East was determined by oil considerations.³⁶⁸ In addition, it was frequently stressed that the U.S.A. uses its revenues from Arab oil to help Israel:

It is no secret that part of the huge income from the exploitation of Saudi oil goes to the Zionist oil tycoons and, through them to the Israeli Treasury, to be spent largely for military purposes and to maintain the inflated Israeli war machine.³⁶⁹

The U.S.S.R. repeatedly urged the Arabs to use the oil weapon against the West.³⁷⁰

In the course of the October 1973 war the U.S.S.R. openly encouraged the Arabs to begin the oil boycott:

Silence must not be tolerated about this contradictory situation, which, in brief, is that the profits made by the American oil monopolies operating in Arab territories go to the Israeli aggressors in the form of military and other assistance. Silence must not be tolerated on the monopolies exporting, like a thief, Arab oil to Israel, which uses this oil in the barbarous war against the Arabs.³⁷¹

When the Arabs decided to impose the oil embargo, Moscow proudly commended the decision:

Here we ought to point out that the Arabs are capable of taking effective retaliatory measures against the forces hostile to them, even if these are situated thousands of miles away. . . . It is noteworthy that the decision represents a heavy blow to the U.S. economy.³⁷²

While consistently reporting the effects of the oil embargo on the Western economy, and urging the Arabs to continue its imposition, Moscow disassociated itself from the decision to use oil as a weapon and stressed that "the Soviet Union did not mastermind the situation."³⁷³ Still, it was Moscow that implored the Arabs "to continue and use the oil embargo even after the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. . . because it is the main weapon in the struggle against the intrigues of Israel and of its patrons."³⁷⁴ Simultaneously, Moscow pointed to its own natural resources of oil and gas and offered the U.S.A. participation in the development of Siberia's energy resources:

The development of Siberia's energy resources is important not only for the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries. . . . It has great significance even for the United States. . . . Large-scale and mutually beneficial deals and cooperation can put the peaceful co-existence of our two countries on a firm foundation. This in turn meets the basic long-term interests of the Soviet and American people, as well as the interests of universal peace.³⁷⁵

With the lifting of the oil embargo, the theme has lost most of its importance, and has once more become a peripheral subject of Soviet propaganda.

XII. THE PALESTINIANS. This is yet another theme related to the Middle East conflict which has rapidly developed from insignificance before the Six-Day War into a major subject of Soviet propaganda. The point usually made by Moscow was that there are *Arab* refugees who fled to Arab states neighboring Israel, and who "must be allowed to return to their homes."³⁷⁷ The terms "Palestinian state," or "Palestinian people" were never used. Instead "Arab refugees," "Palestinian Arabs,"³⁷⁸ etc., were utilized, and "their lawful rights," without further specification supported by the U.S.S.R.³⁷⁹ It was often pointed out that the refugees represent one of the major causes of the Middle East conflict:

The legitimate rights of over a million refugees, the original inhabitants of Palestine, have not so far been restored; no progress has been made in this direction.³⁸⁰

Immediately after the Six-Day War, Moscow continued to speak about "the refugee problem," often repeating that section of Security Council Resolution 242 dealing with the refugees:

... affirms the necessity... for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem.³⁸¹

Following the Six-Day War, Moscow did not introduce any new ideas with regard to the Palestinian problem, though it spoke of "restoring the lawful rights of the Palestinians" and later of "the Arab people of Palestine," and devoted more time and space to the problem, linking it with that of "unlawful occupation of Arab lands by Israel."

A major development appeared several months after the October 1973 war. While in February 1974 Moscow still spoke of "recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people,"³⁸² in May 1974 it was already "ensuring the legitimate *national* rights of the Palestinian Arab people... as an imperative condition for a settlement in the Middle East."³⁸³ The concept of "national rights," which *can* be interpreted as Soviet support for the creation of a Palestinian State (*can* because until the time of this writing —

April 1975 – Moscow has never explicitly used the term “Palestinian State”), probably reflects the opinion prevailing in the Soviet leadership, that creating a state for the Palestinian refugees is one of the alternatives for solving the refugee problem.

This development was accompanied by greater emphasis on the conditions in which the refugees live,³⁸⁴ sometimes allowing the leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Movement themselves to make their point.³⁸⁵ The Palestinian problem is now a much more important subject of propaganda than it was. Its increased importance and the intensity of its propaganda treatment reflect the place it now holds in Soviet priorities.

One last point in this context again relates to the accuracy of the numerical data presented by Moscow – the number of Palestinian refugees. The number of those who fled Israel has been given as “many Arab families,”³⁸⁶ one million,³⁸⁷ more than 900,000,³⁸⁸ 500,000,³⁸⁹ etc. Once again, discrepancies such as these cast serious doubt on both the intentions and credibility of Soviet propaganda.

XIII. JEWISH LIFE IN THE U.S.S.R. While this is an ever-present theme of Soviet propaganda, it is hardly a central one, although for a brief period – around 1969–71 – with the intensification of the activities of the Jewish Defense League, it acquired an unusual importance. The central idea was to prove – usually by quoting Soviet Jews and displaying numbers and percentages – that Jews enjoy complete freedom in the U.S.S.R. in every walk of life. Since the U.S.S.R. has often been criticized for discriminating against Jews, and restricting their religious freedom, this particular theme of Soviet propaganda is obviously defensive in character. Thus, it is only natural that Jews should be the principal weapon utilized by Soviet propaganda to rebuff attacks on Jewish subjugation in the U.S.S.R. There is another interesting aspect of this theme: radio programs dealing with the freedom and equality of Jews in the U.S.S.R. are

never broadcast in Arabic or beamed at Arab countries.

The points usually made are:

a. Jews, like all nations and races in the U.S.S.R., have equal rights in all fields of economic, political, social and cultural endeavor;

b. Jewish cultural life flourishes in the U.S.S.R., and Jewish theaters, singers, musicians and writers function freely and enthusiastically;

c. Jewish religious life does exist (although it follows the general trend of religion under Communism, i.e., it fades away);

d. Anti-Semitism is severely punished as something very hostile to the Soviet order of society.³⁹⁰

Often, detailed descriptions of life in the Jewish Autonomous Region (*Oblast*) of Birobidzhan are added, stressing the brotherhood between Jews and citizens of other nationalities living there.³⁹¹ It is frequently emphasized that:

Jews in the Soviet Union do not need help from abroad. . . . I cannot understand why and by virtue of what rules of morality some leaders of the Jewish community abroad consider it almost their bounden duty on getting up in the morning, to inquire into how we Jews in the Soviet Union have slept, and whether anyone has hurt our feelings. . . . we want to say that. . . . we shall get along without uninvited defenders.³⁹²

A substantial part of Soviet propaganda on the "Jewish" subject is not only produced by Jews, but is aimed directly at the "uninvited defenders," such as the American Jewish Congress³⁹³ the *New York Times*³⁹⁴ and of course Israel.³⁹⁵

While the official claim is that anti-Semitism is "persecuted as something hostile to the Soviet order of society,"³⁹⁶ a number of anti-Jewish books, such as Shevtsov's stories, and especially T. Kichko's book *Judaism without Embellishment*, have never been published in the U.S.S.R. The explanation offered was as follows:

True, Kichko's and Shevtsov's works did contain some formulations, illustrations and episodes that *could be* [italics mine, B.H.] interpreted as disrespectful and even insulting. But the very fate of

these feeble works proved better than anything else that national intolerance in any form is not permitted in the Soviet Union.

Kichko's and Shevtsov's books were condemned by the public, Party and State bodies and long ago banished from bookstores and libraries.³⁹⁷

It was not stated whether or not the two authors were prosecuted.

Between 1969 and 1972, with the intensification of the Jewish Defense League's activities, the "Jewish" subject became a major theme of Soviet propaganda. Not only did it gain a central position, with the number of articles and broadcasts devoted to it increasing sharply, but several new elements were introduced:

a. The subject was directly linked with the Middle East conflict:

Soviet Jews do not need the patronage and concern of Israel's rulers whose hands are spattered with the blood of Arabs and who have involved their people in a bloody war. . . .³⁹⁸

b. The patriotism of Soviet Jews was strongly emphasized:

Soviet Jews, en masse, are deeply aware of what Soviet power brought them and what the building of Socialism in our country gave them. . . . Together with all the peoples of the Soviet Union the Jews put their heart and soul into building a new life in the Socialist homeland, overcoming, and ready to overcome all the difficulties and the temporary setbacks of the unfathomed road to the new social system.³⁹⁹

c. It was repeatedly stressed that Soviet Jews do not wish to immigrate to Israel:

What are we to do in Israel? Swell the army of unemployed [so] that the Israeli Capitalists may exploit Israeli wage earners more easily? Serve as cannon fodder in the Israeli army which is conducting a criminal war against the Arab countries and against progress?⁴⁰⁰

It has already been stressed that Jews are the major instrument of Soviet propaganda's "Jewish" theme. They are utilized in several ways: writing articles and letters; interviews with prominent Soviet Jews are broadcast and delegations composed of Soviet Jews are even sent abroad to "describe the truth about Jewish life in the U.S.S.R." One

such delegation to the U.S.A. was led by the late Chief Rabbi of the U.S.S.R., Leib Levin. Said the Rabbi:

It is my desire that the trip, among other things, will be helpful in dispersing many myths spread in the United States by people who have no true idea of the life of Jews in the U.S.S.R.⁴⁰¹

On several occasions American Jews visiting the U.S.S.R. were also used, their impressions being broadcast or printed.⁴⁰²

During 1973 and 1974 the subject gradually faded, to be replaced by another "Jewish" theme — that of immigration to Israel.

XIV. IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL. This is a very delicate subject, for Soviet propaganda has found itself in the absurd position of having to amplify simultaneously two completely different and contradictory explanations of Jewish emigration, each aimed at a different audience. The West, on the one hand, accused Moscow of restricting immigration to Israel, while the Arabs, on the other hand, accused Moscow of providing "cannon-fodder" for the Israeli army. Moscow met with some difficulties trying to satisfy both sides.

In broadcasts aimed at Arab audiences the official explanation was as follows:

It should be pointed out that the majority of those who leave our country for Israel are old people, women and children. Naturally, when applications for exit visas for Israel are considered, the current situation in the Middle East, as a result of Israel's aggression on the Arab countries and the aggressor's refusal to withdraw their forces from the occupied Arab territories and accept a settlement of the Middle East conflict peacefully and politically, is taken into consideration. . . .

The total number of Jews who have left the Soviet Union for Israel during the 27 years since World War II does not reach 21,000. Here one should not overlook the fact that many of those 21,000 people expressed the desire to return to the Soviet Union. . . . The number of Jews who have immigrated into Israel from countries throughout the world during the same period amounts to 2,000,000, including more than 800,000 from the Arab countries. . . .⁴⁰³

Exactly the same explanation (old people and women, only 21,000 against 800,000) was included in many other Soviet broadcasts to Arab countries, in the period 1971-73.⁴⁰⁴ The exact number of Jews who had left the U.S.S.R. was most often given as 21,000 (or less than 21,000) in the post-war period,⁴⁰⁵ "ten times less than Jews from Arab countries who have immigrated to Israel,"⁴⁰⁶ "10,300 in the past ten years,"⁴⁰⁷ etc. Official figures announced by the Israeli Government approach the 100,000 mark.

The propaganda effort aimed at the U.S.A. follows a different line. Here the main idea is to prove that there are no restrictions on Jewish immigration to Israel.

Such permission [to emigrate] is granted to Jews on the same ground as to other Soviet citizens, irrespective of nationality, ethnic group, sex, or age. Applications are considered by the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Internal Affairs in conformity with procedures established by law, and permission is usually granted.⁴⁰⁸

Another point often made is that Jews do not desire to emigrate from Russia. In reply to a question of an American listener, Lev Gross, Radio Moscow said:

Mr. Gross also asks why it is so hard for Soviet Jews to go to Israel. Jo Adamov answers: Mr. Gross, you seem to think that Jews here are an alien body. Soviet Jews are loyal Soviet citizens, and they are not greatly interested in Israel, if at all.⁴⁰⁹

Americans who had expressed concern about Soviet Jews, or publicly had tried to defend their right to emigrate, were severely rebuked by Moscow and advised to more or less "mind their own business." It was indicated that their concern is no more than an attempt to disrupt Soviet-American relations:

These men, it appears, do not like the order, the way of life in the Soviet Union. But if this order is changed, they will also favor an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. That is why [Senator Henry] Jackson and those who think along his lines thump the drums about the non-existing persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union. . . . Jackson and his kind claim to be champions of pure democracy and, consequently, their lofty principles and morals do not permit them to approve the policy of improving Soviet-American relations.⁴¹⁰

An indication frequently implied was that Senator Jackson's interest in Soviet Jews was not a genuine concern but a matter of political tactics, and anti-Sovietism.

