ARMED STRUGGLE AND THE SEARCH FOR STATE

THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT, 1949-1993

YEZID SAYIGH

Armed Struggle and the Search for State

This page intentionally left blank

Armed Struggle and the Search for State

The Palestinian National Movement 1949–1993

YEZID SAYIGH

INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD

This book has been printed digitally and produced in a standard specification in order to ensure its continuing availability

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in

Oxford New York

Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in

Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan South Korea Poland Portugal
Singapore Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press
in the UK and in certain other countries

Published in the United States
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

© The Institute for Palestine Studies 1997

The moral rights of the author have been asserted
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)

Reprinted 2004

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above

You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover
And you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

ISBN 0-19-829265-1

Antony Rowe Ltd., Eastbourne

To my parents, Yusif and Rosemary Sayigh,
with love, gratitude, and admiration

This page intentionally left blank

PREFACE

An entire era ended when Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin presided over the signing of the Declaration of Principles on 13 September 1993. Their exchange of letters of recognition ended decades of mutual denial between the national communities they represented, even if the accord did not fundamentally resolve all aspects of the conflict. Many thousands had died, both combatants and civilians, since the war that led to the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine and to the mass exodus of its Arab population in 1947–9. The Palestinian national movement was to raise the twin banners of 'total liberation' and 'armed struggle' in following years, but ultimately proved unable to liberate any part of its claimed homeland by force. The civilian uprising that erupted in 1987 initially appeared more effective in shaking Israeli control, but still the PLO finally accepted a negotiated compromise, the terms of which ran counter to virtually all the principles and aims it had espoused for so long.

How did the Palestinian national movement arrive at this outcome, and what factors determined its course over the decades? Could it have achieved more, given the severe external constraints and daunting challenges, both military and political, that it faced? How were its principal leaders and organizations able to maintain their internal control for so long, despite the glaring discrepancy between declared goals and actual achievements at each and every stage? Last but not least, what role did the armed struggle play, given the enduring emphasis it received in Palestinian discourse and strategy on the one hand, and on the other its effective abandonment in the course of the intifada and the diplomatic process that led ultimately to the 1993 accord?

This book tells the story of the Palestinian national movement between 1949 and 1993, taking the armed struggle as its main focus. The central thesis is that the armed struggle provided the political impulse and organizational dynamic in the evolution of Palestinian national identity and in the formation of parastatal institutions and a bureaucratic elite, the nucleus of government. It did so by driving mass politics and the establishment of a national 'political field', in the process enabling a new political class to form, gain recognition and legitimacy, and assert its leadership. By the same token, the armed struggle played a pivotal role in demarcating the Palestinians as a distinct actor in regional politics with a not insignificant degree of autonomy. A subsidiary thesis is that the key to the survival of the Palestinian national movement and to the attainment of at least a modicum of its objectives, was the ability to effect fundamental shifts in goals and strategy at critical stages in its evolution. These shifts took place in response to external circumstances and challenges, but they

also required parallel changes in ideology, structure, and internal politics. Here, again, it is by tracing the course of the armed struggle, both as discourse and practice, that the transformation can be highlighted most effectively.

The following account is divided into four periods—demarcated by the Arab–Israeli wars of 1948, 1967, 1973, and 1982—and is brought to its natural conclusion in the PLO–Israel accord of September 1993. An introductory section precedes each part to summarize the main international and regional trends that set the context for Palestinian politics of the period, and to touch briefly on the most salient developments in the Palestinian arena. Although it is informed by both disciplines, this pretends to be neither a political sociology nor a study of international relations, and the account does not trace systematically or in consistent detail the attitudes and fortunes of distinct Palestinian social forces, nor those of the principal regional and global powers. Rather, it offers a historical reconstruction of the evolution of Palestinian political programmes, ideological discourse, and organizational structures, as revealed by the connecting theme of armed struggle. This book will have achieved its purpose if it deserves to be described as a history.

Between States and State-Building

The voluminous literature on the Palestine conflict attests to the persistent interest and intense emotions it has generated. The reconstruction presented in this book is therefore of obvious relevance and intrinsic value, but it is also set apart from comparable studies by its distinctive framework. Essentially, this views the Palestinians as engaged almost continuously since 1948 in a historical process of state-building, with the PLO gradually emerging after 1964 as the non-territorial equivalent of a state. National liberation has been the goal of many movements in the colonial and post-colonial eras of the twentieth century, but the Palestinian case shows that the state-building dynamic does not come into operation only after independence. Rather, the search for state shapes the articulation of goals, formulation of strategies, choice of organizational structures, and conduct of internal politics through much of the preceding struggle.

These assertions require elucidation, but a disclaimer is first in order. To assert that the Palestinians have been engaged in state-building is to make neither a polemical point nor a juridical one about their status as a national entity or distinct people and their right, accordingly, to exercise self-determination, specifically in the form of an independent state. Nor is it to make a historical or empirical claim about the degree to which—at any stage in the three decades prior to the inauguration of the Palestinian Authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank autonomy areas in May 1994 (and even then only arguably)—the PLO actually exercised sovereignty and fulfilled the major functions attributed to the modern territorial state. Rather, at issue are the emer-

gence and maintenance of a particular set of political practices and institutional arrangements centred on the PLO; the processes through which it redefined its political relations with, and sought to co-opt, Palestinian society; and the manner of its interaction with sovereign members of the regional and international state systems. It is in this sense that the PLO can be seen as a 'statist' actor, and that the underlying logic of Palestinian national politics and organizational evolution—within which framework the armed struggle proved to be situated—since 1948 has been one of state-building.

A crucial distinction is being made here between the 'stateness' of the PLO (its actual possession of the key attributes of the state), which was severely qualified, and its statist character, which is being asserted. The distinction draws on definitions of the state in social science literature to explain what the PLO was not, and what it was. Charles Tilly summarizes the common view that an 'organization which controls the population occupying a definite territory is a state *insofar as* (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another'.[1] Drawing on Max Weber, Joel Migdal adds that an especially important defining function of the state is 'the ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the parameters of rule-making for other social organizations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way'.[2]

That the PLO lacked sovereign authority over a distinct territory and population is obvious. At no point was it able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, that is, to monopolize rule-making and the means of coercion, over the inhabitants of a defined geographical area, even when it formed the rudiments of parallel government in the state-within-the-state it ran in Jordan in 1968–71 and Lebanon in 1972–82. The physical dispersal of the Palestinians and their subordination to the political, administrative, and economic systems of various host governments qualified the stateness of the PLO even further. Not only were its attempts to achieve social control continuously contested by rival state centres (especially Israel and Jordan), but its own development as a statist actor was ultimately contingent on the existence of a counterpart: a society with a common 'sociological space'. Palestinian society was itself in need of demarcation and articulation; the recursive element within the state–society dyad only became realizable when the 1993 Oslo Accord wedded the PLO's political framework to an identifiable social, economic, and territorial base in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The fact that the PLO's own bureaucratic elite was already drawn heavily from these areas, and that it inherited a ready governmental apparatus in the form of the Israeli-run civil administration, facilitated the transition and emphasized it as a new stage in an established process of state-building.

That said, it was precisely in terms of its political framework that the PLO was most identifiable as a statist actor, and not simply because it explicitly sought national independence and statehood as its central goal. Above all, it

conformed to a key distinguishing feature of states described by Theda Skocpol (summarizing Alexis de Tocqueville's approach), namely that 'their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain political issues (but not others)'.[3] The PLO's centralizing tendencies moreover revealed, to borrow from the general discussion of the state by Gianfranco Poggi, 'how keenly, and how successfully, the protagonists of "state-building" sought to entrust the conduct of political business to a single organisation, and to distinguish that from all other entities harbouring and ordering social existence'.[4] Much like a state, the PLO was the receptacle for political legitimacy, and as a consequence it manoeuvred continually in relation to its mass constituency between the politics of control and the politics of mobilization (while adhering strictly to neither).[5]

The fact that the PLO, unlike most states, did not seek to extract financial resources from society or effect social transformations does not detract from its statist character. It was, after all, engaged in a violent nationalist struggle, and so the key internal variable was the ability of leaders, in crisis circumstances, to create and use political arrangements that could eventually solidify into stable, durable structures.[6] Furthermore (to apply a notion borrowed from political economy), the initiators of political change in the Palestinian arena were statists precisely because they were not rooted in any existing set of social or economic interests: 'the state was their chosen instrument of change, and in their vision it was to be self-perpetuating'.[7] Like the state, the PLO was thus more than a mere arena for socio-economic struggles. The insulation of its career officials from current socio-economic interests imbued its political leadership with the relative autonomy that state managers seek in order to act upon their own preferences, 'making decisions that reshape, ignore, or circumvent the preferences of even the strongest social actors'.[8]

The emergence of a distinct political class and durable bureaucratic elite within the PLO framework was in itself additional evidence of state-building, despite the lack of a firm territorial base.[9] This, the institutionalization of political power, was reflected in the rapid increase in the number of people on the PLO payroll and its extension of social welfare and some collective services to its mass constituency. Through the latter means it also reinforced the inclusivist political function of the mass-based corporatist associations it formed or co-opted (in the case of pre-existing ones), such as labour and professional unions, all the while maintaining the exclusivist functions of the core bureaucratic elite. The prevalence of factionalism was another indication of statist corporatism, as it indicated the lack of ability, or interest, of different strata of the PLO elite and mass constituency to organize and act as autonomous social forces in pursuit of specific demands.[10] It was also typical of the post-colonial state, which was significant both as a major employer and as an arena for the articulation of factional conflict and power competition.[11]

The preceding suggests strong similarities between the path of political development taken by the PLO and that of a variety of Arab (and Third World) states. Building on this parallel, the recourse to a combination of traditional and modern techniques of political mobilization and institutionalization—different forms and roles of ideology, bureaucracy, mass organization, and so on—can also be seen as indicative of state-building in the Palestinian case. As in various Arab states, moreover, the availability of 'rent'—the dispensation of financial and other material resources obtained from external sources (or non-extractive ones, such as overseas commercial investments), often in the form of outright patronage—encouraged an authoritarian and populist style of political leadership in the PLO. This, too, was a function of a specific stage of state-building (and of societal modernization), that was especially likely to grow out of a revolutionary or nationalist movement.[12] Lack of territoriality remained an important impediment, but the experience of the Kuwaiti government in exile during the Iraqi occupation in 1990–1 demonstrates that although the existence of a concrete territorial base is symbolically necessary to sustain the notion of statehood, international political, strategic, and financial networks can be equally important.[13]

As the Kuwaiti analogy suggests, finally, the statist character of the PLO cannot be understood without reference to its interaction with the system of states. The latter not only offers the model of the modern territorial state and the Westphalian concept of sovereignty—both of which the PLO strove to appropriate for itself—but also provides a crucial context to help explain the structures and orientations of new state actors. As Skocpol observes in a discussion of regimes emerging from Third World social revolutions that also applies broadly to the PLO, 'these revolutions have happened in settings so penetrated by foreign influences—economic, military, and cultural—that social-revolutionary transformations have been as much about the definition of autonomous identities on the international scene as they have been about forging new political ties between indigenous revolutionaries and their mass constituents'.[14] At the same time, involvement in the system of states can increase regime autonomy from domestic actors, an advantage not lost on the PLO leadership.[15]

That the PLO should have sought international recognition with almost obsessive determination is therefore neither incongruous nor whimsical. A majority in the international community came to recognize its status as the representative national organization of the Palestinians; it enjoyed full membership in the League of Arab States, Non-Aligned Movement, and other multinational groupings of Third World states, as well as observer status at the United Nations; and around 100 states extended varying levels of recognition to the State of Palestine that it declared in November 1988. That they should have done so is partly due to Cold War politics and the peculiar historical and international legal circumstances of the Palestine conflict. But it is also reminiscent of the general position of 'quasi-states', as Robert Jackson describes them,

namely those members of the international system who enjoy juridical statehood by virtue of obtaining formal recognition from the other, more powerful members, even when they lack the full physical and functional attributes of statehood.[16]

The importance of international recognition explains the constant PLO concern to combat any challenge, whether internal or external, to its status as *sole* legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Ironically, it also explains PLO determination to secure the loyalty of its mass constituency and the continued acceptance by opposition groups of its formal framework, even when this required it to adopt political stances or military tactics that damaged its diplomatic standing. This seeming paradox was in fact a logical consequence of the premium placed by the international community on sovereignty, since it prompted the PLO to work ceaselessly to demonstrate its effective political control, at least, over its own population. Nor, in any case, was the use of violence consistently counter-productive. After all, war-making was in itself a crucial element in state-building—whether in relation to internal actors or external ones—and instrumental in the assertion of a particular form of Palestinian nationalism.

Between Nations and Nationalism

Nationalism is a term commonly associated with anti-colonial struggles, but its meaning in the Palestinian context bears examination. Of the various definitions, that of Ernest Gellner is the most apt in this context: 'Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.'[17] The national unit, or nation, has also been conceived in various ways, but Jan Penrose offers the most useful explanation for the present purpose. It is 'the product of three elements: a distinctive group of people, the territory which they occupy, and the bonding over time (of historical experience) which melds people and land into a "natural" whole. It is through the idea that distinctive groups of people exist that the concept of the nation builds directly on the assumption that culture as a particular way of life is essential.'[18]

The assumption of distinctiveness is implicit in much of the Israeli and Palestinian historiography that analyses Palestinian nationalism. The one tends to refute its existence in certain periods and to suggest that it is primarily a reaction to the emergence of Zionism and the State of Israel; it therefore does not stem from a 'real', that is pre-existing, nation or from intrinsic historical processes, but rather is historically 'artificial'. The other affirms the existence of Palestinian nationalism as an autonomous phenomenon and traces its roots to earlier periods; the biblical roots of Jewish nationalism are moreover now confronted with a 'Can'anite' myth of Palestinian origin.[19] However, both views contain an underlying polemical purpose, which is based on twin as-

sumptions: first, that the division of humankind into national entities is 'natural', and second, that claims to the right of self-determination are validated only by the ability to demonstrate early self-awareness and identification as a nation. Neither the purpose nor the assumptions are shared here. Nationalism is not seen to be unilinear, inevitable, or irreversible even though it is most likely to appear as a political force or ideological trend in situations of conflict involving distinct communities. Rather, it remains a fragmented and contingent phenomenon: it draws on historical and cultural specificities, but these are not undying, essential characteristics, and their significance can be properly understood only in terms of specific conjunctions of social, economic, political, and institutional factors.[20]

Seen this way, to speak of Palestinian *nationalism* is problematic on a number of counts. Strictly speaking, the collective political reaction of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to the succession of major events that have affected them since the turn of the century might be termed patriotism—the attachment to *patria* and resistance to the imposition of alien political control (that is, by people who are culturally distinct) and commonly translated in present-day (Mashriqi) Arabic as *wataniyya* (from *watan*, homeland)—rather than nationalism. The fact that Palestine had not previously existed as a sovereign or autonomous political entity weakened the tendency to express such resistance in terms of social or cultural commonality among local inhabitants, and led to a greater emphasis on the common territorial component, suggesting that their movement was akin to what Ernest Dawn has described as 'regional patriotism'.[21] Palestinians have moreover stressed their commonality, rather than distinctiveness, of culture with neighbouring Arab societies, with which they share language, religion, social custom, and family ties.

At the same time, Palestinian patriotism has acquired additional dimensions as a result of its striving for separate statehood. Collective memories, perceptions of common injustice, and the sense of belonging to a particular territory provided a basis for turning a latent collectivity into a community, and set Palestinians apart from other Arabs, with whom language, religion, and culture were shared.[22] As such their patriotism evolved into a form of ethnicity as they strove to redefine themselves after 1948 in particular, and revealed some of the features of 'proto-nationalism' following the rise of the PLO after 1967, to use Eric Hobsbawm's term for the 'feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could operate, as it were, potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with modern states and nations'.[23] This involved some mixture of elements and types, however, as different regions of pre-1948 Arab Palestine and different resident and refugee communities of Palestinian Arabs afterwards experienced significant variations in the material conditions of their existence. Palestinian responses to the direct encounter, first with Zionism and the *yishuv* up to 1948 and then with Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967, came closer to a recognizable form of ethno-nationalism, whereas the political evolution of the PLO in Arab exile should more properly

by seen as state nationalism. The former can also be termed 'experiential' nationalism—the reaction to a lived experience of British and Israeli rule—in contrast to the 'cognitive' nationalism actively propounded and nurtured by the statist PLO.[24]

This course of evolution is commensurate with the pattern in other Arab societies, where fundamental tensions still persist between the ways in which belonging to the imagined wider Arab nation or to the more narrowly-bound territorial states are conceived. *Qawmi(yya)* (from *qawm*, people) has come customarily to denote the former, being used to describe pan-Arab nationalist ideology or other phenomena of relevance to all Arab countries, while *qutri(yya)* (from *qutr*, single territory or country) denotes the territorial state.[25] There is another polemical debate here, as the selection of terminology may be regarded as an attempt to deny the existence of an all-embracing Arab nation or to assert territorial states more distinctively as nation-states. What has emerged in individual countries, particularly of the Mashriq (Arab East), is something of a halfway house: the national state, rather than the nation-state.[26] Other potential bases for ethnicity, such as language and religion, may continue to operate and compete within its framework and may indeed contest it, but the broad pattern since World War Two, if not earlier, has been the attempt to construct national states and inculcate what may be termed state-patriotism or country-nationalism, which is both particularistic and territorially-bound. However, what matters ultimately is not the particular typology of nationalism but the structures, discourse, and politics through which the inclusion and mobilization of a substantial majority of the target population, or at least of significant sectors within it, may be attained.[27]

This book argues that much the same processes have been underway among the Palestinians, the key determinant being the degree to which statist political structures have asserted their symbolic legitimacy and consolidated their social control. This is not to argue that the Palestinians have in fact formed either a fully distinct national community or a sovereign territorial state. Nor is it to suggest that their movement towards a distinctive national character is either inevitable or irreversible; to the contrary, it is contingent on the consolidation of their statist enterprise and on the terms of their interaction with neighbouring populations and political systems. Rather, the purpose of the comparison with other Arab cases is to underline the feasibility of understanding and explaining Palestinian history in terms of wider human experience. It also confirms that the different typologies of nationalism are neither mutually exclusive nor relate to each other necessarily in a fixed order of hierarchy or historic sequence. Far from it, as the Palestinian case reveals the degree to which ethnic and territorial forms of nationalism may in fact overlap in space and time within the same group; co-exist simultaneously but in separate social or geographic spheres (especially for a fragmented or diaspora community); or alternate from one to the other in different historic phases involving fundamentally different material and cultural circumstances.[28] That

said, the text will refer generally to Palestinian 'nationalism' (as well as proto-nationalism where specifically appropriate), while keeping these various qualifications firmly in mind.

A Note on Sources

The historical reconstruction presented in this book is based predominantly on five categories of primary sources. First are the publications issued by the PLO and the various Palestinian guerilla groups in exile (and by the communists and Islamists in the Israeli-occupied territories) articulating their political programmes, military strategies, and, in some cases, social ideologies to their membership and mass constituency alike. Given the intense competition for adherents (and external backing), no guerilla group was without at least one political weekly, and several also published their own soldiers' magazines, besides a variety of reports, yearbooks, and non-periodical statements or pamphlets containing texts of speeches and other public messages. I was able to acquire a significant amount of non-periodical publications, and to view others, along with largely complete series of most of the principal periodicals (and random samplings of many lesser ones), held by various libraries and individuals.

The second category consists of publications produced by the various guerrilla groups for internal consumption. These include party conference reports, circulars to the membership commenting on current events and defining general tasks, 'educational' material (political and ideological indoctrination), rules of membership and organizational statutes, and security, training, and other military manuals (the latter are not cited in the Bibliography). Originally intended for members only, and therefore meant to be confidential, a substantial quantity of this literature was effectively in the public domain. As with the first category, I was able to acquire a substantial number of such publications, and to view an additional number in various libraries and private collections. This applies mainly to material published by the guerrilla groups in exile, but also includes a sizeable representative sample of publications by the Palestinian communists and Islamists.

Third are archival documents relating to military and organizational affairs, and statistical data on 'martyrs' and prisoners. Viewing these was not straightforward. An inevitable consequence of conflict and repeated exile was the physical destruction of many official (and private) collections, whether by enemy fire or as a precaution to prevent confidential material from falling into enemy hands. In some cases forced exile meant that valuable documents (from an academic point of view) were in another country, beyond the reach even of the persons in whose care or possession they had originally been. Nonetheless, I was fortunate to gain access to the military archive of PLO chairman Yasir Arafat, the logbook of the PLO central operations room, parts of the archive

of the Palestine Liberation Army and its intelligence branch, and the computerized records of the PLO's Social Affairs Institution in Amman, Jordan. The first two sources provided detailed information on battles waged by PLO forces in 1976–86; the third offered revealing insight both to internal PLO relations and to PLO relations with Arab host states in 1964–73; while the last gave further depth with basic social data for a sample of some 4,500 martyrs and over 8,000 prisoners in Israeli jails.

The fourth category comprises books and articles written by active or former members of Palestinian organizations in their individual capacity. These vary from memoirs and other personal accounts, through ideological treatises, polemical debates, and operational analyses, to reports in public periodicals on party conferences, battles, and other events by observer-participants. Besides revealing the opinions, assumptions, and advocacy of their authors (or reporting those of interlocutors) and occasionally providing factual information, these texts present a valuable record of the key issues and debates of their period. Much of the material was published in *Shu'un Filastiniyya* (Palestinian Affairs), the monthly journal published by the PLO Research Centre in 1971–93, while the independent *Dirasat ʿArabiyya* (Arab Studies) was a useful source of articles by Arab nationalist and leftist authors, especially in the 1960s and 1970s. In some cases, however, the personal accounts and diaries cited in this book remain unpublished, and were viewed by kind permission of their authors.

Last of the primary sources, but by no means least, are interviews with active and former participants in the Palestinian national movement. They include the interviews I conducted over a period of 15 years starting in October 1981, with members of the PLO military and civilian rank-and-file and a smaller selection of Arab government officials and army or intelligence officers, totalling some 400 in all. To these are added the large number of interviews with PLO and Arab leaders and officials published in the Arabic-language and foreign press. The bibliography contains a list of the interviews that I conducted, but for the most part citations for press interviews appear only in the endnotes. The main exceptions in the latter case are the extensive interviews with leading PLO figures, and the transcripts of seminars and panel discussions also involving senior officials, published in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, and other journals. These are cited in the Bibliography.

The use of oral history sources has potential limitations, some serious, and so requires a brief comment. These include the effects of weak or selective memory, lack or imprecision of concrete historical detail, ideologically-driven portrayal of past events, personal self-promotion, and adaptation or outright distortion of responses in accordance either with the perceived aims and prejudices of the interviewer or with the current political agenda of the interviewee. To avoid or minimize these risks I repeated a number of interviews and restructured others, cross-checked accounts given by different interviewees, requested explanation of conflicting narratives, and at times directly challenged accounts I knew to be inaccurate. I also strove whenever possible not to use interviews

as the sole source of any item of fact or interpretation. I have cited specific interviews in those cases where I could not provide corroboration from other sources, and indicated any reservations I might have in the text or endnotes. That said, although oral history generally lacks the contemporaneity of official documents, and therefore some of their narrative veracity, it allowed me to study the 'anthropology' of the PLO—its internal relations and informal practices—and to compensate partially for the lack or inaccessibility of crucial documents—predictably in a guerrilla movement that either failed to commit key decisions and debates to paper, or else kept its most important documents secret—in order to reconstruct a credible 'inside story'.

The Arabic press was an important adjunct to the primary sources mentioned above. Not only did it carry statements by a variety of PLO and Arab officials and provide inside information and analysis on current events at a level of detail unavailable in most foreign media, but it also helped me both to situate events and debates in the Palestinian arena in their local and regional context, and to place narratives relayed in interviews or official documents (when undated) in correct chronological order. To view more than a few Arabic newspapers first-hand would have been excessively laborious and repetitive, but the PLO Research Centre and the (independent) Institute for Palestine Studies published immensely useful yearbooks, documentary compilations, and chronologies based on press sources in 1964–81. They also issued daily and monthly compilations of translations from the Israeli Hebrew-language media in 1975–82, a task taken on by the Cyprus-based al-Manar Press in 1983–90. The *Arab Report and Record* and the *Middle East Contemporary Survey* (previously the *Middle East Record*) provided valuable additional coverage of both the Arabic and non-Arabic press, while the chronological sections in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, the *Journal of Palestine Studies*, and the *Middle East Journal* offered an instant reference source for daily events and spared me much tedious labour.

Finally, I should note that I have adopted the system of Arabic transliteration used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. However, I have omitted diacritical marks except for the *ayn* (ʿ) and *hamza* (ʾ), which I have transliterated wherever they occur in a word. Given the large number of Arabic sources cited in this book, and for the sake of consistency, I have applied the same system to the original Arabic names of most persons and places, with the inevitable exceptions. So although I have transliterated Hussein to Husayn, Gemayyel to Jmayyil, and Chamoun to Shamʿun, for example, I have kept common Western spellings of North African names (such as Houari Boumediene, al-Habib Bourguiba, Chazli Benjedid) and Christian names (such as George, Camille, and Charles). The most important exceptions, however, are my use of Arafat (instead of ʿArafat) and Fateh (instead of Fath). I have also retained the Anglicized names of countries, capitals, and better known cities: for example, Beirut and Sidon rather than Bayrut and Sayda. I have also defined Arabic terms where they first appear in the text, and provide a glossary of them at the beginning of the book.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To produce a work of such magnitude would have been impossible without the cooperation and support along the way of many individuals and a number of institutions. My greatest debt is to the hundreds of persons who gave up their time to be interviewed, often more than once. They were invariably courteous and hospitable, and tolerated my persistent questioning with good grace. Similarly forebearing were their colleagues and families, who cheerfully put up with my intrusion into their offices and living rooms and supplied seemingly endless rounds of Arabic coffee, sweet tea, and soft drinks or pressed me to join their meals. It came as a pleasant surprise to discover how willing nearly all my interlocutors were, not only to speak about past events, but for the most part to do so with greater candour than I had reason to expect and, in many cases, to commit their memories to tape rather than notebook alone.

My thanks go, too, to the persons who introduced me to interviewees, hunted for telephone numbers, located publications, and shared their detailed knowledge of the inner workings of the PLO. They are many, but I am especially grateful to ʿAbd-al-Fattah al-Jayyusi, formerly aide to Fateh co-founder and PLO deputy military commander Khalil al-Wazir, and Mahjub ʿUmar, formerly deputy director of the PLO Planning Centre. Fateh central committee member Yahya (Sakhr) Habash also gave me useful introductions and the repeated use of his offices in Tunis to hold interviews, while his assistants Marwan and Trad increased the debt I owed by acting as my PLO telephone directory and by helping with the copying of tapes, notes, and documents. Muhammad Hamza, aide to Khalil al-Wazir until the latter's assassination in April 1988, helped with introductions and gave me privileged insight into the internal relations of the Fateh leadership and its organization in the Israeli-occupied territories, and deepened my understanding of Wazir's unique character and special role. Nizar ʿAmmar did the same in relation to the Fateh and PLO security agencies and Salah Khalaf, PLO security chief until his assassination in January 1991, introduced me to additional interviewees, and gave me use of his office to meet them. Samih Shbib arranged meetings with senior PLF cadres, and, as a historian, reciprocated my enthusiasm for the research and shared detailed knowledge of the PLF with me.

A book of this nature would have been lacking without archival documents. In 1988 PLO chairman Arafat gave me free access to his military archive at Hammam al-Shat (Tunis), and to records of the PLO central operations room. I wish to note especially the efficient and friendly assistance of the head of his office, Sami Musallam, and archivists Abu Nasir, Jihad, ʿAzmi, Abu Hasan, and Ghassan. I am also indebted to the chairman for invitations to attend several

PLO and Fateh conferences in 1987–91. These provided a rare opportunity to meet, assembled in one place, large numbers of ranking officials and officers of all political affiliations, and I became a familiar part of the conference landscape as I conducted my interviews with delegates. In Cairo, Brig. ʿAbd-al-Hay ʿAbd-al-Wahid opened a veritable treasure trove by allowing me to view military and intelligence archives of the Palestine Liberation Army. I also enjoyed valuable access to the computerized records of the PLO's Social Affairs Institution thanks to the director of its Amman office, Wahid Mtayr, and his senior assistant Abu Rami.

I was also privileged to have extensive access to a number of PLO leaders who were willing to act repeatedly as sounding boards for my evolving thoughts, even when these led me to question the political, organizational, and military practices and structures that they had done much to put into place. My special appreciation goes to the late Khalil al-Wazir, whom I offended deeply with an article (published in *Shu'un Filastiniyya* in autumn 1985) that aimed particularly harsh criticism at Palestinian military activity, for much of which he was directly responsible. Yet his home and office remained open to me at all times, and he gave my book project, when I told him of it, sight unseen, his enthusiastic and unconditional endorsement in the remaining eight months of his life. Former DFLP military commander Mamduh Nawfal similarly devoted many hours over the years to interviews and discussions, and both he and Fateh central committee member Mahmud ʿAbbas allowed me to view their unpublished narrative accounts of various historical episodes. My stint in the Palestinian delegation to the peace talks with Israel in 1991–4, during which I helped negotiate the Gaza–Jericho implementation agreement and its security protocol, gave me additional access to PLO political and military leaders and valuable insight to their ways of thinking and operation. Thanks are also due to Sabri Jiryis, editor of *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, for the opportunity to air my often critical views of Palestinian politics and military action, and so to elicit responses from a wider audience.

I owe a lasting debt to all the above. Some will no doubt take exception to my representation and interpretation of the struggle to which they gave so much, or object to specific aspects of the factual reconstruction in this book, but I hope they will also identify with much in it and be encouraged, or if necessary provoked, into producing their own historical accounts. In any case I am confident that they see the validity, indeed the necessity, of recording and analysing the past in all its dimensions. Only one potential interviewee, a former military commander of the PFLP, refused completely to speak to me on the grounds that my research would 'serve the enemy'. The majority of interviewees, conversely, saw this as a spurious argument that condemned the Palestinians, alone of all the protagonists, to ignorance about their own struggle and about the causes of their failures and successes. They accepted the need for a critical reappraisal, even when their conviction in the justice of their cause and the legitimacy of their means remained unshaken. For their part general readers

will, I hope, see that, rather than prevent dispassionate analysis, empathy with the subject allows greater insight and explanatory power if combined with a critical approach.

That said, I admit to two failings that cause me particular concern. Most serious is that the history contained in this book is dominated entirely by males. This is not surprising, as coercion, especially possession of the instruments of war, remains a masculine domain, no less so among the Palestinians. The corollary is male domination of political processes and organizational structures, and of the nationalist narrative. Yet feminine narratives exist, and I am at fault for not doing enough to elicit them, although much pioneering work has been done by others. The second failing is the weak representation of the smaller guerrilla groups in my sources, especially the interviews and archival documents. This is largely because the combination of PLO–Syrian tensions and Palestinian–Shiʿa clashes in the 1980s, followed by my involvement in the Palestinian–Israeli peace talks in 1991–4, made it impractical for me, and at times unsafe, to visit Lebanon and Syria, where these groups were based. However, I should add that their senior members were unresponsive to my attempts to make up for this shortcoming with the help of written questionnaires and research assistants, and eluded my requests for interviews when I met them in other countries. The resulting emphasis in the narrative on Fateh, and to a lesser degree on the PFLP and DFLP, is not unfair to historical reality, but the (partial) absence of certain voices is no less regrettable for that.

My acknowledgement of debts owed would not be complete without added mention of the generous help of chief librarians in several institutions, who made it possible for me to peruse such complete collections of PLO publications, especially periodicals. My thanks go above all to Muna Nsuli of the Institute for Palestine Studies (Beirut), who supplied me with missing texts and references over the years and went beyond the calls of duty and friendship to add sources of which I had not thought or been aware, and who kept me up to date on the library's latest acquisitions. I am also grateful to Majid al-Zubaydi and Diane Ring, librarians respectively of the PLO Research Centre (Nicosia) and the Middle East Centre at St Antony's College (Oxford), for their assistance, especially in locating PLO pamphlets. I owe no less a debt to Haim Gal, librarian at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University—which houses an impressive collection of Palestinian and Arab periodicals—whose knowledge of the material and interest in the topic greatly facilitated my work.

Palestinians joke wryly that God created them a dispersed people, and so it was natural for my research to take me to many cities, in many countries across four continents, in pursuit of archives, libraries, and interviewees. I could not have managed without the help of the numerous friends who gave me a bed, house-key, and the run of their kitchens whenever I needed, and kept me up to date with the latest political gossip. Their warm hospitality and companionship made me feel at home wherever I was and for however long, and made my task far more pleasant and enjoyable than it might have been. To all I give my love

and gratitude, but my debt is greatest to my cousin Haifa and her husband Hasan Salih, who made doing my research rounds even easier thanks to the frequent loan of their car, and to Khalid al-Jayyusi, who, only a day after we first met in 1984, became my host for the next two months and my friend ever since.

The hospitality of friends was all the more valuable since my book project was, for the most part, self-financed. Thanks are nonetheless due to the Diana Tamari-Sabbagh Foundation for awarding the initial grant of $10,000 that enabled me to start active research and writing in 1985. It is in accordance with the terms of the grant that copyright belongs to the Institute of Palestine Studies, which kindly awarded me the additional grant of $3,000. Besides acknowledging their material support, I wish to thank both bodies for their scrupulous respect for my complete intellectual independence as the author of this work. A Small Personal Research Grant from the British Academy, though for a different project, was also instrumental in allowing me to conduct research relevant to the book in Cairo, and, as an unexpected bonus, to consult the archives of the Palestine Liberation Army. Finally, I should note that some of the material in the book has also appeared in articles in the *Middle East Journal* (Vol. 45, No. 4, Autumn 1991; and Vol. 46, No. 2, Spring 1992), *International Journal of Middle East Studies* (Vol. 30) No. 1, February 1998, and *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya* (No. 11, Summer 1992).

I owe another debt, this one scholarly, to the friends and colleagues who commented on various parts of the book while in draft form. Special appreciation must go to the publisher's anonymous readers, whose comments on successive drafts were both useful and encouraging, if justifiably demanding. Husayn Agha and Ahmad Khalidi read the entire manuscript, Anne Enayat a much earlier draft of it, Rex Brynen Parts Three and Four, Paul Lalor an earlier version of the account up to 1970, Salim Tamari and Khalil Hindi the various chapters dealing with my analytical framework, the occupied territories, and PLO state-building in exile, and Fawwaz Trabulsi the penultimate draft chapters on the Lebanese conflict of 1975–6. Butrus Abu-Manneh, Qays Firro, Israel Gershoni, Ahmad Khalifa, Yossi Nevo, Roger Owen, Rosemary Sayigh, and Avi Shlaim all read the final version of the Introduction, Chapter One, and Conclusion. Moshe Shemesh commented on a combined draft of Chapters Four and Five, and provided me with documents and references relating to PLO–Egyptian relations in the mid-1960s, while Yossi Nevo and Lamia Radi shared their draft chapters on the Palestinian old elite with me. I also benefited from, and enjoyed, discussing the politics of patronage in the PLO with Rex Brynen and Palestinian political sociology with both him and Rosemary Sayigh, the Palestinian Left with Ahmad Khalifa and Khalil Hindi, the PLO experience in Lebanon with Fawwaz Trabulsi, Egyptian–PLO relations in 1964–7 with Moshe Shemesh, the origins of Palestinian nationalism with Ilan Pappé, and the definition of terrorism with Anat Kurz. It is my failing that I did not seek such scholarly assistance more extensively, and at an earlier stage, but I am deeply grateful for the detailed comments and constructive criticism that I did receive.

I owe one further scholarly debt, if unrelated to this book. This is to three teachers. Hanna Batatu, whose critical guidance at the American University of Beirut in 1979–81 prompted me to become a disciplined reader and encouraged my natural passion for social history, although the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 then set me on a different course altogether for many years. He honoured me way beyond my due or ability at that time by inviting me to collaborate with him on his major new research project on Syria, a task I would approach with great trepidation even now, but which I am proud to have been offered. Lawrence Freedman, my doctoral supervisor at King's College London in 1983–7, has always given me his unstinting endorsement. His genuine support, along with that (especially) of Robert O'Neill of All Souls' College, Oxford and my colleagues at the University of Cambridge, has done more than they know to remind me that there is yet an academic community which does not stop at ethnic boundaries. Last in chronological order, but by no means least otherwise, Roger Owen was not my teacher in the formal sense yet willingly commented on the doctoral thesis of someone to whom he had no personal tie or professional obligation, and has gone on doing so as a friend, host, and colleague ever since.

For a publisher to produce a book, especially one this size, takes conviction, if not courage. I am especially grateful to OUP editor Tim Barton, whose faith in the book remained unshaken over the years as my other commitments, requests from readers for changes, and my own sweeping revisions of narrative focus and conceptual framework imposed repeated delays. His task was ably completed by his successor, Dominic Byatt, assistant editor Sophie Ahmad and copy-editor Lynn Childress, and for their capable and friendly handling of the manuscript I am truly grateful.

My professional and scholarly acknowledgements are done, but two personal statements remain.

In its own way, first, this book is a tribute to those relatives and friends who contributed in various ways to the making of the history it contains. To my father Yusif, Johns Hopkins graduate and professor of economics who was head of the Syrian National Party branch in mandate Palestine and a key official of the Arab Higher Committee's national fund (Bayt al-Mal), until being taken prisoner of war by Israeli forces in 1948 and sent into permanent exile from his country of birth a year later; who has been a member of the Palestine National Council since the mid-1960s and of the PLO executive committee in 1968–74, established the PLO Planning Centre in 1968, and headed the Palestine National Fund in 1971–4; and who overcame his emotional and political misgivings to follow where intellectual reason led and do what he saw as his professional and national obligation, by leading the Palestinian delegation to the working group on economic development in the multilateral peace talks with Israel in 1992–3 and by negotiating the overall international assistance programme to the nascent Palestinian Authority following the signing of the Oslo accord. To my mother Rosemary, Somerville College (Oxford) graduate and sociologist who

made the Arab countries her home nearly five decades ago and accepted all that came with bearing children who saw themselves as Palestinian, but who was also much more, as a founding member of the 5th of June Society in 1967, as a pioneering researcher and author on Palestinian women and on gender and nationalism in the refugee camps, and always as a stubborn witness on behalf of the victims. From my parents I have learnt five things that, perhaps more than anything else, make me who I am: to be honest with myself, to regard all human beings as equal, to give my all in love and work, to be self-confident and self-reliant, and to be willing always to learn.

To my late uncle Fayiz, Georgetown University graduate and professor of political science who, as a member of the PLO executive committee and founder of its academic Research Centre in the mid-1960s, was the target of an abortive abduction scheme by the Israeli Mossad, before moving to New York and playing a critical role in the Arab diplomatic group at the United Nations until his death in 1980, and whose intricate memory for text I could never emulate. To my late uncle Munir, the American University of Beirut graduate and physician who rose at 5 a.m. to make the long journey from Beirut to the UNRWA clinics in the ʿAyn al-Hilwa and Miyya-wa-Miyya refugee camps near Sidon, every working day for the last 21 years of his life, and who helped pass on to me the Sayigh love for teasing. To my uncle Anis, Pembroke College (Cambridge) graduate and historian, who directed the PLO Research Centre in 1966–74 and in the process survived a Mossad rocket attack and a bombing before losing three fingers and part of his sight and hearing to a letter-bomb in 1972, but remains as defiant as ever, and who introduced me to the world of publishing and academic journalism and contributed hugely to my stamp collection. To my late grandfather, the reverend ʿAbdullah, who helped re-knit Palestinian social relations in exile through his church, who bore with fortitude the loss of my grandmother Afifa so soon after the forced exodus from Tiberias in 1948 and the loss of two sons in the next two decades, and who thoughtfully kept sweets in his jacket pocket for inquisitive grandchildren to discover. To my late uncle Tawfiq, American University of Beirut graduate and one-time Harvard student, teacher of Arabic literature at Cambridge and Berkeley, translator of T. S. Eliot, and most importantly poet, by whose intensity, romanticism, willingness to court controversy, and mischievous sense of humour I hope to have been influenced. To the late uncle I hardly knew, Fu'ad, another graduate of the American University of Beirut and an engineer, and to my uncle Michel, the mechanical supervisor, who helped separately to build another Arab country, Iraq. To aunt Mary, the unsung hero (and great cook) who abandoned hopes of a university education to be mother to her brothers after Afifa died. To my aunt Clemence, who carries on ʿAbdullah's work through her church, and who has my admiration for her indomitable cheerfulness in the face of adversity and also my thanks for taking us to see Tarzan films on Sunday. To Hilda, university lecturer in Arabic, and Arlene, Utah graduate, for believing and being willing to bear the price. I admire them all for keeping the

idea of Palestine alive, even though I regard myself firmly as a post-nationalist. It is in that spirit that I also offer this book to the second generation: my sister Joumana, brother Faris, and our cousins, all of whom took part in the struggle in one way or another, or tried to.

The book is a tribute, too, to two more families. To the Jabras, who took me into their home in Baghdad in 1974–5 as son and brother, but especially to Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, who flattered me immensely by incorporating some of my own brushes with life and death in one of his novels about Palestine, and who taught me how to make pickles. And to Aziz Halime, his parents, seven siblings, and grandmother who, like many other families in Shatila refugee camp and elsewhere, spent the first nine years after 1948 in a single tent and the next eight in the tin shack that replaced it, but who have never let the violence of others or the lack of means destroy their spirit.

There have been many victims in the conflict over Palestine, and all are equally deserving of sympathy and respect, as are those who have had to live most intimately with their loss. But it detracts nothing from this if, lastly, I pay a special tribute to those of my own friends who lived through the struggle, and to those who died in it. The living know who they are, but among the dead my special affection goes to Ahmad, Tony, Saʿd, George, ʿAtif, Samir and Gharam and their two children, ʿAli, Basim, and, in a parallel struggle, that of the kurds, Anwar. I have journeyed far since we first met, politically and intellectually, and some disagree with me (or would if they were still alive), but I am proud never to have lost their trust or friendship. They are as close to me now as then, and I love and miss them all.

To return to the beginning, finally, my thanks go to Liz, whose love and support accompanied the making of this book at every stage from inception to completion. I thank her for enduring my frequent absences with such good cheer, for giving me early critical input that did so much to improve my writing style, and for acting as a sounding board and helping me to see what I was trying to say on so many occasions. She may find it hard to believe, but it was her patience that helped me most. She will more certainly know what I mean when I say that it is through her that I have bridged my two cultural worlds, and that I have balanced my collective and individual persona. To her, and to our children Serine and Yusif, I additionally dedicate this book.

Cambridge Y.S.
May 1997

CONTENTS

Abbreviations xxvii
Glossary of Arabic Terms xxix
Maps xxxv
Genealogical Diagram xlii

Introduction: A Historical Framework 1

I. Searching for Palestine, 1949–1966 25

1. Why Palestinian Nationalism? The Social, Economic, and Political Context after 1948 35
2. Palestinians in Arab Uniform 58
3. Rebirth of the Palestinian National Movement 71
4. The Watershed 95
5. Challenges of the Armed Struggle 112

II. Years of Revolution, 1967–1972 143

6. Transforming Defeat into Opportunity 155
7. Carving out the Guerrilla Sanctuary 174
8. Guerrilla War in Theory and Practice 195
9. The Making of the Palestinian Political System 217
10. Dual Power 243
11. End of a Myth 262
12. Interregnum 282

III. The State-in-Exile, 1973–1982 319

13. At the Crossroads 329
14. The Lebanese Crisis 358
15. The Struggle for Lebanon 373
16. Ambition Frustrated, Sanctuary Preserved 392
17. A Ceasefire, Not a Truce 410
18. Rearguard Action 424
19. The 'Fakhani Republic' 447
20. Extending the State-in-Exile or Capturing It? 464

21. No Lull before the Storm 495
22. The Lebanon War 522

IV. Squaring the Circle: Statehood into Autonomy, 1983–1993 545

23. Assaulting the State-in-Exile from Within 551
24. Struggle Within, Struggle Without 574
25. Intifada to the Rescue 607
26. The Road to Oslo 638

Conclusion 663

Notes 693
Bibliography 843
Index 913

ABBREVIATIONS

AAL	Arab Army of Lebanon
ADF	Arab Deterrent Force
AHC	Arab Higher Committee
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
ANM	Arab Nationalists Movement
AOLP	Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
APG	All Palestine Government
ASAP	Arab Socialist Action Party
ASF	Arab Security Force
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
BSO	Black September Organization
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
DA	Democratic Alliance
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Fateh	Palestinian National Liberation Movement
Fateh-PC	Fateh-Provisional Command
Fateh-RC	Fateh-Revolutionary Command
Fida	Palestinian Democratic Movement
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale
GFTU	General Federation of Trade Unions
GiE	Government-in-Exile
GUPS	General Union of Palestine Students
Hamas	Islamic Resistance Movement
JCP	Jordanian Communist Party
LCAO	Lebanese Communist Action Organization
LNM	Lebanese Nationalist Movement
NA	National Alliance
NGC	National Guidance Committee
PAC	Palestinian Action Command
PASC	Palestine Armed Struggle Command
PCO	Palestinian Communist Organization
PCOL	Palestinian Communist Organization in Lebanon
PCP	Palestinian Communist Party
PCWP	Palestinian Communist Workers' Party
PDFLP	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PF–GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army

PLF	Palestinian Liberation Front
PLF/PLA	Popular Liberation Forces (Palestine Liberation Army)
PLF-PR	Palestine Liberation Front-Path of Return
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNF	Palestinian National Front
PNF	Palestine National Fund
PNLA	Palestinian National Liberation Army
PNO	Popular Nasirite Organization
POPL	Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
PPSF	Palestinian Popular Struggle Front
PRCS	Palestinian Red Crescent Society
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council
RPCP	Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party
RPFLP	Revolutionary Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
SLA	South Lebanon Army
UAC	Unified Arab Command
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UPO	Unified Palestinian Organization

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS

Abnaʾ Filastin fi al-Jamiʿa   Sons of Palestine at University

Abtal al-ʿAwda   Heroes of Return

Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya   Regiments of Lebanese Resistance

aliyah   ascension

ʿamal fidaʾi   guerrilla action

ʿamal jamahiri   mass action

amir   commander

amn al-mandubin   security of delegates (envoys abroad)

ansar   partisans

al-ʿaqlaniyyun   rationalists

ʿArab Filastin   Arabs of Palestine

ʿasabiyya   primordial allegiance

al-ʿAsifa   The Storm

aʿyan   notables

bidʿa   reprehensible innovation

bilad al-sham   lands of 'natural' Syria

al-Dawra al-Khassa   Special Course

dawrat taʾhil   qualification course

dawriyya mutarada   fugitive patrol

fard ʿayn   religious duty

fasaʾil   (guerrilla) groups

Fath al-Islam   Islamic Fateh

Fawj al-Tahrir al-Filastini   Palestinian Liberation Regiment

fawq al-sifr wa taht al-tawrit   above zero, but below entanglement

fazʿa   call to arms, alarm

fiʾat shaʿbiyya   popular categories (low-income social groups)

fidaʾiyyun   guerrillas, men of sacrifice

firqa   division among believers

fitna   dissension, dissent

Fursan Badr   Knights of Badr (the full moon)

al-Futuwwa   Youth

ghawarna   inhabitants of the Jordan Rift Valley

al-ghayb   esoteric knowledge

hadith discourse   sayings (of the Prophet)

halaqa (pl. halaqat)   circle

halhala   feebleness

hamula clan, extended family
al-Haraka al-Lubnaniyya al-Musanida li-Fath Lebanese Movement in Support of Fateh
Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami Islamic Jihad Movement
Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami—Bayt al-Maqdis Islamic Jihad Movement—House of the Holy
Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas) Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas)
Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-ʿArab Arab Nationalists Movement
Harakat al-Shabiba Youth Movement
Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (Fath) Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fateh)
harb al-tahrir liberation war
harb wiqaʾiyya preventive war
hashd massing
hasm ʿaskari military decision
Hayʾat Muqawamat al-Sulh maʿ Israʾil Committee for Resistance to Peace with Israel
hayʾat shaʿbiyya popular bodies
hizb (pl. ahzab) (political) party
idara mahaliyya local administration
ijmaʿ consensus
ilhaq subordination (to make into an appendage)
iltisaqiyya (subordinate) attachment
infilash lax organization
infitah opening up
al-inʿizal al-shuʿuri sensory isolation
inkimash contraction
intifada uprising
iqlim region
iqnaʿ persuasion
irtijal improvisation
islah reform, reconciliation
istiʿradiyya ostentation, demonstration
istizlam clientelism
al-Ittijah al-Islami Islamic Direction
izdiwajiyya duality
izdiwajiyyat al-sulta duality of power (or authority)
jabha musanida support front
Jabhat al-ʿAmal Action Front
Jabhat Filastin al-Muslima Muslim Palestine Front
Jabhat al-Qiwa al-Rafida li al-Hulul al-Istislamiyya Front of Forces Rejecting Capitulationist Solutions
Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya Palestinian Liberation Front

Jabhat Tahrir Filastin—Tariq al-ʿAwda   Palestine—Liberation Front—Path of Return
jahiliyya   age of ignorance (pre-Islam), non-Islamic society
al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya   Islamic Group
janah (pl. ajniha)   wing
janah munshaq   dissenting wing (faction)
Jaysh al-Inqadh al-ʿArabi   Arab Salvation Army
jaysh al-jihad al-muqaddas   Army of the Holy War
jiftlik   tax farm (in Ottoman empire)
jihad   holy war, struggle
Jihaz al-Amn wa al-Maʿlumat   Security and Information Apparatus
Jihaz al-Amn al-Muwahhad   Unified Security Apparatus
al-jihaz al-khas   special apparatus
al-jihaz al-sirri   secret apparatus
Kataʾib al-Fidaʾ al-ʿArabi   Battalions of Arab Sacrifice
Kataʾib Muhammad   Battalions of Muhammad
Katibat al-Haq   Battalion of Right
kayan   entity
khaliyya (pl. khalaya)   cell
khalkhala   undermining
al-Khidma al-Khassa   Special Service
khususiyya   characteristic
lajiʾ(-un)   refugee
lijan manatiq   regional (area) committees
al-Lijan al-Qawmiyya   National Committees
lijnat al-mutabaʿa   follow-up committee
al-Mafraza al-Filastiniyya   Palestinian Detachment
maghawir   commandos
al-majal al-ʿaskari al-khariji   external military sphere
majalisiyya   trend calling for power to 'popular councils'
al-majanin   madmen
Majd   Hamas intelligence arm
majlis shura   consultative council
majlis al-shuyukh   council of elders
majmuʿa   squad
al-Majmuʿa 16   Group 16
majmuʿat al-maghariba   Maghribi group
majmuʿat al-ruwwad   pioneers' group
Maktab al-Dabita al-Fidaʾiyya   Guerrilla Control Bureau
Maktab al-Irshad al-ʿAm   general guidance bureau
Maktab Shuʾun al-Urdun   Jordan Affairs Bureau
mantaqa (pl. manatiq)   area
marakiz qiwa   power centres
al-Markaz   The Centre

mazaj whim (temperament)
mihna strife
miskh freak
al-Mithaq al-Qawmi National Charter (pan-Arab)
al-Mithaq al-Watani National Charter (Palestinian)
Muʾassassat al-Ashbal wa al-Zahrat Lioncubs and Flowers Institution
mufawwad ʿam general delegate
Mufawwadiyyat al-Rasd al-Thawri Revolutionary Surveillance Directorate
Mufawwadiyyat al-Watan al-Muhtal Directorate for the Occupied Homeland
mujahid(un) holy warriors
al-Mujammaʿ al-Islami The Islamic Complex
mukhtar headman
Munazzamat al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiyya—Majd Democratic Front's Organization
Munazzamat Shabab al-Thaʾr Revenge Youth Organization
al-munfalishun the 'lax ones'
al-Muqawama al-Shaʿbiyya Popular Resistance
murshid ruhi spiritual guide
musayyir umur al-jaysh conductor of army affairs
mutakhazil capitulationist
mutamawwil capitalist
muwatin(-un) resident, citizen
muzayada outbidding, outdoing
al-Najjada The Sword-Bearers (youth movement in mandate Palestine, political party in Lebanon)
nakba catastrophe
naʿra iqlimiyya particularistic prejudice, regionalism
al-Nizam al-Dakhili Internal Statutes
al-Nizam al-Khas Special Order
qawaʿid bases
qawaʿid irtikaziyya (sing. qaʿidat irtikaz) secure support base
qawaʿid al-shuyukh sheikhs' bases
qawaʿid thawriyya revolutionary bases
qawm(-i, -iyya) national, nationalist
qishra crust
al-Qism al-Filastini Palestinian Section
qitaʿ sector
al-Oitaʿ al-Awsat Central Sector
al-Qitaʿ al-Gharbi Western Sector
Qitaʿ Nusur al-ʿArqub Eagles of ʿArqub Sector
al-qiyada al-markaziyya central leadership
qiyada yawmiyya daily command
qiyadat ʿamal action command

qiyadat al-dakhil inside command
qiyadat iqlim regional command
qutr(-i, -iyya) (pl. aqtar) country
al-Quwwa al-Mahmula Mounted Force
quwwat forces, brigade
Quwwat al-Ansar Partisan Forces
Quwwat al-Tahrir al-Shaʿbiyya Popular Liberation Forces
raqaba monitoring
ruh al-irtizaq mercenary spirit
Salafiyyun Fundamentalists
sanjaq district (in Ottoman empire)
Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami—Saja Companies of Islamic Jihad—Saja
al-sawaʿid al-ramiya the 'throwing arms'
sayf al-din sword of Islam
Shabab al-Aqsa Youth of the Aqsa
Shabab al-Thaʾr Revenge Youth
shahada martyrdom
shakhasiyyat ʿamma public figures
shariʿa Islamic law
shilaliyya cliquism
shirk polytheism
shuʿba (p. shuʿab) branch
al-Shuʿba al-Khassa Special Branch
Shuʿbat al-Taʿbiʾa wa al-Tawjih al-Maʿnawi Mobilization and Moral Guidance Branch
sifa asila lazima la tazul essential and undying feature
sigha formula
Sufiyyun The Sufis
Suhub al-Jahim Clouds of Fire
sulh reconciliation (peace)
sulta authority, power
sumud steadfastness
al-Tabligh wa al-Daʿwa Mission and Call
tadwil internationalization
tafakkuk disarticulation (coming apart)
al-tafjir al-mutasalsil consecutive, or successive detonation
tafrigh to place on the payroll
tafwid mandate
al-tafwid al-siyasi political guidance, commissariat
tahjim cutting down to size
Tahrir Filastin Liberation of Palestine
taʾifat al-ghadr treacherous community (sect)
Tajammuʿ ʿUlamaʾ Filastin Assembly of Jurists of Palestine
tajawuz(-at) excess

tajyish regularization (turning into an army)
tajdhir radicalization
takattulat factions, blocs
al-Takfir wa al-Hijra Proclamation of Unbelief and Exodus
takhabbut erratic behaviour
Tala'i' al-Fida' al-'Arabi li-Tahrir Filastin Vanguards of Arab Sacrifice for the Liberation of Palestine
Tala'i' Harb al-Tahrir al-Sha'biyya—Quwwat al-Sa'iqa Vanguards of Popular Liberation War—Thunderbolt Forces
al-Tanzim al-Sha'bi al-Filastini Palestinian Popular Organization
taqdis sanctification
ta'rib Arabization
tasaqut abandonment
ta'shish nesting
tashkik questioning (casting doubt)
tawajjuh kulli total orientation
al-tawrit al-wa'i conscious entanglement
tawtin resettlement
thawra revolution
umma community, nation
al-'Urwa al-Wuthqa Firmest Bond
usra nuclear family
vilayet province, state (Ottoman empire)
waqf endowment
al-waqi' al-fasid corrupt reality
waqi' al-iqtidar position of capability
watan(-i, -iyya) homeland, patria
wihda, (pl. wihdat) unit
al-Wihda Unity
wisaya tutelage
wujaha' elders, prominent figures
yishuv the Jewish community in mandate Palestine
zakat tithe
zawat the rich



MAP 1. Israel, West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the Arab 'confrontation' states, borders of 4 June 1967



MAP 2. Jordanian Conflict, 1970–71



MAP 3. The Lebanese Conflict and Syrian intervention, 1976



MAP 4. Beirut, 1976–82



MAP 5. Israeli Invasion of South Lebanon, March 1978



MAP 6. Israeli Invasion of Lebanon, 1982



MAP 7. Palestinian Civil War, Tripoli, November-December 1983

GENEALOGICAL DIAGRAM OF PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS





Arab Renaissance Party (Ba'th) 1947- (renamed Arab Socialist Renaissance Party 1952)
Society of Muslim Brothers 1928–
Palestinian Branch 1946-
National Liberation League 1949-1951
Palestinian Communist Organization (Gaza) 1948-1982
Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fateh) 1958-9–
Palestinian National Liberation Front (PNLF) 1959-1966
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 1961-1966 (also known as Path of Return)
(split into rival Syrian and Iraqi wings 1966)
Palestine Liberation Front–Path of Return (PLF–PR) 1966-1968
Palestine Liberation Army/Popular Liberation Forces (PLF/PLA)
Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) 1968-1971
Islamic Fateh 1969
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) 1969-
Ansar (Partisans) 1970-1972
Palestinian Communist Organization–Leninist Cadre (PCO–LC) 1971-1977
1971-1972
Palestinian Communist Organization (PCO) 1975-1982 (West Bank)
Sa'iqa – Corrective Movement 1976-1977
Fateh–Revolutionary Council 1974- (also known as Abu Nidal Faction)
Palestinian Communist Organization–Lebanon (PCOL) 1980-1982
Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) 1982-1990 (renamed Palestinian People's Party in 1991)
(Nominal merger of Fateh forces with Palestine Liberation Army to form Palestinian National Liberation Army in 1983)
Fateh–Provisional Command 1983-
Islamic Jihad Movement 1980-
Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party (RPCP-Syria and lebanon) 1983-
Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) 1987-
Islamic Jihad Movement-Bayt al-Maqdis (House of the Holy) 1986-
Palestinian Communist Party-Provisional Command (PCP-PC) 1987-
'Iz-al-Din al-Qassam Battalions

Introduction

A Historical Framework

Roots of Conflict

The 1947–8 war marked the end of a lengthy chapter in the conflict between Arab and Jew for possession of Palestine. Its roots lay in the emergence in the late nineteenth century of the European-based Zionist movement, which was dedicated to the establishment of a Jewish national homeland. Small numbers of Jews had already emigrated to Palestine from Russia and Yemen in previous decades for religious reasons, but the start of a second, politically motivated wave of immigration from Eastern Europe in 1903 aroused rumblings of discontent and resistance by Palestinian Arab peasants opposed to the loss of land and jobs to the Jewish settlers.[1] The Young Turks revolt of 1908 also ushered in a more prominent role for educated, urban-based Arabs, whose opposition to Zionism and to land sales to Jewish settlers was now expressed with increasing frequency and vigour in the local press, through new political associations, and at the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul.[2] The Ottoman authorities evinced little interest in passing or implementing stringent anti-immigration and anti-land sales laws by the outbreak of World War One, but Palestinian fears rose most dramatically following the formal commitment made in November 1917 by British foreign secretary Arthur Balfour to the establishment of a Jewish 'national home' in Palestine.

The Balfour Declaration was issued shortly after British forces had wrested control over southern Palestine from the Ottoman empire in World War One, and a month before British forces marched into Jerusalem. This came against the backdrop of the Arab revolt against Ottoman rule and the first stirrings of modern Arab nationalism. Instead of supporting Arab independence or federation at the end of the war, however, France and Britain won formal endorsement from the Allied powers conference at San Remo in April 1920 to establish their mandate over the Levant, and obtained ratification from the League of Nations in July 1922. The Palestinian Arabs were now governed by Britain and confronted with a Jewish state-in-the-making—the *yishuv*—and steadily intensified their resistance to both. Their opposition expressed itself graphically in 1920–1 and 1929, during which violent anti-Jewish riots occurred. Continued Jewish immigration, coupled with the emergence of a clear trend within the Zionist movement calling for the voluntary or compulsory 'transfer' of the

Arab population to make way for a Jewish state, led to a further escalation of violence from the mid-1930s.[3]

The first major challenge to British rule over Palestine and to the Zionist movement was mounted in late 1935 by a Syrian-born Muslim preacher, sheikh ʿIzz-al-Din al-Qassam, who had commenced the organization of clandestine military cells among peasants and rural migrants in the Haifa area possibly as early as 1925. An internal split shook the organization in 1929, while successful police action brought an initial series of attacks on Jewish and British targets in 1931–2 to an end, but Qassam resumed recruiting in 1934 until November 1935, when he resolved to relocate to the Jenin area and build a rural base for military operations. His death in the very first encounter with the police pre-empted the attempt, but his example and surviving members of the organization provided both a model and a catalyst for the widespread rebellion that unfolded after renewed incidents in April 1936.[4] The Great Revolt, as the Palestinians dubbed it, started with a six-month general strike in the urban population centres—for which the stage was additionally set by the earlier struggle of Arab workers against Hebrew labour—[5]and later spread into rural areas. At their peak, Palestinian mujahidin held control over much of the countryside and exerted considerable influence in the towns. However, organizational problems and political disunity afflicted the nationalist camp, as 'a broad alliance of peasants, workers and radical elements of the middle class . . . began to implement social and political programs that challenged *aʿyan* (notable) leadership of the nationalist movement and began to threaten the bases of mercantile-landlord dominance'.[6] Assessments of the military effectiveness of the mujahidin also vary widely, but in any case British might finally prevailed in 1939, following a counter-insurgency campaign in which 5,032 Palestinians died, 14,760 were wounded, and 50,000 were detained—of whom 2,000 received life sentences and 146 were hanged—and 5,000 homes were demolished in reprisals.[7] The flight to neighbouring Arab countries of families with the means to do so (numbering some 40,000 persons), extensive internecine killings, and the factionalism that extended from the landowning notables who formed the old elite to all levels of society also contributed heavily to the Palestinian defeat.[8]

The collapse of the revolt in 1939 was overshadowed by the outbreak of World War Two, during which Nazi Germany perpetrated its massive slaughter of the Jews and other peoples in Europe. In Palestine, meanwhile, the British army divided its attention between guarding against the threat of invasion by German or Vichy French forces and suppressing the Zionist military underground. The Palestinian leadership was decimated, its main figures in hiding outside the country or exiled to detention camps in remote parts of the British empire. Its demoralized followers effectively ceased to be a factor in the ongoing contest. The discovery of the full scale of the Holocaust led to a surge in Jewish immigration to Palestine after 1945, as public and government support for the Zionist cause increased among the Allies. British attempts to contain the

influx earned the opprobrium of its US officials and Jewish organizations, and provoked a terrorist campaign against British targets in Palestine by the militant Irgun Zvai Leumi and Lehi (Stern) organizations.

The British government faced an impossible situation by 1947. It could no longer control the Jewish community, nor prevent civil strife with the Palestinians. Responding to the impasse, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 181 in November, in which it ended the British mandate and supported the partition of Palestine into two independent states: one Jewish and one Arab. Each state was to occupy a little under half the territory, leaving Jerusalem in an enclave under UN supervision. The Zionist movement welcomed the partition plan, although its leader, David Ben-Gurion, confided to his followers that the arrangement could not be final, 'not with regard to the regime, not with regard to borders, and not with regard to international agreements'.[9] For their part, the Palestinian leaders rejected the UN partition plan outright, refusing to sign away the right to sovereignty over any part of the country. The principal figures were in exile, however, and their military and political preparations were bedevilled by unceasing factionalism and personal rivalries.[10]

Arab–Jewish confrontation was now inevitable. The British moved largely to the sidelines following the UN vote, and reduced their military contingent in anticipation of the end of the mandate on 15 May 1948. Zionist forces and Palestinian mujahidin meanwhile waged a bitter contest for control over the main communications routes. The Palestinian blockade against Jewish settlements tightened in February and March, but Zionist preponderance in trained manpower, armament, and organization now told. The shortage of combat material, disorganization, and factional rivalries took the mujahidin to the point of collapse in April, during which several cities and towns fell to the Zionists, causing the flight of 200,000–300,000 inhabitants in all. With their national leadership still in exile in Damascus, the Palestinians were in such disarray that they were no longer capable of exerting any real influence on Arab policy, let alone setting up the state called for in the UN resolution.

The Arab governments had largely withheld from the conflict so far, limiting their contribution to the formation of a small irregular force under the command of the League of Arab States. They planned to intervene militarily after the end of the British mandate, in order to secure the areas designated by the UN partition plan for the Palestinian state. Egyptian, Jordanian, Iraqi, Syrian, and Lebanese contingents commenced their entry to Palestine on 15 May, shortly after the leadership of the *yishuv* had declared the unilateral independence of the State of Israel. The Arab military effort was hamstrung by the conflicting agendas of the governments concerned, however, and the Arab forces were pushed back in most sectors. By the end of October Israel had expanded its territory to include 78 per cent of mandate Palestine, in the process of which around 500,000 more Palestinians became refugees.

Although Israeli 'clearing' operations against Palestinian villages in border

areas were to continue for another eight months, the majority of the refugees had lost their homes by the end of October 1948. Of the original 900,000–950,000 Palestinian inhabitants of the areas that were incorporated into the State of Israel, only 150,000 remained. The rest had been expelled or fled to what came to be known as the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, or crossed the borders to what was to become a permanent refuge in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Another 100,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and 60,000 in the Gaza Strip had not lost their homes, but were separated from their fields on the other side of the armistice line and were subsequently described as 'economic refugees'.[11] Responsibility for the refugees had become a matter of increasing contention between Israel and its Arab neighbours during the summer, and on 11 December the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 194, that effectively confirmed their right to return without undue delay or, if they preferred, to receive compensation.

The armistice negotiations between Israel and each of its Arab neighbours dominated the scene after January 1949, but the fate of the refugees remained high on the list of priorities for the representatives of the UN and the Great Powers, especially the US. The final collapse of the UN-sponsored conciliation talks at Lausanne in August left the issue unresolved, but removed it from the immediate political agenda. On 8 December, the UN General Assembly authorized the transformation of the committee that had been providing emergency relief for over a year into the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). On 1 May 1950, UNRWA assumed responsibility for channelling international assistance to the 726,000 refugees on its registers.[12] Arguments have raged ever since over the responsibility of the various protagonists, both for engineering the mass flight and for dealing with its human consequences. Whatever the rights and wrongs, uprooting and dispersal on such a scale constituted a collective trauma of immense, devastating proportions. To the Palestinians, the outcome of the 1947–8 war was known simply as 'the catastrophe' (*al-nakba*). The salvation of the Jews had come at the expense of another people, and in that tragic encounter were laid the seeds for another 45 years of bitter and unremitting conflict. The revival of the Palestinian national movement was now to take place within the framework of three circles of political interaction: Palestinian, Arab, and international.

The Palestinian Circle: Patriotism in Search of State

The fate of the Palestinians ran directly counter to the general trend towards the emergence of new national states among Arab and other peoples, as former colonial empires dissolved. This divergence was rooted in developments that had taken place since the Ottoman defeat in World War One. Previous administrative boundaries were largely superseded as Britain and France redrew the political map of the region. Their design was endorsed by the newly founded

League of Nations, which decreed that the former Ottoman provinces were to gain independence after their inhabitants had been prepared for self-government by the victorious powers. Out of the wider administrative units of which Palestine had also been a part, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan came into being as separate constitutional entities in 1920–1 and all had attained formal independence by 1946 (when Transjordan was renamed Jordan).

Until the entry of British forces to Palestine in 1917, the northern areas of Acre and Nablus had belonged to the Ottoman province (*vilayet*) of Beirut, while the centre and most of the south formed the separate district (*sanjaq*) of Jerusalem under the direct authority of Istanbul.[13] Palestine was known by then as a distinct geographic region, but did not exist as a single administrative unit, let alone a political one; yet neither did post-war Syria, Lebanon, or Transjordan. The crucial difference in the case of Palestine was that Britain was committed to the establishment of a Jewish national home, a commitment reiterated in the mandate granted to it by the League of Nations in 1922. The mandate echoed the Balfour Declaration's pledge that 'nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities', but made no provision for self-government by the Palestinian Arabs, whose claims to have such a right in accordance with the covenant of the League of Nations were consistently rejected by the British government and by the other members of the Permanent Mandates Commission.[14] British attitudes were reflected in the relatively low level of Arab participation allowed in the public administration. Arabs formed 88 per cent of the population of mandate Palestine but accounted for only 60 per cent of all civil service posts in 1925, for example. The Muslims, who accounted for 78 per cent of the population and provided the main social and political leadership of the Arab community, moreover accounted for only 29 per cent of posts, while all top positions were held exclusively by British officials.[15] The proportion rose by the mid-1930s, but even then Arabs accounted for 70 per cent of classified regular employees, and Jews for 30 per cent.[16]

British policy and Zionist ambition meant that the context for the political development of Palestinian society after World War One differed fundamentally from that provided by the emerging national states in neighbouring Arab territories. In the latter, the 'boundaries of [the] colonial state and its administrative structures defined the arena in which most of the political life now took place'.[17] Resistance to the newly formed central governments was often strong among social forces seeking to preserve established political and economic privileges, but the superior military capability of the mandate authorities and their ability to manipulate the allocation of resources and office (as means of reward or punishment) invariably decided the outcome. Similarly, while loyalties to the clan, sect, or other local solidarity and to wider Islamic and Arab identity survived, they operated increasingly within the framework of the territorial state. The state was moreover cast as the repository of a new national identity, a process actively encouraged by the established elites that

strove, with European support, to consolidate their social control within their new boundaries.[18] In this process lay the makings of country nationalism or state patriotism.

The Arab and Palestinian experiences of state-building diverged almost completely. Any commitment by Britain to establish constitutional government or a colonial state in Palestine was to the Jewish community, not the Arab. In 1922, the mandate authorities proposed the election of a mixed Jewish–Arab legislative council as a means of devolving responsibility for communal affairs, but remained opposed to Palestinian statehood. This contrasted with their support for the formation of 'an appropriate Jewish Agency' to assist in the establishment of the 'Jewish National Home', and with their recognition in 1926 of Knesset Israel, the parliament of the *yishuv* that had been founded six years earlier.[19] The World Zionist Organization had already been explicitly recognized in the League of Nations mandate and proceeded to set up the Jewish Agency in 1929, which was henceforth treated by the British as effectively the government of the *yishuv*.[20] For their part the Palestinians rejected the British proposal of 1922 completely, arguing that the council would be powerless to prevent the establishment of a Jewish national home.[21] This stand was taken by the Palestinian Arab Congress, an assembly that convened seven times between 1919 and 1928, and that elected an Arab Executive. The latter body enjoyed the de facto recognition of the mandate authorities, which it studiously avoided challenging directly, for instance by setting up a parallel administration.

The British were primarily interested in maintaining law and order, and so they tolerated the nationalist camp so long as it was seen to observe this requirement.[22] At the same time they nurtured alternative bodies as potential rival claimants for leadership and the power to dispense political patronage within the Arab community, such as the Supreme Muslim Council, established in 1922 and headed by the British-appointed mufti, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni. Seeking to restore its position, the Congress resolved in June 1928 to attain a representative council and authorized its main leaders, Musa Kazim al-Husayni and his long-standing rival Raghib al-Nashashibi, to open negotiations with the British High Commissioner towards this end, but the outbreak of riots in August 1929, in which the ambitious young Amin played an important part, conclusively derailed the tentative agreement they had reached. This signalled the start of the parallel radicalization of Palestinian nationalist politics, and the decline of the 'older politicians' and matching rise of the 'younger politicians' of the old elite, a transition reflected in the rejection in 1935 of a new British proposal to elect a legislative council.[23] The most significant shift in British policy came in July 1937, when the Peel Commission, which was set up to investigate the Palestine problem in the wake of the 1936 revolt, recommended partitioning the country into two states. The Arab state would occupy some 80 per cent of the land, but the exclusion of Jerusalem (which would remain under permanent British mandate) and the suggested merger

with Transjordan under the rule of amir ʿAbdullah prompted categorical Palestinian rejection.[24]

Britain had come close to accepting Palestinian statehood, but was met with the unyielding demand for an Arab government over the whole of the country. The renewal of the Palestinian revolt prompted the British government to go much further in its official White Paper of May 1939, in which it proposed a unitary state and full independence after ten years (subject to 'such relations between the Arabs and the Jews as would make good government possible'), coupled with severe limitations on Jewish immigration and landownership. The Palestinian leadership represented by the Arab Higher Committee again rejected this offer, at the urging of Amin al-Husayni, although the rival Nashashibi camp came out in favour and opinion among the general public and even within the committee itself was distinctly positive.[25] Husayni's stance was the result of a mixture of factors, including the desire for unconditional independence at the end of the transitional period, divergence among the Arab states (that had taken part in the negotiations with Britain), and the militancy of both the mujahidin commanders, who demanded complete independence, and the younger generation of educated activists, who tended to a more radical pan-Arab nationalism. Husayni attempted to retract his opposition after the failure of attempts to revive the revolt, but to little avail. The initiative now passed to the Zionist movement, which devoted its main effort for the next eight years to recruiting and absorbing new settlers and to defeating British rule over Palestine. Zionist opposition may have doomed the White Paper from the very start, but the Palestinians had, through their own reactions, lost the opportunity to enter the mandatory administration at higher levels and prepare for their own post-colonial state. The price they paid was increased social dislocation and political disorganization.

The detention or exile of the main Palestinian leadership in the course of the revolt magnified the disarray of their society. The local economy had undergone profound change since the Ottoman reforms of the mid-nineteenth century, that had led to the formation of an elite of landowning and office-holding notables, many of whom increased their economic wealth and social status by engaging in commerce or by deriving rent from religious endowments. From their ranks came 'older politician' Musa Kazim al-Husayni, who was appointed by the British military government as mayor of Jerusalem in 1918 and presided over the Arab Congress until his death in 1934, 'younger politician' Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, who was appointed mufti by the British high commissioner in 1921 and led the nationalist camp from 1936 until 1948, and the other senior figures in Palestinian politics of the period. Yet the absence of a 'colonial' state and their limited integration into the centralized, territorially-based system of British administration deprived them of a framework within which to compete and assert their social control. The structural basis to overcome the continued fragmentation of Palestinian society into competing patronage networks did not exist.[26]

Factionalism was a natural result, as politics divided broadly between Musa Kazim al-Husayni and his main rival, wealthy landowner Raghib al-Nashashibi, preventing the Congress from reconvening after 1928. The search for alternatives produced a proliferation of political parties, trade and labour unions, and other associations, but many simply transferred old politics to new vehicles and continued to embody elite rivalries.[27] The British decision in 1937 to outlaw the Arab Higher Committee—which had been formed by Amin al-Husayni, Nashashibi, and the leaders of the five Arab parties in April 1936 to fill the vacuum left by the demise of the Arab Congress and its Arab Executive (and by the death of Musa Kazim al-Husayni)—and to banish its members ended the role of the parties.[28] Attempts by local activists to revive the Arab Higher Committee in 1942 and 1947 were fiercely resisted by the exiled Husayni, who feared both that they would accept the British White Paper and that in doing so they would replace him in national leadership.[29]

Partly for these reasons, the modern middle class that grew rapidly in the inter-war years tended to coalesce internally on the basis of religion and place of origin.[30] The economic pressures resulting from the worldwide depression, coupled with the resort of the old elite to nationalist appeals to shore up its authority, weakened any tendency to organize on the basis of occupational or corporate group.[31] Besides, mandate legislation passed in 1929–30 deprived local entrepreneurs of any protection from British businessmen, who were granted completely equal commercial status in the country. The Arab middle class (and the nascent working class, for that matter) was further weakened by Jewish competitors, who had better access to European capital and skills and generally won a disproportionate share of jobs with foreign companies operating the international concessions granted by the mandate authorities.[32] The middle class faced additional competition from members of the old elite, who held what high-ranking civil service posts were open to Arabs (and many lower posts too) and utilized their advantages to engage actively in the economic enterprises that burgeoned during the war years. In contrast to their behaviour in other colonial states, the British did not direct key resources or official posts to the middle class in order to co-opt it and help establish its social control. Elsewhere in the former Ottoman provinces these social forces were actively groomed to assume government after independence, but not so in Arab Palestine. The political, if not numerical, weakness of the middle class was also evident in the late appearance and limited political impact of the modern, ideologically-based parties, which had only a modest following at best.

Besides leaving the Palestinians unable to protect their economic interests, the lack of state deprived them of the opportunity to develop traditions and institutions of self-rule. It had equally significant implications for the development of national identity, which could not be embodied in a single, recognized body. The Palestinian leadership was impeded in its attempt to cultivate a country nationalism or state patriotism, in contrast to its counterparts in neigh-

bouring Arab countries or, for that matter, to the Jewish Agency, which enjoyed para-statal authority within the *yishuv*.[33] This is not to deny that opposition to British rule and the Zionist threat formed a powerful common bond. Rather it is to stress that, in the continuing absence of an overarching political structure, Palestinian-ism remained only one of several strands of identity that Palestinians operated varyingly as the situation required.[34] It was subsumed within a broader anti-colonial patriotism, along with clan, place of origin, religion, and Arab (or pan-Syrian) ethnicity.

The absence of a 'consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity' thus removed an important component of Palestinian proto-nationalism.[35] The Congress used the terms 'Palestine' and 'Palestinian' to describe the land and its Arab inhabitants, for example, but equally regarded the country as the southern extension of *bilad al-Sham*, or natural Syria.[36] Leading members of the old elite, most prominent of whom was 'older politician' Musa Kazim al-Husayni, also welcomed union with other Arab provinces of the former Ottoman empire under the leadership of king Husayn of Hijaz, while 'younger politician' Amin al-Husayni similarly portrayed the Palestine problem as part of the wider Islamic cause. Other leading notables just as readily favoured union with Transjordan, as Raghib al-Nashashibi did privately in 1937 (and West Bank congresses did publicly in 1948).[37] This is not to deny that the 'older politicians'—and subsequently, and in varying degrees, a growing number of the 'younger politicians' too—consciously sought a particularistic, Palestinian territorial framework after 1918–20. Rather, it is to suggest that their political preferences were shaped more by the actual or prospective impact on their economic wealth, social status, and political power of the specific manner in which Britain and France disposed of the former Ottoman territories, than by any attempt to preserve the notional integrity of the idea of 'Palestine'.[38] Even the rising ideologically-based parties, to which members of the modern middle class tended, oscillated between identities—working class, pan-Arab, pan-Syrian, and Islamic—within which they subsumed or explained their Palestinian patriotism.

These political conceptions were, of course, neither uniform nor static. The Congress and 'older politicians' of the old elite called frankly for 'Arab government' in June 1928, but by this they meant the exercise of autonomy by the Arab community within the political framework and territory of British mandate Palestine. Amin al-Husayni, conversely, remained ambivalent towards particularistic, territorial Palestinian nationalism and continued to appeal to wider, pan-Arab and Islamic affiliations even after Britain offered tangible gains in the form of the Peel recommendations of 1937 and the White Paper of 1939. Hardly lacking in pragmatism, he nonetheless adopted a hardline stance in order, largely, to secure his personal leadership of the nationalist camp in the face of challenges from the middle class 'radicals' of the main urban-based political parties, the mujahidin commanders in the countryside, and the ever-present Nashashibi wing. Indeed, the tendency to approach the national

question in terms of communal interests (and, implicitly, those of elite or class) was not to give way to a territorial definition until 1946–7, when the British announcement of the imminent end of the mandate and the publication of the UN partition plan prompted both Jews and Arabs to think practically in terms of areas of control and thus to 'territorialize' their claims.

By then the power and durability of the state were there for all to see, whether individual Palestinians preferred a localized version of it or a much broader one. It provided the conceptual and practical framework within which the neighbouring Arab societies had been reconstituted since 1920–1, with considerable success. The Congress had not once demanded separate Palestinian statehood between 1919 and 1928 (preferring a unitary Arab state), but the unanimity of the activists who rebuilt the national movement after 1948, concerning the need for an 'entity' (*kayan*) and the presumed role it could play in preserving Palestinian identity, confirms the extent to which the territorial state had become a fundamental political construct. That said, since the Palestinians did not see themselves as essentially different from other Arabs in terms of culture, language, and religion, their nationalism after 1948 might indeed be defined as patriotism in search of state.[39]

The problem was that the 1947–8 war had all but destroyed the social, economic, and territorial basis for potential Palestinian statehood. A new elite could not replace an old one and assert its own imprint on state-building, unlike other societies in which external forces had also induced 'rapid and universal dislocation'.[40] Not only were these social forces among the majority of Palestinians who became refugees, but they could no longer seek to establish their social control within a common political and economic framework. By the same token the absence of a common political economy, fragmentation within disparate host contexts, and, equally importantly, the lack of a state structure, impeded the emergence of the associations of civil society (other than those based on kinship). It was this collective uprooting that set the Palestinian experience apart from virtually any other in the post-colonial era. A close comparison was arguably with Algeria, where from 1840 the French sought wholesale colonization, depriving the Muslim inhabitants of much of their land and prompting many into outward migration.[41] France was willing to allow local landowning notables some political and administrative function in order to help rule the native population, but had no intention of constructing an Algerian version of the colonial state.[42] Yet in sharp contrast to the Palestinian Arabs, the vast majority of Algerians remained within a single social, economic, and political 'space' throughout their struggle for independence, French settler colonialism notwithstanding.

The Arab Circle: Palestine in Arab Politics

The development of Palestinian society, economy, and politics—and therefore of Palestinian nationalism—in the mandate period can only be fully understood

if attention is also paid to their interaction with the British authorities and the Jewish community, at all levels and not always in unidimensional conflict. However, by placing all but the small minority of Palestinians who remained in Israel under Arab rule, whether in neighbouring countries or in the West Bank and Gaza, the uprooting and dispersal of 1947–9 ruptured this relational context and reordered it for the large majority. Consequently it was the Arab environment that provided the primary context for the evolution of Palestinian politics after 1948, rather than direct confrontation with the army, administration, and population of the foreign 'colonial' power. Israel was indisputably important as a defining focus of Palestinian nationalism, but it performed this function as a remote, impersonal target, at least until 1967, when it seized the West Bank and Gaza. Until then its inner social workings and political processes remained unknown to most Palestinians, and to all but the intelligence services of neighbouring Arab states. Besides, in Palestinian thinking after 1948 to know Israeli society and politics was not only to acknowledge the Zionist enterprise in Palestine, but also to legitimize it.[43] Much the same could be said of the attitude of most Israeli parties towards the Palestinians, but the point is that it was the encounter with Arab states and societies that exerted the most powerful influence on the 'world outlook' of Palestinian activists. They ultimately made their own choices regarding ideological and organizational models, but the means of struggle, timing, and opportunities available to them were largely determined by developments in the wider Arab context.

By the same token, the Palestinian exodus and the establishment of Israel introduced a new factor to Arab politics. This was especially true for the four 'confrontation' states—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon—which were still in their 'immediate post-independence' phase of government.[44] The 1947–8 war coincided with the start of a period of severe domestic instability. Nine changes of government in Egypt followed, starting with the assassination of prime minister Mahmud Nuqrashi in December 1948 and ending with the Free Officers *coup* that overthrew the monarchy in July 1952. Elected government in Syria gave way to military rule in March 1949, after which the post of president changed hands five times by 1954. In Jordan a plot by colonel ʿAbdullah al-Tal in 1948–9 was foiled, but king ʿAbdullah was assassinated in July 1951; his grandson Husayn, who ascended to the throne in 1952 after a brief regency, pre-empted another purported plot in April 1957. Lebanon also suffered an attempted *coup* in 1949, the assassination of prime minister Riyad al-Sulh in July 1951, and the forced resignation of president Bishara al-Khuri in September 1952.

However, these challenges arose from the struggle to define the nature of the post-independence states, rather than from events in Palestine or the desire to confront Israel. It was 'struggles over power, leadership, ideology, identity, and economy policy', within and among Arab states, that 'determined the framework for coping with the conflict'.[45] Arabs felt genuine sympathy for the Palestinian refugees and deep hostility to the Zionist interlopers, reflected in riots and mob violence against Jewish communities and property in several Arab

capitals. Yet their governments understood that conflict with Israel involved vital state interests and could entail severe consequences. They faced daunting problems as they sought to overcome social divisions, mobilize capital (both local and foreign) for economic investment, and expand the bureaucratic and military institutions required to attain development and security. Their view, if anything, was that Israel was an aggressive state against which they needed to defend themselves. To launch or invite war with it could only increase the already heavy burden on their societies and economies. Arab policy towards the Palestine problem could not be activist, therefore, and in all cases required careful management.

Crucially, this was the outlook not only of the ruling coalitions of old land-owning elites and liberal nationalists who had emerged from the colonial phase to lead the post-independence states, but also of the officers who seized power in several Arab countries in the decade after 1948. Most of the leading putschists had taken part in the Arab military effort in Palestine, yet (except in the Jordanian case) the perception that their political leaders had been largely to blame for the defeat at Israeli hands was only a contributory factor, not a principal one, in the decision to mount a *coup d'état*. For most officers the primary quest was for social justice and redistribution of wealth, economic and administrative reform, and the dismantling of the liberal parliamentary politics inherited from the colonial era, which they considered to be controlled by corrupt and self-serving elites. The loss of Palestine, to the extent that it shaped their political outlook, reinforced the conviction that their foremost task was to remove the allies of colonialism within their own societies. Indeed, conflict with Israel would not only distract them from that task, but might even allow the colonial powers to restore their former clients. Jamal ʿAbd-al-Nasir put this aptly by explaining that the Free Officers who overthrew the monarchy in 1952 did so in response to events in Egypt, not Palestine, and that Egypt would suffer a similar fate unless it resisted domination by outside forces and their local allies.[46]

The military regimes of Egypt and Syria proved to be as anxious as the post-independence governments of Jordan and Lebanon to avoid war with Israel. Syrian strongman Husni al-Zaʿim secretly offered a peace agreement and the resettlement in his country of 300,000 Palestinian refugees during his brief tenure in 1949.[47] His overthrow and execution in August closed this chapter, but Adib al-Shishakli, who seized power in yet another *coup* in December, proved to be far less nationalist than his rhetoric suggested. His flirtation with former colonial power France and suspected ties with the US made him the target of an assassination attempt in October 1950, and he later established contact with Israeli representatives following his final fall from power in 1954.[48] King Faruq of Egypt was more restrained, but his delegation to the armistice talks in Rhodes in 1949 also expressed the desire for peaceful relations with the Jewish state.[49] The Free Officers who overthrew him three years later at first curtailed the propaganda war against Israel and undertook tension-reducing

measures along the armistice lines. Nasir, who assumed leadership in March 1954, responded positively, if cautiously, to a secret overture from Israeli prime minister Moshe Sharett and authorized a continuing exchange of messages and signals into 1956.[50] The president of mandate Lebanon, Emile Edde, met Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann in 1937, and the Maronite Christian patriarch signed a secret agreement with the Zionist leadership in 1946, although the first president of post-independence Lebanon, Bishara al-Khuri, failed to follow their lead.[51] Jordan's king ʿAbdullah had also maintained contact with the Zionist leadership from an early stage (starting in 1922), as had his brother Faysal before him, and pursued private negotiations with Israel until his assassination in July 1951.

State-building was the central process and core objective of Arab politics. The emergence of the Middle East as a distinct international relations subsystem in the post-independence period added new dimensions and arenas of interaction, but state-building remained a primary determinant of the manner in which Arab governments interacted with each other and conducted foreign policy in general. Arab unity or federation had been mooted by various parties since the onset of World War One, but when the League of Arab States was established in May 1945, its founders made respect for the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the former colonial states they had inherited a sine qua non for membership. Seven Arab countries had gained independence by the mid-1940s—the four 'confrontation' states, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen—but their basic disinclination towards unity and concern for self-preservation were broadly shared by the other newly independent member states that joined the League in subsequent years.

Jealous attachment to sovereignty stemmed from the fragile foundations of certain Arab states, and from genuine anxiety about the intentions of neighbours. Syrian refusal to recognize the complete separation of Lebanon following independence in 1943 was a case in point, reflected in a 'fraternal' agreement that an exchange of diplomatic missions was unnecessary. King ʿAbdullah arguably aroused the greatest contention. He had hoped to extend his dominion over 'greater Syria' (to include Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine) since becoming emir of Transjordan in 1920, and considered incorporating Iraq as well following the death in 1933 of its monarch, his brother Faysal, and again in 1951.[52] Some Syrian politicians similarly supported a union between their country and Hashemite-led Iraq, among them colonel Sami al-Hinnawi, who held power in August–December 1949.[53]

King Faruq saw ʿAbdullah's ambition as a direct challenge to Egyptian regional leadership, however. He aligned himself with the dynasty of ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Ibn Saʿud, who had driven the Hashemites out of Hijaz in 1925 in the process of unifying modern Saudi Arabia. Having taken control of Mecca, the Saudis regarded themselves as the natural spiritual leaders of the Islamic world, and opposed subsequent attempts by ʿAbdullah (and Faysal) to revive and lay claim to the Caliphate, which Turkish leader Kemal Ataturk had

abolished in 1924. The challenge to the borders drawn by the colonial powers was dramatically revealed upon ʿAbdullah's assassination. Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Saʿid made a bid to bring Jordan under the Hashemite throne of Iraq, Egypt agitated for Palestinian independence, calling in effect for a League of Arab States mandate over the West Bank, while the Saudi legation in Amman advocated annexation of northern Jordan to Syria and the south to Saudi Arabia.[54]

The Arab regional order that emerged in the mid-1940s was therefore characterized not by harmony and the striving for unity, but by rivalry and shifting alliances. Contrary to the argument presented in many academic analyses, however, the tendency towards 'balancing' and 'bandwagoning' politics and the striving of some Arab states for regional leadership were not primarily driven by ideology, self-image, and the accompanying search for legitimacy, nor driven by perceptions of power and external threats. Rather, domestic variables—including political and social factors and the struggle to define and master the new states, but also the structure of their national economies—and the constant quest for financial solvency have been equally important in shaping the foreign policy of many Arab states since 1945. This was reflected in the construction of alliances or adoption of stances that might be rewarded by the global powers or other Arab states with budgetary assistance, development aid, and other forms of credit.[55] On the eve of the end of the British mandate in Palestine, such considerations tangibly affected the calculations of leaders and governments in the handful of Arab states that had already gained full, formal independence and which remained highly dependent on the political goodwill and military support of the former colonial powers, if not also on their financial subventions.

That such considerations, rather than genuine commitment to the cause of Palestine or pan-Arab unity, determined Arab policy was demonstrated most effectively by the 1947–8 war, which was the first major test of the League of Arab States. Reluctance to commit major resources to the conflict and mutual distrust provoked constant disputes over diplomacy and strategy, leading to incessant behind-the-scenes manoeuvring, half-hearted and poorly conceived military intervention, and, ultimately, defeat on the battlefield. Only ʿAbdullah came away with territorial gains, partly thanks to the secret understanding he had reached with the Zionist leadership for the partition of Palestine prior to May 1948. Whatever their divisions, the Arab states were equally at pains to contain the Palestinian leadership and prevent it from exercising an independent political or military option. The League set up a special military committee to oversee the war effort in Palestine, which not only formed the irregular Arab Salvation Army (*Jaysh al-Inqadh al-ʿArabi*) as a counter to the Arab Higher Committee's Army of Holy War (*Jaysh al-Jihad al-Muqaddas*), but, in conjunction with the Arab governments, also prevented thousands of volunteers from joining either force.[56] For similar reasons, the League ignored strong pleas from Husayni in February 1948 against intervention by the regular Arab armies and

for the appointment of Palestinian military governors for the country, and declined his request for a loan to cover the administrative expenses of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC).[57]

Conflicting agendas and the desire not to relinquish the political reins to the Palestinians also led the Arab leaders to disregard proposals to set up a Palestinian state in any part of the country under their control. Husayni and the AHC had first considered setting up a shadow government in Palestine in early 1947, and made direct appeals to the League of Arab States in October and December for the establishment of a local administration (*idara mahalliyya*). Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were supportive, but unwilling to override the opposition of Jordan and Iraq.[58] Undeterred, the AHC proposed to the League of Arab States in February 1948 that Palestine be declared an independent state on 15 May, the day the British mandate was scheduled to end. The AHC also envisaged the establishment of a national assembly, and put Palestinian civil servants in the British-run administration on notice to be ready to resume their duties under a new, Arab government.[59] These proposals were unequivocally rejected by the Arab states, however. British pressure was a factor, as was Arab, including Egyptian, ambivalence towards Husayni.[60]

Only after Arab forces had suffered severe military setbacks did the League's Council of Ministers approve the formation of a ten-man 'civilian administration' in Palestine in July. This body was to be headed by the only AHC member still in the country, Ahmad Hilmi ʿAbd-al-Baqi, military governor of Jerusalem. The implicit Arab intention was to prevent ʿAbdullah from annexing the territories that his forces held in central Palestine.[61] The Council relented under continuing pressure from the AHC, and on 23 September the civilian administration was allowed to reconstitute itself as the All Palestine Government (APG), based in Gaza and again headed by ʿAbd-al-Baqi. The APG convened a national assembly of appointed delegates a week later, at which the establishment of a democratic, sovereign state over the whole of Palestine was declared.[62] This went well beyond Arab (and Egyptian) intentions, but the APG was now nominally entitled to appoint representatives to the League's Council and other bodies. During the three weeks of its existence in Gaza, the APG also decided to revive the Army of Holy War (the irregular forces formed by the AHC a year earlier), issued 14,000 Palestinian passports to local inhabitants, and designated an official delegation to the UN, although it had been recognized by only five Arab states, and not by the world body.[63]

The Arab decision to approve the formation of the APG was taken in the face of Jordanian opposition, and stemmed substantially from the desire to confront ʿAbdullah.[64] As importantly, it reflected the desire to abdicate responsibility for Palestine, and to provide some means of justifying the withdrawal of Arab armies without provoking a public outcry.[65] However, the Israeli offensive launched in the south on 15 October drove the Egyptian forces into a small pocket around Gaza, and effectively sealed the fate of the APG. Husayni, who had defied an Egyptian ban to enter Gaza on 27 September, was returned less

than two weeks later under armed escort to Cairo, where his activities were kept under strict control.[66] ʿAbd-al-Baqi and the APG ministers soon followed him into enforced exile, and were banned from visiting Gaza subsequently. ʿAbdullah, for his part, responded to the establishment of the APG by convening two carefully stage-managed congresses of West Bank notables and civil servants in October and December 1948, that called for unity with Jordan under his leadership. The Jordanian military administration in the West Bank was replaced by civilian rule from Amman in March 1949. Palestinians were brought into the cabinet in May, and took part in general elections for a new parliament in April 1950. On 24 April the lower and upper houses approved an Act of Union bringing the West Bank under Hashemite rule.[67] ʿAbdullah's Arab rivals protested vehemently, but maintained their studious boycott of the APG, which was consistently excluded from meetings of the League Council in following years despite its repeated complaints.

The International Circle: The Great Powers and the Middle East

Arab decisions had sealed the fate of Palestinian statehood in the immediate sense, but the policies of the Great Powers contributed to the outcome as well. Post-war Britain was economically drained, and sought to reduce its financial burden by reducing its overseas commitments. Palestine posed a special problem. British forces faced a campaign of sabotage and terror by Zionist underground groups in 1945–7, while attempts to limit the immigration of Jewish refugees from Europe were challenged by the US. Yet the Labour government that came to power in 1947 was determined to strengthen the trans-Atlantic alliance in order to counter the growing Soviet threat. It was also committed to building a social-welfare state at home, and so it strongly opposed proposals, such as international trusteeship, that would oblige it to maintain a costly long-term presence in Palestine. Faced with the spread of inter-communal fighting and keen to prevent a free-for-all among the Arab states for possession, the British came to the firm conclusion by February 1948 that a 'clean' partition of the country between ʿAbdullah and the Zionist movement was the most desirable option.[68]

Britain was no longer the only external party with an interest in resolving the conflict. The US had become increasingly involved in its diplomatic efforts since 1945, often to divergent purpose. In April 1946, president Harry Truman publicly called for the abrogation of the British White Paper of 1939 and the lifting of 'existing restrictions on immigration and land acquisition to permit the further development of the Jewish National Home'.[69] The US was dubious about the wisdom of establishing 'either an independent Palestinian State or independent Palestinian States', given the risk of widespread civil strife, and was particularly vague on the future of the Arab community, but eventually supported the UN partition plan of November 1947.[70] The escalation of violence in

Palestine prompted the administration to reconsider this position once more and, as the military situation of the *yishuv* reached a nadir in March 1948, to revive an earlier proposal for UN trusteeship over the country.[71]

The moment of US doubt was at least partly connected to the sharp rise of Cold War tensions in Europe. The USSR supported the communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in February, and in April took the first steps towards imposing the blockade of West Berlin. Administration officials feared that partition of Palestine would lead to widespread bloodshed, in which case the US would be compelled either to commit its scarce forces to peacekeeping or else allow the Soviets to establish a presence in the eastern Mediterranean and outflank American positions in the 'northern tier' formed by Greece, Turkey, and Iran.[72] Britain was unwilling to enforce UN trusteeship, however, and both the Arab states and the *yishuv* leadership opposed the proposal. Zionist battlefield successes decided the issue in any case, and the US was the first country to offer de facto recognition of the State of Israel in mid-May. It quickly followed this up with an emergency loan of $100 million.

The USSR, for its part, generally sought a balance between its commitment to the Jewish right to self-determination and its desire for friendly relations with the Arab states. Aware of the mutual hostility of the two communities in Palestine, and given its own desire to hasten British withdrawal from the region, it initially favoured international trusteeship or, failing that, submission of the problem to the UN. During the UN General Assembly debate in November 1947, special Soviet representative Andrei Gromyko professed a preference for a 'bi-national or federated state of Jews and Arabs in Palestine', but also indicated that partition might be acceptable in the circumstance.[73] In fact, the USSR privately feared that an Arab-dominated unitary state would be pro-British, and regarded partition as the more feasible option. It responded to the delivery of British arms to Arab client states by authorizing the shipment of nearly 10,500 infantry weapons from Czechoslovakia to the *yishuv* in early 1948, and permitted the emigration of 200,000 Jews from Eastern Europe to Israel by the end of the year.[74] The USSR also opposed the entry of Arab armies into Palestine after the declaration of Israeli independence on 15 May; it extended de facto recognition of the new state immediately after the US, and was the first to offer de jure recognition, on 18 May.

Palestinian statehood as such had not been an issue of contention among the Great Powers, and in any case was no longer a practical proposition by the end of 1948. The fate of the Arab refugees was treated as a humanitarian rather than political problem from that point onwards, as the international community sought ways to repatriate or resettle them. Global rivalries exerted a substantial influence on the 'world outlook' of the Palestinians, but the fact that they were not a sovereign party deprived them of any discernible impact on Great Power policies in the region. It also meant that after 1948 they experienced the workings of international politics at a remove, since the primary framework within which they operated was that of the Arab states. The Cold War affected the

Palestinians, but only indirectly, to the extent that it constrained Arab ability to make war or peace with Israel.

The start of the Cold War did not bear much at first on the perceptions and alliances of the Arab states. Egypt and Jordan were tied by treaty to Britain, which retained control of the Suez Canal and asserted various military basing and transit rights. It was also their main arms supplier, and paid the vital subvention that kept the Jordanian budget afloat. British policy therefore had considerable influence on Arab decision-making in 1948. Egypt and Jordan both sought to renegotiate their treaties in this period, but their failure to secure substantive changes on key issues provided a focus for strong domestic opposition. Anti-colonialism remained a potent driving force as a result, especially for the officers who seized power in Egypt in July 1952 and for their counterparts in Jordan, whose agitation led king Husayn to dismiss the British commander of the Arab Legion in March 1956 and to 'Arabize' the army.

Anti-colonialism meant an anti-British stance, not an anti-American one. The new military rulers of Egypt and Syria revealed an early interest in good working relations with the US, which initially regarded them as potential agents of modernization in their societies. Priorities clashed, however. Following the acceptance of Turkish membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1952, the US strove to build an additional regional security alliance in the wider Middle East as part of its global strategy of containment against the USSR. The failure of an attempt by Britain to form a Middle East Defence Organization after the start of the Korean war in 1950 did not deter the US from supporting a second effort in 1954–5. This was the ill-fated Baghdad Pact, intended to include Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Jordan in the first instance. Nasir, who had emerged as the central figure in Cairo and found new allies in Damascus after the final exile of Shishakli in 1954, viewed the emerging axis in both anti-colonial and inter-Arab terms, as an attempted British comeback and a bid by his Hashemite rivals for regional leadership. His role in defeating the pact put him at odds with the US, as did his support for the birth of Third World neutrality at the Afro-Asian summit in Bandung in 1955.

Despite these tensions, it was the conflict with Israel that played the decisive part in introducing Cold War politics to the Middle East. In May 1950, the US, Britain, and France declared their resolve to regulate the flow of arms to the region in order to stabilize the military balance and prevent the outbreak of war between the Jewish state and its Arab neighbours. Border tensions persisted, however, partly because of disputes over the status of demilitarized zones on the Egyptian–Israeli and Syrian–Israeli armistice lines, and partly because of infiltration by Palestinians, mainly unarmed civilians, which was met with Israeli reprisals of escalating force. Ironically, Israeli fear that the Arab states intended to launch a 'second round' was mirrored by the Arab conviction that Israel harboured aggressive intentions. This was coupled with the knowledge that its standing army of 50,000 could be expanded by mobilization of reserves to 200,000 within 48 hours. This prompted the Arab states generally to

avoid deliberate provocation, whereas Israel strove to enhance the credibility of its deterrence through an activist border policy. The problem was that the distinctions between deterrence, pre-emption, and territorial expansion were easily blurred, as shown by secret Israeli proposals for the pre-emptive occupation of the West Bank and Sinai following the assassination of king ʿAbdullah in 1951.[75]

The mutual sense of insecurity between Israel and its Arab neighbours led each side to seek to redress what it saw as an unfavourable military imbalance. In 1954, France contracted secretly to supply Israel with modern combat aircraft, tanks, and artillery, which started to arrive in early 1955.[76] News of this coincided with a particularly severe Israeli raid on Egyptian troops in Gaza in February, and prompted Nasir to negotiate a major deal for Soviet arms (via Czechoslovakia), that was announced in September. The US decision to retract an offer of major economic aid in July 1956 was followed in quick order by Nasir's nationalization of the Suez Canal and, at the end of October, by the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel. The US condemned their action and forced a withdrawal through diplomatic and economic means, but it was the USSR that appeared as the foremost champion of the Arab cause by threatening the invaders with retaliatory missile strikes.

The arms deals of 1954–5 ended the supplier restraints imposed by the Tripartite Declaration several years earlier. France emerged after 1956 as the main source of weapons for Israel, which also received second-hand US equipment from West Germany and British surpluses, while Egypt and Syria were the recipients of a growing volume of Soviet military assistance. War, or at least the preparation for it, was the dynamic through which superpower rivalry extended conclusively into the Middle East. The turning point was marked by the enunciation in January 1957 of the Eisenhower doctrine, that pledged US assistance to friendly states in the region threatened by 'communist subversion'. This was implicitly directed at Nasir and his own Arab allies, and reinforced the tendency among Arab states to engage in 'balancing politics', this time in tandem with superpower allies. The superimposition of Cold War bipolarity on regional politics led naturally to the start of the parallel 'Arab cold war'.

The escalatory effect of the conflict with Israel and superpower rivalry was undeniable, but the extent and persistence of the Arab military build-up throughout this period also reflected the driving force of state-building. The post-colonial governments had inherited small armies at independence and expansion was a logical step, especially after the experience of 1948, but it was also part and parcel of a wider process of social mobility. The rapid spread of modern education was propelling previously marginalized sectors of the population, especially from rural areas, into national armies and, more to the point, into military academies from which a new generation of socially-minded and highly politicized officers emerged. In Syria and Egypt, the legacy of the war-time economic policies of the colonial powers and the subsequent struggle of

the new military-based regimes after 1949 and 1952 to establish their social control accelerated the massive growth of the state sector in general, not only the armed forces. Much the same occurred in Lebanon, especially during the presidency of former army commander Fu'ad Shihab in 1958–64, and also in Jordan, where army strength more than doubled between 1948 and 1956 (and then more than doubled again in the next decade) in an effort both to contain Palestinian nationalist identification and to incorporate the monarchy's Transjordanian constituency.

That this was a secular trend among the confrontation states, related to the conflict with Israel but largely independent of it too, was confirmed by the nationalization of heavy industry, finance, and trade in Egypt and Syria in the 1960s. The promulgation of Nasir's Socialist Decrees in 1961, followed by the sharp leftward turn of the Syrian 'neo-Baʿth' government in 1966, were linked to the rise of the authoritarian state. Jordan shared many similar features, including extensive state involvement in economic management, tight political control, and the construction of ubiquitous internal security services. Only Lebanon differed significantly, adopting a strikingly liberal laissez-faire system and trying to balance the pro-Western leanings of the dominant Maronite Christians with the pro-Nasir or Arabist sympathies of the Muslims, although it also witnessed rapid growth of public services and government monopolies (utilities, ports, tobacco, and the like). With that exception, the centralization of political and economic control was often justified in terms of the requirements of the conflict with Israel, but was essentially driven from within. The pattern was nonetheless reinforced by the Cold War, as the superpowers were willing to offer substantial material assistance to their clients in the region. At the same time, their involvement placed effective constraints on the ability of local states to wage war, while the assurance of external support tended to act as a strategic disincentive to make peace.

Charting a Course

The question facing the activists who rebuilt the Palestinian national movement after 1948 was how to chart a course amidst the three circles in which they operated. At the broadest level, historical opportunities were determined by the current state of US–Soviet relations; it was hardly accidental that both the start of the post-mandate phase of the Palestine conflict and its end were coterminous with the Cold War. Yet the fact that all power relations were enacted or mediated through the Arab circle made it the central one, and made Palestinian–Arab interaction the most important of all relationships. The Arab context in particular revealed the extent to which external factors influenced Palestinian political, ideological, and organizational choices and channelled the national struggle. At the same time, it was the complexity of Arab domestic and regional politics, resulting in multiple-actor interventions and shifting alliances,

that provided Palestinian nationalist patriotism with the critical openings it needed to acquire its distinct character. Palestinianism, as it might usefully be dubbed, was perhaps a natural political response to the circumstances of British rule and the outcome of the 1947–8 war, but even then it was not a pure, pre-existing phenomenon 'only waiting to be awakened'.[77] Rather, it was the product of dynamic interaction with a changing environment.

Interaction and influence are two-way processes, however. 'Internalization' of the Palestinian factor after 1948 added to the complexity of Arab domestic and regional politics, and bound Arab and Palestinian affairs together in an inextricable, often violent, manner. Yet its impact needs to be qualified. It was weaker in Arab countries further away from the 'frontline' with Israel, whatever the emotional, ideological, or religious appeal of Palestine. Even among the confrontation states, the impact on government and society varied according to the strength of state capabilities, proportion of Palestinian communities to host populations, and degree of integration or marginality of Palestinians in local political and economic life.[78] The impact of the Palestine problem also declined as Arab state-building progressed, remaining strongest where it could be harnessed to existing social fissures but weakest where construction of authoritarian rule had developed farthest. By these indicators Egypt was the most immune, followed (in descending order) by Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. The crucial lesson is that the modern Arab states demonstrated remarkable resilience, proving able to deviate from standard policy on the conflict with Israel, confront Palestinian nationalism when it threatened their vital interests, and, ultimately, survive the domestic and regional repercussions of such stands.

The special Palestinian–Arab relationship had three, interrelated consequences. One was that Arab state-building and the parallel construction of separate country-nationalisms (as opposed to pan-Arabism) benefited from the demarcation of a distinct Palestinian national character and autonomous corporate identity. This was least true of Jordan, which sought actively to subsume Palestinianism and to recast its Palestinian subjects as Jordanian citizens, but even then the appearance of a body representing Palestinians elsewhere was not wholly inimical to the kingdom's interests. The result was a curious paradox. The absence of a credible institutional actor after 1948 meant that it was the Arab states that set the Palestinian agenda, invariably according to their own interests, perceptions, and priorities. Yet Arab support for the establishment of the PLO in 1964 and recognition of its status as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians in 1974 effectively implied abdication of practical responsibility for the attainment of its national objectives. The irony was that the further the Palestinians ventured on the same path of political development as the Arab 'colonial' and 'post-independence' states before them, the lesser were Arab reasons to make war on Israel.

A second consequence of the relationship was to demolish the myth that the Arab states could not make peace with Israel, and certainly not without the

Palestinians. Arab state-building and superpower intervention in Middle East politics required management, if not resolution, of the conflict with Israel. This meant that an all-out Arab effort for the destruction of Israel was unlikely, to say the least, and raised basic questions about the viability of Palestinian calls for the 'total' liberation of Palestine. It imposed severe constraints on the conduct of the Palestinian national struggle, therefore, and limited the range of options for political development. More generally, it was Arab decisions on war and peace that determined the timing and scope of opportunities for the Palestinians to put their strategies into practice. In this sense their definition of national goals also followed suit, as ambition had to be tailored to external constraints and intrinsic limitations. This was especially true if the Palestinians were to develop a 'statist' option, since it required a territorial base of sorts and recognition of juridical status by the Arab states, global powers, and, in varying degrees, other members of the international community.

Indeed, the third consequence of the special relationship with the Arabs was that the search for state formed the inescapable framework for Palestinian political development after 1948. This is not to suggest that the PLO ever formed a state as such, but to stress that it came to occupy a broadly similar position in relation to its constituents, albeit with a number of serious qualifications and limitations. 'States are not single things . . . but, rather, a bundle of structures, institutions, arenas, practices and claims', and in that sense, at least, the PLO came to provide the main locus for Palestinian political processes.[79] This may only be evident with hindsight, but it can be argued that the main historic faultline within the Palestinian national movement ran along the division between the state-builders, personified by Arafat, who seized upon every opportunity to transform PLO politics and organization into parastatal form, and those, best represented by George Habash and his comrades, who understood this transformation to mean abandonment of immutable historic rights.

A natural parallel was for Palestinian nationalism to follow two main political paths: one of openness or compromise, characterized by eclecticism but nonetheless legitimizing its pragmatism by referring to tradition; and one of denial, turned towards the past and inwards, yet combining a purist utopianism with conscious assimilation of modern Western models.[80] The duality was reflected in ideology, organization, and tactics, yet ultimately the statist option was the only one operable in the Arab environment. Like virtually all political groups and ideological currents in Arab societies since 1920, Palestinian opponents of the statist ambition (or of its implicit readiness for historic compromise) also came, albeit reluctantly, to conduct their politics primarily within the common political arena and institutional framework provided by the PLO. Its statist structures thereby influenced the politics of all Palestinian social forces, as well as the organization and tactics through which various groups sought to influence national policy processes.[81]

Adoption of the statist model was not a simple or clear-cut choice between

alternatives, however, nor necessarily a conscious one. At one level it built on established patterns and obvious models, but at another it evolved incrementally from the encounter with a complex and often hostile environment. Success in the construction of parastatal institutions and the assertion of a specifically Palestinian national agenda was hardly inevitable, and could only come about through a conflictual process. This was especially so because the ultimate goal was to wrest all or part of Palestine from Israeli control, putting the Palestinians additionally at odds first with the Arab states over issues of war and peace, and second with the superpowers and most of the international community over their commitment to the survival of the Jewish state. The Palestinians had the motive, and seized what opportunities arose out of external events, but still needed to mobilize the human, material, and other political resources required in order both to 'exercise significant autonomy in the face of other centers of state power' and to liberate territory.[82]

Armed struggle provided the necessary mobilizing theme for the Palestinians, and their instrument of liberation. Because it affected the functioning, and at times existence, of the Arab confrontation states, it provided a litmus test of the degree to which their governments had consolidated social control. By the same token, the armed struggle revealed the interplay of domestic, regional, and Cold War politics in the Arab–Israeli arena. In all cases, it was the defining dynamic that drove the reconstruction and reorganization of Palestinian national politics, and that allowed the search for state to proceed. The process unfolded in distinct phases, marked in each case by wars that either closed opportunities or opened them, but always setting the context, contours, and 'ceiling' of the Palestinian national struggle.

This page intentionally left blank

PART I

Searching for Palestine, 1949–1966

The Palestine war of 1948 coincided with the initial phases of three historic processes affecting the entire Middle East in the aftermath of World War Two: the formation or consolidation of independent national states, the emergence of a distinct Arab state system, and the replacement of colonial domination with US–Soviet rivalry. As these processes evolved they increasingly interacted with one another, and it was this multidimensional dynamic that determined the decisions taken by the parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict regarding war and peace. It also set a changing context for Palestinian politics, in which primary identifications, ideological attachments, and organizational structures underwent a parallel transition as Arab host states strove for their own national definition, conducted their regional rivalries, and restructured relations with external powers. Israel was meanwhile intent on absorbing up to a million new Jewish immigrants, many of them from Arab countries, and on preparing to confront the 'second round' of war that it expected the Arab states eventually to launch. Diplomatic efforts by outside parties to help resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict, return of Palestinian refugees to their former homes, and sharing of common water resources in the early 1950s had little chance of success in this fluid situation. The failure of the mission by US special presidential envoy Robert Anderson in 1955–6 marked the end of such efforts for the next decade.

On the Arab side the pace was set by Egypt, where the Free Officers seized power in July 1952. Wishing to destroy the political power of the old landowning elite and to defuse peasant unrest, lest Britain take instability as a pretext to intervene anew, the new government launched a major agrarian reform programme. The new Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) contained an eclectic mix of 'Marxists and Muslim fundamentalists, partisans of existing civilian parties and advocates of military rule, socialists and free-traders, admirers of the West and violent anti-imperialists' and had no common denominator in economic policy.[1] An enthusiasm for major public works and Egyptianization of personnel in foreign-owned enterprises was matched by support for private capital and industry and liberalization of domestic and foreign investment laws. The RCC s main concern was political, and in 1953 it abolished the monarchy, banned all parties, disbanded parliament, and suspended the constitution in order to prevent organized opposition. Instead it created the Liberation Rally as its own political vehicle. This process was driven by Nasir, who replaced

Muhammad Najib as head of the RCC in 1954 and, in 1956, oversaw the promulgation of a new constitution, dissolution of the RCC, and his own election as president.

In its early years the RCC backed away from nationalist stances in foreign policy, largely at Nasir's urging. It toned down anti-Israeli rhetoric in official media (initially, at least), relinquished sovereignty over Sudan, and negotiated an agreement with Britain in October 1954 for the evacuation of its military bases in the Suez Canal zone. The Muslim Brotherhood, which had previously preferred Najib, objected to the terms of the agreement and made itself an enemy of the state by attempting to assassinate Nasir. Yet his foreign policy remained both defensive and pragmatic: he attended the Bandung conference in April 1955 in support of Third World neutrality in the global East–West rivalry, but also laid the basis for military ties with the USSR (through China's Zhou Enlai) while seeking US economic and military assistance (successfully in the former instance). Egyptian forces in Gaza were already the target of severe Israeli reprisal raids, and in January it had transpired that France had commenced delivery of modern tanks, artillery, and combat aircraft to Israel; US unwillingness to provide arms prompted Egypt to start secret talks with Czechoslovakia in May for the supply of Soviet-built weapons. The agreement reached in September provided for 530 armoured vehicles, 500 artillery weapons, 200 aircraft, and a range of combat vessels.[2]

In following months Nasir campaigned against the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact, which he saw as a bid both by Britain to regain its colonial empire and by Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Saʿid to assert Hashemite regional leadership. In February 1956 Nasir reached an agreement with the World Bank that gave it considerable say in Egyptian economic management, but this did not sway US secretary of state John Foster Dulles, who was notably insensitive to Egyptian concerns. Nasir's opposition to the Baghdad Pact and his recognition of the People's Republic of China in May turned Dulles firmly against him.[3] In mid-July the US abruptly withdrew an offer of aid to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam, to which Nasir responded a week later by nationalizing the Suez Canal. This was a direct affront to Britain, as the 99-year lease on the Canal was not due to end until 1968. In the next period it planned secretly with France, angered by Egyptian backing for the Algerian mujahidin, to topple Nasir. The two former colonial powers were later joined by Israel, which wished to destroy Egyptian military capability, in a tripartite invasion of the canal zone and Sinai at the end of October. The military campaign was successful, but the allies were compelled to cease operations by 7 November, especially after the US brought severe financial pressure to bear on Britain, at which time the USSR increased the pressure with its own ultimatum to the aggressors. The British and French withdrawal was complete by 22 December, and that of Israel on 7 March 1957; a UN force now deployed along the armistice lines to keep the peace.

The Suez war marked the end of British and French empire in the Middle

East, and made US–Soviet rivalry a central part of regional politics. The Soviet invasion of Hungary had taken place in parallel to the invasion of Egypt, and contributed to the formulation of the Eisenhower doctrine that was issued on 5 January 1957. Written into law by Congress on 9 March, it committed the US to combat Soviet influence in the region and provide military and financial assistance to local states threatened by communism. When the US reneged on a recent offer to provide arms and emergency food, fuel, and medicine to Egypt, the USSR promptly airlifted the most urgently needed items and shipped 600,000 tons of wheat.[4] The attitude of external powers had a direct impact on economic policy in Egypt, where the state was left holding considerable assets following the settlement of the Suez Canal dispute and other compensations with Britain and France. The failure of earlier attempts to attract foreign capital for industrial investment led in January 1957 to the Egyptianization of the capital of foreign-owned banks, insurance companies, and commercial agencies, followed by the creation of an Economic Organization to supervise the growing number of public and mixed enterprises and of a national planning apparatus. In 1958 the state took active steps to promote industry, and at the end of the year borrowed its first major economic loan from the USSR, worth $126 million.[5] Development targets were overambitious, however, and in July 1961 Nasir ordered sweeping nationalization of finance, industry, and commerce in an effort to concentrate capital and consolidate his political control.

The connection between Cold War, regional, and domestic politics was equally evident in Jordan and Syria. This was demonstrated in the former case when king Husayn, who had ascended to the throne in 1953, was persuaded to join the Baghdad Pact in December 1955. The opposition parties, backed by Egyptian agents and Cairo radio, instigated mass protests in Amman and other towns and forced withdrawal from the pact. The continued presence of British troops in the kingdom and of British commanders in the Arab Legion now became intolerable; in March 1956 the king dismissed legion commander John Glubb and ordered the Arabization over the next few months of what was now renamed the Jordanian Arab Army. Elections on 21 October brought a left-leaning government to power headed by Nationalist Socialist Party leader Sulayman al-Nabulsi, and four days later the king joined Syria in placing his armed forces under Egyptian command.

Jordan saw no action during the tripartite invasion of Egypt, but in the aftermath the Nabulsi government negotiated an end to the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of 1946, and with it the annual British subsidy that had kept the state solvent since the creation of the emirate in 1921. It also initiated an effort to secure Arab financial assistance with the aim of permanently ending Jordanian dependence on Western subventions and taking the kingdom decisively out of the Western orbit. However, the publication of the Eisenhower doctrine offered king Husayn an opportunity to reassert his authority and also to replace the annual British subsidy, which was about to cease. The pro-Nasir army

commander, ʿAli Abu-Nuwar, sought to pre-empt the alliance with the US by mounting a *coup* in April, but the king foiled this and in the following weeks purged the army, forced the resignation of hostile members of government and parliament, and banned all political parties and labour unions. The US emphasized the Cold War dimension by ordering the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean, and in Jordan the new government issued a new law to combat communism. Egyptian and Syrian intelligence, conversely, sponsored sporadic sabotage attacks by opposition parties over the next two years, culminating in the assassination of prime minister Hazaʿ al-Majali in 1959.

The same set of factors had affected Syria, but with different results. There, the fall of the Shishakli dictatorship in 1954 was followed by multi-party elections that brought a number of pan-Arabist and leftist candidates into parliament. In February 1955 a new, 'neutralist' government declared against the Baghdad Pact, and later moved closer still to Nasir by placing its forces under Egyptian command in October 1956. Senior army officers such as military intelligence chief ʿAbd-al-Hamid al-Sarraj had already initiated cooperation with their Egyptian counterparts two years earlier, but the alliance deepened in the wake of the Suez war following the discovery of a US attempt, backed by Britain and Iraq, to organize a *coup d'état*. This was prompted in part by the belief that Syria was moving into the Soviet orbit, but Western pressure was in fact largely responsible for the Syrian turn to the USSR for assistance in July 1957. (The purchase of second-hand tanks from Czechoslovakia in 1954 had not led to wider relations.) Offers of US and World Bank assistance came with political conditions—the US moreover prepared new *coup* schemes in collusion with Britain and Turkey during the summer—whereas the USSR agreed to help in industrial development, oil exploration, construction of agricultural dams, and extension of a modern transport system.

From this point onwards international, regional, and domestic politics came together to an unprecedented degree for Syria, as indeed for other Arab states. The central actor was the Baʿth Party, founded by Damascene schoolteachers Michel ʿAflaq and Salah-al-Din al-Bitar in September 1940, that had only gained considerable strength and a clear social programme by joining forces with Akram Hurani's larger Arab Socialist Party in November 1952. However, by 1957 the Baʿth faced growing competition from the communists, who benefited from the favourable impact of Soviet assistance on public opinion to expand their ranks and, crucially, to win the sympathy of defence minister Khalid al-ʿAzm and the powerful group of 'neutralist' officers in the army who included deputy chief-of-staff Amin al-Nafuri and operations chief Ahmad ʿAbd-al-Karim, besides confirmed communist supporter chief-of-staff ʿAfif al-Bizri.[6] In the emotionally charged and strongly pro-Nasir atmosphere of late 1956 and 1957, the Baʿth perceived deliverance to lie in closer relations with Egypt. It commenced negotiations for a union with Egypt, striving for a loose federation that would leave it in control in Syria. Seeking to outflank the Baʿth, the pro-communist officers instead proposed an immediate merger. This Nasir

accepted on 1 February 1958, and a majority of Syrians approved the union in a plebiscite 20 days later. Under the new constitution the two armies were combined under Egyptian command, all political parties were dissolved, and parliament was replaced by the Egyptian-sponsored National Union, which was conceived as a grass-roots organization in which the entire adult population were automatic members.

The formation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) had an electrifying effect throughout the region. It polarized politics in Lebanon, where opposition parties took up arms in May to defeat an attempt by president Camille Shamʿun to overturn the constitutional ban on standing for a second consecutive term in office. Egyptian and Syrian military intelligence actively assisted the rebels with training and arms, and later dispatched Palestinian reconnaissance units to their aid. Shamʿun and his foreign minister Charles Malik, who had both immediately supported the Eisenhower doctrine in early 1957, now tried to portray theirs as a struggle between pro-Western Lebanon and radical Arab nationalism allied with international communism.[7] Jordan and Iraq had announced a rival Hashemite union a few days after the declaration of the UAR, but the overthrow of the monarchy in Baghdad on 14 July altered the regional landscape once more. Seeing a communist threat, the US landed marines in Beirut and flew fuel and other emergency supplies through Israeli airspace to Jordan, which was subjected to a land blockade by Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, the latter pursuing its own long-standing feud with the Hashemite throne. British paratroops also arrived in Amman.

Regional and superpower rivalries had coincided, and the Arab 'cold war' had well and truly started. However, the next stage pitted Egypt against Iraq and, for divergent if connected reasons, against the USSR and its Syrian partners. Much had to do with the uneasy relationship between Nasir and the Syrian-based Baʿth. Seeking a counterweight to his power, it urged the party's Iraqi branch to press the new government to join the UAR. They had the support of deputy prime minister and assistant commander-in-chief ʿAbd-al-Salam ʿArif, who admired Nasir and may have seen a chance to advance his own position, but his dismissal in September heralded systematic repression of the Baʿth and other Arab nationalists in Iraq in the following months. One reason for Iraqi opposition to joining the UAR was the fear felt by many of the country's Shiʿite Muslims, Kurds, and members of smaller ethnic groups of Sunni domination. This was reflected in the unease of the Iraqi Communist Party, in which Shiʿites and Kurds were heavily represented, and that viewed the pro-Nasir camp with suspicion. It aligned itself with president and commander-in-chief ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Qasim, the principal figure among the Free Officers who had carried out the original *coup*, and who now opted not to join the UAR. This prompted a ruthless purge of communist and leftist officers in the Syrian armed forces at Egyptian behest, as well as the incarceration in Egypt of the handful of local communists. The rift became absolute in March 1959, when Egyptian and Syrian military intelligence supported an abortive mutiny

by nationalist officers in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. In 1961 Egypt also upheld Kuwaiti independence against Iraqi threats to annex the emirate.

The anti-communist and anti-Qasim campaigns severely strained Egyptian relations with the USSR, yet this did not strengthen the partnership between Nasir and the Baʿth leadership. The latter was dismayed by the rise of Sarraj, the pro-Nasir minister of interior in the Syrian provincial council, and by its inability to dominate the Syrian branch of the National Union. Partly because of its own indecision, only 250 Baʿthists were returned in the elections for the local committees of the union in July 1959, out of a total of 9,445 seats.[8] The rift resulted in the expulsion of pro-Nasir representatives from the party's Jordanian branch by a conference that was secretly held in Lebanon in August, and senior Baʿthist government officials resigned when Nasir dismissed one of their cabinet ministers a month later. Sarraj, who replaced the Baʿthist Hurani as chairman of the provincial council under the overall supervision of Egyptian 'viceroy' ʿAbd-al-Muhsin Abu-al-Nur, aggravated tensions with heavy-handed police tactics. The appointment of Egyptian deputy commander-in-chief ʿAbd-al-Hakim ʿAmir as Nasir's special deputy in Syria only deepened local discontent. The imposition of currency controls and sweeping nationalizations unilaterally decreed by Nasir in 1961 further alienated the Syrian bourgeoisie, which had already been affected by the extension of Egypt's land reform laws in 1958. On 28 September 1961 a group of officers led by ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Nahlawi took power in Damascus and took Syria out of the UAR. Parliament was restored and quickly repealed most of the recent nationalization laws.

Nasir blamed the Syrian secession on a conspiracy by businessmen and corrupt officers, backed by Western powers and their reactionary Arab allies. To prevent a similar alliance in Egypt, he sequestered the property of potential class enemies and tightened the land reforms once more, having already lowered the ceiling on permissible ownership in July 1961. In the following year Nasir also replaced the National Union with the Arab Socialist Union (ASU), the purpose of which was to incorporate 'the "national alliance of working forces" consisting of workers, peasants, intellectuals, national capitalists, and soldiers'.[9] His parallel attempt to contain the power of his colleague and close friend commander-in-chief ʿAmir failed, and so the ASU provided a civilian constituency to balance ʿAmir's extensive clientele in the armed forces. It was also at this moment that Nasir greatly expanded the ubiquitous internal security agencies he had rapidly set up after 1952, increasing their powers and allowing them to develop into new bureaucratic fiefdoms.

Externally, the Syrian secession made it impossible for Egypt to proceed with the creation of the unified Arab command decreed at its urging by the ministerial council of the League of Arab States in June 1961, and so impeded its attempts to counter the Israeli ballistic missile and nuclear programmes that had been revealed in late 1960.[10] It also led Nasir to break off diplomatic ties with Jordan and Turkey, which had recognized the new Syrian government

with suspicious haste. Yet he had also come to the conclusion that the Arab World was Egypt's natural sphere of influence and principal foreign policy arena, and that regional leadership was its destiny. Pursuing this logic, he dispatched Egyptian troops to support the republican officers who overthrew the archaic imamate in Yemen in September 1962, embroiling his country in a debilitating war by proxy with Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The hard-pressed Egyptian economy could not take the strain, and Nasir made a bid for inter-Arab reconciliation by inviting the other heads of state to meet in Cairo in mid-January 1964, ostensibly to discuss ways of countering Israeli plans to divert the Jordan river headwaters. In doing so he launched summit conferences as a new instrument of inter-Arab diplomacy, and the first such meeting resolved to divert the Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese tributaries from Israel and to establish a joint defence command headed by Egyptian generals ʿAli ʿAmir and ʿAbd-al-Munʿim Riyad.

The summit conference also provided an opportunity for the reassertion of Palestinian nationalism in a public, institutionalized form. Palestinian political activism in the first decade after 1948 had either been channelled through existing political parties in Arab host states and their extensions in the West Bank and Gaza, or else took the form of localized and short-lived groups of infiltrators and students. The Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM), one of the two main currents that were to dominate the later Palestinian national movement, was founded in 1951 but upheld pan-Arab unity and considered setting up a separate 'Palestine committee' only in 1959. Its main rival-to-be, Fateh, and lesser groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Front also came into being around this time. A reason for the timing was the admission by the immensely popular Nasir in March that he did not possess a plan to liberate Palestine. Iraqi president Qasim was quick to deride his rival, and strove to embarrass him further in June by proposing the formation of a Palestinian republic and a liberation army in the West Bank and Gaza. Both sides used the 'Palestinian card' to outbid each other for the next two years, during which Nasir authorized the expansion of Palestinian border guard units in Gaza and the formation of a Palestinian National Union, which also conducted elections for a legislative assembly. Qasim responded by forming a Palestinian Liberation Regiment, while in Syria the Baʿth Party set up a Palestinian wing to contain similar nationalist pressure.

The break-up of the UAR in 1961 marked a turning point. The defeat of hopes for Arab unity, which was seen by Palestinians as a necessary precursor to the destruction of Israel and liberation of Palestine (and frequently stipulated by Nasir as such), drove a renewed search for autonomous nationalist organizations in the next two years. It was against this background that the first Arab summit conference convened in January 1964, and that the Palestine Liberation Organization was established in May. At the beginning of 1965 Fateh commenced military operations against Israel, but the ANM did not follow its lead until late in 1966. The difference in timing was significant. Fateh was keen to

take the lead and assert its own brand of Palestinian nationalism, and found an ally in the Syrian government, which still sought to discomfit Nasir by threatening to trigger an unwanted and premature war with Israel. The ANM, conversely, was staunchly loyal to Nasir, and subscribed to his view that war with Israel should be delayed until Egyptian and Arab military capabilities were sufficiently developed. Palestinian raids against Israel barely reached the level of nuisance value militarily, but they appeared to signal hostile Arab intent and contributed appreciably to the rise of regional tensions in the next two years.

The issue was decided by the revival of the Arab cold war in 1966. As in 1958, Egypt moved into alliance with Syria, ending the rift that had deepened in July 1963, when Baʿthist officers roundly defeated a *coup* attempt by pro-Nasir officers and political parties, among them the local branch of the ANM. The ouster of Syrian president Amin al-Hafiz amidst battles that left hundreds dead in February 1966 was followed by a radicalization of policy on all levels, as the new government nationalized much of the economy, espoused Maoist doctrine of people's war against Israel, and advocated an alliance with the USSR and other socialist countries.[11] A civilian president and government were installed, but real power was held tightly by a cabal of officers. However, the latter were deeply divided along sectarian and factional lines. Over the next year the powerful ʿAlawi Muslim core headed by defence minister Hafiz al-Asad and assistant secretary-general and former chief-of-staff Salah Jadid, themselves silent rivals, purged followers of the ʿAlawi Muhammad ʿUmran and Sunni officers from the southern Syrian region of Huran, and then launched a campaign against Druze officers loyal to Salim Hatum, who planned a *coup* in September. It was also in this period that the roots of the enduring feud with Iraq were laid: the dispute between the Syrian-based national command of the Baʿth Party and the regional command of its Iraqi branch over accession to the UAR in 1963 rankled, and in 1966 the Syrian regional command retaliated for the shelter offered in Baghdad to party leader Hafiz, ʿAflaq, and other members of the deposed national command by briefly blocking the export of Iraqi oil through Syria to the Mediterranean.

The power struggle in Syria was reflected in heightened tensions with Israel, which was subjected to further guerrilla raids in the latter part of 1966. It was at this point that Nasir authorized action by the Palestinian branch of the ANM, although he also concluded a mutual defence pact with Syria partly in order to restrain it. His conversion was the result of a conjunction of factors earlier in the year. One was the sharp deterioration of relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, after two years of relative relaxation. Nasir perceived the call by Saudi king Faysal in January 1966 for an Islamic conference, backed by king Husayn, and the Jordanian decision to purchase US weapons were perceived as inimical to Egyptian regional leadership. The overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Ahmad Sukarno in Indonesia in 1965–6 also suggested to Nasir that the alliance of pro-Western Arab states indicated a US-backed campaign to

depose him. He retaliated with a renewed campaign against the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood in which 18,000–27,000 were incarcerated for varying lengths of time. Acrimonious propaganda exchanges with Saudi Arabia and Jordan resumed, and in July Nasir announced the end of summit diplomacy.

The conversion of Soviet president Khrushchev to an activist Third World policy in the early 1960s offered an alternative, especially as Soviet interest in building up a naval presence in the Mediterranean encouraged even closer relations wth Egypt. The US had ceased wheat deliveries since 1965 and stepped up CIA activity in Egypt in 1966, at a time when the Yemen conflict continued to drain an economy facing a total debt estimated at $4 billion and fuelled social discontent.[12] Beset by economic contraction (*inkimash*) Nasir abandoned positive neutralism and aligned Egypt with the USSR (now headed by Brezhnev), offering naval facilities and severing relations with West Germany, thereby losing $290 million in credits in the process. Israel, conversely, had enjoyed a period of social and economic consolidation since 1956, during which time it established diplomatic ties not only with the US, Western Europe, and Latin America, but also with many Asian and African states. By 1966 Nasir was convinced that Israel had attained a nuclear weapons capability, but apparently hoped that the return of troops from Yemen would provide the means to take pre-emptive military action before it was too late to shift the strategic balance. These conflicting pressures and pulls moreover unfolded amidst the intensification of the rivalry with commander-in-chief ʿAmir, and set Nasir on the escalatory course that was ultimately to lead to war with Israel in June 1967.

This page intentionally left blank

1

Why Palestinian Nationalism? The Social, Economic, and Political Context after 1948

The 1947–8 war left Palestinian society leaderless and disorganized. Its principal political institutions during the British mandate had been closely identified with key members of the old elite, and suffered their fate. Few of the political parties that had come into being after World War One survived the revolt of 1936–9, and those that attempted a revival in the mid-1940s were paralysed by the persistent personal and factional rivalries of their leaders, most of whom were still in exile. The same was true of the *al-Najjada* and *al-Futuwwa* paramilitary youth organizations (founded in 1945), the 'national committees' (*al-lijan al-qawmiyya*, originally established in 1936 and revived in 1947), and the Army of Holy War (secretly founded in 1933 and relaunched at the end of 1947). All had disappeared by 1949, along with the economic basis of the social status and political power of the landowning notables of the old elite (except in the West Bank). The banishment of 'hajj' Amin al-Husayni and the members of the Arab Higher Committee and of Ahmad Hilmi ʿAbd-al-Baqi and the other ministers of the All Palestine Government from the remaining territories of Palestine confirmed the eclipse of the old elite and effectively eliminated the last national bodies of any consequence.

Yet a new elite could not emerge to assume political leadership following the destruction of its predecessor. Besides the loss of territory, dispersal of population, the fracture of the modern middle class during the British mandate and the absence of 'dynamically autonomous' bureaucrats and officers nurtured within the agencies of the colonial state meant that there was no obvious candidate for the role.[1] *Al-nakba* had fragmented all social strata even further, breaking each down into geographically separate components and introducing an additional distinction between the incoming refugees and the established residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The precipitate flight of the middle class had moreover discredited it, weakening any claim to leadership. As importantly, the ambivalence, if not outright opposition, of the Arab governments towards Palestinian statehood deprived any potential elite of the territorial and institutional basis for the exercise of social control. The failure of the attempt by Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari and other middle-class colleagues such as lawyers

Yahya Hammuda and ʿAziz Shihada to win a role for an independent Palestinian refugee delegation at the Rhodes armistice talks in February 1949 was an early demonstration of this inherent weakness. They persevered in the effort to obtain formal recognition of the General Refugee Congress (and affiliated area committees) as a negotiating interlocutor and political representative, but made little headway with any of the concerned parties and were gradually marginalized by Jordan, where those bodies were based.[2]

The impact that war is seen in political and historical sociology writings to have on state and social formation operated differently in the Palestinian case, therefore. Specifically, neither did a 'native' colonial state exist up to 1948 nor did an autonomous Palestinian state emerge afterwards that could exert a direct influence, through its policy decisions and institutional mechanisms, on the shaping of local society. Nor, for that matter, was there a state to be counter-penetrated and contested by Palestinian society. Instead, the fragmented segments of Palestinian society after 1948 tended to preserve their pre-existing patterns of social solidarity and cultural expression, while at the same time evolving in response to the dominant political, legal, and administrative framework in which each found itself. The difference between Palestinian society and neighbouring Arab societies was not the degree to which any of them were fractured, therefore, but whether or not fragmentation and its various consequences were contained within the framework of the state.

The Palestinians evolved varying strategies of survival in adaptation to their disparate circumstances. The determining factors were, in addition to the political and administrative controls imposed by the governments under whose authority the Palestinians came after 1948, their sources of economic livelihood and the nature of social interaction with surrounding populations, whether fellow Palestinian or Arab. In making these adaptations, moreover, Palestinians stressed the most appropriate strands of their identity: kinship, locality, religion, or Arab ethnicity. These were ultimately political choices too, as the persons who made them were also likely to posit the struggle for Palestine as the duty of the wider Arab nation or Islamic community. The experience of collective dislocation and uncertain exile and the desire to return to a specific territory made patriotism (*wataniyya*), the sentimental attachment to homeland or even more localized birthplace, a common denominator among Palestinians. But the rise of a distinctly Palestinian *nationalism* (or its precursors, nationalist patriotism or proto-nationalism) was not inevitable, given the absence of the common political and institutional framework of the state.

Palestinian nationalist patriotism did, however, ultimately emerge as a dominant force. Its extent, form, and timing were related to three principal factors. First, and in many ways most important, was the degree to which government policies led to the marginalization (or integration) of the stateless Palestinians, especially in the Arab confrontation states. Political entitlement was the paramount issue in each case, measured in terms of the right to bear the national passport (citizenship), to vote, represent, or otherwise take part in national

politics (enfranchisement), and to share in the determination of government policy and allocation of national resources (state office). Second, different social strata were not similarly exposed to economic or political opportunities, nor equally well placed to benefit from them. It followed that patriotic feeling was most likely to acquire a Palestinian nationalist character (rather than pan-Syrian, pan-Arab, or pan-Islamic variants), when social mobility and economic access were blocked or, more pertinently, could not be translated into political resources (although the same predicament could also, and did, prompt greater emphasis on removing barriers between fellow Arabs). This prompted the search for an alternative political framework, most obviously the one provided by the state. Because the assertion of nationalism was intimately connected to the state-building drive, thirdly, it could only proceed when external conjunctures permitted the establishment of parastatal Palestinian institutions.

The Palestinians under Government Controls

Just over 150,000 Palestinians remained in Israel in autumn 1948. Between 20,000 and 30,000 were expelled over the next eight months, while around 40,000 others were allowed to return from exile under a family reunification scheme during the 1950s.[3] Those formally registered under the Registration of Residents Ordinance of 1949 were granted citizenship in 1952, leaving a number without legal status and vulnerable to deportation. All movable and immovable property belonging to refugees was considered abandoned, and was effectively expropriated by the state, which acted as custodian with sole discretionary power over its use and release. The Absentees' Property Law of 1950 also applied to Palestinians who had 'left [their] ordinary place of residence in Palestine' during the war, even if only to take temporary refuge in the next village or nearby hills. Four hundred and eighteen villages had been demolished during or after the hostilities, while over 40 that were reclaimed by their former inhabitants ('present absentees') were permanently denied legal status and, consequently, all basic services and government funds.[4] The state meanwhile inherited all land previously administered by the British mandate authorities, and acted as custodian for the property of Muslim endowments whose administrators had become absentees. With the state, Development Authority, and Jewish National Fund holding more than 90 per cent of all land in the country, the various covenants and memoranda of association between them ensured that Jewish lessees would not allow long-term use by Arabs, let alone transfer of ownership to them.[5]

Registered Palestinian residents (including anything from 25,000 to 75,000 internal refugees) were granted the vote even before the nationality law of 1952, although all were placed under military administration for the first few years after 1948. Those living in mixed Arab–Jewish towns were exempted from martial law from 1951, but the majority of the community remained subjected to it until 1966. Despite enjoying nominal equality under the law, in

reality Palestinian citizens had less than equal status with their Jewish counterparts in terms of government practice in legal, civil, and political matters. There were no formal barriers on employment (except in the army and security-sensitive posts, other than for the Druze minority) or entrepreneurial activity, but access to social benefits and posts in various state agencies or public bodies was formally, if at times indirectly, limited by laws, statutory instruments, and institutional practice.[6] Geographical categorization affected definition of the municipal status of Palestinian population centres and of economic development zones, with major implications for central funding and public investment.

Yet the duality of the legal system and of the nature of the state's relations with its citizens did not prompt a unified political response among the Palestinians. Rather, the Israeli Jewish monopoly over assets and policy promoted localistic interests and encouraged social fragmentation and relative political quiescence. The authorities were moreover in a position to curb political activity by withholding travel permits from known nationalists, or by denying permission to establish political publications and associations. Adoption of the British Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 and the special power granted to the government in 1948 to promulgate emergency regulations that could change any law were also the basis for the exercise of extensive control over all aspects of Palestinian life, including education, culture, and social association.[7] In any case, Palestinian activism was also impeded by the flight in 1947–8 of much of the 'political class'—the educated, professional, urban-based social strata—and by the geographical dispersal and isolation of the Palestinians around Israel. Some 70 per cent lived in the Galilee (including the all-Arab towns of Nazareth and Shafaʿ Amr), while smaller communities remained in the urban centres of Acre, Haifa, Lydda, Ramle, and Jaffa, and in the Negev.[8] In rural areas the clan (*hamula*) remained a powerful social institution, if only because the authorities channelled resources through it as a means of enhancing the status of traditional leaders and in this way ensuring co-optation of the wider community.

MAPAM, on the left of the governing Israeli Labour movement, solicited Palestinian votes during elections, but it was MAQI, the communist party, that attracted a solid following, especially among urban inhabitants and Christians. The nationalists, whose leaders derived from the same social groups, increasingly challenged these parties after the mid-1950s, deriving inspiration from the rise of Nasir and pan-Arabism. The failure of previous attempts to found a non-communist organization finally gave rise in July 1958 to the Arab Front, a nationalist–communist alliance that soon renamed itself the Popular Front, and in 1959, following the nationalist–communist split and the Front's demise, to the al-Ard (Land) movement. Al-Ard failed to obtain legal registration as a party (although it registered as a commercial company in 1960 to circumvent the ban) and was outlawed in 1965 because it refused to recognize the State of Israel, while a communist split at the same time produced the new Arab-dominated

Rakah Party.[9] Yet these instances of party activism remained of limited overall significance, as the majority of the Palestinian community remained politically inactive and quiescent. The political and legislative marginalization of the Palestinians in Israel, coupled with tight security control, effectively prevented them from having a direct influence of any significance on the emergence of the wider Palestinian national movement.

Among the Arab confrontation states, Lebanon imposed the most severe restrictions on the 100,000–130,000 refugees who had arrived by 1949, despite initial statements assuring them of a welcome 'no matter what their number nor how long their stay'.[10] Government policy was shaped to a certain degree by the fragile sectarian balance in the country. A haphazard and constantly changing mix of ministerial decrees and departmental regulations were imposed on the Palestinians, limiting their places of legal residence, freedom to travel in certain parts of the country or abroad, categories of private employment, and license to own property or conduct business.

From 1951 the Palestinians were treated as foreigners with regard to employment, investment, landownership, and practice of white-collar professions. Only refugees with work permits could benefit from social security, but only those with Lebanese spouses could obtain one legally.[11] Even then the permits were valid for only one year at a time and their number was severely restricted (only 2,362 as late as 1969, for example).[12] Controls were lax for seasonal agricultural labourers and construction workers, but manual workers were effectively denied social security, including pensions, redundancy pay, and indemnity against accidental injury or death. Since they were subject to discretionary powers rather than a coherent body of laws, refugees could have little recourse to the judicial system.[13] Indeed, the decisions taken by one government body might be disregarded by another, and in all cases the rigour of application fluctuated according to general economic conditions and to the ability of individual Palestinians to pay fees (and bribes) or utilize personal connections to obtain the necessary permits.[14] The establishment of a refugee affairs department in 1959 helped to centralize control, but had little effect on the regulations actually in force.

Syria, with 85,000–100,000 refugees but a much larger population, freely offered material and moral support. The Palestine Arab Refugees Institution was established in January 1949 to establish camps and provide general facilities.[15] There was no systematic attempt initially to define or standardize regulations defining their legal status, ownership of property, travel, pension rights, although the same procedures as for nationals usually applied. Various laws in the next few years effectively placed the refugees on equal footing with Syrian nationals with respect to civil service employment and the practice of certain professions such as notaries, doctors, and lawyers. The ambition of Husni al-Zaʿim during his short-lived presidency in 1949 to resettle 300,000 Palestinians in the Dayr al-Zur region was abandoned by his successors, but they preferred nonetheless to move the refugees away from the border for security reasons,

and limited the freedom of registered refugees to change address as a means of controlling the distribution of rations. Law number 260, approved by parliament and decreed by the president on 10 July 1956, granted the refugees registered in the country equal status with Syrian nationals regarding employment, trade, and military service.[16] The refugee affairs institution was attached to the ministry of social affairs, with links to the Palestine branch of the department of public security (ministry of interior) and general intelligence.[17] Palestinians could now join the army, work in any part of the public sector, and invest and own property with full legal assurance, the only formal exclusion being from political office. Salaries and prospects for promotion were generally lower than for their Syrian counterparts, and the issue of identity cards and travel documents (renewable every two years) provided the authorities with leverage, but the refugees experienced the least discrimination in Syria (despite friction with the impoverished rural migrants who were attracted in growing numbers to Syrian cities and competed for manual jobs).[18]

Egypt, the largest Arab state with a population of 20 million, granted residence to some 7,000 Palestinians, after transferring a similar number to the Gaza Strip (and several hundred to Jerusalem) in 1950. Some 200,000 refugees and 88,000 original residents were already in Gaza, which was under the direct jurisdiction of the Egyptian army and remained effectively subject to emergency law from 1949 to 1962. A military administration headed by a governor-general held authority for virtually all local affairs, and also controlled the issuance of documents for foreign travel. The latter category included Egypt, to which entry for purposes of residence or work was severely restricted. New laws passed in 1954 allowed the Palestinians to practise certain professions, obtain commercial register, engage in external trade, and send their children to state schools, but this affected only the small number of legal residents in Egypt. More important, perhaps, was that the relaxation of restrictions permitted students from Gaza to receive grants and enroll in Egyptian universities (5,642 in the first decade). Nasir's decree in 1962 permitting Palestinians to take up state employment had less practical import, being applicable again to only a small minority, and was issued largely in the context of sharpened inter-Arab rivalries.[19]

The crucial similarity between Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon was that the Palestinians remained politically disenfranchised in all three. Citizenship was granted to a negligible minority already resident in Egypt, while refugees granted residence after 1948 were obliged to renew their permits periodically. Slightly larger numbers were naturalized in Syria, primarily those with close family connections or skills required by the rapidly expanding army and government bureaucracy, and in Lebanon, where Christian and Muslim officials sought middle-class Palestinian co-religionists to shift the sectarian balance. Non-naturalized Palestinians were barred from state employment and enrolment in the armed forces (except in Syria, after 1956). The official explanation was the desire to uphold the separate national character of the refugees and reject

the status quo created by Israel. This did not prevent the Egyptian military administration in Gaza from employing Palestinians in petty civilian grades, nor the Lebanese and Syrian ministries of interior from paying stipends to Palestinian *mukhtars* and informers who helped keep the refugee camps under control. Nor did it prevent the formation of separate Palestinian military units attached to the Arab armies and their intelligence branches. But in all these cases, salaries were paid out of special allocations from the budgets of the civilian agencies responsible for refugees, not from the army or treasury. Such appointments were not transferrable, and did not provide for promotion or social security according to standard legislation applicable to nationals in state employ.

The problem was compounded by Arab policies regarding the provision of identity papers and passports. Palestinians in Egypt and Gaza, whether refugees or residents, were given travel documents issued under Egyptian control by the Cairo-based APG, but these were replaced by Egyptian travel papers in 1960 as the result of gradual Arab de-recognition of the APG.[20] In Lebanon the issuance of travel documents could be delayed considerably or withheld entirely at the discretion of two sets of officials at the interior ministry's *sureté generale* and the army's *deuxième bureau* (the latter controlled all security agencies dealing with Palestinian affairs after 1959). The relevant Arab ministries also used registration with UNRWA as a condition for the issuance of needed documentation. Palestinians expelled from Israel after 1949 could not register with UNRWA, and so the Lebanese and Syrian authorities refused to issue them with identity cards or travel documents, and deported or imprisoned many.[21] Even so, travel documents issued by one Arab state did not assure the Palestinians of entry into any other, and several states imposed an additional visa requirement. The ministerial council of the League of Arab States called in September 1952 for the issuance of a standard passport to the refugees, and made similar requests in 1954 and 1955, but its decisions were non-enforceable and generally ignored.[22]

The contrast with the situation of Palestinians in Jordan could scarcely have been more complete. ʿAbdullah may have abandoned the ambition of the Hashemite family to rule the whole Arab east, but was determined to expand his kingdom by incorporating the Palestinian territories that his Arab Legion had retained in 1948. Parliamentary approval of the Act of Union in April 1950 added nearly 800,000 Palestinians in the West Bank—425,000 original residents and 360,000–400,000 refugees—and at least 100,000 refugees and 30,000 residents (from before 1948) in the East Bank to the native population of Jordan, estimated at 340,000. All Palestinian inhabitants were offered Jordanian nationality under the citizenship law of November 1949, and had received it by 1954. The term 'refugee' was dropped from passports in 1953, and the last category of refugees received regular passports in 1959. Far from excluding the Palestinians from state employment or commercial enterprise, ʿAbdullah hoped to benefit from their experience of civil service and modern commerce under the British

mandate in order to expand Jordanian public services and stimulate economic growth. They enjoyed the same political franchise as the native Jordanian population, suffered no formal or discretionary exclusions in national legislation, and were accepted into the army (though rarely attaining more than middle rank, and restricted in key combat units). Members of the traditional landowning and office-holding elite also rose to senior, if largely politically powerless, government position.

There was a price to pay, however. On 1 March 1950, even before the Act of Union, ʿAbdullah decreed that the territory under Jordanian control would henceforth be referred to only as the 'West Bank', and banned use of the term 'Palestine' in any official document or correspondence.[23] Suffrage was not universal under the 1949 electoral law: women were denied the vote, as were all men who did not own landed property or some other taxable asset, effectively excluding most refugees. The same limitations applied to native Jordanians, but the formal allocation of half the forty parliamentary seats to the more populous West Bank constituencies effectively denied them equal representation. This reflected the throne's concern to prevent translation of Palestinian demographic preponderance into political predominance, and to secure the loyalty of its native Transjordanian constituency. Never stated explicitly or formulated as official government policy, royal strategy balanced co-optation of Palestinian manpower to expand the state sector, on the one hand, with implicit constraints on infrastructure development in the West Bank, preferential treatment for investment in the East Bank, and effective exclusion of all but a handful of Palestinians from key cabinet and army posts, on the other.[24]

Seeking Social and Economic Niches

The example of Jordan also revealed much about the experience of different Palestinian social strata after 1948. The landowning notables and other traditional leaders in the West Bank had preserved their sources of income and status almost intact, and faced little challenge from the modern middle class, that had been heavily concentrated in the coastal cities and was therefore shattered by the war.[25] ʿAbdullah now sought to co-opt the notables—appointing them to cabinet and other government posts—in order to control the local population and further the incorporation of the West Bank into Jordan.[26] These posts were often symbolic and rarely conferred real power, however. Palestinian officers and administrators ran most districts in the West Bank and university graduates were absorbed into the civil service, for example, but decision-making power was held firmly in the hands of (mainly) Transjordanian superiors and always exercised from Amman.[27] Besides, although former supporters of Husayni were excluded, the co-optation of his main rivals in fact deprived them of any independent political role.[28] Lesser notables and tradi-

tional leaders who were incorporated at lower levels of the system (especially as mayors) played a more important function in securing social control, but only because they had little scope for national leadership.[29] It was from their ranks that some 3,000 delegates were drawn to attend the conference in Amman that called for union with Jordan in December 1948.

The administrative and economic policies of the government tended to work against the middle class, or at least to deepen its divisions. Discriminatory allocation of foreign currency and import licences, for example, blocked opportunities for West Bank entrepreneurs and favoured a clique of merchants and consumers in Amman.[30] Similarly, public infrastructure, industry, and other sectors suffered a distinct decline, as investment was redirected to the East Bank. The massive influx of landless and propertyless refugees exacerbated the local recession brought on by the loss of markets and export outlets in former Palestine, leading to tensions between established residents and newcomers. It also fuelled continuous and large-scale outward migration, as some 120,000 West Bankers resettled in the East Bank and roughly 170,000 more left directly for oil-rich Arab economies, out of a total estimated outflow of one-third to one-half million Palestinians in 1949–67.[31] The lack of resources for West Bank development, coupled with the availability of external assistance for refugee relief and skewed government economic policy, led to rapid urban spread in the East Bank and the growth of services at the expense of productive sectors.

These patterns had a substantial impact on the camp population of the West and East Banks, who accounted for nearly 30 per cent of the refugees in the kingdom, and whose numbers increased as other Palestinians moved in once their savings were exhausted. The role of UNRWA in channelling international aid and providing basic services relieved the government of much of the financial and administrative burden, and added a new input to the local economy. The government hoped to resettle the refugees and quickly transformed the ministry of refugee affairs, set up in 1949, into the ministry of development and reconstruction for this purpose. UNRWA, with US support in particular, also hoped to end refugee dependence on outside assistance by providing them with skills, loans, and farmland, but various proposals towards this end foundered on the inability of Israel and Jordan to agree on the location and manner of the resettlement.[32]

At the same time, the refugees benefited less than other strata from opportunities such as emigration because they often lacked requisite skills. Modern education offered younger refugees a means to improve their lot, but the impact was gradual and the main beneficiaries were those whose parents had previously had access to schools in Palestine.[33] One consequence of marginality was the revival of clan solidarity, which had been in decline due to the economic transformation and urbanization of Palestinian society before 1948, as the refugees sought social and economic security.[34] Another was their resistance to 'Jordanization' and to permanent resettlement, although they willingly

replaced the tents in which they lived with mud huts and tin shacks starting in 1952. Breeze-block rooms with corrugated iron roofs finally became the norm in 1955–6, and the improvement of basic infrastructure actually attracted other refugees to move from outlying villages into the camps.[35]

The attempt to incorporate the Palestinians within the political system of Jordan set it apart from other Arab host states, but some of the social and economic features were similar. Egyptian legislation governed economic activity in the Gaza Strip, but the lack of primary resources and free access to Egypt severely limited the scope for development. The military administration did not pursue a coherent economic policy, and neither it nor Palestinian entrepreneurs invested in public infrastructure. Commerce was directed towards the import of profit-making luxury goods, effectively transforming Gaza into a large black market and smuggling entrepôt and increasing its dependence on the Egyptian government (and UNRWA) to provide basic commodities.[36] This served the interests of a handful of local merchants, but impeded the emergence of entrepreneurial strata. The orientation of much economic activity to meet the requirements of the Egyptian military administration and armed forces (with 5,000 local employees) had an additional distorting effect, as did the exclusion of Palestinians from the higher levels of public employment outside the municipalities (but 6,000 were employed in the civil service).[37]

Conditions were predictably worst for the poorer refugees, among whom unemployment was reportedly as high as 80 per cent even as late as 1960, in contrast to a 35 per cent rate among original residents.[38] In Gaza, as elsewhere, the host authorities generally did not provide electricity, running water, roads, or sewage systems, and so 'UNRWA-managed camps played a basic role in the economic survival of the refugees' by arranging the provision of rent-free space and providing 'shelter, basic rations, facilities (water, sewage disposal) and social services (clinics, schools)'.[39] UNRWA and the UN peacekeeping force UNEF also employed substantial numbers of Palestinians (4,000), although the literacy requirement was a major obstacle for many.[40] Besides providing 75 per cent of imports by 1954, UNRWA also accounted for 19 per cent of gross national product in Gaza by 1966.[41] Like its Jordanian counterpart, the Egyptian government considered resettling large numbers of refugees on farming projects in Sinai with UNRWA assistance after 1951, but abandoned the plans conclusively after angry demonstrations in Gaza in February 1955.[42] Access to higher education in Egypt and migration to the oil-rich Arab states (which spurred a greater educational effort by UNRWA after 1960) eased the problem for some families, but had a negligible economic impact generally. Remittances were a vital source of household wealth, but the lack of real opportunities to invest in productive enterprises led to a focus of spending on domestic needs and social functions.

The cases of the West Bank and Gaza Strip underlined the continued social fragmentation and political marginalization of the Palestinian middle class, and its separation from the poorer refugees in the camps. The patterns were repli-

cated in Lebanon and Syria. Many middle-class refugees had kinship ties or previous business dealings with Lebanese and Syrian counterparts, and found it relatively easily to secure accommodation and employment. Wealthy families had often taken their holidays in Lebanese resorts, especially, and numerous Palestinians had attended missionary schools or (along with Jews from the *yishuv*) the American University of Beirut. In Syria Palestinian professionals, office workers, and entrepreneurs were often more successful at finding work in the main cities than Syrians from provincial towns and rural areas. At the same time, the ease of middle-class integration inhibited concentration in specific economic sectors or geographic areas, while variations in capabilities and opportunities led naturally to further dispersion.

There could still be obstacles to integration, especially in Lebanon. The practice of white-collar professions depended on possession of a work permit and on membership in the relevant syndicate. The latter requirement was difficult: 'foreign' lawyers had to prove Lebanese citizenship of over ten years' standing, while doctors, pharmacists, and engineers of other nationalities could join only if their governments offered Lebanese reciprocal rights, something patently impossible for Palestinians.[43] Possession of the *baccalaureat*, the Lebanese secondary school certificate, or a Ph.D. was at times demanded, or else membership dues were simply raised. Yet there was little attempt either to co-opt middle-class refugees or to isolate them politically through systematic use of social and economic levers. Political disenfranchisement was sufficient to exclude them from government, and the Maronite establishment could always bring down entrepreneurs who were too successful. This was graphically demonstrated when the Lebanese finance sector collaborated with the Central Bank to engineer the crash of the major Palestinian-owned Intra Bank in 1966.[44] Detention and deportation were also available as options for deterring political activism, as shown in the expulsion of 60 Palestinian and Arab students from the American University of Beirut in 1951 and another 17 student leaders in 1955.[45]

Once again, government policies had the greatest impact on the poorer refugees. Most had been villagers in northern Palestine, who halted their flight in 1947–8 as soon as they reached safety in southern Lebanon and Syria. The authorities in both countries were keen to curb infiltration (and smuggling), and gradually moved the refugees away from the borders.[46] The border regions were declared military zones, to which access was possible only with special permits issued by the army.[47] The Christian-dominated authorities in Lebanon were especially concerned to settle the mainly Muslim refugees in Muslim areas and, above all, away from the capital. Government regulations inhibited voluntary movement from one camp to another, while providing for forcible transfers for security reasons; unauthorized relocation could also result in the loss of UNRWA rations and services.[48] The desire of Lebanese industry for cheap labour led to a relaxation of controls, however, and several new camps gradually built up around Beirut.[49] As a later minister of public works

admitted, relocation took place on the explicit advice of Lebanese businessmen, 'so that the Palestinians could be exploited in Beirut and in agriculture on the coast'.[50]

For their part, the refugees were attracted to the main cities of Syria and Lebanon by the availability of additional public services (including education), infrastructure, and employment. Yet camp housing and infrastructure remained minimal in both countries. Several years elapsed before tents gave way to tin shacks and mud huts in Syria, whether because the refugees resisted what they saw as a prelude to resettlement or for lack of government and international funds. The Lebanese authorities, conversely, prohibited the replacement of tents until the late 1950s, when they were allowed to be replaced by tin shacks, and delayed the transition to breeze-block rooms and corrugated iron roofs until the mid-1960s. Entire families still lived in the space previously occupied by a tent, albeit better protected against the weather. Even then they were still denied electricity and piped water, and were forcibly prevented from digging individual cesspits for their homes to replace the communal latrines.[51]

Palestinian Nationalism: Social Origins and Political Paths

Palestinianism was a natural response to *al-nakba*, but it was the experience of social and political marginality that effectively transformed it from a 'popular grass-roots patriotism' into a proto-nationalism in the decade after 1948. The trend was evident in the camps, where a majority of refugees were of peasant background and for whom the sudden, collective loss of land was a devastating blow to livelihood, identity, and self-esteem. The same applied to refugees who had previously been workers in the industrial, construction, transport, services, and artisan sectors, most of whom also had rural backgrounds. Their number had soared from 63,900 in 1939 to 138,100 in 1942 as the inter-war depression, *yishuv* demand for land and its exclusion of non-Jewish labour, and hardships caused by the 1936–9 revolt depressed Palestinian agricultural exports and increased landlessness, which affected some 30 per cent of all villagers by the mid-1930s. These pressures, coupled with the timely work opportunities created by British wartime requirements, drew a growing number of peasants into shanty towns around the coastal cities (and Jerusalem), in which up to 111,000 lived by 1945.[52] Together, poor and small peasants and agricultural wage workers accounted for an estimated 47 per cent of all refugees in 1948, and workers and petty employees in other sectors for another 25 per cent.[53]

Landlessness was hardly new, therefore, but after 1948 it affected a greater number of Palestinians. More to the point, *al-nakba* removed the smallholdings that had provided a crucial source of supplementary income and basic economic security for families that had managed until then to maintain a distinction between poverty and destitution, even as powerful market forces and

integration into the cash economy eroded their ability to eke out subsistence from cultivation alone. That said, possibly the most damaging consequence, and the one that distinguished *al-nakba* from economically driven landlessness, was the wholesale 'social uprootedness' that meant 'mainly the severance of personal and traditional ties connected with the concepts of home, family, clan and community'—the village social organization of which land formed such a central part.[54]

After 1948 landlessness deprived the refugees of social status, both in their own eyes and in those of neighbouring populations (including non-refugee Palestinians), and exposed them to ridicule and the charge that they had 'sold their own land to the Jews'.[55] The fact that their new neighbours in rural areas often belonged to other sects or social groups—Shiʿite Muslims and Maronites in Lebanon, ʿAlawi Muslims and Druze in Syria, and Bedouins in Transjordan—deepened the isolation of the predominantly Sunni Muslim fallahin in the camps.[56] Class barriers had the same effect in urban areas, as even Palestinian city-dwellers tended to shun their peasant compatriots, both in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and in the Arab host countries. Refugees of urban origin who were compelled by destitution to live in the camps or were forcibly transferred there by the authorities set up separate quarters and avoided dealings with the other inhabitants, while often rebuilding social, commercial, and employment ties with compatriots from their towns and cities of origin.[57]

Ghettoization reinforced the tendency of Palestinian peasants (like peasants in other societies) to conduct as much of their lives as possible within their villages, now replaced by camps in which UNRWA, rather than national governments, provided virtually all basic services and an appreciable number of jobs. It was itself reinforced by the resort by the refugees to traditional solidary ties within the camps, which distinguished them further from surrounding populations.[58] Their experience offered proof of the view that it was not physical and economic dislocation, as such, but rather 'the disintegration of the cultural environment of the victim [which is] the cause of the degradation'.[59] The refugees may have yearned 'for incorporation into some one of those cultural pools which already ha[d], or look[ed] as if it might acquire, a state of its own, with the subsequent promise of full cultural citizenship, access to primary schools, employment, and all', but knew that they were spurned and would '*continue* to be spurned', to adapt an argument posited for rural migrants in modern industrial contexts.[60] Being part of a broader Arab (and Islamic) culture was one thing, but losing their place of origin and resettling amidst their Arab brethren evoked deep social (even more than economic) insecurity and cemented opposition to permanent resettlement.[61] It also strengthened attachment to the social structures that had been on the decline under the pressure of market forces before 1948, and drove an almost obsessive striving for education, that offered itself as a new source of identity, dignity, and material security.[62] Marginality could not on its own produce nationalism, in the absence of the political role played by key social forces and the organizing framework

provided by the state, but it emphasized the insecurities and contrasts that made for Palestinianism.

Social background and material circumstances after 1948 also affected the form and purpose of political organization. A primary concern of many refugees in the early years was to reunite families which had been torn asunder during the exodus. They also strove to gather members of their original villages or *hamulas* within the same camp, as a means of economic and cultural solidarity, and replicated the councils of elders (*majalis al-shuyukh* or *wujaha'*) who had exercised social authority before 1948. Some host governments inadvertently reinforced this trend by adopting the British mandate system of designating *mukhtars* in the camps (and villages) to perform administrative functions and maintain political control. They wielded considerable influence as a result, and gained an additional role in representing refugee interests in various committees that appeared after 1948 to organize relief, press property claims, and seek political recognition. These bodies were most prominent in Jordan, not only because it had the largest refugee population, but also because the official policy of integration meant that the committees could gain political significance as a vehicle for voter mobilization during general elections.[63] That said, political activism or radicalism were not inevitable consequences of being a refugee; a majority in the camps was arguably willing to accept a compromise solution based on the existence of Israel, subject to certain serious concessions on its part.[64]

The recourse to traditional forms of social organization also served the political purpose of former Palestinian leader Husayni, who sought support in the camps. The presence of Arab Higher Committee offices and a handful of salaried personnel in Cairo and Damascus helped his effort, as did his visits to the camps in Lebanon. Husayni relied on his personal standing to secure UNRWA jobs for his supporters and to obtain petty administrative favours from the authorities for other refugees. The 'mufti's men' in the camps dispensed such patronage and ensured shows of loyalty during his visits, hailing him as the 'sword of Islam' (*sayf al-din*). He also used these networks to send armed infiltrators against Israel—especially from the West Bank as a means of embarrassing ʿAbdullah and his successor, Husayn—but accounted for only a small proportion of incidents in 1949–56. Infiltration was a widespread phenomenon, as former mujahidin set up their own bands or operated on 'contract' for Arab military intelligence services, but neither they nor Husayni attempted to construct modern political organizations on that basis.

Husayni's patriarchal manner and favouritism alienated many camp refugees, especially younger ones, and steadily reduced his influence among them. Yet few joined modern, ideologically-based political parties instead. This was partly due to the lack of contact with the mainly middle-class activists, and to the limited interest of most parties in recruiting in the camps. It was also the result of low levels of literacy and the struggle to provide the needs of daily life. Refugees who had 'traditionally' been landless even before 1948, such as sea-

sonally migratory nomads or the *ghawarna*—peasants originally 'imported' from the southern frontiers of the Ottoman empire, who consequently had weak clan structures and were subjected to semi-feudal conditions in the *jiftliks* of the Hula Valley of northern Palestine and of the Jordan Valley to the south—were even less likely to be politically active, although they were equally likely to be involved in infiltration and smuggling. The apparent detachment from politics started to alter only after 1954, as education motivated the younger generation and enabled it to compete increasingly for leadership.[65] Even then, the risk of imprisonment for membership of an opposition party and the desire for a secure future prompted many parents to discourage their children from political activism.

Political Islam was the only organized force to gain a noteworthy following in the camps in the 1950s. It built on the natural attachment to religion among the former villagers and lower-income groups, which tended to strong social conservativism. The Muslim Brotherhood Society attracted the most recruits (especially in Jordan) with its emphasis on jihad and on the need for Palestinians to rely on themselves and take military action to regain their homeland. This appeal was backed by an emphasis on sports and scout activities, mock military training, and the free uniforms it gave out. The Brotherhood's Palestinian patriotism was accompanied by the view that Arabism and Arab unity were a sound basis for wider Islamic unity, although Arab nationalism, in the Western sense of the word, was opposed on the grounds that it was a secular concept invented by infidels that divided Arab and non-Arab Muslims and, by establishing a new object of worship and principle for loyalty, sinfully presented the modern nation as a partner of God (*shirk*).[66] The Islamic Liberation Party was a strong competitor, despite opposition to both Palestinian and Arab nationalism, and made a special effort to target rural populations.[67] It recognized only Islam as a valid basis for statehood and believed that a unified Islamic state had to be set up before the jihad against Israel could be launched, but its political focus on Palestine was the source of its appeal. Both Islamist groups also sought recruits among local police and national guardsmen in the West Bank.[68]

Palestinians of peasant background readily accepted the fusion of Islam and Arabism in their identities. They were also responsive to the declared antipathy of the Islamists to modern political parties (*ahzab*), which were perceived as a reprehensible innovation (*bid'a*) and the vehicle for divisive and faction-prone loyalties (*'asabiyya*), that fomented dissension (*fitna*) and led to civil strife (*mihna*). Close ideological ties with Husayni, who also provided some financial support, helped the Islamic Liberation Party in particular to gain ground in the camps. The rise of Nasir as a pan-Arab hero committed to the liberation of Palestine and his clash with the Muslim Brotherhood after 1954 reversed Islamist fortunes among the refugees, but his own hostility to party politics reinforced the distrust evinced by camp refugees towards modern party organization.

Middle-class politics were notably different, although they also had roots in the period before 1948. The decline of the old elite and its associated political bodies after 1939 was reflected in the emergence of new parties that can be described as modern, in terms of their possession of a distinct political ideology, organized structure, and programmatic activities. One was the National Liberation League, that emerged from the dissolution of the mixed Arab–Jewish Palestinian Communist Party on Comintern orders in 1943, after years of internal division, and that had a considerable base in the 20,000-strong Federation of Arab Labour Unions and Associations.[69] The Arab Nationalist Bloc was a much looser grouping of intellectuals founded in 1929, which faltered after 1939 and had only an estimated 300 members in 1947. An ideological rival of both was the Syrian National Party, that benefited from Palestinian identification with 'southern Syria' to win a following in the decade after 1935. The Muslim Brotherhood was a latecomer: it established a Palestinian branch only in 1946, but quickly set up local chapters in several cities, thanks in large part to the support of Husayni, a friend of the Brotherhood's founder and spiritual guide Hasan al-Banna. The mufti and his loyalist Arab Party waged an ideological and political struggle against the secular parties, but displayed a consistently benign attitude towards the Brotherhood.[70]

The ideological parties were unable to develop a mass base or dent Husayni's grip on national politics before the 1947–8 war. This was partly because of the fragmentation and political weakness of their social base, and because they were often led by younger, educated urbanites, with a disproportionate number of Christians among the original founders and local leaders of the secular movements. Another cause of their marginal status was that they were subordinate to 'mother' parties based in neighbouring Arab states (except for the communists, who were loyal to the USSR). The principal leadership of the Arab nationalists in Beirut was riven by internal divisions until 1947, the Syrian nationalists and Muslim Brotherhood were involved in the struggles for power in Lebanon and Egypt that eventually came into the open in 1948–9, while the Soviet Union formally committed itself to the principle of separate Jewish statehood in Palestine in spring 1947. The result in each case was to paralyse the relevant Palestinian branch, deprive it of needed material support, or place it in conflict with its own constituency at a critical moment in national politics.

These patterns replicated themselves after 1948. The same political parties or their equivalents—the National Liberation League gave way in the West Bank to the Jordanian Communist Party in 1951 and the Palestinian Communist Party in Gaza in 1953, while disciples of the Arab Nationalist Bloc set up the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) in 1952—remained the main ideologically-based movements operating among the Palestinians. There were two notable additions. One was the Ba'th Party, launched too late to form a branch in Palestine before 1948 but subsequently acquiring a modest membership in various Palestinian communities. The other was the Islamic Liberation Party,

founded by sheikh Taqi-al-Din al-Nabhani in Jordan in 1952, which was basically a Palestinian organization with branches in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Overall numbers were not insignificant, but none of the parties could be termed a mass force. The largest concentration was in the West Bank, where the communists had an estimated strength of 2,300, the more loosely structured Muslim Brotherhood 700–1,000, and the ANM 'several hundreds' for much of 1949–67.[71] In Gaza the communists had some 220 members at their peak in 1959, the Brotherhood 1,000 at theirs in 1954, while the ANM probably had a few hundred members and the Ba'th a mere 30–40.[72]

What decided patterns of political organization among middle-class Palestinians was arguably their relationship to the state, and equally their ability to benefit from the economic opportunities that state formation in Jordan provided. This was obvious in the case of the West Bank, where co-optation of the notables and preferential treatment for the East Bank marginalized Palestinians with modern education or entrepreneurial skills and prompted them to oppose Jordanization strongly. Not all were negatively affected, however. Families of the traditional elite, especially, took advantage of the concentration of political power and government resources and of preferential investment policies to transfer capital and residence to the East Bank. In this way they not only diversified and expanded their economic wealth and so enhanced their social and political survival, but were also able to improve their position against rivals by using their position in the Amman-based chamber of commerce to manipulate the award of currency and import licences to West Bank businesses.

Joining an opposition party was a predictable response, and led naturally to the assertion of a distinct Palestinian identity. This also explains why the secular parties appealed strongly to professionals, teachers, office workers, and students—the social categories most likely to be both aware and resentful of the discriminatory effect (if not also intent) of government policies. The Muslim Brotherhood Society proved the point in reverse, as its leading personalities were urban-based lay clergy, traditional notables and members of prominent landowning families, merchants of all levels, and government-appointed *mukhtars*—all sectors co-opted in one manner or another by the state.[73] The Society demonstrated its loyalty to the throne, not least with support for government repression of the secular opposition parties. In contrast to the Islamic Liberation Party, which in 1955 provoked a law restricting political sermons in mosques by publicly preaching the overthrow of the government, the Society limited its local concerns to matters of religious observance and the application of Islamic *shari'a* in education and other matters.

The other side of the coin, as the example of the Muslim Brotherhood showed, was that the granting of full political and civil franchise made it possible for the Jordanian state to co-opt or neutralize many middle-class Palestinians, albeit without ceding any real power or excessively altering the 'ethnic' composition of the armed forces and other key government agencies. They

could both vote and stand for election to public office even when in opposition, and repeatedly did so in the first decade after 1948. Even the camp refugees organized to contest general elections (despite the property clause that excluded many of them), fielding candidates and winning a handful of parliamentary seats.[74] Indeed, insecurity only prompted the refugees to seek political stability and material advantage within the state framework more actively. The availability of avenues offered by the state also explains why the participation of refugees of all classes in the opposition parties was substantially less than their proportion to the general population. In general, patriotic attachment to Palestine did not preclude acceptance of the Jordanian state unless the Palestinians were systematically excluded, or thought themselves to be, from key posts and real decision-making power. In the latter case tension resulted between Jordanian and Palestinian national identities, although co-optation and integration obscured the rift at least until the establishment of the PLO in 1964.

Political behaviour among Palestinians in Syria, Lebanon, or the Gaza Strip (and Egypt) confirmed the general patterns. The critical contrast with Jordan was the lack of political franchise. Not only was this a disincentive to joining Arab parties, since membership could not lead to political advantage, but it deprived the Palestinians of alternative channels and relegated them firmly to the margins of national politics. Middle-class activists tended to join the same core group of ideologically-based parties as in Jordan, but in relatively smaller numbers. Communists, Baʿthists, Islamists, and pan-Syrian nationalists in Syria and Lebanon had their own national (in the sense of particularistic) agendas, which inevitably placed Palestinian members and their priorities in a subordinate position. Palestinians especially eschewed local parties with sectarian or regionalist agendas, if only because they had little to offer and little incentive of their own to seek voteless Palestinian adherents. Traditional political 'bosses' in Lebanon often refused to extend bureaucratic favours to Palestinians for this reason, although this did not deter private organizations from offering jobs and school places, the foremost example being the Sunni Muslim Maqasid Charitable Society.[75] The Sunni Muslim Najjada Party was also the only one to welcome Palestinians in its ranks and offer political patronage, if only because it hoped to further its confessional aims with their support.

Common to all Palestinian activists was their exposure to the coercive capabilities of Arab host states. The Jordanian authorities sought to prevent social associations with a patently Palestinian character (such as the Haifa Cultural Association and the Jaffa-Muslim Sport Club) from engaging in politics after 1949, and impeded the appearance of new ones by withholding licences. It harassed the communists incessantly from 1949 onwards, and was finally able to impose a sweeping ban on all forms of political activity—including parties, camp committees, and sports clubs—in April 1957. Only the Muslim Brotherhood was excepted, on the grounds that it was registered as a social association, not a political party. Otherwise, suspected activists were often subjected to town arrest, internal exile, and foreign travel bans. In Gaza the Egyptian mili-

tary authorities immediately outlawed the communists in 1949 and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1954, and persecuted local Baʿthists after 1961, due to their party's role in the Syrian secession from the United Arab Republic. Most secular parties fared better in Syria, but the Syrian National Party and various Islamists were suppressed repeatedly from 1951 onwards. The decision by the ANM and Baʿth Party to dissolve their local branches during the union of Egypt and Syria in 1958–61, in compliance with Nasir's ban on parties, affected their Palestinian members as well. In Lebanon, numerous Palestinians were among those detained by the Lebanese authorities when the Syrian National Party was discovered to be planning a *coup* at the end of 1961.

In each case, it was the Arab states that determined the political 'space' within which the Palestinians—as well as their own nationals—could operate. Their consolidation of control over society progressively reduced that space, leaving the Palestinians increasingly marginalized. The implications were best revealed by the responses of the petite bourgeoisie, disparate, dispersed, and ill-defined as it was. Its ranks included former mandate civil servants, teachers, private-sector employees, small tradesmen and shopkeepers, and artisans who had fled Palestine, as well as their counterparts among the non-refugee populations of the West Bank and Gaza. The size of this broad category is indicated by the fact that former mandate government employees alone accounted for 17 per cent of the refugees who had been economically active prior to 1948.[76] The refugees in this category generally sought urban settings, which offered better public services (such as education) and a wider job market for themselves and their children. Their numbers were gradually swelled by poorer refugees who resumed their trades (tailors, barbers, confectioners, and the like) or secured positions in the lower grades of the UNRWA administration, and so could afford to move into rented housing outside the camps.

Two further patterns contributed to the numerical growth of the petite bourgeoisie, and to the political responses of its members. One was the massive increase in the number of Palestinians with a modern education, as they benefited from the rapid expansion of primary and secondary schools and universities in the Arab states in the late 1940s and 1950s. The impact was also evident in the refugee camps, where the provision of basic schooling by UNRWA brought literacy to the younger generation of peasant background. Most of the Palestinians employed by the agency as teachers came from the lower middle class, whether living inside the camps or outside. Many were barely out of secondary school themselves, and imparted the sense of urgency and political commitment sweeping Arab societies to their students. Teachers (and other UNRWA employees) often provided the link between the camps and the various political parties, and acted as recruiting agents for the latter. Access to Arab universities (especially those of Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut) was another catalyst, as Palestinian students were exposed to the same pool of nationalist politics, revolutionary ideologies, and statist organizational models as their Arab counterparts.

Education fuelled the second pattern, namely the transformation of a 'people of small farmers, artisans and traders . . . into a people of clerks, accountants and administrators'.[77] Whether they worked for UNRWA, the Jordanian state, expanding public sectors in the oil-rich countries, or private-sector companies, a majority of Palestinians had become employees. This paralleled the similar transformation underway in Arab societies, with the difference that the Palestinians had significantly less influence on the political authorities that determined the allocation of economic resources and public office. In the Palestinian case, subversion of the economic independence associated with the petite bourgeoisie into a symbiotic exchange with the state was either impossible or partial and highly uneven, fragmenting it in sociological terms and marginalizing its political role. The same could be said even of the Palestinians in Jordan, where the implicit barriers to the exercise of real political power and limitations on employment in certain state agencies encouraged them to concentrate in the private sector and among the expatriates working in the oil-rich economies. Naturalization in this case meant passports and access to external labour markets, but weak political and psychological identification with the Jordanian state. The denial of naturalization in the secondary host countries accentuated this marginality, as in Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon.

An Imagined Palestinian Community

In classic vein, the dislocation and unprecedented migration of *al-nakba*, followed by education, mobility, and the growth of novel strata in urbanized settings bred strong political discontent.[78] Education offered opportunities for economic and social mobility, but expectations either could not be fully attained or else could not be translated into tangible political assets. The constant 'pilgrimages' of growing numbers of Palestinians between their places of study, employment, and family residence demonstrated the commonality of their experience, while the myriad obstacles to obtaining travel documents and visas emphasized their marginality. Several key conditions for the transformation of popular grass-roots patriotism into modern nationalist patriotism therefore obtained, save one: the state. The search for its unifying and organizing framework was not recognized or shared by all, nor was it consistently the conscious or dominant driving force of Palestinian politics, but it was more than implicit in the manner of the reconstruction of the national movement after 1948.

The search for state was hardly restricted to the petite bourgeoisie, but its numerical growth and heightened awareness of marginality ultimately made it the key social force and drove the transition to nationalist patriotism. It provided the main constituency of the political parties after 1948, and gave rise

to the generation of activists who were to launch the armed struggle and assume leadership of the national movement in the 1960s. The distinct role of the petite bourgeoisie in providing the most sustained driving force of Palestinian nationalist politics differed noticeably from the experience of many other nationalist and revolutionary movements, in which intellectuals and other members of the intelligentsia (narrowly defined) figured heavily among the founders and key cadres.[79] This contrast is best explained by the primarily statist orientation of the Palestinian movement after 1948 (if not since 1918). The petite bourgeoisie (and the poorer camp residents) moreover wielded proto-nationalism as a response to the middle class, 'that denied its Palestinianism and hastened to obtain the nationality of Arab and non-Arab states, and that obscured its Palestinian features, for instance by deliberately changing accent or social customs'.[80]

Yet the petite bourgeoisie was anything but homogeneous politically or ideologically, given its lack of distinction as a logical or economic category, and even less so in fragmented and heterogeneous Palestinian society. More, perhaps, than any other social formation it could be defined 'not as a self-contained and objective category but as a relation which is itself constituted by many other social relations and practices'. The implication being that the predisposition of its members towards political activism and the paths they took varied sharply and revealed wide divergences.[81] Indeed, the fact that it could only be defined sociologically, in its own historical context, encouraged its tendency at one and the same time to be assimilative, utopian, and eclectic in deriving sources of political thought and organizational models.[82] Whatever the choice, common to all was the typical tendency of nationalists to 'traditionalize', that is, to innovate (in ideology, organization, and tactics) in terms of fidelity to the past.[83] This also explains the convergence on the central tasks of consolidating power and of legitimizing exclusive authority, despite the basic duality inherent in Palestinian nationalist patriotism.

Comparable class background did not of course mean that the individuals or organized groups of whom the Palestinian national movement was composed after 1948 related ideological outlook, political behaviour, and social origins in analytically similar ways, if at all. For the founders of Fateh, the socially conservative and mainstream nationalist force that was to dominate the PLO after 1968 and lead the statist drive, the 'lack of a territorial framework and of fully-formed economic and social institutions' allowed greater 'flexibility and adaptability to the diversity of Arab economic systems' and provided a common nationalist cause for Arab states and Palestinians alike.[84] This deliberate obfuscation of the element of class was not shared by the Palestinian communists, who decried the 'chauvinist' nationalism of the middle class, or by the leftist guerrilla groups that were to appear after 1967, and that explained the pragmatic politics of Fateh in terms of the petit bourgeois background of its leaders and their alliance with the grande bourgeoisie. Yet none of these explanations conceived of nationalist patriotism in relation to state-building. Nor did they

situate the fluidity and complexity of the social, economic, and political circumstances of the Palestinians within the historical and institutional context of the construction of nation and state.

The solitary exception to the latter failing was the brief analysis offered in 1971 by Husam al-Khatib, a former member of the PLO executive committee, in an attempt to explain the persistent ideological factionalism, intellectual eclecticism, and political fragmentation of the national movement.[85] These were natural symptoms of revolutionary movements that had risen suddenly and expanded rapidly under the leadership of youthful elites whose localistic or national ambitions had been frustrated, and who appealed to the false consciousness of broad popular sectors. This pathology was typical of the general Arab experience since 1945, but was most pronounced in the Palestinian case for a number of reasons. Foremost was the impact of collective dispersal and the accentuated division of the underdeveloped Palestinian society into groups with disparate interests, that moreover intermingled with the interests of pre-existing, 'traditional' classes and of class counterparts in Arab host societies.[86] The flaws of the national movement during the British mandate and divisive colonial policies had also left their mark, while Arab suppression of Palestinian political activism after 1948 encouraged strategies of survival based on the individual or family rather than national community or class. The lack of shared pragmatic needs and responses among the scattered Palestinian communities and the excessive difficulty of movement between Arab states also produced divergent outlooks on the national question. Rather than suggest a statist solution, however, Khatib regarded the bureaucratization of the guerrilla movement after 1967 as the foremost expression of the 'revolutionary disease', that could only be treated by a 'revolution-within-the-revolution' and by taking the national struggle from exile back to its home territory.[87]

There were other distinctions within the petite bourgeoisie, most significant of which was the marked variation in political participation, ideological inclination, and social outlook between those who had become refugees in 1948 and those who had not. Refugees generally do not form a social force so much as a disparate group, and are consequently less able to turn themselves into an organized political force.[88] They are less likely to be politically active, whatever their class, and more likely both to venture afield in pursuit of economic opportunity and to accommodate to the authorities that had power over their fate. In the Palestinian case, political organizations formed by refugees tended to simple nationalism with little or no ideological depth; Fateh and the Palestinian Liberation Front were foremost examples, but the same might be said of Habash and his colleague Wadiᶜ Haddad, who had little input to the early theoretical writings of the Arab Nationalists Movement that they helped to found. 'Residents'—individuals whose families had not become refugees in 1948—were more likely to join parties espousing a forml ideology or social programme, and to seek non-migratory sources of income. It was they, more

often than not, who authored the theoretical tracts and edited the periodicals of the guerrilla groups that appeared in the 1960s.

As remarkable was that the most enduring, if not the most intense, participation in the armed struggle (and PLO bureaucratic development) after 1967 came from residents rather than refugees. With the exception of the top leadership of the principal guerrilla groups, a majority of the salaried personnel in the PLO's expanding civilian and military bureaucratic elites came from resident families in the West Bank and Gaza. A substantial number moreover came from rural areas or agricultural market towns, had benefited from modern education, and rose into the elite through membership in military organizations, much as was the case with the Free Officers who took power in Egypt in 1952, the FLN in Algeria in 1962, the Ba'thist officers (whether 'Alawi, Druze, or Sunni muslim) in Syria in 1963 and 1966, and the coalition of officers and Ba'thist civilian cadres in Iraq in 1968.[89] Despite the incontestable importance of the contrast between the collective uprooting and dispersal suffered by the Palestinians in 1948 and the physical continuity enjoyed by other Arab societies that had experienced political revolution and sharp social transformation, the evidence is that the same social force eventually asserted its political leadership and dominated the state-building exercise in both cases.

The assertion of the petite bourgeoisie lay in the future, however, and in the 1950s the question was how to mobilize and unite the disparate and dispersed Palestinian communities. Prevailing political conditions made it impossible to establish a national organization with linkages across borders, and so young activists resorted instead to unions and social associations, some a revival from pre-1948 Palestine. The League of Palestinian Students in Cairo proved to be the single most important political arena of the 1950s, within which the later national leadership was formed, and was followed in the 1960s by unions of women, workers, teachers, and other social groups. This was a vital first step towards national mobilization, but it was armed struggle that eventually turned the Palestinian 'idea' into an organized, mass phenomenon, by offering a powerful symbol of the 'imagined community' and providing the impetus to focus it on a common structure. The launch of the war of liberation had to wait until 1965, however, and in the meantime the only Palestinians to wear military uniform did so under the command of one or another Arab state.

2

Palestinians in Arab Uniform

Infiltration: The Post-War Challenge

In January 1949, Arab and Israeli delegations commenced armistice negotiations under UN auspices on the island of Rhodes. Separate agreements were duly reached between Israel and each of its Arab neighbours, starting with Egypt in February, then Lebanon in March and Jordan in April, and ending with Syria in July. This was accompanied on the Arab side by steps to contain the potential repercussions of the Palestine war on domestic and regional stability. Far from endorsing the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Arab governments took active steps to marginalize or dismantle what remained of the Palestinian political and military bodies that had waged the conflict in 1947–8.

ʿAbdullah had called for the dissolution of the Arab Salvation Army, formed and armed by the League of Arab States, as early as May 1948.[1] At the beginning of October, following a decision by the All Palestine Government in Gaza to revive the Army of Holy War, ʿAbdullah ordered the British-officered units of the Arab Legion to disarm and forcibly disband its units in what was soon to be commonly known as the West Bank of Jordan.[2] The remaining 2,464 irregulars subsequently joined whichever Arab contingent was nearest, and the Jordanian military authorities formally dissolved the Army of Holy War on 18 December 1948.[3] The League of Arab States had already decided on 22 October to disband the Arab Salvation Army, which was regrouped in southern Syria. Unhappy with this decision a brigade commander, Wasfi al-Tal, planned to lead his unit to seize power in Damascus and then, reinforced by the Syrian army and with the help of Jordan's Arab Legion, drive back into Palestine.[4] This plan was exposed following the *coup d'état* by Husni al-Zaʿim on 30 March 1949; the decommissioning of the Arab Salvation Army was hastened, and it ceased to exist by 15 May.[5] The Egyptian military authorities in Gaza had disarmed Palestinian irregulars and dismantled a local radio station in the meantime, and repatriated several hundred Egyptian volunteers belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood Society following the armistice in February.[6]

The AHC and APG were powerless to prevent the disbanding of Palestinian irregular forces. A belated announcement by the AHC on 15 May confirming the Arab decision to dissolve the Army of Holy War only underlined its lack of control over events. Despite enjoying the nominal recognition of the League of

Arab States, the APG was not invited to attend subsequent meetings of the ministerial council or other bodies, despite repeated protests. ʿAbd-al-Baqi dutifully kept office at APG headquarters in Cairo, but his death in 1963 signalled its final demise. Husayni similarly sought to keep the AHC alive by opening offices in Cairo and Damascus, but his activity was strictly monitored by the Egyptian authorities, as much as by his Hashemite rivals in Jordan. His attempts to build a political following among the refugees in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon over the next decade met with little success, and he spent the years until his death in 1974 in relative oblivion.

Arab policy towards the AHC and APG was determined by the general wish to avoid entanglement in further conflict with Israel. Israeli military operations in the border areas continued throughout the armistice negotiations in 1949, and later resulted in the loss of part of the al-ʿAwja demilitarized zone on the Egyptian front and of a strategic hill overlooking Lake Tiberias on the Syrian front in May 1951. Arab governments were concerned that infiltration by Palestinian refugees, who slipped across the lines in the attempt to return to former homes and rejoin families, harvest crops, or exact personal vengeance on the Jewish settlers, would provoke Israel and provide pretexts for further expansion. At most 10 per cent of the infiltrators acted out of nationalist motivation, in fact, but the sheer volume of incidents, peaking at 16,000 in 1952 and then dropping to just over 7,000 a year later and then 4,351 in 1955, posed a severe problem.[7]

Israel viewed infiltration as an indication not only of Arab hostility, but of a deliberate intention by the neighbouring states to destroy it in a 'second round'. It responded with a strategy of disproportionate retaliation designed both to compel the Arab governments to prevent infiltration and to deter them from launching a new war. Israeli border guards had effectively initiated a shoot-to-kill policy at the end of the 1947–8 war, and in the next eight years killed between 2,700 and 5,000 Palestinians, mostly unarmed.[8] Few prisoners were taken in the first few years: the wounded were finished off, while many prisoners were 'liquidated', tied to trees and shot.[9] To increase the pressure, other units crossed the armistice lines to attack Arab military outposts and villages. Such action appeared particularly threatening to the Arab states because it coincided with persistent Israeli efforts to take over demilitarized zones, inch the border outwards in certain areas, and expel additional numbers of Palestinians in border-clearing operations.

Most of the infiltration took place from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where there were the largest concentrations of refugees, with relatively long and open borders with Israel. Jordan was anxious to stabilize the armistice line, especially after the transfer of an additional strip of land to Israeli control led to the expulsion of 5,650 Palestinian villagers in 1949–50. Despite continuing secret negotiations with king ʿAbdullah, or perhaps as a means of increasing the pressure on him, Israeli troops mounted 117 raids into the West Bank in this period.[10] In early 1951, after additional attacks had left dozens of civilian

casualties, the Jordanian government decreed the formation of a national guard to assist in the defence of the frontier villages. The guardsmen were poorly armed and lacked communications and transport equipment, but helped the Arab Legion to inflict substantial casualties on Israeli raiders, especially in 1953–4.

Individual infiltration gradually gave way after 1952 to more organized activity. As John Glubb, the British commander of the Arab Legion, saw it, the upsurge of violence in 1953 was the work of 'a group of refugees in Damascus, all of them former terrorists employed by the Mufti [Husayni] in Palestine. The Saudian [*sic*] Arabian government was arming and subsidizing these men to infiltrate through Jordan into Israel and kill Jews.'[11] Egypt and Syria also provided funds and arms, but the Jordanian security services concluded that Husayni had failed.[12] Armed infiltration nonetheless took a toll, with 111 Israeli casualties in 1951, 111 in 1952, 124 in 1953, and 117 in 1954.[13] Palestinian activity also threatened the Israeli ambition to 'nibble' more territory, for example in the Hebron district; Israel feared that intense infiltration activity would challenge its ability to create faits accomplis and disprove its claim to control the area.[14] For all these reasons, Israel launched 200 reprisal raids in the first five months of 1953, inflicting 295 Arab casualties, of whom 95 per cent were civilians.[15] In the bloodiest incident, on 15 October, the raiders dynamited dozens of houses over the heads of their occupants in Qibya, killing 66 and wounding 75.

Fearful of further Israeli reprisals, the Jordanian command increased border patrols in the West Bank and removed officers who had proved diffident in preventing infiltration. Hundreds of Palestinians were detained for attempting to carry out further attacks in the next few months, and the border became relatively calm for a period of fourteen months starting in July 1954.[16] This was not entirely to the liking of Israel, which actually sought escalation in this period in order to secure a pretext to conquer the West Bank.[17] The IDF mounted four unprovoked raids in July and August in order to seize hostages and bargain for the release of a captured Israeli soldier, but a tense calm returned to the border in following months. The vigilance of the Arab Legion was reflected in the fact that a total of 997 infiltrators received sentences in 1954–5.[18] Armed infiltration rose again only after September 1955, instigated by Egypt and Syria in response to the announcement that Jordan intended to join the British-sponsored Baghdad Pact.

The Gaza Strip: Palestinian Border Police, Border Guards, and Fida'iyyun

Egypt was the first country to conclude an armistice agreement with Israel, and, like Jordan, was anxious to avoid further conflict after 1949. The overthrow of the monarchy in July 1952 raised questions about the commitment of the new

government in Cairo to standing policy. The Revolutionary Council that was quickly formed by the Free Officers signalled restraint at first, curtailing the propaganda campaign against Israel and implementing tension-reducing measures on the border, but reverted to a stance of public hostility towards the end of the year following a rise in Israeli reprisals.[19] It remained privately determined to avoid confrontation, but was impeded by the terms of the armistice agreement, which prohibited deployment of regular army units in Gaza. Its answer was to establish Palestinian military formations. This marked the beginning of a difficult and ultimately unsuccessful balancing act, as the government sought to defuse Palestinian discontent with the status quo on the one hand, yet keep the peace with Israel on the other.

In December, the government decreed the formation of the Palestine Border Police under the command of Revolutionary Council member ʿAbd-al-Munʿim ʿAbd-al-Ra'uf. A dynamic former air brigade commander and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, ʿAbd-al-Ra'uf had 250 Palestinian volunteers in training by the beginning of March 1953, followed by three more groups of trainees between May and December.[20] All the officers and most non-commissioned officers were Egyptians, drawn from the standing army reserves or the national guard. Some Palestinians were appointed to non-commissioned rank after completing their training. The Palestine Border Police proved unwilling or inadequate for the task, however, as continuing infiltration provoked a sharp rise in Israeli reprisals in early 1954. The Egyptian command now placed a section of the police under another officer, ʿAbd-al-ʿAzim al-Saharti, to guard public installations in Gaza. Unlike the border police, the Saharti battalion, as it came to be known, was attached to the military governor's office. This caused considerable resentment among the Palestinian personnel, who took this to indicate a lower status.[21]

Palestinian anger at Israeli reprisals and Egyptian restrictions erupted in March, as demonstrators took to the streets of Gaza to demand conscription and the distribution of arms to the local population. This coincided with the sharpening tension between the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamal ʿAbd-al-Nasir, who had just replaced Muhammad Najib as head of the Revolutionary Council, and so the Palestinian members of the Society in Gaza took a leading part in the street protests. To defuse the situation, the Egyptian authorities agreed a few weeks later to redesignate the Palestine Border Police as 11 Battalion, Palestine Borders Guard. Its strength was brought up to 700 and its armament now included medium mortars and machine-guns; Palestinians still accounted for only a few of its non-commisioned officers.[22] There was no change in Egyptian policy, however. Nasir remained keen to avoid clashes with Israel, and responded positively during the year to overtures by the new Israeli prime minister, Moshe Sharett, to reduce border tensions.

The 11 Battalion proved to have no more impact on infiltration than the former border police, however. Mustafa Hafiz, chief of the Palestine branch of Egyptian military intelligence in Gaza, observed in July that, while 'the main

purpose of placing armed forces along the armistice line is to prevent infiltration . . . entrusting Palestinian soldiers with this task will not further that aim, because they encourage infiltration and repeatedly conduct attacks'. He concluded that 'conscripting Palestinians to defend this sector is a failure, and these forces will be a cause of increased tension between us and the Jews'.[23] The battalion was to come under question for a different reason in October, following the abortive assassination attempt on Nasir by the Muslim Brotherhood. Battalion founder 'Abd-al-Ra'uf had been imprisoned along with other leading members of the Society in March, but escaped and revived its secret apparatus in following months. He was later sentenced to death *in absentia* for conspiring to mount a *coup d'état*—with the assistance of the 11 Battalion, according to a Palestinian military attorney—but fled to the West Bank and subsequently remained at large.[24]

The experience of 11 Battalion offered tangible evidence that measures intended to contain Palestinian militancy and curb infiltration could have unexpected, and at times undesired consequences. Palestinian supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood exposed the vulnerability of Egyptian policy with a rash of attacks against Israeli settlements near the Gaza Strip in late 1954. The local military authorities responded with some 200 arrests and harsh prison sentences, and with the imposition of new legal and administrative measures.[25] It was at this point that a particularly severe Israeli reprisal raid on Gaza on 28 February 1955, in which 39 Egyptian soldiers were killed and 32 wounded, triggered mass demonstrations and renewed calls for conscription and for the training and arming of the local population. This followed on three days of local protests over plans to resettle refugees on farming projects near the Suez Canal. More importantly still, it coincided with the discovery that France was secretly supplying Israel with modern weapons, and prompted Egypt to conclude its own major arms deal with Czechoslovakia and to form a joint military command with Syria in October.

The Czech arms deal still lay some months into the future, and a more immediate Egyptian response to the Gaza raid was to increase force levels in Sinai and the Gaza Strip by 15,000 men. These were mostly poorly trained and poorly armed national guardsmen, the first of whom reached Gaza on 7 March. The Egyptian command now raised two new Palestinian battalions (the 32nd and 43rd), and combined them with 11 Battalion to form the 86 Brigade, Palestine Borders Guard.[26] This was soon followed by the 87 Brigade, comprising an additional three battalions (44th, 45th, and 46th), taking total strength to 4,000 by 1956. Once again, all but five of the officers and most noncommissioned officers were Egyptian, mainly drawn from army reserves.[27] The ambiguous status of the Palestinian soldiers was marked by the fact that their pay came not from the army but from a special allowance in the budget of the Egyptian military governor in Gaza.

The Egyptian command planned to raise a third brigade and utimately to form an infantry division 12,000-strong, with armour, artillery, and other sup-

port units. Headquarters elements of the 8th Division were in fact formed during 1956 and several units received training in artillery and armour combat at Egyptian military academies, but the expansion effort was abruptly cut short when Israel, Britain, and France launched their tripartite invasion of Egypt at the end of October.[28] As the official Egyptian history of the war later recounted, the Palestine Borders Guard had not attained its full allotment of personnel and equipment, was still in training, and was armed only with ageing pass-me-downs from the Egyptian army, which now fielded the newer Soviet-bloc weapons.[29]

The Palestine Borders Guard had in fact engaged in hostilities along the armistice line long before the invasion. Israel accused its soldiers not only of assisting infiltrators to mount ambushes and sabotage attacks, but also of laying mines and firing at Israeli patrols and settlements starting with the period of expansion in spring 1955.[30] This reflected the Egyptian decision to relax restrictions on infiltration and guerrilla activity against Israel, as a means of deterring, and responding to, Israeli raids.[31] Opinion within the local Egyptian command was divided, however, as to which military unit or branch should be responsible for such activity. At a meeting with Egyptian commander-in-chief ʿAbd-al-Hakim ʿAmir, during his visit to Gaza in March 1955, local military intelligence chief Hafiz opposed the brigade commanders who sought greater responsibility for the borders guard.[32] Instead, he suggested forming a special task force with suitable training and armament to undertake commando missions inside Israel, allowing the border guard to focus on its main task of repelling Israeli raids. Approval was rapid, as the Revolutionary Council in Cairo had already decided in principle to set up such a unit.

The nucleus for the new commando force, popularly known as the *fidaʾiyyun* ('men of sacrifice'), was a group of Palestinians who had been employed by Egyptian military intelligence to conduct unarmed reconnaissance inside Israel since 1949. Recruitment was stepped up after the Gaza raid, as fifty new volunteers were given special training in light arms and explosives use. Hafiz wanted men who knew the terrain well, and persuaded some 50 Palestinians who had been imprisoned on infiltration charges to join the *fidaʾiyyun*.[33] Basic training was undertaken in Gaza, followed by advanced instruction at national guard camps in Egypt. Regular officers and non-commissioned officers from the Egyptian army were seconded to command the *fidaʾiyyun*, although they now drew their pay from the national guard.[34] The *fidaʾiyyun* commenced combat activity in April, at times jointly with border guardsmen. Military intelligence held operational responsibility, but the *fidaʾiyyun* were paid out of the budget of the Egyptian administration in Gaza.[35]

The *fidaʾiyyun* were still considered a junior adjunct of Egyptian military intelligence, but this view changed after a series of large Israeli raids on Gaza that inflicted several hundred military casualties in autumn 1955. On 15 December, following a military operation in which Israel completed its takeover of the al-ʿAwja demilitarized zone, Egyptian commander-in-chief ʿAmir authorized

the transformation of the *fida'iyyun* into a formal military unit, 141 Battalion. After some delay and a brief mutiny by the disgruntled Palestinian personnel, their monthly pay was raised to E£8 (Egyptian national guardsmen received E£18), in addition to food allowances and special bonuses for missions (E£1–2), injury, and death.[36] *Fida'iyyun* strength reached 700 in the next few months, and may have risen to 1,000, prompting military intelligence to consider forming a second unit, the 142 Battalion.[37] Two more training camps were set up to cope with the expansion, but the new battalion was not established.

Guerrilla activity rose sharply following the formation of 141 Battalion. The IDF noted 180 attacks (cross-border fire, mine-laying, and ambushes) between December 1955 and March 1956, and imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew on its side of the border in order to prevent infiltration.[38] Israel had already concluded that it faced the threat of an imminent invasion in the wake of the Egyptian–Czech arms deal and the formation of the Egyptian–Syrian military command in October 1955. It decided to launch a pre-emptive strike, and on 11 December mounted a largely unprovoked attack on Syrian army positions in the hope of forcing Cairo and Damascus into war before they were ready.[39] War did not break out, but *fida'iyyun* activity only deepened Israeli resolve to wage a confrontation on its own terms.

As the violence intensified, Israeli guns retaliated for several Palestinian attacks with an unprecedented artillery barrage on the centre of Gaza city on 5 April 1956, killing 59 people and wounding 93, most of them civilians. The Egyptian command riposted with dozens of *fida'iyyun* raids over the next week, inflicting widespread damage and killing 12 Israelis. Only the intervention of the UN Secretary-General restored calm. Egypt now sought to shift the focus away from Gaza. Military intelligence smuggled arms and explosives to *fida'iyyun* operating in the West Bank under the name of 'Khalid ibn al-Walid', headed by a veteran Palestinian mujahid, Subhi Yasin.[40] *Fida'iyyun* from Gaza also took refuge in the West Bank after conducting their missions, and were repatriated by the Egyptian military *attaché* in Amman, Salah Mustafa. Syrian military intelligence and Palestinian leader Husayni assisted this effort, which resulted in an additional 95 raids by October, but carefully refrained from similar action on the Syrian front.[41]

Israel responded to the Egyptian-sponsored campaign by arranging the assassination of Hafiz on 12 July, and the fatal wounding of Mustafa on 14 October. The Egyptian command was exercising restraint in Gaza and did not appoint a successor to Hafiz, but its efforts to resume *fida'iyyun* activity in the West Bank triggered four large Israeli reprisal raids on Gaza in September and October that left 161 civilian casualties. Nasir's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July and his support for the Algerian rebellion had already placed him on a collision course with Britain and France, and the two European powers now planned to invade Egypt in collusion with Israel. The IDF contributed to the rise in tension by evicting 700 villagers from the demilitarized zone with Syria at the end of October. To ensure a sufficient pretext for war, it also blew up a water well at

a settlement near Gaza and fabricated reports of *fida'iyyun* attacks on the eve of the invasion.[42] The IDF launched its attack hours later, on 29 October, and had full control of the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula by 5 November. French and British aircraft attacked military targets in Egypt from 31 October onwards, and were followed by the landing of ground troops in the northern Suez Canal zone on 5 November, but were compelled to observe a UN ceasefire at midnight on the following day.

The Lessons of 1956

Shortly before the attack on Gaza commenced, in the early hours of 2 November, Israeli radio announced that the IDF knew the identity of the *fida'iyyun* and intended to punish them for their raids on Israel. The radio also warned the civilian population that it would be held collectively responsible for attacks on Israeli civilians or property.[43] Fearing reprisals, some 1,500 *fida'iyyun* and border guards and a similar number of their close relatives infiltrated through Israel to seek refuge in the West Bank.[44] They were disarmed by the Arab Legion and delivered into the care of the Egyptian military attaché in Amman, where they spent the next five months.[45] In Gaza, the IDF took some 4,000 *fida'iyyun*, border guards, and Egyptian soldiers prisoner.[46] Dozens of *fida'iyyun* were summarily executed, and 275 Palestinian civilians were killed as Israeli troops swept Khan Yunis for fugitives and weapons on 3 November.[47] Another 36 youths were killed in detention on 10 November, and two days later between 48 and 111 unarmed Palestinians died when Israeli soldiers opened fire on a large crowd they had assembled in the central square of Rafah. In all, between 930 and 1,200 Palestinians were estimated to have died by the IDF withdrawal from Gaza on 7 March 1957.[48]

There had been little armed resistance to the Israeli occupation. The flight or detention of thousands of military personnel and the IDF's heavy-handed security measures were major reasons, while another was the capture of Egyptian files containing the names of Palestinian political activists. Members of the political parties were not inclined to resort to arms, in any case. Survivors of the government crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood Society in October 1954 joined local members of the Ba'th Party and pro-Nasir politicians to form the Popular Resistance Front in early December 1956.[49] The communists and other leftists formed a National Front, and soon boasted 2,000–3,000 members. Neither front conducted military activity, however, and any thought of political agitation or civilian disobedience was dashed when the Israelis conducted sweeping arrests in January 1957. Fugitive *fida'iyyun* in Jordan mounted 50–70 attacks by the end of 1956, but this was largely at their own initiative as the Egyptian embassy in Amman proved reluctant to provide funds or combat supplies.[50] Egyptian and Syrian intelligence were more active in Lebanon, where their agents carried out a handful of sabotage attacks

against British and French targets. Members of the Syrian army's 68 Palestinian Reconaissance Battalion also attacked Israeli targets from southern Lebanon on several occasions, after secret coordination with Lebanese military intelligence.[51]

Israel eventually withdrew from Sinai and Gaza after obtaining Egyptian commitments to allow free shipping through the Straits of Tiran and to refrain from deploying regular army units or heavy weapons in Gaza. A UN peace-keeping force arrived in Gaza on 7 March 1957, to extend the buffer now separating the two armies along the old armistice line. A new governor-general arrived from Cairo on 14 March, following Palestinian demonstrations demanding the return of Egyptian administration. The reappearance of armed *fida'iyyun* in the streets confronted the Egyptian authorities with the question of what to do with the Palestinian military formations that had contributed, both directly and indirectly, to the outbreak of war with Israel.

Looking back from the vantage point of March 1957, the creation of the Palestine Border Police over four years earlier could be seen in Cairo as the start of an enduring and unwelcome pattern. Having formed a Palestinian unit in the first instance to contain irridentist threats to the status quo emanating from Gaza, the Egyptian command felt compelled to create additional units with upgraded training, equipment, and functions as a means both of resisting Israeli reprisals and of signalling its determination to deter wider attacks. The creation of those units ultimately proved counter-productive, since it fuelled Israeli suspicions of Egyptian intentions. The Egyptian shift to more active deterrence through the creation of the *fida'iyyun* in 1955 similarly backfired, as did the attempt to relocate the arena of guerrilla activity to the West Bank in 1956, since both efforts only hardened Israeli determination to strike a decisive, pre-emptive blow at the source of the threat.

The lesson was not lost on the Egyptian command. The 86th and 87th Palestine Borders Guard Brigades were dissolved and reconstituted as the Palestinian 107th Brigade, comprising only two battalions, the 19th and 20th. The new unit was based near Cairo at first, and then deployed not to Gaza but Qantarah East, on the eastern side of the Suez Canal, in late 1957. The addition of a third battalion, the 21st, took brigade strength to 3,000–3,600, but it had to be disbanded after disturbances in which the Palestinian soldiers protested against their enforced exile from Gaza, and after many failed to return from home leave.[52] The Egyptian command was more lenient with the *fida'iyyun*: the fugitives in Jordan were returned by sea from Syria (except for a number who resettled in the West Bank 'Aqbat Jabr refugee camp), and 400–450 finally reassembled in Gaza in April.[53] The 141 Battalion was now officially referred to as a police unit, however, in order not to contravene the terms of the evacuation agreement with Israel. It was assigned to guard military facilities and to prevent infiltration, but its main task was to gather intelligence on Israel.[54] Some 200 survivors of the 'Saharti battalion' were also brought under the command of the local Egyptian chief of police.[55]

The Palestinian 'Army' in Arab Politics

In contrast to their inactivity on the Egyptian front, Palestinian military formations were to play a not insignificant, if modest, part in the Arab 'cold war' from 1957 onwards. Most notable was the 68 Reconnaissance Battalion, formed on the orders of Syrian military intelligence chief ʿAbd-al-Hamid al-Sarraj following Israeli attacks on Syrian positions overlooking Lake Tiberias in December 1955. The unit consisted of infiltrators who had gathered intelligence for the 'Israel branch' and 'external branch' of the Syrian *deuxième bureau* (G2) since summer 1953.[56] Most were refugees living in the border region, who supplemented their meagre pay by stealing what they could during missions.[57] Others worked for military intelligence on 'contract', the best known being Abu ʿAbdullah Khalifa, while in Lebanon Muhammad al-ʿArka performed a similar service. The 68 Battalion consisted of 600 Palestinian *maghawir* (commandos) at its peak, but all its officers were Syrian, including the commander, Akram al-Safadi. Another 200–400 refugees based in Syria and Lebanon could be called on when necessary to conduct additional missions, in return for a nominal fee.[58] Yet the Syrian army refused to treat the battalion as a regular unit, and pay for its Palestinian personnel came almost entirely from the budget of the government agency responsible for refugee affairs.[59]

The *maghawir* were under strict orders to avoid combat in Israel, but Syrian military intelligence was not averse to using them for covert operations against domestic and Arab foes.[60] An early victim was Syrian Nationalist Party member Ghassan Jadid, who had assassinated Syrian deputy chief-of-staff ʿAdnan al-Malki in April 1955.[61] Members of the 68 Battalion also conducted a number of sabotage missions in Jordan following the fall of the nationalist government of Sulayman al-Nabulsi in April 1957 and king Husayn's endorsement of the Eisenhower doctrine, and attacked Lebanese targets in response to president Shamʾun's open alignment with the West. A company of *maghawir* also joined pro-Nasir militias in Beirut, following the start of the Lebanese civil war in May 1958, and delivered combat supplies to opposition forces around the country. Lebanese militiamen also received training at the 68 Battalion base camp in Harazta, near Damascus.[62] The *maghawir* contingent in Lebanon built up to over 300 in the next two months, but saw only limited action generally despite a brief clash with US marines who landed in Beirut in July.[63] The crisis was resolved to the mutual satisfaction of Nasir, the US administration, and the main Lebanese parties—on the understanding that army commander Fu'ad Shihab, who had maintained such careful neutrality, would become the next president—and the *maghawir* returned to Syria. Their next combat involvement was again in an inter-Arab struggle, this time in the context of the feud between Nasir and general ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Qasim, who overthrew the Iraqi monarchy in July. In March 1959 the 68 Battalion was ordered to ferry weapons to assist the rebellion by Arab nationalist officers and pro-Nasir parties

in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, but was repulsed by the air force, which remained loyal to Qasim.[64]

Qasim responded to Nasir's intervention in the most damaging way he could, by challenging Egyptian policy towards the Palestinian problem. This took place in the context of Egyptian fears that Israel was about to absorb large numbers of Jewish immigrants from the Soviet bloc, dashing any hope that the Palestinian refugees might return to their homes. This coincided with the revival in early 1959 of US proposals for the resettlement of the refugees, and triggered street protests in Gaza. Nasir was subject to conflicting pressures: the immediate need to mollify Palestinian public opinion and pre-empt militant elements from taking matters into their own hands, and the more general imperative to avoid any escalation that might lead to war with Israel. The result was a precarious balancing act. On the one hand, the Egyptian command transferred the 19th Battalion of the Palestine Borders Guard to Gaza. Nasir marked its arrival with a visit to Gaza in March, during which he announced his intention to establish a Palestinian 'entity' and a legislative council later in the year.[65] On the other hand, he dispelled the expectation that this was a prelude for military action by making the remarkable admission that neither he nor any other Arab leader had a plan to liberate Palestine.

Qasim returned to these statements in June, noting that Nasir had done nothing to establish the proposed Palestinian entity and announcing his own plans to form a Palestinian 'liberation regiment'.[66] He raised the stakes in December by calling for the establishment of a Palestinian republic in Gaza and the West Bank, and announced his decision to prepare 'the armed forces of the Palestinian Republic' in March 1960.[67] Some 350 Palestinians from Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan volunteered.[68] Husayni, who left Cairo for Lebanon in this period following a rift with Nasir, was especially active in nominating recruits from the refugee camps.[69] Between 50 and 62 cadets graduated from Iraqi reserve officers' school in mid-August, and the Palestine Liberation Regiment (*Fawj al-Tahrir al-Filastini*) came officially into existence in November. Three more classes graduated in 1961–2, producing a total of 134–150 officers by spring 1963.[70] The regiment was in fact commanded by Iraqis down to company level and could only absorb 32 Palestinian officers, and so the surplus were absorbed into Iraqi army reserves, after a number had returned home.[71] The regiment was eventually disbanded a few months after the overthrow of Qasim in February 1963; a majority of the Palestinian officers opted to join the Iraqi army, and some were to see action in the anti-Kurdish campaign in northern Iraq in 1964.[72]

The fate of the regiment lay in the future, however, and in 1960 Qasim's challenge was potent. Nasir responded first by authorizing the return of the 20th Battalion of the Palestine Borders Guard, which he now grandiosely called the 'Palestinian army', to Gaza. He also approved the formation in February of the Popular Resistance, a militia force that numbered some 2,500 by the end of the year.[73] Elections for the Palestinian legislative council were held among the

refugees in Syria in July, on Egyptian orders, and in Gaza in January 1961. To reinforce the propaganda message, Cairo radio also launched the Voice of Palestine programme in October 1960.[74] The Egyptian command next decided to call for volunteers and re-establish the 21st Battalion of the Palestine Borders Guard in early 1961, taking total brigade strength to 1,800–2,000.[75]

The rivalry with Qasim was evidently pushing Nasir to take political and military steps that could only raise Palestinian expectations and possibly threaten the truce with Israel. A new challenge suddenly loomed in September 1961, when a group of officers led by ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Nahlawi seized power in Damascus and announced Syria's secession from the UAR. Nasir blamed conservative enemies at home and abroad for the break-up, and responded with a leftward turn in domestic and foreign policies. He approved a 'constitution' for Gaza that designated it as part of 'Palestine' and its inhabitants as Palestinian 'citizens' in March 1962, but the Palestine problem was now relegated to the back of his concerns. First came the Socialist Decrees and nationalization of industry, finance, and commerce, and closer relations with the USSR. This was followed by military intervention to support the republican officers who seized power in Yemen in September, against tribesmen backed by Saudi Arabia (and Jordan), which he suspected of complicity in the Syrian secession.

The overthrow of Qasim in February 1963 brought some relief to Nasir, as did the *coup d'état* mounted by a coalition of Baʿthist and Arab nationalist officers in Syria in March. Relations between the putschists were tense, however. Pro-Nasir elements in the new revolutionary council pushed for immediate revival of the union with Egypt, but a brief mutiny in support of this demand among army units in Aleppo at the end of April only prompted their Baʿthist rivals to seek tighter control of the armed forces. Matters came to a head on 18 July, when a coalition of pro-Nasir officers and political parties headed by army major Jasim al-ʿAlwan attempted a second *coup d'état*. Their attempt was defeated almost at the outset, leaving the 'military committee' of the Baʿth Party alone in power.

The continuing struggle for power in Damascus had direct consequences for 68 Battalion. Although Safadi had been transferred to Cairo during the union with Egypt, the unit was still widely regarded as a pro-Nasir bastion. The secessionist officers who seized power in September 1961 took the precaution of having the *maghawir* disarmed and confined to barracks, and later reduced their numbers from 600 to around 400.[76] The battalion's fortunes were somewhat restored by the *coup* of March 1963, as Palestinian officers, including several Baʿthists, now took command for the first time. However, the ongoing contest within the ruling revolutionary council led to the dismissal in June of 155 *maghawir* known to harbour strong pro-Nasir sympathies.[77] Safadi secretly recruited several dozen of them from his headquarters in Cairo, and then slipped into Syria to lead them in the assault on army headquarters on 18 July. Their boldness was doomed, as the other plotters failed to act; Safadi was able to escape to Egypt, but 18 *maghawir* were executed for their role.[78]

Confronted with this demonstration of the strength of pro-Nasir sentiment, the Syrian authorities set up new security units to observe political activity among the Palestinian refugees.[79] One was the 'Palestinian detachment' (*al-Mafraza al-Filastiniyya*), formed of former 68 Battalion personnel and entrusted with active surveillance and policing, while another was the 'Palestinian section' (*al-Qism al-Filastini*), attached to the ministry of interior. The ministry also instructed its existing 'political department' to monitor political developments among the Palestinians.[80] In August the 68 Battalion was placed under the command of Palestinian officers belonging to the Ba'th Party. Some of its former personnel were regrouped in a separate reconnaissance unit, but the battalion eventually regained a strength of 500–550.[81]

The Syrian experience demonstrated once again the potential dangers of Arab sponsorship of Palestinian military formations. Palestinians had carried out numerous missions on behalf of their hosts, but these often related to inter-Arab rivalries and frequently involved sabotage and subversion, not to mention involvement in internal struggles for power. Arab support for Palestinian political and military organization promised more than was ever intended. The fate of the *fida'iyyun*, Palestine Borders Guard, Palestinian Liberation Regiment, and *maghawir* underlined both the unwillingness of the Arab states to confront Israel and the lack of autonomous Palestinian leadership. It was in this context that new, clandestine guerrilla groups pushed themselves forward.

3

Rebirth of the Palestinian National Movement

The Arab Nationalists Movement

Of the many clandestine groups that emerged among the scattered Palestinian communities in the years after 1948, the most influential by far were the Arab Nationalists Movement (*Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-ʿArab*) and the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (*Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini*), more commonly known by its reversed acronym, Fateh. Fateh was to take command of the PLO and the entire guerrilla movement in the late 1960s, while the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) was the parent of Fateh's two main competitors, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP). The founders of the ANM and Fateh came from substantially distinct regional and social backgrounds, and drew to a large degree on diverse ideological roots, although they shared the common objective of waging relentless war on Israel and regaining the lost homeland, Palestine.

The ANM coalesced in 1951 around a group of students at the American University of Beirut. The driving force came from medical student George Habash, son of a relatively wealthy Christian trader from Lydda, and Hani al-Hindi, the son of a respected Damascene family whose father was an ex-Sharifian officer and had served in the Iraqi army until his involvement in the abortive nationalist revolt by Rashid ʿAli al-Kaylani in 1941. Habash and Hindi had both volunteered for service with the Arab Salvation Army in 1948—to which Habash was attached as a medical attendant. He witnessed the exodus of his family from their home town of Lydda following the massacre by Israeli forces in July, an experience that was to shape the outlook of the previously apolitical student forever:

> The Israelis came to Lydda and forced us to flee. It is a picture that does not leave my mind and that I will never forget. Thirty-thousand people walking, crying, screaming with terror . . . women carrying babies on their arms and children clinging to their [skirts], with the Israeli soldiers pointing their weapons at their backs . . . some people fell by the wayside, and some did not rise again. It was terrible. If you see such things your mind and heart alter . . . So what use is it to treat a sick body when such things

happen? Humans must change the world, they must do something, they must kill if needs be. To kill, even if that means that we in our turn become inhuman.[1]

Habash and Hindi were deeply embittered in the wake of the war by Arab disunity and what they saw as the collusion of Arab governments with Great Britain and the Zionists. They decided to punish any Arab leaders who sought peace with Israel and to subvert the armistice, in part by attacking 'Western and Zionist interests'.[2] Thirsty for revenge, they assisted in the formation of a clandestine organization known as *Kata'ib al-Fida' al-ʿArabi* (Battalions of Arab Sacrifice), along with a handful of Syrian activists and a small group of Egyptian fugitives.[3] The latter were 'green shirts' of the Young Egypt movement who had taken refuge in Syria after being accused of assassinating a government minister in Cairo. They provided the 'muscle' and stressed the importance of 'political violence' at a time when the masses were not mobilized for action.

The leading influence on the Kata'ib was the Egyptian fugitive Tawfiq al-Hakim. He had a considerable impact on young Palestinians who met him in Damascus in 1949–50, and offered them rudimentary paramilitary training.[4] The founders of the Kata'ib were attracted by a mixture of examples: the revolutionary ideas of Giuseppe Garibaldi and his emphasis on 'political violence', the obsessive secrecy of the Italian Carbonari and Young Italy Movement, the absolutist nationalism and iron discipline of Bismarck, and the confrontationist tactics of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Syrian National Party.[5] These were strongly influential roots akin to the ideological springs of Fascism, as the group's own dissidents were to point out many years later.[6] The Kata'ib conducted roughly a dozen terrorist attacks against a variety of targets in Beirut and Damascus starting in August 1949. The first incident was timed to coincide with the armistice talks in Lausanne, and left 12 dead and 27 wounded in a Damascus synagogue. British and US consulates, a foreign school, and an UNRWA office were also bombed over the next year, but the Kata'ib failed to move against the Arab leaders they despised most, king ʿAbdullah of Jordan and Iraqi premier Nuri al-Saʿid.[7]

Habash and Hindi were soon dissatisfied with the direction taken by the Kata'ib, which they felt practised violence without a clear, wider agenda. They hoped eventually to develop the armed attacks into a military campaign against Israel across Arab borders. Acts of sabotage and assassination were merely 'a phase of preparation and experimentation', in which combat teams could train.[8] In their search for models, Habash and Hindi also looked to the 'secret apparatus' (*al-jihaz al-sirri*) of the Muslim Brotherhood and to the Haganah and the other Zionist underground organizations of the pre-1948 period.[9] This divergence within the Kata'ib became obvious in spring 1950, and during the following period Habash and Hindi approached Baʿth Party founder Michel ʿAflaq with an offer to turn the Kata'ib into a military wing of the party, but to no avail.[10] Their Egyptian partners had in the meantime become involved in a plot

to assassinate the Syrian president, Adib al-Shishakli, and the head of the Arab Socialist Party, Akram Hurani. The attempt failed, leading to the arrest and trial of Hakim and the brief imprisonment of Hindi, who had not taken part in the plot. The Kata'ib dissolved.

Earlier, in 1949, Habash and Hindi had also joined *al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqa* ('The Firmest Bond'), a student society at the American University of Beirut. They edited its newsletter and then headed the society in 1949–50, and in this way met the other young men who were to join them in founding the ANM. Among the newcomers were Wadiʿ Haddad, another Palestinian from a middle-class Christian family that had fled Safad in 1948, and Ahmad al-Khatib, a Kuwaiti medical student. Muhsin Ibrahim, a Lebanese schoolteacher and the son of a clerk in a Shiʿite religious court, completed the founding group and lent it its main intellectual strength.[11] The university hospital also played a role in expanding the network: Habash and his colleagues took potential recruits to visit Palestinians who had been wounded in 1948 or during infiltration into Israel.[12] The founding core expanded in 1951–2 by absorbing other student groups in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, to form the ANM.

Liberation of Palestine was the primary goal of the ANM. However, it considered that this goal could not come about unless the Arab countries were free from Western colonial control and therefore able to concentrate their resources against Israel. Wadiʿ Haddad is quoted as having explained to potential recruits that 'the road to Tel Aviv passes through Damascus, Baghdad, Amman, and Cairo'.[13] The ANM believed that sweeping change of Arab governments was necessary, but argued at the same time that this would require extensive political preparation. An early step in this direction was to form the Committee for Resistance to Peace with Israel (*Hay'at Muqawamat al-Sulh maʿ Isra'il*), which mobilized the refugees in Lebanon against plans for their resettlement proposed by UNWRA and the US administration between 1950 and 1953.[14] The Committee proved a useful vehicle, allowing the ANM to make contacts in the refugee camps of Syria and Jordan and build new clandestine cells there.

To achieve its more distant objectives, the ANM sought to build an organization based on strict discipline and secrecy. Full membership could only be attained after a long, painstaking apprenticeship. Indeed, internal critics were later to argue that the movement's 'Fascist' intellectual origins and 'obsessive rituals of secrecy' were to blame for its isolation and inability to attract a wider following in the first years of its existence.[15] The Fascist influence was painfully clear in the ANM diatribe against the 'Jewish threat' and in its view of Zionism and Judaism as identical.[16] It was also evident in its choice of main political slogan—'unity, liberation, and revenge'—and in its dramatic battle-cry—'blood, iron, and fire'.

The ANM worked in the next few years to expand its embryonic organization—which developed a compartmentalized and hierarchical structure, the classic pyramid of communist parties—and to lay its ideological

foundations, in which both Ibrahim and a young Palestinian of middle-class background in Beirut, al-Hakam Darwaza, took a major part. On graduation, Habash and Haddad left Beirut to set up a 'people's clinic', a debating club, and a literacy school in Amman. There they also combined forces with a Jordanian businessman, Hamad al-Farhan, who had already set up a political forum with pan-Arab nationalist leanings that attracted middle-class adherents. Hindi returned to Syria following his brief detention in 1950, while Khatib set up a medical practice in Kuwait. The ANM remained modest in size, but was considerably assisted, ironically, by the expulsion of 17 of its members from the American University of Beirut in January 1955. Most resumed their studies in Cairo, where they met Arab nationalists from the Arabian Peninsula and North Africa, while others went to Syria, where the recent liberalization of political life allowed them to continue their proselytization.[17] A small Iraqi branch was formed next, followed in 1959 by the beginning of a lasting relationship with like-minded nationalists from north Yemen and British-ruled Aden.

The ANM already had a public mouthpiece by now as Habash had launched a weekly magazine, *al-Raʾi*, at the beginning of 1954. It was closed down by the Jordanian government towards the end of the year, but Hindi relaunched it in Damascus in January 1955.[18] The Lebanese branch was even more active, starting its own weekly, *al-Thaʾr* (Revenge) in November 1952 and building up its following among Lebanese workers in Sidon and Tyre and in the adjacent Palestinian refugee camps.[19] Growth was slow, however, especially as much of the potential membership of the ANM had already been won over to the Baʿth Party, which was founded in 1947. The ANM was placed at a particular disadvantage when Akram Hurani's Arab Socialist Party merged with the Baʿth, formally introducing socialism to the new common platform and giving the Baʿth the social agenda it had previously lacked. Only 11 delegates attended the ANM's first general conference in 1956, which formed an executive committee comprising the original founders to lead the movement.[20]

The ANM only achieved some growth in 1956–7. It extended its membership in various parts of Jordan, including East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and reached the Gaza Strip for the first time, where it attracted several former members of the Muslim Brotherhood such as Sabbah al-Thabit and Muhammad al-Musallami. The ANM also achieved notable successes among schoolteachers working for UNRWA in the various refugee camps. Its teachers' section in the ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp near the Lebanese city of Sidon, for example, boasted 40 members by 1957, up from 2 in 1955. Several of the most active ANM cadres in Lebanon were teachers—among them Ahmad al-Yamani, ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Hamad, and Ahmad Salama. The ANM had recruited teachers in most camps in the West Bank, Syria, and Lebanon by the late 1950s.[21] It also attracted many secondary school students, and relied heavily on setting up youth associations such as the Sport and Culture Jihad Club in Sidon and the Palestinian Arab Scouts, founded by Yamani with branches in the main refugee camps of Lebanon.[22]

The ANM was only able to achieve its modest expansion and promote its political fortunes following the rise to regional prominence of Egyptian president Nasir. The ANM had at first been suspicious of the Free Officers who overthrew the monarchy in July 1952, but was impressed by Nasir's opposition to the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and his generally anti-Western stance, expressed among other things in his active role in the Bandung conference and his support for the Algerian liberation struggle. The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and the rise of Nasir a pan-Arab hero after the tripartite invasion of Egypt persuaded the ANM to shape its policy and strategy according to his.

The ANM, Arab Politics, and Palestine

The overriding commitment to Nasir, his philosophy on political, social, and economic issues, and his regional agenda was to be the determining influence on the ideology and behaviour of the ANM for over a decade. This was most obvious when it came to the two issues at the heart of ANM concerns and that had driven its founders since 1948: Palestine and the military campaign to liberate it. In the early years the founders and early members of both the Kata'ib and the ANM had become acquainted with Palestinian infiltrators based in Lebanon.[23] Habash and Haddad were assigned to coordinate similar activity from the West Bank after 1955.[24] Thanks to private contributions from wealthy members or supporters, they were able to supply former mujahidin and new recruits in the refugee camps with money and guns smuggled in from Syria. The ANM offered the infiltrators a modest fee, while trying 'to impart a patriotic and political content to their motivations'.[25] The movement also received assistance from sympathetic Arab officers with whom ties had been forged during and after the 1948 war.

The ANM saw the task of uniting Arab power as a necessary prerequisite for the liberation of Palestine. It threw itself into Arab politics, seeking the overthrow of governments considered hostile to the twin causes of Palestine and Arab unity. Most of its military effort until the early 1960s was therefore devoted to confronting pro-Western or anti-Nasir governments. The ANM secretly contacted pro-Nasir officers in Jordan after 1956, and agitated against king Husayn following the fall of the nationalist government of Sulayman al-Nabulsi in April 1957.[26] It mounted a brief sabotage campaign against government targets over the next year, with support from Syrian and Egyptian intelligence.[27] Haddad was the chief organizer of these attacks, but he and several key aides were arrested and sentenced to between three and five years' imprisonment. Habash, who had run for parliament in 1957, fled to Damascus (as did more junior cadres such as Nayif Hawatma) and was sentenced *in absentia* to 45 years' imprisonment.

The first opportunity to develop a military capability arose from the friendship between ANM co-founder Hindi and one of Haddad's aides, Fayiz

Qaddura, and the head of Syrian military intelligence, ʿAbd-al-Hamid al-Sarraj, who had provided covert assistance during the campaign in Jordan.[28] Sarraj invited the ANM to send its members for training at the camp run by the Palestinian Reconnaissance 68 Battalion in Harazta during the Lebanese civil war in summer 1958.[29] By then the ANM branch in Jordan had been shattered or driven into hiding, and so the movement threw its meager resources into the Lebanese conflict with a will. Ibrahim joined Habash and his aides in Damascus to coordinate the flow of arms into Lebanon, while Hawatma and Muhammad al-Zayyat commanded ANM members in Tripoli and Tyre.[30]

The ANM once again served Egyptian foreign policy during the nationalist rebellion that took place in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in March 1959 in opposition to ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Qasim, who had overthrown the monarchy in the preceding July. Its local branch had a mere 20 members, but it participated in planning the insurrection and tried to recruit Iraqi officers to the pro-Nasir cause after its defeat.[31] This episode confirmed the virulent anti-communism of the ANM, but more importantly, established it as a staunch supporter of Egyptian policy in the region. It provided further evidence of this by helping to smuggle Egyptian-supplied arms to insurrectionists in Oman, through the ports of Kuwait and Basrah, and by renewing sabotage attacks in Jordan in 1959–60 with the help of Syrian (and indirectly Egyptian) intelligence.[32]

Cairo did not yet have direct contact with the ANM—it relied instead on Syrian interior minister Sarraj and intelligence chief Burhan al-Adham—but regarded the movement as a dependable ally.[33] The ANM dissolved its branch in Syria in keeping with Nasir's decree of 12 March 1958 ending party pluralism within the union. It also disbanded its branches in Egypt and the Gaza Strip, but retained an office in Damascus to oversee its branches in Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.[34] The Egyptian intelligence effort in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan declined in the next three-and-a-half years, as such activity was left to Syrian intelligence under its new Egyptian controllers, and so there was no reason for direct contact between Cairo and the ANM.[35]

The *coup d'état* in Damascus on 28 September 1961, and the break-up of the union with Egypt altered everything. Senior ANM cadres in Syria had complained regularly to their leadership of heavy-handed Egyptian authority, but were met with a stout defence of Egypt and Sarraj, who was responsible for many of the excesses that ultimately drove the regional command of the Baʿth Party to support secession.[36] The ANM subsequently lost its major training base and refuge, its secure supply routes into Lebanon and Jordan, and half its Syrian membership. Habash, Hindi, and Haddad sought refuge in Beirut, and the task of rebuilding the local branch fell upon junior cadres who remained. Among them were Salah Salah, Bilal al-Hasan, and Usama al-Hindi, a younger brother of Hani who now headed both the branch and a newly formed 'military action committee'. They faced a difficult task: membership on the eve of the secession had dropped to between 80 and 160, of whom only 15 were Syrian, the rest mainly being Palestinian students.[37]

The secession also brought the ANM into direct contact with Nasir.[38] In October 1961, Muhammad Nasim was dispatched by Egyptian general intelligence to revive its operation in Lebanon. There Nasim met ANM leaders Ibrahim and Mustafa Baydun, and started what was to be a long and mutually beneficial relationship.[39] The two men also flew to Cairo to meet Nasir sometime between November 1961 and February 1962, and were followed by Hindi after his escape from Syria.[40] The relationship developed rapidly, partly because close family ties between Hindi and the chief secessionists enabled him to conduct quiet mediation between Damascus and Cairo. As relations deepened, Hindi met Egyptian commander-in-chief ʿAbd-al-Hakim ʿAmer and obtained a pledge of direct military assistance and training.[41] Haddad's close military aide Qaddura took up residence in Cairo to act as a liaison officer. The main contact on the Egyptian side was Sami Sharaf, head of Nasir's office, while security chiefs Salah Nasr and Shaʿrawi Jumʿa were responsible for coordination in practical matters.[42]

The ANM was involved in a minor way in the abortive Syrian *coup* of March 1962, and with the successful attempt that finally brought a coalition of pro-Nasir and Baʿthist officers to power on 8 March 1963. It was rewarded with two seats on the National Council of the new Revolutionary Command, but supported the pro-Nasir officers who led repeated and inconclusive mutinies among army units near Hums and Aleppo later that month and in April as a means of forcing restoration of the union with Egypt. On the other side, the Syrian branch of the Baʿth Party was encouraged by the success of its Iraqi counterpart, which had seized power in February, and so was disinclined to accommodate its partners. When the ANM members resigned their cabinet posts in protest against policy towards Egypt in May, the Baʿth simply closed down its local magazine *Sawt al-Jamahir* ('Voice of the Masses').[43] The ANM next played an active role as a junior partner in the attempted *coup* by Jasim ʿAlwan on 18 July. Its rank-and-file knew little and had no part, but Hani Hindi met the plotters and may have acted as their go-between with Nasir, while his younger brother Usama probably contacted sympathetic officers in his capacity as head of the local ANM military committee.[44] Hani fled once more to Lebanon, and was followed a few months later by Habash, who hid in Damascus for several months. The ANM was effectively proscribed in Syria as dozens of its members were arrested, some of whom spent the next year in prison.

A similar fate overtook the ANM branch in Iraq, where personal differences within its regional command, overwhelming competition from the Baʿth Party, and government repression had ensured that its role remained minimal during the rule of ʿAbd-al-Karim Qasim in 1958–63. Hawatma headed the local ANM branch, but was imprisoned from late 1961 until the end of Qasim's reign in February 1963, and was deported only two months later by the Baʿth. The ANM sent some 25 cadres from its other branches to strengthen its following in Iraq, but an attempt to contact army officers and mount a *coup* led to a severe

crackdown at the end of May.[45] The movement was unable to resume activity until another *coup* brought a moderate nationalist officer, ʿAbd-al-Salam al-ʿArif, to power in mid-November.[46]

The sudden expansion of ANM membership and activity as a pro-Nasir force after 1961 created new tensions within its ranks. The collapse of the union had dealt a major blow to Palestinian hopes that the war of liberation was near, and triggered a revision of previous assumptions by many believers in Nasir and pan-Arabism. The competition between Nasir and Qasim to promote a Palestinian 'entity' in 1959 and their highly publicized rivalry over the creation of a Palestinian army in 1960 had activated wide interest in creating a specifically Palestinian political vehicle. This idea gained added legitimacy when the Palestinian National Union was formed on Nasir's instructions and then conducted public elections among the Palestinian communities of Syria and the Gaza Strip in July 1960 and January 1961.[47] Numerous 'liberation groups' that formed in this period were boosted by the Syrian secession.

The ANM leadership increasingly faced a difficult question: how to reconcile the emphasis on Arab unity with the need for a special focus on Palestine, and to what extent should commitment to Nasir prevent independent armed action against Israel? The ANM attracted several thousand new recruits in the next three years by portraying itself as the standard-bearer of Arab unity and the loyal ally of Nasir, but its success only begged the question all the more, especially among its Palestinian membership. The debate that now developed within the movement had its roots in the annual meeting of the executive committee in Damascus in 1959, which had discussed the prospects for armed struggle against British rule in Aden. This influenced the committee, which then discussed the possibility of waging an armed struggle in Palestine during its next meeting, in 1960, but decided against this course of action.[48]

The ANM did in fact establish a 'Palestine Committee' in 1959—composed of Habash, Hindi, Haddad, Usama al-Naqib, Zahi al-Qamhawi, ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Hamad, and Ahmad al-Yamani—but Palestinians were not separated from other members or grouped into a distinct branch.[49] This followed the initiative announced by Nasir in March 1959, in which he revived the call for the creation of a Palestinian 'entity'. His speech was significant for two additional reasons. On the one hand he set a clear ceiling on independent military activity by declaring that Egypt would not embark on a confrontation with Israel until it had completed building its military force to ensure 'decisive superiority'.[50] Egypt would select the time and place for war once it was fully prepared. On the other hand, Nasir sent an equally clear message to his Palestinian audience, namely that he had 'no plan for the liberation of Palestine'.[51] This may have motivated the ANM's Palestine Committee to discuss military options for the liberation of Palestine. It defined four, and concluded that the most effective was for the Palestinians to wage their own struggle while relying on the UAR. According to veteran ANM cadre Yamani, members of the Palestine Committee met Nasir during a state visit to Syria, in the presence of interior minister

Sarraj, and requested material support for their venture in the name of 'Palestinian refugees in Syria'. It was as a result of this meeting, he later stated, that the ANM received training in Syria in 1959–60 and took delivery of a shipment of 30 light arms in Lebanon in 1961.[52]

The internal debate intensified in 1962, following the declaration of Algerian independence after a bloody struggle. Yet the ANM leadership opposed following the Algerian model of independent military action, fearing that this would simply allow the Arab states to abdicate their responsibility for the liberation of Palestine.[53] The example of Arab nationalists from Aden was another important influence. Several dozen ANM members from Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan met members of the Aden branch (who had first joined the ANM as students in Cairo in 1959) during their first training course at the Egyptian special forces academy at Inshas in mid-July. The Adenis were preparing a military campaign to drive out the British in October 1963, a fact that impressed their Palestinian counterparts, among them Haddad.[54] The Palestinians were also enthused when republican officers took power in Yemen in September 1962, triggering a civil war and Egyptian intervention. Possibly most important, however, was Nasir's admission before the Legislative Council in Gaza, towards the end of June, that he did not have a plan to liberate Palestine and that no other Arab leader did.[55]

Growing pressure from Palestinian members contributed to the strains that emerged within the ANM in mid-1962. The roots went back to the late 1950s, as Ibrahim and then Muhammad Kishli and Hawatma began to question the basis of their pan-Arabism by arguing that social and economic structures were the determining factors in the progress of Arab society.[56] Ibrahim signalled further movement in this direction when he became the founding editor of the new central mouthpiece of the ANM, the Lebanese-registered weekly *al-Hurriyya*, penning numerous articles to argue that Arab nationalism could no longer be separated in concept or practice from social revolution. The emergent 'leftist faction' remained virulently anti-communist, as several articles by Ibrahim in *al-Hurriyya* showed, but it urged an ever-closer relationship with Nasir after he launched his 'socialist decrees' in July 1961.[57] A leftist proposal to dissolve the ANM and merge with Nasir's Arab Socialist Union was defeated during an acrimonious debate in mid-1962, but an extraordinary conference held in Beirut in June 1963 approved Nasir's call for the unification of all parties advocating Arab unity and socialism.[58] The leftist faction had taken advantage of the continuing absence of Habash and Hindi, who were deeply involved in the Syrian crisis.[59]

It was against this background that a serious move started to create a separate, Palestinian branch within the ANM. The Palestinian rank-and-file was keenest to present an autonomous identity to its wider constituency and to initiate armed action against Israel. It was impatient with the ideological debate, and distrusted the motives of the leading 'leftists', none of whom were Palestinian. Indeed, the fact that five members of the executive committee in

1963 were Lebanese and one, Hawatma, a Jordanian living in Lebanon, prompted mutterings that they were reluctant to embark on military action because they feared repression by the *deuxième bureau* and were out of touch with members in the refugee camps.[60] The ANM members were not disillusioned with Nasir, but viewed the announcement in 1963 of an Israeli plan to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River as a sign of Arab weakness and indecision.

Reflecting these various influences, a group of Palestinian cadres met in Beirut in October and agreed to form a separate branch for Palestinians.[61] Habash and Hindi were still in hiding in Syria, but Haddad either attended the meeting or was aware of the outcome and approved of it; he was 'a man of action', restless and irritable, with no patience for theory or ideology of any sort, especially the Marxist turn of his 'leftist' colleagues. Palestinian ANM members in each country were now regrouped in separate sections: they remained subordinate to the local regional command (*qiyadat iqlim*) but also came into contact with a newly formed Palestinian action command (*qiyadat ʿamal*) based in Beirut.[62] This coincided with Habash's escape from Syria at the beginning of 1964 and with strains in relations with Egyptian intelligence, due to differences over policy and alliances in Aden. ANM representatives in Egypt were briefly detained, prompting Habash to visit Nasir for the first time to resolve the dispute.[63] Upon his return to Beirut, he joined forces with Haddad and Hindi and secured the agreement of the ANM executive committee to form an autonomous Palestinian branch. This was then ratified at a stormy 'national' conference in May. Habash and the other 'rightists' of the old guard were not in a hurry to break ranks with Nasir by launching military action against Israel, but they were willing to use the Palestinian factor to delineate themselves within the ANM and form a distinct power base, or so their leftist opponents concluded.[64]

Fateh is Born

Well before the ANM decided to establish a separate Palestinian branch, Fateh had already formed as an autonomous Palestinian organization. With a few significant exceptions, its founders came from the refugees arriving in Gaza during 1948. A few, such as Muhammad Yusif al-Najjar, Salim al-Zaʿnun, and Fathi al-Balʿawi had joined the Muslim Brotherhood when it established a Palestinian branch in 1946, and were in their late teens or early twenties during the war. Others were even younger, among them Khalil al-Wazir, Salah Khalaf, Kamal ʿUdwan, and Yahya ʿAshur. Secondary school brought them together, along with many other classmates who were later to reappear in the higher political or military ranks of the main guerrilla groups and the PLO's military wing, the Palestine Liberation Army. Membership in the Muslim Brotherhood was another common bond. The Society made significant inroads in Gaza

thanks to the reputation it had established during the war, and its effort was helped by Egyptian officers who recruited Palestinian workers employed at their bases.[65] Yet its main following was among secondary school students, who were drawn to its social activities and sports clubs, which led to short courses in basic military principles and physical exercises.[66]

Although his exact status as supporter or member remains uncertain, one of the Palestinian activists drawn to the Muslim Brotherhood in 1948 was a 20-year-old engineering student at Cairo University, Muhammad ʿAbd-al-Raʾuf al-Qidwa al-Husayni, better known as Yasir ʿArafat. Distantly related to the former mufti, 'haj' Amin al-Husayni, he reportedly fought under ʿAbd-al-Qadir al-Husayni and then with the Muslim Brotherhood contingent in Gaza and Jerusalem. Following his return to Cairo, he joined the volunteer reserve officer training course set up for Egyptian university students. Through these connections he met several of the Free Officers who were to overthrow the monarchy on 23 July 1952.[67] Arafat reputedly reinforced the relationship by participating in some of the attacks organized by the Muslim Brotherhood on British forces in the Suez Canal zone in 1950–4, and by training university students in 1953–4.[68] He was also active in the League of Palestinian Students, becoming head in 1952 and meeting in its ranks many of his future colleagues in the leadership of Fateh.

Another key figure was Wazir, who had fled Ramla with his parents at the age of 13. Regarded by some as the real founder of Fateh, the dynamic teenager set up his own group of militants when he was only 16 years old. His experience in those early years encapsulates the course taken by many of his peers who went on to rebuild the national movement:

> After 1949, as a group of youths we sought out the *mujahidin* who had participated in the Palestine War, to learn from their personal experiences in combat . . . Most of them told us that they had fought in the ranks of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is in reality what deepened the ties between youth in the [Gaza] Strip and the *mujahidin* 'brethren' . . . The experience of the Brotherhood attracted us as a group of youths, especially as there were no political forces in the Strip besides the Muslim Brotherhood and the communists. But the communists were few and had a special view of matters that did not match the feelings of people, because at that time they were calling for coexistence [with Israel] . . . so they were limited to clandestine activity . . . [Whereas] the Brotherhood took the path of preparing and educating for armed struggle.[69]

Wazir joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1951. Spurred on by its members, it arranged for sympathetic Egyptian army officers to offer secret training courses, starting around the beginning of 1952. After seven to ten days of sketchy instruction, mainly in the vicinity of al-ʿArish in northern Sinai, the trainees then formed groups of their own to pass on their scanty knowledge to other Palestinians.[70] Himself only 16, Wazir was already leading up to 200 youths at a time, many of them only a year or two younger.[71] There was no opportunity for proper weapons training, and most of the preparation consisted

of long hikes and mock battles. Some time after training had begun, the local Brotherhood leadership responded to pressure from its youthful members and established two clandestine military bodies. These were *Shabab al-Tha'r* (Revenge Youth) and *Katibat al-Haq* (Battalion of Right); of the later founders of Fateh, Salah Khalaf was in the former, while Wazir was in the latter.[72] The Brotherhood leadership in Egypt had mixed feelings about this development. It was concerned not to damage relations with the new Revolutionary Command Council in Cairo, and prevailed upon the branch leadership in Gaza to restrain its members from attacking Israel.

Dissatisfied with the timidity of the Brotherhood leadership, Wazir used his position in *Katibat al-Haq* to build a parallel network. He set about forming secret cells in preparation for independent military operations, and sternly shunned those of his colleagues who saw Palestine 'as only one of many issues, and who wanted us to concentrate on general Islamic themes only'.[73] It took time to build a secret following, during which Gaza witnessed escalating Israeli reprisal raids and the establishment of the Palestinian border police. When Najjar was arrested during the demonstrations that demanded a Palestinian army, conscription, and weapons in early 1954, this convinced younger members that they had to take matters into their own hands. The outlawing of the Muslim Brotherhood in October 1954 led to a formal parting of ways, as Wazir and many others refused to take sides in the dispute and left the ranks by early 1955. Those who remained regarded the young militants as 'saboteurs and climbers', but the attempted assassination of Nasir had in fact turned many former supporters towards the Arab nationalist parties instead.[74]

Wazir and his companions mounted a handful of small sabotage attacks in Israel in late 1954 and the first half of 1955, initially using the name of *Katibat al-Haq* as a cover.[75] They swayed some of the Egyptian-led *fida'iyyun* to their cause, giving them guns and ammunition to carry out raids in Israel without the knowledge of their command. To magnify the impact of their operations and exaggerate their strength, the group sent handwritten press statements to newspapers in Beirut and Damascus.[76] Wazir also sent one of his colleagues, Hamad al-ʿAydi, to Hebron in order to form secret cells and launch similar attacks, although nothing came of this attempt. Wazir was briefly detained for possession of explosives, but he and his colleagues continued their activities, accounting for some of the 192 attacks reported by Israel in this period.[77]

Reprisals had little deterrent effect, since Wazir consciously sought an 'explosive' atmosphere that would increase Palestinian 'self-awareness'.[78] Indeed, he proudly claimed responsibility for the sabotage attack that triggered the Gaza raid of 28 February 1955, although his veracity cannot be checked.[79] Another of his colleagues, Kamal ʿUdwan, later stated with equal pride that these early attacks and reprisals had prompted Nasir to 'take the decision to confront aggression with arms, and so came the first arms deal [between Egypt and Czechoslovakia]'.[80] The young activists were among the thousands of demonstrators who demanded conscription and weapons following the Gaza raid,

waving banners soaked in the blood of the fallen Egyptian soldiers. To defuse the pressure, the authorities extended the military training programme run for Egyptian university students to Palestinian volunteers from secondary schools in Gaza. A delegation from the Palestine Students Union visited Gaza, during which Arafat met Wazir for the first time. The acquaintance was renewed when Arafat arrived as a military instructor, and the friendship developed when Wazir joined Cairo University in mid-1956, a few months before the tripartite invasion of Egypt.

The actual idea of forming Fateh was a result of the war. As Wazir later recalled, 'when the tripartite invasion took place and the enemy occupied the Gaza Strip, the foremost question in our minds was how to involve a large number of Palestinians in the Strip in our armed activity? And how to form a focus of support for the popular resistance groups in Gaza?'[81] Wazir, Arafat, and their colleagues could do little to pursue this question during the war, although a few volunteered for commando action in the Canal zone.[82] Zaʿnun happened to be in Gaza at the time of the Israeli occupation and played a leading role in bringing together the remaining members of the Muslim Brotherhood, local Baʿthists, and pro-Nasir personalities to form the Popular Resistance Front, but this had little impact. ʿUdwan also played an active role in the front, until his arrest by Israeli occupation forces.

The debate among the future founders of Fateh crystallized in the wake of the war, as it became apparent that the real challenge lay not in supporting armed activity, but in responding to the absence of autonomous Palestinian organizations. The Israeli occupation had effectively shattered what was left of the Muslim Brotherhood, and generally weakened the already limited credibility of the other political parties.[83] Besides, Nasir had emerged as a pan-Arab hero, and many Palestinians now pinned their hopes of national salvation on him. The later founders of Fateh, conversely, were disturbed by the ability of the Egyptian authorities to order a complete halt to *fidaʾiyyun* attacks following the Israeli evacuation of the Gaza Strip in March 1957, and concluded that independent action should be paramount among their concerns.[84]

Wazir identified three lines of thinking that emerged in this period:

> A current emerged among a number of youths in Cairo calling for the assembly of certain Palestinian leaders and for prompting them to form a defined structure to lead our Palestinian people. Some attempts were made in this regard, but the impotence of those leaders and the struggles among [those youths] led them to a dead end. Another current was represented by a second group that saw a need to announce a Palestinian government-in-exile on the foundations of the All Palestine Government, in order to represent our Palestinian people and lead the struggle for the restoration of Palestinian rights. But this attempt too met Arab official refusal and the obstacles set by Arab agencies and leaders.
>
> There was a third current, which believed that existing Arab reality would never allow even the establishment of a Palestinian organization, and so there was no alterna-

tive for the Palestinians but to go underground and adopt absolute secrecy in their organization, until it could impose itself on that reality and force recognition.

This last current was the real expression of the aspirations and experience of the vast majority of our [Palestinian] communities.[85]

Reflecting this outlook, Wazir penned a private memorandum to the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in July 1957. In it he urged 'the Muslim Brothers to establish a special organization alongside their own, that would not appear outwardly as Islamist, but rather would promote the slogan of liberating Palestine through armed struggle. The new organization would undertake preparation for this struggle, and would initiate it in practice once its requirements had been met'. The Society dismissed his appeal, and was to pay the price in the following few years as Fateh attracted such members as Salim Zaʿnun, Salah Khalaf, Asʿad al-Saftawi, Kamal ʿUdwan, Muhammad Yusif al-Najjar, Saʿid al-Mzayyin, and Ghalib al-Wazir.[86]

By mid-1957, several of Fateh's founding members had either graduated from university or emigrated to the oil-rich Arab states of the Gulf in search of employment. Six of them met in Kuwait towards the end of the year and agreed to form a clandestine organization.[87] Arafat and Wazir were joined by two Palestinian activists from Syria, ʿAdil ʿAbd-al-Karim and ʿAbdullah al-Dannan, and Khalid al-ʿAmira and Tawfiq Shadid from Gaza, and the first cell was formed during 1958.[88] The founders formulated two founding documents—*Haykal al-Binaʾ al-Thawri* (Structure of Revolutionary Construction) and *Bayan al-Haraka* (The Movement's Manifesto)—and agreed on the name of Fateh towards the end of the year. The former document presented what remains one of the clearest and most representative articulations of Fateh thinking and of the roots of its organizational structure. It also encapsulated the Fateh outlook in the simple belief that 'freedom is taken, not granted'.[89]

The Fateh founders remained in contact with former colleagues in Gaza and Syria, and in this way widened the circle of potential activists. New members joined the core group in Kuwait during 1959, most prominent of whom was Salah Khalaf. Khalid al-Hasan became a close supporter, and used his position in the Kuwaiti Public Works Department to obtain entry visas to the emirate for Fateh members. In October, representatives of like-minded groups in the Gulf states with some 500 members in all agreed to coalesce. The founding core now sought a public platform for Fateh. This was provided by a former member of the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, Tawfiq al-Huri, who already owned the licence of a magazine called *al-Nidaʾ*. Renamed *Nidaʾ al-Hayat—Filastinuna* (The Call of Life—Our Palestine), it commenced publication in Beirut in November.

Forty issues of *Filastinuna* appeared in all between 1959 and 1964. Wazir was the foremost contributor, although several articles carried the initials of Arafat and others were penned by Huri. The themes it drove incessantly were simple but powerful: war should be waged relentlessly against Israel, political deals

that left Israel in existence should be rejected, the Arab governments were not to be trusted and their attempts at hegemony or tutelage should be resisted, and, above all, the people of Palestine should take their fate into their own hands and unite all their resources in the armed struggle.[90] Other ideological strands were also in evidence. Texts by Palestinian historians were frequently reproduced, while the religious background of the Fateh editors surfaced in frequent references to stereotypical images of Jews and Judaism. This contrasted with the reference to the European resistance to Nazi occupation, and with analyses of Israel that employed poorly digested notions of colonialism, imperialism, and modern political economy.[91]

Filastinuna played a crucial role in bringing the existence of Fateh to the attention of potential members and similar groups, and acted as a mailbox.[92] As a result, Fateh had established links with around 40 other groups by 1961. Wazir also revived his contacts in Saudi Arabia, where he had worked as a schoolteacher in the eastern province in 1957. At that time he had played a part in the allocation of 600 Palestinian teachers hired by the ministry of education, and he renewed his contacts during a brief stint of work in 1961 or 1962.[93] Among the new recruits to Fateh were other former members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including ʿAbd-al-Fattah al-Hmud, Majid Abu-Sharar, and Ahmad Qrayʿ (all of whom were eventually to become members of the Fateh central committee). The Syrian secession from the union with Egypt in September 1961 provided new recruits to the cause, as activists such as Faruq al-Qaddumi now left the Baʿth Party and joined Fateh.

The Syrian connection was of considerable importance for Fateh, providing it with its second main source of leaders. Hasan was the most senior in age and experience, having formed a short-lived group called *Tahrir Filastin* (Palestine Liberation) after arriving in Syria in 1949. He subsequently flirted with the Muslim Brotherhood, before helping to found the Islamic Liberation Party (in 1952). However, Adib al-Shishakli, who had come to power the preceding November, clamped down on the party and Hasan found refuge in Kuwait in the following period.[94] Fateh also drew on another short-lived group of student activists called *al-ʿAsifa* (The Storm). ʿAbd-al-Karim was one of its members who had subsequently joined the Muslim Brotherhood, while others joined the Baʿth Party.[95] More influential was *ʿArab Filastin* (Arabs of Palestine), from whose ranks came later leaders such as Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid. It started out as a group of some 40 secondary school students in the Yarmuk refugee camp near Damascus, and gained sufficient strength to compete in elections of the League of Palestinian Students in the mid-1950s.[96] One of its competitors was *Shabab al-Aqsa* (Youth of the Aqsa Mosque), which was an Islamist slate formed by the younger brother of Khalid al-Hasan, Hani.[97] Like Mahmud ʿAbbas—an older activist who helped to set up *Abnaʾ Filastin fi al-Jamiʿa* (The Sons of Palestine at University) in Damascus and later became a founding member of Fateh—Hani al-Hasan was one of the many young Palestinians who had joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria in the early 1950s.

The influence of Islam on family upbringing explained the appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood to a degree, but as attractive was the secretive aura it maintained and its reputation as a highly organized and militant political movement. Upon joining the Brotherhood, Hasan and many of his peers entered the secret *al-nizam al-khas* (special order) or *Fursan Badr* (Knights of Badr), which were supposed to undertake special missions.[98] They adopted formal ranks and underwent ideological instruction, as well as military training at the hands of a former Egyptian army officer who was sent especially by the Brotherhood leadership in Egypt.[99] The Palestinian members were not noted for their piety, but for their keen interest in handling weapons. Like their counterparts in Gaza, they saw membership of a clandestine organization as a means to liberate Palestine, whereas their Syrian brethren were more interested in seizing power in Damascus.[100] A number of Palestinians broke away to form a more militant group called *Kata'ib Muhammad* (Battalions of Muhammad), yet their only confrontations until the early 1960s were with the Syrian security services.

The search for organization and the obsession with military means for the liberation of Palestine was natural for the young Palestinians. Many were also influenced by the experiences of relatives who had fought in 1948 or who belonged to infiltration bands, some of which worked for Syrian intelligence.[101] The tendency towards clandestine activity and militancy was reinforced by the repressive climate under the Shishakli dictatorship in the early 1950s. The authorities were worried by the strong solidarity between the Syrian population and the Palestinian refugees, moreover, and feared that the Palestine question would provide their internal foes with a vehicle for organized opposition. They banned the entry of Palestinians into the border zone with Israel without special passes and discouraged the formation of explicitly Palestinian clubs and social associations, but this only alerted the young activists more forcefully to their distinct identity.[102]

The end of the Shishakli regime in April 1954 ushered in a relaxation of controls on political activity in the country. A marked shift in Palestinian loyalties away from the Muslim Brotherhood took place, much as it did in Gaza following the confrontation with Nasir in October. The parties espousing Arab nationalism—the Baʿth and the ANM—gained strength following the 1956 war, but indiscriminate purges of Palestinian officers from the Syrian army during the union with Egypt in 1958–61 and the severe difficulties that Palestinian refugees continued to experience in travelling between the two 'regions' of the United Arab Republic tarnished the heroic image of Nasir for some.

By now, the key figures who were to join Fateh in the next few years had already left Syria to seek higher education or employment abroad. ʿAbbas went to Qatar, where he found work as the director of personnel in the civil service, a post that allowed him to hire many Palestinians as teachers and bureaucrats. There he also met former Muslim Brotherhood members from Gaza such as Najjar, ʿUdwan, and Hmud. Najjar and ʿUdwan had kept their ties with former

colleagues in the Society, whom they met during visits to Gaza. ʿAbbas also visited Gaza on the pretext of looking for employees to hire, and in this way made contact with the Fateh founders. Hani al-Hasan enrolled at a German university and immediately played a leading role in expanding union activity among the thousands of Palestinian students and workers in West Germany. ʿAbd-al-Hamid joined him, and together they produced a newsletter, *al-Kifah al-Musallah Tariq al-ʿAwda* (Armed Struggle is the Path to the Return).[103] It was through this newsletter and Fateh' s *Filastinuna*, as well as Khalid al-Hasan, that the first links were established with the Fateh founders in Kuwait. Wazir meanwhile revived contact with his former colleague from Gaza, Yahya ʿAshur, who had formed an active union in Austria, where he was a student, and with another student leader in Spain, Salih al-Kaʿkabani.[104] The Gaza connection led to additional networks, among them the self-styled Revolutionary Armed Struggle Front, whose young founding members were recruited by their former highschool teacher, Salah Khalaf, during his annual vacation to Gaza in summer 1963.[105]

Contacting like-minded groups was one thing, but retaining membership was another. Most members were expatriate students or workers, and contact had to be maintained by correspondence or during vacations spent in Gaza and Syria. The same members often had to be recruited anew after their return.[106] The secession of Syria from the union with Egypt boosted membership, as Fateh attracted disgruntled members of the Baʿth Party, but the backlash of pro-Nasir sympathy also deprived it of other followers. Fateh remained at best a network of disparate groups and gatherings, until a meeting in Kuwait during 1962 gave them a sense of common purpose and confirmed a circle of leaders. ʿAbd-al-Hamid and Hani al-Hasan attended a subsequent meeting in the second half of 1963 or early 1964 (the date is uncertain) and committed their followers to a merger with Fateh.[107] A central leadership emerged around ʿArafat, Wazir, ʿAbbas, Qaddumi, and ʿAbd-al-Karim. Other key figures were Dannan, Khalid al-Hasan, Munir Swayd, and Zaʿnun in Kuwait, and Mahmud al-Khalidi, Husam al-Khatib, and Mahmud Falaha in Syria. With the exception of Qaddumi, who came from the West Bank, all were refugees.

The Ideology of 'Palestine First'

The outlines of Fateh's political thinking took shape as these various strands came together. Its ultimate goal was clear: to liberate the whole of Palestine and destroy the foundations of what it termed a colonialist, Zionist occupation state and society. In short, Fateh sought to destroy Israel as an economic, political, and military entity and restore Palestine as it still existed in the mind of most Palestinians, the homeland that was before 1948.[108] There was little difference between Fateh and any other Palestinian group in this respect (with the solitary exception of the communists).

There was little room for the Jews in this outlook. The original Jewish community in Palestine, that pre-dated the British mandate, could remain but would do so under unequivocally Arab sovereignty. The majority of the Israeli population were an 'alien human assembly', however. Fateh complained that Israel had succeeded in reducing the Palestine conflict in the mind of the international community to a matter of 'refugees, borders, water or tributaries between a small victimized state and 13 rabid [Arab] states that deny its right to existence and life'.[109] For Fateh, Palestinian rights had been obscured by the contrast between 'two million fugitives from the Nazi torment looking for a refuge to live in calm and stability, and 100 million rebellious Arabs who are discontented with the riches and wealth of the vast lands they own and live on, and who wish to throw [the Jews] into the sea just as the Nazis threw them into the gas chambers and death camps'.[110] Yet the resistance of the Palestinians to their committal to oblivion was akin to resistance to Nazi occupation of Europe.[111] The question, in Fateh's view, was how to reassert Palestinian existence.

The clearest expression of the ethos that drove Fateh came in *Structure of Revolutionary Construction*, which stated: 'Our people have lived, driven out in every country, humiliated in the lands of exile, without a homeland, without dignity, without leadership, without hope, without weapons, without direction, without support, without association, without respect, without existence . . . In all the long years that have passed we clung to our hopes and waited with great patience, until all hope had melted away.'[112] The answer was 'revolution, our only course'. Any other choice would be to 'surrender to the circumstances that surround us, remain silent about our situation, and fall back on our dependency. [It would be] to justify our shortcomings and silence, to obscure with all manner of pretexts our recalcitrance and hesitation. In this way we would seal our inevitable fate, and condemn ourselves as a people willing to accept indignity.'[113]

The driving force in the philosophy and ideological outlook of Fateh, to the extent that they existed, was profoundly existential. It derived overwhelmingly from the physical circumstances and deep alienation of the majority of uprooted and exiled refugees, rather than the minority of Palestinians who still resided in their original homes after the end of the 1948 war. The same existential drive imbued Fateh's notion of 'revolution'. 'With revolution we announce our will [hence existence], and with revolution we put an end to this bitter surrender, this terrifying reality that the children of the Catastrophe [of 1948] experience everywhere.' Not all Palestinians would have subscribed to such a bleak view of their encounter with the Arab host countries, certainly not those who belonged to political parties espousing one or another form of pan-Arab nationalism, but Fateh's message also had a fundamentally positive outlook too: 'With revolution we will restore our people's self-confidence and capabilities, and restore the world's confidence in us and respect for us.'[114]

In setting out a programme to achieve its goals Fateh insisted above all on two cardinal principles: the absolute independence of Palestinian organization and decision-making from the Arab governments, and the primacy of armed struggle as the sole means of liberating Palestine. It explained the reasoning behind its insistence on Palestinian autonomy in a sweeping condemnation of Arab policy. Fateh observed that the entry of the Arab armies into Palestine in 1948 had 'failed because the Arab states eliminated the effective Palestinian forces from the battle, by suspending their revolutionary armed activities . . . The Palestinian masses were robbed of the will to act, through coercion and political pressure, and the Palestinian national movement was torn apart as a prerequisite for the safe entry of the Arab armies.'[115] A later text added that 'a number of Arab leaders have exploited the Palestinian cause for their private benefit over the years'.[116]

It followed, in Fateh's view, that the ability to establish an autonomous political entity with independent organizational structures was a necessary key to national revival. Wazir expressed this outlook by observing, with keen regret, that 'our situation would have been very different had the Palestinian leadership after 1948 continued to raise the banner of the [Palestinian] government and entity'.[117] Fateh accordingly adopted the call for a Palestinian entity (*kayan*) that was mooted by Egypt and Iraq in 1959. The *Structure of Revolutionary Construction* asserted that Fateh's intention was to 'declare the establishment of a Palestinian Arab entity and declare a revolutionary leadership to represent this entity, that will assume command of the battle'.[118] It also suggested that Fateh's own 'revolutionary council' and 'higher central committee' would effectively form a Palestinian National Council at the head of the entity. *Filastinuna* developed the argument, and an editorial in the edition for November 1960 noted that 'there are Arab parts of Palestine, and it is on those parts that a leading, revolutionary national Palestinian rule should be established to act in cooperation with the Arab states to save Palestine'.[119]

The theme of a Palestinian entity became the basis of Fateh's political programme in the early 1960s, along with the call for national unity.[120] An internal document clarified that 'we demand this entity in order to create the base for our revolution and to liberate our homeland. The Palestinian entity is necessary in order to concentrate the efforts of our people and mobilize them and to organize our threatened resources.'[121] However, as *Filastinuna* also observed, 'the colonial creators of Israel do not wish us to have an entity because without it the defeated Palestinian people cannot rebel against the Jews'. Worse, the Arab 'rulers combat the entity of the [Palestinian people] and suppress their revolution'.[122]

The belief that the Arab governments sought deliberately to suppress Palestinian identity was central in the thinking of Fateh. Wazir expressed this outlook, widespread among the Palestinians, by arguing that in 1948 'the sole aim of the creation of the [Arab Salvation] Army and of sending it to Palestine [by the League of Arab states] was to confiscate the Palestinian decision and the

independent Palestinian will'.[123] In a later tract, Fateh added that 'the emotional and clannish mentality that led the first Arab revolution was the same impotent bourgeois mentality that governed the abortive battle of 1948. The Palestinian masses were robbed of the will to act through force and political pressure, and the Palestinian national movement was torn apart as a basic precondition for the entry [to Palestine] and safety of the Arab armies'.[124]

Belief in conspiratorial behaviour by Arab governments reinforced the emphasis placed by Fateh on Palestinian-ness. The reverse side of the same coin was the absolute insistence on political and organizational autonomy. In the view of Fateh, a major consequence of the monopoly exercised by the Arab states and their armies over political and military decision-making had been to turn the inhabitants of those parts of Palestine that remained under Arab rule into a 'neglected mass'.[125] It therefore insisted that 'the isolation of Palestine's people from the battle and their distancing from its field must end. Arab tutelage must cease in order to permit [the Palestinians] to organize forces, mobilize and mass them for the battle of vengeance'.[126]

This emphasis was in part also a reaction to what Fateh saw as the dissipation of Palestinian energies in Arab party politics.[127] In its view, after 1948 'Palestinians had been among the most active elements in [Arab] parties, believing that the speed with which good governments arose [in Arab countries] would in itself bring forward the battle of liberation [for Palestine]'.[128] The parties had proved incapable of bringing about change, however, and had instead led to military *coups d'état* and adventures.[129] 'Revolutionary military vanguards in the Arab armies' had removed the rulers associated with *al-nakba* because of the 'weakness of the ideological, nationalist movements and their narrow popular base'. Worse, the parties had then seduced officers to serve their objectives of social revolution, creating power-hungry, adventurist factions and corrupting the initial revolutionary ethos. *Coups* had come to reflect little more than personal ambition, therefore, and led to deep schisms within the armies as they fractured into sects, cliques, or party blocs.[130]

The consequence of party politics for the Palestinians was that 'Palestinian intellectual allegiances were as varied as the Arab parties themselves'.[131] And, as Fateh later argued, 'the multiplicity of intellectual allegiance and the dispersal of means of action entailed in the plurality of parties are not the ideal instruments for the work of a revolution such as ours'.[132] Besides, political parties embodied fixed ideologies and were the instruments by which state power could be seized, but the Palestinians had no state, so party politics were irrelevant.[133] Fateh's attitude towards political parties reflected the deeply-ingrained distrust of *ahzab* in Islamist thinking, but it also stemmed from the memory of the factionalism of Palestinian society before 1948, and especially of the bitter internecine bloodshed of the late 1930s, although neither had stemmed in reality from party politics. In any case the Fateh founders consciously emulated the Muslim Brotherhood by insisting that what they had formed was a movement rather than a party. 'Movement means constant

action far from a rigid organization, [and Fateh] is the movement of a people and not the motion of an organization.'[134] In inviting Palestinians of all ideological tendencies to discard their party affiliations and join armed revolutionary vanguards, Fateh cast itself as *the* national front, rather than one among several political forces.[135]

Connecting the various strands of Fateh thinking were the twin notions of 'revolution' and 'armed struggle'. Revolution was not the outcome of a particular political ideology or social philosophy, but an expression of independent will, a proof of existence. The mere fact that Palestinians acted and organized was a positive assertion and an aim in itself. It was, 'in reality, an act of broad rebellion and defiance against Arab strategy and the defensive means through which the Arab states deal with the Palestine problem'.[136] By placing the liberation of Palestine at the top of Arab priorities, Fateh believed that it could reverse the negative relationship and free the Palestinians from Arab political constraints.

In all cases military action was the quintessential means to mobilize the Palestinian people, assert their identity and attain national unity, and impose their autonomy on the Arab governments. A Fateh memorandum was unequivocal: 'We, the people of Palestine, are in need of a revolutionary upheaval in our daily lives after having been afflicted by the Catastrophe [of 1948] with the worst diseases of dependency, division, and defeatism. This upheaval in [our] lives will not occur except through our practise of the armed struggle and our assumption of responsibility for it and leadership of it.'[137] Khalid al-Hasan expressed the same message prosaically: 'the Palestinians have no citizenship and so they have no history and no rights, duties, or sense of belonging. Without exercising those [functions] they became nothing. Restoring [those functions] requires returning to the homeland, but that in turn requires force.'[138]

At the most basic level, the Fateh founders saw 'revolutionary violence' as a catalytic agent, that could break through the resignation of the refugees. In this they borrowed directly from Frantz Fanon's writings on the Algerian revolution, in which he stressed the 'cleansing' or 'purifying' effect of violence on the psyche of the oppressed.[139] The practice of 'armed struggle' was also the path towards national unity and, in the absence of a guiding ideology, the only way in which experienced cadres could develop.[140] The psychological impact of violence was coupled in the minds of the Fateh founders with the notion of the Palestinians taking their fate into their own hands. Wazir later likened this dynamic to the struggle waged by US blacks, the Mau Mau movement in Kenya, and the Algerians.[141]

The strands in Fateh thinking were brought together by a Fateh leader speaking anonymously in a press interview in 1968:

> Psychological stability, peace with the enemy, and the search for material indulgence are all factors which, if they last, will allow the colonialist plots to kill the Palestinian

spirit of struggle and to assimilate the Palestinians within the new societies to which they move.

In other words, the Palestinians were divided between the residents of the [refugee] camps, eaten by the diseases of laziness, dependency, and indifference, and young people who [obtained education] and went off to seek [ways of] improving their personal conditions.

As a result, it was necessary to extricate the Palestinian [*sic*] from the grasp of Arab patronage, party feuds, and Arab regional designs, and to return him to his natural place as a human being who has lost his land and must strive to recover it . . .

This is why [Fateh] has raised these slogans: unity of Palestinian effort, rejection of Arab patronage, independent Palestinian will, non-interference in the internal affairs of the Arab states, and distancing the Palestinians from social battles on the basis that armed action takes priority in order to return to the occupied part of their homeland.[142]

A Return to Arab Nationalism: Palestinians in the Baʿth Party

The Palestinian emphasis of Fateh contrasted sharply with the pan-Arab beliefs of the ANM, and with those of the Baʿth Party, the only other Arab nationalist force to move towards establishing a separate Palestinian branch in this period. Yet Fateh's 'Palestine first' approach resonated among the Palestinian members of the Baʿth, especially after 1958, when the dissolution of the party in Syria during the union with Egypt left them without an organizational structure. Starting in 1959, they exerted increasing pressure on the national command of the Baʿth to provide them with a distinct political framework.[143] Palestinian Baʿthists in Lebanon were the most vocal, partly because they were the most marginalized. They had gained some military experience in the 1958 civil war, and asserted modest autonomy in the absence of the main party in Syria. A statement issued by the branch in Lebanon in May 1959 threatened to overturn conventional party policy in its desire to make 'Palestine our second Algeria . . . and prepare the youth of Palestine within a popular liberation army', and to enable the refugees to 'select a new leadership'.[144]

The Palestinian Baʿthists in Lebanon also set up a separate *shuʿba* (section) in 1960. Heading it, among others, were national command members ʿAbd-al-Wahhab al-Kayyali and Khalid al-Yashruti. Yashruti, who headed the Palestinian section, was later claimed by the party to have formed a guerrilla group, the Palestine Liberation Front, and organized reconnaissance missions in Israel in 1961.[145] A memorandum sent in the name of the Baʿth Party (presumably by the branch in Lebanon) to a meeting of Arab foreign ministers in Baghdad in January 1961 indicated clearly the divergence from standard policy. It argued forcefully that 'the people of Palestine should be left free to organize themselves within a Palestinian liberation front, and the Palestinian cause must not be dragged into [Arab] regional politics'. The memorandum bordered on her-

esy in Baʿthist terms, moreover, by stating that the Palestinians had 'frequently expressed their desire for the creation of a combatant entity that would gather the sons of Palestine and organize their struggle to liberate Palestine'. Certain Arab countries were guilty of 'forming subordinate Palestinian agencies as instruments of their propaganda and policies at the domestic, Arab, and international levels'. The answer, this group of Palestinian Baʿthists argued, was to allow the Palestinians to establish their entity freely in the form of a 'popular front for the liberation of Palestine'.[146]

Most of these arguments challenged Baʿthist orthodoxy. The party's national command, headed by founders ʿAflaq and Salah-al-Din al-Bitar and supported by Jordanian-born senior ideologue Munif al-Razzaz, firmly opposed the calls for a separate Palestinian branch, regarding it as counter to the unitary ethos of their pan-Arab ideology. Their attitude did not change after Syria's secession from the union, nor after the rupture caused within the party when co-founder Akram al-Hurani and the local regional command supported the break-up. ʿAflaq and Bitar refused to alter their position after taking refuge in Beirut, despite further lobbying. The party branch in Lebanon met in mid-November 1962 and recommended the formation of a Palestinian branch, but the national command again rejected the idea during a meeting held shortly after the *coup* that restored it to power in Damascus in March 1963.[147]

The Palestinian Baʿthists in Lebanon were not alone in their discontent. A number of fugitives from the party branch in Jordan had taken refuge in Syria following the dismissal of the nationalist government of Nabulsi and the banning of opposition parties in April 1957. One of their leading figures, ʿAbdullah al-Rimawi, strongly disagreed with the Syrian regional command for supporting the secession. In disgust, he and numerous colleagues joined a new pro-Nasir gathering of former Syrian Baʿthists, the Socialist Unionists Movement.[148] Many Palestinian Baʿthists in Syria also joined the movement, although some later returned to the Baʿth after March 1963. Others left the party altogether: Qaddumi joined Fateh, while Samih Abu-Kwayk and numerous junior figures such as Naji ʿAllush, Muhammad ʿAwda, and Sabri al-Banna formed small, short-lived 'liberation groups' of their own. Only a minority of Palestinians were not affected and remained loyal to the party, among them embittered Baʿthists from the Gaza Strip such as ʿAbdullah Hurani, who had been expelled by the Egyptian authorities in retaliation for the secession.[149]

Among the dismayed former Palestinian Baʿthists were a group of young officers who had earned their commissions in the Syrian army between 1956 and 1960. Following the secession and the anti-Nasir volte-face by the Baʿth, about a dozen secretly formed the Palestinian Revolutionary Front with the eventual intention of mounting guerrilla attacks on Israel. Among their leading figures were Ahmad Hijju, commander of the 68 Battalion, Mujahid Samʿan, and combat pilot Mahmud ʿAzzam. Also joining them were pro-Nasir colleagues such as Salah Maʿani and Walid Saʿd-al-Din, and civilians such as Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashibi.[150] No military action resulted, but the group

renewed contact with the Baʿth Party after March of 1963. This coincided with renewed pressure by the Palestinian rank-and-file in Syria, who were aware that new groups such as Fateh, the ANM, and the little-known Palestinian Liberation Front, headed by former army captain Ahmad Jibril, were busily recruiting in the refugee camps. The national command relented slightly, allowing the Palestinians to gather in the *shuʿba* of Damascus University, which quickly became the nucleus of a Palestinian grouping with about 80 members in the capital.[151]

The abortive pro-Nasir *coup* of 18 July shook the Baʿthist leadership, however. The regional command was especially suspicious of Palestinian loyalties, but argued equally that 'the Baʿth Party cannot rule in Syria if the Palestinians oppose it'.[152] It was determined to salvage the situation and was instrumental in securing formal approval, finally, for the establishment of a separate Palestinian branch in the party. The branch remained modest in size, but the party's control of state power made it attractive to a number of Palestinians, especially junior officers in the army, which was firmly in the grip of the secretive 'military commitee' of the Baʿth Party. To increase its credibility and compete with emerging rivals, the Palestinian branch also tried to take control of the Palestinian Revolutionary Front.[153] The front had little substance, but several of its members transferred their allegiance to the party's military committee and to the military intelligence branch headed by Ahmad al-Suwaydani. Yet the new rulers of Syria still distrusted the Palestinians, and admitted none to military academies for nearly two years.[154]

What the shift in attitude of the Baʿth Party towards autonomous Palestinian organization revealed, if nothing else, was the growing polarization of Arab regional politics and above all the sharpening rivalry between Damascus and Cairo. Relations between Egypt on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other had soured following the Syrian secession of 1961 and then plummeted to their nadir as the three states backed opposite sides in the civil war that racked Yemen after 1962. The Arab 'cold war' was at its height, pitting the 'reactionary' and 'progressive' states, themselves hardly united, against each other. The announcement by Israel in 1963 that it planned to divert the Jordan River headwaters into a new national water carrier was regarded as a direct challenge to Arab power, and compelled the Arab protagonists to put their commitment to the anti-Israeli cause into practice. In this situation the Palestinian 'card' was used increasingly as a means of demonstrating their patriotic credentials and of embarrassing rivals. The decision by the Baʿth Party to activate its Palestinian membership in 1963 and, soon after, to play host to Fateh, fell precisely into this context. It was largely in response to such considerations too, and aware of the spread of clandestine Palestinian groups such as Fateh, that Nasir was to tolerate the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in early 1964.

4

The Watershed

The 'Entity' is Born

Organizations such as the ANM and Fateh remained modest in numerical strength and political influence, but the growth of their appeal in the early 1960s revealed certain patterns. One was declining Palestinian affiliation to parties whose ideologies did not commit them first and foremost to the liberation of Palestine. This was obvious in the case of the Islamist movements and the Baʿth Party, and also of the communists or the Syrian National Party. The same did not apply as powerfully to the ANM, despite owing much of its appeal to its role as a vehicle for Nasirism, because its *raison d'être* and political programmes were so clearly focused on Palestine as the ultimate goal. Yet it, too, faced a problem, highlighted by Nasir's reiteration in December 1963 that Egypt was unable to wage a war with Israel.[1] The proliferation of small, self-styled 'liberation groups' reflected disappointment with Arab political structures and leaders, but a majority of Palestinians of all social backgrounds remained outside any formal affiliation. The Palestine-first sentiment of Fateh was widely shared, but still lacked embodiment in an institutional framework.

It was in this context that members of the traditional and upper middle classes of pre-1948 Palestine launched the attempt to establish a state-like organization. These were the strata that had occupied the second echelon in the national leadership under Husayni, and that were effectively denied their chance to govern as a result of *al-nakba* and of the subsequent marginalization of the AHC and APG. Their attempt could not have been made had it not been for the opportunity provided by Arab regional politics. The Arab 'cold war' had reached a stalemate by autumn 1963, prompting Nasir to seek a truce with his rivals, above all with Saudi king Saʿud in order to bring the debilitating conflict in Yemen to a close. The Israeli plan to divert the Jordan River headwaters offered a good reason for reconciliation, which Nasir quickly seized to assemble the Arab heads of state. The first Arab summit conference was held in Cairo in January 1964, and took two major decisions: to establish a Unified Arab Command (UAC) under Egyptian supervision to coordinate Arab military preparations for an eventual war with Israel, and to implement a counter-diversion for the Jordan River headwaters to prevent Israeli use.

Noticeable was Arab reluctance to tackle the Palestine problem, by addressing the demands for a body that could represent the Palestinians. This was

already evident in the deliberations of council of foreign ministers of the League of Arab States in mid-September 1963. An Iraqi memorandum revived the contentious issue of forming a Palestinian 'entity', calling for the election of representatives to a national assembly that would in turn elect a 'Palestine government'. The latter body would establish formal relations with all Arab states and coordinate planning for the liberation of Palestine, for which purpose it would also raise a liberation army.[2] Jordan vigorously opposed the proposal, seeing in it a direct challenge to its claimed sovereignty over the West Bank and Palestinian citizens. The council sought safety. It concluded that 'the time has come for the inhabitants of Palestine to assume their own cause, and it is the duty of the Arab states to allow them the opportunity and to enable them to do so through democratic means', but at the same time deferred the matter of establishing an entity to the concerned Arab governments.[3]

In the event, the summit conference skirted the issue of Palestinian national organization once more. King Husayn remained firmly opposed, while Syrian president Amin al-Hafiz provocatively demanded that the West Bank and Gaza Strip be given to a Palestinian entity as its territorial base. King Saʿud suggested the formation of a Palestinian government, and Algerian president Ahmad Ben Bella and Tunisian president al-Habib Bourguiba preferred a national liberation front.[4] The heads of state finally satisfied themselves by vaguely instructing 'Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the representative of Palestine to the League of Arab States, to continue his consultations with the member states and Palestinian people with the aim of arriving at the setting up of sound foundations for organizing the Palestinian people and enabling it to play its role in liberating its homeland and determining its destiny'.[5] Nasir had either failed to promote the idea of establishing a Palestinian national body as a clear priority, or else did not do so forcefully enough. The fact that Mahmud Riyad, who became foreign minister of Egypt in April, made no mention of such a body in his memoirs for that period suggests that it was not high on the scale of priorities.[6] Similarly, Nasir made no apparent attempt to revive the Palestinian National Union or reactivate the Legislative Council in Gaza, both of which had been formed in 1961 and continued to exist, at least in name.

That active steps were taken to set one up was due largely to the determination, in which ambition also played a role, of Shuqayri. Of mixed Egyptian, Hijazi, and Turkish descent, he was born in 1908 in a southern town of what was to become Lebanon. A lawyer by training, he was briefly a minister of the All Palestine Government in 1948 and later acted as a legal adviser to the Saudi government until falling out of favour with foreign minister and crown prince Faysal in August 1963. This coincided with the formal dissolution of the All Palestine Government following the death of Ahmad Hilmi ʿAbd-al-Baqi (himself of Egyptian origin); at Nasir's request Shuqayri was selected to represent Palestine in the League of Arab States' ministerial council in September, and it was in this capacity that he headed an 18-person Palestinian delegation to address the UN in the same month.[7] Shuqayri made numerous enemies during

his political career and was subsequently regarded by his Palestinian rivals as both bombastic and self-serving, but at this point in modern Palestinian history these characteristics proved beneficial. He demonstrated this amply during the summit conference in January 1964, first by pushing his chair forward until he sat among the Arab heads of state at the opening session, and then by forcing himself into the hall and sitting in the front rank once more after being denied entry to the second session.[8]

The formal result of Shuqayri's behaviour was meagre, as attested by the weak resolution adopted regarding Palestinian organization, but it allowed him to take further steps. A few weeks after the conference, he presented Nasir with a blueprint for a Palestinian organization with a national charter, internal statutes, and guidelines for political, military, and financial activity. According to his memoirs, the Egyptian president approved the idea and granted him access to the Palestine Borders Guard in Gaza, as well as authorizing him to draft a Palestinian conscription law.[9] Shuqayri had obviously overstepped his summit mandate. He explained his thinking in an address to the Palestinians on Cairo radio in mid-February. 'We are a people without an entity, without a leadership . . . and so we must assemble in an all-embracing organization', he argued, 'the conference of the [Arab] kings and presidents has opened the way . . . to the entity of the Palestinian people . . . [The entity] is a collective, national leadership . . . [it] is agencies, training camps, and regular forces.'[10]

Shuqayri was formulating explicit articulations of Palestinian 'statism' and nationalism. He developed these themes in his opening address to a large Palestinian assembly convened in East Jerusalem on 28 May. 'We have employed this term—Palestinian entity—for many years, [but] it is alien to Arab and international life. It is a new term with no precedent in the history of nations . . . but Palestine is unique in its catastrophe and alone in its tragedy, and so it could only experience an alien and solitary situation.' The reasons for this anomaly were clear enough in his opinion. 'All peoples who suffered colonialism remained settled in their homelands and safe in their homes, fighting on their land . . . whereas the Palestinian people were uprooted from their homeland, expelled from their homes, and deprived of their entity.'[11] This entity had existed in pre-1948 Palestine, Shuqayri insisted, in the form of 'our parties, organizations, and national committees'. The nationalist reality was moreover embodied by 'the peasants martyred, workers hanged on the gallows, and students and youths, men and women, who were killed, imprisoned, or tortured, and by the bitter struggle waged by the people in all its strata for nearly thirty years'.[12]

The challenge was how to give this entity meaning and substance in the complex Arab environment. The assembly was only able to convene in Jerusalem due to the interest of king Husayn in fostering better relations with Egypt. Even so, he nominated a majority of the 422 Palestinians invited to attend, and Jordanian intelligence agents kept an intrusive and intimidating presence at the

meeting.[13] Shuqayri took additional pains to reassure his hosts that the proposed entity would not 'exercise any territorial sovereignty over the West Bank in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', nor, indeed, over the Gaza Strip and al-Himma (on the Syrian border).[14] This was politically expedient, no doubt, but it revealed both the continuing duality of Palestinian national identity and the inevitable tension between embryonic Palestinian state-building and Arab interests of state.

Despite these constraints, the Jerusalem assembly decreed the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), approved its national charter and other founding documents and statutes, and reconstituted itself as the Palestine National Council (PNC).[15] This parliamentary body was to be the highest authority in the PLO, empowered to legislate, approve budgets, and set overall policy for implementation by an elected executive committee on an annual basis.[16] Each member of the executive committee was responsible for a different 'ministerial' portfolio; Shuqayri was naturally selected as its first chairman. The assembly also resolved to impose compulsory military training on all Palestinian men and women able to bear arms, form regular and guerrilla battalions equipped with the full range of modern weapons, and appoint Palestinian representatives to a special apparatus that it proposed should be set up within the Unified Arab Command to organize Palestinian mobilization.[17] Other resolutions called on the Arab states to accord PLO officials the same immunity and privileges as their own civil servants and to recognize the identity cards that the PLO intended to issue to all Palestinians.[18]

The statist ambition of the PLO founders was unmistakable, as was their conception of a distinctly Palestinian variety of the broader Arab national identity. The first article of the PLO charter—itself dubbed *qawmi* (from *qawm*, nation) rather than *watani* (from *watan*, homeland or *patria*)—stated that 'Palestine is an Arab homeland tied by Arab nationalism to all the Arab countries [*aqtar*] which together compose the wider Arab homeland'. The second and fifth articles defined its borders as those of the British mandate, within which 'Palestinian character is an essential and undying feature [*sifa asila lazima la tazul*], that is passed from fathers to sons'.[19] If the Palestinians were to serve the cause of Arab unity, the charter reasoned, then its immediate task was to 'preserve its Palestinian character and the components [of that character], and to nurture awareness of its existence and oppose any ventures that might dissolve or weaken it'.[20] The Palestinian nationalist theme was underlined in the requirement that all 'doctrines, be they political, social, or economic, must not distract the people of Palestine from their primary duty in liberating their homeland'. Only after liberation could the Palestinians address the question of what 'political, economic, or social system' to adopt.[21]

The social outlook of the PLO founders was also evident in their selection of delegates to the Jerusalem assembly. A publicity pamphlet later stated that the invitees comprised 'the notables [*'aʿyan*] and members of parliament, former ministers, members of parliament, and notables, and mayors and village council

heads in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, clergy, lawyers, doctors, pharmacists, engineers, university professors, and Legislative Council members in Gaza, heads of chambers of commerce, merchants, and emigrants, representatives of women's bodies and of the returnees [refugees] living in the camps, sheikhs of the Beer-Sheva' nomads, heads and representatives of workers' and farmers' unions, directors of company boards, bank employees, and their like'.[22] The clear bias towards traditional social leaders and scions of the established families of pre-1948 Palestine and towards the propertied and professional elements of the middle class in this categorization was confirmed by the list of PNC delegates. Few, if any, were from the refugee camps or of peasant and working-class background, while trade unions and the specific categories of women and journalists were assigned a combined total of only 27 seats.[23] Shuqayri also offered seats to the nascent Palestinian groups such as Fateh and the ANM, but refused to acknowledge them formally in the PNC.

For all its faults, Shuqayri had established a national institution, that was to obtain formal Arab recognition during the second summit conference in September. He had created a fait accompli, but his achievement was sharply criticized in some quarters. The Islamic Liberation Party, for example, opposed both the PLO and Palestinian statehood, fearing that the creation of an entity would relieve the Arab states of their duty to liberate Palestine.[24] Most hostile was Husayni, who had left Egypt for Lebanon after a rift with Nasir over his attempted reconciliation with Jordan in 1959. Husayni's animosity for the Egyptian president led him to support Iraqi leader 'Abd-al-Karim al-Qasim in his own feud with Nasir, and to order sabotage and assassination attacks against ANM cadres in Lebanon in autumn 1962.[25] Husayni also refused an invitation from Shuqayri, whom he regarded as an Egyptian stooge seeking to usurp the leadership he still claimed for himself, to join the preparatory committee of the Jerusalem assembly in May 1964.[26] The proposed entity would, he argued, 'facilitate liquidation of the cause of Palestine, and America and the other colonialist states are supervising this liquidation'.[27] Husayni and other surviving members of the AHC lobbied the Jordanian government not to host the PNC, and convened a counter-assembly attended by 300 Palestinians in Lebanon in mid-May.[28] He was also instrumental in the Saudi decision to boycott the Jerusalem assembly and withhold recognition from the PLO.

Husayni's objections that the PLO was not truly representative and that its subservience to the Arab states would prevent it from waging war on Israel were shared by younger Palestinian activists, notably in the ANM and Fateh.[29] The ANM had generally opposed the idea of a Palestinian 'entity' up to 1963, not only on the grounds that it diverged from the aim of Arab unity, but also for fear that it would prove to be a device for the Arab states to abdicate responsibility for liberating Palestine. Shuqayri repeatedly consulted the ANM between September 1963 and May 1964, but it remained of two minds.[30] It supported his general purpose, but warned against an 'entity' that was not revolutionary in character and whose ultimate authority was merely nominal.[31]

The ANM issued several statements, sometimes jointly with the influential General Union of Palestine Students (GUPS), which it now dominated, and other minor groups, in which it insisted that a credible national organization should have the power to elect its leadership, impose conscription, appoint delegates to the Unified Arab Command, and provide its members with official recognition from the Arab states.[32]

The ANM was impressed by Nasir's support for Shuqayri, but its distrust of the Arab states and dislike of the PLO chairman's overbearing character were strong. At the beginning of May it invited five self-styled liberation groups to form a new front—the Politburo of Unified Action for Palestinian Revolutionary Forces. Nothing more came of this effort, but the ANM followed up by expressing shock at the manner in which Shuqayri had personally selected delegates to the Jerusalem assembly. It complained on the same occasion of Jordanian harassment, believing this to be a deliberate attempt to 'isolate the revolutionary organizations that have taken it upon themselves to organize, educate, and prepare the Palestinians in the past sixteen years'. In its view the PLO 'has no relation to the masses and [lacks] the foundation of a military organization', and the PNC structure effectively prevented 'discussion, planning, reporting, and monitoring'.[33] Arguably the worst crime was that Shuqayri had 'chosen from the start to submit continuously to the demands of Jordan and the other reactionary forces'. GUPS soon followed in similar vein.[34]

Fateh and the 'Revolutionary Process'

Fateh had even less reason than the ANM to trust Shuqayri. Several of its leaders had met him in the latter part of 1963, and were distinctly unimpressed by his character and suspicious of his ties to Nasir. The Fateh founders also considered, not incorrectly, that the PLO leadership was drawn mainly from 'the sons of [upper class] families and traditional figures'.[35] The clash of personalities was strongest between Wazir and Shuqayri, who met in Algiers. Relations soured further in spring 1964, when the Algerian authorities ordered Fateh to hand control of the 'Palestine Office' to a representative of Shuqayri. This was partly due to Fateh's ties to the Islamist-leaning Muhammad Khaydar, who had just broken away from the Algerian government.

Yet Fateh's attitude towards the proposed Palestinian 'entity' remained outwardly more accommodating than that of the ANM. *Filastinuna* had consistently espoused the establishment of an entity since 1959, and commented favourably on Shuqayri's preparations in autumn 1963 and early 1964. Fateh also endorsed the creation of a Palestinian army, even if it were subject to Arab control. Its support for general elections was more qualified, as it feared that public competition would revive the bitter rivalries and factionalism of pre-1948 society.[36] Whatever its fears and concerns, Fateh was keen to see the birth of the entity and instructed the handful of its members among the delegates to

the Jerusalem assembly to focus on this objective and limit their opposition to other aspects of the PLO programme.[37] Yet none of the 15–20 Fateh delegates were nominated for membership in the first executive committee.[38] Shuqayri had discarded earlier thoughts of forming a coalition, and now hoped instead to persuade Fateh and other groups to merge completely within the PLO framework.

Fateh was not interested in a merger, however, partly because it had not fully abandoned a previous plan to convene a national conference under its own auspices. Indeed, its founding documents had envisaged turning Fateh's revolutionary council and higher central committee into a 'national council'. The movement would also 'declare the establishment of a Palestinian Arab entity' after the launch of the armed revolution, in order to take command of the conflict with Israel.[39] Fateh revived this line of thinking in 1964. It regarded the 'armed struggle' as the means both to launch a national front and to demonstrate its credibility and attract the support of other Palestinian and Arab groups.[40] The Palestinian entity had to be revolutionary, as *Filastinuna* argued in April 1964, and it could only be based on an armed revolution.[41] In short, military action was a means to pre-empt the emergence of a less zealous and less independent Palestinian leadership.

Fateh's immediate concerns in mid-1964 were political in any case. One was that general elections, if held, could grant 'legitimacy to representatives who might emerge on the political stage and implement decisions that are categorically rejected by the Palestinian people, [by] taking cover in [that] legitimacy'.[42] The establishment of the PLO therefore threatened to abort the 'mass movement'.[43] As Khalid al-Hasan later explained, 'we considered the PLO to be an Arab instrument and [its military wing] a part of the Arab armies. In view of our experiences with the Arabs and especially in 1936, and our deep lack of trust towards them . . . we feared that the PLO would kill or divert the awakening of our people'.[44] Wazir added that the PLO had been created with the express purpose of pre-empting the revolutionary process among the Palestinians.[45] A subsequent Fateh memorandum also took task with the PLO for being 'the child of the [Arab] summit conference, which inherited its blood and flesh from the conference and so reflected its contradictions'. The Arab states had shied away from confronting Israeli plans to divert the Jordan River headwaters, it argued, and so created the PLO as a means of distracting public attention.[46]

Yet Fateh was also aware, as Wazir later explained, that 'the PLO enjoyed Arab legitimacy, and this was important'.[47] Some of its leaders hoped that the start of military action against Israel would confront the PLO with a fait accompli and compel it to seek greater independence from Arab constraints.[48] They were not content to depend on fate, however, and planned to take control of the PLO and 'revolutionize' it from within. Fateh would join the PNC, executive committee, and other PLO bodies, or else create an alternative front by establishing parallel unions and associations and other mass organizations.

This effort would be coordinated with other liberation groups, and would also form the basis for a wider Arab alliance. The front would then demand the opening of training camps for Palestinians in Arab states, formation of local defence forces in the West Bank and Gaza, and an end to Arab travel restrictions and press censorship imposed on the Palestinians.[49]

The decision of the second Arab summit conference in September to recognize the PLO and its military wing, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), brought matters to a head for Fateh. Egyptian media and the PLO made considerable play of Nasir's decision to transfer the Palestinian Borders Guard to the nominal authority of the PLO. Photographs of PLA soldiers in steel helmets and camouflage uniforms training for combat with drawn bayonets exerted a powerful pull on young Palestinians everywhere. Fateh had not previously envisaged starting military action during 1964, despite pretending to Shuqayri in late 1963 that it intended to do so during the first Arab summit conference.[50] The Fateh leadership had in fact resolved, during a meeting in Damascus in mid-1963, to concentrate on building up membership and soliciting Arab and non-Arab support.[51] The formal endorsement of the PLO and PLA in September 1964 exerted severe pressure on Fateh to launch the 'armed struggle' sooner than planned. As one of its publications subsequently explained, it came to the conclusion that 'intensifying the military bases [*sic*] and starting operations may limit the crumbling [of membership]'.[52]

The internal debate in Fateh took place against a backdrop of improving relations with several Arab states, starting with Algeria. Jamal ʿAbd-al-Ra'uf (al-Qidwa al-Husayni), elder brother of Yasir Arafat, headed the Arab Maghreb (North Africa) Bureau at the AHC office in Cairo, and in this way made the acquaintance of most of the leading members of the Algerian *Front de Libération National*.[53] ʿAbd-al-Ra'uf was also a member of the Society of Struggle for the Liberation of Islamic Peoples, through which he cemented relations with Muhammad Khaydar.[54] Fateh was rewarded with an invitation to attend the Algerian independence ceremony in 1962, during which Arafat won president Ben Bella's approval to set up the Palestine Office in Algiers. Wazir left Beirut, where he had been editing *Filastinuna*, to run the office after its formal inauguration on 23 September 1963.

Wazir quickly developed the relationship, arranging the recruitment of 400 Palestinian teachers for the rapidly expanding Algerian education system and securing 150 places for Palestinians at Algerian universities. The number of teachers eventually rose to 1,000, and together with the students provided a source of recruits for Fateh.[55] In summer 1964, the Algerian army trained 100–200 Palestinians—including students and workers from Germany—in guerrilla warfare.[56] The Algerian base also provided Fateh with valuable introductions to other liberation movements. In January, for example, Wazir met the visiting foreign minister of the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front, Mme Binh. He later met the legendary Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, who pledged Cuban backing, and leaders of emerging national liberation movements in Portuguese

Africa. In this way Fateh received an invitation to visit China: Wazir and Arafat arrived on 15 March for talks with the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, after which a Palestinian office was opened in Beijing.[57] They were received by communist party chairman Mao Zedong during their visit, and were later informed by deputy-chairman Zhou En-Lai and foreign minister Liu Shao-Chi that China had decided to boycott Israel.[58] Wazir visited North Korea on his way home, and returned with Qaddumi and Mahmud Maswada to China three months later to receive a donation of £7,000.[59]

Valuable as it was, the Algerian connection was overshadowed by the Syrian one. The Fateh founders and senior cadres from Syria—ʿAbd-al-Karim, Dannan, Khalidi, and Khatib—provided early contacts with senior officials and political figures in 1962–3, as did Qaddumi and other Baʿthists who joined Fateh after the Syrian secession in 1961. The March 1963 *coup* offered hope of a major opening, as Syrian chief-of-staff Ziyad al-Hariri agreed to receive Algerian arms shipments on behalf of Fateh, but he was dismissed following the abortive pro-Nasir *coup* of 18 July.[60] There was little to commend an alliance between the new regime and Fateh. The leftist officers and civilians of the Baʿth Party were aware of the Muslim Brotherhood background of many Fateh leaders, and suspected them, not without reason, of links to Saudi Arabia. Fateh's Saudi connection was in fact indirect, being conducted through Husayni and Egyptian members of the Muslim Brotherhood who managed the Saudi-sponsored Islamic League.

The establishment of the PLO in May 1964 changed matters. Earlier, the national command of the Baʿth Party had offered broad support for official Arab moves to create a Palestinian entity and army.[61] A long memorandum from the same body prepared on the eve of the Jerusalem assembly stipulated more firmly that the proposed entity should possess 'people, land, and authority', but refrained from repeating the previous Syrian demand that the Palestinians take control of the West Bank and Gaza. It merely added that the entity should have an elected assembly and executive committee, and called on Arab governments to provide material support and ease their restrictions on the guest refugee communities.[62] In sharp contrast, a statement on 2 September by the group of Palestinian Baʿthist officers who operated under the name of the Palestinian Revolutionary Front was openly critical of the PLO. The latter organization was accused of 'subservience' to the Arab states, of being imposed from above rather than emerging 'spontaneously from the ranks of the masses', and of lacking a 'revolutionary vanguard able to bear the burdens of struggle within the ranks of its leadership'.[63]

The belief that the PLO was nothing more than a cat's-paw for Nasir shaped Syrian attitudes. Syrian president Hafiz challenged his Egyptian counterpart during the second Arab summit conference in September, boasting that he could devise a plan to defeat Israel utterly in four days if given 40 Arab brigades to do so.[64] It was largely in response to this 'outbidding', in fact, that Nasir informed the summit that he 'put Sinai and the Gaza Strip at the disposal of the

PLO to form the [Palestinian] army'.[65] He responded to further goading by decreeing an amendment to the Constitutional Law of the Gaza Strip (of February 1962) to make the 'liberation of Palestine a sacred duty for its sons and for every Arab'. The PLO was designated as the 'national organization' of the Palestinians in Gaza and elsewhere, that would take part in 'joint [Arab] action to regain the stolen land of Palestine and participate in the mission of Arab nationalism'.[66] The ruling Baʿth Party in Damascus now came to the conclusion that the best way to embarrass Nasir was to expose his unwillingness to confront Israel. 'We shall rub Nasir's nose in the mud of Palestine', one senior official confided, 'that is where his end will be'.[67] Fateh offered a suitable means to that end.[68]

Fateh Jumps the Gun

Fateh was hardly in a position to launch anything so ambitious as the much-vaunted 'armed struggle'. It had successfully expanded its membership in 1963, but its presence in the Arab confrontation states remained minimal. Arafat moved from Kuwait to Damascus during the year in order to develop the organization in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. One of his first steps was to consult former mufti Husayni, who offered his views on Palestinian and Arab politics and put his followers in the refugee camps at the disposal of Fateh.[69] This provided it with a small, but experienced group of infiltrators, among them brothers Jalal and Kamal Kaʿwash, who had previously worked for the Lebanese *deuxième bureau*, Egyptian and Syrian intelligence, and the Baʿth Party.[70]

As important were Arafat's contacts with other liberation groups in Lebanon. Most important was the Revolutionary Palestinian Organization, founded by a schoolteacher in Beirut, Zakariyya ʿAbd-al-Rahim. A former member of the Lebanese Sunni Muslim *ʿIbad al-Rahman* (Worshippers of the Compassionate) paramilitary youth group, established in the mid-1930s and now close to the Muslim Brotherhood, he had urged the ANM, Baʿth Party, and AHC in 1959 to establish a local Palestine Committee. When ʿAbd-al-Rahim decided to form his own group, he used his position as a teacher to recruit adherents in several refugee camps.[71] The group joined Fateh towards the end of 1963, and ʿAbd-al-Rahim became responsible for building a clandestine organization in Lebanon.[72] With them also came brothers Ahmad (Ziyad) and Mahmud al-Atrash, veteran infiltrators who now set up Fateh 'strike groups' (*al-majmuʿat al-dariba*) under Arafat's direct control. Wazir, ʿAbbas, and Zaʿnun were among the Fateh leaders who visited Lebanon in this period to observe preparations, and to assist in the purchase of light arms left over from the civil war of 1958.[73]

Arafat had greater success in Jordan, where the key local cadre was Muhammad Ghnaym, a merchant who was also a senior official in the syndi-

cate of Jordanian unions. Ghnaym had also been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood before joining Fateh, and belonged to its scout organization, *al-jawwala* (rangers).[74] Like other Palestinians of his generation, he was attracted to the Brotherhood because it described jihad as a religious duty and as the highest form of struggle.[75] Ghnaym and many of his peers left the Society in 1957–8 in protest at its tacit support for the throne's open alignment with the US. In 1962–3, he and those of his colleagues who had joined Fateh were followed by former Baʿthists such as Samih Abu-Kwayk. Acquaintances made at university in Egypt or through GUPS brought additional recruits, among them ʿUmar al-Khatib and ʿAbbas Zaki. Arafat and Wazir visited Jordan repeatedly after mid-1963, and were followed in 1964 by ʿAbbas, Zaʿnun, and Rafiq al-Natsha, who used their positions as public-sector recruiting and personnel officers for Qatar, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia respectively to disguise the real purpose of their visits from the Jordanian authorities.[76] On one such visit, Arafat met Kamil al-Sharif, a leader of the local Muslim Brotherhood and cabinet minister.

The most important arena for Fateh, however, was Syria. Arafat made Damascus his main base, and was assisted by several aides, most active being Muhammad Hishma, a former follower of Husayni and officer of the Palestinian Liberation Regiment in Iraq in 1960–3. Husam al-Khatib provided an especially valuable line of contact to Syrian military intelligence chief Ahmad al-Swaydani, who offered modest, but significant assistance in 1964. Air force commander Hafiz al-Asad also helped, by allowing Algerian arms to reach Fateh through Syrian airbases.[77] The Algerian connection proved useful in more ways than one. Nur-al-Din al-Atasi, Yusif al-Zuʿayyin, and Ibrahim Makhus—Baʿth Party cadres who in 1966 became president, premier, and foreign minister—had served as medical volunteers with the FLN before 1962, and met Arafat and Wazir in Algeria after independence. There the two Fateh leaders also met Munir ʿAbdullah, a senior Baʿthist who introduced them in late 1964 to Khalid al-Jundi, the leftist head of the Syrian workers' union and militia.[78]

Fateh also sought to widen its contacts outside the confrontation states. Arafat, Wazir, and Huri visited Libya in summer 1963, to request training at the Libyan military academy, passports for senior cadres, and permission to open offices, set up 'popular support committees for Palestine', fund-raise, and transport arms through Libyan ports and the diplomatic pouch.[79] The authorities allowed Fateh to open a bank account to receive private donations, but little else. A more important source of funding were the 'popular committees' formed by Palestinians working in Saudi Arabia. The authorities also permitted Fateh supporters to solicit donations from wealthy Saudis, but only on condition that they refrained from clandestine organization and from publishing or distributing political tracts in the kingdom.[80]

Fateh had achieved modest results at best, but the establishment of the PLO in May 1964 convinced it that the launch of the armed struggle had to be

brought forward. *Filastinuna* signalled the imminent change in tactics in July, stating that 'the Palestinian people is more convinced today than ever that the armed Palestinian revolution is the only solution to regain its stolen homeland . . . the unity of Palestinian efforts will follow the first bullet of the armed revolution'.[81] The Fateh leadership in Kuwait and Damascus debated options continuously during July and the first half of August, and arrived at a conclusion only after Arafat submitted an enthusiastic, and grossly exaggerated, report on military preparedness. His proposal that the armed struggle be launched on 1 September was approved despite strenuous objections from a minority led by ʿAbd-al-Karim.[82] The timing was chosen to precede immediately the second Arab summit conference. Nothing happened in the event, and a rueful Arafat was obliged to reveal that his 'strike groups' in Jordan had failed to carry out their orders.[83]

The failure of the first attempt revived the division that had emerged within Fateh during the summer's debate. A 'rational' wing (*al-ʿaqlaniyyun*) headed by ʿAbd-al-Karim and Dannan counselled caution and insisted on further military preparation, whereas the 'madmen' (*al-majanin*) headed by Arafat and Wazir urged immediate action.[84] The dilemma was underlined when Fateh sought funds from a group of wealthy Kuwaitis, who refused to provide support until they saw evidence of combat activity.[85] Algerian officials also opposed a delay, arguing that they would already have launched the armed struggle against Israel by now.[86] Yet a meeting of the Fateh leadership in Damascus in November revealed continuing disagreement. The 'rational' wing was concerned not to lose momentum once the armed struggle was launched, and insisted on more time to accumulate funds and weapons.[87] The 'madmen' maintained that 'the revolution will provide its own needs' and could only develop through actual practice.[88] If only one bullet was fired each month inside Israel, they added, it would demonstrate that the revolution existed.