I am sure that if, say tomorrow, there was not a single Jew left in the Soviet Union – something that will never happen, of course, because the overwhelming majority of Soviet Jews are fervent patriots of their Soviet homeland – but, I say, if we imagined that all the Jews left the Soviet Union, I am sure that the politicians of Jackson's type would think up new excuses to poison Soviet-American relations.⁴¹¹

In other broadcasts (quoted earlier) Senator Jackson was linked with "Zionist hawks," "Tel-Aviv aggressors," etc. During 1974 he became one of Moscow's prime targets for personal attack.

Before concluding the subject of Soviet propaganda themes a word or two should be added on several related aspects:

XV. THE INTERNAL SITUATION OF ARAB STATES.

This theme is connected with the general subject of Arab-Soviet relations and is mainly devoted to the internal effect of Soviet aid on Arab states. While Moscow differentiates between "progressive" and "reactionary" Arab regimes, it prefers to concentrate on the "progressive" ones – Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – and to describe how they benefit from Soviet assistance.

XVI. THE EFFORTS TO REACH A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT. While Moscow often deals with this subject, its substance can be summed up in one sentence: Throughout its existence, Israel had done everything possible to avoid, postpone or frustrate every attempt (usually initiated by the U.S.S.R.) to find a peaceful solution to the Middle East Conflict.

XVII. SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS. Simultaneously, by using all instruments and means of propaganda to attack the Government of Israel, Moscow emphasizes that Soviet

policy in the Middle East is not hostile to the Israeli people.

The Soviet Union comes out against the policy of aggression and territorial aggrandizement being pursued by Israel's Government, but it is not hostile to the people of Israel. Moreover, Soviet policy is in accord with the interests of all peoples in the Middle East, both Arab and Israeli. . . In truth, it is not the Soviet Union that is the enemy of Israel but Golda Meir.⁴¹²

We shall turn now to the means and techniques employed by Soviet propaganda.

NOTES

1. *Moscow News*, No. 4, Jan. 21, 1969, p. 3.
2. This is a key theme of Soviet propaganda, which will be described and analyzed later in the chapter.
3. *Soviet Weekly*, July 4, 1973, p. 7.
4. *New Times*, No. 22, 1948, p. 11.
5. *New Times*, No. 24, 1948, p. 2.
6. P. Demchenko, "Flames of War Raging Again" (from *The History of Crimes Committed by Zionism against the Arab Nations* p. 1), Novosti International Service, 0740 Israel time, Oct. 16, 1973.
7. *New Times*, No. 29, 1948, pp. 1-2.
8. Radio Moscow in Persian, 1630 GMT, Oct. 30, 1957, *SU/877/*.
9. Radio "Peace and Progress" in English to Africa, 1430 GMT, July 10, 1971, *FBIS D.R. 12.7.71*.
10. Z. Sheinis, "International Zionism," *New Times*, No. 4, 1961, pp. 9-10.
11. A. Kostrov, "New Role for Israel," *New Times*, No. 9, 1962, p. 23.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 2000 GMT, Nov. 6, 1958, *SU/981/*.
15. V. Minaev, "Zionist Agents of the American Secret Service," *New Times*, No. 4, 1953, pp. 13-16.
16. R. Scholom, "Telltale Trial," *New Times*, No. 23, 1955, pp. 20-22.
17. K. Ivanov, "Israel, Zionism and International Imperialism," *International Affairs*, No. 6, 1968, pp. 13-21.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
19. I. Braginskii, "The Class Essence of Zionism," *Komunist*, No. 9, 1970, p. 101.

20. I. Braginskii, "The Class Essence of Zionism," *Soviet Weekly*, Oct. 3, 1970, p. 7.
21. V. Alekseev and V. Ivanov, "Zionism at the Service of Imperialism," *International Affairs*, No. 6, 1970, p. 59.
22. V. Bolshakov, "Anti-Sovietism - a Zionist Profession," *Moscow News*, Supplement to issue No. 10, March 6, 1971, p. 4.
23. V. Zhukov, "The U.S.-Zionist Network," *New Times*, No. 32, 1970, p. 25.
24. *New Times*, No. 38, 1972, p. 10.
25. Radio Minsk in Belorussian, 1540 GMT, March 20, 1973, SU/4281/.
26. *New Times*, No. 2, 1972, p. 27.
27. TASS in Russian for Abroad, 1222 GMT (and in English, 1258 GMT), May 17, 1974, SU/4606/.
28. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1800 and 1900 GMT, Nov. 24, 1973, also in French for Algeria, 2100 GMT, Nov. 25, 1973, SU/4461/.
29. Radio "Peace and Progress" in English, 1430 GMT, Jan. 28, 1974, SU/4513/.
30. Radio Moscow in English to Southeast Asia, 1500 GMT, May 18, 1971, FBIS, D.R. 13.5.71.
31. TASS in English, 1425 GMT, Sept. 28, 1972, SU/4106/.
32. *New Times*, No. 44, 1972, p. 26.
33. Y. Schreiber, "Zionism and Swastika," *New Times*, No. 25, 1971, p. 23.
34. Radio "Peace and Progress" in English to Central America, 0001 GMT, Sept. 29, 1971, FBIS D.R. 30.9.71.
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49. V. Bol'shakov, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
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59. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1600 GMT, April 6, 1973, *SU/4266/*.
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63. During 1974 Dr. Shahak made several appearances in the U.S.A. and Europe on behalf of Arab terrorist organizations. In Sept.-Oct. 1974 several articles appeared in the Israeli press demanding that Dr. Shahak be fired from his teaching position at the Hebrew University, and be sentenced for high treason.
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83. Radio Moscow in English for Africa, 1330 and 1830 GMT, May 17, 1974, *SU/4604/*.
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Chapter Six

MEANS AND TECHNIQUES OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA

While many of the techniques of Soviet propaganda are quite conventional, and have been used by other countries (chiefly Nazi Germany), some have been developed exclusively by the Soviet Union. We will begin with the more conventional means, and then proceed to the original contributions made by the Soviet propaganda machine.

I. DECEPTION. Falsehood is an integral part of Soviet propaganda. In the previous chapter we have cited numerous cases of numerical inconsistencies, discrepancies and untruths. Although many of these can probably be attributed to ignorance or exaggeration, this is not the case with many unsubstantiated printed items or broadcasts, which are often completely false. Several such "news items" were cited in the previous chapter (e.g., stories of planned Israeli expansion in Africa based on founding a Jewish state in Uganda; Israelis fighting in Angola, and so on). The common element in these stories is usually the unnamed "Western" or "foreign" sources on which they are allegedly based. When broadcast, they are usually directed at an African or Middle Eastern country, and are never repeated in the broadcasts aimed at Western Europe or the U.S.A. Thus, the story of Israeli guards firing on Arab prisoners while they bathed in the sea¹ was only broadcast to Turkey. As in other "delicate" cases, Jews are utilized as a source of many false accusations. Thus, the allegation that "in Israel children of 10 are working for miserly wages"² was attributed to a letter which, as *Soviet Weekly* maintained, was sent by

a group of 107 Soviet Jews living in Israel who asked to be allowed to return to the U.S.S.R.

In another story, again attributed to a Soviet Jew living in Israel who desired to return to the U.S.S.R., it was stated that "the State [Israel] does not build kindergartens and creches 'because it costs too much' but does build synagogues and gambling houses."³ As it happens, gambling is illegal in Israel.

Deception does not *only*, or even *usually*, imply outright lies. On the contrary, it is much more effective when it is based on a partially true story, which is then modified to serve the purposes of prôpaganda, as in the following example: In the summer of 1971, the Israel Government decided to release from prison a small group of juvenile delinquents who were serving short terms for minor offenses. The Government decided that regular army service might save the youths from degenerating into serious criminals. Moscow reported this as follows:

Twenty hardened criminals were recently released from the Tel-Mond prison before the expiry of their sentences and drafted into a tank unit. The Paris Weekly *France Nouvelle* writes that more law-breakers are to be released for the same purpose in the near future.⁴

Obviously, Moscow's purpose was to distort a philanthropic act of the Israeli Government so that it should appear as yet another aspect of brutal militarism.

During the Six-Day War and the October 1973 war, Moscow usually amplified the announcements and communiqués of the Arab countries, which were often based on pure imagination.

The following item broadcast by TASS is characteristic: A spokesman for the Egyptian military command said that the units of Israeli troops, which crossed the Suez Canal and tried to consolidate ground on its western bank, had been completely wiped out.⁵

In this particular case Moscow was obviously misled by Arab sources, but in many other cases its only source was imagination. Thus, the reports on the fighting during the

first two days of the October 1973 war were usually headlined "Attack by Israel on Syria,"⁶ "Israel's treacherous attack on Egypt, Syria and Lebanon,"⁷ etc.

Nevertheless, Moscow had no qualms about accusing Israel of "distorting facts."

In order to boost the drooping morale of the Israelis, to draw out the sobbing of Israel's widows and mothers by loud sounding [word indistinct] the Zionist rulers are resorting to another vile method, also borrowed from the annals of the Hitlerites. For hours on end Israeli television re-runs the newsreels of the 1967 battles, trying to pass them off as coverage of the current fighting. The six-year-old treacherous and surprise attacks [few words indistinct] portrayed as current victories.⁸

This allegation was not backed by any evidence, or repeated by any Western source.

The examples cited above are representative of hundreds of such cases of distortion, falsehood, exaggeration and misrepresentation of facts, disseminated by Soviet propaganda. While it is by no means the only technique used, it nevertheless seems to be one of Moscow's most preferred means of mass persuasion.

II. GUILT BY ASSOCIATION. A tactic sometimes used by Moscow is to accuse Israel indirectly of masterminding some of the terrorist's acts directed against Israel itself. Once more the technique of quoting nameless Western sources is utilized. Thus, after the killing of 11 Israeli sportsmen at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Moscow announced:

The press in many countries quite justly noted that the action of the terrorists in Munich had nothing to do with the Arab states. And not for nothing were there reports in the Western press that the shooting in Munich had been engineered with the knowledge of the Right-wing circles of the Israeli élite. . . .⁹

Often the accusation is not spelled out, the aim obviously being to stimulate the audience to reach its own conclusion. When Arab terrorists committed an attack at Rome's Fiumicino airport, Moscow offered the following comment:

A group of Palestinian patriots has arrived in Kuwait to investigate the case of the terrorists who committed crimes in the airports of

Rome and Athens. . . . The public of the Arab countries resolutely denounced the actions of the terrorists, who call themselves Palestinians but who act to discredit the just cause of the Arab people of Palestine. The public have started to clarify who is behind these soul-chilling crimes committed in Fiumicino. It is obvious that any serious investigation into where and who the instigators of the crime are has to be based on the clarification of who will benefit by the crime.¹⁰

The implication is clear but still Moscow prefers that its audience reach conclusions "independently." It seems that at least in some cases Soviet propaganda authorities realize that blunt accusations based on "Western sources" are less effective than shrewdly implied guilt which stimulates preconceived conclusions.

III. REPETITION. One of the oldest devices of propaganda is the technique of repetition. Its essence, as described by Adolf Hitler, is:

. . . not continually to produce interesting changes for the few blasé little masters, but to convince; that is, to convince the masses. The masses, however, with their inertia always need a certain time before they are ready even to notice a thing, and they will lend their memories only to the thousand-fold repetition of the most simple fact.¹¹

In this regard Soviet propaganda proved to be an apt pupil of the Nazi theory of propaganda. It repeats the same slogans again and again. There is no Soviet publication or broadcast relevant to the Middle East conflict which does not include a series of *cliché* trigger phrases which are constantly used to describe the situation. The war is always "Israeli aggression," the situation existing after 1967 — "the consequences of Israeli aggression," and the principal task of "progressive forces" — "the liquidation of those consequences." Apart from casual recasting of the content, and the names of authors, there has been no change in the form of the arguments, nor in the identity of the heroes and villains. So accustomed is the Soviet propaganda machine to the same old *cliché*, that it took about 48 hours until it adjusted its terminology to the situation created on October 6, 1973

and stopped attacking "the new Israeli aggression."¹²

The technique of repetition also performs another task. While propaganda utilizes already existing stereotypes, it also seeks to create, or evoke, new stereotypes, as the need arises. The purpose presupposes that the mere mention of the name "Israeli" will produce associations of "aggressors," "occupation," etc.

Closely connected with the device of repetition is the promotion of one simple solution over a long period of time. Thus, the only solution to the Middle East conflict acceptable to the U.S.S.R. after the June 1967 war is Israel's withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders. This persistence has a dual purpose: to convince at least some neutral audiences that there is no other solution to the conflict, and to demonstrate to the Arab countries that the U.S.S.R. is determined to obtain the most desirable solution — from the Arab point of view — to the conflict. Further, by rejecting any other possible alternative, Soviet propaganda has actually prolonged the crisis — which the U.S.S.R. was interested in doing for a certain period, at least so as to provide justification for its own involvement in the area.

IV. DELIBERATE MISUSE OF SENTIMENT. Sentiment is one of the more enduring and consistent aspects of personality, and is thus more vulnerable to propaganda stimuli. As previously stated, the nature of propaganda is manipulative and we can see this demonstrated most often in those instances where propaganda strives to arouse certain sentiments. Several examples will illustrate this aspect of Soviet propaganda.

In August 1969, a pyromaniac, neither a Jew nor an Israeli, tried to set fire to the al-Aqsa Mosque; this event was immediately and extensively utilized by Moscow. The great potential for inflaming the religious sentiment of the Muslim communities was fully exploited. The fire was presented by Soviet propaganda as yet one more Israeli outrage in the occupied territories. The fact that the individual res-

possible for the fire was immediately caught, arrested and proven in court to be not legally responsible for his actions, was completely ignored by Moscow.

On August 29, 1969, TASS published a statement pertaining to the al-Aqsa fire. While the statement itself is of considerable length, only two sentences deal directly with the fire at al-Aqsa. The first reminds its readers that the Mosque,

... one of the most ancient and unique monuments of Arab architecture in the Middle East, a place of pilgrimage for many believers, revered as one of the Muslim sacred shrines, has been set on fire in the Arab part of Jerusalem occupied by the armed forces of Israel.¹³

Then there followed a long list of alleged Israeli misdeeds against the Arab population, among them the al-Aqsa fire.

The basic purpose is obvious: in order to create the impression that the fire was a preconceived act on the part of the Israeli authorities, it was interlinked with other "Israeli criminal acts."

TASS's statement was immediately followed by a series of articles in *Soviet Weekly* (Sept. 6, 1969), *New Times* (No. 36, Sept. 1969), etc., all reflecting the statement published by TASS, with the intention to deceive Muslim audiences throughout the world by portraying the Israelis as machine-gun totting mosque-burners.

Incitement of religious feeling against Israel was not initiated at the time of the fire at al-Aqsa. As early as February 1968, *International Affairs*, clearly aiming for Muslim and Christian reaction, described the "typical behavior of the Israelis":

Israel is exploiting everything it can, including the treasures of the mosques and Christian churches it has plundered.¹⁴

The anti-Jewish connotation is plain - the Jews are plundering the Holy Places and then selling their loot.

Another frequently used topic for provoking responses of this kind is the fate of Arab children. The tone is usually highly emotional and sentimental, and the effect is conveyed by the skillful use of innuendo and implication.

Several stories by D. Vol'skii which were published in *New Times* during the first half of 1970, are typical. (The timing is, of course, very significant for it was then that the war of attrition — and the Soviet involvement in the conflict — reached their peak.) In one such story, there is a description of the results of an Israeli bombardment on the Suez Canal:

Torn copy-books, an English grammar, naive childish drawings — this must have been a school.¹⁵

The implication is often made that this is a threat which hangs over every Arab child.

Another article by Vol'skii describing the situation on the border between Israel and Lebanon, after the author had spotted Israeli jets in the skies, ponders:

Who knows but that one of them might turn north and that the schoolchildren of some Lebanese town might share the cruel fate of the Egyptian children.¹⁶

The "children's theme" is often combined with the Nazi motif, thus increasing its emotional charge:

Israeli pirates. . . scattered "children's toys" with explosive devices in various areas, copying the ways of the Nazi criminals during World War II.¹⁷

At least on one occasion Israel was accused by Moscow of brutally killing Israeli children:

In our day, by the irony of fate, a premeditated killing of Israeli children has taken place on the soil of Israel. The whole world today knows the name of the township of Ma'alot where the crime was committed. . . [where] a unit of soldiers, armed to the teeth, stormed a school with only three Palestinians and 90 Israeli children inside. This crime is amazingly like the widely known operation staged by the Hitlerites and planned personally by Eichmann when Germans were murdered to precipitate the occupation of Poland.¹⁸

Even Anne Frank was utilized by Soviet propaganda, the purpose apparently being to draw a parallel between her fate and that which awaited the children of the occupied territories:

The terror started by the Israeli authorities even against Arab schoolgirls indicated that the extremists in Tel-Aviv are modeling themselves on Hitlerites [who] murdered six million Jews. A

teenager, Anne Frank, victim of Nazi terror, left a diary which gave the warning: a repetition of this should not be permitted. Those in Israel who are responsible for the policy of the so-called mass reprisals against Arabs, are insulting the victims of the Nazi terror and bringing shame on themselves. . . .¹⁹

The techniques of deception, repetition, and play on sentiment were, of course, used long before the U.S.S.R. developed its own propaganda style. However, Soviet propaganda has made an original contribution in the communication channels used to deliver its messages. New, important channels have been developed, the most significant among them being:

- a. international conferences;
- b. exchange of official visits;
- c. organization of worldwide demonstrations of solidarity;
- d. the use of renegade Jews and Israelis as credible sources of radical allegations against Israel;
- e. the use of Soviet Muslims for conveying certain messages to the Arab world.

1. International Gatherings as a Means of Propaganda.

International gatherings — whether in the U.S.S.R. or abroad — have always been utilized by Soviet propaganda. However, an important distinction must be made. Until the Six-Day War in June 1967, the Middle East conflict was seldom, if ever, mentioned at such gatherings. Even at the World Congress for Disarmament and International Cooperation (Stockholm, July–August 1958), where the U.S.A. and Britain were condemned for “the aggression committed against the Arab liberation movement,”²⁰ Israel, Zionism and the Arab-Israel conflict were not even mentioned.

After the June 1967 war Moscow tried to turn every international event in which it participated into a mass demonstration of solidarity with the Arab peoples and a denunciation of “Israel’s aggression.” Thus, it seems that one of the Six-Day War’s consequences was the transition of

Hands Off Egypt!



The Soviet people vigorously protest against Anglo-French-Israeli aggression in Egypt and demand the immediate withdrawal of their forces.

1. Turner Alexander Smirnov addresses a protest meeting at the Vladimir Ilyich Plant in Moscow.

2. Designing engineer Nikolai Yegorov speaks at a meeting at the Likhachov Automobile Works.

3. Mother-heroine Praskovia Bobkova joins in the protest against colonialist aggression in Egypt.

4. Professor Samuel Blinkov at a protest meeting in the Burdenko Neurosurgical Institute.

5. Zootechnician Davydov calls upon collective farmers of the Balashikha District (Moscow Region) to condemn the aggressors.

6. Solidarity demonstration in front of the Egyptian Embassy. Ambassador Mohamed el-Kouni (left) thanks the demonstrators for their sympathy with the Egyptian people.

International campaigns organized in 1956 following the Sinai Campaign.

“Conference Hall” propaganda from the impregnational to operational stage.

On the whole, “Conference Hall” propaganda is less extreme than that published or broadcast by the Soviet propaganda apparatus. There are two kinds of congresses and conferences organized by Moscow which are relevant to this study.

a. Those assembled to deal with a certain issue of general international importance or interest, and at which, though they have no direct connection with the crisis in the Middle East, the problem is included in the debates;

b. International gatherings called by the U.S.S.R., or the Arab states, to deal specifically with the Middle East crisis.

In the first category are the various meetings of the World Peace Council (Delhi, November 1967; Lahti, Finland, November 1968; Budapest, May 1971, etc.), The International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (Moscow, June 1969), The World Congress of Women (Helsinki, June 1969), The Afro-Asian Women's Conference (Ulan-Bator, August 1972), The Session of the Organization for Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity (Tripoli, 1970), etc.

i. The Moderation of Tone. The reason for this is simple. The gatherings are attended by representatives of 60–80, and sometimes even 115, countries. Among them, at least some good friends of Israel are to be found. Thus (at least until November 1973) too strong an anti-Israel resolution stood a chance of rejection, or if accepted, the majority might have been less demonstrative than Moscow would want. So the usual pattern was that of a resolution, containing a standard condemnation of “Israeli aggression,” a call for the restoration of “the lawful rights of the Palestinian people.” the elimination of the “consequences of the Israeli aggression,” etc. Whenever possible (i.e., when the delegations were mainly Communist-oriented) the Middle East conflict was presented as a link in imperialism's worldwide struggle against liberation and progress. Thus, the concluding statement of the World Meeting of Working

Youth (Moscow, November 1972) mentioned the Middle East only briefly:

We demand an early and just peaceful settlement in all of Indochina and in the Middle East and the cessation of imperialist aggression in other areas of the world.²¹

ii. It was almost always the *Soviet delegation or even Soviet leaders who drew the attention of meetings to the conflict in the Middle East*. Thus, at the meeting of the World Peace Council Assembly (Budapest, May 1971) the issue was raised at the behest of the chairman of the Soviet Peace Committee, Nikolai Tikhonov. *XX Century and Peace* No. 7 (July 1971), which reported the meeting, quotes speeches by the representatives of Chile, the G.D.R., Belgium, South Africa and other African countries. While Tikhonov's speech was focused almost exclusively on the Middle East,²² the other representatives did not even mention the subject.

In August 1972 the Second Afro-Asian Women's Conference convened in Ulan-Bator. Leonid Brezhnev himself sent a greeting to the Conference's participants, clarifying "the vital interests of the Afro-Asian peoples," and the assistance the U.S.S.R. is rendering to these peoples, thus actually directing the Conference's attention to international issues of interest to the U.S.S.R.

Loyal to the principles of proletarian internationalism the Soviet people has been rendering comprehensive moral, political and material support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, has been resolutely upholding the just struggle of the Arab peoples against Israeli aggression, and has displayed fraternal solidarity with all the national liberation movements. . . .²³

In this same category are the various conferences and congresses convened within the U.S.S.R. Although the general subject may be music or literature, the Middle East always figures in the debates, and is included in conference resolutions. The Fifth Congress of Writers of the U.S.S.R. (July 1971) was no exception. The concluding statement of the Congress, which called on "writers and workers in culture all over the world to protest against the bloody

crimes of Zionism and its patron – international imperialism – and to come out in defense of the Arab peoples and for a lasting and just peace in the Middle East,"²⁴ was broadcast by Radio Moscow to many countries, and the debates were printed in several international publications brought out by the Soviet Union.

The resolution adopted by the meeting of the Soviet Association of International Law was very similar, and its content, too, was reported to the world by the more conventional channels of Soviet propaganda.²⁵

The second category of international conferences comprises those meetings convened for the sole purpose of dealing with the Middle East crisis. Such were the International Conference of Parliamentarians on the Middle East (Cairo, February 1970), the International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples (Cairo, January–February 1969), and others. The meetings usually take place in an Arab capital, frequently in Cairo. The number of participants is lower than in the first category, and the tone of the various statements and resolutions is very sharp. Attacks are not confined to the Six-Day War and its consequences, but are directed against the very nature and function of the State of Israel. *Moscow News*, previewing the International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples, noted:

Israel is the chief instrument of this [imperialistic] policy. This is easily seen when tracing the short history of this state. Its leading circles have, with a persistency worthy of better application, consistently pursued a policy of expanding their territory by seizing that of neighboring states.²⁶

In its report of the meeting, the same source stated:

Many delegates noted that Israel's extremist elements had reduced their country to the position of an obedient agent of U.S. policy, an accomplice of NATO and the West German revanchists. The leaders of the national liberation movement in Southern Africa and in the Portuguese colonies, who attended the Conference, gave numerous instances of the contacts of Israel (military, economic and political) with the racist regimes of the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal – contacts which are dangerous for the liberation movement.²⁷

Soviet propaganda did its best to amplify and popularize the debates and resolutions of the various conferences dealing with the Middle East conflict. Characteristic numerical discrepancies accompanied every report. Thus, in the International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples (Cairo, 1969), 75 countries and 15 international organizations participated, according to one source,²⁸ 80 countries and 10 international organizations according to another.²⁹

2. Worldwide Demonstrations of Solidarity. Worldwide demonstration campaigns sponsored by Moscow are another original Soviet contribution to the art of propaganda. The demonstrations of solidarity and adherence to "the Arab peoples' just cause" take several forms, one of them being the organization of international "days" or "weeks" in support of the Arab cause. The announcement is usually made by one of Moscow's front organizations:

The World Peace Council proposed to initiate a worldwide campaign of solidarity with the Arab nations in support of a just and durable peace in the Middle East, and to name March 21 as the "International Day of Support for the Palestinian Resistance," the first week in June as the "International Week of Solidarity with the Arab Peoples," and November 2 as the "International Day of Solidarity with the Victims of Israeli Aggression."³⁰

Three years later it was again the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization which announced March 21 as the "International Day of Solidarity with the Arab people of Palestine,"³¹ and April 7 as the "International Day of Solidarity with the Victims of Israeli Aggression."³²

In all cases, the "solidarity events" were connected with similar previous activities of the "front organizations," directed against the U.S.A.:

During the past few years there have been days and weeks of solidarity with the peoples of Indochina, who were heroically struggling against American imperialism. Now... the Vietnamese people, with the support of all progressive peoples of the world, have achieved a historic victory. And now, quite naturally,

mankind is turning its attention to another hotpoint of the planet — the Near East. There, over almost six years, Israeli militarists, having illegally grabbed Arab territory, have been behaving in the same way as the American invaders behaved on the war-torn land of Vietnam, and, earlier still, the Hitlerite occupation troops in the countries of Europe.³³

The solidarity campaigns waged by Moscow when fighting breaks out in the Middle East are much more dramatic. They have two integral parts: a. demonstration of the worldwide support enjoyed by the Arab countries; b. manipulation of Soviet “public opinion” into a manifestation of mass support for the Arab cause.