The 'madmen' carried the day, prompting several of their opponents to resign. The internal dispute subsided for the time being, although it was to have further repercussions in the next years. To overcome the effects, the Fateh leadership suspended itself and handed responsibility for final preparations for the armed struggle over to a caretaker committee that included Qaddumi, Khalid al-Hasan, Zaʿnun, Mahmud Falaha, and Mukhtar Sabri Buʿbaʿ. A second committee was formed with Najjar, Zaʿnun, Huri, and ʿUdwan in it to oversee Arafat as he prepared to renew the military effort.[89] Arafat now briefed his aides in Damascus and held two similar meetings with senior cadres in Jordan, where opinion was again divided over the wisdom of an early start of military action.[90] *Filastinuna* meanwhile informed its audience that the Palestinians 'have reached the critical point . . . and now believe only in themselves and their nation and shall inevitably follow the path of the revolution that will overturn the balance of power'.[91]

Arafat worked feverishly to prepare armed groups for action, scouring the

'model frontier villages' in the Syrian border region with Israel for veteran infiltrators and purchasing ageing light arms from Lebanese traders. Among his recruits were former agents of the 'Palestinian detachment', an internal security unit working for Syrian intelligence, who were members of the semi-sedentarized Bedouin clans (such as the Hayba and Tillawiyya) that extended across northern Israel, south Lebanon, and the Syrian Golan Heights.[92] Others were refugees from the camps in Jordan and Lebanon, not a few of whom had previously been, or in a few cases remained, on the payroll of local intelligence agencies.[93] Arafat also made contact with the Bedouin of southern Jordan, who had expert knowledge of the Negev, through shaikh Musa Abu-Ghayth.[94] As the deadline for the launch of the armed struggle approached, now set for the end of 1964, his hopes were pinned on some 50 men, among them 30 former members of the Palestinian Reconnaissance 68 Battalion in Syria, although a later publication was to insist more grandly that Fateh had launched the armed struggle with an 'elite corps of 82 commandos in ten squads [operating in] six zones'.[95]

This was a far cry from the requirements stipulated in Fateh's founding documents for the conduct of armed struggle. *Structure of Revolutionary Construction* called for an extensive and highly organized membership, the accumulation of funds, weapons, combat bases, communications systems, and supply networks, and intelligence-gathering on vital Israeli military and economic targets.[96] The document also expected Fateh to have a general staff, in addition to central committees for political affairs, indoctrination and mobilization, planning, and supervision, none of which remotely existed.[97] Arafat nonetheless impressed the supervisory committee with his report on readiness, and so the expanded Fateh leadership resolved finally to launch the armed struggle on 31 December. At the same time it decided to announce military operations in the name of *al-ʿAsifa* ('The Storm'), not Fateh, in order to avoid punitive measures by hostile Arab states and prevent a loss of internal morale if the venture failed.[98] It then informed the Algerian, Iraqi, and Syrian authorities and Shuqayri of its intentions.[99] Still opposed, two members of the 'rational' wing now withdrew from the leadership, leaving ʿAbd-al-Karim and Dannan in the minority.

In the event, Fateh's first attack against Israel was aborted at the outset. A guerrilla team planning to demolish a pumping station in the Israeli national water carrier was detained by a Lebanese border patrol on 31 December. Arafat, who was subsequently said to have been a member of the team, was in fact already distributing a statement announcing the operation to news agencies in Beirut, where he was briefly detained by the police.[100] The following night a second Fateh team infiltrated across the border south of Lake Tiberias and laid an explosive satchel in a water canal, which was later stated by Israel not to have detonated. Undaunted, Fateh reported the second attack in its Military Communique No. 1, issued on 2 January 1965, in the name of the General Command of al-ʿAsifa Forces. Despite this lacklustre start, New Year's

Day 1965 was subsequently to be celebrated by all Palestinian organizations as the launch of the armed struggle.

The ANM and the Armed Struggle

When Fateh issued its first military statement, the ANM regarded it as a direct threat to Nasir. 'Fateh', the ANM informed its members, 'is a suspect movement tied to CENTO, that aims to entangle Nasir in a battle for which he is not prepared, and so lead to his defeat.'[101] Yet the movement could not ignore the appeal of Fateh's brand of nationalism and of its military activity to Palestinians in general. Indeed, the ANM had been under increasing pressure internally since 1963 to exercise greater political autonomy and to prepare more actively for armed struggle. An editorial in *al-Wihda*, the clandestine newsletter produced by its Jordanian branch, referred in May 1963 to the need 'to prompt the liberated Arab countries to harness their revolutionary potential . . . and to crystallize the burning hatred of the Palestinians in a revolutionary movement of their own, which will enable them to fulfill their vanguard role'.[102]

Under pressure, the ANM leadership approved the formation in late 1963 of a separate Palestinian Action Command (PAC, *Qiyadat al-ʿAmal al-Filastini*) with nominal authority over Palestinian members in the various branches in Arab states. This step was taken by Haddad in the absence of Habash, who was still in hiding in Syria following the abortive pro-Nasir *coup* of July, and provoked protests from the leftist faction of the ANM. Habash approved the move after his escape to Lebanon in early 1964, and the 'old guard' closed ranks during a stormy general conference in Beirut in May, at which the PAC became a fully autonomous branch.[103] (Initially it was known in public as the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine, but this name soon dropped from use.) Palestinian members of ANM branches in Lebanon, Syria, Kuwait, and Egypt were now regrouped in separate sections (*aqsam*), which communicated directly with the PAC. In 1964 there were several hundred Palestinian members in Lebanon, some 500 in Syria (roughly 10 per cent of branch membership), 'several hundreds' in the West Bank and somewhat fewer in Gaza, and dozens in Kuwait and Egypt.[104] Some Palestinians refused this transition on pan-Arab principle, while others continued to fulfil their previous duties within Arab branches or on central bodies, a prime example being al-Hakam Darwaza's role in the ANM's 'ideology committee', and did not come under the authority of the PAC.[105]

The May conference revealed the depth of divisions between the so-called Left and Right in the ANM. Ideological disputes were so severe in fact that the delegates could not agree on the composition of a new executive committee for the movement, and a caretaker leadership assumed responsibility for ANM affairs for the next ten months. This was not enough to halt the growing divergence of its various branches. The regional command (*qiyadat iqlim*) in

Syria and Iraq, for example, decided to merge with other pro-Nasir forces in July to form local versions of the Arab Socialist Union, the new political vehicle that Nasir had launched in Egypt. This led to renewed tensions in both countries, and the Syrian authorities, suspecting preparation for another pro-Nasir *coup*, imprisoned numerous ANM members until the end of the year.[106] The ANM was drifting, but the Palestine-oriented old guard and its Palestinian constituency were devoting ever more of their attention and energy to developing the PAC.

The leftist faction, which consisted almost entirely of non-Palestinians, viewed the emergence of the PAC with considerable disquiet. It was not alone. The ANM regional command in Jordan, headed by Hamad al-Farhan, was closely aligned with the Right on ideological issues but opposed the creation of a separate Palestinian branch. Most of its members were Palestinian, and it apparently feared that losing them would reduce its stature and undermine the common ground between Transjordanians and Palestinians.[107] At the same time the command, urged on by members from the West Bank, favoured the formation of a dedicated military apparatus for operations against Israel. This was made evident during a meeting in late 1963, in which the militant lead was taken by Muhammad Rabiᶜ, Mustafa al-Zabri, Mahmud ᶜIsa, and others.[108] The strength of this current was such that Rabiᶜ was elected to replace Farhan. The Jordanian regional command became nominally subordinate to the PAC when the latter body was ratified in May 1964, and sent delegates to take part in PAC meetings in Beirut. Yet it was more an equal partner, retaining responsibility for the organizational and ideological affairs of the ANM in Jordan and coordinating when necessary with a permanent representative of the Palestinian command, ᶜAzzam Kanᶜan.[109]

Reorganization did not indicate a major shift in ANM strategy, however. The central leadership insisted on adhering to the policy and timetable of Nasir, and remained opposed to an early start of the armed struggle. This was evident from the discussion in early 1964 between Nasir and Habash, who had just escaped from Syria. According to Habash, the Egyptian president warned that the struggle for Palestine required careful study because 'our enemy is not Israel but the USA'. Nasir agreed that an armed revolution against Israel was inevitable and promised material support for the ANM as it prepared for such a venture, but left the starting date of military action to a distant and vague 'someday'.[110] Habash provided the formal link between the central leadership and the PAC, and so he was in a position to exert decisive influence over its direction and keep it in line.

Caution did not imply complete inactivity, however. Haddad, the ANM's unrivalled 'man of action', was already taking steps to prepare for Palestinian military action. Sometime in late 1963 or early 1964, he instructed two of his close aides, 'haj' Fayiz Jabir and Subhi al-Tamimi, to establish a special paramilitary and intelligence-gathering apparatus from their base in Beirut. Known as the Struggle Apparatus (*al-Jihaz al-Nidali*), it had representatives in several Arab

states and operated as a central military committee under Haddad, who reported to the central ANM leadership rather than the PAC.[111] It drew on the regular membership of the various ANM branches, but its activities were carefully kept secret from the local regional commands, except for the handful, such as Zabri in Jordan, who selected suitable candidates and coordinated the movement of trainees, arms, and information. Other senior cadres involved in overseeing the Struggle Apparatus from Beirut were Ahmad al-Yamani, ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Hamad, and Zaki Hillu.

An early function of the Struggle Apparatus was to select trainees for new training courses at the Egyptian commando school at Inshas. This was coordinated by the ANM liaison officer in Cairo, Qaddura. An earlier course in 1962 had absorbed 60 ANM members, including Haddad, while a second course was offered in 1963 to 75 trainees, among them Faysal al-Husayni.[112] Inshas received six more groups of 20–30 trainees each in 1964–5, and Egyptian intelligence delivered modest supplies of small arms and explosives to the ANM in Lebanon.[113] Once home, graduates of the Inshas courses were expected to offer rudimentary training to other members, although the need for secrecy usually limited this to theoretical instruction in private houses. Local cadres organized camps in the hills of the West Bank under the guise of youth clubs or scout troops, at which groups of 30–40 trainees underwent physical education and, occasionally, practised with live ammunition.[114]

Against this background, the PAC convened its first conference as an autonomous branch in Beirut in September.[115] Attending were senior cadres from Jordan who could travel without arousing the suspicion of the authorities, among them Muhammad Rabiʿ and ʿAzmi al-Khawaja, and Sabbah al-Thabit, Muhammad al-Musallami, and Muhammad Shaʿban from Gaza. Habash, Hindi, and Haddad presided, and under their watchful eyes the conference elected a five-man command consisting of Bilal al-Hasan, Ghassan Kanafani, Salih Shibl, Ahmad Khalifa, and ʿAbd-al-Karim Hamad. Except for Hamad these were youthful and relatively junior figures; hardened veterans such as Yamani and Salah remained directly attached to the old guard leadership, rather than coming under the authority of the PAC.

The PAC conference came hard on the heels of the second Arab summit conference, at which the Arab heads of state had endorsed the establishment of the PLO and PLA. The ANM faced the same vexatious question as Fateh: to cede the political initiative to the PLO or promote its own agenda, which could mean autonomous military activity? The debate at the conference was dominated by this question. A vocal group of delegates, including those from the West Bank and Gaza, advocated an early start of armed struggle and received considerable support from cadres based in Beirut. Habash urged caution, arguing against entangling Nasir prematurely in a war with Israel and for more time to prepare.[116] His view ultimately prevailed, but a compromise of sorts was reached. The ANM would conduct reconnaissance missions and recruit Palestinian citizens in Israel and develop its Struggle Apparatus in neighbouring Arab

states, but would refrain from initiating combat.[117] Ghassan Kanafani, a leading ANM intellectual, coined a slogan to express the desired balance: above zero, but below entanglement (*fawq al-sifr wa taht al-tawrit*).

At this point the Struggle Apparatus remained a modest affair. The core of the military action committee headed by Haddad could probably count on no more than 15–20 trained personnel, several of them, as in the case of Fateh, former members of the Syrian-based Palestinian Reconnaissance 68 Battalion. Yet some ANM members threatened to leave the ranks unless immediate action was taken. To defuse the pressure, the military action committee secured the approval of the central leadership to start reconnaissance missions without further delay. Jabir and Tamimi were among the first to conduct a mission, entering Israel from the West Bank.[118] Another team was intercepted by a Jordanian patrol on 2 November and lost one of its members, Khalid ʿAysha al-Haj.[119]

The ANM had lost its first 'martyr' two months before Fateh claimed the launch of the armed struggle for itself. Unlike Fateh, which publicized its activity and glorified its dead in order to attract new recruits, the ANM remained silent, whether out of an idealistic sense of propriety or concern that it would embarrass Nasir. Looking back, a senior cadre observed that the ANM failure to capitalize on its losses 'was not political thinking . . . it was political stupidity'.[120] Nonetheless, the ANM had already given rise to an autonomous Palestinian organization, and had taken its first steps towards the conduct of armed struggle. Indeed, the extent of its membership, organizational experience, ideological articulation, and military preparation placed it on a par with its main competitors, the PLO and Fateh, if not ahead of them. Whatever their relative positions, in any case, the three main components of the Palestinian national movement had taken distinct form by the end of 1964.

5

Challenges of the Armed Struggle

Building a Liberation Army by Decree

The start of pinprick raids against Israel by Fateh at the beginning of 1965 provoked strong reactions. The PLO immediately denied any connection with *al-ʿAsifa*, and insisted that Palestinian operations should be conducted solely by the PLA.[1] Nasir viewed the start of military action at this time as inopportune and threatening a general loss of control over events.[2] His increasing alarm was evident in the instructions issued in March by the Egyptian commander-in-chief of the Unified Arab Command (UAC), ʿAli ʿAli ʿAmir, to his Arab counterparts to arrest Fateh members on the grounds of belonging to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood Society.[3] Yet the vehemence of these reactions suggested to many Palestinians that Fateh had done what no other group dared and 'hung the bell around the cat's neck'.[4]

This was especially true of the PLO, which was finding it difficult to maintain political momentum and fulfil the expectations generated by the proclamation of the PLA. Nasir's restrained sponsorship of the PLO did not indicate additional support for a Palestinian army, certainly not with the degree of capability and autonomy described in the resolutions of the PNC. Shuqayri's statement that Nasir had offered access to the Palestine Borders Guard in Gaza was self-deluding, while the Egyptian announcement in July that a training camp was being opened for Palestinians in Gaza merely made political capital of a situation existing since 1960. Yet Nasir also came to the assistance of Shuqayri when he came under bitter attack during the second Arab summit conference for having exceeded the mandate given to him in January. Inter-Arab 'outbidding' apparently decided the outcome. On the one hand, Shuqayri secured the crucial support of Saudi king Faysal, who had recently replaced his brother Saʿud, and with whom Nasir sought to resolve the Yemen conflict, his key concern in this period.[5] On the other hand, Syrian president Hafiz supported the creation of a Palestinian army with an enthusiasm that influenced the other Arab leaders, as the PLO chairman later recounted.[6] Not to be outdone, Nasir pre-empted use of the Palestinian 'card' by his rivals by informing the summit that he fully approved the formation of the PLO army.[7]

The same dynamic determined the eventual size and capability of the PLA. The plan submitted by the PLO to the summit conference had called for five infantry brigades and six commando battalions, with a total strength of 16,100,

and for 35 training camps in various Arab states to provide basic military instruction to 56,000 Palestinians annually.[8] The UAC, which was asked by the ministerial council of the League of Arab States for its comments, instead proposed a force of 10 commando battalions with a strength of 5,000, and basic training for 32,000 Palestinians annually if the Arab states were willing to provide the facilities. Egyptian concerns were evident in the recommendation that only three battalions be based in Gaza, with the remaining seven in Jordan and Syria.[9] The Arab heads of state finally agreed to establish the PLA 'in accordance with the contents of the report of the [UAC] commander-in-chief on the subject', but in practice assumed that its composition would follow the lines of the original PLO proposal.[10] They accordingly budgeted £8.5 million for establishment costs and £2 million annually for recurrent expenses.[11] Jordan and Lebanon refused to base PLA units on their soil, but Egypt agreed to host two infantry brigades and a commando battalion, Syria three commando battalions, and Iraq one.

Buoyed by the outcome, the PLO executive committee quickly appointed Wajih al-Madani, a Palestinian officer who headed the bodyguard of the emir of Kuwait, as PLA commander-in-chief, promoted him from lieutenant-colonel to major-general, and co-opted him to the committee. It also formed a military committee comprising Madani and fellow executive committee members Qusay ʿAbadla (head of the military department) and Bahjat Abu-Gharbiyya to negotiate the details of PLA formation, armament, and jurisdiction with their Arab counterparts. Several weeks of discussions with UAC commander-in-chief ʿAmir and chief-of-staff ʿAbd-al-Munʿim Riyad led to a revised establishment plan for the PLA, and on 25 November ʿAmir notified the Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian chiefs-of-staff of its ratification.[12] The UAC had apparently given way to the PLO regarding final PLA force structure and the formation of tank, artillery, and other combat support units, but in reality ʿAmir had simply deferred issues he knew to be contentious for renegotiation with the Arab commands directly concerned.[13]

That the issue of control was at stake immediately became evident when the PLO military committee commenced negotiations with Egyptian chief-of-staff Muhammad Fawzi on 29 November. The PLO aspired from the outset to exercise continuous and effective control over the PLA. Its original submission to the Arab summit had acknowledged that operational command and the supply of food, ammunition, and fuel in wartime would have to be the responsibility of the UAC or relevant Arab headquarters. However, the PLO insisted on taking direct charge of PLA finance, equipment, armament, and the appointment, promotion, or dismissal of officers.[14] In its counter-proposal, the UAC had noted that it could see no objection to PLO control over its finances and armament, while leaving the legal and political status of officers for further study with the League of Arab States and host countries.[15] The Arab summit imposed no formal restrictions on the exercise of PLO authority over its army, except in specific relation to deployment in host states and combat operations.[16]

The Egyptian command held a diametrically opposite view, which applied not only to the immediate formation phase of the PLA, but also, as later became apparent, to control over the army in the long term. Fawzi referred studiously to defence minister Shams Badran on all matters, and so his position during the talks reflected that of the Egyptian political leadership, more precisely of Nasir. The establishment plan presented by Fawzi and his aides on 15 December insisted that the Egyptian army should undertake the formation of the PLA, wholly without the involvement of the PLO military committee or the PLA command, to their intense dismay.[17] This meant denying both bodies any role in the appointment and promotion of officers, disbursement of pay and other expenses, supervision of the receipt and distribution of arms, issue of individual call-up notices on conscripts, or putting contracts for the construction of PLA barracks out to tender.[18] Fawzi similarly refused a request for the PLA command to assume gradual control of its own units as they were established during 1965.

As these meetings showed, the dispute over responsibility for the formation of the PLA concealed a more fundamental disagreement about which party was really to control it. Matters came to a head on 28 December, prompting the PLO military committee to ask Shuqayri to attend the next round of talks.[19] He already had some indication of the Egyptian position, having discussed the issue of control with ʿAmir during talks about the PLA establishment plan. Shuqayri explained that he expected the PLA to come under Arab command for combat operations, but to be independent in all other respects and to come under the authority of the PLO just as Arab armies answered to their respective governments.[20] This seemed to be in line with the formal resolutions of the second Arab summit. As he recalled in his memoirs, however, neither ʿAmir nor any other Arab leader he met had considered that the PLO would assume control over its own army at all, let alone in one or two years' time, so long as it was based in their territory.[21] ʿAmir sidestepped the issue by urging Shuqayri to negotiate it directly with the Arab general staffs concerned.

Shuqayri and Fawzi met on 12 January 1965, by which time Fateh had started its raids on Israel. Shuqayri highlighted the pressure he was under from the Palestinian public to demonstrate progress, and stressed the importance of allowing the PLO to handle all media activities relating to the PLA. He hoped, among other things, to screen a film of the army in training at the second Arab summit conference scheduled for September.[22] Fawzi shrewdly assured the PLO chairman that these concerns would be addressed, but reiterated that there could be only one party with authority over the army-in-formation. 'A ship with two captains will sink', he insisted.[23] However, his additional observation that direct involvement by the PLO would raise serious legislative and administrative problems in the Gaza Strip indicated that Egyptian concern about duality of control was not limited to the PLA, but extended to the exercise of PLO authority more generally.

Shuqayri's protest that the PLO had no desire to exercise sovereign rule over Gaza had little impact.[24] To his added objection that the PLO had already drawn up a blueprint for the PLA command and general staff in agreement with the UAC, Fawzi replied bluntly that the latter body had no jurisdiction in Gaza, which was under Egyptian military authority.[25] Fawzi added that as an officer he was only following orders, and so the PLO should approach Nasir if it wished for more.[26] The only official Shuqayri met in the event was foreign minister Mahmud Riyad, who advised him to take Fawzi's advice.[27] Madani peevishly observed that the PLA did not need a commander, since he had no function to perform.[28] He and ʿAbadla continued to agitate for a greater role in the construction of the PLA, but to little avail despite threatening to resign on a couple of occasions.[29] Finally, a distinctly unhappy Madani accepted Fawzi's terms for the composition of the proposed PLA units and for the call-up of conscripts, armament, and pay, during meetings on 18 February and 13 March.[30] Whether in protest or because Fawzi had objected to him, ʿAbadla did not participate in these or subsequent talks.

The PLO extracted some comfort when Yusif al-ʿAjrudi, the military governor-general of Gaza, approved a draft conscription law for Palestinians in February.[31] Yet the law was put not to the PNC for ratification but to the Legislative Council in Gaza, which gave its token approval in mid-March. The Egyptian authorities had in fact already called up the first of 3,500 conscripts a week earlier. The PLO military committee happily approved plans proposed by the Egyptian mobilization branch in mid-April for a voluntary 'popular' training programme, but was unable to persuade the military administration to increase the number of trainees from 4,000 to 11,500 by the end of the year.[32] The programme was designed to provide manpower for a Palestinian national guard brigade (designated the 19th) attached to the Egyptian army rather than the PLA, but even then only the headquarters elements were formed in 1966 and there were no further intakes of trainees.[33] Two other national guards brigades, two commando battalions, and a second *fida'iyyun* reconnaissance battalion that Fawzi stated would be formed in 1966 similarly failed to materialize, partly due to the shortfall in Arab funding.[34]

By the end of 1965 the PLA in Gaza consisted of the 107 and 108 Palestine Borders Guard Brigades (with the 319, 320, and 321 and the 322, 323, and 324 Battalions respectively) and the 329 Commando Battalion. These units were 40 per cent below strength, however, and had only 35 per cent of their planned equipment and vehicles.[35] The situation was to change little by 1967, as conscription dropped well below the targeted intake of 3,000 annually. The Egyptian command doubled the number of Palestinians entering officers' schools (from 20–30 annually since 1961 to 46) and then took an additional 100 cadets in October 1965, but its adamant refusal to allow the transfer of Palestinian officers from Syria and Iraq posed a severe problem.[36] The shortfall was met by drawing on Egyptian army reserves, who provided up to 90 per cent of officers and non-commissioned ranks in the combat units.[37]

The PLA command also suffered, and in early 1966 still had only seven officers and 33 other ranks, instead of the 59 and 210 respectively called for in its table of establishment.[38] Fawzi doubted the loyalty of Palestinians serving in other Arab armies and regarded them as steeped in the machinations of party politics, and between December 1964 and mid-February 1965 turned down six requests from the PLO involving over 230 Palestinian officers serving with the Syrian and Iraqi armies or in enforced retirement in Jordan.[39] The PLO had been allowed to 'import' only one officer so far, Madani. It appointed two Syrian-based officers, Subhi al-Jabi and Muhammad Abu-Hijla, as military advisers in October 1964, but neither was allowed to take up residence in Egypt.[40] The Egyptian command relented enough for the PLO to appoint Jabi as chief-of-staff in July, but delayed a decision on another nine officers on request from October 1964 until March 1966, when it denied permission.[41] In the meantime, the arms contract included in the memorandum of 28 April 1965 was not implemented and had to be renegotiated in a new agreement signed on 22 March 1966. This was in turn only partially honoured, and then after a delay of some nine months more.

In a report to the PLO executive committee in mid-August 1965, Madani singled out the inability of the PLA command to appoint officers or transfer them between units based in different Arab states as the main example of its lack of authority and credibility.[42] He urged Shuqayri to raise this and other problems affecting the PLA at the coming Arab summit conference, due in September, but any hopes either man may have had were dashed by Nasir. The gist of the Egyptian president's view was that the PLO should build the PLA as an irregular force rather than a regular one with conventional heavy weaponry, taking the south Vietnamese National Liberation Front as its model, not the Free French Forces during World War Two. Picking up his president's theme, UAC commander ʿAmir added that the PLA should be excluded from frontline positions along the borders with Israel and would have no combat role to play until the Arab armies were fully prepared to launch a general offensive, at which point it could be ordered behind enemy lines to sow chaos and facilitate the Arab advance or else act as auxiliary forces to the rear.[43] Shuqayri obtained an Arab commitment for additional funding for the second phase of the PLA's formation, but the pledges were not honoured and little else changed in the event. Returning again to the problem of securing officers in March 1966, Madani feared erosion of the capability and morale of the command and of the unity of PLA units scattered in three Arab states.[44]

The PLO may have entertained unrealistic expectations of the military capability and administrative autonomy it could acquire, but the fact remained that Egyptian constraints undermined its political standing. Conscious of the need to pre-empt militant Palestinian nationalism of the type publicized by Fateh, Nasir offered token compensation. In February 1965, the governor-general of Gaza dissolved the Palestinian National Union and transferred its personnel and assets to the PLO's new 'mass' vehicle, the Palestinian Popular Organization

(*al-Tanzim al-Sha'bi al-Filastini*). On 1 March the PLO assumed control of the Voice of Palestine (*Sawt Filastin*) programme on Cairo radio (broadcasting six hours a day, for which it paid), and on 10 April the Egyptian military administration decreed a 'liberation tax' on all economic activity and trade in the Gaza Strip, with the revenue going to the PLO.[45] Nasir also demonstrated his support for Shuqayri in the face of the mounting challenge from Fateh by addressing a special message to the second PNC session on 31 May, in which he asserted that 'you represent the Palestinian people'.[46]

PLO relations with Syria did not differ fundamentally, despite the greater flexibility shown towards the PLA in some matters. The prices charged by the Syrian command for Soviet-supplied infantry weapons were considerably less than in Egypt, for example, and contracts were concluded relatively quickly, by May 1965.[47] PLA weapons were moreover exempted from customs duty, as for the Syrian army.[48] The Syrians insisted on vetting officers, but acknowledged the nominal right of PLA command in Cairo to make appointments.[49] The PLA command was also allowed relatively free access to its units, and retained the authority to issue pay, make purchases, and request volunteers and conscripts. Palestinians were already liable to three years' duty in the Syrian army, however, and so the allocation of conscripts would still be managed by its Palestine conscription branch in accordance with Syrian requirements.[50]

When it came to effective control, however, the Syrian command was no more flexible than its Egyptian counterpart. PLO correspondence with PLA units had to go through Syrian military intelligence, and Palestinian personnel were subject in all legal and operational matters to Syrian jurisdiction. The Syrian command also refused to permit certain graduates of the 'course of 1948'—the nearly 60 Palestinians who had joined the Arab Salvation Army as cadets and then remained with the Syrian army after the Palestine war—because many were regarded as leftists and had been dismissed during the anti-communist purges of 1959.[51] Some remained *persona non grata* and were assigned by the PLO to posts outside Syria, Rashid Jarbu' and Muhammad al-Sha'ir being the best examples. The PLO was finally able to assign a handful of the veterans to commanding positions following direct approaches to president Hafiz, chief-of-staff Salah Jadid, and military intelligence chief Ahmad al-Swaydani, but only after it accepted the secondment of a number of Palestinian Ba'thist officers from the Syrian army to the PLA. It was unable to persuade the Syrian command to accept the transfer of 134 Palestinian officers from Iraq.[52]

In May 1964, the official *al-Ba'th* newspaper had taken the view that 'the creation of Palestinian military battalions tied to the Arab armies in their direction and command . . . renders them permanently vulnerable to regional Arab problems and disputes . . . These battalions will be scattered and distributed among several [political] parties, which will weaken their strength and influence . . . and we do not know what will remain of [their] influence and effectiveness when the views of the Arab states clash in specific situations'.[53] Yet

the desire not to be outdone by Nasir prompted a change of approach, and on 3 May 1965, the PLA assumed command of 120–150 men of the Palestinian Reconnaissance 68 Battalion in a ceremony attended by Hafiz and Shuqayri. (The Syrian army retained possibly a similar number for its own reconnaissance needs, regrouping them as the 'Jalal Kaʿwash Unit' in 1966.) The new PLA unit was renamed the 411 Commando Battalion, and the 412 and 413 Battalions were formed after the induction of another 600 volunteers and conscripts in the next three months, along with light combat support and headquarters units.[54] The battalions were built up over the next year and provided with a brigade headquarters in spring 1967, but the plan to reach an eventual strength of two brigades and five commando battalions with a strength of 6,257 by 1967 was not even attempted, let alone attained.[55]

Iraq, which hosted only the 421 Commando Battalion, imposed its military jurisdiction on the PLA equally stringently.[56] It was generous in other ways, announcing in February 1965 its willingness to train 60 Palestinian cadets from other Arab states and registering 158 cadets (including three pilots) in its academies by mid-year.[57] This was in addition to the 134 officers trained in 1960–3 who had remained in service with the Iraqi army.[58] The PLO sought to benefit from the surfeit of officers by transferring 129 to Gaza, but was denied permission to do so by Egypt.[59] Only after the deterioration of Egyptian relations with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the US in spring 1966 was the PLO allowed to transfer some 80 officers from Iraq to Gaza, along with 10–12 others from Syria (who were confined to PLA headquarters in Cairo and banned from visiting the combat units).[60] The 421 Battalion lacked soldiers, however. The Iraqi command had promised to impose conscription on the 15,000 Palestinians in the country, but in June 1965 called for volunteers from other Arab states instead. Up to 3,000 Palestinians arrived from Kuwait, Lebanon, and (mainly) Jordan, but Iraq was unwilling to exceed its commitment to host a single unit and inducted only 600 men.[61] It paid all costs for the battalion, but defaulted on pledges to the PLA budget totalling £480,000 in 1965 and 1966.[62]

With the establishment of the 421 Battalion, the PLA reached its full strength. The PLO hoped to attain its original target with the expansion of the units in Gaza and Syria in the second stage, and to establish further units in Lebanon and Jordan, but failed in both efforts. The Lebanese authorities allowed the PLO to open a representative office and a research centre in Beirut, but refused to host combat units and compelled Palestinian refugees who volunteered for PLA service elsewhere to relinquish their right to return to the country.[63] More intractable and unrewarding still were the negotiations conducted by the PLO and Jordan between February 1965 and March 1966. The authorities consistently opposed the establishment of PLA units in the kingdom, arguing that 60 per cent of the Jordanian army was already Palestinian and that its own expansion programme would produce 'four times what the PLO demands'.[64] Agreements were reached in July and December 1965 and March 1966 on a number of military, political, financial, and media issues, but the

Jordanian government had little intention of permitting the PLO to establish a foothold. Both sides had exchanged bitter accusations since October, and from March 1966 engaged in an open propaganda war.

The Challenge of Fateh

The PLO was caught in a paradox. The diplomatic recognition and military capability it received from the Arab states enhanced its stature among the Palestinians, but also raised expectations it could not meet. The contrast with Fateh, which continued to announce guerrilla raids on Israel, further eroded its political credibility. This was ironic, since Fateh faced considerable difficulties of its own in living up to the promise of 'armed struggle'. Its founding documents had predicted that 'at zero hour and the moment of the emergence of the revolution, the throngs of revolutionaries shall set off to their designated targets and strike astonishing blows that will surprise the entire world', but the negligible material results of its raids belied such hopes. Ramshackle methods of recruitment and slipshod security led to further blows, as dozens of members in Jordan and Lebanon were arrested in following months, prompting others to leave the ranks, among them former *Filastinuna* editor Huri. Fifteen activists who arrived in Gaza with instructions to attack Israel were also detained by Egyptian military intelligence following three raids during February.[65]

Fateh was apparently taken aback by the vehemence of Egyptian reactions to the start of military operations against Israel, and issued its first political statement on 28 January to explain that 'our plans in the military and political fields do not conflict with the official Palestinian and Arab plans'.[66] Yet a second publication in the same period titled 'A Statement on Timing' revealed that Fateh sought 'the conscious entanglement [*al-tawrit al-wa'i*] of the Arab masses as a whole, and not of the Arab rulers and states as such' in the conflict with Israel.[67] It regretted that the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were a 'neglected quantity', and insisted that 'any act of liberation that does not take conscious entanglement of the masses into account will fail at the outset because it has overlooked the strongest active force in the battle'.[68] Fateh added that Arab resources could only be mobilized through military activity, and that the cycle of Palestinian action and Israeli reaction would demonstrate the real threat posed by an expansionist Israel to the Arabs.[69] At the very least, it would 'raise the heat of the confrontation along the borders in order for the border villages to pressure their capitals to place weapons in the hands of the masses'.[70]

Al-tawrit al-wa'i reflected a particular perception of how political transformation and military mobilization could proceed. Early issues of *Filastinuna* had argued that the Arabs could not defeat Israel in a 'lightning war' waged by regular armies with conventional weapons, and from 1961 onwards echoed

Arab concerns about the development of the Israeli nuclear programme, which was widely perceived as a major strategic threat.[71] Fateh reiterated in February 1965 that hopes of a blitzkrieg in which the Arab armies would suddenly, and swiftly, destroy Israel were doomed to fail.[72] Yet to 'destroy all the military, political, financial, and intellectual institutions of the Zionist occupation state' and ultimately 'end the Zionist influence on the occupied land, both human and social' would require massive force that only the Arab armies could provide.[73] Fateh was not opposed to conventional warfare as such, but assumed that it would come about in stages, and that it needed to be triggered by independent action from the 'masses'. Its framework was 'liberation war' (*harb al-tahrir*), not 'people's war' as developed in China or Vietnam.

Fateh failed to propose a specific political framework or organizational structure for mass participation. It simply asserted that the masses should first find effective means for self-protection, then provide active support for the revolutionary guerrilla bands, and, in the final phase, join the 'army of return'.[74] Fateh drew heavily on the experience of the Algerian war of independence, arguing that 'the glorious Algerian experience has proved our belief to be correct, that it is the armed struggle that unites the popular base and organizes it into effective, conscious revolutionary cadres . . . it becomes the basic factor in uniting the Arab effort'.[75] Action preceded theory, and practice developed by trial and error. In Wazir's words, Fateh proposed 'to learn swimming by entering the water, and to learn war by waging it'.[76] If nothing else, Fateh was certain of one strategic truth: the means to initiate the historical process was 'the launch of the armed revolution in the usurped part of our homeland'.[77]

The eclectic and non-programmatic nature of Fateh thinking was confirmed in a second notion, *al-tafjir al-mutasalsil* (successive, or consecutive detonation). The Palestinian people stood at the centre of several concentric rings of influence: the Arab masses, Arab governments, and international arena. As Khalid al-Hasan explained, 'our military action provokes an Israeli reaction against our people, who then become involved [in the struggle] and are supported by the Arab masses. This extends the circle of conflict and compels the Arab governments either to join us or stand against us. [Opposing us] means to diverge from their own people, who will then be transformed from a supportive role into an active one [on our side]. The cycle affects the evolution of Arab policy and has further international repercussions, and so feeds back to influence the central sphere [that is, Palestine]'.[78] Ultimately, Fateh reasoned, the Arab armies would 'intervene to decide the conflict, and to bring it to an end after the revolutionary masses had prepared the way for them'.[79]

Al-tafjir al-mutasalsil revealed the influence of the example of the Cuban *foco*, the revolutionary 'nucleus' that practised political propaganda through military action. This appealed strongly to Fateh, which sought 'a spectacular operation that would arrest the attention of the Israelis, Palestinians, Arab regimes, and world public opinion'.[80] Effectiveness was not a priority. As Salah Khalaf later explained, 'to strike at a bridge or culvert could not be a decisive act in libera-

tion, but we also knew that to strike a culvert could draw ten more youths to join Fateh'.[81] In this way Fateh also hoped 'to instil military action and the use of weapons against the enemy in the general Palestinian consciousness, after that consciousness had been overloaded with theorizing and military action that was far from the masses'.[82] Fateh also noted that it was Fidel Castro's small band of guerrillas, rather than the communists in the cities, who had specifically launched the armed revolution in Cuba. This confirmed its conviction that ideologically-based parties were unable to lead the masses or overthrow the Arab governments responsible for defeat in 1948, a task they had left to army officers motivated by a mixture of patriotism and adventurism.[83]

Yet Fateh wanted not only 'to show the world that we are here', but also to propel the PLO towards exercising greater autonomy from the Arab states and, in its own turn, to benefit from the formal political status of the PLO.[84] There was more than a touch of Blanquism in this strategy inasmuch as it expected (to paraphrase Friedrich Engels) that energetic and unrelenting action by a small group of resolute activists would enable them both to draw the mass of the people behind them and to seize the helm of the state (in this case the PLO), although Fateh lacked the requisite organization and revolutionary ideology.[85] In early 1965 Dannan, Zaʿnun, and Khalaf proposed to PLO military department head ʿAbadla that Fateh should operate as the secret guerrilla wing of the PLA.[86] A proposal made to Shuqayri in the same period suggested that the PLA would be the only Palestinian military formation—comprising regular and commando units, and responsible for universal training and the establishment of permanent reserves—if Fateh could act as the political wing of the PLO. Khalid al-Hasan was the main proponent of this option, arguing to his colleagues that carefully-selected attacks by a core of 200 well-trained guerrillas could achieve the desired 'detonation' of Palestinian and Arab military energies.[87] Shuqayri correctly understood that Fateh hoped to assume control of the PLO and declined a merger.

Fateh responded to its rebuff by criticizing Shuqayri sharply for his penchant for rhetoric and his bombastic style, stressing that 'raising the slogan of armed struggle and mass action is not enough to eliminate colonialism, a practical example must be offered'.[88] It added that 'creating institutions that are revolutionary only in their organization cannot be our path to armed revolution, and will instead lead inevitably . . . to inaction and to preservation of the *status quo*'.[89] Privately, Fateh was not entirely unhappy about Shuqayri's attacks, since they confirmed its political independence to the Palestinian constituency.[90] In public, it riposted with a memorandum to the PNC session held in May, in which it retracted its previous support for the PLA and criticized it for being formed in the 'classical' mould. 'Deluding the masses by creating a Palestinian liberation army in this phase is a major sin', it argued, 'because in this way we inject the people's mind with sedatives, since the masses will become isolated from the armed struggle so long as the liberation army will do the task'.[91] The PLO, too, became a means to 'freeze the revolutionary potential of the people',

at a time when Fateh guerrillas, the 'suicidal vanguards of the revolutionary armed Palestinian movement', were being thrown into Arab prisons.[92]

In criticizing the PLO, Fateh implicitly took aim at the ANM as well. Habash and Fateh leaders including Khalid al-Hasan and Za'nun met in Kuwait at the beginning of 1964, but failed to resolve the fundamental differences of outlook and strategy between them.[93] Fateh resented the monopoly exercised by the ANM over relations with Egypt, and was antagonized by the insistence of ANM representatives in Cairo and elsewhere on blocking access to Nasir.[94] Fateh also argued more generally that ANM insistence on bringing about appropriate political transformations in the Arab confrontation states before launching the armed struggle 'is wrong. The opposite is true, because it is the Palestinian revolution that is capable of developing the Arab situation and taking it, through peaceful or violent means, to the required level of the great Arab revolution.'[95] Fateh reversed the ANM slogan 'unity is the path to liberation' to 'liberation is the path to unity'. The ANM was moving towards autonomous Palestinian organization by now, but Fateh saw this as mere political opportunism and argued that 'this constant vacillation and transformation, and the inability to achieve the slogans it raises, indicate the lack of clarity of vision within its vanguard'.[96]

Fateh responded to ANM accusations that its military action would precipitate an untimely war with Israel by noting that 'the claim that [our] acts will arouse the enemy and alert him is false, because Israel is in a state of permanent readiness [anyway]'.[97] This was the basis for a wider critique of Arab policy, as a Fateh statement in February observed that 'planning on the basis of a defensive strategy leaves the initiative in the hands of the enemy'. Guerrilla action, conversely, would 'extricate the Arab strategy from this passing limitation . . . to become an offensive strategy thanks to the Palestinian Arab vanguards'.[98] An internal document developed the same theme:

> [T]he UAC cannot serve the Arab strategy or preserve its defensive or offensive unity if it remains within the limits of coordinating the Arab military effort . . . inaction . . . necessarily leaves Arab strategy within the sphere of Israeli strategy and influence . . .
>
> It is here that the role of the Palestinian Arab people under the leadership of its armed revolutionary movement lies, in extricating Arab strategy . . . The Palestinian armed revolutionary movement is responsible for brandishing Arab rights in a decisive and direct, practical manner.[99]

To prove the urgency of the situation, Fateh added that Israel was working to 'acquire deterrent weapons, both human and material, by settling the Negev with millions of new immigrants and then by possessing nuclear weapons'.[100] The message was clear: Israel would be able to deter a major Arab attack within three years, and so Palestinian action that precipitated a confrontation or at least kept Israel off balance would prevent an Arab strategy that grew steadily weaker with the passage of time.

Fateh's Syrian Connection

Fateh's appeal to the Arab states to adopt an activist military strategy against Israel fell on deaf ears. Cairo instructed national media to ignore the group altogether in summer 1965, and in September the UAC issued similar instructions to the Arab states. This resulted in a government-imposed blackout in Lebanon, which had previously provided Fateh with an important media outlet. Arafat approached the Egyptian intelligence representative in Beirut to complain of the embargo, and Fateh made a similar complaint in a memorandum to the third Arab summit conference later in the month.[101] It added that it was willing to cooperate with the PLO and the Arab states, but only 'in the field of battle and not in offices or conferences' and on condition that 'command will remain in the hands of the Palestinian people, safe from the political rivalries and currents that pull at the Arab world'.[102]

Fateh had suffered serious blows to its civilian membership and 'strike groups', however. Arafat, who remained the principal coordinator of activities 'in the field', responded by recruiting more veteran infiltrators and former agents of Arab intelligence services. They were willing to mount sabotage missions in return for a fee, but their performance was poor and loyalty and endurance minimal.[103] It was partly to reverse this trend and rebuild the 'strike groups' that Wazir now left Algeria to join Arafat in Damascus. With him came Walid Nimr and Mamduh Sabri Saydam, who had been teachers in Algeria and were graduates of the Algerian army's training course in summer 1964. The head of the Fateh civilian branch in Lebanon, ʿAbd-al-Rahim, had meanwhile taken refuge in Damascus. The Fateh field command now took formal shape as an 'emergency council' headed by Arafat, with Wazir, Nimr, Saydam, ʿAbd-al-Rahim, and Abu ʿAbd al-ʿAkluk, another fugitive from Lebanon, as members.[104] Other fugitives, such as Ahmad al-Atrash and Manhal Shadid, were put on the full-time payroll as senior military cadres.

The establishment of the emergency council revealed a deep rift, that pitted those members of the higher central committee who resided in Kuwait against Arafat. ʿAbdul-Karim and Dannan of the old 'rational' wing opposed his methods and regarded his claims of success in military operations and recruitment with deep suspicion. They resented his failure to consult, while he complained that funds were being withheld. Indeed, the emergency council was able to maintain activity only because the Qatar group, headed by ʿAbbas, Najjar, and ʿUdwan, and Hani al-Hasan and his student and worker organization in Germany privately offered financial assistance.[105] However, Wazir was becoming increasingly critical of Arafat too, and was cited in a PLA intelligence report as arguing that 'we must build our party apparatus even if this means stopping all other activity. It is by means of this apparatus that we will construct our guerilla apparatus that believes in acting according to our plan, and then we can dispense with the mercenaries'.[106]

The widening of the internal rift coincided with the growing interest of the Syrian authorities in Fateh. Despite general support for the start of Fateh military activity in January 1965, the relationship was neither formal nor institutional, and consisted mainly of turning a blind eye to the assistance offered by various government officials or army officers. One cabinet minister transported arms for Fateh in his private car, for example, while a senior officer drove Fateh raiding parties past army checkpoints to the border in his official vehicle.[107] The authorities were at first content with this situation, so long as Fateh guerrillas circled into south Lebanon or Jordan and refrained from attacking Israel directly from Syrian territory, but they also sought a more loyal ally.[108] Security chief ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Jundi hoped to create a Baʿthist guerrilla group that could rival Fateh, while military intelligence chief Swaydani tried to revive the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine and urged Palestinian Baʿthist officers to give lectures on guerrilla warfare and people's war to the Palestinian internal security and reconnaissance units.[109]

The Palestinian branch of the ruling Baʿth Party supported movement away from Fateh. The Muslim Brotherhood background of Fateh founders provoked distrust, as did their apparent Egyptian connections: Arafat's accent and the fact that several came from Gaza.[110] The Palestinian Baʿthists were few in number and often ostracized by the generally pro-Nasir refugees in Syria, and Fateh threatened to compete for the same constituency.[111] Fugitive Baʿthists from the West Bank and Gaza were also hostile to Fateh, which they regarded as parochial and reactionary. The Baʿthist officers, in particular, were offended that a band of amateurs should have taken the military initiative against Israel and won the reputation that was rightfully theirs as professional, trained soldiers.[112] They even informed their followers that *al-ʿAsifa*, which announced Fateh raids, was in fact the military wing of the Baʿth Party's Palestinian branch.[113] Fateh's opponents lobbied against it in the party's national command and Syrian regional command, while Palestinian editors in *al-Baʿth*, ʿAbd-al-Muhsin Abu-Mayzar and Kamal Nasir, took their hostility to the official media.[114]

Not all Palestinian Baʿthists opposed cooperation with Fateh. Fathi ʿAbd-al-Hamid, an editor in *al-Thawra*, befriended Fateh leaders, among whom was his own cousin Hayil. The Palestinian branch in Lebanon urged the party leadership to support Fateh during the eighth national congress in April. The congress refrained from taking an official stand, but set up a secret committee to assess Fateh and recommend a policy.[115] The party was keen to counter the influence of Nasir among Palestinians, and issued a strong criticism of the PLO in mid-May, shortly before the PNC was to convene.[116] The failure of the third Arab summit conference in September highlighted Nasir's loss of control over inter-Arab relations and offered an opportunity to intensify his predicament. The Baʿth Party's national command now urged the Palestinian branch to 'cease its introversion and approach the Palestinians in their places of residence and work, and become active among them'.[117] It also directed the party to 'organize

the Palestinians in revolutionary organizations and support these organizations to its best ability'.[118]

This signalled a more active approach, although Syria still wished to avoid overt involvement in guerrilla attacks on Israel. In July, a Syrian patrol had detained a Fateh team headed by Arafat on its way to attack Israel. Arafat was taken to army headquarters, where a number of Syrian and Palestinian officers questioned him for many hours about Fateh ideology and aims.[119] Swaydani favoured cooperation with Fateh, as did his Palestinian aides and officials of the political department of the ministry of interior, while Jundi and air force commander Hafiz al-Asad were hostile, as were their own Palestinian associates (for instance, combat pilot Mahmud ʿAzzam). Chief-of-staff Salah Jadid was typically ambivalent, but leaned to co-optation of Fateh.[120] This provided the background for the later decision by the military committee of the Baʿth Party to recommend a merger between the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Fateh.[121] Ultimately, the party hoped to absorb Fateh.[122]

The leading figure in the Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine was Yusif al-ʿUrabi, an officer in the Syrian army with a reputation for being brave, if headstrong and arrogant.[123] ʿUrabi had known Fateh co-founder ʿAbd-al-Karim since the early 1950s, when they and other young refugees formed a short-lived liberation group. ʿUrabi later joined the Baʿth Party (as did ʿAbd-al-Karim, briefly) and earned his officer's commission, before serving in the Palestinian Reconnaissance 68 Battalion in the early 1960s and being seconded to the PLA in May 1965. He remained attached to Syrian military intelligence, with close working ties to Swaydani, and may have headed its Palestine Branch.[124] ʿAbd-al-Karim promoted the proposed merger to the Fateh higher central committee members in Kuwait, who were tempted by the prospect of acquiring professional military expertise and access to weapons and training. Arafat and the field command objected strenuously, but were overruled, and ʿUrabi led his group into Fateh during the autumn.[125]

At around the same time, the Fateh higher central committee imposed a second merger on the field command in Damascus. This involved the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), *Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya*, formed in 1959 by junior Palestinian officers in the Syrian army, led by Ahmad Jibril, ʿAli al-Bushnaq, and ʿAbd-al-Latif Shururu. Jibril and Bushnaq were among the dozens of Palestinian officers dismissed from service on Egyptian instructions in 1959–61, and received discreet support from a senior officer, ʿUthman Haddad, another 'graduate of 1948' who now headed a Syrian border customs force. The key figure was Jibril, who had received his officer's commission and training as a civilian-military engineer in Egypt in 1956–7; unlike Bushnaq, who was among the dozens of Palestinian officers dismissed from service on Egyptian instructions in 1959–61, he was not dimissed from the Syrian army until after the Baʿthist seizure of power in 1963.[126] Much like Fateh, the PLF founders distrusted political parties and eschewed ideologies, including Nasir's versions of Arab nationalism and socialism. They combined a simple, uncluttered

Palestinian nationalism with a conservative social outlook that evinced a distate for secularism without being overtly Islamist.[127]

Again like Fateh, the PLF took a military focus as its main political dynamic and organizational principle. The founding core of officers decided in 1962 to recruit civilians, but the clandestine cells were constructed according to a strictly military structure and discipline. New recruits underwent a six-month probationary period, in which they read a few political and military tracts, and conducted rudimentary combat and physical training. Only then did they become full members of the PLF. The PLF recruited mostly in the refugee camps, especially among UNRWA teachers and students, as its distaste for ideology and hostility to Nasir alienated university students, employees, and professionals. Its main success was to recruit former members of the Palestinian Reconaissance 68 Battalion, as well as several Palestinian explosives experts trained by Jibril before 1959. Jibril established ties with Syrian military intelligence after the assertion of Baʿthist power in 1963, which ensured, among other things, that his followers received preferential treatment from Syrian security services.[128] Total PLF membership probably reached 150–200 by the end of 1965.

Contact was established between the PLF and the Fateh higher central committee sometime in 1965. ʿAbd-al-Karim and Dannan were again instrumental in persuading their colleagues of the benefits of a merger, not least as a means of bringing Arafat and his ramshackle operation under control. Three joint commands were set up: political, organizational, and military. Jibril joined the General Command of *al-ʿAsifa* (and may have formally headed it) while Hamad al-Mawʿid joined the higher central committee in Kuwait.[129] The new structures had little substance, but there was a sharp clash of personalities between Arafat on the one hand, and Jibril and ʿUrabi, who regarded themselves as professional officers with superior leadership qualities, on the other hand. Jibril kept largely to his own followers, but ʿUrabi posed a direct challenge to Arafat's authority with his direct involvement in the activities of Fateh strike groups.

Despite these tensions, Fateh benefited materially from the alliance with the Syrian authorities. It received modest amounts of arms and explosives from military intelligence, and from the workers' militia headed by Khalid al-Jundi, who had become a close friend and ally.[130] Additional supplies were also permitted to arrive from Algeria, after the *coup* in September that brought colonel Houari Boumediene to power. Boumediene shared Fateh's belief in armed struggle, and espoused the same doctrines of guerrilla war and people's war as the leftist faction of the ruling Baʿth Party, which was soon to seize power in Damascus. The Algerian military academy meanwhile ran an advanced training course for 20 Fateh trainees, who returned to Syria in February 1966. The alliance was made public when Fateh was allowed to hold the funeral of Jalal Kaʿwash, an activist who died during detention by the Lebanese police on 9 January 1966, in Damascus.

However, closer relations rendered Fateh vulnerable to the vagaries of Syrian domestic politics, as became apparent a few weeks after the *coup* of 23 February. Sometime in March, the Fateh higher central committee decided to relieve Arafat of his command and appoint ʿUrabi in his stead. However, Arafat and Wazir had resolved their differences and so the emissary sent from Kuwait to Damascus delayed delivering the written orders.[131] Arafat was aware of these moves, and possibly for this reason precipitated a confrontation with the PLF in early April, claiming that Jibril's followers had detained and wounded a Fateh guerilla returning from a combat mission in Israel.[132] The higher central committee sent a delegation to mediate in the crisis, but Arafat and Wazir insisted adamantly on abandoning the merger with the PLF.[133] The collapse of the merger pushed the committee, at meetings held on 29 April and 2 May, to dismiss Arafat and indict him on various charges. The list was long, starting with his refusal to observe collective decisions and then accusing him of clientilism (*istizlam*), reliance on financial patronage, misuse of funds, and travelling to Lebanon, Cyprus, and Saudi Arabia without prior approval or proper accounts. Arafat was also accused of trying to sabotage the pipeline carrying Saudi oil through Syria and of violating military guidelines by striking Israeli targets close to Arab borders, thus 'causing destruction to some innocent frontier villages and provoking the resentment of their inhabitants against our movement'.[134]

The letter of dismissal withdrew confidence from 'former member Muhammad Yasir ʿArafat al-Qidwa, also known as Jarir Ra'uf and Dr Abu ʿAmmar', and instructed ʿUrabi to replace him.[135] ʿUrabi had already been notified of the decision and, accompanied by two fellow PLA officers, took control of the five Fateh safe-houses on 9 May. A shoot-out in a third safe-house that evening left him dead, along with Muhammad Hishma, one of Arafat's close aides. Three other Fateh cadres in the house were arrested by Syrian military police, as were Arafat, Wazir, Saydam, and Buʿbaʿ, who were not present at the incident. Nimr briefly assumed leadership, but his arrest left Wazir's wife Intisar in sole command. Qaddumi, Khalid al-Hasan, and Khalaf quickly travelled from Kuwait to lobby the Syrian authorities, as did ʿAbbas from Qatar, but met a hostile reception from Asad and ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Jundi. Wazir was nonetheless permitted to leave prison when his infant son Nidal fell to his death from the family apartment two months later. Arafat reportedly staged a 23-day hunger strike in the meantime, and he, Saydam, Nimr, and Buʿbaʿ were released in August.

Syrian indulgence was probably due to a political understanding. Two military tribunals had already convicted the Fateh leaders of instigating the murder of ʿUrabi, but Asad apparently decided to take advantage of the situation to further his own interests in the silent struggle with Swaydani and Baʿth Party chief Jadid. The detainees were moved to the prison at the Dummar airbase, where ʿAzzam and Naji Jamil visited them with an offer of cooperation. Accounts differ, but Nimr later met Asad in person to sign an understanding on

the terms of Fateh presence and activity in Syria.[136] In this way, Asad both co-opted the Palestinian 'card' and asserted the right to confine the activities of any other guerrilla group that his rivals in the Ba'th Party might form. The chapter was closed on 29 November, when a new military tribunal, headed by Asad allies Mustafa Tlas, Jamil, and 'Azzam acquitted 'Abd-al-Rahim and 'Akluk, who had remained in prison, and passed a life sentence on 'Abd-al-Majid Zaghmut, the Fateh guard (and part-time Syrian national guardsman) charged with the actual killing of 'Urabi.

The implications of the emerging alliance between Asad and Fateh were not lost on the civilian wing of the Ba'th Party. In September, its ninth congress approved a recommendation from the Palestinian branch to launch a new liberation group. This task fell upon 'Adnan Abu-Ahmad, a Ba'thist from Iraq who fled to Damascus after the February *coup*. Abu-Ahmad led a handful of followers out of Fateh to establish the Vanguards of Popular Liberation War—Thunderbolt Forces (*Tala' i' Harb al-Tahrir al-Sha'biyya—Quwwat al-Sa'iqa*).[137] This group was stillborn, however, and only reappeared seriously in mid-1968. Fateh, conversely, came out of the crisis with a training camp at al-Hama, where Nimr and former *maghawir* of the 68 Battalion and former *fida'iyyun* of the Gaza-based 141 Battalion provided instruction for a growing number of new recruits.[138] The Syrian national guard—the Ba'th Party militia commanded by Muhammad Ibrahim al-'Ali—provided a steady supply of light weapons and ammunition, including mortars, mines, and explosives, and training in their use.[139] Movement across the borders was facilitated, and the ministry of interior issued Syrian passports to Fateh cadres upon request.[140]

The Fateh power struggle was resolved at the same time. Arafat and Wazir moved to Lebanon in the two months prior to the final military tribunal, during which time Hayil 'Abd-al-Hamid, who headed the Fateh branch in Egypt, assumed command in Damascus. Arafat was arrested while escorting a Fateh combat team in south Lebanon and detained for a period variously reported at 21 to 55 days, and was expelled to Syria after Syrian military intelligence confirmed that he worked for them.[141] An internal enquiry was conducted following his return to Damascus, but produced irreconcilable accounts of the recent crisis. The higher central committee nonetheless instructed him and a senior cadre to take up posts as Fateh representatives in China and Algeria. Arafat ignored this order, prompting 'Abd-al-Karim and Dannan to threaten to leave Fateh if he was not formally expelled.[142] Yet their own backing for 'Urabi had weakened their position, and a majority of Fateh leaders and cadres now rallied around Arafat. A new higher central committee was formed without 'Abd-al-Karim and Dannan.[143] Other cadres who had adopted a low profile since the launch of the armed struggle also ceased activity, most notably Mahmud al-Khalidi, Munir Swayd, Mahmud Falaha, and Yusif al-'Amira. Nimr, Saydam, and Khalaf now joined the committee, tilting the internal balance of power firmly towards Damascus instead of Kuwait.

Fateh was now on the mend. Recruitment progressed rapidly in Syria, espe-

cially among students and teachers, in both the cities and the refugee camps.[144] Fateh also won a few adherents among the small refugee community in Iraq, but more valuable were its contacts with the government. ʿAbd-al-Rahman al-ʿArif, who became president following the death of his brother ʿAbd-al-Salam in a helicopter crash, adopted an attitude of benign negligence towards Fateh activity, permitting it to contact the opposition parties, especially the Baʿth. In Egypt, ʿAbd-al-Hamid had built up considerable support for Fateh among the large number of Palestinian university students, although formal membership remained small.[145] Fateh also absorbed minor groups such as *Talaʾiʿ al-Fidaʾ al-ʿArabi li-Tahrir Filastin* (Vanguards of Arab Sacrifice for the Liberation of Palestine), founded by veteran Palestinian nationalist and *fidaʾiyyun* organizer Subhi Yasin.[146]

Fateh faced serious problems in Jordan and Lebanon, in contrast. Its infiltrators in the West Bank occasionally benefited from the tacit support of Jordanian soldiers and junior officers, many of them Palestinians. Senior politicians and government officials were also sympathetic, and secured the release of Fateh activists in some instances.[147] However, the government crackdown on opposition parties in April 1966 also netted numerous Fateh activists, especially those known to the security services because of past membership of an ideological party, such as Samih Abu-Kwayk. Additional arrests were made following the West Bank riots in November, this time affecting branch leader Muhammad Ghnaym. The arrest or flight of most Fateh cadres in Lebanon at the end of 1965 all but paralysed its activity there too, despite the defection to its ranks of leading Palestinian Baʿthists, among them Khalid al-Yashruti and Tawfiq al-Safadi.[148] Civilian membership in Lebanon was a mere 80 in early 1966, and virtually non-existent by the end of the year.[149]

These problems increased Fateh dependence on the Syrian connection, which in turn prompted an attempt to establish working relations with Egypt. The first such attempt had been made in 1963, probably by ʿAbd-al-Hamid, who approached Kamal Rifʿat, a former Free Officer and leading member of Nasir's entourage. Arafat next introduced himself to the resident Egyptian intelligence officer in Beirut, Muhammad Nasim, in mid-1963.[150] Fateh renewed contact with Rifʿat, now head of the Arab Socialist Union, in February 1965 and reached Mahmud al-Jayyar, head of Nasir's office, but was foiled by counter-lobbying from the director of the Arab Affairs Department in Egyptian intelligence, Fathi al-Dib, and from ANM representative Saʿid Kamal and Muhammad Sbayh, who supported another group, the Palestine Liberation Front.[151] The Egyptian authorities renewed their suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood shortly after, suspecting that it was planning a *coup* in which Fateh's Salim Zaʿnun would be appointed governor-general of Gaza.[152] They also distrusted Fateh's ties to Saudi Arabia, which now escalated its feud with Egypt by forming the Islamic League.[153] The distrust had not abated by the time Qaddumi and Khalaf met intelligence chief Salah Nasr and defence minister Shams Badran in Cairo, towards the end of 1966.[154]

The ANM Marks Time

The ANM proved largely unable to take advantage of the political outlawing of Fateh by Nasir and the UAC in 1965 and of its paralysis for much of 1966. Its own membership was attracted by the lure of the PLA uniform, and exerted increasing pressure to offer tangible competition to Fateh.[155] Yet the caretaker leadership of the ANM remained reluctant in the extreme to embark on active military operations, and a general conference held in February 1965 reaffirmed the standing decision not to do so in the near future. More urgent was the need to reconcile the Left and Right, as the debate about socialism intensified. The continuing dispute made it necessary to abandon the previous method of forming a politburo by nomination, and a general secretariat was elected instead, headed by a triumvirate comprising Habash, Hindi, and Ibrahim. The three leaders now proposed to Nasir that he take command of a wider revolutionary socialist coalition, within which the ANM would merge, but to their surprise and dismay he declined firmly.[156]

According to Habash, the ANM now decided to start preparations for the armed struggle and to direct a major part of its own effort towards Palestine.[157] The PAC adopted the name of *Munazzamat Shabab al-Tha'r* (Revenge Youth Organization) to indicate the seriousness of its intentions and stepped up recruitment. This was most obvious in Gaza, where the Egyptian military administration regarded the ANM favourably. It recruited former *fida'iyyun* and urged its members to attend PLA training courses.[158] Others volunteered for PLA service or earned commissions as officers, while their counterparts in Lebanon and Jordan joined the PLA battalion in Iraq.[159] However, the principal ANM effort in Gaza in this period was still directed to political competition with local Ba'thists and communists for influence in the PLO's Palestinian Popular Organization.[160]

The increasingly Palestinian focus of the ANM was reflected in its media. PAC members Bilal al-Hasan and Ahmad Khalifa joined the editorial board of the Beirut-based weekly *al-Hurriyya* (*Freedom*), where they balanced chief editor Ibrahim. Ibrahim remained the dominant influence, and *al-Hurriyya* devoted most of its space to Lebanese and Arab politics and occasionally debated socialist theory. The PAC created its own mouthpiece by starting *Filastin*, a weekly supplement of the pro-Nasir Lebanese daily *al-Muharrir*; Ghassan Kanafani edited *Filastin* and Salih Shibl was a principal contributor, both members of the PAC. *Filastin* was used to counter the arguments presented by Fateh for an immediate and autonomous Palestinian military effort, although the editors privately held opinions that often contradicted the official ANM stance.

A three-way balance was emerging in the ANM, in which the old guard headed by Habash and Hindi relied on the Palestinian constituency to counter the Left, but at the same time sought to contain pressures for military action against Israel. The regional command of the Jordanian branch, for example, expressed its impatience with ANM inactivity and its displeasure at the recon-

ciliation with the Left during the general conference in February.[161] Delegates from Jordan to a PAC conference later in the year advocated the formation of a specialized military apparatus, although it was unclear whether the main target was Israel, the Jordanian monarchy, or other Arab governments.[162] A vocal minority at the conference—including four PAC members—went further by pressing for an immediate start of military action against Israel. Habash intervened with an impassioned speech against the proposal, which was defeated in a formal vote.[163]

Habash later recounted that the ANM triumvirate had made repeated requests to Nasir to allow an early start of Palestinian military action, but deferred to his insistence on postponement.[164] Nasir expressed support for eventual armed resistance inside Israel, not across Arab borders, an attitude that prompted a decision by the PAC to prepare for *al-ʿamal al-fidaʾi* (a notion best translated as selective guerrilla action), through further training and reconnaissance missions in Israel, but not to wage it.[165] Years later the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which succeeded the PAC in 1967, was to criticize this self-restraint as the product of a 'national bourgeois leadership deeply allied to Nasir'.[166] In 1965–6, however, the PAC sent 30–35 members from the Syrian branch to receive specialized training as commando instructors in Egypt, and stepped up missions into northern Israel to gather intelligence and recruit local Palestinians.[167] The ANM recruited veteran infiltrators for this purpose, including former *maghawir* of the Syrian-based 68 Battalion, and arranged for coded messages to its clandestine members in Israel and elsewhere to be broadcast over the hugely popular Voice of the Arabs programme on Cairo radio.[168]

The PAC pointed to this activity to demonstrate its commitment to the armed struggle, and reminded its members that the ANM had lost its first martyr two months before the start of Fateh military operations. A public statement in March 1965 asserted that 'our struggle for Palestine is at the very heart of our struggle for the realization of the [Arab nation's] objectives: unity, liberation, socialism, and the redemption of Palestine'.[169] Palestine was now the means, Arab unity the end. Yet the ANM was careful not to provoke Israeli reprisals and entangle Nasir in a premature conflict, a balance that both Left and Right preferred. An article by Ibrahim in *al-Hurriyya* in June expressed the leadership consensus that Palestinian guerrilla action was a legitimate right, but would prove to be little more than an emotional outburst unless it was firmly defined as part of Arab war strategy—whether in a war of defence, deterrence, or liberation. 'The liberation of Palestine will be Arab, or it will not be', was his somber conclusion.[170]

The ANM leadership remained firmly committed to a strategy in which the armies of the 'progressive' Arab governments would undertake the main role in a war with Israel.[171] Its attitude also reflected a long-standing fear—first aroused when the notion of a Palestinian entity was mooted in 1959 and then revived by the creation of the PLO in 1964—that the emergence of an autonomous

Palestinian movement with an independent military strategy would encourage the Arab states to abdicate their own responsibility for the liberation of Palestine. The ANM was not impressed with Fateh's argument that Palestinian guerrilla action would itself mobilize Arab resources, and drew different conclusions from its study of the experiences of liberation struggles in China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Algeria, and in Aden for that matter.[172] What impressed it most was the need for careful preparation and appropriate political conditions, leading it to reaffirm the need for full coordination and complementarity with the wider Arab effort.[173] Its insistence on this approach led to the failure of talks in Kuwait between Habash and Fateh leaders Khalid al-Hasan, Qaddumi, and Khalaf, among others, in early 1966.[174]

The PLO Struggles for the Initiative

The PLO was equally discomfited by the political challenge from Fateh. Its discomfit increased sharply in September 1965 when Nasir reiterated in public that he had no plan to liberate Palestine. According to the Egyptian president's confidant and chronicler Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Shuqayri was among several Arab leaders who implored him not to repeat such statements: when Nasir observed that he wished the Palestinians to know the facts, the PLO chairman reportedly replied that 'the masses possess their hopes, but as for the facts, they are the property of the leaders of those masses, especially the historic leaders upon whom those hopes are pinned'.[175] Nasir's comments to the third Arab summit conference, which convened in the same month, regarding the modest capabilities and role he expected the PLA to assume caused even sharper distress. This was evident in Shuqayri's atypical rejoinder, in which he not only insisted that the Palestinians should be the first to join the battle of liberation, but adopted Fateh's slogan of *tawrit waʿi* by predicting that the Arab states would be compelled to follow suit because Israel would not limit the scope and scale of its response.[176]

As if the obvious paralysis of the PLA were not enough to embarrass him before his Palestinian audience, Shuqayri compounded his political problems with his autocratic style of leadership within the PLO. The first major crisis arose in June 1965, when he unilaterally appointed two Jordanian nominees to the executive committee in an attempt to defuse tensions with Amman. Both men were obliged to withdraw, but Shuqayri caused new offence by appointing himself sole official spokesman for the PLO, with the exclusive authority to make political statements, and awarding himself the right to reassign the duties of other executive committee members at will.[177] He moreover took charge of the military committee and made the PLA commander directly answerable to him, prompting Madani to boycott his office for most of August. ʿAbadla had already resigned in disgust when Shuqayri replaced him as head of the military department, adding this to his posts as PLO chairman, head of the PNC, and

Palestinian delegate to the ministerial council of the League of Arab States. Shuqayri later relinquished the military department to Shihada al-ʿAnani, but the PLA command now complained that the department duplicated some of its own functions, such as intelligence-gathering, and recommended that the department's 'enemy affairs bureau' be dissolved.[178]

Further delays in the formation of the PLA and the PLO's lack of control over its own army were an additional embarrassment. At the beginning of March 1966, PLA commander Madani warned the PLO executive committee that 'a danger threatens the confidence of our people in both their military and political leadership . . . [and] threatens the ability of our army's general staff to continue operation'. He noted that the third Arab summit conference in September 1965 had pledged £5.5 million for the establishment of an additional infantry brigade and two commando battalions over the next year, but his report on the receipt of funds and formation of the new units was brief: 'nothing'.[179] Shortly after, Egyptian chief-of-staff Fawzi informed Madani that the transfer of authority over PLA units in Gaza, originally due two months earlier, would not take place until 1 January 1967 (another date that was not to be met).[180]

A more threatening problem suddenly loomed in Syria following the *coup* of February 1966. On 1 March, the PLA command revived a long-standing issue of contention by dismissing several Baʿthist officers. Shuqayri meanwhile informed PLA chief-of-staff Jabi that he would be replaced by a fellow 'graduate of 1948', Fathi Saʿd-al-Din, who was presumed to be less susceptible to Syrian influence.[181] Whether these steps were taken to pre-empt an increase in Baʿthist influence or to take advantage of the political confusion in Damascus, they proved to be misjudged. Asad retaliated on 5 June by 'withdrawing approval' from the commander of the PLA brigade in Syria and from his chief of operations, three battalion commanders, and two other senior officers.[182] He also banned three senior officers (ʿUthman Haddad, ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya, and Samir al-Khatib) from attending a staff course.[183] Asad relented following appeals by Shuqayri to president Atasi and by Madani to chief-of-staff Swaydani, but he had made his point. Shuqayri made a gesture of placing the PLA brigade under Syrian command, which merely confirmed publicly the existing situation.

The main problem for the PLO, however, was political. An early reflection of its striving for greater legitimacy was the preparation by the executive committee in mid-1965 of a draft law for the election of the PNC.[184] This was published in the hope of inviting debate and ensuring wider acceptance in time to elect a proposed 217 delegates to the third PNC, due in May 1966, but the predictable lack of official Arab support made the project little more than a pipedream and it was quietly, and permanently, abandoned. In early 1966 Shuqayri sought to shore up his flagging credibility by reviving the Palestinian Popular Organization (PPO), which was supposed to incorporate trade and labour unions, professional bodies, and other social associations (albeit without

replacing them).[185] The PPO was allowed to operate briefly in Jordan until the government crackdown on the opposition parties in April, and was discouraged from the outset from operating in Syria and Lebanon. Interest flagged even in Gaza, prompting Shuqayri to launch a recruiting campaign in March. He boasted in May that PPO membership had reached 17,000, but the organization proved to be little more than an arena for competition between the ANM, Baʿthists, and communists.[186]

Shuqayri had already sought out the Palestinian groups operating outside the PLO framework. The PLO representative in Beirut, Shafiq al-Hut, met envoys from the ANM, Baʿth Party, Fateh, and three smaller groups on 15 January.[187] Madani later reported to Shuqayri that, at a private meeting on 26 January, Habash had informed him of a recent ANM decision to work towards a 'single Palestinian movement' and offered military, political, and organizational cooperation.[188] Madani also met Ahmad Saʿdi, a founder of the Palestine Liberation Front–Path of Return who represented a coalition of minor groups calling themselves the Political Bureau of Revolutionary Palestinian Forces, and the remnants of the self-styled Palestinian Revolutionary Organization, yet another small group. Saʿdi assured the PLA commander that all these groups were willing to merge immediately within the PLO, but revealed a reluctance to deal with Fateh.[189]

Further meetings in February led to the formation of a Preparatory Committee for Unified Palestinian Action. An article in *al-Hurriyya* explained that this coalition sought a preventive war with Israel to keep it from acquiring nuclear weapons, 'fusion' between the various Palestinian groups and the PLO, development of guerrilla action and expansion of the PLA as 'an arm of the Arab strike force', mobilization of Palestinians in Jordan, and increased awareness among the masses.[190] Fateh had already pulled out by now, stating stingingly that it wanted action 'on the soil of Palestine . . . not in offices'.[191] This was patronizing, but the Preparatory Committee did little to implement its own call in mid-March for armed struggle.[192] Its last act was to warn the PNC at the end of May that Israel was close to acquiring nuclear weapons, and to call for a plan 'that defines the role of the Palestinian people in the preventive war and [that specifies] the preparation for organized guerilla action required for this war'.[193] Shuqayri's attempts at coalition-building had failed, in part because he continued to hold that the plurality of political groups no longer had any justification now that the PLO existed, in contrast to the previous phase when the Palestinian cause 'lived in a vacuum'.[194] He had no protection from the complaints voiced at the PNC of military inaction, autocratic leadership, and the shortage of funds.

To reduce his isolation in the following months, Shuqayri turned to the Palestine Liberation Front–Path of Return (PLF–PR), itself the result of a recent merger between two distinct groups. The first was founded by a small circle of Palestinian intellectuals in Beirut in 1961, most prominent of whom was Shafiq al-Hut, a pro-Nasir journalist who issued the first of a series of polemical leaflets

entitled *Tariq al-ʿAwda* (Path of Return) in 1963. This was the name by which the group was known, although the formal name it chose in 1964 was the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).[195] Hut became PLO representative in Beirut in 1965 and joined the executive committee in alliance with Shuqayri in July 1966. He encouraged the formation of sports clubs and scout troops in the refugee camps in Lebanon, partly as a means of attracting recruits to the PLF, and tried to extend into the camps in Syria under the working guise of the PPO.[196] In spring 1966, the PLF allied itself with the Palestinian National Liberation Front, again a broadly pro-Nasir group founded by Ahmad al-Saʿdi at the end of the 1950s. Saʿdi had a sizeable following in Jordan and Syria, as well as cells among Palestinian workers in Kuwait and students in Egypt, from which he gained a foothold in Gaza.[197] The PNLF claimed to have started armed operations in September 1965, and to have lost its first martyr at that time.[198]

The PLF–PR was a modest force compared to the ANM or Fateh, but this was of little concern to Shuqayri. He needed to respond to internal criticism with a show of political support, and reshuffled the PLO executive committee in July to bring in Hut and Saʿdi. Two of their sympathizers, Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani and Bahjat Abu-Gharbiyya, were also brought into the committee.[199] This move failed to end opposition, and Shuqayri came under renewed pressure in the next two months to demonstrate more than a rhetorical commitment to guerrilla action. This coincided with a fundamental shift in Egyptian policy, as Nasir adopted an increasingly combative tone towards Israel and 'reactionary' Arab leaders, most notably king Husayn. It was against this background that Shuqayri renewed discussion of military cooperation with the ANM.

The ANM: One Foot Forward, One Foot Back

The ANM was still reeling from a series of shocks when Shuqayri approached it. In January, an internal *coup* organized by Egyptian intelligence chief Salah Nasr had excluded the ANM faction of the National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen, threatening the cherished relationship with Nasir. The ANM triumvirate immediately flew to Cairo to give their side of the dispute and mend ties with the Egyptian president.[200] The effects of the crisis had barely dissipated when the Jordanian government cracked down on the opposition in April. Dozens of ANM members were arrested, including virtually the entire regional command and the main cadres in the struggle apparatus. Some key figures held firm, among them Zabri, but the much-advertised recantations by others, notably the head of the regional command Rabiʿ and the young Samir Ghusha, dealt the ANM a major political blow. It accused Jordanian intelligence of extracting false confessions by force or deceit and dispatched two cadres to assess the damage, but morale plummeted and mutual distrust prevailed among the remaining membership.[201]

The worst was not over yet. A new crisis suddenly erupted with Egypt when internal security services arrested several former members of the ANM. These were Egyptians who had joined the Arab Socialist Union following the ANM decision to dissolve its local branch. Also detained were ʿAdnan Faraj, head of the ANM's Palestinian branch in Egypt, and Fayiz Qaddura, the liaison officer appointed by the Palestinian military action committee to Egyptian intelligence. The ANM triumvirate fended off accusations from Egyptian intelligence of subversive activity and again met Nasir to resolve the misunderstanding.[202] Privately, the ANM blamed the crisis on bureaucratic infighting among the various Egyptian security services. The ANM branch in Gaza also ran afoul of the Egyptian authorities in this period, and 60 of its members were briefly detained following the distribution of a statement critical of Egyptian policy.[203]

The immediate effect of these events was to intensify the ideological debate that had racked the ANM since May 1964.[204] A general conference in July 1966 condemned 'bourgeois bureaucracy', implicitly that of Egypt, and moved decisively towards a brand of socialism more radical than that of Nasir. The ANM also instructed its branches in Syria and Iraq to withdraw from the pro-Nasir Arab Socialist Union and to declare against the 'hegemonistic right'.[205] The old guard had found it expedient to give way to the Left on these issues, in order to concentrate on the conflict with Israel. Nasir was now set on the collision course that was to lead to war in June 1967, and Habash and his associates devoted their main effort to Palestinian affairs.

This built on the growing sense of urgency since the beginning of 1966. A plan proposed by the ANM in February argued that the primary task of Palestinian guerrilla activity was to wage 'a preventive war [*harb wiqaʾiyya*] to prevent the development of an Israeli atomic weapon'.[206] An article in the same period by PAC member Bilal al-Hasan stressed that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, Israel stood to benefit more from the passage of time than the Arabs, thanks to its possession of an atomic bomb, irrigation of the Negev desert, and reception of a constant flow of new immigrants.[207] These concerns were repeated at the end of May by the PNC, which regarded 'preventing Israel from possessing atomic weapons [as] an urgent and pressing aim' and called on the Arab states to 'wage a preemptive war with Israel in order to prevent her from obtaining atomic weapons'.[208] Shuqayri reiterated this view in mid-June, as did the ANM general secretariat, which confirmed Israeli nuclear capability to the movement's national conference in July, citing Nasir.[209]

It was against this background that ANM envoys met Shuqayri and PLA commander Madani to discuss the formation of a new guerrilla group. Madani had suggested to the PLO chairman earlier in the year that, while attempting to form a wider coalition, the PLA should also establish its own special apparatus (*jihaz khas*).[210] Nothing happened until early summer, when Madani and the

PLO military committee met in Damascus to discuss options. An approach to Jibril's Palestinian Liberation Front was mooted but rejected, and the decision was taken instead to form a new group.[211] Shuqayri and the ANM had come to an agreement on military cooperation in the meantime, according to which the movement would second veteran activists to the PLA.[212] Fayiz Jabir and Subhi al-Tamimi were now designated to lead the new group—*Abtal al-ᶜAwda* (Heroes of Return)—at the request of Madani and liaise with the PLA command. The chief operations officer of the PLA brigade in Syria, ᶜAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya, was liaison officer for training, pay, and arms.[213] Madani was nominally commander of *Abtal al-ᶜAwda* and the PLO executive committee approved its expenditure as part of the PLA budget, although only intelligence chief Fayiz al-Turk knew the full details and the names of the persons involved.[214]

Shuqayri and Madani believed that they commanded *Abtal al-ᶜAwda*, but in fact it was the ANM that exercised control through Jabir and Tamimi.[215] The group was based on the ANM's struggle apparatus, and had no independent existence, although it performed new functions at the request of the PLA command. The main task was to gather intelligence on Israel, and so ANM members were instructed to recruit veteran infiltrators in the West Bank and former *maghawir* of the 68 Battalion in Syria and Lebanon to conduct reconnaissance in return for a monthly stipend.[216] Information was relayed by the ANM back to the PLA command, which specified targets.[217] Egyptian military intelligence occasionally made requests, and on one occasion one of its officers was escorted into the Negev to take photographs of the Israeli nuclear reactor at Dimona.[218]

Jabir and Tamimi also used *Abtal al-ᶜAwda* to build ties with Syria, where the ANM was still outlawed. Thanks to the intercession of Shuqayri and Madani, Syrian security chief Jundi allowed the group to open an office in Damascus and a training camp nearby.[219] Yet the ANM was careful not to allow Jundi to use *Abtal al-ᶜAwda*, unlike Fateh, as a means of countering Egyptian policy. It was bolder in Jordan, where it recruited a small number of officers and soldiers in the course of 1966. The purpose remains in dispute: the Left later accused the old guard of planning a *coup* against the monarchy, when it should have devoted itself to 'mass action' instead;[220] whereas Habash asserted that the ANM had attached little importance to its secret cells in the army and preferred not to construct a military apparatus that might dominate the political organization.[221]

Paving the Way to War

Abtal al-ᶜAwda launched its first raid on Israel from south Lebanon on 19 October, at the height of the media diatribes between Cairo and Amman. Its public

statement mourned the death of three guerrillas and the capture of a fourth, at least two of whom were former *maghawir* of the 68 Battalion.[222] Fateh had also resumed attacks from the West Bank with the encouragement of the Syrian authorities, which sought to trigger Israeli reprisals and destabilize the Jordanian government. Israel duly responded with an especially severe raid on the frontier village of Samuʿ on 13 November, in which 118 houses were dynamited and 21 Jordanian soldiers were killed and 37 wounded as they rushed to the scene. Palestinian demonstrators in several towns accused the government of leaving them defenceless and called for the population to be armed, but were forcefully suppressed by the army. A new wave of arrests followed, in which PLO and Fateh activists were targeted, along with members of the ANM and other opposition parties.

Undeterred, *Abtal al-ʿAwda* mounted seven additional raids from the West Bank between December 1966 and June 1967. The ANM also reported several clashes between guerrilla teams and Jordanian border patrols in November and December 1966.[223] A caricature in the edition of *al-Hurriyya* published on 28 November depicted guerrilla action as a time bomb about to explode in the face of a terrified Jordanian prime minister Wasfi al-Tal, indicating that Jordan, not Israel, was the real target. Yet Palestinian military action had little impact on king Husayn, who ignored public appeals from Shuqayri for cooperation between the Jordanian army and the PLA following the attack on Samuʿ. Shuqayri urged the Jordanian cabinet to resign, and then boasted that 'our army will enter Jordan at the appropriate time, and we will take no account of Husayn'.[224] His rhetoric was bellicose, but he was naturally unable to answer when a correspondent for *al-Hurriyya* asked when the PLA would cross the borders into Israel.[225]

Shuqayri's threats against Amman revealed the impotence of the PLO, and led to renewed complaints from his critics in the executive committee. He brusquely dissolved the committee on 27 December, and announced that he had already formed a secret Revolutionary Command Council to replace it. This was untrue, but Shuqayri asked PLA commander Madani and intelligence chief Turk to select candidates for membership in the new body.[226] The PLO chairman next took credit for a series of explosions in East Jerusalem a week later, in response to which the Jordanian authorities arrested several PLO officials and closed PLO headquarters in the city. The PLA command in Cairo was shortly to suffer its own internal dissent, as the senior officers, mostly 'graduates of 1948' who had come from Syria, tussled with their subordinates, younger graduates of Egyptian military academies, for control of the headquarters building.[227] The Egyptian authorities reacted by expelling several senior officers to Syria, among them chief-of-staff Jabi and Muhammad Abu-Hijla, who had repeatedly challenged the mild-mannered Madani for command of the PLA.

Shuqayri confronted this latest challenge by issuing several decrees in the name of the Revolutionary Command Council on 10 February 1967. Most

important were the formation of a Liberation Council, comprising 'a number of Arab military professionals' and PLA representatives to oversee the army,[228] and the reduction of pay for officers by 30–40 per cent.[229] When Jabi objected, Shuqayri peremptorily replaced him with Fathi Sa'd-al-Din.[230] This went too far, however, as Madani refused to conduct his duties for the next month and complained directly to the Arab heads of state. Shuqayri reinstated the executive committee some two weeks later, and abandoned the Revolutionary Command Council and Liberation Council. The internal crisis was defused, but the damage had been done: the PLO was completely unprepared for the war that was to erupt in June.

The trials and tribulations of the PLO were merely a sideshow, however. More significant was the clear consensus emerging among the other Palestinian groups that the time was ripe for guerrilla action against Israel. Hundreds of Fateh members were in Jordanian prisons—at least 250 by June 1967 by one count and 1,000 by another, or 60–80 per cent of total strength by a third—[231] but the movement could still call on some 300 members with minimal training in weapons handling in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Syrian support allowed a sharp increase in its military activity, with 37 attacks on Israel across the Lebanese and Jordanian borders in the first six months of 1967.[232] The rate of Fateh operations jumped fourfold between March and April, parallel to the renewal of border clashes between Syria and Israel that culminated in an aerial battle in April in which six Syrian fighters were shot down.

The ANM was also coming round to Fateh's position, although it was far more circumspect. Raids by *Abtal al-'Awda* notwithstanding, the ANM was careful not to cross the dividing line between controlled escalation, in accordance with Egyptian policy, and complete conversion to the strategy of deliberate entanglement espoused by Fateh. The ANM nonetheless stated its frank support for guerrilla action in December 1966, and later called on the PLO to provide the guerrilla groups with financial and material assistance.[233] At the same time, it took care to legitimize its stance by citing speeches by Nasir in which he upheld guerrilla action as 'the means available to the Palestinian people to express its aims'.[234] By February 1967, Nasir was arguing that such action was the natural consequence of the 'important victory' achieved thanks to 'the establishment of the Palestinian entity and the organization of the people that had started through the PLO'.

Nasir was shifting the goal posts, and this emboldened Palestinian cadres of the ANM to publish a scarcely veiled critique of their movement's former reticence towards guerrilla action. Their collective article in *al-Hurriyya* at the end of January celebrated 'the radical transformations [in the ANM] that had come as a reflection of important developments at the Arab level, and which almost seemed to justify objectively [the start of] Palestinian guerilla action'.[235] They acknowledged that in the past the Palestinian groups had refrained from launching guerrilla action for fear that Israel would launch an all-out war against the Arab states before they were ready, but concluded that

'experience shows that Israel is not only afraid of such a war, but also thinks of defensive means'.

The article may have been remarkable for its completely erroneous assessment of Israeli military capability and doctrine, but more striking was the degree to which it followed Fateh thinking. The authors now defined guerrilla action as the means of 'massing [*hashd*] the forces of the Palestinian people, not by abstract organization or traditional political activity but by confronting the [Palestine] issue face-to-face'.[236] Military mobilization was 'the means to save [the people] from the despair they are starting to succumb to', and to highlight the Palestine problem in the international arena. The article added that guerrilla action would raise border tensions and keep the Arab governments on the alert; the higher the level of Palestinian activity, the higher the level of Arab military preparation and effectiveness. Constant raids on Israel would scare away immigrant settlers, weaken the economy, and paralyse vital installations, while readying the Palestinian, Arab, and international conditions for the final and decisive battle of liberation. The ANM cadres warned, however, that Palestinian action neither absolved the Arabs of their historic responsibility nor replaced their military role.

PAC member Bilal al-Hasan took the resemblance to Fateh even further in another article in *al-Hurriyya*, in which he complained that reliance on Arab power in the previous 18 years had led to 'the lack of purely Palestinian organizations that work principally for their own cause'.[237] The Palestinians had operated through Arab parties in order to help create 'revolutionary conditions', but this approach had always failed to offer 'an opening to the battle of liberation'. Hasan repeated his long held view that time worked not for the Arabs but for Israel, which sought to settle the Negev desert and acquire nuclear weapons. The solution lay in creating an independent Palestinian movement that would take its cause into its own hands, and the means was 'armed action over the occupied homeland'. This came perilously close to Fateh's notion of conscious entanglement, but Hasan was unrepentant. Guerrilla action was necessary, first, to revive the Palestinian cause and, second, to 'push the Arab states into a position of strength capable of confronting Israel'.

Other ANM cadres writing in *al-Hurriyya* were more cautious. Salih Shibl and Mundhir ʿAnabtawi noted the fragmentation of the Palestinian arena, the offensive capability of Israel, and the limitations of guerrilla war.[238] The intermediate position taken by Asʿad ʿAbd-al-Rahman probably reflected the attitude of the leadership, including the head of the Palestinian military committee, Wadiʿ Haddad. ʿAbd-al-Rahman concurred with Hasan that the previous 'terror of entanglement' had been an illusion, since the borders had remained tense regardless of Palestinian activity and Israel had not counterattacked massively in any case.[239] He, too, viewed guerrilla action as a means of asserting the Palestinian cause in the international arena, 'detonating' Arab potential, striking

fear in Israel and weakening its economy, and revitalizing the Palestinians. Conversely, Palestinian guerrilla action was insufficient to achieve liberation, and so it needed to overturn reactionary Arab governments and assist Arab unity in order to provide the power necessary to attain the ultimate objective of liberation. This postulation remains the most representative of ANM thinking for years to come.

Shuqayri joined the bandwagon in mid-May, claiming that it was the PLO that funded *al-ʿAsifa*, now commonly known to be the military wing of Fateh. He also proclaimed loudly that the PLO was about to form 'popular resistance battalions in Gaza to take part in the coming conflict'.[240] The Egyptian military administration had indeed agreed with the PLA to call up the 4,000 national guardsmen trained in 1965, but this was taken as a defensive measure.[241] More significant was that the tanks and artillery weapons delivered to the PLA at the beginning of the year had proved to be barely operational: instead of 44 Soviet T-34 tanks and 12 122 millimetre howitzers for which the PLO had paid, it received around 10 ageing US M-4 Shermans and a similar number of British 25-pounders, all previously used by the Egyptian army for training.[242] Their ranges were sharply reduced as a result, and even then PLA crews had little time to train in their use.[243] The PLA also lacked the 300 anti-tank rocket launchers and 45 mortars for which it had contracted with Egypt in March 1966, depriving it of an important defence.[244] Madani tried repeatedly to secure the release of a shipment of Chinese infantry weapons and T-54 tanks that had arrived at Alexandria in late 1966, and to obtain additional weapons to arm 4,000 militiamen, but the Egyptian command only issued some lighter weapons on the eve of the war.[245] The PLO chairman later stated that he had remained unsure of Egyptian intentions until the last minute; he was able to discuss a possible role for the PLA with ʿAbd-al-Hakim ʿAmir only after the withdrawal of the UN peacekeeping force, but was informed by Nasir on 26 May that war was not in the offing.[246]

By now the stage was firmly set for war. The Palestinians occupied a minor place in the wider scheme of things, but their role was not insignificant. The various guerrilla groups had mounted 113 attacks since January 1965 by Israeli count (although Fateh alone claimed 300), in which 11 Israelis were killed and 62 wounded.[247] Seven guerrillas had also died (three to Arab fire) and two fell prisoner. Guerrilla action hardly posed a real nuisance to Israel, let alone a serious threat, but it heightened Israeli threat perceptions. Fateh's example was such that *al-Hurriyya* started to publish its military statements in March 1967, and from that point onwards the weekly's front cover and main articles were dominated by discussion of the imminent war. As war talk reached fever pitch, the ANM finally authorized the Palestinian military action committee to start raids against Israel under its own name, *Munazzamat Shabab al-Thaʾr*, towards the end of May. The statement announcing its first two raids was published on 5 June, the day that Israel launched its surprise attack on Egypt. The irony of

this coincidence was fitting: on 22 May, *Abtal al-ʿAwda* had boasted that its guerrilla formations were 'fully prepared to wage the battle of liberation behind the lines of the Israeli army and between its ranks'.[248] Whatever expectations the various Palestinian groups (if not Nasir) may have entertained for a sweeping victory were demolished beyond repair over the next six days.

PART II

Years of Revolution, 1967–1972

In the space of only six days between 5 and 10 June 1967, the IDF shattered the armed forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and occupied large tracts of their territories. The war had several principal, if at times conflicting, consequences. It moderated the attitude of key Arab states towards Israel, but at the same time complicated the peace process by enmeshing it with superpower rivalry. The humiliating defeat of Nasir's Egypt and the Baʿth's Syria heralded the decline of interventionism between Arab states, but the debacle of their secularizing nationalist and socialist ideologies breathed new life into Islam as a force for political opposition at the domestic and regional levels (though this was not to become apparent until the second half of the 1970s). It also ushered in a period of domestic instability in all four 'confrontation' states, but this only encouraged a greater focus still on *raisons d'état*, at the expense of rhetorical commitments to Arab unity and the Palestine cause. This was demonstrated most forcefully by Arab responses to the rapid rise of the Palestinian guerrilla movement, which introduced a dynamic and destabilizing element to post-war Arab politics and challenged the diplomatic moderation and particularistic national agendas of the confrontation states.

Outwardly, the response to the war adopted by the Arab summit conference in Khartum at the end of August was that there would be 'no reconciliation, no negotiation, and no recognition' between the Arab states and Israel. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Libya pledged an annual grant of $392 million to Egypt (which received two-thirds) and Jordan.[1] However, Nasir and king Husayn had come privately to the conclusion that 'Israel was there to stay'.[2] They revealed this conviction by accepting Resolution 242 issued by the UN Security Council in November, which called for Israeli withdrawal in return for recognition of the right of all states in the region (effectively including Israel) to live in peace and security.[3] Yet Nasir considered that military action still had a key role to play, as a means both of exerting pressure on Israel and of improving Egyptian bargaining power. 'There can be no hope of any political solution unless the enemy realizes that we are capable of forcing him to withdraw through fighting,' he stated in January 1968.[4] In accordance with this view he had already ordered a resumption of low-level hostilities along the Suez Canal soon after the war, and then initiated limited engagements in June 1968, followed by commando raids in August and heavy artillery strikes in September and October. The USSR completed a massive rearmament and retraining effort for both

Egypt and Syria in the meantime, enabling the former to launch a full-fledged war of attrition against Israeli forces along the canal in March 1969.

Egyptian policy was a response to the perceived unwillingness of Israel to relinquish its wartime gains voluntarily. US president Johnson had proposed in the wake of the war that durable peace should be based on the recognized right of national life, justice for the refugees, innocent maritime passage, limitation of the arms race, and political independence and territorial integrity for all.[5] The US also advocated third-party assistance, but Israel opposed this, fearing that it would substitute mediation for direct negotiation with the Arab states and allow them to deny it recognition. Besides, the Israeli government was constrained by the coalition between the majority Labour mainstream and the right-wing nationalist Gahal bloc. The latter opposed any concessions, and delayed unqualified Israeli acceptance of UNSCR 242 until 1 May 1968.

Israeli resistance to triangular negotiations and Arab refusal to conduct direct talks doomed the peace mission that special UN envoy Gunnar Jarring pursued in 1967–9, but the Johnson administration also undermined his effort by tacitly allowing Israel to employ the territories it had seized in June 1967 as a bargaining card. In October of that year it also allowed the sale of 48 A-4 Skyhawks, agreed upon in 1966, to go ahead. Worried by events in Vietnam and seeking to balance Soviet shipments to Egypt and Syria, the administration lifted the embargo on US arms to Israel (and Jordan) in January 1968; it also decided in mid-year not to require Israeli accession to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a condition for receiving US arms, and agreed the sale of 50 F-4 Phantoms in October.[6] A reference two months later by William Scranton, special envoy of president-elect Richard Nixon, to the desire for 'even-handedness' in US Middle East policy therefore came as an unexpected and unwelcome shock to Israel.

Nixon was in fact committed to maintaining Israeli military superiority, but he also advocated a more active US role in the peace process. Starting in February 1969, the US proposed three parallel diplomatic efforts: two-power US–Soviet talks, four-power talks (the US, USSR, France, and Britain), and bilateral US talks with Israel and the Arab states. Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger held a 'globalist' view, and strove to link priority concerns—Vietnam, arms control, and the Middle East—within overall US policy towards the USSR.[7] US belief that the two superpowers were close to agreement was reflected in the submission on 28 October of a proposal by secretary of state William Rogers entailing a complete Israeli withdrawal from Sinai (but leaving the fate of Gaza to further negotiations) and a return to approximately the original armistice line in the West Bank. Egypt and the USSR made no reply, but Israel bluntly rejected the plan after Rogers made it public on 9 December. Golda Meir had become prime minister following the death of the more flexible Levi Eshkol in March, and led the cabinet's formal rejection on 22 December of a parallel US plan to resolve the dispute with Jordan over

the West Bank and Jerusalem. The USSR now delivered its own official rejection of the US proposals, while in Washington supporters of Israel extracted a pledge from Nixon not to impose a diplomatic solution.

These moves took place against the escalation of the Egyptian–Israeli war of attrition. Nasir had timed its start in March 1969 partly in order to influence the two-power and four-power talks that were now underway, and partly because he feared that the construction of the Bar-Lev line of fortifications along the Suez Canal since late 1968 embodied an implicit attempt to demarcate the final political border between Israel and Egypt.[8] Towards the end of the year the Israeli government decided both to bring the war to an end, by threatening to weaken or overthrow Nasir, and to pre-empt imposition by the US of a modified Rogers plan. Starting on 7 January 1970 and for the next three months, the Israeli air force carried the battle deep into the Egyptian interior with highly visible raids on military targets around Cairo and other cities. This action was accompanied by repeated references to the possibility that it might, as a side effect, bring about the collapse of the Egyptian government.[9]

Thoroughly alarmed, Nasir invoked direct Soviet military intervention. Soviet arms supplies and technical assistance had increased since July 1969, but in the first six months of 1970 up to 150 Soviet pilots, 8,000 anti-aircraft missile operators, and 4,000 other personnel arrived to assist Egypt's defence.[10] Israel was not averse to Soviet involvement, in the hope that it might lead to an opposing US commitment, and brusquely rejected a US ceasefire proposal made by Rogers on 19 June. During a summit conference the preceding December, Nasir had angrily accused his Arab counterparts of imposing maximalist political demands on Egypt while offering inadequate practical support, and warned that he would have to go his own way. The significance of this warning was revealed on 22 July when the exhausted Nasir accepted the Rogers initiative; king Husayn followed suit four days later. The Israeli cabinet reluctantly accepted it on 31 July after receiving US reassurances of continued arms transfers, prompting the Gahal ministers to resign in protest. Nasir had told the Soviet leadership that the ceasefire would allow Egypt to restore its defences, but his real intentions were not to be known. On 28 September, after chairing an emergency summit conference to deal with the confrontation between PLO and government in Jordan, he died of cardiac arrest. Anwar al-Sadat now became president.

Nasir's acceptance of the ceasefire with Israel confirmed the centrality of the Arab–Israeli peace process in regional politics, while his death marked the end of the period of domestic instability that had followed the June 1967 war in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. This was most evident in Syria, where the defeat deepened the differences between Baʿth Party assistant secretary-general Salah Jadid and defence minister Hafiz al-Asad over the key policy areas of defence, foreign relations, the economy, and social alliances. The former still exercised considerable influence among the armed forces and enjoyed the backing in particular of chief-of-staff Ahmad Swaydani, but was also aligned with key

civilian officials including the national security chief ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Jundi, prime minister Yusif al-Zuʿayyin, and foreign minister Ibrahim Makhus. This group advocated 'socialist transformation', rejected cooperation with what it deemed as reactionary or pro-Western Arab states, and urged closer ties with the USSR and other socialist countries. Asad, conversely, accorded top priority to the conflict with Israel; military requirements should take precedence over socialist transformation in Syria, and the country's relations with other Arab states should be determined by the need to prepare for war rather than their political leanings and social systems.[11]

Asad was overruled at the regional and national Baʿth Party congresses in September and October 1968, and responded by tightening his grip on the armed forces. He had already utilized the discomfit of Swaydani over the loss of the Golan Heights to appoint Mustafa Tlas as chief-of-staff in his stead in February, and in the following months removed senior commanders Ahmad al-Mir and ʿIzzat Jadid. Swaydani had already fallen out of favour with Jadid and fled after an abortive *coup* attempt in August (but was arrested in July 1969). Following the party congresses Asad boycotted the regional command, and banned contact between the civilian leadership and military bureau on the one hand and party members in the armed forces on the other. At the end of February 1969 he mounted what amounted to an internal *coup* with the help of his younger brother Rifʿat and military intelligence chief ʿAli al-Zaza. Troops deployed in the capital and forcibly ousted Jadid's followers from the offices of the *al-Thawra* and *al-Baʿth* newspapers, Damascus and Aleppo radio stations, and party branches in ʿAlawi-populated areas in the north. Jadid lost another key supporter when Jundi committed suicide on 1 March. Egyptian, Algerian, and Iraqi envoys arrived in Damascus to mediate and the party leadership convened an extraordinary regional congress to effect a compromise, but the duality of power remained unresolved.[12]

Developments in Syria were obscured by wider regional developments in the following period. *Coups d'état* brought pro-Nasir officers Muhammad Jaʿfar al-Nimayri and Muʿammar al-Qadhdhafi to power in Sudan in May and Libya in September, while in June a Marxist faction headed by Muhammad ʿAli Haytham and Salim Rubayʿ ʿAli took power in Aden, which had gained independence from Britain as the People s Republic of South Yemen in November 1967. Nearer to home the Iraqi branch of the Baʿth Party had earlier come to power in a twin-staged *coup* on 17 and 30 July 1968, but it leaned towards party founder Michel ʿAflaq and other members of the original national command who had fled Syria after the February 1966 *coup*. Nasir sought to build on this trend by urging Syria, Jordan, and Iraq in July 1969 to form an eastern front against Israel; an official military alliance was not formed, but the Syrian army clashed more frequently with Israeli units on the Golan and Jordan, which had been host to a division-size Iraqi expeditionary force since June 1967, now permitted the additional deployment near Jersah of a Syrian artillery detachment.

As significant was the role of the Palestinian guerrilla movement, which had risen to regional prominence since June 1967. The defeat shattered the faith of Palestinians in the 'progressive, nationalist' Arab governments and prompted a decisive turn among them towards a more explicitly particularistic, nationalist form of patriotism. An attempt by Fateh and other guerrilla groups to organize 'a spontaneous, popular armed uprising' in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip in the next six months ultimately failed, but their standing was sufficiently enhanced and government controls sufficiently weakened for them to establish sanctuaries in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in the next two years.[13] PLO chairman Shuqayri had been discredited, whether by association with the defeated Nasir or by his own inability to respond to the Israeli occupation with a credible political and military programme, and was compelled to resign in December 1967. A dramatic confrontation with the IDF in March 1968 catapulted the guerrillas forcefully into the limelight, and by February 1969 they had gained enough support within the Palestine National Council to secure the election of Fateh's Yasir Arafat as PLO chairman. The statist PLO structure had been given life by the grass-roots dynamism and nationalist legitimacy of the guerrillas, while the latter had acquired an institutional framework capable of reaping the political rewards of their armed struggle.

This was the heyday of the guerrillas, their 'honeymoon' as they called it. A negligible military force before June 1967—indeed with an uncertain political future at that time—they were mounting several hundred attacks on Israel each month by 1969. Eager to distract Israeli attention while they rebuilt their armed forces, Egypt and Syria provided vital military and logistic assistance in the aftermath of the defeat, and abetted the carving out of a formal sanctuary in Lebanon between April and November 1969, parallel to the war of attrition. Iraq also played a significant role, as its new Baʿthist government sought both to bolster its domestic legitimacy and to outbid its Syrian counterpart by backing the widely popular guerrillas. It also sponsored its own guerrilla group, as did the Syrian Baʿth, further complicating Palestinian politics. Additional assistance came from both 'progressive' and 'reactionary' Arab states, especially to the mainstream Fateh, which now dominated the PLO and won further recognition and support from China, North Vietnam, North Korea, and, belatedly and more modestly, the USSR and, later still, Cuba.

However, the very success of the guerrilla movement contained inherent tensions. Its slogans of 'people's war' and 'total liberation of Palestinian soil' could only be attained through the total involvement of the Arab confrontation states and beyond, yet these aims sat ill with host governments and moreover clashed with the pragmatic requirements of securing wider recognition of the PLO as a statist actor with international character. That serious changes in Arab state power, and even sweeping social revolution, were required in order to remove the obstacles to full involvement only intensified this tension. The result was a contest between the guerrilla groups—carried out at every level of politics, ideology, and organization, and politics—based on the false premiss

that these were all real options among which they could make free choices (in the historical sense). This was most evident in the contrast between the approach of the mainstream, Palestino-centric Fateh, which tightened its grip on PLO institutions and strove to assert the PLO as the central arena of Palestinian national politics and decision-making, and that of its main rivals, whose espousal of Arab nationalism and Marxist-Leninism was accompanied by support for subversion of Arab governments, incipient attempts at class struggle, and forays into international terrorism. The dichotomy was only resolved between September 1970 and July 1971, in which period the successful Jordanian government offensive against the guerrillas effectively ended their 'revolutionary' phase and launched them into a period of intense ideological and organizational flux, during which the basis was laid for the later 'post-revolutionary' phase of state-building in exile.

Indeed, the Jordanian conflict marked a similar transition in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. In the latter case, the revolutionary command council (RCC) left the Palestinian guerrillas to their fate despite repeated pledges to protect them. It assessed, not unreasonably, that the threat of US military intervention, Soviet diplomatic pressure, and the risk of Israeli or Iranian counteraction dictated neutrality. Yet the episode also served a domestic purpose. RCC chairman Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr—who also held the posts of president of the republic, secretary-general of the Baʿth Party's regional command, and commander-in-chief—and deputy-chairman Saddam Husayn—who, as head of the party's national security bureau, oversaw internal security and military intelligence—wished to weaken the influence in the army of deputy commander-in-chief Hardan ʿAbd-al-Ghaffar—who was also deputy premier and minister of defence. They blamed Iraqi inactivity in Jordan on him to justify his demotion (and later assassination), while marginalizing party founder ʿAflaq and chief ideologue ʿAbd-al-Khaliq al-Samarraʾi, both of whom had favoured intervention in support of the guerrillas. Over the next three years Samarraʾi, fellow RCC members Mahdi Salih ʿAmmash, ʿAbd-al-Karim al-Shaykhli, Hammad Shihab, and Saʿdun Ghaydan, internal security chief Nazim al-Kzar, and party military bureau chief Muhammad Fadil were dismissed, killed, or imprisoned. The RCC had already been monopolized by the Sunni Arab minority since 1968, but by 1973 it was held solely by the Takriti clan.[14]

In Syria, as in Iraq, *raison d'état* was ascendant. Jadid and his allies used their control of the civilian party apparatus and government and whatever influence they still had within the army to intervene in support of the Palestinian guerrillas at the height of the Jordanian conflict in September 1970. Asad was either opposed to the venture from the outset or else unwilling to commit the air force for fear of US and Israeli counteraction; in either case the failure of the Syrian intervention brought the internal dispute to a head. The Jadid faction won a fleeting victory at the extraordinary national congress convened by the Baʿth Party to resolve the crisis at the end of October, when a majority of delegates voted to relieve Asad and Tlas of their posts. Asad was in an unassailable position, however, and took power in a virtually bloodless military

coup on 13 November. Jadid, president Atasi, Zuʿayyin, and other key figures were thrown into prison and in February 1971 Asad became the country's first ʿAlawi president. In the following period his 'corrective movement' oversaw limited political and economic liberalization in an attempt to co-opt the urban middle class and defuse Sunni opposition. Sunnis were appointed to senior posts, among them defence minister Tlas and air-force commander Naji Jamil. In March 1972 the Baʿth also invited the communists and three other parties into a 'national progressive front'. Yet only the Baʿth was permitted by law to recruit among army personnel or students, and Asad's power still rested ultimately on ʿAlawi officers, whose overall proportion in the armed forces rose, especially in special units such as the 'defence companies' headed by his brother Rifʿat.[15]

In the Syrian case (and arguably the Iraqi too), the triumph of *raison d'état* resulted in greater foreign policy pragmatism. This was reflected in the decision to join a Federated Arab Republic with Egypt and Libya in May 1971, in the studied restraint shown towards pleas from the Palestinian guerrillas for succour during the final Jordanian offensive in mid-July, and in the tacit support for the Egyptian and Libyan intervention that crushed the communist-led *coup* in Sudan and returned the ousted Nimayri to power a few days later. As significantly, Syrian pragmatism extended to the Arab–Israeli conflict. In March 1972 Asad stated his willingness to accept UNSCR 242, implying readiness to recognize Israel, and joined an emergent axis with Egyptian president Sadat and Saudi king Faysal. It was this trio, later joined by Algerian president Houari Boumediene, that commenced planning for a limited war against Israel.

The success of Arab strategy depended heavily on Egypt, which had undergone its own domestic transition since the death of Nasir. This built on trends already initiated by Nasir after June 1967. Commander-in-chief ʿAbd-al-Hakim ʿAmir and defence minister Shams Badran resigned at the end of the war, and intelligence chief Salah Nasr was dismissed two months later, while 600–850 officers who formed their clientele in the armed forces were retired. ʿAmir's suicide on 15 September removed a major threat to Nasir and permitted him to defuse army resentment at being blamed for the debacle; in February 1968 he approved the light sentences passed against officers accused of dereliction, but was obliged to retreat in the face of widespread protests among workers and students. This alerted him to the challenge posed by the only other significant political force in Egypt, the ASU, which its secretary-general ʿAli Sabri used as a power base. Nasir tried to weaken his grip by ordering elections at all levels of the ASU, but bureaucratic power brokers imposed their own candidates, alienating the more dynamic leftist and youthful members and defeating the fledgling attempt at democratization. Nasir used the nationalist sentiment aroused by the war of attrition to depose Sabri in July 1969, but was unable to contain the remaining 'power centres' led by his own *chef de cabinet* and overall intelligence chief Sami Sharaf and interior minister and republican guard head Shaʿrawi Jumʿa.

Sharaf, Jumʿa, and Sabri (who had been shunted into a second vice-presidency) endorsed Sadat as successor to Nasir in September 1970, but soon discovered that he was not the pliant leader they thought. His unilateral decision in February 1971 to join a union with Syria and Libya prompted a scheme to isolate and discredit him. Matters came to a head on 1 May, when Sadat seized the initiative by dismissing Sabri. Defence minister Muhammad Fawzi, Sharaf, Jumʿa, ASU secretary-general ʿAbd-al-Muhsin Abu-al-Nur, and five other cabinet ministers or senior ASU officials resigned in protest, but, rather than trigger a national crisis, their move facilitated the 'corrective revolution' that Sadat now declared against the nefarious power centres. The dissenters and 80 other officials were arrested, and most were sentenced at the end of August to long prison terms on charges of 'high treason'. The stage was set for de-Nasirization. By the end of the year the security services had been brought under control, the ASU stripped of all real power, the commitment to socialism discredited and replaced with a stress on political liberalism, religious values, and 'Egyptianness'. Sadat wooed lower-income groups with improved public services and increased subsidies for staples, while courting the bourgeoisie with the gradual return of property sequestered since 1961. There had been no development plan since 1967, but a new direction for the economy was signalled by the first investment code issued in autumn 1971 to attract foreign capital.[16]

As in Syria, a central consequence of the resolution of the internal power struggle in Egypt, if not an original purpose, was the adoption of a more pragmatic policy towards the conflict with Israel. *Al-Ahram* editor Hasanayn Haykal, one-time confidant of Nasir and now ally of Sadat, indicated a new course by arguing publicly from February 1971 onwards that destruction of the Jewish state was not a realizable goal, and that the Arabs should seek, through political and economic means, to neutralize the US and prevent an American–Israeli military alliance.[17] In June Sadat privately offered new terms for an interim agreement with Israel on the Suez Canal, and publicly indicated his hope for a breakthrough by describing 1971 as 'the year of decision' a month later. Israel had serious reservations, however. It relented slightly after obtaining US reassurances that the 1969 Rogers plan had been abandoned and securing long-term military assistance agreements in November 1971 and February 1972, but this dismayed Egypt and the peace process lapsed once more.[18]

Diplomatic immobilism was partly the result of superpower rivalry. Angered by Soviet rejection of the Rogers plan at the end of 1969, the US rebuffed a Soviet proposal for a cooperative approach to end the Egyptian–Israeli war of attrition in June 1970. It also suspected Soviet complicity in the build-up of Egyptian anti-aircraft missile defences in violation of the ceasefire, and retaliated by approving the sale of 18 F-4 Phantoms to Israel on 1 September. The US administration wished to tackle a host of global and regional issues, and now decided to confront the USSR in the Middle East. The Jordanian conflict offered

an immediate opportunity to demonstrate US resolve. First Nixon ordered two additional aircraft carriers and a helicopter carrier to join the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean between 15 and 17 September. He also authorized $500 million in military assistance to Israel, which placed its air force and army on standby to repel the Syrian incursion in Jordan, and warned the USSR bluntly of the risk of US and Israeli intervention. The crisis took the US–Israeli 'special relationship' forged by president Johnson in 1965–6 to the level of a strategic alliance: Nixon approved a further $90 million in arms supplies in mid-October and considered an Israeli request for 54 F-4s and 120 A-4 Skyhawks, and a year later permitted Israel to use US-built engines in its version of the French-designed *Mirage* fighter, the *Kfir*.[19] Military assistance jumped from $67 million in 1970 to $1,166 million in 1971, and settled at over $600 million in the next two years.[20]

The Jordanian conflict marked the start of a two-year gridlock in the peace process. From May 1971 Nixon and Kissinger were more concerned with the conduct of secret negotiations with North Vietnam, preparation for a presidential visit to Beijing, and strategic arms limitations talks with the USSR. These efforts culminated in week-long discussions between Nixon and Chinese leaders Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in February 1972 and a summit meeting between the US president and his Soviet counterpart, Leonid Brezhnev, in May. In the US view, the Soviet desire for superpower détente offered a chance to erode the Soviet position in the Middle East and elsewhere. The inverse linkage between global and regional aims was reflected in the application to the Middle East of the Nixon doctrine, originally outlined in July 1969, which entailed shifting the burden of regional security management to local surrogates or bilateral alliances.[21] Israel and Iran were the main pillars of this strategy; in the latter case, the British withdrawal from the southern Gulf sheikhdoms in 1970–1 and Iranian occupation of the Abu Musa and two Tunb islands prompted Iraq to conclude a friendship treaty with the USSR in April 1972 and, when faced with hostile moves by the Western-owned Iraqi Petroleum Company, to nationalize it two months later.

The publication of a set of US–Soviet basic principles at the end of May deepened the unease of the Arab states, which suspected the superpowers of deciding issues of vital concern to local actors without their participation. The PLO was especially worried by the lack of reference to the Palestinians. Speaking in October 1970, US assistant-secretary of state Joseph Sisco had commented that peace would involve 'giving expression to the Palestinian movement and very likely in the form of an entity', but this fell far short of PLO ambition.[22] Syrian pressure, a successful Israeli counterinsurgency campaign in Gaza, Israeli and Jordanian moves to cultivate an alternative leadership in the occupied territories, and Lebanese insistence on suspension of guerrilla activity deepened the sense of siege and prompted a foray by Fateh into international terrorism in 1971–3.

As alarmed by the implications of détente was Sadat, who feared that the superpower pledge to 'prevent situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations . . . [and to] exercise restraint' condemned Egypt to live with the debilitating situation of 'no war, no peace' with Israel.[23] He was aware that the US viewed the Soviet presence in Egypt as an obstacle to a peace settlement, and now concluded that the USSR did not intend to press the US in pursuit of Egyptian aims. Sadat had concluded a friendship treaty with the USSR in May 1971—in order both to reassure it following the purge of Sabri and his leftist allies and to ensure continued arms deliveries—but in July 1972 he abruptly ordered the army of Soviet advisers, numbering 15,000–20,000, to leave Egypt.

Sadat had embarked on what appeared to be a bold and adventurous foreign policy, partly in order to compel the USSR to supply military *matériel* on the scale that Egypt required—from a low of $360 million in 1971 to $550 million in 1972 (mainly after July) and $850 million in 1973.[24] More importantly still, the reduction of Egyptian–Soviet ties was intended to remove the main political obstacle to a massive increase in financial assistance from conservative Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which responded by paying for the new Soviet arms shipments and by approximately doubling the overall amount of Arab assistance at a special session of the Arab Defence Council in January 1973—providing between $300 million and $500 million in hard currency for additional weapons purchases and $400 million to $500 million in balance of payments support, besides the $266 million annual grant stipulated by the Khartum summit of 1967.[25] Such support was vital if the Egyptian state was to secure the resources that it desperately needed both to shield itself from a deepening economic and social crisis at home and to prepare for the war it now deemed unavoidable with Israel, and Sadat's daring move allowed him to maintain his 'international strategy'—namely to shift the financial burden of Egyptian war preparation from domestic to external actors.

Whatever his primary motives and expectations, Sadat's dramatic gesture was a success for the strategy of Nixon and Kissinger, who had determined in 1970 that Egypt should not be allowed to regain territory by force of Soviet arms, lest other Arab states also turn to the USSR for aid. Yet Kissinger, who had sidelined the role of the department of state in Middle East diplomacy since 1971, was now committed to the 'complete frustration' of the Arabs and to forcing a general Soviet retreat in the region. Nixon, conversely, was enmeshed in the Watergate scandal and had progressively less time for foreign policy. The US approved new arms sales to Israel in March 1973, and in May and June Kissinger dismissed three new peace proposals—two from the USSR, which called for complete Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in June 1967 and recognition of the 'legitimate rights' of the Palestinians, and a third from secretary of state Rogers, who urged a twin-track 'exploratory' effort to break the impasse between Egypt and Israel. Sadat and Asad had despaired of the US by now, and were well on their way to launching a war with the limited aim of

triggering active superpower involvement in the peace process. Saudi king Faysal meanwhile spoke repeatedly of the need to use the Arab 'oil weapon' to bring pressure to bear on the US. Israel worriedly ordered a partial mobilization in mid-May, but was taken by surprise when the Egyptian and Syrian armies started their offensive on 6 October.[26]

This page intentionally left blank

6

Transforming Defeat into Opportunity

Fateh Debates Strategy

The June 1967 war had a dramatic effect on the fortunes of Fateh, setting it on a course that was to take it to formal leadership of the Palestinian national movement in February 1969. This owed little to its strategy of conscious entanglement, however, which if anything had contributed to an outcome diametrically opposite to what Fateh fondly envisaged. For despite its deep distrust of the Arab states, the overwhelming defeat of their armies came as a rude shock. As Khalid al-Hasan explained, 'in relying on deliberately entangling the Arab armies [in a war with Israel], we believed in the seriousness of Arab strength, especially that of Egypt as a striking force equipped with the Qahir and Zafir missiles'.[1]

Yet Fateh also perceived a near-miraculous opportunity to escape Arab control. Defeat meant 'the disappearance of Arab repressive ability . . . and the return of the cause to its true nature—a Palestinian–Israeli conflict'.[2] Several leaders, among them Hasan, Qaddumi, and ʿUdwan, saw an opportunity at last to create an autonomous Palestinian entity.[3] Borrowing from the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences, they hoped to create a 'revolutionary authority' with a defined territory and international relations, albeit one that would not compromise or negotiate with Israel.[4] The newly occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip offered just such a base: Arab authority had already been removed, and the remaining task was to compel Israel to withdraw. The notion of setting up an entity met with energetic opposition from other members of the Fateh leadership, but dominated its thinking and behaviour for at least a year.[5]

The initial outlines of Fateh strategy were set during an emergency meeting of the higher central committee in Damascus on 12–13 June. ʿAbbas and Khalaf had arrived from the Gulf, and also present were senior military cadres in Syria and the heads of branches in other countries, such as Hani al-Hasan from Germany. A few voices urged a wait-and-see attitude, but a majority led by Arafat and Wazir favoured a relaunch of the armed struggle from within the occupied territories.[6] The influential branch in Jordan, where the authorities had released hundreds of imprisoned Fateh activists during the war, relayed a similar attitude after separate meetings.[7] When the higher central committee decided to collect more information on the situation in the occupied territories,

Arafat seized the chance to reinforce his position and quickly led a small team of infiltrators into the northern West Bank. ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Shahin, ʿAbd-al-Hamid al-Qudsi, and other cadres followed, and were settled in Jerusalem and other main towns by the end of the month.[8] Fateh was eager to gain political capital, and advertised the transfer of its leadership to the occupied territories on 21 June, and again on 3 July.[9]

Arafat and his senior aides returned to Damascus shortly after, to submit their field report to an impromptu conference attended by some 35 cadres.[10] A minority again opposed an early start of combat activity, arguing that Israel would conduct reprisals against local inhabitants. The majority insisted, conversely, that armed resistance would boost public morale and encourage the Palestinians to remain on their land. Underlying their sense of urgency was the fear that Israel might withdraw from the occupied territories as part of a peace settlement with the Arab states, from which the Palestinians would be excluded.[11] Nasir's decision to restart low-level hostilities on the Suez Canal only confirmed the conclusion that preparation for Palestinian military action needed to be brought forward rather than delayed.[12] A detailed plan was subsequently drawn up to prepare military and civilian resistance, mobilize support from Arab governments, secure material aid, and, if possible, obtain a radio station.[13] Separate committees were formed to direct military, organizational, and other affairs.

The debate about strategy was overshadowed for much of the three-day conference by a renewed rift between the Fateh field command and members of the higher central committee from Kuwait. Khalid al-Hasan, Khalaf, Arafat's younger brother Fathi, and Nimr Salih revived objections to the autocratic leadership of Arafat and his uncontrolled use of funds. Another critic was Mahmud Maswada, an assertive and strong-willed cadre who was among the cadres who had entered the West Bank to recruit supporters and collect arms in June. To resolve the dispute, the conference formed a temporary central committee comprising Arafat, Wazir, Khalid al-Hasan, Khalaf, Najjar, ʿAbbas, and Maswada.[14] It also agreed that Arafat, Maswada, and Salih would establish clandestine military bases in the occupied territories, while Wazir was to organize a supply network and secret support bases in the Jordan Valley. This did not satisfy Arafat's opponents, some of whom declared a 'dissenting wing' (*al-janah al-munshaq*) in mid-July. The leadership offered the dissenters a simple choice: either to replace Arafat at the head of Fateh bases in the West Bank, or to accept his leadership.[15] They declined the challenge, and Maswada and Salih also failed to join Arafat in the West Bank.

A more serious threat to Fateh loomed in the sudden deterioration of relations with Syria. Initially after the war, Fateh teams were allowed to scavenge in the Golan Heights for arms and supplies abandoned by the Syrian army in its hasty retreat. The guerrillas kept anything they could use, and gave heavier weapons and munitions to the Syrians;[16] Fateh later stated that it had amassed a total of 6,000 weapons from the various battlefields.[17] The Syrian command

abruptly changed tack a few weeks later, and ordered Fateh to cease collecting arms. Chief-of-staff Suwaydani and national security chief Jundi both ordered the confiscation of Fateh weapons stores on several occasions, 'in the interest of Syrian dignity and sovereignty'.[18] Defence minister Asad proved more flexible: he encouraged Fateh to operate in the West Bank and Gaza (but not across Syrian lines), and gave them modest quantities of combat equipment to do so.[19] He also agreed to give Fateh light weapons from Syrian army stocks in exchange for munitions it salvaged from the Golan Heights but could not use. To cement its ties, Fateh shared intelligence reports on Israel dispositions that it received from the occupied territories.[20]

The moment of truth came when Wazir and Qaddumi informed Suwaydani that Fateh intended to restart guerrilla attacks on Israel. Thoroughly alarmed, the chief-of-staff reminded them reproachfully that there 'is not one Syrian tank between Qunaytra and Damascus' and warned them against initiating combat on the Golan front.[21] 'I am your friend', he added, 'and I warn you that the others [in the Syrian leadership] will hold you to blame [for the consequences].' His visitors protested that their action would take place in the occupied territories, but he objected that Israel would still blame Syria and asked them to 'wait until we have completed our preparations and the Soviets have compensated us [with new arms]'.[22] Wazir and Qaddumi were summoned on the same day to meet Syrian foreign minister Ibrahim Makhus, who reiterated the same stand, as did prime minister Yusif al-Zuʿayyin. President Nur-al-Din al-Atasi concluded with a stark warning: 'if you insist on this course, we will regretfully have to eliminate you'.[23] Fateh started quietly to transfer its manpower and arms to Jordan, but stopped after the crisis was resolved in a meeting between Asad and Arafat, who returned from the West Bank at the end of July.

Arafat also attended a meeting of the higher central committee to debate strategy. Several Fateh leaders were daunted by the task of mobilizing the population in the occupied territories, and argued for a small-scale guerrilla campaign (*ʿamal fidaʾi*).[24] Others were more ambitious, seeking to replicate the 1936–9 revolt, which they described as 'best representing the Palestinian revolutionary tradition'.[25] They hoped to draw the people into an active role and organize a mass insurrection, and saw armed revolution as the means to that end.[26] As an internal document later put it, 'Fateh entered the arena of armed action in pursuit of an indisputable aim—a battle until victory—and so managed to create an inextinguishable incentive . . . Palestinian armed action was in itself [a means of] awakening the purest sense of self-confidence, at a time when so many catastrophes had beset the Palestinians that they thought rebirth from all those ashes impossible.'[27] Fateh hoped that a new, undisputed national leadership could emerge on Palestinian soil, free from Arab control. The possibility of establishing an independent entity was discussed, but postponed once more.

Arafat influenced the debate with a field report that, characteristically, exaggerated the extent of Fateh organizational and military preparedness. The

higher central committee approved a strategy of building *qawaʿid irtikaziyya* (secure support bases) in the occupied territories, but made the choice of a precise date to start combat operations contingent on material and political conditions. Fateh now asserted that circumstances dictated a transition to 'popular liberation war', although this should start with selective and modest *ʿamal fidaʾi* before developing into a classic guerrilla war.[28] Training was stepped up at the Hama camp in order to send reinforcements—Wazir called them 'waves of confidence and hope'—to the West Bank. Fateh was also encouraged by early signs of civilian resistance in the occupied territories, where the Israelis faced poorly-coordinated but increasingly frequent strikes, sit-ins, and other non-violent protests. Most heartening was the constant influx of new recruits, leading Fateh to conclude that it was now the largest Palestinian organization.[29]

It was at this meeting that Arafat was formally chosen as Fateh field commander, assigned to lead the struggle in the West Bank. He soon became known to the clandestine cells and guerrilla bands as 'commander-in-chief', a title he encouraged. This left the timing of military operations unresolved. Arafat and his aides in the West Bank had originally urged the leadership in Damascus to approve the date of 20 August.[30] However, the Fateh leadership had recently reached an understanding with the ANM and other guerrilla groups to delay combat until the end of the year, in order to allow more preparation. Arafat disputed this wisdom strongly after his return to Damascus in late July, and 1 September was chosen as a compromise date after prolonged discussions. Khalaf subsequently justified this decision by arguing that to impose inactivity on Fateh members was unwise 'politically, militarily, and psychologically', and that Israel had already discovered the existence of secret guerrilla bases and was conducting active counter-insurgency.[31] The debate was academic, in any case, as Arafat led a 30-man team into the West Bank and set up headquarters in Nablus sometime between early and mid-August.[32]

The ANM Takes Stock

The ANM was also preparing for armed resistance in the occupied territories, after a difficult adjustment to the new facts created by the war. For two days the ANM leadership had believed the wildly untruthful claims of battlefield success broadcast by Cairo, Damascus, and Amman radios.[33] Hundreds of members volunteered for duty, in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria, but saw no combat. The ceasefire of 10 June left the ANM rudderless and demoralized, at a loss to grasp the full implications of the defeat or formulate a coherent response. Having tied its political fortunes to Nasir and trumpeted the coming battle for many months, it was all the more devastated by the outcome of the war. *Al-Hurriyya* was absent for a fortnight, and then reappeared under a sober headline: 'No .. the Arabs have not been defeated, it was not a war with Israel but an all-out war

with America.'[34] The leadership core—commonly known to members as the Centre (*al-Markaz*) and comprising Habash, Hindi, Haddad, and their top aides—was therefore slow to respond. One cadre who rushed to Beirut to consult Habash was told that 'we have no organization in the West Bank or Jordan, everyone is in prison and those who have escaped have lost confidence and distrust their colleagues'.[35] Many members arrested by Jordanian security services in April and November 1966 had been released by spring 1967, while the remainder were set free during the war, but the ANM still reeled as 'the argument over responsibility for the collapse of the branch [in 1966] . . . led to ideological and organizational fragmentation'.[36]

With more members arriving in Beirut to consult the leadership, a dozen or so members of the ANM Centre, PAC, and Palestinian military action committee met and agreed on the need to prepare for an independent military effort.[37] One cadre reflected the pervasive mood among the younger membership when he warned Habash that he would emigrate unless the ANM decided to launch a resistance campaign against the Israeli occupation.[38] The Centre and PAC met repeatedly in June and July, and were joined by representatives of the other ANM branches for a meeting of the national executive committee in late July.[39] The result was a lengthy document that identified the 'main error' of the 'Arab revolutionary movement' (the Arab nationalist and progressive governments and parties) as its failure 'to confront at an early stage the new, offensive strategy of colonialism with a constant and final strategy based on all-out and continuous confrontation throughout the breadth of Arab land'.[40]

The growing influence of the Left was evident in the explanation of the causes that had led to the defeat of the petit bourgeois, progressive Arab governments. These were confused economic planning (that had encouraged rising consumerism at the expense of the creation of heavy industry), fear of the masses and of 'popular democracy', ossified bureaucracies in the state apparatus and armed forces (that had developed vested institutional interests), and failure to mobilize millions of armed citizens (in contrast to what 'is now happening in Vietnam').[41] Israeli strength, in contrast, lay in the support received from US imperialism, which in turn was the real enemy of Arab revolution.[42] The ANM noted with regret, conversely, that the main international allies of the Arab camp in the socialist bloc were either divided by the Sino-Soviet rift or else had erroneously indulged in a policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West.[43]

The tone and substance of the July report revealed the degree to which the leftist faction in the ANM had imposed the rhetoric, if not the substance, of its ideological outlook. However, it told little of the internal debate about post-war policy. The Left, best represented by Muhammad Kishli and others in the Lebanese regional command, urged careful preparation and a delay in the start of combat operations against Israeli forces in the occupied territories, arguing that the ANM should not act independently of a wider front of Arab states.[44] The old guard, represented by Habash, Hindi, and Haddad, concurred that time

and effort should be devoted to rebuilding an organizational apparatus and preparing a military capability.[45] The only 'objective condition' for a sustained campaign that already existed was the fact of foreign occupation; conversely, the Palestinian and Arab masses were not ready, cadres and combatants needed to be trained, party structures and mass organizations had to be built, and sanctuaries had to be established and external support secured.[46]

At the same time, the Right feared that Israel might create new political facts in the absence of open resistance. Defeat might turn into capitulation, and so an immediate task was to prevent Palestinians and Arabs from contemplating coexistence with the occupation.[47] The 'open bridges' policy adopted by the Israeli military government in the occupied territories, in which the inhabitants were promised normal lives and easy movement across the Jordan River for people and goods if they refrained from resistance, increased the sense of urgency in Beirut. A majority in the ANM Centre and PAC felt that they could not afford to wait until optimum conditions prevailed, and agreed to establish a presence in the occupied territories before Israeli control tightened.[48] They concluded that the ANM should undertake 'popular armed struggle', although they also recognized the need 'to prepare ourselves, formulate a strategy, and avoid combat until we are sure of our capabilities'.[49]

The deciding factor for the ANM, as on many previous occasions, was Egyptian policy. Muhsin Ibrahim reflected the continuing deep attachment to Nasir in an article in *al-Hurriyya* in which he argued loyally that 'entering the war was not a mistake . . . The Arab citizen should be alert . . . so that the colonialist and Zionist enemy cannot distort his mind and twist the historic heroism of his revolutionary leaders when they accepted the challenge of battle'.[50] Nasir meanwhile announced a massive programme to rebuild and re-equip the Egyptian armed forces, in what he termed 'the phase of pure defence'. He now received the ANM leadership and assured them privately, according to the account they subsequently gave to their membership, that he was preparing for a second round of war with Israel.[51] Ibrahim again signalled the public line by writing: 'After the phase of catching our breath in the wake of the setback [of June 1967], Arab effort is now directed to planning the phase of deterring the aggression . . . [we are] close to the second round.'[52]

Reassured, the ANM Centre saw little reason to rush into combat and opted for more careful preparation. Only after this approach had been approved at the end of July did it seriously address the task of rebuilding the shattered Jordanian branch and its extensions in the West Bank. The first step was to establish a senior command to oversee Palestinian activity. This comprised Habash, Hindi, and Haddad, all three of whom benefited from the lifting of the four-year-old Syrian ban on the ANM to travel frequently between Beirut and Damascus. Habash was now primarily responsible for organization, while Haddad and Hindi devoted their effort to setting up a new 'special apparatus' that revealed its purpose by staging the first of a series of airplane hijacks a year later. This was in line with the resolution passed by the ANM executive committee at the

end of July 1967 to 'strike the enemy everywhere'.[53] The general feeling was that there were enough cadres already in the occupied territories to provide leadership, but the Centre called on a handful of younger cadres originally from Jordan, mainly university students or recent graduates, to return home and assist in rebuilding the local organization.[54]

The next step was to establish a support command in Jordan. It combined hardened veterans such as Mustafa al-Zabri, Hamdi Matar, and Mahmud ʿIsa, as well as newly arrived cadres from Cairo and Beirut universities such as Adib (better known as Yasir) ʿAbd-Rabbu, Taysir Qubbaʿa, and Salih Raʾfat. The head of the ANM regional command in Jordan, Hamad al-Farhan, kept apart from this activity and concentrated on political contacts within the kingdom. The Centre hoped that it could eventually move its main headquarters to Amman, and that the entire leadership could ultimately enter the occupied territories once the revolution had been ignited.[55] There were problems, however. Leftist members in Jordan were dismissive of traditional, wealthy leaders such as Farhan, and were in turn resented by the veterans in the refugee camps.[56] Relations were not much better between the support command in Amman and the cadres entrusted with forming a field command and rebuilding the clandestine organization in the West Bank, as the latter accused the former of exaggerating ANM capabilities and advocating unrealistic policies to the Centre.[57]

Fateh Jumps the Gun

The ANM had already entered a dialogue with Fateh by this time. There was little contact of significance until mid-July, but then a series of meetings were held over the next six weeks attended chiefly by Habash, Haddad, and Usama al-Naqib from the ANM and by Arafat and Wazir from Fateh. The first meeting assessed the results of the June war and outlined prospects for an uprising, and ended with a commitment by both sides to accumulate recruits and weapons.[58] Subsequent meetings debated the form and timing of military action against the Israeli occupation. Both sides agreed on the need to postpone a start of combat operations for at least one month, although some ANM sources claim that the agreement was to hold until December, at which point it would be reconsidered.[59] Practical cooperation, such as the exchange of weapons and personnel in the occupied territories, was not discussed. The ANM and Fateh did, however, discussed a merger at one point, and the ANM later insisted that they and two other guerrilla groups had agreed on unity.[60]

Fateh suddenly aborted the dialogue by announcing the start of combat operations in the occupied territories on 28 August. Arafat had brought the date agreed with the Fateh higher central committee forward by three days in order to impress the Arab heads of state assembling in the Sudanese capital Khartum for an emergency summit conference. An added reason for what Fateh dubbed

its 'second launch' was the arrest of several dozen Fateh members in Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, Jericho, and Gaza in early August.[61] Israel was using captured Jordanian intelligence files to identify known activists, but Fateh's lack of proper security precautions helped: one network leader was arrested with detailed membership lists in his possession.[62] Fear that the armed insurrection would be aborted altogether encouraged an early start of military activity.[63]

The decision to start the armed campaign violated the understanding with the ANM, but Fateh was encouraged by the rapid growth of its trained manpower. A total of 422 volunteers had travelled from Europe, for example, to receive training in guerrilla warfare in Algeria, before being flown to Syria for active service.[64] A constant flow of new recruits from the West Bank also arrived at the Hama camp near Damascus, and Fateh was later to claim that it had trained 'thousands' by the end of the year, including an improbable 7,000 at Hama alone.[65] In July Fateh sent 32 cadres led by Saydam, Hani al-Hasan, and ʿAbd-al-Hamid on a five-month long 'leadership course' in China. Several cadres were to assume senior posts in later years, among them Yahya ʿAshur, 'haj' Ismaʿil Jabr, Nasr Yusif, Musa ʿArafat, Dawud Abu-al-Hakam, and al-Tayyib ʿAbd-al-Rahim. The course returned to Jordan in December, to assist in the construction of a local support base and civilian organization. China donated 400 rifles to Fateh at around this time.[66] The Iraqi expeditionary force in Jordan, commanded by Hasan al-Naqib, offered additional combat supplies from its own stores as well as transport.

Starting in August, Fateh formed its recruits into armed cells in a process it called 'nesting' (*taʿshish*). It also set up roving guerrilla bands known as *al-dawriyyat al-mutarada* (fugitive patrols), generally consisting of 10–15 men each. At their peak there may have been dozens of fugitive patrols (not all belonging to Fateh) in the Nablus and Jenin districts, and up to 150 guerrillas in the hills around Hebron.[67] In mid-month, Arafat formed three commands in the West Bank: northern, central, and southern.[68] His leading aides were veterans of the Algerian guerrilla course in 1964, the 'strike groups' in Lebanon and Syria in 1965–6, and civilian cadres from Jordan. Prominent were Naʿim, Jawad Abu-al-Shaʿr, Mujahid, Atrash, Shahin, Qudsi, and ʿUmar al-Khatib, most of whom were also to assume senior military (or bureaucratic) rank in later years. These cadres shared Arafat's belief that the guerrilla 'fish' now had a 'sea' to swim in: some 660,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and 400,000 in Gaza.[69]

Having started combat operations, Fateh commanders in the West Bank became even more enthusiastic and envisaged a general insurrection.[70] The fugitive patrols would be backed by a large clandestine network in the towns and villages, in conscious emulation of the 1936–9 revolt.[71] The secure support bases would evolve into semi-liberated zones, and remaining Israeli presence along the main roads and in the towns and cities would be gradually eliminated. An undisputed national leadership could then

emerge into the open in the occupied territories. A political statement prepared in this period, but not distributed, explained that the ultimate aim was to announce the formation of the long-awaited Palestinian entity.[72]

Fateh's grand ambition was unlikely to be realized in the best of circumstances, but poor organization, lax security, vigorous Israeli counter-measures, and the generally low level of mass participation made failure inevitable. Israel had immediately established parallel military governments in the West Bank and Gaza following its occupation, in de facto, though not de jure, recognition of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949. The military authorities assumed the power to abrogate legislation and issue new laws in the form of military orders, and assigned 250 officers as local military governors in various towns and regions by the end of 1967.[73] Among the earliest decrees were the suspension of all banking activities, imposition of tight financial and trade controls, establishment of new customs posts, and abolition of the old armistice lines.[74] This was backed by swift punishment for resistance activities: detention, both individual and collective, curfews, demolition of houses, travel and trade bans, and expulsion to Jordan. Many measures were based on the British Defence Regulations of 1945, which, for example, permitted the 'administrative detention' of individuals without charge or trial for up to six months at a time. Active intelligence operations, including recruitment of Palestinian informers and forceful interrogation of prisoners, border security measures, and aggressive patrolling in the hills also took the battle to the guerrillas.

The announcement by Fateh that it was starting combat operations provoked a more intense Israeli counter-insurgency effort. A security sweep in late September led to the capture of some 180 guerrillas and supporters in the northern West Bank, followed by 24 Fateh members in mid-October, 70 in November, and 20 in December, besides followers of the ANM and other groups. Fateh hurriedly sought to replace its losses, and turned to Gaza, where the Palestinian Communist Organization, Baʿth Party, and Palestine Liberation Front (Saʿdi) had joined forces with independent figures at the end of July to form a United National Front.[75] The Muslim Brotherhood and ANM also coordinated with the front, but did not join it. A widely held belief was that Israeli occupation would last no longer than it had in 1956–7, making armed resistance unnecessary and civil disobedience more feasible. Fateh strove to persuade the political parties to adopt a more militant policy, but they refused adamantly, arguing that in the circumstances 'whoever fires a bullet is a traitor'.[76]

Fateh was a lesser force in Gaza, but enjoyed an edge in the West Bank, where the opposition parties had not recovered from the Jordanian security sweeps of 1966. It took advantage to contact or absorb several small groups that appeared after the war, such as the short-lived Battalions of Return, Movement of Arab Revolutionaries, and Front of Free Palestinian Socialists. More significant was the Palestinian Popular Struggle Organization (later Front, hence PPSF), which was the only West Bank group to survive beyond 1967.

It was formed in July by former ANM cadres, most prominent of whom was Jerusalem-based physician Subhi Ghusha. Ghusha took this initiative in the period before the ANM had recovered enough to plan its activity in the West Bank, and subsequently refused to merge with it. His aim was to coordinate anti-Israeli resistance, and the PPSF initially devoted itself to mobilizing civilian protests. It also maintained working relations with the ANM, which signed the first public statement by the PPSF on 15 July.

Ghusha was soon placed under administrative detention (for a total of eight months), and his place was effectively taken by PPSF military commanders Fayiz Hamdan, a former Jordanian officer, and Faysal al-Husayni. Both men had belonged to the ANM until 1967, as did a third colleague, Kamal al-Nimmari. The PPSF lacked arms and trained followers, and limited its action to sit-in protests, leaflets, and calling for a boycott of Israeli goods. It also searched for weapons abandoned by the Jordanian army during its retreat from the West Bank, and instructed members on the preparation of Molotov cocktails and similar techniques.[77] The PPSF still lacked a distinct identity; Husayni doubled as ANM military commander from early August, while Nimmari and Hamdan joined Fateh. Arafat provided arms and funds, while the PPSF reciprocated by smuggling him between safe houses in Jerusalem and Ramallah towards the end of the year.[78] Fateh also benefited from the Palestine Liberation Front–Path of Return (PLF–PR). In July, two PLF–PR leaders, Hasan al-Sabbarini and Taha Mahmud, instructed their followers in the West Bank to supply Fateh with light arms they had secretly obtained from the PLA in 1966. A number also joined Fateh, and were to be followed by most of their remaining colleagues after the dissolution of the PLF–PR in September 1968.[79]

The ANM Joins the Fray

Whatever the consequences for Fateh of the much-publicized 'second launch', it brought the debate within the ANM over the start of armed struggle to a head. The ANM had already lost numerous members or potential recruits who, on trying to join up after the war, found that only Fateh or Jibril's Palestinian Liberation Front had the training camps, weapons, and operational plans to offer.[80] The ANM Centre resisted a change in policy at first, insisting on the need for careful preparation. It was also distracted by the effort to stem the increasing drift of the wider movement, as other Arab branches concentrated on their own local affairs and ideological debates.

It was not until the end of July that the ANM Centre dispatched a former PAC member, Ahmad Khalifa, to rebuild its West Bank branch. Khalifa found the organization in shambles: senior cadres distrusted each other and the sections in different towns refused to cooperate. He was unable to persuade Ghusha to rejoin the ANM, but gradually brought the situation under control by October.[81] The ANM branch now had five local commands in the West

Bank, tied to the field command based in Ramallah. Leading cadres in Gaza such as Sabbah al-Thabit, Munir al-Rayyis, Faruq al-Husayni, and Muhammad al-Musallami feared leftist influence, however, and retained an autonomous status.[82] They operated under the name of Vanguards of Popular Resistance until February 1968, but cooperated with Khalifa in the way of supplying the West Bank branch with much-needed weapons and trained manpower.[83]

The ANM field command had barely formed when Fateh announced its second launch. The Centre in Beirut deemed it necessary to demonstrate ANM credibility in response, and in early September instructed its most senior cadre to date, Mustafa al-Zabri, to assume leadership in the West Bank. Asʿad ʿAbd-al-Rahman and Taysir Qubbaʿa were also ordered to report on progress in the West Bank. The PAC followed these steps in early September with a conference in Beirut to lay the basis for strategy in the occupied territories. It did not consider the Palestinians able to liberate the territories alone, but accepted that they should conduct selective guerrilla action and disrupt the occupation until Nasir could bring Arab power to bear.[84] The militant stance taken by the emergency Arab summit conference in Khartum at the end of August and the constant exchanges of fire along the Suez Canal buoyed ANM spirits. Some cadres even went so far as to see themselves as the vanguard that would draw the Arabs into a popular liberation war against Israel.[85]

The ANM meanwhile pursued the dialogue it had started in July with other guerrilla groups. The largest was Jibril's Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), which had a core membership of 150–200 and a similar number of supporters in 1967. The PLF had resolved immediately after the war to establish a presence in the West Bank, and Jibril and his senior cadres devoted considerable time to the study of topography, infiltration routes, weapons storing, food supply, and Israeli tactics.[86] The PLF collected abandoned weapons and ammunition from the Golan Heights, and established secret cells and safe houses in Jordan to assist infiltration into the West Bank. Its first reconnaissance patrols crossed the Jordan River in August, and brought back dozens of new recruits for training in Syria. Jibril entered the West Bank at one point to acquaint himself with the terrain. The PLF dispatched a special training mission in September to hasten the pace of recruitment, and decided to start combat operations following the arrest of its principal organizer, Mustafa Khmayyis.[87] On 13 October, it stated that an 'emergency conference' of its organization in the occupied territories had declared the start of the 'armed revolution to liberate Palestine'.[88]

There was little truth in the PLF statement, but the ANM Centre urgently recalled Zabri from the West Bank for consultations. The support command in Amman now demanded the start of combat operations as soon as possible. Zabri opposed this, aware that the clandestine organization lacked sufficient numbers, cohesion, training, and weapons. Upon his return to Ramallah, ʿAzmi al-Khawaja left for Amman to pursue the debate. Khawaja was told that the ANM Centre was exerting enormous pressure for a military launch because it faced growing political competition from Fateh. The support command added

that it was proving difficult to solicit donations from the public without participating in guerrilla action.[89] To the dismay of the West Bank field command, ANM cadres from Amman who were sent to report on the situation gave exaggerated reports of readiness upon their return. The ANM Centre had already started to prepare its public for guerrilla action, devoting greater space in *al-Hurriyya* to discussion of its requirements since the beginning of October.[90] It also cited the need to respond to Israeli policy in the interest of boosting public morale, and called for guerrilla unity in order to achieve 'comprehensive armed resistance'.[91]

The support command meanwhile worked to establish a military support network in Jordan. Starting in September, it quietly established safe houses in the northern Jordan Valley to assist the movement of patrols and supplies across the river.[92] It next arranged for 40 ANM members to undergo training at the PLF camp in Syria during October.[93] At the same time, the ANM and PLF agreed to form a united front, and were joined by *Abtal al-ʿAwda* and a group of pro-Nasir exiles from Jordan led by former officer Ahmad Zaʿrur. The new coalition decided to establish a forward military command in the West Bank and a rear military command in Jordan and Syria.[94] Faysal al-Husayni was arrested on 25 October, and so ʿAbdullah al-ʿAjrami, a PLA officer from Gaza who had escaped to Egypt, was chosen to replace him as forward military commander.[95] He entered the West Bank in mid-November with four other PLA officers and 30 soldiers, all ANM members who had deserted their units or been granted open leave. ʿAjrami joined Zabri, Khalifa, Khawaja, and ʿAdil Samara in the field command, while Zaʿrur acted as rear commander.

Matters were pushed to a head by Nasir's public declaration on 23 November that Egypt had moved from a posture of 'pure defence' against Israel, after the rearmament programme had taken Egyptian military strength nearly to pre-war levels. Nasir privately urged the ANM leadership to follow Fateh's suit and start combat operations in the occupied territories, as a means of distracting Israel. The field command pleaded for more time, but the ANM Centre now advocated total commitment to the military effort. The instructions relayed to the field command stressed that 'the battle might start without us . . . Fateh and Jibril will be the only ones to reap the credit . . . and that will finish us'.[96] Zaʿrur secretly toured the West Bank at this point, checking weapons stores and noting potential targets. He explained to the field command that the start of combat operations would bring political rewards and material backing from the Arab states. On his return to Amman, Zaʿrur reported that the military apparatus was ready for action.

The field command strongly disputed this assessment, noting that 'the enemy is strong and the occupation will be protracted, requiring extensive preparation'.[97] It requested arms and training from the Centre, and insisted that priority should be given to expanding the clandestine organization and fomenting civilian resistance. ʿAjrami sympathized with this view, but faced growing pressure from the restless PLA contingent. An optimistic report from Qubaʿa to

the ANM Centre at this point tipped the balance. The ANM, PLF, *Abtal al-ʿAwda*, and Zaʿrur group were ready to announce their united front, and wanted to mark the occasion with spectacular attacks in the occupied territories.[98] ʿAjrami was instructed to launch a series of raids, starting with one on the Ben Gurion international airport at Lydda on 11 December. The Lydda attack was a failure, but a statement published in Beirut on the same day proudly announced the establishment of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[99]

The ANM paid a high price for its political ambition, as ʿAjrami and 56 members of the military apparatus were arrested over the next week. They were followed by another 130 ANM activists by the end of the month. Zabri was in Amman at the time and escaped arrest, but Qubbaʿa and ʿAbd-al-Rahman were captured after infiltrating into the West Bank in late December. Khalifa and other ANM cadres were caught in the Israeli net on 7 January 1968, and Khawaja was compelled to flee to Jordan. The ANM had lost the bulk of its organization by mid-January, and in early February its senior organizer and 70 other members in Gaza were also arrested.[100] The ANM Centre ordered survivors who were not originally residents of the occupied territories to take refuge in Jordan, in an attempt to preserve the remaining membership.[101]

The Communists Diverge

The communists were the only political force that made no effort to compete militarily. Arguably the most organized and experienced party in the occupied territories, they also regarded themselves as the largest.[102] The party was not united, however: the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) operated in the West Bank, and the separate Palestinian Communist Organization (PCO) in Gaza. The JCP was considerably larger, but had suffered severely during the government crackdowns of 1966 and the majority of its politburo and central committee members were either in hiding in Amman or in exile in Damascus. Following the war, a 'leadership committee' headed by Naʾim al-Ashhab took charge of party affairs in the West Bank.[103] Ashhab was among the hundreds of activists released from Jordanian prisons during the war, and infiltrated with Faʾiq Warrad and other communists back to the West Bank, to join Sulayman al-Najjab, ʿArabi ʿAwwad, and other cadres in the reconstruction effort.

The leadership committee strongly opposed an immediate start of guerrilla activity, arguing that the foremost task was to slow the exodus of refugees to Jordan.[104] An average of 5,000 a day left during June, and the rate was still 500 in mid-July and 250–300 in August.[105] The communists were determined not to 'repeat the tragedy of 1948', and so were wary of the guerrilla groups.[106] Ashhab argued that the blows suffered during 1966, the impact of defeat in June 1967, and the general lack of political and organizational experience among the Palestinians meant that military action had to be preceded by proper

preparation.[107] Restraint was partly tactical, however, as the leadership committee privately viewed armed resistance as both necessary and inevitable. Its activity was intended, at least in part, to help prepare for that eventuality.[108] The committee also felt that the JCP central committee should mobilize its supporters in the PLA to follow the lead of the guerrilla groups and form a communist guerrilla force on the east bank of Jordan.[109]

In Amman, JCP deputy secretary-general Fahmi (Salim ʿAwwad) al-Salfiti took the opposite view, completely rejecting independent Palestinian military activity. He was not alone in seeing guerrilla activity as a 'dangerous, leftist phenomenon that will harm the progressive Arab states and prevent them from erasing the effects of [Israeli] aggression'.[110] Secretary-general Fuʾad Nassar was more sympathetic to the West Bank communists, but he was still in exile in Damascus. A majority of the politburo and central committee now supported Salfiti, and backed a statement calling for a 'national congress' and the 'unity of the east and west banks', effectively signalling its allegiance to king Husayn and opposing an autonomous Palestinian movement.[111] In any case, the leadership committee in the West Bank was still firmly committed to non-violent protest and 'mass action'. The communists had little regard for Fateh, but met ANM representatives to discuss civil disobedience, severing contact as each group commenced combat operations.[112] They also met members of the Baʿth Party, PLF, and PPSF, but attached more importance to building a coalition with mayors, former members of parliament, and prominent nationalists.

The situation was markedly different in the Gaza Strip, not least because the PCO was entirely autonomous. However, the local communists—most notable of whom were Samir Barkuni, ʿAbd-al-Rahman ʿAwad, Mahmud Nasr, and ʿAbd-al-Qadir Yasin—were few in number and had suffered severely before 1967 from political factionalism and personal rivalries.[113] The war enabled the PCO and JCP to establish direct contact for the first time since 1948, but their political differences prevented a merger. The PCO initially worked to slow the exodus of refugees from Gaza, where the Israeli policy of offering free transport fed a daily exodus that ranged from 300–400 in September to 100–200 in November.[114] It also joined the United National Front at the end of July and endorsed its strategy of non-violent disobedience, although some communists helped fugitive PLA officers to store arms.[115]

The success of a brief general strike called by the United National Front in November and a declaration by Nasir that Egypt had attained many of its rearmament objectives led the PCO to reconsider its opposition to military action. An editorial in its mouthpiece *al-Muqawama* now stated that 'the military solution is on the way to becoming inevitable', and in December the PCO called formally for armed struggle, albeit in conjunction with the Arab armies.[116] It now authorized active military preparation, and a few communists even took part in guerrilla activity by fugitive PLA soldiers, although this may have been without explicit permission.[117] In any case, the PCO suffered in the subsequent Israeli security sweeps that targeted the PLA, ANM, and Fateh.

The PLO Faces the Challenge

The PLA was the only Palestinian force to have seen combat during the war. In Gaza the ʿAyn Jalut Forces fielded some 5,000 men (of a planned 6,600 for 1965), while the skeleton 19th National Guard Brigade was fleshed out by calling up the 4,000 reservists trained in 1965. The Egyptian military administration and PLA command agreed in February 1967 to form three 'popular resistance' battalions of 420 men with surplus reservists, and to call for volunteers for another five battalions, but it is not clear that these steps were implemented.[118] Only on 23 May did PLA commander Madani receive Egyptian instructions to prepare his headquarters for transfer to Gaza.[119] Several staff officers assumed junior commanding positions in the combat units on 26–27 May, Palestinian cadets followed them to Gaza a few days later, after graduation exercises at Egyptian military academies had been brought forward in readiness for war.[120] In Syria, PLA units were brought together as a single brigade (Hittin Forces) and regrouped around the southern town of Darʿa on 1 June, although in reality the 411, 412, and 413 Commando Battalions continued to operate under the direct command of the Syrian general staff.[121]

PLA duties were not clear, however. Shuqayri exhorted the officers leaving for Gaza with the promise that the war of liberation was imminent and that 'we will advance [from Gaza] to Jerusalem as the capital of our independent state'.[122] The Egyptian command was more modest, instructing the PLA to hold Gaza for 24–48 hours and to protect the northern flank in case the Egyptian army should either attack or counterattack.[123] The PLA was also supposed, more ambitiously, to attack Israeli settlements to its front if the Egyptian army tried to force a corridor to the West Bank.[124] The *fidaʾiyyun* 141 Battalion was ordered at the same time to cut communications routes and disrupt military movements inside Israel.[125] None of these plans were put into practice in the event, although isolated PLA units fought until the surrender of Gaza city on 7 June, by which time they had lost 122 dead.[126] On the Syrian front, the PLA battalions were sent to the Golan Heights and then withdrawn, and were instructed to regroup Syrian army stragglers in the Shaykh Miskin area after 10 June and then to form a thin 'screen' from ʿArna on Mount Hermon to Darʿa for the next two months, while the Syrian army reorganized and rearmed.[127] Shuqayri had asked king Husayn to allow the PLA battalions in Syria to enter Jordan a few days before the war, and newly appointed PLA deputy chief-of-staff ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya made a similar request after its start to Egyptian general ʿAbd-al-Munʿim Riyad, the UAC chief-of-staff who became commander of the 'eastern front' and nominally in charge of Jordanian armed forces following the conclusion of the Egyptian–Jordanian mutual defence treaty on 30 May, but by then the battle was already decided.[128] The 421 Commando Battalion had meanwhile joined the Iraqi expeditionary force sent to Jordan on 5 June and was deployed at Khaw at the end of the war, after briefly crossing the Jordan River on 6 June and coming under air attack near Jericho.

Once the war was over, the IDF commenced a round-up of all military personnel in Gaza. Over the next few weeks some 6,000 PLA officers, soldiers, and reservists were captured: up to 1,000 were kept at the old British prison camp at ʿAtlit, along with other Arab prisoners, while the remaining 5,000 were deported to Egypt.[129] *Fidaʾiyyun* of the 141 Battalion who fell into Israeli hands were incarcerated in the central prison in Gaza, where they suffered severe beatings.[130] Hundreds escaped to Egypt or Jordan, while a number went into hiding in Gaza and Sinai. Some fugitives remained at large for up to three months, supplied by relatives with food and money; some collected and buried weapons abandoned by the Egyptian army or PLA for future use. Israel announced the arrest of 50 youths believed to be PLA soldiers while they forded the Jordan River, as late as 24 August.[131]

The loss of Gaza deprived the PLA of its largest base. The PLA and Egyptian commands now clashed over the fate of the survivors and released prisoners assembling at ʿAmiriyya, near Alexandria. PLA officer Nadir Shakhshir (another 'graduate of 1948') was impatient to replace remaining Egyptian officers with Palestinians, but Muhammad Fawzi, who was now promoted to commander-in-chief of the Egyptian army, wanted to dissolve the ʿAyn Jalut Forces altogether.[132] The dispute was resolved at the end of September, when Fawzi and Shuqayri agreed to place Palestinians at all levels in PLA units, which were reduced at the same time to four commando battalions (329th, 339th, 349th, and 359th) with a total strength of just over 2,000.[133] Remaining personnel were diverted into a 'surplus', and 3,000–4,000 were allowed to resettle in the Tahrir district of Cairo.[134] The Egyptian command abolished the ʿAyn Jalut Forces brigade structure and deployed the Palestinian Commando Units, as they were officially redesignated, to the Bitter Lakes area under its direct authority. PLA headquarters in Cairo was banned from direct contact with the battalions, and from inducting new recruits to replace losses through death, dismissal, or retirement, with the result that strength gradually declined in following years.[135]

Partly in response to these constraints, PLA officers were quick to lobby for a role in the guerrilla campaign in the occupied territories. Shuqayri was eager to restore his political credibility, and tried to revive the pre-war connection with *Abtal al-ʿAwda* as a means of doing so.[136] The ANM was discussing a merger with Fateh and the PLF and had little interest in ceding control of *Abtal al-ʿAwda*, however. Shuqayri turned instead to the former head of the PLO military department Qusay ʿAbadla, who was in hiding in Gaza, and appointed him head of the local resistance movement at the beginning of August.[137] The chairman also endorsed a proposal made by PLA deputy chief-of-staff Yahya to the Syrian general staff, for the PLA to conduct guerrilla operations on the Syrian front, and discussed the idea in face-to-face talks in Damascus.[138] The Syrians flatly rejected the proposal, while ʿAbadla's flight from Gaza after nearly three months as a fugitive ended the other hope.

PLA commander Madani, chief-of-staff Jabi, intelligence head Fayiz al-Turk, and 421 Battalion commander Shaqqura also discussed the formation of a guerrilla wing in early August. An obvious advantage was the presence of numerous junior officers and soldiers in Gaza, among them Husayn al-Khatib, Ziyad al-Husayni, and Jabr ʿAmmar. The PLA now formed a guerrilla sub-command under the supervision of Madani; Bahjat ʿAbd-al-Amin was to be commander and Turk his chief-of-staff, while Shaqqura would provide logistic support.[139] Additional strength was to come from the PLF–PR headed by Hut and Saʿdi, whose followers in Lebanon were trained by PLO military attaché Muhammad al-Shaʿir and then put on the PLA payroll.[140] The PLO executive committee approved their plan, which called for ten officers initially to set up clandestine operational commands in the West Bank and Gaza, and eventually to provide leadership for all Palestinian groups. What Shuqayri and Madani hoped for ultimately was to declare armed revolution, but until then the PLA officers were to avoid combat in order to recruit, train, stockpile weapons and supplies, and conduct reconnaissance.[141]

In September Turk visited Amman, where he met Arafat, Wazir, and Jibril in the hope of persuading them to suspend combat operations until the end of the year.[142] Rustum Hamid transferred to Jordan soon after to select infiltration routes and set up supply networks, and the first group of PLA officers infiltrated to the West Bank and Gaza shortly after. A second group of 17 officers followed in October, including Misbah Saqr, Nimr Hajjaj, Yahya Murtaja, Saʾib al-ʿAjiz, Salim ʿAmr, Fayiz Jarad, ʿUmar ʿAshur, Walid Abu-Shaʿban, and Ahmad Sarsur. The PLA had some 15 officers in place by the beginning of November, besides those who had taken leave separately to join the ANM (the latter group led by ʿAjrami, Yusif Rajab al-Rudayʿi, and Ramadan Dawud). The Israeli counter-insurgency campaign was already underway, however, and it proved easy to distinguish the PLA officers, mostly Gazans, from the inhabitants of the West Bank. Fellow officers in the ANM and PPSF offered support, but they too soon fell victim to the Israeli campaign.

The PLA guerrilla wing also faced a serious problem in Shuqayri, whose striving to retain national leadership led to increasingly hollow rhetoric. In mid-October, he declared that Palestinian guerrilla action had turned into an armed revolution of the masses on the way to becoming a people's liberation war, and stated his willingness to merge the PLA within a unified Arab army.[143] His disagreement with Fateh, he added, was that it looked only to liberating the West Bank and Gaza, whereas he looked more expansively to free 'an Arab country', implicitly Jordan, and establish 'another North Vietnam' to support the armed struggle.[144] Shuqayri's political posturing shocked the PLA command when he proclaimed on 16 November that the PLO was leading the armed struggle 'through its bases inside [the occupied territories]'.[145] Israel intensified its security measures in response, compelling several PLA officers in the West Bank to flee to Jordan over the next three months.[146]

The collapse of the military organization in the West Bank was galling enough, but the last straw came on 9 December, when Shuqayri declared the existence of a Revolutionary Command Council for the Liberation of Palestine. This body, he stated, had been formed by a secret military conference in Jerusalem and controlled all the resistance forces in the occupied territories.[147] He had previously claimed that the PLO was backing all the guerrilla groups, and that the PLA had completed retraining and rearming as a commando force, with help from China and other countries.[148] Fateh angrily denied both his claims and knowledge of the existence of the Council, and accused Shuqayri of 'exhausting' the PLA.[149] The PFLP followed suit after he laid claim to its opening attack on Lydda airport on 11 December and to a second raid the next day.[150]

Shuqayri had gone too far. Fateh sent a strongly worded complaint to the ministerial council of the League of Arab States, accusing the PLO chairman of inventing fictitious councils and demanding his resignation.[151] Its accusations were echoed publicly by seven members of the PLO executive committee, including Madani, on 14 December, and then by the PFLP and the influential General Union of Palestine Students.[152] Shuqayri countered by dismissing several committee members, but his fate was sealed when the powerful head of the Palestine National Fund, ʿAbd-al-Majid Shuman, and other key political and financial backers in the PNC joined the protest on 20 December. Shuqayri tendered his resignation four days later, following a last-minute appeal to Nasir that went unanswered. The PLO chairman had not been forgiven the deep offence he had given the Arab leaders during the Khartum summit in August. Executive committee member Yahya Hammuda, a left-leaning lawyer who had been a leading figure in the ill-fated General Refugee Congress of 1949, was now elected as acting chairman.

Victory in Defeat?

Palestinian hopes of organizing an armed mass uprising had been completely shattered by the end of 1967, although no group would admit as much.[153] Guerrilla statements gave wildly inflated accounts—Fateh claimed killing 83 Israeli soldiers and destroying two helicopters and three vehicles in a single battle on 7 December, for the loss of two guerrilla dead and seven prisoners—but Israeli figures showed a more modest total of 97 IDF casualties in the course of 92 attacks.[154] Palestinian losses reached 65 dead, among them many veteran cadres, while Fateh declared the death of 28 guerrillas in a single month, out of a total of 46 killed or captured in four months of action.[155] Arafat narrowly escaped falling prisoner in Ramallah in early December, reportedly for the sixth time, and now left to Jordan. Guerrilla casualties were not onerous, but 1,000–1,250 activists were in prison, some three-quarters of them local residents.[156]

Privately, the guerrillas could console themselves with the view that 'in these types of war, survival and continued existence are a sort of victory'.[157] Looking back they could also claim, as Habash did, that 'we prevented Israel from achieving a political victory after its military triumph'.[158] Fateh's competitors continued to blame it for starting combat operations prematurely, denying the guerrilla movement time to complete preparations and ringing 'the alarm bell for the enemy'.[159] Yet the critics admitted that armed resistance had also offered a model and stifled thought of coexistence with the occupation, in particular by 'pre-empting the suspect call for a [Palestinian] state'.[160] Fateh did not in fact object at first when West Bank lawyer ʿAziz Shihada revealed in early September that he had discussed setting up an independent state with the Israeli authorities, or when a small group of local figures headed by Hamdi Faruq-al-Taji publicly reiterated the idea in late October.[161] Defeat hardened its attitude, however, and it took responsibility for a rocket attack on Taji's home at the end of December.[162]

For a few, fleeting months after June 1967, the Palestinian guerrillas were embarked on an enterprise of far-reaching ambition: to situate the national struggle on Palestinian soil, and thus lay the basis for an autonomous political institution. 'Arab sequestration' was over, in the view of Fateh particularly, as the defeat of the Arab armies 'allowed the Palestinian people to grasp its cause in its own hands for the first time since 1948'.[163] Failure had equally far-reaching implications. The centre of gravity in Palestinian nationalism moved into exile, and with it the locus of political and social activity, military command, decision-making, and institution-building. Strategies of civilian resistance and mass mobilization in the occupied territories were obscured, marginalizing the role of local political activists and social forces in Palestinian decision-making. The balance was not shift significantly until the eruption of the *intifada* in December 1987, twenty years later.

7

Carving out the Guerrilla Sanctuary

The Battle of Karama

The failure of their enterprise in the occupied territories left the guerrilla groups in flux, much as the June 1967 war had brought the legitimacy of the PLO leadership into question. Yet as in 1948, defeat gave a new impetus to Palestinian nationalism. The debacle of the Arab states and armies, especially of Nasir's Egypt, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by a despised Israel, and the exodus of another 300,000 refugees demolished many social and political certainties to which Palestinians clung. The challenge now was to embody their distinct national identity in an autonomous political institution, and moreover to do so within the complex context of Arab domestic and regional politics. Armed struggle, whether as discourse or practice, was the means for the emerging guerrilla movement both to assert its legitimacy and to carve out the sanctuary it needed in the Arab confrontation states. For a nationalist movement that lacked economic or social control over its constituency, it was also a means of political outbidding and manipulative mobilization.[1]

Fateh reflected these concerns in its attitude towards the PLO. To highlight the negative aspects it stressed past Arab sponsorship for the PLO, which, significantly, had failed to liberate Palestine. Fateh added bitterly that 'certain Arab leaders have exploited the Palestine cause for their private gain over the years', and that the Arab summit conferences had not offered the level of support to be expected of them.[2] Fateh proudly saw itself, conversely, as 'the organization which took on the task of imposing a revolutionary new strategy on the Arab states and defied all the forces hostile to the revolution'. This had only happened by relying first and foremost on Palestinian energies mobilized by incessant revolutionary action , much as had happened in Algeria, where the FLN demanded, not requested, assistance from its Arab backers.[3] Fateh considered in early 1968 that it alone among Palestinian groups had enough experience to fuse all [political] tendencies and create harmony between them , and observed disparagingly that in contrast 'all the other organizations have not been able to attain the level of revolution'.[4] Proof lay in the 'spontaneous, popular armed uprising' organized after June 1967 by Fateh, which was the 'vanguard of the Palestinian people' that continued to lead resistance to Israeli occupation.[5]

Bolstered by this self-confident, even brash, view of itself, Fateh preferred to dissolve the PLO and form a new national front under its own control. To this end it invited eleven other guerrilla groups to a four-day conference in Cairo in mid-January. Seven attended, including the Palestinian Popular Liberation Front and the Vanguards of Popular War (both loyal to the Syrian wing of the Ba'th Party), and the Vanguards of Sacrifice Organization headed by Subhi Yasin and the Action Organization for the Support of the Revolution headed by 'Isam al-Sartawi (both pro-Nasir). These groups announced the formation of the Permanent Bureau for Guerrilla Action and a military department, and offered coordination with the PLA.[6] Fateh's real purpose was to seek allies within the PLO, and to form a bloc that would renegotiate the composition of the PNC with members of the PLO executive committee and representatives of the main unions.[7] The ANM privately regarded itself as the senior claimant to Palestinian leadership, and so it persuaded its partners in the PFLP and other groups (such as the PPSF) to boycott the Cairo meeting and reiterated its support for the representative status of the PLO.[8]

The Permanent Bureau was stillborn, in any event, but Fateh's ability to convene a public meeting in Cairo at all revealed the sea-change in its regional standing. For its Egyptian hosts, the attraction lay in the speed with which Fateh had started combat operations against Israel after the war. As commander-in-chief Fawzi later explained, 'guerilla action was very important to us . . . because we were at point zero, especially in the air force. We needed to heat up the Jordanian and Syrian fronts, and even the Lebanese one if possible, to distract the Israeli army and compel it to transfer forces to other places, while we rebuilt our strength'.[9] Amin Huwaydi, now defence minister and head of intelligence, confirmed the need to 'open additional fronts behind [Israeli] lines, and in the heart of Palestine'.[10] Palestinian action also contributed directly to the military effort that Egypt itself intended to undertake in pursuit of its broader post-war strategy. As defined during a meeting between Nasir, Fawzi, 'Abd-al-Mun'im Riyad, and military intelligence chief Muhammad Sadiq in November 1967, its aims were to prevent the new ceasefire lines from turning into permanent armistice lines such as those of 1949 and to impress the urgency of resolving the conflict on the international community, besides restoring the morale and tarnished image of the Egyptian army.[11]

Sadiq had already posted military intelligence officer Ibrahim al-Dakhakhna, a veteran of dealing with Palestinian activists in Gaza, to Amman to assure regular liaison with the guerrilla groups as early as July. Dakhakhna visited Damascus in August to meet the Fateh leadership, and pledged immediate military assistance. An Egyptian aircraft brought the first shipment of combat supplies shortly after, and carried Dakhakhna and 50 Fateh guerrillas back to Egypt for commando training.[12] Supplies continued to arrive at the rate of one aircraft a month, including two planeloads that landed in Jordan in December, much to the consternation of the authorities. Egyptian military intelligence now employed *fida'iyyun* of the 141 Battalion, which had been reassembled in

Cairo, in operations behind Israeli lines in Sinai.[13] It also sent 15 *fida'iyyun* to Jordan to conduct reconnaissance and special combat missions under the leadership of PLA officers who had escaped the Israeli dragnet in the West Bank. The *fida'iyyun* teamed up with Fateh trainees from Egypt to rocket the Israeli oil refinery at Eilat in January 1968 and on other occasions.[14]

There was not a complete coincidence of political views, however. Sadiq told a Fateh delegation headed by Arafat frankly that 'we need you to strike Israel, in order to strengthen the position of Arab negotiators'.[15] It was in this context that Fateh hardened its position towards figures in the occupied territories who proposed the establishment of a Palestinian state, suspecting that they would be called upon to replace it as interlocutors in negotiations with Israel. Reports in the government-controlled press in Egypt also suggested that the authorities were toying with the idea of reviving the PLO now that Shuqayri was gone, or at least so Fateh believed. Anxiety turned to alarm when Nasir's confidant Muhammed Hasanayn Haykal published an editorial in the influential *al-Ahram* in mid-January belittling the impact of the guerrillas. He argued that guerrilla and people's war could not be a decisive factor in the conflict with Israel, and that the Palestinian situation was not comparable to the Algerian struggle for independence.[16] Press reports a few days later spoke of an understanding between Egypt, Jordan, and the PLO to halt Fateh operations and resolve the conflict with Israel.[17] PLO chairman Hammuda had just stated his conviction that the Jewish citizens of Israel could not be expelled to the countries from which they had originally come, and although he soon retracted the statement, his moderation suggested a worrying willingness to come to terms with the existence of Israel.[18]

Fateh moved quickly to reassert itself in response to the perceived challenge, launching a new wave of 'leadership teams' into the West Bank. It claimed in late January that 'one of its most important long-term tasks, the transfer of all its military bases into the occupied homeland, has been completed' . It then went on to boast, with equal disregard for the truth, that 'from these hidden and well-stocked bases the Palestinian guerillas, who in their majority are farmers and students devoted full-time [to Fateh], conduct tens of operations daily in the territories occupied both previously [in 1948] and recently [in 1967]'.[19] It repeated these claims on 6 February, and was blamed by Israel for an upsurge of attacks in Gaza. Any ambition of reviving widespread guerrilla activity was swiftly crushed, however. Israel arrested 40 Fateh members in Gaza on 18 January and 74 in Nablus on 14 February, and its border patrols killed another 35 infiltrators and captured 10 in a single incident on 2 March. Fateh had lost some 200 members by mid-month, and its remaining networks were in shreds.

Continuing setbacks in the occupied territories underlined the need for secure sanctuaries in neighbouring Arab states. The obvious candidate was Jordan, where a majority of Palestinian refugees lived and which had the longest Arab border with Israel and the West Bank. The East Bank quickly emerged as

the major staging ground and conduit for infiltration into the occupied territories, prompting king Husayn to deliver a public warning on 5 September 1967 against military activity that 'was not part of a comprehensive Arab plan'.[20] Fateh riposted with a severe verbal attack on the authorities, singling out the intelligence chief Muhammad Rasul al-Kaylani and his directorate for special blame and calling for the liquidation of 'collaborators'. Addressing the Jordanian people, it argued that 'distancing the Arab people from its vanguard role in the battle and reliance on classic warfare . . . were among the direct reasons for the setback [of June 1967]'. In contrast, Fateh was 'waging a pioneering, mass revolution in all the occupied [territories]'.[21]

The guerrillas found many Jordanian soldiers unwilling to act against them. Some defied orders against aiding the guerrillas by providing information on Israeli deployment and fire cover for infiltrators crossing the Jordan River. Guerrilla strength in the Jordan Valley meanwhile grew to between 600 and 1,000 by early 1968, of whom some 500 belonged to Fateh and 300–400 to the PFLP.[22] Anxious not to be outdone, the PLO finally announced in early March the existence of a guerrilla wing belonging to the PLA, now officially named the Popular Liberation Forces (*Quwwat al-Tahrir al-Sha'biyya*, PLF/PLA). The build-up alarmed the Jordanian authorities, especially after it started to draw Israeli cross-border fire, but they were well aware of the popularity of the guerrillas. On 21 January, king Husayn and prime minister Bahjat al-Talhuni received Hammuda and other executive committee members and publicly welcomed the revival of PLO activity in the country 'without reservation'.[23]

Positive statements in public could not disguise the basic conflict of interests. Matters came to a head after heavy clashes between Jordanian and Israeli forces on 15 February, in which Israeli tanks, artillery, and aircraft struck the town and refugee camp of Karama in the Jordan Valley, killing 20 soldiers and civilians and wounding another 58. The Jordanian army reacted by surrounding the town and demanding the surrender of all guerrillas and weapons. The siege was lifted a day later after mediation by local inhabitants, but the king reiterated that 'any loyal and purposeful action must come . . . through us and within what we design and plan . . . Any party that ignores this stand from now on and that adopts a different approach . . . is not of us'.[24] Interior minister Hasan al-Kayid reinforced the message, adding that 'persons exposing Jordan to the enemy's attacks will be prevented, as of today, from crossing Jordanian territory' and warning of further punitive measures.[25]

The authorities were not in a position to enforce their will, and the guerrillas benefited from the backlash of public sympathy to improve their position around Karama. The funeral of 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Hmud, a Fateh central committee member who died in a car accident on 28 February, allowed the guerrillas to appear openly in the streets of Amman for the first time. Guerrilla activity increased in parallel, with 42 attacks on Israeli targets in January and February and 36 in March. Faced with a growing volume of raids, Israel decided to launch a large search-and-destroy mission against guerrilla bases in and around

Karama. It signalled its intention on 18 March by complaining to the UN Security Council that six Israelis had died and 44 were wounded in the preceding month, and by warning that it would take whatever action it deemed appropriate in self-defence.

The guerrillas observed the Israeli military preparations across the river, and on 20 March representatives of Fateh, the PFLP, and PLF/PLA met in Karama to decide on a course of action. PFLP military commander Zaʿrur and field commander Jibril had already recommended withdrawal into the hills to the east, arguing that self-preservation was the most sensible option in the face of a massively superior enemy.[26] Fateh took the opposite view, arguing that an act of conscious steadfastness was necessary to dispel the myth of Israeli invincibility and raise Palestinian and Arab morale.[27] The Jordanian command was also aware of Israeli preparations and, fearing a plan to occupy a bridgehead on the East Bank as a means of forcing the kingdom into peace talks with Israel, counselled caution.[28] Army commander ʿAmir Khammash and Iraqi expeditionary force commander Naqib received Arafat on 13 March to advise against confrontation. According to Hani al-Hasan, Arafat replied: 'We want to persuade the world that there are those in the Arab nation who will not withdraw and flee. Let us die under the tracks of the tanks and change the course of history in our region.'[29] Behind the histrionics, Fateh sought once again to use military means for specific political ends, which it later explained were 'revolutionary fusion with the masses . . . closeness and confidence between *al-ʿAsifa* forces and the brave Jordanian army . . . and eliminat[ion of] those elements hostile to the armed resistance movement in the east bank of Jordan'.[30]

Fateh had 220–250 guerrillas, administrative staff, and trainees in the area, while the PLF/PLA, which had also opted to remain in Karama, had some 80 men, including several dozen soldiers of the PLA's 421 Battalion. The PFLP accused both groups of adventurism and withdrew its 30-man contingent. Armament was sketchy, and the 80 Fateh fighters facing the Jordan River had only a handful of anti-tank mines, seven anti-tank rocket launchers, and two 82 millimetre mortars.[31] The real backbone of the defence was provided by the Jordanian 1st Infantry Division and attached tank and artillery battalions deployed on the mountain ridge overlooking the Jordan Valley. It was these units that inflicted the heaviest damage on the Israeli force—estimated at two armour and infantry brigades and three paratroop, tank, and engineer battalions, backed by five artillery battalions—that crossed the Jordan River at several points in the morning of 21 March.[32] The attacking force had full control of Karama by noon and spent the next few hours in systematic destruction of much of the town, and completed its withdrawal to the West Bank by 5:30 p.m. under heavy Jordanian fire. Israel paid dearly: 28 dead and 90 wounded, and four tanks, five other vehicles, and an aircraft destroyed by its own admission.[33] The Jordanian Army lost 61 dead, 108 wounded, 13 tanks destroyed and 20 damaged, and 39 other vehicles disabled.[34] The guerrillas paid the highest price:

Fateh lost 92 dead and the PLF/PLA 24, besides 100 wounded and 40–66 prisoners, accounting for nearly half their full-time military personnel.[35]

Reaping the Rewards of Defeat

Israel had achieved its tactical objectives, but the battle of Karama turned overnight into a resounding political and psychological victory in Arab eyes. The Israelis had left behind some of their destroyed armour, and several burnt-out tanks were paraded triumphantly through the streets of Salt and Amman. The image of the invincible IDF was shaken, appropriately, at Karama, Arabic for dignity. The real credit was due to the Jordanian army, yet it was the guerrillas whose reputation soared. Their decision to stand and fight, militarily disastrous, catapulted them into a position of political pre-eminence. For the same reason it was Fateh that benefited most, whereas the PFLP was racked by disputes that soon led to the formation of a rival Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PF–GC) under Jibril. Arafat's photograph now appeared on at least one popular magazine cover, and on 14 April Fateh named him as its leader and official spokesman, offering an identifiable public figure after years of clandestinity.

Astute manipulation of the media by the guerrillas left many Jordanian officers and soldiers with the feeling that their hard-earned victory had been stolen by upstarts, and inserted a sour note into relations that was to grow into deep bitterness over the next two years. Yet the government was powerless after Karama to prevent the guerrilla groups from setting up combat bases throughout the border region, bringing in volunteers and arms from other Arab states, and opening offices in the capital and in refugee camps around the country.[36] The Jordanian army had by then lifted its siege of Karama and the guerrilla bases. So powerful was the new myth of the heroic guerrilla that even king Husayn joined in, avowing in a televised speech that 'we are all *fida'iyyun*'.

Growing Arab support for the guerrillas was an added constraint on Jordanian policy. Of considerable importance, at least for Fateh, was the invitation extended to Wazir and Khalaf to meet king Faysal of Saudi Arabia, who pledged substantial financial assistance.[37] Relations with Egypt now developed into a strategic alliance. Nasir was lobbying for the establishment of an eastern front comprising Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, while preparing to wage a war of attrition along the Suez Canal. Fateh's decision to stand and fight at Karama demonstrated to him that it did not rely on rhetoric alone, and it received a special delivery of arms to compensate its losses in Karama. Nasir's long-term strategy was now 'to fill the time-gap until our forces are rebuilt with two elements: the war of attrition, and Fateh activity'.[38] He also regarded guerrilla activity as a useful complement to Arab diplomacy, aimed at increasing the pressure on Israel to come to terms. Haykal reflected this view by emphasizing the need for 'a Palestinian element in the struggle [against Israel]', that would be independent of the Arab governments but nonetheless act as 'their irresponsible arm'.[39]

The outcome was an invitation to Arafat, Khalaf, and Qaddumi to meet Nasir soon after the battle of Karama.[40] The Fateh leaders also discussed practical cooperation with military intelligence chief Sadiq and defence minister and general intelligence chief Huwaydi during their visit.[41] Haykal managed political contacts, while Sami Sharaf, head of Nasir s office and of the national security directorate followed up on practical matters, both for Fateh and for all guerrilla groups.[42] Evidence of the new relationship came on 10 May, when Fateh was given its own frequency to broadcast daily over Cairo radio. Egypt assisted the other guerrilla groups as well, but as Huwaydi later explained, 'we helped everyone until clear leaders proved themselves in the field, and it was Fateh that proved itself'.[43] (The PFLP received more modest levels of arms supplies and training, and some of its leaders were issued with Egyptian passports, but the publication of a document criticizing Nasir in August led to cessation of military aid by the end of the year.[44])

Starting in June, a growing number of Fateh guerrillas received training in Egypt as rocket gunners, frogmen, commando instructors, and intelligence officers.[45] Indeed, the intelligence connection was a central component of the new relationship. Most of the cadres attending the first training course in 1968 later went on to head Fateh security agencies, notably ʿAli Hasan Salama, Mahdi Bsaysu, Muhammad ʿAwda, Fakhri al-ʿUmari, Murid al-Dajani, and Majid al-Agha. Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid, then Fateh representative in Cairo and later chief of its central security apparatus, observed a second course in mid-1969, from which came the cadres who were to occupy the second echelon. Fateh cemented the relationship by giving Egypt all information it gathered on Israel, including data collected by its double agents inside Jordanian intelligence.[46] On the Egyptian side, the departments at military intelligence and general intelligence that dealt with national liberation and opposition movements were responsible for cooperation, although Sadiq and Huwaydi also monitored relations with the Palestinians personally. Both services had resident liaison officers at the Egyptian embassy in Amman (Dakhakhna and Muhammad ʿAbd-al-Salam) whose sole task was to maintain contact on a daily basis with the guerrilla leadership. Another officer, Hamdi Yusif, was based in Damascus to coordinate the transit of trainees and supplies through Syria.

To boost guerrilla activity against Israel further, Egypt transferred 130 officers and soldiers of the PLA 29 Battalion to southern Jordan in mid-April 1968.[47] This was partly in response to a request from Arafat, who wished to strengthen Fateh in relation to the other guerrilla groups. Nasir also sought in this way to counter growing Syrian influence in the Palestinian arena, as he confided to PLA officers before they departed.[48] The task force was modelled on the special service—a new branch of Egyptian intelligence tied directly to Nasir for the conduct of 'active' espionage and covert activities abroad—and operated under its orders (in agreement with military intelligence).[49] Heading it was Egyptian special forces officer Ahmad Hilmi (better known as Abu Hani), later replaced by Jumʿa al-Jamala, a former *fidaʾi* of 141 Battalion who adopted the same

nickname. Included in the Abu Hani group, as it was best known, were fugitive PLA officers from the occupied territories, among them Fakhir al-Nahhal, Walid Abu-Shaʿban, and Ahmad Mifrij. Fateh provided supplies, but Egyptian military intelligence controlled missions, which included training, reconnaissance, and special raids (on the Dead Sea potash plant, Masada airbase, and Dimona nuclear reactor), on occasion using heavy 240 millimetre rockets supplied by Egypt.[50] The Egyptian contingent expanded with the arrival in January 1969 of Marwan ʿAbd-al-Hakim and two other officers to set up an additional training camp for Fateh.[51]

By then the guerrilla movement had become a substantial force in Jordan. Karama had brought a flood of volunteers in its wake, both Palestinian and Arab. On 20 May 1968, Fateh stated that it had already been approached by 20,000 students and former soldiers in Egypt, while its office in Baghdad announced that it was receiving 1,500 applications each week.[52] Whatever the truth of these claims, the guerrilla groups were ill-prepared to cope with the influx, in part due to the loss of many veteran cadres in the occupied territories in 1967 and in the latest battle. A majority of volunteers went to Fateh, but even the PFLP had more than it could handle: its main training camp could accommodate only 150–200 out of every 1,000 recruits.[53] However, some two-thirds of the trainees dropped out during the course or within weeks of joining guerrilla bases due to harsh physical conditions.[54] Still, by June guerrilla numbers had risen by around 300 per cent to an estimated full-time strength of 3,000, of whom 2,000 belonged to Fateh, with some 12,000 supporters in the towns and refugee camps.[55]

Thanks to the influx, Fateh was able by June to divide its growing strength into three guerrilla sectors (*qitaʿ*) stretching from Um Qays in the north to Wadi ʿAraba south of the Dead Sea. Each had its own commander (*amir*, 'giver of orders'), deputy-commander, and operations officer, as well as a training camp to absorb new recruits. The sectors consisted of numerous bases (*qawaʿid*) that were often split into even smaller squads (*majmuʿat*), both to avoid Israeli air and artillery strikes and to facilitate control for officers with little military experience.[56] As numbers and administrative capability grew in 1969, every dozen or so bases were regrouped into a unit (*wihda*), with four or five units now forming a sector. In this way the northern sector could absorb a peak strength of 2,000 in summer 1969, while the central sector had up to 1,500.[57]

Fateh had a much smaller contingent of 200 in the southern sector, which was used mainly to smuggle men and arms to the Hebron district or across the Negev desert to Gaza.[58] It overcame the initial distrust of local inhabitants by first gaining a foothold among weaker clans such as the ʿUwaydat-Huwaytat, which saw the guerrillas as a potential ally in traditional disputes. It then extended free medical services thanks to the efforts of its senior political officer, Raʾuf Nazmi (better known as Mahjub ʿUmar), an Egyptian doctor and former communist.[59] Military organization and geographical divisions in the kingdom were much the same for the PFLP, PLF/PLA, and Saʿiqa, each of which grew

to a strength of 300–500 by the end of 1968, 800–1,200 a year later, and 1,000–1,500 by 1970.[60] The PLF/PLA moreover followed Fateh's lead by appointing a Bedouin sheikh, ʿAbdullah Abu-Sitta, as the political head of its southern sector, alongside military commander Salim ʿAmr.[61]

The Palestinian groups equipped their guerrillas with the growing volume of infantry weapons that now arrived from Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, while Bedouin smugglers ran a brisk trade in arms collected from the battlefields of June 1967. China soon emerged as the main supplier of Fateh (followed by Algeria, then Egypt), donating Soviet-designed AK-47 automatic rifles, RPG-2 and RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers, 60 millimetre and 82 millimetre mortars, and 130 millimetre artillery rockets in quantities sufficient for 2,000 men in 1968, for another 7,000 in 1969, and finally for 14,000 in 1970.[62] Arms were flown in through Damascus and the Iraqi airbase at Habbaniyya or shipped by sea to the ports of Lattakia and Basra, and then transported by land to Jordan. At first trucks belonging to the Iraqi and Syrian units stationed in Jordan brought the arms into the country, but by mid-1969 the PLO's military police unit, the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), had its own border checkpoints and provided separate registration for guerrilla vehicles.

The guerrilla sectors expanded constantly to keep pace with the increase in manpower and weaponry. During 1969 Fateh formed a 600-man Mounted Force (*al-Quwwa al-Mahmula*) to act as a central reserve and rapid reinforcement force.[63] It had some 80 jeeps for mobility and fielded most of Fateh's 'heavy' weapons: a dozen 122 millimetre and 130 millimetre rocket launchers, 27 12.7 millimetre machine-guns and 20 millimetre automatic canon, six 106 millimetre recoilless rifles, and a dozen 82 millimetre and 120 millimetre mortars.[64] Of equal note were the three rocket artillery units, known as the Special Course (*al-Dawra al-Khassa*), Group 16 (*al-Majmuʿa 16*), and Clouds of Fire (*Suhub al-Jahim*), while other new units included the 404 Battalion (security), 201 Force (supply), and a military police detachment.[65] Palestinian scientists and engineers who belonged to Fateh or supported it also set up a Scientific Committee in Kuwait in mid-1969, with branches in several Arab states and a workshop in Damascus to repair weapons and produce explosives.[66]

A problem facing Fateh and most guerrilla groups was the lack of experienced commanders, as guerrillas lacking basic military and administrative skills were catapulted into leadership of whole sectors. The alternative was to call on Palestinian officers previously serving in the Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi armies, or in the PLA, especially at senior combat and staff levels. Notable examples were ʿAtallah ʿAtallah, Ahmad ʿAfana, and Muhammad al-ʿAmla in Fateh, Dafi Jamʿani, Mahmud Maʿayta, and Ahmad Hijju in Saʿiqa, and Thaʾir al-ʿAjrami and al-Qadi in the PFLP, which also recruited pro-Nasir former fugitives from the Syrian army Akram Safadi and al-Haytham al-Ayyubi. However, many of these officers brought authoritarian attitudes that sat poorly with the guerrillas, who had adopted an egalitarian system that allowed no distinctions in formal rank, pay, sleeping quarters, or other privileges.[67] The PLF/PLA, in contrast, adopted

the conventional military discipline and hierarchy of the PLA. Its four sectors were commanded by Mahmud Abu-Marzuq, Khalil al-Jayyab, Salim ʿAmr, and Ghazi Mhanna; it had no shortage of professional officers, more of whom arrived from the units in Egypt. This helped it absorb surplus PLA conscripts from Syria and a substantial number of Iraqi Arab and Kurdish volunteers; the 421 Battalion was also built up with surplus conscripts to a strength of 600–800 or more, and then split in two to form the 422 Battalion (together constituting the Qadisiyya Forces brigade).[68]

Fateh set up cadre schools in late 1968 to solve the leadership problem, but these proved largely unsuccessful.[69] More effective was the special qualification course (*dawrat taʾhil*) it ran at the Hama camp in Syria during the summer. Central committee member Nimr supervised, modelling it along the lines of the course he had attended in Algeria in 1964. Many of the trainees were university students, who were now supposed to become military command cadres. The entire class was transferred to the Syrian front upon graduation in July, where it formed the basis for a new guerrilla sector.[70] This was the only course of its kind run by Fateh, but some of the graduates were sent on a similar, extended course in Algeria at the end of 1968, along with new recruits from the occupied territories, and returned in early 1970.[71] A disproportionate number of officers who were to command Fateh units in the next decade had been on these two qualification courses, or from the southern sector in Jordan, where the harsh conditions daunted all but the most committed cadres.

Military expansion led the way for an extension of the guerrilla presence to the civilian population. Israeli fire forced a redeployment of most combat bases out of the Jordan Valley and into the hills to the east by summer 1968, and triggered a more active effort to establish general headquarters and a variety of administrative and media offices and supply centres in the main cities and refugee camps of the kingdom. Unfettered access to the camps allowed the construction of a mass base, in which the primary impetus for mobilization was provided by military activities and organization. By autumn, weapons were appearing frequently on the streets in the hands of guerrillas on leave, office guards, and senior cadres, as did Palestinian military vehicles, many of which lacked registration plates. The implicit challenge to law and order fuelled tensions with the authorities and fed resentment within the army, especially among the native Transjordanians who formed the monarchy's bedrock and held most key posts in the combat units.[72]

The government responded with an attempt to limit guerrilla presence in the cities. It asked the Palestinian leadership in mid-October to bar the entry of personnel to the kingdom without permits issued by the ministry of the interior, and insisted that guerrillas should not enter Jordanian cities unless issued with special military passes.[73] The government also demanded the closure of guerrilla offices in the cities and a ban on the movement of military vehicles in civilian areas. Opposition to the proposed measures was strong, however, and the government negotiators backed down. This did not ease the tension, and

matters finally came to a head during a Palestinian student demonstration in Amman, as unidentified gunmen fired on an army vehicle and royal guard soldiers shot back at the marchers. The authorities blamed the incident on a small guerrilla group, the Battalions of Victory–Nasr, and arrested its leader Tahir Dablan and other members.[74] Fateh made little effort to defend the group, accusing it of working secretly for Jordanian intelligence, although Dablan's covert links, if any, were to Syrian intelligence.[75] The army resumed fire on 5 November and attacked Fateh and PFLP facilities in the Husayn and Wihdat refugee camps in Amman and the Schneller camp in Zarqa. Calm was only restored after appeals to the king from Nasir and Hasan al-Naqib, commander of the Iraqi contingent in Jordan. By then 29 people had died and 100 were wounded.

Though brief, the incident revealed the shifting balance of power between the guerrillas and the Jordanian authorities. This was demonstrated in the negotiations that now took place. King Husayn and his uncle, army commander Nasir bin Jamil, demanded that the guerrillas should notify the army before conducting attacks on Israel or the West Bank, and that they should avoid operations in the vicinity of ʿAqaba, which was the kingdom's only sea outlet. The guerrilla groups were asked not to recruit young men due for military service, and to submit both members and persons in their custody (such as suspected Israeli agents) to Jordanian courts rather than guerrilla tribunals.[76] Fateh and the main guerrilla groups accepted some of these demands, but largely failed to observe any of them. They were still attracting large numbers of new recruits in the cities, and were inundated by requests for weapons.[77] Besides, Fateh had concluded from the recent episode that it needed 'to arm the masses', and took a formal decision to establish a civilian militia in the refugee camps and other areas.[78] The other guerrilla groups followed suit, the largest militia contingents belonging to Saʿiqa, the PFLP, and PLF/PLA. The heyday of the guerrillas had begun, and the Palestinian state-within-the-state was in the making in Jordan.

Observing the Limits with Syria

For Fateh, the alliance with Egypt also served to offset the influence of its other 'big brother', Syria. This became especially important from mid-1968 as new tensions threatened the relationship with Damascus. Alert to Fateh's growing popularity and keen to tie the Palestinian banner to its own mast, the ruling Baʿth Party decided in June to launch its own guerrilla group, the Vanguards of Popular Liberation War Organization. Its origins lay in a resolution taken at the party congress of September 1966 and reconfirmed at the extraordinary congress of September 1967, but the group had remained inactive despite participation in the short-lived Permanent Bureau formed by Fateh in January 1968. The decision to relaunch the Vanguards came in the context of the silent, but

intense struggle for power between party chairman Jadid and defence minister Asad. In February Asad strengthened his grip on the army by replacing chief-of-staff Swaydani, loosely aligned with Jadid, with his own ally, Mustafa Tlas. The creation of a party militia in Syria and of a Palestinian guerrilla group offered the Jadid faction a counterweight.[79]

During the spring, the Vanguards merged with another small group, the Palestine Popular Liberation Front (PPLF), to form the Vanguards of Popular Liberation War Organization–Thunderbolt Forces (commonly known as Saʿiqa). PPLF founder Tahir Dablan, a 'graduate of 1948' who had been purged from the Syrian army in 1959, opposed the merger and formed the PPLF–Saʿiqa, later renamed the Palestinian Battalions of Victory–Nasr. The secretary-general of the remaining Saʿiqa organization was Dafi Jmayʿani, head of the regional command of the Palestinian branch of the Baʿth Party and, by that token, also a member of the national command of the party. With him in the Saʿiqa leadership were Yusif al-Burji and Mahmud Maʿayta. All three were former Jordanian officers who had taken refuge in Syria after the abortive *coup* of April 1957, and who had opposed dissolution of the Baʿth Party in Syria during the union with Egypt in 1958–61.

Saʿiqa grew rapidly. The Baʿth Party decreed that all Palestinian members, now grouped within the Unified Palestinian Organization (UPO), were automatically members of Saʿiqa. It was therefore assured of a considerable following wherever there was a local UPO section, especially in Jordan and Lebanon. The regional command of the UPO moreover doubled as the Saʿiqa leadership, and additionally coordinated its activity through the mother party's 'guerrilla action bureau'.[80] All Saʿiqa members were required to undergo military training, and encouraged to serve in guerrilla bases.[81] Palestinian conscripts were on occasion allowed to serve in Saʿiqa instead of the PLA, and PLA officers were also seconded to it over the next year.[82] As a result, it boasted some 400 guerrillas by October 1968 and 1,000 a year later, deployed evenly between Syria and Jordan.[83] Saʿiqa fielded 120 millimetre mortars, 122 millimetre artillery rockets, and 106 millimetre anti-tank recoilless rifles, putting it on a par with Fateh in terms of firepower.[84]

The significance of Saʿiqa was not lost on Asad. However, he was not in a position to prevent its establishment or deny it facilities in the country, in part because Jadid still had influential followers in the armed forces, although he did issue instructions in mid-September 1968 banning use of guerrilla passes for passage across Syrian borders.[85] Asad was able, conversely, to respond when he perceived an internal challenge to his control over PLA units in Syria. The expulsion by Egypt of chief-of-staff Jabi and several ranking officers from the PLA headquarters in Cairo in early 1967 had resulted in a tacit agreement to establish the general staff in Damascus, where it operated as a parallel command with Syrian support. The PLO executive committee meanwhile abolished the post of PLA commander-in-chief at the end of January 1968, but Madani continued to perform his duties as head of the military department until

August. Jabi was in a position of considerable influence over PLA units in Syria, therefore, but less so over the 421 Battalion and the PLF/PLA in Jordan, both of which were rapidly expanding. He also faced an obstacle in his deputy, ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya, and brigade commander Samir al-Khatib and one of his battalion commanders, ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz al-Wajih. All three were 'graduates of 1948' who had been dismissed from the Syrian army during the purges of 1959; in 1964 Khatib and Wajih had formed a leftist faction with Maoist leanings, the Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP).

The POLP had at best a modest following, whether in the PLA or among civilians, but both Yahya and PLO chairman Hammuda were sympathizers. This enhanced its influence, which it revealed by promoting a plan to bring all guerrilla forces under PLA command within a single body, the Palestinian Liberation Forces, by 1 September 1968. The various groups would cease separate fund-raising, and accept the PLO charter as their common political programme.[86] The POLP also influenced the debate when in mid-July the fourth session of the PNC amended Article 22 of the basic statutes of the PLA, in order to provide for 'an independent command that operates under the supervision of the [PLO] executive committee, and that implements its instructions and decisions'.[87] Several delegates made it clear that this meant independence from Syrian control, and urged that pay be cut from officers whose allegiance was suspect until the PLA command had been reshuffled.[88] The challenge was unmistakable, and the Syrian command responded by dismissing Khatib and Wajih. On their advice, the executive committee retaliated by replacing Jabi with Yahya, citing the PNC resolution to make the PLA 'free in its will and leadership'. It also dismissed ʿUthman Haddad as Hittin Forces commander, replaced the Syrian-leaning Bahjat ʿAbd-al-Amin with Wajih as PLF/PLA commander, and appointed Khatib as head of the military department.

This was the first serious challenge to Arab control over the PLA since its establishment, and the Syrian response was forceful. On 1 August, the PLA command in Damascus issued a statement castigating the PLO executive committee for 'interfering in the area of the army's responsibility', while Haddad and his followers occupied the PLO office in Damascus and took Yahya hostage.[89] The situation quickly escalated. A PLA detachment crossed the border into Jordan with the aim of seizing the PLA command post at Jerash, but was repulsed by units loyal to the PLO.[90] The PLO executive committee threatened to sever pay from rebellious PLA officers in Syria, and followed up on 19 August by ending the service of Haddad, ʿAbd-al-Amin, and PLF/PLA sector commanders in Jordan, Jawad ʿAbd-al-Rahim and Muhammad al-Halabi, all 'graduates of 1948' (the latter two were also former communists).[91] The PLA was now split down the middle.

The PLO finally backed down on most points after a month-long stalemate. Yahya resigned as chief-of-staff in early September, followed by Jabi on 21 October. Haddad briefly held the post, only to be replaced by Misbah al-Budayri

on 14 December. Wajih was confirmed as commander of the PLF/PLA, with ʿAbd-al-Amin as his deputy, a reversal of previous roles. The main losers, ironically, were the younger officers from Gaza, who had solidly supported Wajih and the PLO executive committee. PLF/PLA chief operations officer Turk, 421 Battalion commander Shaqqura, training camp commander Abu-Shaʿban, and central sector commander Hajjaj were all compelled to return to Cairo in a clear reassertion of Syrian authority over the PLA. The Gazans considered that the older generation of 'graduates of 1948', whether pro-Syrian or pro-PLO, had discriminated against them.[92] Their bitterness was compounded by the belief that Fateh had left them to their fate, a justifiable suspicion explained by Fateh's private desire to weaken the POLP.

Fateh was moreover careful to maintain good working relations with Syria, which not only wielded considerable influence within the Palestinian movement but also controlled vital supply routes to Jordan. Its caution was reflected in the manner in which it went about establishing a combat presence on the Golan front. For the first year after June 1967, Fateh generally adhered to the understanding reached with the authorities not to conduct active military operations, restricting itself to reconnaissance and supply missions.[93] (Its guerrillas occasionally ignored the ban with the complicity of sympathetic Syrian officers, who also provided information about Israeli deployment and Syrian minefields and offered fire support.[94]) The first Fateh bases set up in the border region were designated as the '55 Sector' and commanded by a veteran infiltrator and former Syrian intelligence agent, Husayn al-Hayba, who knew the region well. The arrival of the 'military command cadres' who had just completed their qualification course in July led to the formation of the 'Golan Sector' in July, which had 12 combat bases in the southern part of the front by year's end.[95]

Predictably, Saʿiqa enjoyed considerably greater facilities. Its bases and training camps resembled army barracks, and its personnel were equipped with vehicles, communications equipment, and standard uniforms. Its guerrillas received regular pay, and were structured according to a conventional ranking system. Ironically, the intensification of the power struggle between Jadid and Asad provided an opportunity for Fateh and other guerrilla groups to expand their presence in the border region after March 1969. Fateh expanded its Golan sector to a strength of 500, with bases along the entire front, and fielded small numbers of 82 millimetre mortars, RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers, and 122 millimetre rocket launchers.[96] Jibril's followers also had several bases, and were followed by the leftist faction that split off from the PFLP in February. Fateh was also permitted to establish a new training camp near the coastal town of Tartus, where its small naval and frogmen's units were based.[97] Asad responded to a sharp rise in guerrilla attacks on the Golan front by prohibiting combat activity and banning the movement of armed or uniformed guerrillas and military vehicles in civilian areas without prior permission from the Syrian army. The use of travel passes issued by the guerrilla groups had been curtailed since September 1968, but now a Department 235, later known as the National

Bureau of Guerrilla Control (*al-Maktab al-Qawmi li-Dabita al-Fidaʾiyya*), was set up within Syrian military intelligence to issue passes and to check the names and security records of guerrillas.[98]

Guerrillas in the Fragile Republic

The consolidation of the guerrilla base in Syria in the second half of 1968 supported a further expansion, this time into south Lebanon. This built on political pressures and shifts in the country since June 1967, when thousands of Lebanese and Palestinians demonstrated in protest against the resignation of Nasir and attacked US businesses in Beirut. Hundreds of volunteers flocked over the next six weeks to an informal training camp set up by PLA officer Shaʿir in the mountain village of Kayfun or to the Fateh camp at Hama in Syria. Faced with the strength of popular sentiment, the Lebanese army even offered training to dozens of Palestinian refugees in its own barracks, and the *deuxième bureau* eased its grip slightly in the camps.[99]

The guerrilla groups were relatively slow to take advantage, however. The ANM probably had the largest following among Palestinians in Lebanon, while the PLF–PR came second, but overall numbers were modest; Fateh had a mere 80 members, and even former mufti Husayni retained a network of veteran infiltrators in the camps.[100] The ANM benefited from the presence of its central leadership in Beirut, but suffered when Haddad moved to Amman in early 1968 and Habash was imprisoned in Damascus in March. The abdication of Hut in the summer left the local PLF–PR branch leaderless, and most members now joined Fateh, the PFLP, or the PLF/PLA. Fateh benefited from its soaring reputation since Karama and its possession of a radio station, and from the death in combat of a young Lebanese guerrilla, Khalil al-Jamal, whose funeral turned into a large demonstration of support. Prime minister ʿAbdullah al-Yafi was among the mourners, and later received a Fateh delegation and posthumously awarded Jamal a national medal. His predecessor Rashid Karami was also one of several leading Lebanese politicians who made donations to Fateh or solicited funds on its behalf, in cooperation with the opposition parties.[101]

Lebanese support for the guerrillas partly reflected the political alignments of different confessional communities in the country, but as important was the growth of the various leftist or Muslim-based opposition parties. This resulted from the declining position of Beirut as a regional financial market and the weakening of the local services and industrial sectors, driving rural migration to the cities and polarizing society along both class and sectarian lines, all trends that accelerated in the wake of the 1967 war. The introduction of an assertive new factor could only accentuate existing fractures, which was indeed how the Palestinian guerrilla movement achieved a foothold.[102] The ANM already had the backing of its Lebanese branch, of course, but Fateh now devoted much of its energy to weaving a network of contacts with members of all sects and

parties to secure political cover, and sponsored the formation of the Lebanese Movement in Support of Fateh (*al-Haraka al-Lubnaniyya al-Musanida li-Fath*).

For a variety of reasons, including its broad, nationalist appeal and the pragmatism with which it approached Arab hosts, Fateh soon gained the most ground. Samir Abu-Ghazala, a former resident in Lebanon, returned from a teaching post in Saudi Arabia at the end of 1967 to rebuild the civilian organization, still nominally headed by Emil Khuri. Lamʿi al-Qumbarji, another former resident and Egyptian university graduate, also returned to help. Other Fateh cadres arrived from Jordan to assist, disguising their purpose by registering as students at the Beirut Arab University, although three were deported by the authorities in mid-January 1968. The new regional command (*iqlim*) was nonetheless expanded with the inclusion of student representatives from the main universities, former Baʿthist leader Tawfiq al-Safadi, leftist cadres Naji ʿAllush and Ribhi ʿAwad from Jordan, and, unprecedentedly, two women.[103] Fateh concentrated on recruiting students, and resorted to the General Union of Palestinian Workers and to charitable associations, often run by middle-class Palestinian women, to gain access to the refugee camps, which were closely watched by the ubiquitous *deuxième bureau.*[104]

Israeli security measures made infiltration over the Jordan River increasingly difficult after mid-1968, prompting Fateh to consider encircling the Galilee from south Lebanon.[105] In October its 55 Sector crossed the border with Syria and redeployed in the mountainous ʿArqub region to the west of the Mount Hermon massif. At the same time a group of young cadres enrolled as Beirut Arab University students or posing as businessmen and company employees arrived from Jordan to set up a support network in Beirut and southern cities.[106] The rise of guerrilla strength to some 180 allowed a second guerrilla contingent, the 56 Sector (also known as the 502 Sector), to be formed in early 1969. Reinforcements arrived in April and May after clashes with the Lebanese army, and rocket gunners from Jordan followed in June.[107]

Assisting the implantation of the guerrillas was the support they received from Lebanese villagers, many of whom had offered shelter and information to Palestinian infiltrators before 1967.[108] Semi-feudal conditions, especially among the poorer Shiʿite Muslim villagers, and widespread resentment of the heavy-handed *deuxième bureau* led them to regard the guerrillas as natural allies.[109] The ideologically-based opposition parties, primarily the Baʿthists and communists but also newcomers such as the Socialist Lebanon Movement, were gaining ground and offered transport, information, and supplies.[110] As a result, Fateh was able to establish an informal headquarters and a clinic in Hibbariyya and safe houses in several other villages in the ʿArqub, and then extended its civilian support network as far west as the Bint Jbayl district.[111] This did not go unnoticed by the authorities, especially after Fateh started cross-border raids against Israel. The army increased its checkpoints and arrested guerrilla supporters, but street protests erupted in the large border town of al-Khiyam when the local Fateh office was closed down in March 1969.[112] The *deuxième bureau* redoubled

its intelligence effort, and reportedly distributed 700 guns to its informers and to anti-guerrilla villagers.[113]

Official policy was increasingly out of step with substantial numbers of Lebanese citizens. The government had been in crisis since December 1968, when Israeli commandos mounted a devastating raid on Beirut international airport in reprisal for a terrorist attack on an Israeli airliner in Athens. The destruction of 13 Lebanese passenger aircraft and the failure of the army to repel the attack prompted the resignation of prime minister Yafi and his replacement by Karami. By April 1969, the opposition felt strong enough to challenge the government, and called for major demonstrations in support of the guerrillas. Thousands defied the government ban to turn out on 23 April; in Beirut 11 were killed and 82 wounded by army and public security forces fire, according to official figures, while another 200 were arrested around the country. Embarrassed by this demonstration of his lack of control over national security policy, Karami tendered his resignation (and headed a caretaker cabinet).

The events of 23 April marked a watershed, polarizing domestic politics sharply and involving other Arab states in the relationship between the Lebanese government and the guerrillas. Guerrilla numbers rose quickly with the arrival of Fateh reinforcements and a sizeable Saʿiqa contingent, and the authorities announced the arrest of 200 Saʿiqa supporters and 65 from Fateh and the seizure of weapons in several parts of the country.[114] This led to a week of clashes in May that left two Lebanese soldiers and seven guerrillas dead, which in turn triggered the diplomatic intervention of Nasir. The Egyptian president was keen to develop military pressure against Israel on all fronts, and wished to preserve a measure of freedom for guerrilla activity in south Lebanon. At his urging Lebanese president Charles al-Hilu received Arafat, while a Palestinian military delegation visited army headquarters and negotiated a draft protocol regulating guerrilla deployment and movement. Private objections from elements within the army command and the Maronite political establishment prevented ratification, however. Army commander Emil al-Bustani, who had approved the agreement with Arafat, subsequently notified him that it had been cancelled on the instructions of a 'superior official', presumably the president.[115]

Fateh responded by reinforcing its contingent in the ʿArqub. Saʿiqa had some 200 guerrillas in the area, while the PFLP later established a presence with 30–40, followed by the PLF/PLA, PF–GC, and PDFLP with roughly equal numbers.[116] The increase brought total strength to 500–600, and led to a surge in attacks on Israel after June, from a monthly average below ten to 22 in July and 32 in August. Increased guerrilla activity coincided with the conclusion of a formal agreement between Egypt and Syria to activate the eastern front, and prompted a more active Israeli response after several months of restraint. In early September an Israeli spokesman warned: 'either Lebanon has the means to enforce respect of the ceasefire along the border, in which case it should do so, or else it is unable to impose such respect, and thus should not protest if

Israel uses her right to legitimate self-defence against those attacking her from Lebanese territory'. He added: 'the deterioration is caused by Fateh. Lebanon must work to keep the men of Fateh in their place.'[117]

The Israeli message was not lost on the Lebanese authorities. On 28 August, gendarmes tried to demolish a guerrilla office in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in north Lebanon, triggering clashes in which angry refugees burnt the local police station and took control of the camp. The army imposed a siege, but on 10 September the inhabitants of the Rashidiyya camp in the south also expelled government agents after receiving weapons smuggled in by followers of opposition leader Kamal Junblat. The army now extended its siege to guerrilla bases in the border region. A statement by US under-secretary of state Joseph Sisco on 12 October reaffirming support for the government, and a rocket attack by Mossad agents on the PLO office in Beirut three days later, only heightened the tension. By then Fateh had transferred 150 guerrillas from the ʿArqub to the Bint Jbayl district, with the aim of extending its deployment to al-Naqura on the Mediterranean coast.[118] Army units surrounded the guerrillas on 15 October and took them prisoner after a six-day siege in which 16 of them died.[119]

The army action provoked a strong backlash, as government personnel were expelled from most of the 17 refugee camps in Lebanon on 22 October and the next few days, largely without bloodshed, in what the inhabitants called their intifada.[120] An opposition call for a general strike in support of the guerrillas was heeded in most parts of the country (except the Maronite heartland) on 24 October. The army clashed with demonstrators in several cities and imposed a curfew on Beirut, but crowds of youths stormed police stations in Muslim quarters of the capital and seized arms. Two unknown militias—the Popular Nasirite Organization and the 24th of October Movement—declared themselves after wresting control of the old quarters of Sidon and Tripoli in clashes with the army and internal security forces that left 14 civilians dead and dozens wounded. Fateh and Saʿiqa guerrillas had already attacked Lebanese border posts on 23 October, taking 14 prisoners, and seized the main roads and villages leading out of the ʿArqub towards Hasbayya and Rashayya al-Wadi. Army barracks in both towns came under attack, and guerrilla reinforcements from Syria secured a vital supply route at Dayr al-ʿAshayir and Yanta on 26 October, despite losing 24 dead by 31 October.

The Syrian decision to close the border at the onset of hostilities dealt a serious blow to the Lebanese economy. Libya, Algeria, and Sudan publicly declared their support for the guerrillas in the meantime, and on 22 October Nasir stated that the standing of any Arab state depended on its policy towards the guerrilla movement.[121] The US stressed that it would offer the authorities only diplomatic support, while the USSR warned against outside intervention in support of the Lebanese government.[122] Even Israel, that had demanded measures to bring the guerrillas under control, now declared that its cabinet had not even discussed the Lebanese crisis and would not interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbour.[123] Faced with complete isolation, Lebanese

president Hilu appealed to Nasir to mediate, and on 28 October dispatched army commander Bustani to Cairo to negotiate a ceasefire. Arafat held back in order to obtain better terms and raised the pressure by ostentatiously visiting guerrilla units in east Lebanon and ordering new feints against army barracks on 30–31 October. He then flew to Cairo, and on 3 November the two men put their signatures to a secret treaty in the presence of the foreign and defence ministers of Egypt.

The Cairo agreement was to provide the formal basis for Palestinian–Lebanese relations for at least fifteen years, although it was to be observed more in the breach than the rule. Several of its 19 articles guaranteed the rights of residence, employment, and movement of Palestinian refugees in the country, although this proved to be a suspension, rather than a rewriting, of existing Lebanese regulations and legislation enacted since 1948. The PLO now won the right to manage the camps, working through popular committees and the PASC.[124] The government also accepted the right of the guerrillas to attack Israel through specific corridors in the ʿArqub, and pledged that the army would coordinate with the PLO, by way of the PASC and designated liaison officers, on military matters including deployment, communications, medical evacuation, and supply. In return the PLO would maintain internal discipline, provide a census of its military personnel, and submit to the jurisdiction of Lebanese civil and military authorities. Syria, which lifted its land blockade on 13 November as a 'test of [Lebanese] seriousness and sincerity', warned that it would take irrevocable steps against the authorities 'if there is any delay or reneging in implementation'.[125] It was with good reason that Hilu argued to Maronite opponents of the accord that he had little choice in the matter, counselling that he could only 'win time in the hope that circumstances will change'.[126]

A 'higher political committee for Palestinians' headed by Fateh central committee member Najjar was now set up to regulate daily relations with the government. Within days the various guerrilla groups had opened offices and started militia training in most refugee camps, followed by the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), which set up a string of clinics. In the euphoric atmosphere of the 'liberation' of the camps, Fateh again attracted the largest number of recruits (claiming an armed following of 5,000 rifles), while the PFLP benefited instantly from the long-standing presence of the ANM and Saʿiqa built on the existing Baʿth Party sections.[127] The PLF/PLA had already inherited the former members of the PLF–PR in 1968, while a PLA officer from Egypt, Nimr Hajjaj, was able to set up bases in the south with the help of former followers of Husayni in the camps who had earned their commissions in the Iraqi-based Palestinian Liberation Regiment in 1960–3, among them Abu Taʿan, Raja Fayyad, and Ahmad al-Hanafi.[128] The PDFLP had few supporters in the refugee camps, in contrast, and relied heavily on its allies in the Organization of Lebanese Socialists to provide contacts.[129] Many Lebanese also joined the guerrilla groups, not least the Shiʿite Muslim rural migrants and southern refugees and the 'stateless persons' (nomads and Kurds) in the densely populated pov-

erty belt around Beirut. The opposition also expanded in parallel, thanks to the lifting of the government ban on its activities by Junblat, who now became minister of interior in the new cabinet. The secular parties, chiefly the communists and Syrian national socialists, provided the guerrilla groups with valuable support in mainly Christian areas.

The guerrillas quickly took advantage of their new status to extend their presence and activity beyond the terms of the Cairo agreement. A special Fateh military police unit that was formed to assist the Lebanese army in supervising the entry of guerrillas and supplies from Syria in fact assisted a covert flow in excess of agreed limits.[130] Fateh and the PLF/PLA also violated the accord by setting up at least half a dozen combat bases in the Bint Jbayl district in early 1970, evading army controls with the help of sympathetic Lebanese officers and soldiers.[131] The army command was unable to enforce its writ; commander Bustani moreover had presidential ambitions and looked to the PLO for support.[132] When in mid-March an army patrol fired at the Fateh district commander, Riyad ʿAwwad, the guerrillas rode the wave of public protest to set up a headquarters openly in Jwayya, as well as offices, depots, and bases in villages as far westwards as ʿAlma al-Shaʿb in the Qana district. The army recognized the new faits accomplis in April, and the PF–GC, PFLP, and Saʿiqa now established an additional presence.

An Israeli search-and-destroy mission in the ʿArqub in May failed to have a lasting impact. Fateh brought in reinforcements from the Golan sector and in June combined its local 55 Sector and 56 Sector into a new, battalion-sized formation, the Eagles of ʿArqub Sector (*Qitaʿ Nusur al-ʿArqub*) with a strength of 500 and a complement of heavy mortars, recoilless rifles, artillery rockets, and heavy machine-guns for air defence.[133] The contingent in the Bint Jbayl and Qana districts was now formed into a separate operational command known as the Central Sector (*al-Qitaʿ al-Awsat*), with a strength of 270–320 lightly armed guerrillas. Both sectors were commanded by officers who had gained their experience in southern Jordan or the Golan, the illiterate but able Naʿim and Jawad Abul-al-Shaʿr, a graduate of Algiers University and of Fateh's 'military command cadre qualification course'. Fateh also led the way into the coastal Tyre district, again in violation of the Cairo agreement. Its intelligence apparatus had already set up a secret reconnaissance and supply group in the Rashidiyya refugee camp in 1969, with the mission of gathering information and smuggling arms and explosives to clandestine supporters in northern Israel, while the Fateh naval unit also set up base in the area.[134] The two units together had a strength of some 120–150, while the other guerrilla groups had a combined total of up to 200, taking Palestinian combat strength in south Lebanon to some 1,600.[135]

Elsewhere in the country, the lifting of government restrictions in the refugee camps, followed quickly by the rapid expansion of the guerrilla groups and their free distribution of weapons to followers, led to displays of arrogance and indiscipline. Much as had happened in Jordan, the refugees who flocked in large

numbers to the guerrilla movement responded to years of humiliation and subjugation by accosting Lebanese officials—policemen, postmen, or revenue collectors for public utilities companies—or by soliciting donations in Lebanese neighbourhoods. Military training was conducted on the outskirts of camps, often uncomfortably close to residential areas, main roads, or vital installations such as the international airport, and weddings or funerals were frequently accompanied by unruly shooting in the air. The other groups also challenged Fateh's authority by acting unilaterally against the authorities on some occasions, for instance by blocking roads or taking hostages to secure the release of comrades arrested on various charges.

Palestinian indiscipline was grist to the mill of the mainly Maronite parties, which had immediately obtained the text of the Cairo Agreement and vociferously protested the challenge it posed to Lebanese sovereignty and security. Most of their deputies nonetheless voted in favour when the accord came to parliament for ratification on 4 December. As Phalangist Party leader Pierre Jmayyil later explained, the Lebanese state 'was faced with two evils, a destructive civil war or this accord, which it was [thus] compelled to accept'.[136] Tensions persisted, prompting interior minister Junblat to request the guerrillas to cease cross-border fire in January 1970. Yet he also accused 'certain state officials' of actively fomenting trouble with the guerrillas, and revealed that government agents (implicitly the *deuxième bureau*) had distributed weapons to anti-Palestinian elements in the south in February. Phalangist gunmen heightened the tension by ambushing a Palestinian funeral cortège and killing 10 Fateh guerrillas in mid-March, as did the Israeli ground attack in the ʿArqub in May. Junblat sought to defuse the situation by declaring that the guerrillas were now abiding by the Cairo agreement in the south, and had attained an implementation level of 85 per cent in the refugee camps.[137] As in Jordan, the Lebanese government had reached a *modus vivendi* with its guests, but it remained precarious, subject both to the escalating military conflict with Israel and to the dynamics of internal Palestinian politics.

8

Guerrilla War in Theory and Practice

The dramatic rise of the guerrilla movement after the battle of Karama created a new myth. 'To declare Palestinian identity no longer means that one is a "refugee" or second-class citizen. Rather, it is a declaration that arouses pride, because the Palestinian has become the *fida'i* or revolutionary who bears arms.'[1] Armed struggle was the source of political legitimacy and national identity, the new substance of the 'imagined community' of the Palestinians. Guerrilla literature developed this theme by referring to past examples of Palestinian rebellion and emphasizing the continuity of conflict and the tradition of resistance, while political posters and media artwork drew heavily on peasant imagery (real or presumed), symbolizing the Palestinians as a tree with roots embedded deep in the soil or as a defiant and proud horse. These images were repeated by Palestinian artists, who now formed a union and contributed actively to the burgeoning print media of the guerrilla groups, and by instructors in the youth training, supplementary schooling, and kindergarten programmes they also ran. Exhibitions and published compilations of children's drawings depicting refugee camps, heroic guerrillas, and Israeli aggressors were produced; academics collected peasant proverbs and songs and other items of popular culture, while enterprising women of upper-middle-class families revived interest in traditional peasant embroidery. Perhaps the most graphic symbol of the guerrillas, and of the new Palestinians they were meant to represent, was the black-and-white chequered *kufiyya*; adoption of this headdress was yet another throwback to both the 1936 revolt and peasant dress.[2] As a PLO promotional pamphlet later explained, the combination of the 1967 war and the conscious action of the 'various popular, political and military organizations' had 'led to a reawakening of the people's sense of national identity . . . And so . . . the process of a Palestinian cultural renaissance began'.[3]

Fateh radio in particular played a crucial part in disseminating the discourse of armed struggle and particular notions of nationalism and revolution to a much wider audience still. It was the vehicle for Fateh songs that popularized the same images: 'I am born, live, and die a *fida'i*, until I return, land of ancestors, immortal people', and 'the Palestinian people is a revolution, take my blood O revolution and give me victories'. The stress in these battle hymns on blood and death—'Kalashnikoff makes a waterfall of blood . . . O Dayan, drinking blood is the custom of our men' or 'I carry my machine-gun that the generations after us may carry a scythe . . . I have made my wounds and the

blood a river that courses through the plain and valleys'—was part and parcel of a wider ethos of martyrdom (*shahada*). This led to a Palestinian innovation, posters bearing the photographs of the latest martyrs that appeared in the streets and in guerrilla offices, and that served to advertise the military presence and nationalist zeal of each group. Indeed the rapid proliferation of offices was itself an innovation, although perhaps indicative not so much of a nationalist political culture as of the underlying statist ambition of the guerrilla groups.

For Fateh, 'revolution' was imbued with a specific meaning, and excluded others. Revolution meant rejection of the material and psychological circumstances in which Palestinians found themselves after 1948, that Fateh described as the 'corrupt reality' (*al-waqiʿ al-fasid*). The manner of usage of the word *thawra* was virtually identical to that of the urban nationalists and peasant mujahidin during the 1936–9 revolt; its essence was rebellion, and it implied a spontaneity akin to that of the traditional *fazʿa* (alarm, call to arms) of Palestinian villagers. Other guerrilla groups strove to assert the social dimension contained in the notion of 'revolution', and waged much of their discursive contest with Fateh on that point. This was reflected in the different choices of contemporary liberation struggles to hold up as models, and in the divergent emphasis and interpretation that each group placed on the central lessons to be drawn from the experience of other peoples. There was similar variation in the definitions offered of principal allies and enemies, of the processes through which mass mobilization might come about, and of the relationship between military and political means. Ultimately experience was to show that the armed struggle provided the 'currency' in which political competition among the Palestinians was conducted. It also showed that, whatever discursive claims were made to the contrary, Palestinian concepts of guerrilla war and people's war had little grounding in social and economic realities.

'No War but People's War'

The concept of armed struggle was itself developed with an urgency that had been lacking before June 1967. Some activists, among whom Wazir figured prominently, had long rejected reliance on the Arab states and armies. They instead favoured a 'popular liberation war' to be waged with the support of the Arab masses. This notion was poorly defined and its dynamics remained unclear, however. In the case of Fateh, it owed more to the simple anti-colonial nationalism of the Algerian experience than to the socially informed formulations of 'people's war' developed in China and Vietnam. The concepts of popular liberation war and people's war were therefore quite distinct. The former attached minor importance to the questions of *who* would wage the war of liberation or of *how* it would be waged. The latter, conversely, set the struggle firmly within a deeper process of social and economic change involving particular classes and political alliances, that were then reflected in specific

forms of organization and military strategy. After 1967 the Palestinian groups tended to use one term or the other according to their ideological preference, but with little substantive differentiation even then. For example, Fateh asserted that '*fida'i* action is evolving, inescapably, into a total people's liberation war', and the PFLP concurred that 'developing *fida'i* action into people's war is a principal issue that forms the core of our strategy'.[4]

The adoption of the people's war concept after June 1967 was accompanied by the admission that Israel enjoyed clear superiority in several key areas. The PFLP attributed Israeli victory to the rapid and extensive mobilization of resources, high level of training and command, planning, and general superiority in managing the modern instruments of war.[5] Behind these advantages more generally also lay scientific and technological superiority. Looking at the Arab side, Fateh considered that it, too, enjoyed certain advantages, namely 'the number of the Arab people and the expansive space in which they live, which tips the balance of victory in our favour'.[6] More broadly, the Arabs had the advantages of population density, physical expanse, and economic power which should be pitted against Israeli weaknesses of a relatively small population and a society and political entity lacking in cohesion.[7] It was logical to argue, as the PFLP did, that the party enjoying technological superiority would attain victory if it waged lightning war, while the side with greater numbers would be victorious by waging a 'protracted' war.[8] Israel 'was geared to achieve quick military victories out of economic necessity', and so the Arabs should rely on their advantages of human and geographic depth to neutralize its superiority and drain its resources in a lengthy conflict.[9] Fateh agreed, and concluded accordingly that guerrilla war was the strategy to adopt since it allowed evasion of the enemy's blows and pre-empted his blitzkrieg doctrine.[10]

The Palestinian groups again borrowed from the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences to define the actual stages and means through which the popular liberation war would progress. The PFLP argued in classic terms that the armed conflict would pass through three historical phases: strategic defence against Israel, then a situation of overall parity, followed finally by the Arab strategic offensive.[11] This broad sweep required an initial period of guerrilla warfare during which the liberation movement would avoid decisive confrontations, to be followed by a period of more conventional war in which regular armies would wage grinding battles with the enemy until a decision was achieved.[12] Fateh had evolved a similar sequence just before the June 1967 war. In the first stage the Arab strategy should prevent the 'growth of Israeli presence in the occupied homeland', then destroy it, and finally 'liquidate and cleanse the occupied homeland from its traces'.[13] The same sequence was retained after the war, but clothed in the familiar terminology of people's war. The forces that would implement this strategy were the militia or 'local defence forces', as Fateh also called them, the guerrillas or partisans (*ansar*), and the regular units or 'main forces'.[14] Following a similar definition, the PFLP envisioned that the militia and guerrillas would engage in 'strategic attrition', alternating with

'grinding battles' in which revolutionary armies equipped with modern weapons would provide major support.[15]

These concepts presented substantial problems. Most obvious was that the proposed battlefield—the territory of mandate Palestine—was unsuited to classic guerrilla warfare. PDFLP secretary-general Nayif Hawatma made this point forcefully when he criticized Palestinian attempts to draw a parallel with the Algerian war of liberation. Arguing that 'the comparison has no scientific basis', he pointed out that the land area and population of Algeria were many times greater than those of Palestine. The ratio of Algerians to French colonial settlers had been high, whereas the ratio of Palestinians to Israelis was low. Hawatma also noted that the Israeli claim to the holy land was more widely accepted internationally than the claim of the French *colons* to Algeria. He did not mention the Western sense of responsibility towards the Jews following the Holocaust, but noted that the socialist countries in particular were divided over the issue of Palestinian rights, in marked contrast to their support for the Algerian right to independence.[16] Fateh readily admitted that the area of Palestine was small, its terrain poor for concealment and sustenance, and the Palestinians relatively few in number—disadvantages that compelled the guerrillas to launch their attacks from outside their occupied homeland.[17] However, it insisted that 'man, organization, and weapons build victory . . . not forests, mountains, and swamps'.[18] Fateh moreover argued that geographic and strategic disadvantages could be overcome because guerrillas operating from Arab sanctuaries had only short distances to travel to their targets.

A related problem was that the Palestinians could not hope to overcome Israeli superiority unless the Arabs were fully committed to the conflict—politically, economically, and militarily. Indeed, part of Hawatma's criticism was that in focusing on a specifically Palestinian guerrilla war, those he dubbed the 'demagogic right-wing' tended to overlook, or even dismiss, the need to reinforce bonds with the wider Arab liberation movement. Fateh was the obvious target of such criticism, but it responded by arguing that the Arab states would inevitably be drawn in because Israel was an expansionist state by its very nature and would eventually 'swallow' other countries. It had merely 'started with the Palestinian homeland, and [had only] postponed swallowing the Syrian, Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Hijazi [Saudi] homelands'.[19]

Fateh also developed a more elaborate rationale that regarded Israel as an advanced imperialist base. As such it prevented the countries of the eastern Mediterranean from uniting, provided a base for Western military intervention in Africa and Asia, compelled the Arab states to divert resources from economic development into defence, and infused the Arabs with a defensive mentality.[20] This was why the priority should be to destroy Israel, and why the slogan previously raised by Arab nationalists of 'unity is the path to Palestine' needed to be reversed into 'Palestine is the road to unity'. Furthermore, as 'the battle of liberation reaches a stage in which enormous Arab forces clash with the Zionist

occupation forces, the entry of other parties [into the conflict] becomes possible. This necessarily imposes widening the battlefield further than the armistice lines, and also compels the revolutionary Arab forces to draw together, smash the recalcitrant reactionary forces, eradicate division and unite Arab ranks and leaderships as a basic condition for victory in the battle'.[21] Fateh's belief in Arab unity was functional: it would happen because it was needed in order to wage a successful war of liberation. Not that Fateh held strong views on Arab unity; Hani al-Hasan admitted candidly that it 'raised the banner of particularistic territorial [*qutri*] struggle', which it saw as a basic means not to unity but, more vaguely, to 'solving the problems of the Arab nation'.[22]

Evidently Fateh was not overly troubled about the precise political processes and mechanisms through which Arab participation in the conflict with Israel would be secured. Its literature now referred frequently to the 'mass character' of the struggle, but there was little social content otherwise. After all, as Hani al-Hasan was to observe a few years later, with no apparent sense of irony and not a little pride, 'practice is the first nature of Fateh, analysis its second'.[23] Fateh espoused a simplistic, populist version of popular liberation war in which the vanguard would mobilize the masses through its military action and so provide the human and material resources with which the Arabs as a whole, led by their states and regular armies, could confront Israel in a protracted conflict.[24] Leaders such as Qaddumi, ʿUdwan, and Hani al-Hasan authored some of the more articulate Fateh theses, but little thought was given generally to the social, economic, and political implications of embarking on such a grand venture. If Fateh was 'the class of the refugees', as Qaddumi stated, then it followed, as Arafat argued, that 'there is no difference between the worker, peasant, and rich man [*zawat*]'.[25] An official Fateh text concluded that there was no scope for a social programme, since the Palestinians lacked a unified territorial, social, and political base, and because they were obliged to establish their secure sanctuary in exile rather than on their own soil.[26]

Curiously, activists who had been drawn to Fateh from leftist ideological parties did not deviate from some of the basic assumptions of this outlook. Former Baʿthist Naji ʿAllush, for one, was satisfied that Fateh's armed struggle and political strategy would allow the transformation of the Palestinian movement into a comprehensive Arab revolution, without finding it necessary to seek the specific dynamics by which this might come about.[27] Former communist Munir Shafiq offered similarly little guidance on the way in which social processes and structural factors might affect mass mobilization, arguing that the participation of 'tens of thousands of the revolutionary masses' and the loss of 'tens of thousands of martyrs, wounded, and political prisoners' made the Palestinian guerrilla movement a revolution.[28] Besides, the Palestinians were in a phase of national liberation not class struggle, stated Khalaf, while Shafiq argued to the same purpose in explaining that their primary contradiction lay with Israel, to which conflict other contradictions were secondary.[29]

The PFLP attempted a more satisfying answer. It believed that the task of liberation required resources greater than those available to the Palestinians alone.[30] The PFLP desired the mobilization of 'all resources of the [Arab] countries—material, human, and moral—by arming the people and by training and organizing them'. It urged 'subordinat[ion of] the economy to the imperatives of the people's war . . . in order to create a second Vietnam in our countries'.[31] Pursuing the Vietnamese motif, it called for the creation of an 'Arab Hanoi', a secure base which could serve as both a springboard for the liberation war and a source of economic support.[32] The rhetoric was much the same when the PDFLP proposed mobilization of 'tens of millions' and 'building a unified [Arab] economy, liberated from the domination of imperialism and able to follow the requirements of protracted war'. This too, was part of turning 'the Arab region into a second Vietnam', in which the Arab states would play the role of '[North] Vietnam with respect to the south'.[33]

The PFLP realized that its ambition was a long-term prospect. It initially called only for greater cooperation between the Arab armies, and demanded that they undertake 'limited offensive action' in response to Israeli reprisal raids.[34] The Palestinian guerrillas would spearhead the regular Arab armies, much as the NLF had done for the North Vietnamese army in South Vietnam.[35] The PFLP shifted tack slightly in 1969 as the Palestinian movement gained in self-confidence. It continued to stress the importance of rebuilding the regular Arab armies, but emphasized their 'deterrent' role, which involved repelling 'Israeli aggression against Arab territory'.[36] It was now up to Palestinian guerrilla warfare to 'accomplish its tasks . . . of exhausting the enemy forces and shaking his bases'. The Arab main forces would then join the liberation war and strike their decisive blow, once the combination of guerrilla warfare and psychological war had led to the disarticulation (*tafakkuk*) of Israeli social and political will.[37] The policy before 1967 of advocating a link between Palestinian guerrilla action and the Arab armies was seen as wrong because it did not 'derive from the masses'. Cooperation could now only be tactical, not strategic, unless there was agreement on the type of war to be waged.[38]

Despite the grand design, what the Palestinian groups proposed in reality was little more than an expanded version of *al-ʿamal al-fidaʾi*, selective guerrilla action rather than guerrilla war. This came naturally for Fateh, which envisaged clandestine cells in the occupied territories operating in coordination with 'armed deep-penetration units', in other words a revival of the 1967 attempt to establish 'fugitive patrols'. These would be assisted by 'small and secure bases . . . where they are in the midst of the masses who support the revolution'. The West Bank was the battlefield, while the east bank of Jordan provided the secure base.[39] Just how such activity would escalate to reach the level of creating liberated zones or moving into the second stage of people's war, remained a missing link. This was especially the case since Fateh still insisted that the Arab armies, having used this time to rebuild their strength and absorb Israeli retaliation, could not replace 'the struggle of the Palestinian people and

its combat on its soil . . . the revolution is not [merely] a tactical card in the hands of the armies and regimes'.[40]

Ambivalence towards the Arab role also revealed that Fateh, unlike the leftist guerrilla groups, perceived secure bases as being specifically Palestinian in terms of territory and population. Hani al-Hasan, who drew on his study course in China to articulate Fateh thinking on people's war, explained that the 'crisis of the secure base' stemmed from the fact that it had had no option but to be born in exile.[41] Its purpose remained to defeat enemy 'encircle and destroy' campaigns (which enemy, in this case, was unclear), but this broad brush lacked any practical detail. Hasan's additional, assured prediction that the secure base would moreover turn 'into a small model revolutionary society' in which the guerrillas exercised 'full revolutionary authority', was so devoid of social explanation or reference to economic requirements and strategic realities that it was trite.[42]

For their part the PFLP and PDFLP emphasized the importance of building 'secure base areas' according to classic theories of people's war, which meant engendering radical transformation in the surrounding Arab countries. The terminology was grandiose—'mass armed struggle' and 'revolutionary war'—but again the proposal more modestly involved a low-level military campaign almost exclusively inside the occupied territories. The PFLP proposed that clandestine operatives would wage a 'secret war' backed by guerrillas based in adjacent Arab countries. It insisted, however, that there would be no permanent bases outside the occupied territories, and that the guerrillas would not always operate from Arab sanctuaries.[43] The PDFLP concurred, arguing for a revolutionary war in the occupied territories involving the Palestinian masses and 'mobile revolutionary focal points'.[44] The reference to *foci* was ironic, since PDFLP secretary-general Hawatma simultaneously published a critique of the *foco* concept and Fateh's *al-ʿamal al-fidaʾi*, which he considered elitist.[45]

All these formulations raised more questions than they answered. Just how small-scale attacks were to exhaust Israel or allow the build-up of Palestinian forces strong enough to mount large-scale offensives remained unclear. Could the occupied territories actually sustain such a strategy, or would the guerrilla movement have to develop sanctuaries in neighbouring Arab states after all, with the political and military complications that would entail? What was the likely role of the Arab masses and armies, and under what circumstances could they realistically be expected to enter the fray? Possibly the most revealing aspect of Palestinian discourse was the absence of clear thinking on the form and requirements of establishing guerrilla authority. This may have reflected a reluctance to appear to usurp the sovereignty of Arab host governments, since the armed struggle was largely being waged from their territory, but it had far-reaching consequences for Palestinian political institutionalization. The lack of consideration given to the material, administrative, and technical requirements of parallel government, income generation, and enhancing the conditions of

different social strata (above all the much-cited peasants and workers) was particularly significant.

These conceptual discrepancies and discontinuities might have been expected of Fateh, with its Palestinian nationalist emphasis and eclectic epistemological roots, but they were equally evident in the case of the groups espousing both leftist and pan-Arab ideologies. If anything, Fateh was more conscious than its rivals of the opportunities (if not always the institutional, extractive, and programmatic requirements) of 'guerrilla government'. The fact that other guerrilla groups failed to address these issues suggests that ultimately they shared the same petit bourgeois and incipient statist ambition as Fateh, despite deep disagreement about political direction at critical junctures. In any case, the gap between the theory of people's war and the minimal reality of programmatic action was so wide as to suggest that the above questions had not been squarely addressed, let alone dealt with systematically. This discrepancy resulted in an eclectic approach to military tactics and organization in 1968–70, and was reflected both in the sharp fluctuation of armed resistance in the occupied territories and in the resort to international terrorism. The dilemma was momentarily obscured, however, by the heady expansion of guerrilla units and escalation of attacks against Israel.

Guerrilla War: The Epic Mirage

The rapid expansion in numbers and armament and the opening of new guerrilla fronts led to a dramatic rise in the number of attacks on Israel. In Jordan, the rate more than doubled within three months of Karama, totalling 90 attacks in June and then rising to a monthly average of 203 during 1969 and 231 in 1970 (until the September civil war). Guerrilla activity on the Syrian front also rose, from four attacks in January 1969 to 21 in May and 60 in May 1970, and on the Lebanese front from four in January 1969 to 32 in August and 91 in August 1970. Adding resistance operations in the occupied territories, the aggregate average of guerrilla attacks stood at 294 a month during 1969 and 374 in the first eight months of 1970.

Israel responded vigorously with cross-border fire along the Jordan River and occasional 'hot pursuit' starting in early 1968. The Israeli air force commenced raids against guerrilla bases and Arab forces in Jordan later in the year, and more frequently in 1969–70. Israel targeted vital economic targets in order to compel the Jordanian government to curb the guerrillas: the East Ghur Canal project was put out of action and the Jordan Valley was emptied of most of its 100,000 inhabitants, while the port of Aqaba was severely hit following a rocket attack on Eilat in April 1969.[46] The IDF also started construction of a security fence along the Jordan River in June 1968, and similarly reinforced the ceasefire line on the Golan front, albeit mainly to impede attack by the Syrian army. Rough terrain and the initially low level of guerrilla activity in south Lebanon encour-

aged the IDF to delay setting up a fence in south Lebanon until 1970, but it resorted more frequently to shelling and ground raids from August 1969. It mounted its first large search-and-destroy mission on 12–13 May 1970, and then launched a new policy of 'active defence' designed 'to dislodge the PLO from its strongholds' by inflicting 'the same kind of ruin as that suffered on the west bank of the Suez Canal and the east bank of the Jordan'.[47] Some 30,000 civilians fled the border region in the next four months, as the IDF widened the scope of its attacks and patrolled inside Lebanon.

As a result of Israeli counter-measures, up to two-thirds of all Palestinian 'deep penetration' patrols on the Jordanian front were being lost by the end of 1968.[48] Israeli prisons held at least 1,700 guerrillas and local supporters by then, and 2,800 a year later.[49] The guerrillas had also lost 1,354 dead in 1967–9 by Israeli count, rising to 1,828 by the end of 1970.[50] Parallel to the rise in casualties and frustration of infiltration tactics, the guerrillas resorted increasingly to cross-border fire from their sanctuary on the east bank.[51] This trend was reinforced by their receipt of growing numbers of medium weapons such as mortars, artillery rockets, and recoilless rifles. Cross-border fire accounted for 85 per cent of attacks in 1969–70, and much of the remaining 15 per cent involved clashes in the border 'crust' (*al-qishra*). A further result was the decline in Israeli casualties on the Jordanian front, from 22 a month in 1968 to 20 in 1969 and then 14 in the first half of 1970. A similar pattern emerged on the Syrian and Lebanese fronts, where cross-border fire accounted for over 60 per cent of all guerrilla attacks.

Some Palestinian leaders were openly critical of cross-border fire. PF–GC secretary-general Jibril argued that the guerrillas should only 'strike where their feet can reach', while PFLP military commander Abu Hammam worried about their loss of offensive spirit. The possibility that Israel might respond by occupying more Arab territory did not cause much concern, however, since 'Israel does not lack pretexts and the Arab forces would deter it'.[52] Abu Hammam was not wholly opposed to cross-border fire in any case, arguing that the guerrillas should strike where and when they could, and in general guerrilla statements gave no indication that they faced an impasse. Indeed, their claims were if anything inflated more wildly than ever.

The account by one guerrilla of an attack he had taken part in was typical. 'We laid mines on the earth road used by the Israeli patrols [along the Jordan River], and then withdrew to the east bank to watch through binoculars. A patrol with two vehicles passed by, and a mine blew up under one . . . later that day the statement issued in Amman claimed that we had had a 30-minute firefight during which we destroyed two vehicles and shot down a helicopter.'[53] On another occasion Fateh stated that it had suffered 22 casualties in combat with 1,500 Israeli paratroopers who had been dropped on the battlefield, both an impossible number and a tactic never used by the IDF in its counterinsurgency.[54] Central committee member Khalaf deplored Palestinian exaggeration, but then pretended that 10 per cent of weapons used by the guerrillas

had been taken from the IDF.[55] Again this was fiction, but the greatest exaggeration was in Palestinian estimates of Israeli casualties. In one ten-day period in May 1968, for example, Fateh, the PFLP, and the PLF/PLA claimed to have killed or wounded over 176 Israeli soldiers, many times the real number.[56] The PF–GC later boasted that in its first two years of operation it alone had inflicted 3,500 casualties on Israel and destroyed 380 vehicles, for the loss of 52 dead and 30 prisoners.[57]

Exaggeration reflected the high political premium placed on military action, or its appearance, which was commonly seen as a measure of patriotic commitment and the primary means of attracting public support and recruits. As PFLP secretary-general Habash put it, 'the masses will not heed any group unless they feel that it continues its strikes against Israel and increases its effectiveness'. This was in May 1970, a time when the overall number of guerrilla attacks was still on the rise, but even then he argued that 'growth is not taking place fast enough to maintain mass support . . . there is a crisis of combat'.[58] Guerrilla commanders came under intense pressure to increase activity, and responded by submitting inflated reports or by sending their men repeatedly on patrol regardless of fatigue or casualties.[59] Military action was also a means of demonstrating credibility to Arab backers and ensuring the continuation of material assistance. Some groups were not above issuing reports of fictitious operations in order to receive financial backing.[60] Little wonder then, that exaggeration was the order of the day, or that guerrilla groups sometimes vied bitterly to claim responsibility for the same operations.

It was partly to prevent rival claims that Fateh, Saʿiqa, and the PLF/PLA formed the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) in February 1969. Each group was supposed to deposit details of raids it was planning or other documents with the PASC as a means of substantiating later claims, but few actually did so. The smaller factions, keen to advertise their existence, were reluctant to join the PASC or to give it a monopoly on official statements, and continued to issue their own. In mid-May the PDFLP, with barely a few dozen guerrillas, announced that it had mounted a large attack code-named Red Line in the Jordan Valley in which it had killed or wounded 70 Israelis and destroyed seven vehicles, and that it had attempted to occupy the city of Qunaytra and the village of Bir ʿAjam in the Golan Heights in a separate attack code-named Ho Chi Minh.[61] Operations Scythes of the North and Che Guevara followed. Offended by this chaos, some PLA officers proposed to their superiors, who commanded the PASC, to mount a *coup* within the PLO and restore a sense of order and proportion.[62]

Mamduh Nawfal, then a PDFLP sector commander and eventual military commander, later admitted that 'there was pressure on the military base that went beyond its real capabilities because we wanted to assert ourselves and to impose our political and media presence. So there was deliberate exaggeration of operations, to which we gave grandiose names.'[63] The wave of large attacks continued in August, with a joint operation by Fateh, the PLF/PLA, and PLA

Qadisiyya Forces along a 7-kilometre front. Fateh argued that this approach helped to develop combat skills at platoon and company level, but these raids were in fact little more than a series of disconnected, small actions conducted on the same night.[64] Faced with continuing competition, the attempt to coordinate guerrilla action by the PASC had all but collapsed by the end the year. In December, the PDFLP claimed to have attacked Israeli targets on a 60-kilometre-wide front in Operation Che Guevara, but threatened to withdraw from the PASC entirely when the joint command proved unable to find evidence that any military action had taken place at all and refuted the claim.[65]

The PDFLP was not alone. On different occasions in May 1969, Fateh claimed to have seized the deserted village of al-Himma near the Syrian–Jordanian border and an Israeli outpost near the Damiya bridge over the Jordan River. These operations, it trumpeted, heralded a new phase of 'temporary liberation' of Palestinian soil. First, selected targets would be cleared of enemy soldiers and held briefly, but in the next phase the guerrillas would remain in any positions they seized while Fateh completed the transfer of all its forces into the occupied territories.[66] This strategy was supposedly based on intensive study by 'the planning agencies and strategic thinktanks' of the guerrilla movement. The PLO executive committee under Hammuda had indeed founded a Planning Centre in Beirut in mid-1968, which hoped fondly to introduce scientific method into guerrilla operations. However, an attempt to conduct cost-benefit analysis using computer models foundered when the guerrilla groups, starting with Fateh, refused to cooperate and provided distorted data on membership, losses, and combat results.[67] The Centre persevered with a two-year project to devise an overall military, financial, political, and media strategy for the guerrilla movement, but Fateh central committee member Qaddumi received the final product with the scornful observation that 'there is no planning in revolutions'.[68] The document was unceremoniously abandoned in the stairwell of the PLO executive committee headquarters in Amman, where it lay for the next year.[69]

The guerrilla movement faced a dilemma, but would not admit it. The attack by Fateh on Himma was taken as a turning point, from 'hit and run' raids to 'limited confrontation'.[70] Indeed, Arafat and Qaddumi insisted that the guerrillas had already moved into the next stage, which they ambitiously called 'mobile war'.[71] Once the transfer of Fateh forces into the occupied territories was complete, Khalaf added, the Palestinians would have reached the stage of 'total liberation war'.[72] Not everyone was so sanguine. Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan worried that the build-up of Palestinian strength in the Arab sanctuaries would strain relations with the host governments. He revived his argument that the guerrilla groups should dissolve their forces and merge within the PLO, leaving Fateh as its political wing and the PLA as the official military wing. The PLO should train an elite force of 200 commandos, who could act as the Palestinian mosquito against the Israeli elephant. He

remained in an absolute minority, despite repeating his proposals at PNC sessions in 1969 and 1970.

There was occasional candour about the existence of a problem, nonetheless. Husam al-Khatib, once a member of the Fateh higher central committee before 1967 and later a member of the PLO executive committee, noted the parallel between the rising number of operations and the decline in effectiveness.[73] The PDFLP, in one of its more sober comments, admitted that the guerrillas 'have remained at the level of nuisance [to Israel], and we have not risen higher nor will we'.[74] This candour was obscured, however, by the suggestion from PDFLP secretary-general Hawatma that the PLA be transformed into a guerrilla force and that the PLO form 'unified militia battalions', organized, moreover, along democratic, elected lines.[75] He now argued that liberation would be possible with 'the attaining of weapons that are different from those [which we] have at [our] disposal at the present time'.[76]

Only the PFLP was more cautious, doubting the purported shift to 'limited confrontation' and denying that the guerrillas had entered a new phase of 'temporary occupation' or 'mobile war'.[77] A PFLP study criticized the gap between propaganda claims and actual capabilities, and opposed the rash of large operations claimed by its rivals.[78] Its military commander Abu Hammam argued that the Palestinian movement was still in a period of 'creating a revolutionary atmosphere' and developing the 'revolutionary instrument' that could wage action until the launch of a popular liberation war. In order to move into the latter stage, moreover, the guerrillas needed an Arab Hanoi.[79] The PFLP was swimming against the current in late 1969, and at times allowed itself to be swept along by the general enthusiasm. Abandoning caution at one point, it stated that the Palestinians had passed the first two stages of military action leading to popular liberation war, namely preparation and consolidation, and had entered the guerrilla phase fully.[80] Yet some months later it observed more somberly that they were still in a period of preparing and 'ripening' capabilities in order to start guerrilla war.[81] Its vacillation was explained in part by the fear that failure to 'detonate' the 'wider revolution' would result in stagnation and declining support, leaving guerrilla action as a mere figleaf for the inactivity of the Arab states.[82]

However, such doubts did not appear to trouble the commander of Fateh forces in Jordan, Mamduh Saydam, who boasted at the beginning of 1970 that the guerrillas had not only left the stages of 'hit and run' and 'limited confrontation' behind, but also that 'temporary occupation' was already a thing of the past. The guerrillas were now ready for permanent occupation of enemy positions.[83] This was self-delusion in the extreme, and revealed the extent to which Palestinian rhetoric diverged from reality. The various groups clung to poorly digested tenets of guerrilla war and people's war, but even these were completely divorced from daily practice. This was because the primary function of the armed struggle was not in fact military, and because the political function it performed was related, at one level, to the creation of the symbols and myths

of national imagining, and at another level to the competition of various groups to assert their discourse and determine the direction and purpose of Palestinian institutional development.

Resisting Occupation

The contrast between the polemical and instrumental approaches to armed struggle was evident in the experience of Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories. Until spring 1968, the *raison d'être* of the guerrilla movement was to establish itself in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Its slogan was 'the Inside is the basis and the Outside is the complement'.[84] The collapse of its various efforts between June 1967 and March 1968 prompted a shift. Fateh now observed that 'we must be satisfied with the results we have achieved . . . combat in this way cannot be a long-term strategy, because attrition . . . makes developing ourselves difficult . . . and so it was imperative to . . . acquire a secure base' on the East Bank.[85] The slogan now became 'there is no difference between Inside and Outside'.[86] In reality, the role played by the occupied territories in the national struggle had become an adjunct to the political, military, and institutional base evolving in Arab exile.

In the course of 1968, the main guerrilla groups established special committees to direct clandestine operations in the occupied territories. In June, Arafat and two other cadres set up a bureau attached to the Fateh general command with the task of planning sabotage and other attacks in the areas west of the Jordan River. The bureau was later formally instituted as the directorate for the occupied homeland (*Mufawwadiyyat al-Watan al-Muhtal*), but was more commonly known as the Western Sector (*al-Qita' al-Gharbi*), given its geographical focus. Arafat proved to have little aptitude for organization and was increasingly involved in the bid to control the PLO, and so Wazir took the helm towards the end of the year.[87] The next change was to divide the directorate into separate regional committees in early 1969, each taking responsibility for recruitment, organization, and armed activities within a specific area: the Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron districts, Gaza, and the Galilee. Heading these committees were veterans of the abortive insurrectionary effort of 1967, among them 'Umar al-Khatib, Mustafa al-Liftawi, and Abu Salah.

The PFLP was next. In mid-summer it formed a committee known as 'command for the inside' (*qiyadat al-dakhil*), but did little until the secession of Jibril and the emergence of an autonomous leftist faction within the PFLP in October. As with Fateh, the committee was attached to the PFLP military command and adopted a geographical division of organizational and military responsibilities (although two cadres, including one woman, were responsible for recruiting and directing a women's section).[88] However, the factional struggle between Left and Right severely impeded activity. The committee was headed by a member of the Right, Zabri, while the Left was represented by Salih Ra'fat.

Ra'fat had been detained briefly by his rivals a few months earlier at the height of the internal debate, and was in a minority in the committee.[89] The Left enjoyed the support of some junior cadres, though, and sought 'to win over the organization in the occupied territories and the armed forces [the guerrilla bases in Jordan], in order to resolve the internal situation decisively'.[90]

The PFLP Left hoped to take control discreetly of members and weapons stores, and chose one of its cadres, ʿUmar al-Qasim, to head a 'leadership team' into the West Bank.[91] He was captured upon crossing the river in late December, and two other teams headed by Ra'fat and ʿAbd-Rabbu were instructed to remain in Jordan. The dispute continued to disrupt PFLP activity in the occupied territories until the secession of the Left in February 1969. The PDFLP won modest support among younger members, especially in the north and centre of the West Bank, but failed to attract any following in Gaza, which was firmly controlled by old guard cadres and former ANM stalwarts. The PDFLP had too small a following to set up a new committee for clandestine organization in the occupied territories, and so a member of its embryonic military command oversaw activity until January 1970, when a separate command was at last set up.[92]

Political patterns in exile, whether factional and ideological rivalries or the emphasis on polemics, reflected themselves on clandestine organization in the occupied territories, where many problems were self-inflicted. Competition and poor planning led to duplication of effort, even within the same guerrilla group. Security was slipshod in the often large networks, and a single arrest could lead the Israelis to many others. These flaws were most obvious in the case of Fateh, but the pyramidal cell structure adopted by the PFLP was also vulnerable. The emphasis on military action—described as 'sanctification' or 'iconization' (*taqdis*) by some critics—contrasted with the lack of care given to organization, and exposed the networks to exposure.[93] 'Military cells lacked organizational roots, and conducted military action with no long-term prospect. It was action for action's sake.'[94] Much the same applied to the PFLP and PDFLP. 'The yardstick of struggle was military action alone, [a fact] that weakened political, mass, and organizational activity inside.'[95] Lack of interest in social associations, such as trade and labour unions, left the armed cells without semi-legal 'front' organizations that could provide information and vet recruits. The failure to separate military, political, and social functions exposed all members to the same risks.

Repeatedly stymied in their efforts to rebuild networks, the main guerrilla groups tried to establish 'fugitive patrols' (*dawriyyat mutarada*) in the West Bank. Their purpose was not only to attack Israeli forces, but also to act as 'leadership *foci*', mobilizing, recruiting, and directing clandestine cells in the villages and towns.[96] The latter would provide food, medicine, and other supplies, and smuggle correspondence to and from headquarters in Amman. The guerrillas would in return offer protection to the civilian population, for example by punishing local collaborators.[97] The project seemed feasible, but as a

Fateh veteran later observed, 'the primary purpose of building an organizational network inside [remained] to establish [combat] bases, as if we were already in an advanced phase of the armed struggle'.[98] The result, he added, was 'for anyone with a weapon to think not of staying in the city, but to leave for the mountains'.[99] Establishing and supplying fugitive patrols absorbed an inordinate part of Fateh's effort, and to a lesser extent of the PFLP and PF–GC, in 1968–70. Yet, choked off by Israeli border defences and hounded by the IDF and intelligence, the fugitive patrols had collapsed by 1971.

For all these reasons, armed resistance in the West Bank remained modest, accounting for 33 attacks in 1968, 112 in 1969, and 56 in 1970, representing a mere 1.8–3.1 per cent of total guerrilla activity. Israeli casualties were low, rising initially from 49 in 1968 to 59 in 1969, and then dropping to 17 in the whole of 1970. The PFLP attributed poor performance to the Jordanian role before 1967 in crushing the opposition parties and preventing local inhabitants from acquiring military training or weapons. It also blamed the impact of economic difficulties on the will to resist.[100] This explanation disguised the fact that the local population was demoralized and disinclined to take risks, especially given the lacklustre performance of the guerrilla groups. The Israeli carrot-and-stick policy was also effective; the 'open bridges' policy offered scope for a reasonably normal life, while deportation of social leaders weakened the potential for political mobilization and pre-empted organized civil disobedience. Participation in armed resistance by the Palestinian citizens of Israel was even lower, in part because of their physical isolation and political marginalization.[101] Worried by the possible influence of the guerrilla groups, the Israeli authorities at first banned Palestinian citizens from entering the occupied territories.[102] In all, some 220 joined guerrilla groups in exile, while another 159 were detained for security offences in 1967–70.[103] The loss of combat supplies, lack of training and leadership, and personal rivalries prevented a revival after 1971.[104]

The situation in the Gaza Strip offered a sharp contrast, as near-insurrectionary conditions eventually obtained. The PLF/PLA was the first to revive from the Israeli crackdown of early 1968, under a leadership headed by Husayn al-Khatib and comprising Ziyad al-Husayni and Misbah Saqr among others. Khatib was soon obliged to flee Gaza to evade arrest, but continued to direct operations from Jordan. Husayni replaced him as local commander, and directed the sharp rise in attacks by the end of the year. The PLF/PLA was responsible for about half of all guerrilla activity in Gaza, which reached 167 attacks in 1968, 471 in 1969, and 455 in 1970—inflicting a total of 248 Israeli casualties—compared to 33, 112, and 56 attacks respectively in the West Bank[105] IDF personnel and vehicles and the officers and employees of the military administration in Gaza were the main targets, as were the railroad to Sinai, electricity grids, and water systems. Labour exchanges and buses carrying Palestinian daily workers to Israel started to come under attack after March 1970, but most internecine violence was directed against informers recruited by the Israeli Shabak General Security Service. By 1970 the guerrilla groups 'held the

Gaza Strip by night' and exerted significant control over the daily lives of its inhabitants, resolving social disputes and convening secret tribunals to judge misdemeanours or try suspected informers.[106]

The successes made by the resistance movement in Gaza won the admiration of the Palestinian leadership in exile, but by the same token fuelled rivalries, fed illusions, and obscured fatal flaws. The PFLP, for example, declared proudly in 1970 that it 'alone led the most prominent of Gaza's glories', and that it was the group most able to strike at will in the occupied territories and Israel.[107] This was not entirely hyperbole, but PFLP cadres in Gaza accused their superiors of diverting human and material resources needed for expansion towards building up the base in Jordan instead, in pursuit of the competition with Fateh and the PDFLP.[108] The PFLP boast also obscured the fact that the campaign against informers was getting dangerously out of hand. As armed resistance reached its limit, the PFLP started to target Palestinian employees in Israeli-run civilian departments and daily workers in Israel as collaborators. Local inhabitants were already opposed to the number of innocent bystanders killed or injured in guerrilla attacks and Israeli return fire in populated areas, and the additional killings activated family and clan feuds.[109] Israeli figures showed 48 Palestinians killed and 897 wounded in 1967–70 as a result of executions or anti-Israeli operations.[110]

Civilians as Targets: Terrorism in Israel and Abroad

Palestinian resistance in the occupied territories had reached its limit by September 1970, when the Jordanian civil war reduced guerrilla capability to provide direction and logistic support. Poor organization, lax security, and internal rivalries had taken their toll, as had Israeli counter-insurgency and the vagaries of Palestinian–Arab relations.[111] Evidence of the impasse came with the increasing resort to terrorism, both in Israel and abroad. Palestinian opinion was divided over 'external operations' or 'revolutionary violence' (as international terrorism was dubbed in Palestinian discourse), but showed a broad consensus regarding attacks against Israeli civilians in Israel and the occupied territories. This attitude reflected the common view of Israel as a colonial settler state, based on the systematic expulsion of the indigenous Arab population and permanent alienation of the land into exclusively Jewish ownership.

Palestinian policy developed incrementally in the wake of the June 1967 war. The PFLP field command in the West Bank opted to avoid civilians and generally refrain from attacks inside Israel proper, a restraint that was at least partially observed until mid-1968.[112] Fateh also avoided attacking civilians in 1967, although this was the consequence of its focus on expelling the IDF from the West Bank rather than of deliberate policy.[113] When Fateh tackled the matter in early 1968, it argued that 'the enemy has committed many massacres against our civilians [in the past], but we cannot consider that he has adopted hitting

civilians as a policy in the current phase. This does not mean that he will not resort to [this policy] nor that we will not resort to it, but fear of [our] reaction against [his] civilians will delay adopting such a policy somewhat.'[114] An unnamed Fateh leader nonetheless left the option open as a means of response to 'acts of reprisal conducted by the Israeli army among civilians'.[115] In any case, official Israeli statistics revealed few civilian casualties until March 1968.

Restraint had its critics. Reviewing the period later, some Fateh cadres argued that 'we should have struck at the enemy's weak point, his civilian settlers, and not only the army. Everyone, including the "fugitive patrols", concentrated on military targets, with the ultimate result that our losses were much higher than they might have been.'[116] After its initial hesitation, the PFLP echoed this line of thinking in April 1968 with the threat to strike Israeli civilians in response to 'Israeli terror against Arab citizens in the occupied territories'. It, too, noted that in comparison to attacks on military targets, 'attacks on civil targets and concentrations are not so costly'.[117] The shift in targets was reflected in the fact that civilians accounted for 337 out of 787 Israeli casualties by the end of the year (but only 65 of 400 dead in 1967–70).[118] The success of Israeli counter-insurgency prompted clandestine operatives to change tactics by attacking 'soft' targets such as supermarkets, apartment blocks, and bus terminals. The increasing resort by the guerrillas in Arab sanctuaries to cross-border fire also led to a sharp rise in shelling and other attacks on border settlements.

The escalation of Palestinian urban terrorism paralleled the sharp rise in Israeli attacks on civilian targets in Jordan. Increasingly after March 1968, guerrilla spokesmen justified attacks on Israeli civilians in terms of the suffering being visited on Arab civilians in retaliation. Fateh explained that it wished 'to convince the Israeli authorities that we are capable of carrying out actions similar to those carried out by Israel against Arab civilians'.[119] Its means of response was the urban bombing campaign, which it termed 'indirect warfare'.[120] Whether this was really a conscious choice or simply a *post facto* attempt to portray unplanned action as if it were part of deliberate policy is unclear. The question was immaterial in effect for the PFLP (as for all groups), which noted that the number of civilians killed on each side was highly disproportionate in any case.[121]

The guerrilla groups may have had few moral qualms about targeting Israeli civilians, but they evidently felt a need to justify their action, both to foreign audiences and to their own constituency. Fateh explained to the latter that it aimed to weaken the Israeli economy, trigger a flight of capital, and deter tourism, but above all to 'prevent [Jewish] immigration and encourage reverse emigration . . . prevent the bond between immigrants and the land . . . make the Zionists feel that life in Israel is impossible'.[122] A statement to the foreign press at the same time insisted that the guerrillas 'do not target the Jewish people, as Jewish people, with whom the Palestinians have lived in harmony for several centuries in the past, nor does Fateh intend to "throw the Jews into the sea". The movement of resistance and liberation that is being coordinated

by Fateh is aimed only at the Zionist military-fascist regime that raped our land, expelled our people, and condemned them to a life of wandering and misery.'[123]

There was a deep contradiction in Fateh rhetoric, but it resulted not from cynical duplicity so much as from a fundamental inability to understand the sources of the Zionist appeal to Jews or the nature of the Jewish society that had emerged since the establishment of Israel in 1948. On the one hand, a Fateh tract in early 1967 gave an unequivocal view:

Our correct understanding of the reality of Zionist occupation confirms to us that regaining the occupied homeland cannot happen except through armed violence as the sole, inevitable, unavoidable, and indispensable means in the battle of liberation. The process of liberation is not only to eliminate a colonial base but, more importantly, to eradicate a society. Armed violence must take many forms besides destroying the military forces of the Zionist occupation state, that is, to direct itself towards destroying the existential basis of Zionist society in all its industrial, agricultural, and financial aspects. Armed violence must aim to destroy all the military, political, economic, financial, and intellectual institutions of the Zionist occupation state until it is impossible for a new Zionist society to arise [again]. Military defeat [of Israel] is not the only aim of the Palestinian liberation war, but also elimination of the Zionist character of the occupied homeland, both human and social.[124]

This was a stark vision, yet in 1969 Fateh adopted a proposal made by the PDFLP that urged parallel resolution of the 'Palestinian and Israeli problems . . . [through] a popular democratic Palestinian state for Arabs and Jews alike in which there would be no discrimination and no room for class or national subjugation'.[125] A modified version of this suggestion was incorporated by the PNC into the PLO's national charter in September. The amendment effectively distinguished the Jews as a religious or cultural community (but not a people or nation) from Zionism as a political ideology. The Palestinian assumption was that it was possible to eradicate all that made Israel a specifically Zionist state and society, yet avoid physical destruction of the Jews. This distinction may have been a complete fallacy, but it was the root of the contradictions in Palestinian discourse and behaviour. Khalaf shed further light on Fateh thinking when he stated that the movement had asked the Arab states to allow former Jewish nationals to reclaim their citizenship and property, with the aim of opening a floodgate for 'reverse emigration' from Israel.[126]

'Udwan expressed the dichotomy succinctly, if unwittingly. On the one hand, he regarded the 'option of comprehensive cleansing as unacceptable in historic, human, and civilizational terms'.[127] On the other hand, Fateh sought to respond to offensive Israeli strategy by 'taking the battle . . . to the heart of the occupied homeland in a confrontation in which the Israeli invasion finds itself solitary and alone and without protection, facing the Arab fighter at home, on the land, on the road, in the coffee-house, the cinema, and army camps'. The

aim was to 'make [the Israeli] contrast the life of stability and calm he enjoyed in his country of origin with the life of fear and terror that he found awaiting him on Palestinian soil, and to push him into reverse emigration'.[128] The PDFLP revealed the same dichotomy. It took the lead in opposing 'chauvinistic solutions of Palestinian or Arab origin (massacring the Jews, driving them into the sea, and so on)'.[129] At the same time it echoed 'Udwan by stating that 'military operations against civilians are part of any struggle for national liberation . . . the purpose is to provoke anxiety and confusion . . . and to prove that the Zionist design is uncomfortable . . . and to draw attention to the crimes committed by Zionism in the name of the Jews'.[130]

This outlook was broadly shared by all the guerrilla groups. PFLP military commander Abu Hammam argued, for example, that the Israeli reserve system meant that civilians were in fact 'military personnel in civilian clothes'. They had moreover repressed the Palestinians while on service, and both supported the occupation and benefited from it.[131] An official PFLP tract further argued that 'in the case of Israel, the overwhelming majority of its families constitute one of the forces which supports the Israeli military. They form part of hostile activity and are the basic justification for driving out the Arab population from the occupied homeland. They are thus directly responsible for the conditions under which the Palestinian people have lived for more than twenty years.'[132] It was fair, therefore, that Israeli civilians should now be equally at risk from the original owners of the land.[133]

Indeed, it was the PFLP that took this logic furthest, by taking the battle with Israel onto the international stage. On 23 July 1968 two members of the PFLP hijacked an El Al passenger aircraft on the Rome–Tel Aviv route to Algiers. PFLP spokesmen declared that the passengers and crew would be held as hostages until Palestinians in Israeli prisons were released. The hijack operation, they asserted, would enable 'the voice of the Palestinian resistance movement to reach world public opinion, despite the Israeli and colonialist siege . . . and demolish a basic component of Israeli propaganda . . . that the resistance movement is usually individualistic, always improvised, and hardly ever effective'.[134] The hijack was the work of the Special Apparatus, headed by Wadi' Haddad and assisted by Hani al-Hindi. Its political inspiration came from the statement issued by the ANM national executive committee in July 1967, that had stressed the role of the US and its 'British tail' in supporting Israel and opposing the 'Arab liberation movement'. The statement concluded that these foes should be confronted across the Arab world through 'organized, revolutionary violence that is embodied in many forms and extends to armed struggle'. In waging this battle, moreover, the Palestinians were simply one of various 'revolutionary *foci* in the Third World'.[135]

The PFLP justifiably regarded the hijacking as a measure of its dynamism, as its sudden reputation for daring attracted many new recruits. Yet the fact that the resort to international terrorism was explained in terms of breaking 'the Israeli and colonialist siege' betrayed its sense of frustration. Secretary-general

Habash was languishing in a Syrian jail, and Fateh was rapidly emerging as the leading guerrilla group. Whether or not this was their main purpose, 'external operations' offered a means of competing with Fateh and of strengthening the PFLP Right against the Left. The importance attached to external operations as a means of asserting militant credentials and retaining the loyalty of the membership was demonstrated again later in the year and during 1969, as new terrorist incidents coincided with developments in the internal dispute. Israeli aircraft and businesses were struck in Athens, Zurich, London, the Hague, Brussels, and Bonn between December 1968 and September 1969, while a TWA airliner was destroyed on the ground after being diverted to Damascus airport on 4 September. On the latter occasion, the PFLP suggested that its action was a response to the destruction of 13 Lebanese passenger aircraft at Beirut airport in December 1968.[136]

The PFLP developed several arguments to justify its campaign. Airlines flying to Israel, both national and foreign, were part of its lines of communication and revealed it to be a centre of imperialist and world capitalist interests.[137] The PFLP insisted that striking civil aviation and maritime routes should not be construed as attacks on civilians, in the light of the militarized nature of Israeli society. Besides, civilian facilities such as ports and airports were being used for military purposes, and El Al pilots were in fact military personnel in civilian clothing.[138] Another argument offered by Habash was that these attacks were a response, and a deterrent, to Israeli aggression against Palestinian civilians.[139] The PFLP's leading military analyst at the time, Abu Hammam, took a straightforward view, stating bluntly that Israeli confidence in sealing off the borders should be shaken by 'blows that hail down from every side'. 'We should attack not the strong points [of Israel] but its weak ones', he added, 'and the external operations achieve this objective because they attack an isolated, sensitive target that is susceptible to shock.'[140]

These explanations were genuine enough, insofar as they reflected Palestinian perceptions of Israel, but they were secondary. The driving impulse was to shock the international community and shake its complacency regarding the plight of the Palestinians. Speaking the day after a terrorist attack at Zurich airport on 21 February 1969, Habash explained that 'the main aim of the continuation of [external] operations against Israel is that we want people abroad, both friends and enemies, to understand well what is so obvious to us: that we were expelled from our country, and that our people have lived as refugees in tents of misery for twenty years, and so we must fight for our rights'.[141] As the PFLP campaign continued in September, the tone became more bitter towards a 'world that has not heard, for over half a century, the appeals of justice and international law'.[142] Finally came a stern warning: 'in today's world nobody is "innocent", nobody "neutral". A man is either oppressed or he is with the oppressors. He who takes no interest in politics gives his blessing to the prevailing order, that of the ruling classes and exploiting forces.'[143]

Whatever its aims, the PFLP had made a strong bid for pre-eminence among the guerrilla groups. Some competitors hastened to conduct their own external operations, which they similarly described as 'revolutionary violence'.[144] The PPSF was the first to follow suit, as two of its members attacked the El Al office in Athens on 27 November, killing a child and wounding 31 other persons before being taken prisoner. The PF–GC came next with a bomb that destroyed a Swissair aircraft in mid-air on 21 February 1970. The PPSF struck again on 22 July, hijacking an Olympic Airways aircraft in order to secure the release of the perpetrators of its earlier attack in Athens. In each case the Palestinian groups declared that their aim was to strike Zionism and imperialist interests everywhere, in order to widen the battlefield and dissipate Israeli power.

The Syrian-sponsored Saʿiqa refrained, but ventured the opinion that 'since a struggle cannot exist in a vacuum, it must be carried out in the diaspora'. 'The international institutions [the UN] have been powerless to return the Palestine Arab people to their land', it added, 'so it is natural that all the lands of the world, including Athens, Paris, New York, and occupied Jerusalem, or any other, would be the obvious place for the Palestinian . . . to maintain his struggle to regain his homeland.'[145] Saʿiqa also repeated the argument that the Palestinians had the right to strike Israeli targets anywhere, since Zionism was 'a world movement having organizations and activities in various countries of the world'. The need to attack Israeli interests around the globe would cease only if host governments denied Israel the freedom to operate on their territory.

There were two main exceptions to the general view. The PDFLP was the most vocal in its condemnation of PFLP activity, which was to be expected in the light of the bitter rivalry between the former partners. It opposed external operations because they relied on individual acts and created a media sensation that equated 'mass action' with individual terrorism.[146] Terrorism caused major damage to the Palestinian guerrilla movement by encouraging the masses to adulate individual, rather than collective, heroism, and by turning them into observers. Fateh was also critical of PFLP operations abroad. There had been no open dissent by any guerrilla group following the first hijacking of an Israeli airliner in July 1968, but by March 1969 Arafat was able to declare that 'we categorically oppose and reject such attacks on aircraft, for they come at a time when we are making world-wide political gains'.[147]

Mixed Harvest

Arafat had just been elected as PLO chairman when he made this statement and was evidently concerned about the international image of the Palestinians. The successful takeover of the PLO by Fateh and the other guerrilla groups was arguably the clearest measure of their progress since June 1967, and the political capital it represented was not to be wasted. This was especially important

because the guerrillas had reached the limits of their military and organizational capabilities and political potential by 1970, although few could perceive the fact at the time and none would admit it openly. The Palestinian movement had expanded its presence in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon during 'its honeymoon period', but in each country success had already laid the seeds of future conflict.

Arafat and his closest colleagues in Fateh may have been dimly aware that even at its peak the reality of their modest guerrilla force was at odds with the rhetoric of people's war. This had not been put to irrefutable test, however, and there were no radical conclusions to be drawn as yet. The meteoric rise in the number of guerrilla attacks against Israel served to obscure the underlying problems, and doubts were additionally suppressed by the showcase of resistance offered by Gaza. The stream of statements proclaiming the latest Israeli casualties and material damages—Fateh estimated that Israel had incurred a daily cost of $1.5 million in 1968 and $3 million in 1969 as a result specifically of Palestinian military action—were self-deluding, but they continued to ensure popular support and Arab material assistance.[148] The guerrilla movement had been born big in its post-1967 incarnation, and the flood of volunteers after Karama bred the reassurance that the Palestinian leadership could always mobilize a large human reservoir and generate political support through nationalist appeals and populist politics. These circumstances discouraged critical evaluation.

That said, some Palestinian assessments of achievements since 1967 were relatively sober. This was true not of Fateh, which boasted in January 1970 that it was ready to move into the stage of 'permanent occupation of enemy positions', but rather of the PFLP, despite its militant rhetoric. It was content to note that guerrilla action had merely deprived Israel of 'reassurance and security'.[149] The Palestinians had succeeded in undermining Israel's military aura through daily resistance, Habash argued, and in putting their problem back on the international agenda.[150] Guerrilla action had at the very least 'bought time' for the Arab armies to rebuild and rearm.[151] The irony, as the guerrilla movement was soon to discover, was that the closer the Arab states came to regaining their military posture, the less willing they were to tolerate autonomous guerrilla action and sanctuaries. Yet the increasingly restrictive military policies pursued by the confrontation states after 1970 could not eradicate the reality of the distinct Palestinian political system that had taken shape in the previous three years.

9

The Making of the Palestinian Political System

Whatever trials they faced in mounting a military challenge to Israel, the battle of Karama had turned the guerrilla groups into a mass movement, and in doing so brought new debates about ideology, organization, and policy forcefully to the fore. The active political agents within Palestinian society were now in direct contact with a much wider constituency, at a historical juncture in which alternative models to Palestinian proto-nationalism had been severely weakened and external circumstances offered an opportunity for the construction of autonomous institutions. The guerrilla movement was now able to assert its own discourse, symbols, and sources of legitimacy, all structured around the central theme of armed struggle. At the same time, the attempt by the different guerrilla groups to incorporate various social forces, acquire material resources, and institutionalize their political practice led to intense competition and increasingly complex internal politics.

The state-building dynamic was already at work in the emergence of a national political field and in the search for common institutional arenas. This did not necessarily mean that the statist ambition was conscious or consistent, nor that it was shared by all the guerrilla groups. Yet the basic divide within the movement was between those who articulated an unsophisticated Palestinian proto-nationalism and sought to situate it within statist political structures, and those who fused their Palestinianism with wider Arab and class identities and formulated their goals within a discourse of revolution. Fateh most effectively embodied the striving of a stateless and marginalized petite bourgeoisie to acquire an autonomous political framework, and accordingly epitomized Palestinian proto-nationalism and the striving for sovereign status and juridical recognition. This was perhaps best encapsulated by the formal restriction of full membership in Fateh to Palestinians, with other Arabs obliged instead to join a separate 'support front' (*jabha musanida*).[1] The PFLP best represented the opposite ethos, enclosing a Palestinian patriotism, that was if anything narrower still and certainly more absolutist than Fateh's, within an Arab nationalist, then class, ideology as a means of resisting the pragmatism and *realpolitik* of the statist drive. Paradoxically this meant that the PFLP, which advocated the overthrow of reactionary Arab governments and professed commitment to social revolution, failed to lead the development of institutions

and practices of parallel government in the Palestinian arena. It left this task to Fateh, and in that sense undermined its own ability to effect social transformations.

The underlying division between the guerrilla groups was reflected in the debate within Fateh about the formation of a Palestinian national front. This was brought to the fore by the discussion of policy towards the PLO, as Fateh gained in political stature and numerical strength in 1968. Many in the rank-and-file remained deeply hostile to the PLO, which they still viewed as an instrument of the Arab states and a non-revolutionary body dominated by its inherent bureaucratic tendencies. The PLO had moreover been irretrievably discredited in June 1967. In the words of one Fateh member, himself a PLO official at the time, 'the PLO is no more than a payments office, or a ministry of social affairs, at best. What does it have? An army that does not fight, when only war is feasible now, and offices spread across the capitals of the world . . . and funds that are spent mainly on salaries, commissions, and allowances.'[2] Other cadres complained that even under its new leadership, the PLO had formed a PLA guerrilla wing in order to compete with Fateh. The PLF/PLA gave further evidence of its dubious purpose by adopting a conventional system of ranks and pay and by allowing its officers to sleep in separate tents from their soldiers.[3]

As ever, ʿAllush admirably synthesized objections to subsuming the PLO framework made from both the Arab nationalist and leftist viewpoints within Fateh. Even before 1967 he had decried the narrow ambition of the 'semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois elements that took leadership [in Arab countries], whose only concern was to assert their control within the [territorial] framework defined by colonialism . . . in this way independence [of territorial states] became an alternative to [pan-Arab] unity'.[4] Now he argued that there was an attempt to 'turn the PLO into a state in exile' by elements within Fateh who 'had suffered greatly from Arab policies' and by 'capitalists [*mutamawwilin*], small merchants, and craftsmen who wish to . . . compete with their counterparts in the Arab countries. Indeed, we can find shopkeepers in a town who will reveal a particularistic Palestinian prejudice [*naʿra iqlimiyya*] . . . They [all] want to be master in [government] departments'. In his view this 'stupid defence of Palestinianness' would only enable Arab circles, both 'official and grassroots, progressive and reactionary . . . to relieve themselves [of their national duty] and to distance their masses from the battle for Palestine'.[5]

The Fateh leadership, conversely, had long appreciated the importance of 'public action'. It had argued in one of its founding documents that the means to promote its revolutionary activity among the widest constituency possible required two elements, national unity and an entity.[6] Fateh drew similar lessons from the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences, which it believed revealed the necessity of forming a united front, creating a revolutionary authority and defined territorial base, and forging international relations.[7] The question in 1968 was whether or not the PLO offered a suitable framework for unity and

could represent the Palestinian entity. Khalaf summarized the internal debate as follows:

There were several formulas for unity. There could be a national front in which the PLO was [just] one among other parties instead of being the framework for national unity . . . and Fateh could have joined this national front on the basis of fundamental parity with the PLO. There was no opposition in Fateh to this direction . . . However, there was another view of the PLO, an objective view that sought the good of the Palestinian people before [the good of] Fateh. This view saw that the PLO embodied an official Arab commitment towards the Palestinian people for the first time.[8]

Besides, with control of the PLO would also come funds, a trained army, administrative institutions, and established diplomatic recognition. Karama had generated a new political momentum, and a growing number of voices within the PLO apparatus and the PNC now called on the guerrilla groups to take over and unite.[9] At the same time, Fateh was concerned that if all Palestinian parties—the guerrilla groups, the PLA, and the PLF/PLA—entered the PLO on equal footing, then the organization would be paralysed and unable to arrive at decisions without consensus.[10] Any small group would hold veto power over collective decisions, making it vital to have a 'backbone . . . or leading force'.[11] Several voices—among them Khalid al-Hasan, Mamduh Sabri, and Kamal 'Udwan—called for an 'Algerian solution'—physical elimination of groups that resisted forcible unification—but remained in the minority.[12] As a later Fateh tract explained, the Palestinian guerrilla movement contradicted the general laws of people's war because all groups in the national front retained their political and military autonomy, but at least Fateh stood out as the leading force because it 'had the largest mass base of support . . . and represented the aspirations of the most revolutionary sections of the people'.[13] Tolerance of diversity was perhaps dictated by the social fragmentation and geographical dispersal of the Palestinians and their vulnerability to Arab measures, but the confidence to institutionalize it stemmed from the centrality of Fateh. After all, 'Fateh is the Palestinian revolution . . . the history of Fateh is the history of the modern Palestinian revolution.'[14]

Representatives of Fateh, the PFLP, and PLO had already met in Beirut on 17 March, four days before the battle of Karama, to discuss the formation of the next PNC. At that time Fateh accepted an equal distribution of the 100 seats: 50 for the guerrilla groups together, and 50 to be appointed by the PLO executive committee and apparatus.[15] Yet Fateh remained unsure of its basic attitude towards the PLO, and so it insisted that both the PFLP and the PLO should reciprocate by recognizing the Permanent Bureau of the Palestinian Guerrilla Organizations that it had formed with seven smaller groups in January. Then Karama changed everything. Fateh seized its new political advantage to reverse policy and make a bid to control the PLO. It accordingly announced two weeks later that its previous pact with the PLO and PFLP was no longer adequate, and demanded that PNC seats should be divided equally between them. Seeking to

draw the PLA command into an alliance, Fateh stressed that it would adhere to its earlier commitment to coordinate military affairs with the PLO army and demanded an increase in the PLA's share of PNC seats allocated to the PLO.

The bargaining remained deadlocked during the next two months, but Fateh was growing rapidly in terms of number of civilian members and military personnel and of regional stature. As a result, it no longer insisted on dealing with the PLO as a separate party and sought instead to confirm the organization as the national front of all groups, using its influence with its partners in the Permanent Bureau to this end.[16] The PFLP now held back, however. It agreed that all 'combatant forces' should be represented in the PNC, but warned that using the PLO as the central structure and entering its institutions might 'pave the way for a return of tutelage [by the Arab states]'.[17] A compromise was eventually reached on 30 May. Fateh accepted a proposal which would raise the Permanent Bureau's share of PNC seats to 38 and leave the PLO with 50, while the reluctant PFLP was allocated ten. This was insufficient to shift the internal balance, and so in July the PNC simply renewed the mandate of the old PLO executive committee under the chairmanship of left-leaning Yahya Hammuda, albeit for only six months. He and the guerrilla groups were nonetheless able to introduce a number of significant changes to PLO structures and documents, starting with the redesignation of its founding charter as *al-Mithaq al-Watani* rather than *al-Mithaq al-Qawmi*—signifying a shift from a primarily pan-Arab allegiance to a particularistic Palestinian self-identification—and including such measures as the establishment of a dedicated Planning Centre headed by an executive committee member.

Despite some convergence of views, Hammuda and other PLO officials resisted granting the guerrilla groups a majority of PNC seats, arguing that 'most of our people are independents'.[18] However, Fateh continued to gain in strength and was able to make its successful bid for direct control of the PLO at the next PNC session, in February 1969. It had asserted itself as the 'backbone' of the guerrilla movement, and was rewarded after further negotiations with 33 seats in the Council, giving it the largest single voting bloc. Another 12 of the 105 seats went to the PFLP and 12 to Saʿiqa, while the PLO executive committee took 12, the PLA 5, and the trade unions and mass organizations 3, with 'independent' personalities occupying the remaining 28. Both the PFLP and PLA were dissatisfied with their shares and boycotted the session, but their absence only made it easier for Fateh to secure the election of Arafat as PLO chairman and to claim 4 out of 11 seats on the new executive committee.

The election of Arafat marked the conclusive transition of Palestinian national leadership from the established middle-class elements whose political ambitions had been frustrated in 1948 and then briefly revived in 1964–7, to the next generation of activists of petit bourgeois background whose formative experiences had been conditioned primarily by the exodus and Arab exile. Fateh's capture of the parastatal structure of the PLO was a major step towards

the consolidation of a common political arena and, consequently, of Palestinian proto-nationalism. However, the statist approach adopted by Arafat and his colleagues to political practice and institutionalization was resisted at many points, although it increasingly shaped the organizational context within which competing imaginings of nationalism and revolution were articulated. An interactive process was underway—a 'dialogic' relationship between discourses, structures, and the identities that each stressed or embodied—but was not yet contained within a single and uncontested framework.[19]

The Internal Politics of Fateh

The tensions generated by this duality were reflected not only across the guerrilla movement but also in Fateh, which encapsulated the wider transformations and debates within its own ranks. In 1964–7, disputes within Fateh had revolved mainly around tactical questions (such as when to launch the armed struggle) and had primarily reflected differences of character and temperament. There was effectively no debate about organization or ideology, and factions, to the extent that they existed, were related to personality, not policy. The absorption of many former members of the ideologically-based Arab political parties and the acquisition of a mass base in the course of 1968 introduced entirely new debates and struggles over the purpose of organization and the nature of internal relations. The manner in which they were conducted, resolved, or deferred was novel, both because it involved responses to problems that had not been faced previously and because it occurred in altered external circumstances that offered unprecedented opportunities for Palestinian state-building. Fateh made up its 'rules' as it went along, and in the process evolved its own, internal 'political system'.

The transformation of Fateh into a mass movement involved innovation, but this was not a free political exercise. The eclectic intellectual sources of its founders and their proto-nationalist focus were reflected in old-fashioned organizational methods, and pre-empted development of a 'practical ideology' (a set of ideas designed to provide rational instruments for action) or programmatic thinking. The Fateh platform offered members a sense of identity and allowed the creation and use of organization, but this remained rudimentary and prone to political instability.[20] Its proto-nationalism also reinforced the tendency to 'traditionalize' organizational relations (that is, dress up new norms in traditional garb) and to adopt a populist political discourse.[21] An obvious example was the attempt to incorporate different social forces through 'mass organizations' (trade unions and other professional or social associations), which were seen as 'primarily political organizations . . . such that their trade or professional objectives in the current phase are subordinated to the general national line in each historic stage'.[22] Fateh's organizational and political methods were in that sense innovative, even when they replicated the factionalism of

pre-1948 society, mobilized primordial solidarities (clan or village patriarchy), or operated patronage. The most significant innovation, however, was to develop the statist approach in response to the challenge of institutionalizing the mass base. It was this that brought tensions within Fateh and the guerrilla movement as a whole to the fore.

Much of the internal struggle after June 1967 revolved around the relationship between the founding core of Fateh and its civilian organization in Jordan, which was heavily influenced by locally-based former members of ideological parties such as the Baʿth and JCP. Perhaps inevitably, the founding core drew on persons they knew best when making senior appointments: expatriates from the oil-rich Gulf sheikhdoms, colleagues from Gaza, and pre-war veterans. This was most obvious in the guerrilla sector, where central committee member Mamduh Saydam, who was overall field commander, and senior combat officers Maʿadh al-ʿAbid, Musa ʿArafat, and 'haj' Ismaʿil Jabr were all Gazans. The central committee appointed a new regional command (*iqlim*) towards the end of the year, and in February 1968 assigned one of its members, ʿAbd-al-Fattah al-Hmud to head it. Hmud died in a road accident on his way from Saudi Arabia to take up his new post, and was replaced by Muhammad Ghnaym, who had headed the branch before 1967. Both Hmud and Ghnaym had Islamist backgrounds, but Ghnaym's departure in June 1968 for a training course in China left command in the hands of a more junior cadre and former Baʿthist, Sabri al-Banna. Banna had formed his own liberation group in the mid-1960s, but joined Fateh in 1967 and quickly assumed responsibility for security in the *iqlim*. Command members Samih Abu-Kwayk, Yahya Habash, and Husni Yunis were also former Baʿthists, whereas Muhammad al-Aʿraj and ʿAbbas Zaki were Fateh veterans.

Despite this underlying tension, the former party activists were instrumental in the intellectual and organizational development of Fateh. It lacked a central ideological department or committee and had few approved theoretical documents, but Habash and others authored many of the texts that were to become the standard staple of internal indoctrination. Their party training also led to a new emphasis in Fateh writings on formal, hierarchical structure with a clear chain of command. The Leninist principle of democratic centralism was supposed to apply, and the civilian organization was loosely modelled on the communist pyramid.[23] Fateh membership in Jordan was initially divided by social category, with separate networks for women, workers, teachers, and students. In late 1968 or early 1969, the organization was reorganized into 'areas' (*manatiq*, s. *mantaqa*), which descended into 'branches' (*shuʿab*, s. *shuʿba*), largely according to geographical location.[24] Each *shuʿba* was further divided into 'wings' (*ajniha*, s. *janah*), 'circles' (*halaqat*, s. *halaqa*), and 'cells' (*khalaya*, s. *khaliyya*).[25]

Restructuring was not to the liking of the founding core, not least because it perceived a potential threat to its control. In 1968 the General Command of al-ʿAsifa Forces, headed by Arafat (and Wazir), formed a new department of

mobilization and organization with nominal responsibility to oversee appointments and other matters in the civilian organization. The *iqlim*, in contrast, had no authority over Fateh guerrillas nor any responsibility for their supply or other administrative affairs. The new department also rivalled the secular ideological influence of the *iqlim* by publishing its own guerrilla's magazine, *Nida'al-Masira*, which was strongly Islamist in style, imagery, and outlook. Yet the threat of modern party organization had been overstated by the founding core; as one former communist ruefully noted, the reality of Palestinian exile and dispersal and the lack of common bonds deriving from shared modes of production rendered the construction of the desired vanguard organization difficult.[26]

In any case, whatever the contribution of the former party activists to defining Fateh's organizational structures, theirs was largely an informal, ad hoc effort. It drew on the outline provided in the original *Structure of Revolutionary Construction* of 1959, but Fateh still lacked properly drafted internal statutes. Many in the growing rank-and-file considered they had a right to question policy and help shape it, especially concerning relations with the Jordanian authorities, and expected appropriate mechanisms and regulations for the exercise of membership rights. The founding core was ill-suited to meet such expectations. The Islamist formation of most central committee members was reflected in a paternalistic style of leadership, in which authority was assumed through collegial consensus (*ijma*ʿ). Authority within the ranks was exercised through persuasion (*iqna*ʿ) whenever possible, but the central committee maintained real control through its power over appointments and by sidelining intermediary bodies and avoiding firm organizational structures and rules of procedure. The Fateh founders, none of whom had lived in Jordan before 1967 and had little understanding of its society and politics, were also set apart from cadres whose views were coloured by the experience of Hashemite rule and by resentment of Transjordanian attitudes.[27]

Growing pressure from the civilian organization coincided with a renewal of the challenge to Arafat from central committee member Maswada, who commanded a number of combat bases. In mid-April 1968 Maswada prepared to declare himself commander-in-chief, prompting Khalaf, who now headed Fateh's rudimentary intelligence service, to pre-empt him with the public announcement that Arafat was sole official spokesman for the movement.[28] Supporters of the old 'Kuwait group' in Kuwait and Egypt, including Arafat's younger brother Fathi, caused some confusion by declaring for Maswada.[29] The central committee suspended Maswada and his leading supporters, but they were reinstated after an agreement was reached to convene a general conference and select a new leadership by election.[30] Around 100 delegates duly met in the Syrian town of Zabadani in July, in what was recorded as Fateh's second general conference (although there is no consensus on which was the first). The revolutionary council was activated to monitor the central committee, while an attempt (possibly by Qaddumi, among others), to set establishing a Palestinian entity as an immediate aim was roundly defeated. A compromise allowed a

new central committee to be formed: the delegates elected the first three members, who then chose a fourth, and the four then chose a fifth, and so on until the number reached ten.[31] Maswada was not selected, and was subsequently assigned as Fateh representative in Khartum.

The conference failed, however, to resolve the more fundamental tensions. Most central committee members were now based in Jordan, and eclipsed the local *iqlim* almost entirely. It was they who directed the military, intelligence, and administration—all salaried personnel, in other words—and conducted talks with the Jordanian authorities and politicians. The *iqlim* was largely starved of central funds, and received virtually no weapons to form a civilian militia until November, on the grounds that such action would provoke the Jordanian authorities.[32] Its militant members concluded that the leadership was uninterested in political action among the masses, and that it held a conventional military outlook that despised civilian militias.[33] The central committee, for its part, feared that a capable civilian organization would limit its autonomy and ability to take political and military decisions. It also distrusted the former party activists in the *iqlim* and more junior cadres such as former Baʿthists Naji ʿAllush, Muhammad ʿAwda, and Muhammad Abu-Ghazala or former communist Munir Shafiq. Indeed, it was from their ranks that a leftist 'democratic direction' (*al-ittijah al-dimuqrati*) took shape, with strong influence in Amman and the northern city of Irbid.

The November clashes with the Jordanian army accelerated the militarization of Fateh and reinforced the position of its founding core. Arafat and Khalaf, aided by senior intelligence officer ʿAli Hasan Salama, initially responded to the threat by setting up 'revolutionary bases' (*qawaʿid thawriyya*) on outlying hills around Amman. These were commanded by veterans (mainly from Gaza) such as Musa ʿArafat and 'hajj' Ismaʿil Jabr and manned by recruits from the refugee camps. The central committee now gave a modest amount of weapons to the *iqlim* for the civilian militia, but itself distributed arms freely in the camps and rapidly expanded its payroll.[34] Thanks to their access to central funds, commanders of guerrilla bases or sectors also recruited actively and established their own civilian networks in the camps and urban centres, duplicating the *iqlim* and competing directly with the civilian organization for members.[35] The result was that bodies such as the 'revolutionary bases' distinguished themselves most by their 'anarchy, parasitic nature, and ostentatious displays' in the streets of Amman and other cities and towns.[36] The lower ranks came predominantly from the refugee camps, where unemployment was rife, but refugees (especially of peasant or working-class background) were massively under-represented at all senior levels (military, organizational, and political); when locally-based cadres held senior posts, they were almost invariably middle class and, as importantly, residents.

Wazir responded to one cadre who remonstrated with him over the marginalization of the civilian organization by asking 'must everyone who is willing to die for Palestine first pass through the hierarchy?' He added, 'if we

receive 1,000 volunteers and only 100 remain then we have still gained.'[37] For the Fateh leadership, the Palestinians had entered the heyday of 'total orientation [*al-tawwajjuh al-kulli*] towards Palestine'. It believed that 'igniting the battle in the occupied homeland is a test that never fails, an inevitably true measure that distinguishes the traitor and informer from the loyal patriot'.[38] This was identical to the attitude long expressed by former mufti Amin al-Husayni, that 'those who fight cannot be traitors'.[39] The leftist cadres shared this populist ethos in fact, and, given their prominence in Fateh print media, helped actively to disseminate it. An editorial in the weekly *Fath* in October 1968, for instance, insisted that 'what is important is for the masses to move, because the movement of the masses is always correct'.[40] The Maoist doctrine of 'learning from the masses and teaching them' was pervasive: 'the results of their spontaneous practice provide the revolutionary with the raw material to formulate ideas and a guide for the daily action of the masses'.[41]

The populist outlook accompanied the statist approach of the Fateh leadership to social provision. An obvious example was the Palestine Mujahidin and Martyrs Fund (set up in September 1964), which gave modest financial aid to the families of guerrillas who were killed, disabled, or captured. In the course of 1968 the fund was turned into a fully fledged Society for the Care of the Families of Martyrs and Prisoners, with branch offices in five Arab states that hosted large Palestinian communities.[42] This safety net was complemented by the Fateh medical services branch, that at first set up first-aid posts and clinics in the guerrilla sectors and organized periodic visits by doctors and mobile clinics to nearby villages. The PCRS was next established as a separate service in order to cater for the growing civilian constituency, and provided free medical care to all patients.[43] By January 1969 it had seven permanent clinics, seven social work centres, and a convalescent home with emergency service in Jordan.[44] Another example was the military training and supplementary schooling programmes for boys and girls in the 8–15 years age bracket, known as the Lioncubs and Flowers Institution (*mu'assasat al-Ashbal wa al-Zahrat*).[45] Launched in September with 450 boys in the Wihdat and Baqʿa refugee camps, it claimed to have 15 centres and an enrolment of 15,000 by 1970.[46]

At the same time, expansion prompted the emergence of new power bases and rivalries within the central committee. A foremost example was the expansion of the intelligence apparatus after November 1968, as it gained additional tasks of penetrating the Jordanian army and security agencies. A small military intelligence apparatus had been set up in Syria in 1967, and in 1968 Walid Nimr set up headquarters in Darʿa while Zakariyya ʿAbd-al-Rahim set up a branch in Jordan (based in al-Salt).[47] A separate body—the Revolutionary Surveillance Directorate (*Mufawwadiyyat al-Rasd al-Thawri*)—was briefly headed by Qaddumi in late 1967, but his lack of aptitude allowed Khalaf to take command at the beginning of 1968. Military intelligence remained modest in size and function, but Khalaf regarded it as a potential rival because it was attached to Fateh's 'operations centre' and so came under the control of Arafat.[48] Khalaf

waged a discreet campaign against it for this reason and even worked to isolate his own deputy, Hani al-Hasan, who was allied to Arafat.[49] Khalaf asserted Rasd as the central security apparatus by early 1969, and it emerged as a major autonomous power base with an extensive network of informants and its own 'strike force' of 500–600 guerrillas.[50] Inevitably, it too competed with the *iqlim* for recruits and influence.

Internal tensions came to a boil in early 1969, following the appearance of a new guerrilla group, Islamic Fateh (*Fath al-Islam*). In response to a request from former mufti Husayni for an avowedly Islamist group, Arafat and Wazir had secretly assisted two of his veteran aides, ʿUmar ʿAbd-al-Karim and Hasan Abu-Raqaba, to set up camp near al-Zarqaʾ and provided them with arms and funds.[51] Islamic Fateh included numerous members of the Muslim Brotherhood in its ranks (notably including fugitives from Syria), most prominent of whom were ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam and Muhammad Hadid, although none came from the Islamic Liberation Party.[52] Most of the Muslim Brothers came from the Society's branch in Jordan (including the West Bank) and the Sudan, according to one of its chroniclers, but the Gaza branch proved reluctant, disputing the feasibility of the enterprise.[53] Discovery of Islamic Fateh's existence triggered a strong backlash from the *iqlim*; Khalaf adeptly utilized this by ordering Rasd units to close down the camp forcibly. Most of the Islamist guerrillas now joined Fateh, and were allowed to form four separate bases in the north, officially designated the 'western unit' but better known as *qawaʿid al-shuyukh* (the 'sheikhs' bases').[54] Leftist cadres in Irbid protested their presence, but they were to remain in the area until the civil war of September 1970 (when they finally disbanded in order to avoid fighting fellow Muslims).[55]

Maswada resurfaced briefly in the wake of the Islamist Fateh crisis. The Jordanian authorities uncovered a plot by the Islamic Liberation Party to overthrow the monarchy in January, in which Maswada was apparently implicated.[56] He may have intended to use Islamist Fateh to support the planned *coup*, and was among those arrested by Fateh intelligence during the clampdown. This would explain the willingness of Arafat and Wazir to see the group disbanded; Maswada was now formally expelled from Fateh.[57] However, the *iqlim* was simultaneously subjected to a thorough shake-up, as those who opposed the growing role of 'outsiders' were effectively exiled from Jordan: Banna replaced Maswada in Khartum, Aʿraj took up a new post in Syria, and Yunis became Fateh representative in China. Loyalist Ghnaym moved sideways to become Arafat's deputy for military administration, while the commander of the northern guerrilla sector, ʿAbid, summarily dismissed the leftist cadres of the local civilian organization.[58] Abu-Kwayk was named secretary of the *iqlim*, but his authority was eroded by the inclusion of prominent outsiders Hani al-Hasan and Nimr Salih.

These changes did not end instability. Salih had been in contact with Maswada and a Jordanian officer recruited by the Islamic Liberation Party, and was suspected of involvement in the abortive *coup*, but was let off with a

warning.[59] His vulnerability may have made him amenable to manipulation by the central committee, which assigned him to head the Fateh militia in Jordan. Salih promptly separated the militia from the civilian organization and appointed full-time guerrillas to command militia sections, sidelining the *iqlim* of which he was a member. He already headed political guidance (*al-tafwid al-siyasi*) in the Fateh general command, and now strove ambitiously to turn the militia into his personal power base. This, and the constant feuding it provoked, led to his dismissal from both the *iqlim* and militia command at the end of the year. Hani al-Hasan was now assigned to head the *iqlim*, but continued disaffection led to the reappointment of Abu-Kwayk in early 1970. Abu-Kwayk, like Habash and Zaki, who had also survived the various reshuffles, was left-leaning but not openly associated with the 'democratic direction'. However, leftist cadre ʿAllush now headed the powerful Amman branch, which boasted some 5,000 members, and his colleague ʿAwda took command of all militia sections in the kingdom, which were brought into a single command.[60] An ally of Wazir, Hamad al-ʿAydi, tried to counter leftist influence by secretly building a parallel civilian organization in Amman, but was exposed and expelled from the *iqlim*.[61]

The PFLP Beset

Fateh was by no means the only group to experience internal disputes as a result of rapid expansion in 1968, but the strength of its populist appeal and corporatist approach helped maintain an outward appearance of consensus. Its main rival, the PFLP, was not so fortunate, as it was torn by major, and public divisions. Most obvious was the disagreement between its two main coalition partners, the ANM and Jibril's PLF. The unity announced in December 1967 was proving to be nominal at best, as each group jealously kept its membership, political tenets, and guerrilla forces separate. The PFLP had started 1968 with hopes of a further merger with Fateh, to which end secretary-general Habash conducted intensive talks with Wazir during January and February 1968. The PFLP also planned to rebuild secret bases in the West Bank, by sending senior cadres at the head of 'leadership teams', but its efforts were aborted by a sudden crisis.

On 19 March, Syrian military police arrested Habash, the ANM faction's liaison officer in Damascus (Fayiz Qaddura), and 17 PFLP members. PLF co-founder ʿAli Bushnaq was also detained, followed by veteran ANM cadre Ahmad al-Yamani three days later. Ostensibly this was to punish the PFLP for sabotaging the pipeline carrying Saudi oil to the Zahrani terminal in Lebanon, at a point where it crossed the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. In reality, the authorities suspected the ANM faction of plotting a *coup d'état* with Syrian opposition figures led by Jamal al-Atasi, head of the pro-Nasir Arab Socialist Union.[62] Habash and Yamani were incarcerated for the next eight months, and

most PFLP facilities in Syria were closed down. Bushnaq, whose arrest had probably been a mistake, suffered a heart attack and died two days after being released from prison.

The arrest of Habash left the ANM faction without its key figure two days before the Israeli attack on Karama. What his advice would have been cannot be known, but the decision to withdraw before the battle was effectively taken by Zaʿrur and Jibril, and cost the PFLP dearly in terms of Palestinian support and official Arab assistance. Habash's moderating influence was also missing in the subsequent exchange of recriminations. The ANM and PLF formally resolved their differences in April and pledged to merge completely, but in reality cooperation still did not exceed 'joint action'.[63] The ANM rank-and-file remained pro-Nasir and were engaged in a heated debate about the formal adoption of socialism, whereas PLF members tended to dislike Nasir and firmly eschewed ideology. The ANM believed itself the larger force, with a major following in the occupied territories, while the PLF prided itself on its professional military expertise. The ANM hoped to gain the PLF's military muscle yet retain political control, while the PLF desired the intellectual mantle of the ANM but resented its patronizing assumption that it would ultimately absorb its junior partner.[64] On 23 April, the PLF faction publicly disclaimed connections with the ANM and asserted rights to the PFLP name, triggering an acrimonious internal debate that was to drag on for a further six months.

The ANM was distracted from this dispute by the growing division within its own ranks between Left and Right. The leftist faction now took the old guard leadership openly to task for not starting military action sooner after June 1967, and for leaving the initiative to Fateh instead.[65] It similarly decried 'rightist' reluctance to dispatch senior leaders to the West Bank, again in sharp contrast to Fateh, and criticized the subsequent decision not to fight at Karama.[66] The leftists blamed this apparent recalcitrance on the fact that the old guard still contained figures held responsible for the disastrous collapse of the Jordanian branch in 1966.[67] In part the rift revealed a generation gap: the leftists were young, mainly university students, and included intellectuals such as the Tunisian-born al-ʿAfif al-Akhdar who were influenced by the leftist rebellion of European youth, and who now initiated a debate on the writings of Mao Zedong, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, and Franz Fanon.

The factional rift came to the fore when the ANM reformed its leadership committee in Jordan following the dispute with Jibril. The committee contained Hamad al-Farhan, Mustafa al-Zabri, Hamdi Matar, Ahmad al-Yamani, and Mahmud ʿIsa of the old guard, and leftists Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu, Muhammad Katmattu, and Hasan Juʿba. The ANM was meanwhile in the midst of a wider debate about its future as a pan-Arab movement, with branches in different states. ʿAbd-Rabbu attended a meeting in Beirut in June 1968 at which co-founder Muhsin Ibrahim argued for the dissolution of the ANM and the creation of a new body to maintain contacts and coordinate activities.[68] The Right was loathe to take any fateful decisions in the absence of Habash, and so a

provisional triumvirate comprising Hindi, Haddad, and Ibrahim was formed as a liaison body.

The Beirut meeting also brought ʿAbd-Rabbu into direct contact for the first time with Hawatma, who had lived in Lebanon since summer 1967 (after studying abroad in 1965–7). Happy to meet like-minded ANM members, Hawatma returned to Jordan a month later and secretly formed a shadow leadership with ʿAbd-Rabbu, Katmattu, Juʿba, and more junior cadres. A general conference of the Palestinian ANM branch was due in August, and by this time the Left had worked itself into a position of some strength. ʿAbd-Rabbu and Katmattu headed the civilian organization in Jordan, and so ensured that 20 of the 32 delegates were their own supporters. It was possibly to counteract leftist influence that Haddad and Hindi timed the first PFLP hijacking operation on 23 July, in order to enhance the stature of the old guard. This, at least, is what the Left believed, but it made little difference in the event.[69] Leftists swept the leadership election, but the victory of virtual unknowns such as Samir Shihab-al-Din, the ANM liaison officer in Egypt, outraged the Right to such an extent that a second ballot was held. The leftists withdrew several candidates in order to avoid excessive provocation, and only Hawatma was returned to represent them.[70]

The retreat of the Left was only tactical, however, as it had secured adoption by the conference of the Basic Political Report which it had already drafted.[71] The document contained an extensive critique of the 'progressive and nationalist' Arab governments, implicitly including Egypt, whose espousal of 'consumer economies' and investment in conventional armed forces were deemed responsible for the defeat of June 1967. Arab acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242 came in for especially severe attack as the first step towards 'liquidation of the Palestine cause'.[72] The report also signalled an interventionist approach to social and political conflicts in the Arab countries, by criticizing the slogan raised by Fateh of 'non-interference' in internal Arab affairs. The Left castigated the PFLP leadership for having pursued a similar policy in the previous 15 months.[73] Publication was delayed under pressure from the Right, but for Jibril the report was the last straw. After lengthy negotiations over the right to adopt the PFLP name, he declared the formation of the PF–General Command in late October.[74] The PF–GC attracted 100–200 guerrillas, or roughly one-quarter of PFLP combat strength, and retained the old PLF training camp near Damascus.[75] Jibril and his lieutenants, Fadl Shruru and Talal Naji, were also joined by Ahmad Zaʿrur and his followers.

The ANM bitterly viewed Jibril's action as the result of manipulation by Syrian military intelligence, but was distracted by its own divisions.[76] Left and Right now competed by renewing the attempt to establish a clandestine command in the West Bank. Leftist cadre ʿUmar al-Qasim and rightist base commander Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim led two 'leadership teams' into the West Bank, but Qasim was captured and ʿAbd-al-Karim returned to Jordan. This was a blow to the Left, which, despite its ability to influence the selection of conference

delegates in August, remained a small minority within the ANM. The Right strengthened its position by appointing Zabri to replace Jibril as PFLP military commander, and by adding Fayiz Jabir and Subhi al-Tamimi to the command, along with Mahmud ʿIsa and Hindi, who represented the Special Apparatus.[77] Zabri reinforced his position by promoting ʿAbd-al-Karim and another young base commander, ʿAbd-al-Rahim Malluh, to the command. Abu Mahmud al-Dawli was the only leftist with a field command, while Salih Raʾfat was the leftist in the committee responsible for clandestine organization in the occupied territories.

The Right utilized its control (which extended to PFLP finances) to isolate its leftist rivals. At one point Hawatma even complained that Haddad had written to his aides in Jordan to 'get rid of the troublemakers'.[78] Whether this accusation was true or not, Haddad had the capability, as he demonstrated by organizing the rescue of Habash from jail in Damascus and spiriting him to Jordan on 3 November.[79] The old guard hoped that his reappearance would contain the Left, but the dispute was too deep. The two sides agreed to convene a reconciliation conference in February 1969, but the leftists had secretly resolved to break away. They approached Baʿth Party chairman Salah Jadid in Syria, who was eager to retaliate for the embarrassing escape of Habash and instructed Saʿiqa secretary-general Jmayʿani to provide military assistance. Khalaf, who now headed Fateh intelligence, also promised material support, as did leftist PLA commanders Khatib, Wajih, and Yahya.[80]

The old guard PFLP leadership realized that the Left was preparing to secede. Possibly in order to impress the rank-and-file, Haddad's Special Apparatus attacked an El Al aircraft on the ground at Athens airport on 26 December, killing one passenger. Matters came to a head in mid-February, when loyalists attacked several offices in Amman and took a dozen leftists prisoner, summarily executing at least one.[81] On 18 February, the Special Apparatus attacked an El Al aircraft at Zurich airport, leaving one dead and four wounded among the crew and passengers. Once again the timing may have been chosen to distract attention from the internal rift. Fateh stepped in at this point to protect the Left, and provided it with supplies, arms, and funds. Leftist officers meanwhile offered safe passage in and out of Amman in PLA vehicles. Assured of external support, the Left pre-empted the reconciliation conference by announcing the formation of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), on 22 February. Shortly after, Muhammad Kishli and Muhsin Ibrahim broke away with most of the Lebanese branch of the ANM to form the Organization of Lebanese Socialists. The latter group and the PDFLP now shared editorial control of *al-Hurriyya*, compelling the PFLP to start a new weekly, *al-Hadaf* (*Target*).

The PDFLP was headed by the 32-year-old Hawatma, and its leadership included ʿAbd-Rabbu, Raʾfat, Katmattu, Juʿba, and Qays al-Samarraʾi, a recently arrived fugitive Arab nationalist from Iraq. The PDFLP claimed to have the backing of several military sectors and of PFLP branches in various countries,

but in reality it had at most 150 members and a few dozen guerrillas.[82] Its main support came from younger members, especially in the West Bank and in some of the refugee camps of Syria and Lebanon, but it made no headway in Gaza and had a minimal following in the combat bases in Jordan.[83] The Organization of Lebanese Socialists and the like-minded Socialist Lebanon Movement, headed by former Baʿthist Fawwaz Trabulsi, Mahmud Swayd, and others, provided invaluable assistance by seconding 30–40 members to PDFLP bases in Jordan during 1969.[84] The PDFLP was indeed, as one of its sympathizers described it, little more than a 'revolutionary phrase'.[85] External support was vital for survival: Saʿiqa maintained the modest flow of arms and assisted the PDFLP to establish bases on the Golan front, while PLA officers Khatib and Wajih provided additional weapons, training, and basing facilities in Jordan.[86]

The PDFLP gained strength by absorbing smaller groups such as the Palestinian League of the Left. A more substantial gain was the Maoist-leaning POLP, which had grown modestly after attracting a handful of cadres such as ʿAbd-al-Rahman Jbara and Musallam Bsaysu from the Jordanian Communist Party in 1964.[87] The POLP had 250–300 civilian members and 50–60 guerrillas by the end of 1968; Wajih and Khatib diverted PLA funds and weapons to it, and secured training for 15 members in China.[88] However, the decision by Wajih and Khatib to remain in the PLA (and 'revolutionize' it from within) instead of taking active command of the POLP led to disagreement with more ideologically-minded civilian cadres, who initiated a dialogue with the ANM Left in late 1968.[89] Hawatma and ʿAbd-Rabbu attended a POLP general conference, and proposed a merger to a second conference in June 1969.[90] A minority was opposed and continued to operate under the POLP name for another year, but the majority opted to join the PDFLP, although the effective monopoly of the former ANM leftists alienated the POLP cadres and prompted many defections in the next two years.[91]

The PDFLP remained a minor force, and compensated by portraying itself as the vanguard of radical ideological transformation. *Al-Hurriyya* now lambasted the 'bureaucratic Soviet Union' and extolled China, Vietnam, and Cuba.[92] The PDFLP attracted many Arabs who played a prominent role in its radicalism, and was also influenced by the Trotskyist and other 'new left' trends of the dozens, perhaps hundreds, of European youths who flocked to its camps. Its guerrillas were photographed reading Mao Zedong's Red Book, and it expressed the same ethos by calling on the other groups in September 1969 to form 'unified militia battalions' in which commanders and officials would be chosen by election.[93] The PDFLP assertively demonstrated its independence from Fateh by criticizing it for accepting funds from 'reactionary' Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and castigated the PFLP for adopting a policy of non-interference in Arab affairs.[94] This was a time of grand ambition, as the PDFLP envisaged a people's war against Israel involving 'millions and tens of millions' of Arabs. It demanded the nationalization of Arab oil, abrogation of treaties with Western powers, and the consolidation of friendship with the

socialist countries. Addressing the situation in Jordan, it raised the provocative slogan of 'no authority over the authority of the [Palestinian] resistance'.[95]

Radicalizing the PFLP

The political and ideological challenge posed by the PDFLP prompted the PFLP to move decisively to the left. As it later admitted, 'the split was an incentive towards [adopting] Marxism'.[96] It denounced the PDFLP in class terms, for example, stating that the secessionists were petit bourgeois students and the like. The PFLP proudly boasted, conversely, that 'the proletarians of the [refugee] camps' had remained loyal to it.[97] The new Marxist orientation was formally endorsed at a general conference (officially, the second) in late February 1969, that also resolved to transform the PFLP into a 'proletarian party' and to emulate communist party structure by forming a politburo and central committee. Habash was selected as secretary-general, while the politburo comprised Hindi (security), Haddad (Special Apparatus), Zabri (military), Yamani (finance), 'Isa (organization), Matar (armament), and Khawaja and Musallami (occupied territories), among others.

As the composition of the politburo showed, the ideological shift had produced no changes in the PFLP leadership. Its new-found Marxism was skin-deep, if that, and indeed was bitterly opposed by many in the old guard. Most disdainful was Haddad, known as an impatient man of action who disliked theory in general. The divergence became obvious when Habash formed a nine-man 'central organizational committee', that contained several younger, leftist cadres, with nominal responsibility for civilian organization and party construction.[98] However, it proved to have no authority and little impact on internal affairs, and collapsed by the end of 1969. Similarly, the establishment by leftist cadres of an 'education bureau' to supervise and conduct the dissemination of Marxist ideology within the civilian organization and guerrilla forces was not received with universal enthusiasm. Military commander Zabri and his lieutenants in particular complained whenever the bureau paid a visit to guerrilla bases.[99] When leftist political commissars and guerrillas in the PFLP's northern sector conducted elections to get rid of an unpopular commander, Zabri regarded this as open rebellion. The ringleaders were arrested and initially condemned to death for mutiny, but were later released and expelled from the guerrilla forces.[100]

Developments in the PFLP in 1968–9 accentuated the divergence of political and ideological paths within the ANM, as the Left–Right rift was replicated in the branches in other Arab arenas. Leftist representatives of several branches, including Hawatma and Ibrahim, unilaterally convened a meeting of the national executive committee to announce their irrevocable decision to withdraw from the ANM on 10 February.[101] The PDFLP broke away twelve days later, while the Lebanese branch later accused the 'traditional founding elements of

the movement' of 'fascist methods' and an unwavering 'rightist bourgeois' ideology.[102] The Left had been dominant in Oman and South Yemen since 1967–8, while the Syrian and Iraqi branches had withered away into insignificance.

Habash and other members of the old guard reiterated their commitment to the ANM at a rival executive committee meeting in March, but recognized that it had been dealt a mortal blow. Determined nonetheless to uphold the pan-Arab ideal and claim wider nationalist legitimacy, Habash championed the creation of a new movement with a markedly leftist orientation, the Arab Socialist Action Party (ASAP). The PFLP approved this decision during its conference in February, and a fugitive ANM cadre from Iraq, Hashim ʿAli Muhsin, was selected to be ASAP secretary-general later in the year.[103] The PFLP was supposedly merely a branch of the party, with representation in its central leadership, and the ASAP was loyally said to have branches in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and even Saudi Arabia, but these were all so minute as to be effectively non-existent.[104] An internal PFLP report subsequently confessed that these branches had suffered 'a resounding failure'.[105] Only the Palestinian branch (that is, the PFLP) existed, while a modest Lebanese branch was created by the simple expedient of transferring Lebanese members from the PFLP.[106] Muhsin had no function to speak of, let alone power, and compensated by devoting most of his attention to the Lebanese branch, much to the discomfort of its Lebanese cadres who found him overbearing and authoritarian.

The decision to reconstruct the PFLP as a Marxist-Leninist party lacked both a political basis and concrete substance, and the front remained both 'rightist' and 'bourgeois' in this period, according to its own retrospective assessment in 1981.[107] Such an admission was unthinkable in 1969, however. Not to be outdone by the PDFLP, the PFLP's new weekly, *al-Hadaf*, provided frequent coverage of developments in China and other socialist countries. It occasionally emblazoned its cover with Mao Zedong's portrait or other Chinese motifs, while PFLP literature contained numerous references to Mao, as well as to Lenin, in what it later called its 'Chinese phase'.[108] The planned transformation into a Marxist-Leninist party was depicted as a reflection of the Chinese and Vietnamese models, in which a broad national front could only be successfully built around a vanguard party.

The PFLP also followed the PDFLP lead to form a short-lived unit of women guerrillas in late 1969 and run mixed training courses for its militia, which it informally called the 'red guard'.[109] The PFLP encouraged farmers to set up two cooperative farms on fallow land in the Jordan Valley.[110] In September, the central committee decreed the establishment of a 'cadres' school' as a means of assisting the construction of a 'workers party'.[111] The school was launched at the beginning of February 1970 under al-Haytham al-Ayyubi, one of the two exiled Syrian officers in the PFLP military command. However, there was little attempt to analyse the specific problems faced by peasants or workers and other supposedly revolutionary social forces, nor to propose practical measures to

improve production, raise living standards, or generate income. Mass action consisted of little more than 'agit-prop' and theoretical political discussions or speeches.[112] Marxism-Leninism was adopted as 'pure' ideology, not practical ideology, a distinction reflected above all in the absence of any attempt to embody revolutionary power in the construction of parallel, guerrilla government.

The Marxist transformation had little effect on the PFLP Special Apparatus, which renewed its 'external operations' with bomb attacks on two London department stores on 17 July 1969. The London offices of the Israeli shipping company Zim were targeted on 25 August, and four days later two PFLP members hijacked a TWA aircraft flying to Tel Aviv, ostensibly in response to the US decision to supply Israel with advanced Phantom F-4 fighter-bombers. The aircraft was diverted to Damascus, where the hijackers blew up the cockpit before releasing their hostages and surrendering to Syrian security. On 8 September four PFLP 'cubs' mounted synchronized grenade attacks on Israeli-owned buildings in the Hague, Brussels, and Bonn. The PFLP was also implicated in a new *coup* plot by the Islamic Liberation Party in October, and demonstrated its hostility to imperialist and reactionary Arab interests by twice attacking the US-owned pipeline carrying Saudi oil twice through the Golan Heights to the Lebanese terminal at Zahrani.[113]

Sensitive to the dramatic appeal of such acts, PDFLP secretary-general Hawatma commented that such action 'creates media sensation that replaces individual terrorism for mass action and so causes fundamental harm to the resistance [movement]'.[114] In his view, external operations revealed adventurism and elitism, and confirmed the petit bourgeois character of the PFLP leadership. The PFLP naturally viewed the matter differently. It believed that international terrorism was a legitimate means of alerting the world to the Palestinian plight. Besides, it attracted recruits and provided substantial income as airlines paid 'protection money' to be left unharmed. Terrorism also caught the attention of Muʿammar al-Qadhdhafi, the fiery young colonel who seized power in Libya in September. At his prompting the PFLP held unity talks with Fateh in Tripoli in December, but the attempt collapsed when Fateh rejected a PFLP proposal to unify sources of income and to permit a continuation of external operations.[115] Qadhdhafi turned down a PFLP request for direct funding following the untimely publication of a new Marxist tract, but allowed it to collect private donations in the country.[116] Fateh reportedly received 90 per cent of Libyan aid, the rest going to the PF–GC.[117]

The PFLP gave further evidence of its frame of mind during 1969 by maintaining its boycott of PLO bodies. Fateh responded to its absence at the PNC in February by granting Saʿiqa 12 seats, placing it on a par with the PFLP. The PFLP was unrepentant, accusing the Fateh-dominated PLO of persistent bureaucratic tendencies and refusing to attend the next PNC session in September. On this occasion, the PDFLP won eight seats in the council. The PFLP also refused to assign its representatives to fill the quota of posts held for it in PLO

departments, and alienated a potentially important ally by criticizing the PLA for being a conventional military formation rather than an egalitarian guerrilla force. A senior Fateh official explained PFLP behaviour bluntly as motivated by 'what has come to be known as the proportions of representation'.[118] In other words, the PFLP wanted a larger share of seats—an expanded 'quota', in emerging Palestinian parlance—and acknowledgement of its stature as the second force after Fateh.

The PFLP, for its part, explained that its stand stemmed from disagreement over three main demands. It expected the other guerrilla groups to identify the enemy clearly, since 'the [Arab] reactionary forces are more threatening [than Israel]' and insisted that they incorporate 'striking imperialist targets . . . as a fundamental aspect of any program . . . for Palestinian national unity'. The PFLP also demanded, thirdly, the right to pursue its own strategy even if it joined the PLO executive committee, and to retain complete autonomy if disagreement over these demands persisted.[119] It maintained its boycott of the PASC, set up in February by Fateh as a PLO body to coordinate military operations against Israel. PFLP military commander Abu Hammam argued that the PASC had no role to play, since guerrilla war was decentralized by definition, and argued that it could do no more than prevent competing groups from claiming responsibility for each other's operations.[120] The main result, however, was that the PFLP, which continued to acknowledge the PLO as a suitable framework for national unity, forfeited the chance to assert its presence or counter Fateh influence.

The PFLP's self-imposed isolation was mitigated by its growing alliance with Iraq. This followed the sharp deterioration of relations with Egypt following the publication in November 1968 of the Basic Political Report adopted at the PFLP conference in August. The old guard had held up public distribution while Habash remained in a Syrian jail, but after his escape he insisted on carrying out the conference decision.[121] His scruples exposed him to angry reproaches from Nasir during a fraught meeting shortly after; Habash blamed Egyptian intelligence for presenting the president with a distorted summary of the report, but to no avail.[122] Some 100 PFLP guerrillas who were already in training in Egypt were allowed to complete their course, but further training, arms supplies, passports, and other material assistance were stopped and *al-Hadaf* was banned. Only Haddad was able to maintain a covert relationship with Egyptian intelligence, for nearly two years longer.[123]

Habash's next foreign trip was to Baghdad, where the Baʿth Party had taken power in July. In the light of the rift between the ANM and the Baʿth since 1963, both sides made it clear that Habash had been invited as the leader of the PFLP.[124] The Iraqi government was keen to increase its influence in the Palestinian arena, and agreed to replace Egypt as a source of training and arms for the PFLP.[125] It also considered itself to be in direct competition with Syria, and had already helped PFLP guerrillas circumvent the Syrian ban by allowing them to use the Habbaniyya airbase since March.[126] In 1969 the PFLP also started to

receive Iraqi financial assistance, enabling it to develop its administrative services and expand the guerrilla units from a strength of some 400 in late 1968 to 1,150 a year later.[127] What the PFLP gained the PDFLP lost, as *al-Hadaf* replaced *al-Hurriyya* on Iraqi newsstands. The PDFLP was paying the price for championing the cause of a splinter group of the Iraqi Communist Party waging a guerrilla campaign against the government, and for its secret cooperation with leftist officers in the Iraqi expeditionary force in Jordan, who provided it with combat supplies and training from mid-1969.[128]

However, the Iraqi Baʿth Party still 'felt the need for a national counterpart' through which it could wield direct influence in the Palestinian arena.[129] On 11 April 1969, the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) announced its existence as 'the formulation in the national struggle' of the party.[130] The regional command of the Palestinian branch of the party doubled as the ALF leadership, in a mirror-image of the relationship between Saʿiqa and the Unified Palestinian Organization of the Syrian wing of the Baʿth. ALF secretary-general ʿAbd-al-Wahhab al-Kayyali, a historian by training, explained that the Baʿth had resolved to form its own guerrilla group even before taking power in Baghdad.[131] This may have been a retroactive justification, but in any case the ALF relied initially on Palestinian Baʿthists affiliated to other groups, especially Fateh and the PLA Qadisiyya Forces. Its appeal was limited, and the Palestinian refugee community in Baghdad was too small to offer much scope for recruitment, so up to 70 per cent of its personnel were non-Palestinian Arabs.[132] The Iraqi army started a crash commando training course for 100 ALF members in November 1968, and in April 1969 the graduates were deployed near PLA and PLF/PLA positions in northern Jordan.[133] In August the Iraqi government decreed that volunteers would continue to draw their salaries in full while serving in the ALF, and combat strength reached 300 by the end of the year.[134]

The Iraqi decision to form the ALF paralleled the deterioration of relations with Fateh. After taking power, the Baʿth disbanded the 'popular support committees for the Palestinian Revolution' through which it had operated in a semi-public fashion before its *coup*, fearing that they could be used again as a political and organizational vehicle for other opposition parties.[135] The Iraqi government also distrusted Fateh's special relationship with Egypt and its tactical alliance with Syrian-sponsored Saʿiqa in order to gain control of the PLO. Kayyali also expressed Baʿthist hostility to the Palestinian nationalism (*qutriyya*) of Fateh, which ran counter to the commitment to pan-Arab unity.[136] Iraq at first maintained assistance to Fateh and permitted it to set up a training camp near Habbaniyya in late 1968, but hardly had the first 300 trainees graduated in March 1969 than the authorities closed down the camp.[137] Relations were not completely severed, as Fateh was allowed to receive large shipments of Chinese weapons through Basra (3,000 assault rifles in 1969, for example).[138] The ALF moreover moderated its tone towards Fateh after July, when the Syrian authorities imposed a ban on its activities and arrested its known members in the country.

Iraqi hostility sharpened after Fateh (adopting an original proposal by the PDFLP) secured amendment of the PLO national charter at the PNC session in September in favour of the eventual establishment of a 'secular, democratic Palestinian state' after liberation, with equal rights for Muslim, Christian, and Jewish citizens. The Ba'th, ALF, and PFLP viewed this as a betrayal of the Arab nation as a whole, that threatened to leave Palestine in the hands of Zionism and colonialism.[139] The ALF refused to join the PLO as a sign of protest, despite joining the PASC in July and sending an observer to the PNC in September. The Iraqi Ba'th stepped up assistance to the PFLP and other militant groups, distributing funds and combat supplies according to a set quota.[140] Beneficiaries such as the POLP and PPSF were at last able to offer a token salary to its guerrillas, while continuing to receive additional assistance from Egypt, Syria, Fateh, or the PLA.[141] As importantly, the Iraqi authorities issued a set of regulations governing all Palestinian activity in the country and placing it under the direct jurisdiction of military intelligence.[142]

Dealing with Fragmentation

Iraqi policy offered a potent example of the complications involved in forming an autonomous Palestinian political system. Arab constraints played a significant part in the evolution of its internal 'rules' and artificially altered the balance of power between the various guerrilla groups with some form of representation in the PLO, which numbered nine by mid-1969, not counting the PLF/PLA and PLA. Until then the proliferation of guerrilla groups had not disturbed Fateh overly. In 1965 it argued that the 'emergence of numerous groups means that the Palestinian Arab people as a whole feels the need to act for the return [to Palestine], and indicates that the impetus and momentum of revolution do not lie in one faction or group'.[143] Fateh maintained this attitude as it sought allies in the bid either to replace the PLO or to take control of it in 1968, and found pluralism a useful means to weaken the PFLP. The PFLP, for its part, was caught between opposition to proliferation for these reasons, and the fear that support for a united front would facilitate domination by Fateh. It regarded fragmentation as a problem, but saw it at the same time as a natural outcome of the multiplicity of political parties and social and economic interests in Palestinian society. Such differences, the PFLP argued, could not be obscured by emotive slogans calling for national unity and liberation.[144]

Yet Fateh discovered that there was a price to pay for encouraging the secession of groups such as the PDFLP, which denounced its policy of 'non-interference in internal Arab affairs' as the viewpoint of 'the reactionary Palestinian right'.[145] This criticism came in the Basic Political Report issued by the PFLP conference in August 1968, that served as the political manifesto of the PDFLP after February 1969. The document also regarded Fateh's call for national unity and postponement of social struggles as an attempt to 'consolidate

affluent feudal and capitalist circles at the head of the political leadership of the resistance movement, who have had no connection with the armed struggle throughout modern Palestinian history'. National unity under these terms was dominated by 'feudal elements, bank-owning millionaire money-changers, large merchants, and dyed-in-the-wool Palestinian reactionaries'. The PDFLP was equally scathing of the PFLP: 'The PNC has gathered all the representatives of Palestinian reaction, headed by the millionaire clique of bank-owners and contractors that made it a condition to head the national council, while the resistance movement (Fateh, the PFLP) formed their right and left hands.'[146] The Palestinian movement had become a mere 'card' in Arab hands, a means of pressure to bring Israel and the US to the negotiating table.[147]

Much of this was hyperbole, but ideological rivalry and political 'outbidding' (*muzayada*) were increasingly translated into provocative behaviour in Jordan and elsewhere. Fateh revealed growing concern after the election of Arafat as PLO chairman to assert its authority and prevent the emergence of rival coalitions, and to contain the influence of the Arab states. After all, it had argued since 1965 at least for the creation of a unified Palestinian organization in order 'to preserve identity and independence' from Arab control.[148] The establishment of the PASC in mid-February with the support of Saʿiqa and the PLA/PLF was intended to bring all guerrilla activity under a single general staff.[149] Arafat gave further evidence of the importance attached to the PASC by appointing PLA officers ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya as chief-of-staff and Samir al-Khatib as secretary of its council.[150] The PFLP refused to join, but Fateh could still claim that, with the PLA, the PASC comprised 90 per cent of Palestinian combat strength.[151]

Fateh concern about fragmentation increased when the Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP), which it had absorbed in 1968, broke away on 23 May 1969 under the leadership of ʿIsam al-Sartawi. The AOLP refused to join the PASC, and in August demanded provocatively that all Palestinian assets, including Fateh's programme on Cairo radio and the Palestine National Fund, be placed at the disposal of a new national front that would replace the PLO.[152] The appearance at this point of yet another group (the Arab Organization for Palestine, headed by Ahmad Zaʿrur) convinced Fateh that the Arab states actively sought to use the 'small organizations that appear from time to time . . . to strike the main forces in the Palestinian [arena]'.[153] Some of its leaders urged an 'Algerian solution': compulsory unification within a single military structure, under the political direction of the Fateh-dominated PLO.[154] The majority understood that Fateh could not easily impose unity on a widely dispersed community in the absence of a recognized central authority and a territorial base. Vulnerability to counter-measures by host governments was a major consideration, making accommodation of Arab-sponsored guerrilla groups a more prudent course of action than the attempt to exclude or eliminate them. Arafat summed up Fateh thinking concisely:

We faced two ways of dealing with this phenomenon, democratic dialogue or bloody violence. We are a people [made up] of clans and extended families, and the method of [internal] violence went out with our Great Revolt of 1936–9. We found, after studying that experience, that this [current] revolution will die if we follow the path of violence to determine its path. We are a small people, dispersed, and cannot tolerate liquidations. It is true that we have tired of the democratic approach, but who says that it is worse than physical extermination?[155]

Fateh devised a dual policy. On the one hand, it staffed PLO departments heavily with its own members and incorporated several of its own institutions within the PLO, notably the Palestine Martyrs' Fund and PRCS. On the other hand, it expanded PLO institutions in order to offer posts at all levels to the other guerrilla groups according to a fixed quota. To reinforce co-optation and widen its constituency still further, Fateh supported expansion of the PNC in order to offer seats to the smaller groups and so bring them within the PLO framework. In short, the policy pursued by Fateh through the PLO was unmistakably corporatist, involving both an intricate relationship between the dominant political force and the statist structure, and co-optation of other political actors with the guarantee of a fixed share of posts and resources. This was hardly unusual for a developing state, but what made it striking in the Palestinian case was that it evolved within the framework of a national liberation movement that was in an early stage of its armed struggle and that remained far from controlling its own national soil and an autonomous territorial, social, and economic base for institutional development.

PLO policy towards trade unions and other social associations offered a particularly revealing example of its corporatism, and of the willingness of the principal guerrilla groups to operate by its rules. Previously, Shuqayri and his colleagues had paid the unions scant attention, preferring to concentrate on the development of the Palestinian Popular Organization (PPO) as the broadly-based political vehicle of the PLO, through which the grass-roots membership could elect representatives to the PNC. The existing unions (of students, teachers, and so on) continued to be regarded as independent bodies, and as late as May 1966 the PNC merely noted that it was studying options for their future relationship with the PPO.[156] Attitudes changed fundamentally with the replacement of Shuqayri with the left-leaning Yahya Hammuda and the substantial increase in the representation of the guerrilla groups at the fourth session of the PNC in July 1968.

The PNC reflected the change both in attitudes and in structures by abandoning the PPO in favour of 'organizing the [various] popular sectors on a syndical or professional basis or in any other form'. To oversee this shift it decreed the establishment of a Popular Organization Department, which was to be headed by a member of the PLO executive committee. Among the department's main tasks were to supervise the activity of all unions and 'popular bodies' (*hay'at sha'biyya*) and to organize membership within individual

trades and professions, effectively uniting each within a single union. A higher council of Palestinian unions would also be formed, and would be responsible to ensure observance of the policy guidelines set by the PNC and PLO executive committee with respect to mass organization and national unity. Where they existed, union branches in the Arab states would similarly form branches of the higher council, which would in turn liaise with other Palestinian bodies, PNC delegates, and the PLO office in each country. The PLO executive committee would draw up the statutes regulating all its relations with the popular organization department and higher council (albeit after consulting them and obtaining their approval), and in return would offer funding and other facilities to the unions.[157]

The consequences were not long in becoming apparent. Unions had been among the few formally established organizations that could be based specifically on Palestinian membership between 1948 and the establishment of the PLO in 1964, and so their role as repositories of national identity was a crucial reason for their existence and appeal. This primarily political role subsumed the main social functions of the unions, and was further reinforced after 1968; the problem now was that it overlapped extensively with the political role of the various guerrilla groups, which attracted large numbers of activists into their civilian wings and fledgling bureaucracies.[158] Union membership stagnated as a result of this functional redundancy, a fact reflected especially in the small proportion of actual to potential membership within any given social or professional constituency. Of an estimated 80,000 Palestinian workers in Lebanon, Syria, and Kuwait in 1970, for example, at most 20,000 belonged to the General Union of Palestine Workers.[159] This ratio was moreover higher than for most other social categories, a notable exception being the General Union of Palestine Students—understandably for the most politically active group in any population. Otherwise, the concentration on political issues hindered recruitment in most social categories.

The incorporation of the unions into the PLO structure accentuated these patterns. Union leaders at the national and branch levels pre-empted activism by grass-roots members by securing benefits and services on their behalf from host governments and the PLO, demanding little more in return than participation in union elections and factional loyalty. The increasing focus on forming official delegations to Arab and international conferences, issuing joint political statements with non-Palestinian counterparts, and sending ritualistic messages of support to the PLO on various anniversaries and other special occasions reinforced the emerging 'top-down' character of PLO-affiliated syndicalism and marginalized union members still further, as did excessive factionalism.[160] Even the payment of membership dues was not always expected, as the guerrilla groups were often willing to pay for their followers in order to secure additional votes. It followed that union membership became nominal for many, possibly a large majority, who were expected to appear once a year only in order to vote, and that membership statistics greatly exaggerated actual participation. The

preference of Fateh and, albeit to lesser degrees, the other guerrilla groups for 'national unity' lists of candidates moreover meant that few union elections were seriously contested by the early 1970s and, indeed, that some were cancelled altogether.[161] This was most evident when major crises (such as the Jordanian conflict of 1970–1) affected the PLO as a whole, in which case the unions and their branches further afield experienced prolonged paralysis as a result of their growing subordination to the political and administrative centre. The eleventh session of the PNC, in January 1973, merely formalized an existing reality by stating that the popular organization department would draw on the specialized cadres of the guerrilla groups to provide administrative personnel for the unions and by expecting them to submit routine reports to the department and participate in official PLO delegations.[162]

The state of Palestinian unions was hardly an immediate concern in the months following the PNC session of February 1969, however, as Fateh discovered that the biggest challenge to its striving for autonomy lay in the attempt to assert PLO control over the PLA. Arafat signalled a campaign to restructure the army only one day after his election as PLO chairman. Addressing its units in Egypt on 5 February, he asserted that the PLA would 'not only be a classic regular army, but [also] the primary nucleus of the army of the revolution'.[163] An anonymous Fateh official launched a more direct attack in a carefully timed press interview, stating that the PLA was 'afflicted by all the defects of professional armies'. The crux of the matter, however, was the 'connection of most of its officers to one Arab regime or another'.[164] As Khalaf later complained, '[we cannot] change the chief-of-staff without consulting this Arab country or that, and without the approval of the second country . . . This army is not the army of the PLO, it lacks free will . . . [Each host] state wants the army to be subservient, in order one day to be the instrument of that state in striking the guerilla movement at a given hour or in a given circumstance.'[165] To redress this situation, Fateh aimed to turn 'the professional army into guerilla squads . . . and achieve [its] eventual unity with Fateh and all the [guerrilla] groups, so as to produce the Palestinian national liberation army that cannot only annoy or resist [the enemy] but also start liberation'.

The PNC session of July 1968 had already reinforced the position of the PLO executive committee by transferring control over the disbursement of the PLA budget and other expenditure to it, away from the PNF.[166] However, the opportunity to initiate changes in the PLA only followed Nasir's announcement of the start of a full-fledged war of attrition along the Suez Canal in March 1969 and his pressure on Syria to open a second front against Israel. In June, the executive committee asserted its prerogatives by reviving the post of commander-in-chief, to which it appointed ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya, and naming ʿAyn Jalut Forces commander Fathi Saʿd-al-Din as his deputy.[167] It also removed chief-of-staff Budayri, but to placate the Syrians appointed ʿUthman Haddad in his stead. The committee also placed the former communist Jawad ʿAbd-al-Rahim at the head of PLA military intelligence and brought at least one other

leftist officer into the command. It also declared, in an astute if insincere gesture to the PLA rank-and-file, that the recent appointments were intended to improve promotion prospects for junior officers.[168] Cuts in pay were decreed for senior officers and PLO officials, while the lower ranks were awarded increases.[169]

Placatory measures were wise because many junior officers felt that senior posts were the preserve of the 'graduates of 1948'.[170] Critical comments about the PLA by Fateh leaders had also disgruntled the officers, who were dismissive of the disunity and indiscipline of the guerrillas. Ironically, the problem facing Fateh was posed by the very leftist officers it had helped put in command of the PLA. Yahya, Khatib, and PLF/PLA commander Wajih regarded Fateh as a reactionary, right-wing organization, but realized that they could not resist Syrian control without its help. Yet Yahya sorely tested the tacit alliance in September, when he proposed sweeping military and organizational reforms that would merge all guerrilla forces under PLA command. The various groups could retain their distinct political identities and autonomous civilian organizations, and compete within the framework of the PLO. Fateh held that equal status for all groups would paralyse PLO decision-making, and suggested that the smaller factions should be made to disappear through persuasion or 'other means'.[171] The three-way tension between Fateh, the PLA command, and Damascus continued to simmer as the year drew to a close.[172] This, as much as anything else, revealed the complex interactions that characterized the emerging Palestinian political system.

10

Dual Power

The guerrilla movement had made several important gains since June 1967. It had carved out a sanctuary and acquired extraterritorial rights in three Arab confrontation states, and asserted itself as a distinct, if junior, regional actor. An autonomous Palestinian political system was taking form, that mitigated the impact of Arab constraints and penetration by transferring itself into the formal institutional framework provided by the PLO. Integration into the Arab political context was neither an aim nor an option, and so the dynamics of armed struggle instead drove Palestinian state-building (or, more precisely, 'statization' of its political institutions) and proto-nationalism.

The lack of a single territorial, social, or economic base inevitably made this course of political development uneven. For Palestinian communities in the wider diaspora or the inhabitants of the occupied territories it was mainly notional, and at most partial, since their 'strategies of survival' at the pragmatic level still had to be operated through the structures of host governments and societies, even if they identified increasingly with the guerrillas and Palestinianism. Statization and proto-nationalism had substance in the refugee camps of Syria and Lebanon, but above all in Jordan, where the high proportion of Palestinian citizens in the population and the major guerrilla presence meant that there was a fundamental challenge to Jordanian state-building and identification. It was within the context of this implicit clash that relations between the guerrilla movement and the government unfolded in 1968-70.

The Jordanian government had good reason to rein in the emerging Palestinian state-within-the-state and reassert its own authority. Israeli retaliatory fire in 1968 had laid waste to the Jordan Valley and triggered an exodus of some 100,000 inhabitants, and in 1969 the artillery and air strikes extended further into the country, to reach the outskirts of Irbid and Salt. Guerrilla disregard of the November 1968 agreement regulating attacks across the border was replicated in population centres and on main roads. Makeshift guerrilla and militia checkpoints frequently subjected Jordanian army personnel and civil servants to insult and occasionally to abduction, often in revenge for slights inflicted by Bedouin troops (known disparagingly by locals as 'knights of the West Bank') before 1967.[1] Yet the government was the largest single employer in the kingdom and many Transjordanian families had at least one member on the public payroll, so abuses against military and civilian personnel threatened to alienate the entire community.[2] At the same time, any potential for class solidarity was

undermined by what the JCP bitterly decried as 'Palestinian chauvinism'. 'Constant discrimination by the reactionary Jordanian regime against the Palestinians, to a degree that prevented the political influence of the Palestinian bourgeoisie from matching its economic influence', had driven it and its masses into nationalism.[3]

The Jordanian army was galled that many young men were able to avoid military service and remain at home or take up civilian employment simply by joining a guerrilla group.[4] This, coupled with the loss of authority of the Jordanian police and courts, highlighted the emergence of a parallel, if loosely organized, Palestinian government in the kingdom. The guerrilla movement now had its own military police, security apparatus, revolutionary courts, information offices, media, trade union movement, and, of course, full-time armed forces and 'liberated zones' in the refugee camps. 'It arrested, imprisoned, and punished, intervened in matters of marriages and rents, and departed from all the laws set down by the authorities.'[5] Yet parallel government did not mean law and order. A study published by the Jordanian ministry of defence in 1970 blamed the guerrillas (but not the PLA or PLF/PLA) for a staggering 43,397 violations of the peace, including illegal arrest, murder, injury, forced entry into homes, kidnapping, rape, theft, assault on civilians, road accidents, attacks on government property, and forgery of official documents.[6] Many incidents may have been wrongly blamed on the guerrillas or fabricated, but the figures revealed an unmistakable trend.

The leftist guerrilla groups did much to activate latent tensions between the Palestinians and native Transjordanians and to threaten social cohesion. The monarchy offered a convenient foil in particular for the determined 'outbidding' (*muzayada*) between the PFLP and PDFLP, as each vied to prove its revolutionary credentials and outdo the other with fiery rhetoric and provocative acts. The PDFLP argued openly that the throne was inimically opposed to the masses and their liberation movement, and concluded that the guerrillas should plan for the inevitable conflict with it. The PFLP had previously been mild in its criticism of the monarchy, but the appearance of the PDFLP in February 1969 prompted it to advocate, for the first time, the establishment of an 'Arab Hanoi' in Amman. Hostility to the throne was occasionally compounded by offence to religious sensibilities. The PDFLP showed itself especially prone to raise the red flag over mosques or celebrate Lenin's birthday and other anniversaries from the minarets. Palestinian complaint that government *agents provocateurs* had instigated some of these incidents was true, but missed the point.

Yet Fateh arguably posed the greater threat to the monarchy. Formally, it insisted that the guerrillas 'must understand the imperatives of Arab security in all Arab countries, and understand the need for internal Arab stability', but in Jordan it displayed the reassurance of an equal, if not superior, force.[7] In February, for example, Arafat declared his unilateral intention to transfer the bulk of PLA units to the kingdom, prompting urgent Jordanian appeals to Nasir

to intercede.[8] Another cause for serious concern was the knowledge that Fateh enjoyed considerable support at all levels of government, and that it had extensively penetrated the army and security services. The real challenge, however, lay not in the possibility that Fateh might seek to overthrow the government, but rather in its determination to develop a Palestinian national identity and situate it within a statist framework of its own. In this manner Fateh 'terrified and terrorized the regime . . . yet it did not in reality plan to do so, even if there were those within it who strove [for power] out of awareness of its necessity, or who worked for it because of ambition and personal drive'.[9]

Starting in 1969, king Husayn worked systematically to meet the challenges posed by the guerrilla movement. Above all, this meant reinforcing his ties with the Transjordanian community, especially the Bedouin clans and tribes in the south, from whose ranks came most senior army officers and the bulk of personnel in the key combat units. An initial step was to restore the self-confidence of the army rank-and-file; many officers felt that they had entered the battle in June 1967 unprepared, and that they had taken more than their fair share of blame for the defeat.[10] To that end, the army command assigned a formerly exiled officer, Maʿn Abu-Nuwar, to reactivate its Mobilization and Moral Guidance Branch (*Shuʿbat al-Taʿbiʾa wa al-Tawjih al-Maʿnawi*).[11] Under his editorial guidance two new soldiers' magazines (*al-Aqsa* and *al-Jundi*) stressed the Arab nationalist and Islamic credentials of the Hashemite monarchy, general Islamic themes, and the conservative social values of a rural and clan-based society. The 'foes' were not openly named at first, but were portrayed as undisciplined and incompetent atheists or effete urban intellectuals in thinly veiled allusion to the leftist guerrillas.[12] To emphasize the contrast, the moral guidance branch published books extolling the army's role in past wars with Israel, including one authored by Abu-Nuwar about the recent battle of Karama, and distributed 60,000 copies of the Qurʾan to the troops.[13]

The 'hearts and minds' campaign was complemented by a determined intelligence and covert operations effort. This was launched in mid-1969, with the creation of a secret Special Branch (*al-Shuʿba al-Khassa*) attached to the army. According to Palestinian security sources, it was headed by a five-man committee comprising army commander-in-chief and uncle to the king, sharif Nasir bin Jamil, armour commander and cousin to the king, sharif Zayd bin Shakir, prince Nayif bin ʿAli, military intelligence chief Muhammad Bashir, and military police commander Saʿd-al-Din Hasu.[14] Army officers were seconded to the Special Branch and instructed to set up intelligence networks in the refugee camps and main towns and villages. They devoted special attention to recruiting agents within the guerrilla groups, and gathered data on their membership, names and addresses of leaders, armament, supply routes, locations of offices, bases and depots, and guard routines.[15] In this way, the army command created a parallel apparatus to general intelligence and military intelligence, which were heavily penetrated by the guerrilla groups.[16]

The Special Branch campaign intensified from the end of 1969. A major element was disinformation, through rumour mongering and the dissemination of exaggerated accounts of guerrilla abuses against Jordanian soldiers and families. Agents provocateurs fed rivalries between the guerrillas and occasionally instigated armed clashes or planted bombs in guerrilla offices and bases.[17] Some worked their way into relatively senior positions in the guerrilla groups and contributed deliberately to the more extreme rhetoric and anti-social behaviour.[18] Fateh intelligence chief Khalaf later accused 'the secret agencies of the army' of mutilating the bodies of soldiers slain in incidents with the guerrillas in order to provoke their families and villages.[19] More ominously, the PFLP disclosed details of a Special Branch plan to assassinate guerrilla leaders including Arafat and Habash, and to extend the destabilization campaign to Lebanon in cooperation with local parties there.[20]

Small guerrilla groups that suddenly appeared in the course of 1969, such as al-Quds and al-Aqsa, were also believed to be the creation of the Special Branch. It also ran an 'executive section' that resembled the bona fide guerrilla groups in structure and appearance. This body comprised a select cadre of 'commandos', who commanded a second echelon of armed 'partisans' (*ansar*), that in turn provided a means of mobilizing a wider civilian base. The entire structure was built around a rudimentary political programme that extolled the Hashemite monarchy and the army.[21] A more significant force was the army militia known as the Popular Resistance (*al-Muqawama al-Sha'biyya*), which the king announced 'is supervised and directed by me personally'.[22] First proposed in early 1968, the government did not establish the militia until August 1969, when the army set up detachments of armed Transjordanian villagers. Claims that the Popular Resistance had a strength of 45,000 were probably greatly exaggerated, but its appearance showed that the throne was winning the hearts and minds of the Transjordanian community.[23] Grass-roots support also made it possible to form three new commando battalions and a third armoured brigade in 1969, drawn mainly from the southern tribes.[24]

Reassertion Round One, and Its Aftermath

The Jordanian government felt ready to modify its defensive posture by the beginning of 1970. Having met Nasir the day before in Cairo, king Husayn and prime minister Bahjat al-Talhuni presided on 10 February over a special cabinet session attended by crown prince Hasan, army commander bin Jamil, and director of general intelligence Nazir Rshayd. A statement issued at the end of their meeting set new terms for guerrilla activity in the kingdom. Civil servants and army conscripts were ordered to show up for duty, while the cabinet asserted its intention to ensure that official personnel, both civilian and military, could operate freely in all parts of the country. Only Jordanian identity cards and vehicle licence plates or documents issued by the government would be

recognized, and the possession or transport of arms and ammunition within municipal boundaries was prohibited (except by the Popular Resistance).[25] The cabinet also prohibited unauthorized marches, rallies, and public meetings, imposed official censorship on all publications, and renewed the ban on party activity.

These decrees convinced the Palestinian leadership that the government intended to dismantle its civilian support base and protective shield in the cities, and to deprive it of its public, political status. The new measures were not to be enforced until 15 February, but the army fired at an Amman school in which a political rally was scheduled to be held four days earlier, triggering a ten-hour clash. Thoroughly alarmed, the guerrilla groups set aside their factional differences to form a unified command; unlike the PLO executive committee and the PASC, the new body comprised representatives from all groups. Arafat was on his first official visit to Moscow (at the invitation of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee), but rushed back to Amman on 12 February. Iraqi minister of interior Salih Mahdi ʿAmmash also arrived on the same day and mediated a ceasefire agreement in the evening, by which time 13 guerrillas and 6 Jordanian soldiers had died. Further talks between the king and Arafat on 21–22 February succeeded in defusing tensions, especially after the resignation of Jordanian interior minister Muhammad Rasul al-Kilani, who was known to hold strong anti-guerrilla views. The decrees of 10 February were discreetly ignored, as was the November 1968 agreement. The two sides effectively observed a truce, with little more than proclamations of good intentions to back it up.

Despite their brevity, the recent clashes revived the internal debate within the guerrilla movement about the duality of power in Jordan and the nature of the *modus vivendi* with the authorities. Fateh hoped to sidestep the issue, but the PDFLP and PFLP became increasingly vocal and direct in their opposition to the status quo. The PDFLP had signalled its growing militancy in a position paper submitted to the PNC in September 1969, in which it argued that victory over Israel required the Arab states to nationalize foreign oil concessions, abrogate treaties with Western countries and dismantle their military bases, and rebuild national economies in cooperation with the socialist bloc.[26] It implicitly anticipated confrontation with the Arab governments, and urged the other groups to raise the slogan of 'no power above that of the resistance [movement]'.[27]

What the PDFLP sought after the February 1970 clashes, however, was not so much the immediate overthrow of the government in Jordan as to form parallel power in preparation for a final resolution of the duality. Writing in *al-Hurriyya*, one of its ultra-left ideologues, al-ʿAfif al-Akhdar, asserted that seizing power in Jordan 'is not on the agenda of the resistance movement'.[28] Such an act could only take place safely if it were repeated in several Arab states within a short period of time, he added, in order to pre-empt Israeli intervention. Otherwise, a premature assumption of power in Jordan would be a trap for the Palestinian guerrillas. Yet the PDFLP continued to reiterate its slogan of 'no

power over that of the resistance'.[29] To give it substance, the PDFLP published a plan at the end of March for the creation of 'popular councils' in the refugee camps and in every village, town, and city neighbourhood possible.[30] In April, a main headline of its daily newspaper *al-Sharara* (launched in the wake of the February clashes), was emblazoned 'Popular Councils Everywhere . . . Now and Immediately'.[31]

Not to be outdone, Habash declared PFLP opposition to the ceasefire reached on 12 February. The latest agreement was 'boobytrapped', he insisted, adding that the battle now being waged was at once both a national and a class struggle.[32] The proletarian masses that had spent 20 years in tents and suffered poor medical care, unemployment, and the loss of infants, he explained, had risen to defend their one hope, the Palestinian resistance movement. Habash gave further evidence of his new-found Marxist rhetoric as he warmed to his theme. 'What does the poor worker think about, who spends days without employment?', he asked rhetorically, 'about commercial deals? . . . About a television, refrigerator, or car? He does not work, and so what does he think about? About revolution, revolution, and continued revolution until victory'.[33] The PFLP supported the call for the establishment of popular councils, and presented detailed proposals for their functioning.[34] In May it fielded a shared list of candidates with the PDFLP and Saʿiqa in the elections that were actually conducted in the small refugee camps of Suf and Gaza (near Jerash).

PFLP hostility to the Fateh-dominated PLO did not abate, and it called repeatedly for the establishment of a 'progressive, revolutionary national front' based on the principle of parity among its members.[35] The PFLP regarded the formation of the unified command on 10 February as a major step forward, because it granted all guerrilla groups equal representation regardless of their actual strength, and proposed that all militia forces in the kingdom also be integrated into a single structure of command.[36] The PFLP had reason to believe that conditions were ripe for a shift in the internal Palestinian balance. The February clashes had polarized opinion within the guerrilla movement, even within Fateh. The Fateh regional command in Jordan was now firmly dominated by militant, leftist cadres, including militia commander ʿAwda, whose command claimed a strength of 10,000.[37] Saʿiqa was also moving to the left, as the struggle between Jadid and Asad intensified.[38] It described this as a move 'in the direction of scientific socialism, as the [Baʿth] Party works ceaselessly to educate the [Saʿiqa] organization's cadres in Marxist-Leninist culture'.[39] Saʿiqa downgraded its alliance with Fateh and aligned itself openly with the PDFLP and PFLP, and adopted an increasingly hostile stance towards the Jordanian government.[40]

The Palestinian Left was also reinforced by the new, militant direction of the JCP, which announced the formation of its own guerrilla force, *Quwwat al-Ansar* (Partisan Forces), on 3 March. Its statement explained that this was a joint initiative by the communist parties of Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. This represented a radical shift in contrast to 1968, when the Syrian and Lebanese

communists had joined the JCP in viewing the guerrillas as pursuing 'a romantic and reckless course . . . advocated by progressive nationalist elements of the petite bourgeoisie . . . circles known for their reactionary character encourage this adventuristic path in the hope of aborting the natural development of the mass struggle movement'.[41] The volte-face of the JCP reflected the defeat of secretary-general Salfiti, who in autumn 1968 had published a lacerating criticism of the guerrillas. In his view they were guilty of failing to 'appreciate the correlation of strength in the region and the dangerous consequences of provoking the [Israeli] enemy'. 'Neither in Jordan nor in any other Arab country are conditions ripe for guerrilla activity inside or outside the occupied territories', he stated, adding emphatically that 'supporting guerilla organizations means supporting unrealistic political aims, aims that we reject'. The guerrilla groups ignored 'mass and political activity', Salfiti charged, and the price of their action 'runs into too many casualties, and precipitates eviction of Arabs from the most fertile areas'.[42] Under his influence, the JCP politburo had taken a similar stance, describing the guerrillas as petit bourgeois and adventurist, both traits typical of detested Maoism. The land of Palestine was unsuited for guerrilla warfare, the masses and Arab armies were unprepared, and the aim of destroying Israel was both impractical and offensive to democratic and progressive forces in Israel itself and unlikely to win over any members of the Israeli armed forces.[43]

However, Karama had shown that resistance to Israel was possible, and a number of communists joined various guerrilla groups after the battle.[44] The patent failure of the Arab armies and diplomacy to end Israeli occupation, coupled with Israeli settlement activity and Palestinian civil disobedience, fuelled the internal debate in early 1969.[45] A clear schism emerged between what the Salfiti faction termed 'a capitulationist tendency wishing to erase the traces of [Israeli] aggression with US assistance . . . and the outbidding, adventurist tendency that calls for total liberation [of Palestine]'.[46] The return of deputy secretary-general Fu'ad Nassar from exile at this point prevented a rupture. The JCP central committee voted in May to prepare for guerrilla action, after consultation with Soviet ideologue Suslov and the Lebanese, Syrian, and Iraqi communist parties.[47] The intention was to organize armed resistance in the occupied territories and a support base in Jordan, the latter defined as the establishment of a nationalist government in Amman and acquisition of Soviet weaponry for the Jordanian armed forces.[48] A special committee was set up to oversee practical preparations and contact other guerrilla groups, but it was paralysed by the continuing dispute within the party as a whole.[49]

The clashes of February 1970 pushed matters to resolution. A dozen or so communists had been instructed to undergo training at PLA camps in 1969 and were now armed by the PLF/PLA.[50] The militant wing in the JCP seized upon this opportunity to create a fait accompli, and declared the formation of Ansar. JCP representatives, including Fa'iq Warrad, privately met Arafat to negotiate Ansar membership in the unified command. According to the Salfiti faction,

Arafat demurred, explaining that for all their disunity, the guerrillas were unanimous in their determination to liberate Palestine 'from [Mediterranean] sea to [Jordan] river, and from Rafah to Naqura', whereas the communists accepted the existence of Israel.[51] To secure his backing, the communists agreed to declare their adherence to 'total liberation'; in the event their official statement asserted more vaguely that Ansar was committed 'to achieving the grand national goals that the resistance movement is working for in order to liberate Palestine'.[52]

The Salfiti faction viewed the muted reference to the liberation of Palestine as a deviation engineered by 'adventurous nationalism', while the militants considered it a reflection of their true aims. A third current considered that the statement had merely described the aims of the main guerrilla groups and did not commit the JCP.[53] Nassar and the broad centre lent their support to the militant wing. This permitted the dissolution of the politburo (thus paralysing the Salfiti faction) and its replacment with a provisional leadership. The JCP now affirmed that 'our party committed an error when it delayed for no little time in the participation in armed struggle'.[54] A party conference in April confirmed the shift and the isolation of Salfiti, and gave Ansar its formal blessing. A military committee was formed to oversee Ansar, in which Warrad and Ishaq al-Khatib played a central role.

The JCP shift was encouraged by the change in the Soviet view of the Palestinian guerrilla movement. Until 1967, the USSR had considered groups such as Fateh to be 'mythical diversionary groups', whose attacks on Israel were orchestrated 'by well-known services or agencies of these services for provocation purposes'.[55] Only after Arafat's visit to Moscow in February 1970, as he reported, did the Soviet leadership come to describe the guerrillas officially as a 'progressive and patriotic liberation movement'.[56] The USSR continued to oppose international terrorism strongly, however, describing the PFLP as 'an extremist group led by the reactionary Lebanese [*sic*] politician Habash, which bears the responsibility for hijacking'.[57] The change of heart in Moscow towards the Palestinian guerrillas led to a similar shift among the Arab communist parties.[58] In 1968 the Lebanese communists had insisted that the 'rash call for an immediate war of liberation . . . is not only wrong, but an adventuristic gamble with the Arab revolution and the Palestine cause itself', but in 1970 they declared themselves guilty 'for not having played from the outset [our] expected role within the Palestinian resistance movement'.[59] Their Syrian counterparts now also asserted that the guerrillas 'occupy an exalted position within the Arab liberation movement'.[60]

There were barely a dozen Iraqi volunteers for Ansar and no Syrians, however, while armed Lebanese communists operated in south Lebanon.[61] The Arab communists offered financial assistance instead.[62] Ansar was a negligible force at first—with only 40 guerrillas in two bases near Irbid—but 30 communists flew to Soviet bloc countries in June to receive three months' military training (something not yet offered to any other Palestinian group).[63] Ansar

strength rose to 100 guerrillas and a militia of 200–300 in the refugee camps by late summer, but it failed to gain entry to the unified command or the PLO and suffered a severe shortage of weapons. The PLF/PLA provided modest quantities of arms, while the PFLP softened its previous hostility to offer training. This stemmed in part from the coincidence of views after February on the need to resolve decisively the 'duality of power' (*izdiwajiyyat al-sulta*) in Jordan.[64] The PDFLP had taken a similar line, but the JCP regarded it as a Maoist organization and disdained dealings; the communists referred to PDFLP secretary-general Hawatma sarcastically as 'Nayif Zedong'.

Dual Power

References to the duality of power naturally alarmed the Jordanian government, although the truce brokered in February still held. King Husayn in fact regarded the brief trial of strength as a 'test manoeuvre', and anticipated a full-scale crackdown 'within three months'.[65] He strove continuously to improve his position, meeting 200 representatives of 33 southern Bedouin clans on 21 February and signing a joint statement that called for restoration of law and order.[66] He held similar meetings in following weeks, and rallied support in the army with a series of visits and speeches to combat units. In one four-week stretch between April and May, for example, he addressed six 'open letters' to the armed forces, that were given considerable play in official media. Tensions with the guerrillas rose in April, after the army banned the guerrillas from returning to an area south of the Dead Sea that Israeli troops had briefly occupied.

On 15 April the Jordanian government announced an imminent visit by US under-secretary of state Joseph Sisco. Sisco was negotiating an end to the Egyptian–Israeli war of attrition along the Suez Canal, and so the guerrilla movement reacted to the announcement with alarm. It called for a peaceful protest demonstration in Amman, but leftist guerrillas broke into the US embassy grounds, despite a pledge from Fateh to maintain law and order. Sisco cancelled his visit, and the guerrillas escalated attacks on Israel over the next few weeks in an effort to disrupt the ongoing diplomacy. Habash fuelled the tension in a public speech on Labour Day, in which he publicized the existence of the Special Branch, naming its sponsors and detailing its covert activities.[67] The necessary response, he argued, was to mobilize the Palestinian and Arab peoples and go on the offensive: 'not the strategic offensive in the sense of a final and decisive battle right now . . . but that the resistance should respond to every plot and [to every] blow with two blows in return'.[68]

Clashes finally broke out in the Jordan Valley on 2 May, and the army seized two guerrilla bases the next day. The threat prompted the guerrilla movement to close ranks; eleven groups (excluding Ansar) and the PLA published a joint

'unity document' on 6 May. The document reaffirmed the aim of total liberation, by way of people's war, and reiterated Palestinian rejection of UN resolution 242 and refusal to establish a truncated state in only part of Palestine.[69] It pointedly asserted that any Arab territory around Israel was 'a legitimate arena for the Palestinian struggle', and stressed the right of the guerrilla movement to arm Palestinians and Arabs alike. Any attempt by an Arab state to close its borders to the guerrillas would be 'in effect a betrayal of the goals of the Palestinian people and Arab nation'.[70] Each guerrilla group was moreover entitled to interpret these principles as it saw fit and to pursue an independent programme. The PFLP happily considered that Fateh had at last submitted to the demands it had made in September 1969, and boasted that it remained free to 'strike at colonialism and Zionist centres outside the homeland and to take a frank position towards reactionary and nationalist [Arab] regimes alike'.[71] The PFLP, PF–GC, and other militant groups now ended their boycott of the PLO and abandoned previous demands for reallocation of PNC seats. They moreover considered that the guerrilla movement was finally on its way to resolving the duality of power in Jordan.

Building on this new-found solidarity, the PNC convened at the end of May and agreed to replace the ad hoc unified command with a 28-person central committee. The committee was endorsed as a formal PLO body, acting to supervise the executive committee in between PNC sessions. The timing was fortunate, as fighting broke out again on 7 June, leaving 30 dead in Zarqa. King Husayn and Arafat arranged a truce, but it collapsed amidst fierce clashes in Amman on 9 June. The PFLP raised the drama a day later by seizing two major hotels in the heart of the capital and taking 88 foreign guests hostage. Habash explained this action as an attempt to deter army shelling of the refugee camps, but a PFLP military commander privately explained that the intention was to demonstrate the government's weakness and encourage the other guerrilla groups to take the opportunity to resolve the duality of power.[72] The PFLP also attempted to seize the government radio station, while Fateh rockets struck the royal palace in retaliation for army artillery fire. Total casualties were estimated at 800–1,000 by 12 June.[73]

The Jordanian government was coming under intense Arab pressure to cease hostilities, and Iraqi interior minister ʿAmmash and a personal envoy of Nasir arrived in Amman. Iraq warned bluntly that its expeditionary force in Jordan would not allow the guerrillas to be defeated. King Husayn was unwilling as yet to wage a major offensive, and opted for compromise. At a crisis meeting on 11 June, he offered Arafat the post of prime minister and the freedom to form a cabinet of his choice.[74] This was the second time in a month that the Palestinian leadership had been offered the chance to hold formal power in Jordan: in May ʿAmmash proposed a joint *coup d'état* with the support of the Iraqi expeditionary force to Fateh, which declined.[75] Arafat and his colleagues were possibly more surprised by king Husayn's proposal, but declined again.[76] Instead they insisted that he annul the conscription law, disband the Special Branch, and

dismiss army commander bin Jamil and armour commander bin Shakir.[77] The king accepted the latter demand, assuming army command himself and appointing Mashhur Haditha al-Jazi as chief-of-staff and ʿAbd-al-Munʿim al-Rifaʿi as prime minister, both of whom enjoyed the trust of the guerrillas. The king had made a last-ditch effort to avert a showdown, although he probably believed it inescapable. This was evident in his statement announcing the dismissal of bin Jamil and bin Shakir. In it he decried 'the plot against the army, people, and their steadfastness, that aims to destroy all we have built in three years since the bitter catastrophe [of 1967]' and warned, 'this is the last chance, after which there is no other'.[78]

The guerrillas had reached the peak of their power, as the king's offer of the premiership to Arafat showed, but they were to enjoy it for only a few weeks. Their failure (or unwillingness) to build alliances with major social forces on the basis of pragmatic interests and to construct institutions capable of duplicating government services and economic functions undermined the 'multiple sovereignty' they exercised in the kingdom, at a time when the cohesion of the throne's social and institutional base was on the rise.[79] The PFLP and PDFLP maintained their hostility towards the government, while Saʿiqa warned against any attempt by the US or Arab states to intervene militarily in Jordan.[80] Even Fateh was more openly critical of the authorities than previously, accusing the Special Branch of resuming its 'dirty tricks' campaign in early July and alleging US covert support.[81] The leftist groups, and to a lesser extent Saʿiqa, were not satisfied with the agreement that had ended the recent clashes, but agreed to improve coordination with Fateh. A permanent secretariat was formed on 16 June to stand in for the PLO central committee during crisis situations, headed by Arafat and comprising Habash, Hawatma, Saʿiqa commander Jmayʿani, AOLP secretary-general Sartawi, and PLO spokesman Kamal Nasir. Fateh launched a daily newspaper, which was adopted as the central newspaper of the PLO central committee.

The Palestinian arena faced a sudden new challenge on 22 July, when Nasir accepted a ceasefire along the Suez Canal. King Husayn lost little time in following suit, committing Jordan to a cessation of hostilities with Israel on 26 July. The Palestinian movement was united in expecting new restrictions on its activity in Jordan, but could not agree on a unified stand towards Nasir. Arafat, as PLO chairman, and Fateh were cautious in their criticism, but the Palestinian Left immediately launched a campaign of public vilification. The harshest reaction came from the PFLP, which rounded fiercely on Zaʿrur's APO and Sartawi's AOLP for offering qualified support for Nasir. PFLP and ALF militiamen attacked offices belonging to the two groups on 5 and 9 August, and desisted only after the intervention of Fateh.[82] Nasir was reportedly most offended when PFLP demonstrators paraded a donkey with his photograph on it, and retaliated with the expulsion of 140 PFLP and PDFLP supporters from Egypt.[83] Egyptian intelligence now cut its remaining ties with the PFLP.[84] The Voice of Palestine programme on Cairo radio had also overstepped the

mark, and was closed down, although Fateh resumed broadcasts from its own transmitter in Darʿa and on Damascus, Baghdad, and Algiers radio.[85] Nasir also reportedly told a PLO delegation that he had approved a request from king Husayn for 10,000 AK-47 rifles, to mark his anger.[86]

The worst damage for the guerrilla movement was its loss of Nasir's political support. The irony, as Fateh's ʿUdwan later noted, was that the Palestinian movement had split 'not over king Husayn's attitude towards the Rogers Plan but rather over Nasir's attitude'.[87] The guerrillas were now on the strategic defensive and sought to obscure their confusion by announcing a rise in attacks on Israel (although the actual increase was minimal). More indicative of the sense of threat was the decision by the Fateh leadership to reverse previous policy and open its weapons stores to its civilian organization and militia. The Rasd intelligence apparatus activated its contacts in the Jordanian army and security services. Rasd chief Khalaf, deputy Hani al-Hasan, and senior lieutenant Salama had set up a central bureau in late 1969 to coordinate these contacts, and revived the effort after the February 1970 clashes.[88] Their methods were slipshod and so a majority of Fateh members and sympathizers in the armed forces were not properly organized, but a secret network of officers and a parallel network of some 500 soldiers did at least provide excellent intelligence.[89]

The information reaching Fateh confirmed the obvious: Jordan was heading towards civil war. Several army officers urged the Palestinian leadership to take pre-emptive action. One group of majors led by Saʿid Maragha proposed a *coup d'état* and requested a meeting with Arafat.[90] Possibly fearing a government trap, Arafat refused to meet these and other officers, and relayed his opposition to the assumption of power by the guerrilla movement. Fateh explained to its members that a military takeover would trigger Israeli intervention and occupation.[91] Rebuffed by Arafat, Maragha approached the PDFLP, which happily approved the plan.[92] So, apparently, did the PFLP, in which Maragha's cousin, Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, headed a guerrilla sector.[93] Jordanian military intelligence was also informed by the commander of the 40th Armoured Brigade, ʿAtallah al-Ghasib, that the PFLP had approached him during August to suggest a *coup*.[94] The PFLP politburo and organizational committee had indeed approved such a move at the urging of ASAP secretary-general Hashim ʿAli Muhsin, while Habash was abroad.[95]

Not that a *coup d'état* had a serious chance of success. The army command increased pay for soldiers in July and posted officers whose loyalty was suspect out of their units.[96] Its mobilization and moral guidance branch stepped up its propaganda campaign against the guerrillas, while the Special Branch increased its covert operations. King Husayn also revealed his growing self-confidence by reinstating bin Shakir as armour commander on 6 August. In a 'royal message' to the armed forces soon after, the king anticipated that he and government officials would be the target of assassination attempts. That he was informed of Palestinian plans for a *coup* was evident in his added warning that 'certain

elements may reach some targets in Jordanian military uniforms to achieve certain objectives'.[97]

Leftist Denouement

The Palestinian Left showed equal self-confidence, as it came to the conclusion that the time was right to end the duality of power in Jordan. Most vocal in this regard was the PDFLP, which interpreted the concessions made by king Husayn in June as clear evidence of weakness. This impression was reinforced when the army failed to respond forcefully to an assault by PDFLP guerrillas on the central Amman post office in late July.[98] As Hawatma later insisted, 'the cities, villages and [refugee] camps of Jordan were in our hands . . . When the PDFLP called in early 1970 for "power to the revolution, soldiers, and armed people", the balance of forces was tilted in favour of the revolution and people, had the revolution taken the initiative to topple the reactionary [regime]'.[99] He again argued that the political balance in the kingdom, and even in the army, had shifted significantly at a politburo meeting on 19 August. The task now was to effect a decisive change in the balance of power, by seizing the military initiative. Referring to the Bolshevik experience in 1917, he argued that the very act of launching an offensive against the government would suffice to swing large sections of the Jordanian population and armed forces behind the guerrillas. This remained a minority view within the guerrilla movement as a whole, but Hawatma was confident that this strategy would transform the PDFLP into the major force within a few months, just as the minority Bolsheviks had overtaken the majority Mensheviks in Russia decades earlier.[100]

Hawatma faced spirited dissent from a few politburo members, and the debate was referred to a general conference two days later. Hawatma and his close ally Qays al-Samarra'i opposed formation of a national government, since that would mean compromise with the throne, and insisted on a decisive resolution of the duality of power.[101] Samarra'i presented a prepared proposal for an armed insurrection, and prompted the conference to abandon the slogan of 'no power above that of the resistance' in favour of a new one: 'all power to the resistance'.[102] With barely 250 guerrillas and a modest militia, the PDFLP obviously lacked the means to attain its aims. However, Hawatma and Samarra'i proposed to multiply its strength by deliberately stampeding the other guerrilla groups, especially Fateh, into a confrontation with the government. The conference overrode the strenuous objections of politburo members Bilal al-Hasan and Khalil al-Hindi, and adjourned with a public call to resolve the duality of power in Jordan. The hidden agenda was to whip up popular feeling and draw the Fateh rank-and-file into the fray. Jordanian intelligence had at least two agents among the delegates, and was fully aware of PDFLP intentions.[103]

The PDFLP now sought to persuade the other guerrilla groups of the need to end power-sharing with the monarchy. At an extraordinary session of the PNC convened by the PLO to unify the Palestinian position on 27–28 August, the PDFLP urged 'establishment of a revolutionary nationalist authority [in Jordan] based on the resistance organizations and soldiers and armed people, in which the main forces of the joint Palestinian–Jordanian national front are represented'.[104] This proposal was rejected and the PNC closed on a slightly more moderate note, but the debate indicated the temper of the Palestinian Left. Hawatma muted his rhetoric somewhat in following days, but reiterated his call to transform Jordan into a 'little Hanoi' a week later.[105]

The PFLP had meanwhile been preparing actively for confrontation. Its assessment of the situation had changed substantially since May, when Habash acknowledged that there was 'a gross imbalance between the power of enemy forces . . . and the reality of resistance forces'.[106] However, the confrontation of June led to a more optimistic assessment of the military balance in Jordan. Habash subsequently argued that it had become effectively impossible, in the absence of direct US military intervention, to defeat the guerrilla movement. 'There have been six attempts so far to destroy the resistance movement, three in Lebanon and three in Jordan, but none have been successful', he explained, and then concluded that 'it follows that no further attempts can succeed . . . since the [enemy] military forces are the same that we confronted and defeated on previous occasions'.[107] At the same time, Habash viewed Nasir's acceptance of the Rogers Plan in late July as a distinct threat, and warned that the PFLP would respond to any attempt to suppress the guerrilla movement by doing its best 'to turn the Palestinian, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Arab arenas in general into a hell for all enemies of the masses'.[108]

A sense of great urgency now dominated PFLP thinking. Writing two weeks after Nasir's statement, *al-Hadaf* editor Ghassan Kanafani called on the guerrilla movement as a whole to adopt 'an escalatory spirit . . . and an offensive action programme'. The Palestinians could not afford to remain on the defensive while the Arab 'regimes dictate the terms of surrender to our masses' and had to act as quickly as possible.[109] The PFLP commanded at most 1,500 guerrillas and non-combat personnel and only a few thousand militiamen, but by now believed firmly that the guerrilla movement enjoyed considerable support in the army.[110] It expected Palestinian soldiers to defect *en masse*, especially if the guerrilla groups acted forcefully and swiftly.[111] Having satisfied itself previously with the call for a nationalist government rather than the overthrow of the monarchy, the PFLP argued in August that the Palestinian leadership should assault the throne directly, by splitting the army and launching a general offensive with all guerrilla and militia forces under its command.[112]

The key to such a strategy, in the view of the PFLP, was to end the Arab ceasefire with Israel. An article by Kanafani in *al-Hadaf* on 5 September signalled what was to come by insisting on 'shattering the ceasefire with any possible

means'.[113] The next day, armed PFLP members hijacked three passenger aircraft belonging to Western airlines and attempted to seize a fourth. A Pan Am aircraft was flown to Cairo Airport and destroyed on the ground after the passengers had been released, while two Swissair and TWA aircraft were flown to a remote airstrip held by PFLP guerrillas in the Jordanian desert, where they were joined three days later by a newly hijacked BOAC flight. Jordanian units surrounded the area, while Israel arrested 450 Palestinians in the occupied territories with relatives in the PFLP as a means of leverage.[114] The PFLP demanded the release of members captured in previous hijackings, but more significantly explained that its latest action was a blow against the peace process, made necessary by the 'ceasing of fire against the [Israeli] enemy and the opening of fire against the [Palestinian] resistance'.[115] A later article in *al-Hadaf* crowed that the 'hijacking carnival' had dealt a devastating blow to 'the world nervous system and disrupted the delicate balance on which the peace game rested'.[116] In this context, the demolition of the Pan Am aircraft in Cairo was 'a blow to the US–Nasir conjunction'. The PFLP added that 'there had to be a series of operations to penetrate . . . the Arab and international media and political conspiracy'.[117]

The first statement issued by the PFLP was the most revealing. It recognized that for many Palestinians, ultimate victory against Israel appeared impossible. The hijackings were designed therefore 'to disseminate a revolutionary atmosphere'.[118] This provocative instinct was typical of Haddad, who had masterminded the operation. Faced with the closing ring of US diplomacy and Arab acquiescence, the natural response in his view was an apocalyptic act that would upset the political applecart.[119] It would also serve as 'muscle-flexing' towards the Jordanian government. The resulting confusion would temporarily disrupt the balance of power in Jordan and offer a window of opportunity for the guerrilla movement (or army *putschists*) to take the military initiative. Indeed, Haddad deliberately sought to embroil the Palestinian movement in a general confrontation.[120] The possibility of triggering Israeli intervention was probably not seen as a threat, since it promised a still wider, desirable conflagration.

The PFLP had prepared its provocation in the absence of Habash, who left Jordan in mid-August on a two-month 'study tour' of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. Ostensibly in response to a long-standing invitation to examine the Asian practice of Marxism-Leninism, the visits were also an attempt to match the extensive foreign relations of Fateh.[121] More importantly, his colleagues insisted on keeping him out of harm during the confrontation they were about to precipitate.[122] Habash was absent when Haddad and Zabri took command of the hijacked planes at 'revolution airport', which was guarded by the bulk of the PFLP's central sector, that had been transferred from the Jordan Valley under its commander, 'Abd-al-Karim.[123] He was also not at the helm when the Palestinian leadership considered how to deal with the crisis. Reactions to the multiple hijackings were mixed, but Arafat and Fateh insisted on

suspending PFLP membership in the PLO central committee and ordered the front to move the hostages to safety in Amman.

The Palestinian Left was actively setting the stage for confrontation, but its impact was reinforced by the ambivalent attitude of Fateh towards the duality of power. Reports reaching Jordanian intelligence confirmed that Arafat wished to avoid a showdown, but the Fateh leadership had nonetheless become accustomed to think that it already shared power with the government.[124] This led to over-confidence and a thinly-veiled arrogance. ʿUdwan later offered a sober account of the period, arguing that the guerrillas should have abandoned any thought of overthrowing the throne because they could no longer count on the support of the secret pro-Nasir organization in the army. 'After the shift in the balance of power we needed time to rearrange matters', he added, 'but the mad rush of the regime to detonate matters by any means and the pressure of the other [guerrilla] groups . . . to defy and contest . . . meant that the scale of their decision exceeded the scale of their capabilities'.[125] More typical in summer 1970, however, was the view that 'the Palestinian revolution and the Palestinian and Jordanian masses as a whole are now capable of defeating the Rogers Plan, and we will benefit from every passing day to reinforce that capability . . . the revolution will destroy this plan utterly . . . as the very near future will show'.[126]

Besides, as Fateh intelligence chief Khalaf later noted, virtually none of the central committee members had had first-hand experience of Jordanian politics before June 1967. They had dealt with the throne only in its moment of weakness in 1968–9, and failed to understand its true nature, resilience, and determination. This led to arrogance: 'We approached the regime only "from above" . . . and the king used to have to wait 20 days before we would allow him to meet us, and we would bang on the table in front of him . . . We felt that there was nobody who could harm us in Jordan.'[127] By the same token, Fateh leaders had little idea of how to conduct relations with different sectors of Jordanian society and the political establishment, and underestimated the negative impact of certain types of guerrilla rhetoric or behaviour. Indeed, as PF–GC secretary-general Jibril later noted, this lack of understanding was widely shared among Palestinian leaders.[128] One consequence was vacillation: the Palestinian leadership would neither take the political and military initiative against the government nor curb the escalatory rhetoric and unruly behaviour of its followers.[129] Fateh had long raised the slogan of non-interference in domestic Arab politics, but its problem, Khalaf summarized, was that it had in fact 'interfered, but not intervened', and 'defied [king] Husayn's authority without seriously trying to seize his power'.[130]

Indecision was partly the result of serious misjudgement of the military balance.[131] Speaking to the PNC at the end of August, Arafat boasted that the Palestinian movement as a whole had '36 to 38 thousand rifles in Jordan'.[132] Seeking to deflect criticism that it was not prepared for a government assault, Fateh also bragged privately to the other groups that it had an extensive secret

organization within the Jordanian army.[133] Hani al-Hasan, one of the cadres responsible for this organization, promised a public audience that Fateh could 'turn Amman's night into day and day into night' and that it was capable of seizing power if it wished. Even ʿUdwan appeared to wonder if the Palestinian movement should take the initiative and attack.[134] Others were less self-assured. Wazir was particularly opposed to any attempt to seize or share power, and preferred to find ways of reassuring king Husayn. Central committee member Walid Nimr, renowned as a brave and unyielding military commander, pleaded with his colleagues in early September to leave Amman and return to the natural guerrilla battleground in the countryside facing Israel.[135] Qaddumi expressed the dominant view on the eve of the showdown, however, boasting that the king was no more than 'a paper tiger, whom we can topple in half an hour'.[136] Underlying such cockiness was the unspoken belief, shared by many in the Left as well, that Arafat would always find a way of defusing the crisis, and that fear of Arab reactions would inhibit the king from launching an all-out offensive.[137] Both assumptions were soon to be shattered.

A renewal of fighting was inevitable against this background. Three days of sporadic clashes degenerated into sustained combat on 31 August, during which the army shelled refugee camps in Amman. The violence intensified the next day, after king Husayn's convoy came under fire near the airport in what the authorities described as a deliberate assassination attempt. By the evening of 2 September, 33 persons had been killed and 160 wounded by Palestinian count, and 60 guerrillas had been arrested in various areas. The PLO central committee declared itself in constant session and put its forces on full alert.[138] Alarmed at the upsurge in violence, Iraq warned the government that it would intervene militarily to defend the refugee camps and the guerrillas if fighting continued.[139] ʿAmmash reinforced the message by visiting the expeditionary force in Jordan, whose troops signalled their preparedness by removing the protective covers from their tanks and field guns. This comforted the guerrillas, whose media had earlier reported the visit by a Jordanian envoy to Baghdad to request the withdrawal of Iraqi units or at least guarantees of their neutrality.[140] The guerrillas were also unsure of Nasir's position after receiving the king in late August. Their reports suggested that the king had asked him to ensure Iraqi neutrality, but that Nasir had opposed a Jordanian crackdown.[141]

Jordanian prime minister Rifaʿi and his cabinet were proving to have little influence on events. King Husayn highlighted their decline by convening the 'council of prime ministers', dominated by staunch loyalists, anti-guerrilla hardliners, and Transjordanian nationalists. An inner leadership consisting of the king, crown prince Hasan, bin Jamil, bin Shakir, and former prime minister Wasfi al-Tal held real decision-making power, and was advised by military intelligence chief Bashir and general intelligence chief Rshayd. It supervised the redeployment of Jordanian army units away from the frontline with Israel during August, and directed the expulsion of the guerrilla contingent from the south. This was heralded by a tribal congress on 4 September, that resolved to

clear the area of all but 'honourable' guerrillas. Fateh had some 200 guerrillas and 400 militiamen in the south, including medical and administrative personnel in Karak, Maʿan, Tafila, and Shubak, while the PLA and PLF/PLA had 300, the PFLP and PDFLP roughly 50–60 militiamen each, and Saʿiqa, the ALF, and PPSF even smaller detachments. Local commanders generally chose to avoid bloodshed, and the entire contingent had been dismantled by 9 September. Parallel clashes in Amman and Zarqa took the total toll to 150 dead and 500 wounded.[142]

The violence was brought to a temporary halt when army chief-of-staff Jazi complained angrily that army shelling and redeployment had occurred without his consent. He accused certain parties in the army of deliberately engineering clashes, and threatened to resign his post in protest.[143] Playing for time, king Husayn granted Jazi full authority over the army, and allowed him to conclude a new ceasefire agreement with the guerrillas on 10 September. The king may still have hoped to avert all-out confrontation, even at this late stage, but the mood of other members of the inner leadership and of the army command left no room for compromise. Matters nearly came to a head on 7 September, when Jordanian combat units based at Nuzha and ʿArda readied to move on guerrilla positions and refugee camps in Amman in defiance of standing orders. The king was compelled to intervene in person to bring his mutinous troops under control and was received with open hostility.[144] As worrying were indications that senior combat commanders were considering a *coup d'état*: if the Hashemite family would not protect them, they hinted darkly, then it was time for native Transjordanians to rule themselves.[145]

The guerrilla movement contributed to Jordanian determination in no small way. The extraordinary PNC session had closed on 28 August with the statement that 'the Palestine–Jordan arena is a single arena of struggle . . . we are working with all means to turn it into a stronghold of the armed, popular revolution and soldiers'.[146] The PNC rejected the more extreme demands of the Left, but borrowed their rhetoric. The reference to soldiers could only imply an intention to split or take over the army; the fact that Transjordanian opposition leaders had attended the meeting confirmed government concern that the guerrillas were building alliances in order to assume power.[147] Fateh had not yet reached this conclusion, but the army offensive in the south and the severe shelling of Amman and Zarqa on 8 September forced a shift. Its revolutionary council held an emergency meeting that evening, and decided formally to call for the overthrow of the government. Once Fateh had chosen this course, it was natural for the PLO central committee to confirm the decision the next day.[148] Fateh made its position public on 11 September, when its daily newspaper carried a banner headline calling for a 'revolutionary nationalist government'.[149]

Reconciliation was now impossible, as a five-member Arab truce committee that arrived in Amman on 13 September discovered. The army was trying to improve its positions around Irbid and Zarqa, and killed 15 guerrillas in surprise

attacks in the north. Jazi protested his lack of control and tendered his resignation once more. This time king Husayn accepted it, and requested the cabinet to resign as well.[150] He next formed a military government under Muhammad Dawud, a retired general of Palestinian origin, on 16 September. Habis al-Majali was recalled from retirement to become army commander-in-chief, and bin Shakir was appointed deputy chief-of-staff for operations. The new government immediately declared martial law and ordered all Palestinian militia forces in the cities and refugee camps of the kingdom to surrender their weapons.[151]

The Palestinian reaction was swift. The PLO central committee met in emergency session and declared Arafat commander-in-chief of all Palestinian forces and PLA commander ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya as his chief-of-staff. The PFLP was reinstated, and the central committee called for a general strike on 17 September with the aim of forcing the resignation of the military government. Fateh and the PLA distributed additional weapons and ammunition to some of the smaller groups.[152] Some Fateh leaders still hoped to avert the inevitable, chief among them Wazir. Khalid al-Hasan and Walid Nimr argued in similar vein, and warned that expectations of Syrian intervention in support of the guerrillas were unwise. Qaddumi expressed the dominant mood, however, predicting confidently that 'we'll show them tomorrow'.[153] The battle lines were drawn, and the confrontation was now only hours away.

11

End of a Myth

The September 1970 Showdown

The general strike called by the PLO on 16 September was pre-empted by the start of the government offensive at dawn the next morning. The principal objective was to 'control Amman, as the capital, and hold all government installations, to show the outside world that we are master'.[1] The army command hoped to decide the battle in 36–48 hours, in order to forestall diplomatic intervention by the Arab states. It accepted that achieving complete control throughout the kingdom might take longer, and planned accordingly to conduct offensive operations between Jarash and Irbid in a second stage.[2] To attain its initial objective, the army massed 30,000–35,000 men, comprising the bulk of its combat units, in the Amman governate and placing blocking forces around Zarqa to prevent possible Iraqi intervention.[3]

Jordanian planning and preparations were meticulous, and contrasted utterly with the situation on the Palestinian side. PLA commander Yahya had in fact submitted a detailed and comprehensive defence plan to the Palestinian leadership at the end of June, well in advance of the September confrontation.[4] He offered a detailed situation assessment and identified material requirements (gathering intelligence on Jordanian dispositions, stockpiling supplies and combat *matériel*, and selecting weapons sites, for example), estimated manpower needs, and allocated battle tasks for all the guerrilla groups and the PLA. The result was a classic piece of planning, but it was effectively ignored by the rest of the leadership. A similar fate befell the special three-man committee set up by Fateh in late August to conduct a full survey of its military capabilities. The committee, headed by ʿUdwan, presented a 30-page report in strict secrecy, but its findings and recommendations were not immediately acted upon.[5] Fateh's general command belatedly proposed a defence plan for Amman and the rest of the kingdom, but this was neither coordinated with the similar plan prepared by Fateh's militia command nor integrated with the tactical plans hastily drawn up by individual guerrilla units.[6]

The situation was little better among the other guerrilla groups. Having had their proposals for an armed insurrection against the Jordanian government rejected earlier, the PDFLP and PFLP both failed to take the precaution of preparing fallback defence plans.[7] As one PDFLP sector commander recalled, 'on the eve of the battle [a politburo member] who was also a member of the

Palestinian joint military command came to me and instructed me to attack this hill and that. That was all the plan we had.'[8] The PFLP may have been lulled into a false sense of security because it expected a military *coup* to overthrow the monarchy in the opening hours of the looming confrontation.[9] Some individual units or sectors made their own plans or coordinated patrol and guard duty with their counterparts from other guerrilla groups who happened to be deployed nearby, but there was no joint defence plan.[10]

Even where joint operational or sector commands were formed, as in Amman and the other main regions (especially Irbid and Jerash), Palestinian forces were not integrated. Rather, each guerrilla group assumed responsibility for a different part of the defence perimeter, leading to marked fluctuations in armament, training, and actual combat performance. Guerrilla and militia forces around the kingdom were not regrouped or redeployed; the lack of contingency planning meant that they were left in effect to hold all positions, and to wait passively until they were attacked. The Jordanian army was able to concentrate against each as and when it chose. Nor had the guerrilla groups drawn the basic lessons from previous encounters for the provision of shelters or the stockpiling of water, food, and medical supplies for the civilian population.[11] As PLO executive committee member Husam al-Khatib later commented, 'there was no indication that the revolution was able to move its forces or organize its defence in an integrated, joint plan even if there was the will to do so . . . [it] not only adopted a defensive posture, but applied it in the worst possible way'.[12]

The Jordanian army also enjoyed a clear superiority in numbers and armament. It had rebuilt its strength to 65,000, backed by 10,000 paramilitary troops in the police and public security forces. The army fielded 330 tanks, 350 armoured personnel carriers, 270 armoured cars, some 1,500 mortars and recoilless rifles, and 100–150 artillery guns, not to mention 32 combat aircraft.[13] The army command stated publicly that it faced 25,000 guerrillas and 76,000 militiamen, but privately estimated total Palestinian strength at only 10,000–15,000, possibly reaching 20,000, including the lightly armed and hastily trained militiamen.[14] Of this number at most 9,000 were guerrillas and full-time support personnel, of whom 4,500–5,000 belonged to Fateh, 1,000–1,500 each to the PFLP and PLF/PLA, 500 to Saʿiqa, and 200–300 each to the PF–GC, PDFLP, and ALF. The PLA and PASC military police numbered an additional 1,000–1,200.[15] The guerrillas completely lacked heavy weapons, and reportedly had only 25 recoilless rifles, 150 anti-tank rocket launchers, 150 light and medium mortars, and 50 machine-guns of various calibres.[16] A shipment of Chinese weapons for Fateh reached Basra, and a South Yemeni consignment for the PDFLP reached Damascus on the eve of the battle, too late for more than a limited quantity to be smuggled into Amman.[17]

The guerrillas had the advantage of fighting a defensive battle in the built-up areas of Amman, where they had up to 4,000–6,000 militiamen, 1,000–1,500 guerrillas or support staff, and 300–350 PLA soldiers.[18] The army was therefore

able to make early gains in Amman and Zarqa on 17 September, but slowed down considerably after the first day of combat. Paradoxically, the guerrilla command in the north failed to exploit the inactivity of local army units, partly because it was so sure that it could achieve a quick decision when it wished.[19] It conducted a few offensive operations designed to secure control of Irbid, but then lapsed into a defensive posture. Several guerrilla commanders, including Fateh's Maʿadh al-ʿAbid, argued that the city was an inappropriate place for their forces to fight and insisted on pulling out into the surrounding countryside, to the anger of the civilian cadres and militia command, who were determined to defend Irbid against any army counterattack.[20] The field command in Jarash (which included such figures as Fateh's Hani al-Hasan, Saʿiqa's Dafi Jamʿani, and the PFLP's Fuʾad ʿAbd-al-Karim) had at least 2,000 men at its disposal and large weapons stores, but failed to take aggressive action at any stage in the conflict.[21] The PLO central committee in Amman was blissfully ignorant of the situation, and late on 17 September declared the establishment of three 'liberated provinces' in Irbid, Jerash, and ʿAjlun. Two Transjordanians, opposition leader Hamad al-Farhan and former officer Mahmud al-Rusan, were designated as governor-general of the 'liberated zones' and military commander for the north.

There was little change in the pattern of combat over the next two days, during which the guerrillas and army struggled for control of communications routes between Jarash and the town of Ramtha on the Syrian border. The army had failed to meet its deadline to secure Amman, but the PLO was similarly taken aback by the failure of the Iraqi expeditionary force to come to its aid as promised. Fateh intelligence chief Khalaf later stated that he had listened to a taped telephone conversation in which Iraqi vice-president Hardan al-Takriti assured king Husayn that his country would not intervene militarily.[22] A PLA liaison officer at the Iraqi command in Jordan was shown 'Operational Order Number One' issued by the Jordanian general staff on the eve of the conflict, which revealed that a 'friendly' intelligence service had guaranteed that Iraqi forces would not intervene.[23] Indeed, the Iraqis allowed major Jordanian units to pass through their lines to attack guerrilla strongholds in and around Zarqa on 17–18 September. When a Fateh officer challenged this action, an Iraqi commander showed him written orders instructing him to allow the Jordanians safe passage.[24] An official circular was posted in Iraqi barracks confirming this stance to the Iraqi rank-and-file, and a number of personnel were arrested for trying to join the guerrillas.[25]

Contrary to both Jordanian and Palestinian expectations, it was Syria that intervened.[26] The Jadid faction was making a last-ditch attempt to regain the initiative in the internal power struggle with Asad, and mobilized its remaining supporters in the army. A battalion of the PLA's Hittin Forces was probably dispatched across the border towards Irbid during the day on 19 September, and was followed that night by two armoured brigades and a mechanized infantry brigade under the command of the Syrian 9th Infantry Division.[27] As Jordanian

and Syrian units manoeuvred in the border region, the Iraqi units deployed near the Ramtha–Amman road suddenly withdrew towards Mafraq, possibly in order to avoid accidental involvement in combat.[28]

Later, the Iraqi revolutionary command council was to explain that the PLO had not requested direct military intervention. More revealing was its statement that 'pitting the Iraqi state against the Jordanian state' was unacceptable, whereas material and political support for the PLO was justified because 'the resistance [movement] was not waging a war against the Jordanian state but against the Jordanian fascist authorities'.[29] Behind this convoluted reasoning lay the more mundane fear of US air strikes, as Iraqi president Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr confided to Fateh central committee member Khalaf a few months later.[30] ʿAmmash confirmed the US threat to Fateh central committee member Mahmud ʿAbbas, adding bluntly that 'we can replace the [Palestinian] revolution with 100 others, but our regime is more important'.[31] The vote in the revolutionary command council was apparently unanimous, but deputy chairman Saddam Husayn subsequently used the decision not to intervene as a means of discrediting former defence minister Hardan al-Takriti, who was dismissed from his post as vice-president in October and then assassinated in Kuwait in March 1971.[32]

In any case, the Iraqi withdrawal left the battlefield clear. Syrian armour crossed the border near Ramtha at dawn on 20 September, and soon engaged in fierce combat with the Jordanian 40th Armoured Brigade. The Syrians took control of the strategic Ramtha crossroads in the late afternoon, and two more PLA battalions reached Irbid by the next day.[33] The Syrian government meanwhile denied that its forces were involved, claiming that only PLA units had crossed the border into Jordan. The US addressed a peremptory message to the USSR demanding a Syrian withdrawal, and discussed the possibility of Israeli air strikes or even ground intervention in Jordan.[34] It reinforced the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and put the 82nd Airborne Division in West Germany on the alert, while Israel moved two additional brigades into the Golan Heights. The Jordanian air force meanwhile went into action for the first time, launching continuous attacks on the Syrian force on 21–22 September. The Syrians finally withdrew after nightfall on 22 September, having lost some 120 tanks and armoured personnel carriers and suffered 600 casualties.

The Jordanian army had declared a unilateral ceasefire on 19 September, once it realized that Syrian intervention was in the offing, but its victory allowed it to turn its attention once more to the battle with the PLO. The Palestinian leadership in Amman pleaded with the Syrian command to maintain its advance on Irbid for another 24 hours, but to no avail.[35] The PLO had already given way in parts of Amman and in the centre of Zarqa on 20–22 September, and was compelled to move its central operations room and main command post. More damaging was the capture of Fateh central committee members Khalaf and Qaddumi and PLO executive committee members Ibrahim Bakr and Bahjat Abu-Gharbiyya on 20 September. The government

raised the pressure by posting a reward of 5,000 dinars for the capture of Habash or Hawatma. The defence was crumbling in some areas, and the army held the whole of the Husayn refugee camp and half the Wihdat camp by nightfall on 23 September. Elsewhere, the guerrillas were pushed away from much of the main road from Amman to Ramtha, although the army was itself pushed out of ʿAjlun and suffered the defection of 300 soldiers, including infantry brigade commander Saʿd Sayil, to the PLO.

Despite its successes, the Jordanian army was running out of time. Nasir had maintained a public silence for the first few days of the conflict, but on 20 September ordered the PLA battalions in Egypt to aid the PLO. Egyptian military transports flew the 49 Battalion to Damascus that day, and the 39 and 59 Battalions arrived by sea at Lattakia on 22 September. PLA chief-of-staff ʿUthman Haddad had not been consulted and refused to provide shelter, food, or instructions; the Syrian army placed the PLA battalions in unused barracks near Darʿa, and Fateh provided supplies from its stores.[36] The Syrian intervention in Jordan was over by now, and the PLA was to play no further role in the conflict. On 22 September, Sudanese president Jaʿfar al-Nimayri arrived in Amman at the head of an Arab peace mission comprising Egyptian defence minister Muhammad Sadiq, Tunisian foreign minister al-Bahi al-Adgham, and Kuwaiti foreign minister Saʿd al-Salim al-Sabah. To deflect Arab pressure, king Husayn dispatched Muhammad Dawud to Cairo at the same time, and on 23 September offered to permit 600–1,000 'honourable' guerrillas (from Fateh, the PLA, and PLF/PLA) to remain in Jordan, subject to operational and administrative coordination with the army.

Fateh now tried to regain the political initiative. Wazir and ʿUdwan prepared to issue a statement from their command post in Amman 'relieving' king Husayn and appointing a new cabinet. They intended to offer the premiership to former army chief-of-staff Jazi in the hope of splitting the army.[37] This scheme had little chance of success, and was abruptly pre-empted when Jordanian radio broadcast a statement by Khalaf on 23 September. He proposed a ceasefire based on mutual withdrawal from Amman, removal of all guerrilla bases from population centres and redeployment in the border region, and PLO adherence to Jordanian law.[38] The king revealed in a separate broadcast that this plan had been put to him during a meeting with the captured Fateh and PLO leaders in the presence of Nimayri.[39] Khalaf was later to insist that he had been deceived into reading a text aloud without knowing that it was being taped for transmission, but the damage had been done. Arafat and other Palestinian officials vehemently repudiated the proposal and disputed the ability of the imprisoned leaders to assess the situation or offer compromises.[40]

Amidst the political jockeying, Jordanian prime minister Dawud resigned his post while in Cairo on 24 September. Arafat suddenly appeared in the Egyptian capital on the same day, having been smuggled out of Amman by Nimayri and Sabah. While the pressure mounted on king Husayn to call a general ceasefire and attend an Arab summit conference in Cairo, the army made a determined

bid to take its remaining objectives. It seized the Wihdat camp and most parts of the Taj and Ashrafiyya hills in Amman by 25 September, and attained complete control of Zarqa and outlying refugee camps a day later. The guerrillas were also pushed out of Marka and Hashimi hill in the capital, but held on to the centre, al-Luwaybda hill, and part of Amman hill. The situation was deteriorating in Irbid, where the PDFLP guerrilla contingent pulled out of the city without warning during the night of 23 September, followed by the PFLP. The Syrian command meanwhile ordered the two PLA battalions to leave Irbid, and banned PLA units and guerrilla reinforcements in Syria from attacking Jordanian positions across the border.[41]

Jordanian insistence on pursuing the offensive provoked Nimayri to accuse the authorities of implementing 'a complete plan to eliminate the men of the Palestinian resistance and all Palestinians in Amman . . . despite all the promises and agreements made'.[42] Bowing to pressure, king Husayn accepted a draft ceasefire plan on 26 September and appointed a new civilian cabinet headed by a Palestinian, Ahmad Tuqan. The king signed the agreement with Arafat in Cairo the next day, in the presence of Nasir and the assembled Arab heads of state. This was the Egyptian president's last political act, as he died of cardiac arrest hours after the close of the summit on 28 September. In Jordan, the army continued operations in some areas until 1 October, but ceased fire as the Arab truce committee deployed observers around the kingdom. The agreement committed both sides to withdraw their forces from Amman, restore the status quo ante in the other cities, and release all detainees. An Arab follow-up committee (*lijnat al-mutaba'a*) was designated to help negotiate new regulations for guerrilla activity in Jordan, and these were duly incorporated in a series of special protocols signed on 1, 13, and 21 October and known collectively as the Amman agreement.[43]

The toll had been heavy. The conflict had cost 3,000–5,000 dead, well above the government figure of 2,500 but further still from estimates of 15,000–25,000 cited by some Palestinian and foreign sources.[44] The army had lost over 600 dead and 1,500 wounded, as well as 5,000–7,000 defectors, including a division commander and several brigade and battalion commanders, to the PLO.[45] Palestinian military losses stood at 910–960 dead, of whom over 400 belonged to Fateh and roughly 200 to the PLA, followed by Sa'iqa with 80–90, the PFLP with 70–80, and the PDFLP and PLF/PLA with 30–45 each.[46] The remaining dead, between 1,500 and 3,500, were civilians, mostly Palestinians in Amman, where there was considerable devastation of houses and property, especially in the refugee camps.[47] The army released between 16,000 and 20,000 Palestinian men detained in mass round-ups during the battle, but imprisoned several hundred others at its Jafar desert camp.[48] The PLO claimed that the army had lost nearly 100 tanks and one combat aircraft, besides other vehicles and equipment, and stated its own equipment losses at a value of 12 million dinars, of which Arafat said Fateh had borne 80 per cent.[49] Direct losses to the national economy were estimated at 25 million dinars, while the suspension of Kuwaiti

and Libyan aid cost the government £29 million, contributing to a 10–15 per cent drop in gross national product.[50]

The ceasefire ushered in several weeks of political calm. In his letter of appointment to prime minister Tuqan on 26 September, king Husayn urged him to 'bandage the wounds' and combat 'regionalism' and Palestinian–Jordanian animosity.[51] More important was the protocol signed on 13 October, which granted the guerrillas much of the political, military, and administrative freedom they had previously enjoyed.[52] They were also allowed to resume attacks on Israel, albeit at a fraction of the pre-conflict level.[53] Even the appointment of Wasfi al-Tal, regarded as an anti-guerrilla hardliner, as prime minister on 28 October did not cause serious Palestinian alarm. Tal hurried to reaffirm government adherence to the Cairo and Amman agreements, and most of the ministers he selected were technocrats devoted to the reconstruction programme, among them several Palestinians on good terms with the PLO.[54] Yet there were negative signs too: the king and Arafat no longer met, and contacts were held at ministerial level only.[55]

The Politics of Disarray

The guerrilla movement now tried to put its house in order. In early October, the PLO central committee formed a 'command for the Amman military region' headed by representatives of Fateh, Saʿiqa, the PFLP, PDFLP, and PLA. Attached to it were a PASC military police section, a field tribunal, a special committee for reorganization and rearmament, and a relief committee.[56] Later in the month, the central committee endorsed the unification of militia forces belonging to the different guerrilla groups in Amman, although this proved to be a merely nominal step. It also set up regional military commands outside the capital, in each of which a single commander was supposed to control the local military units of all groups. At the same time, the central committee created a central bureau with exclusive authority to issue permits for the movement of guerrillas and vehicles.[57] Arafat and Yahya took matters further with a formal agreement to unify Fateh and PLA forces, although this too came to nothing.[58] Arafat stated proudly in December that all Palestinian units in Amman had been integrated by December and that steady progress was being made in the guerrilla sectors around the kingdom, but this was entirely belied by reality.[59]

The frustration of these various measures was reflected in an increasingly bitter internal debate about responsibility for the shortcomings revealed in the recent confrontation. Reflecting on the September showdown a few months later, Arafat noted a number of fundamental flaws which, he argued, revealed the failure of the guerrilla movement to understand how to operate in Jordan. Crucially, it had lost the political battle to win the hearts and minds of the Jordanian army. As seriously, it had exaggerated its own strength and asserted itself 'as if we were a substitute for the whole Arab nation'. The guerrilla

movement had presented itself 'as an alternative to everything, to the [Jordanian] national movement and to the associations and [trade and mass] unions'.[60] There was little disagreement with these comments in Fateh, and ʿUdwan reiterated the view that the guerrilla movement had undertaken 'non-Palestinian tasks in Jordan, and presented itself as a substitute for the Jordanian national movement'.[61]

ʿUdwan's comment was echoed by the PFLP, which added that inadequate effort had been made to split the army from within or to plan organized action by sympathetic soldiers and officers.[62] It also criticized the belief that the Jordanian regime could be overturned in a military *coup d'état*, although, as the PDFLP observed, it was the PFLP itself that had hoped for a putsch in the first 48–72 hours of combat in September.[63] The ALF, which had been severely embarrassed by the absence of its leaders from Jordan during the battle and by the reneging of its Iraqi sponsors on their promise to intervene on behalf of the guerrillas, sought the middle ground by criticizing all wings of the Palestinian movement.[64] Alluding first to Fateh and then to the Left, ALF secretary-general Kayyali observed, 'to say that the Jordanian regime could be neutralized was an illusion . . . the most dangerous of illusions and the worst. To say that it could be toppled in 24 hours was a lie, because nobody tried to guarantee that.' He concluded that 'we blame Fateh because it is the largest, but also the offshoots of the Baʿth and the Arab Nationalists Movement'.[65]

There was considerable agreement in condemning the widespread abuses committed by Palestinian personnel against Jordanian soldiers and civilians in the preceding two years. The PFLP regarded this partly as an expression of the 'regional split' that was actively deepened between the two communities, and also the result of the absence of a Jordanian national movement and of 'neglect of the masses'.[66] Its official report criticized ostentatious military behaviour, laziness in the guerrilla bases, 'excesses' towards farmers and their crops, and deliberate insults to local custom. To this list were added weak organizational structure, unhealthy relations between leadership and base, indiscipline, poor military training, exaggerated propaganda, petty factional jealousies and narrow party loyalties.[67] The PF–GC concurred generally, and stressed that indiscipline and lax organization (*infilash*) were equally to blame.[68] Fateh's Qaddumi ascribed 'arrogant showing-off' in part to the proliferation of offices in the cities and to the growing bureaucratization of the guerrilla movement, which allowed 'infiltration by opportunists and climbers' who were presumably responsible for the excesses.[69]

The consensus was only superficial, however. When the leftist groups spoke of 'opportunists', they meant not only middle-ranking officials but also senior Fateh and PLO leaders. In its assessment of the confrontation, the PFLP explicitly blamed Palestinian shortcomings on the 'PLO leadership and its political line, and [on] its capitulationist [*mutakhadhil*] stance that corresponded to the nature of its class structure'.[70] Both the PFLP and the PDFLP deplored the general absence of planning and lack of unity, and decried the fact that there

had been no formal assessment nor an investigation to apportion blame, for which state of affairs the Fateh-dominated PLO was again held responsible.[71] The main error of the 'rightist leadership', the PFLP argued, was to insist on coexistence with the Jordanian authorities, from which derived its excessive tendency to make concessions.[72] The PFLP reiterated that the balance of power on the eve of the confrontation had favoured the guerrillas, who could have split the army and overthrown the government if they had taken the initiative.[73] It was to admit many years later that in fact 'the balance had favoured the foe', but still held that a bold initiative could have turned the tables.[74] The PLO had failed first by adopting a defensive posture, and then by lacking a coherent defence plan.[75]

The PDFLP and PF–GC echoed much of the PFLP's criticism. The PDFLP claimed that Arafat had been authorized only to obtain a truce in order to allow the guerrilla groups to strengthen the defence of Amman by bringing in reinforcements from north Jordan, and accused him of overstepping his mandate in accepting more sweeping terms.[76] The PDFLP was also proud, rather than repentant, of its own role in precipitating the confrontation. It reminded its members that it had sought to mobilize 'the masses, resistance, and soldiers' prior to the battle by raising the slogan of 'all power to the resistance and soldiers and armed people'.[77] The PF–GC, for its part, blamed much of the debacle on the 'importation' of leaders and experts from outside Jordan who were unfamiliar with its social and political composition.[78] It, too, believed that the ceasefire had aborted a favourable military situation at the end of September; the guerrillas had remained on the defensive before, during, and after the showdown, and the confusion of aims had impeded preparation.[79] Yet the PF–GC also criticized those 'who raised slogans bigger than their capabilities', implying the PFLP and PDFLP, and admitted that the Left had remained a 'prisoner of the bourgeois leadership and performed no better'.[80]

Fateh responded with growing vigour to the criticism. Arafat was later to reveal his conviction that 'even if we had been winged angels without sin, the Jordanian regime would still have struck us'.[81] But in January 1971, he lashed out at 'those among us who committed idiocies in the streets and villages. Red flags should not have been raised over mosques, for example. Attacks by some on army soldiers and officers should not have recurred. They [Jordanian personnel] were not mercenaries or traitors.'[82] Arafat also had harsh words for the PFLP, whose hijack operations had helped precipitate the confrontation. He insisted that Israel endangered civilians by using its civilian aircraft to carry military equipment, but at the same time denounced hostage-taking because it allowed opponents 'to represent us as false revolutionaries and people devoid of principles'.[83]

To drive the point home, Qaddumi criticized the 'infantile slogans' of the Left and 'erroneous behaviour . . . including airplane hijacking operations'.[84] In his view, international terrorism was 'no more than a publicity stunt that almost cost us the backing and support of world opinion'.[85] Coming as they had

on the eve of the showdown with the Jordanian army, the multiple hijack operations had allowed hostile forces 'to strike at the Palestinian revolution on the pretext of liquidating terrorism and sabotage'.[86] Qaddumi also rejected criticism from the militant groups that the guerrilla movement had failed to unite behind their proposals to take the initiative against the Jordanian government. Quite the contrary, he argued, they were to blame for jealously guarding their 'independence of action', which effectively reduced talk of national unity to mere coordination of divergent policies. These groups responded to some of the charges by protesting that the Jordanian government was the real culprit, and that responsibility for the outcome could not be blamed on the Palestinian Left.[87]

The most scathing response to leftist criticism came from ʿUdwan, who devoted most of a press interview at the beginning of January 1971 to a blistering counter-attack against the PFLP, which had just accused Fateh of monopolizing Palestinian decision-making and of acting unilaterally in its dealings with the Jordanian government and the Arab truce committee. ʿUdwan started by implicitly accusing the PFLP and other critics of alienating native Transjordanians, by giving the impression that they wanted to 'establish a Palestinian state on both banks [of the Jordan River], on the ruins of the Jordanian state'.[88] In his view, they were also guilty of undermining Palestinian national unity by refusing to uphold the authority of the PLO central committee, which 'sought to steer Palestinian action in one direction, free of [individual] whim'. He then reminded Habash that he had been abroad throughout the period in which crucial agreements were being negotiated with the Jordanian government. ʿUdwan went on to accuse the PFLP of instigating labour strikes and deliberately provoking clashes with the Jordanian army, and pointedly asked why clashes broke out whenever the front was about to be censured by the PLO central committee for one misdemeanour or another. In a later interview, ʿUdwan attacked the leftist groups for 'gambling on the capability of Fateh' to instigate a showdown. They were too small 'to pay the price of the decision, and so were not much concerned by the calculations [involved]. After all, decision[-making] is not a matter of whim [*mazaj*], but rather the outcome of a series of equations of forces'.[89]

In referring to Habash's prolonged absence, ʿUdwan had touched on an issue of considerable embarrassment for the PFLP. *Al-Hadaf* even felt it necessary to publish an official explanation in mid-October. This account stated that he had gone abroad in response to a long-standing invitation, and stressed that he had decided to return home after learning of the start of hostilities on 17 September. It failed to mention, however, that Habash in fact remained abroad for several weeks more.[90] The PFLP's discomfit was also revealed in its attempt to deflect accusations of reckless behaviour and gross political misjudgement before the confrontation. Military commander Abu Hammam went so far as to assert that 'the resistance [movement] never wanted a confrontation with the regime . . . nor did we expect a large split within the army'.[91] He also tried to

play down the inauspicious outcome, arguing that the most significant aspect of the conflict had been 'the establishment of the liberated zones . . . and the joint Palestinian–Jordanian revolution'.[92]

Seeking to regain its composure, the PFLP raised the issue of Palestinian national unity repeatedly in the following months. A memorandum to the PLO central committee in late December suggested the formation of a new national front, and was followed by a formal proposal to the PNC in February 1971.[93] As in earlier proposals submitted in 1969–70, the thrust was to circumvent the Fateh-dominated PLO by establishing a new body in which all guerrilla groups would enjoy equal representation and freedom of action. Its ambition was even less likely to succeed after September 1970, not least because the PFLP was now shaken by an intense internal debate. This was revealed during a special meeting of the expanded PFLP central committee in early November.[94] Attended by a number of middle-ranking cadres, the meeting took on the form of an impromptu conference in which the old guard was pitted in stormy discussions against younger, leftist cadres. Among the latter were Ghazi al-Khalili and Syrian-born Abu ʿAli 'Irbid' Hamidi from Jordan, and Yunis Bujayrami, Walid Qaddura, Suhayl al-Natur, and the Iraqi-born Ahmad Farhan and Tariq ʿAli from Lebanon. Habash played arbiter, although as one leftist cadre later recalled, 'we used to revere the doctor [Habash] before September 1970, but our view changed after that'.[95]

A central issue at the conference was to determine responsibility for provoking the September showdown. Habash and the old guard exerted considerable pressure to avoid discussion of the abortive *coup* plans, but Haddad and the hijacks came in for vehement criticism from the leftist cadres who felt that the guerrilla movement had paid an inordinate price as a result.[96] Haddad defended himself vigorously, but the conference agreed to suspend 'external operations'.[97] Other bones of contention were the poor military showing of the PFLP, which had suffered a sharp drop in full-time combat strength from 1,500 to 950, and the lack of coordination with the PLO.[98] PFLP guerrillas in the north had mutinied briefly in protest against the withdrawal of their sector commander during the battle for Irbid, while latent rivalries between guerrillas from the West Bank and officers from Gaza resurfaced.[99]

Unable to bridge the internal rift, Habash suggested the dissolution of both the politburo and the central committee. Government control of the main roads and borders in Jordan made it difficult, even dangerous, for these bodies to meet. The solution was to form a new 'supporting political leadership' in Amman, comprising Farhan, Khawaja, Mahmud ʿIsa, Rubin Jabir, and Khalili, each of whom would take charge of a separate function: civilian organization, military affairs, clandestine activity in the occupied territories, and so on.[100] Habash and other leaders were deemed to be under threat of arrest or assassination if they stayed in Amman, and so Habash, Zabri, Matar, and Hammuda formed a second command in Jerash.[101] Haddad, Hindi, Yamani, Musallami, and other old guard cadres were to form an overall 'supporting leadership

outside' based in Lebanon, where there was to be a separate local 'supporting political leadership'.

The PFLP may have offered the most graphic example, but its disarray was typical of the Palestinian Left. The PDFLP had suffered an equally damaging loss of credibility due to the failure of its calls for 'all power to the resistance'. The handful of politburo members who had originally opposed the call for an armed insurrection during the crucial meetings in August left the ranks in disgust. However, the PDFLP was not inclined to acknowledge its role in precipitating the conflict, and continued to defend its past policies resolutely and to blame Fateh for the outcome. Yet its formal assessment of the September showdown revealed its inability to suggest solutions. The document renewed faith in people's war and accused the PLO of having regressed into 'semi-regular' forms of combat, but offered no further suggestions on how the guerrilla movement could actually develop militarily or confront the new phase.[102] At the same time, the PDFLP sought to recover its poise by adopting a lower political profile and by tacitly aligning itself more closely with the PLO mainstream on practical issues. It also took the precaution in October of moving 40–50 guerrillas, a sizeable part of its remaining strength, to southern Syria in order to avoid further losses.[103]

The JCP meanwhile suffered an open split. The Salfiti faction considered that the outcome of the September showdown vindicated its earlier opposition to the policies of the 'adventurist nationalist' wing, especially the decision to form the Ansar guerrilla force.[104] It also opposed the inclusion of non-party members in Ansar and its integration into the PLO military command structure, which it believed had led to growing material dependence on Fateh.[105] The Salfiti faction remained in the minority, however, and split off in January 1971 to form the JCP–Leninist Cadre. This had little discernible impact on the JCP. Ansar had taken active part in the defence of Amman and was rewarded with invitations to join local militia commands in several neighbourhoods and with ammunition and non-combat supplies from the PLO central committee.[106] The JCP also upheld its formal commitment to guerrilla action for another year (albeit as one among several different forms of struggle), but continued to distinguish itself from the PLO by advocating a negotiated settlement with Israel based on UN Security Council Resolution 242.[107]

The general disarray of the Palestinian Left was reflected in the outcome of demands for organizational reform in the PLO. The PLO central committee had proved largely unable to instil order in its proceedings or consistency in its decision-making and political pronouncements. As one member observed acidly, 'each meeting lacked continuity with what went before, and started from zero again'.[108] Khalaf added that the committee had proved to be little more than an assembly for the purpose of representation, embarrassment [of each other], and conciliation'.[109] Fateh had obviously concluded that it was time to marginalize the central committee, in favour of the executive committee, which it dominated and from which the smallest factions were excluded. Several

guerrilla groups submitted formal unity proposals to the central committee on 3–5 December but were foiled by Fateh, which saw little reason to cede control and deflected the pressure by arguing for incremental integration in stages.[110]

The Left was again unable to mount an effective challenge at the PNC session held towards the end of February 1971, and Arafat successfully prevented serious discussion of a detailed plan for national unity and internal reorganization that was submitted by the PLO planning centre. He also benefited from the support of PLA commander Yahya, who had proposed in recent weeks that the PLO central committee be dissolved and the authority of the executive committee increased, as a means of ending the duality of decision-making within the PLO.[111] The central committee was not dissolved in the event (although its name was changed to 'central council'), but Arafat took advantage of the decline of the Left to concentrate power in the executive committee and to exclude the smaller groups from its ranks. He had to give way on a different matter, however, bowing to Syrian pressure to reinstate ʿUthman Haddad as chief-of-staff.

The Creeping Offensive

Palestinian disarray contrasted sharply with the systematic manner in which the Jordanian leadership approached the next phase of its conflict with the PLO. The first step was to reinforce internal cohesion, in order to prevent a recurrence of the defections that had taken place during the September showdown. In his letter appointing Tal as prime minister on 28 October, king Husayn instructed him to uproot the sources of 'vacillation and slackness' shown by certain government agencies during the confrontation.[112] The PLO later claimed that 3,000 civil servants of Palestinian origin were dismissed in this period.[113] Jordanian intelligence continued to target the guerrilla movement with covert operations and a disinformation campaign, and mounted a parallel destabilization campaign against the PLO in Lebanon.[114] The king compounded Palestinian divisions and deepened the mutual distrust between the various groups by repeatedly stressing his willingness to cooperate with the 'honourable' guerrillas, implying Fateh and the PLA.

The Jordanian army meanwhile made good its equipment losses thanks to a rapid US resupply effort.[115] Palestinian combat strength, on the other hand, declined substantially as demoralized guerrillas and militiamen left the ranks. Counting the casualties incurred in September, the number of full-time personnel had dropped by at least 2,000 to reach 7,000 by the end of 1970, and probably to 5,000–5,500 (excluding the PLA). Worst hit was the militia, which now paid the price of hasty recruitment, loose organization, and indiscipline. Of equal importance was the fundamental shift in the regional environment. Anwar Sadat had replaced Nasir as Egyptian president, while Asad seized power in Syria in November; both leaders were less committed than their predecessors

to the PLO, and were in any case still engaged in securing their domestic power. Libya's Qadhdhafi strained relations with the PLO by publicly criticizing its behaviour in Jordan in early 1971, but worst was the feud with Iraq, which suspended financial assistance in March.

The Jordanian army was ready to renew military operations in November 1970. Its command was instructed to implement an incremental strategy in order to reduce casualties and limit Arab reaction, with the final objective of subduing the guerrilla movement completely.[116] The army plan was to isolate Amman gradually, by eliminating guerrilla strongholds in the other cities and towns and taking control of principal roads and strategic heights. Political pressure would be exerted at the same time to reduce the guerrilla presence in Amman, and in the last phase the army would eliminate remaining guerrilla bases in the countryside. The Palestinian leadership was not unaware of the danger. The head of the Fateh civilian organization in Amman, ʿAllush, wrote in November that 'the coming war of annihilation is close, and is coming no matter what'.[117] A few weeks later he added perceptively that the Jordanian plan was to achieve 'complete control along the main communications routes . . . control Amman and other cities by occupying numerous strategic positions in all hills and neighbourhoods . . . and increase the capability of the army by increasing its number and turning it into a mobile force'.[118]

These warnings ultimately made little difference. The ministry of interior established new police stations in most Amman neighbourhoods in November, largely manned by public security force personnel who now conducted checks on vehicle registrations and searched for arms. In this manner, the government gradually took control of the Hamlan, Hashimi, and Nasr hills and of Mahatta in the city centre over the next three months. On 23 November, a royal decree transformed the Popular Resistance militia into the Popular Army, and established a 'defence council' in every governate to direct its operations and coordinate with local police, intelligence, and Jordanian youth associations. Its main tasks were to guard vital installations and government facilities and provide self-defence in the villages, mobilizing the rural population and freeing the army for the coming campaign.[119]

The army developed its 'creeping offensive' at the beginning of December by ordering the guerrillas to evacuate Thaghrat ʿAsfur, a strategic pass on the Jerash–Irbid road. After they had complied, Jordanian troops set up a checkpoint on the Jerash–Zarqa bridge, effectively isolating guerrilla supply bases and headquarters in Jerash. The army next attacked Jerash and the nearby Suf refugee camp on 6 December, and wrested control after two days of combat in which 63 PLA soldiers were taken prisoner and 80 guerrillas 'disappeared'.[120] (A number of Jordanian officers and soldiers were later tried for 'extremism' during the battle.[121]) When the Arab follow-up committee next met on 14 December, government representatives exploited their advantage to extract what became known as the 'militia agreement' from the PLO. This called for the collection of all militia weapons in urban areas in designated stores under

PLO guard, and banned armed PLO personnel entirely from Zarqa. The government promised to apply similar measures to its Popular Resistance militia in return, and agreed to withdraw the public security force from Amman and cease the search for weapons.[122]

Publication of the militia agreement provoked a storm of protests, most vocal of which came not from the Palestinian Left but from the Fateh *iqlim* and militia command. The militia had won considerable credit for its stubborn resistance during the September showdown—in contrast to the rapid collapse of the 'revolutionary bases' previously established by Arafat and the general command—and gained additional influence following the recent unification of Palestinian militias. For the prominent leftist cadres especially, this decision was the outcome not of military defeat (which they did not acknowledge) but of 'the loss of confidence in the readiness of the masses, militia, and fighters to enter new battles and make additional sacrifices'.[123] Taken aback by the strength of internal opposition, and in any case not keen to disarm the militia, the PLO quickly backtracked. It declared that the PLO representative in the follow-up committee had not been authorized to make such concessions, and repudiated the agreement. This triggered sporadic clashes in Amman, that ended when the government implicitly abandoned the matter.

It was in this context that the PFLP decided to launch a guerrilla campaign against the army. Habash had first proposed this strategy during the informal conference of early November, and initially met with strenuous opposition from old guard and leftist cadres alike. He eventually won his audience over, and the conference confirmed that the PFLP would respond to army action on the basis of 'an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth' for a trial period of three months.[124] An internal document issued many years later explained that the aim was to break the siege imposed on the guerrilla movement and overcome the disadvantages of being physically penned in, by compelling the army to disperse its units.[125] The PFLP next approached the other guerrilla groups for support, but they refused to participate in the campaign.[126] Undeterred, it mounted scattered attacks on army positions during the first half of December, but obscured its role by announcing the raids in the name of The Movement of Free Jordanians–Shihan Forces.[127]

These guerrilla attacks had little impact on the Jordanian army. It resumed its creeping offensive on 25 December by taking full control of Salt and of a main road leading to guerrilla bases in the Jordan Valley. It followed up at the beginning of 1971 by seizing the Mirhab junction connecting Jerash and Mafraq, cutting the guerrilla's last secure supply route to Syria and Iraq. The army next forced the guerrillas off the strategic Talluza mountain and Um Rumman hill on 8 January: 400 guerrillas, mostly belonging to Saʿiqa and the smaller groups, were provided safe escort to Syria, while Fateh guerrillas redeployed around Dibbin. This left Baqʿa refugee camp isolated and guerrilla bases in Ramimin under siege. The army also seized Rusayfa and the Schneller refugee camp near Zarqa, completing the isolation of Amman.

Faced with this grim reality, the PLO central committee accepted a modified version of the militia agreement on 13 January.[128] Once again its decision provoked stormy protests, not least within Fateh. ʿAllush warned that 'the loss of our positions in Jordan will shake our positions in Lebanon and [the occupied territories]', and concluded that 'the lackey regime must be overthrown, and a nationalist government set up in its place'.[129] The Fateh *iqlim* obeyed nonetheless, but the PFLP renewed its guerrilla raids on the army. It was at this point that ʿUdwan, who represented Fateh in the PLO central committee secretariat, took the PFLP to task in a much-publicized press conference. The PFLP was guilty, he noted bitterly, for helping to bring about the very circumstances that had obliged the PLO to submit to government demands. He ridiculed its call for a guerrilla campaign and pulled an old skeleton out of the cupboard by reminding his audience that the PFLP had withdrawn in face of the imminent Israeli attack on Karama in March 1968. ʿUdwan added ominously, 'we have grave question marks about the PFLP. I believe there is a connection between the PFLP and the Jordanian authorities, to say the least', and threatened a resort to arms against the front if it did not adhere to the latest agreement.[130]

The PFLP had already declared on 12 January that it was waging a guerrilla campaign against the army. Its statement stressed the need to 'open fire' and seize the initiative.[131] In a comment on the second militia agreement a few days later, Habash insisted that 'it is imperative to resolve the political stand of the resistance [movement], that is, to struggle with the masses for the establishment of a popular, progressive government'.[132] He also revived the somewhat contradictory call for 'a decision of the military situation, that is, abandon large exposed battles with the regime and reply with tactical blows'. The PFLP recognized Palestinian weakness but hoped 'to keep the battle alive, and to prevent the collection [by the army] of [Palestinian] weapons and personnel'.[133] The PFLP realized that it could not resist Fateh on this issue, however, and backtracked on 21 January with an announcement that it would obey the PLO central committee and abide by the agreement with the government. Privately, the PFLP bemoaned the fact that 'the others rejected our call, so we waged the [guerrilla war] in a limited fashion to the best of our resources'. The PFLP would not accept that it was at fault in any way, declaring itself perplexed that its campaign had only 'led to more concessions'.[134]

For its part, the Jordanian government pressed its advantage by demanding the withdrawal of remaining guerrillas and heavy weapons from Amman and other cities. It now decreed stiff penalties for unlawful possession of weapons, and at the beginning of February announced that identity cards and travel passes issued by the guerrilla groups would no longer be recognized at border checkpoints. The army kept up its momentum by occupying Suf refugee camp on 4 February, using any pretext that presented itself to launch localized attacks.[135] After several more weeks of friction, Jordanian units occupied Mafraq

on 23 March and won control of Irbid two days later, followed by the nearby refugee camp on 27 March. Saʿiqa had quietly withdrawn from Irbid a few days earlier in agreement with the army, which provided safe escort to the Syrian border, while members of the other groups escaped as best they could to ʿAjlun or Syria.[136] The government reported 200 casualties in all, but the PLO insisted that 200 guerrillas had been killed and 400 wounded, besides civilian casualties. It added that hundreds of its followers had been taken to the Jafar prison camp, taking the number of its inmates up to 1,000.[137]

Building on these successes, the Jordanian leadership turned its attention to Amman. In a speech to parliament on 4 April, king Husayn complained of guerrilla attacks on the army, and demanded that all guerrillas and heavy weapons be withdrawn from the capital. He made a point of noting that army strength had risen to 75,000 since September 1970, a net increase of 10,000.[138] The PLO insisted at first that it would not give up the rights it enjoyed under the Cairo and Amman agreements, arguing that it had already adhered to most of their terms and that it was the government that was guilty of disregarding them.[139] Faced with a Jordanian build-up around the capital it capitulated, and evacuated some 2,000 guerrillas and non-combat personnel to ʿAjlun and the Jordan Valley on 6–13 April. Wazir headed the field command in ʿAjlun, where 2,500 guerrillas were now assembled, assisted by Walid Nimr. The civilian organization was utterly dismayed and vehemently opposed the pullout, but its attempt to form a secret militia was foiled by Jordanian intelligence.[140] During the same period, the army cleared the northern border zone and cut all but one guerrilla supply route to Syria, and pushed Palestinian bases in the Jordan Valley southwards and captured the Ramimin area.

Arab responses to Jordanian action had been muted so far, although Asad summoned the Jordanian ambassador in Damascus to protest the attack on Irbid. The Arab follow-up committee objected to the ultimatum of 4 April instructing the guerrillas to evacuate Amman, but was simply ignored by the government.[141] Frustrated, Adgham resigned and the committee was formally dissolved on 17 April. The army quickly confiscated militia weapons stores in Amman and closed all but two PLO offices, compelling the Palestinian leadership to move to Damascus.[142] It also tightened its ring around the guerrilla stronghold in ʿAjlun over the next two months, to which the PFLP, PDFLP, and PF–GC responded with sporadic raids. Remaining guerrilla bases south of the Zarqa river and near Jabir on the border with Syria were overrun at the end of May, and the Baqʿa and Gaza refugee camps came under siege. Baqʿa surrendered on 28 June, while Gaza came under intermittent sniper and artillery fire from the beginning of July onwards. The government now cut direct contact with the PLO.[143]

At this critical moment, the Palestinian leadership was assembled in Cairo to attend the PNC. The situation in Jordan occupied a considerable part of the debate, but perennial disputes about national unity and the allocation of PNC seats were also a focus of attention.[144] The PDFLP presented an ambitious

proposal for the merger of all Palestinian forces in a single 'people's liberation army', overlooking its own inability to muster more than 200 guerrillas.[145] Fateh, for its part, was concerned with its continuing effort to reduce the number of guerrilla groups. It had recently obliged the POLP to dismantle its small guerrilla contingent and merge with other groups, and the PPSF and AOLP now announced that they would join Fateh. A more serious concern was the untimely bid by PLA chief-of-staff ʿUthman Haddad to replace Yahya as PLA commander, a bid that could only have been made on the instructions of Syrian military intelligence. This issue dominated the rest of the PNC debate, on the eve of the Jordanian army's final offensive.

On 12 July, as the PNC drew to a close, the Jordanian government suddenly ordered the guerrillas to evacuate a strategic mountain at the heart of their stronghold in ʿAjlun. Their field command rejected the order, and the army started its attack the next morning with an intense artillery barrage. An infantry division, an armoured brigade, and two commando battalions backed by up to 10,000 members of the Popular Army advanced on three sides, while an additional force of three battalions attacked the 500 guerrillas in the Jordan Valley.[146] The army had seized much of the battlefield by nightfall on 14 July, and secured complete control by the morning of 16 July, for a toll of 120–200 casualties.[147] Mopping-up operations continued for another two days, during which Nimr and several Jordanian army officers who had defected to Fateh in September 1970 were executed.[148] Some 200–250 guerrillas had been killed and another 2,300 captured, while 500 escaped to Syria and 100 crossed the Jordan River and surrendered to the IDF.[149]

Once again, the Arab response to Jordanian action was minimal. Sadat, Asad, Qadhdhafi, and Nimayri, who happened to be meeting within the framework of their recently formed Federation of Arab Republics, issued a statement deploring the bloodshed in Jordan.[150] Asad promised to dispatch a Syrian military mission to ʿAjlun, but by the time it had conducted preliminary talks in Amman the battle was over.[151] The Syrian army meanwhile stopped Palestinian attempts to send raiding parties or shell Jordanian positions across the border, and surrounded the PLA ʿAyn Jalut Forces to prevent any movement towards Jordan.[152] Wazir, who had been in Cairo for the PNC and now accompanied the Syrian mission to ʿAjlun, accused it of deliberate delays and of identifying guerrilla officers for capture by the Jordanian army.[153] The guerrillas who arrived at assembly points designated by the Syrians were screened by the army and separated according to affiliation. Some 1,500, mostly belonging to Fateh, were released: 800 returned to civilian life in Jordan while the rest, including ALF and Saʿiqa members, were bused to the border.[154] Nearly 200 prisoners were sent to the Jafar prison camp, including 90 leftists ('ideological detainees'), among them senior PFLP and PDFLP cadres Matar, Hammuda, Khalili, and Raʾfat.[155] The PLA 421 and 422 Battalions, which had not taken part in the recent battle, were transferred to Syria at Jordanian request a few weeks later.

The Final Rupture

The battle of ʿAjlun marked the final destruction of the guerrilla movement's principal Arab sanctuary. This represented a defeat of the strategy of people's war championed by the various guerrilla groups since 1967, and posed a fundamental challenge to their professed aims, political programmes, and organizational structure. Both in reaction and as a means of obscuring their predicament, the guerrilla groups launched a campaign of sabotage and subversion against Jordan in mid-August that was to continue sporadically for the next 20 or so months.[156] The Palestinian Left was most active at first. Habash explained that regaining the Jordanian sanctuary was vital because 'it is the central backbone for the existence of all branches of the resistance outside Jordan, and for the existence of the phenomenon of armed struggle'. The 'battle against the reactionary regime in Jordan is the central battle now faced by the resistance [movement]', he stressed, adding that 'this regime is an enemy and an integral part of the enemy camp, and there is no difference whatsoever between [Israeli defence minister] Dayan, [king] Husayn, or [former Jordanian army commander] sharif Nasir [bin Jamil]. As we act in Israel, so should we act in Jordan.' The means, accordingly, was to be 'guerilla war in the mountains and clandestine war in the cities'.[157]

Remaining PFLP and PDFLP members in Jordan bombed police stations, government offices, and economic installations in urban areas after July. Their effort proved to be erratic and shortlived, however, as Jordanian intelligence was highly effective in exposing the clandestine networks. The PFLP was suffering a leadership crisis in Beirut, and its most active cadres in Jordan were in prison by year's end. The PDFLP organization had been crushed, while the PF–GC, which had joined the campaign, had only nine members left in the kingdom, all fugitives.[158] Jordanian military courts handed out stiff sentences—12 Palestinians were hanged on sabotage charges in this period—and the survivors ceased action by the end of 1971.[159] By then attention was firmly fixed on the inter-Arab level.

Arab reactions to the Jordanian offensive had gradually built up in the meantime. Libya had already severed diplomatic relations and Syria, Iraq, and Algeria now followed suit, while Egypt and North Yemen denounced the Jordanian government. Syria and Iraq also subjected Jordan to a land and air blockade, and brief border clashes broke out between Jordanian and Syrian armour in August. In order to relieve this pressure, and after energetic lobbying from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, king Husayn agreed to hold reconciliation talks with the PLO in mid-September. His reluctance was matched by the opposition not only of the Palestinian Left, but also of Khalaf, Qaddumi, and other Fateh cadres, who voiced their views during a general conference of their movement in early September.[160] Arafat, Wazir, Khalid al-Hasan, and ʿUdwan advocated moderation, largely to convince the Arab states of their readiness to compromise.[161] As a delegate to the Fateh conference explained, 'we voted against mediation but

faced two choices, to do so frankly or to confront it in a manner that placed the blame for failure on the other side, and so we chose the second course'.[162] Syria backed Fateh on this occasion, as Saʿiqa representatives joined the PLO delegation to the talks in Jedda, and Iraq instructed the ALF to attend the second round (after boycotting the first).[163]

Failure was inevitable. The Jordanian delegation rejected a PLO return to the kingdom, while Fateh instructed its representatives to stall by presenting demands that Jordan could not possibly accept.[164] On the eve of the second round of talks at the beginning of November, king Husayn informed his chief negotiator, Riyad Muflih, that 'this may be the last and decisive round, since there is no justification in our view for matters to remain as they are, coming and going'.[165] Prime minister Tal had reportedly been privately opposed to the army campaign in ʿAjlun, and was unhappy with the collapse of the Jedda talks. He now started secret negotiations with Khalid al-Hasan, and continued the dialogue in Cairo, where both men were attending meetings of the Joint Arab Defence Council at the end of November.[166] According to Hasan, Tal was ready to allow Fateh to operate in Jordan as a political, but not military, organization. Should Tal fail to secure royal approval for his proposal, Hasan recounted, he intended to force the king into exile and possibly assume power himself.[167]

The truth of these claims was never put to the test. On 28 November, Tal was gunned down by four gunmen as he walked into his hotel in Cairo, where he was attending the Joint Arab Defence Council. An unknown group, the Black September Organization, announced its responsibility, but the Jordanian government accused Fateh of masterminding the attack as part of a 'terrorist plan' against Jordan.[168] It renewed martial law and closed down the two remaining PLO offices in Amman. The rupture was complete, and with it went the last vestiges of the Palestinian state-within-the-state in Jordan.

12

Interregnum

Defeat in Jordan left the Palestinian guerrilla movement at a historic crossroads. Other guerrilla movements, especially those led by communist parties, had initiated purposeful internal debates that led to far-reaching reassessment of political programmes and to modified approaches to mass organization following comparable crises, but similar 'rectification' campaigns did not occur in the Palestinian case. The self-criticism that had followed September 1970 was intense and, for an Arab political movement, unprecedentedly frank, but much of it was conducted verbally, in the form of media interviews and public speeches, and so remained erratic and fragmented. This was especially true of Fateh, but even the PFLP and PDFLP, each of which published a formal internal assessment of the showdown in early 1971, were unable to produce a similar effort after July.

An explanation for the contrast with other revolutionary experiences was that proto-nationalism remained the primary source from which all Palestinian guerrilla groups, including those proclaiming Marxism-Leninism, derived their understanding of political and social processes and the framework within which they formulated their programmes and aims. Neither was social transformation an aim, nor intervention in productive relations a means, even for the generation of revenue. Political capability was based on the potency of the appeal to nationalist patriotism, not on social mobilization, and the lessons to be learnt from defeat diverged accordingly. This also meant that the debate after September 1970 centred on 'pure' political issues, such as relations with the Arab states and masses or attitudes to 'liquidationist' peace proposals, rather than questions of social programme, organizational structure, policy instruments, or the extraction and allocation of resources. Much of the criticism had in fact consisted of invective, mutual recriminations, and polemics, and there was little change after July 1971.

The predominance of 'pure', nationalist politics was further manifested in both open and hidden organizational schisms that were exacerbated by the defeat, and that resulted in the intensification of factional politics and the emergence of new political formations. As a member of the PFLP military command noted, 'in the present phase the resistance movement faces all the problems of military, organizational, and ideological reconstruction and all that goes with it in the way of [scurrilous] questioning [*tashkik*], splits, outbidding, exaggeration, abandonment [*tasaqut*], and deviation. To this are added direct

and indirect measures of Israeli deterrence . . . [that threaten] to turn this phase from one of "self-preservation and reconstruction" into one of "self-preservation" in the negative sense'.[1] A struggle for power was underway, replicated within each guerrilla group and within the movement as a whole, that utimately reflected the underlying contest between pragmatic and absolutist versions of nationalist patriotism.

The writings in this period of two Arab leftist intellectuals usefully expressed the dichotomy. Lebanese communist Ilyas Murqus had questioned the basic nature and function of the Palestinian movement and developed a sustained critique of its terminology and slogans in two books published in 1970 and 1971. His central argument was that the Palestinian movement was not, as it termed itself, a revolution. Be they social or national, bourgeois or socialist, revolutions were only possible when a majority of participants resided on their land.[2] The Palestinian movement was revolutionary only in the sense that it had taken up the gun to contest the usurpation of Palestine, but mere rejection of reality was neither a strategy nor a tactic.[3] The real task was to resist Israeli occupation through carefully planned guerrilla action and non-violent struggle, as part of a major effort by the Arab armies and states; the Palestinian guerrillas could not hope to emulate the Yugoslav partisans or the French Maquisards of World War Two to form liberated zones, given the geographical constraints and the demographic imbalance with the Israeli population.[4] The rhetorical stress on armed struggle, people's war, and revolution ignored basic military realities and allowed utopian ideology (especially on the Left) to obscure the more mundane requirements of daily struggle.[5] The guerrilla groups now needed to discard demagoguery and 'verbalism', close down 95 per cent of their publications and offices, and declare that their task was not to liberate Palestine single-handedly, but to demonstrate Palestinian existence and will, for 100 years if necessary.[6]

Sadiq Jalal al-ʿAzm, a Syrian Marxist-Leninist close to the PDFLP, offered a direct counter-view. The Palestinian movement had erred in regarding the contradiction with the Jordanian monarchy as secondary compared to that with Israel, when in fact it faced primary contradictions with Israel, US imperialism, and Jordan.[7] Fateh was most guilty of vacillation and middle-roadism, leading to an excessively defensive posture during the confrontations of 1970–1.[8] This was a direct result of its 'subordinate attachment' (*iltisaqiyya*) to the Arab states, which was also reflected in the erroneous assumption that the Palestinians could wage war on Israel and mobilize the masses without active engagement in surrounding Arab social structures and political systems, if only to provide the basic needs of the armies of liberation.[9] Fateh was guilty of a hollow and perverted interpretation of Maoism, in which it 'sanctified' military action in order to escape the need for ideology and systematic political action among the masses.[10] Fateh militarism revealed its 'petit bourgeois utopianism' and violated the principles of war, especially people's war, just as the Arab states had done in June 1967.[11] Its failure to change the conservative customs and

inherited, spontaneous 'backward consciousness' of the masses meant that there could be no liberation.[12] The answer lay in the emergence of a new revolutionary leadership drawn from the peasantry and working class and espousing Marxism-Leninism, to conduct genuine social revolution and people's war.[13]

In basing their criticism on a literal interpretation of Palestinian military and ideological discourse, both Murqus and ʿAzm overlooked (or implicitly rejected) the crucial function of armed struggle in the development of Palestinian proto-nationalism and state-building. The suggestion that the Palestinians had made conscious choices between models of resistance, revolution, and people's war in the past, or at least could do so now, implied a freedom of agency and availability of strategic options that simply did not apply. It also misunderstood the driving need for political and institutional autonomy, or at least failed to realize that the lack of programmatic alternatives and the imperative of self-preservation would prompt greater emphasis on institutional control. Statist restructuring was the other option, that offered protection for Palestinian political autonomy and national identity.

The statist option emerged incrementally, out of measures undertaken for reasons of short-term political expediency in response both to external challenges and the striving for internal control. Its beginnings were not the result of conscious design, therefore, and arose amidst deep internal divisions over the nature of the problem and its solution. PLO executive committee member Husam al-Khatib offered one of the few systematic attempts to diagnose the Palestinian condition after July 1971, in which he led to one set of conclusions. In his view, the Palestinian guerrilla movement had revealed pathological symptoms of organizational dislocation (*halhala*), erratic politics (*takhabbut*) based on a trial-and-error approach to policy-formulation and decision-making, lack of national unity, and military failure. The loss of the principal base in Jordan now compelled the movement to focus its efforts on preserving Palestinian national identity and keeping the 'atmosphere of revolution' alive. To start the liberation of Palestine was not an option.[14] Khatib did not discuss the statist option in those terms, but denounced the extensive bureaucratization of the guerrilla movement and the meteoric increase of salaried administrative personnel and political staff as a 'revolutionary disease' that could only be reversed by renewed struggle against Israel.[15]

Khatib's point of view reflected the pessimism generated by the recent defeat, and converged with the calls for a return to clandestinity. Arafat and other Fateh leaders had led the way after September 1970 by threatening to 'go underground and follow a scorched earth policy . . . as a last resort' if the guerrillas came under Arab siege.[16] Fateh was unwilling to abandon the major political advantages it derived from its public status, however, and it was the Palestinian Left that took up the slogan after July 1971. The PFLP formally decreed 'going underground' in March 1972, while the PF–GC and ALF called for the construction of 'large secret networks', and the PDFLP argued for

greater discipline and tighter organization.[17] So persistent were these calls that in July the PLO executive committee formally denied any intention of going underground.[18] ʿAllush subsequently presented the Fateh case by arguing that the public nature of the movement 'reinforced its legitimacy, and legitimacy affords moral and material strength. Thanks to this legitimacy, Palestinians can organize, train, arm, operate, and move around . . . Those who demand that we forgo what they call our "public presence" are asking us to dissolve our organizations, bid farewell to our mass organizations, surrender our rifles, and open our [refugee] camps and positions to the gendarmes, police and army and all manner of intelligence agencies, all in order to wage a "secret" struggle.'[19]

If the debate about clandestinity revealed anything, then it was the lack of a policy or strategy. This was reflected in the consistent attempt by the Palestinian leadership, especially that of Fateh, to deflect criticism and contain public dissent, and in the manner in which it sought to explain the defeat in 1970–1. Behind the apparent frankness with which it discussed Palestinian failures lay the conviction that 'honesty with the masses' could only come once 'our internal affairs have been put in order'.[20] The implication was that any admission of the predicament facing the guerrilla movement would damage public morale.[21] The manoeuvring of the Fateh leadership provoked an outburst in February 1971 from ʿAllush, who complained bitterly that 'the revolutionary concept of democracy has expired, criticism has become a crime and discussion an accusation, and a sound, clear opinion is met with threats or sarcasm'.[22]

Faced with constant questioning, Fateh leaders in particular increasingly blamed Palestinian failures on external agencies. Speaking at the end of 1970, for example, Arafat clearly blamed 'what happened in September' not on Palestinian political or military behaviour, but on 'the ferocity of the colonialist assault and the scale of the US threat [to Syria] . . . Nixon was supervising what took place in the Middle East from the aircraft carrier Saratoga'. His own main error of judgement, Arafat stated, was to underestimate the willingness of king Husayn to bombard Amman with 'six times the [explosive power] of the atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima'.[23] Surprise at the ferocity of the Jordanian onslaught was a recurrent refrain, to which Qaddumi added that external circumstances had impeded Palestinian preparations before the confrontation.[24] Returning to this theme after July 1971, Arafat stated bitterly that the movement had fallen 'into the trap of Arab political appeasement, based on the illusion that coexistence with the Jordanian regime was possible. After adhering to the Cairo agreement we accepted to live in the forests and mountains and left the cities and everything to the Jordanian regime . . . trusting in the signatures of the Arab kings and presidents on the Cairo agreement.'[25]

Of equal importance in the view of the Fateh leadership was to shore up morale among the rank-and-file and wider public. An internal newsletter produced by the mobilization and guidance branch of its general command in

January 1972 described the 'miraculous achievement' in Jordan, in which Fateh had 'triumphed politically even as we retreated militarily'.[26] Arafat expanded on this reasoning by defining 'revolution as the succession of temporary setbacks until final victory'. What was important, he added, was that the Palestinians had not abandoned the gun.[27] Leftist Fateh cadres adopted much the same view. Indeed, Shafiq argued that the guerrillas had not suffered a military defeat in September 1970 at all, having emerged from the confrontation in a stronger position than before. The arrival of reinforcements and new weapons in following weeks actually strengthened the guerrilla movement in Amman, Irbid, Jerash, and the rest of the centre. Disaster only struck because of two political decisions: to collect militia weapons in February 1971, and to evacuate all weapons and forces out of the cities and refugee camps to the mountains and forests in April, leaving the guerrilla fish stranded out of the water.[28]

What could not be obscured, however, was the pressing need for a secure base. The anguish and despair following the expulsion of July 1971 were expressed in the widespread view that 'without Amman there is no revolution'. Fateh concluded that 'the recent events in Jordan have proved that the Palestinians have no place of their own except on their land, and that a quarter of a century in which Jordanian nationality was imposed on the Palestinians in Jordan has not altered their belonging to Palestine'.[29] Yet the guerrilla movement remained in a tenuous exile, and its policy choices were now more severely constrained than ever by the Arab states.[30] Some cadres such as Shafiq still spoke confidently of the ability of Palestinian armed struggle to lead 'tens of millions of the Arab masses—several Arab countries at least—to join directly the long-term people's war against the national enemy'.[31] But Khalaf was closer to the truth when he admitted that short-term tactics had wholly taken the place of strategy in Palestinian politics.[32] The predicament deepened as the guerrillas came under siege in the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Lebanon.

Under Siege

Looking back in summer 1971, Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan observed that 'the Jordanian arena is the foremost natural arena for any Palestinian action requiring direct contact with the occupied land'.[33] That the loss of the former threatened the latter had already been demonstrated over the preceding year, as Israel took advantage first of the ceasefire along the Suez Canal and then of the protracted confrontation in Jordan to launch a sustained counter-insurgency campaign in Gaza. The rupture with Nasir led to a suspension of Palestinian activity in Egypt, which impeded recruitment of students from the occupied territories and the smuggling of cadres and combat supplies to Gaza by sea or through Sinai.[34] In January 1971 the commanding officer for the Israeli southern front, Ariel Sharon, signalled a new policy by replacing

army units in Gaza with the border police, known for harsh, even brutal methods. Administrative detention and the use of informers were stepped up, and in March an 'information programme' was launched to induce clandestine guerrillas to surrender. The 'stick' was complemented on 1 April with the 'carrot', as Sharon offered the inhabitants the prospect of more efficient services and a normal life by nominally separating civilian affairs from the military government.

Partly as a result of these measures, the number of Palestinian security prisoners in Israeli jails rose from 3,000 at the end of 1970 to 3,700 by mid-1971.[35] Israeli courts convicted 5,620 Palestinians of committing security offences in Gaza in the year up to April 1971, while the number of administrative detainees rose by around 1,000.[36] The guerrillas struck back with particular violence against suspected Palestinian informers, killing 75 in 1970 and another 61 in the first half of 1971, as well as civilian employees of the Israeli administration and day-labourers who worked in Israel.[37] However, up to half of all executions after August 1970 targeted members of rival groups (on the grounds that they were double agents for the Israeli General Security Service, Shabak), and increasingly provoked clan feuds and revenge killings. The PFLP, which claimed responsibility for 29 executions in 1967–71, insisted steadfastly that 'the enemy's informers are an integral part of the enemy . . . we do not distinguish between them'. When asked if such action had not acquired a terrorist character, Habash replied that 'there is no terrorist phenomenon in Gaza that requires a response'.[38]

The final defeat of the guerrilla movement in Jordan signalled an escalation of the Israeli campaign in Gaza. Israeli reports in late March had spoken of the demolition of thousands of houses in the refugee camps and the forcible evacuation of 100,000–150,000 inhabitants in order to create broad avenues and divide the camps into separate blocks, offering Israeli troops clear fields of fire and enabling them to isolate neighbourhoods during searches.[39] Over 2,500 houses were in fact demolished in the Jabalya, Beach, and Rafah camps in July and August, and up to 38,000 people were relocated in other parts of Gaza, Sinai, or the al-Dhaysha camp in the West Bank.[40] Dozens of guerrilla arms caches and secret bunkers were uncovered in the camps and in groves and orchards, while bulldozers cleared large swathes of vegetation along the main roads to prevent ambushes.

Under relentless pressure, guerrilla attacks dropped from a peak of 69 in July to 26 in October, and ceased almost entirely after December. In all, Israel announced the death of 100 guerrillas and the capture of 1,000 others between March 1971 and the end of January 1972.[41] Among the dead were PFLP commander Mahmud 'Guevara' al-Aswad and deputies Dawud Khalaf and Sulayman Mahmud and the renowned PLF/PLA commander Ziyad al-Husayni, while his predecessor Muhammad al-Hasanat and successors Jabr 'Ammar and Mahmud al-Mabhuh were captured. The resistance movement that had taken Gaza nearly to the point of open insurrection in 1969–70 was

utterly crushed, and in August 1972 the Israeli command relieved the border police after 19 months in action.

The defeat in Gaza was yet another demoralizing blow for the Palestinians, but more significant for the guerrilla movement in exile was the impact of Syrian policy in the same period. The effects were first felt by Saʿiqa, which was obedient to Baʿth Party chairman Jadid. Having ordered the closure of most Saʿiqa offices outside Damascus in August 1970, defence minister Asad had all its remaining facilities placed under army guard during his takeover of power in November. On 23 November the new regional command of the Baʿth Party appointed Saʿiqa military commander Mahmud Maʿayta as secretary-general, and on 1 December a presidential decree separated Saʿiqa from the Baʿth Party and attached it directly to Syrian army command.

Asad tightened control by ordering Saʿiqa guerrillas who were forced out of their positions in Jordan between January and April 1971 to return to Syria. He also assigned a loyalist in the Saʿiqa general command, Zuhayr Muhsin, to head the branch in Lebanon, which had openly sided with Jadid and regularly vilified Asad in the Saʿiqa weekly, *al-Raya* (*Banner*), published in Beirut. Muhsin firmly believed that 'it is impossible to deal with the Palestinians except as part of the Syrian–Palestinian equation, for good or bad'.[42] Matters came to a head on 29 June with the arrest of Maʿayta, Jamʿani, and general command members Hasan al-Khatib and Yusif al-Burji. Muhsin was now appointed secretary-general, and explained that his former colleagues had been arrested for involvement in the Syrian power struggle and misuse of funds.[43] At least one Jadid supporter in Lebanon was killed in July and several Saʿiqa bases in the south defected to Fateh following internal clashes at the beginning of November, but Muhsin had asserted his control by the end of the year.[44] His opponents still held *al-Raya*, however, obliging Saʿiqa to launch a new weekly, *al-Talaʾiʿ* (*Vanguards*).

The appointment of Muhsin also revealed growing tensions between Syria and Fateh. Among the charges he levelled against the previous Saʿiqa leadership in July was its alleged intention to merge with Fateh, 'which would have strained relations between us and Fateh'.[45] His deputy, Sami ʿAtari took up the same theme a few months later, claiming that the Saʿiqa base had rebelled against its leadership in order to bring the tactical alliance with Fateh to an end in protest against its management of the Jordan conflict and its general political line.[46] Muhsin also revealed that the Syrian authorities had impounded a large Algerian arms shipment intended for Fateh a few weeks earlier. This included 36 BTR-152 armoured personnel carriers, two batteries of 105 millimetre artillery guns, and light arms and personal equipment sufficient for 7,500 men.[47] The Syrian command considered the heavy weapons unsuitable for the guerrillas, Muhsin explained, adding that 'to equip Fateh with these arms might lead to clashes on Syrian soil with the PLA'.[48] Asad was presumably worried by the presence in Syria of up to 9,000 guerrillas, including 5,000 Jordanian army defectors attached to Fateh, and 2,000–2,500 soldiers in PLA units loyal to the PLO in Syria, besides the 3,000 personnel in Saʿiqa and the PLA Hittin Forces

whose loyalty might not be certain. Certainly the tone he adopted behind closed doors at a Baʿth Party conference in this period was frankly hostile towards the guerrilla movement.[49]

Whether due to hostility or caution, the Syrian authorities applied the regulations governing guerrilla activity in Syria with greater rigour than ever starting in July. Publications had to be approved by the official censor, and the Palestinian groups could not hold political rallies without prior permission, especially outside the refugee camps. They could only recruit Syrian nationals after vetting by Syrian intelligence, which had the right of free access at any time to the refugee camps and all guerrilla facilities.[50] The guerrillas moreover had to provide advance notice and details of raids against Israel, as well as the names of the men actually taking part. The guerrillas could no longer leave or enter the country without proper passports, and had to obtain travel passes from the National Bureau of Guerrilla Control in military intelligence. Fateh remained silent about these measures, but the PDFLP complained publicly that the restrictions were impeding action against Israel.[51]

Syria also tightened its grip on the PLA. Towards the end of June, the PLA command in Damascus bypassed the PLO executive committee to dismiss the PLF/PLA commander in Jordan, Bahjat ʿAbd-al-Amin. ʿAbd-al-Amin was a left-leaning 'graduate of 1948', as was military intelligence chief Jawad ʿAbd-al-Rahim, who was also dismissed when he refused to remove his colleague forcibly. On 5 July chief-of-staff Haddad publicly accused both men of building autonomous power bases.[52] He claimed that all PLA commanders and branch heads had agreed two days earlier to form a military council, with responsibility for senior appointments. Yahya, the PLA commanders in Jordan, and the commanders of the PLA ʿAyn Jalut and Qadisiyya Forces in Syria had not attended in fact, but the key issue was that Haddad could have acted in this manner only on explicit instructions from Syrian military intelligence. The PNC was due to convene a few days later, and its final statement reiterated the intention to 'liberate the will and command of the [PLA] . . . and enable the political leadership of the PLO to exercise its legitimate rights over the PLA [in a way] that allows it to move and employ the units of the army'.[53] Arafat was already under Syrian pressure to return the ʿAyn Jalut and Qadisiyya Forces, both deemed loyal to the PLO, to Egypt and Iraq. He had little option; ʿAyn Jalut sailed in late August, but Qadisiyya was allowed to stay after Iraq agreed to sever administrative ties (while continuing to pay recurrent expenses).[54]

Relations took a turn for the worse as the Syrian command launched a purge of leftist officers, apparently worried by the example of the recent abortive communist *coup* in Sudan. This extended to the PLA, and was accompanied by growing pressure on its officers to join the Baʿth Party, although its statutes prohibited party affiliation. In early September, Haddad instructed PLA battalion commanders to submit the names of all leftists in their units.[55] The hunt extended to Lebanon, where some officers had taken refuge; local PLF/PLA commander ʿAbd-al-Raʾuf Harbaji was replaced with Ahmad al-Hanafi, who

asked the Lebanese *deuxième bureau* to assist in apprehending 'subversive communist elements'.[56] Hanafi was also responsible for the death in custody of a civilian PLA intelligence agent, as a subsequent PLO investigation confirmed.[57] Haddad escalated seriously on 16 September with the statement that the PLA military council had secretly dismissed commander-in-chief Yahya on 3 July.[58]

The PLO executive committee came immediately to the conclusion that it faced a Syrian-inspired *coup*, and responded by dismissing Haddad and reconfirming Yahya.[59] It was vulnerable, however. On 5 October shots were fired during a visit by Arafat to a Fateh base on the Golan front commanded by Husayn al-Hayba, a one-time agent of Syrian intelligence. Accounts varied, but Fateh leaders privately suspected Syrian involvement.[60] Two days later the PLO executive committee dismissed Yahya and abolished his post, and appointed Misbah al-Budayri as chief-of-staff with the added powers of commander-in-chief.[61] It may have hoped that Budayri would be neutral, but Syria had made its point. There were indications, too, that Arafat had acquiesced willingly in the dismantling of leftist influence in the PLA. His relations with Yahya and other 'graduates of 1948' had always been tense, and had soured further in July when Yahya demanded independent control over the Palestine National Fund, a seat for the PLA commander on the executive committee, and unification of all Palestinian forces within six months.[62] In October, the PLO dismissed another 31 PLA officers, almost all leftists or dissenters whose names were put forward by the PLA command and included ʿAbd-al-Amin and ʿAbd-al-Rahim.[63]

The truce did not last long. Budayri and Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin criticized the assassination of Jordanian prime minister Tal, and warned in January 1972 that divisions within the guerrilla movement and PLO executive committee had alienated the PLA and PLF / PLA, which they described as the natural nucleus of Palestinian national unity.[64] The PLA command next proposed that the PLO should be reorganized into three main components: the PLA as a regular army, a united guerrilla force, and the 'people's forces'. The latter was described as 'an overall, united, popular political and defence organization' designed to support the main forces and mobilize the people. Palestinians could adhere to various ideologies, but 'the continued existence of numerous guerrilla groups' was intolerable, and so all would have to merge within the proposed popular organization, which would then elect the national leadership.[65] The memorandum was anathema to most guerrilla groups, although the PNC approved virtually identical recommendations submitted by a special 'national unity committee' in April.

Nothing came of these proposals, but Budayri meanwhile extended his control over the PLF / PLA. First he recognized the new PLF/ PLA battalion established by the Jordanian army in the wake of the expulsion of the guerrillas in July 1971. This had followed the failure of earlier attempts by Jordanian military intelligence in May and July to set up its own guerrilla group, Fateh Forces-Salah-al-Din, under the command of Muhammad ʿAbd-al-Hadi, a former Fateh

officer.[66] The Jordanian command now decided to form a new PLA unit instead, 'that would be disciplined and obedient to Jordan, just as the Hittin Forces are to Syria'.[67] Some 550–600 PLA and PLF/PLA prisoners and new volunteers agreed to join the Zayd Bin Haritha Battalion under the command of Nihad Nusayba. The PLA command secretly recognized the new unit a few months later, provoking an outcry from the guerrilla groups, and in January 1972 added two nominal battalions, Jaᶜfar Bin abi-Talib and ᶜAbdullah Bin Rawaha.[68] Budayri meanwhile reorganized PLF/PLA members in Lebanon into the new Misᶜab Bin ᶜUmayr Battalion (with a strength of 700 by the end of the year), and attached it directly to the PLA command for more secure control.[69]

Budayri's next step was to assert his control over what remained of the clandestine PLF/PLA organization in Gaza, which Fateh was equally keen to inherit.[70] The Gaza-Sinai-Negev section, as it was known, was headed by Husayn al-Khatib, who moved his staff from Jordan to Syria after July 1971. In early 1972 Budayri severed the section's previous link to the PLO executive committee and Palestine National Fund, and started to pay its expenses from the PLA budget.[71] Khatib resisted this move, and was accused by Budayri of misusing funds; he was dismissed, and his 'chief-of-staff', Fateh sympathizer Nahid al-Rayyis, was compelled to resign.[72] However, the new section head Yahya al-Murtaja and his deputies Mahmud Abu-Marzuq and Saʾib al-ᶜAjiz leaned heavily towards Fateh as well. They used their position to infiltrate the PLF/PLA battalion in Jordan, and secretly handed lists of PLF/PLA members in Gaza to Kamal ᶜUdwan, who had recently taken charge of Fateh operations in the occupied territories.[73] Murtaja fled to Cairo in September to escape arrest; Budayri attached the Gaza section directly to the PLA command to prevent further defections, but by then it had effectively ceased to exist.[74]

Continuing pressure in Syria increased the determination of most Palestinian groups to expand their base in Lebanon. This was not an easy choice, as the general view was that 'Lebanon cannot be a sanctuary'.[75] The PFLP saw it at best as 'compensation for a loss, but not a principal base', while the PF–GC concurred that 'Lebanon is a complementary arena, not a main one'.[76] As the largest group, Fateh was particularly aware of vulnerability to Syrian constraints, and had in fact started to transfer guerrilla units from Jordan to south Lebanon as early as June 1971.[77] It moved additional units from Syria at the end of the year, along with some of the 600 Libyan volunteers who had originally responded to their government's call to support the guerrilla movement in July.[78] The Syrian ban on the PFLP was partially lifted for a few months, but its guerrillas were expelled to Lebanon in June 1972.[79] The ALF was similarly proscribed in Syria, but was unable to maintain a full-time combat presence in south Lebanon anyway (nor was Saᶜiqa).[80] The influx took Fateh combat strength in south Lebanon to 1,800–2,000 by the end of 1971, the PFLP to 250–500, and the PDFLP and PF–GC each to 100–250 by mid-1972, with nearly as many more guerrillas in the refugee camps and main cities.[81] Counting dependents, the influx totalled 15,000–30,000.[82]

Israel did not stand by passively, despite the sharp decline in guerrilla attacks after September 1970. It declared its intention to take the offensive to the guerrillas, to inflict casualties, disrupt their build-up, and weaken support among the local population. The ultimate objective was to coerce the Lebanese authorities into moving against the guerrillas, by triggering a refugee exodus and causing widespread destruction.[83] This involved artillery fire, commando raids, and occasional infantry-armour probes. In a four-day search-and-destroy mission in the ʿArqub in late February 1972, 47 guerrillas were killed and 64 wounded for the loss of three Israeli dead and 11 wounded.[84] Although Palestinian literature extolled the guerrillas, the battle revealed their lack of planning and coordination, and their inability to defend their sanctuary.[85] The Lebanese army now strove to enforce the 1969 Cairo agreement more strictly, and to prevent the return of the guerrillas to the ʿArqub. They restored their former deployment by summer, and even increased it with the arrival of two more Fateh battalions and the PFLP and PDFLP contingents from Syria, but attacks on Israel plummeted to only three or four a month. Finally, after an Israeli air and artillery blitz on 21–24 June in which some 80 civilians and 30 guerrillas were killed or wounded in the border region, the government extracted a PLO promise to suspend all cross-border attacks.[86]

Fateh's Autumn of Discontent

The succession of setbacks on every front deepened the pervasive sense in the Palestinian guerrilla movement of being under siege. The leadership was at a loss not only to explain the relative ease with which its state-within-the-state in Jordan had been dismantled, but also to offer a way out of the predicament. This was particularly true of the Fateh leadership, which, its internal critics charged, was 'used to spontaneous action and temperamental evaluation [and] is apparently not capable of assessing seriously the situation [in terms of] past experience and future prospects'. Instead it revealed a 'traditional', 'paternalistic' approach to politics, that was moreover reflected in bureaucratization, a mercenary spirit (*ruh al-irtizaq*), ostentatious displays of strength (*istiʿradiyya*), improvisation (*irtijal*) instead of planning, and patron–client relations (*istizlam*).[87] Criticism was used to defuse discontent, therefore, not to initiate reform. Khalaf agreed with these critics, noting that 'the critical evaluations published in the newspapers and elsewhere, or in seminars, were all just talk, which was not translated into practice and action'. The central committee had failed utterly to learn the lessons of Jordan or to address the need for a new strategy, he admitted, and instead 'held tortuous meetings, governed neither by reason nor by logic'.[88]

The Fateh central committee came under mounting internal pressure after July 1971, and decided to convene a general conference in early September as a means of containing dissent.[89] The impassioned debate inevitably focused on

responsibility for the defeat in Jordan. Arafat managed to deflect much of the criticism by immediately taking the floor to issue a powerful self-critique of his own, pre-empting his detractors and distancing himself from other members of the central committee.[90] The main target, in any case, was the hapless Khalaf, who suffered blistering attacks for his propitiatory radio broadcast during the September showdown.[91] Adding insult to injury, many delegates accused him and the Rasd intelligence apparatus of failure to predict the full scale of the Jordanian onslaught. This was unfair, as Khalaf and his lieutenants hastened to point out, since they had in fact provided detailed information on Jordanian preparations and plans. They had also warned, correctly as events had proved, that Iraq would not intervene on behalf of the guerrillas.[92] The real fault, they intimated, lay with the leadership that had ignored the evidence. Khalaf was nonetheless shorn of responsibility for Rasd, which was disbanded soon after the conference.

Another issue of contention was the special relationship between Fateh and the PLO. Khalaf, who evidently wished to repair his tarnished image, led the attack by arguing that Arafat's delegation of political authority to the PLO and the takeover of its departments since 1969 had led to duplication and to the bureaucratization of Fateh institutions.[93] He took the leadership to task for 'ceasing to be honest with the masses and ending the commitment to its slogans', adding that the choice now was 'to remain as we are, which means continuing towards the abyss and collapse, or to go towards the radical revolutionary solution, which destroys all that is negative in order to build a new construction without fear or hesitation'.[94] Khalaf pointedly reminded his audience that 'Fateh leadership is collective . . . there is no commander-in-chief . . . Arafat is a member like any of us'.[95] Another delegate suggested that a different member of the central committee should become PLO chairman, leaving Arafat to focus on his duties as Fateh commander-in-chief and official spokesman. This, the argument went, would keep real decision-making power in the hands of Fateh and reduce the PLO to a forum for discussion with the other guerrilla groups.[96]

A parallel line of debate was taken by the representatives of the once-influential Kuwait branch, Salim al-Zaʿnun and ʿAli al-Hasan. They revived the argument long put forward by ʿAli's younger brother Khalid that the substantial Palestinian military presence and mass organization was alarming to the Arab host states, and argued that the guerrilla movement was now more vulnerable than ever to government repression in Syria and Lebanon.[97] The experience in Jordan had proved the dangers of establishing guerrilla sanctuaries, and they proposed that Fateh should instead build a small, clandestine nucleus of well-trained commandos to conduct carefully planned and selective attacks on Israel. As Khalid summarized the argument many years later, 'guerilla action inside Palestine requires fundamental discussion of its means and aims and study of the requirements of political success, such as a [sober assessment] of the political feasibility of each guerilla attack. To put it simply, guerilla action [should]

not merely be [a means to] deflate Palestinian anger or express rejection of the Palestinian plight, but rather part of an integrated military, political, information, and economic plan at the Palestinian, Arab, and international levels.'[98] Proponents of this argument who had left Fateh by now added that the funds saved from such 'rationing' of military forces in exile could be used to develop armed resistance in the occupied territories, which in turn required reorganization of nationalist political activity there.[99] ʿUdwan, Zuhayr al-ʿAlami, and others apparently endorsed these views, but were roundly defeated.[100]

Contributing to the defeat of the proponents of clandestinity was the loose grouping of leftist cadres that had coalesced shortly before the conference. Few were Marxists, and what principally defined their leftist label was their unremitting hostility to the Jordanian monarchy, commitment to organized 'mass action', and belief in the necessity of political intervention in the affairs of Arab states and societies, since passivity had made the guerrillas the victim in Jordan.[101] The majority were survivors of the 'democratic direction' that had formed in the civilian organization in 1968–70, and were socially and ideologically distinct from the central committee members whose political formation had been in the ranks of Islamist movements in Gaza and Syria. The leftists were especially bitter at the continuing disregard of the civilian organization and the leadership's lack of political accountability, and viewed the expansion of the full-time payroll as a bureaucratic disease.[102] Indeed, a document they presented singled out 'the construction of agencies at the expense of the civilian organization and the emergence of power centres [*marakiz qiwa*]' for special criticism.[103] The leftist faction was strengthened by the addition of former Jordanian army officers Musa al-ʿAmla and Saʿid Musa Maragha, who attended private meetings held before the conference to coordinate a common stand.[104]

The central committee was ultimately able to beat off all challenges at the conference, although Arafat reportedly stormed out of the hall three times during the heated debates, a ploy that was to become familiar in later years.[105] Proof of success was the re-election of seven out of eight surviving members of the central committee; Arafat and Wazir obtained 130 and 129 votes out of 133 cast, and even Khalaf was reinstated. ʿUdwan and Nimr Salih now joined the committee to replace Walid Nimr and Mamduh Saydam (the latter having died of cancer in July).[106] Only Zaʿnun lost his seat, possibly because he threatened at one point to lead his faction out of Fateh. At the insistence of leftist reformers the conference also formalized Fateh's internal statutes and rules of procedure in a new text, *al-Nizam al-Dakhili*, which asserted the principle of leadership elections and defined the size and functions of the revolutionary council more clearly, and asserted the communist-inspired notion of 'democratic centralism' as its own organizing principle. (It also became possible for non-Palestinian Arabs to join Fateh as full members, for the first time.)[107] The leftists made notable gains, as ten were voted to the revolutionary council, among them Majid Abu-Sharar (secretary), Abu-Kwayk, ʿAllush, ʿAwda, ʿAmla, Maragha, Husni Yunis, and Sabri al-Banna.

The conference succeeded in obscuring the rifts within Fateh from the outside world, but personal rivalries and factional politics only intensified. Arafat responded to what he saw as direct challenges to his leadership by striving for greater personal control in the following period. He worked on three parallel tracks: to weaken potential contenders in the central committee, bring a growing number of Fateh forces and bodies under his direct command or influence, and strengthen his second power base in the PLO by reinforcing its central political and decision-making roles. This led to an unacknowledged struggle with his long-standing ally and co-founder Wazir, who had shown reservations about Arafat's political and military management on various occasions, and who had a loyal, if loosely associated network of supporters among the pre-1965 Fateh membership. Wazir had been criticized at the conference for the poor performance of the occupied homeland bureau and relinquished it to a close ally, ʿUdwan, but translated his general popularity to become Arafat's deputy as Fateh commander-in-chief. Arafat responded by forming a tacit alliance with Salih, who in turn was building close ties with the leftist faction.

The complex interplay of internal politics was revealed by the reorganization of Fateh forces after July 1971. This started with the large number of Jordanian army personnel who had defected to the PLO in September 1970 or following months. Fateh attracted the vast majority, and regrouped them in the Yarmuk Forces (*Quwwat al-Yarmuk*) in early 1971. The brigade was based in Syria and numbered some 3,500 by the end of 1970 and 5,000 in July 1971, and settled at 4,000 by the end of the year.[108] The Yarmuk Forces retained their conventional organization, with three infantry battalions, an artillery battalion and other combat support units, and a full complement of support units (medical, communications, engineering, supply, transport, and workshop).[109] The embryonic Fateh air unit (formed in 1968–9) was renamed Force 14 and attached to the brigade in 1971, having built up a modest core of several dozen pilots and technicians trained in Algeria, Morocco, and Libya.[110]

The Fateh command initially viewed the Yarmuk Forces as the nucleus of a 'liberation army' along the lines of the Algerian ALN, that could defend guerrilla sanctuaries and counter threats from host governments.[111] The feelings of the rank-and-file were more mixed, however. The appearance of a large, well-armed, well-trained, and disciplined force almost overnight alarmed many Fateh cadres, who feared that the former Jordanian army officers might have bonapartist ambitions. These fears were hardly allayed when some officers of the Yarmuk Forces demonstrated their political independence by contacting other guerrilla groups, including the PDFLP and Saʿiqa, to secure supplies and training.[112] To assert its control and pre-empt Syrian or leftist influence, the Fateh command in Syria, overseen by Wazir, borrowed instructors from the PLA ʿAyn Jalut Forces and the renowned Abu Hani Group.[113]

Partly in order to prevent challenges from the Yarmuk Forces, and partly to defuse complaints about its conventional military structure, the Fateh

command formed a 200-man Special Unit with commando training.[114] However, the Special Unit and Force 14 were subsequently detached from the brigade and attached to the 'central operations room', Fateh's equivalent of a general staff. On Arafat's instructions, the brigade was also shorn of its supply and transport sections, which were merged with Fateh services in the course of 1972. Its medical section was similarly absorbed by the PRCS, while the engineering section (grown to battalion size) was combined with the Fateh engineering service and later together subsumed under the PLO fortifications department. Salih, who headed the political education branch in the Fateh general command, meanwhile appointed leftist cadres as political commissars in the brigade.[115] Their relations with the former Jordanian army personnel varied sharply, and, whether or for this reason or to escape the rigid military discipline of the Yarmuk Forces, a growing number of its officers requested transfers to the guerrilla units.

Morale in the Yarmuk Forces dropped steadily as a result of these various pressures, and suffered still further from the bitter rivalry between commander Saʿd Sayil and battalion commanders ʿAmla and Maragha. This started as a dispute over the formation of the brigade as a conventional unit (as Sayil favoured) or its reconstruction as a guerrilla force. The rift quickly acquired a regional and clan character, as ʿAmla lobbied personnel from the Hebron district against Sayil, who came from Nablus. ʿAmla's own alliance with the leftist faction in Fateh meant that the political commissars inducted by Salih enjoyed good working relations with officers of similar clan or regional background, while officers from the northern West Bank suffered systematic isolation and, on occasion, forced transfer to other units or even detention.[116] Jordanian intelligence agents fanned the flames, and Amman radio gleefully reported that Fateh had cut funds from the Yarmuk Forces and that 120 men had defected to Saʿiqa towards the end of 1972.[117] Well-timed government amnesties in May and September prompted hundreds more to return to Jordan or emigrate to other Arab states, and by the end of the year brigade strength had dropped to 2,000, and sank to 1,200–1,600 in 1973.[118]

The striving of the Fateh leadership for control was not limited to the Yarmuk Forces, and extended in the same period to the guerrilla forces. Here reorganization came under the banner of *tajyish*, literally 'turning into an army'. Arafat launched *tajyish* in July 1971 with the announcement that Fateh guerrilla units had been regrouped in two brigade-size formations: al-Karama Forces and al-Thawra Forces (later renamed al-Qastal). According to Arafat, the Yarmuk Forces were a conventional brigade, but Karama and Thawra were 'neither regular nor guerilla . . . using new methods in training, armament, exercise, and combat'.[119] An obvious aim was to improve internal control and discipline, especially after the discovery that officers such as the widely respected commanders of the Golan Sector and Unit 401, 'haj' Hasan and Naʿim, had on several occasions considered assassinating Arafat and other leaders.[120] Another aim was to staunch the debilitating exodus of guerrillas from the ranks;

trying to find veteran guides and volunteers for dangerous, long-range missions into northern Israel in early 1972, Western Sector head Kamal ʿUdwan was shocked at the lack of response.[121] The hidden purpose of *tajyish*, however, was to offset the considerable clout of the Yarmuk Forces.[122] Survivors from the guerrilla bases in Jordan were meanwhile regrouped in a new Jordan Sector (*Qitaʿ al-Urdun*) and deployed on the Golan front along with remnants of the Mounted Force, or added to the old Unit 404 and sent to south Lebanon.

The person to whom responsibility for implementation of *tajyish* was entrusted was ʿAttallah ʿAttallah, a clever and ambitious officer who had been dismissed from the Jordanian army in 1968. He was given command of Fateh forces in south Lebanon in spring 1971, and seized the opportunity to build his own power base. An indication was his attempt to diminish the authority of Walid Nimr, the general command member who held overall responsibility for Syria and Lebanon, for example by ordering Fateh military police out of Lebanon.[123] After July, ʿAttallah's next step was to form a new unit, the Martyrs of September Battalion (*Shuhadaʾ Aylul*), comprising recruits from the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria and surviving guerrillas from Jordan. He also developed a tacit alliance with Yarmuk Forces officers ʿAmla and Maragha, building on the fact that both he and ʿAmla came from Hebron.[124] ʿAttallah formed an even closer working relationship with Salih, who assumed overall military responsibility for south Lebanon following the death of Nimr in July.

ʿAttallah had already established a brigade staff for the Karama Forces towards the end of 1971, and in early 1972 another former Jordanian army officer, Muhammad Badr, was assigned to command the Qastal Forces. The collapse of the Martyrs of September Battalion in the next few months prompted ʿAttallah to push *tajyish* with renewed vigour, as a means of increasing his control. He now introduced formal ranks and a graduated pay-scale to the guerrilla units, bringing them in line with the Yarmuk Forces. Guerrilla sectors and units were renamed battalions and companies, and battalions were now tied to brigade headquarters for administrative and logistic purposes. This provoked a furore among the guerrillas, who were already deeply suspicious of the former Jordanian army officers and, indeed, of the Yarmuk Forces as a whole. The guerrillas disdained conventional military behaviour (such as saluting officers) and held firmly to their egalitarian ethics; many commanders refused officer's rank and turned down their increases in pay.[125]

ʿAttallah had been over-ambitious and had implemented the changes too quickly.[126] A brief firefight involving artillery exchanges broke out between the guerrilla Golan Sector and the Yarmuk Forces in southern Syria, and guerrilla bases refused to receive senior Fateh officials.[127] In south Lebanon, dissenters from other units flocked to the Eagles of ʿArqub Battalion, which emerged as a focus of resistance to *tajyish*. After several months had passed, Salih and ʿAttallah suspended delivery of weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment to the dissenting units. Pay and food supplies were not interrupted, but

supplementary funds for incidental expenses and local recruitment were withheld. Matters came to a head in mid-October, when the 302 Sector in south-east Lebanon mutinied and detained officers of the Yarmuk Forces.[128] Acting on the orders of Salih and ʿAttallah, Margaha quelled the beginnings of a revolt in his own battalion by summarily executing the ringleader, and then surrounded the 302 Sector, which also came under artillery fire. Mediation by Wazir, Qaddumi, and Algerian ambassador Muhammad Yazid brought the mutiny to an end, after the death or injury of 30 guerrillas, and the 302 Sector was disbanded and dispersed.

The collapse of the mutiny signalled the end of serious dissent in other guerrilla units. They had failed to support the 302 Sector partly because its commander, a former AOLP guerrilla named Abu Yusif Kayid who had joined Fateh in July 1971, was suspected (correctly) of ties to Syrian intelligence and the PLA command.[129] Other threats of open dissent in the same period were quickly pre-empted. An attempt during the summer to revive the Arab Organization for Palestine, which had joined Fateh in 1971, was foiled by the arrest of ringleader Marwan Mufid and 16 others.[130] The Palestinian National Liberation Front had already broken away from Fateh under Hasan al-Sabarini in May 1971 in protest at the lack of internal reform; and in summer 1972 it succeeded in attracting the commander of Fateh's Special Unit, Mahmud al-Sahla. However, his attempt to trigger wider defections in protest at the 'political deviation' of the Fateh central committee failed utterly, and the group dissolved.[131]

The Kayid mutiny convinced Arafat that Salih, ʿAttallah, and the Yarmuk Forces commanders were dependable allies. His next move was to assert control over the Fateh regional command in Lebanon, which was becoming increasingly important as a base. Najjar, who had handled the local *iqlim* on behalf of the central committee since 1968, enjoyed good working relations with its head, Yahya ʿAshur. Like Najjar and Wazir, with whom he was most closely identified, ʿAshur was a refugee from Gaza and a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Nimr was equally content to leave the civilian organization alone, managing military affairs through a special bureau set up in 1969 under veteran guerrilla Ahmad (Ziyad) al-Atrash. He also shared the *iqlim*'s intense dislike of Arafat's nominee, ʿAttallah.[132] The deaths of Nimr and Saydam (both originally protégés of Wazir) and the exodus of the Fateh leadership from Jordan and Syria in 1971–2 left the *iqlim* overshadowed. In the view of a senior civilian cadre, 'when the leadership left Amman for Damascus, they turned from masters of Jordan into a secondary role. Lebanon offered them an arena in which they could be masters again.'[133]

Wazir and Mahmud ʿAbbas remained in Syria, but the arrival of Arafat and other leaders in Lebanon quickly led to the familiar spread of paramilitary agencies and the rapid increase of salaried personnel. The ability of central committee members to use Fateh funds to construct competing power bases, usually headed by newly arrived cadres from Jordan, deepened local

resentment of *izdiwajiyya* (duality) with the civilian organization. In early 1972 Salih attempted to divest the *iqlim* of authority over the militia, much as he had in Jordan in 1969, by placing it under Maʿadh al-ʿAbid, the inept former commander of northern Jordan. Arafat and Salih followed up by dismissing ʿAshur, triggering a clash in the Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp on 10 June and protest marches in the Shatila camp. The order was rescinded, but ʿAbid and two of Arafat's military aides were added to the *iqlim.*[134] Criticism of the leadership's performance in Jordan and of *tajyish* combined with hostility to the 'outsiders', namely the former Jordanian army officers in command and 'Gazans' such as Arafat, his brother-in-law and military administration head Mutlaq Hamdan, and ʿAbid.[135] The struggle for control of the *iqlim* ended after the mutiny in the 302 Sector in mid-October: ʿAshur had not been involved, but found Wazir unwilling to confront Arafat, and so reluctantly accepted an alternative posting in Cairo. He was replaced by Yahya Habash, formerly *iqlim* member in Jordan. ʿAttallah now became head of the central operations room in Beirut, while Maragha took his place as commander of Fateh forces in the south.

In the following period Arafat, operating through Salih and the militia command (itself attached to the Fateh general command headed by Arafat), used militarization as a means of extending and consolidating his control over the civilian organization in Lebanon. This was easier in the case of organizational sections in areas which were relatively isolated or where Fateh had a concentrated military presence—such as the Wavell camp in Baʿlbak, or the Baddawi and Nahr al-Barid refugee camps in northern Lebanon, which were home to training facilities and rear offices—but the leadership met greater difficulty in the Beirut and Sidon areas, possibly because it had to be more circumspect where the Lebanese state exercised its power more actively. Here Arafat resorted to the expedient of appointing military commanders to each section—by 1974 none came from the refugee community in Lebanon—and ordered the wholesale detention of sections that resisted the replacement of local cadres.[136] In most cases the hapless military commanders eventually overcame the mistrust of their civilian counterparts, but the long-term consequence was an implicit tendency to deny Palestinian cadres from Lebanon equal opportunity to attend training courses abroad or attain senior rank.

The PFLP in Crisis

Unlike Fateh, the PFLP was unable either to obscure or to contain its divisions. The leadership structure it had devised in November 1970 was in shambles by mid-July 1971: Habash left ʿAjlun for Beirut in spring, while the 'supporting political leadership' in Amman joined the general evacuation to 'Ajlun and was dispersed in the final battle. The PFLP was severely embarrassed to see central committee member ʿAbdullah Hammuda—the outspokenly radical central

committee member known as 'the president of the Baqʿa Republic', who had been taken prisoner at Jerash—deliver a bitter critique over Jordanian television in early September.[137] It promptly suspended him, but was more discomfited by the revelation that Zabri and Ahmad Farhan had escaped from ʿAjlun thanks to Jordanian intelligence chief Muhammad Rasul al-Kaylani, who drove them to the Syrian border. These incidents were grist to the mill of the leftist cadres who dominated the 'supporting political leadership' in Lebanon. As in the case of Fateh, the influx of senior cadres from Jordan provoked the anxiety of the local rank-and-file, who feared that the newcomers would monopolize senior posts and dominate the PFLP as a whole.[138] Latent tensions between cadres from the West Bank or Gaza deepened the rift.[139]

The influence of the leftist faction was evident in the official report on events in Jordan in 1970–1. It blamed the right-wing, petit bourgeois Palestinian leadership for making the fatal error of waging an 'exposed confrontation' in Amman (instead of conducting a classic guerrilla war, presumably in the countryside), but then accused the leftist groups of 'lackeyism' and failure to assert their leadership of the national front.[140] They were also guilty of gravely misjudging the balance of power in Jordan, and of mishandling relations with the 'nationalist Arab regimes' (implicitly with Nasir).[141] Airplane hijacks and slogans such as 'all power to the resistance' were examples of leftist 'adolescence' (of the PFLP and PDFLP, in effect).[142] The PFLP leftists privately criticized their own 'rightist' leadership for entertaining hopes of a *coup* in Jordan, and directed much of their ire at the Special Apparatus and Wadiʿ Haddad, whom they believed to wield excessive political influence and financial control. The emphasis on purely political issues revealed the fundamental lack of attention to the practicalities of social and economic activities, and helped to explain why detailed criticism of public behaviour and organizational procedure failed to lead to programmatic or structural reforms.

The rift was forcefully revealed during a meeting in Beirut on 5 October 1971. The leftists launched a bitter attack on Haddad and his aides, forcing a decision to suspend hijacks and similar action against civilian targets, although attacks on vital 'imperialist interests' in the Arab region were still deemed legitimate.[143] Habash referred to the sabotage of the Saudi oil pipeline in 1969 and to a rocket attack on an oil tanker in the Red Sea in June 1971 as examples of the sort of external operations that the PFLP would continue to mount.[144] So bitter was the debate that the PFLP was unable to reform the politburo or central committee. Habash suggested a typical compromise: he, Farhan, and Zabri would lead the PFLP, while a five-member 'supporting political leadership' would stand in for both the politburo and central committee. The branch in Lebanon would be headed by a regional command, that would in turn select a five-member 'daily command' (*qiyada yawmiyya*) to oversee routine matters.

The Left was represented by Farhan, and considered Habash to be sympathetic to its Marxist rhetoric. It wielded considerable influence in the regional

command for Lebanon, and dominated the guerrilla contingent in the south through commander Tariq ʿAli and deputy Salim al-Darduni.[145] However, Haddad had been given control of PFLP finances and, his detractors charged, now cut off pay and supplies from the guerrillas.[146] The new leadership structure was paralysed, as the PFLP remained riddled with 'cliquism and factions' (*shilaliyya wa takattulat*), and suffered from 'fragmentation, disorientation, and the lack of a leadership in control of events'.[147] Increasingly impatient with the situation, the leftists unilaterally convened a 'conference of the leftist phenomenon' on 4–8 February 1972. Present were the members of the regional commands for Lebanon and Syria, delegates from Kuwait and Iraq, delegates from the civilian organization in Tyre, Sidon, and Tripoli, and the military commanders in south Lebanon.

The conference devoted part of its time to yet another harsh reappraisal of the role of the old guard leadership in Jordan, but reserved the most biting criticism for Haddad. In their view the hijacks he had planned represented 'a fundamental point of dispute between the Left and Right in the PFLP . . . not only because they contradicted adherence to Marxist-Leninist theory, but also because they invited much damage to the Palestinian revolution'.[148] The multiple hijacks of September 1970 had been a particular disaster that, by arousing a media sensation, had permitted the Jordanian regime to launch its offensive and undermined the mobilization of the masses to meet the threat.[149] The leftists considered that Haddad had used external operations to build an autonomous power base, and resented his secretive control of finances.[150] They accused him of lavishing money on costly foreign adventures and of developing a network of private interests, and pointedly asked where the ransoms and 'protection money' extorted from various airlines had gone.[151] An added accusation was that Haddad maintained questionable ties with Iraqi (and Egyptian) intelligence, for whom he conducted special missions without the knowledge or approval of the PFLP.[152]

The leftist conference concluded with a secret resolution to form a parallel organization within the PFLP. Habash, who had attended the entire debate and showed sympathy to leftist calls for greater Marxist 'radicalization' (*tajdhir*), appeared to give his blessing. However, he abruptly changed tack a few days later and joined the old guard in calling for a general conference on 7 March. Habash no doubt wished to avoid an irremediable split, but an added factor was the threat by Haddad and his aides to secede from the PFLP and form their own rival group.[153] Alarmed by Habash's apparent volte-face, the 'leftist leadership' declared itself on 6 March, and then announced the birth of the Revolutionary Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (RPFLP) four days later. A majority of PFLP guerrillas in the south and of the student organization swung behind the RPFLP, along with section heads in several refugee camps.[154] The PFLP branch in Syria also came over, as did several cadres in Jordan, most notably Ghazi al-Khalili (now in prison), but there was little response in the occupied territories.[155]

Shortly after, the Lebanese branch of the Arab Socialist Action Party (ASAP), which had been set up by the PFLP in 1969, also suffered a leftist split. It had 600–700 members by 1972, many of them recent recruits attracted by its Marxist rhetoric. They disliked their evident subordination to the PFLP old guard, especially Iraqi-born ASAP secretary-general Hashim ʿAli Muhsin, and felt that insufficient attention was being paid to the demands of class struggle in Lebanon.[156] Nazih Hamza, a former cadre of the Progressive Socialist Party, now claimed the ASAP branch for the Left; a minority stayed loyal to Muhsin and the PFLP and continued to use the ASAP name as well, but suffered a marginal existence for the rest of the decade.[157]

The PFLP reacted with outrage to the secession of the Left, and Habash publicly accused Syria of engineering it.[158] Farhan and Syrian-born Abu ʿAli 'Irbid' Hamidi had in fact met Syrian officials in Damascus while preparing to secede, possibly with the mediation of the PDFLP, and later urged their colleagues in the RPFLP leadership to cement ties with Syria.[159] The PFLP also accused Fateh and the PDFLP of plotting to weaken it and of providing the leftists with supplies and funds.[160] Both groups protested their innocence and declared their neutrality in the dispute, urging the PFLP factions to resolve their differences peacefully. This was sheer hypocrisy, since both Fateh and the PDFLP had indeed assured the leftist faction of support several weeks earlier; Khalaf continued to channel funds to the RPFLP for the next few months.[161] These were not the only external forces involved, however. Unknown to the leftist faction, one of its leading figures, PFLP regional command head Walid Qaddura had been an agent of the Lebanese *deuxième bureau* since 1963. In 1972 he encouraged the faction to break away, but remained in the PFLP on the grounds that he could provide covert assistance to his friends in the RPFLP.

The PDFLP had been even more closely involved with the creation of the RPFLP, despite its formal denials.[162] Hawatma and various politburo and central committee members met their RPFLP counterparts on several occasions, and agreed to merge in a new leftist alliance. This did not happen, perhaps because the PDFLP was undergoing its own internal upheaval. The handful of senior cadres such as Bilal al-Hasan and Khalil al-Hindi who had opposed the insurrectionary plans of the PDFLP conference in Jordan in August 1970, had since left the ranks in disgust, while a small number of officers were demoted or suspended for dereliction of duty.[163] Leading non-Palestinian cadres also left in 1971–2, among them extremist ideologues who complained that the PDFLP was now drifting towards moderation.[164] This was reflected in its increasing openness towards the USSR and in the attempt to formulate a new 'phased' political programme, that set establishment of a 'national authority' on any part of Palestine (rather than total liberation) as its interim objective.

The PDFLP also suffered a blow when its Lebanese ally, the Lebanese Communist Action Organization (LCAO), suffered a debilitating split in 1972. The LCAO had formed in May 1971 as a result of the merger of the Organization of Lebanese Socialists headed by Muhammad Kishli and Muhsin Ibrahim,

and the Socialist Lebanon Movement, a smaller grouping of former Baʿthists and Arab nationalists such as Fawwaz Trabulsi. The LCAO espoused an eclectic leftist programme that drew on several currents of Marxist thought, and based its appeal on support for the Palestinian armed struggle. It provided the dozens, even hundreds, of Lebanese volunteers without whom the PDFLP would have been hard pressed to maintain a combat presence in Jordan and Lebanon in 1969–70.[165] A substantial current in the LCAO felt that their organization and the PDFLP were insufficiently committed to people's war, however, and defected to the Palestinian groups, especially Fateh, in spring 1972.[166] The LCAO now recalled those of its members who were still serving in PDFLP bases, causing a passing tension in relations.

The PDFLP remained an established force, whatever its passing difficulties, but the RPFLP went into immediate decline. Qaddura had been the real driving force in the leftist faction, but his refusal to leave the PFLP left leadership of the RPFLP in the hands of Farhan, who lacked the same appeal or the charismatic authority of Habash. Farhan moreover had to contend with several equals, and so competing factions quickly formed. Farhan advocated a special relationship with Syria, while Abu ʿAli 'Irbid' and others drifted further to the left, influenced by the Chinese cultural revolution and the anarchic writings of the Tunisian-born al-ʿAfif al-Akhdar. Al-Akhdar himself left the RPFLP to form his own circle of young students and promote *al-majalisiyya*—the formation of revolutionary 'popular councils' to replace existing political organizations.

Despite Fateh funding, the RPFLP was desperately short of funds. Some guerrillas rustled cattle or foraged for food across the border in Israel, while one of its leading cadres, former PFLP security official Yunis Bujayrami, organized armed raids on Lebanese banks and shops.[167] A growing number of RPFLP members left in the course of 1972, leaving a mere handful by mid-1973. In May, remaining members of the 'politburo, central committee, regional command in Lebanon, and leadership, cadres, and bases in the Tyre district', as they somewhat grandly described themselves, revealed that the group had experienced constant rifts due to the lack of theoretical and cultural unity.[168] They accused Farhan of dubious behaviour, including the establishment of ties with 'anti-Marxist' Qadhdhafi, and announced the dissolution of the RPFLP. Some joined the PDFLP, PPSF, or PF–GC, while others, including Bujayrami, eventually rejoined the PFLP.[169]

Yet the PFLP could take little comfort from the collapse of the RPFLP. It had lost some 80 per cent of its guerrillas, a sizeable part of its student organization, and many members in Syria and Jordan. The real paradox, however, was that the secession of the Left had not lessened internal tensions. If anything, the split forced the PFLP to address a question it had repeatedly ducked: what to do about Haddad and 'external operations', which had proved so costly? As Habash explained, the hijacks had damaged the front's 'international revolutionary relations . . . and we saw that the consequences might not affect the front alone but also the whole resistance and the liberation movement'.[170] His

concern with international relations was real. The PFLP had sought ties with the socialist countries since spring 1970, in parallel with Fateh and the PLO. China responded by inviting Habash in August, and in May 1971 insisted that a visiting PLO delegation should include representatives of the PFLP, PDFLP, and Saʿiqa, as the PFLP proudly noted.[171]

The PFLP met severe criticism of its international terrorism from the USSR, conversely. When Habash arrived in Moscow at the end of an Asian tour in September 1970, his Soviet hosts abruptly cancelled scheduled meetings in protest at the multiple hijacks to Jordan. This apparently had a sobering effect, as Habash cited Soviet pressure as a reason to suspend hijacks during the expanded central committee meeting of November 1970.[172] The PFLP was nonetheless excluded from a top-level PLO delegation that accompanied Arafat to Moscow in October 1971, during which the USSR made its first offer of training and direct arms shipments to the PLO.[173] The PFLP, for its part, still had mixed feelings about the USSR. The internal report on the Jordanian conflict that it issued in August was critical of Soviet policy, arguing that Moscow did not wish the Palestinians to be in a position to block the Egyptian–Israeli ceasefire and the Middle East peace process, and so was 'implicitly content to see [the guerrilla movement] tamed and its claws cut'.[174] Yet the informal PFLP conference in October registered satisfaction with 'the development of Soviet policy', and renewed the suspension of hijack operations.[175]

Haddad was now instructed to brief the PFLP leadership fully before conducting any 'external operation'.[176] He retorted that his detractors had compromised the security of several operations since early 1970, adding defiantly that the Special Apparatus would liaise only with Habash, and to lesser degrees with Hindi (security), Yamani (finance), and Kanafani (media).[177] The issue was pushed to the fore when a Lufthansa flight from New Delhi was diverted to Aden on 22 February 1972. The PFLP denied responsibility, but the hijackers were under orders from Haddad, and received a $5 million ransom before releasing the passengers and aircraft.[178] The delegates to the PFLP's third general conference on 7 March reacted firmly, voting to dissolve the Special Apparatus or 'external military sphere' (*al-majal al-ʿaskari al-khariji*) as it was vaguely labelled, because it had 'proved its inability to bridge the gap between military effectiveness and theoretical postures'.[179] An 'emergency military committee' was set up instead, and later commented that Haddad's apparatus had become 'a large drain into which money poured'. The PFLP had not turned its back on external operations altogether, though: PFLP members abroad were entrusted with some of the previous functions of the Special Apparatus because, as Habash explained, the end of hijacks did not preclude strikes against 'other Israeli, Zionist, imperialist, and reactionary interests outside Palestine'.[180]

Haddad and his aides strongly opposed these measures at the conference but failed to impress the other delegates. Only the first three attacks on passenger aircraft were deemed praiseworthy, because they had targeted the Israeli

airline El Al.[181] The rift had become so deep that the revised, official account of the third conference released nine years later referred to Haddad as the leader of 'the obstructionist right . . . who operated in his own private way and his individualistic rightist mentality, spending as he wished on external operations . . . without referring back to the front'.[182] The conference resolved to expel Haddad, 'the big symbol' of the Right. Angered, Haddad's aides Fayiz Jabir and Subhi al-Tamimi now considered reviving their old group, Abtal al-ʿAwda, and met Syrian chief-of-staff Mustafa Tlas and military intelligence chief Hikmat al-Shihabi to request training facilities and material assistance.[183] Jabir and Tamimi refused the Syrian demand for an open break with the PFLP, however, and eventually left politics altogether. Haddad meanwhile utilized his private contacts—including with Iraqi intelligence, and later with Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen—and hidden funds to set up the PFLP-International Operations. He did not abandon the PFLP entirely, however, keeping close ties with his old friend Habash and channelling substantial funds to the PFLP over the next three years.

Once again, the resolution of the dispute with Haddad brought little relief to the PFLP. The political report issued by the general conference in March 1972 emphasized the strategic predicament facing the guerrilla movement. 'We face a more trying and difficult phase after July 1971', it admitted, 'the battles of September [1970] and Jerash [July 1971] raised questions about the ability of the resistance [movement] to realize hopes . . . speculation about getting past this phase quickly was merely wishful thinking and unrealistic.'[184] It came to the grim, if unoriginal, conclusion that the guerrilla movement was 'on the strategic defensive'.[185] Unable or unwilling to devise alternatives, however, the PFLP simply reaffirmed the notions of guerrilla war and people's war. An editorial in *al-Hadaf* had reminded its readers as early as May 1971 that the Palestinian movement was still in 'a preliminary stage in which the laws and principles of guerrilla warfare apply'.[186] The March 1972 conference report continued in the same vein, stating that 'the battle is a protracted people's war extending for tens of years . . . it is the only way'.[187]

To translate such sweeping slogans into a practical programme, the PFLP set establishment of a 'nationalist' government in Amman as the foremost task of the guerrilla movement. The report of August 1971 called for the formation of a united Palestinian–Jordanian front to overthrow the throne, using 'all means'.[188] The March 1972 conference report asserted in similar vein that 'the battle with Jordan is central in the coming phase, it is the principal link in the armed struggle against the [Israeli] enemy'.[189] Since the Palestinian Right had proven its inability to lead the national front in this quest, moreover, it was up to the Left to assume command.[190] Once again, PFLP ambitions far exceeded its capabilities. It played a minor role in the sabotage campaign waged against Jordan in late 1971, and abandoned this effort under the impact of its internal strife in 1972. The paucity of commentary on Palestinian affairs in *al-Hadaf* after November 1971 gave eloquent evidence of the failure to devise a

workable strategy. Yet by its own admission a decade later, the PFLP continued to devote its primary effort in Jordan to the violent overthrow of the monarchy until 1975, to which end it formed the clandestine People's Party in July 1974.[191]

Any hope of tackling these problems was dashed when Habash was incapacitated by heart trouble in April 1972. His absence came in a period of competition between PFLP cadres to fill the senior posts left vacant by the recent defections. Competition was especially strong between the rank-and-file in Lebanon—most prominent of whom were Salah Salah, ʿAbd-al-Rahim al-Tayyib, ʿUmar Qtaysh, and Yunis al-ʿAbd Taha—and the newcomers from Jordan. Hindi had a largely advisory role by now, and so leadership was effectively exercised by Zabri, Yamani, and Musallami, implicitly representing the main constituencies (West Bank, Lebanon, and Gaza). Zabri succeeded in promoting his protégés from Jordan, Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim and ʿAbd-al-Rahim Malluh, to assume military command. So strong was the internal tension by now that the PFLP was later to state that it had suffered 'an undeclared split' in 1972.[192] Habash recovered enough from his illness to prevent an open split, and supervised the restoration of a central committee in February 1973 and a much-reduced politburo in June, which he headed. He also improvised and headed yet another body, the 'central leadership' (*al-qiyada al-markaziyya*), which was elected by the politburo and remained the highest authority for years to come. This idiosyncratic approach to organizational structure and democratic centralism showed, as much as anything else, how far the PFLP remained from its oft-repeated goal of transforming itself into an 'iron' Leninist party.[193]

Fateh: Terror Unleashed

Whereas organizational dislocation and factional disputes led to a decline in the 'external operations' of the PFLP, in the case of Fateh they led to an unprecedented turn to terrorism, both local and international. This was the closest that Fateh came to devising a strategy to deal with the state of siege imposed on the Palestinian guerrilla movement, but it also drew much of its dynamic from the rivalry within the central committee between Khalaf on the one hand, and a tacit alliance of Arafat, Wazir, Najjar, and ʿUdwan on the other. The latter group scored an important success during the Fateh conference in September 1971, by stripping Khalaf of responsibility for the Rasd intelligence apparatus. Arafat, whose tensions with Khalaf went back to 1967, had in fact started to dismantle Rasd several months earlier by ordering its personnel in Jordan to the Hama camp in Syria for retraining, where Walid Nimr sought to persuade them to leave the apparatus. Following the conference, ʿUdwan drew some Rasd cadres into the Western Sector—where the likes of Subhi Abu-Kirsh and Muhammad Bhays later gained senior rank—while others were detained on

various charges, exiled to PLO offices in Arab states, or dispersed to Fateh agencies. Finally, Rasd was formally replaced with the Security and Information Apparatus (*Jihaz al-Amn wa al-Maʿlumat*) under Najjar.

Khalaf attempted to salvage his position during the conference by taking responsibility for Fateh activity in Jordan, but was turned down. General command member Muhammad Ghnaym was instead made responsible for clandestine organization, ensuring Arafat's control. It was against this background that Khalaf's former lieutenant, ʿAli Hasan Salama, suddenly stole the limelight by masterminding the assassination of Jordanian prime minister Tal on 28 November. Salama had lost his seat on the revolutionary council following severe criticism at the conference for the failures of Rasd, and resented the embattled Khalaf for not coming to his rescue. Embittered, he struck out on his own with the aim, as he confided to his associates, of using terror as the means for the 'rebirth of the revolution'. Salama quietly recruited former Rasd members to his cause (it is not clear if Khalaf helped) and named his group the Black September Organization (BSO).[194] The BSO shot its way to notoriety with the murder of Tal, and wounded the Jordanian ambassador in London, Zayd al-Rifaʿi, in an attack on 15 December. On 6 February 1972 it bombed a Dutch gas company and German electronics company that it accused of cooperating with Israel.

Further terrorism came against a backdrop of increasing threats to the Palestinian movement. Most worrying were what appeared to be political challenges to the status of the PLO as the Palestinian national institution and potential interlocutor. This was demonstrated when a group of unaffiliated Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem—most prominent of whom were former refugee congress member ʿAziz Shihada, Hamdi al-Faruqi-Taji, and Muhammad Abu-Shilbaya—revived the call for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories during 1971. The guerrilla groups were unanimous in their hostility, accusing the advocates of 'selling out'.[195] Suggestions from Egyptian president Sadat that the PLO should form a government-in-exile to assert its political presence were meanwhile seen as a ploy to draw the Palestinians into formal negotiations with Israel and similarly dismissed. Events now followed in quick succession: the final battle of ʿAjlun, the assertion of Syrian control over the PLA, Israeli counter-insurgency in Gaza and raids in south Lebanon, and Lebanese restrictions on guerrilla activity.

The sequence of events convinced the Palestinian leadership that a concerted effort was underway to marginalize it.[196] The Israeli announcement in early 1972 that municipal elections were to be held in the West Bank reinforced its concern that the mayors would be presented as an alternative leadership. Concern turned to alarm on 15 March, when king Husayn proposed the establishment of a United Arab Kingdom on both banks of the Jordan River. Arafat had been convinced since July 1971 that the expulsion of the guerrillas from Jordan was 'in return for Israel relinquishing parts of the West Bank that will

revert to the Hashemite throne, so that [king] Husayn Bin Talal will become the only interlocutor on behalf of the Palestinian people in any coming [peace] settlement'.[197] Reports that the king was holding secret talks with Israeli prime minister Golda Meir in early 1972 seemed to confirm these fears.[198] The PNC met in extraordinary session in April, and concluded that the PLO faced a joint Israeli-Jordanian attempt to implement the plan originally proposed by Israeli foreign minister Yigal Allon in 1968.[199]

The guerrilla groups responded with a renewal of the sabotage campaign against Jordan. Syria allowed raids to be launched from its territory for the next three months, in which Fateh and the PDFLP were most active, but Fateh also attempted to revive its clandestine organization in Jordan. Khalaf saw this as an opportunity to gain political vindication and build a new power base, and eagerly took charge of the Jordan Affairs Bureau (*Maktab Shu'un al-Urdun*), that was established by the Fateh revolutionary council in March to organize operations in Jordan.[200] Aiding him was the former *iqlim* head Samih Abu-Kwayk, and their first recruits were former Rasd members. Sabotage was only one task, the foremost goal being to construct a mass organization and eventually mount an armed insurrection.[201] The bureau was given a monthly budget of one million Syrian lira, regarded as sufficient to pay small stipends for up to 20,000 members, should they be forthcoming.[202] However, Jordanian intelligence countered with customary efficiency, and mounted its own counter-campaign of disinformation and selective sabotage against the guerrilla movement in Lebanon (sometimes conducted under fictitious names such as the Palestinian Eagles Organization or the Free Officers of Fateh).[203] The Jordanian army meanwhile increased patrols, minefields, and fencing on the border with Syria, taking the Palestinian effort to collapse by June.[204]

Najjar was preparing his own foray into international terrorism, albeit in a manner intended to 'take the struggle back to Palestine'.[205] On 8 May a former member of Haddad's Special Apparatus, 'Ali Taha, and three Fateh members hijacked a Sabena aircraft with 100 passengers on board to Ben Gurion international airport, using the BSO name. Two hijackers died and two were captured when Israeli commandos stormed the aircraft and freed the hostages. Fateh disclaimed responsibility, but observed that the BSO operation reflected 'new planning that surprised the enemy ... *on our own soil*'.[206] As telling was the boast in a Fateh publication that 'for 24 hours the attention of 100 million Arabs remained drawn to Lydda airport, and for a whole day all revolutionaries caught their breath as they watched what was happening in the occupied Palestinian airport. The gaze of all parts of the world turned to ask what is happening there?'[207]

Fateh commented in the same manner when three members of the Japanese Red Army faction operating for the PFLP opened fire in the arrival hall of Ben Gurion airport on 30 May, killing 31 civilians and wounding 50 before being killed or overwhelmed by security guards. 'Udwan described this as 'an ordinary attack similar to any other attack conducted by a combat unit on a

settlement or military camp . . . in any part of Palestine'.[208] Such operations were proof, he added, that 'although our departure from Jordan deprived us of a principal base, it did not affect our combat abilities'.[209] The drama of these terrorist attacks had a profound impact on Palestinian morale. As a Fateh cadre involved in BSO activities aptly explained: 'After Wasfi al-Tal's death we had hundreds of applications from people wanting to join the BSO. Many, of course, were from our brothers in Fateh; some were comrades from the other organizations; and some were civilians in the diaspora who had not previously belonged to any guerrilla group. They were all saying the same thing: "At last you have found the way to make our voice heard in the world"'.[210]

The drama also appealed to Khalaf, who had first raised the theme of an international effort against Israel and its US backers in October 1971. At that time, he redefined Palestinian enemies as 'a series starting with US imperialism, passing through the Arab regimes tied to it, and ending with Israel. This series forms a front and we, if we seek success, must contact all forces that resist this front, whether they are in the Arab World or outside it.'[211] In June 1972, following the failure of his effort against Jordan, Khalaf stated that 'to ensure our survival and await better circumstances' meant extending Palestinian attacks 'to the external arena . . . we must follow new methods, our tactics must change'.[212] The recent attacks on Ben Gurion airport, he added, were 'a strategy adopted by the revolution to eliminate all challenges that prevent us from achieving our victories against the three circles of "Arab reaction, the occupied land [Israel], and American interests"'.[213]

On 5 September eight Fateh gunmen entered the Olympic village in Munich, where they killed two Israeli athletes and took another nine hostage. The hostages, five terrorists, and a German policeman died in a shoot-out at a nearby military airbase, and the surviving Palestinians were captured, as they attempted to leave the country. Although they used the BSO name, the attackers were all former Rasd members who had been transferred to a camp belonging to Najjar's reconstituted Security and Information Apparatus in Libya, where Khalaf recruited them. Whether he did so with the knowledge of Najjar or, more importantly, of Arafat, is unclear. Outwardly, Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan took the view that 'so long as people suffer oppression . . . then an organization like BSO is natural'.[214] Arafat argued similarly that 'violent political action in the midst of a broad popular movement cannot be termed terrorism . . . it is appropriate in certain objective conditions, in a given phase'. Israel retaliated with extensive raids on Syria and Lebanon, killing 200 people (of whom 40 per cent were civilians) according to Israel or 300 people (of whom 75 per cent were civilians) according to Syria.[215]

Terrorism served a distinct function in distracting the rank-and-file and taking the initiative to various foes, but in private Arafat and his colleagues were increasingly aware of the costs. Khalaf was outflanking them by using the BSO title, the political penalty in terms of international support and public opinion was mounting, and Israel was exacting a heavy toll in the way of reprisals. A

car-bomb killed PFLP spokesman Ghassan Kanafani on 8 July, while letter-bombs injured PLO research centre director Anis Sayigh on 19 July and *al-Hadaf* editor Bassam Abu-Sharif six days later. Between October and January 1973, Israeli intelligence bombed other Palestinian targets in Paris and Beirut, sent letter-bombs to PLO officials in Algeria, Tripoli, and Cairo, and assassinated the Fateh representatives in Rome (Wa'il Zu'aytir), Paris (Mahmud al-Hamshari), and Nicosia (Husayn Abu-al-Khayr). The BSO attack in Munich marked the turning point for the Palestinian leadership, as it catapulted Khalaf to the fore in Fateh politics and threatened any diplomatic gains made by the PLO. The genie had to be put back into the bottle.[216]

First to forsake international terrorism were Salama and Najjar. Salama had organized the bombing of a fuel storage depot near Trieste on 4 August, wounding 18 people, but had left Fateh since then to seek a civilian job in Kuwait. Najjar had shifted strategy after the Sabena hijack in May, directing his effort to the construction of a new security apparatus designed to conduct special operations inside Israel, in coordination with 'Udwan's Western Sector.[217] The shift was signalled by a senior aide, who argued that the Palestinians 'must smash the siege on all fronts. In combat, by increasing our ability to strike the enemy at the heart of his occupation . . . which requires more direction towards the land and people . . . In propaganda, we must penetrate the wall of silence and distortion and reach our masses . . . with carefully planned operations of armed propaganda . . . And in organization, we must redouble our efforts to put our ranks back in order.'[218]

The implications of turning off the 'terror tap' were not lost on Khalaf.[219] A BSO team under his control seized the Israeli embassy in Bangkok on 28 December, but embarrassed him by abandoning its hostages and demands in return for safe conduct to Egypt. A new wave of letter-bombs reached Israeli and Jordanian officials in January 1973. It was at this point that Wazir and 'Udwan accused Khalaf of plotting to assassinate his rivals in Fateh, and placed one of his senior aides under arrest.[220] Khalaf had spent much of his time since the Munich attack on the move in order to avoid Israeli vengeance, and now avoided Beirut entirely. He had not given up, however, and warned that 'whoever prevents us from fighting the enemy from his territory compels us to adopt complete clandestinity and to expand the battlefield'.[221] Fateh disavowed Khalaf's support for 'external operations' and clandestinity, but the significance of his statement became apparent when the Jordanian authorities announced the arrest of a 17-member Fateh team that had entered the kingdom in mid-February. Its orders had been to take the prime minister and US ambassador hostage, or, failing that, to attack parliament or the royal palace.[222] The guerrillas were sentenced to death, and the Jordanian army stepped up its purge of Palestinian personnel, reportedly expelling 200 and placing another 1,000 on dismissal lists.[223]

The abortive operation in Amman followed a slight moderation of PLO policy towards Jordan, as the PNC session in January 1973 had abandoned its

call for the overthrow of the monarchy. However, speculation in the next few weeks about the possible establishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories revived suspicions that the Arab states intended to start peace talks with Israel in the absence of the PLO. As Najjar angrily commented, the guerrillas refused to join 'the game of the Arab regimes that seek partial or surrenderist solutions'.[224] This may have influenced the Fateh decision to allow a final BSO attack on the Saudi embassy in Khartum on 8 March, in which two US ambassadors and a Belgian diplomat were killed after being taken hostage. According to Khalaf, who was probably in direct command, the original aim had been to coerce Saudi Arabia into securing the release of the Fateh team captured in Jordan a few weeks earlier.[225] Arafat was implicated once the attack had taken place, but it is not clear that he or other members of the Fateh central committee had prior knowledge of it.

The Khartum attack marked the end of Fateh's foray into international terrorism, but the violence was not yet over. On 21 February Israeli commandos attacked guerrilla offices in the Baddawi and Nahr al-Barid refugee camps in north Lebanon, killing nearly 40 Palestinians, mostly PFLP members.[226] More devastating still was the commando raid on the heart of Beirut on 10 April, in which Najjar, ʿUdwan, and PLO spokesman Kamal Nasir died. The Israelis also seized files from ʿUdwan's home containing details of the clandestine organization in the occupied territories; Fateh and the PFLP had recently agreed to coordinate their activities, and regarded the loss of the documents as a 'catastrophe'.[227] The raid had an immediate effect on Fateh politics. Wazir resumed his old post as head of the Western Sector instead of ʿUdwan, while Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid was brought into the central committee to replace Najjar as head of security. Arafat mended relations with Khalaf, who was appointed by the PLO executive committee a few months later to coordinate and unite the intelligence effort of all the guerrilla groups. None complied in the event, but he used the opportunity to build the PLO Unified Security Apparatus (Jihaz al-Amm al-Muwahhad) as his new power base. Arafat meanwhile recalled Salama from Kuwait to head his personal bodyguard, the nucleus of what later became known as Force 17.

The Palestinian–Israeli 'war in the shadows' was nearly over, but for a final exchange of attacks and counter-attacks in the next few months. Most were the work of Haddad's Special Apparatus or of a faction that had broken away from Fateh in 1972 under one of its financial comptrollers, Muhammad ʿAbd-al-Ghafur. ʿAbd-al-Ghafur based himself in Libya and secretly coordinated his activities with the Fateh representative in Baghdad, Sabri al-Banna; he was responsible for terrorist attacks on Rome and Athens airports in spring 1973, and was gunned down a year later on the orders of Arafat, with the knowledge of Wazir and ʿAbbas.[228] Haddad organized the hijack of a Japanese Airlines flight to Libya on 20 July, prompting a hasty denial of responsibility from the PFLP.[229] A further attack in the Athens airport terminal left three passengers dead and 55 wounded on 5 August, and on 10 August Israeli fighters compelled a Middle

East Airlines flight to land in Israel in the hope of capturing Habash, who was supposed to be on board.[230]

By this time, Palestinian public opinion had shifted sufficiently for the PLO to condemn the latest terrorist attacks officially. It was about to attend the Non-Aligned Movement summit conference for the first time, and viewed continued terrorism as a blow to its diplomatic status. Arafat had slowly brought the Fateh military and civilian wings under control since summer 1972, and was placing himself in an unassailable position of command in the PLO as a whole. This was evident, for example, in his success in persuading the PNC in January 1973 to approve the establishment of a Higher Military Council for the PLO, thereby placing an additional strand of military authority over the other guerrilla groups in his hands. The problem that remained unresolved, however, was how the guerrilla movement was to resume its effort to attain its goal of national liberation. Guerrilla attacks against Israel had dropped to 670 in 1971, and then to 271–351 in 1972.[231] In Syria the guerrillas had been ordered away from the border following the Israeli air strikes of September 1972, and were banned from combat activity altogether after further heavy clashes between Israeli and Syrian forces in January 1973.[232] Development of the armed struggle, and of the construction of political and social institutions, was now concentrated almost entirely in Lebanon.

The 'Jordan Syndrome' in Lebanon?

The PLO position in Lebanon was tenuous, and had come under growing pressure since a two-day Israeli search-and-destroy mission in the south in mid-September 1972, in which 30 guerrillas, 18 Lebanese soldiers, and 25–80 civilians died.[233] The Lebanese government declared a state of emergency in the country, and the army demanded the evacuation of illegal guerrilla bases and offices in the Bint Jbayl and Qana districts. The Maronite-dominated rightist parties renewed their opposition to the presence of the 5,000 guerrillas now estimated to be in the country, and called for the abrogation of the 1969 Cairo agreement that regulated official Palestinian–Lebanese relations.[234] Anxious to forestall these aims, the PLO agreed to vacate a number of border bases and reiterated its pledge to suspend cross-border attacks, and was in return allowed to maintain rear offices and depots in the prohibited zones.[235] Arafat stepped up his visits to Maronite political and religious leaders, and even donated a quantity of rifles to the Phalangist Party as a token of friendship.

The new *modus vivendi* held for several months despite clashes on 8–9 December in which four guerrillas and two Lebanese soldiers died, but the resumption of guerrilla cross-border attacks at the beginning of 1973 revived the tension. The social crisis in Lebanon was deepening, as police clashed with striking workers and protesting farmers in the capital and the various parties stepped up paramilitary training and acquired weapons. Worried by the

potential for civil strife, the PLO executive committee impressed on its members the need to 'avoid the eruption of an all-out and large-scale confrontation with the Lebanese authorities'.[236] It faced growing challenges from the militant guerrilla groups, however. The PF–GC deployed 150 guerrillas in the Bint Jbayl in early February in direct violation of the PLO commitment to the government, but was compelled to withdraw after pressure from Fateh and a frank warning from the Lebanese army.[237] The RPFLP and PPSF also aroused Lebanese ire, and on 22 March PLO military police arrested members belonging to both groups who were wanted by the authorities for armed robbery.

The Israeli commando raid of 21 February polarized Lebanese opinion sharply. Phalangist leader Jmayyil called for 'control over guerilla action, because the world will then [support] Lebanon and Israel will cease its aggression'.[238] He later added that 'any force that is above Lebanese law and government . . . is the greatest violation of Lebanese sovereignty', and warned that 'in such a situation there cannot be proper and permanent coexistence [with the guerrillas]'.[239] The assassination of the three Palestinian leaders on 10 April posed a greater challenge. Sunni Muslim prime minister Sa'ib Salam accused the army of failing in its duty to defend the capital and tendered his cabinet's resignation. An embarrassed president Sulayman Franjiyya informed the PLO that the Lebanese authorities could not ensure protection of the refugee camps, and reluctantly allowed it to acquire weapons and build fortifications necessary for their defence.[240] The PLO now increased its guards and stepped up patrols in the Fakhani district of Beirut, where it had numerous offices, and brought modest quantities of anti-tank rockets, light mortars, and machine-guns into the refugee camps.

The Maronite establishment, for its part, was evidently alarmed by the fact that 250,000 people, 10 per cent of the entire population, had turned out for the PLO funeral in Beirut, while tens of thousands marched in other cities and towns.[241] It resumed its campaign to abrogate the Cairo agreement, and demanded the removal of PLO 'heavy' weapons' from the refugee camps. Government troops entered camps on several occasions and seized Palestinian arms stores along the border with Syria, while undercover agents posing as guerrillas instigated a number of incidents.[242] Possibly in retaliation, unknown assailants attacked the oil tanker farm at Zahrani on 14 April. The PF–GC complained a fortnight later that the Lebanese army had arrested 18 guerrillas in separate incidents.[243] As the tension mounted, Lebanese security personnel at Beirut airport arrested three members of an unidentified Palestinian group attempting to smuggle explosives aboard a flight to France on 27 April. Later that evening, a bomb was thrown from a speeding car at the house of the Jordanian ambassador to Lebanon.[244]

On 30 April a Lebanese army patrol arrested three PDFLP members in Beirut. The PDFLP retaliated by taking two Lebanese soldiers hostage the next day, prompting a deployment of Lebanese armour around the five Palestinian refugee camps in the Beirut area at daybreak on 2 May. The army command

demanded the release of its soldiers by 11 a.m. and, when the deadline passed, ordered its forces to open fire. Amin al-Hafiz, who had replaced Salam as caretaker prime minister, attempted to mediate in the afternoon, but was overruled by Franjiyya, the army command, and the minister of interior. The PLO was convinced that the authorities had used the kidnapping incident as a pretext to launch a premeditated offensive, but privately also held the PDFLP partly responsible for the crisis and compelled it to return its hostages.[245] This enabled Hafiz to arrange a ceasefire that evening, but the army went over his head to announce a curfew in most parts of Lebanon, and then resumed fire the next morning.

Although the authorities made no public statement of their demands, Franjiyya and the anti-guerrilla faction in the government and army command had made it clear that they sought to replace the Cairo agreement with a new accord that would place the guerrillas and refugee camps under government control and reduce the PLO to the limited status it enjoyed in other Arab states.[246] A Fateh radio broadcast from Syria now drew the conclusion that 'America has declared war on the revolution. Our enemies have agents, lackeys and clients in Lebanon and elsewhere', and hinted that the adversary would not be deterred 'by advice and reason alone'.[247] The PLO executive committee was more circumspect, calling on the Arab states to help stop the bloodshed, in which it detected 'bad intent'.[248] Egyptian president Sadat and Sudanese president Nimayri both expressed concern, and the Arab ambassadors in Beirut called on the authorities to secure a ceasefire.[249] Most serious was the announcement from Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin, who now headed the PLO military department, that the PLA and other Palestinian forces in Syria had been placed on standby for intervention.[250] At the same time, an official statement from the department signalled the desire to pull back from the brink, asserting that 'we regret the necessity of taking these precautionary measures and reaffirm our concern to contain the crisis within the limits it has already reached, and [express] the utmost desire to avoid confrontation'.[251]

Unknown to the Lebanese authorities or the PLO, Syria was secretly planning to launch war on Israel in conjunction with Egypt. It envisaged a supportive combat role for the PLO in south Lebanon, and viewed the instigation of clashes as a distinct threat to its strategy. Muhsin's statements coincided with an urgent telephone conversation between Syrian chief-of-staff Hikmat al-Shihabi and Lebanese army commander Iskandar Ghanim, but to little avail.[252] The Lebanese army disregarded the Syrian signals, and ordered further armour and infantry attacks on the refugee camps and then sent the air force into action for the first time in its history. Lebanese soldiers also killed two Fateh and Saʿiqa battalion commanders in an ambush in the south during the day, and seized the isolated Dbayya refugee camp after nightfall. Fateh responded by ordering rocket attacks on Lebanese airbases and by bringing three guerrilla battalions from Syria into the south on 3–4 May. Lebanese opposition militiamen wrested control of the inner quarters of Sidon and Tripoli, while the guerrillas pushed

from the ʿArqub towards the Beirut–Damascus highway and army positions in the central Biqaʿ Valley.

The PLO had demonstrated its ability to punish the army, although it remained largely on the defensive for fear of triggering Israeli intervention.[253] At the same time, it cited the experience of Jordan in 1970–1 and the more recent assassination of Palestinian leaders in Beirut to justify its unwillingness to permit any reduction of its military presence or extraterritorial rights in Lebanon.[254] Several Arab states moreover supported its stance by citing the same historical precedents.[255] The PLO drew the lesson that any willingness to whittle down the Cairo agreement would only lead to 'further accords in a descending spiral towards [ultimate] liquidation'.[256] A statement from its executive committee on 5 May stressed these themes. It stressed that the PLO had acted only in self-defence, but added that 'the Palestinians are spread out in all parts of Lebanon and are capable . . . of extending the confrontation to other areas'. To warn against any attempt to modify the Cairo agreement, it pointedly reminded the authorities that 'we would have extended the battlefield to all other areas, if we had any intention of undermining the accords'.[257]

The army command finally suspended offensive operations in the afternoon of 5 May, after breaking the three previous ceasefires. It had come under pressure from Hafiz, who had threatened to resign on 3 May, and was worried about the loyalty of its Muslim rank-and-file; 18 officers and pilots were reportedly court-martialled for disobeying orders, while others sabotaged heavy weapons to prevent them being used against the PLO.[258] Yet the anti-guerrilla faction was strong enough, not least thanks to the backing of Franjiyya, to declare a state of emergency and resume hostilities during the night of 7 May.[259] Franjiyya and the army command had overreached. On 8 May the opposition called on its armed followers to take to the streets in support of the PLO, and Hafiz formally tendered his resignation in the evening.[260] Sadat recalled his special envoy from Beirut in protest and declared full backing for the PLO, but most alarming was the Syrian decision to close the border with Lebanon to all traffic.[261] Retreating hurriedly, Franjiyya accepted a new ceasefire that night, but the army command stubbornly continued shelling, air strikes, and sporadic probes against the refugee camps and guerrilla bases during the night and next day. Its inability or unwillingness to mount major ground operations made such activity meaningless, however, and it finally accepted a lasting truce in the evening of 9 May.

The active combat phase of the crisis was over, but the army command strove to salvage some gains during the negotiations that were held with a PLO military delegation over the next week. It demanded a complete inventory of Palestinian armament, removal of 'heavy weapons' and 'outside' personnel from the refugee camps, and subordination of the guerrillas to Lebanese civilian jurisdiction.[262] Another demand, reportedly, was the relocation of 40,000 refugees in the camps around Beirut and a reduction of guerrilla strength in the country to its level prior to November 1969.[263] On 14 May Franjiyya expanded

the list by adding 'questions' about the cessation of cross-border attacks on Israel, government control over the refugee camps, restriction of PLO political and information activity, and curtailment of PLO relations with the Lebanese opposition.[264] To exert pressure on the PLO, the state of emergency was kept in force and the army arrested numerous opposition activists and guerrillas. Official media stressed their 'privileges' and 'excesses', describing the PLO alliance with the opposition as interference in the country's domestic politics and referring obliquely to the Palestinians as 'aliens'.[265] Franjiyya also indicated his wish to reduce the number of refugees in Lebanon, now estimated at 300,000.[266]

The PLO saw little reason to give way. The Lebanese economy had suffered an estimated $43 million in losses, and Syria stressed that it would not lift its blockade until a satisfactory settlement was reached.[267] In the meantime, the Lebanese opposition called for the lifting of the state of emergency, punishment of the officials responsible for the crisis, and formation of a government acceptable to all Lebanese.[268] As significant was its call for 'restoration of the national balance in the army command', a clear and unprecedented allusion to Maronite dominance.[269] Little wonder that the authorities sought to disengage the PLO from the opposition; the latter replied angrily to this attempt, while the PLO pledged that it would not abandon its allies.[270] Encouraged, the PLO executive committee stated on 10 May that it had agreed 'to put an end to the bloodshed in Lebanon, so long as this is not at the expense either of the rights of the revolution or of the Cairo agreement, which [we] regard as the basic foundation of relations between [us] and the authorities'.[271] It followed that the refugee camps would remain firmly under PLO control, and that there would be no disarmament or removal of any category of weapons.[272]

Arafat meanwhile assured the Arab leaders that 'we endeavoured from the outset to avoid fratricide, but were surprised by the premeditated offensive that compelled us to fight in defence of ourselves and our people, [while] exerting efforts to contain the clash in the interest of the sovereignty, stability, and security of Lebanon'.[273] Subsequent PLO statements repeatedly argued that the guerrilla presence did not pose a threat to Lebanese sovereignty, while Arafat and other senior PLO officials sought to reassure the Maronites that the PLO sought ties with 'all sectors of the Lebanese masses', implicitly not just the Muslims.[274] At the same time, the PLO military delegation refused to discuss anything but consolidating the ceasefire during the first three days of talks.[275] This was aimed at preventing renegotiation of the Cairo agreement, and the PLO weekly warned on 13 May that any change in the accord 'will lead to new clashes'.[276] Two days later, Franjiyya relayed his readiness to accept the Cairo agreement 'in letter and spirit' if the PLO would discuss practical modalities for implementation.[277]

There was to be no return to the status quo ante in Beirut, where the PLO had seized greater defensive depth around its headquarters and offices in the Fakhani district, or in the south, where the guerrilla reinforcements called up

from Syria during the crisis were to stay.[278] In return, the PLO met Lebanese concerns by renewing its pledge to cease attacks against Israel from south Lebanon, and by agreeing to observe specific stipulations on personnel numbers and armament levels in the refugee camps and elsewhere.[279] These terms circumscribed the Cairo agreement to some degree, but were incorporated in a new annex (dubbed the Melkart Protocol) that was formally approved by both sides on 17 May.[280] Three days later Hafez resumed activity as prime minister, and the state of emergency was lifted on 23 May. The PLO had extracted significant concessions with a limited military effort, and for a relatively modest death toll of 35–40 PLO members, 37 Lebanese soldiers, and 60–70 civilians.[281]

Ironically, the PFLP, PF–GC, and RPFLP objected to what they saw as unnecessary PLO concessions and conducted a handful of attacks on army posts, but the PDFLP contritely adhered to the latest accord.[282] The anti-guerrilla faction in the army command was not reconciled with the outcome either, and continued to harass PLO and Lebanese opposition activists and migrant Syrian workers for several weeks longer. It gradually relented, allowing the punishing Syrian blockade to be lifted in early August. The rightist Maronite parties now renewed their secret training and armament programmes with the private encouragement of Franjiyya, who instructed the Lebanese *deuxième bureau* to provide them with covert assistance.[283] The guerrilla groups, Fateh included, meanwhile increased military assistance to their Lebanese allies.[284] The May 'events', as they were dubbed, were to prove a rehearsal for the civil war that was to erupt in 1975. They also launched the PLO state-within-the-state in Lebanon. A territorial base assured, what it sought was the political opportunity for the assertion of the statist option. This was to be unexpectedly provided in October, when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel.

This page intentionally left blank

PART III

The State-in-Exile, 1973–1982

On 6 October 1973 Egyptian and Syrian forces launched simultaneous attacks along the length of the Suez Canal and on the Golan Heights. The IDF gave way at first, but mounted successful counter-attacks on both fronts over the next 16 days. Iraq dispatched a 20,000-strong expeditionary force to assist the Syrian army, while Jordan and Morocco sent smaller forces; Algerian and Kuwaiti units supported the Egyptian army; and PLO units fought on both fronts and mounted cross-border attacks from south Lebanon. The conflict cost Israel over 2,800 dead and an estimated 109 aircraft, and 840 tanks, while Egypt and Syria (and their Arab allies) lost another 8,500 dead, 447 aircraft, and 2,554 tanks.[1] Massive resupply efforts by the US and USSR that started on 9 October provided the immediate needs of the combatants and made up for most Israeli and Syrian equipment losses over the next month or two, but the death toll shook Israel and led to a formal inquiry into the failure to predict the Arab attack. The Arab oil-producing countries decided on 17 October to cut production by 5 per cent until Israel relinquished the territories occupied in 1967; three days later Saudi Arabia imposed a 10 per cent production cut and an embargo on sales to the US following Nixon's request to Congress for $2.2 billion in aid to Israel. The embargo, which was not lifted until mid-March 1974, exacerbated the world energy crisis that had already started to build up a year earlier, sharply raising oil prices and taking the war to the industrialized nations and oil-importing Third World countries.

The October war showed Arab solidarity at its peak. From that point onwards divisions set in that ultimately rent the wartime alliance completely asunder, leading by the end of the 1970s to a level of fragmentation not seen since the start of the Arab cold war in 1958, if ever. Setting the pace was the Egyptian striving for peace with Israel, around which the strategies and reactions of other regional actors and the superpowers were effectively structured. Indeed, presidents Sadat and Asad had disagreed about the conduct of combat operations and timing of ceasefires even during the war. The rift deepened with the conclusion of a bilateral agreement to disengage Egyptian and Israeli forces in January 1974, which Syria saw as a blow to its own bargaining position. It persevered in a low-level campaign of military attrition on its front until the end of May, when it accepted a similar disengagement of forces. Under the terms of the agreement Syria at last endorsed UNSCR 338 (the ceasefire resolution issued on 22 October 1973) as the basis for a lasting peace, and in so doing

accepted UNSCR 242 of November 1967, which had been cited in the preamble.

The Egyptian–Syrian rift coincided closely with the divergence of US and Soviet policies in the region. Kissinger had become secretary of state at the end of August 1973 and, with the embroilment of president Nixon in the Watergate scandal, played the primary part in shaping US foreign policy. His approach was to dismantle the combined diplomatic, economic, and strategic pressures mobilized by the Arab coalition, while initiating bilateral negotiations that would move only incrementally from interim arrangements to matters of substance. He therefore worked in the following period to neutralize European, Japanese, and Third World support for the Arab position, deny the USSR (and UN) a substantive role, lift the oil embargo, encourage Arab 'moderates' versus 'radicals', and reassure Israel of US support while lobbying Congress to back his diplomacy. The special US–Israeli relationship was crucial, because it would compel the Arab states to seek satisfaction of their diplomatic aims from the US.[2] To this end Nixon waived repayment of $2.67 billion of a total of $4.42 billion in military assistance provided to Israel during the war and in 1974; Gerald Ford, who became president in August, approved an increase in economic aid to $575 million in 1975 and $1.12 billion in 1976 (from $92 million in 1974) and additional military aid of $489 million and $2.84 billion in the same years.[3] Starting immediately after the October war, Kissinger pursued a strategy of step-by-step diplomacy that staggered negotiations on each Arab front, while keeping the principal focus always on the Egyptian–Israeli track.

Sadat, for his part, had concluded in 1972 that détente reduced the scope for countries such as Egypt to manipulate superpower rivalry to their advantage. Alignment was likely to be more effective, especially given his added belief that the US held 'all the cards' in the region. Kissinger drove the point home shortly after the war, stating that 'the USSR can give you arms, but the United States can give you a just solution which will give you back your territories'.[4] Sadat sought more than territory, however. Egypt owed the USSR $4 billion in military debts alone, and faced a severe balance of payments deficit. The Arab states provided $500 million in official aid after the war and considerable bilateral assistance and multilateral investments—$200 million in a pipeline company and $840 million in the defence-related Arab Organization for Industrialization from the Gulf sheikhdoms, for example, and credits totalling nearly $2 billion from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iran alone for reconstruction—but this was insufficient to maintain the Egyptian economy as it was then structured.[5] Sadat initiated an open-door (*infitah*) economic policy in March 1974, but realized that Egypt had to resolve the conflict with Israel if it was to attract substantial Western aid and capital. Soviet demands for payment for the arms supplied during the war angered him, especially as the USSR halted Egyptian rearmament by ceasing further deliveries after November 1973. He made his feelings public with increasing bitterness after March 1974; in parallel he lobbied to lift the oil embargo against the US, and received Nixon on a much-publicized state visit to Egypt in June.

The consolidation of US–Egyptian ties alienated the USSR and Syria. The former had co-sponsored an inaugural peace conference in Geneva on 21 December 1973 and maintained a neutral attitude during the Syrian–Israeli disengagement talks, but came to the realization in late 1974 that the US intended to deny it a more effective role in the peace process. Asad had received Nixon in Damascus in June, and foreign minister ʿAbd-al-Halim Khaddam relayed his interest in further negotiations to Kissinger in August, but the Syrian president reached the conclusion by autumn that Israel sought to split Syria and Egypt. The immediate consequence was the defeat of the attempt that Kissinger had launched in July to draw Jordan formally into the peace process, by suggesting a token disengagement in the Jordan Valley. There had in fact been no combat on this front during the war, but the purpose was to prevent the PLO from supplanting Jordan as the interlocutor for the occupied Palestinian territories. However Syria, backed by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, played a key role in ensuring Arab recognition of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians during a summit conference in the Moroccan capital Rabat at the end of October. Brezhnev next demanded the reconvening of the Geneva peace conference during a meeting with Ford in late November, and a joint Soviet–Syrian statement issued on 1 February 1975 echoed the demand.[6]

There was not to be another meeting in Geneva nor, it seemed for a few months, any other progress in the peace process. Former Israeli ambassador Yitzhaq Rabin had taken over from Golda Meir as prime minister in June 1974, but governed uncomfortably in tandem with defence minister Shimon Peres and foreign minister Yigal Allon. The fragility of the Israeli government and increasing outspokenness of the right-wing nationalist opposition impeded further negotiations with Egypt, and on 22 March 1975 Kissinger somberly announced the suspension of his mission. A three-month hiatus followed, during which the attention of the US administration was drawn to the final collapse of its allies in Cambodia and South Vietnam, but the assassination of Saudi king Faysal on 25 March and the spread of clashes in Beirut after mid-April aroused new concern for Middle East stability. Kissinger resumed his shuttle diplomacy in June and was rewarded with the conclusion of the Sinai-II disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel on 4 September. He also signed three secret documents with Israel: two dealt with military and economic assistance, the future shape of the peace process, and other matters of common strategic interest, but the last committed the US not to deal with the PLO until it recognized Israel's right to exist and accepted UNSCR 242 and 338. In his own view 'the idea of a Palestinian state run by the PLO [is] not a subject for serious discourse', although he was willing to authorize a document written by his deputy assistant for near eastern affairs Harold Saunders, who stated that 'the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiating of an Arab–Israeli peace'.[7]

The battle-lines in the Middle East peace process had been drawn, and would

remain largely unchanged for the next decade, if not until the very end of the Cold War. This was to the marked disadvantage of the PLO, that had won unprecedented Arab and international recognition in the year following the October war. Its initial success was partly due to its willingness to modify its objectives and strategy, exemplified by the resolution of the PNC in June 1974 to establish a 'fighting national authority' on any Palestinian soil vacated by Israel. This fell far short of offering recognition of the Jewish state, let alone coexistence, but it implied readiness both to enter into indirect negotiations and to put off the total liberation of Palestine, if not abandon it altogether. The diplomatic strategy of the Fateh-dominated PLO mainstream from this point onwards was to bring Arab, Third World, and European pressure, both political and economic, to bear on the US. The purpose was twofold: to place Palestinian statehood on the negotiating agenda, and to assert the PLO as a valid interlocutor. Demonstrative military action against Israel would reinforce this approach, by underlining the ability of the PLO to spoil any peace initiative that excluded it. This strategy went hand in hand with the continuing statist transformation of PLO structures and politics, and with the struggle to capture the hearts and minds of the Palestinians in the occupied territories.

Both Syria and the USSR supported PLO moderation, reflected in the coalition between their respective Palestinian allies, Saʿiqa and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the dominant Fateh. This failed to impress the 'rejectionist' groups, most important of which was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, that received growing political and material support from Libya and Iraq starting in late 1973. Libya had formed a stillborn union with Egypt at the end of August, but turned firmly against its partner for accepting the ceasefire in October and then concluding the two disengagement agreements with Israel. Iraq also explained its attitude with reference to pan-Arabism and the commitment to the destruction of Israel, but had more prosaic reasons. In spring 1974 Iran had reactivated the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq, as part of Kissinger's strategy of neutralizing opposition to his Middle East diplomacy. The completion of a Syrian dam on the Euphrates river in April 1975 aggravated tensions with Iraq, which complained angrily of the harm done to its agriculture by the reduced flow of water. The resolution at this point of the dispute with Iran over use of the Shat al-Arab waterway allowed Iraq first to crush the Kurdish guerrillas, and then to devote greater effort to reinforcing the internal opposition to Syrian president Asad and his diplomatic partner, PLO chairman Arafat.

The irony was that the intrinsic incompatibility of Syrian and PLO diplomatic strategies was already undermining the partnership. On the one hand Syria was determined to acquire leverage over the peace process and compensate for Egyptian unilateralism by forming a rival axis under its leadership comprising Jordan, the PLO, and Lebanon. Israeli prime minister Rabin deepened Syrian resolve in February 1975 by stating that Syria would not regain the Golan Heights 'even in a peace treaty'.[8] It responded by forming a joint political

and military command with the PLO in March and high-level coordination committees with Jordan in June. Syria proposed a formal alliance between the three parties following the conclusion of the Sinai-II disengagement agreement in September, but this aroused the disquiet of the PLO which suspected, not incorrectly, that king Husayn still hoped to supplant it as the interlocutor for the Palestinians of the occupied territories in eventual negotiations with Israel.[9] The PLO faced a dilemma: its diplomatic strategy was based on preserving good working relations with Egypt in the hope of conducting an indirect dialogue with the US, but it faced intense pressure within its own ranks and from Syria (and the USSR) to oppose both Egyptian and US policy. The result was outward solidarity with Syria, but private determination to pursue an autonomous diplomatic course, free of Syrian influence.

The Lebanese civil war brought these implicit tensions to the fore, varyingly pitting Iraq, Egypt, and, most importantly, the PLO and Syria against each other in 1975–6. In Lebanon itself the political system, in which senior political and military appointments were allocated according to a confessional balance agreed at independence in 1943, had been under increasing strain since 1967. The establishment of Palestinian guerrilla sanctuaries in the south, massive social and economic dislocation caused by Israeli counter-insurgency campaigns, and emergence of the PLO's state-within-a-state brought tensions between the country's dominant Maronite Christian community and the Muslim majority to crisis points in 1969 and 1973 over government policy towards the PLO. The October war exacerbated the situation: the booming revenues of the oil-rich Arab states attracted regional capital away from the Beirut money market, fuelling inflation and outward migration of labour while providing resources to the PLO and allied Lebanese leftist and Muslim militias. After the war former Sunni prime minister Rashid Karami challenged the unwritten 'national pact' of 1943 by stating his interest in running for the office of president, always held by the Maronites. Shiʿite imam Musa al-Sadr, leader of what was now the largest single community in the country and certainly the most impoverished (among the Lebanese), posed another challenge by holding two mass rallies in which thousands of armed followers took part in spring 1974.

The sharpening of regional rivalries in spring 1975 meant that all the ingredients for conflict in Lebanon were present. Asad regarded the country as the western flank of Syrian defences against Israel, and viewed the instigation of clashes by Maronite militias in Beirut in April as a threat inspired directly by Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy.[10] Arafat was also worried and initially sought to defuse the conflict. However, the Syrian attempt to impose an alliance with Jordan after the Sinai-II disengagement agreement prompted a shift. Arafat now sought to assert the PLO as the central power broker in Lebanon and guarantor of the cohesion of the state, hoping in this way both to safeguard its presence and to enhance its regional stature. Positionality now set the PLO and Syria on collision course: it led the Fateh-dominated PLO to challenge the compromise

solution to the Lebanese crisis brokered by Syria in February 1976 and to seek realignment with Egypt; it also led Syria, which feared that a takeover of Lebanon by the PLO and its Lebanese allies would trigger Israeli intervention, to intervene first and impose *pax Syriana* on the country with considerable force. Iraq and Egypt pursued their own feuds with Syria by providing the PLO with material aid, until Arab summit conferences in October and November brought the conflict temporarily to a close and paved the way for inter-Arab reconciliation.

The regional outlook was brightened by the inauguration of a new US administration under president Jimmy Carter in early 1977, whose pronouncements on the need to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict and provide for a Palestinian homeland persuaded the principal Arab interlocutors that negotiations on a comprehensive peace with Israel might at last be at hand. However, they were forced to revise their expectations after the electoral victory that brought the Likud Party to power in Israel in May. The disappointment was greatest for Sadat, who had lobbied insistently since 1976 for an 'Arab Marshall Plan' worth $10 billion to compensate Egypt for war losses and assist its economic recovery; he was dissatisfied with a $2 billion commitment by the Gulf sheikhdoms to a special development fund and disgruntled by their demands for austerity and stabilization measures.[11] Under severe economic pressure and frustrated by US inability to maintain the joint peace initiative launched with the USSR in October 1977 in the face of Israeli opposition, Sadat once again took dramatic action. On 9 November he announced his intention to visit Jerusalem in an attempt to relaunch the peace process with Israel, taking even his own advisers and ministers by surprise. On 17 September 1978 Sadat and Begin signed preliminary accords in the presence of Carter at the presidential retreat of Camp David, and on 26 March 1979 concluded a peace treaty formally ending the state of war between their two countries.

The Egyptian–Israeli peace process paralleled the deterioration of superpower relations. Soviet allies had made striking gains in Indochina and southern Africa in 1974–5, to which the US responded with stepped-up military assistance to their local rivals. Sadat abrogated the friendship treaty with the USSR on 15 March 1976 (possibly to attract increased funds from the Gulf sheikhdoms), took up anti-Soviet causes in Zaire, the Ogaden, and Afghanistan in the next three years, and ordered the expulsion of remaining Soviet diplomats and technicians from Egypt in September 1981, shortly before his assassination by Egyptian Islamists. The US had meanwhile committed $3.5 billion in economic aid to Egypt by 1979, and rewarded it for signing the Camp David accords with an arms package worth $1.5 billion over three years.[12] For its part the USSR had already upgraded ties with the PLO in 1974, and in 1976 undertook major expansion of political and military relations with Libya and increased its support for the Polisario front in the Western Sahara. It backed Ethiopia against Somalia in the Ogaden war in 1977 and South Yemen in its border war with North Yemen in February 1979, and admitted the former to the Warsaw Pact in

October. The USSR had assisted leftist groups that took part in the Islamic revolution in Iran in January and resolutely opposed the Egyptian–Israeli accords, but its most controversial act was to invade Afghanistan in December, prompting the US to suspend ratification of the SALT-II agreement and impose trade sanctions in response. The second cold war was well and truly underway.

As in the late 1950s, the escalation of superpower rivalry two decades later coincided with the polarization of inter-Arab politics. Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO formed a 'steadfastness and confrontation front' in December 1977 to counter Sadat's peace initiative, although the Fateh-dominated Palestinian leadership was in fact loathe to sever all ties with Egypt. Iraq had attended the deliberations but refused to join the front; it saw an opportunity to fill the vacuum in Arab leadership left by Egypt's defection, and sought to head a broader coalition. It had the assets: massive oil wealth, that had in turn financed the military build-up (and nuclear programme) deemed necessary to match the major expansion of Iranian armed forces and grandiose regional ambitions of the Shah. The conclusion of the Camp David accords and the start of the Islamic revolution in Iran provided Iraq with the opportunity: its agents and sympathizers within the Baʿth Party had waged a violent campaign against the Syrian government since 1976, but at the end of October 1978 the two adversaries announced their reconciliation with the publication of a joint 'national charter'. A week later Iraq made its bid for leadership by hosting a summit conference and marshalling the Arab states (except Oman, Sudan, and Djibouti) to impose collective sanctions on Egypt. The conference also decreed substantial annual grants to Syria, Jordan, and the PLO to assist their steadfastness over the next ten years; with an added subvention for the occupied territories, the PLO was able to extend and deepen its statist transformation to an unprecedented degree.

The new-found Arab solidarity was to last no longer than its Iraqi–Syrian core. Iraq had demonstrated its non-alignment by openly opposing Soviet policy on a number of fronts—from Afghanistan, through the two Yemens and the Horn of Africa, to the Western Sahara—and by diversifying the sources of its arms and other imports. In contrast oil-poor Syria remained entirely dependent on its commercial, economic, and military relations with the Soviet bloc, and loyally backed the Third World policies of the USSR. More important in both cases were domestic developments. Saddam Husayn assumed the Iraqi presidency on 16 July 1979, and 12 days later announced the discovery of a Syrian-led plot to overthrow his government; he took personal part in the execution of seven RCC members and 15 other senior officials, and summarily imprisoned or dismissed 44 others. Asad was probably innocent of the charge, but faced a growing threat from the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, which had for some time waged a violent campaign against ʿAlawi domination and the alliance with the USSR. On 16 June it effectively declared all-out war with the massacre of 32 unarmed cadets at the military academy in Aleppo, and the state

responded with corresponding ferocity (culminating in the ruthless suppression of an uprising in Hama in February 1982, in which 5,000–10,000 people died). Deepening its anger was the emergence of a tacit axis between Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, and by July 1980 it was accusing the latter publicly of arming and training the Muslim Brotherhood.[13] Syria concluded a mutual defence treaty with the USSR in August, formed a union with Libya and aligned itself with Iran following the Iraqi invasion in September, and massed its troops on the border with Jordan when the latter hosted an Arab summit conference in November.

The Arab–Israeli peace process was at a complete standstill, despite the continuation of talks between Egypt and Israel over Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO struggled to revive the indirect dialogue with the US, but the election of 'Cold War warrior' Ronald Reagan as president in November signalled a return to the pro-Israeli stance of the 'globalist' school in US foreign policy, as opposed to the more even-handed 'regionalist' approach of the Carter administration. In any case the Fateh mainstream was constrained by the Palestinian opposition, which was its peak, bolstered both by the backing of the Arab steadfastness front states and the USSR and by its own following in the occupied territories. Little, too, was left of the Arab pillar of the PLO's diplomatic strategy with the Iraqi–Syrian feud, Iran–Iraq war, decline of Gulf oil revenues, ostracism of Egypt, Libyan involvement in Chad and confrontations with US aircraft in the Mediterranean, and Algerian–Moroccan rivalry over the Western Sahara. The PLO was moreover beset by the proxy conflict waged in Lebanon by the proxies of Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and by the Israeli campaign of attrition that had persisted since 1978.

Heavy clashes had also pitted Syrian forces against the Maronite militias in Lebanon since 1978, and in spring 1981 Israel raised the stakes by sending its air force into action and triggering the 'missile crisis' with Syria. It demonstrated its reach again with the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June, and on 30 November signed a memorandum of strategic cooperation with the US that committed both parties to confront threats to the Middle East from the USSR or 'Soviet-controlled forces'.[14] On 13 December Israel extended Israeli law to the Golan Heights, effectively annexing them; the US suspended the agreement with Israel in protest, but vetoed a UN Security Resolution condemning it. Israeli defence minister Ariel Sharon now redefined the 'sphere concerning Israeli strategic interests' expansively as extending beyond the confrontation states to the 'outer Arab countries . . . and countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and areas like the Persian Gulf and Africa, and in particular the countries of North and Central Africa'.[15] The Begin government was in fact intent on challenges closer to home: it sought to subdue Palestinian nationalism in the occupied territories, and to this end resolved to destroy what it considered to be the source of its inspiration and leadership, the PLO state-in-exile in Lebanon. However, the trigger came from afar. Having suffered severe reverses in the war with Iran during the spring, Iraq sought a means both of reducing the

pressure and of avenging itself against Syria, which had provided Iran with military supplies and blocked the financially vital export of Iraqi oil through its own territory. Israel was known to be planning an invasion of Lebanon, and on 3 June 1982 Iraqi intelligence gave it the needed pretext by attempting to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Lebanon.

13

At the Crossroads

The October 1973 War

Surveying its situation in summer 1973, the PLO had more reason to feel secure than at any time since the conflict in Jordan. The May 'events' had stabilized a new balance of power in Lebanon with the backing of Syria and Egypt, while the suspension of guerrilla attacks in the south brought welcome relief from Israeli reprisal raids. The assassination of the three PLO leaders in April and the recent confrontation with the Lebanese army had moreover served to unite the Palestinian rank-and-file. Arafat took advantage of these developments to confirm the PLO as the central decision-making body in the Palestinian arena, prevailing upon the various guerrilla groups to unite their security, militia, and, information agencies within new PLO departments.[1] A central news agency, WAFA, and an official weekly, *Filastin al-Thawra* (*Palestine the Revolution*), had already been established at his insistence. The unification of the other departments was at most token, but even nominal acceptance of the principle reflected growing acknowledgement of PLO status and of Arafat's personal stature.

One consequence of the consolidation of Fateh's dominance in the PLO was to revive tensions with Syria. As on previous occasions, this took the form of a renewed contest between the PLO executive committee in Beirut and the PLA command in Damascus. PLA chief-of-staff Budayri had in fact sought continuously throughout 1972 to tighten his control, starting in February with the dismissal of Qadisiyya Forces commander Muhammad al-Tayyib and the appointment of Muhammad Zahran as Hittin Forces commander in June. In October he reacted to a rash of defections and resignations of junior officers by ordering all personnel to surrender their passports to the PLA command for safekeeping.[2] An open dispute with the PLO was finally triggered at the end of December by the expulsion of 67 members of the PLF/PLA Zayd Bin Haritha Battalion in Jordan, who were accused of secret membership in Fateh.[3] The PNC convened shortly after, and Fateh seized the opportunity to call on the PLA command to retract its recognition of the battalion, to which Budayri, supported by Saʿiqa, responded by arguing for reconciliation with Jordan.[4] Fateh accused the PLA of 'isolation' from the guerrilla movement, and was backed by ʿAyn Jalut Forces commander Fathi Saʿd-al-Din, who stated that the PLA rank-and-file supported PLO policy against Jordan.[5]

Shrugging off the criticism, Budayri oversaw the expansion of the PLA in the next few months. The 414 and 423 Anti-Aircraft Battalions were formed, and attached to the Hittin and Qadisiyya Forces, respectively. This was also a means of absorbing and controlling PLA personnel originally trained in Iraq and Egypt. ʿAbdullah Siyam and Saʾib al-ʿAjiz commanded battalions and ʿAbdullah Jallud and Muhammad Tamraz headed new fire support companies in the Qadisiyya Forces; all were Fateh supporters and former refugees from Gaza, as were the head of operations (general staff) Mahmud Abu-Marzuq, brigade chief-of-staff Jamal Abu-Zayid, and staff officer Fakhri Shaqqura. Another former Gazan, Ghazi Mhanna, had headed the PLF/PLA Misʿab Bin ʿUmayr Battalion in Lebanon since October 1972 (replacing Majid Shahrur), to which the Gazan Yusif Rajab al-Rudayʿi and Iraqi-trained Kamal Qaddumi were also assigned. A new rocket artillery unit was formed and armed with 30 single-tube 122 millimetre launchers confiscated from Fateh in 1969, but it was now trained, ironically, by Fateh.[6] (The 415 Artillery Battalion was also formed in 1975.) By now, the PLA the Hittin Forces had up to 3,000 men and the Qadisiyya Forces 1,500.

The expansion of the PLA apparently encouraged its command to challenge Fateh openly in July. This was evident from its monthly magazine, *Sawt Filastin*, which opposed 'the domination of one group among the resistance forces'.[7] The PLO executive committee countered by creating the new post of 'conductor of army affairs' (*musayyir umur al-jaysh*), to which it assigned a loyalist PLA officer. This was a direct challenge to Budayri's status, and when Fateh and the leftist guerrilla groups renewed their demand for the withdrawal of remaining PLA personnel from Jordan in September, the Syrian authorities irately closed down the Fateh radio station in Darʿa. Syrian anger was also reflected in president Asad's refusal to inform the PLO that Syria and Egypt were about to launch a war against Israel. Sadat had in fact told a Fateh delegation in mid-August that the two Arab states intended to mount a surprise attack in the near future, and revealed that Asad had insisted that the only PLO officials to be informed, if any, were PNC president Khalid al-Fahum, Saʿiqa secretary-general (and PLO military department head) Muhsin, and Budayri.[8]

In September, Sadat asked Arafat for the contribution of guerrilla and PLA units to the Egyptian war effort. The Syrian command had assigned battle missions to PLA units in Syria, but made no request for assistance from Fateh. It moreover ignored repeated PLO requests for an official briefing in the last two weeks before the war.[9] Syrian distrust was not entirely misplaced, as Fateh had already conveyed the information received from Sadat to the other guerrilla groups and told its own rank-and-file that a limited Arab offensive was in the offing. Palestinian opinion was divided: some cadres were eager to end the stalemate with Israel, but others believed that the planned Arab attack was no more than a theatrical gesture designed to break the diplomatic deadlock, and would lead to a negotiated settlement with Israel that would leave Palestinian goals unfulfilled. Whatever misgivings it had, Fateh sent a guerrilla company to

Egypt on 1 October and placed its forces in Lebanon on the alert in the evening of 5 October, having been given the precise timing of the attack the day before.[10]

The PLO was thus in a position to make a modest contribution to the war that broke out on 6 October. On the Golan front, the three commando battalions of the PLA Hittin Forces made ground and heliborne assaults on fortified Israeli hilltop positions, seizing one, while the Qadisiyya Forces were initially held in reserve and then participated in counter-attacks on the Israeli forces that successfully pushed into the Huran plain in a later stage of the war. Saʿiqa's Khalid Ibn al-Walid Battalion also conducted an abortive heliborne assault, while its ʿAbd-al-Qadir al-Husayni Battalion conducted reconaissance and tactical support for the Syrian army. Fateh's Galilee Battalion gave similar support in the southern sector and its naval unit helped guard the Syrian coast against possible Israeli landings from 6 October. Three days later, as the Israeli counter-offensive got underway, Fateh also responded to urgent requests from the Syrian command for the deployment of its 3rd Battalion on Mount Hermon and for the supply of a large number of RPG-7 anti-tank launchers and rockets from its stores in Damascus.[11] Following the ceasefire that ended the war, the Syrian command asked Fateh to mediate in the dispute with Iraq, which threatened to withdraw the 20,000-strong expeditionary force it had sent to the front in protest.[12] By then, the PLA had lost 44 dead and missing, while the guerrilla groups lost 77 killed, of whom 57 belonged to Saʿiqa.[13]

On the Egyptian front, the PLA ʿAyn Jalut Forces had been deployed on the eastern shore of the Greater Bitter Lake since mid-1968, with the exception of the year spent in Syria in 1970–1. Strength had declined to 1,200–1,500, due to the Egyptian policy prohibiting induction of new recruits, and armament remained light.[14] The PLA was asked to assign 50 soldiers for missions behind Israeli lines in northern Sinai in the first week of the 1973 war, but saw no further action until 14 October, when it observed Israeli preparations to cross the Suez Canal.[15] The Egyptian command disregarded its repeated warnings, even after forward PLA patrols reported sighting three Israeli armoured vehicles on the west bank of the canal on 16 October.[16] The PLA was not directly involved in combat until 20 October, when its outposts clashed with Israeli armour in Wadi Jamus. Its four battalions had been dispersed by 23 October; two were trapped when the IDF surrounded Suez city the next day, while the other two escaped encirclement and rejoined the Egyptian army at Dhashur.[17] The PLA lost 30 killed, 70 wounded, and 45 prisoners on the Egyptian front during the war, while Fateh's Special Unit, which had been flown to Egypt during the war, lost an additional 18 dead or missing.[18]

The PLO also opened what it called 'the third front' against Israel from south Lebanon. Its explicit aims were to distract Israeli attention and divert IDF resources from the Golan front by mounting guerrilla attacks on northern Israel, and to impede Israeli attempts to outflank the Syrian army by advancing through the southern Biqaʿ Valley.[19] The PLA command also instructed the

PLF/PLA to deploy reconnaissance and artillery observation teams on the western slopes of Mount Hermon, to assist the Syrian garrison holding the summit.[20] Fateh guerrilla battalions that had been guarding refugee camps in other parts of Lebanon were now rushed to the south.[21] Arafat enthusiastically called on PLO forces to 'increase blows against the enemy's communication routes, his assembly centres, his vital targets, within the occupied territories and along the borders'.[22] Over the next 16 days, Israel suffered 140 attacks, and at least 23 settlements (the PLO claimed 42) were shelled or otherwise hit, while the IAF lost a helicopter and a Phantom F-4 fighter-bomber to guerrilla ground fire.[23] The attacks only ceased on 29 October, when the Lebanese government requested the PLO to observe the ceasefire that had been declared on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts five days earlier. By then the PLO had redeployed its units in prohibited areas of the border region, an important gain, for which it had effectively paid with the lives of 44 guerrillas.[24]

The PLO was unable to replicate this level of military activity on the Jordanian front or in the occupied territories, however. Fateh and the PDFLP had suspended their sabotage campaign against Jordan in mid-1973, and on 18 September king Husayn declared an amnesty, as a result of which most of the 800 Palestinian security prisoners were released, among them Fateh commander ʿAwda, PDFLP politburo member Salih Raʾfat, and senior PFLP cadres Matar, Hammuda, and Khalili.[25] However, a PLO request to deploy a token force of 100 guerrillas in Jordan during the October war was firmly denied.[26] A direct appeal from Sadat failed to sway the king, prompting public PLO condemnation of Jordanian policy.[27] Guerrilla squads attempting to infiltrate from Syria were turned back by Jordanian border patrols, and by the end of the war had suffered 15 casualties in Jordanian minefields. Another 103 guerrillas detained in these attempts were released in a second royal amnesty on 31 October.[28] The PLO compensated partially for the difficulties it faced in Jordan by organizing a jump in armed attacks against Israeli targets in the occupied territories, from 36 in September to 78 in October, and another 51 by the end of 1973.

The PLO had played a minor military role in the war, but it was rewarded when the Arab summit conference in November recognized it as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, despite strong Jordanian reservations.[29] It received similar recognition from the Non-Aligned Movement, and rapidly expanded its links with the socialist countries in the following months. The war offered a historic opportunity, but also posed major challenges. The PLO could seek to join the peace process, taking advantage of the demonstration of Arab military, political, and financial power to make territorial gains. At the same time, to join the regional system and engage in negotiations with Israel would mean a radical departure from the goals and slogans raised by the Palestinian national movement since 1948. In essence the debate was about the historic nature and purpose of the Palestinian national movement, as the revolutionary and statist options were now brought into direct conflict. Indeed, it was not

certain that such options were available, giving rise to an intense and deeply divisive debate within the PLO and dominating its internal politics for years to come. Palestinian political institutionalization took increasingly overt statist forms and the quest for a territorial base became paramount, ultimately turning the PLO from a state-within-the-state in Lebanon more broadly into a state-in-exile.

Opportunity or Threat?

Barely had the guns fallen silent along the Suez Canal when Sadat announced that discussions were underway with the two superpowers with the purpose of convening a peace conference in Geneva, to be attended by the parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict. He insisted that the Palestinians would be represented, but failed to specify who would represent them: the PLO, other Palestinian interlocutors, or an Arab state.[30] Behind this approach was the widespread Arab perception that the recent war and use of the oil weapon had reinforced Arab diplomacy, paving the way for a comprehensive peace settlement that would restore all or most of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. The terms of reference for the Geneva peace conference reinforced this view, since their basis was UN Security Council Resolution 242, which stipulated Israeli withdrawal and resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem in return for mutual recognition and security for all states in the region, including Israel.

The PLO had consistently rejected UNSCR 242, objecting that it reduced the Palestine conflict to a mere refugee problem and embodied permanent Israeli possession of nearly 80 per cent of Palestine. Yet its pragmatic wing now perceived a tangible shift in the correlation of Arab–Israeli and US–Soviet power, that suggested the likelihood of obtaining concrete gains through diplomacy. Indeed, Arafat had been struck by a joint US–Soviet statement in June that spoke, for the first time, of 'the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people'.[31] He sent secret messages to the US administration over the next few months expressing willingness to coexist with Israel.[32] The war allowed a more open and fundamental shift. As Sa'iqa secretary-general Muhsin argued, it had altered the way Palestinians perceived reality. Previously, they had 'desired war for the sake of war. We wanted more to feel that we were able to fight, than to attain clear and coherent aims specific to the phase.' The recent war, conversely, had 'eliminated the feeling of impotence, and so it is no longer permissible for the Arab nation or the Palestinian national movement to remain the prisoner of romantic thinking. What is now demanded of it is to define what it wants, within a realistic framework.'[33]

The challenge was to recast the PLO within a statist framework in terms not only of institutional structure, but also of political aims and programmes. Muhsin explained that conclusion of peace between the Arab states and Israel, no longer an improbable prospect, would render 'the PLO in its current

formulation [*sigha*] unable to continue and survive'. What was needed was a new formulation to pursue the national struggle and prevent dispersal of the Palestinian people. The PLO had to avoid the fate of 'the All Palestine Government and the Arab Higher Committee, which became names without content and lifeless bodies from the very end of the 1948 war'.[34] Fateh central committee member Khalaf argued to the same purpose. Looking back over six decades of Palestinian history, he observed that the fatal error of the previous Palestinian leadership had been to relinquish its cause to the Arab governments in 1948. Now, in 1973, it was imperative to prevent the Arab governments from taking the initiative away from the Palestinians again. The international and Arab environment had changed since 1948, however, and so the PLO needed to translate its long-standing principles and aims into a realizable and unprecedented programme suitable for the current phase.[35]

Once again, Muhsin came closest to an explicit formulation of the statist goal. In order to avoid the fatal errors of 1948 and after, the PLO had to place the construction of a national Palestinian authority at the centre of its concerns. 'Any revolution', he explained, 'has to strive to establish power, or else ends in nihilism. Power is not an evil that pollutes the revolutionaries . . . No revolution is worthy of the name unless its ultimate goal is to establish revolutionary power or a national authority that can pursue the goals of the revolution by using the instruments of government and power.'[36] The problem was how to acquire and exercise power over Palestinian territory, without making historic concessions that would deprive the new authority of political legitimacy. Muhsin tackled the issue obliquely, avoiding mention of sovereign statehood, since that would involve negotiation and coexistence with Israel, but blurring the issue at the same time by playing on the confusion in Arabic between the concepts of state power and that of authority—both denoted by the word *al-sulta*.[37]

These views were expressed in seminars or panel discussions in front of small audiences, and official pronouncements were more cautious. In a rare statement on 4 November 1973, the Fateh central committee avoided taking a firm position on whether or not it would attend the proposed Geneva peace conference, or if it would accept a negotiated solution to the conflict with Israel. It reiterated its commitment to historic Palestinian rights and aims and stressed the need for national unity, but at the same time signalled a shift by insisting that the final decision should 'stem from the national interest' and aim to 'preserve gains and accomplishments'. Both military and political struggle should continue, but in the meantime Fateh would 'study current issues objectively' and consult the Palestinian people, its Arab 'brothers', and 'international friends'.[38] Behind this statement lay the conviction, greatly strengthened by recent experience, that the Middle East was a region of primary global importance because of its position as a geostrategic crossroads, possession of oil, and long history of rivalry with neighbouring Europe. This made external factors determinant in the outcome of the Palestine conflict, and encouraged a move

away from the direct strategy of constant war to liberate the whole of Palestine, towards an indirect strategy or 'policy of phases'.[39]

Several guerrilla groups were quick to oppose the emerging trend. The PF–GC was first to publicize its rejection of peace talks, since they would involve direct negotiation with Israel and recognition of the Jewish state. Their outcome would be the creation of a 'freak' (*miskh*) state in the West Bank and Gaza. The PF–GC warned against the emergence of 'an opportunistic and liquidationist current' in the PLO leadership, and summed up its position as 'no to the treasonous negotiations, no to the Palestinian state'.[40] It also urged all 'rejectionists' to form an alliance outside the PLO.[41] The PFLP declined the latter suggestion, but also reacted strongly to the Fateh statement. Talk of 'careful study' was a prelude to capitulation, it argued, adding that the US wished to establish a Palestinian mini-state in the occupied territories as a means of containing the PLO and pre-empting the liberation war. The Geneva peace conference was merely a device to seduce the PLO into accepting that outcome, and would accord international legitimacy to 'the aggression of 1948'. The PFLP warned that the PLO would forfeit the claim to represent the Palestinians if it 'dropped the gun', and concluded with a resounding 'no to the Palestinian state' and 'yes to revolution, yes to protracted people's war'.[42]

As the debate unfolded, the PDFLP took the lead in arguing the case for Palestinian participation in the putative peace process. In its view, the October war had produced relative parity in the strategic balance with Israel, and provided a basis for further struggle 'to compel the enemy to withdraw completely from the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories, and to extract the right of self-determination and national independence for the Palestinian people in the framework of an independent and sovereign national state'.[43] Sensing that at least some Palestinian land might be restored, the PDFLP argued that the PLO should take the lead and establish sovereign rule in the occupied territories.[44] Above all, it insisted, king Husayn should be allowed to take neither the West Bank nor the diplomatic initiative. As secretary-general Hawatma argued, the way to defeat him was by preventing subordination (*ilhaq*) of the West Bank to Jordan: having lost the ability to control the Palestinians and with no claim to be in the frontline against Israel, the Hashemite kingdom would lose both its *raison d'être* and the pretext for obtaining Arab financial assistance.[45] 'When we remove the goose that lays golden eggs from the hands of king Husayn,' Hawatma added, 'his downfall comes within our grasp.'[46]

Fateh was more guarded, but a consensus had developed along broadly similar lines within its central committee. Khalaf now emerged as the principal articulator of the new trend. Speaking frequently in public in following months, he stressed that 'the October war . . . has created new realities in the region which must be recognized so that our discussion of coming challenges can take place on a scientific basis'.[47] The peace process was moving forward and it was not enough simply to say no, he argued, especially as friends such as the USSR

were urging the PLO to 'define phases in our struggle'. 'The position now is to be or not to be. Absolute rejection is sometimes a form of escapism'. The crucial point, he stressed repeatedly, was that 'the West Bank and [Gaza] Strip must not revert to king Husayn . . . concerning this phase, the basic object is to extract [the territories] from the regime of king Husayn'.[48]

The implication was clear: Fateh was willing neither to reject the peace process outright nor to risk ceding control of the occupied territories to Jordan. The problem was that opposition to direct negotiation with Israel or recognition of it was widespread among the rank-and-file. Fateh leaders therefore justified their policy proposals in rejectionist terms. 'Rejection means practice, preparation, and hard political work', Khalaf warned, 'we do not hesitate between surrender and continuing the revolution. We pause so as to search for the best means to attain our aims and slogans . . . we pause now so as to know how to say no yet continue with the revolution.' At the same time, he tempted the Palestinian constituency with the potential reward: control over the occupied territories would be 'the first step towards forming a base. Call it a revolutionary base, or call it a national base.'[49]

Fateh and the PDFLP still faced the obvious question: how to 'deprive the lackey regime [of Jordan] of the West Bank and [Gaza] Strip without making the concessions [to Israel] of recognition, reconciliation [*sulh*], and negotiation'? How to achieve the 'first step, without having to relinquish the historic right [of return to the whole of Palestine] as the price'? Fateh central committee member Nimr Salih expressed a common sentiment when he stressed that rejecting the 'tutelage' of king Husayn did not mean accepting Palestinian–Israeli reconciliation.[50] In November the PLO central council expressed the carefully balanced formulation developed by the mainstream. PLO policy would be guided by three principles: insistence on the historic right of the Palestinian people to liberate their entire homeland, rejection of the restoration of Jordanian rule over the occupied territories, and attainment of the Palestinian right to self-determination.[51]

Habash derided mainstream statements, observing bitingly that 'they say "we will not enter into direct negotiations with Israel, but we will sit with it in the same room". Our masses are not so stupid as to accept such talk from anyone.'[52] He clarified that the PFLP was opposed to the process 'not because it is opposed to peace, but because this process is based on UNSCR 242, and so it is a process for surrender not a process for liberation'.[53] If a Palestinian state was established, he added, it would cover 'only 22.5 per cent of the area of Palestine. And what about the rest of our Palestinian masses?'[54] To relinquish historic rights and recognize Israel was too high a price to pay for the return of 'the parcel of land we will regain'. Habash went on to warn his audience that once Israel had relinquished the occupied territories and won recognition, then 'the international [community] will not tolerate that any Palestinian or Arab force should reject, at least in the foreseeable future, what it has previously accepted and agreed to'.[55] It followed that 'in the present balance of power, the

party that assumes authority [in the occupied territories] will be a reactionary and liquidationist authority'. Habash concluded by reaffirming that

> Zionism will not evacuate a single yard of land without a political [and] military struggle that compels it to do so . . . the gun, weapons, and people's liberation war are the first and foremost means capable of compelling imperialism and expelling zionist imperialist presence from our homeland . . . We can by no means accept that the end of the aggression of 1967 should come at the price of confirming the aggression of 1948.[56]

Fateh and the PDFLP could not easily brush aside these objections. Hawatma argued that the establishment of an 'independent national presence [in the occupied territories] would provide a base for a protracted people's war against the Zionist enemy'.[57] The struggle to achieve this objective would 'not take place on diplomatic fronts, but with our guns in our hands'. Nonetheless, it was clear that 'the gun' was intended not to prevent a political settlement but to strengthen the Palestinian bargaining position: 'our revolutionary opposition enables us to wage the struggle *in all forms* with our guns in our hands in order to extract the independence of our people on any tract of land from which the Israelis withdraw, whether they do so due to force or the threat of force or *as the result of a settlement* that is imposed on the region by the forces active in the region' (that is, the superpowers).[58]

Besides, as Hawatma reminded the rejectionists, an independent national authority in the occupied territories would offer 'a secure base [*qaʿidat irtikaz*] when the revolution loses its secure base [in Arab states] as a result of the general settlement and the Zionist–US–Hashemite solution . . . Not Jordan, Syria, Egypt, or Lebanon will open their doors to us, and they will clash with us constantly in order to liquidate us. It is up to the revolution to avoid this fate by extracting our people's right to self-determination on liberated Palestinian soil, to preserve our independent presence.'[59] Yet references to 'liberating all of Palestinian national soil' or 'the right of our people to liberate their homeland and attain self-determination' could not obscure the fact that the PDFLP was thinking of more modest gains. This was clear in its accusation that when the PFLP insisted on 'liberating the entire national soil [of 1948]', it was actually 'turning its back on the masses inside [the occupied territories of 1967]'.[60]

Saʿiqa developed the mainstream argument further. As Muhsin noted, the dilemma was that 'if the PLO declares that it wishes to rule the Gaza Strip and West Bank, then it will seem to have abandoned the historic rights of the Palestinian people to the rest of Palestinian land . . . but if [it] says that it is not concerned with UNSCR [242] and with this settlement, then it will have officially relinquished the [West] Bank and [Gaza] Strip to the Jordanian regime'.[61] He criticized those PLO leaders who were so intent on pre-empting a Jordanian bid to control the occupied territories that they preferred to deal directly with Israel, but then challenged the long-standing Palestinian consensus by

expressing open willingness to recognize Israel within the boundaries suggested in the UN partition plan of 1947.[62] He added that Israel could survive if it 'became a Middle East state, neither aggressive nor Zionist, coexisting with the surrounding Arab society and merging in the general current of its economic and strategic interests, and relinquishing its expansionist Zionist character'.[63] Behind this remarkable shift lay the realization not only that the peace process might succeed, but that it might offer the Palestinians tangible gains. The price would be high, however, and Muhsin observed soberly that 'we face a real test for the first time'.[64]

The convergence of Fateh, the PDFLP, and Saʿiqa allowed the PLO to formulate the closest it could come to a policy in January 1974. Khalaf articulated this most succinctly when he concluded a survey of six possible courses of action by stressing that the fate of 'any Palestinian land affected by the [peace] settlement must be determined by our people, and must not revert to king Husayn at any cost'.[65] This still ducked the question of how land could be restored without negotiating directly with Israel. Nimr Salih gave a rhetorical response: 'Is such an authority taken or given? We will say it is taken, but within the reordering of the Arab situation and in evolving circumstances.'[66] He gave a clearer answer by confirming that the PLO would establish a national authority over any square inch of soil that was recovered.[67] One reason for the continued evasiveness of the mainstream leadership was the uncertainty that it would be invited to take part in the peace process at all, in which case a formal commitment could prove embarrassing and strengthen internal opposition.

The furthest that the PLO would go was to explain its new policy guidelines. An editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra* stated that the October war had confronted the PLO with the need to deal with:

> the future of the Palestinian lands that will be liberated from occupation in the new phase of struggle . . . [We] reject the return of any Palestinian land extracted from the occupation to the Jordanian government . . . The Palestinian people will exercise on it their full rights of national sovereignty and establish on it their independent national presence . . . This would be a victory that reinforces the struggle to attain the strategic goal of building the democratic Palestinian state . . . over the whole of national soil . . . [We] regard implementation of military disengagement talks on the Jordanian front as a handover of our Palestinian land from the Zionist enemy to the Jordanian regime under US imperialist sponsorship with the aim . . . of redividing Palestinian lands as happened in 1948.[68]

Arafat lent this view his personal authority a few weeks later, asserting that:

> through the rifle and as a result of the [October] war and Arab unanimity, Israel will withdraw. The fourth Arab–Israeli war will give us parts of Palestine, and the fifth war will give us Tel Aviv . . . What is called the West Bank and Gaza Strip . . . now faces two possibilities: one, to go to king Husayn . . . as to the second possibility, it is to set up a Palestinian authority on it, or to set up the Yigal Allon plan on it, that would

transform our land and people into a reservoir that feeds Israel with labourers . . . We will lose some present positions [in Arab countries], but *we will head for our motherland*, as we did in 1965 and 1967 . . . The revolution that turned a refugee people into a revolutionary people will itself never turn into a refugee revolution.[69]

Behind the belligerent tone and the hyperbole, Arafat was indicating a definite choice: the PLO would seek control of the occupied territories. By what means it would do so remained unclear or poorly defined. The Palestinian leadership was holding out for better terms, and it evidently hoped that the combination of military and diplomatic pressure could compel Israel to withdraw without obtaining fundamental concessions from the PLO in return. Yet its stout denials could not obscure the realistic conclusion that the new, 'phased' objective would only be attained through direct negotiation with Israel.

Political Rivalry, Military Outbidding

This was the conclusion drawn in any case by the rejectionist guerrilla groups, which had formed a loose alliance backed by Iraq and Libya by the end of 1973. They feared that direct negotiations with Israel were in the offing, leading to major concessions on Palestinian patrimony, and so sought to undermine the evolving PLO policy. To this end the rejectionist groups renewed guerrilla activity from south Lebanon, but their guerrilla contingents were capable only of mounting sporadic attacks. Yet their purpose was not to revitalize the armed struggle, so much as to challenge the PLO leadership politically and demonstrate opposition to the peace process. The PF–GC took a dramatic lead on 11 April 1974, when three of its guerrillas took several dozen teenage members of the Israeli Nahal youth organization hostage in the border town of Kiryat Shmona. It demanded the release of 100 Palestinian prisoners, but negotiations collapsed in a shoot-out when the IDF assaulted the building. The three guerrillas were killed, as were 19 hostages and soldiers. PF–GC secretary-general Jibril proudly stated that the 'suicide guerillas' had shown the external powers that they could not overlook the Palestinians.[70] The PF–GC had demonstrated its ability to abort any peace talks and prevent both a political settlement with Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state.[71]

The raid on Kiryat Shmona catapulted the PF–GC to instant prominence and attracted new recruits, among them a group of PPSF cadres (formerly of the RPFLP).[72] It also halted the drift that the PF–GC had experienced since September 1970, when Jibril had unilaterally dissolved the central committee in an attempt to silence criticism of his autocratic leadership. Internal opposition came from younger members who had joined the civilian organization since 1967 and from cadres in the information department in Syria, who tended to be better educated and more left-leaning than the founding generation. The emerging leftist faction was strengthened in 1970 by the arrival from the West Bank of ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim and Talʿat Yaʿqub, who had just finished

serving sentences in Israeli prisons for forming the short-lived Battalions of Return group in 1967. They were immediately inducted to the PF–GC central committee on the strength of these credentials, and, along with writer Rashad Abu-Shawar, who edited the weekly *Ila al-Amam*, provided a focus for leftist sentiment.

The reassertion of Jibril's control over the PF–GC in September 1970 prompted a number of key cadres and dozens of guerrillas and civilian members to defect to other Palestinian groups over the next year, but this did not discomfit him overly. His power base lay among the remaining guerrilla contingents in Syria and south Lebanon, who evinced deep hostility towards leftist discourse and political education generally.[73] The guerrillas even mutinied briefly in protest at leftist influence in the PF–GC during 1971; their support enabled Jibril to disregard the leftist-dominated central committee that was restored at the PF–GC's third general conference in 1972.[74] He also managed to delay publication of the leftist political programme that was adopted at the next conference in August 1973, until May 1974.[75] By then, the leftist faction had won considerable support among the guerrillas thanks to its role in planning the Kiryat Shmona raid and other suicide missions. Muhammad ʿAbbas Zaydan and other leftist colleagues dominated the 'pioneers' group' (*majmuʿat al-ruwwad*), the special wing of volunteers who conducted the attacks under the overall command of Jibril.

The success of the Qiryat Shmuna raid obscured the internal divisions, and brought a welcome influx of Libyan and Iraqi assistance. The PF–GC had been the only guerrilla group besides Fateh to receive funds from Libya in 1969–72, but suffered near-bankruptcy for much of 1973 and was saved only by the resumption of Libyan aid in spring 1974.[76] The new Iraqi connection was less expected, given the long-standing ties between Jibril and Syrian military intelligence. It was explained by the Syrian decision to accept a final ceasefire with Israel and a limited disengagement of forces on the Golan front towards the end of May. A number of PF–GC members in Syria were arrested for publicly criticizing government policy, and guerrilla bases in the border region were placed under tighter restrictions.[77] Jibril was distinctly unhappy with the deterioration of relations, but gave way to leftist pressure to move the bulk of the guerrilla contingent to Lebanon as a precautionary measure.[78]

Jibril nonetheless kept a guarded distance from Iraq, and worked to mend fences with Syria. Possibly for this reason, he took the surprising step of voting in support of the relatively moderate political programme that was endorsed by the PNC in June. Spearheaded by the PDFLP, Fateh, and Saʿiqa, the programme called for 'the establishment of the people's independent, national combatant authority on every part of Palestinian land that is liberated'.[79] Jibril justified his vote on the grounds that the PF–GC did not oppose the establishment of a 'national authority' in the occupied territories, but rather rejected a negotiated peace with Israel.[80] In private he argued that the PF–GC could not afford to alienate its Syrian patrons altogether. The leftist faction was unconvinced, and

launched a suicide mission against Kibbutz Shamir in northern Israel on 13 June. The attack, which left three civilians and four guerrillas dead, was announced as retaliation for recent Israeli air raids on refugee camps in Lebanon, and triggered a week of Israeli reprisals that left another 27 dead and 105 wounded. Amongst themselves, however, the leftists viewed the suicide mission as a response to Jibril's acceptance of the PNC programme.[81] Their manoeuvre had the desired effect, as the PF–GC formally retracted its support for the programme, albeit too late to affect the vote.

Despite its momentary vacillation, the PF–GC had made a strong bid for militant legitimacy and posed an embarrassing challenge to the PLO mainstream. The PDFLP was the first to respond in kind, having come under intense criticism for raising the 'national authority' slogan, which many Palestinians, even within Fateh, described as 'treason or fantasy'.[82] As PDFLP military commander Mamduh Nawfal later explained, 'we wished to deflect the accusations of treason and reinforce our political line through military operations'.[83] An added consideration was the desire to thwart US secretary of state Henry Kissinger, whose shuttle diplomacy excluded the PLO and raised the possibility of transferring the occupied territories to Jordanian control. Once again the means was a suicide mission: three PDFLP guerrillas took 100 high school students hostage in the northern Israeli border town of Maʿalot on 15 May, and demanded the release of 25 Palestinian prisoners. The guerrillas and 23 Israelis, mostly schoolchildren, died when the IDF finally stormed the building. Israeli aircraft bombed the ʿAyn al-Hilwa and Nabatiyya refugee camps in south Lebanon the next day in revenge, killing 60 civilians and wounding 140.[84] Having stolen the limelight, the PDFLP mounted another suicide mission against ʿAyn Ziv on 23 May. This time it hoped to 'reinforce the phased political programme adopted by the front since late 1973' and influence the forthcoming PNC debate scheduled for early June.[85]

The PDFLP used the influx of new recruits attracted by its daring exploits to build up its guerrilla contingent, previously organized into nine regular *quwwat* (the term usually denoting a brigade) and three militia formations (including women and teenagers).[86] The designations were grandiose but hollow, and in 1974 the PDFLP regrouped its combat personnel in four guerrilla battalions and a fifth 'national security' battalion that comprised military police, bodyguards, and headquarters protection.[87] Even then, total guerrilla and militia strength did not exceed 800–900 by 1975, with some 250 reservists. Modest as it was, expansion required external support: Iraq, South Yemen, and Algeria had provided some material assistance since 1972, but Iraq now severed ties in protest at the PDFLP's new political programme. This loss was more than made up for by Libya's Qadhdhafi, who was so impressed by the Maʿalot raid that he overlooked the political pragmatism of the PDFLP and received its leadership for the first time in October. The PDFLP was awarded a monthly stipend of $1 million, and took delivery of new weapons supplies starting in 1975.[88]

The PDFLP courted the USSR assiduously, parallel to the consolidation of its Arab ties. It considered Soviet support crucial to secure Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and obtain the establishment of a Palestinian national authority, and strove to assert itself as the principal Soviet ally within the PLO. In effect, the PDFLP remained faithful to its conviction that the Palestinians needed a major ally or 'big brother', the change being to substitute a worldwide class alliance led by the USSR for its previous Arab nationalism. To distinguish itself better, it shortened its name to the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and in November Hawatma, ʿAbd-Rabbu, Nawfal, Samarraʾi, and other leaders were invited to Moscow on the first official visit by a Palestinian delegation other than the PLO. They were offered infantry weapons for 2,000 combatants (to be supplied through East European states) and training at Soviet military academies, as well as medical equipment and light industrial machinery for DFLP clinics and workshops (to be delivered directly from the USSR).[89] The DFLP also requested intelligence training, and in return promised to supply the KGB with information about Western embassies and agents in Beirut.

The USSR meanwhile deepened political and military relations with Fateh and the PLO. Arafat was offered training and arms during a visit to Moscow in November 1973, but most important was the Soviet effort to persuade the Palestinian leadership of the value of diplomacy. The thrust of the argument, as Fateh central committee member Khalaf relayed to a home audience, was that 'there is no revolution in the world that does not have a program for each phase. You must phase your struggle.'[90] Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin added that the USSR had urged the PLO 'to participate in the peace conference . . . and formulate its view or the proposal it desires. The USSR will adopt [that view] as relates to the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Palestinian rights.'[91] According to Wazir, Soviet officials also countered Palestinian opposition to UNSCR 242 by asking rhetorically, 'would it not be better for you to fight from Tulkarm [in the West Bank], for example, than from outside?'[92] Soviet policy towards Israel was far less belligerent in fact, but this logic spoke directly to the pragmatic element in the PLO, whose way of thinking was best summed up as 'arriving at a balance between one's decision and one's capability, and the method of phased steps within the realm of the foreseeable, and not the realm of dreams'.[93]

Soviet arguments were reinforced by the obvious need for the PLO to cultivate strong political support in the occupied territories. Israel unwittingly assisted the pragmatic trend by deporting a number of prominent West Bank figures in spring 1974, all of whom attended the crucial PNC debate in June. The impact was evident in the adoption by the PNC of a new, ten-point political programme that committed the PLO to the 'national authority' slogan. To placate rejectionist sentiment and prevent an open split, the mainstream injected a militant tone into the concluding statement. This confirmed that the Palestinians would struggle 'with all means, foremost of which is the armed

struggle . . . in order to produce further change in the balance of power in [our] favour'. The PLO also pledged to oppose any 'Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, reconciliation, or secure borders [for Israel], or . . . depriving our people of their rights of return and the right to self-determination on their national soil . . . Any liberating step is a stage in continuing the PLO strategy to establish the democratic Palestinian state as specified in previous PNC resolutions.'[94] It followed naturally that the PLO continued to reject UNSCR 242.

Khalaf again sought to head off internal opposition by explaining that the PLO did not intend 'to establish a Palestinian state, but a national authority. The conditions of this authority are that it should not recognize Israel nor make peace with it, and it should never consider establishing secure borders or appeasing the enemy. This authority represents, in our view, a phase in the action of the revolution.'[95] Yet both the pragmatic shift and the attempt to court Soviet favour were evident in the inclusion of four of the recent West Bank deportees—ʿArabi ʿAwwad (communist), ʿAbd-al-Jawad Salih (communist supporter), Anglican bishop Iliyya Khuri, and ʿAbd-al-Muhsin Abu-Mayzar (former Baʿthist)—in the PLO executive committee. Arafat moreover outraged the rejectionists by signing a joint statement with Egypt and Syria on 21 September, in which Palestinian rights were linked specifically to the restoration of Arab land occupied by Israel in 1967. This implied that the exercise of those rights would be limited to the West Bank and Gaza, while the confirmation that national authority would be established on land liberated 'by *political* means or military' signalled readiness to negotiate with Israel.[96]

What, precisely, the mainstream leadership really sought in the long term remains open to contention. Total liberation of Palestine presumably remained the genuine desire of most, if not all its members, but they were keenly aware of the regional and international impediments to the destruction of Israel. Writing a decade later, Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan provided the clearest enunciation of a strategy that otherwise remained largely implicit.[97] The PLO faced a hypothetical choice between an indirect, 'phased' strategy that would see the establishment of a state in the occupied territories as a first stage, and a direct strategy of unrelenting military conflict in which Arab resources would have to be fully mobilized. The latter option was simply not available, and so the PLO would have to rely on a combination of elements—a coordinated Arab effort to attain parity with Israel at the military level, Arab solidarity at the political level, Palestinian armed resistance in the occupied territories, and construction of international alliances—and on the lowest common denominator among the Arab states. The indirect strategy still took the establishment of a secular, democratic state over the whole of mandate Palestine as its ultimate goal, but whether or not the mainstream leadership believed this to be a likely eventuality, it was perceptive enough to realize that attaining its statist ambitions could only come about through major compromises in historic claims and opportunistic enough to make that choice.

In any event, the USSR rewarded the PLO for its pragmatic shift by inviting it in September to open an official delegation in Moscow—a much-prized trophy for a Third World liberation movement—and on 29 October the Arab summit conference in Rabat recognized the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. King Husayn had successfully opposed exclusive recognition at the previous summit in 1973, but felt compelled to retreat a year later. Arab backing secured similar recognition of the PLO from the Non-Aligned Movement, which granted it observer status. The USSR and socialist bloc supported the Arab and non-aligned groupings at the UN general assembly, which invited Arafat to address it on 14 November. His appearance at the UN was not as a representative of stateless refugees, but rather of a national community with a distinct institutional character. The headline on the front cover of the DFLP weekly *al-Hurriyya* summarized the occasion aptly, crowing that 'Palestine has re-entered history'.[98]

The rejectionists took a more jaundiced view of events. The PFLP withdrew from the PLO executive committee and central council on 26 September in protest at the joint statement with Egypt and Syria. It accused the pragmatic wing of lulling the Palestinians into accepting a negotiated settlement with Israel 'drop by drop', and of making secret contacts with Jordan and the USA.[99] Arafat had indeed conducted preliminary discussions with an unofficial US envoy in November 1973 and March 1974, but these ceased after Kissinger concluded that a formal dialogue was not feasible.[100] Yet Arafat continued to argue that 'the US holds the key to Israel', and endeavoured to persuade the US public that 'its friendship with our Arab nation is more important, lasting, and beneficial' than the alliance with Israel.[101] Such statements convinced the PFLP that the 'lackey and deviationist' leadership was firmly set on 'the path to capitulation, that will cast the PLO into arrangements for a treasonous settlement'.[102]

The rejectionist groups now moved into formal alliance against the PLO leadership. Following meetings with top government and Baʿth Party officials in Baghdad, the PFLP, PF–GC, ALF, and PPSF announced the formation of the Front of Forces Rejecting Capitulationist Solutions (*Jabhat al-Qiwa al-Rafida li al-Hulul al-Istislamiyya*) on 10 October. Iraq and Libya provided material backing, and urged the new front to set up joint information departments and military forces. The rejectionists had already formed a joint artillery battalion in August; and over the next two years maintained a military liaison office and a few mixed platoons, as well as publishing a joint weekly, *al-Muqawama Mustamirra* (The Resistance Continues).[103] Their political impact was not inconsiderable, but their decisions to boycott the PLO delegations to the Arab summit conference and the UN general assembly showed serious misjudgement. This contrasted sharply with the mood in the occupied territories, where Arafat's appearance at the UN was celebrated by the first mass demonstrations since 1967.

The failure of the rejectionist alliance to have a greater impact was partly due

to the continuing internal crisis of the senior partner, the PFLP. It had taken the PFLP until December 1973 to put its finances into order, but another year was to pass before it could announce that it had at last 'rearranged' its organizational and military affairs.[104] It was also unable to revive its pan-Arab vehicle, the ASAP, or the Lebanese branch of the ASAP, despite an extensive review in 1974.[105] The PFLP's financial situation improved, however, as covert assistance from Haddad was now topped up with additional funds from Libya and, especially, Iraq, which was to remain its main backer for the next few years.[106] Yet the combination of internal instability and Iraqi–Libyan backing only encouraged greater rhetorical militancy. The PFLP responded to the Arab summit conference recognition of the PLO as sole Palestinian representative by accusing the mainstream leadership of submitting to a Saudi–Egyptian axis.[107] Similarly, the UN general assembly invitation to Arafat was described as a device to draw the PLO into the snare of diplomacy. The US wished to establish a truncated Palestinian state and needed PLO participation in its scheme, the PFLP asserted, and 'the reactionary Right [Fateh] and opportunistic Left [the DFLP]' were proving only too happy to oblige.[108]

Resurgence in the Occupied Territories

As they pursued their political contest, both pragmatists and rejectionists looked increasingly to the occupied territories for political support. The October 1973 war had ended the period of relative quiescence brought about since 1967 by the Israeli 'open bridges' policy. Previously, as ranking PLO officials admitted ruefully, Israel had 'gained a great deal thanks to the apparently liberal policy, especially with regard to facilitating transport and travel, which is a novel event in the Arab region, whose inhabitants suffer complicated and tedious procedures at the borders between each Arab country and another'.[109] 'Unpatriotic habits' had taken root as a result, as 'many interests have evolved that tie a large part of our people directly to the Israeli economy'. The patterns of 'coexistence, travel, and tourism in Israeli cities and settlements may even deprive our people of their revolutionary identity and of their ability to preserve a cohesive national character'.[110]

However, the PLO had itself been guilty of a striking lack of interest in the occupied territories. At its first session after the June 1967 war, in July 1968, the PNC confined itself to denouncing 'the suspect calls for the establishment of a fake Palestinian entity' in the areas under Israeli occupation, and took only one resolution of a vaguely practical nature, namely 'to form a bureau for the affairs of the occupied homeland with specialized personnel from the popular organization department and the military council, and to provide it with the resources to serve the goals of the revolution'.[111] There was no further reference of any significance to the occupied territories until July 1971, when the PNC at last recognized the need to tackle the Israeli 'open bridges' policy, Palestinian

employment in Israeli (economic) institutions and in civilian departments run by the military government, and the need of Palestinians wishing to study at universities abroad (at a time when acceptance to Arab universities had dropped sharply since 1970). It decreed the formation of a single command body to supervise political, military, organizational, and social activity in the occupied territories and offered token acknowledgement of the importance of 'all forms of mass struggle along with revolutionary armed struggle towards comprehensive popular liberation war', but once again limited its practical resolutions to increasing its media and social welfare efforts in the occupied territories.[112]

The extraordinary PNC session of April 1972 was convened especially to deal with the occupied territories, but only in the context of stating political opposition to king Husayn's United Arab Kingdom proposal and the Israeli-sponsored municipal elections in the West Bank. Again, no practical or programmatic decisions were taken. Only in January 1973 did the PNC finally address the occupied territories as a distinct, and primary, arena. It now resolved to stem the exodus of Arab inhabitants, resist the Israeli settlement and Judaization programmes, mobilize and organize the masses systematically, support farmers, develop local economic and cultural institutions, preserve the national identity of the Arab citizens of Israel, reabsorb labourers working in the Israeli economy, and combat collaborators, as well as generally to 'reinforce ties of national unity and struggle between our masses in the land occupied in 1948, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and outside the occupied homeland'.[113] This did not stem from detailed planning, nor did it reach the level of a comprehensive programme for resistance and the construction of a rival authority in the occupied territories, but significantly it was accompanied by novel references to a 'phased' political programme and the 'current rights of our people, headed by the right to resist occupation and to [enjoy] national independence'.[114]

The significance of these references became apparent after the October 1973 war, as the marked increase in armed attacks and civilian protests propelled the occupied territories to the centre of PLO thinking. The war also led to the formation of a Palestinian National Front (PNF) in the West Bank in 1974. A similar front had failed the previous year because it was dominated by the JCP, but the PNF now included representatives of the main guerrilla groups. Building the coalition was not easy, since the JCP continued not only to withhold from openly endorsing armed struggle, but also to view implementation of UNSCR 242 as its principal objective.[115] Yet there was common ground too, as the JCP and the guerrilla groups were united in opposing the ongoing Arab–Israeli military disengagement talks.[116] The local JCP branch was even encouraged by 'the momentum after the October 1973 war and the creation of the PNF' to form 'youth committees as a nucleus for the front, among which some were earmarked for armed struggle'.[117] This was partially a throwback to the decision in 1969–70 to establish a handful of armed cells in the West Bank,

which was not put into practice due to disagreement with the politburo in Amman.[118] The JCP had subsequently called for a national front in 1971 and stressed civilian resistance and political action, and it was only in 1974 that it resolved to form a military wing attached to the PNF.[119] This would be kept separate from the party and would include non-communists, and JCP cadres in Lebanon would arrange training and arms supply from Fateh and the PLF/PLA.[120]

Israel pre-empted the plan in July by arresting hundreds of JCP and PNF members, among them Sulayman al-Najjab, the fugitive head of the local JCP branch. He was accused of heading the incipient military wing and deported at the end of February 1975, while other JCP members received jail sentences of up to four years.[121] The JCP hurriedly came to a tacit understanding with the Israeli military authorities to refrain from armed activity in future. Politburo member Bashir al-Barghuti was permitted to resume residence in the West Bank, and effectively assured adherence to this policy.[122] This episode marked the decline of the 'nationalist' wing that had dominated the JCP since 1970 and, by the same token, the reassertion of the centrist leadership. Indeed, a militant minority suspected darkly that Barghuti had been assigned to pre-empt the transition to armed struggle.[123] In any case, the prevalent view in the JCP now held firmly that geography and demography both made guerrilla war in the occupied territories difficult, if not impossible. The experience of the main guerrilla groups showed that up to 90 per cent of their members were arrested before mounting armed attacks, and so for the JCP to call for armed struggle would be an invitation to destroy the party.[124] Privately the JCP accepted that its branches outside the occupied territories might become militarily active in the right circumstances, but this option was not actively pursued.[125]

Among the guerrilla groups only Fateh, the PFLP, and DFLP were still active in the occupied territories by now, as the smaller ones lacked sufficient political and logistic support. Yet even the main groups faced considerable difficulties. Jordanian intelligence foiled their attempts to establish secret command committees in Amman to direct clandestine organizations in the occupied territories. Fateh was still able to conduct modest activities in Egypt, thanks to its working relations with Egyptian intelligence and military intelligence, but the PFLP and DFLP had been proscribed since August 1970.[126] They also suffered an additional setback when the capture of separate sets of documents in March and May 1973 led to the arrest of a number of their members in Gaza and the West Bank.[127] Syrian restrictions on the PFLP in 1974 greatly impeded the supply of weapons and explosives to its cadres in Jordan (destined for the occupied territories).[128] Matters became worse after November, when Habash publicly criticized Syria and revealed the rift with the ruling Ba'th Party, to which the authorities responded by arresting remaining PFLP members in the country.[129]

The PFLP tried to overcome these obstacles by mounting a modest number

of sabotage attacks in Israel and the occupied territories in 1974–5 (as well as a solitary act of international terrorism, the explosion of oil storage tankers in Singapore on 31 January 1975). Most dramatic was a suicide operation on 11 December 1974, when one of its members detonated a bomb in a Tel Aviv cinema, killing himself and an Israeli viewer and wounding 58 others. Yet the PFLP now discovered the consequences of its single-minded determination since 1971 to overthrow the monarchy in Jordan, for which purpose it had formed the clandestine People's Party as recently as July 1974. It sponsored the futile attempt by Jordanian national Brik al-Hadid to assassinate king Husayn in 1975, but eventually abandoned the campaign, by which time its military activity in the occupied territories had subsided almost completely. This failure was ironic, since the PFLP had led the way in criticizing Palestinian military and organizational methods. A report issued in 1972, for example, stated that armed resistance was marred by 'individual heroics and adventurism', inability to learn from past experience, neglect of proper organizational method, and technical flaws.[130] The guerrilla groups had moreover 'sanctified' military activity at the expense of political and social mobilization of the masses. This undercut the effort to build trade unions and other grass-root bodies, and left the clandestine organization bereft of a public shield.[131]

In the event, it was the DFLP, rather than the PFLP, that modified its methods of operation. It devoted greater attention to political activity after October 1973, although responsibility for organization in the occupied territories remained in the hands of the grandly named 'command of the forces inside' (*qiyadat quwwat al-dakhil*). This was a military committee with branches in Damascus and Beirut, that also trained the guerrillas who conducted suicide missions. The structure of the clandestine organization in the occupied territories did not change, as members continued to be divided by social category (students, workers, women, and so on) rather than by operational function.[132] The release of several cadres from Jordanian prisons in September and October allowed the DFLP to rebuild its secret command committee in Amman. The DFLP had foresworn further sabotage attacks in Jordan and firmly kept the command committee separate from its clandestine Jordanian branch, known as the Democratic Front Organization in Jordan (*Majd*).[133] Jordanian intelligence maintained a tight grip nonetheless, rearresting politburo member Salih Ra'fat in mid-July 1974 and 32 other DFLP members a few weeks later.[134]

The DFLP showed that it could inflict damage on occasion—a bomb caused 12 Israeli casualties in a west Jerusalem market on 20 December, for example—but its members were generally able to mount only minor sabotage attacks. It sought more dramatic results, and launched two suicide raids on 4 September and 19 November, in which it lost 6 dead and inflicted 25 Israeli casualties. The DFLP reiterated that its aim was to confront 'a parcelling of the Palestinian people and land between the Jordanian regime and Israel . . . support the diplomatic efforts of the PLO . . . and support the political line of struggle presented

by the [front] after the October [1973] war, embodied in the ten-point programme approved by the PNC'.[135] Significantly, the latest raids coincided with a tour by the DFLP leadership of the USSR, China, and North Korea, and prepared the way for it to moot publicly the establishment of a 'revolutionary provisional government'.[136] This demonstrated once again the political purpose of military action, as did the manner in which the periodicals of the various guerrilla groups reported anti-Israeli attacks by their rivals. The PFLP's *al-Hadaf* reported DFLP and Fateh raids but omitted mention of their authorship, while the DFLP's *al-Hurriyya* reciprocated when reporting raids by the rejectionist groups.

Fateh: Asserting Patriotic Credentials

The competitive logic also affected Fateh, which sought to assert its patriotic credentials by escalating its own military effort in the course of 1974. Of equal importance was the wish to assert its presence in the occupied territories and demonstrate that the PLO was a key party in the conflict, with the capability to obstruct peace talks that excluded it.[137] Reflecting this thinking, three Fateh guerrillas took an Israeli family hostage in the coastal town of Nahariya on 24 June, and killed two of the hostages and a soldier before being shot dead by the IDF. Fateh directed its principal effort towards the clandestine organization in the occupied territories, however. This was the responsibility of Wazir and the Western Sector (*al-Qita*ʿ *al-Gharbi*). His predecessor, Kamal ʿUdwan, had reorganized the directorate from a purely geographical division into separate sections for military operations (including training and supply), organization, and intelligence; Wazir retained these following ʿUdwan's assassination in April 1973, but also restored the old 'regional committees' (*lijan manatiq*) of Jerusalem, Gaza, Hebron, Nablus, and the Galilee.[138]

Fateh recovered sufficiently from ʿUdwan's death to organize a steady rise in sabotage attacks in the occupied territories after August 1973, accounting for 90 per cent of all Palestinian military activity in the following period.[139] It also redoubled its recruitment effort among the thousands of students from the West Bank and Gaza who flocked to Arab and foreign universities (as did all the guerrilla groups), and sought new means to smuggle explosives and arms into the occupied territories. The extent of its success was revealed in mid-August 1974, when Israel announced the arrest of the Catholic archbishop in Jerusalem, Syrian-born Hilarion Cappucci, and his driver, who were charged with using the diplomatic status of his car to smuggle weapons and money into the West Bank for Fateh.

As the arrest of Cappucci showed, Israeli counter-measures were increasingly effective. This prompted Fateh to revive the 'fugitive patrols' of the late 1960s: roving guerrilla bands in the hills of the West Bank. Their purpose was to attack Israeli forces on occasion and demonstrate Fateh presence, and to

construct new clandestine networks in the villages and towns.[140] The guerrilla *foci* would conduct armed propaganda to mobilize the general population, train a new generation of cadres, and ultimately obviate the need for infiltration from Arab sanctuaries.[141] This proved difficult. Only one fugitive patrol belonging to Fateh in the Hebron district had survived after 1971, and the task of training, installing, and supplying new guerrilla teams posed considerable logistic and organizational challenges.[142] Five fugitive patrols were established in the West Bank in 1974–5 (while a DFLP attempt in April 1975 was foiled by Jordanian border guards).[143] Their arrival coincided with the rise in civilian protests, and helped to demonstrate PLO capability. As one fugitive guerrilla recalled, 'the leadership asked me to appear in public or attack facilities such as the post office, so as to show the presence of Fateh'.[144] However, harsh conditions, lack of a strong civilian organization, and constant Israeli pressure prevented multiplication of the fugitive patrols and drove them to escape gradually to Jordan in 1975–7.[145]

Whatever the eventual fate of the fugitive patrols or clandestine organization, the general rise of Fateh activity in the occupied territories boosted Wazir's standing within Fateh. His intimate knowledge of local political and social forces made him a crucial ally in Arafat's drive to extend PLO influence in the West Bank and Gaza. He also strengthened his position by masterminding the few suicide missions conducted by Fateh in this period. These were conducted by the Special Service (*al-Khidma al-Khassa*), an arm of the Security and Intelligence Apparatus that was set up by former Egyptian intelligence officer Muhammad Najib al-Juwayfil in late 1972 or early 1973.[146] Wazir attached the service to the Western Sector following the death of Najjar and ʿUdwan, and combined it with the famed Abu Hani Group.[147] Additional volunteers, training, and naval transport came from the Abu Yusif al-Najjar Battalion, that was formed in 1973 by merging former intelligence and naval reconnaissance units and the mutinous 302 Sector.[148] Also assisting Wazir was Saʿd Sayil, the dour former Jordanian army officer who now headed Fateh's central operations room in Beirut.

The resurgence of Wazir, long dubbed the 'silent man of Fateh', and his alliance with Sayil alarmed the loose coalition of left-leaning officers and civilian cadres, who regarded Wazir as an archetypal rightist. The leftists were strongest in the Yarmuk Forces, where 2nd Battalion commander Musa al-ʿAmla was a key figure, but they also had sympathizers at the head of three other guerrilla battalions and in the political commissariat. Also associated with the leftist current were two more former Jordanian army officers, Saʿid Maragha (Fateh commander in south Lebanon) and Muhammad Badr (Qastal Forces commander). Most influential was Fateh central committee member Nimr Salih. Salih believed that a new regional balance of power had resulted from the October 1973 war, in which growing Soviet influence played a major role. As he saw it, 'the battle of the crossing [of the Suez Canal] was won by Arab soldiers on Soviet tanks'.[149] Closer PLO ties with the USSR seemed to confirm Salih's

outlook and suggested that his position in Fateh would be secure. By 1974, indeed, he believed that he and his leftist allies controlled the military wing of Fateh.

Salih may have exaggerated his influence, but not without justification. His support for the new direction in PLO policy and the 'national authority' slogan was crucial to Arafat, who relied on him to help contain dissent within Fateh. This was revealed on at least one occasion in late 1973, when Salih instructed Maragha to dispatch guerrilla detachments to Beirut in order to prevent Fateh dissenters from holding a public rally to protest PLO policy.[150] Leftist utility to Arafat was demonstrated by his decision to appoint the secretary of the Fateh revolutionary council, Majid Abu-Sharar, as director of the PLO unified information department in order to ensure media support for the new political direction. Ahmad ʿAbd-al-Rahman, a former communist who had formed a leftist network (known by his own code name 'Radwan') within Fateh in the early 1970s, now became editor-in-chief of the PLO weekly *Filastin al-Thawra*. Other important media posts were similarly given to leftists—the PLO news agency, WAFA, was headed by Ziyad ʿAbd-al-Fattah, and its radio station by al-Tayyib ʿAbd-al-Rahim.

The leftists were no longer united, however. Much as had happened in the Palestinian national movement as a whole, Fateh was deeply divided by the debate over whether or not to attend a peace conference and to establish a national authority in the occupied territories. The leftists were similarly divided by 1974. On one side stood the so-called 'Soviet group' headed by Salih and Abu-Sharar and backed by key officers such as Maragha, while on the other assembled a disparate collection of civilian cadres. The first faction supported the pragmatic trend and argued for a strategic alliance with the USSR, while the second, perhaps best described as leftist-nationalist, generally opposed the 'phased' political programme of the PLO and looked to China or Vietnam for its model. Opinions also varied on whether to form a separate Marxist-Leninist organization, a progressive bloc within Fateh pressing for a strategic alliance with the USSR, or reform Fateh as a disciplined, 'iron' organization working to democratic centralism rather than individual and clan-based cliques and factions. Pan-Arabism remained an influence for some, who framed their thinking in terms of the search for the party that could lead the wider, Arab 'national democratic revolution' and mobilize people's war against Israel.[151] However, the crucial point of internal division on the Left, as a militant leftist-nationalist ideologue later noted, was the 'gamble by progressive and leftist figures in Fateh on the possibility of [concluding] a nationalist [peace] settlement with Soviet support'.[152]

The result was the emergence of several leftist factions with distinct ideological outlook and divergent political agendas. The 'Soviet group' was the most established in the military and media apparatus, but a militant wing now coalesced around a small group of civilian cadres. The latter had concluded by 1973, if not earlier, that the Palestinians needed a vanguard revolutionary party,

and planned to build one on the basis of the parallel network they were building within Fateh. A leading figure in the 'Vietnamese line' (as it was later dubbed) was the head of the civilian organization and *iqlim* member in Lebanon, Hanna Mikha'il.[153] Others were senior Western Sector cadres Raji Muslih and ʿAbd-al-Rahman Marʿi, Jordan Affairs Bureau head Samih Abu-Kwayk, and officials in the information and external relations departments such as Muhammad Abu-Mayzar, Abu Na'il, and Abu Khalid Husni. Additional support came from leading Fateh members of the General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists, such as Nazih Abu-Nidal and Yahya Yakhlif, and of the General Union of Palestinian Women, such as May Sayigh and Jihan al-Hilu. Abu-Nidal best expressed the strong nationalist ethos of this leftist tendency in an early rebuttal of the DFLP's proposals for a 'national authority' after the October 1973 war, which he declared to be 'either treasonous, if it comes about through a deal with the enemy or as part of an international deal, or else imaginary, because it cannot be achieved in the current phase'.[154]

Some militants did not join this faction, whether for personal reasons or because their Marxist-Leninist inclinations were more heavily influenced by populist Arab nationalism, notable examples being Naji ʿAllush and Muhammad ʿAwda, who were to head Fateh's civilian organization and militia in West Beirut in 1975–6. Many of the militant leftists were former Baʿthists, while the handful of former communists tended more to the 'Soviet group'. Nationalist sentiment moreover mixed with opposition to the paternalistic and eclectic modes of leadership and organization in Fateh. This was exemplified by ʿAllush, who on the one hand derided expectations that Israel could be forced into making political and territorial concessions that were belied by military realities, and on the other bemoaned the failure of the Palestinian guerrilla movement 'to construct a cohesive, solid, and effective organization' and its inability to build internal relations that were not clannish, improvised, and paternalistic. Palestinian forces were an unhappy hybrid of 'backward conventional spirit and lax guerrilla liberalism', while the PLO had been singularly unable to form a viable national front, eliminate factionalism and Arab interference, or erase the structural defects with which it and its constituent groups had been born. The movement remained caught in a strategic dilemma: the spectacular methods of Black September had become part of the problem and deepened confusion and disorientation within the ranks, while the organizational shortcomings of the various guerrilla groups prevented them from responding adequately to the challenges and opportunities posed by the October 1973 war.[155]

The search for a politically correct line also led to the appearance of a so-called Maoist tendency under a former senior JCP cadre and ideologue, Munir Shafiq. Shafiq had been ousted as an editor of *Filastin al-Thwara* because of his outspoken opposition to the new PLO programme in late 1973, and was subsequently relegated to direct the PLO planning centre. The 'Maoist tendency' had few senior figures besides Shafiq, but built up a sizeable following among Fateh

student branches in Lebanon and abroad in the next few years, and attracted senior Western Sector cadres such as Muhammad Bhays and Basim al-Tamimi and the deputy head of the Jordan Affairs Bureau, Saʿd Jaradat.[156] Unlike the other leftist factions, this current maintained good working relations with Wazir and with the many cadres of the local civilian organization who still supported former *iqlim* head Yahya ʿAshur. Its Maoist outlook also attracted like-minded Lebanese activists—most prominently, perhaps, the sizeable group of cadres who had broken away from the LCAO in 1972—which in turn enabled it to develop an appreciable following in the urban neighbourhoods and villages from which they came, and later gave rise to such Lebanese factions as the 'Patriotic Committees', the 'Movement of Arab Lebanon', and a student and youth group that was eventually to merge into the Islamic Unification Movement in Tripoli.

In virtually every case, the leading leftists were cadres who had arrived in Lebanon after the final defeat in Jordan in July 1971 and were all salaried personnel. Indeed their social and career profile differed little from those they considered their political and ideological rivals, but it distinguished them from the bulk of the local civilian organization, who drew from the Palestinian refugee community that had arrived in 1948. The PLO's 'phased' political programme alarmed local Palestinians, who concluded that a negotiated peace might recover the West Bank and Gaza but would leave refugees from the areas incorporated into Israel in 1948 in exile. For this reason, the 'Soviet group' found relatively little support among the local rank-and-file, who moreover remembered bitterly the role that Salih had played in repressing the *iqlim* in 1972. When local members veered to the left, as a number did, they looked to one of the militant nationalist wings instead.

ʿAllush and Shafiq, who wrote prolifically and spoke regularly in public, were particularly effective at disseminating their views to this and similar audiences, although the former lacked an effective institutional base or informal organizational vehicle and proved unable to construct a significant faction. Besides, Shafiq's 'correct line', as the faction dubbed itself, alienated ʿAllush and other former allies, such as militant officer ʿAmla, by adopting a positive view of the inter-Arab solidarity that was generated by the recent war and by advocating 'national front' policies in general. Yet it, too, remained hostile to a military truce and to negotiation with Israel, and consequently to such instruments of Middle East diplomacy as UNSCR 242.[157] Shafiq objected in particular that the new focus on restoring the territories occupied in 1967 made this, rather than the loss of Palestine in 1948, the primary cause of conflict and in this manner 'transformed the aims of the minimal [Palestinian] program into the aims of a maximal program'.[158]

Fateh had always been a national front of sorts, and factionalism was a natural, if unwelcome, pattern. Indeed, Arafat not only tolerated the fragmentation of the civilian organization and the emergence of fiefdoms within the formal institutions of Fateh and the PLO, but actively encouraged them in

order to disperse opposition, both actual and potential. The increased influx of Arab funds after October 1973 enabled him and the Fateh leadership generally to dispense patronage on a widening scale and to reinforce control through the construction of clientilist interests. Yet Arafat was alert to threats from the military in particular, and pursued the *tajyish* campaign of 1971–2 with further steps to eliminate centres of dissent in the guerrilla forces. The mutinous 302 Sector had been disbanded and its junior officers scattered among other units in October 1972, and in 1973 officers of the Golan Battalion were similarly transferred to the under-strength Galilee Battalion and to the Martyrs of September Battalion, which was brought back into existence at the end of the year. The Golan Battalion was also a source of officers for the central militia command that Fateh formed in the wake of the clashes with the Lebanese army in May. Central Sector commander Jawad Abu-al-Shaʿr was also reassigned, to head the militia.

Arafat tightened his grip further in 1974 by bringing a growing number of units under the direct command of the central operations room, now headed by Sayil, who kept loyally clear of factional politics. The central operations room compensated for the distance of the Fateh general command, which remained in Damascus, but also reduced it to the functions of a rear administrative office. By the same token, the marginalization of the general command limited the military authority of Wazir and Salih and placed more in Arafat's hands. Among the units attached to the central operations room since 1972 were the 1st Artillery Battalion, Special Unit, Force 14 (air), and Naval Unit, as well as the various support services. In 1974 the newly established Air Defence Battalion was added to the list, as were the PASC military police and the short-lived Martyr Nimr al-Hajjaj Unit, an internal military police unit formed with the purpose of ensuring obedience in guerrilla units during the bitter debate about the new PLO political programme.[159] The latter unit was nominally attached to Fateh military intelligence, another recent creation that was headed by Arafat's associate ʿAttallah ʿAttallah. Arafat's personal bodyguard was also expanded under the command of ʿAli Hasan Salama, the former intelligence officer who had inspired the Black September Organization in 1971.