The “Hands off Egypt” campaign sponsored by the U.S.S.R. in October–November 1956 is an apt example of Moscow’s ability to arouse worldwide support when necessary. However, this campaign seems somewhat modest when compared with that of October 1973.

As soon as the fighting started (constantly referred to as the “new Israeli aggression” by Moscow for the first few days, after which a new line was adopted which clarified that “it is not important who fired the first shot. . .”), TASS began transmitting hundreds of “solidarity messages.” During October 7 the messages, telegrams, statements and denunciations (of Israel, of course) transmitted by TASS included those of the Delhi newspaper *Patriot*,³⁴ the Israel Communist Party,³⁵ the World Federation of Democratic Youth³⁶ and many, many more. Gradually, the campaign gained momentum and between October 10 and 12 approximately 60 to 70 such messages were transmitted daily. Thus on October 11, in less than eight hours, the following declaration of support of the Arab cause and denunciation of “Israeli aggression” were broadcast by TASS:

1. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1034 GMT — “The Heads of the delegations of the non-aligned countries condemn the Israeli aggression against Egypt and Syria and express full support for their heroic struggle. . . .”

2. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1053 GMT — “The Polish

Government. . . will further act as a loyal friend of the Arab peoples. . . .”

3. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1057 GMT – “The Mauritanian Government decided to give financial aid to Egypt and Syria and the Palestinian Resistance movement fighting against the Israeli invaders. . . .”

4. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973 1140 GMT – “It is with feelings of wrath and indignation that the members of the Free German Youth Union, all the youths and girls of the G.D.R., learnt about the new perfidious attack unleashed by Israel against Egypt and Syria. . . .”[!]

5. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1144 GMT – “The Chairman of the ruling Indian National Congress Party S.D. Harma strongly condemned the Israeli aggression against the Arab states. . . .”

6. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1202 GMT – “India expressed profound concern over the new serious aggravation of the Middle East crisis caused by the unlawful occupation of Arab territory by Israel. . . .”

7. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1230 GMT – “The people of Guinea condemn the new Israeli aggression. . . .”

8. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1232 GMT – “Responsibility for the resumption of military operations in the Middle East fully rests with Israel’s ruling circles, that disregarded world opinion, said Malaysia’s premier, Abdul Razak. . . .”

9. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1234 GMT – “The people and Government of Mauritania regard the struggle waged by Arab countries in the East as their own struggle. . . .”

10. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1250 GMT – “The World Peace Council has called on all the public organizations to launch a wide movement of protest against the barbarous actions of Israeli military, of solidarity with the Arab peoples. . . .”

11. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1340 GMT – “Upper Volta condemns the new Israeli aggression. . . .”

12. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1356 GMT – “Nigeria denounces the new Israeli aggression. . . .”

13. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1421 GMT — A more detailed statement of the World Peace Council was retransmitted.

14. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 147 GMT — “The National Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of Bangladesh sharply denounced the Israeli air raids. . . .”

15. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 155 GMT — “The Indian Press unanimously condemns Israel. . . .”

16. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1756 GMT — “The Italian Communist Party expresses its solidarity with the Arab peoples’ just cause. . . .”

17. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1805 GMT — “The Pakistan people express its solidarity with the struggle of Arab countries against the Israeli aggression. . . .”

18. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1805 GMT — “Iran supports the lawful demands of the Arab countries. . . .”

19. TASS, Oct. 11, 1973, 1805 GMT — “The Congolese people (Brazzaville) fully support the just struggle of the Arab peoples. . . .”

Of course, these were not the only items transmitted by TASS. Reports of Arab successes on the battlefields, descriptions of Israeli losses, commentaries, etc. accompanied the solidarity messages. And all this continued about a month, maintaining the same intensity and never losing momentum.

Soviet “public opinion” was also mobilized. “Meetings of solidarity with the Arab peoples” were held in every corner of the U.S.S.R. Their declarations and resolutions were promptly transmitted by TASS and Novosti in broadcasts which usually included several such denunciations.³⁷

Jews, Muslims, and even Allah, were extensively employed by Soviet propaganda in its “campaign of solidarity.” Thus, TASS quoted Mufti Ziya ut-din Babakhanov, the Chairman of the Muslim Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, as saying:

We pray to Allah for an early victory for our Arab brothers, and together with the entire Soviet people, we warn the Israeli aggres-

sors that they will make a terrible miscalculation if they do not end their adventure.³⁸

Radio Moscow in its Arabic broadcast mentioned:

It is noteworthy that Moscow Radio and TV are nowadays receiving a large number of letters *also* from Jewish Soviet citizens. In their letters they express satisfaction with the resistance the heroic Arab forces have shown to the Israeli invaders who have been waging a war of seizure and aggression in the Middle East.³⁹

One final aspect of the October 1973 "solidarity campaign" were the reports of anti-Israeli demonstrations in the West, transmitted by TASS and Novosti. The general idea was to demonstrate that not only Moscow-influenced circles supported the Arab cause. At least some of those reports looked ridiculous. Such was the description of a "mammoth demonstration to protest against the Israeli aggression" which had taken place outside the building of Israel's permanent mission at the U.N. According to TASS, "the demonstrators were met by several dozens of fascistic thugs from the 'Jewish Defense League' armed with pieces of pipe. They started beating demonstrators and many of them were injured. . . ."⁴⁰

How it was possible for "several dozens of facistic thugs" to intimidate "a mammoth demonstration" was not clarified by TASS.

3. Exchange of Official Visits. An additional channel of communication developed by the Soviet Union is the official visit. Being a super-power, the Soviet Union's involvement in world politics is matched only by that of the U.S.A. However, when it comes to despatching delegations abroad, and receiving such delegations in the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Union has no equal. Generally, such visits are followed by an official joint declaration or a joint communiqué, which draws attention – among other things – to the Middle East.

Since June 1967 there has seldom been a declaration in which the Middle East question was not mentioned. While the paragraph devoted to the problem usually revolves around the U.N. Security Council Resolution (242) of

November 22, 1967, and after October 1973 – Resolutions 338 and 339 and “the legitimate rights and interests of the Arab people of Palestine,” careful study of the text reveals that:

i. The joint communiqués issued at the end of every official visit are, in fact, a good illustration of the use made by the U.S.S.R. of two older propaganda techniques, with which we have already dealt. Although the framework is new, we find the same constant reiteration of the problem, and Moscow’s single answer as its only solution. The author has scrutinized over 600 joint communiqués issued by the U.S.S.R. in conjunction with other countries since the Six-Day War, and has not found any suggestion of a solution of the crisis, other than U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, and later Resolutions 338 and 339. Resolution 242 has been subject to differing interpretations by the parties, and is therefore unworkable. The Rogers’ Plan and Kissinger missions, aimed at at least partial agreement, have been consistently attacked by the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, the number of joint communiqués which “ignore” the Middle East, is significant. (For instance, it was not mentioned in the communiqué published after the visit of Willy Brandt to Moscow in 1970.)⁴¹

ii. The only other international issue which appeared in joint communiqués with the same frequency was the war in Indochina. During the period 1967–69 the Vietnam issue occupied more space, and usually appeared before the Middle East was mentioned, but from February 1970 onward, the Middle East conflict clearly moved into first place. This corresponded to a sharp escalation of the crisis, and an equally sharp reaction by the U.S.S.R., which took the form of an exchange of letters between Aleksei Kosygin and Richard Nixon.⁴² Not only was greater coverage given to the Middle East, but the tone became more strident, and included frequent condemnations of “Israeli aggression,” demands for “the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians,” etc.

iii. When resolutions and communiqués are drawn up in the Soviet Union itself the Middle East issue figures more prominently and the tone is correspondingly more vehement than in similar documents drawn up abroad. For example, in the communiqué following the visit of Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to the Soviet Union in May 1971,⁴³ the paragraph dealing with the Middle East was at least twice as long as the same paragraph in the communiqué issued at the end of Kosygin's visit to Canada.⁴⁴

iv. It is possible to tell whether the co-signer of such a document is a client of Moscow or a state independent in its relations with the U.S.S.R. When a client state is involved the paragraph on the Middle East includes not only a very virulent condemnation of Israel, but also of Zionism, American imperialism, etc. Such was the Joint Soviet-Bulgarian communiqué, which followed the visit of a Bulgarian official delegation to the U.S.S.R. in November 1972.⁴⁵ When an independent state is involved, the tone is milder, and the U.S.A. and its "imperialistic policy" are not mentioned.

This phenomenon is illustrated in one single issue of the *Moscow News* Supplement No. 44 (October 1972), which includes Soviet-Egyptian, Soviet-Iranian and Soviet-Italian communiqués. The differing relations of the three states to the Middle East conflict (Egypt – directly involved, Iran – pro-Arab, and Italy – more or less neutral) were reflected by the Middle East paragraph. Almost half of the Soviet-Egyptian communiqué was devoted to the Middle East conflict. Israel, "its expansionist plans," etc. were denounced.⁴⁶ In the Soviet-Iranian communiqué (October 22, 1972) the Middle East paragraph read:

In discussing the strained situation in the Middle East, the two sides expressed concern over the dangerous situation in the area. They consider it necessary for all states concerned to make efforts to achieve a fair and lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of the implementation of all the provisions of the Security Council's Resolution of November 22, 1967. It was also pointed out that the withdrawal by Israel from the territories it occupied in 1967 is the

prime condition for a settlement of this crisis. The two sides reaffirmed that they will continue to give assistance to the special representative of the U.N. Secretary General, G. Jarring, in his activities aimed at enforcing the Security Council's Resolution. They stressed that the search for ways to a lasting settlement of the conflict in the Middle East is possible, provided the legitimate rights of the Arab peoples, including the Arab people of Palestine, are respected.⁴⁷

A week later, on October 30, 1972, a Soviet-Italian communiqué was published. Its Middle East paragraph was considerably shorter and milder:

The sides are seriously concerned with the continuing tension in the Middle East. They again expressed their conviction that energetic efforts should be taken for establishing a just and lasting peace in this region on the basis of the fulfillment of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, in all its clauses. They believed it necessary to ensure the lawful rights and interests of all states and peoples in the Middle East.⁴⁸

Thus, Moscow has fashioned a new instrument of propaganda, using it time and again to promote its own version of the Middle East conflict and to insert its own proposed solution to the problem. Many states, whose stand differs from that of the Soviets, find themselves, under the circumstances, compelled to approach the Soviet position when signing such joint communiqués.

Official visits are also an excellent instrument for promoting goodwill and understanding (impregnational propaganda), as well as improving and strengthening political and military relations (operational propaganda). Thus, well-publicized visits of Arab officials were utilized for publicly praising the quality of Soviet weapons,⁴⁹ dramatically broadcasting the May 1st Parade from Red Square:

Dear Arab brothers, I wish you were here to see Jamal Abdel Nasser, leader of the Arab nation, standing side-by-side with the sincere leaders, the Soviet leaders, who are defending peace throughout the world. . . ."⁵⁰

Thus the propaganda element in official visits is exploited to the full by the Soviet propaganda apparatus.

4. The Use of Soviet Muslims as an Instrument of Propaganda. Since the Arabs (almost all of whom are, of course, Muslims) are a prime target of Soviet propaganda, it is only natural that Soviet Muslims should be utilized as an instrument designed to convey the message of Soviet friendship and support for all Muslims loud and clear, especially for those "struggling against Zionism and imperialism." Soviet Muslims have been utilized by Moscow whenever Muslims were involved in a conflict in which Moscow showed an interest. Thus, when Moscow developed an extensive propaganda campaign against French nuclear tests in the French Sahara, Soviet Muslims were one of the most vocal of propaganda instruments. The Chairman of the Muslim Board of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, Mufti Babakhanov, declared in one of his many public appearances protesting against the tests, that Algeria, Morocco and other African Muslim countries wanted to build a new future for their peoples, but the colonialists were hindering this, "just as they were hindering the disarmament talks at Geneva." The French, "following the example of their American masters," were carrying out underground testing in the Sahara. This was "aggression against all mankind." The Muslims of the U.S.S.R. condemned "these colonialist actions" and demanded an end to the tests.⁵¹

Soviet Muslims are utilized in four major ways in the Middle East Conflict:

a. Descriptions of Muslim Religious Freedom in the U.S.S.R. This is primarily an impregnational method of employing Muslims. The main idea is to show audiences — and of course primarily Arab audiences — that Moscow and Marxism in general are not hostile to any religion, least of all the Muslim religion.

Soviet Weekly of October 3, 1970 carried an extensive report on Muslim life in the U.S.S.R., by Mufti Babakhanov. Special emphasis was placed on the close connection between Soviet and Arab Muslims. Thus, "exceptionally gifted Muslim students are sent to famous Muslim univer-

sities, such as al-Azhar in Cairo or the Karaum in Morocco, for further study.”⁵²

Muslim religious freedom in the U.S.S.R., and its connections with the Arab world are frequently emphasized in Radio Moscow’s Arab broadcasts. Often, the Middle East conflict serves as a background:

Men of the Muslim religion in our country during every prayer, every Friday, and during the religious festivities denounce Israel’s aggression against the Arab peoples, and Israeli occupation of Arab land, as well as Israeli violation of the U.N. resolutions. . . . We wish the men of the Islamic [religion] to continue to carry out the responsibility they are entrusted with in enlightening the Muslims about their religion and the situation throughout the world. The Muslims of the Soviet Union sincerely and faithfully adhere to the principles of the Islamic religion and perform the duties required by Islam at mosques and everywhere.⁵³

The close ties with Arab Muslims were further emphasized by:

b. Mutual Visits. Soviet Muslim delegations frequently visit Arab countries, while the U.S.S.R. often hosts similar delegations from the Arab world. Thus, in 1963 alone, 130 religious Muslim delegations visited the Soviet Union.⁵⁴ The same source stressed that during that year “many Soviet Muslims were sent to al-Azhar and other religious universities in the Middle East.”⁵⁵

Soviet Muslim pilgrims visit Mecca annually, “where they meet with Muslims from foreign countries. . . who showed a special interest in the Soviet people and in conditions in the Soviet East and expressed a wish to visit the Soviet Union.”⁵⁶

Often, these visits are utilized to stress the Soviet stand on the Middle East conflict. Thus, in April 1974 a Soviet Muslim delegation led by Mufti Babakhanov visited the Yemeni Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Radio Moscow emphasized in a report on the visit that:

In Yemen, Babakhanov told Members of Parliament of the feelings of friendship and cooperation of the Soviet people for the peoples

of Yemen and other Arab countries in the struggle against imperialist aggression and for the development of their countries.⁵⁷

c. Muslim Conferences. Another way in which Moscow utilizes its Muslims is by organizing or participating in various Muslim conferences, which serve as an effective platform for various declarations or resolutions reflecting the Soviet stand on the Middle East issue. Sometimes the entire conference is devoted to the Middle East conflict. On November 13, 1973, a conference entitled "Soviet Muslims in Support of the Just Struggle of the Arab Peoples against Israeli Imperialist Aggression"⁵⁸ was held. The Conference was attended by the Chief Mufti of Lebanon, an Iraqi representative and Vladimir Kuroedov (Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers), as well as by representatives from Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Kuwait, "all of whom expressed profound gratitude to Soviet Muslims for their strong support for the Arab peoples." The Soviet Mufti, Babakhanov, "expressed pride that in the hard days for Arab countries the Soviet Union unhesitatingly offered its hand of friendship to our brothers."⁵⁹ The Conference worded an appeal "to all Muslims and all people of goodwill to support the Arab struggle against the Israeli aggression."⁶⁰

The World Islamic Conference held in February 1974 was utilized by Soviet propaganda to emphasize that:

The October war in the Middle East has proved once more, beyond a shadow of doubt, that remarkable results can be achieved by the heroism and doggedness of the Arab fighters when they are supported by the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries which supplied the Arabs with modern weapons and gave them political support on a large scale.⁶¹

Even when Soviet Muslim delegations participated in the Conference of the Academy of Islamic Studies, held in Cairo in September 1972, the event was exploited for propaganda purposes. The chairman of the Soviet delegation, Mufti Babakhanov, said:

I believe that such conferences help the Muslim *ulama** throughout the world to speak in unity and cooperate among themselves. . . . The *ulama* are voicing their calls for peace, and are mobilizing public opinion in the world against the imperialist acts of aggression, whether in the Middle East or in Indochina.⁶²

d. **Declarations of Support for the Arab Cause.** The most dramatic usage of Soviet Muslims for the purposes of Soviet propaganda related to the Middle East conflict takes the form of such declarations, which are frequently disseminated by the Soviet press and radio. They usually serve a twofold purpose: to voice Soviet Muslim support of the Arabs, and to express their adherence to the Soviet position on the Middle East issue. One such statement broadcast by Radio Moscow read:

The current tension in the Middle East, which is being intensified by the Israeli aggressors with the help of the U.S.A., is causing anxiety among the widest circles of world public opinion. All the progressive forces of the world support the just struggle of the Arabs. . . . The U.S.S.R. stands in the front rank of those defending the Arab cause and the Arab peoples. The Soviet Muslims stand by the Arab peoples together with the whole Soviet people.⁶³

However, nothing compares with the dramatic declaration of Soviet Muslims issued during the October 1973 war:

We pray to Allah for an early victory for our Arab brothers and, together with the entire Soviet people, we warn the Israeli aggressors that they will make a terrible miscalculation if they do not end their adventure.⁶⁴

Finally, it is noteworthy that unlike Jews and Israelis, who are extensively used by Soviet propaganda in broadcasts and articles in every conceivable language, Muslims are a propaganda instrument aimed exclusively at the Arab world. The Muslim potential is almost completely irrelevant when Soviet propaganda is directed at Europe and the U.S.A., and thus its scope is limited.

5. Jews and Israelis as the Mouthpiece for Soviet Propaganda. In principle, there are at least two characteristics

* Muslim religious functionaries.

common to the employment of Soviet Jews and Muslims by the Soviet propaganda machine.

i. Individual Soviet Jews protest Israeli politics only as part of, and in the name of, the Soviet people. Never, in this broad campaign, is the "Jewish" protest that of a national minority group, i.e., Soviet Jewry as a body.

ii. The Soviet Union calls on prominent progressive Jews all over the world to join the voice of protest of Soviet Jews, which Moscow officially sponsors.

There are several aspects of the "Jewish" campaign which resembles the way use is made of Muslims. We shall deal with each in turn.

a. Jewish Life in the U.S.S.R. As in the case of Muslims, the first concern of Soviet propaganda, where Jews are involved, is to prove the freedom of Jewish religious and cultural life in the U.S.S.R. To prove that there is free Jewish life in the U.S.S.R. serves a twofold objective: it is aimed at rebuffing attacks which claim the opposite; it is expected to add a dimension of credibility to various anti-Israeli and anti-Zionist statements and declarations by Soviet Jews.

The usual manner of dealing with the subject of "Jewish freedom" in the U.S.S.R. involves answers to questions by listeners and readers, large articles and broadcasts describing the conditions under which Jews live in the U.S.S.R. (which rely extensively on numerical data), statements by prominent Soviet Jews on the subject, and occasional reports on Jewish cultural activity in the U.S.S.R. Thus, in a reply to a question asked by a listener from Brighton, Massachusetts, Radio Moscow stated:

. . . Jews, like all nations and races in the Soviet Union, have equal rights in all fields of economic, political, social and cultural endeavor. There are Jews in every field of endeavor in the Soviet Union.⁶⁵

The same broadcast quoted the names of many Jewish artists, singers and writers to prove its point.

Sometimes the same idea is conveyed in the form of a

broadcast interview with a foreigner (usually — as in the case of Mandel Terman, Chairman of the Chicago Council of US-Soviet Friendship⁶⁶ — a member of Moscow's Front Organizations).

Very often, prominent Soviet Jews, such as the chief editor of the Soviet-Jewish newspaper *Sovetish Heimland*, Aaron Vergelis,⁶⁷ or the late Chief Rabbi of the U.S.S.R., Yehuda Levin,⁶⁸ described Jewish freedom in the U.S.S.R.

Moscow also publishes books aimed at describing the freedom of Jewish life in the U.S.S.R. Among them: *Soviet Jews — Facts and Fiction*, a 48-page paperback which examines the historical background and provides questions and answers on Soviet Jews today; "available free from the Soviet Booklets bookstore. . ."⁶⁹ Another such book is *Vremya* (Time), written by Aaron Vergelis, which showed changes which have taken place in the life of the Jews during Soviet rule.⁷⁰

Finally, foreign delegations or even tourists visiting the U.S.S.R. are asked to express their opinion on Jewish freedom in the U.S.S.R. — which they usually do. Such were the cases of an Israeli Leftist Delegation in 1972,⁷¹ the American Rabbi Sidney Rackoff of Wheeling, West Virginia,⁷² and many others. Soviet-Jewish delegations are also dispatched abroad with the same purpose. In addition, Soviet Jews often publicly express their Soviet patriotism and devotion to the Communist idea. By thus establishing that there is freedom (of sorts) for Jews in the U.S.S.R., the propagandists engineer the correct atmosphere for further utilization of Soviet Jews in the propaganda machine.

b. **Protesting against the Policy of the Israeli Government.** Soviet Jews are used extensively to protest both against Zionism in general and Israeli policy in particular. During the period of 1968 to 1972 (in which the Jewish Defense League was increasingly active), Soviet Jews were among the main contributors to Soviet anti-Zionist campaigns. They wrote letters to Soviet newspapers, participated in broadcasts of Radio Moscow, and traveled abroad

to explain and defend the Soviet Government's opposition to Jewish nationalism. A collected edition of some of the letters which had previously appeared in *Pravda* and other daily newspapers was published in several languages by Novosti in 1970, entitled *Zionism: Instrument of Imperialist Reaction*. Many of the letters were from entire Jewish communities or professional groups. A comparison of the style and nature of accusations against Zionism and Israel immediately reveals a much more aggressive tone in the letter signed by Jews than in letters signed by non-Jewish writers.

Among the most active of the Jewish anti-Zionists was General D. Dragunskii. He participated in many broadcasts, and wrote several articles, among them "Lies — Zionist Weapon" (*International Affairs* No. 2, 1973, pp. 48-49; the same article had appeared several months earlier, in *New Times* No. 28, 1972, pp. 22-23), "Zionism" (*Soviet Weekly*, March 7, 1970 p.7), "Soviet General Answers Zionist Lie" (*Soviet Weekly*, July 15, 1972, p.5), etc. In February 1971 Dragunskii was a member of a Soviet-Jewish delegation which visited Brussels and Uruguay, its aim being to defend the anti-Zionist stand of the U.S.S.R. It may be mere coincidence, but at the beginning of this "Jewish" campaign General Dragunskii was a Lt.-General,⁷³ while a year later he had reached the rank of Col.-General⁷⁴ (equivalent to a promotion from three- to four-star General).

Soviet Jews are frequently utilized to denounce the policy of Israel. Thus, on Jan. 20, 1970 *Soviet News* published a collection of letters from Soviet Jews, previously published in Soviet newspapers or broadcast by Radio Moscow, under the headline "Soviet Jews Answer Mrs. Meir." Some of the letters stated:

We, and hundreds of previous generations of Jews, have never lived in Israel. We feel shame and pain that the State of Israel is following in the footsteps of the Nazi vandals.⁷⁵

Soviet Jews constantly protested the "ruthless treatment of the Arabs by Israel,"⁷⁶ "Israel's racist policy,"⁷⁷ , etc.

During the October 1973 war Radio Moscow declared:

It is noteworthy that Moscow Radio and TV are nowadays receiving a large number of letters also from Jewish Soviet citizens. In their letters they express satisfaction with the resistance the heroic Arab forces have shown to the Israeli invaders who have been waging a war of seizure and aggression in the Middle East.⁷⁸

In addition to Soviet Jews, Moscow often utilizes Jewish members of foreign Communist Parties. One of them is the American Communist journalist Mike Davidov, who broadcast several times to North America, and described in glowing terms the life led by Jews in the U.S.S.R. He also reprimanded Israel for its "militaristic" and "anti-Soviet propaganda."⁷⁹ The Soviet foreign-language newspapers reported his activities at length.

c. Descriptions of Life in Israel. Soviet Jews who have emigrated to Israel from the U.S.S.R. are virtually the sole source of information for this aspect of propaganda. This practice began long before the Six-Day War and the beginning of mass emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. Thus, in 1957, the story of an anonymous Jew, who had allegedly returned from Israel to the U.S.S.R. was broadcast as follows:

On arrival in Israel we found ourselves in a camp behind barbed wire. . . . The workers of Israel greet each new day with anguish — how to earn one's bread, how to feed one's children. . . . I and my family lived for seven years in Israel, this was long enough to convince us that the working Jew in Israel is destined only to humiliation and misery. I have no words to describe the happiness I and my family felt on returning to the Soviet Union; we became once again free citizens.⁸⁰

In 1963 another Soviet Jew who returned from Israel to the U.S.S.R., Valentina, told the readers of *Trud* on Oct. 26, 1963 (and on the same day the audience of TASS at 1053 GMT) "of the unbearable life of immigrants in Israel, of racial discrimination, chauvinist propaganda and Judaization in that country. . . ."