There was considerable reason for Arafat to be concerned at internal challenges. Growing Arab intervention threatened both his tenuous control over Fateh and Fateh's equally contentious control over the PLO. Having supported the formation of the rejectionist front in 1973–4, Iraq mounted a more direct challenge through the Fateh representative in Baghdad, Sabri al-Banna. Banna, best known by his code name Abu Nidal, had developed close ties to Iraqi intelligence since 1971. He also doubled as head of the PLO office in Baghdad, and in this capacity joined the rejectionist guerrilla groups to form a 'political committee for Palestinians in Iraq' in early 1974. The PLO executive committee refused to recognize this body, which had announced the expulsion of the DFLP from its ranks and vehemently denounced the 'deviation' of the PLO leadership under Arafat. Banna now seized Fateh facilities in Iraq: training

camp, farms, supply depots, and an industrial workshop producing light combat equipment.[160] The Iraqi authorities also gave him a large shipment of Chinese infantry weapons that they had confiscated from Fateh in 1971, and allowed him to set up office under the name of Fateh-Revolutionary Council and to publish a parallel magazine called *Filastin al-Thawra.*

The militant ethos expressed by Banna struck a chord among some in the Fateh rank-and-file, although his decision to split the ranks formally and his obvious collusion with the Iraqi authorities denied him the resonance achieved by the Black September Organization several years earlier. He maintained covert links with former acquaintances from the civilian organization and intelligence apparatus in Jordan in 1968–70, among them Abu-Kwayk, ʿAllush, Qadri, Bhays, and Jaradat. Even Khalaf, something of an 'establishment leftist', discreetly kept channels of contact open. Fearing further defections, Arafat had ʿAllush briefly detained in August 1974; on 12 September Muhammad ʿAbd-al-Ghafur, another renegade and associate of Banna who was responsible for several terrorist outrages in Europe, was gunned down in Beirut on Arafat's orders. Banna sent gunmen to Damascus to assassinate central committee member Mahmud ʿAbbas in revenge, but they were arrested and the central committee sentenced Banna to death *in absentia.*[161] A statement purporting to come from 'The Free Officers in Fateh' was published in the PFLP weekly in December, but by now the leadership was in firm control.[162]

Fateh central committee member Khalaf was uneasy with the turn of events. As head of the PLO unified intelligence apparatus, he maintained connections with a variety of political groups, both friendly and hostile, among them those headed by Banna and ʿAbd-al-Ghafur. The polarization of opinion within Fateh was also eroding the middle ground, making it difficult for Khalaf to promote his leadership stature without taking sides. His solution was to adopt a position of critical loyalty to the mainstream, balancing his support for the pragmatic trend in PLO policy with the discourse of a committed revolutionary nationalist and opponent of improper organizational procedure and corrupt practice. At the same time, he turned the unified intelligence apparatus into a personal power base, and bargained with Arafat to appoint his supporters to leading posts in the influential General Union of Palestine Students.

Possibly because he hoped to attain incontrovertible status, Khalaf planned a dramatic act of terror: the assassination of king Husayn during the Arab summit conference in Rabat. There were added reasons for this: Jordanian intelligence chief Muhammad Rasul al-Kaylani had secretly visited Beirut in mid-1974, and the PLO suspected him of instigating the Lebanese government to crack down on it.[163] The king aroused more serious concern by persuading Egyptian president Sadat to qualify his recognition of the PLO as *sole* legitimate representative of the Palestinians. A joint statement issued by the two leaders in July explicitly excluded 'those Palestinians residing in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan'

from the PLO's representative status.[164] Unknown to his colleagues in the Fateh central committee, Khalaf sent an assassination team to Rabat in late October to deliver the response.[165] The exposure of the plot by Moroccan security severely embarrassed Fateh, but the unrepentant Khalaf was to boast for many years after that it was his threat that had secured unequivocal Arab, and Jordanian, recognition of the PLO.[166]

Military Jockeying for Diplomatic Position

Khalaf's assassination plot was not the only attempt to use military means for diplomatic advantage. Israel had steadily increased its military pressure since the massive air raids of April and May, directing air and artillery strikes against guerrilla bases and, in up to 80 per cent of all instances, Lebanese villages and Palestinian refugee camps.[167] The PLO had renewed its pledge to the Lebanese government to cease cross-border attacks in April following a small spate of incidents, and in July military department head Muhsin reconfirmed that the PLO had resolved to move guerrilla operations into 'the depth' of Israel and the occupied territories.[168] There were fewer than a dozen guerrilla attacks in south Lebanon during 1974 in fact, but Israel reacted to the diplomatic gains made by the PLO with a sharp military escalation in November and December. In mid-January 1975, the IDF also mounted a week-long demonstrative ground operation in the ʿArqub, while the various guerrilla groups responded with a total of 40 attacks between February and June.[169]

It was against the backdrop of intensifying violence in Lebanon that US secretary of state Kissinger planned a return visit to the Middle East to negotiate the second Israeli–Egyptian military disengagement agreement. To demonstrate once again PLO presence and the futility of excluding it from the peace process, a team of eight Fateh guerrillas seized a waterfront hotel in Tel Aviv on the night of 5 March, just as Kissinger was due to arrive in Israel.[170] Seven guerrillas died in the IDF rescue operation, that also cost 20 Israeli casualties, among them general Uri Ya'eri, who was killed.[171] As far as Fateh was concerned, the raid had achieved its demonstrative purpose; it later announced that a 'fugitive patrol' had fired rockets at the Israeli Knesset on 4 May, while the DFLP announced three attempts to mount guerrilla attacks across the Jordan River in the same period. Fateh regarded Kissinger's inability to secure an Israeli–Egyptian agreement in March and the delay of his next trip to the region until August as a direct result of its military demonstrations.

Whatever the real impact of the Fateh raid on Tel Aviv, it helped to improve PLO–Syrian relations. Both sides felt excluded by US diplomacy, and on 24 March announced the establishment of a unified military and political command. This had little practical consequence in fact, and the PFLP described the command as a mere subterfuge designed to disguise PLO involvement in the peace process and to pave the way for reconciliation with Jordan.[172] To defeat

the perceived threat, the PFLP and other rejectionist groups increased guerrilla attacks from south Lebanon in the following months, to which Israel responded actively. Long before then, at the beginning of the year, the PLO had come to the conclusion that 'Israeli attacks aim at diverting attention from a larger operation to be carried out inside Lebanon'.[173] The escalation of Israeli military activity after March seemed to point in this direction, especially as it coincided with the opening shots of the Lebanese civil war.

14

The Lebanese Crisis

The spiral of violence in the south in 1974 pushed Lebanon inexorably towards civil war. Official statistics showed that Israel had launched 1,437 fire attacks and 55 air raids during the year, killing 167 civilians and wounding another 412, besides military casualties.[1] The mounting strain on relations between the PLO and the Lebanese government became evident in July 1974, when the latter resisted an offer from the council of Arab defence ministers to provide protection against Israeli air raids such as the attack that had obliterated much of the Nabatiyya refugee camp in May.[2] In August the joint defence command of the League of Arab States gave the PLO a grant of 30 million Lebanese lira to build air raid shelters, but the government again opposed any fortification work in the camps.[3] The authorities compelled the head of the PLO engineering department, Muhammad al-Shaʿir, to leave the country in September, but finally relented under Syrian pressure and allowed 100 Syrian soldiers equipped with portable SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles to deploy in the camps.[4]

The vicious circle of guerrilla attacks and Israeli reprisals heightened communal tensions within Lebanese society and deepened its political polarization since the clashes of May 1973. At that time, a statement issued by the influential Sunni Muslim Maqasid Society protested sectarian discrimination in the army and government bureaucracy and contrasted the excessive power of the Maronite presidency with the limited authority of the Sunni premiership, concluding that the state did not represent the country.[5] Lebanese Muslims took heart from the partial Arab military successes against Israel in October and the demonstration of Arab economic and diplomatic power. Former prime minister Rashid Karami reflected their growing self-confidence by declaring his intention to challenge the Maronite monopoly and stand at the next presidential election.

The Maronite establishment, too, saw the May clashes as a turning point. President Franjiyya privately advised the leaders of the Maronite-dominated rightist parties 'not to rely on the army after today, but on yourselves'.[6] Muslim assertiveness only increased the unease with which the Maronite camp viewed the emerging Palestinian state-within-the-state. Speaking in September 1973, Phalanges Party leader Pierre Jmayyil echoed the common view that 'the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and Lebanon's relationship with the [PLO] . . . are the foremost problem at present. It is

why the issue of [power-sharing] is being raised, and why there is disagreement about the identity, role, and [spiritual] message of Lebanon'. He described the guerrilla presence as 'a blatant transgression against Lebanese sovereignty', and warned that, if the identity and existence of the country were threatened, his party would 'transform Lebanon into . . . scorched earth'.[7]

The October war and the prospect that the PLO would acquire a limited territorial base in the West Bank and Gaza intensified Maronite fear that the Palestinian refugee community, conservatively estimated at 300,000, would be permanently resettled in Lebanon. Jmayyil expressed this outlook starkly to the annual party conference on 27 September 1974, saying 'some consider me to be an extremist, and place me in the same category as the [Palestinian] rejection front! This is because I do not believe in any solution to the Palestine problem other than a solution that returns the son of the Galilee to the Galilee, the son of Haifa to Haifa, and the son of Jerusalem to Jerusalem.' He commended the PLO for 'refraining absolutely for some time from interfering in any disputes among the Lebanese', but reflected Maronite unhappiness with the parallel power it exercised, observing that 'this revolution is a revolution against us in particular, rather than a revolution against injustice and dispersal and Israel'.[8]

Jmayyil's statements came against a backdrop of looming political violence. In April Shi'ite Muslim leader imam Musa al-Sadr had mounted a remarkable demonstration of his community's growing number and organization with two massive rallies in Hermel and Tyre that each attracted 80,000–100,000 people, of whom 10,000–15,000 were armed. Sadr called for political reform, and pressed the government to arm the inhabitants of the south and confront Israel.[9] Maronite–Palestinian tensions also spilled over on 28–29 July, as a firefight between drug smugglers degenerated into heavy clashes between rightist militiamen and the Tal al-Za'tar refugee camp. Government agents were suspected of killing several opposition activists in the northern 'Akkar region in August, and three persons died at the end of September when villagers tried to prevent the Phalanges Party from opening an office in Tarshish. Two leftist cabinet ministers resigned in protest when the ministry of interior attempted, unsuccessfully, to suspend publication of four national newspapers in the same month.

Continued violence in the south deepened the Lebanese political divide. The opposition parties demonstrated their growing strength when a leftist candidate defeated the traditionalist incumbent in a parliamentary by-election in the major southern town of Nabatiyya in December. Escalating Israeli reprisals prompted a complaint at the end of the month from Jmayyil, that Israel 'will always hit back even more violently' in response to Palestinian attacks, and that 'the retaliation will always be in Lebanon'. He called for a complete halt to guerrilla activity, arguing that 'the war of attrition will be principally in south Lebanon and in the Palestinian [refugee] camps that

encircle Beirut and the other Lebanese cities'. Warning that the price was too high for Lebanon to pay, he asked rhetorically: 'should [the south] come under [Israeli] occupation too?' His grim conclusion was that 'the battle should be a comprehensive Arab one, or it should not be at all'.[10] Yet on the other side, southern villagers mounted large demonstrations in January 1975 to protest government neglect and demand protection by the army from Israeli attack.

Faced with this situation, the Lebanese army had issued secret instructions to the commanders of its various military regions in September 1974 to prepare contingency plans for the restoration of government control in the capital and the removal of heavy weapons from the Palestinian refugee camps.[11] Concern at the potential for conflict was also growing within the PLO mainstream, which feared that any regional diplomacy that excluded the Palestinians would ultimately lead to a major outbreak of violence in Lebanon.[12] Its anxiety increased in December, when the Lebanese government turned down Libyan offers to provide air defence units or finance the purchase of anti-aircraft missile systems by Lebanon to deter Israeli air attack.[13] The PLO now decided to implement the Arab proposal of August for the construction of shelters in the refugee camps unilaterally. A 'higher fortifications committee' headed by executive committee member ʿAbd-al-Jawad Salih started work in the southernmost Rashidiyya camp in January 1975 and extended to the camps in the Beirut area in February.[14]

A ground operation by the IDF against the border village of Kfar Shuba on 11 January contributed to the political tension. The local Fateh garrison withstood repeated Israeli probes over the next week, during which Kfar Shuba became a rallying point for guerrilla and militia units throughout the country and for the Lebanese opposition, which mobilized hundreds of volunteers to take part in the battle and later to help the villagers repair their homes. The appeal of the PLO and opposition parties to large sectors of the Lebanese population left a deep impression on the Maronite camp. Sectarian mobilization proceeded apace, and reached a critical stage following an incident on 26 February in which Lebanese soldiers shot and fatally wounded Maʿruf Saʿd, a former Sunni member of parliament for Sidon and a veteran opposition leader. Saʿd was at the head of a large demonstration of fishermen and local citizens protesting the decision by Franjiyya to grant a company owned by former president Camille Shamʿun a 90-day fishing monopoly in the high season. Armed residents drove the army out of the old city, aided by Palestinians from the nearby ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp. The Maronite camp attracted 35,000 people to a rally in support of the army in east Beirut, while 150,000 mourners attended Saʿd's funeral and an opposition counter-rally in Sidon on 6 March. Shiʿite leader Sadr urged the army to stay out of politics, while Karami later accused 'official circles' of assisting the rightist parties to smuggle illegal weapons into the country.

Between Persuasion and Coercion

It was against this background that the opening shots of the civil war were fired. On 13 April unidentified gunmen in a speeding car shot at a church in the Beirut suburb of ʿAyn al-Rummana where phalangist leader Jmayyil was attending Sunday service, killing at least one person. In revenge, phalangist militiamen ambushed a bus carrying Palestinians from the Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp on their way home from a rally in the capital, killing 26 passengers and wounding 29, all unarmed supporters of the ALF. The massacre provoked a wave of condemnation in Lebanon and the Arab states. PLO and Lebanese opposition militiamen went on the rampage, firing at Phalanges Party offices and dynamiting Maronite-owned businesses in Beirut. Jmayyil regretted the violence, but argued that the Lebanese state had abdicated its responsibility and sovereignty and allowed 'statelets and armies', implicitly those of the PLO and its allies, to mushroom in the country.[15] A day later, on 15 April, the various Palestinian guerrilla groups joined Lebanese opposition parties of every hue in a formal call for the 'isolation' of the Phalanges Party; this meant exclusion of its ministers from government, formal dissolution, and the confiscation of its monies and arms.[16]

Arafat was reluctant to endorse the call to isolate the Phalanges Party, but was compelled to do so under overwhelming pressure from his partners in the PLO and Lebanese opposition, and even from within Fateh. He and his closest colleagues realized that this represented an unprecedented degree of PLO intrusion in Lebanese affairs and would alienate Maronite official and public opinion, perhaps irretrievably. They were alert to the danger that the situation could deteriorate into generalized civil strife, that might jeopardize the diplomatic strategy they had pursued since the October 1973 war. Participation in the Middle East peace process on equal footing with the Arab states and Israel required a 'power equalizer', or at least the perception of relative power, which could best be provided by retention of the PLO base in Lebanon.[17]

Positionality was a critical element in PLO thinking, therefore, and shaped its behaviour in the ensuing conflict. This was especially true because the PLO was convinced that Kissinger sought to exclude it from the Middle East peace process (in favour of Jordan), and that the US was instigating civil conflict in Lebanon to that end. The CIA was accused (correctly) of helping the Maronite militias to acquire weapons from Mediterranean and European black markets, prompting PLO 'foreign minister' Qaddumi to aver that 'current events in Lebanon are the making of external powers, with which the Phalanges Party cooperates'.[18] Similar views were taken by the rest of the pragmatic wing in the PLO, as both the DFLP and Saʿiqa saw a clear link between phalangist behaviour and Kissinger's mission in the region.[19] The 'Soviet group' in Fateh was especially outspoken, as revolutionary council secretary Abu-Sharar described US step-by-step diplomacy as a deliberate attempt to demolish the PLO's

phased political programme, and warned that Fateh was able to mount further suicide missions against Israel in order to defeat US plans.[20]

Consequently, the strategic objective of the mainstream PLO leadership in the unfolding crisis was to pre-empt any moves, whether by local forces or external ones, to undermine its established position in Lebanon. This meant preservation of the political and military prerogatives it enjoyed by virtue of formal agreement with the authorities or of the various faits accomplis it had created since 1969. The PLO had strong motivation to defend itself, but at the same time concluded that the only way to secure its position was by heading off a wider conflagration. The problem was that its desire to avoid combat and defuse political tensions, which presupposed dialogue with the Maronite adversaries, severely limited the types of pressure it could utilize against them. The result was what might be dubbed a minimalist form of 'coercive diplomacy', consisting of three elements.[21] The PLO insisted on dealing only with the Lebanese authorities (and not with the Phalanges Party), gave general reassurances of non-involvement in Lebanese domestic politics, and defined certain 'red lines' that it would defend resolutely, by force if necessary.

Fateh central committee Khalid al-Hasan best summarized the outlook of the PLO mainstream in this period. He stressed that 'any eruption of violence in Lebanon is against the interests of Lebanon and of the Palestinian revolution . . . at the same time, we must not be silent in the face of any blow directed at our people or our presence in Lebanon. In this context the Palestinian leadership refrains from intervening in Lebanese internal affairs and tries, to the best of its ability and wherever practicable, to help prevent the Lebanese situation from erupting militarily, and then to achieve an understanding with the president of the republic.'[22] He noted the pressing need to end the strife before the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for 1976, but came to two sceptical conclusions: that the rival Lebanese sects would continue to arm themselves, and that Israel, with US backing, would pursue its attacks on Palestinian targets in Lebanon in order to push the guerrilla presence constantly to the centre of the domestic Lebanese debate.[23]

Hasan's prognosis, though not his prescription, was to prove accurate. PLO efforts at conflict resolution were undermined, time and again over the next eight months, by deliberate military escalation on the part of the Maronite camp. Far from reaching a firm understanding with the PLO, as Hasan hoped, Franjiyya secretly authorized the army to assist the Maronite militias with training and covert arms supplies and to provide them with fire support on occasion.[24] There was little hope of success, therefore, for the official PLO–Lebanese liaison committee that was set up on 3 May to observe the ceasefire and conduct joint patrols in areas that had witnessed fighting. Nearly as serious a problem for the Fateh-dominated PLO was its inability to restrain its own partners. The Palestinian guerrilla groups—both the rejectionists and the DFLP and Sa'iqa pragmatists—and the Lebanese opposition parties, now formally grouped in the Lebanese Nationalist Movement (LNM) under the leadership of

Kamal Junblat, were united in their desire to see a 'nationalist' government in Lebanon. For the Palestinian Left especially, the formation of revolutionary fronts and nationalist governments was a necessary condition for the development of the Palestinian struggle wherever it was located, and it saw just such an ally in the LNM, which in reality was a highly heterogeneous coalition led by parties committed to social democratic reforms.[25] This Palestinian–Lebanese alliance was encouraged by Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the USSR, each of which perceived the behaviour of the Maronite camp as a direct extension of US policy in the region.

From the outset, the PLO sought at one and the same time to signal restraint and resolve, in order both to reassure and deter the Maronite camp. It was soon put to the test. Having rallied Maronite opinion against the 'isolation' campaign, the Phalanges Party triggered a government crisis and compelled prime minister Rashid al-Sulh to resign on 15 May.[26] In his last statement to parliament, Sulh blamed the phalangists squarely for instigating the conflict and presented a list of conditions for national reconciliation: fundamental reform of the political system, review of the basic law governing army composition and command, revision of the nationality and immigration law, and support for the Palestinian guerrilla movement. The phalangists were buoyed by their success, however, and declared that they would pursue their 'revolution' to the end. Rightist gunmen subjected the Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp, situated in a suburb of Maronite-controlled east Beirut, to sniper fire and random shelling.[27] Jmayyil raised the stakes by suggesting that the camp be relocated entirely, because it 'threatens Lebanese areas'.[28] This was a direct challenge, and Arafat warned publicly that the PLO would be compelled to respond if attacks did not stop.[29] Fateh privately offered to purchase the land on which the camp stood from its owners, the Order of Maronite Monks, but was refused.[30]

The crisis took a dramatic turn on 23 May, when Franjiyya formed a military government. The new minister of interior, general Saʿid Nasrallah, was quick to reassure the PLO that Lebanon would protect 'the struggle of the Palestinian people and its admirable revolution' and would continue to observe existing accords.[31] The minister of information, general Musa Kanʿan, confirmed that this meant the 1969 Cairo agreement and 1973 Melkart protocol.[32] Despite these reassurances, the PLO feared that it would be the ultimate target of the Maronite-commanded army. It refrained from making a public response, but took the precaution of convening its military command in Damascus and putting the guerrilla forces on the alert. A storm of protest had erupted in the meantime from the entire spectrum of Muslim politicians and at least one senior Maronite, National Bloc Party leader Raymond Edde, as well as the LNM. The religious heads of the Muslim denominations called on the premier, Sunni Muslim general Nur-al-din al-Rifaʿi, to resign. Syria also relayed its disquiet to Franjiyya, who retreated on 28 May and appointed the veteran Karami to form a new civilian cabinet.

The military government represented the last attempt by the Lebanese state to take control of the crisis. Franjiyya's retreat suggested that the authorities could still be coerced *in extremis* by the combination of domestic, Syrian, and PLO pressure, but it also underlined the ability of the Maronite parties outside government to destabilize the status quo and escalate politically and militarily. This prompted the PLO to moderate its coercive diplomacy in a key respect: Arafat secretly broke the boycott of the Phalanges Party by sending the head of his bodyguard, ʿAli Hasan Salama, to negotiate terms for ending the crisis with the Maronite leadership in east Beirut. The talks were based on a draft agenda for political reform drawn up by the LNM, and succeeded both in identifying common ground and in narrowing down the areas of disagreement. Nothing was revealed in public, but the phalangists issued a conciliatory statement on 1 June to confirm that recent events had neither sundered Palestinian–Lebanese ties nor activated sectarian and political rifts in the country.[33]

The approach taken by Arafat was dealt a mortal blow, however. His partners in the PLO and LNM were outraged when Salama reported on the secret talks, despite the promising results, and reacted by ordering an unprecedented and indiscriminate mortar and rocket barrage against largely Christian east Beirut. The discovery on 2 June on a southern Lebanese beach of a shipment of light arms, apparently delivered by Israel and destined for the Maronite militias, added fuel to the fire.[34] As the tenuous ceasefire crumbled once again, guerrillas belonging to all PLO groups except Fateh appeared alongside LNM militiamen in the Beirut area. The rejectionists had already announced the end of 'self-restraint' following the phalangist ambush of 13 April, and were joined by the rest of the Palestinian Left in opposing compromise with the Maronite camp.[35] Clashes resumed in the southern suburbs of al-Shiyyah and ʿAyn al-Rummana and later spread to the Maslakh-Karantina shanty town (inhabited by impoverished Lebanese Muslims, Kurds, Syrian migrant workers, and a few Palestinian refugees) on the northern side of Beirut. Fateh still refused to put its militia and guerrilla forces on alert or issue weapons to the civilian organization, but many members took to the streets anyway. Only after Maronite shells struck the Shatila refugee camp, and following an appeal from Lebanese families whose children had been killed in recent bombardment of Shiyyah, did Arafat finally permit the Fateh militia to assume responsibility for organizing the defence in the suburb and to respond to hostile fire.

This episode showed that PLO coercive diplomacy was arguably that of Fateh alone. Even then, its minimalist, defensive strategy was also under attack by the 'Soviet group' and militant leftists within Fateh itself. Central committee member Salih and other senior officials brandished their solidarity with the LNM at public meetings, and liaised regularly with the Lebanese and Palestinian Left over political and military matters. Salih even instructed Fateh gunners under his command to join in the barrage that the militant guerrilla groups and LNM parties launched against east Beirut in their effort to defeat the secret negotiations conducted by Salama. Abu-Sharar expressed a widely held view

when he stated belligerently, on 12 June, that the PLO 'has two options, confrontation or submission', and that only the former could defeat 'the conspiracy'.[36] Although the standing of the Left within Fateh was contested, its open hostility for the Maronite camp was representative of the rank-and-file as a whole.

Despite the collapse of the secret talks, the mainstream leadership persisted in its attempt to reassure the Maronites. Indeed, PLO diplomacy now contained little that was coercive. On 9 June, for instance, Qaddumi stressed that 'the Palestinian revolution adopts a defensive posture and does not try, under any circumstances, to move to the offensive, because we are committed to the sovereignty of Lebanon and to its security, stability, and national unity'.[37] The PLO also set up a special military tribunal to curb violations of law and order by its own members, especially those involved in sectarian kidnappings, and conducted a few executions in September.[38] Arafat next approached the Maronite camp directly, meeting in mid-June with the heads of the Order of Maronite Monks and with Camille Sham'un, former president and head of the National Liberals Party, who was now minister of interior in the Karami cabinet. The PLO chairman, Franjiyya, and political and military officials from both sides met on 23 June, and agreed to expand existing joint patrols and to empower them to suppress any source of fire by force.[39]

Arafat crowned his diplomacy with a major policy statement on 25 June. This reiterated neutrality in internal Lebanese affairs and confirmed that the basis of bilateral relations was 'Palestinian respect for Lebanese sovereignty, and recognition by Lebanon of the right of the [Palestinian] revolution to maintain its presence on its soil in the context of adherence, in both letter and spirit, to existing agreements'. 'Despite everything that has happened', Arafat added, 'we can only suppress our pain, bear our wounds, and bypass events, leaving it to the justice of the [courts] or to the judgment of history as to who caused the tragedy and unleashed the mad violence.' Obviously hoping to reassure the Maronites, Arafat stressed that the PLO 'is not a political faction belonging to one [Lebanese] side or the other . . . it is not a party in the internal Lebanese arena . . . it is not a sect or the adjunct of a sect, nor does it wish to be'. To drive the message home and distance himself from the LNM and Palestinian Left, he added that the PLO 'has no opinion on what Lebanon chooses for itself in the way of a governing system and legislation, whether political, social, or economic'.[40]

The Phalanges Party welcomed Arafat's statement, but once again hardliners on both sides escalated. Phalangist militiamen attacked Maslakh-Karantina and received covert support from internal security forces loyal to Sham'un. In response, Arafat authorized Fateh gunners to respond to rightist shelling with light mortar fire if civilian casualties had been incurred, but maintained the ban on more extensive engagement. On the other side, an unknown group calling itself the Revolutionary Socialist Action Organization embarrassed the PLO on 29 June by kidnapping colonel Ernest Morgan, a US officer visiting Beirut.[41]

PLO security quickly revealed that the group responsible was in fact the PPSF, which had handed Morgan to the PF–GC. The PF–GC eventually released him in exchange for a delivery of food and money to the refugee camps on 12 July, by which time a new ceasefire was at last taking precarious hold. This was the result of coercive diplomacy by Syria in preceding weeks, however, rather than the PLO effort.

Syria had reacted with intense hostility to the bus massacre in April. The ruling Baʿth Party was convinced that the timing was directly linked to Kissinger's mission, and its official newspaper described the Phalanges Party as an 'agent of imperialism'.[42] Its anger increased as the Maronite militias targeted Syrian migrant workers in Lebanon, killing 63 and forcing thousands to flee by the end of May.[43] Syria supported the PLO–LNM decision to isolate the Phalanges Party and assisted its Palestinian and Lebanese allies with training and arms, including direct deliveries of Soviet-bloc combat supplies to the DFLP.[44] When Arafat revealed the secret talks with the Maronite camp in late May, Syrian-sponsored Saʿiqa played a major role in the bombardment of east Beirut that defeated his initiative. Yet Syrian escalation gave way to the desire for an early end to the crisis, especially after a statement by Israeli foreign minister Yigal Allon on 3 June confirming the existence of direct contacts with the Maronite camp raised the spectre of growing Israeli involvement.[45]

From this point onwards, the Syrian objective was to coerce the Maronite camp into complying with a lasting ceasefire and accepting a political solution negotiated between the Lebanese state and the PLO, with Syrian mediation. Syrian foreign minister ʿAbd-al-Halim Khaddam and deputy defence minister and airforce chief Naji Jamil had visited Beirut to mediate on several occasions in previous weeks, but by late June Syria saw a need to reinforce its political message with the threat of more direct military intervention. On 22 June two Saʿiqa battalions entered south Lebanon; the 500 guerrillas included Syrian soldiers in Saʿiqa uniform, and fielded an impressive assortment of heavy mortars, multiple-rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, machine-guns, and anti-aircraft cannon.[46] Khaddam returned to Beirut on 29 June, and this time was rewarded with a lasting ceasefire. The gradual transfer of the Saʿiqa force to Beirut during the summer made it the largest PLO or LNM contingent in the capital, and considerably reinforced Syrian leverage. Muhsin explained that Syria's national security was directly affected by events in Lebanon, and it would not wait for an invitation to mediate and contain the conflict.[47] President Asad confirmed this view at the beginning of August, asserting that Syria could not be a mere spectator in the Lebanese crisis and that it was directly concerned with Lebanese defence.[48]

The protagonists in the Lebanese crisis meanwhile prepared for a renewal of the conflict. The Maronite camp now comprised five major militias—the phalangists, National Liberals Party's Tigers, Front of the Guardians of the Cedar, Marada Brigade (affiliated to Franjiyya), and Organization (affiliated to

the Order of Maronite Monks)—while the Muslim-leftist opposition comprised nearly 30 separate groups of varying size and allegiance. A major newcomer was Amal—the Regiments of Lebanese Resistance (*Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniyya*)—intended as the military wing of the Movement of the Disinherited that Shiʿite imam Sadr had formed in spring 1974. Fateh helped Amal with training, arms, and the loan of military personnel and civilian cadres. The appearance of Sadr at a graduation exercise at Fateh's military academy in Syria on 23 June revealed the alliance, while it was the death of a Fateh instructor and 25 Amal members in a training accident that prompted the imam to reveal the existence of Amal on 6 July. The leftist and nationalist parties of the LNM were also growing in confidence, and on 18 August published an ambitious political programme that sought the elimination of the Lebanese confessional system, formation of a constituent assembly to pass basic constitutional and organizational legislation, and sweeping changes in the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of government, the effect of which would be to bring the country in line with Western liberal democracies.[49]

The tense calm in Beirut contrasted sharply with the renewed upsurge of violence in south Lebanon during July and August. The Palestinian rejectionists stepped up cross-border attacks, accounting for many of the 30 incidents in this period, while Fateh attempted to mount several 'special operations' across the Jordanian border and conducted sabotage attacks in the occupied territories, the most damaging being an explosion that killed 13 Israeli civilians and wounded 28 in a west Jerusalem market on 4 July. Israel launched a series of air and artillery strikes and infantry raids against guerrilla bases, villages, and refugee camps in south Lebanon in the same period, both in retaliation and as a means of increasing the pressures on the PLO.

Sinai-II

It was against this background, on 1 September, that Kissinger announced the conclusion of a second military disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. Shortly afterwards, phalangist militiamen attacked the Muslim quarters of al-Karak and al-Muʿallaqa in the mainly Christian town of Zahla in the Biqaʿ Valley, while Franjiyya's followers started a new battlefront in and around Tripoli, capital of the north and home of prime minister Karami. The Lebanese army stood aloof, deploying a buffer force only when clansmen and opposition militiamen in the ʿAkkar region attacked Maronite villages in retaliation for the massacre on 7 September of a busload of Muslim civilians by the Marada Brigade. Franjiyya replaced army commander Ghanim with the more neutral Hanna Saʿid to placate Karami, but this did nothing to impede the Maronite militias from extending the battle to the heart of Beirut in mid-month. Masked rightist gunmen asserted control over much of the commercial centre and seafront hotel district, and appeared around the government radio station and

central bank in the Qantari neighbourhood. As seriously, Maronite militiamen in Damur and Dayr al-Naʿma repeatedly blocked the coastal road south of Beirut, which was the main artery connecting the capital (and PLO headquarters) to south Lebanon.

The renewal of fighting in Lebanon, hard on the heels of the 'Sinai-II' disengagement agreement, caused Syria and the PLO grave concern. The Syrian government activated the 'higher committee' it had formed with Jordan in June and sought a reconciliation with its bitter rival in Baghdad. Its effort to form an 'eastern front' against Israel made no headway in the event, but Asad was more successful during an arms shopping trip in Moscow on 9–10 October. The PLO, for its part, was outraged to learn on 11 September that Kissinger had made a written pledge to Israeli prime minister Rabin not to recognize the PLO, negotiate with it, or allow it to attend peace talks unless it met conditions acceptable to Israel.[50] Yet its response diverged significantly from that of Syria. The diplomatic strategy of Arafat and his closest colleagues was based on maintaining good working relations with Egypt, in the hope of conducting an indirect dialogue with the US, whereas Syria now strove for a Syrian-led alliance with the PLO and Jordan in order to confront Egypt and resist US policy.[51]

Outwardly, Syria and the PLO remained firm allies. The PLO echoed Syrian accusations that Sadat was extending political support to the Maronite camp, and was allowed to set up a new radio station in Syria when Sadat retaliated by suspending its programme on Cairo radio.[52] Privately, the PLO was deeply unhappy with Syrian insistence on the tripartite alliance with Jordan, which, it suspected, was a prelude to replacing it once negotiations for the occupied territories started. Kissinger's pledge to Israel not to invite the PLO to the Geneva peace conference (if convened) or permit its attendance without prior consultation with Israel seemed to confirm Palestinian suspicions. Its misgivings deepened on 25 September, when *al-Baʿth* published a statement by the Syrian-controlled PLA command calling for 'coordination between the Palestinian, Syrian, and Jordanian confrontation forces' and for Palestinian–Jordanian dialogue.[53] The national command of the ruling Baʿth Party reiterated the same position on 6 October, urging 'the confrontation forces [including Jordan] and the PLO to move beyond their differences and create a new formula of unity or of a front'.[54]

Syria and the PLO remained equally convinced of the imperative need to contain the Lebanese crisis, but the underlying divergence of their diplomatic strategies led to subtle differences in means and objectives in Lebanon, although this was not immediately apparent. The Maronite camp aroused severe Syrian alarm in mid-September by proposing 'internationalization' (*tadwil*) of the crisis: mediation by the UN Security Council or a Western power such as France. This challenged the special status that Syria claimed in Lebanese security affairs, and prompted a new mediation effort by Khaddam and chief-of-staff Hikmat al-Shihabi in Beirut towards the end of the month. Their effort was

rewarded with another ceasefire agreement and the formation of a Lebanese 'committee for national dialogue', to which the Phalanges Party was invited, effectively ending the five-month boycott of the party. The initiative foundered amidst renewed fighting, however, prompting calls from LNM leader Junblat and 'traditional' leaders such as the Maronite Edde and Sunni Sa'ib Salam for the resignation of Franjiyya.

Arafat had launched his own mediation effort in parallel, seeking to revive the dialogue with the Maronite camp by meeting Sham'un in mid-September. Yet Maronite opinion was difficult to sway, as shown by a conference of political and religious leaders on 24 September, at which the debate centred on whether to abrogate the 1969 Cairo agreement altogether or merely to compel the PLO to relinquish the gains it had made since May 1973.[55] Undeterred, Arafat applauded the formation of the committee for national dialogue, with phalangist participation, to the annoyance of his partners in the PLO and LNM.[56] He also persuaded the LNM to accept a new ceasefire after a week of renewed fighting in early October, and then addressed Maronite fears directly on 12 October by insisting that there would be no permanent resettlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.[57] Franjiyya and Jmayyil met the statement with open approval, the latter going so far as to voice support for the Palestinian presence in Lebanon and for the Cairo agreement, so long as relations were properly regulated.[58]

However, PLO diplomacy was accompanied by more active military involvement. In mid-September, Arafat instructed a detachment of PASC military police to help monitor the ceasefire in Tripoli at the request of prime minister Karami, and deployed Fateh personnel to undertake defensive and peacekeeping duties at other main flashpoints.[59] Fateh militia units were expanded and issued with light arms, guerrilla officers were assigned to lead them, and a new command structure was established in Beirut with logistic, communications, and security sections.[60] Arafat next approved a contribution of PLO personnel to form a joint peacekeeping force to police the truce in Beirut in early October, and made the first major commitment of Fateh forces by ordering a company of guerrillas from the ʿArqub to the Baddawi refugee camp in the north. This was in response to a request from Karami for a Palestinian peacekeeping force in Tripoli, and Fateh later brought up a second company, followed by the whole of its Golan and 1st Battalions. According to Fateh reports, army troops who tried to stop the first unit on 8 October were brushed aside with 50–60 casualties and the loss of a dozen vehicles.[61]

Increased military involvement reflected the PLO perception that Franjiyya and the Lebanese army command were abandoning even the appearance of neutrality, and served as a deterrent signal. At the same time, it revealed a shift in mainstream Palestinian attitudes towards the crisis. The fact that Karami had asked the PLO, not the army, to undertake peacekeeping duties in Tripoli exposed the fragmentation of the higher echelons of the state and offered the PLO the chance to act as mediator and key power broker in Lebanon. By

holding the balance it could assure its presence and status in the country, and by the same token enhance its regional stature, diplomatic strategy, and autonomy from Syrian influence. It was this political purpose, rather than military calculations, that prompted Arafat, Wazir, and their allies in the Fateh central committee to provide material assistance to various Lebanese militias. Assistance covered the full range, from the LCP, LCAO, and Trotskyite Workers' Leagues on the Left, through the Baʿthist Popular Committees, to the Islamist Jundullah (Soldiers of God). Their closest allies were among the Sunnis of the coastal cities, such as the Independent Nasirites Movement-al-Murabitun, Popular Nasirite Organization, 24th of October Movement, and the three factions of the Arab Socialist Union. It was to extend such ties that Fateh also formed the National Assembly Forces at the end of October, a grand title for what was a motley collection of militarily useless clientilist networks headed by local 'bosses' in Sunni Muslim neighbourhoods of the capital, such as the Salah-al-Din Movement, Arab Regiments, Sharhabil Regiments, and Tariq Bin Ziyad Regiments.[62]

The PLO strategy faced daunting challenges from militants on both sides. For the hardliners in the Phalanges Party, the aim was 'to expel the aliens. Out with the Palestinians who sold their land and came here to pollute our soil. The fighting must not cease so long as there are Palestinians on our land.'[63] In mid-October they renewed attacks on the besieged Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp, perpetrated a new wave of sectarian killings, and forayed into West Beirut. While the PLO sought to restore the truce, the LNM and rejectionist guerrilla groups mounted an offensive on 24 October that swept the phalangists out of the Qantari district in the heart of the capital. The discovery a few days later that the army was assisting the Maronite militias to smuggle armoured vehicles and other arms by sea added to the tension.[64] Racing against time, Arafat resorted to secret diplomacy once more, and Salama met two members of the Phalanges Party politburo and a personal representative of Franjiyya on several occasions in early November.[65] The talks collapsed after their existence was revealed, to the anger of Palestinian rejectionists and militants of the LNM and Maronite camp alike. A subsequent attempt by Salama and Shamʿun to hold talks on 2 December also failed.[66]

The PLO had coordinated its policy moves with Syria so far, only deploying forces to Tripoli after extensive discussions between Arafat and Asad on 7–9 October for example, but the attempt at secret diplomacy revealed differences in approach. Syria was now increasingly worried by the arrival in Beirut of Egyptian, Iraqi, Saudi, and Libyan mediators, while the Kuwaiti, Tunisian, and Algerian ambassadors conducted additional contacts. Syrian ambivalence towards 'Arabization' (*taʿrib*) of conflict resolution turned to alarm when the League of Arab States called for a special meeting of foreign ministers in mid-October to discuss the Lebanese crisis, at Egyptian request. Determined to deny Sadat a role, Syria boycotted the meeting and prevailed upon the PLO to follow suit. The dispatch of special envoys from the Vatican and France to Lebanon in

early November, following what Syria saw as deliberate escalation of the fighting by the Maronite militias in conjunction with internal security forces loyal to Shamʿun, was equally alarming.[67] Muhsin pointedly reminded the Maronite camp that Syria had not intervened so far because the PLO possessed sufficient force for self-defence, but that it was committed by formal pact to defend the PLO if necessary. At the same time, Syrian consultations with Lebanese officials and political leaders redoubled in an attempt to broker a lasting resolution of the conflict.

Some rejectionists were now openly critical of Syrian policy, but Fateh in particular feared that a Syrian–Maronite reconciliation would lead to the imposition of a *pax Syriana* in Lebanon and curtail its autonomy. Its officials spoke increasingly of the 'independence' of Palestinian political will and decision-making and hinted privately at Syrian plans to assert hegemony over the PLO. Counter-rumour suggested that Syria intended to replace Arafat with Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin as chairman of the PLO.[68] At issue were the discreet dialogue that Arafat maintained with Egypt and his continued disagreement with Asad, during further meetings on 17 October and 14 November, over the tripartite axis with Jordan. Syrian suspicion that Fateh sought a role for the PLO in the US-sponsored peace process was now echoed across the guerrilla movement. PF–GC secretary-general Jibril warned that the US and Israel intended to 'drain' the PLO and 'drag' it into a political settlement, and then exclude it, and various groups renewed guerrilla attacks against Israel from south Lebanon.[69] The PFLP and DFLP also found themselves on the same side of the fence as they intensified demands for implementation of overdue reforms in the PLO, 'purification' of its departments, assertion of collective decision-making, and an end to autocratic leadership.[70]

The Lebanese crisis was rapidly approaching the point of no return. Syria had come to the conclusion that a durable solution depended on engineering a new distribution of power among the Lebanese sects. This was a far cry from recent statements by Muhsin that the Lebanese political system was archaic and that sectarianism needed to be abolished, a shift noted with particular disfavour by the LNM, which held firmly to its programme for secularization and democratic reform.[71] The evolving Syrian outlook was relayed to Jmayyil, who, in a dramatic gesture, was invited to Damascus on 6 December. His hosts sought three aims: the assurance that Lebanon would not become part of a hostile regional axis, Maronite ackowledgement of the special relationship with Syria, and official Lebanese reconfirmation of the existing accords with the PLO. To achieve a lasting end to the crisis, moreover, they stressed the need to reform the sectarian balance in Lebanon.[72] Jmayyil was already aware of Syrian views, and his presence in Damascus suggested willingness to discuss the commitments and reforms proposed.

Any hope of a breakthrough was immediately shattered, however, as militant phalangists headed by Jmayyil's son Bashir went on the rampage in Beirut on the same day, kidnapping 300 Muslims and killing at least 70 in what was

instantly dubbed 'black Saturday'. The Phalanges Party acknowledged responsibility, blaming 'mutinous' and 'undisciplined' elements within its ranks for 'irresponsible reactions' to the earlier murder of four of Bashir's bodyguards.[73] LNM militiamen and rejectionist guerrillas stormed the main hotel district in revenge two days later, and the phalangists were saved from a rout only by the intervention of the army. Extensive looting took place in the downtown banking district, from which the DFLP and Saʿiqa came away with especially valuable rewards.[74] Black Saturday marked the final slide into civil war. Over the next three weeks, militiamen on both sides occupied police stations and town halls in areas under their control, while a growing number of Maronite and Muslim soldiers deserted army ranks to join their co-religionists. The Maronite militias now conducted systematic 'sectarian cleansing', expelling some 300 Muslim families from Hay al-Ghawarna in north Beirut on 11 December and evicting the Muslim inhabitants of Sibnay, a small southern suburb, five days later.

The Maronite militias were slowly, but surely, forcing the PLO's hand. Towards the end of December they set up roadblocks on the coastal road at Damur, all but cutting off PLO headquarters in Beirut from the main guerrilla forces in south Lebanon. The army, which had a sizeable presence in the area, ominously made no move to reopen the road, despite the risk of abduction and murder facing the thousands of Lebanese Muslims and Palestinian civilians who used it daily. On 3 January 1976 the Maronite militias started a full blockade of food, fuel, and medical supplies to the Tal al-Zaʿtar, Jisr al-Basha, and Dbayya refugee camps and to the Maslakh-Karantina shanty town and the low-income Lebanese Muslim neighbourhood of Nabʿa in east Beirut, affecting some 150,000 people. They also closed one of the alternative routes to south Lebanon at Dayr al-Qamar, Shamʿun's home town. The Lebanese army now deployed at key junctions along the main Beirut–Damascus road, threatening the sole remaining line of communications between west Beirut and the rest of the country.

15

The Struggle for Lebanon

The PLO on the Offensive

The PLO had a simple, urgent objective at the beginning of 1976: to end the siege of the beleaguered pockets in East Beirut and lift the stranglehold on the western half of the capital. Representatives of Tal al-Zaʿtar lobbied Arafat for help on 4 January, and the PLO made a last appeal to the Lebanese authorities, warning that it would have to consider 'all measures' to ensure the delivery of vital supplies to the camp.[1] Two food convoys organized by the UNWRA and the army over the next two days were prevented from reaching Tal al-Zaʿtar by the Maronite militias, but Arafat remained reluctant to use force. This was partly not to give a pretext for escalation to the Maronite leadership, which had reportedly decided on New Year's eve to end 'foreign intervention in Lebanon' and ensure the exodus of 'non-Lebanese forces' from the country.[2] Leaked minutes from their summit meeting revealed that the Maronite militias intended to escalate the fighting in order deliberately to drag the PLO into open combat involvement. The ultimate aim was to compel it to accept modification of the Cairo agreement and Melkart protocol, restrict its presence and activity generally, and relocate the population of the besieged refugee camps away from Maronite-held areas.[3]

The PLO was aware that forceful military action in Lebanon could have costly consequences. Not least would be the diversion of attention and resources from its ongoing campaign to win wider international recognition and gain a role in the peace process. Direct, major intervention against the Maronite camp would also defeat the PLO's objective of portraying itself as an indispensable intermediary and key power broker in the Lebanese political system. There was the added danger that large-scale action by PLO forces in the Beirut area would push Franjiyya to take the side of the Maronite militias openly, and would trigger large-scale intervention by the army. It would then become necessary to commit additional PLO forces to the battle, reducing the guerrilla garrison in south Lebanon and exposing it to potentially heavy casualties. Yet the mainstream leadership was also coming under rejectionist and leftist criticism for adopting 'a defensive military policy that has led to static warfare', and being pressed for decisive action.[4]

The PLO was effectively deprived of choice, and finally resorted to force. On 6 January, Arafat headed a meeting of the PLO's higher military council—

attended by representatives of all the guerrilla groups and the LNM—to consider options. The plan that was hastily drawn up envisaged three distinct operations: a PLO–LNM force would push from West Beirut to Tal al-Zaʿtar; the defenders of Tal al-Zaʿtar and Nabʿa would simultaneously break out to link up with each other and with the outside force; and an elite guerrilla contingent would meanwhile land by sea at Maslakh-Karantina to stiffen its defence and lead a link-up with Nabʿa from the north.[5] The offensive was scheduled to start a few hours later, shortly after midnight. Success would give the Joint Forces (the name under which the PLO and LNM now operated) control of a solid belt of territory completely encircling east Beirut, and put them in a strong position to compel the Maronite camp to accept a binding ceasefire and a lasting settlement. Failing that, they could at least compel it to divert forces to meet the new threat, and so lift the blockade.[6]

Still hoping to signal restraint and avoid total involvement, Arafat withheld Fateh guerrilla units from the capital and limited its combat role to the lightly armed and poorly trained militia in the beleaguered camps. The other partners in the PLO–LNM coalition were left to provide the bulk of the relieving forces (again, mainly militiamen), but each faction jealously insisted on retaining control over its followers and resisted subordination to a single military command. The paradox was that although the planned breakthrough would pose a major threat to the Maronite camp, the Joint Forces assigned to the task were woefully inadequate. The result was predictable. The lack of seaworthy boats prevented the landing at Maslakh-Karantina, and the garrison in Nabʿa failed entirely to act. Only the defenders of Tal al-Zaʿtar kept to plan: some 250 fighters made initial gains, but the disunity and indiscipline of the nine factions involved allowed Maronite counterattacks to wrest back most of the lost ground over the next three days. The major Joint Forces attack from west Beirut had also failed to materialize: it was not launched until 8 January, and then by a mere 300 militiamen belonging to a wide variety of groups, backed by a handful of veteran guerrillas. The intervention of Lebanese infantry and armour to protect the strategic Hazmiyya crossroads alarmed the PLO leadership, which refused to provide reinforcements and ordered a tactical retreat to avoid further contact. The only lasting gains were made in the hotel district.

Having resorted to force, the PLO succeeded only in signalling a lack of political resolve and military capability. As a result, its subsequent attempts to ratchet up the pressure with demonstrative attacks only prompted counter-escalation from the Maronite militias. This was shown when Arafat ordered two new attacks on 11 January: the first targetted Zghurta, home town of Franjiyya, but failed; the second involved the capture of two key bridges connecting east Beirut to the Maronite heartland, but the PLO relinquished them after the Maronite militias blocked delivery of flour and fuel supplies from government depots in their areas to west Beirut.[7] They next pushed the PLO closer to a showdown by attacking the Dbayya refugee camp, well to the north

of Beirut, on 12 January. The Joint Forces riposted with a second abortive attack on Zghurta and the capture of more ground in central Beirut. Arafat had requested a battalion of the PLA ʿAyn Jalut Forces from Egypt, and its arrival at the northern port of Tripoli during the day added to the punitive threat.[8] This proved insufficient to ease the pressure on Dbayya, however, prompting Arafat to order elements of Fateh's Yarmuk Forces to deploy around Zahla during the night.[9]

The combat deployment around Zahla was the first by Fateh main forces, but Maronite pressure on Dbayya continued. On 13 January Fateh moved two more guerrilla battalions from the south into position around the coastal towns of Damur, Saʿdiyyat, and al-Jiyya, while a third battalion deployed above the strategic Khalda crossroads at the southern entrance to Beirut. This demonstration had little impact, as the Maronite militias overran Dbayya during the night of 14 January and expelled its inhabitants to west Beirut. The PLO garrison of 70–80 militiamen and a dozen PASC military policemen had already lost 30 dead and 20 wounded in 12 days of blockade and three days of combat, and lost another 20 dead as it escaped through the wooded valleys.[10] Fateh guerrillas now isolated Jiyya, but paused again in the hope that the Maronite camp would lift the siege of Beirut. As this did not occur, they overran Lebanese positions above Saʿdiyyat and cut the road to Dayr al-Qamar after coming under army fire. Other guerrilla groups and LNM parties now contributed reinforcements to the siege.

The PLO was still trying to signal both resolve and restraint, but major intervention by the army on 16 January pushed matters to confrontation. Lebanese troops occupied the Khalda crossroads and pushed towards Damur, where the garrison of some 600 soldiers and militiamen was being reinforced to a strength of 1,000. The Lebanese air force suddenly appeared in the sky, attacking guerrilla positions and destroying several jeeps, for the loss of one ground attack aircraft. By chance, prime minister Karami, LNM leader Junblat, senior PLO official Tawfiq al-Safadi, and Shiʿite imam Sadr happened to be meeting in the house of Sunni Muslim mufti Hasan Khalid in ʿAramun, overlooking Khalda. Karami, who doubled as defence minister, twice ordered army commander Saʿid to halt the air action, but to no avail. The Muslim leaders subsequently issued a statement condemning the 'dangerous mutiny' of the army and the militia attacks on the Tal al-Zaʿtar and Dbayya refugee camps. Hinting at president Franjiyya and interior minister Shamʿun, they criticized 'those at all levels who hold malicious intentions against the Arab affiliation of Lebanon'.[11]

The rift was final. The guerrillas forced the army out of Khalda, seized the coastal village of Naʾma, and closed in on Damur. Rather than pause, the army attacked the Muslim quarter of Hawsh al-Umara in Zahla on 17 January, with the apparent aim of establishing a zone of control extending to its major barracks of Iblah and the Riyaq airbase.[12] A day later, the Maronite militias overran Maslakh-Karantina with the support of army commandos, armoured

vehicles, and gunboats. They razed the shanty town as they advanced, killing 150 inhabitants, including 30 civilians and dozens of militiamen who were killed after surrendering, and expelled those of its original 30,000 inhabitants who had not already fled to west Beirut.[13]

The guerrillas responded with a final assault on Damur, and on 21 January stood outside Saʿdiyyat, where thousands of Lebanese refugees and Maronite leader Shamʿun were trapped. The PLO made a last attempt to parley, offering safe escort for the besieged civilians and military personnel to the destination of their choice, in return for a Maronite pledge to allow free movement on the coastal road for Palestinian civilian and military traffic.[14] Two army officers who were present agreed, but Shamʿun prevaricated. The guerrillas waited for 24 hours and then launched a final attack on 23 January. Shamʿun capitulated and was taken to east Beirut; the remaining 5,000 refugees were escorted to Dayr al-Qamar and east Beirut. Some 150 besieged civilians and militiamen had died, and up to 20,000 became refugees.[15] Numerous acts of murder and rape had taken place during the fall of Damur, and Lebanese villagers from the Shuf region, LNM militiamen, Palestinians guerrillas, and looters from Beirut now put the abandoned homes to the sack.[16]

The cataclysmic battles of January confirmed the transition to civil war. Yet this did not mean *guerre à l'outrance*, a period of total military effort and uninterrupted conflict, but rather a protracted, multi-sided contest in which phases of intense diplomacy regularly followed repeated outbreaks of violence. Indeed, the fall of Damur now led to a tense calm, in which Syria renewed its diplomatic effort to resolve the Lebanese crisis. Syrian determination had been hardened by the launch of sectarian cleansing by the Maronite camp in December 1975, which president Asad viewed as a prelude to the formal partition of Lebanon, a prospect he opposed vehemently.[17] Not only might a confessional division of the country activate latent tensions in Syria, dominated by his minority ʿAlawi sect, but a Maronite canton in Lebanon could align itself with Israel and resist Syrian influence in Lebanese security and foreign policy affairs. Maronite statements calling for the expulsion of the Palestinian refugees from Lebanon only confirmed Syrian suspicions.[18]

Syria signalled its intention to act forcefully against partition by deploying two battalions of the PLA Qadisiyya Forces in the Biqaʿ Valley on 22 December.[19] Foreign minister Khaddam delivered the message more bluntly a fortnight later, following the start of the Maronite dual blockade in and around Beirut. 'Any attempt to partition Lebanon', he warned, 'will lead to instant Syrian intervention and annexation of Lebanon'. Phalangist leader Jmayyil replied by vowing that the Lebanese would 'fight to the last man against a Syrian or Israeli invasion'.[20] Syrian chief-of-staff Shihabi made a last-ditch attempt to persuade Franjiyya to break the political deadlock on 16 January 1976, just as the Lebanese army intervened in the battle for Khalda and Damur. Franjiyya rejected a ceasefire, and Shihabi returned to Damascus after being

physically prevented by the army from meeting the Lebanese Muslim and opposition leaders meeting in ʿAramun.

Syria now blamed the Lebanese president and army for the obduracy of the Maronite militias, and replaced mediation with military pressure.[21] The army offensive around Zahla on 17 January decided the issue. Two days later, three battalions of the PLA Hittin Forces entered Lebanon and deployed between Tripoli and Zghurta, while a fourth took up position east of Zahla.[22] The Syrian command responded to the army-backed sacking of the Maslakh-Karantina shanty town by ordering a PLA battalion into a hurried, frontal attack on the outer defences of Zghurta on 21 January, as a warning to the president.[23] The unit was thrown back with losses of 48 killed and 72 wounded, forcing its withdrawal to Syria to recover, but the Syrian command considered that the attack had served to warn Franjiyya.[24] To drive the point home it redeployed another PLA battalion from the Biqaʿ Valley into defensive positions around PLO headquarters in Beirut on 22 January.[25]

The fall of Saʿdiyyat and the end of the battle for the coastal road on 23 January offered an opportunity for diplomacy that Syria was quick to seize. Maronite political will was not broken, however, and Jmayyil and Shamʿun both used the threat of partition as a lever in the intensive negotiations that now started.[26] This proved effective, at least to the extent of persuading Khaddam and other Syrian mediators to abandon the LNM programme for democratic reform. Instead, they proposed a more modest adjustment of the confessional division of political power, by moving from a 5 : 4 ratio of Christian to Muslim seats in parliament to an equal 5:5 ratio. The new formula was embodied in a Constitutional Document published by Franjiyya on 14 February, following his meeting with Asad in Damascus.[27] As Asad later described it, this solution was reasonable, if less than ideal.[28] The attainment of *pax Syriana* on these terms deeply offended the LNM, and brought the latent tensions between Syria and the PLO into the open.

The PLO versus *pax Syriana*

Positionality, the striving for relative advantage in regional politics and the Middle East peace process, was the issue that set the PLO and Syria on a collision course. Arafat and his colleagues in the Fateh leadership, especially, feared that the assertion of *pax Syriana* in Lebanon would constrain their ability to pursue an autonomous diplomatic strategy. They were also worried that Syria, in order to reassure the Maronite camp, had promised to ensure strict implementation of the 1969 Cairo agreement by the PLO. Starting in late January, Fateh leaders revealed their fear of *tahjim* (literally, cutting down to size), and signalled their intention to resist Syrian policy by stressing the 'independence' of Palestinian decision-making from Arab 'tutelage' (*wisaya*).

For its part, Syria strongly suspected that Fateh sought alignment with Egypt in the hope of conducting separate peace talks with Israel, a prospect that would seriously undermine its own position. This suspicion had grown since the conclusion of the Sinai-II disengagement agreement in September 1975, especially after Mahmud Riyad, the Egyptian secretary-general of the League of Arab States, declared towards the end of December that the PLO approved 'Arabization' as a means of ending the Lebanese conflict. Fateh central committee member Khalaf seemed to confirm the trend by publicly extolling Palestinian ties with 'the Egyptian people' on 31 December.[29] Arafat meanwhile responded to Libyan criticism of the overtures to Cairo by complaining of the attempt to 'impose conditions' on the PLO.[30] Nor were the political implications of Sadat's decision to approve the PLO request for the dispatch of a PLA battalion to Lebanon in mid-January 1976 lost on Syria. It now feared increasingly that Fateh might challenge the precarious truce it had just engineered in Lebanon, leading to Israeli intervention and endangering Syrian national security and regional objectives. Syria already had to deal with a resentful and volatile Maronite camp, and was resolved to ensure PLO compliance with *pax Syriana.*

Evidence of the shift in Syrian attitude came on 31 January, when Sa'iqa gunmen acting on the orders of Mushin attacked the Beirut offices of two pro-PLO newspapers, *al-Muharrir* and *Beirut*, killing two journalists and narrowly missing Shafiq al-Hut, the official PLO representative in Lebanon, in retaliation for editorials that had criticized Syrian policy.[31] Khaddam and Muhsin also instructed the commander of the PLA task force in Beirut, Mahmud Abu-Marzuq, to deploy a battalion against unidentified 'rebels' in the refugee camps; he refused to do so, but the PLO received the Syrian message anyway.[32] Publication of the Constitutional Document pushed tensions to the fore. Khalaf stated acidly that 'the revolution is not merely a number to be added to the Muslims in this country, nor a number to be added to any party'. The PLO was not 'subject to Syrian tutelage', he added, and warned that 'we in Fateh have never allowed any Arab regime, no matter which one, to act as our guardian'.[33] Fateh, along with most guerrilla groups and LNM parties, also suspected that the Syrian compromise with the Maronite camp was a calculated gesture towards the US. Their suspicions deepened following press reports that the US had secretly presented two new proposals to Syria for a negotiated settlement with Israel relating to the Golan Heights and West Bank.[34]

Syrian displeasure with Fateh became increasingly obvious after the publication of the Constitutional Document. On 22 February Muhsin declared that 'it is time for new blood in the PLO', and posters went up in Beirut streets showing him in the traditional *kufiyya* and seated at a desk, pen in hand; the resemblance to Arafat's own posed photographs was unmistakable, as was the political message.[35] Khalaf later riposted by implicitly blaming Sa'iqa of hoping to 'inherit' Fateh, adding that while Fateh believed in a strategic relationship with Syria, this could not be one of dependency.[36] When Fateh posed a direct

challenge by dispatching central committee member Khalid al-Hasan to hold talks with Sadat on 28 February, Muhsin stated angrily that the confrontation in the region was between 'the path of nationalist commitment and patriotic steadfastness . . . and the path of retreat and capitulation led by the [Sadat] regime'. He directed scathing, if implicit, criticism of Fateh by denouncing 'certain Palestinians who raise slogans of . . . rejecting tutelage . . . [and] rejecting *tahjim*', and regarded insistence on 'independent Palestinian decision-making' and 'safeguarding the decrees of Rabat' (recognizing the PLO as sole legitimate Palestinian representative) as an attempt to disguise the surreptitious dialogue with Sadat.[37] The Syrian command had already deployed a PLA battalion as a buffer force in Tripoli and moved two additional battalions from Syria into the Biqaʿ Valley, and at the end of the month Syrian defence minister Mustafa Tlas warned that Syria would strike any group opposing the new compromise in Lebanon.[38]

The problem for Syria was that its fragile achievement in Lebanon was already coming under pressure from the Maronite militias, which broke the truce with steadily escalating violence in the second half of February. It was loath to take its dispute with Fateh too far, therefore, and still hoped to benefit from the PLO and LNM to coerce the Maronite camp. A prime example of this dual policy was the heated debate about the fate of officers and soldiers who had deserted the Lebanese army in previous weeks. The Maronite camp insisted on dismissing Muslim personnel who had formed rebel groups, but Syria preferred a general amnesty for deserters on both sides, who should then be allowed to return to their posts. Syria was worried by the collapse of the Lebanese state—starting on 19 January, militias on both sides had seized police stations, prisons, town halls, and army outposts in areas under their control—but was also under pressure from the LNM and 'traditional' Muslim leaders to reject Maronite terms for army reunification.

The fate of one particular rebel group, the self-styled Arab Army of Lebanon (AAL), provoked the most contention. A young Sunni Muslim officer, lieutenant Ahmad al-Khatib, had declared the existence of the AAL on 21 January after receiving covert assistance from Fateh deputy commander Wazir, who had recently moved his headquarters from Damascus to Taʿlbaya in the Biqaʿ Valley. Fateh facilitated the movement of Khatib's followers, who scored a significant success by persuading the commander of the army barracks at Baʿlbak and 200 soldiers to join the AAL on 31 January. A large demonstration that took place in Sidon on 8 February in support of Khatib showed the extent to which he had fired Muslim and opposition feeling. The Syrian attempt to impose *pax Syriana* prompted Fateh to escalate the AAL revolt. On 9–11 March Fateh helped the AAL seize army barracks throughout the south and in Tripoli, taking its strength to some 3,000.[39] Fateh now received 122 and 155 millimetre howitzers and 130 millimetre guns, armoured cars, guided anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft cannon, support vehicles, and large quantities of ammunition from army stores. The Syrian command hurriedly instructed Saʿiqa to prevent the fall

of the major Sidon barracks, and ordered the PLA to block any movement by Fateh forces in the Biqaʿ Valley.[40]

Fateh took a more dramatic step on 11 March, by engineering a *coup d'état* by the commander of the Beirut military district, lieutenant-general ʿAziz al-Ahdab. Ahdab was only one of numerous officers considering such a step, when Fateh came into the picture. PLO security chief Khalaf later denied Fateh involvement, but it was Salama, head of Arafat's bodyguard, who escorted Ahdab to the television station in West Beirut to make his announcement.[41] Ahdab announced the launch of a 'corrective movement' to reunite the army and the country, and called on Franjiyya to resign.[42] He privately hoped to replace him with Maronite politician Raymond Edde, who had distanced himself from the Maronite militias throughout the conflict, and received public support from scores of ranking army and public security officers, many of them Christians.[43] Fateh officials also lobbied leading Lebanese politicians such as imam Sadr and mufti Khalid, as well as Edde, to support Ahdab.

Fateh had made a daring gamble, but was defeated by further events of its own making. Arafat had apparently hoped that the AAL would join a reunified Lebanese army under Ahdab, but Wazir instead launched a major drive to expand the AAL. Within 24 hours of the Ahdab *coup*, the AAL had taken over all remaining army barracks and public security posts in south Lebanon and west Beirut. Arafat was concerned that these moves would not only reignite the armed conflict, defeating the aim of the putsch, but might also trigger Israeli intervention. He made this clear in cables to Wazir's field headquarters on 12 March, in which he warned that 'the seizure of Sidon by [the AAL] deprives the south of official legitimacy and exposes it to unpredictable possibilities from [Israel]'.[44] Such was his concern that at midday he ordered Fateh's Qastal Forces to prevent AAL units in Sidon from marching on Beirut, and in the afternoon requested Wazir to halt the advance of AAL and Fateh forces from Shtura towards the strategic mountain pass of Dahr al-Baydar, explaining that LNM leader Junblat feared further deterioration of the security situation.[45] Arafat also urged Wazir to delay plans to take control of the Lebanese Riyaq airbase and the major Iblah barracks, and instructed Fateh units in the north to prevent looting of the army officers' housing estate in Tripoli.[46]

Arafat may have been privately disquieted by the turn of events, but this was not evident from the public statements of senior PLO officials. Abu-Sharar, head of the PLO unified information department and the Fateh revolutionary council raised the stakes on 14 March by demanding guarantees for the full freedom of guerrilla activity in Lebanon.[47] The editorial of the PLO's *Filastin al-Thawra* on the same day obliquely accused Syria of seeking to 'contain the Palestinian revolution' in conformity with 'the latest stage in the conspiracy'.[48] This coincided with the arrival in Tripoli of a second battalion of the ʿAyn Jalut Forces, which Arafat had requested from Egypt a few days earlier.[49] More seriously, Wazir and Khatib resumed the drive to expand the AAL. The PLA officers who had been instructed by the Syrian command to prevent the fall of

the Riyaq airbase and Iblah barracks secretly colluded with Fateh to hand them over to the AAL, in coordination with sympathetic Lebanese officers.[50] PLA artillery units next defied Syrian orders by shelling Bikfayya, home town of phalangist leader Jmayyil, and the army barracks in Hammana.

The Maronite commander of the Fayyadiyya barracks on the outskirts of Beirut, Antoine Barakat, had meanwhile launched his own mutiny 'in support of legitimacy'. Other co-religionists took over units and weapons in Bayt Miri and Zahla, and by mid-March the army had ceased to exist. Up to 9,000 men were in areas held by the LNM and PLO (roughly half of whom joined the AAL), and the remaining 6,000 in the Maronite heartland.[51] Syria viewed these developments with growing alarm. The rapid expansion of the AAL, hostile statements from PLO officials, and intelligence from its Palestinian and Lebanese allies convinced it that recent events were the work of Fateh. According to PF–GC secretary-general Jibril, who met Asad in this period, the Syrian president feared that the outcome would be to 'push the [Maronites] to declare the partition of Lebanon, and then an Israeli division would land at Junia, and that would be the end of our hopes'.[52] Having vacillated at first, Syria now signalled its hostility to the Ahdab *coup*, through an official statement by the head of the Baʿth Party Organization in Lebanon, ʿAsim Qansu.[53]

Despite its failure, the Ahdab *coup* had undermined the Syrian-brokered Constitutional Document and placed the demand for the resignation of Franjiyya at the centre of Lebanese politics. Franjiyya offered to resign if a two-thirds majority in parliament asked him to do so, but abruptly retracted his offer when a petition with the required 66 signatures was presented to him. The Maronite camp now insisted that he complete his term, and sharply escalated its attacks around Lebanon. Syria had meanwhile come to the conclusion that the resignation of Franjiyya was a necessary condition for resolution of the conflict, and decided to stem the deterioration of relations with the PLO. First, however, it showed its displeasure by closing down the Fateh military academy near Damascus and other facilities on 14 March, and by detaining cadres of Wazir's Western Sector. The Syrian command also ordered Saʿiqa to prevent AAL artillery from bombarding the presidential palace on the same day, prompting LNM leader Junblat to accuse Syria angrily of supporting Franjiyya and to castigate 'those who set up roadblocks in the face of the army [AAL] that tried to implement the decision of the parliament'.[54] The Syrian command next transferred a second PLA battalion from the Biqaʿ Valley to west Beirut, where it deployed around PLO headquarters.

Arafat, accompanied by Muhsin and DFLP secretary-general Hawatma, was next invited to meet Asad on 16 March. No details emerged from the meeting, but the Maronite militias responded by opening new battlefronts in north Lebanon, and were suspected of planting a bomb that exploded on an aircraft preparing to take prime minister Karami and other Muslim leaders to Damascus. They also laid siege to several Christian towns whose inhabitants supported the LNM, and reimposed a full blockade on Tal al-Zaʿtar and Nabʿa in

east Beirut. Saʿiqa gunners were now ordered to reverse roles, and over the next few days joined the AAL in bombarding the presidential palace.[55] Syrian proxies also stood aside while Fateh and AAL units spearheaded attacks that pushed Maronite forces out of the villages of ʿAbadiyya, Shwit, Qmatiyya, and ʿAytat on 18 March, and out of the Qubba quarter in Tripoli and as far as Majdlayya two days later.

What Syria now sought, according to Jibril, who was suddenly summoned to Damascus on 19–20 March, was 'to strike a big blow and then call for a roundtable conference, to establish a new formula of "no victor and no vanquished"'.[56] On his return to Beirut, on 21 March, he directed a successful assault by a joint force of PF–GC guerrillas, LNM militiamen, and AAL armour on a renowned phalangist stronghold in the hotels district.[57] Over the next ten days the force pushed to Beirut harbour in bitter street combat; the PF–GC revealed that its casualties alone since April 1975 now stood at 200 dead.[58] Yet negotiations with the Maronite camp were not revived, largely because the PLO and LNM developed their recent victories into a major new offensive.

Although it was not apparent from the outside, there were deep divisions within the PLO over the aims of the offensive. Arafat supported action to lift the siege of Tal al-Zaʿtar—Fateh's Eagles of the ʿArqub Battalion tried, in vain, to force a way through the Beirut River valley and Monteverdi on 23 March—but a broad coalition comprising most of the leftist and rejectionist guerrilla groups, the LNM, and the 'Soviet group' in Fateh itself now sought complete military decision (*hasm ʿaskari*) and expanded the offensive. The 110 cadets from the Fateh military academy had seized the Dahr al-Baydar pass a week earlier, allowing a large AAL column to advance from the Biqaʿ Valley and take control of the major army barracks in Hammana on 23 March, after building up to a strength of 1,000. LNM forces now drove on to Ras al-Matn and seized the village of Mtayn, on the edge of the Maronite heartland in the Kisrwan mountains, while a mixed force of some 200 Fateh guerrillas and militiamen backed by AAL armour seized Tarshish and Majdal Tarshish to the east.

Arafat saw the expansion as an unwanted entanglement, that moreover exceeded an unspoken Syrian 'red line'.[59] His fears were confirmed on 24 March, when the official Syrian *al-Baʿth* newspaper accused 'some parties' of 'turning the partition of Lebanon into a fait accompli' and warned that the latest events 'threaten the entire Arab nation, which Syria will not permit'.[60] LNM leader Junblat rejected Maronite and Syrian calls for a ceasefire, stating that the offensive would continue 'so long as our brothers . . . are under siege', and the presidential palace and Zghurta came under renewed fire after 25 March.[61] Paradoxically, the ability of the leftist coalition to set the pace of events was due to the crucial backing of Wazir, who once again was working at cross-purpose to Arafat. This was not the result of political disagreement, but rather of Wazir's characteristic tendency to seize the moment. His instinct since January, when confronted with opportunities to assist the disintegration of the Lebanese

army and acquire its much-valued artillery and armour, was to do so regardless of political consequences.[62] In the euphoria of the major gains made since 9 March, he encouraged the latest offensive, and on 25 March committed Fateh's Eagles of ʿArqub Battalion to retake Mtayn, which had fallen to a Maronite counterattack.

Arafat was anxious to prevent a major rift with Syria, and persuaded Junblat to meet Asad in the hope of resolving their differences. A marathon nine-hour meeting in Damascus on 27 March only led to a final rupture, however, as Junblat insisted on being allowed to pursue the offensive against the Maronite heartland for another two weeks.[63] Syrian patience was wearing exceedingly thin, but a separate meeting between Asad and Arafat the next day produced a compromise. Nothing was revealed at the time, but later events showed that they had agreed on two key items: the need to proceed with the election of a successor for Franjiyya, and the imminent deployment of a token Syrian peace-keeping force in Lebanon. Arafat's position was supported by Fateh central committee members Khalaf, ʿAbbas (who wielded considerable influence over Fateh finances, and to a lesser extent over security), and Ghnaym, who had attended the talks. The PLO chairman returned to Beirut, and lobbied for a ceasefire in coordination with Saʿiqa and the DFLP.

The offensive was not yet over, however. The PFLP, which had earlier called for the expulsion of Saʿiqa from the PLO executive committee and for an end to the alliance with Syria, summed up the position of the leftist coalition with a clarion headline in *al-Hadaf*: 'no to the ceasefire, no to the Syrian initiative, yes to [military] decision'.[64] The 'Soviet group', backed by Wazir, directed the capture of the Kisrwan village of ʿAyntura on 27 March, even as Arafat and Junblat were in Damascus. Salih next directed four abortive attacks on the Maronite stronghold of Kahhala in the Matn mountains on 28–31 March, in which Fateh, the AAL, and LNM lost 60 dead; he had insisted on temporarily replacing the overall commander of joint PLO–LNM forces in the area, Ahmad ʿAfana, and was assisted by DFLP military commander Nawfal. Most significant was Wazir's commitment of the 2nd Battalion, commanded by 'Soviet group' officer ʿAmla, to seize the Zaʿrur mountain on 31 March and retake ʿAyntura, which fell for the second time on 2 April. This put the port of Junya within artillery range for the first time, and placed the combined forces of the PLO, LNM, and AAL in position to drive deep into the Maronite heartland. Thousands of inhabitants prepared to flee by sea, and for a moment the Maronite leadership appeared ready to break.

The escalation of the offensive after 27 March was partly the result of a private meeting between Junblat, Salih, ʿAmla, Nawfal, and other leftist officials in ʿAlay. The Palestinian Left, at least, considered that inflicting a decisive defeat on the Maronite camp would undermine PLO hopes of joining Egypt in the US-brokered peace process. It was also convinced, as indeed were members of the mainstream Fateh leadership such as Khalaf, that the USSR viewed the Lebanese conflict as part of the wider contest with the US and would therefore

support the transformation of Lebanon into another Cuba. Confident that Soviet pressure would constrain Syria, the leftist coalition now intended to push from the Kisrwan mountains to Junya, thus surrounding east Beirut and forcing the Maronite camp into unconditional surrender.[65] Only Fateh and the AAL had the strength to mount such an attack, but once the battle was engaged after 27 March Arafat proved unable to withhold support. Indeed, he may still have hoped privately to assert PLO dominance in the Lebanese equation, calculating, as he stated publicly, that Syrian intervention against the organization was 'inconceivable'.[66]

Arafat, as well as Wazir and the leftist coalition, had seriously misjudged the Syrian mood. The resumption of the offensive in the Matn and Kisrwan mountains aroused deep suspicion in Damascus that Arafat was playing a double game. Syria perceived an additional threat to its special status in Lebanon when Egyptian president Sadat offered to mediate, and tabled a motion at the League of Arab States on 29 March for the deployment of a token Arab peacekeeping force.[67] As Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin explained, Syria had achieved 'growing influence' in Lebanon and regionally, which its Arab rivals sought to 'demolish'.[68] It did not help matters that the edition of the PLO's *Filastin al-Thawra* appearing on 31 March renewed the attack on attempts to impose Jordanian 'tutelage' on the PLO, and pointedly reiterated the unity of the PLO and LNM.[69] 'Internationalization' also reappeared menacingly on 31 March with the arrival in Beirut of US special envoy Dean Brown, who stated that his mission was 'to assess the situation and suggest possible options'.[70] This followed several warnings in preceding months, including one delivered by the US ambassador in Damascus, against intervention in Lebanon.[71] Increasingly alarmed, Syria delivered a private ultimatum to the PLO on 2 April demanding an immediate ceasefire.[72] Dozens of Fateh personnel in Damascus were arrested to reinforce the warning, and this time it was heeded.

Syrian Intervention

Asad had apparently concluded that only the deployment of Syrian forces in Lebanon could signal Syrian resolve with sufficient strength and coerce the protagonists into complying with a negotiated settlement. On 3 April the Syrian command imposed a ban on ships docking at Tripoli, a major route for PLO supplies and reinforcements, and two days later Saʿiqa took control of the Zahrani oil terminal and Jiyya power plant, cutting fuel and electricity supplies to Beirut.[73] It also shelled the Shatila refugee camp on 8 April. Seeking to capitalize on Syrian–PLO tensions, the Maronite militias blocked alternative fuel shipments from the government storage tanker farm north of Beirut, to which the Joint Forces responded by halting flour supplies from government stores in the western half of the capital. Supplies were resumed and the blockade of Tal al-Zaʿtar and Nabʿa eased after several days of mutual shelling, but

the Maronite militias broke the truce with attacks around Zghurta and in the Kisrwan mountains.

Syria meanwhile prepared for intervention. King Husayn reportedly approached the Israeli ambassador in London on its behalf to seek assurances that his country would not react militarily, while Khaddam communicated the Syrian view to the US state department.[74] Kissinger had apparently come to the view that direct Syrian intervention would in fact serve a useful purpose by pitting Syria against its erstwhile allies, and had already exchanged views on the matter with Israel.[75] Brown reinforced this conclusion by writing from Beirut, on 1 April, in favour of the deployment of three or four Syrian brigades in Lebanon.[76] A second letter on 4 April lauded the success of the Syrian truce initiative, and noted with pleasure that it had taken the PLO and LNM by surprise.[77]

On 9 April Syrian troops took control of the border crossing point at Masnaʿ and the next morning an armoured brigade and two infantry battalions entered the Biqaʿ Valley. Muhsin explained that Syria had intervened to restore security and assist the election of a new president, and indicated LNM responsibility by renewing the harsh criticism of Junblat.[78] Abroad, Jordanian prime minister Zayd al-Rifaʿi expressed wholehearted support for Syria, but the reticence or open hostility of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, and Libya prompted Muhsin to take the unusual step of castigating them collectively for 'seeking to demolish the growing influence of Syria'.[79] More significant, however, were Israeli and US reactions. Israel had informed Washington two weeks earlier of the limits it expected Syria to observe in the case of intervention in Lebanon.[80] After ascertaining the scale of the Syrian deployment of 10 April, prime minister Rabin stated that it would be treated as an internal Lebanese affair so long as Syria did not exceed certain 'red lines'—relating both to the size and armament of Syrian units and to the geographical extent of their deployment—in which case Israel would act 'to preserve its safety'.[81] Kissinger reflected US neutrality by testifying to a congressional committee on 14 April that the Syrian move had not endangered Israeli security.[82]

Asad explained the Syrian outlook in a rare policy speech made two days after the deployment. In his view, LNM leader Junblat and 'the merchants of religion and revolution' were at fault for necessitating a forceful response. Asad also sent a strong signal to the Maronite camp by stressing repeatedly that Franjiyya had already agreed to relinquish the presidency, and then issued a general warning that 'we possess full freedom of movement [in Lebanon] and are able to take any position we deem suitable, without anyone being able to prevent us from doing so'.[83] Syrian checkpoints in Lebanon now started to arrest Joint Forces members carrying unlicensed guns or driving unmarked vehicles. To avoid friction, Fateh pulled the bulk of its forces out of the central part of the valley on 12 April.[84] Saʿiqa meanwhile gave a blunt signal of Syrian readiness to employ force by revealing that the combined strength of forces loyal to Syria in Lebanon now totalled 17,000.[85]

The PLO response to the Syrian intervention was cautious. It suspected a secret US–Syrian understanding, and feared the emergence of a tacit axis comprising Syria, Jordan, the Maronite camp, the US, and Israel.[86] Its unease was reflected in the decision to call up a third battalion of the PLA ʿAyn Jalut Forces from Egypt, but at the same time it reiterated the alliance with Syria.[87] In any case, having demonstrated Syrian resolve, Asad now invited Arafat for talks on 16 April. The outcome was a new agreement consisting of seven articles and several secret annexes, that outlined the principles for resolving the Lebanese conflict, restoring central government, and defining the basis for Syrian–Palestinian relations in Lebanon. In a concession to the PLO, Asad promised to withdraw the Syrian forces and allow free election of a new Lebanese president, while Arafat endorsed the Constitutional Document and pledged to oppose both 'Arabization' and 'internationalization'.[88] In parallel, Syria worked for the election by the Lebanese parliament of the successor to Franjiyya, in the hope that this would produce a durable political compromise. Parliament had already amended the constitution on 10 April to allow early election of a new president, now set to take place on 8 May.

Once again, any hope that Syrian–PLO agreement would lead to a solution was soon dashed. The Maronite parties, now united in a Lebanese Front, were first to threaten the Damascus accord. They were encouraged by several factors. On Kissinger's instructions, Brown had advised them at the beginning of April to be 'strong so that they could negotiate', which they took to be a recommendation to cooperate with Israel.[89] After months of secret contacts, Shamʿun met a high-ranking Israeli official on 2 April, by which time the Phalanges Party had also initiated a direct Israeli relationship.[90] The Maronites were further encouraged by the start of modest, but nonetheless significant, Israeli involvement in the southern border region in mid-April—a worrying development that only deepened Syrian resolve to bring the Lebanese crisis to a close. The Lebanese Front now revived the prospect of cantonization and partition by setting up an autonomous civil administration in the Maronite heartland, with parallel police, civilian courts, and postal and public transport services.[91] It knowingly aroused Syrian concern on 22 April with renewed calls for international or US mediation in the conflict, and in early May proposed the creation of a 'deterrent force' comprising French, Moroccan, and Saudi troops, with US political support, to oversee any truce. The Lebanese Front also started clashes in north Lebanon, as if to press the point, and finally launched a major offensive against the Joint Forces in the Kisrwan mountains on 7 May, on the eve of the presidential election.

The Palestinian rejectionists had also opposed the Damascus accord, albeit after wavering initially. Junblat supported Arafat, but also called for Syrian withdrawal and a wider Arab role in peacekeeping. Maronite escalation brought the hostility of militant PLO and LNM factions towards the Damascus accord into the open. Before 9 April Junblat had believed that Syria could not send troops into Lebanon for fear of counter-intervention by Israel and

because of US opposition to 'a second Czechoslovakia', and so the fact that Syria had actually proceeded with its intervention came as a rude shock.[92] Leftist anger deepened when the Lebanese Front finally compelled the Christian villages of Dhur al-Shwayr, Bayt Shabab, Byaqut to capitulate and put the homes of LNM members to the torch. A statement from Saʿiqa claiming that its men and the PLA had lifted the siege only added insult to injury.[93] Junblat subsequently debated the establishment of a civil administration to rival the Maronites—playing the partition 'card', in effect—and accused Syria of extending its influence in Lebanon on the basis of a secret understanding with the US.[94] PFLP secretary-general Habash similarly castigated Syria for intervening in Lebanon in accordance with a US plan to restore 'the Lebanon of the past and the army of the past', while the deputy secretary-general of the Lebanese Communist Party, George Hawi, equated the Syrian and US roles.[95]

Arafat, for his part, sought to preserve the fragile understanding with Asad. He resolutely opposed the formation of a 'local authority' in areas held by the LNM and PLO, seeing it as a dangerous political escalation that would inevitably alarm Syria, and vetoed requests for a forceful response to LF offensives, arguing that the Maronites sought precisely such a reaction as a means to undermine the Damascus Accord.[96] Arafat also resigned himself to the likelihood that the presidential candidate preferred by the PLO and LNM, Edde, would fail, and secretly met his Syrian-backed rival, former central bank governor Ilyas Sarkis, to assure him of PLO neutrality in the coming vote.[97] The Syrian command deployed a third PLA battalion in Beirut to secure the parliamentary vote, and Sarkis was duly elected by a narrow margin on 8 May. In an internal memorandum to PLO personnel, Arafat expressed the hope that Sarkis's victory presaged 'an end to the tribulations'.[98]

Arafat wished to avoid open confrontation with Syria. Yet PLO media and senior officials associated with the 'Soviet group' in Fateh repeatedly gave contradictory signals. The editorial of *Filastin al-Thawra* on 25 April, for example, launched a broadside against Syrian policy by opposing 'any intervention, whether under the guise of preventing the fictitious partition [of Lebanon], or of legitimacy, or of preserving law and order'. Central committee member Salih stated belligerently two days later that Fateh 'will not permit the intervention of any Arab forces', and on 2 May *Filastin al-Thawra* editor Ahmad ʿAbd-al-Rahman rejected the Syrian notion of a 'security vacuum' and declared total commitment to the LNM.[99] It was also ʿAbd-al-Rahman, in an editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra*, who vowed on 4 May 'to prevent the election of a president on the bayonets of intervention' and railed against 'the unholy alliance that includes parties who pretend to oppose imperialism and the Sinai [disengagement] agreement'.[100]

One reason for the contradiction of PLO attitudes was the deepening alliance between Syria and Jordan. *Filastin al-Thawra* urged Syria to reassess its ties with Jordan on 18 April, but a week later the two countries decided to close down

their embassies as a demonstration of their fraternal ties. This followed the conduct of municipal elections in the West Bank on 10 April, under the supervision of the Israeli military government, in which PLO supporters swept 85 per cent of the seats. Junblat expressed a widely held view when he described the Syrian–Jordanian alliance as a 'conspiracy to contain the resistance movement and impose hegemony over the West Bank, and so eliminate the independent Palestinian character'.[101] It was against this background that Arafat's close political aide, Hani al-Hasan, held talks with Egyptian foreign minister Isma'il Fahmi in Cairo at the end of April. A few days later Sadat stated that the elections had sent a sobering 'message to the king and to those who dream of tutelage' over the Palestinians.[102] He also declared his opposition to any attempt to weaken the PLO, whether physically or politically, and allowed it to resume broadcasts over Cairo radio on 6 May.[103]

Renewed contacts between the PLO and Egypt only confirmed Syrian suspicions of PLO duplicity. The deterioration of security in Lebanon following the presidential election heightened Syrian apprehension further. The LF offensive in the Kisrwan mountains on 7 May lasted for three days, during which it lost at least 100 dead and the Joint Forces another 30, while an attempt by the LF to bring Zahla within its canton triggered a counter-offensive by the Joint Forces on 11 May. On the political level, the LNM took the first step towards establishing a parallel civil administration in areas under its control.[104] The PLA battalions in Beirut were now instructed by chief-of-staff Budayri to establish regular liaison with the LF and to identify their positions as a confidence-building measure.[105] To deter the PLO and LNM, conversely, three Syrian commando battalions were deployed at Beirut airport and the Khalda crossroads on 8–9 May. An official PLO statement complained that this had occurred without prior notification. It also accused the commandos of shelling the Burj al-Barajna refugee camp, and demanded an end to restrictions on the movement of Joint Forces personnel and supplies.[106] On 13 May, the Syrian command pulled PLA units in Beirut out of the frontline and concentrated them opposite the PLO headquarters area in the Fakhani district.[107]

Resistance to Syrian policy was growing. Lebanese leftists and Palestinian rejectionists clashed with Sa'iqa and captured 46 of its members on 9 May. The clashes also spread to Tripoli on 11–12 May, as Sa'iqa and the Lebanese branch of the Ba'th Party attacked the ALF and pro-Iraqi Ba'thists. The Syrian command instructed the PLA to assist the assault, which left a final toll of some 20 dead on both sides, but faced a mutiny in one of its battalions.[108] As the rift deepened, Sa'iqa secretary-general Muhsin signalled the prospect of wider Syrian intervention by asking rhetorically, 'since when is Syrian occupation of Lebanon rejected by its people, and what is patriotism if Lebanon is not part of Syria and [part of] its steadfastness against Israel?'[109] He made the target clear by criticizing the LNM, whose leaders 'work to implement the partition plot under nationalist slogans, such as local administration, and who drag behind them the Palestinian resistance, that has all but forgotten the cause of liberating Palestine

due to its distraction in the search for power bases in the streets of Beirut and the mountains [of Lebanon]'.[110]

The PLO and LNM responded defiantly with a major rally in Beirut on 15 May, at which Khalaf gave an impassioned view of events. 'In 1948 our people heeded the entry of Arab forces [to Palestine] and surrendered their weapons and rifles to those armies in the hope of attaining victory. But 28 years have passed while [the Palestinians] have languished in pain in Arab prison camps.' Turning to the present, he pledged PLO loyalty to the LNM and castigated the 'lackey command that does not represent the spirit of the PLA'. Khalaf also criticized Damascus directly, saying 'we have long kept silent about the harm [done to us] and the intervention, about the [shelling] of our [refugee] camps which we never expected would be struck by any Syrian force. But when the Lebanese masses are hit in Tripoli we cannot remain silent at all, and must raise our voices in caution and warning, out of concern for Syria'.[111] A day later the Fateh representative in Cairo revealed that the Syrian authorities had detained hundreds of PLO members and confiscated both military and non-military supplies since the end of March.[112]

Syria was given added reason to consider expanding its intervention in Lebanon on 14 May, when Franjiyya announced that he did not intend to transfer power to president-elect Sarkis until 22 September, the original date for the end of his tenure. An increased Syrian military presence in Lebanon had already been anticipated by the US and, less openly, by Israel. US special envoy Brown voiced the opinion on 11 May that the election of Sarkis had launched Lebanon on the path of 'rehabilitation, rationality, and the renewal of the state', and added casually that 'the question of the entry of additional Syrian forces to preserve security in Lebanon is contingent on a decision by Sarkis'.[113] Israel had recently made much of PLO military gains in Lebanon, but on 13 May prime minister Rabin observed approvingly that 'forces operating under Syrian control in Lebanon have killed more terrorists in the past week than Israel has in the past two years'.[114] Once again, king Husayn had argued the Syrian case in Washington and to the Israeli ambassador in London, receiving clear reassurances in return.[115]

The violence in Lebanon was spiralling out of control. The Syrian decision to pull the PLA out of the frontline in Beirut triggered artillery exchanges and street combat that left 199 dead and 658 wounded on 16–17 May alone.[116] On 17 May Arafat and Libyan envoy 'Abd-al-Salam Jalloud were recieved in Damascus by Asad, who informed them of his intention to increase the Syrian force in Lebanon. The PLO chairman was opposed, and the meeting ended in rancour. Senior Syrian officials repeatedly implored Fateh central committee members 'Abbas and Ghnaym, who still resided in Damascus, to impress the gravity of the situation on their colleagues in Beirut, but Arafat and the rest of the mainstream leadership were now completely convinced that the PLO position in Lebanon was under direct Syrian threat.[117] To pre-empt it, Arafat initiated secret talks with president-elect Sarkis on 19 May, in the presence of Junblat and

Khalaf, and lobbied the Arab states to convene a summit conference. Continued Maronite violence and Syrian refusal to tolerate an Egyptian role condemned both efforts to failure, but statements of support for the PLO from Iraq, Libya, and Algeria only deepened Syrian concern.

The announcement by French president Valerie Giscard d'Estaing on 22 May that he had US backing to deploy 7,500 troops in Lebanon confirmed Syrian determination to act quickly and forcefully. Any doubts were dispelled the next day, when Khalaf theatened major military escalation with a grandiose declaration that 'the road to Palestine cannot but pass through ʿAyntura and ʿUyun al-Siman, and must even reach Junya, in order to defeat the conspiracy and prevent partition'.[118] Speaking at a rally in Beirut, he was implicitly addressing the USSR, which he believed to be committed to a radical anti-US realignment in the eastern Mediterranean. The Syrian leadership took him at his word in any case. Clashes broke out between Fateh and Saʿiqa in Sidon on 24 May, and secret instructions now went out from Damascus to Saʿiqa to silence Fateh artillery around Beirut.[119] Arrests of Joint Forces personnel at Syrian checkpoints around the country also increased.[120] Khaddam visited Amman on 25 May, presumably to request assurances of US and Israeli neutrality, and two days later Arafat was denied entry to Syria.[121] Sarkis made a last attempt on 27 May to head off confrontation by holding secret talks with Khalaf and Qaddumi, AAL commander Khatib, Sunni mufti Khalid, Shiʿite imam Sadr, and Druze spiritual leader sheikh Muhammad Abu-Shaqra, but the murder by unidentified assailants of Junblat's sister on the same day polarized the atmosphere and aborted the dialogue. The violence resurged, resulting in a toll of 117 dead and 212 wounded on 30 May alone.[122]

Syria and the PLO were now locked irrevocably onto a collision course. Muhsin had not ceased his verbal attacks on Junblat, accusing him of 'conspiring against the national unity of the Palestinian people', and castigated the rejectionist guerrilla groups for supporting 'the narrow personal ambitions of Junblat . . . who cannot replace Syria as the ally of the [Palestinian] resistance [movement]'.[123] The rejectionists were wholly opposed to reconciliation with Syria by now. Habash argued that the Syrian army was serving US policy by 'eating up' the PLO and LNM, and *al-Hadaf* referred to the 'capitulationist regime' of Syria.[124] Under the influence of the 'Soviet group' in Fateh, *Filastin al-Thawra* assailed 'the proponents of military intervention in Lebanon, who aim to impose tutelage, containment, and dependence, and to take the king [Husayn] to the [negotiating] table'.[125]

On 31 May the PLO reported that Syrian and Saʿiqa gunners were shelling its headquarters area and the refugee camps around Beirut with 160 millimetre mortars.[126] This followed a three-day assault on the northern Maronite towns of ʿIndqit and Qbayyat, launched by the local AAL commander, Ahmad al-Miʿmari, in defiance of orders from the Joint Forces command in Beirut. On 29 May Khalaf voiced a general concern by accusing Miʿmari of implementing a 'suspect plan . . . to justify the entry of [outside] forces into the area'.[127] His

suspicion was well founded, as Syria dispatched two armoured battalions across the border on 31 May, citing the clashes in the ʿAkkar region as the reason for the deployment.[128] Additional units followed the next day, bringing the total to 8,000 men and 200 tanks.

16

Ambition Frustrated, Sanctuary Preserved

PLO reactions to the latest Syrian deployment were swift. Fateh called for a total Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and held Damascus responsible for any bloodshed that might ensue, and urged the League of Arab States to convene an emergency meeting of Arab foreign ministers.[1] The Palestinian Left, LNM, and some Lebanese politicians such as defeated presidential candidate Edde described the Syrian intervention as 'military occupation' and vowed to resist it 'with all means'.[2] LNM leader Junblat saw an Arab–Israeli plot to partition Lebanon into 'sectarian statelets', hinting at an alliance between the dominant ʿAlawi community of Syria, the Lebanese Maronites, and the Jewish state. Seeking an anti-Syrian alliance, he and Fateh security officer Salama met the LF deputy-commander, Bashir Jmayyil, in secret on 2 June, and was later joined by Khalaf to meet president-elect Sarkis, but was unable to come to a satisfactory agreement with either.

The PLO and its Lebanese allies were evidently unwilling to submit to Syrian pressure. Syria now prepared to assert its will by force, based on the assessment that the remaining key players would favour its approach or take a stand of studied neutrality. In Lebanon leading members of the Muslim establishment (including Karami) had distanced themselves from the LNM during May, while Shiʿite imam Sadr had called frankly for action by 'non-Lebanese' forces.[3] Syria also enjoyed the formal support of its own allies in the PLO and LNM—Saʿiqa, the Baʿth Party Organization in Lebanon, and three lesser Lebanese groups—who issued a joint statement on 31 May. The AAL was firmly opposed, but its commander in the Biqaʿ Valley, Ibrahim Shahin, now broke away to form a pro-Syrian rival, the Vanguards of the Lebanese Army. Syria was equally keen to ensure Maronite neutrality, and offered private assurances that its troops would not enter areas held by the Lebanese Front.[4] Having tested this pledge by expelling the remaining Muslim inhabitants of Zahla, the Maronite camp declared its support for the Syrian intervention on 5 June.[5] Most important, arguably, was the muted reaction of Israeli defence minister Peres, who stated bluntly that a military response to the Syrian intervention at this stage 'can only help the PLO'.[6]

Encouraged by these reactions, the Syrian command planned to take physical control of Beirut. It was reluctant to employ its own forces, whether to

avoid casualties and a domestic backlash in Syria or to retain the means for further escalation if necessary, and was apparently confident in the ability of its Palestinian and Lebanese allies to achieve a quick decision and pre-empt Arab responses.[7] Syrian thinking was reflected by Muhsin, who offered the assessment that neither Saʿiqa nor the PLA could possibly oppose Damascus, since the former belonged to the ruling Baʿth Party and 93 per cent of the latter's personnel came from the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria.[8] The Syrian command instructed its contingent in the Beirut area—some 1,500 Syrian commandos and 2,000 PLA soliders, besides thousands of militiamen—to seize PLO and LNM offices in the western half of the capital and the adjacent refugee camps.[9] The PLO was fully informed of Syrian plans by supporters in Saʿiqa and the PLA, and launched a pre-emptive strike on 5 June, under the overall direction of Khalaf. Most offices and detachments belonging to Saʿiqa and the other pro-Syrian militias had surrendered by evening, almost without a shot, and the same took place in Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, and a host of smaller towns over the next two days.

Angered by this unexpected setback, the Syrian command responded with a full-scale offensive against the Joint Forces throughout Lebanon on 7 June.[10] In west Beirut, the Syrian representative to the truce committee, Muhammad al-Khuli, and military intelligence chief ʿAli al-Madani, along with Muhsin and PLA chief-of-staff Budayri directed the attempt to seize PLO headquarters and control the rest of the city. PLA task force commander Mahmud Abu-Marzuq ordered his units not to move, however, and by the end of the day his three battalions had declared their defection to the PLO.[11] Syrian purges in 1975 of dozens of officers accused of communist or anti-Baʿthist sympathies had taken their toll of morale, contributing to the decision of PLA commanders to mutiny in June 1976.[12] Budayri and 90 Syrian commandos were taken prisoner, the Saʿiqa field commander was killed, and Muhsin escaped to east Beirut, where the Phalanges Party provided him with safe escort to Syrian lines in the Biqaʿ Valley.[13] From Damascus his deputy, Sami al-ʿAtari, furiously accused Fateh of 'seeking not only to partition Lebanon, but also to liquidate the Palestinian resistance and establish a Palestinian state in Lebanon'.[14] The Joint Forces seized massive Saʿiqa weapons stores, while the Syrian commando battalions at the airport and Khalda shelled the capital and refugee camps in revenge and imposed a food and fuel blockade. The police and hospitals reported 290 dead—among them Fateh militia commander Jawad Abu-al-Shaʿr and Murad, commander of DFLP forces in the south—and 400 injured in the next 48 hours.[15]

Syrian forces in the north were more successful, as an armoured brigade occupied the coastal region from the border to Tripoli and inland to ʿIndqit and Qbayyat, leaving the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp isolated. The commander of one of two PLA battalions in the area had been in secret contact with Fateh since mid-May, and now led his unit in mutiny, while officers of the second battalion smuggled ammunition from the Lebanese airbase at Qlayʿat to

Fateh.[16] The Syrian army extended the blockade of food and fuel to Tripoli and the nearby refugee camps, but its principal effort came in central Lebanon. A fresh armoured brigade crossed the border and drove up the Beirut–Damascus highway into the western mountain range, easily brushing aside Joint Forces outposts. It slowed at Mdayrij, but a tank battalion secured control of Sawfar in the afternoon. The advance stopped abruptly, however, after the loss of six tanks and several personnel carriers to a hasty ambush on the outskirts of Bhamdun. Unknown to the Syrians, a mere 30 militiamen, including a dozen teenage Fateh trainees, stood between them and the town of ʿAlay, that controlled the main roads to Beirut and the rest of the Matn mountain. The LF tried to hammer the Joint Forces against the Syrian anvil with a battalion-sized attack on the western side of ʿAlay, but were beaten back. Two more mechanized brigades had entered Lebanon in the meantime, one of which pushed south towards Rashayya al-Wadi. The other climbed to Jizzin and paused, and then resumed its advance to Sidon the next morning. Its lead battalion hastily withdrew after stumbling into an ambush in the main square, however, leaving behind 30 vehicles, including 18 tanks and personnel carriers, 60 dead, and 150 prisoners. Two other battalions now deployed in the ʿAbra and al-Hilaliyya suburbs, and poured indiscriminate tank, machine-gun, and artillery fire into the city and refugee camps below, killing 125–140 people and injuring 350–400 in the next two days. Shelling closed the port and reduced traffic on the coastal road to a trickle.

The Syrian offensive stalled, allowing Arab political pressure to build up. Sadat had closed the Syrian embassy in Cairo and recalled Egyptian diplomatic staff from Damascus on 5 June, and a joint Libyan–Algerian delegation arrived in Syria the next day to mediate in the conflict. Iraq responded to the Syrian offensive with the announcement that its own troops were massing on the common border, 'on their way to the front'.[17] On 9 June an emergency meeting of the ministerial council of the League of Arab States decided to deploy an Arab Security Force (ASF) in Lebanon, composed of 3,600 soldiers from eight member states, under the overall supervision of Egyptian foreign minister Fahmi. A meeting of Arab foreign ministers the next day also praised the PLO for adhering to the various ceasefires and accords in Lebanon.[18] The arrival of the first Arab truce observers in Beirut on 13 June restored relative calm to the capital, although only 500 Libyan soldiers of the promised ASF followed on 21 June. They were joined by 500 Syrian commandos to form the nucleus of the ASF, while the remaining garrison of 1,500 Syrians left Beirut for the Biqaʿ Valley.

Although major clashes ceased in the main cities, Syrian units continued to sweep the Biqaʿ Valley for guerrillas and their Lebanese supporters, while the latter responded with small-scale attacks that took a constant toll of Syrian troops and vehicles.[19] The PLO accused Syrian agents of planning to assassinate PLO and LNM leaders, while in Syria Fateh facilties were closed down and hundreds of members were detained.[20] The Syrian army also im-

prisoned dozens of PLA officers and soldiers, among them Qadisiyya Forces commander Fakhri Shaqqura and battalion commanders Sa'ib al-ʿAjiz and ʿAbdullah Siyam, and recalled others whose loyalty was suspect to Damascus, among them Muhammad Qasim, Majid Shahrur, and Jamal Abu-Zayid. Units of the Hittin Forces that had not defected were returned to Syria on 20 June, following further mutinies a few days earlier, but much of the 415 Artillery Battalion had already defected to the PLO in the ʿAyntura region.[21]

Syria had not offered an official explanation of its actions in Lebanon since 5 June, but a fortnight later Asad maintained that the entire battle had in fact been an internal conflict between rival PLO factions.[22] He subsequently insisted that Syria had intervened to defend both the Palestinians and Lebanon, arguing that it had done so in response to an appeal by a summit meeting of Lebanese Muslim leaders at ʿAramun (of which there was no record). Besides, he added, the Palestinians had no more right in Lebanon than Syria, and could not exclude it.[23] On the other side, Khalaf considered that 'Asad is trying to achieve what the Jordanian army failed to do [in 1970–1]'. He described the Syrian intervention as an 'invasion' intended to attain the US aim of forming a Syrian–Jordanian–Palestinian union.[24] The DFLP, which had tried hard to maintain good relations with Damascus (and was allowed in return to receive Soviet arms supplies through Syria up to March, and maybe later), now accused Syrian policy of leading to the partition of Lebanon.[25]

Despite general hostility to the Syrian intervention, opinion within the PLO and LNM was divided regarding Arab mediation and negotiations with Syria. Khalaf and Qaddumi expressed willingness to accept Syrian demands for the return of Saʿiqa to Beirut and other cities, albeit only after a full Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, but the PFLP and other rejectionists demanded the expulsion of Saʿiqa from the PLO.[26] Indeed, the PFLP and its allies sought *guerre à l'outrance*. On 17 June members of the PFLP's Lebanese sister party, the ASAP, killed the US ambassador to Lebanon, Francis Melloy, and his bodyguard and driver. Their intention was to drag the USA into the Lebanese conflict, believing that this would trigger a wider war of national liberation and a second Vietnam.[27] Eleven days later, a Palestinian team hijacked a French airliner to Entebbe in Uganda, where they held 83 Israeli passengers hostage. When Israeli commandos freed the hostages and killed the hijackers in a dramatic rescue operation, the PFLP described their leader, Fayiz Jabir, as the head of its Special Operations branch, although the operation had in fact been conducted by Wadiʿ Haddad.[28]

The Siege of Tal al-Zaʿtar

By then, attention was firmly focused elsewhere. On 20 June Shamʿun's Tigers militia launched a major offensive on the Tal al-Zaʿtar and Jisr al-Basha refugee

camps in east Beirut, which were inhabited by 21,000 Palestinians and 10,000 Lebanese rural migrants. The camps had effectively been under blockade since the beginning of the year, when the last delivery of fresh food was made; the Maronite militias sporadically allowed shipments of durable foods and other supplies, the last being on 24 April.[29] The local command prudently stockpiled food to last 2,000 fighters for two months, while elected 'popular committees' provided for the basic needs of the civilian population by redistributing stocks of grain, pulses, and other durables seized from warehouses in the outlying Dikwana and Mkallis neighbourhoods. The defence consisted of 1,200 militiamen, stiffened by 60–70 guerrillas and PLA soldiers who operated some three dozen support weapons.[30] There were few fortifications, however, and the 18 air raid shelters built by the PLO in 1975 could accommodate only 60 per cent of the population of Tal al-Zaʿtar.[31] Jisr al-Basha lay on a steep slope and rocky soil that impeded similar construction, but its breeze-block houses provided a better defence than the tin shacks of its larger neighbour. This became evident on the first day of the Maronite offensive, when up to 5,000 shells landed on the camps, damaging up to 70 per cent of their housing.[32]

For the first month, much of the battle around Tal al-Zaʿtar was in fact waged in Mkallis and other outlying areas that the defenders had seized to provide a protective shield. They gave little ground at first, repeatedly retaking buildings and high points lost to the Maronite forces. The balance was shifted by the entry of the Phalanges Party in the battle on 24 June, and again a week later when rebel factions of the Lebanese army led by Fuʿad Malik and Antoine Barakat committed their infantry, armour, and artillery fully to the onslaught. Under pressure, the defence ceded Jisr al-Basha on 29 June; the vengeful besiegers shot or hacked dozens of unarmed men to death, committed numerous acts of rape and looting, and then expelled the surviving refugees to west Beirut. Fateh and AAL artillery based in the Matn mountains and Beirut now protected Tal al-Zaʿtar with a 'curtain of fire' that was brought down with pinpoint accuracy on Maronite attack waves, but the defence was gradually pushed back into the camp perimeter by 20 July.

The PLO made several attempts to relieve Tal al-Zaʿtar or divert Maronite pressure during this period, but to no avail. The need to defend additional fronts (totalling some 120 kilometres in length) against the Syrian army stretched the Joint Forces to the limit, and the PLO was simply unable to muster sufficient reserves to support a breakout plan proposed by the camp command in late June.[33] Instead, the various members of the PLO–LNM coalition mounted a series of small attacks on Maronite lines in the ʿAyn al-Rummana suburb and other areas, that revealed all the failings of poor command, training, coordination, and general lack of cohesion. The account submitted by one Fateh officer of an attack he commanded painted an eloquent picture. Taking part were 'three PFLP squads, three PPSF squads, two squads from ʿIsam al-ʿArab [a pro-Nasir 'boss'], two PF–GC squads, the Martyr Hasan Salama Unit [Fateh's Force 17], an AAL platoon (with an armoured car and two

personnel carriers), but the PLA did not arrive nor did the fire support'. Halfway, 'the PFLP and PF–GC withdrew leaving the right flank empty and confusing the attack . . . the armoured car refused to advance . . . and the Force 17 platoon fled.'[34]

Fateh relied increasingly on its own forces as a result, but experienced much the same difficulties. For example, a force of 120 Fateh guerrillas and PLA soldiers melted away to a mere 20 by the time it reached its target of Monteverdi, on the way to Tal al-Zaʿtar, on 1 July.[35] A repeat effort the next day started more successfully, as a company of Fateh guerrillas occupied the slopes below Bayt Miri, and bulldozers opened an earth road to allow a column of vehicles carrying support weapons and 250 Joint Forces fighters to advance on Qurtaza.[36] Syrian fire from ʿAyn al-Sihha broke up the attack, however, and the attempt was abandoned. Two nights later, on 4 July, some 200 Fateh and LNM militiamen attacked the villages of Bdadun and ʿArayya, with the aim of circling around Kahhala and cutting the main road to the major Fayyadiyya barracks below, but low levels of coordination, battle management, and fire support compelled the attackers to withdraw after a loss of 20 dead.[37]

Even as the Joint Forces retreated from Bdadun and ʿArayya, the Fateh commander in north Lebanon, 'haj' Hasan, led a surprise attack on the coastal town of Shakka in the hope of diverting Maronite forces away from Tal al-Zaʿtar. PLO central operations room chief Saʿd Sayil had opposed the plan—apparently because the PLO was due to meet Syrian and Maronite representatives at a meeting in Sawfar of the Arab truce committee on the same day—but the mixed force of 400 guerrillas and militiamen had full control by early afternoon.[38] However, the breakdown of discipline among the Joint Forces attackers, many of whom turned to looting, and the death of Hasan and his deputy in an artillery barrage, allowed the Maronite forces to mount a devastating counter-attack.[39] Fateh's Galilee Battalion and Mounted Force intervened to prevent total rout, but the Joint Forces had lost 30 killed and over 20 out of 50 vehicles.[40] The triumphant Maronites seized 15 villages in the Kura region over the next week, including Infa, and the major towns of Amyun and Bturram, while Syrian units encircled the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp again.

The plight of Tal al-Zaʿtar worsened steadily from mid-July onwards. Fateh patrols regularly made the dangerous journey through the wooded Beirut River valley and Maronite lines around the camp to deliver reinforcements and combat supplies—a total of 75 volunteers and nearly 100 RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers arrived this way—but the retraction of the defence perimeter gradually reduced the flow. Rejectionist and leftist circles intimated darkly that the mainstream leadership was determined not to rescue Tal al-Zaʿtar in punishment for the hostility of its cadres to the PLO 'phased' political programme, but there was little succour to be had from the 'Soviet group' in Fateh either. A delegation of Fateh cadres from the camp who were caught in west Beirut pleaded with central committee Salih for a greater military effort, but he

reminded them angrily of their opposition to him during the factional dispute in 1972 and accused them of continuing to support his former rival, Yahya ʿAshur.[41] The Joint Forces commander in the ʿAyntura region, ʿAmla, stubbornly refused requests from the PLO central operations room to release any of his 1,600 men or his armour and artillery detachments to the battle for Tal al-Zaʿtar or to attack Bayt Miri, arguing that he needed these resources to face Maronite and Syrian threats on three sides.

In any case, the greatest pressure on Tal al-Zaʿtar was the shortage of water, food, and medical supplies. The entire camp had only three sources of water by the end of June, and was reduced to a single working tap from 14 July onwards. This lay on the frontline, and up to 25 refugees were killed or wounded by sniper and machine-gun fire every night for the next month as they tried to reach it. Malnutrition and dehydration were rife among children, while gangrene, tetanus, and loss of blood claimed a growing number of victims as antibiotics and plasma ran out, and compelled doctors to resort more frequently to amputation of injured limbs.[42] Salt water was now the only remaining means for sterilization. Yet flight was not an option: Maronite militiamen murdered over 90 civilians after seizing several buildings in Dikwana on 12 July. The defence refused to give ground after 20 July, however, and grimly endured the bombardment for the next 23 days.

Diplomacy Frustrated

The general military stalemate was accompanied by the revival of diplomacy. Arafat had returned secretly to Lebanon on 4 July, coming ashore at Sidon amidst Syrian rockets, and initiated a private dialogue with the Phalanges Party over the next fortnight. The result was an agreement on 18 July to establish a neutral buffer zone in Beirut and restore water and electricity supplies to both sides, followed by a ceasefire on 23 July.[43] However, Shamʿun's militia prevented a planned evacuation of 100 wounded from Tal al-Zaʿtar on 21 July and the deployment of the ASF in east Beirut four days later. By now there were at least 400 dead and 500 wounded in the camp, and Arafat authorized the start of formal negotiations with Syria to obtain a truce. For its part, the Syrian government, which stated that it was now host to one million refugees from Lebanon, faced growing domestic opposition to its intervention and was equally interested in resolving the conflict.[44] A few dozen Syrian soldiers had deserted to the Joint Forces in June and many more were arrested; a number of units were withdrawn to Syria for failing to obey orders, and the PLO and Iraq reported the defection of two combat pilots and the execution of ten others.[45] As serious was Soviet displeasure: military shipments to the Syrian army were slowed in June, and in mid-July Leonid Brezhnev sent a stiff letter to Asad insisting on full withdrawal from Lebanon.[46]

Once again, Palestinian opinion was divided over the negotiations with

Syria. PFLP central committee member Taysir Qubbaʿa questioned the utility of talks with Syrian leaders who were bent on containing the PLO and eliminating the LNM, and expressed renewed fear of *tahjim*.[47] The PFLP was in the minority, however, and Fateh's Qaddumi, ʿAbbas, and Ghnaym were joined by the DFLP and PF–GC in the meetings that started in Damascus on 20 July, in the presence of Libyan envoy Jallud.[48] The formal agreement reached on 29 July provided for a general ceasefire, placed the 'joint higher security committee' under a League of Arab States chair, and called for roundtable talks between the Lebanese protagonists chaired by president-elect Sarkis. The Syrian-brokered Constitutional Document was endorsed as the basis for national reconciliation, and PLO–Lebanese relations would be regulated in accordance with the 1969 Cairo agreement and the Syrian proposals of February 1976.[49] The status of the Syrian contingent in Lebanon was not mentioned, ignoring PLO demands that it be wholly withdrawn and replaced by the ASF. The PLO had implicitly acknowledged Syria as its guarantor in Lebanon, and agreed to separate discussion of its status and privileges from intra-Lebanese talks.

The accord might have resolved the Lebanese conflict, but faced energetic opposition. The rejectionists opposed it bitterly on the Palestinian side. Junblat gave the accord a cautious welcome, but protested that it allowed excessive Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs and renewed the call for a full withdrawal of Syrian forces.[50] On the Maronite side, Franjiyya maintained his opposition to the deployment of ASF contingents belonging to certain Arab states and insisted on complete PLO disarmament and the expulsion of all guerrillas and other personnel not registered by UNRWA as resident refugees since 1949.[51] Maronite forces also escalated sharply by launching a week-long offensive against Fateh positions on the Sannin plateau on 27 July, in which they incurred some 300 casualties, and later suffered substantial losses in major attacks on Fateh positions in the al-Karmaliyya monastery, to the east of Tripoli.[52]

Most significant was the volte-face by Arafat, Khalaf, and other Fateh officials, whether because they were displeased with the concessions made by Qaddumi, ʿAbbas, and Ghnaym in Damascus or in order to circumvent the agreement and obtain better terms. Khalaf led the way on 30 July, stating belligerently that the Syrian initiative of February 1976 could not be revived. His call for the expansion of the ASF to 6,000–8,000 men, with Egyptian support, and reaffirmation of the alliance with the LNM could only provoke Syrian ire.[53] Arafat now accused the Syrians of altering the text of the accord to include strong condemnation of the Egyptian disengagement agreement of September 1975 with Israel, and hurried to mend relations with Egypt. The 'Soviet group' in Fateh was confident of Soviet support, especially after learning of Brezhnev's protest to Asad, and speculated that the USSR was about to land Cuban, Czechoslovak, or other Soviet-bloc troops in Lebanon to assist the PLO.[54] Abu-Sharar reflected this self-confidence in a speech given in Moscow on 1 August, in which he accused Syria of seeking to impose its tutelage over the PLO and

noted acidly that the Syrian army could serve the Palestinian cause better on the Golan front than in Lebanon.[55] *Filastin al-Thawra* meanwhile argued that Syria's intentions should be put to the test by ending the tacit alliance with the Maronites, restoring ties with the LNM, and lifting the siege of Tal al-Zaʿtar.[56] Taken against this backdrop, PLO support for the formation on 1 August of a splinter group headed by the commander of Saʿiqa forces in Lebanon, Hanna Bathish, could only be construed by Damascus as an added gesture of defiance.

This debate took place amidst a paroxysm of violence around the besieged pockets in east Beirut. The first target was Nabʿa, which had been struck by an average of 150–300 shells daily since 16 July, prompting an exodus that reduced its population from 30,000 in mid-year (down from 100,000 at the beginning of the conflict) to 15,000 by the end of July. The defence comprised a motley coalition of 36 groups, including several overtly Shiʿite gangs such as *Fityan ʿAli* (Youth of ʿAli) that were responsible for numerous sectarian killings, mustering 1,500 lightly armed militiamen (of whom 500 belonged to Fateh). Ten Fateh officers had provided military leadership since the end of 1975, and, as in all areas of Joint Forces control, assigned responsibility for the defence of different sections of the defence perimeter to a separate faction.[57] Thousands of civilians (and hundreds of militiamen) accepted a Maronite offer of safe passage to flee to west Beirut at the end of July, and on 1 August an unexpected offensive by the Armenian Tashnaq Party from neighbouring Burj Hammud inflicted some 200 dead on the remaining defenders.[58] Another 60 were killed in the final Maronite assault on 5 August and the surviving 150–250, including the Fateh commanders, fled as best they could; numerous civilians were also killed, and the remaining 5,000 were stripped of their possessions and expelled to the west, leaving Nabʿa to the looters.

Hardly had the Joint Forces received this blow than another followed in Tal al-Zaʿtar, where the situation had become desperate. Israel had recently delivered Super Sherman tanks and M-3 armoured personnel carriers to the Maronite militias, which were used to devastating effect: buildings were brought down by firing pointblank at their supporting pillars, causing the death of over 250 refugees sheltering in the basement of one building in Ras al-Dikwana on 24 July.[59] Some 1,000 inhabitants died in the three weeks to 3 August, and another 1,000 were reported wounded, prompting Arafat to renew negotiations with the Phalanges Party.[60] As a result, the International Commission of the Red Cross was allowed to evacuate 334 wounded to west Beirut on 3–4 August, followed by 500 children a day later. Yet Bashir Jmayyil, who had recently taken command of the Phalanges Party's Lebanese Forces militia (after a young defender from Tal al-Zaʿtar killed phalangist military commander William Hawi as he paraded his troops nearby), and Shamʿun joined forces to launch a final assault on Tal al-Zaʿtar on 8 August. The new ceasefire agreement reached between Arafat and senior party officials in the presence of Arab mediators on 10 August was doomed, and the PLO anxiously concluded that

the Maronite intention was to force it into renewed confrontation with the Syrian army.[61]

The remaining 400 defenders of Tal al-Zaʿtar were running short of ammunition and food, and finally lost the vital water tap that had kept the camp alive on 10 August. Their fate was sealed when the local Saʿiqa commander, Bilal al-Hasan, and some of his men surrendered their positions during the night in return for safe escort to Syrian lines.[62] Some 3,000 civilians had braved Maronite fire to flee on 9–10 August, and were followed by the remaining 9,000–12,000 two days later. The defence command ordered the surviving fighters to break out through the Beirut River valley; Fateh artillery provided cover and pinpointed the routes out, and 300 men and women finally reached safety in ʿAlay after losing many comrades to Maronite ambushes.[63] The Phalanges Party had pledged the PLO not to harm Palestinians who surrendered to ASF representatives, and its loudspeaker vans relayed these terms to the camp in the morning of 12 August, but between 1,000 and 2,000 civilians were shot or hacked to death in the next few hours.[64] Bulldozers came close behind, razing the camp and crushing anyone in hiding or too weak to walk.[65] Maronite militiamen and civilians from other areas arrived to take part in the massacre, and additional victims died at each of the nine checkpoints that the terrified survivors had to pass on their way to west Beirut. The death toll in the 55-day siege stood at 3,500—of whom 450 had belonged formally to a PLO group and another 750 were armed volunteers—taking the camp's total for the entire conflict to 4,280.[66]

The fall of Nabʿa and Tal al-Zaʿtar provoked angry reactions from most Palestinian groups. Khalaf blamed Syria frankly, as did DFLP deputy secretary-general Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu.[67] ʿAbd-Rabbu had been invited to Damascus on 6 August in a bid to mend relations, but now stated that the Syrian leadership had broken a pledge to prevent such a massacre and accused it not only of pinning down the Joint Forces, but also of seconding senior army officers to Maronite headquarters during the siege.[68] The Syrian authorities retaliated by closing down DFLP offices in Damascus, but faced an incipient rebellion in the PF–GC, whose spokesman, Muhammad ʿAbbas Zaydan, blamed the fall of Tal al-Zaʿtar on the policy of 'appeasing Syria and negotiating with it'.[69] The PFLP apparently sought a more dramatic response, as four of its gunmen attacked an Israeli passenger aircraft in Istanbul on 12 August and inflicted 24 casualties before being killed or captured. Syria meanwhile antagonized the LNM by opposing its participation in the meetings of the Arab truce committee; Junblat's Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party responded by announcing the creation of a Popular Army in its strongholds in the Matn and Shuf mountains, and the LNM by renewing its demand for replacement of the Syrian army with the ASF.[70]

Junblat also drew a new 'red line' by rejecting Syrian demands for a Joint Forces withdrawal from the ʿAyntura 'pocket', as it was known, and vowed to turn it into 'a second Tal al-Zaʿtar' if attacked.[71] Retention of ʿAyntura now

became a rallying cry not only for the combined Palestinian and Lebanese Left, but also for the 'Soviet group' in Fateh, that viewed its command of the region, which it fondly called 'the red pocket', as a major embodiment of its status and political design.[72] This posed a problem for Arafat, who considered that ʿAyntura deprived the PLO of badly-needed combat resources and aggravated relations with Damascus, not to mention the Maronites, still further. He pointedly reminded the other PLO and LNM groups on more than one occasion that they had contributed a mere 100 fighters out of 1,600 deployed in the region, and so did not bear the consequences of their stand, but was vehemently opposed. Yet Arafat was willing neither to undermine the alliance with Junblat and the LNM, nor to relinquish the ʿAyntura 'card' without improving the terms of the final settlement. Khalaf signalled the latter purpose clearly at the end of August by linking discussion of the ʿAyntura pocket to a general political settlement, and by suggesting that a Joint Forces withdrawal should be matched by a Syrian pullback, a line also taken up by *Filastin al-Thawra*.[73]

PLO determination to reinforce its negotiating position was meanwhile reflected in the major effort devoted to bringing in reinforcement, combat *matériel*, and basic supplies for the nearly two million civilians living in areas under its control. Its mainstay was the 'sea bridge' to Egypt that allowed it to bring in additional PLA troops, some 2,000 volunteers from the Palestinian university students population abroad, an Iraqi commando battalion, and between 1,500 and 5,500 members of the Iraqi Popular Army, as well as weapons and badly needed artillery shells donated by Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and South Yemen.[74] Saudi Arabia also provided flour and medical supplies, and several tankers of oil for the Jiyya thermal power station, while the PLO, LNM, and government ministries based in west Beirut purchased additional quantities of fuel, flour, and sugar from various Mediterranean suppliers. Up to four ships were arriving daily at Sidon, Tyre, Jiyya, and Tripoli by the end of August, with up to 7,500 tons of flour and several million litres of petrol being unloaded on peak days. The Israeli navy interdicted a growing number of ships after mid-August and sank an arms-carrying ship in Tyre harbour and another loaded with flour in Sidon, but curiously only intercepted one of 43 military sailings organized by the PLO throughout this period.[75] Fateh engineers also connected west Beirut to the Jiyya power station with a makeshift grid, making up for the loss of electricity supplies from the eastern half of the capital.[76]

Still seeking to increase combat strength, Fateh provided funds to the LNM and its own sector commanders to put additional numbers of recruits on the payroll in late August.[77] On 21 August, the PLO also decreed compulsory military service for all Palestinian males in Lebanon aged 18 to 30.[78] This aroused the dismay of refugee families, who feared further disruption to education and income, while the PFLP viewed the decision as merely a cynical ploy 'to soothe the wounds of Tal al-Zaʿtar and exert pressure during the negotia-

tions with Syria'.[79] Fateh and the DFLP had already raised two battalions among the survivors of Tal al-Zaʿtar, and after additional debate the PLO executive committee and central military command reaffirmed the mobilization decree with effect from 1 September.[80] The PLA was to provide training and receive 25–30 per cent of the intake, the rest being free to choose which guerrilla group to join.[81] Implementation was half-hearted, however, giving credence to PFLP suspicions. The PASC military police allowed hundreds of youths to sail abroad and gave exemption papers to many others. Only the DFLP applied the decree with a will, detaining hundreds of often unwilling recruits at roadblocks around the refugee camps.[82] Hostile reactions from the public, Fateh, and the PFLP compelled a halt, by which time the DFLP had 2,500–4,000 conscripts in its training camps, of whom it retained some 750.[83]

Vicious Circle

The PLO had stabilized its situation sufficiently by the end of August for Arafat to instruct Salama to renew the dialogue with the Phalanges Party. This led to an understanding on ways of dealing with the ʿAyntura pocket, prompting phalangist leader Jmayyil to declare publicly that he would accept the Cairo agreement without modification if the PLO withdrew from the Kisrwan mountains.[84] Again, however, neither side was able to persuade its allies. Franjiyya stated publicly that he wished to strip the PLO of its heavy weapons, permit only a token military presence in the refugee camps, and reduce the number of Palestinian refugees in the country to 120,000 (from an estimated 300,000).[85] He had only three weeks left of his term, but provocatively reshuffled the cabinet and assigned the defence portfolio to Shamʿun, a decision that prime minister Karami did not recognize. On 8 September, the Lebanese Front raised the pressure by asserting that the government was entitled to modify or abrogate the 1969 Cairo agreement at will.[86]

The PLO was also worried by widening rifts among its Lebanese allies. Most damaging was the antagonism between the LNM and imam Sadr, which stemmed in part from the inroads that his Amal movement had made in the past year among Shiʿites in the poverty-stricken suburbs of Beirut and in the south, who had previously been a major constituency of the LNM. Sadr's followers clashed with the militant wing of the PF–GC near Tyre in early July, and his public support for the Syrian army later in the month deepened tensions.[87] His attitude was based on the belief that the under-privileged Shiʿites could only improve their lot under a unified central government, and on the fear that prolonged civil war might trigger Israeli intervention. This would lead to partition and the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees in the south, causing yet further dislocation to the Shiʿites.[88] The fall of Nabʿa

brought matters to a head, as phalangist radio revealed that a local Amal official and the head of the *Fityan ʿAli* gang had negotiated safe passage for their followers and families.[89] A 'whispering' campaign now targeted the Shiʿites generally as 'the treacherous community' (*taʾifat al-ghadr*), and the LNM forcibly closed several Amal offices on 11 August. The Palestinian Left joined in the criticism, accusing Sadr of serving a Syrian–Maronite alliance.[90] To curb the population exodus, the Joint Forces command issued a formal ban three days later preventing families in the predominantly Shiʿite southern suburbs from leaving the capital.[91]

Another serious rift was triggered by LNM insistence on expanding the parallel civilian administration, which it had formally established following the Syrian intervention in June. The administration had virtually no impact beyond a few parts of west Beirut, but Junblat tried to revive it in response to the fall of Nabʿa, a defeat he blamed partly on Sadr and Shiʿite parliamentary speaker Kamil al-Asʿad.[92] This aroused the open hostility of a range of 'traditional' Sunni and Shiʿite leaders, as well as some Sunni militia leaders in the Joint Forces coalition, many of whom resented the pre-eminence of the Druze Junblat. Several conservative members of parliament and religious leaders now formed rival groupings; former prime minister Saʾib Salam met phalangist leader Jmayyil, and on 12 September accused Junblat of 'wishing to fight on until the last Muslim and the last Palestinian' in order to keep the ʿAyntura pocket.[93] AAL commander Ahmad al-Khatib added to the drama by ending the alliance with the LNM and opposing its civilian administration; he also declared that he would place the AAL at the disposal of president-elect Sarkis and rejoin a reconstituted Lebanese army.[94] Junblat lashed back angrily, scorning those 'who are crawling on their bellies to Damascus'.[95] The DFLP and other Palestinian leftists had been openly critical of the traditional Sunni leaders since June, and similarly labelled them as 'merchants of religion' and 'lackeys of Damascus' after the fall of Nabʿa.[96]

Arafat, conversely, was keen to prevent a further loss of Sunni support and wooed the traditional leaders assiduously. His close aide Hani al-Hasan lobbied, albeit futilely, for the formation of a 'broad national front' comprising the LNM and its main Sunni rivals, the Islamic Assembly and the National Union Front.[97] Khalaf meanwhile criticized the LNM for rejecting recent Syrian proposals for talks, and called on it to 'revise its stands and its practice'.[98] What these stands revealed was that Fateh now sought a bilateral agreement with Sarkis that would circumvent Syria. Khalaf signalled this by insisting that further talks with the Maronite camp and Syria were useless until 'a legitimate Lebanese government' was in place, and by privately offering to hand the ʿAyntura pocket over to the LNM and AAL as a means of defusing the crisis.[99] The PLO repeated this offer to Lebanese officials in the presence of Syrian military negotiators in Sawfar on 10–11 September, but the Syrians concluded that it was merely testing their resolve and did not intend to make serious concessions.[100]

Arafat was indeed playing for time, but he also faced growing internal resistance. Habash, for one, doubted the utility of Arab diplomacy and declared the PLO unconcerned with the mission of League of Arab States envoy Hasan Sabri al-Khuli.[101] He also criticized 'the defensive posture' of the LNM and accused the PLO leaders of 'always making concessions, as if they had learned nothing from the experience in Jordan', and on 5 September, possibly seeking to demonstrate the alternative, a PFLP team hijacked a KLM aircraft to Cyprus.[102] The 'Soviet group' in Fateh also became more belligerent as the talks focused on the fate of the ʿAyntura pocket. Abu-Sharar gave a clear example in a speech on 6 September in which he reiterated the rallying cry of 'no Syrian tutelage', insisted on full Syrian withdrawal, and renewed support for an intra-Lebanese dialogue as the means to end the conflict.[103] For its part, the LNM adamantly refused to cede on any matter of substance so long as Syria refused to recognize its special status and allow it separate representation at the talks.

The outcome was graphically demonstrated when Khuli succeeded in convening a further round of talks in Shtura on 17 September. Arafat agreed to withdraw from the ʿAyntura pocket under relentless pressure from Syrian air force commander Jamil, who promised in return that the League of Arab States could supervise the withdrawal and that Syrian units would be placed under the ASF flag.[104] A storm of protest met Arafat on his return to Beirut, resulting in his retraction at the next round of talks on 19 September. The PLO chairman now demanded that Syria should conduct a dialogue with Junblat and withdraw from Sawfar as a sign of good will, and ignored a subsequent suggestion from Syria for the PLO to present ʿAyntura to Sarkis as an inauguration gift on 23 September.[105]

The latest failure convinced Syria of the need to decide the issue militarily. A timely attack by three gunmen claiming to belong to the unknown Black June Organization on a hotel in Damascus on 26 September provided an ideal pretext. Syrian commandos captured the terrorists after they had killed a guest, and the authorities maximized the impact on public opinion by hanging them in a public square the next day. The incident was the work of the notorious Abu Nidal faction led by Sabri al-Banna, but Syria disregarded this fact and the immediate PLO condemnation to launch an offensive on the ʿAyntura pocket on 28 September. Two brigades advanced along four axes, and the Joint Forces had ceded the entire area by 2 October. Maronite forces tried to take advantage with a two-battalion assault on Qmatiyya and Dhar al-Wahsh on 1 October, but were beaten back with heavy losses of some 150 dead in what proved to be their last offensive action of the war.[106]

The 'battle of the mountain' was finally over, both militarily and politically. The fact that the Joint Forces had lost a mere 11 killed and 40 wounded in five days of combat against the Syrian army (besides 15 dead in repelling the Maronite assault), belied claims of killing 180 Syrians and destroying 35–50 vehicles in the first two days alone.[107] The Joint Forces were also compelled to

leave behind nearly all their combat vehicles, artillery, and other equipment. A principal casualty of the rout was area commander ʿAmla, who had bitterly opposed a negotiated withdrawal and most recently asserted that determined guerrillas could hold the rugged terrain of the ʿAyntura pocket against major attack for a whole month. Yet, as his detractors acidly noted, he had escaped early enough to leave by car before Syrian units cut the few roads out. His final orders were for every unit to fight and then withdraw as it saw fit.[108] The mainstream Fateh leadership was not displeased: it had given ʿAmla all the rope he needed in the way of combat resources and operational leeway, as Wazir saw it, and he had obligingly hanged himself with it.[109] ʿAmla was now relieved of command duties, and assigned to a nominal post in the PLO central operations room.

For Arafat, the loss of the ʿAyntura pocket had removed a political albatross from the PLO's neck and reopened the way for a substantive dialogue with Sarkis. So convenient was it, indeed, that the PFLP accused the mainstream leadership of taking 'an individual decision' to order the precipitate withdrawal and of concocting a 'theatrical battle' to disguise its role.[110] Sarkis, for his part, was equally interested in a reconciliation, feeling that further bloodshed would complicate the task of building a stable political order in Lebanon. He was also anxious to limit Syrian influence, and had recently rejected a Syrian proposal to sign a bilateral security pact.[111] Sarkis had opposed Syrian plans to retake the ʿAyntura pocket by force, for both these reasons.[112] The PLO chairman and Lebanese president now held lengthy telephone discussions, followed by intensive meetings between their representatives. On 8 October, the two sides approved a draft agreement consisting of four main elements: an immediate ceasefire to be policed by the ASF, which would also act as a buffer force; withdrawal of all other forces to the positions held prior to 13 April 1975; reopening of all ports and roads and the return of public buildings and facilities to government control; and return of all displaced persons to their original homes.[113]

Khuli had arranged a new round of talks on 9 October, and was present when the PLO and Lebanese delegations submitted a joint working paper to the astonished Syrian delegates. The document also proposed immediate reconciliation talks between the various Lebanese protagonists, followed by an orderly PLO withdrawal from the Matn mountains and by implementation of the 1969 Cairo agreement without, the PLO news agency stressed, Syrian involvement.[114] Taken aback, the Syrian side suggested consulting the Maronite Lebanese Front, which signalled its displeasure with increased shelling and firefights throughout the country. The PLO also faced opposition from its own ranks, as Habash described its proposals as 'a cheap Syrian–US deal' and denounced both the Shtura meeting and the very principle of negotiation.[115]

The PLO had mounted a diplomatic *coup*, nonetheless, which it translated into an official draft agreement with the Lebanese side at a follow-up meeting

in Shtura on 11 October. As Khuli happily announced to the press, the protagonists had reached '100 per cent agreement'.[116] Yet the Syrians were reluctant to accept the latest fait accompli, and requested a two-day break for consultations in Damascus. Their leadership apparently considered that it was strong enough both to dictate terms and to extend its deployment throughout Lebanon, and had been preparing for a renewed offensive in recent days.[117] Khaddam, Jamil, and Muhammad al-Khuli (military intelligence) had received a high-ranking phalangist delegation in early October, and Syrian officers accompanied it on a tour of the Jizzin area, to which the Maronite command had reportedly transferred a total of 1,580 fighters since mid-August, also under Syrian escort.[118] The Syrian command was moreover responsible for an abortive attempt by guerrillas loyal to Jibril to assault offices held by the militant wing of the PF–GC in Beirut on 7 October.

Syrian discomfit was evident, but terrorist attacks by the Abu Nidal faction on the Syrian embassies in Rome and Islamabad on 11 October again offered a pretext for military action. Blaming Fateh, the Syrian command launched a large attack on PLO positions west of Jizzin at noon the next day. Its forces advanced cautiously at first, taking only one village in the first two days and finally stopping six kilometres short of Sidon on 14 October. PLO eavesdropping on Syrian radio traffic showed that many commanders were reluctant to press forward, and halted at every sign of resistance. However, the weight of the Syrian offensive came in the Matn mountains, where Bhamdun was struck by an intense gun and rocket artillery barrage in the morning of 13 October. Syrian infantry and commandos led the attack in most points in order to avoid anti-tank ambushes and flush out the Joint Forces, and conducted a successful encirclement at Baʿlshmayya on the second day. Combat was bitter in some sectors—the angry Syrians shot a number of prisoners and threw others to their deaths from rooftops—but the bulk of the 800 defenders had retreated by the morning of 14 October.[119] Chaos reigned for the next few hours. The various Joint Forces contingents withdrew hastily to ʿAlay, but 30 members of Fateh's student battalion formed a new defence line on their own initiative. They might have remained alone had Wazir not arrived at midday and promptly ordered up guerrilla reinforcements.

The Syrian forces were still securing their flanks, and did not reach the new defence line in time to continue their advance before dark. Nor did they renew the attack the next morning, because Asad had accepted a general ceasefire after Arab intercession. This was a triumph for Arafat, whose 'order of the day' at the beginning of the battle for Bhamdun had exhorted the Joint Forces to stand firm for between 24 and 48 hours, in order to allow sufficient time to mobilize Arab diplomatic intervention.[120] They had done so, at a cost of 50 killed or captured, and two days later Asad, Arafat, and Sarkis joined Sadat, Kuwaiti amir Jabir al-Sabah, and Saudi king Khalid in the Saudi capital, Riyadh. The PLO scored an additional victory when the other Arab leaders agreed not to invite king Husayn, despite vigorous lobbying by Asad. The meeting declared a general

ceasefire in Lebanon with effect from 21 October, and agreed to change the ASF mandate from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement, for which purpose its strength was to be increased to 30,000. The Lebanese government was to regain control over all ports, borders, and public buildings and installations, while the PLO was to implement the 1969 Cairo agreement within 45 days of the establishment of the expanded ASF, now designated the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF).[121]

Last-minute disputes still threatened the agreement. The PLO argued vehemently against having more than token Syrian participation in the ADF, but its Arab allies were either unwilling to contribute troops or faced Syrian and Lebanese opposition. The 25,000 Syrian soldiers already in Lebanon were incorporated into the ADF, with Saudi, Sudanese, and South Yemeni units bringing the total to 30,000.[122] The PLO also faced opposition within its own ranks. The PFLP was again the most vociferous, having accused the mainstream Fateh leadership even during the battle for Bhamdun of conducting negotiations solely in order to assure its withdrawal. It now launched a virulent campaign against Syria and the Riyadh agreement, and an editorial in *al-Hadaf* asked plaintively 'why not attack' the Syrian army instead of remaining on the defensive?[123] In blissful obliviousness to reality, another essay in the same issue argued for 'a comprehensive people's war, and the extermination of enemy forces'.[124]

However, the peace process could no longer be derailed. A full Arab summit conference in Cairo on 25–26 October formally endorsed the Riyadh agreement, and joint committees hammered out timetables for the withdrawal of combatants and the deployment of the ADF. An informal ceasefire was already in force between the Joint Forces and the Syrian army, but exchanges of fire still took place with Maronite forces in various parts of the country. The two halves of Beirut were struck by some 2,000 shells in one last night of indiscriminate bombardment, but an unusual calm finally descended on the capital at daybreak on 21 October. PLO guerrilla units were transferred to the south over the next week, taking strength there to 4,000–4,500 (besides 2,000 on garrison duty elsewhere). The ADF only commenced deployment in the Beirut area on 10 November, having started with Tripoli and Sidon two days earlier, and then extended into the Matn and Shuf mountains and the Maronite heartland.

Hostilities at last over, the PLO could take stock of the cost of eighteen months of civil war. Fateh and loyalist PLA units had lost 900 dead and the smaller Palestinian groups another 900, while the various parties of the LNM suffered a total of 700–900 deaths.[125] Especially painful for the PLO was the loss of veteran personnel, including over a dozen brigade and battalion commanders. The Maronite forces had incurred a comparable toll of at least 3,000 dead, but Syrian losses remained unknown.[126] The civilian population had suffered the most grievous losses, totalling some 14,000 dead, of whom 9,000–11,000 were killed by Maronite or Syrian action and 3,000–5,000 by

Joint Forces fire. The PLO Social Affairs Institution, which paid monthly stipends to Lebanese and Palestinian families who had lost a member due to hostile action, had 10,000 cases on its registers at the end of the war.[127] Yet horrendous as the toll was, the Lebanese conflict was far from over.

17

A Ceasefire, Not a Truce

The resolution provided by the Riyadh and Cairo summit conferences for the Lebanese conflict provided welcome relief for the PLO, but left its mainstream leadership facing a triangle of interrelated political challenges. Its central purpose was to develop an independent diplomatic strategy, in order to gain a formal role in the Middle East process and ultimately obtain tangible rewards, but this depended on its ability to preserve institutional autonomy in the face of Arab (especially Syrian) pressures and to contain internal opposition. PLO ambition to become the key power broker in Lebanon had ultimately been frustrated, effectively ending its direct intervention in the reshaping of Lebanese state and society. This by no means indicated a complete loss of influence or an end to manipulative politics—quite the contrary in fact, as the PLO had undeniably become an integral actor in the new balance of power in the country—but it encouraged continued movement towards a more self-contained and clearly demarcated Palestinian statist framework. For the next year, however, the PLO was principally engaged in a complicated holding action: extending the truce in Lebanon and containing the damage done to relations with Syria, while conducting a discreet diplomatic dialogue with the US.

The Middle East peace process had been in hiatus since the conclusion of the Sinai-II military disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel in September 1975, but the electoral victory of Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter in November 1976 signalled imminent reactivation of US diplomacy in the region. The immediate problem for the PLO, however, was to safeguard its base in Lebanon against various physical threats. The first came from Israel, which had not ceased its military pressure on the south at any point during the Lebanese conflict. Its launch of the Good Fence policy in mid-July had signalled the shift to overt intervention in Lebanese affairs, which it reinforced in August by opening new gates in the border fence at Kafr Kila and Rmaysh. The PLO and LNM paid little attention at the time, prompting the PLO planning centre to raise the alarm in a special report to Arafat on 2 September. The rival members of the local Joint Forces command were guilty of 'indifference and laxity' towards Israeli activity, it charged, and of being more interested in acquiring political influence and competing for control over the distribution of food and other supplies to the civilian population. Not only had they allowed the Israeli-backed Maronite soldiers from Qlayʿa to extend to Rmaysh and ʿAyn

Ibl, but their belated decision to impose a total blockade on the two villages had compelled the inhabitants to deal with Israel.[1]

Israeli policy was intended in large measure to pre-empt a return of PLO forces to south Lebanon. This became evident in October, as the tripartite negotiations in Shtura to end the civil war were met by a sharp escalation of hostilities by Israel's Maronite allies in the south. Shamᶜun, acting as defence minister, had secretly sent major Saᶜd Haddad to lead army personnel in the south at the end of August, and the Lebanese Front reportedly reinforced his command with 500 militiamen who travelled from Junia through Israel in early October.[2] Haddad's forces shelled major border towns repeatedly from 7 October onwards, and responded to the Riyadh conference ten days later by occupying Hanin (from which they expelled 200 Muslim families), Marjᶜuyun, and ᶜAyshiyya. This severed the PLO's principal route between its bases in east and west Lebanon that did not pass through the Syrian zone of control, and threatened a link-up with Maronite forces in the Jizzin district. The attacks coincided with expressions of Israeli concern that the Riyadh agreement would lead to the deployment of 30,000 Arab troops in Lebanon and to a guerrilla build-up in the south.[3] Thoroughly alarmed, the PLO quickly obtained assurances that the Syrian army would not move against it, and then hurriedly retook ᶜAyshiyya on 19 October, but failed to regain Marjᶜuyun.[4] An informal truce now held, and the PLO prudently kept the bulk of its forces at a distance from the border and refrained from military activity that could be interpreted by Israel as aggressive.

Equally worrying for the PLO was the potential threat from Syria. The central aim of Syrian policy in Lebanon was to restore stability and central control, which meant denying Israel any pretext for wider intervention in the south and halting Maronite support for partition or alignment with the Jewish state. Ensuring PLO adherence to Syrian priorities and limitations was essential in both cases, and to this end the Syrian leadership pressed its Palestinian counterpart on four distinct issues. Most important was the demand for strict implementation of the 1969 Cairo agreement, in pursuit of which Syria also sought the repatriation of PLO forces that had arrived in Lebanon during 1976 and the surrender of heavy weapons acquired since the beginning of the year. Its fourth, parallel objective was to reassert its influence within the Palestinian political arena, by obliging the PLO to reinstate its proxies. The PLO was well aware of Syrian aims and their consequences, but, as Fateh central committee Khalaf reluctantly admitted, the legitimacy granted to Syrian policy in Lebanon by the Riyadh and Cairo summit conferences necessitated compliance.[5] The dilemma for the mainstream leadership was to secure adherence by the militant guerrilla groups to the accords, while working at the same time to postpone implementation and reduce its scope and impact.

Syrian pressure commenced immediately after the Riyadh conference with the demand for the dismissal of key PLO media officials, under the guise of ending hostile propaganda and building goodwill.[6] The PLO successfully

resisted this demand, but its media now emphasized the importance of developing close ties with Syria.[7] Syrian pressure also compelled Arafat to retract a statement in which he confirmed that the USSR had suspended arms shipments to Syria during the summer as a sign of displeasure with the intervention in Lebanon.[8] More serious was Syria's insistence on the return of its Palestinian proxies to their former positions in the main cities and refugee camps. Besides Saʿiqa, this affected the PF–GC, whose leader Jibril had been confronted with a simple choice by Asad during a meeting in March: to remain aligned with the rejectionist front and Iraq, or to support Syrian policy in Lebanon.[9] As Jibril later explained to his followers, it was imperative for the Palestinians to avoid the fate of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, which collapsed after the loss of Iranian backing in spring 1975. The strategic alliance with Syria was therefore indispensable.[10] Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin similarly insisted on the need to coordinate Palestinian military action with Syria.[11]

The PLO was reluctant to rehabilitate Syria's proxies, prompting Muhsin to describe its leadership in early November as 'deviationist'.[12] Its continued prevarication prompted the Syrian command to order demonstrative deployments by the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) in various parts of Lebanon over a three-day period in mid-November.[13] The PLO finally relented, allowing Jibril to return to Beirut on 17 November, followed by Muhsin a week later. The militant wing of the PF–GC, led by official spokesman Muhammad ʿAbbas Zaydan, had openly opposed the Syrian intervention and now sneered that Jibril had returned to Beirut 'on top of a Syrian tank'.[14] Jibril, conversely, accused the militants of 'extorting protection money and forming gangs for robbing and looting under the guise of confiscations' during the Lebanese conflict.[15] He probably commanded only a minority of the rank-and-file in Lebanon, but now reconstituted an obedient politburo and requested the PLO to arrest his rivals, whom he described as 'queer and morally deviant'.[16] For their part the militants complained of persecution by Syrian troops with the assistance of Jibril's followers, and on 23 November two people died in a clash between the two factions in the ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp.[17]

Fateh had prevailed upon the DFLP to relinquish control over Saʿiqa offices in the Beirut area following clashes on 17 November, and signalled its goodwill by dissolving the anti-Syrian faction it had formed in August (the Leadership of the Palestinian Organization). A number of former Saʿiqa members, including at least one former battalion commander and several section heads, refused to return to the fold and instead joined Fateh.[18] Relations with Saʿiqa remained tense, and the Syrian-dominated ADF demanded PLO assistance in restoring Saʿiqa and PF–GC offices still held by rejectionist groups in Tripoli.[19] The tension erupted in a gun battle between Saʿiqa and a large crowd of angry refugees and rejectionists attending a funeral in the Nahr al-Barid camp on 6 December, in which 10 civilians and 10–15 Saʿiqa members died.[20] Muhsin reacted by calling for radical change in the composition of the PLO executive committee, but he and Arafat successfully resolved the dispute on 12 Decem-

ber, having met for the first time since May.[21] The next day Saʿiqa deployed 300 men (including Syrian soldiers in guerrilla uniform) to Beirut and Sidon. Tensions persisted, however, as the PF–GC and rejectionist groups clashed in Tripoli on 28 December and Syrian checkpoints arrested guerrillas transiting through the Biqaʿ Valley.[22]

The persistence of incidents reflected tensions over implementation of the 1969 Cairo agreement. In early November, the Syrian command appointed Lebanese colonel Ahmad al-Haj to command the ADF; he promptly called on the PLO to surrender its heavy weapons by 5 December. The PLO complained that his appointment violated the stipulation that a non-Lebanese officer should head the ADF, and on 2 December Arafat stated that the existing accords allowed the PLO to deploy certain types of weapons for the defence of the refugee camps.[23] Muhsin countered with a blunt argument: '[the Palestinians] are not free to keep tanks or heavy artillery; we do not need them in the camps, all we need are simple, ordinary weapons to defend ourselves'.[24] He also stated that 'it is no longer necessary for [PLO] forces to be based in south Lebanon in order to infiltrate into [Israel] . . . they may be in north Lebanon or Syria [instead] . . . I do not insist on the return of the guerillas to the ʿArqub and do not think it necessary for us to have a dense presence in the ʿArqub . . . [or] direct, daily [combat] tasks'.[25] Syrian checkpoints of the ADF intensified searches of PLO personnel and vehicles over the next few weeks, and Fateh guerrillas were subjected to harassment towards the end of the month.[26]

Under constant pressure, the PLO and LNM transferred most of their armour to the AAL, but the ADF responded to this subterfuge by seizing AAL barracks in the main cities and arresting its commander, Ahmad al-Khatib, on 26 January 1977.[27] The PLO also repatriated some 1,000 men of the PLA ʿAyn Jalut Forces and 850 of the reconstructed Qadisiyya Forces (including 100–300 defectors from the Syrian-controlled Hittin Forces and several hundred new recruits from Lebanon) to Egypt by mid-January.[28] Remaining PLA defectors took advantage of an amnesty to return to Syria, leaving barely 600 PLA personnel and PLF/PLA militiamen under PLO command in Lebanon. As the PLO reduced its military presence in the main cities, the ADF extended its presence to the southern town of Nabatiyya on 23 January.[29] The Fateh commander for south Lebanon, Saʿid Maragha, apparently attempted to oppose the latest deployment, and was severely wounded on the same day in an ambush by unidentified gunmen probably belonging to Saʿiqa. Fateh central committee member Ghnaym still insisted publicly that 'we do not fear the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and indeed regard such presence as protection for us', but his words rang hollow.[30]

PLO fears and Syrian insistence on asserting complete control were also linked to renewed tensions with the Maronite Lebanese Front. East Beirut was shaken by a series of bombings and shootings, with 50 people being killed and 46 wounded by a single car bomb on 3 January alone. The death of four

Maronite militiamen in Dawra the next day triggered a wave of sectarian murders and a mutiny of Maronite soldiers at a Lebanese army barracks, by the end of which some 100 Muslims had died.[31] The Phalanges Party added to the tension in mid-January by renewing its call for the abrogation of the Cairo agreement and the elimination of armed PLO presence in the south, while a Lebanese Front conference called a few days later for 'redistributing' the Palestinian refugees to other Arab states. This was accompanied by a constant stream of virulent anti-Palestinian statements from Maronite leaders and factions.[32] The affiliated Lebanese Forces militia meanwhile proposed 'decentralization' of the Lebanese political system, a term Syria understood to mean partition.[33] It responded by ordering the ADF to deploy in east Beirut on 22 January, and to take control of Junya and other illegal ports along the Lebanese coast.

Walking the Tightrope

Continuing Syrian pressure and renewed violence in Beirut posed a serious challenge for the PLO, which was convinced by the beginning of 1977 that a real opportunity was in the offing for it to gain a role in the Middle East peace process. Sadat and king Husayn revealed Arab expectations at the beginning of January by calling for the resumption of the Geneva peace conference. Their joint statement reaffirmed recognition of the PLO as sole Palestinian representative and insisted that it should participate in the talks as an independent interlocutor and on equal footing with other delegations, adding that the process should lead to the creation of 'an independent Palestinian entity'.[34] Syria had ended its boycott of Egypt by now, and the two countries formed a 'joint command'. Muhsin gave a remarkable indication of the shift in Syrian thinking by stating frankly that 'in return for liberating some land we may accept a truce [with Israel], for a longer or shorter period, and we may cancel the embargo on dealings with [it]'.[35] Asad was less direct, but endorsed the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, 'if that is what the Palestinians want'.[36]

Anticipating the revival of US diplomacy in the region, the mainstream PLO leadership initiated a private dialogue with a handful of dovish Israelis. On 1 January retired Israeli general Matityahu Peled revealed that he and unnamed PLO officials had agreed the 'principles of peace'. These contacts had taken place in various European capitals over the preceding year under the overall supervision of Fateh central committee member ʿAbbas, although PLO spokesmen stoutly denied the fact. ʿAbbas and the senior Fateh representative in the Gulf, Salim al-Zaʿnun, were publicly known only to have formed a committee in February 1976 to persuade Arab governments to allow the return of Jewish citizens who had emigrated to Israel after 1948.[37] As significant was the start of a hesitant dialogue between the PLO and Jordan. King Husayn revived thought

of a Jordanian–Palestinian federation on 11 January, and in mid-month received PNC speaker Khalid al-Fahum and Fateh revolutionary council member Hani al-Hasan.[38] The PLO central council gave its stamp of approval to the dialogue on 22 January and Fahum and ʿAbbas made a second visit to Amman in mid-February, despite a recent Jordanian statement rejecting the return of guerrilla units to the kingdom.[39]

Arafat took PLO diplomacy further by meeting UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim in Damascus on 5 February. The PLO opened offices in several foreign capitals (including Vienna, Helsinki, Tokyo, and Ankara) in the next few weeks. Waldheim, Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky, and Romanian president Nicolae Ceaucescu became active intermediaries for the PLO in its attempts to extend diplomatic 'feelers' to the US or Israel. The PLO envoys to the UN and London, Zuhdi al-Tarazi and Saʿid Hamami, also sent out political signals, for instance by advocating a federation of Palestinian and Jewish states. Arafat built on the rapidly growing momentum of these moves to announce towards the end of February that the PLO now sought a Palestinian state and was willing to attend the Geneva peace conference.[40] From Damascus, Ghnaym hurriedly stressed that the PLO would not negotiate on the basis of UNSCR 242, but Arafat's statement clearly signalled PLO willingness to coexist with Israel.

The most serious sign that the PLO was having an effect came on 17 February, when the new US secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, hinted that it could gain a seat at the peace talks. The main obstacle, he explained, was that its national charter failed to recognize Israel or to accept UNSCR 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiation.[41] It transpired that Arafat was meeting Egyptian foreign minister Ismaʿil Fahmi in Cairo on the same day to discuss possible amendments to the PLO charter.[42] Their attempt failed, but it was obvious by now that the PLO viewed a Palestinian state—implicitly limited to the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip—both as a viable goal and as a means of limiting any Jordanian role. The latter concern prompted PLO spokesman ʿAbd-al-Muhsin Abu-Mayzar and Arafat's close aide Hani al-Hasan to attack Sadat for proposing a Jordanian–Palestinian confederation on 20 February. At the same time, Fateh central committee member Qaddumi confirmed that the PLO would indeed attend the Geneva peace conference and subsequently establish an independent state if these steps were guaranteed by the US and other parties.[43]

The implications of these various statements were not lost on the rejectionist guerrilla groups. They had forfeited the opportunity to derail the dialogue with Jordan by boycotting the PLO central council on 22 January, partly because the meeting was held in Damascus, which they still considered as 'enemy territory'. In their bid to counter Fateh influence, the rejectionists opposed increasing the number of 'independents' in the PNC and blocked formal representation for the Palestinian branch of the JCP, which openly preferred negotiation with Israel to the much-vaunted armed struggle.[44] The rejectionists demanded 'near-

equivalent proportional representation' in the PNC instead, a contradiction in terms that obscured their junior role and ignored the difficulty of assuring an equitable distribution of seats without general Palestinian elections. PFLP secretary-general Habash had suffered a major heart attack in mid-January, but found the strength a month later to give a stark reminder of the rejectionist mood. He warned that the peace talks were intended to 'wipe us out finally', and promised ominously that 'we will do everything to harm the enemy, no matter where'.[45] This was not an empty threat, as five Palestinians had been arrested a month earlier while preparing to shoot down an Israeli El-Al passenger aircraft.[46]

The PLO was equally concerned to display its moderation and sense of responsibility, and announced that it had foiled a terrorist attack by the Abu Nidal faction in mid-January. Its Fateh-dominated leadership was proving able to contain the political challenge posed by the rejectionists, but faced a greater threat when they revived their feud with Syria and its Palestinian proxies. Fierce clashes broke out between the militant wing of the PF–GC and Jibril's followers in the Shatila and Burj al-Barajna refugee camps on 10–11 February, with the PFLP and ALF and Saʿiqa joining opposite sides. Fateh had previously provided the PF–GC militants with discreet military and financial backing and offered them shelter and identity cards in order to offset Syrian influence, but the eruption of fighting in the camps alarmed it.[47] Arafat quickly deployed the PASC military police and banned the other groups from putting their forces on the alert.[48] Syrian patience had already run out, however, and the ADF was instructed to prepare to assault the Fakhani district and Shatila and Burj al-Barajna camps in the early hours of 14 February. The Syrian command suspended the offensive only after last-minute intercession by Saudi Arabia, the US administration, and other parties.[49]

Fateh strove to defuse the tension by condemning the 'erroneous behaviour' and 'despicable acts' of the rejectionists, but the Syrian authorities retaliated by further restricting Palestinian activity and permanently closing down the Fateh military academy near Damascus.[50] The ADF tightened identity checks and weapons searches of Palestinian personnel around Lebanon, hampering the PLO reinforcement and resupply effort during the clashes that broke out in the south in the next few weeks. The Syrian command also deported dozens of officers of the PLA Hittin and Qadisiyya Forces, who had originally come to Syria from Gaza or the ʿAyn Jalut Forces, back to Egypt because their loyalty was deemed suspect.[51] Worse was still to come. The Iraqi–Syrian feud had sharpened since the attempt to assassinate Syrian foreign minister Khaddam in December 1976 and defence minister Mustafa Tlas in January 1977, prompting an even closer alliance between Iraq and the Palestinian rejectionists.[52] The rift resulted in bloody clashes between Saʿiqa, the PF–GC, and ALF in Nabatiyya on 6–7 March, leaving 25 dead and 35 wounded.

The clashes highlighted the climate of deepened distrust and sharpened polarization within the Palestinian arena. The rejectionists had taken note of

repeated references in recent weeks by Egyptian president Sadat to PLO readiness to recognize Israel and of his calls for a formal US–PLO dialogue. They reasoned, and their information suggested, that where there was smoke there was fire. A statement by US president Carter on 16 March, in which he called for the first time for the creation of a 'Palestinian homeland' within the framework of Jordan 'or by other means', indicated the existence at least of an indirect US–PLO dialogue.[53] The trend was confirmed during the 13th session of the PNC, held in Cairo on 12–20 March after a hiatus of nearly three years. Addressing the council in his capacity as head of the PLO political department, Qaddumi explained that the current goal was to compel Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in June 1967, and to establish an independent Palestinian state on the territory liberated in this way. He reaffirmed that the PLO was willing to attend a peace conference in Geneva, effectively acknowledging that its goals would be attained through negotiation with Israel. As significantly, Qaddumi formally linked the notions of a Palestinian national authority or independent state to a specific territory for the first time: the West Bank and Gaza Strip, rather than the whole of mandate Palestine.

PFLP central committee members Taysir Qubbaʿa and Bassam Abu-Sharif took the unprecedented step of stating their willingness to accept what they disparagingly termed a 'mini-state' as the first step towards 'liberating the whole of Palestine', but the PFLP finally voted against the modified political programme and resumed its boycott of the PLO executive committee and central council. The Rejection Front also reiterated its strong exception to dialogue with Jordan, and renewed its call for the overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy.[54] Arafat and king Husayn had in fact failed to resolve their differences during private meetings in Cairo on 6–9 March, and the revival of plans for 'ultimate confederation' between Syria and Jordan led the suspicious PLO to suspend the dialogue. The rejectionists also pursued their feud with Syria at the PNC, which the PFLP urged to expel Saʿiqa from the PLO.[55] The militant wing of the PF–GC denounced the reconciliation with Syria vociferously, and roundly condemned the PNC for continuing to recognize Jibril as leader of the group.[56]

Once again, intra-Palestinian rivalries were played out against a backdrop of further violence in Lebanon. The Israeli-backed Haddad forces occupied Khiyam on 17 February, but were stopped short of Ibl al-Saqi in a defensive action that cost the life of a Fateh battalion commander, and were also repulsed at Bint Jbayl a week later. Israeli escalation was partly a response to the build-up of guerrilla forces in the south to a strength of 4,000–4,500, but the timing also suggested a desire to pre-empt PLO engagement in the peace process.[57] Prime minister Rabin indicated this in January by stressing that there would be no Palestinian 'mini-state' and no talks 'with the terror organization called the PLO'.[58] The assassination of LNM leader Kamal Junblat on 16 March in circumstances pointing to Syrian responsibility led to a wave of sectarian killings in the Shuf region, while a series of explosions struck both halves of Beirut in mid-

month. Violence returned to the south on 30 March, when the Haddad forces occupied a string of six border villages, triggering a substantial civilian exodus. After several chaotic efforts, Fateh retook the whole area in a well-executed counter-attack on 6 April; Haddad was wounded and abandoned by his men, and had to be extricated by Israeli troops. Fateh built on this success to retake Dibbin and Khiyam three days later, but stopped short of Marjʿuyun in order to avoid provoking renewed Israeli intervention.

Israeli escalation in the south worried the Syrian command, prompting defence minister Tlas to visit Syrian units in Lebanon on 2 April. The next day his deputy, Naji Jamil, met Arafat in Nabatiyya and agreed to facilitate the movement of guerrilla reinforcements during the forthcoming battle.[59] However, the thaw in relations was soon threatened by the Palestinian rejectionists. The PF–GC militants attacked Syrian troops in various areas on 13 April and provoked heavy clashes in the Fakhani district on 23–25 April, leading to the death of some 50 people, including 12 Syrian soldiers. These tactics seemed to pay off, as the rival wings of the PF–GC agreed to part ways on 23 April. The militants formed the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) and selected the 28-year-old Zaydan as secretary-general, and on 14 May the Rejection Front welcomed the PLF into its ranks and expelled the PF–GC.

Partly as a consequence of constant rejectionist violence, Syria resumed its pressure on the PLO to implement the 1969 Cairo agreement. A four-party 'disengagement committee' had been formed in mid-March to negotiate the details, but quickly stalled over the question of the defence of the refugee camps. The Lebanese and Syrian delegations insisted that only the PASC military police could remain, with a strength of one officer to every 750 inhabitants, and that its armament should consist only of light infantry weapons, with one light machine-gun and one anti-tank rocket launcher to every 750 inhabitants. President Sarkis also pressed the PLO to relocate the survivors of the Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp in order to allow the original inhabitants of Damur to return, but there was little progress on this issue too.[60] The Syrian attitude was gradually shifting, however, in response to the refusal of the Maronite Lebanese Front to consider changes in the Lebanese political system. National Liberal Party leader Shamʿun pushed matters to a head in early May by proposing the division of Lebanon into two *wilayas*, a throwback to the Ottoman administrative unit that lay somewhere between a province and a state.[61] The threat of partition alarmed Syria, which was further incensed by a Maronite ambush in the north on 14 May, in which 27 Syrian soldiers died.

The electoral victory of the Likud Party in Israel on 17 May polarized the situation in Lebanon. Iraq extended its feud with Syria by encouraging the Palestinian rejectionists to renew their attacks on Syrian proxies. The PFLP and PF–GC clashed in the ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp on 20–21 May, leaving 20 casualties. Over a dozen people died when the rejectionists resisted attempts by PF–GC and Saʿiqa guerrillas to deploy in the Tyre and Zahrani districts in the first half of June, and as many people were killed when the fighting spread to

Nabatiyya, Sidon, and the Burj al-Barajna refugee camp in the next fortnight. The violence peaked on 17 July, with up to 29 dead and 50 wounded in various areas. The PLO meanwhile sought to circumvent Syrian pressure to implement the 1969 Cairo agreement by initiating a separate dialogue with Lebanese president Sarkis and prime minister Salim al-Hus in mid-May. Fateh central committee members ʿAbbas and Ghnaym also met senior phalangist official Amin Jmayyil in late June, following renewed calls by his younger brother and Lebanese Forces' commander Bashir for the 'redistribution' of the Palestinian refugees in the country to other Arab states. The PLO offered on 11 July to establish a demilitarized zone in the border region, and declared a unilateral ceasefire in the south a fortnight later.[62]

Syria viewed PLO overtures to the Maronite camp with some suspicion, fearing a Palestinian attempt to circumvent implementation of the 1969 Cairo agreement, that could in turn give the Lebanese Front a pretext to oppose *pax Syriana*.[63] PLA commander Budayri reflected Syrian displeasure by stating publicly in mid-June that the PLO needed new leadership and reorganization, 'by force if necessary', in order to restore good relations with both Lebanon and Jordan.[64] Abu Saʾid, a former Fateh officer working for Syrian intelligence, raised the pressure by hijacking a Kuwaiti passenger aircraft to Damascus on 8 July: he demanded to confront members of the Fateh central committee, but released his hostages unharmed and disappeared into Syrian custody three days later.[65] Yet Syria also had good reason to improve relations with the PLO: it was worried by the sharp deterioration of Egyptian–Soviet relations and the realignment of Egyptian foreign policy towards the US. The outbreak of the brief border war between Egypt and Libya on 21–24 July heightened Syrian concern. Pro-Syrian and rejectionist groups alike had mobilized an estimated 500 volunteers to fight for the Libyan army by 4 August, and Qadhdhafi received Jibril, Habash, and Hawatma twice over the next month.[66]

It was against this background that Syria, the PLO, and Sarkis finally reached an understanding on implementation of the 1969 Cairo agreement. The Shtura accord, as it was known, envisaged three phases: redeployment of PLO forces, removal of PLO heavy weapons from the cities and refugee camps, and the return of the Lebanese army to the south. The ADF command announced that Phase One had been fully implemented by the end of July, and supervised the removal of 152 crew-served weapons and 125 tons of ammunition from PLO stores in the Beirut area on 8–13 August.[67] The weapons represented a mere fraction of the hidden arsenal and many were obsolete or non-operable, but the ADF declared itself satisfied that it had eliminated the 'surplus'. The guerrilla groups also closed down 71 offices and vacated 14 arms depots in Beirut and other cities. Fateh central committee member Khalaf, who had played a key role in the accord, revealed that the Syrian leadership had promised to release some 200 prisoners (mainly rejectionists and Iraqi volunteers), issue passports for PLO officials, and reopen PLO offices and facilities in Syria.[68] He added firmly that 'we will not permit the Revolution to be swept again into the

tribulations of[internal] struggles, neither in the Lebanese arena nor in the Arab arenas'.[69]

The Lebanese Front was quick to decry Syrian complaisance towards the PLO, and refused to conduct parallel disarmament. The Maronite militias and press intensified their anti-PLO rhetoric; the more extreme polemicists promised that 'whoever kills a Palestinian will enter heaven'.[70] The PLO and LNM quickly cited Maronite obstructionism as reason to postpone further disarmament in Sidon and Tripoli, and the government suspended plans to deploy army units in the south in mid-August, as called for in the third phase of the Shtura accord. Begin raised the stakes by revealing that the Maronite militias had received military and financial aid worth £100 million from Israel in the preceding year, reportedly including 110 tanks, 5,000 machine-guns, 12,000 rifles, and training for 1,500 militiamen at IDF camps.[71] The IDF and Haddad forces shelled the border region repeatedly over the next fortnight, and on 27 August the Lebanese Front added to the tension by stating its formal opposition to the Shtura accord and renewing its call for the expulsion of the Palestinian refugees from Lebanon. The PLO withdrew its offer to pull back its forces from the southern border, while Syrian intelligence was suspected of mounting the wave of bombings that struck east Beirut in the next fortnight.

The US–PLO Dialogue: Now You See It, Now You Don't

As in February–April, military escalation in south Lebanon in August reflected Israeli hostility not only to the recent Syrian–PLO understanding regarding the Cairo agreement, but also to the indirect dialogue that was obviously underway between the mainstream Palestinian leadership and the US administration. An early indication of the progress of these contacts was the growing anxiety of king Husayn, who requested assurances from president Carter in May that a Palestinian homeland, if established, would not include the east bank of Jordan.[72] PLO expectations were raised significantly on 27 June, when the US department of state formally confirmed 'the need for a homeland for the Palestinians whose exact nature should be negotiated between the parties'.[73] An intermediary relayed a private message from the PLO to the White House on 26 July, in which it expressed willingness to 'live in peace with Israel' in return for a US commitment to an independent Palestinian 'state unit entity', that might moreover be linked to Jordan.[74] Shortly after Carter called on the Palestinians to renounce their aim of destroying Israel, in order to gain a place at the eventual peace talks.

The dialogue was still neither formal nor direct, but it now dealt with substantive issues. On 1 August US secretary of state Vance started a 13-day tour of the Middle East, at the end of which he stated that the PLO might at last be willing to accept UNSCR 242.[75] The US, he added, might accept the emer-

gence of some form of Palestinian state in the occupied territories after a ten-year transitional period.[76] Privately, Carter had already instructed Vance to approve PLO attendance at peace talks 'together with Arab nations', if it accepted UNSCR 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiation. For their part Fateh central committee members Khalaf and Qaddumi publicly confirmed that the PLO was willing to accept a modified version of UNSCR 242 and, Qaddumi added, to abandon the armed struggle.[77] The main PLO concern was to alter the wording of UNSCR 242 so that it would deal with the Palestinian issue not only as a refugee problem, but also as one of self-determination. Carter was willing to accommodate PLO concerns by allowing it to state its reservations when accepting UNSCR 242, and by assuring the PLO that 'the Palestinian question will be on the agenda'.[78] Vance discussed various formulations for an appropriate PLO statement with Sadat and Egyptian foreign minister Fahmi, who had received suggested drafts from the PLO.[79]

The PLO mainstream leadership attempted to shroud these exchanges in secrecy, fearing Syrian opposition in particular. Asad had come to the conclusion following the Likud Party's electoral success in Israel that the Geneva peace conference was unlikely to convene in 1977 after all, and on 21 June suggested the formation of an Arab rejection front comprising Iraq, Libya, and Algeria, with Syria as its nucleus. He was moreover adamant that the Arabs should form a single delegation in order to combine their strength and prevent separate deals with Israel.[80] The indirect exchange of messages between the PLO and Vance in August deepened his suspicion that the PLO would accept UNSCR 242 in order to gain attendance as a separate delegation at the peace talks; unknown to him Vance had indeed suggested just such a trade-off to Carter. Asad now suggested that the PLO did not need to attend the Geneva peace conference at all, arguing that it could be represented by the League of Arab States instead, so long as Israel recognized Palestinian rights.[81]

Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin expressed Syrian ire with public attacks on Egypt and Saudi Arabia in early September, which were met by an unusually direct counter-attack by Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan, who frankly praised both states.[82] Israeli prime minister Begin had already responded to the progress of the US–PLO dialogue by granting legal status to three settlements that an ultra-nationalist Jewish group, *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful) had illegally constructed in the West Bank. He announced plans for up to twelve more settlements, and approved three more following the Vance tour in the region. Israeli defence minister Ariel Sharon, who had aroused Jordanian concern earlier in the year by proposing to establish a Palestinian state in Jordan (with Israeli help), revealed an even more ambitious settlement plan at the end of August.[83]

From this point onwards, political developments raced with military escalation. On 13 September the US department of state explained officially that

> the status of the Palestinians must be settled in a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. This issue cannot be ignored if others are to be solved . . . to be lasting, a peace agreement must be supported by all of the parties to the conflict, including the Palestinians. This means that the Palestinians must be involved in the peacemaking process. Their representatives will have to be at Geneva for the Palestinian question to be solved.[84]

Arafat immediately welcomed the statement and confirmed that the PLO would accept UNSCR 242, albeit with suitable modifications. Qaddumi went further, stating that the PLO would accept both the resolution and the right of Israel to exist if the Jewish state recognized Palestinian rights. The PLO aimed to establish an independent state in the occupied territories, he added, and would pose no threat to Israel.[85]

Fearful of a breakthrough in US–PLO relations, Israel resumed its military escalation in south Lebanon.[86] Over the next two weeks, the IDF and Haddad forces shelled civilian targets in a wide radius on a daily basis; UN truce observers reported 1,917 shells on 16–19 September alone.[87] Israeli armour also intervened when an attack by the Haddad forces on Khiyam was beaten back on 20 September, and was engaged in close combat by PLO guerrillas. Fateh gunners rocketed northern Israel in response, and increased the volume of fire thanks to the loan of a Syrian army BM-21 multiple rocket launcher.[88] The IDF accepted a US-brokered ceasefire and withdrew in the morning of 25 September, and an elated PLO confirmed the truce that evening.[89] In following weeks it allowed the Lebanese army to regain control of its barracks in Tyre, Nabatiyya, and Tibnin, but still refused to withdraw from the border region, citing the constant Israeli threat.

Despite its positive response to the US statement of 13 September, the PLO remained unable or unwilling to make the concessions required by the US administration. Its overtures to the US had aroused opposition from a wide coalition, including the USSR and its allies in the Palestinian arena. The Soviet leadership had expressed its disquiet to Arafat during the Vance tour of the region in August, and invited him to Moscow for talks at the end of the month.[90] DFLP secretary-general Hawatma was more forthright, stating in mid-September that he expected 'internal alignments to change, in order to isolate the line of the "centrist right" that is kowtowing to Egyptian–Saudi–US plans'.[91] Syria also renewed its public criticism, and Muhsin explained that the rift with Arafat was over policy towards the US.[92] Under growing pressure, and perhaps expecting to extract more from Carter, the mainstream leadership directed a special meeting of the PLO central council on 26 September not to accept UNSCR 242 until amended.

Carter reacted to this setback by questioning the PLO's status, arguing that it was a substantial, but not exclusive, representative of the Palestinians. He had not yet reversed policy, however. On 1 October the US and USSR issued an unprecedented joint statement of the principles for Middle East peace. The key

passage, as far as the PLO was concerned, confirmed the commitment of the superpowers to 'the resolution of the Palestinian question, including ensuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people'. Two days later, Carter received a message from Arafat informing him that the PLO was willing to relinquish its demand to be directly represented at the peace conference, and to nominate a US citizen of Palestinian origin to represent the Palestinians instead.[93] It therefore came as a considerable shock to the PLO when the US effectively retreated from its joint statement with the USSR on 4 October after coming under intense Israeli pressure. Still hoping doggedly to revive the dialogue, Arafat instructed the PLO planning centre to draft various formulations for acceptance of UNSCR 242 and scheduled a meeting of the executive committee to discuss them in mid-November.[94]

The meeting was never held. On 9 November, in a speech to the Egyptian parliament, Sadat took the world by surprise with the announcement that he was willing to go to Jerusalem in order to make peace with Israel. Arafat was present as a special guest, but had not been informed in advance of Sadat's intentions. He faced bitter accusations on his return to Beirut for having appeared on Egyptian television, visibly shaken but joining in the standing ovation of the president. His explanation that he was unsure of what Sadat had just said and applauded merely out of politeness failed to sway his critics, whose suspicion deepened when he refused to condemn Sadat publicly in the next few days. A statement issued by the Fateh central committee on 17 November did little to reassure the other guerrilla groups: it called on the Egyptian president to reconsider his intended visit to Jerusalem, but in a notably moderate tone.[95] Israel meanwhile heightened the sense of crisis with renewed attacks on south Lebanon: its air and artillery strikes had killed 78 people and wounded 175, almost entirely civilians, in the Tyre district on 8–9 November, and renewed the onslaught on 12 November. The PLO came under pressure from Syria and traditional Muslim leaders in Lebanon to pull back from the border in order to avoid further violence.[96] By then all the actors in the Middle East had paused to consider the implications of Sadat's initiative.

18

Rearguard Action

On 19 November 1977 Sadat marked a turning point in the history of the Arab–Israeli conflict by addressing the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem. His determination to pursue his diplomatic initiative shattered the PLO strategy of balancing relations with Egypt and Syria while cultivating a political dialogue with the US, and threatened to take Palestinian and Arab divisions to breaking point. Arafat summarized the outlook in his typically personalized style: 'I was on the mountaintop, but Sadat threw me into the valley.'[1] The characteristic response was to attempt to play all sides and prevaricate in the hope that a change of circumstances would enable the PLO to resume its original strategy. To pursue this course required a greater degree of internal control than ever before, however, the more so if the mainstream leadership was to resist political intervention by Arab states. Consequently, the period following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem was one of political flux and military tension in the Palestinian arena, as it was throughout Lebanon and in the wider region.

The immediate dilemma for the PLO was how to preserve an independent diplomatic option in the face of intense pressures to align itself frankly with an anti-Egyptian Arab coalition and abandon contacts with the US. This was demonstrated when the Syrian, Algerian, South Yemeni, and Libyan presidents and the PLO chairman met in Tripoli on 2–5 December. Arafat was privately unwilling to sever ties with Egypt, but nonetheless signed a closing statement that denounced Sadat for 'grand treason' and declared an embargo on meetings of the League of Arab States in Cairo.[2] The statement called on all Arab states to suspend diplomatic and economic relations with Egypt, cease official aid, and boycott Egyptian individuals or companies dealing with Israel. The signatories announced their intention to form a 'steadfastness and confrontation front', and pledged that aggression against any member of the front would be regarded as an aggression against all.

The Tripoli meetings also witnessed attempts to assert Arab influence over the PLO. The Iraqi delegation, which subsequently stormed out of the conference without signing the closing statement or endorsing the steadfastness front, suggested that the PLO should be prohibited from receiving funds from any source without the approval of a supreme command to be set up by the anti-Egyptian coalition.[3] Qadhdhafi posed a more serious challenge by unilaterally inviting the leaders of all the guerrilla groups to attend the Tripoli conference in their separate capacities, thus challenging the authority of Arafat and his

representative status as PLO chairman. The Libyan leader also intervened in the drafting of a 'unity statement', that was signed both by the PLO and by the individual groups. The text went beyond denouncing Sadat to include blanket rejection of UNSCR 242 and 338 and the Geneva peace conference, and reiterated that there could be 'no peace, no recognition, and no negotiation' with Israel.[4] The PFLP crowed that the 'phased' political programme adopted by the PNC in June 1974 had finally been overturned, and a fortnight later announced that it was ending its three-year boycott of the PLO executive committee and central council.

Arafat had declined to put his name to the Tripoli document; Khalaf signed for Fateh and the 'independent' Hamid Abu-Sitta for the PLO executive committee. He also refused to withdraw PLO representatives Saʿid Kamal and Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani from Cairo, claiming that they no longer performed official duties there, although in reality they continued to conduct a discreet dialogue with Sadat on his behalf for the next few years. Arafat's unwillingness to sever ties with Egypt brought growing Syrian pressure. Outwardly, the PLO moved closer to Syria following a token offer from Asad in mid-December to permit the re-establishment of guerrilla bases on the Golan front. Palestinian and Syrian media also announced the formation later in the month of three joint committees for information, political, and military affairs, another hollow gesture.[5] More revealing, if melodramatic, was a private letter from Arafat to Fateh cadres in Egypt at the end of December, in which he complained that he and '10,000 fighters' in Lebanon faced the threat of assassination, implicitly by Syria.[6]

In the event, the physical threat came from Iraq, not Syria. On 4 January 1978 gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal faction killed the PLO representative in London, Saʿid Hamami. Hamami had played a key role since 1972 in contacts with dovish Israelis, and had repeatedly sent up 'trial balloons' on behalf of Arafat suggesting coexistence with Israel. Iraqi-backed rejectionists took the battle to south Lebanon by preventing Saʿiqa and PF–GC guerrillas from deploying in the Tyre and Sidon areas on 27 January. Sidon went on strike in protest, prompting Walid Junblat, who had assumed leadership of the LNM after the assassination of his father Kamal, to warn the PLO of the damage being done to its relations with the Lebanese. The PLO promised to evacuate armed personnel from population centres, but failed to do so, prompting a protest strike in Nabatiyya. Fateh finally interceded to secure the deployment of Saʿiqa and the PF–GC in mid-February, following further clashes near Tyre. Iraqi-inspired violence was not yet over, however, as the Abu Nidal faction murdered Yusif al-Sibaʿi, a leading Egyptian writer and confidant of Sadat, during a conference in Cyprus on 18 February.

The PLO's margin for political manoeuvre was growing steadily narrower. Carter's national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski had at the end of December 1977 signalled the end of its incipient dialogue with the US eloquently, if simply, as 'bye-bye PLO'. This prompted an improvement of PLO relations

with the USSR. Fateh central committee member Khalaf stated in late January 1978 that 'we consider the Soviet Union to be one of our biggest friends in the world . . . the Arabs cannot stand fast in the battle without the Soviet Union', and in early March Arafat headed a delegation to Moscow to request military assistance.[7] Yet the intention behind this apparent alignment remained to impress the US with the centrality of the PLO in Middle East politics. To demonstrate the impossibility of ignoring it, Fateh ordered a dramatic raid on the Israeli coast on 11 March.[8] Ten guerrillas landed south of Haifa and commandeered a civilian bus, which they drove towards Tel Aviv. A firefight erupted at a roadblock at Herzliya, in which nine guerrillas and 36 Israelis, all but two civilians, died. Wazir, who had masterminded the raid with Arafat's approval, argued that it had shown the 'ability of the revolution to reach wherever it wishes'.[9]

Israel promised to retaliate, and the PLO prepared for an assault on south Lebanon. The area had enjoyed relative calm in the last three months of 1977, in part because the PLO and LNM adopted a flexible policy towards the border villages under Maronite control, allowing free movement of civilians and goods and concluding neutrality pacts. However, the Israeli-backed Haddad forces escalated steadily following the start of the Egyptian–Israeli peace process, and on 2 March 1978 clashed sharply with the guerrillas for control of Yarun and Marun al-Ras. The Fateh naval raid brought tensions to a head, and the IDF launched a major assault along the entire length of the border at midnight on 14 March. The invasion force consisted of mechanized and armour units with an overall strength of 25,000–30,000 men and 300 tanks, according to PLO estimates, while some 2,000 guerrillas held the target area, besides another 2,000 in the rest of south Lebanon and up to 3,000 Palestinian and Lebanese militiamen in main towns and refugee camps.[10] The declared Israeli objective was to drive the guerrillas away from the border and establish a 'security belt' seven to ten kilometres wide along its length.[11] Official spokesmen expected the operation to last 36–48 hours, but stated that the IDF would remain in Lebanon until satisfactory security arrangements were made.

Despite PLO convictions to the contrary, physical elimination of the guerrillas was only a secondary Israeli objective.[12] This was reflected in the slow, methodical advance of the IDF, which reached the limit of its declared security belt on 18 March, some 48–60 hours behind schedule. The guerrillas resisted fiercely in a few positions, especially around Bint Jbayl and Tayba, but withdrew after brief skirmishes in some other sectors; PLO artillery units lost only one gun during the entire operation. In the ʿArqub, rough terrain and landmines were the main obstacle to the Israeli advance, with the IDF losing 22 vehicles on the first day alone.[13] Israel was already under international pressure to halt its offensive, but, after pausing for 24 hours, the IDF suddenly made a rapid armoured movement to occupy the entire area south of the Litani River. Whether the change of tactics and objectives reflected the desire to inflict heavier casualties on the guerrillas and drive their artillery completely out of

range, or had been the intention all along remained unclear.[14] The guerrillas scattered in considerable confusion and thousands of civilians fled as the IDF closed in on the Tyre district. Only some of the larger Fateh and PLA units still held their ground, and the timely appearance of Arafat, Wazir, and chief-of-staff Saʿd Sayil on the outskirts of the city helped to shore up the defence. The fall of Burj Rahhal and al-ʿAbbasiyya in the evening brought the IDF within sight of the strategic Qasmiyya bridge, which commanded the coastal road from Tyre to the north, but it still faced determined resistance from remnants of Fateh's Jarmaq Battalion and suspended its advance. The UN Security Council passed a ceasefire resolution on 20 March, which was accepted by Israel the next day and the PLO a further day later.

What Israeli chief-of-staff Mordechai Gur now called a 'small war' was over. The IDF had lost 21 dead and one prisoner, while killing at most 65 guerrillas and capturing a dozen.[15] The Lebanese and Palestinian civilian population had paid the highest price, as usual, with press reports of 1,000–2,000 dead, although a preliminary count showed 176 dead and 392 wounded, among them 75 Lebanese villagers killed in a single air strike on a mosque in ʿAbbasiyya.[16] The invasion had also caused the flight of 285,000 civilians, who crowded into schools, sports stadiums, and municipal facilities in Sidon and Beirut.[17] Beyond providing relief, the task for the Lebanese government and the international community was to secure implementation of UNSCR 425, which called for a complete Israeli withdrawal from the south. To assure this, the resolution envisaged the deployment of an international peacekeeping force along the border and the restoration of full government control. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was duly assembled over the next fortnight, and assumed control from the IDF of a large swathe of territory by 29 April. The IDF completed its withdrawal on 12 June, but handed 23 of the 37 remaining villages over to the Haddad forces, now renamed the South Lebanon Army (SLA), instead of UNIFIL.

The IDF had achieved its main operational objectives, but the PLO also boasted that it had seriously delayed the Israeli advance and prevented occupation of the Tyre 'pocket'. Sayil explained that the PLO's higher military council had instructed its forces to resist as long as possible before retreating, and then to wage a guerrilla campaign behind Israeli lines.[18] 'The position of the enemy was difficult as a result of this method, despite the intensity of his forces' firepower', he argued, adding that 'this was one of the few occasions in which the enemy has confronted [Arab] forces that are determined to fight, and Israel will now be compelled to revise its calculations.'[19] PLO performance had been far more mixed, in reality, although it could still assert that 'merely emerging [from the battle] intact was a victory'.[20] Palestinian insistence that the Fateh raid had substantially disrupted Egyptian–Israeli peace talks also lacked credibility, as Israeli prime minister Begin flew to Washington to hold a new round of discussions with Carter on 21 March. As US national security council staff member William Quandt observed, continuing hostilities in Lebanon 'over the

next few months . . . [were] a continuing irritant in US–Israeli relations, but the peace process was not brought to an end'.[21]

The battle in the south had other strategic consequences for the PLO. The 5,000 UNIFIL soldiers formed a sizeable buffer that kept PLO forces at a considerable distance from the border in most areas, except for an eight-kilometre gap opposite Marʿuyun, where the guerrillas and Haddad forces still faced each other directly. The PLO was moreover disappointed, but hardly surprised, that its allies in the steadfastness front had done little to assist it besides offer diplomatic support and modest arms shipments.[22] Syria permitted the transit to Lebanon of PLO volunteers from other Arab states and arms from Algeria, but also detained or refused entry to many others. Iraq hurriedly sent a commando battalion to Lebanon on 24 March, but prevented volunteers from joining the PLO, while the Jordanian authorities similarly prevented up to 800 volunteers from leaving the kingdom.[23] Some 3,000 recruits eventually reached the PLO during March and April, of whom 600 joined guerrilla units on a permanent basis.[24]

Of equal significance for the PLO was the marked improvement in relations with Syria, and, on the negative side, the revival of Maronite objections to the 1969 Cairo agreement. The two developments were connected. Maronite army officers and the Lebanese Forces militia had instigated fierce battles with Syrian units of the ADF around Beirut in early February and again in early April, and Shamʿun posed a direct political challenge to *pax Syriana* by calling on 12 April for 'internationalization' of the Lebanese crisis. The Syrian explanation of Maronite escalation, in the words of Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin, was that Israel planned to 'create pressures inside Lebanon in an attempt to raise tension and push matters to a new eruption of the civil war, with the foremost aim of exerting pressure on Syria to moderate its steadfast opposition to Sadat and his capitulationist policy and liquidationist ventures'.[25] Syrian suspicion deepened when it transpired in mid-April that the Lebanese defence ministry was secretly paying the salaries of former army personnel now in the ranks of the SLA, including Haddad, and maintained regular contact with the Israeli-backed militia.

The discovery of the arrangement with the SLA led to a government crisis, and to the resignation of the Hus cabinet on 19 April. Four days later a special parliamentary committee called for a complete halt to guerrilla action and the dissolution of all armed forces not directly loyal to the state.[26] The committee also considered that the passage of UNSCR 425 and deployment of UNIFIL effectively superseded the 1969 Cairo agreement and abrogated it, although this was not a binding opinion. The PLO executive committee issued a restrained response, reiterating respect for Lebanese sovereignty and renewing the pledge not to intervene in domestic politics, but argued that the parliament lacked the power to undo accords concluded between the executive and the PLO and ratified by Arab summit conferences. 'The Palestinian armed presence and action have a [pan-Arab] character and role in the Arab–"Israeli" conflict and are

not the private internal affair of this Arab country or that', it stressed, 'and no one has the right to decree this fateful national issue so long as Zionist occupation of Arab land persists'.[27] Arafat later promised Hus, who resumed his post as prime minister on 15 May, to uphold the ceasefire in the south, facilitate the UNIFIL mission, and repatriate the volunteers who arrived in Lebanon after the Israeli invasion. Khalaf repeated the commitment to the ceasefire following anti-PLO protests in Qana and Jwayya on 21 May.

Internal Struggle and Arab Intervention

The strategic consequences of the Israeli invasion were obvious enough, but no less important was the internal struggle it precipitated within the Palestinian movement. An immediate question was why the mainstream leadership had risked provoking a massive Israeli response. Misjudgement was a factor, as the PLO apparently believed that Israel would exercise restraint for fear of jeopardizing the peace talks with Egypt. Sayil later admitted that reports of the IDF build-up on the border after Fateh's naval raid 'were so inflated that we tended not to take them seriously'.[28] The prevalent assumption was that Israel would retaliate much as it had in the past, possibly with extensive air strikes. Muhsin confirmed that the Israeli assault exceeded Palestinian expectations by stating that 'we noticed from the first moment that the Israeli operation in south Lebanon was not merely a response to the recent heroic guerilla operation near Tel Aviv, but instead was a considered and deliberate plan waiting for a pretext'.[29]

Conversely, internal opponents of the mainstream PLO leadership believed that it had intended from the outset to provoke Israel into pushing the guerrilla forces back from the border. The aim of Arafat and his colleagues, this line of reasoning went, was to weaken the PLO militarily in order to win a freer hand in making the major political concessions required for it to join Egypt in the US-sponsored peace process. As PF–GC secretary-general Jibril caustically observed, 'the eyes of the [leadership] are so constantly fixed on Sadat that they have developed a squint'.[30] The fact that Arafat, echoed by Sayil and PLO representative Shafiq al-Hut, offered at the end of April to guarantee Israeli security in return for Palestinian statehood only confirmed rejectionist suspicions.[31] Fateh revolutionary council member Naji ʿAllush shared this outlook, arguing that the death of 'only 45 guerillas' during the March invasion showed that what had taken place was not a real battle but 'a brilliant trick'. In his view the rightist PLO leadership, affiliated to the reactionary regimes of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, had stage-managed a withdrawal and deliberately introduced a UN buffer force in the border region.[32] Saʿid Maragha, now deputy-head of the central operations room, privately concurred, and was to accuse his superiors several years later of having had advance knowledge of the precise extent of the Israeli invasion.[33]

Whether Arafat was guilty of such cynical manipulation or not, the rejectionists sought to pre-empt any tendency to political moderation by mounting a guerrilla campaign against IDF units in south Lebanon. PFLP secretary-general Habash argued that 'the extent of losses inflicted on Israel and the damage to its stature offer us a living example of the value of such confrontations'. Warming to his theme, he asked rhetorically: 'why don't we start so that this line spreads throughout the Arab region around Israel . . . from the borders of Lebanon and the borders of the Golan and the borders of Jordan and inside every city in Palestine? What would happen to Israel? The beginning of the loosening [*khalkhala*], the beginning of the collapse.'[34] This was at best a flight of fancy. The PFLP and its Lebanese offshoot, the ASAP, had formed the grandly titled Popular Resistance Front to Liberate the South from Occupation and Fascism during the invasion, but this proved ineffective and short-lived.[35] Its first act was to accuse the PLO leadership of having decided to withdraw remaining guerrilla forces in the night of 18 March, in the absence of the PFLP and ASAP representatives, and also to blame the Arab steadfastness front for inaction and Syria for impeding the arrival of volunteers.[36]

Fateh played the major part in the guerrilla campaign in fact, but it did so largely as a means of securing formal contact with the UNIFIL command. The UN had originally arranged the ceasefire and the deployment of UNIFIL with the Lebanese authorities, not the PLO. Only after UN secretary-general Kurt Waldheim visited Arafat at his Beirut headquarters on 17 April, followed by UNIFIL commander Emmanuel Erskine six days later, did Fateh quietly wind down the guerrilla campaign. In public, Arafat still insisted that the attacks would continue until the IDF had withdrawn completely from Lebanon, but 'foreign minister' Qaddumi stated more candidly that the PLO would 'facilitate any measures and arrangements taken at the Arab or international levels to ensure an immediate and unconditional Israeli withdrawal'.[37] Fateh meanwhile regrouped the small number of guerrillas who had remained in hiding behind Israeli lines and smuggled weapons into areas under IDF control before they were transferred to UNIFIL control. This allowed it to claim the right to maintain bases—35 in all, including small PFLP and DFLP detachments, with an eventual peak strength of 700 guerrillas—in the buffer zone. Rules of conduct were gradually developed and liaison officers appointed by both sides, and it became customary for UNIFIL to return guerrillas and weapons caught in violation of standing arrangements.[38]

The PLO was not alone in recognizing the implications of the *modus vivendi* it had established with the UN. Israeli chief-of-staff Gur noted publicly that the UN ceasefire had made the PLO a de facto party to any agreement affecting south Lebanon.[39] The Palestinian rejectionists came to much the same conclusion, and viewed the understanding reached by the PLO and UN in April as confirmation that Arafat sought to ingratiate himself with the international community by preventing attacks on Israeli targets. Unable to attack the IDF, the rejectionists saw more political reward in turning against UNIFIL instead.

Attempts by the French battalion of UNIFIL to expand its zone of operations around Tyre in the first half of April provided a convenient pretext for the rejectionists and their Lebanese allies to initiate clashes, that ceased only after intercession by Fateh. Iraq also entered the scene, arranging the transfer to Lebanon of over 120 volunteers recruited by the Abu Nidal faction. Their orders were to attack UNIFIL and disrupt the ceasefire, but Fateh forces took the entire contingent into custody on 17 April.[40] Investigation revealed that ʿAllush and Muhammad ʿAwda had secretly provided the newcomers with accommodation, transport, supplies, and fake military passes, and both men were immediately arrested on orders from Arafat and Wazir.

The arrest of ʿAllush and ʿAwda was an unprecedented step, despite the gravity of their action, and provoked strong internal reactions. Central committee members Khalaf and Nimr Salih protested openly, as did the secretary of the Fateh revolutionary council, Majid Abu-Sharar, and Muhammad Abu-Mayzar, head of its foreign relations department. Even more unusual was the public condemnation of the arrests issued by Musa al-ʿAmla and Maragha, who urged Fateh units to offer support to the dissident guerrillas.[41] Protests also came from the other guerrilla groups and leftist Lebanese parties, and were published in the daily newspaper of the Lebanese Communist Party, *al-Nida'*. Arafat relented, and ordered the release of ʿAllush and ʿAwda; ʿAllush promptly fled to Baghdad, where he was appointed to the leadership of the Abu Nidal faction, but ʿAwda remained in Beirut.[42] Khalaf now averred that 'we do not accept the Abu Nidal faction among us' and joined Hayil ʿAbdul-Hamid in questioning ʿAwda regarding his role.[43] Abu-Sharar, arguably the most influential figure in the 'pro-Soviet group' (rather than Salih), similarly persuaded ʿAmla, Maragha, and other allies to leave ʿAllush and ʿAwda to their fate lest Arafat find cause for a wider crackdown.[44] The central committee made a show of its unity by appearing at a passing-out parade at the Fateh military academy on 27 April.

Although the mainstream leadership had reasserted its control, the episode encouraged its opponents. Among them was Iraq, which regarded the PLO and south Lebanon as convenient battlefields to wage its continuing feud with Syria. On 15 May, a week after Asad and Arafat had announced the formation of a committee for 'strategic coordination', the Abu Nidal faction murdered the PLO representative in Kuwait, ʿAli Yasin. The rejectionist groups renewed their attacks on UNIFIL at the same time; the French battalion commander was wounded and a PLO liaison officer narrowly escaped injury when the car they were travelling in near Tyre was ambushed by the PLF on 2 May. The UNIFIL command responded by relocating its headquarters from Zahrani to Ras al-Naqura in the SLA zone of control, much to the embarrassment of the PLO and Syria, but the PFLP probed UNIFIL positions again on 3 and 13 May. Running out of patience, the Syrian government warned the guerrillas that to persevere in armed activity in the south would constitute an act of 'collusion with Israel and give it the pretext to hit Lebanon'.[45] According to Jibril, Syria wished 'to

close the windows' in the south that might allow Israel to bring its military preponderance to bear; he later added that Syria also considered that deployment of UNIFIL and implementation of UNSCR 425 would deny the Maronite camp the means to 'blackmail' it with the threat of triggering Israeli intervention.[46]

Rejectionist behaviour was not simply the result of Iraqi instigation, but it usefully revealed the close connection between the political and ideological polarization of the Palestinian arena, on the one hand, and Arab rivalries and the beginnings of the 'second cold war', on the other. At one level organizational struggles intensified between the guerrilla groups and within each, while at another a broad, if fractured, alliance of self-declared leftists and militants emerged across the Palestinian movement. A case in point was the PLF, the core leadership of which consisted mainly of Palestinian refugees from Syria. Although Zaydan was nominal secretary-general, he had to share effective authority with the West Bank-born Tal'at Ya'qub and 'Abd-al-Fattah Ghanim in a formal triumvirate, and also faced constant challenges from the three other cadres who together formed the collective leadership.[47] The combination of regional differences and personal ambition encouraged ultra-left politics, as well as putting the function and viability of the PLF in question. By coincidence, prominent members of the Fateh leftist faction such as 'Abd-al-Rahman Mar'i had also grown up or studied in Syria, and knew the PLF leaders well. They maintained a secret dialogue with the PLF and provided a modest supply of funds and arms until the Iraqi connection became more important.[48] The PLF reciprocated by publicly adopting the cause of the Fateh leftists in 1978 and by issuing fake military identity cards and travel passes to members of the Abu Nidal faction and supporters of 'Allush, to the intense annoyance of Arafat.

Like the PLF, the extremist behaviour of the PFLP was also due to the combination of internal instability and ideological dogmatism. Looking back on this period in April 1981, the fourth general conference of the PFLP admitted that, following the end of the Lebanese conflict in October 1976 and the deployment of Syrian peacekeeping troops, 'a new opportunistic leftist current emerged that . . . demanded confrontation with the ADF'. The conference report now revealed that politburo member Walid Qaddura, who had secretly instigated the leftist split of March 1972, and 'a group of university graduates from Egypt' had led the ultra-left tendency in 1977.[49] Qaddura was exposed at that time as an agent of the Lebanese *deuxième bureau* and fled the country. As if one scandal were not enough, the PFLP discovered at the end of 1977 that another politburo member, Yunis Bujayrami, was responsible for a number of armed robberies in Lebanon since 1976.[50] Further investigation showed that he had ordered the murder of fellow politburo member 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Tayyib and his wife, for which crime he was executed.

Little changed in PFLP rhetoric, however. Speaking in December, Habash castigated the 'rightist' leadership of Fateh and the PLO for adopting policies

'convenient to the defeatist reactionary [Arab] regimes', and described the PLO, Egypt, and Syria collectively as 'capitulationist'.[51] He insisted that the PFLP no longer conducted 'external operations', which activity was the work of 'former members'; Wadi' Haddad in fact died of cancer on 28 March 1978, but the PFLP's Lebanese offshoot, the ASAP, was implicated in an attack on passengers awaiting an El-Al flight at Orly airport in France on 20 May.[52] The real threat, Habash now argued, was that 'the PLO leadership still clings to the illusion that it can extract a certain political settlement of the [Palestinian] cause'. This illusion was evident in its insistence on maintaining covert links with Egypt, its attempts at reconciliation with Jordan, statements implying willingness to recognize Israel, and flirtation with the US.[53] For Habash, the PLO pledge to halt guerrilla activity in south Lebanon in June confirmed these suspicions and effectively suspended the 1969 Cairo agreement.[54]

The Palestinian rejectionists now gained an unexpected ally. The DFLP had criticized the Fateh-dominated PLO leadership for seeking to join the US-sponsored peace process during 1977, and in May 1978 moved into open alliance with its former adversaries in the rejection front. Secretary-general Hawatma explained this as a response to 'the readiness of some bourgeois Palestinian forces that straddle the pinnacle of political power in the PLO to adapt to the apostasy of Sadat, that is directly tied to the plots for a liquidationist US [peace] settlement'.[55] He attacked the autocratic style of leadership in Fateh and its monopoly on PLO decision-making, and decried what he described as the division of the Palestinian movement into 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' groups. In the view of the DFLP, PLO policy was influenced by 'the higher sections of the petite and middle bourgeoisie in the diaspora', who were 'dispersed and lacking in social cohesion, and so they ally themselves with their Arab class [counterparts]'. The solution suggested by the DFLP was to impose collective leadership in the PLO and to deprive the Palestinian Right of its monopoly on decision-making. 'Foiling the role of the Right occupies pride of place' in the national agenda, it concluded.[56]

The DFLP cemented its opposition by signing a joint memorandum with the four rejectionist groups on 24 May.[57] The signatories took the PLO leadership to task for trying to 'obtain a share in the promised settlement and gain a seat on the American train'. They also condemned PLO policies in Lebanon, which sought to control the LNM by creating 'fictitious and grassroots organizations to pressure it from within', and curried favour with 'suspect traditional personalities and groupings' and conceded to government and UN demands affecting south Lebanon. Certain PLO leaders were guilty both of 'propagating the reactionary Arab position and instigating to explode the [Palestinian] revolution from within', and of belittling the importance of the Arab steadfastness front. The memorandum complained bitterly, and repeatedly, that PLO policies were the result of autocratic, individual decisions, implicitly by Fateh and by Arafat himself.[58] To rein in the PLO chairman and Fateh, the opposition demanded the

formation of a committee comprising the leaders of all the guerrilla groups and a handful of senior PLO officials and 'independent' figures to supervise national decision-making.[59]

If nothing else, the joint memorandum served to persuade Arafat that he faced a concerted political campaign. Adding to his anxiety was the knowledge that the leftist faction in Fateh was busily regrouping and, indeed, had secretly elected a shadow central committee in early 1978.[60] ʿAbd-al-Rahman Marʿi and Ilyas Shufani, a Palestinian researcher who held token responsibilities in the Western Sector, emerged as leading figures in a loosely organized clandestine party. They were closely allied to ʿAmla, who had his own secret network in Fateh guerrilla units, and to Abu-Sharar and Salih of the 'pro-Soviet group'. Another leading figure was Samih Abu-Kwayk, still nominally head of organization in Jordan, who maintained covert ties from his office in Damascus to the Abu Nidal faction in Baghdad. Other small groups within this internal coalition were the self-styled Palestinian Communist Workers' Party, which drew support from Fateh university students and intellectuals and enjoyed discreet, if non-committal backing from central committee member Khalaf.

Arafat was aware of the situation in Fateh, and also that the leftists were secretly coordinating their political position with the DFLP and the rejectionists.[61] On 6 May he issued Legislative Decree Number One modifying the Fateh Revolutionary Penal Code of 1974, in which he outlined procedural rules for arrest, investigation, and trial and effectively granted himself the powers of military prosecutor.[62] The reason for this step became clear on 19 June, when two Fateh cadres, ʿAli Salim and Mahmud Dʿaybis, were put on trial for having provided shelter and transport to the Abu Nidal faction dissidents smuggled into south Lebanon by ʿAllush and ʿAwda in April. Salim and Dʿaybis, both veterans of the siege of Tal al-Zaʿtar in 1976 who now headed the Fateh branch in Damur, were executed immediately after the trial. This act, as much as any other, convinced the rejectionists, themselves responsible for most of the internecine violence to date, that Arafat and his colleagues would resort to military means in the drive for political control. The PLO chairman was also suspected of ordering an attempt on 25 July on the life of Hanna Muqbil, a Palestinian writer close to ʿAllush, prompting Habash to imply, in a public speech, that the executions were a response to the ASAP attack at Orly airport in May.[63] He added that the mainstream leadership was using violence to turn the internal debate about the peace process 'from a political battle into a military one . . . [in order] to silence us'.[64]

For his part, Arafat was reacting to what he insisted was essentially an Iraqi-inspired challenge. The PLO executive committee issued a statement on 16 June formally accusing Iraqi intelligence of murdering its representative in Kuwait two months earlier, to which Iraq responded a fortnight later by recalling the commando battalion it had sent to south Lebanon in March. Clashes also broke out between the ALF and PF–GC in the ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp

on 21 June, and the rejectionists defied PLO policy by opposing the deployment of Lebanese army troops in the UNIFIL zone in early July. As tensions sharpened, the PLO executive committee publicly declared on 11 July that Iraqi complicity in the attacks and media broadcasts of the Abu Nidal faction constituted 'a declaration of a war of extermination against the Palestinian people and its revolution and leadership'.[65] The PLO demanded the surrender of Sabri al-Banna 'in order to avert bloodshed', but the ALF and PLF replied to the implicit threat by taking 40 UNIFIL troops hostage the next day. Fateh retaliated by occupying PLF offices and bases and arresting PLF personnel in most parts of Lebanon over the next two days, and released them only after their leadership pledged to moderate its behaviour.

As the feud deepened, an unidentified Iraqi official accused Arafat of resorting to violence in order to stifle internal dissent, and complained that pro-Syrian and pro-Soviet guerrilla groups had joined the campaign 'to avenge the execution of communists [in Iraq] and to divert attention from internal Palestinian conditions'.[66] Fateh responded on 16 July with a long diatribe in which it revealed that the Iraqi authorities had closed all of its offices in the country but one, diverted 60 per cent of funds donated by the Iraqi public to Fateh to the Ba'th Party's own 'bureau of the armed struggle', confiscated arms shipments from China worth $50 million and food, medicine, and uniforms worth another $30 million, and expropriated arms manufacturing workshops and a large poultry farm.[67] An internal circular sneered that Iraq was unable to do anything but form 'a feeble and ineffective organization' such as the ALF or else 'subvert and buy off an agent' such as Banna.[68] It also likened Saddam Husayn to Israeli prime minister Begin in their shared determination 'to shed the blood of the strugglers of Fateh'. Warming to its theme, Fateh regarded 'Husayn and the rest of the Takriti clan' as the spiritual heirs of Nuri al-Sa'id, the detested prime minister of Iraq under the Hashemite monarchy who had been hanged and then disinterred and torn to shreds by the mob during the revolution of July 1958. 'If the Palestinians could not regard Nuri al-Sa'id as a national hero', it concluded, 'then they are incapable of seeing the features of a national hero in the face of Saddam the Takriti'.[69]

The feud now degenerated into open violence, as gunmen assumed to belong to Fateh fired at the Iraqi embassy in Beirut on 17 July. Over the next month, Iraqi diplomats in London, Paris, Karachi, Beirut, and Tripoli (Libya) were targeted by unidentified assailants who killed three persons and wounded a third, while the Abu Nidal faction and Iraqi intelligence struck back with the assassination of the PLO representative in Paris, 'Izz-al-Din al-Qalaq, and his assistant, and four bystanders outside the PLO office in Islamabad. (Amidst the tit-for-tat killings the Israeli Mossad killed a PFLP cadre in Athens on 19 August, while two passengers died in a gun attack on an El-Al bus in London the next day.) The Abu Nidal faction then declared a truce, presumably on Iraqi orders. Iraq also played down the defection to the PLO in early September of its former ambassador in Sweden, general Hasan al-Naqib, appointed by Arafat as his

military adviser, and ignored an attempt by Fateh to engineer a split in the ALF.[70]

During the same period, Fateh guerrilla units had clashed with the rejectionists and DFLP in the Nahr al-Barid and al-Baddawi refugee camps in north Lebanon on 30 July, leaving three dead. Renewed fighting in Baddawi three days later left 50 casualties, as Fateh closed down opposition offices, and eight people were killed or injured when the clashes spread to Damur, Tyre, and Sidon on 1 and 10 August.[71] Worst was the explosion in a basement ammunition depot that brought down the building housing PLF headquarters in Beirut on 13 August, killing 135 civilian inhabitants, 37 PLF members, and 16 Fateh members. Whether the tragedy was the result of accident or design, the PF–GC was widely suspected of a revenge attack on the breakaway PLF. It was against this background that Fateh revived a proposal it had originally made to the PNC in January 1977 for the unification of Palestinian military forces.[72] Not surprisingly, the opposition saw this as an attempt by Fateh to impose its political will, and objected that unity required collective decision-making in the PLO.[73] The rejectionists clashed with the PF–GC on 17 August and renewed their attacks on UNIFIL in the south, ceasing only when Fateh intervened four days later.

Syria was increasingly alarmed by the internecine Palestinian violence, not least because it also faced a growing military challenge from the Maronite camp. On 13 June militiamen loyal to the ambitious young commander of the Lebanese Forces, Bashir Jmayyil, killed Tony Franjiyya, elder son of former president Sulayman and head of the rival Marada militia, as well as his wife, daughter, and 30 guards, servants, and passers-by in the northern town of Ihdin. As Syrian pressure on east Beirut mounted, Israel signalled its concern by sending combat aircraft over Beirut on 6 July and 8 August, and then struck a Fateh training camp outside the Burj al-Barajna refugee camp on 21 August. This followed a series of air strikes since May that had gradually extended from the south to Damur, and was accompanied by shelling against guerrilla bases and civilian targets in the Tyre and Nabatiyya districts during August and September. Anxious to contain further violence on at least one front, Syria instructed Saʿiqa and the PF–GC in mid-August to start a formal dialogue with the PFLP, which had resisted pressure from its rejectionist allies to take the military offensive against Fateh.[74] Fateh meanwhile committed itself in a joint statement with the PFLP to 'democratic dialogue', and held reconciliation talks with the other guerrilla groups.

Salvaging a Diplomatic Option

The readiness of the mainstream PLO leadership to respond forcefully to the opposition and Iraqi intervention was a token of its determination to defend its ability to act autonomously with regard to the peace process. However, any

success it might have achieved was jeopardized by the announcement that the latest round of peace talks at the US presidential retreat in Camp David had produced an agreement between Egypt and Israel. On 17 September, Sadat and Begin signed a general statement of the principles of peace, including an outline for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and a detailed framework agreement for further negotiations on a final Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty.[75] Syria, Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, and the PLO hurriedly relaunched the National Steadfastness and Confrontation Front on 23 September, this time as a formal structure with a supreme leadership, political and information committees, and a joint military command.[76] As if to emphasize this resolve, the Syrian air force challenged Israeli fighters over Lebanon the next day, but lost four aircraft. Fateh sought a more dramatic response: on 30 September the Israeli navy sank a trawler loaded with explosives and inflammable fuel that a Fateh team was attempting to sail into Eilat harbour.[77]

The Camp David accords coincided with the increasing instability of the imperial throne in Iran, a threatening combination that prompted Iraq and Syria to set aside their bitter rivalry. On 26 October Iraqi vice-president Husayn and Syrian president Asad signed a 'national charter' that brought their countries into military union. The surprise reconciliation greatly enhanced their combined influence, which they exerted to considerable effect during the Arab summit conference that was held in Baghdad on 4–5 November. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other 'Arabs of America', as the Palestinian opposition called them, had adopted a studied neutrality since the Sadat visit to Jerusalem but now found their position untenable.[78] Yet they remained reluctant to break completely with Egypt; at their insistence the conference stopped short of denouncing Sadat so long as he had not concluded a peace treaty, much to the disgust of the steadfastness front.[79] The final statement simply resolved 'not to approve the two [Camp David] accords, not to deal with their results, and to reject their political, economic, legal and other effects'.[80] The oil-rich states also pledged to give annual grants of $1.58 billion to Syria, $1.25 billion to Jordan, and $250 million to the PLO over the next ten years. The Palestinian occupied territories were to receive an additional $150 million annually over the same period, $50 million of which would be disbursed by the PLO alone and the remaining $100 million, much to its dismay, jointly with Jordan.[81]

Despite the deepening polarization of the Arab position, the mainstream PLO leadership had not given up its attempt to construct an autonomous diplomatic option. Arafat hoped that the references in the Camp David accords to Palestinian autonomy might offer scope for discussion, and sent a secret enquiry to this effect to the US administration shortly after the signing ceremony.[82] He was more circumspect in public, but in an obviously staged interview published on 24 October asserted that 'I, as a leader, confirm that we are not nihilists, because nihilism means defeat [whereas] the revolution deals with reality. This is why the PNC has declared that the PLO has the right to establish its independent state on any part of Palestinian soil that is liberated or

from which there is [an Israeli] withdrawal.' Arafat exaggerated actual PNC resolutions, but his purpose was to stress that 'the PLO has the right to participate in all international conferences or meetings that deal with a just and comprehensive solution of the Palestinian cause, allowing the Palestinian people to exercise their national rights in complete freedom on their own land'.[83]

The declaration of the Iraqi–Syrian national charter two days later took Arafat by surprise, and threatened to constrain his margin for political manoeuvre severely. The PLO responded by reviving the dialogue with Jordan, in the hope of devising a new diplomatic track. Like Arafat, king Husayn was also interested in the possibility that the Camp David accords might offer an opportunity to join the peace process, and submitted a list of 14 related queries to the US administration.[84] Mutual concern at the influence of the new Iraqi–Syrian axis encouraged Jordan and the PLO to mute their differences over Palestinian representation and ultimate ownership of the West Bank, in order to develop a diplomatic partnership and preserve their joint relevance to the US. This was not an easy option, however, as a wide Palestinian front comprising the rejectionists, DFLP, pro-Syrian groups, and Fateh central committee members Khalaf and Qaddumi had opposed resumption of the dialogue with Jordan since the beginning of the year.[85] The 'bourgeois nationalist wing of the PLO', as Hawatma saw it, intended to resolve the conflict 'in the framework of a weak and distorted Palestinian entity tied to Jordan, [coupled with] the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees, "half our people", in the Arab countries with multiple Arab nationalities'.[86] The opposition continued to insist that reconciliation could not take place unless Jordan joined the Arab steadfastness front and granted the PLO full freedom of political and military action in the kingdom.

The conclusion of the Camp David accords allowed Arafat to alter direction. Accompanied by Qadhdhafi, who had become increasingly critical of the PLO chairman's refusal to 'cut completely with [Arab] reaction' and wished to curb any excessive moderation on his part, Arafat met king Husayn in the Jordanian border town of Ramtha on 22 September.[87] Further meetings took place during the summit conference, at times in the presence of Asad and Iraqi president Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. As the dialogue developed in following weeks, Fateh revolutionary council member Hani al-Hasan justified PLO policy:

> Dialogue with Jordan in the wake of Camp David is a confrontation that the Palestinian revolution may not avoid . . . If Jordan maintains its adherence to the Baghdad summit [conference] and the stand against Camp David . . . then that is an important step towards defeating Camp David . . . We wish that Jordan would shift from a position of questioning [the accords] to one of rejection . . . Our plan for dialogue . . . aims to defeat Camp David through the non-participation of Jordan [in the accords] and by shooting down the [Palestinian] autonomy conspiracy.[88]

Hasan also revealed that Romanian president Ceausescu had warned the PLO in April that 'Jordan will become the centre of political action if the Palestinians do not negotiate with the Israelis'. 'Had we gone to Jordan for dialogue eight months ago it would have been possible to set Palestinian preconditions', he complained, 'but now Jordan has become the centre of political action of the Baghdad summit and its spoilt child.' The problem lay with the opposition, which 'does no more than raise the slogan of "opening" the Jordanian borders without taking on the difficult negotiations and alliances that permit us to reach that [goal]'.[89] An added consideration he did not mention was the PLO's continuing need for a conduit to transfer funds to the West Bank; this was a primary reason for PLO interest in the conciliation talks that had taken place in early 1977, as a result of which it was able to deposit donations from the Gulf monarchies, Algeria, and Libya in Jordanian banks, with government approval.[90]

The PFLP and DFLP reacted to the budding dialogue with growing ire. Habash averred adamantly that diplomacy would not return the guerrillas to Jordan, and called on 'the Palestinian masses . . . to conduct a political and military struggle against the "Israeli" enemy from Jordan'.[91] An official memorandum from the DFLP politburo to the PLO executive committee in mid-December detailed the conditions that Jordan would have to meet for a viable dialogue: a general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles, the lifting of restrictions on travel to and from the kingdom for PLO personnel, permission to open offices and recruit, and the right to establish guerrilla support bases on Jordanian territory.[92] However, this opposition was undercut by clear indications of Iraqi and Syrian support for the PLO–Jordanian dialogue. ALF secretary-general ʿAbd-al-Rahim al-Ahmad now declared it consistent with the National Unity Programme approved by all guerrilla groups at the end of October.[93] PF–GC secretary-general Jibril also grudgingly approved the dialogue, while continuing to demand the release of Palestinian detainees in Jordan and the right to establish 'guerilla bridges to supply our people inside [the occupied territories] with the means to multiply [military operations]'.[94]

As usual, Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin gave the most articulate and reasoned account of Syrian thinking. Speaking on the eve of an official visit to Amman in late November, he asserted that Jordan had fulfilled PLO conditions for a dialogue. It had

> resolved its position regarding the Camp David accords and Anwar Sadat's regime clearly and fully, and proved its positive stance with complete clarity with respect to the Rabat decisions, confirming its commitment to regard the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and to the right of the Palestinian Arab people to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent state on its national soil.[95]

Speaking on a later occasion, Muhsin added that 'the Jordanian regime still retains its role and influence in the West Bank, and so the continuation of the

state of enmity and conflict between us in such a sensitive phase will open up a gap through which the Zionist enemy and agents of Sadat may slip to propagate the autonomy plan and Sadat's policy of surrender'.[96] It was therefore imperative 'to spare no effort to ensure that Jordan sides with the . . . camp of steadfastness represented by Syria, Iraq, and the PLO . . . and moves further and further away from . . . the camp of surrender represented by Egypt'.[97]

Reflecting this stance, PNC speaker Khalid al-Fahum and Muhsin joined Fateh central committee members 'Abbas and Khalid al-Hasan on official visits to Amman on 25–28 November and 16–20 December. On the latter occasion the two sides agreed a draft 'framework for joint action'.[98] Among other things, the document committed the PLO to conduct any political activity in the kingdom in accordance with Jordanian law, 'avoid anything that might give the enemy [Israel] any pretext to implement his plots against Jordan', and develop a joint diplomatic position. The opposition saw this as abdication of the right to mobilize Palestinians in Jordan and launch military activity against Israel, and suspected an attempt to allow the Jordanian government to negotiate on behalf of the PLO.[99] An equal cause for alarm was that the document acknowledged a Jordanian role in the occupied territories and advocated an effort to 'neutralize Israel's friends', which the opposition interpreted as a signal to the US.[100]

Syrian and Iraqi endorsement of the PLO–Jordanian dialogue did not indicate support for the diplomatic strategy of Fateh, however. Far from it, in fact, as a statement from the Syrian-backed Jibril in early September showed. 'The prevalent approach', as he labelled the mainstream PLO leadership, 'has gambled that Sadat's policy will present it with a political solution to the Palestinian cause [in the shape of] of an independent Palestinian state. It believes that political affairs are as simple as one plus one equals two, so long as Egypt is the Arab [centre of gravity] and the US stands by it.' The PLO leadership had only 'played the game of firmness and rejection', he added, after Sadat had failed to deliver and Israel had insisted on excluding the PLO and rejecting any transition from Palestinian autonomy to full self-determination.[101] It followed that Fateh proposals for Palestinian military unity were unacceptable, since there could be no *tajyish* without 'a clear political programme to which all parties within the PLO adhere, and after which the fighters become an instrument for the implementation of that political programme'.[102]

Arafat indeed considered, with great bitterness, that 'Anwar Sadat robbed us of [our] state when he refused to go to the Geneva [peace] conference [in 1977], because, as it transpired later, he had [already] decided to go to Jerusalem'. Yet he persevered in his effort to preserve a diplomatic option, while manoeuvring to defuse internal opposition. Fateh reflected the latter concern at the end of October by permitting the PLO central council to pass a 'political programme for national unity' that emphasized the principles of collective leadership and joint decision-making.[103] This had little practical impact, as Arafat immediately

displayed his disregard for proper consultation and consensus politics by unilaterally approving talks between Fateh central committee member Khalaf and the Maronite Lebanese Front. The revelation in mid-November that Palestinian businessman Hasib al-Sabbagh and historian Walid al-Khalidi were still pursuing these contacts prompted DFLP secretary-general Hawatma to comment angrily that 'these meetings make a mockery of the unity of the Palestinian position and of collective decisions . . . The ink is not yet dry on the signatures of the leaders of all the [guerrilla groups] and the revolution on the joint political programme and organizational principles, foremost of which is respect for collective leadership and a united decision and an end to the policy of [individual monopoly].'[104]

The convening of the Arab summit conference in early November deepened divisions within the Palestinian movement, not least because it provoked competition for control over the $300 million in annual assistance promised to the PLO and the occupied territories. Hawatma observed wryly that 'some in the revolution may believe that the sums allocated by the Baghdad summit to the PLO will act as an inducement to "buy" the armed forces of the [guerrilla groups] and to confiscate democratic relations between [them]'.[105] Privately, however, all groups sought a share of the funds, and for this reason demanded changes in the PLO system of representation and decision-making with greater force than ever. Outwardly, this was reflected in increased opposition to the semi-secret diplomacy of the mainstream leadership. The private dialogue with Lebanese Maronite leaders provoked sharp criticism from Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin, who asked rhetorically 'if we refuse dialogue with Sadat because he has dealt with the Zionist enemy, how can we accept dialogue with Shamʿun when he commits the same crime?'[106] The opposition was also angered by the continued activity of PLO representatives in Cairo, and were unimpressed when Arafat claimed that this was solely in order to look after the interests of 20,000 Palestinian university students and 150,000 refugees in Egypt.[107] Their suspicions deepened when the PLO chairman received US senator Paul Findley several times in December, reportedly to discuss means of securing de facto PLO recognition of Israel.

The Left Makes its Bid

Growing suspicion of the mainstream PLO leadership prompted the emergence of a broad coalition comprising all the guerrilla groups except Fateh during autumn 1978. Crucially, this embodied an unprecedented alliance between Syria, Iraq, the guerrilla groups backed by both governments, and the Palestinian Left. The most telling indication was the reconciliation between the PFLP and Syria. The PFLP still maintained that the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in 1976 had denied total victory to the PLO and LNM over 'the fascist forces', and regretted Syrian reluctance to expose 'the role of

Arab reaction headed by Saudi Arabia'.[108] It also noted Syrian unwillingness to take a clear stand against 'the dangerous role of the Palestinian Right and its relations to the Saudi–Egyptian axis, and the attempts to detonate the Palestinian arena'. Yet there was sufficient coincidence of outlook for Asad to receive Habash on 25 September, and for the Syrian authorities to respond positively over the next few months to PFLP requests for the release of prisoners, delivery of arms shipments through Syrian ports, safe passage for guerrillas, and freedom to operate in the Palestinian refugee community.[109]

As Syria moved into a tacit alliance against Fateh, it extended the relaxation of controls to the guerrilla groups backed by its former adversary, Iraq. ALF members were now allowed to transit through Syria, for the first time in a decade; the PLF developed close working ties with Syrian intelligence and obtained special training, while continuing to receive funds and arms from Iraq.[110] Muhsin now insisted not only on 'collective leadership' in the PLO, but also on participation by all guerrilla groups, implicitly including the PLF and PPSF, which remained outside the executive committee.[111] The DFLP was another beneficiary of the alliance with Syria, which it used to compensate for the deterioration of its relations with Iraq. It was avidly seeking Soviet recognition as the principal communist force in the Palestinian arena, which prompted it to side openly with the Iraqi Communist Party in the face of a severe crackdown by the ruling Baᶜth Party.[112] The DFLP believed that the USSR was leading a global counter-offensive against US imperialism, and offered both political and practical support; in Iran, for example, it assisted the KGB by training, arming, or contacting leftist groups.[113]

Soviet gains in the Third World impressed the Palestinian opposition deeply. After a one-week visit to Moscow by Habash in November, the PFLP central committee issued a statement calling for a 'strategic alliance' between the USSR and the 'progressive' Arab states to foil the Camp David accords.[114] It, too, was impressed by the 'persistent successes achieved by the USSR and the socialist bloc countries on the economic, social, and political levels', and noted the rise of working-class struggles around the world, the increasing number of 'peoples struggling against imperialism', and the radical social transformations promoted by 'many anti-imperialist governments' that were now set 'on the path towards progress, democracy, and construction of socialist society'.[115] Little wonder that the Palestinian Left was disinclined to submit to Arafat's autocratic leadership or Fateh's monopoly of PLO decision-making. As Hawatma put it,

> there is a certain line in the ranks of the revolution and the PLO that moves to the right of the Steadfastness Front and the Syrian-Iraqi [charter], more and more, towards the reactionary and rightwing Arab forces and regimes . . . whose plans demand the building of bridges with the Lebanese Front in Lebanon and with king Husayn in Jordan, while retaining a network of relations with reactionary Arab [states], even those that

have declared their support for Sadat . . . This line is dangerous and must be stopped immediately and without hesitation.[116]

The growing confidence of the Palestinian opposition and the implications of its alliance with Syria (especially) were not lost on Arafat and his allies within Fateh. For the first time ever Fateh did not have a ready alliance with which to enter the PNC, which was due to convene in late January 1979 after a two-year hiatus caused by the inability to agree a common political programme. It was against this background that the PLO chairman resorted to draconian measures to pre-empt the internal challenge. On 3 January Fateh gunmen attacked a PPSF office in Sidon, killing one member and wounding two. Four DFLP members died two days later when their office in the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp was attacked; PF–GC personnel were luckier, escaping unscathed after a firefight at the nearby Baddawi camp on 7 January. The clampdown extended to the PLO research centre, as gunmen of Arafat's bodyguard briefly detained several of 46 employees who had signed a petition protesting the behaviour of their director.

The DFLP was in little doubt about the significance of what it proclaimed were 'hysterical and bloody police acts . . . that light the fire of Palestinian civil war'.[117] A subsequent report by its central committee insisted that the Palestinian Right was under Saudi and Egyptian pressure, and had resorted to violence against the Left to prove its moderate credentials.[118] The DFLP appeared confident that the PNC would reveal the isolation of Arafat and impose a fundamental change in relations within the PLO. To reinforce its political standing at the meeting, the DFLP resorted to the well-tried tactic of mounting a 'suicide' operation against the northern Israeli settlement of Maʿalot on 13 January. It claimed that three of its guerrillas had taken 230 hostages to demand the release of Palestinian prisoners; the guerrillas and one Israeli died when the IDF stormed the building.

Other groups shared the confidence of the DFLP that the outcome of the internal debate would favour the opposition. Speaking to a group of PFLP trainees in this period, Habash issued a clarion call for PLO reform.

As you know, Palestinian decisions, whether on the Palestine subject or on the simplest organizational, financial, or military issues, are taken in an individual manner . . . There can be no strong national unity that mobilizes all the [guerrilla groups] if this situation continues—the PLO budget, means of disbursement, external assistance and its distribution, and ending with the issue of military and political decisions, that is, to cease combat or continue it. All the [guerrilla groups] used to find themselves faced with the announcement of decisions . . . in which they had not taken part and which they did not feel were their own decisions.[119]

Habash concluded that 'the time has come to conduct a serious battle with the aim of correcting conditions in the PLO . . . The battle now is against the Palestinian Right . . . and we in the PFLP wish to create an effective Palestinian

democratic progressive axis'.[120] An added reason for optimism was that Fateh central committee members Salih, Khalaf, and Qaddumi, supported by one or two colleagues, similarly demanded reform. Habash envisaged 'the convergence of five [leftist and rejectionist] organizations that cooperate with [Saʿiqa and the PF–GC], plus the beginning of cooperation with this axis in Fateh to lay the basis for a program of struggle to rectify the situation of the resistance [movement]'.[121]

Opposition hopes were raised further by the arrival in Damascus of Iraqi foreign minister Tariq ʿAziz for consultations with his Syrian counterpart ʿAbd-al-Halim Khaddam in advance of the PNC. The two ministers received a succession of high-ranking delegations from the various guerrilla groups. Following long meetings with Fateh leaders on 13 and 14 January, ʿAziz affirmed that 'we respect the political and organizational independence of the Palestinian resistance [movement] and of every legitimate political entity whether a party or organization or regime, but when it comes to essential national issues that affect the Arab fate as a whole, then no Arab party has the right to monopolize the fateful decision'.[122] This was a clear warning to Fateh. Over the next few days ʿAziz and Khaddam manned an 'operations room' outside the PNC meeting hall, from which they coordinated every move with the opposition.[123] As Hawatma later recalled,

> the revolutionary and democratic nationalist forces enjoyed ideal . . . conditions for rectification. Internally in the form of seven Palestinian [guerrilla groups] united in their political and organizational stand, and externally in the presence of the Steadfastness Front and the Syrian–Iraqi national charter that blocked and suspended Syrian–Iraqi rivalries within Palestinian and Arab politics. We resolved on the 'red line' of reform, the key to which was reform of leadership and the formation of a PLO executive committee in which the majority would be firmly nationalist, and in which the leftist and democratic forces would take their role.[124]

Leftist hopes were rudely shattered, however. Hawatma recounted the shock of the Left when, 'at the last minute, Muhsin, Jibril, and Salih entered the PNC . . . and said to [Arafat] we are with you in forming any leadership you see fit'. To his utter dismay, 'the Fateh delegation from one end to the other, from right to left, stood up to dance and sing . . . "Fateh is a revolution against the enemies" '. Hawatma noted in disgust, 'the enemies who were outside the hall were the DFLP and PFLP, the pioneers of democratic reform'.[125] He concluded bitterly that 'Arafat draws his power and autocracy from the Fateh tendency towards factional class hegemony . . . and Fateh in all its currents exercises its narrow self-interested hegemony within PLO institutions and trade unions and mass unions according to the rules of the bourgeois game, based on expropriating democratic rules within the [Palestinian] front'.[126] The Left had misjudged the nature of factional politics within Fateh and the emotive power of the call for 'the independence of the Palestinian decision' in the face of the alliance with Syria and Iraq. It was unable to secure the entry of the PLF and PPSF to the PLO

executive committee or central council, although each took two of the PNC seats nominally assigned to 'independents'. The PFLP expressed its dissatisfaction by renewing its boycott of the executive committee and central council, and declared itself in alliance with the Abu Nidal faction 'so as long as there is agreement on political issues'.[127]

Buoyed by its last-minute success, the mainstream PLO leadership resumed the official dialogue with Jordan in the hope of developing its diplomatic strategy. Qaddumi abandoned his previous objections to head a delegation to Amman on 27 February, and Muhsin headed the following delegation on 14 March; Arafat held discussions with king Husayn in the northern Jordanian town of Mafraq three days later.[128] PLO diplomacy ground to a sudden halt on 13 March, however, when US president Carter announced that Egypt and Israel had at last concluded a peace treaty following intense negotiations since 21 February. He still held out some hope of bringing the PLO into the peace process, suggesting on 23 March that the US might talk to the PLO if it accepted UNSCR 242 (even with reservations), but received no response.[129] Saudi Arabia and Jordan proved similarly unwilling to support Sadat, despite visits by US national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski. Apparently convinced by now that Arab reactions did not matter much, Carter presided as Sadat and Israeli prime minister Begin signed the peace treaty on the White House lawn on 26 March.

Palestinian reactions were immediate. Habash, Hawatma, Muhsin, and PPSF and PLF leaders Samir Ghusha and Talʿat Yaʿqub visited Baghdad on 24 March; Habash, Hawatma, Jibril and ALF leader ʿAbd-al-Rahim al-Ahmad next visited Tripoli on 4 April. For its part Fateh attempted to mount a naval raid on Israel on 28 March, but the guerrilla team was intercepted at sea and captured. Central committee member Khalaf now warned that the Black September Organization might resume its terrorist operations, while Arafat revealed the extent of his pique by threatening to 'cut off the hands' of the US and reiterating the importance of relations with the USSR.[130] Speaking at a press interview in the same period, he pointedly observed that the PLO operated 'in the most dangerous region of the world, the region of petroleum'.[131] His political aide, Hani al-Hasan, drove the point home by directly threatening US interests in the region, including oil in the Gulf.[132] Fateh lost 10 guerrillas in infiltration attempts against Israel in mid-April, while the PLF lost three men and killed three Israeli civilians in a subsequent attack on Nahariya, but these efforts only underscored the PLO's lack of a credible military option despite Khalaf's attempt to blame the Arab states for placing obstacles in its way.[133] The Eagles of the Revolution Organization, a front for Saʿiqa and Syrian intelligence, meanwhile claimed a handful of terrorist attacks in western Europe, and wounded 11 passengers boarding a flight to Israel at Brussels airport on 16 April.

More significant was the emergency conference of Arab foreign, economy, and finance ministers that convened in Baghdad on 29 March, in the absence of representatives of Egypt, Oman, Sudan, and Djibuti. Saudi Arabia and the

other Arab monarchies were reluctant to take extreme steps at first, but submitted to the militant mood and agreed to impose a range of severe new sanctions on Egypt. These included the recall of ambassadors, severance of diplomatic relations, and a total political and commercial boycott covering all forms of aid, loans, and assistance. Egypt was to be expelled from the League of Arab States, which would move its headquarters lock, stock, and barrel from Cairo to Tunis. At the same time, the oil-rich Gulf states promised to end the flow of oil through Egypt, and to dissolve their formal investment organizations in the country, including a $1.4 billion stake in the joint defence company, the Arab Organization for Industrialization. The rift in Arab ranks was complete, confronting the PLO with one of its most serious dilemmas ever.

19

The 'Fakhani Republic'

The signing of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty posed a strategic dilemma for the PLO, which had made a sustained effort since 1973 to gain a direct role in the US-sponsored peace process and place Palestinian statehood on the negotiating agenda. Its strategy had necessarily depended on bridging Arab divisions and utilizing its Soviet, Third World, and other international connections to impress US policy-makers with its relevance, but the deep polarization of the Arab state system and the intensification of the 'second cold war' between the superpowers at the end of the 1970s encouraged the Palestinian internal opposition and made the conduct of autonomous PLO diplomacy dangerous, if not impossible. The mainstream leadership did not relinquish its core objectives, nor did it abandon its basic assumptions about the means to attain them, but it was obliged to retrench politically. The major consequence was to reinforce the statist transformation of the PLO.

Statism was at once a defensive and an assertive response to the dilemma. The historic 'window of opportunity' to join the peace process had closed conclusively, depriving the mainstream PLO leadership of any strategic initiative and leaving it struggling for direction. Centralization of internal control was a natural response to political intervention from the militant Arab states and the USSR, and from the resultant assertiveness of the Palestinian opposition, and went hand in hand with certain patterns of political institutionalization. This process was greatly assisted by the massive influx of Arab funds after the Baghdad summit of November 1978, as the availability of resources enabled the Fateh-dominated PLO leadership not only to employ patronage on an unprecedented scale in the pursuit of cohesion among the rank-and-file, but also to extend its version of *rentier* politics to a much wider public constituency than before. Besides, the official recognition of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians by the Arab states (and to a lesser degree by the USSR) mitigated the effects of their interventions to some degree, and helped its leadership assert the organization as the principal depository of national identity and political will. The steady progress of its international relations enhanced its status still further.

The statist transformation of the PLO built on well-established long-term trends, but in 1978–9 it was greatly accelerated as a result of external factors. The increased stake of regional and international actors in its political role was one, reflected as much in the evolving policies of European Community

members and pro-Western Arab states (such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia) as in the anti-US coalition promoted by the USSR and its Arab allies (or, after January 1979, by Islamic Iran). Another was the impact of Israeli, Egyptian, and US policies towards the Palestinians in general and the inhabitants of the occupied territories in particular, the effect of which was to marginalize, if not altogether ignore, their nationalist claims and to strengthen their incentive to acknowledge the moral and political authority of the PLO. The declining ability for budgetary reasons of UNRWA to provide services to the refugee camps was another factor prompting the PLO to extend its rudimentary social welfare system, as was the Lebanese conflict, with its aftermath of social damage, economic dislocation, and reduced security role of the host state.[1]

The conjunction of these factors enhanced the established pattern of statist political development. The mainstream leadership was in any case eager to portray the PLO as a capable and responsible quasi- or proto-state actor, in order to assert its credibility as a negotiating partner in the peace process. This required a physical and social base, however, which was to be secured primarily by consolidating the PLO's military presence and parastatal institutions in Lebanon, and subsequently by extending PLO influence in the occupied territories. In Lebanon, the intensification of Israeli attacks on the south after spring 1979, the ever-present threat of Maronite assault, and the memory of Syrian intervention gave a powerful added impetus, assisting the mainstream leadership to militarize and bureaucratize internal relations further, dampen dissent within its own ranks, and contain the opposition. For its part the opposition still contested the diplomatic objectives and strategy pursued by the mainstream leadership, but, crucially, conducted this struggle almost entirely within the statist arena provided by the PLO, which it ultimately sought to dominate. The PLO had become more than a state-within-a-state in Lebanon, it was a state-in-exile, with an autonomy born out of the combination it enjoyed of territorial control in Lebanon, non-extractive financial resources (Arab aid), and international recognition. This was the age of the 'Fakhani Republic', as the PLO headquarters area in the west Beirut neighbourhood of Fakhani was sometimes dubbed by its critics.

Military Transformation

Among the most obvious manifestations of the statist transformation of the PLO was the accelerated 'regularization' of its armed forces throughout this period. The adoption of quasi-conventional force structures and ranks since 1971 had been largely nominal, despite the influx of heavy weapons and resort to static defensive tactics during the Lebanese conflict of 1975–6. The Israeli invasion of south Lebanon in March 1978 and renewed Maronite challenges in the centre and north of the country led to a qualitative shift, however. The PLO

still held exclusive sway over a substantial enclave in the south, shielded from IDF or SLA attack by the UNIFIL buffer zone, and shared control of the coastal region as far north as Beirut (in which it also maintained a very considerable presence) with the Syrian units of the ADF and token units of the Lebanese army and public security forces. It additionally had free access to areas of Syrian control in the Biqa' Valley and the north, where it maintained bases, training camps, weapons dumps, supply depots, and offices. The PLO generally left responsibility for civilian and economic affairs to Lebanese government agencies in the areas it held or shared, but effectively superseded the state in all other respects. Indeed its parallel authority also remained palpable in west Beirut, where it coexisted with that of the Syrian-dominated Arab Deterrent Force, and where it maintained a large number of internal security offices, official representatives at the international airport, and a separate field telephone network connecting all PLO offices.[2]

PLO autonomy in Lebanon was reflected in the major military build-up it conducted over the next four years, that was marked above all by major increases in armament and infrastructure and in the growing compartmentalization of combat and support services. The PLO considered itself formally responsible for the defence of the areas it held in Lebanon, but the battles of March 1978 revealed, as chief-of-staff Sa'd Sayil subsequently argued, that Palestinian forces had not been 'sufficiently qualified for defence against th[e] invasion, and our weapons were not integrated'.[3] He was aware that the PLO could neither match the IDF nor wage a static defence against it, but argued that the guerrillas should magnify what strength they had through the 'dynamic combat use . . . of firepower and forces'. 'We face an enemy who possesses all that is developed and all that is new in the world,' Sayil explained, 'and so we must have something in our hands that allows us, through proper concentration and proper use, to direct a blow with some impact too on the enemy's weapons.'[4]

PLO ambition was not solely defensive, however. By summer 1980 Sayil was looking forward to the time when 'we in Fateh, and in the Palestinian revolution generally, can attain the level of a regular army'. In his opinion 'regular warfare is in reality the best type of war to reach decisive situations rapidly'.[5] He acknowledged that current Palestinian capability was limited, and so the provision of an air defence system against Israeli aerial attacks on Lebanon or even on guerrilla bases was too large a task for the PLO to undertake.[6] The answer in the meantime was to acquire heavy weapons that were mobile or easy to transport, to keep them on the move during combat, and to disperse and hide them and their attached supplies at all other times.[7] This also meant that the PLO did not have to build a highly developed military infrastructure, and would be less vulnerable to attempts to destroy its logistic and communications systems or its command structure.[8] In short, the principles of sudden concentration of firepower and quick dispersal characteristic of guerrilla warfare were to be applied to the use of heavy weaponry. This would not have been possible,

though, had it not been for the buffer zone that separated the IDF and Israeli-backed SLA from PLO enclaves.

The smaller guerrilla groups undertook a parallel, albeit more modest, military build-up, despite the misgivings of some. PF–GC secretary-general Jibril had consistently opposed the acquisition of long-range weapons in the preceding decade. He was still arguing as late as 1977 that the Palestinians were compensating for their military shortcomings by 'extending the barrels of our cannon', and that the important issue in guerrilla war was 'not where our shells land but where our feet reach'.[9] Yet he acknowledged after the Israeli invasion of March 1978 that the border zone held by the IDF and SLA 'has somewhat impeded our ground operations against the enemy, and has driven us to acquire the heavy weapons that we used to fear acquiring'.[10] The guerrillas had a duty to defend south Lebanon against Israeli attack, he added, and this required appropriate weapons and the ability to retaliate forcefully. In both cases, long-range artillery and rockets were the only way to reach Israel, literally over the heads of various buffer forces. 'We [have] started to shift from the tactics of guerilla warfare to the tactics of semi-regular warfare', he later explained, 'and so we possessed field guns, multiple rocket launchers, and means of air defence and against Israeli gunboats, and possessed armour and tanks'.[11]

Expansion was evident in the increased number of combat units. Fateh had formed three new battalions in autumn 1976—Suqur al-Tal, Ra's al-ʿAyn, and Jarmaq—and in 1977 brought the first two together under a new brigade headquarters, the Ajnadayn Forces, which it designated as a strategic reserve. Arafat's bodyguard unit, Force 17, grew from a battalion in 1977 into a seven-battalion brigade equipped with tanks, artillery, and guided anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles by 1980, taking the Fateh total to five brigades comprising a total of 26 nominal battalions (including several independent ones). Loyalist PLA troops were recalled from Egypt as the Maronite threat escalated in 1978–9, building up to another seven battalions, along with three mixed Fateh–PLA artillery units.[12] That said, the fact that most nominal battalions were in fact barely company-size revealed the underlying statist drive, with its tendency towards bureaucratic aggrandizement. It also led to problems when officers and non-commissioned ranks who should have received instruction in small-unit combat tactics—which PLO forces should have excelled at, but in reality performed poorly—were instead sent abroad to attend battalion- and brigade-level training programmes.

The stress on regularization led in parallel to the appointment of officers with conventional military training to head most new formations: Yarmuk Forces officers commanded two of the three new guerrilla battalions, and one of the two new brigade headquarters that Fateh formed in 1976–80, as well as one of three joint Fateh–PLA artillery battalions formed in 1978–9, the other two being headed by ʿAyn Jalut Forces officers. Former Jordanian army officers already commanded Fateh's central operations room, training directorate, military intelligence, and Karama Forces. The extent of the reorganization and

regularization of Fateh command structures—and in particular of the reliance on loyalist PLA officers whose place of origin (Gaza or pre-1948 southern coastal Palestine) set them apart from the vast majority of combat and civilian personnel in Lebanon—suggested a conscious attempt to keep the military on a tight leash, given the escalatory potential for conflict in the south and the subsequent need to avoid confrontation with UNIFIL. The close PLA–Fateh relationship was cemented administratively in 1979 with the confirmation of the PLO Social Affairs Institution as the sole provider for all Palestinian armed forces, and with the effective subordination of Fateh engineering and construction services to those of the PLO.

The smaller guerrilla groups similarly strove, as the official PFLP programme urged, to 'promote the military in training, armament, and numbers'.[13] The DFLP eventually organized 13 battalions (eight infantry, two gun artillery, one rocket artillery, one air defence, and one security) into four nominal brigade headquarters (Galilee, Eastern, Central, and Western), to which were added the militia and reserves.[14] The other groups did not form brigades, but by 1980–1 the PFLP had 10 battalions and the PF–GC six, in each case attached directly to the central military command.[15] One of its senior officials, ʿAbd-al-Rahim Malluh, was later to admit that it was no longer possible to wage guerrilla warfare, but argued that regularization had been made necessary by 'the fear of liquidation'.[16] Actual battalion strength for all groups fluctuated sharply, averaging 60–150 men. On this basis even the minuscule ALF could claim three battalions, as well as artillery, mortar, and anti-tank sections.[17] The smaller groups still emphasized the primacy of guerrilla war as the means to reach total people's war, but adopted as much as they could of the regular designations and strove for advanced military skills.[18] All set up specialized support services and military departments to manage their increasingly regularized guerrilla units, and in 1978 the PFLP and PF–GC each set up a military academy to train its personnel.

Whatever the efforts of the smaller groups, Fateh still led the way. It obtained nearly 30 World War Two-vintage Soviet-designed T-34 tanks from Yemen in May 1979, and secured basic training for its crews in Syria.[19] Fateh personnel received additional armour training in Pakistan in the same year, and started the first of at least three similar courses in Hungary.[20] The guerrillas who took delivery of the first consignment of ageing tanks were uncomfortable with the transition, but Arafat and Wazir explained that the purpose was to 'break the psychological barrier' against using armour.[21] The T-34s were expendable, they added, and once their crews had received sufficient training the tanks could be replaced with newer versions such as the T-54/55.[22] In the meantime they would provide mobile firepower to help protect the coastal region from recurring Israeli commando raids. Fateh also placed artillery along the coast and acquired four tracking radars in 1978–9 to repel Israeli naval attacks.[23] An added, unspoken purpose of these heavy weapons was to deter attack by the Lebanese army or Maronite militias.[24] Fateh was unable to acquire T-54/55s or more

modern tanks in the event, but purchased another 60 T-34s from Hungary in early 1980 and a similar number a year later, besides obtaining a dozen or so BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles and BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers in mid-1980, possibly through Libya or Algeria.[25]

The pragmatic attitude towards the acquisition of armour was typical of Wazir, who believed firmly in acquiring experience and equipment whenever the opportunity arose. It was natural to see ageing tanks as stepping stones to greater capabilities. Responding to a question about the direction of the Palestinian military in 1980, he argued that 'we work constantly to develop our means and capabilities in all fields. This naturally applies to armament and training for our forces and the raising of [their] combat efficiency and ability, and to reorganization in a form that suits the lessons we derive from every battle'.[26] The development of Fateh's air arm (Force 14) offered a special example of this outlook: 32 pilots and 60 mechanics returned from courses in August 1978 and another 150 were in training in Soviet bloc countries a year later.[27] To secure such capabilities, Wazir, Sayil, and Arafat developed close working ties with the defence ministries and general staffs of several Arab states, the USSR and its east European allies, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and, in Asia, China, North Korea, Vietnam, India, and Pakistan.

The farflung network of Palestinian military ties enabled the PLO to send an estimated 5,000 trainees of all ranks abroad in the next few years for instruction in a wide variety of military skills. The courses on offer ranged from air defence, engineering, and anti-tank combat, through armour and artillery, to aviation and naval operations. By 1980 the PLO had permanent slots on the general staff and commanders' courses offered by several countries, and a fixed number of places on other courses—the USSR was accepting an annual intake of 200 Palestinian trainees by the late 1970s (besides another 100 from the DFLP). Sayil could boast in August 1980 that, thanks to training at modest Palestinian facilities—such as the Fateh military academy, which was reopened in the Shatila refugee camp in mid-1978—and abroad, '80 per cent of the military cadres of the revolution, fighters and officers, have become militarily qualified or re-trained following the experience they gained in combat'.[28] This gave rise to the confident prediction that 'we should now direct ourselves towards forming a national popular army, which I hope we can achieve quickly . . . because to do so will mean that we are very close to the point of [military] decision [with Israel]'.[29]

Sayil emphasized the combat potential of the military build-up, but the mainstream PLO leadership was equally interested in using it to reinforce its diplomacy. Its acquisition of training and arms cemented PLO ties with key international allies, and established a routine Palestinian presence at their military academies and embassies. The consolidation of military expertise and the accumulation of weapons and funds in turn enabled the PLO to offer assistance to Third World states, which then backed its diplomatic *démarches* at the United Nations, Non-Aligned Movement, Organization for African Unity, and other

multilateral organizations. Fateh (as well as the PFLP and DFLP) also assisted a wide range of revolutionary movements in its own capacity, this effort being overseen directly by Wazir through a dedicated 'liberation movements bureau'. Among the beneficiaries were the anti-Shah groups in Iran (both Islamist and Marxist), Argentinian Montoneros, Salvadoran FMLN, Sri Lankan Marxist Tigers, southern Thai muslims (Fatanis), and the African National Congress, to name but a few. At times these ties conflicted with the formal relations maintained by the PLO with the governments directly affected, but in some instances such support was a useful means of pressure against states that were perceived to be aligned with Israel or that withheld recognition of the PLO. In any case, Sayil could boast quite accurately that 'we have widespread ties with friendly parties that are in need of specialists and to which we extend our help . . . we may be the only revolution that has [such] an abundance of specializations . . . and wide relations around the world'.[30]

The consolidation of the trend towards regular armament and organization in 1978 permitted the PLO to expand its military assistance programme significantly. Fateh had already sent crews to assist the Ugandan air force in 1976, and provided training for the bodyguard of Idi Amin.[31] It also sent the equivalent of an infantry company to Kampala to stiffen the Ugandan army during the Tanzanian invasion of March 1979, but hurriedly extricated its contingent after suffering a dozen casualties in the rout. The PLO was more successful in Nicaragua, where Fateh delivered arms shipments to the Sandinistas after their victory and later provided helicopter and combat aircraft pilots for the war against the Contra rebels, as well as crews for the Aeronica civil airline.[32] Indeed Force 14 was a particularly useful instrument of Palestinian diplomacy, enabling the PLO to offer pilots and technical crews to Third World states that would otherwise have had to wait years to build their own air forces.[33] In 1981 the Fateh military academy also received 100 cadets from newly independent Zimbabwe, which sought training for its officer corps from neutral parties.

The PLO sought additional diplomatic benefits from the secondment of Palestinian personnel to other countries. By sending arms and pilots to Nicaragua, for example, it signalled its presence to the USA and implicitly offered an exchange: the start of a political dialogue in return for cessation of Palestinian military support for the Sandinistas. In the PLO's view, its ability to second qualified air personnel to Third World states was a source of prestige, and lent credibility to its statist image. The striving for this image extended to the smallest details: from steel combat helmets and standard webbing for the guerrillas, to the guard of honour that took the salute when Arafat received foreign dignitaries at his Beirut headquarters. These trappings were meant to confirm the PLO as a quasi- or proto-state actor. In crude strategic terms, PLO military assets were intended to defend the base in Lebanon until it could be traded for a seat at the negotiating table, at which point the state-in-exile would transform into a sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza.

The Politics of Patronage, or Neopatrimonial Bureaucratization[34]

Such a considerable investment in the military build-up was not without its drawbacks, leading among other things to the consolidation of what one critic later termed 'military and paramilitary bureaucratic elites' throughout the Palestinian movement.[35] Indeed, the connection between military preparation and state-building, both of which had developed for the strategic reasons discussed in previous chapters, had become integral by now. However, their precise forms and effectiveness cannot be fully understood without reference to the neopatrimonial dimensions of Palestinian politics, which became a dominant characteristic in this period.

Inevitably the pattern was strongest in Fateh—partly because it commanded by far the greatest human and financial resources, and partly due to its extensive symbiotic relationship with the statist PLO apparatus—but it applied equally in most respects to all the smaller guerrilla groups. Deepening bureaucratization facilitated political management and propelled statist transformation, but the particular mode of the centralization owed much to the unique role of Arafat, who strove to concentrate the key means of control in his own hands. This was evident in his growing grip on military affairs; he was now the final arbiter in all appointments and senior promotions, and exercised additional control through his brother-in-law, Mutlaq Hamdan, who headed the Fateh military administration. Wazir was the only other central committee member who still exercised notable authority in the armed forces, but he was content, whether by political temperament or lack of choice, to complement Arafat's decisions. Sayil, who was a member neither of the central committee nor of the founding core, focused on administration, logistics, and planning, and cautiously refrained from areas of decision-making that he knew to be the PLO chairman's domain.

Arafat left his colleagues little option. In his drive for control, he insisted on subjecting a widening range of administrative affairs to his personal review. This extended from the final selection of cadets to be sent on training courses abroad, through requests from officers for study leave or special medical treatment, to the requisition of such mundane sundries as ammunition or combat boots. Battalion commanders were obliged to travel to Beirut in order to submit both official and personal requests to Arafat or one of his aides, unless Wazir or Sayil could act in the matter, and spent much of their leave or absented themselves from their commands for this purpose. Indeed, the situation was no different for senior cadres of the paramilitary agencies, civilian organization, administrative departments, and social unions or other affiliated bodies, who were compelled to ascertain where Arafat was holding office on any given night in order to apply for various resources or obtain approval for appointments, electoral lists, and other matters. A major reorganization of Arafat's headquarters and archives in 1980 failed to expedite matters of this sort, and may instead have confirmed his headquarters as the necessary

clearing house for all administrative transactions, large or small, despite the considerable delays involved. Even military radio traffic to the PLO central operations room had to be sent in duplicate to his office from 1981 onwards.

Key to Arafat's growing power was the control he steadily extended over Fateh and PLO finances.[36] The influx of major Arab assistance to PLO coffers after November 1978 in particular enhanced his neopatrimonial capabilities greatly, and in turn reinforced his personal autonomy, both political and organizational, within the Palestinian movement as a whole. His financial control was not absolute in either case, but he manipulated the duality to gain leverage over his colleagues in the Fateh central committee and PLO executive committee alike. Arafat's ability to utilize resources in this manner depended on the loyalty of a handful of finance officers, who also made investments and managed secret funds according to his instructions. Crucially, they acknowledged his informal authority to limit the access to Fateh funds of other central committee members—the menacing deployment of Force 17 personnel outside their offices and forcible entry on a number of occasions was sufficient to intimidate the recalcitrant.[37] As a result, modest payments approved by certain central committee members, primarily Wazir and to a lesser degree Khalaf, would still be honoured, but increasingly after 1979 no amount could be disbursed outside of agreed departmental budgets without the added signature of Arafat. Only he could comfortably grant major extra-budgetary allocations, whether these were to would-be investors acting on his behalf, allied Lebanese militias, foreign officials, or Palestinian activists in the diaspora, to name but a few beneficiaries.

By now, the extent and location of Fateh finances were a tightly guarded secret known only to the founding core, and in full detail possibly only to Arafat, who relied on his own, private bookkeeping. The allocation of resources depended on an informal bargaining process—personal rather than collective—based on the moral authority and organizational clout of the individual concerned. Junior central committee members generally had at most a partial overall picture and even less control of assets, and correspondingly lower ability to obtain allocations. The secretiveness and informality involved in the acquisition and distribution of Fateh's financial resources may not have been entirely unusual for a guerrilla movement born in clandestinity, but the lack of a formal central budget enabled Arafat to assert himself as the principal arbiter in determining the amounts to be awarded to individual departments from one month to the next, increasing or decreasing budgets according to the need to forge tactical alliances with, or against, the central committee members directly concerned. This still left them considerable means to operate modest levels of patronage—whether by permitting subordinates to exaggerate operational expenses and inflate the payrolls of their agencies, or by approving requests for housing and medical allowances or for private loans—and therefore encouraged their acquiescence in the system.

The result was a classic case of 'planned corruption', in which 'the chief planner, distributor and regulator of spoils guarantees his relevance to the system and, in the best of circumstances, his indispensability. To the extent that he is able to establish that the political game is about "spoils", then his role as chief dispenser becomes crucial.'[38] The emphasis on spoils focused the attention of many senior and middle-ranking cadres on acquiring access and prompted ostentatious displays of loyalty and subservience among some, and further eroded the value of professional competence and administrative rationality. Many cadres were bitter, but the power of the system was such that a generalized feeling of dependency and helplessness emerged and inhibited sustained counter-action or public criticism. A rare exception was the tract penned by central committee member Khalid al-Hasan, but this was published only after his death in September 1994 and even then spoke only in abstract terms, naming no names. However, its detailed analysis of the conduct of autocratic power and of the manipulation of funds took Arafat unmistakably as its primary example.[39]

Subtle shifts in the internal balance of the founding core helped Arafat. The reclusive Mahmud ʿAbbas had consistently refrained from building a power base, and insisted on distancing himself from the hurly-burly of Palestinian politics and administration in Beirut by residing in Damascus. Yet he retained a special, if little-known, role in assuring a modicum of collective control over Fateh finances, and was not above strategically placing a long-standing colleague in the technical committee that supervised the flow of Arab funds through the Joint Jordanian–Palestinian Committee for the Support of Steadfastness to the occupied territories. At the same time he was equally willing to relinquish his post as head of the Palestinian side in the 'steadfastness committee' to Wazir in early 1979. Wazir, for his part, had lost key supporters with the deaths of Walid Nimr in 1971 and Kamal ʿUdwan and Muhammad al-Najjar in 1973, and was under constant pressure from the Fateh Left and its allies in the central committee, Salih, Khalaf, and Qaddumi. His assumption of direct responsibility in the steadfastness committee gave him considerable influence over the allocation annually of $100 million in joint funds and another $50 million in PLO funds, and allowed him to build an extensive, and virtually exclusive, political network in the occupied territories. Yet this came at a price, as from 1979 onwards Arafat progressively reduced the allocation of Fateh funds to Wazir's Western Sector, instructed the military administration, which controlled all personnel affairs, to impede or entirely block promotions and new appointments in the directorate, and subsequently poached his lieutenants.[40]

Increasingly secure in his control of finances, the military, and appointments in general, Arafat actively encouraged the proliferation of parallel agencies and departments in virtually every sphere, all of which required central funding. Prime examples were the expansion of the military intelligence branch and Force 17—which reached a nominal strength of some 1,500 by 1980 thanks to

the simple expedient of putting hundreds of Fateh members in the refugee camps on the payroll, few of whom actually had duties to perform. With their help Arafat secured his personal control of the 'Fakhani Republic', and occasionally ordered arrests in other parts of west Beirut. In 1980 he also created the 'political security' and 'chairman's security' agencies, implicitly rivalling the 'unified security apparatus' headed by Khalaf and 'central security apparatus' headed by Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid. At some point in this period he also brought the two men into a new 'security committee', of which he made himself head (general delegate, or *mufawwad ʿam*), as an added means of limiting their authority.

The availability of resources for institutional aggrandizement also encouraged excessive functional redundancy: a prime example being the proliferation of newsletters, periodicals, and research sections set up by competing agencies or even by vying departmental heads within the same agency. Resistance to duplication and institutional fragmentation was weak, since it offered increased opportunities for patronage and rent-seeking to a wider constituency. Arafat's colleagues on the central committee contributed to the situation by sharing his native distrust of institutional procedure, seeing in it the potential to constrain decision-making. Fateh's civilian organization was bereft of influence: headed by appointed, salaried cadres, many originally from outside Lebanon, it was overshadowed by the burgeoning paramilitary agencies and itself afflicted with creeping bureaucratization. The result was more than a classic case of patron–client relations however, since the potential 'patrons' relied not on personal wealth or social status to disburse favours but on 'second order' resources of bureaucratic office or political influence. In other words, they were bound by the system, within which bureaucratic as well as personal 'pyramiding' assured the flow of resources from the leadership, while supposed clients could, and frequently did, beat the system by switching allegiances and retain some autonomy.[41] The availability of resources to certain key Fateh leaders encouraged competition among 'patronage arenas', but this decreased with time and gave way to a more stable clientelist system as Arafat concentrated control over resources in his own hands.[42]

Buttressing and extending the neopatrimonial system at all levels were the extensive fringe benefits available to Fateh and PLO personnel. These included specialized medical treatment at private or foreign hospitals, housing rent assistance, advances on salaries for private expenditures (such as car purchases), and the per diems and travel expenses issued for missions abroad. The consolidation of ties with Soviet bloc countries offering an additional fringe benefit: rest and recreation leave for senior officers and officials at communist party facilities, or the equivalent for the less fortunate, namely attendance for varying periods on courses organized by communist youth organizations, cooperative associations, and party departments responsible for ideological and organizational training, among others. To secure the loyalty of the lower ranks, meanwhile, many members of Force 17, along with other PLO personnel and

Lebanese refugees and rural migrants, were given building grants and materials to construct cheap housing on state land in the southern suburbs, starting in 1980.[43]

To these benefits were added the thousands of university seats and associated stipends that various Arab and foreign governments made available to the PLO, which in turn allocated the scholarships to members, supporters, or their children and other relatives. Graduates were expected to serve in PLO ranks for a specified number of years in return, but exemption from duty was another privilege that Arafat could grant. Ranking combat officers were often allowed to absent themselves from their units in order to attend courses or register as external students at the Beirut Arab University, for which their expenses were also paid. This may have been a positive trend in some respects, but it reflected the decline of military cohesion, the growing attraction of the capital and other main cities, and the deepening involvement of senior officers in the political factions and clientilist networks of the Fakhani Republic.

Favouritism also offered opportunities for private gain to certain 'gatekeepers' in Arafat's headquarters and to those instrumental to his system of control (and investment), whose ability to obtain rewards grew as they became privy to his secrets. Other Fateh central committee members had the nominal authority to approve benefits for personnel in the departments they directed, but could not in reality assure payment by the relevant finance offices; it was Arafat who had eventually to give his added approval, upon personal approach, and who ultimately controlled disbursement. A further result of the prevalence of patronage and of the chairman's control of spoils was the spread of petty cronyism, as personnel in various departments and units took it upon themselves to report privately to him on the actions of his colleagues and of their own immediate superiors. Inevitably this practice was mirrored in the behaviour of lesser officials and commanders, who kept watch on their own rivals in a similar manner.

Although benefits were routinized, the manner of their allocation turned what might have been a straightforward procedure, operating on the basis of standard criteria for awards and loans (and repayment), into an entrenched and highly personalized system of patronage. Accountability had never been a strong point and now vanished for all intents and purposes. Numerous middle-ranking officials developed a vested interest in the system, padding expense claims or presenting them in duplicate or triplicate to more than one departmental 'boss', while their superiors entered into fraudulent contracts with commercial suppliers for a variety of goods (from food and fuel to paper for printing presses) or inflated departmental and unit payrolls with non-existing personnel. Some military commanders exacted taxes on commerce in Tyre, Sidon, and similar centres, senior paramilitary officials engaged in contraband and forgery, while trade in duty-free goods flourished as PLO missions abroad gained diplomatic status (some two-thirds of over 100 offices by 1982).[44] The shrinkage of the Lebanese state left a void that criminal networks and PLO

security agencies filled, often to their mutual benefit: a particularly lucrative source of profit was the sale of weapons to local arms traders, another the recovery of stolen cars (for a fee).[45] Indeed, the trade in smuggled goods—from cigarettes to electrical appliances, drugs, counterfeit money, forged documents, and the like—created a network of intermeshing interests between Palestinian guerrilla groups, Maronite and Muslim Lebanese militias, and Syrian units of the ADF, that extended to Syria, Israel, and beyond.

In this manner, a faction-ridden but distinct 'nomenklatura' had emerged at the heart of the evolving Palestinian 'political class' by the end of the 1970s. Encouraging the growth of this 'bourgeoisified bureaucratic category' was the trend to place a substantial proportion of the rank-and-file on the payroll, a process known as *tafrigh*.[46] In addition to a basic salary, which in Fateh stood at LL570 ($200) a month in mid-1980, members were entitled to marriage and cost-of-living allowances, social security, and an annual paid airfare for personnel whose families resided in other countries. This was the lowest basic salary among the various guerrilla groups and significantly less than the minimum level in the Lebanese civil service and army, but it was sufficient to make *tafrigh* the most common form of patronage, by means of which rival Fateh central committee members and lower echelon leaders constructed clientilist networks. The larger the number of followers, the greater the share of resources that could be obtained in the way of budgets, offices (in turn requiring rent, furniture, and utilities), arms, vehicles, and other equipment. An informal estimate by the central committee placed the number of salaried personnel in Fateh paramilitary agencies alone at 10,000 by 1980–1, mostly in the Beirut area.[47] According to Wazir, Fateh combat forces registered an additional 15,000 on the payroll, including administrative and support personnel, besides 25,000 militiamen, many of whom also received token payment.[48] The militia was moreover stiffened by 1,200 full-time personnel: officers, gun crews, and administrative, communications, and supply staff.[49]

'Bureaucratization' was replicated in every sphere and at every level. *Tafrigh* extended to the leadership and principal cadres of the civilian organization as well as the 'mass organizations'—the unions of students, workers, women, and so forth—which had long been incorporated into the PLO. The fact that these bodies had always been intended as vehicles for political, rather than social, mobilization assisted this trend, since it emphasized securing loyalty rather than generating resources. The unions were considered an official extension of the PLO by the end of the 1970s, and had atrophied into bureaucratic appendages staffed by salaried 'apparatchiks'. Whenever elections were due Arafat intervened to determine the quota of seats to be given to other groups and to select Fateh candidates, occasionally after awarding a share of seats to one central committee member or another.[50] These trends were replicated in other departments. A survey conducted in 1981–2 estimated that 7,000 persons were employed in PLO administration, information agencies, medical services, orphanages and schools (some in Kuwait), and diplomatic missions abroad.[51] A

related study added that the PLO employed 10,000 non-military personnel, and that it had created a similar number of jobs indirectly.[52] These estimates did not distinguish Fateh membership from the PLO payroll, but the close intermeshing of the two structures and fusion of their core leadership made the distinction of little significance in this context.

Parallel to the spread of *tafrigh* among its active membership, the Fateh-dominated PLO agencies provided the wider public constituency with basic social welfare. Directly responsible was the Social Affairs Institution—until 1979 titled the Society for the Care of the Families of Martyrs and Prisoners—which was providing pensions and special assistance to well over 20,000 families by 1980.[53] Social welfare provided an additional opportunity for patronage: whereas the families of 'military martyrs'—anyone dying in combat or of natural causes while an active member of a PLO group—were granted a permanent stipend, the families of 'civilian martyrs'—non-members killed in enemy attacks or cross-fire—were given only a one-off payment in compensation, creating an incentive for them to request reclassification of their dead as military. It also ran three large orphanages, 11 daycare centres, and a society for the blind, besides paying the costs of secondary and university education for the children of deceased PLO personnel. Towards the end of the 1970s the Society commenced construction of a massive complex intended to accomodate 10,000 schoolchildren near Damascus.[54]

Other PLO agencies provided additional services and employment. The Palestine Martyrs' Society Workshops–Samid (founded in 1970) employed 5,000 full-time workers and administrative personnel in 46 workshops in Lebanon (and five in Syria), besides several thousand more who worked from home, mainly women producing clothing and embroidery, and offered vocational training to over 30,000 by 1982.[55] The General Union of Palestine Workers operated seven consumer cooperatives with 25,000 members in the refugee camps of Lebanon, while the General Union of Palestine Women offered vocational training, literacy classes, and instruction in preventive healthcare and nutrition at 90 centres.[56] The PRCS and the various medical services of Fateh, the smaller guerrilla groups, and the PLA extended the social benefits by offering comprehensive health care at token cost to Palestinian refugee communities and host populations in Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt; in Lebanon alone PRCS clinics treated 373,328 persons in the first half of 1980 and 425,682 in the same period of 1981.[57]

The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion

Yet however widely the net of neopatrimonial dispensation within the PLO and of statist social benefits more generally was cast, access to the middle and senior ranks of the 'political class' was severely restricted. The broadest distinction was between cadres from the refugee community in Lebanon

and the salaried personnel arriving from Jordan after 1971: few of the former reached senior position in any section of the military, bureaucracy, civilian organization, or affiliated unions, while the latter held the vast majority of posts above a certain level. This was an inadvertent consequence of recent history as much as the result of deliberate policy: the PLO had moved lock, stock, and barrel to Lebanon, and so its key agencies were already staffed and institutional patterns established. Once there, the tendency to authoritarian control, natural in a guerrilla movement, and the marked disinclination to hold elections within the civilian organization or convene general conferences, weighed implicitly against local Palestinians (or Lebanese nationals, for that matter), who predominated in the civilian organization, and kept them from rising through the ranks. *Tafrigh* reinforced this tendency by transforming unpaid volunteers into a growing petty salariat, undermining the civilian organization and fragmenting or coopting potential sources of dissent within it.

There were other, mundane reasons for differentiation within the broad salariat. Senior cadres and officers whose families resided in the occupied territories or Jordan had little hope of returning or securing commensurate civilian employment. Their residence in Lebanon (or wherever else they were posted) depended on affiliation to the PLO, as did the continued flow of their salaries. They had strong incentives both to remain in their posts, and acquiesce in neopatrimonial expansion, and to resist the rise of local personnel, at least unless it meant the aggrandizement of their commands and their own promotion. The original Palestinian refugee or resident communities in the host countries concerned, conversely, generally enjoyed greater access to local and foreign labour markets. The post-1973 oil boom exerted a powerful pull on professionals as well as on skilled and unskilled workers, who migrated in large numbers to the oil-rich Gulf monarchies and Libya.

Affiliation to a guerrilla group was not a primary economic choice, therefore. Nonetheless, it became part of the 'strategy of survival' for poorer families, which were assured of a regular addition to remittances or other income and of insurance against loss of employment. Especially likely to join the payroll were the part-employed, students, and war widows, the greatest number of whom were among the survivors of Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp. The latter augmented the modest martyr's stipends they received from the PLO Social Affairs Institution by becoming office workers, radio operators, or organizational cadres and union officials. 'Lateral migration' from the civilian organization to paramilitary agencies played a similar role, as duties were minimal and attendance only casually enforced, allowing members to pursue their studies or engage in other employment. Military commanders similarly became familiar with cyclic rises and drops in recruitment, for example from the refugee camps in Syria, where seasonal fluctuations in demand for agricultural labour affected employment levels. The overall consequence was high turnover rates in the lower levels of the salariat; an extrapolation from the experience of one frontline battalion

suggested that 25,000 persons may have rotated through Fateh combat units alone in 1978–81.[58]

Tafrigh had become an added part of the financial safety net extended to the wider civilian constituency of the PLO, but its inclusionary impact still operated only at the lower levels of the apparatus. The parallel process of bureaucratization tended to impede upward mobility from the ranks, and stabilized membership at the upper levels of the apparatus. Wars and natural attrition took their toll, but there were sufficient numbers for the replacement of members to occur without drawing too heavily on local personnel, and circulation was largely kept within the bureaucratized elite. It was by no means homogenous in its composition or cohesive in its politics, however, the most important cleavages deriving from differences in regional origin and professional formation, notably within the military. Their impact varied widely, and in many cases had become negligible by the end of the 1970s as the result of common combat experience and advanced training, but distinct patterns were still discernible in the concentration of combat officers. The most obvious rifts divided personnel from the Hebron and Nablus districts in the West Bank, the West Bank and Gaza, graduates of regular army and guerrilla training, and the PLA and Fateh. Hebronites predominated in the Yarmuk Forces, while many officers in guerrilla and militia units originated from the northern West Bank. There were strikingly few Gazans in Fateh combat forces generally, but they naturally formed a majority of the Egypt-based PLA ʿAyn Jalut Forces. However, the latter resented what they perceived to be their marginal standing (measured in terms of political recognition and access to material resources) compared to the Fateh faithful.

These patterns were the result of intrinsic social and historical causes, but they lent themselves to manipulation for the purposes of internal control. The most significant instance, certainly in the case of Fateh, was the disproportionate number of Gazans assigned to key posts: senior finance officers Fu'ad al-Shawbaki, Abu Usama Muhammad, and Zuhdi Saʿid; military administration head 'haj' Mutlaq; Social Affairs Institution director Wahid Mtayr; and senior security officers Amin al-Hindi and ʿAtif Bsaysu. The proportion of Gazans in Fateh combat forces was strikingly low, in contrast, but they held several important commands: the Qastal Forces ('haj' Ismaʿil Jabr), Bayt al-Maqdis Battalion (ʿAla' al-Affandi), and the Special Service (Majid al-Agha), among others.

The concentration of officers of one regional or professional background or another in a given sector was not necessarily the result of a cynical policy or prejudice, as many in the rank-and-file believed, nor did it always signify lack of competence or undeserved appointments. As often as not, concentration was equally the result of the natural tendency to appoint acquaintances holding shared social values and political outlooks formed in common contexts (home town, school, or training course). Cases in point were the gathering of Gazan security officers in the unified security apparatus headed by Khalaf, or of former

Jordanian army officers and cadres hailing from the Nablus district around Sayil, who headed the central operations room and the Western Sector's 'supply committee' (formed in 1980). Yet the emphasis on personalized loyalties and fragmentary institutionalization characteristic of a neopatrimonial system turned these bonds into a potential basis for cliquism and cronyism, and ultimately weakened political cohesion.

Genuine patriotism was by no means foregone—whether because liberation and sovereign statehood had not yet been achieved, or because Palestinians still faced ever-present military threats in Lebanon and constant Israeli encroachment on land and economic resources in the occupied territories—but the idealism and *élan* of previous years were steadily being replaced by resigned indifference in the lower ranks of the salariat and civilian membership and cynical manipulation at leadership level. The existential and economic insecurity of poorer refugee families also meant that a new 'hierarchy emerged that despised the Palestinian agricultural day labourer in ʿAkkar or the Biqaʿ [Valley] or the street trader or shopkeeper in ʿAyn al-Hilwa [camp]—the initial moral respect for those who sacrificed or belonged to the resistance gave way to respect for those [employed by] the PLO because they earned a higher income!'[59] Besides rampant corruption and abuse of privilege, this trend was reflected in the growing number of young Palestinians, many of them junior cadres or militiamen from the refugee camps (especially Tal al-Zaʿtar), who now sought asylum in West European countries.

The PLO was far from attaining its minimal national goals, but its political and institutional dynamics revealed the degree to which it had already made the transition from the period of revolutionary ascendancy in 1967–70 to a typically post-revolutionary phase of (in this case neopatrimonial) state-building. Yet it still faced a major task: to contest Israeli social control (and Jordanian influence) in the occupied territories, and so further its twin aims of securing participation in the peace process and placing Palestinian statehood on the negotiating agenda. Objective circumstances prevented straightforward statist extension to the occupied territories in the form of bureaucratized social services, but it provided the broad framework for the operation of corporatist organization and neopatrimonial political management.

20

Extending the State-in-Exile or Capturing It?

The growing importance for the PLO's diplomatic strategy of the extension of its state-in-exile to the occupied territories came clearly into play as it strove to reassert its centrality to the peace process in the late 1970s. This proved a daunting task, as it faced strenuous opposition from a range of actors. In the first instance, the PLO faced competition from the other two, well-entrenched statist centres, Israel and Jordan. That it was able to pose an effective challenge was due primarily to the deep social transformations that had taken place in the occupied territories since 1967, but equally to its ability, unilke its two rivals, to harness Palestinian nationalism. Even then the PLO was hamstrung by its own shortcomings, as lax security, slipshod organization, and perennial factionalism repeatedly undermined its effort to confront the Israeli military occupation with widespread armed resistance. These flaws were prompting frank, if privately-expressed complaints from leading personalities in the occupied territories by 1979, but the potential damage was mitigated as the PLO increasingly emphasized political and social action. Its relative success in mobilizing the population of the occupied territories, and in attracting or co-opting the local leadership, moreover enhanced its diplomatic standing internationally. However, this also triggered a struggle for political predominance between Fateh and the Palestinian Left, which emerged in this period as a serious contender for national leadership. Key to its rise was the convergence of strategic interests among key Arab states such as Syria and Iraq and the USSR at the start of the 'second cold war', although Arafat was ultimately able to utilize his control of the statist institutions of the PLO and of its sources of 'rent' to co-opt the Left and maintain his position internally.

Statist Competition and Social Transformation in the Occupied Territories

The PLO had emphasized the importance of political action in the occupied territories through successive PNC resolutions since January 1973, but exerted little concrete effort to that purpose until the launch of the Egyptian–Israeli peace talks in 1978–9. Now its need to avoid strategic marginalization required

far more systematic mobilization of what was arguably its largest, and certainly most politically significant, social constituency. The establishment of a sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in the DFLP phrase, 'offered the only opportunity available, in prevalent Arab and international balances, to confront the national [*qawmi*] dissipation of the Palestinian people and to restore and formulate its national [*watani*] independent character'.[1] However, the PLO faced a radically different context in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the one in which it was already consolidating its state-in-exile. This was determined not only by the immediate reality of Israeli occupation, but also by the fact that the military government directly administered civilian affairs. Its absolute power to grant or withhold the permits and to issue or abrogate the legislation affecting every aspect of Palestinian life in the occupied territories was central to the pervasive and highly intrusive system of population control it maintained, backed by the Shabak General Security Service and the extensive network of informers and collaborators it maintained among the local population.[2]

Yet the ability to punish or reward was only one dimension of social control. As significant was the impact of Israeli policy on the local economy. Israel aimed consciously to prevent the occupied territories from imposing a budgetary burden or competing with it economically.[3] Among the first measures taken by the military government in June 1967 was the suspension of local banking and financial services, depriving Palestinian entrepreneurs of a source of credit. A host of administrative decrees issued in the form of military orders impeded industry and agriculture, but equally important were the highly unequal terms of Palestinian economic integration with Israel. Rapid expansion of Israeli industry, agriculture, and construction in the next six years absorbed a growing number of Palestinian workers who were attracted not only by the prospect of employment, but also by the higher wages offered by Israeli enterprises. The wage differential was reinforced by exclusive access of Israeli producers to government subsidies and easy financial terms, and contributed to the decline of their Palestinian counterparts.[4] Israel pursued a common market, but the combined impact of its political control, dual legal system, and ethnic segregation severely constrained the captive local economy and distorted development.[5]

The PLO had also had to contend in the occupied territories with determined political competition from Jordan. Immediately following the June 1967 war, Jordan had endorsed a policy of non-cooperation with the Israeli occupation. Steadfastness (*sumud*), as it was dubbed, meant refusing to participate in social, political, or administrative activities directed by the Israeli military authorities, nor, consequently, to establish new institutions since that would involve registration under Israeli auspices. An important instance of this policy was Jordanian support for the open strike declared by Palestinian lawyers, judges, and teachers in the West Bank, who refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Israeli-run administration. Jordan paid their salaries, for which purpose it

received an annual grant from the League of Arab States; it suspended this practice in 1970 but resumed it in 1975, and for the next 13 years continued to pay monthly stipends to 8,000–10,000 teachers and civil servants, or roughly 40 per cent of the total number.[6] In 1978 this assistance amounted to $18 million. Jordanian hostility towards dealings with the Israeli-run administration lessened after 1970, but the fear that local Palestinians might seek a separate political and territorial arrangement with Israel prompted a continuing diplomatic effort to reassert Jordanian sovereignty over the area.

However, the fact that Israel did not seek political (as opposed to functional) integration of the occupied territories made it possible for a degree of tacit cooperation with Jordan to arise by the mid-1970s.[7] There was no joint control, but the belief of the Labour government in the 'Jordanian option'—a political solution in which West Bank population centres would revert to Jordanian sovereignty while Israel annexed border areas necessary for its security—led to an implicit administrative and political 'condominium'. This was abruptly threatened when the Likud Party came to power in May 1977, with its commitment to 'greater Israel'. New agriculture minister Ariel Sharon announced intentions to settle 'two million Jews in a security belt from Golan, through the West Bank, and into Sinai', and to establish a Palestinian state on the east bank of Jordan as a means of resolving the Palestine conflict.[8] The potential threat to Jordan was an added factor in its gradual reconciliation with the PLO over the next year.

From the viewpoint of the PLO, in any case, Jordanian administrative and repressive capacities in the occupied territories were inferior to those of Israel. The immediate priority of the mainstream leadership was therefore to contest Israeli, not Jordanian, social control. This demanded a combination of military and civilian resistance to Israeli occupation, and the parallel construction of an alternative system of social services and, to the extent possible, of economic opportunities. Nationalist patriotism provided an essential ingredient, but to achieve popular disengagement from the Israeli system and offer alternatives that were sufficiently credible (or at least not overly costly) to the public required novel approaches and structures, that could ultimately be effective only within a putative statist framework. Arab financial assistance after 1978 facilitated this shift by greatly augmenting the resources necessary for the extension of neopatrimonial politics and corporatist tendencies to the occupied territories. However, it was a necessary condition, not a sufficient one.

Crucial to PLO statist extension in the occupied territories was the opportunity offered by the fundamental transformations that had taken place in local society and economy since 1967. First was the marked decline of the traditional, pro-Jordanian sub-elite in the West Bank. It had played a leading role in the civilian protests immediately after the war, founding the Islamic Supreme Council and Higher Committee for National Guidance for that purpose, but the deportation of 514 social and political figures from the West Bank between

September 1967 and September 1969 decapitated the movement.[9] Israeli measures affecting its capital and land weakened the traditional sub-elite further, as did the Israeli decision to devolve greater administrative authority on the municipalities. Yet Jordanian insistence on *sumud* denied it the opportunity to build alternative institutions or run for municipal elections, thus marginalizing its ability to deliver patronage and exercise social control on behalf of Jordan.[10] An added consequence was to encourage some members of the traditional sub-elite to dissent and adopt a 'separatist' national agenda, evident in the support for Palestinian statehood evinced in 1970–2 by the likes of Hebron mayor Muhammad al-Jaʿbari, Jerusalem physician Hamdi al-Taji al-Faruqi, and *al-Quds* newspaper journalist Muhammad Abu-Shilbaya.[11]

The decline of the traditional sub-elite (and of Jordanian influence) was reflected in the sweeping victory of pro-PLO candidates in the West Bank municipal elections of April 1976. The victors came partly from the 'diploma elite', as younger, white-collar professionals took 40 per cent of all seats, while businessmen and merchants won a similar share, the rest being held by farmers and landowners.[12] Many members of the urban-based strata had been active in opposition politics before June 1967; many also came from families of the traditional elite, revealing that it was adapting to change, both politically and economically, rather than withering away.[13] The divergence in political attitudes and affiliations had become apparent following the municipal elections of April 1972, in which traditional candidates took a majority of seats; the nationalist line adopted by their younger, better-educated rivals was given voice in *al-Fajr* (*The Dawn*) and *al-Shaʿb* (*The People*), the two new newspapers that were launched in east Jerusalem immediately after the elections.

The reason for the shift in allegiance and increasingly overt Palestinian nationalism lay in the circumstances faced by the urban-based strata after 1967. The experience of Palestinian industry was indicative. Jordanian insistence that manufactured exports from the West Bank should contain no Israeli components and refusal to recognize enterprises registered after June 1967 hindered local industry.[14] Israeli competitors drew labour away and inundated Palestinian markets with cheaper products, accounting for over 90 per cent of imports in the occupied territories by the late 1970s. The gradual conviction after 1970 that Jordan and the Arab states would not soon rescue them from Israeli control deeply affected the political outlook of these strata. Yet, at the same time, the ability of the military government to affect trade—through control of licences and permits, and by imposing travel and export bans on specific towns or areas as a form of collective punishment—accentuated a localistic approach to entrepreneurial activity. Companies that rebased operations in Jordan flourished, while those staying put stagnated and tended to 'think small'. The effect was to impede the coalescence of a cohesive, territory-wide middle class.

The situation in Gaza differed markedly. There a distinct middle class did not emerge to challenge traditional social leaders, for a combination of reasons.

The sharp dichotomy between the relatively small number of original residents (*muwatinun*) and much larger number of refugees (*laji'un*) was one: the former generally owned what land and capital there were in Gaza, and it was from their ranks that the middle class was also drawn. The effective absence of industrial and financial sectors, low levels of education, and limited prospects for university graduates meant that there was little opportunity for a distinct middle class to emerge from other sources before 1967. The subsequent decline of agriculture weakened the resident families, but the spread of wage labour, proliferation of small workshops feeding Israeli industry, and import of Israeli products to local markets encouraged the appearance of a multitude of middlemen, not of modern middle-class strata. In any case there were few channels to compete for political or administrative power: whether before 1967, because of the clear demarcation between local society and the Egyptian-staffed military administration, or after, because the Israeli military government upheld the lack of provision for municipal elections in the inherited Egyptian law.

The defeat of the armed resistance movement in Gaza led to a prolonged period of political quiescence after 1972, and to the concentration of nationalist politics and organization in the West Bank for well over a decade. There professional and entrepreneurial strata tended to oppose a return to Jordanian rule and to support Palestinian statehood, and did so increasingly explicitly from 1973 onwards. Yet the debilitation of their economic base and the vulnerability to Israeli controls of the institutional framework they captured in April 1976 still constrained their political influence. These strata did not seek to assert their own primacy, and instead devoted much of their effort to affirming the leadership of the PLO, in contrast to the preference of the dwindling number of traditional leaders of the older generation for a return to Jordanian control. At the same time, although the professional and entrepreneurial strata brought a 'new ideological orientation and political rhetoric' to the debate, 'they had no economic or social agenda that differentiated them from the older generation'.[15] Their narrow focus on nationalist politics discouraged any effort to construct a system of social control to counter that of Israel, and led to a continuing emphasis on the strategy of *sumud* and extension of services, rather than one of social mobilization, generation of resources, and parallel institutionalization.

Increasingly, the institutional initiative was being taken at grass-roots level by a new generation of activists, not a few of them university graduates who had gained valuable political and organizational experience during their studies in neighbouring Arab states or abroad. A key element in their emergence as a distinct force was the establishment of three universities in the West Bank in 1972–5. By employing a significant number of graduates, the universities permitted a 'critical mass' of activists to gather, provided a ready organizational structure, and offered intensive contact with a crucial social category, students. The influence and aims of the young graduates were reflected in the nature of

academic programmes: Birzeit University required its students to complete 120 hours of community work (including paving rural roads, harvesting crops, extending literacy, and conducting social surveys); Bethlehem University offered courses in community health work and other non-traditional subjects; and al-Najah University set up a rural development centre.[16] These programmes revealed a conscious effort to 'go to' the rural population, which accounted for up to 70 per cent of the West Bank total and now provided a substantial proportion of the 6,000 students enrolled in higher education by the end of the 1970s (besides an estimated 15,000 studying abroad).[17]

The attendance at university of a growing number of young men and women from the villages of the West Bank revealed underlying trends of change in the rural population, the social consequences of which were becoming apparent by the end of the 1970s. One was the spread of wage labour, due in large measure to massive land expropriations, restrictions on water supply, and other Israeli-induced pressures on agriculture since 1967. Thanks to a much-improved transport system, the largest number of wage labourers commuted daily to work in Israel: this involved 69,000 officially registered workers (of whom 42,000 came from the West Bank, 77 per cent of them from villages) or roughly one-third the total labour force, with a sizeable additional number in illegal labour.[18] A second trend was migration to the oil-rich states, which contributed heavily to the outflow of 10,000–20,000 Palestinians (including students) a year from the West Bank and brought remittances worth $55 million annually by 1978.[19] Access to tertiary education was itself a third trend, that ultimately fuelled the outward migration in search of jobs and higher pay, but also encouraged adoption of new agricultural techniques or ventures and movement into salaried or clerical employment.[20] Starting in the late 1970s Israeli administrative and security policy also fuelled the drain, as men in a certain age bracket who travelled abroad for study or work were prohibited from returning in less than six months; all Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories moreover risked the permanent loss of their right of residence if they did not renew their travel permits annually while abroad, and if they did not physically return within three years.

These trends gave rise to a phenomenon of 'non-migratory urbanization' of West Bank villages.[21] Palestinian cultivators were no longer peasants, since they were heavily involved in markets outside their villages, but the fact that they were not physically displaced enabled them to cling to traditional arrangements that guaranteed 'access to land and the labour of kin and neighbours'.[22] Attachment to social solidary ties and values was a natural response to the encroachment of hostile external forces, in this case Israel. However, such attachment by now 'glorified a peasant society that did not exist in reality'.[23] The reality was that men, who formed the large majority of wage labourers, brought back new values from Israel, the cities, or abroad; whereas women were drawn into the agricultural cycle to an unprecedented degree and became 'the sole bearers of traditional culture and the preservers of peasant traditions'.[24] Parallel processes

were underway. On the one hand was the proletarianization of cultivators—although non-migratory urbanization, which allowed villagers to continue to derive part of their income from smallholdings and to perform non-cash transactions, and the unstable tenure of wage labour in Israel impeded this process—while on the other was the addition of a rural component to the Palestinian petite bourgeoisie. In all events, the rural population underwent a cleaving of traditional social moorings that enabled the mobilization of growing numbers within new political and organizational frameworks, although the same factors of market integration coupled with residual smallholding equally reinforced political inactivism and conservatism.[25]

The social and economic transformations in the occupied territories were not uniform in their impact, nor led to similar political results. Yet they were sufficient to allow the PLO to redirect the political engagement and nationalist identification of significant sectors of the population towards its own, statist framework. Whether statist extension was to occur by mobilizing the political movement in the occupied territories from below or co-opting it from above was a moot question from the viewpoint of the mainstream PLO leadership, which saw both approaches as serving a single, integrative function. It faced two problems, however. First was the need to devise effective organizational means, both to mobilize overt resistance to the Israeli occupation and to co-opt key social forces. The second problem facing the Fateh-dominated PLO was the opposition of other guerrilla groups to its strategic objectives and general policy, reflected in ostensibly divergent attitudes to the role of local leadership and social mobilization. However, the political and organizational practice of the exile-based opposition revealed it to be concerned primarily with influencing the direction of central PLO policy and, ultimately, with 'capturing' its statist structure. It was within this context that all the guerrilla groups sought allies and constituencies in the occupied territories, determinedly retaining political and operational control in their own hands all the while.[26]

Clandestine Organization

Whatever its mode or purpose, mobilization in the occupied territories required a fundamental change of course in terms of organizational instruments and operational objectives. The PLO had grappled with this challenge since Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, but the turning point came only after March 1979. Until then, the purpose of political proselytization and clandestine organization remained almost exclusively to mount armed resistance to Israel. This was equally true of the only guerrilla groups with a significant following in the occupied territories—Fateh, the PFLP, and DFLP—despite modest variations in emphasis and method. The priority given to military action was reflected in the collective failure to translate the upsurge of civilian protests in the occupied territories after November 1974 into a systematic

organizational effort. The consequences were demonstrated when embroilment in the Lebanese conflict prevented the guerrilla groups from building on the widespread disturbances that took place on what was celebrated as Land Day, on 29 March 1976, or on the sweeping victory of PLO supporters in the municipal elections held a fortnight later.

Fateh explained the continuing primacy of military action by describing it as the most effective 'means to mobilize the energies of the people'.[27] It put this outlook into practice with single-minded determination, its followers in the occupied territories accounting for twice as many armed attacks as members of the leftist groups.[28] The DFLP similarly insisted in 1979 that 'the armed struggle is the basic mainstay in the expansion and development of all forms of mass and political struggle'.[29] Yet by 1981 DFLP deputy secretary-general ʿAbd-Rabbu implicitly acknowledged an impasse, arguing that there could be no 'real way out for armed action in the occupied territories' unless it turned from an individual effort into a 'mass phenomenon'.[30] For all its stress on political mobilization, or 'mass action' (*ʿamal jamahiri*) as it was known, and interest in labour unions, the DFLP had not fundamentally altered its methods or devoted major resources to social mobilization by the time its second general conference convened in May.[31] Even then, it reiterated that it was the combination of 'mass and armed struggle' in the West Bank and Gaza that would make the costs to Israel of continued occupation outweigh the benefits.[32]

The PFLP offered further evidence of the failure to formulate an effective strategy for mobilization. Speaking in summer 1981, politburo member Mustafa al-Zabri admitted that even in its heyday 'the military and political momentum [of PFLP guerrillas] in the Gaza Strip lacked this depth, that is, it did not turn into a comprehensive mass condition . . . The military level . . . lacked an organizational depth, in the sense of establishing an organizational structure around it.'[33] As a result, he concluded, the political activism of the largely unorganized population in the occupied territories had outstripped clandestine military activity since the late 1970s. To remedy the situation, the PFLP conference in April reaffirmed clandestine military activity as a foremost organizational task.[34] Its appreciation of the relationship between political and military action and of objective circumstances in the occupied territories appeared flawed, however. The PFLP military doctrine manual offered a good example of wishful thinking, arguing that even a small, flat, and isolated area such as the Gaza Strip could be host to a successful guerrilla campaign 'if we follow tactics and techniques that are suited to the nature of the area'.[35]

Even then, the course of clandestine military organization in the occupied territories in the late 1970s had mixed results. The Lebanese conflict in particular had exacted a severe toll. The principal guerrilla groups threw all available personnel into battle against the Syrian army and Maronite militias in summer 1976, and in so doing lost a number of cadres responsible for the occupied territories. Communications between the clandestine networks and their commands in Lebanon were impeded or severed for much of this period, while the

punitive closure of PLO offices and training camps in Syria and the arrest or expulsion of staff caused further disruption. The end of the Lebanese conflict brought a badly needed respite; Fateh benefited most because it was allowed gradually to reopen its facilities in Syria from 1977 onwards. This was evident in the rising number of arrests announced by the Israeli authorities: from 800–900 (involving 109 cells) in 1977 to 1,600 (146 cells) in 1978.[36] Yet Israeli data showed that a majority (up to 83 per cent) were being arrested before conducting any hostile act, and that up to 30 per cent did not belong to a recognized guerrilla group.[37] The PLO acknowledged this lacklustre performance, blaming it partly on the fact that the outward flow of '20,000 young men' from the occupied territories each year prevented 'a more explosive situation' from developing.[38]

Fateh had learnt some lessons from its experience in the occupied territories since 1968. One was to organize members into small 'clusters' tied separately to control officers based in exile, instead of the large, pyramidal structures that could more easily be dismantled by the Israeli security services.[39] This was not uniformly applied, however. The approach to recruitment and organization remained at best varied, at worst lackadaisical. Much depended on the disposition of the cadre responsible in each case; the heads of the geographically demarcated committees that Wazir had revived after resuming command of the Western Sector following the death of Kamal ʿUdwan in April 1973 were mostly the same individuals who had started with him in 1968, and changed little in their eclectic and haphazard methods. Wazir had retained the 'organization committee' formed by ʿUdwan, the purpose of which was to feed the regional committees with a constant flow of new members, but in practice the various committees were riven by personal rivalries and petty disputes over recruits and budgets and rarely cooperated. Wazir was disinclined by temperament to intervene, with the result that several committees split into two or more rival compartments, as in the case of the Gaza, Nablus, and organization committees; the Western Sector also boasted two information and research sections, with the usual lack of communication or sharing of resources.[40]

Rather than impose discipline, Wazir simply approved separate budgets for the rival committees as a means of normalizing the situation in the Western Sector. The creation in 1980 of a 'regions committee' with the task of recruiting among the thousands of Palestinian students abroad failed to alter this pattern. No more successful was the formation of new 'political', 'organization', and 'supply' committees following the Fateh general conference in May; Wazir used these bodies to contain the attempts by recently elected central committee members to involve themselves in the Western Sector, and maintained his existing staff.[41] An even more serious trend was the growing role of money, used primarily to buy arms, explosives, and false documents, obtain transport, and bribe border guards and other officials. The ready availability of funds, secrecy of use, and lack of accountability encouraged inflated budgets, unwar-

ranted expenditure, and outright pilfering. Wazir overlooked such behaviour so long as 'the job was done', and refrained from punitive action lest his subordinates seek the patronage of Arafat instead.[42]

The situation was substantially different in the PFLP and DFLP, but not necessarily for the better. In an extensive internal review of operations in 1973–80, the PFLP noted the inexperience of its followers in clandestine activity and military skills. Excessive emphasis had been placed on theoretical and political issues, which it now recognized 'were not tied to the practice of struggle nor translated into specific action programs'. The defeat in Jordan in 1970–1 had exerted a long-term impact, as had the Lebanese conflict, but the PFLP also admitted that internal disputes had led to organizational 'indiscipline and laxity'.[43] The cadres responsible for clandestine organization tended to guard their separate preserves jealously, and allowed their subordinates in the West Bank and Gaza little autonomy. The PFLP, which proudly proclaimed its ongoing self-transformation into a Marxist-Leninist party, continued to stress 'democratic centralism' in relations between its leadership in exile and followers in the occupied territories. Yet it took no formal note of the need to separate political and military functions, nor of the importance of social mobilization, despite exhorting its membership in general (without specifying the occupied territories) to join unions and other social associations.[44] Indeed, not a single section of the 1981 conference report, let alone a chapter, was devoted to the strategy, requirements, or circumstances of action in the occupied territories.[45]

A smuggled letter from PFLP members in Israeli prisons at the beginning of the year bluntly accused the leadership of focusing its military effort on Lebanon instead of the occupied territories, where there was 'no action'. 'We appreciate fully the big part played by our comrades in the Lebanese arena, whether in the civil war or the battles of the south and the confrontation against the gangs of [SLA commander] Sa'd Haddad, and we take great pride in their heroism,' the letter stated, but then it asked pointedly, 'has our political leadership forgotten that the masses of our people . . . still delight to the sound of bullets and the sound of exploding bombs and mines under the military vehicles of the [Israeli] enemy?'[46] The PFLP killed collaborators, but this needed to be complemented 'with direct attacks on army, civilians, and installations of the Zionist enemy'. 'Don't you believe that the faith of our masses in the revolution will increase and their uprisings will escalate . . . when they hear with their own ears and see with their own eyes the rifles and grenades of their vanguards reaping enemy soldiers?', the letter continued. The prisoners came to a clear conclusion: 'even from a media point of view, we consider that a [single] successful military operation inside the occupied homeland, in the midst of the current sweeping uprising in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, will raise the rating of the group that undertakes it'.[47]

Although he rejected the criticism levelled at the PFLP leadership, Habash admitted to the April conference that there was 'confusion in arranging our

military and organizational situation [in the occupied territories]'. As the internal review explained, the 'branch for the occupied land' had started out as a single command, and then developed into 'an organizational apparatus to which combat tasks were assigned, and then a military apparatus alongside the organizational apparatus, and so on'.[48] The decision taken by the PFLP in 1978 to restructure itself as a Leninist party had only complicated matters; the 'party leadership' in the occupied territories had failed to 'assume its natural place', as the PFLP noted three years later.[49] The solution was to set up a separate apparatus headed by a combination of military and organizational cadres with responsibility to

> 1-Kill as many enemy troops as possible and obtain their weapons and equipment, without suffering large losses in our ranks. 2-Direct blows at military and economic installations and at communications routes. 3-Liquidate enemy military and political leaders. 4-Liquidate collaborators. 5-Work to disrupt enemy plans in the occupied land.[50]

The clandestine civilian networks would shield the military apparatus if any of its commanders were arrested. They would also 'gather intelligence about the enemy and his agents, and about enemy plans, analyze them and transfer them to the appropriate bodies . . . and prevent penetration and espionage against the [PFLP] and the revolution in general'. The PFLP even intended ambitiously, if unrealistically, to 'build and organize combat units belonging to the front in [Israel] and especially in the Galilee'.[51] The fact that these problems persisted and that such solutions were still being proposed as late as 1981 revealed the unresolved tension between the declared aim of building self-sufficient and autonomous local commands in the occupied territories, on the one hand, and the reluctance of Habash and his principal colleagues in exile to relinquish control over organizational and political matters alike, on the other.

Mass Action

It was the DFLP that embarked on the most serious changes in operational methods and aims in the occupied territories in this period, in contrast to Fateh and the PFLP. The DFLP first stressed the importance of social and political mobilization in 1972–3, but had minimal presence at the time and changed little in its method of operation. In 1976 it signalled a formal shift from the single-minded focus on military action in order to place a greater emphasis on mass action, but this too proved to be at most nominal.[52] Starting in autumn 1977, the DFLP resolved to lead its new strategy by constructing a Leninist party in the occupied territories. This mirrored the decision to build a hierarchical party apparatus in exile, wherever the DFLP had a following among Palestinians, in the Arab states or elsewhere.[53] The party branch in the West Bank and Gaza

was intended to be largely autonomous, however, with a locally-based leadership and 'the full freedom to devise its tactics and daily tasks in the struggle, in the framework of the general policy that unites the [DFLP] and its action on the Palestinian level as a whole'.[54]

Whatever degree of nominal autonomy they were to enjoy, the local commands in the occupied territories were also instructed to ensure that their programmes for action 'were in harmony with the unified strategy and general political line of the [DFLP] as a whole, and were approved by the central committee'.[55] The DFLP military apparatus in the occupied territories would meanwhile be sundered from the civilian party body, in order to protect the latter from possible Israeli reprisals. It would also retain its 'thread-like' chain of command—individual members or combat cells connected not to each other but directly to cadres based in Jordan, Syria, or Lebanon—in order to reduce security risks.[56] The DFLP's sister branch in Jordan—the Democratic Front's Organization (*Munazzamat al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiyya-Majd*)—would similarly be divided in two, albeit for different purposes: a local branch would maintain the involvement in Jordanian politics, while a specialized apparatus would take over support for the clandestine networks in the occupied territories.[57]

A principal task of the party core in the occupied territories, meanwhile, would be to envelop itself with mass organizations that could undertake overt political and social activity, channelling recruits and proselytizing among the general public. Charitable organizations, voluntary agencies, and youth clubs were examples of appropriate social associations, but the primary focus was on trade unions, especially of workers. As DFLP deputy secretary-general Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu later explained, 'the organization of 150,000 Palestinian workers, who form the Palestinian working class in the occupied territories . . . is the greater and foremost task . . . [we should] act energetically to form new trade unions, by reviving old ones, or establish branches for existing unions . . . there are open vistas to develop the action of the mass movement and to organize it'.[58]

This focus moreover served the DFLP's foremost political objective—to establish an independent state in the West Bank and Gaza—and was reflected in the devotion of a whole chapter in its 1981 conference report to the struggle in the occupied territories.[59] The document also explained the main point of divergence between the DFLP and rejectionist groups such as the PFLP, obliquely castigating them for raising slogans such as 'armed struggle until total liberation' and 'protection of the phenomenon of armed struggle'. This rhetoric disguised a 'policy of waiting' for external factors to change the strategic balance, the DFLP argued, and diverted Palestinian energy into 'revolutionizing the other Arab peoples' rather than themselves.[60] The Palestinians had to make their own distinct contribution to the historic struggle for 'the final national goal', above all by 'securing a firm, launch base [*qaʿidat irtikaz*] in the areas where a majority of the people reside on the soil of their homeland',

namely the occupied territories.[61] Mass action was one of the means to that end.

In paying increasing attention to political and social mobilization, the guerrilla groups merely followed the path charted by the Palestinian communists over the preceding decade. The West Bank communists had reactivated the General Federation of Labour Unions in 1969, and played an active part in the expansion and leadership of the dynamic voluntary work programme among university and high school students from 1972 onwards.[62] However, they were unable to attract significant support outside Jerusalem and the main towns and nearby refugee camps of the central West Bank. Their following was far weaker in areas characterized by social and religious conservatism: the main towns of the northern and southern West Bank, rural areas, and the densely crowded and poverty-stricken Gaza Strip. The stagnation of Palestinian industry and its fragmentation into small-scale workshops also undermined the emergence of 'working-class politics', as did the high rate of outward labour migration and the growing dependence on work in Israel. This was reflected in the fact that only 5.4–10 per cent of the West Bank labour force had joined unions by 1982.[63] The Israeli military authorities further impeded 'unionization' by tightening inherited Jordanian legislation, itself already severely restrictive.[64]

Divisions among the communists posed an added impediment. Followers of former JCP secretary-general Fahmi al-Salfiti who had broken away in 1971 still operated separately in the West Bank as the self-styled 'Leninist cadre'. They opposed the increasing Palestinian nationalism of the local JCP branch and its deepening ties with the PLO, and criticized the JCP-dominated Palestinian National Front in September 1973 for supporting the PLO's political programme, which still called for 'total liberation of Palestine'.[65] However, their conviction after the October war that an independent state would emerge in the occupied territories prompted them to form the Palestinian Communist Youth Organization in 1975 (renamed the Palestinian Communist Organization, *munazzama*, in 1977).[66] Conversely, a militant wing declared itself in 1980 as the Palestinian Communist Organization (*tamzim*) in Lebanon (PCOL), headed by ʿArabi ʿAwwad. ʿAwwad had been deported from the West Bank in 1973 on suspicion of preparing military action, and was now a member of the PLO executive committee. The PCOL attracted other deportees, students abroad, and local communists, but considered itself a branch of the JCP. It criticized the West Bank communists for failing to conduct armed struggle and for replacing the objective of establishing a 'secular democratic state in all of Palestine' with the minimalist goal of a much smaller state in the occupied territories, coexisting with Israel.[67]

The West Bank communists, for their part, chafed at the refusal of the JCP to allow them to reorganize as a separate Palestinian party. In 1975 they were permitted to form the Palestinian Communist Organization (*tanzim*), but as a branch of the JCP. Another attempt to form a separate party was rejected in

1977–8, but the PCO finally won the support of the sister parties in the Soviet bloc and Arab countries to form the Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) in February 1982.[68] Unlike the guerrilla groups or the PCOL, the communists had firmly eschewed armed struggle since 1974; a political report issued by the local 'command committee' in August 1979 made no reference to military action, for example, although the JCP had reportedly urged its members to volunteer for duty in south Lebanon during the Israeli invasion of March 1978.[69] As they later explained in a published discussion of this period, the communists were acutely aware of the geographic and demographic difficulties of waging guerrilla war in the occupied territories. Besides, they noted, up to 90 per cent of the clandestine members of the guerrilla groups were arrested even before carrying out military attacks.[70] These groups were at fault for continuing to structure their networks for military functions, although they no longer waged armed struggle seriously.[71] The communists concluded that any call for them to conduct military action was an invitation to destroy the party, although the new programme issued in 1983 by the first conference of the PCP acknowledged it as a possible form of struggle, given appropriate conditions.[72]

In spite of the success of their 'mass mobilization', or rather because of it, the communists faced growing competition from the three main guerrilla groups for control over the voluntary work committees, social associations, and, above all, labour and trade unions. The DFLP had certainly learned this lesson by 1979, but by 1981 the PFLP was also insisting to its membership adamantly, if unsuccessfully, that 'everyone must enter the unions'.[73] Fateh showed sustained interest in competing for influence among students, workers, and eventually women's associations as prime groups for mobilization and recruitment. Wazir in particular saw the need for 'a public political organization, from which is drawn the clandestine organization—[both] political and military . . . and [which is] protected by a broad mass base'.[74] Fateh, the PFLP, and the DFLP were not above forming entirely new, parallel bodies to compete for influence. For their part the communists decided in 1979 to counter rival attempts to infiltrate the existing unions, by vetting new members and resisting the inclusion of new unions in the General Federation of Trade Unions, which they had controlled since reviving it in 1969. The intensification of the rivalry between the Fateh-dominated Workers' Youth Movement and the loose leftist alliance—the communist-led Progressive Workers' Bloc, the DFLP's Workers' Union Bloc, and the PFLP's Progressive Unionist Action Front (not to mention the minuscule Baʿthist Workers Vanguard Bloc)—finally led to a complete rift and the creation of a second, Fateh-dominated general federation in August 1981.

The Left had already accused Fateh of splitting the unions and subverting the national front in the occupied territories as early as mid-1979.[75] Fateh responded, with some justification, that the communists in particular and the Left in general were trying to operate 'closed shops' against it. Even a leading figure of the leftist faction in Fateh such as Majid Abu-Sharar, who coordinated closely

with the leftist guerrilla groups, complained of exclusion from some unions. They were 'closed off, in the sense of delays in conducting elections, delays in subscribing [new] members, because what governs the act of subscription is a mentality [that seeks] continued control over this union or that'.[76] As competition intensified, Fateh resorted to setting up 'cardboard' unions, often among dubious labour categories such as 'cassette-sellers or bread-carriers', in order to inflate the nominal membership of its own general federation of trade unions.[77] It was not alone in this practice, however. The DFLP was especially keen to attain leadership of the labour movement: in 1981 it embarked on a determined effort either to gain control of individual unions from within, by adding as many of its own recruits as possible to membership lists, or to form a parallel union to every one it could not dominate, and eventually formed a third general federation (in 1985).[78]

Yet the unions were not the most important arena of nationalist politics or social mobilization. More prominent by far was the role of the student and youth organizations established by the four main political actors in the occupied territories. This reflected the expansion of the higher education system, but it was equally the inadvertent consequence of Israeli security measures over the years. By 1981 an estimated 230,000–250,000 Palestinians had passed through interrogation and detention for at least 24 hours or served actual prison sentences.[79] In contrast to the late 1960s and early 1970s, prisoners now tended to be young, educated, and familiar with the tactics of civilian disobedience and unarmed protest.[80] In prison they received political indoctrination and instruction in security and organization from veteran guerrillas and cadres.[81] Prisoners were organized according to political affiliation and operated their own codes of conduct. They complained to the prison authorities about torture or mistreatment and demanded improved living conditions, conducted hunger strikes and boycotted prison labour, and worked systematically to eliminate informers. Combined with the educational programmes, literacy classes, and ideological curricula taught by the prisoners themselves, the contest of wills with the Israeli authorities turned the prisons into unsurpassed 'cadre schools'. Upon their release many prisoners entered universities or colleges of higher education, where they took leading roles in the student and youth organizations.[82]

The Struggle for Political Predominance

The activism of Palestinian prisoners and civilian protesters reinforced the image of widespread rejection of the Egyptian–Israeli peace talks and of plans for Palestinian autonomy.[83] By the same token they also enhanced the status of the PLO, and confirmed the rising prominence of new leaders and structures in the occupied territories. Foremost were the mayors, who divided into two broad trends. A 'pragmatic' wing comprising both the traditionalist, pro-Jordan

mayors of Bethlehem and Gaza and moderate nationalists and Fateh-supporters such as the mayors of Hebron and Tulkarm preferred to avoid confrontation with the Israeli military government, in the hope of securing municipal needs and a measure of political leeway. A 'hardline' group, including the outspoken mayors of Nablus and Ramallah, leaned towards the Palestinian Left and advocated total non-compliance with the occupation, while highlighting support for the PLO.[84]

The 'pragmatists' refused to condemn Sadat for visiting Jerusalem in November 1977 and supported contact with the US. The 'hardliners', conversely, refused to meet US envoys and criticized Fateh for maintaining a dialogue with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, as well as for failing to coordinate closely with Syria. In the proud view of the Palestinian Left, this group was offended by the 'compromises and divisive policies of the Palestinian Right'.[85] The two wings moderated their disputes, however, in order to resist the aggressive settlement and land expropriation programmes pursued by the Likud government. To this end 'pro-PLO mayors from various regions of the West Bank and Gaza, representatives of voluntary organizations, trade and students' unions, the religious establishment, business circles, and journalists' formed the National Guidance Committee (NGC) in October 1978.[86] Fateh was satisfied with minority representation in the NGC, believing that it could control the coalition, but was unable to overcome leftist opposition to its effort to include pro-Jordanian mayors.

Another issue of major contention was the role of the Jordanian–Palestinian joint committee and the 'steadfastness' funds it started to disburse in the occupied territories in 1979.[87] The strategy of *sumud* had evolved considerably since 1967, and now consisted of several main components.[88] One was to assist disengagement from the Israeli-administered system by funding infrastructure, especially in rural areas, where hundreds of West Bank villages received electricity generators, piped water, and paved roads for the first time. Urban standards of living were also to be improved by funding municipal projects. Ironically, this relieved the Israeli military government of a considerable financial burden, but the PLO was determined to block the extension of Israeli-supplied utilities and basic services to the Palestinian population.[89] With Jordan, it waged a protracted struggle to save the East Jerusalem Electricity Company in particular, and made similar attempts to provide the main cities and towns with alternatives to Israeli national carriers. A second aim of *sumud* was to increase local income and raise employment, with the ultimate purpose of reducing the economic reasons for emigration. Agricultural marketing schemes, producer cooperatives, and agro-industrial projects received major funding, while industrial enterprises of varying sizes and nature were awarded individual loans.

The contentious aspect of *sumud*, however, was the utilization of steadfastness funds for political influence. Jordan sought actively to shore up its standing in the occupied territories by securing funding for bodies headed by its

supporters, especially municipalities such as that of Bethlehem and the agricultural cooperatives. In doing so it quietly reduced long-standing allocations for these purposes in its own government budget, shifting the burden instead to the steadfastness fund.[90] The PLO tolerated this practice because it was compelled to accept joint disbursement of the $100 million annual Arab grant, and reciprocated by channelling funds to its own constituencies, with Jordanian acquiescence. An example was the allocation of funds to the trade unions, which were almost entirely dominated by the guerrilla groups and the communists. Any union could apply for assistance, a fact that encouraged the proliferation of 'cardboard' and parallel unions, but the joint committee, with Jordanian approval, would only accept applications from unions that obtained the approval of the Fateh-led general federation. Indeed, steadfastness funds were granted exclusively to the latter body after 1981.[91] Besides, by acknowledging the material interests of pro-Jordanian elements of the established middle class, Fateh coaxed them into a wider 'national *bourgeoisie*' that was coming increasingly under its own influence, whether by conscious design or political instinct.[92]

The example of the unions demonstrated the third component of *sumud* and a foremost PLO priority: social subsidies. Universities and hospitals received regular grants to cover salaries and to provide education and health care in return for token fees. Steadfastness funds were also used (starting in mid-1981) to provide monthly stipends to employees on limited salaries, and to unemployed university graduates. Specific social categories were targeted with additional subsidies, notably the substantial housing loans offered to professionals and lower middle-class urban strata.[93] Higher councils were set up to oversee the provision of services and management of funds in education, health, and housing, and to coordinate needs between the West Bank and Gaza. Formally registered with the appropriate Israeli authorities, these bodies were dominated by Fateh, which also encouraged the establishment, with steadfastness funds, of a university college in Hebron and six new technical colleges (in addition to the existing five) in 1980. Wazir played an instrumental role in extending the pattern to Gaza with the establishment of the Islamic University in 1978, securing Arab funds and academic accreditation from al-Azhar University in Cairo. Total university enrolment in the occupied territories stood at 7,500 in 1980, and reached 10,000 by 1982.[94] The rising proportion of students with a rural background, coupled with the extension of infrastructure and services, also increased Fateh influence in the villages.

Not surprisingly, the Palestinian Left reacted with growing ire to the political uses to which steadfastness funds were being put. DFLP secretary-general Hawatma spoke for all when he accused Jordan of 'employing the Arab steadfastness funds in the service of reinforcing its influence in the occupied territories, and exploiting the work of the Jordanian–Palestinian joint committee as a cover to spend most of these funds on clients and on administrative agencies and municipal and village councils that are loyal to the Jordanian regime and to

its calls for annexation and subordination of the [West] Bank and [Gaza] Strip'.[95] The DFLP later added that the 'Palestinian Right' could find support for its policies 'only among the remaining handful of big capitalists, large landowners, traditional family notables, and limited strata of the upper national *bourgeoisie* who have escaped the effects of colonial [Israeli] destruction because their principal economic activity relies on continued trade with Jordan and the Arab countries'.[96] The PFLP went a step further, accusing 'the rightwing bureaucratic leadership' of the PLO of actively assisting Jordan to expand the role of its clients.[97] Yet the PFLP was itself guilty of inconsistency: it had opposed PLO participation in the municipal elections of April 1976 and accused the new Nablus mayor Bassam al-Shakʿa of seeking to 'foil the revolution' at the behest of the Israeli military government, yet was now allied with some of the mayors, most militant of whom was Shakʿa.[98]

Abu-Sharar accepted that 'whatever benefits we derive from the [joint] committee, the Jordanian regime derives more', but insisted that 'ultimately, we achieve a national goal by supporting the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territories'.[99] Yet, as leftist critics pointed out, *sumud* was leading to additional abuses. Palestinian employers received funding regardless of the performance of their enterprises, encouraging them to save on costs, reduce quality, and take summary action against staff in blithe disregard of work closures or market response. Recipients of commercial and housing loans from the steadfastness fund did not pay interest; indeed the tacit understanding was that the loans would not be repaid, turning them effectively into grants.[100] This was seen as further support for *sumud*, but in any case political considerations—the discreet rivalry with Jordan and PLO concern to co-opt key constituencies—encouraged a casual attitude towards financial accountability and led to massive waste and outright embezzlement. The expansion of joint committee activity prompted the PLO in mid-1981 to request an increase in the total Arab grant for the occupied territories, from $150 million annually to nearly $460 million.[101] There was already a shortfall in the original pledge and new funds did not materialize, but even so the revelation by Arafat that $172 million had been disbursed so far showed how substantial the stakes had become.[102]

The Left forfeited the chance to exert serious influence on these trends by boycotting the Jordanian–Palestinian joint committee. By the same token it also lost the opportunity to gain direct access to its political constituency in the occupied territories. Wazir, conversely, eagerly established contact after spring 1979 with a wide range of social, political, business, and union leaders who visited Amman to apply for assistance or to meet him. Furthermore, Fateh controlled allocation of the additional $50 million annually in Arab assistance for the occupied territories that was channelled through the PLO independently of Jordan. Wazir set up an 'economic committee' within the Western Sector to help disburse these funds, circumventing the PLO's economic department and the Palestine National Fund.[103] PFLP opposition to the joint commit-

tee did not waver, but the DFLP now reconsidered its stance and nominated a delegate in August 1979; however, this followed publication of a political statement by the DFLP central committee containing harsh criticism of the Jordanian authorities, which retaliated by refusing entry to the DFLP representative.[104]

Dissatisfied with their inability to contain Fateh, despite their influence within the NGC, the leftist groups next tried to set up a new Palestinian National Front (PNF) in October 1979.[105] They formulated a political programme that was more militant on all key issues than that of the PLO, yet urged the PLO to recognize the PNF as its 'sole political instrument' in the occupied territories. The PNF would accordingly assume direction of the NGC while coordinating on strategic political matters with the PLO leadership, which it would continue to promote as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.[106] This was an ambitious challenge to Fateh, which the PNF reinforced by advocating total non-compliance with the Israeli military government. It pushed matters to a head in November by calling on Palestinian mayors to resign their posts in protest at an Israeli decision to deport Nablus mayor Shakʿa. Fateh opposed the call, fearing that it would mean ceding the advantage to Israel and losing PLO gains, but the Left won a double victory: first when Fateh was embarrassed into supporting the resignations, and then when Israel rescinded the deportation order in December.

The Shakʿa episode only deepened Fateh determination to assert its control, which meant insisting on the central role of the PLO leadership in exile in directing political and operational matters alike in the occupied territories. At its urging, the PLO executive committee refused to recognize the PNF.[107] Fateh also used its control of the steadfastness fund to direct aid away from the NGC and leftist-dominated bodies, although it was in this period that the latter, thanks largely to the Western-trained members of the intelligentsia who were prominent in their ranks, started to set up specialized private voluntary organizations and receive a growing flow of funds from international non-governmental organizations based largely in the West. It was in this period too that Fateh launched its most sustained campaign to take over workers and students unions in the occupied territories—at times by forming electoral alliances with the increasingly active Muslim Brotherhood—with the result not only of weakening its leftist rivals and the PNF, but also of marginalizing the NGC.[108] The DFLP spoke for the Left when it bitterly decried 'the irresponsible policy of sabotage exercised by the Palestinian rightwing towards the national movement in [the occupied territories] . . . [that has caused] the reversal of the mass movement . . . because it lacks the unified instrument of leadership and guidance'.[109] It was equally clear that 'the rightist current in the PLO sees the uprising and struggle of our people inside as no more than a means of pressure and of support for its diplomatic moves in the Arab and international arenas'.[110]

The outcome of the struggle for influence was not a foregone conclusion in late 1979, however, and the Left pursued its political offensive. King Husayn aroused its suspicion in September by calling for an international peace conference and a comprehensive, negotiated solution to the Palestine problem and Arab–Israeli conflict.[111] His reiteration of this proposal at the Arab summit conference in Tunis at the end of November convinced the Left that the PLO intended to form a joint delegation with Jordan and discard its demand for an independent Palestinian state. Habash accused 'the Jordanian regime and [its] agents in the West Bank' of 'preparing themselves for a partnership with the PLO, in order to deviously implement the old conspiracy, the conspiracy of the United Arab Kingdom'.[112] This was not an uncommon belief at the time; Fateh central committee member Khalaf also expected the united kingdom proposal, originally tabled by the king in 1972, to be revived if the PLO was weakened.[113]

The reason for this sudden concern was the suggestion made in January 1980 by Egyptian president Sadat that transitional arrangements for Palestinian self-rule should be applied first in the Gaza Strip and only subsequently in the West Bank. Sadat had first mooted this idea in February 1979, but revived it as a face-saving device just as Egypt readied to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel on 26 January 1980.[114] This time Palestinian opposition was unanimous. An editorial in the PLO weekly roundly denounced the 'Gaza first' plan and accused Sadat of trying to woo local leaders.[115] It was reassured when the most senior among them, Gaza mayor Rashad al-Shawwa, called the plan 'a propaganda ploy' and complained of recent Israeli measures designed to portray a false image of Palestinian self-administration in civilian affairs.[116]

Israel was indeed reviewing its methods of control in the occupied territories, and hoped to undermine the influence of the NGC for its own reasons. From 1979 onwards, the military authorities extended discreet support to the Islamist tendency that had surfaced since the Islamic revolution in Iran earlier in the year. Social associations, student groups, and charitable societies or voluntary committees—mostly affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood—mounted an increasingly assertive challenge to the pro-PLO nationalists and the leftist groups from the beginning of 1980.[117] In two days of rioting in early January, Islamist demonstrators attacked a cinema, a youth centre, and shops and cafes selling alcoholic beverages. They also burnt the PRCS headquarters and attacked the home of its chairman, left-leaning Haydar ʿAbd-al-Shafi. Contrary to their norm, the Israelis did not intervene until the crowd had already dispersed.

In parallel, the Israeli military government worked to reduce the influence of the pro-PLO mayors in the West Bank. Starting in 1978, on the advice of its adviser on Arab Affairs, Menahem Milson, it sponsored the establishment of 'village leagues'. This effort only gathered pace in 1981, by which time a number of administrative functions had been removed from the jurisdiction

of urban municipalities and reassigned to *mukhtars* or, as often as not, self-promoting individuals in the villages. By then the leagues were receiving a budget of nearly JD3 million from the Israeli military government, which also provided training and light arms for their members.[118] In 1980 the Israeli military government moved to repress Palestinian nationalism by making public 'identification or sympathy with a terrorist organization, by raising a flag, presenting a symbol or slogan or causing an anthem or slogan to be heard' a criminal offence punishable by up to three years' imprisonment.[119] It also took a direct step to enhance the appearance of Palestinian autonomy by reorganizing the administration of civilian affairs in March. Yet as Gaza mayor Shawwa described it, 'the Arab director is responsible for his department in form only, whereas the real director is an Israeli staff officer sitting in the room next door to the Arab manager, but in civilian clothes'.[120] Unable to promote the emergence of a local leadership that would challenge the PLO, prime minister Begin cancelled the West Bank municipal elections scheduled for April 1980.[121]

Preparing to 'Capture' the PLO

The rupture between Fateh and the Left over policy towards the NGC, PNF, and Jordanian–Palestinian joint committee deepened in the second half of 1979 as a result of the launch of a new diplomatic initiative to win Western European recognition of the PLO. In July Arafat met Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky and the president of the Socialist International, Willy Brandt, in Vienna. Hani al-Hasan explained this as an attempt to drive a wedge between Israel and its allies in the West; his older brother Khalid later stressed that historical and geopolitical factors made Europe more sensitive to Arab concerns and more likely to distinguish its Middle East policy from that of the US.[122] The two Hasan brothers and Arafat insisted that they were engaged in a 'political struggle [not] a political settlement', and argued that their diplomatic effort was intended to reap the rewards of the armed struggle.[123] The PLO central council approved the dialogue with Europe on 12 August, and in the following months Arafat visited Spain, Turkey, and Portugal, while PLO 'foreign minister' Qaddumi visited Belgium, Italy, and Athens and EEC headquarters in Brussels.

The Palestinian opposition suspected Arafat of seeking European mediation with the US in order to secure a place in the Palestinian autonomy talks underway between Egypt and Israel, as Habash argued.[124] Hawatma similarly accused the PLO chairman of seeking to join the peace process although 'all proposed settlements derive from the American settlement or take it as a given reality'.[125] As significant was open Syrian hostility. On 5 August the official *Ba'th* newspaper stressed the importance of a common Syrian–Palestinian position, and pointedly reminded its readers that the power to liberate Palestine lay in

Damascus.[126] An editorial in *Tishrin* on the same day issued a thinly veiled warning to 'those engaged in a race to ensure dialogue and obtain conditional recognition'.[127] Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin and PF–GC secretary-general Jibril echoed Syrian fear that the Vienna meeting signalled PLO intention to recognize Israel, and viewed it in the context of US plans for the region.[128] Syria moreover suspected Fateh of covertly assisting the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood with funds, arms, and training, and by sheltering fugitive rebels in Lebanon. Apparently acting on hard intelligence, it imprisoned Abu Usama Muhammad, chief Fateh financial officer in Syria.

The PLO was also coming under growing pressure from Libya to revise its diplomatic strategy. Qadhdhafi had already taken an active role in Palestinian politics by hosting an 'emergency conference' attended by Arafat and the leaders of all the guerrilla groups in Tripoli on 13–15 June. The meeting reconfirmed the Tripoli Document of December 1977 as the basis for PLO policies and promised to 'develop the military capabilities of the Palestinian revolution, and supply it with the weapons and all the material means for the defence of its presence and to enable it to escalate the armed struggle'.[129] Libya pledged to 'provide all the requirements that the Palestinian resistance groups have requested'. Little came of this, but Arafat's mediation effort in the US–Iranian hostage crisis in early November was interpreted as a renewed overture to the US. His meetings in the same period with the reverend Jesse Jackson and other black leaders from the US pointed in the same direction. Occasional rhetorical militancy from Arafat, such as the call to 'strike at the head of the serpent, that is, US interests in the region', did little to dispel leftist suspicions.[130]

Qadhdhafi directed increasingly acerbic public criticism at the mainstream PLO leadership, especially after it promised in November to suspend attacks on Israel from south Lebanon. He urged it instead to attack shipping in the Suez Canal and Arab oil wells, and accused Fateh of following in the footsteps of Sadat on the path of capitulation.[131] On 9 December Qadhdhafi ordered the deportation of the PLO representative in Tripoli, and the expulsion of three senior PLO officials a week later. Libyan security services now organized 'popular revolutionary committees' among Palestinian civilians working in the country, who were encouraged to take over PLO offices and assume responsibility for official dealings with government agencies.[132] Qadhdhafi meanwhile likened Arafat to Israeli prime minister Begin in his attempt 'to submit the Palestinian people to his will', and professed understanding for Lebanese parties that preferred to deal with Israel rather than Fateh. Libya finally placed all PLO offices in the country under seal on 24 December, and formally severed relations with Fateh and suspended financial aid to it twelve days later.[133]

In an official statement on 9 December, the PLO executive committee deplored the initial Libyan measures and praised the Palestinian community in Libya for 'refusing attempts to impose formulas or experiments [the popular committees] on the Palestinian revolution'. At the same time it stressed

the importance of fraternal relations with Libya, and thanked it for its past support.[134] The deportation of the PLO representative provoked a sharper response, and the Fateh central committee now stated its determination to 'reject tutelage, containment, and lackeyism . . . in the defence of the independence of Palestinian decision[-making]'.[135] As relations deteriorated in the next few weeks, Fateh radio accused Qadhdhafi of instigating the revolutionary committees to occupy PLO offices and vowed not to allow 'the champion of revolutionary statements and dreamer on the sand dunes to impose his views'. It added that Libyan financial aid to Fateh had ceased in 1975 and so the declared cut-off was meaningless, and protested that in any case Palestinian decision-making could not be bought for 'a few barrels of oil'.[136] As the rift deepened, the Libyan authorities pressured Fateh personnel in the country to join the revolutionary committees; the sizeable contingent of Fateh pilots and technicians in the air force resigned *en masse*, and were deported on 27 January 1980.[137]

By then, Qadhdhafi had already committed himself against Arafat. On 26 December 1979 he received the general secretaries and military commanders of the PFLP, DFLP, PF–GC, PPSF, and Saʿiqa.[138] Only Fateh and the Iraqi-backed ALF and PLF were absent. The opposition leaders had already agreed with the Syrian government to counter Fateh policy and shift the internal balance in the PLO, and came to a similar understanding with Qadhdhafi, who offered major military and financial assistance as a means of reinforcing their political influence.[139] In following months the DFLP and PFLP each received 12 Soviet-made BM-21 multiple launchers and six single-tube launchers with 2,000 122 millimetre rockets, 12 SPG-9 recoilless rifles, four SA-7 anti-aircraft missile launchers and 20 missiles, and 1,000 assault rifles.[140] Saʿiqa and the PPSF received four BM-21s each, but most favoured was the PF–GC, which received 14–16 BM-21s and large quantities of other weapons. The PF–GC was the conduit for Libyan arms shipments to the other guerrilla groups and, some claimed, took an additional 'cut'.[141] Libya also provided training in artillery, explosives, and aviation. According to Jibril, there were dozens of Palestinian pilots in Libya by August 1979; PFLP pilots had received instruction in 1976–8, but a year later even the minuscule PPSF had air cadets in training.[142] The PF–GC was also awarded a monthly subsidy of $1.5 million, the DFLP and PFLP $1 million each, and Saʿiqa and the PPSF $400,000 each.[143]

The Highpoint of the Left

Syrian and Libyan support, coupled with deepening ties with Algeria and South Yemen and with the USSR and Soviet-bloc countries, took the Palestinian opposition to the highpoint of its strength in 1979–80. Even the communists, who tended to caution in comparison to the guerrilla groups, argued that despite the setback caused by the separate Egyptian–Israeli peace, 'international

reality points to anything but the global hegemony of US imperialism'. Rather, 'the international balance of power is shifting steadily in favour of the forces of socialism, liberation and peace in the world', as further countries in Indochina and Africa threw off the imperial yoke, Western capitalism suffered a severe economic crisis and growing working-class struggles, and the socialist countries achieved growing successes.[144]

The effects of Arab and Soviet-bloc support were most immediately obvious in the case of the DFLP, which had played a key part in mobilizing the anti-Arafat coalition and now strove to establish itself as the principal force on the Left. It pursued the expansion and regularization of its grandly titled Revolutionary Armed Forces as a principal means both to strengthen 'the democratic forces in the Palestinian arena' and to demonstrate its ability to 'create events'. If necessary, it would achieve the latter aim by dragging the Arab states into confrontation with Israel, a goal well served by the acquisition of long-range artillery and other heavy weapons.[145] The military build-up also offered the DFLP the means to undertake a prominent role in countering the war of attrition being waged by Israel against PLO positions in Lebanon. It had received its first direct arms shipment from the USSR in 1978, and in the next period took delivery of additional supplies from East Germany, Bulgaria, and Cuba, as well as South Yemen, Algeria, and Libya. These included 14.5 millimetre anti-aircraft machine-guns, 120 mm and 160 mm heavy mortars, 76 mm and 85 mm light field guns, and six- or nine-tube 122 mm multiple rocket launchers; Libya provided an additional six 122 mm D-30 howitzers and heavy-duty tunnel-digging equipment.[146]

Heavy weapons required crews and logistic support, but personnel increases necessitated reorganization and more developed command and communications systems. The DFLP had in fact commenced expansion in March 1978, when it ordered all civilian members to serve a tour of duty in south Lebanon following the Israeli invasion. They were encouraged to remain in the ranks, allowing full-time combat strength to rise to 800 over the next year. Libyan aid made possible a further increase to 1,200–1,600 by 1980 (1,800 by mid-1982), with a reserve force of 800.[147] However, this expansion was deceptive, as it was achieved by the simple expedient of placing a majority of the DFLP's 2,000 militiamen on the payroll, and by placing skeleton battalions near refugee camps so that they could be brought up to strength when necessary. The militiamen also performed regular tours of duty in full-time units, as did all student members, who were subject to a form of conscription.[148] In this manner the DFLP formed nine nominal infantry battalions and four artillery and anti-aircraft battalions, besides security, support, and reconnaissance units, central training camps, and a general staff. Yet it failed to develop a corresponding military doctrine: only seven of 523 pages in the 1981 conference report dealt with military affairs, and then only with organizational matters, not operational methods or strategic objectives.[149]

Political objectives were uppermost in the minds of the DFLP leadership.

The DFLP had resolved to transform itself into a Marxist-Leninist party at its first national congress in November 1971, but little happened until the central committee revived the effort in autumn 1977.[150] In July 1978 a decision was taken to 'multiply the base of the democratic and military organizations and to reinforce their organized mass base'.[151] Translated, this meant the construction of a Leninist party core, around which the DFLP would form an outer shell. Membership of both was made easier in order to increase numbers, as the DFLP hoped to become 'a mass party with its organized supports in every Palestinian house, and in every factory, workplace, establishment, school, village, and [refugee] camp inside the occupied homeland and outside it'.[152] This far-flung organization was supposed to be tied together through 'democratic centralism', although in reality the central committee was imbued with 'all the powers accorded by the internal statutes to the national general conference and the party congress, including the power to decree the political program and amend the internal statutes'.[153]

Centralized control led to a marked authoritarian tendency. The DFLP guarded its expanding organization jealously, actively pursuing defectors to bring them back into the ranks and punishing offenders against party discipline. Several clashes took place in 1979 as a result of the attempt to arrest former members who had joined Fateh, including a battle near PLO headquarters in the Fakhani district of Beirut on 15 May that left two dead. Two DFLP members were executed by firing squad a few months later for failing to resist a Fateh attack on their office in the Shatila refugee camp. Widespread condemnation of these incidents produced a moderation in policy, however, and led to punishment of the over-zealous officers responsible, headed by central committee member Taysir Khalid, known internally as the 'dictator'.[154] Yet when a Fateh security officer (later revealed as an Israeli agent) instigated an assault on DFLP offices in Sidon at the end of August, DFLP artillery shelled the old city in retaliation, leaving further civilian casualties.[155]

Muscle-flexing reflected growing self-confidence. The DFLP now viewed itself as the putative leader of a wide front: 'a focal point of the revolutionary democratic alliance between all the proletarian classes and democratic strata in Palestinian societies [*sic*]'.[156] It would lead the various guerrilla groups professing Marxism-Leninism into a united communist party. 'Historical necessity . . . requires the emergence of a new class vanguard', its political programme asserted, 'and only the working class, in its leadership of the revolutionary democratic alliance and of the broad national front, can fulfil this pressing objective need . . . The establishment of its united vanguard party becomes an utmost necessity.'[157] The DFLP extended its effort in parallel by setting up 'party units' in the guerrilla and militia forces. According to its revised internal statutes, and to the political and organizational programme approved by the 1981 conference, the armed forces were now open to any volunteer willing to abide by the internal regulations, even if not a member of the DFLP or the party core.[158] The armed forces were to develop into 'a military

organization comprising all nationalist fighters ready to join its ranks full-time for combat against the enemies of the people and homeland, under the leadership of the DFLP and its party organization'.[159]

Ultimately, the DFLP hoped to secure Soviet accreditation as the principal Marxist party in the Palestinian arena, whether or not a single, unified communist party could be formed. It offered wholehearted support for Soviet policy in Afghanistan and Ethiopia, and for Soviet-backed South Yemen, Libya, and Algeria in various disputes with their respective neighbours. The DFLP roundly condemned the Iraqi government for its bloody repression of the communist party in mid-1979, and sheltered fugitive communists in Lebanon.[160] The Iraqi authorities retaliated by closing the DFLP office in Baghdad and deporting its staff at the beginning of May 1980.[161] The DFLP condemned Iraq unequivocally and accused it of forming a reactionary axis with Saudi Arabia and Jordan following the outbreak of the Gulf war in September, and called for a strategic Arab coalition with Iran.[162]

The DFLP was not alone. The PFLP adopted much the same stances on foreign policy issues, for example, supporting Soviet action in Afghanistan and identified itself with a wide range of Soviet-backed allies and causes in Indochina, Central America, the Horn of Africa, and the Western Sahara. It similarly criticized Iraq for its stance on the Yemen conflict and for 'instigating clashes' with Iran, and expressed its dismay that Iraq was now aligned with that bastion of Arab reaction, Saudi Arabia, and 'the lackey Jordanian regime'.[163] The Iraqi authorities finally retaliated after the PFLP condemned their repression of the communist party, closing its offices in Baghdad and expelling the staff at the end of April 1980. When the Gulf war broke out in September, the PFLP was quick to denounce Iraq and declare its solidarity with Iran.[164] It was unequivocal: this was a war 'planned by US imperialism and encouraged by [Arab] reaction . . . in order to abort the Iranian revolution . . . and co-opt the Iraqi regime finally within the circle of imperialist designs'.[165]

Closer to home, the PFLP cemented relations with Syria. This marked a significant shift since the beginning of 1979, when Habash still considered that 'our relations with the Syrian regime are tactical and not strategic relations, because of our strategic contradiction with it'. 'Naturally this relationship cannot reach the level of the relationship with the regime in Iraq or Libya', he added, yet a year later Syria had become the PFLP's foremost Arab ally.[166] This reflected the need to redress the strategic balance following the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, and continuing hostility towards Jordan, which was covertly assisting the Muslim Brotherhood in its armed insurrection against the Syrian government.[167] The shift in Arab alliances was also partly due to the drive by the PFLP to assert itself as a Marxist-Leninist party and win recognition from the USSR as a member of the 'international communist movement'. For the same reason the PFLP expunged the previous praise for China and numerous quotations from Mao Zedong from its documents, which now accused China of 'apostasy' and referred to the USSR instead for organizational models.[168] The

shift was also reflected in the decision to disband the PFLP's nominal 'mother party', the ASAP, which had never come to life despite an attempted revival in 1974.[169] These changes were not lightly taken, nor were they the result of mere political opportunism. The PFLP was still prepared to warn that 'we will fight Syria if it commits treason', for example, and to issue public criticism of the Arab–Israeli peace plan proposed by Soviet party chairman Brezhnev in early 1981.[170]

The PFLP gave further evidence of its unwillingness to compromise on principle by resolutely maintaining its opposition to an international peace conference, unlike the DFLP. It also continued to oppose firmly any linkage between the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and negotiation with Israel.[171] In April 1980 the PFLP announced that 83 of its members were in Jordanian prisons, besides 'tens of others' held at the general intelligence directorate; it pointedly asked the PLO: 'where to in the relationship with Jordan?'[172] The following month a Jordanian court sentenced Brik al-Hadid, deputy secretary-general of the illegal Jordanian Revolutionary People's Party, originally formed by the PFLP, to life imprisonment after uncovering a plot to assassinate king Husayn during a visit to Spain.[173] In the meantime the PFLP, along with the DFLP, PF–GC, and smaller opposition groups, mounted a flurry of guerrilla attacks against the Israeli-backed SLA in south Lebanon, in coordination with Syrian military intelligence.[174] The PFLP was willing to justify the Syrian failure to live up to a promise made in December 1979 to allow guerrilla attacks against Israeli forces on the Golan front, arguing that the SLA 'is the obstacle that prevents the Palestinian revolution from exercising its legitimate right to fight the enemy from all fronts'.[175] It proudly claimed 28 attacks, eight conducted jointly with other groups, in the first four months of 1980.[176]

PFLP military activity in early 1980 was intended in part to underline its opposition to PLO diplomacy. Habash asserted belligerently in April that 'our masses have the right to question any political line calling for the liberation of Palestine that does not base itself on enmity towards reaction and imperialism. Our masses have the right to pose a big question mark about the correctness of this line even if it belongs to nationalist forces.'[177] PFLP was equally unshaken in its faith in 'popular liberation war', which it continued to regard as 'the sole means . . . of liberation, in the process of which the surrounding Arab regions will unite and liberate themselves in a new, revolutionary society'.[178] In contrast to the DFLP, the PFLP continually refined an extensive articulation of classic theories of guerrilla war and people's war, which it published in official training manuals and general guidelines. Yet it was patently unable to develop clandestine military operations in the occupied territories, expand guerrilla units in Lebanon and upgrade battlefield command and planning, or revive the capability to strike Israeli targets abroad.[179]

The disparity between ambitious political goals and organizational reality was equally obvious in the PFLP attempt to transform itself into a Marxist-

Leninist party. It revived the effort in 1978, after nearly a decade of failures, by setting up a dedicated 'cadre school' in the Shatila refugee camp and dispatching many senior officials, including politburo and central committee members, to the USSR and other socialist countries for ideological instruction. Yet it was compelled to admit three years later that it still lacked a systematic 'cadre policy', and that supervision was patchy.[180] Its internal party circular, *al-Hayat al-Jadida* (*New Life*), had ceased publication altogether in 1975–8 and appeared only erratically since 1979. Party rank-and-file were moreover guilty of 'not giving the circular the required attention in terms of reading it, using it to mobilize the masses, or working to spread and distribute it'.[181] The PFLP found this distressing, since it advocated the unification of all Palestinian 'democratic forces' in a single communist party; it saw this as part of a wider Arab communist movement, and referred to the success of Marxist groups in merging into a single party in Cuba and South Yemen.[182] Its political report somehow found grounds for optimism nonetheless, stating confidently that 'we are as close as possible to becoming a communist party'.[183]

Lax discipline and lagging performance were due in large measure to bureaucratization. Although it did not admit as much in so many words, the PFLP had used an influx of private funds in 1978 and Libyan financial assistance since 1979 to place many of its members in the party organization and militia on the payroll and to expand its paramilitary agencies, in line with the general trend among all guerrilla groups in this period. So it was with considerable chagrin that the leadership noted that when it had 'raised the revolutionary organizational and financial slogan of "no membership without [paying] membership dues" many members left, some of whom were cadres and members of area commands, although the salaries of some were twice the top scale earned by any full-time member'.[184] The trend towards *tafrigh* became even more pronounced with the influx of Arab assistance to PLO coffers starting in 1979: the PFLP now received a monthly stipend of $400,000 from the Palestine National Fund, as did every other guerrilla group.[185] The PFLP, along with the rest of the Palestinian opposition, bitterly contested this minimal 'quota', which remained a key issue of contention with the Fateh-dominated PLO leadership over the next few years.

Bureaucratization proceeded apace nonetheless. The financial report presented at the 1981 conference revealed that the PFLP had invested funds in productive and commercial ventures, but lacked 'an executive technical committee to manage money and take part in supervision and follow-up'.[186] Donations from 'the masses' had sadly not lived up to expectations.[187] 'Revolutionary operations'—armed robberies, ransom money derived from airplane hijacks, and protection money paid by airlines to avoid attack—offered an alternative source of income, but experience showed that corruption and criminality could result from over-dependence on unorthodox forms of revenue.[188] Yet 'special operations' would remain one among other potential sources of revenue; after all, press reports suggested that in 1979 the PFLP had inherited an amount

estimated varyingly at $45 million to $100 million following the death of the former head of its Special Operations branch, Wadi' Haddad.[189] Besides, the PFLP was worried by the degree of its reliance in the past five years on monthly stipends from 'nationalist progressive' Arab governments. Such support remained insufficient for its needs, and left it facing 'a dangerous gap' in resources that was all the more problematic because it found itself unable to reduce excessive expenditure on salaries, offices, houses, cars, and medical and education services.[190]

These various trends were replicated in the smaller guerilla groups. All now emphasized the strategic nature of the alliance with the Soviet Union. Even the taciturn PF–GC, not given normally to grand rhetoric, devoted space in the terse political statement issued by its fifth general conference in mid-October 1979 to praise the 'socialist bloc headed by the USSR'.[191] The PLF and PPSF adopted the same catechism and announced their formal adoption of Marxism-Leninism in this period, influenced in part by the material assistance they received from Soviet-backed South Yemen.[192] The Palestinian Left was heartened by the addition in 1980 of the PCOL, which, though nominally a branch of the JCP, adopted a militant stand on the key issues of the armed struggle and peace process. The smaller groups moreover utilized the flow of Arab aid and their 'quota' of PLO funds to expand their salaried membership and bureaucratize their civilian and military agencies. The PLF gave a graphic example, taking membership to a grossly inflated 9,000–10,000 by placing immediate families on the payroll, although its core probably numbered 1,400 in reality and declined to 700 whenever funds were low.[193] Several groups supplemented their income by sending hundreds of volunteers to Libya, which paid an additional monthly stipend in return for support in its armed dispute with Chad. The PF–GC and DFLP were most active in this regard, the former offering the highest basic salary in the entire guerrilla movement.

Arafat Hemmed in, the Left Co-opted

Whatever its other gains in this period, the most heartening development for the Palestinian Left was the marked rise of leftist influence in Fateh. This was evident in a number of statements that diverged from the policy directions set by Arafat. An example was the statement on 9 February by the secretary of the Fateh revolutionary council, Majid Abu-Sharar, who confirmed the alliance with Syria and renewed support for the Iranian revolution at a time when the PLO chairman sought balanced relations with Iraq.[194] Central committee member Nimr Salih threatened PLO relations with Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries by openly backing the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan at the end of 1979, and renewed his criticism of the dialogue with Jordan and the surreptitious contacts with Egypt. Qaddumi echoed these stands, while Khalaf reiterated provocatively that there would be 'no peace and no recognition [of Israel]'

and that the PLO would continue to 'grasp the rifle'.[195] He distanced himself from the Left by advocating good relations with Iraq, but came closer by reaffirming the commitment to the moribund Arab steadfastness front.

Confident of its own strength and buttressed by its implicit alliance with the Palestinian opposition and Syria, the leftist faction pressed the central committee to convene a general conference. Arafat and his colleagues had resisted similar pressure in the past two years, but finally gave way and scheduled a conference for May 1980, the first since September 1971. Apparently they felt the need to demonstrate Fateh unity and to renew the legitimacy of their leadership at a time of growing external challenges, although their detractors believed their purpose merely to be to defuse internal criticism.[196] In the event, the conference had sharply contradictory results. Leftist influence was clearly reflected in the militant tone and Marxist terminology of the new political programme, which adopted a somewhat idiosyncratic class analysis of Palestinian history and adopted the standard array of Soviet-backed causes espoused by the rest of the Palestinian Left. More importantly, the document deemed the US to be the principal enemy of the Palestinians and called for action against US interests, and urged a closer alliance with the USSR and the Soviet bloc.[197] Most dramatically, Abu-Sharar and Samih Abu-Kwayk were elected to the new central committee, where they formed a distinct bloc with Salih, while numerous leftists joined the revolutionary council, among them Musa al-ʿAmla (later selected deputy-secretary to the council) and Saʿid Maragha (later acting as deputy chief-of-staff).

The leftist faction had demonstrated considerable support among the 500 conference delegates.[198] Yet Arafat was not entirely discomfited with the results. He had insisted on putting his tenure as commander-in-chief to an open vote, separately from the secret ballot for the other central committee members, and was rewarded with a near-unanimous show of hands in favour. The electoral success of Abu-Sharar and Abu-Kwayk was balanced by the election to the central committee of Arafat's political aide and diplomatic troubleshooter Hani al-Hasan, the dour but loyal chief-of-staff Saʿd Sayil, and the Fateh representative in Saudi Arabia, Rafiq al-Natsha. The conference also approved two key amendments requested by Arafat to the internal statutes: to give the military a mandatory 51 per cent share of seats on policy-making bodies, and to expand the revolutionary council by including both the central committee and the higher military council, which comprised officers of the rank of battalion deputy-commander and above.[199] Expansion increased Arafat's control, since he determined military appointments, while diluting leftist influence. Last, but not least, the new political programme appeared to endorse unconditionally all policy guidelines already approved by the PNC; dissident cadres accused the mainstream leadership of altering the text before publication, but Arafat had effectively won a rubber stamp to pursue his various political initiatives, the rhetorical militancy of the document notwithstanding.[200]

Perhaps predictably, the leftist faction moderated its political behaviour

somewhat once it had gained a stake in Fateh decision-making. Abu-Sharar now proved himself to be a shrewd pragmatist who realized that the prospects for leftist influence were greatest in a united and autonomous movement. He rapidly emerged as the leading ideologue of the 'Soviet group' in Fateh and a key political manager of the leftist faction in general, and sought a role in directing policy in the occupied territories by joining the Western Sector directorate. Certain figures such as Salih maintained their hardline stands, but Abu-Sharar was at least willing to pursue the dialogue with Western Europe, which had received the endorsement of the Fateh conference. The internal struggle was by no means over, but the leftist faction was able to translate its political influence into increases in central funding and allocation of posts, although Arafat typically sought to split its ranks by targeting resources and appointments towards competing currents within it.

Much the same patterns applied to the Palestinian Left in general, which stressed national unity even as it started to exert a major, demonstrable impact on PLO diplomacy and secured a tangible, albeit modest, share of PLO funds.[201] A case in point was the willingness of all the guerrilla groups to relinquish responsibility for paying compensatory stipends to the families of their martyrs and prisoners to the Fateh-dominated social affairs department of the PLO, a step that deprived them of a means for claiming additional Arab funding and eliminated opportunities for inflation or duplication of registers. Another was the readiness of the principal leftist groups to join 'national unity' slates with Fateh in union elections, often with candidates of the Fateh leftist faction appointed by Arafat, further confirming the corporatist character of the 'mass organizations'.[202] The Left had reached the highpoint of its political and organizational capacity and was as close as it would ever come to 'capturing' the PLO, but by the same token it had become deeply enmeshed in Palestinian statist transformation. After all, it, too, viewed the PLO as 'the framework that embodies the unity and autonomy of the national Palestinian entity and expresses its national character'.[203] Whatever its negative aspects, neopatrimonial bureaucratization was serving to channel and contain the opposition within this framework, stabilizing internal relations in a phase fraught with political tensions and ultimately enabling the mainstream leadership to reassert its control. This was especially timely, because from 1979 onwards the PLO was beset by spiralling violence in Lebanon.

21

No Lull before the Storm

The Lebanese Quagmire Revisited

The violence in Lebanon had not ceased since the Israeli invasion of March 1978. The IDF mounted a number of commando raids on PLO bases in the next few months, and shelled the Tyre and Nabatiyya districts in August and September. A large ground attack on guerrilla positions near ʿAyshiyya on 19 January 1979 marked a sharp rise in offensive action, as it was followed by ten days of shelling that caused the flight of 50,000 civilians from the Nabatiyya district alone.[1] A Lebanese army battalion deploying in the UNIFIL zone was shelled by the Israeli-backed SLA, which responded to the attempt to restore government authority by declaring the establishment of the Republic of Free Lebanon in the border zone on 18 April. This moreover coincided with the degeneration of Syrian–Maronite tensions into open battles. From this point onwards the SLA attacked Lebanese villages under UNIFIL protection, while the Israeli air force stepped up its activity with raids on the Nahr al-Barid and Baddawi refugee camps in the north and the village of ʿAqbiyya in the south on 6–8 May.

International reactions to the air raids, not least from a group of Australian members of parliament and trade union officials who were caught in the latest strike, led to their cessation, but artillery fire escalated to unprecedented levels over the next three months. The Tyre district suffered 235 casualties in the last week of May, and 25 villages and refugee camps were struck on 9 June alone, contributing to the flight of 50,000 refugees in this period.[2] The Lebanese government stated the number killed in July at 309 and the wounded at 1,011 (mostly civilians), while UN observers counted 5,180 Israeli or SLA shells in the first three weeks of August.[3] As the UN worked for a ceasefire, Israeli artillery struck 26 villages on 21 August alone, and an estimated 170,000 people had fled the south by the time a truce was agreed on 25 August.[4] The shelling slackened, but did not cease entirely, and Israeli and SLA troops mounted several attacks on guerrilla bases opposite Marjʿuyun in September and October. Israeli chief-of-staff Rafael Eitan now revealed that the IDF had conducted a total of 1,020 'preventive operations' in Lebanon in the year up to July 1979.[5]

Constant Israeli pressure exacerbated the tensions between the PLO and a widening cross-section of the Lebanese population. This was expressed most

frankly as opposition to Palestinian 'excesses' (*tajawuzat*)—arrogant behaviour by PLO members, theft, extortion, damage to property, nonpayment of rents, and physical injury. In response, the PLO announced in early June 1979 that it was closing its offices in Tyre and relocating guerrilla bases away from villages. It added that a special committee was to supervise assistance to displaced persons, while a security committee was to prevent excesses. The PLO promised to continue the payment of compensation to families that had suffered human or material loss as a result of enemy fire, and indeed disbursed some LL17 million by December.[6] However, the PLO had decreed the closure of offices in Lebanese towns and cities on previous occasions with little result, and the latest announcement proved to be no different.

Fateh central committee member Khalaf admitted the PLO failure in September, stating that 'we took several decisions to remove [armed presence] from the cities but they have not been implemented 100 per cent, nor even 80 per cent'.[7] He now insisted that 'we must put an end to these excesses because they are the root of the problem. We must oppose the feeling of the combatant carrying a gun, whether a Palestinian or a member of the LNM, that he is on a higher level than the ordinary citizen, and that he can impose his opinion with the force of arms. The excess that we wish to fight the most is extortion. We have often raised our voices asking the victims of the [protection racket] to complain, to expose the aggressors, but people are afraid.'[8] The PLO was compelled once again in December to ban commercial dealings by its members, prohibit acquisition of property without payment, and order the evacuation of houses illegally occupied. It also felt it necessary to repeat its promise to close all offices outside the refugee camps and remove its armed presence from Lebanese population centres.[9]

Excesses were only the tip of the iceberg, however. The root cause of tension was the unwillingness of the PLO to relinquish its freedom of action or allow the Lebanese army to deploy in areas under its control in south Lebanon. Khalaf indicated as much by echoing the reservations of the LNM about the sectarian and political imbalance in the army.[10] There could be no progress without national reconciliation among the Lebanese, he argued, and hinted that the army could not expect to deploy freely until then. He complained pointedly that the Maronite Lebanese Front, president Sarkis, and certain government officials focused their objections on the PLO's armed presence in the south, but ignored the activity of Israel and the SLA.[11] He anxiously denied that 'Israeli raids and aggression against Lebanon were due to the Palestinian presence in Lebanon'.[12] Indeed the PLO, as chief-of-staff Sayil observed, was convinced that 'the Israelis are deliberately targeting civilian concentrations in order to exert pressure on the Palestinian revolution and create rifts with the Lebanese people'.[13] Arafat relayed this view to Sarkis on 24 September, but promised to suspend guerrilla activity and facilitate army deployment.[14] The PLO renewed this commitment during the Arab summit conference in Tunis in late November, but sought an escape clause by advocat-

ing coordination with Syria, which it knew looked upon Sarkis with increasing disfavour.[15]

The PLO was able to manoeuvre successfully at the diplomatic level, but faced resistance from the Lebanese Shiʿite Muslims, who had suffered the most in the continuing conflict between the PLO and IDF in south Lebanon. Growing numbers of LNM members had shifted their allegiance since 1976 to the Amal movement headed by the charismatic imam Musa al-Sadr. Ironically, the disappearance of Sadr during a visit to Libya in September 1978 did nothing to dampen the trend. Quite the contrary, as the continued mystery about his whereabouts resonated with the belief of 'twelver Shiʿism' in the hidden imam and enhanced his appeal. The dramatic victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in January 1979 magnified the impact, and allowed Amal to assert itself as the principal party of the Shiʿite community. Arafat, who was the first foreign leader to visit Tehran in the wake of the revolution, sought to utilize ties with Iran as a means of ameliorating relations with Amal, but with little success. In November Amal leader Husayn al-Husayni exerted public pressure on the PLO to assist in the liberation of the south from Israeli occupation by permitting the Lebanese army to deploy and facilitating the restoration of government authority. 'I must help the Palestinian to liberate his land but he must help me liberate my land too', he stated, adding that although ties with the PLO were 'strategic', the Lebanese did not wish to suffer the same fate as the Palestinians: 'Palestinian land was lost in 1948 because the decision on confrontation was not Palestinian, and I am not willing to lose my land and to enable others to take my place in taking decisions.'[16]

Amal still hoped to come to terms with the PLO, but had already locked horns with the Palestinian and Lebanese Left. The rift had not mended since the fall of Nabʿa to the Maronite militias in August 1976, and worsened after Sadr's disappearance two years later, as the Left was closely allied to Libya. The growing tensions between Baʿthist Iraq and Islamic Iran in 1979 were also reflected among their ideological adherents and co-religionists in Lebanon. This was forcefully demonstrated on 4 July, when militiamen belonging to the Nasirite Murabitun, LCP, OACL, Baʿth Party (pro-Iraqi wing), and several Palestinian guerrilla groups (with discreet help from Fateh battalion commander ʿAzmi al-Sghayyar) assaulted Hanaway, a village in the UNIFIL zone near Tyre, killing nine people.[17] The Palestinian Left next opposed the deployment of Lebanese army units in the south.[18] Hawatma spoke for most in viewing this as a precursor to elimination of the PLO presence in Lebanon and, eventually, of the Syrian-dominated ADF.[19] Palestinian and Lebanese leftists resumed guerrilla attacks on the SLA in August; they also retaliated for the arrest of nine of their comrades by UNIFIL, by taking 22 peacekeepers hostage on 22 August, and killed three others in an ambush two days later. As tensions revived, PLO and LNM militiamen, Syrian troops, and Amal members clashed in Beirut on 2 November. The Fateh leadership preferred neutrality, but its leftist faction, which had tried to assassinate Amal military commander Mustafa

Shimran in late 1978, openly urged action against what it disparagingly referred to as 'the Shiʿite phalangists'.[20]

Most worrying for the Fateh-dominated PLO leadership, however, was the convergence between emergent threats in Lebanon and the deterioration of relations with Syria. The Syrian leadership similarly perceived a coincidence of challenges, starting with the revival of French and US proposals in autumn 1979 for the evacuation of PLO forces south of the Litani River and the expansion of the UNIFIL zone. Western involvement could only encourage the Lebanese Maronites, who confirmed Syrian fears by calling belligerently on 16 October for 'the liberation of Lebanese territory starting with the liberation of Beirut, and then pursuing the liberation towards the south . . . to the last of the occupied land'.[21] Clashes broke out in November, and Syrian artillery shelled east Beirut. This coincided with the confirmation of Syrian suspicions that Fateh was covertly supporting the Muslim Brotherhood. On 23 January 1980 the Syrian command retaliated by suddenly withdrawing ADF units from the positions they had held between Sidon and Beirut since 1976, and on 2 February reduced its garrsion in the capital, ordering the remaining troops into barracks. This imposed a severe burden on the PLO, which now had to spread its forces even more thinly by extending into the coastal region, and confronted it with the worrying possibility that the Lebanese army would redeploy in force in west Beirut.

PLO fears seemed to be confirmed on 6 February, when the Lebanese government announced its intention to fill the 'security vacuum' in Beirut. It also stated its firm opposition to 'the presence of any armed force in all parts of Lebanon other than the forces of legitimacy [the army]'.[22] The PLO executive committee complained that this effectively abrogated the Cairo, Riyadh, and Bayt-al-Din accords.[23] Prime minister Hus hurriedly reassured the PLO that the decree did not affect existing agreements, but this provoked Maronite anger.[24] The Lebanese Front had already warned, a few months earlier, that 'any withdrawal by the Syrian forces, in which they are replaced by Palestinian forces such as Saʿiqa, in the commercial district [downtown Beirut] . . . is not in the interest of Lebanon . . . [T]he replacement of one force with another, [is] dictated by the interests of the occupier [the Syrians] and meets with the interests of the aggressor [the Palestinians]'.[25] Yet when the Lebanese army proved unable to assume responsibility for security in the capital, the government was obliged to accept the deployment of the PLA Hittin and Qadisiyya Forces instead.[26] The Phalanges Party now declared the Syrian army's presence in Lebanon to be in violation of its original mandate, and its followers clashed with Syrian units in the north.[27] The Syrian command cautiously withdrew its remaining troops from east Beirut on 6 March.

The Syrian withdrawal led to a hardening of PLO positions regarding army deployment in the south. Arafat openly attacked government policy and the sectarian bias of the army, and indicated his reluctance to change the status quo in the south.[28] Khalaf was blunt: there would be no PLO withdrawal from the

main cities until national reconciliation between the Lebanese protagonists had taken place.[29] The Palestinian Left concurred. Hawatma objected to the attempt 'to turn the temporary truce in the south into a permanent truce', and described army deployment as the first step towards 'expelling the forces of the [Palestinian] resistance, in contravention of the agreements regulating relations between the Lebanese state and the PLO . . . The next step [will be] to raise the whole question of the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon for discussion.'[30] The ultimate aim of this hidden agenda, he added, was to secure the exodus of the ADF. It was partly for this reason that Syria endorsed the resumption of guerrilla attacks on Israel by the Palestinian opposition. Most serious was an ALF raid on Misgav ʿAm on 7 March, in which three guerrillas and three IDF soldiers died, and a PFLP attack on Hanita on 17 May, in which it lost three men. Habash meanwhile voiced renewed concern at the expansion of the Lebanese army, which was striving to build from a strength of 23,000 to 40,000. Israel depended on Lebanese forces to eliminate the PLO, he argued, because it could not reach PLO headquarters in Beirut or the refugee camps in the north.[31]

Adding to Palestinian apprehension was the reactivation of the feud with Amal. Four persons were killed in clashes in Beirut on 13 March, while 20 more died in three days of fighting between Amal and the ALF in mid-April. As many again were killed in the suburbs of Beirut and in various parts of south Lebanon towards the end of May. Rising violence was partly due to Shiʿite concern that the ongoing Palestinian autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel might lead to *tawtin*, the imposed resettlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees in Lebanon. This had long been an exclusively Maronite concern, but the Sadat initiative and Camp David accords now persuaded a wider Lebanese audience that *tawtin* was a distinct possibility. Little wonder that the official Fateh response to the Camp David accords issued on 4 October 1978 deemed it relevant to reiterate Palestinian opposition to *tawtin*, while Khalaf relayed the same message in person to the phalangist leadership at the end of the month.[32] The Lebanese Front remained unconvinced, however, and renewed its warnings in formal statements on 16 October 1979 and 20 May 1980.[33]

By now the Maronites were no longer alone. The new secretary-general of Amal, lawyer Nabih Birri, also felt it necessary to reject *tawtin* publicly in May 1980. Having stressed the close ties between Amal and Fateh and his own childhood recollections of the 1948 war in Palestine, he warned that *tawtin* was 'a hellish idea to compensate for the rape of Palestine [by committing] the crime of rape against the land of another people, the Lebanese people'. Amal and Fateh should stand hand in hand to confront this conspiracy, he urged, but warned that in all events 'this resettlement will not take place so long as the wombs of our women bear children'.[34] His statement may have been intended to influence Fateh's fourth conference, which was just convening, but it had little impact. Fateh's leftist faction was determined to prevent reconciliation, and shouted down delegates who advocated dialogue.[35] Wazir later stated that

the conference had 'devoted great attention to the affairs of south Lebanon, and . . . stressed that the people of the south have given much in order to defend the Palestinian revolution. Their sacrifices were historic and should not, cannot, be forgotten.' He insisted that Fateh opposed 'resettlement of the sons of Palestine in Lebanon, which is a myth invented by our enemies and picked up by those who wish ill to the Palestinian revolution', adding that the conference had discussed 'practical measures to alleviate the pains suffered by our brothers in the south'.[36]

However, chief-of-staff Sayil admitted that the PLO simply did not have the means to offer 'adequate compensation for the growing losses' incurred during Israeli attacks on Lebanon.[37] This admission came amidst a growing volume of Israeli attacks, as the IDF implemented a preventive strategy designed to disrupt guerrilla planning and operations from Lebanon.[38] Artillery strikes and infantry probes accounted for many of the 360 attacks conducted during 1980, while naval commandos killed 18 guerrillas in a PF–GC recuperation centre in Sarafand on 17 April. Most dramatic, however, was the large ground assault on the Beaufort crusader castle at Arnun during the night of 19 August, that left 29 guerrillas dead, for a cost of three Israeli dead, and obliged the Fateh command to rotate the defending garrison for rest and recuperation.[39] The IDF achieved more modest results in subsequent raids, which it now described as routine, but generally kept the PLO on the defensive and subjected it to a steady trickle of casualties.[40]

The attack on Beaufort castle prompted the PLO to step up its military build-up. In late August, Wazir travelled to China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Pakistan to request new arms shipments and training. The PLO executive committee ordered a general call-up at the same time, but amended this a few weeks later to affect Palestinian university students only.[41] The PFLP, which had opposed the mobilization campaign of 1976, and the DFLP, which had supported it, both welcomed the latest decree.[42] There were some 25,000 Palestinians at Arab and foreign universities, a majority of them on scholarships awarded through the PLO, and it became the duty of the General Union of Palestine Students to arrange their arrival in successive batches to Lebanon.[43] Some host governments assisted by requiring the students to attend military service in order to continue or graduate. In Lebanon, recruits underwent basic training and then did three- and six-month tours of duty in regular combat units. The bulk went to loyalist PLA units, building their strength up to 2,000, while Fateh absorbed a large number (especially Force 17 and the Ajnadayn Forces), with the PFLP following in third place.[44] Despite its need for combat personnel, however, Fateh actively discouraged Iran from sending 10,000 young activists who had volunteered for service in Lebanon; 1,200 reached Syria in December 1979, but Fateh insisted on rotating only 200–300 at a time through its combat units while confining the rest to barracks, until a majority tired of the enforced idleness and returned to Iran.

Political Retrenchment, Military Escalation

The mainstream PLO leadership was truly on the defensive by May 1980. However, the most significant challenge came not from Israel, Amal, or the Lebanese Front, but from the Palestinian opposition and Syria, which had reacted with increasing vigour to what they saw as an attempt to revive the indirect dialogue with the US administration in late 1979. Hawatma, for one, argued in October that US proposals for a ceasefire in south Lebanon and a Palestinian military pullback were intended to draw the PLO into 'moderation' and open the way for a formal dialogue.[45] An added cause for discontent with the PLO was its decision to send an observer to the Islamic Conference Organization summit in Islamabad in January 1980, which convened to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Returning to the theme in February 1980, Hawatma derided the 'public and secret trial balloons of the US dialogue' which sought 'to mislead [certain] quarters in the PLO and to drug its ranks in order to paralyse the PLO's role and initiative in massing and grouping all Palestinian and Arab forces against US policy'.[46] Habash picked up the argument shortly after, condemning the PLO leadership for seeking 'to impede the process of polarization that became necessary after the Camp David [accords], and to revive illusions about the [peace] settlement within the Palestinian arena and adversely affect Palestinian national unity'.[47]

More ominous, though, was obvious Syrian displeasure with PLO attempts to revive an autonomous diplomatic strategy. Saʿiqa secretary-general ʿIsam al-Qadi spoke for Syria when he warned at the end of October 1979 that 'any attempt by any state or [guerrilla] group to weaken the Arab stand, and especially the Palestinian stand, in confrontation with the [enemy] alliance is a form of treason no matter what the intentions'. The PLO might have fond hopes of gaining a state by joining 'the military colonialist alliance, the alliance of Sadat, Carter and Begin', but his sober conclusion was that 'there will be no independent Palestinian state, not even a Jericho state, so long as this alliance exists'.[48] Qadi also voiced Syrian opposition to the PLO dialogue with Western Europe, which Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan did so much to revive in early 1980. Hasan's proposal to place the West Bank and Gaza Strip under UN trusteeship attracted especially strong condemnation.[49] Syrian vice-president ʿAbd-al-Halim al-Khaddam was now convinced that certain Arab and European states were working 'to find a Palestinian interlocutor in the framework of Camp David or something like it'.[50] He pressed the message home in an opening address to the Fateh conference in May, stressing that there could be talk of a political settlement no longer, and that armed struggle was the sole option remaining to the Palestinians.[51]

As it happened, the mainstream PLO leadership was disappointed with the results of its diplomatic courting of Western Europe. The European Community achieved something of a breakthrough by calling on 7 June for PLO involvement in the peace process. The PLO was disappointed, however, that

the Venice declaration, as it was known, failed to recognize it as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinians and referred only vaguely to Palestinian self-determination. DFLP deputy secretary-general ʿAbd-Rabbu expressed a common view that the Europeans, though making 'a limited step towards Arab and Palestinian rights', had revealed only 'marginal independence from US policy in the Middle East'.[52] For the rejectionists, the Venice Declaration confirmed the acerbic assessment offered two months earlier by Habash of PLO diplomacy: 'any shift in the positions of some imperialist quarters in favour of the Palestine cause has not taken place because of the suaveness of PLO representatives in London, Paris, or Rome, but thanks to the Palestinian rifle, thanks to tens of thousands of martyrs . . . Let Giscard [d'Estaing] and Brandt and Kreisky understand that the Palestinian rifle will remain raised, to launch itself from Jericho to liberate Jaffa and from Nablus to liberate Haifa'.[53] Arafat gave a token of his dismay with the Venice Declaration, or rather of the untenability of his position, by joining Habash, Hawatma, and Syrian president Asad on 18 June to criticize the Europeans for emphasizing UNSCR 242 excessively and for succumbing to US pressure in support of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty.[54]

Arafat's seeming militancy, coming soon after the publication of the hawkish political programme by the Fateh conference, helped him defuse internal opposition. So did his effort to mend relations with Libya; the PLO chairman attended the fourth summit meeting of the Arab steadfastness front in Tripoli in mid-April, at which the formation of a joint military command under Syrian leadership and of a unified 'security military force' was announced.[55] Fateh demonstrated its militant credentials by ambushing Israeli yeshiva students in the heart of Hebron on 2 May, killing five and wounding 17, and lost two guerrillas in attacks on the northern Israeli settlements of Ne'ot Hakikar and Akhziv on 7–9 June. The relaxation of tensions with the Palestinian opposition and Syria was timely, because regional developments during 1980 confronted the PLO with major additional difficulties. An early example was the sharp deterioration of PLO relations with both Algeria and Morocco in April, as it vacillated between supporting first one and then the other in their dispute over the Western Sahara.

More serious still was the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq war. Syria, Libya, and the Palestinian opposition immediately took the side of Iran, but Arafat mounted a desperate bid to mediate between Baghdad and Tehran. Fateh central committee member Salih and others in the leftist faction were also openly hostile to Iraq, although Abu-Sharar dissented, describing the war neutrally as 'a waste of both sides'.[56] Iraqi involvement in the conflict moreover deprived the PLO of a counterweight to Syrian pressure; the consequences were demonstrated as Syria urged an end to the PLO dialogue with Jordan, which was openly backing the Iraqi war effort. A senior Saʿiqa official accused king Husayn of reneging on his commitments to Syria, 'for which he has been paid thousands of millions of dollars', and called for blows 'against US interests in the Arab region and the

imposition of a total boycott of the US, and a sincere and loyal move towards the strategic ally . . . the USSR and all countries of the socialist bloc'.[57] Saʿiqa and the PF–GC announced their withdrawal from the Jordanian-Palestinian joint committee in mid-November, and severe Syrian pressure compelled an extremely reluctant PLO to take the unprecedented step of boycotting the Arab summit conference held in Amman on 25 November.[58] To deflect criticism of Fateh's continued participation in the joint committee, Arafat reiterated his rejection of the 'Jordanian option' and commitment to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[59]

The victory of 'Cold War warrior' Ronald Reagan in the US presidential elections at this point hardly augured well for the PLO, but the publication in February 1981 of a Soviet proposal to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict gave Arafat hope that revival of the peace process was in the offing. The Brezhnev proposal drew on UNSCR 242 to guarantee the right of Israel to a secure existence, but also endorsed the Palestinian right to self-determination in an independent state, and asserted the role of the PLO. The mainstream leadership and the opposition alike welcomed the plan, and gave it special note in the political statement issued by the PNC in mid-April.[60] Encouraged, Arafat stated emphatically to the council that 'there can be no solution, no stability, and no security in the Middle East without the attainment of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, including its right of return, self-determination, and the establishment of an independent state, with Jerusalem as its capital'.[61] The imminence of general elections in Israel influenced his outlook: the Labour Party was tipped to return to power, and a slight dovish shift in its political platform suggested that it might show greater flexibility towards the Palestinian issue than the incumbent Likud government.[62]

The rest of the PNC debate was taken up with other, perennial concerns. The DFLP renewed its demand for the adoption of proportional representation for all guerrilla groups in PLO bodies and affiliated mass organizations; the PFLP demanded replacement of the existing 'quota' with proportional distribution of funds, as well as proportional membership in the PASC military police and PLO unified security apparatus.[63] Both groups also argued for inclusion of the PLF and PPSF in the executive committee, hoping to gain new allies. However, Arafat was able to deflect these pressures and resist opposition attempts to adopt a more hawkish political programme. Whether for this reason or because of escalating military threats in Lebanon, the Palestinian opposition experienced a change of heart after the PNC. Habash qualified his earlier support for the Brezhnev proposal following the PFLP conference in May.[64] PF–GC secretary-general Jibril was more direct. Addressing the PLO leadership he scathingly observed that diplomacy would not offer 'an independent state with sovereignty and borders', and asked disparagingly 'how can we get an independent state from Sabra and Shatila [refugee camps]?' 'We say to all those who bet on European initiatives and capitulationist initiatives . . . that these are all enemies. Who are the Europeans, who are the English, are they not the

grandchildren of [Lord] Balfour who gave Palestine to the Israeli enemy? Are the French not those who colonized our Arab homeland?'[65]

Also contributing to the dissipation of hopes raised by the Brezhnev proposal was the escalation of violence in various parts of Lebanon. Unidentified gunmen had fired on the US ambassador and kidnapped the Spanish ambassador in east Beirut towards the end of August 1980, and in March 1981 there were further attacks on the US ambassador and his embassy in west Beirut. Iraqi intelligence added to the bloodshed by assassinating several fugitive communists working with Palestinian groups—among them the deputy-editor of the PLO weekly, *Filastin al-Thawra*—while Iraq's own opposition groups killed or wounded half a dozen Iraqi diplomats. Clashes with Amal in September 1980 were followed in November by vicious streetfighting in west Beirut between the Nasirite Murabitun and Syrian Social Nationalist Party. Amal and the LNM briefly put aside their differences in February 1981 to criticize president Sarkis for failing to condemn Israeli policy in the south, but then clashed repeatedly in March and April.[66]

In the south, the Palestinian opposition mounted two border attacks on Israel in November 1980, while the PLF launched an unusual, if abortive, paraglider raid on 7 March 1981. For its part Israel maintained its campaign to inflict casualties on the guerrillas and keep them on the defensive.[67] It resumed air strikes against civilian targets in the Tyre and Nabatiyya districts on 31 December 1980, and at the end of January 1981 countered the decisions taken by the Arab summit conference in Ta'if (to extend political, economic, and military support to Lebanon) with severe air and artillery attacks on 32 cities, towns, and villages in the south.[68] Israeli commandos maintained the pressure with raids on guerrilla bases in Kfur, ʿArabsalim, al-Wadi al-Akhdar, and Zahrani in February and April. Syria demonstrated its commitment to the defence of the PLO and Lebanon by repeatedly challenging the Israeli air force, and lost four combat aircraft between August 1980 and February 1981.

It was against this background that Lebanese Forces commander Bashir Jmayyil deliberately provoked a more serious confrontation between Syria and Israel. The ambitious Maronite leader had eliminated the rival Tigers militia in a brief but bloody campaign that left up to 500 dead in July 1980, and took advantage of renewed assurances of support from Israeli prime minister Begin to challenge the Syrian army for control of the Christian town of Zahla in the Biqaʿ Valley in December.[69] The first attempt failed, but Jmayyil made a second bid in late April 1981. The new US secretary of state, Alexander Haig, had recently urged Begin to adopt a tougher line against the USSR and its Arab client states, a view supported by chief-of-staff Eitan and agriculture minister Sharon.[70] Ignoring the warnings of several ministers and intelligence chiefs, Begin ordered the Israeli air force into action. Two Syrian helicopters were promptly shot down near Zahla, but the Syrians responded by deploying SA-6 anti-aircraft missile batteries in the Biqaʿ Valley. Four Syrian fighters were downed in aerial battles, while Israeli aircraft struck the entire coastal region

from Tyre to Beirut and the Nabatiyya and Rihan districts, inflicting 49 casualties. A sudden Israeli artillery barrage on the crowded high street in Sidon also killed 20 civilians and wounded another 30 on 20 April. Mediation by special US envoy Philip Habib averted a wider showdown, leaving the missile batteries intact and the Syrians still in tenuous control of Zahla.

The 'Artillery War'

The PLO had carefully avoided being drawn into the confrontation, but Israel now sought to compensate for the unsatisfactory outcome of its clash with Syria by renewing attacks on guerrilla positions in south Lebanon.[71] Eitan and Sharon moreover urged Begin, who desired dramatic successes ahead of the general election, to conduct a controlled escalation of the conflict with the PLO.[72] The chief-of-staff had previously explained that the purpose of Israeli raids in Lebanon was to compel the PLO to reorganize along semi-regular lines, making it easier to destroy, and made considerable public play of the acquisition by the PLO of 60 T-34 tanks in February.[73] He noted that it had learnt from IDF attacks and was improving tactics, communications, and firepower, and returned to the theme in the spring to confirm the deployment of a Libyan SAM-9 battery in south Lebanon under PF–GC command. The Israeli cabinet approved a series of air strikes against guerrilla positions at the end of May, in the course of which a SAM-9 launcher was destroyed and four Libyans (among others) were killed.[74] The raids ceased on 3 June, but five days later the air force staged a spectacular *coup* by destroying the nuclear reactor in Baghdad. Begin rode the wave of public admiration to win the general election.

Lebanon enjoyed a five-week truce, but on 10 July Israeli aircraft launched heavy raids on PLO positions in Habbush and on the nearby Zubayda bridge. Artillery struck the entire Nabatiyya district the next day, followed by more air raids against Damur, Naʿma, and Dayr al-Zahrani on 12 July. Another day of shelling was again succeeded by further air raids against Baʿasir and Zifta on 14 July. Eitan explained Israeli action by arguing that the transformation of PLO units into a regular force 'if allowed to continue will produce extremely dangerous results [for Israel] in the future'.[75] His obvious eagerness to escalate the conflict impressed Arafat, who maintained the caution shown during the confrontations of April and May for fear of providing Israel with a pretext to invade south Lebanon. On the fifth day, however, DFLP military commander Mamduh Nawfal went behind Arafat's back to persuade Wazir and Sayil to approve a stronger riposte.[76] Over the next 10 days, Palestinian gunners poured a steady volume of shells and rockets into the northern Israeli settlements.

The UN Security Council had called for an immediate ceasefire on 14 July, but Israeli artillery struck 46 villages and cities in south Lebanon two days later,

killing 15 civilians and wounding 53 others. Israeli aircraft also destroyed five bridges across the Litani and Zahrani rivers in an effort to sever PLO communications and 'cut the terrorists off from their sources of supply'.[77] The flow of water was low at this time of year, however, and field commanders requested PLO headquarters to lower it further by having the sluice gates at the Qarʿun dam in the Biqaʿ Valley closed.[78] PLO engineers constructed primitive culverts over the main fords to resume the movement of traffic, and swiftly repaired the damage caused by subsequent air strikes.[79] The shelling of Israeli settlements meanwhile continued, killing three Israeli civilians and wounding 20 others in Nahariya, and triggering a mass flight from the border region.

Unable to destroy Palestinian artillery or cow it into silence, the Israeli cabinet authorized an air strike on PLO headquarters in Beirut on 17 July. The central operations room, Arafat's office, and DFLP headquarters were hit; 150 civilians died and 600 suffered injury, besides another 126 civilian casualties elsewhere in the country. Yet Israeli sources estimated that as few as 30 PLO personnel had died, not one of them of senior rank.[80] Israeli spokesmen insisted that the civilian casualties in Beirut were unintentional, but an editorial in one mainstream newspaper regretted that 'deliberate harm to citizens' had become 'official policy'.[81] UN observers estimated that south Lebanon was struck by 2,000 shells and bombs on 19 July alone; among the targets was the Zahrani oil refinery, while Israeli commandos attacked a guerrilla outpost at Wadi Msaylih on 20 July and made an abortive attempt against the Jiyya power station three days later. The PLO did not change tactics, and maintained its fire on Israeli settlements. It was especially encouraged by the inability of the Israeli air force to locate its artillery; only one gun was destroyed while actually in service, a few others being lost in weapon stores that were successfully targeted.[82]

Information now reaching the PLO revealed that Israel had put two mechanized brigades on the alert and was preparing landing craft in the Haifa dockyards for action, suggesting that large ground and amphibious operations were imminent.[83] The Palestinian command expected an Israeli offensive aimed at cutting off the south from the rest of Lebanon, especially after the Israeli air force had destroyed all ten original bridges over the Litani and Hasbani rivers.[84] A ceasefire was close, but the PLO defiantly mounted a show of strength by ordering its gunners to fire 300 rockets and shells against Israel. By the time the truce went into effect on 24 July, its gunners had fired 1,230 shells and rockets at 35 Israeli settlements and seven army camps, causing the flight of some 40,000 civilians. Only 3,000 to 4,000 of the 17,000 inhabitants of Kiryat Shmona remained in the town by the end of the hostilities.[85] At six dead and 59 wounded, Israeli casualties were minimal compared to a total of 2,567 Palestinian and Lebanese casualties, 95 per cent of whom were civilians, but the experience on the Israeli side had been unprecedented.[86]

US envoy Habib once again played the central role in securing a ceasefire, relying on Saudi mediation with the PLO. UNIFIL commander William

Callaghan approached the PLO directly, shuttling between its headquarters in Beirut and Israeli government offices in Jerusalem to produce what was in effect the first negotiated agreement between the two foes. The PLO insisted that the truce applied only to south Lebanon, leaving it free to act on other fronts or inside the occupied territories. As a mere afterthought, it also demanded an Israeli commitment to suspend offensive air activity over the whole of Lebanon.[87] Begin and his cabinet had been sobered by the dislocation inflicted by PLO artillery on northern Israel, and accepted these terms. The one challenge to the truce was posed by the PF–GC, which had attended the PLO meeting that approved the ceasefire, yet sent two BM-21 multiple rocket launchers through Syrian lines to shell Israel a few hours later. They fired six rockets, but Fateh guerrillas forced them to leave the area and set up a roadblock near Mashghara to prevent their return the next day. The PF–GC fired several 130 millimetre rounds from a site near Syrian lines, but finally complied with the ceasefire.[88]

For the second time in three months the Israeli government was dissatisfied with the outcome of its military activity in Lebanon. It had promised residents in the north that they would not be subject to Palestinian shelling, but the IDF had proved unable to force the PLO to cease artillery fire despite taking the battle to Beirut. Not only was the PLO now free to acquire new weapons and fortify its positions in south Lebanon without fear of Israeli attack, but it had also won 'indirect recognition by both the United States and Israel'.[89] The Israeli cabinet might not have disagreed with the assessment offered by Sayil, who boasted that the guerrillas had shown the world community they were no longer a negligible military force, and that the PLO had won international respect both for its willingness to negotiate a ceasefire and for its ability to maintain one.[90]

Israeli unease turned into alarm a fortnight after the end of the 'artillery war', when Saudi crown prince Fahd bin ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz used a newspaper interview on 7 August to present an eight-point plan for peace. His proposal called for Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, creation of an independent Palestinian state, and recognition of the right of all states in the region (implicitly including Israel) to live in peace.[91] Fahd had mediated between the US and PLO to secure the recent ceasefire in Lebanon, and so publication of his plan suggested that Israel might soon face peace talks involving the PLO. The knowledge that the PLO had resurrected an informal and indirect dialogue with the US administration at the beginning of August—for the next nine months a young US citizen, John Mroz, acted as a go-between for Arafat and secretary of state Haig, with the knowledge of president Reagan—added to Israeli concern.[92] The Soviet decision on 20 October to extend formal recognition of the PLO as sole legitimate Palestinian representative and to grant its office in Moscow full diplomatic status—an unprecedented step in Soviet relations with a non-state actor—also suggested that the superpowers might be preparing to revive the peace process.

The assassination of Egyptian president Sadat on 6 October raised grave

doubts about the future of the ongoing Palestinian autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel, but they could still be revived if the PLO showed any willingness to join the peace process. The Likud government perceived a threat to its aim of eventually incorporating the occupied territories into Israel, and intensified its drive to reduce PLO influence there. The military authorities had already proscribed the NGC in April, and in August banned receipt of money from the Jordanian–Palestinian steadfastness fund and reduced the amount of cash that Palestinian travellers could bring in to $1,000. The village leagues in the West Bank were relaunched in an effort to cultivate an alternative local leadership, while the Israeli claim to the land was marked by regrouping the 89 Jewish settlements established to date in the occupied territories in 10 regional councils. Yet the PLO continued to pose a potential diplomatic threat from its base in Lebanon. The conclusion, in the words of an Israeli scholar, was that Israel 'would either have to pursue a settlement with the PLO or to use all its power to deal the PLO a massive blow . . . If the PLO were to "go political" and gradually renounce military action and terrorism, it would increase the political menace (from the Israeli point of view) of a Palestinian state. *To escape this trap . . . Israel could do only one thing—go to war.*'[93]

The Search for Deterrence

The PLO also drew far-reaching conclusions from the 'artillery war'. One was that external factors could constrain Israeli action in Lebanon. US mediation during the 'missile crisis' in April was a case in point, as were US support for the UN Security Council ceasefire calls in July and the suspension of F-16 deliveries to Israel. The PLO also came implicitly to assume that the presence of UNIFIL had impeded large-scale ground attacks by the IDF and would do so again in the future.[94] The Palestinian leadership was most struck, however, by its success in disrupting life in northern Israel. Chief-of-staff Sayil argued that, in contrast to previous conflicts, in July 'the Israeli citizen felt the suffering of war, what it meant to flee, and what it meant to take refuge and sit in shelters for a long period'.[95] He considered that Israel had ceased fire not because of international pressure, but because of the casualties and 'material and economic damages . . . such as loss of the tourist season' that it had suffered. The PLO, Sayil argued, had created a rift between Israeli residents in the north and the government over its war policy.[96] Fateh central committee member ʿAbbas, who had devoted considerable effort since the mid-1970s to the study of Israeli society and to a discreet dialogue with dovish Israelis, was convinced that Begin had only ordered a halt to the raids on Lebanon when PLO artillery struck Nahariya, because it was heavily populated by Ashkenazi Jews.[97]

The key to the PLO's recent success, as Sayil explained, was its new-found ability to 'mass firepower against a given target'. In the past, the smaller number of artillery guns and rocket launchers it had possessed could only

deliver 'light fire without any concentration, and failed to produce tangible or swift results'.[98] However, the PLO did not conclude from this that it could force Israel to the negotiating table by launching an artillery blitz on the north. Rather, heavy weapons provided a credible deterrence against Israeli attacks on its positions and civilian constituency in Lebanon. PF–GC secretary-general Jibril expressed the common view by stating that 'our acquisition of heavy weapons . . . was to make the enemy understand that he could not continue to destroy [Lebanese] villages and terrorize their inhabitants while his settlements and settlers live in peace and security. We wanted the enemy to understand that we can inflict heavy casualties among his settlers just as he inflicts among our citizens, and that just as our citizens have to sleep in shelters so too must his settlers sleep in shelters.'[99]

The reason why deterrence now occupied so central a place in the thinking of the Palestinian leadership was that it had come to the conclusion that Israel was determined to mount a major offensive in Lebanon. It was entirely justified. Begin desired the physical elimination of the PLO, and was firmly backed by Sharon (who had become defence minister in early August), foreign minister Yitzhaq Shamir, Eitan, and Moshe Arens, Israeli ambassador in Washington. Eitan had believed since May that war with the PLO was inevitable by the end of the year, and Sharon now took the lead in planning actively for this eventuality.[100] The lessons derived from the 'artillery war' shaped their approach. Not only had the air raid on PLO headquarters in Beirut failed to achieve its strategic purpose, but the use of massive air and artillery power to such minimal effect considerably weakened Israeli deterrence. The PLO could not be defeated without a major ground attack.[101] In the following period Sharon oversaw the preparation of various invasion plans—labelled 'little pines', 'medium pines', and 'big pines'—presenting their broad outline to Begin and the other ministers on 20 September and actively lobbying US officials to secure their added support.[102] He confided to the IDF general staff that 'destroying the terrorists' necessarily meant operating inside Beirut, but cagily kept this from the cabinet.[103] Eitan next raised the alarm about PLO armament to the Knesset security and foreign affairs committee on 3 November, while Western military media published unofficial scenarios of the invasion.

The signs were plain to see, and Arafat was already worried enough to place PLO forces on the alert in late September.[104] Priority was now given to acquiring a credible deterrent against Israeli attack; Sayil requested Frog-7 surface-to-surface bombardment missiles, SA-6 anti-aircraft missiles, and anti-shipping missiles for coastal defence during a visit to Moscow in November.[105] The PLO believed that the ability 'to inflict, say, 500 casualties in an Israeli city' with the Frog-7—which had the range to strike Haifa, Safad, and Tiberias—coupled with the defensive capability of the radar-guided SAM-6, could deter a repetition of the July air raids on Beirut.[106] The USSR refused to supply these weapons, however, and proved reluctant even to provide conventional tube artillery. Qadhdhafi promised to provide the Frog-7 missiles instead, and the PLO

prepared a transporter to move them into hiding once they were delivered to Lebanon, but nothing transpired of his offer.[107]

Undaunted, Arafat, Wazir, and Sayil visited 14 Arab and non-Arab countries in October 1981 and January 1982 to seek military assistance. Armour, engineering, technical services, battalion commanders, and staff training courses for PLO personnel were stepped up in Soviet-bloc countries. The PLO acquired Soviet-designed infantry weapons including the guided SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles and Sagger anti-tank missiles from various sources, and was reported to have concluded a deal with the USSR for arms worth $50 million in February 1982. The PLO had acquired four ZSU-23-4 self-propelled anti-aircraft systems from the GDR in September 1981 and requested another six in April 1982, although its crews were not trained to use their tracking radar. Fateh received a handful of BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles and BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers in autumn 1981, possibly from Libya, which provided a number of 122 millimetre howitzers and 130mm field guns. Fateh received six obsolete 100mm anti-aircraft guns from South Yemen in March 1982, which it tied to a fire-control radar to use for coastal defence. North Korea provided a dozen modified BM-21 30-tube rocket launchers and a number of towed 107mm 12-tube rocket launchers (for which Libya may have paid). China supplied Fateh with 24 120mm and 160mm mortars, as well as 37mm and 57mm anti-aircraft guns and large quantities of infantry weapons, ammunition, and other combat supplies.[108]

The various guerrilla groups fielded this growing arsenal in eight artillery battalions and two rocket battalions, besides independent batteries. Fateh now had at least 100 ageing T-34 tanks, which it organized into three armoured battalions and an armoured regiment attached to the PLA, while the PF–GC received a dozen T-54/55 tanks from Libya, doubling the number it had received in 1980. Older artillery weapons were redistributed among 'infantry' battalions, brigades, and headquarters to form additional fire support units. Anti-aircraft, anti-tank, and mortar detachments were also formed at every level. By spring 1982, a typical Fateh battalion with a strength of 150 fielded 24 medium and heavy weapons: three 12.7/14.5mm machine-guns; seven 23/37/57mm anti-aircraft guns; four 75mm anti-tank recoilless rifles; two 76/85mm guns; three 81mm mortars and three heavier 120/160mm mortars; and two 122mm and 107mm multiple rocket launchers.[109]

To operate such an arsenal was well beyond the capacity of the under-strength guerrilla battalions, but the added need for support services swamped them altogether. Every Fateh brigade and PLO group had its own vehicle workshops, mechanical and electrical sections, transport companies, and ammunition, petrol-oil-and-lubricants, and spare parts depots. It also had its own military police, reserve, fire support, and anti-aircraft defence detachments, as well as communications and medical services. While the 'tail' grew longer and heavier, the 'teeth' declined in number and mobility. Sayil had boasted in summer 1981 that the semi-regular, semi-guerrilla military infrastructure of the

PLO offered a poor target and was resilient in the face of attacks on its supply routes and command posts, but the reality was different.[110] The irony was that as poor administration and low motivation led to high turnover rates among PLO personnel, it sought to reduce the shortage by relying on contract employment and non-Palestinians. Fateh and the PF–GC signed Palestinian refugees from Syria on short-term contracts, and most groups employed expatriate Asian workers (Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Fatanis) in military construction and rear combat units.[111] This was besides the Arab volunteers (Syrians, Iraqis, Egyptians, Libyans, and Tunisians) who accounted for up to half of PF–GC strength and for a large part of personnel in the DFLP's Nazareth Battalion, while Fateh also attracted hundreds of Yemenis and several dozen Turks.[112]

It was largely to compensate for the shortage of Palestinian personnel that the PLO reactivated its mobilization programme in autumn 1981. An additional wave of university students were called-up, and all civilian personnel (in Lebanon and abroad) were ordered to attend military training. The PLO also called on Palestinian expatriates in Libya to volunteer for short-term duty, but the results were disappointing. By now most students had already served one tour of duty, and could not be made to lose yet another academic year. The last intake returned to their universities in March 1982, leaving a serious shortfall in combat manpower. To compensate, the PLO executive committee ordered a partial call-up of its 'strategic reserve'—the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon—in early December 1981. The PFLP had supported an earlier mobilization decree in April but objected to the latest step, while the DFLP tried opportunistically to direct as many recruits as possible into its own ranks.[113] The call-up was unpopular and elicited a negligible response in any case, and by March 1982 the latest conscripts were back in their homes or schools.

Political Pressures and the Spiral of Violence

The threat of Israeli invasion was by no means the only pressure on the PLO. The publication of the Fahd peace plan in August 1981 had provoked the Palestinian opposition, which bridled when Arafat considered the plan, which he had discreetly helped to formulate, as a 'positive step . . . and an important basis' for negotiations. Article Seven, which implicitly recognized Israel and therefore undermined the right of Palestinian refugees to return to homes lost in 1948, aroused particular anger. The PFLP termed the proposal 'treasonous', and DFLP secretary-general Hawatma spoke for the Left when he accused Fahd of attempting to lure 'all the Arab states to join Sadatist Egypt, without Sadat, on the basis of US solutions and conditions for recognition and normalization [with Israel]'.[114] As regrettable in his opinion was that 'some rightwing and reactionary Palestinian voices propagate the Fahd initiative'. Several Fateh central committee members, among them Khalaf and Salih, also shared this

view.[115] Arafat riposted, with considerable justification, that the opposition had already approved broadly similar principles in the Brezhnev proposal earlier in the year.[116] He was obliged to disassociate himself from the Fahd plan, however, and in doing so incurred Saudi displeasure. In early September the Saudi representative in the Arab Follow-Up Committee in Lebanon supported a ban on arms imports by any party other than the Lebanese government, much to the alarm of the PLO.[117]

The PLO was also under pressure to cede control over south Lebanon. Khalaf had stated in July 1981 that the PLO would not relinquish its hold to a government that 'cannot control the city and port of Junya and all public installations in east [Beirut]'. Army deployment in the south could only take place following the establishment of 'a national government that will not stab us in the back, with a Lebanese army that represents the same [national] spirit and internal balance'.[118] In private, Arafat informed the Fateh higher military council that the PLO had already refused to hand over the Beaufort castle or the bridges connecting central Lebanon to the south.[119] The PLO meanwhile sought to appease the local inhabitants: it bought the entire tobacco harvest to compensate farmers for the loss of markets during the 'artillery war', and distributed another LL18 million to families that had suffered injury or damage.[120] It also launched an internal campaign against *tajawuzat*, a particular target being the illicit sale of weapons by military personnel and quartermasters. This had little effect, prompting the head of the PLO's Palestinian Revolutionary Justice Committee to observe at the end of October that 'the punishment imposed on members of the Palestinian revolution's forces who commit criminal acts does not deter, and so it will be made more severe for military personnel, by raising the minimum sentence called for by the law'.[121]

As serious a threat was the campaign of sabotage and assassination in areas under PLO control. The French ambassador died in an ambush near the green line in Beirut on 4 September 1981, but even worse was the massive bomb that destroyed the Iraqi embassy, killed the ambassador and 26 other people, and wounded 100 on 15 December. An increasing number of attacks moreover targeted the PLO. A car bomb in the Fakhani district inflicted 250 casualties on 1 October, including 80 women who were trapped by a fire that swept through a nearby PLO sewing workshop. A fortnight later Fateh central committee member Abu-Sharar was killed by an explosion in his hotel room during a visit to Rome. The Israeli Mossad was presumed responsible, but the unknown Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners took responsibility for several explosions in Beirut in the last two weeks of September, contributing to the total death toll of 82 in this period. When one blast killed 20 civilians near the Fateh headquarters for the south, in a Sidon suburb, the PLO removed its offices from the vicinity and paid LL12 million in repairs and compensation to local residents.[122] In Beirut, unidentified gunmen shot dead the former secretary-general of the ALF and Palestinian historian, 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-

Kayyali, on 6 December. Nor could the PLO rely on the LNM to stem the growing tide of Lebanese disaffection; the LNM had been in steady decline since the assassination of Kamal Junblat in 1977, and by 1981 it was 'in a state of asphyxiation'.[123]

The bombing campaign intensified towards the end of 1981, with eighteen incidents in December alone. The PLO had introduced new security measures in 1980 to combat car bombings, and in late 1981 acquired a number of trained police dogs from the GDR to assist in the detection of explosives. It was usually circumspect in accusing parties other than Israel, but frankly blamed the Lebanese *deuxième bureau* and the Phalanges Party for the car bomb of 1 October. The DFLP and the PFLP were less circumspect, accusing the *deuxième bureau* of organizing most bombings in this period, as well as a series of earlier attacks stretching back to July 1979.[124] The PFLP argued that the Bureau wished to provoke the population in areas under PLO and LNM control to demand the return of the Lebanese army.[125] It also accused the Bureau of instigating at least some of the clashes with the Shi'ite Amal movement, including the bloody battles with the LCP that left 20 dead in the southern suburbs of Beirut in the second half of August 1981.[126] Adding to the problem were repeated bouts of severe fighting in Tripoli, between Sunni Islamist militiamen sympathetic to Fateh and rivals among the 'Alawi community, who were linked to Syria. The toll reached 22 dead in August, and 14 dead and 86 wounded in December, besides 10 killed and 60 wounded in a car bomb in the city on 10 December. Lebanese police statistics showed that Israeli attacks, internecine clashes, and car bombs had caused 2,100 deaths by the end of the year.[127]

The spiralling bloodshed in Lebanon intensified the sense of impending conflict. The Knesset vote on 13 December to extend Israeli law to the Golan Heights was officially perceived in Syria as an annulment of the truce and a declaration of war.[128] Sharon deepened Syrian apprehension in mid-December by stressing the US–Israeli alliance against the USSR and its 'radical' Arab allies. He redefined the 'sphere concerning Israeli strategic interests' to include not only the Arab confrontation states and the 'outer Arab countries' beyond, but also 'countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and areas like the Persian Gulf and Africa, and in particular the countries of North and Central Africa'.[129] Apparently worried by the US veto against a UN resolution condemning the Israeli decision to extend legal jurisdiction over the Golan and by Sharon's reformulation of Israeli strategic doctrine, Syria issued a frank offer of peace at the end of January 1982: an end to the Arab state of war with Israel, in return for full withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state under the PLO.[130] By now the deadline for the return of the Sinai peninsula to Egypt was only three months away, and Israel rejected the Syrian offer out of hand.

In his enunciation of Israeli strategic doctrine in December 1981, Sharon had also lashed out at the PLO as 'a latent threat to the very existence of Israel . . . [and] the framework for terrorist organizations operating against

Israel inside her territory or all over the world'.[131] Such rhetoric only heightened PLO anxiety, and prompted a series of measures intended to demonstrate its intention to resist an attack, and so to deter one taking place at all.[132] Training courses were stepped up and graduation ceremonies were widely publicized, as were Arafat's visits to induction centres and guerrilla bases in south Lebanon. Israel took particular note, as it was intended to, of three full-scale manoeuvres by Fateh forces in the last two months of 1981.[133] In one of them, tank, artillery, and infantry units of Fateh's Karama Forces carried out an assault on a mock Israeli settlement. Arafat also used the anniversary of the 1965 launch of the Palestinian armed struggle to mount a massive military parade past PLO headquarters in Beirut, on 1 January 1982, in which the full range of PLO combat hardware was displayed.

The PLO leadership knew that the IDF had prepared detailed invasion plans by December 1981. It also knew that Lebanese Forces commander Jmayyil intended to run in the presidential election due in September 1982, and feared the consequences of his ambition. Hoping to pre-empt a clash Arafat and Wazir suggested a secret dialogue, but were defeated by opposition within the Phalanges Party.[134] PLO anxiety turned to alarm in early February when word reached it that Sharon had secretly visited Jmayyil and other Maronite leaders in Junya. Its information suggested that the Israeli invasion plan was discussed, and that a link-up was envisaged between IDF units advancing north along the coast and Maronite forces circling round Beirut to meet at Damur, fifteen kilometres to the south of the capital.[135] Sharon added that the IDF might extend its action to Beirut if the Lebanese Forces would take part in the battle, and if they were prepared subsequently to sign a peace treaty with Israel.[136]

The PLO now made a second attempt to ensure Maronite neutrality. Khalaf met Amin Jmayyil, and Fateh military intelligence chief ʿAtallah ʿAtallah met his younger brother Bashir, on three occasions in early February. The PLO was unwilling to offer the concessions demanded by the Jmayyil brothers, however, and the dialogue collapsed. Arafat now spoke with growing frequency of the 'accordion plan', in which the IDF and Lebanese Forces would 'squeeze' the PLO, LNM, and the ADF in Beirut. Begin confirmed the general fears by warning publicly on 22 February of Israeli military action in south Lebanon.[137] This was accompanied by exaggerated references to PLO combat manpower, now estimated by foreign minister Shamir at 20,000 men, and to its arsenal, which Sharon claimed comprised an astonishing 3,000 guns and 200 rocket launchers.[138] This was pure fiction, but it worried the PLO that US secretary of state Haig repeated the Israeli estimates on 2 March.[139] Western media published substantially accurate details of Israeli invasion plans, meanwhile, amidst reports that only the advent of bad weather had prevented their implementation in late February.[140] Shamir immediately denied these reports, but Moshe Arens, the Israeli ambassador in Washington, reconfirmed them.[141]

Predicting, Preparing, and Planning

IDF war planning after July 1981 was matched by the Palestinian debate about the objectives and scale of its coming offensive. Indeed, Jibril addressed this question on the very day that the 'artillery war' came to an end. One possibility was for the IDF to occupy the Nabatiyya district in order to distance PLO artillery from the border, while mounting amphibious landings to capture the Tyre pocket.[142] He considered an operation on this scale unlikely, however, because PLO weapons could inflict intolerable military casualties and strike back at the northern settlements. Israel would also refrain from occupying Nabatiyya, let alone the Biqaʿ Valley, in order to avoid confrontation with the Syrian army.[143] Speaking a few weeks later, Sayil focused on two prospects: an Israeli ground assault through the Marjʿuyun gap, and landings at various points along the coast.[144] He was also convinced that the IDF would mount amphibious operations as far north as Damur, which had been the target of armed reconnaissance earlier in the year.

The conviction that Israel planned a major offensive had become widespread by early 1982. The PFLP and DFLP central committees came to the same conclusion at separate meetings in January and February.[145] Both expected a simultaneous Lebanese attack, whether by the Maronite Lebanese Forces or the army. Indeed, Hawatma had a year earlier predicted 'aggressive [Israeli] combat operations in various forms that combine invasion with wars of attrition, and landings of enemy forces behind our defence lines. There is also the possibility that [Maronite] forces will pursue the expected Israeli–US plan and that the [Lebanese] civil war will erupt once more'.[146] The PFLP conference in April 1981 expressed special concern that the Lebanese police were building up to a strength of 20,000 and the army to 40,000, and in early 1982 went so far as to predict that the Lebanese army (rather than the IDF) would be the principal force to attack the PLO.[147] It also predicted that the offensive would be on a larger scale than the invasion of March 1978, and added that the PLO, LNM, and Syria would all be targeted.[148]

The debate focused from this point onwards on the extent of the expected invasion, although there was still some scepticism among the rank-and-file that it would take place at all. The fact an offensive failed to materialize after Arafat had placed PLO forces on full alert at the end of February persuaded many that he was crying 'wolf' too often. Israeli preparations were increasingly obvious, nonetheless, an early example being the practice drill held by the IDF, civil defence, and fire brigade in Acre, Nahariya, and Maʿalot on 4 March. Israeli troops practised combat in mountainous terrain in south Lebanon five days later, and conducted a night exercise on the Golan Heights on 17 March under the watchful eyes of Sharon and Eitan.

Arafat was the most prescient among the PLO leadership, expecting Israeli landings 'north of Damur, at Damur, and south of Damur'.[149] He was unsure if the IDF would push as far by land, but warned that it might reach Khalda, at the

southern approaches to Beirut, where it could link up in a pincer movement with the Lebanese Forces.[150] Yet even then he did not predict a direct assault on Beirut. As he admitted after the war, he had not expected the IDF to reach 'the dunes of Beirut [airport], which the [Syrian] ADF was supposed to protect. That is, I did not expect Beirut itself'.[151] The most common PLO assumption was that an offensive would be confined to the south. An ad hoc 'situation assessment committee' was sure, for example, that the Israeli advance would not exceed 'Sidon's shoulders [the hills to its east], or not Sidon itself, and definitely not as far as Beirut or Khalda'.[152]

Optimism was partly due to the belief that international pressure and the presence of UNIFIL would constrain Israel. Wazir had taken this view at the end of the 'artillery war' in July 1981, arguing that Israeli occupation of the entire south 'would have grave implications and entail political circumstances that the enemy would have to prepare for', while Jibril added that UNIFIL deployment limited Israeli options.[153] Acting deputy chief-of-staff Maragha later explained that the PLO had specifically 'assessed, erroneously, that the presence of UNIFIL in the sector of the Qaʿqaʿiyya bridge would prevent the enemy from using it as a principal route'.[154] Sayil argued, conversely, that UNIFIL would neither block nor deter a determined offensive.[155] He added that Israel could attack if it had US approval, for which Sharon lobbied hard in spring 1982.[156] Yet for all their anti-US rhetoric, even the PFLP and other leftist groups 'failed to realise adequately . . . the new directions in US policy', as they later admitted.[157] Excessive confidence in Soviet and Syrian support led them to 'exaggerate the strength of the Palestinian revolution'.[158] As a result, Hawatma was among those who did not believe that the IDF would even reach Sidon, let alone Beirut.[159] A subsequent report by the PFLP also noted ruefully that 'the joint command did not expect the enemy to reach Beirut, only Zahrani or Sidon, despite incoming information'.[160] Indeed, several of Arafat's advisers were certain on the eve of the invasion that Israel would not invade at all.[161]

Fortunately for the PLO, the leading military 'triumvirate' of Arafat, Wazir, and Sayil were convinced otherwise. The least they expected was a repeat attempt to decapitate the PLO by striking its headquarters in the capital, while multi-pronged advances and 'leapfrogging' tactics would be applied to divide Palestinian defences in south and coastal Lebanon into isolated pockets. To prepare for this, Arafat ordered the construction of alternative command posts in west Beirut, brushing aside the protests of disbelieving advisers.[162] A field telephone network and extensive wireless communications net linked underground operations rooms—which were given number codes 3, 4, 5, 35, and 61—and administrative, logistic, and combat centres throughout the Beirut area.[163] The operations rooms were in direct radio contact with brigade headquarters and regional commands around Lebanon, and could communicate directly with combat units. Communications codes were changed more frequently to improve security, and antennae were strung out at a distance from

command posts to avoid location by Israeli tracking equipment.[164] Handheld wireless sets were distributed at platoon level and even to combat squads, while large numbers of spare sets, parts, and batteries were also stocked.[165]

Regional commands and brigade headquarters were expected to fight on their own for a lengthy period, whether because of isolation by the IDF or because roads might be blocked by fire or clogged with refugees.[166] Each stockpiled weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, and medicine, and in turn provided its battalions with their own spare weapons, ammunition, and fuel, which were distributed in small caches to obviate the need to move under fire.[167] Large stores—enough to last a six-month siege according to Arafat—were assembled in Beirut.[168] The derelict sports stadium now held large stocks of food and non-combat supplies, while ammunition was placed in metal containers and buried away from built-up areas.[169] The PLO also dug artesian wells in Beirut and southern cities.[170] A network of covered trenches was constructed around the strategic Beaufort castle, and reinforced concrete shelters were dug into hill-sides to shelter artillery; the PF–GC even housed its entire combat force in underground bases fitted with sleeping quarters, kitchens, tiled bathrooms, and television. Bunkers and earth ramparts were constructed around refugee camps and military camps in the Beirut area, both to impede bombing and possible attack by the Lebanese army.[171] Two basement floors were added to the PRCS hospital in al-Bass refugee camp near Tyre, but the most ambitious project was to start digging three parallel tunnels for the movement of people, ammunition, and military vehicles between the ʿAyn al-Hilwa and Miyya-wa-Miyya refugee camps near Sidon.[172]

The PLO meanwhile stepped up planning. Arafat repeatedly convened the Joint Forces command of the PLO and LNM, the PLO higher military council, and the expanded military council of Fateh, presiding over an average of four meetings a month from December 1981, and seven in February 1982. He also visited brigade and battalion commands, guerrilla bases, and training camps in all sectors—his photograph was ostentatiously taken with the garrison of Beaufort castle—and checked fortifications, gun sites, and battle plans. Brigade and battalion commanders held additional planning sessions, and each battalion was instructed to prepare tactical plans and firing grids. At the end of May, Fateh's Qastal Forces issued 'operational order no. 4', and the PLA 'operational order no. 5'.[173] These orders described road conditions and terrain, gave firing coordinates, and assigned combat tasks to individual battalions, companies, tank platoons, and artillery batteries. Special attention was given to likely advance routes for armour, but the likelihood of naval landings to isolate Tyre and Sidon was also noted. Artillery was to provide interlocking fire, and local commands were to retain reserve units. However, the operational orders made little provision for coordination between Fateh, the PLA, and other Palestinian forces. Units around the main cities were ordered to hold their ground while frontline forces gradually pulled back, but the stress was on set-piece tasks; contingency plans in case of an Israeli breakthrough were not made.

The flaws in planning were most evident in the eastern sector. Karama Forces commander Ghazi ʿAtallah assembled his battalion and company commanders in mid-May to inform them that the IDF would strive for the Beirut–Damascus highway. The officers could not agree on how best to defend the sector, with the result that the brigade did no more than prepare eight vehicle dugouts along the Hasbayya road.[174] The Karama and Yarmuk Forces were meanwhile instructed to draw closer to Syrian lines in the Biqaʿ Valley for protection. In the coastal region, three of Fateh's tank battalions were now deployed between Zahrani and the outskirts of Damur, while the equivalent of four gun and two rocket artillery battalions provided fire support for the entire western sector. Frontline units received newly arrived 160 mm mortars and 107 mm multiple rocket launchers for added firepower. Anti-aircraft detachments were posted to guard the coast from Beirut to Rmayla, and Arafat insisted on siting guns in the hills of Dawha to prevent landings at Khalda.[175] Force 17 was ordered to extend its deployment along the Beirut shore, and reinforced its garrisons near the international airport and the Lebanese army barracks at Uzaʿi as an added precaution.[176]

Countdown to War

From March, the Israeli invasion was only a matter of time. The IDF dug new gun emplacements in south Lebanon and moved self-propelled artillery, radars, and anti-aircraft missiles into place. It cut roads on Mount Hermon bypassing the ʿArqub, and brought mobile bridges into the Marjʿuyun sector in early May. Israeli officials meanwhile sought to redefine the terms of the ceasefire agreement of July 1981. According to Sharon and Eitan, any attack on Israeli or Jewish targets anywhere, not just across the Lebanese border, would constitute a violation and be treated as *casus bellum*.[177] This interpretation was not formalized by the Israeli cabinet, but US spokespersons repeated it on more than one occasion in March.[178] The PLO did not oblige by committing obvious violations, however, prompting Eitan to state in some desperation that stone-throwing by demonstrators in the occupied territories would be regarded as a ceasefire violation.[179] UNIFIL, conversely, blamed Israel squarely for 193 ceasefire violations in south Lebanon between July 1981 and March 1982.[180]

The PLO took great pains to avoid providing the pretext for an invasion. Arafat revealed the level of Palestinian anxiety on 11 April, when he predicted that the offensive would start within 48 hours.[181] Nothing happened, but Israel responded to the death of a soldier on patrol in south Lebanon on 21 April with air strikes on PLO artillery near Dawha, Saʿdiyyat, Mazbud, and Sidon, killing 17 and wounding 20, half of them civilians. PLO gunners retaliated with a handful of rockets on northern Israel, but on Arafat's instructions aimed at uninhabited areas to avoid escalation. Wazir and Sayil hurried to Damascus to

consult with their Syrian counterparts, followed on 28 April by Arafat, who signed an agreement of 'strategic coordination' with president Asad.[182] The death of a second Israeli soldier on patrol in Lebanon provided the pretext for further raids against guerrilla bases near Zahrani, Sidon, and Dalhamiyya on 9 May, leaving a toll of 12 dead and 20 wounded, again mostly civilians. Arafat preferred not to retaliate at all, but gave in to his colleagues and allowed 150 rockets to be fired at uninhabited areas in northern Israel.

The provocative nature of the air raids prompted municipal officials and residents in northern Israel and opposition members of Knesset, among them Labour Party leader Shimon Peres, to blame the government for needless escalation. They urged it to observe the ceasefire, noting that no Palestinian rockets had been fired from Lebanon since July 1981.[183] Some Israeli analysts objected that government behaviour weakened Israeli deterrence, while others disputed the claim put forward by Sharon and Eitan that any incident involving the PLO constituted a violation of the truce in south Lebanon.[184] Commenting on a raid by a Fateh squad in the Jordan Valley on 29 January, the deputy-leader of the Labour Party, Yitzhaq Rabin, argued that such attacks did not offer a sufficient pretext for retaliatory action in Lebanon.[185] In any case, the IDF was not instructed to respond to PLO retaliatory fire. The PLO may have misread this restraint to indicate Israeli unwillingness to incur international criticism or risk renewed shelling against civilians in the north.[186] As the PFLP later observed, there was an 'under-estimation of the enemy's determination to invade . . . because of his unwillingness to suffer casualties or a protracted war'.[187]

Besides, the PLO was distracted by the intensifying confrontation in the occupied territories since the launch of Begin's 'iron fist' policy in June 1981, which was accompanied by new restrictions on Palestinian universities and newspapers, an escalation of curfews and trade bans, increased resort to beatings, and repression of activities or works expressing Palestinian national identity and culture.[188] Most significant was the Israeli decision to establish a separate civilian administration attached to its military government in the West Bank in September (and Gaza in December), which was partly intended to preempt the talks about Palestinian autonomy with Egypt by implementing the Israeli interpretation of the Camp David accords unilaterally. More seriously, it gave the Israeli military orders issued since 1967 the same status as standing Jordanian and Egyptian law, reflecting the conscious aims of binding the occupied territories permanently to Israel, impeding Palestinian self-determination, and facilitating Jewish settlement and eventual annexation.[189] The inauguration of the civilian administration in November triggered widespread protests, but the unrest intensified after the publication of a military decree in March 1982 banning the NGC and reached its peak in following weeks, by which time 28 Palestinian protestors had been killed, 500 wounded, and 1,000 detained. The head of the new civilian administration, Menahem Milson, now announced that the municipal elections due in April had again been postponed 'until PLO

influence is removed'.[190] On 28 April, a day before Israel returned the Sinai peninsula to Egyptian control, it authorized the construction of six new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, as if to demonstrate its resolve not to relinquish them.

Security continued to deteriorate in areas under PLO control in Lebanon in the meantime. Clashes between Amal and the LCP at the beginning of 1982 left 12 dead and 40 wounded, but worse battles erupted between Amal and a coalition of Palestinian and Lebanese leftists in Beirut on 25 January, and then spread to Baʿlbak and half a dozen villages in the Tyre district over the next few days. The toll in the south on 30 January alone stood at 25 dead and 30 wounded, and further clashes broke out in the Nabatiyya district a week later. A substantial portion of Fateh's combat manpower was now pinned down keeping the peace in Shiʿite villages, and the garrison in Uzaʿi was discreetly reinforced to guard against strangulation of west Beirut by Amal.[191] Faced with the anger of local inhabitants, Fateh officers mediating between Amal and the Left in villages in the UNIFIL zone withdrew.[192] Hardly had these clashes died down, when fighting broke out between Fateh and Saʿiqa in Beirut on 1 February, leaving 19 casualties. Similar confrontations between pro-Fateh and pro-Syrian militias in Tripoli later in the month left 21 dead and 70 wounded. Fateh central committee member Salih had openly supported the Syrian government in its campaign to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Syrian authorities evidently suspected the mainstream leadership of sheltering fugitives in northern Lebanon.[193] Under both Syrian and internal pressure, Arafat led a high-level Fateh delegation to Damascus to conclude a strategic pact, but was subsequently accused by the Palestinian Left of ensuring that it remained stillborn.[194]

The PLO was being buffeted on every side. The LNM criticized Fateh for seeking neutrality in the conflict with Amal, and for supporting Islamist militias in Tripoli. The Progressive Socialist Party, one of the PLO's staunchest allies in the past, denied it permission to deploy combat units or communications posts in the strategic Shuf region.[195] Yet 'traditional' Sunni Muslim leaders were also joining in public criticism of the PLO, and pressed it on some occasions to move gun emplacements and ammunition dumps away from residential areas. Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi Shams-al-Din, head of the Shiʿite higher council, took the unprecedented step of castigating the PLO on Lebanese state television in mid-April, following six days of vicious fighting between Amal and its rivals that left 94 dead and 243 wounded in Beirut and the south.[196] Unidentified gunmen intensified Muslim anxiety by shooting a Sunni cleric in Beirut on 16 April and planting a bomb near the residence of the Sunni mufti and long-time PLO ally, Hasan Khalid, on 5 May. This coincided with further clashes between rival wings of the Baʿth Party and between pro-Fateh and pro-Syrian gunmen in Tripoli, in which 45 people died and 98 suffered injury. Internal discipline had all but disappeared, and the PLO–LNM alliance had fragmented to an unprecedented degree.[197]

Internal violence had become endemic, but hostile intelligence agencies were also actively involved. A car bomb that was defused at the ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp on 13 March contained 200 kilograms of explosives with Hebrew markings. The Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners reappeared on 21 May to claim responsibility for three explosions that killed 10 and wounded 25 in west Beirut. A Nasirite militia was suspected of bombing the French embassy on 24 May, while a car bomb elsewhere in the capital brought the day's casualties to 30 dead and over three dozen wounded. A Fateh security officer working for Israeli intelligence also instigated bitter clashes with the Nasirite Popular Organization, the staunch PLO ally in Sidon. The PLO hurriedly offered compensation for the LL20 million in damages to the commercial centre and withdrew its personnel from the city, but the harm to local relations could not be undone. The PLO had not only lost the hearts and minds of many Lebanese, but was also unable to deploy in a key stronghold that straddled the main route for an Israeli invasion.

22

The Lebanon War

Belief Suspended

By the end of May 1982, the PLO had a remarkably accurate picture of Israeli war plans, thanks in part to information from a variety of diplomatic and intelligence sources—Soviet, French, American, and Egyptian, to name but a few. It had even obtained a detailed version of IDF general staff plans, or so Wazir later claimed, and lacked only precise dates.[1] The PLO now expected one of two scenarios. The first envisaged armoured attacks through Nabatiyya and Tyre linking up with amphibious landings at Qasmiyya or Zahrani, with heliborne or naval diversions at other points and a possible thrust towards Hasbayya.[2] The IDF might also circle round Sidon to link up with a major troop landing at the Awwali river estuary to the north, and then drive towards a second beachhead at Damur. The PLO apparently viewed the latter option as unlikely; it envisaged three defence lines to the south and east of Sidon but left the Awwali estuary and coastal road to the north inadequately defended.[3] In the second scenario, the IDF would drive to Khalda and, in parallel, push Syrian units in the Biqaʿ Valley to a line north of the Beirut–Damascus highway.[4] The PLO concluded that in either case the IDF would halt south of Sidon within five days, at which point the superpowers would impose a ceasefire and resume the peace process, this time with Syrian and PLO participation.[5] This was a major misreading of Israeli and US aims, but otherwise the PLO accurately anticipated the IDF's 'little pines', 'medium pines', and 'big pines' plans, which, ironically, the Israeli cabinet itself had not seen.[6]

Fatigue and wishful thinking persuaded the PLO that the IDF would not reach Beirut, even in the worst-case scenario. The PFLP and DFLP were adamant that the capital was not a target, despite expecting a 'big operation'.[7] For this reason the PFLP and other groups opposed the PLO decision in early May to conscript Palestinian men aged 16 to 39, accusing Arafat of over-dramatizing the invasion threat.[8] Reassurances from Damascus and other capitals reinforced the conviction that an offensive would not exceed Zahrani, let alone Sidon, prompting the PFLP later to complain that the Syrian command had been unable to go beyond 'conventional thinking'.[9] Indeed, when Wazir and Sayil presented details of much broader Israeli plans to Syrian defence minister Mustafa Tlas and chief-of-staff Hikmat al-Shihabi at the end of May, the Syrians regarded the information as merely 'routine'.[10] They rejected PLO

requests to deploy additional anti-tank and anti-aircraft units around Beirut and in the Shuf mountains, and even withdrew some air defence and armour units from the capital in the following week.[11] Among those pulled out, according to Wazir, were the 107 SA-7 anti-aircraft missile operators who had been based in the refugee camps since 1974.[12]

By now, even the PLO 'triumvirate' had become innured to the imminent threat of invasion by the flood of detailed information, and lulled into believing that the IDF would not reach Beirut. They persevered in military preparations, forming 12–16 year old 'lion cubs' into the Zayd Bin Haritha Battalion at the end of May, and offering on 4 June to place the sons of guerrillas who volunteered for duty in their fathers' units on the payroll, but by now the invasion was only hours away.[13] At this late stage an Israeli attack on Syrian forces in the Biqaʿ Valley was seen as likely, but the Palestinian leadership assumed that the Syrian garrison in the Shuf mountains at least would stand fast, making an IDF advance along the coast towards Beirut highly dangerous and therefore improbable.[14] Arafat reflected this ambivalence by flying to Saudi Arabia immediately after Beirut was struck by massive air raids on 4 June. Ostensibly this was to start a new mediation effort in the Iran–Iraq war, but his real purpose was to use the Saudi–US connection to ascertain the full extent of the coming Israeli offensive.[15] His hosts assured him that the IDF would stop at a line 40 kilometres from the border—at or before Sidon—and it was only upon his return to Beirut that he realized their error. Even then, Arafat did not grasp that the Lebanese capital itself was the final Israeli target.

The Israeli Invasion

In the evening of 3 June, gunmen belonging to the renegade Abu Nidal faction shot and wounded the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov.[16] The British police quickly established the responsibility of Iraqi intelligence, not the PLO, but the Israeli government had the pretext it sought to invade Lebanon.[17] Defence minister Sharon had recently briefed US secretary of state Haig on Israeli plans, and confirmed that Israel had a 'green light' to proceed as it saw fit.[18] The Israeli air force signalled the start of the invasion with heavy strikes on west Beirut and the Nabatiyya area in the afternoon of 4 June, and followed up the next day with raids on a corridor 40 kilometres wide stretching from Tyre to al-Naʿma, just south of the capital.

The start of the Israeli offensive should have come as no surprise after the shooting of Argov, but the initial reaction of the PLO revealed some confusion, despite the precision of the information reaching it and the accuracy of its own predictions. Its central operations room placed all units 'on full alert in coming hours because there is an Israeli–US decision to conduct a limited or expanded operation. Be ready to confront all possibilities.'[19] Yet its caution was belied by the instruction to PLO gunners to fire over 1,000 rockets and shells at 20

settlements and towns in northern Israel, according to a preset target list, on 4–5 June.[20] Even then, when the ground offensive started at 11 a.m. on 6 June, PLO outposts in the Tyre district believed the armoured vehicles they observed driving through UNIFIL checkpoints to belong to the peacekeepers; the sector commander, ʿAzmi al-Sughayyar, later radioed the central operations room in Beirut to profess surprise that the IDF was attacking through the UNIFIL zone and to ask for instructions.[21] He was not alone in the naïve assumption that the peacekeepers could impede the Israeli advance; Arafat subsequently accused UNIFIL of 'collusion' with the IDF.[22] In any case the PLO chairman, who returned to Beirut in the early hours of 6 June, accepted the ceasefire call issued by the UN Security Council with alacrity. He informed PLO forces that 'we will adhere to it precisely, so long as the other side adheres [too]'.[23] Arafat arranged to meet UNIFIL commander Callaghan to confirm the ceasefire, and the central operations room instructed all units to show extreme restraint.[24]

PLO caution was to no avail. Additional IDF units entered the UNIFIL zone and fanned out towards Bint Jbayl, Jwayya, and Qana, and at 3 p.m. other task forces started the assault on the Nabatiyya and eastern sectors. In all, the IDF committed 75,000–78,000 men, 1,240 tanks, and 1,520 APCs to the invasion.[25] PLO full-time military personnel in Lebanon probably totalled around 15,000, but only 6,000 were deployed in the south, of whom at most 4,500 were regulars; they were equipped with around 60 tanks, many no longer mobile, and 100–200 assorted artillery weapons scattered in small concentrations.[26] The odds told, and PLO defences gave way or drew into isolated pockets in most areas. Nabatiyya fell during the afternoon, followed by the famed Beaufort Castle in the evening, and at 9 p.m. the central operations room ordered a general withdrawal from the sector. Tyre and the Bas refugee camp fell the next day; the Burj al-Shamali camp held out for another three days and Rashidiyya for a week, but by then the IDF had already reached Beirut. The fact that virtually the entire PLO command in Nabatiyya had been wounded in an artillery strike in the morning of 6 June, coupled with the rumoured death of Sughayyar in Tyre and the loss of radio contact with many combat units, had a discernible impact on the defence.

The second stage of the Israeli invasion was well underway even before the fall of Tyre. Naval commandos landed at the Awwali estuary sometime after 10 p.m. on 6 June, and were followed by the equivalent of a brigade of paratroops and tanks in two main waves between midnight and 2:30 p.m. the next day.[27] The PLO did not even realize that an amphibian operation was underway until a patrol reported at 11 p.m. that two jeeps had been ambushed on the coastal road. The duty officer at the Qastal Forces command was disbelieving and requested another patrol, by which time Israeli armour had also landed.[28] Even then no reinforcements or senior officers were sent to the area, and an irate Arafat sent a Force 17 detachment from Beirut to investigate. An officer finally reported seeing 'a landing attempt' at 3:45 a.m., but Qastal Forces commander 'haj' Ismaʿil Jabr only ordered a full counter-attack against the beachhead at 11

a.m. on 7 June, by which time other IDF units were approaching the city from the south.[29] He then abandoned his headquarters and moved to the suburb of ʿAbra, pausing to oversee a futile attempt to retake the strategic Sharhabil hill to the northeast, before escaping to Salhiyya and then the Shuf, accompanied by Fateh's Martyrs of September Battalion commander Kamal al-Shaykh, Popular Nasirite Organization leader Mustafa Saʿd, and other officers.[30]

Qastal Forces operations officer ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Abu-Fidda, PFLP military commander Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, and DFLP chief-of-staff Abu Mahmud al-Dawli remained in Sidon, but by then hundreds of fugitive guerrillas and militiamen from the Nabatiyya and Tyre districts were pouring into the city and adding to the general confusion. Many units had been ordered to retreat in the hope of preserving them, but the sight of armour and towed artillery driving past had a devastating effect on morale, and for some evoked images of the Arab rout in June 1967.[31] Yet an afternoon assault by the IDF on the ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp—involving an armoured brigade and a mechanized infantry battalion, backed by five artillery battalions—was repulsed.[32] The IDF was finally able to push armoured columns around and through Sidon on 9 June (capturing the small Miyya-wa-Miyya refugee camp in the process), but had suffered a critical delay in its drive for Beirut. Thousands of civilians assembled in an Israeli-designated 'safe zone' on the beach, where hooded informers helped the IDF identify PLO and LNM personnel. The old city held out for another three days; Abu-Fidda fell prisoner, while ʿAbd-al-Karim and Dawli hid for several days and then escaped with the stream of refugees. The last pocket of resistance in ʿAyn al-Hilwa did not fall until 14 June, having been subjected to relentless fire including, in the last three days, bombardment with napalm.[33]

The IDF had already commenced its northward advance towards Beirut in the afternoon of 7 June, and reached Saʿdiyyat by evening. Its armour forced a crossing over the Damur bridge by 3 p.m. the next day, but the battle for Sidon was still delaying the arrival of badly needed infantry fighting vehicles. Then the unthinkable happened. The IDF directly assaulted Syrian positions in the Rihan mountain in the afternoon of 8 June, triggering a precipitate Syrian withdrawal from the Jizzin district and most of the Shuf. Fateh's Karama Forces commander Ghazi ʿAtallah had abandoned his post in the eastern sector on 6 June, claiming the need to confer with the PLO leadership in Beirut and leaving his units to 'act as they saw fit', but reappeared in Shtura on 8 June and ordered a retreat behind Syrian lines.[34] Yarmuk Forces commander Yasin Saʿada meanwhile withdrew his brigade to Baʿlbak in the northern Biqaʿ Valley, on instructions from the PLO central operations room. At this point the US vetoed a draft UN Security Council resolution renewing the call for immediate Israeli withdrawal and threatening sanctions in the case of non-compliance. The next day the Israeli air force destroyed the Syrian SAM-6 batteries in the Biqaʿ Valley and shot down dozens of Syrian fighters, allowing three divisions to advance rapidly towards the Beirut–Damascus highway.

The fall of the Shuf similarly allowed the IDF to complete the circle round

Sidon and to approach Damur from the mountains to the east on 9 June. The local command had informed PLO headquarters that it was under artillery fire from the east on 8 June, indicating an Israeli breakthrough in the Shuf, but this was initially discounted.[35] Wazir then rushed to Mukhtara to persuade Druze leaders to permit the PLO to place blocking forces in the Shuf, but could not sway them; he radioed the central operations room to confirm the Israeli advance and warn of a pincer movement focused on Damur.[36] There some 400 guerrillas and 330 militiamen equipped with a motley mixture of T-34 tanks, gun and rocket artillery, and SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles faced two Israeli divisions.[37] The IDF easily brushed aside the defence or bypassed it by racing along the new coastal highway on 9 June, but PLO stragglers continued to clash with Israeli troops for another two days, and in one ambush killed the IDF's deputy chief-of-staff, Yekutiel Adam, and several senior staff officers. The IDF paused at Na'ma in the evening of 9 June after its lead unit lost four vehicles in an ambush set by PLO fighters, Amal militiamen, and Syrian commandos, and after two attempted naval landings at Dawha and Khalda were repulsed.[38] (It meanwhile captured PF–GC weapons stores at Dayr al-Na'ma intact.)

The PLO leadership had been slow to grasp the implications of the rapid Israeli advance, until the IDF reached Damur. Sayil had first expressed consternation when he received the news that it was already north of the Awwali estuary, explaining that 'we arranged our affairs on the basis of three defensive lines, the last of which was the 'Arabsalim area. The enemy has now destroyed the three lines. Everything is now possible.'[39] DFLP military commander Nawfal later admitted that the PLO higher military council only regarded Beirut as a target 'after the enemy had passed the Awwali bridge . . . This was not taken into account at the first moment of the war, but became apparent to us around the fourth day of the offensive.'[40] As the gravity of the situation dawned, the PLO asked Jordan to dispatch the PLA Badr Forces to Lebanon; one battalion deployed in Beirut and a second between Qabr Shmun and Kfar Matta on 9 June. The central operations room also sent PLA officer 'Abdullah Siyam and 30 fighters to bolster the defence of Khalda, consisting so far of three Syrian tank and commando companies and several dozen Palestinian and Lebanese militiamen.

It was this mixed force that repelled renewed Israeli attacks in the Dawha sector on 10 June. By this time US envoy Philip Habib had persuaded Syria and Israel to observe a ceasefire, starting at noon the next day. The PLO was not formally included, and Israel rejected Habib's suggestion to apply the truce to 'Ayn al-Hilwa and other pockets of resistance, where the siege of fire was resumed with new ferocity.[41] Typically, Israeli defence minister Sharon ordered the IDF to race against the clock with a night attack on Dawha, and then to disregard the ceasefire in western Lebanon altogether, citing specious violations by the PLO. The IDF took the strategic mountain crossroads of Qabr Shmun at 6:30 p.m. on 11 June, following the withdrawal of the Syrian garrison, although the Syrian command did not learn of this loss until noon the next

day.[42] Still arguing that the ceasefire did not apply to the PLO, the IDF expanded its foothold in the mountains overlooking Beirut on 12 June, and seized the Khalda junction briefly before pulling back in the face of a surprise night counter-attack by the ragtag force under Siyam. Israel was now obliged by US pressure to accept a ceasefire, but broke it yet again on 13 June to reach Bsaba, where it finally linked up with the Maronite Lebanese Forces.

Arafat had often warned of the 'accordion' that would close on Beirut, but the Israeli–Maronite link-up threw the Palestinian leadership off balance. As the PLO chairman later admitted, 'I was confused when the ring was closed around us from the mountain. I had not conceived that the mountain would fall and be occupied with such speed'.[43] The PLO had ended the previous day unaware of the full extent of Israeli gains in the mountains above Beirut, and apparently believed that the ceasefire would save it from an increasingly desperate situation. However, the IDF refrained from exploiting its advantage with an immediate assault on the capital, and the moment of opportunity passed. Instead it consolidated its grip around Beirut, occupying Sibnay, Jamhur, and Shuwayfat unopposed, after the commander of the Syrian 85th Brigade withdrew his units and allied PLA forces into the capital to avoid being outflanked.[44] Syrian units were also pushed uphill along the Beirut–Damascus highway to Jamhur on 14 June, allowing the IDF to deploy along the 'green line' in Beirut a day later.

It was only at this point that the IDF developed its direct pressure on Beirut. Repeated attacks by the two armoured brigades at Khalda had pushed the defence back by only a few hundred metres since 13 June. Siyam still led a handful of defenders, backed by 250 guerrillas from Fateh's Ra's al-ʿAyn Battalion and Force 17 and by effective fire support from PLO and Syrian artillery. The guerrillas accepted heavy casualties in their determination to retain the junction, losing 13 dead and 18 wounded in a single counter-attack on 13 June and 26 dead and 25 wounded in a second the next day. This followed a day-long assault on Khalda by two IDF battalions with air, artillery, and naval support, by the end of which the defence had ceded. Siyam died in this last battle, having won a grace of six days during which the PLO prepared Beirut to resist a major assault. This proved invaluable as the IDF launched repeated attacks on the southern and eastern runways of the international airport on 15–17 June. Syrian commandos armed with Sagger anti-tank guided missiles and a Syrian tank company bolstered Fateh units, which lost another 25 dead and 30 wounded blocking the coastal road on 15 June alone. Israeli armour finally covered the 500 metres to the eastern runway by 17 June, but paused after an attempted naval landing behind PLO lines at Uzaʿi was driven off.

The battle for the runways convinced the PLO that the IDF intended to launch a full-scale assault on Beirut from the airport.[45] Sharon was not yet ready to order this, however, preferring to expel remaining Syrian units from the ʿAlay mountain above the capital. The problem was that the link-up around Beirut had caused a furore in the Israeli cabinet and prompted US envoy Habib

to return to the region. Prime minister Begin was due to meet US president Reagan on 21 June, and so combat operations in Lebanon were severely restricted, with Sharon and Eitan authorized to employ the air force only after obtaining cabinet approval. Chafing at these restrictions, Sharon secretly ordered a creeping offensive towards the major mountain town of Bhamdun on 20 June. It took the IDF four days to reach its target, by which time the Syrian army had withdrawn from the ʿAlay mountain, leaving only elements of a commando battalion and PLO forces in Bhamdun.[46] A bitter battle unfolded at daybreak on 24 June, and by evening the IDF was in control, having lost 29 dead and 141 wounded in two days. Success also came at a political price: the cabinet demanded stricter control on military operations, and cracks appeared in the national consensus as the Israeli opposition and public realized that the IDF had greatly exceeded its declared objectives and now faced a protracted siege around Beirut. An added blow was the dismissal of Sharon's closest US ally, secretary of state Haig, for reasons partly connected to his handling of the war in Lebanon.

The Battle of Beirut

The Israeli government was caught between its reluctance to conduct a protracted siege around Beirut, and its unwillingness to relieve the PLO by withdrawing the IDF unilaterally to the line publicly declared as the objective at the start of the war, 40 kilometres from the border. The PLO, for its part, had little choice in the matter. The realization on 9 June that the invasion was aimed at Beirut had come as a shock, which Israel sought to exploit the next day by dropping leaflets from the air urging civilian residents and Syrian and PLO personnel alike to flee the city. Fortunately for the PLO, the central operations room revived quickly enough to devise an impromptu defence plan that evening. It divided west Beirut and its southern suburbs into seven sectors, each with a separate command and core of regular combat units, as well as communications nets, weapons and ammunition stores, food distribution centres, and medical stations.[47] The bulk of personnel came from Fateh and the PLA (both loyalist and pro-Syrian units), but were also drawn from the LNM and Amal in some neighbourhoods. All groups were represented in the PLO higher military council, except for the Syrian brigade and PLA Hittin and Qadisiyya Forces: the Syrians were instructed by Damascus to confine themselves to barracks for the rest of the war, but the PLA units took frontline positions under effective PLO command. Both the Syrians and the allied PLA units also received their full requirements of food, fuel, combat supplies, and pay from the PLO throughout the siege.

The PLO defence comprised some 8,000 armed personnel, but combat strength depended on a core of 3,500 regulars and trained militiamen. Armament consisted of 24 T-34 tanks, 100 anti-tank recoilless rifles and guided missile

launchers, and an assortment of medium and heavy mortars, artillery guns and howitzers, and rocket launchers of all calibres (including a dozen BM-21s), numbering 150–200 in all. Rudimentary air defence was provided by several hundred machine-guns, four ZSU-23-4 vehicles, and a handful of SAM-7 launchers. Starting in the evening of 9 June, PLO engineers and large numbers of volunteers threw up new earth ramparts, dug trenches, and laid minefields; the time purchased by the resistance at Khalda allowed additional ramparts and trenches to be prepared in the open terrain lying between the airport and nearby urban neighbourhoods, once it became obvious that a major assault would come that way. The PRCS meanwhile set up first aid stations and field hospitals in various areas, while other civilian agencies organized food and water distribution and other services for the thousands of refugees flooding into west Beirut from the suburbs, Damur, and other areas outside the capital.

Military preparedness had reached a reasonable level and civilian morale improved distinctly, but the main problem now facing the PLO was the reluctance of the Arab states to exert serious efforts to lift the Israeli siege. Syria was unwilling to resume combat following the painful losses of 8–11 June, and studiously ignored public reminders from the PLO of their recent agreement on strategic coordination. It felt that it had done more than any other member of the Arab steadfastness front to fulfil the commitment to collective defence; Libya sent an air defence battalion to aid Syrian forces in the Biqaʿ Valley, while the two Yemens sent hundreds of volunteers to the PLO. When Syria refused an offer of more troops from Algeria, it instead placed an urgent order for Soviet weapons worth $20 million to be supplied to the PLO.[48] Saudi Arabia, followed by Egypt (which sought to escape its ostracization), meanwhile mediated with the US, but the League of Arab States proved unable to muster enough support for an emergency summit conference; Arab foreign ministers were not to meet until 29 July, eight weeks after the start of the war.

As serious a problem for the PLO was the pressure exerted by virtually the entire range of Lebanese political parties and leaders to withdraw from Beirut. Israel demanded publicly on 13 June that the PLO should lay down its arms and leave the capital under escort to the Biqaʿ Valley; with one or two exceptions, such as the Nasirite Murabitun, the LNM joined the traditional Muslim leaders in lobbying Arafat to consider this option. LNM leader Walid Junblat and Amal leader Nabih Birri joined the Council for National Salvation formed by president Sarkis on 14 June, in a move intended to facilitate negotiation of a withdrawal on Israeli terms.[49]

Not that Palestinian views were uniformly opposed to withdrawal. One line of thinking saw 'no alternative to withdrawing PLO military forces from Beirut', but hoped for minimal 'political compensation': a formal US–PLO dialogue and guarantees for the remaining Palestinian presence in Lebanon, both civilian and military.[50] Holding this view were Jibril, Zaydan, and Ghusha—the

general secretaries of the rejectionist PF–GC, PLF, and PPSF respectively—and Fateh central committee members Hani al-Hasan and Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid.[51] Several leaders, including Jibril, had apparently approved the dispatch of Fateh military intelligence chief ʿAtallah ʿAtallah to east Beirut on 13 June with an offer to negotiate with Israeli defence minister Sharon, although nothing came of the attempt.[52] However, Khalaf and Salih opposed their colleagues, as did Habash and Hawatma. They realized that withdrawal was inevitable, but believed that the PLO could rely on its experience in urban combat and abundant supplies to stiffen its stance and negotiate for better terms. A consensus over two matters emerged over the next week, nonetheless: a commitment in principle to withdraw from Beirut, coupled with absolute rejection of the terms demanded by Israel and backed by the US.[53]

The challenge for the PLO was how to explore various diplomatic options and negotiate terms for withdrawal, not only under fire, but also in a manner that would not undermine the morale of the general public and the motivation to fight among the rank-and-file. This became evident when news surfaced that Fateh central committee member Hani al-Hasan had held secret talks in east Beirut with French envoy Francis Gutman on 15–17 June to discuss Israeli terms.[54] Press leaks suggested that Hasan had accepted the Israeli demand for PLO disarmament, necessitating an exercise in damage limitation by PLO media and prompting Arafat to vow on 17 June to turn Beirut into 'the Stalingrad of the Arabs'. Israel meanwhile intensified its military pressure: 73 civilians died when a gunboat fired a guided missile at a residential building on 15 June, and the PRCS Acre and Gaza hospitals received direct artillery hits in following days. Extensive use of air-burst and white phosphorous artillery shells and air-launched cluster bombs pushed the mortality rate among the wounded up to 30–50 per cent, double the normal levels in war.[55] Israeli intelligence agents added to the carnage with a series of car bombs, the first of which killed 60 refugees on 24 June.

Contrary to Israeli intentions, the onslaught hardened PLO resolve. Field commanders raised morale by sending their men across the lines to raid IDF positions, and the central operations room launched several artillery barrages to demonstrate PLO defiance and signal the abundance of ammunition.[56] On some occasions, officers who suspected the PLO leadership of political weakness or of negotiating on Israeli terms broke the truce and triggered an Israeli riposte deliberately.[57] Two additional factors reinforced PLO self-confidence. One was active French diplomacy, embodied on 19 June in a formal proposal that combined full Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, renegotiation of the Palestinian presence between the PLO and the Lebanese government, and PLO withdrawal in return for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.[58] Five days later France tabled a draft resolution at the UN Security Council calling for 'an initial disengagement of forces (a key PLO demand), with the Israeli army pulling back 10 kilometers from Beirut and PLO forces retiring to the refugee camps, with UN observers, the Lebanese armed

forces, and possibly a UN military force being interposed between the two sides'.[59] Fourteen votes were cast in favour, but the US vetoed the resolution; Haig had adopted the Israeli demand for PLO disarmament as his own, and reiterated it in a final message to France on 25 June, the day of his dismissal from office.

The second encouraging development for the PLO was the stiffening of Lebanese resolve in late June. This was partly a reaction to the heavy toll of civilian casualties caused by Israeli fire, but it also reflected the alarm felt by both the LNM and the traditional Muslim leaders when the IDF allowed the Lebanese Forces militia into the ʿAlay mountain following the capture of Bhamdun. The Maronites mounted a campaign of murder, abduction, and pillage against the local inhabitants, similar to the action of the Israeli-backed SLA in south Lebanon. Angered by the helpless impotence of president Sarkis, Junblat, Birri, and other leading figures resigned from the National Salvation Council in protest on 25 June. By then, according to Lebanese police statistics, the IDF had inflicted a toll of 10,112 dead and 19,000 wounded, of whom 84 per cent were civilians. The IDF announced losses of 269 dead and 1,255 wounded to date.[60]

Encouraged by these developments, Arafat took the diplomatic initiative on 2 July by presenting Lebanese prime minister Shafiq al-Wazzan with a written commitment to the principle of PLO withdrawal from Beirut. The PLO chairman had shrewdly ensured the unanimous approval of the entire Palestinian leadership before submitting the document, which was relayed by Wazzan to US envoy Habib. The new secretary of state, George Shultz, instructed Habib to respond positively by presenting a new US proposal consisting of two main points. First, the PLO should regroup in the refugee camps of Beirut, while the IDF pulled back sufficiently to lift the siege. Second, the PLO could retain a political bureau and up to 2,000 personnel in the capital under the command of the Lebanese army, until all Israeli and Syrian forces had withdrawn from the country.[61] The US ambassador to Israel, Samuel Lewis, conveyed these terms to Begin on 3 July, along with an offer to send US troops as part of a multinational peacekeeping force around Beirut. The Israeli cabinet indignantly rejected the proposal outright, and the US later abandoned it as well, but the episode confirmed the view of the PLO leadership that military resistance had strengthened its negotiating position.

These exchanges worried Sharon and Eitan, who feared that diplomacy would prevent the utter defeat of the PLO and impede the installation of a government friendly to Israel in Beirut. At their urging, the Israeli cabinet had already issued what it cast as a peace plan on 27 June: the demand that all PLO personnel should leave Lebanon forthwith, with no commitment to withdraw the IDF from the country. Israeli aircraft dropped leaflets over Beirut warning that Israel had not yet used its full strength and urging the inhabitants to 'flee for your lives'; as if to underline the message, a car bomb inflicted 23 civilian casualties on the same day, while brief firefights broke out around the ground

perimeter. Combat aircraft also flew mock bombing runs and broke the sound barrier over the capital, sometimes at night, to increase the pressure. Sharon and Eitan had been obliged to rescind the order for a ground offensive on 20 June after facing strenuous objections from unit commanders, but now prepared for a major effort.[62] Overflights and ostentatious troop movements increased on 2 July, and Israeli radio urged the besieged defenders to flee. IDF units replaced Maronite troops on the 'green line' and imposed a food and fuel blockade on west Beirut the next day, and then cut off electricity and water supplies over the next 48 hours.

The US peace proposal brought matters to a head. One hour after it had been delivered to Israel, at 11 p.m. on 3 July, IDF artillery launched a massive barrage. With nearly 500 tanks in the wider Beirut region, the IDF could bring some 800 guns to bear on an area of roughly 48 square kilometres, besides the additional firepower of the air force and navy. Elements of the three divisions now deployed from Damur to Bhamdun started the ground attack shortly after midnight, focusing on the airport runways, which were held by 350 Fateh guerrillas in the first defence line and 300 in the second.[63] (The decimated Syrian tank and anti-tank platoons had finally been withdrawn on 18 June.) Fearing chemical attack, the PLO had distributed gas masks and antidote to its garrison earlier on the same day. Despite its immense firepower, the IDF was repeatedly driven back over the open tarmac by well-directed shelling from PLO artillery; this included fire from Fateh's 6th Artillery Battalion in Kanisa mountain, which delivered a total of 6,000 shells and 900 rockets during the siege of Beirut, and its 2nd Artillery Battalion, which was rushed from the Biqa' Valley into the western mountains on 4 July to provide additional support.[64] Wazir was so impressed with the impact of massed fire in dispersing Israeli units attempting to assemble for the attack that on 5 July he instructed all PLO batteries to adopt the tactic.[65]

Frustrated, the IDF riposted on 6 July with an artillery blitz that struck the entire southern sector and, for the first time, the heart of west Beirut, where the Syrian barracks and Soviet embassy were hit. A new bid to seize the airport at 6 p.m. failed after a three-hour battle; the PLO reinforced its defence the next day with another 120 guerrillas, 45 anti-tank weapons, and five T-34 tanks. The passenger terminal and the capital's main rubbish dump (on the coastal road) were the battleground over the next five days, during which an attempted naval landing behind PLO lines on 7 July was also repulsed. Finally, after a sudden PLO barrage scored direct hits on an Israeli ammunition dump, transport centre, and infantry company on 11 July, killing three soldiers and wounding 28, the IDF hurriedly pulled back the bulk of its units from the exposed frontline. Eitan, who had unwittingly provoked the barrage by boasting a few hours earlier that 'only one PLO gun remains in Beirut', accepted a ceasefire, the sixth to date. In Israel, an opinion poll showed a majority of two-thirds opposed to an assault on Beirut, where the death toll had reached 2,683.[66]

Stalemate

The new ceasefire allowed a revival of diplomacy. The foremost US concern was to ensure the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut, and so its contacts focused on finding willing Arab hosts. The PLO, for its part, insisted on adequate safeguards for the Palestinian civilians it would leave behind, and presented a new proposal to the US through Wazzan on 11 July. France and Egypt echoed PLO concerns and endorsed similar proposals in a draft resolution they jointly submitted to the UN Security Council. Yet when Syrian foreign minister ʿAbd-al-Halim al-Khaddam and his Saudi counterpart Saʿud bin Faysal met US president Reagan and secretary of state Shultz on 16–19 July, they failed to discuss the PLO plan, let alone support it. Indeed, Khaddam had informed a PLO envoy before travelling to Washington that Syria rejected the latest French proposal and would ask the USSR to veto it at the Security Council.[67] Syrian contacts with US officials throughout this period focused instead on the technical aspects of evacuating the PLO from Beirut. Faced with an impasse, the PLO appealed to Syrian president Asad for succour. As Khalaf later revealed, he and Nimr Salih drafted a letter on behalf of all the guerrilla groups to Asad on 21 July, but had received no response by the end of the war.[68] Disappointed by the failure of one ally, Salih had to be dissuaded from issuing a public statement criticizing another, the USSR, for its inactivity.[69] An irate Arafat hinted publicly at the end of the month that certain Arab states had given the 'green light' to Israel to invade Lebanon, and the PLO subsequently complained that an Arab summit conference had not convened although a quorum in favour had been achieved.[70]

The Syrian attitude was explained partly by the embarrassing contrast between the hasty withdrawal of Syrian units from the Shuf mountain and southern Biqaʿ Valley and the humiliating defeat of the Syrian air force, on the one hand, and the determined PLO stand in Beirut, on the other. The Syrian leadership was anxious to avoid wider confrontation with the IDF, and so sought an early end to the conflict in Lebanon. Its outlook was evident in the refusal to permit arms shipments to reach PLO forces in the Biqaʿ Valley. This included the recent donation from Algeria, but also, according to Wazir, 5,000 tons of combat supplies from China, the USSR, GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the two Yemens.[71] Among the items held up in this way were 2,500 RPG-7 anti-tank rocket launchers; this was besides Fateh stores in Syria that were confiscated by the authorities. A secret list compiled by the Fateh quartermaster in Damascus enumerated the loss of 1,050 pistols, 11,810 assault rifles and light machine-guns, 78 machine-guns and light anti-aircraft guns, 18 160 mm mortars, 800 RPG-7 anti-tank launchers with 17,660 rockets, six recoilless rifles, six Sagger anti-tank launchers with 200 missiles and 80 SAM-7 anti-aircraft launchers with 500 missiles, 550 artillery rockets, 5,216 landmines, 37,399 hand grenades, 6,842,278 rifle and machine-gun rounds, and 29,541 artillery and mortar shells.[72]

Syrian restrictions extended to PLO forces in the Biqaʿ Valley, which numbered 2,000 regulars and fielded 30 heavy artillery weapons. Some 3,000 Palestinian volunteers from other Arab countries and several hundred Yemenis arrived during June, although PLO commanders complained of inadequate training and indiscipline.[73] The Syrian army permitted Fateh artillery battalions to shell Israeli positions around Beirut, but discouraged guerrilla attacks from its zone of control. The commanders of Fateh's Karama and Yarmuk Forces did not appear eager for combat in any case, but remnants of the Qastal Forces that had regrouped near Shtura conducted an active campaign. Wazir and Sayil coordinated guerrilla action from Beirut, using radios and civilian couriers to contact guerrillas who remained in hiding behind Israeli lines. The IDF estimated their number at 1,000 on 4 July, among them at least three Fateh battalion commanders in the Tyre district.

Cables reaching the PLO command reported three to five guerrilla attacks every night from the beginning of July; and the IDF suffered at least 69 casualties in raids during the month. It made between 30 and 60 new arrests in the main towns and refugee camps of the south every day, aided by informers and the SLA, swelling the population of the prison camp at Ansar to 9,000. To deter attacks, Israel declared that they would be regarded as ceasefire violations, and stated on several occasions that it held the Syrian army responsible for the compliance of PLO forces in its area of control. This prompted the Syrian command to ban further guerrilla activity from the Biqaʿ Valley on 17 July.[74] For obscure reasons it took the local command four days to inform central operations room in Beirut, but Arafat immediately radioed back in coded defiance: 'the wolves' forays must continue'.[75]

However, the PLO was equally intent on improving its defences in Beirut. The central operations room trained hundreds of volunteers, and formed a new artillery battalion officered by veterans from the south and equipped with guns taken out of storage. It brought all artillery batteries into two, integrated sectors; the central operations room could override the sector commands when necessary, and direct every one of the 150–200 gun sites through a common communications net. In the meantime, guerrilla patrols made repeated journeys through Israeli and Maronite lines to carry in RPG-7 anti-tank launchers and other needed weapons, while Fateh's tiny naval unit brought in munitions by boat from Tripoli. The most rewarding source of combat supplies proved to be local arms traders and Lebanese Forces militiamen: PLO agents bribed Maronite guards (and Israeli soldiers) at the checkpoints on the 'green line' to allow carloads of banned food, fuel, and medicine—and the occasional weapons—into west Beirut.

Of equal importance was the effort to maintain public morale and welfare in west Beirut. The IDF eased its blockade on only two occasions to allow the entry of international relief shipments, but smuggling assured the city of fresh meat and vegetables on most days. The IDF also restored a limited supply of water and electricity on 20 July after coming under US pressure, but switched

it off again five days later. PLO and Lebanese government agencies countered by ensuring that local hospitals and communications centres received regular supplies of fuel; their teams also drilled new artesian wells, and toured residential neighbourhoods with mobile generators to pump up water for household use. Arafat meanwhile made a point of visiting hospitals and orphanages, and often broke the Ramadan fast with families of Palestinian and Lebanese refugees. He also made frequent, highly publicized visits to combat units, and local newspapers daily published photographs of him filling sandbags or observing the enemy from forward positions. PLO media reinforced the impact by running a 24-hour radio programme and producing a new daily newspaper and several weekly magazines.

The Battle of Beirut Resumed

Sharon was well aware that the PLO was busily reinforcing its position, and urged the Israeli cabinet to authorize a final, full-scale assault on Beirut. Without waiting for its response, he instructed the IDF general staff to prepare combat plans.[76] Looking beyond the expected defeat of the PLO, Sharon defined a central task as '[t]he destruction of the refugee camps in Lebanon and the mass deportation of the 200,000 Palestinians from that country', according to a critical Israeli history of the war.[77] Cabinet permission was delayed in the event, but the IDF moved two more brigades and 130 tanks to Beirut on 13 July and maintained the pressure with mock bombing raids; a car bomb in the city left 32 casualties on the same day, and Israeli troops instigated daily firefights from 18 July.

Although the cabinet remained divided on the question of a major ground assault, Sharon persuaded it to allow the air force to 'bomb for a week . . . the southern part [of Beirut] must be destroyed, razed to the ground'.[78] Citing alleged PLO and Syrian ceasefire violations, the IDF launched the blitz the next day with intense air raids and artillery strikes that left 182 casualties in Beirut and various towns in the Biqaʿ Valley. It lost a combat aircraft during an attack and destroyed three Syrian SAM-8 vehicles in the valley on 24 July, triggering day-long tank and artillery duels with the Syrians. The bombing now focused exclusively on the Beirut area, and on 27 July the heart of the city was targeted systematically for the first time, leaving 120 dead and 232 wounded. The toll rose by 203 dead and 297 wounded the next day, again mainly civilians. US envoy Habib won a 24-hour respite, but the barrage resumed on 29 July, only hours after the UN Security Council had approved a French–Egyptian peace proposal linking the siege of Beirut to resolution of the Palestine problem. For once the US did not veto the resolution, but Sharon disregarded the ceasefire arranged by Habib in the evening of 30 July and ordered the bombardment to resume a few hours later. The League of Arab State's council of foreign ministers had also convened that day, but adjourned without taking firm decisions,

having declined an Algerian suggestion to recall the Arab ambassadors from Washington.[79] Beirut was effectively being left to suffer another bout of intense violence. Despairing of Arab succour, a Fateh editorial on 31 July signalled the PLO intention to accept terms for withdrawal by arguing that 'we should avoid an Andalusian tragedy that threatens the [Arab] nation'.

The IDF general staff had demanded ten days of 'preparation' before it would countenance an assault on Beirut, and by dawn on 1 August it was ready. This was ironic, as the PLO had agreed a working paper based on the proposals of Habib, including a timetable for withdrawal from Beirut, by the end of July. The Arab foreign ministers had moreover met in Jeddah on 29 July to debate the ways and means of accommodating the PLO evacuees. Indeed, the fact that the US and PLO were close to agreement may have prompted Sharon to order a sudden thrust towards Uzaʿi in the early morning of 29 July, but its failure presumably convinced the IDF general staff not to bring the planned offensive forward. When the offensive finally came, it was preceded by an intense pre-dawn artillery barrage, and by 5 p.m. the IDF was at last in control of the entire airport area and part of Uzaʿi. The PLO reported 30 dead and 50 wounded, while the Lebanese police announced total casualties of 238 dead and 480 wounded in the city.

A tense calm followed, while the IDF prepared a new pincer attack. The artillery barrage resumed at 11 p.m. on 3 August, and five hours later the equivalent of three brigades rolled forward on four main axes. The defence gave way in Uzaʿi shortly after 5 a.m., but Wazir rushed to nearby Janah to rally the troops, running from one building to another under the rain of shells. He was soon on the other side of Beirut, joining PLA soldiers deployed in the grounds of the city's famous racetrack. Here, as in the downtown port area, the PLA made full use of the dense urban terrain to shrug off Israeli bombardment (its losses for the entire war were only 28 dead and 59 wounded) and repel repeated armoured attacks throughout the day. The IDF made greater gains in the open terrain around the airport, but was eventually stopped at the first line of buildings running through Janah, Bir Hasan, Ghazar, and Burj al-Barajna. It announced losses of 19 dead and 64 wounded, while on the other side the toll stood at 300 dead and 670 wounded, of whom less than a tenth were military personnel.

There was to be no further ground movement, although Sharon ordered further attacks in the Janah and museum sectors between 6 and 12 August. The air and artillery bombardment now reached unprecedented intensity, as the IDF sought to destroy PLO anti-aircraft and artillery weapons. These were forced into silence, but the use of decoys and the tactic of sudden, simultaneous fire by all available weapons confused the pilots and kept losses down.[80] (Artillery deputy-commander Wasif ʿUrayqat later claimed that his sector had lost only one gun during the siege, and that overall losses came to a mere 2 per cent of total strength.[81] Fateh's two artillery battalions in the Biqaʿ Valley similarly lost a single gun between them in combat, while the PFLP lost only three BM-

21s and four 107mm multiple rocket launchers during the entire war.[82] Most anti-aircraft crews and weapons in Beirut also survived, including three of four ZSU-23-4 vehicles.) The IDF also redoubled its efforts to kill PLO leaders, employing agents inside the city to direct air strikes on specific locations.[83] The central operations room was hit a few hours after its staff had vacated it on 5 August, while a second strike the next day demolished a residential building that had been briefly used by the PLO command at the beginning of the war, killing over 200 Palestinian refugees. A car bomb left nearby exploded as Arafat arrived on the scene, but missed him. Captured SLA agents later admitted planting three other bombs that inflicted scores of casualties among Lebanese refugees in the Wadi Abu-Jamil area, on Israeli orders.

The added tragedy of the slaughter was that PLO and Lebanese government negotiators had already drafted an evacuation agreement on 3 August, which received US approval the next day. Reagan reacted with unusual vigour to the Israeli offensive of 4 August, pressing Israel to relinquish its gains of the day and observe a ceasefire for the next two weeks. Yet the IDF continued its onslaught even after all technical details relating to the PLO evacuation and the arrival of multinational peacekeepers had been agreed, and inflicted an additional 256 casualties in Beirut between 9 and 11 August. The Israeli cabinet finally approved the evacuation agreement in the morning of 12 August, but the city was struck by 220 air sorties and tens of thousands of shells until 5 p.m., by which time some 300 people had died.[84] Sharon still preferred a full-scale assault on Beirut and, in the laconic words of Habib, would have aborted the evacuation had he been able in order to 'get the PLO fighting men'.[85] Sharon was to be disappointed. Officers of the multinational force arrived in Beirut to prepare for the PLO evacuation and Israeli withdrawal. The IDF continued to inch forward at Janah, sent armoured units through the Maronite heartland towards north Lebanon, and organized a further five car bombs on 18–20 August, but the ceasefire held.

From Evacuation to Massacre

Israeli behaviour augured ill, but the PLO evacuation proceeded without a hitch. Two peacekeeping battalions, one French and one American, arrived in time to secure the Beirut port for the departure of 400 Palestinian guerrillas to Cyprus on 21 August. Tens of thousands of residents lined the roads and crowded into the port to bid an emotional farewell as a total of 14,398 PLO personnel and PLA and Syrian soldiers left the city by sea or overland over the next 11 days. The various contingents went to the eight Arab states that had offered to host them: Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, and the two Yemens. Suspicious of Syrian intentions, the Fateh central committee decided not to concentrate its rank-and-file in Syria; Wazir sailed to Lattakia, followed by Sayil on the last ship on 1 September, but Arafat delivered a deliberate snub

by sailing to Athens rather any Arab capital.[86] The PLO had donated many heavy weapons to the LNM, and on 3 September its official representative in Beirut, Shafiq al-Hut, handed remaining weapons stores over to the Lebanese army.

While the evacuation proceeded, on 23 August, the Lebanese parliament elected Lebanese Forces commander Bashir Jmayyil to replace Sarkis as president of the republic. Sharon's grand design to reshape Lebanon seemed to be succeeding. Yet Reagan suddenly posed an unexpected challenge to Israeli policy by announcing a new proposal to solve the Palestine conflict on 2 September. The Reagan plan, as it came to be known, drew on the Egyptian–Israeli autonomy talks and the 'Jordanian option' favoured by the Israeli Labour Party to suggest Palestinian self-rule in part of the West Bank and Gaza, leading to an entity that would be linked to Jordan. Independence was explicitly excluded, leading to the suspicion that the real US purpose was to pre-empt a proposal for Palestinian statehood being prepared by France for submission to the UN. Wazir, Qaddumi, and Khalid al-Hasan criticized Reagan's rejection of PLO participation in the peace process and Palestinian statehood, but nonetheless described his plan cautiously as containing 'some positive elements'. The Israeli cabinet, conversely, immediately expressed its condemnation of the US proposal, as did most of the Palestinian opposition.[87]

Apparently in response to the Reagan plan, Israel now refused to withdraw from Beirut. As a new precondition, Eitan demanded the evacuation of the Nasirite Murabitun militia, which was composed predominantly of local Lebanese nationals. The IDF also rejected a request to return the airport to Lebanese government control, and threatened to enter the capital unless LNM militiamen withdrew from Janah.[88] Its troops occupied Bir Hasan on 3 September, only returning to their original positions four days later under US pressure. Israeli aircraft had already been in action again, shooting down a Syrian MiG-25 on 31 August, and then destroyed four SAM-9 vehicles in the Biqaʿ Valley between 9 and 12 September and left 40 civilian casualties in strikes against seven Lebanese villages and towns the day after. President-elect Jmayyil also provoked Israeli ire by informing a special envoy on 23 August that he would not openly ally Lebanon with Israel.[89] He reiterated his stand during a meeting with Begin and Sharon in Haifa a week later, and resisted pressure to reinstate SLA commander Saʿd Haddad in the Lebanese army without at least going through the motions of a military trial for dealing with the Israeli 'enemy'.

Despite these various tensions, the US suddenly withdrew its peacekeeping contingent from Beirut on 10 September, offering no prior notice or explanation to its Italian, British, and French partners, who reluctantly followed suit by 14 September. On that day, a massive bomb demolished the phalangist headquarters in east Beirut, killing Jmayyil and leaving another 85 party members dead or wounded. A member of the pro-Syrian Syrian Social Nationalist Party was arrested and charged with the assassination, but the phalangist and Leba-

nese Forces commands refrained from issuing public accusations against Syria. Parliament hurriedly convened, and elected Amin Jmayyil to replace his younger brother as president. Declaring that it wished to protect Palestinian civilians from vengeful Maronite gunmen, the IDF entered Beirut at daybreak on 15 September. Later in the day official spokesmen altered the official justification for the Israeli action, which they now explained was intended to flush out '2,000 terrorists' who had remained in Beirut after the PLO evacuation. Some LNM militiamen fought back, but the IDF was in complete control within 48 hours, having lost three dead and 88 wounded and killed over 48 Lebanese. The Lebanese army had already taken control of the Burj al-Barajna refugee camp on 9 September, where it arrested 230 inhabitants, but this left the Sabra and Shatila camps, which the IDF now surrounded on all sides.

The Israeli occupation of west Beirut was to be brief, but it came to an end because of one final act of major violence. On 15 and 16 September, Eitan and Amir Drori, commander of the IDF northern front, met Lebanese Forces intelligence chief Elie Hubayqa and other Maronite officers and agreed that the militia would enter Sabra and Shatila to kill or capture remaining PLO personnel. The IDF transported several hundred militiamen to Shatila in the morning of 16 September, and provided wireless communications, ammunition, food rations, and night-time illumination for the next 48 hours while the Lebanese Forces conducted a systematic slaughter of every living thing, human or animal, they met. Much of the killing took place on the main road of Shatila, in plain view of Israeli posts on the ridge above. Israeli roadblocks in Sabra turned back terrified refugees trying to flee, and hundreds of prisoners were herded into the nearby sports stadium, where, in the presence of Israeli officers, Maronite gunmen led young men away for execution.[90]

Sharon, Eitan, Drori, and military intelligence chief Yehoshua Saguy all knew what was happening by the evening of 17 September, according to their own subsequent testimony, but the massacre was allowed to continue for twelve more hours. Another 200–300 militiamen had already been allowed into Shatila by then, and the IDF also provided bulldozers which the Lebanese Forces hurriedly used to dig mass graves. The militia was finally ordered out at 8 a.m. on 18 September, by which time at least 700 refugees had died by Israeli estimate. The Lebanese military prosecutor later stated that 328 bodies had been recovered and that 991 persons were missing, but the ICRC reported 1,500 dead and an independent international commission subsequently asserted that the final count was 2,750.[91]

In Tel Aviv, 350,000 to 400,000 demonstrators demanded a formal inquiry, which a reluctant Begin finally set up ten days after the massacre. The commission headed by chief justice Yitzhaq Kahan subsequently disclaimed direct Israeli responsibility, but acknowledged indirect responsibility. It criticized Eitan severely, faulted Begin and Shamir for remaining inactive towards events in Beirut, and recommended the reassignment of Drori, Saguy, and brigade commander Amos Yaron. The commission reserved its most damning

conclusions for Sharon: it deemed him to bear personal responsibility and bluntly advised his resignation or dismissal from the cabinet, although this advice was stubbornly ignored.[92] The multinational peacekeeping force hurriedly returned to Beirut, but the IDF delayed its withdrawal until 27 September. During this time it continued to search for PLO and LNM personnel, occupied the Soviet and several other embassies, confiscated the contents of PLO offices (including the Research Centre's academic library), and seized files from some local banks. The IDF meanwhile lost six dead and 42 wounded in hit-and-run attacks. On 29 September it pulled out of east Beirut and the airport to positions just beyond the municipal boundaries of the capital and southern suburbs, where it was to remain for the next year.

Taking Stock

The conflict in Lebanon was by no means over, but the summer war between Israel and the PLO was. Lebanese police statistics showed a total of 17,825 dead and 30,203 wounded, although the death toll may have been inflated by unverifiable estimates of casualties in south Lebanon during the first week of the invasion.[93] The PRCS dealt with 5,675 deaths and 29,506 injuries in Beirut alone up to 15 August; 83.8 per cent of the total were civilians.[94] Private hospitals in the capital received an additional number of casualties, the three largest receiving 515 dead and 2,200 wounded by 9 July, for example. The Syrian army did not publish its losses, but these were estimated at 1,200 dead and 3,000 wounded, 300 tanks, 140 armoured personnel carriers, 80 artillery weapons, and 76 combat aircraft and six helicopters.[95] The PLO stated that 560 of its full-time personnel had been killed, and roughly an equal number of Palestinian and Lebanese militiamen may also have died. Grievous as these losses were, they were well below Eitan's claim that the IDF had killed 2,000 PLO members in the first fortnight of the war, and from Drori's later claim of a total of 3,000 PLO dead.[96] The IDF, in contrast, announced the loss of 368 dead and 2,383 wounded on all fronts, besides some 50 soldiers killed in combat accidents.[97]

The material costs of the war were also staggering. Israeli relief workers estimated that Tyre had suffered structural damage to the value of $75 million, and listed 310 destroyed dwellings and 1,550 damaged ones.[98] Israeli radio cited an official survey that estimated damages and destruction to 7,500 houses in Sidon at $100 million.[99] These were tentative estimates, and no comparable estimates were compiled for Beirut. UNRWA gave more precise statistics for damage in the refugee camps: from 16–20 per cent of housing in al-Bass to 100 per cent in ʿAyn al-Hilwa, while the local 'popular committee' in Shatila reported that 20 per cent of all houses had been completely destroyed and 70 per cent suffered damage.[100] Israeli officials claimed the capture of PLO combat supplies worth $1 billion, including 243 combat vehicles and 300 guns and

rocket launchers. Much of this weaponry was in fact Syrian, and more sober estimates of PLO hardware referred instead to 38 T-34 tanks and light weapons sufficient to equip five infantry brigades.[101] Syrian losses included 84 combat aircraft and helicopters, 21 SAM-6 and SAM-8 vehicles, and from 400 to 800 armoured vehicles. The IDF admitted the loss of four aircraft and helicopters, while US government sources estimated its armour losses at 150 tanks and 175 personnel carriers.[102] In all, Israel incurred $2 billion in direct costs and $1.5 billion in indirect costs, according to economics minister Gad Yaʿcovi.[103]

If not the human and material costs, then the staggering blow to the Palestinian state-in-exile should have prompted the PLO to conduct a thorough reappraisal of its political, organizational, and military performance in previous years. Its stand in Beirut had galvanized broad popular support among Palestinians everywhere, and circumstances appeared favourable to apply the principle of internal accountability, conduct organizational reforms, and achieve national unity. This, at least, was the expectation of many in the rank-and-file, who demanded an explanation for the precipitate withdrawal and investigation of commanders accused of abandoning their units. Sayil and several other members of the higher military council who sailed with him on the last ship from Beirut shared this outlook, and agreed to start with a detailed reconstruction of events in every combat unit during the war. They devised a questionnaire, but the assassination of Sayil in the Biqaʿ Valley on 27 September apparently put an end to this inquiry.[104]

Arafat later came under renewed pressure within Fateh to order a full investigation into the conduct of the war in Lebanon, and eventually formed a committee of inquiry headed by the director of the revolutionary justice department, Mahmud al-Rusan, and military intelligence chief ʿAtallah ʿAtallah. It interviewed over 100 officers, including Qastal Forces commander Jabr and Karama Forces commander Ghazi ʿAtallah, but concluded its work without producing a final report. Arafat subsequently placed the records under strict embargo, and Fateh conducted no other analysis of the war. Virtually the only self-critical comment came a year later in an anonymous article in *Filastin al-Muhtalla* (*Occupied Palestine*), which admitted that Palestinian performance had displayed 'clear flaws' but insisted, even then, that 'these were all beyond the control of the leadership'.[105]

Some of the other guerrilla groups conducted internal inquiries—the DFLP took disciplinary action against its chief-of-staff, for instance—but did not seriously question pre-war military strategy and organization. Their criticism was largely directed against the failure to predict the full scale of the invasion or against specific operational shortcomings. The PFLP admitted that it had belittled the possibility of a large-scale war against the PLO, for example, and that it had disregarded the prospect of a major Israeli offensive 'even when Zionist aircraft started to raid the city of Beirut and other Joint Forces positions in the south in the morning of 4 June'.[106] In all cases, it went on, 'we did not expect the

enemy to besiege Beirut'.[107] The PFLP also bemoaned the lack of military unity and of a united plan, and revealed that it had expected the IDF to clear each sector systematically before advancing further, which it patently avoided doing. Another faulty assumption was that the Lebanese army, not Israel, would be the 'principal instrument' of the offensive against the PLO.[108]

DFLP military commander Nawfal similarly admitted that the DFLP had not seriously expected the IDF to reach Beirut, although its formal report on the war was not so explicit.[109] It devoted even less attention than the PFLP in its official publications to reassess its basic assumptions about military strategy and organization, but was openly critical of 'the gap between predictions and measures' that had appeared during the war.[110] Nawfal again offered the most specific comments, although he too focused much of his public criticism on operational matters. In his view, for example, the failure to prepare for contingencies was the consequence of 'the atrocious flaw in assessing the situation by the commanders concerned in the [south], their lack of cohesion, and their lack of interaction with the fighting base'.[111] Central committee member Suhayl Natur added more generally that the PLO and its Lebanese allies had entered the war 'without the appropriate level of unification of military forces and capabilities'.[112]

If the limited Palestinian criticism aired in private or public was remarkable for anything, it was the lack of serious disputes or recriminations between the guerrilla groups over responsibility for the general outcome of the war. The consensus was strongest concerning the decision to leave Beirut. This was a potentially explosive topic, but even the PFLP expressed its conviction that 'the leadership of the Palestinian revolution led the process of military confrontation with courage and heroism, [and] also conducted the process of negotiation with proficiency. The tactics it followed in this process were generally correct'.[113] The evacuation represented 'the best terms possible in light of the given political, military, local masses, and Arab and international realities'.[114]

The PFLP was blunt about the strategic consequences of the war, however. It acknowledged that the PLO and 'its principal active and public presence in the Lebanese arena' had been dealt a major blow. The PLO might have achieved a political and moral victory in view of the vast military superiority of Israel, and its various foes might find it 'extremely difficult to eliminate the revolution completely', but the Palestinians faced daunting new challenges. Not least was to conduct armed struggle in the occupied territories, preserve the guerrilla forces still deployed in east and north Lebanon, and ease the dislocation suffered by hundreds of thousands of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. The PFLP also noted the damage done to the LNM, morale of the Syrian army, cohesion of the Arab steadfastness front, and reputation of the USSR and Soviet-supplied weaponry.[115] The DFLP echoed much the same strategic outlook, but stressed certain positive results. Not only had Israel suffered serious cracks in its national consensus while its army was at war, for

the first time in its history, but it had also failed to destroy the PLO or its armed forces. Indeed the war had 'forcefully reaffirmed the PLO, more than ever, as an important and basic party without which there can be no solution to the Middle East conflict'.[116]

Arafat and Fateh might not have disagreed with the overall assessment offered by the PFLP and the DFLP, but there was a clear divergence over the implications for future direction. The PFLP now regarded the biggest threat facing the PLO as the attempt by the 'reactionary Arab regimes to contain the Palestinian revolution and tame it politically, and to drag it step by step into the swamp of the liquidationist political settlement in accordance with the plans and objectives of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance'.[117] The DFLP adopted a more cautious, middle-of-the-road position, warning against the 'nihilism' and 'revolutionary rhetoric' of the rejectionists and insisting on the importance of preserving the gains 'of 18 years of armed struggle . . . and of the pains of 34 years of dispersal'.[118] The mainstream PLO leadership, for its part, saw an opportunity to relaunch its diplomatic strategy, a choice that was soon to polarize Palestinian politics as never before.

This page intentionally left blank

PART IV

Squaring the Circle: Statehood into Autonomy, 1983–1993

Unlike previous Arab–Israeli wars, the strategic impact of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in summer 1982 did not extend appreciably beyond the principal protagonists. Yet its effect was immense on the PLO, which lost the territorial base of its state-in-exile, its headquarters, and the bulk of its military infrastructure. The blow to the neopatrimonial system of political control managed by Arafat and to the interests and influence of the bureaucratized elite provided the opportunity for Syrian-backed factions to lead a major split within Fateh and then to expel forces loyal to the PLO chairman from Lebanon by the end of 1983. As importantly, the loss of its territorial base removed a main pillar of the mainstream PLO leadership's diplomatic strategy. It sought to compensate by forming a diplomatic alliance with Jordan and effecting a limited reconciliation with Egypt, but the problem lay in the loss of its other pillars, above all of Arab and Soviet support.

In the first case, the gruelling Iran–Iraq war distracted Arab attention from the Palestine conflict and consumed substantial financial resources. The Gulf sheikhdoms provided Iraq with at least half its foreign credit (in loans and grants) during the conflict, and were further drained by the decline of oil revenues in real terms starting in the early 1980s. This reduced the official assistance reaching the PLO, and restricted employment opportunities for expatriate Palestinian labour (especially from the occupied territories). The Iran–Iraq war and the Iraqi–Syrian feud so divided Arab ranks that a full summit conference could not be held until five years after the Fez meeting in September 1982.[1] The same topics wholly dominated the agenda when the summit finally reconvened in Amman in November 1987, with the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Palestinians receiving only token mention, much to the chagrin of both Syria and the PLO. The latter derived modest satisfaction from the formal return of Egypt to the Arab fold at the summit, but when the Gulf conflict ended in August 1988 the feud between Iraq and Syria was resumed with undiminished intensity.

As significant for the PLO was the shift in Soviet foreign policy during the decade. Soviet displeasure with the orientation of its diplomatic strategy towards the US (through Jordanian and Egyptian offices) was reflected in the sharp downgrading of contacts during the brief tenures of Uri Andropov and

Konstantin Chernenko, who succeeded each other following Brezhnev's death in November 1982. The succession of Mikhail Gorbachev in March 1985 eased relations with the PLO, but a full thaw was delayed until April 1987, when Arafat effected a reconciliation with the principal Palestinian opposition groups. By then, however, application of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' was fundamentally altering the Soviet stance towards the Arab–Israeli conflict and US peace initiatives. Global developments meanwhile minimized the influence of Western Europe and the Third World, such as it had ever been, in support of Palestinian rights. The international polarization caused by the Cold War in the early 1980s constrained European inclination to diverge from US Middle East policy, while the decline of US–Soviet competition for Third World support in the second half of the decade tended to marginalize the developing countries, which were primarily concerned to overcome the debt crisis and obtain new Western credit.

Compounding the diplomatic drift of the PLO, ironically, was the loss of US interest in the Middle East peace process. The publication of the Reagan plan in September 1982 offered momentary hope of progress in addressing Palestinian concerns, but it proved to be largely motivated by the desire to pre-empt a more far-reaching French initiative and was not pursued with any vigour by the new secretary of state, George Shultz. Shultz was more interested in achieving a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel, and his efforts were crowned with the Troop Withdrawal Agreement signed on 17 May 1983. His utter disregard for Syrian interests and influence proved disastrous, however. The USSR had fully replaced Syrian equipment losses since June 1982 and, indeed, had upgraded Syrian capability with SS-21 tactical ballistic missiles, long-range SA-5 anti-aircraft missiles, and modern T-72 tanks and the loan of an estimated 5,000 Soviet operators and instructors. In September 1983 Syrian-backed Lebanese opposition militias mounted a successful offensive against their Maronite rivals and army units loyal to president Amin Jmayyil in the mountains overlooking Beirut. On 23 October Hizbullah suicide bombers killed 230 US marines and 58 French paratroopers in Beirut, and four US aircraft were shot down during raids on Syrian positions on 4 and 5 December. The disintegration of the Lebanese army finally gave the opposition control of west Beirut in February 1984: the multinational force withdrew, and the new 'unity' government immediately abrogated the agreement with Israel. Taking this as a personal affront, Shultz petulantly distanced himself from the Middle East peace process for the rest of his six-year tenure.

PLO diplomacy still strove to attain two objectives: to place Palestinian statehood on the political agenda, and to ensure its own participation in negotiations dealing with Palestinian rights. Bereft of other means of persuasion, it sought to circumvent US opposition by formally aligning its diplomacy with that of Jordan starting in 1983. Jordan, for its part, was alarmed by the renewal in 1982 of statements from Israeli government officials that 'Jordan is Palestine'; in August 1984 cabinet minister Ariel Sharon argued that the east bank of the

Jordan river belonged to Israel and would one day be settled by Jews.[2] Reactivating the peace process after 1982 and engaging the US was necessary to preempt these threats, but there could be no viable Jordanian diplomatic option without the PLO. Besides, in its weakened state the PLO would be more amenable to a central Jordanian role. Yet the hawkish stance of the Israeli government was itself under pressure. The human and material costs to Israel of the invasion of Lebanon and the continuing occupation of much of the country told, with some 600 military dead by the end of 1984 and annual inflation of nearly 450 per cent. Begin resigned in September 1983, and his successor Yitzhaq Shamir was compelled to cede the premiership to Labour Party leader Shimon Peres for a two-year period following the election of a hung parliament in July 1984, which led to the formation of a coalition government.

The alliance between the PLO and Jordan was cemented in February 1985 with the conclusion of an accord on joint diplomatic strategy that was designed to meet US terms for Palestinian participation in the peace process. This divided the mainstream PLO leadership from the principal opposition groups more deeply than ever, and alienated the USSR even further. It also prompted a Syrian-backed offensive by the Shiʿite Muslim Amal militia against the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and south Lebanon, where Fateh had been steadily rebuilding its military presence. This moreover took place amidst an escalation of terrorist attacks and Israeli reprisal raids in late 1985. The violence was insufficient to deflect PLO diplomacy, but the unwillingness of its leadership to accept UNSCR 242 unequivocally and to relinquish a direct role in negotiations led to the collapse of the agreement with Jordan in February 1986. King Husayn mended relations with Syria, apologizing publicly for past Jordanian support for the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood, and went further by closing PLO offices in the kingdom and establishing a functional 'condominium' with Israel in the occupied territories. The PLO was completely adrift, its presence almost entirely overlooked at the Amman summit conference in November 1987.

It was at this point that the mass uprising erupted in the occupied territories, catapulting the PLO, which hurried to assert its control over the political direction of the intifada, back into the international limelight. The revolt spread quickly throughout the West Bank and Gaza, and defeated a half-hearted peace mission by Shultz in early 1988, that again ignored the PLO. Faced with the parallel collapse of Jordanian influence, king Husayn took the equally dramatic step of severing the kingdom's 40-year-old administrative ties with the West Bank on 31 July. The challenge was daunting, but Arafat seized the political initiative: at a session in mid-November, the PNC implicitly accepted UNSCR 242 and 338 and Israel's right to exist—in the guise of accepting all UN resolutions relating to the Palestine conflict and of endorsing the UN partition plan of 1947 (UNGAR 181), that had called for the establishment of both an Arab and a Jewish state in Palestine—and renounced all forms of terrorism (while

asserting the legitimacy of armed struggle). This was not enough to elicit US recognition, but a few weeks later Shultz approved the start of an official dialogue after Arafat had unequivocally met US terms. The PLO, too, seemed at last to have obtained the opening it had long sought.

Palestinian hope was misplaced, however. General elections in Israel had resulted in another hung parliament and a coalition government headed by the hawkish Shamir in November. The new US secretary of state James Baker strove to relaunch the peace process in early 1989, but, faced with Shamir's insistence on excluding the PLO and limiting initial negotiations to the selection of alternative Palestinian interlocutors from the West Bank and Gaza, his subsequent diplomacy focused on Israeli proposals presented in April and May. The US–PLO dialogue marked time, and even the USSR, which advocated an international peace conference and a comprehensive settlement, urged flexibility towards US bridging proposals. The intifada was losing its mass *élan* by now, and Islamists were challenging the leadership of the more secular nationalists of the PLO. As serious was the lack of effective Arab support, both diplomatic and material, despite repeated pledges of financial assistance from June 1988 onwards.

The Arab states were riven by political disputes and drained economically. Food riots broke out in 1984–9 in Tunisia, Egypt, Sudan, Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco in response to stabilization and structural adjustment programmes, while other countries, such as Syria and even Iraq, conducted more controlled privatization and economic liberalization. Civil war dragged on in southern Sudan and started in Somalia, the Iraqi army waged a brutal military campaign and a forcible relocation programme against the Kurds in 1988–9, and in 1989 the Syrian-Iraqi feud was played out with considerable violence in Lebanon. Economic pressures and the Soviet global retreat prompted political retrenchment at home and restructuring of regional relations. The Gulf sheikhdoms had already formed the Gulf Cooperation Council in February 1981 as a protective device against their powerful Iraqi and Iranian neighbours, and had since steadily reduced their financial commitment to oil-poor Arab states. Precisely eight years later, the five North African countries formed the Arab Maghrib Union—to cushion themselves against the impact on trade, aid, and immigration of the inauguration of the European Union in 1992—while Egypt, North Yemen, Jordan, and Iraq formed the Arab Cooperation Council. Much was made of the strategic might and economic potential of the latter grouping, but like the others, its formation revealed uncertainty about the implications of external changes and the sense of siege internally.

Most threatened was oil-rich Iraq. The war with Iran had left it with an estimated $200 billion in material and economic losses and up to $90 billion in external debts, besides a massive reconstruction bill and the potentially explosive problem of unemployment among demobilized personnel of the million-strong army. The inactivity of the international community towards a major war in the world's most important oil-producing region, coupled with its toler-

ance of the brutal campaign against the Kurds in 1988, suggested to Iraq that it would be free to act against its oil-rich southern neighbours in order to ease its financial crisis. Speaking on 24 February 1990, president Saddam Husyan warned against submission to the dictates of the sole remaining superpower, the US, and called for decisive action to pre-empt its hegemony. The discovery of Iraqi efforts to acquire non-conventional weapons led to the exchange of bellicose threats with Israel and the US in the next two months, and in May Husayn prepared the stage for major escalation by accusing Kuwait and the UAE of exceeding their oil production quotas and depressing oil prices, which constituted a 'kind of war against Iraq'. He now demanded that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia forgive war loans worth $30–40 billion, the return to Iraqi control of the Rumayla oil field and payment of $2.4 billion by Kuwait in compensation for extracted oil, and Kuwaiti cession of islands controlling Iraqi access to the Gulf at Um Qasr. Even as Arab mediators sought to defuse the crisis, the Iraqi army occupied Kuwait on 2 August.

Contrary to Iraqi expectation, the international community reacted forcefully to the occupation of Kuwait. A US-led coalition massed some 500,000 troops in Saudi Arabia, and expelled the Iraqi army from the emirate after a six-week air campaign and a four-day ground offensive that ended on 28 February 1991. The League of Arab States had been unable from the very outset to achieve a diplomatic solution to the crisis, and was now paralysed by the bitter divisions among its members. The PLO paid especially heavily for its alignment with Iraq. Barely a week after the war, Baker launched a new peace initiative with joint US–Soviet sponsorship that envisaged two negotiating tracks: one consisted of separate bilateral talks between Israel, on the one hand, and Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation on the other; the other comprised multilateral talks involving the same parties along with other Arab and non-Arab Middle Eastern states and extra-regional parties, to deal with matters of general concern. The PLO was to be denied a direct role in the talks, which were intended to lead to a five-year period of Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories, following which further negotiations would decide the final status of the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem.

Shorn of options, the PLO reluctantly accepted these terms, but worked over the next two years to obstruct substantive progress by the delegation of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza that it had chosen. This strategy worked, insofar as the government of Yitzhaq Rabin, who came to power in June 1992, finally reversed policy and concluded an agreement with the PLO in September 1993. In it the PLO accepted a formula for Palestinian autonomy that was not far akin from the proposals made in the context of the autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel in 1979–82. The phase in Palestinian history that had started in 1948 ended with the exchange of mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO in 1993, but the terms and nature of Palestinian statehood, if it was ultimately to be attained, were yet to be determined.

This page intentionally left blank

23

Assaulting the State-in-Exile from Within

Opportunity or Threat?

In the immediate wake of its departure from Beirut, the mainstream PLO leadership was less concerned to reassess past performance than to obtain what it saw as the political dues it had earned by dint of sheer survival. This expectation was not unreasonable. The Arab heads of states, who were assembling to convene a summit conference in the Moroccan city of Fez on 6 September, gave Arafat an unprecedented welcome by meeting him at the airport. The publication of the Reagan plan five days earlier indicated that the US administration had come to the conclusion that lasting stability in the region required resolution of the Palestinian problem, and the PLO and Arab states hoped to seize the opportunity. Arafat had already reflected this aim by adopting a relatively positive, if guarded, attitude to the plan in public, saying that 'we do not reject the US proposals, nor do we criticize them. We are studying them'.[1] The PLO executive committee echoed him in a statement issued at the end of its first meeting since the evacuation, on 5 September, in which it avoided open criticism of the Reagan plan and promised to 'continue to study it'.[2]

The cautious PLO response to the Reagan plan equally reflected recognition of the greatly reduced state of its bargaining power. A common view was that 'Lebanon was a hostage in our hands that allowed us to negotiate, but now we have lost that card'.[3] The PLO therefore muted its objections to the Reagan plan, and instead worked to secure Arab support for a counter-proposal that encapsulated its principal diplomatic objectives and signalled the terms it was willing to accept in return. The eight-point Fez Declaration on the Principles of Settlement in the Middle East made a gesture to the US position by advocating that the West Bank and Gaza be placed under UN supervision for an interim period of 'several months', following which an independent Palestinian state was to be established, with (east) Jerusalem as its capital.[4] This was predictable, but the key passage came in Article Seven, which stated that 'the UN Security Council shall establish guarantees of peace between all the states in the region, including the independent Palestinian state'. Arafat explained that this formulation made peace contingent on the establishment of a Palestinian state, but the implicit exchange was PLO willingness to recognize Israel and negotiate on the basis of UNSCR 242.[5]

Arab support for the declaration was not unanimous, however. Libyan leader Qadhdhafi, who had boycotted the conference altogether, denounced it unequivocally. Syrian president Asad was unwilling to appear obstructionist and voted in favour, albeit with a deep reluctance that was to become worryingly apparent in following weeks. His objection was not to the implied readiness to recognize Israel—Syria formally offered recognition in return for withdrawal from all territories occupied in 1967 and Palestinian statehood—but to the surrender of an important diplomatic card ahead of negotiations.[6] Arafat's effort to keep the option of a dialogue with the US open aroused particular suspicion, and prompted Syrian information minister Ahmad Iskandar to note acidly that his government dealt with the PLO, not its chairman.[7] As if to prove this point, Asad invited several opposition leaders who had attended the conference as members of the PLO delegation to return to Damascus in his aircraft. Among them was Fateh central committee member Salih, who signed a joint statement with PFLP and PF–GC delegates Ahmad al-Yamani and Talal Naji bitterly condemning Article Seven.[8] They were soon echoed by the PPSF and Saʿiqa, although Arafat was still able to obtain endorsement of the Fez declaration from the PLO central council.[9]

An added bone of contention was the revival of the PLO dialogue with Jordan and references to an eventual Jordanian–Palestinian confederation, which Syria quickly described as a 'clear violation of Arab summit decisions', implying the 1974 recognition of the PLO as sole legitimate Palestinian representative.[10] King Husayn had dispatched his chief of court, Ahmad al-Lawzi, and foreign minister Marwan al-Qasim to meet Arafat in Athens immediately following his arrival from Beirut, to offer renewed diplomatic coordination. The king supported the Reagan plan on 14 September, and stated a few days later that the dialogue with the PLO should resume 'with the aim of formulating a confederal union between the Palestinian and Jordanian entities'.[11] He also anticipated the formation of a joint Palestinian–Jordanian delegation to eventual peace talks.[12] These proposals were intended to circumvent Israeli and US objections to the direct involvement of the PLO and to the return to Arab control of the West Bank and Gaza.

Arafat and king Husayn discussed these proposals in Amman on 9–10 October, and agreed to form a joint committee to prepare a diplomatic strategy.[13] Israel warned Jordan not to permit the PLO to establish guerrilla bases in the kingdom, and deemed the Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 'a direct threat' to its security.[14] Arafat also faced severe criticism from the Palestinian opposition, which objected that he had given the Jordanian government a mandate (*tafwid*) to negotiate on behalf of the PLO. In response, he insisted that the PLO would remain autonomous at all stages and a Palestinian state would have to be established before a confederal union could come about.[15] Wazir and Qaddumi echoed Arafat, while the official *Filastin al-Thawra* praised Jordan for seeking coordination on the basis of 'an alliance of equals, not from a desire to contain [the PLO]'.[16] In reality, Arafat had not distanced himself from con-

federation so emphatically during his talks in Amman; the four-point peace plan he presented suggested negotiations on a Jordanian–Palestinian union, but did not make Palestinian independence a clear precondition.[17] The Fateh revolutionary council apparently accepted his diplomatic flexibility, as it approved the principle of confederation with Jordan during a meeting in Tunis on 9 November.[18]

To develop its diplomatic initiative, the mainstream PLO leadership next sought to repair relations with Egypt, which had provided such active support at the UN during the siege of Beirut. Senior officials met in Paris on 6 November, amidst reports in the Egyptian press that the PLO was ready to recognize Israel.[19] PLO executive committee member Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani met Egyptian foreign minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Cairo four days later, and on 21 November a PLO delegation visited Cairo, the first to do so openly in five years. Neither side was ready for a major shift in policy, however. Wazir, who publicly justified the contacts by saying that they were intended in part to regulate the affairs of PLA personnel based in Egypt, expressed his disappointment with the results of the political dialogue a few days later.[20]

By now, Syria had taken an increasingly open lead in opposing the political direction of Arafat. On 11 October its information minister criticized the proposals he had just presented in Amman and questioned his authority to negotiate without the approval of the PLO executive committee. The minister reiterated that Syria 'focuses relations on the PLO, not Mr Arafat', while Syrian government media mounted a sustained criticism of the proposed Jordanian–Palestinian confederation.[21] The Palestinian opposition adopted a similar stance, with the PFLP arguing that the proposal was intended to 'eliminate the PLO and the Palestine cause . . . and to destroy national unity within the PLO and create tension between it and Syria'.[22] The DFLP also opposed what it saw as the attempt to 'revive the United [Arab] Kingdom proposal [of 1972] under a new name and with the support of the Saudi leaders', while the PF–GC warned the PLO leadership that giving Jordan the mandate to speak in its name would be 'a brazen concession of legitimacy'.[23] Wazir acknowledged the growing tension with Syria, but argued that it was as much the result of disinformation by Syrian intelligence as of PLO insistence on pursuing the dialogue with Jordan.[24] The PFLP, DFLP, PLF, and PNC speaker Khalid al-Fahum also qualified their stand, refuting a Syrian radio report that they had joined Saʿiqa and the PF–GC in a statement endorsing the Syrian information minister's attack on Arafat's visit to Jordan.[25]

The launch of the PLO dialogue with Egypt hardened attitudes, however. PF–GC deputy secretary-general Talal Naji spoke for the entire opposition when he described reconciliation with Cairo as a direct threat to Palestinian national unity.[26] A statement issued by the PLO central council after a meeting in Damascus on 25–26 November revealed the political clash. On the one hand, it stressed the importance of reviving Egyptian–Arab relations, albeit 'far from the Camp David [accords]', and refrained from rejecting the Reagan

plan outright, despite complaining that it did not secure the 'inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO'. On the other hand, Arafat was unable to win formal endorsement of the Fez declaration. He was also compelled to allow the opposition a greater say in the remaining issues of contention, which were to be debated by a new, temporary body that comprised both the PLO executive committee and the general secretaries of all the guerrilla groups.[27] The absence of any reference in the final statement to Syria or the Arab steadfastness front revealed the depth of disagreement over policy; Syrian media similarly ignored the presence of Arafat in Damascus.

Despite the political truce, Saʿiqa, the PF–GC, and PPSF denounced Arafat for holding another round of discussions with king Husayn at the end of November. Private sources in Damascus suggested that efforts were now underway to establish an 'alternative' PLO.[28] That this was not idle gossip was indicated by the Syrian decision to allow the Abu Nidal faction to set up a headquarters in Damascus, in addition to his offices in Baghdad. Fateh central committee member Khalaf riposted to the media campaign by publicly airing PLO resentment of Syrian behaviour during the siege of Beirut, stating that 'we had hoped that Syria would intervene more seriously in Lebanon, but nothing of the sort happened'.[29] The rupture was not yet complete, however. The PFLP and DFLP openly opposed threats to the status of the PLO, and cautiously kept most of their senior leaders in Libya and the two Yemens for fear of Syrian pressure.[30] The DFLP additionally distanced itself from the opposition by regarding the Fez declaration as 'a weapon in the hands of the nationalist forces'.[31] In any case the opposition—with the exception of the closest Syrian allies, Saʿiqa and the PF–GC—attended scheduled discussions with Fateh and the PLO executive committee in Aden on 3–5 December.

Although there was little agreement regarding the Reagan plan and relations with Egypt, the internal PLO dialogue produced an informal consensus that there could be no confederation with Jordan unless an independent Palestinian state was established first.[32] This view extended to Fateh, with Khalaf emerging most vocally against Jordanian–Palestinian union of any type and at any stage.[33] The dialogue was to continue, however, and Wazir, Hani al-Hasan, and, most surprisingly, DFLP deputy secretary-general ʿAbd-Rabbu took up residence in Amman on 12 December. To ease tensions with Syria, Qaddumi met foreign minister Khaddam on 16 December and then headed a Fateh delegation that met the Baʿth Party's deputy-chairman towards the end of the month. The futility of these gestures was demonstrated by increasingly open Syrian support for Fateh central committee member Salih, who had opposed Arafat's earlier visits to Amman.[34] Salih's supporters were allowed to put up posters castigating Arafat in the streets of Damascus in late November, and he was shown several times on state television in the company of president Asad and other senior officials.[35] Salih joined Saʿiqa and PF–GC in renewed media attacks on the

Jordanian–Palestinian committee in mid-December, in which he identified himself totally with the Syrian position.[36]

The mainstream PLO leadership finally crossed the Syrian 'red line' when it published a four-point agreement with Jordan on 26 December.[37] The text asserted the Fez declaration as the basis for a peaceful settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict, but aroused the greatest furore by revealing that Jordan and the PLO had opted for 'integral coordination' to the point of forming a single delegation to prospective negotiations.[38] This could only mean that Arafat had resolved to join the peace process under US auspices, a conclusion reinforced by his offer of PLO mediation to restore Arab ties with Egypt, itself an important intermediary to the US.[39] His customary New Year's message only added insult to Syrian injury. Using literary metaphors, the PLO chairman extolled the fraternal ties that bound the Arabs of the two Yemens, Maghreb, Sudan, Jordan, Palestine, Egypt, and Iraq, but references to Syria, Libya, and the oil-rich Gulf states were pointedly missing. He did not except Syria when he accused the Arab states of lacking the political will to fight Israel, and pointedly confined his praise for the defenders of Beirut to 'the Palestinian resistance, the Lebanese nationalist forces, and with them *those of the [Syrian] ADF who were besieged*'.[40]

The PLO also diverged from Syrian policy in Lebanon, where the Jmayyil government had commenced talks with Israel over security arrangements and a peace treaty. Fateh did not denounce the talks, in contrast to the Palestinian opposition, partly because it wished to maintain dialogue with the Lebanese authorities. The latter had deported 300 Palestinians and detained some 600 by the end of 1982, but Arafat, Wazir, and Khalaf overlooked this when they offered on numerous occasions in the latter part of 1982 to evacuate remaining PLO forces in order to expedite Israeli withdrawal from the country.[41] They wished to retain a token military presence and the right to conduct political activity, but urged the Lebanese to use PLO evacuation 'as a card for leverage' in negotiations with Israel.[42] Syria, in contrast, viewed Jmayyil with deep hostility.

The Fateh central committee made a half-hearted attempt on 6 January 1983 to mend relations by calling for improved ties with Syria and criticizing the Reagan plan.[43] This had no effect, and Wazir now acknowledged the clear 'divergence of views over political activity'.[44] King Husayn next visited Washington, and held talks with Arafat in mid-January to discuss a new US proposal: the PLO could approve the Palestinian members of a joint delegation with Jordan, but could not nominate PLO officials, and the negotiations with Israel would be based on UNSCR 242. In return, the US would pressure Israel to cease settlement activity in the occupied territories.[45] Arafat, who had just been to Moscow to win the backing of new Soviet chairman Yuri Andropov for an international peace conference, declined the US offer, but his willingness to discuss it with king Husayn alarmed Syria and the Palestinian opposition.

The Die is Cast

Also antagonized by PLO policy was Qadhdhafi, who invited the leaders of the PFLP, DFLP, Saʿiqa, PF–GC, and PPSF to spend a week in Tripoli discussing the future of the PLO behind closed doors. Presiding was his second in command, ʿAbd-al-Salam Jallud, who steered the debate towards a central aim: to overthrow Arafat, not from within, but by establishing a parallel, alternative organization.[46] Libya would provide financial, military, and political assistance, he stated, and would place its two battalions in east Lebanon under the command of a joint operations room. Jallud also called for an escalation of guerrilla raids in Israel and the occupied territories and for 'special operations' against Israeli and US targets abroad. The PFLP and DFLP were unwilling to undermine the PLO, insisting on the need to 'protect Palestinian national unity, and indeed reinforce it within the framework of the PLO'.[47] Nonetheless they signed a joint statement on 16 January rejecting the Reagan plan, Fez declaration, joint diplomacy with Jordan, and any easing of the boycott of Egypt. The signatories concluded with the 'three noes' pronounced by the Arab summit conference of August 1967: no peace, no recognition, and no negotiation with Israel.[48] This ran counter to the DFLP programme and Hawatma's own recent call for 'mutual recognition between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples', but he subsequently justified his support for the joint statement by stressing the need to preempt Libyan plans to split the PLO.[49]

Syria now signalled a hardening of political attitude, rescinding its approval of the Fez declaration on 21 January.[50] It stepped up consultations with the Palestinian opposition, bringing in Fateh dissidents Salih, Samih Abu-Kwayk, Musa al-ʿAmla, and Saʿid Maragha. This preceded a meeting of Fateh's revolutionary council in Aden on 25–27 January, at which Maragha read out a memorandum citing a long list of political grievances and calling for radical internal reforms. He accused the Fateh central committee of neglecting the rank-and-file since the evacuation from Beirut, and of failing to return PLO forces from exile to east Lebanon. He also faulted it for disregarding proper procedures, including the requirement to meet regularly and take decisions by collective agreement. Maragha bitterly decried portrayal of the battle of Beirut as if the PLO had fought alone, arguing that this was a defeatist view propagated by the leadership in the hope of persuading its constituency to end the armed struggle and accept any diplomatic solution 'that is proposed to them before the opportunity is lost'.[51] Some of his harshest criticism was directed at the Fez declaration, which threatened an end to the state of war with Israel and to the *raison d'être* of the PLO itself. To recognize Israel, conduct dialogue with Israelis of any hue, empower Jordan to negotiate on behalf of the PLO, accept the Reagan plan as a basis for negotiation, or ease the boycott of Egypt would violate the PLO founding charter and Fateh political programme. Maragha urged Fateh to oppose the Israeli–Lebanese talks and denounce the 'reactionary Arab regimes' as imperialist allies, and conversely to cement the alliance with Syria, the

steadfastness front, and the Soviet bloc. He concluded with a call for an emergency conference to be held within the next fortnight.

The more militant, Syrian-backed members of the Palestinian opposition had secretly taken part in drafting the memorandum, which Syrian agencies helped to disseminate during the revolutionary council meeting in Aden.[52] The Fateh leadership was well aware that it faced a concerted campaign, prompting Khalaf to declare that the imminent session of the PNC would be held in Algiers rather than Damascus, in order to escape 'Arab interference'.[53] Libya and Syria intensified their contacts with the opposition, which was urged by the leftist faction in Fateh to boycott the PNC altogether as a means of compelling the central committee to accept its demand for a general conference. Its opposition partners refused to do this, but on 8 February they helped to draft an alternative political programme for presentation to the PNC. The text reiterated the militant position on the usual range of topics, and was signed by the PFLP, PF–GC, Saʿiqa, PPSF, and the 'democratic nationalist current', the name now used by the Fateh dissidents.[54] The DFLP and PLF stood aloof, as did the PCP.

The Fateh central committee was aware of these contacts, and responded by suspending Salih and Abu-Kwayk. Salih was also dropped from the Fateh delegation to the PNC. The dissidents suffered a further blow when the opposition failed to adhere to the common political programme they had prepared together. The PFLP and DFLP proved especially reluctant to undermine national unity, and in any case had a number of points in common with Fateh: formal commitment to Palestinian statehood, even if only in part of mandate Palestine, and the principle of confederation with Jordan, despite continued vacillation by the PFLP. Even the generally pro-Syrian speaker of the PNC, Fahum, stressed in his opening address that the PLO did not wish to 'destroy any state in the region' and confirmed that it sought only to establish its own state in the West Bank and Gaza.[55] The final PNC statement issued on 21 February was relatively moderate, rejecting the Reagan plan as a suitable basis for peace but endorsing the Fez declaration instead. The PNC insisted that relations could be resumed with Egypt only if it abrogated the Camp David accords, but did not condemn Arafat's previous contacts. It also urged a closer alliance with Syria, but gave formal support to the principle of confederation with Jordan, albeit to be implemented only after Palestinian independence.[56]

The PNC had given Arafat sufficient leeway to justify further diplomatic flexibility, much to the chagrin of his Palestinian and Arab opponents. Their ire increased when he called for a direct dialogue with the US in early March, prompting Syria to warn 'those who are ready to declare joining the Reagan camp' that it would 'seek to prevent such a collapse with all means possible'.[57] Undeterred, Arafat started a new round of talks with king Husayn on 31 March, and assembled the PLO executive committee and other senior officials for their first meeting in Amman since 1970. The result was a draft agreement on the formation of a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation,

without official PLO members, that would negotiate on the basis of the Fez declaration, UNSCR 242, and 'the principles of the Reagan initiative'.[58] Arafat had gone too far, however. The Fateh central committee rejected the draft agreement when it was presented for discussion at a stormy meeting in Kuwait on 8 April. Khalaf publicly insisted that 'it is impossible for anyone to be empowered to speak or negotiate on behalf of the PLO', while the dissidents happily considered that they had prevented the signing of a formal Jordanian–Palestinian agreement.[59]

Faced with this setback, Arafat cancelled his intended return to Amman. Fateh expressed the hope that the dialogue would continue in a formal statement. Stung, the Jordanian government declared the talks at an end. It sulkily left matters to 'the PLO and the Palestinian people to . . . save themselves and their land', but warned that Jordan would take any steps necessary to protect itself 'from the consequences of the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and from the accelerated settlement programme and systematic economic pressure on the Palestinian people intended to compel them to leave their land'.[60] As if to give credence to this warning, Israel revealed plans to increase the number of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories from 30,000 to 50,000 within 18 months.[61] The PLO received a warning of a different type on 10 April when gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal faction, which now took instructions from the intelligence branch of the Syrian air force, assassinated ʿIsam al-Sartawi, a key figure in the dialogue with dovish Israelis, while he attended a conference of the Socialist International in Portugal.

The suspension of the PLO dialogue with Jordan gave heart to the opposition, but by now the leftist faction in Fateh was preparing to mount an open rebellion. It had come to the conclusion after its abortive attempt to influence the PNC that radical measures were necessary to correct what it saw as deviation in the course of the revolution. 'Faced with that disappointment,' Maragha later recalled, 'we were left with nothing but an uprising, as the one and only solution.'[62] Exactly when planning for a mutiny started remains unclear, but a firm decision was taken in the first week of April, if not earlier.[63] A statement attributed to Fateh central committee member Khalaf on 22 April, revealing that the PLO would no longer insist on abrogation of the Camp David accords before resuming relations with Egypt, only strengthened the resolve of the opposition to act, quickly and forcefully.

In planning a rebellion, the Fateh dissidents built on the widespread sense of frustration and bitterness among the rank-and-file. Fateh personnel who had been evacuated to Syria suffered most, having largely been confined to their camps by the authorities. This restriction, which was not applied with any vigour to the opposition groups, contrasted sharply with the public pledge made by president Asad at the end of August 1982 to grant the PLO 'full freedom' in the country.[64] Cadres whose families had since left Lebanon to join them were allowed to seek accommodation in Damascus or other cities but

often could not afford the rents, and so they moved into crowded apartments with relatives or other families. The Shatila massacre and the harsh treatment of Palestinians in various parts of Lebanon had an added impact on evacuees who had left friends and relatives behind, fuelling an angry debate about the wisdom of withdrawing from Beirut and accepting US guarantees for the safety of civilians left behind. Resentment of the leadership intensified as the PLO revived its diplomatic initiative at the Fez summit and flirted with the Reagan plan.

A substantial number of Fateh cadres were now pressing for reform. One prominent group comprised the heads of the Gaza and Nablus committees in the Western Sector, Subhi Abu-Karsh and Ihsan Samara, PLO spokesman Mahmud al-Labadi, combat officers Abu Munir, Abu Nidal Isma'il, and Abu Ma'n, and civilian cadres Abu Talib Hasan, Abu Majid, Majid Fanus, and Abu Sa'id Taraway. In an internal memorandum reviewing Fateh policy since 1967, they complained that 'the policy of relying on the support of Arab regimes has led to sabotage of the internal structure of [Fateh]', and criticized the narrow, parochial focus on Palestinian concerns, disregard for the Arab dimension of the struggle, and lack of progress towards national unity. Action in the occupied territories lacked seriousness and suffered from inadequate budgets.[65] The document attacked the paralysis inflicted on the civilian organization and the spread of the 'bureaucratic disease'; the result was acute clan and regional loyalties and 'appalling bourgeoisification of a certain stratum of Fateh leaders and cadres . . . in full sight and hearing of the leadership'. A root of many afflictions was the 'domination of autocracy in decision-making in political, military, and financial affairs, which has led to the marginalization of organizational bodies'.[66]

A more scathing critique still came from nationalist leftist cadres Nazih Abu-Nidal and 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Nashshash, who argued that the mainstream leadership had knowingly presided over the long-term decline of Fateh forces since 1971. The result by the end of the 1970s was 'a dangerous vacuum caused by the withdrawal of Palestinian fighters, to compensate for which the search began for contractees from here and there, most prominently Bangladeshis . . . In this situation of internal expulsion, Palestinian fighters headed for Berlin or the Gulf, or fell back into simple administrative work in the offices as guards, drivers, or bodyguards, while Bangladeshis under contract took their place in south Lebanon.' This went hand in hand with the ethical decline and corruption that spread among the rank-and-file. The problem 'is no longer limited to [certain] individuals, but now stretches to entire agencies whose members perpetrate corrupt acts, thievery, smuggling, [criminal] trade, and protection rackets with utter impunity [thanks to] the support and protection of the senior influential leaders in the revolution, for whom many previously worked as firsthand aides'.[67]

The mainstream PLO leadership was indeed much to blame and contributed to the aggravation of its own position. Arafat persevered in his silent feud with

Asad, convening the PLO executive committee and Fateh central committee in Tunis or other Arab capitals rather than Damascus, and avoiding contact with Syrian officials on the few occasions when he came to Syria to head the PLO central council or Fateh revolutionary council. Wazir devoted most of his time to supervising the occupied territories from Amman. The leadership was moreover constrained by its commitment under the terms of the evacuation agreement not to re-enter Lebanon, and so PLO forces in the Biqaʿ Valley suffered the most neglect. Sayil returned to assume command following the Shatila massacre, but his assassination on 27 September in circumstances pointing to Syrian complicity left the PLO contingent leaderless and demoralized.[68] Replacing him as chief-of-staff was Ahmad ʿAfana, a taciturn officer who lacked the authority of Sayil and spent most of his time in Damascus.

Field command in east Lebanon now rested on the discredited commanders of Fateh's Karama, Yarmuk, and Qastal Forces, who acted as ʿAfana's deputies. It was further weakened by the loss of many middle-ranking officers and by the decimation of many units in the war: the Martyrs of September Battalion had reassembled only 48 men, Bayt al-Maqdis was down to 40 per cent of strength, and even Jarmaq, which had restored morale by quickly organizing guerrilla attacks on the IDF, numbered a mere 90 men.[69] The drain on personnel was worsened by the series of decrees transferring officers and specialized personnel (training instructors, logistics officers, and technicians) to PLO camps in other Arab states. The leftist faction viewed this as a deliberate attempt to scatter the armed forces and pave the way for negotiation with Israel; it later insisted that the central committee had decided on 14 September to regroup all PLO units in Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq, and accused the leadership of threatening to sever the pay of guerrillas who returned to Syria or Lebanon without permission.[70]

Deepening insecurity among the military was a key factor in the rebellion that was about to break out in Fateh. As a critical observer later noted, this was because the 'military and paramilitary elites . . . suffered fragmentation following their loss in the Israeli invasion of most of their military bases and offices in south Lebanon, from which they had derived the legitimacy required to justify their privileges and political role'.[71] Syria had additional reasons of its own for assisting a rebellion at this stage, not least of which was the PLO decision at the beginning of 1983 to reverse course and transfer military personnel back into Lebanon. The prospect that the PLO might rebuild an autonomous sanctuary worried the Syrian command, which was already being held responsible by Israel for the growing number of guerrilla attacks on IDF units in Lebanon. The PLO move may have been partly intended to exert pressure on the Lebanese government in fact, but the Palestinian opposition revealed its own preferences by demanding the recall of PLO forces from Arab exile to Syria where, presumably, more effective constraints could be exercised against the mainstream leadership.[72] In Lebanon, the Syrian army ordered Fateh guerrillas in the Matn mountains to cease anti-Israeli operations and surrender their weapons, and

blocked the entry of vehicles carrying food and combat supplies when they did not comply.[73]

The Split in Fateh

Conditions were ripe for rebellion by spring 1983. The leading Fateh dissidents had lobbied the rank-and-file in Syria and the Biqaʿ Valley tirelessly since September 1982, offering help with mundane problems such as finding accommodation or paying rent. It was easy to dwell, as Maragha did in his memorandum to the revolutionary council, on the widespread 'laxity, indiscipline, and disorientation' that afflicted guerrilla units and their 'fear of the future, the prevalence of lassitude and indifference, the appearance of defeatism, and the search for personal solutions [to wider problems]'.[74] Although Salih and Abu-Kwayk were important figures, it was Maragha and ʿAmla, and the former Jordanian army officers grouped around them, who formed the real core of revolt. Sometime in March or April 1983, Maragha set up an informal headquarters at Hammara in the Biqaʿ Valley, from which he coordinated contacts with sympathetic officers in various units.[75] Among them was Muhammad Badr, head of Fateh's training branch, who received supporters at the ʿAyn al-Sawda training camp. The Syrian army meanwhile instructed its checkpoints in the Biqaʿ Valley and on the border to facilitate the movement of personnel carrying passes signed by Maragha.[76]

The dissidents consolidated their political alliances in parallel. Salih boasted proudly to his colleagues that he had clocked up 18 hours of discussions with president Asad in recent weeks, culminating in a highly publicized meeting at the beginning of May, and considered himself the principal Palestinian ally of Syria.[77] Hashim ʿAli Muhsin, the former secretary-general of the defunct ASAP who styled himself as a dissident ideologue and biographer of the revolt, later insisted that there had simply been a 'coincidence' of views with Syria, but admitted that there had been a dialogue with it for some time and that 'the leaders of the uprising would have hesitated to launch it had it not been for the Syrian position'.[78] Also in this period (the exact date is unclear), Jibril accompanied the leading dissidents on a secret visit to Libya, where they obtained a pledge of $5 million in monthly assistance.[79] In early May, Salih, Abu-Kwayk, Maragha, and ʿAmla secretly agreed with the general secretaries and military commanders of the PF–GC, PPSF, and Saʿiqa to 'correct the course of the revolution'.[80] They formed a joint headquarters and three military sectors in Lebanon, each led by a dissident Fateh officer and representatives of the other groups. The Abu Nidal faction was not included, but coordinated separately with the Fateh dissidents.[81]

Full details of the secret meeting reached Arafat, who immediately flew to Damascus to convene the PLO higher military council and confront the plotters. On 7 May he appointed Ghazi ʿAtallah and 'haj' Ismaʿil Jabr as

commanders of PLO forces in the Biqaʿ Valley and north Lebanon, and ordered the transfer of 40 dissident officers, including Maragha and ʿAmla, to PLO headquarters in Tunis and military camps in other Arab states. Thoroughly alarmed, the anti-Arafat coalition went into action.[82] On 8 May Syrian military intelligence delivered 60 tons of weapons—originally confiscated from PLO stores during the 1982 war—to dissident Fateh officers at the Masnaʿ crossing point on the Syrian–Lebanese border.[83] On 9 May Maragha and two of the dismissed officers took over the command posts of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Yarmuk Forces and declared the start of a 'corrective movement' in Fateh. Salih, Abu-Kwayk, and ʿAmla declared their support from Damascus, followed over the next few days by Badr, Karama Forces deputy commander Ziyad al-Sughayyar, artillery commander Wasif ʿUrayqat, battalion commander Mahmud ʿIsa, and other senior officers.

The dissidents explained their motives and listed their demands in a statement published on 13 May. They accused the PLO leadership of ordering the transfer of 'Palestinian nationalists committed to the revolution and liberation' in order to pave the way for 'withdrawal from Lebanon and to remove the obstacles that prevented signing of the Jordanian–Palestinian agreement on the basis of the Reagan plan'. The dissidents were offended that officers who were not only 'deviationist, defeated, and wanted for trial', but also responsible for 'Palestinian infighting' had been given command of PLO forces in Lebanon. This, combined with the 'exile . . . of the best officers and cadres', represented 'a military and organizational *coup d'état* in Fateh'. In their view these measures revealed the determination of the PLO leadership to facilitate the 'US settlement' and 'deliberately tear apart the unity of Fateh . . . in accordance with the plot to eliminate Fateh and its [armed forces]'. The dissident statement called for the transfer order to be rescinded, and for the dismissal of ʿAtallah and other derelict commanders, who were to be brought before a revolutionary tribunal. It insisted on keeping PLO forces in Lebanon and deepening ties with nationalist Arab states and the USSR, and rejected the Reagan plan, Fez declaration, and confederation with Jordan.[84]

The initial reaction of the mainstream leadership was confused. Wazir issued an internal memorandum to all Fateh units on 10 May, in which he spoke darkly of an attempt to destroy 'the unity of our movement and revolution' and warned that Fateh 'will not [refrain] from taking all steps to preserve [its] unity and strength'.[85] Wazir and ʿAfana next convened the expanded military council, and formed a delegation of 'neutral' officers to parley with the dissidents. Arafat arrived in Damascus in the meantime, and joined Wazir and ʿAfana for a tour of Fateh bases in the Biqaʿ Valley, his first visit to Lebanon since leaving Beirut. It was in response to this visit that the dissidents published their first political statement, bringing their rebellion to the attention of the media. A meeting of the Fateh central committee at this point revealed divergent views; Khalaf and Qaddumi expressed understanding for the demand for internal reforms and

generally adopted a more militant political line, and urged their colleagues to conduct a peaceful dialogue with the dissidents.

Arafat was either unaware of the extent of the rebellion or unwilling to regard it as anything but the result of external instigation. A circular issued from his office in Damascus on 15 May spoke merely of 'a misunderstanding within the Yarmuk Forces' and insisted that 'only a few dozen' guerrillas were still involved.[86] His anger was directed at 'intervention by Ahmad Jibril . . . who deployed a force of his own, and with it a force of some 40 men with weapons and ammunition from the Abu Nidal faction'. Arafat hinted at Syrian and Libyan involvement by directing the finger of blame not only at Jibril, but also at 'those who stand behind him'. At the same time the PLO chairman called for 'a calm dialogue' to resolve differences within Fateh units. Three days later he stated that a mere '30 men have followed Abu Musa [Maragha]', arguing that the rebellion existed only in the accounts of the media.[87] The circular also sought to discredit the rebellious officers by insisting that they had been disciplined for 'misconduct', among them two offenders who had previously been expelled from Fateh for dealing in cannabis.

Despite these dismissive and at times contradictory statements, the Fateh leadership authorized a delegation of widely respected combat officers to mediate with the rebels. The latter responded on 19 May with new demands, including the return of all PLO forces to Lebanon and the formation of a special committee to supervise Fateh finances, in order to 'halt the systematic acts of corruption and sabotage . . . by the use of money, and to investigate those who have become rich at the expense of the revolution'. Another demand was for an emergency general conference to resolve the internal crisis.[88] The central committee issued its own response on 20 May, in which it agreed to convene the conference by 1 June, in Aden. It also approved the nominal reorganization of the military command in Lebanon and Syria into a single 'front' headed by ʿAfana, effectively cancelling the posts held by ʿAtallah and Jabr. The transfer of dissident officers to PLO camps in other Arab states was suspended; the leading rebels were to be attached directly to Arafat in his capacity as commander-in-chief, but were to be barred at the same time from having further contact with Fateh forces.[89]

These measures failed to satisfy the dissidents, who took them to indicate that the central committee had rallied around Arafat and Wazir. The dissidents were probably encouraged to stiffen their stance by Syria, which was hurriedly mobilizing opposition to the Lebanese–Israeli agreement signed on 17 May. A declaration of moral and material support for the rebellion from Qadhdhafi on 22 May was another factor, although it also seemed to confirm Arafat's accusations of Libyan instigation.[90] The PLO chairman accused Libya of channelling weapons and $6 million in financial aid to the dissidents through the PF–GC, an accusation denied by all parties concerned but subsequently proven true.[91] Khalaf, Qaddumi, and Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid had been swayed by now, and demonstrated their support for Arafat by joining him on a five-day tour of Fateh

bases in Lebanon on 21 May, and by voting for the severance of pay and supplies to the rebellious units.

Once again, the dissidents escalated, demanding the right to appoint half the members of the revolutionary council and half of the delegates to the general conference. The central committee would also have to be divided equally between the two sides, with Maragha replacing Wazir as deputy commander-in-chief; this 'emergency leadership' would remain in place until a conference could be held.[92] These steps threatened to turn Fateh into a two-party coalition; Arafat offered instead to reinstate Salih and Abu-Kwayk to the central committee in order to take part in selecting a new revolutionary council. He also held out further changes in military appointments, and agreed to establish clear rules of procedure for the central committee and to subject the budget to collective approval.[93] His sincerity may have been in doubt, but neither the dissidents nor Syria were interested in a peaceful resolution of the crisis. Asad assured Arafat of Syrian neutrality during a meeting on 23 May, their first for nearly a year, but Syrian intelligence agents helped the dissidents to seize several Fateh depots, workshops, and transport pools in Damascus, as well as the PLA's finance office, five days later. Asad reiterated Syrian impartiality on 31 May and announced that he had delegated three senior Baʿth Party officials to 'help mend the rift within Fateh', but this gesture was belied by Salih's boast that 'we coordinate with the Syrians in the field'.[94] Salih also boasted that 'had it not been for our movement, Arafat would have gone to Washington by now'. In private, as Wazir later recounted, Khaddam declared that 'if you wish to resolve your problems, you must conform to our policies, our friends are to be your friends, and our enemies are to be your enemies'.[95]

The rebellion had reached a critical stage. On 1 June the former head of the Fateh regional command in Lebanon, Abu Akram, announced his defection to the dissidents 'with 10,000 combatants and revolutionaries'.[96] This was pure bombast by an unpopular official with a reputation for petty corruption; hundreds of adherents of the leftist faction had sided against the central committee, among them most members of the so-called 'Vietnamese line', but key individuals such as ʿAbd-al-Rahman Marʿi and smaller internal factions such as the Palestinian Communist Workers' Party notably did not. The Abu Nidal faction, which now set up its first guerrilla bases ever in east Lebanon, provided the dissidents with military support, but the association may have alienated many potential supporters.[97] The dissidents also enjoyed the public backing of the PF–GC, PPSF, and Saʿiqa, but had yet to trigger a mass defection within Fateh.

The neutrality of the main opposition groups, the PFLP and DFLP, did not help the dissidents. A joint statement in early June urged 'reinforcing the democratic forces . . . and restricting the role of the bureaucratic groups that have bourgeois aspirations', but argued at the same time that 'reform should be implemented within the framework of national unity and with adherence to the

principle of internal democratic dialogue'.[98] The Arab steadfastness front was also divided; whereas Qadhdhafi roundly condemned Arafat and applauded his opponents on 9 June, Algeria and South Yemen opposed a formal break and sent mediators to Damascus. The USSR expressed its opposition to a split in Fateh and its dismay at the strains in Syrian–Palestinian relations to Khalaf, who was received in Moscow on 1 June. The rebellion appeared to be losing momentum. An internal circular issued by Arafat in this period instructed Fateh cadres to emphasize the role of the Syrian army, Saʿiqa, and PF–GC when explaining the crisis to members and the public, and to ignore the dissidents completely.[99] Support for the dissidents among Palestinians was weak in any case; on 4 June women protestors from the Wavell refugee camp in Baʿlbak compelled them to remove a roadblock following clashes that had left a number of casualties.

The impasse pushed the dissidents to escalate militarily. On 18–19 June they attacked 'loyalist' units near Taʿnayel and Taʿlbaya, with the support of PF–GC tanks, but were beaten back. Syrian forces occupied the Fateh training camp at Hammurya near Damascus, and attacked Fateh positions in the Biqaʿ Valley while Fateh's revolutionary council was meeting in the Syrian capital on 20 June. The Syrian command admitted that the attack had taken place, but insisted that it was 'an individual act'.[100] Yet Syrian armour renewed the battle on 22 June, compelling loyalist guerrillas at Majdal ʿAnjar to pull out. It was no longer possible to disguise Syrian intervention, despite a statement by Asad on 23 June reiterating neutrality and urging a 'fraternal and democratic' dialogue within Fateh.[101] That night, one of Arafat's bodyguards was killed and nine were wounded in an ambush in northern Lebanon; the PLO chairman was not in the convoy, however, having secretly remained in Damascus. He reappeared to accuse Syria frankly of using the rebellion to bring the PLO under control. The Syrian government responded by expelling him from the country on 24 June and by declaring Wazir, who was in Tripoli, *persona non grata*. The rift was complete.

The public humiliation of Arafat made it obvious that a wider confrontation with Syria was imminent. Polarization of the situation posed a particular problem for the PFLP and DFLP. They were agreed on the need to cement ties with Syria—Habash feared that otherwise the PLO would become a 'refugee revolution'—but remained equally committed to 'a democratic dialogue' within Fateh and to the non-use of arms to resolve internal differences.[102] The PFLP was openly hostile towards the Fateh leadership and held it largely responsible for the crisis, but at the same time concurred firmly with the DFLP on the importance of maintaining 'the unity of Fateh on the basis of democratic reforms' and the integrity and independence of PLO institutions.[103] In a defensive move designed to protect their neutrality and preserve a degree of political autonomy, the two groups formed a joint political and military command on 26 June, and subsequently agreed to unite their 'mass [organizations], trade unions, and social institutions'.[104] The DFLP, meanwhile, continued secretly to

smuggle ammunition to Fateh bases and help loyalist personnel pass through Syrian checkpoints.[105]

The dissidents rounded angrily on the PFLP and DFLP. One of their ideologues, a former communist from Gaza, bitterly accused the two groups of seeking to increase their 'credit' among leftists and so preventing 'the recent opposition movement in Fateh from attracting the masses of the Palestinian Left'.[106] They were guilty of political confusion, since 'our principal enemy is the US, our immediate enemy is Israel, and our first foe is Arafat'.[107] Hashim ʿAli Muhsin dismissed the DFLP for calling for an independent Palestinian state and mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel, and then lashed at his former comrades in the PFLP. The PFLP, he charged bitterly, 'has not only remained a lackey to the Palestinian Right, but has also raised a large question mark about the seriousness of its opposition to the path of political settlement and about the sincerity of its commitment to the cause of liberating Palestine and of its refusal to recognize Israel'.[108] As serious, arguably, was the Libyan decision to sever all financial aid to the PFLP and DFLP.[109]

The PFLP and DFLP had been right to anticipate military escalation. An attack by a mixed force of dissident, PF–GC, PPSF, and Saʿiqa guerrillas on loyalist units at Rawda and Kfar Zabad left some 50 military and civilian casualties on 27–28 June. From Tunis, Arafat accused Syria of giving part of the thousands of tons of weapons and ammunition confiscated from Fateh in 1982 to the dissident and Abu Nidal factions.[110] He also accused Libyan troops of supporting the attacks on loyalist units, while Syrian commandos joined the fighting on 29 June in an attempt to expel Fateh personnel from Bar Ilyas and Saʿdnayil. Some 50 loyalists were killed or wounded in the next three days as the clashes spread to Mazariʿ ʿAbbud, Taʿnayil, and Kfar Zabad, but no ground was exchanged. Arab and Soviet pressure prompted the Syrian command to suspend operations on 3 July. A PLO executive committee delegation met foreign minister Khaddam in Damascus, but was curtly told that Fateh would have to accept dissident demands before a dialogue with Syria could be started.[111]

For their part the dissidents refused to receive several members of the PLO delegation, among them DFLP deputy secretary-general ʿAbd-Rabbu, whom they considered 'too close to Arafat'.[112] The Fateh central committee offered another olive branch on 6 July by announcing new military command appointments, administrative changes, and the formation of supervisory bodies to monitor budgets. Three days later Arafat suggested that the PFLP should resolve the impasse by choosing an overall commander for Fateh forces, and in mid-July he renewed the compromise package proposals and offered to disengage forces in the Biqaʿ Valley.[113] Khaddam responded negatively, reiterating that relations could be resumed only when the crisis in Fateh was resolved, to which Arafat riposted by accusing Syria of seeking to establish an 'alternative PLO'.[114] Nonetheless, the Fateh central committee dismissed ʿAtallah and Jabr and formed a new five-member military command, in a unilateral goodwill gesture on 21 July.

The latest Fateh step appeared to alarm the dissidents and their militant partners, who broke the three-week old truce with an attack on loyalist positions at Taʿnayil and Taʿlbaya on 23 June. PF–GC armour and Libyan crews helped take the battle to Rawda, Kfar Zabad, and Jdita five days later, where the head of Fateh's 'liberation movements bureau', Halim, was killed and brigade commander Nasr Yusif was captured. The attackers lost 64 prisoners, but Maragha and ʿAmla renewed the assault after bringing up reinforcements and artillery.[115] The Syrian army finally intervened, forcing Fateh units to evacuate Kfar Zabad and Jdita on 31 July. The renewal of combat was accompanied by sharp media exchanges. Syria accused Arafat of 'lying, agitation, and blackmail', while he characterized the conflict as 'Palestinian–Syrian combat backed by a small Libyan group, employing some token Palestinians'. He argued that Syria was implementing 'a conspiracy to expel Palestinian forces from the Biqaʿ [Valley] and Baʿlbak before September 1983, in agreement with [US secretary of state] Shultz', which would be followed by a 'seige of Tripoli, as happened in Beirut'.[116] His prediction subsequently proved self-fulfilling, if not prophetic, but a sudden calm prevailed on 3 August.

Palestinian Civil War

The reason for the informal truce was the surprise announcement by the IDF that it intended to withdraw from the Shuf mountains in the next few weeks. The PLO central council quickly launched a new mediation bid, and called on Arafat to seek dialogue with Syria, with whom the PLO should stand 'in one trench'.[117] Fateh announced that it would halt the anti-Syrian propaganda campaign.[118] Attention now turned to the Matn mountains, where Maronite and Druze militiamen clashed and units of the reconstructed Lebanese army were starting to disintegrate along sectarian lines. The Lebanese Forces and SLA also expelled 5,000 Palestinian refugees from the Sidon area, which remained under Israeli control, in the next few weeks.[119] The battle widened when Amal and LNM militiamen took to the streets of Beirut on 28 August, and traded sniper and artillery fire with the US marine contingent at the airport. The army regained control of west Beirut, but the sudden completion of the Israeli withdrawal triggered a major battle for control of the mountain ridge above the capital at dawn on 4 September.

The Palestinian opposition viewed the outbreak of fighting in Lebanon, with open satisfaction, as a reflection of the degree to which Syria had improved its position in the regional balance of power, thanks in large measure to sustained Soviet assistance over the preceding year. Speaking at the end of May, Maragha for one argued that 'the Soviets are here too, and it seems that many things have changed since last autumn. We are witnessing new realities. We can see now that the US role has become much less effective.'[120] Salih now referred enthusiastically to 'the Biqaʿ Gulf', a strategic arc of solidarity stretching from

Moscow through Damascus to the Palestinian forces in east Lebanon, while Hawatma observed in August that 'we are in a situation of a Soviet offensive'.[121] The Palestinian opposition placed its forces on the alert on 3 September, and quickly joined the battle that unfolded around Bhamdun the next day. Salih now spoke of a push by the Soviet–Syrian–Palestinian alliance towards Beirut, and a new slogan—Forces of the Return to Beirut—was optimistically daubed on dissident vehicles.[122]

The mainstream PLO leadership similarly saw an opportunity to return to Beirut, and immediately ordered the loyalist Jarmaq Battalion into the fray. Advancing rapidly from its forward bases in Ras al-Matn to ʿAlay, it isolated Bhamdun and then helped the Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) to clear most of the Suq al-Gharb ridge. The army and Lebanese Forces still held the town of Suq al-Gharb itself, which became the focus of fighting for the next three weeks. Reinforcements took loyalist strength to 300, while the DFLP and PFLP guerrillas fielded an equal number; the dissidents and PFLP–GC provided another 400 guerrillas, the former calling up an additional battalion from Syria and the latter fielding artillery and tanks.[123] Fateh, the PFLP, and DFLP set up a joint operations room in ʿAlay, while the other factions formed their own, separate command. The loyalists helped capture the strategic Qabr Shmun crossroads on 8–9 September, and were joined by the DFLP to scout towards Beirut, reaching the slopes above Khalda, where they clashed with army outposts. A few guerrillas even reached the Burj al-Barajna refugee camp, while Maragha and PPSF military commander Mahmud Hamdan briefly entered the southern suburb Hay al-Sillum.

The fractured nature of the Lebanese–Palestinian coalition arrayed against Suq al-Gharb impeded a decisive victory over the army, which successfully retained the town. It even expanded its positions on 16 September, after Syrian pressure compelled the PSP to order the Fateh contingent away, leaving a vulnerable gap in the frontline. It was at this point that Arafat suddenly appeared in the northern city of Tripoli, having risked detection by Israeli naval patrols to arrive by boat. Visiting the Baddawi and Nahr al-Barid refugee camps he stated defiantly that the PLO 'is a giant revolution that nobody can contain or control; we shall preserve our independent national will . . . and support the nationalist Lebanese decision'.[124] The challenge to Syria was unmistakable, and it responded on 20 September by ordering Fateh units to leave the Matn mountains.[125] The Syrian command was worried at the same time by the escalation of hostilities between its own units in the region and the US and French contingents around Beirut, and compelled its partners to accept a cease-fire on 26 September.

The Syrian command now moved to end the loyalist presence in the Biqaʿ Valley quickly. Backed by the dissidents, its units had already expelled Fateh's Karmil, 1st Artillery, and Jalil Battalions and the Karama Forces headquarters towards Tripoli on 2–4 September, while dissident roadblocks detained dozens of loyalist guerrillas and PLA soldiers. On 23 September, the Syrian command

ordered remaining loyalist forces in the Biqaʿ Valley, now numbering nearly 1,200 after the Fateh withdrawal from the Matn mountains, to depart for Tripoli. Several attempts were made to disarm and detain the contingent, but the 100-vehicle convoy finally escaped its Syrian escort at al-Jbab al-Humr and reached its destination on 28 September, with its entire inventory of weapons. The Syrians now ordered all Palestinian guerrilla groups to withdraw from the Matn mountains two days later, allowing them to leave a token force only 200 strong.[126]

Syrian attention now focused on Tripoli, where a steady flow of PLO personnel, weapons, vehicles, and non-combat supplies was arriving by sea. Alerted to this 'sea bridge', which operated largely through the Cypriot port of Limassol, Israeli naval commandos attacked PLO positions near the city on 13 September and arrested several dozen Palestinians on board various ships sailing to north Lebanon. Wazir, who had been in Tripoli since June, arranged the arrival of additional Fateh members by land from other parts of Lebanon, and expanded the loyalist contingent by placing local militiamen on the payroll.[127] He issued monthly stipends to local PF–GC and PPSF officials to secure their neutrality and assisted allied Lebanese militias, borrowing from Lebanese merchants when funds ran short.[128] The arrival of Arafat heralded a rise of violence, as Fateh consolidated control around Tripoli. Clashes with the PF–GC left 24 casualties on 27 September; an anti-Syrian faction was formed, and remaining PF–GC personnel were expelled from the entire area. Saʿiqa members were faced with a similar choice, and a second, small anti-Syrian faction was formed, while PPSF offices were forcibly closed down. The PLF was by now effectively split between its three main leaders, but its branch in north Lebanon opted for Arafat.[129]

The dissidents responded by seizing Fateh facilities in Syria, and on 5 October the government announced the confiscation of all Fateh properties and assets in the country. Four days later the dissidents occupied a number of PLO offices, among them the WAFA news agency, with the help of Syrian intelligence. This antagonized well-known leftist writers sympathetic to the rebellion, such as Naji ʿAllush, Yahya Yakhlif, and Rashad Abu-Shawar, who held a press conference to condemn the seizures. Unimpressed, the dissidents took the last five Fateh offices in Damascus on 10–11 October, killing four loyalists and wounding seven. Syrian intelligence threatened Fateh members with deportation or imprisonment if they did not join the dissidents. By this time an estimated 1,000 loyalists were already in Syrian jails.

The mounting tension prompted the PFLP and DFLP to delineate their position in a joint 'programme for unity and reform' published on 10 October. The document renewed their criticism of autocracy and factional domination (implicitly by Arafat and Fateh), demanded an investigation into the failings of the 1982 war, and called for PLO finances to be properly regulated, appointments to be based on merit and professional competence, and Palestinian unions and 'mass organizations' to become truly independent.[130] Their appeal

for democratic internal reform and peaceful resolution of the PLO crisis had little impact, however. Two Syrian brigades had arrived near Tripoli in the meantime, and it may have been in response to this that Arafat now took steps to tighten PLO control inside the city.[131] Fateh stood by when a Sunni Islamist movement, Tawhid, launched a two-day offensive on 12 October against the LCP, which leaned towards Syria, leaving a final death toll of 60 dead and 130 wounded. The communists angrily stated that the bloodshed had taken place 'within sight and earshot of Brother Yasir Arafat and the leadership of the Fateh organization in Tripoli, with its sponsorship and encouragement'.[132]

Matters were coming to a head. A statement issued in Damascus by PLA chief-of-staff Muhammad Tariq al-Khadra on 17 October, in which he criticized Arafat and called for his replacement as PLO chairman, signalled Syrian intentions clearly.[133] Saʿiqa echoed Khadra's call, and gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal faction were arrested a few days later while planning to assassinate PLO officials in Cairo.[134] Salih now revealed that the dissidents were in contact with faction leader Sabri al-Banna, and had discussed cooperation after the expected elimination of Arafat.[135] In Libya, meanwhile, the authorities urged Palestinian expatriates to occupy PLO offices and turn them into 'popular committees'. Two days later, on 24 October, a mixed force of some 400 PF–GC guerrillas and Libyan troops, supported by artillery and armour, started five days of clashes with loyalist positions around the Nahr al-Barid refugee camp.[136] Dissident forces built up to 500 and Saʿiqa and the PPSF to 100–200 each during this time, and on 27 October the PLA Hittin Forces also arrived in the area.[137] The PLA Ajnadayn Forces, which had been formed by calling up Palestinian reservists in Syria during the 1982 war, were already deployed near Tripoli, taking PLA strength to nine battalions—six infantry, two tank, and one artillery—with 4,000 men. In all, the Syrian-backed forces fielded up to 90 T-54/55 tanks, 60 gun and rocket artillery weapons, and some 50 120/160mm mortars, besides the usual inventory of recoilless rifles, medium mortars, and machine-guns.

By now the PLO had assembled 4,000 guerrillas and militiamen in the Tripoli area, armed with a dozen 120mm mortars, seven multiple rocket launchers (including two BM-21s), and two 122mm howitzers. An additional 45 PLA gunners arrived in great secrecy from the ʿAyn Jalut Forces in Egypt, along with rocket launchers of up to 240 millimetre calibre and supplies of rockets. However, the main PLO advantage was possession of detailed information about Syrian battle plans. Much of this came from sympathizers in the PLA and the opposition, who also provided wireless codes and frequencies.[138] One secret missive gave details of the planned opening attack on the strategic Turbul mountain overlooking the city, while another warned of an imminent assault on Nahr al-Barid, giving precise numbers and locations of attacking armour and artillery in the sector.[139] The most significant leak came from a PLA battalion commander renowned for his leadership during the siege of Beirut, who passed

the Syrian master plan to the PLO at least 20 hours before the offensive was due to start.[140] Wazir also used these contacts to arrange for mass desertions among PLA troops once the offensive started.[141]

Forewarned, Arafat placed loyalist forces on full alert at midnight on 2 November. At dawn Palestinian, Syrian, and Libyan gunners launched a 40-minute barrage against the entire frontline from Nahr al-Barid to Baddawi.[142] Infantry and armour then attacked Nahr al-Barid and the Turbul mountain. Directing the battle were the Syrian commander in north Lebanon, Sulayman al-ʿAbs, and the head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanʿan, who presided over a joint operations room with PLA chief-of-staff Khadra, Saʿiqa military commander Salah al-Maʿani, Maragha, Jibril, and PPSF military commander Mahmud Hamdan.[143] The attack almost immediately ran into difficulty, as dozens of PLA soldiers defected to the PLO; PLA and PF–GC armour were brought up to resume the advance, and the loyalists had retreated in some sectors by evening.[144] The pattern was repeated daily for a week, by the end of which the loyalists had been pushed back into Tripoli and the Baddawi camp, having withdrawn from Nahr al-Barid on 6 November to spare it further destruction.

The see-saw nature of the fighting showed that there was not much enthusiasm on either side. PLO claims of destroying or capturing 36 tanks and at least 28 other military vehicles showed that combat was bitter in some places, yet loyalist defences also gave way easily in others. The incessant attrition in combat and political upheaval since June 1982 had left a deep impact: by the end of the battle for Tripoli in late December 1983, Fateh's Abu Yusif al-Najjar Battalion had only nine of its original members and the Bayt al-Maqdis Battalion ten.[145]

On the other side, another 215 PLA soldiers defected to the PLO in this period, while a number of artillery and tank gunners fired shells without fuses or deliberately missed their targets, and at least one senior officer was later court-martialled for disobeying orders to shell loyalist positions.[146] An official statistic from the Fateh dissidents later revealed that they had lost a total of 106 dead in the whole year from the beginning of their rebellion until May 1984—since this included all clashes with the loyalists and the 'mountain war' of September 1983, their losses around Tripoli cannot have been onerous, indicating a half-hearted effort by their combat personnel.[147] Palestinian demonstrators in the Yarmuk refugee camp in Damascus meanwhile protested the offensive on Tripoli, suffering dozens of casualties and numerous arrests as Syrian security forces reasserted control. Against this background Fateh's Jarmaq Battalion, which had grimly held the strategic Fawwar crossroads for the past five days, took 60 PLA soldiers prisoner and destroyed seven armoured vehicles in a surprise attack around Baddawi on 9 November.[148] It beat off several counter-attacks, and the joint Syrian–Palestinian command finally accepted a ceasefire in the evening.

Syria was also under mounting Arab pressure. Saudi Arabia called on it to

work for an end to the conflict on 5 November, and a day later king Fahd appealed to Asad to strive for a truce and dispatched a special envoy to Damascus. Egyptian president Mubarak made a similar appeal, and Jordan declared its support for the PLO on 7 November, while the Kuwaiti parliament voted to suspend $265 million in annual aid to Syria. The foreign ministers of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, Tunisia, and Algeria also arrived in Damascus, as did official delegations from the Gulf Cooperation Council and the USSR. Local associations in Tripoli also appealed to both sides to spare the city, and sent a delegation to lobby Asad for a lasting ceasefire. However, Tawhid leader sheikh Saʿid Shaʿban now encouraged the PLO to stay as long as it liked. It strove to shore up its defences by hastily forming new combat units—a reserve force comprising 320 PLA defectors, a 'special unit' drawn from Fateh's Western Sector, and another composed of bodyguards of PLO leaders—and by purchasing the neutrality of potential foes—the communists and ʿAlawis.[149]

The truce held until dawn on 15 November, when an intense artillery barrage signalled the start of a new offensive against Baddawi and the nearby Qubba neighbourhood of Tripoli. Wazir rushed to the refugee camp to rally the defence, and by evening the attackers were back at their starting positions, having lost 51 prisoners and, the PLO reported, 14 tanks.[150] During the day a PLO shell hit the Syrian–Palestinian command, killing Saʿiqa military commander Maʿani and wounding the head of the joint operations room and a tank battalion commander. PPSF military commander Mahmud Hamdan had pulled his contingent back to the Biqaʿ Valley earlier, and now Saʿiqa was also out of the battle. The PF–GC and dissidents reinforced the depleted PLA units, and resumed the offensive against Qubba and Baddawi at dawn on 16 November. The battle for the camp see-sawed for the next three days, during which the Jarmaq Battalion spearheaded five counter-attacks, but the loyalists finally ceded in the evening of 18 November. Syrian commandos had taken part in the battle for Baddawi, and supported further attacks on Tripoli over the next three days; Syrian shells meanwhile hit three ships in the port and cut water and electricity supplies to the city. The loyalists gave no more ground, however, and the Syrian–Palestinian command declared a ceasefire on 24 November.

Syrian acceptance of the ceasefire followed a week of renewed mediation by Saudi Arabia. The agreement called for an indefinite truce, evacuation of all Palestinian forces from Tripoli, and initiation of a peaceful dialogue between the various guerrilla groups. Arafat immediately accepted these terms, but Jibril still demanded that the PLO chairman should be brought before a 'revolutionary tribunal' on charges of 'political and ethical deviation'. Morale in opposition forces was low, however. The Syrian–Palestinian command received regular requests for relief from its units, while PLA chief-of-staff Khadra felt it necessary to warn his officers during a staff meeting on 22 November that recalcitrance would be severely punished.[151] Syria was determined not to allow Arafat to escape, and had already transferred two battalions of the PLA Qadisiyya Forces

from the Golan front to north Lebanon on 20 November.[152] The opposition now prepared to instigate a resumption of combat, presumably on Syrian instructions. According to Khadra, who briefed his officers on 24 November, the opposition would announce that Arafat had recruited 300 Muslim Brotherhood members from Jordan and would demand their surrender.[153] The PLO would naturally be unable to comply, providing a pretext to launch the final offensive on Tripoli.

Syrian plans were suddenly derailed by the announcement on 24 November of a large prisoner exchange between the PLO and Israel. The PLO had negotiated the release of 5,900 Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners from the Ansar camp in south Lebanon, in return for the repatriation of six Israeli soldiers captured by Fateh in September 1982. This was a major propaganda *coup* for Arafat, prompting the Syrian command first to delay, and then to cancel its planned offensive, scheduled to start at midnight on 25 November. Protracted negotiations about a PLO evacuation from Tripoli ensued, during which its port came under sporadic artillery fire. Israeli gunboats also shelled PLO positions after a bomb killed four civilians and wounded 46 in a Jerusalem bus on 6 December, and PLO positions came under naval and helicopter fire on five further occasions between 9 and 18 December. Aiding the PLO was its knowledge of the impact that the confrontation with Syria was having on its wider constituency: opinion polls in the occupied territories, for example, had showed support for Arafat running consistently at 92–94 per cent since June and right up to December.[154]

The PLO finally agreed to evacuate Tripoli after obtaining US assurances of protection from Israeli attack and the offer of a French naval escort. The agreement marked an additional success for Arafat, who had utilized the diplomatic contacts during the battle for Tripoli to raise the costs of an assault to Syria and increase its discomfit. PLO wounded left by sea on 17 December, while 166 loyalists who had been captured over the preceding seven months were exchanged for 42 Syrian and opposition prisoners taken in the recent battle. The main evacuation took place on 20 December, as 4,700 persons—including the PLA defectors and 250 women and children—sailed out under UN flags towards PLO camps in Algeria, Sudan, and the two Yemens. Before leaving, Fateh distributed its weapons stores and surplus funds to various Lebanese militias, including Tawhid, Amal, and Hizbullah. The conflict had cost 438 dead and 2,100 wounded, according to the Lebanese police and local hospitals, but life slowly returned to normal in Tripoli and the shattered refugee camps. There was to be one last piece of political drama, however. As the ship carrying Arafat to Yemen passed through the Suez Canal on 21 December, he left it briefly to hold an unscheduled meeting with Egyptian president Mubarak in Cairo. The Palestinian civil war was over but, as the storm that followed the PLO chairman's latest act showed, the internal dispute was not.

24

Struggle Within, Struggle Without

Divided We Stand

The surprise visit by Arafat to Cairo showed that the loss of the territorial base in Lebanon had freed the mainstream Palestinian leadership to undertake controversial steps in pursuit of its diplomatic strategy. By the same token, it revealed the degree to which Arafat had secured his own position within the PLO and Fateh. Both conclusions were confirmed by the ease with which he contained the dismay of his colleagues in the Fateh central committee. Few believed his protestations that 'the imperatives of protocol' had dictated a courtesy call on Mubarak, but a formal statement on 3 January 1984 merely disassociated the committee from the visit, which it described as 'a personal initiative'.[1] The PLO executive committee adjourned four days later without issuing a formal comment on the matter, let alone a condemnation, despite the efforts of PFLP and DFLP representatives Ahmad al-Yamani and Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu and the 'independent' ʿArabi ʿAwwad, who had travelled to Tunis especially for the meeting.

Emboldened, Arafat renewed his effort to obtain PLO participation in the peace process. Israeli prime minister Yitzhaq Shamir was sufficiently concerned to deem it necessary, on 18 January, to reiterate his rejection of talks with the PLO, whether direct or indirect.[2] The PLO chairman persevered over the next few months, publicly reaffirming his willingness on 24 April to negotiate directly with Israel at an international peace conference, and to hold a plebiscite under UN supervision in order to determine the future of the occupied territories.[3] A week later he suggested that Israel and the PLO should exchange mutual recognition and hold peace talks under UN auspices, but the Israeli cabinet summarily rejected his proposals on 5 May. Arafat may not have expected a positive response in fact, and probably made these overtures as a means of buying time, as part of a general political strategy that included bringing the Iran–Iraq war to a close, restoring Egypt to the Arab fold, and involving the Maghrib more actively in the affairs of the Arab Mashriq.[4]

Yet although the mainstream leadership no longer feared Syrian reprisal, as its repeated diplomatic overtures to Israel showed, it could not altogether ignore the need to legitimize its political direction internally. After all, it could only portray itself as a credible participant in the peace process if it were able to reaffirm the representative status of the PLO. The obvious means to do so was

to convene the PNC, and to this end it actively sought reconciliation with the Palestinian opposition. A mission by PLO 'foreign minister' Qaddumi to Damascus in mid-February proved a failure, but the PFLP, DFLP, PLF, and PCP distinguished themselves from the Syrian-backed opposition groups by forming a Democratic Alliance (DA) on 27 March. Its founding statement rejected dialogue with Egypt, opposed Jordanian representation of the Palestinians, and advocated a closer alliance with Syria and the USSR, but despite this militancy, the DA was encouraged by a joint declaration of Soviet and Syrian support for Palestinian national unity on 14 March, and by South Yemen and Algeria, to offer a dialogue with Fateh.[5]

The dialogue commenced on 18 April and culminated, after four rounds of talks in Algiers and Aden, in an agreement signed on 13 July in the presence of senior representatives of the Yemeni Socialist Party and Algerian FLN. The Aden–Algiers accord, as it was known, condemned Arafat's visit to Cairo and pledged to cease contact with Egypt, opposed formation of a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation, rejected the Reagan plan and the Israeli Labour Party's 'Jordanian option', and called for improvement of relations with Syria.[6] Looking inwards, the signatories renewed their commitment to national unity and democratic dialogue, and promised to increase the powers of the PLO central council. This would give it greater authority over the executive committee, which would in turn form a secretariat to oversee daily political management, the implication in both cases being to limit the ability of either Fateh or Arafat to monopolize PLO affairs and take unilateral decisions.[7] Fateh also agreed to recognize the PCP as a formal member of the PNC, and to allow the PCP, PLF, and PPSF to take up seats on the executive committee, for the first time ever.

The Syrian-backed opposition reacted angrily to the Aden–Algiers accord. Qaddumi had visited Damascus at the beginning of July for talks with Asad, but the president's refusal to deal with Arafat and Fateh's own insistence on the cessation of Syrian support for the dissidents made reconciliation impossible.[8] Parallel attempts by the DA to engage the other opposition groups in dialogue also broke down. On 9 July the Fateh dissidents, who had recently assumed the name of Fateh–Provisional Command (Fateh–PC), Saʿiqa, PF–GC, and the PPSF formed the rival National Alliance (NA).[9] (The PCP–Provisional Command, a splinter group that had broken away under ʿArabi ʿAwwad in October 1982, supported the NA but did not join it.) The new coalition criticized the DA bitterly for conducting a dialogue with 'Arafat's central committee' and immediately rejected the Aden–Algiers accord when it was published.[10] The NA was especially irritated that the DA had agreed to convene the PNC on 15 September, considering that Fateh had not yet conceded on outstanding disputes.

The PLO effort to convene the PNC now became the focus of contention. The NA described it towards the end of August as a deliberate attempt to split the PLO, while PNC speaker Fahum, who resided in Damascus, argued that the

council should not convene until all Palestinian groups had come to an understanding.[11] If the opposition was not heeded, he warned, it might establish a second PLO enjoying the recognition of several Arab states.[12] Asad revealed the importance he attached to the matter by flying to Algiers on 27 August, in order to secure the support of Algerian president al-Chadhli Benjedid for the postponement of the PNC. At this point the PFLP, which had been the most reluctant to repair relations with Arafat, broke ranks with the DA; it made attendance at the PNC dependent on 'completing the national dialogue' and securing the unanimous approval of the Aden–Algiers accord by Algeria, South Yemen, and, more significantly, Syria.[13]

These were patently impossible conditions. Mediation by South Yemeni president ʿAli Nasir Muhammad in mid-September failed to sway Asad or the NA, but South Yemen and Algeria informed the PLO that they would not host the PNC until there was mutual consent.[14] Complaining bitterly of this stance, Fateh central committee member Khalaf revealed that the PLO had asked the Greek government for permission to convene the council on board a rented passenger ship in Greek waters.[15] This was a theatrical gesture, since Baghdad and Amman had both been offered as venues; on 1 October Fateh opted for the Jordanian capital, confident that it could secure the attendance of the statutory two-thirds of council members.[16] The NA roundly condemned the decision and announced a boycott; the PFLP accused Fateh of forming a council composed of 'one colour' and lacking a legal quorum, and joined the opposition boycott.[17] Undeterred, the PLO executive committee decided formally on 5 November to convene the PNC and, when Fahum refused to do so, Arafat issued the invitations to its members in his capacity as chairman.

The PNC opened in Amman on 22 November, attended by 257 of 374 accredited delegates. Fateh assured a quorum, in part, by substituting loyalists for those former members of its official delegation who had joined the dissidents. It did the same with representatives of the mass organizations who belonged to Fateh, regardless of whether or not the original delegates had been elected by their union conferences. The PLF, which had effectively split three ways, was represented by the wing headed by Muhammad ʿAbbas Zaydan and ʿAli Ishaq, while ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim and Talʿat Yaʿqub remained in Damascus. The seats belonging to Saʿiqa and the PF–GC were similarly assigned to cadres who had broken away during the battle of Tripoli, while the ALF, which had loyally supported Arafat throughout, retained its usual share. Yet the fact that the mainstream leadership resorted to devices of dubious legality did not mean that it lacked broad support, nor that the PNC ran a serious risk of remaining inquorate. The DFLP quietly instructed those of its delegates who resided in Amman to be ready to attend the PNC if it became necessary to ensure the quorum, despite joining the formal boycott under Syrian and Soviet pressure.[18] Besides, popular interest was intense, and Jordanian television broadcast the debate live to audiences in the occupied territories and Syria.

The rift with Syria dominated much of Fateh's official address to the PNC,

which was delivered by Khalaf. He revived the long-standing accusation that Syria had sought hegemony over the Palestinian movement since 1976, and reproached it once again for leaving the IDF to conduct its siege of Beirut throughout summer 1982. It had subsequently robbed the PLO of its victory in Beirut, he insisted, by employing 'Palestinian killers' to carry out the rebellion in Fateh and the offensive against Tripoli in 1983.[19] The dispute could ultimately be reduced to the fact that 'Syria under the rule of this regime does not [back] the independent Palestinian state . . . nor the PLO as sole legitimate representative of independent decision[-making]'.[20] Khalaf next indicated the direction of PLO diplomacy by strongly advocating the resumption of ties with Egypt, despite its adherence to the peace treaty with Israel. 'We know that seven years of curses against Camp David have taken us neither forward nor back', he explained, 'we must establish this relationship, and Egypt must assume its [role].'[21]

The references to Egypt underlined the determination of the mainstream PLO leadership to pursue an autonomous diplomatic strategy, but a special relationship with Jordan was central to making it viable. King Husayn had stood firmly by a 'free and legitimate PLO' during its internal crisis, despite a series of attacks by the Abu Nidal faction that had left six Jordanian diplomats abroad dead or wounded since October 1983, and he now sought to persuade the PNC of the need to chart a new course.[22] In a careful but frank 35-minute address, he urged the delegates to endorse UNSCR 242 and the 'territory for peace' formula as the basis for face-to-face negotiations, which would be held at an international peace conference attended by the PLO, on an equal footing with the other parties. He avoided mention of a joint delegation or future confederation, but stressed that 'the international position at large is one that perceives the possibility of restoring the occupied territories through a Jordanian–Palestinian formula'. Should the council decide nonetheless on 'going it alone' without Jordan, he added, 'then we say to you "Godspeed: you have our support". In the final analysis, the decision is yours.'[23]

In the event, the PNC concluded on 29 November with a general call for continued 'dialogue and coordination' with Jordan and renewed its support for an eventual confederation between an independent Palestinian state and the kingdom.[24] It also endorsed a diplomatic strategy based on 'all UN resolutions relating to the Palestine question', but withheld from accepting UNSCR 242 specifically. The PNC also praised Egyptian support for the PLO during the internal crisis of 1983, and empowered the executive committee to discuss the administrative and legal needs of Palestinian residents in Egypt with the relevant authorities. Most significantly, the leadership was authorized to develop the bilateral relationship, subject to Egyptian reaffirmation of the PLO as sole Palestinian representative and to continue PLO rejection of the Camp David accords.[25] This was a considerable victory for Arafat, who had won the diplomatic leeway he sought.

The leaders of the NA, who had used Syrian government media to launch

bitter attacks on the mainstream PLO leadership over the preceding week, denounced the PNC resolutions with predictable vehemence.[26] Diverging clearly from the DA, Habash asserted that Arafat was firmly set 'on the path of alliance with the Camp David regime [Egypt] and the Jordanian regime, and at the same time of enmity towards Syria . . . [Arafat] is saying by his alliance with Jordan that he is indirectly with US imperialism . . . The alliance of Husni Mubarak, king Husayn, Saddam Husayn, and Arafat will not achieve anything that is nationalist for us.'[27] Violence followed. The Abu Nidal faction, which accused Arafat and PLO and Fateh security chiefs Khalaf and ʿAbd-al-Hamid of working for the CIA and Israeli Mossad, was believed responsible for an abortive attack on a Jordanian diplomat in Athens and the murder of a second in Bucharest in the last two months of the year, apparently acting on Syrian orders.[28] It was also suspected of the assassination in Amman on 29 December of PLO executive committee member Fahd al-Qawasma, although a PLO investigation later showed dissident leader ʿAmla to be responsible.[29] In either case, Wazir insisted, the order had come from Asad, the embodiment of 'Arab Zionism'.[30]

The death of Qawasma had little impact on PLO policy. In his New Year message on 1 January 1985, Arafat stated bluntly that Egypt 'deserves of us a serious and responsible effort to enable it to recover its historic Arab role'.[31] Asad replied irately four days later that 'the most dangerous thing facing the Palestine question and the Palestinian people is the plot that is being concocted through the slogan of independent Palestinian decision-making'.[32] It was against this background that Arafat and king Husayn announced on 11 February that they had formulated a draft statement of the principles for achieving peace with Israel. The Amman accord, as it was known, called for total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for 'comprehensive peace as established in UN and Security Council resolutions'. That this included Israel was more clearly indicated in the confirmation that negotiations would involve 'all parties to the conflict'. As remarkable was the statement that the 'Palestinians will exercise their inalienable right of self-determination when Jordanians and Palestinians are able to do so within the context of the formation of the proposed confederated Arab states of Jordan and Palestine'. Not only did this tie Palestinian statehood to confederation with Jordan, but the PLO also committed itself to forming 'a joint delegation (joint Jordanian–Palestinian Delegation)' to the peace talks.[33]

The Amman accord triggered a veritable storm of protest. The PFLP decried the 'destructive, divisive path' of the mainstream PLO leadership, while Syria described the Jordanian–PLO agreement as 'treason'.[34] The dissidents and Abu Nidal faction announced that they were forming a joint command intended to defeat the accord and topple Arafat.[35] Even the DFLP, which had directed much of its public invective during the PNC at king Husayn, condemned the accord as a reformulation of US proposals.[36] Fateh central committee member Qaddumi also joined the attack, firmly rejecting UNSCR 242, the Reagan plan,

and the Camp David accords.[37] Khalaf was more circumspect, arguing that the Amman accord was in harmony with PNC resolutions, but adding that it neither endorsed UNSCR 242 nor empowered Jordan to negotiate on behalf of the PLO.[38] However they, like other central committee members, had apparently only seen the draft initially proposed by Arafat to the king, rather than the final text.[39]

Under pressure from both the PLO executive committee and the Fateh central committee, Arafat made a half-hearted attempt to modify the accord over the next week. The king was unyielding, and the executive committee finally ratified the accord on 19 February, insisting all the while that it still rejected UNSCR 242, the Reagan plan, and a Jordanian mandate (*tafwid*) to represent the Palestinians.[40] To defuse continuing opposition, the PLO leaked its own version of the Amman accord; this confused the wording of several articles, prompting Jordan to release the official text on 23 February. King Husayn confirmed the worst suspicions of the Palestinian opposition by clarifying that in his interpretation, the reference to UN Security Council resolutions meant UNSCR 242, which he regarded as 'the common denominator of all the initiatives to resolve the Palestine issue'.[41]

PLO ratification of the Amman accord signalled a final rupture in Palestinian ranks. The DFLP and PCP, which had held out hope of reconciliation with the mainstream leadership, now rejected the accord outright.[42] Qadhdhafi described it as treasonous, while Egyptian president Mubarak only poured oil on the fire by suggesting an immediate start to direct, bilateral negotiations between the joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation and Israel, rather than await the formation of a unified Arab delegation to conduct comprehensive talks.[43] The PLO declined the latter suggestion and hurriedly reaffirmed its commitment to a collective Arab presence at an international peace conference.[44] Algeria expressed its displeasure by refusing to host a meeting of the PLO central council, and joined Libya, South Yemen, and Syria in calling for the steadfastness front to reconvene.

Syria now took the lead in organizing the Palestinian opposition, and its call for a broad anti-Arafat front was echoed by Jibril and Habash.[45] Statements by king Husayn and Jordanian foreign minister Tahir al-Masri in the second half of March, confirming that Arafat had accepted UNSCR 242 as a basis for peace talks, pushed matters to a head.[46] On 25 March the PFLP, PF–GC, Sa'iqa, PPSF, PLF, and Fateh dissidents announced the establishment of a new alliance, the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF). The PNSF cast itself as the 'protector of the PLO and national unity', but its central aim was to 'lead the PLO and topple Arafat'.[47] Heading it was Fahum, who still regarded himself as PNC speaker; the opposition had not accepted the meeting in Amman as a legal session, and refused to recognize the new speaker it had elected, sheikh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sayih.

The PNC session of November 1984 had reflected the transition from consensus to majority politics within the Palestinian arena, but the Amman accord

revealed the difficulties of defining, let alone maintaining, a nominal majority in a movement based in a scattered exile and subject to the conflicting pressures of different Arab hosts. The appearance of a rival structure such as the PNSF that might challenge its representative status threatened the Fateh-dominated PLO leadership, in particular because the polarization of Palestinian politics now deprived it of the claim to speak for the most important members of the opposition. PLF co-leader Talʿat Yaʿqub, who had previously adopted a centrist position in the PLO dispute, now aligned his faction with that of the militant ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim to join the PNSF. Most significant, however, was the PFLP decision to abandon the DA in favour of a leading role in the Syrian-backed PNSF. This reflected its long-standing conviction that Syria had a 'big role to play' as the cornerstone of any Arab front against Israel, and explained in part the belief, voiced by Habash in December 1984, that Arafat was a willing actor in the plot to 'encircle and confuse Syria . . . which refuses to follow the American initiative'.[48] The two remaining members of the DA, the DFLP and PCP, issued a joint statement condemning the Amman accord at the end of March, but were ostracized by the PNSF for refusing to take their opposition to the mainstream PLO leadership further.[49]

The Camps War

Seen from Damascus, the alliance with Jordan and reconciliation with Egypt were not the only threats posed by the PLO to Syrian strategic interests in early 1985. Of added importance was the growing presence in Lebanon of Fateh, which had steadily rebuilt a clandestine military capability over the preceding year. The opportunity to do so had come with the collapse of the Lebanese government in February 1984, following an uprising by an alliance of Amal and LNM militias. This was followed by the withdrawal of the multinational peacekeeping force and the formation of a caretaker cabinet on 5 March. Its first act was to abrogate the Lebanese–Israeli troop withdrawal agreement of 17 May 1983, and on 30 April president Jmayyil appointed Rashid Karami to head a national unity government, in which Amal leader Nabih Birri and PSP leader Walid Junblat took up ministerial posts. The change of government came as an immense relief for the Palestinian refugee community. Following earlier clashes with Lebanese militiamen at the end of December 1983, the army had brushed aside the Italian peacekeepers to enter the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps and detain over 500 Palestinians.[50] UNRWA recorded the abduction or murder of 28 others by unidentified gunmen in the two months up to February 1984, while Palestinian homes and shops were dynamited on 26 occasions.

A number of veteran Fateh officers took advantage of the change of government in Lebanon to return illicitly. They set up 'safe houses', communications

networks, and weapons stores in Beirut and Tripoli and revived dormant sections of the local organization; Fateh claimed 1,000 members in the Biqaʿ Valley alone, for example.[51] It initially avoided the refugee camps, however, where the opposition and Syrian intelligence kept close watch for 'Arafatists'.[52] Conversely, the PSP and DFLP gave covert assistance, providing fake military passes and helping to smuggle Fateh personnel and weapons through Syrian or Amal checkpoints, while mainly Sunni militias, such as the Tawhid movement in Tripoli and Popular Nasirite Organization (PNO) and *Jamaʿa Islamiyya* in Sidon, offered shelter and contacts.[53] The DFLP had in fact taken hundreds of loyalist Fateh members into its ranks since 1983, as a tacit means of enabling them to remain in Lebanon or Syria while escaping Syrian or dissident wrath.[54] Some Fateh dissidents were themselves willing, for that matter, to turn a blind eye as their former loyalist colleagues started to extend into the refugee camps.[55] By mid-year, Fateh had organized a regular flow of personnel and funds to Lebanon, allowing it to establish a formal payroll, expand recruitment, and purchase weapons and supplies.

As a result of this build-up, Fateh resumed its role in the guerrilla campaign against the IDF in Lebanon. It was hardly alone: the PFLP and DFLP cooperated actively with the LCP, LCAO, and ASAP, which together operated as the Lebanese National Resistance Front, while Amal and the nascent Hizbullah played an increasingly prominent part, along with myriad smaller groups of various ideological persuasions.[56] Guerrilla attacks had risen from 15 in September 1982 to 64 in May 1983, and then declined during the September mountain war, but climbed again to an average of 75–80 a month by summer 1984. Increased Israeli patrolling at sea and air strikes on suspected guerrilla bases on 14 occasions in 1984 had minimal impact; nor did the assassination of a key Fateh military coordinator in a dissident ambush near Tripoli in July. The reconstruction of Fateh clandestine networks in and around the refugee camps of the south led to a marked upsurge of activity from September; it claimed the loss of 60 members in anti-Israeli attacks by February 1985.[57] The IDF, for its part, lost 28 dead and 275 wounded in nearly 900 attacks during 1984, taking its total death toll since June 1982 to just over 600.[58] The overall cost of its military involvement in Lebanon had already reached $4.5 billion by spring 1984, at which time the expense of maintaining its occupation was running at $200–250 million annually.[59]

The IDF gradually reduced its garrison in Lebanon to 10,000 at the end of 1984, from 30,000 a year earlier. On 16 February 1985 it pulled out of Sidon, prompting a dramatic rise in guerrilla attacks, which reached 160 in February and 200 in March. The IDF next withdrew from most of the Nabatiyya district on 11 April, releasing 750 prisoners from the Ansar prison camp and transferring the remaining 1,100 to Israel. It then evacuated the Tyre district, Baruk mountain, and Jizzin area by 29 April, and pulled out of the Biqaʿ Valley to Hasbayya at the beginning of June. Some 60 suspected collaborators were killed in its wake, while the Israeli-armed 'national guard' collapsed

and the SLA lost 1,000 defectors.[60] The Maronite Lebanese Forces were also expelled from Sidon, but regrouped to attack the Miyya-wa-Miyya refugee camp on 29 March, killing 40 civilians. Fateh had already sent 20 officers to ʿAyn al-Hilwa earlier in the month, and landed another 450 guerrillas from its camps in Algeria and Yemen by sea on 29–31 March.[61] Maronite shelling inflicted 110 casualties among the refugees and prompted 30,000 others to flee, but the guerrillas counter-attacked on 31 March and swiftly captured the overlooking hills, aided by a Lebanese army battalion that mutinied against its command. The IDF withdrawal from Nabatiyya led to renewed clashes, and on 20 April a joint Lebanese–Palestinian offensive routed the Lebanese Forces from dozens of villages in the Iqlim al-Tuffah and Nabatiyya districts.

The resurgence of Fateh in the Sidon area, following closely as it did on the conclusion of the Amman accord and the formation of the PNSF, thoroughly alarmed Syria. At the end of April it bluntly accused Arafat of attempting to 'ignite Lebanon', and argued that he (along with the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, Oman, and Iraq) was one of the 'worn-out instruments that US policy depends on'.[62] Syrian anger intensified after the PLO and Jordan launched a new diplomatic initiative on 8 May, as Arafat and king Husayn separately visited the capitals of one or other of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to lobby for support for the Amman accord. The PNSF, which had done little since its establishment, reconvened at Syrian urging and ostentatiously assigned various duties to its members.[63] Khaddam attacked the 'rightist deviation' of Arafat, who aimed to 'liquidate the Palestine cause', and vowed that the 'Arafat–Husayn agreement' would be overthrown just as the Lebanese–Israeli troop withdrawal agreement had.[64]

Also alarmed was Amal, which feared that the reappearance of Fateh in south Lebanon might provide Israel with reason to prolong its occupation of mainly Shiʿite areas or resume reprisal raids. The death of 20 Fateh guerrillas at sea and capture of eight others on their way to attack military targets in Tel Aviv on 22 April was a case in point, as was the death of five guerrillas off the coast of Tyre on 8 May. The potential revival of the traditional alliance between Fateh and the Sunni militias in Sidon and Beirut was equally worrying, not least because it would threaten the fragile integrity of the Lebanese state, in which Amal was staking a major claim for the Shiʿite community. As Amal military commander ʿAkif Haydar later explained, the Shiʿites were now the primary victims of 'the clash between the logic of the [Lebanese] state and the logic of the [Palestinian] revolution'.[65] Other officials stressed that 'following the unconditional withdrawal of the [Israeli] occupation, there will be no guerilla action, Lebanese or Palestinian, unless it is part of a comprehensive Arab strategy'.[66] Amal demonstrated its resolve by mounting a two-day offensive (with the PSP) in west Beirut against the Nasirite Murabitun, the Sunni-led militia long allied to Fateh, killing dozens and driving hundreds into hiding on 17–19 April. Unable to prevent the violence, the Karami government resigned. By now Amal was believed to field 8,000–10,000 full-time militiamen, rising to 20,000

when fully mobilized, and exerted considerable influence over the army's 6th Brigade.

Amal had initially permitted Palestinian guerrillas to enter the refugee camps on short-term passes following the uprising of February 1984, but changed radically after its victory in Beirut. It now set up checkpoints around the refugee camps of Beirut and Tyre, and particularly impeded the entry of visitors from Sidon. As it did so, however, it alienated its former ally, the PSP, which perceived a bid by Amal for outright control of the capital. Finally, following an altercation between local militiamen, Amal launched a massive infantry and artillery attack on the Sabra and Shatila camps towards midnight on 19 May, citing provocation by 'Arafatist fighters'.[67] The attackers, estimated at 2,000, heavily outnumbered and outgunned the 250–300 defenders in Sabra and Shatila and 500–600 in nearby Burj al-Barajna, but the latter counter-attacked vigorously under the command of clandestine Fateh officers. Two truces came and went the next day as the 6th Brigade and army armour intervened in support of Amal, which mounted repeated 'human-wave' attacks and extended the battle to Burj al-Barajna. Amal repeatedly promised to 'decide the issue by evening, and regain control over the camps', but was instead pushed out of the Fakhani district and nearby Tariq al-Jadida, where Lebanese Sunni militiamen suddenly wrested control.[68]

Amal faced a further unexpected setback when PNSF and DFLP artillery in the ʿAlay mountain intervened on 22 May, pouring up to 500 shells and rockets on Amal positions and targeting the Shiʿite southern suburbs two days later. The PSP reportedly smuggled 150 Fateh guerrillas into Burj al-Barajna in the next few days, while dissident officers transported reinforcements and ammunition for the loyalists, albeit without the knowledge of their command.[69] Sympathetic Sunnis in the Lebanese army similarly assisted the Palestinian defenders, as did some Amal members who had formerly belonged to Fateh.[70] Clandestine Fateh members and Lebanese allies meanwhile waged an urban guerrilla campaign, mounting 85 attacks on Amal and army targets in Beirut by 3 June. Frustrated Amal militiamen killed dozens of Palestinian civilians in revenge and detained 2,000 in other parts of the capital in the same period, prompting at least 15,000 more to seek refuge in areas under PSP control and other main cities.[71] By then Amal and the 6th Brigade had lost at least 170 dead and 430 wounded.[72] Their preponderance told nonetheless, and they had boxed the defence into Shatila by 26 May. No more ground was given, but the camps were subjected to a total blockade of food, fuel, and medicine. The lack of surgical equipment and antibiotics led to high mortality rates, with 47 out of 267 wounded in Shatila alone dying of their injuries by mid-June.[73]

The intervention of the Palestinian opposition in the battle had come as a rude shock to Syria. It ordered the PNSF and DFLP to cease artillery fire, blocked their reinforcements and combat resupply, demanded full personnel lists and detailed inventories of weapons and ammunition, and suspended publication of the PFLP, DFLP, and PF–GC weeklies.[74] Habash wisely left Syria

at the end of May, prompting the authorities to impose a travel ban on other Palestinian leaders. They also detained 500 refugees during five days of protests in the Yarmuk camp—unconfirmed reports spoke of 30 Palestinian dead and 1,800 arrested throughout Syria—[75] while ten refugees were killed in similar disturbances in the Nahr al-Barid camp on 26 May. Even the PF–GC was not immune; several guerrillas were arrested after confronting Amal and Syrian troops at the Wavell camp. The PF–GC also lost politically in another way: it concluded an exchange of prisoners with Israel on 20 May, in which it returned three Israeli servicemen captured in 1982 and obtained the release of 1,150 Palestinians from Israeli jails, of whom some 600 were allowed to return to their homes in the occupied territories, but this drama was overshadowed by the camps war. Unsure of Palestinian loyalties, the Syrian command subsequently withdrew the PLA Hittin Forces from Lebanon and ordered the PLA Badr Forces back to Jordan.[76] Amal leader Birri was openly bitter about the role of the members of the PNSF, sneering that they 'have fallen into the trap set by Arafat . . . they are his best pupils'.[77]

Both Amal and Syria were coming under political pressure in the meantime. A unanimous vote by the UN Security Council for a ceasefire on 1 June allowed the evacuation of 79 wounded and 40 corpses from Burj al-Barajna and the burial of 40 dead in Shatila, but Amal resumed the systematic demolition of the Daʿuq and Hursh quarters of Sabra and Shatila the next day, provoking a wave of protest from Sunni political and religious leaders; defence minister ʿAdil ʿUsayran complained that he had not authorized participation by the 6th Brigade in the siege.[78] Amal relented slightly, allowing 83 more dead in Shatila to be buried, but Shiʿite gunmen reacted to a meeting of the council of foreign ministers of the League of Arab States by commandeering a Jordanian airliner and blowing it up on the ground at Beirut airport on 9 June. Another Amal group hijacked a TWA aircraft to Beirut, where Birri, negotiating on their behalf, demanded the release of 766 Lebanese prisoners from Israeli prisons.[79] Amal exploited this distraction to attack the Mar Ilyas refugee camp on 9 June and launch massive 'human wave' assaults on Shatila six days later, backed by the Lebanese army with armour and artillery and by the Asad Battalion of the pro-Syrian wing of the Baʿth Party; the PNSF defied Syrian orders and resumed its shelling, prompting an exhausted Amal finally to accept a lasting ceasefire on 17 June.[80]

The camps war had cost the lives of 638 people in the refugee camps and caused injury to 2,500, 80 per cent of whom were civilians.[81] Palestinians abducted elsewhere in Beirut and later killed numbered over 100; mass graves were still being discovered at the end of July.[82] Civilian losses in the Shiʿite suburbs were unknown, but Amal had suffered up to 600 dead and over 1,000 wounded and the army another 300–400 casualties.[83] The PLO later revealed that it had spent or disbursed $37 million for repairs in the camps.[84] As significant was the impact that the camps war had on political relations between Syria and the Palestinian opposition. The alliance was sorely tested, as indeed was the loyalty of Palestinian personnel in Lebanon, who were unwilling to obey in-

structions from leaders in Damascus to remain neutral in the conflict. This prompted a determined Syrian effort to bring its various allies to heel, starting with the PNSF, which issued a statement after meeting president Asad on 25 June reaffirming the alliance.[85] The DFLP also came under intense pressure, as a result of which Hawatma and such politburo members as Qays al-Samarra'i pressed its field command to expel Fateh personnel from the ranks and to distance itself from Fateh militarily and politically.[86]

Syria undertook additional measures during the summer to contain the apparent threat from Fateh. Sporadic clashes between Syrian troops and allied Lebanese militiamen and the Islamist Tawhid movement had left 360 casualties by mid-September, while the PNO was pressured into confiscating a Fateh arms shipment on 20 July. Four days later Khaddam stated that Syria 'is determined to confront the line of Arafat and intends to take deterrent measures, by land and sea, in order to prevent repetition of the smuggling of weapons to those loyal to him in the camps of Sidon and the south'.[87] Amal, the PNSF, PNO, and a grouping of pro-Syrian parties in Lebanon now agreed to form a joint security committee which, with the assistance of Syrian observers, would track down 'agents of Israel and members of the capitulationist Arafatist line' and block arms supplies to the refugee camps.[88] Two days later Fateh dissidents acting on the orders of ʿAmla shot dead a loyalist battalion commander and three aides near Sidon; three more loyalists were killed in the next five weeks.[89] This followed the earlier assassination by Syrian intelligence of a former Fateh activist and his entire family in Beirut in mid-July, in response to his role in bringing independently minded Sunni and Shiʿite clerics and Islamist thinkers together in a joint body.

The continuing Syrian campaign against Fateh inevitably affected the refugee camps of Beirut, which remained under partial siege; Amal was especially concerned to prevent the entry of building materials.[90] In July the Syrian army donated 46 T-54 tanks to Amal, which announced that 500 militiamen had undergone training in armoured combat, while allied units of the Lebanese army received another 32 T-54s.[91] There were brief clashes at Burj al-Barajna and Burj al-Shamali on 22 July, and Amal later revealed that it had arrested Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in the Tyre district accused of smuggling weapons to Fateh and Hizbullah.[92] Burj al-Barajna was again targeted in mid-August, and was subjected to a week-long offensive in early September that left 53 dead, including 19 refugees killed by vengeful Amal militiamen in one incident, and 250 wounded. The arrival of Syrian army observers the next day marked its first overt presence in Beirut since summer 1982.

The PLO Adrift

The violence around Burj al-Barajna was now overtaken by a series of dramatic events, starting with the murder on 25 September of three Israeli yachters in Cyprus by Fateh's Force 17, which alleged the victims to be Mossad agents

spying on the PLO's 'sea bridge' to Lebanon. Israel retaliated by bombing PLO headquarters near Tunis on 1 October, killing 73 Palestinians and Tunisians. The UN Security Council condemned the raid, but the PLO lost any political advantage six days later, when PLF gunmen hijacked an Italian passenger ship, the Achille Lauro, on its way to Tel Aviv. The hijackers finally surrendered to Egyptian police in Alexandria, after murdering a crippled American Jewish tourist, and were put on a flight to Tunisia in the company of PLF leader Zaydan. However, US combat aircraft forced the Egyptian Airlines plane to land at a US airbase in Sicily, where Zaydan and his followers were detained; their leader was released following strong Egyptian and Italian protests, but the PLF hijackers were taken into Italian custody and later brought to trial.

The PLF hijack dealt PLO diplomacy a severe blow, not least because of the damage to the relationship with Jordan. The kingdom was under pressure from Israel, which blamed it for providing Wazir with a base to organize an upsurge of armed resistance in the occupied territories. Wazir supervised some 30 'safe houses' in Amman, in which members of the clandestine networks were trained and briefed, and arranged additional training at the Fateh camp in Jordan, which was under the nominal control of the PLA Badr Forces. A total of 349 attacks were conducted in the occupied territories in 1984, in which five Israelis died and 108 were wounded, but the monthly average more than doubled during 1985. Israeli prime minister Peres was reported to have used US diplomatic channels to request the expulsion of PLO leaders from Jordan at the end of August, while deputy chief-of-staff Don Shomron urged the same in public.[93] By late September the tension between the PLO and Jordan was such that Fateh central committee member Khalaf publicly accused Jordanian intelligence of deliberately sowing dissent between the two sides.[94]

Most important to the decline of relations with Jordan, however, was the continuing inability of the mainstream PLO leadership to defuse Soviet, Arab, and Palestinian opposition and its stubborn unwillingness to accept US conditions for a formal dialogue. The Achille Lauro incident pushed matters to a head, prompting king Husayn to state openly that there was now a need to reassess relations with the PLO.[95] The PLO, which had anxiously suspended the membership of Zaydan in the executive committee, suffered a further setback when the British government declined to receive two other committee members who were due to arrive in London on a pre-arranged visit in early November. Taking the advice of Egyptian president Mubarak, Arafat sought to repair the damage to the PLO's diplomatic standing by issuing a formal statement on 7 November that strongly condemned all forms of terrorism and promised disciplinary measures against PLO members who violated this commitment, while implicitly upholding the legitimacy of military action inside Israel and the occupied territories. The Cairo declaration, as it was known, was too little, too late. King Husayn signalled a new alignment with Syria by apologizing publicly for the covert assistance that Jordan had given to the Muslim Brotherhood in the past, and by appointing Zayd al-Rifa'i, known to advocate

close ties with the northern neighbour, as prime minister. Rifaʿi quickly confirmed the alliance by issuing a joint statement with Syrian vice-president Khaddam on 13 November, opposing the conduct of separate or bilateral peace talks with Israel.

The implied abandonment of the Amman accord was not lost on the PLO, which was further discomfited by a new wave of terrorist attacks by the Abu Nidal faction. Nearly 60 passengers died when an Egyptian airliner that had been hijacked to Malta was blown up during a rescue attempt by Egyptian commandos on 25 November; while another 16 people were killed and 118 were wounded when gunmen opened fire indiscriminately on passengers at Rome and Vienna airports on 27 December.[96] The Abu Nidal faction also claimed responsibility for the murder of two Fateh cadres in Jordan on 28 November, and for the assassination on 2 December of West Bank lawyer ʿAziz Shihada, who had long espoused coexistence between a Palestinian state and Israel. The PLO could not afford to lose the special relationship with Jordan, and Arafat spent much of January 1986 in talks with king Husayn and Jordanian officials. The king was merely going through the motions, however. He established contact with Peres later in the month through the offices of US special envoy Richard Murphy, and then came to an informal agreement with the Israeli prime minister during a secret meeting in London in mid-February.[97]

The rift became formal when, in the course of a major policy speech delivered on 19 February, king Husayn announced the suspension of diplomatic and political coordination with the PLO. Among the many reasons he cited for taking this step was PLO refusal to meet US conditions for dialogue and participation in the peace process, although, he revealed, Arafat and key PLO leaders had pledged privately to accept those terms.[98] Jordan had meanwhile come under punitive pressure from the US congress, which was blocking badly needed arms sales to Jordan. The PLO executive committee refuted the king's version of events in a formal statement issued from Tunis on 7 March, but it was relatively restrained otherwise, reiterating its interest in a peaceful settlement based on the Amman accord. It also accused the king of obscuring the role of 'US rejectionism' in defeating the Amman accord, and later released the drafts it had prepared accepting UNSCR 242 and 338 in order to prove its good faith.[99]

The mainstream PLO leadership resisted intense internal pressure to abrogate the Amman accord, but was visibly irritated by the Jordanian campaign to mobilize support in the occupied territories, where the local Palestinian press had received the king's speech with unprecedented condemnation. Seeking to restore its sagging influence, the Jordanian government privately approved the appointment by the Israeli-run civilian administration of Zafir al-Masri, a youthful and well-regarded member of that wealthy local family, as mayor of Nablus. Masri only accepted the post after obtaining the backing of Wazir, with whom he was in secret contact, but was assassinated by the PFLP on 3 March.[100]

Some 50,000 Palestinians attended his funeral, which turned into a massive show of support for the PLO, much to Jordanian chagrin. The government persevered, securing parliamentary approval on 27 March for a new electoral law that increased the number of deputies from 60 to 142, divided evenly between the East and West Banks.[101] At the same time it punished West Bank journalists who had opposed the king's speech of 19 February by refusing them entry to Jordan, and suspended public aid and civil service payments to the occupied territories in mid-April.[102]

The Jordanian government took matters a step further by closing several Fateh offices in Amman at the beginning of April, but most serious was its covert backing for a new split in Fateh ranks. On 8 April, military intelligence head ʿAtallah ʿAtallah announced the launch of a 'corrective movement to combat corruption and political deviation' within the PLO leadership. This was ironic, given his own unsavoury reputation, but he claimed the support of 800 cadres and officers—among them Force 14 (air unit) commander Husayn ʿUwayda and battalion commander Kamal al-Shaykh, later joined by former Karama Forces commander Ghazi ʿAtallah—and 'many more' guerrillas. ʿAtallah later convened a conference attended by 410 supporters, who elected him as caretaker PLO chairman instead of Arafat. This was pure fiction, but the presence at the much-publicized launch of ʿAtallah's movement of PLA Badr Forces commander Naʿim al-Khatib, who was wholly subject to Jordanian military jurisdiction, signalled the direct involvement of the authorities. Official indulgence was also evident when ʿAtallah was allowed to seize Arafat's office on 22 April, and in the deportation on the same day of seven loyalist officers who had refused to join him.

The PLO cautiously refrained from attacking the Jordanian government for its support of ʿAtallah, but a new issue of contention arose after Jordanian army and security personnel entered the Yarmuk University campus to prevent a one-day symbolic strike on 15 May, killing between three and thirty-five students, depending on the account. King Husayn accused the PLO of escalating the clash, which it strenuously denied. Fateh's revolutionary council finally brought matters to a head on 19 June with a belated statement opposing the new Jordanian electoral law of 27 March. The Jordanian government retaliated by closing down remaining Fateh offices and ordering Wazir to leave the kingdom on 7 July. The PLO was suddenly buffeted from a different direction on 21 July, when Moroccan king Hasan broke ranks with the formal Arab boycott of Israel by receiving Peres in Fez. Relations were severely damaged when Labib Hawwari—who doubled as head of the PLO 'chairman's security apparatus' and of *amn al-mandubin* (the security of PLO envoys and representatives abroad)—organized an attempt to smuggle explosives into Morocco, presumably for a retaliatory attack. This led to a second crisis, as the Tunisian authorities requested the transfer of Hawwari to another country and then demanded the removal of the bulk of PLO military personnel when Arafat refused to comply. The PLO chairman relocated his headquarters to Baghdad

and Sanʿa, and signalled his displeasure by avoiding Tunis on all but the rarest occasions in following months.

Jordan had in the meantime launched a major bid to regain its political standing in the occupied territories. It had replaced Tahir Kanʿan as 'minister for the occupied homeland' at the end of April for failing to stem the loss of Palestinian support, and on 31 August announced an ambitious $5 billion development plan for the territories, wholly sidelining the joint steadfastness fund with the PLO.[103] At the end of September the Jordanian government also extended official assistance to the Gaza municipality for the first time, and decreed that Gazan refugees in the kingdom were now entitled to full Jordanian passports with three-year validity instead of the previous one-year travel documents. Israeli defence minister Rabin had called in March for an Israeli–Jordanian 'umbrella' to administer civilian affairs in the occupied territories, and this now took shape as the Amman–Cairo Bank was allowed to reopen its branch in Nablus, Jordanian payments to Palestinian civil servants in the West Bank were resumed, and three new mayors were appointed by mutual consent in various cities.[104] As telling a sign of the functional condominium, though, was the freedom of proselytization enjoyed by ʿAtallah's supporters in the West Bank and the ability of his 'personal representative' to hold an official press conference in east Jerusalem in December.[105]

In Conflict Lies Unity

The PLO had reached a nadir by autumn 1986. The rift with Jordan removed the central pillar of its diplomatic strategy and deprived it of the principal political gain it had derived from the evacuation of Beirut in summer 1982. Having lost its territorial base in Lebanon, the Israeli air raid on Arafat's headquarters in Tunisia in October 1985 and the dispute with the Tunisian government in summer 1986 only reinforced the isolation and peripatetic nature of the PLO leadership. Its struggle for political survival now rested largely on the conscious use of the camps war in Lebanon for political advantage. Internally, to mobilize nationalist sentiment and rebuild the consensus around the legitimacy of the mainstream leadership, and, externally, to reactivate Arab and international interest in Palestinian affairs and reassert the PLO as a significant regional actor.

The reconstruction of its military base in Lebanon had been at most a secondary objective for the PLO leadership until the outbreak of the camps war in May 1985. The conflict offered a means to undermine *pax Syriana* in the country and so counter Syrian threats to PLO diplomacy elsewhere, but even then it remained a sideshow that was useful primarily for its nuisance value. This was reflected in the modest effort made by the PLO to reinforce and resupply the camps around Sidon and Beirut, moving only 150 guerrillas to the latter area in the first nine months after the camps war. The picture changed

fundamentally after the suspension of the Amman accord by king Husayn in February 1986, however. In following months Arafat supervised a substantial expansion of PLO involvement in Lebanon, best symbolized by the resumption of radio broadcasts from an underground station near the ʿAyn al-Hilwa camp in late March.

The PLO build-up came against a backdrop of renewed violence in Lebanon. The trigger was the Syrian-backed tripartite agreement of 28 December 1985, in which the leaders of Amal, the PSP, and Lebanese Forces endorsed an equal division of parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims and granted Syria a special status in Lebanese security. President Jmayyil and Lebanese Forces deputy-commander Samir Jaʿjaʿ rebelled against this surrender of Maronite prerogatives; they drove Forces commander Elie Hubayqa from east Beirut in mid-January 1986, killing 350 to 500 of his supporters in the process, and upgraded covert military ties with Israel.[106] Syria was probably responsible for a series of retaliatory car bombs that inflicted nearly 300 casualties in Maronite areas by early April. Israel intensified Syrian concern by diverting a Libyan airliner to one of its airbases on 3 February, believing the notorious Sabri al-Banna and other Palestinian opposition leaders to be on board; it may have been in response that the Abu Nidal faction attempted to plant a bomb on an El Al 747 flying from London on 17 April, on orders from Syrian air force intelligence, leading to the downgrading of European relations with Syria and deepening its beleaguerment.

Syria could only feel alarm, therefore, when increased naval activity by Fateh drew Israeli air raids on the Miyya-wa-Miyya refugee camp on 27 March and ʿAyn al-Hilwa on 7 April and threatened to provoke wider Israeli intervention. Amal now declared that all military activity in the south had to go through a special operations room under its control, amidst reports that it had come to a secret understanding with Israel to prevent guerrilla attacks by the PLO and Hizbullah.[107] It had already attacked Shatila repeatedly on 28–30 March, but blamed the clashes on Arafat, whom it accused of seeking 'to create disturbances in the camps . . . in order to embarrass Syria'.[108] The PNSF disputed this, however, and the PFLP suggested that factions within Amal had instigated the fighting in order to reinforce their position ahead of the general conference that the movement was about to convene.[109] Whatever the case, Amal mounted sporadic attacks on Burj al-Barajna from 5 to 10 April, taking the total toll to 46 dead and nearly 200 wounded. It had made no gains, but Syrian intelligence scored a notable success when information from the dissident commander in Beirut, Ibrahim Hammad, allowed it to capture Samih Nasr and Abu al-Fath, the Fateh officers heading the defence in Shatila and Burj al-Barajna, at Amal checkpoints in the next fortnight.

The camps war was causing severe strains within Amal, in its relations with other Lebanese militias, and in relations between Syria and its regional allies. This was revealed at the Amal conference in mid-April, as Birri faced a challenge from politburo member Ahmad Hashim, who was reportedly friendly to

Fateh and opposed to the war against the camps.[110] Birri swayed the conference in the event, warning that 'the growth of Palestinian military presence in Lebanon poses a threat to us, because it leads to a second war with Israel; it will also disrupt security and political stability in Lebanon'.[111] However, the resumption of sporadic firefights around the refugee camps on 19 May finally degenerated on 1 June into widespread clashes in west Beirut between Amal on the one hand, and the PSP and mainly Sunni Sixth of February Movement on the other, leaving 30 dead and 70 wounded in the next three days. Syria was equally worried by the active mediation efforts of Iran and Algeria; to pre-empt outside involvement it pressured Amal and the PNSF into forming a joint operations room on 5 June and signing a new security agreement nine days later.[112]

Seeking political advantage, Arafat published a formal proposal on 17 June for the formation of an Arab or UN peacekeeping force to protect the refugee camps in Lebanon.[113] Khaddam responded to this challenge on 20 June by proposing the deployment of 2,000 PNSF fighters in the camps. Greatly alarmed, Birri warned that PNSF personnel 'would become Arafatists the moment they reach [the outskirts of Beirut]' and ordered a pre-emptive bombardment of Burj al-Barajna the next day.[114] The Syrian response was equally swift. Palestinian artillery in the ʿAlay mountain launched a sudden barrage against the southern suburbs of Beirut, prompting Amal to cease fire five hours after it had started. It vented its frustration in the Tyre district, where 250 Palestinian families were expelled from the Jal al-Bahar refugee camp on 27 June, but pulled back when 150 Syrian commandos and 1,000 Lebanese army soldiers deployed around Shatila and Burj al-Barajna on 2 July. By then Palestinian casualties since 19 May stood at 96 dead and 524 wounded, while Amal and the 6th Brigade had lost 150–200 dead and 700–1,000 wounded.[115]

The slight easing of the siege allowed Fateh to infiltrate new commanders to Shatila and Burj al-Barajna, ʿAli Abu-Tawq and Sultan Abu-al-ʿAynayn. Abu-Tawq, who had led the reconstruction of Fateh's clandestine organization in west Beirut since early 1984, now built on relations developed during years of service in the capital and Shiʿite areas of the south before 1982 to build new support networks, extending even into Amal.[116] The initial defence of Shatila had been bolstered by such home-made devices as blankets sewn into sandbags and catapults made out of the inner tubes of car tyres that were used to launch hand grenades. Now, with the additional help of the PSP and Hizbullah in particular, the defenders acquired an estimated 100,000 sandbags, pumps for the artesian wells it now dug, and fax machines for communication with PLO headquarters in Tunis, stockpiled food and fuel, and equipped the field hospitals that the PRCS and foreign medical volunteers ran in Shatila and Burj al-Barajna.[117] The other guerrilla groups joined the unified command led by Fateh in each camp, and assisted the expansion of the tunnels under Shatila until they could shelter the entire population. The Fateh dissidents provoked a number of incidents with the loyalists and were accused by the PLO of passing information

on fortification work to Syrian intelligence and Amal, but otherwise accepted the authority of the unified commands without joining them.[118]

These measures stood the camps in good stead, as violence escalated in the rest of the country. The continuing rivalry between Syria and the Lebanese Forces was believed responsible for six car bombs that left 720 civilian casualties in both halves of the capital between 28 July and 14 August, while a Syrian-backed attempt by Hubayqa to invade east Beirut ended in a fiasco and another 62 dead and 200 wounded. Israeli aircraft also struck Palestinian bases on nine occasions during the summer, while the guerrillas rocketed northern settlements six times and lost three naval teams in the same period. Fateh maintained the flow of reinforcements to Lebanon in the meantime; an estimated 3,500 guerrillas reached Sidon by sea between April and October, despite Israeli naval interdiction and the assassination of Fateh naval commander Ma'mun Mraysh in Athens on 22 October.[119] By then loyalist strength around Sidon stood at 6,000–7,000, besides the local militia and civilian organization, with another 1,000 in the Beirut camps.

Encouraged by the steady increase of Fateh strength in Lebanon, Arafat ordered selective military escalation in the Beirut area during the summer. His purpose was twofold: to provoke violent responses from Amal and so dramatize the Palestinian plight to international public opinion, and to demonstrate his ability to discredit *pax Syriana* and so coerce the Syrian leadership into relaxing its own anti-PLO campaign. One means to this end was to instruct the infamous Hawwari to organize attacks on Syrian intelligence agents in Beirut. More cynical still were the directions Arafat issued to certain loyalists in the camps, with whom he maintained contact by wireless or telephone, to sabotage the ceasefire with Amal deliberately.[120] Abu-Tawq, who had made a determined effort to ensure strict Palestinian observance of the ceasefire and to conduct a discreet dialogue with interlocutors in Amal, remonstrated strongly with Arafat, as did other Fateh commanders. The PLO chairman responded with the simple expedient of undermining the authority of his recalcitrant subordinates by diverting the payroll to other officers, until the battle with Amal compelled them to accept his dictate. There was a price to pay: at one point a Fateh commander in the Sidon region complained that rival factions in the refugee camps were on permanent alert against each other and warned that as a result 'our [political] credit with the masses is below zero. There is anger and regret at the return of the revolution's forces, and if things stay as they are the forces and everyone else will be expelled by the people of the camp'.[121] However, in September an opinion poll conducted where it mattered more politically—in the occupied territories—showed the potency of Arafat's general policy: his popularity stood at 74 per cent—despite the divisive impact of the Amman accord and the opposition of the DFLP, PCP, and PFLP—against Maragha's 1 per cent.[122]

The intensification of the feud with Syria coincided with the predicament of the PLO following its rift with Tunisia and the relocation of its main headquar-

ters to Iraq. Possibly to deepen its embarrassment, the Abu Nidal faction hijacked a Pan Am airliner to Karachi on 5 September; four terrorists were captured after killing 21 passengers and wounding 100 in a shoot-out with Pakistani commandos. In a second attack the next day, two more terrorists were captured after killing 22 Jewish worshippers in a synagogue in Istanbul. This distracted world attention from the food blockade that Amal imposed on the 20,000 refugees of Rashidiyya camp on 8 September. By now, combat losses and defections over the preceding year had reduced Amal strength to an estimated 4,000–6,000 regulars and 6,000–8,000 militiamen and the 6th Brigade to 2,500, with a combined inventory of some 70 tanks.[123] The reluctance of some regional commanders, such as Mahmud al-Faqih in Nabatiyya, to mobilize their followers or to permit deployment of Amal units from other areas was an added constraint.[124] Amal refrained from mounting major attacks, but fitful clashes and continued violence against Palestinian civilians caused 17,270 of 40,000 refugees registered with UNRWA in the Tyre district to leave by the end of October.[125]

A large Amal attack on Rashidiyya on 27 October marked the start in earnest of the third round of the camps war. Hoping to relieve the pressure, a joint Fateh–DFLP force of some 800 guerrillas seized seven suburbs and villages around ʿAyn al-Hilwa in the next 24 hours, threatening Amal communications between the south and Beirut. A stalemate ensued, but a determined Amal assault on Burj al-Barajna on 15 November provoked Palestinian artillery deployed above Beirut to intervene, once again in defiance of Syrian orders. Food and other vital supplies were starting to run low in Rashidiyya and Burj al-Barajna, prompting the assembled commanders of the various guerrilla groups in ʿAyn al-Hilwa to open a major new front in the hope of coercing Amal into lifting its siege. Their resolve hardened when Amal occupied the town of Maghdusha, which had been left neutral by common agreement, on 21 November, posing a direct threat to ʿAyn al-Hilwa. Three days later Fateh and the DFLP seized most of Maghdusha and nearby Zughdrayya in a surprise attack, at the cost of only three dead and seven wounded.[126]

The capture of Maghdusha threatened the entire region to the south of Sidon, and triggered a hurried counter-attack by Amal later in the day. The Palestinian garrison was pushed back under the pressure of repeated human-wave attacks, but the arrival of reinforcements allowed it to regain most of the lost ground by the end of the day in bitter combat. Significantly, the sudden threat by Amal had prompted the local PFLP battalion commander to commit his unit to the battle against the orders of his leadership in Damascus, for which act he was later disciplined.[127] PPSF military commander Hamdan also defied orders to throw a guerrilla company into the fray (and was later placed under house arrest in Damascus), followed by the small contingents belonging to the PF–GC, PLF, PCP, and PCWP, as well as the Abu Nidal faction and the Islamic League.[128] Only the Fateh dissidents refused to join the offensive, to the discomfort of their local commanders. The arrival of DFLP military

commander Mamduh Nawfal in ʿAyn al-Hilwa at this point raised his group's profile even further, alarming the politburo in Damascus, which feared Syrian retribution.

Amal retaliated for its setbacks by burning hundreds of houses in the Abu-al-Aswad and Jmayjim refugee camps near Tyre and expelling 7,000 inhabitants on 27 November, and by evicting hundreds of Palestinians from Fakhani and Bir Hasan in Beirut. It also intensified its military pressure on Shatila, but a mutiny in a 6th Brigade unit the next day obliged it to pause.[129] This was followed by the defection of 135 soldiers on 2 December and an additional number the next day, who, Fateh proudly stated, 'joined the forces of the revolution'.[130] Whatever the truth of Fateh claims, these incidents revealed the strains caused by the camps war. An unidentified PSP official voiced a common belief by accusing Amal of working to redraw the social and confessional map of Lebanon, 'by transferring the Palestinians [from Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre] to the north, and by replacing them in the suburban refugee camps and west [Beirut] with Shiʿites from Baʿlbak and the south'.[131] Junblat criticized the Palestinian occupation of Maghdusha severely in public, but in private the PSP provided Fateh and the DFLP with shelter, safe passage, weapons, and ammunition.[132]

Maghdusha had become a fixation. An attempt to replace the Palestinian garrison with a buffer force from Hizbullah on 9 December failed when Amal mounted a sudden attempt to seize the town. Under intense pressure from Syria, the PNSF groups pulled out their contingents on 14 December, but Fateh now stated that it would not withdraw before Amal accepted a general cease-fire, lifted the siege of the camps, and allowed a neutral party (Hizbullah, the PSP, PNO, or Islamic League) to deploy a buffer force in Maghdusha.[133] From Beirut, Abu-Tawq and Abu-al-ʿAynayn argued that continued occupation of Maghdusha only inflamed Shiʿite anger and worsened the plight of the refugee camps, but the commanders in ʿAyn al-Hilwa and the PLO leadership in Tunis were unwilling to relinquish the town for which they had already lost 100–120 military dead and 350 wounded.[134] The DFLP command in Lebanon similarly ignored entreaties to withdraw from the politburo, whose members were subjected by the Syrian authorities to a travel ban in punishment.[135]

PLO obduracy angered Syria, which considered itself 'the target of the ongoing war . . . which was initiated at a time when an immense international campaign is being waged against us, under the direction of Washington'.[136] Syria also blamed the Palestinian opposition for being *plus royaliste que le roi*, allowing itself to be drawn by Arafat into the confrontation with Amal. Syrian commandos were secretly dispatched to Beirut to assist Amal attacks on Shatila.[137] This had little effect, as Amal targets in west Beirut were themselves coming under guerrilla attack from clandestine Fateh members and Sunni militiamen several times daily. Even the LCP, which had consistently blamed the camps war on Arafat in the past, now criticized Amal publicly and accused it of repressing resistance to the IDF in the south.[138] Iran also signalled

its displeasure with the Shiʿite militia, sending two envoys to join the besieged refugees in Rashidiyya, where starvation was imminent. Qadhdhafi was next to diverge from the Syrian position, condemning Amal on 18 December and reopening the PLO office in Tripoli a week later. The DFLP and PCP had already resumed the political dialogue with Fateh, while the PFLP, PPSF, and PLF tacitly followed Fateh's political lead in the camps, prompting a disgruntled Birri to observe that he could no longer distinguish the PNSF from Fateh. Negotiating with Arafat, he added, might be the only way to resolve the conflict.[139]

Negotiation between Amal and the PLO was not to be, however. The siege of the camps continued grimly. For Syria, the issue at stake was not the camps war, but 'the presence of Arafat and the PLO in Lebanon'.[140] Refugees in Rashidiyya and Burj al-Barajna started to eat weeds and rats and to scavenge from rubbish dumps in January 1987, despite the delivery of a food truck to the latter camp under the escort of Iranian envoys and Hizbullah. Hizbullah smuggled a second food shipment into Burj al-Barajna on 13 February, but the desperate refugees now obtained a fatwa from Muslim clergy in west Beirut permitting them to eat cats and dogs. Conditions were better in Shatila, despite widespread malnutrition, but the defence suffered a grievous blow when the Fateh dissidents, acting on orders from ʿAmla, assassinated Abu-Tawq on 27 January.[141] Three days later the PLO finally handed Maghdusha over to the PNO and Hizbullah, which in turn withdrew, allowing Amal to regain the town. On 13 February Syria proposed the withdrawal of Amal and all Palestinian forces to positions held before 24 October 1986 and an end to the siege of the camps; however, the long-suffering PSP, Nasirite Murabitun, and LCP suddenly mounted a sweeping offensive on 15 February that routed Amal from most of west Beirut and isolated the southern suburbs over the next three days.

Asad, who felt that 'what is happening in Beirut poses a threat to Syria and its security', reacted with characteristic vigour, ordering the PSP to cease its advance from the south and announcing his intention to deploy a peacekeeping force to Beirut.[142] The head of Syrian military intelligence in Lebanon, Ghazi Kanʿan, argued that 'the conspiracy is led by Arafat . . . in order to threaten nationalist gains in Lebanon. We will confront the plot and its instruments, whoever they may be'.[143] On 21 February, 7,000 Syrian soldiers deployed in west Beirut, closing down 70 offices belonging to various militias and banning them from carrying arms in public. The PNSF and Amal welcomed the Syrian action, while in Israel Peres (now foreign minister) and chief-of-staff Moshe Levy stated cautiously that 'the deployment of thousands of Syrian soldiers in Beirut does not represent a threat to Israel at present . . . [we] must wait, watch, and follow the course of events'.[144] The IDF was more concerned with the Palestinian build-up, having discovered recently that Lebanese president Jmayyil and Lebanese Forces commander Jaʿjaʿ had allowed hundreds of PLO guerrillas to reach Lebanon through Junya in return for substantial payments;

the Israeli navy intensified its patrols, capturing 50 suspected guerrillas in early February.[145]

The PLO, for its part, responded to the Syrian deployment in Beirut by holding Syria responsible for lifting the siege of the camps. Syria had other priorities, however. In early March Syrian and Lebanese troops deployed at the Awwali estuary, blocking Palestinian supply routes between Sidon and the PSP zone of control. Kanʿan was unequivocal: the siege of the camps would continue 'until their political problem is solved, and until the brothers in the PNSF are able to expel the men of Arafat, with whom we will settle our accounts'.[146] This stance was untenable, however, and Syrian troops deployed around Shatila and Burj al-Barajna on 7 April, allowing a trickle of food and medical supplies to enter the two camps after 163 days of near-total blockade. Another round of the camps war was over. The death toll in the camps reached 452, with another 861 wounded and 140 missing, while 32,000 of 144,000 refugees registered with UNRWA had been displaced.[147] This time half the overall casualties were military: in Shatila, where their proportion was highest, 98 armed defenders had died and 442 suffered injury in a garrison of 900–1,200.[148]

The Dissidents' Moment of Truth

The ordeal of the refugee camps was still far from over, but the Syrian intervention confirmed the failure of Amal and the unravelling of the various coalitions put together by Syria among its Lebanese allies and the Palestinian opposition groups. The conflict had also allowed the PLO to mend its fences with Algeria, South Yemen, and the USSR; the Jordanian government initiated a limited reconciliation, condemning the camps war, overlooking an attempt to assassinate ʿAtallah and the defection of several of his supporters to the PLO in January, and inviting Wazir to Amman in mid-February. The DFLP (which had abandoned its 'joint command' with the PFLP in spring 1986), PCP, and PFLP in the meantime held extensive talks with Fateh, which promised to abrogate the Amman accord and downgrade the dialogue with Egypt.[149] This was sufficient to persuade these groups to attend a 'national unity' session of the PNC in Algiers at the end of April. The PF–GC, Saʿiqa, and Fateh dissidents had rejected similar political overtures by Fateh and boycotted the PNC, but the PPSF, which was kept away by last-minute Syrian pressure, announced its withdrawal from the PNSF. PLF faction leader Talʿat Yaʿqub also broke ranks with ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim, who remained in Damascus, to rejoin the wing headed by Zaydan and attend the PNC.

The Palestinian opposition was irretrievably split. Its principal members had been faced with an impossible choice over the preceding two years. To accept the Syrian-backed war on the refugee camps was morally repugnant and politically suicidal among the wider Palestinian constituency, but to diverge from Syrian policy and confront the onslaught lent credence to the anti-Syrian stance

of Arafat and, by extension, to his wider diplomatic strategy. The PLO chairman understood this dilemma perfectly, and kept the camps war active or even escalated it at times (as at Maghdusha) with the single-minded purpose of driving the opposition from the middle ground in which it sought political safety. It did not help that Syria pursued its own objectives with single-minded and often cruel determination, that raised deep foreboding about the nature of its supposed alliance with the Palestinian opposition. The principal opposition groups were encouraged by the political concessions Fateh was willing to make (formal abrogation of the defunct Amman accord, and curtailment of contacts with Egypt) and by the improvement of PLO relations with the USSR and Syria's Arab allies, to ignore Syrian displeasure and return to the fold during an appropriately named 'unity session' of the PNC at Algiers at the end of April. The 'loyalist opposition', for such it had become, made clear its preference to operate within the statist structure of the PLO, while the groups that boycotted the PNC relegated themselves conclusively to the sidelines in so doing.

The marked decline of the Fateh dissidents revealed these various dynamics most graphically. Their movement had lacked cohesion from the outset. At its core were the military putschists, whose parochial nationalism and personal ambition were cloaked by the ideological mantle and alternative organizational programme provided by a separate group of leftist civilian cadres. However, the motivations of the bulk of the rank-and-file for joining the revolt were more diverse: a simplistic yearning to return to Fateh's 'roots' for some; for others anger over the abandonment of families in Beirut and the south after the PLO evacuation in 1982 for Palestinians from Lebanon, or intimidation by the dissidents and Syrian intelligence for those whose families lived in Syria or areas under Syrian control; and a genuine desire for internal reform for a great many. This applied especially to the numerous officers and bureaucrats who had not been members of the secret military network led by ʿAmla or the clandestine Marxist factions before the mutiny of May 1983, and who only rebelled after being faced with the fait accompli or after coming under siege in the Biqaʿ Valley in following months. Many officers, including dissident brigade commanders ʿUmar Abu-Layla, Muhammad Jihad, and Wasif ʿUrayqat, were deeply unhappy with the internecine violence and equally uneasy about the alliance with Syria, and refused to send units to participate in the assault on the loyalist stronghold in Tripoli.

The departure of Arafat from Tripoli at the end of the year proved to be a phrrhic victory. As Muhsin Ibrahim, OACL secretary-general and one of the most trusted Lebanese confidants of the Palestinian movement, later argued, the battle in reality heralded the exodus not only of the loyalist PLO leadership and forces, but 'of all Palestinian combatants and their leaders from north Lebanon and all Lebanese areas'. The dissidents might proclaim their imminent 'return to Beirut', he added, but they failed to understand that there could be no return to the extensive Palestinian armed presence as it was before 1982.

Not only was their talk of turning attention against the Israeli occupation in south Lebanon a futile attempt to 'wash [their] hands of the waterfall of Palestinian blood that was shed freely' in the name of radicalizing PLO policies, correcting the path of struggle, and implementing organizational reform, but they had in fact subsequently failed utterly to confront the IDF at all. Adding final insult to injury, Muhsin observed, the dissidents had 'rapidly committed all the moral excesses [*tajawuzat maslakiyya*] against which they had originally raised the banner of protest, to pursue, as we expected, a naked struggle for leadership'.[150]

This judgement was harsh, but uncomfortably close to its mark. The end of the battle of Tripoli erased any sense of common purpose among the dissidents, and revealed their lack of a coherent political and ideological programme. It also pushed their internal rivalries to the fore, most immediately between former Fateh central committee member Salih and ʿAmla. Salih saw himself as the natural successor to Arafat and the leader of the former 'Soviet group' in Fateh, and now sought to consolidate his position by staffing the dissident regional command for Lebanon with his followers, setting up a military security apparatus and other new bodies, and using his control of Libyan assistance to dispense patronage freely. The uprising against the Jmayyil government in February 1984 seemed to offer an opportunity to re-establish the Palestinian movement in Beirut under his leadership, and he visited the city several times in the following weeks to forge an alliance with the Nasirite Murabitun and other local militias. When the Syrian authorities responded by restricting Salih's entry to Lebanon in March, ʿAmla exploited his discomfit to set up a parallel channel of financial aid from Libya and demonstrated his own utility to Syrian intelligence by arranging a steady supply of information on 'Arafatists' returning to Lebanon.

The continued obsession of the dissident leadership with the struggle against Arafat worried the middle-of-the-road officers, who also chafed at its refusal, in deference to Syrian wishes, to authorize a guerrilla campaign against Israeli forces in Lebanon. Three brigade commanders and a number of other officers now planned a second 'corrective movement', this time against the dissident leadership. Their aim was to take control of the combat units in Lebanon, appeal to Salih for leadership, and declare their 'return to legitimacy', that is, the PLO under Arafat.[151] Syrian intelligence came into possession of the details at the beginning of June, however, and quickly stifled the incipient revolt. A dissident military court sentenced the ringleaders to death but stayed execution, and then released them after a wave of protests within the ranks and in the refugee camps; the Syrian authorities later deported the officers or encouraged them to leave the country, and placed Salih under house arrest (where he remained until his death of cardiac arrest in September 1991).

The dissidents never recovered, as a collective exodus reduced their numbers severely in following months. They had claimed a payroll of between 10,000 and 15,000, including 4,000–5,000 armed personnel, in spring 1984, but up to

2,000 members left during the summer alone, many of whom rejoined the PLO.[152] The most serious drain was of combat personnel: not one of the five dissident brigades had more than 200 men by the end of the year. Hundreds of former dissidents received token salaries from the house-bound Salih, who drew on leftover Libyan funds and discreet assistance from the PLO, or took employment in construction and other manual work. Many joined other guerrilla groups, including the hitherto secretive Abu Nidal faction, which was now intent on building up its combat bases in east Lebanon and welcomed the influx.

Over the following period ʿAmla, who had previously disguised his real power, took formal responsibility for military affairs in the dissident movement and PNSF and assumed command of the Western Sector. Maragha retained a nominal post as secretary of the provisional command, but ʿAmla tightened his control by appointing Mahmud ʿIsa as chief operations officer and Sughayyar, Abu Khalid Shinnar, and Abu al-ʿAbd al-Battat to head various security and intelligence agencies, and by co-opting Sughayyar and Shinnar to the provisional command. The key bonds were former service in the Jordanian army and common origin from the Hebron district, although clan and family ties also played a role; ʿAmla appointed a relative, Abu Nidal al-ʿAmla, to head financial affairs. He also reintroduced formal military ranks in all sectors, including civilian departments, and used his power of appointment to reward loyalty or punish recalcitrance. As he strove for dominance, ʿAmla ordered the detention of the senior PLO finance officer in Damascus, Darwish al-Abyad, who was forced to divulge bank account numbers and sign away deed to Fateh real estate in the country; the dissidents reportedly acquired $15 million in this manner, but the PLO was able to save another $53 million.[153]

The rise of ʿAmla disquieted the leftist civilian cadres whose defection in May 1983 had given the rebellion much of its organizational base, ideological appeal, and political credibility. Their complaints about financial mismanagement and general lack of accountability multiplied, but to no avail. The camps war brought the tension to a head, and gave ʿAmla the opportunity to consolidate his power. Dissident personnel in Lebanon had spontaneously set aside their differences with the loyalists and fought under their overall leadership to defend the Shatila and Burj al-Barajna camps in May 1985, and eagerly defied Syrian orders to join the artillery barrage against Amal and the Shiʿite-populated suburbs of Beirut. With the resumption of the camps war in May 1986, the dissident leadership ordered 33 combat officers and senior cadres (including the head of the regional command) to return to Syria.[154] To ensure greater internal control and compliance with Syrian demands for neutrality in the conflict, ʿAmla now appointed his confidant and leading ideologue, Ilyas Shufani, to head the regional command. Shufani, member of the provisional command responsible for mobilization and organization, waged a bitter campaign against leniency towards the loyalists, insisting that promotion should go only to those who had been 'blooded'—shed the blood of an Arafatist.[155]

It was against this background that provisional command member Samih Abu-Kwayk posed a second challenge to ʿAmla. Like Salih before him, Abu-Kwayk based his claim to leadership of the dissident movement on former membership of the Fateh central committee. He also had long-standing ties with Abu Nidal faction leader Sabri al-Banna, going back to their days together in the Fateh regional command in Jordan in 1968, and used this bond to propose a merger in spring 1986. ʿAmla, who had secretly coordinated with the Abu Nidal faction and received financial assistance from it, possibly since 1982, cautiously stood aloof, but approved the merger.[156] Libya eagerly offered to fund the unified movement—possibly to reduce its overall contribution, which dropped from a reported $5–6 million in 1983 to $2.7 million in 1986—and a joint 'leadership committee' was formed with Maragha, Abu-Kwayk, and Ahmad al-Khatib representing Fateh–Provisional Command and ʿAbd-al-Rahman ʿIsa (intelligence chief) and Mustafa Murad (military commander) representing Fateh–Revolutionary Council. Abu-Kwayk fondly concluded that he could now assume leadership of the dissidents, but discovered that he had little following among the all-important military and security agencies, loyal to ʿAmla, or the leftist civilian cadres, who disdained him. He hurriedly tried to rally the support of such veteran senior officers as Muhammad Jihad, Muhammad Badr, Wasif ʿUrayqat, and Yusif Kayid, but they had been largely sidelined by the astute ʿAmla and had little remaining power. The intervention of Syrian intelligence, which siezed Abu-Kwayk's office and handed it over to ʿAmla, determined the outcome, and his military allies eventually left Syria for Jordan and Tunis a few years later.

Abu-Kwayk's eventual exclusion from the provisional command removed its last claim to legitimate descent from the Fateh central committee. The Abu Nidal faction had assisted his downfall by secretly inviting his aides to defect, and attracted hundreds of other disillusioned dissidents (including a brigade commander) to its own ranks. This influx and continued access to Libyan funds allowed it to expand from an estimated strength of 500–800 active members and to reorganize its 'people's army directorate' in Lebanon into five regional commands by the end of the year.[157] The reduction of Libyan aid intensified the rivalry between Fateh–PC and Fateh–RC, and it was partly for this reason, as well as to stifle internal dissent, that the dissident command pledged to second hundreds of members to the Libyan army for service in the border dispute with Chad. This failed to halt the decline: the dissident command had disbanded the Saʿd Sayil Forces in 1985 and did the same with the Shqif Forces in 1986, and by the end of the year ʿAmla was trying to disguise the predicament by pronouncing his desire for a revolution with no more than 'a thousand fighters'.[158]

Abu Nidal faction leader Banna, conversely, hoped at long last to emerge from the shadows and win acceptance of his Fateh–Revolutionary Council as a bona fide guerrilla group and PLO member. This had been the underlying logic behind the formation of the people's army in 1985, establishment of public

offices and social services in refugee camps in southern Lebanon, and curtailment of ties with Syria by the end of 1986. Apparently there had initially been some opposition within the faction to the influx of former Fateh dissidents—in August 1984 its mouthpiece announced the dismissal of all members who had joined since the beginning of 1983—but this was overcome.[159] The faction was already led by a central committee, from which a politburo (known as the 'daily command') was drawn, but by October 1986 it claimed to have completed the restructuring of the revolutionary council as its internal legislative body, conducted elections for its leading bodies (including a central body for organizational supervision), and established new departments and committees to direct the growing organizational, political, and mass activities.[160]

In early 1987 an assured Banna held talks with Wazir and Khalaf in Algiers to negotiate entry to the PNC, but they were unwilling to accept his terms and the attempt ended in failure. Disappointed, the paranoid Banna oversaw the wholesale destruction of his 'people's army' in a frenzy of bloodletting that started in November. According to senior cadres who subsequently broke away, commanders Jasir al-Disi and ʿAyish Badran and 600 other guerrillas were executed and buried in secret detention centres near Sidon on the grounds of being enemy agents. Another 120 escaped death by joining the PFLP, but 156 may have died in a second bout of mass murder in the faction's camps in Libya, among them deputy-leader Mustafa Murad, in whose torture and death Banna reportedly took personal part.[161] Shocked to discover the extent of the slaughter, which had been kept a closely guarded secret, official spokesman and ideologue ʿAtif Abu-Bakr and former intelligence chief ʿAbd-al-Rahman ʿIsa broke away in October 1989 to form an 'emergency leadership' with the help of PLO security chief Salah Khalaf.[162]

The Politics of Manipulation

The drastic decline of the dissidents, and for that matter Banna's desire to join the PLO, revealed the extent to which Arafat's provocative strategy during the camps war in Lebanon had succeeded, above all by transforming the internal crisis of the PLO into a nationalist struggle with Syria over the autonomy of Palestinian political will and decision-making. His ability to manipulate the conflict in this manner was equally due to the success of his drive for absolute control within Fateh and the PLO, which in turn was the result of a combination of external and internal factors. The evacuation from Beirut was a case in point, as it led to the dismantling of the power bases of actual or potential rivals: the intelligence and security apparatuses headed by Khalaf and Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid, and the civilian organization, for which Muhammd Ghnaym was ultimately responsible. The expulsion of Wazir from Jordan in July 1986 and the rift with Tunisia shortly after had a similar impact; the relocation of PLO headquarters limited the authority of officials who remained in Tunis, while those who

tried to operate from Baghdad and San'a found that they had neither the communications network nor the administrative apparatus that Arafat had developed to keep pace with his peripatetic movements.