Soviet emigrants to Israel become a major instrument of Soviet propaganda only in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Thus, in January 1973 TASS dramatically announced:

Hundreds of letters are coming from Jews who have left the Soviet Union for Israel, letters resembling the signals of distress in the ocean: "Save our souls," "help us return to the motherland" . . . Some made the tragic mistake because of lack of will-power, passiveness. . . others fell under the influence of Zionist poison. . . .⁸¹

Another Soviet source claimed about the same time that "the Finnish Embassy in Israel, which represents the U.S.S.R.'s interests in that country, has received more than 10,000 applications from people wanting to leave the 'Promised Land' and return to their homeland. . . ."⁸²

On Sept. 12, 1972 TASS broadcast a collection of letters from Soviet Jews living in Israel, among them Dora Kuperman, Sluz Mostovaya and Basya Kabanova. They all emphatically condemned life in Israel and expressed regret at having left the U.S.S.R.⁸³

Some of the Soviet Jews who had emigrated to Israel did actually decide to leave, and applied to the U.S.S.R. for permission to return. They left Israel, and awaited the decision of the Soviet Government in Vienna. These Jews were mercilessly exploited by Soviet propaganda. A Novosti TV crew interviewed them several times, the interviews being not only telecast by Moscow TV, but also broadcast by Radio Moscow, and printed by Soviet foreign-language magazines.⁸⁴ They all denounced their decision to emigrate to Israel, the policy of the Israeli Government, and living conditions in Israel. A year later, the same group of Jews visited the Israeli Embassy in Vienna, and handed in a statement of protest to the Israeli Government.⁸⁵ They protested "the continued deception of Soviet citizens of Jewish nationality and the entire world public by the Israeli Government."⁸⁶

The author has interviewed some of these Soviet Jews, who had decided meanwhile to return to Israel. While they expressed their wish to preserve their anonymity (having relatives still in the U.S.S.R.), they described at length the role of the Soviet Embassy in Vienna, and of Novosti, in

the entire anti-Israel campaign. It seems that they were promised permission to return to the U.S.S.R. on condition that they cooperate. Despite their agreement, only a few of them were allowed to return to the Soviet Union and even these were further exploited by Moscow. A. Fishkin, who described his "escape" from Israel via Cyprus⁸⁷ and Austria,⁸⁸ said in one of his broadcasts:

They treated us like cattle and we worked like slaves under the constant supervision of the overseers. . . . Work contracts were handed out by foremen. The chief overseer had 28 of these ruffians under him. They would beat men and women whom they thought worked badly. I saw how one of the overseers beat up a dark-skinned Jewish woman who had come to Israel from Morocco. The heartless man beat her up mercilessly. . . .⁸⁹

At least in some cases, an explanation for their cooperation with Soviet propaganda was actually included in their statements. B. Samokhvalov, who was allowed to return to the U.S.S.R., and later sent abroad to tell his story, announced at a press conference in Geneva:

Israel is a country of savage and inhuman mores. . . . I realized that my decision to leave the Soviet Union for Israel was the biggest mistake of my life. Fortunately, my family did not follow me and remained in Minsk. . . .⁹⁰

Splitting families is an old Soviet technique, aimed at securing cooperation with the Government, or return to the Soviet Union. It has often been applied to artists and sportsmen. A significant number of those Soviet Jews who immigrated to Israel, and later returned to the U.S.S.R. (to be utilized by Soviet propaganda) were members of such "split families." Could it be that they were "on propaganda missions" to Israel?

d. Israelis. Soviet Jews are not the only Jews used by Moscow propaganda; whenever possible it employs Israelis. While Soviet Jews cooperating with the Soviet propaganda machine can be divided into two main groups — those who did it eagerly and enthusiastically (Dragunskii, Vergelis, etc.), and those who did it for personal reasons (permission to return, etc.), Israelis who are utilized by Soviet propa-

ganda introduce a new category — namely those who have not been asked whether or not they wish to cooperate with Moscow.

Israel is a democratic society and, as in every such society, the right to differ is preserved by the law and by tradition. Thus, there are people and political groups in Israel who oppose Government policy, or aspects of it, in regard to its handling of the conflict in the Middle East. Soviet propaganda fully utilizes this fact. Statements, articles, and even books by some of the Israeli opposition (including among others, Prof. Arieli and Prof. Talmon,⁹⁰ Generals (res.) Peled and Gavish,⁹² Prof. I. Leibowitz⁹³) have been exploited by Moscow. The common denominator in all cases was that the persons quoted (and there are many more than those listed) were never asked permission for the use of their statements. Furthermore, the quotations were always abridged, taken out of context and therefore misleading.

The other two “classic” kinds of cooperator were present among Israelis as they were among Soviet Jews.

i. Cooperation by Compulsion. This group was made up exclusively of Israeli pilots and soldiers captured during the October 1973 war and “interviewed” by Arab authorities. Moscow amplified the statements made by the Israeli prisoners of war, and disseminated them. Among them were fantastic declarations, such as the one allegedly made by a captured Israeli pilot:

Many Israeli pilots are afraid of flying missions against Syria which had become a veritable hell for them. Thirty men bluntly opposed the orders to bomb Syria and eight of them were executed in the presence of all others.⁹⁴

Other Israeli prisoners of war were reported to have called the Israeli commanders “war criminals,”⁹⁵ and their own acts “inhuman actions.”⁹⁶ While the majority of these statements were actually made by Israeli prisoners of war, one must bear in mind under what conditions they were extracted, and the alternative that faced the prisoners

should they have refused to cooperate with their interrogators.

ii. **Willing Cooperation.** Most, but not all, of the Israelis utilized by Soviet propaganda are Israeli Communists.

Statements of the Israel Communist Party related to the Middle East conflict are often used by Moscow. Such statements – usually harshly condemning Israel's policy – were published even before the Sinai Campaign. A typical statement was that broadcast by Moscow on September 16, 1956 which declared:

Israel must not be a weapon in the hands of the imperialists against her neighbors. The people of Israel do not want and must not be made to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the British, French and American multi-millionaires.⁹⁷

Such statements became much more frequent after the Six-Day War and followed every major event related to the Middle East conflict. Thus, after the killing of Israeli sportsmen at the Munich Olympic Games (September 1972), the New Communist List (Rakah) did not issue a statement. However, when the Israeli army retaliated against terrorist centers in Lebanon, Rakah declared:

The Israeli Government is seeking to mislead public opinion, using the tragic incident at Munich for its selfish interests. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Israel Communist Party calls on all peace-loving forces in Israel to step up the struggle against the policy of the Government, for a peaceful political settlement of the conflict, for a lasting peace. . . .⁹⁸

Rakah was one of the first to condemn the "Israeli aggression" in October 1973.⁹⁹ An additional "Call of the Communist Party of Israel," once again denounced Israel's policy "which caused the resumption of war in the Middle East."¹⁰⁰

In addition to these statements and declarations, Radio Moscow and Soviet magazines in foreign languages frequently broadcast or print interviews and articles by leading Israeli Communists (Meir Vilner,¹⁰¹ Emile Touma,¹⁰² etc.) Vilner even used the 24th Party Congress in Moscow to denounce the policy of the Israeli Government.¹⁰³

While the vast majority of Israelis cooperating with Moscow are Communists, there are others serving its interests who – at least so it seems – are not officially connected with the Israel Communist Party. One of them is Prof. I. Shahak. He has to his record several appearances before various U.N. and U.S. Senate commissions where he fiercely denounced and condemned Israel's treatment of Arabs in the occupied territories.¹⁰⁴ While Prof. Shahak does not appear to be directly connected with Moscow, his appearances have been widely publicized and utilized by Soviet propaganda.¹⁰⁵

Any event in Israel which may aid Soviet propaganda receives wide coverage in the Soviet media. In May 1970, according to an unsigned article in *Moscow News*, Soviet Army Day was celebrated in Israel. The celebration (which took place, according to the article, somewhere in the Jerusalem mountains) is described at length. There is no indication of who organized the event, nor of how many participants attended, but it is stressed that the speakers condemned the "anti-Soviet slander" of the Israeli press, and praised Soviet efforts to reach a "just peace" in the Middle East.¹⁰⁶

Soviet propagandists also used various statements of Israeli leftist public organizations. When "The Israeli Association of Fascism Fighters and Victims of Nazism" issued a statement against the Zionist Conference in Brussels, it was published by most foreign-language newspapers of the U.S.S.R. and broadcast by Radio Moscow.¹⁰⁷

To briefly summarize the characteristic use made of Israelis in Communist propaganda:

1. Moscow endeavors, as far as possible, to use statements made by Jews. It is only very seldom that Israeli Arabs are quoted by Moscow, and then as a rule it is two or three Arab leaders of the New Communist List (Rakah).

2. Whenever a statement by an Israeli Communist is quoted by Moscow, it is emphasized that it is the Communists who "carry the flag" in the struggle for peace in the

Middle East. When an Israeli public delegation was invited to the U.S.S.R. in September 1971, it was the sole Communist member of the delegation, Mrs. R. Lubitch, on whom the attention of the Soviet press was focused. Her statements were quoted more often than those of all other members of the delegation put together. However, Moscow also tries to convey the impression that the Communists enjoy substantial support amongst the Israeli population at large, who are depicted as disaffected with their Government and its policies.

3. The Soviet Union frequently reminds the Israelis that it was the Red Army which defeated Fascism. They are reminded, too, that the debt still stands, and that it is their duty to assist in the struggle of the "progressive forces" against neo-fascism and imperialism.

We have attempted to describe and analyze the major themes, techniques and instruments of Soviet propaganda, related to the Middle East conflict. It is time now to turn to some general conclusions.

NOTES

1. Radio Moscow in Turkish to Turkey, 1630 GMT, Feb. 11, 1971, *D.R.* 12.2.71.
2. *Soviet Weekly*, June 11, 1959, p. 7.
3. Radio Kiev in Ukrainian for Abroad, 1800 GMT, June 10, 1972, *SU/4016/*.
4. *New Times*, No. 45, Nov. 1971, p. 23.
5. TASS in English, 1008 GMT, Oct. 18, 1973.
6. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1300 GMT, Oct. 6, 1973, *SU/4418/*.
7. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1600 GMT, Oct. 6, 1973, *SU/4418/*.
8. Radio "Peace and Progress" in English for Africa, 1430 GMT, Oct. 18, 1973, *SU/4429/*.
9. On Sept. 16, 1972, this commentary was broadcast in many of Radio Moscow's foreign-language programs for Europe and Asia. Slightly shorter versions were broadcast in English, French and Portuguese for Africa, *SU/4096/*.
10. Radio "Peace and Progress" in English for Africa, 1430 GMT, Dec. 27, 1973, *SU/4486/*.

11. A. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York, 1938, p. 239.
12. A collection of Soviet broadcasts during the first 48 hours of the October 1973 war can be found in the *Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/4096/*.
13. *Soviet News*, No. 5506, Sept. 2, 1969, p. 3.
14. N. Aleshina, "Will Sabbath Come," *International Affairs*, No. 2, Feb. 1968, p. 85.
15. D. Vol'skii, "Suez Canal – A Battle Front," *New Times*, No. 21, 1970, p. 10.
16. D. Vol'skii and Farid Seiful-Mulyukov, "At the Middle East Crossroads," *New Times*, No. 16, Apr. 1970, p. 27.
17. TASS in Russian for Abroad, 1725 GMT; and in English, 1726 GMT, June 22, 1974; also Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1900 and 2130 GMT, June 22, 1974, *SU/4633/*.
18. TASS in Russian for Abroad, 1553 GMT; and in English 1722 GMT, May 20, 1974, *SU/4606/*.
19. V. Matveev, "Don't Make Crises, Prevent Them . . ." *Moscow News*, March 8, 1969, p. 7.
20. TASS in English, July 23, 1958, *SU/950/*.
21. *Moscow News*, Supplement to issue No. 48, 1972, p. 12.
22. *XX Century and Peace*, No. 7, July 1971, pp. 9–10.
23. L. Brezhnev, "To the Participants of the Second Afro-Asian Women's Conference," *Moscow News*, Supplement to issue No. 33, 1972, p. 2.
24. *Soviet News*, No. 5595, July 6, 1971, p. 196. Part of the debate was transmitted by TASS International Service in English, 1612 GMT, Feb. 5, 1971, *DR 8.2.71*.
25. TASS International Service in English, 1845 GMT, Feb. 5, 1971, *DR 8.2.71*.
26. *Moscow News*, No. 4, Jan. 25, 1969, p. 3.
27. A. Dzasoknov, "Cairo, Forum of Forces of Peace and Progress," *Moscow News*, No. 6, Feb. 8, 1969, p. 7.
28. A. Dzasoknov, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
29. No name, "In Support of the Arab People," *XX Century and Peace*, No. 3, 1969, p. 23.
30. No name, "Program of Action," *XX Century and Peace*, No. 2, 1970, p. 2.
31. Radio "Peace and Progress" in English for Africa, 1430 GMT, March 21, 1973, *SU/4252/*.
32. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1600 GMT, Apr. 6, 1973, *SU/4266/*.
33. Radio Moscow Home Service, 2230 GMT, Apr. 6, 1973, *SU/4266/*.