Arafat relied on more than external intervention to concentrate power in his hands, however. The PNC in February 1983 had almost ritualistically reiterated its long-standing calls for military and financial unity, but this time the PLO chairman took active advantage.[163] First, he approved the recommendation by the PNC's military committee for the merger of guerrilla forces and the PLA in a new, Palestinian National Liberation Army (PNLA), applying it immediately to Fateh.[164] This merely confirmed the existing situation for Fateh and the loyalist PLA, but the other groups were also given the opportunity to shift the financial burden for their military personnel to the PLO's Palestine National Fund (PNF); by the same token it implicitly tied them more firmly into the PLO's statist structure and enhanced Arafat's grip. As significantly, the nominal merger all owedhim to bring the Fateh and PLA finance departments under his direct control and to transfer Fateh personnel onto the PLO payroll, thus freeing Fateh funds under his control for other uses. Until then the formal institutional autonomy and regulatory mechanisms (including a separate inspection department and annual auditing of accounts) of the PNF, coupled with the strength of character of its directors, had constrained excessively free-handed disbursement of PLO finances. However, the lack of serious opposition to the merger from the other guerrilla groups or within Fateh in 1983 and the subsequent appointment of a more pliable director at the 1984 PNC, Jawid al-Ghusayn, allowed Arafat to bring PNF officers to heel through co-optation and intimidation in a manner similar to that he had exercised with Fateh financial officers in the late 1970s.

Fateh and PLO finances remained distinct, not least because other central committee members had some residual control in the former case and the PNF remained nominally independent in the latter, but Arafat utilized the formal military merger to implement a third measure. This was for the PNF to transfer the military budget, which was increased in accordance with the expansion to $7.5–8 million a month, into a special 'chairman's account for the PNLA' from which the army's expenses were then disbursed, without further control or detailed auditing by the Fund. The opposition groups acquiesced in this administrative change, as in the others, in return for rhetorical concessions in the PNC political programme and renewal of their financial 'quota'.[165] What they did not know, or chose to ignore, was that finance officers now paid PNLA personnel in local currencies purchased at black market rates, leaving an average surplus of some $5 million in the chairman's account each month.[166] A special sub-committee of the Fateh central committee that conducted a secret internal inquiry into this practice in summer 1993 estimated that $540 million could have entered the account in the intervening period.

The camps war allowed a similar manipulation a few years later. At its start the 'Lebanon committee', which had been formed at the PNC in 1983, was

revived and transformed into a token military command under Arafat's direct supervision. Much like the under-staffed and under-funded general staff, idling the hours away in a Tunis suburb, the Lebanon Committee had no decision-making power, but its existence allowed Arafat to obtain executive committee approval to set up a 'chairman's account for Lebanon', from which he again controlled all disbursement. (In August 1989 Arafat formed a second nominal 'Lebanon Committee', this time attached to the Fateh central committee and headed by ʿAbbas Zaki, thus co-opting and distracting a troublesome junior colleague.)[167] To these sums entering the chairman's accounts were added the official Saudi contributions to the PLO—amounting to '$30 million every few months'—starting at least in 1983.[168] Payments from other Arab states may also have been dealt with in similar fashion. This went hand in hand with the concentration of the system of patronage; so deeply entrenched was it by now that its primary purpose was no longer to secure political loyalty as such, but rather to ensure the survival of Arafat through the constant regeneration of dependency among the rank-and-file. By implicating all as participants and inculcating cynicism and resignation, neo-patrimonialism had become 'planned corruption'.[169]

The reactivation of the Lebanon Committee accentuated the concentration of power in Arafat's hands, not least by giving him exclusive control over management of the camps war and, more broadly, of the feud with Syria. This explained the importance of security aide Labib Hawwari, who organized a series of bomb attacks against Syrian army positions in Beirut in 1986 and later attempted to take the campaign to Damascus. Coupled with the general need for clandestinity in all areas of Syrian, Israeli, and Lebanese Maronite or government control, the conflict allowed further militarization and fragmentation of what was left of Fateh's civilian organization in the country as Arafat personally directed individual intermediaries in the anti-Syrian campaign and the rearmament and resupply effort for the camps. These contacts were often coordinated on his behalf by a shifting coterie of security aides and troubleshooters, or by Force 17, which performed as the PLO chairman's hold-all for security, organizational, and military matters. An obvious example was the displacement of ʿAbd-al-Hamid, whose responsibility for assigning security officers to PLO missions abroad (and bodyguards for PLO leaders) was progressively taken over by Force 17 commander Natur after 1985. The unit was directly implicated in the murder in London in July 1987 of Palestinian political cartoonist Naji al-ʿAli, who had incensed Arafat with his acerbic lampooning.[170] It expanded further as Arafat took to rotating officers from PLO camps in other Arab states through Tunis on short-term assignment, during which they were placed on the Force 17 payroll for alleged administrative convenience, and then keeping them there.[171]

The extension of power inevitably generated a growing volume of administrative detail, but for Arafat the issue was not so much to process it efficiently as to control it. To this end, he equipped his offices in various capitals with

modern communications equipment, using his headquarters in Tunis as the initial clearing house for the receipt, forwarding, and ultimate storage of all documents. Arafat boasted proudly that a satellite link-up allowed him to receive faxed correspondence wherever he was in the world, even in flight. However, his steadfast refusal to delegate responsibility resulted in a backlog of paperwork and erratic attention to issues that did not have his priority status. In this situation centralization meant fragmentation. The ability to maintain direct voice and fax contact with individual combat officers in Lebanon, for example, encouraged petty rivalry and jealous competition for resources, as each sought the chairman's ear. It also impeded the emergence of an integrated field command: when a joint operations room was formed with the other guerrilla groups in ʿAyn al-Hilwa in November 1986, six Fateh battalion commanders and senior officials insisted on being present in addition to Arafat's personal representative, ʿIsam al-Lawh, while the local Force 17 commander, who was not invited, petulantly refused to join the offensive on Maghdusha as a means of registering his protest.[172] Arafat deepened the paralysis and fragmentation of the field command still further in the same month by ordering the formation of yet another unit, the Martyr Saʿd Sayil Battalion, which he attached to his own Chairman's Security Apparatus.[173] At the height of the battle only DFLP deputy secretary-general Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu and military commander Mamduh Nawfal could mediate between the 'Fateh tribes'.[174]

Arafat's obsessive drive for absolute control was partly an outcome of the siege mentality that afflicted the mainstream leadership in this period. The Israeli raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis in October, followed by the setback of its diplomatic strategy and the collapse of the alliance with Jordan in February 1986, had a particular impact. The violence of the feud with Syria was an added factor; Palestinian and Egyptian media alleged that the Syrians had hatched a scheme to shoot down Arafat's aircraft in late May.[175] The PLO chairman now became increasingly paranoid, and his aides spoke of extreme mood swings, a volatile temper, and an at times tenuous grasp of reality. The tendency to autocratic behaviour, improvisation in policy, and unconsidered, off-the-cuff decision-making became more marked.

There was system, nonetheless, in the effort to weaken Wazir. Arafat had tightened the financial 'squeeze' on the Western Sector steadily since 1983, and exploited Wazir's loss of a base in Amman in 1986 to poach several of his lieutenants, who were now attached loosely to Force 17. The PLO chairman also strove to curtail Wazir's military and diplomatic contacts, pressuring senior officers not to accompany him on visits to Soviet bloc and other countries that supplied arms, training, and other assistance.[176] Arafat also used his financial control to take over the weekly magazine sponsored by Wazir, *Sawt al-Bilad*, and so cemented what was to be a long-lasting association with its editor, Muhammad Rashid (better known as Khalid Salam). Wazir retained considerable influence, however, and played the key role in repairing relations with Algeria, Libya, and the Soviet bloc and in drawing the 'loyalist' opposition back

into the PLO fold in early 1987. Yet he was compelled to watch bitterly from the sidelines as a new executive committee was sworn in by the PNC in April, his bid to join it thwarted by Arafat.

Unlike Wazir, who maintained his reserve before all but his closest aides, Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan offered a rare example of public criticism of Arafat in this period. This came in the context of an extensive analysis of PLO options published in 1986, in which he observed that although the Arab states had formally abandoned the military option against Israel by adopting the Fez peace plan of September 1982, the PLO had also contributed to their political paralysis. It was totally estranged from Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, relations with Egypt were proving ineffective, and the Arab state system had reached an unprecedented degree of fragmentation, all at a time when US–Israeli policy coordination, in contrast, was at its closest. The situation demanded that the PLO work primarily to ensure its survival, which in turn required the preservation and development of its existing structures, but its behaviour in fact revealed serious shortcomings. These included a stark disregard for teamwork and contingency planning, overreaction to differences of opinion, a tendency to confuse friendly relations with dependency on other parties, and a distrust of information that did not come through the PLO's own channels, coupled with a general disinclination to analyse and interpret information and transform it into a plan of action. For Hasan, the root of these ills was 'monopoly, arrogance, suspicion, and accusation, leading to chaos, confusion, ignorance, failure, and defeats, and to more repression, imprisonment, and confiscation of intellect and minds'. Typically he did not mention Arafat by name, but this may also have been because he considered these flaws and the 'senility of leadership' to afflict much of the Palestinian political class. 'Do we have a special genius for failure?', he asked.[177]

The fact remained, however, that Arafat had attained an unprecedented concentration of power. This revealed unmistakably the special advantages endowed by operating at the head of a statist structure, whatever its flaws and dysfunctional aspects. He had also demonstrated the potency of the appeal to Palestinian nationalism, backed as it was by neopatrimonial political management, a system he now personified more than ever before. Yet whatever triumphs the PLO may have achieved by surviving the gruelling test of the internal split and the bruising confrontation with Syria and Amal in Lebanon, it still lacked the means of reviving its diplomatic strategy and obtaining the minimum of its core national aims. It could still exert some military pressure on Israel with occasional guerrilla attacks or naval raids, but this was just as likely to alienate the US and underline the basic predicament of the PLO.

Nor could this strategic conundrum be resolved by the camps war, the political utility of which had largely been expended by now. Supervised by Syrian intelligence, Amal still prevented the entry of non-perishable and canned foods, medicines and surgical equipment, fuel, batteries, machinery, and building materials to the besieged refugee camps, and its sniper fire continued to

exact a toll of their inhabitants. Clashes became a daily occurrence around ʿAyn al-Hilwa in mid-August, but the build-up of IDF and SLA forces in the Jizzin district to the east prompted the local protagonists to observe a truce.[178] The PLO itself claimed a strength of 10,000 combatants in the Sidon area by now, but in any case Amal had had enough by then.[179] On 30 August Birri proposed a disengagement of forces in all sectors, reconstruction of the camps, and the reopening of schools, and offered to include the PLO-dominated 'popular committees' from the camps in security talks with Amal, leftist Lebanese parties, and the Syrian peace-keeping force.[180] This displeased Syria, which instigated clashes the next day and again after Birri approved an agreement reached by his representatives with PLO officials on 11 September.[181] Its losses in the camps war and the growing challenge from Hizbullah put Amal in an untenable position, however, and in early November the beleaguered Birri held talks in Algiers with DFLP secretary-general Hawatma, who was deputized for this purpose by Arafat.[182]

Lebanon had become a minor sideshow, leaving the PLO with its strategic dilemma. Arafat had mended his ties with the Tunisian government, but visitors to his headquarters during the summer and autumn of 1987 found little of the frenetic bustle that had long been his hallmark. All but absent were the PLO officials, foreign dignitaries, and journalists waiting into the early hours of the morning for brief interviews, the telephone rarely rang, and the reams of papers to be scanned and signed had dwindled. Relations with the USSR had thawed, but Gorbachev was signalling substantive changes in Soviet Middle East policy as he proceeded with glasnost and perestroika. The Iran–Iraq war still diverted Arab attention and resources, moreover, further undermining any hope of relaunching PLO diplomacy. The extent to which Palestinian concerns had been relegated to the margin was starkly revealed during the Arab summit conference in Amman in mid-November. Having been deliberately snubbed by king Husayn, who neglected to meet him at the airport and overlooked the PLO completely in his opening address, Arafat was unable to induce the other Arab leaders to make more than ritual mention of Palestine in their final statement. His own subsequent comment that 'what I wanted I got . . . I am very comfortable with the results of the Arab summit' was stoic, but unconvincing.[183] The PLO remained in the wilderness, until salvation suddenly came in the unexpected guise of a road accident in Gaza, on 8 December.

25

Intifada to the Rescue

The Making of a Revolt

On 8 December 1987 an Israeli agricultural vehicle drove into two cars carrying Palestinian workers from Gaza, killing four. Angry crowds gathered as the news spread, convinced that the accident had been a deliberate act of murder, and then attacked Israeli military outposts and patrols. There had been numerous demonstrations and confrontations during the year, the latest in response to the death of four members of the little-known Islamic Jihad Movement on 7 October. The occupied territories were again electrified on 25 November, when a lone PF–GC guerrilla flew over the Lebanese–Israeli border in a motorized hang-glider and killed six soldiers and wounded seven at an IDF camp near Kiryat Shmona before being killed himself. In this atmosphere the rioting sparked by the road accident spread quickly to other parts of the Gaza Strip and then to the West Bank. The coordinator of government activities in the occupied territories, Shmuel Goren, initially denied that a popular rebellion had started, dismissing the demonstrations as 'merely the peak in a periodic cycle of unrest'.[1] Reassured by his generals that this was not 'even the beginning of a rebellion . . . [but rather] a rush of events centered [in] various locations and instigated by a minority', Israeli prime minister Yitzhaq Shamir similarly shrugged off the protests.[2]

The uprising showed no sign of abating in the next few weeks, however, and then continued forcefully into the new year. Driving it was the cumulative impact of economic and social developments over the preceding decade. By 1987, 52 per cent of the area of the West Bank and 42 per cent of Gaza had come under direct Israeli control, while the number of Jewish settlers had reached 67,000, besides an even larger number in the settlements arching around east Jerusalem.[3] To the highly visible threat of Israeli encroachment was added the effect of Israeli policies since 1967 on the local economy: industrial labour declined from 15 per cent of the total employed workforce to 10.4 per cent by 1986, that in agriculture from 34.3 to 15.9 per cent, construction from 11.7 to 7.3 per cent, and services from 38.6 to 30.1 per cent.[4] Wage labour in Israel absorbed up to 125,000 Palestinian commuters daily (40 per cent of the total), but only half were registered with Israeli labour exchanges, and all were wholly vulnerable to fluctuations in the Israeli economy.[5] The drop in oil revenues meanwhile reduced the outflow of labour to the Arab petroleum-exporting

countries, from an average of 17,900 annually in 1974–81 to 4,900 from 1982 onwards, fuelling unemployment while cutting remittances, which had reached $55 million in 1978.[6] Yet as pressure to relax restrictions on Palestinian entrepreneurial activity and investment intensified in early 1985, defence minister Rabin replied that 'there will be no development in the occupied territories initiated by the Israeli Government, and no permits will be given for expanding agriculture or industry (there), which may compete with the State of Israel'.[7]

Restricted employment opportunities had a special impact on a population with nearly 50 per cent under the age of 15 and 70 per cent under 30. The expansion of tertiary education exacerbated the pressure. University enrolment reached 13,500 in 1984–5—besides several thousand registered at 11 technical colleges, and 10,000 to 15,000 students abroad—but only 20 per cent of the 1,000 graduates and 10,500 school-leavers entering the local job market each year could find employment.[8] There was a close correlation between these patterns and the marked rise of overt resistance to the Israeli occupation; in one sample of 500 convicted security offenders 87 per cent were under 30, 82 per cent had attained secondary education or higher, and 25 per cent were students.[9] 'Illegal acts' such as stone-throwing and demonstrations rose from 953 in 1985 to 1,358 in 1986 and 2,982 in 1987, while armed attacks rose from 351 in 1983 to 870 in 1986.[10] By 1985 an estimated 250,000 Palestinians had experienced interrogation or detention—40 per cent of all adult males had been held for at least one night—since 1967, of whom 43,000 had received prison sentences in Gaza alone.[11] In the next two years 103 Palestinians died, 668 were wounded, and 12,842 were arrested in confrontations with Israeli forces, while Israeli military courts passed another 7,457 sentences for security offences. In short, the patterns and skills of revolt were already in place by the start of the intifada.

Although the spread of education and unemployment were necessary conditions for rising nationalism in the occupied territories, they did not predetermine political leadership, organizational structure, or ideological preference. The Israeli ban on the National Guidance Committee in March 1982 removed the only body with a claim to territory-wide leadership, while the forced departure of the PLO from Lebanon and its internal crisis contributed to the loss of political direction. In the following period the PLO promoted 'public figures' (*shakhsiyyat ʿamma*)—nationalists loosely affiliated to Fateh and mostly drawn from established middle-class families, including some from the traditional elite—whose influence rested not on their social standing and economic wealth but on public support for the mainstream leadership in exile, which in turn confirmed them as credible interlocutors and go-betweens to Israel and foreign consuls in Jerusalem.[12] More important still was the new stratum of public activists: senior cadres in the principal organizations who came to the forefront as the all-but formal façade of the PLO in the occupied territories. Overwhelmingly of lower middle class (or middle class) background and

frequently holders of university degrees, they emerged from the variety of institutions receiving PLO funding since the late 1970s: universities, trade unions, newspapers, and other research centres or media and information offices, especially those based in the Jerusalem 'triangle' (Jerusalem, Bayt Hanina, and Ramallah). Fateh was again heavily represented, but so were the PCP, DFLP, and PFLP.

These activists at first benefited after 1982 from the benign negligence of the Israeli military government, which showed itself willing to tolerate, if not encourage, some forms of non-violent, political action. Awareness of the importance of this opportunity was evident, for example, in an internal tract written by local Fateh activists in 1982, which emphasized that 'the organization of [our] masses politically is among the most important means of shaking the "secure base" of the Zionist military machine . . . the clandestine political and military organization is drawn from the public political organization, and is protected by a broad mass base'.[13] Such indeed was the confidence of local activists by 1983 that the PCP, which faced the least risk of an Israeli clampdown, felt it necessary to remind its members of the continuing need for tight security even though 'the attitude of the occupation authorities towards our organizations has changed because they practise political and mass action and have no connection with the military activity'.[14] However, the institutionally-based activists were dealt a severe blow when Rabin relaunched the 'iron fist' policy in August 1985. This followed the release in May of 1,150 Palestinian prisoners in an exchange with the PF–GC, according to which some 600 were allowed to remain in their homes in the West Bank and Gaza, provoking a severe backlash from the Jewish settler movement and the right wing of the Labour–Likud coalition government. A series of military orders issued in 1980–2 had already asserted the power of Israeli officers to dismiss elected union officials and ban candidates, require university staff to sign a 'loyalty oath' pledging to refrain from political activity, and ban or confiscate outside funding to charitable societies.[15] Invoking the powers of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations issued by Britain in 1945, which Israel had revived in 1967, Rabin resorted extensively in 1985–6 to administrative detention, town arrest, dismissal from public sector employment, closure of offices and other facilities, and deportation to decapitate the PLO-backed institutions. In all 35 cadres were deported, most prominent of whom were Fateh's Akram Haniyya and ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Shahin and the DFLP's ʿAzmi al-Shuʿaybi and ʿAli Abu-Hilal.

The mass movement in the occupied territories had been set back, but it was by no means defeated. The detention or exile of the first rank in PLO-backed institutions pushed second-echelon cadres forward, grooming them to assume leadership in relatively short periods of time. Israeli repression also forced the trade unions and other public associations into less formal methods of organization, that often proved more effective, in the long run, in escaping Israeli controls and mobilizing the population.[16] Besides providing a protective shield

for the clandestine organizations, an added, crucial benefit of the emergence of these semi-legal structures was to attract 'tens of thousands of young people who would otherwise have been reluctant to join the clandestine organizations . . . [and to] incorporat[e] marginalized social groups who, for class reasons, had been left out of the political arena'.[17] It was in this period that Fateh's *Harakat al-Shabiba* (Youth Movement), the PFLP's *Jabhat al-ʿAmal* (Action Front), DFLP's *al-Wihda* (Unity), and PCP-backed agricultural and medical relief committees expanded most rapidly and gained valuable experience. The release of hundreds of veterans from Israeli prisons in the 1985 prisoner exchange accelerated this process, as did widespread arrests among the rank-and-file of the grass-roots organizations; sentences for unarmed confrontations did not exceed six months or at most one year, and so imprisonment merely allowed the training en masse of thousands of young activists. Among them were the authors of new, specially adapted training and action manuals, who sought to compensate for the shortcomings of their leadership and case officers in exile, of whom they were quietly but firmly critical.[18] It was from their ranks, too, that the activists of the intifada were to come, and through whom it was also to spread to the rural population. In the latter case, receptiveness to political mobilization was heightened as the cumulative threat to Palestinian land and water resources posed by the accelerated Israeli settlement drive since 1977 approached a critical level in the mid-1980s. No less important was the adverse impact on rural family incomes of declining employment in Israel and the oil-rich Arab countries, leading to a rise in political activism as a means of compensation for the situation of partial self-sufficiency and market dependency in which they were caught.[19]

These consequences of the Israeli 'iron fist' were not yet apparent in 1986, when Jordan's alliance with the PLO was replaced by its functional condominium with Israel. The Jordanian government increased the salaries of civil servants and other public sector employees who had been on its payroll before 1967, and initiated monthly stipends for those who had been appointed since then by the Israeli administration.[20] To promote its views it launched a Jerusalem-based newspaper, *al-Nahar* (*The Day*), while punishing PLO supporters by withholding travel documents and commercial licences or denying them entry to the kingdom. The village leagues also benefited indirectly from the thaw; Jordan had bitterly opposed their formation, seeing a threat to its own network of social patronage and political influence, and in March 1982 made membership in the leagues punishable by confiscation of property or death.[21] The Israeli authorities had persevered, making the leagues the principal channel through which villagers could obtain permits for relatives in the diaspora to visit, and rewarding them with resources for the development of local infrastructure and basic services.[22] Israeli control was further consolidated by creating beneficiaries of economic integration: the urban entrepreneurs who mediated as 'labour sub-contractors, sub-contracting businessmen, and wholesale distributors of Israeli commodities', and the 'proletarianized peasants and

refugee camp dwellers whose sole (or primary) source of livelihood was employment in the Israeli–Jewish sector'.[23]

The Israeli and Jordanian challenges to the PLO revealed that Palestinians in the occupied territories remained subject to the pulls of contending statist centres. Indeed the PLO was the weakest of the three, as it lacked the means to exercise direct social control. Yet it had certain advantages, not least of which was its ability to harness Palestinian nationalism. This allowed it to extend its social base to include a large part of the established middle class, especially those who felt that they had been economically and politically marginalized by the Jordanian government before 1967 or as a result of its policies towards the occupied territories since then. The kingdom's failure to raise Arab or international funding for the ambitious development plan it launched in August 1986 further limited its ability to compete with the PLO appeal to Palestinian nationalism. Besides, the ranks of the local middle class were expanded during the 1980s by entrepreneurs who utilized loopholes in Israeli controls over markets and labour to tap nationalist sentiment with a 'buy Palestinian' appeal.[24] By the same token the PLO found allies even among beneficiaries of commercial dealings with Israel, who had secured their own niches in contracting, production of building materials, and other activities; their number included persons nominated in 1986 to head West Bank municipalities, such as Zafir al-Masri and Ghassan al-Shakʿa (Nablus), Jamil al-Tarifi (al-Bira), and Mustafa al-Natsha (Hebron).[25] The dual system of integration and segregation within the larger Israeli system had created 'a Palestinian ethno-class', which the PLO tapped.[26]

However, the single most important nationalist constituency was the lower middle class or petite bourgeoisie, loosely defined as it was. Its ranks had expanded with the spread of tertiary education in the occupied territories, and with the additional availability of thousands of scholarships to foreign universities distributed through the PLO, individual guerrilla groups, and the PCP. Israeli economic control and growing unemployment intensified its nationalism, while the creation or funding of institutions, trade unions, and other social associations by the PLO tied it to an alternative statist centre, that both provided 'rent' and exercised tight control over appointments and policy. Elements of this stratum had also benefited from steadfastness funds in 1979–86, especially housing loans ($77 million), grants to educational institutions ($121 million), and various social benefits ($26 million).[27] The fact that so many of its members now came from rural backgrounds additionally meant that these and other forms of patronage also reached down to the local level in the villages.[28]

Not all were happy with this relationship with the PLO, whether because they opposed the political direction of the mainstream leadership or because they sought to mobilize, rather than co-opt, the wider social constituency. A notable example were the young professionals, often Western-trained members of middle-class families with autonomous sources of income, who

established the PCP-backed agricultural and medical relief committees in 1979 or after. The PCP moreover decried the practice of publishing statements of support for the PLO in the local press (in the form of paid advertisements) or of sending similar messages to the Jordanian–Palestinian Joint Committee in Amman (up to 1986, that is), which it saw as a crass ploy to ensure financial assistance, and denounced Arab and foreign media for grossly exaggerating the extent of grass-roots backing for Arafat in the occupied territories.[29]

The critics of the PLO generally played a key role in the hundreds of private voluntary and non-governmental organizations that had appeared since 1967; most set social and economic development as their aim, and extended into the areas of literacy, women's skills, and early learning, among others.[30] Lacking the secure sources of funding that Fateh had, the leftist groups proved particularly adept at tapping international non-governmental organizations and Western aid programmes for funds—which, like Fateh, they too employed as rent within their constituencies—in part because of their strengths at the activist, intellectual, and professional level. What proportion of international assistance to the occupied territories went to leftist-controlled private voluntary and non-governmental organizations is not clear, but with external flows for relief and development totalling $170 million to $240 million by the early 1990s their share could not have been insignificant.[31]

Rent-seeking aside, the stress by private voluntary and non-governmental organizations on development reflected both a radical agenda, in that they sought consciously to alter conventional methods of political action, and a populist one, in that they strove to involve all sectors of the population in participatory forms of political organization.[32] This contrasted sharply with the statist approach of the mainstream PLO leadership, which, in its continued emphasis on *sumud*, viewed the population as a target audience to be co-opted through the provision of services and public goods. It strove neither for social mobilization, in the sense of assisting local communities or social groups to gain collective control over resources, nor for transformation of social relations, but rather to construct an alternative framework (to Israel) for the exercise of political power. The availability of external sources of funding enabled it to operate in this manner, the allocation of $463 million in steadfastness funds by the end of 1986 being a particular case in point, which at its peak accounted for one-third of all external transfers to the occupied territories (other than UNRWA expenditure).[33] This helped to explain the tolerance shown by the Fateh-dominated PLO leadership towards the allocation of steadfastness funds to pro-Jordanian recipients, despite accusations from the Palestinian Left that it had in this way entered into an anti-nationalist alliance. It also showed that the political agendas of the contending statist centres could converge at given points in time.

Yet the distinction between the radical populist agenda and *sumud* was contrived to a significant degree, not least because proponents of the former strategy were no more able than the PLO to construct alternative economic,

social, and administrative structures to those under Israeli control. The stress on income-generation and empowerment was similarly illusory, more often than not. The various voluntary and non-governmental organizations, much like the paternalistic charitable societies they sought to displace, relied almost wholly on external funding, provided mainly by Western counterparts, international multilateral institutions, and a small number of Arab, Islamic, and Palestinian sources.[34] As importantly, the various Palestinian opposition groups kept jealous political and administative control of their institutional fiefs, with ultimate decision-making power often held by leaders in exile, and utilized these bodies primarily as a means to recruit new members. Implicit rivalries also emerged as institutional entrepreneurs in Gaza and the southern and northern West Bank resented what they saw as the concentration of development practitioners and foreign funds in the Jerusalem triangle.[35] The Palestinian Left may not have employed patronage in the manner or scale of Fateh, but it, too, operated 'rent'.

Whatever the source, the availability of rent was crucial to the political competition that drove the 'war of the institutions' in the years up to the intifada. The resultant over-politicization eventually affected the other forms of grass-roots organization, although the full implications were not to become evident until well into the uprising. Before then the consequences were most visible in the trade unions, which suffered a second major split in the GFTU in September 1985, and in the increased antagonism between Fateh and its leftist rivals during the rift over the PLO's diplomatic alliance with Jordan in 1984–5. A very different reflection of the primacy of rent and nationalist politics (rather than the requirements of social mobilization and economic development) in driving factional competition was the continued stress on armed struggle (despite its persistent failures) and hostile disregard for strategies of non-violent resistance (proposed most vocally by the American-Palestinian Mubarak ʿAwad). Reliance on rent and statist patterns of political institutionalization were ultimately to prove detrimental, but in the short term the populist ethos of the grass-roots movement and its appeal to Palestinian nationalism allowed effective political mobilization and social incorporation. The reconciliation of the PLO and formal inclusion in its ranks of the PCP in April 1987 provided the added, timely element of united leadership that was about to be faced with an extraordinary political opportunity.

Centre-Stage Regained

The impact of moves towards reconciliation within the PLO was demonstrated when trade unionists belonging to the principal groups in Gaza successfully defied the Israeli ban to re-enter their union premises and hold elections in February and April 1987, for the first time since 1979. The growth of the grass-roots movement and build-up of civilian protests in the course of 1987 was such

that Wazir's aides in exile could boast on the eve of the intifada, with some justification, that they could instigate demonstrations virtually at will anywhere in the occupied territories.[36] This, a leading Fateh cadre in the West Bank added, was the result of careful study of the brief, localized uprisings that had erupted in previous years, leading to a restructuring of the clandestine organization away from its previous emphasis on disconnected, armed cells towards youth and 'action' committees conducting social and mass action.[37] The local leadership was already planning to escalate mass protests and confrontations with the Israeli occupation at the beginning of 1988, a timing chosen to coincide with the anniversary of Fateh's launch, and so was prepared (as were the Palestinian Left and Islamists) to seize the moment when the spark that set off the intifada came spontaneously, slightly earlier than expected.

Yet the PLO leadership in exile, at least, was as surprised as Israel by the outbreak of the uprising. Statist institutionalization had enabled the PLO to retain its constituency in a particularly difficult phase, but not to advance from that negative function to the more assertive one of organizing a broadly-based rebellion such as now unfolded, whatever the expectations of local cadres in the occupied territories or the retroactive assertions of their superiors in exile. It had already dubbed the confrontations between local protestors and Israeli forces in preceding months as an intifada, and if anything was not immediately sensitive to the transformation that took place after 9 December. This shortcoming was shared by all the exile-based groups. A statement issued by the PFLP politburo three days later to mark the twentieth anniversary of its founding was revealing: it defined seven tasks in the coming period, but made no mention of the occupied territories or of the ongoing mass protests.[38]

Delayed reaction was also the result of a certain ambivalence, if not reticence, on the part of the PLO. Foreign media quickly made much of the role of Islamists in the uprising, and of the possible emergence of a youthful, local Palestinian leadership that was not subservient to the PLO. The unarmed intifada, the reasoning went, had achieved in a few weeks what years of costly armed struggle had failed to produce, implying a failure of the PLO leadership in exile. Seeking to counter these views, Arafat went so far as to claim that the PLO had previously decided to counter the siege of the refugee camps in Lebanon with mass demonstrations in the occupied territories.[39] His customary New Year message asserted a symbiotic relationship between the camps war and the intifada, and affirmed the unity of the 'children of the RPGs' in Lebanon and the 'children of the stones' in the occupied territories.[40] Wazir described the uprising as the result of a long accumulation of struggle, a view echoed by the entire spectrum of guerrilla groups.[41]

An article published towards the end of December by Akram Haniyya, a deportee and key aide to Wazir, reflected both the sense of continuity with past protests and the growing realization that the uprising represented something radically different. 'This *intifada*', he wrote, 'is in reality much more than an

uprising but slightly less than a comprehensive, popular revolution . . . It separates one phase from another, and is the most important and the greatest in effectiveness and impact in comparison with the other important uprisings witnessed in the occupied land in the past ten years, namely: the *intifada* of winter 1981 (against the civil administration project), the *intifada* of spring 1982 (in the face of the dismissal by the occupation authorities of the nationalist municipal councils, before the invasion of Lebanon), and the *intifada* of winter 1986 (that erupted against the attempts to create an alternative leadership to the PLO in the occupied land).'[42]

The initial surprise did not last long, therefore. The local cadres had already joined the uprising spontaneously, and as the first few weeks passed the principal guerrilla groups sought to institutionalize the revolt. Islamist forces in Gaza were in fact first on the scene with a leaflet on 10 December extolling the uprising, followed by the PCP, which issued statements in Gaza in the name of 'the nationalist forces' on 14 and 18 December, after consulting local representatives of the guerrilla groups and the 'committee of public figures' headed by Haydar ʿAbd-al-Shafi.[43] Fateh issued the next appeal unilaterally in the name of 'the Palestinian nationalist forces' on 8 January 1988 (drafted by journalist ʿAbdullah ʿAwad, newspaper editor Salah Zuhayqa, reverend ʿAwda Rantisi, and university lecturer Sari Nusayba), followed by the DFLP with a similar appeal two days later (drafted by electrician Muhammad al-Labadi and bookshop owner Nasir al-Juʿba). Efforts to provide united leadership led to the creation by Fateh, the PFLP, DFLP, and PCP of parallel 'unified national commands' (UNC) in Gaza and the West Bank, which issued the first of a series of public 'appeals' (*nida'*) on 16 January.[44]

The formation of the UNC was largely the initiative of DFLP cadres Jamal Zaqqut and Muhammad al-Labadi, the PFLP's Marwan Kafarna, PCP's Marwan Mabhuh and Taysir ʿAruri, and Fateh's Ihab al-Ashqar and Samir Shihada, who were later replaced by cadres with similar backgrounds and experience as one command after another was exposed to arrest or deportation. Besides confirming allegiance to the PLO, the UNC appeals provided political direction and offered practical guidelines on means of organization and resistance. They designated strike days, urged a boycott of Israeli goods, and called for social solidarity. As the uprising gained momentum the appeals formulated the elements of a programme designed to disengage the occupied territories from Israel economically and administratively, in the undeclared hope of readying the population ultimately for outright civilian disobedience.

In exile, the mainstream PLO leadership seized the opportunity to revive its flagging political fortunes even before it had grasped the need to construct organizational structures capable of sustaining the intifada. The uprising had so transformed the political landscape that peace talks, in which the PLO could participate as an independent actor, suddenly seemed a realistic prospect. The DFLP was the most optimistic, arguing in mid-January 1988 that although some

had thought that Palestinian statehood was merely a dream, it was now a visible prospect. Indeed, the PLO had already formulated the main principles that were to guide its diplomatic strategy for the next two and a half years by the beginning of 1988, at a time when neither it nor Israel could predict with any confidence that the uprising would last beyond the next few days. Fateh central committee member Mahmud ʿAbbas stated during a visit to Cairo in mid-December 1987 that the PLO sought an international peace conference, while PNC deputy-speaker Salim al-Zaʿnun added that it hoped to revive four-party coordination with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, 'along the lines of the 1974 Rabat summit'.[45]

Arafat outlined PLO strategy in his New Year message, defining three aims: 'return, self-determination, and the establishment of our free independent state, with its capital Jerusalem'.[46] The mechanism proposed was a UN-sponsored international peace conference attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the regional protagonists, including the PLO on an equal footing with the other parties. Negotiations would be based on 'international legitimacy and the resolutions of Arab summit [conferences], especially the Fez summit of 1982'. Arafat had recently stated PLO acceptance of all UN resolutions, explicitly including UNSCR 242 and 338 for the first time, in an interview published by the official weekly *Filastin al-Thawra*; at new year he reiterated the commitment to 'all [UN] resolutions', but, with an eye to internal opposition, also insisted that international 'legitimacy is a whole that cannot be fragmented, it is not one or two resolutions [only]'.[47] The PLO central council adopted the call for an international peace conference in identical terms on 9 January, and repeated earlier demands for the deployment of UN troops to protect Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories.[48]

The attempt to capitalize on the intifada led the mainstream PLO leadership to consider forming a government-in-exile (GiE). For some, among them PFLP secretary-general Habash, the idea was premature, not least because it implied readiness to negotiate directly with Israel and so to recognize it as a legitimate entity.[49] DFLP secretary-general Hawatma supported peace talks, but objected that setting up a GiE would split Palestinian ranks. More importantly, he argued, the PLO was already recognized by 130 states and should not burden itself with the laborious task of securing similar recognition for a GiE.[50] Fateh central committee members Khalaf and Khalid al-Hasan were also opposed; Khalaf argued that a GiE would have to assume power and manage people's affairs, something that current political circumstances did not allow.[51] ʿAbbas, conversely, argued that a GiE would have more room for diplomatic manoeuvre than the PLO, because 'there is a big difference between the discourse [*hadith*] of a state and the discourse of a revolution'.[52] An editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra* added that a GiE would circumvent US and Israeli refusal to deal with the PLO, and would effectively enable the Palestinians to participate in an international peace conference on equal footing with other state actors, since the GiE had the status of a quasi-state.[53]

Arafat was guarded in public but hardly dismissive, not least because certain foreign friends were urging the PLO to form a GiE.[54] The Fateh central committee had apparently decided to postpone discussion of the issue, but Arafat signalled his interest by saying that the Palestinians should indeed have a GiE, and that the PLO would consult the superpowers and friendly states on the issue.[55] He went further in mid-January: 'any revolution that approaches victory must form a provisional government; we will declare such a government at the appropriate time'.[56] That time was not yet at hand, however. Zaʿnun reflected the consensus reached by the end of the month that 'despite the intifada, its success and continuation, conditions are still not ripe and we do not believe that Israel will acquiesce as easily as some say. We need a second, third, and fourth intifada, and we need to increase our [military] operations in the occupied land. We consider that the idea of a GiE stands, and is justified, but the time is not opportune.'[57] The subject had run its course for the time being and was shelved, but the discussion surrounding it revealed the PLO's assessment that Palestinian participation in the peace process was imminent and that its international status needed to be upgraded.

The PLO may have believed that the intifada had reconfirmed the Palestinian issue as the core of the Arab–Israeli conflict, but found that that it still faced stiff US opposition.[58] The mainstream leadership was convinced that the Israeli lobby did not determine US Middle East policy, contrary to widespread Arab belief, and that the US administration was in fact the stronger party in relation to Israel.[59] Arafat insisted that talk of 'Israeli influence in the US is an American device to deceive the Arabs', and accordingly directed his efforts towards securing a formal dialogue with the US, paying far less attention to the impact of PLO rhetoric and action on Israel.[60] The PLO was soon put to the test. US secretary of state George Shultz conducted the first of several shuttle missions to the region in early February in an attempt to produce a formula for Palestinian participation in the peace process that would satisfy Israeli prime minister Shamir and his coalition government. Arafat came under fire from the Palestinian Left for instructing two 'public figures' in the occupied territories—east Jerusalem editor Hanna Sanyura and Gaza lawyer Fayiz Abu-Rahma—to meet Shultz, but was angered by the secretary's refusal to meet Palestinians from the diaspora.[61] *Filastin al-Thawra* commented that succumbing to 'the US decision is not the Palestinian fate', and Arafat banned further meetings to demonstrate PLO authority.[62]

A hiatus ensued while Shultz pursued his futile mission. The mainstream PLO leadership privately came to the conclusion that it would have to devise a suitable means to accept UNSCR 242 and 338, and obtained enthusiastic support during visits by ʿAbbas and other PLO officials to Moscow and Cairo.[63] The problem was that the PLO did not yet have sufficient leverage to reinforce its diplomacy or ensure a major shift in US policy. A prevailing assumption was that the intifada could not last indefinitely, and the attention of Wazir, in particular, was devoted to devising new initiatives that might prolong it from

one week to the next.[64] Another consequence of the search for a strategy was the instinctive resort to military activity across the Arab borders, as the various guerrilla groups sought both to bolster the uprising and to demonstrate their nationalist credentials. A number of letter-bombs reached Israel, and were followed by ten rocket attacks across the Lebanese border in January alone. The guerrillas also mounted 14 infiltration attempts, suffering 37 casualties and inflicting 20, the last being an attempt to penetrate the Israeli nuclear facility at Dimona on 7 March.

Guerrilla activity was very much a secondary effort, however. The focus was clearly on the occupied territories, widely regarded as the preserve of Wazir, who had developed encyclopaedic knowledge of the social, political, and economic map in the West Bank and Gaza (and of the Palestinian community in Israel, for that matter) thanks to nearly 20 years as head of Fateh's Western Sector and nine years as head of the PLO side in the Jordan–Palestinian joint committee. The intifada was viewed as his personal triumph, and he was applauded in various PLO and Arab fora as its architect. Wazir saw the uprising as an all-engulfing phenomenon with immense potential, and feared that Arafat would abort it by seeking diplomatic gain prematurely. His suspicion was evident in the stern admonition in late January that 'no voice rises above that of the intifada, and so talk of a GiE must cease', and in his caution against 'hurried political exploitation' in mid-April.[65] Wazir wished to escalate the uprising, and indeed take it to the Palestinian citizens of Israel; he foresaw a general insurrection, at which point his private ambition was to enter the occupied territories to lead the revolt.[66] In the meantime, he confided to his aides in scathing terms, he intended to tackle Arafat and bring his autocratic ways and financial irregularities under control.

The ambition was grand, the task daunting. Wazir strove to weave all possible means into a single strategy of resistance to the Israeli occupation, with the pragmatism and unflagging energy that were his trademark. The intifada involved three forms of confrontation, he explained: use of 'popular means' such as 'molotov cocktails', slingshots, and spiked metal projectiles by the general public; construction of a dedicated military apparatus composed of the 'strike groups' of committed activists, in preparation for an eventual general insurrection; and cross-border attacks by guerillas based in Arab sanctuaries.[67] At the same time, Wazir was conscious of the immense impact that confrontations between unarmed Palestinian protestors and Israeli troops were having on world opinion, and stressed repeatedly that the intifada activists should not resort to firearms.[68] He also resolved during February to cease guerrilla raids, authorizing the last attempt on Dimona only reluctantly, but foresaw a role for Palestinian combat units in an unspecified 'second stage of the uprising'. In all cases, however, the graduation from stones to guns would have to be a natural progress from within the intifada.[69] Whether or not Wazir's Blanquist strategy could ultimately defeat the highly structured and deeply entrenched system of Israeli control was moot, but in any case his

assassination by Israeli commandos in Tunis on 16 April rendered the question academic.

Forcing a Decision

Wazir's assassination was a severe blow, but the momentum of the intifada was not affected. Its unique mass character was sustained by a large number of youth and action committees organized by geographical location—village, refugee camp, and urban neighbourhood—or social category—women, students, and trade or profession. Israeli sources estimated the 'hard core' of activists, from whom came the uprising's 'strike groups', at 10,000 to 20,000, while a leading cadre of Fateh's *Shabiba* claimed it alone to have 40,000 members.[70] Other grass-roots committees organized neighbourhood watches, food and supplies, and harvest and donation drives. Charitable societies, trade unions, and voluntary and non-governmental organizations launched income-generation and land reclamation projects and cottage industries to boost the local economy and assist the boycott of Israeli goods. This effort was backed by specialized committees providing medical and agricultural outreach programmes to the rural population. Adherence by shopkeepers to strike calls was another novel feature, as was the high level of participation by women, and by adults generally. The nature of the UNC itself was a crucial factor: composed overwhelmingly of former prisoners, students, and trade unionists, it proved adept at setting practical objectives and at delegating authority. Its amorphous structure and large reserves—Israeli sources estimated a core of 40 senior cadres backed by a pool of 500 second-echelon activists—allowed it to survive repeated security sweeps.[71]

The IDF doubled the number of personnel in the West Bank (and then doubled again) and increased them threefold in Gaza, while the Shabak hurriedly rebuilt its networks of informers. Rabin vowed to crush the uprising with 'force, might, and beatings', and a host of punitive measures were imposed on the civilian population.[72] One was the closure of 900 schools, while curfews prevented tens of thousands of Palestinian labourers from commuting to work in Israel. The authorities also reduced the amount of cash that travellers could bring in from $5,000 to $1,000 in an attempt to block the flow of PLO aid. Especially rebellious towns or villages were denied permits for travel or trade as an added, collective punishment; the provision of all official documents, including identity cards and driving licences, was now conditional on proof of payment of taxes, ordinary fines, and the penalties imposed by security courts. Over 2,600 Palestinians were in administrative detention by September according to a US state department report, and a total of 40,000 were arrested in the first eighteen months of the uprising, a handful of whom were expelled to south Lebanon.[73] Yet the IDF registered 23,092 unarmed protests or stone-throwing incidents, 1,390 involving molotov cocktails, and 149 in which knives,

explosives, or guns were used for the whole of 1988; army sources later stated that official statistics under-reported incidents by one-third.[74]

The force of the intifada enabled the PLO to improve its position in relation to Syria and Jordan. It had enjoyed a slight thaw with Syria since the release of 150 political prisoners in December 1987, but vice-president Khaddam still insisted that the PLO should acknowledge overall Syrian management of the conflict with Israel.[75] This the mainstream PLO leadership was unwilling to do; it also estimated that 3,000 to 5,000 Palestinians remained in Syrian prisons. A meeting between Khaddam and Fateh central committee members Qaddumi and Khalaf in mid-March 1988 failed to resolve any of these issues, but the assassination of Wazir offered an opportunity to end the feud.[76] When a PLO delegation visited Asad to request permission to bury the slain leader in Damascus, he affirmed that 'we will remain with the PLO. We never once thought, even at the height of our differences, of creating an alternative organization. We support the Palestinian decision to establish their own independent state.'[77] An editorial in *Tishrin* added that in recent talks with Shultz Syrian leaders had 'insisted that the PLO was the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and there is no alternative to involving [it] in any [peace] talks'.[78] Between 500,000 and one million people turned out for Wazir's funeral, and on 23 April Asad received Arafat, who had refused to come to Damascus until assured of an audience with the Syrian president.[79]

The improvement in PLO–Syrian relations proved shortlived. The first challenge came from the Fateh dissidents, who feared that they would be sacrificed on the altar of PLO–Syrian reconciliation. They responded by instigating a series of altercations with PLO loyalists in Shatila in the second half of April, and later complained that 'our movement was exposed to a hostile media campaign that targeted its stance and leaders through the dissemination of false rumours and lies'.[80] Arafat, for his part, was evidently encouraged when Khaddam stated at the beginning of May that the fate of the dissidents was 'a Palestinian-Palestinian issue, which does not concern Syria'.[81] On 5 May the loyalists expelled the dissidents almost entirely from Shatila, and a day later 300 of 450 dissidents in the Sidon area, including an artillery battalion commander, were induced to rejoin Fateh, while 100 defected to other groups.[82] This coincided with the outbreak of severe fighting between Amal and Hizbullah in Beirut; by 25 May Hizbullah had routed the pro-Syrian Amal from all but one of the southern suburbs, and stood poised at the edge of the refugee camps.

Evidently suspecting Arafat of secretly threatening its position in Beirut, Syria abruptly abandoned its previous neutrality. On 25 May it cancelled a commemorative rally in Damascus marking the first 40 days since Wazir's death, and deployed a buffer force around the camps in Beirut.[83] The dissidents were allowed to reinforce to a strength of 400–600, and on 9 June assaulted Shatila with heavy Syrian artillery support.[84] Mediation by Qadhdhafi and Jibril with Maragha and ʿAmla produced two ceasefires, but the dissidents resumed

fire on each occasion, and on 28 June the surviving loyalists finally agreed to leave the camp for ʿAyn al-Hilwa.[85] They had lost 86 dead and 110 wounded since the end of April, having started with 250–300 personnel.[86] The dissidents next turned to Burj al-Barajna: 400 to 500 loyalists left the camp during four days of clashes, and on 8 July another 175 were escorted to ʿAyn al-Hilwa, by which time the total toll for the last battle of the camps stood at 151 dead and 594 wounded.

The dissident victory was pyrrhic. In the occupied territories the UNC condemned the 'followers of the renegade and apostate [Maragha]', and the PFLP, DFLP, PCP, and PLF also blamed them frankly for the carnage.[87] PFLP deputy secretary-general Mustafa al-Zabri added that the dissidents had 'always sought, throughout the previous years and even when we were together in the PNSF, to push matters to the point of infighting despite our warnings against such a destructive path'.[88] The dissidents furiously described the other groups as defeatist, and denounced the PFLP in particular for having become so bureaucratized and overburdened with payrolls that it had shed its former revolutionary spirit in favour of vested interests.[89] Even the PF–GC had let them down by refusing to join the assault, and Maragha declared bitterly that 'we are the only ones in the Palestinian arena now who disagree with Arafat and oppose his political programs . . . I am the only one rejecting the international [peace] conference'.[90]

Arafat had once again utilized the conflict in Lebanon to harness Palestinian nationalism to his cause. At the end of June the PLO executive committee formally accused Syria of having aided the dissidents from the outset; a fortnight later an editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra* signed by Ahmad ʿAbd-al-Rahman, signifying direct sanction by Arafat, averred that Asad had 'spent his life combatting the [Palestinian] revolution . . . such is the "protection money" that every Palestinian must pay who lives on Arab soil ruled by a man like [him]'.[91] The next editorial caustically reminded the Syrian army that it was shelling 'the camps of Palestine, not Zionist settlements in the Golan [Heights]'.[92] A series of car bombs and assassination attempts against Fateh and DFLP officials in the Sidon area followed, but the PLO–Syrian feud was suddenly cut short on 31 July, when king Husayn announced the severance of administrative and financial ties between Jordan and the West Bank.

The Jordanian decision offered conclusive proof of the impact of the intifada on the political standing of the PLO. Jordan had reacted quickly to the start of the uprising in December 1987, offering on the one hand to resume the dialogue with the PLO and on the other sponsoring the creation of a 'Palestinian–Jordanian assembly' as its political vehicle in the occupied territories. The mainstream leadership rejected Jordanian terms for the dialogue—acceptance of UNSCR 242 as the basis for negotiation with Israel, and the formation of a joint delegation to peace talks—but restrained attacks on Jordan in UNC appeals after February 1988.[93] The PLO scored a major success in June, when the Arab summit conference in Algiers gave it exclusive control over the flow of

Arab financial assistance to the occupied territories—stated by the PLO to comprise an immediate grant of $128 million and a monthly stipend of $43 million. The Jordanian government made a last-ditch attempt in July to muster support in the West Bank, but signalled its failure by cancelling the 1986 development plan later in the month. The king's decision to sever ties came a few days later.

PLO delight with the king's decision was tempered by the realization that it would now have to assume the Jordanian financial burden in the West Bank. A measured statement from the PLO central council on 3 August insisted that it would meet its 'national and [Arab] responsibilities', but suspicion of the king's real intentions ran deep.[94] An editorial by ʿAbd-al-Rahman in *Filastin al-Thawra* was blunt: 'the king believed he would place on the PLO's shoulders a burden it could not bear, so that it would return to obedience and accept a feeble entity, a bantustan . . . but he has lost the battle, this is the end of the unholy alliance between [his] regime and the [Israeli] enemy'.[95] On 22 August Arafat decreed payment for Palestinian civil servants in the West Bank from PLO funds, while *Filastin al-Thawra* reminded its readers that it was the king 'who took the decision of September 1970 [to confront the PLO]', with US–Israeli protection and the connivance of Syrian president Asad.[96]

However, the real challenge for the PLO was political, not financial. In order to assert its claim to the occupied territories, the PLO would have to devise a formula allowing it to overcome US opposition to its participation in the peace process. Arafat had already accused the US administration in March of seeking shared rule and a functional condominium between Israel and Jordan, which, he charged, would reduce the Palestinians to the slavery of a South African bantustan.[97] Shultz, he added, was guilty of rejectionism. If the US position was 'no PLO, no Palestinian state, no self-determination, and no independent Palestinian delegation to peace talks', then what did the secretary of state have to offer? Arafat concluded confidently that if the US wanted to resolve the Arab–Israeli conflict, it would have to knock on the PLO's door.[98] The lack of progress at a meeting between Shultz and American–Palestinian academics Edward Saʿid and Ibrahim Abu-Lughud on 26 March led to an informal PLO ban on further contacts. Its conviction that the real struggle was with the US had only deepened: '[Israel], government, army, and settlers, is nothing but a unique, colonialist American enterprise'.[99]

Behind the bluster, Arafat still sought to manoeuvre the PLO into a diplomatic position amenable to US terms. A document penned in July by his adviser, Bassam Abu-Sharif, tested the water by acknowledging Israel's existential concerns and suggesting direct Palestinian–Israeli negotiations within the wider framework of an international peace conference. Internal opposition prompted the PLO chairman to disassociate himself from the proposal, but a signed editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra* on 31 July once again reflected his thinking. In it ʿAbd-al-Rahman criticized those who considered the demand for 'an independent state as an extremely modest goal in comparison to the grand Palestin-

ian demands embodied by the historical slogan calling for liberation of Palestine from the [Jordan] river to the [Mediterranean] sea'. He identified national goals 'for this phase' as the end of Israeli occupation, self-determination, and the establishment of an independent state under PLO leadership. Arafat followed up by stating that the declaration of Palestinian statehood was now only 'a matter of time'.[100]

Surprising as it was, the Jordanian decision to sever ties with the West Bank therefore found Arafat ready politically. It even assisted his endeavour by inducing a sober realism among the opposition. An intense debate unfolded behind closed doors in Tunis, as the Palestinian leadership considered reports from the political and legal committees of the PNC analysing the implications of the Jordanian action and surveying Palestinian options.[101] A statement in early September by PFLP secretary-general Habash showed that a consensus had been reached: the PLO had to declare a state in order to fill the vacuum left by Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank and pre-empt annexation by Israel.[102] The 'loyalist' opposition still rejected direct negotiation with Israel, however, and called instead for UN trusteeship over the occupied territories until a lasting solution was reached at an international peace conference.[103] The PFLP opposed the establishment of a GiE for this reason, but the DFLP adopted a more pragmatic attitude, in the hope, its detractors sneered, of ensuring a seat in an eventual cabinet.[104]

Once again *Filastin al-Thawra* signalled mainstream policy. 'In 1948 the Palestinian leaders were unable to build themselves or protect their decision from Arab collusion and treason', its editorial on 11 September stated, 'and so the international accord was built around the [UN] partition plan and the Palestinian people were unable to meet the terms of the international accord at that time. In 1988, however, the Palestinian situation in national, political, leadership, and unity terms is one million times better. Today our decision is independent and is in the service of our people, and we must take our decision for national independence in light of our understanding of regional and international developments.' As the consensus widened over the next month, the editorial on 2 October argued that 'the [pre-independence] Algerian example is being repeated in the West Bank and [Gaza] Strip, where life is paralysed', and a week later insisted that 'the present moment is the suitable historic moment . . . we must grasp it firmly'.[105] Shultz meanwhile injected a policy statement on 16 September, in which he reaffirmed US opposition both to the establishment of a Palestinian state and to Israeli annexation of the occupied territories, while recognizing the 'legitimate political rights' of the Palestinians and accepting an international peace conference as 'an appropriate vehicle for direct negotiations'.[106] The only question now remaining for the PLO was when to convene the PNC for maximum impact on US policy: before the coming presidential elections or after.[107]

In the event the PNC was scheduled to start on 12 November. Syria threateningly massed dissident and PF–GC forces north of Sidon and readied PLA

units for action in Lebanon, but to no avail.[108] On 15 November, Arafat read the Palestinian declaration of independence to a standing ovation at the closing session of the 19th PNC. The new political programme formally approved UNSCR 242 and 338, albeit in tandem with a provision on Palestinian rights, and condemned terrorism. Its endorsement of the UN partition plan of 1947 (UNGAR 181), effectively committed the PLO to the coexistence of Israel and a Palestinian state. The PNC also empowered the central council to form a GiE when appropriate, and the executive committee to perform the functions of government until such time as a GiE was established.[109] Even the PFLP voted in favour of the programme after its attempt to delete the article endorsing UNSCR 242 and 338 had been defeated (by 253 votes to 46). The decision by the PFLP, PPSF, and other opponents to abide by the outcome rather than withdraw subsequently from the executive committee or central council, as had been their wont previously, marked the final transition of PLO politics from consensus to majority rule.

Arafat had obtained the diplomatic mandate he had sought for so long, but one obstacle remained. The US still demanded a more explicit PLO statement before agreeing to an official dialogue, and denied Arafat a visa to address the UN general assembly in New York. In response the assembly took the unprecedented step of reconvening in Geneva on 14 December to hear Arafat; in separate votes, 150 members welcomed the results of the PNC and supported PLO participation in an international peace conference, while 104 members 'recognized the declaration of the State of Palestine' and approved changing the title of the PLO observer delegation to 'Palestine'. The US was not fully satisfied, but finally, after mediation by Swedish foreign minister Sven Anderson, the PLO chairman used the required wording at an especially convened press conference: I accept 'the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security, and, as I have mentioned, including the state of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbours, according to the Resolutions 242 and 338 . . . we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group and state terrorism'.[110] The next day Shultz approved the start of the official dialogue, his last act as secretary of state in the outgoing Reagan administration.

The PLO seemed at long last to have achieved the political breakthrough it had striven for since its first overture to the US administration in June 1973. Even the death of 270 passengers and inhabitants as a result of a mid-air explosion (widely attributed to the PF–GC) that brought a Pan-Am 747 down onto the Scottish town of Lockerbie on 21 December failed to derail PLO diplomacy. Eighty-four countries extended full recognition of the new State of Palestine and some 20 others offered qualified recognition in the next two months, and in mid-January 1989 the PLO scored another symbolic victory by gaining the right to address the Security Council on equal footing with member states. It now planned to win upgraded recognition from the EC, and, in this manner, provide itself with additional means to press the US into undertaking

active mediation with Israel.[111] Yet even as it basked in its new-found respectability, the PLO faced a serious new challenge to its statist enterprise from within the Palestinian arena.

Islam to the Fore

The secular, nationalist Palestinian opposition had patently failed to prevent the mainstream PLO leadership from attaining its political purpose. Yet the latter also faced a profound structural problem. The continued reliance of the Fateh-dominated PLO on statist patterns of political incorporation, in a situation where a competing statist centre (Israel) exercised much more extensive social, economic, and administrative control, inevitably left substantial sectors of the population in the occupied territories without channels for political participation. As in many Arab countries, the failure of one statist model and its accompanying secular, nationalist ideology was accompanied by the rise of another, political Islam. Palestinian Islamists had been growing steadily in number and influence since the beginning of the 1980s, and, although the PLO strenuously denied this, played a prominent role from the beginning of the intifada.[112] The PLO position was not tenable, however, and on 21 March 1988 its executive committee implicitly acknowledged the Islamist impact by heading a formal statement, for the first time, with the invocation 'in the the name of God, the Compassionate the Merciful' and by quoting several suras from the Qur'an.[113] By August the Islamists were ready to put on a show of strength, and did so by calling for a general strike on a day other than the one designated by the UNC, with considerable success.

The Islamists were represented by two main groups; a third, the Islamic Liberation Party, remaining completely inactive. The smaller by far, but first to confront the occupation openly, was the Islamic Jihad Movement (*Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami*), a group with disparate origins. One of its founders was Fathi al-Shiqaqi, a young refugee from Gaza who qualified in mathematics and took a doctorate in pharmacy at Egyptian universities during the 1970s. Born in 1953 and influenced as a teenager by the common pro-Nasir sentiment, he turned to the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab defeat of June 1967.[114] Shiqaqi became disillusioned with the Society's reluctance to organize armed resistance to the Israeli occupation, however, and left its ranks in 1975. The 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran impressed him deeply, spurring him to write a book about Ayatullah Khumayni's thought. In resorting to Shiʿite theology for injunctions to rebel against tyranny, which he could not find in orthodox Sunni teachings, Shiqaqi consciously followed the path of the militant Islamist groups appearing in Egypt.[115] In 1980 he joined forces with ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz ʿAwda—a refugee born in 1948, former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and now a preacher and a lecturer at the Islamic University in Gaza—to found Jihad.[116] Shiqaqi, who composed poetry and contributed to the cultural page of the Fateh-backed *al-*

Fajr, and ʿAwda later produced a clandestine periodical, *al-Taliʿa al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Vanguard), to disseminate their views.[117]

Shiqaqi and ʿAwda made slow progress, but separate spells in Israeli prisons in 1983 and 1984 offered a chance to attract new recruits. Most important were the Islamic Group (*al-Jamaʿa al-Islamiyya*), who stemmed from an attempt by a handful of junior PLA officers from Gaza to redress the lack of political organization and ideological guidance among Palestinians in Ashkelon prison through observance of Islamic religious teachings. Their amir was Jabr ʿAmmar, who was captured in the early 1970s after operating in the guerrilla wing of the PLA, the Popular Liberation Forces. Other followers included PFLP cadre Muhammad al-Jamal, PLF cadre Misbah al-Suri, and the PF–GC's Hafiz al-Dalqamuni and Yusif al-ʿAjjuri.[118] Like the Jihad co-founders, they had been deeply affected by the 1967 defeat, seeing it as the sign for a 'return to God'.[119] The group coalesced in 1974, and fifty of its adherents initiated a new phase in the history of the Palestinian prison movement by organizing a hunger strike of unprecedented rigour and duration in 1976.[120] Only then did its members gain an overtly political role, and they came to be known to the other prisoners as the 'independents', because they disavowed membership in the nationalist organizations, or the 'Qassamites', after the renowned leader of the armed revolt of 1935. Another leading figure was ʿAbdullah Ahmad Hasan Mhanna: a junior PLA/PLF officer captured in 1971, he became a Fateh supporter until 1977, and then led an Islamist current in Beer-Sheva prison known disparagingly as *al-munfalishun* (the 'lax ones') due to their loose organization and indiscipline.[121]

The major boost for Jihad came in 1985, when several of its leading cadres were released in the prisoner exchange between Israel and the PF–GC. It now acquired a spiritual mentor in sheikh Asʿad Bayyud al-Tamimi, a former preacher in Jerusalem who had lived in Jordan since 1970.[122] However, Tamimi opposed what he deemed to be the objectionable attachment of his younger partners to Iran.[123] He won the support in the occupied territories of Ibrahim Muʿammar, who formed a new faction called Islamic Jihad Movement—House of the Holy (*Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami—Bayt al-Maqdis*) in 1986. Muʿammar died of natural causes soon after, but Tamimi remained leader of the group, assisted by his son Nadir, who held a doctorate in theology from al-Azhar University in Cairo and had pretensions to military command. Mhanna subsequently joined the faction, and ʿAmmar became a close sympathizer. Both groups drew their members predominantly from the same social background—the lower middle class, especially impoverished refugee families—but with discernible distinctions.[124] On the one hand Jihad clearly held sway in Gaza, and several of its leaders were among the many poorer Palestinians who had benefited from Arab state grants to receive a modern university education; on the other hand the smaller following of Bayt al-Maqdis was mainly in the West Bank, and the Tamimis, father and son, were religious preachers by vocation or training, while Mhanna and ʿAmmar had only secondary school education.

These social and educational distinctions left an imprint on the political discourse of the two groups, although there were few fundamental differences in formal ideology, avowed means, or ultimate aims. Jihad was arguably the more sophisticated, as its leaders and literature referred extensively to Muslim Brotherhood founders Hasan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutub.[125] Yet the constant references to Qassam and Khumayni also revealed the powerful pull of Palestinian nationalism and the eclectic theological foundations of Jihad's version of political Islam. The nationalist roots of its founders were also evident in their insistence that struggle (*jihad*) in all its forms, especially militarily against Israel, was both a religious duty (*fard ʿayn*) for every Muslim and the prerequisite for the return of society to Islam.[126] Jihad criticized the Muslim Brotherhood for choosing the 'path of belief' without *jihad*, and the PLO for taking the 'path of *jihad*' without belief.[127] Bayt al-Maqdis, conversely, relied on the often obscurantist writings of Tamimi (and his son Nadir, to a lesser extent).[128] One book was titled 'The Role of Esoteric Knowledge in the Battle', while 'The Extinction of Israel is a Qurʾanic Inevitability' reflected the deterministic and ahistorical outlook of the Islamists in general. Both groups stressed the essential and unchanging nature of conflict with the Jews and the pernicious influence of Israel in the heart of the Islamic world, seeking its destruction and the establishment of an Islamic state in its place.

These goals were shared by the main Islamist force, the Islamic Resistance Movement (*Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya*). Best known by its acronym, Hamas, it was an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood Society in Palestine, itself part of the movement founded in Egypt in 1928. Like its Arab counterparts, the Palestinian branch took heart from the resounding Arab defeat of 1967, seeing it as proof of the failure of secular socialism and nationalism. Its representative in Gaza was sheikh Ahmad Yasin, a refugee (born in 1938) who became a preacher after poverty and a crippling accident had prevented attendance at university, and who reportedly regarded the humiliation of the Egyptian army as revenge for the execution of Qutub in 1966.[129] The Society's followers took their cue to preach stricter observance of Islam, regarding piety, proper family upbringing, education uncorrupted by Western values, and Islamic awareness as the sine qua non for resistance to Israel.[130] The epithet for their political inactivity was 'sensory isolation' (*al-inʿizal al-shuʿuri*), through which good Muslims could live in an non-Islamic society (*jahiliyya*). Some were eager to do more, however. A number (possibly several dozen) joined Fateh guerrilla bases in 1968–70, most prominent of whom was ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam, who later became an Arab mujahidin leader in Afghanistan until his assassination there in 1989.[131] Unaffiliated Islamists in the occupied territories such as Muslim preachers Yaʿqub Qirrish and Muhammad Abu-Tayr attempted to organize armed resistance in the 1970s but did so in cooperation with Fateh, which also had the sympathy of leading Muslim officials such as sheikhs ʿAkrama Sabri and Saʿd-al-din al-ʿAlami.

The Muslim Brotherhood firmly eschewed military action in the first two

decades after 1967. Working through local 'Islamic societies' in the main cities and towns of the West Bank and Gaza, it sought to encourage observance of Islam and widen its social base by establishing religious schools, Islamic libraries, childcare centres, vocational training centres for young men, and sports clubs, usually attached to local mosques. The most important society was the Islamic Complex (*al-Mujammaʿ al-Islami*) in Gaza, that commenced activity in 1973. The timing was significant: the suppression of the PLO-led resistance movement and detention of thousands of young activists in 1971–2 had left a vacuum into which stepped 'a satanic growth of informers, pimps, and hashish dealers', whom the Islamists combatted resolutely.[132] The existence of legally registered, public bodies also enabled the Muslim Brotherhood to rival the influence of official, Israeli-controlled Islamic institutions—the endowments (*waqf*), which controlled 10 per cent of immovable assets in Gaza, and religious courts—whose employees attended solely to administrative matters and often leaned to Sufi orders, the Islamic Liberation Party, or even the secular nationalist groups.[133] The Society additionally played an active role in the tithes (*zakat*) and reconciliation (*islah*) committees, and through these various means the Islamic Complex boasted 2,000 members by the late 1970s.[134]

The Muslim Brotherhood leadership was traditional in its composition, including senior preachers and merchants, but its social programmes and institutions were managed largely by younger, self-employed professionals. Among those providing a public face were pharmacist Ibrahim al-Yazuri and physicians ʿAbdullah al-Rantissi, Mahmud al-Zahhar, and Muhammad Siyam. A further social shift resulted from access to numerous scholarships at Egyptian and Saudi universities (especially al-Azhar and Um al-Qura) after 1967, and from the subsequent expansion of tertiary education in the occupied territories, including the establishment of the Islamic University in Gaza in 1978, a faculty of theology and Islamic law at Najah University, and two further Islamic colleges in Hebron and Jerusalem in 1980. Benefiting were large numbers of students from low-income 'popular categories' (*fiʾat shaʿbiyya*) for whom tertiary education offered new-found hope of social mobility and economic attainment—enrolment at the Islamic University alone built up to an eventual 5,000. Prevailing economic conditions dictated otherwise: many university graduates, especially in Gaza, were compelled instead to join the tens of thousands of wage labourers who commuted daily to work to Israel. Frustrated ambitions led easily to political Islam, especially among urban-based petty employees or urbanized refugees and villagers, and it was this category that now came to account for a large proportion of the membership and of middle-ranking cadres of the Muslim Brotherhood.[135]

The growing electoral challenge posed by Islamist candidates in PLO-dominated student unions in Gaza and the West Bank showed that the Muslim Brotherhood had emerged as a distinct political force by the end of the 1970s. This process was boosted in 1979 by the Israeli decision, prompted by the search for alternatives to the PLO, to allow official registration of the Islamic

Complex. Its administrative council was virtually identical to that of the local Muslim Brotherhood: headed by founder Yasin and with the membership of Yazuri, Rantisi, teachers ʿAbd-al-Fattah Dakhkhan and Muhammad Shamʿ, sheikh Salah Shihada, and engineer ʿIsa al-Nashshar.[136] The council now asserted formal responsibility for a variety of institutions, among them the Islamic University, which had been founded with PLO help a year earlier and was financed from the steadfastness fund. The PLO attempted to regain control of the university in 1985–6, during which period the Fateh-dominated Council for Higher Education blocked payments on several occasions; it was unsuccessful, and later sponsored the establishment of a branch of al-Azhar University in Gaza to assert its own claim to the Islamist constituency.[137]

Not only did the establishment of the Islamic University offer a timely alternative to Egyptian universities, from which Palestinian students were banned in 1979 as a result of PLO opposition to the Camp David accords, but it also provided employment for 150 graduates, besides administrative and non-academic personnel. The Islamic colleges and other public institutions in the West Bank, such as the Maqasid charitable hospital in Jerusalem, employed hundreds more, consolidating the social base of the Muslim Brotherhood. In following years it extended into the professional syndicates of doctors, engineers, lawyers, and accountants, and among UNRWA employees and Israeli-controlled civil servants. Access to funding from the oil-rich sheikhdoms of the Gulf (both official and from local tithes committees) allowed both greater independence from the PLO and the sustained construction of mosques, which increased from 400 to 750 in the West Bank and from 200 to 600 in Gaza in 1967–87.[138] The Islamic University and other colleges provided the preachers required, as well as a number of employees in the endowments bureaucracy, courts, and other official Islamic bodies. In November 1986 the Muslim Brotherhood underlined its divergence from the PLO by taking part in the conference convened by Jordan to discuss its development plan for the occupied territories, and by joining the Jordanian development committees in the West Bank.[139]

The Israeli authorities were initially content to let the Islamist challenge to the PLO grow, and turned a blind eye to attacks by Islamist militants on known PLO supporters in the early 1980s.[140] The Muslim Brotherhood cautiously refrained from civilian protests against the occupation, arguing that they merely defused public anger, but its position was coming increasingly under question from the rank-and-file.[141] In 1982 or 1983 sheikh Yasin secretly founded the 'Palestinian *mujahidun*' as the military arm of the Society, but was arrested in 1984 for illegal possession of weapons.[142] This did not impress the PFLP, for one, which was convinced that the Islamists had in fact been planning sabotage against the PLO, not Israel.[143] The Society did not change policy after the release of Yasin in the prisoner exchange of 1985, but the next year he founded an intelligence arm known as *Majd*. Led by two former student council presidents at the Islamic University, Yahya al-Sinuwar and Khalid al-Hindi, it was

entrusted to punish informers, drug pushers, and other 'deviants', expose Israeli entrapment techniques to the general population, and organize publications and communications.[144] Attacks on shops selling alcoholic drinks and on women in 'improper' attire or bathing in public now peaked, with 'acid attacks, knife slashing, and fire bombing'.[145]

Yet it was Jihad that first took the military initiative against Israel, along with a small Islamist faction emerging within Fateh. The latter was inspired by the Christian-born Munir Shafiq, one-time communist and former ideologue of a 'Maoist' tendency in Fateh, who had directed the PLO planning centre since 1974. Its leading figures were Muhammad Bhays and Basim al-Tamimi, who were senior cadres in Fateh's Western Sector. They served as a bridge to the new Islamist forces, especially Jihad, with the support of Wazir. The alliance took practical form in a joint grenade attack that injured 70 Israeli soliders at a passing-out ceremony at the Wailing Wall in mid-October 1986. The Fateh faction sought an autonomous identity as *Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami* (Companies of Islamic Jihad), but the assassination of Bhays and Tamimi by the Mossad, in Cyprus in February 1988, dealt it a fatal blow.[146] *Saja* reported attacks on Israeli targets through 1990, offering itself as 'a framework open to all who wish to conduct military action against the enemy'.[147] It claimed links with *al-Ittijah al-Islami al-Mujahid*, *Jabhat Filastin al-Muslima*, and *Tajammuʿ ʿUlamaʾ Filastin*, but these all proved short-lived, as did the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and more esoteric tendencies such as the *Sufiyyun*, *Salafiyyun*, *al-Takfir wa al-Hijra*, and *al-Tabligh wa al-Daʿwa*.[148]

The Muslim Brotherhood only shifted direction radically with the start of the intifada. The Gaza branch decided quickly to combine its civilian membership and military and intelligence arms into a single, new organization in order to take active part in the uprising, but was overruled by the 'general guidance bureau' (*maktab al-irshad al-ʿam*), the supreme leadership of the Society based in Egypt. The latter preferred to establish a separate, 'front' organization, and relayed this decision to Gaza on 15 December 1987, taken as the date Hamas was born.[149] However, disagreement persisted among the Society's leaders in Gaza over the status of Hamas. The old guard feared that it would acquire a life of its own and attract members who 'do not know how to perfect recitation of the Holy Qurʾan, smoke, or fail to read the letters of Hasan al-Banna'.[150] To commit the Society to overt resistance to Israel would moreover entail severe consequences should the uprising collapse. The compromise survived nonetheless, and the Society's branch in Jordan assumed responsibility for providing its counterpart in the occupied territories with political guidance and financial assistance. Possibly in order to stem the defection of impatient young members to other groups, Hamas was authorized to announce itself as 'the powerful arm of the Muslim Brotherhood' in mid-February 1988.[151]

Some confusion about the identity and status of Hamas remained, but in August it published its founding charter. This confirmed Hamas as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, 'a global organization and the largest Islamic

movement in modern times'. It was therefore committed to the Society's 'deep understanding of all Islamic tenets in all areas of life, in concept and belief, politics and economics, upbringing and social affairs, judiciary and government, the [Islamic] call and education, art and media, and in esoteric knowledge (*al-ghayb*), martyrdom, and the remaining areas of life'.[152] There was little description of organization or structure, but as a formal branch of the Muslim Brotherhood Hamas, or at least the original Palestinian section of the Society that still stood in the shadows behind it, presumably had its own consultative council (*majlis shura*) and spiritual guide (*murshid ruhi*), in this case Yasin. Whether the council was based in the occupied territories or in Jordan was not clear, however.

The charter had little to commend it as the work of the intellectual heirs of Banna and Qutub. This was largely because it was authored by Islamist cadres in Gaza, whose prolonged geographical isolation and limited exposure to the outside world (even including the West Bank) were reflected in simplistic political analysis and lack of social content, and in their recourse to broad generalizations, crude stereotypes, and conspiratorial theories of world history and politics.[153] This was reflected most strongly in the description of the Jews, who, the charter implied, had gained 'control [of] world media with their money . . . and engineered revolutions in all parts of the world to serve their interests and make profits . . . They were behind the French revolution and the communist revolution . . . With money they formed secret organizations spread in all parts of the world to destroy societies and attain Zionist interests, such as the Freemasons, Rotarians, Lions, and Sons of the Covenant . . . With money they managed to control the colonialist states, and to push them to colonize many countries . . . They were behind the First World War . . . and the Second World War . . . and instructed the formation of the UN and Security Council instead of the League of Nations to rule the world as well'.[154] In waging war on Israel, the charter continued, Hamas was simply continuing the confrontation against a nefarious enemy that had started in the crusades.

Despite its tenor, the charter was vague on the aims and methods of the struggle against Israel. Hamas sought the establishment of 'the state of Islam' over the whole of Palestine, and opposed the call for a secular democratic state raised in 1969 by the PLO; perhaps predictably, it revealed nothing about the social, economic, and political nature of the desired Islamic state. The charter held out the possibility of cooperation with the PLO, which contained 'brother, father, or friend', but stressed Islamist opposition to the peace process and all political steps that would leave any part of Palestine in the hands of non-Muslims.[155] Yet the means to destroy Israel were not clear. The charter simply stated that the liberation of Palestine, as a Muslim land, was a religious duty.[156] There was no alternative but to raise the banner of jihad, it added, a task that required 'spreading Islamic awareness among the local, Arab, and Muslim masses'. Armed struggle was not specifically mentioned, although Hamas

exhorted its followers to 'spread the spirit of jihad among the community [*umma*], joust with the enemies, and join the ranks of the mujahidin'.[157]

The charter did not offer a coherent programme for political and military action—and was ultimately superseded, effectively if not formally, by later tracts that were authored by experienced cadres in the West Bank or Jordan, and that showed greater political sophistication—but Hamas had indubitably become a major political force, with its own considerable following of street fighters, to whom it referred as the 'Throwing Arms' (*al-sawaʿid al-ramiya*). The Israeli authorities had arrested Rantisi and deported sheikh Khalil al-Quqa in April, but maintained their previous restraint towards the Muslim Brotherhood until the start of armed attacks by Hamas in August. A majority of the Society's known leaders were arrested in September, and in May 1989 sheikh Yasin, the entire replacement leadership, and nearly 250 other members were incarcerated following the abduction and murder of two IDF soliders. Jihad had also been decapitated by this time, ʿAwda, Shiqaqi, and Mhanna having been deported in the course of 1988. These were severe blows, but Hamas, especially, proved adept at reorganizing its membership and expanding its constituency at a time when the intifada was starting to lose its mass character. The fact that Hamas had an irreducible organizational network in the mosques and other Islamic institutions and a ready ideology in Islam was important, but did not fully explain its ability to make inroads into the social base of the more secular nationalist groups, particularly Fateh. Of equal importance was the disarray of the latter competitor, which became more marked as Arafat concentrated his power in exile and extended his system of neopatrimonial politics directly to the occupied territories.

Capturing the Intifada

Two models of Palestinian political organization confronted each other in 1988: the voluntary, grass-roots activism, social mobilization, and decentralized leadership that typified the intifada in its first year, and the contrasting bureaucratization, patronage, and centralizing institutions through which the PLO extended its statist control from exile. For a brief moment the former model appeared to pose a serious challenge, but the triumph of the latter was perhaps inevitable. Arafat spearheaded the statist process, and indeed personified it in April 1989 by securing nomination from the PLO executive committee and central council as president of the recently declared State of Palestine.[158] Largely titular, this post nonetheless enabled him to stand above the PLO and Fateh when the occasion demanded; the relative marginalization of both structures was evident first in the fact that neither the PLO executive committee nor the Fateh central committee convened in his absence, and secondly in the frequency with which they convened jointly in his presence, regardless of whether or not they were quorate.

Arafat reinforced his position further at Fateh's fifth general conference in August, which was attended by over 1,000 delegates drawn almost entirely from the salaried personnel. At his insistence two new posts were established—Fateh commander-in-chief and chairman of the central committee—the votes for which were conducted separately from the election of the new central committee. Arafat was duly recorded as having been selected by unanimous ovation to hold both posts, thereby overshadowing Qaddumi, who remained secretary of the central committee. The delegates also approved the expansion of the central committee and revolutionary council and the creation of a politburo, again at Arafat's insistent behest. The politburo was not formed in the event, but the expansion of the other two bodies allowed him both to co-opt a larger number of second-echelon leaders and middle-ranking cadres and to dilute the influence of surviving members of the founding core. None of his nominees were returned, but he remained unruffled, quipping that he could 'eat up' any number of rivals.[159]

Arafat's self-confidence was not misplaced. Of the nine new members elected to the central committee only Ahmad Qrayᶜ retained substantial influence, thanks to the partial control he exercised as director of Samid (the PLO's foreign investment arm), director-general of the PLO's economic department, and member of Fateh's three-man financial sub-committee. Salim Zaᶜnun, al-Hakam Balᶜawi, and al-Tayyib ᶜAbd-al-Rahim loyally served Arafat's policy as PNC deputy-speaker and PLO ambassadors in Tunisia and Jordan respectively, while as a PNLA general Nasr Yusif remained subject to the chairman's parallel authority as commander-in-chief. The remaining new central committee members, generally regarded as critics of Arafat, were safely relegated to less consequential posts: ᶜAbbas Zaki became head of the PNLA's political commissariat, Intisar al-Wazir and Yahya Habash remained heads of the PLO's social welfare bureau and Fateh's ideological mobilization bureau, Subhi Abu-Karsh became PLO ambassador in Saudi Arabia, while former dissident Muhammad Jihad returned to his desk at the PLO's political department in frustration. Even so, Arafat subsequently reinforced his position by securing the election in March 1990 of Nabil Shaᶜth (head of the PNC political committee) and ᶜAbdullah al-Ifranji (PLO ambassador to Germany) to the central committee (and later still co-opted *Filastin al-Thawra* editor Ahmad ᶜAbd-al-Rahman).[160]

Of the old guard central committee members, 'foreign minister' Qaddumi faced encroachment from Arafat, who had formed a special 'regions finances' section several years earlier as a means of eroding his rival's authority over PLO missions abroad, and who now appointed a growing number of representatives and security officers to the missions. Khalaf secured a niche by providing information on international terrorism to Western intelligence agencies, but carefully refrained from openly disputing the chairman's authority.[161] Even ᶜAbbas, who had held the Fateh treasury until the early 1970s and was now the third member of the financial sub-committee (along with Arafat),

prudently closeted himself at the PLO's national relations department, which he headed. The conference also separately elected the heads of new committees for financial supervision (*raqaba*) and membership supervision and protection, although it is not evident that their duties and prerogatives were ever specified.[162]

Not surprisingly, the power that Arafat wielded over the rest of the PLO and Fateh was virtually absolute. Scattered in various Arab states, PNLA personnel depended wholly on the commander-in-chief for pay, logistic and administrative services, travel funds, and even passports. Commanders could only visit his headquarters in Tunis with prior permission—the Tunisian authorities allowed entry only to those whose names had been placed on visitors' lists by the PLO embassy—but Fateh's general staff and the PLO military council had lost all administrative and operational authority and could not help. Resentment sharpened as Arafat seconded a number of PNLA units to Iraq and Libya (in return for substantial financial and military assistance) in the course of 1989, but he took this as an opportunity to reduce personnel and cut costs, offering the alternatives of early retirement, full release with compensation, or nominal service in the reserves on reduced pay. Much was subsequently made in foreign media of the election of numerous officers to senior positions at the Fateh conference in August, but in reality the primary concern of the demoralized military was to ensure job security, and they had no corporate influence on political or organizational direction.

Long *primus inter pares*, Arafat was now virtually unassailable. As Habash, Hawatma, PCP deputy secretary-general Sulayman al-Najjab, and Khalaf acknowledged in a closed panel discussion that was later published in *al-Hadaf*, he 'possesses the elements of power, as political leader of Fateh and head of the PLO, that enable him to monopolize practical [politics]'. He held a special advantage since 'Fateh is the largest of the effective Palestinian groups in the arena, that enjoys extensive popular support both inside and outside [Palestine]', and moreover 'has an important apparatus of advisers . . . extensive Arab support, and a special status among the states of the world. He also has a large apparatus of PLO representatives abroad, not to mention overwhelming popular support that nobody can ignore.' The implications hardly needed elucidation. Arafat was now 'confident in his strength and ability to do as he pleases. [He] appears able to behave politically without taking heed of the decisions taken by Palestinian legitimacy [the PNC] all the while insisting that he is [in fact] implementing them.'[163]

Yet the diplomatic credibility of the PLO rested on a single major input, the intifada, which Arafat strove assiduously to control. His first step following the assassination of Wazir was to form a Fateh committee responsible for the occupied territories under his direct supervision; Zaki later became secretary to the committee, but it had no authority and rarely met. Fateh's Western Sector was further dissipated as Arafat attached its senior cadres and Wazir's former aides to his office or transferred them to the parallel PLO 'intifada follow-up

committee', which he now set up under his control, or to deskjobs at the PLO's occupied homeland affairs bureau. The former military and organizational functions of the Western Sector were gradually reassigned to Force 17. In January 1989 Force 17 commander Muhammad Natur announced the reorganization of Fateh 'strike forces' into a 'popular army'; maps at his headquarters in Tunis were dotted with flags representing companies, battalions, brigades, and field commands in the West Bank and Gaza.[164] This was pure fantasy, and the arrest of dozens of hopeful members of the new army ensured its quick demise.

In any case, Arafat relied heavily on an unstructured and constantly shifting coterie, comprising members of his personal entourage and self-promoting 'brokers' from the occupied territories. Substantial cash sums were dispensed on an ad hoc basis, ostensibly to pay recruits and purchase weapons, but in reality to secure the loyalty of the Fateh constituency. The flow of steadfastness funds from the PLO—stated by senior officials to be as much as $1 million a day, although this was probably an exaggeration—tied local activists and institutions even closer to Tunis.[165] Opponents charged that it also enabled some intermediaries to 'build villas with steadfastness funds' (both inside the occupied territories and outside).[166] Arafat faced resistance, not least from cadres who saw themselves as inheritors of Wazir, but the appearance of the 'Battalions of Abu Jihad' and other formations only underlined the fragmentation of the Fateh organization in the occupied territories. Economic hardship increased the demand for patronage from Tunis, but the spread of clientilist networks reduced the clandestine movement to an amorphous, fractured, and leaderless mass.

The fragmentation of Fateh served Arafat's broader purpose of preventing the potential emergence of an alternative leadership in the occupied territories, to which Israel and the US might turn. Though grossly overstated, this fear was common among PLO leaders in exile. The publication on 14 January 1988 of a 14-point political programme prepared by representatives of Palestinian 'national institutions' assembled in east Jerusalem may have accentuated this concern. In any case the PLO immediately asserted its authority over the UNC; the next public appeal, four days later, placed the signature of the PLO above that of the UNC. The UNC defied the mainstream leadership on several occasions in the next two months—calling for a boycott of the Shultz mission at a time when the PLO wanted contact with the US and for the resignation of West Bank members of the Jordanian parliament, appointed mayors and village council heads, and Palestinian employees of the Israeli-run civil administration.[167] The PLO responded by editing draft appeals, and later took to dictating the political preamble entirely to the UNC, which it now routinely described as merely one of its 'arms'.[168]

The PCP was the most discomfited by this relationship, and for this reason refused to integrate itself into a national front with its UNC partners, fearing complete domination from Tunis. The local DFLP representatives sympa-

thized strongly, but the DFLP and PFLP leaders in exile proved as concerned as the mainstream PLO leadership to exercise tight political control over their followers in the occupied territories, despite much lip-service to demands for democratization and devolution of authority to the UNC. Much like *Filastin al-Thawra*, *al-Hurriyya* and *al-Hadaf* also published their own re-edited versions of UNC appeals, and in all cases selected terminology that signalled clearly the subordination of the UNC to the PLO.[169] The DFLP and PFLP also acquiesced in the formation of an 'intifada follow-up committee' headed by Arafat to direct the UNC and to coordinate political and financial support for the uprising more generally. Yet once again this proved to be a powerless body, through which the PLO chairman both co-opted and marginalized other actors. Its main use was to provide him with the justification to set up a special 'chairman's account for the intifada', held by the PNF, into which Arab financial assistance for the occupied territories was directed. This was his third such account to date, and as with the other two expenditure was entirely at his discretion.

Ironically, Israeli repression of the uprising assisted the concentration of power by Arafat. Continuing arrests greatly weakened the UNC by 1989, as veteran cadres were replaced by younger activists with less political and organizational experience, and rendered it more amenable to dictate from exile. Increasingly the mass movement was sidelined, as the PLO assigned a growing political role to its 'public figures' in the occupied territories, who effectively subsumed the UNC. The shift of emphasis was evident in the abandonment of attempts at full civil disobedience. The UNC had been sufficiently encouraged by the initial success of the boycott of Israeli products and resignation of Palestinian police, tax and customs officials, and employees of the vehicle and driver registration department in the Israeli-run civil administration during spring 1988 to refer to civil disobedience in an appeal issued on 3 July, but subsequently retreated as local income plummeted. This was due to the combined impact of the commercial strike, Israeli curfews and financial penalties, 50 per cent devaluation of the Jordanian dinar, and restriction of Arab imports of Palestinian agricultural produce. Attempts in 1989 to organize a general boycott of the new, magnetized identity cards issued by the Israeli authorities and of employment in Israel imposed an intolerable burden on low-income families and also had to be abandoned.

The effects of fragmentation and weakened command were obvious in the excesses of the campaign against Palestinians accused of collaboration with Israel. Hundreds of informers atoned publicly during 1988, especially after a much-publicized lynching in Qabatya on 23 February, but the Shabak soon rebuilt its networks. Violence against alleged informers rose sharply in April 1989, after revelations in the Israeli press that the IDF was using undercover units against Palestinian activists. A majority of alleged collaborators killed now were in fact accused of prostitution and drug-peddling or the victims of personal vendettas, and their bodies were often mutilated. 'Strike forces' such as Fateh's Black Panthers and the PFLP's Red Eagles were openly flouting instruc-

tions from the UNC and PLO committees in Tunis to moderate their behaviour by July 1989, although Hamas was the most notoriously active in this regard.[170] Arafat only added his voice in public to the appeals for restraint and due process in June 1991, probably due to the pressure of international opinion; he may have privately tolerated a certain number of murders in the meantime as a means of implicitly asserting Fateh dominion and intimidating rivals, or even of competing with Hamas, with which a new 'gentleman's agreement' was concluded that month.

In any case, the extensive use by Israel of undercover units to capture or, more frequently, kill intifada activists, coupled with its successive decisions to outlaw Fateh's *Shabiba* movement, relax IDF rules of fire, and allow widespread use of supposedly non-lethal plastic bullets (which killed dozens of Palestinians in following months) encouraged militarization of the uprising. As the mass character of the intifada regressed, youthful militants started to levy extortionist 'taxes' from shops and businesses and took the law into their own hands with growing frequency. The situation was such by August 1990 that the UNC felt compelled to appeal openly against interrogation, torture, and unsanctioned expropriation of funds and property by vigilante groups, and called on activists not to hide their faces with *kuffiyyas* except when confronting Israeli troops.[171] The bitter contest with the Israeli authorities continued, but for the past year events in the occupied territories had been steadily overshadowed as the PLO attempted to maintain its flagging 'peace offensive' amidst dramatic international and regional developments.

26

The Road to Oslo

Back to Square One

Despite stout denials from the PLO leadership in exile and local activists alike, the intifada reached a stalemate in spring 1989. So, by the same token, did PLO diplomacy. This was not immediately apparent, as Arafat developed the Palestinian 'peace offensive' launched at the PNC in mid-November 1988 with a tour of African, Asian, and socialist countries in following months. However, the official dialogue with the US was not progressing well. The first round of talks in December dealt only with procedural matters, while at the second, which did not take place until March 1989, the US side refused to discuss anything but ending terrorism. President George Bush and secretary of state James Baker raised PLO hopes in following weeks by calling for an end to Israeli occupation and the achievement of Palestinian political rights, but then dismayed it by limiting the dialogue to discussion of a proposal for peace talks made by Shamir in April and the formal peace initiative published by the Israeli government on 14 May.

The Israeli proposals called for the division of the peace process with the Palestinians into two main phases. In the first, general elections would be held in the occupied territories to choose Palestinian representatives, who would then meet Israeli officials to negotiate an interim period of self-government. Further talks would be conducted in the second phase, in order to reach a permanent settlement to the conflict. The PLO was explicitly to be excluded throughout.[1] 'Public figures' in the occupied territories close to Fateh—mainly Faysal al-Husayni, Ziyad Abu-Zayyad, Sari Nusayba, and Jamil al-Tarifi (later joined by Saʿid Kanʿan)—had previously discussed elections with senior Israeli officials in February and March, but ceased contact after the PLO formally rejected the Shamir proposal on 26 April.[2] The PLO now reiterated its belief that its real counterpart was the US administration, not the Israeli government. Israel, an editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra* stated, 'is merely a field command, whereas the strategic command in this battle lies with the US'. Only the US could deliver Israel to the table.[3] US moves to block applications by the PLO to join the UN's World Health Organization, Food and Agriculture Organization, and Education, Science, and Culture Organization increased its ire; Arafat warned in May that the suspension of military action was now at risk, because 'patience has its limits'.[4] Behind the bluster, the American stance at the UN

confirmed PLO belief that US opposition was the main obstacle to Palestinian statehood.[5]

The Fateh conference in August did not help matters by calling for the escalation of armed struggle against Israel. This earned the praise of the PFLP among others, but drew public remonstrations from the US administration.[6] Arafat hurriedly published a 'final political statement' several days later from which the more offensive phrases had been deleted, while Khalaf explained that armed struggle and terrorism were not the same thing.[7] Overlooked in this flurry of statement and counter-statement, however, was the fact that Arafat had obtained blanket endorsement from the Fateh conference for the political resolutions of the PNC, which meant retroactive approval of UNSCR 242 and 338 and implicit recognition of Israel. Arafat's irritation at the US attitude was not entirely disingenuous, therefore, even if his warning that the intifada would adopt escalatory new methods lacked conviction.[8] Besides, the formal, albeit conditional, acceptance by the PLO of a ten-point compromise proposal published by Egyptian president Mubarak on 19 September indicated undiminished interest in dialogue. Baker presented a five-point 'bridging' proposal on 6 October in the hope of softening PLO opposition to elections in the occupied territories, and US and PLO envoys renewed their dialogue a fortnight later, after a hiatus of over two months, to discuss it. The secretary of state modified the proposal during November to meet PLO concerns, but its final response on 6 December still tied approval to a direct PLO role in selecting the Palestinian negotiators.

The year ended on an uncertain note, but Arafat insisted confidently in his customary New Year's message on 1 January 1990 that Palestinian statehood was 'only a stone's throw away'. Such reassurance was suddenly punctured by the Soviet decision to lift remaining restrictions on the emigration of Jewish citizens to Israel. Shamir's vow to settle the newcomers, expected to number at least one million, in the occupied territories, alarmed the PLO and Jordan, which feared massive expropriation of Palestinian land and a new wave of refugees. The consequences of the end of the Cold War were being brought home to the PLO, which until then had made little comment on the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dramatic transformations underway in Eastern Europe. To soften the impact, the USSR raised the status of the PLO mission in Moscow to that of a full embassy and appointed a plenipotentiary ambassador to the PLO in Tunis in January 1990. The emigration issue dominated PLO–Soviet relations from this point onwards, as one editorial after another in *Filastin al-Thawra* discussed the dangers of Soviet Jewish emigration to Israel. On 4 February, for instance, it argued that the influx threatened the peace process and reinforced the hardline policies of Shamir. Arafat feigned nonchalance, stating that 'we used to fight 3.5 million Jews, and so we will fight 4.5 million', but the PLO was evidently discomfited.[9]

Further discussion of the Soviet Jewish 'menace' took place amidst the sharp escalation of tensions between the US, Israel, and Iraq. The PLO had drawn

steadily closer to Iraq: Wazir confided privately that the Iraqi leadership had assured him that its 54 army divisions would be committed to the struggle against Israel once the war with Iran was over, and in January 1988 Arafat described Iraq as the defender of the eastern gate of the Arab nation.[10] The Palestinian leadership was deeply impressed by Iraqi military and industrial capability, and hailed the end of the war with Iran in July because Israel would now face a major new challenge.[11] During 1989 Arafat and Iraqi president Saddam Husayn coordinated their support for the appointed president of Lebanon, general Michel ʿAwn, who mounted a violent campaign to expel Syrian forces from Lebanon. In December the PLO chairman expressed his dissatisfaction with the progress of the dialogue with the US by praising the unveiling of a new Iraqi ballistic missile as 'a gift to the intifada'.[12] Iraq also played a role in persuading a number of Third World states to recognize the State of Palestine by supplying them with oil and arms on behalf of the PLO.[13] The revelation that it was attempting to acquire nuclear triggers and assemble a 'super-gun' in April 1990 elicited further admiring comments from the PLO, which argued that 'we now move towards peace from a position of capability [*waqiʿ al-iqtidar*]'.[14] The PLO also backed the Iraqi request for an extraordinary summit conference in Baghdad to respond to US pressure, as did most Arab states.[15]

The PLO took the chance offered by the summit conference to complain bitterly about the shortfall in Arab financial assistance. This was a familiar refrain, Arafat having berated the Arab heads of state at the previous conference, held in Casablanca in May 1989, for failing to fulfil pledges made the year before that.[16] In March 1990 PNF director Jawid al-Ghusayn revealed that the PLO had received a total of $1.7 billion since 1978 and an additional $165 million in 1989. The $128 million promised to support the intifada in June 1988 had failed entirely to materialize, although Libya had made separate donations totalling between $28 million and $35 million; only Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE had paid their share of the additional monthly grant decreed at the same time, but even then this supposedly accounted for only 30 per cent of the $43 million pledged. With an annual budget of $200 million and another $300 million earmarked for the occupied territories, the PLO faced a severe deficit, Ghusayn concluded.[17] Arafat became more irate as the financial crisis deepened, stating angrily in May that Arab aid to the PLO since its inception in 1964 totalled $2.6 billion, whereas the Arab states had given $19 billion to the Afghan mujahidin in only nine years.[18]

The peace process was also in jeopardy. On 11 March Shamir and his supporters in the Israeli cabinet refused to vote on the modified Baker plan, prompting the Labour Party to walk out of the coalition and precipitate its fall with a no-confidence vote in the Knesset four days later. The PLO pressed the US to widen the scope of the official dialogue over the next period, drawing condemnation of the 'free concessions' it had already given from the opposition, but to no avail.[19] Its diplomacy received a second setback on 30 May, when

guerrillas belonging to the PLF were captured after landing by sea on a Tel Aviv beach, in an abortive raid sponsored by its two patrons, Iraq and Libya. The US demanded punishment for the PLF and secretary-general Zaydan, who had resumed his seat on the PLO executive committee in 1987, but Arafat was under strong pressure from the rank-and-file, who saw little gain from eighteen months of dialogue with the US, and would only repeat that the PLO had not been involved in the PLF raid and still opposed attacks on civilians.[20] This was insufficient for president Bush, who suspended the dialogue on 20 June. The news quickly followed that the Likud Party had formed a new government in Israel, in alliance with ultra-nationalist and religious parties. The PLO considered that the formation of what it termed a 'war cabinet' in Israel had buried the Baker peace plan. There was little reason to offer political concessions in order to restore the dialogue with the US, therefore, and successive editorials in *Filastin al-Thawra* reflected this stance by stressing PLO rejection of 'conditions that impinge on Palestinian sovereignty'.[21]

Any hope of reviving the dialogue with the US was shattered when the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait on 2 August. The PLO faced a dilemma of unprecedented proportion. To condemn the invasion would entail the loss of Iraqi financial and strategic support and invite retaliation against the 300,000 Palestinians in the emirate. Conversely, relations with the Gulf sheikhdoms had been deteriorating since 1988. The PLO was angered in particular by Kuwaiti insistence on circumventing the PNF and channelling funds directly to institutional recipients in the occupied territories, and accused it of financing Hamas. Speaking privately to the PLO executive committee and central council, Arafat reportedly accused the 'oil sheikhs' of unbridled corruption, both financial and moral, and of starving the PLO of funds.[22] The PLO was further influenced by the demonstrations of strong Palestinian support for Iraq in the occupied territories and Jordan.

Seeking to escape its predicament, the PLO called for a settlement that would restore Kuwaiti sovereignty after the dispute with Iraq had been settled. It lobbied hard for an 'Arab solution' to the Gulf crisis during an emergency Arab summit conference in Cairo on 4 August, but finally voted against a resolution endorsing the Saudi resort to Western military aid. What the PLO could not obscure was that not a single one of its statements and editorials contained unequivocal condemnation of the Iraqi invasion or unconditional affirmation of Kuwaiti rights. Husayn's proposal of 12 August to link resolution of the Gulf crisis with the end of Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and the Syrian military presence in Lebanon seemed to offer a face-saving device. The PLO subsequently made 'linkage' the central plank of its crisis diplomacy, and Arafat boasted to his entourage that he had put the idea to Husayn.

What appears ultimately to have swung Arafat firmly behind Husayn was the tantalizing thought that his bold gamble might pay off, in which case the PLO could benefit enormously. Palestinian leaders who journeyed to Baghdad were assured that Iraq was capable of confronting the US-led coalition and had planned for all military contingencies. It held a secret trump card, a 'magic

weapon', some confided, hinting at a nuclear capability.[23] Together these factors suggested that the international coalition was unlikely to go to war, reinforcing prospects for a diplomatic solution. Building on these calculations, Arafat proposed in early September that the Gulf crisis could be resolved by simultaneous negotiation of all Middle East conflicts, the lifting of international sanctions against Iraq, withdrawal of US forces from the Gulf, and an 'Arab solution' in which the PLO would act as a neutral mediator.[24] Whatever his intentions, this proposal could only be construed as evidence that the PLO had irrevocably taken the Iraqi side. This was certainly the conclusion of the PFLP and DFLP, which gave the PLO chairman their formal support on that basis.[25]

Until then, the PLO had been sparing in its official pronouncements on the crisis. *Filastin al-Thawra* ceased publication for a fortnight in August, possibly to avoid having to take a clear stand, and even the PFLP expressed regret that the Iraqi action had relegated the Palestine issue to the background, while calling for confrontation with US forces in the Gulf.[26] The PLO tone had shifted by the beginning of September, when the US troops were described as 'new crusaders in *Filastin al-Thawra*; it also published a lengthy discussion of the economic factors that had propelled Iraq to invade Kuwait, supporting Iraqi claims that its financial crisis had been deliberately engineered by outside forces.[27] In following weeks the PLO and all the principal guerrilla groups adopted unreservedly the argument that the invasion had in fact been a defensive, pre-emptive action designed to defeat a US-inspired conspiracy against Iraq. The US had instructed its Arab allies to withhold aid from Iraq and the PLO since the mid-1980s, *Filastin al-Thawra* insisted, and had mounted a hostile media campaign against them since the beginning of 1990.[28] The PFLP agreed, politburo member Malluh arguing that Iraq had 'acted to defend itself against a conspiracy in which Kuwait took part' and 'to correct a historic wrong', namely the creation of the emirate from Iraqi territory.[29]

Some Palestinian leaders opposed the PLO stance. Most vocal were Fateh central committee members Khalid and Hani al-Hasan, who had long enjoyed close ties with the Gulf sheikhdoms. Opposition was also expressed privately by Khalaf, who was conscious of the damage to the PLO's standing in the West and distrusted Husayn. Theirs were solitary voices, however, as admiration for Iraqi boldness and might fired Palestinian imagination. 'Our revolutionary choice', said Arafat in late December, 'is to be in the trench facing Israel and the US'.[30] PFLP deputy secretary-general Zabri similarly enthused that 'Iraq is the strategic depth of our cause and the intifada', adding that Iraq had broken Israeli strategic superiority and restored the military option to the Arabs.[31] Just how illusory these perceptions were was demonstrated by the start of the coalition air offensive against Iraq on 17 January 1991 and the resounding defeat of the Iraqi army and its expulsion from Kuwait between 24 and 28 February.

The PLO had already lost the support of the Gulf sheikhdoms and Egypt, and watched helplessly as the forcible exodus of tens of thousands of Palestinians from Kuwait commenced, insisting all the while that its popularity among its

people was at a peak.[32] Striving to repair the damage to its standing, it offered to hold direct negotiations with Israel, albeit under UN supervision and in the presence of the five permanent members of the Security Council.[33] Coming barely two weeks after the liberation of Kuwait this was an optimistic opening bid indeed. The US was unimpressed, and proceeded with its own peace plan, which Baker published on 6 March. This envisaged separate, bilateral talks between Israel and each of Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation. In deference to Israeli insistence the Palestinian negotiators could be drawn only from the West Bank or Gaza, to the exclusion of inhabitants of Jerusalem and the diaspora and of PLO officials. This track would focus solely on interim arrangements for Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories, again excluding Jerusalem, to last for five years, with the commitment to hold further talks after the first two years to decide the final status of the territories and their population.

Predictably, the PLO objected that the US proposal was little more than an Israeli interpretation of the Camp David autonomy proposals it had already rejected many years earlier, and protested melodramatically that 'America is not the fate of Palestine'.[34] Towards the end of April the PLO central council reaffirmed its commitment to the programme adopted at the PNC in November 1988, but Arafat argued more realistically for 'slogans and programmes [that are] commensurate with our capability'.[35] He authorized Faysal Husayni, Hanan ʿAshrawi, and other 'public figures' in the occupied territories to discuss Palestinian representation with Baker in following months. The abortive *coup* attempt in Moscow on 21 August briefly raised hopes of a Soviet revival and an improved Palestinian bargaining position; Arafat privately exulted in the downfall of Gorbachev, and Qaddumi, ʿAbd-Rabbu, and other senior officials intemperately made their feelings public, but the defeat of the putschists chastened the PLO leadership. The decision by Syria to join the peace process in early September swayed doubters such as Qaddumi, and on 21 September the PNC empowered the executive committee to take the final decision on the terms and nature of Palestinian participation in the talks.[36] The PFLP had earlier expressed the sentiment of the Palestinian opposition by declaring 'no to the American conference' and calling for 'hardline tactics in the era of retreat', but to no avail.[37] On 18 October the PLO central council confirmed that a Palestinian delegation headed by Gaza physician Haydar ʿAbd-al-Shafi and composed according to the terms set by the US and Israel would attend the inaugural conference in Madrid eleven days later. As Qaddumi explained, the PLO had either to join the peace process or to exit history.[38]

The Opposition in Crisis

The mainstream PLO leadership had long sought to join the peace process, albeit on more favourable terms, but its ability to take the fateful decision was

partly due to the disarray of the Palestinian opposition. This was most obvious for the Syrian-backed groups, which no longer had a following of any significance outside Syria or Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon. In November 1988 the Fateh dissidents condemned the PNC for 'exchang[ing] a homeland for a state' and accepting 'surrender in the guise of independence', but their repeated calls in following weeks to form a rival PLO and PNC had no result.[39] Adding to their predicament was the Libyan decision earlier in the year to suspend financial aid to most of the rejectionist groups, prompting several to turn to Iran.[40] In February 1989 the dissidents deleted the commitment to 'democratic and socialist progress' emblazoned on their weekly *Fath*, and attended the First Islamic Conference for Palestine in Tehran in December 1990. Their plight had not been eased by holding a general conference and replacing the 'provisional command' with a central committee in November, and by May 1991 they had abandoned calls to topple Arafat in favour of appeals for solidarity, unity, and democratic reform within the PLO.[41]

The PF–GC fared little better, despite gaining an appreciative audience in the occupied territories for its *al-Quds* radio programme, that started broadcasts from southern Syria shortly after the start of the intifada. It maintained guerrilla bases in various parts of Lebanon, but enforced paralysis and political divisions led to a split in December 1989. The PF–GC cultivated ties with Iran, and Jibril, now sporting a beard, attended the Islamic conference in Tehran in December 1990.[42] The Syrian-backed wing of the PLF suffered a similar decline. The death of Tal'at Ya'qub of a heart attack in November 1988 was followed by the resignation of 'Abd-al-Fattah Ghanim, prompting their remaining followers to sign a nominal unity agreement with Zaydan's wing a year later, although this too failed to resolve all differences.[43] Ghanim returned to the PLO fold at the PNC in September 1991; the combination of internal discontent and the mainstream desire to defuse US hostility led at the same time to the replacement of Zaydan by 'Ali Ishaq as PLF representative in the PLO executive committee. The PPSF had also pulled out of the Syrian-backed PNSF coalition in 1988, and in September 1991 secretary-general Samir Ghusha entered the PLO executive committee for the first time; a small faction under Khalid 'Abd-al-Majid broke away in protest in Damascus, but to no effect.

The marginalization of the Syrian-backed groups was made inevitable by their lack of a following in the occupied territories, but this could not explain the deepening malaise that had afflicted the PFLP and DFLP since 1988. They had both rallied to the nationalist banner during the camps war in Lebanon and the uprising in the occupied territories, but these major events had equally compelled them to come to terms with the diplomatic strategy of the mainstream PLO leadership, albeit in varying degrees and with continued reluctance in both cases. The PFLP gave an example of the resulting tension: having initially questioned the ability of the PLO to transform the Palestinian state declared at the PNC in November 1988 into a practical reality, it had come round by the end of 1989 to consider the declaration 'an important qualitative

step' and statehood a realistic prospect.[44] Habash meanwhile confirmed the PFLP's willingness to resolve the Palestine conflict in its entirety at an international peace conference.[45] In Lebanon, this political ambivalence and deteriorating social and economic conditions drove a growing number of members, including many middle-ranking cadres, to emigrate or seek asylum abroad. Maintenance of military and civilian bureaucracies still weighed on relatively limited resources, and provided an added reason to remain firmly within the PLO framework. This tacit compromise was uncomfortable, however, and deepened existing fissures.

The intifada intensified the dilemma of the PFLP and DFLP by bringing into question the practical ideologies and organizational structures that had evolved in the framework of an armed struggle led from exile in the previous two decades. The mainstream PLO leadership, with its typically pragmatic sense, had quickly grasped both the potential and the limitations of the uprising. The revolt would persevere to ensure Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, but the inhabitants of the occupied territories could not be expected to 'continue throwing stones until the Israelis leave Haifa and Acre'.[46] In contrast the PFLP and, to a lesser extent, the DFLP sought refuge in exaggerated expectations of what the intifada could achieve; its goal was quite simply 'to remove the occupation from the areas which it occupied in 1967', and they called repeatedly for its escalation in 1989–90, in studious disregard of the uprising's deepening frustration, in order to embarrass the PLO and resist its diplomacy. However, the untenability of this position was now brought to the fore, as were internal pressures for reform, by the sweeping changes in the strategic landscape caused by the collapse of communism.

The PFLP and DFLP had continued to celebrate events in the communist calendar such as the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, Lenin's birthday, and the national days of Soviet bloc countries, but otherwise took little note of the gradual demise of the Cold War. Only on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall did Habash finally acknowledge the signs of change by welcoming 'perestroika, glasnost, and new thinking [because they] show . . . the ability of socialism to renew itself and deal with its shortcomings and problems'.[47] The PFLP drew no further ideological conclusions nor expressed a political view on developments in Eastern Europe in the following months, except to criticize the new governments for hastily restoring diplomatic ties with Israel and to bemoan the fact that the 'limelight has been stolen' from the intifada.[48] The primary concern was the impact on the Arab–Israeli conflict: Habash warned that Gorbachev's much-vaunted 'balance of interests' was meaningless if adversaries still dominated the balance of power, which would prevent 'attainment of Palestinian national rights to freedom and independence'.[49] By the end of 1990 he acknowledged that 'the Third World has lost the support and model represented by the Soviet Union' and averred that 'the US now stands at the head of a multi-polar [international system]'.[50]

Shorn of its ideological and strategic underpinnings of over 20 years'

standing, the Palestinian Left derived considerable comfort from the rise of Iraqi power. A PFLP manual on military doctrine published in 1989 observed admiringly that whereas Israel had revealed its weakness by leaving Lebanon after the loss of 'only' 700 dead, 3,000 wounded, and $5 billion, Iraq (and Iran) could lose that in a single month without having to cease fire.[51] In April 1990, as Iraq exchanged bellicose threats with Israel, Habash stated optimistically that 'the international situation is good', while his deputy, Zabri, enthused that Iraq was a 'giant' and that the revival of the Arab eastern front (subject to reconciliation between Iraq, Syria, and the PLO) could compensate for the loss of East European support.[52] The Gulf crisis pushed matters to a head, as Habash and Hawatma visited Amman for the first time since 1971 and met king Husayn; they were next received by Saddam Husayn in Baghdad, ending a second, ten-year boycott. In October the PFLP frankly criticized the USSR for supporting US-initiated measures against Iraq (but wisely refrained from adverse comment on the pro-coalition stance of its Syrian hosts), and in December Habash reiterated that Iraq was a principal factor in Arab power thanks to its armed force and possession of oil.[53] Following the start of the war in mid-January 1991 the PFLP and DFLP threatened to 'set the ground under the feet of the American invaders on fire' and applauded Iraqi missile strikes on Israel.[54] These threats came to little, and the PFLP later admitted that it had been 'hasty in raising this slogan, which it could not implement anyway'.[55]

The Iraqi defeat left the PFLP and DFLP pondering their dilemma anew. In order both to obscure this and to impede PLO acceptance of the US peace plan, they now revived calls for internal reform of the Fateh-dominated PLO. *Al-Hadaf* had in fact launched this drive in January 1990 by reporting in detail on a closed panel discussion between Habash, Hawatma, PCP deputy secretary-general Sulayman al-Najjab, and Fateh central committee member Khalaf. The consensus was frank condemnation of 'bureaucratization, corruption, and clientilism' in the PLO, features that were connected to the autocratic leadership of Arafat.[56] These themes reappeared in spring 1991, when Hawatma called for 'democracy, financial reform, and reduction of the bureaucracy and its costs', while Habash strove for greater opposition influence by renewing the long-standing demand for proportional representation within the PNC and PLO executive bodies.[57] This followed his earlier complaint that 95 per cent of the heads of over 100 PLO missions abroad belonged to Fateh, proving that 'PLO institutions are in reality Fateh institutions, with a decorative [sprinkling] from the other groups'.[58]

The irony was that the PFLP and DFLP were both accused of the same ills. In the latter case, deputy secretary-general ʿAbd-Rabbu, backed by politburo member Salih Raʿfat, military commander Mamduh Nawfal, and a majority in the central committee, had already aroused Hawatma's ire in 1990 by objecting to the 'tendency to centralize offices and headquarters and to ensure the continuity of affiliated agencies and institutions'. This was a result of bureaucratization, military regularization, and the continued flow of oil-based

funds, and explained the failure to assign priority to political and organizational activity in the occupied territories.[59] The critics had tacitly aligned themselves with the Fateh-dominated PLO mainstream since 1983, and ʿAbd-Rabbu enhanced his stature by heading the PLO side in the official dialogue with the US in 1988–90. The intifada fuelled the tension, as ʿAbd-Rabbu supported cadres in the occupied territories who resented Hawatma's autocratic leadership and demanded a greater say in the formulation of DFLP policy.[60] The rift became public on 23 August 1990, and over the next year divided DFLP-affiliated trade unions, student and youth organizations, and women's committees in the West Bank and Gaza.[61] Seeking to assert its own legitimacy ahead of the PNC in September 1991, Hawatma's wing claimed that it had a membership of 50,000 and ʿAbd-Rabbu's a mere 350, an utter flight of fantasy in the first case and gross underestimation in the second; the PNC finally recognized Hawatma as the inheritor of the DFLP mantle, but also awarded a seat on the PLO executive committee to ʿAbd-Rabbu's wing, which renamed itself the Palestinian Democratic Union (al-Ittihad al-Dimuqrati al-Filastini—*Fida*) a few months later.[62]

As the experience of the DFLP suggested, pressure for internal reform was affected by developments in the occupied territories. It was largely because its membership was based almost entirely in the West Bank and Gaza that the PCP was better able to weather both the challenges of the intifada and the end of the Cold War. The party was firmly committed to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism, but at the same time was responsive to local initiatives and sensitive to grass-roots pressures. An early instance of the success of this approach was the decision by the 'Communist Party of 1977'—what was left of the Leninist Cadre that had broken away from the JCP in 1971—to join the PCP in September 1989.[63] Sensitive to the changes in Moscow, the PCP changed its name to the Palestinian People's Party and dropped all mention of Leninism from its political programme (while retaining Marxism) at a general conference in October 1991, anticipating the dissolution of the USSR by two months.[64]

The PFLP, in contrast, remained torn between contending convictions. A few weeks after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait it proclaimed stoutly that the intifada would continue 'until independence', but in July 1991 politburo member Malluh admitted soberly that 'we burdened the uprising with more than it could bear'.[65] The PFLP was less willing to acknowledge the loss of the armed struggle option, however. The 1989 edition of its military doctrine manual, for example, still insisted that despite massacres, Israeli military superiority, and the absence of a secure sanctuary or 'liberated, red base', Palestinian forces in Lebanon had reached the stage of 'constructing the revolutionary, popular army with its institutions, advanced weapons, cadres, and rich experience'.[66] In late 1991 PFLP military commander Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim reiterated that 'armed struggle is our choice' and stressed the importance of moving guerrillas and weapons into the occupied territories, while criticizing those who saw the

intifada as a non-violent revolt.[67] It was true that Palestinian forces lacked an Arab sanctuary and exhibited 'laziness, decrepitude, and a mercenary [spirit]', but the armed struggle and uprising would persevere together until the Arab 'masses, liberation movements, parties, and governments' realized that Israel would not willingly relinquish an inch of occupied Arab land.[68]

The disarray of the PFLP became even more marked following the PLO decision to authorize Palestinian participation in the Madrid peace conference. This was especially evident in the continuing attempts to uphold the rhetorical commitment to armed struggle and Marxist-Leninism. In public it shrugged off the impact of the arrest between July and September 1991 of 460 PFLP members in the occupied territories, among them 170 members of armed cells in Gaza, but could no longer mount a credible military effort.[69] To cope with uncomfortable realities, Habash stated in October 1992 that the armed struggle had been replaced with a new formulation, 'intifada revolutionary violence'.[70] In February 1993 the political report of the fifth congress upheld military action as the 'principal form of struggle, since it promotes and drives the other forms of struggle', but again stressed the role of the 'unarmed violent struggle' of the uprising.[71] A few months later ʿAbd-al-Karim observed merely that armed struggle 'occupies a role in the process of Palestinian struggle', noting that it had restored national identity and secured international recognition of Palestinian rights and the PLO.[72]

There was a similarly hesitant attempt to deal with the ideological ramifications of the end of the Cold War. In November 1989 Habash still insisted that Soviet *perestroika* also meant 'revival of the Leninist concept of socialism'.[73] The PFLP officially distanced itself when the Soviet old guard mounted its abortive *coup* against Gorbachev in August 1991, but noted 'the yearning of our people for the old-style Soviet [officials]'.[74] It continued loyally to stress its attachment to socialism as late as summer 1992, despite the 'defeat of state socialism' in the USSR.[75] The ideological document issued by the fifth congress in February 1993 contained some new nuances, emphasizing 'historical dialectical materialism' and blaming Stalin for much of the bureaucratization and personality cult that had corrupted socialist practice in the USSR.[76] It also blamed the tendency among Arab Marxists to rely excessively on direction from Moscow on the fact that most communist parties in the Middle East had been founded by members of minorities—Christians, Armenians, Kurds, Berbers, and Jews—and had remained elitist.[77] Palestinian Marxists were also at fault, however. They had borrowed heavily from Moscow too and should return, albeit for guidance only, to the creative roots of Marxism in order to renew socialism, retaining those practical aspects of Leninism that related to party organization but discarding its other, 'aged' ideas.[78]

The marked reluctance of the PFLP to conduct a more thorough review of its principal strategy, ideology, and organizational structure was directly related to the continued grip of Habash and the general predominance of the salaried personnel in its civilian and military agencies based in Syria and Lebanon. The

replacement of Zabri as PFLP representative on the PLO executive committee in September 1991 had indicated that he was being freed to assume the post of secretary-general. Habash's health was ailing, which may have prompted his transfer of residence to Amman a year later, but he insisted testily that he remained in overall command. He moreover used the fifth congress in February 1993 to contain the implicit challenge from Zabri, and to encourage harsh criticism of the senior officials representing the PFLP in PLO bodies—especially politburo members Malluh, Taysir Qubbaʿa, Salah Salah, and Muhammad al-Musallami—who were held to task for alleged political compromises and comfortable living. The mood among the delegates was also reflected in the posthumous rehabilitation of Wadiʿ Haddad, mastermind of PFLP hijack operations in 1968–71, although Habash took pains to explain that this did not indicate a return to 'external operations'.[79]

Malluh and Zabri were re-elected in the event, but Salah refused to stand, joining staunch Habash loyalist Ahmad al-Yamani, who had retired from active membership in 1991. The elections brought many new faces to the politburo and central committee—four of 11 seats in the first body and over half of 40 seats in the second—but the majority came from Syria and Lebanon—which accounted for 302 of 324 delegates actually present—and included a significant number of officers loyal to ʿAbd-al-Karim.[80] The congress had resolved that 30 per cent of the 365 delegates stipulated by the statutes should come from the occupied territories, but only two delegates were actually able to attend in Damascus and the statute was ignored. Habash also prevented distribution of a memorandum from PFLP cadres in Gaza who urged flexibility towards the peace process and an end to the association with the Syrian-backed opposition coalition.[81] This, coupled with the failure of Musallami, himself originally from Gaza, to win re-election, fuelled rumour of the reactivation of regional rivalries within the PFLP. Democratic centralism had prevailed, in that the leadership in exile ensured that 'the centre of political decision-making has not passed to the inside', but the price was the withdrawal of veteran cadres in Gaza (especially) and further loss of political influence in the occupied territories.[82]

The predicament of the PFLP and DFLP was evident in their continuing inability to influence PLO policy. The PFLP called for the withdrawal of the Palestinian delegation from the peace talks in January 1992 and suspended its membership of the PLO executive committee in protest, while the DFLP demanded rectification of Palestinian representation and in May renewed calls for democratization and 'collective leadership' in the PLO.[83] The PFLP then backtracked in May, retracting its demand for a boycott of the peace talks and satisfying itself instead by calling for the terms of participation to be improved.[84] In June the PFLP acknowledged the opposition's loss of impact, and by September both groups had been reduced to demanding that negotiations with Israel be based on UNSCR 242.[85] This was an abject retreat, and to salvage their influence the PFLP and DFLP formed a 'joint leadership body' at the end of the month.[86] They also joined a new, ten-member opposition coalition based in

Damascus; this included breakaway factions of the PLF, PPSF, and PCP and, astonishingly, a representative of the long-defunct Arab Higher Committee, in addition to the Fateh dissidents, PF–GC, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas. The presence of Hamas was significant, but it also led to rivalry with the PFLP and DFLP, which objected to its strict attitude towards women's dress, among other things, and strongly opposed its demands for a 40 per cent share both of seats in the PNC and of votes within the opposition coalition.[87]

Staking a Claim

Hamas had reason to assert itself, as its position had been strengthened since May 1989, when sheikh Yasin and up to 250 activists in the occupied territories were arrested. Over the next year the prisoners conducted an extensive review of the organizational structure and political programme of Hamas.[88] They were especially critical of the traditional reliance of the Muslim Brotherhood on the *usra* (nuclear family) as its basic unit, in which members were grouped, regardless of function, for all-embracing religious indoctrination. The prisoners, in contrast, held separate sessions in which political and security matters were the focus of discussion. Under their impetus Hamas made a substantial transition in organizational structure and political focus by summer 1990. Also contributing to the shift were the growing number of members who had not previously belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, to the dismay of many of its older figures, who still strove determinedly to retain control. Over the next three years Hamas was to undergo significant change in its organization and leadership as a result not only of these internal pressures, but also of Israeli countermeasures and of the growing flow of private donations from Palestinians abroad and Arab sympathizers in the Gulf sheikhdoms. By the end of 1993 it boasted a politburo, as well as a formal military apparatus, security apparatus, occupied homeland affairs bureau, organization and mass mobilization bureau, and information bureau (with an official spokesman based in Amman).[89] This reorganization was brought about largely by the exile, in December 1992, of the most influential Hamas figures after sheikh Yasin, especially of ʿAbdullah al-Rantisi. Directing it was Musa Abu-Marzuq, a little known physician from Gaza who now returned after residing for several years in the US, and who remained free to travel in and out of Israel until he advertised his leadership of the politburo by moving to Damascus in 1993. His control over much of Hamas finances, internal appointments, and foreign contacts gave him a degree of personal political power within the movement not unlike that of Arafat within Fateh and the PLO, if put to different use.[90]

Yet this lay in the future. In 1989–90, despite the rise of younger activists within Hamas and the concomitant increase in military activity, the movement's political position remained ambivalent. Speaking a few days before his arrest, Yasin supported the PLO aim of Palestinian statehood, albeit if this did

not entail relinquishing 'the remaining land of my homeland Palestine'. This was more than semantics, however. Yasin went on to approve negotiation with Israel 'if it acknowledges our rights in their entirety, and recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to live in freedom and independence inside its homeland'.[91] Yasin pointedly refrained from ruling out the possibility of recognizing Israel, if it withdrew from the West Bank and Gaza. He was more explicit in stating unequivocally that 'I do not wish to eradicate Israel. Rather, we will negotiate with Israel so that the Palestinian people of the inside and outside may live in Palestine, and with that the problem will end'. Yasin stressed that Hamas would not supplant the PLO as an interlocutor, but at the same time clearly regarded it as the representative of the Palestinians in the diaspora, rather than those in the occupied territories. He also took fault with the PLO for not 'adopting Islam as an outlook and constitution', but saw the future in terms of 'a multi-party democratic state, in which power goes to whoever wins the elections'.[92]

Despite Yasin's relative moderation, the changes within Hamas prompted the younger activists increasingly to challenge Fateh. In January 1990 the unofficial Hamas spokesman in Gaza, Mahmud Zahhar, adopted a conciliatory tone, reaffirming that the PLO 'represents us all', and Hamas assigned an informal representative to the PLO central council.[93] But when the PLO considered convening the PNC in spring, Hamas demanded 40–50 per cent of the seats and insisted on abrogation of the political programme adopted in November 1988.[94] Altercations between Hamas and Fateh activists finally provoked Arafat to sanction a lengthy tirade against the Islamists in *Filastin al-Thawra* in July. This contained an impassioned refutation of the political accusations made by Hamas, but the real cause of anger was its apparent attempt to stand outside the PLO framework and portray itself as an alternative representative for a large part of the Palestinian people. The PLO insisted that its own status came from the blood of its martyrs, and to question that article of faith was an act of blasphemy that contravened '[Islamic] law, belief, religion, homeland, and Arabism' and invited *fitna* (dissent). The PLO was not a party within a state, but the state itself: rivalry with it was akin to rivalry with the homeland and amounted to *firqa*, division of the community of believers.[95]

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait prompted a truce in the propaganda war in September. It also presented Hamas with a dilemma. The Gulf sheikhdoms had provided major funding over the years, but Palestinian grass-roots sentiment was deeply hostile to the perceived corruption and wasteful opulence of the 'oil sheikhs'. Hamas sought safety by calling on 13 August for the withdrawal of foreign forces from the Gulf, evacuation of the Iraqi army from Kuwait, and freedom for the Kuwaitis to choose their own future.[96] Hamas was rewarded with continued financial assistance, unlike the PLO, which suffered a total cut-off. Hamas resumed its political muscle-flexing with a call for general elections to choose PNC delegates in spring 1991, and in October joined Jihad and the PNSF for the first time in a statement opposing the PLO decision to send a

Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference.[97] In following months it enhanced its prestige by conducting dramatic attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians, tapping the anger of a population suffering from severe security and economic controls. As Hamas asserted itself, clashes in which knives and clubs were used also broke out between its followers and those of Fateh in the Tulkarm district in July and August; two reconciliation agreements were reached outside the occupied territories on 19 and 30 September, but local activists maintained their feud sporadically for another eight months.

The election of Labour Party leader Yitzhaq Rabin at the head of a new government in Israel in June 1992 raised PLO hopes of significant progress in the peace talks. By the same token, it intensified tensions between Hamas and Fateh, leading to frequent clashes in Gaza in June and July. Starting in May Arafat had bitterly accused the Gulf sheikhdoms and Iran of financing the Islamists, and in October he claimed that Saudi Arabia alone had donated $18 million to Hamas and paid an additional $40 million to the Abu Nidal faction in 'protection money'.[98] The PLO chairman instructed the Palestinian delegation in Washington repeatedly to urge the US state department to pressure the Saudi government to block the funds, which the latter insisted came only from private donors. He used the same channel to request a renewal of Saudi assistance to the PLO, but to little avail, although in October 1991 the Saudi authorities had resumed the transfer of 'liberation' taxes levied from Palestinian employees in the kingdom, worth some $12 million annually.

The mass expulsion of over 400 Islamists from the West Bank and Gaza to south Lebanon on 20 December, following the abduction and murder of an Israeli serviceman, led to a further deterioration of relations with the PLO. The latter mobilized energetically to negotiate the repatriation of the Islamists and secured Israeli agreement to allow their return in stages over two years, but Hamas publicly disputed PLO authority to speak on behalf of the expellees. That Hamas was using the issue for political leverage became evident when its senior representatives from Jordan held talks with Arafat in Khartum, in the presence of National Islamic Front leader Hasan al-Turabi. Arafat was keen to bring Hamas within the PLO fold in order to strengthen his claim to representative status, but the Islamists repeated their demands for a militant political programme and a 40 per cent share of PNC seats, and the dialogue collapsed amidst bitter recriminations.

Arafat angrily blamed the impasse on the old guard Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Jordan, which he knew to exercise ultimate control over Hamas. The Hamas spokesman in Amman, Ibrahim Ghusha, stated that the movement had enjoyed the support of 45 per cent of the Palestinian population in the occupied territories even before the mass expulsion, and that the PNC should be restructured accordingly.[99] Tempers frayed dangerously in late April when Ghusha and the official Hamas representative in Jordan, Nafidh al-Nazzal, accused the Palestinian negotiators in Washington of 'selling out the expellees for a handful of coins' and formally demanded the abdication of the PLO

leadership.[100] A furious Arafat threatened to 'cut off any hand that stretches against any PLO official or member of the negotiating delegation'.[101] The views of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders in Jordan were not entirely representative of Hamas in the occupied territories, however, and Ghusha retracted his statements in July, reaffirming that the PLO was the 'national political framework for all Palestinians' and offering to renew the dialogue.[102]

The Final Act

Any thought of resuming the dialogue was abruptly cut short by the revelation, at the end of August, that the PLO and Israel had been conducting secret negotiations in the Norwegian capital, Oslo. This was news not only to Hamas and the rest of the Palestinian opposition, but also to the Palestinian delegation in Washington and most of the PLO leadership. Besides Arafat, only Fateh central committee member ʿAbbas, PLO executive committee member ʿAbd-Rabbu, PPP (formerly PCP) secretary-general Bashir al-Barghuti, and a handful of their closest colleagues were fully apprised of the talks, which had been conducted by Fateh central committee member Ahmad Qrayʿ and senior PPP cadre Hasan ʿAsfur. There were immediate fulminations from the opposition and varying protests from the PLO executive committee and Fateh central committee, but the rank-and-file reacted with a weary resignation that resulted from the impact of a series of debilitating pressures since the beginning of 1990.

The first instance was the disarray of Fateh forces in Lebanon. In January 1990 they extended from the ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp into the Tuffah region under the guise of ending bitter fighting between Amal and Hizbullah, but lost up to 150 dead after intervening against Hizbullah in July.[103] This was accompanied by clashes between Fateh and the Abu Nidal faction: Fateh had encouraged senior cadres in the latter group to break away and form the Revolutionary Council–Emergency Leadership in October 1989, and expelled its remaining adherents from the ʿAyn al-Hilwa and Rashidiyya camps after battles that left over 90 dead and 280 wounded in June and September 1990. Fateh also turned on one of its own, a rebellious officer with Islamist leanings named Jamal Sulayman, who was accused of receiving aid from the PF–GC and the Abu Nidal faction, and defeated him at the beginning of August, for a toll of 24 dead and 150 wounded. Violence next pitted loyalist commander ʿAla' al-Afandi and against Fateh battalion commander Abu Muhammad Zaʿrura in February 1991; Zaʿrura and 20 supporters were summarily tried and executed, taking the overall toll to 31 dead and 62 wounded. The Lebanese army was next to act, pushing Fateh forces back into the Miyya-wa-Miyya and ʿAyn al-Hilwa camps in desultory fighting on 1–4 July, and compelling them to surrender their heavy weapons over the next fortnight. In October Fateh officer Munir Maqdah and 300 followers seized the movement's offices in ʿAyn al-Hilwa to protest

Palestinian participation in the Madrid peace conference, while loyalists clashed with local Islamists in mid-December.

The upheaval in Lebanon was mirrored elsewhere. Fateh had suffered a serious blow only hours before the start of the Gulf war on 17 January, when a gunman belonging to the Abu Nidal faction assassinated security chiefs Khalaf and ʿAbd-al-Hamid in Tunis. Senior aide Fakhri al-ʿUmari was killed in the same incident, while Arafat's own aide, the notorious Hawwari, died in a road accident on the Amman–Baghdad highway in May. Arafat typically gathered remaining security cadres in a committee as a means both of sidelining Fateh central committee member al-Hakam Balʿawi, who now assumed nominal responsibility for the security portfolio, and of gathering these added reins of power in his own hands. (Khalaf's former aide, ʿAtif Bsaysu, still played a useful role as senior liaison officer with Western intelligence agencies, but his assassination in Paris in June 1992, probably by the Mossad, left the PLO heavily dependent on Tunisian security services.) Arafat also reinforced his position by co-opting senior delegation coordinator Nabil Shaʿth and the PLO delegate in Bonn, ʿAbdullah Franji, to the central committee in this period (later followed by Fateh information head Ahmad ʿAbd-al-Rahman). Fateh forces in exile suffered a parallel drain as hundreds of personnel sought political asylum in Scandinavian and other Western countries in 1991, rather than accept transfer to military camps in southern Libya. In the occupied territories, meanwhile, Arafat sponsored the formation of new public bodies—such as the 'political committees' launched by Sari Nusayba at the end of the year—apparently in order to prevent the clandestine organization from re-emerging as an autonomous power base and to limit the influence of potential claimants to leadership, above all of Faysal al-Husayni.

The concentration of Arafat's power was virtually absolute by the end of 1991, but the decline of the intifada and fragmentation of the Fateh organizational and military base equally deprived him of effective policy instruments.[104] In his assessment, attainment of Palestinian national goals now relied almost entirely on the attitude of the US administration. He perceived that the US was intent on resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict in order to ensure lasting regional stability, and that it would brook no opposition from the local protagonists. Any doubts on this point or on US ability to 'deliver' Israel had been dispelled in September, when president Bush used the threat of withholding $10 billion in housing loans guarantees as a means of securing the agreement of prime minister Shamir to attend the Madrid peace conference. At the same time, Arafat was convinced that the US wished him merely to initiate Palestinian participation in the peace process and then fade away, his role ended 'like that of a male bee that fertilizes once and then dies'.[105] This he was wholly unwilling to do.

However, Arafat calculated that if Palestinian participation in the peace process was crucial for the success of US Middle East policy, then there was an opportunity to carve out a direct role for the PLO. This perception seemed to

be borne out by US willingness both to allow PLO officials to accompany the Palestinian delegation to Washington and to resume official contacts, subject in the latter case to reaffirmation by the PLO of the original conditions for dialogue. It was presumably also for this reason that he rejected the renewed suggestion made by Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan for the establishment of a Palestinian provisional government that would undertake negotiation with Israel, sparing the PLO the need to relinquish its founding principles of non-recognition of Israel and total liberation of Palestine.[106] PLO diplomatic leverage was modest and could not be overplayed, but for the next year Arafat used delaying tactics and measured obstruction of the peace talks in order to compel the US to deal with him directly.

Others in what remained of the mainstream PLO leadership attached more importance to addressing Israel directly and set greater stock in the progress of the bilateral peace talks. Most representative of this outlook was ʿAbbas, who headed the PLO's 'negotiations follow-up committee', but Qrayʿ and other members of the committee shared it too. They argued that flexibility was wise, if only to win US goodwill, and considered that a settlement negotiated directly by the PLO or indirectly through the delegation in Washington to be of equal merit.[107] This again was in contrast to Arafat, who privately resented the delegation's access to the US administration, and feared that such recognition could presage the emergence of an alternative 'insider' leadership.[108] The Americans 'want to humiliate Yasir Arafat and eliminate him', he repeatedly told the rest of the PLO leadership, 'and eliminating him means eliminating the PLO and all of you'.[109] His response was partly defensive, therefore, and consisted characteristically of asserting absolute control over the course of the negotiations: personally checking all texts and instructions issued to the delegation, preventing the slightest political or administrative step being taken without his prior approval, and requiring key PLO officials and delegation members in Washington to report to him separately of each other. Obstruction of the peace talks also helped to marginalize the delegation, and Arafat was later to make acerbic comments about it to other PLO leaders in Tunis and wage a hostile 'whispering' campaign among the rank-and-file in exile and the occupied territories.

Despite his conviction that the US was a principal interlocutor rather than mediator, Arafat was not averse to dealing directly with Israel. He actively pursued several, parallel lines of contact, and had come by the end of 1992 to the preliminary conclusion that the PLO would ultimately take full charge of Palestinian autonomy in the occupied territories, which it would police with PNLA units from exile. Arafat believed that such a solution could only be found by secret negotiation, and so responded favourably when ʿAbbas and Qrayʿ disclosed that a back channel had been opened with Norwegian mediation in December. The Oslo talks were not to achieve a breakthrough until mid-May 1993, when Rabin authorized official Israeli participation, but they had already dominated the PLO agenda at least since mid-February, when the

Israeli academics who had started the effort, Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundik, raised the 'Gaza first' option and produced the first draft of a joint declaration of principles with Qrayʿ and ʿAsfur. From this point onwards the PLO chairman obstructed the official talks in Washington with even greater insistence, to the dismay of ʿAbbas and other colleagues who preferred to progress on both tracks, and utilized the objections of the confused delegation to suggest that Faysal al-Husayni and other key figures entertained private political ambitions and were being used by the US administration as 'a Trojan Horse' to supplant the PLO.[110]

Whether by accident or design, the progress of the secret talks at Oslo was accompanied by a severe financial crisis within the PLO. This had built up gradually since the Gulf crisis, when the cut-off of aid from Iraq and the oil-rich sheikhdoms compelled the PLO and Fateh to reduce salaries by 9–12 per cent for civilian personnel and 7 per cent for the military, starting in September 1990.[111] The PLO budget was reportedly halved, forcing severe cuts in departmental budgets and the closure of numerous PLO-backed media outlets in various countries. In December 1991 Arafat ordered reduction of the Fateh garrison in Lebanon—the payroll was varyingly estimated at 10,000 to 21,000—by 5,000 to cut costs further.[112] By then the stipends to the families of PLO 'martyrs', prisoners, or wounded in Lebanon—which amounted to an estimated LL280 million monthly—and additional payments for health care, food assistance, and other services—reportedly amounting to another $1 million monthly—had been slashed and severely slowed.[113] Assistance to the occupied territories—of which probably the larger part by far was channelled to political and organizational 'brokers', rather than to social welfare and income-generating projects—also dropped steadily, going from an estimated JD8 million monthly to JD700,000 monthly by mid-1993.[114]

Financial decline threatened the neopatrimonial system of control maintained by Arafat. This was reflected in a new-found willingness among some figures in the occupied territories to criticize the corruption and lack of accountability of senior PLO officials and to press for a greater political role for the 'inside'.[115] The knowledge that Arafat continued to make dubious commercial investments, dispense large sums in patronage, and protect the budgets of favoured subordinates also caused growing discontent among the rank-and-file in exile. This was expressed in a series of internal memoranda that were faxed anonymously between PLO offices and leaked to the Arab press, including a bitter critique of Arafat's autocratic mismanagement of funds and organizational appointments widely presumed to be authored by senior Western Sector cadre ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Shahin. Better known still was the lengthy political document written by Fateh central committee member Hani al-Hasan in April, in which he took strong exception to the conduct of PLO diplomacy and internal affairs.[116] Even Fateh's revolutionary council called for institutional reform.[117]

The tide of criticism receded temporarily when the aircraft carrying Arafat

crashed in the Libyan desert on 7 April, but discontent had become generalized a year later as salaries were slashed, payment was delayed by several months at a time, special benefits (housing allowances, medical costs, school fees, and transport) were reduced or ended altogether, and stipends to the families of martyrs, prisoners, and the disabled were stopped. By then PLO revenues had dropped to $140 million, from $320 million in 1990, according to PNF head Ghusayn. The flow of funds to the occupied territories also plummeted from $120 million in 1990 to $45 million in 1992, according to US reports, or from $360 million to $84 million according to the secretary of the intifada committee.[118] Up to one-third of PLO personnel, including many on the PNLA payroll, received no pay at all after March 1993; 1,000 military personnel were reportedly struck off the lists, and others were ordered to move from Tunis or PLO offices abroad to southern Libya, where the Libyan army bore all their costs.

The PLO Social Affairs Institution now ceased to receive any funds, accumulating a deficit of $56 million over the next year, affecting 74,000 families in all.[119] In June PLO clinics in Jordan were shut down, affecting some 20,000 patients.[120] In the meantime economic conditions in the occupied territories were aggravated by additional problems: the Gulf crisis and wartime curfews in 1990–1 caused losses of $600 million out of an annual GNP of $1.6 billion, and in spring 1993 Israeli border closures following Hamas bombings caused sharp drops in employment and reduced Palestinian income by $2 million daily. The extensive stratum of beneficiaries from PLO funding were directly affected, as Palestinian universities, which saw Arab aid for their recurrent expenses slashed from $22–25 million annually to $1–2 million, delayed payment of salaries, and media such as the pro-Fateh *al-Fajr* newspaper closed down.[121] In such circumstances the decision to disband Fateh paramilitary groups in the occupied territories prompted growing recourse to extortion.

Conditions were near-catastrophic for the broad mass of the rank-and-file, but this only deepened its financial dependence on Arafat. The result was not open dissent, therefore, but apathy and indifference towards political issues. This was reflected, for example, in Arafat's ability to suspend the intifada committee and reshuffle Fateh's terminally ailing Western Sector, sidelining its nominal head, ʿAbbas Zaki, and making the new appointees answerable directly to himself. The signal failure of the estranged Zaki and his new ally, Hani al-Hasan, to mobilize sustained opposition to PLO diplomacy among Fateh activists in the occupied territories during the spring gave further evidence of the disarray of the clandestine organization and of the PLO chairman's dominance.[122] Elsewhere, the closure of PLO missions in various Third World and East European countries, reduction of staff at others, stoppages at media and information centres (including the PLO's weekly *Filastin al-Thawra* and its research centre, in August), and efforts to sell off real estate holdings and commercial investments abroad widened the circle of disquiet among salaried personnel and eroded the influence of 'foreign minister' Qaddumi and senior bureaucrats.[123]

Dissent within the higher echelons of the military and bureaucratic elite came to a head during stormy sessions of Fateh's revolutionary council and central committee that started on 19 June and lasted for five days. However, the main criticism offered by the angry delegates and the principal demands they raised were related to financial corruption and mismanagement and to restoration of collective decision-making, rather than matters of overall political direction and participation in the peace process. Seeking to contain the outburst of anger, Arafat agreed to the formation of separate sub-committees to investigate financial, personnel, and organizational affairs. A second round of meetings starting on 20 July was noticeably less tense, and concentrated instead on the progress of the peace talks in Washington.[124] The findings of the financial sub-committee revealed irregularities of staggering proportions, but the renewal of the internal debate was forestalled by the disclosure that the PLO and Israel had initialled a secret agreement in Oslo on 20 August.

The Oslo accord provided for the establishment in the first instance by the PLO of a self-governing authority in Gaza and Jericho. Palestinian authority would extend to the remaining Palestinian population centres of the West Bank in a second phase, coinciding with general elections to form a governing council, the nature and powers of which were yet to be negotiated. These interim arrangements were to last for five years, once both sides had arrived at a detailed implementation agreement. Further negotiations would start after the first two years of autonomy to decide the final status of Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the fate of Palestinian refugees, and other matters, as part of a permanent settlement of the Palestine conflict. The resemblances with previous proposals for Palestinian autonomy were strong, but the key differences related to the official role of the PLO, its responsibility for internal security, and the degree of economic self-management.

Publication of the Oslo accord provoked an immediate backlash. PLO executive committee member Mahmud Darwish resigned and Shafiq al-Hut suspended his participation in protest, while in the occupied territories Faysal al-Husayni briefly called for the establishment of a 'Palestinian government of national salvation that would arrest the all-out collapse of the Palestinian institutional network'.[125] Arafat faced spirited resistance at a Fateh central committee meeting on 3–5 September, but finally won grudging ratification of the accord. The PLO executive committee also approved it after a two-day debate on 8–9 September; Arafat secured only nine votes in favour, exactly half of the original 18 members of the committee, but the resignation or self-imposed absence of five opponents enabled him to have his way. The PLO and Israel now exchanged letters of mutual recognition, and on 13 September US president Bill Clinton presided over a special ceremony on the White House lawn as ʿAbbas and Peres signed the Declaration of Principles in the presence of Arafat, Rabin, and 3,000 guests and international dignitaries. Seven months of negotiations followed, and on 4 May 1994 Arafat and Rabin met in the Egyptian capital to sign the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, also known as the

Cairo accord. The first PLO military personnel entered Gaza on 10 May and Jericho three days later, and on 12 July Arafat also arrived in Gaza to lead the nascent Palestinian Authority in person and start an entirely new phase in the Palestinian striving for statehood.

Gaza and Jericho First—and Last?

Just how far the Palestinians could in fact proceed towards sovereign statehood was to remain the subject of bitter internal debate, not to mention contest with Israel. What the Declaration of Principles (DoP) of 13 September 1993 offered was a far cry not only from the PLO's original goal of 'total liberation' of mandate Palestine, but also from the much-reduced independent state envisaged in its Declaration of Independence of 15 November 1988. Indeed, its critics argued that the PLO leadership had relinquished the right to an independent state by failing to obtain specific Israeli agreement that this option would remain open at the end of the interim period.[126] Israel had imposed its terms entirely throughout, gaining effective sovereignty and consolidating its control over the occupied territories. Worse, it had done so with Palestinian acquiescence, the PLO having moreover made a series of unilateral concessions and renunciations for which there was no meaningful Israeli recompense. The PLO leadership had revealed its incompetence and transformed itself from a national liberation movement into a small-town government in the occupied territories, an enforcer of Israeli policy with no real autonomous power of its own.[127] Ultimately, for its critics, the DoP represented no more than a 'Palestinian Versailles', an instrument of abject and self-denying surrender.

Palestinian criticism was not without substance. Rabin, who had continued to oppose direct dealings with the PLO until mid-1993, only approved the draft Oslo accord in August after coming to the conclusion that the PLO was 'on the ropes' and would be amenable to Israeli conditions.[128] That he thought it necessary to recognize the PLO and acknowledge 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people' at all was due to several factors, not least of which was the impact of the intifada. The uprising had driven home the lesson that Israel could neither ignore Palestinian nationalism nor defeat it indefinitely, and that the 'Jordanian option' no longer offered a viable means of containing it either. Israel could not incorporate the Palestinians fully in its own political and civil system without undermining its character as a Jewish state, but to maintain direct rule over them without granting equality would erode its democracy. The intifada had convinced Israeli army and security chiefs, and latterly the business community, that a fundamental reordering of political relations with the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories was required. Allowing them some form of separate political and juridical status had become unavoidable. The fact that the PLO had successfully neutralized the local leadership, and that Israel faced a growing Islamist threat, made the former the obvious interlocutor. Israel

secured the best of all worlds in the circumstances: a five-year interim period during which it would retain ultimate (when not direct) control over Palestinian affairs, a delay in negotiation of core issues of contention, and, even before these were resolved, the diplomatic and economic rewards of the end of the state of war with the Arab states.

For its part the mainstream PLO leadership, or what was left of it, was well aware of the limitations of the Oslo accord, but considered that it had had little choice other than to accept them.[129] Its position in the post-cold war and post-Gulf war era was much weakened, and it had consciously come to terms with Israel and secured a foothold on Palestinian soil before its regional and international standing declined still further. The financial crisis, administrative and organizational breakdown, and political dissent of the preceding year only underlined the precariousness of its situation. Arafat, ʿAbbas, and other PLO leaders described the DoP publicly as 'bad', but also argued that it offered a means to statehood if properly acted upon. Their critics could cite the stark imbalance of power with Israel and the structural constraints on Palestinian autonomy built into the accord to doubt the validity of this expectation, but it was genuinely held, if only because the statist ambition it reflected was real. By the same token, the PLO leadership's determination to secure certain core objectives—notably the assertion of a political claim to at least part of east Jerusalem, exclusive jurisdiction over Palestinian territory and population, control over border crossing points, and free conduct of foreign relations—was equally serious, since they underpinned both its claim to legitimacy and the credibility of an eventual independent state.

Yet for Arafat, especially, the key element in the DoP was that it extended formal Israeli recognition of the PLO and ensured the transfer of its state-in-exile to the occupied territories. It was the PLO's political survival, rather than any specific provision in the accord, that provided the real guarantee of eventual statehood. This moreover explains the willingness to make major territorial compromises, whether measured in the amount of land left in Israeli control in the interim period, or implied in the effective abandonment of the Palestinian diaspora. By way of contrast, the Washington talks had stalled precisely because the requirement for the PLO to relinquish direct participation in the negotiations and the denial of its representative status challenged the very basis of its political control, and so made compromise on substantive issues too costly for it to accept.

Critics of the Oslo process identified the linkage between self-preservation and compromise correctly, but failed to grasp the extent to which the acquisition by the PLO of territoriality and the enhancement of its international standing enabled it to maintain, and even reinforce, its statist character under the new circumstances, however restrictive these were. This is not to say that the PLO gained sovereignty in the occupied territories—despite Arafat's insistence that even if implemented in stages, Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territories made them as fully 'liberated' in terms of international law as had the French pull-out from Lebanon, Syria, and the Maghreb countries or the British

from India and Egypt—nor that it now exhibited the other main attributes of 'stateness'.[130] Rather, to repeat the argument made at the beginning of this book, the issue remained the PLO's ability to reproduce, and adapt to local conditions, political practices, and institutional arrangements centred on itself; to redefine its political relations with, and co-opt, local society; and to expand and diversify ties with sovereign members of the regional and international state systems.

Implementation of the DoP therefore underlined, rather than undermined, the state-building dynamic. The Cairo accord of May 1994 and accompanying economic and security protocols severely circumscribed the jurisdiction and legislative and functional powers of the new Palestinian Authority. Yet the latter body's drive for administrative centralization and social control was reinforced by its inheritance of a ready governmental apparatus, its role as necessary intermediary for most dealings between Israel and the Palestinian population, and its grip on the internal levers of trade and security. Facilitating and consolidating this process at another level was the assertion of Fateh as the 'government party' and the active effort to fragment the various opposition groups.

The extension of the Palestinian Authority was also helped by the repatriation and assimilation of the PLO's bureaucratic elite, which had shown virtually no opposition to the DoP once signed, and whose members now reforged political ties based on family and place of origin. The transformation of local political figures and social leaders into functionaries, election of a representative assembly in January 1996, expansion of the 'government' payroll to some 75,000 by 1997, and, of course, use of nationalism further enabled the Authority to co-opt or sideline key social groups, not least the intelligentsia and modern middle class. The emerging social patterns were crucial to the consolidation of the Authority's control and reflective, once again, of its statist character. Of particular note was the accelerated incorporation of the rural population, driven by the massive expansion of the salariat and by the out-reach of 'government' departments, utilities, and civilian services, and proliferation of security agencies to rural areas. Its statist incorporation was mirrored in the rural background of much of the 'returnee' PLO bureaucratic elite. This pattern moreover built on the cumulative impact of the spread of higher education and salaried white-collar work among village inhabitants, and on the changing demographic composition of urban areas as the emigration of city-dwellers during the intifada was matched by an inflow of villagers seeking new places of trade or commuting to office and jobs.

The Palestinian Authority's possession of a distinct, if limited, territorial, administrative, and revenue base and its ability to construct relatively stable new political structures and social alliances in turn enhanced its international standing and helped mobilize diplomatic support and external budgetary assistance and economic aid. Control of such additional political and material resources further legitimated the structures through which the Authority sought to contain and channel local politics, and enhanced its autonomy from domestic

actors. So, paradoxically, did its nominal subordination to the PLO, since the latter organization not only retained its own international political and diplomatic network and formally represented 'Palestine' to the UN and other multilateral and regional bodies, but also upheld its status as sole representative of *all* Palestinians, including those in the diaspora, whose moral weight could be used when convenient to counter-balance the political clout of Palestinian society in the occupied territories. Conversely, the Authority could add its social control to the PLO's continued monopoly on representation and to its own international legitimacy, in order to gain a special advantage in the ongoing contest with exile-based Palestinian groups and, implicitly, with Jordan.

These various processes confirmed the continuation of the state-building dynamic in Palestinian politics, but also showed it to be subject to several dichotomies. Two of these were long-standing, related to the enduring contrast between the PLO's statist character and its lack of stateness, internally, and between its pseudo-sovereign juridical standing and non-state empirical reality, externally. The DoP extended this dichotomy and brought about new ones. The PLO, in its guise as Palestinian Authority, was now both subordinate and challenger to Israel, its core national objectives unattained yet partially realized. To get this far it had had to reverse a long-held assumption, striking a deal first with Israel in order to win recognition from the US, rather than the other way around as in the previous two decades, but subsequently looking again to the US to intervene diplomatically on its behalf in order to secure full implementation of the accords with Israel. At one level this reflected the fundamental shift in circumstances, such that both the international community and the Palestinian social constituency could be brought more effectively to bear in support of national aims, through political means.

At another level, the reorientation of PLO strategy confirmed that Israel had replaced the Arab host states in providing the primary relational context for the political and institutional development of the Palestinian national movement as a whole, and not only for the inhabitants of the occupied territories. This revealed a further dichotomy: on the one hand the functional subordination of the Palestinian Authority to Israel and its structural vulnerability—again primarily to Israel, and secondarily to the US and then Jordan and lastly Egypt—meant that Palestinian state-building and nationalism remained contested and contingent; yet, on the other hand the maintenance and consolidation of statist political institutions and administrative structures provided the PLO with a crucial advantage in its striving for exclusive social control over the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories. It is therefore over the key determinants of the primary context—the terms of access to other states and economies, the attributes of Palestinian stateness (including exclusivity of jurisdiction over territory and population and power of rule-making), and the means of limiting external political penetration and of tying national self-identification specifically to a single statist structure—that the contest between the PLO and Israel would henceforth be conducted.

Conclusion

The start of the interim self-government arrangements in Gaza and Jericho in May 1994 and Arafat's arrival in July to assume direct control of the newly established Palestinian Authority marked the end of the phase in modern Palestinian history that had begun with the collective dispossession and dispersal of 1948. The essential conflict with Zionism remained unresolved and unchanged so long as the consequences of *al-nakba* had not been fully erased, opponents of the Oslo and Cairo accords might argue, but the transformation of the PLO from a national movement in exile to a governmental apparatus on its own soil signalled a fundamental shift in the nature and form of Palestinian politics as they had evolved in the intervening period. This is not to deny that state-building remained at the heart of the national enterprise as before, nor that the political system that had developed in exile now worked to reproduce itself in the occupied territories, but rather to assert that the discourse of total liberation, the strategies and tactics of armed struggle, and the accompanying organizational instruments and institutional forms had been displaced. The PLO accords with Israel were arguably the outcome of a deep crisis of leadership, strategy, and mode of politics, but by the same token they signalled 'the end of the era of the *fasa'il'*—the guerrilla groups based in exile—and the start of a new one in which the centre of national politics, primary social constituency, and statist institutions were based in one and the same location, the occupied territories.[1]

What role, then, had the much-vaunted armed struggle played in recent Palestinian history, and what factors determined its course and outcome? This question acquires special relevance because 'total liberation' simply could not be achieved in the historical setting in which the Palestinian national movement emerged and waged its struggle after 1948. The Western nations, and indeed the Soviet Union and its allies as well, were firmly committed to the survival of Israel after the suffering of the Jewish people in the Holocaust. The superpower rivalry that shaped the international system after 1945 reinforced this Western commitment. The Arab states, deeply divided by their own rivalries, were unwilling or unable to pose a unified military threat to Israel. Such freedom of agency that the Palestinians had lay not in the range of strategic options available to them, therefore, but in the political, ideological, and organizational choices that took them along one path of national development rather than another. External structural limitations were always

paramount—the evolution of Arab state and society after 1945 was the principal determining framework—but the complexity of the regional environment and the multiplicity of its actors offered the Palestinians crucial openings at critical moments.

In this context the main guerrilla group, Fateh, was highly successful in utilizing particularist nationalism to mobilize its narrower, Palestinian constituency, but patently incapable of mustering single-handedly the material resources required to overwhelm Israel. For this reason its main rivals, the PFLP and, to a lesser extent, the DFLP, insisted on linking the Palestinian struggle to the wider currents of pan-Arab nationalism and social revolution in the Arab states, but both trends were progressively undermined by developments in the regional order and changes in Arab societies and economies after 1967. Awareness of these domestic, regional, and international limitations contributed to the fundamental shift in strategy and aims promoted by Fateh and the DFLP from the early 1970s onwards.

Yet this could not mean abandonment of the Arab connection. An intricate relationship evolved in which the empirical status of the guerrilla movement—its possession of combat bases and a mass constituency on Arab soil—brought it repeatedly into conflict with host states, while its striving for juridical status—recognition of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians—depended on the support and acknowledgement of those same states. The Palestinians paid the price when their own role in setting their national agenda was expropriated—by the League of Arab States in 1947–8, by Egyptian president Jamal ʿAbd-al-Nasir and his rivals in 1958–63, or by Iraqi president Saddam Husayn in 1990—yet recognition of the representative status of Palestinian bodies—as with the All Palestine Government in 1948, the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964 (recognized as sole legitimate representative in 1974), and the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Madrid peace conference in 1991—signified abdication by the Arab states of their political and military commitments towards Palestine.

These implicit tensions notwithstanding, the guerrilla groups composing the PLO consistently described the armed struggle as the principal, even exclusive, means of liberating Palestine throughout their evolution. Yet their military effort never exceeded a certain level in terms of scale and impact, and certainly failed to approach the models offered by the frequently cited Chinese and Vietnamese experiences of guerrilla war and people's war. Whatever the individual sacrifices of the Palestinian rank-and-file or the strength of their convictions, the movement as a whole lacked the single-minded determination to take the practice of armed struggle to the elevated position it occupied in formal doctrine and to develop its organization in a manner commensurate with the task. The frequent use of the term 'intifada' to describe mass actions moreover revealed the enduring strength of traditional forms of non-organized participation such as the village *fazʿa* (alarm, call to arms), despite the extensive bureaucratization of the movement, and exposed the disinclination to incor-

porate the mass constituency into structured political organizations and cross-cutting territorial units and functional associations possessed of a real capability both to generate and to control material resources.

The fact that the Palestinian movement was able for so long to accommodate such marked discrepancies—between rhetoric and reality, slogans and capabilities, and nationalist myth and social requirement—without undergoing radical changes of structure or leadership reveals the extent to which the latter had successfully entrenched itself. More to the point, it suggests that military performance was not measured in conventional terms, and leads to the conclusion that armed struggle served other primary functions. Above all, the armed struggle provided the central theme and practice around which Palestinian nation-building took place, and laid the basis for state-building by driving elite formation and militarization and allowing political legitimation.

Setting the Context

The establishment of the State of Israel over most of mandate Palestine in 1948 deprived its Arab inhabitants of the national base in which territory, economy, and society met. *Al-nakba* decisively ended any hope for the emergence of a Palestinian national state along the lines of the entities that had already taken root and gained independence in surrounding Arab countries since the end of direct European rule. The loss of land and other means of production undermined the sense of identity in what was a predominantly agrarian society, and removed its sources of autonomous wealth and economic reproduction. The impact was compounded by the physical dispersal of the population and its subjection to separate, often rival, Arab authorities in its various places of refuge.

As seriously for Palestinian society, the destruction of the old elite of large landowners, merchants, and officeholders in 1948 was accompanied by the precipitate flight of a large part of the urban-based middle class. The exodus of civil servants, professionals, businessmen, and other educated Palestinians removed social strata that were already on the rise and that would normally have provided an alternative focus of national leadership and organization. Instead, the middle class was fragmented and marginalized at a critical juncture. Palestinians of peasant or working-class background gathered in destitute refugee camps in impoverished rural areas or in the periphery of Arab cities, while those of middle-class background used their movable capital, skills, and family connections to find residence and employment in the cities or further abroad. The equalizing impact of *al-nakba* had not so much destratified Palestinian society as disarticulated it.

National politics could not reappear under these circumstances. The absence of a single territorial, economic, and social base meant that there was no longer the basis for a common political 'arena', with agreed modes of competition and structured means for the selection of a new generation of leadership. Besides,

commonality of language, culture, and religion with other Arabs blunted any tendency to revive a Palestinian agenda that was distinct from that of the Arab governments and host societies. The experience of *al-nakba* made for a distinct Palestinian*ness*, but not necessarily for Palestinian*ism*. Palestinians sought national salvation by joining Arab opposition parties, or hoped that new Arab leaders would come to power and launch their armies to destroy Israel and liberate Palestine. This explains the enduring strength of the pan-Arab appeal among Palestinians in the 1950s and early 1960s, reflected above all in widespread support for Nasir.

The reverse side of the coin was the extreme sensitivity of the Arab states towards political activity among the Palestinian refugees who came into their midst in 1948. The legitimacy of Arab rulers was still open to challenge by their own citizens, whose identification with the new territorial states and borders created in recent decades by the colonial powers was not yet secure. The host governments responded either by isolating the Palestinian refugees from their own populations through physical and legal barriers, or by inhibiting the emergence of social and political organizations with an explicitly Palestinian character among the refugees. For all these reasons Palestinian political activism after 1948 was unfocused and operated at grass-roots level, and was often initially channelled into Arab parties espousing radical national, social, or sectarian agendas.

The re-emergence of distinctly Palestinian nationalist politics depended primarily on the progress made by the scattered Palestinian communities in rebuilding their 'sociological space', that is, reviving their social networks, value systems and norms, and cultural symbols. This was a painstaking and time-consuming process, and it was not until the early 1960s that Palestinian society approached the critical mass required to generate its own, overt politics and to sustain an autonomous national movement. It was no coincidence that the Palestinians should have reached this stage soon after the hopes pinned on pan-Arabism were dashed by the collapse of the Egyptian–Syrian union in September 1961 and by the resurgence of the Arab cold war. What the general disillusionment with Arab politics in the early 1960s showed was that the Palestinians had not been politically incorporated in any meaningful way by host governments. The build-up of pressure was evident in the proliferation of dozens of small, self-styled liberation groups espousing armed struggle in this period. It was to defuse and contain irredentism that the Arab heads of state approved the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964. However, PLO founder Ahmad al-Shuqayri substantially exceeded his mandate and presented the Arab leaders with a fait accompli by creating a state-like body, with a constitution, executive, legislative assembly, 'government' departments, army, audited budget, and internal statutes. The PLO even imposed limited taxes and conscription on the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip with Egyptian assistance, and requested similar facilities in other Arab states.

Even so the PLO could not live up to the expectations of its public, not least because its political authority and military operation were both firmly subordinated to Arab command. Jordan had moreover strongly influenced the selection of delegates to the founding conference of the PLO, many of whose principal figures came from the upper middle class and established families or from the business and professional strata. As importantly, the PLO provided the 'state' but no institutions for mass participation in national politics. Its leadership suffered the same dilemma as Nasir, who lacked a political vehicle to mobilize grass-roots support for government policies but distrusted political parties. The PLO imitated his decision to form an official, government-led movement and modelled its own single, all-embracing Palestinian Popular Organization on his National Union and its successor, the Arab Socialist Union. The PPO was banned in most Arab states and allowed to operate only in Gaza, but its main undoing was that it had been created from above, by decree. Shuqayri and his principal colleagues were accustomed to paternalistic leadership and unused to grass-roots organization and had little of Nasir's charisma, despite their populist rhetoric, and so their new political vehicle had little life of its own. The PLO failed in two key respects, therefore: it neither took the military initiative against Israel, nor provided its mass constituency with channels for political participation.

Everything changed in June 1967. The humiliating defeat inflicted by Israel on the Arab states weakened them both physically and politically, and made it difficult for them to move too forcefully against the Palestinian guerrilla groups that now appeared on the scene. The decision by Fateh, the Palestinian branch of the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM), and others to launch an armed insurrection against the IDF in the newly occupied West Bank and Gaza brought them more widely to public attention. Their stand against a superior Israeli force in the battle of Karama in March 1968 catapulted them to centre-stage, and enabled them to take control of the PLO over the next year. The founding leadership of the PLO had proved unable to cope with the scale of the defeat, and by 1969 the guerrilla movement had established itself as a regional actor in its own right. Its espousal of armed struggle and adoption of grass-roots organization enabled it to mobilize the Palestinian constituency and at last translate 'potential politicization into political action'.[2]

Palestine Recovered

The Palestinian guerrilla movement remained a modest force in terms of combat strength and military effectiveness, even in its heyday in 1968–70. More significant was the contribution made by the armed struggle to Palestinian political development. Specifically, it led to four interlinked consequences. First was confirmation of Palestinian national identity, that had started to be reforged with the social reconstruction of the 1950s. Fateh in particular had

insisted since its formation in 1958–9 on seeing a direct relationship between armed struggle and identity. Co-founder Khalil al-Wazir, for one, argued that the Arab states had worked after 1948 to ensure 'the elimination of Palestine, suppression of Palestinian identity, erasing of the Palestinian character, and the merging and dissolving of Palestinian decision and Palestinian will'.[3] Military action was therefore a reassertion of Palestinian existence and autonomous will, and evidence of Palestinian determination to pursue an independent course. Violence moreover allowed a unique 'massing effect' in a segmented society.[4]

The launch of the armed struggle in 1965 represented the 'beginning of the search for the suppressed and subjugated identity', in the words of DFLP secretary-general Nayif Hawatma, but it was the Arab defeat in June 1967 that crystallized that identity 'because it enabled the Palestinian people to take their cause into their own hands for the first time since 1948'.[5] The heroic imagery and language of armed struggle gave new substance to the imagined community of the Palestinians. They now portrayed themselves as a revolutionary people waging an active struggle to determine their fate, rather than as a mass of helpless refugees passively awaiting charity handouts. Wazir offered an apt definition when he described the armed struggle as 'a central, comprehensive and multi-dimensional process. Its sum-total embodies the various facets and activities of the Palestinian people as a whole, whether those facets and activities are political, social, economic, military, or cultural. This is how we understand the armed struggle. This is also how we have proceeded to rebuild our people and reassert its national identity, in order to achieve its aims of return and liberation of the land. We understand [the armed struggle] as an integrated process involving three dimensions: organization, production, and combat'.[6]

The second consequence of the armed struggle after 1967 was to consolidate the Palestinian 'entity'. The PLO had been founded in 1964 as the official vehicle of Palestinian nationalism enjoying the formal recognition of the Arab states. It was bereft of independent political will, however, and lacked physical control over a territorial base or population. The shock delivered by Israel to the Arab states in June 1967 produced cracks that the Palestinian guerrilla groups were quick to widen. Their resort to armed struggle effectively kept open a space, a margin of freedom from Arab government control, within which Palestinian grass-roots organizations and quasi-governmental institutions could flourish. This was reflected in the formal agreements with the governments of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon that enshrined the right of the guerrilla movement to maintain an autonomous presence on their national soil and wage a military campaign against Israel from their borders. Rivalries between the Arab states played an important part in creating this space, much as they had allowed the emergence of the PLO in 1964. To the extent that this detracted from the sovereignty of the host states, the assertion of a parallel 'guerrilla government', however embryonic, laid the basis for thinking and organizing in statist terms.

The takeover of the PLO by the guerrilla movement in 1969 gave institutionalized embodiment to Palestinian national identity, an achievement considered by one PLO analyst to be the 'ambition of all revolutions'.[7] By the same token it permitted the guerrilla leadership to assume the mantle of diplomatic recognition already accorded to the PLO, and to operate on a larger regional and international stage. The extension of an invitation to PLO chairman Yasir Arafat to address the United Nations General Assembly in November 1974 demonstrated the distance the Palestinians had come, as did the establishment of PLO representation in dozens of capitals in following years. Indeed, Fateh central committee member Salah Khalaf considered that the most important achievements of the guerrilla movement by 1979 were that it had 'restored the Palestinian cause to the people . . . [and] gained international legitimacy'.[8] Wazir was clear, however, that 'it was the logic of revolution that carried us to the UN in 1974'.[9]

The third consequence of the armed struggle for Palestinian nation-building was that it produced a common political 'arena'. It defined objectives and strategies around which the broad constituency could be mobilized and organized, and provided the channels through which mass participation in national politics could take place. The guerrilla groups were the political parties—but, conducting their activity within a military framework, were termed *fasa'il* (the term used during the 1936–9 revolt to denote rebel bands) rather than *ahzab*—and their members could compete and rise in the ranks according to defined rules and informal criteria. Once the guerrilla movement had taken over the PLO, it became the acknowledged Palestinian leadership and central decision-making body. Its parliament in exile, the Palestine National Council, provided an additional means of incorporating various sectors of the Palestinian population, as did the affiliated mass organizations (trade unions and social associations). Participation in the armed struggle was the main source of legitimacy, and distinguished the guerrilla leadership that emerged after 1967 from the founding generation of the PLO.

The distinction between leadership generations was a major one. The founders of the PLO had been active in Palestinian nationalist politics before 1948, and many had gained experience of party politics or had held office in the quasi-governmental Arab Higher Committee, All Palestine Government, and other bodies in Palestine. In contrast, virtually all the grass-roots activists who established new guerrilla groups in the 1950s and 1960s and eventually assumed control of the PLO in 1968–9—led by the likes of Arafat, Wazir, and George Habash—had been teenagers, or at most in their early twenties, in 1948. Most came from a lower middle-class background, had benefited from the rapid expansion of the education system in the Arab countries in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and were influenced by the new, statist models of political organization and economic development adopted by the host Arab governments. Few, if any, had professional military training, but they could base their claim to political legitimacy on their role as leaders of the guerrilla

war and national struggle against Israel. No less significant was the fact that the majority came from the smaller cities and market towns of mandate Palestine, as did many prominent members of the post-1967 political class, while a substantial proportion of the long-serving, salaried personnel of the PLO hailed from the rural districts of the West Bank. In brief, the generation that took control of the PLO in 1968–9 and that subsequently staffed its various departments and agencies was strikingly similar in terms of its social origins to the 'new elites' that came to power in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Iraq between 1952 and 1968.[10]

State-Building without a State

The similarity with the Arab states went further, as the consolidation of Palestinian nation-building gave way to a process akin to that of state-building, that has been described in this book as statist political institutionalization characterized, moreover, by neopatrimonialism. This was the fourth and arguably most central and enduring consequence of the armed struggle, and demonstrated the degree to which the restoration of national identity, reaffirmation of the imagined community, and institutionalization of the representative entity had progressed. The consolidation of the new Palestinian elite was the first component of state-building, as its struggle to assert control shaped the emerging political system much in the way that the drive for legitimacy and internal control had helped form the modern Arab territorial and evolving national states. The fact that the Palestinian leadership based its legitimacy on its role in the armed struggle against Israel encouraged the tendency towards populist politics and authoritarian control. Both tendencies were inevitable, indeed, since the Palestinian guerrilla movement was engaged in a military conflict and had to structure its internal organization and politics accordingly. The relationship between elite formation and state-building was also evident as the transition from one leadership generation to another in 1968–9 was reflected in the changing composition of PNC membership, in PNC resolutions pertaining to the corporatist status of trade unions and mass organizations and to the primacy of mass action, and in the new, competitive form of political organization offered by the armed *fasa'il*.

The new Palestinian elite was well-defined, with publicly identifiable figures and at least nominal demarcation of official posts and responsibilities. It was also exclusive, with little upward mobility through the ranks and few newcomers joining it from outside the guerrilla groups. The bureaucratization of the movement from the late 1960s onwards tended both to consolidate and to ossify membership in the elite, which comprised civilian, military, and paramilitary elements. A principal decision-maker, Arafat, asserted himself over time with the support of the inner core of Fateh. A political class also developed, composed of the leaders of the various guerrilla groups and a few

unaffiliated 'independents', who lacked decision-making power but whose input was necessary to determine the direction of policy and legitimize it. Finally came the wider elite, made up of middle-ranking officials of the PLO or senior cadres in the guerrilla groups, as well as unaffiliated individuals who held seats on PLO bodies such as the PNC. In all cases the Palestinian elite proved to be remarkably durable, despite intense factional rivalries and deep political rifts.

The composition of the bureaucratized elite confirmed the importance of statist political development. With the exception of the founding core of the guerrilla groups, refugees were minimally represented at the middle or senior levels of the salariat. This was most notably the case for Fateh and, given its close symbiosis with Fateh, the PLO. Very few refugees from the camps attained rank at which they could command significant resources or exercise political authority, and those who joined the guerrilla leadership invariably came from families that had already possessed a level of property or other wealth and of education (before the exodus of 1948) that defined them as lower middle class and distinguished them from peasants and workers. The majority of the bureaucratized PLO elite were 'residents' (*muwatinun*), Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza whose families remained in their places of origin and retained possession of land or other properties (from which they continued to draw income, even as they entered into new market relations). At the same time their common social background was petit bourgeois rather than established middle class, and many came from market towns and villages rather than cities. Their predominance in the PLO and Fateh apparatus underlined the similarities with the Arab experience of state-building. The pattern differed somewhat in the PFLP and DFLP—in that both groups were compelled to compensate for the considerable losses and defections incurred in the Jordanian conflict of 1970–1 by recruiting heavily from the refugee communities of Lebanon and Syria and by gradually promoting local Palestinians to senior rank—but the extensive bureaucratization of their civilian and military agencies and transformation of their personnel into a salariat only confirmed the overall trend towards statist political institutionalization.

State-building in the Palestinian case involved the establishment of quasi-governmental services providing medical care and social welfare to the mass constituency. It was equally obvious in the obsessive insistence on obtaining recognition from both Arab and non-Arab governments of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Another mark that the statist model was being emulated was the rapid proliferation of the offices that the guerrilla groups vied to set up in every camp, village, and city neighbourhood possible, the closest they could come to the ubiquitousness of government bureaucracy. The statist ethos was evident, too, in the use of nationalism as a legitimizing instrument rather than a mobilizing one, especially after the defeat in Jordan in 1970–1. As important was the role of the guerrilla groups, which acted as the equivalent of political parties in their

competition for public support and for a share of power within the PLO, and that enhanced its political legitimacy in this way and provided a further means to incorporate and integrate the scattered Palestinian society. Integration was also achieved by the development of patron–client networks within the elite itself, parallel to the adoption of *rentier* politics in relation to the wider mass constituency.

The willingness of those in opposition to the mainstream leadership to continue to operate within the PLO framework—despite basic differences over policy—offered as clear an indication as any of the powerful appeal and ubiquity of the statist drive. Additional evidence came in the form of their willingness to utilize rent and corresponding disinclination to replace *tafrigh* with mobilization of their social base, their tendency to authoritarian leadership and lack of responsiveness to pressures from the ranks for change (reflected especially in the subordination of the membership in the occupied territories to the salaried apparatus in exile), and their general lack of accountability, political or otherwise.

If 'the territorial shape of a state, the character of the regime institutionalized within its borders, and the power position of incumbent elites are linked to one another', then the lack of territoriality in the Palestinian case prompted an exaggerated recourse to neopatrimonialism as a means of compensation in the pursuit of political management and social control.[11] However, neopatrimonialism had contradictory consequences. At one level it tended to an integrative effect by opening organizational membership to the widest possible constituency and by tying the scattered Palestinian communities to a central political structure, the PLO, but at another it limited the vertical mobility of members and the access of all social forces to the upper reaches of the organization. Yet it was this combination of inclusionary and exclusionary processes, above all else, that confirmed the character of the PLO as a statist actor, offering it means to 'capture' its general public while reinforcing its structural autonomy. The implications were not universally understood, however. The Palestinian Left, for example, acknowledged the statist nature of PLO institutions and recognized the special advantages that their autonomy conferred on them, but promptly contradicted this recognition by arguing, in crude class terms, that national policy was determined by the 'upper segment of the Palestinian national bourgeoisie, situated within the bourgeoisies of Kuwait, Saudi [Arabia], the Gulf emirates, and Jordan, in alliance with the grand bureaucracy in the PLO agencies and the Palestinian *grande bourgeoisie* in the occupied territories, which is tied to Jordan through joint investments and other economic interests'.[12]

Statist autonomy was further affected by the physical dispersal of the Palestinians and their lack of a shared economic base, which meant that the PLO, itself nomadic due to the circumstances of operating in Arab exile, developed in relation not to a single society but to several societal fragments or 'partial societies'. Each of these was moreover shaped by a distinct combination of

factors, of which the statist extension of the PLO was only one, and arguably the lesser one in comparison to the predominant politico-administrative, social, and economic configurations of the host country (or occupying power, in the case of Israel in the West Bank and Gaza). Thus although the choice of policies and instruments by the mainstream leadership was an important determinant of the PLO's statist evolution, its interaction with the scattered Palestinian communities led to multiple and often divergent social, political, and organizational outcomes. The results were contradictory: the PLO may have been in a stronger position to bargain with the disparate societal fragments and resist 'penetration' by them at one level, but at another its inability to exercise social control over the greater part by far of its constituency deprived it of resources and deepened its dependency on Arab host governments and other external powers.

Because the PLO was unable to provide the everyday, pragmatic needs of most of its dispersed population in terms of income, resolution of social conflict, and so on, its constituents perforce maintained the 'strategies of survival' they had developed since 1948. They came to view the armed struggle as an added layer to their identity, but did not participate in it consistently or universally. Similarly, although they increasingly regarded the PLO as the institutional embodiment of their national identity, especially after 1967, Palestinians generally conducted their social lives and economic activities within the framework of the sovereign governments under whose territorial jurisdiction they came. The complexity and embedded contradictions of their strategies of survival—which provided a basis for personal survival on the one hand, while allowing the individual to link personal identity and self-serving action to group identity and collective action—[13] help to explain the aloofness and occasional ambivalence of the more established sectors of Palestinian society, particularly among the upper middle class and rural inhabitants of the West Bank and, as the experience of 1968–70 showed, of Jordan. Only in those situations where the sovereign power actively marginalized Palestinians and eroded their strategies of survival—whether by 'ghettoizing' them as in Lebanon or by assaulting their economic foundations as in the occupied territories—were they pushed into actively seeking in the PLO a 'state' of their own. The PLO contributed to this process by providing a widening range of services and extending patronage and 'rent' to various sectors of its constituency as it acquired greatly increased funding and material assistance from the Arab states in the second half of the 1970s.

The inescapable reality, however, was that Palestinian state-building remained fundamentally constrained by the lack of a single territorial, social, and economic base. Consequently Palestinian nationalism was weakened, fractured, and contested whenever the statist system of the PLO was unable to operate effectively and wherever Palestinians were compelled to link their strategies for survival to rival statist centres. The contrast with the Jewish *yishuv* is particularly instructive in this regard. The PLO was not in a position to

emulate the experience of the early *yishuv* (particularly of the second wave of immigration, or *aliyah*, of 1904–14), in which the determined efforts of the Zionist movement to transform Hebrew labour and implement organizational measures designed to restructure the existing labour market laid the basis for subsequent Israeli nation and state formation.[14] Nor was the PLO able to extend its powers through control of the land (unlike the post-1948 State of Israel), intervening in market mechanisms or circumventing them altogether in order to alter modes of use and the identity and purpose of ownership. The result in the Palestinian case was an accentuated emphasis on neopatrimonial forms of political management and social control. This may have enhanced the PLO's tactical flexibility in the diplomatic sphere, but it further impeded the development of the sort of organizational skills and novel political and economic arrangements with which the *yishuv* established the foundations of the Israeli state during the mandate period.[15] That said, there was a significant parallel nonetheless in that the hegemony of the Zionist labour movement within the *yishuv* 'derived not only from values or organizational capacity alone but from the effective combination of its ideal of state building with an ability to address the interests—particularly in obtaining employment—of those "building the state" '.[16] In the latter sense, at least, the PLO followed a well-travelled path.

Despite its various flaws—among them, arguably, the excessive and counter-productive nature of its neopatrimonialism—state-building by the PLO served a crucial function by 'territorializing' Palestinian nationalism and by firmly locating it within the conceptual framework of the formation of national states in the twentieth century, to the exclusion of alternative political paths or ideological models. It was also the critical factor enabling the new political class that emerged after 1967 to maintain its ascendancy for nearly three decades, despite the general absence of an internal dynamic based in social and economic struggles and the most unpropitious external circumstances. Most striking, however, was that despite their unique circumstances of collective dispossession and dispersal and their lack of statehood, the Palestinians ultimately revealed patterns of elite formation and politics, corporatist organization, neopatrimonial bureaucratization, and authoritarian political management and concentration of power that were typical of the experience of state-building in neighbouring Arab countries.

Determining Factors

An additional difference between the Palestinian and Arab situations was that the PLO sought to alter the status quo, and was engaged in an armed struggle against a militarily superior foe who controlled the whole of the disputed homeland. The bulk of PLO combat strength, civilian membership, and 'governing' institutions were based in exile. So was at least half the Palestinian

population, leaving the PLO physically dispersed and constantly vulnerable to the whims of host governments and the vagaries of inter-Arab rivalries. A complex relationship developed as Palestinian state-building took place in physical proximity to, and close interaction with, the evolving social, economic, and political systems of the modern Arab national states. All these factors determined the nature of Palestinian politics, to the effective exclusion of social and economic factors. The process of Palestinian state-building was distorted and truncated as a result. It was a shadow process that existed largely in form, and gained substance only to the extent that the PLO could carve out a secure sanctuary and construct a state-within-a-state in an Arab host country, as happened in Jordan and Lebanon in different periods.

The evolution of the Palestinian armed struggle was therefore determined by three main factors. First was the complex and all-important relationship with Arab host societies, since the leadership and main body of the PLO were based in exile. The need to establish secure sanctuaries brought the Palestinian guerrillas into conflict with the Arab governments concerned and invited punitive Israeli reprisals that increased the burden on civilian populations and national economies. Opposition to the presence of these sanctuaries from certain government quarters or communities prompted the guerrillas to seek protection. This they did by developing their military capabilities, invoking the help of external allies, and building alliances with local political parties and social forces. Their intervention in domestic politics inevitably exacerbated latent tensions in the host society and fuelled civil strife. Nowhere was this more obvious than in Lebanon, where the PLO emerged as a major power-broker and, cuckoo-like, constructed a state-in-exile in 1973–82. It had a similar experience in Jordan in 1968–70: at the highpoint of guerrilla power in June 1970 king Husayn offered the PLO the chance to form the cabinet, and three months later it attempted to overthrow the military government and install a 'nationalist' replacement.

The relationship with Jordan was more complex, in any case. At its core was the unceasing rivalry over who represented the Palestinians, especially those with Jordanian citizenship living on the east and west banks of the Jordan river. The kingdom also had the longest borders of any Arab state with Israel, and controlled the main access routes to the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. Loss of this major base in 1970–1 weakened the PLO and increased its dependence on a sanctuary of secondary importance, Lebanon. It also increased PLO dependence on Syria, which wielded considerable influence in Lebanon, controlled the overland movement of guerrilla supplies and reinforcements, and perceived itself as a claimant both to Arab leadership and to a special say in the Palestine question. Indeed, Syria arguably exerted the greatest direct influence of any Arab state on the course and politics of the Palestinian armed struggle. Certainly the relationship with Syria was the most contentious of the PLO's Arab relations, most of which experienced severe fluctuations. Iraq and oil-rich Saudi Arabia also figured prominently, but of more direct importance was

Egypt, whose military and diplomatic support were sought by the PLO and whose decision to conclude a separate peace with Israel led to a fundamental shift in the regional strategic balance.

The second main factor determining the evolution of Palestinian politics was the division between 'inside' and 'outside', especially after the rest of mandate Palestine came under Israeli control in June 1967. A majority of the population in the country as a whole was now Jewish, and even the Arab-populated West Bank and Gaza were too small to sustain a conventional guerrilla war, let alone permit the establishment of sanctuaries or liberated zones. On the one hand this reduced Palestinian military action in the occupied territories and Israel largely to urban terrorism, and made it easier for the IDF and security services to seal off the borders and deal with resistance using police methods. On the other hand it compelled the guerrilla movement to launch its armed struggle from sanctuaries in neighbouring Arab countries and to base its political institutions and main leadership in exile. With the leadership went the centre of gravity in Palestinian national politics.

The PLO proved unable to resolve the inside–outside dichotomy, and experienced a constant imbalance and tension between its two wings. This was reflected in the contrasting forms of struggle adopted in each case. For the outside, military action was an essential means to assert a distinct Palestinian identity and demarcate the boundaries with the wider Arab identity. By the same token it served to carve out and define the Palestinian entity amidst the Arab state system. Armed struggle was the most effective means of mobilizing the scattered Palestinian diaspora and enabling it to make a material contribution to changing the balance of power with Arab host governments or with Israel.[17] The reverse side of the coin was that the PLO was slow to pay serious attention to the inner workings of Israeli society and politics, or to appreciate the implications for its own military, political, and diplomatic strategies. Similarly, it tended to overlook or belittle non-military forms of struggle waged by Palestinians in the occupied territories. The PLO attached greater importance to the political role of the West Bank and Gaza and devoted major efforts to mass action and social organization from the late 1970s onwards, but even then it feared competition from local leaders and sought to subordinate them firmly to its strategy.

Fear of the emergence of a rival leadership and of the political challenge that an autonomous organizational base might pose also helps explain the PLO failure to develop 'parallel hierarchies' in the occupied territories such as those constructed by the Vietminh during the struggle against the French, in which territorial units (such as the village and district) were cross-cut by multiple associations based on social category and economic function.[18] Such territorial or social organizations as existed in the Palestinian case were extensively factionalized, and in any case served as channels to dispense patronage and consolidate PLO influence more often than as means for mass mobilization and resource generation. The PLO preferred to rely on the intrinsic appeal of

nationalism to mobilize its population, even though the invasive and pervasive nature of Israeli occupation required greater organizational effectiveness. The eruption of the intifada in December 1987 revealed the potency of a civilian rebellion operating within its natural social base and on home ground, but otherwise failed to impose basic changes in the PLO's political system and methods of operation.

The nature of the Palestinian leadership, and its politics, were the third main factor determining the evolution of the armed struggle. The crucial formative experiences for the entire generation who took control of the PLO in early 1969 were the catastrophe of 1948, which they witnessed at first hand as teenagers or young men in their early twenties, and subsequent life under the authority of different Arab states. Almost all came from cities and villages in Palestine that had become part of the new state of Israel. The dominant group, who went on to found Fateh and lead the PLO, grew up and studied under Egyptian rule in Gaza and Cairo. Some of their colleagues were refugees in Syria, but even then the majority started their political life in the Muslim Brotherhood and later found work in the oil-rich Gulf states. In contrast, the founders of the ANM (to take Fateh's most important rival) and most senior cadres of its Palestinian branch came mainly from Jordan (including the West Bank) and, to a lesser degree, Syria and Lebanon. Their ideology was a romantic nationalism with fascist undertones, and their early experiences were of the tempestuous party politics of the Arab East in the 1950s.

The variations in background were clearly reflected in political outlook. The Fateh founders were obsessed with the autonomy of Palestinian decision-making from Arab influence, and emphasized a narrow Palestinian nationalism to the deliberate exclusion of other, overt ideologies (and to the exclusion of non-Palestinian Arabs from membership, until 1971). This went hand-in-hand with a conservative attitude towards social conflict and a deep distrust of political parties, but, paradoxically, it also produced a strong pragmatic streak when the matter came to practical politics. Their main competitors in the ANM were initially no more radical in terms of social agenda, but were active in the opposition politics of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon in the 1950s and 1960s. They viewed Palestinian identity as part of a wider pan-Arab identity, and sought to acquire strength and to further Palestinian interests by working for the unity of the Arab states. Theirs was an ideological mindset, and with it went a stress on structured organization and party discipline. In later years the PFLP, which succeeded the ANM, shifted ideologically from pan-Arabism to Marxism but changed little in its political psychology and essential philosophy. Its leftist offshoot, the DFLP, diverged radically towards a pragmatic position on the national issue, but also professed faith in wider Arab (and international) alliances, this time on a class basis.

The divergences appeared clearly in Palestinian attitudes towards the Arab states. Most obvious, perhaps, was the fact that a majority of the Fateh leadership, who dominated the PLO, were outsiders when it came to the domestic

politics and society of Jordan and Lebanon, where the Palestinian state-within-a-state emerged. They tended towards a cautious, defensive posture in their relations with host governments, and sought to avoid confrontation while they pursued the armed struggle, state-building, and diplomacy. Fateh always held a special regard for Egypt, in part because Cairo made no attempt to subsume Palestinian identity or supplant the representative status of the guerrillas and the PLO. Fateh actively sought Egyptian support to counter-balance Syrian influence, underpin Arab solidarity, and, after 1974, gain a place in the peace process. The leftist groups, particularly the PFLP and DFLP, had bitter experience of the Jordanian and Lebanese authorities and advocated their overthrow in alliance with local political parties. They initially viewed Nasir as a 'big brother' but subsequently opposed Sadat's Egypt, and supported polarization of the Arab state system between 'progressives' and 'nationalists' on the one hand and 'conservatives' and 'reactionaries' on the other. The Palestinian Left also placed itself firmly in the pro-Soviet camp, whereas Fateh privately regarded the USSR merely as a tactical ally and worked covertly to obtain recognition from the US.

Yet despite the differences within the new leadership generation that rose to prominence in the late 1960s, the common denominator provided by nationalism gave rise to broadly similar attitudes towards organization, the role of ideology, and the function of knowledge. This set the Palestinian movement apart from many of its contemporaries in the Third World, and was itself due to a number of shared traits. One was the general lack of familiarity with Western culture and political thought—the interest of the ANM founders in European nationalist literature notwithstanding—and of firsthand knowledge of Western society and politics. This contrasted with the experience of such revolutionary leaders as Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Zhou Enlai in China, or even of the principal figures of the Algerian FLN, whose familiarity with the operational methods and organizational structures of communist parties and labour unions in France and elsewhere left a tangible imprint on the construction of their own movements.[19] The individuals who assumed command of the PLO in 1968–9 had considerable understanding of, and respect for, international politics—unlike their predecessors who, until the Young Turks revolution of 1908 forced a reappraisal of the longevity of Ottoman rule, had found it unnecessary to match the intimate knowledge of the Zionist movement of the centres of global power in Europe—but their approach to the conduct of politics and the creation of power was discursive, rather than instrumental.

The dominance of its nationalist ethos and the power of its statist ambition also meant that although a majority of this generation had benefited from a university education and many had gained their first experience of politics in Palestinian student associations, they did not form a student leadership in the manner of its contemporaries among the Marxist guerrilla movements of Latin America (for example). Hence the marginal role of social ideology and

the absence of a truly transformative programme. It followed that learning was accorded a notably low standing—whether because of the low epistemological status of memory, or of the dominance of 'pure' nationalist politics over socially informed reconstruction—and both eclecticism and improvisation became confirmed parts of political and organizational culture.[20] There was no equivalent to Mao Zedong's *Report from Xunwu*, the detailed account of village economy, society, politics, and culture painstakingly compiled during a year's residence in a Chinese hamlet, that laid the basis for the transformation of communist revolutionary strategy from the urban focus of the 1920s to the rural one of the 1930s and 1940s.[21] Nor was there a sweeping rectification campaign such as that conducted by the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1940s, at any stage in the Palestinian struggle. The underlying process of state-building placed political consolidation and control at a higher premium than social mobilization and transformation, while nationalism in turn legitimized the statist drive, even as the basic goals of liberation and independence remained unattained.

Internal Politics and Organization

Palestinian nationalism therefore remained at the core of the political programmes and ideologies of the main guerrilla groups, providing the glue that kept the PLO together in a complex and often hostile Arab environment. The major challenge facing the PLO leadership was to maintain national unity among disparate factions and scattered communities, and to do so in the face of constant intervention by one Arab state or another. This gave rise to the politics of consensus and the lowest common denominator rather than majority rule, since the outvoted group could seek external support and threaten the PLO's claim to be the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinians. Consensus politics granted disproportionate influence over decision-making to the smallest group so long as it had a seat on PLO bodies and, by extension, to the Arab state backers of proxy groups such as the Syrian-sponsored Saʿiqa and Iraqi-sponsored Arab Liberation Front. There was little incentive to deepen national unity with mergers, therefore, and less so as each group could lay claim to a share of PLO funds and appointments according to an agreed 'quota'.

At the same time, the nationalist emphasis of Palestinian politics and the reliance on the Arab states for material support had a fundamental impact on the social content of the struggle. The Palestinian Left may have employed Marxist-Leninist terminology and spoken in terms of class conflict after 1967, but in reality there was little social or economic analysis in its programmes. As was the case for the mainstream PLO leadership, the predominance of nationalist politics and the rapid emergence of a statist option, financed by Arab oil wealth, precluded a transformative project and instead encouraged *rentier* politics even on the Left. This was evident in the absence of any systematic

effort to construct a 'guerrilla economy' in Jordan in 1968–70 or in Lebanon in 1973–82; there was either insufficient awareness of the importance of extracting resources from society, or an excessive readiness to replace social mobilization with statist provision and relations based on rent. Attempts by guerrillas to join villagers in the harvest had little more than token propaganda value, while social projects in the refugee camps were geared towards attracting members and organizational aggrandizement and rarely sought income-generation seriously (let alone the creation of a tax base). Much the same occurred in the occupied territories, where social programmes and income-generating projects at grass-roots level proved to be entirely dependent on externally provided funds and dominated by political appointees. Social mobilization by the leftist groups, such as it was, ultimately operated to the same corporatist assumptions as those that guided Fateh policy towards the other PLO-affiliated mass organizations.

The influx of massive financial assistance from the Arab states in the late 1970s reinforced the trend towards rentier politics in the PLO and within each member group. Patronage on such a large scale had an integrating function in a scattered constituency and helped tie the occupied territories to the PLO, but ultimately it distorted the formulation of policy and impeded attainment of national goals. These patterns were typical of neopatrimonial state-building, but they also arose from the particular circumstances of Palestinian nationalism. The catastrophe of 1948 suspended the evolution of social and political organization. The result was to maintain the strength of primordial relationships based on family, clan, regional, and urban–rural cleavages, and to hinder the emergence of fundamentally new politics.[22] What change did occur was moreover influenced by models of political institutionalization and state-building in Arab host societies.

Additionally, physical dislocation and the sense of loss of identity encouraged an obsession with rhetoric, symbols, and discourse, and discouraged functional or instrumental organization. Fateh in particular avoided firm structure or 'practical ideology', believing that the essence of organization was 'constant motion'.[23] It was a movement, not a party, and movement meant 'continuous action, free of rigid organization, because it is the movement of a people not the movement of a [political group]'.[24] Fateh considered that Palestinian nationalism offered the broad framework within which all social classes and ideological currents could fit. It followed naturally that regional and clan- or family-based loyalties could be accommodated, as could elders, *mukhtars*, and other persons of traditional social standing in the refugee camps and in the villages and cities of the occupied territories. What emerged was a classic triangle of political leaders, bureaucrats, and societal leaders who bargained over political influence and mediated it, albeit in varying degrees from one social sector and geographical location to another.

There was little incentive for the Palestinian leadership to change behaviour, especially as the Palestinian national cause seemed to assure a constant flow of

recruits and funds. This seemed to be the lesson of the battle of Karama in March 1968, that generated thousands of volunteers for the guerrilla groups, and of the influx of massive financial assistance from various Arab states over the next two decades. An immediate consequence was to reinforce autocratic leadership and reduce accountability, whether political, military, or financial. The generation that took control of the PLO in early 1969 proved to be remarkably durable, with virtually no change in its principal personalities in the next quarter of a century. The leaders of the various guerrilla groups clung jealously to their positions, with only minor exceptions, and even in the second echelon changes mainly involved rotation within a very small circle of individuals. Evaluation of performance and learning from experience were uncommon or superficial as a result, not least in Fateh and the Fateh-dominated PLO. Even in the military sphere the duplication of effort between the guerrilla groups, jealous preservation of organizational autonomy, and lack of standardization of training and tactics was striking. Another consequence was to undermine grass-roots mobilization and organization, as the proliferation of paramilitary agencies and payrolls weakened voluntarism and bureaucratized the mass base. Palestinian trade unions and social associations became extensions of political factions, led by salaried apparatchiks, in typical corporatist fashion.

Arafat, more than anyone else, personified this system. A uniquely ambitious and self-promoting character, he had virtually hijacked Fateh in 1965 by taking field command of its motley guerrilla wing. He defeated challenges to his position in the next two years by precipitating showdowns, launching himself into abortive missions that landed him in Arab jails, and finally by entering the West Bank to lead the attempted insurrection against Israeli occupation after June 1967. His preference to avoid confrontations with Arab governments was balanced by his eagerness to play power-broker, in the hope of weakening his hosts and protecting the Palestinian movement from repression. Similarly, his obsession with independence from Arab control was matched by his willingness to strike deals and offer various governments a degree of influence, giving them a stake while jealously retaining ultimate decision-making power in his own hands. When cornered, his response was to 'escape by running forwards'. Arafat was largely successful in holding the fractious Palestinian guerrilla movement together, and in weaving a tortuous course through the perils of Arab politics.

Certainly Arafat succeeded in maintaining his personal control, and in prodding an often reluctant PLO to accept a diplomatic strategy that he did much to develop. His initial means was to use the dominant position of Fateh to take over the PLO and assert it as the central Palestinian decision-making body. Once secure, he used his position as PLO chairman and commander-in-chief to weaken and disperse potential rivals in Fateh. He had already embarked on a policy of creating numerous, parallel agencies and departments within Fateh as a means of fragmenting rival power bases and reinforcing his own control, and subsequently did the same within the PLO. The pattern differed little even in

the Palestinian military, where Arafat was not disturbed by the lack of cohesion nor averse to the emergence of fiefdoms, so long as they were subject to his ultimate control. He also created several, redundant security agencies in order to weaken rivals and reward loyal officers. In all cases, Arafat worked most avidly to tighten his grip on the military, finances, and senior organizational appointments.

Arafat deeply distrusted the organized mass base, and indeed any structure or institution that might dilute his power or hinder his policy. He actively marginalized Fateh civilian branches and PLO-affiliated trade unions and social associations, whether by shuffling their senior cadres around, backing rival factions and allowing parallel bodies to emerge, or assigning salaried officials to head them. To maintain a semblance of unity and ensure his overall control, he resorted consistently to populist nationalist slogans, of which arguably the most effective and long-lasting was the commitment to 'the independent Palestinian decision', which he employed both to resist Arab political intervention and to polarize internal Palestinian politics. Arafat was not unlike many Arab leaders in wishing to lead the masses without the impediments of intermediate bodies such as political parties or highly structured mass organizations. The negative consequence, however, was to leave a widening circle within the mass constituency that lacked established organizational channels through which to participate in national politics. Ultimately, unincorporation was to leave a sizeable margin for the operation of other political forces, most notably the Islamists. In these various respects he followed the example of other Arab leaders, with much the same consequences. The fundamental difference was, however, that he did not head a sovereign state or command a national economy, and so his neopatrimonial style of management and manipulative politics were both dysfunctional and self-defeating.

The Revolution and After

The major evolution of the Palestinian political system took place after the expulsion from Jordan in 1970–1. The armed struggle had reached its apogee in the previous two years, at least in rhetorical terms, as the entire national movement enthusiastically espoused the terminology of guerrilla war and people's war. Several groups refused to come under the Fateh-dominated PLO umbrella, regarding the PLO as a creature of Arab state interests and a bureaucratic trap. They saw the guerrilla movement as the more authentic representative of the mass base and of grass-roots militancy. Even in their heyday, however, the guerrillas had numbered fewer than 10,000 and their attacks against Israel were already declining in effectiveness. More to the point, the guerrillas were patently unable to trigger the wider conflict or social revolution that would draw millions of their Arab compatriots into a tidal wave of people's war against Israel. The Arab governments had recovered since the debacle of

June 1967 and were actively rebuilding their systems of population control. Ongoing changes in local societies and economies reinforced the Arab national state and reduced the vulnerability of political systems to the appeals of Palestine and pan-Arabism.

The limitations of the Palestinian armed struggle did not become obvious until the eruption of civil war in Jordan in September 1970. The defeat of the guerrillas owed much to their own political and organizational failings, but above all it revealed starkly the real balance of power in the region and demonstrated the divergence between Arab state interests and any political movement, Palestinian or otherwise, that would radically challenge the status quo. It was the leftist guerrilla groups that had adopted the most extreme slogans and aims, and so it was natural that the outcome of the Jordanian conflict should have dealt them a particularly severe blow. The PFLP was not to recover for several years, while the DFLP reacted by crossing the Palestinian floor to take a leading position in the pragmatic camp. The balloon had been pricked, and the remaining guerrilla groups dwindled or disappeared, among them the extensions of the Syrian and Iraqi wings of the Baʿth Party. The phase of revolutionary *élan* and fervour was over, giving way to a period of intense ideological and organizational flux that was eventually resolved with the transition into a phase that can best be described as post-revolutionary state-building. The Palestinians had yet to attain a minimum of their territorial goals, and so nationalism remained a potent force that moreover required further conduct of armed struggle, but the statist ambition now clearly dominated the political agenda even if the PLO remained patently lacking in most attributes of the sovereign state.

The defeat in Jordan had three significant consequences. First, Fateh emerged from the conflict as the undisputed leader of the Palestinian national movement. From then on it held the decisive say in all political and military matters, constrained only by its own internal divisions and, crucially, by the ability of its rivals to form coalitions with outside parties. Second, Fateh exploited the discomfit of the leftist groups to assert the PLO as the common arena of Palestinian politics and central decision-making body, a process driven above all by Arafat. There was now one Palestinian national institution, in which identity and entity were fused. This was best expressed by the relaunch of the PLO official weekly in 1972 under the title of *Filastin al-Thawra* (Palestine the Revolution); Fateh had appropriated the right to define the meaning of revolution, imbuing it with a clear statist content that prompted many in the rank-and-file to nickname the weekly *Filastin al-Dawla* (Palestine the State). Finally, references to guerrilla war and people's war all but disappeared from official Palestinian rhetoric, despite continued commitment to armed struggle.

The absence of new formulations of military doctrine revealed a strategic predicament, if not an implicit admission that the grand design of destroying Israel and liberating Palestine by force was unachievable. Armed struggle had

not outlived its purpose, however. The Fateh leadership employed military means to gain a breathing space and assert its internal control in the wake of the expulsion from Jordan. In the first instance it embarked on a two-year foray into international terrorism in order to disguise its predicament from outside enemies and regain the strategic initiative. Its second concern was to contain internal dissent and rebuild military strength, and so it ordered a reorganization of guerrilla forces along semi-conventional lines and commenced acquisition of heavy weapons. Both efforts proved successful, placing the Fateh-dominated PLO in position to exploit the new political opportunities offered by the Arab–Israeli war of October 1973.

The October war marked a major turning point in the evolution of the Palestinian armed struggle. The Arab states had taken the military offensive to break the diplomatic deadlock and improve their bargaining position in an eventual peace settlement with Israel. The war confirmed the limits of Arab military power and political will, but at the same time indicated the potential of a negotiating strategy backed by the use of force and the manipulation of regional and international alliances. Total liberation of Palestine remained an impossibility, but the pragmatic wing in the PLO leadership was quick to seize the opportunity that beckoned to achieve more modest goals. The 'national authority' programme approved by the PNC in June 1974 represented implicit acceptance of a negotiated settlement that would lead to the creation of a small Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and to recognition of Israel. Acknowledgement (in one form or another) of the PLO as sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians by the Arab states, Non-Aligned Movement, other Third World groupings, and the Soviet bloc cemented the shift in strategy, as did the invitation to Arafat to address the UN General Assembly.

The armed struggle had successfully reforged national identity and given substance to the PLO as the representative entity of the Palestinians. Consequently its function now changed. Military action became one of several instruments of policy serving a broader diplomatic strategy. On the one hand, suicide raids against Israel from the sea or across Arab borders and sabotage attacks by clandestine cells in the occupied territories were intended to demonstrate PLO presence. The purpose was twofold: to 'spoil' political initiatives that excluded the Palestinians, such as the shuttle diplomacy of US secretary-of-state Henry Kissinger in 1974–5, and to persuade the US and Israel of the necessity of bringing the PLO into the peace process. On the other hand, the development of Palestinian forces in Lebanon was intended to protect the statist entity from attack, reinforce its political credibility, and enhance its diplomatic strategy. This was especially obvious after the Lebanese civil war of 1975–6, as the Palestinian state-within-the-state took full shape. Lebanon had become the base from which pressure would be maintained against Israel, and at the same time allowed the PLO to present itself virtually as a state actor. The role of armed struggle was now to preserve this status and shield the internal processes of Palestinian state-building, even if they took place in exile.

Not everyone agreed with the new direction of PLO strategy, which indeed contained contradictory elements. The Palestinian 'rejectionists', headed by the PFLP and backed by Iraq and Libya, were adamantly opposed to the PNC's national authority programme of 1974 and to any process, diplomatic or otherwise, that would lead to recognition of Israel. The DFLP had led the way to acceptance of the 'phased' strategy, but opposed attempts by Fateh to build an axis with 'reactionary' Egypt and Saudi Arabia and start a dialogue with the US. It argued, along with others in the pragmatic camp such as the Syrian-sponsored Saʿiqa and the Palestinian communists, that the PLO should only negotiate from a position of strength provided by a strategic alliance with 'progressive' Arab states and the Soviet bloc. Distrust of Arafat and Fateh reached new depths following the visit of Egyptian president Sadat to Jerusalem in November 1977 and the launch of the talks that led to the signing of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty in March 1979. The result was the emergence of an unprecedented coalition between all the other Palestinian groups, Libya, Syria, Iraq, and, tacitly, the USSR. Each of the Arab states had its own reasons for disliking independent Palestinian diplomacy, especially if it entailed Egyptian and US mediation and led to another separate peace deal with Israel. For its part the Palestinian opposition was at its highpoint, and entertained exaggerated notions of its own strength and of the cohesion of its regional and international alliances. It was strong enough to play a spoiling role within the PLO, but manifestly unable to offer a strategy that differed fundamentally from that of Fateh or to develop the armed struggle against Israel.

The irony was that the PLO also reached a historic highpoint in this period. Its position in Lebanon was secure, despite growing internal challenges, and its military build-up was at a peak. The political support it enjoyed in the occupied territories, coupled with the continuing armed activity of its clandestine cells, reinforced its claim to be the central Palestinian representative. The PLO demonstrated its military capability during confrontations with Israeli forces in south Lebanon in March 1978 and July 1981, and displayed its diplomatic potential by negotiating ceasefires through the UN and, indirectly, the US. It developed working relations with several European countries in the late 1970s, and won official recognition from the European Community in June 1980 as an essential party in the peace process. The PLO had received sharply increased financial assistance from the Arab states since the Baghdad summit conference in November 1978, and this, coupled with the extension of its political institutions into the occupied territories and the worldwide expansion of its diplomatic activity, effectively turned it from merely a state-within-the-state in Lebanon into a far-flung state-in-exile. Arafat sought determinedly to capitalize on the PLO's stature in order to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. He had tried as early as summer 1977 to win PLO backing for acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 242, that implied acceptance of Israel, and later tried to keep open lines of communication with Egypt. He was unable to sway his partners in the PLO and was compelled to retract, at least publicly, under

pressure from the Palestinian opposition, Fateh dissenters, and his Arab allies in the steadfastness front.

Opportunities and constraints were finely balanced for the PLO at the beginning of the 1980s. It had reached the limit of its ability to bring military pressure to bear on Israel from its base in Lebanon or inside the occupied territories. Conversely, it was coming under increasing attack from Israel and the Lebanese Maronite Right, while its former alliances with the Shiʿite Amal militia, Lebanese National Movement, and Syria were crumbling. The PLO's diplomatic strategy had reached its limits, and was now marking time. The predicament was reflected in the popularity of the thesis formulated by Palestinian researcher Nazih Qura, who argued that structural contradictions doomed Israel to decline and destruction from within.[25] A parallel thesis was that Israel faced a demographic time bomb, as the substantial difference in birth rates would eventually turn the Arab citizens in Israel from the minority into the majority, displacing the Jews. The appeal of this quasi-scientific, deterministic thinking was reflected in its adoption by Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan, who saw the 'suicide' of Israel as a serious possibility.[26]

Even had they been anything more than pipe dreams, the fulfilment of these scenarios for the incremental, structurally ordained demise of Israel lay far in the future. The dilemma facing the PLO at the beginning of the 1980s was acute: its limited armed struggle was insufficient to compel Israeli withdrawal and impose establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, but it remained unwilling to accept the offer made in the Camp David accords for a transitional period of Palestinian autonomy to be followed by negotiation of a permanent settlement with Israel. Arafat and his close colleagues still sought discreetly to join the US-sponsored peace process, hoping to improve terms once they were accepted as partners, but the PLO state-within-the-state in Lebanon was too vulnerable to counter-measures by their suspicious allies for them to take this step. The government of Israeli prime minister Menahem Begin would probably have refused to pursue the autonomy talks had the PLO come to the table, but in any case the Fateh leadership was more interested in striving for a dialogue with the US that, it believed, would allow it to change the negotiating agenda to discussion of Palestinian statehood.[27] The PLO was trapped between these contending aims, but still came close to achieving a breakthrough by 1982. So close, indeed, that the Israeli government launched the invasion of Lebanon in order to pre-empt negotiations that might eventually lead to Palestinian statehood.[28]

Dysfunctional Success

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut in summer 1982 effectively ended the Palestinian armed struggle and severely

constrained the process of state-building. The Palestinian leadership continued to organize armed activity against Israel from its new places of exile, maintained its civilian institutions, and pursued its diplomatic strategy, but military action was no longer the only source of national identity nor the main underlying dynamic of state-building. The problem for the PLO was that it lacked other instruments of policy, other means of constructing its state-in-the-making. Without an autonomous territorial base, the PLO was reduced to little more than a structure for political management from afar, for which it was patently ill-suited. So long as the state-in-exile in Lebanon had existed, the leadership was able to divert energies into military and bureaucratic development and to co-opt various constituencies, whether by creating new institutions and power bases or by dispensing patronage of one sort or another. The loss of this cushioning effect left it heavily dependent on the performance of administrative structures, paramilitary agencies, civilian branches, and affiliated social institutions that were not only dispersed geographically, but that were also fragmented, factionalized, and bureaucratized—when they were not frankly corrupted—by the spread of rentier politics and patronage.

To the extent that it was a problem of internal politics and organization, the structural predicament of the PLO was a direct result of the combination of populism, nationalism, and neopatrimonialism. These were enduring features of the Palestinian struggle partly because the principal guerrilla groups had not undertaken a serious attempt to transform their society at any point, and partly because of the domination, at first implicit and then explicit, of the state-building drive from the earliest stages. The ambition of forming a national state might have been a modern construct in historic terms, but although nationalist movements 'give their members a sense of identity in the world, [they] do not furnish them with rational instruments for action. Nationalistic movements, therefore, tend to be eclectic or old-fashioned in their organizational methods. Though these organizational methods often suffice to create and use organization, they are not constituted into a body of practical ideology, such as is the case with Communist movements. This, in many instances, has led to serious organizational weakness and political instability.'[29] Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan, who described Palestinian disorganization acerbically as 'a genius for failure', decried the resistance to teamwork and contingency planning, tendency to adversarial internal relations and patron–client relations, distrust of information from any but subservient sources, and disinclination to subject information to analytical processing. The Palestinians leaned towards 'monopoly, arrogance, suspicion, and accusation, and so towards chaos, confusion, ignorance, failure, defeats, and further repression, jails, and intellectual and mental blockage'.[30]

If any one man was the principal driving force behind this system, then it was indisputably Arafat. His obsessive drive for control led him to distrust, and actively fragment, any organizational structure or institution that could

possibly challenge his decisions or impede his policy directions. This trend intensified in the wake of the evacuation from Beirut. Many members of the Palestinian leadership and senior officials were already marginalized, having lost their power bases in Lebanon, and Arafat now sought to weaken remaining colleagues and potential rivals. He concentrated formal authority for a growing number of departments and programmes in his own hands, merging the military and finance sections of Fateh and the PLO on the one hand, and duplicating agencies that had not yet come under his control on the other (such as Wazir's Western Sector). Arafat fragmented organizational structures and channels still further, relying instead on increased distribution of patronage to maintain his personal control.

These methods of control were insufficient for the requirements of political management, however. Arafat still needed to bind the PLO apparatus and the wider Palestinian constituency to his diplomatic strategy, and to neutralize the Palestinian opposition based in Damascus. It was in this context that he relentlessly waged the feud with Syria between 1983 and 1987, leaving his senior colleagues and the rank-and-file with little choice but to back 'the independent Palestinian decision' and, in effect, to acquiesce grudgingly in his concentration of power and diplomatic manoeuvres. Arafat repeated this Machiavellian approach during the war of the camps in Lebanon, at times deliberately instigating clashes or escalating the conflict. He did this as a means both of embarrassing and discrediting his Palestinian opponents and of garnering international sympathy for the PLO cause. Arafat reinforced this approach by using the continuing flow of funds to political supporters, clandestine networks, media outlets, and social institutions in the occupied territories to consolidate his local constituency. Yet much as 'haj' Amin al-Husayni had done during the years of his exile from mandate Palestine—forbidding his associates in the Arab Higher Committee from rebuilding political parties, social associations, or military organizations during the 1940s and from conducting political negotiations about the future of the country with the British authorities in his absence in 1947, lest they sideline and supplant him—Arafat also worked obsessively to prevent the emergence of a distinct local leadership in the occupied territories, even one loyal to the PLO.

The return of the main opposition groups to the PLO fold at the unity session of the PNC in April 1987 gave concrete evidence of Arafat's success in reconfirming his leadership over the Palestinian movement as a whole. He still lacked the means to exert pressure against Israel or impose the PLO as a party to negotiations on terms acceptable to the Palestinians, however. The eruption of the intifada in the occupied territories in December 1987 provided sudden salvation, as Arafat employed the popular uprising to rebuild the political fortunes of the PLO and secure the acceptance of his coalition partners for a two-state solution to the conflict and recognition of Israel. Sensing a realistic chance to secure a place in the peace process, the Palestinians were at last pressing a limited territorial gain as 'a policy option rather than an ideological

imperative'.[31] The intifada, more than anything else, revealed the shortcomings of PLO management in general and Arafat's style of leadership in particular. The ability of the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza to persevere in the uprising after its spontaneous start was due to the extensive experience of clandestine activity acquired over the years and to the construction of mass organizations by Fateh, the PFLP, DFLP, and communists, and, latterly, the Islamists. Wazir was the person most responsible for this process within Fateh, and arguably within the PLO as a whole, yet Arafat had devoted considerable effort during the 1980s to weakening him. Arafat did this by reducing Wazir's budget, poaching his senior lieutenants, constructing parallel command committees, and excluding him from official PLO posts and delegations.

The assassination of Wazir by Israeli commandos in April 1988 left Arafat in sole control of Fateh and PLO relations with the occupied territories. Wazir had used patronage to secure the loyalty to the PLO of specific social groups, such as teachers or workers, but did so relatively sparingly and usually directed it towards established institutions, professional associations, or non-governmental organizations. This was common among the leftist groups as well, albeit on a more modest scale and with greater internal accountability. Arafat, conversely, distributed funds freely to individuals in all spheres and areas and encouraged the emergence of a large and uncoordinated network of beneficiaries who reported directly to him. The reasonably unified clandestine organization and the more centralized youth movements and semi-public associations that Wazir had painstakingly constructed in the shadow of the Israeli occupation fragmented rapidly into competing factions and cliques under the impact of Arafat's patronage. A similar proliferation of parallel institutions and redundant committees occurred among Palestinian non-governmental organizations engaged in community work or other social, economic, and educational activities in the occupied territories. The adverse effects were reinforced by the unrelenting factionalism of the rival guerrilla groups, and help to explain why the inside–outside dichotomy was not reflected in organizational form, that is, in the establishment of political organizations whose main membership and constituency were in the occupied territories—the PCP being a minor exception, and Hamas representing a more serious one only in the twilight of the era of the exile-based *fasa'il*.

Arafat may have proved himself to be a consummate and indefatigable politician, one able to construct a system of political control and to operate rent on an extensive scale, but these patterns revealed his inability to build institutions of state. Whether upon assuming leadership of the PLO in 1969 or of the intifada in 1988, he inherited existing structures created by others. These he had then fragmented and duplicated to an astonishing degree, reshaping their form and function to his purpose. The assassination of PLO and Fateh security chiefs Salah Khalaf and Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid in January 1991 offered a case in point, as it left Arafat in sole control of their former agencies, which all but disintegrated

as he transferred what remained of their functions to officers within his own coterie and left only their shells in the hands of powerless committees. A degree of neopatrimonial organization and politics was perhaps inevitable, even effective, in a national movement compelled both to operate from exile and to integrate a far-flung population. This was especially so when the rank-and-file was subject to the competing pulls of rival Arab host governments or tempted by the prospects of employment in local economies. Yet neopatrimonial politics were taken to excessive lengths in the Palestinian case, seriously impairing the ability of the PLO leadership to implement policy or attain goals even when these had been clearly formulated or a major threat loomed.

These limitations were brought dramatically to the fore by the Gulf war, which brought to an abrupt end the prolonged rearguard action that the PLO had waged to maintain its role as an autonomous regional actor and credible diplomatic interlocutor since the loss of its state-in-exile in Lebanon in summer 1982. The polarization of Arab regional politics throughout the 1980s, the paralysis of the USSR in 1982–5 and the application of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' to the Arab–Israeli conflict in following years, and the parallel decline of the Non-Aligned Movement and similar Third World groupings deprived the PLO of the principal pillars of its diplomatic strategy. The intifada had delivered a critical boost in 1988, but the survival of the PLO as a credible political force was ultimately due to its success in appropriating nationalist legitimacy and its adeptness at turning the uprising to its purpose. However, statist political institutionalization and the employment of neopatrimonial politics in what had become the PLO's key social constituency, the occupied territories, had equally contributed to the decline of its organizational capacity and inability to retain the diplomatic initiative in 1989–90.

The PLO had traced a course similar in its broad patterns to that of state-building in neighbouring Arab countries, and suffered a parallel structural crisis during the 1980s as the influx of funds from oil-rich Arab economies and the strategic support of external powers, especially the USSR, declined. There were of course fundamental discrepancies between the PLO and the sovereign Arab territorial states in terms of attributes, capabilities, and resources—that were highlighted by the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut in 1982—but it was hardly accidental for the statist PLO structure to come under severe strain at the same time as the governments of many Arab and East European states in the closing days of the Cold War. Submission to US and Israeli terms for Palestinian participation in the Middle East peace talks in 1991 reflected this structural predicament, as well as confirming the demise of the armed struggle. The irony was that superpower rivalry had prevented the PLO from reaping the diplomatic rewards of political moderation when it enjoyed more favourable strategic circumstances, but the end of the Cold War left it too weak to refuse the terms of reference for the Madrid peace conference. Yet had the PLO not seized the opening it would not only have sealed its fate as a viable political organiza-

tion, but would probably also have delayed the Palestinian statist enterprise for at least a generation.

The episode that followed the end of the Cold War and the Gulf war showed the extent to which the course taken by the Palestinian national movement since the mid-1960s was affected by the unique character of Arafat. By the time that he concluded the Oslo accord with Israeli prime minister Rabin in September 1993, his political control was so personalized that Palestinian politics had become almost wholly subservient to his sense of timing, temperament, and choice of priorities and methods. The consequences for the Palestinian national movement of his errors of judgement, such as the decision to escalate the conflict with Syria in Lebanon in 1976 or to back Iraq during the Gulf crisis, were magnified as a result of this symbiosis between leader and cause. Conversely, Arafat's instinctive grasp of the direction of change in the Soviet Union and the international system led him to make the timely concessions in 1988 and 1991 that assured the PLO of a continued place in regional politics and a role in the Arab–Israeli peace process. This is by no means to suggest that he was a completely free agent—by signalling a transition in the methods and organization of the national struggle, the intifada compelled him to accept the conclusive relocation of its geographic centre and, consequently, to acknowledge the decisive shift in political constituency from the diaspora to the occupied territories, a fact reflected and fundamentally entrenched in the Oslo accord—but rather to emphasize his ability continuously to adapt, co-opt, and control through statist political institutionalization and neopatrimonial bureaucratic management.

Arafat succeeded, but he did so in a manner that exaggerated the material costs to his people at virtually every stage. His jealous grip on power and reliance on planned corruption prevented rational planning, minimized learning and accumulation of experience, and impeded coordination of resources. The result was to reduce the political utility of sacrifices and strategic opportunities, and ultimately to bring diminishing returns. Just how much of the bloodshed after the start of the Camp David process at the end of 1978, or at least after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, was unavoidable is a moot point. The PLO under Arafat finally accepted limited autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza at a moment when fundamental changes in states and societies throughout the Middle East threatened to relegate the Palestine cause to the back of domestic, regional, and international concerns. The armed struggle probably could have achieved no more, at any time, than the offer of transitional autonomy made in 1978. It is unlikely that better organization and a different style of politics and leadership could have altered the outcome in any fundamental way, given the objective reality of divergent Arab priorities, Israeli power, Soviet diffidence, and US hostility. There can be no doubt that the final gains, however modest, were purchased at tremendous cost to the Palestinians and their Arab hosts. Their eventual success in establishing an autonomous

entity in the West Bank and Gaza was partly due to Arafat, and partly in spite of him. The armed struggle had taken the Palestinians this far, but the future of their attempt to build a sovereign state amidst severe external constraints would depend largely on their success in transforming their internal politics and organizational dynamics.

NOTES

Preface

1. Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State-Making', in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, 1975), 70.
2. Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, 1988), 19.
3. Theda Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, 1985), 21.
4. Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Cambridge, 1990), 20.
5. Adeed Dawisha and I. William Zartman (eds.), *Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State* (London, 1988), 8 and 9.
6. Notion from Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge, 1979), 165.
7. John Waterbury, *Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey* (Cambridge, 1993), 31.
8. Migdal, *Strong Societies, Weak States*, 19.
9. This draws on Ian Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza* (Ithaca and London, 1993), 141.
10. Notion from Vivienne Shue, 'State Power and Social Organization in China', in Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge, 1994), 70.
11. Migdal, *Strong Societies, Weak States*, 136.
12. A point made in reference to post-1952 Egypt in Raymond Hinnebusch, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State* (Cambridge, 1985), 2.
13. Idea from Timothy Luke, cited in Alexander Murphy, 'The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge, 1996), 109.
14. On importance of international context, Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge, 1994), 288.
15. Point about internal advantage made in Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 31.
16. This argument is developed in Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge, 1990).
17. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, 1983), 1.

18. Jan Penrose, 'Essential Constructions? The "Cultural Bases" of Nationalist Movements', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1/iii (November 1995), 406–7.
19. Good examples of opposing views of Palestinian nationalism are Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian–Arab National Movement 1918–1929* (London, 1974); id., *The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion*, ii. *1929–1939* (London, 1977); and Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York, 1988).
20. This draws on Jan Blommaert, 'Language and Nationalism: Comparing Flanders and Tanzania', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2/ii. (July 1996), 237.
21. C. Ernest Dawn, 'The Origins of Arab Nationalism', in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva Simon (eds), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism*, New York, 1991, 8.
22. On these notions of collectivity and ethnicity, Denis-Constant Martin, 'The Choices of Identity', *Social Identities*, 1: 1 (1995), 10–11 and 12–13; and John Rex, 'Ethnic Identity and the Nation State: The Political Sociology of Multi-Cultural Societies', ibid. 26. The interpretation of latent collectivity as the basis for a distinct national or ethnic identity has echoes in the view expressed in May 1992 by Khalid al-Hasan, a senior PLO official and leading Fateh thinker. Speaking to an audience of Palestinian-Americans and Arab-Americans on the concept of homeland and belonging, he argued that 'the homeland is not simply a home and money, nor mountains and trees. These are all material things that remind us of the homeland, but it is larger than all these, it is something human. The homeland is about citizenship not nationality, for nationality is a racist term derived from the European heritage . . . that confines belonging to the homeland in belonging to a specific human race. But for us homeland is citizenship and societal relations. What does this mean? It means that the homeland is not only the place in which a human group (that we call a people) lives, or in which the food and drink which are the needs of the individual's life are provided, but also that it is the outcome of the daily societal life of that people, including the daily relations between its members according to specific social laws, standards, and values'. Text of speech in *Conversations and Articles about the (US–Israeli–Palestinian) Negotiating Process to the 'Gaza–Jericho First Agreement'* (Arab.) (Political Papers No. 18; Amman, 1994), 144–5.
23. Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1990), 46.
24. I owe these notions to Ilan Pappé.
25. The terminology is additionally complicated when Islamic interpretations and concepts are involved. A case in point is *umma*, which may be translated as 'community' (of believers) or, in secular usage, as nation. This often gives rise to fluidity and interchangeability, as shown in Richard P. Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (New York, 1969), 264–7 and 269.
26. On the national state, Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992*, rev. edn. (Oxford, 1992), 2–3.

27. Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986; 1995 reprint), 166.
28. A sample list of different types of territorial and ethnic nationalism is in Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London, 1991), 82–3.

Introduction: A Historical Framework

1. Rashid Khalidi, 'Palestinian Peasant Resistance to Zionism before World War I', in Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens (eds.), *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question* (London, 1988), 207–34.
2. Yehoshua Porath, *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1918–1929* (London, 1974), 26–9.
3. Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (Cambridge, 1987), 23–8. Also Nur Masalha, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Washington, DC, 1992).
4. A study of the Qassam movement is ʿAli Husayn Khalaf, *The Experience of Sheikh ʿIz-al-Din al-Qassam* (Arab.), Part 1 (Amman, 1984).
5. Zachary Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley, 1996), 366.
6. Ted Swedenberg, 'The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936–1939)', in Edmund Burke, III, and Ira M. Lapidus (eds.), *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements* (Berkeley, 1988), 170.
7. Figures based on official British records, Yusef Rajab al-Rudayʿi, *The 1936 Revolt in Palestine: A Military Study* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1983); and from Walid Khalidi, *From Haven to Conquest* (Beirut, 1971), 848–9.
8. Bayan Nuwayhid al-Hut, *The Political Leaderships and Institutions in Palestine, 1917–1948*, 3rd edn. (Arab.) (Beirut, 1986), 400–8. Figure of 40,000 refugees from Morris, *The Birth*, 57. On internecine violence, Porath, *Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 251–8.
9. Simha Flapan, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities* (New York, 1987), 32.
10. An excellent account is Joseph Nevo, 'The Arabs of Palestine 1947–48: Military and Political Activity', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 23: 1 (January 1987).
11. Michael Mazur, *Economic Growth and Development in Jordan* (London, 1979), 8–9; and Sarah Roy, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development* (Washington, DC, 1995), 79.
12. UNRWA, *A Brief History, 1950–1982* (Vienna, n.d.).
13. Ann Mosely Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement* (Ithaca, NY, 1979), 25–6.
14. Ibid. 35 and 39.
15. Administration Report 1920–1925, *Palestine and Transjordan Administrative Reports*, ii (Oxford, 1995), 47–8. Cited in Yossi Nevo, 'Arab Society and Leadership in Mandatory Palestine', unpublished paper, 3.

16. Deborah S. Bernstein, 'Expanding the Split Labor Market Theory: Between and Within Sectors of the Split Labor Market of Mandatory Palestine', *Comparative Studies in Society* and *History*, 38: 2 (April 1996), 252.
17. Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London, 1992), 19.
18. The notion of 'social control', denoting the power and capabilities of states to ensure compliance by populations with their policies, is taken from Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton, 1988), 22–3.
19. Ibid. 147–8 and 155–6.
20. Ibid. 151.
21. Hut, *Political Leaderships*, 166–7.
22. Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Hussaini: Founder of the Palestinian National Movement* (London, 1993), 9–10 and 12–13.
23. Notions of 'older politicians' and 'younger politicians' from Muhammad Muslih, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York, 1988).
24. Avi Shlaim, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (Oxford, 1988), 62.
25. Porath, *Palestinian Arab National Movement*, 292–3.
26. Notion borrowed from Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 33.
27. Hut, *Political Leaderships*, 253.
28. Ibid. 302.
29. Ibid. 470.
30. May Seikaly, *Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918–1939* (London, 1995), 116.
31. Role of nationalist appeal noted in Issa Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948* (Albany, NY, 1991), 59–60.
32. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 57 and 63–4; and Joel Migdal, 'The Effects of Regime Policies on Social Cohesion and Fragmentation', in Joel Migdal *et al.*, *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton, 1980), 35.
33. Notion of 'state-patriotism' from Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1990), 90.
34. This point is made for post-1948 in Laurie A. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State* (New York, 1988), 11.
35. Quote from Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 73.
36. Hut, *Political Leaderships*, 95.
37. Lesch, *Arab Politics*, 120–1.
38. An arguably more conventional view is taken in Adnan Abu-Ghazaleh, *Palestinian Arab Cultural Nationalism* (Brattleboro, Vt., 1991).
39. Distinction based on Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 93.
40. Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 173.
41. Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (pbk. edn.; New York, 1973), 211 and 217.
42. Ibid. 221–2.

43. The decision in 1966 by the director of the PLO Research Centre, Anis Sayigh, to conduct academic research on Israeli society, economy, polity, and international relations and to disseminate the results in public, the first time an Arab institution had done so, represented a direct challenge to prevailing attitudes and broke an important psychological barrier.
44. Notion adapted from Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, 6.
45. Barry Rubin, *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict* (Syracuse, NY, 1981), 236.
46. 'Philosophy of the Revolution, 1952', in E. S. Farag (ed.), *Nasir Speaks: Basic Documents* (London, 1972), 18 and 49. Cited in Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 43.
47. Avi Shlaim, 'Husni Zaʿim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 15: 4 (60) (Summer 1986), 73.
48. Itamar Rabinovich, *The Road Not Taken: Early Arab–Israeli Negotiations* (New York, 1991), 21.
49. Shlaim, *Collusion*, 484–7.
50. Michael Oren, 'Secret Egypt–Israel Peace Initiatives Prior to the Suez Campaign', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 26: 3 (July 1990), 351–70. Avi Shlaim, 'The Lavon Affair', *Middle East International*, 76 (October 1977), 12.
51. Edde–Weizmann meeting cited in Tabitha Petran, *The Struggle over Lebanon* (New York, 1987), 43. The Maronite–Zionist agreement is noted in Rabinovich, *Road Not Taken*, 43.
52. Shlaim, *Collusion*, 33–4. On 1951, Mary Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (Cambridge, 1987), 207.
53. Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics (1945–1958)* (London, 1965), 73.
54. Shlaim, *Collusion*, 608.
55. A critique of the literature on Middle East balancing politics is Laurie Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making* (New York, 1994), ch. 1. Also on the role of domestic inputs, Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, 'Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73', *International Organization*, 45: 3 (Summer 1991), 369–95; and Michael Barnett, 'High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967–1977', *World Politics*, 42: 4 (July 1990), 529–62.
56. Hut, *Political Leaderships*, 612–13. An interesting historical footnote to the Army of Holy War is that several of its commanders—including ʿAbd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, Hasan Salama, and ʿAbd-al-Rahim Mahmud—had graduated from the military academy in Baghdad in 1940 thanks to the special ties between Amin al-Husayni and the Iraqi government. The former mufti also arranged training in Germany during World War Two for a number of Palestinians and other Arabs, some of whom later served in the Army of Holy War and the Algerian National Liberation Army. *Filastin*, Higher Arab Committee for Palestine, Year 5, No. 48 (1 January 1965), 30.
57. Avi Shlaim, 'The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20: 1 (77) (Autumn 1990), 38.

58. Philip Mattar, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement* (New York, 1988), 130.
59. Samih Shbib, *The All Palestine Government: Preliminaries and Results* (Arab.) (Nicosia, 1988), 35–6.
60. Ilan Pappé, *Britain and the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1951* (London, 1988), 83.
61. Mattar, *Mufti of Jerusalem*, 130.
62. Shbib, *All Palestine Government*, 41–6.
63. Shlaim, 'Rise and Fall', 42.
64. Wilson, *King Abdullah*, 180.
65. Shlaim, 'Rise and Fall', 40.
66. Ibid. 48–9.
67. Peter Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (London, 1983), 85–6.
68. Shlaim, *Collusion*, 618.
69. Michael Cohen, *Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945–48* (Princeton, 1982), 113.
70. Quote from Anglo-American report of April 1946, cited in ibid. 105.
71. Ibid. 354–66.
72. Ibid. 346–9.
73. Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev* (Cambridge, 1990), 35.
74. Ibid. 37.
75. Shlaim, *Collusion*, 611.
76. Paul Jabber, *Not by War Alone: Security and Arms Control in the Middle East* (Berkeley, 1981), 160.
77. Quote from Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY, 1983), 48.
78. Framework developed in Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 223–33.
79. Owen, *State, Power and Politics*, 4.
80. Adapted from Abdullah Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?* (Berkeley, 1976), 38.
81. Adapted from Margaret Weir and Theda Skocpol, 'State Structures and the Possibilities for "Keynesian" Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge, 1985), 118.
82. Quote from Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 269. Importance of motive, opportunity, and resources noted in Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 223.

Part I Searching for Palestine, 1949–1966

1. Yahya Sadowski, *Political Vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture* (Washington, DC, 1991), 55.
2. Jon Glassman, *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East* (Baltimore and London, 1975).
3. Kenneth Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War* (New York, 1969), 313.
4. Ibid. 647.

5. John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton, 1983), 70–1.
6. Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton, 1978), 823.
7. Fawaz Gerges, 'Lebanon', in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.), *The Cold War and the Middle East* (Oxford, 1997), 187.
8. Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970* (New York, 1971), 14.
9. Waterbury, *Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 315.
10. Ministerial decision in cited in resolution QQ/12/D1/, 17 January 1964, *First Arab Summit Conference* (Arab.), compilation, Cairo, Article 2, Item 1, 27.
11. The most detailed exposition of Syrian views of 'people's war' was by lieutenant-colonel (staff) Mustafa Tlas, 'The Genesis and Formation of the Communist Theory of Guerilla War' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 3: 7, (May 1967), 55–70. People's war was also espoused by the Syrian veterans of the Algerian war of independence, who held the top civilian posts in the state after February 1966 (Atasi and Zuʿayyin, and foreign minister-to-be Makhus), and Ahmad Swaydani, who returned from a study tour in China fully enthused with people's war.
12. Fawaz Gerges, *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967* (Boulder, Colo., 1994), 205–8.

1 Why Palestinian Nationalism? The Social, Economic, and Political Context after 1948

1. Term from Ellen Kay Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1978), 5.
2. Avi Plascov, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948–1957* (London, 1981), 20.
3. Jacob Landau, *The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study* (Oxford, 1969), 3–4; and Morris, *Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Poblem*, 253.
4. Walid Khalidi (ed.), *All That Remains* (Washington, DC, 1992), p. xx.
5. David Kretzmer, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder, Colo., 1990), 37, 55–6, 60, 66, and 69. The residents registration law was amended in 1980.
6. Ibid., chs. 6 and 7.
7. Ibid. 141 and 145.
8. Landau, *Arabs in Israel*, 5.
9. Habib Qahwaji, 'The Complete Story of the Land Movement' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, 1 (March 1971), 116. He dates the launch of the Arab Front in July 1957, not 1958 (p. 113).
10. Ministerial statements quoted in Suhayl al-Natur, 'The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon' (Arab.), unpublished manuscript, n.d., 3.
11. Ibid. 20.

12. Number of permits cited in Hani Faris, 'Lebanon and the Palestinians: Brotherhood or Fratricide?', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 3: 4 (Fall 1981), 356. More detail on work permits and on the legal and administrative framework in Hani Mindis, *Labour and Labourers in the Palestinian Camp: A Field Study of the Tal al-Zaʿtar Camp* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1974), ch. 5.
13. Rosemary Sayigh, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* (London, 1979), 112.
14. *Idem*, *Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon* (London, 1994), 24–5.
15. Laurie Brand, 'Palestinians in Syria: The Politics of Integration', *Middle East Journal*, 42: 4 (Autumn 1988), 622.
16. Jabir Sulayman, 'The Palestinians in Syria: Statistics and Indicators', (Arab.) *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, 20 (Autumn 1994), 146.
17. Sayigh, *Palestinians*, 111; and Brand, 'Palestinians in Syria', 623.
18. On competition between Palestinian and Syrian labour and social prejudices, Faysal Hurani, *From the Paths of Exile* (Arab.) (Amman, 1996), 79–80.
19. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 44–5 and 48–53.
20. Ibid. 50.
21. Sayigh, *Palestinians*, 112–13.
22. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 25–6.
23. Joel Migdal *et al.*, 'The Effects of Regime Policies', in *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton, 1980), 38.
24. On economic and political patterns, ibid. 37 and 39–40; Wilson, *King Abdullah*, 192–4; Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 162; and Jamil Hilal, *The West Bank: Social and Economic Composition, 1948–1974* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1975), 78. On the army, P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan* (London, 1967), 111 and 135; Hilal, *West Bank*, 58; ʿAbbas Murad, *The Political Role of the Jordanian Army, 1921–1973* (Arab.) (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1973), 74 and 85.
25. Khalaf, *Politics in Palestine*, 45.
26. Migdal, 'Effects of Regime Policies', 36–7.
27. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military*, 53.
28. Migdal, 'Effects of Regime Policies', 36.
29. Moshe Maʾoz, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank: The Changing Role of the Mayors under Jordan and Israel* (London, 1984).
30. Wilson, *King Abdullah*, 193.
31. Hilal, *West Bank*, 83; and Migdal, 'Effects of Regime Policies', 40.
32. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 150 and 153.
33. Sayigh, *Palestinians*, 119 and 128.
34. Migdal, 'Effects of Regime Policies', 38.
35. Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 45.
36. Roy, *Gaza Strip*, 90.
37. Ibid. 90–1; and Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 49–50.
38. Jamil Hilal, 'West Bank and Gaza Strip Social Formation under Jordanian and Egyptian Rule (1948–1967)', *Review of Middle East Studies*, 5 (1992), 52.

39. Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies*, 23. That such deprivation was at times a deliberate government policy was confirmed by Henri Edde, one-time minister of public works in Lebanon. *Al-Safir*, 9 and 10 August 1975.
40. Roy, *Gaza Strip*, 91; and Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies*, 43.
41. Roy, *Gaza Strip*, 80.
42. Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, 49.
43. Natur, 'Legal Status', 24–5.
44. Petran, *Struggle over Lebanon*, 63–4.
45. Shafiq al-Hut, *Twenty Years in the PLO: Recollections, 1964–1984* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1986), 52; and Walid Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism* (London, 1975), 31.
46. Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies*, 24.
47. Mindis, *Labour and Labourers*, 206.
48. Faris, 'Lebanon and the Palestinians', 356. Confirmation in Laws 42 and 927, cited in Natur, 'Legal Status', 7–8.
49. Mindis, *Labour and Labourers*, 24.
50. Henri Edde, in a radio debate reproduced in *al-Safir*, 9 and 10 August 1975.
51. Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies*, 39–40.
52. Number of workers from Mahir al-Sharif, *Communism and the National Question in Palestine 1919–1948: Nation and Class in the Liberation Struggle against Imperialism and Zionism* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1981), 105. On shanty towns, and number of inhabitants, Hilal, 'West Bank and Gaza Strip Social Formation', 34; and Lesch, *Arab Politics in Palestine*, 70.
53. Hilal, 'West Bank and Gaza Strip Social Formation', table, p. 56.
54. Fred C. Bruhns, 'A Socio-Psychological Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes', unpublished manuscript, October 1954, 31.
55. Shimon Shamir, 'West Bank Refugees—Between Camp and Society', in Migdal, *Palestinian Society*, 149–51; and Sayigh, *Palestinians*, 125 and 126–7.
56. Ibid. 126.
57. On forcible relocation, Sayigh, *Too Many Enemies*, 37.
58. Faysal Darraj, *A Critique of Palestinian Arms* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1994).
59. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (1944; rev. edn., Boston, 1957), cited in Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers, 'Beyond the Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi', in Theda Skocpol (ed.), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge, 1984), 67.
60. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 46.
61. Fred Bruhns, 'A Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes', *Middle East Journal*, 9 (1955), 133.
62. Role of education in ibid. 85.
63. Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 16–26.
64. This is borne out by the survey carried out by Bruhns, 'A Socio-Psychological Study', 30.
65. Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 126.

66. Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London, 1969), 264.
67. ʿAwni al-ʿUbaydi, *The Islamic Liberation Party: Historical Survey and General Study* (Arab.) (Amman, 1995), 60–1.
68. Amnon Cohen, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967* (Ithaca, NY, 1982), 163, 204, 206–8, and 217; and Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 135–6.
69. Sharif, *Communism and the National Question*, 109.
70. Hut, *Political Leaderships*, 496 and 503–4.
71. Cohen, *Political Parties*, 55, 95, 162. Based on Jordanian security files captured by Israel in 1967.
72. Ziad Abu-ʿAmr, *The Origins of the Political Movements in the Gaza Strip 1948–1967* (Arab.) (Acre, 1987), 52 and 116; and *idem*, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (Bloomington, 1994), 8.
73. Cohen, *Political Parties*, 22–3, 25, 95, and 163–4.
74. Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 24–5.
75. On the bosses, Michael Johnson, *Class & Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840–1985* (London, 1986), 94.
76. Hilal, 'West Bank and Gaza Strip Social Formation', table, p. 56.
77. Sayigh, *Palestinians*, 121.
78. I have adapted an argument based on the European experience. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, 109.
79. The role of the intelligentsia is stressed, for example, in Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford, 1986), 197–8, 207, and 209.
80. Husam al-Khatib, 'Whither the Palestinian Revolution?' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971, 10–11.
81. Quote from Lockman, *Comrades and Enemies*, 13.
82. Adapted from Laroui, *Crisis of the Arab Intellectual*, 161–6.
83. Ibid. 35 and 38.
84. Fateh, *The Palestinian Cause as an Axis of the Arab Cause* (Arab.), lecture by central committee member Faruq al-Qaddumi (n.d.), 10–11. Cited in Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Understanding of the June Defeat' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 3, July 1971, 8.
85. Khatib, 'Whither the Palestinian Revolution?', 8. I have not come across a comparable analysis in my survey of 45 years of Palestinian political writing.
86. Ibid. 8, also 14 and 15.
87. Ibid. 7, 8, and 30.
88. Jean-François Bayart, 'Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A Tocquevillian Reading', in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World* (London, 1994), 297–8.
89. The social origins and rural background of the new elites in Arab states is stressed in Hanna Batatu, 'The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions: Some Observations on their Underlying Causes and Social Character' (Washington, DC, 1983).

2 Palestinians in Arab Uniform

1. ʿAli al-Mahafza, *Jordanian–British Relations* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 187–8.
2. ʿIsam Sakhnini, 'The Annexation of Central Palestine to Jordan' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, 40 (December 1974), 67–8.
3. *Encyclopaedia Palaestina* (Arab.), Part I, Vol. ii (Damascus, 1984), 126.
4. ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya and Samir al-Khatib, al-Tal's subordinates.* (*Note*: The star indicates that the information is based on interviews. The author's interviews are listed in the Bibliography.)
5. Khairiyya Qasmiyya (ed.), *Palestine in the Memoirs of Qawuqji, 1936–1948* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1975), 280–2.
6. Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 58.
7. Benny Morris, *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956* (Oxford, 1993), 28 and 49–50.
8. Ibid. 137.
9. Ibid. 124, 130, 132, 137, and 166–7.
10. S. A. el-Edroos, *The Hashemite Arab Army, 1908–1979: An Appreciation and Analysis of Military Operations* (Amman, 1980), 288.
11. John Glubb, *Soldier with the Arabs* (London, 1957), 306.
12. According to records seized by Israel in 1967. Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 138–9.
13. Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970* (Ithaca, NY, 1988), table 2, p. 37.
14. Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, 139.
15. El-Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 293.
16. Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*, 50.
17. Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, 178–9.
18. Ahmad Saʿd and ʿAbd-al-Qadir Yasin, *The Palestinian National Movement 1948–1970* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, 1978), 69.
19 Oren, 'Secret Egypt–Israel Peace Initiatives', 353.
20. ʿAbdullah Mhaysin, then NCO and training instructor.*
21. Fayiz al-Turk, later unit commander.*
22. Mhaysin; ʿAbdullah Jallud, later officer; and Qusay ʿAbadla, later deputy chief of military regulations in the guard.*
23. Original Arabic document reproduced in Ehud Yaʿari, *Egypt and the Fida'iyyun, 1953–1956* (Heb.) (Givat Haviva, 1975), 35.
24. ʿAbd-al-ʿAzim Ramadan, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Secret Organization* (Arab.), 2nd edn. (Cairo, 1993), 225; Mitchell, *Society of the Muslim Brothers*, 148–9 and 162; Abu-ʿAmr, *Origins of Political Movements*, 69; and ʿAbadla.*
25. Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, 90.
26. Turk, Mansur al-Sharif, ʿAbd-al-Raziq al-Majayda, Jallud, and Mhaysin, then officers in training with these battalions.*
27. *The Tripartite War of Aggression against Egypt* (Arab.) (Cairo, n.d. [1989]), 204.
28. Sharif, later brigade commander.*
29. This problem applied to all border and national guard units. *Tripartite War*, 204–5.

30. Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*, 82.
31. Yunis al-Katari, *A Lost Link in the Struggle of the Palestinian People: Battalion 141 Fida'iyyun* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1987), 27–9. Nasir stated that the decision to form the *fida'iyyun* was his in the first instance, and stressed the deterrent role, in an interview in *Akhir Sa'a*, 29 May 1956, cited in Avi Shlaim, 'Egypt and the Fedayeen, 1953–56', *Middle East International*, 84 (June 1978), 24.
32. Katari, *Lost Link*, 27–9.
33. Ibid. 22–3.
34. Tal'at Jalabi, Egyptian *fida'iyyun* officer.*
35. Jalabi.*
36. Katari, *Lost Link*, 37–9; and Jalabi.*
37. Husayn Abu-al-Naml, 'The Fida'iyyun War in the Gaza Strip' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, 62 (January 1977), 183.
38. Moshe Dayan, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign 1956* (London, 1966), 18.
39. Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, 281.
40. Subhi Yasin, *Guerilla War in Palestine* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1967), 182.
41. Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*, tables 4 and 5, pp. 43 and 119.
42. Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, 403 n. 1.
43. Love, *Suez*, 551; and E. L. M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli* (London, 1962), 183.
44. Confirmed in Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 88.
45. 'Abadla, Turk, and Jalabi;* and Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 88.
46. Morris, *Israel's Border Wars*, 408.
47. According to the director of UNRWA. Cited in Love, *Twice-Fought War*, 552. UN Document A/3212/Add. I. Also, UNRWA, *Brief History*, 254.
48. Muhammad Khalid al-Az'ar, *Resistance in the Gaza Strip, 1967–1985* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1987), 55.
49. Ibid. 54–5; and Salim Za'nun, front leader.*
50. Jalabi and Mhaysin.*
51. Muhammad al-'Arka, Palestinian officer in Lebanese internal security and a secret agent for Egypt;* and Yasin, *Guerilla War*, 201–2.
52. 'Abadla, Mhaysin, and Sharif.*
53. Resettlement mentioned by Rashad Abu-Shawar, *al-Quds al-'Arabi*, 27 November 1995.
54. Abu Riyad, *fida'i*; and Jalabi.* Also Love, *Suez*, 670. The battalion lost 30 dead in reconnaissance missions in 1957–67. Katari, *Lost Link*, 111–19.
55. Turk, later police commander.*
56. Safadi.*
57. Abu Muhammad.*
58. Safadi.*
59. Safadi;* and written testimony of *mighwar* Rafiq 'Assaf, viewed by author, 14–19.
60. Safadi.*
61. 'Arka.*

62. Hani al-Hindi, co-founder of the Arab Nationalists Movement; and Salah Salah, ANM section leader.*
63. On clash, Abu Muhammad.*
64. Safadi.*
65. Moshe Shemesh, *The Palestinian Entity, 1959–1974: Arab Politics and the PLO* (London, 1988), 3–4.
66. Ibid. 13.
67. Ibid. 8, 11, and 13; and ʿIsa al-Shuʿaybi, *The Palestinian Entity: Self-Awareness and Institutional Development 1947–1977* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1979), 69.
68. Ibid. 13; and Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 71.
69. Kamal al-Qaddumi, and Faysal al-Husayni, Palestinian cadets;* and *Filastin*, Higher Arab Committee for Palestine, Year 5, No. 48, 1 January 1965, 31.
70. Lower number according to Wajih al-Madani, PLA commander-in-chief, in letter to the Syrian Army General Command, ref. S/2/65/92, 13 March 1965. Higher number in Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 13. The overall number of officers and non-commissioned officers was given as 250 in *Filastin*, Higher Arab Committee for Palestine, Year 5, No. 48, 1 January 1965, 31.
71. Ibid. 13; and Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 71 and 265.
72. Ibid. 71.
73. Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 7.
74. Ibid. 6–7; and Raji Sahyun, and Fu'ad Yasin, Palestinian radio broadcasters.*
75. Turk, Majayda Sharif, and Mhaysin.*
76. Ahmad Hijju, battalion commander;* and written testimony of Rafiq ʿAssaf, 14–19.
77. Ibid. 90.
78. Tabitha Petran, *Syria* (London, 1972), 250; and Safadi.*
79. Khalid al-Jundi, Faysal Hurani, and Husayn Hallaq, senior Baʿthist cadres; and Muwaffaq Yasin, Fateh cadre in Syria.*
80. ʿArka, 'Palestinian section' head; and Fathi ʿAbd-al-Hamid, Palestinian Baʿthist cadre.*
81. Hijju, battalion commander; and Walid Saʿd-al-Din, battalion officer.*

3 Rebirth of the Palestinian National Movement

1. Quotation taken from Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 84. Habash described his memories in several interviews, and is quoted for example in Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 18.
2. Basil al-Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation and Development of the Arab Nationalist Movement* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1985), 66.
3. Fu'ad Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution* (Arab.) (London, 1984), 3. Also see Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 58–71.
4. Fathi ʿAbd-al-Hamid, Syrian-based Palestinian activist.*

5. Ibid. 61–2.
6. *Why the Organization of Lebanese Socialists? The Arab Nationalist Movement from Fascism to Nasirism, 'Analysis and Critique'* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1970), 16–17.
7. Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 68–70.
8. Hani al-Hindi.*
9. Hindi.*
10. Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 70–1.
11. Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 17, 19, and 24.
12. Faysal al-Khadra, then ANM member.*
13. Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 89.
14. Ibid. 87–9.
15. *Arab Nationalist Movement from Fascism to Nasirism*, 38–9.
16. For example ibid. 19.
17. Khadra; and Faysal al-Husayni, then ANM member.* Also Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 31.
18. Ibid. 27.
19. Ibid. 28.
20. Hindi.* Kazziha places the number at eight (*Revolutionary Transformation*, 44).
21. Munir al-Khatib, a founding member of the section; ʿAzmi al-Khawaja, then teacher in Ramallah; and Ahmad Khalifa, then teacher in the Nayrub camp.*
22. Munir Khatib; and Qasim al-ʿAyna, then ANM member in Tal al-Zaʿtar camp.*
23. Khadra; and Ahmad Yaghi, former ANM cadre.*
24. Fayiz Qaddura, then ANM military cadre and liaison officer.* Hani Hindi claims that the ANM was responsible for up to half of all armed infiltration on this front 1952 onwards.*
25. Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, ANM member and later PFLP military commander.*
26. Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 129.
27. Qaddura; and Subhi al-Tamimi, former aide to Haddad;* Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 29; and Cohen, *Political Parties*, 96–7.
28. Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 100.
29. Hani Hindi, Khadra, Munir Khatib, and Qaddura.*
30. Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 32; Safadi;* and Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 100–4.
31. Number from *Arab Nationalist Movement from Fascism to Nasirism*, 24. On the ANM in Iraq, Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, ch. 44; and Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 105–6.
32. Arms smuggling confirmed by Hani Hindi.* Sabotage attacks confirmed in Cohen, *Political Parties*, 97.
33. Muhammad Nasim, then Egyptian intelligence officer in charge of contacts with Palestinian groups.*
34. Hani Hindi.*
35. Nasim.*
36. Khadra; and Husayn Hallaq, formerly senior Baʿth cadre and secretary of the Socialist Unionists Movement.*

37. Higher membership figure from Khadra; and Bilal al-Hasan, then member of the regional command.* The estimate of Syrian members is for 1960, from *Arab Nationalist Movement from Fascism to Nasirism*, 23.
38. Habash suggests that the ANM was already in contact with Egyptian commander-in-chief ʿAbd-al-Hakim ʿAmir, but this was probably only through the offices of Syrian interior minister ʿAbd-al-Hamid al-Sarraj. Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 71 and 87.
39. Nasim.*
40. Kubaysi implies an earlier date, but Habash suggests the end of 1961. Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 105; and Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 87.
41. Hani Hindi.*
42. Qaddura, Yaghi, and Sami Sharaf.*
43. Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 42.
44. Hani Hindi denies this, but other members of the regional command at the time find it probable. His presence at some meetings is confirmed by Hallaq.*
45. Yaghi.*
46. Summary of events in Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 40–1.
47. For details, Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 5–6.
48. Hani Hindi.*
49. Hani Hindi;* and Habash in Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 61. Names from Yamani, quoted in Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 86.
50. Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 3.
51. Ibid. 3.
52. Quoted in Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 86. The meeting was probably with ʿAbd-al-Hakim ʿAmir, not Nasir. Habash states that ANM relations with Nasir in this period were conducted through Sarraj and ʿAmir (in Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 87).
53. Cohen, *Political Parties*, 137.
54. ʿAbd-al-Rahim Jabir, and Yaghi, who attended the course.*
55. *Al-Ahram*, 27 June 1962. Cited in Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 326 n. 15.
56. Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 67.
57. For example, *al-Hurriyya*, 7 March 1960.
58. Habash discusses the debate and confirms his opposition to the merger in Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 76–7. Also see Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 72.
59. *Arab Nationalist Movement from Fascism to Nasirism*, 51.
60. Hani Hindi.*
61. Asʿad ʿAbd-al-Rahman, ANM cadre who attended the meeting.*
62. Habash, in Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 115–16.
63. Ibid. 89 and 92–3.
64. *Arab Nationalist Movement from Fascism to Nasirism*, 53; and Salah Salah, then regional command member in Syria.*
65. Details in Abu-ʿAmr, *Origins of the Political Movements*, 66–7.
66. Yahya ʿAshur (*Hamdan*), then member.*

67. Janet Wallach and John Wallach, *Arafat in the Eye of the Beholder* (Rocklin, Calif., 1992), 100.
68. For additional details, Brand, *Palestinians in the Arab World*, ch. 4; and Abu-ʿAmr, *Origins of the Political Movements*, ch. 3.
69. Interview with Salwa al-ʿAmad published posthumously in *al-Safir*, 25. April 1988.
70. ʿAshur.*
71. Interview in *al-Safir*, 25 April 1988.
72. Abu-ʿAmr, *Origins of the Political Movements*, 78.
73. Interview in *al-Safir*, 25 April 1988.
74. *Report on Fateh* (Arab.), PLA Intelligence Branch Report, undated [late 1968], 1. On the switch of affiliation, Husayni, and Yasin.*
75. Khalil al-Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis, Rise, Evolution, Legitimate Representative—Beginnings Part One* (n.p., 1986), 17. Confirmed by an unidentified leader of Fateh interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1969), 26.
76. ʿAshur.*
77. Statistic from Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence*, table 4, p. 43.
78. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 17.
79. Muhamma Hamza, *Abu Jihad: The Secrets of his Beginnings and the Reasons for his Assassination* (Arab.) (Tunis, 1989), 165.
80. 'Fateh: Birth and March, a Conversation with Kamal ʿUdwan' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973, 57.
81. Interview with Salwa al-ʿAmad, *al-Safir*, 25 April 1988.
82. Brand, *Palestinians*, 69.
83. Mahmud ʿAbbas.*
84. Sakhr Habash, later Fateh central committee member.*
85. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 21–2. Emphasis added.
86. Details from ʿAbdullah Abu-ʿIzza, *With the Islamist Movement in the Arab Countries* (Arab.) (Kuwait, 1992), 71 and 73. Cited in Khalid al-Hrub, *Palestinian Islamism: Hamas, its Thought and Political Practice* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1996), 24–5.
87. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 24.
88. Wazir suggests the date as 1957, but several other sources place it in 1958. Unidentified leader interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968; also 'A Historical Brief about the Movement', in *Fateh, Movement's Sessions*, 1–12 (Arab.), n.p., n.d. (essay written in late 1967 or early 1968), 15.
89. 'Structure of Revolutionary Construction' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Revolutionary Lessons and Experiences*, n.p., n.d. [reprinted compilation], 113.
90. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 26 and 32; *Report on Fateh*, 2; and a reading of *Filastinuna*.
91. Reference to resistance to Nazi occupation, for example, in article by Huri in issue 31, 15 May 1963.
92. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 27.
93. Ibid. 74–6.
94. Khalid al-Hasan.*
95. Muwwafaq Yasin, group member.*

96. Hurani, then member.*
97. Hani al-Hasan.*
98. Muwaffaq Yasin.*
99. Hani al-Hasan.*
100. Hani al-Hasan.*
101. ʿAbd-al-Hamid.*
102. Hani al-Hasan, and Fu'ad Yasin.*
103. Hani al-Hasan.*
104. ʿAshur.*
105. According to one of the founders, Hasan Khalil Husayn, *Unknown Pages from the Life of Salah Khalaf 'Abu Iyad'* (Arab.) (Amman, 1991), 54–5. The author provides the names of other members of the group, and of early members of Fateh in Gaza and elsewhere (pp. 67 and 73).
106. Khalid al-Hasan.*
107. Hani al-Hasan.*
108. 'Principles, Aims, and Means' (Arab.), reproduced in Fateh, *Revolutionary Lessons and Experiences*, n.p., n.d., 6.
109. Quote from later tract that summarizes the outlook in this period well. 'Birth and March' (Arab.), undated but early 1967, in Fateh, *Revolutionary Studies*, n.p., n.d., 37.
110. Ibid.
111. Editorial in *Filastinuna*, No. 31, 15 May 1963.
112. Reproduced in Fateh, *Revolutionary Lessons and Experiences*, n.p., n.d., 100–1.
113. Ibid. 102.
114. Ibid. 102–3.
115. 'Our National Struggle' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerilla Action* (Kuwait, n.d.), 37.
116. *The First Press Statement* (Arab.), presented by Fateh to the foreign press, pamphlet issued in January 1968. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 55.
117. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 4.
118. Fateh, *Structure of Revolutionary Construction*, 113.
119. *Filastinuna*, 2: 11 (November 1960), 3.
120. Detailed discussion in Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 51–8.
121. Reproduced in Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 66.
122. *Filastinuna*, 2: 9 (July 1960).
123. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 8.
124. 'Our National Struggle', 37.
125. 'Fateh Starts the Discussion' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerilla Action*, 16.
126. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 52–3.
127. Ibid. 61–2.
128. Unidentified leader interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968; and 'Our Revolution and Parties' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Movement's Sessions*, Session 12, undated (essay probably written before 1967), 103.
129. 'Our National Struggle', 41.

130. Ibid. 42.
131. Unidentified leader interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968.
132. 'Our Revolution and Parties', 100.
133. Ibid. 101.
134. Unidentified leader interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968.
135. Discussion in Faysal Hurani, *Palestinian Political Thought (1964–1974): A Study of PLO Basic Documents* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, 1980), 110–11.
136. 'Revolutionary Vanguards', in Fateh, *Movement's Sessions*, Session 2, 62.
137. Fateh, *The Memorandum Submitted by the General Command of Asifa Forces to the Chairman and Members of the Palestinian National Council in Cairo in its Second Session* (Arab.), 28 May 1965, 20.
138. Khalid al-Hasan.*
139. An abridged translation of Fanon is in 'Revolution and Violence are the Way to Liberation' (Arab.), Fateh, *Revolutionary Studies and Experiences*, No. 3, n.p., n.d.
140. 'Revolutionary Vanguards', 61; and *Memorandum*, 22.
141. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 71.
142. Unidentified leader interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968.
143. Hurani; ʿAbd-al-Hamid; and Tawfiq al-Safadi, then a senior Palestinian Baʿthist cadre in Lebanon.*
144. Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 79–80.
145. Safadi; and Nimr Hammad, then Baʿthist cadre in Lebanon.* On Yashruti, *The Arab Liberation Front or the Nationalist Experience in Guerilla Action* (Arab.), n.p., n.d., 5.
146. Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 81.
147. Hurani; ʿAbd-al-Hamid; and Ahmad al-Shihabi, then senior Palestinian Baʿthist cadre in Syria.* Also Mahmud ʿAbbas, 'Political Papers: How Similar Yesterday is to Today . . . But?' (Arab.), Parts 1 and 2, unpublished manuscript, n.d. [approximately 1985], 143.
148. Hallaq.*
149. Zakariyya ʿAbd-al-Rahim, then Fateh cadre who knew Hurani.*
150. Hijju, and Saʿd-al-Din.*
151. Hurani.*
152. Jundi, and Hallaq.*
153. Hijju.*
154. Samir al-Khatib, who negotiated the resumption of training.*

4 The Watershed

1. In a public speech, text in *Collected Speeches of Nasir, 1962–64* (Arab.), iv. 505–6.
2. Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 92–3.
3. Ibid. 92.
4. Ibid. 46–50.

5. Resolution QQ15/D1/, 17 January 1964, in League of Arab States, *First Arab Summit Conference* (Arab.), Compilation, General Secretariat (Cairo), undated, Article 5, p. 30.
6. Mahmud Riyad, *The Memoirs of Mahmoud Riad, 1948–1978: The Search for Peace, and the Conflict in the Middle East* (Arab.), 2nd edn. (Beirut, 1985), 25.
7. Khairiyya Qasmiyya, *Ahmad al-Shuqayri as a Palestinian Leader and Arab Pioneer* (Arab.) (Kuwait, 1987), 35–6, 68, and 70–1.
8. Ibid. 72–3.
9. Ahmad al-Shuqayri, *From Summit to Defeat* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1971), 50; and Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 101.
10. Ibid. 102.
11. Text in Rashid Hamid, *Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, 1964–1974* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1975), 59.
12. Ibid. 60.
13. On the Jordanian role, Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 45–7.
14. Shuqayri's opening address, and also Article 24 of the PLO national charter, in Hamid, *Resolutions*, 50 and 59–60.
15. Text of resolutions in ibid. 41–66.
16. Ibid., Basic Law, Article 2, Items 7, 8, and 10, p. 52.
17. Ibid., Military Resolutions, p. 42.
18. Ibid., General Resolutions, Items 13 and 14, p. 45.
19. Ibid., National Charter, Articles 1, 2, and 5, p. 48.
20. Ibid., National Charter, Article 11, p. 48.
21. Ibid., National Charter, Articles 9 and 10, p. 48.
22. PLO, *The First Palestinian Congress* (Arab.), pamphlet, undated [1965], 2.
23. Full list of delegates in Hamid, *Resolutions*, 66–72.
24. Plascov, *Palestinian Refugees*, 228.
25. Formal ANM statement in *al-Hurriyya*, 10 December 1962.
26. *Al-Hayat*, 29 March 1964. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestinian Cause 1964* (Arab.) (Beirut, n.d.), 98.
27. *Filastin*, 4: 39 (1 May 1964). Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestinian Cause 1964*, 99.
28. *Al-Hadaf* (Beirut), 24 May 1964. Cited in Hamid, *Resolutions*, 11; and Elpeleg, *Grand Mufti*, 142.
29. Husayni stated his fears, for example, in the AHC's newsletter *Filastin*, 4: 40 (1 June 1964). Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestinian Cause 1964*, 100.
30. According to Ghassan Kanafani in *al-Muharrir*, 6 May 1964. Cited in Hurani, *Palestinian Political Thought*, 92.
31. Ibid. 92.
32. For example statements in *al-Muharrir*, 16 and 25–28 March 1964. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestinian Cause 1964*, 94 and 96.
33. *Al-Hurriyya*, 15 June 1964.
34. Ibid. 29 June 1964.
35. Mahmud ʿAbbas, *The Impossible Revolution: The Impossible Writing* (Arab.), May 1990, 9.

36. *Filastinuna*, No. 36, April 1964, 5.
37. According to Khalid al-Hasan, interviewed by Faysal al-Hurani and cited in Hurani, *Palestinian Political Thought*, 101. Also confirmed in *Report on Fateh*, 4.
38. Figure of 20 Fateh delegates from *Report on Fateh*, 4.
39. 'Structure of Revolutionary Construction', 113.
40. Hurani, *Palestinian Political Thought*, 102. Based on interviews with Mahmud ʿAbbas and Khalid al-Hasan.
41. No. 36, April 1964.
42. *Filastinuna*, No. 36, April 1964, 5.
43. Mahmud ʿAbbas, quoted in Hurani, *Palestinian Political Thought*, 102.
44. Khalid al-Hasan.*
45. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 99.
46. Husam al-Khatib, *The Palestinian Revolutionary Experience* (Arab.) (n.p., 1972), 167–8.
47. Ibid. 99.
48. Khalid al-Hasan.*
49. Text in Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 101–4.
50. *Report on Fateh*, 4. Confirmed by Hani al-Hasan.*
51. Zaʿnun.*
52. 'Birth and March', 33.
53. Hamza, *Abu Jihad*, 204–5.
54. *Report on Fateh*, 2.
55. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 47.
56. Hamza, *Abu Jihad*, 232; and PLA intelligence report, *Supplement to the Lebanon Report: Information about the Palestine Liberation Movement (Fateh)* (Arab.), December 1965, 1.
57. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 37.
58. Ibid. 40–1.
59. Ibid. 82.
60. ʿAbbas, *Political Papers*, Part 1, 149; and Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 84–5.
61. Official statement on 5 March 1964. Text in *The Baʿth and the Palestine Cause: Statements and Positions 1945–1975* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1975), 184.
62. Text in Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 257–64.
63. *Al-Baʿth*, 7 September 1964. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1964*, 108.
64. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, *Years of Upheaval* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1988), 767.
65. Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 60.
66. Shuqayri, *From Summit to Defeat*, 152.
67. Related by Hallaq.*
68. Mahmud ʿAbbas, and Jundi.*
69. Sharif al-Husayni, and Ghazi al-Husayni, both of whom worked in the mufti's office in that period.*
70. ʿArka;* and *The Arab Liberation Front: Why . . . and What is it?*, 5.
71. ʿAbd-al-Rahim.*

72. Confirmed by several Fateh cadres from Lebanon. For example Lamʿi al-Qumbarji, and Samir Abu-Ghazala.*
73. ʿAbd-al-Rahim.*
74. Muhammad Ghnaym.*
75. ʿAbd-al-Hamid al-Qudsi.*
76. Salim Zaʿnun.*
77. Faysal al-Hurani, 'A Reading of Jiryis' Article and the Infantile Right-Wing Disease', *al-Hurriyya*, 16 June 1985, 33–4.
78. Jundi.*
79. *Report on Fateh*, 2.
80. Ghazi al-Husayni.*
81. *Filastinuna*, No. 38, July 1964.
82. Mahmud ʿAbbas;* and ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 9.
83. Ibid. 12.
84. Khalid Hasan.*
85. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 80–1.
86. Hallaq, who took refuge in Algeria in this period.*
87. Khalid Hasan, and Mahumd ʿAbbas.*
88. Wazir, Khalid Hasan, Zaʿnun, and Habash.*
89. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 12, and annexes, 5; and Zaʿnun.*
90. Ghnaym.*
91. *Filastinuna*, No. 40, November 1964.
92. Hurani; Abu Muhammad, border resident recruited by Arafat; and ʿArka, then head of Palestinian internal security unit working for Syrian intelligence.*
93. Confirmed by several sources, including Ghnaym;* and *Supplement to Lebanon Report*, 5–6.
94. Ghnaym; and ʿAbd-al-Hamid al-Qudsi, senior cadre.*
95. An internal document listed 50 names of Fateh personnel in 1964–5. Cited in Ahmad Kalash, *Filastin al-Thawra*, 6 June 1993. Quote from Fateh, *Revolution Until Victory* (n.p., n.d. [1969]), 4.
96. 'Structure of Revolutionary Construction', 110–12.
97. Ibid. 114.
98. Mahmud ʿAbbas, and Zaʿnun;* and *Dialogue about the Principal Issues of the Revolution* (Arab.) (Kuwait, n.d.) (interview with Salah Khalaf, published in *al-Taliʿa*, Cairo, in late 1969), 4.
99. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 88.
100. Suhayl al-Natur, PLO official who bailed Arafat from police station.*
101. Various interviewees, for example Usama al-Shinnar, then ANM section leader.*
102. Cited in Cohen, *Political Parties*, 139.
103. Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 83.
104. Figures from Salah Salah, Khadra, and Bilal al-Hasan, then members of ANM regional command in Syria; Mumir Khatib, then Palestinian section head in Syria (July 1991); Mustafa al-Zabri, later head of regional command in Jordan; and Shinnar and Salih Raʾfat, then cadres in the West Bank; Yaghi and Abu Suhayl,

then cadres in Gaza; and Ahmad Khalifa, then member of Palestinian action command.* West Bank figure from Cohen, *Political Parties*, 95.
105. Yaghi.*
106. Munir Khatib.*
107. Khalifa, who relayed the conference resolutions to the Jordanian regional command.*
108. ʿAzmi al-Khawaja, then member of the Jordanian regional command.*
109. Ghazi al-Khalili, then section head in the West Bank.*
110. Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 93.
111. Subhi al-Tamimi, Khawaja, and Yaghi.*
112. Yaghi, and Faysal al-Husayni.*
113. Qaddura, ʿAbd-al-Rahim Jabir, Khalili, Asʿad ʿAbd-al-Rahman.*
114. Shinnar; Khalili; and Mamduh Nawfal, then ANM cadre.*
115. Khawaja; Bilal Hasan; Khalifa; and ʿAbdullah Hammuda, a delegate.*
116. Khawaja, Bilal Hasan, and Khalifa.*
117. Khawaja, Bilal Hasan, Khalifa, and ʿAbdul-Karim.*
118. Tamimi.*
119. *Al-Hadaf*, 1 November 1969.
120. Khadra.*

5 Challenges of the Armed Struggle

1. Text of original statement.
2. Written note from Nasir and Haykal's assessment, in Haykal, *Years of Upheaval*, 769, and Document no. 53, Appendix, 950.
3. Riad el-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, *Guerillas for Palestine* (London, 1976), 31; and Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 59.
4. ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim, later secretary-general of the Palestinian Liberation Front.*
5. ʿAbadla.*
6. Shuqayri, *From Summit to Defeat*, 155. On Hafiz, Haykal, *Years of Upheaval*, 767.
7. Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 60.
8. [PLO/PLA], *Military Memorandum Presented by the PLO to the Conference of the Arab Kings and Presidents* (Arab.) [September 1964], 1–4.
9. Memorandum (containing proposal) to the General Secretariat, Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, League of Arab States, from General ʿAli ʿAmir, Unified Arab Command for the Armies of the Arab States, Office of the Commander-in-Chief, File 142, 4 September 1964, 1–2.
10. Quote from Resolution QQ 21/D2/, 11 September 1964, in *Second Arab Summit Conference*, Article 4, p. 36. The assumptions are confirmed in the Memorandum to the chiefs of staff of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria from UAC commander-in-chief ʿAli ʿAmir, Organization and Mobilization Branch, UAC, 25 November 1964, no. 104/

64/16/1216; and [PLO/PLA], *The General Report Presented to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965* (Arab.), PLO military committee, 3.

11. Resolution QQ 21/D2/, 11 September 1964, in *Second Arab Summit Conference*, Article 4, Items 5, 6, and 7, p. 37.
12. Letter to Egyptian, Iraqi, and Syrian chiefs-of-staff from ʿAli ʿAmir, Organization and Mobilization Branch, UAC, 25 November 1964, no. 104/64/16/1216.
13. [PLO/PLA], *Draft Plan for the Formation of the Palestine Liberation Army*, 8 November 1964, appendix A.
14. *Military Memorandum of the PLO*, 2.
15. Letter to the General Secretariat, Office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs, League of Arab States, from General ʿAli ʿAmir, Unified Arab Command for the Armies of the Arab States, Office of the Commander-in-Chief, File 142, 4 September 1964, 4.
16. Resolution QQ 21/D2/, 11 September 1964, in *Second Arab Summit Conference*, Article 4, Items 3 and 4, p. 37.
17. [PLO/PLA], *Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic* (Arab.), PLO military committee, n.d. [late May 1965], 1.
18. Ibid. 1–2.
19. Ibid. 3.
20. Shuqayri, *From Summit to Defeat*, 150.
21. Ibid. 149–50.
22. *Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic*, 3.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Shuqayri, *From Summit to Defeat*, 151.
26. Ibid. 152.
27. Ibid.
28. *Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic*, 3.
29. ʿAbadla.*
30. Instructions on organization, Organization and Mobilization Branch, Egyptian General Staff, 23 February 1965, ref. Organization/4/General 1; and *General Report Presented to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965*, 4.
31. [PLO/PLA], *Compulsory Conscription Law* (Arab.), appendix no. 13.
32. *Progress Report on the First Phase of the Establishment of the PLA in the Period 24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965* (Arab.), 1.
33. Letter from Madani to Shuqayri, reference D/1/214, dated May 11, 1965.
34. *Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic*, 7.
35. *Progress Report on the First Stage and Second Stage of the Establishment Plan for the PLA for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 May 1966* (Arab.), submitted by Madani to the PLO Executive Committee, 30 April 1966, ref. 16/S/66/481, Section 1, Article 2, p. 1. On earlier attainment level, Article 1, Item H.1, p. 2.

36. Ibid., Article 2, Item B.3.g, p. 8; and *Report of the PLA Command to the UAC for the Period 18 September 1964 to 1 June 1965* (Arab.), Article 3, Item D.6, p. 4. On earlier intakes, Mansur Sharif.*
37. Mansur Sharif, later brigade commander.*
38. Tables in *Report of the PLA Command to the UAC*, Article 1, Items A and B, p. 2.
39. This was certainly Madani's interpretation. *Progress Report on the First Stage and Second Stage of the Establishment Plan for the PLA for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 March 1966*, Section 1, Article 9.a, p. 4.
40. *General Report Presented to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965*, Section 3, Article 2, Item A.1, p. 6.
41. Request for ten officers noted in ibid., Article 2, Item A.6, p. 2. On appointment of Jabi, Turk.*
42. [PLO/PLA], *Progress Report on the First Phase of the Establishment of the PLA in the Period from 24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965*, Article 10, Item B, p. 8.
43. Lebanese newspaper report based on insider account of the summit debate.
44. *Progress Report* (1 September 1965 to 1 March 1966), Section 1, Article 10, Items B and C, p. 5.
45. Raji Sahyun, programme founder and director; and Fu'ad Yasin, broadcaster; *Qasmiyya, *Ahmad al-Shuqayri*, 80; and Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 60. The radio programme accounted for 40 per cent of the PLO budget by 1966–7, according to a complaint registered among the resolutions of the PNC's financial committee in 1968. Hamid, *Resolutions*, Item 9, pp. 118–19.
46. Ibid. 60.
47. [PLO/PLA], *Minutes of Talks with the Syrian Arab Republic and the Signing of the Contract no. 2/S on 5 May 1965* (Arab.), appendix no. 8; and [PLO/PLA], *Contract no. 4/S Concluded with the Syrian Arab Republic on 16 May 1965* (Arab.), appendix no. 9.
48. Law no. 18, issued by Hafiz dated 2 January 1966.
49. [PLO/PLA], *Minutes of the PLO Military Committee's Talks with the Syrian Arab Republic the Period from 23 March 1965 to 29 March 1965* (Arab.), appendix no. 6, p. 2.
50. Samir al-Khatib.*
51. ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya, and Samir Khatib, leftist 'graduates of 1948'; and ʿAbadla.* Also, Hamad al-Mawʿid, *Palestinian Communist Action in Syria* (Damascus, 1995), 20.
52. Letter from Madani to the Syrian command, reference S/2/65/92, dated 13 March 1965.
53. *Al-Baʿth*, 27 May 1964. Quoted in Hamid, *Resolutions*, 12.
54. *Progress Report* (24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965), 9.
55. *Minutes of the PLO Military Committee's Talks with the Syrian Arab Republic on 6 December 1964*, 5. This figure represented 75 per cent of full establishment strength.
56. *Minutes of the Talks with the Iraqi Republic* (Arab.), appendix no. 10.
57. *General Report* (24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965), 10; and *al-Anwar*, 12 February 1965. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1965*, 84.
58. Shuʿaybi, *Palestinian Entity*, 71.
59. *Progress Report* (24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965), 4.

60. ʿAbadla, Shaqqura, Sharif, and Turk; Ramzi Badran, officer transferred from Syria; and Kamal al-Qaddumi, officer transferred from Iraq.*
61. Shaqqura.*
62. Correspondence between the UAC and PLA in early 1967. For example, letter to PLA commander Madani, reference ShM/607/5/6, 20 January 1967; and letter from Madani to Shuqayri, reference MH/13/2/, 18 March 1967.
63. *Progress Report* (24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965), 7; and letter from Madani to Shuqayri, reference QʿA/9/1/131, 21 February 1967.
64. Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 70.
65. Ibrahim al-Dakhakhna, then Egyptian military intelligence officer in Gaza;* and Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 59.
66. Text in Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 162.
67. 'Statement of Timing' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerilla Action*, 26.
68. First quote from 'Fateh Starts the Discussion' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerilla Action*, 16; Second quote from 'Statement of Timing', 26–7.
69. Ibid. 26–7.
70. This, Fateh boasted, was what its founders had done in 1955, when their raids provoked the Israeli reprisals that prompted Egypt to conclude its first contract for Soviet arms. Kamal ʿUdwan, in 'Fateh: Birth and March, a Conversation with Kamal ʿUdwan', *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973, 57.
71. For example, No. 12, December 1960. On nuclear issue, for example, No. 15, March 1961, 6, and No. 32, August 1963, 16.
72. 'Fateh Starts the Discussion', 14–15 and 16.
73. 'Liberating the Occupied Lands and the Method of Struggle against Direct Colonialism' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerilla Action*, 85.
74. Ibid. 114.
75. 'Statement to Journalists' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Bases of Guerilla Action*, 55.
76. Khalil Wazir, Fateh co-founder.*
77. 'Our Movement, Fateh' (Arab.), founding document reproduced in *Fateh: Genesis*, 65.
78. Khalid al-Hasan.* Hasan later formulated this notion in terms of the three characteristics (sing. *khususiyya*) of the Palestine cause in *The Genius of Failure* (Arab.), Political Papers 10 (Amman, 1987), 128–9.
79. Quote from Fateh memorandum to the second session of the PNC, end May 1965. Text in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1965*, 114.
80. Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf) with Eric Rouleau, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle* (New York, 1981), 43.
81. Fateh, *Dialogue about the Principal Issues of the Revolution* (Arab.), text of interview with unnamed Fateh official in *al-Taliʿa* published in 1968 (Kuwait, n.d.), 72.
82. Wazir quoted in Hamza, *Abu Jihad*, 166.
83. 'Our National Struggle', in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerilla Action*, 41.
84. Mahmud ʿAbbas, Wazir, and Khalid al-Hasan.*
85. Wolf, *Peasant Wars*, 269.
86. ʿAbadla.*

87. Khalid al-Hasan.*
88. 'Liberating the Occupied Lands', in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerilla Action*, 76–7.
89. 'Press Statement', in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerilla Action*, 55.
90. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 99.
91. Text in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1965*, 14–15. Quote from ibid. 114.
92. Ibid.; and Hurani, *Palestinian Political Thought*, 108 and 113.
93. Zaʿnun.*
94. Nasim.* Also on the ANM role, report from Habash to Nasir, quoted in Haykal, *Years of Upheaval*, 768.
95. 'How the Popular Armed Revolution Erupts', in Fateh, *Revolutionary Lessons and Experiences*, 178.
96. 'Seventh Session: Why I am Fateh—Second Programme, Revolutionary Vanguards', in *Movement's Sessions 1–12* (Arab.), 58.
97. 'How the Popular Armed Revolution Erupts', 178.
98. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1965*, 112.
99. 'How the Popular Armed Revolution Erupts', 176–7.
100. Ibid. 176; and 'Statement to Journalists', 59.
101. Nasim.*
102. From text in Khatib, *Palestinian Revolutionary Experience*, 169.
103. On recruitment, Ghnaym, and Qudsi;* and *Supplement to Lebanon Report*, 9.
104. Zaʿnun.*
105. Mahmud ʿAbbas, Hani al-Hasan, and Wazir.*
106. *Supplement to Lebanon Report*, 5.
107. ʿAbd-al-Hamid, and Buʿbaʿ.*
108. Confirmed by several Fateh cadres, for example ʿAbd-al-Rahim.*
109. Jundi, and ʿArka.*
110. Hallaq, and ʿAbd-al-Hamid.*
111. Jundi.*
112. ʿAbd-al-Rahim.*
113. Ahmad Dahbur, then Palestinian Baʿthist.*
114. ʿAbd-al-Hamid.*
115. Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 65.
116. Cited in Shuqayri, *From Summit to Defeat*, 157.
117. 'Secret Internal Circular about the Party's Palestinian Policy and the Summit Conferences' (Arab.), No. 4/8, 29 September 1965, 9.
118. Ibid.
119. ʿArka.*
120. Hurani.*
121. Ahmad al-Shihabi, then leading cadre in the Palestinian branch. Confirmed by Jundi.*
122. Hurani.*
123. Zaʿnun, and Mukhtar Sabri Buʿbaʿ, the emissary. Other details on ʿUrabi from several interviews.*

124. Dawud Ibrahim, *Salah Khalaf: The Warrior Teacher* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, n.d. [1991]), 29.
125. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution,* appendices, p. 6.
126. Jibril was born in 1937 in the village of Yazur (near Jaffa). His mother came from a wealthy Syrian family, which is why the Jibril family had the means to leave the country on a flight from Lydda airport to Beirut in 1948. Family ties, which later included connections by marriage to two senior Syrian and PLA commanders, may also have assisted his subsequent career. Details from Jibril interview in *al-Wasat*, 10 April 1995.
127. ʿAli Ishaq, Abu Haytham, Abu Ahmad Halab, and ʿUmar Abu-Rashid, then PLF cadres.*
128. Ishaq, and Abu-Rashid.*
129. Hani al-Hasan.*
130. Jundi.*
131. Buʿbaʿ, the emissary.*
132. Hamza, *Abu Jihad*, 274.
133. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 16.
134. Nazih Abu-Nidal, *The History of the Crisis in Fateh from Foundation to Uprising* (Arab.) (n.p., 1984), 42–4.
135. Buʿbaʿ.*
136. That a 'political' meeting took place is confirmed in Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 46.
137. Samir Sabri, then Fateh military cadre.*
138. Abu Mahmud al-Dawli, then Fateh trainee.*
139. Sabri.*
140. Jundi.*
141. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 47; and ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 18.
142. Mahmud ʿAbbas.*
143. Hani al-Hasan.*
144. ʿAbd-al-Rahim.*
145. Lamʿi al-Qumbarji, then cadre in Cairo.*
146. Subhi Yasin came from Shafa ʿAmr in north Palestine and was a guerrilla with the legendary sheikh ʿIzz-al-Din al-Qassam in 1935. He fought as an officer of the Arab Salvation Army in 1948 and then headed a small network of infiltrators in Jordan (under the name of Khalid ibn al-Walid) connected to Egyptian military intelligence in the mid-1950s, before taking refuge in Syria. Staunchly pro-Naser, he was accused of complicity in the *coup* attempt in Damascus on 18 July 1963, and was exiled to Cairo after a period in prison. Sometime between 1959 and 1964 he founded the Vanguards of Sacrifice Organization and recruited a handful of young Palestinian students and employees in Egypt. He merged with Fateh in 1968, but was killed a few months later in circumstances suggesting an internal dispute or rivalry with another Fateh leader. Information from several sources, including Yahya Habash, then member of Fateh regional command in Jordan; Fuʾad Yasin,

senior member of Vanguards Organization in the mid-1960s (no relation); and Ahmad Sarsur, then PLA officer.*

147. Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 79; and Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 79.
148. Tawfiq al-Safadi.*
149. ʿAbd-al-Rahim, and Qumbarji, who took command of the Lebanon branch in 1967.*
150. Nasim.*
151. Qumbarji, and ʿAbd-al-Rahim.*
152. ʿAbd-al-Qadir Yasin, *The Fateh Crisis: Its Roots, Dimensions, Future* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1985), 34.
153. Amin Huwaydi, Egyptian defence minister and chief of intelligence after June 1967, and Dakhakhna.*
154. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 47–8.
155. Khalifa.*
156. Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 72 and 93–4.
157. Ibid. 116.
158. Zabri, and Yaghi.*
159. For example, ʿAbdullah al-ʿAjrami.*
160. Details in Abu-ʿAmr, *Origins of the Political Movements*, 138--42.
161. Khalifa.*
162. Bilal Hasan.*
163. Bilal Hasan, and Khalifa.*
164. Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 95.
165. Bilal Hasan;* and Haykal, *Years of Upheaval*, 769.
166. PFLP, *The Organizational, Military, and Financial Report* (Arab.), Fourth National Congress, April 1981, 103–4.
167. Munir al-Khatib, then ANM section head in Syria; Asʿad ʿAbd-al-Rahman, then Palestinian military action committee member; and ʿAbd-al-Karim.*
168. Khawaja, then Palestinian military action committee member; and Salah.*
169. Text in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1965*, 96.
170. 'Is There an Alternative to the Path of Nasir?', *al-Hurriyya*, 21 June 1965, 5.
171. Zabri.*
172. This study was apparently not based on primary sources or first-hand experience. The only material available to the ANM on China, for example, was a copy of the Red Book and other writings by Mao Zedong that student leader Taysir Qubaʿa received during an official visit to China in the mid-1960s. According to Ahmad al-Yamani, senior ANM cadre and later leading PELP official.*
173. Salah.*
174. Hasan; Faysal al-Khadra, then ANM section head in Kuwait; and Munir al-Khatib.*
175. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, *1967 the Eruption: The Thirty-Years War* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1990), 212.
176. Lebanese newspaper report based on insider account of the summit debate.
177. *Filastin*, No. 17, *al-Muharrir* supplement No. 590, 17 June 1965.
178. *Progress Report* (24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965), 8.

179. *Progress Report* (1 September 1965 to 1 March 1966), 5–6.
180. *Agreement Concerning the Formation and Armament of PLA Units* (Arab.), ref. 4296/3764, 22 March 1966.
181. Decree by Shuqayri, no ref., 13 February 1967, referring to his earlier decision of 1 March 1966.
182. Letter from Asad to Madani, ref. 403/1/66, 5 June 1966.
183. Yahya, and Samir Khatib.*
184. Text of draft law in *Filastin*, No. 20, *al-Muharrir* supplement No. 626, 29 July 1965.
185. Text of the Palestinian Popular Organization Law approved by the PNC in *Filastin*, No. 17, *al-Muharrir* supplement No. 590, 17 June 1965.
186. Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 82.
187. *Filastin*, 5 May 1966.
188. Undated and unreferenced private memorandum, 2–3.
189. Ibid. 3.
190. 'An Acute Attempt to Unite the Instrument of the Revolution', *al-Hurriyya*, 21 February 1966, 10–11.
191. *Al-Ahrar*, 2 April 1966. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1966*, 125.
192. *Filastin*, 5 May 1966.
193. *Al-Ahrar*, 28 May 1966. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1966*, 127.
194. Text of speech to the PNC in May 1966, in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1966*, 193–206.
195. Details in Hut, *Twenty Years in the PLO*.
196. Suhayl al-Natur, then PLF cadre; and Qasim al-ʿAyna, then member of Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp committee.*
197. Bhays, then PLF cadre in Jordan and Egypt; Samih Shbib, then PLF cadre in Syria; and Abu-Rashid, then PLF–Jibril cadre in Syria.*
198. Statement published in *Kul Shay'* (Beirut), 21 August 1968. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology* (Beirut, 1969), xiv. 220.
199. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1966*, 89.
200. Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 97–9 and 103–5.
201. ANM accusations, for example, in *al-Hurriyya*, 18 July 1966. The two cadres were Khalifa and Munir Khatib.*
202. Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 97–9 and 103–5.
203. Abu Suhayl, then senior ANM cadre in Gaza.*
204. Al-Hakam Darwaza, then member of the ANM general secretariat and head of its ideology committee.*
205. Kubaysi, *Concerning the Formation*, 109–11.
206. *Al-Hurriyya*, 21 February 1966.
207. Ibid. 13 February 1966, 16.
208. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1966*, 223–33.
209. *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, 15 June 1966. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1966*, 88–9. On ANM conference, Khatib.*
210. 'Private and highly confidential' report from Madani to Shuqayri, undated but around end of January or February 1966, 4.

211. Yahya, and ʿAbadla.*
212. Subhi Tamimi.*
213. Yahya.*
214. Turk.*
215. Subhi Tamimi.*
216. ʿAbd-al-Rahim Jabir, then *Abtal al-ʿAwda* cadre; and Mamduh Nawfal, then ANM cell leader.*
217. Nawfal.*
218. Jabir, patrol leader.*
219. Subhi Tamimi.*
220. Shinnar.*
221. He added that in retrospect this caution was mistaken (Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 85–6).
222. *Al-Hurriyya*, 31 October 1966.
223. For example, *al-Hurriyya*, 23 January 1967.
224. *Al-Ahram*, 30 November 1966. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1966*, 91.
225. *Al-Hurriyya*, 21 November 1966.
226. Turk.*
227. Shaqqura.*
228. Hut, *Twenty Years in the PLO*, 98–103.
229. *Al-Hurriyya*, 13 February 1967.
230. Order from Shuqayri to Madani, no reference, 13 February 1967.
231. Lower figure from Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 83. Higher figure from Ghnaym. Percentage from Kifah, then Fateh cadre in Jordan.*
232. Gunther Rothenberg, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army* (London, 1979), 132.
233. *Al-Hurriyya*, 5 December 1966, and 9 January 1967.
234. Ibid. 5 December 1966, and 13 February 1967. Quote from latter.
235. Article by the Arab Studies Section, titled 'Issues of the Current Palestinian Phase: A Discussion of Guerrilla Action, its Reality and Results', ibid. 30 January 1967.
236. Ibid. 30 January 1967, 11.
237. Ibid. 13 February 1967, 16.
238. Ibid. 15 May 1967, 9–10, and 29 May 1967, 9–13.
239. Ibid. 15 May 1967, 10–11.
240. *Al-Muharrir*, 16 May 1967.
241. *Conference on the Popular Resistance Held at the PLA GHQ on 22 February 1967* (Arab.), Items 1.a, b, and c, p. 1.
242. Letter from Madani to Shuqayri, 4 February 1967, QʿA/9/1/209, Article 3, p. 3; and letter from Shuqayri to Nasir, undated but sent soon after 4 February 1967, Item 2, p. 3. Confirmed by Mansur Sharif; Mahmud Abu-Marzuq, then PLA artillery company commander; and Ahmad Sarsur, then armour company commander.*
243. Sharif, Abu-Marzuq, and Sarsur.*
244. *Agreement Concerning the Establishment and Armament of PLA Units*, tables, p. 2.

245. For example, letter from Madani to Shuqayri, ref. QʿA/9/1/330/, 3 May 1967.
246. Qasmiyya, *Ahmad al-Shuqayri*, 95.
247. Fateh claim in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1967*, 124 n. 2.
248. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 269.

Part II Years of Revolution, 1967–1972

1. Kerr, *Arab Cold War*, 139.
2. R. D. McLaurin, Don Peretz, and Lewis Snider, *Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and Processes* (New York, 1982), 4.
3. Convergence of Egyptian and Jordanian views evident in minutes of discussions between Nasir and Husayn in Cairo on 31 August 1969. Text in ʿAbd-al-Majid Farid (ed.), *From the Minutes of Abdul-Nasir's Arab and International Meetings* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1979), 176–8.
4. Interview in *al-Ahram*, 21 January 1968. Cited in Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, *The Israeli–Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969–1970: A Case-Study of Limited Local War* (New York, 1980), 44.
5. Saadia Touval, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979* (Princeton, 1982), 138.
6. William Quandt, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy Towards the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976* (Berkeley, 1977), 66–7.
7. Ibid. 77–8.
8. Touval, *Peace Brokers*, 152; and Bar-Siman-Tov, *Israeli–Egyptian War*, 46.
9. Ibid. 120–5.
10. Ibid., table 6.1, p. 160.
11. Niklaos Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria* (London, 1967), 84.
12. Ibid. 84–7; and Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkley, 1979; 1990 edn.), 148–51.
13. Quote from Fateh political statement to the foreign press, January 1968, pamphlet. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 56.
14. Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, 1088, 1093–4, and 1096–7.
15. Van Dam, *Struggle for Power in Syria*, 88–9 and 101; and Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East*, 157–9, 163–4, 173, and 175–6.
16. Waterbury, *Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 331–2, 337–8, and 350–3; and Alvin Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet–Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June War* (Princeton, 1977), 131–2 and 145–6.
17. Articles published on 26 February and 5 March 1971. Cited in ibid. 140–1.
18. Touval, *Peace Brokers*, 200.
19. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 99, 108, 114–15, and 131.
20. A. F. K. Organski, *The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel* (New York, 1990), table 6.3, p. 142.
21. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 78 and 149.
22. Ibid. 130–1 n. 1.

23. Quote from ibid. 151.
24. Michael N. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton, 1992), 117.
25. Ibid. 117–18. Other considerations may have been anti-Soviet pressure from the Egyptian armed forces, and Sadat's assumption that the expulsion could obscure economic grumblings among the public and improve his domestic standing (Rubinstein, *Red Star on the Nile*, 195–6).
26. Ibid. 120–1, 129, 156, 158–60.

6 Transforming Defeat into Opportunity

1. Khalid Hasan.*
2. 'The Palestinian Revolution and the Arab–Israeli Conflict' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Revolutionary Studies*, n.p., n.d., 85.
3. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, appendices, 14; and Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 288.
4. Fateh, *The Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban Experiences* (Arab.) (Kuwait, n.d.), 47–50.
5. Hostile views in Abu-Nidal, *History of the Crisis in Fateh*, 45; and anonymous Fateh official in *al-Mujahid* (Algiers), 17 December 1967. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 1012.
6. Khalid Hasan, Hani al-Hasan, Habash, and ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Shahin.*
7. Ghnaym.*
8. Shahin, and Qudsi.*
9. *Middle East Record 1967*, 319; and *al-Ahram* (Cairo), 4 July 1967, cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1967*, 129.
10. Hani al-Hasan, Ghnaym, Mahmud ʿAbbas, and Shahin.*
11. Khalid al-Hasan.*
12. Habash.*
13. Details in Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 106–10.
14. Hani al-Hasan.*
15. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 20.
16. Mahmud ʿAbbas, Shahin, and Sabri, military cadre.*
17. Fateh, *Revolution Until Victory*, 4.
18. Hurani, 'A Reading of the Jiryis Article', *al-Hurriyya*, 16 June 1985.
19. Wazir.*
20. Shahin.*
21. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, appendices, 7. Confirmed by Buʿbaʿ.*
22. Mahmud ʿAbbas.* Israel did hold Syria responsible for guerrilla attacks. For example, statement by Haim Herzog, military governor of the West Bank, cited in *Arab Report & Record*, 16–30 September 1967.
23. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 22 and 167–9; and Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 99.
24. Khalid al-Hasan.*
25. 'The Enemy is Strong but not Legendary' (Arab.), 29.

26. Khatib, *Palestinian Revolutionary Experience*, 25.
27. 'The Twelfth Session: Our Revolution and Party Allegiance' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Movement's Sessions*, 1–12, 102.
28. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 106–10; and 'Tenth Session: Our Armed Struggle—Its Feasibility and How We Should Understand its Course' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Movement's Sessions*, 1–12, 91.
29. ʿAbd-al-Rahim, founder of Fateh intelligence.*
30. *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 39.
31. Ibid. 36.
32. Sabri.*
33. Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 116.
34. *Al-Hurriyya*, 19 June 1967.
35. Khalifa.*
36. Khalifa, Khawaja, Khalili, and Hammuda.*
37. Bilal al-Hasan.*
38. Asʿad ʿAbd-al-Rahman.*
39. PFLP, *The Front . . . and the Question of the Split* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1970), 55.
40. ANM, *After the Colonialist Zionist Agression: The Arab Revolution Faces the Battle of Destiny* (Arab.), Political Report issued by the Expanded Session of the Executive (National) Committee of the ANM at the end of July 1967, 14.
41. Ibid. 22–3.
42. The perception that the primary enemy in the conflict with Israel was in fact the USA was succinctly expressed on the eve of the war by a Tunisian leftist who subsequently joined the ANM: 'the principal obstacle to liberating Palestine is not Israel but its guardian, the USA and its Sixth Fleet' (Al-ʿAfif al-Akhdar, 'Perspectives of the Vietnamese War' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 3: 7 (May 1967), 52).
43. Ibid. 7 and 8–9, for example.
44. Ra'fat.*
45. Mustafa al-Zabri, *The June Defeat and the Launch of the Resistance* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1970), 68. Confirmed in numerous interviews.
46. PFLP, *Military Thinking of the PFLP: A Discussion with al-Hadaf from Abu Hammam* (Arab.) (Beirut, n.d. [1970]), 7–8.
47. Zabri, *June Defeat*, 69.
48. PFLP, *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 7–8.
49. First quote from *The Arab Revolution Faces the Battle of Destiny*, p. 30. Second quote from Yaghi.*
50. Quoted in *The Front . . . and the Issue of the Split*, p. 11.
51. Khalifa.*
52. Quoted in *The Front . . . and the Issue of the Split*, 12.
53. *After the Colonialist Zionist Aggression*, 25.
54. Khawaja, Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu, and Munir Khatib.* The ANM executive committee called on all members to go to Jordan, according to *The Front . . . and the Issue of the Split*, 67.

55. ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
56. ʿAbd-Rabbu; and Nabil ʿAbd-al-Rahman, then ANM member.*
57. Khalifa, Faysal al-Husayni, and ʿAjrami.*
58. Munir Khatib.*
59. Jabir;* and Abu Ahmad Fu'ad, *al-Hadaf*, No. 892, December 1987 (special 20th anniversary issue), 94.
60. Salah;* and PFLP founding statement, 12 December 1967.
61. Term used in *Revolutionary Lessons and Experiences* (Arab.), n.p., n.d., 9; and Hani al-Hasan, 'A Pause on the Fourth Anniversary of the Karameh Battle' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 8, April 1972, 42.
62. *Arab Report & Record*, 1–15 August 1967; and *Palestinian Chronology*, 8 August 1967, vol. vi.
63. *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 35–6.
64. Hani al-Hasan; and ʿAbbas, Fateh trainee.*
65. Anonymous Fateh official interviewed in *al-Mujahid*, 17 December 1967. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 1012. Figure for Hama training output in 'Second Session: A Historical Glimpse of Fateh and the Circumstances of its Genesis' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Movement's Sessions*, 1–12, 17.
66. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 82.
67. Muhammad Bhays, then Fateh cadre in Hebron area; and Jabir, ANM fugitive guerrilla.*
68. Shahin, and Sabri.*
69. Population figures from Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, cited in *Arab Report & Record*, 16–30 September 1967; and Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* (Washington, DC, 1984), table 1, p. 2.
70. Sabri.*
71. Bhays.*
72. Document in possession of Salih ʿAbd-al-Jawad, Bir-Zeit University.
73. Dayan, cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, 16 February 1968, vol. vii.
74. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 4, 16–29 June 1967, 55.
75. Azʿar, *Resistance in Gaza*, 75.
76. Faysal Husayni, then PLA liaison officer with the front.*
77. Samir Ghusha, later PPSF secretary-general.*
78. Ghusha, Faysal Husayni, and Shahin.*
79. Husayni, and Shahin.* Also PLF–PR statement in *Kul Shay'*, 21 August 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 220.
80. Shinnar; Khalifa; Yahya Habash; and Musa Fawwaz and Abu Mahir, then ANM members who joined Fateh in 1967.*
81. Khalifa; and Khawaja, then head of Ramallah section.*
82. Shinnar, and Ra'fat.*
83. PFLP, *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 117; and Khawaja.*
84. *The Strategy for Revolutionary Palestinian Action as Understood by the Palestinian Command of the Arab Nationalist Movement* (Arab.), August 1967; *The Outline of the Strategy for Palestinian Action and the Organizational Situation in the Palestinian Sphere*

(Arab.), August 1967; and *The Strategy for Revolutionary Palestinian Action* (Arab.), Resolutions of the Palestinian Regional Command Outside, September 1967.

85. Khalifa, ʿAjrami, and Yaghi.*
86. Ishaq, Abu-Rashid, Abu al-Haytham, Abu Ahmad Halab, and Shbib.*
87. *Jerusalem Post*, 27 September 1967; and Abu-Rashid.* In a curious historical twist, this PLF mission was known as 'the Maghribi group' (*majmuʿat al-maghariba*), because several of its members were the descendants of the 1,000 or more Algerians who had followed the mufti of Tlemcen to Syria in 1911 in order to avoid conscription into the French colonial army.
88. *Al-Anwar*, 14 October 1967. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1967*, 153.
89. Khawaja.*
90. For example, Bilal al-Hasan, 'Four Urgent Tasks that Face Palestinian Action', *al-Hurriyya*, 23 October 1967, 4–5.
91. *Al-Hurriyya*, 9 October 1967, 6.
92. Abu Mahmud al-Dawli, then ANM cadre.*
93. Khalili.*
94. ʿAjrami.*
95. ʿAjrami.*
96. Khalifa.*
97. Khalifa.*
98. Khawaja, and Asʿad ʿAbd-al-Rahman.*
99. PFLP statement in *al-Hurriyya*, 11 December 1967. It did not admit the failure of the Lydda attack for many years, until PFLP, *Essays on People's War* (Arab.), 1989, 96.
100. Hani Hindi.*
101. Ra'fat.*
102. *Ten Years after the Establishment of the Palestinian Communist Party 1977/1987* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, 1987), 47.
103. Sulayman al-Najjab.*
104. *Ten Years After*, 46; and Taysir ʿAruri, communist cadre.*
105. *Jerusalem Post*, 12 and 16 June, 11 July, and 22 August 1967.
106. Najjab.*
107. Naʿim al-Ashhab, *To Overcome the Crisis in the Palestinian Liberation Movement* (Arab.) (n.p., 1972), 18–19.
108. Najjab.*
109. ʿAruri.*
110. Samir ʿAbdullah, communist cadre.*
111. Text of statement.
112. ʿAruri, and Najjab.*
113. *Ten Years After*, 44.
114. Cited in *Middle East Record*, 3 (1967), 310.
115. ʿAbd-al-Qadir Yasin, *The Experience of the National Front in the Gaza Strip* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1980), 21–2 and 29; Azʿar, *Palestinian Resistance in Gaza*; and Husayni.*
116. Yasin, *Experience of the National Front*, 33 and 121–3.

117. *Al-Muqawama*, 17 November 1967. On combat activity, Hasan ʿAsfur, communist cadre;* and Mahir al-Sharif, *On Communist Thought: The Communists and the Issues of Current National Struggle* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1988), 127.
118. Minutes of meeting between the PLA command and the Egyptian governor-general for Gaza, ʿAbd-al-Munʿim Husni, 22 February 1967, 1 and 4.
119. 'Warning Order' from Egyptian supreme command to Madani, reference QʿA/35/349, 23 May 1967.
120. Turk; Shaqqura; Badran; and Muhammad Tamraz, then cadet.*
121. Samir al-Khatib, Hittin Forces commander.*
122. Badran.*
123. ʿAbadla, commander of reserve forces in Gaza city; and Mansur Sharif, battalion operations officer.*
124. Sharif; and ʿAbdullah Jallud, then combat officer.*
125. Dakhakhna.*
126. Death toll based on memorial plaques at PLA main camp near Cairo, viewed by author.
127. Yahya, then PLA deputy chief-of-staff; and Samir Khatib.*
128. Qasmiyya, *Ahmad al-Shuqayri*, 97–8; and Yahya.*
129. Shmuel Gavish, Israeli commanding officer of the southern front, cited in *Haʾaretz*, 30 April 1968. However, PLA figures showed 24 officers and 200–300 soldiers as prisoners at ʿAtlit in March 1968.
130. Abu-Marzuq.*
131. *Davar*, 25 August 1967.
132. Sarsur.*
133. Majayda, and Hasan Abu-Lubda, then battalion commanders;* and battalion table of establishment.
134. Majayda.*
135. Instructions from Fawzi, ref. 403/14524, 29 September 1967. Also Sharif, later brigade commander.*
136. Tamimi.*
137. ʿAbadla.*
138. Yahya, and Samir Khatib;* and ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 178.
139. Turk, and Shaqqura.*
140. Faysal Husayni, training instructor; and Natur, then PLF–PR and Shaʿir aide.*
141. Yahya, and Majayda.*
142. Turk.*
143. *Al-Muharrir*, 14 October 1967.
144. *Al-Hawadith*, 13 October 1967. Cited in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 814.
145. *Palestinian Chronology*, 16 November 1967, vol. vi.
146. Sarsur.*
147. *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 8 December 1967. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 985.
148. *Palestinian Chronology*, 24 November 1967, vol. vi.

149. *Al-Ra'i al-ʿAm* (Kuwait), 8 December 1967. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 986.
150. *Palestinian Chronology*, 11 and 13 December 1967, vol. vi.
151. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 989.
152. Text of executive committee statement in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 1009. Also *Al-Muharrir*, 19 and 20 December 1967.
153. Term used in Fateh statement. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 56.
154. Inflated example in *al-Mujahid*, 17 December 1967. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 1012. Israeli figures from defence minister Moshe Dayan, *Jewish Observer*, 28 February 1968.
155. Figures according to Dayan and defence ministry director-general Moshe Kashti, *Jewish Observer*, 8 December 1967, and 28 February 1968; and Fateh, *Our Armed Struggle between Theory and Practice* (Arab.), June 1970, 17.
156. *Jerusalem Post*, 14 January 1968.
157. PFLP military commander Abu Hammam in *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 8.
158. *The Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution* (Arab.), two speeches by George Habash in May 1970 (Beirut, n.d. [1970]), 31.
159. Zabri, *June Defeat*, 68–9.
160. PFLP, 'Guerilla action . . . one year after the defeat', *al-Hurriyya*, 3 June 1968, 4–5.
161. *Palestinian Chronology*, 9 September 1967, vol. vi.
162. The Israeli cabinet briefly considered a 'Palestinian option'—granting autonomy or even independence to the inhabitants of the West Bank, after annexing large areas to Israel—and contacted a few local figures in spring 1968. Reuven Pedatzur, 'Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967', *Middle East Journal*, 49: 2 (Spring 1995), 276–8.
163. First quote from Muhsin Ibrahim, *Theoretical and Political Issues after the War* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1984), 257. Second quote from Nayif Hawatma, *Action after the October War to Defeat the Surrenderist Liquidationist Solution and Extract the Right of Self-Determination* (Arab.) (DFLP, 1974), 37–8.

7 Carving out the Guerrilla Sanctuary

1. This notion adapted from Lee Kendall Metcalf, 'Outbidding to Radical Nationalists: Minority Policy in Estonia, 1988–1993', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2/ii (July 1996), 228–9.
2. Untitled pamphlet distributed to the foreign press in January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 55.
3. 'The Seventh Session: Why I Am Fateh—Second Programme, the Revolutionary Vanguards' (Arab.), in *Movement's Sessions*, 1–12, n.d. [End 1967 or early 1968], 62.
4. Ibid. 61.
5. Untitled pamphlet distributed to the foreign press in January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 55 and 56.
6. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 106.

7. Decisions published in an untitled pamphlet. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 20–2.
8. This was the view of Habash, according to Khalili.* Statement in *Palestinian Chronology*, 20 January 1968, vol. vii.
9. Fawzi.*
10. Huwaydi.*
11. Haykal, *1967 Eruption*, 937.
12. Dakhakhna.*
13. Katari, *Lost Link*, 59–60.
14. Dakhakhna, and Sarsur;* and Katari, *Lost Link*, 96. Fifty *fida'iyyun* died fighting in Fateh ranks in 1967–71, ibid. 111–19.
15. Mahmud ʿAbbas.*
16. *Al-Ahram*, 19 January 1968.
17. *The Daily Star* (Beirut), 24 January 1968. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 3, 1–15 February 1968, 43.
18. *Al-Nahar*, 4 January 1968.
19. Untitled pamphlet distributed to the foreign press in January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 56.
20. *Jordanian News Agency (Petra)*, 5 September 1967. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, 1–15 September 1967.
21. Leaflet published on 7 October 1967. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1967*, 797.
22. ʿAshur, then commander of Fateh bases in Jordan Valley; Abu Mahmud al-Dawli, then commander of ANM bases in the valley; and Abu Suhayl, then PFLP sector commander. Figure on PFLP strength from Zabri, then member of PFLP command.*
23. *Al-Hurriyya*, 12 February 1968.
24. *Al-Dustur* (Amman), 17 February 1968. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1968*, 115.
25. *Al-Nahar*, 18 February 1968.
26. ʿAbd-Rabbu.* Confirmed in PFLP, *Organizational, Military, Financial Report*, 131.
27. Fateh accounts in Fateh, *Four Big Battles of al-ʿAsifa Forces* (Arab.) (Amman, 1969); Hani al-Hasan, 'Pause on the Fourth Anniversary'; and Munir Shafiq, 'The Battle of al-Karama' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 19, March 1973.
28. Muhammad Bashir, then chief of Jordanian military intelligence;* and Saʿd Sayil, 'Testimony of Brigadier Saʿd Sayil' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 8, April 1972, 209.
29. Hasan, 'Pause on the Fourth Anniversary', 56.
30. Fateh statement in *al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya*, No. 4; and *Hisad al-ʿAsifa*, No. 13, special anniversary issue, 21 March 1969.
31. 'Testimony of ʿAbd-al-Ilah al-Aththir, Commander of the First Advance Base between al-Karama and the River' and 'Testimony of the Fighter Nasir Jihad' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 8, April 1972, 203 and 205.
32. T. N. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab–Israeli Wars, 1947–1974* (London, 1978), 351–2.

33. Ibid. 354. Dupuy suggests higher Israeli losses.
34. Ibid. Another Jordanian estimate is of 128 casualties and 12 tanks destroyed and 8 damaged. Sayil, 'Testimony', 210. The semi-official Jordanian account is Ma'n Abu-Nuwar, *The Battle of Karamah* (Arab.) (Amman, 1968).
35. Hasan, 'Pause on the Fourth Anniversary', 57. Israel claimed taking 128 prisoners, but 81 were Jordanian farmers who were later released. *Al-Nahar*, 20 May 1968.
36. The negative view of the guerrillas was taken, for example, by the Jordanian Ministry of Defence in its publication *Guerrilla Action in Jordan* (Arab.) (Amman, 1970).
37. 'Abbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 40; and Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 63.
38. 'Abd-al-Majid Farid, then private secretary to Nasir.*
39. Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan* (London, 1975), 64.
40. Described in ibid. 64; and in Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 62–3.
41. Fawzi, and Huwaydi.*
42. Sami Sharaf.* In a later book Haykal asserts that he received Fateh central committee member Khalid al-Hasan in Cairo in September 1967, and then introduced Arafat, Khalaf, and Qaddumi to Nasir during a subsequent visit in October. This is unlikely, given Arafat's presence in the West Bank, and contradicts Haykal's earlier account. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, *The Peace of Illusions: Oslo, Before and After*, The Secret Negotiations between the Arabs and Israel, Part 3 (Arab.) (Cairo, 1996), 17.
43. Huwaydi. Also Farid; and Amin Ghaffuri, then personal aide to Nasir.*
44. Dakhakhna, Abu Suhayl, and Yaghi.*
45. Abu 'Azzam, intelligence officer; Abu Mhadi, naval officer; Yusif Tahir, and Dakhakhna.*
46. Nizar 'Ammar, then intelligence officer.*
47. Abu-Lubda, and Tamraz.*
48. Mansur Sharif.*
49. Majayda; Sami Sharaf; and Nasim, who founded the service.*
50. Dakhakhna; Tariq Sharaf, then operations officer in the force; Jallud; and Tamraz.*
51. 'Umar; and Abu Mahir, then a Fateh instructor.*
52. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1968*, 109 n. 112.
53. Abu 'Azab, then PFLP training camp commander.*
54. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Karim, then Fateh base commander; and Tariq 'Ali, then head of a PFLP training camp.*
55. Estimate of combat manpower based on numerous interviews. Also confirmed by then defence minister Moshe Dayan, *Jewish Observer*, 5 July 1968. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1968*, 630.
56. Nasr Yusif, then central sector commander.*
57. Yusif.*
58. Mahjub 'Umar, then senior political officer in the south.*
59. Yusif, then senior military cadre in the south; 'Umar; Ramzi, and Musa al-Shaykh,

then training instructors in the south; and Yahya Habash, then Fateh regional command member.* Further details in Mahjub ʿUmar, 'September in the South of Jordan' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 71, October 1977.

60. *Guerilla Action in Jordan*, 11, 13, and 18; and Yaghi, then head of PFLP supply in south; Abu Mahir, then PFLP base commander in south; Hijju, then Saʿiqa military commander; Sarsur, then PLF/PLA base commander in south and head of training camp; Abu-Marzuq, then PLF/PLA sector commander in north; and Sa'ib al-ʿAjiz, then PLF/PLA company commander.*
61. Abu-Marzuq.*
62. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 82; and Wazir, and Ghnaym.*
63. Wazir.*
64. Hasan al-Shibl, then company commander.*
65. Yusif Tahir, artillery gunner; Ahmad Mifrij, later military police commander; and Khalil al-Jamal, then military policeman.*
66. Nasr Jabr, then head of the committee;* and interview with ʿAdnan Samara (later committee head) in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 10 October 1987.
67. Complaint, for example, in ALF, *Arab Liberation Front or the Nationalist Experience in Guerrilla Action*, 20.
68. Sharif, Shaqqura, Sarsur, Abu-Marzuq, and Qaddumi.*
69. Habash, programme initiator.*
70. Abu Zayd Hdayb, ʿUmar Abu-Layla, and Adham, then trainees.*
71. ʿAbd-al-Karim, course graduate.*
72. Muhammad Bashir, then head of Jordanian military intelligence; Maʿn Abu-Nuwar, then head of the army's moral guidance branch; and two Jordanian generals who did not wish to be named.*
73. *Al-Muharrir*, 14 and 16 October 1968.
74. Dablan was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for endangering national security, and died in prison in 1972.
75. Statement in Fateh, *Yearbook 1968* (Arab.) (Amman, 1969), 161–3. On Dablan links, Khatib, then head of the PLO military department.*
76. *Al-Hurriyya*, 9 December 1968.
77. ʿUthman Abu-Gharbiyya, then cadre in Fateh's mobilization and guidance directorate.*
78. Yahya Habash, then member of the Fateh regional command in Jordan who acted as local military commander during the clashes.* Absence of a formal militia before the clashes confirmed by Naji ʿAllush, 'The Palestinian National Liberation Movement and Mass Action' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973, 16.
79. Hurani, then senior member of the Palestinian branch of the Baʿth Party.* On the Jadid–Asad rivalry in 1968, Van Dam, *Struggle for Power in Syria*, 87–8.
80. Ahmad al-Shihabi, then Saʿiqa delegate to the PNC;* and Sami al-ʿAtari, PLO executive committee member for Saʿiqa, interviewed in 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972, 35.

81. Hurani, and Hallaq.*
82. Abu Nidal, then PLA officer on secondment.*
83. Hijju, then Saʿiqa military commander.*
84. Yusif al-Sharqawi, later Saʿiqa battalion commander.*
85. *Al-Hurriyya*, 16 September 1968.
86. Text of draft plan, no reference, undated, issued under the title 'Proposal to Unify the Armed Struggle' (Arab.), PLO Amman office notepaper, serial number 339.
87. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 523.
88. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1968*, 73.
89. Statement cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1968*, 72. On house arrest, Yahya.*
90. Khatib, and Sarsur.*
91. Circular issued by Hammuda, 19 August 1968; referral from Madani, ref. 22/DʿA/2, 19 August 1968; *al-Hurriyya*, 26 August 1968; and *al-Nahar*, 5 and 15 August 1968.
92. Turk, Shaqqura, Abu-Marzuq, Sarsur, and ʿAjiz, among others.*
93. The PFLP publicized the Syrian ban, *al-Hurriyya*, 15 July, 12 August, and 16 September 1968.
94. Hdayb; Abu-Layla; and Sabri, then Fateh intelligence cadre.*
95. ʿAlaʾ Husni, then company commander.*
96. Hdayb, and Abu-Layla, Husni, and Adham.*
97. Abu Mhadi.*
98. Text of regulations reproduced in *Guerilla Action in Jordan*, 226–31.
99. Wahib Ramadan, then trainee; and ʿAyna.*
100. Samir Abu-Ghazala, cadre in charge of Fateh network after June 1967; and Ghazi Husayni.*
101. Arab Liberation Front, *Guerrilla Action and the Challenges of the Lebanese Situation* (Arab.), 1972, 14 and 19.
102. Muhsin Ibrahim, *The War and the Experience of the Lebanese National Movement* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1983), 322–3; and Husam al-Khatib, 'Closed Borders and Open Bridges, "The Reality of the Palestinian Arena"' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 21, May 1973, 55.
103. Abu-Ghazala; Qumbarji; Jihan Hilu, then women section leader; and ʿAmmar.*
104. Abu-Ghazala; and Jihan al-Hilu, then senior woman cadre.*
105. *Our Armed Struggle between Theory and Practice*, 28.
106. ʿAbd-al-Fattah al-Jayyusi, one such cadre.*
107. Farid, then gunner.*
108. Hisham Hawari, then Fateh officer in south Lebanon.*
109. Sayigh, *Palestinians*, 156–8.
110. Fawwaz Trabulsi, co-founder of the Movement of Socialist Lebanon.*
111. Jayyusi, Hawari, Yusif Tahir, and Farid, then guerrillas in the district.*
112. ʿAli Mruwwa, and Hani, then Lebanese cadres in Fateh;* and *al-Nahar*, 22 April 1969.
113. Revealed by interior minister Kamal Junblat in April 1970. Text of statement in *Arab Political Documents 1970*, Document 124, p. 214.

114. *Al-Nahar*, 9 May 1969.
115. Existence of military agreement revealed by Arafat, ibid. 29 October 1969. Confirmed by Emil Bustani in his serialized memoirs, *al-Safir*, 15 March 1997.
116. Hijju, then Saʿiqa military commander; Zabri, then PFLP military commander; Tariq ʿAli, then PFLP military commander in Lebanon; Ishaq, then member of PF–GC military command; Qaddumi, then PLA/PLF officer in Lebanon; and Nawfal, then member of PDFLP military command.*
117. *Al-Nahar*, 5 September 1969.
118. Farid.*
119. Among the prisoners was Kuwaiti prince Fahd al-Jabir al-Sabah, who was deported to Syria but rejoined his Fateh unit in the ʿArqub, where he remained until July 1970. He died in the early hours of 2 August 1990 while defending the royal palace against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
120. Description in Sayigh, *Palestinians*, 160–3.
121. *Al-Nahar*, 23 October 1969.
122. Ibid. 24 and 26 October 1969.
123. Ibid. 26 October 1969.
124. Text of agreement in Walid Khalidi, *Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979), appendix I, 185–7.
125. *Al-Nahar*, 14 October 1969.
126. Karim Baqraduni, *The Curse of a Nation: From the Lebanon War to the Gulf War* (Arab.) (Beirut, n.d. [1991]); 127. *Deuxième bureau* chief Sami al-Khatib accused Bustani many years later of signing the accord against the orders of Hilu (*Al-Wasat*, 2 January 1995).
127. Yahya ʿAshur, then head of Fateh regional command in Lebanon.*
128. Sarsur, PLA officer in PLF/PLA bases in Lebanon.*
129. Nawfal; and Fawwaz Trabulsi, co-founder of the Movement of Socialist Lebanon.*
130. Jamal.*
131. Hawari.*
132. Yusif Sayigh, then PLO executive committee member who was approached by Bustani.*
133. Hasan Abu-Bakr, then company commander.*
134. Jayyusi; Durgham, then intelligence cadre; and Abu Mhadi.*
135. On the smaller groups, ʿAli, then PFLP military commander in the south; Abu ʿAzab, then senior PFLP military cadre; Nawfal; Sarsur; and Qaddumi.*
136. *Al-Nahar*, 25 January 1973.
137. Ibid. 19 March and 20 May 1970.

8 Guerrilla War in Theory and Practice

1. Shihada Yusif, *Palestinian Reality and the Union Movement* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 39–40.

2. Ironically, the original peasant *kufiyya* of the 1930s was in fact usually all-white; the black-and-white version was introduced in the early 1950s by the British commander of Jordan's Arab Legion, John Glubb (Pasha), to distinguish Palestinian personnel from East Bank Jordanians. Ted Swedenberg, *The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past* (Minneapolis, 1995), 35.
3. *Palestinian Popular Culture Faced with Zionist Attempts at Arrogation* (n.p., 1976), 6. A more recent analysis of Palestinian political art is Yann Le Troquer and Inés Nammari, 'Reflets d'une imagerie Palestinienne', *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 32 (1993), 193–214.
4. Interviews with Fateh and PFLP leaders in *al-Nahar*, supplement, 6 October 1968.
5. *Political, Organizational, and Military Report*, 221.
6. 'Fateh Starts the Discussion', 16.
7. Fateh, 'Eighth Session: Why Am I Fateh?—Programme Three: People's Liberation War' (Arab.), in Fateh, *Movement's Sessions*, 1–12, 68–71.
8. *Al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, 15 June 1969, 6–8.
9. *Al-Hurriyya*, 4 November 1968.
10. For example, 'Why Am I Fateh?—Programme Three', 74–5; and 'Fourth Session: Our Armed Struggle—its Feasibility and How We Should Understand its Course', in Fateh, *Movement's Sessions*, 1–12, 88.
11. *Al-Hurriyya*, 22 July 1968.
12. Fateh, *Political and Armed Struggle* (Amman, 1969); and PFLP, *The Military Strategy of the PFLP* (Arab.), cited in *al-Hadaf*, 28 November and 5, 12, and 19 December 1970.
13. 'Birth and March', 40.
14. Hani al-Hasan, 'Pause on the Fourth Anniversary', 51–2. A good statement of Fateh military thinking is *Our Armed Struggle between Theory and Practice* (Arab.) (Amman, 1970).
15. *Al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, 15 June 1969, 4 and 6–8.
16. *The Palestinian Resistance Movement in its Current Reality: A Critical Study* (Arab.), foreword by Nayif Hawatma (Beirut, 1969), 17–18. A more extensive critique on this point is made in Ilyas Murqus, *A Critique of the Resistance's Thought* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1971).
17. *Political and Armed Struggle*, 31; and 'Eighth Session: Why Am I Fateh?—Programme Three: People's Liberation War', 68–71.
18. 'Fourth Session: Our Armed Struggle', 88.
19. Ibid. 89.
20. Unidentified Fateh official interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 28.
21. 'Liberating the Occupied Lands', 87.
22. Hani al-Hasan, 'Fateh between Theory and Practice: (1) The Theoretical Framework' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972, 20.
23. Ibid. 12.
24. Fateh, *Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban Experiences*, 47–50.

25. Qaddumi cited in Sadiq Jalal al-ʿAzm, *A Critical Study of the Thought of the Palestinian Resistance* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 33–4. Arafat quoted in Salman, *With 'Fateh' and the Guerrillas*, 53–4.
26. Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerrilla Action*, 61–2; and Hani al-Hasan, 'Fateh between Theory and Practice', 20.
27. Naji ʿAllush, 'Is the Palestinian Revolution an Arab Nationalist Movement?' (Arab.), in *The Palestinian Revolution: Its Dimensions and Issues* (Beirut, 1970), 37–53 (especially p. 42).
28. Munir Shafiq, *The Palestinian Revolution between Criticism and Destruction* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 47–8.
29. Khalaf interview in *Jeune Afrique*, 19 October 1971. Munir Shafiq, *Concerning Contradiction and Practice in the Palestinian Revolution* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1971).
30. According to military commander Abu Hammam, *The Resistance Seen Militarily* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1971), 14.
31. *Al-Hurriyya*, 21 October 1968.
32. Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, later PFLP military commander.* The concept of the secure base was developed in *A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine* (n.p., 1969), 75–7.
33. *The Palestinian Resistance and the Arab Situation* (Arab.), memorandum submitted to the sixth PNC convening in Cairo on 1 September 1969, 61. Also *al-Anwar*, 15 February 1970; and *al-Ahad*, 27 July 1969. Both cited in *Middle East Record 1969*, 275–6.
34. *Al-Hurriyya*, 2 September 1968.
35. Abu Hammam, *Resistance Seen Militarily*, 35.
36. George Habash in *al-Ahad*, 19 October 1969. Cited in *Middle East Record 1969*, 269.
37. Ibid.; and Abu Hammam, *Resistance Seen Militarily*, 28.
38. *Military Thinking of the PFLP: A Discussion with al-Hadaf from Abu Hammam* (Arab.) (Beirut, n.d. [1970]), 37–8.
39. *Political and Armed Struggle*, 34.
40. *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 74–5.
41. Hasan, 'Fateh between Theory and Practice', 20.
42. Hani al-Hasan, 'Pause on the Fourth Anniversary', 44. Also *idem*, 'The Secure Base or Martyrdom' (Arab.), *al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya*, No. 25, April 1970, 19 (cited in ʿAzm, *Critical Study*, 82–3).
43. *Military Strategy of the PFLP*, 72–4.
44. *Amman al-Masa* (Amman), 9 June 1969. Cited in *Middle East Record 1969*, 276.
45. Hawatma, *Palestinian Resistance Movement*, 18. The same criticism was repeated again in later PDFLP literature, for example *The Political, Organizational and Military Report* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1981), 467.
46. Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz, *The Israeli Army* (London, 1975), 309–10.
47. First quote from Ze'ev Schiff, 'Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel's Policy', *Middle East Journal*, 38: 2 (Spring 1984), 221. Second quote from Moshe Dayan, *Jerusalem Post*, 12 May 1970.
48. Abu Suhayl, and Abu ʿAzab.* Another PFLP guerrilla commander, Jabir, estimated that only two out of every 30 patrols sent from Jordan to Gaza reached it.*

49. *Jerusalem Post*, 28 November 1968; and *Davar*, 26 November 1969.
50. Israeli official sources cited in *Arab Report & Record*, 1–15 January 1971.
51. The impact of Israeli border defences noted in numerous interviews. Also *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 10; and *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 133.
52. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 42–3.
53. Musa al-Shaykh.*
54. On 3–4 May 1970. *Middle East Record 1969–1970*, 188.
55. *A Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 34.
56. *Arab Report and Record 1968.*
57. Ghazi Khurshid (ed.), *Guide to the Palestinian Resistance Movement* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1971), 210–11.
58. *The Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution* (Arab.), two speeches by George Habash in May 1970 (Beirut, n.d. [1970]), 53–4.
59. Noted, among others, by the Arab Liberation Front, *Arab Liberation Front or the Nationalist Experience in Guerrilla Action*, 20.
60. ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim, founder of Battalions of Return group.*
61. *Al-Hurriyya*, 16 May 1969.
62. Samir al-Khatib, then secretary of the PASC council.*
63. Nawfal.*
64. *Our Armed Struggle between Theory and Practice*, 31.
65. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1969*, 79.
66. *A Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 19.
67. Sayigh, PLO executive committee member in 1968–74 and founder of the Planning Centre, referring to later Fateh central committee member Kamal ʿUdwan.*
68. Sayigh, quoting Fateh central committee member Qaddumi.*
69. The document was discovered by Yunis al-Katari, who became secretary to the committee and arrived in Amman in April 1971.*
70. *A Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 18–19 and 21–3.
71. Interviews in *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 26 July 1969. The notion of mobile war was first mentioned by Fateh in early 1968. In 'Eighth Session: Why Am I Fateh?—Programme Three: People's Liberation War', 72.
72. *A Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 21–3.
73. Khatib, *Palestinian Revolutionary Experience*, 85.
74. *Palestinian Resistance and the Arab Situation*, 7.
75. Ibid. 30.
76. *Palestinian Resistance Movement in its Current Reality*, 51; and *Yawm*, 7 November 1969 (cited in *Middle East Record 1969*, 276).
77. On criticism, *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 42–3.
78. *The Resistance and its Problems* (Arab.) (Beirut, n.d. [1970]), 13.
79. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 42–3.
80. Ibid.
81. *Resistance and its Problems*, 15.
82. Ibid. 23.
83. *Al-Hayat*, 3 January 1970.

84. Zabri;* and PFLP, *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 114–15.
85. *Our Armed Struggle between Theory and Practice* (Arab.), in *Military Studies* (Amman, 1970), 18.
86. Quotation from Abu Hammam, *Resistance Seen Militarily*, 40.
87. Abu Salah, then senior cadre in the bureau.*
88. Khawaja, then senior member of committee; and Yaghi, then member of the bureau.*
89. Ra'fat.*
90. Shinnar, then leftist cadre.*
91. ʿAbd-Rabbu. On weapons stores, Nawfal, then senior military cadre of the left.*
92. Nawfal.*
93. PFLP, *Tasks of the Current Phase*, 53–4.
94. Subhi Abu-Kirsh, then senior Fateh Western Sector cadre.*
95. Shinnar.*
96. ʿUmar, and Jayyusi, then Fateh cadres; Jabir, then PFLP 'fugitive' guerrilla; and Dawli.*
97. Abu Zayd, Abu Mahir, and ʿAziz, former 'fugitive' guerrillas; and Mansur, Western Sector cadre.*
98. Bhays.*
99. ʿUmar.*
100. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 123.
101. Ibid.
102. Habib Qahwaji, 'The Arabs in Israel after the 1967 Aggression', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971, 103–4.
103. *Arab Report and Record 1970*; and Elie Rekhess, 'Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza: Political Affinity and National Solidarity', *Asian and African Studies*, 23: 2 and 3 (November 1989), 125–7.
104. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 121–2.
105. Israeli figures cited in *Middle East Record 1968*, table 1, p. 352, and *Middle East Record 1969–1970*, tables 1 and 2, pp. 221 and 223. On PLF/PLA share, Azʿar, *Resistance in the Gaza Strip, 1967–1985* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1987), 142.
106. Amnon Kapeliuk in *'Al Hamishmar*, 11 December 1970. Cited in ʿAli Zayn-al-ʿAbidin al-Husayni, 'Features from the Palestinian Experience of Struggle: Guerilla War in the Cities and Camps of Gaza' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 35, July 1974, 68.
107. *Resistance and its Problems*, 4.
108. Yaghi.*
109. The PFLP later criticized attacks among civilians. *Essays on People's War* (Arab.), Part 2, n.d. [approximately 1989], 134.
110. *Arab Report and Record 1970*.
111. A summary of Palestinian errors is in Husayni, 'Features from the Palestinian Experience', 71–2. The PFLP also criticized the over-confidence of the guerrillas in *Essays on People's War*, 134. Zabri, then PFLP politburo member in charge of military affairs, considered that the military effort should have been rationed to avoid provoking an excessive Israeli reaction.*

112. Khalifa, then field commander.*
113. ʿUmar, Fateh Western Sector cadre.*
114. 'Tenth Session: Our Armed Struggle and How We Must Understand its Course', in Fateh, *Movement's Sessions*, 1–12, 90.
115. Interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 30.
116. Bhays; and ʿUmar, Fateh Western Sector cadre.*
117. PFLP commander quoted in *Akhir Saʿa*, 17 April 1968. Cited in *Middle East Record 1968*, 412.
118. Figures calculated from official Israeli statements reproduced in *Middle East Record 1968* and *Middle East Record 1969–70*.
119. Fateh official interviewed in *Ruz al-Yusif*, 9 February 1970. Cited in *Middle East Record 1969–70*, 250.
120. Various statements cited in *Middle East Record 1969–1970*, 250.
121. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 49.
122. Unidentified Fateh leader interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 30.
123. Pamphlet published in January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 56.
124. 'Liberating the Occupied Lands and the Method of Struggle against Direct Colonialism', in Fateh, *Some Tenets of Guerrilla Action*, 84–5.
125. Quote from *al-Hurriyya*, 1 September 1969.
126. *A Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 85.
127. 'Fateh: Birth and March, A Conversation with Kamal ʿUdwan', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973, 56.
128. 'Birth and March', 39.
129. *Al-Hurriyya*, 8 September 1969.
130. Ibid. 16 May 1969.
131. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 46 and 48.
132. *Military Strategy of the PFLP*, 90–2.
133. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 49.
134. *Al-Hurriyya*, 29 July 1968.
135. ANM, *After the Colonialist Zionist Aggression*, 27, 29, 30, and 31.
136. *Al-Hadaf*, 6 September 1969.
137. PFLP, *The Popular Front and External Operations, Discussions* (Arab.) (Beirut, n.d.), 12 and 29.
138. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 46; and Abu Hammam, *Resistance Seen Militarily*, 46.
139. Interview in *al-Nahar*, 25 February 1969.
140. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 46–7.
141. Interview in *al-Nahar*, 25 February 1969.
142. From a statement in *al-Hadaf*, 13 September 1969.
143. *The Times*, 29 September 1970. Cited in *Middle East Record 1969–70*, 268.
144. Term used in Muhammad Shadid, 'Palestinian Revolutionary Violence as a Factor in US Middle East Policy' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 92/93, July/August 1979, 92.
145. *Al-Thawra*, 29 December 1968. Cited in *Middle East Record 1968*, 418.

146. Hawatma in *al-Anwar*, 4 September 1969. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1969*, 108.
147. *Jerusalem Post*, 19 March 1969.
148. Statistics cited in Fateh, *Revolution Until Victory*, 22.
149. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 10.
150. *The Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution*, 32.
151. *The Revolutionary Alternative to the Liquidationist Proposal for a Palestinian State* (Arab.), PFLP Central Information Department, 1974, 48.

9 The Making of the Palestinian Political System

1. Unidentified Fateh official interviewed in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 31.
2. Quoted in Talal Salman, *With Fateh and the Guerrillas* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1969), 73–4.
3. Ibid. 76.
4. Naji ʿAllush, 'Concerning the Strategy of the Arab Revolution' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 3: 7 (May 1967), 4.
5. ʿAllush, 'Is the Palestinian Revolution an Arab Nationalist Movement?', 52–3.
6. Reproduced in Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 65.
7. Fateh, *Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban Experiences*, 47–50.
8. *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 9.
9. Yusif Sayigh, *Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1968), 64–5.
10. *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 9.
11. Ibid. 10.
12. Khalid al-Hasan and Husayn, *Unknown Pages from the Life*, 155.
13. 'The Laws of People's War' (Arab.), in *Revolutionary Studies*, n.d. [1969], 169.
14. Hasan, 'Fateh between Theory and Practice', 9.
15. *Al-Hurriyya*, 8 April 1968.
16. This thinking was best clarified in a subsequent public statement in February 1969. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1969*, 36-47.
17. *Al-Hurriyya*, 10 June 1968.
18. Interviewed in *al-Majlis*, autumn 1995.
19. The term 'dialogism' describes the 'constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others'. Borrowed from Linda Layne, *Home and Homeland: The Dialogies of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan* (Princeton, 1994), 9. The author is citing a term used by M. Bakhtin and explained by his editor Michael Holquist.
20. Notions borrowed from Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1968), 22–3. He defines 'practical ideology' as a set of ideas designed to provide rational instruments for action.
21. This definition of 'traditionalization' from Joseph Massad, 'Conceiving the Masculine: Gender and Palestinian Nationalism', *Middle East Journal*, 49: 3 (Summer 1995), 468.

22. Naji ʿAllush, 'The Palestinian National Liberation Movement and Mass Action' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973, 15.
23. In addition to numerous interviews, see ʿUthman Abu-Gharbiyya, *Organization between Theory and Practice in our Experience* (Arab.), 1984, 72–4.
24. Habash; and Abu al-Raʾid, then head of Amman branch.*
25. Abu-Gharbiyya, *Organization*, 218.
26. Shafiq, *Concerning Contradiction and Practice*, 59–60.
27. For example, Salah Khalaf, 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971, 35.
28. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 60–1.
29. Qumbarji, then member of regional command in Egypt. Branch head Hayil ʿAbd-al-Hamid was abroad, and command was temporarily assumed by Hani al-Hasan.*
30. Abu-Nidal, *History of the Crisis in Fateh*, 45.
31. Ibid. 46.
32. Habash;* and Naji ʿAllush, writing later in *al-Hurriyya*, 4 May 1971.
33. ʿAllush, 'Palestinian National Liberation Movement and Mass Action', 16.
34. Habash, head of militia after November 1968; and Abu al-Raʾid, then head of Amman branch.* Complaints of lack of arms for the militia also noted in Naji ʿAllush in *al-Hurriyya*, 4 May 1971.
35. For example in the north, with guerrilla commander Maʿadh al-Abid. According to Yahya Yakhlif, then member of local branch command.*
36. Ghnaym.*
37. Mahjub ʿUmar.*
38. 'Fateh Starts the Discussion', 11.
39. Ghazi al-Husayni, former aide to the mufti.*
40. *Fath: al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya*, No. 12, 6 October 1968.
41. Sakhr (Yahya Habash), *Basis of Revolutionary Behaviour* (Arab.), n.d., 24.
42. Detail in Yusif ʿAbd-al-Haq, 'The Martyrs' Families' Institution: Social Protection for the Palestinian Struggle', *Samid al-Iqtisadi*, 12: 79 (January–February–March 1990).
43. Brief histories in Fathi Arafat, *Health, War and Steadfastness* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1989); and ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz al-Labadi, *The Palestinian Red Crescent* (Arab.) (Amman, 1988).
44. *Middle East Record 1969–1970*, 253.
45. Habash, founder and head of the programme;* and *Middle East Record 1969–1970*, 251–2. Further detail in ʿAllush, 'Palestinian National Liberation Movement and Mass Action', 17–18.
46. Habash.*
47. Sabri, and ʿAbd-al-Karim, then intelligence officers; and ʿAbd-al-Rahim.*
48. Ghnaym, then head of military administration in the general command.*
49. ʿAmmar.*
50. ʿAmmar; and Ghazi Husayni, then intelligence officer.*
51. Ghazi Husayni, former confidant of the mufti and then Fateh intelligence officer

who conducted the investigation;* and Khalaf in *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 11.

52. A record of Muslim Brotherhood 'martyrs' in 1968–70 offers a useful sample of their varied origins. Muhammad ʿAbd-al-Qadir Abu-Faris, *Martyrs of Palestine* (Arab.) (Amman, 1990), 376–86. On the absence of ILP members, ʿUbaydi, *Islamic Liberation Party*, 65.
53. Details from ʿAbdullah Abu-Izza, *With the Islamist Movement in the Arab Countries* (Arab.) (Kuwait, 1991), 123–65. Cited in Khalid al-Hrub, *Palestinian Islamism: Hamas, its Thought and Political Practice* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1996), 30.
54. ʿAbdullah al-ʿAzzam, *Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement, its Historical Roots and Charter* (Arab.) (Qaywayn, 1989), 71; and *al-Sabil*, No. 10, 8.
55. Yahya Yakhlif, then leftist member of branch command in north.*
56. Ghazi Husayni, and Habash;* and ʿUbaydi, *Islamic Liberation Party*, 65.
57. *History of the Crisis in Fateh*, 45.
58. Ghnaym.*
59. ʿUthman Abu-Gharbiyya, then senior Fateh cadre; and Abu al-Raʾid.*
60. ʿAllush, ʿAwda, and Abu al-Raʾid.*
61. Habash.*
62. Habash continued to deny any role many years later. Interview in *al-Wasat*, 6 November 1995.
63. Ishaq, then senior PLF cadre; and Shinnar, then ANM sector head.*
64. ʿAbd-Rabbu, then member of PFLP command; Dawli, then ANM sector commander; and Abu-Rashid, then PLF cadre.*
65. Dawli.*
66. Raʾfat, and Shinnar.*
67. Hammuda, then senior ANM cadre.*
68. ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
69. Hani Hindi.*
70. ʿAbd-Rabbu, Khawaja, and Hammuda.*
71. Ghazi al-Khalili, then senior ANM cadre in whose house the document was drafted.*
72. *The Basic Political Report of the PFLP* (Arab.), August 1968.
73. Ibid. 37.
74. *Al-Hurriyya*, 28 October 1968.
75. Estimates of strength from Mustafa al-Zabri, then member of PFLP military command; and ʿAli Ishaq, then member of the PF–GC military command.*
76. Zabri, then member of the PFLP military command; Khawaja, then a senior cadre in Jordan; and ʿAbd-Rabbu.* The same accusation was later repeated by Jibril's internal opponents. See PF–GC, *Internal Memorandum* (Arab.), 21 December 1976, 2.
77. Yaghi, then senior officer in south Jordan; and ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
78. Hammuda.*
79. *Al-Hurriyya*, 11 November 1968; and Qaddura.*
80. ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
81. *Al-Hurriyya*, 17 February 1969.

82. Nawfal.*
83. Nawfal, Shinnar, and Yaghi.*
84. Fawwaz Trabulsi, co-founder.*
85. Khalili.*
86. Nawfal, Shinnar, and Dawli.*
87. *Palestinian Encyclopaedia*, ii. 11–12; and Ahmad Sa'd and 'Abdul-Qadir Yasin, *The Palestinian National Movement 1948–1970* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, 1978), 112.
88. Samir Khatib; 'Abd-al-Rahman Jbara, then politburo member; and Ahmad Zikra.*
89. Khalil al-Hindi, then POLP politburo member.*
90. Zikra.*
91. Khalil Hindi.*
92. *Al-Hurriyya*, 16 May 1969.
93. *Palestinian Resistance and the Arab Situation*, 30.
94. *Concerning Spontaneity and Theory in Palestinian Guerrilla Action*, 91 and 103--4.
95. *Palestinian Resistance and the Arab Situation*, 11, 15, 17, 30, and 33.
96. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 15–16.
97. *The Front . . . and the Question of the Split*, 67 and 85.
98. Hammuda, and 'Ali.*
99. Hammuda, then central committee member and head of the bureau. PFLP military commander Abu Hammam confirmed this attitude generally, without specifying any group, in 'A Critical Stand on the Resistance Before, During, and After the September Events' (Arab.), in *Palestinian Resistance: Reality and Expectations*, 150.
100. Nabil 'Abd-al-Rahman, then political commissar sentenced to death.*
101. *Why the Organization of Lebanese Socialists?*, 156–92.
102. Kazziha, *Revolutionary Transformation*, 100.
103. *Al-Hurriyya*, 10 February 1969; and *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 79.
104. Nazih Hamza, head of the Lebanese branch, in a debate published as 'An Evaluation of the Role of the Arab National Movement in Supporting the Palestinian Resistance Movement' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972, 96. Reference to the Saudi branch in *al-Hadaf*, 3 May 1980.
105. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 85.
106. According to former PFLP cadre and member of the first Lebanese ASAP cell.*
107. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 17.
108. *The Political and Organizational Strategy* (Arab.), Central Information Committee, 1983 (4th edition), 25 and 30.
109. On the role of women, Khawaja; and Um 'Azab, then a woman guerrilla.* On red guard, numerous interviews, for example Hammuda.*
110. Ghazi Khurshid, 'The Palestinian Resistance and Social Work' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 6, January 1972, 117.
111. *Towards the Transformation into a Revolutionary Proletarian Organization* (Arab.), Information Department, April 1970, 37.
112. Noted, for example, by Munir Shafiq, *The September Battle Militarily* (Arab.).
113. On plot, Hani Hindi;* and *Arab Report & Record*, October 1969. Also *al-Dustur*, 23

November 1969, 14 March 1970, and 25 January 1971; and *al-Hawadith*, 7 November 1969. Cited in ʿAbbas Murad, *The Political Role of the Jordanian Army, 1921–1973* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 128.

114. *Al-Anwar*, 4 September 1969. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1969*, 108.
115. George Habash interviewed in *al-Nahar*, 16 December 1969.
116. Khalili, PFLP cadre who arranged contacts with Qadhdhafi.*
117. *Al-Ahram*, 14 December 1969. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1969*, 76.
118. Salman, *With Fateh and the Guerrillas*, 6.
119. *Al-Hadaf*, 26 July 1969.
120. *Military Thinking of the PFLP*, 50–1.
121. Hammuda.*
122. Matar (ed.), *Doctor of the Revolution*, 108–10.
123. ʿAli, Nasim, Huwaydi, and Dakhakhna.*
124. Salman, *With Fateh and the Guerrillas*, 41.
125. ʿAli.*
126. Duli.*
127. Yaghi.*
128. Support for the communist guerrillas expressed in various editions of *al-Hurriyya* in autumn 1968 and 1969. On secret military assistance, Nawfal, and ʿAbd-al-Karim.*
129. *Arab Liberation Front*, 10.
130. According to Baʿth Party founder Michel ʿAflaq. Cited in Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 123.
131. ʿAbd-al-Wahhab al-Kayyali, 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972, 46.
132. Abu Khalid, later ALF military commander.* According to one source, Palestinians formed 30 per cent of ALF membership, Lebanese 35 per cent, Iraqis 30 per cent, with the rest composed of Syrians and other nationalities.
133. Majid al-Khatib, later ALF battalion commander and member of its military council.*
134. *Al-Anwar*, 14 August 1969. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestinian Cause 1969*, 121.
135. Wazir;* and Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 85.
136. Kayyali, *The Palestinian Struggle: Lessons and Examples* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1972), 32.
137. ʿAmla, then camp commander.*
138. ʿAmla, and Wazir.*
139. Extended critiques by leading ALF ideologue Tariq Ahmad, 'The Palestinian State between Tactical Error and Strategic Sellout' (Arab.), dated February 1970 and reprinted in Tariq Ahmad, *The State of Part of Palestine: A Discussion of the Slogan of the Democratic Palestinian State* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973).
140. Zikra.*
141. Mahmud Hawdan, later PPSF military commander.*
142. The regulations consisted of 8 main points and 15 Articles. PDFLP, *Palestinian Resistance and the Arab Situation*.

143. 'How the Popular Armed Revolution Erupts', 163.
144. *Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution*, 32.
145. Basic Political Report. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 662.
146. Ibid. 664; and *al-Hurriyya*, 25 August 1969.
147. *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 667.
148. 'Birth and March', 32–3.
149. *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 17.
150. Yahya, and Samir Khatib.*
151. *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 17.
152. AOLP statement, 28 August 1969. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1969*, 125.
153. *Dialogue about the Principal Issues*, 7.
154. Khalid al-Hasan.*
155. *Palestinian Chronology*, 3 January 1972, xv. 9.
156. Hamid, *Resolutions*, 97.
157. Ibid., 'Resolutions on Popular Organization', Items 1–5, 116–17.
158. Shihada Yusif, *Palestinian Reality and the Union Movement* (Beirut, 1973), 85 and 88–9.
159. Ibid. 94 and appendix 1, tables 1 and 2. The author uses 1960 statistics for Syria, but estimates that the figure of 20,000 members represents *less* than one-quarter of the total by 1970–1.
160. Mindis, *Labour and Workers*, 209–10.
161. Shihada Musa, 'Comments on the Experience of the General Union of Palestinian Teachers' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 16, December 1972, 159–60.
162. Hamid, *Resolutions*, 234.
163. *Al-Ahram*, 6 February 1969. Cited in *Middle East Record 1969–70*, 332.
164. *Al-Sayyad*, 12 February 1969. Cited in *Middle East Record 1969–70*, 332.
165. 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Resistance about the Problems of Palestinian Guerilla Action', Part 2, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971, 40.
166. Hamid, *Resolutions*, 120.
167. *Sawt Filastin*, July 1969.
168. *Al-Nahar*, 4 June 1969.
169. Ibid.
170. Jamal Abu-Zayid, Badran, Turk, Shaqqura, Sarsur, and ʿAjiz, among others.*
171. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1969*, 70–1.
172. *Daily Star*, 30 December 1969. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestinian Cause 1969*, 79.

10 Dual Power

1. Fateh leaders quoted in *Le Monde*, 12 November 1970; Hani Hindi, Ishaq;* Kayyali, *Palestinian Struggle*, 39; and the PLA, *The Palestinian Resistance and the Lessons Drawn from the Circumstances through which it has Passed* (Arab.), Education and Awareness Section, General Affairs and Moral Guidance Branch, Damascus,

1971 [*c*. February], 12–13. Also noted, and criticized, in *Fateh in the Service of the People* (Arab.), Mobilization and Organization Bureau, No. 101, 10. Cited in ʿAzm, *Critical Study*, 209.

2. This was subsequently admitted by all groups. Wazir, Khalid al-Hasan, Habash, ʿAllush, Ghnaym, Nawfal, Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, Hani Hindi, Zabri, Yaghi, Ishaq; and Ishaq al-Khatib, later communist guerrilla cadre.* Also the verbal report by PLO central committee secretary Ibrahim Bakr in February 1971. Cited in Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 2, May 1971, 147.
3. *Ten Years after the Re-establishment of the Palestinian Communist Party* (Arab.) (n.p., n.d.), 48.
4. Muhammad Bashir, then head of military intelligence; and Maʿn Abu-Nuwar, then head of the army's moral guidance branch.*
5. Naji ʿAllush, 'Towards a New Strategy for the Palestinian Revolution' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, No. 4, February 1971, 10.
6. *Guerrilla Action in Jordan*, 34.
7. 'How the Popular Armed Revolution Erupts', 165.
8. Statement in *al-Hurriyya*, 17 February 1969. Appeal to Nasir confirmed by Huwaydi.*
9. ʿAllush, 'Towards a New Strategy for the Palestinian Revolution', 11–12.
10. ʿAbbas Murad, *The Political Role of the Jordanian Army, 1921–1973* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 124.
11. Two detailed accounts are offered in Khalil al-Hindi, 'Jordanian Mobilization against the Palestinian Resistance before the September 1970 Onslaught' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971.
12. *Al-Aqsa* and *al-Jundi* viewed in a private collection.
13. Maʿn Abu-Nuwar in a press interview reproduced in *al-Hurriyya*, 22 February 1971.
14. *Al-Hadaf*, 2 May 1970.
15. Testimony of three Special Branch operatives, including a senior officer, presented to Fateh Intelligence. Text in Nabil Sha'th, with Khalil al-Hindi, Fu'ad Bawarshi, and Shihada Musa (eds.), *The Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1971), 472–8.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 75–6.
19. Interviewed in *Jeune Afrique*, 19 October 1971. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 809.
20. *Al-Hadaf*, 9 May 1970.
21. *Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime*, 139.
22. Quoted in Bilal al-Hasan, 'The September Events and the Responsibility of the Jordanian Regime', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No.1, March 1971, 49.
23. Details and figures from an interview with the head of the Popular Resistance, in *al-Nahar*, 12 February 1970.

24. Abu-Nuwar.*
25. Text in *Jordanian Documents 1970* (Arab.) (Amman, 1971), 31–3.
26. 'The Palestinian Resistance and the Arab Situation', 14–15.
27. Ibid. 32.
28. *Al-Hurriyya*, 23 February 1970.
29. Internal memorandum from the central organization bureau of the PDFLP, 15 February 1970. Cited in Hasan, 'September Events', 42.
30. Ibid. 30 March 1970.
31. *Al-Sharara*, No. 6, April 1970.
32. *Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution*, 14 and 17.
33. *June Defeat and the Launch of the Revolution*, 17.
34. *Al-Hadaf*, 14 and 21 March 1970.
35. *Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution*, 42–4.
36. *Al-Hadaf*, 14 and 21 March 1970.
37. ʿAwda, ʿAllush, and Abu al-Raʾid;* and Abu Thaʾir, 'Fateh Press and the Revolution' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973, 71.
38. ʿAwad Khalil, 'The Course of the Palestinian Left from Marxism to Perestroika' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 212, November 1990, 30.
39. 'Special Document' (Arab.), cited in Khurshid, *Guide to the Palestinian Resistance Movement*, 87.
40. Saʿiqa representative on the PLO executive committee, Sami al-ʿAtari, interviewed in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972, 34.
41. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 566.
42. *Qadaya al-Silm wa al-Ishtirakiyya*, No. 10/11, 1968.
43. JCP, *The Jordanian Communist Party in the Struggle to Repel the Imperialist–Israeli Aggression and Liquidate It* (Arab.), report of the poliburo, unanimously approved by the central committee of the JCP in its meeting of late August 1968, 19.
44. Sharif, *On Communist Thought*, 112.
45. Ishaq al-Khatib; and Samir ʿAbdullah, then communist cadre.*
46. *Ten Years after the Re-establishment*, 52.
47. Decision and date confirmed in JCP, *The Economic Roots of the Rightist Opportunism* (Arab.), February 1971, 18. The same publication stated that the 'right wing' had approved the decision at the time, and similarly the use of 'Molotov cocktails' against Israeli troops in the West Bank.
48. Ibid. 53–4.
49. Ishaq Khatib, and ʿAruri.* Confirmed in JCP, *Political Report of the Party Conference* (Arab.), April 1970, 9.
50. Ishaq Khatib.*
51. *Ten Years after the Re-establishment*, 55.
52. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1970*, 130–1.
53. Hasan ʿAsfur, then communist cadre.*
54. *Report of the Jordanian Communist Party* (Arab.), March 1971, 5.
55. First quote from V. Kondrashov, in *Isvestya*, 8 May 1966. Second quote from Soviet note to Israel, 6 November 1966. Both cited in Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna, *PLO Strategy and Tactics*, 85.

56. Arafat to *SANA News Agency*, 13 April 1970.
57. *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, 12 April 1970.
58. A Palestinian critique of the attitude of the Arab communist parties towards the Palestine conflict since 1948 is Naji ʿAllush, 'The Arab Communists and the National Liberation Movement' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 3: 1 (November 1966).
59. LCP, *The Struggle of the Lebanese Communist Party through its Documents* (Arab.), Part I (Beirut, 1971), 43; and LCP, *The Lebanese Communists and the Tasks of the Coming Phase* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1972), 342.
60. *Issues of Conflict in the Syrian Communist Party* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1972), 84.
61. ʿAruri, and Ansar platoon commander, name withheld upon request.*
62. Ishaq Khatib.*
63. Ansar platoon commander.*
64. ʿAruri.* The Salfiti faction later criticized the slogan strongly. *Ten Years after the Re-establishment*, 48.
65. Letter of appointment from the king to the army deputy chief-of-staff, major-general Muhammad Khalil ʿAbd-al-Dayim, cited in Hasan, 'September Events', 49–50.
66. Text in *Jordanian Documents 1970*, 44.
67. *Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution*, 19–20.
68. Ibid. 52.
69. Full text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1970*, 300–1.
70. Ibid. 301.
71. 'Why is the PFLP Taking Part in the Seventh Palestine National Council and in Token Form?' (Arab.), Statement issued in May 1970, 10.
72. Akram al-Safadi.*
73. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1970*, 8; and *Palestinian Chronology*, xii. 33.
74. Arafat interview in *al-Hayat*, 30–31 December 1989. This account is confirmed by both Palestinian and Jordanian sources.
75. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 80.
76. It is not clear if the Palestinian Left was consulted, but the PDFLP, at least, subsequently confirmed its opposition to the formation of a 'national government' because this would imply reconciliation between the two authorities in the country. PDFLP, *Politburo Report*, presented to the founding conference convened on 21 August 1970, 21 (cited in Bilal al-Hasan, 'September Events', 42.)
77. *Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime*, 92.
78. Text in *Jordanian Documents 1970*, 102–3.
79. This use of the notion of 'multiple sovereignty' borrowed from Timothy Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolutionaries in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton, 1992), 185.
80. For examples of Saʿiqa statements, *Palestinian Chronology*, xi. 546 and 551.
81. *Fath*, for example on 1 and 2 July 1970.
82. The PFLP acted on Habash's orders. Tamimi, then Habash aide.*
83. *Al-Ahram*, 17 August 1970.
84. Safadi.*

85. Fateh spokesman, *Palestinian Chronology*, 6 August 1970, vol. xii; and Donald Browne, 'The Voices of Palestine: A Broadcasting House Divided', *Middle East Journal*, 29: 2 (Spring 1975), 140–1.
86. Naji ʿAllush, *Towards a New Revolution* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1972), 45–6.
87. 'Fateh: Birth and March, a Conversation with Kamal ʿUdwan', 52. For a similar view, PLO executive committee member Ibrahim Bakr, cited in Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 2, May 1971, 147.
88. ʿAbbas Murad, then Jordanian officer and secret Fateh member.*
89. Fateh intelligence officer, and Habash, then responsible for political contacts in the army.*
90. Fateh intelligence officer, and Saʿid Maragha.* Many years later Maragha still insisted that a *coup* would have succeeded.
91. Fateh intelligence officer.*
92. Nawfal, then deputy PDFLP military commander in the north.*
93. Yaghi, then head of PFLP military administration in whose house the meetings took place.*
94. Safadi, and Khawaja.*
95. Hammuda.*
96. Murad, *Political Role of the Jordanian Army*, 135.
97. Text in *Jordanian Documents 1970*, 143.
98. Khalil al-Hindi, then politburo member.*
99. Nayif Hawatma, *Action after the October War to Defeat the Surrenderist Liquidationist Solution and Extract the Right of Self-Determination* (Arab.) (DFLP, 1974), 39.
100. ʿAbd-Rabbu, then PDFLP deputy secretary-general; and Khalil Hindi, then politburo member.*
101. Politburo report submitted to the conference, ch. 1, p. 21. Cited in Hasan, 'September Events', 42.
102. ʿAbd-Rabbu, Nawfal, Bilal al-Hasan, then politburo member, and Hani Hindi.*
103. ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
104. Formal memorandum, quoted in *Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime*, 104.
105. Interviewed in *al-Nahar*, 6 September 1970.
106. *Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution*, 49–50.
107. *Al-Hadaf*, 1 August 1970.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid. 8 August 1970.
110. Figures from Yaghi.* A lower estimate of 500 guerrillas is offered by Safadi, then PFLP military command member.*
111. Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, then sector commander.*
112. Confirmed, for example, by Khawaja, Hammuda, and ʿAli.*
113. Ibid. 5 September 1970.
114. *Ha'aretz*, 14 September 1970.
115. *Al-Hadaf*, 19 September 1970.

116. Ibid. 10 October 1970.
117. Ibid. 19 September 1970.
118. Ibid. 12 September 1970.
119. Khawaja.*
120. Tamimi.*
121. ʿAli.*
122. Khawaja.*
123. Yahya, who negotiated the release of the passengers with the PFLP; Hammuda, then head of PFLP branch in Baqʿa refugee camp; and Nabil ʿAbd-al-Rahman, then PFLP base commander.*
124. Then senior Jordanian intelligence analyst.*
125. 'Fateh: Birth and March, a Conversation with Kamal ʿUdwan', 52.
126. Fateh information official Munir Shafiq, in 'The Arab Dilemma and the Rogers Plan, panel discussion reproduced in *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, No. 12, October 1970, 127.
127. Interview in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971, 35.
128. Ahmad Jibril, 'The Crisis of the Resistance Movement: A Self-Critique' (Arab.), lecture given on 28 November 1972, PF–GC, 12.
129. PLA, *Palestinian Resistance and the Lessons Drawn*, 19–20.
130. *Jeune Afrique*, 19 October 1971. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 808.
131. Wazir.*
132. Cited by former Fateh central committee member, and member of the PLO executive committee and PNC, Husam al-Khatib, 'Whither the Palestinian Revolution?' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971, 17.
133. For example, to the PDFLP. Hindi.*
134. 'Fateh: Birth and March, a Conversation with Kamal ʿUdwan', 52.
135. Mahjub ʿUmar, senior cadre present at the relevant encounter.*
136. Yusif Sayigh, then a fellow member of the PLO executive committee.*
137. Evident in public statements by Arafat, quoted in Sadiq al-ʿAzm, *A Critical Study of the Thought of the Palestinian Resistance* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 62 and 65; and Abu Hammam, 'A Critical Look at the Resistance Before, During, and After the September Events' (Arab.), in *Palestinian Resistance: Its Reality and Expectations*, 151–2.
138. *Al-Nahar*, 3 and 4 September 1970.
139. The Iraqi message was made public by Jordan. Ibid. 3 September 1970.
140. *Al-Sharara*, 1 September 1970.
141. This is borne out in the published minutes of the meeting. Text in ʿAbd-al-Majid Farid (ed.), *From the Minutes of ʿAbd-al-Nasir's Arab and International Meetings* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1979), 250–1.
142. *Palestinian Chronology*, xii. 317.
143. Former senior Jordanian intelligence analyst.*
144. First reported in *al-Sharara*, 8 September 1970.
145. Palestinian sources at the time suggested that generals Kasib al-Sfuk and Ghasib ʿAtallah were among the ringleaders. Ibid. 8 September 1970.
146. Hamid, *Resolutions of the Palestine National Council*, 171.
147. Khatib, *Palestinian Revolutionary Experience*, 101.

148. Nayif Hawatma, interviewed in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971, 53.
149. *Fath*, 11 September 1970.
150. Wafiq Ramadan, 'Jordan', *al-Nahar* Special Report, No. 57, Beirut, 26.
151. Texts of resignations and appointments in *Official Gazette* (Arab.), 15 September 1970; and *Jordanian Documents 1970*, 174–5.
152. Nawfal.*
153. Mahjub ʿUmar, senior cadre present.*

11 End of a Myth

1. Bashir.*
2. Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 450–1.
3. Ibid.; and Bashir.*
4. Text in *Guerrilla Action in Jordan*, 134–47.
5. ʿAmla, then a committee member; and Habash, then member of Fateh regional command.*
6. Texts of plans reproduced in *Guerrilla Action in Jordan*, 214–16 and 217–25, for example. Confirmed by ʿAwda.*
7. PFLP, *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 139.
8. Dawli.*
9. PDFLP, *The September Campaign: Lessons and Results* (Arab.) (Jordan, n.d. [early 1971]), 18 n. 1.
10. Confirmed for example by Wazir, Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, and Nawfal.*
11. Munir Shafiq, *The September Battle Militarily* (Arab.).
12. Khatib, *Palestinian Revolutionary Experience*, 94 and 96–7.
13. Entry for Jordan, *The Military Balance 1970* (London, 1971).
14. Official figures cited in Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 449–50. Lower estimate in ibid. 658 n. 1; and Bashir.*
15. Figures based on numerous interviews, for example, Wazir, ʿAwda, ʿAmla, Nasr Yusif, Abu al-Ra'id, ʿUmar, Zabri, Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, Yaghi, Safadi, Nawfal, Dawli, Ishaq, Abu Khalid, Samir Khatib, Yahya, Shaqqura, Ishaq Khatib, Qaddumi, Sarsur, Abu-Marzuq, and Tamraz.* Also, *Black September* (Beirut, 1971), 59; and *Guerrilla Action in Jordan*, 11, 13, and 18.
16. *Black September*, 59. These figures appear broadly accurate.
17. Wazir, and Nawfal.*
18. Arafat later stated that PLO forces in Amman totalled 1,500 guerrillas and 4,000 militiamen. *Palestinian Chronology*, xv. 15.
19. Nawfal.*
20. Yakhlif; Nawfal; and Marwan Bakir, then political officer in the PFLP northern sector.
21. Confirmed in Munir Shafiq, *The Palestinian Revolution between Criticism and Destruction* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 157.
22. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 85. Also Patrick Seale, *Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire* (London, 1992), 78.

23. Qaddumi, then liaison officer.*
24. Murad, then Jordanian officer and secret Fateh member.*
25. Hammuda, the PFLP liaison officer with the Iraqis.*
26. Wazir, and Bashir.*
27. Nawfal.* Syrian force details in *Guerrilla Action in Jordan*, 98; Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 453–6; internal Jordanian army report cited in *al-Hadaf*, 18 September 1971; and confirmed by a former Syrian general.*
28. Several vehicles were hit in a brief encounter between Syrian and Iraqi units. Witnessed by Murad.*
29. Official statement cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xii. 417.
30. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 85.
31. Mahmud ʿAbbas, 'Political Papers: How Similar Yesterday is to Today . . . But?', unpublished manuscript, 107.
32. Details in Ephraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography* (London, 1991), 47–50 and 59–60. Saddam Husayn admitted many years later that he too had opposed intervention in Jordan, supposedly in order to avoid bloodshed between fellow Arabs (*al-Siyasa*, 17 January 1981). Cited in ibid. 60. Sudanese leader Jaʿfar al-Nimayri accused Takriti of receiving a hefty Jordanian bribe, in his memoirs in *al-Hayat*, 25–29 April 1991.
33. PLA participation confirmed in *Sawt Filastin*, No. 33, December 1970.
34. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London, 1979), 619 and 628.
35. Jibril made one such plea, according to a lieutenant at PF–GC headquarters in Damascus who received the message. Name withheld on request.*
36. Mansur Sharif, brigade commander.*
37. Wazir, and ʿAmla.*
38. *Palestinian Chronology*, xii. 391.
39. Text in *Jordanian Documents 1970*, 213 and 215–16.
40. Khalaf's account in Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 85–8.
41. Sharif, Hdayb. ʿAli.*
42. *Palestinian Chronology*, xii. 410.
43. Texts in *Jordanian Documents 1970*, 257–60; and *Arab Documents 1970*, 657–9.
44. Lower figure offered by Habis al-Majali, *Palestinian Chronology*, 26 September 1970, xii. 409. Some Israeli sources spoke of 20,000 dead. Ibid. 409. Arafat gave the reasonable estimate of 3,400 dead and 10,800 wounded in *Fath*, 24 March 1971.
45. Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 459; Arafat, cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, 3 January 1972, xv. 9; and numerous interviews, for example Bashir; Muhammad Jihad, Murad, and Mazin Hijazi, former officers; and Mahjub ʿUmar, Fateh official responsible for transporting the defectors to Syria.*
46. Based on PLO Social Affairs Institution files viewed by the author. Arafat gave the total as 910, but claimed that 860 of them belonged to Fateh, *Palestinian Chronology*, xii. 684. Khalaf gave the more plausible estimate of 700–800 Fateh casualties, including the seriously wounded (ibid. 684). The PLA stated the loss of 'hundreds of martyrs', *Sawt Filastin*, No. 33, December 1970, 37. The record of PLA losses in other wars and total casualties recorded in the PLA archives suggest that the loss

was in fact far lower. The Saʿiqa representative to the PLO executive committee Sami al-ʿAtari stated the loss of 93 dead, although it is not clear if this refers to casualties incurred only in September 1970. 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance', 35. The PFLP gave a figure of only 50, which is less than the number registered with the PLO Social Affairs Institution, *Register of the Immortals* (Arab.), Part 1, register of martyrs 1964–1970 (Beirut, n.d.).

47. Lower figure based on the register of the Palestinian Social Affairs Institution, which did not include all fatalities. Viewed by the author. Higher figure from a PRCS statement reproduced in *Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime*, 502. The latter may have included Palestinian military casualties.
48. Figure of 16,000–20,000 detainees given by king Husayn and a Jordanian general, while Adgham reported 25,000 (ibid. 240); and *Palestinian Chronology*, xii. 403 and 642.
49. Khatib, *Palestinian Revolutionary Experience*, 98; and *Fath*, 24 March 1971.
50. On loss of Arab aid, *Annual Report of the Central Bank of Jordan 1970* (Amman, 1971), 3 and 27.
51. Text of letter of appointment in *Official Gazette 1970*, 1411–12.
52. Text in *Arab Documents 1970*, 657–8.
53. Khalaf stated that the PLO was pleased, but added that the prime minister Tal later told him that the king had never intended to adhere to the protocol. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *A Palestinian Without Identity* (Arab.) (Kuwait, n.d.), 150.
54. Text of press conference in *Arab Documents 1970*, 706–9.
55. Munib al-Masri, then cabinet minister.*
56. *Al-Hadaf*, 10 October 1970.
57. Ibid. 24 October 1970.
58. ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya, interviewed in May 1991.
59. Interview on 28 December 1970, quoted in ʿAzm, *Critical Study*, 156.
60. Interviewed in *al-Ahram*, 1 February 1971. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 110.
61. Interviewd in *al-Nahar*, 16 January 1971.
62. Abu Ahmad Fuʾad [Fuʾad ʿAbd-al-Karim], 'The Experience of the Palestinian Armed Struggle, from the 1920s to the Contemporary Palestinian Revolution' (Arab.), *al-Tariq*, No. 6, 46.
63. PDFLP, *September Campaign*, 18 n. 1.
64. On the absence of ALF leaders, Kayyali, 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance', 47.
65. Kayyali, *Palestinian Struggle*, 33 and 37.
66. PFLP, *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 139.
67. *Summary of the Political Vision of the PFLP in the Post-September Phase* (Arab.), n.d. [July–August 1971]. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 774–5.
68. Unnamed PF–GC official interviewed in *Ila al-Amam*, No. 367, 17 September 1971.
69. Interview titled 'The Current Crisis of the Resistance Movement' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, No. 4, February 1971, 2.
70. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 139.

71. PFLP, *Tasks of the New Stage* (Arab.), political report of the third national congress, March 1972, 51; and PDFLP, *September Campaign*, 28.
72. *Tasks of the New Stage*, 136.
73. Zabri, and Fuʾad ʿAbd-al-Karim.*
74. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 139.
75. PFLP, *Tasks of the New Phase*, 50.
76. Ibid. 10.
77. PDFLP, *September Campaign*, 6.
78. Ahmad Jibril, 'The Crisis of the Resistance Movement: A Self-Critique' (Arab.), lecture given on 28 November 1972, PF–GC, 1972, 12.
79. Interviewed in *Ila al-Amam*, No. 367, 17 September 1971.
80. Unnamed PF–GC official interviewed in *Ila al-Amam*, No. 367, 17 September 1971; and PF–GC, *The Political Programme*, approved by the fourth general conference, 20–27 August 1973, 30.
81. Interviewed in *Ruz al-Yusif*, No. 2273, 3 January 1972. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1972*, 2.
82. Interview in *al-Ahram*, 1 February 1971. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 110.
83. *Le Monde*, 12 November 1970. Cited in *Middle East Record 1969–70*, 338.
84. 'Current Crisis of the Resistance Movement', 2.
85. *Al-Ahram*, 15 December 1970.
86. *Akhir Saʿa*, 16 December 1970.
87. Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 2, May 1971, 147.
88. *Al-Nahar*, 17 January 1971.
89. 'Birth and March: A Conversation with Kamal ʿUdwan', 53.
90. *Al-Hadaf*, 17 October 1970. Also Tamimi, then aide who travelled with Habash.*
91. Interviewed in *al-Hadaf*, 31 October 1970.
92. Ibid. 17 October 1970.
93. Ibid. 26 December 1970; and *Palestinian National Unity* (Arab.), n.d. [approximately 1973].
94. Khawaja, Hammuda, Yaghi, Subhi Tamimi, ʿAli, Bakir, and Natur.*
95. Natur.*
96. The PFLP officially adopted this view at its third general conference in March 1972.
97. *Al-Hadaf*, 18 March 1972.
98. Figures from Yaghi.*
99. Bakir.*
100. Khawaja.*
101. Khawaja, and Hammuda.*
102. PDFLP, *September Campaign*, 10 and 28.
103. Dawli, who commanded the guerrillas sent to Syria.*
104. Saʿd and Yasin, *Palestinian National Movement*, 114; and *Ten Years after the Establishment*.
105. Ibid. 58.

106. Ishaq Khatib, and communist sector commander.*
107. JCP, *Towards a National Front against the Occupation: A Proposed Program* (Arab.), June 1971, 3.
108. Khatib, 'Whither the Palestinian Revolution?', 8.
109. Interviewed in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971, 38.
110. Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance', monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 1, March 1971, 154.
111. *Al-Nahar*, 20 February 1971.
112. See letter of appointment, *Official Gazette 1970*, Amman, 1540–2.
113. General Command of Palestinian Forces statement on 26 March 1971. *Palestinian Chronology*, xiii. 322.
114. Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 1, 158; and *al-Hadaf*, 24 October 1970.
115. Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 460 and 471; PDFLP, *Black September*, 59; Arafat, interviewed in *Fath*, 24 March 1971; and *al-Hurriyya*, 20 September 1971.
116. Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 460–1; and Ghazi al-Khalili, 'Before Leaving Jordan' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 58, August–September 1976, 53–6.
117. Naji ʿAllush, 'A Pause Immediately after the September Battle' (Arab.), reproduced in *Towards A New Palestinian Revolution*, 15.
118. Naji ʿAllush, 'The Palestinian Revolution Faces the Major Challenges' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 7: 3 (December 1970).
119. 'Popular Army Order' (Arab.), Defence Order no. 1 for 1970, 23 November 1970, *Official Gazette*, No. 2272, 2 December 1970, 1666.
120. *Palestinian Chronology*, xii. 664.
121. Court-martials confirmed by Bashir.*
122. Text in *Arab Documents 1970*, 777.
123. Shafiq, *Palestinian Revolution between Criticism and Destruction*, 13.
124. Khawaja, Hammuda, and Subhi Tamimi.*
125. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 141.
126. Fateh central committee member Salah Khalaf subsequently offered a revealing critique of the guerrilla campaign in 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971, 34–5.
127. *Al-Hadaf*, 26 December 1970.
128. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 63–4.
129. ʿAllush, 'Towards a New Strategy for the Palestinian Revolution', 15.
130. *Al-Nahar*, 17 January 1971.
131. *Al-Hadaf*, 16 January 1971.
132. Interviewed in *al-Nahar*, 17 January 1971.
133. Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim.*
134. The PFLP maintained its view for many years. See *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 141.
135. Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 460–1.
136. Yakhlif.*
137. Fateh radio from Damascus, cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiii. 332.

138. Text in *Arab Documents 1971*, 269–72.
139. Statements in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 265, 267, and 267–8.
140. ʿAwda.* Example of protests in an article by Naji ʿAllush in *al-Huriyya*, 4 May 1971.
141. Statements by Adgham and the final report by the committee, in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 273, 287–9, 291–3, and 295.
142. Government statements on stores, *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 294.
143. Tal, interviewed in *al-Nahar*, 6 June 1971.
144. *Al-Hadaf*, 3 July 1971.
145. *Al-Hurriyya*, 12 July 1971.
146. Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 462; Palestinian communiqués in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 606–7, and 610–11; and Muhammad Kattmattu, *The Palestinian Resistance and the Battle of the Forests* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 36.
147. Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 462.
148. PLO statement in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 112–13; *Fath*, 18 August 1971; Bashir, and Jordanian colonel, name withheld on request; and Ra'fat, then PDFLP commander in ʿAjlun.*
149. Detailed statistics from the PLO Social Affairs Institution, viewed by author; official Palestinian sources in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 84 and 118; press statement by Tal, *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 618–22; and Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *Palestinian Without Identity*, 155.
150. *Arab Documents 1971*, 495–6.
151. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *Palestinian Without Identity*, 155.
152. *Al-Hurriyya*, 12 July 1971; and Sharif; Hdayb; and Hamada Faraʿna, then PF–GC guerrilla in Syria.*
153. Khalil al-Wazir, *Internal Circular* (Arab.) (Amman, spring 1984), 4–5. Also eyewitness account, Hammuda.*
154. Jordanian army spokesman quoted in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 98.
155. Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971, 168.
156. Fateh announced the first series of attacks in August, *Fath*, 25 August 1971.
157. *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 291 and 295.
158. Hamada Faraʿna, then a PDFLP cadre in Jordan; and ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim, then PF–GC cadre in charge of the Jordan branch.*
159. *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 32 and 137; and Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971, 201.
160. Khalaf interviewed in *Jeune Afrique*, 19 October 1971.
161. *Al-Dustur*, 13 September 1970. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 319.
162. *Al-Hayat*, 10 September 1970. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 303.
163. Syrian position relayed by Saʿiqa secretary-general Zuhayr Muhsin to the PLO executive committee, reported in *Beirut*, 18 September 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 344.
164. Unidentified Fateh official, *al-Hayat*, 10 September 1970.
165. *Al-Dustur*, 3 November 1971. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 824–5.
166. Tal's position is confirmed by family members, and by Bashir.*

167. Hasan interviewed by Alan Hart, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?* (London, 1984), 339, 340, and 346. Also confirmed by Hurani, who accompanied Hasan to Cairo and was informed of the secret negotiations as they took place.*
168. Text of Jordanian statement in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 910.

12 Interregnum

1. Al-Haytham al-Ayyubi, 'The Palestinian Resistance in Flexible Dynamic Defence' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 19, March 1973, 28.
2. Murqus, *Palestinian Resistance*, 23.
3. Ibid. 24–5.
4. Ibid. 46 and 127.
5. Ibid. 19–21.
6. Ibid. 126–7.
7. ʿAzm, *Critical Study*, 89–93 for example.
8. Ibid. 199.
9. Ibid. ch.1, and 144 and 171.
10. Ibid. 181–2 for example.
11. Ibid. 186.
12. Ibid. 213–14 and 220.
13. Ibid. 253 and 255; and *idem, Leftist Studies of the Palestinian Cause* (Beirut, 1970), 151–2.
14. Khatib, *Palestinian Revolutionary Experience*, 116–18.
15. Khatib, 'Whither the Palestinian Revolution?', 7, 8, and 30.
16. Quote from Arafat interview in *al-Anwar*, 1 January 1971. Similar sentiments expressed in Khalaf interview in *Jeune Afrique*, 20 October 1970 (cited in *Middle East Record 1969–70*, 340); and Qaddumi interview in 'Current Crisis of the Resistance Movement', 2.
17. PFLP, *Tasks of the Coming Phase*, 80; and ALF, *Arab Liberation Front*, 16.
18. *WAFA News Agency*, 4 July 1972. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1972*, 330.
19. Naji ʿAllush, 'Between Sanctifying Public Appearance and Sanctifying Secrecy' (Arab.), in *Concerning the General Strategic Line of Our Movement and Revolution* (Beirut, 1974), 88.
20. Khalaf, 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Resistance', 30.
21. Khatib, 'Closed Borders, Open Bridges', 51.
22. 'Towards a New Strategy', 145.
23. Public speech reproduced in 'ʿAla al-Fawr', *Iraqi News Agency*, no. 830, 28 December 1970. Quoted in Sadiq al-ʿAzm, *A Critical Study of the Thought of the Palestinian Resistance* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 62 and 65.
24. Qaddumi interview in 'Current Crisis of the Resistance Movement', 4.
25. Interviewed in *Ruz al-Yusif*, 16 August 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 204.

26. 'Our Revolution in its Eighth Year' (Arab.), in *al-Masira*, No. 1, January 1972, 8. Cited in ʿAzm, *Critical Study*, 35.
27. Text of private talk to Fateh guerrillas reproduced in *al-Muharrir*, 20 January 1972. Cited in ibid. 69–70.
28. Shafiq, *Palestinian Revolution between Criticism and Destruction*, 12. A similar view was taken by Naji ʿAllush, in an editorial in *al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya*, No. 31, 1 January 1971.
29. 'Our Revolution in its Eighth Year', 9.
30. Khalaf, 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Resistance', 30.
31. Shafiq, *Palestinian Revolution between Criticism and Destruction*, 44.
32. Interviewed in *Jeune Afrique*, 19 October 1971.
33. Interviewed in 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerilla Action' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971, 281.
34. Subhi Abu-Kirsh, senior Fateh cadre in charge of organization in Gaza.*
35. Police minister Shlomo Hillel and defence minister Moshe Dayan, *Arab Report and Record* for 1970 and 1971.
36. *Maʿariv*, 13 May 1971; Dayan and other official sources, *Middle East Record 1969–1970*, 363; and *Financial Times*, 26 January 1972 (cited in *Arab Report and Record 1972*).
37. *Middle East Record 1969–1970*, 225; and *Arab Report and Record 1971*; and *ʿal Hamishmar*, 30 July 1971.
38. PFLP statement cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiii. 618. Habash interview in 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerilla Action', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971, 298.
39. *Maʿariv*, 1 April 1971.
40. Based on a UN report cited in *Arab Report and Record 1972*. Official Israeli figures published in *Davar*, 6 September 1971; and *Ha'aretz*, 21 October 1971.
41. *Palestinian Chronology*, 8 February 1972, xv. 143.
42. Interview in *al-Diyar*, 23–29 September 1974. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 342.
43. Press statement cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 23–4.
44. *Al-Hurriyya*, 12 July 1971; and *al-Nahar*, 3 November 1971.
45. Press statement cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, 5 July 1971, xiv. 23–4.
46. Interview with ʿAtari, 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Resistance', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972, 34.
47. Wazir; and Adham, then Fateh company commander in Syria. *Also internal memorandum by Wazir, untitled, n.d. [early 1984], 6.
48. Press statement cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, 5 July 1971, xiv. 23–4.
49. Faysal Hurani, then senior party cadre who attended the conference.*
50. *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 450.
51. *Al-Hurriyya*, 12 July 1971.
52. *Al-Yawm*, 6 July 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 28.
53. Hamid, *Resolutions*, 187.

54. Shaqqura, later Qadisiyya commander; and Mansur Sharif, then ʿAyn Jalut commander;* and *al-Hayat*, 24 August 1971 (cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1971*, 23–4).
55. Letter from Haddad reproduced in *al-Hadaf*, 4 September 1971.
56. Letter from Hanafi reproduced in ibid.
57. PLA statement, *al-Nahar*, 25 September 1971. Investigation results in *Hisad al-ʿAsifa*, Fateh newsletter, No. 12, 25 September 1971.
58. *Al-Nahar*, 18 September 1971.
59. Khalaf, 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance', 40–2; and internal memorandum from Wazir, untitled, n.d. [early 1984], 5–6.
60. Ibid. 5; *Hisad al-ʿAsifa*, No. 22, 7 October 1971; Ghnaym;* and *Beirut*, 1 January 1972 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xv. 16).
61. Text of statement in *al-Talaʾiʿ*, 11 October 1971.
62. *Sawt Filastin*, No. 7 (43), July 1971. On Arafat's attitude, Yahya;* and *Beirut*, 13 October 1971 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 427).
63. List in *Bayrut*, 13 October 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 427.
64. *Sawt Filastin*, January 1972.
65. Ibid. February 1972.
66. Bashir;* and Shemesh, *Palestinian Entity*, 147.
67. Bashir.*
68. Order from Budayri, reference 1790/10/88, 30 January 1972. PLA archives.
69. Order from Budayri, reference 5006/1, 7 March 1972. PLA archives. Battalion strength from Shaqqura; Walid Saʿd-al-Din, then battalion operations officer; and Qaddumi, then company commander.*
70. Abu-Marzuq, then deputy commander of the section.*
71. ʿAjiz, then second deputy commander of the section.*
72. An investigation later reported that PLF/PLA personnel in Gaza had not received salaries for five months. Commission report to the PNC cited in *al-Nahar*, 24 January 1973. The truth of the matter was obscured by the fact that Fateh had instructed the PLO Social Affairs Institution to suspend monthly stipends to PLF/PLA families as a means of resisting Budayri, provoking angry complaints from the PLA. *Al-Muharrir*, 22 May 1972; and *Sawt Filastin*, special supplement, June 1972. Khatib was later assigned to head the Moral Guidance Department in the PLA, under Budayri.
73. Abu-Marzuq.*
74. Order from Budayri, reference 21653/10, 5 September 1972. PLA archives.
75. Khalid al-Hasan, *Palestinian Thoughts-3* (Arab.) (Amman, 1988), 92–3.
76. Zabri;* and Ahmad Jibril, 'The Crisis of the Resistance Movement: A Self-Critique', lecture given on 28 November 1972, PF–GC, 1972.
77. On vulnerability, unnamed Fateh official, probably Khalaf, interviewed in *al-Hayat*, 10 September 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 204.
78. *Hisad al-ʿAsifa*, 3 December 1971; and Ahmad Jibril interviewed in *Ila al-Amam*, 24 July 1981. Fateh was unhappy with the Libyan volunteers, and kept most of them in Damascus until they tired and returned home.

79. Abu ʿAzab, Yaghi, and ʿAli.*
80. Implicit in ALF statement, *al-Kifah* (Beirut), 3 January 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiii. 113.
81. Nawfal; Dawli; ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim, and Ishaq, then members of PF–GC military command; and ʿAli, then PFLP military commander in south Lebanon; Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim, then member of PFLP military command; and Abu ʿAzab, then PFLP head of training.*
82. Rex Brynen, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo., 1990), 64 n. 27.
83. Bard O'Neill, *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Boulder, Colo., 1978), 83–4; and Edgar O'Ballance, *Arab Guerilla Power* (London, 1974), 111. Confirmed by Dayan, cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1972*, 76.
84. *Fath*, 1 March 1972; and O'Ballance, *Arab Guerilla Power*, 207.
85. Ahmad Jibril interview in *al-Hawadith*, 24 March 1972. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xv. 326. Palestinian accounts are Ahmad Jibril, *The ʿArqub between Two Raids* (Arab.) (n.p., 1972); Fateh, *The Four-Day War* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1972); and Munir Shafiq, 'The ʿArqub Battle Seen Militarily' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 9, May 1972, 70–7.
86. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1972*, 74–5; and *Palestinian Chronology*, xv. 21–24 June 1972.
87. ʿAllush, 'Towards a New Strategy for the Palestinian Revolution', 144–5.
88. Interviews in 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance', 26; and *Jeune Afrique*, No. 563, 19 October 1971 (text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 807).
89. ʿAbd-al-Qadir Yasin, *The Crisis of Fateh: Its Roots, Dimensions, and Future* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1985), 33.
90. Ibid. 33.
91. Habash, and Ghazi al-Husayni.*
92. ʿAmmar.*
93. Interview in *Jeune Afrique*, No. 563, 19 October 1971. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 809.
94. *Fath*, 25 August 1971.
95. Interview in *Jeune Afrique*, No. 563, 19 October 1971. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 807.
96. Mahjub ʿUmar, who made the proposal.*
97. Salim al-Zaʿnun.*
98. Khalid al-Hasan, *Genius of Failure*, 158.
99. Khatib, 'Whither the Palestinian Revolution?', 26.
100. *Al-Hawadith*, 17 September 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 338.
101. Intervention argument made by Naji ʿAllush, *Fath*, 1 September 1971.
102. For example, Naji ʿAllush, 'A Pause Immediately After the September Battle' (Arab.), in *Towards A New Palestinian Revolution*, 16–17.
103. Abu Hatim, *The Crisis and the Solution: Concerning the Internal Crisis in Fateh*) (Arab.) (n.p., n.d. [1983]), 17.

104. Murad, in whose house several meetings took place.*
105. *Al-Dustur*, 13 September 1970. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 320.
106. Habash, conference secretary.*
107. Exclusion of non-Palestinians from Fateh membership before 1971 confirmed by unnamed Fateh leader in interview in *al-Usbu ʿal-ʿArabi*, 22 January 1968. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 30.
108. Muhammad Jihad, then brigade deputy-commander; Murad, then brigade administrative officer and first intelligence officer; Mazin Hijazi, then administrative officer; and Mahjub ʿUmar, Fateh cadre in charge of evacuating the defectors from Amman.* Arafat gave the figure of 4,500 defectors in spring 1971. *Fath*, 3: 1 (23 March 1971). Also Murad, *Political Role of the Jordanian Army*, 130; and Edroos, *Hashemite Arab Army*, 459.
109. Jihad; Hijazi; Abu Khalid Hashim, then air defence battalion commander; and Abu al-Shaykh, Samih Nasr, and Abu Zaytun, then company commanders.*
110. Usama al-ʿAli, then Force 14 commander; and Fayiz Zaydan, later Force 14 commander;* *Ha'aretz*, 9 March 1972; and Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance', monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971, 201.
111. Muhammad al-ʿAmla, then Fateh central operations officer.*
112. Nawfal.*
113. Mansur Sharif; and ʿAbdullah Jallud, then Abu Hani Group officer.*
114. Muhammad Jihad; and Abu al-Shaykh, later Special Unit commander.*
115. Murad, then chief political officer.*
116. Murad, and Nasr.*
117. Broadcast on 15 January 1973. *Arab Report and Record 1973.*
118. Habash.* Jordanian sources stated that 300 exiles had returned in the first week of the May 1972 amnesty alone. *Al-Dustur*, 11 and 19 May 1972. Cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1972*, 150.
119. Interview in *al-Ahram*, 7 July 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 575.
120. On plots, Burhan Jarrar, then Golan Sector deputy-commander.*
121. Munir Shafiq, *Martyrs and March: Abu Hasan, Hamdi, and their Brothers* (Arab.) (n.p., 1994), 50.
122. Wazir.*
123. Jamal.*
124. Habash, and Hijazi.*
125. Abu-Nidal, *History of the Crisis in Fateh*, 49; and Hdayb, Hasan Abu-Bakr, Abu-Layla, Adham, and Jamal, then company and platoon commanders.*
126. Wazir.*
127. Abu-Nidal, *History of the Crisis in Fateh*, 49.
128. Adham, then 302 Sector platoon commander;* and Abu-Nidal, *History of the Crisis in Fateh*, 51. Further details in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1972*, 36; and *Arab Report and Record*, 14 October 1972.
129. Wazir; and Nawfal, then PDFLP military commander; confirmed by Adham.* Also *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1972*, 36; *Palestinian Chronology*, xvi. 382; and *al-Nahar*, 15 October 1972.

130. Abu-Nidal, *History of the Crisis in Fateh*, 59.
131. Ibid. 60. Statement in *Kul Shay'*, 21 August 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 220.
132. ʿAshur, ʿAbd-al-Muhsin, then senior civilian cadre; and Jamal, then military police NCO.*
133. ʿAbd-al-Muhsin.*
134. Samir Abu-Ghazala, then deputy head of *iqlim*;* *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1972*, 35; and *Palestinian Chronology*, xv. 577 and 579.
135. Abu-Ghazala.*
136. The Jisr al-Bash and Dbayya sections were threatened with detention in 1974, for example. ʿAziz Halima, then Fateh security cadre.*
137. On Hammuda's nickname, ʿAbbas, *Beginnings*, 198.
138. ʿAli; Natur, then head of student organization; and ʿAbd-al-Rahman.*
139. Hani Hindi, and Yaghi.*
140. *Summary of the Political Vision* (in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 774).
141. Ibid. 776.
142. Ibid.
143. Hani Hindi;* and *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1971*, 65.
144. Interviewed in 'Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance', 298.
145. ʿAli, and Bakir.*
146. Confirmed in *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 213.
147. Ibid. 25.
148. Statement in *al-Muqawama*, No. 112, 9 March 1972.
149. Ibid. Also text of statement in *al-Nahar*, 11 March 1972.
150. Former aide to Haddad.*
151. Natur.*
152. Israeli sources suggested that an airplane hijack masterminded by Haddad in February 1972 was planned and executed with members of Egyptian intelligence who supported pro-Nasir government officials jailed by Sadat. *Jewish Chronicle*, 3 March 1972 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xv. 234).
153. Subhi Tamimi, then a close aide to Haddad.*
154. ʿAli, Natur, and numerous other PFLP guerrillas and student cadres.*
155. Statements by the leftist leadership and the military command, in *al-Muqawama*, No. 111, 8 March 1972. Corroborated for example by Khawaja.*
156. Member of the ASAP central committee.*
157. As the PFLP later admitted. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 83–4.
158. Statement on 14 March 1972, in *Arab Report and Record 1972*.
159. ʿAli, and Hammuda, who met Farhan and Abu ʿAli in Damascus.*
160. The PFLP published a document showing that Fateh was supplying 150 leftist guerrillas. Reproduced in *al-Hadaf*, 25 March 1972.
161. ʿAli, ʿAbd-al-Rahman, and a former aide of Khalaf who acted as go-between.*
162. For instance in *al-Muharrir*, 9 March 1972.
163. Bilal al-Hasan, and Khalil Hindi.*

164. Nawfal; and Jamil Hilal, later head of PDFLP information.*
165. Fawwaz Trabulsi, LCAO co-founder and deputy secretary-general; and Nawfal.*
166. Riyad al-Dada, then LCAO central committee member; and Ribhi, Adham, Nazir, Ramadan, and Marwan al-Kayyali, LCAO activists who joined Fateh. Confirmed by Trabulsi.*
167. ʿAli.*
168. *Palestinian Chronology*, 21 May 1973, xvii. 443.
169. Natur, RPFLP cadre who joined the DFLP central committee; and ʿAli, RPFLP military commander who joined the PPSF and then the PF–GC.*
170. 'Concerning the Third National Conference' (Arab.), statement issued by George Habash on 14 March 1972, 28–9.
171. *Political Treatises*, 23.
172. Al-Haytham al-Ayyubi, 'The Military Activity of the Resistance Organizations and Israeli Counter-Operations' (Arab.), *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1971*, 65.
173. *Al-Hadaf*, 23 October 1971. On Soviet offer, *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 11 November 1971 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 458).
174. *Summary of the Political Vision of the PFLP*, 773.
175. Habash speaking on 14 March 1972. Text in *al-Hadaf*, 18 March 1972; and *Political Treatises*, 18.
176. Hani Hindi.*
177. Hani Hindi.*
178. *Al-Muharrir*, 25 February 1972.
179. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 35–6.
180. Ibid. 35–6; and *al-Hadaf*, 18 March 1972.
181. *Concerning the Third National Conference.*
182. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 23.
183. Subhi Tamimi.*
184. *Tasks of the New Stage* (Arab.), political report of the third national congress, March 1972, 15 and 18.
185. Ibid. 79.
186. *Al-Hadaf*, 15 May 1971.
187. *Tasks of the New Phase*, 77.
188. *Political Treatises*, 61.
189. *Tasks of the New Phase*, 111.
190. *Summary of the Political Vision of the PFLP*, 777.
191. *Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Congress April 1981* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1981), 272.
192. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 30.
193. *Summary of the Political Vision of the PFLP*, 776.
194. ʿAmmar, and a close associate of Salama.* Also Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 160–82; Alan Hart, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker*? (London, 1984), 337–8; and Rayyes and Nahas, *Guerrillas for Palestine*, 58–63.

195. For example, 'A Dialogue with the Leaders of Fateh' (Arab.), in Sha'th *et al.*, *Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime*, 322; and *Summary of the Political Vision*, in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 777.
196. *Fath*, 26 January 1972.
197. Interview in *Ruz al-Yusif*, 16 August 1971. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xiv. 204.
198. Meetings confirmed in Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, *Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians* (New York, 1989), 120.
199. Hamid, *Resolutions of the Palestine National Council*, 208–13.
200. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *Palestinian Without Identity*, 155.
201. Numerous Fateh cadres, including Kifah, 'Adnan Abu al-Hayja, and then deputy head of the Jordan Affairs Bureau.*
202. Then deputy head of Jordan Affairs Bureau.*
203. Statements, for example, in *al-Anwar*, 20 May 1972 (cited in *Arab Report and Record 1972*); and *Palestinian Chronology*, 6 January 1972, xv. 28.
204. Border defences described in Khalid al-Hajuj, 'The Participation of the 40th Armoured Brigade in the 1973 War' (Arab.), official report to the defence council of the League of Arab States, 1973, 2.
205. Then intelligence cadre.*
206. Khalaf interview in *al-Wihda*, 1 June 1972. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1972*, 273. Emphasis added.
207. *Fath*, No. 338, 17 May 1972.
208. Interview in *al-Wihda*, 1 June 1972; and press conference, *WAFA News Agency*, 13 June 1972. Texts in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1972*, 273 and 304.
209. *WAFA News Agency*, 13 June 1972. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1972*, 306.
210. Quoted in Hart, *Arafat*, 347.
211. Interviewed in *Jeune Afrique*, No. 563, 19 October 1971. In *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 810.
212. Interviewed in *al-Wihda*, 1 June 1972. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1972*, 273.
213. Khalid al-Hasan interview in *al-Wihda*, 1 June 1972. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1972*, 273.
214. Interview by *WAFA News Agency*, 15 October 1972. In *Palestinian Arab Documents 1972*, 445.
215. O'Ballance, *Arab Guerilla Power*, 221.
216. PLO desire to suppress the terrorist wing confirmed in Muhammad Shadid, 'Palestinian Revolutionary Violence as a Factor in US Middle East Policy' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 92/93, July/August 1979, 204.
217. Assisting this was a former Egyptian intelligence officer, Muhammad Najib Juwayfil, a one-time member of the Muslim Brotherhood Society who had been stripped of his nationality in 1954. Later he was repatriated and reinstated, but joined Fateh in the early 1970s after disagreeing strongly with the policies of the new president, Anwar Sadat.
218. Mahjub 'Umar, 'Vision of the Future' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973, 61.
219. Expression from Khalid al-Hasan, quoted in Hart, *Arafat*, 349.

220. Aide.*
221. Interview in *al-Nahar*, 1 February 1973. In *Palestinian Arab Documents 1973*, 45.
222. Fateh disavowal in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 55 and 61–2. Details of Fateh plan in Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 99–101; Hart, *Arafat*, 357–60; and Ahmad ʿAbd-al-Karim, then a member of the team.* The team was led by Muhammad ʿAwda, former intelligence officer and militia commander in Jordan in 1969–71.
223. Fateh reports, cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 119. The purges may also have been a response to the Libyan-inspired *coup* plot by officers Rafiʿ al-Hindawi and Mahmud al-Khalili in October 1972.
224. Speaking to Arab defence ministers in Cairo. *WAFA News Agency*, 28 January 1973 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 73).
225. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 102.
226. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1973*, 55; and *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 141.
227. ʿUmar, then aide to ʿUdwan; and a PFLP cadre.* Also Antoine Shalhat, 'The Secret of the Two Missing Briefcases?' (Arab.), *Filastin al-Thawra*, Nicosia, No. 553, 13 April 1985, 26–7; and *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1973*, 55.
228. Yasin, *Fateh Crisis*, 37.
229. *Al-Hadaf*, 4 August 1973.
230. Ibid. 18 August 1973.
231. Israeli radio cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, 2 January 1972, xv. 15, and 8 January 1973, vol. xvii; and list of attacks in appendices in ibid., vols. xv and xvi.
232. *Al-Hayat*, 10 August 1972 (cited in *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1972*, 163); and *Jerusalem Post*, 19 January 1973, and *L'Orient–Le Jour*, 23 January 1973 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 48 and 61).
233. Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance', monthly report, *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 15, November 1972, 217; and *Palestinian Chronology*, xvi. 219.
234. A US embassy report estimated the number of guerrillas at 6,000. *Washington Post*, 13 September 1972. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvi. 207.
235. *Al-Nahar*, 22 September 1972; and ʿAbbas Murad, 'Palestinian Military Activity' (Arab.), in *The Fourth Arab–Israeli War: Facts and Interactions* (Beirut, 1974), 139 n. 4.
236. *WAFA News Agency*, 7 January 1973. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 16.
237. *Al-Nahar*, 1 and 17 February 1973.
238. Ibid. 27 February 1973.
239. *Al-ʿAmal*, 16 March 1973.
240. Maronite leader Raymond Edde, *al-Safir*, 14 February and 21 July 1976; and Khalaf, *al-Nahar*, 6 September 1976.
241. Ibid. 13 April; and *al-Muharrir*, 13 April 1973.
242. *Al-Hawadith*, 15 June 1973.
243. *Ila al-Amam*, 27 April 1973.
244. *Al-Nahar*, 28 and 29 April 1973; and *al-Muharrir*, 29 April 1973.
245. Khalid al-Hasan, *The Lebanese Crisis: An Attempt to Understand* (Arab.), Political Papers 8 (Amman, 1986), 9 and 40.

246. *Al-Hayat*, 3 May 1973; and *al-Nahar*, 5 May 1973. Confirmed by Karim Baqraduni, *The Curse of a Nation: From the Lebanon War to the Gulf War* (Arab.) (Beirut, n.d. [1991]), 131.
247. *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 373.
248. *WAFA News Agency*, 3 May 1973.
249. *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 374.
250. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1973*, 144.
251. *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 4 May 1973.
252. *Al-Baʿth*, 3 May 1973 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 379); and official Syrian statement on 8 May (text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1973*, 155–6).
253. Arafat interview in *Tempo*, 14 May 1973 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 419); al-Haytham al-Ayyubi, 'Military Report' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 22, June 1973, 280–1; and Hasan, *Lebanese Crisis*, 40.
254. For example, Fateh radio from Baghdad on 5 May, cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 387.
255. For example, messages from Algerian president Houari Boumediene and South Yemeni president Salim Rubayʿ ʿAli to Arafat on 2 and 5 May, and the Iraqi revolutionary command council statement on 3 May. Cited in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 2 May 1973; *WAFA News Agency*, 5 May 1973; and *al-Jumhuriyya* (Baghdad), 4 May 1973.
256. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 13 May 1973.
257. *WAFA News Agency*, 5 May 1973.
258. According to rebel Lebanese officer Ahmad al-Miʿmari, *al-Muharrir*, 19 February 1976; and *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 417.
259. Ibid. xvii. 399.
260. Ibid. xvii. 402; and ʿIsam al-Salih, 'The May Events in Lebanon' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 22, June 1973, 271.
261. Syrian statement, text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1973*, 155–6; and *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 379 and 405.
262. *Al-Nahar*, 11 May 1973.
263. *Al-ʿAmal*, 12 May 1973.
264. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 May 1973.
265 Ibid. 13 May 1973.
266. *Al-ʿAmal*, 13 May 1973.
267. *Al-Nahar*, 10 May and 4 June 1973.
268. Salih, 'May Events', 275.
269. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 14 May 1973.
270. *Al-Akhbar*, 2 June 1973; and *Filastin al-Thawra*, 13 May 1973.
271. Ibid. 13 May 1973.
272. *Al-Muqawama*, 14 May 1973.
273. *WAFA News Agency*, 10 May 1973.
274. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 14 May 1973.
275. Ibid. 13 May 1973.
276. Ibid.

277. *Al-Muqawama*, 15 May 1973.
278. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 May 1973.
279. Text of annex in *Le Livre blanc libanais: Documents diplomatiques, 1975–76* (Beirut, 1976), 200 ff.
280. The Melkart Protocol was named after the hotel in which the talks took place.
281. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 28 May 1973.
282. *Al-Tala'i'*, 28 May 1973.
283. Baqraduni, *Curse of a Nation*, 135.
284. Abu Ghazala, then deputy-head of Fateh *iqlim* in Lebanon; Naji 'Allush, then Fateh cadre in charge of ties with Lebanese opposition parties; 'Abbas Murad, then Fateh officer in charge of training assistance; Trabulsi, then deputy secretary-general of the LCAO; and Nazih, ASAP central committee member.*

Part III The State-in-Exile, 1973–1982

1. T. N. Dupuy, *Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars, 1947–1974* (London, 1978), tables E and F, p. 609.
2. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 196; and Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 209–10.
3. Organski, *The $36 Billion Bargain*, table 6.3, p. 142.
4. *Al-Ahram*, 11 November 1973. Reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 3: 2 (10) (Winter 1974), 214.
5. Waterbury, *Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 128, 130, 398, and 416. On AOI, Yezid Sayigh, *Arab Military Industry: Capability, Performance and Impact* (London, 1992), 50.
6. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 256–7 and 261.
7. First quote from Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 625. Second quote from Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 278.
8. *Ha'aretz*, 18 February 1975; and *Ma'ariv*, 20 February 1975.
9. Jordanian aims in official document cited in Madiha Madfai, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process 1974–1991* (Cambridge, 1993), 39.
10. *Al-Ba'th*, 3 August 1975; and Sa'iqa secretary-general Zuhayr Muhsin, *al-Tala'i'*, 24 June 1975.
11. Waterbury, *Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, 417.
12. Ibid. 403–4.
13. For example, statement by Hasan 'Ajjaj, deputy regional head of the Unified Palestinian Organization of the Ba'th Party and member of the political department of Sa'iqa. *Ila al-Amam*, 4–11 July 1980.
14. Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination* (Urbana, Ill., 1986), 167.
15. *Ma'ariv*, 18 December 1981. Reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 11: 3 (43) (Spring 1982), 167–70.

13 At the Crossroads

1. *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 413.
2. Order from Budayri, reference 25208/10, 8 October 1972. PLA archives.
3. Battalion commander Nusayba in *al-Nahar*, 27 December 1972; and ʿAjiz, Qaddumi, and Tamraz.*
4. *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 23.
5. *Al-Ahram*, 10 January 1973. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xvii. 28, 23.
6. Jallud.*
7. *Sawt Filastin*, No. 13, July 1973, 8.
8. Mahmud ʿAbbas, 'How Similar Today is to Yesterday, But?' (Arab.), unpublished manuscript, n.d., 91; and Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 121–2.
9. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 37.
10. Nidal, and Durgham, then guerrilla NCOs sent to Egypt.*
11. On deployment, Nasr, then company commander; Murad, then liaison officer with the Syrians; and Abu Mhadi. On weapons loan, then Fateh logistics officer.* Also ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 44.
12. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 47.
13. Compiled from *Saʿiqa Martyrs in the October War* (Arab.) ([Damascus], 1976), and from p. 24. Also Asʿad ʿAbd-al-Rahman (ed.), *The Fourth Arab–Israeli War: Facts and Interactions* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1974), 157.
14. Majayda, then chief operations officer.*
15. Majayda.*
16. Mansur Sharif, then brigade commander.*
17. Sharif; and Hasan Abu-Lubda, then battalion commander.*
18. ʿAbd-al-Rahman (ed.), *Fourth Arab–Israeli War*, 163; and Sharif, Majayda, and Abu-Lubda.* Also confirmed by PLA memorial plaque in Cairo barracks.
19. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1973*, 48.
20. Badran, then battalion commander.*
21. Numerous interviews, and ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Abu-Fidda, *Beaufort Castle: Castle of Steadfastness* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1982), 80.
22. Text of statement in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1973*, 339.
23. 'Guerilla Action According to the Admissions of the Israeli Spokesman' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 27, November 1973, 200, and list of PLO military statements, 201–24.
24. Casualties compiled from official statements cited in ibid.
25. *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1973*, 164.
26. According to Salah Khalaf, 'Clear Thoughts in an Obscure Phase' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 29, January 1974, 8; Fateh revolutionary council secretary Majid Abu-Sharar in seminar, 'Issues of National Struggle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip' (Arab.), ibid., No. 118, September 1981, 70; and ʿAbd-al-Rahman (ed.), *Fourth Arab–Israeli War*, 159.
27. Heikal, *Road to Ramadan*, 221 and 226; interview with Salah Khalaf in *al-Balagh*

(Beirut), 29 July 1974 (cited in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 275); and text of PLO statement in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1973*, 335.

28. Bhays;* and ʿAbd-al-Rahman (ed.), *Fourth Arab–Israeli War*, 160.
29. Text of secret decisions of the Arab summit, *al-Nahar*, 4 December 1973.
30. For example, *al-Ahram*, 2 November 1973. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1973*, 417–18.
31. Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 160.
32. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, 626–7.
33. Zuhayr Muhsin, in panel discussion, 'The Palestinian Resistance Faces the New Challenges' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 30, February 1974, 11.
34. Ibid. 14.
35. Ibid. 25.
36. Ibid. 45.
37. Ibid.
38. *Al-Anwar*, 5 November 1973. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1973*, 423.
39. Khalid al-Hasan, *The Genius of Failure* (Arab.) (Amman, 1987), 128–9 and 144.
40. *Ila al-Amam*, 9 November 1973.
41. *Ila al-Amam*, 1 February 1974.
42. *Al-Hadaf*, 10 and 17 November and 8 December 1973. Also *Tasks of the Coming Phase*, cited in Political Report 1981, 270.
43. *The Political Programme* (Arab.), modified and approved by the central committee, 1975, 27.
44. PDFLP central committee statement in *al-Hurriyya*, 12 November 1973.
45. Nayif Hawatma, *Action after the October War to Defeat the Surrenderist Liquidationist Solution and Extract the Right of Self-Determination* (Arab.), DFLP, 1974, 45.
46. *Al-Hurriyya*, 12 December 1973.
47. Khalaf, 'Clear Thoughts in an Obscure Phase', 5.
48. Ibid. 10.
49. Ibid.
50. *WAFA News Agency*, supplement, 8 January 1974. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 5.
51. Khalaf, 'Clear Thoughts in an Obscure Phase', 6.
52. Speech published in George Habash, *The Revolutionary Path in Confronting the Challenges* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1974), 14.
53. Ibid. 41.
54. Ibid. 15–16 and 41.
55. Ibid. 13–14.
56. Ibid. 17, 26, and 32.
57. Hawatma, *Action after the October War*, 26.
58. Hawatma in *al-Hurriyya*, 12 December 1973. Emphasis added.
59. Ibid. 17 December 1973.
60. Ibid. 11 February 1974.
61. *Al-Muharrir*, 5 November 1973.
62. Ibid. 25 December 1973.

63. Ibid. 5 November 1973.
64. Ibid.
65. *Al-Akhbar* (Beirut), 12 January 1974. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 19–21.
66. *WAFA News Agency*, supplement, 8 January 1974. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 6.
67. *Al-Hurriyya*, 15 April 1974.
68. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 31 January 1974.
69. Speech reproduced in ibid. 27 February 1974. Emphasis added.
70. *Ila al-Amam*, 12 July 1974.
71. Jibril interviewed in *al-Safir*, 3 February 1976; and *Ila al-Amam*, 5 March 1976.
72. ʿAli.*
73. Samih Shbib, then PF–GC information official; and Faraʿna, then PF–GC guerrilla in south Lebanon.*
74. Ghanim.*
75. Programme published in *Ila al-Amam*, 17, 24, and 31 May and 7 June 1974.
76. Earlier funding confirmed by Qadhdhafi, *al-Nahar*, 18 November 1971. Bankruptcy in 1973 confirmed in PF–GC, Internal Memorandum (Arab.), 21 December 1976.
77. Shbib; and then senior cadre in the PF–GC command in Syria.*
78. Ghanim.*
79. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 12 June 1974.
80. *Ila al-Amam*, 12 July 1974.
81. Internal Memorandum, 21 December 1976, 10.
82. Nazih Abu-Nidal and ʿAbd-al-Hadi al-Nashshash, *The Palestinian Programme between the Two Paths of Liberation and Compromise: A Study of the Covenant and the Resolutions of the National Councils* (Arab.) (n.p., n.d. [1983–4]), 107.
83. Nawfal.*
84. *Al-Safir*, 19 May 1974.
85. Nawfal;* and political wills of suicide guerrillas in *al-Hurriyya*, 3 June 1974.
86. *Al-Hurriyya*, 4 March 1974; and Abu Mahmud al-Duli, then chief-of-staff.*
87. Nawfal.*
88. Nawfal.*
89. Nawfal.*
90. Khalaf, 'Clear Thoughts in an Obscure Phase', 10.
91. Interviewed in *al-Muharrir*, 5 November 1973.
92. Wazir, *Fateh: Genesis*, 83.
93. Kamal ʿUdwan speaking a few months before his assassination, in 'Birth and March', 52.
94. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 12 June 1974.
95. *Al-Shaʿb* (Algeria), 24 August 1974. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 310.
96. *WAFA News Agency*, 21 September 1974. Emphasis added.
97. Khalid al-Hasan, *A Critical Reading of Three Initiatives: The Brezhnev Initiative, the*

Prince Fahd Initiative, the Reagan Initiative (Arab.) (Amman, 1986), 41–3.
98. *Al-Hurriyya*, 18 November 1974.
99. *Al-Hadaf*, 28 September 1974.
100. The emissary was retired general Vernon Walters. Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, *Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution* (London, 1991), 141–3.
101. First quote from an interview in *Time*, 11 November 1974 (cited in Gowers and Walker, *Behind the Myth*, 213). Second quote from speech to the UN General Assembly, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 40, December 1974, 8.
102. *Al-Hadaf*, 28 September and 5 October 1974.
103. Mahmud Hamdan, then PPSF military commander; and Majid al-Khatib, then ALF battalion commander;* and *al-Hadaf*, 13 August 1974.
104. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 34–5; and *al-Hadaf*, 14 December 1974.
105. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 82–3.
106. Libyan funding confirmed by Habash, *The Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution: Roots and Solutions* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1985), 32.
107. *Al-Hadaf*, 2 November 1974.
108. Ibid.
109. Khatib, 'Closed Borders, Open Bridges', 64.
110. Zuhayr Muhsin, in 'The Palestinian Resistance Faces the New Challenges', 46.
111. Hamid *Resolutions*, 106–7 and 117.
112. Ibid. 188–9. On drop in Palestinian enrolment at Arab universities, Item 20, p. 235.
113. Ibid. 229–30.
114. Ibid. 229 and Item 13, p. 230.
115. JCP, *The Tasks before the Jordanian Communist Party in the Current Phase* (Arab.), as presented by the politburo and discussed and unanimously approved by the central committee, late May 1974, 27.
116. Sharif, *On Communist Thought*, 128.
117. Sulayman al-Najjab, then fugitive leader of the JCP branch.*
118. Ishaq al-Khatib, then JCP central committee member responsible for armed organization.*
119. *Towards a United National Front against the Occupation: A Proposed Programme* (Arab.), submitted by the politburo to the central committee of the JCP, late June 1971, 3–4.
120. Najjab.*
121. Ghassan al-Khatib, then JCP cadre imprisoned for four years.*
122. Ilan Halevi, Israeli activist involved in securing a residence permit for Barghuti.* Also Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 91.
123. According to a splinter group. *Documents of the Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party* (Arab.), founding conference, September 1987, 69.
124. *The Text of the Letter of Bashir Barghuti's Faction: A Discussion of the Question of Armed Struggle in Response* (Arab.), n.d. [approximately 1982], 64–5, 66, and 68.

125. Sharif, *On Communist Thought*, 129–30; and Khatib.*
126. Ra'fat, then DFLP politburo member in charge of the occupied territories.*
127. Khawaja, then PFLP cadre in Amman responsible for the occupied territories;* and *al-Hadaf*, 9 March 1973.
128. Mustafa al-Zabri.*
129. *Al-Hadaf*, 2 and 23 November 1974.
130. *Tasks of the New Stage*, 43–5.
131. Criticism shared by many cadres, for example Ra'fat and Khawaja.*
132. Usama al-Shinnar, then member of DFLP command committee.*
133. Ra'fat.*
134. *Al-Hurriyya*, 5 August 1974.
135. Statement by Mamduh Nawfal in *al-Safir*, 5 September 1974.
136. *Al-Hurriyya*, 14 April 1975.
137. Wazir.*
138. Confirmed by numerous Fateh Western Sector cadres, including Habash, Ghazi Husayni, Bhays, Mahmud al-ʿAlul, and ʿUmar.*
139. Statistic based on the official military statements of the guerrilla groups, reproduced in their periodicals and in successive editions of *Palestinian Chronology*.
140. Ghazi al-Husayni.*
141. Bhays and Mansur, then Western Sector cadres; and ʿAziz, ʿAdnan Jabir, Abu Zayd, Basil, and Abu Mahir, then fugitive guerrillas.*
142. The Hebron group was headed by the famed Bajis Abu-ʿAtwan, who was killed by a double-agent in June 1974, while his partner, ʿAli al-Rabaʿi, remained at large until his capture in 1985.
143. *Al-Hurriyya*, 4 and 25 April 1975.
144. Abu Mahir.*
145. Mansur, ʿAziz, Abu Zayd, Basil, and Abu Mahir;* and the PFLP, *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 116–17.
146. ʿAmmar, then senior intelligence cadre.*
147. Jallud, then Abu Hani Group company commander.*
148. Mahir, then deputy battalion commander; and Durgham, then platoon commander.*
149. Public speech reproduced in *al-Hurriyya*, 15 April 1974.
150. Munir Shafiq, then director of the PLO planning centre and leading dissenter.*
151. Naji ʿAllush, 'Our War with the Zionist Occupation State: Aims, Characteristics, and Prospects' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 10: 4 (February 1974), 40–1; and *idem*, 'From the Battle of June to the Battle of October' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 10: 2 (December 1973), 155.
152. Abu-Nidal, *History of the Crisis in Fateh*, 54.
153. A relatively rare sample of Mikha'il's political thinking in this period is his 'The Palestinian Revolution and the World Revolution' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973, 30–6.
154. Abu-Nidal and Nashshash, *Palestinian Programme*, 107.
155. ʿAllush, 'From the Battle of June', 5 and 137–9.

156. The Maoist influence is evident in the writings of Shafiq and of his brother George with Jaradat: Munir Shafiq, *Concerning Palestinian National Unity* (Arab.) (n.p., 1976); *idem, Lessons from the Experience of the Five Martyrs* (Arab.) (n.p., n.d. [1977]); and Saʿd and Abu Khalid, *Revolutionary Thoughts on the Conduct of Combat* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1978). Shafiq's own account briefly refers to the leftist politics of this period (*Martyrs and a March*, 41).
157. Opposition to political compromise with Israel evident, for example, in Munir Shafiq, 'The US Imperialist Conspiracy from Resolution 242 to Resolution 340' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 10: 2 (December 1973), 28–41.
158. Munir Shafiq, *Between the Strategy of Total Liberation and the Strategy of 'Political Solution'* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1973), 59 and 81.
159. Samir Sabri, then unit commander.*
160. Fateh, *Isolationists of Baghdad! Yes to Dialogue, and Yes to Non-Dialogue Too* (Arab.), Mobilization and Guidance Department, Circular No. 34, n.d. [approximately 1979].
161. Mahmud ʿAbbas, *The Testimony of [Martyr] Abu al-Hul* (Arab.) (n.p., n.d. [1991–2]), 10. The PFLP queried the Fateh decision to execute ʿAbd-al-Ghafur, in *al-Hadaf*, 2 November 1974.
162. An indication of the potential for defection was the publication of a statement purporting to come from 'The Free Officers in Fateh' in *al-Hadaf*, 12 October 1974.
163. Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin, *al-Diyar*, 23–29 September 1974. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 341.
164. Text of joint statement in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 255.
165. Details in Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 144–7.
166. According to then Fateh and PLO intelligence cadres and aides to Khalaf.*
167. Calculated from full listing of incidents in Faysal Salman *et al.* (eds.), *Lebanon 1949–1985, Israeli Aggression: Chronology—Documents—Positions* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1986); *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1974*, 57–9; and *Yearbook of the Palestine Cause 1975*, 64–6.
168. Tawfiq al-Safadi, then Fateh official and head of the Higher Political Committee for Palestinians in Lebanon, cited in *al-Nahar*, 18 April 1974.
169. *Maʿariv*, 10 June 1975. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, vol. xxi.
170. Wazir, and Saʿid Maragha.*
171. Rubin Ben Yishai, *Yediot Aharonot*, 7 and 10 October 1994.
172. *Al-Hadaf*, 15 March 1975. The PFLP comment appeared before the declaration was issued.
173. *Al-Safir*, 4 January 1975.

14 The Lebanese Crisis

1. *Al-Hurriyya*, 6 January 1975.
2. Ibid. 8 July 1974.

3. *Al-Yawm*, 4 September 1974 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xx. 290); and Fadl Kaʿwash and ʿAziz, then Fateh engineers involved in the project.*
4. Wazir.*
5. Statement issued on 19 May. *Al-Muharrir*, 28 May 1973.
6. Baqraduni, *Curse of a Nation*, 135.
7. *Al-ʿAmal*, 29 September 1973.
8. *Al-Nahar*, 28 September 1974.
9. *WAFA News Agency*, 15 April 1974.
10. *Al-Nahar*, 22 December 1974.
11. Memorandum No. 404/3S, 9 September 1974. Confirmed by Lebanese army Beirut area commander ʿAziz al-Ahdab in *al-Safir*, 16 June 1976.
12. Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin interview in *al-Diyar*, 23–29 September 1974. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1974*, 342.
13. *Al-Hurriyya*, 21 December 1974 and 6 January 1975.
14. Ibid. 3 February 1975.
15. *Al-Nahar*, 15 April 1975.
16. Text of resolutions in *al-Safir*, 16 April 1975.
17. Notion of 'power equalizer' from I. William Zartman and Maureen Berman, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven, 1982), 57.
18. *WAFA News Agency*, 9 June 1975; and Hasan, *Lebanese Crisis*, 84–5. On covert Israeli and US assistance, Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Yaʿari, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York, 1984), 12.
19. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 24 June 1975.
20. *WAFA News Agency*, 7 and 12 June 1975.
21. Notion of coercive diplomacy from Alexander George and William Simons (eds.), *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boulder, Colo., 1994).
22. Hasan, *Lebanese Crisis*, 99–100.
23. Ibid. 100.
24. According to prime minister Rashid al-Sulh, in a subsequent statement. *Al-Safir*, 7 March 1976.
25. The PFLP, for one, later admitted it had misread the LNM. *Political Report*, 1981, 271.
26. *Al-Nahar*, 16 May 1975.
27. *Al-ʿAmal*, 21 May 1973.
28. *Al-Nahar*, 20–22 May 1975.
29. *Al-Thawra*, 21 May 1975; *Palestinian Chronology*, 22 May 1975, vol. xxi.
30. Offer made by Wazir, according to Mahjub ʿUmar, senior cadre involved in the negotiations.*
31. *Al-Nahar*, 25 May 1975.
32. Ibid. 26 May 1975.
33. Ibid. 2 June 1975.
34. Ibid. 3 June 1975; and *WAFA News Agency*, 5 June 1975.
35. Statement by the rejectionist front, in *al-Hadaf*, 26 April 1975.
36. *WAFA News Agency*, 12 June 1975.

37. Ibid. 9 June 1975.
38. *Palestinian Chronology*, 5 June 1975, vol. xxi.
39. *Al-Nahar*, 27 June 1975.
40. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 29 June 1975.
41. *WAFA News Agency*, 9 July 1975. The PPSF and PF–GC initially denied the charges, but a statement by the rejection front on 22 July admitted their role. *Al-Safir*, 23 July 1975.
42. *Al-Baʿth*, 20 April 1975; and Muhsin interview in *al-Talaʾiʿ*, 24 June 1975.
43. Casualty statistic from the Assembly of Syrian Workers in Lebanon. *WAFA News Agency*, 1 June 1975.
44. Nawfal, and Dawli.*
45. Speaking to the Knesset foreign and defence committee. Cited in Yair Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli–Syrian Deterrence Dialogue* (London, 1987), 42. On the inherent contradiction in Syrian policy, Reuven Avi-Ran, *The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975* (Boulder, Colo., 1991), 20.
46. Israeli military sources cited by news agencies, in *Palestinian Chronology*, 23 June 1975, vol. xxi. Additional details from Sharqawi, then Saʿiqa artillery commander.*
47. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 15 July 1975.
48. *Al-Baʿth*, 3 August 1975.
49. Text in *Documents of the Lebanese National Movement, 1975–1981* (n.p., n.d.), 7–23.
50. Text of secret US–Israeli protocol in *International Herald Tribune*, 11 September 1975. Confirmed in Quandt, *Decade of Decisions*, 275.
51. Syrian proposal in *al-Baʿth*, 15 September 1975. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxii. 289–90.
52. For example, statement by Arafat, *WAFA News Agency*, 6 October 1975.
53. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxii. 317.
54. *Al-Baʿth*, 6 October 1975. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxii. 347.
55. Minutes leaked to *al-Nahar*, 26 September 1975.
56. *Al-Muharrir*, 27 September 1975.
57. Official PLO memorandum to the committee for national dialogue. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 19 October 1975.
58. *Al-Nahar*, 15 October 1975.
59. PLO military department head Muhsin, *al-Muharrir*, 15 September 1975.
60. Numerous interviews, including Muhammad ʿAwda, then militia commander in West Beirut; ʿAlaʾ Husni, later overall militia commander in Lebanon; ʿAmmar, then militia officer; and Muʿin Tahir, then deputy commander of militia battalion.*
61. Cable from the Fateh command in north Lebanon to PLO headquarters in Beirut, 8 October 1975. Chairman's archive.
62. Letter from PLO chief-of-staff Saʿd Sayil, 31 October 1975. Chairman's archive.
63. *Al-Safir*, 21 September 1975. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Guardians of the Cedar on 4 October.
64. *Al-Nahar*, 30 October 1975.

65. According to politburo member Baqraduni, who attended the talks (*Curse of a Nation*, 143).
66. *Al-Safir*, 5 December 1975.
67. Syrian view of escalation stated by Muhsin, *al-Safir*, 1 November 1975.
68. *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Cairo), 26 November 1975 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxii. 544); and denied by Saʿiqa, *al-Nahar*, 28 November 1975.
69. *Al-Siyasa*, 7 December 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxii. 581–2.
70. For example, Hawatma interview and PFLP statement in ibid. 7 and 9 December 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxii. 581 and 589.
71. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 4 November 1975.
72. Baqraduni, *Curse of a Nation*, 144–6.
73. Text in *Arab Documents 1975*, 738.
74. Admitted by Khalaf, *WAFA News Agency*, 6 February 1976. Zuhayr Muhsin was reputed to be fond of Persian carpets, and so gained the derogatory nickname of Zuhayr 'al-ʿAjami'. Further criticism of looting came in Naji ʿAllush, 'Concerning the War in Lebanon' (Arab.), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 12: 5 (March 1976), 52.

15 The Struggle for Lebanon

1. *Al-Safir*, 5 January 1976.
2. *Al-Nahar*, 1 January 1976.
3. The decrees were leaked to the local press a few days later. *Beirut*, 7 January 1976.
4. DFLP secretary-general Hawatma interview in *Le Monde*, 24 January 1976.
5. Details from Adham, then deputy Fateh commander of Tal al-Zaʿtar; ʿAbd-al-Muhsin, then head of Fateh civilian organization in Tal al-Zaʿtar; Hdayb, then Fateh commander in Nabʿa; Fakhri, then head of Fateh task force in Karantina-Maslakh; and Mahmud Hamdan, then PPSF military commander.*
6. Adham.*
7. Orders in cable from Arafat to Beirut northern command, 1545 hours, 11 January 1976. Chairman's archive.
8. Mamsur Sharif:* and cables from Arafat to the Fateh office in Cairo, 2330 hours, 11 January 1976. Chairman's archive.
9. Cable from Arafat to Yarmuk Forces command, 2000 hours, 12 January 1976. Chairman's archive.
10. Edward and Hani, Fateh cadres from Dbayya; and ʿUthman, PASC commander in Dbayya.*
11. Text in *Arab Documents 1976*, 55.
12. AFP report cited in *al-Safir*, 18 January 1976.
13. A spokesman for the inhabitants later stated total losses at 500 dead. Ibid. 2 February 1976.
14. *Al-Safir*, 24 January 1976. Confirmed by Maʾmun Mraysh, then Fateh parleying officer.*

15. The highest estimate of the death toll placed it at 500, but the average of most estimates was 150. Based on Maronite sources cited in Jonathan Randal, *The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and American Bunglers* (London, 1983), 90.
16. One Fateh unit defied threats of a field tribunal and pulled out of Damur after commander Maragha refused to issue binding orders to stop the killing of prisoners, including women and children. Shafiq, *Martyrs and March*, 113.
17. Asad speech on 20 July 1976, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5266, 22 July 1976. Cited in Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley, 1988), 275.
18. For example by the Order of Maronite Monks, *al-Safir*, 15 January 1976. Later echoed by phalangist leader Jmayyil, *al-ʿAmal*, 7 February 1976.
19. Shamʿun, *al-Safir*, 23 December 1975. Confirmed by Shaqqura, then PLA brigade commander.*
20. *Al-ʿAmal*, 8 January 1976.
21. Statement by Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin, *al-Nahar*, 17 January 1975.
22. Shaqqura; Jamal Abu-Zayid, then brigade operations officer; and ʿAjiz, then battalion commander.*
23. Badran, then head of PLA administration and organization branch; and Ahmad Abu-ʿUlba, then company commander.*
24. Abu-ʿUlba.*
25. Badran, who compiled the official report on the attack.*
26. *Al-Nahar*, 25 January 1976.
27. Text in *Arab Documents 1976*, 90–2.
28. Antoine Khwayri (ed.), *The War in Lebanon* (Arab.), Part One (1976: Junia, 1977), 574.
29. *Al-Safir*, 30 December 1975, and 1 January 1976.
30. Letter from Arafat to Qadhdhafi, 12 January 1976. Chairman's archive.
31. Saʿiqa blamed the attack on undisciplined members, *WAFA News Agency*, 1 February 1976. The orders had in fact come from Muhsin, according to Abu-Marzuq, then PLA task force commander in Beirut.*
32. Abu-Marzuq.*
33. *Al-Safir*, 16 February 1976.
34. Ibid. 24 February 1976.
35. Ibid. 22 February 1976.
36. *Al-Muharrir*, 1 March 1976.
37. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 1 March 1976.
38. On PLA deployment, *Maʿariv*, 17 February 1976; *al-Nahar*, 19 February 1976; and Walid Saʿd-al-Din, then PLA artillery battalion commander; and Lubbad, Tamraz, and Jallud, then PLA company commanders.* Tlas quoted in *al-Hayat*, 28 February 1976.
39. Estimate from Israeli defence minister Shimon Peres, *Maʿariv*, 11 March 1975.
40. Shaqqura.*

41. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 183. Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin later blamed Khalaf personally for organizing the putsch (*al-Safir*, 6 June 1976). PF–GC secretary-general Jibril also claimed that Fateh had dispensed $25 million in order to secure support for Ahdab (in *The Current Reality and Emerging from the Predicament* (Arab.), series of interviews with Ahmad Jibril (n.p., 1977), 35).
42. Texts of successive statements by Ahdab in *Arab Documents 1976*, 130–3. His personal account is ʿAziz al-Ahdab, *Communiqué Number One* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1977).
43. On Edde, Khwayri, *War in Lebanon*, 327. Lists of names of supporters also in ibid. 306–7, 319–20, and 343.
44. Cable at 1330 hours, 12 March 1976. Chairman's archive.
45. Cable at 1620 hours, 12 March 1976. Chairman's archive.
46. Ibid.
47. *WAFA News Agency*, 14 March 1976.
48. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 14 March 1976.
49. Ahmad Draz, then PLA company commander.*
50. Tamraz, then liaison officer; and Jallud.*
51. R. D. McLaurin and Paul Jureidini, *Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)*, (Belmont, Va., 1981), 1–2. Both the AAL and the Maronite rebel factions continued to draw pay from the ministry of defence. For example, statement by Ahmad al-Khatib, *al-Safir*, 15 September 1976.
52. Jibril, *Current Reality*, 29.
53. Official statement in *al-Safir*, 17 March 1976.
54. *Al-Nahar*, 17 March 1976.
55. Sharqawi.*
56. Jibril, *Current Reality*, 28.
57. Abu Ahmad Halab, and Abu al-Haytham, then senior military and organizational cadres of the PF–GC.*
58. *Al-Safir*, 8 May 1976. Figure reiterated by Jibril, interviewed in *al-Wasat*, 3 April 1995.
59. Mahjub ʿUmar, then deputy-director of the PLO planning centre and close aide to Arafat.*
60. *Al-Baʿth*, 24 March 1976.
61. *Al-Nahar*, 25 March 1976.
62. Wazir.*
63. According to Asad, in his speech of 13 April 1976, in which he alluded clearly to Junblat without naming him directly. Text in Khwayri, *War in Lebanon*, 574. The meeting was also attended by Khalaf, who described it in Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 184.
64. *Al-Nahar*, 22 March 1976; and *al-Hadaf*, 27 March 1976.
65. Nawfal.*
66. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 11 April 1976.
67. *Al-Nahar*, 30 March 1976. Syrian opposition voiced in *al-Baʿth*, 31 March 1976.
68. *Monday Morning*, 12 April 1976.

69. Issue of 31 March 1976.
70. Text of his press briefing in Khwayri, *War in Lebanon*, 481.
71. According to Asad in his speech of 20 July 1976, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5266, 22 July 1976. Cited in Seale, *Asad*, 275.
72. Wazir.*
73. Syrian fire also targeted ships trying to enter Tripoli harbour. Cable from Joint Forces command in north Lebanon to PLO headquarters, untimed, 6 April 1976. Chairman's archive.
74. On the US contacts, Ze'ev Schiff in *Ha'aretz*, 18 April 1976. Also detailed account in *al-Nashra* (Nicosia), 2: 76 (7 April 1986), 22; and Moshe Zak, 'Message from Sidon', *Ma'ariv*, 19 June 1986.
75. Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon*, 46.
76. USADOS, for Secretary from Brown (secret), Beirut 2868, 1 April 1976. Letter viewed by author thanks to Fawwaz Trabulsi.
77. USADOS, for Secretary from Brown (secret), Beirut 2936, 4 April 1976. Letter viewed by author thanks to Fawwaz Trabulsi.
78. *Al-Qabas* (Kuwait), 13 April 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 333.
79. *Monday Morning*, 12 April 1976.
80. Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon*, 46.
81. *Ma'ariv*, 14 April 1976. On the relay of terms, Itamar Rabinovich, 'The Lebanese Crisis', in *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, v. *1980–81* (London, 1982), 172. The best description of the red lines is in Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon*, 46–7.
82. AFP report cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 341.
83. Khwayri, *War in Lebanon*, 574.
84. Cable from 70 [Wazir] to 99 [Arafat], 1130 hours, 12 April 1976; and cable to PLO headquarters, 13 April 1976. Chairman's archive.
85. *Al-Nahar*, 13 April 1976.
86. This view shared by some Israeli analysts, for instance Ze'ev Schiff, *Ha'aretz*, 18 April 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 353–4.
87. *Monday Morning*, 12 April 1976.
88. *Tishrin*, 16 April 1976, cited in Avi-Ran, *Syrian Involvement in Lebanon*, 33–4; and Khalaf in Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 185.
89. According to Sham'un, cited in Randal, *Lebanon: Christian Warlords*, 177–8.
90. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, ch. 1.
91. *Al-Safir*, 16 April 1976.
92. A credible account of his view is in Baqraduni, *Curse of a Nation*, 24.
93. *Al-Nahar*, 15 April 1976.
94. *Monday Morning*, 3 May 1976.
95. Habash in *al-Nahar*, 3 May 1976; and Hawi in *al-Safir*, 4 May 1976.
96. Cables, 24 April and 7 May 1976. Chairman's archive.
97. 'Ammar, who arranged the meeting and escorted Sarkis to Arafat's headquarters.*
98. Cable, 8 May 1976. Chairman's archive.
99. *WAFA News Agency*, 27 April and 2 May 1976.
100. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 4 May 1976.

101. *Al-Safir*, 4 May 1976.
102. *Al-Ahram*, 2 May 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 400.
103. Ibid. 2 May 1976.
104. *Al-Safir*, 13 May 1976.
105. Abu-Marzuq, then PLA task force commander in Beirut.*
106. *WAFA News Agency*, 13 May 1976. Fateh security reported the arrival of 53 Syrian army trucks and four multiple rocket launchers and 120mm mortars at Khalda. Cable to PLO headquarters, 9 May 1976. Chairman's archive. Shelling confirmed by Sharqawi.*
107. *WAFA News Agency*, 13 May 1976; and *al-Nahar*, 14 May 1976.
108. *Al-Nahar*, 12 April and 12 May 1976; and cable to PLO headquarters on 12 May 1976. Chairman's archive.
109. *Al-Safir*, 13 May 1976.
110. Ibid. 13 May 1976.
111. *WAFA News Agency*, 13 May 1976.
112. *Al-Ahram*, 17 May 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 470.
113. *Al-Nahar*, 12 May 1976.
114. News agencies cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 452.
115. Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon*, 51.
116. *Al-Muharrir*, 18 May 1976.
117. Mahmud ʿAbbas.*
118. *WAFA News Agency*, 23 May 1976.
119. The documents containing the orders were published in *al-Akhbar*, 27 May 1976.
120. PFLP statement in *al-Muharrir*, 26 May 1976.
121. The king's role later confirmed in Zak, 'Message from Sidon', *Maʿariv*, 19 June 1986.
122. *Al-Nahar*, 31 May 1976.
123. Interviewed in *Newsweek*, 26 May 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 522.
124. *Al-Hadaf*, 29 May 1976. The PFLP drove its militant message home by claiming responsibility for explosions at Lydda airport in Israel that killed two persons and wounded seven others on 25 May (*Al-Safir*, 26 May 1976).
125. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 31 May 1976.
126. *WAFA News Agency*, 31 May 1976.
127. *Al-Nahar*, 30 May 1976.
128. Official statement on Damascus radio, 1 June 1976. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1976*, 340.

16 Ambition Frustrated, Sanctuary Preserved

1. Statements by Khalaf and Qaddumi, *WAFA News Agency*, 1 June 1976.
2. *Al-Hurriyya*, 8 June 1976; *al-Nahar*, 2 June 1976; and *WAFA News Agency*, 1 June 1976.
3. *Al-Nahar*, 16 May 1976.

4. Lebanese Front statement, ibid. 6 June 1976.
5. *Al-Safir*, 6 June 1976.
6. *Ha'aretz*, 3 June 1976.
7. This thinking suggested in Asad speech on 20 July 1976. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5266, 22 July 1976. Cited in Seale, *Asad*, 275.
8. Interview in *Newsweek*, 26 May 1976.
9. Details of the plan confirmed by Saʿiqa military commander in Lebanon, Hanna Bathish, *al-Safir*, 26 June 1976. Also by Abu-Marzuq, and Sharqawi.*
10. This thinking suggested in Asad speech on 20 July 1976. *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, ME/5266, 22 July 1976. Cited in Seale, *Asad*, 275.
11. Abu-Marzuq; and Muhammad al-Saʿdi, then PLA battalion commander.*
12. Reports and lists of names in *al-Hadaf*, 15 March and 9 August 1975. Also Saʿdi, and Ruhi.*
13. The prisoners were later exchanged for a number of PLO detainees in Syria. Arafat dismissed Budayri from his post, although the Syrian and PLA commands did not recognize his decision.
14. AFP report, cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 568.
15. *Al-Safir*, 9 June 1976.
16. On secret contacts, letter to PLO headquarters reporting the approach from the PLA battalion commander, 13 May 1976. Chairman's archive. On smuggling, Abu-ʿUlba.*
17. *Al-Safir*, 10 June 1976.
18. *Arab Documents 1976*, 389.
19. Confirmed by Wazir, Majid Khatib, and numerous Fateh cadres including Hani, Lamiʿ, and Radwan.*
20. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 15 June 1976.
21. Abu-ʿUlba; Walid Saʿd-al-Din, then battalion commander; and Lubbad, then company commander.*
22. *Al-Nahar*, 20 June 1976.
23. Ibid., 21 July 1976.
24. Khalaf interview in *Liberation*, 16 June 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 592.
25. *Al-Hurriyya*, 8 June 1976. On supplies, Nawfal.*
26. Habash in *al-Safir*, 2 July 1976. He also considered this an opportunity to rid the PLO of unaffiliated 'independents'.
27. According to Khalaf, who investigated the incident. Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 189. Khalaf suggested that the killers may have cooperated with Iraq.
28. According to Jabir's former colleagues, he had not in fact been involved in the operation to begin with, but was persuaded at the last minute by Haddad to take part in his personal capacity. Subhi Tamimi, and a former aide to Haddad.*
29. Cable from command to PLO central operations room, 25 April 1976. Chairman's archive.

30. Adham, then Fateh deputy-commander in the camp, interviewed in May 1985; and ʿAbd-al-Muhsin, then head of the Fateh civilian organization in the camp, interviewed in January 1992. There were also a handful of Syrian soldiers who had been based in the camp since 1974 to provide air defence.
31. Shelter number and capacity from ʿAziz, and Kaʿwash, then PLO engineers.*
32. General details from McLaurin and Jureidini, *Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)*, 14, 15, and 16; and *al-Safir*, 23 June 1976. Estimate of shelling from Ahmad al-Zaʿtar (ed.), *Tal al-Zaʿtar: Symbol and Legend* (Arab.) (Beirut, PFLP Information, n.d), 64.
33. Adham.*
34. Report from Mujahid Simʿan to PLO central operations room, 28 June 1976. Chairman's archive.
35. Plan prepared by Ahmad ʿAfana, Joint Forces commander in ʿAlay, 1 July 1976. Chairman's archive. Information on outcome from Muhammad ʿAli, force commander.*
36. Durgham, then Fateh platoon commander.*
37. Guevara, then Fateh platoon commander.*
38. Sayil's fears were confirmed in a report issued by the Arab truce committee on 15 July, that cited the Shakka battle as the reason for the cancellation of the Sawfar meeting. *Al-Nahar*, 16 July 1976.
39. Fateh's Eagles of the ʿArqub Battalion commander Naʿim and his deputy Abu al-Wafa were secretly sent by sea to replace Hasan and his deputy, along with the head of the Fateh civilian organization in Lebanon, Hanna Mikha'il, but never arrived. A PLO security report stated that their boat had landed by mistake at Shakka, where they were taken prisoner by the Maronite militias although their fate was never conclusively determined. Cable from Fateh northern command to PLO headquarters, 29 July 1976. Chairman's archive.
40. Abu-Layla, Abu Mhadi, and Shibl.*
41. ʿAyna.*
42. *WAFA News Agency*, 8 August 1976.
43. Phalanges Party statement and interview with unidentified PLO official, *al-Safir*, 20 July 1976. Also Jmayyil interview in *al-Nahar*, 20 July 1976.
44. Damascus radio cited in *al-Nahar*, 20 July 1976.
45. *Al-Safir*, 15 June 1976; *Filastin al-Thawra*, 19 June 1976; *WAFA News Agency*, 6 July 1976. Palestinian sources also claimed that Syrian security forces had violently broken up repeated protest demonstrations.
46. Confirmed by Asad, interviewed in *al-Hawadith*, 1 October 1976.
47. *Al-Nahar*, 21 July 1976.
48. Details in ibid. 24 July 1976; and *al-Safir*, 28 July 1976.
49. *Al-Safir*, 30 July 1976.
50. Ibid. 31 July and 2 August 1976; and *al-Nahar*, 2 August 1976.
51. Arab truce committee report issued on 15 July. Ibid. 16 July 1976. Also Franjiyya interview in *al-Sayyad*, 1 September 1976 (cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiv. 217).

52. Casualty figure based on Maronite signals traffic intercepted by Fateh communications eavesdropping section. Rafiʿ al-Khalidi, then section officer.*
53. *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), 31 July 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiv. 96–7.
54. The significance of Brezhnev's letter was also noted, for example, by Junblat. *Al-Safir*, 20 July 1976.
55. *WAFA News Agency*, 2 August 1976.
56. Edition of 3 August 1976.
57. Hdayb, then Joint Forces commander in Nabʿa.*
58. Press conference by Abu Zayd Hdayb, *al-Safir*, 1 September 1976.
59. The Lebanese press published photographs of Israeli-supplied tanks in action against the camp. For example, *al-Hurriyya*, 16 August 1976. US special envoy Dean Brown confirmed the transfer of Israeli weapons a week later, *al-Safir*, 23 August 1976.
60. *Al-Nahar*, 4 August 1976.
61. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 10 August 1976.
62. Not to be confused with the former DFLP cadre and Palestinian editor.
63. Wasif ʿUrayqat, 'Palestinian Artillery' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 115, June 1981, 35.
64. Agreement confirmed in Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 192.
65. Abu Walid, then phalangist bulldozer driver.*
66. Overall death toll from Sharif, PLO Social Affairs Institation representative in Lebanon.* Military casualties based on Adham;* official statements by the various guerrilla groups, and Zaʿtar, *Tal al-Zaʿtar: Symbol and Legend*. The survivors were resettled in the vacant houses of Damur in following weeks, despite the disquiet of cadres who saw an uncomfortable parallel with the displacement of Palestinians by Jewish immigrants in 1948. Shafiq;* *al-Hurriyya*, 30 August 1976; and ALF secretary-general ʿAbd-al-Rahim Ahmad, *al-Tha'ir al-ʿArabi*, No. 18, 20 May 1977.
67. *WAFA News Agency*, 16 August 1976.
68. *Al-Hurriyya*, 16 August 1976. This accusation is corroborated by Yusif Tahir, then PLO liaison officer who was received at the Maronite headquarters.*
69. *Al-Nahar*, 19 August 1976.
70. Syrian position in *al-Safir*, 12 and 17 August 1976. LNM response in *WAFA News Agency*, 21 August 1976. The Popular Army was announced on 10 August.
71. *Al-Safir*, 19 August 1976.
72. For example, the DFLP in *al-Hurriyya*, 16 August 1976.
73. *WAFA News Agency*, 30 August 1976; *al-Nahar*, 2 September 1976; and *Filastin al-Thawra*, 1 September 1976.
74. Request for PLA troops in order from Arafat, 2 August 1976. Chairman's archive. On student volunteers, Sakhr Bsaysu, then head of GUPS and responsible for its mobilization effort.* Iraqi strength estimates from Majid Khatib, then ALF battalion commander; Mansur Sharif, then ʿAyn Jalut Forces commander responsible for the sea bridge from Egypt;* and Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis*, 152. On agreement with Iraq, Hani al-Hasan interview in *Monday Morning*, 14–20 August 1978.

75. On Israeli naval action, *WAFA News Agency*, 14 August 1976; Abu Iyad with Rouleau, *My Home*, 193; and report, 26 September 1976 (Chairman's archive). In one incident, an Israeli vessel stopped a yacht carrying Kamal Junblat and loyalist PLA commander ʿAbd-al-Raziq al-Majayda, but let it continue its journey to Egypt without boarding it, according to Draz, who was also on board.*
76. Abu Jaʿfar, then member of Fateh Scientific Committee; and Kaʿwash.*
77. For example, instructions for the recruitment of 1,000 Lebanese volunteers in cable from Arafat to Ghazi ʿAtallah, Joint Forces commander in the north, 28 August 1976. Chairman's archive.
78. *Al-Safir*, 22 August 1976. A cable from Arafat to the Fateh command in north Lebanon set the age group at 18 to 25, dated 29 August 1976. Chairman's archive.
79. *Al-Hadaf*, 23 October 1976.
80. *Al-Hurriyyah*, 23 August 1976; and Abu Yasir and al-Shamʿa, later battalion commanders.* On conscription, *News Agency*, 21, 27, and 30 August and 1 and 2 September 1976.
81. Instructions from Arafat, 29 and 30 August 1976. Chairman's archive.
82. *Al-Hurriyya*, 6 September 1976.
83. Dawli, then DFLP chief-of-staff; Natur, then head of DFLP military administration; and Nawfal, then DFLP commander-in-chief.*
84. *Al-Safir*, 30 August 1976. Jmayyil statement in *al-Nahar*, 1 September 1976.
85. *Al-Sayyad*, 1 September 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiv. 217.
86. Lebanese Front statement in *al-Nahar*, 9 September 1976.
87. *Al-Safir*, 27 July 1976.
88. For example, speech by Sadr on 11 August. Ibid. 12 August 1976.
89. Broadcast on 5 August. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiv. 115.
90. *Al-Hurriyya*, 8 June and 9 August 1976.
91. *Al-Safir*, 15 August 1976.
92. Ibid. 7 August 1976.
93. *Monday Morning*, 13 September 1976.
94. *Al-Safir*, 15 September 1976.
95. *Al-Nahar*, 14 September 1976.
96. *Al-Hurriyya*, 8 June and 9 August 1976; and Nayif Hawatma and Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu, *Against the Syrian Invasion: All Resources to the Battlefronts until the Conspiracy is Smashed* (Arab.) (DFLP Publications, 1976), 32–3.
97. *Al-Safir*, 27 and 28 August 1976.
98. *Al-Nahar*, 8 September 1976.
99. Ibid. 6 and 8 September 1976.
100. Syrian conclusion relayed in a letter from air force commander Naji Jamil to Sarkis. Reproduced in Karim Baqraduni, *The Lost Peace: The Reign of President Elias Sarkis 1976–1982* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1984), 48.
101. *Al-Nahar*, 4 September 1976.
102. Ibid. 5 September 1976. The hostages were later released unharmed.
103. *WAFA News Agency*, 6 September 1976.
104. Baqraduni, *Lost Peace*, 50.

105. *Al-Nahar*, 24 September 1976. Syrian suggestion relayed through Fateh central committee members ʿAbbas and Ghnaym. ʿAbbas.*
106. Casualty figures from *al-Safir*, 3 October 1976; and partial body count in *al-Nahar*, 24 November 1976. Maronites militiamen also killed 37 unarmed Druze villagers in Salima before being ordered out by the Syrian army. *Al-Safir*, 4 October 1976.
107. Claims made by Wazir and the Progressive Socialist Party, ibid. 30 September 1976. The DFLP claimed an overall Syrian death toll of 550, *al-Hurriyya*, 11 October 1976.
108. Muʿin Tahir, then battalion commander.*
109. ʿUmar.*
110. *Al-Hadaf*, 2 October 1976; and *al-Muharrir*, 10 October 1976.
111. *Al-Safir*, 6 September 1976.
112. Baqraduni, *Lost Peace*, 51.
113. *Al-Nahar*, 8 and 12 October 1976; and *WAFA News Agency*, 10 October 1976.
114. Ibid. 10 October 1976.
115. *Al-Hadaf*, 16 October 1976.
116. *Al-Nahar*, 12 October 1976.
117. This, at least, was the interpretation put by the Phalanges Party on the letter from Jamil to Sarkis in mid-September. Baqraduni, *Lost Peace*, 48.
118. According to the Joint Forces command, *Beirut*, 13 August 1976; and *WAFA News Agency*, 20 August and 8 September 1976.
119. ʿAmmar and Karim, then Fateh platoon commanders who witnessed such incidents.*
120. Muʿin Tahir and ʿAbd-al-Muʿti al-Sabʿawi, then Fateh battalion commanders.*
121. Text of statement, resolutions, and appendices in *Arab Documents 1976*, 741–4.
122. South Yemen replaced Libya, which withdrew its offer of troops because of a crisis in relations with Egypt.
123. Edition of 16 October 1976.
124. Ibid. 16 October 1976 (p. 15).
125. Official figures provided by Fateh central committee member Khalaf to the author. Also calculated from casualty figures provided in various guerrilla periodicals, registers of martyrs, and other publications, and from interviews and press reports.
126. According to later speeches by Lebanese Forces commander Bashir Jmayyil. It is not clear if this figure included Lebanese army losses. *Al-Nahar*, 1977. Also Richard Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli–PLO War in Lebanon* (New York, 1984), 45. The author's estimate is based on intelligence sources.
127. Figures cited by Rashid Khalidi, 'The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of Israel's Invasion', *Middle East Journal*, 38: 2 (Spring 1984), 257.

17 A Ceasefire, Not a Truce

1. Report from PLO planning centre to Arafat, 2 September 1976. Chairman's archive.

2. *Al-Hurriyya*, 18 October 1976. Haddad boasted soon after that his force had grown to 680 regular soldiers and 800 militiamen, *al-Nahar*, 10 November 1976.
3. For example in the *Jerusalem Post*, 20 October 1976.
4. In his haste, Fateh commander Saʿid Maragha ordered a frontal attack, accepting the loss of 14 dead and 30 wounded. Another 44 villagers died, of whom 14 were unarmed, some apparently killed after capture. Phalangist radio claimed that over 400 of 1,500 inhabitants had been massacred, but this was flatly denied by the village priest and Maronite leader Raymond Edde, who visited ʿAyshiyya on 23 October. *Al-Safir*, 23 and 24 October 1976.
5. *Al-Nahar*, 17 November 1976.
6. AFP news agency, cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, 28 October 1976, xxiv. 453.
7. For example, editorials of Voice of Palestine radio and *WAFA News Agency*, 29 November 1976.
8. Ibid. 4 November 1976.
9. PF–GC, internal memorandum, 21 December 1976, 5.
10. *Current Reality*, 40.
11. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 9 November 1976.
12. Ibid.
13. Cables reaching PLO headquarters on 15, 16, and 17 November 1976. Chairman's archive.
14. Abu Ahmad Halab and Abu Haytham, then senior PF–GC cadres.* Opposition to Syrian intervention, for example, in statement by Zaydan in *al-Safir*, 3 June 1976.
15. *Al-Nahar*, 9 October 1976.
16. Ibid. 21 November 1976.
17. Ibid. 20 and 24 November 1976.
18. Sharqawi;* *al-Nahar*, 15 and 17 November 1976.
19. PLO report, 25 November 1976. Chairman's archive.
20. Cable from PLO command in the north to PLO headquarters, 7 December 1976. Chairman's archive.
21. Interview in *Monday Morning*, 12 December 1976.
22. For example cables to PLO headquarters, 28 and 30 December 1976. Chairman's archive.
23. *WAFA News Agency*, 4 November 1976; and letter from Arafat to Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, 2 December 1976 (Chairman's archive).
24. *Monday Morning*, 12 December 1976.
25. Ibid. 6 December 1976.
26. Cables to PLO headquarters, 15, 17, and 30 December 1976. Chairman's archive.
27. Khatib was incarcerated for two years at the Syrian officer's prison in Damascus, possibly as part of a prior agreement with the head of Syrian military intelligence.
28. Mansur Sharif, then ʿAyn Jalut Forces commander; Majayda, then ʿAyn Jalut Forces task force commander; Abu-Marzuq, then Qadisiyya task force commander; and Shaqqura, coordinator of PLA affairs in Lebanon.*
29. Israel viewed the deployment as a violation of its 'red lines' and ordered the Haddad forces to seize the border village of ʿAdaysa on the same day as a deter-

rent signal. Fateh retook the village the next day, but the ADF withdrew towards Sidon shortly after.

30. Interview in *al-Ahram*, 28 January 1977. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1977*, 30.
31. *Le Monde*, 19–20 January 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, 1–15 January 1977.
32. A compilation of Maronite statements is in PLO, The Unified Revolutionary Security Apparatus, Information Section, *The Campaign against the Palestinian People in the Statements and Media of the Lebanese Front after the Riad and Cairo Conferences* (Arab.), n.d. [1977].
33. *L'Orient–le Jour*, 23 January 1977.
34. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 1, 1–15 January 1977.
35. *Al-Usbuʿal-ʿArabi*, No. 905, 5 January 1977. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1977*, 5.
36. Interview in *Time*, 24 January 1977.
37. *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), 19 February 1976. Cited in *Palestinian Chronology*, xxiii. 148–9.
38. *L'Orient–le Jour*, 11 January 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 1, 1–15 January 1977.
39. Jordanian statement in *L'Orient–le Jour*, 4 February 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 3, 1–14 February 1977.
40. Interview in *al-Ahram*, 28 January 1977.
41. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 4, 15–28 February 1977.
42. *Egyptian Gazette*, 18 February 1977.
43. Interview in *al-Ahram*, 26 February 1977.
44. *Al-Thawra Mustamirra*, No. 4, 28 January 1977.
45. Interviewed in *Stern*, 15 February 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 4, 15–28 February 1977.
46. The team probably belonged to the Special Operations section headed by Wadiʿ Haddad, who was now based in Baghdad and worked closely with Iraqi intelligence, while maintaining discreet contact with Habash.
47. On assistance to rejectionists, Mahmud ʿAbbas.* Fateh military cards were also issued to ALF and PFLP members to help them evade Syrian checkpoints.
48. *WAFA News Agency*, cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 3, 1–14 February 1977.
49. On Syrian plan and Saudi role, Bhays, and senior Fateh security official.* On the role of US and other (unnamed) parties, then US ambassador in Beirut Richard B. Parker, 'Kawkaba and the South Lebanon Imbroglio: A Personal Recollection, 1977–1978', *Middle East Journal*, 50: 4 (Autumn 1996), 547.
50. Fateh statement in *Arab Report & Record*, for the period 1–14 February 1977. Syrian measures reported in *al-Qabas*, 18 February 1977; and *Washington Post*, 21 February 1977 (cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 4, 15–28 February 1977).
51. Confirmed for example by Abu-Marzuq, Abu-Zayid;* and *Arab Report & Record*, No. 4, 15–28 February 1977.
52. Iraq later claimed that the attacks were the work of the Black June Organization, the name used by the Abu Nidal faction. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 19, 1–31 October 1977.

53. William Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC, 1993), 260.
54. Text of memorandum in *al-Thawra Mustamirra*, No. 9, March 1977.
55. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 7, 1–15 April 1977.
56. Cited in ibid.
57. Figures based on numerous interviews with guerrilla officers. They confirm Israeli estimates issued in February and March 1977. For example, Israeli radio on 22 February and 1 March 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, Nos. 4 and 5, 15–28 February and 1–15 March 1977.
58. *New York Times*, 20 January 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, 16–31 January 1977.
59. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 7, 1–15 April 1977.
60. Ibid., No. 8, 16–30 April 1977.
61. *L'Orient–le Jour*, 13 May 1977.
62. *Al-Muharrir*, 12 July 1977.
63. Reports following Asad–Arafat meeting on 20 June. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 12, 16–30 June 1977.
64. *Al-Liwa'* (Amman), 21 June 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 12, for the period 16–30 June 1977.
65. Abu Sa'id continued to operate with Syrian intelligence in Lebanon until his death in an ambush believed to have been set up by Fateh.
66. *L'Orient–le Jour*, 28 July 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 14, 15–31 July, and No. 15, 1–15 August 1977.
67. *Al-Nahar*, 31 July and 11 August 1977.
68. Syria had issued thousands of passports to certain guerrilla groups, including Fateh, up to 1976. Only diplomatic passports were issued in 1977–83 to senior PLO officials and members of the PLO executive committee. Yahya, then director-general of the PLO political department based in Damascus.*
69. Interview in *al-Nahar al-'Arabi wa al-Duwali*, No. 14, 6 August 1977. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1977*, 251–2.
70. PLO, Unified Revolutionary Security Apparatus, Information Section, *The Campaign Against the Palestinian People in the Statements and Media of the Lebanese Front after the Riad and Cairo Conferences* (Arab.) (n.d. [1977]).
71. *Time*, 14 August 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 15, 1–15 August 1977.
72. Ibid., No. 9, 1–15 May 1977.
73. Text reproduced in William Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, DC, 1986), 73.
74. Ibid. 85.
75. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 15, 1–15 August 1977.
76. A suggestion relayed to Egyptian Foreign Minister Isma'il Fahmi, according to *al-Siyasa*, 17 August 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 16, 16–31 August 1977.
77. Ibid., No. 15, 1–15 August 1977.
78. Quandt, *Camp David*, 86 and 89.

79. Saʿiqa secretary-general Muhsin confirmed the exchange of proposals. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 16, 16–31 August 1977.
80. Ibid. 74.
81. *New York Times*, 26 August 1977. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 16, 16–31 August 1977.
82. Muhsin quoted in *al-Jamahir* (Damascus), 5 September 1977; and *al-Tala'iʿ*, 9 September 1977.
83. Quoted by *Reuters* news agency (cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 5, for the period 1–15 March 1977). On settlement, quoted in *Maʿariv*, 1 September 1977.
84. Quandt, *Camp David*, 102.
85. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 18, 16–30 September 1977.
86. This assessment of Israeli action was shared in Cairo and Washington. Quandt, *Camp David*, 93 and 99.
87. *Al-Nahar*, 22 September 1977.
88. Muʿin Tahir, then Fateh battalion commander.*
89. US role described in Quandt, *Camp David*, 103–4.
90. On Soviet messages, *al-Nahar*, 18 August 1977.
91. Text of interview held in private papers of the Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, and reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1977*, 311.
92. Interview in *al-Usbuʿal-ʿArabi*, 26 September 1977. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1977*, 316.
93. This person was generally assumed to be Edward Said, professor of comparative English literature at Columbia University, New York. Jibril interview in *Ila al-Amam*, 1–8 September 1978.
94. ʿUmar, then deputy-director of the centre.*
95. *WAFA News Agency*, 17 November 1977. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1977*, 434.
96. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 20, 1–30 November 1977.

18 Rearguard Action

1. For example, to representatives of the General Union of Palestine Students in December 1977. Meeting attended by the author.
2. Text in *al-Baʿth*, 6 December 1977. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1977*, 536–7.
3. Text of proposal in *al-Safir*, 1 February 1978.
4. Text in *WAFA News Agency*, 5 December 1977.
5. *Al-Safir*, 26 December 1977.
6. *Al-Jumhuriyya* (Cairo), 3 January 1978. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 1, 1–15 January 1978.
7. *WAFA News Agency*, special supplement, 22 January 1978.
8. Wazir;* and Wazir interview in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 77, April 1978, 27.
9. Ibid. 27.

10. Estimate of Israeli strength from PLO chief-of-staff Sa'd Sayil, interviewed in Ilyas Khuri, 'War of the South' (Arab.), ibid. 13. PLO strength calculated from figures provided for individual battalions or groups in numerous interviews. One source suggests as few as 1,000 guerrillas were in the area. Ahmad Kalash, *The War Did Not Stop on the Seventh Day* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1978), 39.
11. Israeli chief-of-staff Mordechai Gur, cited in *al-Safir*, 16 March 1978.
12. PLO view expressed by Wazir and Sayil in separate interviews cited in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 77, April 1978, 13 and 28. Israeli military analyst Ze'ev Schiff discussed Israeli aims in *Ha'aretz*, 14 March 1979.
13. Israeli General Accountant's Report, part reprinted in *Jerusalem Post*, 10 May 1979.
14. Ze'ev Schiff, *Ha'aretz*, 14 March 1979.
15. Israeli losses cited in *al-Safir*, 1 April 1978; and the Israeli General Accountant's Report. The PLO claimed that at least 77 Israeli personnel had died, while Arafat claimed an Israeli toll of 1,200 dead and wounded. See list of Israeli obituaries in Kalash, *War Did Not Stop*, 175–9; and Arafat interview in *al-Usbu' al-'Arabi*, 27 November 1978. Official tally of PLO dead in *WAFA News Agency*, 20 March 1978. Israel claimed to have killed 250–400 guerrillas, but the list of guerrilla bodies that it submitted to the ICRC showed only 65 names, some taken from identity cards of guerrillas who had fled the area and remained alive. Tamraz, then PLO liason officer with the UN.* The real toll may have been lower, and included 35 Fateh personnel. Mu'in Tahir, then battalion commander.*
16. The names of the 75 victims are listed in the US congressional record, reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 9: 3 (35) (Spring 1980), 203–8.
17. Lebanese ministry of information, cited in Yasin Swayd, *The 1978 Litani Operation: A Strategic Look* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1992), 90.
18. Sayil interview, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 77, April 1978, 14; and Wazir interview, ibid. 28–9.
19. Sayil interview, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 77, April 1978, 14 and 15–16.
20. Quote from *To the Isolationists of Baghdad*, 10.
21. Quandt, *Camp David*, 183.
22. Salah Khalaf interview in *Ila al-Amam*, 19–25 May 1978.
23. On Iraqi role, Majid al-Khatib, then ALF battalion commander, and interviews with several ALF and Fateh cadres.* Also Israeli radio, cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 6, 16–31 March 1978. On Jordan, Ghanim Zurayqat, 'The Mass Movement in Jordan during the War in the South' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 78, May 1978. Also numerous interviews.
24. Hasan Salih, then political officer and deputy-commander of the Fateh military academy, which processed the volunteers.*
25. Interview in *al-Tala'i'*, 25 April 1978.
26. Text in *al-Nahar*, 28 April 1978.
27. Text in *WAFA News Agency*, 25 April 1978.
28. Sayil interview in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, April 1978, 13.
29. Interview in *al-Tala'i'*, 25 April 1978.
30. Interview in *Ila al-Amam*, 7–13 April 1978.

31. *New York Times*, 1 May 1978. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 9, 1–15 May 1978.
32. Naji ʿAllush, *Dialogue about the Issues of the Arab Revolution* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1979), 116.
33. Interviewed Hashim ʿAli Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks: About the Fifth War and the Steadfastness of Beirut* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1984), 34–5.
34. George Habash, *Speeches and Articles, 1977–1979* (Arab.) (Red Papers series 36; n.d. [1979]), 170.
35. Founding statement, 22 March 1978.
36. *Al-Hadaf*, 22 March 1978.
37. Quoted in Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance', monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 78, May 1978, 164.
38. Saʿdi, and Tamraz, then PLO liaison officers.*
39. *Jerusalem Post*, 31 March 1978.
40. A rejectionist account of events is given in Hashim ʿAli Muhsin, *The Uprising: Revolution Until Victory* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1984), 431–2.
41. Yasin, *Fateh Crisis*, 39.
42. According to a former associate of ʿAllush, identified only as Abu Hazim, he was co-opted to the 'leadership body' of the Abu Nidal faction sometime between November 1978 and March 1979. In late 1979 ʿAllush attempted to launch his own political vehicle, the Arab Popular Liberation Movement, and was allowed to open an office in Baghdad in January 1980, although little came of this effort. He apparently remained loosely affiliated with the Abu Nidal faction until 1984, when the publication in its official biweekly magazine of a bitter diatribe against him and other members of what it termed 'the crusader cell' revealed that a formal split had occurred. See articles in *Filastin al-Thawra* (Revolutionary Council), 1 September and 1 October 1984; and series of articles by Abu Hazim in ibid. 1 and 15 November and 1 and 15 December 1984. On opening of office in Baghdad, *Tariq al-Intisar*, 21 January 1980.
43. *Ila al-Amam*, 19–25 May 1978.
44. Kifah, then a senior leftist cadre.*
45. Statement by information minister Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 10, 16–31 May 1978.
46. *Ila al-Amam*, 7–13 April and 1–8 September 1978.
47. ʿAli.*
48. ʿAli; and Shbib, then senior PLF cadre and official historian.*
49. PFLP, *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 37–8.
50. Ibid. 39.
51. *Speeches and Articles, 1977–1979*, 59 and 70.
52. *Al-Thawra Mustamirra*, 7 December 1977. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 10, 16–31 May 1978. Habash implied a link some eight months later, by regarding the Orly attack as a turning point towards the worse in relations with the PLO leadership. *Speeches and Articles, 1977–1979*, 115.
53. *Al-Hurriyya*, 5 June 1978.
54. *Ila al-Amam*, 16–22 June 1978.

55. *Al-Hurriyya*, 5 June 1978.
56. *Li-Tattahid al-Qiwa (Let the Forces Unite)*, 34.
57. *Al-Safir*, 25 May 1978.
58. *Al-Thawra Mustamirra*, 27 May 1978.
59. Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 80, July 1978, 154–5.
60. Yasin, *Fateh Crisis*, 39.
61. Several interviews, including Nawfal, then DFLP politburo member and military commander.*
62. Muhammad al-Rusan (ed.), *The Collected Penal Codes of the PLO, 1979* (Arab.) (Tunis, 1979), 9. The Fateh penal code was supplanted by the PLO penal code of 1979.
63. *Speeches and Articles*, 115.
64. Habash, speaking after further clashes several months later (in ibid. 115).
65. Text in Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 81/82, August/September 1978, 281–2.
66. *Al-Nahar al-ʿArabi wa al-Duwali*, 15 July 1978. The official was probably foreign minister Tariq ʿAziz.
67. *WAFA News Agency*, 16 July 1978.
68. *To the Isolationists of Baghdad*, 20.
69. Ibid. 24, 26, and 27.
70. On ALF split, Yasin, *Fateh Crisis*, 79–80.
71. The PPSF, which was among the targeted opposition groups, later claimed that Fateh had also attempted to engineer a split in its ranks. According to its secretary-general Samir Ghusha, *The Current Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution: Roots and Solutions* (n.d. [approx. 1983]), 58.
72. Bilal al-Hasan, 'The Palestinian Resistance', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 80, July 1978, 153–4.
73. For example, later comment by Hawatma in *al-Hurriyya*, 20 November 1978.
74. *Speeches and Articles*, 116.
75. Quandt, *Camp David*, 254.
76. Text in *al-Baʿth*, 24 September 1978. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1978*, 452–4.
77. Jallud, commander of Fateh team.*
78. For example, Hawatma interview in *al-Hurriyya*, 20 November 1978.
79. Protest from steadfastness front in memorandum to Iraqi president Bakr, *al-Safir*, 6 November 1978.
80. Text in *al-Baʿth*, 6 November 1978. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1978*, 660–2.
81. Summary of official Arab summit decision, Joint Jordanian–Palestinian Committee to Support the Steadfastness of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Homeland, *Report of Achievements, 1979–1986* (Amman, 1987), appendix 1, 54–5.
82. Quandt, *Camp David*, 265.
83. *WAFA News Agency*, special supplement, 24 October 1978.
84. Text of questions and US answers in Quandt, *Camp David*, appendix H, 388–96.

85. Qaddumi interview in *WAFA News Agency*, 6 March 1978; and Khalaf, Habash, and Muhsin interviews in *al-Safir*, 8, 9, and 11 March 1978.
86. *Al-Hurriyya*, 27 February 1978.
87. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 18, 16–30 September 1978.
88. *Al-Safir*, 14 December 1978.
89. Ibid. 14 December 1978.
90. Maʿoz, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank*, 149.
91. *Speeches and Articles*, 179–80.
92. Text in *al-Hurriyya*, 18 December 1978.
93. *Al-Thaʾir al-ʿArabi*, 15 December 1978.
94. *Al-Safir*, 15 December 1978. Also PF–GC spokesman Fadl Shururu in *Ila al-Amam*, 15 December 1978.
95. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 28 November 1978.
96. *Al-Safir*, 15 December 1978.
97. Ibid.
98. Text in *al-Nahar*, 18 December 1978.
99. Separate interviews with Hawatma and Habash in *al-Safir*, 14 December 1978.
100. Hawatma interview in ibid.
101. *Ila al-Amam*, 1–8 September 1978.
102. Ibid.
103. Text of draft unity programme published in *al-Safir*, 28 October 1978.
104. *Al-Hurriyya*, 20 November 1978.
105. Ibid.
106. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 19 December 1978.
107. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 23, 1–15 December 1978.
108. Habash in speech delivered in Baghdad, probably in October 1978. *Speeches and Articles*, 205–6.
109. Ibid. 206.
110. Senior PLF cadre.*
111. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 26 December 1978.
112. On DFLP policy towards the USSR, ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
113. Nawfal.*
114. *Arab Report & Record*, No. 22, 16–30 November 1978.
115. *A Discussion of the Report by the Palestinian Communist Organization in the West Bank*, al-Hadaf Publications No. 11 (Dar al-Hadaf, n.d. [autumn 1979]), 25–6.
116. Interview in *al-Hurriyya*, 20 November 1978.
117. Ibid. 15 January 1979.
118. *The Current Situation and the Tasks of the Revolution and the Arab Movement for Liberation and Progress* (Arab.), political report issued by the central committee meeting in mid-July 1979, 39.
119. *Speeches and Articles*, 112.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid. 113.
122. Interview in *al-Nahar*, 16 January 1979.

123. ʿAbd-Rabbu, and Nawfal.*
124. *The PLO Crisis: Analysis and Critique of the Roots and Solutions* (Arab.) (Nicosia, n.d. [end 1983]), 46.
125. Ibid. 46–7.
126. Ibid. 48.
127. *Speeches and Articles*, 124.
128. Qaddumi publicized his opposition in an interview with *al-Qabas*, 29 November 1978. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 23, 1–15 December 1978.
129. Cited in *Arad Report & Record*, No. 6, 11 April 1979.
130. Cited in ibid.
131. Interview in *al-Mustaqbal*, 22 April 1979. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 206.
132. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 7, 25 April 1979.
133. Ibid.

19 The 'Fakhani Republic'

1. Points made in Rashid Khalidi, 'The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of Israel's Invasion', *Middle East Journal*, 38: 2 (Spring 1984), 257.
2. The telephone network was installed after the May 1973 'events' by the PLO technical department under the supervision of Fateh communications officer Abu Sa'id, who was later revealed to work for Syrian intelligence.
3. Interview titled 'The Military Action of the Palestinian Revolution and the Prospects for its Development' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 105, August 1980, 39.
4. Interview titled 'We have Created a Psychological Gap between the Israeli Citizen and Leadership' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981, 110 and 113.
5. 'Military Action of the Palestinian Revolution', 35.
6. 'We have Created a Psychological Gap', 116.
7. Ibid. 111 and 112.
8. Ibid. Wazir also noted the limited nature of PLO military infrastructure. Interview in *al-Hawadith*, 29 August 1980. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1980*, 305.
9. *Current Reality*, 67; and *Ila al-Amam*, 24 July 1981.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Shaqqura, al-Majayda, and Tamraz.*
13. PFLP, *Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Congress* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1981), 45.
14. The battalions were: ʿAbd-al-Qadir al-Husayni, Martyr Murad, Nazareth, Salah-al-Din, Martyrs of Tal al-Zaʿtar, ʿIzz-al-Din al-Qassam, Tarshiha, National Security, 1st Artillery, 2nd Artillery, Air Defence, and Rocket Unit.

15. The PFLP battalions were: Ghassan Kanafani, Abu al-Tayyib al-Sharqi, Abu Amal, ʿAbd-al-Wahhab al-Tayyib, Guevara of Gaza, and Abu Karim, in addition to artillery, air defence, and rockets.
16. Interviewed in *al-Hurriyya*, 5 June 1983.
17. Abu Khalid, and Majid Khatib.* The ALF battalions were named: Kamal Nasir, Jabir Nabahan, and Abu al-Dhar al-Ghufari.
18. On the PPSF, for example, *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Precepts* (Arab.), as modified and approved by the Sixth General Conference convened on 17–23 June 1979, 105 and 125; and Mahmud Hamdan.*
19. Wazir.* Israel announced the capture of a ship with 27 tanks on board destined for the PLO in late May 1979, but the shipment may have belonged to the Yemeni contingent of the ADF in Lebanon and was released. Shadi, then Fateh armour officer confirms receipt of the Yemeni tanks in this period.*
20. According to details of training for officers of Fateh's Martyrs of September Battalion (armour), reproduced in Raphael Israeli (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents* (London, 1983), 102.
21. According to Kamal al-Shaykh, and Munjid, then commander and deputy commander of Fateh's Martyrs of September Battalion (armour).*
22. Abu Hasan, then Fateh tank crewman.*
23. Fayiz Zaydan, then Fateh air unit commander; Abu ʿAzzam, then Fateh special service officer; and Nasr Jabir, then head of the Fateh scientific committee.*
24. Shaqqura.*
25. Israeli chief-of-staff Rafael Eitan reported the arrival of the tanks on Israeli Radio. *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 12–13 February 1980, and 3 and 4 March 1981. And Wazir interview in *al-Hawadith*, 29 August 1980.
26. Interview in ibid.
27. *Al-Watan al-ʿArabi*, 3 August 1978; and *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 13 September 1979. Cited in Eliezer Ben-Rafael, *Israel–Palestine: A Guerilla Conflict in International Politics* (New York, 1987), 134.
28. 'Military Action of the Palestinian Revolution', 35.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. 36.
31. Zaydan;* and *WAFA News Agency*, 30 October 1976.
32. Information on Aeronica from Rex Brynen.
33. Zaydan.*
34. One author summarizes the wider literature to describe patrimonial leaders as standing 'at the apex of a social pyramid, dispensing resources and social regulation through a chain of superior/subordinate relationships'. He then defines neo-patrimonialism as a system that 'variously combines and overlays the informal social structures of patrimonialism with the formal and legal structures of the state—or, in the case of the Palestinian national movement, the quasi- or proto-state'. Rex Brynen, 'The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 25: 1 (Autumn 1995), 24–5.

35. Jamil Hilal, 'Problems of Change in the Palestinian System' (Arab.), *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, No. 15, Summer 1993, 25.
36. Estimates of the total reserves and of annual income from all sources of the PLO and Fateh have varied widely, ranging from $1.5 billion to $14 billion for the former and as high as $7–8 billion for the latter. Adam Zagorin, 'Auditing the PLO', in Augustus Norton and Martin Greenberg (eds.), *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization* (Carbondale, Ill., 1989), 196–7 and 199. Colonel Saʿid Maragha, who led the major mutiny against Arafat in 1983, asserted that the PLO Chairman had $1.5 billion in bank assets by 1982. Cited in ibid. 203. This seems a more likely estimate.
37. Confirmed, for example, by Mustafa al-Khatib, former Fateh cadre and PLO finance officer.*
38. John Waterbury, 'Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco', *Government and Opposition*, 11: 4 (Autumn 1976), 432.
39. Khalid al-Hasan, *Lest Leadership Become Autocracy: From the Harvest of My Experience* (Arab.) (n.p., 1995).
40. Budget cuts noted in internal protest memorandum signed by Gaza and Nablus committee heads Subhi Abu-Kirsh and Ihsan Samara in 1983. Portions of text later reproduced in *al-Nashra*, Year 2, No. 76, 7 April 1986, 4.
41. Points made by Clement Henry Moore, 'Clientelist Ideology and Political Change: Fictitious Networks in Egypt and Tunisia', in Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury (eds.), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London, 1977), 258–9 and 261.
42. On competition between patronage arenas, John Waterbury, 'An Attempt to Put Patrons and Clients in their Place', in ibid. 330.
43. Abu al-Tayyib, *The Beirut Earthquake: The Third Sector* (Arab.) (Amman, 1984), 385. Confirmed by Fadl Kaʿwash, senior PLO engineer.*
44. A list of PLO offices, including those with diplomatic status, is in Kemal Kirisci, *The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause* (London, 1986), appendix IV and table A4.1, pp. 181–3.
45. The PF–GC gained a special notoriety for its involvement in the recovery and trade of stolen cars.
46. DFLP, *The Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report* (Arab.), the second general conference (Beirut, 1981), 278.
47. Salah Khalaf.*
48. Wazir.*
49. ʿAlaʾ Husni, then Fateh militia commander in Lebanon.*
50. The DFLP complained bitterly at the appointments. *Al-Hurriyya*, 15 January 1979.
51. TEAM, *Health Services for Palestinians in Lebanon*, presented to ECWA, January 1983.
52. Study conducted by Salim Nasr, Lebanese sociologist involved in a survey of Palestinian manpower in Lebanon.* Similar figures in Salim Nasr, *MERIP Reports*, No. 162, January–February 1990, 5.

53. Khalidi, 'Palestinians in Lebanon', 257; and Wahid Mtayr, society director, Amman office; and Abu Rami, his assistant.* The Society was renamed in 1979.
54. Khalil al-Sawahri, *The Palestinians: Compulsory Displacement and Social Welfare* (Arab.) (Amman, 1986), 65–6.
55. Ibid. 68.
56. Ibid. 69.
57. Table in Fathi Arafat, *Health, War and Steadfastness* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1989), 264; and Rashid Khalidi, *Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking during the 1982 War* (New York, 1986), 32. Only the PRCS offered services in Egypt, while the PLA also ran a hospital in Jordan.
58. Study conducted by ʿAli Abu-Tawq, then battalion administrative officer.*
59. Comment by ʿIsam al-Khafaji in the series of articles sponsored by the PFLP on reform in the PLO. *Al-Hadaf*, 1 July 1990, 15.

20 Extending the State-in-Exile or Capturing It?

1. *The Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1981), 255.
2. The Shabak used this administrative power, as well as more conventional techniques of blackmail and entrapment, to recruit informers. On some occasions Palestinians serving criminal sentences were released early after agreeing to collaborate. The International Commission of Jurists, *The Civilian Judicial System in the West Bank and Gaza: Present and Future* (Geneva, 1994), 47.
3. Shmuel Sandler and Hillel Frisch, *Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank* (Lexington, Mass., 1984), 49; and Joost Hilterman, *Behind the Intifada: Labour and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton, 1991), 19–20.
4. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel*, 56.
5. On common market, Hilterman, *Behind the Intifada*, 30.
6. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel*, 66; and Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967* (Washington, DC, 1988), 26 and 44.
7. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel*, 47–8 and 59.
8. First quote from Quandt, *Camp David*, 111. Second cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 6, 11 April 1979.
9. Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 22–3 and 46.
10. Ibid. 43.
11. Ibid. 28–30 and 44
12. Term 'diploma elite' taken from Wolf, *Peasant Wars*, 24. On election results, Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 67.
13. The argument that traditional elite families have in fact retained much of their social and political control is made forcefully by Lamia Radi, 'La Famille comme mode de gestion et de controle du social chez les élites traditionelles palestiniennes', unpublished manuscript, March 1996.
14. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel*, 56.
15. Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 47.

16. Sarah Graham-Brown, *Education, Repression and Liberation: Palestinians* (London, 1984), 83–5.
17. Ibid., table 1, p. 84, and p. 87.
18. Hilterman, *Behind the Intifada,* 20; Sandler and Frisch, *Israel,* table 4–2, p. 54; and Salim Tamari, 'Building Other People's Homes: The Palestinian Peasant's Household and Work in Israel', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 11: 1 (41) (Autumn 1981), table 3, p. 42.
19. Remittances figure from Salim Tamari, 'Social Dynamics and the Ideology of Resistance in the West Bank' (Arab.), in Camille Mansur, *The Palestinian People Inside* (n.p., 1990), 256. Emigration statistics from Israeli sources cited by Majid Abu-Sharar in seminar titled, 'Issues of the National Struggle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip', Part 2, *Shu'un Filastiniyya,* No. 119, October 1981, 29 and 44–5.
20. Graham-Brown, *Education, Repression and Liberation,* table 1, p. 84, and p. 87.
21. Notion of non-migratory rural urbanization from Salim Tamari.
22. Wolf, *Peasant Wars,* p. xiv.
23. Quote from Tamari, 'Social Dynamics', 254. Similar conclusions drawn by Marisa Escribano and Nazmi el-Joubeh, 'Migration and Change in a West Bank Village', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* II: 1 (41) (Autumn 1981), 156–7 and 160.
24. Tamari, 'Building Other People's Homes', 62.
25. On impeded proletarianization, ibid. 60. On cleaving of traditional moorings, Glenn Robinson, 'The Role of the Professional Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society: The Medical and Agricultural Committees', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 25: 2 (May 1993), 301.
26. On the view of local sub-elites and activists, Tamari, 'Social Dynamics', 258.
27. Majid Abu-Sharar in seminar, 'Issues of the National Struggle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip' (Arab.), Part 1, *Shu'un Filastiniyya,* No. 118, September 1981, 34.
28. Eliezer Ben-Rafael, *Israel–Palestine: A Guerrilla Conflict in International Politics* (New York, 1987), 112.
29. DFLP, *The Current Situation and the Tasks of the Revolution and the Arab Movement for Liberation and Progress* (Arab.), political report issued by the central committee meeting in mid-July 1979, 50.
30. Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu in seminar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 1, p. 32.
31. Shinnar.*
32. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report,* 253.
33. Zabri in seminar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 1, p. 33.
34. *Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Congress,* 305.
35. *Essays on People's War* (Arab.), Part 2 (n.d. [approximately 1989]), 113.
36. Ze'ev Schiff, *Haʿaretz,* 9 June 1980. Cited in Ben-Rafael, *Israel–Palestine,* 71. The then Israeli interior minister Yosef Burg offered the lower figures of 67 cells uncovered in 1977 and 82 cells in the first eight months of 1978. Cited in *Arab Report & Record,* No. 17, 1–15 September 1978.
37. Ben-Rafael, *Israel–Palestine,* 71.

38. Editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 20 January 1980.
39. Bhays, then head of organization committee.* Organizational structure also detailed in Fateh internal document viewed by author.
40. Comments in this section largely based on Wazir, Abu-Karsh, Bhays, Ghazi Husayni, Jayyusi, ʿAlul, Mansur, ʿUmar, ʿAbbas, and several aides of Wazir and other cadres.*
41. ʿAbbas, then head of regions committee.*
42. According to various aides and Western Sector cadres.*
43. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 124.
44. *Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Conference*, 304–5.
45. The main exception was to call for the reactivation of the Palestinian National Front (ibid. 287).
46. *Political Statement Issued by the Fourth National Conference*, 92–3.
47. Ibid. 94.
48. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 124.
49. *Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Conference*, 85.
50. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 125.
51. Ibid. 125–6.
52. Usama al-Shinnar, then a leading DFLP cadre in charge of clandestine organization.*
53. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 473–83.
54. ʿAbd-Rabbu, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 1, p. 49.
55. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 479.
56. Salih Ra'fat, then the senior DFLP cadre responsible for clandestine organization.*
57. Hamada Faraʿna, then DFLP cadre in Jordan.*
58. 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 2, pp. 26–7.
59. The most explicit statement of the territorial location of the state was in *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 252.
60. Ibid. 247.
61. Ibid. 248.
62. Communist views on recruitment among workers and on union activity are detailed, for example, in updated editions of *Organizing the Friendly Worker Belt in the Workers' Blocs* (Arab.), internal party education series, the occupied areas, 1983; and *How to Build Our Workers' Unions? How to Develop Their Role?* (Arab.), worker preparation, the occupied areas, 1983.
63. Figures from Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 104; and Abu-Sharar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 2, p. 28. The DFLP suggested a unionization rate of 7 per cent in 1979. See *The Current Situation and the Tasks of the Revolution and the Arab Movement for Liberation and Progress* (Arab.), political report issued by the central committee meeting in mid-July 1979, 50.
64. Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 104–5.
65. *Ten Years after the Establishment of the Palestinian Communist Party 1977/1987* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, 1987), 60.
66. Ibid. 64–5.

67. Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 97.
68. *Founding Statement and the Provisional Internal Statutes of the Palestinian Communist Party* (Arab.), 10 February 1982.
69. Sharif, *On Communist Thought*, 123.
70. *The Text of the Letter of Bashir Barghuti's Bloc: A Discussion of the Question of Armed Struggle in Response* (Arab.) (n.d. [approximately 1982]), 64–5 and 66.
71. Ibid. 72–3.
72. Ibid. 68; and PCP, *The Programme: For the Liberation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and for the Attainment of the Durable Rights of the Palestinian People* (Arab.), proceedings of the first conference, 1983, 18.
73. *Political Report*, 304.
74. *Concerning the Strategy for Action in the Occupied Land* (Arab.), Fateh Western Sector, n.p., n.d. [1982, pre-June], 62.
75. *Current Situation*, 39.
76. Abu-Sharar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 2, p. 29.
77. Hilterman, *Behind the Intifada*, 85.
78. Ibid. 84–6.
79. Abu-Sharar and ʿArabi ʿAwwad, ibid, 36 and 41. Figures borne out by official statistics in *Affairs of the Occupied Homeland* (Arab.) (Amman, 1986); and unofficial statistics *The West Bank: Facts and Figures* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, 1985).
80. Phases described in *Lessons in the Revolutionary Course* (Arab.), n.p., n.d. [approximately 1983], unofficial text produced by former Fateh prisoners in the occupied territories.
81. Detailed view in ʿAbd-al-Sattar Qasim *et al.*, *The Experience of Detention in Zionist Jails* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1986); and *Lessons in the Revolutionary March.*
82. PFLP, *Political Statement*, 84.
83. Detailed account of conditions by Mahdi Bsaysu, edited by Muʿnis al-Razzaz, 'Testimonies: Mahdi Bsaysu on the Experience of Detainees in the Prisons of the Occupation' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 103, June 1980, 129–39. Another description in *'Al-Hamishmar*, 30 May 1980. Text in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 10: 1 (37) (Autumn 1980), 155–6.
84. Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 70.
85. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 278.
86. Shaul Mishal, *The PLO under Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch* (New Haven, 1986), 127.
87. Fateh thinking explained by Abu-Sharar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 1, pp. 76–7.
88. Wazir, Zuhdi Saʿid, Jayyusi, Buʿbaʿ.*
89. Jayyusi, then head of PLO side in joint technical committee.*
90. Abu-Sharar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 1, p. 76.
91. Hilterman, *Behind the Intifada*, 75 and 80.
92. Bassam al-Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership in the Occupied Territories* (Jerusalem, 1993), 66–7.

93. On uses of steadfastness funds, General Secretariat of the Joint Committee, *Report of Achievements, 1979–1986* (Arab.) (Amman, 1987). Also Abu-Sharar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 1, p. 77; and Tamari, 'Social Dynamics', 256–7.
94. Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 122; and Graham-Brown, *Education*, 87.
95. Interview in *al-Hurriyya*, 25 February 1980.
96. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 278.
97. *Political Statement*, 83.
98. *Al-Hadaf*, 17 April and 23 October 1976.
99. Abu-Sharar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 1, p. 77.
100. Jayyusi.*
101. Abu-Sharar, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 1, p. 77.
102. Speech reproduced in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 15 April 1981.
103. Zuhdi Saʿid, then head of the Fateh economic committee; and Jayyusi, head of the Palestinian side in the technical committee of the Joint Jordanian–Palestinian Steadfastness Fund.*
104. Text of the report in *al-Hurriyya*, 30 July 1979. Confirmed by ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
105. On leftist thinking towards the PNF, DFLP, *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 363–9.
106. Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership*, 77–81.
107. The PLO executive committee officially confirmed on 15 October 1979 that it had not approved the formation of the PNF, and rebuked member ʿAbd-al-Jawad Salih for announcing it. Resolution No. 520/79, given in letter from Executive Committee secretary Muhammad Zuhdi al-Nashashabi, 16 October 1979, ref. 963/100/3.
108. Mishal, *PLO under Arafat*, 143–5.
109. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 362.
110. Ibid. 359.
111. Text in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 9: 2 (34) (Winter 1980), 170.
112. Speech reproduced in *al-Hadaf*, 5 April 1980.
113. Interview in *Monday Morning*, 25 February 1980.
114. On earlier proposal by Sadat, Quandt, *Camp David*, 297.
115. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 20 January 1980.
116. Interview in *al-Nahar*, 16 January 1980.
117. Interview with Munir Fasheh, 'Political Islam in the West Bank', *MERIP Reports*, 12: 2 (103) (February 1982), 15–17.
118. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel*, 152–3; Salih, *Israeli Military Orders* (Amman, 1986), 19; and Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law*, 175–6.
119. Kretzmer, *Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel*, 140.
120. *Al-Nahar*, 16 January 1980.
121. *Haʿaretz*, 15 April 1980. Text in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 10: 1 (37) (Autumn 1980), 155.
122. Hani al-Hasan in *al-Watan al-ʿArabi*, 20 September 1979; and Khalid al-Hasan in *Le Monde*, 10 May 1983. Cited in *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, iv. *1979–80*, 258.

123. For a survey of attitudes on both sides, *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, iv. *1979–80*, 234–6 and 243–4.
124. Interview in *al-Watan al-ʿArabi*, 1 November 1979. Cited in *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, iv. *1979–80*, 235.
125. Interview in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 103, June 1980, 12.
126. *Al-Baʿth*, 5 August 1979. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 15, 5 September 1979.
127. *Tishrin*, 5 August 1979. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 15, 5 September 1979.
128. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 14, 1 August 1979.
129. Text of statement in *al-Fajr al-Jadid* (Tripoli), 16 June 1979. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 337.
130. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 12 November 1979.
131. *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, iv. *1979–80*, 246.
132. Faysal Hurani, 'The Palestinian Resistance' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 98, January 1980, 167–8; and Sabir Musa, 'The Palestinian Resistance' (Arab.), monthly report, ibid. February 1980, No. 99, 157–60.
133. *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, iv. *1979–80*, 639.
134. *WAFA News Agency*, 9 December 1979.
135. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 12 December 1979.
136. *Voice of Palestine Radio*, 12 December 1979, and 3 and 8 January 1980. Cited in *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, iv. *1979–80*, 247.
137. Zaydan.*
138. Joint statement issued on 29 December, *al-Safir*, 31 December 1979.
139. ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
140. Nawfal.*
141. Natur, then head of DFLP military administration.*
142. Mahmud Hamdan, then PPSF military commander.* Jibril cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 15, 5 September 1979. On PFLP air training, *al-Hadaf*, 12 December 1980.
143. Nawfal, and ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
144. Bashir al-Barghuti, *Against Camp David* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, 1978), 24.
145. Nawfal.*
146. Nawfal, Dawli, and Natur.*
147. Nawfal, Dawli, and Natur.*
148. *The Internal Statutes* (Arab.), approved by the second congress, May 1981, 78. On conscription of students, Dawli.*
149. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 508–15.
150. Summary in ibid. 473–83.
151. Ibid. 481.
152. Ibid. 483.
153. Ibid. 474.
154. Nawfal; and Hani Hurani, then leading cadre in DFLP organization in Jordan.*
155. The agent was Abu ʿArida, and these incidents were cited as examples of Fateh attacks in Nayif Hawatma, *The PLO Crisis: Analysis and Critique of the Roots and Solutions* (Arab.) (Nicosia, n.d. [end 1983]), 50.

156. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 474.
157. Cited in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981, 49.
158. Ibid. 509.
159. Ibid.
160. On DFLP view of relationship with the USSR, ʿAbd-Rabbu.*
161. Hawatma, *PLO Crisis*, 117. He recalled the date mistakenly as early 1979.
162. Statement by Hawatma in *al-Hurriyya*, 6 October 1980. Reference to the axis in *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 443.
163. *Al-Hadaf*, 10 May 1980; and *Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Congress*, 49.
164. Ibid. 121; and *al-Hadaf*, 4 October 1980.
165. Habash, written message published in ibid. 20 December 1980.
166. Habash, *Speeches and Articles*, 122.
167. Ibid. 34.
168. *The Political and Organizational Strategy* (Arab.), Central Information Committee, al-Hadaf Publications (printed in Damascus), 1983 (4th edition), 24–6. The latter is a reprint of an earlier report debated at the 1981 conference. Reference to the USSR, for example, in *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 76.
169. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 84–5. In 1974 a 'preparatory committee' was formed representing all branches of the ASAP, to draft a working paper and political programme.
170. PFLP politburo member Mustafa al-Zabri in *al-Hadaf*, 18 April 1981; and Habash in ibid. 16 May 1981.
171. *A Discussion of the Report by the Palestinian Communist Organization in the West Bank* (Arab.) (Dar al-Hadaf, n.d. [autumn 1979]), 49–50 and 55.
172. George Habash, *New Developments in the Arab Situation and the Requirements of Confrontation against the Imperialist Zionist Reactionary Pact* (Arab.) (Dar al-Hadaf, 1980).
173. *Al-Hadaf*, 10 May 1980.
174. Coordination confirmed by Nawfal.*
175. *Political Report*, 45.
176. PFLP battalion commander Abu Suhayl in *al-Hadaf*, 3 May 1980.
177. Ibid. 5 April 1980.
178. *Internal Statutes* (Arab.), Information Department, 1981, 10–11. For a conventional discussion of people's war based on the Vietnamese and Chinese experiences, for example, *Political and Organizational Strategy*, 106–12.
179. *Political Report*, 1981, 500–1.
180. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 61.
181. Ibid.
182. *Political Report*; *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 79; and Zabri, 'Issues of the National Struggle', Part 2, p. 50.
183. *Political Report*, 506.
184. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 219–20.
185. Hanna Nasir, later director of Palestine National Fund.*
186. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 226.

187. Ibid. 222.
188. Ibid. 226–7.
189. *Al-Watan*, 10 July 1979, and *al-Qabas*, 10 July 1979. Cited in *Arab Report & Record*, No. 14, 1 August 1979.
190. *Organizational, Military, and Financial Report*, 216, 228, and 230.
191. *Ila al-Amam*, 26 October to 12 November 1979.
192. Samir Ghusha, PPSF secretary-general; and Shbib, PLF historian.*
193. Abu Ahmad Halab, then head of the PLF military administration; and Tariq ʿAli, then PLF military commander.*
194. *WAFA News Agency*, 11 February 1980.
195. Ibid. 26 January 1980. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1980*, 34–5.
196. Suspicions relayed in Ziyad ʿAbd-al-Fattah, 'The Fourth Conference of Fateh' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 104, July 1980, 135.
197. *WAFA News Agency*, 1 June 1980.
198. The conference was attended by 530 delegates representing Fateh branches in 70 countries, according to Wazir. Interview in *al-Safir*, 5 June 1980.
199. Other points related to the internal statutes discussed in ʿAbd-al-Fattah, 'The Fourth Conference', 139–40.
200. *WAFA News Agency*, 1 June 1980. Dissident accusations repeated in Abu-Nidal and Nashshash, *Palestinian Programme*, 100.
201. For example, PFLP, *Draft Programme to Implement Palestinian National Unity*, 29.
202. The DFLP complained bitterly about Arafat's intervention, for example in *al-Hurriyya*, 15 January 1979.
203. *Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report*, 255.

21 No Lull before the Storm

1. According to the town mayor, *al-Safir*, 20 January 1979.
2. UNRWA statistics, *Arab Report & Record*, No. 11, 20 June 1979.
3. *Al-Safir*, 25 August 1979.
4. According to the governor of south Lebanon, ibid. 25 September 1979.
5. *Yediʿot Aharonot*, 21 and 30 September 1979. Cited in *IPS Hebrew Bulletin*, 10: 9, supplement, 603.
6. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 11 June 1979. Compensation figure according to Arafat, *al-Nahar*, 6 December 1979.
7. Interview in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 17 September 1979. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 424.
8. Ibid.
9. *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 4 (1979–80), 251–2.
10. Interview in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 17 September 1979. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 424.
11. *Al-Safir*, 8 October 1979.

12. Interview in *al-Usbuʿ al-ʿArabi*, 17 September 1979. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 424–5.
13. Interview in 'Military Action', 42.
14. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 29 September 1979.
15. Text of summit decisions in *al-Nahar*, 24 November 1979.
16. *Al-Mawqif*, 26 November 1979. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 489–90.
17. ʿAli Mruwwa, then leading cadre in the Fateh civilian network in the area.*
18. Habash and Hawatma, for example, in *al-Hadaf*, 27 October and *al-Hurriyya*, 29 October 1979.
19. *Al-Hurriyya*, 29 October 1979.
20. Hawatma, *PLO Crisis*, 53. On Shimran, Mruwwa.* Shimran later became Iranian minister of defence, and was killed in an artillery barrage during the war with Iraq.
21. Text in *al-ʿAmal*, 17 October 1979. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 454.
22. Text in *al-Nahar*, 7 February 1980.
23. *WAFA News Agency*, 7 February 1980.
24. *Al-Nahar*, 7 February 1980.
25. Text in *al-ʿAmal*, 17 October 1979. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 454.
26. Jamal Abu-Zayid, then Qadisiyya Forces operations officer.*
27. Text in *al-ʿAmal*, 12 February 1980. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1980*, 62.
28. *Al-Nahar*, 23 January 1980.
29. *Monday Morning*, 25 February 1980; and *al-Sharq*, 4 March 1980 (cited in *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, iv. 1979–80, 252–3).
30. *Al-Hurriyya*, 25 February 1980.
31. *Al-Hadaf*, 3 and 10 May 1980.
32. *WAFA News Agency*, 4 October 1978. Additional statement by Khalaf in *al-Nahar*, 17 November 1978.
33. Texts in *al-ʿAmal*, 17 October 1979, and 21 May 1980. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 454, and *Palestinian Arab Documents 1980*, 172.
34. *Al-Hawadith*, 9 May 1980. Reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1980*, 157–8.
35. Marwan al-Kayyali, then Fateh battalion deputy-commander.*
36. *Al-Safir*, 5 June 1980.
37. Interview, 'Military Action', 42.
38. Interview with Yehoshua Saguy, Head of Israeli military intelligence, on Israeli radio. Reproduced in the *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 21 August 1980.
39. ʿAbd-al-Hamid Salim Abu-al-Futuh, 'The Battle of Beaufort-Arnun' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 107, October 1980, 164; and ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz Abu-Fidda, *Beaufort Castle: Castle of Steadfastness* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1982), 69; ʿAlaʾ al-Affandi, then battalion commander; and Yusif Tahir, then platoon commander.*
40. Israeli army spokesman on Israeli Radio. *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 19 December 1980.

41. Interview with Sakhr Bsaysu, GUPS president, in *al-Hadaf*, 15 November 1980. And Bsaysu.*
42. *Al-Hadaf*, 6 September 1980; and *al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 6 (June), 1981, 18.
43. Nuʿman al-ʿUwayni, then senior GUPS official.*
44. Majayda, and Shaqqura.*
45. *Al-Hurriyya*, 29 October 1979.
46. Ibid. 25 February 1980.
47. *Al-Safir*, 13 March 1981.
48. *Al-Baʿth*, 30 October 1979. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 463.
49. *Al-Talaʾiʿ*, 27 May 1980.
50. Speech reproduced in *al-Baʿth*, 16 June 1980. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1980*, 202.
51. *Al-Baʿth*, 30 May 1980. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1980*, 180.
52. *Al-Safir*, 14 June 1980.
53. *Al-Hadaf*, 5 April 1980.
54. *WAFA News Agency*, 18 June 1980.
55. Text of resolutions in *al-Baʿth*, 16 April 1980. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1980*, 139–40.
56. Salih later published his views in *We and America* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1981). Abu-Sharar statement in *al-Hurriyya*, 13 October 1980.
57. Hasan ʿAjjaj, *Ila al-Amam*, 4–11 July 1980.
58. Withdrawals announced in *Ila al-Amam*, 21–28 November 1980. Boycott announced in PLO executive committee statement, *WAFA News Agency*, 25 November 1980.
59. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 15 January 1981.
60. Ibid. 21 April 1981.
61. Ibid. 15 April 1981.
62. A Palestinian assessment of the Labour Party programme in Ahmad Khalifa, 'The New Political Programme of the Labour Party is Conservative, Backward, and Lacks a New Vision' (Arab.), *Bulletin of the Institute for Palestine Studies*, 11: 1, (January 1981), 4–9.
63. Hawatma, *PLO Crisis*, 47; and PFLP, *Draft Programme to Implement Palestinian National Unity in this Phase* (Arab.), submitted to the 15th PNC, September 1980, 29 and 30.
64. *Al-Hadaf*, 16 May 1981.
65. *Ila al-Amam*, 1–8 May 1981.
66. *Al-Safir*, 7 February 1981.
67. On Israeli aims, statements by prime minister Begin, chief-of-staff Eitan, and deputy defence minister Mordechai Zippuri, in *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 17–18 October and 15 August 1980.
68. Further afield, the Mossad was suspected of the assassination attempt on Hani al-Hindi, who had helped direct the PFLP's 'external operations' in the late 1960s.
69. Schiff and Yaʾari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 29.
70. Ibid. 31.

71. Yair Evron, *War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli–Syrian Deterrence Dialogue* (London, 1987), 98.
72. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 35.
73. On PLO transformation and arrival of tanks, speaking on Israeli Radio. *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 17–18 October and 15 August 1980, and 3 and 4 March 1981.
74. On Libyan deaths, *al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 6 (June), 1981, 28.
75. *Ha'aretz*, 15 July 1981. Cited in *Bulletin of the Institute of Palestine Studies*, 11: 8 (August 1981).
76. Nawfal.*
77. Eitan in *Davar*, 19 July 1981. Cited in *Bulletin of the Institute of Palestine Studies*, 11: 8 (August 1981).
78. Cable to Arafat's office from the commander of the Shqif Forces on 18 July 1981. Chairman's archive.
79. Fadl Ka'wash, senior PLO engineer.*
80. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 36.
81. Yoram Peri, *Davar*, 24 July 1981. Text in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 11: 1 (41) (Autumn 1981), 204.
82. Figures on shelling from Ze'ev Schiff, *Ha'aretz*, 27 July 1981. Text in *Bulletin of the Institute of Palestine Studies*, 11: 8 (August 1981). A breakdown of Palestinian fire is in 'Issues of the Sixth War' (Arab.), *al-Ma'raka*, 1: 1 (February 1982), 95. PLO artillery losses from Wasif 'Urayqat, Abu Zaytun, Hasan al-Shibl, and Abu al-Shaykh, then artillery or rocket battalion commanders, and Nawfal. Single 130 millimetre gun loss reported in a cable from the 3rd Battalion to Arafat's office on 17 July 1981. Chairman's archive.
83. Information received on 21 July. Filed in Arafat's archive on 28 July 1981. Chairman's archive.
84. Wazir interview in *Monday Morning*, 27 July 1981.
85. *Ha'aretz*, 24 July 1981. Cited in Ahmad Shahin, 'Events of the War' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981, 155.
86. Israeli casualty figure from Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 36. Egyptian sources placed Israeli casualties at 300, cited in Yazid Khalaf, 'A Military Reading of the July War' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981, 98. Sayil estimated Israeli casualties at 1,500, against 2,567 in Lebanon. See interview in ibid. 112.
87. Wazir.* Also Wazir interview in *Monday Morning*, 27 July 1981.
88. Cables from Yarmuk Brigade headquarters to Arafat's office, 1730 and 2000 hours, 24 July and undated (25 July) 1981. Chairman's archive.
89. Avner Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (Oxford, 1987), 89.
90. Sayil, 'We Have Created a Psychological Gap', 119.
91. *Al-Riyadh* (Riyadh), 8 August 1981. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1981*, 357.
92. On dialogue, Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, *Behind the Myth: Arafat* (London, 1990), 252–4.
93. Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security*, 89.

94. Sayil confirmed this view, although he did not share it. Interview, 'We Have Created a Psychological Gap', 114.
95. Ibid. 112. Wazir, took the same view.*
96. Ibid. 118.
97. ʿAbbas, *Impossible Revolution*, 74.
98. Sayil, 'We Have Created a Psychological Gap', 113.
99. *Ila al-Amam*, 24 July 1981.
100. Schiff and Yaʾari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 35.
101. Point made by many Israeli officials. For example, Yitzhak Rabin, *Davar*, 20 July 1981. Cited in *Bulletin of the Institute of Palestine Studies*, 11: 8 (August 1981), 517.
102. Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Israel's Fateful Decisions* (London, 1988), 104.
103. Schiff and Yaʾari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 42–3. Harkabi disputes the assertion that Begin was unaware of Sharon's full intentions. *Israel's Fateful Decisions*, 104.
104. Salwa al-ʿAmad (ed.), 'Yasir Arafat Speaks about the War' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 136–137, March–April 1983, 19.
105. *Strategy Weekly*, February 1982.
106. Wazir.*
107. Abu al-Tayyib, *The Beirut Earthquake*, 74; and Wazir.*
108. ʿUrayqat, Abu Zaytun, Tamraz, Fannuna, Shibl, and Abu al-Shaykh.*
109. Example taken from Jarmaq Battalion. Tahir, Kayyali, Jihad, and Salah, then battalion commander, deputy-commander, company commander, and support weapon platoon commander, respectively.*
110. Sayil, 'We Have Created a Psychological Gap', 110–11.
111. Three documents relating to Asians in Fateh units reproduced in Raphael Israeli (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents* (London, 1983), 182–4.
112. According to PF–GC official spokesperson, Fadl Shruru in *Ila al-Amam*, 19–26 June 1981; DFLP, *al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 11 (November), 1981, 21; and numerous Fateh officers, for example Hdayb, Yusif Tahir, Muhammad Bakdash, and Muhammad Hamza.*
113. Wazir.*
114. PFLP view in *Report of the General Central Committee*, February 1982 session, 19. Hawatma quoted in *al-Hurriyya*, 9 November 1981.
115. *Al-Safir*, 9 November 1981; and *al-Hurriyya*, 9 November 1981.
116. A developed Fateh critique of leftist attitudes is Khalid al-Hasan, *A Critical Reading of Three Initiatives*, 17–20 and 33–4.
117. Text of decree in *al-Nahar*, 5 September 1981.
118. *Al-Hawadith*, 24 July 1981. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1981*, 304.
119. Minutes of meeting, reproduced in Israeli (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon*, 176.
120. *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 6 (1981–82), 326.
121. Memorandum from committee head Abu al-Hakam to Arafat, 26 October 1981, ref. 15Q/2/, reproduced in unnumbered appendix, Mahmud Tawfiq al-Rusan, *Collected Criminal Legislation of the PLO, 1979*, 2nd edn. (Tunis, n.d.), 326–7.
122. Kaʿwash.*

123. In the words of OACL secretary-general Muhsin Ibrahim, *The War and the Experience of the Lebanese National Movement* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1983), 93.
124. PFLP, *Report of the General Central Committee* (Arab.), February 1982 session, 55. On earlier incidents, *al-Hurriyya*, 9 July 1979; and PFLP, *Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Congress April 1981* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1981), 167; and PFLP, *Political Statement Issued by the Fourth National Congress* (Arab.) (1981), 193.
125. *Al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 47, January 1982, 11.
126. *Report of the General Central Committee*, 55.
127. *New York Times*, 2 January 1982.
128. Official statement in *al-Thawra*, 15 December 1981. Text in *Journal of Palestine Studies* 11: 3 (43) (Spring 1982), 199.
129. Text in *Maʿariv*, 18 December 1981. Reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 11: 3 (43) (Spring 1982), 167–70.
130. Syrian information minister Ahmad Iskandar interview in *Monday Morning*, 31 January 1982.
131. Text in *Maʿariv*, 18 December 1981. Reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 11: 3 (43) (Spring 1982), 167–70.
132. Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security*, 107.
133. *International Herald Tribune*, 16 November 1981; Schiff and Yaʾari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 83; and Israeli radio, 7 February 1982 (cited in *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 8 February 1982).
134. Jmayyil intentions and PLO approach confirmed in Baqraduni, *Curse of a Nation*, 40–1 and 149.
135. Schiff and Yaʾari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 87.
136. Baqraduni, *Curse of a Nation*, 40. The author dates the visit in January.
137. *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 23 February 1982.
138. Shamir, *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 16 March 1982. Sharon, ibid. 20 February 1982.
139. *Al-Safir*, 3 March 1982.
140. See e.g. *Financial Times*, 11 February 1982.
141. *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 28 February 1982.
142. *Ila al-Amam*, 24 July 1981.
143. Ibid.
144. Interview, 'We Have Created a Psychological Gap', 114.
145. DFLP, *Towards an Overall Confrontation with the American–Zionist Onslaught on the Arab Homeland and the Proposed Autonomy* (Arab.), Political Report of the Central Committee, January 1982, 47; and PFLP, *Report of the General Central Committee*, 52–3.
146. *Al-Hurriyya*, 23 February 1981.
147. *The Political Report Issued by the Central Committee in its Fourth Session Concerning the War in Lebanon* (Arab.), Central Information Department, March 1983, 18; and *Political Statement Issued by the Fourth National Congress*, 190.
148. *Report of the General Central Committee* (Arab.), February 1982 session, 52.
149. Interview with ʿAmad, 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 22.

150. Interview in *al-Fikr* (Paris), July 1984, 14.
151. Interview with ʿAmad, 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 22.
152. Hamza, then senior aide to Wazir.*
153. *Monday Morning*, 27 July 1981; and *Ila al-Amam*, 24 July 1981.
154. Interviewed by Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1984), 48.
155. Sayil interview, 'We Have Created a Psychological Gap', 114. A similar view in Yazid Khalaf, 'A Military Reading of the July War' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981, 107.
156. Sayil interview, 'We Have Created a Psychological Gap', 114. On Sharon contacts with Haig, Schiff and Yaʾari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 72–7.
157. *Military Report*, 17–18.
158. Ibid. 18.
159. Mahmud Hamdan.*
160. *Military Report*, 17. That the PFLP itself did not expect the invasion to extend beyond the south was later confirmed by Habash, interviewed in *al-Wasat*, 6 November 1995.
161. Makram Yunis, who provided Arafat with analysis of Israeli media and statements.*
162. Interview with ʿAmad, 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 20.
163. Sayil, 'We Have Created a Psychological Gap', 116; and *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 74.
164. Khalidi, *Under Siege*, 70.
165. Rafiʿ al-Khalidi, then head of Fateh Western Sector communications.*
166. According to plan drawn up by DFLP military commander Nawfal, cited in Schiff and Yaʾari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 85.
167. *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 39; and several battalion and company commanders, including Abu-Layla, Muʿin Tahir, and Abu-Bakr.*
168. Arafat assertion in interview, *al-Fikr*, 18.
169. Abu al-Tayyib, *Beirut Earthquake*, 54.
170. Kaʿwash, and ʿAziz, PLO engineers; and Faysal and Sari, private engineers.*
171. Abu al-Tayyib, *Beirut Earthquake*, 54.
172. Kaʿwash.*
173. Issued by 'haj' Ismaʿil Jabr and Fakhri Shaqqura, respectively. Documents reproduced in Israeli (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon*, 215–21.
174. Abu-Bakr.*
175. Arafat made this prediction, for example, at a rally in Beirut. *Al-Safir*, 16 March 1982.
176. Abu al-Tayyib, *Beirut Earthquake*, 385; and Kaʿwash.*
177. For example, statements in May. *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 8 and 12 May 1982.
178. For example state department spokesman Dean Fisher. *Al-Safir*, 4 and 20 March 1982.
179. *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 11 April 1982.
180. Commander Callahan, *al-Safir*, 21 March 1982.

181. *New York Times*, 12 April 1982.
182. Text in Samih Shbib, *The PLO and its Interactions with the Official Arab Environment—the Confrontation States, 1982–1987* (Arab.) (Nicosia, 1988), 129–30.
183. Interviews and reports on Knesset hearings carried by Israeli Radio, for example in *Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts*, 28 April and 11 May 1982.
184. On deterrence, former military intelligence chief Yaron Ahariv. Other critics included residents in the north and analysts taking part in radio debates, for example on 24 April and 12 May 1982. Ibid. 25 April and 12 and 13 May 1982.
185. Ibid. 4 February 1982.
186. Assessment reflected in Yazid Khalaf, 'The Palestinian Resistance—Militarily' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 127, June 1982, 190.
187. *The Political Report Issued by the Central Committee in its Fourth Session Concerning the War in Lebanon*, 18.
188. Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank* (Washington, DC, 1987), 215–18.
189. Ibid. 253–4; Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law*, 70 and 72; and Salih, *Israeli Military Orders*, 18.
190. *Washington Post*, 27 March 1982.
191. Muʿin Tahir, Yusif Tahir, Durgham, and Abu ʿAwad, then Fateh battalion and company commanders.*
192. Mruwwa.*
193. Salih statement in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 26 February 1982.
194. For example, Habash, *The Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution: Roots and Solutions* (Beirut, 1985), 15.
195. Arafat interview with ʿAmad, 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 22.
196. Khalidi, *Under Siege*, 19.
197. PFLP, *al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 47, January 1982, 11.

22 The Lebanon War

1. Wazir.*
2. Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 38; and Hamza, member of Fateh's post-war committee of inquiry.*
3. On the three defence lines, George Habash, *Concerning the Lebanon War and its Results* (Arab.), Central Information Department, March 1983, 25; and interview with PFLP politburo member ʿAbd-al-Rahim Malluh in *al-Hurriyya*, 5 June 1983.
4. Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 38.
5. Assessment relayed by Fateh military intelligence chief ʿAtallah ʿAtallah. Document in Israeli (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon*, 227. Israeli translates the date on this document as 28 May 1981, when in fact it was written a year later.
6. The existence of three, rather than two, variations on the IDF plan was not revealed until 1994, by former northern front commander Amir Drori. Interviewed by Alex Fishman in *Maʿariv*, 1 July 1994 (cited in Israel Shahak, 'New

Revelations on the 1982 Invasion of Lebanon', *Middle East International*, No. 485, 7 October 1994).

7. Malluh interview, *al-Hurriyya*, 5 June 1983; and the PFLP, *Military Report*, 17. Also DFLP commander Nawfal, interviewed by Salwa al-ʿAmad, 'Testimony of Mamduh Nawfal about the War' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 135, February 1983, 29.
8. Wazir.*
9. *Political Report Issued by the Central Committee in its Fourth Session Concerning the War in Lebanon*, 17 and 37; and Nawfal.* On Syrian belief, Arafat interview in *al-Fikr*, No. 2, July 1984, 14.
10. Wazir.*
11. Wazir.*
12. Wazir.*
13. Munjid, then deputy battalion commander;* and document reproduced in Israeli (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon*, 225.
14. Arafat interview with ʿAmad, 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 20; and interview in *al-Fikr*, 14. Also Yazid Khalaf, 'Prospects of the Next Palestinian–Israeli War', unpublished manuscript submitted to *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, April 1982.
15. On Saudi reassurances, Nawfal;* and acting PLO deputy chief-of-staff Maragha in Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 35–6 and 60.
16. The Abu Nidal faction later acknowledged responsibility. *Filastin al-Thawra* (Baghdad), 15 August 1984.
17. *Guardian*, 7 March 1983.
18. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 72–7.
19. Cable from PLO central operations room to all units, no date, but position in file indicates the evening of 5 June or the morning of 6 June 1982. Chairman's archive.
20. Shibl;* and cable from 1st Artillery Battalion to Arafat's headquarters, 1330 hours, 5 June 1982. Chairman's archive.
21. On outposts, testimony in 'The RPG Lioncubs, Tales of Heroism' (Arab.), *Sawt al-Bilad*, 3: 92 (4 June 1986), 11. On Sghayyar message, Maragha in Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 61.
22. 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 21–2.
23. Letter from Arafat to all units, morning of 6 June 1982. Chairman's archive.
24. Hamza.* Arafat gave some details of the meeting with Callahan in 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 22.
25. Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee*, 81.
26. The IDF estimated 15,000 PLO combatants, in 'Operation Peace for Galilee', *IDF Spokesman* (Tel Aviv), 21 June 1982, 26; and Mordechai Gichon, 'The Campaign', *IDF Journal*, 1: 2 (December 1982), 12. A lower estimate of 6,000 was given in *Jerusalem Post International*, 7 June 1982. An inflated figure of 30,000 appeared in Martin van Creveld, 'The War: A Questioning Look', ibid. 12 December 1982; and in *Filastin al-Muhtalla* (Nicosia), special issue on the 1982 war, 49. Wazir suggested that total salaried and voluntary personnel was 45,000, but Arafat estimated 14,000

regulars in interview with ʿAmad, 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 26. Maragha suggested a total of 30,000–35,000 personnel in all categories.*

27. Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee*, 87–9. Also Mike Eldar, 'The Amphibious Assault at Sidon', *IDF Journal*, 3: 3 (1983), 47–51.
28. One Fateh battalion commander claimed that the PLA denied at first that any landing had taken place. Kamal al-Shaykh.*
29. Husayn al-Hayba, in cable to Arafat's office at 0345 hours, 7 June 1982.
30. Jabr justified his action in a letter to Arafat on 8 June, explaining that Israeli troops had cut him and his command off from the city after the battle for Sharhabil, and that a further Israeli advance compelled him to retreat away from Sidon. Letter from Jabr to Arafat, 8 June 1982. Chairman's archive.
31. Khalil al-Jamal, then militia officer; and Nazmi al-Hazzuri, then senior cadre in Fateh civilian organization in ʿAyn al-Hilwa.*
32. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 142.
33. Ibid. 149. The holdouts mostly belonged to a local Islamist group.
34. Abu-Bakr, then battalion operations officer.*
35. Adham, then PLO commander in Damur.*
36. Cable from Wazir to PLO central operations room, 8 June 1982. Chairman's archive.
37. Israeli strength in Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 184.
38. Account of ambush in *Jerusalem Post*, 20 August 1982.
39. Recollection from Malluh, *al-Hurriyya*, 5 June 1983.
40. 'Testimony of Mamduh Nawfal', 29.
41. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 146.
42. Hamza, then Fateh liaison officer with the Syrian army in the area.*
43. 'Yasir Arafat Speaks', 23; and *al-Fikr*, No. 2, July 1984, 14.
44. Mustafa Tlas (ed.), *The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon* (Damascus, 1983), 252.
45. Cable from Arafat, 16 June 1982. Chairman's archive.
46. Muhammad Hamza, *War of Attrition* (Arab.) (Amman, 1985), 55.
47. Abu al-Tayyib, *Beirut Earthquake*, 154–7; Maragha in *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 72–4 and 80–2; and Nawfal interview, 'Testimony of Mamduh Nawfal', 30.
48. On Algerian offer and Syrian refusal, ʿAbbas, *Political Papers*, Part 2, 260. Weapons order confirmed by Algerian foreign minister Talib Ibrahim, *Middle East Economic Digest*, 21 January 1983.
49. Khalidi, *Under Siege*, 114.
50. Ibid. 110 and 113.
51. Ibid. 111.
52. Nawfal, *Maghdusha*, 161–2.
53. Ibid. 118. Among the proposals from Habib was for the PLO to withdraw under the flags of the International Commission of the Red Cross. George Habash, *Concerning the Lebanon War and its Results*, PFLP central information department, March 1983, 40.
54. Details in ibid. 118.

55. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 11: 4 and 12 (double issue), 1 (44/45) (Summer/Fall 1982), 144. On use of these munitions, Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee*, 151.
56. Maragha, interviewed by Salwa al-ʿAmad in, 'If Only the Arabs, All the Arabs, Had Given Half of What Beirut Gave' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 134, January 1983, 63; and Maragha in Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 114–15.
57. Abu ʿAdawi.*
58. Khalidi, *Under Siege*, 120.
59. Ibid.
60. On the proportion of civilian casualties, *Washington Post*, 2 December 1982.
61. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 208.
62. According to two Israeli paratroop officers who attended the meeting in which Sharon gave his original order.*
63. Israeli strength from Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 221.
64. On 6th Artillery Battalion, Abu al-Shaykh, then battalion commander.* On 2nd Artillery Battalion, cable from PLO commander in the Biqaʿ Valley, Ahmad ʿAfana, to battalion commander Abu Zaytun, 2000 hours, 4 July 1982. Chairman's archive.
65. Message from Wazir to PLO units, 5 July 1982. Chairman's archive.
66. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 44/45 (Summer/Fall 1982), 166.
67. Khalidi, *Under Siege*, 151.
68. Khalaf, *al-Safir* 31 May 1983.
69. Nayif Hawatma, *The PLO Crisis: Analysis and Critique of the Roots and Solutions* (Arab.) (Nicosia, n.d. [end 1983]), 87–8.
70. *Fath* (Beirut), No. 50, 31 July 1982, and No. 60, 10 August 1982.
71. Wazir.*
72. Document reproduced in Hamza, *War of Attrition*, 60.
73. Several hundred Iranian revolutionary guards reached Baʿlbak on 11 June, but remained under Iranian control and received their supplies from the Syrian army, not the PLO.
74. Cable from Karama Forces commander Ghazi ʿAtallah to Arafat, 21 July 1982. Chairman's archive.
75. Cable from Arafat to Karama Forces commander Ghazi ʿAtallah, 21 July 1982. Chairman's archive.
76. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 211–13 and 214.
77. Ibid. 211.
78. Ibid.
79. Hawatma, *PLO Crisis*, 86.
80. Tactic described by Maragha in Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 168.
81. ʿUrayqat.*
82. Abu al-Shaykh, and Fu'ad ʿAbd-al-Karim.*
83. Salah Khalaf said the PLO arrested seven agents and that Israeli bombs killed another 10, of a total of 24 operating in Beirut. Quoted in Khalidi, *Under Siege*, 94.

84. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 223. Begin's comment on civilian casualties in this period was that 'they should be punished'. Israel Home Service, 12 August 1982, cited in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 14 August 1982.
85. Interviewed by Khalidi, *Under Siege*, 172.
86. ʿAbbas, *Political Papers*, Part 2, p. 82.
87. *Washington Post*, 3 September 1982; and *al-Safir*, 3 September 1982.
88. *Washington Post*, 7 September 1982.
89. Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 223.
90. The interrogation of Palestinians in the stadium by Israeli officers (but not the later role of the Maronites) is confirmed in ibid. 276.
91. *New York Times*, 1 October 1982; and *Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the International Commission to enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its Invasion of the Lebanon* (London, 1983), 176.
92. *Report on Events in the Refugee Camps in Beirut*, Kahan Commission, reproduced by the *Jerusalem Post*, 1983.
93. *Al-Nahar*, 1 September 1982.
94. Fathi ʿArafat, *Health, War and Steadfastness*, tables, p. 251.
95. Seale, *Asad*, 394.
96. Eitan cited in Michael Jansen, *The Battle of Beirut* (London, 1982), 25. Drori interview in *Ha'aretz*, weekly supplement, 3 June 1983.
97. Combat accidents cited in *Newsview* (Tel Aviv), 4: 32, 16; and Schiff and Ya'ari, *Israel's Lebanon War*, 120.
98. Cited by David Shipler, *New York Times*, 20 June 1982.
99. Cited in Jansen, *Battle of Beirut*, 18.
100. UNRWA, Commissioner-General Office, *Explanatory Note*, Beirut, 28 September 1982; and Zakaria al-Shaikh, 'Sabra and Shatila 1982: Resisting the Massacre', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 1 (53) (Fall 1984), 58.
101. Amnon Sella, 'The USSR and the War in Lebanon: Mid-1982', *RUSI Journal*, 128: 2 (June 1983), 37–8.
102. Anthony Cordesman, 'The Sixth Arab–Israeli Conflict', *Armed Forces Journal International*, August 1982, 29; W. S. Carus, 'The Bekaa Valley Campaign', *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1982, 38; CIA report cited in *al-Khalij*, 22 July 1983; and *US Assistance to the State of Israel* (Washington, DC, 1983).
103. Interview in *Davar*, 9 June 1985.
104. 'Testimony of Mamduh Nawfal', 39; and Abu ʿAdawi.*
105. 'The Palestinian–Israeli War' (Arab.), *Filastin al-Muhtalla*, Summer 1983, 49.
106. *Concerning the Recent War in Lebanon* (Arab.), report of the central committee, Central Information Department, March 1983, 69.
107. Malluh interview in *al-Hurriyya*, 5 June 1983, 29.
108. *Report of the Central Committee*, 67 and 18.
109. 'Testimony of Mamduh Nawfal', 29.
110. *Al-Hurriyya*, 12 June 1983.
111. Ibid.

112. 'Could Palestinian Concessions Have Prevented the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon?' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 136–137, March–April 1983, 40.
113. *Report of the Central Committee*, 20–1.
114. Ibid. 22.
115. Ibid. 80–3 and 91.
116. Nayif Hawatma, 'The Tasks of the Revolution after the Invasion of Lebanon and the Heroic Battle of Beirut' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 135, February 1983, 15–17.
117. *Report of the Central Committee*, 84–5.
118. Hawatma, 'Tasks of the Revolution', 21.

Part IV Squaring the Circle: Statehood into Autonomy, 1983–1993

1. A rump summit conference was held in Casablanca in 1985.
2. *Ma'ariv*, 27 August 1984. King Husayn expounded Jordanian fears in a policy speech on 19 February 1986. Excerpts in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 15: 4 (60) (Summer 1986), 210.

23 Assaulting the State-in-Exile from Within

1. *Al-Safir*, 4 September 1982.
2. Ibid. 6 September 1982.
3. Shafiq, *Martyrs and a March*, 23.
4. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 2 October 1982.
5. *Al-Safir*, 13 September 1982.
6. Offer in statement by information minister Ahmad Iskandar. *Washington Post*, 12 October 1982.
7. *Al-Nahar*, 8 September 1982.
8. *Al-Safir*, 9 September 1982.
9. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 2 October 1982.
10. *Al-Nahar*, 8 September 1982.
11. *Al-Safir*, 21 September 1982.
12. Ibid. 26 September 1982.
13. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 16 October 1982.
14. *Al-Safir*, 13 October 1982.
15. Ibid. 5 October; and *al-Nahar*, 19 October 1982.
16. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 16 October 1982; and *al-Safir*, 18 October 1982.
17. According to summary of plan given by PLO spokesman Mahmud al-Labadi. *Washington Post*, 12 October 1982.
18. *Al-Safir*, 10 November 1982.
19. *Al-Ahram*, 8 November 1982.
20. *Al-Safir*, 24 November 1982.

21. *Al-Nahar* and *al-Safir*, 12 October 1982.
22. *Al-Thawra Mustamirra*, 16 October 1982.
23. *Al-Safir*, 17 October 1982.
24. Ibid. 16 and 21 October 1982.
25. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 23 October 1982.
26. *Al-Nahar*, 16 November 1982.
27. Text in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 27 November 1982.
28. *Al-Nahar*, 3 December 1982.
29. *Al-Safir*, 4 December 1982.
30. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 6 December 1982.
31. Statement by DFLP central committee, December 1982.
32. Statements by Arafat, Habash, and Hawatma in *Nida' al-Watan*, 11 December 1982; and *al-Safir*, 6 and 16 December 1982.
33. For example, statement in *al-Safir*, 4 December 1982.
34. Ibid. 12 October 1982.
35. On posters, *al-Nahar*, 24 November 1982.
36. *Al-Safir*, 17 December 1982.
37. Statement in *al-Mawqif al-'Arabi*, 6 December 1982.
38. Text in *al-Safir*, 27 December 1982.
39. Ibid. 30 December 1982.
40. Text reproduced in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 134, January 1983, quotations from p. 8.
41. On Lebanese treatment of Palestinians, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 12: 2 (46) (Winter 1983), 108; and *Middle East International*, No. 190, 23 December 1982. PLO statements, for example, in *al-Nahar*, 13 November 1982; and *al-Safir*, 4 and 24 December 1982.
42. Khalaf statement in ibid. 4 January 1983.
43. Ibid. 8 December 1982.
44. Ibid. 14 January 1982.
45. *Al-Nahar al-'Arabi wa al-Dawli*, 17 January 1983.
46. Jamil Hilal, then DFLP central committee member who attended the discussions.*
47. Hawatma, 'Tasks of the Revolution', 21.
48. Text in *al-Nahar*, 18 January 1983.
49. Hilal.*
50. *Kuwait News Agency*, cited in *FBIS*, 21 January 1983.
51. Full text in pp. 199–213. Large sections of the memorandum were reproduced in *al-Safir*, 25 and 26 June 1983. Also translated in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 13: 1 (49) (Fall 1983).
52. Samih Shbib, *The PLO and its Interactions with the Official Arab Environment—the Confrontation States, 1982–1987* (Arab.) (Nicosia, 1988), 19. On role of opposition groups in drafting, Mahmud Hamdan.*
53. *Al-Safir*, 11 February 1983.
54. Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 214–16.

55. *Middle East Economic Digest*, 18 February 1983.
56. Text in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 136–137, March–April 1983, 141–7.
57. *Tishrin*, 20 March 1983.
58. Jordanian statement, *al-Safir*, 11 April 1983. Confirmed by Habash, ibid. 9 September 1983.
59. Khalaf in *al-Nahar*, 8 April 1983. Dissident view expressed, for example, by Salih in *al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 30 May 1983.
60. *Al-Ra'i* (Amman), 11 April 1983.
61. Statement from Israeli prime minister's office, *New York Times*, 13 April 1983.
62. Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 216.
63. Suggested by a close associate of the Fateh dissidents, Hashim 'Ali Muhsin, *The Uprising: A Revolution Until Victory* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1983), 64.
64. Interview in *Stern*, 31 August 1982.
65. Portions of text reproduced in *al-Nashra*, Year 2 No. 76, 7 April 1986, 4.
66. Ibid. 4.
67. Abu-Nidal and Nashshash, *Palestinian Programme*, 152 and 156–7.
68. Fateh, Amal, and the Syrian army set up a commission of inquiry, which concluded that local Amal members had laid the ambush. On whose orders was not ascertained, but Fateh independently established that Syrian troops had prevented Sayil's escort from giving chase and subsequently delayed his transfer to hospital for four hours, by which time he had bled to death. Salih, Fateh representative in the commission.*
69. Shaykh, Mu'in Tahir, Abu-Layla, Abu-Bakr, and Yusif Tahir.* The Jarmaq Battalion conducted 50 guerrilla attacks up to September 1983. Battalion logbook.
70. According to the circular issued by the dissidents. *Al-Ta'mim*, No. 5, 1 June 1983. Reproduced in Muhsin, *Uprising*, 128–36.
71. Hilal, 'Problems of Change', 25–6.
72. Demand raised, for example, by Maragha in *al-Nahar*, 18 January 1983; opposition statement issued in Libya, text in *al-Nahar*, 18 January 1983; and Hawatma, 'Tasks of the Revolution', 22.
73. Khalil al-Nabtiti, then Fateh base commander.*
74. Muhsin, *Colonel Abu Musa Speaks*, 200.
75. Nabil 'Abd-al-Rahman, then dissident battalion commander.*
76. Khalil al-Jamal, dissident regional commander for Lebanon (in 1984).*
77. Nabil 'Abd-al-Rahman; Jamal; Abu-Layla, then dissident brigade commander; and Kifah, then dissident section commander.*
78. Muhsin, *Uprising*, 153.
79. Jibril interview in *al-Wasat*, 24 April 1996.
80. Mahmud Hamdan.*
81. Later confirmed by Salih.
82. The impact of the decree on dissident timing acknowledged in *al-Ta'mim*, No. 6, 16 June 1983. Excerpts reproduced in Yasin, *Fateh Crisis*, 45 and 47.
83. *The Times*, 27 May 1983. Origin of weapons confirmed by 'Abd-al-Rahman.*
84. *Al-Ta'mim*, No. 1, 9 May 1983. Reproduced in Muhsin, *Uprising*, 88–95.

85. Reproduced in Muhsin, *Uprising*, 59.
86. Issued in Damascus on 15 May 1983. Text in Chairman's archive; also reproduced in Muhsin, *Uprising*, 67–9.
87. Text in Chairman's archive. Parts also reproduced in Muhsin, *Uprising*, 75.
88. Ibid. 109–10.
89. Ibid. 73–5.
90. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 12: 4 (48) (Summer 1983), 148.
91. Confirmed for instance by Mahmud Hamdan, overall coordinator for opposition forces in 1983; and Jamal.*
92. Muʿin Tahir and Kayyali, then military mediators;* DFLP deputy secretary-general ʿAbd-Rabbu, who mediated in the rift, *al-Safir*, 26 June 1983; and Yasin, *Fateh Crisis*, 64.
93. Muʿin Tahir and Kayyali;* and ʿAbd-Rabbu, *al-Safir*, 26 June 1983.
94. Salih interview in *al-Kifah al-ʿArabi*, 30 May 1983. Asad quoted in *al-Safir*, 1 June 1983.
95. Interview reproduced as 'Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad): The 17th Palestine National Council', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 2 (54) (Winter 1985), 8.
96. *Al-Safir*, 2 June 1983.
97. Muhsin, *Uprising*, 165.
98. *Al-Hadaf*, 6 June 1983.
99. Cable from Arafat to all Fateh branches, undated. Chairman's archive.
100. Memorandum issued from Arafat's office on 27 June 1983. Chairman's archive.
101. *Syrian News Agency*, 23 June 1983. Cited in Samih Shbib, 'Official Syrian–Palestinian Ties, 27/2/1982 to 26/4/1987' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 181, April 1988, 80.
102. Habash interview on Radio Monte Carlo, cited in Emile Sahliyeh, *The PLO After the Lebanon War* (Boulder, Colo., 1986), 107. On alliance with Syria (and USSR), *al-Hurriyya*, 22 February 1983; and PFLP, *Clarity of Vision* (Arab.), central committee report, 3 February 1983.
103. PFLP deputy secretary-general Mustafa al-Zabri, interviewed in *al-Safir*, 26 June 1983.
104. Text in ibid. 27 June 1983.
105. Nawfal; confirmed by Tahir.*
106. Yasin, *Fateh Crisis*, 98.
107. Ibid. 104.
108. Muhsin, *Uprising*, 161 and 163.
109. Confirmed by Habash, *Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution*, 32; and Hilal.*
110. Cable from Arafat to all Fateh branches, regional commands, and military units, 27 June 1983. Chairman's archive.
111. *Al-Nahar*, 4 July 1983.
112. Ibid.
113. *Al-Anbaʾ*, 18 July 1983. Cited in Shbib, *PLO and its Interactions*, 24.
114. *Al-Safir*, 17 July 1983; and *al-Anbaʾ*, 19 July 1983 (cited in Shbib, *PLO and its Interactions*, 24).

115. Jamal.*
116. Syrian statement in *al-Nahar*, 1 August 1983; Arafat statement in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 2 August 1983.
117. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 7 August 1983. Ibid.
118. *Al-Watan* (Kuwait), 8 August 1983. Cited in Shbib, *PLO and its Interactions*, 26.
119. *Middle East International*, 9 March 1984.
120. Maragha interview in *al-Kifah al-ʿArabi*, 30 May 1983.
121. Speaking in the PLO central council. Hawatma, *PLO Crisis*, 54.
122. Nabil ʿAbd-al-Rahman, and Jamal.*
123. PFLP, *al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 110, July 1992, 22; Muʿin Tahir, Kayyali, Nawfal, Mahmud Hamdan, dissident brigade commander ʿUrayqat, Abu-Layla, ʿAbd-al-Rahman, Jamal.*
124. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 24 September 1983.
125. Muʿin Tahir.*
126. Nabil ʿAbd-al-Rahman.*
127. Trad, Salih, Nazir, Ramadan, Misbah, and Muʿin, then Fateh civilian cadres in Lebanon.*
128. For example, various cables from Wazir to Arafat, 27 July, 9 and 28 August, and 1 September 1983. Chairman's archive.
129. ʿAli, then PLF military commander in north Lebanon.*
130. PFLP and DFLP, *Programme for Unity and Reform* (Arab.), 10 October 1983, 12, 18–19, and 20.
131. On arrival of Syrian forces, *al-Anbaʾ*, 8 October 1983. Cited in Shbib, *PLO and its Interactions*, 29; and *al-Nahar*, 8 October 1983.
132. LCP statement. Also reproduced in *al-Safir*, 13 October 1983.
133. Ibid. 23 October 1983.
134. Saʿiqa statement in *Washington Post*, 19 October 1983. Arrest of gunmen reported in *al-Safir*, 23 October 1983.
135. *Al-Safir*, 23 October 1983.
136. Internal memorandum from Fateh security, 1 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
137. Dissident strength from brigade commanders Abu-Layla, Muhammad Jihad, and ʿUrayqat; and battalion commanders Nabil ʿAbd-al-Rahman and Jamal. PPSF strength from Mahmud Hamdan; and Saʿiqa strength from then staff officer.*
138. Internal memorandum, 1 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
139. Letter received 1 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
140. Then Saʿiqa staff officer; and ʿAli, then head of PLF loyalist forces and member of PLO Higher Military Council.*
141. Undated cable from Wazir to Arafat reporting on his contacts. Chairman's archive.
142. Syrian and Libyan participation confirmed by Abu-Zayid, then commander of the PLA Qadisiyya Forces; Mahmud Hamdan; and then Saʿiqa staff officer.*
143. Names in cable from Fateh security, 27 October 1983. Chairman's archive. Confirmed by Mahmud Hamdan; and then Saʿiqa staff officer.*

144. The PLO claimed that three Syrian armoured battalions were brought up that day. Cable from Arafat, 3 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
145. Yusif Tahir, and Durgham.*
146. Defections reported in successive cables to Arafat's headquarters from field units, 5 November 1983. Chairman's Archive. On shelling, Abu-Zayid; and then Saʿiqa staff officer.* A PLA artillery officer informed the PLO leadership that his and other units would not shell loyalist forces. Secret letter received 1 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
147. *Fath* (Damascus), anniversary issue, 9 May 1984.
148. Cable from battalion deputy-commander Marwan al-Kayyali to headquarters, 0640 hours, 9 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
149. On Lebanese contacts, Nazir.*
150. Cable from Wazir to Arafat at 1300, 15 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
151. Fateh security apparatus report on 22 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
152. Abu-Zayid, then Qadisiyya Forces commander.*
153. Fateh security apparatus report, 25 November 1983. Chairman's archive.
154. Cited in *Jerusalem Post*, 1 July and 2 December 1983.

24 Struggle Within, Struggle Without

1. *Washington Post*, 4 January 1984.
2. *New York Times*, 19 January 1984.
3. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 13: 4 (52) (Summer 1984), 238.
4. Policy elements cited in Yasir ʿArafat, interviewed by Tahir ʿAbd-al-Hakim, 'An Intellectual and Political Encounter with Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO' (Arab.), *al-Fikr*, No. 2 (1984), 21.
5. Text in ibid. 206–7.
6. Text in *al-Hurriyya*, 15 July 1984.
7. Ibid. and *Filastin al-Thawra*, 3 November 1984.
8. According to the account submitted by Qaddumi to the PNC in November 1984. 'The Political Report of the PLO Executive Committee' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 140–141, November–December 1984, 149.
9. Text in *Sawt al-Mukhayyam*, No. 4, July 1984. Reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 1 (53) (Autumn 1984), 205.
10. *Al-Hadaf*, 22 July 1984.
11. *Al-Safir*, 26 August 1984.
12. Ibid.
13. *Al-Hadaf*, 24 August 1984.
14. South Yemeni and Algerian refusal confirmed by Wazir and Khalaf in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 9 November 1984; and *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 November 1984.
15. *Kul al-ʿArab*, 11 September 1984. Cited in *Shu'un Filastinyya*, No. 142–143, January–February 1984, 132.
16. *WAFA News Agency*, 1 October 1984; and *Filastin al-Thawra*, 13 October 1984.

17. *Al-Hadaf*, 29 October 1984.
18. ʿAbd-Rabbu; Nawfal; and ʿAzmi al-Shuʿaybi, then PNC delegate.* Also confirmed in Mamduh Nawfal, 'Maghdusha: Before Memory is Lost' (Arab.), unpublished manuscript, n.d. [approximately 1992], 75–6 and 109.
19. Text in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 140–141, November–December 1984, 175.
20. Ibid. 176.
21. Ibid. 183.
22. Quotation from *al-Safir*, 17 January 1984.
23. Excerpts taken from the official Jordanian translation of king's speech, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 2 (54) (Winter 1985), 253–7.
24. Text of PNC resolutions in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 140–141, November–December 1984, 167.
25. Ibid.
26. For example, NA statement in the dissident *Nashrat Fath*, 3 December 1984. Also statements by Maragha, PLF faction leader ʿAbd-al-Fattah Ghanim, PCP-PC secretary-general ʿArabi ʿAwwad, and Saʿiqa in *al-Nahar*, 3 December 1984, *al-Talaʾiʿ*, 4 December and *al-Safir*, 5 December 1984.
27. *Al-Hadaf*, 3 December 1984.
28. Patrick Seale, *Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire* (London, 1992), 127. Accusations made in the faction's periodical *Filastin al-Thawra*, 1 October and 5 December 1984.
29. ʿAbd-al-Razzaq al-Yahya, then PLO executive committee member who headed the PLO investigation.*
30. *Al-ʿAmal*, 1 January 1985. Cited in *Shu'un Filastinyya*, No. 142–143, January–February 1984, 141. Quote from *al-Nahar*, 31 December 1984.
31. New Year message, text in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 142–143, January–February 1985, 10.
32. Speech to the opening session of the Baʿth Party regional congress. Excerpts reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 3 (55) (Spring 1985), 203.
33. Official Jordanian text in ibid. 206.
34. PFLP cited in *al-Nahar*, 13 February 1985. The Syrian position relayed in *Tishrin*, 13 February 1985 (cited in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 3 (55) (Spring 1985), 157).
35. *AFP*, 16 February 1985. Cited in *Shu'un Filastinyya*, No. 144–145, March–April 1985, 118.
36. Earlier criticism in *al-Hurriyya*, 2 December 1984. Later comment by deputy secretary-general Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu, *al-Watan*, 14 February 1985.
37. *Al-Safir*, 16 February 1985.
38. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 14 February 1985.
39. Various drafts cited in Khalid al-Hasan, *The Jordanian–Palestinian Agreement on Joint Movement* (Arab.) (Amman, 1985).
40. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 22 February 1985. English translation in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 3 (55) (Spring 1985), 206–7.
41. In interview with ABC TV. Official transcript in ibid. 207.
42. For example, *al-Safir*, 20 February 1985; and *al-Hurriyya*, 24 February 1985.
43. *Al-Safir*, 25 February 1985. Qadhdhafi quoted in *Fath* (Damascus), 11 March 1985.

44. *WAFA News Agency*, 28 February 1985.
45. *Al-Baʿth*, 27 February 1985; *Kuwait News Agency*, 26 February 1985; and *Tishrin*, 8 Mar3ch 1985. Cited in *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 144–145, March–April 1985, 121.
46. For example, *al-Qabas*, 18 and 19 March 1985; *al-Nahar*, 22 March 1985; and *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 27 March 1985. Cited in *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 146–147, May–June 1985, 137.
47. Founding statement reproduced in ʿAbd-al-Hadi al-Nashshash, *The Current Crisis in the Palestinian Revolution: Its Roots and Prospects for Resolution* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1985), 168–72.
48. Quotes from *Political Report Issued by the Central Committee in its Fourth Session Concerning the War in Lebanon*, 82 and 37. Quote from Habash in *al-Hadaf*, 3 December 1984.
49. DA statement in *al-Hurriyya*, 31 March 1985.
50. Correspondent's report, 'No Respite for the People of Chatila', *Middle East International*, 27 January 1984.
51. Trad, then leading Fateh cadre in the valley.*
52. Kayyali, then senior Fateh officer in Tripoli; ʿAli Abu-Tawq, then senior Fateh officer in Beirut; and Nazir, Ramadan, and Misbah, then senior civilian cadres.*
53. Nawfal; Kayyali; Abu-Tawq; Samih Nasr, then Fateh commander in Shatila; and Abu al-Fath, then Fateh commander in Burj al-Barajna.*
54. Nawfal.*
55. Jamal, then dissident regional commander.*
56. For a list of Fateh units and Lebanese groups active in the campaign, Hamza, *War of Attrition*, ch. 5.
57. Wazir.*
58. *Jerusalem Post*, 20 December 1984.
59. Total cost given by the chairman of the Knesset economics committee. Estimate of annual cost from Israeli defence minister Yitzhaq Rabin. Cited in Chronology, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 13: 4 (52) (Summer 1984), 232 and 244.
60. On SLA, *Los Angeles Times*, 16 February 1985. Cited in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 3 (55) (Spring 1985), 240.
61. *Al-Watan*, 11 March 1985; and *UP*, 31 March 1985.
62. *Tishrin*, 28 April 1985; and *al-Thawra*, 28 April 1985. Cited in *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 146–147, May–June 1985, 138.
63. *Al-Qabas*, 8 May 1985. Cited in *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 146–147, May–June 1985, 138. Jibril confirmed the Syrian role in *al-Nahar*, 8 May 1985.
64. *Al-Nahar*, 10 May 1985.
65. ʿAkif Haydar.*
66. ʿAli al-Husayni, interviewed on the BBC World Service. 14:15, 22 March 1985.
67. *Al-Safir*, 21 May 1985; and *AFP*, 22 May 1985 (cited in *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 148–149, July–August 1985, 93).
68. *Al-Safir*, 21 and 22 May 1985.
69. Cable from Fateh command in Burj al-Barajna to PLO headquarters in Tunis, undated (Chairman's archive); Jamal;* and *al-ʿAmal*, 28 May 1985.

70. On the role of one Sunni battalion commander, ibid. 29 May 1985. Role of former Fateh members in Amal confirmed by Abu-Tawq; and Mansur, former Amal section commander.*
71. On number of prisoners, Amal official cited in *al-Safir*, 30 May 1985. On number of refugees, UNRWA statement in *al-Nahar*, 6 June 1985.
72. Ibid. 28 May 1985; and *al-ʿAmal*, 6 June 1985.
73. Mahmud al-Khatib, then camp doctor.*
74. Nawfal; Hamdan; Jamal; Nabil ʿAbd-al-Rahman; and Abu ʿAdhab, then PFLP area commander in the ʿAlay mountain.* Nawfal, 'Maghdusha', 4–5; cable from Fateh commander, Lebanon, to Arafat, 26 May 1985 (Chairman's archive); and Fateh security apparatus report, undated (towards the end of May 1985) (Chairman's archive).
75. *Al-Qabas* 14 June 1985; and *WAFA News Agency*, 12 June 1985.
76. Abu-Zayid.*
77. *Al-Safir*, 26 May 1985; and official Lebanese radio (cited in *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 148–149, July–August 1985, 95).
78. For instance, statements by former prime minister Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh, Sunni mufti for Mount Lebanon Muhammad al-Juzu, and chief mufti Hasan Khalid. *Al-Nahar*, 4 June 1985.
79. The hijackers belonged to the ʿAbbas Group of the Martyr Muhammad Saʿd Forces affiliated to Amal, but may have operated in conjunction with Hizbullah and the breakaway Islamic Amal. *Al-Taqrir*, 1: 10 (15–30 July 1985).
80. Fateh security appartus report, undated (but towards end of May 1985), Chairman's archive. DFLP statement, cited in *al-Nahar*, 17 June 1985.
81. *Al-Dustur*, 12 August 1985.
82. *AFP*, 28 July 1985 (cited in *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 150–151, September–October 1985, 114); and dissident official interviewed by Kuwait radio (cited in report from the Fateh monitoring service, 26 May 1985, Chairman's archive).
83. Estimates based on internal circulars of Amal; and reports cited in *al-Qabas*, 13 June 1985. Figures confirmed by Amal leader Birri in *al-Nahar*, 24 June 1986.
84. PNF director Jawid al-Ghusayn, interviewed in *Filastin al-Thawra*, No. 596, 1 March 1986.
85. *Al-Taqrir*, 1: 11 (1–15 August 1985).
86. Nawfal, 'Maghdusha', 7.
87. Quoted by a Lebanese party leader who attended the meeting, *al-Nahar*, 25 July 1985.
88. Ibid. 26 July 1987.
89. Ibid. 6 August 1985; and Jamal.*
90. Swee Chai Ang, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (London, 1989), 185.
91. *Al-Taqrir*, 1: 12 (15–31 August 1985).
92. *Al-Nahar*, 31 August and 5 September 1985; and *al-Qabas*, 31 August 1985.
93. *Haʾaretz*, 1 September 1985; *Davar*, 21 August; and *ʿAl Hamishmar*, 15 September 1985.
94. *Al-Safir*, 23 September 1985.

95. *Al-Ra'i* (Kuwait), 25 October 1985.
96. Text in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 15: 2 (58) (Winter 1986), 214–16.
97. *Al-Ahram*, 18 February 1986.
98. Text of king's speech in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 15: 4 (60) (Summer 1986), 206–32.
99. Text of draft proposals in ibid. 241–3. Executive committee statement published in a separate pamphlet by the Fateh office in Kuwait.
100. The Abu Nidal faction incorrectly claimed responsibility. Claim repeated for example by deputy-leader Salim ʿAbd-al-Rahim, *Filastin al-Thawra* (Damascus), 1 January 1987. On Wazir support, for example, Bassam al-Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership in the Occupied Territories* (Jerusalem, 1993), 67.
101. Details in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 15: 4 (60) (Summer 1986), 177–8.
102. *Jerusalem Post*, 14 and 18 April 1986.
103. Details and a critical discussion of the plan are in Jamil Hilal, 'The Jordanian Five-Year Plan to Develop the West Bank and Gaza Strip' (Arab.), *al-Urdun al-Jadid*, Year 3, No. 8/9 (Autumn/Winter 1986), 85–95.
104. Rabin statement, *Ha'aretz*, 13 March 1986.
105. *Ha'aretz*, 15 December 1986; and *ʿAl-Hamishmar*, 22 December 1986.
106. *Al-Taqrir*, 2: 2 (1–15 March 1986).
107. For an example of the Israeli debate about cooperation with Amal, *Ha'aretz*, 2 April 1986. Amal statements on military action in south Lebanon in *al-Safir*, 3 and 22 April 1986. Claim of secret agreement between Amal and Israel made by Fateh central committee member Salah Khalaf, ibid. 5 April 1986.
108. Deputy-leader ʿAkif Haydar in *al-Safir*, 9 April 1986.
109. PFLP politburo member Salah Salah in *al-Safir*, 4 April 1986; and Ahmad Shahin, 'War against the Camps and a Suspended Arab Summit' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 158–159, May–June 1986, 138.
110. *Al-Taqrir*, 2: 5 (15–30 May 1986), 1–4. Also on internal rivalries. Marius Deeb, 'Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Syria and Iran', *Third World Quarterly*, 10: 2 (April 1988), 689.
111. *Al-Ufuq*, 12 June 1986.
112. *Al-Nahar*, 6 and 15 June 1986.
113. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 28 June 1986.
114. Khaddam cited by Birri, and Birri quotation, in *al-Qabas*, 21 June 1986.
115. According to Birri, Amal alone had lost 800–850 dead and 2,500–3,000 wounded since May 1985. *Al-Nahar*, 24 June 1986.
116. Amal announced the arrest of 40 of its members in one such network in January 1987, for example. *Al-Taqrir*, 2: 24 (1–15 February 1987).
117. On sandbags, report of the Lebanon committee, 16 April 1987 (Chairman's archive). The best accounts of conditions and medical preparations are by doctors Chris Giannou, *Besieged: A Doctor's Story of Life and Death in Beirut* (London, 1991); Pauline Cutting, *Children of the Siege* (London, 1987); and Swee Chai Ang, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (London, 1989).
118. Report of the Lebanon committee, 16 April 1987. Chairman's archive.

119. Estimates in *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, 30 October 1986. One researcher suggests that Mraysh was killed in a joint operation by the Abu Nidal faction and Mossad. Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 213.
120. Abu-Tawq; and Mansur, then local go-between.*
121. Letter to Arafat dated 20 September 1986 (the year is not marked, but its position in the file indicates 1986). Chairman's archive.
122. Poll analysed in Daoud Kuttab, 'Opinions of the Occupied', *Middle East International*, No. 283, 12 September 1986.
123. *Al-Taqrir*, 2: 21/22 (15 December 1986 to 15 January 1987).
124. Ibid. 2: 24 (1–15 February 1987).
125. Refugee statistics from *al-Nahar al-ʿArabi wa al-Duwali*, No. 493, 12–19 October 1986; DFLP statement in December 1986, reproduced in *al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ*, 12 January 1987; and *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 16: 4 (63) (Spring 1987), 223–30.
126. Cable from Fateh command in Sidon to PLO headquarters, Tunis, 1500 hours, 24 November 1986. Chairman's archive.
127. Report of the PLO Lebanon committee, 16 April 1987. Chairman's archive.
128. Hamdan, and Nawfal.*
129. According to ʿAli Abu-Tawq, in cable to PLO headquarters in Tunis, 27 November 1986. Chairman's archive.
130. Cable from Fateh command in Beirut to PLO headquarters in Tunis, 2 December 1986. Chairman's archive.
131. Cited in *al-Nahar al-ʿArabi wa al-Duwali*, No. 500, 1–7 December 1986.
132. Nawfal, 'Maghdusha', 8.
133. Cable from Fateh command in Sidon to PLO headquarters in Tunis, 1200 hours, 16 December 1986. Chairman's archive.
134. Casualties cited in report of the PLO Lebanon committee, 16 April 1987 (Chairman's archive); and Nawfal, 'Maghdusha', 25. The latter source notes that the DFLP lost a battalion commander, a company commander, and four platoon commanders in a single day (p. 50).
135. Nawfal, 'Maghdusha', 28.
136. Cited in an editorial in *al-Safir*, 13 December 1986.
137. The body of a Syrian captain was retrieved by the defenders on 13 December. Cable from ʿAli Abu-Tawq to PLO headquarters in Tunis, 1130 hours, 13 December 1986. Chairman's archive.
138. Statement by LCP secretary-general George Hawi in *al-Safir*, 15 December 1986.
139. Interviewed in *al-Raʾi*, 26 December 1986.
140. Khaddam, speaking to a delegation from the Egyptian opposition. Cited in *Filastin al-Thawra*, No. 635, 3 January 1987.
141. Dissident responsibility confirmed by Chris Giannou, then camp doctor; and Abu ʿAwad, then Fateh company commander in Shatila.* Also confessions of the two dissidents who planted the bomb, taken after their arrest by Fateh, reproduced in *al-Nashra*, No. 110, Year 4, 27 June 1988.
142. Interview in *al-Majalla*, No. 369, 4–10 March 1987.
143. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 19 February 1987.

144. *Al-Ahram*, 24 February 1987.
145. PLO–Maronite cooperation confirmed in Baqraduni, *Curse of a Nation*, 161.
146. Cited in *Filastin al-Thawra*, No. 643, 7 March 1987.
147. *UNRWA's Emergency Operations in Lebanon*, annex 1, p. 37.
148. Report of the PLO Lebanon committee, 16 April 1987. Chairman's archive. According to Mahmud al-Faqih, Amal commander in the Nabatiyya district, the movement lost 1,400 dead in the two years up to September 1988. Interviewed in *al-Nahar al-ʿArabi wa al-Duwali*, 26 September to 2 October 1988.
149. Dissolution of the PFLP–DFLP union revealed in *al-Hadaf*, 9 June 1986.
150. Muhsin Ibrahim, *Theoretical and Political Issues after the War* (Beirut, 1984), 262–4.
151. Abu-Layla.*
152. Maragha, Nabil ʿAbd-al-Rahman, ʿUrayqat, Muhammad Jihad, Abu-Layla, and Jamal.*
153. *Al-Taqrir*, March 1985.
154. Nabil ʿAbd-al-Rahman.*
155. Shufani was a former Israeli citizen and graduate of the Hebrew University who had joined Fateh in 1967. On his appointment and view of the loyalists, Jamal.*
156. This amounted to $500,000, according to Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 134.
157. Ibid. 143 and 196.
158. Jamal, then head of the Western Sector.*
159. Decision announced in faction's *Filastin al-Thawra*, 15 August 1984.
160. According to the new deputy secretary of the faction's central committee, Salim Ahmad ʿAbd-al-Rahim. Originally interviewed in *al-Kifah al-ʿArabi*, but text reproduced in faction's *Filastin al-Thawra*, 1 January 1987.
161. According to a statement by Banna's opponents, *al-Hayat*, 16 December 1989.
162. Details in Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 302–7.
163. From text of PNC statement, and Suha Majid, 'The Palestinian Resistance Politically' (Arab.), monthly report, in ibid. 115. *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 136–137, March–April 1983, 142.
164. Majid, 'Palestinian Resistance Politically', 115.
165. Hanna Nasir, then PNF head.*
166. Subhi Abu-Karsh, based on internal inquiry by Fateh central committee in 1993.*
167. Formation of committee reported in *al-Hayat*, 21 August 1989.
168. Nasir.*
169. This distinction between patrimonialism and planned corruption from John Waterbury, 'Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime', *World Politics*, 25: 4 (July 1993), 555.
170. The Mossad was also indirectly implicated (Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 5).
171. I owe this observation to Rex Brynen.
172. Fax from Force 17 commanding officer to his superiors in Tunis, 25 November 1986; and report of the PLO Lebanon committee, 16 April 1987 (Chairman's archive). Also Nawfal, 'Maghdusha', 194 and 197.
173. Order dated 8 November 1986. Chairman's archive.
174. Nawfal, 'Maghdusha', 191.

175. *Al-Ahram*, 27 May 1986.
176. Shaqqura.*
177. Khalid al-Hasan, *Genius of Failure*, 7, 145, 148–9, 155, and 157.
178. Internal tensions in Fateh appeared to pose a more serious threat, with the wounding of Arafat's representative in Sidon, Lawh on 12 August, the murder ten days later of Force 17 colonel Rasim al-Ghul, and the hospitalization of 50 guerrillas after drinking poisoned coffee on 23 September.
179. PLO strength from *al-Nahar al-ʿArabi wa al-Dawli*, 4–10 July 1988; *al-Taqrir*, 5: 22 (15–30 January 1990); and Wazir.*
180. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 12 September 1987.
181. *Al-Hurriyya*, 20 September 1987.
182. *Al-Hawadith*, 13 November 1987.
183. Interview in *al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ*, 7 December 1987.

25 Intifada to the Rescue

1. Goren cited in *Maʿariv*, 13 December 1987, and *Jerusalem Post*, 30 December 1987 (cited in Elie Rekhess, 'The West Bank and Gaza Strip', *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 11 (1987), 266).
2. *Jerusalem Post*, 14 December 1987, cited in Rekhess, 'West Bank and Gaza Strip', 266.
3. Yezid Sayigh, 'Structure of Occupation: The Economic, Social and Security Impact of Israeli Controls on the West Bank and Gaza Strip', *Arab Affairs*, 1: 9 (Summer 1989), 43. Number of settlers from *Haʾaretz*, 18 November 1988, cited in Hillel Frisch, 'The West Bank and the Gaza Strip: The *Intifada* from Spontaneous Disturbances to Organized Disobedience', *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 12 (1988), 301.
4. Nafidh ʿAlayyan, 'The Palestinian Economy between Dependence and Independence' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 188, November 1988, 39.
5. Ibid. 51; and Fayiz Sara, 'The Social Structure of the Palestinian Intifada' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 189, December 1988, 4.
6. ʿAbd-al-Fattah Abu-Shakir, 'Out-Migration from the Occupied Territories: Its Volume, Characteristics and Motives' (Arab.), *Samid al-Iqtisadi*, 11: 75 (January–February–March 1989), 65.
7. Quoted in *Jerusalem Post*, 15 February 1985. Cited in Mohammed Shadid, 'Israeli Policy towards Economic Development in the West Bank and Gaza', in George Abed (ed.), *The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development under Prolonged Occupation* (London, 1988), 134.
8. Graduation statistics and employment rate from Sawahiri, *Palestinians: Compulsory Displacement and Social Welfare*, 34.
9. Ben-Rafael, *Israel–Palestine*, 109 and exhibit 6.2, p. 110.
10. Palestinian statistics compiled in ʿAbd-al-Fattah al-Jayyusi (ed.), *Occupied Palestine, 1985–1987: Steadfastness and Challenge* (Arab.) (Amman, 1988), ch. 1; and cited by Khalil al-Wazir in *al-Safir*, 16 November 1987.

11. Official figures issued by the Jordanian ministry of the occupied homeland, *Affairs of the Occupied Homeland* (Amman, 1986); Arab Studies Society, *The West Bank: Facts and Figures* (Jerusalem, 1985); and Aronson, *Creating Facts*, 23.
12. ʿAli al-Jarbawi, *The Uprising and Political Leadership in the West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1989), 27–8 and 30.
13. *Concerning the Strategy for Action in the Occupied Land* (Arab.), Fateh Western Sector, n.p., n.d. [1982, pre-June], 62.
14. PCP, 'With Organized Work, Alertness, and Steadfastness We Protect the Security of Our Organizations' (Arab.), Reinforcing Security No. 1, the occupied areas, 1983, 18.
15. Salih, *Israeli Military Orders*, Part I, pp. 16–18.
16. Hilterman, *Behind the Intifada*, 118.
17. Tamari, 'The Palestinian Movement in Transition', 21.
18. For example, in unattributed manual by Fateh activists, *The Art of Confrontation* (Arab.), Pamphlet No. 1, n.p., Intimaʾ Publications, 1 January 1984, 54–9.
19. The relationship between the political activism, on the one hand, and the degree of self-sufficiency or market integration, on the other, is argued in Peter van Sivers, 'Rural Uprisings as Political Movements in Colonial Algeria, 1851–1914', in Burke and Lapidus (eds.), *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements*, 46.
20. Jarbawi, *Uprising and Political Leadership*, 96.
21. Sandler and Frisch, *Israel*, 152–3.
22. Ibid.
23. Tamari, 'Palestinian Movement in Transition', 17.
24. Ibid.; and Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 66.
25. Ibid. 66–7 and 105.
26. Term from Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* (Washington, DC, 1984), 12.
27. General secretariat of the joint committee, *Report of Achievements*, tables 2, 8, and 14, pp. 61, 68, and 76.
28. Majdi al-Malki, 'Clans et partis politiques dans trois villages palestiniennes', *Revue d'études Palestiniennes*, 52 (1994).
29. PCP, *The Current Palestinian Situation and the Tasks of the Palestinian National Movement* (Arab.), the political report of the central committee of the PCP, December 1984, 86–7.
30. For an overview, Khalil Nakhleh, *Indigenous Organizations in Palestine: Towards a Purposeful Societal Development* (Jerusalem, 1991).
31. Denis J. Sullivan, 'NGOs in Palestine: Agents of Development and Foundation of Civil Society', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 25: 3 (99) (Spring 1996), 96.
32. Tamari, 'The Palestinian Movement in Transition', 21.
33. Total allocations in general secretariat of the joint committee, *Report of Achievements*, table 19 and summary, pp. 81 and 120. Proportion from Tamari, 'Palestinian Movement in Transition', 19.
34. External sources discussed in Khalil Nahkleh, 'Non-Governmental Organizations and Palestine: The Politics of Money', *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 2: 1 (1989),

113–24. Importance also noted in Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 78 and 87.

35. Sara Roy, 'Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Disintegration', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22: 4 (88) (Summer 1993), 27.
36. Hassan.*
37. According to ʿAbd-al-Jalil al-Mutawwar, senior Fateh representative in the unified national command of the uprising. In 'Deportees Speak to *Sh'un Filastiniyya* about the *Intifada*, its Continuity, and Achievements' (Arab.), *Sh'un Filastiniyya*, No. 199, October 1989, 104. The interviews with six Fateh cadres from the West Bank and Gaza who were expelled by Israel in 1988–9 offer considerable insight into the organization and development of the uprising. A useful analysis is also Rabʿi al-Madhun, *The Palestinian Uprising: Organizational Structure and Methods of Action* (Arab.) (Nicosia, 1988).
38. Reproduced in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 December 1987.
39. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 14 January 1988.
40. Text in ibid. 7 January 1988.
41. Wazir interviewed in *al-Safir*, 27 January 1988.
42. *Al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ*, 28 December 1987.
43. First statement by Islamic Jihad on 10 December, cited (and reproduced) in Jean-François Legrain (with Pierre Chenard), *Les Voix de soulevement palestinien* (Cairo, 1991), 14. On PCP, Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 120–1.
44. Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 17–18. The first UNC appeal was numbered 3, taking Fateh's as 1 and the DFLP's as 2.
45. ʿAbbas cited in *al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ*, 21 December 1987. Zaʿnun cited in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 2 January 1988 (cited in Ahmad Shahin, 'The Palestinian Resistance—Arab Report' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 178, January 1988, 106).
46. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 7 January 1988.
47. Interview in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 December 1987.
48. Text in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 178, January 1988, 141–4.
49. *Al-Hadaf*, 4 January 1988.
50. Interviewed in *al-Mujahid*, 6 January 1988. Cited in Samih Shbib, 'The Palestinian Resistance—Political Report' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 179, February 1988, 99.
51. Interviewed in *al-Hawadith*, 15 January 1988. Cited in Shbib, ibid. 100.
52. Interviewed in *al-Tadamun*, 22 January 1988. Cited in Shbib, ibid. 98.
53. Hasan al-Batal, *Filastin al-Thawra*, 7 and 14 January 1988.
54. Fateh central committee member Qaddumi in ibid. 7 January 1988.
55. Fateh decision according to Zaʿnun, interviewed in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 2 January 1988. Arafat interviewed in *al-Qabas*, 5 January 1988. Both cited in Shahin, 'The Palestinian Resistance', 112. Also see *Filastin al-Thawra*, 7 January 1988.
56. *Al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ*, 18 January 1988.
57. Interviewed in *al-Tadamun*, 30 January 1988. Cited in Ahmad Shahin, 'The Palestinian Resistance—Arab Report' (Arab.), monthly report, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 180, March 1988, 101.

58. PLO view from Wazir interview in *al-Ufuq*, 14 January 1988. Cited in Shbib, 'The Palestinian Resistance', 98.
59. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 12 November 1987.
60. Ibid. 17 December 1987.
61. An example of leftist criticism is the statement by Mustafa al-Zabari, *al-Hadaf*, 7 February 1988.
62. Editorial comment in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 8 February 1988.
63. ʿAbbas, *Road to Oslo*, 40–1.
64. Hamza.*
65. First quote from interview in *al-Safir*, 27 January 1988. Second quote from interview in *al-Anbaʿ* (Kuwait), 17 April 1988 (text in *Abu Jihad: Conversations about the Uprising* (Tunis, n.d. [1989]), 113).
66. On escalation, for example, *Concerning the Revolutionary Uprising of Our People in Palestine* (Arab.), report presented to the PLO central council, convened in Baghdad on 9–12 January 1988. On long-term aims, Hamza, Muʿin Tahir, Jayyusi, and Hassan.*
67. Interview in *al-Anbaʿ*, 17 April 1988. Text in *Abu Jihad: Conversations about the Uprising*, 119–21.
68. Conversation reproduced in ibid. 86; and interview in *al-Anbaʿ*, 17 April 1988, also in ibid. 119.
69. Wazir expressed this sense of escalation, for example, in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 24 December 1987.
70. First figure from Meir Litvak, 'The West Bank and the Gaza Strip', *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 13 (1989), 236. Fateh figure from deportee Luʾay ʿAbdu, interviewed in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 11 December 1988.
71. Litvak, 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip', 231.
72. *Jerusalem Post*, 26 January 1988. An analytical survey of Israeli counter-measures in the first year of the uprising is Aryeh Shalev, *The Intifada: Causes and Effects* (Boulder, Colo., 1991), ch. 4.
73. US report cited in Frisch, 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip', 296. Figure on arrests cited in Litvak, 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip', 236.
74. Official statistics cited here from Uzi Rabi and Joshua Teitelbaum, 'Armed Operations', *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 12 (1988), table 1, p. 132. Under-reporting quoted in Israeli media cited by Litvak, 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip', 235.
75. On prisoners, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 3 December 1987. Khaddam in discussion with ʿAli Ballut, *al-Qabas*, 29 December 1987 (cited in Shahin, 'The Palestinian Resistance', 106).
76. Lower estimate of prisoners from PLO adviser Bassam Abu-Sharif, *al-Nahar*, 9 May 1988; and editorial, *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 July 1988. Arafat subsequently gave a figure of 4,000 prisoners, while Zayd Wahba, the senior Fateh civilian representative in Lebanon, set the number at 5,000. *Al-Hayat*, 29 September 1989; and *al-Qabas*, 20–21 January 1990.
77. *Al-Safir*, 27 April 1988.
78. Ibid. 25 April 1988.

79. On funeral, *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 20 May 1988; *Fath* (dissidents), 16 April 1988 (issue appeared later than publication date); *Filastin al-Thawra*, 1 May 1988; and editorial in ibid. 17 July 1988.
80. Statement issued on 4 May 1988, reproduced in *Fath*, 14 May 1988.
81. *Al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ*, 2 May 1988.
82. *Al-Safir* and *al-Nahar*, 5 May 1988; and *al-Nahar al-ʿArabi wa al-Dawli*, 22 May 1988. Expulsion confirmed by Maragha, *Fath*, 22 July 1988.
83. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 20 May 1988; *Fath* (dissidents), 16 April 1988 (issue appeared later than publication date); *Filastin al-Thawra*, 1 May 1988; and editorial in ibid. 17 July 1988.
84. On Syrian role, *al-Nahar al-ʿArabi wa al-Dawli*, 13 June 1988; and *Filastin al-Thawra*, 3 and 24 July 1988.
85. Libyan statement on talks held by Qadhdhafi, *al-Nahar*, 25 June 1988.
86. Yusif al-Sharqawi, then Fateh camp commander.*
87. UNC appeal no. 21, reproduced in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 July 1988.
88. Interviewed in *al-Hadaf*, 5 June 1988.
89. *Fath*, 14 May, 25 June, and 9 and 22 July 1988.
90. Interviewed in *al-Mustaqbal*, 9 July 1988.
91. PLO statement in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 3 July 1988. Editorial in ibid. 17 July 1988.
92. Ibid. 24 July 1988.
93. Jordanian officials speaking to ʿAli Ballut, *al-Qabas*, 29 December 1987. Cited in Shahin, 'Palestinian Resistance', 105.
94. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 7 August 1988.
95. Ibid. 21 August 1988.
96. Ibid. 4 September 1988.
97. Ibid. 17 March 1988.
98. Interviewed in *al-Dustur*, 21 March 1988. Cited in Shahin, 'Palestinian Resistance,' 114.
99. Editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 29 May 1988.
100. Ibid. 14 August 1988.
101. Ibid. 28 August 1988.
102. Cited in *al-Intifada*, internal Fateh dissident bulletin, No. 5, Year 1, October 1988, 10.
103. *Al-Hadaf* and *al-Hurriyya*, 11 September 1988.
104. *Al-Hadaf*, 11 September 1988; *al-Hurriyya*, 11 and 18 September 1988; and *al-Safir*, 13 September 1988.
105. Quotes from *Filastin al-Thawra*, 2 and 9 October 1988.
106. Statement cited in *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 13 (1989), 92.
107. ʿAbbas, *Road to Oslo*, 43.
108. Ibid. 6 November 1988.
109. Texts in ibid. 20 November 1988.
110. Quote from *Middle East International*, No. 341, 6 January 1989.
111. Ahmad ʿAbd-al-Haq, 'Europe and the Taming of Israel' (Arab.), *Filastin al-Tharwa*, 22 January 1989.

112. Denial by Arafat, for example, in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 22 January 1988.
113. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 31 March 1988.
114. Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (Bloomington, 1994), 94.
115. Ibid.
116. Shiqaqi ultimately proved the dominant figure, as ʿAwda was reportedly expelled from Jihad in September 1994. *Al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 19 September 1994.
117. *Al-Hayat*, 8 July 1994.
118. According to Mhanna, interviewed in *al-Nafir*, 7 May 1990; Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 94; and Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 214.
119. Expression used in *al-Jihad*, No. 2–3, August–September 1990, 28.
120. Foundation date from Mhanna, interviewed in *Fath*, 14 January 1989. On strike, Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 215.
121. Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 216.
122. Some accounts state that Tamimi was a preacher at the al-Aqsa mosque and was exiled by Israel, but this is firmly denied by Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 13 n. 8.
123. Mhanna interview in *al-Nafir*, 7 May 1990.
124. On poor background, Jarbawi, *Uprising and Political Leadership*, 50.
125. The role of two former Palestinian members of the Islamic Liberation Party—Salih Sirriyya and Muhammad Salim al-Rahhal—in the founding of the Egyptian Jihad Movement may also have exerted an intellectual influence, evident in the stress on putschist violence, deep antipathy to Arab governments, and the call for the revival of the Islamic caliphate. Iyad al-Barghuthi, *The Palestinian Islamic Movement and the New World Order* (Jerusalem, 1992), 38.
126. Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 13.
127. Abu-Amr, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 103.
128. Summary in *al-Jihad*, No. 2–3, August–September 1990, 27–9.
129. Yasin quoted by a communist representative who met him at the time. Cited anonymously in ʿAbd-al-Qadir Yasin, *Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine* (Arab.) (Cairo, 1990), 26.
130. Evident in the Hamas charter, for instance Articles 15 and 16. Text in ibid. 83–113.
131. Hamas statement in *al-Sabil*, No. 10, 30 November 1989.
132. Hamas pamphlet titled *Ahmad Yasin: The Miraculous Phenomenon and Historical Legend*, quoted in Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 186.
133. Ibid. 191–2.
134. *Hamas: Background to Formation and Prospects of the Struggle*, cited in Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 194. Possibly the most detailed account of the Brotherhood's organization and social activities, and of Hamas founder and leader Yasin, is ʿAtif ʿUdwan, *Shaykh Ahmad Yasin: His Life and Struggle* (Arab.) (Gaza, 1991).
135. Ibid. 194–5 and 203; Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 13 n. 8; and Shadid, 'Muslim Brotherhood', 666.
136. Muhammad Bin Yusif, *Hamas: A Passing Event or a Permanent Alternative?*, cited in ibid. 15.

137. Interview with acting university president in *al-Nahar*, 13 July 1992. Cited in ibid. 202–3.
138. Ziyad Abu-ʿAmr, *The Origins of the Political Movements in the Gaza Strip 1948–1967* (Arab.) (Acre, 1987), 36.
139. Shadid, 'Muslim Brotherhood', 676. Its officials in Amman were still declaring support for the restoration of formal ties between the East and West Banks of Jordan as late as November 1989, although this view may well not have been representative of the Hamas rank-and-file in the occupied territories. Statement by official spokesman Ziyad Abu-Ghanima, *al-Quds*, 22 November 1989.
140. Details in Yasin, *Hamas*, 31.
141. On civilian protests, ʿAbdullah al-Saʿafin, 'The Organizational and Intellectual Structure of the Hamas Movement' (Arab.), *al-Hayat*, 27 November 1994.
142. On military arm, Yusif, *Hamas: A Passing Event*, in Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 16.
143. *Al-Hadaf*, 2 April 1984.
144. Yusif, *Hamas: A Passing Event*, in Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 16; Litvak, 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip', 237; and Iyad al-Barghuthi, *Islamization and Politics in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (Jerusalem, 1990), 76.
145. Elie Rekhess, 'The West Bank and the Gaza Strip', *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 10 (1986), 221.
146. The faction later disputed press reports linking it to Fateh. See *al-Sabil*, No. 10, 30 November 1989, 10, and No. 14, April 1990, 9. However, articles in the latter newsletter confirmed Bhays and Tamimi as among the founders of *Saray al-Jihad al-Islami*. Issue No. 12, 31 January 1990, 6, and No. 21, February 1991, 6–7. Confirmation of this, and some other detail, is offered in Shafiq, *Martyrs and a March*, 31. Additional material revealing the faction's ideology is a text originally written in 1984 and republished posthumously as Muhammad Bhays (Abu Hasan) and Muhammad Basim Sultan (Hamdi), *Questions about Islam and Marxism from Behind Prison Bars* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1990).
147. *Al-Sabil*, No. 21, February 1991, 7.
148. Religious groups named in various issues of *al-Sabil* and in Shadid, 'Muslim Brotherhood', 677. The IFLP was led by sheikh Nasir al-ʿAnqawi and claimed a number of attacks between 1986 and August 1990. *Al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 26 September 1991.
149. Yusif, *Hamas: A Passing Event*, in Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 15. Two earlier statements in 1987 had carried the signature of the Islamic Resistance Movement, but this name did not correspond to a real organization.
150. Saʿafin, 'Organizational and Intellectual Structure'.
151. Text of statement issued on 16 February 1988 in Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 50 (Arabic section).
152. Article 2, in Yasin, *Hamas*, 88.
153. On the greater maturity in later Hamas writings, Khalid al-Hrub, *Palestinian Islamism: Hamas, its Thought and Political Practice* (Arab.) (Beirut, 1996), 276.
154. Article 22, in Yasin, *Hamas*, 101.
155. Article 27, in ibid. 105.

156. Articles 14 and 15, in ibid. 96.
157. Article 15, in ibid. 96.
158. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 9 April 1989.
159. Personal observation. A list of the successful candidates to the revolutionary council and of the distribution of posts in the central committee is in *al-Taqrir*, 5: 19 (1–15 December 1989).
160. *Al-Sakhra*, 19 March 1990. Sha'th and Ifranji had previously failed to obtain sufficient votes during the general conference, but were now elected by the Revolutionary Council thanks to a prior mandate from the general conference allowing the selection of up to three additional central committee members.
161. Khalaf's role first alluded to by Sa'iqa, *al-Tala'i'*, 7 January 1986, 12.
162. On election, *al-Hayat*, 13 August 1989.
163. Ahmad Barqawi, 'A Reading of al-Hadaf's Political Panel' (Arab.), *al-Hadaf*, 28 January 1990.
164. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 15 and 22 January 1989.
165. Litvak, 'West Bank and the Gaza Strip', 254.
166. PFLP politburo member 'Umar Qtaysh in ibid. 5 November 1989; and PFLP politburo member 'Abd-al-Rahim Malluh in *al-Hadaf*, 15 July 1990.
167. Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 19–20; and Salhi, *Political and Religious Leadership*, 135; and Jarbawi, *Uprising and Political Leadership*, 99.
168. Statement by the PLO executive committee, for example. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 7 May 1989.
169. Legrain, *Les Voix de soulevement*, 20.
170. For instance, the public appeal by the UNC reproduced in *al-Hurriyya*, 30 July 1989.
171. Appeal issued on 1 August. Text in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 12 August 1990.

26 The Road to Oslo

1. Texts in *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 13 (1989), 93–6.
2. The Palestinian opposition immediately objected to the elections proposal. As PFLP deputy secretary-general Zabri explained, elections in the occupied territories would involve only one million Palestinians and exclude the other five million (*sic*) Palestinians of the diaspora. *Al-Hadaf*, 22 April 1990.
3. Ibid. 7 May 1989.
4. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 28 May 1989.
5. Ibid. 23 July 1989.
6. *Al-Hadaf*, 20 August 1989.
7. Texts of Fateh documents in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 13 August and 3 September 1989. Khalaf statement in *al-Hayat*, 23 August 1989.
8. *International Herald Tribune*, 21 August 1989.
9. Arafat quote in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 4 February 1990. Reference to declining Soviet interest in editorial, ibid. 20 May 1990.

10. Wazir*. Arafat cited in *Filastin al-Thawra,* 7 January 1988.
11. Ibid. 24 July 1988.
12. Ibid. 17 December 1989.
13. Businessman close to Arafat.*
14. *Filastin al-Thawra,* 8 April 1990.
15. Ibid. 22 April 1990.
16. Ibid. 28 May 1989.
17. Ibid. 4 March 1990.
18. Ibid. 20 May and 3 June 1990.
19. Habash in *al-Hadaf,* 8 April 1990.
20. *Filastin al-Thawra,* 10 and 17 June 1990. Khalid al-Hasan opposed the raid, however. Interview in *al-Hayat,* 4 June 1990.
21. *Filastin al-Thawra,* 24 June 1990.
22. Cited for example, in *al-Hadaf,* 21 October 1990.
23. Habash.*
24. *Filastin al-Thawra,* 9 September 1990.
25. Ibid. 16 September 1990.
26. Editorial in *al-Hadaf,* 12 August 1990.
27. Article by Muhammad Sulayman, executive editor, *Filastin al-Thawra,* 2 September 1990.
28. Ibid. 23 September 1990.
29. *Al-Hadaf,* 30 September 1990.
30. In *Filastin al-Thawra,* 23 December 1990.
31. *Al-Hadaf,* 9 September 1990.
32. *Filastin al-Thawra,* 24 March 1991.
33. Arafat interviewed in *al-Hayat,* 19 March 1991.
34. Ibid. 31 March and 21 April 1991.
35. Central council statement in ibid. 28 April 1991. Arafat in monthly message to the *intifada,* text in ibid. 19 May 1991.
36. Text of council statement in *Filastin al-Thawra,* 27 October 1991.
37. *Al-Hadaf,* 1 and 15 September 1991.
38. Interviewed in ibid. 12 January 1992.
39. *Fath,* 26 November 1988; and *al-Safir,* 16 and 19 December 1988.
40. Joshua Teitelbaum, 'The Palestinian Liberation Organization', *Middle East Contemporary Survey,* 13 (1989), 221.
41. *Al-Hayat,* 8 November 1989; and *Fath,* 6 April and 4 and 18 May 1991.
42. An Islamist faction broke away from the PF–GC in April 1994. *Al-Quds al-ʿArabi,* 28 April 1994.
43. Some details in *al-Risala al-Tanzimiyya,* No. 2, PLF central information, 1990, 4–5; and Tariq ʿAli, letter of resignation from the central committee, 29 December 1988.
44. Statement by Habash in early 1989 cited in *Filastin Lana,* 18 November 1989; second statement in *al-Hayat,* 16 December 1989; and *al-Hadaf,* 14 January 1990.
45. Habash press conference cited in ibid. 20 November 1988.

46. ʿAbbas, *Road to Oslo*, 40.
47. Article by Habash in *al-Hadaf*, 5 November 1989.
48. Ibid. 11 February 1990; and politburo member ʿAbd-al-Rahim Malluh in ibid. 11 March 1990. The latter contained a slightly more extensive comment on the consequences, albeit in the context of a critique of the Palestinian People's Party.
49. Habash in ibid. 5 November 1989; and Malluh in *Sawt al-Watan*, 7 March 1990.
50. Interviewed in *al-Hadaf*, 23 December 1990.
51. PFLP, *Essays on People's War* (Arab.), Part 2, n.d. [approximately 1989], 13.
52. Ibid. 8 and 22 April 1990.
53. Interviewed in ibid. 23 December 1990.
54. Criticism of USSR in editorial in ibid. 7 October 1990. Examples of statements relating to the war in *al-Hurriyya*, 27 January 1990; and *al-Hadaf*, 20 January and 17 February 1990.
55. Military commander ʿAbd-al-Karim, interviewed in *al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 106/107, November/December 1991, 16.
56. Report of the debate in *al-Hadaf*, 28 January 1990.
57. Cited, curiously, in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 7 April 1991.
58. Interviewed in *al-Hadaf*, 23 December 1990.
59. *Issues of Democratic Renovation: The Political and Organizational Documents Presented to the Session of the Central Committee, 15 February to 3 March 1990*, n.p., n.d. (1991), 99.
60. *Al-Hayat*, 8 March 1990; *al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ*, 19 March 1990; and *al-Hurriyya*, 18 March 1990. Also ʿAbd-Rabbu, Nawfal, ʿAzmi al-Shuʿaybi, Zahira Kamal, and Hilal.*
61. *Al-Hayat*, 24 August 1990.
62. Ibid. 17 August 1991; and *al-Hadaf*, 29 September 1991.
63. *Al-Watan*, cited in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 1 October 1989.
64. *The Palestinian People's Party: Internal Statutes and Program*, issued late October 1991.
65. *Al-Hadaf*, 2 September 1990 and 21 July 1991.
66. *Essays on People's War* (Arab.), Part 2, p. 18.
67. Article by ʿAbd-al-Karim in *al-Hadaf*, 22 December 1991.
68. First quote from ibid. 22 December 1991. Second quote from interview with ʿAbd-al-Karim in *al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 106/107, November/December 1991, 15.
69. On arrests, *al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 28–29 September 1991. Responses from Habash;* and ʿAbd-al-Karim interview in *al-Muqatil al-Thawri*, No. 106/107, November/December 1991, 17.
70. *Al-Hayat*, 18 October 1992.
71. 'Political Document of the Fifth General Congress', in Mahir al-Dassuqi (ed.), *Fifth Congress* (Arab.) (Jerusalem, 1993), 249–50.
72. Panel discussion, organized and edited by ʿAbd-al-Qadir Yasin, Samih Shbib, and Majid Kayyali, 'The Palestinian Armed Struggle: Experience and Determinants' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 244–245, July–August 1993, 95.
73. Article by ʿAbd-al-Karim in *al-Hadaf*, 5 November 1989.

74. Ibid. 25 August 1991.
75. Ibid. 9 August 1992.
76. Ideological document in Dassuqi, *Fifth Congress*, 180 and 183.
77. Ibid. 187–8.
78. Ibid. 189 and 203. The stress on guidance rather than formal ideology noted by ʿAbd-al-Rahim Malluh, interviewed in *al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 24 February 1993.
79. Habash explained mention of Haddad as merely a gesture to a prominent leader. Interviewed in *al-Hayat*, 19 March 1993.
80. Report in *al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 24 February 1993.
81. Ibid. 24 February 1993; and *al-Safir*, 23 February 1993.
82. Quote from ʿAbd-al-Rahim Malluh interview in *al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 24 February 1993. On withdrawals, Marwan Kafarna, and Raji Surani.*
83. *Al-Hadaf*, 16 January 1992; and *al-Hurriyya*, 2 February and 17 May 1992.
84. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 May 1992.
85. *Al-Hadaf*, 28 June 1992.
86. Ibid. 27 September 1992.
87. On dialogue with Hamas and diasgreement over women's dress, *al-Hadaf*, 18 August 1991; and Zabri interview in *al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 7–8 September 1991. On PNC seats and voting share, *al-Hadaf*, 23 December 1990 and 22 September 1991; and *al-Hayat*, 23 December 1993. The DFLP was especially hostile towards Hamas, and had expressed this as early as the publication of the Hamas charter in August 1988. See Muhannad ʿAbd-al-Hamid, 'The "Hamas" Movement in the Occupied Land: From Deferred "Jihad" to Organized Sabotage', *al-Hurriyya*, No. 278, 18 September 1988, 6–9.
88. Saʿafin, 'Organizational and Intellectual Structure'.
89. *The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): An Introductory Memorandum* (Arab.), text reproduced in Khalid al-Hrub, *Palestinian Islamism: Hamas, its Thought and Political Practice* (Arab.) (Beirut. 1996), 316.
90. On Abu-Marzuq, two Palestinian Islamist analysts.*
91. Interviewed in *al-Nahar* (Jerusalem), 30 April 1989. Text reproduced in *al-Shaʿb*, 1 December 1992.
92. Ibid.; and interview from prison in *al-Hayat*, 18 September 1989.
93. Quoted in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 28 January 1990.
94. *Al-Hayat*, 9 April 1990.
95. Text in special annex in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 8 July 1990.
96. Text in *al-Sabil*, special issue, September 1990, 13.
97. *Al-Hayat*, 2 May and 11 October 1991.
98. Ibid. 24 September 1992; and *Filastin al-Thawra*, 11 October 1992. More details on Abu Nidal faction's finances in Seale, *Abu Nidal*, 203–5.
99. Arafat interview in *al-Hayat*, 12 January 1993; and Ghusha interview in *al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 13 January 1993.
100. *Al-Hayat*, 25 April 1993.
101. Ibid.
102. *Al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 13 July 1993.

103. Yazid Sayigh, 'The Palestinian Resistance—Military Report' (Arab.), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 203, February 1990, 122–3, and No. 210, September 1990, 133–4. On casualties, Tariq ʿAli.*
104. Many of the remarks in this section are based on the author's observations as an adviser to the delegation in Washington and later as a senior negotiator in Taba and Cairo in 1991–4; meetings or private discussions at various times in the same period with Arafat, the members of the 'negotiations follow-up committee' (collectively and individually), and the members of the delegations to Washington, Taba, and Cairo; minutes of meetings with US officials; and official or internal correspondence.
105. Quoted in Mamduh Nawfal, *The Story of the Oslo Accord* (Amman, 1995), 32.
106. *Palestinian Thoughts (5) Conversations and Articles*, 115.
107. Ibid. 35–6.
108. Ibid. 47 and 63–4.
109. Ibid. 37.
110. Ibid. 63.
111. *Al-Hayat*, 6 November 1990.
112. Lower estimate from ibid. 20 December 1991. Higher from Tariq ʿAli, then member of PLO Higher Military Council and Lebanon Committee.*
113. Statistics from 'The Palestinian Economic Withdrawal from the Sidon Region Intensifies Recession and Paralysis and Impacts on Investment', *al-Hayat*, 8 September 1991.
114. 'The PLO Closes its Clinics and Suspends the Salaries of its Employees in Jordan', in ibid. 7 June 1993. JD1 = $1.5.
115. Examples cited in Meir Litvak, 'The Palestine Liberation Organization', *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 16 (1992), 265.
116. Published in ibid. 29 April and 2 May 1992.
117. Statement cited in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 5 April 1992.
118. *US News and World Report*, 18 April 1993; and *al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 23 August 1993.
119. According to institution director Intisar al-Wazir. *Al-Hayat*, 20 February 1994. Wazir and other institution officials, including West Bank economist Samir Hlayla, added that 50,000 families had lost a member, and that 42,000 were based in the occupied territories. 'PLO Financial Crisis Changes Life of Thousands of Palestinians', ibid. 17 August 1993.
120. 'The PLO Closes its Clinics', ibid. 7 June 1993.
121. On universities, 'PLO Financial Crisis Changes Life of Thousands of Palestinians', ibid. 17 August 1993. On media, 'PLO Financial Crisis Hits Press in Occupied Territories', ibid. 26 June 1993.
122. An example of Zaki's outlook is his 'Reform and Combating Corruption' (Arab.), in *What We in Fateh See: Encounters and Conversations with ʿAbbas Zaki* (n.p., September 1993), 89–93.
123. 'Reduction of Number of Employees at Palestinian Embassies Raises Questions . . . and Arouses Speculation', *al-Hayat*, 8 August 1993; 'Reduction of Number of

Employees at PLO Embassies and Offices Abroad', *al-Quds al-ʿArabi*, 25 August 1993; and 'PLO Sells its Properties to Cover Expenses', ibid. 23 August 1993.

124. On both sets of meetings, *al-Hayat*, 23 June and 20 July 1993.
125. Quote from Meir Litvak, 'The Palestine Liberation Organization', *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 17 (1993), 168.
126. Haydar ʿAbd-al-Shafi, former head of the Palestinian side in the joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation to the bilateral peace talks in Washington, interviewed by Sharif Elmusa in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23:1 (89) (Autumn 1993), 17.
127. For example, Edward Said, interviewed by Mouin Rabbani in 'Symbols versus Substance: A Year After the Declaration of Principles', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 24:2 (94) (Winter 1995), 61; and *idem*, 'The Lost Liberation', *The Guardian*, 9 September 1993.
128. Confirmed in Avi Shlaim, 'The Oslo Accord', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23:3 (91) (Spring 1994), 32.
129. For example, Faruq Qaddumi, interviewed by Zuhayr Qusaybati in *al-Hayat*, 4 November 1993.
130. Arafat interviewed in ibid. 19 January 1994.

Conclusion

1. Quote from Hasan al-Batal, editorial in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 31 May 1992.
2. Quote from Augustus Norton, *Amal and the Shiʾa: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin, Tex., 1987), 34–5.
3. Interviewed by Ahmad Sayf, 'Khalil al-Wazir Assesses the Various Phases of the Palestinian Struggle' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 152–153, November–December 1985, 17.
4. Wolf, *Peasant Wars*, 273.
5. Nayif Hawatma, *Action after the October War to Defeat the Surrenderist Liquidationist Solution and Extract the Right Of Self-Determination* (Arab.) (DFLP, 1974), 37–8.
6. 'Khalil al-Wazir Assesses', 14.
7. Mahjub ʿUmar, 'The Palestinian Ramadan War: Position and Results' (Arab.), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981, 78–9.
8. Interviewed in *al-Hawadith*, 18 May 1979. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1979*, 268.
9. Interviewed in *al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ* (Paris), 1 February 1988.
10. The similarity is evident from Hanna Batatu, 'The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions: Some Observations on their Underlying Causes and Social Character', Washington, DC, 1983.
11. Quote from Ian S. Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank–Gaza* (Ithaca, NY, 1993), 441.
12. Explicit recognition of the statist character of PLO institutions, for example, by PCP deputy secretary-general Sulayman al-Najjab in *al-Hadaf*, 28 January 1990. Quote from PCP, *The Current Palestinian Situation*, 56–7. Similar views taken, for

example, in PCP–Provisional Command, *The Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution: Its Causes and Means of Dealing with It*, May 1984, 15–17; and Ghusha, *Current Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution*, 12.

13. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States*, 27.
14. This is the argument in Gershon Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* (Berkeley, 1996).
15. Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*, 67.
16. Shafir, *Land, Labor and the Origins*, 4–5
17. These ideas discussed in Yazid Sayigh, 'The Role of the Armed Struggle and the Uprising in the Palestinian National Struggle', (Arab.) *Shu'un 'Arabiyya*, No. 67, September 1991.
18. Wolf, *Peasant Wars*, 188–9.
19. Dunn, *Modern Revolutions*, 145.
20. On the status of memory, in reference to India, Bhikhu Parekh, 'Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1/i; (March 1995), 40.
21. Mao Zedong, *Report from Xunwu*, introduced by Roger R. Thompson (Stanford, Calif., 1990).
22. Donna Divine, 'The Dialectics of Palestinian Politics', in Migdal, *Palestinian Society and Politics*, 214 and 225.
23. Term 'constant motion' used by Khalil al-Wazir, cited in *Filastin al-Thawra*, 12 December 1993.
24. Fateh leader interviewed in *al-Usbu' al-'Arabi*, 22 January 1968. Text in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1968*, 27.
25. Nazih Qura, *The Zionist Enterprise Faces its Internal Crisis* (Arab.) (Damascus, 1977).
26. Hasan, *Genius of Failure*, 151.
27. This assessment of Begin's likely stance is offered in Quandt, *Camp David*, 323.
28. Assessment of Israeli thinking from Yaniv, *Dilemmas of Security*, 89.
29. Schurman, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 23.
30. Hasan, *Genius of Failure*, 148–9.
31. James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge, 1990), 59.

This page intentionally left blank

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography is organized into the sections, listed below. Citations in the documentary sections up to, and including, 'Published Interviews (other than the press) with Palestinian Officials' are arranged in chronological order of publication. All other sections are arranged in alphabetical order of author or organization.

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 844

Palestinian Organizations 844

- Fateh (Palestinian National Liberation Movement) 844
- Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) 848
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 848
- Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine/Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP/DFLP) 852
- Democratic Alliance (1983–1984) 854
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PF–GC) 854
- Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) 855
- Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) 855
- Arab Liberation Front (ALF) 856
- Saʿiqa (Vanguards of Popular Liberation War Organization) and Baʿth Party 856
- Palestine Liberation Organization/Palestine Liberation Army (PLO/PLA) 856
- Palestinian National Front (PNF) 860
- Palestinian Communists 860
- Islamist Groups 863

Arab Organizations 863

- Arab Communists 863
- Organization of Lebanese Socialists 863
- Jordanian Democratic People's Party 863
- League of Arab States 863

Published Interviews (other than the press) with Palestinian Officials 864

OTHER PRIMARY SOURCES 866

- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 866
- Unpublished Personal Accounts 866

ASSORTED DOCUMENTS 867

- Arabic 867
- English 867

LIST OF PERIODICALS 868
Palestinian Periodicals 868
Other Periodicals 870
- Newspapers 870
- Magazines (weekly or monthly) 870
- Documentary material, translations 871
- Journals 871

COMPILATIONS AND YEARBOOKS 871
- Arabic 871
- English 872

MEMOIRS, OTHER ACCOUNTS, AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS BY PARTICIPANTS 872
Arabic 872
- Books 872
- Articles 876
English 878
- Books 878
- Articles 879

AUTHOR'S INTERVIEWS WITH PARTICIPANTS 879
Interviews 879
Unstructured or Informal Discussions 891

SECONDARY SOURCES 891
Arabic 891
- Books 891
- Articles 896
Hebrew 899
- Books 899
English 900
- Books 900
- Articles and Chapters 908

Official Documents

Palestinian Organizations

Fateh (Palestinian National Liberation Movement)

Not included: statements by the General Command of Asifa Forces, speeches and annual messages by Yasir Arafat, instruction manuals and the like, and studies of the Israeli military, political parties, and society.

——*al-Mudhakkira al-Marfuʿa min al-Qiyada al-ʿAmma li-Quwwat al-ʿAsifa ila Raʾis wa Aʿdaʾ al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini fi al-Qahira fi Dawratih al-Thaniya (The Memorandum Submitted by the General Command of Asifa Forces to the Chairman and Members of the Palestine National Council in Cairo in its Second Session)*, 28 May 1965.

——*al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya: Qadayaha wa Abʿaduha (The Palestinian Revolution: Its Dimensions and Issues)* (Kuwait: Dar al-Qabas, n.d.).

——*ʿAduwwun Qawiyyun wa Lakinnahu laysa Usturiyyan (A Strong Enemy but not a Legendary One)* (Kuwait: Dar al-Qabas, reprint for Fateh, n.d.).

——*Dirasat ʿan al-ʿAdu (Studies of the Enemy)* (Kuwait: Dar al-Qabas, reprint for Fateh, n.d.).

——*al-Thawra wa al-ʿUnf Tariq al-Tahrir (The Revolution and Violence are the Way to Liberation)*, Dirasat wa Tajarib Thawriyya (Revolutionary Studies and Experiences), no. 3, n.p., n.d.

——*Dirasat wa Tajarib Thawriyya (Revolutionary Studies and Experiences)*, n.p., n.d., compilation of:

- 'Ahdaf wa Mabadi' wa Shiʿarat al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya' (Aims, Principles, and Slogans of the Palestinian Revolution);
- 'Kayf Tanfajir al-Thawra al-Musallaha, wa Kayf Fajjarat "Fateh" al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya' (How the Armed Revolution Ignites, and How Fateh Detonated the Palestinian Revolution);
- 'Tahrir al-Aqtar al-Muhtalla wa Uslub al-Kifah al-Musallah Dud al-Istiʿmar al-Mubashir' (The Liberation of the Occupied Lands and the Method of Armed Struggle against Direct Colonialism).

——*Dirasat Thawriyya (Revolutionary Studies)*, n.p., n.d., reprinted by al-Thawra Publications. Compilation of:

- 'Bayan Harakatina' (The Manifesto of Our Movement), n.d. [*c.*1959];
- 'Haykal al-Binaʾ al-Thawri' (Structure of Revolutionary Construction), n.d. [*c.*1959];
- 'al-Milad wa al-Masira' (Birth and March), n.d. [*c.* early 1967];
- 'al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya wa al-Siraʿal-ʿArabi-al-Israʾili' (The Palestinian Revolution and the Arab–Israeli Conflict);
- 'al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya wa al-Thawra al-Qawmiyya al-Dimuqratiyya al-ʿArabiyya' (The Palestinian Revolution and the National Democratic Arab Revolution);
- 'al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya wa al-Thawra al-ʿAlamiyya' (The Palestinian Revolution and the World Revolution);
- 'al-Thawra wa Istratijiyyat al-Tahaluf' (The Revolution and the Strategy of Alliance);
- 'al-ʿAmal al-Siyasi bayn al-Jamahir' (Political Action among the Masses);
- 'Qawanin Harb al-Shaʿb' (The Laws of People's War);
- 'Hatta Takuna Thaʾiran Mumtazan' (To Be An Exemplary Revolutionary).

——*Durus wa Tajarib Thawriyya (Revolutionary Lessons and Experiences)*, n.p., n.d. Compilation of:

- 'al-Mabadiʾ—al-Ahdaf—al-Uslub' (Principles, Aims, and Means);

- 'Kayf Nutabbiq al-Mabadi' al-Asasiyya al-ʿAshara fi al-Tanzim' (How to Apply the Ten Basic Principles in Organization);
- 'Hawl al-ʿUdwiyya wa al-Qawaʿid al-Asasiyya fi al-Tanzim' (Concerning Membership and the Basic Principles in Organization);
- 'Haykal al-Bina' al-Thawri' (Structure of Revolutionary Construction);
- 'al-Manhaj fi al-ʿAmal al-Thawri' (The Approach to Revolutionary Action);
- 'Kayf Tatafajjar al-Thawra al-Shaʿbiyya al-Musallaha' (How the Popular Armed Revolution Erupts).

——*al-Jalasat al-Harakiyya*, 1–12 (*Movement's Sessions*, 1–12), n.p., n.d. [early 1968]. Compilation of:

- 'Maʿna al-ʿUdwiyya wa Mustalzamatuha wa Mafhum al-Jalsa al-Harakiyya wa Mustalzamatuha' (The Meaning of Membership and its Requirements, and the Concept of the Movement Session and its Requirements);
- 'Nabdha Tarikhiyya ʿan al-Haraka' (A Historical Brief about the Movement);
- 'Bayan Harakatina' (Our Movement's Statement);
- 'Mabadi' wa Ahdaf wa Shiʿarat al-Haraka' (The Principles, Aims, and Slogans of the Movement);
- 'Huquq wa Wajibat al-ʿUdu al-Asasiyya' (The Basic Rights and Duties of Members);
- 'Limadha Ana Fath—al-Burnamij al-Awwal' (Why I am Fateh—First Programme);
- 'Limadha Ana Fath—al-Burnamij al-Thani' (Why I am Fateh—Second Programme);
- 'Limadha Ana Fath—al-Burnamij al-Thalith' (Why I am Fateh—Third Programme);
- 'Limadha Ana Fath—al-Burnamij al-Rabiʿ' (Why I am Fateh—Fourth Programme);
- 'Kifahuna al-Musallah wa Jadwah—wa Kayf Yajib an Nafham Masiratah' (Our Armed Struggle and its Feasibility—and How We Must Understand its Course);
- 'Thawratuna wa al-Madmun al-Ijtimaʿi' (Our Revolution and the Social Content);
- 'Thawratuna wa al-Hizbiyya' (Our Revolution and Party Politics).

——*al-Qawaʿid al-ʿAshara fi al-Tanzim (The Ten Basic Rules in Organization)*. n.p., Revolution Publications, n.d.

——*Hiwar Hawl al-Qadaya al-Asasiyya li al-Thawra (Dialogue About the Principal Issues of the Revolution)* (Kuwait: Qabas for Fateh, n.d.; interview with Salah Khalaf, published in al-Taliʿa, Cairo, in late 1969).

——*Min Muntalaqat al-ʿAmal al-Fidaʾi: Tahrir al-Aqtar al-Muhtalla (Some Tenets of Guerrilla Action: Liberating the Occupied Lands)* (Kuwait: Dar al-Qabas, reprint for Fateh, n.d. [1965]). Compilation of:

- 'Fath Tabda' al-Niqash' (Fateh Starts the Discussion);
- 'Bayan al-Tawqit' (Statement of Timing);
- 'Nidaluna al-Qutri' (Our National Struggle);
- 'Bayan ila al-Suhafiyyin' (Statement to Journalists);
- 'Thawratuna al-Musallaha wa al-Madmun al-Ijtimaʿi' (Our Armed Revolution and the Social Content);

- 'Tahrir al-Aqtar al-Muhtalla wa Uslub al-Kifah Dud al-Isti'mar al-Mubashir' (Liberating the Occupied Lands and the Method of Struggle against Direct Colonialism) [early 1967].

——*Hiwar Hawl al-Qadaya al-Asasiyya li al-Thawra (Dialogue about the Principal Issues of the Revolution)*, text of interview with unnamed Fateh official in *al-Tali'a*, published in 1968 (Kuwait: al-Qabas reprint for Fateh, n.d.).

——*Ma'na al-Istishhad fi Harakat Fath (The Meaning of Martyrdom in the Fateh Movement)*, information centre, n.d. [1968 or 1969].

——*'Fath' fi Khidmat al-Sha'b (Fateh in the Service of the People)*, Mobilization and Organization Bureau, n.d. [1969].

——*al-Tajriba al-Siniyya, al-Tajriba al-Vyatnamiyya, al-Tajriba al-Kubiyya (The Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban Experiences)* (Kuwait: Dar al-Qabas, for Fateh, n.d.).

——*Dirasat 'Askariyya (Military Studies)*, 1969.

——*Political and Armed Struggle* (Amman: Fateh Information Office, 1969).

——*Revolution Until Victory* (n.p., n.d. [1969]).

——*Arba' Ma'arik Kabira li-Quwwat al-'Asifa (Four Big Battles of al-'Asifa Forces)* (Amman: n.p., 1969).

——*al-Kitab al-Sanawi 1968 (Yearbook 1968)* (Amman: Fateh, 1969).

——*al-Kitab al-Sanawi li-Harakat Fath, 1969 (The Fateh Movement Yearbook, 1969)* (Amman: Fateh, 1970).

——*al-Yaqza al-Thawriyya: 'al-Munadil al-Asir wa al-Maslak al-Thawri' (Revolutionary Alertness: The Imprisoned Struggler and Revolutionary Behaviour)*, Information and Organization Bureau, n.d. [approximately 1970].

——*'Ish al-Nusur: Qissat Ma'rakat al-'Arqub fi 12 wa 13 Ayyar 1970 (Eagles' Nest: The Story of the Arqub Battle of 12–13 May 1970)*, Fateh.

——*Kifahuna al-Musallah bayn al-Nazariyya wa al-Tatbiq (our Armed Struggle between Theory and Practice)*, Central Information, June 1970.

——*Qawa'id al-Maslakiyya al-Thawriyya (Principles of Revolutionary Behaviour)* (n.p., n.d., reprinted by al-Thawra Publications).

——*Mutatallabat wa Qawa'id al-'Amal li-Tahqiq al-Istratijiyya al-Siyasiyya al-'Amma li-Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini/Fath/ min Khilal al-Tanzim (The Requirements and Rules of Action to Attain the General Political Strategy of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement-Fateh through the Organization)*, n.d. [1974 or later].

Abu Gharbiyya, 'Uthman, *al-Tanzim bayn al-Nazariyya wa al-Tatbiq fi Harakatina (Organization between Theory and Practice in our Movement)* (n.p., n.d. [1976]).

al-Wazir, Khalil, *al-Karama al-Jadida (The New Dignity)*, pamphlet, April 1977.

Fateh, *In'izaliyyu Baghdad! al-Hiwar . . . Na'm, al-La Hiwar . . . Na'm Aydan (To the Isolationists of Baghdad! Dialogue Yes, and Non-Dialogue Yes Too)*, Mobilization and Guidance Department, Circular no. 34, n.d. [July 1978].

——*Mudhakkara min Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini 'Fath' ila al-Hukuma al-'Iraqiyya (A Memorandum from the Palestinian National Liberation Movement 'Fateh' to the Iraqi Government)*, a response to the statement by an official Iraqi government and party spokesman in *al-Nahar al-'Arabi wa al-Dawli* (1978).

——*Fi Istratijiyyat al-'Amal Dakhil al-Ard al-Muhtalla (Concerning the Strategy for Action in the Occupied Land)*, Fateh Western Sector, n.p., n.d. [1982, pre-June].

——*Durus fi al-Masira al-Thawriyya (Lessons in the Revolutionary Course)* [unofficial text produced by former prisoners in the Occupied Territories], n.p., n.d. [1983].
——(unattributed), *Fan al-Muwajaha (The Art of Confrontation)*, Pamphlet no. 1, n.p., Intima' Publications, 1 January 1984.

Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM)

This section includes the ANM periodical, *al-ʿUrwa*. Citations in chronological order of publication.

al-ʿUrwa, monthly periodical of the ANM at the American University of Beirut, issues from 1949–52.
Zurayk, Constantine, *Meaning of the Disaster* (Beirut: n.p., 1956; original written in 1948).
Hindi, Hani, and Darwaza, al-Hakam, *'Isra'il': Fikra, Haraka, Dawla ('Israel': An Idea, A Movement, A State)*, Beirut: Dar al-Fajr al-Jadid, 1958.
ANM, *al-ʿIraq wa Aʿda' al-Wihda (Iraq and the Enemies of Unity)* (Lebanon: n.p., 1959).
——*al-Wihda: Thawra . . . wa Mas'uliyya (Unity: Revolution . . . and Responsibility)*, ANM publications, n.p., 1959.
Darwaza, al-Hakam, and al-Jaburi, Hamid, *Maʿ al-Qawmiyya al-ʿArabiyya (With Arab Nationalism)* (Beirut: Dar al-Fajr al-Jadid, 1960; fourth printing).
——*al-Shuyuʿiyya al-Mahaliyya wa Maʿrakat al-ʿArab al-Qawmiyya (Local Communism and the Arabs' National Battle)*, n.p., 1961.
Ibrahim, Muhsin, *fi al-Dimuqratiyya wa al-Thawra wa al-Tanzim al-Shaʿbi (On Democracy, Revolution, and Popular Organization)* (n.p., ANM Publications, n.d. [probably 1962–3]).
——*Munaqashat Hawl Nazariyyat al-ʿAmal al-ʿArabi al-Thawri (Discussions of the Theory of Revolutionary Arab Action)* (Beirut: Dar al-Fajr al-Jadid, 1963).
ANM, *Baʿd al-ʿUdwan al-Istiʿmari al-Sahyuni: al-Thawra al-ʿArabiyya Amam Maʿrakat al-Masir (After the Colonialist Zionist Aggression: The Arab Revolution Faces the Battle of Destiny)*, political report issued by the expanded session of the executive (national) committee of the ANM at the end of July 1967.
——*Istratijiyyat al-ʿAmal al-Thawri al-Filastini kama Tafhamuha al-Qiyada al-Filastiniyya li-Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-ʿArab (The Strategy for Revolutionary Palestinian Action as Understood by the Palestinian Command of the Arab Nationalist Movement)* (Arab.), August 1967.
——*Maʿalim Istratijiyyat al-ʿAmal al-Filastini and al-Wadʿ al-Tanzimi fi al-Majal al-Filastini (The Outline of the Strategy for Palestinian Action and the Organizational Situation in the Palestinian Sphere)* (Arab.), August 1967.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

Not included: party education materials, and speeches by George Habash that were reproduced as separate official publications.

PFLP, *al-Bayan al-Siyasi (Political Statement)*, founding statement issued in December 1967.

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi al-Asasi li al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin (The Basic Political Report of the PFLP)*, August 1968).

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi wa al-Tanzimi wa al-ʿAskari li al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin (The Political, Organizational and Military Report of the PFLP)*, February 1969.

——*al-Istratijiya al-ʿAskariyya li al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin (The Military Strategy of the PFLP)*, 1969.

——*A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine* (Amman: PFLP information department, 1969).

——*al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya wa al-ʿAmaliyyat al-Kharijiyya, Munaqashat (The Popular Front and External Operations, Discussions)* (Beirut: n.d.).

——*Limadha? Darabat al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin dud al-Muʾassasat al-Israʾiliyya wa al-Sahyuniyya wa al-Imbiryaliyya fi al-Kharij (Why? The Blows of the PFLP against the Israeli, Zionist and Imperialist Institutions Abroad)*, n.d. [approximately end 1969]).

——*al-Muqawama wa Muʿdilatuha (The Resistance and its Problems)* (Beirut: al-Hadaf, n.d. [1970]).

——*ʿala Tariq al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya (On the Path of the Palestinian Revolution)*, Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1970. Compilation of:

- *al-Istratijiyya al-Siyasiyya li al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya (The Political Strategy of the Popular Front)*;
- *al-Istratijiyya al-Tanzimiyya li al-Jabha al-shaʿbiyya (The Organizational Strategy of the Popular Front)*;
- *Nahu al-Tahawwul ila Tanzim Brulitari Thawri (Towards the Transformation into a Proletarian Organization)*;
- *al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya wa al-Wihda al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya (The Popular Front and Palestinian National Unity)*;
- *al-Thawra wa al-ʿUmmal (The Revolution and Workers)*;
- *Bayan Siyasi li al-Jabha bi-Munasabat Murur Thalath Sanawat ʿala Hazimat Huzayran (A Political Statement by the Front on the Third Anniversary of the June Defeat)*.

——*Limadha Tashtarik al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin fi al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini al-Sabiʿ wa bi Shakl Ramzi? (Why is the PFLP Taking Part in the Seventh Palestine National Council and in Token Form?)*, statement issued on 30 March 1970.

——*Nahwa al-Tahawwul ila Tanzim Brulitari Thawri (Towards the Transformation into a Revolutionary Proletarian Organization)*, Information Department, April 1970.

——*al-Kadihun wa al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya (The Proletariat and the Palestinian Revolution)*, two speeches by George Habash in May 1970 (Beirut: al-Hadaf Books 3, n.d. [1970]).

Zabri, Mustafa, *Hazimat Huzayran wa Intilaq al-Muqawama (The June Defeat and the Launch of the Resistance)* (Beirut: al-Hadaf Books 4, n.d. [June 1970]).

Habash, George, *al-Thawra wa al-ʿUmmal (Revolution and Workers)*, Amman: central information department, 1970.

PFLP, *Mashariʿ li-Tanzim Nashat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya fi Lubnan (Proposals for the Organization of the Activity of the Palestinian Resistance Movement in Lebanon)*, submitted to the central political committee for Palestinians in Lebanon, n.p., July 1970.

——*Rad al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin ʿala Muʾamarat al-Istislam (The PFLP's Response to the Conspiracy of Surrender)*, n.p., July 1970.

——*al-Fikr al-ʿAskari li al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya: Hadith li al-Hadaf min Abu Hammam (Military Thinking of the PFLP: A Discussion with al-Hadaf from Abu Hammam)* (Beirut: n.d. [1970]).

——*al-Jabha . . . wa Qadiyyat al-Inshiqaq (The Front . . . and the Question of the Split)* (Beirut: PFLP central information committee, 1970).

——*Military Strategy of the PFLP* (Beirut: PFLP Information Department, 1970).

——*Palestine: Towards A Democratic Solution* (Beirut: PFLP Information Department, 1970).

——*Rihlat al-Istislam min Qarar Majlis al-Amn ila Mashruʿ Rujarz (The Journey of Surrender from the Security Council Resolution to the Rogers Plan)*, 1970.

——*al-Thawra wa Qadiyyat Taharrur al-Marʾa (The Revolution and the Cause of Women's Liberation)* (n.p.: PFLP information Department, 1970).

——*Dirasa Hawl 'Mulakhkhas al-Ruʾya al-Siyasiyya li al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin fi Marhalat ma baʿd Aylul (Sibtambar)' (A Study of 'the Summary of the Political Vision of the PFLP in the Post-September Phase')*, excerpts reproduced in *Palestinian Arab Documents 1971*, 772–9.

——*Mashruʿ Burnamij al-Tanzim al-Tullabi li al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin (Draft Programme of the PFLP Student Organization)*, April 1971.

——*Hands Off the Militia!* (Beirut: PFLP Information Department, 1971).

——*Muhimmat al-Marhala al-Jadida (Tasks of the New Stage)*, Political Report of the Third National Congress, March 1972.

——*Hawl al-Muʾtamar al-Watani al-Thalith (Concerning the Third National Conference)*, statement issued by George Habash on 14 March 1972.

——*al-Wihda al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya (Palestinian National Unity)*, n.d. [approximately 1973].

Abu-Sharif, Bassam, *Naʿm li al-Qital . . . La . . . li al-Taswiya al-Istislamiyya (Yes to Combat . . . No . . . to the Surrenderist Settlement)*, n.p., n.d. [1973–4].

Habash, George, *al-Nahj al-Thawri fi Muwajahat al-Ahdath (The Revolutionary Path in Confronting Events)* (Beirut: PFLP central information office, 1974).

——*al-Nahj al-Thawri fi Muwajahat al-Tahaddiyat (The Revolutionary Path in Confronting the Challenges)* (Beirut: PFLP central information committee, April 1974).

PFLP, *al-Badil al-Thawri li Mashruʿ al-Dawla al-Filastiniyya al-Tasfawi (The Revolutionary Alternative to the Liquidationist Proposal for a Palestinian State)* (Beirut: PFLP central information department, 1974).

——*al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya li-Tahrir Filastin Tuʿlin Insihabaha min al-Lijna al-Tanfidhiyya li-Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (The PFLP Declares its Withdrawal from the PLO Executive Committee)*, 1974.

——*Sijil al-Khalidin (Register of the Immortals)*, Part 1—register of martyrs 1964–1970 (Beirut: PFLP central information, n.d.).

——*Sijil al-Khalidin (Register of Immortals)*, Part 2—register of martyrs 1971–1974 (Beirut: PFLP central information, n.d.).

al-Zaʿtar, Ahmad (ed.), *Tal al-Zaʿtar: al-Ramz wa al-Ustura (Tal al-Zaʿtar: Symbol and Legend)* (Beirut: PFLP information, n.d. [approximately end 1976 or 1977]).

PFLP, *Thawra Mustamirra li-Iqamat al-Mujtamaʿ al-Dimuqrati fi Filastin (Continuing Revolution to Establish a Democratic Society in Palestine)*, 10th anniversary, central information department [Beirut], 1977.

——*ʿAshr Sanawat min al-Nidal: Taqyim li al-Wadʿ al-Rahin wa Afaqih (Ten Years of Struggle: An Assessment of the Current Situation and its Prospects)*, PFLP politburo internal memorandum, 11 December 1977. Reproduced in Red Papers series no. 27, Jerusalem, 1980.

Habash, George, *Khitabat wa Maqalat 1977–1979 (Speeches and Articles, 1977–1979)*, Red Papers series no. 36, n.p., n.d. [1979].

PFLP, *Munaqasha li-Taqrir al-Tanzim al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini fi al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya (A Discussion of the Report by the Palestinian Communist Organization in the West Bank)*, al-Hadaf Publications no. 11, Dar al-Hadaf, n.d. [autumn 1979].

——*al-ʿAlaqa maʿ al -Nizam al-Urduni ila Ayn? (The Relationship with the Jordanian Regime, Where To?)*, Dar al-Hadaf, 1979.

Habash, George, *Mustajiddat al-Wadʿ al-ʿArabi wa Mutatallabat Muwajahat al-Hilf al-Imbiryali al-Sahyuni al-Rafʿi (New Developments in the Arab Situation and the Requirements of Confrontation against the Imperialist Zionist Reactionary Pact)*, Dar al-Hadaf, April 1980.

PFLP, *Mashruʿ Burnamij li-Tatbiq al-Wihda al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya fi Hadhihi al-Marhala (Draft Programme to Implement Palestinian National Unity in This Phase)*, submitted to the 15th Palestine National Council, September 1980.

——*Burnamij al-Tadrib al-ʿAskari (Military Training Programme)* (Beirut: PFLP, 1981).

——*al-Bayan al-Siyasi al-Sadir ʿan al-Muʾtamar al-Watani al-Rabiʿ (Political Statement Issued by the Fourth National Congress)* (Beirut: PFLP, April 1981).

——*al-Nizam al-Dakhili (Internal Statutes)*, information department, 1981.

——*al-Taqrir al-Tanzimi al-ʿAskari al-Mali (The Organizational, Military, and Financial Report)*, Fourth National Congress, April 1981.

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi al-Sadir ʿan al-Muʾtamar al-Watani al-Rabiʿ Nisan 1981 (Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Conference April 1981)* (first edition: Beirut: PFLP, 1981).

——*Taqrir al-Lijna al-Markaziyya al-ʿAmma (Report of the General Central Committee)*, February 1982 session.

——*Wuduh al-Ruʾya (Clarity of Vision)*, central committee report, 3 February 1983.

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi al-Sadir ʿan al-Muʾtamar al-Watani al-Rabiʿ Nisan 1981 (Political Report Issued by the Fourth National Congress, April 1981)* (second edition; July 1983).

——*Hawl al-Harb al-Akhira fi Lubnan (Concerning the Recent War in Lebanon)*, report of the central committee, central information department, March 1983.

Habash, George, *Hawl Harb Lubnan wa Nataʾijuha (Concerning the Lebanon War and its Results)*, central information department, March 1983.

PFLP, *al-Taqrir al-Siyasi al-Sadir ʿan al-Lijna al-Markaziyya fi Dawratiha al-Rabiʿa Hawl Harb Lubnan (The Political Report Issued by the Central Committee in its Fourth Session Concerning the War in Lebanon)*, central information department, March 1983.

——*al-Istratijiyya al-Siyasiyya wa al-Tanzimiyya (The Political and Organizational Strategy)*, central information committee, al-Hadaf Publications (printed in Damascus), 1983 (4th edition).

——(with the DFLP), *Programme for Unity and Reform* (Arab.), 10 October 1983.

——*Hawl Khuruqat al-Yamin al-Filastini li-Ittifaq ʿAdan-al-Jazaʾir (Concerning the Violations by the Palestinian Right of the Aden–Algiers Agreement)*, central information, December 1984.

Habash, George, *Azmat al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya: al-Juzur wa al-Hulul (The Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution: Roots and Solutions)* (Beirut: Dar al-Farabi, 1985).

PFLP, *Mawduʿat fi Harb al-Shaʿb (Essays on People's War)*, Part 2, n.d. (approximately 1989).

al-Dassuqi, Mahir (ed.), *al-Muʾtamar al-Khamis (The Fifth Conference)* (Jerusalem: Palestinian Studies Center, 1993).

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine/Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP/DFLP)

Not included: party education materials.

DFLP, *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya fi Waqiʿiha al-Rahin: Dirasa Naqdiyya (The Palestinian Resistance Movement in its Current Reality: A Critical Study)*, foreword by Nayif Hawatma (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1969).

——*Hawl al-ʿAfawiyya wa al-Nazariyya fi al-ʿAmal al-Fidaʾi al-Filastini (Concerning Spontaneity and Theory in Palestinian Guerilla Action)*, 1969.