34. TASS International Service in English, 1530 GMT, Oct. 7, 1973.
35. TASS International Service in English, 1930 GMT, Oct. 7, 1973.
36. TASS International Service in English, 2128 GMT, Oct. 7, 1973.
37. TASS Oct. 15, 1973, 0022 GMT, transmitted denunciations by the workers of a plant in Minsk, and "the working people of Kiev"; Novosti, Oct. 11, 1973, 0820 GMT, transmitted several letters of Soviet citizens condemning Israel. There are many more similar examples.
38. TASS in English, 1408 GMT, Oct. 19, 1973, *SU/4430/*.
39. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1700 GMT and 1800 GMT, Oct. 21, 1973, *SU/4431/*.
40. TASS International Service in English, 1002 GMT, Oct. 8, 1973.
41. *Izvestiya*, Aug. 13, 1970.
42. In a note to the heads of Governments of the U.S.A. Britain and France, Kosygin, early in February, alluded to Israeli air attacks and said that the U.S.S.R. would "see to it that the Arab states have means at their disposal" to deal with them. This and other Soviet statements of the same period were interpreted as indicating additional aid to Egypt - possibly including Soviet pilots. See: "Text of Kosygin-Nixon Exchange of Mid-East Note Made Public," *Washington Post*, Feb. 26, 1970.
43. *Soviet News*, No. 5590, June 1, 1971, p. 152.
44. *New Times*, No. 45, Nov. 1971, pp. 29-30.
45. *Moscow News*, Supplement to issue No. 48, Nov. 1972, p. 5.
46. *Moscow News*, Supplement to issue No. 44, Oct. 1972, pp. 2-3.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
48. *Ibid.* pp. 6-7.
49. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1600 GMT, Aug. 16, 1974, *SU/4681/*.
50. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 0645 GMT, May 1, 1958, *SU/927/*.
51. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1700 GMT, May 12, 1962, *SU/945/*.
52. Mufti Babakhanov, "The Moslems of Central Asia," *Soviet Weekly*, Oct. 3, 1970, p. 8.
53. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1700 GMT, Sept. 7, 1972, *SU/4089/*.
54. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 2000 GMT, Sept. 20, 1963, *SU/1359/*.
55. *Ibid.*
56. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1230 GMT, May 27, 1963, *SU/1261/*.
57. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1700 GMT, Apr. 16, 1974, *SU/4579/*.
58. TASS International Service in English, 1922 GMT, Nov. 13, 1973; also Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1600 GMT, Nov. 13, 1973, *SU/4452/*.
59. *Ibid.*

60. TASS International Service in English, 1959 GMT, Nov. 14, 1973, *SU/4452/*.
61. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1900 GMT, Feb. 21, 1974, *SU/4534/*.
62. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1700 GMT, Sept. 7, 1972, *SU/4089/*.
63. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1230 GMT, Sept. 9, 1972, *SU/4090/*.
64. TASS International Service in English, 1408 GMT, Oct. 19, 1973, *SU/4430/*.
65. Radio Moscow in English to North America, 2300 GMT, Oct. 18, 1958, *SU/977/*.
66. Radio Moscow in English for North America, 2300 GMT, Nov. 7, 1958, *SU/982/*.
67. A. Vergelis, "Jews in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Weekly*, Apr. 13, 1961, p. 8; also a broadcast interview with Vergelis, Radio Moscow in English for North America, 2800 GMT, Oct. 31, 1972, *SU/4135/*.
68. *Soviet Weekly*, March 1, 1969, p. 7.
69. *Soviet Weekly*, Jan. 9, 1971, p. 14.
70. TASS in Russian for Abroad, 1745 GMT, Sept. 10, 1974, *SU/7704/*.
71. *Soviet Weekly*, May 27, 1972, p. 3.
72. No name "American Rabbi Comments on Visit to U.S.S.R.," *Soviet Weekly*, June 17, 1972, p. 5.
73. "Statement on Behalf of Soviet Jews," *Soviet News*, No. 5534, March 17, 1971.
74. TASS International Service in English, 1219 GMT, March 2, 1972, *D.R. 3.3.72*.
75. From the letter of M. Yulevich, *Soviet News*, No. 5526, Jan. 20, 1970.
76. TASS International Service in English, 1554 GMT, Feb. 16, 1971, *D.R. 17.2.71*.
77. Radio Moscow in English to Eastern North America, 0001 GMT, Nov. 18, 1971, *D.R. 19.11.71*.
78. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1700 and 1800 GMT, Oct. 21, 1973, *SU/4431/*.
79. Radio Moscow in English to North America, 2200 GMT, Nov. 11, 1971, *D.R. 12.11.71*.
80. Radio "Return to the Homeland" in Russian for Soviet Expatriots, 0500 GMT, Nov. 5, 1957, *SU/881/*.
81. TASS International Service in English, 0745 GMT, Jan. 14, 1973, *SU/4195/*.
82. M. Melamed, "Israel, The Unpromised Land," *Soviet Weekly*, March 17, 1973, p. 6.

83. TASS International Service in English, 0727 GMT, Sept. 12, 1972, *SU/4093/*.
84. No name, "Israel - by Jews Who Left It," *Soviet Weekly*, Apr. 15, 1972, p. 10.
85. TASS International Service in English, 1940 GMT, Apr. 27, 1973, *SU/4282/*.
86. *Ibid.*
87. Radio Moscow in English to Eastern North America, 2200 GMT, Jan. 13, 1971, *SU/3584/*.
88. TASS International Service in English, 1243 GMT, Feb. 16, 1971, *D.R.17.2.71*.
89. Radio Moscow in English to Eastern North America, 2200 GMT, Jan. 13, 1971, *SU/3584/*.
90. TASS International Service in English, 1552 GMT, March 3, 1971, *D.R. 4.3.71*.
91. I. Braginskii, "Israel and Zionism," *Soviet Weekly*, Oct. 10, 1970, p. 7.
92. Col. O. Ivanov, "Israel - Shock Detachment of Imperialism and Zionism," *International Affairs*, No. 6, 1972, p. 48.
93. J. Schreiber, "Israel: Pre-Election Scene," *New Times*, No. 43, Oct. 1969, p. 19.
94. TASS International Service in English, 1546 GMT, Oct. 16, 1973.
95. TASS International Service in English, 2059 GMT, Oct. 11, 1973, *SU/4423/*.
96. TASS International Service in English, 2356 GMT, Oct. 11, 1973.
97. TASS International Service in Russian for Abroad, Sept. 14, 1956 (no time specified), *SU/762/*.
98. TASS International Service in Russian for Abroad, 1620 GMT; and in English 1745 GMT, Sept. 17, 1972, *SU/4096/*.
99. TASS International Service in English (time indistinct), Oct. 7, 1973.
100. TASS International Service in English, 0936 GMT, Oct. 10, 1973.
101. "Meir Vilner on the Israeli Communists' Stand," *New Times*, 24, June 1973, pp. 10-11, and many others.
102. Emile Touma, "Zionism's Big Lie," *New Times*, No. 51, Dec. 1970, pp. 24-25.
103. *Soviet Weekly*, Apr. 17, 1971, p. 6.
104. U.N. Document A/8089, Annexe VI, pp. 3-4.
105. V. Ladeikin, "Criminal Policy of the Israeli Extremists," *International Affairs*, No. 1, 1972, p. 45.

106. No name, "In Honor of the Glorious Soviet Army," *Moscow News*, No. 24, June 13, 1970, p.7.
107. TASS International Service in English, 0615 GMT, Feb. 24, 1971, *D.R. 25.2.71*.

Chapter Seven

CONCLUSIONS

Soviet propaganda's stand on the Middle East issue is clear: The Soviet Union is presented as an ally and sometimes even as a partner of the Arabs; the Soviet-Arab partnership was clearly emphasized after the October 1973 war, by the stress on the importance of Soviet weapons as an instrumental factor in achieving what Moscow called "the great Arab victory." Israel and Zionism, as servants of imperialism, are the enemies against whose aggression the friendly Arab states are to be helped. For their part, the Arab states are presented (with few exceptions after October 1973) as gratefully receiving the moral, economic and military support rendered by the U.S.S.R., to which frequent mutual declarations of eternal love and friendship testify.

The entire Middle East conflict is viewed as a part of the struggle which imperialism wages against progress and national liberation. Consequently the "front line" of imperialism in the Middle East, Israel, is backed in its aggression by other agents of imperialism such as NATO, West Germany, South Africa and, of course, the U.S.A. This is naturally of mutual concern to Arabs and Russians and strengthens their alliance.

The main objective of this study was to describe and analyze the structure of the Soviet propaganda apparatus, the development of the Middle East issue, its main themes, instruments and techniques. An attempt has been made to demonstrate the vigor of Soviet propaganda, its hostility and aggressiveness, the energy invested in this tremendous effort to mobilize people's minds and control their behav-

ior, by carefully preconceived exploitation of people's negative and positive sentiments.

There remain two additional aspects of Soviet propaganda to be dealt with: its purpose and effectiveness.

Soviet propaganda is rooted in action. It is designed to supplement other, more concrete actions of the Soviet Government. It can be viewed as an additional activity, performing a function, quite apart from its symbolic significance. Therefore, one of the major strategic tasks of Soviet propaganda is to get its timing right in relation to specific dangers and opportunities in any given set of circumstances, to enhance the global position of the U.S.S.R., and the expansion of its power. As propaganda is shaped by the same factors as the political, military and economic policies of the country, namely the international situation, national goals, domestic factors, and Communist ideology, and since propagandist and politician pursue exactly the same goals, propaganda develops parallel to external events, responding and reacting to changes and developments in the political, economic and military spheres.

A review of the development of Soviet propaganda, in relation to the Middle East conflict in the period 1967-71, will serve to illustrate the hypothesis outlined above:

After June 1967 the immediate and basic goal of Soviet propaganda on the Middle East was the "elimination of the consequences of Israeli aggression." During the period 1967-71, this basic line was not altered, although its intensity and centrality were subject to certain shifts in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

The first such development was the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in August 1968. For almost a year prior to that event, the Middle East problem had received practically as much attention as Vietnam, and had occupied a major place in propaganda publications and broadcasts. For a period of several months after August 1968 its place was taken by official "explanations" of the invasion. The rubric "Our International Commentaries" in *Moscow News* which

usually serves as a barometer of Soviet propaganda, by featuring its most pertinent concerns at any given moment, did not mention the Middle East for more than a month. The same phenomenon could be noted in *Soviet Weekly* and *New Times*, which were devoted to Czechoslovakia. If the Middle East was mentioned at all, it was usually in connection with the Security Council Resolution 242. There was no change in the *substance* of Soviet propaganda, simply because the basic goals of the U.S.S.R. in the Middle East had not changed, but its attention was focused elsewhere, and the quantity and intensity of the Middle Eastern propaganda reflected that shift. As soon as Czechoslovakia no longer posed a threat, the Middle East regained its former priority. The article of S. Astakhov, "Bonn-Tel-Aviv Axis" (*International Affairs*, No. 11, November 1968), heralded the renewed anti-Israel campaign.

In late 1968 there was a spiralling cycle of incidents, which threatened the renewal of open warfare. These included attacks on Israeli airlines abroad and other heightened activity by Arab guerillas, and Israeli actions such as a commando foray in the vicinity of the Aswan Dam, and a raid on Beirut airport. The situation escalated further in 1969, when there were more acts of sabotage and infiltration by the guerilla organizations; Israel stepped up its air-raids on Egypt, and there were recurrent artillery duels and armored assaults across the Suez Canal.

This escalation compelled the U.S.S.R. to take certain serious diplomatic steps aimed at the reduction of tension, and the promotion of a possible solution to the crisis. The first notification was a *Pravda* editorial of December 30, 1968, which came out in support of G. Jarring's mission, aimed at U.N. mediation in the Middle East. The Soviet Union sent official notes to France, Great Britain and the U.S.A. on December 30, 1968, which indicated a more flexible attitude than Moscow had displayed hitherto, and among other things mentioned the possibility of guarantees

Dear Readers,

We think your opinion, advice and any criticisms you may have would help us to improve our paper and make it more interesting. Would you be kind enough to fill in this form, fold, seal and post it (without a stamp, if you like) to the address indicated.

1. Do you think the paper has changed over the past few years? If so, in what way? (Underline appropriate phrase.)

Has become more interesting	No change	Has become less interesting
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2. What do you think of the material (language, style)?