——*al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya wa al-Awdaʿ al-ʿArabiyya (The Palestinian Resistance and the Arab Situation)*, memorandum submitted to the Sixth Palestine National Council convening in Cairo on 1 September 1969.

——*Himlat Aylul: Durus wa Nataʾij (The September Campaign: Lessons and Results)* (Jordan: PDFLP, n.d. [approx. 1971]).

——*al-Mawduʿat al-Siyasiyya, Sadira ʿan al-Majlis al-Watani al-ʿAm al-Awwal, 'al-Kunfarans', Tishrin al-Awwal 1971 (Political Treatises, Issued by the First General National Council, 'The Conference', October 1971)*, 3rd intl. edn., 1972.

——*al-Nizam al-Dakhili (The Internal Statutes)*, 1972.

——*Suqur al-Tahrir wa al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya: Yawm Filastin fi Bisan (The Hawks of Liberation and the Palestinian Revolution: Palestine's Day in Beit-Sheʾan)*, central information committee, 1974.

Hawatma, Nayif, *al-ʿAmal baʿd Harb Tishrin li Dahr al-Hal al-Istislami al-Tasfawi wa Intizaʿ Haq Taqrir al-Masir (Action after the October War to Defeat the Surrenderist Liquidationist Solution and Extract the Right of Self-Determination)* (DFLP, 1974).

DFLP, *al-Burnamij al-Siyasi (The Political Programme)*, draft amended and approved by the central committee in the last quarter of 1975.

Hawatma, Nayif, and ʿAbd-Rabbu, Yasir, *Dud al-Ghazu al-Suri: Kul al-Taqat ila Jabahat al-Qital hatta Sahq al-Muʾamara (Against the Syrian Invasion: All Resources to the Battlefronts until the Conspiracy is Smashed)*, DFLP Publications, 1976.

——*al-Thawra wa Haq Taqrir al-Masir wa al-Dawla al-Mustaqilla (The Revolution and the Right of Self-Determination and the Independent State)* (Beirut: DFLP, n.d. [1977]).

DFLP, *The Palestinian Revolution: The Right to Self-Determination and the Palestinian State*, DFLP department of international relations, n.d. [1977].

——*Min Ajl Injah Himlat al-Tasaddi wa al-Sumud (For the Success of the Campaign of Confrontation and Steadfastness)*, central information, 1 December 1977.

——*Al-Wadʿ al-Siyasi al-Rahin wa Muhimmatuna (The Current Political Situation and our Tasks)*, political report issued by the central committee, late July 1978.

——*al-Wadʿ al-Rahin wa Maham al-Thawra wa Harakat al-Tahrrur wa al-Taqaddum al-ʿArabiyya (The Current Situation and the Tasks of the Revolution and the Arab Movement for Liberation and Progress)*, political report issued by the central committee, mid-July 1979.

——*al-Awdaʿ al-Rahina wa Muhimmat al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya wa Harakat al-Taharrur al-ʿArabiyya (The Current Situation and the Tasks of the Palestinian Revolution and the Arab Liberation Movement)*, political report issued by the ninth session of the central committee, July 1980.

——*The Political Programme*, as approved by the second national congress, May 1981, DFLP committee for central information and international relations.

——*al-Nizam al-Dakhili (Internal Statutes)*, approved by the second congress, May 1981.

——*al-Taqrir al-Nazari wa al-Siyasi wa al-Tanzimi (The Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Report)* (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1981).

Hawatma, Nayif, *Ma al-ʿAmal baʿd Qimmat ʿArab ʿAmman? (What Is to Be Done After the Summit of the Amman Arabs?)*, January 1981.

DFLP *Nahwa Mujabaha Shamila li al-Hujum al-Amriki al-Sahyuni ʿala al-Watan al-ʿArabi wa Ihbat Mashruʿ al-Hukm al-Zati (Towards an Overall Confronation with the American-Zionist Onslaught on the Arab Homeland and the Proposed Autonomy)*, political report of the central committee, January 1982.

Hawatma, Nayif, *Qadaya al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya wa al-Marhala al-Jadida baʿd al-Ghazu al-Israʾili li Lubnan wa Maʿrakat Bayrut (Issues of the Palestinian Revolution and the New Phase after the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and the Battle of Beirut)*, DFLP Publications, April 1983.

DFLP (with the PFLP), Burnamij al-Wihda Wa al-Islah (*Programme for Unity and Reform*), 10 October 1983.

——*Azmat Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya: Tahlil wa Naqd al-Judhur wa al-Hulul (The PLO Crisis: Analysis and Critique of the Roots and Solutions)* (Nicosia: THA Publications, n.d. [end 1983]).

——*al-Quwwat al-Musallaha al-Thawriyya: al-Laʾiha al-Dakhiliyya (The Revolutionary Armed Forces: Internal Statutes)* (n.p.: DFLP, 1986).

——untitled minority report submitted to central committee meeting of late Septem-

ber 1988. [By Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu, Mamduh Nawfal, Salih Ra'fat and other politburo and central committee members.]

——*Balagh Sadir ʿan Aʿmal al-Lijna al-Markaziyya li al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiyya li-Tahrir Filastin (A Statement Issued about the Workings of the Central Committee of the DFLP)*, early March 1990. [Representing Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu wing.]

——*Hawl Nata'ij Aʿmal al-Dawra al-Kamila li al-Lijna al-Markaziyya (Concerning the Working Results of the Full Session of the Central Committee)*, circular to all our party organizations, 10 March 1990. [Issued by politburo and representing Nayif Hawatma wing.]

——*Taʿmim Dakhili Hawl Nata'ij Dawrat al-Lijna al-Markaziyya li-Hizbina (An Internal Circular Concerning the Results of the Session of Our Party's Central Committee)*, mid-March 1990. [Issued by new politburo elected by central committee, and representing Yasir ʿAbd-Rabbu wing.]

ʿAbd-Rabbu, Yasir, letter to secretary-general Nayif Hawatma, 17 March 1990. [Reproduced as limited internal circular.]

Nawfal, Mamduh, letter to unidentified comrade [probably Nayif Hawatma], 22 May 1990. [Reproduced as limited internal circular.]

——*Murajaʿa wa Taqyim li-Dawr al-Maktab al-Siyasi fi Tanfidh Qararat al-Lijna al-Markaziyya Khilal Thalathat Ashhur (A Review and Assessment of the Role of the Politburo in Implementing the Resolutions of the Central Committee during Three Months)*, 30 May 1990.

DFLP *Qadaya al-Tajdid al-Dimuqrati: al-Watha'iq al-Siyasiyya wa al-Tanzimiyya al-Muqaddama ila Ijtimaʿ al-Lijna al-Markaziyya (Issues of Democratic Renovation: The Political and Organizational Documents Presented to the Session of the Central Committee, 15 February to 3 March 1990)*, n.p., n.d. [1991].

Democratic Alliance (1983–1984)

——*Burnamij al-Wihda wa al-Islah al-Dimuqrati fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (The Programme for Unity and Democratic Reform in the PLO)*, Joint Leadership of the Two Fronts, 1983.

——*al-Nas al-Kamil li Watha'iq Ittifaq ʿAdan-al-Jaza'ir bayn al-Tahaluf al-Dimuqrati wa al-Lijna al-Markaziyya li-Harakat Fath (Complete Text of the Documents of the Aden–Algiers Agreement between the Democratic Alliance and the Fateh Central Committee)*, n.d. [1984].

——*Rad al-Tahaluf al-Dimuqrati ʿala Bayan al-Tahaluf al-Watani Hawl: Ittifaq ʿAdan-al-Jaza'ir (The Reply of the Democratic Alliance to the Statement of the National Alliance Concerning: The Aden–Algiers Agreement)*, 1984.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PF–GC)

PF–GC, 'Bayan Siyasi Hawl Tard Shabab al-Tha'r "Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-ʿArab"' (Political Statement about the Expulsion of the Revenge Youth 'Arab Nationalists Movement'), December 1968 [mistakenly dated as December 1967].

Jibril, Ahmad, *al-ʿArqub bayn Igharatayn (The ʿArqub between Two Raids)*, PFLP–GC, 1972.

——'Azmat Harakat al-Muqawama: Naqd Dhati (The Crisis of the Resistance Movement: A Self-Critique)', lecture given on 28 November 1972, PF–GC, 1972.

——*The Political Programme*, approved by the fourth general conference, 20–27 August 1973.

——*al-Duwayla al-Filastiniyya: Bayn al-Qubul wa al-Rafd (The Palestinian Statelet: Between Acceptance and Rejection)*, central information, 1975.

——*Ahmad Jibril ʿan al-Rafd wa al-Qubul (Ahmad Jibril Concerning Rejection and Acceptance)*, Beirut: PF–GC Information, 1977.

——*al-Waqiʿ al-Rahin wa al-Khuruj min al-Maʾzaq (The Current Reality and Emerging from the Predicament)*, series of interviews with Ahmad Jibril, 1977.

PF–GC, *Usus al-ʿAmal al-Tanzimi (Foundations of Organizational Action)*, Department of Central Organization, Organizational Preparation and Studies Section, n.p. [Beirut], 1979.

Fadl Shruru, *Daʿwa li-Tanshit al-Dhakira, Daʿwa li al-Tamassuk bi al-Muntalaqat (A Call to Activate the Memory, A Call to Adhere to the Tenets)*, n.p., n.d. [1984–5].

Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF)

——*Kayf Nafham al-Khilafat Dakhil al-Jabha al-Shaʿbiyya–al-Qiyada al-ʿAmma (How We Understand the Internal Differences in the PF–General Command)*, internal circular, 21 December 1976.

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi wa al-Burnamij al-Siyasi (The Political Report and the Political Programme)*, documents of the sixth general national conference, 30 September to 3 October 1979.

Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF)

——*al-Taswiya min Khilal Muʾtamar Jinif wa Qarar 242 (The Settlement Through the Geneva Conference and Resolution 242)*, central information committee, 1974.

——*al-Muntalaqat al-Nazariyya wa al-Siyasiyya wa al-Tanzimiyya (Theoretical, Political, and Organizational Tenets)*, as modified and approved by the sixth general conference convened on 17–23 June 1979.

——*al-Tabaʿiyya al-Thaqafiyya wa al-Iʿlamiyya wa Dawruha fi Tamrir Mashruʿat al-Taswiya (Cultural and Information Dependence and its Role in Facilitating Proposals for a Settlement)*, 1979.

——*The Theoretical, Political and Organizational Tenets*, Central Information Committee, n.d. [1979].

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi (The Political Report)*, issued by the sixth general conference, convened 17–23 June 1979, central information, 1979.

——*al-Muntalaqat: al-Nazariyya wa al-Siyasiyya wa al-Tanzimiyya (The Tenets: Theoretical, Political, and Organizational)*, as amended and confirmed by the sixth general conference (17–23 June 1979), 2nd edn., central information, 1980.

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi wa al-Tanzimi (The Political and Organizational Report)*, issued by the seventh general conference, convened 10–14 January 1982.

——*al-Nizam al-Dakhili (Internal Statutes)*, as amended and approved by the seventh general conference, convened 10–14 January 1982.

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi al-Sadir min al-Lijna al-Markaziyya fi Dawrat Inʿiqadiha al-Rabiʿa (The Political Report of the Central Commiittee in its Fourth Session)*, central information, April 1983.

Ghusha, Samir, *al-Azma al-Rahina li al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya: al-Judhur wa al-Hulul (The Current Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution: Roots and Solutions)*, n.d. [approx. 1983].

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi (The Political Report)*, issued by the eighth general conference, 1988.

Arab Liberation Front (ALF)

ALF, *al-Bayan al-Siyasi (Political Statement)*, n.p., n.d. (1969, statement announcing formation of the ALF).

——*al-ʿAmal al-Fidaʾi wa Tahaddiyat al-Wadʿ al-Lubnani (Guerrilla Action and the Challenges of the Lebanese Situation)*, 1972.

al-Baʿth wa al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya: Bayanat was Mawaqif, 1945–1975 (The Baʿth and the Palestine Cause: Statements and Positions 1945–1975) (Beirut: Arab Institute for Studies and Publications, 1975).

ALF, *Jabhat al-Tahrir al-ʿArabiyya Limadha . . . wa ma Hiya? (The Arab Liberation Front: Why . . . and What is It?)*, 2nd edn. (Beirut: al-Thaʾir al-ʿArabi Publications, 1976).

——*Jabhat al-Tahrir al-ʿArabiyya aw al-Tajriba al-Qawmiyya fi al-ʿAmal al-Fidaʾi (The Arab Liberation Front or the Nationalist Experience in Guerrilla Action)*, n.p., n.d.

——*Hawl al-Wihda al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya (Concerning Palestinian National Unity)* (Beirut: al-Thaʾir al-ʿArabi Publications, 1976).

Saʿiqa (Vanguards of Popular Liberation War Organization) and Baʿth Party

Baʿth Party, 'Nashra Dakhiliyya Sirriyya Hawl Siyasat al-Hizb al-Filastiniyya wa Muʾtamarat al-Qimma' (Secret Internal Circular about the Party's Palestinian Policy and the Summit Conferences), no. 4/8, 29 September 1965.

Baʿth Party, *Muqararat al-Muʾtamar al-Qawmi al-Tasiʿ (Resolutions of the Ninth National Conference)*, convened in the second half of September 1966.

Saʿiqa, *Nahu Fihm ʿIlmi wa Thawri li-Mahiyyat al-Thawra fi al-Ard al-Muhtalla al-Siyasiyya wa al-Tabaqiyya ʿala al-Saʿidayn al-Qawmi wa al-Umami (Towards a Scientific and Revolutionary Understanding of the Political and Class Nature of the Revolution in the Occupied Land on the National and International Levels)*, n.p., n.d. [possibly 1970].

Muhsin, Zuhayr, *al-Nidal al-Watani al-Filastini fi Muwajahat al-Tahadiyyat al-Jadida (The Palestinian National Struggle Confronts the New Challenges)*, information office, 1974.

Saʿiqa, *Shuhadaʾ al-Saʿiqa fi Harb Tishrin (Saʿiqa Martyrs in the October War)* ([Damascus]: Talaʾiʿ Publications, information department, 1976).

Palestine Liberation Organization/Palestine Liberation Army (PLO/PLA)

In cases where the PLO or Palestine National Council documents cited in the endnotes were reproduced in journals or books, they have not been listed in this section. The

PLA documents cited here do not include correspondence or inter-departmental memoranda.

al-Mu'tamar al-Filastini al-Awwal (The First Palestinian Congress), pamphlet, undated [1965].

Compilation (reprinted in Tunis, post-1982) of:

- *al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Filastini (The Palestinian National Charter)*;
- *al-Nizam al-Asasi li-Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (The Basic Ordinance of the PLO)*;
- *al-La'iha al-Dakhiliyya li al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini (The Internal Statutes of the Palestine National Council)*.

Al-Mudhakkara al-ʿAskariyya al-Muqaddama ila Mu'tamar al-Muluk wa al-Ru'asa' al-ʿArab (Military Memorandum Presented by the PLO to the Conference of the Arab Kings and Presidents), marked Document no. 3 [September 1964].

Mashruʿ al-Khitta al-ʿAskariyya li-Tashkil Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Filastini (The Draft Plan for the Formation of the Palestine Liberation Army), PLO Military Committee, 8 November 1964.

Mashruʿ al-Qiyada al-ʿArabiyya al-Muwahhada al-ʿAskari al-Muqaddam ila Mu'tamar al-Qimma al-ʿArabi al-Thani ʿala Daw' al-Mashruʿ al-ʿAskari li Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (The UAC Military Proposal Presented to the Second Arab Summit Conference in Light of the Military Proposal of the PLO), Office of the Commander-in-Chief of the UAC, Ref. 142, 4 September 1964, marked as appendix 2.

Mahdar Mubahathat al-Lijna al-ʿAskariyya li Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya maʿ al-Jumhuriyya al-ʿArabiyya al-Suriyya bi-Tarikh 6/12/64 (Minutes of the Discussions of the PLO Military Committee with the Syrian Arab Republic on 6 December 1964), marked as appendix 5.

Qanun al-Tajnid al-Ijbari (Compulsory Conscription Law), marked appendix no. 13.

Mahdar Mubahathat al-Lijna al-ʿAskariyya li-Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya maʿ al-Jumhuriyya al-ʿArabiyya al-Suriyya al-Fatra min 22/3/65–29/3/1965 (Minutes of the PLO Military Committee's Talks with the Syrian Arab Republic the Period from 23 March 1965 to 29 March 1965), marked appendix no. 6.

Taqrir ʿan al-Mubahathat maʿ al-Jumhuriyya al-ʿArabiyya al-Muttahida (Report on the Talks with the United Arab Republic), marked appendix 4 [approximately beginning May 1965].

Mahdar al-Mubahathat maʿ al-Jumhuriyya al-ʿArabiyya al-Suriyya, wa al-Tawqiʿ ʿala al-ʿAqd raqm 2/S bi-Tarikh 5/5/65 (Minutes of Talks with the Syrian Arab Republic and the Signing of the Contract no. 2/S on 5 May 1965), marked appendix no. 8.

Al-ʿAqd raqm 4/S al-Mubram maʿ al-Jumhuriyya al-ʿArabiyya al-Suriyya bi-Tarikh 16/5/65 (Contract no. 4/S Concluded with the Syrian Arab Republic on 16 May 1965), marked appendix no. 9.

Taqrir Marfuʿ min Qiyadat Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Filastini ila al-Lijna al-Tanfidhiyya ʿan al-Mudda 24/8/64–22/5/65 (Report Submitted by the Military Committee to the Executive Committee concerning the period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965).

Al-Taqrir al-ʿAm al-Muqaddam ila al-Lijna al-Tanfidhiyya ʿan al-Mudda 24/8/64–22/5/65

(The General Report Presented to the Executive Committee for the Period 24 August 1964 to 22 May 1965, from the PLO military committee).

Taqrir Najah al-Marhala al-Ula min Insha' Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Filastini 'an al-Fatra min 24/8/1964 ila 15/8/1965 (Progress Report on the First Phase of the Establishment of the PLA in the Period 24 August 1964 to 15 August 1965).

Mulhaq Taqrir Lubnan: Ma'lumat 'an Harakat Tahrir Filastin (Fath) (Supplement to the Lebanon Report: Information about the Palestine Liberation Movement (Fateh)), December 1965.

Taqrir Marfu' min Qiyadat Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Filastini ila al-Qiyada al-Muwahhada al-'Arabiyya li-Juyush al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya 'an al-Fatra min 18/9/1964 ila 1/6/1965 (Report Presented from the PLA Command to the UAC for the Period from 18 September 1964 to 1 June 1965).

al-Khitta al-Niha'iyya li-Insha' Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Filastini (The Final Plan for the Establishment of the PLA), [A compilation of various documents exchanged in November 1964], marked as appendix 3.

Mahdar al-Mubahathat ma' al-Jumhuriyya al-'Iraqiyya (Minutes of the Discussions with the Iraqi Republic), [February 1965], marked as appendix 10.

al-'Aqd Raqm 1/S ma' al-Jumhuriyya al-'Arabiyya al-Suriyya bi-Tarikh 29/3/1965 (Contract No. 1/S with the Syrian Arab Republic on 29 March 1965).

Mahdar al-Mubahathat ma' Dawlat al-Kuwayt (Minutes of the Discussions with the State of Kuwait), [March 1965], marked as appendix 11.

Taqrir 'an al-Mubahathat ma' al-Mamlaka al-Urduniyya al-Hashimiyya (Report on the Discussions with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), [March 1965], marked as appendix 12.

Mashru' Khitta li-Tashkil Wihdat Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Filastini fi al-Marhala al-Thaniya ('Am 1966–1967) fi Aradi al-Jumhuriyya al-'Arabiyya al-Suriyya (Draft Plan for the Formation of PLA Units in the Second Stage (the Year 1966–1967) in the Territory of the Syrian Arab Republic), PLA, Military Administration Bureau, Organization and Administration Branch, No. 759/w/1, 7 August 1965.

Taqrir Najah al-Marhala al-Ula wa al-Thaniya, 1/9/1965–1/3/1966, ila al-Qiyada al-'Amma li-Juyush al-Duwal al-'Arabiyya (Progress Report for the First and Second Stages, 1 September 1965 to 1 March 1966, to the Unified Arab Command of the Armies of the Arab States).

Taqrir Najah al-Marhala al-Ula wa al-Marhala al-Thaniya min Khittat Insha' Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Filastini 'an al-Fatra min 1/9/65 ila 1/5/1966 Marfu' ila al-Lijna al-Tanfidhiyya li Munazzamat at-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (Progress Report for the First and Second Stages in the PLA Establishment Plan for the Period from 1 September 1965 to 1 May 1966, Submitted to the Executive Committee of the PLO).

Ittifaqiyya bi-Sha'n Tashkil wa Taslih Wihdat Jaysh al-Tahrir al-Filastini, 22/3/66 (Agreement Concerning the Formation and Armament of the PLA, 22 March 1966), Office of the Head of the Armed Forces War Staff [UAR] Ref. 426/3764.

Nizam al-Muwazzafin al-Asasi (Basic Statutes of Employment), Ref. jh/19–2381, 23 August 1966.

al-Mu'tamar al-Mun'aqid fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya, 18/2/1967 (The Conference Convened at the PLO, 18 February 1967), [Minutes].

Mu'tamar al-Muqawama al-Sha'biyya al-Mun'aqid bi al-Qiyada al-'Amma li Jaysh al-Tahrir al-

Filastini 22/2/1967 (The Popular Resistance Conference Convened at the PLA General Command 22 February 1967), [Minutes].

Concerning the Democratic State in Palestine (Beirut: Department of Information and National Guidance, n.d.).

Kadi, Leila, *Basic Political Documents of the Armed Resistance Movement* (Beirst: PLO Research Centre, 1969).

PLA, *al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya wa al-Durus al-Mustafada min al-Zuruf al-lati Marrat biha (The Palestinian Resistance and the Lessons Drawn from the Circumstances through which it has Passed)*, Education and Awareness Section, General Affairs and Moral Guidance Branch, Damascus, 1971 [*c*. February].

Al-Kifah al-Musallah ʿAm 1974: Tasaʿud wa Tarabut maʿ al-Nidal al-Siyasi (The Armed Struggle in 1974: Escalation and Connection with Political Struggle) ([Beirut]: PLO Unified Information, n.d.).

Hamid, Rashid, *Muqarrarat al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini, 1964–1974 (Resolutions of the Palestine National Council, 1964–1974)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1975).

Palestinian Popular Culture Faced with Zionist Attempts at Arrogation, n.p., PLO Department of Information and National Guidance, Studies and Publications Section, September 1976.

The Unified Revolutionary Security Apparatus, Information Section, *al-Himla Dud al-Shaʿb al-Filastini fi Tasrihat wa Iʿlam al-Jabha al-Lubnaniyya baʿd Muʾtamaray al-Riyad wa al-Qahira (The Campaign against the Palestinian People in the Statements and Media of the Lebanese Front after the Riyadh and Cairo Conferences)*, n.d. [1977].

al-Rusan, Mahmud Tawfiq, *Majmuʿat al-Tashriʿat al-Jizaʾiyya, 1979 (Collected Criminal Legislation of the PLO, 1979)* (second edition; Tunis: Dar al-Nashr li al-Maghrib al-ʿArabi, n.d. [after 1982]).

Mahdar Liqaʾ ʿAdan fi al-Fatra ma bayn 22/Yunyu/1984m ila 27/Yunyu/1984m (The Minutes of the Aden Meeting, from 22 June 1984 to 27 June 1984), published by the PLO office in Aden.

Bayan al-Lajna al-Tanfidhiyya al-Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (Statement of the PLO Executive Committee), reproduced by the information bureau, Fateh, Kuwait, March 1986.

Al-Bayan al-Siyasi (The Political Statement), PLO, Palestine National Council, Extraordinary 19th Session (Uprising Session), Algiers, 12–15 November 1988.

Iʿlan al-Istiqlal (Declaration of Independence), PLO, Palestine National Council, Extraordinary 19th Session (Uprising Session), Algiers, 12–15 November 1988.

Palestinian National Front (PNF)

This section relates to the PNF formed in 1973 and the revamped PNF formed in 1974. Also consulted, but not included here, are assorted PNF leaflets and statements, and statements by the National Guidance Committee in 1978–80.

—— *Burnamij al-Jabha al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya fi al-Ard al-Muhtalla (The Programme of the Palestinian National Front in the Occupied Land)*, August 1973.

——*Mu'ash.shirat ʿala al-Tariq (Indicators of the Path)*, January 1974.
——*Maʿalim al-Tariq (Features of the Path)*, February 1975.

Palestinian Communists

Included are the relevant documents of the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP). Not included in this section are publications issued to mark party anniversaries or to discuss a variety of historical, social, and political topics not related directly to the contemporary Palestinian struggle.

JCP, *al-Burnamij al-Marhali li al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Urduni (The Phased Programme of the JCP)*, August 1967.

——*al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Urduni fi al-Nidal min ajl Sad al-ʿUdwan al-Imbiryali-al-Israʾili wa Tasfiyatih (The Jordanian Communist Party in the Struggle to Repel the Imperialist-Israeli Aggression and Liquidate It)*, report of the politburo, unanimously approved by the central committee of the JCP in its metting of late August 1968.

——*al-Taqrir al-Siyasi li al-Kunfarans al-Hizbi (The Political Report of the Party Conference)*, April 1970.

——*al-Judhur al-Iqtisadiyya li al-Intihaziyya al-Yaminiyya (The Economic Roots of Rightwing Opportunism)*, February 1971.

——*Taqrir al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Urduni (Report of the Jordanian Communist Party)*, March 1971.

——*Mashruʿ Jabha Wataniyya Muwahhada (A Proposal for a United National Front)*, June 1971.

——*Nahwa Jabha Wataniyya Muʿadiya li al-Ihtilal: Mashruʿ Burnamij (Towards a United National Front against the Occupation: A Proposed Programme)*, submitted by the politburo to the central committee of the JCP, late June 1971.

——*Hawl al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya wa al-Haraka al-Sahyuniyya wa Mawqif al-Zumra al-Munshaqqa minha (Concerning the Palestinian Cause, the Zionist Movement, and the Attitude of the Splinter Clique Towards It)*, August 1971 (second printing).

al-Ashhab, Naʿim, *Fi Sabil al-Taghallub ʿala al-Azama fi Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (To Overcome the Crisis in the Palestinian Liberation Movement)* (n.p.: JCP publications, 1972).

JCP, *al-Taqrir al-Siyasi (Political Report)*, approved unanimously by the JCP Central Committe at its meeting held in early May 1973.

——*al-Maham al-Matruha amam al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Urduni fi al-Marhala al-Rahina (The Tasks before the Jordanian Communist Party in the Current Phase)*, as presented by the politburo and discussed and unanimously approved by the central committee, late May 1974.

—— *Fi al-Dhikra al-Ula li Wafat Fu'ad Nassar: al-Rajul . . . wa al-Qadiyya (On the First Anniversary of the Death of Fu'ad Nassar: The Man . . . and the Cause)*, Culture for the People 2 (Jerusalem: Saladin Press, 1977).

—— and PCO, *Mudhakkirat al-Lijna al-Markaziyya li al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Urduni wa al-*

Lijna al-Qiyadiyya li al-Tanzim al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini fi al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya ila Aʿdaʾ al-Dawra al-Thalitha ʿAshara li al-Majlis al-Watani al-Filastini (Memorandum from the Central Committee of the JCP and the Leadership Committee of the PCO in the West Bank to the Members of the 13th Session of the PNC), 1977.

——*Taqrir al-Lijna al-Markaziyya al-Muqaddam ila Aʿdaʾ al-Kunfarans al-Thalith (The Central Committee Report Presented to the Members of the Third Conference)*, July–August 1977.

al-Barghuthi, Bashir, *Dud Kamb Dayfid (Against Camp David)* (Jerusalem: Salah-al-Din Press, 1978).

JCP, *Baʿd Qadaya wa Ittijahat al-Wadʿ al-Siyasi al-Rahin fi al-Mantaqa (Some Issues and Directions in the Current Political Situation in the Region)*, text of the report presented by the JCP Politburo to the Central Committee, which approved it unanimously, at its expanded meeting in the middle of January 1978.

——*Taqrir Siyasi (Political Report)*, issued by the JCP Central Committee meeting held in December 1978.

PCO, *al-Tanzim al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini fi al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya (The Palestinian Communist Organization in the West Bank)*, summary of the political report issued by the expanded session of the leadership committee in the West Bank, n.p., 1979.

JCP, *Taqrir al-Lijna al-Markaziyya li al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Urduni (The Political Report of the JCP Central Committee)*, February 1980.

——*Munaqasha li-Mudhadkkirat al-Amin al-ʿAwwal li al-Lijna al-Markaziyya li al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Urduni, al-Muqadamma ila Ijtimaʿ al-Lijna al-Markaziyya, al-Munʿaqid fi 10 Ab 1981, bi-Sadad Masʾalat al-Iʿlan ʿan al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini (A Discussion of the Memorandum from the First Secretary of the JCP Central Committee, Presented at the Meeting of the Central Committee Convened on 10 August 1981, Concerning the Announcement of the PCP).*

PCP, *Risala Dakhiliyya Dud Himlat al-Mughalatat—Tawdihat li-Siyasat al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi (Internal Letter Against the Campaign of Distortions—Clarifications of the Policy of the PCP)*, n.d. [probably 1982].

Nas Risalat Kutlat Bashir al-Barghuthi: Munaqashat Masʾalat al-Kifah al-Musallah Raddan (The Text of the Letter of Bashir Barghuthi's Bloc: A Discussion of the Question of Armed Struggle in Response), n.d. [approximately 1982].

PCP, *al-Bayan al-Taʾsisi wa al-Nizam al-Dakhili al-Muʾaqqat li al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini (The Founding Statement and Provisional Internal Statutes of the Palestinian Communist Party)*, 10 February 1982.

——*Nas al-Risala al-Dakhiliyya al-Lati Asdaratha Kutlat Bashir al-Barghuti fi Tammuz 1982 (Text of the Internal Letter Issued by the Bashir Barghuti Bloc in July 1982)*, January 1983.

——*al-Burnamij min Ajl Tahrir al-Aradi al-Filastiniyya al-Muhtalla wa min Ajl Tahqiq al-Huquq al-Thabita li al-Shaʿb al-Filastini (The Programme for the Liberation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and for the Attainment of the Durable Rights of the Palestinian People)*, proceedings of the first congress, 1983.

——*Tanzim al-Hizam al-ʿUmmali al-Sadiq fi al-Kutal al-ʿUmmaliyya (Organizing the Friendly Worker Belt in the Workers' Blocs)*, internal party education series, the occupied areas, 1983.

——*Niqabatuna al-ʿUmmaliyya Kayf Nabniha? Kayf Nutawwir Dawraha? (How to Build our Workers' Unions? How to Develop their Role?)*, worker preparation, the occupied areas, 1983.

——*Hawl Tawsiʿ wa Tatwir ʿAmal al-Qaʿida (Concerning the Expansion and Development of the Action of the Base)*, internal construction, the occupied areas, 1983.

——*Mulahazat Hawl al-Binaʾ al-Qaʿidi wa Dawr al-Hayʾat al-Wasita (Comments on the Construction of the Base and the Role of Intermediate Bodies)*, internal construction, the occupied areas, 1983.

——*bi-al-ʿAmal al-Munazzam, bi-al-Yaqza, wa bi-al-Sumud Nahmi Amn Munazzamatina (With Organized Work, Alertness, and Steadfastness We Protect the Security of our Organizations)*, Reinforcing Security no. 1, the occcupied areas, 1983

——'Taʿliq ʿala Afkar wa Suluk al-Majmuʿa "al-Yasariyya" al-Munsahiba' (A Comment on the Thoughts and Behaviour of the 'Leftist' Splinter Group), *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, n.d. [March 1984].

——'Hawl Shiʿar Tanhiyat Yasir ʿArafat' (Concerning the Call for Yasir Arafat's Abdication), *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, n.d. [early 1984].

——*al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini (The Palestinian Communist Party)*, n.d. [early 1984].

PCP–Provisional Command, *Azmat al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya: Asbabuha wa Turuq Muʿalajatiha (The Crisis of the Palestinian Revolution: Its Causes and Means of Dealing with It)*, May 1984.

al-Barghuthi, *Bashir, al-Wadʿ al-Siyasi al-Rahin wa Maham al-Qiwa al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya fi al-Manatiq al-Muhtalla (The Current Political Situation and the Tasks of the Palestinian National Forces in the Occupied Areas)*, reprint of interview in *al-Katib*, November 1984, PCP Publications.

——*al-Wadʿ al-Siyasi al-Rahin wa Maham al-Qiwa al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya fi al-Manatiq al-Muhtalla (The Current Political Situation and the Tasks of the Palestinian National Forces in the Occupied Areas)*, the political report of the central committee of the PCP, December 1984.

——*al-Wadʿ al-Filastini al-Rahin wa Muhimmat al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya (The Current Palestinian Situation and the Tasks of the Palestinian National Movement)*, the political report of the central committee of the PCP, December 1984.

PCP, *Rad ʿala al-Burnamij al-Siyasi li-Zumrat Bashir al-Barghuthi (A Response to the Political Programme of the Bashir Barghuthi Clique)*, February 1985.

ʿAshar Sinin ʿala Taʾsis al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini 1977/1987 (Ten Years after the Establishment of the Palestinian Communist Party 1977/1987) (Jerusalem, 1987).

RPCP, *Wathaʾiq al-Hizb al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini al-Thawri (Documents of the Revolutionary Palestinian Communist Party)*, founding conference, September 1987.

PCP, *Fi Sabil al-ʿAwda wa Taqrir al-Masir wa Iqamat al-Dawla al-Filastiniyya al-Mustaqilla (Towards the Return, Self-Determination, and the Establishment of the Independent Palestinian State)* (Nicosia: Muʾassassat Nassar, October 1988).

Bashir al-Barghuthi, *al-Burnamij al-Siyasi Awwalan: Maqalat wa Muqabalat (The Political Programme First: Articles and Interviews)* (Nicosia: Muʾassassat Nassar, October 1988).

PPP, *al-Nizam al-Dakhili wa al-Burnamij: min ajl Tahrir al-Aradi al-Filastiniyya al-Muhtalla*

wa Ta'min al-Huquq al-Wataniyya li al-Sha'b al-Filastini wa Iqamat al-Dawla al-Filastiniyya al-Dimuqratiyya al-Mustaqilla (The Internal Statutes and Programme: For the Liberation of the Occupied Palestinian Lands, Attainment of the National Rights of the Palestinian People, and the Establishment of the Democratic Independent Palestinian State), including the statement of the second conference of the PCP, late October 1991.

Islamist Groups

Hamas, *Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Filastin: al-Judhur al-Tarikhiyya wa al-Mithaq (The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine: Its Historical Roots and the Charter)* (Qaywayn, UAE: Dar al-Huda, 1989).

al-Islam wa Filastin: al-Mashru' al-Islami al-Mu'asir fi Filastin (Islam and Palestine: The Contemporary Islamist Project in Palestine) (n.p.: Dar al-Isra', n.d.).

Masirat al-Jihad al-Islami fi Filastin (The March of Islamic Jihad in Palestine) (Beirut: Dar al-Maqdis, 1989).

Arab Organizations

Arab Communists

LCP, *Nidal al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Lubnani min khilal Watha'iqih (The Struggle of the Lebanese Communist Party through its Documents)*, Part One (Beirut: Amal Press for the Lebanese Communist Party, 1971).

——*al-Shuyu'iyyun al-Lubnaniyyun wa Muhimmat al-Marhala al-Muqbila (The Lebanese Communists and the Tasks of the Coming Phase)* (Beirut: Amal Press for the Lebanese Communist Party, 1972).

SCP, *Qadaya al-Khilaf fi al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Suri (Issues of Conflict in the Syrian Communist Party)* (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1972).

Organization of Lebanese Socialists

——*Limadha? Munazzamat al-Ishtirakiyyin al-Lubnaniyyin (Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-'Arab min al-Fashiyya ila al-Nasiriyya) 'Tahlil wa Naqd' (Why the Organization of Lebanese Socialists? The Arab Nationalist Movement from Fascism to Nasirism 'Analysis and Critique')* (Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1970). (Foreword by Muhsin Ibrahim.)

Jordanian Democratic People's Party

Hurani, Hani, *Nida' ila Jami' Munadili al-Hizb (An Appeal to all the Party's Strugglers)*, 28 June 1990. [Allied to Yasir 'Abd-Rabbu wing in DFLP.]

League of Arab States

Mu'tamar al-Qimma al-'Arabi al-Awwal (First Arab Summit Conference), Compilation, General Secretariat (Cairo), undated.

Mu'tamar al-Qimma al-'Arabi al-Thani (Second Arab Summit Conference), Compilation, General Secretariat (Cairo), undated.

Mu'tamar al-Qimma al-ʿArabi al-Thatlith (Third Arab Summit Conference), Compilation, General Secretariat (Cairo), undated.

Published Interviews (other than the press) with Palestinian Officials

'al-Ma'zaq al-ʿArabi wa Khittat Rujarz' (The Arab Dilemma and the Rogers Plan), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, Year 6, No. 12, October 1970, [transcript of panel discussion].

Abu-Sharar, Majid, *et al.*, 'Nadwa: Qadaya al-Nidal al-Watani fi al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qitaʿ Ghazza' (Panel: Issues of the National Struggle in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, July 1981; reproduced in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, Nos. 118 and 119, September and October 1981).

Yasin, 'Abd-al-Qadir, Shbib, Samih, and al-Kayyali, Majid (eds.), 'al-Kifah al-Musallah al-Filastini: al-Tajriba wa al-Muhaddidat' (The Palestinian Armed Struggle: Experience and Determinants), panel discussion, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 244–245, July–August 1993.

Faruq Qaddumi, 'al-Azma al-Rahina li-Harakat al-Muqawama' (The Current Crisis of the Resistance Movement), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 7:4, February 1971.

George Habash (PFLP), 'Ahadith maʿ Qadat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya Hawl Mushkilat al-ʿAmal al-Fida'i' (Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971.

Khalid al-Hasan (Fateh), 'Ahadith maʿ Qadat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya Hawl Mushkilat al-ʿAmal al-Fida'i' (Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971.

Nayif Hawatma (PDFLP), 'Ahadith maʿ Qadat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya Hawl Mushkilat al-ʿAmal al-Fida'i' (Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971.

Salah Khalaf (Fateh), 'Ahadith maʿ Qadat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya Hawl Mushkilat al-ʿAmal al-Fida'i' (Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 5, November 1971.

Sami al-ʿAtari (Saʿiqa), 'Ahadith maʿ Qadat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya Hawl Mushkilat al-ʿAmal al-Fida'i' (Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972.

ʿAbd-al-Wahhab Kayyali (ALF), 'Ahadith maʿ Qadat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya Hawl Mushkilat al-ʿAmal al-Fida'i' (Conversations with the Leaders of the Palestinian Resistance Concerning the Problems of Guerrilla Action), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972.

'Taqyim Dawr al-Harakat al-Wataniyya al-ʿArabiyya fi Daʿm Harakat al-Muqawama

al-Filastiniyya' (An Evaluation of the Role of the Arab National Movements in Supporting the Palestinian Resistance Movement), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972, [transcript of panel discussion].

Saʿd Sayil. 'Shahadat al-ʿAmid Saʿd Sayil' (Testimony of Brigadier Saʿd Sayil), interviewed by Hadi Abu-Aswan, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No, 8, April 1972.

'Shahadat min Maʿrakat al-Karama' (Testimonies from the Karama Battle), interviews conducted by Hadi Abu-Aswan, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 8, April 1972.

Kamal ʿUdwan (Fateh), 'Fath: al-Milad wa al-Masira, Hadith maʿ Kamal ʿUdwan (Fateh: Birth and March, a Conversation with Kamal ʿUdwan)', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973.

'al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya Amam al-Tahaddiyat al-Jadida (The Palestinian Resistance Faces the New Challenges)', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 30, February 1974. Proceedings of panel discussion between Salah Khalaf, Zuhayr Muhsin, George Habash, Nayif Hawatma, and Shafiq al-Hut.

Khalil al-Wazir, 'al-Karama al-Jadida' (The New Karama [Dignity]), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 77, April 1978.

Yasir ʿArafat, 'Thawratuna Kalimat Sir al-Umma' (Our Revolution is the Password of the Nation), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 86, January 1979.

——'Nazra Shumuliyya ila al-Siraʿ' (A Comprehensive Look at the Conflict), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 98, January 1980.

Nayif Hawatma, 'Ma Huwa al-Matlub li-Taʿziz al-Wihda al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya?' (What is Required to Reinforce Palestinian National Unity?), interviewed by Salwa al-ʿAmad, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 103, June 1980.

Sa'd Sayil, 'ʿAmal al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya al-ʿAskari wa Afaq Tatawwurih' (The Military Action of the Palestinian Revolution and the Prospects for its Development), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 105, August 1980.

——'Khalaqna Fajwa Nafsiyya bayn al-Muwatin al-Isra'ili wa Qiyaditih' (We have Created a Psychological Gap between the Israeli Citizen and Leadership), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981.

Saʿid Maragha (Abu Musa), 'Layt Aʿta al-ʿArab, Kul al-ʿArab, Nisf Ma Aʿtathu Bayrut' (If Only the Arabs, All the Arabs, Had Given Half of What Beirut Gave), interviewed by Salwa al-ʿAmad, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 134, January 1983.

Mamduh Nawfal, 'Shahadat Mamduh Nawfal ʿan al-Harb' (Testimony of Mamduh Nawfal about the War), interviewed by Salwa al-ʿAmad, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 135, February 1983.

Yasir ʿArafat, 'Yasir ʿArafat Yatakallam ʿan al-Harb' (Yasir Arafat Speaks about the War), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No, 136–137, March–April 1983.

Yasir ʿArafat, 'Liqa' Fikri wa Siyasi maʿ Yasir ʿArafat Ra'is Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya' (An Intellectual and Political Encounter with Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO), interviewed by Tahir ʿAbd-al-Hakim, *al-Fikr*, No. 2, 1984.

Khalil al-Wazir, 'Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad): The 17th Palestine National Council', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 2 (54) (Winter 1985).

——'Khalil al-Wazir Yuqayyim Mukhtalaf Marahil al-Nidal al-Filastini' (Khalil al-Wazir

Assesses the Various Phases of the Palestinian Struggle), interviewed by Ahmad Sayf, *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 152–153, November–December 1985.

Faruq Qaddumi, 'Faruq al-Qaddumi: Assessing the Eighteenth PNC', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 17: 2 (66) (Winter 1988).

'Mubʿadun Yatahaddathun maʿ *Shu'un Filastiniyya* ʿan al-Intifada, Istimrariyyatiha, wa Injazatiha' (Deportees Speak to *Shu'un Filastiniyya* about the Intifada, its Continuity, and Achievements), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No, 199, October 1989.

Other Primary Sources

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)

PLA archive, Cairo HQ, 1964–73.

PLO Chairman's Military Archives, 1976–88.

PLO Central Operations Room Logbook, 1982.

Guerilla operations logbook of Jarmaq Battalion (Fateh), 1983.

PLA Personnel Department. Statistical breakdowns on martyrs and disabled, up to end 1990.

PLO Social Affairs Institution, Amman office. Register of martyrs to March 1990.

——Sample register of sentenced prisoners to 28 December 1990.

——Sample statistical breakdown of martyrs by cause, year, marital status, occupation, geographical distribution, age, education, place of origin and nationality (undated, to 28 December 1990).

——Sample statistical breakdown of prisoners by sentence, age, occupation, education, marital status, and geographical distribution to 28 December 1990.

——Sample statistical breakdown of intifada wounded and martyrs to 28 December 1990.

Unpublished Personal Accounts

Mahmud ʿAbbas (Abu Mazin), 'Awraq Siyasiyya: Ma Ashbah al-Ams bi al-Yawm . . . Wa Lakin?' (Political Papers: How Similar Yesterday is to Today . . . But?), Parts 1 and 2, n.d. [approximately 1985].

——*Thawrat al-Mustahil: al-Kitaba al-Mustahila (The Impossible Revolution: The Impossible Writing)*, May 1990.

——*Abu al-Hawl . . . Jil al-Sahwa (Abu Hawl . . . The Generation of Awakening)*, n.d. [approximately 1991].

ʿAli, Tariq (Abu al-Yasar), letter of resignation from the central committee of the Palestinian Liberation Front, 29 December 1988.

Nawfal, Mamduh, *Maghdusha: Qabl an Tafqudaha al-Dhakira (Maghdusha: Before Memory is Lost)* [approximately 1992].

——Untitled manuscript on PLO–Soviet relations, 1993.

Wazir, Khalil, untitled internal memorandum, n.d. [early 1984].

Diary of Rafiq ʿAssaf, member of Palestinian 68 Reconnaissance Battalion. Undated, written sometime between July 1963 and his death in October 1966.

Assorted Documents

Arabic

al-Dustur al-Muʾaqqat li-Filastin (Provisional Constitution of Palestine), promulgated by Jamal ʿAbd-al-Nasir and published in *al-Ahram*, 10 March 1963.

Majumʿat Khutab Nasir, 1962–64 (Collected Speeches of Nasir, 1962–64), Vol. iv.

Abu-Nuwar, Maʿn, *Maʿrakat al-Karama (The Battle of Karama)* (Amman: n.p. [Jordanian army], 1970).

Farid, ʿAbd-al-Majid (ed.), *Min Mahadir Ijtimaʿat ʿAbd-al-Nasir al-ʿArabiyya wa al-Dawliyya . . . 1967–1970 (From the Minutes of ʿAbd-al-Nasir's Arab and International Meetings)* (Beirut: Institute for Arab Studies, 1979).

General Secretariat of the Joint Committee, *Taqrir al-Injazat, 1979–1986 (Report of Achievements, 1979–1986)* (Amman: Joint Jordanian–Palestinian Committee to Support the Steadfastness of the Palestinian People in the Occupied Homeland, 1987).

al-Hajuj, Lt. Gen. Khalid, *Musharakat al-Liwaʾ 40 fi Harb 1973 (The Participation of the 40th [Armoured] Brigade in the 1973 War)*, official report to the defence council of the League of Arab States, 1973.

Harb Filastin, 1947–1948: al-Riwaya al-Israʾiliyya al-Rasmiyya (The Palestine War 1947–1948: The Official Israeli Account) (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984), 219. (Arabic translation from the Hebrew)

Harb al-ʿUdwan al-Thulathi ʿala Misr (The Tripartite War of Aggression against Egypt) (Cairo: al-Ahram for the Ministry of Defence, n.d. [1989]).

Jordanian Ministry of Defence, *al-ʿAmal al-Fidaʾi fi al-Urdun (Guerilla Action in Jordan)* (Amman: n.p., 1970).

Shuʾun al-Ard al-Muhtalla (Affairs of the Occupied Homeland) (Amman: Ministry of the Occupied Homeland, Research Department, 1986).

Salih, ʿAbd-al-Jawad (ed.), *al-Awamir al-ʿAskariyya al-Israʾiliyya (Israeli Military Orders)*, Parts I–IV (Amman: n.p., 1986).

English

ʿAbdul-Nasir, Jamal, 'Philosophy of the Revolution, 1952', in E. S. Farag (ed.), *Nasir Speaks: Basic Documents* (London, 1972).

Documents of the Lebanese National Movement, 1975–1981, n.p., n.d.

Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the International Commission to Enquire into Reported Violations of International Law by Israel during its Invasion of the Lebanon (London: Ithaca Press, 1983).

The Six Days' War (Tel Aviv: Israeli Ministry of Defence, 1967).

Agreement on Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, Cairo, 4 May 1994, published by the Israel Information Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Declaration of Principles, Oslo accord, signed 13 September 1993, published by the Israel Information Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
TEAM, *Health Services for Palestinians in Lebanon*, presented to ECWA, January 1983.
Report on Events in the Refugee Camps in Beirut, Kahan Commission, reproduced by the *Jerusalem Post*, 1983.
UNRWA, *UNRWA's Emergency Operations in Lebanon: 1986–'87* (UNRWA, 1987).
——*A Brief History, 1950–1982* (Vienna: UNRWA, n.d.).
——Commissioner-General Office, *Explanatory Note*, Beirut, 28 September 1982.
US Assistance to the State of Israel (Washington, DC: US General Accounting Office, 1983).
USADOS, for Secretary from Brown (secret), Beirut 2868, 1 April 1976. [Document viewed by author thanks to Fawwaz Trabulsi.]
——for Secretary from Brown (secret), Beirut 2936, 4 April 1976. [Document viewed by author thanks to Fawwaz Trabulsi.]

List of Periodicals

Palestinian Periodicals

Where place and dates of publication are not stated they do not appear on periodical in question. Dates of publication indicate issues consulted, and not necessarily lifespan of periodical.

al-Ard al-Muhtalla: Waqa'i' wa Ahdath, Fateh (Occupied Homeland Bureau). 1984–90.
al-Ashbal, Fateh. 1981, 1986–7.
al-'Asifa, Fateh. 1983–6.
al-Dirasat, Fateh. Monthly report issued by the Occupied Homeland Bureau. 1976–82.
Dirasat Thawriyya. Fateh, General Command of 'Asifa Forces (Abu Nidal's Fateh-Revolutionary Council faction). Irregular series containing monthly internal political analysis briefings, and interviews and public speeches by leaders. 1975.
Fath, Fateh. Assorted incarnations (including *Fath–al-'Asifa*, 1969–71). Latest version 1984–94.
Fath, Fateh (Occupied Homeland Bureau). 1981–2.
Fath–Daymumat al-Thawra, Fateh. 1978–82.
Filastin al-Muhtalla, Fateh (Occupied Homeland Bureau). 1975–83.
Hisad al-'Asifa, Fateh.
al-Ma'raka (Fateh). Nos. 1–2, 1981–2.
Nida' al-Hayat–Filastinuna, Fateh. 1959–64.
al-Sakhra, Fateh (Kuwait). 1985–90.
Sawt al-'Asifa, Fateh. 1978–82.
Sawt al-Bilad, Fateh affiliate.
al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya, Fateh.
al-Thawra (Tariquna ila al-Hurriyya), Fateh.

al-Masir. Fateh/PLO 'corrective movement' (led by 'Atallah 'Atallah). 1986.

al-ʿAsifa, Fateh–Provisional Command.
Fath, Fateh–Provisional Command (dissidents). 1984–91.
Fath, Fateh–Provisional Command (dissidents), internal bulletin. 1988.
al-Taʿmim, Fateh–Provisional Command (dissidents). 1983–4.

al-Hadaf, PFLP. 1969–92.
Lana Filastin, PFLP (Lebanon). 1987–9.
al-Muqatil al-Thawri. PFLP. February 1978–92.
al-Rifaq. PFLP, occupied territories branch. Occasional. 1978.
al-Sumud, Rejection Front. 1975–80.
al-Thawra Mustamirra, PFLP. 1975–8.

al-Fajr al-Jadid, DFLP (Lebanon). 1979–81.
al-Hurriyya, Arab Nationalists Movement 1960–9, PDFLP/DFLP 1969–94.
al-Muqatil al-Thawri. DFLP, 1977–81.
Rayat al-Shaʿb, DFLP. 1977–85.
al-Sharara, PDFLP. 1969–70.
Tariq al-Munadil. DFLP.
Tariq al-Watan, DFLP (Lebanon). 1989–92.
al-Tasaddi, DFLP. 1976–80.

al-Jamahir, Saʿiqa. 1977–8.
al-Talaʾiʿ, Saʿiqa. 1975–87.

Ila al-Amam, PF–GC. 1972–94.
al-Masira, PF–GC.

al-Ghad, PLF. 1985–9.
al-Khalsa, PLF. 1980–1.
Tariq al-Thawra, PLF (Lebanon). 1980–3.

al-Munadil al-Thawri/Tariq al-Nidal/Sawt al-Nidal, PPSF.
Nidal al-Shaʿb, PPSF. 1974–90.

al-Thaʾir al-ʿArabi, ALF. 1969–89.

Fath, PLO (daily). 1970–2.
Filastin al-Thawra, PLO. 1972–94.
al-Karama, PLA (Jordan). 1991–4.
al-Majalla al-ʿAskariyya al-Filastiniyya, PLO. 1984–90.
al-Majlis, PLO (quarterly magazine of the Palestine National Council). 1994–5.
al-Maʿraka, PLO (daily). Summer 1982.
Sada al-Maʿraka, PLO. Summer 1982.
al-Sadaqa, PLO. monthly issued by the Palestinian Committees for Friendship with Peoples. 1987–9.

Sawt Filastin. PLA. Damascus. 1968–94.
Shu'un Filastiniyya. Beirut and Nicosia: PLO Research Centre, monthly, 1971–93.
Watani, PNLA, monthly. 1979, 1983–1990.

Dirasat Thawriyya. Fateh–Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal faction).
Filastin al-Thawra, Fateh–Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal faction). Baghdad 1974–82, Damascus 1982–7, no stated place 1987–91.

al-Muqawama, Political Committee of the Palestinian Revolution. 1974–5.

al-Intilaqa, Arab Popular Liberation Movement. 1980–92.

al-Muqawama al-Sha'biyya, PCP–Provisional Command. 1980–7.
al-Tali'a, PCP.
al-Watan, PCP.

Rayat al-Wihda, PCWP (Lebanon). 1986–90.
Tariq al-Intisar, PCWP. 1978–91.

Filastin al-Muslima, 1980–91.
al-Jihad, Islamic Jihad-Bayt al-Maqdis, 1990.
al-Mujahid, Islamic Jihad. 1990–2.
al-Nafir, Islamic Jihad-Bayt al-Maqdis, 1990.
al-Sabil, unaffiliated Islamic (SAJA), 1989–92.
Sawt al-Aqsa, Hamas. 1989–90.

Filastin. Higher Arab Committee for Palestine. 1960–5.
Filastin. Supplement to *al-Muharrir* (Beirut), fortnightly. Started November 1964 to August 1966.

Other Periodicals

Newspapers

al-Anwar. Beirut.
al-Hayat. London.
al-Muharrir. Beirut.
al-Nahar. Beirut.
al-Quds al-'Arabi. London.
al-Safir. Beirut.

Magazines (weekly or monthly)

IDF Journal. Tel Aviv.
IDF Spokesman. Tel Aviv.

Jerusalem Post. Weekly, international edition. Jerusalem.
al-Wasat. Weekly. London.

Documentary material, translations

Arab Report and Record, weekly editions, 1967–79.
IPS Hebrew Bulletin (Arab. trans.), Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, from Hebrew press, weekly and monthly editions for years 1970–82 and 1986–8.
al-Malaf (The File), Nicosia: Manar Press, Hebrew translations, monthly editions for years 1984–90.
al-Nashra, Nicosia, various issues, 1982–6.
al-Nashra al-Istratijiyya, London, 1978–90.
Rasd al-Idhaʿa al-Israʾiliyya (Monitor of Israeli Broadcasts) (Arab. trans.), Beirut: PLO Research Centre, daily editions for years 1977–82.
Al-Taqrir, London, 1985–91.
al-Taqrir al-ʿAskari (Military Report), Nicosia: Manar Press, monthly editions for years 1985–90.

Journals

Dirasat ʿArabiyya. Monthly, Beirut.
Al-Fikr al-Dimuqrati. Quarterly, Nicosia.
Journal of Palestine Studies, quarterly, Beirut and Washington.
Middle East Journal. Washington, DC.
Shuʾun ʿArabiyya. Quarterly, Cairo and Tunisia.
Al-Urdun al-Jadid. Quarterly, Nicosia.

Compilations and Yearbooks

Chapters, essays, or reports appearing as regular features in the volumes cited below are not listed individually.

Arabic

al-Ard al-Muhtalla: Waqaʾiʿ wa Ahdath (The Occupied Land: Facts and Events) (Amman: Fateh Bureau for the Occupied Land, monthly editions for years 1984–90).
al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya: Haqaʾiq wa Arqam (The West Bank: Facts and Figures) (Jerusalem: Arab Studies Society, 1985).
al-Harb fi Lubnan (The War in Lebanon), four parts, 1975–6, compiled by Antoine Khwayri (Junyi: Paulus Press, 1977).
al-Jarida al-Rasmiyya (Official Gazette), Amman: Ministry of Justice, various issues in 1957–73.
al-Jayyusi, ʿAbd-al-Fattah (ed.), *Filastin al-Muhtalla, 1985–1987: al-Sumud wa al-Tahaddi (Occupied Palestine, 1985–1987: Steadfastness and Challenge)* (Amman: Dar al-Karmil, 1988).

al-Kitab al-Sanawi li al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya (Yearbook of the Palestine Cause) (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, annual editions for years 1964–76).

al-Mawsuʿa al-Filastiniyya (Encyclopaedia Palaestina), Part I, Vols. i–iv (Damascus: Encyclopaedia Palaestina Corporation, 1984).

al-Mawsuʿa al-Filastiniyya (Encyclopaedia Palaestina), Part II, Vols. i–vi (Damascus: Encyclopaedia Palaestina Corporation, 1990).

al-Waqaʾiʿ al-Yawmiyya li-Masirat al-Muqawama al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya (A Chronology of Events in the Course of the Lebanese National Resistance, 1982–1985) (Beirut: Cultural Council for South Lebanon, n.d.).

al-Wathaʾiq al-ʿArabiyya (Arab Documents) (Beirut: American University of Beirut, annual editions for years 1965–80).

al-Wathaʾiq al-Filastiniyya al-ʿArabiyya (Palestinian Arab Documents) (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, annual editions for years 1965–81).

al-Wathaʾiq al-Urduniyya (Jordanian Documents) (Amman: Ministry of Information, annual editions for years 1967, 1970, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983).

al-Yawmiyyat al-Filastiniyya (Palestinian Chronology) (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, six-monthly editions for years 1964–76).

Yawmiyyat al-Harb al-Lubnaniyya (Chronology of the Lebanese War) (Beirut: PLO Planning Centre, Parts 1 and 2, February 1975 to July 1976, published 1977).

al-Yawmiyyat al-Lubnaniyya (Lebanese Chronology) (Beirut: al-Fihrist, Yusif Dib (ed.), 1985 and 1986).

Salman, Faysal, *et al.* (eds.), *Lubnan 1949–1985, al-Iʿtidaʾat al-Israʾiliyya: Yawmiyyat—Wathaʾiq—Mawaqif (Lebanon 1949–1985, Israeli Aggression: Chronology—Documents—Positions)* (Beirut: Arab Centre for Information, 1986).

English

Middle East Contemporary Survey (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center, annual editions, 1976–93).

The Middle East Military Balance (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, annual editions).

Middle East Record (Tel Aviv: annual and biannual editions for years 1966–71).

The Military Balance (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, annual editions).

Memoirs, Other Accounts, and Political Analysis by Participants

Writings by active or former participants that deal specifically with their recollections and contributions to political debates. Works of social analysis or historical treatises by the same authors are not included in this section, and are cited instead as secondary sources.

Arabic

Books

ʿAbbas, Mahmud, *Shahadat Abu al-Hawl (The Testimony of [Martyr] Abu al-Hawl)* (n.p., n.d. [1991–2]).

Abu-Fidda, ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz, *Qalʿat al-Shqif: Qalʿat al-Sumud (Beaufort Castle: Castle of Steadfastness)* (Beirut: Manshurat Filastin al-Muhtalla, 1982).

Abu Hammam, *al-Muqawama ʿAskariyyan (The Resistance Militarily)* (Dar al-Taliʿa, 1971).

Abu Hatim, *al-Azma wa al-hal: Hawl al-Azma al-Dakhiliyya fi Harakat Fath (The Crisis and the Solution: Concerning the Internal Crisis in Fateh)* (Fateh, n.p., n.d. [1983]).

Abu Jihad: Ahadith ʿan al-Intifada (Abu Jihad: Conversations about the Uprising) (Tunis: PLO unified information, n.d. [1989]).

Abu-Nidal, Nazih, *Tarikhiyyat al-Azma fi Fath min al-Taʾsis ila al-Intifada (The History of the Crisis in Fateh from Foundation to Uprising)* (n.p., 1984).

——and Nashshash, ʿAbd-al-Hadi, *al-Burnamij al-Filastini bayn Nahjay al-Tahrir wa al-Taswiya: Dirasa fi al-Mithaq wa Muqarrarat al-Majalis al-Wataniyya (The Palestinian Programme between the Two Paths of Liberation and Compromise: A Study of the Covenant and the Resolutions of the National Councils)* (n.p., n.d. [approx. 1983–4]).

Abu al-Tayyib [Muhammad al-Natur], *Zilzal Bayrut: al-Qatiʿ al-Thalith (The Beirut Earthquake: The Third Sector)* (Amman: n.p., 1984).

al-Ahdab, ʿAziz, *al-Balagh Raqm Wahid (Communiqué Number One)* (Cairo: Dar al-Maʿarif, 1977).

Ahmad, Tariq, *Dawlat Baʿd Filastin: Munaqasha Naqdiyya li Shiʿar al-Dawla al-Filastiniyya al-Dimuqratiyya (The State of Part of Palestine: A Critical Discussion of the Slogan of a Democratic Palestinian State)* (Beirut: Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973).

ʿAllush, Naji, *al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya: Abʿaduha wa Qadayaha (The Palestinian Revolution: Its Dimensions and Issues)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1970).

——*Nahu Thawra Filastiniyya Jadida (Towards a New Palestinian Revolution)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1972).

——*Hawl al-Khat al-Istratiji al-ʿAm li-Harakatina wa Thawratina (Concerning the General Strategic Line of Our Movement and Revolution)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1974).

——*Hawl al-Harb al-Ahliyya fi Lubnan (Concerning the Civil War in Lebanon)*, Popular Culture series 3 (n.p., 1976).

——*Hiwar Hawl Qadaya al-Thawra al-ʿArabiyya (Dialogue about the Issues of the Arab Revolution)* (Beirut: n.p. [printed by Dar al-Hadaf], 1979).

ʿArafat, Fathi, *al-Sihha wa al-Harb wa al-Sumud (Health, War and Steadfastness)* (Cairo: Egyptian Arab Centre for the PRCS, 1989).

ʿAzzam, ʿAbdullah, *Hamas: Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, al-Judhur al-Tarikhiyya wa al-Mithaq (Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement, its Historical Roots and Charter)* (Qaywayn, UAE: Dar al-Huda, 1989).

Baqraduni, Karim, *al-Salam al-Mafqud: ʿAhd Ilyas Sarkis 1976–1982 (The Lost Peace: The Reign of Elias Sarkis 1976–1982)* (Beirut: TOP ʿAbr al-Sharq Publications, 1984).

——*Laʿnat Watan: min Harb Lubnan ila Harb al-Khalij (The Curse of a Nation: From the Lebanon War to the Gulf War)* (Beirut: TOP ʿAbr al-Sharq Publications, n.d. [1991]).

Bhays, Muhammad (Abu Hasan), and Sultan, Muhammad Basim (Hamdi), *Asʾila ʿan al-Islam wa al-Marksiyya min Waraʾ al Qudban (Questions about Islam and Marxism from behind Bars)* (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Islami, 1990).

Fawzi, Muhammad, *Harb al-Thalath Sanawat 1967/1970 (The Three-Year War)* (Beirut: Dar al-Wihda, 1983).

al-Hasan, Khalid, *al-Ittifaq al-Urduni–al-Filastini li al-Taharruk al-Mushtarak (The Jordanian–Palestinian Agreement on Joint Movement)* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1985).

——*Qira'a Naqdiyya li Thalath Mubadarat: Mubadarat Brijinif, Mubadarat al-Amir Fahd, Mubadarat Righan (A Critical Reading of Three Initiatives: The Brezhnev Initivative, the Prince Fahd Initiative, the Reagan Initiative)*, Samid al-Iqtisadi series 16, Political Papers 3 (Amman: Dar al-Karmil for Samid, 1986).

——*al-Azma al-Lubnaniyya: Muhawala li al-Fihm (The Lebanese Crisis: An Attempt to Understand)*, Samid al-Iqtisadi series 31 (Amman: Dar al-Karmil for Samid, 1986).

——*ʿAbqariyyat al-Fashal (The Genius of Failure)*, Political Papers 10 (Amman: Dar al-Karmil for Samid, 1987).

——*Filastiniyyat–3 (Palestinian Thoughts–3)*, Political Papers 11 (Amman: Dar al-Karmil for Samid, 1988).

——*al-Intifada al-Filastiniyya: al-Thawra al-Shaʿbiyya Mata? Limadha? Wa ila Ayn? (The Palestinian Uprising: The Popular Revolution When? Why? And Where To?)*, Samid al-Iqtisadi series, Political Papers 12 (n.p., n.d. [1988]).

——*Filastiniyyat (5) Ahadith wa Maqalat ʿan Masar al-Tafawud (al-Amirki al-Isra'ili al-Filastini) ila 'Ittifaq Ghazza-Ariha Awwalan' (Palestinian Thoughts (5) Conversations and Articles about the (US–Israeli–Palestinian) Negotiating Process to the 'Gaza–Jericho First Agreement')*, Political Papers 18 (Amman: Dar al-Shuruq, 1994).

——*Likay la takun al-Qiyada Istibdadan—Min Hisad Tajribati (Lest Leadership Become Autocracy: From the Harvest of My Experience)* (Amman: n.p., 1995).

Haykal, Muhammad Hasanayn, *Sanawat al-Ghalayan (Years of Upheaval)* (Cairo: al-Ahram, 1988).

——*1967 al-Infijar: Harb al-Thalathin Sana (1967 the Eruption: The Thirty-Years War)* (Cairo: al-Ahram, 1990).

——*Salam al-Awham: Uslu—Ma Qablaha wa ma Baʿdaha (The Peace of Illusions: Oslo—Before and After)*, Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1996.

Hurani, Faysal, *Min Durub al-Manfa (From the Paths of Exile)* (Amman: Sindbad Press, 1996).

al-Husayni, Ghazi, and al-Mansuri, Faris, *Asalib al-Tahqiq al-Isra'ili (Israeli Interrogation Methods)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1975).

al-Hut, Shafiq, *ʿIshruna ʿAman fi Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya: Ahadith al-Dhikrayat, 1964–1984 (Twenty Years in the PLO: Recollections, 1964–1984)* (Beirut: Dar al-Istiqlal, 1986).

——*Likay Nahruth fi al-Ard: Ahadith Mustaqbaliyya (So That We May Plough the Earth: Futuristic Conversations)* (Beirut: Dar al-Istiqlal, 1986).

Ibrahim, Dawud, *Salah Khalaf: al-Muʿallim al-Muharib (Salah Khalaf: The Warrior Teacher)* (Jerusalem: Abu-Arafa Agency, n.d. [1991]).

Ibrahim, Muhsin, *al-Harb wa Tajribat al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya (The War and the Experience of the Lebanese National Movement)* (Beirut: Beirut al-Masa', 1983).

——*Afaq al-ʿAmal al-Watani (Prospects of Nationalist Action)* (Beirut: Beirut al-Masa', 1984).

——*Qadaya Nazariyya wa Siyasiyya baʿd al-Harb (Theoretical and Political Issues after the War)* (Beirut: Beirut al-Masa', 1984).

al-Khatib, Husam, *Fi al-Tajriba al-Thawriyya al-Filastiniyya (The Palestinian Revolutionary Experience)* (n.p., 1972).

Kishli, Muhammad, *al-Azma al-Lubnaniyya wa al-Wujud al-Filastini (The Lebanese Crisis and the Palestinian Presence)* (Jerusalem: Salah-al-Din Press, 1976).

al-Labadi,ʿAbd-al-Aziz, *al-Hilal al-Ahmar al-Filastini (The Palestinian Red Crescent)* (Amman: Sanabil, 1988).

Matar, Fuʾad (ed.), *Hakim al-Thawra (Doctor of the Revolution)* (London: Highlight Publications, 1984).

Muhsin, Hashim ʿAli, *al-Intifada Thawra Hatta al-Nasr (The Uprising: A Revoluion Until Victory)* (Damascus: Dar al-Jalil, 1983).

——*al-ʿAqid Abu Musa Yatakallam: ʿan al-Harb al-Khamisa wa Sumud Bayrut (Col. Abu Musa Speaks: About the Fifth War and the Steadfastness of Beirut)* (Damascus: Dar al-Jalil, 1984).

Nawfal, Mamduh, *Qissat Ittifaq Uslu (The Story of the Oslo Accord)* (Amman: al-Ahliyya, 1995).

Nazmi, Raʾuf (Mahjub), *al-Ashrafiyya: Qissat Mustashfa al-Ashrafiyya khilal Ahdath Aylul fi ʿAmman (Ashrafiyya: The Story of the Ashrafiyya Hospital during the September Events in Amman)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1971).

Qura, Nazih, *al-Mashruʾ al-Sahyuni Yuwajih Azmatih al-Dakhiliyya (The Zionist Enterprise Faces its Internal Crisis)* (Damascus: 1977).

al-Razzaz, Munif, *al-Sabil ila Tahrir Filastin (The Path for the Liberation of Palstine)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1970).

——*Ahadith fi al-ʿAmal al-Fidaʾi (Conversations about Guerrilla Action)* (Beirut: Arab Institute for Publications and Research, 1973).

Riyad, Mahmud, *Mudhakkirat Mahmud Riyad, 1948–1978: al-Bahth ʿan al-Salam wa al-Siraʿ fi al-Sharq al-Awsat (The Memoirs of Mahmud Riyad, 1948–1978: The Search for Peace, and the Conflict in the Middle East,* 2nd edn. (Beirut: Arab Institute for Research and Publication, 1985).

Saʿd (Jaradat) and Abu Khalid (Shafiq ʿAsal), *Afkar Thawriyya fi Mumarasat al-Qital (Revolutionary Thoughts on the Conduct of Combat)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1978).

Sakhr (Yahya Habash), *al-Naqd wa al-Naqd al-Dhati (Criticism and Self-Criticism)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1974).

——*Qawaʿid al-Maslakiyya al-Thawriyya* (n.p.: printed by Revolution Presses, n.d.).

Salih, Nimr, *Nahnu wa Amirka (We and America)* (Beirut: Dar Spartakus, 1981).

Sayigh, Yusif, *Istratijiyyat al-ʿAmal li-Tahrir Filastin (Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1968).

——*Filastin bayn al-Tahrir wa al-Taswiya (Palestine between Liberation and Settlement)*, Paper (Kuwait: Nadi al-Istiqlal, 1973).

Shafiq, Munir, *Hawl Kitabat al-Shahid Kamal ʿUdwan (Concerning the Writings of the Martyr Kamal ʿUdwan)* (Beirut: Publications of the General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists, n.d.).

——*Hawl al-Tanaqud wa al-Mumarasa fi al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya (Concerning Contradiction and Practice in the Palestinian Revolution)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1971).

——*Bayn Istratijiyyat al-Tahrir al-Kamil wa Istratijiyyat 'al-Hal al-Siyasi' (Between the*

Strategy of Total Liberation and the Strategy of 'Political Solution') (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1973).

——*al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya bayn al-Naqd wa al-Tahtim (The Palestinian Revolution between Criticism and Destruction)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1973).

——*Baʿd al-Qawanin al-ʿAskariyya fi al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya (Some Military Rules in the Palestinian Revolution)* (n.p. [Beirut], 1976).

——*Hawl al-Wihda al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya (Concerning Palestinian National Unity)* (n.p., 1976).

——'Maʿrakat Aylul ʿAskariyyan' (The Battle of September Seen Militarily), in *al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya—al-Waqiʿ wa al-Tawaqquʿat' (The Palestinian Resistance—Reality and Expectations)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, n.d.).

——*Durus min Tajribat al-Shuhadaʾ al-Khamsa (Lessons from the Experience of the Five Martyrs)* (n.p., n.d. [1977]).

——*Shuhadaʾ wa Masira: Abu Hasan wa Hamdi wa Ikhwanuhuma (Martyrs and March: Abu Hasan, Hamdi, and their Brothers)* (n.p.: Muʾassassat al-Wafaʾ, 1994).

al-Shuqayri, Ahmad, *Min al-Qimma ila al-Hazima (From Summit to Defeat)* (Beirut: Dar al-ʿAwda, 1971).

al-Wazir, Khalil, *Harakat Fath: al-Nushuʾ, al-Irtiqaʾ, al-Tatawwur, al-Mumaththil al-Sharʿi—al-Bidayat 1 (Fateh: Genesis, Rise, Evolution, Legitimate Representative—Beginnings Part One)* (n.p.: Research and Mobilization Centre, 1986).

——*Hawl al-Intifada al-Thawriyya li-Shaʿbina fi Filastin (Concerning the Revolutionary Uprising of our People in Palestine)*, address to the PLO central council, meeting in Baghdad, 9–12 January 1988.

al-Yamani, Ahmad, *Jamʿiyyat al-ʿUmmal al-ʿArabiyya al-Filastiniyya bi-Haifa (The Palestinian Arab Workers' Society in Haifa)* (Beirut: Dar Kanʿan for Studies and Publications, 1993).

Yasin, ʿAbd-al-Qadir, *Hizb Shuyuʿi Dahruh ila al-Haʾit: Shahada Tarikhiyya ʿan al-Haraka al-Shuyuʿiyya fi Qitaʿ Ghazza, 1948–1967 (A Party with its Back to the Wall: A Historical Testimony about the Communist Movement in the Gaza Strip, 1948–1967)* (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1978).

Zaki, ʿAbbas, *Ma Narah fi Fath: Liqaʾat wa Hiwarat maʿ ʿAbbas Zaki (What We in Fateh See: Encounters and Conversations with ʿAbbas Zaki)* (n.p.: Occupied Homeland Publications, September 1993).

Articles

ʿAbd-al-Fattah, Ziyad, 'al-Muʾtamar al-Rabiʿ li Harakat Fath' (The Fourth Conference of Fateh), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 104, July 1980.

Abu Ahmad Fuʾad, 'Tajribat al-Kifah al-Musallah al-Filastini mundhu al-ʿIshrinat ila al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya al-Muʿasira' (The Experience of Palestinian Armed Struggle from the 1920s to the Contemporary Palestinian Revolution), *al-Tariq*, No. 6.

Abu-Aswan, Hadi (ed.), 'Shahadat al-Muqatil Nasir Jihad' (Testimony of the Fighter Nasir Jihad); 'Shahadat ʿAbd-al-Ilah al-Aththir Qaʾid al-Qaʿida al-Mutaqaddima al-Ula bayn al-Karama wa al-Nahr' (Testimony of ʿAbd-al-Ilah al-Aththir, Commander of

the First Advance Base between Karama and the River); 'Shahadat Abu al-ʿIzz Amir al-Qitaʿ al-Junubi' (Testimony of Abu al-ʿIzz, Commander of the Southern Sector); 'Shahadat al-ʿAmid Saʿd Sayil' (Testimony of Brigadier Saʿd Sayil), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 8, April 1972.

al-Akhdar, al-ʿAfif, 'Manzurat al-Harb al-Viyatnamiyya' (Perspectives of the Vietnamese War), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 3: 7 (May 1967).

ʿAllush, Naji, 'al-Shuʿiyyun al-ʿArab wa Harakat al-Taharrur al-Watani' (The Arab Communists and the National Liberation Movement), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 3: 1 (November 1966).

—— 'Hawl Istratijiyyat al-Thawra al-ʿArabiyya' (Concerning the Strategy of the Arab Revolution), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 3: 7 (May 1967).

—— 'Nahwa Istratijiyya Jadida li al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya' (Towards a New Strategy for the Palestinian Revolution), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 7: 4, February 1971.

—— 'al-Ahzab al-Shuyuʿiyya al-ʿArabiyya wa al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya baʿd ʿUdwan 1967' (The Arab Communist Parties and the Palestinian Cause after the 1967 Aggression), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971.

—— 'Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini wa al-ʿAmal al-Jamahiri' (The Palestinian National Liberation Movement and Mass Action), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973.

—— 'Min Maʿrakat Huzayran ila Maʿrakat Tishrin' (From the Battle of June to the Battle of October), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 10: 2 (December 1973).

—— 'Harbuna maʿ Dawlat al-Ihtilal al-Sahyuni: al-Ahdaf, al-Khasa'is, wa al-Afaq' (Our War with the Zionist Occupation State: Aims, Characteristics, and Prospects), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 10: 4 (February 1974).

—— 'Hawl al-Harb fi Lubnan' (Concerning the War in Lebanon), *Dirasat ʿArabiyya*, 12: 5 (March 1976).

—— and Nuwayhid, Walid, 'Ra'yan fi Kitab *Dirasa Naqdiyya li-Fikr al-Muqawama al-Filastinyya*: Hal Huwa Naqd li-Fikr al-Muqawama Haqqan?' (Two Opinions of the Book *A Critical Study of the Thought of the Palestinian Resistance*: Is It Really a Critique of Resistance Thought?), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 21, May 1973.

al-Hasan, Hani, 'Fath bayn al-Nazariyya wa al-Tatbiq: (1) al-Itar al-Nazari' (Fateh between Theory and Practice: (1) The Theoretical Framework), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 7, March 1972.

—— 'Waqfa ʿind al-Dhikra al-Rabiʿa li-Maʿrakat al-Karama' (A Pause on the Fourth Anniversary of the Karama Battle), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 8, April 1972.

—— 'Waqfa ʿind al-Dhikra al-Khamisa ʿAshara li-Intilaqat al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya' (A Pause on the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Launch of the Palestinian Revolution), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 98, January 1980.

Hawatma, Nayif, 'Muhimmat al-Thawra baʿd Ghazu Lubnan wa Maʿrakat Bayrut al-Batala' (The Tasks of the Revolution after the Invasion of Lebanon and the Heroic Battle of Beirut), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 135, February 1983.

Khalaf, Salah, 'Afkar Wadiha Amam Marhala Ghamida' (Clear Thouhts in an Obscure Phase), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No, 29, January 1974.

al-Khalili, Ghazi, 'Muʿtaqal al-Jafar al-Sahrawi: Sura Hayya li al-Sumud wa Israr ʿala

Mutaba'at al-Nidal' (The Jafar Desert Prison Camp: A Live Portrait of Steadfastness and Determination to Pursue the Struggle), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 32, April 1974.

—— 'Durus Mustafada min Tajribat al-Muqawama fi al-Urdun' (Lessons Learnt from the Experience of the Resistance in Jordan), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 55, March 1976.

—— 'Qabl al-Khuruj min al-Urdun' (Before Leaving Jordan), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 58, August–September 1976.

Mikha'il, Hanna, 'al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya wa al-Thawra al-'Alamiyya' (The Palestinian Revolution and the World Revolution), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973.

Natur, Suhayl, 'Hal Kan bi Imkan Tanazulat Filastiniyya an Tamna' al-Ghazu al-Isra'ili li Lubnan?' (Could Palestinian Concessions Have Prevented the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon?), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 136–137, March–April 1983.

al-Salfiti, Fahmi, *Qadaya al-Silm wa al-Ishtirakiyya*, No. 10/11, 1968.

Shafiq, Munir, 'Rad 'ala Kitab "al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya wa al-Wad' al-Rahin"' (A Response to the Book 'The Palestinian Resistance and the Current Situation'), *Dirasat 'Arabiyya*, 7: 11, September 1971.

—— 'Ma'rakat al-'Arqub 'Askariyyan' (The Battle of the Arqub Seen Militarily), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 9, May 1972.

—— 'Munaqasha ma' al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Urduni' (A Discussion with the Jordanian Communist Party), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 13, September 1972.

—— 'Taqrir 'an Ma'rakat al-Qita' al-Awsat' (Report on the Battle in the Central Sector), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 15, November 1972.

—— 'Ma'rakat al-Karama' (The Battle of al-Karama), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 19, March 1973.

—— 'al-Mu'amara al-Imbiryaliyya al-Amirkiyya min al-Qarar 242 ila al-Qarar 340' (The US Imperialist Conspiracy from Resolution 242 to Resolution 340), *Dirasat 'Arabiyya*, 10: 2 (December 1973).

—— 'Hawl Kitabat al-Shahid Kamal 'Udwan' (Concerning the Writings of the Martyr Kamal Udwan), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 32, April 1974.

—— 'Munaqashat Ara' fi Taqyim al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya' (A Discussion of Opinions in Evaluating the Palestinian Revolution), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 44, April 1975.

Tlas, Mustafa, 'Nushu' wa Takawwun al-Nazariyya al-Shuyu'iyya fi Harb al-'Isabat' (The Genesis and Formation of the Communist Theory of Guerilla War), *Dirasat 'Arabiyya*, 3: 7 (May 1967).

'Urayqat, Wasif, 'al-Madfa'iyya al-Filastiniyya' (Palestinian Artillery), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 115, June 1981.

—— 'Dawr al-Madfa'iyya fi Hisar Tal al-Za'tar' (The Role of Artillery during the Siege of Tal al-Za'tar), *al-Ma'raka*, No. 1, January 1982.

English

Books

'Abdul-Nasir, Gamal, *Nasir Speaks: Basic Documents* (London: Morsett Press, 1972).

Abu Iyad, with Rouleau, Eric, *My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle* (New York: Times Books, 1981).
Ang, Swee Chai, *From Beirut to Jerusalem* (London: Grafton, 1989).
Cutting, Pauline, *Children of the Siege* (London: Pan, 1987).
Giannou, Chris, *Besieged: A Doctor's Story of Life and Death in Beirut* (London: Bloomsbury, 1991).
Zedong, Mao, *Report from Xunwu*, translated and introduced by Roger R. Thompson (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990).

Articles

al-Shaikh, Zakaria, 'Sabra and Shatila 1982: Resisting the Massacre', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 14: 1 (53) (Fall 1984).

Author's Interviews with Participants

The following list comprises an extensive selection from over 400 interviews conducted by the author. It does not contain all names cited in the endnotes.

The interviews are listed in alphabetical order, starting with interviewee's name, main relevant biographical information, and place and date of interview. (The place is not stated in some cases.) Names in italics are *noms de guerre*; these may be given in brackets after the interviewee's real name.

Interviews

(Bold type denotes family name)

Qusay ʿ**Abadla**. PLA reserve colonel. Head of PLO Military Department 1965–8. Interviewed in Helwan on 27 November 1992.

ʿAbbas. Head of Regions Committee in Fateh's Western Sector. Interviewed in Tunis on 4 August 1989.

Mahmud ʿ**Abbas** (*Abu Mazin*). Fateh central committee member. Interviewed in Tunis in March 1992.

Fathi ʿ**Abd-al-Hamid**. Former senior Baʿth Party cadre (1950s to early 1960s). Interviewed in Tunis on 19 March 1992.

Ahmad ʿ**Abd-al-Karim** (*Ben Bella*). Fateh guerrilla officer to 1971; and Black September Organization cadre, 1973. Interviewed in Algiers on 22 April 1987.

Fuʾad ʿ**Abd-al-Karim** (*Abu Ahmad Fuʾad*). ANM cadre to 1967, then PFLP sector commander to 1970, then military commander and politburo member. Interviewed in Algiers on 24 April 1987.

Zakariyya ʿ**Abd-al-Rahim** (*Abu Yahya*). Senior PLO political department official, formerly leading Fateh organizer in Lebanon to 1966, founding cadre in Fateh military intelligence 1968, and first PLO ambassador to Cyprus in 1975. Interviewed in Tunis on 21 August 1991.

Ahmad ʿ**Abd-al-Rahman**. Fateh central committee member; formerly head of Fateh information and editor-in-chief of *Filastin al-Thawra*. Interviewed in Ramallah in January 1996.

Asʿad ʿ**Abd-al-Rahman**. Former senior Arab Nationalist Movement and PFLP cadre to 1970. Interviewed in Amman on 30 May 1991.

Nabil ʿ**Abd-al-Rahman** (*Abu Sara*). ANM cadre to 1967, PFLP political officer to 1972, cadre in RPFLP to 1973, then Fateh militia officer to 1983, dissident battalion commander to 1986. Interviewed in Tunis on 7 September 1990 and in Nicosia on 22 January 1992.

ʿAbd-al-Hay ʿ**Abd-al-Wahid**. Commander of PLA ʿAyn Jalut Forces. Interviewed in Gaza on 31 December 1995.

Adib (*Yasir*) ʿ**Abd-Rabbu** (*Abu Bashshar*). FIDA secretary-general, DFLP deputy secretary-general to 1990. Interviewed in Moscow on 30 January 1992, and in Tunis on March 1992 and 23 February 1993.

Samir ʿ**Abdullah**. Senior PCP cadre. Interviewed in Amman on 19 June 1992.

Yusif **Abu-ʿAfifa**. Head of Organization Committee 100 in Fateh's Western Sector. Interviewed in Tunis in August 1989.

Abu Ahmad Halab. PLF politburo member, and former head of its military administration. Interviewed in Tunis is September 1991.

Abu ʿAwad. Company commander in Fateh's Abu Yusif al-Najjar Battalion to 1982, and in defence force in Shatila refugee camp, 1987. Interviewed in Tunis on 1 July 1988.

Abu ʿAdhab. PFLP representative to PLO higher military council; formerly head of PFLP training branch. Interviewed in Tunis on 27 June 1988 and 14 June 1989.

Abu ʿAzzam. Senior cadre in Fateh's Western Sector. Interviewed in Tunis on 24 June 1988.

Hasan ***Abu-Bakr***. Commander of Fateh's Eagles of ʿArqub Battalion 1982. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985.

ʿUthman **Abu-Gharbiyya**. Senior member of Fateh's Mobilization Branch. Interviewed in Tunis on 3 February 1990.

Samir **Abu-Ghazala** (*'haj' Talal*). PLO ambassador to Cyprus, former member of Fateh regional command in Lebanon and head of Fateh civilian organization to 1982. Interviewed in Nicosia in January 1992.

Abu al-Haytham. PLF politburo member, and representative to the PLO Higher Military Council. Interviewed in Tunis in September 1991.

Abu Khalid. ALF military commander and representative to the PLO Higher Military Council. Interviewed in Tunis in June 1988.

Subhi **Abu Kirsh** (*Abu al-Mundhir*). Head of Gaza Committee in Fateh's Western Sector, member of central committee from 1989. Interviewed in Algiers on 24 April 1987. Died of cancer 1993.

ʿUmar ***Abu-Layla***. Commander of Fateh's Jalil Battalion 1982; commander of Fateh dissidents' Karama Brigade 1983–4. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985, and in Tunis in August 1989.

Hasan **Abu-Lubda**. PLA brigadier, battalion commander 1968–77. Interviewed in Baghdad on 12 September 1988.

Abu Mahir. Fateh 'fugitive guerrilla' and instructor. Interviewed in Kuwait on 15 March 1990.

Mahmud **Abu-Marzuq**. PLA brigadier, commander of PLA loyalist forces in Lebanon 1977–82, member of PLO Higher Military Council. Interviewed in Cairo on 7 January 1993.

Abu Mhadi. Senior Fateh naval officer. Interviewed in Tunis in August 1989.

Maʿn **Abu-Nuwar**. Head of Jordanian Army's Mobilization and Moral Guidance Branch in 1969–70. Interviewed in Oxford in September 1991.

Abu Raʾid. Senior ʿAllush faction cadre, former Fateh senior cadre. Interviewed in Amman on 28 May 1991.

ʿUmar **Abu-Rashid**. Former leader of breakaway PF–GC faction and former PF–GC military cadre and prisoner in Israel. Interviewed in Tunis on 5 and 15 August and Algiers on 25 September 1991.

Abu Salah. Head of Galilee Committee in Fateh's Western Sector, to 1982. Interviewed in Tunis on 5 August 1989.

Abu al-Shaykh. Formerly commander of Fateh's Special Unit, then of artillery battalion, then member of general staff. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985.

Abu Suhayl. PFLP representative in PLO higher military council; formerly PFLP battalion commander. Interviewed in Tunis on 14 June 1988.

ʿAli **Abu-Tawq**. Operations officer of Fateh's Jarmaq Battalion, then commander of defence in Shatila refugee camp, 1985–7. Interviewed on behalf of author in August 1986. Assassinated 1987.

Ahmad **Abu-ʿUlba**. PLA colonel, Hittin Forces battalion commander 1976, operations officer to 1983. Interviewed in Tunis on 10 August 1989.

Abu Yasir. Commander of Fateh's Ras al-ʿAyn Battalion to 1982, member of general staff. Interviewed in Tunis on 29 June 1988.

Jamal **Abu-Zayid**. PLA brigadier, chief of staff of Qadisiyya Forces 1976, task force commander 1980–2, brigade commander to 1985. Interviewed in Tunis on 31 January 1990.

Abu Zaytun. Fateh artillery battalion commander, later dissident artillery battalion commander. Interviewed in Beirut in October 1981.

Saʾib **al-ʿAjiz**. PLA brigadier. Interviewed in Tunis on 2 September 1990.

ʿAbdullah **al-ʿAjrami** (*Abu Anwar*). PLA officer and PFLP military commander in the West Bank 1967, prisoner in Israel to 1985. Interviewed in Tunis on 28 August 1991.

Tariq ʿ**Ali** (Abu al-Yasar). Senior PFLP cadre 1969, military commander in Lebanon 1970–1, chief political officer and politburo member of RPFLP 1972, politburo member of PPSF 1973, military commander in south Lebanon and central committee member PLF to 1982. Interviewed in Tunis on 19 August 1991.

Usama ʿ**Ali**. First commander of Fateh's Force 14 air unit. Interviewed in Tunis on 4 August 1989.

Naji ʿ**Allush** (*Abu Ibrahim*). Formerly Baʿth Party cadre in early 1960s, head of Fateh civilian organization in Jordan in 1970 and in west Beirut in 1975–6, head of dissident group from 1978. Interviewed in Amman on 28 May 1991.

Mahmud **al-ʿAlul**. Deputy head of Nablus Committee in Fateh's Western Sector. Interviewed in Tunis on 18 June 1988.

ʿAbdullah **ʿAmir** (*Adham*). Fateh commander in Damur, 1982; formerly deputy commander of Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 1975–6. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985.

Muhammad **al-ʿAmla** (*Abu Khalid*). Head of Fateh training camp in Iraq, 1968–9; official in PLO military department. Interviewed in Amman on 8 March 1990.

Nizar ***ʿAmmar***. Senior official in PLO National Relations Department, former senior Fateh and PLO security official. Interviewed in Algiers on 26 September 1991, in Cairo on 28 November 1992, Tunis on 18 and 19 February 1993.

Basil **Aql**. Former director of PLO Political Department and PLO envoy to the UN and League of Arab States. Interviewed in London on 31 July 1991.

Muhammad **ʿArka**. Head of Syrian internal security unit to 1966. Interviewed on 20 August 1992.

Taysir **ʿAruri**. PCP central committee member. Interviewed in Washington, DC on 1 March 1992.

Hasan **ʿAsfur**. Senior JCP, then PCP, cadre. Interviewed in Tunis in March 1992.

Yahya **ʿAshur** (*Hamdan*). Secretary of Fateh's Revolutionary Council, former head of Fateh regional command in Lebanon 1969–72, senior cadre in mobilization and organization department. Interviewed in Tunis in August 1991.

Muhammad **ʿAwda** (*Abu Dawud*). Commander of Fateh militia in Jordan, 1970; senior Black September Organization officer 1973; military commander of 'western area' in Beirut, 1975–6. Interviewed in Algiers on 24 April 1987.

Qasim **ʿAyna**. ANM cadre in Tal al-Zaʿtar to 1967, then Fateh cadre in camp and later director of a PLO orphanage. Interviewed in Nicosia in January 1992.

ʿAziz. Fateh engineer, 1974–6. Interviewed in Kuwait on 23 March 1988.

Ramzi **Badran**. PLA brigadier, headquarters staff 1965–7, commander Qadisiyya Forces 422 Battalion 1969–71, head of PLA–Popular Liberation Forces in Lebanon 1972–6, head of organization and administration 1975–7, to 1983. Interviewed in Tunis on 3 February 1990.

ʿAdnan **al-Bakhit**. Senior Jordanian academic, who analysed intelligence files after 1970–1. Interviewed on 6 March 1990.

Marwan Bakir. PFLP political commissar 1970, chief political officer of RPFLP 1972–3, senior cadre of Palestinian Liberation Front. Interviewed in Amman on 14 June 1993.

Muhammad **Bashir**. Head of Jordanian military intelligence 1970–1. Interviewed in Amman on 6 March 1990.

Muhammad **Bhays** (*Abu Hasan Qasim*). Head of Organization Committee 77 in Fateh's Western Sector. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985. Assassinated 1988.

Sakhr **Bsaysu**. Senior PLO Political Department official, former president of General Union of Palestine Students, and formerly Fateh and PLO security officer. Interviewed in Tunis in September 1993.

Mukhtar Sabri **Buʿbaʿ** (*Abu Firas*). Senior Fateh cadre in mid-1960s. Interviewed in Amman on 26 May 1991.

Ahmad **Dahbur**. Cadre in PLA information department, early 1970s. Interviewed in Algiers on 24 September 1991.

Ahmad Sidqi **al-Dajani**. PLO Executive Committee member, formerly associated with Palestine Liberation Front in 1960s. Interviewed in Cairo in June 1992.

Ibrahim **al-Dakhakhna** (*Sami*). Egyptian military intelligence officer in Gaza to 1967, and liaison officer in Amman with PLO to 1970. Interviewed in Cairo in April 1992 and December 1993.

al-Hakam **Darwaza**. Senior ANM ideologue. Interviewed in Tunis on 7 September 1990.

Abu Mahmud **al-Dawli**. DFLP chief-of-staff to 1982. Interviewed in Amman on 26 May 1991.

Ahmad **Dhikra**. Military commander and politburo member, POLP, 1968–70; cadre in PLA mobilization and moral guidance branch early 1970s. Interviewed on 14 November 1991 and 7 January 1992.

Ahmad **Draz**. PLA officer, ʿAyn Jalut Forces. Interviewed in Cairo on 7 February 1989.

Durgham. Fateh company commander in Force 17, formerly in Abu Yusif al-Najjar Battalion. Interviewed in Algiers on 26 April 1987 and in Tunis on 4 February 1990.

Hamada **Faraʿna**. Former military cadre in PF--GC. Interviewed in Amman on 8 March 1990.

Farid. Company commander in Fateh's Central Battalion, then militia officer. Interviewed in Tunis on 5 August 1989.

ʿAbd-al-Majid **Farid**. Secretary to Nasir, 1967–70. Interviewed in London on 30 May 1990.

Muhammad **Fawzi**. Egyptian chief-of-staff to 1967, army commander to 1970. Interviewed in Baghdad on 11 September 1988 and in Cairo in June 1991.

Amin **Ghaffuri**. Former Egyptian officer in Nasir entourage. Interviewed in London on 30 May 1990.

ʿAbd-al-Fattah **Ghanim**. PLF deputy secretary-general, former PF–GC politburo member 1970--6. Interviewed in Algiers on 28 September 1991.

Muhammad **Ghnaym**. Fateh central committee member and head of mobilization and organization branch, formerly member of General Command and head of Fateh organization in Jordan to 1967. Interviewed in Tunis in March 1992.

Samir **Ghusha**. PPSF secretary-general. Interviewed in Tunis on 1 February 1990.

Chris **Giannou**. PRCS surgeon and head of medical team in Shatila refugee camp during 'camps war' in mid-1980s. Interviewed in New York on 8 November 1988.

Yahya (*Sakhr*) **Habash**. Fateh central committee member. Interviewed in Tunis on 11, 12, and 13 February 1989, 3 February 1990, and 22 February 1993.

'Haj' Nicola. PPSF military commander in Lebanon to approximately 1990. Interviewed in Tunis on 1 February 1990. Died of illness 1991/2.

Ilan **Halevi**. PLO representative to the Socialist International. Interviewed in Washington, DC in December 1992.

ʿAziz **Halima**. Fateh security officer in Lebanon to 1982. Interviewed in Oxford in 1996.

Husayn **Hallaq**. Former senior Baʿth Party cadre to 1961, founding member of Arab Unionists Party to 1963. Interviewed in London on 24 August 1987, 21 and 24 May 1988, 11 September and 10 October 1991, and 7 January 1992.

Mahmud **Hamdan** (*Abu ʿAdawi*). PPSF military commander 1976–91 and member of PLO higher military council. Interviewed in Tunis on August 1991.

Nimr **Hammad**. PLO representative in Rome, former Baʿth Party cadre in Lebanon in 1960s. Interviewed in Rome in August 1992.

ʿAbdullah **Hammuda**. Member of PFLP central committee to 1971. Interviewed in Amman in June 1992.

Muhammad ***Hamza***. Aide to Khalil al-Wazir. Interviewed in Algiers on 23 April 1987 and in Tunis in August 1987, 23 June 1988, and in September 1993.

Akram **Haniyya**. Senior Fateh cadre in the West Bank in mid-1980s. Interviewed in Ramallah in January 1996.

Ismaʿil **Haniyya**. Senior Hamas cadre. Interviewed in Gaza on 31 December 1995.

Bilal **al-Hasan**. Member of PDFLP politburo to 1971. Interviewed in Tunis in August 1991.

Hani **al-Hasan**. Fateh central committee member since 1980. Interviewed in Tunis on 20 February 1993.

Khalid **al-Hasan** (*Abu al-Saʿid*). Fateh central committee member 1964–94. Interviewed in Tunis on 12 August 1987 and 22 August 1991 and in Washington in December 1991. Died of heart condition 1994.

Abu-Khalid **Hashim**. Commander of Fateh's Air Defence Battalion. Interviewed in Algiers on 23 April 1987.

Hassan. Aide to Khalil al-Wazir. Interviewed in Baghdad in December 1987 and in Amman in March 1990.

Hisham **al-Hawwari**. Senior Fateh militia officer, formerly company commander in Central Battalion. Interviewed in Tunis on 4 August 1989.

Nazmi **Hazzuri**. Head of Fateh student section in ʿAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp. Interviewed in Tunis on 4 August 1989.

Abu-Zayd **Hdayb**. Senior Fateh militia officer; formerly company commander in Golan Battalion, and commander in Nabʿa (Beirut) 1975–6. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985.

Mazin **Hijazi**. Former Jordanian army officer, then Fateh officer (Yarmuk Forces) and duty officer in PLO central operations room. Interviewed in Tunis on 10 August 1989.

Ahmad **Hijju**. Commander of Palestinian 68 Reconnaissance Battalion (Syrian army) 1963; field military commander of Saʿiqa, 1968–70; ALF military commander 1971–2. Interviewed in Algiers on 20 March 1992.

Jamil **Hilal**. DFLP spokesperson and member of central committee to 1990. Interviewed in Oxford in April 1994.

Jihan **al-Hilu**. Former senior Fateh cadre and leading member of General Union of Palestinian Women. Interviewed in London on 27 January 1993.

Hani **Hindi**. ANM co-founder and member of PFLP leadership with responsibility for external operations to 1971. Interviewed in Kuwait on 15 March 1990.

Khalil **Hindi**. Politburo member, POLP, 1968–9; politburo member DFLP, 1969–71. Interviewed in Oxford on 2 January 1991.

Faysal **Hurani**. Former senior Baʿth Party cadre. Interviewed in Nicosia in May 1986, in Algiers on 25 and 27 September 1991, and in Nicosia on 30 January 1992.

Hani **Hurani**. Leading cadre of DFLP organization in Jordan until late 1980s. Interviewed in London in March 1996.

Faysal **al-Husayni**. Fateh central committee member, former Arab Nationalist Movement cadre and PLA lieutenant 1956–67. Interviewed in Stockholm on 30 April 1989 and in Moscow on 30 January 1992.

Ghazi **al-Husayni**. Senior Fateh 'Western Sector' cadre, revolutionary council member. Interviewed in Tunis on 10 August 1989 and in Algiers on 27 September 1991.

Sharif **al-Husayni**. Former member of ANM military action committee and aide to Wadiʿ Haddad in PFLP. Interviewed in Algiers in September 1991.

ʿAla' **Husni**. Company commander in Fateh's Golan Battalion, then head of militia in Lebanon to 1982. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985.

Shafiq **al-Hut**. Member of PLO executive committee and representative in Lebanon to 1993. Interviewed in New York on 6 November 1988.

Amin **Huwaydi**. Egyptian defence minister and head of general intelligence 1967–71. Interviewed in Cairo in June 1991.

ʿAli **Ishaq**. PLF representative to PLO executive committee. Interviewed in Tunis in February 1989 and in Amman in June 1993.

ʿAbd-al-Rahim **Jabir**. ANM/Abtal al-ʿAwda guerrilla to 1967, PFLP 'fugitive guerrilla' after 1967. Interviewed in Algiers on 23 April 1987.

Nasr **Jabr**. Deputy head of Fateh's Scientific Committee. Interviewed in Tunis on 4 and 5 August 1989.

Talʿat **Jalabi**. (*Abu Sulayman*). Egyptian army general, formerly officer in 141 Battalion ('fida'iyyun'). Interviewed in Cairo on 28 November 1992 and in May 1994.

ʿAbdullah **Jallud** (*Abu Dawud*). Former PLA officer (ʿAyn Jalut Forces) and Fateh officer. Interviewed in Baghdad in November 1987.

*Khalil **al-Jamal***. Fateh student militia commander to 1982, dissident battalion commander 1983, deputy head for Lebanon 1984–6. Interviewed in Tunis on 21 and 22 March 1992.

Burhan **Jarrar**. Fateh Golan Battalion deputy-commander 1971, later head of coastal defence in south Lebanon, PLO military attaché in Algeria, and chairman's security in 1980. Interviewed by ʿAdnan ʿAwda on behalf of author, in July 1996.

ʿAbd-al-Fattah **al-Jayyusi**. Senior cadre in Fateh's Western Sector, aide to Khalil al-Wazir, and head of technical bureau in Palestinian–Jordanian Joint Committee. Interviewed in Amman in April 1984 and May 1985.

ʿAbd-al-Rahman **Jbara**. Co-founder and politburo member of POLP. Interviewed in Amman in June 1992.

Jihad. Company commander in Fateh's Jarmaq Battalion to 1982. Interviewed in Kuwait on 4 December 1987.

Muhammad **Jihad**. Fateh brigade commander to 1982, dissident brigade commander 1983–4. Interviewed in Tunis on 11 August 1989.

Samir **Jiryis**. Member of Galilee Committee in Fateh's Western Sector in 1970s. Interviewed in Tunis on 5 August 1989.

Khalid **al-Jundi**. Senior Baʿth Party official and head of Syrian workers union and militia, 1964–7. Interviewed in Tunis on 18 and 19 March 1992.

Marwan **Kafarna**. PFLP cadre and founder of Unified National Command committee in Gaza at start of the intifada. Interviewed in Gaza on 1 January 1996.

Kamal (*Abu Rami*). Senior official in PLO Social Affairs Institution office in Amman. Interviewed in Amman on 7 March 1990.

Zahira **Kamal**. Fida central committee member, formerly DFLP central committee member and head of DFLP women's organization in the occupied territories. Interviewed in Washington in April 1992.

Yunis **al-Katari**. First salaried PLO official, later secretary to the executive committee. Interviewed in Cairo in April 1992.

Fadl **Kaʿwash**. Senior Fateh engineer. Interviewed in Tunis on 5 August 1989.

Marwan **Kayyali**. Deputy commander of Fateh's Jarmaq Battalion. Interviewed in Tunis in February 1984. Assassinated 1988.

Faysal **al-Khadra**. Former senior cadre of ANM Syrian branch and Palestinian section. Interviewed on 24 June 1991.

Salah **Khalaf** (*Abu Iyad*). Fateh central committee member and head of security, 1966–91. Interviewed in Tunis in June 1988. Assassinated 1988.

Rafiʿ **al-Khalidi**. Head of Fateh communications branch. Interviewed in Tunis on 18 June 1988.

Ahmad **Khalifa**. Former member of Palestinian regional command of the ANM 1964–6, leading PFLP cadre in West Bank and prisoner 1967–70. Interviewed on 27 April 1990, 16 and 17 June and 19 November 1991.

Ghazi **al-Khalili**. Former PFLP senior cadre. Interviewed on 15 June 1993.

Ahmad **al-Khatib**. Former ANM executive committee member and head of ANM Kuwait branch. Interviewed in London on 31 July 1991.

Ghassan **al-Khatib**. JCP cadre imprisoned in 1974 on charges of planning armed resistance. Central committee member of PCP, and member of Palestinian delegation to Middle East peace talks in Washington, DC (1991–3). Interviewed in June 1992.

Ishaq **al-Khatib**. Central committee member of the JCP, head of the communist Ansar group 1971–2. Interviewed on 11 June 1993.

Mahmud **al-Khatib**. PRCS doctor in Shatila camp in 1985. Interviewed by Rosemary Sayigh in 1985.

Majid **al-Khatib**. ALF military commander. Interviewed in Tunis on 23 August 1988.

Munir **al-Khatib**. Former senior ANM cadre. Interviewed on 4 and 11 July 1991.

Mustafa **al-Khatib**. Fateh cadre and PLO finance officer until 1993. Interviewed in May 1996.

Samir **al-Khatib**. 'Graduate of 1948', Hittin Forces brigade commander 1965–8, PASC commander 1969–71, and director of PLO military department since 1968. Interviewed in Amman on 8 March 1990 and 28 and 30 May 1991.

ʿAzmi **Khawaja**. Former PFLP politburo member, responsible for organization in the occupied territories. Interviewed in Amman (twice) in September 1993.

Kifah. Former member of Fateh's Jordan Affairs Bureau, later dissident cadre. Interviewed in Algiers on 27 September 1991.

Haytham **Kilani**. Former Syrian army general and diplomat. Interviewed in Tunis on 13 February 1989.

Ahmad **Lubbad**. PLA company commander (anti-aircraft). Interviewed in Tunis on 3 August 1989.

ʿAbd-al-Raziq **al-Majayda**. ʿAyn Jalut Forces battalion commander 1967–73, brigade operations officer 1973–6, commander of brigade units in Lebanon 1977–82, member of PLO higher military council, and deputy commander of Palestinian police force in Gaza (from 1994). Interviewed in Tunis on 20 August 1991.

Mansur. Senior cadre in Fateh's Western Sector. Interviewed in Tunis on 3 August 1989.

Jamal **Mansur**. Islamist cadre (Hamas). Interviewed in Nablus on 4 January 1996.

Nabil **Maʿruf** (*ʿAbd-al-Muhsin*). PLO representative to Islamic Conference Organization, formerly head of Fateh branch in Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp to 1976. Interviewed in Nicosia on 20 January 1992.

Munib **al-Masri**. Jordanian minister of reconstruction in government of Wasfi al-Tal, 1970–1. Interviewed in London in March 1987.

Phil **McKenna**. PRCS doctor in Lebanon. Interviewed in Oxford on 7 March 1987.

ʿAbdullah **Mhaysin**. Palestine Border Guard 1953–63, PLA officer since 1964 (ʿAyn Jalut Forces). Interviewed in Cairo on 8 January 1994.

Ma'mun **Mraysh**. Head of naval operations in Fateh's Western Sector, assassinated by the Israeli Mossad in Athens in 1985. Interviewed in Tunis in February 1984.

ʿAli **Mruwwa**. Senior Lebanese cadre in Fateh (central border area). Interviewed in Tunis on 3 August 1989.

Wahid **Mtayr**. Head of PLO Social Affairs Institution office in Amman. Interviewed in Tunis on 4 August 1989 and in Amman on 11 March 1990.

*Saqr **Mujahid***. Fateh battalion commander. Interviewed in Tunis on 6 August 1989.

ʿAbbas **Murad**. Jordanian army, then Fateh officer to 1974 (Yarmuk Forces). Interviewed on 18 November 1990.

Talʿat **Musallam**. Egyptian army general. Interviewed in Cairo on 23 November 1988.

Khalil **al-Nabtiti**. Fateh guerrilla officer. Interviewed in Algiers in April 1987.

Sulayman **al-Najjab**. Head of JCP branch in West Bank to 1974, deputy secretary-general of PCP, representative to PLO executive committee from 1987. Interviewed in Tunis on 13 June 1988.

Muhammad **Nasim**. Egyptian general intelligence officer in Beirut and liaison officer with Palestinian groups 1961–5, founder of 'special service'. Interviewed in Cairo on 17 June 1992.

Hanna **Nasir**. Director of PNF, 1983–4. Interviewed in Bir Zayt on 8 January 1996.

Samih **Nasr**. Former deputy commander of Fateh military college, and commander of Shatila camp 1985. Interviewed in Tunis on 23 March 1992.

Suhayl **Natur**. DFLP politburo member. Member of PLF–PR 1966–7; head of political guidance in PFLP military command 1969–72; senior cadre in RPFLP 1972–3; head of DFLP military administration 1974–9. Interviewed in Nicosia on 23 January 1992.

Mamduh **Nawfal**. DFLP military commander and politburo member (to 1990), politburo member of FIDA, member of PLO Higher Military Committee and of Lebanon Committee, and member of Palestine National Council. Interviewed in Algiers on 22

April 1987, Tunis on 11 and 12 February 1989, 17 August 1991, and 23 March 1992, and Oxford on 23 January 1994.
Nazih. ASAP central committee member. Interviewed on 26 October 1992.
Faruq **Qaddumi** (*Abu al-Lutuf*). Fateh central committee member. Interviewed in Tunis in August 1987.
Kamal **Qaddumi**. PLA company commander (Qadisiyya Forces). Interviewed in Baghdad on 29 November 1987.
Fayiz **Qaddura**. Former ANM liaison officer in Cairo 1962–7 and in Damascus 1967–8, aide to Wadiʿ Haddad to 1971. Interviewed in Amman on 31 May 1991.
Taysir **Qubbaʿa**. PFLP Politburo member to 1993. Interviewed in Tunis on 14 August 1991.
ʿAbd-al-Hamid **al-Qudsi**. Senior Fateh cadre in Jordan in pre-1967 period. Interviewed in Amman in June 1992.
Lamʿi **Qumbarji**. Senior Fateh cadre in Cairo then Lebanon 1964–82. Interviewed in Cairo on 18 June 1992.
Salih **Ra'fat**. ANM cadre to 1967, then cadre in PFLP committee for the occupied territories in 1968, and member of DFLP central committee then politburo from 1969. Interviewed in Amman on 10 March 1990.
Muhammad **Rajab**. PLA company commander, ʿAyn Jalut Forces, to 1982. Interviewed in Tunis on 9 August 1989.
Samir **Sabri**. Fateh military intelligence officer. Interviewed in Tunis on 23 June 1988.
Walid **Saʿd-al-Din**. PLA artillery officer, commander Hittin Forces 12 Battalion 1977–9, nominal Saʿiqa representative to Palestine National Council 1984. Interviewed in Tunis on 22 February 1993.
Muhammad **al-Saʿdi**. PLA battalion commander in 1976 and PLO liaison officer with UNIFIL in 1978. Interviewed in Beirut in October 1981.
Akram **Safadi**. Founder and commander of 68 Palestinian Reconnaissance Battalion of the Syrian army to 1959. Interviewed in Cairo on 3 and 4 June 1991.
Tawfiq **al-Safadi**. Director of PLO Returnee Affairs Department, leading Baʿth Party cadre in Lebanon 1952–66, head of Higher Political Committee for Palestinian Affairs in Lebanon 1973–82. Interviewed in Tunis on 22 August 1991. Died of cardiac arrest.
Raji **Sahyun**. Former head of Palestinian broadcasting 1948 and PLO radio 1965. Interviewed in Washington, DC on 28 October 1992.
Salah **Salah**. Formerly ANM cadre, then member of PFLP central committee and politburo. Interviewed in Tunis on 1 February 1990.
Hasan **Salih**. Senior Fateh political officer, deputy commander of military academy 1976. Interviewed in Tunis in August 1987.
Ahmad **Sarsur**. PLA brigadier. Interviewed in Cairo in April 1992.
Yusif **Sayigh**. Member of PLO executive committee 1968–74, director of PNF 1971–4, and director of planning centre 1968–71. Interviewed in Amman in April 1984 and in Oxford on 27 January 1987.
Shadi. Company commander in Fateh's Martyrs of September Armoured Battalion. Interviewed in Tunis on 5 August 1989.

Munir **Shafiq** (*Abu Fadi*). JCP cadre to 1967. Fateh official in Amman to 1970, editor-in-chief of PLO *Filastin al-Thawra* to 1973, then director of PLO planning centre. Interviewed in Tunis in August 1987.

ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz **Shahin** (*Abu ʿAli*). Member of Fateh's Revolutionary Council, senior Fateh cadre and leading figure in Israeli prisons 1964–85. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985, Tunis on 7 July 1990, and Cairo 29 November 1992.

al-Shamʿa. Commander of Fateh's Suqur al-Tal Battalion. Interviewed in Tunis on 3 August 1989.

Fakhri **Shaqqura**. Head of PLA Chairman Shuqayri's office 1965–7, commander Qadisiyya Forces 421 Battalion 1968, brigade commander 1972–6, 'coordinator' of PLA loyalist forces in Lebanon 1977–82, head of military intelligence 1983–93. Interviewed in Algiers on 24 April 1987, Tunis on 22 August 1991, and in Cairo in April 1992.

Sami **Sharaf**. Former head of Egyptian President Nasir's bureau and security coordinator. Interviewed in Cairo on 23 May 1991, 9 April 1992, and 28 November 1992.

Tariq **Sharaf**. Former Egyptian army officer. Interviewed in Geneva on May 1993.

Sharif. Fateh intelligence officer. Interviewed in Baghdad on 12 September 1988.

Mansur **al-Sharif**. PLA major-general, head of ʿAyn Jalut Forces 1973–9, member of Palestine National Council. Interviewed in Cairo on 4 February 1989.

Yusif **Sharqawi**. Fateh commander in Shatila refugee camp, 1987–8; formerly Saʿiqa battalion commander (to 1976). Interviewed in Tunis on 5 August 1989.

Faysal *Kamal* **al-Shaykh**. Commander of Fateh's Martyrs of September Armoured Battalion to 1982, then of dissident brigade. Interviewed in Algiers on 22 April 1987.

Musa **al-Shaykh**. Former PLA NCO and Fateh training instructor. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985.

Samih **Shbib**. Senior PLF cadre and historian. Interviewed on 13 and 21 August 1991.

Hasan **al-Shibl**. Commander of Fateh's Rocket Unit to 1982. Interviewed in Algiers on 23 April 1987.

Ahmad **Shihabi** (*Abu Zafir*). Former member of Saʿiqa leadership, and representative to the PNC. Interviewed in Algiers on 26 September 1991.

Usama **Shinnar**. Formerly responsible for DFLP organization in the occupied territories, member of central committee. Interviewed in Amman on 10 March 1990.

Khalil **al-Shiqaqi**. Brother of Islamic Jihad co-founder and leader Fathi al-Shiqaqi. Interviewed in Amman in June 1996.

ʿAzmi **al-Shuʿaybi**. Former member of al-Bira municipal council (1976), DFLP central committee member, and DFLP delegate to the PNC. Interviewed in Ramallah in January 1996.

Raji **Surani**. PFLP cadre in Gaza. Interviewed in Gaza on 31 December 1995.

Muʿin **Tahir**. Commander of Fateh's Jarmaq Battalion to 1982. Interviewed in Algiers on 24 and 25 April 1987.

Yusif **Tahir**. Senior Fateh militia officer, formerly company commander in Central Battalion, and member of heavy rockets unit. Interviewed in Tunis on 8 August 1989.

Basim **al-Tamimi** (*Hamdi*). Deputy head of Organization Committee 77 in Fateh's Western Sector. Interviewed in Amman in May 1985. Assassinated 1988.

Subhi **al-Tamimi**. Former senior cadre of Arab Nationalist Movement's 'military action committee', and founding member and representative of Heroes of Return guerrilla group, senior aide to PFLP leadership to 1972. Interviewed in Cairo on 18 June 1992.

Muhammad **Tamraz**. Former PLA battalion commander. Interviewed on 1 May 1989.

Fawwaz **Trabulsi**. Former OACL deputy secretary-general. Interviewed in Oxford on 26 November 1990 and 9 January 1992.

Fayiz **Turk**. PLA major-general, acting head of PLA military intelligence 1965–8, commander PLA–Popular Liberation Forces 1969. Interviewed in Cairo on 25 April 1993.

Mahjub ***ʿUmar***. Former deputy director of PLO Planning Centre. Interviewed in Algiers on April 1987 and in Cairo on 14 and 24 November 1988, May 1991.

Wasif **ʿUrayqat**. Commander of Fateh artillery battalion, then dissident brigade commander 1983–4. Interviewed in Amman on 30 May 1991.

Khalil **al-Wazir** (*Abu Jihad*). Fateh co-founder, central committee and general military command member, and head of 'Western Sector'. Interviewed in Amman on 19 March 1984, in Algiers on 27 April 1987, in Tunis in August 1987, and in Baghdad on 1 December 1987. Assassinated 1988.

Ahmad **Yaghi**. ANM cadre and aide to Wadiʿ Haddad. Interviewed on 13 June 1988.

ʿAbd-al-Razzaq **al-Yahya**. PLA major-general, PLA Hittin Forces commander 1967–8, PLA commander-in-chief 1969–71, director of PLO political department 1971–6, member of PLO executive committee 1984–91. Interviewed in Tunis on 12 February 1989, Amman on 27 May 1991, and Cairo on 11 and 12 December 1993 and 9 January 1994.

Ahmad **al-Yamani** (*Abu Mahir*). ANM cadre and member of military action committee, member of PFLP central committee, and later politburo member with responsibility for finance. Interviewed in Beirut in September 1996.

Fu'ad **Yasin**. PLO ambasador to Turkey, founder of PLO radio 1968. Interviewed in Istanbul on 12 June 1992.

Muwaffaq **Yasin**. PLO National Relations Department, formerly Baʿth Party cadre to 1965, then Fateh cadre. Interviewed in Tunis on 19 February 1993.

Markram **Yunis**. Adviser to Arafat on Israeli affairs. Interviewed in Tunis in August 1987.

Nasr **Yusif**. Commander of Fateh's Central Sector in Jordan 1968–71, central committee member from 1989. Interviewed in Algiers on 24 April 1987 and in Gaza on 1 January 1996.

Mustafa **al-Zabri** (*Abu ʿAli*). Head of ANM branch in Jordan in 1966–7, PFLP military commander to 1970, member of politburo and representative to PLO executive committee to 1991. Interviewed in Tunis on 25 August 1987.

Salim **al-Zaʿnun** (*Abu al-Adib*). Fateh central committee member, speaker of Palestine National Council. Interviewed in Tunis on 15 August 1991.

Jamal **Zaydan** (*Munjid*). Deputy commander of Fateh's Martyrs of September Armoured Battalion. Interviewed in Tunis on 5 August 1989.

Fayiz **Zaydan**. Commander of Fateh's Force 14 air unit. Interviewed in Baghdad on 12 September 1988.

Unstructured or Informal Discussions

ʿAbd-al-Rahim **Ahmad**. ALF secretary-general. 1979. Died of natural causes.
Abu al-ʿAbd **al-ʿAkluk**. Senior official in Fateh's Mobilization and Organization Bureau. 1989. Died of natural causes.
Yasir **Arafat**. Numerous occasions.
Sami ʿ**Atari**. Saʿiqa deputy secretary-general. 1979.
ʿAbd-al-Karim **Hamad** (*Abu ʿAdnan*). Algiers September 1991. Died of natural causes.
ʿAkif **Haydar**. Amal politburo member and military commander in mid-1980s. Spring 1988.
'haj' Ismaʿil **Jabr**. Qastal Forces commander. September 1993.
Salah **Khalaf** (*Abu Iyad*). Fateh central committee member and head of PLO Unified Security Apparatus. Assassinated.
Ahmad **al-Khatib**. 1973. Former commander of the breakaway Arab Army of Lebanon.
Talal **Naji**. PF–GC deputy secretary-general. 1979.
Muhammad **Natur**. Force 17 commander. June 1988.

Secondary Sources

Arabic

Books

ʿAbd-al-Hamid, ʿIsa, *Sit Sanawat min Siyasat al-Jusur al-Maftuha (Six Years of the Open Bridges Policy)* Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1973).

ʿAbd-al-Haq, Badr, and al-Saʿdi, Ghazi (eds.), *Harb al-Jalil: al-Harb al-Filastiniyya–al-Israʾiliyya al-Khamisa, Tammuz 1981 (The Galilee War: The Fifth Palestinian–Israeli War, July 1981)* (Beirut and Amman: Arab Research and Publications Institute and Dar al-Jalil, 1981).

——— (eds.), *Shahadat Midaniyya li-Dubbat wa Junud al-ʿAdu (Field Testimony from Enemy Officers and Soldiers)* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1982).

ʿAbd-al-Rahman, Asʿad (ed.), *al-Harb al-ʿArabiyya–al-Israʾiliyya al-Rabiʿa: Haqaʾiq wa Tafaʿulat (The Fourth Arab–Israeli War: Facts and Interactions)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1974).

——(ed.), *Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya: Judhuruha, Taʾsisuha. Masaratuha (The PLO: Its Roots, Establishment, and Courses)* (Nicosia: PLO Research Centre, 1987).

Abu-ʿAmr, Ziyad, *Usul al-Harakat al-Siyasiyya fi Qitaʿ Ghazza 1948–1967 (The Origins of the Political Movements in the Gaza Strip 1948–1967)* (Acre: Dar al-Aswar, 1987).

——*al-Haraka al-Islamiyya fi al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qitaʿ Ghazza (The Islamic Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip)* (Acre: Dar al-Aswar, 1989).

Abu-Faris, Muhammad ʿAbd-al-Qadir, *Shuhadaʾ Filastin (Martyrs of Palestine)* (Amman: Dar al-Firqan, 1990).

al-Ashqar, Riyad, *al-Adat al-ʿAskariyya al-Israʾiliyya wa al-Harb al-Israʾiliyya–al-ʿArabiyya al-Muqbila (The Israeli Military Instrument and the Next Arab–Israeli War)* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1981).

al-Azʿar, Muhammad Khalid, *al-Muqawama fi Qitaʿ Ghazza, 1967–1985 (Resistance in the Gaza Strip, 1967–1985* (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabi, 1987).
—— *al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya bayn Ghazu Lubnan wa al-Intifada (The Palestinian Resistance between the Invasion of Lebanon and the Uprising)* (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1991).
al-ʿAzm, Sadiq, *Dirasat Yasariyya Hawl al-Qadiyya al-Filastiniyya (Leftist Studies of the Palestinian Cause)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1970).
—— *Dirasa Naqdiyya li Fikr al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya (A Critical Study of the Thought of the Palestinian Resistance)* (Beirut: Dar al-ʿAwda, 1973).
al-Barghuthi, Iyad, *al-Aslama wa al-Siyasa fi al-Aradi al-Filastiniyya al-Muhtalla (Islamization and Politics in the Occupied Palestinian Territories)* (Jerusalem: al-Zahraʾ Centre, 1990).
—— *al-Haraka al-Islamiyya al-Filastiniyya wa al-Nizam al-ʿAlami al-Jadid (The Palestinian Islamic Movement and the New World Order)* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1992).
Darraj, Faysal, *Naqd al-Silah al-Filastini (A Critique of Palestinian Arms)* (Beirut: Dar al-Jadid, 1994).
Hamza, Muhammad, *Harb al-Istinzaf (War of Attrition)* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1985).
—— *Abu Jihad: Asrar Bidayatuh wa Asbab Ightiyaluh (Abu Jihad: The Secrets of his Beginnings and the Reasons for his Assassination)* (Tunis: Arab Institute for United Publishers, 1989).
Hijazi, Husayn, and al-ʿAli, Muhammad, *al-Harb aʿala al-Mukhayyamat: min al-Waqaʾiʿ ila al-Dalalat (The War on the Camps: From Facts to Implications)* (Nicosia: Bisan Press for the PLO, 1987).
Hilal, Jamil, *al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya: al-Tarkib al-Ijtimaʿi wa al-Iqtisadi (1948–1974) (The West Bank: Social and Economic Composition, 1948–1974)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1975).
al-Hrub, Khalid, *al-Islamiyya al-Filastiniyya: Hamas, al-Fikr wa al-Mumarasa al-Siyasiyya (Palestinian Islamism: Hamas, its Thought and Political Practice)* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996).
Hurani, Faysal, *al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-Filastini 1964–1974: Dirasa li al-Mawathiq al-Raʾisiyya li-Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya (Palestinian Political Thought (1964–1974): A Study of PLO Basic Documents)* (Jerusalem: Abu-ʿArafa Agency, 1980).
Husayn, Hasan Khalil, *Safahat Majhula min Hayat Salah Khalaf 'Abu Iyad' (Unknown Pages from the Life of Salah Khalaf 'Abu Iyad'*) (Amman: al-Dustur Press, 1991).
al-Hut, Bayan Nuwayhid, *al-Qiyadat wa al-Muʾassasat al-Siyasiyya fi Filastin, 1917–1948 (The Political Leaderships and Institutions in Palestine, 1917–1948)*, 3rd edn. (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986).
Jabr, Marwa, *Jamiʿat al-Duwal al-ʿArabiyya wa Qadiyyat Filastin (1945–1965) (The League of Arab States and the Palestine Cause, 1945–1965)* (Nicosia: al-Abhath Publishing for the PLO Research Centre, 1989).
al-Jaʿfari, Walid, *al-Mustawtanat al-Istitaniyya al-Israʾiliyya fi al-Aradi al-Muhtalla, 1967–1980 (Israeli Colonial Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967–1980)* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1981).

Jallul, Faysal, *Wadi al-Dumuʿ: al-Muqawama al-Wataniyya wa al-Ihtilal al-Israʾili fi Junub Lubnan (Valley of Tears: National Resistance and Israeli Occupation in South Lebanon)* (Amman: Dar al-Karmil for Samid, 1986).

al-Jarbawi, ʿAli, *al-Intifada wa al-Qiyadat al-Siyasiyya fi al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya wa Qitaʿ Ghazza (The Uprising and Political Leadership in the West Bank and Gaza Strip)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1989).

al-Junaydi, Salim (ed.), *Muʿtaqal Ansar wa Siraʿ al-Iradat (The Ansar Prison Camp and the Clash of Wills)* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1984).

Kalash, Ahmad, *Lam Tatawaqqaf al-Harb fi al-Yawm al-Sabiʿ (The War Did Not Stop on the Seventh Day)* (Beirut: Dar al-Quds, 1978).

al-Katari, Yunis, *Halaqa Mafquda min Kifah al-Shaʿb al-Filastini: al-Katiba 141 Fidaʾiyyun (A Lost Link in the Struggle of the Palestinian People: Battalion 141 Fedayeen)* (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabi, 1987).

Katmattu, Muhammad, *al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya wa Maʿrakat al-Ahrash (The Palestinian Resistance and the Battle of the Woods)* (Beirut: Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1973).

al-Kayyali, ʿAbd-al-Wahhab, *al-Nidal al-Filastini: Durus wa ʿIbar (The Palestinian Struggle: Lessons and Example)* (Beirut: Arab Institute for Research and Publishing, 1972).

Khalaf, ʿAli Husayn, *Tajribat al-Shaykh ʿIzz-al-Din al-Qassam (The Experience of Shaykh ʿIz-al-Din al-Qassam)*, Part 1 (Amman, 1984).

Khurshid, Ghazi (ed.), *Dalil Harakat al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya (Guide to the Palestinian Resistance Movement)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1971).

al-Kubaysi, Basil, *Hawl Nushuʾ wa Tatawwur Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-ʿArab (Concerning the Formation and Development of the Arab Nationalist Movement)* (Beirut: Institute for Arab Studies, 1985 (4th printing)).

al-Lami, Jumʿa, *Qadiyyat Thawra (The Cause of a Revolution)* (Nicosia: Babel Press, 1986).

Madhun, Rabʿi, *al-Intifada al-Filastiniyya: al-Haykal al-Tanzimi wa Asalib al-ʿAmal (The Palestinian Uprising: Organizational Structure and Methods of Action)* (Nicosia: Sharq Press, 1988).

Mahafza, ʿAli, *al-ʿAlaqat al-Urduniyya al-Britaniyya (Jordanian–British Relations)* (Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1973).

Mahmud, Muʿin, *al-Filastiniyyun fi Lubnan (al-Waqiʿ al-Ijtimaʿi) (The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Reality)* (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1973).

Mansur, Kamil (ed.), *al-Shaʿb al-Filastini fi al-Dakhil (The Palestinian People Inside)* (n.p. [Beirut]: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990).

Matar, Jamil, and Hilal, ʿAli, *al-Nizam al-Iqlimi al-ʿArabi: Dirasa fi al-ʿAlaqat al-Siyasiyya al-ʿArabiyya (The Arab Regional System: A Study of Arab Political Relations)* (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1979).

al-Mawʿid, Hamad, *al-ʿAmal al-Shuyuʿi al-Filastini fi Suriya (Palestinian Communist Action in Syria)* (Damascus: Dar al-Taliʿa al-Jadida and Dar Kanʿan for Studies and Publications, 1995).

Mindis, Hani, *al-ʿAmal wa al-ʿUmmal fi al-Mukhayyam al-Filastini: Bahth Midani ʿan Mukhayyam Tal al-Zaʿtar (Labour and Labourers in the Palestinian Camp: A Field Study of the Tal al-Zaʿtar Camp)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1974).

Murad, ʿAbbas, *al-Dawr al-Siyasi li al-Jaysh al-Urduni, 1921–1973 (The Political Role of the Jordanian Army, 1921–1973)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1973).

Murqus, Ilyas, *ʿAfawiyyat al-Nazariyya fi al-ʿAmal al-Fidaʾi (The Spontaneity of Theory in Guerilla Action)* (Beirut: Dar al-Haqiqa, 1970).

——*al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya wa al-Mawqif al-Rahin (The Palestinian Resistance and the Current Position)* (Beirut: Dar al-Haqiqa, 1971).

al-Nashshash, ʿAbd-al-Hadi, *al-Azma al-Rahina li al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya: Judhuruha wa Afaq Halluha (The Current Crisis in the Palestinian Revolution: Its Roots and Prospects for Resolution)* (Damascus: Dar al-Naʿim al-Waʿi, 1985).

Nasir, Darwish, *ʿAmaliyyat al-Dabbuya kama Yarwiha Abtaluha (The Dabbuya Operation as Told by its Heroes)* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1982).

al-Natur, Suhayl, *al-Wadʿ al-Qanuni li al-Filastiniyyin fi Lubnan (The Legal Status of Palestinians in Lebanon)*, unpublished manuscript, n.d.

——*Awdaʿ al-Shaʿb al-Filastini fi Lubnan (Conditions of the Palestinian People in Lebanon)* (n.p., Dar al-Taqaddum al-ʿArabi, 1993).

Qasim, ʿAbd-al-Sattar, *et al.*, *al-Tajriba al-Iʿtiqaliyya fi al-Muʿtaqalat al-Suhyuniyya (The Experience of Detention in Zionist Jails)* (Beirut: Dar al-Umma for Najah University (Nablus), 1986).

Qasmiyya, Khairiyya (ed.), *Filastin fi Mudhakkirat al-Qawuqji, 1936–1948 (Palestine in the Memoirs of Qawuqji, 1936–1948)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre and Dar al-Quds, 1975).

——*Ahmad al-Shuqayri Zaʿiman Filastiniyyan wa Raʾidan ʿArabiyyan (Ahmad al-Shuqayri as a Palestinian Leader and Arab Pioneer)* (Kuwait: the committee to commemorate the memory of the struggler Ahmad al-Shuqayri, distributed by the Arab Institute for Studies and Publications, 1987).

Qura, Nazih, *al-Mashruʿ al-Sahyuni fi Muwajahat Azmatih al-Dakhiliyya (The Zionist Enterprise Confronts its Internal Crisis)* (Damascus: al-Ard Institute for Palestinian Studies, n.d. [1977]).

Ramadan, ʿAbd-al-ʿAzim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimum wa al-Tanzim al-Sirri (The Muslim Brotherhood and the Secret Organization)*, 2nd edn. (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Misriyya al-ʿAmma li al-Kitab, 1993).

Al-Rudayʿi, Yusif Rajab, *Thawrat 1936 fi Filastin: Dirasa ʿAskariyya (The 1936 Revolt in Palestine: A Military Study)* (Beirut: Institute for Arab Studies, 1983).

Sabri, ʿAbd-al-Rahman, *Athar al-Infaq al-ʿAskari fi Israʾil ʿala Masar al-Numu al-Iqtisadi fi al-Fatra 1950–1970 (The Impact of Military Spending in Israel on the Course of Economic Growth in the Period 1950–1970)*, Arab Strategic Thought Book 3 (Beirut: Arab Development Institute, 1983).

Saʿd, Ahmad, and Yasin, ʿAbd-al-Qadir, *al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Filastiniyya 1948–1970 (The Palestinian National Movement 1948–1970)* (Jerusalem: Salah-al-Din Press, 1978).

al-Saʿdi, Ghazi (ed.), *Ahdaf lam Tatahaqqaq, Mawaqif Israʾiliyya (Unfulfilled Aims, Israeli Positions)* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1984).

——(ed.), *al-Asra al-Yahud wa Safaqat al-Mubadala (The Jewish Prisoners and Exchange Deals)* (Amman: Dar al-Jalil, 1985).

al-Salhi, Bassam, *al-Zaʿama al-Siyasiyya wa al-Diniyya fi al-Ard al-Muhtalla (Political and Religious Leadership in the Occupied Territories)* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Press for Publications and Distribution, 1993).

Salih, Salih ʿAbd-al-Jawad, *al-Bayanat al-Isra'iliyya al-Muzawwara: Dirasa Khassa hawl al-Harb al-Nafsiyya dud al-Intifada (The Counterfeit Israeli Statements: A Special Study of the Psychological War against the Uprising)* (Jerusalem: Jersalem Centre for Development Studies, 1991).

Salman, Talal, *Maʿ 'Fath' wa al-Fida'iyyin (With 'Fateh' and the Guerillas)* (Beirut: Dar al-ʿAwda, 1969).

Sanatan min al-Ihtilal . . . Sanatan min al-Muqawama (Two Years of Occupation . . . Two Years of Resistance), Supporters of the Lebanese National Resistance Front (Beirut: n.p., 1984).

al-Sawahiri, Khalil (ed.), *Ahadith al-Ghuzat: Shahadat min al-Harb al-Filastiniyya al-Isra'iliyya al-Thalitha (Conversations of the Invaders: Testimony from the Third Palestinian Israeli War)* (Kuwait: Dar Kazima, 1983).

——*Atfal al-RPG (The RPG Children)* (Amman: Dar al-Karmil, 1983).

——*al-Filastiniyyun: al-Tahjir al-Qasri wa al-Riʿaya al-Ijtimaʿiyya (The Palestinians: Compulsory Displacement and Social Welfare)*, Samid al-Iqtisadi series no. 11 (Amman: Dar al-Karmil, 1986).

Sayigh, Yazid, *al-Urdun wa al-Filastiniyyun (Jordan and the Palestinians)* (London: Riad el-Rayyes Books, 1987).

——*Rafd al-Hazima: Bidayat al-ʿAmal al-Musallah fi al-Daffa wa al-Qitaʿ—1967 (Rejecting Defeat: The Beginnings of Armed Action in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1967)* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).

al-Shaʿir, Muhammad, *al-Harb al-Fida'iyya fi Filastin (Guerrilla Warfare in Palestine)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1967).

Sharara, Waddah, *Hurub al-Istitbaʿ: Lubnan al-Harb al-Ahliyya al-Da'ima (The Wars of Imposed Dependency: Lebanon the Permanent Civil War)* (Beirut: Dar al-Taliʿa, 1979).

al-Sharif, Kamil, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin (The Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestine War)* (Cairo: n.d.).

al-Sharif, Mahir, *al-Shuyuʿiyya wa al-Mas'ala al-Qawmiyya fi Filastin 1919–1948: al-Watani wa al-Tabaqi fi al-Thawra al-Taharruriyya al-Munahida li al-Imbiryaliyya wa al Sahyuniyya (Communism and the National Question in Palestine 1919–1948: Nation and Class in the Liberation Struggle against Imperialism and Zionism)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1981).

——*Fi al-Fikr al-Shuyuʿi: al-Shuyuʿiyyun wa Qadaya al-Nidal al-Watani al-Rahin (On Communist Thought: The Communists and the Issues of Current National Struggle)* (Damascus, Nicosia, Prague: Centre for Socialist Research and Studies in the Arab World, 1988).

——*al-Bahth ʿan Kayan: Dirasa fi al-Fikr al-Siyasi al-Filastini 1908–1993 (The Search for an Entity: A Study of Palestinian Political Thought 1908–1993)* (Nicosia: FKA Publishing for the Centre for Socialist Research and Studies in the Arab World, 1995).

Shaʿth Nabil, with al-Hindi, Khalil, Bawarshi, Fu'ad, and Musa, Shihada (eds.), *al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya wa al-Nizam al-Urduni (The Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian Regime)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1971).

Shbib, Samih, *Hukumat ʿUmum Filastin: al-Muqaddimat wa al-Nataʾij (The All-Palestine Government: Preliminaries and Results)* (Nicosia: al-Sharq Press, 1988).

——*Munazzamat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya wa Tafaʿulatuha fi al-Biʾa al-Rasmiyya al-ʿArabiyya—Duwal al-Tawq, 1982–1987 (The PLO and its Interactions with the Official Arab Environment—the Confrontation States, 1982–1987)* (Nicosia: Sharq Press, 1988).

Shihada, Yusif, *al-Waqiʿ al-Filastini wa al-Haraka al-Naqabiyya (Palestinian Reality and the Union Movement)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1973).

al-Shuʿaybi, ʿIsa, *al-Kayaniyya al-Filastiniyya: al-Waʿi al-Dhati wa al-Tatawwur al-Muʾassasati 1947–1977 (The Palestinian Entity: Self-Awareness and Institutional Development 1947–1977)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1979).

Swayd, Mahmud (ed.), *Yawmiyyat al-Harb al-Israʾiliyya fi Lubnan Huzayran-Kanun al-Awwal 1982 (Chronology of the Israeli War in Lebanon, June–December 1982)* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985).

——with Salman, Rida (eds.), *al-Ihtilal wa al-Muwajaha—1983: Min Suʿud al-Muqawama al-Wataniyya ila Ittifaq Ayyar (Occupation and Confrontation, 1983: From the Rise of the National Resistance to the May Agreement)* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985).

Swayd, Yasin, *ʿAmaliyyat al-Litani 1978: Nazra Istratijiyya (The 1978 Litani Operation: A Strategic Look)* (Beirut: Centre for Strategic Studies, Research and Documentation, 1992).

Tlas, Mustafa (ed.), *al-Ghazu al-Israʾili li-Lubnan (The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon)* (Damascus: Dar Tishrin, 1983).

al-ʿUbaydi, ʿAwni Jadduʿ, *Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami: ʿArd Tarikhi, Dirasa ʿAmma (The Islamic Liberation Party: Historical Survey and General Study)* (Amman: Dar al-Liwaʿ, 1995).

ʿUdwan, ʿAtif, *al-Shaykh Ahmad Yasin: Hayatuh wa Jihaduh (Shaykh Ahmad Yasin: His Life and Struggle)* (Gaza: The Islamic University, 1991).

ʿUmar, Mahjub, *al-Nas wa al-Hisar: Beirut 1982 (People and the Siege: Beirut 1982)* (Cairo: al-ʿArabi, 1982).

Yasin, ʿAbd-al-Qadir, *Tajribat al-Jabha al-Wataniyya fi Qitaʿ Ghazza (The Experience of the National Front in the Gaza Strip)* (Beirut: Dar Ibn Khaldun, 1980).

——*Azmat 'Fath': Judhuruha, Abʿaduha, Mustaqbaluha (The Fateh Crisis: Its Roots, Dimensions, Future)* (Damascus: al-Jarmaq, 1985).

——*Hamas: Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi Filastin (Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine)* (Cairo: Sina, 1990).

Yasin, Subhi, *Harb al-ʿIsabat fi Filastin (Guerilla War in Palestine)* (Cairo: Dar al-Katib, 1967).

Yunis, Fadil, *ʿAwdat al-Ashbal: Riwayat ʿAmaliyyat Dalal al-Mughrabi (The Return of the Lion Cubs: The Story of the Dalal Mughrabi Operation)* (Amman: Dar Ibn Rushd, 1986).

Yusif, Shihada, *al-Waqiʿ al-Filastini wa al-Haraka al-Naqabiyya (Palestinian Reality and the Union Movement)* (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1973).

Articles

Individually-authored reports or other regular sections of periodical publications are not listed.

ʿAbd-al-Haq, Yusif, 'Muʾassasat Usar al-Shuhada': al-Himaya al-Ijtimaʿiyya li al-Nidal al-Filastini' (The Martyrs' Families Institution: Social Protection for the Palestinian Struggle), *Samid al-Iqtisadi*, 12: 79 (January–February–March 1990).

Abu-al-Futuh, ʿAbd-al-Hamid Salim, 'Maʿrakat Shqif-Arnun' (The Battle of Beaufort-Arnun), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 107, October 1980.

Abu-al-Naml, Husayn, 'Harb al-Fidaʾiyyin fi Qitaʿ Ghazza' (The Fedayeen War in the Gaza Strip), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 62, January 1977.

Abu-Shakir, ʿAbd-al-Fattah, 'al-Hijra al-Kharijiyya li al-ʿAmala fi al-Ard al-Muhtalla: Hajmuha, Khasaʿisuha wa Dawafiʿuha' (Out-Migration from the Occupied Territories: Its Volume, Characteristics and Motives), *Samid al-Iqtisadi*, 11: 75 (January–February–March 1989).

Abu Thaʾir, 'Sahafat Fath wa al-Thawra' (The Fateh Press and the Revolution), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973.

ʿAlayyan, Nafidh, ʿal-Iqtisad al-Filastini bayn al-Tabaʿiyya wa al-Istiqlal' (The Palestinian Economy between Dependency and Independence), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 188, November 1988.

al-Ayyubi, al-Haytham, 'al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya fi al-Difaʿ al-Dinamiki al-Marin' (The Palestinian Resistance in Flexible Dynamic Defence), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 19, March 1973.

ʿAzmi, Mahmud, 'Khibrat Maʿarik Rafah-Ghazza fi Harb 1967' (The Experience of the Battles of Rafah-Gaza in the 1967 War), *Shuʿun Filastiniyya*, No. 22, June 1973.

Badr, Walid, 'Hawl Siyasat wa Tajribat al-Intaj al-Harbi fi al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya' (Concerning the Policy and Experience of Military Production in the Palestinian Revolution), *al-Maʿraka*, 1: 1 (1981).

Barakat, Khalil, 'al-Wadʿ al-ʿAskari fi Junub Lubnan' (The Military Situation in South Lebanon), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 65, April 1977.

al Hasan, Bilal, 'Ahdath Aylul wa Masʾuliyyat al-Nizam al-Urduni' (The September Events and the Responsibility of the Jordanian Regime), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 1, March 1971.

——'al-Fihm al-Filastini li-Hazimat Huzayran' (The Palestinian Understanding of the June Defeat), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 3, July 1971.

Hilal, Jamil 'al-Khitta al-Khamsiyya al-Urduniyya li-Tanmiyat al-Daffa wa al-Qitaʿ' (The Jordanian Five-Year Plan to Develop the West Bank and Gaza Strip), *al-Urdun al-Jadid*, No. 8/9, Year 3, Autumn/Winter 1986.

——'Ishkalat al-Taghyir fi al-Nizam al-Filastini' (Problems of Change in the Palestinian System)', *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, No. 15, Summer 1993.

al-Hindi, Khalil, 'al-Taʿbiʾa al-Urduniyya dud al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya qabl Hajmat Aylul 1970' (Jordanian Mobilization against the Palestinian Resistance before the September 1970 Onslaught), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971.

al-Husayni, ʿAli Zayn-al-ʿAbdin, 'Malamih min al-Tajriba al-Nidaliyya al-Filastiniyya: Harb al-ʿIsabat fi Mudun wa Mukhayyamat Qitaʿ Ghazza' (Features from the Palestinian Experience of Struggle: Guerrilla War in the Cities and Camps of Gaza), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 35, July 1974.

Khalaf, Yazid, 'Qiraʾa ʿAskariyya fi Harb Tammuz' (A Military Reading of the July War), *Shuʾun Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981.

——'Afaq al-Harb al-Filastiniyya al–Isra'iliyya al-Qadima' (Prospects of the Next Palestinian–Israeli War), unpublished manuscript submitted to *Shu'un Filastiniyya* in April 1982.
Khalil, ʿAwad, 'Masar al-Yasar al-Filastini min al-Marksiyya ila al-Biristruyka' (The Course of the Palestinian Left from Marxism to Perestroika), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 212, November 1990.
al-Khatib, Husam, 'al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya ila Ayn?' (Whither the Palestinian Revolution?), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, 4, September 1971.
——'Hudud Muqfala wa Jusur Maftuha, "Waqiʿ al-Saha al-Filastiniyya"' (Closed Borders and Open Bridges, 'The Reality of the Palestinian Arena'), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 21, May 1973.
al-Khattab, S., 'Asalib al-Muqawama al-Shaʿbiyya fi al-Intifada' (Methods of Popular Palestinian Resistance in the Intifada), *Samid al-Iqtisadi*, 11: 75 (January–March 1989).
Khurshid, Ghazi, 'al-Muqawama al-Filastiniyya wa al-ʿAmal al-Ijtimaʿi' (The Palestinian Resistance and Social Work), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 6, January 1972.
'Mawduʿat al-Harb al-Sadisa' (Issues of the Sixth War), *al-Maʿraka*, 1: 1 (February 1982).
Musa, Shihada, 'Mulahazat Hawl Tajribat al-Ittihad al-ʿAm li al-Muʿallimin al-Filastiniyyin' (Comments on the Experience of the General Union of Palestinian Teachers), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 16, December 1972.
Qahwaji, Habib, 'al-Qissa al-Kamila li-Harakat al-Ard' (The Complete Story of the Land Movement', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 1, March 1971.
——'al-ʿArab fi Isra'il baʿd ʿUdwan 1967' (The Arabs in Israel after the 1967 Aggression), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971.
Sakhnini, ʿIsam, 'Nashrat al-Tha'r: Qira'a fi Muqaddimat al-Fikr al-Muqawim' (The Revenge Periodical: A Reading of the Preliminaries to Resistance Thinking), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 21, May 1973.
——'al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya fi al-Harb al-Rabiʿa: Tawzif al-Khibrat wa Ijtiyaz al-ʿAqabat' (The Palestinian Revolution in the Fourth War: Utilising Experience and Overcoming Obstacles), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 38, October 1974.
——'Dam Filastin al-Wusta ila al-Urdun' (The Annexation of Central Palestine to Jordan), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 40, December 1974).
——'al-Kayan al-Filastini, 1964–1974' (The Palestinian Entity, 1964–1974)', *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 41/42, January–February 1975.
Sara, Fayiz, 'al-Bunya al-Ijtimaʿiyya li al-Intifada al-Filastiniyya' (The Social Structure of the Palestinian Intifada), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 189, December 1988.
Sayigh, Yazid, 'al-Muqawama al-ʿAskariyya li al-Ihtilal al-Isra'ili fi Lubnan mundh Harb 1982' (Military Resistance to Israeli Occupation in Lebanon since the 1982 War), *al-Taqrir al-ʿAskari*, No. 7, August 1985.
——'al-Tajriba al-ʿAskariyya al-Filastiniyya al-Muʿasira' (The Contemporary Palestinian Military Experience), *Encyclopaedia Palaestina*, 1990, Part II, v. 355–474.
——'Dawr al-Kifah al-Musallah wa al-Intifada fi al-Nidal al-Watani al-Filastini' (The Role of the Armed Struggle and the Uprising in the Palestinian National Struggle), *Shu'un ʿArabiyya*, No. 67, September 1991.

Sayigh, Yusif, 'Istinzaf Isra'il Natijat al-Sira' al-'Askari' (The Attrition of Israel Due to the Military Conflict), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 4, September 1971.

Shadid, Muhammad, 'al-'Unf al-Thawri al-Filastini ka-'Amil fi al-Siyasa al-Sharq Awsatiyya li al-Wilayat al-Muttahida' (Palestinian Revolutionary Violence as a Factor in US Middle East Policy), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 92/93, July/August 1979.

Shahin, Ahmad, 'Waqa'i' al-Harb' (Events of the War), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 119, October 1981.

Shbib, Samih, 'al-'Alaqat al-Rasmiyya al-Suriyya al-Filastiniyya 27/2/1982 to 26/4/1987' (Official Syrian–Palestinian Ties, 27/2/1982 to 26/4/1987), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 181, April 1988.

Sirhan, Basim, 'al-Atfal al-Filastiniyyun: Jil al-Tahrir' (Palestinian Children: Generation of Liberation), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 1, March 1971.

—— 'Shuhada' al-Thawra al-Filastiniyya' (The Martyrs of the Palestinian Revolution), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 9, May 1972.

—— 'Dirasa Hawl al-Ittijahat al-Siyasiyya lada ba'd Wihdat al-Milishya al-Filastiniyya' (A Study of Political Trends among Some Palestinian Militia Units), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 12, August 1972.

Sulayman, Jabir, 'al-Filastiniyyun fi Suriya: Ihsa'at wa Mu'ashshirat' (The Palestinians in Syria: Statistics and Indicators), *Majallat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya*, 20 (Autumn 1994).

Tamari, Salim, 'al-Dinamiyyat al-Ijtima'iyya wa Idyulujiyyat al-Muqawama fi al-Daffa al-Gharbiyya' (Social Dynamics and the Ideology of Resistance in the West Bank), in Kamil Mansur (ed.), *al-Sha'b al-Filastini fi al-Dakhil (The Palestinians Inside)* (n.p. [Beirut]: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990).

'Taqrir 'an Ma'rakat Ghazza fi Harb Huzayran 1967' (A Report on the Battle of Gaza in the War of June 1967), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 22, June 1973.

'Umar, Mahjub, 'Ru'ya al-Mustaqbal' (Vision of the Future), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 17, January 1973.

—— 'Aylul fi Junub al-Urdun' (September in the South of Jordan), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 71, October 1977.

—— 'Harb Ramadan al-Filastiniyya: al-Mawqi' wa al-Nata'ij' (The Palestinian Ramadan War: Position and Results), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No, 119, October 1981.

Zrayqat, Ghanim, 'al-Taharruk al-Jamahiri fi al-Urdun khilal Harb al-Junub' (the Mass Movement in Jordan during the War in the South), *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, No. 78, May 1978.

Hebrew

Books

Avi-Ran, Reuven, *Melhement Levanon—Mismakhim ve Meqorot Araviim: ha-Derekh li-Melhemet 'Shalom ha-Galil' (The Lebanon War—Arab Documents and Sources: The Road to the 'Peace for Galilee' War)* (Mirkaz Koved Series; Tel Aviv: Ma'rakhot (Ministry of Defence), 1987).

Kurtz, Anat, with Burgin, Maskit, and Tal, David, *Teror Islami ve-Yisra'el: Hizbullah, Gihad Islami Filistini, Hamas (Islamic Terror and Israel: Hizbullah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas)* (Tel Aviv: Papyrus for the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1993).
Meir, Shmuel, *Melhemet Levanon—Mabat mi-1987 (The Lebanon War—A Look from 1987)* (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, n.d. [1988]).
Yaʿari, Ehud, *Mitsrayim ve ha-Feda'in, 1953–1956 (Egypt and the Fida'iyyun, 1953–1956* (Givʿat Haviva: Center for Arabic and Afro-Asian Studies, 1975).

English (some French sources also included)

Books

Abed, George (ed.), *The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development under Prolonged Occupation* (London: Routledge, 1988).
Abu-ʿAmr, Ziad, *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994).
Abu-Ghazaleh, Adnan, *Palestinian Arab Cultural Nationalism* (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1991).
Ahmad, Hisham, *From Religious Salvation to Political Transformation: The Rise of Hamas in Palestinian Society* (Jerusalem: PASSIA, 1994).
Amos, John, *The Palestinian Resistance: Organization of a Nationalist Movement* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).
Aronson, Geoffrey, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987).
Asmar, Fawzi, *To be an Arab in Israel* (London: Frances Pinter, 1975).
Avi-Ran, Reuven, *The Syrian Involvement in Lebanon since 1975* (Boulder Colo.: Westview, 1991).
Barnett, Michael N., *Confronting the Costs of War: Military Power, State, and Society in Egypt and Israel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov, *The Israeli–Egyptian War of Attrition, 1969–1970: A Case-Study of Limited Local War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).
Batatu, Hanna, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
Ben-Rafael, Eliezer, *Israel–Palestine: A Guerilla Conflict in International Politics* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987).
Benvenisti, Meron, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1984).
Biersteker, Thomas J., and Weber, Cynthia (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Black September (Beirut: PLO Research Centre, 1971).
Brand, Laurie, A., *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).
——*Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

Bruhns, Fred C., *'A Socio-Psychological Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes'*, unpublished manuscript, October 1954.

Brynen, Rex, *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo. and San Fransisco: Westview Press, 1990).

——(ed.), *Echoes of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict* (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1991).

Burns, E. L. M., *Between Arab and Israeli* (London: George Harrap & Co., 1962).

Chaliand, Gerard, *The Palestinian Resistance* (London: Penguin Books, 1972).

Charters, David, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1989).

Cobban, Helena, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Cohen, Amnon, *Political Parties in the West Bank under the Jordanian Regime, 1949–1967* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1982).

Cohen, Michael, *Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945–48* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

Dawisha, Adeed, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis* (London: Macmillan, 1980).

——and Zartman, I. William (eds.), *Beyond Coercion: The Durability of the Arab State* (London: Routledge, 1988).

Dayan, David, *Strike First* (New York: Pitman, 1967).

Dayan, Moshe, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign 1956* (London: Wiedenfeld & Nicolson, 1966).

——*Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt–Israel Negotiations* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1981).

Dubar, Claude, and Nasr, Salim, *Les Classes sociales au Liban* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1976).

Dupuy, T. N., *Elusive Victory: The Arab–Israeli Wars, 1947–1974* (London: MacDonald & Jane's, 1978).

Dupuy, Trevor, and Martell, Paul, *Flawed Victory: The Arab–Israeli Conflict and the 1982 War in Lebanon* (Fairfax, Va.: HERO Books, 1986).

el-Edroos, S. A., *The Hashemite Arab Army, 1908–1979: An Appreciation and Analysis of Military Operations* (Amman: Amman Publishing House, 1980).

Elpeleg, Zvi, *The Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Hussaini: Founder of the Palestinian National Movement* (London: Frank Cass, 1993).

Evans, Peter, Rueschmeyer, Dietrich, and Skocpol, Theda (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Evron Yair, *War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Israeli–Syrian Deterrence Dialogue* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

Flapan, Simha, *The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities* (New York: Pantheon, 1987).

Freedman, Robert, *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

Gabriel, Richard, *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli–PLO War in Lebanon* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1984).

George, Alexander, and Simons, William (eds.), *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).

Gerges, Fawaz, *The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994).
Ghabra, Shafeeq, *Palestinians in Kuwait: The Family and the Politics of Survival* (Boulder, Colo. and London: Westview Press, 1987).
Glassman, Jon, *Arms for the Arabs: The Soviet Union and War in the Middle East* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
Glubb, John, *Soldier with the Arabs* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1957).
Golan, Galia, *The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance* (New York: Praeger, 1980).
—— *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Gowers, Andrew, and Walker, Tony, *Behind the Myth: Arafat* (London: Corgi, 1991).
Graham-Brown, Sarah, *Education, Repression and Liberation: Palestinians* (London: World University Service, 1984).
Gresh, Alain, *The PLO: The Struggle Within, towards an Independent Palestinian State* (London: Zed Books, 1985).
Gubser, Peter, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events* (London: Croom Helm, 1983).
Haley, P. E., and Snider, L. W., *Lebanon in Crisis* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1979).
Harkabi, Yehoshofat, *Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy*, Adelphi Papers No. 53 (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968).
—— *Arab Strategies and Israel's Response* (New York: Free Press, 1977).
—— *Israel's Fateful Decisions* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988).
Hart, Alan, *Arafat: Terrorist or Peacemaker?* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984).
Heikal, Mohamed, *The Road to Ramadan* (London: Collins, 1975).
Hilterman, Joost, *Behind the Intifada: Labour and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).
Hinnebusch, Raymond, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Hobsbawm, Eric J., *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: Canto, 1990).
Hudson, Michael, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977).
Hunter, F. Robert, *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991).
International Commission of Jurists, *The Civilian Judicial System in the West Bank and Gaza: Present and Future* (Geneva: Centre for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, June 1994).
Israeli, Raphael (ed.), *PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983).
Jabber, Paul, *Not by War Alone: Security and Arms Control in the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
Jackson, Robert, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Jansen, Michael, *The Battle of Beirut* (London: Zed Press, 1983).
Jiryis, Sabri, *The Arabs in Israel* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).
Johnson, Michael, *Class & Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840–1985* (London: Ithaca Press, 1986).
Karsh, Efraim, and Rautsi, Inari, *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography* (London: Futura, 1991).
Kazziha, Walid, *Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World: Habash and his Comrades from Nationalism to Marxism* (London: Charles Knight, 1975).
Kerr, Malcolm, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971; 3rd edn., 1978 reprint).
Khalaf, Issa, *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948* (Albany: State University of New Yrok Press, 1991).
Khalidi, Rashid, *Under Siege: P.L.O. Decisionmaking during the 1982 War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
Khalidi, Walid, *From Haven to Conquest* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1971).
——*Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Center for International Affairs, 1979).
——(ed.), *All That Remains* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).
Kirisci, Kemal, *The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986).
Kissinger, Henry, *The White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979).
——*Years of Upheaval* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1981).
Kretzmer, David, *The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990).
Landau, Jacob, *The Arabs in Israel: A Political Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).
Laroui, Abdullah, *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
Layne, Linda, *Home and Homeland: The Dialogies of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
Legrain, Jean-François, (with Pierre Chenard), *Les Voix de soulevement palestinien* (Cairo: CEDEJ, 1991 (in French and Arabic)).
Lenczowski, George (ed.), *Political Elites in the Middle East* (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1975).
Lesch, Ann Mosely, *Arab Politics in Palestine, 1917–1939: The Frustration of a Nationalist Movement* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979).
Lockman, Zachary, *Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).
Louis, Roger, and Stookey, Robert (eds.), *The End of the Palestine Mandate* (Austin: Texas University Press, 1986).
Love, Kenneth, *The Twice-Fought War* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969).
Lustick, Ian S., *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank–Gaza* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993).
Luttwak, Edward, and Horowitz, Dan, *The Israeli Army* (London: Allen Lane, 1975).

McLaurin, R. D., and Jureidini, Paul, *Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)* (Belmont, Va: Abbot Associates, 1981).

—— Peretz, Don, and Snider, Lewis, *Middle East Foreign Policy: Issues and Processes* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

Madfai, Madiha, *Jordan, the United States and the Middle East Peace Process 1974–1991* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Maʿoz, Moshe, *Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank: The Changing Role of the Mayors under Jordan and Israel* (London: Frank Cass, 1984).

Masalha, Nur, *Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992).

Mattar, Philip, *The Mufti of Jerusalem: al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

Mayall, James, *Nationalism and International Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Mazur, Michael, *Economic Growth and Development in Jordan* (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

Melman, Yossi, and Raviv, Dan, *Behind the Uprising: Israelis, Jordanians and Palestinians* (London: Greenwood, 1989).

Merari, Ariel, and Elad, Shlomo, *The International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1986).

Migdal, Joel S., *Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressures towards Political and Social Change in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

—— *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

—— Kohli, Atul, and Shue, Vivienne (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

—— *et al., Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

Mishal, Shaul, *The PLO under Arafat: Between Gun and Olive Branch* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986).

—— and Aharoni, Reuben, *Speaking Stones: Communiques from the Intifada Underground* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1994).

Mitchell, Richard, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

Morris, Benny, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

—— *1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

—— *Israel's Border Wars, 1949–1956* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

Musallam, Sami, *The Palestine Liberation Organization* (Brattleboro, Vt.: Amana Books, 1988).

Muslih, Muhammad, *The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988).

Nakhleh, Khalil, *Indigenous Organizations in Palestine: Towards a Purposeful Societal Development* (Jerusalem: Arab Thought Forum, 1991).

Norton, Augustus, *Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).

——and Greenberg, Martin (eds.), *The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989).

O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Third Arab–Israeli War* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972).

——*Arab Guerrilla Power, 1967–1972* (London: Faber and Faber, 1974).

——*No Victor, No Vanquished* (San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1978).

O'Brien, William, *Law and Morality in Israel's War with the PLO* (New York and London: Routledge, 1991).

O'Neill, Bard, *Revolutionary Warfare in the Middle East* (Presidio, Calif.: Paladin Press, 1974).

——*Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978).

Organski, A. F. K., *The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

Owen, Roger, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East* (London: Routledge, 1992).

Pappe, Ilan, *Britain and the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1951* (London, Macmillan: 1988).

Peteet, Julie M., *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).

Petran, Tabitha, *Syria* (London: Frank Cass, 1972).

——*The Struggle over Lebanon* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987).

Plascov, Avi, *The Palestinian Refugees in Jordan 1948–1957* (London: Frank Cass, 1981).

Poggi, Gianfranco, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).

Porath, Yehoshua, *The Emergence of the Palestinian Arab National Movement, 1918–1929* (London: Frank Cass, 1974).

——*The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion*, ii. *1929–1939* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).

Quandt, William, *Decade of Decisions: American Policy towards the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1967–1976* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1977).

——*Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986).

——*Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab–Israeli Conflict since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1993).

——Jabber, Fuad, and Lesch, Ann Mosley, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

Qubain, Fahim, *Crisis in Lebanon* (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 1961).

Rabinovich, Itamar, *The War for Lebanon, 1970–1983* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984).

——*The Road Not Taken: Early Arab–Israeli Negotiations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

Randal, Jonathan, *The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and American Bunglers* (London: Chatto & Windus—The Hogarth Press, 1983).

el-Rayyes, Riad, and Nahas, Dunia, *Guerillas for Palestine* (London: Croom Helm, 1976).

Rothenberg, Gunther, *The Anatomy of the Israeli Army* (London: Batsford, 1979).

Roy, Sarah, *The Gaza Strip: The Political Economy of De-Development* (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995).

Rubenberg, Cheryl, *The Palestine Liberation Organisation: Its Institutional Infrastructure* (Belmont, Mass.: Institute for Arab Studies, 1983).

—— *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986).

Rubin, Barry, *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

—— *Revolution Until Victory? The Politics and History of the PLO* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1994).

Rubinstein, Alvin, *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet–Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977).

Sadowski, Yahya, *Political Vegetables? Businessman and Bureaucrat in the Development of Egyptian Agriculture* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1991).

Sahliyeh, Emile, *The PLO after the Lebanon War* (Boulder, Colo. and London: Westview Press, 1986).

—— *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics since 1967* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988).

Said, Abu-Lughod, *et al.*, *A Profile of the Palestinian People* (Chicago: Palestine Human Rights Campaign, 1983).

Said, Edward, *The Question of Palestine* (New York: Times Books, 1979).

—— and Hitchens, Christopher (eds.), *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question* (London and New York: Verso, 1988).

Sanbar, Elias, *Palestine 1948: l'Expulsion* (Paris: Institut d'Etudes Palestiniennes, 1984).

Sandler, Shmuel, and Frisch, Hillel, *Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank* (Lexington Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984).

Sayigh, Rosemary, *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* (London: Zed Books, 1979).

—— *Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon* (London: Zed Books, 1994).

Sayigh, Yezid, *Arab Military Industry: Capability, Performance and Impact* (London: Brassey's, 1992).

Schiff, Ze'ev, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising—Israel's Third Front* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989).

—— and Rothstein, Raphael, *Fedayeen: The Story of the Palestinian Guerrillas* (London: Vallentine, Mitchell, 1972).

—— and Ya'ari, Ehud, *Israel's Lebanon War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984).

Schurmann, Franz, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*, 2nd, enlarged edn. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

Seale, Patrick, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics (1945–1958)* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

—— *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: California University Press, 1988; 1990 edn.)).

——*Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire* (London: Hutchinson, 1992).

Seikaly, May, *Haifa: Transformation of an Arab Society, 1918–1939* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1995).

Shafir, Gershon, *Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, 1882–1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

Shalev, Aryeh, *The West Bank: Line of Defense* (New York: Praeger for JCSS, 1985).

——*The Intifada: Causes and Effects* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

Sharabi, Hisham, *Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970).

Shehadeh, Raja, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank*, revised edn. (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988).

Shemesh, Moshe, *The Palestinian Entity, 1959–1974: Arab Politics and the PLO* (London: Frank Cass, 1988).

Shimshoni, Jonathan, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1988).

Shlaim, Avi, *Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement, and the Partition of Palestine* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Skocpol, Theda, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

——*Social Revolutions in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Smith, Anthony, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; 1995 reprint).

——*National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991).

Swedenberg, Ted, *The 1936–1939 Rebellion and the Palestinian National Past* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

Tilly, Charles (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

——*Coercion, Capital, and European States,* AD *990–1992*, revised edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

Touval, Saadia, *The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

Trabulsi, Fawwaz, 'Identitées et Solidarités croisées dans les conflits du Liban contemporain, Thèse de Doctorat en Histoire (Connaissance du Tiers-Monde), Université de Paris 8 decembre 1993.

Trimberger, Ellen Kay, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978).

Van Dam, Niklaos, *The Struggle for Power in Syria* (London: Croom Helm, 1980).

Vatikiotis, P. J., *Politics and the Military in Jordan* (London: Frank Cass, 1967).

Wallach, Janet, and Wallach, John, *Arafat in the Eye of the Beholder* (Rocklin, Calif.: Prima Press, 1992).

Waterbury, John, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

——*Exposed to Innumerable Delusions: Public Enterprise and State Power in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

Whetten, Lawrence, *The Canal War: Four Powers Conflict in the Middle East* (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1974).

Wickham-Crowley, Timothy, *Guerrillas and Revolutionaries in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes since 1956* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

Wolf, Eric R., *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper Row, 1969; pbk. edn., New York: Harper Collins, 1973).

Yaniv, Avner, *Dilemmas of Security: Politics, Strategy, and the Israeli Experience in Lebanon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

Yermiya, Dov, *My War Diary: Israel in Lebanon* (London: Pluto Press, 1983).

Yodfat, Aryeh, and Arnon-Ohanna, Yuval, *PLO Strategy and Tactics* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1981).

Yorke, Valerie, *Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel* (London: Gower for IISS, 1988).

Zartman, I. William, and Berman, Maureen, *The Practical Negotiator* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982).

Zubaida, Sami, *Islam, the People and the State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993).

Articles and Chapters

Individually-authored reports or other regular sections of periodical publications are not listed.

Abu Khalil, Asad, 'Internal Contradictions in the PFLP: Decision-Making and Policy Determination', *Middle East Journal*, 41: 3 (Summer 1987).

Barkai, Haim, 'Reflections on the Economic Cost of the Lebanon War', *Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 37, 1986.

Barnett, Michael, 'High Politics is Low Politics: The Domestic and Systemic Sources of Israeli Security Policy, 1967–1977', *World Politics*, 42: 4 (July 1990), 529–62.

——and Levy, Jack S., 'Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962–73', *International Organization*, 45: 3 (Summer 1991), 369–95.

Batatu, Hanna, 'The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi Revolutions: Some Observations on their Underlying Causes and Social Character', inaugural address, Washington, DC, Georgetown University, 1983.

Bayart, Jean-François, 'Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A Tocquevillian Reading', in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994).

Bernstein, Deborah S., 'Expanding the Split Labor Market Theory: Between and Within Sectors of the Split Labor Market of Mandatory Palestine', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 38: 2 (April 1996).

Block, Fred, and Somers, Margaret R., 'Beyond the Economistic Fallacy: The Holistic Social Science of Karl Polanyi', in Theda Skocpol (ed.), *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology* (Cambridge, 1984).

Blommaert, Jan, 'Language and Nationalism: Comparing Flanders and Tanzania', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2/ii (July 1996).

Brand, Laurie, 'Palestinians in Syria: The Politics of Integration', *Middle East Journal*, 42: 4 (Autumn 1988).

Browne, Donald, 'The Voices of Palestine: A Broadcasting House Divided', *Middle East Journal*, 29: 2 (Spring 1975).

Bruhns, Fred, 'A Study of Arab Refugee Attitudes', *Middle East Journal*, 9 (1955).

Brynen, Rex, 'The Neopatrimonial Dimension of Palestinian Politics', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 25: 1 (Autumn 1995).

Carus, W. S., 'The Bekaa Valley Campaign', *Washington Quarterly* (Autumn 1982).

Cordesman, Anthony, 'The Sixth Arab–Israeli Conflict', *Armed Forces Journal International* (August 1982).

Dawn, C. Ernest, 'The Origins of Arab Nationalism', in Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva Simon (eds.), *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York, 1991).

Deeb, Marius, 'Shia Movements in Lebanon: Their Formation, Ideology, Social Basis, and Links with Syria and Iran', *Third World Quarterly*, 10: 2 (April 1988).

Divine, Donna, 'The Dialectics of Palestinian Politics', in Migdal, Joel, 'The Effects of Regime Policies', in Joel Migdal *et al.*, *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

Eaton, Joseph, 'Gadna: Israel's Youth Corps', *Middle East Journal*, 23: 4 (Autumn 1969).

Eldar, Mike, 'The Amphibious Assault at Sidon', *IDF Journal*, 3: 3 (1983).

Escribano, Marisa, and el-Joubeh, Nazmi, 'Migration and Change in a West Bank Village', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 11: 1 (41) (Autumn 1981).

Faris, Hani, 'Lebanon and the Palestinians: Brotherhood or Fratricide?', *Arab Studies Quarterly*, 3: 4 (Fall 1981).

Gabriel, Judith, 'The Economic Side of the Intifada', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 18: 1 (Autumn 1988).

Heymont, Irving, 'The Israeli Nahal Program', *Middle East Journal*, 21: 3 (Summer 1967).

Hilal, Jamil, 'West Bank and Gaza Strip Social Formation under Jordanian and Egyptian Rule (1948–1967)', *Review of Middle East Studies*, 5 (1992).

Khalidi, Ahmad, 'The War of Attrition', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 3: 1 (Autumn 1973).

Khalidi, Rashid, 'The Palestinians in Lebanon: Social Repercussions of Israel's Invasion', *Middle East Journal*, 38: 2 (Spring 1984).

—— 'The PLO Dilemma: PLO Policy after Lebanon', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 15: 1 (57) (Autumn 1985).

—— 'Palestinian Peasant Resistance to Zionism before World War I', in Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens (eds.), *Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question* (London and New York: Verso, 1988).

Khalidi, Walid, 'The Arab Perspective', in Roger Louis and Robert Stookey (eds.), *The End of the Palestine Mandate* (Austin: Texas University Press, 1986).

—— 'At a Critical Juncture: The United States and the Palestinian People', *CCAS Reports*

(Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University, 1989).

Le Troquer, Yann, and Nammari, Inés, 'Reflets d'une imagerie Palestinienne', *Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord*, 32 (1993).

al-Malki, Majdi, 'Clans et partis politiques dans trois villages palestiniennes', *Revue d'études Palestiniennes*, 52 (1994).

Martin, Constant, 'The Choices of Identity', *Social Identities*, 1: 1 (1995).

Massad, Joseph, 'Conceiving the Masculine: Gender and Palestinian Nationalism', *Middle East Journal*, 49: 3 (Summer 1995).

Metcalf, Lee Kendall, 'Outbidding to Radical Nationalists: Minority Policy in Estonia, 1988–1993', *Nations and Nationalism*, 2/ii (July 1996).

Migdal, Joel, 'The Effects of Regime Policies', in Joel Migdal *et al.*, *Palestinian Society and Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

Morris, Benny, 'Yosef Weitz and the Transfer Committees, 1948–1949', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 22: 4 (October 1986).

Murphy, Alexander, 'The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Nevo, Joseph, 'The Arabs of Palestine 1947–48: Military and Political Activity', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 23: 1 (January 1987).

—— 'Arab Society and Leadership in Mandatory Palestine', unpublished paper presented to Middle Eastern Studies Association conference, December 1995.

Omar, Mahjoub, 'Vingt ans de lutte armée', *Revue d'études palestinennes*, No. 14 (winter 1984).

Oren, Michael, 'Secret Egypt–Israel Peace Initiatives Prior to the Suez Campaign', *Middle Eastern Studies*, 26: 3 (July 1990).

Parekh, Bhikhu, 'Ethnocentricity of the Nationalist Discourse', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1: Part 1 (March 1995).

Pedatzur, Reuven, 'Coming Back Full Circle: The Palestinian Option in 1967', *Middle East Journal*, 49: 2 (Spring 1995).

Penrose, Jan, 'Essential Constructions? The 'Cultural Bases' of Nationalist Movements', *Nations and Nationalism*, 1: Part 3 (November 1995).

Radi, Lamia, 'La Famille comme mode de gestion et de controle du social chez les élites traditionelles palestiniennes', unpublished essay, March 1996.

Rekhess, Elie, 'Israeli Arabs and the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza: Political Affinity and National Solidarity', *Asian and African Studies*, 23: 2 and 3 (November 1989).

Rex, John, 'Ethnic Identity and the Nation State: The Political Sociology of Multi-Cultural Societies', *Social Identities*, 1: 1 (1995).

Robinson, Glen, 'The Role of the Professional Middle Class in the Mobilization of Palestinian Society: The Medical and Agricultural Committees', *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25: 2 (May 1993).

Sayigh, Rosemary, 'The Third Siege of Bourj Barajneh Camp: A Woman's Testimony', *Race & Class*, 29: 1 (Summer 1987).
Sayigh, Yezid, 'Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 12: 4 (48) (Summer 1983).
——'Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon, June 1982', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 13: 1 (49) (Fall 1983).
——'Palestinian Armed Struggle: Means and Ends', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 16: 1 (61) (Autumn 1986).
——'Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics since 1982', *International Affairs*, 65: 2 (April 1989).
——'The Intifadah Continues: Legacy, Dynamics and Challenges', *Third World Quarterly*, 11: 3 (July 1989).
——'Structure of Occupation: The Economic, Social and Security Impact of Israeli Controls on the West Bank and Gaza Strip', *Arab Affairs*, 1: 9 (Summer 1989).
——'Reconstructing the Paradox: The Arab Nationalist Movement, Armed Struggle, and Palestine, 1951–1966', *Middle East Journal*, 45: 4 (Autumn 1991).
Schiff, Ze'ev, 'Lebanon: Motivations and Interests in Israel's Policy', *Middle East Journal*, 38: 2 (Spring 1984).
Sella, Amnon, 'The USSR and the War in Lebanon: Mid-1982', *RUSI Journal*, 128: 2 (June 1983).
Shadid, Mohammed, 'The Muslim Brotherhood Movement in the West Bank and Gaza', *Third World Quarterly*, 10: 2 (April 1988).
Sheehan, Edward R. F., 'Step by Step in the Middle East', *Foreign Policy*, 22 (Spring 1976).
Shlaim, Avi, 'The Lavon Affair', *Middle East International*, 76 (October 1977).
——'Egypt and the Fedayeen, 1936–56', *Middle East International*, 84 (June 1978).
——'Husni Zaʿim and the Plan to Resettle Palestinian Refugees in Syria', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 15: 4 (60) (Summer 1986).
——'The Rise and Fall of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20: 1 (77) (Autumn 1990).
Shue, Vivienne, 'State Power and Social Organization in China', in Joel Migdal, Atul Kohli, and Vivienne Shue (eds.), *State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
Skocpol, Theda, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
Sullivan, Denis J., 'NGOs in Palestine: Agents of Development and Foundation of Civil Society', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 25: 3 (99) (Spring 1996).
Swedenberg, Ted, 'The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936–1939)', in Edmund Burke, III, and Ira M. Lapidus (eds.), *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
Tilly, Charles, 'Reflections on the History of European State-making', in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

van Sivers, Peter, 'Rural Uprisings as Political Movements in Colonial Algeria, 1851–1914', in Edmund Burke, III, and Ira M. Lapidus (eds.), *Islam, Politics, and Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

Waterbury, John, 'Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco', *Government and Opposition*, 11: 4 (Autumn 1976).

INDEX

AAL, *see* Arab Army of Lebanon
ʿAbadla, Qusay 113, 115, 121, 132, 170
ʿAbbas, Mahmud (Abu Mazin) 105, 298, 419, 658
  assassination plot 355
  in central committee 155, 156, 265, 633–4
  early career 85, 86–7
  Israel and 414, 508
  Jordan talks 415, 440
  Lebanese crisis 383, 389, 399
  Oslo accord 653, 660
  peace process 616, 655, 656
  in Qatar group 104, 123, 127
  role in PLO 456
ʿAbd-al-Amin, Bahjat 171, 186, 187, 289, 290
ʿAbd-al-Baqi, Ahmad Hilmi 15, 16, 35, 59, 96
ʿAbd-al-Fattah, Ziyad 351
ʿAbd-al-Ghaffar, Hardan 148
ʿAbd-al-Ghafur, Muhammad 311, 355
ʿAbd-al-Hadi, Muhammad 290–1
ʿAbd-al-Hakim, Marwan 181
ʿAbd-al-Hamid, Fathi 124
ʿAbd-al-Hamid, Hayil (Abu al-Hawl) 124, 431
  in *ʿArab Filastin* 85, 87
  assassination 654, 689–90
  in central committee 311, 530
  in Fateh 128, 129, 162, 180, 563–4
  security apparatus 457, 601, 603
ʿAbd-al-Karim, ʿAdil 125, 126
  founding of Fateh 84, 85, 87, 103
  objection to armed struggle 106, 107
  opposes Arafat 123, 128
ʿAbd-al-Karim, ʿUmar 226
ʿAbd-al-Karim, Ahmad 28
ʿAbd-al-Karim, Fu'ad (Abu Ahmad) 230, 254, 257, 264, 306, 525
  armed struggle 647, 648
  PFLP crises 229, 649
ʿAbd-al-Majid, Khalid 644
ʿAbd-al-Ra'uf, ʾAbd-al-Mun'im 61, 62
ʿAbd-al-Ra'uf, Jamal 102
ʿAbd-al-Rahim, al-Tayyib 261, 351, 633
ʿAbd-al-Rahim, Jawad 186, 241, 289, 290
ʿAbd-al-Rahim, Zakariyya 104, 123, 128, 225
ʿAbd-al-Rahman, Ahmad 351, 387, 621, 622–3, 654
ʿAbd-al-Rahman, Asʿad 140–1, 165, 167
ʿAbd-al-Salam, Muhammad 180
ʿAbd-al-Shafi, Haydar 615, 643
ʿAbd-Rabbu, Adib (Yasir) 502, 554, 574, 604, 653
  in ANM 161, 228, 229
  armed struggle 471
  DFLP crisis 646, 647
  Fateh split 566
  in PDFLP 208, 230, 231
  Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 401
  trade unions 475
  in USSR 342, 643
ʿAbdullah, king of Jordan 11, 13–14, 16, 41–2, 59
  dissolution of Arab Salvation Army 58
ʿAbdullah, Munir 105
al-ʿAbid, Maʿadh 222, 226, 264, 299
Abnaʾ Filastin fi al-Jamiʿa 85
al-ʿAbs, Sulayman 571
Abtal al-ʿAwda 142, 170, 305
  formation of 136–7
  raids 137–8
Abu Akram 564
Abu Hani group 180–1, 350
Abu Hamman 203, 206, 213, 214, 235, 271–2
Abu Maʿn 559
Abu Munir 559
Abu Na'il 352
Abu Nidal faction 431, 435, 445, 570, 599
  aid from Saudi Arabia 652
  camps war 593
  Fateh and 561, 563, 564, 653
  Syrian headquarters 554
  terrorism 407, 416, 587, 590, 593
  violence 405, 425, 523, 558, 577, 578
Abu Sa'id 419
Abu-Ahmad, ʿAdnan 128
Abu-al-ʿAynayn, Sultan 591, 594
Abu-al-Hakam, Dawud 162
Abu-al-Khayr, Husayn 310
Abu-al-Nur, ʿAbd-al-Muhsin 30, 150
Abu-al-Shaʿr, Jawad 162, 193, 354, 393
Abu-Bakr, ʿAtif 601
Abu-Fidda, ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz 525
Abu-Gharbiyya, Bahjat 113, 135, 265

Abu-Ghayth, Musa 107
Abu-Ghazala, Muhammad 224
Abu-Ghazala, Samir 189
Abu-Hijla, Muhammad 116, 138
Abu-Hilal, ʿAli 609
Abu-Karsh, Subhi 559, 633
Abu-Kwayk, Samih 308, 355, 434
  in Baʿth party 93, 105, 222
  in central committee 493
  in Fateh 226, 227, 352
  Fateh split 556, 557, 561, 562, 564, 600
  in revolutionary council 294
Abu-Layla, ʿUmar 597
Abu-Lughud, Ibrahim 622
Abu-Marzuq, Mahmud 183, 291, 330, 378, 393
Abu-Marzuq, Musa 650
Abu-Mayzar, ʿAbd-al-Muhsin 124, 343, 415
Abu-Mayzar, Muhammad 352, 431
Abu-Nidal, Nazih 352, 559
Abu-Nuwar, ʿAli 27–8
Abu-Nuwar, Maʿn 245
Abu-Rahma, Fayiz 617
Abu-Raqaba, Hasan 226
Abu-Shaʿban, Walid 171, 181, 187
Abu-Shaqra, Muhammad 390
Abu-Sharar, Majid 85, 434
  in central committee 493
  assassination 512
  as director of information department 351
  Fateh policies 494
  Iran–Iraq war 502
  Lebanese crisis 361–2, 364–5, 380, 399–400, 405
  in revolutionary council 294, 431, 492
  steadfastness funds 481
  trade unions 477–8
Abu-Sharif, Bassam 310, 417, 622
Abu-Shawar, Rashad 340, 569
Abu-Shilbaya, Muhammad 307, 467
Abu-Sitta, ʿAbdullah 182
Abu-Sitta, Hamid 425
Abu-Tawq, ʿAli 591, 592, 594
  assassination 595
Abu-Tayr, Muhammad 627
Abu-Zayid, Jamal 330, 395
Abu-Zayyad, Ziyad 638
al-Abyad, Darwish 599
accordian plan 527
Achille Lauro hijacking 586
Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP) 238, 253, 279
Action Organization for the Support of the Revolution 175
activism, political 35–6, 38–9, 48–54
Adam, Yekutiel 526
Aden 79, 80
  becomes South Yemen 146
Aden–Algiers accord 575, 576
ADF, *see* Arab Deterrent Force
al-Adgham, al-Bahi 266, 278
administration:
  PFLP 491
  PLO 454–60, 603–4
ʿAfana, Ahmad 182, 383, 560, 563
al-Afandi, ʿAlaʾ 462, 653
Afghanistan 640
Afghanistan invasion 325
ʿAflaq, Michel 28, 72, 93, 146, 148
al-Agha, Majid 180, 462
AHC, *see* Arab Higher Committee
al-Ahdab, ʾAziz 380
al-Ahmad, ʾAbd-al-Rahim 439
al-Ahram 176
al-ʿAjiz, Saʾib 171, 291, 330, 395
al-ʿAjjuri, Yusif 626
ʿAjlun, battle of 279–81
al-ʿAjrami, ʿAbdullah 166–7
al-ʿAjrami, Thaʾir 171, 182
al-ʿAjrudi, Yusif 115
al-Akhdar, al-ʿAfif 228, 247, 303
al-ʿAkluk, Abu ʿAbd 123, 128
al-ʿAlami, Saʿd-al-din 627
al-ʿAlami, Zuhayr 294
ALF, *see* Arab Liberation Front
Algeria 96, 341, 502, 572, 576
  Aden–Algiers accord 575
  Amman accord 579
  Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319
  arms from 533
  battle of ʿAjlun 280
  camps war 596
  Fateh and 100, 102, 106, 126, 182, 183, 565
  food riots 548
  Front de Libération National 102
  guerrilla movement 191
  independence struggle 10, 79, 91, 120, 678
  Lebanese crisis 402
  steadfastness and confrontation front 325
al-ʿAli, Muhammad Ibrahim 128
al-ʿAli, Naji 603
ʿAli, Salim Rubayʿ 146
ʿAli, Tariq 272, 301
All Palestine Government (APG) 35, 41,

58–9, 334, 669
dissolution 96
formed 15–16
Allon, Yigal 308, 321, 338, 366
ʿAllush, Naji (Abu Ibrahim) 93, 355, 434
arrested 431
in Fateh 189, 199, 224, 285
Fateh internal disputes 352, 353, 429, 432
in Jordan 227, 275, 277
Palestinian civil war 569
on PLO 218
in revolutionary council 294
al-ʿAlwan, Jasim 69, 77
Amal 513, 567
camps war 581, 582–5, 590–1, 593–4, 605–6
clashes in Lebanon 520
Fateh and 367, 573
feud with Hizbullah 620, 653
feud with LNM 403–4, 497, 504
feud with PLO 497, 499
Lebanese war 528, 529
al-ʿamal al-fidaʾi 131
American University of Beirut 45, 71, 73, 74
Amin, Idi 453
ʿAmir, ʿAbd-al-Hakim 30, 63–4, 77, 141
resignation and suicide 149
ʿAmir, ʿAli ʿAli 31, 112, 113, 114, 116
al-ʿAmira, Khalid 84
al-ʿAmira, Yusif 128
al-ʿAmla, Abu Nidal 599
al-ʿAmla, Muhammad 182
al-ʿAmla, Musa 294, 296, 297, 353, 434
assassinations ordered 578, 585, 595
camps wars 620
condemns arrests 434
Fateh split 556, 561, 562, 567, 597, 599
Lebanese crisis 383, 406
in revolutionary council 493
Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 398
Amman accord 267, 578–80, 582
abandonment of 586–7
ʿAmmar, Jabr 171, 287, 626
ʿAmmash, Salih Mahdi 148, 247, 252, 259
ʿAmr, Salim 171, 182, 183
ʿAnabtawi, Mundhir 140
al-ʿAnani, Shihada 133
Anderson, Robert 25
Anderson, Sven 624
Andropov, Yuri 545–6, 555
ANM, *see* Arab Nationalists Movement
Ansar guerrilla group 273
formed 248–51
AOLP 238, 253, 279
APG, *see* All Palestine Government
al-Aqsa guerrilla group 246
Arab Army of Lebanon (AAL) 384, 413
Lebanese crisis 392, 404
revolt 379–82
Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 396
Arab cold war 19, 29, 32, 94, 95
Palestinian military units in 67
resurgence 666
Arab Congress 8
Arab Cooperation Council 548
Arab countries, *see* Arab states
Arab Defence Council 152
Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) 408, 412, 413, 414, 416
Shtura accord 419, 420
withdrawal from Lebanon 498
ʿArab Filastin 85
Arab Follow-Up Committee 512
Arab Front 38
Arab Higher Command 334
Arab Higher Committee (AHC) 35, 99, 649–50, 669
Muhammad Amin Husayni and 8, 14–15, 48, 688
Arab–Israeli war (1947–8) 10, 14
aftermath 1–4
Arab–Israeli war (1967) 667–8
aftermath 143–53, 155–73
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319–20, 329–33, 684
Arab Legion 27, 58, 60, 65
Arab Liberation Front (ALF) 253, 260, 442, 576
battle of ʿAjlun 279, 281
clandestinity 284
clashes in refugee camps 416, 434–5
formed 236–7
in Jordan 253, 260
Jordan civil war (1970) 263, 269
Lebanese crisis 361, 388
in Lebanon 291, 499
military organization 451
Arab Maghrib Union 548
Arab Nationalist Bloc 50
Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM) 53, 56, 163, 175
appeal of 95
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 158–61
Arab politics and 75–80
armed struggle 108–11

Arab Nationalists Movement (*cont.*):
Basic Political Report 229
Fateh and 122, 161–2
formed 50, 71–5
guerrilla action 139–42
inactivity of 31–2, 130–2
internal disputes 108–9, 228–30
leadership 677
in Lebanon 188
in occupied territories 164–7
Palestinian branch formed 79–80
PFLP and 227, 228, 232–3
PLO on 99–100
see also Special Apparatus
Arab Organization for Palestine 238, 298
Arab Party 50
Arab Salvation Army 14, 58, 71, 89–90
Arab Security Force (ASF) 394, 399, 401, 406
see also Arab Deterrent Force
Arab Socialist Action Party (ASAP) 233, 302, 345, 490
camps war 581
guerrilla campaigns 430
Lebanese crisis 395
terrorism 433
Arab Socialist Party 28, 74
Arab Socialist Union (ASU) 149, 150, 370, 667
ANM and 79, 109, 136
formed 30
'Arab solution' 641, 642
Arab states:
aid: decline in 690; for occupied territories 481, 621–2; for Palestinian movement 679, 680, 681; for PLO 447, 548, 603, 640; for universities 657
ANM and 75–80
attitudes of Palestinian leadership to 677–8
control of Palestinian refugees 36–42, 666
Fateh and 89–90
gaining of independence 4–6
infiltration problem 58–9
Iran–Iraq war 545
Lebanese war 529
Palestine and 10–16, 20–3, 674–6
Palestinian military units in 67–70
political disputes in 548
relations with Israel 11–12, 18–20, 21–2
relations with Palestinian movement 198–9, 664
see also specific countries
ʿArafat, Fathi 156, 223
ʿArafat, Musa 162, 222, 224
Arafat, Yasir (Abu ʿAmmar) 22, 102, 171, 190, 252, 294
AAL and 380
accordian plan 514, 527
Amman accord 578–80, 582
ANM and 161
Ansar and 249–50
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 155–6
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 330, 332
armed struggle: launch of 104, 105, 106–7, 161
arms 451
artillery war 505
al-ʿAsifa 222–3
assassination plot 246
ʿAyn Jalut forces 289
background 669
battle of Karama 178, 179
Beirut attacks 592
Brezhnev proposal 503
Bustani and 192
Cairo accord 658–9
Cairo declaration 586
camps war 582, 591, 596–7
as commander-in-chief 261
criticisms of 156, 293
Egypt and 129, 368, 371, 378, 425, 574
Egyptian–Israeli peace process 424
Fahd peace plan 511, 512
Fateh 83, 84, 87; as field commander 158; internal disputes 238–9, 306, 433–4; power struggle 127, 128; reorganization 296; split 561–2, 563, 565, 566, 567
Fez declaration 554
government-in-exile (GiE) 617
Hamas and 651, 652–3
intifada 614
Iran revolution 497
Iraq and 640
Islamic Fateh 226
Jordan 254, 417; dual power in 247, 258–9
Jordan civil war (1970) 266, 267, 270, 280–1, 284–6, 307–8
Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 552–3, 555, 557–8
leadership 440–1; challenges to 126, 223, 295; power of 601–6, 632–7, 681–2, 687–8
Lebanese crisis 361, 364–6, 369, 370,

373–5, 381, 383–4, 389–90, 402; ceasefire attempts 398, 399, 403, 404–5, 406, 407, 412–13, 415; Damascus accord 386, 387
Lebanese war 509–10, 515–19, 523–4, 530–1, 533–5, 537; aftermath 541, 543, 545, 551
Lebanon 312, 316; Israeli invasion 427, 429–30
military organization 452
mobile war 205
multiple hijackings 257–8
in Muslim Brotherhood 81
Nasir and 180
neopatrimonial organization of 689–90
occupied territories 207
Oslo accord 654–8, 660–1, 691
Palestinian civil war 569, 570, 571, 572, 573
Palestinian state 437–8
paranoia 604
peace process 616, 638–9; after 1973 conflict 333, 338–9, 343
people's war 216
PLA and 241, 244–5, 268
PLF and 127, 641
PLO: bureaucratization 646; centrality of 683; control of 454–7; elected chairman 220–1; funds 641; reorganization 274; role in success of 691–2; status 329; withdrawal from Beirut 537–8
PPSF and 164
revolutionary bases 224, 276
rise of 670
statist image 453
steadfastness funds 481
Syria and 125, 520, 553, 620; expulsion from 565
tajyish 296
Tal al-Za'tar refugee camp 363, 400
terrorism 215, 309, 311
UN address (1969) 344, 345, 669
UN resolutions: acceptance of 547
unions and 459
US and 485
US–PLO dialogue 423
USSR relations 426
Venice declaration 502
Wazir and 618, 689
West Bank commands 162
al-A'raj, Muhammad 222, 226
al-Ard movement 38
Arens, Moshe 509, 514
Argov, Shlomo 523
al-'Arif, 'Abd-al-Rahman 129
al-'Arif, 'Abd-al-Salam 29, 78, 129
al-'Arka, Muhammad 67
armed struggle 23, 284, 684
abandonment of 421, 690
ANM and 108–11
challenges of 112–42
Fateh and 89, 91, 101, 102, 639
launch of 104–8, 161–4
limitations of 682–4
in occupied territories 471
PFLP and 647–8
political consequences of 667–70
role of 663–5
armies:
Arab: post-independence 19–20
Jordan 245–6, 263, 275
Lebanon 360
PLO: regularization 448–53
see also Palestine Liberation Army
arms:
British 17, 18
Czechoslovakian 17, 19, 26, 62, 82
Fateh 126, 128, 451–2
French 19, 26, 62
for guerrilla movement 182
heavy weapons 449–50, 684
Lebanese war 533
Libyan 486, 509–10
for PLA 116, 117, 141
for PLO 509–10
removal from Lebanese refugee camps 313
Soviet 19, 143–4, 145, 152
Syrian 156–7
US 144, 152
Army of Holy War 14, 15, 35, 58
artillery war 505–8, 508–9, 512
'Aruri, Taysir 615
al-As'ad, Kamil 404
al-Asad, Hafiz 32, 278, 578
as air force commander 105, 125
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319
camps war 595
Constitutional Document 377
Fateh: alliance with 127–8, 157
Fateh split 561, 564, 565
feud with Jadid 145–6, 148–9, 184–5, 187, 248, 264
Fez declaration 552

al-Asad, Hafiz (*cont.*):
  Geneva peace conference 421
  guerrilla movement 288–9
  Lebanese crisis 323, 366, 376, 385, 395; ceasefire attempts 407, 412; Damascus accord 386, 387; talks with Arafat 370, 381, 383, 389
  Lebanese war 519, 533
  Palestinian civil war 572
  Palestinian state 414
  peace process 502
  PLA: control of 133
  PLO and 330, 558, 559–60, 620, 621; rift with 575, 576
  as president 274–5
  USSR and 368, 398
Asad, Rifᶜat 146, 149
ASAP, *see* Arab Socialist Action Party
ASF, *see* Arab Security Force
ᶜAsfur, Hasan 653, 656
al-Ashhab, Naᶜim 167–8
al-Ashqar, Ihab 615
ᶜAshrawi, Hanan 643
ᶜAshur, ᶜUmar 171
ᶜAshur, Yahya 80, 87, 162, 353, 398
  as *iqlim* head 298, 299
al-ᶜAsifa 85, 107, 124, 126, 141, 222–3
associations, *see* social associations
ASU, *see* Arab Socialist Union
al-Aswad, Mahmud 'Guevara' 287
ᶜAtallah, ᶜAtallah 182, 299, 354
  accordian plan 514
  assassination attempt 596
  Fateh split 562, 563, 566, 588, 589
  guerrilla mutiny 297–8
  Lebanese war 530, 541
ᶜAtallah, Ghazi 518, 525, 541, 561–2, 588
al-ᶜAtari, Sami 288, 393
al-Atasi, Jamal 227
al-Atasi, Nur-al-Din 105, 149, 157
Ataturk, Kemal 13–14
al-Atrash, Ahmad (Ziyad) 104, 123, 162, 298
al-Atrash, Mahmud 104
authoritarian control: Palestinian leadership 670
authority, guerrilla 201–2
ᶜAwad, ᶜAbdullah 615
ᶜAwad, ᶜAbd-al-Rahman 168
ᶜAwad, Mubarak 613
ᶜAwad, Ribhi 189
ᶜAwda, ᶜAbd-al-ᶜAziz 625–6, 632
ᶜAwda, Muhammad 93, 180, 224, 227, 248, 294, 352, 431, 434
  release from Jordanian prison 332
ᶜAwn, Michel 640
ᶜAwwad, ᶜArabi 167, 343, 476, 574, 575
ᶜAwwad, Riyad 193
ᶜAwwad, Salim 168, 249–50, 273
al-ᶜAydi, Hamad 82, 227
ᶜAyn al-Hilwa refugee camp 590, 621, 653–4
ᶜAyn Jalut Forces 170
ᶜAyntura pocket 383, 401–2, 403, 404, 405, 406
al-Ayyubi, al-Haytham 182, 233
al-Azhar University 629
ᶜAziz, Tariq 444
al-ᶜAzm, Khalid 28
al-ᶜAzm, Sadiq Jalal 283–4
ᶜAzzam, ᶜAbdullah 226, 627
ᶜAzzam, Mahmud 93, 125, 127, 128

al-Baᶜth 368, 382, 484–5
Baᶜth Party 30, 32, 50, 497, 683
  decline in appeal of 95
  Fateh and 103, 124–5, 128
  founded 28–9
  in Gaza 53, 163
  in Iraq 146, 147
  Kataʾib and 72
  Lebanese crisis 388, 392
  in Lebanon 189
  merge with Arab Socialist Party 74
  Palestinians in 92–4, 124
  PFLP and 235–6
  PLO and 103–4
  in Syria 77, 147, 184–5, 288–9
Baᶜthist Popular Committees 370
Badr, Muhammad 297, 350, 600
  Fateh split 561, 562
Badran, ᶜAyish 601
Badran, Shams 114, 129, 149
Baghdad Pact 18, 26, 27, 28
Baghdad summit conference (1978) 640, 685
Baker, James 548, 549, 638, 639
  peace process 640–1, 643
al-Bakr, Ahmad Hasan 148, 265
Bakr, Ibrahim 265
Balᶜawi, al-Hakam 633, 654
al-Balᶜawi, Fathi 80
Balfour, Arthur 1
Balfour Declaration 1, 5
Bangkok 310
Bangladeshis 559
al-Banna, Hasan 50, 627
al-Banna, Sabri 93, 226, 311, 590
  as Abu Nidal faction leader 405, 600–1

as *iqlim* leader 222
Iraq and 354–5
Palestinian civil war 570
in revolutionary council 294
Barakat, Antoine 381, 396
al-Barghuti, Bashir 347, 653
Barkuni, Samir 168
Bashir, Muhammad 245, 259
Battalions of Return 163, 339–40
Battalions of Victory–Nasr 184
al-Battat, Abu al-'Abd 599
Baydun, Mustafa 77
Bayt al-Maqdis battalion 626–7
Beaufort castle 500, 517, 524
Bedouin 107
Begin, Menahem 420, 427, 435, 686
artillery war 505, 507
Camp David accords 324
Egyptian–Israeli peace process 437, 445
iron fist policy 519–20
Lebanese war 509, 514, 528, 531, 538
resignation 547
Shatila massacre 539
Syria–Israel clash 504
US–PLO dialogue 421
West Bank elections 484
Beirut 498, 504, 506, 567, 595–6
battle of 528–32, 535–7, 556
Israeli attack on 516
Lebanese crisis 364, 367–8, 369, 373, 392–3, 398
Lebanese war 516–17, 522–3, 527–8, 534–5
PLO in 449, 592
PLO withdrawal from 531, 533, 536–8, 601, 686–8
terrorism 512–13, 521
withdrawal of US peacekeeping force 538
Beirut 378
Beirut airport raid 190
Beirut Arab University 458
Ben Bella, Ahmad 96, 102
Ben-Gurion, David 3
Benjedid, al-Chazli 576
Bhays, Muhammad 353, 355, 630
bin Jamil, Nasir 184, 245, 246, 252–3, 259, 280
bin Shakir, Zayd 245, 252–3, 254, 259, 261
Binh, Mme 102
'Biqa^c Gulf' 567–8
Biqa^c Valley 533, 534, 535, 597
Fateh in 565, 566, 567, 568–9, 581
Birri, Nabih 499, 529, 531, 580
camps war 584, 590–1, 595, 606
al-Bitar, Salah-al-Din 28, 93
al-Bizri, ^cAfif 28
Black June Organization 405
Black Panthers 636–7
Black Saturday 371–2
Black September Organization 352, 445
formed 307
murder of Tal 281, 309
terrorism 308, 310, 311
Boumedienne, Houari 126, 149
Bourguiba, al-Habib 96
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 553
Brandt, Willy 484, 502
Brezhnev, Leonid 151, 321, 398, 399, 490
Brezhnev proposal 503–4, 512
Britain:
commitment to Jewish national home 1, 5, 6
Palestine policies 6–7, 16, 18
relations with Jordan 27
rule in Palestine 1–3
Suez crisis 26–7, 64–5
White Paper (1939) 7, 8, 9, 16
Brown, Dean 384, 385, 386, 389
Brzezinski, Zbigniew 425, 445
Bsaysu, ^cAtif 462, 654
Bsaysu, Mahdi 180
Bsaysu, Musallam 231
Bu^cba^c, Mukhtar Sabri 106, 127
al-Budayri, Misbah 186–7, 241
as chief-of-staff 290–1
control of PLA 329–30
Lebanese crisis 388, 393
PLO leadership 419
Bujayrami, Yunis (Abu Ahmad) 272, 303, 432
bureaucratization:
PFLP 491
PLO 454–60, 646
Burj al-Barajna refugee camp 590, 621
camps war 583–5, 591, 593, 595, 596, 599
al-Burji, Yusif 185, 288
Bush, George 638, 641
al-Bushnaq, ^cAli 125, 227–8
al-Bustani, Emil 190, 192, 193

Cairo accord (1994) 661, 663
Cairo agreement (1969) 192–4, 285
implementation 413, 419–20
Lebanese crisis 363, 369, 373, 377, 403, 406, 408
Maronite objections to 428
Cairo conference: Fateh 175
Cairo declaration 586

Callaghan, William 506–7, 524
Camp David accords (1979) 324, 686
Fateh response to 499
camps war 580–5, 590–4, 599, 605–6, 620–1
Arafat and 589, 591, 596–7, 602–3
Cappucci, Hilarion 349
Carter, Jimmy 324, 421, 427
Egyptian–Israeli peace process 445
Middle East peace process 410
Palestinian homeland 417, 420, 422–3
Castro, Fidel 121
Ceaucescu, Nicolae 415, 439
'central leadership': PFLP 306
Central Sector: Fateh 193
Chernenko, Konstantin 545–6
China 500, 679
DFLP and 349
Fateh and 103, 147, 162, 182, 510
people's war 664
PFLP and 304, 489
US and 151
CIA: Lebanese crisis 361
citizenship: for Palestinian refugees 40–1
civil disobedience: occupied territories 636
civilians: as targets 210–15
see also terrorism
clandestinity: calls for return to 284–5
Clinton, Bill 658
coercive diplomacy: Lebanese crisis 362, 364
Cold War 17–20, 26–7, 150–3, 324–5
end of 639, 648, 690–1
Committee for National Dialogue: Lebanon 369
Committee for Resistance to Peace with Israel 73
Committee for the Support of Steadfastness 456
communism, collapse of 645
communists 486–7
decline in appeal of 95
formation of Ansar 248–51
in Lebanon 189
in occupied territories 167–8, 476–7, 689
Palestinian 55, 685
Syrian 28–9
conscription:
in Lebanon 402–3
student 500, 511
conscription law 97, 115
consensus politics 679
Constitutional Document: Lebanon 377, 378, 381, 386, 399
corruption:
in Fateh 559, 588
planned 456, 603, 691
in PLO 656
Council for National Salvation 529, 531
crime:
of guerrillas 244
in Lebanon 458–9
cross-border fire 203
Cuba 102, 120–1, 147
culture: guerrilla movement 195–6
Czechoslovakia: arms from 17, 19, 26, 62, 82

DA (Democratic Alliance) 575, 580
Dablan, Tahir 184, 185
al-Dajani, Ahmad Sidqi 135, 425, 553
al-Dajani, Murid 180
al-Dakhakhna, Ibrahim 175, 180
Dakhkhan, ʿAbd-al-Fattah 629
al-Dalqamuni, Hafiz 626
Damascus accord 386–7
Damur, fall of 375–6
al-Dannan, ʿAbdullah 84, 87, 103, 121, 126
Fateh split 106, 107, 123, 128
al-Darduni, Salim 301
Darwaza, al-Hakam 73–4, 108
Darwish, Mahmud 658
al-Dawli, Abu Mahmud 230, 525
Dawud, Muhammad 261, 266
Dawud, Ramadan 171
Dayan, Moshe 280
Dʿaybis, Mahmud 434
Declaration of Independence (1988): PLO 659
Declaration of Principles 658, 659, 660–1, 662
Democratic Alliance 575, 580
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) 322, 356
Amman accord 578, 579, 580
attitudes to Arab states 678
bureaucratization 671
camps war 581, 583, 593–4, 595, 621
conscription 511
crisis in 646–7, 649–50
Fateh and 436, 564–5, 565–6, 596
Gulf crisis 642, 646
ideology 677
intifada 615–16, 645
Iraq and 442
Jordan and 439, 553, 554
Jordanian civil war 683

Lebanese crisis 361–3, 372, 395, 399, 401, 403
Lebanese *deuxième bureau* and 513
Lebanese war 515, 522, 541, 542–3
Libya and 486, 487, 492
mass action 474–6
military organization 451
name change 342
in occupied territories 347–9, 470–1, 477, 609, 635–6, 689
Palestinian civil war 569–70
Palestinian declaration of independence 623
pan-Arabism and 664
PLO and 371, 433–4, 487–9, 556, 557, 685
PNC and 503, 576
Sa'iqa and 412
steadfastness funds 480–1, 482
student conscription 500
Syria and 366, 585
unions 478
al-Wihda 610
see also Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Democratic Front Organization in Jordan (*Majd*) 348, 475, 629–30
deterrence: search for 508–11
DFLP, *see* Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
al-Dib, Fathi 129
al-Disi, Jasir 601
disinformation: in Jordan 246
Drori, Amir 539, 540
Dulles, John Foster 26

East Bank 42, 43, 51
East Jerusalem Electricity Company 479
EC, *see* European Community
Edde, Emile 13
Edde, Raymond 363, 380, 387
Lebanese crisis 369, 392
education 53–4
occupied territories 608, 611
refugees 43
steadfastness funds for 480
see also teachers; universities
Egypt 14
ANM and 76, 77, 80, 110, 135, 136
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 143–4, 149–50
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319, 330–1
Arafat and 573, 574
battle of ʿAjlun 280
Britain and 18, 19
Czech arms for 62, 82
domestic instability 11
Fateh and 119, 129, 175–6, 179–81, 378, 678; arms for 182
food riots 548
Gaza Strip border conflict 60–5
guerrilla movement 147, 286
Iraq and 67–9
Israel and 12
Jordan and 32–3
Jordan civil war 266, 274–5
Lebanese crisis 368, 370, 384–5, 388, 394, 399, 402
Lebanese war 529, 533, 535
Libya: border war 419
nationalization 20
Palestinian civil war 572
Palestinians: government control of 40–1; social and economic control of 44
PFLP and 235
PLA 102, 112, 138, 141, 169, 170; control of 113–17, 133
PLO and 545, 553–4, 555, 577–8, 675–6
policies 25–7
political activism 52–3
Revolutionary Council 61, 63
Saudi Arabia and 32–3, 94
state-building 19–20
Syria and 94, 666
tripartite axis 371
UAR 28–32
USSR and 29–30, 33, 152–3
war of attrition 143–4, 145
Egyptian–Israeli peace process 423, 427–8, 437, 685
effect on Arab states 424–5
PLO and 445–6, 447
Eisenhower doctrine 19, 27, 29
Eitan, Rafael 504, 509
artillery war 505
IDF attacks 495
Lebanese war 528, 531–2, 538, 539, 540; preparations for 515, 518, 519
elections, general: Fateh and 100, 101
emigration:
reverse 211–13
Soviet Jews 68, 639–40
entity, Palestinian:
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 155
Arafat's part in success of 691–2

entity, Palestinian: (*cont.*):
  birth of 95–100
  consolidation of 668–9
  Fateh 162–3, 218–19
Erskine, Emmanuel 430
Europe, Western:
  Fateh and 494
  influence of 546
  PLO and 484, 501–2
  see also specific countries
European Community 447–8, 501–2
  Palestinian declaration of
    independence 624–5
  PLO recognition 685
exaggeration: guerrilla groups 203–4, 216
excesses:
  campaigns against informers 636–7
  PLO in Lebanon 495–6
external operations, *see* terrorism
extortion: PLO in Lebanon 496

Fadil, Muhammad 148
Fahd, king of Saudi Arabia: Palestinian civil
    war 572
Fahd peace plan 507, 511–12
Fahmi, Isma'il 388, 415, 421
al-Fahum, Khalid 330, 415, 440, 557, 575–6
  PNSF and 579
  Syria and 553
al-Fajr 467, 657
Fakhani republic 447–63
Falaha, Mahmud 87, 106, 128
Fanon, Frantz 91
Fanus, Majid 559
al-Faqih, Mahmud 593
Faraj, 'Adnan 136
Farhan, Ahmad 272, 300, 302, 303
al-Farhan, Hamad 74, 109, 161, 228, 264
Faruq, king of Egypt 12, 13
al-Faruqi, Hamdi al-Taji 307, 467
Fateh 31–2
  Aden–Algiers accord 575
  Amal and 367
  appeal of 95
  Arab–Israeli war (1973) 330–1, 332
  battle of ʿAjlun 279, 280–1
  battle of Karama 178–9, 181
  camps war 580–5, 593, 594
  civilian militia 184
  civilian targets 210–13
  clandestinity 284
  conferences 223–4, 499–500, 633–4, 639
  Egypt and 179–81, 378
  Fez declaration 552
  financial crisis 656
  formation 71, 80–7
  as government party 661
  government-in-exile (GiE) 617
  guerrilla campaigns 430–1
  guerrilla fragmentation 237–9, 279
  Hamas and 632, 651–2
  Harakat al-Shabiba 610
  heyday of 147–8
  ideology 56, 87–92, 217–18, 222, 283–4,
    680
  internal disputes: (1964) 106; (1965)
    123–4, 128; (1969) 226–7; (1974)
    349–56; (1978) 441–6; (1983) 545, 556,
    558–61, 561–7, 588
  internal politics of 221–7
  intifada 615
  Iraq and 236–7, 435–6
  Israel: raids 107–8, 112, 138, 139;
    recognition of 639
  Jordan, dual power in 252–4, 258–9, 260,
    261
  Jordanian civil war (1970) 263, 266, 267,
    683; aftermath 268–9, 270; internal
    reassessment after 282, 285–6, 292–9
  Jordanian monarchy 244–5
  Jordanian Special Branch 246
  Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 553, 554,
    558
  leadership 440–1, 677–8
  Lebanese clashes 418, 520
  Lebanese crisis 361–72, 373–91, 392–3,
    399–407
  Lebanese guerrilla bases 291
  Lebanese war 510, 517–18, 528, 530, 532,
    534, 536; aftermath 543
  in Lebanon 188–91, 314–15, 592, 653–4
  marginalization of civilian organization
    224–5
  May events (1973) 312–17
  military organization 119–22, 205, 450,
    451–2
  militia agreement 276, 277
  Movement's Manifesto 84
  Muslim Brotherhood and 627
  national identity and 667–8
  al-Nizam al-Dakhili 294
  in occupied territories 161–4, 207–9,
    347–50, 470–2, 477–8, 482, 609, 689
  organization 162, 181–2, 221–3

Palestine Armed Struggle Command 204–5
Palestinian civil war 567–73
patronage and bureaucratization in 454
peace process after 1973 conflict 322, 334, 335–6, 337
people's war 197–9, 200–1, 202, 216
personnel: origins 462
PFLP and 302
PLA and 329, 330; control of 241
PLO and 99, 100–4, 273–4, 293; attitude to 174–5; takeover 218–21
PNC and 576
POLP and 187
Reagan plan 555
recruits 500
representation: refugee 671
revolutionary movements: aid for 453
Saʿiqa and 412
Security and Information Apparatus 307
Shabiba 619
Shiʿite Muslims and 497–8
Shuqayri and 172
social class and 55
steadfastness funds 480
Structure of Revolutionary Construction 84, 88, 89, 107, 223
Syria and 124–9, 184, 187, 288–9
Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 363, 396–8, 401
terrorism and 151, 257–8, 306–12, 684; condemnation of 215
USSR and 342
Fateh–Provisional Command 575, 600
Fateh–Revolutionary Council 355, 600
al-Fath, Abu 590
Fath 225, 644
Fawzi, Muhammad 113, 150, 170, 175
control of PLA 114–15, 116
Faysal, king of Iraq 13
Faysal, king of Saudi Arabia 32, 112, 153
assassination 321
Fateh and 179
war plans against Israel 149
Faysal, Saʿud bin 533
Fayyad, Raja 192
Federation of Arab Labour Unions and Associations 50
Federation of Arab Republics 149, 279
Fez Declaration on the Principles of Settlement in the Middle East 551–2, 554, 555, 556, 557
fidaʾiyyun 66, 169
Egypt and 83, 175–6
formation of 63–6
imprisoned in Gaza 170
Katibat al-Haq and 82
Fida 647
field command, PLO: fragmentation of 604
Filastin al-Muhtalla 541
Filastin al-Thawra 351, 352, 355
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 338–9
Asad on 621
emigration of Soviet Jews 639
Gulf crisis 642
Hamas 651
Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 552
Lebanese crisis 380, 384, 387, 390, 400, 402
peace process 617, 638, 641
publication 329
relaunch 683
stoppages 657
UN resolutions 616
Filastin: publication of 130
Filastinuna 87, 89, 119–20
armed struggle 106
Palestinian entity 100
publication of 84–5
finances:
Fateh 456, 563, 602
PFLP 491–2
PLO 602–3; Arafat's control of 455; crisis in 656–8, 690; in West Bank 622
financial services: occupied territories 465
Findley, Paul 441
Fityan ʿAli 400
food riots: Arab countries 548
Force 17 456–7, 457–8, 603, 635
Ford, Gerald 320, 321
France 1, 4–5
arms to Israel 19, 26, 62
Lebanese crisis 368, 370–1, 390
Lebanese war 530–1, 533, 535
Palestinian statehood 538
Suez crisis 26–7, 64–5
Franji, ʿAbdullah 654
Franjiyya, Sulayman 314, 317, 360, 367, 370
calls for resignation of 369, 380, 381
Constitutional Document 377
Lebanese crisis 363–4, 365, 376–7, 403; support for Maronites 358, 362, 373, 399
refugee camps 313, 315–16

Franjiyya, Sulayman (*cont.*):
resignation 385, 389
successor 383
fringe benefits: PLO 457–8
Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners 512, 521
Front of Forces Rejecting Capitulationist Solutions 344
Front of Free Palestinian Socialists 163
fugitive patrols: guerrilla 208–9, 349–50, 356

Gaza:
ANM in 130
APG and 15–16
Arab–Israeli war (1947–8) 4, 40
Cairo accord 658–9
counterinsurgency campaign (1970) 286–8
Egyptian troops in 58, 68
Fateh in 80–1, 87
fida'iyyun 63–5
infiltration problem 59, 60–3
Israeli occupation (1956) 64–6
Palestinian Authority 663
PLO and 57, 103–4, 114–15
political activism 52–3
political parties 51
raids 62, 64, 82–3
social and economic control 35–6, 44
see also occupied territories
GDR 510, 513
General Federation of Labour Unions 476
General Federation of Trade Unions 477
General Refugee Congress 36
general strike: Lebanon 191
General Union of Palestine Students (GUPS) 100, 172, 240, 355, 500
General Union of Palestine Workers 189, 240, 460
General Union of Palestinian Women 352, 460
General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists 352
Geneva Convention, Fourth (1949) 163
Geneva peace conference 415
Ghana 32
Ghanim, ʿAbd-al-Fattah 339–40, 432, 576, 580, 596
resignation 644
Ghanim, Iskandar 314
al-Ghasib, ʿAtallah 254
Ghaydan, Saʿdun 148
Ghnaym, Muhammad (Abu Mahir) 129, 222, 307, 413, 419
as Arafat's deputy 226
early career 104–5
Lebanese crisis 383, 389, 399
peace process 415
al-Ghusayn, Jawid 602
PLO finances 640, 657
Ghusha, Ibrahim 652–3
Ghusha, Samir 135, 529–30, 644
Ghusha, Subhi 164
Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry 390, 502
Glubb, John 27, 60
Golan Heights: Israeli law extended to 326, 513
Gorbachev, Mikhail 546, 606, 643, 645, 690
attempted *coup* 643, 648
Goren, Shmuel 607
government-in-exile (GiE) 616–17, 624
Great Revolt (1936–9) 2
'green shirts': Young Egypt movement 72–3
Gromyko, Andrei 17
guerrilla movement:
armed struggle 664–5
battle of Karama 174–84
establishment of 667–70
fragmentation 237–42
in host Arab states 664, 668–9
in Jordan 243–61; end of dual power 262–81
Jordan civil war (1970) 262–8, 268–79; internal reassessment after 282–312
in Lebanon 312–17
limitation of 682–3
making of political system 217–42
in occupied territories 155–73, 207–10, 470–4
PLA officers and 170–2
PLO: coalition against 441–6; power battle 671–2; takeover 669
rise of 143
sanctuaries 174–94
success of 147–8
tensions 147–8
theory and practice 195–216
see also specific groups
Guevara, Ernesto 'Che' 102
Gulf Cooperation Council 548, 572
Gulf war 489, 502, 545, 606, 646, 690
Gur, Mordechai 427, 430
Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) 421
Gutman, Francis 530

Habash, George 22, 56, 110, 252, 253, 311–12
in ANM 71–80, 130–1, 134, 136–7, 159–60
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 173
Arafat and 578, 579, 634
assassination plot 246
background 669
Brezhnev proposal 503
camps war 583–4
collapse of communism 645
criticism of 272
Egypt and 235
Fateh and 132, 161
Fateh split 565
foreign visits 257
government-in-exile (GiE) 616
guerrilla movement 204, 216, 276, 277, 430
illness 306
intifada revolutionary violence 648
Iraq and 646
Jordan 256, 280
Jordan civil war (1970) 248, 271
on Lebanese army expansion 499
Lebanese crisis 387, 390, 405, 406
Lebanese war 530
in occupied territories 473–4
Palestinian declaration of independence 623
peace process 502, 645; after 1973 war 336–7
PFLP 227–8, 232–3; crisis 299, 301, 302, 648–9
PLO and 432–3, 443–4, 490, 501
PLO–Jordan dialogue 439
Qadhdhafi and 419
reward for capture 265–6
Special Branch and 251
Syria and 108, 347, 489
in Syrian jail 188, 213–14; rescue 230
terrorism 287, 300, 303–4
Habash, Yahya 222, 299, 633
Habib, Philip 505, 506–7, 526, 527–8
battle of Beirut 531, 535, 536, 537
al-Hadaf 236, 271, 305, 636
Arafat on 634
banned 235
Jordan conflict 256–7
Lebanese crisis 390
PLO internal reforms 646
publication 230, 233
raid reports 349
Haddad, Sa'd 411, 473, 538
Haddad, 'Uthman 125, 133, 186, 279, 289–90
as PLA chief-of-staff 241, 266, 274
Haddad, Wadi' 140, 418, 649
action not ideas, for 56, 80
in ANM 75, 76, 78, 79, 159–60, 188
ANM internal disputes 228–9
death 433, 491–2
early career 73, 74
Egypt and 235
Fateh and 161
PAC and 108
in PFLP 232, 301
PFLP-International Operations 305
Special Apparatus 213, 230, 311
Struggle Apparatus 109–10, 111, 300
terrorism 257, 272–3, 303–5, 395
Haddad forces 417–18, 420, 422, 428
renamed South Lebanon Army 427
al-Hadid, Brik 348, 490
Hadid, Muhammad 226
al-Hafiz, Amin 32, 96, 103
Lebanon conflict 314, 315, 317
PLA and 112, 117, 118
Hafiz, Mustafa 61–2, 63, 64
Haig, Alexander 504, 507, 514, 523, 528, 531
al-Haj, Ahmad 413
al-Haj, Khalid 'Aysha 111
Hajjaj, Nimr 171, 187, 192
al-Hakim, Tawfiq 72
al-Halabi, Muhammad 186
Halim 567
al-Hamad, 'Abd-al-Karim 74, 78, 110
Hamami, Sa'id 415, 425
Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) 627, 636–7, 641, 689
charter 630–2
rise of 650–3
Hamdan, Fayiz 164
Hamdan, Mahmud 568, 593
Palestinian civil war 571, 572
Hamdan, Mutlaq 299, 454
Hamid, Rustum 171
Hamidi, Abu 'Ali 'Irbid' 272, 302, 303
Hammad, Ibrahim 590
Hammuda, 'Abdullah 299–300
Hammuda, Yahya 172, 176, 177, 205, 272
battle of 'Ajlun 279
PLO 220
POLP and 186
refugee congress 35–6
release from Jordanian prison 332
unions 239
Hamshari, Mahmud 310

Hamza, Nazih 302
al-Hanafi, Ahmad 192, 289–90
Haniyya, Akram 609, 614–15
Harbaji, ʿAbd-al-Raʾuf 289
al-Hariri, Ziyad 103
Hasan, crown prince of Jordan 246, 259
Hasan, king of Morocco 588
al-Hasan, ʿAli 293
Hasan, Abu Talib 559
al-Hasan, Bilal 76, 110, 136
  as editor of *Al-Hurriyya* 130, 140
  in PDFLP 255, 302
Hasan, 'haj' 296, 397
al-Hasan, Hani 155, 162, 445, 484, 642
  battle of Karama 178
  in central committee 493
  early career 85–6, 87, 123
  Egypt and 388
  Fateh ideology 199, 201
  head of *iqlim* 227
  intelligence apparatus 254
  Jordan and 259, 264, 415, 438–9, 554
  Khalaf and 225–6
  Lebanese crisis 404
  Lebanese war 530
  PLO criticism 656, 657
al-Hasan, Khalid 87, 127, 132, 484
  ANM and 122
  after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 155, 156
  armed struggle 91, 106, 120, 121
  criticism of Arafat 156, 605
  early career 84, 85
  government-in-exile (GiE) 616
  guerrilla movement 205–6, 293–4
  on Israel 686
  Jordan and 261, 280, 281, 286, 440
  Lebanese crisis 362, 378–9
  on Palestinian disorganization 687
  Palestinian strategy 343
  PLO and 101, 219, 456, 655
  Reagan plan 538
  on terrorism 309
  Western Europe and 421, 501
al-Hasanat, Muhammad 287
Hashim, Ahmad 590–1
Hasu, Saʿd-al-Din 245
Hatum, Salim 32
al-Hawari, Muhammad Nimr 35–6
Hawatma, Nayif 230, 585, 606
  in ANM 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 229
  Arafat and 634
  armed struggle 668
  DFLP crisis 647
  Fahd peace plan 511
  government-in-exile (GiE) 616
  Gulf crisis 646
  Jordan and 255–6, 265–6, 438
  Lebanese conflicts 419, 499
  Lebanese war 515, 516, 530
  national unity 441
  in PDFLP 198, 201, 206, 230, 253, 302
  peace process 337, 484, 502
  PLO and 433, 442–3, 444, 497, 556, 646
  POLP and 231
  referred to as 'Nayif Zedong' 251
  steadfastness funds 480–1
  on terrorism 234
  US–PLO dialogue 422, 501
  USSR and 342, 568
Hawi, George 387
Hawi, William 400
Hawwari, Labib 588, 592, 603, 654
al-Hayat al-Jadida 491
al-Hayba, Husayn 187, 290
Haydar, ʿAkif 582
Haykal, Muhammad Hasanayn 132, 150, 176, 179, 180
Haytham, Muhammad ʿAli 146
Hijju, Ahmad 93, 182
Hillu, Zaki 110
Hilmi, Ahmad (Abu Hani) 180–1
al-Hilu, Charles 190, 191–2
al-Hilu, Jihan 352
al-Hindi, Amin 462
al-Hindi, Hani 213, 306
  in ANM 71–80, 110, 130, 159–60, 228–9
  in PFLP 232, 272–3, 304
  Special Apparatus 230
al-Hindi, Khalid 629–30
al-Hindi, Khalil 255, 302
al-Hindi, Usama 76, 77
al-Hinnawi, Sami 13
Hirshfeld, Yair 655–6
Hishma, Muhammad 105, 127
Hizbullah 573, 590, 594, 606
  camps war 581, 585, 591, 595
  feud with Amal 620, 653
al-Hmud, ʿAbd-al-Fattah 85, 86, 177, 222
Ho Chi Minh 678
hospitals: steadfastness funds for 480
housing: grants for 457–8, 480
Hubayqa, Elie 539, 590, 592

Hurani, ʿAbdullah 93
Hurani, Akram 28, 73, 74, 93
al-Huri, Tawfiq 84, 105, 106, 119
al-Hurriyya 134, 349, 636
  Arab–Israeli war (1967) 141, 158–9
  Arafat at UN 344
  guerrilla movement 138, 139, 140
  Ibrahim as editor 79, 130, 131, 160
  PDFLP 230, 231
al-Hus, Salim 419, 429, 498
Husayn, king of Hijaz 9
Husayn, king of Jordan 11, 18, 32, 75, 97, 179
  Amman accord 578–9, 582
  Arab–Israeli war (1973) 332
  Arafat and 606
  assassination attempts 348, 355–6, 490
  Baghdad Pact 27
  Camp David accords 438
  guerrilla movement 184, 245–7, 252–5, 259, 278, 281, 285
  Israel: recognition of 143
  Jazi and 260, 261
  Jordan civil war (1970) 264, 266, 267, 268, 274
  Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 552, 554, 555, 557
  Lebanese crisis 385, 389
  Nasir and 135
  occupied territories: control of 336; infiltration 177
  Palestinian movement 96, 420
  peace conference: call for 483
  PFLP and 646
  PLA and 169
  PLO and 323, 344, 414–15, 417, 577, 586–7, 675
  Rogers plan 145
  Shuqayri and 138
  Syria and 502–3, 547
  United Arab Kingdom 307–8, 346
  West Bank: severance of ties 547, 621–2
Husayn, Saddam 148, 265, 435, 640
  Kuwaiti invasion 549
  PFLP and 646
al-Husayni, Faruq 165
al-Husayni, Faysal 638, 643, 654, 656
  in ANM 110, 164, 166
  Oslo accord 658
al-Husayni, Husayn 497
al-Husayni, Muhammad Amin 6, 7, 9, 64, 103, 225
  Arab Higher Committee 8, 14–15, 59, 688
  in exile 15–16, 35
  Islamic Fateh 226
  Islamic Liberation Party 49
  raids 64
  refugee camps and 48, 68, 188
al-Husayni, Musa Kazim 6, 7–8, 9
al-Husayni, Ziyad 171, 209, 287
Husni, Abu Khalid 352
al-Hut, Shafiq 134–5, 171, 188, 429, 538
  Lebanese crisis 378
  Oslo accord 658
Huwaydi, Amin 175, 180

Ibrahim, Muhsin 232, 597–8
  ANM and 73–4, 76, 77, 228–9
  editor of *al-Hurriyya* 79, 130, 131, 160
  Organization of Lebanese Socialists 230, 302
identity, national 667–8
identity cards 41
  Jordan 277
  PLO 98
ideology:
  DFLP 677
  Fateh 56, 87–92, 217–18, 222, 283–4, 680
  leadership background and 677
  PFLP 217–18, 648–9, 677
  PLF 56
IDF:
  accordian plan 514
  Arab–Israeli war (1967) 143, 170
  guerrilla movement and 147, 202–4
  infiltration problem 60
  informers 636–7
  intifada 619–20
  invasion of Lebanon 426–9
  Kfar Shuba raid 360
  Lebanese war 515, 518, 522, 524, 535, 625–8
  Lebanon and 422, 595–6
  occupation of Gaza Strip 64–5
  raids 356, 495
  Shatila massacre 539–40
  withdrawal from Lebanon 581–2
  withdrawal from Shuf mountains 567
al-Ifranji, ʿAbdullah 633
immigrants, Jewish 1–3, 25
  civilian targeting and 211–12
  from USSR 68, 639–40

Independent Nasirites Movement 370
Indonesia 32
industry, Palestinian: in occupied territories 467, 476
infiltration 18, 48, 75
  government policies to curb 45
  Palestinian military units to curb 60–5
  problem of 58–60
informers 287
  violence against 636–7
institutions: war of 612–13
intelligence apparatus:
  Fateh 225–6, 254
  Jordan 245–6
international community:
  Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 549
  statism of PLO and 447–8
international non-governmental organizations
  funds for occupied territories 612
  funds for Palestinian left 482
international politics: Palestine and 16–20
intifada 547, 638
  Arafat and 688–9
  DFLP and 647
  Israel and 659
  Palestinian Left and 645
  PFLP and 645, 647–8
  PLO and 607–37, 634–5
  potency of 677
  use of term 664–5
Iran 151, 437
  camps war 594–5
  Iraq and 322, 497
  Islamic revolution 497
  PLO recruits 500
  see also Gulf war
Iraq 14, 354–5
  ANM and 76, 77–8, 108–9
  Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319
  battle of ʿAjlun 280–1
  DFLP and 489
  domestic unrest 325–6
  economic liberalization 548
  Egypt: feud with 67–9
  Fateh and 129, 236–7
  guerrilla movement 147
  Iran and 322, 497
  Israel: invasion of Lebanon 428
  Jordan: dual power in 252, 259
  Jordan civil war (1970) 264–5, 275
  Kurds 548–9
  Kuwait: invasion of 548–9, 641–3
  Lebanon and 504
  Lebanese crisis 385, 394, 402, 418
  Palestinian Left and 416
  PDFLP and 341
  peace process after 1973 conflict 322, 339, 344
  PF–GC and 340
  PFLP and 235–6, 345, 489
  PLO and 424, 425, 434–6, 444, 640
  PLO headquarters in 592–3
  PLO–Jordan dialogue 440
  Revolutionary Command Council 148
  rise in power 645–6
  steadfastness and confrontation front 325
  Syria and 32; feud 324, 326–7, 545; national charter 437, 438
  UAR and 29–30
  UNIFIL and 431
  US and 639–40
  USSR and 151
  see also Gulf war
Irgun Zvai Leumi organization 3
ʿIsa, ʿAbd-al-Rahman 601
ʿIsa, Mahmud 232, 272, 599
  in ANM 109, 161, 228, 230
  Fateh split 562
Ishaq, ʿAli 576, 644
Iskandar, Ahmad 552
Islam:
  in refugee camps 49
  revitalization of 143
Islamic Assembly 404
Islamic Complex 628–9
Islamic Conference Organization 129, 501
Islamic Conference for Palestine 644
Islamic Fateh 226
Islamic Front for the Liberation Of Palestine 630
Islamic Group 626
Islamic Jihad Movement 607, 630
  intifada 625–7
Islamic League 103
  camps war 593
Islamic Liberation Party 50–1, 99, 226, 234, 625
Islamic Liberation Society: appeal of 49
Islamic movement and Islamists 625–32, 682
  decline in appeal of 95
  expulsion from Israel 652
  intifada 615
  Israel and 483

in occupied territories 689
Islamic Resistance Movement, *see* Hamas
Islamic Supreme Council and Higher Committee for National Guidance 466–7
Islamic Unification Movement 353
Islamic University 480, 628, 629
Islamists, *see* Islamic movement
Isma'il, Abu Nidal 559
Israel 197
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319
Arab states: relations with 11–12, 18–20, 21–2
artillery war 508–9
battle of Karama 177–9
civilian targeting 211–13
demographic time bomb 686
Fateh and 88, 107–8, 112, 311
formation of state of 3–4, 5, 6, 11
France: arms from 19, 26, 62
Gaza occupation (1956) 64–6
Good Fence policy 410
guerrilla movement 202–4, 292
Hamas and 651
infiltration problem 59–60
informers 636–7
intifada 619–20
iron fist policy 519–20, 609–10
Islamic movement 629
JCP and 347
Jordan and 546–7, 610–11
Jordan River dispute 80, 94, 95, 101
Lebanese crisis 362, 364, 366, 371, 385, 389, 392, 400
Lebanese war 518–19, 523–8, 530, 531–2, 539–40; invasion plans 509, 514, 522
Lebanon 417–18, 495, 504, 555; invasion of 326–7, 426–9, 429–36, 686–7
Maronite militia, aid for 420
Negev settlement 122, 136
Nixon doctrine 151
nuclear weapons 33, 119–20, 122, 134, 136, 140
occupied territories 286–8, 483–4, 589; economic policy 465; government 163
open bridges policy 160, 209, 345
Oslo accord 655–6, 659–60
Palestinians: attitudes to 11; government controls 37–9
peace process 548, 638, 640–1; after 1973 war 324
PLO and 414, 513–14, 574; recognition 368, 549, 658, 659, 660
PNF and 347
prisoner exchange 573, 584, 609, 610, 626
Rogers plan 144–5
terrorism: reprisals 309–10
Suez crisis 26
Syria and 504–5, 595–6
Troop Withdrawal Agreement with Lebanon 546
US arms for 144, 152
West: commitment to 663
al-Ittijah al-Islami al-Mujahid 630

al-Ja'bari, Muhammad 467
Ja'ja', Samir 590, 595
Jabhat Filastin al-Muslima 630
al-Jabi, Subhi 116, 133, 138, 139
influence of 185–6
PLA guerrilla wing 171
Jabir, Fayiz 109, 111, 230, 305, 395
Jabir, Rubin 272
Jabr, 'haj' Isma'il 162, 222, 224, 462
Fateh split 561–2, 563, 566
Lebanese war 524–5, 541
Jackson, Jesse 485
Jadid, Ghassan 67
Jadid, 'Izzat 146
Jadid, Salah 32, 117, 125, 127, 230
power struggle with Asad 145–6, 148–9, 184–5, 187, 248, 264
Sa'iqa and 288
Jallud, 'Abd-al-Salam 389, 399, 556
Jallud, 'Abdullah 330
Jam'ani, Dafi 182, 264, 288
Jama'a Islamiyya 581
al-Jamal, Khalil 188
al-Jamal, Muhammad 626
al-Jamala, Jum'a 180–1
Jamil, Naji 127, 128, 149, 418
Lebanese crisis 366, 405, 407
Jarad, Fayiz 171
Jaradat, Sa'd 353, 355
Jarbu', Rashid 117
Jarring, Gunnar 144
al-Jayyab, Khalil 183
al-Jayyar, Mahmud 129
al-Jazi, Mashhur Haditha 253, 260, 261, 266
Jbara, 'Abd-al-Rahman 231
JCP, *see* Jordanian Communist Party
Jericho:
Cairo accord 658–9
Palestinian Authority 663

Jewish Agency 6, 8–9
Jibril, Ahmad 165, 171, 207, 228, 412, 419
  artillery war 509
  battle of Karama 178
  Brezhnev proposal 503–4
  camps wars 620
  criticism of 339–40, 417
  Fateh split 561, 563
  Lebanese crisis 371, 381, 382, 407
  Lebanese war 515, 516, 529–30
  opposition to Arafat 126, 127, 579
  Palestinian civil war 571, 572
  in Palestinian Liberation Front 94, 125
  in PF–GC 203, 229, 258, 644
  PLO and 429, 439, 440, 444, 485
  UNIFIL 431–2
Jihad, Muhammad 597, 600, 633
Jihad Movement, *see* Islamic Jihad
Jisr al-Basha refugee camp 395–6
Jmayʿani, Dafi 185, 230, 253
Jmayyil, Amin 419, 555, 590
  accordian plan 514
  elected president 539
Jmayyil, Bashir 371–2, 392, 419
  accordian plan 514
  death 538
  elected president 538
  Lebanese crisis 392
  Syria–Israel clash 504
  Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 400
Jmayyil, Pierre 194, 313
  Lebanese crisis 358–61, 369, 371, 376–7, 403, 404
  Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 363
Johnson, Lyndon 144
Joint Arab Defence Council 281
joint committee: Jordanian–Palestinian 479–82, 503
Joint Forces 385
  Israeli Good Fence policy 410
  Lebanese crisis 374–5, 388–9, 390, 393–4, 398, 405–9
  Lebanese war 517
  Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 396–8
Jordan 18
  Amman accord 578–9
  ANM and 75, 109, 135, 159, 161, 166
  Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319, 321
  Arab states: grants from 143
  battle of ʿAjlun 279–81
  battle of Karama 177–9
  Britain and 27
  camps war 596
  civil war (1970) 148–9, 150–1, 262–8, 671, 683; aftermath 268–79, 274–9
  domestic instability 11
  Egypt and 30–1, 32–3
  Fateh and 104–5, 129, 222, 224, 307–8
  food riots 548
  fugitive patrols 208–9
  guerrilla action against 138
  guerrilla groups in 147, 176–7, 181–4, 202, 668, 675; deterioration of relations 243–61; end of dual power 262–81
  infiltration problem 59–60
  Israel and 13, 610–11
  Lebanese war 526
  Lebanon: Israeli invasion of 428
  Muslim Brotherhood and 629
  occupied territories 465–6; control of 335–6
  Palestine problem 96
  Palestinian civil war 572
  Palestinian military units missions in 67
  Palestinian policies 15, 21
  Palestinians in 4, 54; alliance 545, 546–7, 552–3, 557–8; federation 414–15; government control 41–2; social and economic control 42–4
  PFLP and 305–6, 417, 490
  PLA 169, 290–1
  PLO 118–19, 438–40, 577, 586–9; expulsion from (1970–1) 682; personnel from 460–1
  plot to overthrow monarchy 226–7
  political activism in 51–2
  refugee organizations 48
  state-building 13–14, 20
  Syria and 387–8, 489, 502–3
  UAR and 29
  United Arab Kingdom 483
  US and 27–8
  West Bank: severance of ties with 621–2, 623
Jordan Affairs Bureau 308
Jordan River dispute 31, 80, 94, 95, 101
Jordanian Arab Army 27
Jordanian Communist Party (JCP) 243–4, 273, 415
  formation of Ansar 248–51
  in occupied territories 167–8, 476–7
  PNF and 346–7
Jordanian Communist Party–Leninist Cadre 273

Jordanian option 466
Jordanian Revolutionary People's Party 490
al-Juʿba, Hasan 228, 229, 230
al-Juʿba, Nasir 615
Jumʿa, Shaʿrawi 77, 149–50
Junblat, Kamal 191, 193, 194, 369, 380, 388
assassination 417
Damascus accord 386–7
leader of Lebanese Nationalist Movement 362–3
Lebanese crisis 381–3, 385, 389–90, 392, 399, 401–4
Junblat, Walid 425, 531
camps war 594
Lebanese war 529
in national unity government 580
al-Jundi, ʿAbd-al-Karim 124, 125, 127, 145–6, 157
al-Jundi, Khalid 105, 126
Jundullah 370
al-Juwayfil, Muhammad Najib 350

al-Kaʿkabani, Salih 87
Kaʿwash, Jalal 104, 126
Kaʿwash, Kamal 104
Kafarna, Marwan 615
Kahan, Yitzhaq 539
Kamal, Saʿid 129, 425
Kanʿan, ʿAzzam 109
Kanʿan, Ghazi 571, 595, 596
Kanʿan, Musa 363
Kanʿan, Saʿid 638
Kanʿan, Tahir 589
Kanafani, Ghassan 110, 111, 130, 256–7, 304
death 309–10
Karama, battle of 174–9
effect on Palestinian movement 681
Karami, Rashid 190, 360, 363, 367, 375
assassination attempt 381
funds for Fateh 188
Lebanese crisis 369, 392, 403
national unity government 580
runs for president 323, 358
Kata'ib al-Fida' al-ʿArabi 72–3, 75
Kata'ib Muhammad 86
Katibat al-Haq 82
Katmattu, Muhammad 228, 229, 230
Kayid, Abu Yusif 298
al-Kayid, Hasan 177
Kayid, Yusif 600
al-Kaylani, Muhammad Rasul 177, 300, 355
al-Kayyali, ʿAbd-al-Wahhab 92, 236, 269
assassination 512–13
Kfar Shuba raids 360
al-Khaddam, ʿAbd-al-Halim 321, 366, 378, 444, 501
Amman accord 582
assassination attempt 416
camps war 591
Fateh split 566
Jordan and 587
Lebanese crisis 368–9, 376, 377, 385, 390, 407
Lebanese war 533
opposition to Arafat 585
PLO and 554, 620
al-Khadra, Muhammad Tariq 570, 571, 572, 573
Khalaf, Dawud 287
Khalaf, Salah (Abu Iyad) 199, 230, 302, 380, 383, 434, 601
accordian plan 514
Amman accord 579
ANM and 132
after Arab-Israeli war (1967) 155, 156
Arafat and 601, 633, 634
assassination 654, 689–90
in central committee 294, 431
criticisms of 293
early career 80, 82, 84, 87
Egypt and 129, 378, 558
Fahd peace plan 511–12
Fateh 120, 127, 128, 158, 205, 492–3; criticism 292; internal disputes 156, 306–7; split 562–3, 563–4, 565
Faysal of Saudi Arabia and 179
government-in-exile (GiE) 616
guerrilla movement 669
Gulf crisis 642
Husayn assassination plot 355–6
intelligence apparatus 223, 225–6, 246, 254
Jordan 258, 264, 280, 586; civil war 265, 266
Jordan Affairs Bureau 308
Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 558
Lebanese crisis 389–93, 395, 399, 402, 404, 429
Lebanese war 530
Lebanon and 512
Nasir and 180
national authority 343
peace process 421; after 1973 conflict 334, 335–6, 338, 342
PLA and 241

Khalaf, Salah (Abu Iyad) (*cont.*):
  PLO 219, 273, 555; reform 444, 646; withdrawal from Lebanese cities 496, 498–9
  PLO–Jordan dialogue 438
  PNC and 557, 576
  'reverse immigration' 212
  revolutionary bases 224
  security apparatus 457, 462
  Shtura accord 419–20
  Syria and 554, 576–7, 620
  Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 401
  terrorism 309, 310, 311, 639
  Tripoli conference 425
  USSR and 426
Khalid, king of Saudi Arabia: Riyadh agreement 407
Khalid, Hasan (Abu al-Saʿid) 375, 380, 390, 520
Khalid, Taysir 488, 642
'Khalid ibn al-Walid' 64
al-Khalidi, Mahmud 87, 103, 128
al-Khalidi, Walid 441
Khalifa, Abu ʿAbdullah 67
Khalifa, Ahmad 110, 130, 164, 165, 166
  arrested 167
al-Khalili, Ghazi 272, 279, 301, 332
Khammash, ʿAmir 178
Khan Yunis raid 65
Khartum 311
al-Khatib, ʿUmar 105, 162, 207
al-Khatib, Ahmad 73, 74, 379, 600
  arrested 413
  Lebanese crisis 390, 404
  as PLA commander 230, 231, 242, 380
al-Khatib, Hasan 288
al-Khatib, Husam 87, 103, 105, 284
  on PLO executive committee 56, 206, 263
al-Khatib, Husayn 209, 291
  guerrilla groups 171
al-Khatib, Ishaq 250
al-Khatib, Naʿim 588
al-Khatib, Samir 133, 186, 238
al-Khawaja, ʿAzmi 110, 165, 166, 167, 232, 272
Khaydar, Muhammad 100, 102
Khmayyis, Mustafa 165
Khrushchev, Nikita 33
al-Khuli, Hasan Sabri 405, 407
al-Khuli, Muhammad 393
al-Khuri, Bishara 11, 13
Khuri, Emil 189
Khuri, Iliyya 343
al-Kifah al-Musallah Tariq al-ʿAwda 87
Kilani, Muhammad Rasul 247
Kishli, Muhammad 79, 159, 230, 302
Kissinger, Henry 144, 151, 152, 356, 684
  Lebanese crisis 361, 385, 386
  policies 320, 321, 322, 341
  recognition of PLO 368
Korea, North 500
  arms for Fateh 510
  DFLP and 349
  support for Fateh 147, 510
Kreisky, Bruno 415, 484, 502
kufiyya 195
Kuwait:
  aid to Jordan 267–8
  aid to PLO 640
  Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319
  grant to Egypt and Jordan 143, 152
  Iraqi invasion of 548–9, 641–3, 651
  Palestinian civil war 572
al-Kzar, Nazim 148

al-Labadi, Mahmud 559
al-Ladabi, Muhammad 615
labour, *see* workers
Labour Party: Israel 503, 652
landlessness 46–7
landowners: in Jordan 42–3
al-Lawh, ʿIsam 604
al-Lawzi, Ahmad 552
LCAO 302–3, 353, 370, 581
LCP, *see* Lebanese Communist Party
leadership, Palestinian:
  age differentiation 6, 9, 669–70
  in exile 2, 3, 7–9
  Fateh 223
  guerrilla groups 182–3
  lack of 35
  lack of accountability 680–1
  nature of 677–9
  in occupied territories 635–6
  in Palestinian Authority 661
  rivalries 676
Leadership of the Palestinian Organization 412
League of Arab States 3, 13, 14–15, 30, 41
  battle of Beirut 465–6
  disbanding of Palestinian armed forces 58–9
  Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 549
  Lebanese crisis 358, 370, 392, 394

Lebanese war 529, 535–6
Palestine problem 95–6
PLA and 113
League of Nations 1, 4–5
League of Palestinian Students 57
Lebanese Communist Action Organization (LCAO) 302–3, 353, 370, 581
Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) 370, 497, 513
Amal and 520
camps war 581, 594, 595
Palestinian civil war 570
Lebanese *deuxième bureau*: bombing campaigns 513
Lebanese Forces 414, 527, 567, 568, 582, 590, 592
accordian plan 514
camps war 582
Lebanese war 531
Syria and 538–9
Lebanese Front 406, 411, 413–14, 418, 496, 499
Lebanese crisis 386, 387, 388, 392, 394, 403
Palestinian refugees and 414
Shtura accord 420
withdrawal of Syrian forces 498
Lebanese Movement in Support of Fateh 189
Lebanese National Resistance Front 581
Lebanese Nationalist Movement (LNM) 413, 496, 567
control of 433
decline of 513
feud with Amal 403–4, 497, 504
formed 362–3
Israeli Good Fence policy 410
Lebanese crisis 369–74, 387, 392–3, 395, 401–4
Lebanese war 528, 529, 531, 539, 542
PLO weapons for 538
political programme 367
political reform draft 364
Shtura accord 420
Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 397
Lebanon:
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 331–2
Ba'th party 92–3
camps war 580–5
civil war (1975–6) 190–4, 323–4, 471–2, 684; approach of 358–72; ceasefire attempts 398–403, 410–23; PLO and Syrian rivalry in 373–91, 392–5; Tal al-Zaʿtar siege 395–8
conflict (1974) 356
conflict (1978–82) 495–521
domestic instability 11
Fateh and 104, 129, 298–9, 653–4, 656
guerrilla bases in 291–2, 312–17
guerrilla groups in 147, 188–94, 202, 668, 675
independence 5
Israel and 13, 555
Israeli invasion (1982) 326–7, 426–9, 686–7; effects of 429–36
liberalism 20
national unity government 546, 580
Palestinian dissidents and 597–8
Palestinian military units missions in 67
Palestinians in 4; government control 39, 40–1; social and economic control 44–6
PFLP in 645
PLA in 118, 289–90
PLO and 448, 449, 460–1, 560–1, 589–90, 685
political activism 52, 53
state-building 20
Troop Withdrawal Agreement with Israel 546
UAR and 29
war (1982) 523–40; aftermath 540–3, 551–5; effect on PLO 545; preparations for 522–3
Lebanon committee: camps war 602–3
Legislative Council in Gaza 96, 115
Lehi (Stern) organization 3
Lenin 233
Levy, Moshe 595
Lewis, Samuel 531
Liberation Council: formation of 138–9
liberation groups 666
liberation movements, national: relations with Fateh 102–3
Libya:
aid to Jordan 267–8
aid to PLO 640
Amman accord 579
Arafat and 502
arms: for Palestinian Left 486; for PLO 509–10
battle of ʿAjlun 280
domestic instability 146
Egypt: border war 419
Fateh and 105
Fateh split 561, 563, 566, 567
Fez declaration 552

Libya: (*cont.*):
grant to Egypt and Jordan 143
guerrilla movement 191
Jordan civil war 275
Lebanese crisis 360, 385
Lebanese war 529
Palestinian civil war 570
Palestinian dissidents and 486, 600, 644
PDFLP and 341
peace process after 1973 conflict 322, 339, 344
PF–GC and 340
PFLP and 234, 345
PLO and 378, 485–6, 556
steadfastness and confrontation front 325
al-Liftawi, Mustafa 207
Likud Party 324, 418, 466, 479, 503
Baker peace plan 641
plan to incorporate occupied territories 508
Liu Shao-Chi 103
LNM, *see* Lebanese Nationalist Movement
Lockerbie bombing 624
Lydda attack 166–7

al-Maʿani, Salah 93, 571, 572
Maʿayta, Mahmud 182, 185, 288
al-Mabhuh, Mahmud 287
al-Mabhuh, Marwan 615
al-Madani, ʿAli 393
al-Madani, Wajih 116, 169, 171, 172
formation of Abtal al-ʿAwda 136–7
as PLA commander-in-chief 113, 115, 133, 141, 185–6
Shuqayri and 132, 134, 138, 139
Madrid peace conference 648, 651–2, 653–4, 690
Maghdusha 593–4, 595
Mahmud, Sulayman 287
Mahmud, Taha 164
al-Majali, Habis 261
al-Majali, Hazaʿ 28
Majd 348, 629–30
Majid, Abu 559
Makhus, Ibrahim 105, 145–6, 157
Malik, Charles 29
Malik, Fuʾad 396
al-Malki, ʿAdnan 67
Malluh, ʿAbd-al-Rahim 230, 306, 451, 642, 647, 649
Mao Zedong 103, 151, 233, 489
Report from Xunwu 679

MAPAM 38
Maqdah, Munir 653–4
MAQI 38
Marʿi, ʿAbd-al-Rahman 352, 432, 434, 564
Maragha, Saʿid 294, 296, 350, 351, 599
ʿAtallah and 297
camps war 620, 621
as Fateh commander 299, 600
Fateh split 558, 561, 562, 563, 567
Lebanese war 516
opposition to Arafat 556–7
Palestinian civil war 571
PLO internal disputes 429
proposed *coup* 254
quells revolt 298
in revolutionary council 493
USSR and 567
wounded 413
Maronites, Lebanese 323, 498, 531
see also Lebanese crisis
martyrs: social welfare for families of 460
Martyrs of September battalion 297
Marxism:
Arab and Palestinian 648
in PFLP 232–7
Marxist-Leninism:
DFLP 488
guerrilla groups 492
PFLP 490–1, 648
al-Masri, Tahir 579
al-Masri, Zafir 587–8, 611
mass action 471, 474–8
Maswada, Mahmud 103, 224
challenge to Arafat 156, 223
expelled from Fateh 226
Matar, Hamdi 161, 228, 232, 272, 279
release from Jordanian prison 332
al-Mawʿid, Hamad 126
mayors: in occupied territories 478–9, 482, 483–4
Meir, Golda 144–5, 308
Melkart protocol (1973) 317, 363, 373
Melloy, Francis 395
Mhanna, Ghazi 183, 330
al-Miʿmari, Ahmad 390
middle class 8, 665
birth of Palestinian entity 95
founding of PLO 667
in guerrilla leadership 671
Islamic movements 626–7
in Jordan 43
marginalization of 44–5

in occupied territories 466–8, 608–9, 611–12
Palestinian nationalism and 35–6
political activism 50–1, 608–9
transfer of leadership from 220
see also petite bourgeoisie
Mifrij, Ahmad 181
Mikha'il, Hanna (Abu ʿUmar) 352
military action, *see* armed struggle
military training:
Fateh 162, 180, 187, 225
PLO: compulsory 98
military units, Palestinian:
in Arab countries 41, 58–70
see also armies; Palestine Liberation Army
militia agreement: Jordan 275–7
Milson, Menahem 483–4, 519–20
al-Mir, Ahmad 146
missile crisis 326
Miyya-wa-Miyya refugee camp 590, 653
mobile war 205, 206
Morgan, Ernest 365–6
Morocco 319, 502, 548, 588
Mossad: terrorism 512
Movement of Arab Lebanon 353
Movement of Arab Revolutionaries 163
Movement of Free Jordanians–Shihan Forces 276
Mraysh, Ma'mun 592
Mroz, John 507
Mtayr, Wahid 462
Muʿammar, Ibrahim 626
Mubarak, Husni 572, 573, 579, 586, 639
Mufid, Marwan 298
Muflih, Riyad 281
Muhammad, ʿAli Nasir 576
Muhammad, Abu Usama 462, 485
Muhanna, ʿAbdullah Ahmad Hasan 626, 632
al-Muharrir 378
Muhsin, Hashim 'Ali 233, 254, 302
Fateh split 561, 566
Muhsin, Zuhayr 288, 290, 314
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 330
collective leadership 442
Israeli invasion of Lebanon 429
Israeli truce 414
Lebanese conflict 412–13
Lebanese crisis 366, 371, 378–9, 384–5, 388–90, 393, 428
peace process after 1973 conflict 333–4, 337–8, 342
PLO and 441, 444, 485
PLO–Jordan dialogue 439–40, 445
US–PLO dialogue 421, 422
Munazzamat Shabab al-Tha'r 141
Muqawama 168
Muqawama Mustamirra 344
Muqbil, Hanna 434
Murad, Mustafa 393, 601
Murphy, Richard 587
Murqus, Ilyas 283, 284
al-Murtaja, Yahya 171, 291
al-Musallami, Muhammad 110, 165, 232, 272–3, 306
in ANM 74
criticism of 649
Muslih, Raji 352
Muslim Brotherhood:
appeal of 49, 86, 105
Arafat and 573
campaign against ʿAlawi domination 325–6
Egyptian training for 81–2
Fateh and 80–1, 84, 485, 498
in Gaza 53
government loyalty of 51
Hamas 652–3
intifada 630–2
Islamic Fateh and 226
Islamist movement and 483
Jordan and 52, 489, 586
Nasir and 26, 33, 61–2
in occupied territories 482, 627–30
PLO leadership in 677
spread of 50
suppression 129
Syria and 520, 547
United National Front and 163
weakening of 83
Muslims, Lebanese, *see* Lebanese crisis
Mustafa, Salah 64
Mutlaq, 'haj' 462
al-Mzayyin, Saʿid 84

Naʿim 162, 193, 296
Nabʿa 400, 403–4
Nabatiyya clashes 416
al-Nabhani, Taqi-al-Din 50–1
al-Nabulsi, Sulayman 27
al-Nafuri, Amin 28
al-Nahar 610
al-Nahhal, Fakhir 181
al-Nahlawi, ʿAbd-al-Karim 30, 69
Nahr al-Barid refugee camp 191, 584

Naji, Talal 229, 552, 553
Najib, Muhammad 61
al-Najjab, Sulayman 167, 347, 634, 646
al-Najjar, Muhammad Yusif (Abu Yusif) 106, 123, 192, 298, 306
  after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 156
  arrested 82
  death 311
  in Muslim Brotherhood 80, 84, 86–7
  terrorism 308, 309, 310
al-nakba 1–4, 46–7, 90, 663, 665–6
al-Naqib, Hasan 162, 178, 184, 435–6
al-Naqib, Usama 78, 161
al-Nashashabi, Muhammad Zuhdi 93, 482
al-Nashashibi, Raghib 6, 7, 8, 9
al-Nashshar, ʿIsa 629
al-Nashshash, ʿAbd-al-Hadi 559
Nasim, Muhammad 77, 129
Nasir, Jamal ʿAbd-al- 12, 13, 49, 184, 191–2
  ANM and 75, 77, 80, 131, 135, 136
  after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 175
  Arab Socialist Union and 31
  assassination attempt 82
  attitudes to 83, 160, 666, 678
  Baʿth Party and 28–9, 30
  Baghdad Pact 18
  death 145
  domestic conflict 149
  Egyptian policy 135
  establishment of eastern front 146, 179
  Fateh and 108, 112
  grass-roots support 667
  guerrilla movement 191
  Habash and 235
  inter-Arab relations 31, 32–3, 124
  Israel: recognition of 143
  Jordan 259
  Jordan civil war (1970) 266, 267
  Muslim Brotherhood and 61
  nationalization 27, 64
  Palestinian movement 78–9, 96, 97, 100
  Palestinian rupture 286
  PLA and 116
  PLO and 102, 103–4
  in Revolutionary Command Council 25–6
  Qasim: feud with 67–9, 78, 99
  Rogers plan 256
  Shuqayri and 117
  Soviet arms 19
  war of attrition 241, 253–4
  Yemen conflict 95
Nasir, Kamal 124, 253, 311
Nasirite Murabitun 497, 504, 529, 538
  Amal and 582
  camps war 595
  Salih and 598
Nasirite Popular Organization 521
Nasr, Mahmud 168
Nasr, Salah 77, 129, 135
  dismissal 149
Nasr, Samih: capture of 590
Nasrallah, Saʿid 363
Nassar, Fu'ad 168, 249, 250
National Alliance (NA) 575, 576, 577–8
National Assembly Forces 370
'national authority' 322, 340–1, 342–3, 351–2, 684, 685
National Bureau of Guerilla Control: Syria 187–8, 289
National Front 65
National Guidance Committee (NGC) 482, 483, 508
  banned 519, 608
  formed 479
National Liberation League 50
National Salvation Council 529, 531
National Steadfastness and Confrontation Front 437
National Union 29, 30, 31, 667
National Union Front 404
National Unity Programme 439
nationalism 95–111, 687
  Arafat and 605
  country 5–6, 8–9
  Fateh and 680
  pan-Arab 664, 666
  policies 20–3
  political activism 48–54
  rebirth 71–94
  re-emergence of national politics 665–7
  repression in occupied territories 484
  social origins 46–8
  statist and revolutionary options 332–3
nationalization, Arab 20
al-Natsha, Mustafa 611
al-Natsha, Rafiq 105, 493
al-Natur, Suhayl 272, 542, 603
Natur, Muhammad (Abu al-Tayyib) 635
Nawfal, Mamduh 204, 341, 383, 604
  artillery war 505
  camps war 593–4
  DFLP internal reform 646
  Lebanese war 526, 542
  USSR and 342

Nayif bin ʿAli, prince 245
Nazmi, Ra'uf (Mahjub ʿUmar) 181
Nazzal, Nafidh 652
neopatrimonialism 656, 672, 674, 680, 687
  Arafat 605, 689–90
  in state-building 670
NGC, *see* National Guidance Committee
Nicaragua 453
al-Nida' 431
Nida'al-Masira 223
Nidal, Abu, *see* Abu Nidal faction; al-Banna, Sabri
al-Nimayri, Muhammad Jaʿfar 146, 149, 266, 267, 314
  battle of ʿAjlun 279
al-Nimmari, Kamal 164
Nimr, Walid (Abu ʿAli Iyad) 123, 259, 261, 278, 297, 306
  arrested 127
  in central committee 294
  death 279, 297, 298
  intelligence apparatus 225
  as military trainer 128, 183
Nixon, Richard 144, 145, 151, 152, 285, 320
Nixon doctrine 151
Nkrumah, Kwame 32
Non-Aligned Movement 344, 690
  PLO and 312, 332
non-governmental organizations: in occupied territories 689
nuclear weapons: Iraq 641–2
Nuqrashi, Mahmud 11
Nusayba, Nihad 291
Nusayba, Sari 615, 638, 654

OACL 497
occupied territories:
  activists 608–9
  Arafat popularity 592, 654
  effect on Palestinian politics 676–7
  emigration of Soviet Jews 639–40
  Fateh in 1974 349–50
  guerrilla movement 147, 207–10, 470–4; after 1967 war 155–73; after 1973 war 345–9
  iron fist policy 519–20
  Islamic movement in 625–32
  Jewish settlements 508, 520, 558, 607, 609
  Jordan and 587–8, 589
  leadership in 635–6
  Likud plan to incorporate 508
  mass action in 474–8
  Palestinian autonomy in 549
  Palestinian civil war 573
  Palestinian representation 643
  peace process after 1973 war 333–9
  PLO and 657, 660–1, 685
  rentier politics in 680
  social and economic transformations 464–70
  struggle for political predominance in 478–84
  see also intifada
October war, *see* Arab–Israeli war (1973)
oil embargo 319
oil states:
  aid for Hamas 651, 652
  funds for PLO 641; suspension of 656
  see also specific countries
Olympic village attack 309, 310
Organization of Lebanese Socialists 192, 231
  formed 230
Oslo accord 653, 655–6, 659–60, 663, 691
  provisions 658

PAC, *see* Palestinian Action Command
Pakistan 500
Palestine and Palestinians:
  after Arab–Israeli war (1947–8) 1–4
  Arab politics and 10–16, 20–3
  armed struggle 112–42, 673
  'civilian administration' 15
  in Egypt: government controls 40–1; social and economic controls 44
  imagined community 54–7
  international politics and 16–20
  in Israel: government controls 37–9; *see also* occupied territories
  in Jordan: government controls 41–2
  in labour market 461, 469, 607–8
  in Lebanon: government controls 39, 40–1; social and economic controls 44–6
  military units in Arab countries 58–70
  opposition to statehood of 4–10, 25–33
  in Syria: government controls 39–41; social and economic controls 44–6
  unsuitability for guerrilla warfare 198
  see also Palestine Liberation Organization
Palestine Arab Refugees Institution 39
Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC) 182
  formed 204–5
Palestine Border Police 61, 66

Palestine Borders Guard 61–3, 66, 68–9, 115
  Shuqayri and 97, 112
Palestine Committee: ANM 78–9
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) 80, 294–5, 368, 413
  Abtal al-ʿAwda 136–7
  after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 169
  Arab recognition 102
  battalions 118
  battle of ʿAjlun 279
  camps war 584
  control of 113–19, 132–3, 185–7, 241–2, 289–90
  expansion of 330
  Fateh and 121
  formation of 112–19
  guerrilla wing 170–2
  in Jordan 260, 261
  Jordan conflict (1970) 262, 267, 268
  Lebanese crisis 376–8, 380–1, 387–8, 393–4, 402
  Lebanese war 526, 528, 536
  military expansion 450
  Palestinian civil war 570–1
  personnel: origins 462
  recruits 500
  Saʿiqa and 185
  Syria and 329–30, 416
  Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 397
  unity document 251–2
  see also Popular Liberation Forces
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) 92, 125–6, 127, 165, 432, 435
  Achille Lauro 586
  camps war 593, 595, 621
  explosion in headquarters 436
  formed 418
  ideology 56
  Lebanese war 529–30
  opposition to Arafat 553
  Palestinian civil war 569
  PFLP and 227, 228
  PLO and 444–5
  PNC and 503, 575, 576
  raids 504, 640–1
  Syria and 442
  USSR and 492
Palestine Liberation Front–Path of Return (PLF–PR) 134–5, 164, 171, 188
Palestine Liberation Organization:
  after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 169–72
  Arab support for 21
  Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319, 329–33
  armed struggle: launch of 132–5
  army regularization 448–53
  clandestinity 285
  Fakhani republic 447–63
  Fateh and 100–4, 121–2, 174–5, 293; takeover by 218–21
  formed 94, 97–100, 666–7
  guerrilla movement 141, 205–6, 239–42; takeover by 669
  internal crisis (1966–7) 138–9
  international image, concern for 215–16
  intifada 613–19, 632–7
  Islamic University 629
  Jordan and 253, 260, 261, 445
  Jordanian civil war 267, 268, 273–4, 683
  Lebanon: conflicts (1978–82) 495–521; Israeli invasion of 429–36; May events 312–17
  Lebanese crisis 323–4, 373–91, 392–5, 683; approach of 358–72; ceasefire attempts 403–9, 410–23
  Lebanese refugee camps 192
  militia agreement 275–7
  in occupied territories 57, 345–6, 464–70, 611–13
  opposition 584–5, 685, 688; coalition 441–6; in crisis 643–50; decline of 596–601; highpoint of strength 486–92; Lebanese clashes (1982) 520; peace process 339–45, 484–6, 501–2
  Oslo accord 660
  PLA: control of 113–19, 132–3; formed 112–13
  Planning Centre 205, 220
  policies (1984) 574–80
  recognition: by Israel 658; by Jordan 355–6; obsessive insistence on 671; as Palestinian representative 321, 322, 332, 344, 345
  Social Affairs Institution 409
  steadfastness and confrontation front 325
  terrorism: condemnation of 586
  Tripoli conference 424–5
  US and 420–3
  see also peace process
Palestine Liberation Regiment 68
Palestine Martyrs' Fund 225, 239
Palestine Martyrs' Society Workshops–Samid 460
Palestine National Council (PNC) 89, 186, 579–80

Arafat and 557, 602
Brezhnev proposal 503
DFLP crisis 647
division of power in 219–20, 234–5
election of 133
formation of 97–100
guerrilla movement and 147
Israeli nuclear weapons 136
Jordan 252, 256, 260
Jordan civil war (1970) 278–9
national authority 322, 340–1, 342–3, 684, 685
national unity 272, 596, 597, 688
occupied territories 345–6
Palestinian declaration of independence 623–4
Palestinian state 417
peace process 415–16, 638
PLO opposition: reconciliation attempt 574–7
Popular Organization Department 239–41
role of 669
Shuqayri and 134
Palestine National Fund 491, 602
Palestine National Union: dissolution of 116
Palestine Popular Liberation Front (PPLF) 185
Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) 237, 260, 279, 442, 644
Cairo conference and 175
camps war 593, 595
Fateh and 443
Fateh split 561, 564
Fez declaration 552
formed 163–4
in Lebanon 313
Lebanese crisis 365–6
Lebanese war 529–30
Libya and 486
Palestinian civil war 569
Palestinian declaration of independence 624
peace process after 1973 conflict 344
PLO and 444–5, 556
PNC and 503, 575
terrorism 215
USSR and 492
withdrawal from PNSF 596
Palestine Students Union 81, 83
Palestinian Action Command (PAC) 110, 130, 131, 159, 165
formation of 108–9
Palestinian Arab Congress 6, 8, 9, 10
Palestinian Authority 661–2, 663
Palestinian civil war 567–73
Palestinian Communist Organization 163, 476–7
in occupied territories 167, 168
Palestinian Communist Organization in Lebanon (PCOL) 476
Palestinian Communist Party (PCP) 50, 477
Amman accord 579, 580
camps war 593, 595, 621
change to Palestinian People's Party 647
Fateh and 596
intifada 615
in occupied territories 609, 610, 611–12, 635, 689
PLO and 613
in PNC 575
Palestinian Communist Party–Provisional Command 575
Palestinian Communists Workers' Party 434, 564, 593
Palestinian Democratic Union (*Fida*) 647
'Palestinian detachment' 70, 107
Palestinian League of the Left 231
Palestinian Liberation Forces 186
Palestinian Liberation Group 137
Palestinian National Front (PNF) 476, 482, 636
formed 346–7
Palestinian National Liberation Army (PNLA) 602, 634
Palestinian National Liberation Front 135, 298
Palestinian National Liberation Movement, *see* Fateh
Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF) 580
Amal and 590
Amman accord 582
camps war 583, 584, 585, 591, 594, 596
formed 579
Syria and 585
Palestinian National Union 78, 96
Palestinian People's Party 647
Palestinian Popular Liberation Front 175
Palestinian Popular Organization (PPO) 116–17, 130, 135, 239
failure 667
revival 133–4

Palestinian Reconnaissance 68 Battalion 66, 76, 107, 111, 118
recruits for PLF 126
Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) 192, 239, 296, 460, 483
camps war 591
Lebanese war 517, 529, 530, 540
Palestinian Revolutionary Front 93–4, 103
Palestinian Revolutionary Organization 134
'Palestinian section' 70
Palestinians, *see* Palestine
pan-Arabism 664, 666
parties, political:
discarded by Fateh 90–1
limited appeal in refugee camps 48–9
PASC 237, 238
compulsory conscription 403
Jordan civil war 263, 268
Lebanese crisis 369
PFLP boycott 235
in refugee camps 418
passports: Palestinian 41
Patriotic Committees 353
patriotism:
nationalist: factors for 36–7; guerrilla movement 282; occupied territories 466
state 5–6, 8–9
patronage:
Arafat 688
Fateh 354
in occupied territories 680, 689
within Palestinian elite 672
PLO 447, 603, 635, 656, 687
politics of 454–60
PCP, *see* Palestinian Communist Party
PCRS 225
PCWP 434, 564, 593
PDFLP, *see* Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
peace process 574, 615–16, 638–9
after Arab–Israeli war (1973) 321–2, 326, 333–9, 684
guerrilla opposition to 339–45
after Lebanese civil war (1975–6) 414–20
US–PLO dialogue 420–3
US sponsored 622, 640–1, 654–5, 686, 690–1
peacekeeping forces 369–70, 383
Peel Commission 6, 9
Peled, Matityahu 414
People's Party 348
people's war: concept of 196–202, 216
Peres, Shimon 321, 547, 587, 588
Declaration of Principles 658
Lebanese crisis 392
Lebanese war 519
PLO and 586
Syria and 595
Permanent Bureau of the Palestinian Guerilla Organizations 175, 184, 219–20
petite bourgeoisie:
in occupied territories 611, 671
political activism 53
state-building 54–7
transfer of leadership to 220
PF–GC, *see* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command
PFLP, *see* Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-International Operations 305
Phalanges Party 386, 514
abrogation of Cairo agreement 414
Arafat and 312, 398, 403
Black Saturday 371–2
headquarters bombed 538–9
isolation of 361, 366
Lebanese crisis 363–70, 400
Syrian army and 498
Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 400, 401
PLA, *see* Palestine Liberation Army
PLF, *see* Palestine Liberation Front
PLF / PLA, *see* Popular Liberation Forces
PLF–PR 134–5, 164, 171, 188
PLO, *see* Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC, *see* Palestine National Council
PNLA 602, 634
PNO 191, 370, 581, 585
PNSF, *see* Palestinian National Salvation Front
Politburo of Unified Action for Palestinian Revolutionary Forces 100
Political Bureau of Revolutionary Palestinian Forces 134
political committees 654
political system, Palestinian: making of 217–42
politics, Arab:
ANM and 75–80
in Palestine 10–16, 20–3
in Palestinian military units 67–70
separation of Fateh from 89–90
POLP 186, 187, 231, 237, 279
Popular Army: Jordan 275

popular committees: camps war 606
popular councils: in Jordan 248
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) 71
battle of ʿAjlun 279
clandestinity 284–5
condemnation of terrorism 215
formed 230–2
guerrilla fragmentation 237–8
internal reassessment after Jordan civil war 282, 302–3
Iraq and 236
JCP and 251
Jordan 247–8, 253, 254, 255–6, 260; civil war 262–3, 267, 269–70, 273, 278–9; monarchy 244; sabotage 280, 332
in Lebanon 190, 192, 291, 313–14, 317
military operations 204, 205, 206
name changed to DFLP 342
in occupied territories 208
organization 341
Palestinian state 212
peace process after 1973 conflict 335, 337, 341–2
people's war 201
PFLP and 302
seats in PNC 234
Popular Front 38
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) 71, 131, 184
Amal and 590, 593
Amman accord 578–9
armed struggle 639
attitudes to Arab states 678
Basic Political Report 235, 237–8
battle of ʿAjlun 279
battle of Karama 178, 181
bureaucratization 671
Cairo conference and 175
camps war 595, 621
civilian targets 210, 211
clandestinity 284
concept of popular liberation war 197–8
conscription 402–3, 500, 511
crises in 227–30, 345, 432–3, 644–6, 647–50
Egypt and 180
Fahd peace plan 511
Fateh and 596
Fateh split 564–5, 565–6
Fez declaration 552
formed 167
government-in-exile (GiE) 623
guerrilla movement 206, 237, 356–7, 430
Gulf crisis 642
ideology 217–18, 648–9, 677
informers 287
internal reassessment after Jordan civil war 282, 299–306
intifada 614, 615
Islamic movement 629
Israeli attacks 499
Jabhat al-ʿAmal 610
Jordan 181–2, 280; dual power in 253, 254, 256–8, 260
Jordanian civil war 262–3, 267, 269–70, 271–3, 276, 277, 683
Jordanian monarchy 244, 417
Jordanian Special Branch 246
Lebanese crisis 371, 383, 395, 399, 406
Lebanese *deuxième bureau* and 513
Lebanese war 515, 516, 519, 522, 536–7, 541–2
in Lebanon 190, 192, 193, 317
Libya and 486
Marxism in 232–7
military organization 216, 451
in occupied territories 207–10, 347–8, 470–4, 477, 481–2, 609, 635–6, 689
Palestinian civil war 569–70
Palestinian declaration of independence 624
Palestinian state 417
pan-Arabism and 664
peace process 322, 335, 336–7, 344, 643
people's war 200, 201
PF-GC and 418
PLO and 425, 443–4, 445
PLO internal disputes 489–92, 553, 554, 556, 557
PLO–Jordan dialogue 439
PNC and 503, 576
PNSF and 580
Riyadh agreement 408
seats in PNC 219–20, 234–5
Shuqayri and 172
Syria and 441–2
terrorism 213–15, 229, 252, 348, 401, 405, 649; Haddad and 257, 272–3, 303–5, 395; multiple hijacks 257–8, 270–1, 301; suspension 272, 300
UNIFIL and 431–2
USSR and 250
see also Special Apparatus

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PF–GC) 179, 229, 252, 503
ALF and 434–5
artillery war 507
camps war 584, 593
clandestinity 284
crisis in 418, 644
Fateh and 416, 443
Fateh split 561, 563, 564, 565, 567
Fez declaration 552
hang-glider attacks 607
in Jordan 280
Jordan civil war 263, 269, 270
Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 554–5
Lebanese crisis 366, 382, 399, 401, 403, 407
Lebanese war 510, 517, 529–30
in Lebanon 190, 193, 291, 313, 317, 412
Libya and 486
military organization 450, 451
Palestinian civil war 569, 570, 571
peace process after 1973 conflict 335, 339, 344
PFLP and 418
PLF and 436
PLO internal disputes 429, 553, 554, 556
PNC and 576
prisoner exchanges 584, 609, 610, 626
Syria and 417
terrorism 215
USSR and 492
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-International Operations 305
Popular Liberation Forces (PLF/PLA) 177, 184, 187, 329
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 331–2
battle of Karama 178–9
formed 177
in Jordan 181–2, 260
Jordan civil war 263, 267
leadership 182–3
in Lebanon 190, 192, 193
in occupied territories 209
organization 218
Palestine Armed Struggle Command 204–5
Syria 290–1
popular liberation war:
concept of 196–8
PFLP and 490
Popular Nasirite Organization (PNO) 191, 370
camps war 581
Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP) 186, 187, 231, 237, 279
Popular Resistance 68, 246, 275, 276
Popular Resistance Front 65, 83
Popular Resistance Front to Liberate the South from Occupation and Fascism 430
popular revolutionary committees 485–6
populism 687
tendency toward 670
Portuguese Africa 102–3
PPSF, *see* Palestine Popular Struggle Front
PRCS, *see* Palestinian Red Crescent Society
Preparatory Committee for Unified Palestinian Action 134
prisoner exchanges:
PF–GC 584, 609, 610, 626
PLO 573
prisoners:
Hamas 650
hunger strike 626
political indocrination of 478
in Syria 620
Progressive Socialist Party 401, 520, 568, 590
Amal and 583
camps war 581, 591, 594, 595, 596
Progressive Unionist Action Front 477
Progressive Workers' Bloc 477
proto-nationalism 9, 46
Fateh 221
guerrilla movement 282
in Jordan refugee camps in 243
PSP, *see* Progressive Socialist Party
'public figures': in occupied territories 608, 638, 643

al-Qaddumi, Faruq (Abu al-Lutuf) 87, 103, 127, 129, 132
Amman accord 578–9
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 157
in Ba'th party 85, 93
in central committee 633
erosion of influence 657
Fateh policies 199, 492
Fateh split 562–3, 563–4
guerrilla movement 269, 430
Jordan 259, 261, 280, 285, 552
Jordan civil war 265
Lebanese crisis 361, 365, 390, 395, 399
mobile war 205
mutiny 298

Nasir and 180
Palestinian entity 155, 223, 417, 422
peace process 415, 421
PLO and 444, 484, 575
PLO–Jordan dialogue 438, 445
Reagan plan 538
Revolutionary Surveillance Directorate 225
Syria and 554, 620
terrorism 270–1
USSR and 643
Qaddumi, Kamal 330
Qaddura, Fayiz 75–6, 77, 110, 137
Qaddura, Walid 272, 302, 303, 432
al-Qadhdhafi, Muʿammar 146, 234, 303, 419
Amman accord 579
battle of ʿAjlun 279
camps war 595, 620
Fateh split 563, 565
Fez declaration 552
PDFLP and 341
PLO and 275, 424–5, 485–6, 509–10, 556
PLO–Jordan dialogue 438
al-Qadi, ʿIsam 182, 501
al-Qalaq, ʿIzz-al-Din 435
al-Qamhawi, Zahi 78
Qansu, ʿAsim 381
Qarʿun dam 506
al-Qasim, ʿAbd-al-Karim 29–30, 31, 76
feud with Nasir 67–9, 78, 99
al-Qasim, ʿUmar 208, 229
al-Qasim, Marwan 552
Qasim, Muhammad 395
al-Qassam, ʿIzz-al-Din 2
al-Qawasma, Fahd 578
Qibya raid 60
Qirrish, Yaʿqub 627
Qiryat Shmuna raid 339, 340
Qrayʿ, Ahmad (abu ʿAla') 85, 633, 653
peace process 655, 656
Qtaysh, ʿUmar 306
Quandt, William 427–8
Qubbaʿa, Taysir 161, 165, 167, 399, 417, 649
al-Quds guerrilla group 246
al-Quds radio programme 644
al-Qudsi, ʿAbd-al-Hamid 156, 162
al-Qumbarji, Lamʿi 189
al-Quqa, Khalil 632
Qura, Nazih 686
Qutub, Sayyid 627
Quwwat al-Ansar, *see* Ansar
Ra'fat, Salih 161, 207–8, 230
arrested 348
battle of ʿAjlun 279
DFLP internal reform 646
PDFLP formed 230
release from Jordanian prison 332
al-Ra'i 74
Rabiʿ, Muhammad 109, 110, 135
Rabin, Yitzhaq 321, 322, 368, 417
Cairo accord 658–9
intifada 619
iron fist policy 609
Lebanese crisis 385, 389
Lebanese war 519
occupied territories 589, 608
Oslo accord 655, 659, 691
Palestinian autonomy 549
peace process 652
Rafah raid 65
Rakah Party 38–9
al-Rantisi, 'Abdullah 628, 629, 632, 650
Rantisi, ʿAwda 615
Rasd 254, 293, 306–7
Rashid, Muhammad (Khalid Salam) 604
Rashidiyya refugee camp 191, 193, 595, 653
food blockade 593
al-Raya 288
al-Rayyis, Munir 165
al-Rayyis, Nahid 291
al-Razzaz, Munif 93
Reagan, Ronald 326, 503, 507, 528, 533, 537
Reagan plan 5, 538, 546, 551, 552
Fateh and 555
Maragha and 556
PLO and 553–4
PNC and 557
Red Eagles 636–7
refugee camps:
ANM in 73, 74
defence of 418
facilities 46
in Gaza 44, 287
in Lebanon 191, 192
PLO social welfare system 448
political activism 48–9, 52, 53
recruitment from 461
working class and peasants in 665
see also camps war; specific names
refugee organizations 48
refugees 3–4
compared with residents 35, 56–7
'economic' 4

refugees (*cont.*):
  Fateh and 88, 107, 224
  government control of 37–42
  international policies 17
  Lebanese crisis 359–60
  in Lebanon 193–4
  marginality 46–54
  from occupied territories 167, 168
  representation 35–6, 671
  social and economic control 42–6
  treatment of 666
Rejection Front 418
residents, occupied territories 37–8
  compared with refugees 35, 56–7
  in PLO elite 671
Revenge Youth Organization 130
reverse emigration 211–13
revolution:
  in Fateh ideology 91, 196
  Palestine movement as 283–4
Revolutionary Armed Forces 487
Revolutionary Armed Struggle Front 87
revolutionary bases: Fateh 224
Revolutionary Command Council 25–6, 138–9
  Fateh leftists in 493
  Shuqayri and 172
Revolutionary Council–Emergency Leadership 653
Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine 124, 125
revolutionary movements: Fateh aid for 453
Revolutionary Palestinian Organization 104
Revolutionary Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 301, 313, 317
Revolutionary Socialist Action Organization 365–6
Revolutionary Surveillance Directorate 225–6
Rif'at, Kamal 129
Rifa'i, 'Abd-al-Mun'im 253
al-Rifa'i, Nur-al-Din 363
al-Rifa'i, Zayd 259, 307, 586–7
  Lebanese crisis 385
al-Rimawi, 'Abdullah 93
Riyad, 'Abd-al-Mun'im 31, 113, 169, 175
Riyad, Mahmud 96, 115, 378
Riyadh agreement 407–8, 411
Rogers, William 144, 145, 152
Rogers plan 144, 145, 150, 254, 256
RPFLP 301, 313, 317
Rshayd, Nazir 246, 259
al-Ruday'i, Yusif Rajab 171, 330
Rundik, Ron 655–6
rural population:
  in occupied territories 610, 611
  Palestinian Authority and 661
  West Bank 469, 470
al-Rusan, Mahmud 264, 541

Sa'ada, Yasin 525
Sa'd, Ma'ruf 360
Sa'd, Mustafa 525
Sa'd-al-Din, Fathi 133, 139, 241, 329
Sa'd-al-Din, Walid 93
Sa'di, Ahmad 134, 135, 163, 171
Sa'id, Edward 622
Sa'id, Hanna 367, 375
al-Sa'id, Nuri 14, 26, 435
Sa'id, Zuhdi 462
Sa'iqa 184, 187, 248, 685
  Arab–Israeli war (1973) 331
  battle of 'Ajlun 279, 281
  Fateh and 520
  Fateh split 561, 564
  Fez declaration 552
  in Jordan 181–2, 253, 260
  Jordan civil war 263, 267, 276, 278
  Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 554–5
  Lebanese crisis 361–3, 366, 372, 379–95
  in Lebanon 190, 191, 193
  Libya and 486
  opposition to Arafat 554
  Palestine Armed Struggle Command 204–5
  Palestinian civil war 569, 570, 572
  peace process after 1973 conflict 322, 337–8
  PNC and 220, 234, 576
  in refugee camps 401, 412–13, 416
  in Syria 288
  on terrorism 215
  withdrawal from joint committee 503
Sa'ud, king of Saudi Arabia 95, 96
al-Sabah, Jabir 407
al-Sabah, Sa'd al-Salim 266
al-Sabarini, Hasan 164, 298
al-Sabbagh, Hasib 441
sabotage:
  in Jordan 308
  in Lebanon 512–13
Sabra refugee camp 580, 583, 584
Sabri, 'Akrama 627
Sabri, 'Ali 149–50
Sabri, Mamduh 219
Sadat, Anwar 314, 315

Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319, 330
assassination 507–8
battle of ʿAjlun 279
Egyptian–Israeli peace process 416–17, 423, 437, 445
Gaza self-rule proposal 483
Lebanese crisis 368, 378, 379, 384, 394
peace process 333, 414, 421
PLO and 307, 355–6, 388
as president 150, 274–5
relations with superpowers 152–3
Riyadh agreement 407
US–Egyptian relations 320–1
war plans 149
Sadiq, Muhammad 175, 176, 180, 266
al-Sadr, Musa 323, 360, 367, 375, 380
disappearance of 497
Lebanese crisis 390, 392, 403, 404
al-Safadi, Akram 67, 69, 182
al-Safadi, Tawfiq 129, 189, 375
al-Saftawi, Asʿad 84
Saguy, Yehoshua 539
al-Saharti, ʿAbd-al-ʿAzim 61
Saharti battalion 61, 66
al-Sahla, Mahmud 298
Saja 630
Salafiyyun 630
Salah, Abu 207
Salah, Salah 76, 110, 306, 649
Salah-al-Din Movement 370
Salam, Khalid (Muhammad Rashid) 604
Salam, Saʾib 313, 369, 404
Salama, ʿAli Hasan 180, 254, 307, 311, 354
Lebanese crisis 364, 370, 380, 392, 403
revolutionary bases 224
terrorism 310
Salama, Ahmad 74
al-Salfiti, Fahmi (Salim ʿAwwad) 168, 249–50, 273
Salih, ʿAbd-al-Jawad 343, 360, 482
Salih, Nimr (Abu Salih) 156, 226–7, 299
authority limited 354
'Biqaʿ Gulf' 567–8
in central committee 294, 431
death 598
Fahd peace plan 511–12
in Fateh 295, 296, 434
Fateh policies 492, 494
Fateh split 556, 557, 561, 562, 564
Fez declaration 552
guerrilla mutiny 297–8
Iraq and 502
Lebanese crisis 364, 383, 387
Lebanese war 530, 533
Muslim Brotherhood and 520
Palestinian civil war 570
peace process after 1973 conflict 336, 338
PLO reform 444
Syrian support for 554–5
Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 397–8
USSR and 350–1
Salim, ʾAli 434
SALT-II agreement 325
Samʾan, Mujahid 93
Samara, ʿAdil 166
Samara, Ihsan 559
al-Samarraʾi, ʿAbd-al-Khaliq 148
al-Samarraʾi, Qays 230, 255
Fateh and 585
USSR and 342
Samid 633
Samuʿ raid 138
Sanyura, Hanna 617
Saqr, Misbah 171, 209
Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami 630
Sarkis, Ilyas 392, 399, 419, 496–7
criticism of 504
elected president 387
Lebanese crisis 392, 404, 406
National Salvation Council 531
as president-elect 389–90
refugee camps 418
Riyadh agreement 407
al-Sarraj, ʿAbd-al-Hamid 28, 30, 67, 75–6, 78–9
Sarsur, Ahmad 171
al-Sartawi, ʿIsam 175, 238, 253, 558
Saudi Arabia 13, 14
aid for Hamas 652
aid for PLO 603, 640
Arab Deterrent Force 408
Egyptian–Israeli peace process 445–6
Fahd peace plan 512
Fateh 85, 103, 105, 129
grant to Egypt and Jordan 143, 152
infiltration 60
Iraq and 549
Lebanese crisis 385, 402
Lebanese war 523, 529
oil embargo 319
Palestine problem 96
Palestinian civil war 571–2
PLO 99
relations with Egypt 32–3, 94
Saunders, Harold 321
Sawt al-Bilad 604

Sawt al-Jamahir 77
Sawt Filastin 330
Saydam, Mamduh 206, 222, 294
Saydam, Mamduh Sabri 123, 127, 128
Sayigh, Anis 310
Sayigh, May 352
al-Sayih, ʿAbd-al-Hamid 579
Sayil, Saʿd 266, 296, 500, 534
  aid for revolutionary movements 453
  artillery war 505, 507
  assassination 541, 560
  authority of 454
  in central operations room 354, 462–3
  guerrilla groups 449
  on Israel 508–9
  Israeli invasion of Lebanon 427, 429
  Israeli raids 496
  Lebanese war 509–11, 515–16, 518–19, 522, 526
  military organization 452
  PLO withdrawal from Beirut 537
  occupied territories 350
  Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 397
Sbayh, Muhammad 129
Scranton, William 144
secure bases:
  need for 286
  theory of 201
security:
  Arafat 457
  guerrilla groups 208–9
September 1970 conflict, *see* Jordan, civil war
al-Sghayyar, ʿAzmi 497
al-Shaʿb 467
Shaʿban, Muhammad 110
Shaʿban, Saʿid 572
al-Shaʿir, Muhammad 117, 171, 188, 358
Shaʿth, Nabil 633, 654
Shabab al-Aqsa 85
Shabab al-Thaʾr 82
Shabak security service 465, 619, 636
Shabiba 637
Shadid, Manhal 123
Shadid, Tawfiq 84
Shafiq, Munir 199, 224, 286, 352–3, 630
Shahin, ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz 156, 162, 609, 656
Shahin, Ibrahim 392
Shahrur, Majid 395
al-Shakʿa, Bassam 481, 482
al-Shakʿa, Ghassan 611
Shakhshir, Nadir 170
Shamʿ, Muhammad 629
Shamʿun, Camille 29, 360, 375
  Lebanon 411, 418
  Lebanese crisis 365, 376, 377, 386, 403, 428
  PLO and 441
  Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 400
Shamir, Yitzhaq 509, 547, 548, 574
  intifada 607
  peace process 617, 638, 640
Shams-al-Din, Muhammad Mahdi 520
Shaqqura, Fakhri 171, 187, 330, 395
Sharaf, Sami 77, 149–50, 180
al-Sharara 248
Sharett, Moshe 13, 61
al-Sharif, Kamil 105
Sharon, Ariel 286–7, 421, 466, 504, 513–14
  artillery war 505
  Israeli strategic interests 326
  Jordan and 546–7
  Lebanese war 509, 514, 515, 518–19, 523, 526–38
  Shatila massacre 539–40
Shatila refugee camp 580, 591, 620–1
  camps war 583, 584, 591, 594–6, 599
  massacre 539–40
al-Shawwa, Rashad 483, 484
al-Shaykh, Kamal 525, 588
al-Shaykhli, ʿAbd-al-Karim 148
Shibl, Salih 110, 130, 140
Shihab, Fuʾad 20, 67
Shihab, Hammad 148
Shihab-al-Din, Samir 229
al-Shihabi, Hikmat 305, 314, 368–9, 376–7
  Lebanese war 522–3
Shihada, ʿAziz 35–6, 307, 587
Shihada, Salah 629
Shihada, Samir 615
Shiʿites 403–4, 497–8, 520, 582
  attack on refugee camps 547
  camps war 594–5
  Lebanese crisis 359
  Lebanon 323
  terrorism 584
Shimran, Mustafa 497–8
Shinnar, Abu Khalid 599
al-Shiqaqi, Fathi 625–6, 632
al-Shishakli, Adib 12, 73, 85
Shomron, Don 586
Shruru, Fadi 229
Shtura accord 411, 419–20
al-Shuʿaybi, ʿAzmi 609
al-Shubaki, Fuʾad 462
Shufani, Ilyas 434, 599

Shultz, George 531, 533, 546, 547, 567
 Palestinian declaration of independence 623
 peace process 617, 622
 US–PLO dialogue 548
Shuman, ʿAbd-al-Majid 172
al-Shuqayri, Ahmad 112, 169
 ANM and 135, 137
 Fateh and 100–4
 founding of PLO 666, 667
 guerrilla movement 170, 171–2
 Jordanian army and 138
 Nasir and 117, 132
 Palestinian movement 96–100
 PLA and 114–15, 116, 118, 121, 132–3, 141
 PPO and 133–4
 RCC and 138–9
 resignation 147
 unions 239
Shururu, ʿAbd-al-Latif 125
al-Sibaʿi, Yusif 425
Sidon 592, 606, 620
Sinai 62, 65, 103–4
Sinai-II disengagement agreement 321, 323, 367–72, 378
al-Sinuwar, Yahya 629–30
Sisco, Joseph 151, 191, 251
Siyam, ʿAbdullah 330, 395, 526, 527
Siyam, Muhammad 628
SLA, *see* South Lebanon Army
Social Affairs Institution 451, 460
social associations 681
 marginalization of 682
 in occupied territories 609–10, 611–12
 PLO and 239–41, 669
Social Nationalist Party: Syria 504, 538
social networks:
 Palestinian: rebuilding 666
 Palestinian Authority and 661
social provision: Fateh 225
social class 42–6
 Palestinian nationalism and 35–6, 46–8
 PLO founders 98–9, 670–1
 West Bank 466–7
 see also middle class; petite bourgeoisie
social welfare system: PLO 448, 460, 657, 671
Socialist Lebanon Movement 189, 231, 302–3
Society for the Care of the Families of Martyrs and Prisoners 225, 460
Society of Struggle for the Liberation of Islamic Peoples 102
Somalia 548
South Lebanon Army (SLA) 427, 567
 attacks on UNIFIL protected villages 495
 Lebanese war 537
 Palestinian Left and 497
 Syria and 428
Special Apparatus 160–1, 300, 304, 311–12
 terrorism 213, 230, 234
Special Branch: Jordan 245–6, 251, 253, 254
Special Service 350
Special Unit: Fateh 295–6
Stalin 648
state-building:
 Arab 4–6, 13, 19–20, 21–2
 Fateh 221, 222
 Palestinian 22–3, 663, 683; determining factors 674–9; oppositon to 4–10; petite bourgeoisie 54–7
 PLO 97, 98, 284, 334, 447–63
statehood: Declaration of Principles 660–2
steadfastness (*sumud*) 465–6, 502
 split in 565
steadfastness committee 456
steadfastness funds 479–82, 508
 occupied territories 611, 612
 patronage and 635
strike groups:
 Fateh: failures 106; formation of 104; rebuilding of 123
 intifada 619
Struggle Apparatus 109–11
student organizations: in occupied territories 478
 see also universities
Sudan 548
 Arab Deterrent Force 408
 communist-led *coup* 149
 domestic instability 146
 support for guerrillas in Lebanon 191
Suez crisis 19, 26–7, 64–5
Sufiyyun 630
al-Sughayyar, ʿAzmi 524
al-Sughayyar, Ziyad 562, 599
Sukarno, Ahmad 32
Sulayman, Jamal 653
al-Sulh, Rashid 363
al-Sulh, Riyad 11
summit conferences, Arab:
 first (1964) 31, 95, 97
 second (1964) 99, 102, 103, 110, 112, 114
 third (1965) 124, 132, 133
 (1967) 143, 556

summit conferences, Arab: (*cont.*):
(1987) 545, 547, 606
(1990) 640, 641
sumud, see steadfastness
Sunni Muslim Maqasid Society 358
Sunni Muslims 370
camps war 583, 584, 591
criticism of PLO 520
Fateh and 582
support services: PLO 510–11
Supreme Muslim Council 6
al-Suri, Misbah 626
Swayd, Mahmud 231
Swayd, Munir 87, 128
al-Swaydani, Ahmad 94, 105, 117, 124, 127, 145
coup attempt 146
Fateh and 125, 157
replaced as chief-of-staff 185
Syria:
Amman accord 578
ANM and 76, 77, 108–9, 137, 166
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 145–6
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319
Arafat and 559–60, 580; expulsion 565; opposition to 553, 554, 556–7, 579
Baʿth party 93–4
battle of ʿAjlun 280–1
camps war 582, 583–5, 591, 594, 595–6, 606
domestic instability 11, 32, 69–70, 146, 325–6
economic liberalization 548
Egypt and 94
expulsion of Arafat 565
Fateh and 85–6, 105, 124–9, 156–7
Fateh personnel in 558–9
Fateh split 560–1, 563–7
Fez declaration 552, 556
guerrilla movement 147, 184–8, 202, 312, 314, 436, 668; policy (1970) 288–91
Gulf war 502–3
independence 5
Iraq and 32, 548
Israel and 12, 504–5
Jordan civil war (1970) 264–5, 274–5, 278
Lebanese crisis 358, 366–9, 370–1, 376–84, 418–19; ceasefire attempts 406–9; intervention 384–91, 392–5
Lebanese war 518–19, 522–5, 528, 529, 533–4, 540
Lebanon: Israeli invasion 428
Muslim Brotherhood and 520, 547
national charter 437, 438
nationalization 20
Palestine problem 96
Palestinian civil war 567–73
Palestinian declaration of independence 623–4
Palestinian military units in 67
Palestinians in 4; government control of 39–41; social and economic controls 44–6
peace process: 1973 conflict 322: opposition to 421
PF–GC in 340
PFLP and 227–8, 302, 441–2, 489–90
PLA 169, 170, 329–30; control of 117–18, 133, 242, 289–90; mutiny 393
PLO–Jordan dialogue 440, 554–5
PLO–Syrian relations 103–4, 322–4, 356, 425, 484–5, 675; backing for opposition 441–6, 501, 620–1, 644; feud 592–3, 603, 688; in Lebanon 416, 417, 436, 498, 576–8
policies 28–9
political activism 52
political parties 53
state-building 13, 19–20
steadfastness and confrontation front 325
UAR 28–32; secession from 69
UNIFIL and 431–2
US and 28, 546
US–PLO dialogue 422
USSR and 28, 546
Syrian National Party 50, 53, 95

Taʿan, Abu 192
al-Tabligh wa al-Daʿwa 630
al-tafjir al-mutasalsil 120–1
tafrigh 459–60, 461, 462, 491
Taha, ʿAli 308
Taha, Yunis al-ʿAbd (Abu al-ʿAbd) 306
Tahrir Filastin 85
Tajammuʿ ʿUlamaʾ Filastin 630
tajawuzat 512
tajyish 296–7, 354
al-Takfir wa al-Hijra 630
al-Takriti, Hardan 264, 265
Tal al-Zaʿtar refugee camp 374, 375, 461
attacks on 359, 363, 370
massacre 361, 400–1
siege 373, 381–2, 395–8
al-Tal, ʿAbdullah 11

al-Tal, Wasfi 58, 259, 268, 281
  assassination 290, 309
  as prime minister 138, 274
al-Talhuni, Bahjat 177, 246
al-Talīa al-Islamiyya 626
al-Tamimi, Asʿad Bayyud 626
al-Tamimi, Basim 353, 630
al-Tamimi, Nadir 626
al-Tamimi, Subhi 109, 111, 137, 230, 305
Tamraz, Muhammad 330
Taraway, Abu Saʿid 559
al-Tarazi, Zuhdi 415
al-Tarifi, Jamil 611, 638
Tariq al-ʿAwda 134–5
Tawhid 570, 573, 581, 585
al-tawrit al-waʿi 119–20
tawtin 499
tax, liberation: for PLO 117
al-Tayyib, ʿAbd-al-Rahim 306, 432
al-Tayyib, Muhammad 329
teachers:
  ANM members 74
  political activism 53
Tel Aviv raid 356
territoriality, lack of: effect of 672–4
terrorism 210–15, 419, 676
  Abu Nidal faction 407, 416, 587, 590, 593
  Amal 584
  ANM 160–1
  ASAP 433
  Beirut 512–13, 521
  Eagles of the Revolution Organization 445
  Fateh 151, 306–12, 684
  PFLP 213–15, 229, 252, 303–5, 348, 401, 405, 649; criticism 301; Haddad and 257, 272–3, 303–5, 395; multiple hijacks 257–8, 270–1, 301; suspension 272, 300
  PLF 586
  PLO denunciation of 547–8, 624
  Shiʾites 584
  Special Apparatus 213, 230, 234
  US and 638
al-Thaʾr 74
al-Thabit, Sabbah 74, 110, 165
Third World 645, 690
  closure of PLO missions 657
  influence of 546
  PLO aid for 452–3
  recognition of Palestine 640
Tishrin 485, 620
Tlas, Mustafa 128, 305, 418
  attempt to assassinate 416
  as chief-of-staff 146, 185
  as defence minister 149
  dismissal 148
  Lebanese crisis 379
  Lebanese war 522–3
Trabulsi, Fawwaz 231, 302–3
training, *see* military training
Transjordan: independence 5
travel papers 38, 41, 54, 277, 289
Tripoli:
  battle of 597–8
  Palestinian civil war 569, 570–1, 572, 573
Tripoli conference 424–5, 485–6
Troop Withdrawal Agreement: Israel and Lebanon 546
Trotskyite Workers' Leagues 370
Truman, Harry 16
Tunisia 548
  Palestine problem 96
  Palestinian civil war 572
  PLO and 588–9, 592, 601, 606
Tuqan, Ahmad 267, 268
al-Turabi, Hasan 652
al-Turk, Fayiz 137, 138, 171, 187
Turkey 30
24th of October Movement 191, 370

UAC, *see* United Arab Command
UAE, *see* United Arab Emirates
UAR, *see* United Arab Republic
ʿUdwan, Kamal 106, 123, 258, 294, 295, 297
  criticism of PFLP 271, 277
  early career 80, 82, 83, 84, 86–7
  death 311
  Fateh and 199, 306, 310
  guerrilla movement 212–13, 219
  Jordan 258, 259, 269, 280
  Jordan civil war (1970) 266
  military survey 262
  occupied territories 291, 349
  Palestinian entity 155
  in Qatar group 123
  terrorism 308–9
Uganda 453
ʿUmar, Mahjub (Raʾuf Nazmi) 181
al-ʿUmari, Fakhri 180, 654
UN, *see* United Nations
UNC, *see* unified national commands
UNEF 44
Unified Arab Command (UAC) 95

unified national commands (UNC) 635, 636–7
activists 619
camps war 621
formed 615
Unified Palestinian Organization (UPO) 185
UNIFIL, *see* United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
Unionist Socialists Movement 93
unions:
in occupied territories 482
PLO and 239–41, 459
of social groups 57
trade 681; marginalization of 682; in occupied territories 475, 476, 477–8, 480, 609–10, 613; PLO and 669
United Arab Command (UAC) 122
Fateh and 123
PLA and 113, 115
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 549
aid to PLO 640
United Arab Kingdom 307, 346, 483
United Arab Republic (UAR) 28–32
Syrian secession from 69
United National Front 163, 168
United Nations:
Amman accord 582
Arafat address to (1974) 344, 345, 669
camps war 584
Fez declaration 551
Israeli invasion of Lebanon 427
Lebanese conflicts (1978–82) 495, 505, 508
Lebanese crisis 368
Lebanese war 524, 525, 530–1, 533, 535
Palestine partition plan (1947) 3, 10, 16, 17, 337–8, 547, 624
Palestinian declaration of independence 624
Palestinian refugees 4
peacekeeping force to Gaza 66
PLO and 415, 638–9
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 427, 428, 430–1, 435, 495, 498
ceasefire violations 518
influence of 508, 516
Lebanese war 524
Palestinian Left and 497
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 143, 149, 229, 252, 333, 353
European emphasis on 502
Fateh 639
JCP 346
king Husayn 579
PFLP 336
PLO 321, 342, 343, 587, 685–6; acceptance 422, 616, 624
PNC acceptance 547–8
Sa'iqa 337
Syria 319–20
United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 319–20, 321
Fateh 639
PLO 587
PLO acceptance 616, 624
PNC acceptance 547–8
United Nations Security Council Resolution 425 427, 428, 432
United States, *see* US
unity, national 218–19
PFLP 272
'unity statement' 425
universities:
lack of student leadership 678–9
Muslim Brotherhood 628
in occupied territories 608, 611
PLO funding 458, 657
political activism 53
steadfastness funds for 480
student conscription 500, 511
West Bank 468–9
UNRWA 44
decline in services 448
economic aid 43
formation 4
Lebanese war 540
registration with 41
UNSCR, *see* United Nations Security Council Resolutions
al-ʿUrabi, Yusif 125, 126, 127, 128
ʿUrayqat, Wasif 536, 562, 597, 600
urbanization, non-migratory: West Bank 469–70
al-ʿUrwa al-Wuthqa 73
US:
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 144
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319
Baker plan 640–1
Cold War 324–5
Egypt and 26, 27
Egyptian–Israeli peace process 427–8
guerrilla movement and 251
Iraq and 639–40
Jordan and 27–8

Jordan civil war (1970) 265, 285
Jordanian–Palestinian alliance 555
Lebanese crisis 191, 361–2, 371, 378, 384, 389–90, 395
Lebanese war 516, 518, 523, 525, 527–8, 531, 533, 535–8
Lebanon and 67, 508
Palestine policies 16–17, 18, 19, 320–1
Palestinian declaration of independence 623, 624–5
Palestinian homeland 417
peace process 410, 415, 546, 638–9; after 1973 conflict 326, 344; Palestinians in 420–3, 617, 622, 654–5, 684, 686
PLO and 485, 662
Reagan plan 551
Syria–Israel clash 504–5
US–PLO dialogue 507, 548, 557
end of 425–6
US–USSR détente (1972) 151–2
ʿUsayran, ʿAdil 584
USSR 191, 412, 690
abortive *coup* 643, 648
Arab–Israeli war (1973) 319
arms for PLO 509–10
arms for Egypt and Syria 143–4
camps war 596
Cold War 324–5
DFLP and 349, 442, 487, 489
Egypt and 27, 29–30, 33
Egypt–Israeli war of attrition 145
Fateh and 147, 342, 350–1
Fateh split 565
guerrilla movement 492
Israel: commitment to 663
Jewish emigration 68, 639–40
Jordan civil war (1970) 265
Lebanese crisis 383–4, 390, 398, 399
Lebanese war 533
military training 452
Palestinian civil war 572
Palestinian policies 17, 19, 321, 545–6, 548
Palestinian state 422–3
PDFLP and 342
peace process 1973 conflict 322
PFLP and 489, 646
PLO and 342, 344, 425–6, 507, 606
Suez crisis 26
Syria and 28, 146, 567–8
on terrorism 304
ʿUwayda, Husayn 588

Vance, Cyrus 415, 420–1
Vanguard Bloc 477
Vanguards of Arab Sacrifice for the Liberation of Palestine 129
Vanguards of Popular Liberation Organization–Thunderbolt Forces, *see* Saʾiqa 185
Vanguards of Popular Liberation War Organization: formed 184–5
Vanguards of Popular Resistance 165
Vanguards of Popular War 175
Vanguards of Sacrifice Organization 175
Vanguards of the Lebanese Army 392
Vatican: Lebanese crisis 370–1
Venice declaration 501–2
Vietnam 500
guerrilla war 664
Vietnam, North: support for Fateh 147
Vietnam, South 102
Vietnamese line 564
village leagues 483–4, 508, 610
violence, revolutionary, *see* armed struggle
Voice of the Arabs radio programme 131
Voice of Palestine radio programme 69, 117, 253–4

WAFA 329, 351, 569
al-Wajih, ʿAbd-al-ʿAziz 230, 231, 242
as commander of PLF PLA 186–7
Waldheim, Kurt 415, 430
Warrad, Faʾiq 167, 249, 250
Washington peace talks 658, 660
Wavell camp 584
al-Wazir, Intisar (Um Jihad) 127, 633
al-Wazir, Khalil (Abu Jihad) 171, 294, 299, 311
AAL and 379, 380
ʿAmla and 406
ANM and 161
after Arab–Israeli war (1967) 155, 156, 157, 158
Arafat's attempts to weaken 295, 604–5, 689
armed struggle 668; launch of 104, 105, 106
arms 451, 452
arrested 127
artillery war 505
Asad and 578
al-ʿAsifa 222–3
assassination 618–19, 620
authority 454; limited 354

al-Wazir, Khalil (Abu Jihad) (*cont.*):
  background 669
  battle of ʿAjlun 279
  early career 80–2, 83–4, 85, 87, 89–90, 91
  Egypt and 553
  Fateh 120, 224–5; internal disputes 128, 306, 310; split 562, 564
  Faysal of Saudi Arabia and 179
  guerrilla mutiny 298
  international relations 102–3, 500
  intifada 614, 617–18
  Iraq and 640
  Islamic Fateh 226
  Israeli invasion of Lebanon 427
  Israeli raid 426
  Jordan 259, 261, 280, 596; expulsion from 588, 601
  Jordan civil war (1970) 266
  Jordanan–Palestinian alliance 554
  Lebanese crisis 370, 382–3, 407
  Lebanese war 510, 516, 518–19, 522–3, 526, 533–7
  leftist factions and 353
  Masri and 587
  massed fire 532
  occupied territories 350, 481, 560, 689; organization 207, 349, 472–3, 586
  Palestinian civil war 569, 571, 572
  peace process after 1973 conflict 342
  PFLP and 227
  PLO and 101, 456
  PLO evacuation from Lebanon 555
  popular liberation war 196
  Reagan plan 538
  Shuqayri and 100
  strike groups 123
  Syria and 298, 565
  UN 669
al-Wazzan, Shafiq 531, 533
Weizmann, Chaim 13
West:
  aid for occupied territories 612, 613
  commitment to Israel 663
  lack of knowledge of Palestinian movement 678
  see also specific countries
West Bank:
  Arab–Israeli war (1947–8) 4
  economic policies 43
  fida'iyyun 64, 65
  Hashemite rule 16
  infiltration problem 59–60
  Israeli settlements 421
  Jordan: severance of ties with 547, 621–2, 623
  PLO membership 57
  political parties 51
  social strata 35
  see also occupied territories
Western Sector 207, 311, 349
al-Wihda 108
women:
  guerrillas: PFLP 233
  intifada 619
workers, Palestinian 461, 469
  migration to oil-rich states 469, 607–8
Workers' Union Bloc 477
Workers' Youth Movement 477
working class, Palestinian 665
World Bank 26, 28
World War II 2
World Zionist Organization 6

Yaʿcovi, Gad 541
Yaʿeri, Uri 356
Yaʿqub, Talʿat 339–40, 432, 576, 580, 596, 644
al-Yafi, ʿAbdullah 188, 190
al-Yahya, ʿAbd-al-Razzaq 137, 230, 242, 289
  as chief-of-staff 238, 261
  as commander-in-chief of PLA 241, 290
  dismissal 290
  Fateh and 242, 268
  Jordan defence plan 262
  PLO reorganization 274
  Syria and 133, 169, 170, 186
Yakhlifʿ, Yahya 352, 569
al-Yamani, Ahmad 552, 574, 649
  in ANM 74, 78–9, 110, 228
  arrested 227
  in PFLP 232, 272–3, 304, 306
Yarmuk Forces 295–6, 297–8
Yarmuk refugee camp 584
Yarmuk University 588
Yaron, Amos 539
al-Yashruti, Khalid 92, 129
Yasin, ʿAbd-al-Qadir 168
Yasin, ʿAli 431
Yasin, Ahmad 627, 629, 631, 650
Yasin, Subhi 64, 129, 175
Yazid, Muhammad 298
al-Yazuri, Ibrahim 628, 629
Yemen conflict 69, 95, 112
Yemen, North 79, 529
  battle of ʿAjlun 280

Egyptian troops in 31, 33
Palestinian civil war 572
Yemen, South 146, 529
Aden–Algeria accord 575
aid for guerrilla groups 492
Amman accord 579
Arab Deterrent Force 408
camps war 596
Fateh split 565
Lebanese crisis 402
PDFLP and 341
PNC and 576
steadfastness and confrontation front 325
Yemeni Socialist Party 575
yishuv 1–3, 6, 673–4
Young Egypt movement 72–3
Young Turks revolt (1908) 1, 678
youth organizations:
ANM 74
in occupied territories 478
Yunis, Husni 222, 226, 294
Yusif, Hamdi 180
Yusif, Nasr 162, 567, 633

al-Zaʿim, Husni 12, 39
al-Zaʿnun, Salim 106, 121, 129, 294, 616, 633
ANM and 122
early career 80, 83, 84, 87
government-in-exile (GiE) 617
guerrilla movement 293
Jewish emigrants 414
launch of armed struggle 104, 105
Zaʿrur, Ahmad 166, 228, 238
battle of Karama 178
in PF–GC 229
Zaʿrura, Abu Mahammad 653
al-Zabri, Mustafa 228, 232, 272, 300, 621, 642
in ANM 109, 135, 161, 167
Iraq and 642, 646
multiple hijackings 257
occupied territories 165, 166, 471
in PFLP 207, 230, 306
Zaghmut, ʿAbd-al-Majid 128
al-Zahhar, Mahmud 628, 651
Zahran, Muhammad 329
Zaki, ʿAbbas 105, 222, 603, 633, 634, 657
Zaqqut, Jamal 615
Zaydan, Muhammad ʿAbbas (Abu ab-ʿAbbas) 576, 586, 641, 644
Lebanese war 529–30
in PF--GC 340, 401, 412
as PLF secretary-general 418, 432
al-Zayyat, Muhammad 76
al-Zaza, ʿAli 146
Zhou Enlai 103, 151, 678
Zionism:
conflict with 663
views of guerrilla groups 211–13
yishuv 1–3, 6, 673–4
Zuʿaytir, Waʾil 310
al-Zuʿayyin, Yusif 105, 145–6, 149, 157
Zuhayqa, Salah 615