Interesting	Dull	No opinion
-------------	------	------------

3. Do you read the following columns and what do you think of them?

Your Questions Answered

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

Round-Up of Soviet Press

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

International commentaries and articles on international affairs

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

Moscow Diary

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

The Way Natasha Sees It...

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

Business Page

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

Articles on economy, science and medicine

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

Articles on literature, theatre, cinema, art

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

Sport page

Regularly	Sometimes	Never
Good	Fair	Uninteresting

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7. Do you receive Moscow News regularly? _____

SEX

AGE

PROFESSION

Respectfully, EDITORIAL BOARD



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From:

4. Do you like the lay-out and pictures?

Yes	No	No comment
-----	----	------------

5. Do you like our serials?

Yes	No	No comment
-----	----	------------

6. Which articles did you like and which did you not like?

7. Remarks:

IF YOU DON'T MIND

YOUR AGE

ADDRESS:

PROFESSION:

by the four permanent members of the Security Council as a means of ending the conflict.¹

The increased diplomatic activity was matched by a parallel stepping-up of Soviet propaganda. The Middle East problem became the central theme in all channels of communication. Not only was there an increase in the number of articles on the Middle East, in which the language became more critical, but there was a significant expansion of Moscow's foreign-language broadcasts, particularly to the Arab world and Africa. Furthermore, new techniques were introduced, the most important of which was propaganda by conference. It was soon after the Six-Day War that the Soviet Union organized several "spontaneous" conferences in support of the Arabs. These conferences did not have any continuity in 1968, but the International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples was summoned again in 1969, and introduced a series of propaganda events, such as the "Week of Solidarity with the Arab Peoples," a "Day of Solidarity," etc. Several other "conferences of support" took place in the course of that year.

These Soviet efforts proved futile, and by early 1970 a settlement seemed as remote as ever. This same period was marked by a notable escalation along the Suez Canal, and the Soviet Union responded with increased diplomatic and propaganda pressure. In the field of diplomacy, there was the Kosygin-Nixon Exchange of Mid-East Notes (*Washington Post*, February 26, 1970) and several vague hints that the Soviet Union might send "volunteer" pilots to Egypt. Soviet propaganda dealing with the Middle East conflict was also intensified in at least two ways:

1. There was a marked increase in the virulence of the language used by Soviet sources. The tone was set by L. Koryavin in "The Middle East, Tel-Aviv and Its Patrons" (*Izvestiya*, February 5, 1970), and the newspapers, journals and broadcasts in foreign languages followed suit. One of the innovations of this period was a series of "historical" articles reviewing the history of Palestine and the role of the

various Jewish organizations in the political and social development of the Middle East before the establishment of Israel as an independent state. The purpose was to prove that the Jews have always been a reactionary element in the region. In the article by Simon Jargy, "War and Peace in Palestine,"² the Jewish independence movement is labeled "cut-throat."

2. During 1970 there was a constant increase in the number of Jews and Israelis whom Soviet propaganda used as its mouthpiece. This emerged as a major technique of 1971, and 1970 gave it a promising start. At that time some Soviet Jews returned from Israel to the U.S.S.R., where they were recruited by Soviet propaganda. Such was the case of Abram Cherches, first described in *Izvestiya* (July 31, 1970), and then broadcast by Radio Moscow to its foreign audiences.³ Israeli Communists also gained prominence. *Communist* of July 1970 carried an article by D. Henin, member of the Politburo of the Israel Communist Party, and this was also broadcast by Radio Moscow.⁴

In the same period we find some of the strongest letters written by Soviet Jews; the most extreme amongst them were collected and republished in *Soviet News* (January 20, 1970). One of them was a letter from V. Kreinin, previously published in *Pravda* (January 13, 1970):

Soviet Jews do not need the patronage and concern of Israel's rulers whose hands are spattered with the blood of Arabs and who have involved their people in a bloody war.⁵

The tone of the other letters was similar.

The cease-fire of August 1970 brought a relative relaxation in both the tone and intensity of Soviet propaganda. There were no more hints of direct involvement on the part of the Soviet Union in the Middle East conflict. The various demonstrations, such as the "Solidarity Weeks," were stored away for more suitable times. However, the period of relaxation did not continue for long. The negotiations between Israel and Egypt which were expected to begin immediately did not take place. Instead, mutual accusations

of violations of the cease-fire were exchanged. Israel's refusal to negotiate surprised the Soviet Union, which could only explain Israel's ability to withstand the pressure from a super power like the U.S.S.R. as being due to the support it received from the U.S.A. Thus, the old theme of Israeli-American cooperation was brushed up and reactivated, to also include the accusation that American pilots were serving in Israel. Was this not perhaps an indication that part of the Soviet leadership favored intensifying the Soviet involvement in the Middle East, even to the point of sending Soviet "volunteers" to Egypt?⁶

During the second half of 1970 the "American volunteers" were given much prominence, particularly in broadcasts to Africa. For Western audiences a series of articles was published in which explanations and details of the American-Israeli alliance were set out. I. Belyaev's article, "Who is Obstructing a Middle East Settlement,"⁷ is an example. The intention was to show that everything which occurred after the cease-fire was part of an Israeli-American plot.

At the end of 1970 and the beginning of 1971 there was an intensification of one particular subject of Soviet propaganda — the anti-Zionist campaign. Again the timing is significant, corresponding, as it does, to specific developments on the international scene. It was during the summer of 1970 that the activities of the Jewish Defense League and several Zionist organizations took a sharp anti-Soviet turn.

There were many demonstrations, protest campaigns and harassments directed against representatives of the Soviet Union acting abroad. This activity reached its climax at the Zionist Conference held in Brussels in February 1971. Soviet propaganda retorted with several articles, during January–March 1971, which bitterly attacked Zionism and Israel: among them were L. Medvedko's "Zionism and Israel" (*International Affairs* No. 1, January 1971), N. Nikitin's "Zionism's Espionage Network" (*Soviet Military Review* No. 3, March 1971), and the anonymous "Zionism

Self-Exposed" (*New Times* No. 5, February 1972). The most noteworthy of all, however, were several articles of V. Bol'shakov which appeared at that time in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*. We also find more Jews and Israelis appearing as the spokesmen for Soviet propaganda, and this culminated in the invitation of a delegation of Israelis, some, but not all of whom were Communists, to visit the U.S.S.R.

Despite the intensification of the anti-Zionist campaign, the importance of many other subjects of Soviet propaganda concerned with the Middle East diminished. The lessening of tension in the area and the fact that during the first half of 1972 the U.S.S.R., to a certain degree, lost its initiative and had to respond to acts initiated by others, such as the various peace plans, the Indo-Pakistan war, and the trip of President Nixon to the U.S.S.R., were all factors which caused a limited "cease-fire" in Soviet propaganda. Anti-Zionism was directed more to internal consumption (and intensified), in an attempt to dissuade Soviet Jews from emigrating to Israel, rather than to influence foreign audiences.

While major changes and developments of Soviet foreign policy are immediately reflected by Soviet propaganda, changes in Soviet foreign propaganda *precede* similar developments in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R.

Two months after the October 1973 war, and several weeks before the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement, the scope of Soviet propaganda aimed at the Arab world increased. More broadcast hours were added to Soviet radio Arab transmissions, and the weekly *New Times* began to appear in Arabic. Radio Moscow proudly announced that:

Its publication has brought positive reaction from the readers. For instance, two copies of the December issue were sent to the Governor of Alexandria, Abd al-Munim Wahbi, and to other public figures, as complimentary copies. . . . The new issue of the magazine maintains its wide view of international facts, but the current events in the Arab world received top priority. Thus, the first issue of the magazine, the January number, contains many contributions

about the Middle East, the affairs of Arab unity and other material of interest to Arab readers.⁸

These developments indicate that the Arab world, and especially Egypt, had now become an important target of Soviet propaganda. The reason soon became obvious. The U.S.S.R., unhappy with the Egypt-Israel disengagement agreement, or rather with the negligible role it had played in that agreement, scolded Egypt and repeatedly warned its leaders to distrust the U.S.A. Thus, the subsequent semi-rift between Egypt and the U.S.S.R. was first intimated by developments in Soviet propaganda. Other such cases could be observed in 1970 and 1972.

But the prime objective of Soviet propaganda is not to announce or indicate changes of Soviet foreign policy, but to control the behavior of its audiences, to prompt action by changing, molding or preserving certain of their opinions, and thus to facilitate the implementation of Soviet foreign policy goals.

But after all its efforts, just how successful is Soviet foreign propaganda? It seems plausible that the existence of certain favorable predispositions toward the Soviet Union, as well as negative attitudes toward Israel, the West, Zionism, etc., in Soviet foreign propaganda audiences, combined with intensive, systematic cultivation of these attitudes by Moscow, will increase Soviet influence abroad. Still, we maintain that it is impossible to measure or even assess the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda, and this for at least two main reasons:

a. Direct statistical evidence on the size of Soviet propaganda audiences is meagre. Soviet sources publish no information concerning the size of Soviet radio's audiences or the number of people reading Soviet journals and newspapers.

The best available statistical evidence of the size of Radio Moscow's audiences (Table 11) shows a relatively low audience level compared to the Voice of America in most countries. No doubt, the various contests promoted by

Soviet radio broadcasts in foreign languages and the Soviet foreign press is aimed at increasing the size of the captive audience.

The data on credibility is sparse. In Tanzania, where this factor was polled, fewer than 1% of 725 men named Radio Moscow as the station which gives the most reliable information on world affairs. Two percent of the same group named V.O.A. Among better educated men, 6% named Radio Moscow and 12% V.O.A. In Senegal, 41% of a group of 83 Radio Moscow listeners said they believed all or most of its news content, while 46% of 260 V.O.A. listeners in the same country replied affirmatively to the same question.⁹

b. Even if we had exact figures concerning the size of the Soviet propaganda audience, what could it tell us about Soviet propaganda's effectiveness? It is debatable how much of the U.S.S.R.'s success in international relations can be attributed to propaganda, and how much to other factors, some known and some unknown. We have no evidence as to what the exact goals of Soviet propaganda are. While in general it is obvious that propaganda tries to facilitate the implementation of foreign policy goals, we still do not know what are its intermediate goals.

What contributes to our confusion is the impossibility of assessing not only the output, but also the input, of Soviet propaganda. While we know the input produced by the propaganda agencies (i.e., Soviet radio, press, etc.) we also know that this is *not* the input that reaches the audiences' personality screen. The absorption screen rejects a part of this input, and produces a new input, the characteristics of which are not known even to the Soviet Union.

Those who direct the propaganda machine of the Soviet Union would also like to know the size of their audiences and readership as well as the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. This is the reason for the annual questionnaire distributed by the Editorial Office of *Moscow News* and other Soviet foreign-language journals, asking readers to give their

“opinion, advice and criticism” in order to “improve the paper and make it more interesting.” There are also questions relating to the profession, sex, age and preference of the readers; thus, at least a partial picture of the character of the consumer must emerge.¹⁰

Despite the difficulties, if we may make an evaluation of our own, it seems that Soviet foreign propaganda suffers from several serious shortcomings, which undoubtedly weaken it:

i. Soviet propaganda *clichés* are obsolete, and dull. They are subject to the ostensibly infallible doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, with its repetitions and rigid terminology, which sometimes remains unintelligible to a large part of its audience.

ii. Moscow has low credibility. The numerous cases of mistakes, exaggerations, lies and ignorance (not to mention hypocrisy) which plague Soviet propaganda do not add to its credibility.

iii. Finally, the citizens of freer societies are able to compare and check the accuracy of the information they receive against other, non-Communist, sources.

These factors place a serious question mark over the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. This is probably the reason for its tremendous scope and aggressiveness – its chief characteristics. Obviously, Moscow hopes that quantity and intensity can counterbalance poor quality and low credibility.

NOTES

1. No name, “A Just and Stable Peace in the Middle East is an Urgent Necessity,” *Pravda*, Jan. 25, 1969.
2. S. Jargy, “War and Peace in Palestine,” *International Affairs*, No. 2, Feb. 1970, p. 119.
3. TASS International Service in English, 1657 GMT, July 31, 1970, D.R. 3.8.70.
4. TASS International Service in English, 1512 GMT, July 31, 1970, D.R. 3.8.70.

5. No name, "Soviet Jews Answer Mrs. Meir," *Soviet News*, No. 5526, Jan. 20, 1970, p. 37. .
6. Israel's former Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, told the author that at about this time the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko, proposed to send Soviet "volunteers" to Egypt – a proposition rejected by the majority of the Politburo.
7. I. Belyaev, "Who is Obstructing a Middle East Settlement," *International Affairs*, No. 11, Nov. 1970.
8. Radio Moscow in Arabic, 1900 GMT, Jan. 7, 1974, SU/4495/.
9. *Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics*, USIF Research Service, Washington, 1972, p. 30.
10. See appendices.

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